Religion, Religiosity, and Democratic Values : A Comparative Perspective of Islamic and Non-Islamic Societies [1 ed.] 9789004274464, 9789004269095

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Religion, Religiosity, and Democratic Values

International Studies in Religion and Society Series edited by Lori G. Beaman and Peter Beyer (University of Ottawa)

VOLUME 23

The titles published in this series are listed at brill.com/isrs

Religion, Religiosity, and Democratic Values A Comparative Perspective of Islamic and Non-Islamic Societies

By

Abbas Mehregan

LEIDEN | BOSTON

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Mehregan, Abbas.  Religion, religiosity, and democratic values : a comparative perspective of Islamic and non-Islamic societies / by Abbas Mehregan.   pages cm. -- (International studies in religion and society, ISSN 1573-4293 ; VOLUME 23)  Includes bibliographical references and index.  ISBN 978-90-04-26909-5 (hardback : alk. paper) -- ISBN 978-90-04-27446-4 (e-book) 1. Islam and civil society. 2. Islam and world politics. 3. Islam and social problems. 4. Islamic countries--Relations. I. Title.  BP173.63.M44 2014  201’.72--dc23                           2014009257

This publication has been typeset in the multilingual “Brill” typeface. With over 5,100 characters covering Latin, ipa, Greek, and Cyrillic, this typeface is especially suitable for use in the humanities. For more information, please see www.brill.com/brill-typeface. issn 1573-4293 isbn 978-90-04-26909-5 (hardback) isbn 978-90-04-27446-4 (e-book) Copyright 2014 by Koninklijke Brill nv, Leiden, The Netherlands. Koninklijke Brill nv incorporates the imprints Brill, Brill Nijhoff, Global Oriental and Hotei Publishing. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission from the publisher. Authorization to photocopy items for internal or personal use is granted by Koninklijke Brill nv provided that the appropriate fees are paid directly to The Copyright Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive, Suite 910, Danvers, ma 01923, usa. Fees are subject to change. Brill has made all reasonable efforts to trace all rights holders to any copyrighted material used in this work. In cases where these efforts have not been successful the publisher welcomes communications from copyright holders, so that the appropriate acknowledgements can be made in future editions, and to settle other permission matters. This book is printed on acid-free paper.

To my wife because of her patience

∵

Contents Acknowledgements ix List of Tables x List of Figures xiv Introduction 1 1 Democratic Values, Islamic Principles, and Political Democracy 14 Democratic Values and Political Democracy 14 Islam and Free Market Economics 22 Islam and Civil Society 40 Theory of Political Modernization: Influencing Factors on Political Modernization 55 2 Religiosity, Market Economics, Civil Society: Comparisons of 60 Societies 74 Religiosity in Cross-National Perspective 74 Attitudes towards Free Market Economics in 60 Societies 81 Confidence in Civil Society Organizations in Cross-National Comparison 101 The Relationship between Democratic Political Tradition, HDI, and Predominant Religion of Societies 124 3 The Link between Religion, Religiosity, and Democratic Values: Multilevel Analyses 135 Introduction 135 Religion, Religiosity, and Free Market Economics in Islamic, Christian, Buddhist, Hindu, and Folk-Religion Societies 136 Religion, Religiosity, and Confidence in Traditional, Modern, and Post-Modern Civil Society Organizations in Various Types of Religious Societies 144 Religiosity and Attitudes towards Free Market Economics in Sunni and Shia Islamic Societies 165 Religiosity and Confidence in Civil Society Organizations in Sunni and Shia Islamic Societies 172 Discussion and Conclusions 199

viii Appendix 1: Materials and Method 219 Appendix 2: Additional Descriptive Statistics 239 Bibliography 280 Index 296

contents

Acknowledgements First and foremost, I would like to express my sincerest gratitude to Prof. Dr. Jürgen Friedrichs. Without his help this work could certainly not have been accomplished and accepted as a dissertation in the Faculty of Philosophy at the University of Cologne. Furthermore, I must add that the support from the Friedrich-Ebert Stiftung greatly facilitated the completion of this book. I appreciate this assistance enormously. Last but not least, I must give honourable mention to my parents, my wife, and my son. They are the most important things I have. I am indebted to them for their patience, empathy, and encouragement.

List of Tables table caption 0.1 List of 60 compared societies and their predominant religion 5 1.1 Comparison of Islamic and capitalist economic systems 36 2.1 Comparison of the frequency distribution of religiosity among 60 societies 76 2.2 Comparison of the frequency distribution of non-religiosity among 60 societies 78 2.3 Comparison of the frequency distribution of atheism among 60 societies 80 2.4 Comparison of the frequency distribution of agreement with the increase of private ownership of business among 60 societies 83 2.5 Comparison of the mean score of attitudes toward private vs. government ownership of business among 60 societies 84 2.6 Comparison of the frequency distribution of agreement with responsibility of people to provide for themselves among 60 societies 87 2.7 Comparison of the mean score of attitudes toward responsibility of people vs. government responsibility to provide for people among 60 societies 89 2.8 Comparison of the frequency distribution of agreement with larger income differences among 60 societies 92 2.9 Comparison of the mean score of attitudes toward desirability of income equality vs. larger income differences among 60 societies 94 2.10 Comparison of the frequency distribution of agreement with utility of competition among 60 societies 97 2.11 Comparison of the mean score of attitudes toward utility vs. harmfulness of competition among 60 societies 99 2.12 Comparison of the frequency distribution of confidence in religious institutions among 60 societies 102 2.13 Comparison of the mean score of confidence in religious institutions among 60 societies 104 2.14 Comparison of the frequency distribution of confidence in labor unions among 60 societies 107 2.15 Comparison of the mean score of confidence in labor unions among 60 societies 110 2.16 Comparison of the frequency distribution of confidence in political parties among 60 societies 111

l ist of tables

xi

2.17 Comparison of the mean score of confidence in political parties among 60 societies 114 2.18 Comparison of the frequency distribution of confidence in the environmental protection movement among 60 societies 116 2.19 Comparison of the mean score of confidence in the environmental protection movement among 60 societies 117 2.20 Comparison of the frequency distribution of confidence in the women’s movement among 60 societies 120 2.21 Comparison of the mean score of confidence in the women’s movement among 60 societies 121 2.22 Predominant religion, the length of democratic experience, and hdi value of the 60 compared societies 125 2.23 Spearman’s Rho correlation between hdi value and the length of democratic experience of the compared societies 127 2.24 Spearman’s Rho correlation between predominant Islamic religion of societies and the length of democratic experience 128 2.25 Spearman’s Rho correlation between predominant Christian religion of societies and the length of democratic experience 128 2.26 Spearman’s Rho correlation between predominant Islamic religion of societies and hdi value 129 2.27 Spearman’s Rho correlation between predominant Christian religion of societies and hdi value 129 2.28 Comparison of the group mean score of the factors of a free market economy among three types of religious societies 130 2.29 Comparison of the group mean score of the factors of confidence in civil society among three types of religious societies 131 2.30 Descriptive statistics for factors of a free market economy and control variables in two levels (individuals nested within societies) 132 2.31 Descriptive statistics for factors of confidence in civil society and control variables in two levels (individuals nested within societies) 133 3.1 Multi-level models of the effects on attitudes toward private vs. government ownership of business 137 3.2 Multi-level models of the effects on attitudes toward responsibility of individuals vs. government responsibility to provide for people 140 3.3 Multi-level models of the effects on attitudes toward desirability of income equality vs. larger income differences 142 3.4 Multi-level models of the effects on attitudes toward utility vs. harmfulness of competition 145 3.5 Multi-level models of the effects on confidence in religious institutions 148

xii

list of tables 

3.6 Multi-level models of the effects on confidence in labor unions 152 3.7 Multi-level models of the effects on confidence in political parties 155 3.8 Multi-level models of the effects on confidence in the environmental protection movement 159 3.9 Multi-level models of the effects on confidence in the women’s movement 162 3.10 Multi-level models of the effects on confidence in the civil society organizations 166 3.11 Multi-level models of the effects on attitudes toward private vs. government ownership of business in Islamic societies 170 3.12 Multi-level models of the effects on attitudes toward responsibility of individuals vs. government responsibility to provide for people in Islamic societies 173 3.13 Multi-level models of the effects on attitudes toward desirability of income equality vs. larger income differences in Islamic societies 175 3.14 Multi-level models of the effects on attitudes toward utility vs. harmfulness of competition in Islamic societies 177 3.15 Multi-level models of the effects on confidence in mosques in Islamic societies 179 3.16 Multi-level models of the effects on confidence in labor unions in Islamic societies 183 3.17 Multi-level models of the effects on confidence in political parties in Islamic societies 186 3.18 Multi-level models of the effects on confidence in the environmental protection movement in Islamic societies 191 3.19 Multi-level models of the effects on confidence in the women’s movement in Islamic societies 193 3.20 Multi-level models of the effects on confidence in the civil society organizations in Islamic societies 196 A.1.1 Compared societies with the year and wave of the study for the both dependent variables 220 A.1.2 Categories of answers to the question of religiosity 222 A.1.3 Combined categories of answers to the questions related to free market economics 224 A.1.4 Categories of answers to the questions of confidence in civil society organizations 225 A.1.5 Spearman’s Rho correlation between confidence in various civil society organizations 225 A.1.6 Correlation matrix for five civil society organizations 226

l ist of tables A.1.7

xiii

kmo measure of sampling adequacy and Bartlett’s test of sphericity for confidence in various civil society organization 226 A.1.8 Islamic denominations 228 A.1.9 Christian denominations 228 A.1.10 Denominations of other religions 229 A.1.11 Categories of education 230 A.1.12 Categories of age 230 A.1.13 Categories of income 231 A.1.14 Index of micro-level variables in wvs and evs 231 A.1.15 Predominant religion, the length of democratic experience, and hdi value of the 60 compared societies 234 A.2.1 Descriptive statistics of religiosity in the 60 compared societies 239 A.2.2 Descriptive statistics of attitudes toward private vs. government ownership of business in the 60 compared societies 242 A.2.3 Comparison of the frequency distribution of agreement with the increase of government ownership of business among 60 societies 246 A.2.4 Descriptive statistics of attitudes toward responsibility of individuals vs. government responsibility in providing for people in the 60 compared societies 248 A.2.5 Comparison of the frequency distribution of agreement with government responsibility to provide for people among 60 societies 252 A.2.6 Descriptive statistics of attitudes toward desirability of income equality vs. larger income differences in the 60 compared societies 254 A.2.7 Comparison of the frequency distribution of agreement with income equality among 60 societies 257 A.2.8 Descriptive statistics of attitudes toward utility vs. harmfulness of competition in the 60 compared societies 259 A.2.9 Comparison of the frequency distribution of agreement with harmfulness of competition among 60 societies 263 A.2.10 Descriptive statistics of confidence in religious institutions in the 60 compared societies 265 A.2.11 Descriptive statistics of confidence in labor unions in the 60 compared societies 268 A.2.12 Descriptive statistics of confidence in political parties in the 60 compared societies 271 A.2.13 Descriptive statistics of confidence in the environmental protection movement in the 60 compared societies 274 A.2.14 Descriptive statistics of confidence in the women’s movement in the 60 compared societies 277

List of Figures figure caption 1.1 The theory of human development 66 1.2 Model of micro-level hypotheses 68 1.3 Model of macro-level hypotheses 69 1.4 The complete model of hypotheses tested 70 2.1 Religiosity, non-religiosity, and atheism in all compared societies 75 2.2 The mean score of attitudes toward private vs. government ownership of business 85 2.3 The mean score of attitudes toward responsibility of individuals vs. government responsibility to provide for people 90 2.4 The mean score of attitudes toward desirability of income equality vs. larger income differences 95 2.5 The mean score of attitudes toward utility vs. harmfulness of competition 100 2.6 The mean score of confidence in religious institutions 106 2.7 The mean score of confidence in labor unions 109 2.8 The mean score of confidence in political parties 113 2.9 The mean score of confidence in the environmental protection movement 118 2.10 The mean score of confidence in the women’s movement 122 3.1 The effect of religiosity on confidence in religious institutions 150 3.2 Comparison of the effect of religiosity on confidence in religious institutions among Islamic and non-Islamic societies 150 3.3 The effect of religiosity on confidence in labor unions 154 3.4 Comparison of the effect of religiosity on confidence in labor unions among Islamic and non-Islamic societies 154 3.5 The effect of religiosity on confidence in political parties 157 3.6 Comparison of the effect of religiosity on confidence in political parties among Islamic and non-Islamic societies 157 3.7 The effect of religiosity on confidence in the environmental protection movement 161 3.8 Comparison of the effect of religiosity on confidence in the environmental protection movement among Islamic and non-Islamic societies 161 3.9 The effect of religiosity on confidence in the women’s movement 164

list of figures 3.10 Comparison of the effect of religiosity on confidence in the women’s movement among Islamic and non-Islamic societies 164 3.11 The effect of religiosity on confidence in civil society organizations 168 3.12 Comparison of the effect of religiosity on confidence in civil society organizations among Islamic and non-Islamic societies 168 3.13 The effect of religiosity on confidence in religious institutions in Islamic societies 182 3.14 Comparison of the effect of religiosity on confidence in religious institutions among Sunni and Shia societies 182 3.15 The effect of religiosity on confidence in labor unions in Islamic societies 185 3.16 Comparison of the effect of religiosity on confidence in labor unions among Sunni and Shia societies 185 3.17 The effect of religiosity on confidence in political parties in Islamic societies 188 3.18 Comparison of the effect of religiosity on confidence in political parties among Sunni and Shia societies 188 3.19 The effect of religiosity on confidence in the environmental protection movement in Islamic societies 190 3.20 Comparison of the effect of religiosity on confidence in the environmental protection movement among Sunni and Shia societies 190 3.21 The effect of religiosity on confidence in the women’s movement in Islamic societies 195 3.22 Comparison of the effect of religiosity on confidence in the women’s movement among Sunni and Shia societies 195 3.23 The effect of religiosity on confidence in civil society organizations in Islamic societies 198 3.24 Comparison of the effect of religiosity on confidence in civil society organizations among Sunni and Shia societies 198 A.1.1 Scree plot of eigenvalues for factors of confidence in civil society 227

xv

Introduction The flames in which a young Tunisian self-immolator perished on 17 December 2010 in protest at police behavior, were the spark of a revolution in the country which led to the ousting of President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali in January 2011. A year and a half before, on 12 June 2009, Iran’s tenth presidential election was held, which was accompanied by a series of protests initially against the announced results and subsequently in opposition to the Islamic regime. But that was not the whole story. The whole region of the Middle East and North Africa was in upheaval. Within the space of about one year, civil uprisings of Muslims led to the removal of Hosni Mubarak, Muammar al-Gaddafi, and Ali Abdullah Saleh from power in Egypt, Libya, and Yemen respectively. Simultaneously mass protests and calls for democracy erupted in Syria and Bahrain; other Arabic countries such as Algeria, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, Oman, and Saudi Arabia witnessed major or minor protests against traditional autocracies in the region. These emancipatory movements in Islamic societies raise the question of whether they “will translate into a fully fledged ‘fourth wave’ of democratization” (Blaydes and Lo, 2011: 2). The current indications of political instability, typical of the first phase of revolutionary change, indicate that it is still too early to answer this question; however, the fundamental issue of whether Islam and democracy are compatible have been debated by social and political scientists for the last few decades. Many observers interpreted the events of 9/11 and other terrorist attacks as supporting evidence for Samuel P. Huntington’s (1996) thesis of the ‘clash of civilizations’ based on different political values between various types of religio-cultural societies and specifically between democratic societies with a Western Christian heritage and Islamic societies. Huntington was not alone in this view about Islam. Francis Fukuyama (1992) in The End of History and the Last Man considered Islam as an impediment to democracy and blamed Islam for the lack of liberal democracy in many parts of the Muslim world.1 1 For more on incompatibility of Islam with democracy see for example: Kedourie, E. (1992) Democracy and the Arab political culture, Washington, D.C.: Washington Institute for Near East Policy; Gellner, E. (1994) Conditions of Liberty, London, Penguin Books; Lewis, B. (1993) ‘Islam and Liberal Democracy’, The Atlantic Monthly, Vol. 271, no. 2, February, pp. 89–98; Kramer, M. (1996) ‘Fundamentalism at Large: the Drive for Power’, Middle East Quarterly, Vol. 3, no. 2; Brynen, R. and Korany, B. and Noble, P. (1995) ‘Introduction: Theoretical Perspectives on Arab Liberalization and Democratization’, in Brynen, R. and Korany, B. and Noble, P. (eds.) Political Liberalization and Democratization in the Arab World, Vol. I, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, pp. 6–7.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2014 | doi 10.1163/9789004274464_002

2

Introduction

On the other hand, some scholars such as Norris and Inglehart (2002: 15) and Esposito and Mogahed (2008: 31–35, 47–48, 57–58), who base their research on an extensive body of empirical evidence, found that the democratic political system is very favorable in Islamic societies.2 Today, in the light of the waves of civil upheavals against authoritarianism, they can point to the ‘Arab Spring’ as a vindication of their conclusion that “both Islamic and Western societies are similar in their positive orientation toward democratic ideals” (Norris and Inglehart, 2002: 15). These contrasting theories demonstrate that the controversial debate about the relationship between Islam and democracy is still unresolved and remains at the forefront of academic and public disputes. With all due respect to former studies, a few of which have already been referred to, it seems that the extremes of compatibility or incompatibility of Islam with democracy is based on a consideration of democracy as a purely political concept. They have endeavored to address the relationship between Islamic theology and/or Muslim’s opinions on the one hand, and political values of democracy on the other. A comprehensive understanding of democracy, however, should also include non-political principles of democracy. In other words, a stable democracy requires adequate social and economic foundations, in addition to a free and politically competitive election system. Accordingly, any consideration of the compatibility or otherwise of Islam with democracy needs to address the issues of civil society and free market economics as indicators of the social and economic values of democracy. Furthermore, from a sociological point of view, the opinions of religious individuals are indeed more important than theological theorems or religious instructions about what is lawful and unlawful. In other words, so long as the individual systems of preferences do not reflect religious values they are merely words on a page which cannot be considered the criterion of social trends. Thus religiosity is one piece of the puzzle which characterizes the relationship 2 For more on support of democracy in Islamic and Arab world see for example: Tessler, M. (2002) ‘Do Islamic Orientations Influence Attitudes toward Democracy in the Arab World? Evidence from Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and Algeria’, International Journal of Comparative Sociology, Vol. 43, no. 3–5, pp. 229–249; Tessler, M. (2006) ‘Public Opinion in the Arab and Muslim World: Informing U.S. Public Diplomacy’, in McMillan, J. (ed.), “In the Same Light as Slavery”: Building a Global Antiterrorist Consensus, Washington: National Defense University Press, pp. 15–16; Filali-Ansary, A. (2003) ‘Muslims and Democracy’, in Diamond, L. and Plattner, M. F. and Brumberg, D. (eds.) Islam and Democracy in the Middle East, Johns Hopkins University Press, pp. 199–201; Jamal, A.A. (2006) ‘Reassessing Support for Islam and Democracy in the Arab World, Evidence from Egypt and Jordan’, World Affairs, no. 169, pp. 54–56.

Introduction

3

between Islam and democracy. The crucial question here is: does religiosity in highly religious Islamic societies (Esmer and Pettersson, 2007: 497) play a determining role in their non-democratic conditions? Is there any difference between Islamic religiosity and religiosity in other world religions in regard to their effect on democratic values? In addition to these, there are some contextual factors which make the puzzle more interesting. Contemporary modernization theory argues that socioeconomic growth is one of the prerequisites of political development. Likewise some scholars stress that the foundation of a stable democracy depends on a suitable political culture as well as the existence of liberal political institutions. Measuring the probable effect of socioeconomic and political development on social and political democratic values is as important as measuring their effect on political democracy. Indeed the development of democratic values in Islamic societies should be seen against this background. It should also be stressed that a more comprehensive overview of the relationship between Islam and democratic values, both social and economic, can be gained if all the above-mentioned individual and contextual factors be considered in a comparative approach. The comparative approach in this study will help us to understand the role of these issues in the other world religions in general and in Islam in particular.

Materials, Method, and Definitions3

The individual-level data of this study comes from the renowned studies of the World Values Survey (wvs) and the European Values Study (evs). In order to access the considerable number of countries and to enrich this comparative research with different societies with diverse socioeconomic, political, and cultural backgrounds, 57 countries from three waves of the wvs including third wave (1994–1998), fourth wave (1999–2004), and the last available results namely fifth wave (2005–2008), which provided the majority of our data, were chosen. In addition to these, three countries were selected from the third wave (1999) of the evs. The independent variable, namely individual religiosity, was measured by asking whether people consider themselves to be religious, non-religious, or convinced atheist. Attitudes towards free market economics as the first dependent variable was measured by the question about private ownership of business, responsibility of people to provide for themselves, income equality, and 3 More detailed information is to be found in Appendix 1: Materials and Method.

4

Introduction

competition. The second dependent variable was confidence in civil society organizations. Using the appropriate statistics, this variable was categorized in three factors as follows: confidence in traditional civil society organization includes confidence in the church, mosque, temple or other similar religious institutions; confidence in modern civil society organizations includes confidence in labor unions and political parties; and finally, confidence in postmodern civil society organizations includes trust in the women’s movement and in the environmental protection movement. To be sure about the influence of micro and macro-level independent variables, the effect of five control variables namely religious denomination, the level of education, gender, age, and income was considered. It must be added here that, in addition to the predominant religious tradition of the compared societies as a cultural factor, the length of democratic experience of the societies as an indicator of political context, and their value of Human Development Index as the indicator of socioeconomic development were chosen as the macro-level dependent variables. Before expressing the aims of the study, it should be noted that, the data used in this book has a multilevel structure in which level one or the individual level is nested within level two or the country level. At the individual level the current investigation aims to shed light on the relationship between religiosity, on the one hand, and attitudes towards free market economics as well as confidence in civil society organizations, on the other, as a basis for democracy. This will allow us to determine whether religious orientation is a generally effective factor in predicting democratic social and economic values and if so, to what extent. In order to ensure a wide-ranging perspective on this question, the samples were chosen from different types of religious traditions. At the country level the study will examine, in the main, the probable effect of Islam, as the predominant religion of 49 countries around the world in which Muslims comprise more than 50 per cent of the population,4 on attitudes towards democratic social and economic values. In order to attain a comprehensive understanding about the role of religion generally and Islam in particular as a long-term historical tradition in shaping contemporary democratic values, attitudes will be compared in 60 societies across the globe. It should be noted that the compared societies were selected from three various types of religious societies, namely predominantly Islamic societies 4 ‘The Future of the Global Muslim Population: Projections for 2010–2030’ (2011) The Pew Research Center’s Forum on Religion & Public Life, [Online], Available from: http://www .pewforum.org/future-of-the-global-muslim-population-muslim-majority.aspx [Accessed 05/11/2013].

5

Introduction Table 0.1 List of 60 compared societies and their predominant religion Predominantly Christian societies

Predominantly Islamic societies

Societies with Buddhist, Hindu, and Folk-Religion traditions

Argentina Australia Brazil Bulgaria Canada Chile Colombia Finland France Germany (East) Germany (West) Ghana Great Britain Italy Mexico Netherlands New Zealand Norway Peru

Philippines Poland Romania Russian Federation Serbian Republic of Bosnia South Africa Spain Sweden Switzerland Tanzania Ukraine United States Venezuela Zambia

Albania Algeria Azerbaijan Bangladesh Bosnian Federation Burkina Faso Egypt Indonesia Iran Iraq Jordan Kyrgyzstan Malaysia Mali Morocco Nigeria Pakistan Saudi Arabia Turkey

China Hong Kong India Japan South Korea Taiwan Thailand Viet Nam

Total

33

19

8

(19 societies), predominantly Christian societies (33 societies), and societies with Buddhist, Hindu, and folk-religion traditions (8 societies). Table 0.1 presents the compared societies and their predominant religion. It is noteworthy that, according to the wvs West and East Germany, the Bosnian Federation and SrpSka (Serbian Republic of Bosnia), and Hong Kong and China were considered separately. This means that there were 57 independent countries but 60 societies or rather 60 units to analyse. Because of this, I have preferred to use the word societies instead of countries to include all the units, both in the title and throughout the book. In order to achieve its aims this book seeks to address the following questions both on a micro as well as a macro-level of analysis. Since the first and

6

Introduction

second research questions concern the effect of religiosity on attitudes towards a free market economy and civil society organizations at the individual level, and the four remaining research questions are about socioeconomic, political, and religious effects at the contextual level, there are therefore two hierarchical levels of analysis: level 1 or individual level of analysis and level 2 or country level of analysis. Considering the level-1 independent variable, religiosity, and two dependent variables of the research, namely attitudes towards free market economics and confidence in civil society, there are two questions that relate to the micro or individual-level of analysis as follows: • Is there any relationship between religiosity and attitudes towards free market economics? • Is there any relationship between religiosity and confidence in civil society organizations? Regarding the level-2 variables, namely the predominant religion of societies, the length of time a country has experienced under the rule of democratic institutions, and finally the score on the Human Development Index (HDI) (and regarding the comparative nature of the study) the country-level questions are: • Are predominantly Islamic countries more negatively associated with free market economy, compared to the other types of religious societies? • Do predominantly Islamic countries put less confidence in civil society, compared to the other types of religious societies? • Does the democratic tradition of a country positively affect attitudes towards free market economics as well as civil society? • Do high levels of hdi positively affect attitudes towards free market economics as well as civil society? The present study attempts to find answers to these questions by analyzing the empirical data of 60 societies around the world in a comparative perspective using a multilevel analysis method. Multilevel analysis is an appropriate method of research which takes into consideration both the individual’s attitudes and behavior as well as their social and surrounding contexts. “The hierarchical linear model is a type of regression analysis for multilevel data where the dependent variable is at the lowest level” (Snijders, 2009: 11). Here it makes sense to present the theoretical definitions of key concepts as they are used in the book. It should be noted that these concepts will be operationalized in Materials and Method (Appendix 1). The key concepts are

Introduction

7

democracy, free market economy, civil society, religion, and religiosity. We will begin with an explanation of the term democracy. A brief review of the literature indicates that there are two sets of definitions for democracy: minimalist as well as maximalist definitions. While the former focuses only on the political dimension and, more explicitly, on free and competitive electoral system, the latter expands the function of democracy to other aspects too. An example of the minimal definition of democracy is that given by Lipset and Lakin (2004: 19): “An institutional arrangement in which all adult individuals have the power to vote, through free and fair competitive elections, for their chief executive and national legislature.” It is a “modified version” of Schumpeter’s (1943) explanation of democracy which stresses the vital role of political institutions in democracy. This kind of definition has its roots in the ancient Greek understanding of fair and just governance. The combination of the words demos and kratia, “rule by the people” (Bogdanor, 1987: 166), refers to this political philosophy. Also Abraham Lincoln’s famous phrase about democracy: “Government of the People, by the People, for the People” is one of the most oft-quoted definitions of democracy which focuses only on the role of state. On the other hand, a multidimensional perspective of democracy considers certain non-political aspects without which democracy does not function properly. In other words, the rule of the people will only be realized if all spheres of social life are managed democratically by the people. Here the maximalist definition of Larry Diamond (1995) has been selected who, following Robert Dahl’s Polyarchy (1971: 1–9), defines democracy as a system which encompasses not only a civilian, constitutional, multiparty regime, with regular, free, and fair elections and universal suffrage, but organizational and informational pluralism; extensive civil liberties (freedom of expression, freedom of the press, freedom to form and join organizations); effective power for elected officials; and functional autonomy for legislative, executive, and judicial organs of government. Though “civil liberties” in this definition includes freedom of private organizations with commercial goals, Diamond emphasizes that democracy cannot be consolidated unless the regime lays the basis for (eventual) sustainable economic growth. Such economic dynamism, it is increasingly apparent, cannot be achieved without reforms (of a very radical nature in post-Communist and formerly very statist economies) to stabilize and liberalize the economy.

8

Introduction

As it is apparent from the above definition, democracy embraces in addition to the free political regulations, other aspects such as civil and economic liberties too. Another concept is free market economy. A free market economy here has a great common denominator with a capitalist economy. As a result, to define free market economy we use eight factors which Elliott (1973: 24) identified in Comparative Economic Systems as leading criteria in defining an economic system. Accordingly classic or competitive market capitalism is a system with the following features: a developed or developing economy, with an advanced or advancing technology; heavy reliance upon capital and capitalistic methods of production; predominantly private and individual ownership and control of business enterprise; a relatively large role for individual units (households and businesses) and accompanying small role for largescale organizations, specially government; market-oriented motivation with particular emphasis upon the profit motive; decentralization of economic decisions and wide areas of discretion for freedom of individual choice; primary reliance upon a competitive price/market system; distribution according to market-determined contributions to production, with the possibility of considerable inequality in income and property. Civil Society: When we talk about civil society we usually refer to certain concepts. Some of these concepts are clear such as individuals, community, a common purpose, and social interaction. Some of them are relatively vague such as public sphere, and social engagement. The concept of civil society lacks clear definition and the boundary to the public sphere is some dispute. For example, scholars argue about the extent to which economics should be included, and the term often suggests an element of social engagement which is not explicitly defined. We also need to consider the following relations and functions: Does civil society rely on some philosophical foundations such as individualism, utilitarianism, modern rationality, and pluralism? What is the relationship between this term and other institutions such as the state? Must civil society be completely independent from the state? Does civil society necessarily involve political participation, accountability of government, and democracy? Like for many other concepts in behavioral sciences scholars are not unanimous in defining civil society. The definition of civil society here is the one used by Diamond (1999: 221):

Introduction

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Civil Society is the realm of organized social life that is open, voluntary, self-generating, at least partially self-supporting, autonomous from the state, and bound by a legal order or set of shared rules. It is distinct from “society” in general in that it involves citizens acting collectively in a public sphere to express their interests, passions, preferences, and ideas, to exchange information, to achieve collective goals, to make demands on the state, to improve the structure and functioning of the state and to hold state officials accountable. Civil society is an intermediary phenomenon, standing between the private sphere and the state. This definition covers various collective activities in the society which represent the free will of social actors in establishing voluntary associations and points out to their role as an obstacle to despotism. In other words, there is little doubt that civil society is a symbol of individual autonomy and is therefore closely linked to democracy. Religion: There are many different definitions of religion. One can categorize these definitions at least according to functions, content, or elements of religion (Stringer, 2008: 1). While functional definition refers mainly to the social and psychological role of religion, substantial definition refers essentially to the content of faith and elements of religion. Emile Durkheim, as one of the pioneers to concentrate on functions, believes that religion, at an individual level, aids people to act and live. On the societal level, religion unites society and legitimizes established values and common goals (Durkheim, 2001 [1912]). Yinger (1970) is another scholar who has pointed out the social functions of religion and claims that religion “can be defined as a system of beliefs and practices by means of which a group of people struggles with the ultimate problems of human life” (p. 7). As a minimum substantive definition, on the other hand, Edward Tylor (1958) defined religion as “a belief in spiritual beings” (p. 8). This is a simple perspective which stresses only the internal faith in supernatural beings as the core of religion. For others religion is a relationship with spiritual beings: “an institution consisting of culturally patterned interaction with culturally postulated superhuman beings” (Spiro, 1971: 96). These definitions reduce religion to an inner and totally personal issue. The definition of Geertz (1973: 90), despite some reservations,5 does not refer to the function of religion. He considers religion to be 5 See for example: Mechling, J. (2010) Religious Studies, in J. C. Rowe (ed.), A Concise Companion to American Studies, Malaysia: Wiley-Blackwell, pp. 92–123. (p. 94).

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(1) a system of symbols which acts to (2) establish powerful, pervasive, and long-lasting moods and motivations in men by (3) formulating conceptions of a general order of existence and (4) clothing these conceptions with such an aura of facticity that (5) the moods and motivations seem uniquely realistic. Regardless of what religion does or is, for the macro level of analysis in this book religion plays the role of a sociohistorical institution which shapes a relatively common tradition of beliefs, ritualistic behavior, and sacred morals. This institution shapes and expresses the collective experiences of a transcendent being in a society or community. These collective experiences have a cultural nature and therefore a long-lasting impact on values. Religiosity: Reviewing the literature on religiosity, Cornwall and her collaborators (1998) indicate two general approaches to defining and measuring religiosity: conceptual and empirical. While from an empirical perspective the mathematical relationship between sets of items in this regard is essential, conceptual approach attempts to measure religiosity by selecting or constructing items for assumed religious dimensions. Cornwall et al. classify the major conceptual dimensions of religiosity, which are provided from a cross-class­ ification of: “(1) the modes of religiosity (personal vs. institutional) and (2) the components of religiosity (belief, commitment, and behavior),” in six dimensions as follows: “traditional and particularistic orthodoxy (cognitive), spiritual and church commitment (affective), and religious behavior and participation (behavioral)” (p. 206). According to this, any (personal or institutional) form of attachment to all or one of the cognitive, affective, and behavioral dimensions of religion which leads individuals to describe themselves as a religious person marks as a kind of religiosity, though attachment to the cognitive and/or affective dimensions without practicing religious behavior is conceivable, but not vice versa.

A Brief Overview of the Book

This book has been divided into 3 parts with an introduction and a discussion and conclusion section. This Introduction is followed by Part One or Democratic Values, Islamic Principles, and Political Democracy which will address the general background to the research, comprises 4 main chapters. The first chapter is in fact a theoretical introduction to the whole study and argues for the strong connection between political democracy and the non-political democratic values of free market economics as well as civil society. The first section makes

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clear the importance of free market economics for the development of democracy from a philosophical, cultural, social, political, and empirical perspective. The free market can generally be seen as a symbol of individual free choice in the economic sphere. Likewise, democracy is a symbol of individual free will in the political sphere. This common aim means that a free market economy and political democratic institutions support each other. The second section stresses the role of civil society organizations in the founding and establishing of a political democratic system from a social, political, and cultural viewpoint. This section discusses the intermediary role of ngos between the state and its citizens, the function of civil organizations as social forces in the public domain and the cultural impact of cooperative civil life, and assesses these as social virtues in society. The second chapter reviews the literature concerning the relationship between Islam and democratic economic values. This chapter, Islam and Free Market Economics, covers the two opposite standpoints in considering Islam’s compatibility with the principles of a free market economy. While on one hand it is argued that there is no serious conflict between an Islamic economy and free market economics, the overwhelming majority of scholars, on the other hand, argue that Islamic teachings and beliefs seriously contradict democratic economic values. The incompatibility of Islam with free market economics is to be considered under the following aspects: the political, legal and economic structure of Islamic society, Islamic ethics and values, the minimal or maximal role of government in the economy, and finally the controversial role of private ownership. The third chapter, Islam and Civil Society, reviews the literature concerning the compatibility of Islam with civil society. It shows that disagreement between scholars on this topic is greater than on Islam and free market economics. While many students of democracy attribute the lack of democracy in Islamic and Arabic societies to the Islamic worldview and Islamic political theology, numerous social scientists enumerate various kinds of civil society organizations which originate within Islamic traditions. They demonstrate not only that Islam is no impediment to the development of civil society but also that it can in itself promote civic life. In order to further explore the strengths and weaknesses of voluntary associations in the Muslim world this section also presents a brief report of civil society in some Islamic countries. The fourth chapter engages in the theoretical framework of the book. The first section of this part attempts to clarify the role of various influencing factors on political development from the perspective of the modernization theory. Theorists maintain that socioeconomic growth is one of the most influential factors. Urbanization, industrialization, advanced technology, literacy

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and higher levels of education are some important prerequisites of development which, historically speaking, have assisted societies to achieve democracy. Political tradition is the next influential factor to be discussed. The necessity of both a developed political culture and the appropriate institutions for the establishment of a stable democracy are some of the issues considered here. Finally this chapter will explore the controversial role of religion as a great factor of cultural influence. The second section introduces “the theory of human development” taken from Inglehart and his collaborators as the selected theoretical model of the study. The rest of this chapter presents the research hypotheses. Regarding the multilevel research questions, the research hypotheses were proposed both on an individual level as well as on a contextual level. Two hypotheses formulate the probable effect of individual religiosity on attitudes towards free market economics and confidence in civil society organizations. Additionally, four hypotheses were developed to examine the probable effect of contextual factors of the predominant religion of societies, their socioeconomic development, and the length of their political democratic tradition. This chapter ends with the presentation of the model of hypotheses and a short conclusion. Following these, Part Two presents the preliminary statistical analyses. These include firstly a descriptive comparison at the individual level of analysis between the 60 compared societies. The first chapter compares the issue of religiosity, non-religiosity, and atheism. The second chapter compares attitudes towards factors favorable to free market economics which include private versus government ownership of business, the responsibility of individuals versus government responsibility to provide for people, income equality versus larger income differences, and finally the utility versus the harmfulness of competition. Subsequently, confidence in 5 kinds of civil society organizations is descriptively compared in the third chapter. These civil society institutions are: religious institutions, labor unions, political parties, the environmental protection movement, and lastly the women’s movement. Following these, the fourth chapter provides a descriptive comparison at the macro level. Here the correlation between different aggregate variables (predominant religion, the length of democratic experience, and hdi value of the 60 compared societies) is measured. Also the group mean of attitudes towards the democratic social and economic values is compared between the three types of religious societies: predominantly Islamic, predominantly Christian, and predominantly Buddhist, Hindu, and folk-religion societies. Part Three reports on the results of multilevel analysis. The first and second chapters concentrate on the results of global multivariate comparison. The third and fourth chapters report on the multivariate comparison between

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Islamic societies and examines, among other issues, the difference between Shiite and Sunni Islamic countries. The Discussion and Conclusions offers an interpretation of the most important findings and their contribution to the related literature. It continues by answering the research questions, summarizes the most important results and the lessons learnt from this investigation. Appendix 1 or Materials and Method, introduces, in addition to the method of analysis, the databases, the compared societies, the method of operationalization of variables and other technical points. This section also reports on the correlation between micro-level variables. And finally, Appendix  2 presents some additional descriptive statistics.

chapter 1

Democratic Values, Islamic Principles, and Political Democracy

Democratic Values and Political Democracy

Importance of a Free Market Economy for Democracy A brief look at the development of the theory of democracy shows that the economy has been thought of as a key element which greatly assists in our understanding of the role of non-political factors in the flourishing of democracy. These theories connect political democracy with what we can ultimately call economic democracy. The close relationship between a free market economy and a liberal political system convinced some students of democracy to claim that democracy and capitalism are identical (Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens, 1992: 1). Not only political and social scientists endorse this strong correlation but also the different schools of economics from Marxism to classical capitalist economics have affirmed the link between industrial capitalism and democracy (Glassman, 1991: 65). There are several possible explanations, namely, philosophical, cultural, social, political, and empirical which try to clarify the topic from different perspectives. From a philosophical point of view the similarity of the underlying foundation links free market economies and democratic political systems. This connection can even be causal. Both of these systems claim that the freedom of individual choice, as their common principle, results in a favorable social output. Relying on individual consumers and individual voters disperses the centralized source of power and therefore both liberal economic and political institutions uphold each other (Coe and Wilber, 1985: 2/16–17). In other words the logic of a liberal economy has directly to do with the way of governance. The notion of “possessive individualism” which is hidden in capitalism promotes free will and emphasizes “the legal rights of individual freehold.” The right of individual freehold creates many centers of power which are rivals of the state’s authority. They control the state, dividing and sharing its power (Johnson, 1980: 56–58). Though some students of democracy have highlighted the historical synchronization of the birth of democracy and capitalism, it would not be true to assume that democracy and a free economy are tied together merely because of an historical “accident.” Rather, in fact, “the natural logic of capitalism leads to democracy.” Economic freedom needs inherently political liberty and

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2014 | doi 10.1163/9789004274464_003

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a liberal political structure cannot be compatible with any economic regularity other than the free market. The logic of democracy’s legitimacy involves the creation of “equal opportunity” for individuals and a belief in their free will. The manifestation of free will depends definitely upon economic development (Novak, 1982: 14–15). Milton Friedman (2002 [1962]), who is known as the leader of the Chicago school of economics, argued that not only historically but also logically economic liberty is a necessary condition for political liberty. The experience of the nineteenth and early twentieth century in the West evidences this cohesion. Logically, [b]y removing the organization of economic activity from the control of political authority, the market eliminates this source of coercive power. It enables economic strength to be a check to political power rather than a reinforcement. p. 15

Competitive capitalism, by separating the economy from politics, creates a counteracting force to the political source of power. While government in countries with a closed economic system tends to determine the “rules of game,” liberal market economies restrict the range of political decision making and minimize the direct participation of government in the economic game. Schumpeter (2010 [1943]) not only emphasized the historical simultaneousness of the rise of democracy and capitalism but also acknowledged the “causal connection” between these two. He specified that “modern democracy is a product of the capitalist process” (p. 264). Moreover, in a cultural context, he argued that the material and private concerns of a bourgeois make him/her more tolerant towards various political ideas and consequently this approach, which is suitable for democracy, can be spread easily throughout the other classes of society (pp. 263–265). The cultural view is supported by Dahl (2000) who highlighted the impact of a market economy on shaping democratic culture and beliefs. He considered a capitalist economy, in which the private sector and not the state owns enterprises, as a highly desirable circumstance of the emergence of democratic institutions (p. 158). “Centrally planned economies,” on the other hand, are intimately associated with totalitarian political systems (p. 169). Socially, the capitalist system of economy modifies the construction of ­society in a way which realizes the democratic potential within it. Capitalism, ­historically speaking, is an outcome of the hostility of the industrial bourgeoisie towards the feudal-aristocratic state. Thus it is not strange that capitalist

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revolution leads to democracy. In other words, “[i]t is in the nature of capitalism  that it secretly nurtures and eventually unleashes democratic forces.” The middle classes of society, even under an authoritarian industrializing state, play a significant role in this unleashing process (Kim, 1993: 23). A capitalist economy which contains an autonomous peasantry creates a middle class which protects independent groups which in turn restrict the power of the state (Lipset, 1994: 2–3). An inductive investigation of history reveals that liberalism as a political movement and as a representative government has only flourished where there are several independent economic groups and classes (Andreski, 1965: 337/357). Capitalist development “transforms the class structure, strengthening the working” class which was historically “the most consistently pro-democratic” group in society. The history of capitalist development shows also that it weakened the “landed upper-classes which were dependent on a large supply of cheap labor [and] were the most consistently anti-democratic force” (Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens, 1992: 7–8) (see also Stephens, 1993: 438). Some other analytical viewpoints have attempted to draw attention to other perspectives of the association between capitalism and democracy. The tradition of Anglo-American political sciences, for example, considers free market economy as a prerequisite of democracy and suggests that “economic liberalization” and democratization are twin processes. Market economics creates an independent social network which is voluntary, non-hierarchical, and decentralized with regard to ownership and decision making. These features, on the one hand, restrict the domain of state sovereignty and, on the other hand, consolidate civil society. In other words the needs of democracy and economic development can be satisfied by a free business environment in which the privatization of economy restrains the scope of “public decision making” and allows a separation between economic sphere and political domination. As a result, it is alleged that free market economy is supportive of democratic political institution (Beetham, 1997: 77–86). Additionally, capitalism prepares the proper social conditions for democracy to work. Capitalism, “primarily by providing for national defense, maintaining domestic law and order, and enforcing contracts,” restricts the realm of political decision making to the options which protect private property rights  and individual freedom. Furthermore, a capitalist system of economy raises the standard of living and trains more educated men and women for state bureaucracy (Coe and Wilber, 1985: 17–18). To assess the linkage between free market and liberty it would be also helpful to consider other functions of a capitalist economy. Capitalist development assists democracy by making possible higher levels of literacy, expanding urbanization as well as

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the mass media, and of course by extending the variety of choice in every field of life. It is an irrefutable reality that democratic society enjoys internal consistency. Free market economy increases the country’s gdp. A high-income ­economy, through the high volume of trading and exchange, develops the interaction between individuals and minimizes conflict over the distribution of wealth. Consequently, it provides a sort of consensus in society which is essential to democracy. Another reason why a free economy is considered to be important for democracy is that almost invariably a politically dependent ­economic system tends to hand the future of society over to those who promote the interests of state over the interests of people (Schweinitz, 1964: 59/279). When we talk about the interests of state we do not mean merely the economic benefits. There is another potential political advantage. The uncontrolled access of the state to resources leads naturally to governmental corruption which is endemic in authoritarian and totalitarian states. Poor and weak economies usually suffer from particularism. The institutionalization of a reformist alternative in these states is a difficult task. A competitive market economy limits the “nepotistic networks” and hinders the unrestrained access of elites to state power and resources (Lipset, 1994: 2–3) which is the paramount obstacle to the peaceful development of political power and meritocracy. In addition to this, capitalism assists democracy in another political way. The authority of government over the production process is accompanied by control over the political opposition’s means of expression (Reynolds, 1986: 79). In other words, since the sources of economic power in a free market economy are disparate, the political decision making cannot become authoritarian. In a private economy in which individuals own the productive resources, both employers and employees are independent from the state. The large-scale allocation of productive resources to the private sector decreases the coercive power of government and augments freedom for individuals in their economic activities. This in turn favors associative life, freedom of opinion, political diversity (Lekachman, 1980: 34), and greater “political competitiveness” with its positive relationship to economic development as stressed by Coleman (1960: 538). In contrast to non-capitalist economies – whether socialist or Islamic – a private free economy has no ideology or aim other than the accumulation of wealth. It therefore effectively reduces conflict and moderates the political and non-political tensions in society. It is not only the classical theory of politics that argues that democracy is affected by capitalist development. Also

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the cross-national comparisons and other empirical studies have proven the positive correlation between economic well-being and the spreading of democracy. Lipset (1959) stressed that examples from Europe, Latin America, and English-speaking countries confirm this affinity. In a recent survey whose samples cover up to 169 countries, it was found that political instability, through its unpropitious impact on total factor productivity growth, diminishes economic progress (Aisen and Veiga, 2013). Also as a result of his survey of different countries around the world, Huntington (1984: 214) suggested that some economic preconditions such as a “high level of economic well being [,]…a strong autonomous bourgeoisie [, and] a more market-oriented economy” assist the emergence of democracy. He claimed that among single social, economic, and cultural preconditions for democracy only a market economy is necessary for democratic development. Peter Berger (1993) has no doubt that political democracy depends upon a market economy. His reason is also of an empirical nature: “There has been no case of political democracy that has not been a market economy” (p. 3). A successful market economy creates pressure for democratization. In other words, capitalism is a necessary condition for democracy. However, as the experience of East Asian countries shows, capitalism in this asymmetrical relationship does not necessarily need democracy. Democracy needs capitalism because it provides the social space for individuals and institutions to grow outside state control (p. 6). To put it differently, freedom of choice and private ownership are important components of the capitalist economy. Empirical evidences show that there has been no democratic government combined with a fully socialist economic system which denies private property. A free market economy produces an autonomous sphere which, as the case of East Asia illustrates, creates a middle class which demands freedom and self-government (Bhagwati, 1993: 34–35). Importance of Civil Society for Democracy It goes without saying that the making and fostering of a democratic system is contingent upon some conditions fundamental among which is the emergence of a robust and vibrant civil society. Current theory of society and politics invariably links civil society with democracy (Mahajan, 2003: 167). Without extra-state organizations and groups there can be no democracy (Rich, 1999: 27). In other words, civil life is one of the decisive factors in the expansion of democracy (Nord, 2000: xxiii). Both from a normative and structural (if not teleological) perspective on civil society, democratic development relates in some way to associational life (Elliott, 2003: 12–19). Democracy is structurally founded on “liberal civil society” (Bromely, 1994: 167) since without freedom of expression in non-political issues there can be no political freedom. Democracy

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needs the aid of civil society to establish a democratic atmosphere in society (Entelis, 1996: 47). In other words, the idea of civil society embodies the idea of freedom (Kukathas, 2003). Historically, the experience of nineteenth-century Europe demonstrates that “civic sources” were the turning-point in the struggle for the democratization of public life (Nord, 2000: xxxi). How civil society has assisted democracy is a question that numerous scholars have attempted to clarify from various standpoints. After reviewing the literature, one can distinguish political, social, and cultural trends which tend to illustrate relationship between associative lifestyles and a democratic model of governance. Political perspective is perhaps the first perception of civil society in this regard. The political philosophy of John Locke and G.W.F. Hegel considered civil society as a concept of a political nature which pursues democracy through emphasizing the individual rights of citizens (Mahajan, 2003: 182). Politically, civil society prefigures the forming of political parties which seek the fulfillment of civic rights. For some researchers (for example Encarnación, 2003: 706–707) civil society is essentially neutral and is only beneficial for democracy if it is “encased in stable and efficient political institutions.” In other words, only the direct political function of civil society enables it to influence the political sphere. A serious weakness with this argument, however, is that this view neglects the influential role of culture in the democratization process. In addition, without the support of stable non-political institutions, non-state political organizations could not buffet the authority of government. Democracy is a participatory political system. An ideal political participation requires in addition to common goals what Norton (1993: 213) calls “a shared sense of identity” in which its general framework is provided by civil society. This, however, does not conflict with pluralism and tolerance toward disparate sociopolitical outlooks. A mixture of various associations in civil society serves as “a buffer between state and citizens” (p. 211). Because of this Norton (1995: 7) sees civil society as the home of democracy and as a sign of democratic development on a global scale. Moreover, from a political point of view one can state that a common feature of authoritarian governments is the limiting of autonomous organizations. This is largely because ngos design “collective projects for an alternative future.” These collective alternatives present other political choices for isolated individuals (Przeworski, 1991: 54–55). While political trends compete with political rivals for the unrestricted authority of state, social tendency stresses the potential of social forces in ­public sphere. It was in the twentieth century that civil society shifted to the public sphere and presented “an associative model of democracy” (Mahajan, 2003: 182). Social trends consider civil society as a social capital through which

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associative democracy is made possible. This social capital could be applied to mobilize individuals for the common good of society. Obviously only directly political civic activities have political consequences. Non-political civil associations exert a profound influence on the political realm through the reinforcement of social solidarity, the development of civic education and skills, and the hindrance of state pressure (Smidt, 1999: 176–192). Francis Fukuyama (2002) is one of those who adopt this outlook. His definition of social capital is very close to the general understanding of civil society: Social capital is what permits individuals to band together to defend their interests and organize to support collective needs…. [S]ocial capital is shared norms or values that promote social cooperation, instantiated in actual social relationships. pp. 26–27

He confirms that such a collective perspective of social capital is opposed to despotism since “authoritarian governance…thrives on social atomization” (p. 26). The cultural perspective is another trend in the public sphere which is coterminous with social perception and tries to illuminate the role of civil society in diffusing democratic culture and values. Participatory life, John Stuart Mill (1861) argued, impacts on the character of citizens. Participation directs people to cooperation and not competition. Without associational life man “never thinks of any collective interest, of any objects to be pursued jointly with others but only in competition with them, and in some measure at their expense” (p. 68). The cultural aspect of civil society is highlighted in Tocqueville’s Democracy in America which is an innovation in this regard. For Alexis de Tocqueville as a pioneer in this field, civil society was the “indispensable counterpart” to democracy. He reported how different voluntary associations, which facilitated participation of “isolated individuals” to achieve collective goals, reinforced American democracy. In his view democracy and civil society were intrinsically linked (Whitehead, 1997: 98–99). The building of a democratic state entails the political contribution of citizens and civil institutions expedite this process (Tocqueville, 1948b: 115). The strengthening of democratic political institutions also needs civil associations “to prevent the despotism of faction or the arbitrary power of a prince” (Tocqueville, 1948a: 195). Furthermore, intermediary associations that are not specifically political in nature play the role of protector of democracy’s legal system, which limits authoritarian rule. Democracy requires these non-political associations that act as “sources of meaning and social engagement.” The participatory way of

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life, Tocqueville argued, safeguards individual freedom and participation of citizens in collective actions and joining with others for common aims guarantees democracy (Smidt, 1999: 177). For Putnam (1993) civil society is composed of non-political voluntary associations with horizontal ties which disseminate democratic values such as cooperation, trust, reciprocity, civic engagement and collective well-being. Civil institutions teach citizens how to use these social virtues as the basis for collective action which in turn assures a democratic government. He writes: “Tocqueville was right: Democratic government is strengthened, not weakened, when it faces a vigorous civil society” (p. 182). In Bowling Alone Putnam (2000: 338) says that social networks of civil society promote democracy at two levels: at the level of polity as well as at an individual level. Citizens, through voluntary associations, indicate their expectations from state and obtain support to influence political procedures. In this sense they act as a buffer against the power of government. In addition to this external effect, civil associations  internally “instill in their members habits of cooperation and publicspiritedness, as well as the practical skills necessary to partake in public life.” He cited from Tocqueville that “feeling and ideas are renewed, the heart enlarged, and the understanding developed only by the reciprocal action of men one upon another” (p. 338). The cultural approach has a number of further aspects. Diamond (1999: 239–250) described the democratic function of civil society among others as follows: “Education of democracy” is today a task of civil associations through which democratic political culture is improving. Civil society has a supplementary role for political parties in promoting participatory political life and an acceptance of the rules of democratic play. ngos are the voice of citizens, notably of minorities. Civil organizations have a deep impact on democracy at the local level. “[T]he principal polarities of political conflicts” may be reduced through different civic interests. Civil society trains new generations of political leaders. It empowers citizens through free exchange of information. It mobilizes new information for economic betterment in a democracy. Some civil institutions aid society to solve social conflicts. And the strengthening of the state is the concluding and leading function of civil society, which is based on the success of the mentioned functions. Habermas also (1996: 372) believes that civil society has an effect on the “personnel and programming” in a political system. In other words, he emphasizes the cultural effects of associational life on individuals and through individuals on plans and projects of a political unit. Civil society, moreover, is of vital importance for the rule of the people. It is known as the “third sector” of society (Encarnación, 2003: 711). It monitors of political power and offers a third source for the providing of social services

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which can counterbalance the domination of state and market economy respectively (Lewis, 2004: 302). This underlines the restrictive role of civil society as a watch-dog of the political system, which reduces state corruption (see also: Diamond, 1999: 239–242). Although democracy is the rule of majorities, it must guarantee the rights of minorities. Civil society promotes the participatory life of ethnic, religious, gender, political, migratory, and other peripheral clusters and supports these “excluded or marginalized groups” to contribute to an inclusionary process in which the democratic system becomes stronger. In other words civil society prevents the colonization of life sphere by both state and market economy (Young, 2000: 189). Cohen and Arato (1992: 412–413) have shown how civil society and representative democracy are mutually dependent politically as well as juridically. From a political viewpoint, on one hand, the parliamentary process, based on dialogue, presupposes the extension of politically relevant public discussions which occur in the public sphere and within non-governmental associations. On the other hand, for civil society parliament is an appropriate framework in which conflicts can be resolved and further collaboration between active forces of society can be developed. This mutual relationship can be observed from a juridical perspective too. A parliamentary democracy is premised on political, communication rights while the base of civil society is communication and private rights. Political rights are necessary to access to parliamentary representation and private communication rights are needed to guarantee the autonomy of members of civil society which is the precondition for the parliamentary public forum. In sum, it is safe to assume that there is a dialectical relationship between democracy and civil society. “Only a democratic state can create a democratic civil society; only a democratic civil society can sustain a democratic state” (Walzer, 2003: 79). The importance of civil life for democracy in all political, social and cultural perspectives is such that it is no exaggeration to say that “[t]he democratic society…is an association of associations” (Adams, 1980: 1). In the rest of this part the relationship between Islam and free market ­economics and between Islam and civil society will be reviewed according to the literature.

Islam and Free Market Economics

One can consider the relationship between Islamic thought and the free market economy as part of an extensive debate about the kinship of religion

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in  general and capitalism in particular. The concordance or discordance of these two has aroused considerable controversy in this field. At first glance it may appear as though religion has little to do with economy. The primary concern of most religions is the life after death, and religious economic regulations are codified in so far as they relate to other-worldly salvation which depends on the spiritual content of life and not on material interests (Rosser, 1993: 361). But further investigations revealed that this view is only the reduction of a more complex problem in the field of interaction between values and behavior. Scholars have attributed a notable role to religion as a fundamental cause of economic achievement or failure in a country (Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales, 2003: 226). Some of them have perceived Capitalism as Religion because their goals are adaptable and both of them want to relieve the concerns of man (Benjamin, 1996). Weber (1934), Tawney (1927) and others acknowledged the decisive influence of religious thought on the creation of wealth and the rise of capitalism. But on the other hand, some researchers see the modern industrial economic system as a serious challenge for the traditional idea of religion which, because of the conservative and “communalistic” nature of Jewish and Christian moral values, justifies why many religious intellectuals have had “anticapitalist and prosocialist” trends (Berger, 1990: 2). However, returning to the point, Islam, however, with “Islamic Economy” has recently drawn more attention. It has been argued that the application of Islamic economy is a result of three processes: the decrease of Arabic and Islamic socialism in the 1960s and 1970s, the increase of Islamic movements around the Muslim world early in the 1970s, and the extension of the idea of “Islamization of knowledge” (Hefner, 2006: 17). Be that as it may, the story of Islam and free market economy shares the same fate as that of other religions which is the subject of controversy. To review the subject the variety of ideas is regarded here under two headings: the compatibility and incompatibility of Islamic thought with a free market economy. Incompatibility of Islam with Principles of Free Market Economics An overwhelming majority of observed literature that addresses the relationship between Islam and modern economies has focused on the disagreement of these two systems on economic philosophy, the moral set of values, aims and ends, the nature and modes of the operation of market forces and, of course, historical, social and political backgrounds in which the Islamic economic idea and a free market economy have developed. At this point, the literature is broken down into several subtopics:

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Political, Legal, and Economic Structure of Islamic Society Max Weber as a pioneer in economic sociology is one of those who have deliberated about the inadequacy of Islam to construct a capitalistic economic system. Although Islam as a prophetic and salvation religion is a crucial test of Weber’s theory on asceticism and capitalism (Turner, 1974 a: 230), he preferred instead to consider religious teachings, the political structure of early Islamic society and its economic consequences. In answer to the question: “Why did modern rational bourgeois capitalism appear as a dominant phenomenon only in the modern West” (Parsons, 1949: 512) Weber, in an internalist theory of the sociology of development (Turner, 1978: 383), has connected the incompatibility of Islam with capitalism to patrimonialism (Turner, 1974a: 231). There is a general agreement among scholars that Weber’s discussion in this regard is accurate (Swatos, 1995: 52). The patrimonial structure of politics and economics, which is abstracted by Weber under the term “sultanism,” is the reason why there is no “spirit of capitalism” and no rational law – as a necessary prerequisite of a developed economy – in Islam (Turner, 1974a: 237). Rationality is an essential component of capitalism which is absent from Islamic theology: This type of religion, with its orgiastic and mystical elements, with its essentially irrational and extraordinary character, and with its official and thoroughly traditionalistic ethic of everyday life, became influential in Islam’s missionary enterprise because of its great simplicity. It directed the conduct of life into paths whose effect was plainly opposite to the methodical control of life found among Puritans, and indeed, found in every type of asceticism oriented toward the control of the world. Islam, in contrast to Judaism, lacked the requirement of a comprehensive knowledge of the law and lacked that intellectual training in casuistry which nurtured the rationalism of Judaism. weber, 1963[1922]: 265

For Weber the discord of Islamic soul with industrial capitalist substance has more fundamental reasons. Feudalism, Weber says, is the essential feature of Islamic economic ethics (p. 262). [T]he original Islamic conception of sin;…the obviously unquestioned acceptance of slavery, serfdom, and polygamy; the disesteem for and subjection of women; the essentially ritualistic character of religious obligations; and finally, the great simplicity of religious requirements and the

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even greater simplicity of the modes ethical requirements display some aspects of the “feudal spirit” of Islam. p. 264

Besides, the social concept of the city, which had a vital role in Western economic development, was only a political entity in early Islamic society and urbanization had no capitalistic function: Islamic cities which had emerged from army camps and garrison cities (amsar) continued to reflect the organization of tribal bedouins. …[T]he continuity of clan and tribal organization within the city context imported rural feuding arrangements into urban life. turner, 1974b: 100

Though Weber’s essay on Islam and capitalism is not expanded, it embodies most of the significant elements of a deep analysis of the subject from a sociological perspective. Bryan Turner has studied the orientalist outlook with relation to Islamic economy. He inferred that some of elements of the framework that oriental studies has picked out to address the issue of Islam and capitalism are the historical characters of Islamic societies as well as the comparison between the theoretical structure of Islam and Christianity. According to these studies, Islamic societies have a static structure which hinders the right of private proprietorship and promotes predominantly totalitarian governments. Because of their political absolutism, Islamic societies possess no independent institutions. In addition, Islamic teachings cause fatalism and submission especially towards the authority of government (Turner, 1978: 375–378), whereas “selfreliance” and “personal achievement” are the inherent characters of capitalism (Burdenski and Dunson, 1999: 94). For McCleary and Barro (2006) one of the differences between Islam and Christianity is the matter of personal and public responsibility in religious legislation. Contrary to Christianity, particularly Protestantism, which makes individuals responsible for religious injunctions and duties, “Islam is legalistic, stressing the fulfillment of laws that are communally enforced. …The legalistic aspect of Islam creates a communal enforcement of religiosity” (p. 53). But this legal system is not market friendly. Studies show that Islamic countries are highly religious overall, especially in relation to beliefs in contrast to religious participation, but this high rate of religiousness in Islamic countries does not have a positive impact on economic growth. State measures in Islamic

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countries can explain the influence of resistant factors of growth among Muslims. Government in Muslim societies utilizes laws, rules, and terms and conditions which are hostile to business and economic operations (p. 69). In addition to legal considerations, the motivation of economic activity is absolutely crucial for growth, as McCleary and Barro have pointed out. The concept of salvation in the world’s main religions is a reference point for various kinds of economic motivation among believers. Some religions recommend that pious men try to earn “salvific merit” in this world through personal activities such as hard work. Scholars agree that the incentive of earning salvific merit in Calvinist Protestantism is very low or non-existent. Islam, Catholicism, and Hinduism, do not contain much incentive for earning salvific merit and therefore individual activities in these religions have no conclusive effect on salvation. Islamic Ethics and Values One starting point for discussing the polarity between free market theory and religious doctrine is the difference between their values. Difficulties begin with the concept of value itself. Economists usually deem it to be a “subjective entity” in which the consumer plays a key role in its definition, while religious thinkers have an objective interpretation of the term and ascribe it to the “­natural-law” category (Santelli et al., 2002: 44). Besides, many of scholars have noted that the modern idea of industrial life is extremely foreign to Islamic fundamental values and ethics. In the Qur’anic approach the life of this world is nothing but “frivolity” (6/32), “a trivial comfort” (9/38), and a “cheating object” (3/185). Non-material Islamic philosophy which attributes a temporary role to this life in preparation for a future existence breaks the utilitarian logic of market economy. This also goes a long way in explaining why almost all countries which are predominantly Islamic are not fully developed economically. Furthermore, it explains why Islamic moral economy is the challenge of capitalism. In his book, Charles Tripp has taken a comprehensive look at the roots and scope of conflict between the Islamic conception of economic life and the postulates of a modern mode of production. As Tripp (2006: 32–33) delineates, concerns about the overthrow of the moral economy in Islamic countries in nineteenth century originated in this feeling that a conversion to an industrial capitalistic system threatens not only their material interests but also their Islamic value system and the “ideal Islamic order” in these countries. Al-Afghani’s Al-Ishtirākiyyah fi al-Islam (Socialism in Islam) (1968) and writings of Muhammad Abduh and Rashid Rida are some attempts that address these concerns (Tripp, 2006: 32–33).

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In the light of the following verses of the Qur’an, the reservations of the majority of ʿulamāʾ and Muslim scholars about capitalism would be ­understandable. Ayatollah Mutahhari (1989: 19) argues that this verse shows how wealth and money corrupt the spiritual side of man: “the human being will rebel if he sees himself self-sufficient” (96/6). There are more verses that seem to be incompatible with the spirit of capitalism, among others: “who gather gold and silver and do not spend them for God, they will be punished painfully” (9/34); “What bestowed God to the Prophet … must not be in the hand of wealthy among you” (59/7); “Woe to every slanderer backbiter, who collect wealth and counts it over” (104/1–2). The general feeling of threat, among others, has led to a kind of cultural contention between Islamic world and the West which involves a conflict between the economic values of the two different world-views. “The values fostered by the material structure of capitalism” explain, as Tripp reports (p. 47), what Muslims fear from capitalism and why they worry about the moral economy in their countries. Hedonistic individualism, contrary to the normative values of Islamic ethics, propels individuals towards purely private ends. It cuts them off from society as an organic whole, and encourages self-direction and autonomy which are seen as contrary to mankind’s constant need for God in the Islamic world-view. Materialistic desires at the centre of capitalistic values give rise to selfishness, moral egotism, and profit-oriented behaviour which eliminate the spirituality inherent in Islamic community, and ultimately they are the cause of the “divisiveness of social relations” and weakening social solidarity (pp. 50–54). Hence, In accepting the picture of the being assumed to lie at its heart as a representation of reality, the function of Islam becomes clear: to introduce restraints on the hedonistic individual. Only then can an orderly society and an ‘Islamic economy’ be instituted. p. 124

The difference in value structure between Islamic economics and the economy of market, as Naqvi (1994) has contended, is fundamental. While capitalists insist on the morality of “self-interest behaviour both in theory and practice,” the economic ethic of Islam rejects this philosophy. Capitalism morally confirms the unending accumulation of wealth, while according to Islamic doctrine individuals must pay some part of their wealth to the poor. Free market economy is based on an individual’s economic freedom and private ownership whereas from an Islamic point of view God is the possessor of all property. And

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finally, in contrast to capitalism, the issue of “social responsibility” is a central concern in Islamic economics (pp. 76–78). In order to illustrate the relationship between these two sets of values, Abdul-Rauf (1979a) selected another starting point. He has tried to distinguish the main peculiarity of economic ethic of Islam. From a value judgment perspective economics, particularly Islamic economics, is not strictly a branch of sciences but rather a moral system which has not been created by human beings but “is based on divine revelation” (p. 19). This moral system has been made in order to test the rate of obedience and submission of man to God and like other sets of obligations has its regulations. It has been claimed that The Ten Commandments of Islamic Economics give a unique feature to Islamic economy. The more significant commandments which are heterogeneous to the rules and ethics of free market economics are: The payment of zakat or religious tax; the payment of nafaghah or financial support for some specific relatives such as one’s wife, children, and needy parents; the necessity of charitable help to the poor, which in the Qur’an is expressed under the term haqq or “an inalienable right” of the needy; the compliance of Islamic terms and conditions of trade such as the necessity of accessibility and deliverability of goods; valuability of goods according to Islamic business law, Islamic heritage law; the prohibition of ribā or usury; refraining from unproductive and “unethical” activities such as gambling, deceiving, hoarding, monopoly, and trading pornographic products. Thomas Philipp (1990) has claimed that the basic precepts of Islamic economics have been constructed as a rejection of other economic patterns (p. 122). Unlike Naqui who emphasized that “unity, equilibrium, free will, and responsibility” are the moral postulates of Islam – and that these can be used to establish an Islamic economy – Philipp is not as optimistic that these religious principles are adequate to distinguish it from other specific economic systems (p. 132). He believes that Islam is very far from any form of capitalism and is in fact more comparable with a sort of European model of social democratic economy (p. 124), due to the limitation of individual ownership, the tendency to give a relatively important role to government in economic activities, and to attach great significance to certain notions such as social justice. He cites (p. 127) Mawdudi who claims that economic justice is not only based upon Islamic law but also on “reforming the inner man” to accept and behave according to the moral principles of justice. Mawdudi (1970) has asseverated  that “maximum attention should be given to the reform of the individual’s attitude and character so that the root cause of evils in the human personality is uprooted” (pp. 31–32). This reveals, Philipp argues, the “Utopian character” of Islamic economics which entails the creation of a “new human being” (p. 128).

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The idealistic character of Islamic economic man has been criticized by others too. Reilly and Zangeneh (1990), considering this as a weakness of Islamic economic thought, emphasize the exclusive prerequisite of the successful fulfillment of Islamic economics in theory and praxis leading to the appearance of the “Islamic man” (p. 31). They assess the Islamic resurgence around the Muslim world as a social and political movement which aims to attain an alternative to the nonfunctional and or unpurified forms of capitalism and socialism. Obviously both of these economic systems have their strength and weakness. However, in spite of some who claim that Islamic business principles generate a new mode of economy or a “third way,” Islamic economics must be seen as merely a “hybrid system” (p. 25). This label points to the mixed identity of Islamic economics which tries to combine the premises or strengths of both capitalism and socialism. The emphasis on the importance of promoting the welfare of individuals and society simultaneously results in a paradox that Islamic economics needs to confronts (p. 32). The fundamental differences between the business ethics in Islamic economics and secular capitalism, as Saeed, Ahmed, and Mukhtar (2001) have argued, refer to their system of values. While modern business ethics, following the logic of relativism and individual selfishness, disregards moral values and drives toward “profit maximization,” Islamic economics, because of its absolute and idealistic philosophy and its concerns about the common good of the Islamic society, asserts a “value-maximization approach.” The core value in the Islamic approach is justice (pp. 129–130). Economic justice, as Saeed, Ahmed, and Mukhtar cite from Miskawayh,1 consists of “fair play,” considering the interests of both buyer and seller, and “just dealing,” as a virtue of fairness which prescribes that interest and loss should be shared equally. Justice, according to Miskawayh, is hindered by greed “in lawful earning” and the extreme desire for money. It is abundantly clear that this leaves little room for competition in financial activities which is a principle of free marketing (ibid, p. 130). They have added that according to Islamic commercial ethics a businessman has four responsibilities: responsibility toward God, society, environment, and finally own welfare. In fact the market, under Islamic law, is accountable toward society at large (ibid, p. 135). Another factor that should be discussed here is motivation. Motivation in economic activities is a crucial factor for success. According to the modern theory of neoclassical economy, as Zaman (2008) has delineated, the selfishness of “self-interested individuals” is the only motivation of man which drives 1 Abu ‘Ali Ahmad ibn Muhammad ibn Yaʿqub Ibn Miskawayh (932–1030 ce), a leading Persian philosopher, historian, and poet.

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him toward achievement, whereas from an Islamic standpoint human beings were created for inner spiritual evolution in which moral personality such as collaboration and sympathy with the other members of society play a prominent role. This polarity in the metaphysics of the two economies is evident in three fields: 1. Islam emphasizes balance and cooperation within communities while “the neoliberal economic vision of the free market as a jungle” stresses competition with others in order to earn maximum wealth. 2. In an Islamic society public interests take precedence over individual interests whereas the latter is one of the axes of a liberal economy. 3. In Islamic economics spiritual and subjective issues carry great weight, while in positivist economics visible activities have an extraordinary importance (pp. 25–27). In other words a central conflict between capitalist and Islamic economic ethics is the role of morals. For some Westerners morality is necessary to acquire individual freedom, which is symbolized by wealth. That is to say, money empowers individuals to achieve their desires and satisfy their demands. A more accurate motto in this regard might be “Good ethics is good business” (p. 33), while the core of an Islamic community is “virtue” and non-material values (pp. 25–27/33). Kuran (1997: 1) believes that the aim of Islamic economics is to organize an economic system in accordance with Islamic standards and tradition as opposed to scientific economics that seeks ways to satisfy the “unlimited wants” of mankind with limited resources (Byrns and Stone, 1995: 5), Shams (2004) argues that value-based Islamic economics imposes a restriction on wishes and emphasizes controlling nafs – the essential part of the inner entity of man which has neglected God and persuades humankind to satisfy worldly desires and enjoyments – (p. 5). This is the decisive difference between a market economy and Islamic economics. The prohibition of the material nature of man from paying for its desires leads ultimately to small government, providing public goods by private sector, rare inflation and unemployment (pp. 9–10). But it seems it has been neglected that the restriction of trade has a negative effect on the process of production and consumption, the rate of dealing, and other factors that cause high inflation and unemployment. The significance of moral precepts in business among Muslims was also investigated empirically. Having reviewed some Islamic teachings and the assumptions of ethical economics, Williams and Zinkin (2005) in their comparative study across 21 countries proposed some hypotheses that suggest that “Muslims will be more likely than other groups: to expect high ethical standards from firms,” “to expect firms to provide good quality products at low prices,” “to expect firms to apply the same high standards in production wherever they operate in the world,” “to expect firms to treat employees and job applicants equally,” “to punish firms for poor Corporate Social Responsibility,”

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and to be “concerned…about the environment.” Many Muslim scholars consider Islamic economics as an ethical system. Accordingly, Muslims were thought to be more likely to feel concern about the moral dimension of the economy in general than others. Nevertheless, contrary to expectations, the test disproves the hypotheses and confirms that Muslims were ranked lower than non-Muslims in all of these fields. In a comparison between the Islamic and capitalist theory of economics, Anjum (1996) concluded that the following reasons lead to their incongruity: a) The reason of economic problems, from a capitalistic view, is the insufficiency of resources to satisfy human desires, whereas Islam claims that the problem is maladministration. Allah has furnished all the resources which man really needs but not necessarily all that he wishes. b) While capitalism ensures an unrestrained free market and allows the competitive system to perform perfectly, Islam administers market operations through religious moral codes. c) Capitalism recognizes only private ownership while Islam acknowledges the ownership rights of individuals, society, and state in order to optimize material welfare and maximize spiritual prosperity (pp. 85–86). Most religions are not the unconditional proponents either of capitalism and socialism. They usually introduce a “Third Way” (Abdul-Rauf, 1979b), picking out elements from both existing systems and adding them to their own original economic doctrine (Rosser, 1993: 362). Islam favours a new path combining worldly material aspects which are necessary for human beings with a spiritual dimension which is the basis of  religious life. This compromise guarantees the wellbeing of man both in his  worldly existence and in afterlife. This “third way” tries to establish a path which neither acknowledges unlimited capitalist free market economics nor the strictly limited freedom that socialism imposes on business (Kuran, 1995: 159). But how successful is this path in reaching its goals? Kuran, in his critical essay on Islamic economics, enumerates three reasons why Islamic ethics of trade seems to be impotent. These are: firstly the ambiguity of the moral principles in practice, secondly the lack of a clear Islamic policy with regard to the terms and conditions of contemporary business, and lastly the inability of the traditional Islamic fathers to propose an economic theory (p. 165). Kuran presents some controversial areas within Islamic economics such as “loan repayments under inflation,” “pricing,” and the boundaries of private ownership (p. 165). He highlights the lack of a proper structure in Islamic economic theory and also the absence of a discernible and “operational” analytical method. The comparison between Islamic economics and capitalist and/or socialists alternatives made by adherents of Islamic ­economics clarifies this systematic deficiency. Obviously it is not logically

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admissible to compare “actual practices” of capitalism and socialism as two unfavorable sets of ideas with the “ideal operation” of desirable Islamic theory (p. 170). The Role of Government in the Economy One of the distinctive discrepancies between Islamic economics and the economy of the free market is the issue of government and the limits of its intervention in business decision-making. The new industrial mode of production confronts Muslims not only with the issue of capital and money but also with a foreign cultural setting. As it was said previously, Tripp (2006: 32–33) has showed how threatening the spread of capitalism has been for Islamic tradition and values. From the Muslim’s point of view it is obvious that authority is an essential factor which safeguards the traditional order of Islamic society in the face of foreign peril. As a result, one of the key topics for Al-Afghani, Al-Kawakibi, Al-Azm, Haddad, Al-Mansuri and others who write about the moral economy and who defend maslaha al-ʿām (the real public good) of community against capitalist trends, was the virtuous role of the state in a market system (p. 37). In their opinion the state has a duty to “protect the guarded sphere.” Its task is to re-form property in order to eradicate the possibility of its corrupting influences on social interconnection, to prevent the trend towards materialism to rectify injustice in society, to achieve the goal of maslaha al-ʿām, and finally, to provide suitable conditions for the catharsis of the soul (islah al-nafs) (p. 50). Capitalism threatens social solidarity and social autonomy and provokes the divergence and fluidity of identity in an Islamic society (p. 97). Therefore, from the standpoint of many Islamic scholars especially in 1940s and early 1950s, it is the government’s responsibility to protect Islamic society from the “depredation of capitalism” and to re-establish its religious basis (p. 77). By the 1970s and later some Muslim scholars like Ayatollah Khomeini (1979) in Iran, Muhammad al-Awwa (1983) in Syria and Hasan al-Turabi (1995, 2003) in Sudan asserted that Islamic government under the guidance of Sharia rules is a “command system” and that it must be obeyed (pp. 81–82). Chapra (2004) has criticized the “Utopian character” of the Islamic ideal businessman which involves a change of human nature in order to conduct a business justly and religiously, because moral exhortation, particularly in public sphere, is no guarantee for such characters. This explains the high significance given to government’s function in an Islamic economy. The state in Islamic countries must enact financial laws in which ethical values are embodied and it must superintend the operational process of the law (p. 171). Chapra referred (p. 170) to ‘competition’ in economic activities in Mawdudi’s opinion. According to Mawdudi only “fair” and “humane” competition which is based

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on friendship, mutual understanding between people, and a contribution towards a shared aim is in the public interest. This needs to be provided by government by the application of ethic principles into business. Mawdudi’s opinion reveals that some historical and socio-political factors were hindering the Islamic community from a just Qur’anic rule. In fact the various interpretations of Qur’an and personal inferences were another source of religious governance. For example despite the fact that Qur’an confirms private ownership and business, the experience of early Islamic society demonstrates that trade in the religious community was not free. Religious authorities in association with politicians were regulating the market. Muhtasib as a representative of religious and political institutions controlled prices, weights, and measures (Baeck, 1991: 102). The socio-political, historical, and economical evolution of Islamic society has expanded the responsibility of government in the economic sphere. The duties of an Islamic state, according to the religious body of knowledge, as Abdul Hannan (2002) has recapitulated are: a) Government in an Islamic community must ensure that individuals obey the rules, prerequisites, and guidance of Islam. If the educative role of the state is not sufficient it is permitted to use coercion to apply the religious code b) Government should check and regulate the market regularly in order to ensure that it functions appropriately c) Direct intervention in the assignment of wealth and the distribution of resources as well as improvement of this process through indirect control and leadership form part of the state’s responsibilities. D) Government is in charge of developing effective order in the procedure of production and the accumulation of wealth to expedite economic growth. These tasks give a considerable role to government which extends to all individual and societal aspects of financial activities and leave little space for individual autonomy and freedom of will. Additional problems related to this idea include the openness to a variety of interpretations of such terms as proper functioning, and agreement with the application of coercion. Abdul-Rauf’s (1979b) view on the limits of government interference in market operations is evidence that Islam is the subject of heterogeneous interpretations. For him the role of the Islamic state depends on the pragmatic judgment of the executive body. The intellectual foundation and doctrinal outlook of economics among Muslims is not solid and it enjoys flexibility within the Islamic framework. This pliability is actually rooted in the recognition of both the freedom of individuals and the interventionism of government in economic sphere (p. 14). In a cluster analysis and with regard to the state interference in their market activities, Pryor (2007) has classified the economic systems of 62 developing

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countries around the world. After examination and comparison of several factors, he found that most of the countries with predominantly Islamic religion lie in these categories: “traditional government,” “market encouraging government,” and “high direct government role” (p. 1822). He has also highlighted that Islam has no significant effect on the shaping of the economic system in these countries and apparently non-religious socio-economic and political conditions make up the market order of Islamic communities. What is more, Muslims do not have any particular economic system in general, and only few financial institutions are Islamic (p. 1815). The affinity of many missions or concepts of Islamic and socialist ­economics has persuaded some Muslims scholars to generate a new kind of socialism. Certainly the dominant role of an authoritative government in the economic sphere was a favorable part of Islamic socialism. A “pioneer” of the Islamic socialist trend, as Hanna (1967) said, is Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1838–1897). Contrary to many clerics, theologians, and Islamic economists, Afghani claimed that not only the association of Islam and socialism is admissible, but also that it is inevitable because Islam inspires and teaches “al-Ishtirakiyyah” (socialism). This was a controversial idea in the Islamic world (p. 24). Since religion in Marxist ideology is “the opium of the people” (Marx and Engels, 1964: 42), some of ʿulamāʾ excommunicate Islamic socialists. What Islam has in common with socialism, as As-Siba’i (1960) has declared, is an insistence on social justice, an emphasis on the extended role of the state in social and economic matters, conflict with capitalism, the rejection of exploitation, equality in the distribution of wealth in society, and control of the production process. Based on this common ideological terminology, he has contended (p. 281) that Islamic socialism was to be found in the early Islamic era and has persisted, with some decline, thereafter. But some great but ultra-extreme Ayatollahs grant an extraordinary authority to Islamic government. According to them, the dominant powers of a righteous Muslim governor can be expanded to such an extent that permits him even to confiscate the dress of individuals (Khosroshahi, 2001: 305). This idea, as Sahabi (2010: 277–278) says, applies to Ayatollah Khomeini. It is nothing short of the complete abolition of private ownership. Private Ownership Private ownership and its limitations is a subject of controversial debate between Islamic market adherents and free economy advocates. While the latter affirm that state interference disrupts the natural order of free business, the Islamic socialists’ argument is based on two antagonistic premises: first, all

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kinds of properties on the earth pertain to God. Second, all of people around the world and throughout history are servants of God. Therefore, since man is God’s vice-regent on earth, the whole wealth must belong to all his servants and the registration of property does not refute the statute. Tripp (2006: 87) cited from Shaikh Shaltut that “it [property] is guarded by all for the benefit of all” and remarks that accordingly public good is patently preferable to private interests. Without doubt, Islamic government determines this form of preference. This outlook to private ownership clearly demonstrates the wide gulf that exists between the communal ideology of Islamic thought and the individualistic philosophy of liberal economics. Indeed, Islamic socialists are not the only group that insists on public ownership. Many economists, economic sociologists, and theologians support the idea that Islamic principles restrict the area of private ownership. To compare capitalism with Islamic economics, El-Ashker (1987: 63–66) has employed factors that Elliott (1973: 24–25) has identified as the characteristics of an economic system. The comparison has eight economic criteria namely the level of economic development, the resource base, ownership, the locus of economic power, the motivational system, the organization of economic power, the social process for economic co-ordination, and the distribution of wealth. Although he has compared capitalism, socialism, and Islamic economics, socialism, in this case, has been excluded. Table 1.1 illustrates the symmetries and asymmetries of the two compared systems. As can be clearly seen in the table, the restricted freedom of individual choice and state surveillance are two distinctive traits of Islamic economics, which along with spiritual orientation distinguish it from a liberal enterprise. El-Ashker (ibid: 61) has cited from Al-Sadr (1968) and Kahf (1978) some Islamic legislative instruments which on the one hand support the state’s role to enhance the employment of resources but on the other hand demonstrate the insecurity of private ownership and the overarching role of government in a religious economic system. Some of these Islamic laws are as follow: (1) The government has the right to take away land from the private owner, without compensation, if he does not till it and abstains from utilising it. The land will be disposed of by the government to the best of its judgement (What is said about land could also be applied to other economic resources). (2) No privately owned natural resources are to be left unused. Non-use of them leads to the invalidation of the private claim on them. (3) All kinds of non-productive intermediary activities are prohibited, such as leasing a piece of land at a certain rate and letting it at a higher rate. (4) Economic non-productive activities such as gambling

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Table 1.1

Comparison of Islamic and capitalist economic systems

Economic factor

Capitalism

Level of economic development

Developing Developed/developing + advanced/advancing technology Capital and capitalist methods Labouristic + some reliance on capital & capitalist methods Private Private and public2 Individual units + small role Individual units + state for the state surveillance3 Market-oriented + emphasis Market-oriented + moral & on profit motive spiritual orientation Decentralization of economic Decentralization of decisions & wide freedom of economic decisions & restricted freedom of individual choice individual choice Competitive price/market Competitive price/market system system + state surveillance

Resource base

Ownership Locus of economic power Motivational system Organization of economic power

Social process for economic co-ordination Distribution of wealth

Market-determined contributions to production

Islamic economy

Equitable distribution + recognition of differences

are prohibited. (5) Hoarding of money or liquid assets is discouraged by imposition of Zakat. (6) The state has a leading role to play in relation to planning and public enterprise. The government is permitted to obtain 2 Private ownership in Islam “is not absolute.” It “introduces two main principles…First, the ownership is not to be abused, it should be used for the welfare of the society causing ‘no harm nor injury’…Second, the right to private ownership is a limited right, limited to the life of the owner. The owner does not have discretion, beyond one-third of his wealth, as to how his wealth is distributed after his death. The distribution of the heritage is carried out according to the Islamic law of inheritance…” (El-Ashker, 1987: 59). 3 “The role of the state in economic activities emanates from its political role, which is organised in the ‘Shari’a’. The authority of the state is derived from the concept of ‘vice-regency’ of God on earth, while its responsibility is to safeguard the community religiously, politically and economically. The state may adopt all available resources to implement its policies within the framework of Islamic law.” (El-Ashker, 1987: 60).

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resources and redistribute them and it can enter into the field of economic activities as a planner and a supervisor. In other words the restraint imposed on private ownership and the widespread powers of government in commerce are two sides of the same coin. Metwally (1997: 941–943) has asserted that the economic basis of Islamic teachings is contrary to the principles of a free economy. From a Muslim’s point of view, all kinds of resources in the world belong to God. He grants them to mankind and man must give them in turn to the following generations. This belief is more akin to trusteeship than ownership and opposes the “self-interest principle” as the foundation of free enterprise. The recognition of private ownership in Islam is contingent upon certain conditions. Some restrictions of private ownership in Islam relate to the priority of Islamic society’s interest, to the prohibition of earning money through the amassing of goods, any kind of speculative techniques or activities, the receipt of interest on loan etc… . For example the practice of discouraging the squandering of resources for personal desires and the distributional nature of Islamic inheritance laws are not compatible with the role of property in a capitalist system. In addition, the private monopolistic and oligopolistic rule of the free market economy is completely at odds with the regulation of utilities in Islamic economics which is based on public ownership. These features characterize the Islamic economy as an “interest-free economy.” Because of this, Voigt (2005: 66/79) argues that not only do Islamic values not contribute to the foundation of a free society and a free market, but that the application of Islamic values in a commercial system is the Achilles’ heel of the economic system in Islamic countries and it is the main reason why most countries around the Muslim world are still at a developing stage. The free market demands a personal belief in the utilization of all apparently unproductive activities as well as the affirmation of “private – property rights,” whereas Islamic law reduces economic efficiency by restricting private ownership and through the prohibition of ribā (ibid, pp. 70–71). Naturally Islamic law and tradition affect the attitudes of Muslims. Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2003) in their empirical investigation of the relationship between religiosity and attitudes toward the economy found that religion generally has a positive impact on the contributing views of a free economy. Among the world religions Christianity is more attached to the idea of a free market economy, while “religious Muslims are the most anti-market” (pp. 228– 264). They also found that Muslims are significantly more hostile to competition and private ownership (p. 264), which are two substantial components of a free market economy. Although economic growth cannot necessarily be

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equated with capitalism, in fact many developed countries have a free market system. In other words, though free business is not the defining condition for growth, it does represent one necessary requirement. Mossaad (2005) has examined whether Islam is an obstacle to economic growth using certain factors which are not “amenable to egalitarianism” namely “gender inequality,” “human capital investment through education and training,” and “the level of private and public investment in relation to gdp.” Analyzing World Values Survey data from 73 Islamic and non-Islamic countries, she tested the indirect effect of Islam on growth and found that while religiosity in non-Muslim countries hardly affects growth, it is important and conducive in Islamic countries. Islamic religious passion negatively affects the rate of economic investment in these societies. Also the increasing Islamic motivation in these countries has a negative effect on growth (pp. 18–19). Compatibility of Islam with Principles of Free Market Economics In contrast to the view that Islam is incompatible with a free market economy, some scholars have argued that there is not only no conflict between them but that Islam actually encourages free commerce. Indeed the basic tenets of “Islamic capitalism” are based as far as possible on the Qur’an and Prophetic Sunna (see for example: Çizakça, 2011). The Qur’an generally states that, “Allah created for you all that is in earth” (2/29) and also says that, “trading is lawful” (2/275). In other verses there are more specific statements which can be cited by those who advocate a compatibility between Islam and free market economics. For example Sura Al-Qasas presents a moderate perspective in which both this world and the after-world are considered: “seek the abode of the Hereafter in wealth and other things that Allah has given you, but do not forget your portion in this world” (28/77). The second part of this verse, which seems to be very liberal, emphasizes satisfaction and enjoyment in life and implicitly encourages economic activities. Furthermore, the Qur’an affirms that promoting well-being and using ornaments and luxuries are not forbidden: “who has made unlawful beauty, adornment, and the pure foods which Allah created for his servants?” (7/32). In addition, some of these verses can be seen as confirmation of private ownership and the right of owners to assess price: “O believers! Do not engorge the wealth and property of each other unjustly; it must be according to a mutual consent” (4/29). Moreover, one can argue that the following verse has accepted the inequality of income: “He raised some of you in rank above others” (6/165). Islam, Hefner insists (2006), is scripturally and historically one of the most “market-friendly” religions of the world (p.16). This reduces the tensions between the religion and the modern business world. Notwithstanding, the

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“culture – wars” between Muslims and the West, which center on the delimitation of “private choice and public ethics” in the area of consumption pattern and lifestyle are on-going (p. 22). Similarly, some academics believe that the economic problems of Muslim countries relate to the their inability to develop the economy and not to Islamic teachings (Becker, 1924: 65). Religious instructions can indeed be seen as relatively amenable to the idea of liberal trade. Thus the reason why Muslim countries do not have a perfect system of capitalism lies not in the Koranic teachings but rather in “post Koranic Muslim ideology,” according to Rodinson (1974, [1966]). Islamic Sunna (sayings, deeds, and sanctions of Muhammad, the Prophet of Islam) which forms a significant part of Islamic ideology, was compiled during an extended process of social evolution. It contains conflicting opinions which have led to a long tradition of interpretation and consequently have shaped many different schools in the history of Islamic thought. Based on this pluralism various governments have more or less supported different interpretations in accordance with their interests. The rise of fatalism in Islamic ideology, for example, as antagonistic of economic rationality must be seen in this context (pp. 99–102). Rodinson does not see any conflict between Islam and capitalism. During the last century the religious doctrine of economics in the Islamic world was not de facto an obstacle to economic policies which promote capitalism. It should be noted here that, in spite of Rodinson’s opinion, Sunna is a prominent component of Islamic Sharia and has social and religious origins and roots common to the Qur’an. Qur’an and Sunna have approximately equal significance in Islamic teachings and therefore perform a similar role in the construct of Islamic ideology. One of those who advocate the compatibility of Islamic economic axioms with a free market economy is Wilson (2006). He tries to demonstrate that the teachings of Islam have no intrinsic disagreement with capitalism (p. 109), but he does not render enough evidence to substantiate this claim. At the beginning of the essay (p. 110) he cites from Maxime Rodinson’s Islam and Capitalism that Islam’s set of economic values and capitalism are inconsonant with each other but a few pages latter (p. 116) he quotes from the same source to show that Islam is not an impediment to the growth of capitalism in Islamic countries! He postulates a number of moral theorems central to Islamic economics: believers have a duty to execute what God has willed; practical economic decisions should be made with consideration to principles of faith; justice as a fundamental base of God’s will must be respected; property and riches should be distributed fairly and ethically; money, possessions, and physical comforts can deprave the celestial soul of man; the poor have a right to wealth; and finally

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that the Islamic law of inheritance shares wealth (pp. 113–116). All this, however, does not constitute an “Islamic mode of capitalism.” Based on the specific case study of Malaysia, Brunei, and the mena region, Karim (2010: 122) considers Islamic economic institutions which are “state directed or privately administered by banking and credit agencies” as a system in which more humanistic principles of investment and redistribution of profits is reflected. However, this does not mean that there is a fundamental conflict between Islam and modern capitalism. He writes that Islamic economics support economic globalization and the free market.

Islam and Civil Society

Describing the “enemies of civil society,” Hall (1995: 14) refers to the Islamic vision of civilization as a cultural enemy of Western civilization. He is not alone in this view. Peter Berger (2006: 15) suspects that religion in general has an adverse effect on civility, because of its role in the creation and/or legitimization of conflict between and within societies. Some other scholars, on the other hand, argue that Islam and Islamist movements, far from involving incongruity with civil society, actually contribute to its creation. In key Islamic countries it is Islamists who challenge the hegemony of totalitarian governments, through a broad religious network and hard-to-control, “private, unlicensed mosques” (Norton, 1996: 9). Be that as it may, civil society and its relationship with Islam is a highly controversial topic. The emergence of the idea of civil society in the Arab World at the beginning of the 1980s was a consequence of some internal as well as global changes. The resurgence of Islamic Movements, the demise of modern national-state projects in Islamic countries, in addition to the experience of democratization in many so-called Third World countries have opened a debate on civil society in the political and academic arena (Hamzawy, 2003). Three viewpoints will be considered in the following study: the incompatibility of Islam with civil society, the compatibility of Islam with civil society, and civil society in Islamic countries. Incompatibility of Islam with Civil Society Not only do many scholars consider that Islam lacks incentives for Muslims to construct civil society, but also that it represents a serious impediment to associative and modern civic life. They employ cultural, philosophical, sociological, economic, and religious arguments to substantiate their claim. From an orientalist point of view the crisis of democracy, the lack of a ­capitalist basis in the economy, and cultural problems in Islamic countries

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originate from the absence of civil society. According to Turner (1984: 26) orientalism asserts that “Islamic society lacked independent cities, an autonomous bourgeois class, rational bureaucracy, legal reliability, personal property and cluster of rights which embody bourgeois culture.” In his analysis of the relationship between religion and global civil society, Peter Berger (2006) points out that scholars disagree about the degree to which Islamic ethics conform with the spirit of democratic values. He specifies that “Islam, even in its moderate forms, has certain characteristics that are unfavorable to the development of civil society” (p. 18). These characteristics include particularly a) the all-embracing nature of Islamic law which covers social and political spheres and is therefore conducive to close collaboration between religion and state, to economic underdevelopment, and more importantly still, to the curtailment of autonomous organizations and institutions of civil society; b) the subordinate status of women in Islamic tradition that equally results in economic backwardness as well as the suppression of civil society; and finally c) the Islamic concept of jihad and its violent interpretation which is severely destructive to civility. One of the functions of discourse in civil society, as Ernest Gellner (1994) expresses, is to reveal the differences between various social orders. In a society which benefits from the fruits of civil society, economic and social life is separated from politics. Politics is instrumental as a check on “extremes of individual interests.” At the same time organizations which are based on economic principles, control the state and hinder “ideological monopoly.” In Islamic societies, which are clientelistic and supranational in orientation and tend to construct Islamic Umma and consequently define their identity according to the limits of shared faith regardless of geographical territory, Islamic law plays a more significant role than the state. Therefore there is no need for civil society to check the state. The cement that binds these kinds of societies is faith and customer loyalty. There is no compromise between liberal civil society and the absolute and transcendent doctrine of ideological Umma. The sacralization of faith in Islamic Umma leaves no room for pluralism. Islam exemplifies a social order which seems to lack much capacity to provide political countervailing institutions or associations, which is atomized without much individualism, and operates effectively without intellectual pluralism. p. 29

Gellner suggested that Islam enjoins ideological monopoly which prevents the development of civil society. Elsewhere he has viewed the subject from the

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perspective of historical context and accentuated that “the direct transition from communal priests to universalistic unitarian enthusiasts, as it occurred in Islam,…does not favour the mergence of civil society” and liberty (Gellner, 1991: 510). Martin Kramer (2001) in his critical review on American Middle Eastern studies specially analysing the last two decades of the last century concludes that there is an immense gap between expert accounts and the reality of Middle Eastern social groups. These studies follow, he claims, some disciplinary fashions. Contrary to the ideas propounded by these scholars, evidence shows that there is no influential civil society that is about to overthrow the despotic states of the region and Islamists do not battle for the establishment of democratic government. These reports, which attempt to apply a civil society paradigm to the Middle East, are in fact “political activism, not political science” (p. 70). He declares that, with the exception of Israel, many countries in the Middle East lack the basis for civil society because of strong authoritarian tendencies, in spite of their varied culture, race, and socio-economic conditions. Issawi (1981) has described the necessary conditions for the flourishing of democracy in the Middle East. He has referred to the special efforts of the middle class to take part in political life as the “historical origin” of anti-authoritarianism in most of the old as well as modern democratic states. On the other hand, the most unfortunate feature of Middle Eastern history is the incapability of people to develop a culture of co-operation style, especially with regard to local government. For every requirement, such as roads, schools, playgrounds, they refer immediately to the central state (p. 255). The historical cause of this inability and delay of social reaction to the development of the environment has been the downfall of Islamic civilization. This has led to the elimination of both “individual initiative and co-operation.” Indeed, authoritarian governments do not favor creativity and social collaboration. With reference to the relationship between democracy and Arab political tradition, which is construed by Kedourie (1994) as synonymous with Islamic political teaching, he has commented that Islamic principles are irreconcilable with democracy. Modern democratic states take their legitimacy from active and contemporary political organizations which lean heavily on the voluntary sector in the different domains of civil society, while “the notion of popular sovereignty as the foundation of governmental legitimacy” and the idea of “society being composed of a multitude of self-activating, autonomous groups and associations…are profoundly alien to the Muslim political tradition” (p. 6). He cites (p. 8) from Karl Wittfogel (1981) that in the Middle East “the state is stronger than society.”

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Regarding the socio-political culture, Mardin’s (1995) essay deals with incongruous Western and Islamic dreams of society. While the history of the West has realized its dream of civil society, the Muslim world has a different wish. In his comparison of Islam and the West, he refers to the role of some philosophical ideas as well as some social elements including the city, the merchant class, and capitalism, which have determined the historical development of Western civil society. On the other hand he illustrates a threefold historical dream of Muslims: the only acceptable political principle originates from Qur’an; the authenticity of the commentators of Qur’an in their interpretations; and the dream of a righteous sultan in the absence of the manifestation of either of the former. “Charismatic authority” and denying the piecemeal evolution of man through history are two distinctive features of the Islamic dream of society. All elements, add to different interaction between social institutions in Western and Islamic society, demonstrate that “civil society…does not translate into Islamic term” (p. 279). The Ottoman Empire was an example of this distracted dream which was not in a position to realize its own “original social system.” For Sariolghalam (1997), Middle Eastern culture is responsible for the lack of proper civil society in this sub-region. Civil society is originally a Western term which relies on a particular socio-economic and political background and its improvement needs appropriate cultural underpinning in all these areas. But the culture and religion of the Islamic Middle East do not accord with it. Rationalism and individualism are two underlying components which are absent from the civic culture of the Middle East. One can trace this to: a) a form of Middle Eastern arrogance which is the product of autocracy and “unidimensional religious teaching”; b) citizens’ self-accepted status as “conformist” of government; and c) the unawareness of the requirements of associative life and interaction with others which is the result of ideology, politicization, and the low level of interpersonal trust. From the viewpoint of some researchers, civil society is threatened by both the state and religion. This situation is particularly acute when religion and the state are both overbearing. Contemporary Iran is a clear example of theocracy which restricts individual freedom as well as the autonomy of civil associations (Béteille, 2003: 203). The case of Iran is interesting from other aspects too. Contrary to some Islamists from countries such as Egypt and Turkey that support the consolidation of an intermediary sphere between the state and its citizens, some Iranian Islamists oppose civil society and have coined the term “guided society” instead. Schirazi (2003: 56) cites from Mohebiyan (1997) that Lockean civil society aims to provide more public good through the rule of the majority which is philosophically relative, while an Islamic “guided society” is ruled by the absolute law of God.

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From a global viewpoint Lechner (2006), in his comparative study of what he calls the “global religious left” with the “Islamists global religious right,” concludes that whereas the former normatively justifies the formation of civil society and contributes to its activities in order to reform the world order, the latter condemns all non-Islamic aims and seeks “to eliminate civil society” (p. 128), to uproot the world order and to replace it with the Islamic order which is interpreted in the form of Umma. Compatibility of Islam with Civil Society José Casanova (2001) bases his positive view about the affinity of Islam to civil society on a comparison between Catholicism and Islam. While he confesses that this is not a systematic comparison he finds illuminating similarities between “Catholic aggiornamento” and Islamic reformation. This relatively comparable process in the history of Catholicism and in contemporary Islam has the aim of modifying and reforming what is called the solid existence of these religions in their confrontation with some new concepts such as ­modernization, secularization, capitalism, socialism, and women’s rights. The history of democracy shows that although Catholicism is not always propitious to civil society and democracy, it has had a crucial function in the “third wave of democratization,” which Huntington and Casanova have termed a “catholic wave” (p. 1041). While Catholicism is an intrinsic element of Western history, the accusation of Islam from a Western essentialist perspective as an antimodern religion or as incapable to develop civil society is an unjustifiable simplification of the problem. Referring to Tocqueville’s argument in which he relates the equality of citizens in a democratic state to the equivalence of slaves before God, Casanova (p. 1058) points out that Islam emphasizes the equality of believers before God more than other religions. Besides, the other characteristics of Islamic teachings like the decentralization of religious authority – especially in Sunni Islam – the pluralistic system of the interpretation of religious resources, and their egalitarianism assist Muslims to build a democratic civil society. From Esposito’s (2000) point of view, Muslim civil society currently exists. He insists that religion in Islamic countries plays a prominent part in civil society and in its re-expression in diverse forms. He enumerates several types of non-governmental organizations and activities in the history of Muslim societies such as endowments (waqf) and guilds. These groups and associations have been neglected, because of the emergence of advanced forms of governance and its authoritarian function in these countries and because civil society has been seen as an alien concept. In addition to the historical existence of civil institutions, Esposito affirms that the Islamic revivalist movement in the

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contemporary Muslim world tries to reform the corruption or the disability of Islamic governments through independent organizations which act in social, political, and economic spheres. The Islamic resurgence has a number of peculiarities that support the expansion of civil society: many members of this movement are highly-educated young people; a lot of them belong to middle and lower middle social classes; and finally, they live in cities. They participate extensively in activities which are offered by voluntary organizations such as religious assembly, health programs, electoral meetings, the protection of women’s and human rights, and the support of charity. Contrary to some theorists who postulate that civil society can grow only on the basis of an individualistic and democratic tradition, which is the fruit of Western culture, Kamali (2001) asserts that civil society is not a “Western monopoly” and its emergence is not conditional on the translation of Occidental legacy. Islamic communities have a long history of civil society. It began simultaneously with the early construction of religio-political system. He identified two kinds of civil society in contemporary Islamic countries: the “quasi-traditional” and the “quasi-modern.” The ʿulamāʾ – learned Muslim scholars – and the bazaris are two major traditional civic institutions who conventionally play a significant role in the social and political sphere. Religious and financial interactions between these organizations have created an extensive network which historically has restricted the dominance of state besides ensuring the performance of social services. Subsequently, as a consequence of the modernization process, many intellectuals from the urban middle classes in Islamic countries have set up voluntary organizations which have facilitated political participation. Hence the late nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century witnessed the invention of a quasi-modern civil society. Kamali considers the triumph of the Constitutional Revolution (1905–1909) and the Islamic Revolution (1979) in Iran as an outcome of cooperation between traditional and modern civil society. Hefner (2000) likewise emphasizes that non-governmental organizations, particularly religious associations of Muslim ʿulamāʾ and others who had focused on the application of Islamic law were very active in the Umayyad and Abbasid caliphates during the first centuries of Islamic history. Referring to elements indispensable to the idea of democracy, he has portrayed medieval Islamic society, in which the institutional power of religion and politics was inevitably segregated, as “religiously plural.” In defence of contemporary “civil Islam,” Hefner has illustrated how some basic pluralistic and democratic values such as the division of religion and state, tolerance toward other faiths, and women’s rights are nowadays promulgated by Indonesian Islamic groups.

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The extent to which Islamic codes conform with civic institutions is cited by Schirazi (2003: 53), among others, from Kadivar (1997) who believes that civil society is a phenomenon which Islam keeps quiet about (mantaqat ­al-feraq). That is to say Islamic Sharia is not an impediment to associative life. He has cited (p. 54) from Sahabi (1996) that “(s)erving the people, which belongs to the teaching of all religions, favours the development of the civil society.” Hajjariyan (1997), as Schirazi says, remarks that this connection between ­religion and civil society in an Islamic community serves to strengthen associative life. Civil society can fulfill “Islamic requirements” and aids Muslims to carry out their religious obligation in protest against the “inadequacies of the state” (p. 54). The significant role of the state in dealing with the relationship between religion and civil society in Islamic countries is underlined by Turam (2004). He stresses that the mutual co-operation of state and civil society groups, especially secular states and Islamic nationalists, has the potential to drive the government towards a more democratic political system. The role of Islamists in the rise and fall of civil society is a controversial debate. Moussalli (1995) classified two kinds of Islamic fundamentalism: radical and moderate. The foundation of an Islamic government which controls the application of Islamic instructions, even with resort to force, is one of the principles of radical Islamists. Obviously there is not any room for civil society in a regime that upholds the absolute power of authorities over individuals. But “moderate fundamentalists” recognize the autonomy of individuals, accept the representative character of the state, and admit pluralism, human rights, freedom, and autonomous groups. Lubeck and Britts (2001) have investigated the development of civil society in Muslim majority cities from a historical standpoint and they related it, among other things, to the “unexpected shift from secular national to Islamic discourses” (p. 4). By Islamic discourse they mean the political interpretation of Islam that intends to realize the wishes of a Muslim society in accordance with early Islamic community which was ruled by the instruction of Sharia. This social trend is essentially urban and is widespread across genders and social classes, especially among young graduates of universities. The foundation of the Muslim Brotherhood in 1928 by Hasan al-Banna in Egypt was the beginning of the implementation phase of this discursive shift which is based on civil society and enables the mobilization of grassroots citizens. Others (Eickelman, 2000) point to a new process of awareness which is growing throughout the Muslim majority world. This awareness is promoted by the combination of modern communication channels and new participants who are keen to contribute meaningfully to the debates about the relationship

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between religion, politics, and society. This generates a particular pattern of civility. For Kukathas (2003) the unique attribute of civil society is pluralistic freedom and toleration which facilitates peaceful coexistence for the mass of individual citizens, as well as for various traditions and institutions regardless of differences and conflicts. Islam, he argues, opposes neither this modern form of social life, nor the specific concepts of civil society, democracy, and modernity. Examples from Islamic tradition as well as Islamic doctrine about “opposition and disagreement, consensus and consultation, and the freedom of thought and expression” (p. 13) demonstrate the potential for an untroubled symbiosis of Islam with other religions and civilizations. The history of thought provides some justification for this idea. Islamic rationalism, inspired by Greek philosophy and the traditional civility of Islamic civilization, was “one of the major sources of inspiration for the European Renaissance” (p. 29). It suggests that Islamic rationalism, as Tibi (1997) perceives, is not unfamiliar with the idea of democracy, rooted as it is in Greek philosophy. The tradition of Islamic thought can support democratic civil ­society with the aid of modern interpretative insights. A Brief Look at Civil Society in Islamic Countries Studies of civil society in the Middle East present significant differences between the various countries of this region. The progress of Turkish civil society can be traced back historically to state measures introduced during the Ottoman Empire and its initial preparation for recognition of basic civil rights in the form of “Tanzimat edict” in the mid-19th century. Nevertheless, the first and foremost obstacle of civil society is state bureaucracy which restricts individual freedom. Some attempts to attain civil rights are being made in Turkey today. The acceptance of many international agreements which defend human rights, the enforcement of the principles of free market economics, which leads to more participation of individuals in public life, the foundation of many ngos around the country, and the emergence of modern social movements, among others Islamists and feminists, are not only shaping a participatory society but also are modifying the role of the state in Turkey (Toprak, 1996). This development introduces civil society as a new political potential which will trigger the establishment of a more decentralized, pluralistic, and institutionalized democracy in Turkey (Toros, 2007). However, this will only be realized if the Turkish government recognizes the autonomous existence of civil society and guarantees its independent and free presence in the public and political sphere (Aknur, 2012). As Kazemi (1996) illustrates, the deeply-rooted tradition of associative life and civil society represents a notable element of Iranian social history.

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Civil  society in Iran has experienced different periods of contraction and expansion. However it seems that religious groups have always had more freedom relative to others. The tolerance of diversity as an integral element of civility has been traditionally accepted by Iran but since the Islamic revolution of 1979 many religious minorities as well as social, political, and gender groups have been persecuted in spite of their explicitly-stated rights in the Constitution. In other words, the definition of citizenship, Kazemi argues, is severely restricted in the “theocratic conception of social order.” The network of social organizations in Iran follows a “form of patrimonialism.” These organizations can be categorized under state organizations and semi-state organizations. The latter includes Bonyads (foundations) whose functions vary from economic and profitable to social and ideological activities, as well as guilds and other professional unions whose scope for action is delimited by government. In spite of state hegemony in the public sphere and in civil society the proliferation of new voices challenges this pattern. According to Jahanbegloo (2013), the experience of civil activities in Iran during the past two decades clearly demonstrates that it has the capacity to generate values as well as civic solidarities which assist the democratic movement. Al-Sayyid (1995) in Civil Society in Egypt claims that of the three essential conditions for the establishment of civil society, namely the existence of various non-governmental organizations, pluralistic culture, and the constitution of countervailing powers to the state Egypt enjoys only the first. During the social differentiation process in the early 19th century Egypt prepared the ground for the growth of diverse voluntary groups and associations among different social classes. The 1950s and 1960s witnessed a peak in the formation of professional organizations which the state hoped would control the middle classes and the workers. Egyptian ngos act in a whole spectrum of professional, political, social, cultural and economic fields. Statistically speaking, there were only 12,832 private organizations in 1990 that were under the surveillance of the Ministry of Social Affairs. Obviously, besides ngos, an established civil society requires pluralism and religious toleration. But non-democratic legislation and the other restrictive measures of the state as well as Islamists militants who strive to apply Sharia in society threaten plural civil society. Besides this, the violent clashes following the revolution of 2011 expose other factors relating to civil society in Egypt which need to be discussed. The lack of a strong democratic political culture in Egyptian society has prevented social forces from making a compromise to achieve a social contract (Melcangi, 2012). For many, as Montagu (2010) comments, the existence of civil society in Saudi Arabia is under the shadow of doubt. But “if civil society,” as Kazziha (1997) (cited in Montagu, 2010: 69) says, “is viewed in terms of the existence of formal and informal

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initiatives in society which have a direct bearing on the political level” then one can observe a wide network of traditional civil institutions in Saudi Arabia. What characterizes the voluntary sector is its “informal structure.” This feature aids the different factions of the heterogeneous imperial family to use voluntary associations as an instrument for gathering information. This is the reason why some experts suggest that civil society is “complementary” to the Saudi Arabian state. Saudi civil society is “a key player in social reform.” The advancement of civic culture, the proliferation of charity projects, and the emphasis on “liberal reform” highlight the mainstream character of Saudi collective action. In addition to that, religious and political minorities as well as women and professionals are not completely inactive despite state pressure. In sum, civil society in Saudi Arabia has been described as a top-down process which is managed and controlled from above and has a very narrow capability to effect policies (Kanie, 2012). Since sovereignty was achieved in 1919, modern Iraqi civil organizations and the traditional networks of cooperation have been coexisting successfully side by side. In its later social and political changes Iraq has experienced the “bloody conflicts” of different groups, parties, and ideologies which prepared the ground for the emergence of the Ba’ath regime that amalgamated civil society with government. The “authoritarian étatisation of civil society” features Ba’athists in this regard (Zubaida, 2006). The Ba’athist experience is not foreign to Syria. While the Syrian monarchy had acknowledged a partly independent civil society, Hinnebusch (1995) saw the “imbalance of state and class” as the historical obstacle to the growth of associative life and democratic political culture in Syria. The imperial government did not permit civil society to integrate into the existent political system. The next regime, the populist-totalitarian Ba’ath state obstructed structurally any trends towards political pluralization and liberalization, and destroyed traditional bourgeois civil associations – suq – thereby severely restricting individual autonomy. By the late seventies the state had made some efforts to reconstruct a dependent bourgeois class; the eighties saw a reduction in some of the state’s economic tasks; and by the nineties the private sector was the “second engine” of economic development. By the end of the 20th century, demand for privatization of the economy could be seen as a social pressure that entailed more liberty and more space for civil society organizations in Syria. The Syrian conflict, which began in early 2011 and in which more than 100,000 people have died, according to the UN,4 and millions have fled the 4 Watkins, T. and Alkhshali, H. (2013) Syria mounting anti-polio campaign in wake of suspected outbreak, [Online], cnn, Available from: http://edition.cnn.com/2013/10/25/world/meast/ syria-civil-war/ ,October 25, [Accessed 18/11/2013].

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country or been made homeless, has caused devastation to ordinary civil activities and social relations, but has also given rise to some new civil networks. These initiated networks and structures coordinated the protest movement against Bashar al-Asad, circulated information inside and outside of Syria, and carried out humanitarian activities (Elvira, 2013). Historically speaking, the development of Palestinian civil society can be divided into three periods of time, as Muslih (1995) outlined. In the first era which covers 1917 to 1948 there were a wide range of private organizations whose activities encompassed a spectrum of religious and charitable purposes as well as women’s rights and professional aims. Though civil society in the second period (1948–1967) was also dynamic, the Palestinian population was dispersed amongst the Arab countries, following the foundation of Israel. In this situation Palestinian civil organizations were influenced by the political intentions of Arab states. For the third era (1967–) one can identify the four kinds of civic institutions namely: “political shops, voluntary cooperatives, voluntary mass organizations, and Islamist groups” (p. 249). Whereas the first Intifada in 1988, which facilitated the convergence between the national liberation and the socio-economic agenda, had an affirmative impact on civil society in Palestine, the second Intifada in 2000 and the victory of Hamas in the 2006 elections both resulted in an expansion of the role of Islamic civil organizations, and decelerated the development of local ngos (Mikhelidze and Pirozzi, 2008). Altogether, if “responsible associational engagement,” commitment to the public good, and  socio-political plurality constitute the spirit of civility, it is safe to say that  Palestine enjoys civility and a diverse associative life notwithstanding some divergent indications such as the distrust between some military groups (Muslih, 1995). The weakness of civil society in the Arabic countries of the Persian Gulf area such as Qatar, Bahrain, and Oman is characteristic of oil states. In some cases the wealthy states of the region have undertaken the duties of social organizations in other countries. In fact Arab monarchs do their best to hinder the improvement of civil society. But, notwithstanding their efforts, various “nascent” social groups are developing. They benefit socially, politically, and economically from traditional sources of power and try either to confirm or to reform the state. It seems that the reformist trend increasingly pushes the rulers into more “accountability” and “transparency” (Crystal, 1996). During the Arab democratization movement (Arab Spring) the Emir of Qatar promised that the country would hold its first national legislative elections in 2013. However, without autonomous civil society organizations and independent political parties, a stable democracy is not feasible, as Khatib (2013) points out in his analysis of Qatar’s current situation. The Bertelsmann Stiftung’s annual

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report (2012: 17)5 also indicates a slight relaxation in the stance of Oman’s government on civil society organizations. Among the Arab societies of the Persian Gulf, Kuwait provides a different illustration of civil society in which participatory and competitive political life constitutes the major activities of various groups and institutions. The growth of oppositional political associations is an aftermath of the toleration policy of the state that historically goes back to the independence of Kuwait in 1961. The country enjoys an albeit imperfect parliamentary democracy, an autonomous judicial system, freedom of expression, and miscellaneous non-governmental organizations. Diwaniyyah institution, a “traditional home-based open meeting,” and cooperative societies are two famous civil organizations which have a pivotal role in Kuwaiti socio-political life. The former is characterized by a countervailing power to the state and the latter as a “political battleground.” A vibrant civil society in Kuwait that emerged in the form of cooperative ­societies established the country’s “backbone” of defence against occupation by Iraq in 1990. It is noteworthy that after the war the voluntary network immediately proliferated (Hicks and al-Najjar, 1995). In spite of this optimistic ­picture of Kuwaiti civil society, Salameh and al-Sharah (2011) argue that nongovernmental organizations particularly the political parties in Kuwait are rather weak. This factor, alongside the marginalization of women both in social and political spheres and the lack of a democratic political culture, are the chief obstacles to democracy in this Islamic country, which also suffers from sectarian divisions between Sunnis and Shiites. The process of social emancipation in Jordan, which derives from the strategic changes of national policy in 1989, has led to the extension of human and civil liberties as well as the proliferation of civil society. Nevertheless, these fruits are threatened by a twofold danger: “managed liberalization” or limitations imposed by the king on the development of civil society as well as the undermining of pluralism by Islamists who bring pressure to bear on the state to compel it to enforce the particular parts of Sharia as law (Brand, 1995). However, the role of Islamic groups in the social sphere is debatable. Based on the results of participant-observer studies in Egypt, Lebanon, Tunisia, and in the Gaza strip, Sivan (1990: 358) argues that the Islamic revival movement aims to change the division between government and society to reach a stable and independent civil society.

5 Bertelsmann Stiftung, bti (2012) Oman Country Report, [Online], Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung, Available from: http://www.bti-project.de/fileadmin/Inhalte/reports/2012/pdf/ BTI%202012%20Oman.pdf [Accessed 04/11/2013].

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A substantial number of civil society organizations in Jordan are subject to state intervention. According to World Alliance for Citizen Participation’s (civicus) 2011 report,6 there is common consensus on the weakness of civic engagement in this country. This is mainly rooted in state despotism and interference, a conservative and rigid social and cultural context, and a lack of financial transparency, which leads to the undermining of social trust. Political parties especially suffer from the lack of rotation in leadership positions, lack of contest in electing administrative boards, and lack of tangible programmes which hinder attracting more members among young people, women and other sectors of society. Dimitrovova (2009) relates Morocco’s thriving civil society to political changes, particularly the close relationship with the eu, and new legal conditions, which were conducive to the removal of obstacles that were in the way of the development of associative life since the 1980s. As a consequence of this, human rights institutions are notably protected. Nevertheless, Moroccan civil society is characterized as “elitist” with little social influence, because of the divergence between the real needs of the masses and the concerns of the leading civic organizations. Its share in political reform is also rather limited. This political ineffectiveness can certainly be traced to the fragmentation of organizations of civil society which is the result of the co-option strategy of the state. And finally, the last feature of the Moroccan civil society is that it “has been hijacked by the security and trade concerns of the EU and the makzen” – the king and his advisers – (p. 14). History and politics have generated a mixed pattern of civil society in Tunisia. As a result of this, one can refer to the paradoxical role of the state before the revolution of 2011. On the one hand it vigorously promoted civil participation for various groups – except for Islamists – but on the other hand it restricted liberties and limited the autonomy of ngos and political parties. As a consequence of this “controlled civisme” the great potential for development of civil society including notable intellectual middle classes, an ethnically and religiously homogeneous population, an expanded network of civil participants, and an independent entrepreneur class, was stalled (Bellin, 1995). During the revolutionary transition, Tunisian civil organizations presented themselves with a new face and played a significant role in mobilising opposition to the authoritarian regime. These social movements created the “spirit of 6 World Alliance for Citizen Participation’s (civicus) (2011) The Contemporary Jordanian Civil Society: Characteristics, Challenges and Tasks, [Online], Civil Society Index, Analytical Country Report: Jordan 2010, Available from: https://civicus.org/resources/reports-and -publications/csi-reports/asia-country-reports/359-jordan [Accessed 18/11/2013].

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solidarity” against dictatorship. This new Tunisian civil society “is characterised by the fast-moving, collaborative way Arab citizens influence institutional changes by creating newly institutionalised frameworks for public participation” (Deane, 2013: 8). However, it should not be forgotten that civil society institutions in Tunisia are encountering numerous problems. Very recent studies7 from 2013 show that, among other factors, organizational and financial problems, and insufficient experience of management of associations affects the performance of Tunisian civil associations. Sudan’s civil society has had a dichotomous experience. From 1985 to 1989 Sudan witnessed a four year period in which associative life emerged in the formation of a broad spectrum of independent religious, socio-political and economic organizations and groups. The concept of citizenship was established and individual freedom was enhanced. But a military coup in 1989 with the support of the National Islamic Front changed the circumstances. The new government has denied the ethnic, linguistic, and religious diversity of the population and tries to impose a unitary identity to different groups. It implements a rigid interpretation of the Islamic penal code, violates w ­ omen’s rights, and suppresses institutions of civil society (Lesch, 1996). According to  Human Rights Watch (2013)8 this situation is still persisting. It reports on some civil institutions that have been closed, and the registration of others that have been cancelled without explanation, and their property confiscated. The history of civil society in Algeria relates to its colonial experience as well as its war of independence, which established national identity and “solidarity.” The activities of some social and political groups such as Islamists, feminists, journalists, and human rights groups in addition to the close contact of Algerian citizens with the co-operative way of life in France, shape an “inchoate but adaptive” civil society in the country (Entelis, 1996). This civil society was not strong enough to lead the country to a real democracy. The limited social protests during the Arab Spring, which were less noteworthy than in Egypt, Tunisia or Libya, are also attributed to the lack of organizational structures within Algerian civil society, especially and surprisingly among the younger generation (Watanabe, 2012). Islamic organizations are an inseparable part of civil society in Indonesia and all scholars agree that Islamic groups have an enormous capacity to develop 7 Foundation for the Future (2013) Study on Civil Society Organizations in Tunisia, [Online], Available from: http://foundationforfuture.org/en/Portals/0/Publications/Etude%20SC%20 english%20Version%20Finale.pdf [Accessed 01/11/2013]. 8 Human Rights Watch (2013) Sudan: End Crackdown on Civil Society, [Online], Available from: http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/01/13/sudan-end-crackdown-civil-society [Accessed 22/10/2013].

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associative life. Azra (2003: 76) cites from Hefner (2000) that “Indonesia has the strongest civic-based Muslim society in the world.” Voluntary association, as Nakamura (2001) (cited in Azra, 2003: 76) has said, is rooted in the colonial period of Indonesian history. The broadly defined scope of the activities of some Islamic groups allows them to operate across the country. The Muhammadiyah – founded in 1912 – and the Nahdlatul Ulama are the most prominent Islamic ngos in Indonesia. While the former has refrained from political activities the latter has been a political party since 1955. Civil society organizations in Indonesia, in addition to their religious and political role, have a humanitarian function too. The activity of civil society in form of individual and collective citizen activity, as well as the participation of civil society associations, is one of the effective elements which define the concept of “disaster risk governance” and results in the totality of risk reduction (Lassa et al. 2013). The weakness of civil society in Malaysia, as Case (2003) has described, derives from the historical backdrop as well as the political system of the c­ ountry. In spite of Malaysia’s independence from Britain in 1957 colonial experience casts a constant shadow over Malay associative life. The late industrialization of the economy, which the government began in the 1970s, prevented the molding of an independent business class. “Ethnic rivalry,” which can be traced back to the colonial period and, without doubt, to the state’s discriminatory policies against Chinese, has led to the fragmentation of the middle class which is the second impediment to the evolution of civil society. The supremacy of a dominant party and Malay political culture that requires “obeisance” of people to government contribute to the causes for the decline of civil society in Malaysia. On the other hand, state patronage of trade communities, resulting from the crisis of the late 1990s, and the emergence of a new pattern of collaboration between various organizations from different ethnic groups from the middle classes show promise of a new boost to civil society in Malaysia. Observation of the current political development, as argued by Subramaniam (2011), indicates that democratization in Malaysia is in progress and that civil society actors, opposition parties, and the modern media, which challenge the structural and institutional obstacles to democracy are the driving force in this process. Totalitarian regimes and an undeveloped economy have had a negative influence on Pakistani civil life. The fusion of “identity-politics,” the low level of trust between the state and ngos on the one hand and amongst grassroots citizens on the other, as well as the controversial role of religion in the public arena represent some of the obstacles faced by associative life in Pakistan. Nevertheless, Malik (2004) reports that the results of surveys confirm that the majority of Pakistanis favor gender equality and equal rights for minorities which reflects, among other things, the deep desire for a “renewal of civil life.”

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They also desire a life in peace and free from terrorism. Some recent findings have illustrated that civil society organizations can provide the motivation and capacity to assist in the elimination of Taliban in various ways. In public urban and rural areas community leaders cultivate peace and social cohesion, while cultural and religious organizations condemn terrorist attacks as ideologically and religiously unlawful, and some organizations provide alternative financial support to deter groups from turning to fanatical charities (Mirahmadi, Farooq and Ziad, 2012). Roy (2004) has identified three conceptual patterns for civil society in Central Asia namely Western civil society, the conventional web of interaction – such as the circles of deliberation (gap), agricultural co-operatives (kolkhoz), neighborhood assemblies (mahalla) –, and “religious civil society.” While the two formers are operating efficiently, he expresses certain reservations about some militant religious organizations in Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan which weaken the performance of religious civil society. The historical background in Tajikistan especially following the civil war of independence (1992–1994), as Akiner (2004) emphasizes, has left a legacy of fragility and incompetence both in the state and society. To be more explicit, the “highly personalized nature of power,” the overwhelming domination of the state on the circulation of information, selfcensorship, the absence of effective political parties, the marginal role of ngos, the isolation of the intelligentsia and professionals are all factors that explain why civil society has not established itself in Tajikistan. However, the weakness of civil society does not mean that people neglect its significant role in society. Faradov’s (2004) survey suggests that nearly a third of respondents in postsoviet Azerbaijan find that the foundation of civil and democratic society is a very important “national task” and a quarter of them believe this should take precedence over other issues. However, other researchers (Böttger and Falkenhain, 2011) found that the concept, role, and objectives of civil society were not intelligible for many Azerbaijanis. Additionally, civil society organizations in Azerbaijan have many other problems. Because they have no connection with political elites, they do not play a significant role in political decision-making. Furthermore, they are isolated from the broader public.

Theory of Political Modernization: Influencing Factors on Political Modernization

The radically changing essence of our contemporary era has encouraged sociologists to endeavor to discover the mystery of these changes. The wide spectrum of diverse theories of modernization, for example, is a sign of inquiry into

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the logic of social and political change. A brief look at the scholarly works in this field demonstrates that socioeconomic advancement, proper political tradition, and cultural transformation are three significant influencing factors on which political modernization depends. Below you will find some explanations about the role and necessity of each of these processes in modernizing societies. Socioeconomic Development To be sure, the most visible symbol of development in a society for the general public is the economy, followed by social welfare. In other words, the concrete criterion for assessing development is socioeconomic conditions. Sociologists and political scientists point to industrialization, modern technology, urbanization, literacy, a higher level of education, among other factors, as important prerequisites of development. Huntington (1968: 33–34) for instance, considered economic development, with some indices such industrialization, per capita gross national product, and the rate of individual welfare, as an immediate condition of modernization. From this perspective economic development is the “conceptual cousin” of modernization (Smelser, 1966: 120). Because of this, many modernization theorists link modernization with economic growth. Berger, Berger, and Kellner (1973: 15) wrote that “modernization must be seen in close relation to economic growth – more specially, to the particular growth processes released by recent technology.” In other words, to use Black’s (1966: 18) explanation, modernism is basically rooted in the growth of knowledge especially in the development of economic knowledge which emerged in the technical revolution. Many economists also consider modernization mostly as a consequence of concrete opportunities which societies create to develop, with the aid of advanced modern technology. Wellisz (1966: 252–253) is one such economist. He writes that the replacement of outdated tools, the building new factories and installation of new machines, and, in short, technological progress, in addition to advanced methods of management, and professional education are essential for modernization. Admittedly, modernizing the means of production and management has profound social consequences. Money is a key source of power in society. The economy is, although not in a Marxist sense, a determinant factor in the trajectory of social change. Economic development reinforces this supremacy to the extent that, as Cartwright (1965: 11) reports most social scientists, especially analyzing the source of power in society, agree that economic resources have influence over other agents. There is no doubt that political power, in its internal and external role, depends on sources of wealth. These sources have two

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types of influence on political power. In a primary form, financial sources exert certain expectations on political agency. This form of influence is typically private and has a non-democratic nature, which is to be found in pre-modern structures such as undeveloped communities, tribes, and clans. On the other hand, in more developed societies and in a long-term process of economic development sources of wealth have the ability to function as a powerful social force. Contrary to the primary form of influence, sources of wealth as a potential of social pressure tend to be public and democratic. Some scholars go even further and say that historically the political institution of the state is not only affected by the economy, but is actually a product of the First Economic Revolution (North, 1981: 208). Be that as it may, the question remains as to how economic growth affects political development. In response to this question one can point to freedom of will as the core of democracy. A free market economy increases individual political freedom because individuals are free to pursue their interests unrestricted by the state (Rohrschneider, 1999: 162). Defenders of this idea maintain that individual liberties, especially in the wide sphere of the economy, promote freedom in the political realm. Democracy, however, has other preconditions. The theory of modernization emphasizes simultaneously the role of economic growth and the rate of social development in human progress. Industrialization, urbanization, education, and wealth are different aspects of economic development each of which sustains democracy. Lipset (1959) stresses the relationship between the level of economic growth and a democratic state and says that the average wealth, degree of urbanization and industrialization, as well as the level of education in democratic societies are much higher than in countries with a non-democratic political system. However, attempts to demonstrate that the modernization of political systems depends on economic growth are not only based on theoretical explanation. Some empirical evidence from different parts of the world supports this claim. Studies in the Pacific region of Asia, for instance, show that economic growth is positively associated with activating party politics which promote democratization (Feng, 2000). In addition, a survey of some Sub-Saharan African countries confirms that economic prosperity leads to political development (Narayan and Narayan and Smyth, 2011). Other African studies also demonstrate that economic growth results in more democracy in the short-run (Jaunky, 2013). Gasiorowski and Power’s (1998) empirical study of about 66 transitions to democracy in ‘Third World’ countries shows that among other structural factors, “development-related socioeconomic factors” strongly and positively affect democratic consolidation. This study confirms Lipset’s (1959) theory that links socioeconomic growth with political development. Other empirical

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research into societies with a communist background produced the same result. Connor (1991), Hough (1988), and Lewin (1988) argue that the industrialization of the economy, as well as factors such as expansion of literacy and higher education, promoted modernization and further democracy in former Soviet societies. Also, Reisinger et al. (1994) found in their study about Russia, Ukraine and Lithuania that industrialization, urbanization, war and educational opportunities shape citizens’ modern attitudes, encouraging pro-­ democratic values within these societies. Moreover, King (1994: 134) in his study of democratization in Taiwan says that the democratization of society was positively influenced by some structural forces which were the products of economic development. Economic development affected attitudes and the system of values. Industrialization, especially through the extension of education, has changed Confucian political culture. Furthermore, Almond and Coleman (1960) try in their comparative survey of the political systems of the “developing areas” to explain the patterns of modernization in Southeast Asia, South Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, Near East, and Latin America. Their “working hypothesis” as they say, is that there is a positive relationship between economic development and political competitiveness (p. 538). They conclude that in addition to traditional economies, the pre-modern social and political structure of these areas, particular the social and political forces and institutions, and other internal characteristics negatively affect modernization. Also Waisman (1992: 140–155) argues that the reason why especially some capitalist countries in Latin America do not have a democratic political system is that democracy needs a strong market economy. It should be noted here that further arguments about the need for democracy in economic development were already discussed in importance of a Free Market Economy for Democracy. Political Tradition One of the influencing factors that must be considered in modernization studies is democracy. The definition of modernization in a normative theory of political development should contain democracy (King, 1994: 134). Many scholarly studies over the last decades provide sufficient evidence that a stable democracy depends not only on a democratic culture but also on democratic institutions or on, in Spengler’s (1966: 352) words, an adequate legal and governmental milieu which are from pillars of modernization. Generally speaking, the political history of a society is a significant component of its contemporary political circumstances. That is to say, political tradition correlates positively or negatively with present political values and institutions.

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Rohrschneider (1999: 8) describes two approaches to the process of the development of democracy particularly in the study of political changes in Central and Eastern Europe. In contrast to the cultural approach which emphasizes the importance of proper culture and value systems for democracy, the institutional approach insists on the role of democratic institutions in the spreading of liberal attitudes. His study about democratic and economic values in the unified Germany concluded that democratic institutions play a significant role even in forming democratic culture: “…the process of institutional learning fundamentally shapes citizens’ ideological values in partially predictable ways” (p. 247–248). Another example in which political democratic institution facilitated democratization is the Indian experience. The non-radical handover of political power, the foundation of some leading political parties such as the Congress Party, and the commitment of elites to a liberal-democratic polity are the fundamental elements of democratization in India (Krishna, 1995). These and other cases declare that one of the central historical causes for the flourishing of a stable democracy in a country is its democratic experience, which emerges mainly in the practice of democratic institutions. Democratic institutions introduce citizens to the democratic ‘rules of the game’. Moreover, democratic institutions play the role of guardian and referee which guarantees the rules of this game. Democratic institutions teach and spread knowledge, tolerance, flexibility, competition, cooperation, self-determination, pragmatism, autonomy, peaceful coexistence, and freedom as democratic values. These institutions facilitate the dissemination of democratic values as well as the expansion of education and information among the masses. In sum, transition to democracy is a process of institutional adoption (Jansson and Lindenfors and Sandberg, 2013). However, it does not entail a reduction of political culture. Japan is an interesting case in this regard with multiple perspectives particularly because Japan is an exceptional modern society with a non-Western/Christian tradition. The coexistence of Japanese traditions with modern institutions especially in the political sphere was examined, among others, by Ward (1965: 75–80). He claims that without the affirmative contribution and support of traditional political culture and behavior, Japan could not have been successful in achieving modernization so swiftly and effectively. To replace feudalism with a more modern political system, for instance, the Japanese began with some aspects of their political culture. The creation of a sense of Japanese national identity was one of the more important decisions in this regard. However, parallel to the political culture, the Japanese political structure plays a great role in modernization. Ward concludes that there is a unidirectional “causal relationship between political structure and political culture” and both sides affect each other.

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As Diamond (1994: 239) explains, democratic values and culture contributes to democratization and redemocratization in three ways: “by changing beliefs and perceptions of key elites, by effecting broader changes in mass political culture, and by reviving established but dormant democratic norms and preferences.” When we talk about key elites we actually refer implicitly to institutions because institutions are in the hands of elites. In other words, although Stinchcombe (1965: 183) reveals the impact of culture on elites, stating that “elites raised in democratic countries differ from those raised in aristocratic countries,” decision-making elites can, on the other hand, also function as ­culture-makers too. Therefore, it is safe to say that there is an interaction between democratic institutions and democratic culture. They support and reinforce each other. Just as political orientation, values, and opinions can be modified by the thoughts and actions of political leaders, and democratic attitudes and norms can be expanded through positive experiences with democracy (Diamond, 1994: 232/234), so democratic political culture can drive society towards developing democratic structures and institutions. In other words, “[d]emocratic values, modes, beliefs, and sensitivities grow from but also sustain democratic institutions” (ibid, p. 242). Studies undertaken by King (1994) similarly show that in Taiwan the practice of democratic election plays a significant role in the institutionalization of “the values and rules of the game of democratic participation and competition” (p. 149). Inkeles (1966) in The Modernization of Man describes, from another perspective, how political systems help change modern values. Modern man, he writes, is one who is ready for new experience, has a disposition to formulate diverse solutions to many problems, has a democratic orientation, is present and future-oriented, is essentially a learner and organizer believing in the calculable nature of the world, He has awareness of the dignity of others and has more faith in science and technology. “[T]he development of the national state and its associated apparatus of government bureaucracy, political parties and campaigns, military and paramilitary units” are some of the sources of modernization which transform traditional man into the new existential condition (p. 161). Some governmental institutions such the army pave the way towards a modern outlook. He pointed out that the effect of the state on this trend towards modernity is not only positive. In some cases the state can be a barrier to modernization (p. 162). What is more, the dearth of experience in the institutional practice of democracy prior to independence is one of the chief factors with which Chazan (1994: 71) substantiates the lack of democracy in Africa: “By independence, Africans had barely had a chance to familiarize themselves with competitive institutions and the franchise, let alone acquire any experience with

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their operation.” The same condition is true for the Islamic republic of Iran. Before the revolution, Iranians had no experience of the institutional practice of democracy. Partly because of this, despite the fundamental change in the structure of government, the revolution could not represent a transition phase to modern democracy. Democratic institutions prepare an appropriate milieu for constant democratic practice. Sidney Verba (1965) principally sees political development through the eyes of political culture, yet he does not neglect the role of political institutions in political modernization. He writes: “One needs experience with democratic politics for democratic attitudes to become firmly rooted” (p. 168). This means the seeds of a political culture, in Verba’s term, need appropriate conditions and circumstances to grow. “Experience with democratic politics” can only be attained under the rule of a developed political system. Political institutions also have a central role in social, psychological, and economic transformation, as LaPalombara (1966) argues. In the economic sphere, for example, the state provides facilities for development and manages crises. One of the striking crises in which government has a key role is the issue of the distribution of material benefits. It is actually an achievement of the West that has seen the expansion of the function of state in a variety of fields from economy to health, from military to education, from agriculture to urban renewal. In addition to these, the state plays a substantial role in legislation, law enforcement, the protection of people, the co-ordination of economic activities, and in adapting bureaucracy to economic needs in critical situations. He concludes that a stable political framework is a precondition of ­economic modernization (pp. 238–239 & 241/247). Historically, economic development around the world has been attained under different kinds of relationship between the state and the economy (Staley, 1966). The British government in the nineteenth and the middle of twentieth centuries intervened in the economy “to check abuses and to cope with new problems.” The German state was a great supporter of industry and entrepreneurs. Government in the United States in the nineteenth century developed infrastructures and simultaneously adopted appropriate public policy such as free public education. Japan, especially after the Meiji restoration of 1868, sent many people abroad to learn new methods and imported new technology (pp. 321–323). This historical precedence shows that development needs state contribution. Besides, economic development is a goal that requires the co-operation of people both with one another and with the state. Co-operation here means political stability. “Indeed, the whole prospect of economic development rests, in the end, on the possibility for political development. …[A]uthoritarian ways can impede rather than speed up modernization” (Pye, 1966: 371/372).

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It is not only the state’s cooperative capacity but sometimes its coercive ability that helps society to achieve economic goals: “[t]he more rigorously the system is able to exclude all outside resistance in its way, the more likely it may be to reach the particular goal chosen” (Deutsch, 1966: 252). In sum, scholars argue that socioeconomic and political modernization is in need of support from democratic culture and institutions. Democracy remains an influencing factor both subjectively and objectively. Religion Modernization can be seen in part as an advanced form of tool making. Because of his nature as a toolmaker, man constantly seeks new forms of material progress. Needless to say, physical progress is based on innovation which is socially and culturally constructed. In other words, social and cultural conditions form our modern experience. Exactly because of this, modernization has no linear or global model. Despite some commonalities, modernization is a unique phenomenon which has emerged in the context of various cultural legacies. As a result, some scholars consider cultural background as the most important influencing factor on modernization and particularly on political development. If one considers this approach as a school of modernization, two orientations for this school can be distinguished, namely the individual and the social orientation. Individual orientation concentrates principally on a certain way of thinking and specific personal habits as the essential quality of modern man. For a group of theorists of individual orientation psychological reasons are at the heart of the argument. For McClelland (1966) for example, self-reliance and “need for achievement” are the virtues of modern man. He recognized that an individual and psychological motivation is of itself inadequate for the purpose of modernization and because of this he added “interest in the welfare of the generalized other fellow” (p. 37) as a social virtue; however, this interest does not represent a social but rather an individual and psychological factor. Huntington (1968: 32) also argues that “modernization involves a fundamental shift in values, attitudes, and expectations.” Waves of modernization do not allow pre-modern man to retain and continue a traditional system of individual and societal beliefs and values. Especially a modern political system needs some reforms in the social and economic spheres, which requires a change in the traditional patterns of values and behavior (p. 140). Gibson (1997: 679) likewise, found a correlation between the support of democratic institutions as well as processes, and some personal values such as the belief in individual rights, the approval of protest against government, and the accountability of the state towards its people. The social orientation of the cultural school of modernization focuses essentially on collective processes such as public culture and specifically on

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the predominant religion of society and its effect on political modernization. Certainly no stable sociopolitical change or transformation occurs without a new and well-founded shift in attitudes (Verba, 1965: 130–131). Accordingly, a stable democratic political system builds upon “a stable democratic attitudinal base.” “This political culture,” Verba (1965: 133) argues, “is conducive to the maintenance of democratic stability.” Similarly, Gibson and Duch (1994: 28) emphasize the importance of cul­ ture  in shaping democratic attitudes and values. They claim that new post-­ materialist value orientations, or “cultural shifts” in Inglehart’s words, are significant elements which support basic democratic institutions and positively affect the political realm and processes in former Soviet societies. Almond and Coleman (1960) examine this effect in a part of the political system of the developing regions and concludes that “socializing experiences and influences” produce particular “predispositions and orientations toward authority and politics” (p. 545). Turning to one of the most important components of culture which belongs to the social orientation of the cultural school of modernization, namely religion, there is considerable dispute between scholars about the role of religion in the modernization process. Studies suggest that religious and ethnic groups sometimes propel modernization in diverse ways and that they sometimes ­represent a major barrier to modernization (Wuthnow, 2005: 606). Through rationalistic and ascetic economic teachings, which were suitable for accumulation of wealth, religious beliefs have had an undeniable influence on the industrialization process as many students of history, economy, and sociology accept. However, some attempt to generalize this effect and transpose it onto the whole process of modernization, while another group considers it as a specific case in the preindustrial history of some societies (see for example Gerschenkron, 1966: 271). As it is well and widely known, the concept of relating religion to economic growth stem from innovations by Max Weber (1934) which is also endorsed by some recent investigations (see for example: Basten, and Betz, 2011). Capitalist development, in Weber’s view, needs incentive to save, plan, and work hard, which are values provided by Protestantism. Weber described Protestantism as a kind of inner-worldly asceticism which was favorable to the rational logic of economics (Wuthnow, 2005: 604). Weber (1978 [1956]: 630) contended that some religious traditions are not competent to be the cultural source of economic development: For the various popular religions of Asia, in contrast to ascetic Protestantism, the world remained a great enchanted garden in which the practical way to orient oneself, or to find security in this world or the

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next, was to revere or coerce spirits and seek salvation through ritualistic, idolatrous, or sacramental procedures. No path led from the magical religiosity of the non-intellectual classes of Asia to a rational methodical control of life. Nor did any path lead to that methodical control from the world accommodation of Confucianism, from the world-rejection of Buddhism, from the world-conquest of Islam, or from the messianic expectations and economic pariah law of Judaism. Gerschenkron (1966: 271) agrees partially with Weber that particularly teachings from the Calvinist branch of Protestantism “promote the attitudes of honesty and thrift, lifetime dedication to one’s work, and interest in innovation” but he emphasizes that firstly, these habits of thinking are rooted in different sources, and secondly, this phenomenon occurred only in the history of certain countries. In his view one cannot generalize this as a necessary precondition for modernization. Lipset (1994: 5) observes the relationship between world religions and political development and endorses Weber’s idea of different inherent features and their social impact on religions. He reviews why some religions have been negatively and others positively correlated with democracy: Historically, there have been negative relationship between democracy and Catholicism, Orthodox Christianity, Islam, and Confucianism; conversely Protestantism and democracy have been positively interlinked. These differences have been explained by (1) the much greater emphasis on individualism in Protestantism and (2) the traditionally close links between religion and the state in other four religions. In spite of all these differences, religion has a significant influence on political development. Huntington (1993: 25–29) sees different religious traditions as a major element in the transformation towards democracy. If democratic transformation is partially carried out by political elites, the trace of religious pedagogy is to be found there too: “elites raised as Protestants or Jews differ from those raised as Catholics” (Stinchcombe, 1965: 183). In fact, the cultural traditions of societies, in spite of their age, are actually alive and active today. “[A] society’s historical cultural heritage continues to shape the values and behavior of its people” (Inglehart and Welzel, 2005: 46). In wide-reaching empirical studies, Inglehart and Welzel (ibid) stress that the impact of religious traditions in society is still transmitted today: The fact that a society was historically shaped by a Protestant or Confucian or Islamic cultural heritage leaves an enduring impact, setting that society

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on a trajectory that continues to influence subsequent development – even if the direct influence of religious institutions is modest today. p. 22

The controversial role of religion in the process of democratization is a sign that religion is an important influencing factor which should be considered when considering modernization. Some students of democracy (among others Bryce (1901), Tocqueville (1948b), and Lipset (1994)) emphasize the separation of Church and state as a promoter or prerequisite of democracy, some others (such as Stepan (2001) and Casanova (2009)) argue that secularization is not a necessary or sufficient condition of democracy, while a third trend (see for example: Jamal, (2009)) talks about a non-deterministic relationship between state, religion and democracy. Model of Analysis Theoretical Model Scholars from the Age of Enlightenment to the contemporary era have tried to find the logic of social change and to construct a rational and realistic theoretical framework for human progress. Each group of scholars highlighted some factors and attempted to justify the irreplaceable role of these factors. In the trajectory of these studies one can distinguish some trends, such Marxism, that stresses one factor as the determinant and predictor of human progress. The failure of such a linear approach to modernization led other scholars to take into account some different factors such as economic growth, the cultural system, and political tradition, as detailed above. One of the recent and most influential theories of modernization which studies the relationship between all these factors is the human development theory by Inglehart and Welzel (2005) and Welzel, Inglehart, and Klingemann (2003). This theory relies chiefly on a massive body of cross-national data and provides an empirically supported explanation for the modernization process. The core of the human development theory is that “(1) socioeconomic modernization, (2) a cultural shift toward rising emphasis on self-expression values, and (3) democratization” widen human choice (Inglehart and Welzel, 2005: 2) which emerges partially in a democratic political system which legally and institutionally is the custodian of individual autonomy and freedom of choice. In other words, the theory of human development also provides an explanation for the democratization process as follows: economic development has two material and cognitive effects which are both conducive to democracy. Firstly, socioeconomic modernization expands social and material resources. Economic development brings urbanization, the extension of high

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levels of education, rising occupational specialization, growing organizational networks, and more income equality and consequently transforms the structure of society. Material development mobilizes mass activism in the political sphere. Specialization of occupation and rising educational standards create an independent labor force whose “specialized skills” grant it bargaining power in the political realm. Secondly, the cognitive changes of economic growth develop some postmaterial values such as interpersonal trust, tolerance of diversity, emphasis on freedom, political participation, and life-satisfaction and well-being which Inglehart and his collaborators call “well-being values” (Inglehart and Basañez and Moreno, 1998: 14) or “self-expression values” (Inglehart and Baker, 2000: 23). These cognitive changes place a high priority on participation in decisionmaking. Furthermore, higher levels of well-being correlate positively with greater legitimacy of the state which is a crucial feature of democratic government (Inglehart, 2000: 92). The theory of human development argues that: (1) socioeconomic development brings increasingly favorable existential conditions; (2) this gives rise to mass self-expression values, which place a high priority on human freedom and choice; (3) these values mobilize social forces that seek the adoption of democracy, if it is not yet in place, and favor the survival and deepening of democracy, if it is already in place inglehart and welzel, 2005: 172

Figure 1.1 illustrates the theory of human development.9 In this study democracy is considered as a cultural system and not merely as a political structure. The main core of a democratic cultural system is, in this

Economic development

Higher levels of Self–Expression Values

Higher levels of democracy

Figure 1.1 The theory of human development 9 This figure was constructed from the combination of two descriptions of the theory of human development by Inglehart, R. (2000) ‘Culture and Democracy’, in Harrison, L. E. and Huntington, S. P. (eds.) Culture Matters: How Values Shape Human Progress, New York: Basic Book, p. 92 and Inglehart, R. (2003) ‘How Solid Is Support for Democracy: And How Can We Measure It?’, PS: Political Science and Politics, Vol. 36, no. 1, Jan., p. 56.

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sense, freedom of choice. Realization of free will is the highest goal of all social, economic, cultural, and political aspects of democracy. Without free will there is no democracy. The dependent variables in this study, namely attitudes toward a free economy and confidence in civil society, which represent economic and social aspects of democracy, depict, in fact, the extent of man’s free will in these fields. The theorists of the human development theory conceptualize human development as “the growth of human autonomy and choice in major aspects of people’s lives” (Welzel, 2002: 33). This means that freedom of choice is the common denominator of human development and democratic culture. This theory of human development was chosen as the theoretical framework because it shares factors such as socioeconomic development, ­cultural affects, and political consequences that are under consideration in this research. It should be noted that, just as the theory of human development considers the effect of a cultural factor (self-expression values) on democracy, so the first and second research questions seek to examine the effect of a cultural factor (individual religiosity) on democratic values. Correspondingly, the third and fourth research questions concern the effect of a related cultural factor (religion) on democratic values but from a contextual-level of analysis. The fifth and sixth questions, like the theoretical framework, relate to the direct effects of some background factors such as socioeconomic and political tradition of societies on the development of democratic values. Research Hypotheses After reviewing the influencing factors in the democratization process, namely economic growth, political tradition, as well as cultural norms, and after adopting the theory of human development as the theoretical framework, the research hypotheses will now be presented. In line with the nature of the research, which is a multilevel one and analyzes the relationship between religious context, religiosity and democratic values on two different levels, namely on the individual or micro level and on the country or macro level, there are two kinds of hypotheses that will be addressed here: micro and macro level hypotheses. Micro-Level Hypotheses: There are two hypotheses at the individual level, which deal with the relationship between the degree of piety and ­religiosity and attitudes towards democratic values. According to the egalitarian nature of world religions as well as some theories and scholarly works which were discussed in the theory of political modernization, the first hypothesis is:

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High levels of religiosity are negatively associated with democratic economic values.

However, with consideration to the fact that world religions have a communicational essence and always recommend believers to come together for different purposes, we hypothesize that: (H2)

High levels of religiosity are positively associated with democratic civil value.

Figure 1.2 shows the micro-level hypotheses. Macro-Level Hypotheses: At this level four hypotheses have been formulated to examine the probable differences between three types of religious society, namely predominantly Islamic societies, predominantly Christian societies, and societies with a predominant religion other than Islam and Christianity. The probable differences will be observed in economic, political, and religious contexts. In accordance with a huge body of literature, which is extensively reviewed in Part I and refers to the relationship between Islam and the free market economics from within and independently of religious perspectives, and based on the concrete experience of Islamic countries that reveals a hostile approach within these societies towards the modern banking system, we hypothesize that: (H3) Predominantly Islamic countries are more negatively associated with democratic economic values than the other types of religious societies. However, based on extensive literature that is broadly reviewed in Part One and discusses the relationship between Islam and civil society from theoretical, historical, and objective perspectives, we hypothesize that:

H1 (-)

Free Market Economy

Religiosity H2 (+)

Figure 1.2 Model of micro-level hypotheses

Civil Society

Democratic Values, Islamic Principles, and Political Democracy

(H4)

69

Predominantly Islamic countries are more positively associated with democratic civil value than the other types of religious societies.

Moreover, according to the various modernization theories which have been reviewed in the theory of political modernization, political and particularly socioeconomic development has a significant effect on human progress. Based on this we hypothesize that: (H5)

The more years of experience of democracy a country has, the more it tends towards democratic values.

And finally: (H6)

A high level of HDI raises the probability that democratic values will grow.

Figure 1.3 represents the macro-level hypotheses. Figure  1.4 presents the complete model of hypotheses which consists of micro level and macro level hypotheses as well as control variables. As Figure 1.4 shows, the complete model of hypotheses includes also an examination of the

Years of Democracy

H5 (+)

Predominant Religion (Islam)

H4 (+)

HDI

H3 (-)

Democratic Values Civil Society

Figure 1.3 Model of macro-level hypotheses

Free Market Economy

H6 (+)

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Predominant Religion (Islam)

HDI

Macro Level H5 (+) H4 (+)

Micro Level

Religiosity

H3 (-) H6 (+)

H1 (-) H2 (+)

Control Variables

Democratic Values Civil Society Free

Market Economy

Income Education Age Sex Religious Denomination: -Muslim -Christian -Other Religions

Figure 1.4 The complete model of hypotheses tested

correlation between rate of income, level of education, gender, age as well as religious denomination (Muslim, Christian, and denominations of other religions), as control variables, with democratic values. Part Three will endeavor to evaluate the hypotheses. Conclusion The first chapter of Part One, Democratic Values and Political Democracy, illustrated the interaction between free market economics and civil society on the one hand, and political democracy on the other, from political, social, and cultural perspectives. Generally, it argued that a free market economy, an active civil society, and a free competitive political system have an underlying value that emphasizes the free choice of individuals. This common denominator means that a non-planned economy, intermediary associations of civil society, and democracy not only reinforce but also mutually depend on each other.

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On the one hand, the private economic sector and civil society organizations require equal opportunity for individuals, freedom, tolerance, legal protection, and a great role in the decision-making process. A political democratic institution prepares these requirements and guarantees the functions of the free market and civil society. On the other hand a stable democracy cannot emerge without a free market as well as autonomous extra-state organizations which act as a buffer between government and citizens. The second and third chapters give an account of the background to the relationship between Islam and democratic values. The second chapter was about Islamic outlook of a free market economy. Since Max Weber formulated  his critical view on conformity of Islam with the spirit of capitalism many other scholars have examined the subject. The huge body of academic literature confirms that Islam is not favourable to the principles of a free market economy. Some controversial debates in this field concern the political, legal, and economic structure of Islamic societies, the differences between the ethics and values of Islam and capitalism, the role of the state in economic activities, and the issue of private ownership and its scope. The main peculiarities and structural constituents of Islamic thought that oppose the autonomous character of a free market economy are the static construction of Islamic society, which can be traced back to the patrimonial structure of politics and economy, the absence of modern rationality from Islamic philosophy, fatalism and submission especially to the state, and the legalistic nature of Islam, which stresses the fulfillment of communally enforced laws. Besides these, there is a value difference between these two economic viewpoints. Hedonistic individualism, contrary to the normative values of Islamic ethics, encourages individuals to aim solely for private ends such as endless accumulation of wealth. The selfishness of self-interested individuals is the only motivation factor in a modern business environment and results in profitoriented behaviour. The value-maximization approach of Islam rejects this profit-maximization model. In an Islamic society public interests take priority over individual interest. The utopian character of Islamic economics, which involves the creation of a “new human being,” seeks to achieve this goal. Responsibility towards God, society, the environment, and ultimately one’s own welfare are some features that should characterize an Islamic businessman. In addition to that, Muslims have another reason to reject capitalism. Capitalism, it is said, threatens social solidarity and social autonomy and ­provokes the divergence and fluidity of identity in an Islamic society. The role of the state and the limits of its intervention in business decisionmaking from the perspective of both economic systems has also been reviewed. While capitalism affirms that state interference disrupts the natural order

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of free business, the concept of an Islamic economy without the state is ­unfeasible. The affinity that exists between many of the ideals and theories of Islamic and socialist economics has persuaded some Muslims to generate a new kind of socialism. Certainly the dominant role of an authoritative government in the economic sphere favors the development of Islamic socialism. The restricted freedom of individual choice and state surveillance are two outstanding traits of Islamic economics which among others such as spiritual orientation distinguish it from a liberal enterprise. Islamic principles restrict private ownership. Since Muslims believe that all resources belong to God, the concept of trusteeship replaces that of ownership. The prohibition of earning money through excessive trading and the predicament of the Islamic banking sector reveal that Islamic economics embodies many anti-utilitarian values. It  seems that the statement of William Laud (1847: 6), the Archbishop of Canterbury from 1633 to 1645 is valid for Muslims too. He said: If any man be so addicted to his private, that he neglect the common, state, he is void of the sense of piety and wisheth peace and happiness to himself in vain. For whoever he be, he must live in the body of the Commonwealth, and in the body of the Church. The third chapter in this part addresses the issue of Islam and civil society. To summarize the theoretical reactions of the Muslim world to the emergence of civil society one can identify alternatives ranging from fundamental rejection, radical receptivity and modernist viewpoints. The fundamental rejection reaction considers civil society as antireligious and completely alien to Islamic thought. At the other extreme, another opinion sees civil society as a favorable “universal concept” and as an ideal pattern for individual and societal life. It  refutes any contrary evidence from Islamic tradition as specific events of ­history which cannot be generalized and applied to our time. The modernist view is a middle course which endeavors to reconcile Islam with modern institutions through the reinterpretation of Islamic teachings (Hanafi, 2002: 56). The advocates of compatibility between Islam and civil society point to many factors that substantiate their view. Some of these include the decentralization of religious authority, the pluralistic system of the interpretation of religious resources and egalitarianism in Islam, the existence of several types of non-governmental organizations and the activities both in past and present of Muslim societies, the possibility of an Islamic resurgence to reform political conditions, the potential of moderate fundamentalists who admit pluralism, human rights, and freedom, the awareness of young Muslims and their motivation to participate in social and political issues, and finally, Islamic rationalism’s familiarity with the idea of democracy and civility.

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On the other hand, the promoters of the opposite doctrine claim that the obstacles to the development of civil society in the Islamic world predominate. They point to the lack of a capitalist system of economics, undeveloped economies, the characteristic Islamic notions of politics, the role of women, and jihad, emphasis on the revival of Islamic Umma, the inability of Muslims to associate for co-operative action, the absence of rationalism and individualism from the civic culture of Middle East, as well as the extreme position of Islamists in some Islamic countries. Though the issue of civil society is part of Middle Eastern political discourse today (Norton, 1995: 25) experience of civic life in Islamic countries, as it was illustrated above, reveals that, in spite of some progress in this field, most of the Muslim world has a long way to go before it can achieve an autonomous, authoritative, and stable civil society which can function as a buffer between the individuals and the government and represent a countervailing balance of power. After the consideration of many aspects of associative life in Muslim countries it is safe to say that “civil pluralist Islam is an emergent tradition and comes in a variety of forms.” (Hefner, 2000: 12). Clearly there is difference and divergence between Islamic and Western models of civil society but as Hann (1996: 18) makes clear, civil society “is not the unique product of the West after all: others have developed important elements of it, before and after the impact of the European enlightenment.” And finally, the fourth chapter has shown how, according to the modernization theory, political development is affected by social, economic, political, and cultural factors. While economic growth provides the material foundation for development and changes economic infrastructures in a society, social progress modifies the attitudinal bases of individuals. The degree of industrialization and urbanization, the level of education and health, and the average wealth of a society are factors that determine political development. Furthermore, political institutions, as another influencing factor, create an appropriate milieu for experiencing democracy. In parallel there are some political cultural beliefs and perceptions such as tolerance of human diversity and interpersonal trust which encourage the constitution of a democratic system. In addition, some scholars emphasize cultural context as one of the most important influencing factors on political development. This trend was divided in this chapter into two individual and social orientations. Religion is one of the most important components of social orientation of cultural school of modernization theory which has a controversial role in the process of development. The vast body of debate about religion shows that its effect on development needs to be included in our model of analysis if it is to fully encompass the topic.

chapter 2

Religiosity, Market Economics, Civil Society Comparisons of 60 Societies

Introduction This part presents some of the empirical findings of the research in four chapters. It compares 60 societies around the world through preliminary statistical analyses and shows the differences between societies with regard to religiosity, non-religiosity, atheism, as well as attitudes towards favorable factors with free market economics such as private ownership of business, responsibility of people to provide for themselves, income equality, and competition, as well as c­onfidence in traditional, modern, and post-modern civil society organizations. Descriptive statistics of religious denominations, education, sex, age, and income will also be added as control variables. After that country-level comparisons will present a comparative global perspective of three types of religious societies, namely predominantly Islamic societies, predominantly Christian societies, and predominantly Buddhist, Hindu, and folk-religion societies. Lastly, multilevel descriptive data will summarize the most important statistics of both macro-level and micro-level variables for all 60 compared societies.

Religiosity in Cross-National Perspective

Religiosity as the individual-level independent variable of the research was measured by the following question text: “Independently of whether you go to church or not, would you say you are: a religious person, not a religious person, a convinced atheist.” Table A.2.1 (in Appendix 2) presents descriptive statistics of religiosity. Descriptive statistics here include the size of the overall data set (N), frequency distribution, minimum, maximum, mode, and variation ratio (V). Since religiosity was a nominal variable, we used mode to measure the central tendency of the answers. Figure 2.1 Religiosity, Non-religiosity, and Atheism in All Compared Societies. As can be seen in Figure 2.1 it is striking that 72.3 per cent of respondents overall described themselves as a religious person, 22.7 per cent as not a religious person, and 4.9 per cent as a convinced atheist. The variation ratio (V) of 0.318 shows that religiosity among all the respondents from the 60 compared

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2014 | doi 10.1163/9789004274464_004

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Religious Person

Non-Religious Person

Atheist

5% 23%

72%

Figure 2.1 Religiosity, non-religiosity, and atheism in all compared societies

societies were not very differentiated or dispersed. To achieve more details about religiosity, the data of 60 societies in three parts was compared according to the three items of the question. Religiosity Table 2.1 compares the frequency distribution of the variable between 60 societies according to the preference of religiosity. It is apparent from the table that in 43 of the 60 societies in question, namely in about three-quarters of them, more than 60 per cent of the respondents were religious. Eighteen of these 43 societies were predominantly Islamic societies, 24 cases were predominantly Christian and 1 country belonged to the category of predominantly Buddhist, Hindu, and folk-religion societies. The top three religious countries were all predominantly Islamic. Egypt with 98.7 per cent was the most religious country. Mali was just 1.1 per cent behind (97.6 per cent) and Bangladesh with 96.9 per cent was the third. From the 12 countries at the top of the table in which more than 90 per cent of their respondents said they are a religious person, eight countries were Muslim. These were Egypt (98.7 per cent), Mali (97.6 per cent), Bangladesh (96.9 per cent), Nigeria (94.2 per cent), Morocco (91.8 per cent), Burkina Faso (91.6 per cent), Jordan (91.2 per cent), and Pakistan (90.7 per cent). Four remaining countries, namely Tanzania (94.3 per cent), Poland (94.1 per cent), Romania (93.4 per cent) and Ghana (91.5 per cent) were predominantly Christian. Among these 12 strongly religious countries, there was no country with more

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Table 2.1

Comparison of the frequency distribution of religiosity among 60 societies

Rank

Society

Religious person

Rank

Society

Religious person

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30

Egypt Mali Bangladesh Tanzania Nigeria Poland Romania Morocco Burkina Faso Ghana Jordan Pakistan Zambia Malaysia Brazil Azerbaijan Italy Iraq Indonesia Iran South Africa Peru Turkey Ukraine Colombia Argentina Philippines Venezuela India SrpSka-Serbian Republic of Bosnia

98.7 97.6 96.9 94.3 94.2 94.1 93.4 91.8 91.6 91.5 91.2 90.7 89.5 89.1 88.4 88.3 88.0 86.7 84.6 83.7 83.0 82.4 82.1 82.0 80.0 79.9 79.0 78.6 77.9 76.2

31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60

Mexico Kyrgyzstan United States Bosnian Federation Saudi Arabia Canada Albania Russian Federation Bulgaria Switzerland Chile Germany (West) Finland Algeria Netherlands Australia New Zealand Great Britain France Spain Norway Taiwan Viet Nam Thailand Sweden South Korea Germany (East) Hong Kong Japan China

75.4 75.2 74.5 70.4 70.4 69.9 68.3 63.6 63.4 63.3 62.7 60.7 60.4 59.0 57.5 51.9 49.8 48.5 46.9 45.4 41.3 40.8 39.2 35.5 33.2 32.3 28.5 27.3 24.2 21.8

Note: The numbers are percentage.

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than three decades of democratic tradition in its political history. Poland, which is a Christian country, with 28 years holds the record. While there was no significant difference between the most religious Islamic country, namely Egypt with 98.7 per cent, and the most religious Christian country (Tanzania: 94.3 per cent), the disparity is much greater at the other extreme. The last Islamic country in the table is Algeria with 59.0 per cent religiosity while the last Christian unit of analysis (society) in the table is East Germany with 28.5 per cent and the last Christian country is Sweden with 33.2 per cent, which had respectively 30.5 per cent and 25.8 per cent difference with Algeria. Values in the bottom of the table relate to the category of predominantly Buddhist, Hindu, and folk-religion societies. China (21.8 per cent), Japan (24.2 per cent), and Hong Kong (27.3 per cent) are bottom of the table of religiosity. Overall, seven of 10 societies with a given predominant religion other than Islam and Christianity, namely China (21.8 per cent), Japan (24.2 per cent), Hong Kong (27.3 per cent), South Korea (32.3 per cent), Thailand (35.5 per cent), Viet Nam (39.2 per cent), and Taiwan (40.8 per cent) are at the bottom of the table and had less than or about 40 per cent religious respondents. Altogether, a brief look at Table 2.1 reveals that predominantly Islamic countries were the most religious societies while societies, which fall in the category of predominantly Buddhist, Hindu, and folk-religion societies were the least religious communities among the 60 societies around the world. Non-Religiosity Table 2.2 compares the frequency distribution of the variable between 60 societies according to the preference of non-religiosity. As was already mentioned above, more respondents in predominantly Buddhist societies and societies with Chinese folk-religion than in other societies considered themselves ­unreligious, namely Hong Kong (67.4 per cent), Thailand (64.3 per cent), Japan (62.1 per cent), and China (60.3 per cent). Predominantly Christian countries took second place in this respect. Sweden with 49.4 per cent, Spain with 47.2 per cent, and New Zealand with 43.3 per cent were the most non-religious Christian countries. Among predominantly Islamic countries, the highest frequency of respondents who selected the option of ‘not a religious person’ is found in Saudi Arabia (29.6 per cent) the country in which Mecca, the most holy place for Muslims is located. ‘I am not a religious person’ was not the popular choice in countries such as Egypt (1.3 per cent), Mali (2.0 per cent), Bangladesh (3.1 per cent), Algeria and Poland and Tanzania (4.3 per cent), and  Nigeria (4.4 per cent), most of which are predominantly Islamic. Among  Christian countries Poland and Tanzania (4.3 per cent), Romania (6.0  per cent), Ghana (8.0 per cent), Italy (9.3 per cent), and Zambia

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Table 2.2 Comparison of the frequency distribution of non-religiosity among 60 societies Rank

Society

Unreligious person

Rank

Society

Unreligious person

1 2 3 4

Hong Kong Thailand Japan China

67.4 64.3 62.1 60.3

31 32 33 34

20.2 19.5 19.5 18.2

5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30

Norway Sweden Spain New Zealand Taiwan Germany (East) Great Britain South Korea Australia Viet Nam Finland France Netherlands Germany (West) Chile Russian Federation Bulgaria Saudi Arabia Switzerland Albania Canada Bosnian Federation United States Kyrgyzstan Mexico Philippines

51.9 49.4 47.2 43.3 42.8 41.9 41.5 40.9 37.5 37.3 36.4 36.1 35.2 34.0 33.9 32.4 31.2 29.6 27.7 26.2 24.5 23.7 22.5 22.2 21.7 20.8

35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60

Venezuela Colombia India SrpSka-Serbian Republic of Bosnia Argentina Turkey Iran Peru South Africa Ukraine Indonesia Iraq Azerbaijan Brazil Zambia Italy Pakistan Jordan Malaysia Morocco Ghana Burkina Faso Romania Nigeria Algeria Poland Tanzania Bangladesh Mali Egypt

Note: The numbers are percentage.

17.5 17.3 16.2 16.2 16.0 15.4 15.2 13.3 10.7 10.4 9.9 9.3 9.3 8.7 8.6 8.2 8.0 6.9 6.0 4.7 4.3 4.3 4.3 3.1 2.0 1.3

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(9.9 per cent), and Brazil (10.4 per cent) had the lowest rate of non-religiosity. Among societies with a predominantly Buddhist, Hindu, and folk-religion, the lowest rates are to be found in India (19.5 per cent) and Viet Nam (37.3 per cent). Atheism Atheism was the third option in the question about religiosity. Table  2.3 ­compares the frequency distribution of the variable in 60 societies according to the preference of atheism. While, as previously mentioned, the first place for religiosity belongs to an Islamic country (Egypt with 98.7 per cent), surprisingly, the highest ranking of atheism among the 60 societies from around the world is also found in an Islamic country, namely Algeria with 36.7 per cent. Other societies with a high quota for atheism were East Germany (29.6 per cent), South Korea (26.8 per cent), Viet Nam (23.6 per cent), China (17.9 per cent), Sweden (17.3 per cent), France (17.0 per cent), Taiwan (16.4 per cent), Japan (13.7 per cent), Australia (10.6 per cent), and Great Britain (10.0 per cent). Whereas many predominantly Buddhist and folk-religion countries are to be found at the top of this list, some other of non-Islamic and non-Christian countries for example Thailand (0.2 per cent) and India (2.5 per cent) are at the end of it. Though the highest frequency of atheists was found in an Islamic country, the lowest frequencies in this regard were recorded for the Islamic countries too. No one considered herself or himself as a convinced atheist in Bangladesh, Egypt, Iraq, Morocco, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia. Subsequent Islamic countries in this regard were Iran (0.1 per cent), Jordan (0.2 per cent), Indonesia (0.3 per cent), Mali (0.4 per cent) and Turkey (0.6 per cent). However, it should be noted that in some Islamic societies atheism is punishable according to Islamic Sharia. This reality should be considered when interpreting the low level of atheism in the majority of Islamic counties as found in the present study. The highest frequencies of atheists in Christian societies were found respectively in East Germany (29.6 per cent), Sweden (17.3 per cent), France (17.0 per cent), Australia (10.6 per cent), Great Britain (10.0 per cent), Switzerland (9.1 per cent), Spain (7.5 per cent), Netherlands (7.3 per cent), and New Zealand (7.0 per cent). The lowest frequencies of atheists in Christian countries were in the Philippines (0.2 per cent), Colombia (0.5 per cent), Romania (0.6 per cent), South Africa (1.0 per cent), Brazil and Venezuela (1.2 per cent), Peru and Tanzania (1.4 per cent), and Poland (1.5 per cent). It should be added here that no pattern of relationship between atheism and non-religiosity was found in which the rise of one entails the rise of the other or vice versa.

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Table 2.3 Comparison of the frequency distribution of atheism among 60 societies Rank

Society

Atheist

Rank

Society

Atheist

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20

Algeria Germany (East) South Korea Viet Nam China Sweden France Taiwan Japan Australia Great Britain Switzerland Spain Netherlands New Zealand Norway Bosnian Federation Albania Canada SrpSka-Serbian Republic of Bosnia Bulgaria Hong Kong Germany (West) Russian Federation Chile Finland Mexico United States Italy Argentina

36.7 29.6 26.8 23.6 17.9 17.3 17.0 16.4 13.7 10.6 10.0 9.1 7.5 7.3 7.0 6.8 5.9 5.5 5.6 5.6

31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50

Kyrgyzstan Ukraine India Malaysia Burkina Faso Poland Peru Tanzania Brazil Venezuela Nigeria South Africa Azerbaijan Romania Turkey Colombia Ghana Zambia Mali Indonesia

2.6 2.6 2.5 2.3 1.6 1.5 1.4 1.4 1.2 1.2 1.1 1.0 .9 .6 .6 .5 .5 .5 .4 .3

5.4 5.4 5.3 4.0 3.5 3.1 2.9 2.9 2.7 2.6

51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60

Jordan Philippines Thailand Iran Bangladesh Egypt Iraq Morocco Pakistan Saudi Arabia

.2 .2 .2 .1 0 0 0 0 0 0

21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30

Note: The numbers are percentage.

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Attitudes towards Free Market Economics in 60 Societies

The first dependent variable of the study related to attitudes towards a free market economy. This variable included four indictors, namely opinion about private ownership versus government ownership of business, responsibility of people versus government responsibility to provide for people, income equality versus larger income differences, and finally utility of competition versus harmfulness of competition. The descriptive statistics used here include size of overall data set (N), frequency distribution, mean, variance, standard deviation (sd), skewness, and kurtosis (see Appendix 2). In order to have a more comprehensive perspective of the compared societies, we compared the frequency distributions of questions on both sides of the scales and the mean scores.

Private Ownership of Business versus Government Ownership of Business To measure attitudes towards the importance of private or government ownership of business, respondents were asked to place their views on a scale ranging from 1 to 10. One meant completely agreement with the notion that private ownership of business should be increased and 10 meant completely disagreement with the idea that the government ownership of business should be increased. Table A.2.2 (in Appendix  2) displays descriptive statistics of attitudes towards private and government ownership of business. It is obvious that not only the values of two extremes are determinant for the analysis of a scale but that other scores play an essential role in understanding its content. Because of this, to know better the attitudes towards private ownership versus government ownership of business, we computed the values of three scores together from both extremes. Table 2.4 shows the societies more interested in private ownership according to the results of adding up of scores 1 and 2 and 3 of the ten-point scale of private ownership of business versus government ownership of business. The first thing to be noted is that 21.6 per cent of respondents overall strongly agreed or agreed with the idea that private ownership of business should be increased. On the other hand, 29 per cent of them strongly agreed or agreed with the notion that government ownership of business should be increased. This means that the opinions of about half of the respondents lie in between. As can be seen in the table, Albania, an Islamic country with a HDI value of 0.670 which enjoys ‘medium human development’, scored highest with 50.8 per cent as the country with the most favorable attitude towards private ownership of business. American’s respondents with 47.8 per cent were in second

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place on the table. In 8 societies more than 40 per cent of respondents said that private ownership of business should be increased. These were Albania (50.8 per cent), the United States (47.8 per cent), Tanzania (43.5 per cent), Romania (43.1 per cent), New Zealand (41.0 per cent), France (40.3 per cent), the Bosnian Federation (40.1 per cent), and Jordan (40.0 per cent). In 13 other societies about one-third or more of respondents were for the increase of private ownership of business: Canada (39.1 per cent), Algeria (36.0 per cent), Nigeria (35.7 per cent), SrpSka-Serbian Republic of Bosnia (33.3 per cent), Viet Nam (32.4 per cent), South Africa (32.0 per cent), the Netherlands (31.7 per cent), Venezuela (31.4 per cent), Iran (31.2 per cent), West Germany (30.9 per cent), India (30.9 per cent), Bangladesh (30.7 per cent), and Kyrgyzstan (30.3 per cent). At the bottom of Table  2.4 with the lowest tendency towards the private ownership of business there were Hong Kong with only 1.5 per cent, the Russian Federation with 10.1 per cent, Thailand with 11.9 per cent, and Chile with 12.3 per cent. It is noteworthy that there were 2 developed countries (Spain with 19.2 per cent and Norway with 19.1 per cent) among societies which less than 20 per cent of their surveyed population who agreed relatively strongly with the privatization of business. To get a better understanding of the tendency towards government ownership of business among 60 societies, percentages of points 8 and 9 and 10 in the scale were added together. Table A.2.3 (in Appendix 2) illustrates the more interested societies in an expansion of the role of the state in the economic sphere. Comparison between the mean scores of the societies provides another outlook in this issue. In Table 2.5 the societies were ranked according to their mean score. It must be added here that, as can be seen in Figure 2.2, the grand mean score of 60 societies (5.56) shows that the average of respondents overall was in the middle of the scale, although slightly more favorable to private ownership. As the table makes clear, there were four groups of societies. The first group, which agreed with private ownership of business, includes only the United States and Albania with respective mean scores of 3.61 and 3.85. The second group with a mean score between 4.03 and 4.88 partially agreed with it. These societies were France, New Zealand, Canada, the Netherlands, SrpSka-Serbian Republic of Bosnia, the Bosnian Federation, Japan, Finland, West Germany, Switzerland, Romania, Great Britain, Sweden, Australia and Italy. The third and largest group is approximately located in the middle of the scale. The view of this group does not clearly support the private or government ownership of business; however, the first part with mean scores between 5.00 and 5.89 lean towards the private ownership. This part consisted of 26 societies: Viet Nam, Pakistan, Algeria, Burkina Faso, Tanzania, Taiwan, Norway, Bangladesh, Jordan,

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Table 2.4 Comparison of the frequency distribution of agreement with the increase of private ownership of business among 60 societies Rank

Society

Private ownership of business

Rank

Society

Private ownership of business

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12

Albania United States Tanzania Romania New Zealand France Bosnian Federation Jordan Canada Algeria Nigeria SrpSka-Serbian Republic of Bosnia Viet Nam South Africa Netherlands Venezuela Iran Germany (West) India Bangladesh Kyrgyzstan Ghana Brazil Finland Switzerland Mexico Great Britain Sweden Azerbaijan Australia

50.8 47.8 43.5 43.1 41.0 40.3 40.1 40.0 39.1 36.0 35.7 33.3

31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42

Italy Burkina Faso Zambia Saudi Arabia Colombia Taiwan Japan Bulgaria South Korea Turkey Morocco Germany (East)

26.7 26.5 25.7 25.3 24.8 23.9 23.4 23.0 22.8 20.9 20.4 19.8

32.4 32.0 31.7 31.4 31.2 30.9 30.9 30.7 30.3 29.7 29.3 29.2 29.0 28.8 28.6 28.2 26.8 26.7

43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60

Egypt Spain Norway Mali Malaysia Peru Indonesia China Pakistan Philippines Poland Argentina Ukraine Iraq Chile Thailand Russian Federation Hong Kong

19.4 19.2 19.1 19.0 18.5 17.6 17.2 16.0 16.0 15.5 14.0 13.8 13.6 13.1 12.3 11.9 10.1  1.5

13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30

Note: The numbers are percentage.

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Table 2.5 Comparison of the mean score of attitudes toward private vs. government ownership of business among 60 societies Rank

Society

Private vs. government ownership

Rank Society

Private vs. government ownership

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

United States Albania France New Zealand Canada Netherlands SrpSka-Serbian Republic of Bosnia Bosnian Federation Japan Finland Germany (West) Switzerland Romania Great Britain Sweden Australia Italy Viet Nam Pakistan Algeria Burkina Faso Tanzania Taiwan Norway Bangladesh Jordan Morocco Hong Kong Brazil Germany (East)

3.61 3.85 4.03 4.15 4.35 4.37 4.63

31 32 33 34 35 36 37

Spain South Africa Saudi Arabia South Korea Nigeria Azerbaijan Iran

5.43 5.44 5.51 5.54 5.55 5.57 5.58

4.64 4.64 4.68 4.70 4.72 4.76 4.78 4.78 4.88 4.89 5.00 5.01 5.06 5.06 5.15 5.25 5.30 5.31 5.32 5.35 5.36 5.41 5.42

38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60

Mexico Venezuela Malaysia Kyrgyzstan Bulgaria India Turkey Mali Zambia Indonesia Thailand Colombia Chile Ghana Philippines Peru China Egypt Poland Ukraine Iraq Argentina Russian Federation

5.63 5.64 5.70 5.75 5.79 5.85 5.89 6.04 6.07 6.13 6.28 6.31 6.35 6.36 6.41 6.54 6.63 6.68 6.75 6.75 6.93 6.95 7.07

8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30

Note: This question has been scaled from 1–10 in which 1= strongly agree with private ownership of business and 10= strongly agree with government ownership of business.

0

RU AR IQ UA PL EG CN PE PH GH CL CO TH ID ZM ML TR IN BG KG MY VE MX IR AZ NG KR SA ZA ES DE-E BR HK MA JO BD NO TW TN BF DZ PK VN IT AU SE GB RO CH DE-W FI JP BA-F BA NL CA NZ FR AL US

Figure 2.2 The mean score of attitudes toward private vs. government ownership of business Note: This question has been scaled from 1-10 in which 1 = strongly agree with private ownership of business and 10 = strongly agree with government ownership of business.

Mean Score

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

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Morocco, Hong Kong, Brazil, East Germany, Spain, South Africa, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, Nigeria, Azerbaijan, Iran, Mexico, Venezuela, Malaysia, Kyrgyzstan, Bulgaria, India, and Turkey. The second part with mean scores between 6.04 and 6.95 tended towards government ownership of business. These countries were Mali, Zambia, Indonesia, Thailand, Colombia, Chile, Ghana, the Philippines, Peru, China, Egypt, Poland, Ukraine, Iraq, and Argentina. The last group and country was the Russian Federation, with a mean score of 7.07, who partially agreed with government ownership of commerce. It is worth noting that Pakistan, Hong Kong, Japan, the Netherlands, the United States, and Finland had the lowest standard deviations among the 60 societies, which means attitudes in these societies towards the private ownership of business tended to be very close to the average response. On the other hand, a divergence of attitudes is to be found in Tanzania, Jordan, India, Bangladesh, Ghana, Nigeria, Venezuela, and Colombia which are all, interestingly, developing countries. That is to say, in these countries it is not the mean score but rather the percentages (which have been listed in Table 2.4, and Table A.2.3 (in Appendix 2)) that appropriately represent the ideas. Responsibility of People versus Government Responsibility The second question that tried to measure attitudes towards a free market economy was about the responsibility of government in providing for people. There was a ten-point scale in which 1 meant completely agreement with the idea that people should take more responsibility to provide for themselves and 10 meant completely agreement with the statement that the government should take more responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for. Table A.2.4 (in Appendix 2) presents the descriptive statistics of this variable. Table  2.6 helps to show that respondents of which societies were more interested in providing for themselves. In this table the percentages of points 1 and 2 and 3 in the scale were added together. It is worth noting that 23.1 per cent of participants overall strongly agreed or agreed that people should take more responsibility to provide for themselves. On the other hand, 37.6 per cent indicated they strongly agree or agree that the government should take more responsibility. The remaining 39.3 per cent were in between. A closer analysis of Table 2.6 reveals that 46.6 per cent of respondents in France, more than in any other country, said they strongly agree or agree that people should take more responsibility to provide for themselves. Other countries where more than 30 per cent of their respondents were for this idea are Venezuela (37.5 per cent), Great Britain (37.1 per cent), New Zealand (36.9 per cent), Sweden (36.7 per cent), Peru (35.8 per cent), Mexico (35.4 per cent),

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Religiosity, Market Economics, Civil Society Table 2.6 Comparison of the frequency distribution of agreement with responsibility of people to provide for themselves among 60 societies Rank

Society

Responsibility of

Rank

Society

Responsibility of

people to provide

people to provide

for themselves

for themselves

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16

France Venezuela Great Britain New Zealand Sweden Peru Mexico Viet Nam Switzerland United States Bangladesh Netherlands Canada China Philippines Finland

46.6 37.5 37.1 36.9 36.7 35.8 35.4 34.3 34.1 33.1 32.7 31.8 31.5 31.4 30.3 29.9

31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46

17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30

Australia Mali Thailand Indonesia Saudi Arabia Ghana Argentina South Africa Romania Colombia Bosnian Federation Taiwan Kyrgyzstan Malaysia

29.8 29.6 29.3 29.2 29.0 28.5 28.1 27.4 26.3 24.2 23.9 23.2 23.1 22.3

47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60

Note: The numbers are percentage.

Zambia Algeria India Poland Nigeria Turkey Egypt Chile Burkina Faso Brazil Albania Tanzania Germany (West) Iran Norway SrpSka-Serbian Republic of Bosnia Italy Iraq Bulgaria Jordan Azerbaijan Germany (East) Russian Federation Ukraine South Korea Japan Spain Morocco Pakistan Hong Kong

22.3 21.8 21.4 21.1 20.8 20.2 19.7 19.5 19.0 18.9 17.8 17.8 17.0 16.3 15.2 15.2 15.1 14.6 14.0 13.7 12.4 12.1 11.8 11.7 10.6 10.1 8.6 5.6 4.2 0.8

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Viet Nam (34.3 per cent), Switzerland (34.1 per cent), the United States (33.1 per cent), Bangladesh(32.7 per cent), Netherlands (31.8 per cent), Canada (31.5 per cent), China (31.4 per cent), and the Philippines (30.3 per cent). In contrast to this, there are some other societies which did not strongly agree or did not agree that people should take more responsibility to provide for themselves: Hong Kong (0.8 per cent), Pakistan (4.2 per cent), Morocco (5.6 per cent), Spain (8.6 per cent), Japan (10.1 per cent), South Korea (10.6 per cent), Ukraine (11.7 per cent), the Russian Federation (11.8 per cent), East Germany (12.1 per cent), Azerbaijan (12.4 per cent), Jordan (13.7 per cent), Bulgaria (14.0 per cent), and Iraq (14.6 per cent). A different perspective to the issue is presented in Table A.2.5 (in Appendix 2) which shows the frequency distribution of answers expressing a positive attitude towards government responsibility in providing for people. Although, as shown in Table 2.6, there was no country with more than 47 per cent agreement with responsibility of people to provide for themselves, there was categorical support for government responsibility in this field among some compared societies. Notably, Japan was the first industrial country in this table with 45.6 per cent support for government responsibility. East Germany with 45.1 per cent and West Germany with 37.4 were the second and third advanced societies respectively in this regard, and ranked nineteenth and twenty-eighth positions in the table. Also the comparison of mean scores can provide a different outlook. Table 2.7 presents the mean scores of societies and provides a general outlook for comparison (see also Figure 2.3). It is worth noting that the grand mean score of all compared societies (6.15) demonstrates that the average of respondents was in the middle of the scale although they were slightly more favorable towards governmental participation. Morocco with a mean score of 8.07 was the country with the highest average of participants who agreed that the government should take more responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for. Moreover, Jordan, Tanzania, Iraq, Azerbaijan, South Korea, Pakistan, the Russian Federation, and Iran all partially agreed with this. The only country in which respondents agreed with the idea that people should take more responsibility to provide for themselves was France. Furthermore, respondents in Great Britain, Sweden, the Netherlands, New Zealand, and the United States were in relative agreement with the importance people play in the issue of responsibility. All countries of this group are developed societies while most supporters of government responsibility such as Morocco, Jordan, Tanzania, Iraq, and Azerbaijan are developing countries. The other 45 societies with mean scores between 5.03 and 6.98 were in the middle of the scale and significantly belonged to neither of the poles; however, participants in Bulgaria,

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Religiosity, Market Economics, Civil Society Table 2.7 Comparison of the mean score of attitudes toward responsibility of people vs. government responsibility to provide for people among 60 societies Rank

Society

Responsibility of people

Rank

Responsibility of people vs. government

responsibility

responsibility

1 2 3 4

Morocco Jordan Tanzania Iraq

8.07 7.64 7.48 7.42

31 32 33 34

5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17

Azerbaijan South Korea Pakistan Russian Federation Iran Bulgaria Japan Ukraine Hong Kong Germany (East) Nigeria Brazil SrpSka-Serbian Republic of Bosnia Burkina Faso Egypt Spain Kyrgyzstan India Zambia Colombia Albania Germany (West) Ghana Italy Chile Turkey

7.41 7.38 7.13 7.13 7.08 6.98 6.97 6.97 6.89 6.87 6.77 6.69 6.68 6.59 6.58 6.58 6.54 6.53 6.52 6.48 6.40 6.30 6.28 6.23 6.22 6.21

18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30

Society

vs. government

6.14 6.11 6.09 6.07

35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47

Poland Algeria Argentina Bosnian Federation Romania South Africa Norway Mali Taiwan Mexico China Malaysia Bangladesh Indonesia Venezuela Philippines Saudi Arabia

48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60

Australia Peru Viet Nam Thailand Canada Finland Switzerland United States New Zealand Netherlands Sweden Great Britain France

5.19 5.17 5.10 5.06 5.05 5.05 5.03 4.99 4.74 4.68 4.53 4.45 3.99

6.07 6.00 5.91 5.90 5.89 5.67 5.65 5.62 5.56 5.54 5.45 5.41 5.20

Note: This question has been scaled from 1–10 in which 1= strongly agree with responsibility of individuals to provide for themselves and 10= strongly agree with responsibility of government to provide for people.

0

FR GB SE NL NZ US CH FI CA TH VN PE AU SA PH VE ID BD MY CN MX TW ML NO ZA RO BA-F AR DZ PL TR CL IT GH DE-W AL CO ZM IN KG ES EG BF BA BR NG DE-E HK UA JP BG IR PK RU KR AZ IQ TZ JO MA

Figure 2.3 The mean score of attitudes toward responsibility of individuals vs. government responsibility to provide for people Note: This question has been scaled from 1-10 in which 1 = strongly agree with responsibility of individuals to provide for themselves and 10 = strongly agree with responsibility of government to provide for people.

Mean Score

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

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Japan, Ukraine, Hong Kong, East Germany, and Nigeria tended to favor the role of the state to provide for the public. Notably, standard deviation in developing countries such as India, Venezuela, Mexico, Bangladesh, Tanzania, Colombia, Argentina, Kyrgyzstan, Mali, and Ghana was relatively large which indicates that attitudes towards the responsibility of individuals vs. government responsibility to provide for people in these countries was very divergent from the average response. In these cases, percentages (presented in Table 2.6 and in Table A.2.5 in Appendix 2) are more representative than the mean score. On the other hand Hong Kong, Pakistan, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Morocco had a relatively small standard deviation which shows that the attitudes in these societies were clustered closely around the mean. Income Equality versus Income Differences The third economic question was about income equality. Participants were asked to place their views on a ten-point scale in which 1 meant completely agreement with the idea that incomes should be made more equal and 10 meant completely agreement with the statement that we need larger income differences as incentives. Table A.2.6 (in Appendix 2) presents the descriptive statistics of this variable. To gain a better perspective of those who voted for larger income differences in various countries, points 8 and 9 and 10 of the scale were added together. A brief look at this extreme of the scale shows countries around the world in which participants agreed more or less strongly that larger income differences are necessary as incentives in economic activities. Table 2.8 displays the comparative results. It should be stated here that overall 24.5 per cent of respondents strongly or relatively strongly believed that incomes should be made more equal. On the other hand, 37.1 per cent felt strongly or relatively strongly that people need larger income differences as incentives. The remaining 38.4 per cent fell in between. Also Table A.2.7 (in Appendix 2) shows the frequency distribution of agreement with income equality among 60 societies. As can be seen in the table more than any others, Egyptian respondents with 76.7 per cent strongly agreed or agreed with the necessity of larger income differences as incentives in economic activities. Ghana with 70.4 per cent took second place. Algeria (67.5 per cent), Jordan (62.3 per cent), Peru (61.7 per cent), and Mali (61.2 per cent) each with more than 60 per cent all revealed considerable sympathy for income differences. The idea was also supported by 57.6 per cent of respondents in Bangladesh, 55.2 per cent in Nigeria, 53.3 per cent in Burkina Faso, and 52.7 per cent in Indonesia. The proportion of ­respondents who strongly agreed or agreed with income differences was 49.7 per cent in Poland, 46.8 per cent in Ukraine, 45.4 per cent in Mexico, 44.7 per

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Table 2.8 Comparison of the frequency distribution of agreement with larger income differences among 60 societies Rank Society

Income differences

Rank

Society

Income differences

1 2

Egypt Ghana

76.7 70.4

31 32

33.8 32.6

3 4 5

Algeria Jordan Peru

67.5 62.3 61.7

33 34 35

6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30

Mali Bangladesh Nigeria Burkina Faso Indonesia Poland Ukraine Mexico Taiwan South Korea Thailand Iraq Philippines Russian Federation Saudi Arabia Zambia Malaysia Viet Nam China Colombia Venezuela South Africa Brazil Sweden Tanzania

61.2 57.6 55.2 53.3 52.7 49.7 46.8 45.4 44.7 43.9 43.7 43.4 42.2 41.4 40.5 39.9 39.4 39.4 39.1 39.0 37.9 36.3 35.9 34.7 33.9

36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60

Azerbaijan SrpSka-Serbian Republic of Bosnia Argentina Kyrgyzstan Bosnian Federation Bulgaria Netherlands Italy Spain Albania Great Britain Morocco Turkey United States India Australia Canada Japan France New Zealand Romania Chile Iran Germany (West) Norway Finland Germany (East) Switzerland Pakistan Hong Kong

Note: The numbers are percentage.

32.0 31.9 30.6 29.5 28.7 28.5 28.4 27.7 27.6 27.5 27.1 27.0 26.8 26.4 25.9 25.2 24.8 24.4 24.2 23.6 18.3 18.0 16.8 14.8 8.8 8.2 3.9 1.8

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cent in Taiwan, 43.9 per cent in South Korea, 43.7 per cent in Thailand, 43.4 per cent in Iraq, 42.2 per cent in the Philippines, 41.4 per cent in the Russian Federation, and 40.5 per cent in Saudi Arabia. Over one-third of those interviewed in Zambia, Malaysia, Viet Nam, China, Colombia, Venezuela, South Africa, Brazil, Sweden, Tanzania, Azerbaijan, SrpSka-Serbian Republic of Bosnia, Argentina, Kyrgyzstan, and the Bosnian Federation strongly agreed or agreed with income differences. Remarkably, relatively few respondents from the developed countries in question (between 8.2 per cent in Switzerland and 28.7 per cent in the Netherlands) voted for larger income differences, with the exception of Sweden (34.7 per cent). In other words, respondents in the first country in the table (Egypt), which is a developing country, believed more than twice as much as the first developed country in the table that larger variances in income motivate individuals and increase their economic performance. Finally, Hong Kong (1.8 per cent) and then Pakistan (3.9 per cent) were societies which least convinced that larger income differences are necessary as incentives in business. In this case it is also possible to compare the mean scores. Table  2.9 presents the rank-ordered mean scores of the compared societies. Notably, the grand mean score (5.97) shows that the average of those who responded was in the middle of scale, although they tended to favor income equality (see Figure 2.4). We will now study this information in more detail. As can be seen from the table above, the average Egyptian and Algerian res­ pondents agreed that larger income differences have a motivational role. Participants from Ghana, Bangladesh, Mali, Peru, Indonesia, Burkina Faso, and Thailand partially agreed with this. On the other hand, the mean score in Finland, Tanzania, Turkey, West Germany, France, India, Chile, Hong Kong, Romania, and Iran demonstrates that participants were only in relative agreement and in East Germany, Pakistan, and Switzerland they agreed that incomes should be made more equal. All other societies were in the middle of the scale and did not decide conclusively one way or the other. Data from this table can be compared with the data in Table 2.8 which shows developed countries were not well disposed towards income differences. Moreover, we find confirmation for what was mentioned above concerning the difference between developed and developing countries in this regard when we compare the mean score of Egypt (8.23) and the Netherlands (6.18) with close standard deviation (2.051 for Egypt and 2.025 for the Netherlands), which means the observations are quite evenly spread in both countries. Further analysis of the data shows that in the developing countries of Tanzania, India, Jordan, Colombia, Venezuela, Mexico, and Argentina approaches towards desirability of income equality vs. larger income differences were not evenly distributed and were not close to the

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Table 2.9 Comparison of the mean score of attitudes toward desirability of income equality vs. larger income differences among 60 societies Rank

Society

Income equality

Rank

Society

Income equality

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

Egypt Algeria Ghana Bangladesh Mali Peru Indonesia Burkina Faso Thailand Jordan Ukraine Taiwan Nigeria Poland Saudi Arabia Malaysia South Korea Philippines Russian Federation Zambia Netherlands United States Japan Mexico SrpSka-Serbian Republic of Bosnia Sweden Bosnian Federation Viet Nam Albania Italy

8.23 8.09 7.76 7.56 7.53 7.48 7.37 7.07 7.07 6.97 6.88 6.85 6.78 6.78 6.72 6.66 6.59 6.56 6.46 6.23 6.18 6.18 6.15 6.11 6.11

31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55

Azerbaijan China Brazil Australia Bulgaria South Africa Spain Canada Great Britain Venezuela Colombia Kyrgyzstan New Zealand Iraq Morocco Argentina Norway Finland Tanzania Turkey Germany (West) France India Chile Hong Kong

5.90 5.77 5.68 5.67 5.67 5.67 5.65 5.64 5.60 5.58 5.50 5.44 5.43 5.42 5.35 5.33 5.07 4.98 4.98 4.97 4.96 4.85 4.79 4.78 4.78

6.09 6.08 5.98 5.96 5.94

56 57 58 59 60

Romania Iran Germany (East) Pakistan Switzerland

4.66 4.17 3.89 3.83 3.63

26 27 28 29 30

Note: This question has been scaled from 1–10 in which 1= strongly agree that incomes should be made more equal and 10= strongly believe that we need larger income differences as incentives.

CH PK DE-E IR RO HK CL IN FR DE-W TR TZ FI NO AR MA IQ NZ KG CO VE GB CA ES ZA BG AU BR CN AZ IT AL VN BA-F SE BA MX JP US NL ZM RU PH KR MY SA PL NG TW UA JO TH BG ID PE ML BD GH DZ EG

Mean Score

Figure 2.4 The mean score of attitudes toward desirability of income equality vs. larger income differences Note: This question has been scaled from 1-10 in which 1 = strongly agree with incomes should be made more equal and 10 = strongly believe that we need larger income differences as incentives.

9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0

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average response. In these cases, the percentages given in Table  2.8 and Table A.2.7 (in Appendix  2) are more reliable than the mean scores. This is while in some other developing societies such as Thailand, Hong Kong, as well as Egypt, Pakistan, Kyrgyzstan, Malaysia, and in some industrial societies like the Netherlands, the United States, and Japan, a relatively small standard deviation indicates a stronger consistency among the responses. Utility of Competition versus Harmfulness of Competition The fourth question aimed at measuring attitudes towards a free market economy was about the role of competition. There was a ten-point scale in which 1 meant completely agreement with the idea that competition is good and it stimulates people to work hard and develop new ideas, and 10 meant completely agreement with the statement that competition is harmful and it brings out the worst in people. Table A.2.8 (in Appendix 2) presents the descriptive statistics of this variable. To compare the frequency distribution of the compared societies, points 1 and 2 and 3 were added together. Table 2.10 presents rank-ordered responses according to completely agreement or agreement with the utility of competition. Significantly, more than half of respondents overall (53.0 per cent) in 60 societies strongly or relatively strongly agreed with competition. On the other hand, only 9.8 per cent strongly or relatively strongly agreed that competition is harmful. The remaining 37.2 per cent were in between. As data in Table 2.10 clearly shows, an overwhelming majority of respondents interviewed around the world believed that competition stimulates people to work hard and develop new ideas. In Jordan, Ghana, and India more than 70 per cent strongly agreed or agreed with this notion. This view was also shared by more than 60 per cent of respondents from Nigeria, Tanzania, Albania, Bangladesh, Mexico, Romania, the Bosnian Federation, SrpSka-Serbian Republic of Bosnia, New Zealand, China, and Sweden. Similarly, more than 50 per cent of responses from Peru, Kyrgyzstan, Venezuela, Indonesia, Colombia, Norway, the United States, Mali, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, South Africa, Burkina Faso, Switzerland, Zambia, South Korea, East Germany, Australia, and Taiwan were positive, and the figure for Canada, Morocco, the Russian Federation, Brazil, Malaysia, West Germany, the Philippines, Turkey, Great Britain, Finland, Viet Nam, and Argentina was more than 40 per cent. Likewise, more than 30 per cent of respondents in Spain, Italy, Ukraine, Poland, France, Japan, and Thailand, and more than 20 per cent in Chile, and the Netherlands considered competition as an incentive for diligence and innovation. Hong Kong was the only society in which a relatively small percentage (13.3 per cent) strongly agreed with Utility of competition.

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Religiosity, Market Economics, Civil Society Table 2.10 Comparison of the frequency distribution of agreement with utility of competition among 60 societies Rank Society

Competition is good

Rank Society

Competition is good

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12

76.4 74.8 72.1 69.2 69.0 68.1 67.6 65.8 65.1 64.6 63.1 62.6

31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42

Germany (East) Australia Taiwan Canada Morocco Russian Federation Brazil Malaysia Germany (West) Philippines Turkey Great Britain

50.8 50.6 50.6 49.7 48.2 47.7 46.4 44.4 43.8 43.6 43.6 43.3

61.8 61.0 60.4 59.4 59.0 56.9 56.1 56.0 55.8 55.8 55.7 55.5 55.5 55.5 55.2 53.2 51.9 51.7

43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60

Finland Viet Nam Argentina Spain Italy Ukraine Poland France Japan Thailand Chile Netherlands Hong Kong Algeria Egypt Iraq Pakistan Saudi Arabia

43.2 41.9 40.2 38.9 37.7 37.6 36.2 36.1 34.8 34.4 29.8 29.5 13.3 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.

13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30

Jordan Ghana India Iran Nigeria Tanzania Albania Bangladesh Mexico Romania Bosnian Federation SrpSka-Serbian Republic of Bosnia New Zealand China Sweden Peru Kyrgyzstan Venezuela Indonesia Colombia Norway United States Mali Azerbaijan Bulgaria South Africa Burkina Faso Switzerland Zambia South Korea

Note: The numbers are percentage. The question of attitudes toward utility vs. harmfulness of competition was not asked in Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia.

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On the other hand, in order to show in which countries competition was considered harmful, percentage of respondents who indicated that they agreed more or less strongly with the harmfulness of competition was added together. Table A.2.9 (in Appendix 2) compares these results. This table clearly reveals that the idea that competition is harmful overall was not common. What is interesting here is that France was the first developed country in the ranking in which a significant minority (19.3 per cent) indicated that competition brings out the worst in people. The next developed countries in the ranking were Italy and the Netherlands with approximately 10 per cent difference. Further descriptive statistics and in particular the mean score of the countries can help us to have a better comparative perspective of the 60 societies around the world. Table 2.11 presents the rank-ordered mean scores. It is worth mentioning that the grand mean score of compared societies (3.70) reveals that the average of respondents overall felt that competition is good and it stimulates people to work hard and develop new ideas (see Figure 2.5). This table is quite different in several ways. First, unlike the other similar tables there is no undecided zone, which means no one of mean scores is in the middle of the scale. Second, all of the compared societies are on the right side of the scale. This means the average of participants of no society felt that competition is harmful and brings out the worst in people. Third, all of the compared societies fall into two groups. The first group of societies agreed with the statement that competition is good and it stimulates people to work hard and develop new ideas. These societies were Jordan, Ghana, India, Bangladesh, the Bosnian Federation, Nigeria, Iran, Albania, Romania, Tanzania, SrpSka-Serbian Republic of Bosnia, Mexico, New Zealand, Sweden, Peru, Burkina Faso, the United States, Indonesia, China, Norway, Bulgaria, Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, Colombia, Mali, Taiwan, East Germany, South Africa, Australia, Viet Nam, Switzerland, Hong Kong, Venezuela, Canada, South Korea, and the Russian Federation. The second group partially agreed on the utility of competition. These societies were Morocco, Finland, the Philippines, Great Britain, Zambia, Malaysia, West Germany, Brazil, Turkey, Spain, Japan, Italy, Ukraine, the Netherlands, Argentina, France, Thailand, Chile, and Poland. A brief look at the further comparative results reveals that the distribution of opinions about the utility or harmfulness of competition in Hong Kong, Norway, Sweden, Finland, Spain, the United States, and Albania were close to the average response. On the other hand, in Argentina, Tanzania, Zambia, Venezuela, Mali, Colombia, Mexico, and Brazil the opinions were widely spread over a relatively large range. Therefore, in these countries the frequency distribution of answers, which are listed in Table  2.11 and in Table A.2.9 (in Appendix 2), are more properly representative of the dispersion of ideas.

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Religiosity, Market Economics, Civil Society Table 2.11 Comparison of the mean score of attitudes toward utility vs. harmfulness of competition among 60 societies Rank Society

Competition good or harmful

Rank Society

Competition good or harmful

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15

Poland Chile Thailand France Argentina Netherlands Ukraine Italy Japan Spain Turkey Brazil Germany (West) Malaysia Zambia

4.89 4.86 4.75 4.73 4.71 4.68 4.61 4.42 4.30 4.20 4.20 4.19 4.15 4.15 4.09

31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45

3.68 3.67 3.59 3.51 3.51 3.49 3.47 3.44 3.43 3.41 3.41 3.38 3.27 3.22 3.14

16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30

Great Britain Philippines Finland Morocco Russian Federation South Korea Canada Venezuela Hong Kong Switzerland Viet Nam Australia South Africa Germany (East) Taiwan

4.08 4.06 4.04 4.03 3.90 3.88 3.84 3.84 3.81 3.79 3.78 3.77 3.76 3.75 3.74

46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60

Mali Colombia Kyrgyzstan Azerbaijan Bulgaria Norway China Indonesia United States Burkina Faso Peru Sweden New Zealand Mexico SrpSka-Serbian Republic of Bosnia Tanzania Romania Albania Iran Nigeria Bosnian Federation Bangladesh India Ghana Jordan Algeria Egypt Iraq Pakistan Saudi Arabia

3.10 3.09 2.97 2.96 2.94 2.88 2.87 2.78 2.69 2.44 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.

Note: This question has been scaled from 1–10 in which 1= strongly agree that competition is good and 10= strongly agree that competition is harmful. The question was not asked in Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia.

0

JO GH IN BD BA-F NG IR AL RO TZ BA MX NZ SE PE BF US ID CN NO BG AZ KG CO ML TW DE-E ZA AU VN CH HK VE CA KR RU MA FI PH GB ZM MY DE-W BR TR ES JP IT UA NL AR FR

CL PL

TH

Figure 2.5 The mean score of attitudes toward utility vs. harmfulness of competition Note: This question has been scaled from 1-10 in which 1 = strongly agree with that competition is good and 10 = strongly agree that competition is harmful. The question was not asked in Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia.

Mean Score

1

2

3

4

5

6

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At the end of this chapter it is worth noting that the greatest dispersion of attitudes about factors compatible with free economy from the average mean was observed in Tanzania, Colombia, Venezuela, and India. The least dispersion was found in Hong Kong and in three factors in the United States, the Netherlands, and Pakistan. After reviewing the descriptive statistics of the first dependent variable, namely attitudes towards a free market economy, we shall now turn to the second dependent variable, namely confidence in civil society.

Confidence in Civil Society Organizations in Cross-National Comparison

The second dependent variable in this study was trust in civil society as an undeniable principle of democracy. Confidence in five different kinds of civil organizations, namely confidence in churches (religious institutions), labor unions, political parties, the environmental protection movement, and the women’s movement were compared in 60 societies. This section will report on the descriptive statistics of trust in the activities of these non-governmental organizations. The additional descriptive statistics used include size of overall data set (N), frequency distribution, minimum, maximum, mean, variance, standard deviation (sd), skewness, and kurtosis (see Appendix 2). In order to have a wide-ranging view of the compared societies in this regard, we compared firstly the frequency distribution of the questions and then the mean scores. Confidence in Religious Institutions The first non-governmental organization in question was the church. People were asked how much confidence they had in the church, mosque, temple or other similar religious institutions: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence, or none at all. Table A.2.10 (in Appendix 2) shows the descriptive statistics of all 60 societies in detail. It is noteworthy that confidence in religious institutions overall, was high. More than 70 per cent of respondents in all 60 societies around the world had a great deal or quite a lot of confidence in the church, mosque, temple or other similar religious institutions and nearly 30 per cent did not have very much or did not have any confidence in them. Rank-ordered frequency distribution of trust in religious institutions gives us a comparative perspective of the societies. Table  2.12 provides this perspective. In this table percentages of ‘a great deal of confidence, and quite a lot of confidence’ in religious institutions were added together.

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Table 2.12 Comparison of the frequency distribution of confidence in religious institutions among 60 societies Rank

Society

Confidence in religious institutions

Rank

Society

Confidence in religious institutions

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11

Bangladesh Saudi Arabia Indonesia Jordan Mali Tanzania Philippines Malaysia Morocco Ghana Algeria

98.6 96.7 94.4 93.8 92.9 92.8 91.2 90.9 90.9 90.3 89.0

31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41

69.4 67.9 67.5 66.7 66.4 65.9 63.7 63.2 60.8 56.3 54.7

12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30

Pakistan Romania Zambia Egypt South Africa India Nigeria Colombia Burkina Faso Brazil Iraq Venezuela Iran Italy Azerbaijan Poland Ukraine Turkey Mexico

88.2 88.1 87.3 84.0 83.9 83.4 83.2 80.4 79.9 77.8 77.0 76.5 75.0 74.8 72.2 71.9 71.9 70.7 70.4

42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60

Thailand Chile Kyrgyzstan United States Albania Russian Federation Finland Canada Bulgaria Sweden SrpSka-Serbian Republic of Bosnia Viet Nam Peru Argentina Norway South Korea Switzerland Germany (West) France Great Britain New Zealand Bosnian Federation Australia China Spain Taiwan Netherlands Germany (East) Japan Hong Kong

54.4 52.2 50.8 50.5 49.8 48.5 48.4 46.8 45.3 40.9 39.6 38.8 38.0 32.5 31.7 30.3 27.9 8.8 n.a.

Note: The numbers are percentage. The question of confidence in religious institutions was not asked in Hong Kong.

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As the table illustrates, in 10 countries more than 90 per cent of participants said that they have a great deal of or quite a lot of confidence in the church, mosque, temple or other similar religious institutions. These countries were Bangladesh (98.6 per cent), Saudi Arabia (96.7 per cent), Indonesia (94.4 per cent), Jordan (93.8 per cent), Mali (92.9 per cent), Tanzania (92.8 per cent), the Philippines (91.2 per cent), Malaysia (90.9 per cent), Morocco (90.9 per cent), and Ghana (90.3 per cent). Except for Tanzania, the Philippines and Ghana, all other countries in this group are predominantly Islamic. The next 9 countries in the ranking registered between 80 and 89 per cent confidence in religious institutions. This group of countries includes Algeria (89.0 per cent), Pakistan (88.2 per cent), Romania (88.1 per cent), Zambia (87.3 per cent), Egypt (84.0 per cent), South Africa (83.9 per cent), India (83.4 per cent), Nigeria (83.2 per cent), and Colombia (80.4 per cent). These countries were followed by: Burkina Faso (79.9 per cent), Brazil (77.8 per cent), Iraq (77.0 per cent), Venezuela (76.5 per cent), Iran (75.0 per cent), Italy (74.8 per cent), Azerbaijan (72.2 per cent), Poland (71.9 per cent), Ukraine (71.9 per cent), Turkey (70.7 per cent), and Mexico (70.4 per cent). Between 60.8 and 69.4 per cent trust in religious institutions was reported in Thailand, Chile, Kyrgyzstan, the United States, Albania, the Russian Federation, Finland, Canada, and Bulgaria. Over half of participants in Sweden, SrpSka-Serbian Republic of Bosnia, Viet Nam, Peru, Argentina, and Norway as well as more than 40 per cent in South Korea, Switzerland, West Germany, France, Great Britain, New Zealand had a great deal of or quite a lot of confidence in the church, mosque, temple or other similar religious institutions. Except for Japan, about one-third of participants in all remaining societies, including the Bosnian Federation, Australia, China, Spain, Taiwan, Netherlands, and East Germany indicated that they have a great deal of or quite a lot of confidence in religious organizations. Japan with only 8.8 per cent was the single country in which the overwhelming majority of those interviewed said that they do not have very much confidence or no confidence at all in religious institutions. It is noteworthy that with the exception of the Bosnian Federation (39.6 per cent), confidence in religious institutions in all other Islamic societies was more than 65 per cent. As mentioned already, the lowest rate of confidence in religious institutions among predominantly Islamic societies was 39.6 per cent (in the Bosnian Federation), while the lowest rate among predominantly Christian societies was 27.9 per cent (in East Germany) and among predominantly Buddhist, Hindu, and folk-religion societies 8.8 per cent (in Japan). Data from Table 2.12 can be compared with the data in Table 2.13 that demonstrates rank-ordered mean scores of the compared societies and endorses, with some slight variations, the obtained results from the frequency distribution

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Table 2.13 Comparison of the mean score of confidence in religious institutions among 60 societies Rank Society

Confidence in religious institutions

Rank Society

Confidence in religious institutions

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30

3.39 3.00 2.91 2.84 2.81 2.77 2.69 2.69 2.68 2.68 2.57 2.56 2.55 2.53 2.48 2.46 2.45 2.36 2.34 2.31 2.29 2.28 2.24 2.21 2.18 2.16 2.16 2.15 2.13 2.12

31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60

2.11 2.10 2.06 2.01 2.01 2.00 1.84 1.82 1.80 1.78 1.71 1.68 1.67 1.64 1.59 1.57 1.55 1.55 1.52 1.45 1.44 1.44 1.42 1.42 1.38 1.37 1.36 1.19 1.12 n.a.

Japan Germany (East) Netherlands Spain Taiwan China Australia Bosnian Federation France New Zealand Germany (West) Switzerland Great Britain Norway South Korea Argentina Sweden SrpSka-Serbian Republic of Bosnia Bulgaria Viet Nam Finland Peru Canada Russian Federation Azerbaijan Albania Ukraine United States Thailand Chile

Turkey Kyrgyzstan Italy Brazil Mexico Poland Iran Iraq Venezuela Burkina Faso Colombia Egypt India South Africa Zambia Nigeria Malaysia Romania Algeria Philippines Morocco Tanzania Ghana Pakistan Mali Indonesia Jordan Saudi Arabia Bangladesh Hong Kong

Note: This question has been scaled from 1–4 in which 1= A great deal confidence in religious institutions and 4= No confidence at all in religious institutions. The question was not asked in Hong Kong.

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in Table 2.12. It should be said that the overall mean score of all compared societies (1.99) confirms quite a lot of confidence in religious institutions around the world (see Figure  2.6). As shown in Table  2.13 only in Japan and East Germany did the average of respondents not have very much confidence in religious institutions. The average of participants in Bangladesh, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Indonesia, Mali, Pakistan, Ghana, Tanzania, Morocco, the Philippines, Algeria, Romania, Malaysia, Nigeria, Zambia, South Africa, India, Egypt, Colombia, Burkina Faso, Venezuela, Iraq, and Iran had a great deal of confidence in the church, mosque, temple or other similar religious institutions. Likewise, the mean score in all other societies show quite a lot of confidence in reli­gious   organizations. These societies included Poland, Mexico, Brazil, Italy, Kyrgyzstan, Turkey, Chile, Thailand, the United States, Ukraine, Albania, Azerbaijan, the Russian Federation, Canada, Peru, Finland, Viet Nam, Bulgaria, SrpSka-Serbian Republic of Bosnia, Sweden, Argentina, South Korea, Norway, Great Britain, Switzerland, West Germany, New Zealand, France, the Bosnian Federation, Australia, China, Taiwan, Spain, and the Netherlands. Interestingly, as the very tight standard deviation values show (see Table A.2.10 in Appendix  2), confidence in religious institutions overall closely concentrated about the mean. In this regard particularly Bangladesh, Saudi Arabia, and India are to be named. Confidence in Labor Unions Confidence in labor unions was the second indicator of confidence in civil society. People were asked how much confidence they have in labor unions: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence, or none at all. Table A.2.11 (in Appendix 2) displays the details of descriptive statistics for all compared societies. Preliminary statistical analysis tells us that 58.5 per cent of respondents in all the compared societies did not have very much or did not have any confidence, and 41.5 per cent had a great deal or quite a lot of confidence in labor unions. Table 2.14 presents the rank-ordered frequency distribution of a great deal and a lot of confidence in labor unions and allows a comparison between societies. As can be seen from the table, the rate of confidence in labor unions in Viet Nam with 91.1 per cent was higher than in any other society. China with 74.3 per cent was ranked second followed by Bangladesh with 71.9 per cent. The rate of a great deal and a lot of confidence in labor unions in Tanzania, Egypt, Norway, Malaysia, Finland, and Jordan was between 61.9 and 69.8 per cent. This rate was between 50.3 and 56.1 per cent in Mali, the Philippines, India, Burkina Faso, Hong Kong, Sweden, and Ghana. Approximately 40 per cent of respondents in Nigeria, South Africa, the Netherlands, Brazil, Indonesia, the Russian

0

BD SA JO ID ML PK GH TZ MA PH DZ RO MY NG ZM ZA IN EG CO BF VE IQ IR PL MX BR IT KG TR CL TH US UA AL AZ RU CA PE FI VN BG BA SE AR KR NO GB CH DE-W NZ FR BA-F AU CN TW ES NL DE-E JP

Figure 2.6 The mean score of confidence in religious institutions Note: This question has been scaled from 1-4 in which 1=A great deal confidence in religious institutions and 4 = No confidence at all in religious institutions. The question was not asked in Hong Kong.

Mean Score

0.5

1

1.5

2

2.5

3

3.5

4

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Table 2.14 Comparison of the frequency distribution of confidence in labor unions among 60 societies Rank

Society

Confidence in labor unions

Rank

Society

Confidence in labor unions

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21

Viet Nam China Bangladesh Tanzania Egypt Norway Malaysia Finland Jordan Mali Philippines India Burkina Faso Hong Kong Sweden Ghana Nigeria South Africa Netherlands Brazil Indonesia

91.1 74.3 71.9 69.8 67.6 66.0 64.0 63.0 61.9 56.1 56.1 54.4 53.2 53.0 51.8 50.3 47.6 46.9 46.8 46.0 45.2

31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51

37.1 34.8 34.2 34.0 33.9 32.5 32.5 30.8 30.4 29.8 29.7 29.7 29.2 29.1 28.8 28.5 28.4 28.1 27.9 27.1 26.5

22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30

Russian Federation Switzerland Morocco Turkey South Korea Kyrgyzstan France Ukraine Japan

43.3 43.3 41.9 41.9 41.5 39.3 38.9 37.9 37.8

52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60

Chile Germany (West) Italy Canada Thailand Albania Zambia Mexico Great Britain Azerbaijan Romania Spain United States Algeria Australia Germany (East) Poland New Zealand Colombia Taiwan SrpSka-Serbian Republic of Bosnia Pakistan Iran Venezuela Bulgaria Bosnian Federation Peru Argentina Iraq Saudi Arabia

26.0 25.9 23.1 22.8 16.0 13.4 6.6 n.a. n.a.

Note: The numbers are percentage. The question of confidence in labor unions was not asked in Iraq and Saudi Arabia.

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Federation, Switzerland, Morocco, Turkey, and South Korea, and likewise about a third (between 30.4 and 39.3 per cent) of those in Kyrgyzstan, France, Ukraine, Japan, Chile, West Germany, Italy, Canada, Thailand, Albania, Zambia, Mexico, and Great Britain trusted in labor unions. All remaining societies had less than 30 per cent confidence in labor unions. The lowest rate of trust in labor unions was to be found in countries from South America, namely Argentina with 6.6 per cent and Peru with 13.4 per cent. Table 2.15 provides the possibility of a country comparison referring to their mean score. Viet Nam is the only country in which the average of respondents had a great deal confidence in labor unions. The mean score of responses in Argentina, Peru, Venezuela, Bulgaria, Algeria, and Colombia shows that the rate of confidence in labor unions was not very high there. In other words, they said they do not have very much confidence in labor unions. All remaining societies had on average quite a lot of confidence in labor unions as the grand mean of compared societies (2.68) endorses (see Figure  2.7). Further analysis shows that overall in the 60 compared societies the answers to the question of confidence in labor unions were very close to mean (see Table A.2.11 in Appendix 2). Confidence in Political Parties The third factor in the measurement of trust in civil society was confidence in political parties as major and decisive civil organizations. People were asked how much confidence they have in political parties: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence, or none at all. Table A.2.12 (in Appendix  2) presents descriptive statistics of this variable. The most interesting result of the descriptive statistics here is that in general confidence in the political parties is relatively low. Only 30.3 per cent of respondents overall admitted to having a great deal or quite a lot of confidence in the political parties whereas 69.7 per cent had just a little confidence or no confidence at all. To compare confidence in political parties between the 60 societies around the world, totals claiming a great deal and quite a lot of confidence in political parties were added together. Table 2.16 presents a rank-ordered frequency distribution of these two categories. From the table we can see that the rate of confidence in political parties globally differed considerably. While, 93.8 per cent of Vietnamese, 87.8 per cent of Chinese, and 79.0 per cent of Bangladeshi respondents trusted political parties, only 4.6 per cent of Peruvian, 7.1 per cent of Polish, and 7.2 per cent of Argentinian participants as well as 8.3 per cent of participants in East Germany expressed confidence in political parties. Furthermore, only between 10 and 15.5 per cent of those interviewed in Taiwan, the Bosnian Federation, Romania, Australia, New Zealand, and the United

0

VN TZ CN EG BD JO MY NO ML FI IN PH HK GH BF NG SE ID ZA NL KR MA BR CH RU JP IR TH TH UA KG FR CA CL DE-W IT ZM US ES BA PL PK GB AZ TW AU NZ DE-E AL RO MX BA-F CO DZ BG VE PE AR

Figure 2.7 The mean score of confidence in labor unions Note: This question has been scaled from 1-4 in which 1=A great deal confidence and 4 = None at all confidence in labor unions. The question of confidence in labor unions was not asked in Iraq and Saudi Arabia

Mean Score

0.5

1

1.5

2

2.5

3

3.5

4

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Table 2.15 Comparison of the mean score of confidence in labor unions among 60 societies Rank Society

Confidence in labor unions

Rank Society

Confidence in labor unions

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30

3.41 3.21 3.20 3.15 3.07 3.05 2.99 2.97 2.94 2.93 2.92 2.92 2.90 2.89 2.88 2.88 2.88 2.87 2.86 2.85 2.84 2.84 2.83 2.82 2.81 2.80 2.80 2.76 2.75 2.74

31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60

2.73 2.72 2.72 2.72 2.68 2.67 2.66 2.65 2.62 2.57 2.54 2.53 2.50 2.46 2.46 2.45 2.38 2.37 2.36 2.35 2.34 2.29 2.22 2.21 2.18 2.14 2.02 1.58 n.a. n.a.

Argentina Peru Venezuela Bulgaria Algeria Colombia Bosnian Federation Mexico Romania Albania Germany (East) New Zealand Australia Taiwan Azerbaijan Great Britain Pakistan Poland SrpSka-Serbian Republic of Bosnia Spain United States Zambia Italy Germany (West) Chile Canada France Kyrgyzstan Ukraine Thailand

Turkey Iran Japan Russian Federation Switzerland Brazil Morocco South Korea Netherlands South Africa Indonesia Sweden Nigeria Burkina Faso Ghana Hong Kong Philippines India Finland Mali Norway Malaysia Jordan Bangladesh Egypt China Tanzania Viet Nam Iraq Saudi Arabia

Note: This question has been scaled from 1–4 in which 1= A great deal confidence and 4= None at all confidence in labor unions. The question of confidence in labor unions was not asked in Iraq and Saudi Arabia.

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Table 2.16 Comparison of the frequency distribution of confidence in political parties among 60 societies Rank

Society

Confidence in political parties

Rank

Society

Confidence in political parties

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18

Viet Nam China Bangladesh Tanzania Malaysia Azerbaijan Egypt India Philippines Ghana South Africa Mali Morocco Sweden Jordan Turkey Indonesia Albania

93.8 87.8 79.0 59.4 58.3 53.5 50.7 46.4 46.3 40.7 39.8 36.6 36.0 33.4 33.3 32.9 30.5 29.4

31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48

23.3 23.1 22.7 21.4 20.8 20.1 19.4 19.4 19.0 19.0 18.3 18.2 17.8 17.7 16.9 16.5 16.3 16.2

19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30

Finland Burkina Faso Norway Spain Pakistan Hong Kong Switzerland Zambia Kyrgyzstan Nigeria Mexico South Korea

29.1 28.6 28.6 28.5 27.9 27.8 27.6 27.0 25.7 24.5 24.0 23.8

49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60

Thailand Canada Netherlands Brazil Iran Venezuela Colombia Russian Federation Algeria Chile Japan Germany (West) Great Britain Bulgaria Ukraine Italy France SrpSka-Serbian Republic of Bosnia United States New Zealand Australia Romania Bosnian Federation Taiwan Germany (East) Argentina Poland Peru Iraq Saudi Arabia

15.4 14.8 14.3 12.9 11.3 10.3 8.3 7.2 7.1 4.6 n.a. n.a.

Note: The numbers are percentage. The question of confidence in political parties was not asked in Iraq and Saudi Arabia.

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States had a great deal or quite a lot of confidence in political parties. This percentage was about one-fifth for SrpSka-Serbian Republic of Bosnia, France, Italy, Ukraine, Bulgaria, Great Britain, West Germany, Japan, Chile, Algeria, the Russian Federation, Colombia, Venezuela, Iran, Brazil, and the Netherlands, and about a quarter for Canada, Thailand, South Korea, Mexico, Nigeria, Kyrgyzstan, Zambia, Switzerland, Hong Kong, Pakistan Spain, Norway, Burkina Faso, Finland, and Albania. Also about one-third of respondents in Indonesia, Turkey, Jordan, Sweden, Morocco, Mali, South Africa and nearly half or more than half of participants in Ghana, the Philippines, India, Egypt, Azerbaijan, Malaysia, and Tanzania had a great deal or quite a lot of confidence in political parties. To allow the comparison from a different perspective, the mean score of societies can be useful. Table  2.17 offers rank-ordered mean scores of the compared societies. A quick look at the table reveals that the average of respondents in Viet Nam, China, and Bangladesh indicated that they have a great deal of confidence in political parties. The average of respondents in Albania, South Korea, the United States, the Netherlands, Pakistan, Canada, Jordan, Zambia, Iran, Turkey, Thailand, Finland, Spain, Switzerland, Mali, Morocco, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Norway, Sweden, South Africa, Ghana, the Philippines, Egypt, India, Azerbaijan, Malaysia, and Tanzania had quite a lot of confidence in political parties. On the other hand, the mean score of many other societies show that the average of their participants did not have very much confidence in political parties and organizations. These societies included Peru, Argentina, Poland, East Germany, Taiwan, Algeria, Venezuela, Romania, the Bosnian Federation, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, France, Bulgaria, Ukraine, the Russian Federation, Mexico, Italy, West Germany, Japan, Great Britain, SrpSka-Serbian Republic of Bosnia, Australia, New Zealand, Nigeria, Burkina Faso, and Kyrgyzstan. It should be noted here that the grand mean for all compared societies (2.88) indicates little confidence in the political parties (see Figure 2.8). Moreover, the values of standard deviations (see Table A.2.12 in Appendix  2) show that the ideas about political parties in Jordan, Mali, Pakistan, and India were relatively far from the mean, compared to the other societies. Confidence in the Environmental Protection Movement The next question aimed at examining confidence in civil society asks people how much confidence they have in the environmental protection movement: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence, or none at all. Table A.2.13 (in Appendix 2) comprises descriptive

VN CN BD TZ MY AZ IN EG PH GH ZA SE NO ID HK MA ML CH ES FI TH TR IR ZM JO CA PK NL US KR AL KG BF NG NZ AU BA GB JP DE-W IT MX RU UA BG FR CO CL BR BA-F RO VE DZ TW DE-E PL AR PE

Mean Score

Figure 2.8 The mean score of confidence in political parties Note: This question has been scaled from 1-4 in which 1=A great deal confidence and 4 = None at all confidence in political parties. This question was not asked in Iraq and Saudi Arabia.

3.5 3 2.5 2 1.5 1 0.5 0

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Table 2.17 Comparison of the mean score of confidence in political parties among 60 societies Rank

Society

Confidence in political parties

Rank

Society

Confidence in political parties

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22

Peru Argentina Poland Germany (East) Taiwan Algeria Venezuela Romania Bosnian Federation Brazil Chile Colombia France Bulgaria Ukraine Russian Federation Mexico Italy Germany (West) Japan Great Britain SrpSka-Serbian Republic of Bosnia Australia New Zealand Nigeria Burkina Faso Kyrgyzstan Albania South Korea United States

3.44 3.42 3.34 3.32 3.32 3.31 3.30 3.27 3.23 3.23 3.23 3.21 3.20 3.19 3.17 3.14 3.12 3.11 3.09 3.06 3.05 3.05

31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52

Netherlands Pakistan Canada Jordan Zambia Iran Turkey Thailand Finland Spain Switzerland Mali Morocco Hong Kong Indonesia Norway Sweden South Africa Ghana Philippines Egypt India

2.96 2.95 2.93 2.93 2.93 2.87 2.87 2.86 2.85 2.85 2.84 2.82 2.82 2.80 2.80 2.77 2.73 2.70 2.67 2.56 2.54 2.54

3.02 3.02 3.02 3.01 3.01 2.99 2.98 2.98

53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60

Azerbaijan Malaysia Tanzania Bangladesh China Viet Nam Iraq Saudi Arabia

2.45 2.39 2.30 1.99 1.81 1.44 n.a. n.a.

23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30

Note: This question has been scaled from 1–4 in which 1= A great deal confidence and 4= None at all confidence in political parties. This question was not asked in Iraq and Saudi Arabia.

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statistics of answers to the question. To compare the rate of confidence in the environmental protection movement between 60 societies, the frequency distribution of two categories, namely a great deal and quite a lot of confidence in the movement, were added together. Table 2.18 shows the rank-ordered results. Remarkably, 60.6 per cent of respondents overall expressed a great deal or quite a lot of confidence in the environmental protection movement while 39.4 per cent did not trust in the movement, totally or partially. As Table 2.18 illustrates, confidence in the environmental movement overall was relatively high. In 47 societies the majority of those who responded felt that the environmental protection movement is greatly or quite trustworthy. About 90 per cent of Vietnamese and more than 80 per cent of Bangladeshi respondents expressed a high level of confidence in the movement. This proportion was over 70 per cent in China, the Russian Federation, Hong Kong, Egypt, the Philippines, Sweden, Mali, Canada, Ghana, Norway, and South Korea, and 60 or more per cent in Great Britain, Jordan, Burkina Faso, Switzerland, Brazil, Venezuela, Italy, Malaysia, South Africa, France, Indonesia, Mexico, Morocco, Chile, India, Tanzania, Argentina, and Australia. In Spain, Poland, West Germany, SrpSka-Serbian Republic of Bosnia, Saudi Arabia, Japan, Taiwan, Finland, Turkey, the Netherlands, Colombia, East Germany, the United States, New Zealand, Nigeria, and Romania scores were at 50 per cent. Zambia, Bulgaria, Iran, Peru, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan registered between 40.3 and 48.3 per cent. Finally, approximately one-third of respondents in the Bosnian Federation, Albania, Pakistan, and Thailand reported that they have a great deal or quite a lot of confidence in the environmental protection movement. Notably, the lowest rate (14.2 per cent) of confidence in the movement was reported in Azerbaijan. Table 2.19 which comprises the rank-ordered mean score of the societies, presents a general view of confidence in the environmental activities of ngos in the compared societies. The table clearly demonstrates that the average of respondents in the overwhelming majority of compared societies indicated that they have quite a lot of confidence in the environmental protection movement (see also Figure 2.9). Additionally, the grand mean score (2.33) expresses the same attitude for all compared societies. The average of Vietnamese, Bangladeshi and Egyptian respondents had a great deal of confidence in this civil movement. It is noteworthy that Azerbaijan is the only country in which the average of respondents did not have very much confidence in the environmental protection movement. Considering the standard deviations (see Table A.2.13 in Appendix 2), it transpires that especially in Hong Kong and Norway ideas about the environmental movement are more closely concentrated around the mean, compared to the other societies.

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Table 2.18 Comparison of the frequency distribution of confidence in the environmental protection movement among 60 societies Rank Society

Confidence in the environ­mental movement

Rank

Society

Confidence in the  envi­ronmental movement

1 2 3 4 5

Viet Nam Bangladesh China Russian Federation Hong Kong

89.6 83.4 78.5 78.5 78.2

31 32 33 34 35

60.0 59.9 59.5 59.1 58.6

6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30

Egypt Philippines Sweden Mali Canada Ghana Norway South Korea Great Britain Jordan Burkina Faso Switzerland Brazil Venezuela Italy Malaysia South Africa France Indonesia Mexico Morocco Chile India Tanzania Argentina

76.8 74.4 74.2 72.8 72.7 72.7 72.7 71.2 69.4 69.4 69.3 69.2 68.3 68.2 67.5 66.7 65.5 64.8 64.5 62.8 62.8 62.3 61.4 61.4 60.4

36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60

Australia Spain Poland Germany (West) SrpSka-Serbian Republic of Bosnia Saudi Arabia Japan Taiwan Finland Turkey Netherlands Colombia Germany (East) United States New Zealand Nigeria Romania Kyrgyzstan Ukraine Peru Iran Bulgaria Zambia Bosnian Federation Albania Pakistan Thailand Azerbaijan Algeria Iraq

58.2 56.9 56.8 56.5 56.1 54.9 54.4 54.0 52.6 51.7 51.4 50.8 48.3 48.2 46.6 44.7 43.3 40.3 39.3 38.0 35.6 31.2 14.2 n.a. n.a.

note: The numbers are percentage. This question was not asked in Algeria and Iraq.

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Confidence in the environmental movement

Rank

Society

Confidence in the environmental movement

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29

3.28 2.80 2.77 2.74 2.73 2.72 2.69 2.60 2.59 2.58 2.53 2.51 2.50 2.50 2.50 2.49 2.47 2.47 2.46 2.46 2.44 2.42 2.41 2.41 2.40 2.38 2.37 2.31 2.31

31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59

Chile Saudi Arabia Italy Indonesia Malaysia South Africa Switzerland Great Britain Morocco South Korea Tanzania Ghana Norway Canada India Sweden Brazil Burkina Faso Hong Kong Venezuela China Jordan Russian Federation Philippines Mali Egypt Bangladesh Viet Nam Algeria

2.29 2.29 2.28 2.27 2.26 2.26 2.26 2.25 2.24 2.24 2.23 2.22 2.21 2.19 2.19 2.19 2.18 2.18 2.16 2.12 2.07 2.05 2.04 2.01 2.00 1.94 1.88 1.63 n.a.

2.30

60

Iraq

n.a.

30

Azerbaijan Thailand Pakistan Bosnian Federation Albania Bulgaria Zambia Kyrgyzstan Romania Ukraine Peru New Zealand Germany (East) Netherlands Turkey United States Colombia Iran Argentina Finland Japan Taiwan Nigeria Spain Poland Germany (West) Australia France SrpSka-Serbian Republic of Bosnia Mexico

note: This question has been scaled from 1–4 in which 1= A great deal confidence and 4= None at all confidence in the environmental protection movement. This question was not asked in Algeria and Iraq.

0

VN BD EG ML PH RU JO CN VE HK BF BR SE IN CA NO GH TZ KR MA GB CH ZA MY ID IT SA CL MX BA FR AU DE-W PL ES NG TW JP FI AR IR CO US TR NL DE-E NZ PE UA RO KG ZM BG AL BA-F PK TH AZ

Figure 2.9 The mean score of confidence in the environmental protection movement note: This question has been scaled from 1-4 in which 1=A great deal confidence and 4 = None at all confidence in the environmental protection movement. This question was not asked in Algeria and Iraq

Mean Score

0.5

1

1.5

2

2.5

3

3.5

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Confidence in the Women’s Movement One of the more important indicators of democracy is the emancipation of women. Today numerous civil society organizations around the world pursue this goal. Do they and their goals inspire confidence in people and to what extent: a great deal, quite a lot, not very much, or none at all? This was the last question in this section. Table A.2.14 (in Appendix 2) shows its descriptive statistics. The first point to be noted here is that overall 58 per cent of participants trusted to a greatly or relatively great degree in the women’s movement. The remaining 42 per cent did not trust in this movement. In order to gain a comparative perspective of confidence in the women’s movement, the frequency distribution of a great deal and quite a lot of confidence in the movement were added together. Table 2.20 offers rank-ordered results. As can be seen from the table the rate of confidence in the women’s movement overall was high. More than 96 per cent of Vietnamese, 84.4 per cent of Chinese, 80.2 per cent of Bangladeshi, and 80 per cent of Tanzanian respondents had a great deal or quite a lot of confidence in the movement. The percentage in the Philippines, Canada, Hong Kong, Egypt, Burkina Faso, the Russian Federation, and Mali was over 70 per cent. Moreover, in Malaysia, Great Britain, South Africa, South Korea, Ghana, Indonesia, Brazil, India, Mexico, Jordan, Finland, Turkey, and Australia it was between 61.2 and 69.9 per cent. Between 50 and 59.8 per cent of respondents in Switzerland, Chile, Norway, Spain, Taiwan, Morocco, West and East Germany, Poland, the United States, SrpSka-Serbian Republic of Bosnia, Nigeria, Ukraine, Zambia, Kyrgyzstan, and Peru had faith in the women’s movement. Venezuela, Sweden, France, the Netherlands, Romania, Colombia, Saudi Arabia, New Zealand, Bulgaria, Italy, and Japan scored between 40 and 49.9 per cent in this regard. The proportion of trust in the movement in Thailand, Argentina, Albania, Iran, the Bosnian Federation, Algeria, and Pakistan was about one-third of respondents. The lowest rate of confidence in the women’s movement was to be found in Azerbaijan with 19.5 per cent. To allow for a better comparison, the mean score of confidence in the women’s movement in 60 compared societies was ordered and presented in Table 2.21. It is apparent from this table that the average of participants of the majority of compared societies had quite a lot of confidence in the women’s movement (see also Figure 2.10). Similarly, the grand mean score (2.38) suggests that the average of respondents in all 60 compared societies had the same attitude. Furthermore, the average of respondents in Viet Nam, Tanzania, Bangladesh, and China had a great deal of confidence in the movement. Not surprisingly, the average of respondents from two Islamic countries, namely Azerbaijan and Algeria did not have very much confidence in the women’s movement. Moreover, considering

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Table 2.20 Comparison of the frequency distribution of confidence in the women’s movement among 60 societies Rank Society

Confidence in the women’s movement

Rank Society

Confidence in the women’s movement

1 2 3 4 5

Viet Nam China Bangladesh Tanzania Philippines

96.4 84.4 80.2 80.0 77.2

31 32 33 34 35

56.0 55.5 53.4 53.2 52.9

6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30

Canada Hong Kong Egypt Burkina Faso Russian Federation Mali Malaysia Great Britain South Africa South Korea Ghana Indonesia Brazil India Mexico Jordan Finland Turkey Australia Switzerland Chile Norway Spain Taiwan Morocco

75.5 75.1 73.9 71.3 70.5 70.0 69.9 67.7 67.6 67.4 67.1 67.0 66.5 64.7 64.6 64.4 62.9 62.0 61.2 59.8 59.3 58.0 58.0 57.8 56.5

36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60

Germany (West) Germany (East) Poland United States SrpSka-Serbian Republic of Bosnia Nigeria Ukraine Zambia Kyrgyzstan Peru Venezuela Sweden France Netherlands Romania Colombia Saudi Arabia New Zealand Bulgaria Italy Japan Thailand Argentina Albania Iran Bosnian Federation Algeria Pakistan Azerbaijan Iraq

note: The numbers are percentage. This question was not asked in Iraq.

52.5 52.1 51.4 50.6 50.0 49.9 49.4 48.9 48.8 48.7 43.8 43.5 41.9 41.7 41.1 40.0 39.0 38.3 38.1 35.8 29.6 29.5 28.8 19.5 n.a.

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Religiosity, Market Economics, Civil Society Table 2.21 Comparison of the mean score of confidence in the women’s movement among 60 societies Rank Society

Confidence in the women’s movement

Rank

Society

Confidence in the women’s movement

1

Azerbaijan

3.25

31

2.41

2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30

Algeria Bosnian Federation Argentina Pakistan Albania Bulgaria Colombia Italy Thailand Japan New Zealand Saudi Arabia France Romania Iran Venezuela Netherlands Kyrgyzstan Sweden Ukraine United States Poland Germany (East) Peru Germany (West) Spain Zambia Nigeria Norway

3.07 2.89 2.85 2.85 2.78 2.76 2.70 2.69 2.69 2.68 2.67 2.67 2.63 2.63 2.60 2.60 2.58 2.56 2.55 2.55 2.50 2.49 2.47 2.47 2.46 2.45 2.44 2.43 2.43

32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60

SrpSka-Serbian Republic of Bosnia Switzerland Taiwan Finland Turkey Australia Chile Morocco South Korea Great Britain Indonesia Mexico Brazil Malaysia Hong Kong Jordan Russian Federation South Africa Canada India Ghana Burkina Faso Egypt Mali Philippines China Bangladesh Tanzania Viet Nam Iraq

2.41 2.40 2.38 2.36 2.35 2.35 2.34 2.28 2.26 2.24 2.24 2.22 2.22 2.21 2.19 2.19 2.19 2.15 2.13 2.12 2.09 2.05 2.04 2.02 1.97 1.96 1.78 1.42 n.a.

note: This question has been scaled from 1–4 in which 1= A great deal confidence and 4= None at all confidence in the women’s movement. This question was not asked in Iraq.

0

VN TZ BD CN PH ML EG BF GH IN CA ZA RU JO HK MY BR MX ID GB KR MA CL AU TR FI TW CH BA NO NG ZM ES DE-W PE DE-E PL US UA SE KG NL VE IR RO FR SA NZ JP TH IT CO BG AL PK AR BA-F DZ AZ

Figure 2.10 The mean score of confidence in the women’s movement note: This question has been scaled from 1-4 in which 1=A great deal confidence and 4 = None at all confidence in the women’s movement. This question was not asked in Iraq.

Mean Score

0.5

1

1.5

2

2.5

3

3.5

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Religiosity, Market Economics, Civil Society

123

the standard deviation (see Table A.2.14 in Appendix 2), it was found that in some Islamic countries such as Saudi Arabia, Morocco, and Nigeria, as well as in some non-Islamic counties like Zambia and Venezuela, opinions about the women’s movement were far from the average response, compared to other societies. The small standard deviation, on the other hand, shows a remarkable homogeneity of attitudes particularly in Viet Nam and Hong Kong. Also it should be said that no difference was found between Islamic countries with more than 95 per cent Muslim population and Islamic countries with less or about 60 per cent Muslim population in regard to confidence in various civil society organizations. It is worth taking a brief look at Tables 2.14, 2.16, and 2.20. They all indicate that Viet Nam, China, Bangladesh, and Tanzania, respectively always occupied first to fourth place. In Table  2.18 Viet Nam, Bangladesh, and China ranked respectively first to third place. That is to say respondents in Viet Nam, China, Bangladesh, and Tanzania had more confidence in labor unions, political parties, and the women’s movement than respondents in other compared societies. Also, participants in Viet Nam, Bangladesh, and China expressed more confidence in the environmental movement than participants in other compared societies. Since there are some distinguishing differences between the socioeconomic conditions, the political systems, historical factors, and religious traditions in these counties, more specific studies should be undertaken to detect the reasons for the high level of citizens’ trust in civil society organizations in these countries. Descriptive Statistics of Control Variables In the rest of this chapter we will address some statistical details of control variables, namely religious denomination, education, sex, age, and income. Religious Denomination: To coordinate religious denomination of respondents with the study’s hypotheses, all different denominations were reduced to three categories, namely Islamic denominations, Christian denominations, and denominations of other religions. 51.5 per cent of participants overall belonged to Christian denominations, 37.5 per cent to Islamic denominations, and finally, 11.1 per cent to denominations of other religions. Education: The highest educational level attained by respondents can be divided into eight categories. The frequency distribution of all categories is as follows: Inadequately completed elementary education 15.7 per cent. Completed (compulsory) elementary education 14.4 per cent. Incomplete secondary school: technical/vocational type/(Compulsory) elementary education and basic vocational qualification 6.6 per cent. Complete secondary school: technical/vocational type/Secondary, intermediate vocational qualification 17.0 per cent. Incomplete secondary: university-preparatory type/Secondary,

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intermediate general qualification 7.6 per cent. Complete secondary: university-preparatory type/Full secondary, maturity level certificate 16.8 per cent. Some university without degree/Higher education–lower-level tertiary certificate 6.8 per cent. University with degree/Higher education–upper-level tertiary certificate 15.1 per cent. Sex: 51.2 per cent of those who responded were female and 48.8 per cent were male. Age: There were six age groups in the study. Their frequency distribution was as follows: 15–24 age group 18.2 per cent; 25–34 age group 23.5 per cent; 35–44 age group 21.3 per cent; 45–54 age group 15.8 per cent; 55–64 age group 11.1 per cent; and finally, 65 and more years 10.1 per cent. Income: The income variable had 10 categories. Their frequency distribution was as follows: Lowest step 9.7 per cent; second step 11.3 per cent; third step 13.8 per cent; fourth step 14.3 per cent; fifth step 16.8 per cent; sixth step 11.9 per cent; seventh step 9.6 per cent; eighth step 6.4 per cent; ninth step 3.3 per cent; and tenth step 2.8 per cent. The grand mean score for income overall was 4.63.

The Relationship between Democratic Political Tradition, hdi, and Predominant Religion of Societies

Before addressing the relationship between macro-level variables, it may be helpful to report some of their descriptive data. At the macro level of the current research we employed, as mentioned above, three variables to measure socioeconomic, political and cultural effects on attitudes towards a free market economy and confidence in civil society organizations. The cultural indicator used is the predominant religion of the societies. There were three religious categories: Islamic, Christian, and Buddhist, Hindu, and folk-religions. 19 of 60 compared societies were predominantly Islamic, 33 were predominantly Christian, and the eight remaining societies were predominantly Buddhist, Hindu, and folk-religion societies. The indicator of political context was the length of democratic tradition in these societies. The least years of experience of a democracy was zero and the highest was 211 years for the United States. The indicator of socioeconomic context was the Human Development Index value. The lowest hdi value was 0.279 for Mali and the highest was 0.937 for Norway. The lowest value of hdi in Christian societies was 0.332 (for Tanzania) and the highest was 0.937 (for Norway). The lowest hdi value in Islamic societies was 0.279 (for Mali) and the highest was 0.732 (for Saudi Arabia). The lowest hdi score in predominantly Buddhist, Hindu, and folk-religion societies was 0.491 (for India) and the highest was 0.873 (for Japan). Table 2.22 illustrates the

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Table 2.22 Predominant religion, the length of democratic experience, and hdi value of the 60 compared societies Christian societies

Years of hdi democracy

Argentina Australia

37 110

0.757 Albania 0.925 Algeria

Brazil Bulgaria Canada

41 21 144

0.681 Azerbaijan 0 0.724 Bangladesh 20 0.883 Bosnian 0 Federation 0.762 Burkina 2 Faso 0.658 Egypt 6 0.863 Indonesia 12 0.856 Iran 0 0.881 Iraq 0

0.608 Thailand 0.568 Viet Nam 0.684 0.583

0.881 Jordan

0

0.665

1 16 19 0 11 18

0.572 0.731 0.279 0.551 0.432 0.416

0

0.732

53

0.672

Chile Colombia Finland France Germany (East) Germany (West) Ghana Great Britain Italy Mexico Netherlands New Zealand Norway Peru Philippines Poland Romania

48 91 92 131 21 42

Islamic societies

12 174 63 14 89 154

0.443 0.842 0.838 0.698 0.882 0.896

108

0.937 Saudi Arabia 0.715 Turkey 0.597 0.775 0.733

34 49 28 15

Kyrgyzstan Malaysia Mali Morocco Nigeria Pakistan

Years of hdi democracy

19 0

Buddhist, Hindu, and folk-­ religion societies

0.670 China 0.602 Hong Kong 0.563 India 0.390 Japan 0.698 South Korea 0.285 Taiwan

Years of hdi democracy

0 0

0.639 0.842

61 59 24

0.491 0.873 0.851

19

0.639

14 0

0.642 0.547

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Table 2.22 Predominant religion, the length of democratic experience, and hdi value of the 60 compared societies (cont.) Christian societies

Russian Federation South Africa Spain SrpSkaSerbian Republic of Bosnia Sweden Switzerland Tanzania Ukraine United States Venezuela Zambia

Years of hdi democracy

7

0.700

99 85 0

0.590 0.857 0.698

94 163 0 19 211

0.885 0.876 0.332 0.703 0.897

48 8

0.637 0.360

Islamic societies

Years of hdi democracy

Buddhist, Hindu, and folk-­ religion societies

Years of hdi democracy

full perspective of the compared various types of religious societies with their years of experience of democratic government and their value of hdi. Correlation between Macro-Level Variables To find the correlation between different aggregate variables statistical analyses were used. Firstly, the relationship between the length of democratic experience of compared societies and their hdi values needed to be considered. Table 2.23 shows the results. As can be seen from the table above, there is a positive relationship between the length of democratic tradition of the societies and their hdi score. That is to say, the longer a society has enjoyed democratic government, the higher its hdi.

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Religiosity, Market Economics, Civil Society Table 2.23 Spearman’s Rho correlation between hdi value and the length of democratic experience of the compared societies

Pearson Correlation Sig. (2-tailed) N Pearson Correlation Years of Democracy Sig. (2-tailed) N HDI

Spearman’s Rho

HDI

Years of democracy

1 . 60 .581** .000 60

.581** .000 60 1 . 60

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

In addition, the relationship between years of democracy and the predominant religion of the compared societies was measured. To analyze the correlation between aggregate data, each type of religious society (predominantly Islamic societies, predominantly Christian societies, and predominantly Buddhist, Hindu, and folk-religion societies) was coded as a dummy (0/1) variable and the last category of societies was used as the (omitted) reference ­category. Tables  2.24 and 2.25 present the correlation coefficients and their significance. As can be seen from the tables above, Islamic societies had a negative relationship to democratic experience. That is to say Islamic societies had less experience of democracy compared to predominantly Christian societies and predominantly Buddhist, Hindu, and folk-religion societies. In addition, Christian societies had more experience of democratic government, compared to predominantly Buddhist, Hindu, and folk-religion societies. Further analyses address the correlation between the hdi value and the predominant religion of compared societies. Here too, each type of religious society was coded as a dummy (0/1) variable. The category of predominantly Buddhist, Hindu, and folk-religion societies was selected as the (omitted) reference group. Tables 2.26 and 2.27 show the results. The data shows that Islamic societies had lower hdi values, compared to predominantly Christian and predominantly Buddhist, Hindu, and folkreligion societies, reflecting the relationship between predominantly Islamic countries and democratic traditions, as seen above. Similarly, predominantly Christian societies had higher hdi values than predominantly Buddhist, Hindu, and folk-religion societies.

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Table 2.24 Spearman’s Rho correlation between predominant Islamic religion of societies and the length of democratic experience Years of Predominantly democracy Islamic societies Years of Democracy Correlation Coefficient Spearman’s Rho

Predominantly Islamic Societies

Sig. (2-tailed) N Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N

1.000 . 60 −.576** .000 60

−.576** .000 60 1.000 . 60

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Table 2.25 Spearman’s Rho correlation between predominant Christian religion of societies and the length of democratic experience Years of Predominantly democracy Christian societies

Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N Spearman’s Predominantly Correlation Coefficient Rho Christian Societies Sig. (2-tailed) N Years of Democracy

1.000 . 60 .681** .000 60

.681** .000 60 1.000 . 60

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).



Attitudes towards Free Market Economics in Various Types of Religious Societies It can be useful to compare the mean scores of attitudes towards democratic values on a macro-level. Here we compare between three types of religious societies: predominantly Islamic, predominantly Christian, and predominantly Buddhist, Hindu, and folk-religion societies. Table  2.28 presents the results of comparison of mean scores of attitudes towards a free market

129

Religiosity, Market Economics, Civil Society Table 2.26 Spearman’s Rho correlation between predominant Islamic religion of societies and hdi value

HDI Spearman’s Rho

Predominantly Islamic Societies

Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N

HDI

Predominantly Islamic societies

1.000 . 60 −.553** .000 60

−.553** .000 60 1.000 . 60

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Table 2.27 Spearman’s Rho correlation between predominant Christian religion of societies and hdi value

Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N Predominantly Correlation Coefficient Christian Sig. (2-tailed) N Societies HDI

Spearman’s Rho

HDI

Predominantly Christian societies

1.000 . 60 .652** .000 60

.652** .000 60 1.000 . 60

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

e­ conomy without any prior demographic, socioeconomic or political controls. The table includes also the significance of the difference between societies. The results show that, generally, all religious types of societies have relatively similar attitudes towards indicators of a free market economy. All religious types of societies with little differentiation are at the middle of the scale regarding attitudes towards private or government ownership of business. This

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Table 2.28 Comparison of the group mean score of the factors of a free market economy among three types of religious societies Variable Type of society

Islamic Christian Other* All Difference between Islamic and Christian group means Difference between Islamic and Other group means Difference between Christian and Other group means N

Private ownership

Responsibility

Income equality

Competition

5.67 5.41 5.77 5.56 .264***

6.62 5.77 6.17 6.15 .852***

6.29 5.64 6.19 5.97 .652***

3.33 3.89 3.70 3.70 −.560***

−.093**

.460***

.095**

−.363***

−.357***

−.392***

−.557***

.197***

81182

84727

84060

73787

note: For the classification of religious societies see Table A.1.15 (in Appendix 1). All items have been scaled from 1–10. The significance of the difference between group means is measured by anova without any controls. *** Sig. P.000. *Other = predominantly Buddhist, Hindu, and folk-religion societies.

means the average of respondents in all religious types of societies neither agree nor disagree with a greater role for private or government ownership of business. The table reveals that while Islamic societies, and to a lesser extent predominantly Buddhist, Hindu, and folk-religion societies tend to espouse the idea that the government should take more responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for, attitudes from Christian societies score at the middle of the scale; however, the differences between societies are not considerable. Furthermore, in relation to income equality, predominantly Islamic societies and to a lesser extent predominantly Buddhist, Hindu, and folk-religion societies recognize a need for larger income differences as incentives, while Christian societies remain also at the middle of the scale. Likewise, all religious types of societies agree that competition is good and that it stimulates people to work hard and develop new ideas. Here again, the predominantly Islamic societies and, to a lesser extent, the predominantly Buddhist, Hindu, and folk-religion societies emphasize the benefits of competition slightly more than the Christian societies.

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Confidence in Civil Society in Various Types of Religious Societies Table 2.29 shows the results of the comparison of mean scores of confidence in civil society in three religious types of societies without any prior demographic, socioeconomic or political controls. The table includes also the significance of the difference between societies. As can be seen from the table, Islamic societies have a great deal confidence in religious institutions, namely mosques, while Christian societies and predominantly Buddhist, Hindu, and folk-religion societies have quite a lot of confidence in their religious institutions. All three different religious types of societies, with little differentiation, have quite a lot of confidence in labor unions, the environmental protection movement, and women’s movement. In Table 2.29 Comparison of the group mean score of the factors of confidence in civil society among three types of religious societies Variable Type of society

Islamic Christian Other* All Difference between Islamic and Christian group means Difference between Islamic and Other group means Difference between Christian and Other group means N

Religious Labor institutions unions

Political parties

The The All factors environmental women’s protection movement movement

1.65 2.19 2.20 1.99 −.538***

2.56 2.82 2.47 2.68 −.263***

2.76 3.06 2.59 2.88 −.301***

2.33 2.34 2.28 2.33 −.009

2.40 2.43 2.21 2.38 −.034***

8.74 9.99 8.73 9.33 −1.254***

−.546***

.086***

.169***

.050***

.182***

.008

−.008

.349***

.470***

.059***

.216***

1.262***

82545

73554

77894

74231

74244

82612

note: For the classification of religious societies see Table A.1.15 (in Appendix 1). All items except of “all factors” have been scaled from 1–4. “All factors” do not include religious institutions and has been scaled from 1–16. The significance of the difference between group means is measured by anova without any controls. *** Sig. P.000 *Other = predominantly Buddhist, Hindu, and folk-religion societies.

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the case of political parties, predominantly Islamic societies and to a lesser extent predominantly Buddhist, Hindu, and folk-religion societies have quite a lot of confidence, whereas Christian societies do not put much trust in political parties. In addition, confidence in labor unions, political parties, the environmental protection movement, and women’s movement together was tested. Reflecting the attitudes towards political parties, Christian societies do not have very much confidence in these four civil institutions, while Islamic societies and predominantly Buddhist, Hindu, and folk-religion societies trust them quite a lot. Summary of Descriptive Data for Micro and Macro Variables Having reported all the descriptive statistics, two tables were drawn up to have summarized multilevel descriptive data, taking all micro and macro-level independent variables as well as dependent and control variables into account. As explained in materials and method (Appendix 1) there were two files of data in this study according to our two dependent variables. Table 2.30 presents the summarized multilevel descriptive data of attitudes towards a free market economy. In addition, Table 2.31 provides summarized multilevel descriptive data of confidence in civil society organizations. Having reported the descriptive data both on an individual and a contextual level, the remainder of the empirical findings in the research will focus on multilevel analyses to observe the nested structure of the relationship between independent variables, namely religiosity as the micro-level and socioeconomic, political and religious contexts as the macro-level factors regarding attitudes towards a free market economy and confidence in civil society organizations. Table 2.30 Descriptive statistics for factors of a free market economy and control variables in two levels (individuals nested within societies) Variable

Level One Private vs. State Ownership of Business Government Responsibility Income Equality

N

Min

Max

 M

Range

SD

Skewness Kurtosis

81182

1

10

5.56

9

2.860

.023

−1.062

84727

1

10

6.15

9

2.960

−.229

−1.142

84060

1

10

5.97

9

2.986

−.262

−1.138

133

Religiosity, Market Economics, Civil Society Variable

N

Min

Max

Competition Good or Harmful Religious Person Religious Denomination Highest Educational Level Attained Sex Age Income

73787

1

10

3.70

9

2.514

.803

−.110

84215 70516

1 1

3 3

1.33 1.74

2 2

.564 .642

1.525 .299

1.332 −.704

86758

1

8

4.39

7

2.381

.053

−1.278

87276 87036 77798

0 1 1

1 6 10

.51 3.08 4.66

1 5 9

.500 1.567 2.332

-.050 .382 .279

−1.998 −.908 −.640

60

1

3

1.83

2

.693

.234

−.865

60 60

0 211 .279 .937

51.567 .169748

1.442 −.581

1.437 −.255

Level Two Predominant Religion of the Societies Years of Democracy Human Development Index

 M

43.43 .68312

Range

211 .658

SD

Skewness Kurtosis

Table 2.31 Descriptive statistics for factors of confidence in civil society and control variables in two levels (individuals nested within societies) Variable

Level One Confidence in Religious Institutions Confidence in Labor Unions Confidence in Political Parties Confidence in the Women’s Movement Confidence in the Environmental Protection Movement Religious Person

N

Min

Max

M

Range

SD

Skewness Kurtosis

82545

1

4

1.99

3

.971

.587

−.755

73554

1

4

2.68

3

.882

−.146

−.713

77894

1

4

2.88

3

.882

−.436

−.518

74244

1

4

2.38

3

.894

.197

−.699

74231

1

4

2.33

3

.855

.231

−.552

83669

1

3

1.33

2

.564

1.536

1.364

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Table 2.31 Descriptive statistics for factors of confidence in civil society and control variables in two levels (individuals nested within societies) (cont.) Variable

N

Religious Denomination Highest Educational Level Attained Sex Age Income Level Two Predominant Religion of the Societies Years of Democracy Human Development Index

Min

Max

M

69785

1

3

1.74

2

.645

.312

−.715

86223

1

8

4.39

7

2.382

.050

−1.273

86694 86482 77343

0 1 1

1 6 10

.51 3.08 4.63

1 5 9

.500 1.570 2.334

−.049 .378 .300

−1.998 −.918 −.626

60

1

3

1.83

2

.693

.234

−.865

60 60

0 .279

211 .937

51.567 1.442 .169748 −.581

1.437 −.255

43.43 .68312

Range

211 .658

SD

Skewness Kurtosis

chapter 3

The Link between Religion, Religiosity, and Democratic Values Multilevel Analyses Introduction Part Three focuses on multilevel analyses and will empirically examine the effect of religiosity and some control factors such as religious denomination, education, sex, age, and income at the micro level, on attitudes towards a free market economy and confidence in traditional, modern, and post-modern civil society organizations. In addition to these, this part compares the contextual effects of religious tradition, socioeconomic conditions, and history of political democracy on these democratic values in various religious societies, namely predominantly Islamic, predominantly Christian, and predominantly Buddhist, Hindu, and folk-religion societies. The rest of the part presents a multivariate comparison of Islamic societies to examine, among other things, the difference between Shiite and Sunni Islamic countries. And finally the results of findings will be discussed. As mentioned above, to analyze the data, we have generally employed a two-level model, using the hlm program. Here, it should be noted that different authors represent the results of multilevel analysis in a variety of ways and, to be more exact, in a variety of models. Some of them prefer to discuss only two models: the individual model and the complete model which includes all variables from both levels. Another group of researchers separate independent variable(s) from control variable(s) at the individual level, and accordingly present 3 models. In this study, in order to have a comprehensive perspective about the relationship between all micro as well as macro-level variables and dependent variables, these relationships were analyzed in 5 different ways and the results presented in 5 models as follows. Model 1: Model 1 shows the results of the analysis of the relationship between the micro-level independent variable (religiosity) and indicators of economic dependent variable (private ownership versus government ownership of business, responsibility of people to provide for themselves versus government responsibility to provide for people, income equality, and competition) as well as indicators of social dependent variable (confidence in religious institutions, labor unions, political parties, the environmental protection movement, and the women’s movement). © koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2014 | doi 10.1163/9789004274464_005

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Model 2: this model presents the relationship between the micro-level independent variable (religiosity) as well as 5 control variables (religious denomination, education, sex, age, and income) and indicators of economic as well as social dependent variables. Model 3: the third model is a macro model in which only the impact of macro-level variables (predominant religion, length of their democratic tradition, and their Human Development Index score) on indicators of economic as well as social dependent variables were measured. Model 4: in this model, in addition to macro-level variables, the micro-level independent variable (religiosity) was added. Model 5: model 5 is the complete model in which all macro-level variables (predominant religion, length of their democratic tradition, and the Human Development Index score) as well as the micro-level independent variable (religiosity) and control variables (religious denomination, education, sex, age, and income) were added to examine all possible influences on attitudes towards a free market economy and confidence in civil society organizations in 60 compared societies. In all 5 models mentioned above, intercept (γ00) and level-one variance (σ2) were estimated. Furthermore, variance components, degrees of freedom (d.f.), and chi-squared distribution (x2) were estimated too, except in the case of model 3 that appertains to macro-level variables. To present the results of the multilevel analyses, we begin with 4 indicators of a free market economy followed by 5 factors of confidence in civil society. It must be said that because all of these 9 indicators were used to measure two previously mentioned concepts and the explanation of the findings are in many cases similar, I have avoided addressing them one by one, and instead, the explanations will be presented in Discussion.

Religion, Religiosity, and Free Market Economics in Islamic, Christian, Buddhist, Hindu, and Folk-Religion Societies

Religion, Religiosity and Private versus Government Ownership of Business The first indicator of a tendency towards a free market economy can be seen in attitudes towards private or government ownership of business. The research focused on which factors from our micro as well as macro-level variables influence preferences concerning private or government ownership of business and by how much. Table 3.1 shows the results. Beginning with the individuallevel effects, religiosity, as it is apparent from this table, had a very small

Islamic Denominations Christian Denominations Education Sex (1=Female) Age Income Country-level Variables Islam Christianity Democracy HDI 0.084 0.011*** 0.032*** 0.019 0.014***

 0.010

–0.083  0.304  –0.022 –0.063

0.051 0.117

–0.056

0.040*

0.114***

SE

 0.091

5.434

Coefficient

Model 2

0.104***

Coefficient SE

Model 1

–0.403    0.362 –0.009 –1.366

5.460

Coefficient

0.233 0.261 0.002*** 0.529*

0.084***

SE

Model 3

Model 4

–0.361    0.391 –0.008 –1.430

–0.078

5.468

0.242 0.262 0.002*** 0.519**

0.041

0.087***

Coeffi­cient SE

Multi-level models of the effects on attitudes toward private vs. government ownership of business

Intercept (γ00) 5.467 Individual-level Variables Religiosity –0.082

Table 3.1

–0.481    0.309 –0.008 –1.556

–0.083    0.307 –0.021 –0.063

   0.009

   0.096

–0.053

5.437

Coefficient

0.292 0.284 0.002*** 0.570**

0.011*** 0.032*** 0.019 0.014***

0.084

0.117

0.051

0.096***

SE

Model 5

The Link between Religion, Religiosity, and Democratic Values

137

Var Comp

d.f

χ2

7.53198

0.067

Var Comp

χ2

Var Comp

0.004 0.025 0.015 0.009

216.483*** 0.085 0.255

7.54841

59

d.f

121.971*** 131.143***

χ2

42  184.590*** 42 66.675** 42 195.807*** 42 261.270*** 7.42602

42 42

d.f

Note: Each type of three religious societies, three categories of religious denominations, and sex were coded as a dummy variable. hdi= Human Development Index. *p ≤ 0.05; **p ≤ 0.01; ***p ≤ 0.001.

42 184.944*** 42   66.662** 42 195.785*** 42 261.314*** 7.42616

0.004 0.025 0.015 0.009

121.980*** 130.885***

χ2

42 42

d.f

0.087 0.258

Var Comp

Multi-level models of the effects on attitudes toward private vs. government ownership of business (cont.)

Religiosity 0.066 59 216.651*** Islamic Denominations Christian Denominations Education Sex (1=Female) Age Income Level 1(σ2) 7.54844

Variance components (random effects)

Table 3.1

138 chapter 3

The Link between Religion, Religiosity, and Democratic Values

139

i­nfluence and only in Model 1 in which religiosity is the only predictor, but after adding other individual variables in Model 2 and country variables in Models 4 and 5, we see that religiosity plays no significant role in constructing attitudes towards private or government ownership of business. The only considerable and significant individual effect was according to sex. Women agreed more than men that government ownership of business should be increased. Besides, more educated people as well as those who had more income generally felt that private ownership of business should be increased, however, their estimated coefficients were less than 0.1 which statistically means there is a weak relationship between these two variables. In country-level effects, we see that only hdi is an effective factor. Societies with higher hdi scores had a greater tendency to endorse the increase of private ownership of business. Surprisingly, the length of democratic experience had no effect on views about private or government ownership of trade. Also the predominant religion of a country, in spite of a quite considerable coefficient, had no significant effect.

Religion, Religiosity and Responsibility of People versus Government Responsibility The second indicator of inclination to a free market economy is the question of how far people are responsible for providing for themselves versus government providing for them. Table 3.2 presents the results of the multilevel analysis. As the table illustrates, at the individual level, religiosity had no significant impact on the issue of who should provide for people. Gender and income were two statistically significant effective variables, each of which with the same coefficient (0.149, p-value ≤ 0.001 for sex and – 0.104, p-value ≤ 0.001 for income) in both the micro-level model (Model 2) and complete model (Model 5). Women believed more than men that the government should take more responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for. On the other hand, those who had more income did not expect the state to assume more responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for, and considered this as an individual duty. Also the low impact of higher levels of education endorses the responsibility of individuals (estimated coefficient = – 0.062, p-value ≤ 0.001). At the country level, none of the social, political, and religious variables correlated with the issue of responsibility.

Religion, Religiosity and Income Equality versus Income Differences The third indicator of attitudes towards a free market economy can be derived from views about income equality versus income differences. Table 3.3 offers the results of the multilevel analysis. The results surprisingly indicate that at

Islamic Denominations Christian Denominations Education Sex (1=Female) Age Income Country-level Variables Islam Christianity Democracy HDI

Intercept (γ00) 6.105 Individual-level Variables Religiosity 0.032

0.069 0.012*** 0.031*** 0.016 0.013***

–0.018

–0.061 0.149 –0.010 –0.104

0.042 0.104

0.039

0.032

0.122***

0.039

6.066

SE

Model 2

Coefficient

0.115***

Coefficient SE

Model 1

0.280 0.021 –0.009 0.199

6.105

Coefficient

0.313 0.332 0.001*** 0.738

0.090***

SE

Model 3

0.266 0.047 –0.009 0.058

0.039

6.105

0.294 0.312 0.001*** 0.718

0.033

0.090***

Coeffi­cient SE

Model 4

–0.040 –0.141 –0.008 –0.186

–0.062 0.149 –0.010 –0.104

–0.021

0.102

0.041

6.080

0.279 0.292 0.001*** 0.653

0.012*** 0.031*** 0.016 0.013***

0.067

0.105

0.042

0.098***

SE

Model 5 Coefficient

Table 3.2 Multi-level models of the effects on attitudes toward responsibility of individuals vs. government responsibility to provide for people

140 chapter 3

Var Comp

d.f

χ2

39 39 39 39 39 39 39 7.90620

0.113

0.005 0.023 0.010 0.007

d.f

0.044 0.198

Var Comp

70.643**

133.185*** 179.035***

106.064***

   72.689***

     57.465*  66.857**

χ2

7.99476

0.036

Var Comp

8.00940

59

d.f

Var Comp

0.005 0.023 0.010 0.007

0.116

157.434*** 0.043 0.212

χ2

72.487***

57.578* 70.717**

χ2

39  106.173*** 39 70.643** 39 133.243*** 39 178.997*** 7.90592

39 39

d.f

Note: Each type of three religious societies, three categories of religious denominations, and sex were coded as a dummy variable. HDI= Human Development Index. *p ≤ 0.05; **p ≤ 0.01; ***p ≤ 0.001.

Religiosity 0.035 59 157.910*** Islamic Denominations Christian Denominations Education Sex (1=Female) Age Income Level 1(σ2) 8.00948

Variance components (random effects)

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141

Islam Christianity Democracy HDI

Islamic Denominations Christian Denominations Education Sex (1=Female) Age Income Country-level Variables

Intercept (γ00) 5.940 Individual-level Variables Religiosity –0.078

Coefficient

0.050 0.009*** 0.030*** 0.012

–0.075

0.091 –0.131 –0.000

0.043** 0.142

–0.138

0.035*

0.134***

–0.028

5.910

SE

Model 2

Coefficient

0.133***

SE

Model 1

–0.071 –0.224 –0.002 –1.271

5.934

0.391 0.351 0.003 1.038

0.123***

Coefficient SE

Model 3

0.037 –0.191 –0.003 –1.090

–0.078

5.940

Coeffi­cient

0.419 0.379 0.003 1.069

0.035*

0.125***

SE

Model 4

Table 3.3 Multi-level models of the effects on attitudes toward desirability of income equality vs. larger income differences

–0.161 –0.087 –0.002 –0.639

0.091 –0.132 –0.000 0.119

–0.076

–0.034

–0.138

5.913

Coefficient

0.371 0.367 0.003 0.971

0.009*** 0.030*** 0.012 0.014***

0.050

0.142

0.043**

0.130***

SE

Model 5

142 chapter 3

Var Comp

d.f

χ2

43 43

43 43 43 43 7.58886

0.003 0.020 0.005 0.009

d.f

0.050 0.465

Var Comp

122.889***   84.847*** 106.989*** 285.538***

 107.381*** 125.831***

χ2

7.76358

0.047

Var Comp

χ2

Var Comp

0.003 0.020 0.005 0.009

161.871*** 0.049 0.047

7.77409

59

d.f

χ2

43 122.870*** 43 84.858*** 43 106.984*** 43 285.928*** 7.58882

43 107.381*** 43 126.045***

d.f

Note: Each type of three religious societies, three categories of religious denominations, and sex were coded as a dummy variable. hdi= Human Development Index. *p ≤ 0.05; **p ≤ 0.01; ***p ≤ 0.001.

Religiosity 0.046 59 161.840*** Islamic Denominations Christian Denominations Education Sex (1=Female) Age Income Level 1(σ2) 7.77417

Variance components (random effects)

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144

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the individual level, religiosity is negatively associated with income equality, which means religious people expressed the view that larger income differences are needed as incentives. The same estimated coefficient (-0.138, p-value ≤ 0.01) was to be found even when we added all other predictors in the complete model (Model 5). Moreover, some other individual variables affect slightly views about income equality. Women felt more than men that incomes should be made more equal. On the other hand, those who had more income believed that larger income differences are necessary as incentives. Likewise, those who attained higher levels of education, considered income difference as a positive source of incentive. Regarding the macro-level effects, it should be said that no correlation was found between the predominant religion of societies, their democratic tradition, and their Human Development Index score and views about income equality.

Religion, Religiosity and Utility of Competition versus Harmfulness of Competition The last indicator of attitudes towards a free market economy can be found in the opinions about utility or harmfulness of competition. Table 3.4 provides the results of the multilevel analysis. From this analysis we can see that at the individual level, religiosity did not significantly affect views on the utility or harmfulness of competition. Gender, on the other hand, did exert an influence. Women believed more than men that competition is harmful and brings out the worst in people. People with higher levels of education tend to subscribe to the idea that competition is good, although the magnitude of the estimated coefficient is rather low (-0.083, p-value ≤ 0.001). Turning to the influence of the macro indicators contained in the models, the findings are similar to those for private or government ownership of business presented in the Table 3.1. Neither predominant religion of the countries nor the length of their democratic tradition show any significant correlation with views about the utility or harmfulness of competition. The only significant positive correlation was between hdi and competition. Societies with higher hdi scores had a greater tendency to support the notion that competition is harmful and brings out the worst in people.



Religion, Religiosity, and Confidence in Traditional, Modern, and Post-Modern Civil Society Organizations in Various Types of Religious Societies

Religion, Religiosity, and Confidence in Religious Institutions Turning now to the second dependent variable, the results of the multilevel ana­lysis of confidence in civil society will be presented, starting with ­confidence

Islamic Denominations Christian Denominations Education Sex (1=Female) Age Income Country-level Variables Islam Christianity Democracy HDI

Intercept (γ00) 3.724 Individual-level Variables Religiosity 0.030

0.075 0.010*** 0.029*** 0.013*** 0.012*

–0.145

–0.082 0.222 –0.048 –0.026

0.039 0.114

0.031

0.032

0.077***

–0.058

3.735

SE

Model 2

Coefficient

0.079***

Coefficient SE

Model 1

–0.305 0.126 –0.000 0.744

3.734

0.242 0.227 0.001 0.505

0.071***

Coefficient SE

Model 3

Table 3.4 Multi-level models of the effects on attitudes toward utility vs. harmfulness of competition

–0.301 0.132 –0.000 0.779

3.697 0.029

0.242 0.228 0.001 0.502

0.071*** 0.032

Coeffi­cient SE

Model 4

0.039

–0.000 1.159

–0.224 0.013

–0.048 –0.026

–0.083 0.222

–0.136

0.210 0.204 0.001 0.462*

0.010*** 0.029*** 0.013*** 0.012*

0.078

0.115

0.033 –0.068

0.070***

3.715

Coefficient SE

Model 5

The Link between Religion, Religiosity, and Democratic Values

145

Var Comp

d.f

χ2

38 38 38 38 38 38 38 5.99006

0.081

0.003 0.018 0.006 0.006

d.f

0.039 0.262

Var Comp

136.119*** 62.197** 121.772*** 243.696***

  63.141**

     91.619*** 84.244***

χ2

6.00413

0.036

Var Comp

5.99815

54

d.f

Var Comp

0.003 0.018 0.006 0.006

0.092

158.698*** 0.040 0.240

χ2

63.107**

91.675*** 84.364***

χ2

38  136.052*** 38 62.155** 38 121.760*** 38 243.210*** 5.98995

38 38

d.f

Note: Each type of three religious societies, three categories of religious denominations, and sex were coded as a dummy variable. HDI= Human Development Index. *p ≤ 0.05; **p ≤ 0.01; ***p ≤ 0.001.

Religiosity 0.036 54 158.769*** Islamic Denominations Christian Denominations Education Sex (1=Female) Age Income Level 1(σ2) 5.99816

Variance components (random effects)

Table 3.4 Multi-level models of the effects on attitudes toward utility vs. harmfulness of competition (cont.)

146 chapter 3

The Link between Religion, Religiosity, and Democratic Values

147

in religious institutions. Table 3.5 displays the results of the multilevel analysis. Beginning with the individual-level effects, Table 3.5 shows a significant and not altogether surprising correlation between religiosity and confidence in religious institutions in all models of analysis. The value of the estimated coefficient in the final model in which all variables were entered is 0.464 with p-value of ≤ 0.001. It means those who described themselves as a religious person put more trust than others in religious institutions such as the church, mosque, temple and other similar religious organizations. Figure 3.1 illustrates this correlation. Comparing the effect of individual religiosity on trust in religious institutions in various types of religious societies, Figure  3.2 shows, ­religious people in Islamic societies put very slightly less trust in religious institutions than religious people in non-Islamic societies. Further analysis shows that people who belonged to Christian denominations had more confidence in religious institutions, compared to those who belonged to the category of non-Islamic and non-Christian religious denominations. Similarly, people who belonged to Islamic denominations had more confidence in ­religious institutions, compared to those who belonged to the category of ­non-Islamic and non-Christian religious denominations. Comparing people who belonged to the Christian denominations to those who belonged to the Islamic denominations, there was no large difference. That is to say both of these groups expressed equal confidence in religious institutions. It must be noted here that all above mentioned coefficients of denominations are generally below -0.3 and therefore indicate weak relationships with religious institutions. Some other relationships can be found between the level of education, sex, as well as age and confidence in religious institutions too; however, the estimated coefficients in these cases are weak in strength albeit highly significant. Turning to the country-level effects, Islamic societies, compared to the predominantly Buddhist, Hindu, and folk-religion societies, had more confidence in religious institutions. Likewise, Christian societies had greater trust in religious institutions than predominantly Buddhist, Hindu, and folk-religion societies. Comparing Islamic countries to Christian societies, we found no large difference; that is to say Islamic and Christian societies had nearly equal confidence in religious organizations. In addition to the predominant religion of societies, another contextual effect relates to the hdi score. Societies with a higher hdi score had less confidence in churches, mosques, temples and other similar religious organizations. Further multilevel analysis showed that the political conditions, namely, the length of democratic tradition in societies had no effect on confidence in religious institutions.

−0.499 0.152** −0.535 0.158*** −0.353 0.166* −0.443 0.171* −0.000 0.001 −0.000 0.001 2.117 0.440*** 2.021 0.424***

−0.349 0.125** −0.345 0.142* −0.000 0.000 1.494 0.329***

0.020 0.003*** −0.044 0.008*** −0.022 0.004*** −0.000 0.002

0.464 0.030*** −0.130 0.058*

1.950 0.030***

Coefficient SE

Model 5

0.019 0.003*** −0.044 0.009*** −0.022 0.004*** 0.000 0.002

0.540 0.030***

2.081 0.045***

Coefficient SE

Model 4

−0.191 0.052***

2.077 0.043***

Coefficient SE

Model 3

−0.187 0.051***

0.462 0.030*** −0.127 0.057*

1.943 0.055***

Coefficient SE

Coefficient SE

Intercept (γ00) 2.069 0.066*** Individual-level Variables Religiosity 0.538 0.029*** Islamic Denominations Christian Denominations Education Sex (1=Female) Age Income Country-level Variables Islam Christianity Democracy HDI

Model 2

Model 1

Table 3.5 Multi-level models of the effects on confidence in religious institutions

148 chapter 3

0.62373

Var Comp d.f χ2

0.102 40 222.957*** 0.000 40 184.380*** 0.002 40 86.125*** 0.000 40 108.803*** 0.000 40 55.906* 0.57444

0.101 40 222.797*** 0.000 40 185.716*** 0.002 40 86.112*** 0.000 40 109.073*** 0.000 40 56.195* 0.57441 0.62373

0.086 40 124.068***

0.084 40 124.050***

0.70363

χ2

0.048 58 1434.659*** 0.047 40 596.615***

Var Comp d.f

Note: Each type of three religious societies, three categories of religious denominations, and sex were coded as a dummy variable. hdi= Human Development Index. *p ≤ 0.05; **p ≤ 0.01; ***p ≤ 0.001.

Islamic Denominations Christian Denominations Education Sex (1=Female) Age Income Level 1(σ2)

χ2

0.048 58 1434.239*** 0.047 40 595.059***

Var Comp d.f

Religiosity

χ2

Var Comp d.f

Variance components (random effects)

The Link between Religion, Religiosity, and Democratic Values

149

150

chapter 3

Confidence in Religious Institutions

2.72

2.49

2.26

2.03

1.79 -0.33

0.17

0.67 Religiosity

1.17

1.67

Figure 3.1 The effect of religiosity on confidence in religious institutions Note: in X-axis 1= A religious person and 3 = A convinced atheist. in Y-axis 1 = A great deal confidence and 4 = None at all confidence in Religious Institutions.

Confidence in Religious Institutions

2.83

Non-Islamic societies Islamic societies

2.52

2.20

1.88

1.56 -0.33

0.17

0.67 Religiosity

1.17

1.67

Figure 3.2 comparison of the effect of religiosity on confidence in religious institutions among Islamic and non-Islamic societies Note: in X-axis 1= A religious person and 3 = A convinced atheist. in Y-axis 1 = A great deal confidence and 4 = None at all confidence in Religious Institutions.

The Link between Religion, Religiosity, and Democratic Values

151

Religion, Religiosity, and Confidence in Labor Unions Confidence in labor unions represents the second indicator of confidence in civil society. Table 3.6 displays the results of the multilevel analysis. When the individual effects are taken into account, we see that religiosity had a weak but significant impact on confidence in labor unions. In other words, as can be seen in Figure 3.3, religious persons have more confidence in labor unions than those who described themselves as a non-religious person or a convinced atheist. Comparing the effect of individual religiosity on trust in labor unions in various types of religious societies, Figure 3.4 reveals that religious people in Islamic societies put more trust in labor unions than religious people in nonIslamic societies. Other individual variables played no role in predicting confidence in labor unions. Turning to the macro-level effects, Christian societies (with estimated coefficient of 0.317, p-value ≤ 0001), compared to the predominantly Buddhist, Hindu, and folk-religion societies, were less confident in labor unions. Another contextual effect relates to the hdi. Surprisingly, societies with higher hdi scores found labor unions less trustworthy than low-hdi societies. Again, we did not find any evidence to prove that democratic governance affects views about labor unions. Religion, Religiosity, and Confidence in Political Parties The third indicator of confidence in civil society is confidence in the political parties. Table 3.7 shows the results of the multilevel analysis. Beginning with the individual-level effects, religiosity had a weak but significant impact (estimated coefficient = 0.067, p-value of ≤ 0.001) on confidence in political parties. That is to say religious persons had more confidence in political parties than those who said they are non-religious or said they are convinced atheists (see Figure 3.5). As Figure 3.6 illustrates, religious individuals in Islamic societies had very slightly more confidence in political parties than religious people in non-Islamic societies. Furthermore, people who belonged to Islamic denominations expressed greater confidence in political parties than those who belonged to other religious denominations (non-Islamic and non-Christian denominations). Similarly, individuals who belonged to the Islamic denominations had more confidence in political parties, compared to those who belonged to Christian denominations. Turning to country-level effects, the predominantly Christian societies showed lower levels of confidence in political parties than people from predominantly Buddhist, Hindu, and folk-religion societies. In addition, predominantly Christian societies put less faith in political parties than inhabitants of predominantly Islamic countries. Surprisingly, democratic conditions and the level of hdi had no impact on trust in parties.

Coefficient SE

Model 4

 0.106 0.146  0.353 0.121** −0.001 0.000*  0.338 0.289

 0.098 0.145  0.348 0.119** −0.001 0.000*  0.382 0.283

 0.182 0.106  0.317 0.093*** −0.001 0.000*  0.545 0.232*

 0.005 0.003 −0.002 0.010  0.009 0.005  0.004 0.003

0.005 0.003 −0.001 0.010 0.009 0.005 0.004 0.002

 0.040 0.015* −0.026 0.033

 2.666 0.035***

Coefficient SE

Model 5

 0.028 0.032

0.040 0.012**

2.686 0.036*** 2.682 0.037***

Coefficient SE

Model 3

0.032 0.031

0.040 0.015* −0.030 0.034

2.664 0.040***

Coefficient SE

Coefficient SE

Intercept (γ00) 2.685 0.042*** Individual-level Variables Religiosity 0.041 0.012** Islamic Denominations Christian Denominations Education Sex (1=Female) Age Income Country-level Variables Islam Christianity Democracy HDI

Model 2

Model 1

Table 3.6 Multi-level models of the effects on confidence in labor unions

152 chapter 3

0.67685

0.67608

Note: Each type of three religious societies, three categories of religious denominations, and sex were coded as a dummy variable. hdi= Human Development Index. *p ≤ 0.05; **p ≤ 0.01; ***p ≤ 0.001.

0.67607

0.000 38 122.373*** 0.002 38  59.859* 0.001 38 150.554*** 0.000 38  80.179*** 0.67244

χ2

0.000 38 122.546*** 0.002 38  59.674* 0.001 38 150.554*** 0.000 38 80.060*** 0.67246

Var Comp d.f

0.025 38 87.480***

χ2

0.025 38  88.163***

Var Comp d.f

0.006 57 203.320*** 0.007 38 95.759*** 0.025 38 70.110***

χ2

0.006 57 203.965*** 0.007 38  95.672*** 0.022 38  70.728***

Var Comp d.f

Religiosity Islamic Denominations Christian Denominations Education Sex (1=Female) Age Income Level 1(σ2)

χ2

Var Comp d.f

Variance components (random effects)

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154

chapter 3

Confidence in Labor Unions

2.73

2.71

2.68

2.66

2.64 -0.33

0.17

1.17

0.67

1.67

Religiosity

Figure 3.3 The effect of religiosity on confidence in labor unions Note: in X-axis 1= A religious person and 3 = A convinced atheist. in Y-axis 1 = A great deal confidence and 4 = None at all confidence in Labour Unions.

Confidence in Labor Unions

2.84

Non-Islamic societies Islamic societies

2.78

2.71

2.65

2.59 -0.33

0.17

0.67 Religiosity

1.17

1.67

Figure 3.4 Comparison of the effect of religiosity on confidence in labor unions among Islamic and non-Islamic societies Note: in X-axis 1= A religious person and 3 = A convinced atheist. in Y-axis 1 = A great deal confidence and 4 = None at all confidence in Labour Unions.

Coefficient SE

Model 4

 0.167 0.195  0.465 0.169** −0.001 0.000***  0.475 0.330

0.176 0.195 0.466 0.119** 0.001 0.000*** 0.492 0.331

 0.188 0.188  0.449 0.165** −0.001 0.000*  0.505 0.336

 0.007 0.003  0.013 0.010 −0.008 0.003* −0.006 0.002*

0.027

 0.067 0.013*** −0.127 0.041**

0.007 0.003 0.014 0.010 −0.009 0.003* −0.006 0.002*

0.010***

 2.868 0.043***

Coefficient SE

Model 5

−0.017

0.069

2.910 0.041*** 2.906 0.041***

Coefficient SE

Model 3

−0.016 0.027

0.066 0.013*** −0.123 0.042**

2.867 0.050***

Coefficient SE

Coefficient SE

Intercept (γ00) 2.907 0.049*** Individual-level Variables Religiosity 0.069 0.010*** Islamic Denominations Christian Denominations Education Sex (1=Female) Age Income Country-level Variables Islam Christianity Democracy HDI

Model 2

Model 1

Table 3.7 Multi-level models of the effects on confidence in political parties

The Link between Religion, Religiosity, and Democratic Values

155

0.63204

Var Comp d.f

χ2

0.63095

Note: Each type of three religious societies, three categories of religious denominations, and sex were coded as a dummy variable. hdi= Human Development Index. *p ≤ 0.05; **p ≤ 0.01; ***p ≤ 0.001.

0.63094

0.000 42 188.093*** 0.002 42 90.418*** 0.000 42 113.580*** 0.000 42 104.269*** 0.63560

χ2

0.000 42 188.352*** 0.002 42 90.540*** 0.000 42 113.653*** 0.000 42 104.167*** 0.63559

Var Comp d.f

0.003 57 148.715*** 0.005 42 63.150* 0.045 42 130.013***

χ2

0.003 57 148.741*** 0.005 42  63.244* 0.046 42 128.953***

Var Comp d.f

Religiosity Islamic Denominations Christian Denominations Education Sex (1=Female) Age Income Level 1(σ2)

χ2

Var Comp d.f

Variance components (random effects)

Table 3.7 Multi-level models of the effects on confidence in political parties (cont.)

156 chapter 3

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157

Confidence in Political Parties

2.98

2.94

2.90

2.87

2.83 -0.33

0.17

0.67 Religiosity

1.17

1.67

Figure 3.5 The effect of religiosity on confidence in political parties Note: in X-axis 1= A religious person and 3 = A convinced atheist. in Y-axis 1 = A great deal confidence and 4 = None at all confidence in Political Parties.

Confidence in Political Parties

3.09

Non-Islamic societies Islamic societies

3.01

2.93

2.85

2.77 -0.33

0.17

0.67

1.17

1.67

Religiosity

Figure 3.6 Comparison of the effect of religiosity on confidence in political parties among Islamic and non-Islamic societies Note: in X-axis 1= A religious person and 3 = A convinced atheist. in Y-axis 1 = A great deal confidence and 4 = None at all confidence in Political Parties.

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Religion, Religiosity, and Confidence in the Environmental Protection Movement The fourth indicator of confidence in civil society is the trust people put in the environmental protection movement. Table 3.8 presents the results of the multilevel analysis. Analysis shows that at an individual level, religiosity had a slight effect on confidence in the environmental protection movement. Religious people confide more in the environmental protection movement than those who were not religious or were convinced atheists (see Figure 3.7). Figure  3.8, however, indicates that religious people in Islamic societies put very slightly more trust in the environmental protection movement than believers from other types of religious societies. Moreover, there was a weak relationship between this trust in the movement and education on the one hand and gender on the other. Women as well as those who attained higher levels of education were slightly more inclined to consider the environmental movement as reliable; the estimated coefficients, however, are negligible. To examine the contextual effects, we must turn to the societies’ predominant religion. The predominantly Islamic countries displayed less confidence in the environmental movement than the predominantly Buddhist, Hindu, and folk-religion societies. The same situation was to be found when we compared predominantly Islamic countries with predominantly Christian societies. Other macro variables, namely political and socioeconomic factors, did not have any effect on attitudes towards the environmental protection movement.

Religion, Religiosity, and Confidence in the Women’s Movement The last indicator of confidence in civil society is confidence in the women’s movement. Table 3.9 offers the results of the multilevel analysis. As the table illustrates, regarding the individual level, religiosity had a weak relationship with the women’s movement. That is to say, surprisingly, religious persons had more confidence in the women’s movement than those who were not religious or were convinced atheists (see Figure 3.9). Furthermore, as Figure 3.10 shows, the pious in Islamic countries have slightly more confidence in the women’s movement than in non-Islamic societies. There was also a significant negative correlation between gender and the movement. As predicted, women trusted the women’s movement more than men. Turning to the contextual effects, the predominantly Islamic countries had less confidence in the women’s movement compared to the predominantly Buddhist, Hindu, and folk-religion societies. Another contextual effect relates to the hdi. Unexpectedly, societies with higher hdi score had less confidence in the women’s movement. It is worth noting that the

0.127 0.123 0.097 0.099 −0.000 0.000 0.268 0.239

 0.238 0.104*  0.032 0.084 −0.000 0.000  0.452 0.237

−0.012 0.003** −0.038 0.013** 0.009 0.003* −0.005 0.003

−0.012 0.003** −0.038 0.013**  0.009 0.003* −0.005 0.003

0.018

−0.009

 0.073 0.017***  0.027 0.033

 2.346 0.036***

Coefficient SE

Model 5

−0.009 0.018

 0.085 0.133  0.072 0.105 −0.000 0.000  0.280 0.244

0.051 0.013***

 0.072 0.013***  0.026 0.034

Coefficient SE

Model 4

2.348 0.033*** 2.348 0.034***

Coefficient SE

Model 3

 2.339 0.036***

Coefficient SE

Coefficient SE

Intercept (γ00) 2.346 0.034*** Individual-level Variables Religiosity 0.051 0.013*** Islamic Denominations Christian Denominations Education Sex (1=Female) Age Income Country-level Variables Islam Christianity Democracy HDI

Model 2

Model 1

Table 3.8 Multi-level models of the effects on confidence in the environmental protection movement

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159

0.66188

Var Comp d.f

χ2

0.65786

0.000 43 243.872*** 0.006 43 181.384*** 0.000 43 102.883*** 0.000 43 123.495*** 0.65354

Note: Each type of three religious societies, three categories of religious denominations, and sex were coded as a dummy variable. hdi= Human Development Index. *p ≤ 0.05; **p ≤ 0.01; ***p ≤ 0.001.

0.65787

χ2

0.008 57 231.978*** 0.011 43 128.334*** 0.026 43 116.996***

Var Comp d.f

.

0.000 43 243.843*** 0.006 43 181.367*** 0.000 43 102.899*** 0.000 43 123.478*** 0.65353

χ2

0.008 57 231.890*** 0.010 43 128.454*** 0.025 43 116.972***

Var Comp d.f

Religiosity Islamic Denominations Christian Denominations Education Sex (1=Female) Age Income Level 1(σ2)

χ2

Var Comp d.f

Variance components (random effects)

Table 3.8 Multi-level models of the effects on confidence in the environmental protection movement (cont.)

160 chapter 3

The Link between Religion, Religiosity, and Democratic Values

161

Confidence in the Environmental Movement

2.47

2.43

2.39

2.36

2.32 -0.33

0.17

0.67 Religiosity

1.17

1.67

Figure 3.7 The effect of religiosity on confidence in the environmental protection movement Note: in X-axis 1= A religious person and 3 = A convinced atheist. in Y-axis 1 = A great deal confidence and 4 = None at all confidence in Environmental Protection Movement.

Confidence in Environmental Movement

2.63

Non-Islamic societies Islamic societies

2.53

2.43

2.34

2.24 -0.33

0.17

0.67 Religiosity

1.17

1.67

Figure 3.8 Comparison of the effect of religiosity on confidence in the environmental protection movement among Islamic and non-Islamic societies Note: in X-axis 1= A religious person and 3 = A convinced atheist. in Y-axis 1 = A great deal confidence and 4 = None at all confidence in Environmental Protection Movement.

Coefficient SE

Model 4

0.243 0.194 −0.001 0.720

0.138 0.120 0.000 0.281*

 0.319 0.109**  0.171 0.104 −0.000 0.000  0.564 0.239*

−0.004 0.004 −0.203 0.019***  0.005 0.003 −0.001 0.003

−0.202 0.019*** 0.005 0.003  0.009 0.003* −0.001 0.003

0.020

 0.067 0.016***  0.017 0.033

 2.391 0.037***

Coefficient SE

Model 5

−0.004

0.073 0.014***

0.036*** 2.410 0.036***

 0.232 0.139  0.181 0.119 −0.001 0.000  0.750 0.273**

 2.412

Coefficient SE

Model 3

−0.004 0.004

 0.068 0.016***  0.017 0.033

 2.384 0.039***

Coefficient SE

Coefficient SE

Intercept (γ00) 2.409 0.039*** Individual-level Variables Religiosity 0.073 0.0142*** Islamic Denominations Christian Denominations Education Sex (1=Female) Age Income Country-level Variables Islam Christianity Democracy HDI

Model 2

Model 1

Table 3.9 Multi-level models of the effects on confidence in the women’s movement

162 chapter 3

0.70390

χ2

Var Comp d.f χ2

0.69842

0.000 54 247.603*** 0.017 54 395.868*** 0.000 54  95.789*** 0.000 54 162.458*** 0.68077

0.008 58 251.922*** 0.008 54 144.693***

Var Comp d.f

Note: Each type of three religious societies, three categories of religious denominations, and sex were coded as a dummy variable. hdi= Human Development Index. *p ≤ 0.05; **p ≤ 0.01; ***p ≤ 0.001.

0.69842

0.000 54 243.843*** 0.017 54 396.034*** 0.000 54  95.777*** 0.000 54 162.585*** 0.68077

0.000 54 247.672***

χ2

0.008 58 251.949*** 0.008 54 144.688***

Var Comp d.f

Religiosity Islamic Denominations Christian Denominations Education Sex (1=Female) Age Income Level 1(σ2)

χ2

Var Comp d.f

Variance components (random effects)

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164

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Confidence in the Women’s Movement

2.49

2.45

2.42

2.39

2.36 -0.33

0.17

0.67 Religiosity

1.17

1.67

Figure 3.9 The effect of religiosity on confidence in the women’s movement Note: in X-axis 1= A religious person and 3 = A convinced atheist. in Y-axis1 = A great deal confidence and 4 = None at all confidence in the Women’s Movement.

Confidence in the Women’s Movement

2.69

Non-Islamic societies Islamic societies

2.58

2.47

2.36

2.25 -0.33

Figure 3.10

0.17

0.67 Religiosity

1.17

1.67

Comparison of the effect of religiosity on confidence in the women’s movement among Islamic and non-Islamic societies Note: in X-axis 1= A religious person and 3 = A convinced atheist. in Y-axis1 = A great deal confidence and 4 = None at all confidence in the Women’s Movement.

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165

length of democratic tradition of the societies did not affect views about the movement.

Religion, Religiosity, and Confidence in the Four Civil Society Organizations It is revealing to look at the results of the multilevel analysis of confidence in all mentioned factors of civil society except for confidence in religious institutions. Because of significant and considerable correlations between all factors except for religious institutions, as mentioned in materials and method, ­confidence in religious institutions was removed from the final analysis. Here the dependent variable is the sum of confidence in labor unions, political parties, the environmental movement, and the women’s movement. Table  3.10 presents the results. On the individual level, religiosity affected confidence in civil organizations. In other words, religious people trusted ngos (labor unions, political parties, environmental movements, and women’s movements) more than those who are non-religious or convinced atheists (see Figure  3.11). It should also be noted that, as can be seen in Figure 3.12, believers and religious people in Islamic countries put more trust in civil society organizations than religious individuals in non-Islamic societies. More analysis shows that women had more confidence in ngos than men. Unpredictably, those who attained higher educational levels tended to consider ngos less reliable. Turning to the contextual effects, it was very surprising to see that the high and significant coefficient of 0.946 (p-value of ≤ 0.05) reveals a very strong relationship between predominantly Christian societies and trust in civil organizations. That is to say predominantly Christian societies had far lower levels of confidence in ngos, compared to predominantly Buddhist, Hindu, and folkreligion societies. It should be said that no statistically significant relationship between predominantly Islamic societies and confidence in ngos was found. It is also worth noting that political and socioeconomic contexts had no ­significant effect on confidence in ngos.

Religiosity and Attitudes towards Free Market Economics in Sunni and Shia Islamic Societies

In this chapter we will consider the relationship between religiosity as well as control variables, namely religious denomination, level of education, gender, age, and income at the individual level, and the length of democratic tradition



 0.067 −0.333 −0.008  0.028

0.078 0.016*** 0.039*** 0.014 0.011*



−0.040

 0.203 0.051*** −0.055 0.123

 9.449 0.173***

Coefficient SE

Coefficient SE

Intercept (γ00) 9.458 0.170*** Individual-level Variables Religiosity 0.250 0.041*** Islamic Denominations Christian Denominations Education Sex (1=Female) Age Income Country-level Variables Islam Christianity Democracy HDI

Model 2

Model 1

0.148***

−0.044 0.677  1.041 0.555 −0.001 0.002  1.382 1.246

 9.450

Coefficient SE

Model 3

Table 3.10 Multi-level models of the effects on confidence in the civil society organizations

0.041***

0.149***

 0.047 0.677  1.104 0.555 −0.002 0.002  1.371 1.222

0.248

9.449

Coefficient SE

Model 4

 0.498 0.582  0.946 0.447*  0.000 0.002  0.801 1.279

0.016*** 0.039*** 0.014 0.011*

0.078

0.051*** 0.121

0.162***

 0.068 −0.334 −0.008  0.027

−0.033

 0.201 −0.020

 9.444

Coefficient SE

Model 5

166 chapter 3

χ2

 0.012 40 285.173***  0.055 40 115.318***  0.006 40 113.605***  0.004 40 139.561*** 7.13958

0.012 40 285.469*** 0.055 40 115.249*** 0.006 40 113.612*** 0.004 40 139.534*** 7.13969 7.49423

 0.090 40 60.192*

7.59374

Var Comp d.f

Note: Each type of three religious societies, three categories of religious denominations, and sex were coded as a dummy variable. hdi= Human Development Index. *p ≤ 0.05; **p ≤ 0.01; ***p ≤ 0.001.

7.49417

χ2

0.071 58 220.532***  0.085 40 129.114***  0.249 40  71.644**

Var Comp d.f

0.087 40  59.980*

χ2

0.072 58 220.755*** 0.085 40 128.969*** 0.272 40  73.148***

Var Comp d.f

Religiosity Islamic Denominations Christian Denominations Education Sex (1=Female) Age Income Level 1(σ2)

χ2

Var Comp d.f

Variance components (random effects)

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Confidence in Civil Society Organizations

9.76

9.66

9.55

9.44

9.33 -0.33 Figure 3.11

0.17

0.67 Religiosity

1.17

The effect of religiosity on confidence in civil society organizations Note: in X-axis 1= A religious person and 3 = A convinced atheist. in Y-axis1 = A great deal confidence and 4 = None at all confidence in the Civil Society Organizations.

10.05 Confidence in Civil Society Organizations

1.67

Non-Islamic societies Islamic societies

9.84

9.62

9.40

8.18 -0.33

Figure 3.12

0.17

0.67 Religiosity

1.17

1.67

Comparison of the effect of religiosity on confidence in civil society organizations among Islamic and non-Islamic societies Note: in X-axis 1= A religious person and 3 = A convinced atheist. in Y-axis1 = A great deal confidence and 4 = None at all confidence in Civil Society Organizations.

The Link between Religion, Religiosity, and Democratic Values

169

of the societies and their hdi score at the country level with economic factors of democracy. We shall only consider these factors in Islamic societies. Because all these societies belong to the Muslim world, the predominant religion of societies was replaced with the predominant religious denomination of the societies. In other words, the question here was whether Islamic countries with predominant Shiite denomination has a different tendency towards the economic and social factors of democracy compared to Islamic societies with predominant Sunni denomination. The Islamic countries in this study with Shiite denomination were Iran, Azerbaijan, and Iraq. The Islamic soci­ eties with Sunni denomination were Albania, Algeria, Bangladesh, Bosnian Federation, Burkina Faso, Egypt, Indonesia, Jordan, Kyrgyzstan, Malaysia, Mali, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey. In addition, religious denomination at the individual level was changed to Muslim and non-Muslim in order to control whether there is any difference between the ideas of Muslims and non-Muslims who live in these Islamic societies.

Religiosity and Private or Government Ownership of Business in Islamic Societies As can be seen from Table 3.11, the rate of religiosity in Islamic societies, at the individual level, bore no significant relationship to the attitude towards increasing private or government ownership of business, and there was no difference in this regard between Muslims and non-Muslims who live in these Islamic societies. Women in Islamic societies, just as women in general, agreed more than men that government ownership of business should be increased. The level of education and income in Islamic societies had a slight but significant influence on attitudes towards increasing of private or state ownership of business, reflecting global results. That is to say, more educated people and those who have more income agreed more than others with the idea that private ownership of business should be increased. Turning to the macro-level effects, the Islamic societies with predominant Sunni denomination tended to endorse the idea of private ownership of business more than those with Shia denomination.

Religiosity and Responsibility of People versus Government Responsibility in Islamic Societies Beginning with the individual-level effects, gender in Islamic societies had no impact on the notion that individuals or the state should have more responsibility to provide for people. These findings differ with the global results. Those who attained a higher educational level as well as those who had more income in Islamic societies tended to suggest that people should take more responsibility to provide for themselves. However, the effects were not very

Intercept (γ00) 5.516 Individual-level Variables Religiosity –0.114 Denomination (1=Muslim) Education Sex (1=Female) Age Income Country-level Variables Denomination (1=Sunni) Democracy HDI

Coefficient

Model 1

0.112 0.108 0.020*** 0.053*** 0.030 0.025*

–0.082 0.194 –0.082 0.273 –0.013 –0.055

0.097

0.167***

SE

5.504

Coefficient

0.148***

SE

Model 2

0.412 0.006 0.810

0.007 –0.292

0.007 –0.339

–0.706

–0.114

0.006 0.810

0.418

0.097

0.137***

SE

Model 4 Coeffi­cient

0.137*** 5.515

SE

–0.707

5.504

Coefficient

Model 3

Table 3.11 Multi-level models of the effects on attitudes toward private vs. government ownership of business in Islamic societies

–0.006 –0.162

–1.313

–0.081 0.285 –0.013 –0.055

–0.077 0.181

5.486

Coefficient

0.009 0.690

0.428**

0.020*** 0.053*** 0.030 0.025*

0.111 0.109

0.177***

SE

Model 5

170 chapter 3

d.f

χ2

16 16

d.f

0.005 16 0.025 16 0.012 16 0.009   16 7.89112

0.160 0.140

Var Comp

98.615*** 33.572** 66.429*** 96.365***

79.645*** 51.518***

χ2

8.33646

0.131

Var Comp

χ2

Var Comp

8.35504

0.005 0.024 0.012 0.009

19 90.142*** 0.155 0.137

d.f

χ2

16 98.924*** 16 33.303** 16 66.445** 16 96.365*** 7.89125

16 79.797*** 16 51.208***

d.f

Note: Religious denomination in both micro and macro-levels of analysis and sex were coded as a dummy variable. HDI= Human Development Index. *p ≤ 0.05; **p ≤ 0.01; ***p ≤ 0.001.

Religiosity 0.131 19 90.138*** Denomination (1=Muslim) Education Sex (1=Female) Age Income Level 1(σ2) 8.35504

Variance Var components Comp (random effects)

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171

172

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high. Turning to the macro-level effects, Islamic societies with predominant Sunni denomination agreed more than Shia countries that people should take more responsibility to provide for themselves. In contrast to global results, Islamic countries with higher hdi scores also tended to endorse this idea (see Table 3.12).

Religiosity and Income Equality versus Income Differences in Islamic Societies The only variable at the individual level which affected attitudes towards income equality versus income differences in Islamic societies is income. Those who have more income agreed more than others that larger income differences plays a positive role as an incentive. Also more educated people shared this view. Regarding the macro-level effects, Islamic societies with predominant Sunni denomination considered more income differences as a positive and encouraging factor in business and work, compared to Shia countries. Surprisingly and contrary to other variables, the democratic tradition of these societies affected views about income equality. Islamic societies which had more years of democratic governance expressed negligible support for larger income differences as a positive incentive (see Table 3.13).



Religiosity and Utility of Competition versus Harmfulness of Competition in Islamic Societies At the individual level, women more than men in Islamic societies believed that completion is harmful and brings out the worst in people. These results are shown in Table  3.14 and reflect the attitude taken by women globally. Likewise, there was a weak but significant relationship between the level of education and competition as a factor of free trade. Those who attained higher levels of education agreed more than others that competition is good and that it stimulates people to work hard and develop new ideas. It must be noted that in Islamic societies, contrary to the global findings, there was no effect of age and income on competition. At the macro level, none of the variables ­significantly affected competition.

Religiosity and Confidence in Civil Society Organizations in Sunni and Shia Islamic Societies

Religiosity and Confidence in Mosques in Islamic Societies As Table  3.15 demonstrates, there was a moderately positive relationship between Islamic religiosity and confidence in mosques. Religious people

6.601 Intercept (γ00) Individual-level Variables Religiosity –0.075 Denomination (1=Muslim) Education Sex (1=Female) Age Income Country-level Variables Denomination (1=Sunni) Democracy HDI

Coefficient

0.072 0.118 0.024** 0.065 0.017 0.025**

–0.113 –0.055 –0.077 0.126 0.028 –0.088

0.072

0.189***

SE

6.580

Coefficient

Model 2

0.175***

SE

Model 1

0.283* 0.012 1.083

–0.017 –0.925

0.149***

–0.712

6.596

Coefficient SE

Model 3

–0.016 –1.037

–0.757

–0.076

6.600

0.013 1.083

0.308*

0.071

0.152***

Coeffi­cient SE

Model 4

–0.010 –1.677

–0.932

–0.079 0.121 0.028 –0.088

–0.102 –0.091

6.558

Coefficient

0.012 0.767*

0.312**

0.024** 0.063 0.017 0.025**

0.069 0.120

0.163***

SE

Model 5

Table 3.12 Multi-level models of the effects on attitudes toward responsibility of individuals vs. government responsibility to provide for people in Islamic societies

The Link between Religion, Religiosity, and Democratic Values

173

Var Comp

d.f

χ2

144.273*** 47.185***

28.288* 39.512***

χ2

16 75.442*** 7.88611

16 16

0.007 0.045 0.009  

16 16

d.f

0.050 0.130

Var Comp

8.18240

0.055

χ2

0.009

0.007 0.045

27.933* 40.368***

χ2

16 75.474*** 7.88653

16 144.318*** 16 47.238***

16 16

Var d.f Comp

19 49.097*** 0.040 0.138

d.f

8.18698

Var Comp

Note: Religious denomination in both micro and macro-levels of analysis and sex were coded as a dummy variable. HDI= Human Development Index. *p ≤ 0.05; **p ≤ 0.01; ***p ≤ 0.001.

Religiosity 0.054 19 49.130*** Denomination (1=Muslim) Education Sex (1=Female) Age Income Level 1(σ2) 8.18704

Variance components (random effects)

Table 3.12 Multi-level models of the effects on attitudes toward responsibility of individuals vs. government responsibility to provide for people in Islamic societies (cont.)

174 chapter 3

Intercept (γ00) 6.261 Individual-level Variables Religiosity 0.031 Denomination (1=Muslim) Education Sex (1=Female) Age Income Country-level Variables Denomination (1=Sunni) Democracy HDI

Coefficient

0.098 0.181 0.016*** 0.045 0.02 0.031**

–0.098 –0.179 0.086 –0.067 0.006 0.115

0.094

0.292***

SE

6.095

Coefficient

Model 2

0.277***

SE

Model 1

0.516* 0.015 1.68

–0.021 –0.139

Model 4

–0.033 0.396

1.943

0.033

0.011** 1.461

0.668**

0.093

0.260***

Coeffi­cient SE

0.245*** 6.261

SE

1.495

6.256

Coefficient

Model 3

–0.014 0.672

2.331

0.084 –0.064 0.002 0.120

–0.081 –0.067

6.155

0.006* 0.515

0.279***

0.016*** 0.046 0.019 0.032**

0.093 0.156

0.279***

SE

Model 5 Coefficient

Table 3.13 Multi-level models of the effects on attitudes toward desirability of income equality vs. larger income differences in Islamic societies

The Link between Religion, Religiosity, and Democratic Values

175

Var Comp

d.f

χ2

16 16

d.f

39.081*** 81.081***

χ2

0.003 16 71.760*** 0.021 16 30.550* 0.005 16 38.192** 0.016   16 141.112*** 7.38147

0.122 0.492

Var Comp

7.71062

0.127

Var Comp

χ2

Var d.f Comp

7.70637

0.003 0.018 0.004 0.017

39.060*** 69.670***

χ2

16 71.521*** 16 30.427* 16 38.383** 16 145.291*** 7.38033

19 75.927*** 0.123 16 0.406 16

d.f

Note: Religious denomination in both micro and macro-levels of analysis and sex were coded as a dummy variable. HDI= Human Development Index. *p ≤ 0.05; **p ≤ 0.01; ***p ≤ 0.001.

Religiosity 0.127 19 75.865*** Denomination (1=Muslim) Education Sex (1=Female) Age Income Level 1(σ2) 7.70616

Variance components (random effects)

Table 3.13 Multi-level models of the effects on attitudes toward desirability of income equality vs. larger income differences in Islamic societies (cont.)

176 chapter 3

Intercept (γ00) 3.350 Individual-level Variables Religiosity 0.073 Denomination (1=Muslim) Education Sex (1=Female) Age Income Country-level Variables Denomination (1=Sunni) Democracy HDI

Coefficient

0.086 0.142 0.019** 0.042*** 0.025 0.027

0.108 –0.012 –0.075 0.154 –0.043 0.010

0.084

0.123***

SE

3.412

Coefficient

Model 2

0.128***

SE

Model 1

0.304 0.007 0.758

0.014 0.149

Model 4

0.014 0.203

0.023

0.073

0.007 0.774

0.315

0.084

0.123***

Coeffi­cient SE

0.115*** 3.333

SE

–0.007

3.362

Coefficient

Model 3

Table 3.14 Multi-level models of the effects on attitudes toward utility vs. harmfulness of competition in Islamic societies

0.009 0.668

0.266

–0.075 0.154 –0.044 0.009

0.111 –0.01

3.405

Coefficient

0.006 0.543

0.222

0.020** 0.042*** 0.025 0.028

0.086 0.142

0.120***

SE

Model 5

The Link between Religion, Religiosity, and Democratic Values

177

Var Comp

d.f

χ2

Var Comp

d.f

Var d.f Comp

χ2

6.24192

0.005 13 39.922*** 0.009 13 84.883*** 6.09247

39.914*** 84.697*** 6.25462

χ2

14 44.773*** 0.068 13 30.401** 0.204 13 67.880***

d.f

0.004 13 58.624***

0.065

Var Comp

58.627***

30.376** 67.982***

χ2

Note: Religious denomination in both micro and macro-levels of analysis and sex were coded as a dummy variable. HDI= Human Development Index. *p ≤ 0.05; **p ≤ 0.01; ***p ≤ 0.001.

Religiosity 0.065 14 751.813*** 0.071 13 Denomination 0.213 13 (1=Muslim) Education 0.003 13 Sex (1=Female) Age 0.006 13 Income 0.009   13 Level 1(σ2) 6.24192 6.09285

Variance components (random effects)

Table 3.14 Multi-level models of the effects on attitudes toward utility vs. harmfulness of competition in Islamic societies (cont.)

178 chapter 3

 0.032 0.005*** −0.030 0.016 −0.006 0.006  0.001 0.005

 0.442 0.070*** −0.030 0.090

 1.655 0.074***

Coefficient SE

Coefficient SE

Intercept (γ00) 1.661 0.077*** Individual-level Variables Religiosity 0.453 0.059*** Denominations (1=Muslim) Education Sex (1=Female) Age Income Country-level Variables Denomination (1=Sunni) Democracy HDI

Model 2

Model 1 Coefficient SE

Model 4

0.171

0.112

0.062***

−0.000 0.005  0.522 0.420

−0.161

 0.455

0.069***  1.661 0.073***

 0.004 0.005  0.696 0.534

−0.322

 1.669

Coefficient SE

Model 3

Table 3.15 Multi-level models of the effects on confidence in mosques in Islamic societies

−0.001 0.002  0.961 0.288**

−0.032 0.114

 0.032 0.005*** −0.030 0.016  0.006 0.006 −0.001 0.005

 0.446 0.070*** −0.028 0.092

 1.664 0.070***

Coefficient SE

Model 5

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χ2

0.57446

Note: Religious denomination in both micro and macro-levels of analysis and sex were coded as a dummy variable. hdi = Human Development Index. *p ≤ 0.05; **p ≤ 0.01; ***p ≤ 0.001.

0.57446

0.61458

Var Comp d.f

0.000 16 139.553*** 0.003 16  49.476*** 0.000 16  65.417*** 0.000 16 104.417*** 0.54226

χ2

0.000 16 139.464*** 0.002 16 49.456*** 0.000 16  65.556*** 0.000 16 104.249*** 0.54230

Var Comp d.f

0.067 19 664.199*** 0.083 16 377.993*** 0.123 16 536.005***

χ2

0.067 19 663.240*** 0.083 16 378.034*** 0.122 16 537.190***

Var Comp d.f

Religiosity Denominations (1=Muslim) Education Sex (1=Female) Age Income Level 1(σ2)

χ2

Var Comp d.f

Variance components (random effects)

Table 3.15 Multi-level models of the effects on confidence in mosques in Islamic societies (cont.)

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had more confidence in mosques than those who were non-religious or ­convinced atheists (see Figure  3.13). Comparing confidence in mosques among Sunni and Shia religious people, Figure 3.14 demonstrates that there is no difference between these two groups in this regard. Analysis shows more educated people in Islamic societies had less confidence in mosques than others. However, the estimated coefficient is low. Interestingly and contrary to the global results in which women showed more confidence in religious institutions than men, gender in Islamic societies plays no significant role in this regard. Turning to macro-level effects, hdi scores had a strong relation with confidence in mosques (estimated coefficient = 0.961, p-value ≤ 0.01). The higher the hdi score in Islamic societies, the less confidence in mosques. Religiosity and Confidence in Labor Unions in Islamic Societies As can be seen from Table 3.16 at the individual-level effects, more Islamic religiosity had an impact on confidence in labor unions. People who considered themselves as religious put more faith in labor unions than those who said they were non-religious or convinced atheists (see Figure  3.15). Besides, as Figure 3.16 shows, religious people in Sunni countries put more trust in labor unions than religious individuals in Shia countries. Turning to macro-level effects, Islamic societies with predominant Sunni denomination had clearly more confidence in labor unions than Shia countries (estimated coefficient = –0.457, p-value ≤ 0.001). Furthermore, Islamic countries with more experience of democratic government had a very slightly tendency to have more confidence in labor unions. Religiosity and Confidence in Political Parties in Islamic Societies As can be seen from Table 3.17 at the individual level, there was a weak positive relationship between Islamic religiosity and confidence in political parties. As can be seen in Figure 3.17 Political parties were considered more trustworthy by religious people than by those who were non-religious or convinced atheists. In addition, Muslims who live in these Islamic societies had greater confidence in political parties than non-Muslims in these same societies. It should be added that, as shown in Figure 3.18, religious Muslims in Shia countries trust political parties slightly more than religious Muslims in Sunni societies. At the macro level, there was no significant correlation to be found in Islamic societies that affects confidence in political parties.

Religiosity and Confidence in the Environmental Protection Movement in Islamic Societies Regarding micro-level effects, religious people had more confidence in the environmental protection movement than those who were non-religious or

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2.48

Confidence in Religious Institutions

2.25

2.03

1.81

1.59 −0.15

0.35

0.85 Religiosity

1.35

1.85

Confidence in Religious Institutions

2.50

Figure 3.13 The effect of religiosity on confidence in religious institutions in Islamic societies Note: in X-axis 1= A religious person and 3 = A convinced atheist. In Y-axis1 = A great deal confidence and 4 = None at all confidence in Religious Institutions.

Shiite Sunni

2.27

2.04

1.81

1.58 −0.15

0.35

0.85 Religiosity

1.35

1.85

Figure 3.14 Comparison of the effect of religiosity on confidence in religious institutions among Sunni and Shia societies Note: in X-axis 1= A religious person and 3 = A convinced atheist. In Y-axis1 = A great deal confidence and 4 = None at all confidence in Religious Institutions.



0.067***

 0.011 0.006 −0.017 0.013 −0.005 0.008  0.000 0.005

 0.104 0.026***  0.000 0.021

 2.555

Coefficient SE

Coefficient SE

Intercept (γ00) 2.566 0.069*** Individual-level Variables Religiosity 0.117 0.026*** Denominations (1=Muslim) Education Sex (1=Female) Age Income Country-level Variables Denomination (1=Sunni) Democracy HDI

Model 2

Model 1 Coefficient SE

Model 4

0.144

 2.558

0.064***

Coefficient SE

Model 5

0.100

 0.008 0.001***  0.447 0.264

−0.457 0.099***

 0.011 0.006 −0.017 0.013 −0.005 0.008  0.000 0.005

0.0267***   0.105 0.026*** −0.001 0.021

−0.001 0.002  0.650 0.397

−0.156

 0.114

0.063***  2.581 0.064***

 0.001 0.003  0.648 0.449

−0.214

 2.569

Coefficient SE

Model 3

Table 3.16 Multi-level models of the effects on confidence in labor unions in Islamic societies

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0.73651

χ2

0.000 15  54.105*** 0.000 15  38.686*** 0.69916

Var Comp d.f

0.000 15  53.962*** 0.000 15  38.541*** 0.69919 0.73629

χ2

0.007 17 46.225***

Var Comp d.f

0.000 15 75.390***

χ2

0.000 15  74.653***

Var Comp d.f

Note: Religious denomination in both micro and macro-levels of analysis and sex were coded as a dummy variable. hdi = Human Development Index. *p ≤ 0.05; **p ≤ 0.01; ***p ≤ 0.001.

0.73650

0.008 17 46.965***

Religiosity Denominations (1=Muslim) Education Sex (1=Female) Age Income Level 1(σ2)

χ2

Var Comp d.f

Variance components (random effects)

Table 3.16 Multi-level models of the effects on confidence in labor unions in Islamic societies (cont.)

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2.74

Confidence in Labor Unions

2.69

2.64

2.59

2.54 −0.15

0.35

0.85 Religiosity

1.35

1.85

Confidence in Labor Unions

3.11

Figure 3.15 The effect of religiosity on confidence in Labor unions in Islamic societies Note: in X-axis 1= A religious person and 3 = A convinced atheist. In Y-axis 1 = A great deal confidence and 4 = None at all confidence in labour unions.

Shiite Sunni

2.95

2.80

2.64

2.49 −0.15

0.35

0.85 Religiosity

1.35

1.85

Figure 3.16 Comparison of the effect of religiosity on confidence in labor unions among Sunni and Shia societies Note: in X-axis 1= A religious person and 3 = A convinced atheist. in Y-axis 1 = A great deal confidence and 4 = None at all confidence in labour unions.

0.076***

 0.015 0.008  0.005 0.021 −0.016 0.008 −0.001 0.004

 0.090 0.041* −0.106 0.036*

  2.737

Coefficient SE

Coefficient SE

Intercept (γ00) 2.780 0.074*** Individual-level Variables Religiosity 0.104 0.034** Denominations (1=Muslim) Education Sex (1=Female) Age Income Country-level Variables Denomination (1=Sunni) Democracy HDI

Model 2

Model 1 Coefficient SE

Model 4

0.155

0.203

0.034**

−0.002 0.004  0.641 0.550

 0.234

 0.104

0.070***  2.780 0.069***

−0.004 0.004  0.559 0.569

 0.244

 2.783

Coefficient SE

Model 3

Table 3.17 Multi-level models of the effects on confidence in political parties in Islamic societies

−0.003 0.004  0.429 0.503

 0.123 0.227

 0.015 0.008  0.005 0.020 −0.016 0.008 −0.001 0.004

 0.090 0.041* −0.108 0.036**

 2.751 0.072***

Coefficient SE

Model 5

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χ2

0.000 14 91.628*** 0.004 14 41.756*** 0.000 14 49.241*** 0.000 14 26.336* 0.74371

0.021 14 23.731* 0.014 14 31.975**

Var Comp d.f

0.79639

χ2

0.79686

0.015 17 67.246***

Var Comp d.f χ2

0.000 14 91.651*** 0.004 14 41.742*** 0.000 14 49.221*** 0.000 14 26.312* 0.74370

0.021 14 23.764* 0.014 14 32.185**

Var Comp d.f

*p ≤ 0.05; **p ≤ 0.01; ***p ≤ 0.001.

Note: Religious denomination in both micro and macro-levels of analysis and sex were coded as a dummy variable. hdi = Human Development Index.

0.79686

0.015 17 67.287***

Religiosity Denominations (1=Muslim) Education Sex (1=Female) Age Income Level 1(σ2)

χ2

Var Comp d.f

Variance components (random effects)

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Confidence in Political Parties

2.91

2.86

2.82

2.77

2.73 −0.15

0.35

0.85

1.35

1.85

Religiosity

2.92

Figure 3.17 The effect of religiosity on confidence in political parties in Islamic societies Note: in X-axis 1= A religious person and 3 = A convinced atheist. In Y-axis 1 = A great deal confidence and 4 = None at all confidence in political parties.

Shiite Sunni

Confidence in Political Parties

2.85

2.77

2.69

2.62 −0.15

0.35

0.85 Religiosity

1.35

1.85

Figure 3.18 Comparison of the effect of religiosity on confidence in political parties among Sunni and Shia societies Note: in X-axis 1= A religious person and 3 = A convinced atheist. In Y-axis 1 = A great deal confidence and 4 = None at all confidence in political parties.

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convinced atheists (see Figure  3.19). Also, as Figure  3.20 illustrates, religious people in Sunni countries have more confidence in the movement than religious people in Shia countries. No other significant effect was found at this level of analysis. At the macro level of analysis we found that Islamic societies with predominant Sunni denomination put greater trust in the environmental movement than Shia countries (see Table 3.18).

Religiosity and Confidence in the Women’s Movement in Islamic Societies Reflecting global results, Table 3.19 also reveals here two effective variables at the individual level. The first one is religiosity. More religious people in Islamic societies trusted more in the women’s movement than those who were nonreligious or convinced atheists (see Figure 3.21). It should be added here that, as Figure 3.22 shows, believers in Sunni societies put slightly more trust in the movement than religious individuals in Shia countries. The second effect relates to gender. Women in Islamic societies expressed more confidence in the women’s movement than men. It is worth noting that the estimated coefficients of both these variables are higher than the estimated coefficients in global results. Turning to macro-level effects, there are two effective variables too, namely Islamic denomination and hdi. Islamic societies with predominant Sunni denomination trusted the women’s movement more than Shiite countries. On the other hand, Islamic societies with higher hdi scores had less confidence in the women’s movement.



Religiosity and Confidence in the Four Civil Society Organizations in Islamic Societies As previously mentioned, it is revealing to look at the results of the multilevel analysis of confidence in all factors of civil society (except for confidence in religious institutions which had no closed correlation with other indicators of confidence in civil societies). Table 3.20 presents the results of the multilevel analysis in Islamic societies. Beginning with micro-level effects, religious individuals in Islamic societies had more confidence in labor unions, political parties, the environmental movement, and the women’s movement than those who were non-religious or convinced atheists (see Figure 3.23). Notably, the rate of confidence religious people in Islamic societies expressed in these ngos was higher than the global rate (estimated coefficients respectively = 0.369, p-value ≤ 0.01 and 0.201, p-value ≤ 0.001). Moreover, as Figure 3.24 shows, the pious in Sunni countries had more confidence in civil society organizations than religious people in Shia countries.

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Confidence in Environmental Movement

2.58

2.53

2.47

2.42

2.36 −0.15

0.35

0.85 Religiosity

1.35

1.85

Confidence in Environmental Movement

3.20

Figure 3.19 The effect of religiosity on confidence in the environmental protection movement in Islamic societies Note: in X-axis 1= A religious person and 3 = A convinced atheist. In Y-axis 1 = A great deal confidence and 4 = None at all confidence in the environmental protection movement.

Shiite Sunni

2.97

2.74

2.51

2.28 −0.15

0.35

0.85 Religiosity

1.35

1.85

Figure 3.20 Comparison of the effect of religiosity on confidence in the environmental protection movement among Sunni and Shia societies Note: in X-axis 1= A religious person and 3 = A convinced atheist. In Y-axis 1 = A great deal confidence and 4 = None at all confidence in the environmental protection movement.

−0.003 0.008 −0.041 0.025  0.000 0.006 −0.000 0.007

 0.125 0.044*  0.048 0.050

 2.382 0.081***

Coefficient SE

Coefficient SE

Intercept (γ00) 2.353 0.077*** Individual-level Variables Religiosity 0.094 0.044* Denominations (1=Muslim) Education Sex (1=Female) Age Income Country-level Variables Denomination (1=Sunni) Democracy HDI

Model 2

Model 1 Coefficient SE

Model 4

0.304

0.161**

0.043*

 0.001 0.002  0.292 0.267

−0.587

 0.094

0.062***  2.376 0.066***

 0.004 0.002  0.217 0.352

−0.610

 2.354

Coefficient SE

Model 3

Table 3.18 Multi-level models of the effects on confidence in the environmental protection movement in Islamic societies

−0.002 0.001  0.126 0.319

 0.696 0.116***

−0.003 0.008 −0.040 0.025 −0.000 0.006  0.000 0.007

 0.110 0.043*  0.053 0.049

 2.409 0.072***

Coefficient SE

Model 5

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χ2

0.72912

*p ≤ 0.05; **p ≤ 0.01; ***p ≤ 0.001.

Note: Religious denomination in both micro and macro-levels of analysis and sex were coded as a dummy variable. hdi = Human Development Index.

0.72910

0.73344

Var Comp d.f

0.000 15 140.768*** 0.008 15  74.888*** 0.000 15  28.219* 0.000 15  57.692*** 0.69501

χ2

0.001 15  140.320*** 0.008 15  74.919*** 0.000 15  28.175* 0.000 15  57.573*** 0.69474

Var Comp d.f

0.027 17 123.804*** 0.022 15  50.430*** 0.030 15  74.163***

χ2

0.028 17 123.910*** 0.028 15  49.014*** 0.031 15  73.862***

Var Comp d.f

Religiosity Denominations (1=Muslim) Education Sex (1=Female) Age Income Level 1(σ2)

χ2

Var Comp d.f

Variance components (random effects)

Table 3.18 Multi-level models of the effects on confidence in the environmental protection movement in Islamic societies (cont.)

192 chapter 3

0.040* 0.046

  0.103   0.032  0.000 0.009 −0.293 0.040***  0.004 0.006 −0.002 0.008

0.086***

 2.395

Coefficient SE

Coefficient SE

Intercept (γ00) 2.412 0.084*** Individual-level Variables Religiosity 0.109 0.038* Denominations (1=Muslim) Education Sex (1=Female) Age Income Country-level Variables Denomination (1=Sunni) Democracy HDI

Model 2

Model 1

 0.001 0.004   0.952 0.426*

 0.000 0.003  0.822 0.415

0.209*

0.038*

−0.480

 0.109

0.071***  2.436 0.071***

Coefficient SE

Model 4

−0.493 0.280

 2.415

Coefficient SE

Model 3

Table 3.19 Multi-level models of the effects on confidence in the women’s movement in Islamic societies

0.040* 0.045

−0.003  0.766

0.001 0.303*

 0.581 0.075***

 0.000 0.009 −0.293 0.040*** −0.003 0.005 −0.002 0.008

 0.105  0.032

 2.428 0.067***

Coefficient SE

Model 5

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Note: Religious denomination in both micro and macro-levels of analysis and sex were coded as a dummy variable. hdi = Human Development Index. *p ≤ 0.05; **p ≤ 0.01; ***p ≤ 0.001.

0.80295

0.001 15  63.992*** 0.74037

0.80295

0.80715

χ2

0.000 15  62.814*** 0.74002

Var Comp d.f

0.001 15 158.094*** 0.025 15 182.779***

χ 2

0.001 15  145.142*** 0.024 15  178.634***

Var Comp d.f

0.021 18 101.192*** 0.020 15  55.166*** 0.025 15  59.999***

χ 2

0.022 18 101.180*** 0.019 15  56.024*** 0.024 15  58.847***

Var Comp d.f

Religiosity Denominations (1=Muslim) Education Sex (1=Female) Age Income Level 1(σ2)

χ

2

Var Comp d.f

Variance components (random effects)

Table 3.19 Multi-level models of the effects on confidence in the women’s movement in Islamic societies (cont.)

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Confidence in the Women’s Movement

2.59

2.53

2.48

2.43

2.38 −0.15

0.35

0.85

1.35

1.85

Religiosity

Confidence in the Women’s Movement

3.11

Figure 3.21 The effect of religiosity on confi­dence in the women’s move­ment in Islamic societies Note: in X-axis 1= A religious ­person and 3 = A convinced atheist. In Y-axis 1 = A great deal confidence and 4 = None at all confidence in the women’s movement.

Shiite Sunni

2.91

2.71

2.51

2.31 −0.15

0.35

0.85 Religiosity

1.35

1.85

Figure 3.22 Comparison of the effect of religiosity on confidence in the women’s movement among Sunni and Shia societies Note: in X-axis 1= A religious person and 3 = A convinced atheist. In Y-axis 1 = A great deal confidence and 4 = None at all confidence in the women’s movement.

 0.115 0.031** −0.442 0.076*** −0.055 0.018**  0.021 0.025

 0.367 0.117** −0.010 0.132

0.114***

0.334***

 8.844

0.304***

Coefficient SE

Coefficient SE

Intercept (γ00) 8.773 Individual-level Variables Religiosity 0.430 Denominations (1=Muslim) Education Sex (1=Female) Age Income Country-level Variables Denomination (1=Sunni) Democracy HDI

Model 2

Model 1 Coefficient SE

Model 4

0.691

1.008

0.112***

 0.034 0.016   0.755 2.012

−1.271

 0.429

0.284***  8.815 0.278***

 0.026 0.018  0.763 2.207

−1.206

 8.768

Coefficient SE

Model 3

Table 3.20 Multi-level models of the effects on confidence in the civil society organizations in Islamic societies

0.116** 0.136

−0.030 0.020 −1.212 1.975

−1.626 0.843

 0.114 0.031** −0.439 0.077*** −0.055 0.018** −0.023 0.025

 0.369  0.033

 8.835 0.348***

Coefficient SE

Model 5

196 chapter 3

χ2

0.009 15  73.464*** 7.74727

0.009 15  73.365*** 7.74816

8.41358

χ2

0.160 15  52.588*** 0.216 15  44.722***

Var Comp d.f

0.015 15 130.776*** 0.080 15  79.348***

8.47528

χ2

0.187 18 93.729***

Var Comp d.f

0.015 15  130.519*** 0.079 15  79.227***

0.159 15  52.614*** 0.201 15  43.143***

Var Comp d.f

Note: Religious denomination in both micro and macro-levels of analysis and sex were coded as a dummy variable. hdi = Human Developmentt Index. *p ≤ 0.05; **p ≤ 0.01; ***p ≤ 0.001.

8.41356

0.189 18 93.830***

Religiosity Denominations (1=Muslim) Education Sex (1=Female) Age Income Level 1(σ2)

χ2

Var Comp d.f

Variance components (random effects)

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Confidence in Civil Society Organizations

9.52

9.34

9.16

8.98

8.79 −0.15

0.35

0.85 Religiosity

1.35

1.85

Confidence in Civil Society Organizations

10.80

Figure 3.23 The effect of religiosity on confidence in civil society organizations in Islamic societies Note: in X-axis 1= A religious person and 3 = A convinced atheist. In Y-axis 1 = A great deal confidence and 4 = None at all confidence in civil society organizations.

Shiite Sunni

1.25

9.71

9.17

8.62 −0.15

0.35

0.85 Religiosity

1.35

1.85

Figure 3.24 Comparison of the effect of religiosity on confidence in civil society organizations among Sunni and Shia Societies Note: in X-axis 1= A religious person and 3 = A convinced atheist. In Y-axis 4 = A great deal confidence and 12 = None at all confidence in civil society organizations.

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Further analysis shows that women in Islamic societies had more confidence in ngos than men. Here too, the rate of confidence was higher than the global rate (estimated coefficient = –0.439, p-value ≤ 0.001 in Islamic societies and –0.334, p-value ≤ 0.001 in global results). Another individual-level effect relates to education. More educated people in these Islamic societies had slightly less confidence in the civil organizations in question. As is apparent from the table, at the macro level, no significant effective variable was found. At the end of this chapter, it should be added that all global multilevel analyses of the current study were tested using a combination of two other questions about religiosity namely ‘importance of God in life’ and ‘importance of religion in life’ with the selected independent variable namely ‘are you a religious person, not a religious person, or a convinced atheist’. The results were similar to the results presented. However, since the statistical correlation between these three variables was not very high, only the third question was used as independent variable.

Discussion and Conclusions

Discussion Predominant Religion, Religiosity, and Free Market Economics As detailed above, one part of this study tried to measure attitudes towards a free market economy using four factors. These factors were: private ownership versus government ownership of business, responsibility of people versus government responsibility to provide for people, income equality versus larger income differences as incentives, and finally harmfulness of competition versus acceptance of competition as stimulation to work harder. The results of this study indicate that in all of these cases, with the exception of competition, the average response in the 60 societies around the world was in the middle of the scales. This means that on average there was no clear-cut tendency either for or against the favorable factors with a market economy, except in relation to competition in which the average of those interviewed expressed in relatively strong terms that competition is good and stimulates people to work hard and develop new ideas. It is somewhat surprising that there is no significant difference in this regard between the three types of religious societies, namely predominantly Islamic societies, predominantly Christian societies, and predominantly Buddhist, Hindu, and folk-religion societies. A possible explanation for the result might be that this pattern of opinion implies that people are not totally convinced either of the mentioned capitalist principles or of the ideas of socialism, or indeed of ‘the third way’ or Islamic economy. The reason for this is perhaps

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that the benefits of a free economic system such as individual freedom, more diversity of choice, economic development, and social well-being are important to people. But, on the other hand, the humanitarian and egalitarian ideals of socialism and Islamic economics attract those who worry about living conditions in the present economic situation. Furthermore, the lack of response at either extreme of the scale can perhaps imply that a mixed economic system with reduced features from both a market economy and a controlled economy might be favorable. Tough only the construction of an ‘ideal type’ of such a mixed system in which both incompatible sides function perfectly seems to be straightforward, some European countries like Germany with the Social Democracy model try to do this extraordinary task. Without doubt, every effort to find a middle way should take the free will of individuals into account. Also more support of the lower and more needy strata of society can facilitate attempts to reach a compromise, as the average of responses endorse slightly more government responsibility to provide for people. Turning now to the multivariate analyses to review the predictors of factors compatible with a free market economy, we are confronted with some unanticipated findings. Surprisingly, and contrary to Max Weber’s (1934) theory of the deep influence of religion on economy, the current study found that religion does not affect economic attitudes so much. In contrast to the first microlevel hypothesis, that pointed to a negative association between high levels of religiosity and democratic economic outlooks, the results of this study did not show any significant correlation between individual religiosity and preference for private or government ownership of business. Similarly, no significant relationship could be established between individual piety and opinions as to whether individuals or government should provide for people. Views about the benefits or harmfulness of competition could not be linked to religiosity either. However, contrary to predictions, most religious people subscribed to the idea that larger income differences were necessary as incentives. At first glance this seems very surprising, especially if we take in account the great emphasis of world religions on equality and note that one of the most important missions of some religions is the establishment of social justice in the world. How then can people who consider themselves as religious agree with income inequality? According to some religious texts justice means putting everything in its place (Bihishti and Bahunar, 1982: 147). Accordingly, one might infer a certain justification for income differences which acknowledge a different place for people according to their work or status. Moreover, according to the multilevel analyses, there is no relationship between the religious tradition of the societies and compatible attitudes to a free market economy. Remarkably, there is no difference here between the

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three types of religious societies, namely predominantly Islamic societies, predominantly Christian societies, and predominantly Buddhist, Hindu, and folkreligion societies. Accordingly, we have to reject the third hypothesis which claimed that predominantly Islamic countries are more negatively associated with democratic economic values than the other types of religious societies. In addition, this research cannot confirm Max Weber’s thesis about the conduciveness of protestant teachings to capitalism and the inability of other religions to induce such motivation. Needless to say, advances in the methodology of sociology since Weber, which facilitate empirical studies and cross-cultural comparisons taking various contextual and historical conditions into consideration, provide the opportunity to evaluate classical doctrines which did not have large empirical support. In short, one of the most interesting findings of the current study is that religion is no obstacle to the development of market-friendly values. This survey did not detect any evidence that religious individuals tend to endorse features of non-capitalist economies. It is worth noting that there is no difference in this regard between Christians, Muslims, Buddhists, Hindus and Chinese folk-religionists. Also, as mentioned above, the societies’ historical religious traditions play no role in determining economic opinions. In other words, people do not refer to their religious beliefs when considering whether private or government ownership of business should be increased, whether individuals or the state has more responsibility to provide for people; and whether competition is beneficial or harmful to the economy. This is especially interesting in the case of Muslims and Islamic countries. As it was already discussed at length in Islam and Free Market Economics a huge body of academic literature as well as Islamic texts emphasize the incompatibility of Islam with principles of a free market economy. This inconsistency can be traced to the legal and political structure of Islamic countries, the role of Islamic states in economic activities, the differences of ethics and values of Islam and capitalism, and the issue of private ownership and its limitations in Islam. What seems puzzling is that this incompatibility is not mirrored in the attitudes of Muslims. A possible solution, drawing inspiration from Malinowski’s (2002 [1944]) theory of needs, could be that one of the functions of culture and values is to serve needs. Indeed, new needs require new values to serve them. Capitalism, a free market economy, and other similar concepts are modern systems which attempt to satisfy the needs of modern man. Contemporary man, initially, refers automatically to new cultural resources to react to modern concepts and phenomena and not necessarily to religious values, which were the cultural reference of pre-modern man and his/her needs.

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In other words, if we accept Parsons’ view (1966: 21–23) that institutional differentiation, among other factors characterize the modern age in which religious teachings are not the only source of knowledge and specialization process creates plural and special value subsystems, it seems reasonable to assume that Muslim individuals do not refer to Islamic values when addressing certain economic questions, which in turn implies a development in Muslim thinking. However, it should be noted that this development does not involve a separation between religious belief and economic ideas, nor does it suggest economic secularization at societal level, but is a sign that non-Islamic value sources were also taken into consideration. While it remains true that religion has a long standing impact on society and its contemporary value system, it should not be overlooked that most fundamental issues of human existence and concrete economic conditions of life are decisive factors which tend to rival with religious values. The hard reality of life imposes itself on believers and non-believers alike and sometimes leads the former to disregard religious teachings. It is worth noting that whether Islamic countries are more than 95 per cent Muslim or about 65 per cent Muslim does not seem to have a significant influence on attitudes towards the relationship between religion and economic policy, as the evidence in Religiosity in Cross-National Perspective shows. For instance people in Nigeria which is about 48 per cent Muslim has the same attitude to the desirability of private ownership of business as people in Algeria which is more than 98.2 per cent Muslim. In Malaysia which is about 62 per cent Muslim, and in Turkey which is more than 98 per cent Muslim, respectively 22.3 per cent and 20.2 per cent of respondents agreed that government has no great responsibility to provide for people. In both Burkina Faso and Azerbaijan which have Muslim populations of about 58 and 98 per cent respectively, nearly 55 per cent of people considered competition as a mechanism which stimulates people to work hard and develop new ideas. And in both Malaysia (62 per cent Muslim) and Saudi Arabia (97 per cent Muslim) approximately 40 per cent of respondents agreed with the statement that we need larger income differences as incentives. This means that attitudes in both of these categories are the same. In other words, a higher level of Islamic religious belief and more institutional and personal Islamic religious activities in a country have no effect on attitudes towards free market economics. Turning to contextual effects, the current study found that, contrary to the hypothesis that the democratic tradition of a country positively affects ­attitudes towards democratic (economic) values, the political background exerts no influence on economic attitudes. In other words, the length of democratic tradition does not affect the democratic economic opinions within these

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s­ ocieties. This suggests that benefiting from the experience of a democratic government is not a necessary precondition for the growth of democratic ­economic ideas. Put differently, the development of a democratic economic culture is not dependent on an institutional democracy and this culture may grow even under the shadow of authoritarianism. This is because people even under a concentrated political institution with a market-based economic system, have economic interests. The experience of China shows how effective this approach is. The present findings seem to be in the same direction with the research undertaken by Inglehart and Welzel (Inglehart and Welzel, 2003: 70; Welzel, 2002: 332; Inglehart and Welzel, 2005: 198–200; Welzel and Inglehart, 2008: 6) which found that the length of time a country has experienced under the rule of democratic institutions has a negligible effect on self-expression values, if it be considered that the core of Inglehart’s self-expression values and liberal economic attitudes is human free choice. In other words, the expression of free will in individuals does not depend on and is not strengthened by political democratic conditions. This is particularly remarkable from a comparative perspective. The realization that democratic economic principles are barely affected by democratic political tradition suggests that especially the Islamic societies, which have less experience of democracy compared to predominantly Christian societies and predominantly Buddhist, Hindu, and folkreligion­societies, have the chance to develop democratic values in spite of their authoritarian political history. In other words, the lack of a deeply-rooted liberal political tradition in Islamic societies does not prevent the development of cultural prerequisites of economic democracy. A comparison of the economic attitudes in some societies with a long history of democracy and other countries without or with less democratic tradition confirms that underlying economic principles were not affected by institutional democracy. Respondents from the United States, for example, with a history of more than two centuries of democratic governance, agreed almost to the same extent as Albanians, with only about two decades of democracy, that private ownership of business should be increased. Likewise, the Netherlands with 89 years of democratic tradition, and Finland and Sweden each with about one century of democracy on the one hand, and the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and the Bosnian Federation with no democratic experience and Romania with only 15 years of democracy on the other hand, partially agreed with an increase in the private ownership of business. Neither Italy with 63 years democracy, nor Azerbaijan, with no democratic tradition, could decide definitively whether larger income differences act as incentives or whether incomes should be made more equal. Indeed it is interesting to note

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that the 154 years that New Zealanders or the 108 years that Norwegians have experienced a democratic state make little difference to attitudes regarding income equality when compared with people in Iraq and Morocco who have witnessed nothing but authoritarianism. Similarly, the 110 years of institutional democracy in Australia did not result in very different views about competition in comparison to Viet Nam which has never had a democratic state. Neither the 85 years of democratic government in Spain nor the 1 year of democracy in Kyrgyzstan enable us to predict what attitudes respondents may have about the responsibility of the state or individuals to provide for people. These examples illustrate our claim that experience of institutional democracy does not affect economic attitudes. Furthermore, according to other findings from the current investigation at the contextual level, socioeconomic development does not have a statistically significant effect on attitudes regarding all factors consistent with a free market economy. That is to say that, contrary to our hypothesis, socioeconomic development does not necessarily encourage market-friendly values except in the case of proprietorship where more developed societies did lend greater support to the idea of private ownership of business. On the other hand, it clearly demonstrates that developing countries, Islamic societies included, have no hostility towards free-market values. Cultivating liberal economic ideas as an indispensable feature of democracy is not inevitably linked to the rate of human development. Indeed it is reasonable to assume that the successful experience of free market economics in developed countries, influences people in developing societies too. In other words, there seems to be little evidence that human development determine economic attitudes. Both Norway and Mali, with hdi values of 0.937 and 0.279 respectively, shared the same slight tendency to say that people should take more responsibility to provide for themselves; Japan, on the other hand, with an hdi value of 0.873 agreed with Nigeria (hdi value of 0.432) that government should take more responsibility to provide for people. Norway and Burkina Faso present another interesting pair with hdi values of 0.937 and 0.285 respectively which both expressed the same low level of interest in private ownership of business. Respondents in Great Britain with an hdi value of 0.842 and in Zambia with hdi value of 0.360 both rated competition as a good thing, because it stimulates people to work hard and develop new ideas. The situation is the same if one compares the United States with an hdi value of 0.897 and Burkina Faso or Indonesia with hdi values of 0.285 and 0.568 respectively. Socioeconomic development does not affect other economic-related factors such as wealth distribution. Switzerland, for instance, with an hdi value of 0.876 demonstrates the same rate of agreement with the idea that incomes should be made more equal as

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Pakistan whose hdi value of 0.416 is less than half that of Switzerland. Finland and Tanzania are also two countries that agree with income equality, although their hdi values are very different (0.863 and 0.332 respectively). To sum up, this very close similarity of ideas in various societies with ‘very high human development’, ‘high human development’, ‘medium human development’, and ‘low human development’ reveals that human development cannot be considered as a predictor of economic attitudes. The current study found that gender, more than anything else, affects the economic approaches. Generally, women opposed attitudes compatible with a free market economy more than men. Women in the 60 compared societies preferred more state intervention in the economy, more income equality, and believed that competition is harmful and brings out the worst in people. This approach may have something to do with the competing and conflicting nature of markets which is more alien to the preferences of women compared to men, who are more likely to be risk takers. Contrary to this, more educated people and those who had more income supported the principals of a market economy. Predominant Religion, Religiosity, and Civil Society The second dependent variable which this study attempted to clarify in its relations with given individual as well as contextual factors was trust in civil society. To do this, five civil society organizations which are active in different areas were considered. These were religious institutions such as churches, mosques, temples and other similar religious organizations, labor unions, political parties, the environmental protection movement, and the women’s movement. It is interesting to note that the overall mean score of all 60 compared societies showed quite a lot of confidence in religious institutions around the world. Descriptive statistics also show that more than 70 per cent of respondents in all 60 societies around the world had a great deal or quite a lot of confidence in churches, mosques, temples or other similar religious institutions. About 60 per cent placed great or relatively great trust in the environmental protection movement, and 58 per cent trusted the women’s movement. 41.5 per cent had confidence in labor unions while only 30.3 per cent had a great deal or quite a lot of confidence in political parties. As mentioned above, In order to gain a deeper perception into their aims and objectives, these organizations were divided into three categories as follows: traditional, modern and postmodern organizations. Religious institutions are naturally traditional organizations. Modern organizations are labor unions and political parties, and finally, the women’s and the environmental movements can be seen as postmodern organizations. Interestingly, the current study found that the traditional civic organization of religion was trusted

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more than any other non-governmental organizations. In second place were postmodern civic institutions, namely the environmental protection movement and the women’s movement, and finally, modern organizations such as labor unions and political parties. It is interesting but not surprising to find that religious institutions such as churches, mosques, temples and other similar organizations were held to be trustworthy, considering 72.3 per cent of respondents overall described themselves as religious, 22.7 per cent as not religious, and only about 5 per cent as convinced atheists. Furthermore, in 43 of the 60 societies in question namely in about three-quarters of them more than 60 per cent of the respondents were religious. These finding from the present study are consistent with those described by Norris and Inglehart (2004: 217) who found that “the world as a whole is becoming more religious.” The fact that religion is rooted in the history of each society and its teachings are transmitted from generation to generation by a process of socialization and official education strengthens the civil institution of religion. Furthermore, “the need for reassurance and a sense of certainty” (Norris and Inglehart, 2004: 231) and the spiritual concerns of premodern as well as modern man have always driven him to find comforting and satisfactory answers in religion as well as other sources. This crucial role of religion, which is surrounded in an aura of sacredness, serves to increase trust in religious institutions. Being traditional in this context puts religion at an advantage over its modern rivals who likewise attempt to address deep issues concerning the origin and meaning of life. The high level of confidence in religious institutions, particularly compared to the lack of trust in political parties, suggests that religious organizations enjoy a massive potential source of power. If this resource can be activated both in social and political spheres, it can challenge the theory of secularism in a large part of the world, particularly if we note that Islamic and Christian societies display roughly equal confidence in religious organizations. In other words, trust in religious civil organizations is a contemporary force. Although its potential has declined in one part of the world, namely in many European industrial countries, it provides a vital link in other parts of the globe between different social strata and religious authorities, whether in Islamic or Christian societies. Thus, religious authorities can still provide an important frame of reference for people and influence them greatly. There is no reason to believe that people only trust to religious organizations in their religious teachings. In fact, their social and political positions inspire considerable trust too. The fact that many religious authorities avoid interference in social and political issues does not mean that they have no influence in society. What is more, there is no guarantee that they will never use their social capital for sociopolitical aims.

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It seems more research is needed in order to come to a better understanding of what effect does the high level of trust in religious institutions have on the theory of secularism, especially considering the low level of confidence in political parties? Turning to the second favorite kind of civil organizations, namely postmodern civil institutions, it should be said that these organizations focus mainly on the quality of life. The fact that one of the great concerns of contemporary man is his non-material needs is not just a justification for the trust placed in religion, but probably also explains why, according to the findings, postmodern – rather than modern – civil society organizations were ranked second after religion. It is no coincidence that these findings are in agreement with Inglehart and Welzel’s (2005: 52) findings which showed a shift from materialist to postmaterialist values. This move away from modern towards postmodern values, which emphasize subjective well-being and the quality of life rather than materialistic values, also creates a link to the emergence of the environmental movement and the women’s movement. It is worth noting that, women trusted postmodern civil organizations more than men. This is because women’s ngos defend their rights. Women’s confidence in environmental activities is considered by some ecofeminists to represent support for the claim that there is a relationship between gender and nature and that women are more responsive to environmental issues, a question that needs much more research to be confirmed. One unanticipated finding was that the shift toward postmodern civil organizations occurred mainly in Christian as well as Buddhist, Hindu and folkreligion societies, and less in Islamic societies. In fact, predominantly Islamic societies put less trust in postmodern civil organizations than other types of religious societies. Predominantly Christian societies trust modern civil institutions less than other types of religious societies. And predominantly Buddhist, Hindu, and folk-religion societies have less confidence in religious civil organizations than other types of religious societies. Therefore, it should be noted here that the fourth hypothesis claiming that predominantly Islamic countries are more positively associated with democratic civil value than the other types of religious societies, was not completely confirmed. The reason why predominantly Islamic societies put less trust than other types of religious societies in postmodern civil organizations may be partially due to the fact that subjective well-being and the quality of life as the turning-points of postmaterialist trend are appreciated mainly in societies in which the basic needs and material sustenance as the main requirements for survival have been provided for (ibid, pp. 97–98). Only under conditions of prosperity do people have the chance to emphasize their second-rank needs (Maslow, 1954). But it should not

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be forgotten that this fact, like any other social reality, cannot be explained by any single factor. Another aspect that needs to be stressed in this connection is the significant role of culture. Undoubtedly the patriarchal system of Islamic societies has a great effect on all areas and aspects of life from family to work, social relations, politics, economics, law, education, art, etc…. ngos that defend women’s rights have actually been in the vanguard of the struggle against this rigid culture which has deep historical roots. While the environmental movement is often considered to be an uninteresting and inferior issue which authorities can afford to neglect culturally, the women’s movement is seen as anathema which must be annihilated. Government is a paternalistic authority which does not want to share its centralized power with women. Social forces, political activists, civil society organizations, and the mass media are not free to address and explore ideas other than those dictated by the state. In these restricted circumstances, which are the historical product of a combination of cultural elements and political despotism, postmodern activities have little chance to emerge and develop. As a result, such issues are not seen as a social problem and their influence is very restricted. Postmodern civil organizations are not well known at grass roots level in predominantly Islamic societies and consequently there is less confidence in the women’s and environmental movements. This goes some way to explaining why there is more trust in political parties, which may be partly to do with the precedence of parties in Islamic societies. Political parties, in contrast to postmodern civil organizations, have a relatively long history, which makes them more well-known in society. Additionally, and more importantly still, some political parties have adopted special Islamic values in order to conform to the political theology of Islam and display themselves in accordance with religious orientations, which is very important in strictly Muslim world. The feminist movement, on the other hand, as a postmodern phenomenon, meets with more disapproval both in Islamic holy texts and in the patriarchal culture of Muslim societies. Even Muslim Arab-American women are more gender traditional than their nonMuslim peers (Read, 2003). Strangely enough, many Muslim women accept the idea of inequality between men and women. In some of Islamic societies, especially in small towns, issues such as wearing of modern dress, working with men in an office, marrying later than usual, and late childbearing are treated as abnormal even by other women, let alone having a baby or abortion when a woman is not married. As studies in Turkey have shown, women in this Islamic country have a negative attitude towards women managers. Interestingly, women’s attitudes were even more negative than those of men (Güney et al., 2006). A cross-sectional study of 9159 women in Egypt shows that up to 82 per cent of women supported the continuation of female genital mutilation (Dalal,

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Lawoko, and Jansson, 2010). How can one imagine to talks about feminism in a country like Mali where 74 per cent of women who participated in a survey, justify wife-beating “if the wife refuses to have sexual relations with the husband,” while only 40 per cent of men in this country agree with this. It should also be noted that, more than three quarters of women in Mali justified wifebeating for at least one reason. Generally, women in Mali were more likely to accept wife-beating in different given scenarios than men! (Rani, Bonu, and Diop-Sidibé, 2004). Obviously under these cultural conditions the low level of confidence in the feminist movement is not unexpected. The most important and natural implication of a low level of trust in postmodern civil organizations in Islamic countries is that the activities of these ngos cannot be extended and play a significant role in sociopolitical changes in the short-term. As long as authoritarian governments do not support extrastate organizations any progress in this area can only come from the voluntary sector. It is clear that civil participation is based on inner conviction about accuracy and the necessity of the aims and objectives of civic action, which in turn presupposes that these objectives are underpinned by the cultural values in society. Where this is not the case, voluntary sector needs long term strategies and activities to effect a process of cultural change. However, more research is needed in order to come to a better understanding of how Muslims think about postmodern values and in how far postmodern values conform to Islamic norms and ethics. Turning now to the most important micro-level findings, the results of this study endorse the second research hypothesis and indicate that religious people have a greater trust in all the civil-society organizations in question than non-religious people. Interestingly, multilevel analyses in predominantly Islamic societies show that religious people in these societies trusted religious institutions, political parties, labor unions and environmental and women’s movements more than those who described themselves as a non-religious person. These findings are reminiscent of the ideas of Emile Durkheim (2001 [1912]) about the affirmative influence of religion on social solidarity. Religion brings individuals together and consequently creates and gradually reinforces social solidarity among them, not only directly through religious rituals and collective prayers but also by motivating the establishment of other civic societies, because, to use Durkheim’s term: “the idea of society is the soul of religion” (ibid, p. 314). To put it differently, religion basically has a communicative essence. This communication is primarily formed in the relationship between servants and God. In the next stage religion provides the context and motivation for communication between believers. This happens through, as Schleiermacher says, “paradigmatically, communicative activities” (cited in

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Dole, 2010: 23). It seems that the emphasis in religion on communication has an affirmative influence on trust in other forms of communication in society. If we consider that the members of various civil organizations stand in communication with each other, and that religiosity has a positive effect on confidence in traditional, modern, and postmodern civil organizations, then one can conclude that communication, regardless of its type, as a human action is important for believers. If this point about the effect of the communicative soul of religion on confidence in civil communication is true, one may conclude that the more communicative possibilities a religion offers, the more sympathetic it will be towards civil communication. Accordingly, Islamic Sharia, with its frequent and numerous collective rituals, should logically have a more positive effect on various civil communications than other religions especially Christianity which has far fewer rites and rituals. The obligation to pray five times a day (which Muslims are strongly recommended to do in the mosque and with the Jemaah (congregation)), fasting in the month of Ramadan and its special ceremonies, hajj (the Pilgrimage) that annually brings millions of Muslims from around the world together, are some of the more important collective Islamic rituals. These and other religious practices strengthen the communicative essence of Islam which is mirrored in the comparatively high confidence of Muslim believers in the four given ngos. According to the findings, religious people in the Muslim world have more trust in civil society organizations compared to religious people in the other religious societies. The positive effect of religiosity on the trust in various ngos may be weak, but suggests at the very least that religion is no barrier for one of the most important bases of a stable democracy. Furthermore, considering the high level of religiosity worldwide, religion can have a facilitating role in providing more social trust in civil society organizations which act as intermediary associations between the state and its citizens and are essential for a stable democratic system. As it surveyed in details and contrary to the claim that the more years of experience of democracy a country has, the more it tends towards democratic civic values, the findings indicate that the political democratic context of societies did not affect confidence in civil society organizations. Yet we know that people in the United States, a country with more than 200 years of democratic government, and people in Kyrgyzstan, which has never experienced democracy, have confidence in religious institutions to the same extent (about 67 per cent). The same holds true for Australia, with 110 years of experience of democracy, and China, with a long history of communism (both about 38 per cent). Finns and Jordanians both trust labor unions almost equally (about 63 per cent),

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although the former has enjoyed democracy for nearly one century while the latter has always lived with dictatorship. Both Norway, with a multiparty system and with a parliamentary democracy that goes back to 1814, and Burkina Faso, as a one party dominated state in which multiparty elections are not free, have 28.6 per cent confidence in political parties. In the same way an equivalent attitude to political parties is to be found in West Germany, with about half of century democratic multiparty-elections and Algeria, an authoritarian regime (both about 19 per cent). ngos who try to protect the environment were successful in attracting the approbation of Saudi Arabian citizens, although the latter had never experienced anything except an absolute monarchy without any national elections, and of the Japanese population, with 60 years political freedom, in similar proportion (about 58 per cent). Furthermore, India and Tanzania, respectively with 61 and 0 years of democratic state, are comparable in this regard (61.4 per cent confidence in the movement in both countries). The influence of political context on attitudes towards women’s movement does not differ either. Individuals in Canada, who have enjoyed a democratic political system for 144 years, and respondents in Hong Kong, with absolutely no experience of political democracy, express the same level of confidence in the women’s movement (about 75 per cent). This rate was 48 per cent for the Netherlands and Romania, with 89 and 15 years of democratic tradition respectively. These examples illustrate that institutional democracy cannot be considered as a predictor of confidence in civil society organizations. Building trust in a civil society is essentially the task of ngos and not a politically developed state. These organizations are autonomous and situate themselves between the private and state spheres as an intermediate and buffer to guard individual’s rights against the state. In principal, a democratic political system opens the space for civil activities and by promoting democratic culture gives ngos the opportunity to present themselves freely; however what engenders trust in civil society had nothing to do with institutional democracy. It is quite possible that ngos with the same area of activity are much more highly trusted in an authoritarian state than in a democratic country. This can be seen, for instance, in the case of trust in political parties which in Viet Nam stands at 93.8 per cent whereas in New Zealand it only stands at 14.8 per cent. Further examples are Egypt and Italy in which the former ranks trust in women’s movements at 73.9 per cent and the latter at 41.1 per cent. Another important finding of this study at the contextual level refuted the hypothesis that a high level of hdi raises the probability that democratic values will grow. Analysis demonstrates that societies which had more hdi value, had less confidence in three out of five civil society organizations, namely religious

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institutions, labor unions, and women’s movement. While the hdi value of societies is a stronger predictor of confidence in religious institutions, it can only moderately be linked to confidence in labor unions (estimated coefficient: 0.545, p-value ≤ 0.05) and women’s movement (estimated coefficient: 0.564, p-value ≤ 0.05). Many academics, including Newton and Norris (2000) in their study of 17 advanced industrial democracies (Trilateral democracies),1 have found that from the early 1980s to early 1990s (1990–93) confidence in public institutions such as parliament, the legal system, the armed forces, the police, and the civil service has declined. They explain this by focusing on the institutional performance of government. In other words, a well-run of state elicits trust while poor performance generates distrust in people. The explanation here relates to the role of government but in another too. The current study, because of its comparative nature, equates the finding: ‘the higher the hdi value, the less trust in civil society organizations’, with the conclusion: ‘the lower the level of hdi value, the more trust in civil society organizations’. Since citizens in societies with low values of hdi often have social and economic problems in their everyday life and the government fails to solve these problems, people are naturally looking for external support. This can partially be found in civil organizations. Religious institutions both in their spiritual and social roles, labor unions with their crucial activities to protect the interests of the middle class, and women’s movements as a point of the refuges for women against cruelty and violence, these all elicit the confidence of people in developing countries. States in socioeconomically developed countries do many of the tasks for which people in developing countries must look for another agent. Conclusions This book has investigated the relationship between religiosity and democratic values. Democratic values in this research do not only mean political norms such as free elections. Following some extensive definitions, democracy was here considered as a comprehensive concept with social, political, legal, and economic aspects, which represents a dominant trend in the world today. This trend is, more than anything else, an essentially cultural phenomenon. In other words, a stable democracy appears in an environment in which all components necessary for a proper democratic culture are present. Without democratic culture a real democracy cannot emerge. 1 These countries include: Belgium, Britain, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany (W), Iceland, Ireland, Ireland (N), Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, and United States.

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As mentioned above, some scholars have claimed that religion generally, and Islam in particular, is not compatible with democratic culture. Religiosity, they argue, negatively affects democratic values. Islam, along with some other religions, is considered at odds with modern political discourse, because of the irrationality of its teachings and its worldview based on the afterlife. The present study was designed to empirically evaluate the accuracy of these two claims. To achieve this purpose two aspects of democracy, namely economic and social dimensions, were selected. Attitudes towards a free market economy and confidence in civil society constituted dependent variables which represented these two aspects. Opinions about private ownership of business, competition, income differences, and government responsibility were indicators of a free market economy, while confidence in religious institutions, labor unions, political parties, the environmental protection movement, and the women’s movement provided indicators of confidence in civil society. In order to determine more closely the effect of religiosity as well as religious context on democratic values in predominantly Islamic societies, a comparative perspective was chosen in which the independent variables were selected from two levels: the individual level and the country level. This comparative approach allowed us to compare not only the effect of individual religiosity but also that of historical religious tradition in various types of religious societies. It should be noted that the study compared not only the religious background, but also the influence of socioeconomic development and democratic political contexts on the popularity of democratic values. To provide a rich context, the comparison included 60 societies from around the world with various levels of socioeconomic growth as well as different religious and political backgrounds. These were classified in three types of religious categories: predominantly Islamic societies (19 societies), predominantly Christian societies (33 societies), and finally predominantly Buddhist, Hindu, and folk-religion societies (8 societies). It should be noted that the data of the current study came from the third wave (1994–1998), fourth wave (1999–2004), and the last available results namely the fifth wave (2005–2008) of the World Values Survey as well as the third wave (1999) of the European Values Study. Furthermore, in order to take into account the individual level as well as the social contexts as methodically as possible, multilevel analysis was used in present study. After comparing the descriptive statistics from the 60 societies, the multivariate and multilevel analyses were conducted to measure the relationship between religiosity in general, and democratic economic and civil values at the individual level in all compared societies. Additionally, relations between democratic values, on the one hand, and the predominant and historical

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r­ eligion, the socioeconomic development and the democratic political context of the 60 compared societies on the other, were measured. In addition, religious denomination, education, sex, age, and income were considered as control variables. The effect of individual Islamic religiosity on the democratic values solely in predominantly Islamic societies was analysed as well as the influence of two major denominations of Islam (Sunni and Shia) as the religious tradition of a society and its socioeconomic development and democratic political background. To consider the effects of all these variables individually, all multilevel analyses were employed in 5 different models. To return to the questions posed at the beginning of this study, it is now possible to state that the answer to the first question: Is there any relationship between religiosity and attitudes towards free market economics is, for the most part, negative. The only unexpected result related to the issue of social justice in which religious respondents tended to accept larger income differences as incentives rather than income equality. As regards the other economic issues, the results of the present research did not show any significant correlation between individual piety and a preference for capitalist or non-capitalist factors such as private or government ownership of business, individual or state responsibility to provide for people, and harmfulness or utility of competition. To put it differently, if it is true that democracy is not a purely political concept but rather embraces economic aspects too, then it is safe to claim that religiosity is no hindrance to the growth of free market economic norms such as competition, income differences, private ownership of business, and low levels of state responsibility in the public economic sphere. On the issue of income, religious individuals even supported the notion that larger income differences function as incentives, which represents a basic principal of a freemarket economy. Turning to the individual-level analyses, the second research question: Is there any relationship between religiosity and confidence in civil society, produced a different answer. The analyses revealed the striking fact that religious people put greater trust in all kinds of civil-society organizations considered in this study than non-religious individuals. It is also worth noting that religious individuals in Islamic societies put more trust in civil society associations than non-religious people. This confidence of believers in a wide spectrum of ngos, which includes religious, trade union, political, environmental and feministic activities, not only demonstrates that religiosity is no obstacle to the growth of democratic values but also that it can be seen as social capital for establishing or strengthening the civil foundation of democracy. It is also interesting to note that not only did religious people trust civil ­society organizations more than non-religious individuals, but also that civil

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religious organizations generally attracted more confidence than their nonreligious counterparts. The preliminary analysis showed that over 70 per cent of those interviewed in all 60 societies around the world had a great deal or quite a lot of confidence in churches, mosques, temples or other similar religious institutions, whereas only 30 per cent trusted political parties, to take just one example. To put it differently and more comprehensively, the traditional organization of religion was judged the most reliable civil organization in all 60 compared societies. The environmental and women’s movements took second place as postmodern civil organizations, followed by labor unions and finally political parties as modern civil organizations. Following the above classification of civil society organizations we can now move on to the contextual level of analysis and answer the next research question: Do predominantly Islamic countries put less confidence in civil society, compared to the other types of religious societies? A detailed consideration of this question reveals that predominantly Islamic societies had less trust in some postmodern civil organizations than other types of religious societies. The predominantly Christian societies trusted some modern civil institutions less than other types of religious societies. And the predominantly Buddhist, Hindu, and folk-religion societies displayed less confidence in religious civil organizations than other types of religious societies. Turning to the next research question, which addressed the attitudes towards a free market economy in predominantly Islamic countries in comparison to the other types of religious societies, no relationship could be established between the religious tradition of the societies and a favorable outlook towards free market economics. Remarkably, there was no difference in this regard between the three types of religious societies. Likewise, the current study indicated that democratic tradition, that is the length of time a country has experienced democratic institutions, did not affect attitudes toward democratic economic values and confidence in civil society. Finally, socioeconomic development was not found to have any regular pattern of influence either on attitudes toward a free market economy or on confidence in civil society. *** Taken together, the results of the present research suggest that religiosity generally, and Islamic religiosity in particular, is firstly not incompatible with the economic fundamentals of democracy, and secondly that in the service of civil society it strengthens an essential foundation of democracy. Considering the multi-componential nature of democracy, it cannot simply be reduced to a

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chapter 3

political system in which free elections is the main feature. Indeed a stable democracy needs, among other factors, a democratic economy and civil society without which a real democratic political system cannot be established. Contrary to those essentialists who argue that Islam lacks democratic culture and that its anti-democratic teachings cannot be changed, the results of the current research show that the Muslim world is not inherently resistant to given democratic foundations. As mentioned above, the multilevel analyses taken solely among predominantly Islamic societies demonstrate that religious Muslims in these societies trusted civil voluntary associations more than those who described themselves as a non-religious person. What is surprising is that, religious people in Muslim societies put more trust in the intermediary organizations between state and citizens even compared to religious people overall (all compared faiths and religions worldwide). In sum, bearing in mind the extensive definition of democracy which includes social and economic aspects, some results of this study, which address the social aspect of democracy, seem to complement those of Norris and Inglehart (2002) who compared attitudes between Islamic and Western societies towards democracy from a political perspective and concluded that “support for democracy is surprisingly widespread among Islamic publics” (p. 16). Similarly, this study concludes that religious Muslims confide more than nonreligious persons in Islamic societies and more than religious people overall in extra-state organizations. Furthermore, some other results of this study, which address the free market economy, seem to complement those of Tessler (2011: 68) which concluded that “Islam appears to have less influence on political attitudes than is frequently suggested by students of Arab and Islamic societies.” Correspondingly, this study concludes that individual Islamic religiosity and contextual Islamic tradition have no influence on attitudes towards factors that favor economic democracy. Finally, it should be noted that, as Norris and Inglehart (2002: 15) suggested, there is obviously a “cultural cleavage” in some areas between Islam and the West. However, this does not mean that Muslims reject democracy or that Islamic values are so rigid that they cannot be changed. The history of the development of Islamic Sharia has witnessed many modifications in religious rules and injunctions. Nowadays religious intellectuals and reformist Muslims are attempting to establish a modern religious thought system which acknowledges modern, contemporary values and modifies itself accordingly.2 On the 2 See for example: Soroush, A. (1994) Gabz wa Bast-e Teorik-e Shariat: Nazariyyey-e Takamol-e Marefat-e Dini (The Theoretical Contraction and Expansion of Religion: The Theory of Evolution of Religious Knowledge), Tehran: Serat.

The Link between Religion, Religiosity, and Democratic Values

217

other hand, it should not be ignored that political development, like modernization in general, does not follow an exclusive pattern. There is a good case for suggesting that Islamic societies should develop their own model of democracy which is more appropriate to their cultural values. The problem of freedom in Islamic societies, despite some historical and cultural roots, is more a political problem rather than a religious one. New interpretations of holy texts as well as the reconstruction of some initial models in the history of Islam can be applied to encourage the rising demand for democracy among grassroots Muslims.

Appendix 1

Materials and Method This appendix will review the list of compared societies, details of their studies, the resources of the data, micro-level variables including independent, dependent, and control variables, the index of each variable, the questions asked, as well as macrolevel variables, the source of aggregate data, and, in short, the process of operationalization of all variables in both individual and country levels. Additionally, the method of analysis will be introduced in this appendix.

Materials

Databases and Compared Societies

The data of this study comes from the well-known studies of the World Values Survey (wvs)1 and the European Values Study (evs).2 In order to access the extensive number of countries to compare diverse socioeconomic, political, and cultural backgrounds, 57 countries from three waves of the wvs including third wave (1994-1998), fourth wave (1999-2004), and the last available results namely fifth wave (2005-2008), which provided the majority of our data, were chosen. It should be noted here that according to the wvs West and East Germany, the Bosnian Federation and SrpSka (Serbian Republic of Bosnia), and Hong Kong and China were considered separately. This means that there were 57 countries but 60 societies or rather 60 units to analyse. From 60 compared societies the data of 44 related to confidence in civil society, and the data of 41 societies related to attitudes towards free market economics, belong to the fifth wave of wvs. To measure the relationship between religiosity and attitudes towards free market economics, three countries from the third wave (1999) of the European Values Study were selected. This means the data of Great Britain, France, and the Netherlands concerning attitudes towards free market economics belong to the evs of 1999 and their data related to confidence in civil society belong to the wvs of 2006. The reason for this is simply that there is no complete data about attitudes towards free market economics in their 1 WORLD VALUES SURVEY 1981–2008 OFFICIAL AGGREGATE v.20090901, 2009. World Values Survey Association (www.worldvaluessurvey.org). Aggregate File Producer: asep/jds, Madrid, [Accessed 05/11/2013]. 2 European and World Values Surveys four-wave integrated data file, 1981-2004, v.20060423, 2006. Surveys designed and executed by the European Values Study Group and World Values Survey Association. File Producers: asep/jds, Madrid, Spain and Tilburg University, Tilburg, the Netherlands. File Distributors: asep/jds and gesis, Cologne, Germany.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2014 | doi 10.1163/9789004274464_006

220

Appendix 1

questionnaire of wvs in 2006. Although as far as possible the most recent survey of all countries were taken, in the cases of the Russian Federation and Egypt, because of the problem already mentioned, their surveys from 1995 and 2000 were taken. Table A.1.1 shows compared societies, their year of survey, wave of wvs and evs for both dependent variables namely attitudes towards free market economics and confidence in civil society. Table A.1.1

Compared societies with the year and wave of the study for the both dependent variables Free market economy

Confidence in civil society

No.

Society

Year of study

Wave

Year of study

Wave

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26

Albania Algeria Argentina Australia Azerbaijan Bangladesh Bosnian Federation Brazil Bulgaria Burkina Faso Canada Chile China Colombia Egypt Finland France Germany (East) Germany (West) Ghana Great Britain Hong Kong India Indonesia Iran Iraq

2002 2002 2006 2005 1997 2002 2001 2006 2006 2007 2006 2005 2007 2005 2000 2005 1999 2006 2006 2007 1999 2005 2006 2006 2007 2004

4 4 5 5 3 4 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 5 3 5 5 5 3 5 5 5 5 4

2002 2002 2006 2005 1997 2002 2001 2006 2006 2007 2006 2005 2007 2005 2000 2005 2006 2006 2006 2007 2006 2005 2006 2006 2007 2004

4 4 5 5 3 4 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 4

221

Materials And Method Free market economy

Confidence in civil society

No.

Society

Year of study

Wave

Year of study

Wave

27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49

Italy Japan Jordan Kyrgyzstan Malaysia Mali Mexico Morocco Netherlands New Zealand Nigeria Norway Pakistan Peru Philippines Poland Romania Russian Federation Saudi Arabia South Africa South Korea Spain SrpSka-Serbian Republic of Bosnia Sweden Switzerland Taiwan Tanzania Thailand Turkey Ukraine United States Venezuela Viet Nam Zambia

2005 2005 2007 2003 2006 2007 2005 2007 1999 2004 1995 2008 2001 2008 2001 2005 2005 1995 2003 2007 2005 2007 2001

5 5 5 4 5 5 5 5 3 5 3 5 4 5 4 5 5 3 4 5 5 5 4

2005 2005 2007 2003 2006 2007 2005 2007 2006 2004 1995 2008 2001 2008 2001 2005 2005 1995 2003 2007 2005 2007 2001

5 5 5 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 3 5 4 5 4 5 5 3 4 5 5 5 4

2006 2007 2006 2001 2007 2007 2006 2006 2000 2006 2007

5 5 5 4 5 5 5 5 4 5 5

2006 2007 2006 2001 2007 2007 2006 2006 2000 2006 2007

5 5 5 4 5 5 5 5 4 5 5

50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60

222

Appendix 1



Operationalization of Micro-Level Variables



The Independent Variable (Religiosity)



Operationalization of the Dependent Variables

The independent variable in this study was religiosity. To measure religiosity, respondents were asked whether they consider themselves as a religious person. The question text was: “Independently of whether you go to church or not, would you say you are a religious person, not a religious person, (or) a convinced atheist.” The categories of answers are shown in Table A.1.2

This study had two dependent variables:

• Attitudes towards free market economics • Confidence in civil society Below it will be clear how these variables became operational.



Attitudes towards Free Market Economics

As already stated in concepts and definitions the free system of business is a system with some features such as: a predominantly private and individual ownership of business enterprise; a relatively large role for individual units (households and businesses) and accompanying small role for large-scale organizations, specially government; primary reliance upon a competitive price/market system; distribution according to marketdetermined contributions to production, with the possibility of considerable inequality in income and property. To measure and compare the opinions of populations of 60 societies in relation to free market economics, four questions were chosen. The first question was about the private ownership of business, which is one of the most important features of a market economy. The question text was: “Now I'd like you to tell me Table A.1.2

Categories of answers to the question of religiosity

1 2 3 4

A religious person Not a religious person A convinced atheist Other answer

Materials And Method

223

your views on various issues. How would you place your views on this scale? 1 means you agree completely with the statement on the left; 10 means you agree completely with the statement on the right; and if your views fall somewhere in between, you can choose any number in between. Sentence […]: Private ownership of business should be increased vs. Government ownership of business should be increased.” The second question was a question about government responsibility in providing for people. The question text was: “Now I'd like you to tell me your views on various issues. How would you place your views on this scale? 1 means you agree completely with the statement on the left; 10 means you agree completely with the statement on the right; and if your views fall somewhere in between, you can choose any number in between. Sentence […]: People should take more responsibility to provide for themselves vs. The government should take more responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for.” To have a complete scale of free market economics, the equality of incomes must be added to private ownership and government responsibility. The third question was about income equality. The question text was: “Now I'd like you to tell me your views on various issues. How would you place your views on this scale? 1 means you agree completely with the statement on the left; 10 means you agree completely with the statement on the right; and if your views fall somewhere in between, you can choose any number in between. Sentence […]: Incomes should be made more equal vs. we need larger income differences as incentives.” In addition to all these, it is obvious that there can be no free market economy without competition. The fourth question was about competition. The question text was: “Now I'd like you to tell me your views on various issues. How would you place your views on this scale? 1 means you agree completely with the statement on the left; 10 means you agree completely with the statement on the right; and if your views fall somewhere in between, you can choose any number in between. Sentence […]: Competition is good. It stimulates people to work hard and develop new ideas vs. Competition is harmful. It brings the worst in people.” The categories of answers for all these four questions can be combined as Table A.1.3 shows. It should be noted that the correlation between these factors is very low.



Confidence in Civil Society

The second dependent variable is confidence in civil society. As mentioned in the introduction, civil society includes many different kinds of non-­governmental organizations. To compare the confidence in civil society five kinds of voluntary activities were selected. The question text was: “I am going to name a number of organisations. For each one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in them: is it a great

224

Appendix 1

Table A.1.3

Combined categories of answers to the questions related to free market economics

1

–Private ownership of business should be increased. –People should take more responsibility. –Incomes should be made more equal. –Competition is good. 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 –Government ownership of business should be increased. –The government should take more responsibility. –We need larger income differences as incentives. –Competition is harmful.

2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence, or none at all”? Organizations: Churches (Religious Institutions), Labor Unions, The Political Parties, The Environmental Protection Movement, and The Women’s Movement. The ­categories of answers are shown in Table A.1.4.



Factor Analysis of Confidence in Civil Society Organizations

To understand the correlation between these five items, which measure confidence in civil society, some statistical tests were undertaken. Firstly the Spearman correlation coefficient was computed. As Table A.1.5 demonstrates confidence in Churches (religious institutions) has a low correlation with confidence in all other civil society organizations. On the other hand, confidence in the women’s movement has a relatively high ­correlation with c­ onfidence in the environmental protection movement, as confidence in political parties does with confidence in labor unions. The correlation matrix (see Table A.1.6) provides f­ urther confirmation of these links; however, before employing factor ­analysis, the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (kmo) measure of sampling adequacy and Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity were checked (see Table A.1.7). According to kmo measure of

225

Materials And Method Table A.1.4

Categories of answers to the questions of confidence in civil society organizations

1 2 3 4

A great deal Quite a lot Not very much None at all important

Table A.1.5 Spearman’s Rho correlation between confidence in various civil society organizations Spearman’s Rho

Religious institutions

Labor unions

Political parties

Women’s movement

Environmental protection movement

 Correlation Coefficient Religious Sig. (2-tailed) InstitutionsN  Correlation Coefficient Labor Unions Sig. (2-tailed) N  Correlation Coefficient Political Parties Sig. (2-tailed) N  Correlation Coefficient Women’s Sig. (2-tailed) MovementN  Correlation Coefficient Environmental Sig. (2-tailed) Protection Movement N

1.000 . 82545 .163** .000 71110 .166** .000 74822 .156** .000 71686 .150** .000 71618

.163** .000 71110 1.000 . 73554 .410** .000 71447 .365** .000 67677 .348** .000 67827

.166** .000 74822 .410** .000 71447 1.000 . 77894 .297** .000 70632 .264** .000 70705

.156** .000 71686 .365** .000 67677 .297** .000 70632 1.000 . 74244 .606** .000 70494

.150** .000 71618 .348** .000 67827 .264** .000 70705 .606** .000 70494 1.000 . 74231

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

.704 and highly significant Bartlett’s test (p= .000) factor analysis is appropriate. An examination of the Scree Plot of Eigenvalues indicates that breaks occur between factors 1 and 2, and between factors 3 and 4 (see Figure A.1.1). Using these statistics, the factors are categorized as follows: confidence in traditional civil society ­organization includes confidence in Churches (religious institutions); confidence in modern civil

226

Appendix 1

Table A.1.6

Correlation matrix for five civil society organizations

Confidence in

Religious Labor Political Women’s Environmental institutions unions parties movement movement

1.000 Religious Institutions .182 Labor Unions .199 Political Parties .172 Women’s Movement Environmental Movement .155

Table A.1.7

1.000 .425 .369 .362

1.000 .311 .289

1.000 .613

1.000

kmo measure of sampling adequacy and Bartlett’s test of sphericity for confidence in various civil society organizations

kmo measure Bartlett’s test of Sphericity

approximate Chi-square df Significance

.704 59212.789 10 .000

society organizations includes confidence in labor unions and political parties; and finally, confidence in postmodern civil society organizations includes trust in the women’s movement and in the environmental protection movement.3



Operationalization of Control Variables

To be sure about the influence of micro and macro-level independent variables, namely religiosity as well as political, socioeconomic and religious factors on attitudes towards the free market economy and confidence to civil society organizations, five control variables were added to the model. Below explanations about operationalization of control variables are to be found. 3 Inglehart and Welzel also report a growing emphasis on the women’s movement and the environmental protection movement as values which link to postmaterialist values: Inglehart, R. and Welzel, C. (2005) Modernization, Cultural Change and Democracy: The Human Development Sequence, New York: Cambridge University Press, p. 52.

227

Materials And Method Factor Eigenvalue

2.5

Eigenvalue

2.0

% of Variance Cumulative %

1

2.288

45.765

45.765

2

.939

18.771

64.536

3

.820

16.407

80.943

4

.567

11.334

92.277

5

.386

7.723

100.000

1.5

1.0

0.5

0.0 1 Figure A.1.1



2

3 Factor

4

5

Scree plot of eigenvalues for factors of confidence in civil society

Religious Denomination

There were five control variables in this study. First was religious denomination. The question text was: “wvs: Do you belong to a religious denomination? In case you do, answer which one. evs: Which one?” The categories of answers after recoding and reordering in three groups, according to the aim to compare the effect of Islamic denominations with the effect of Christian denominations and non-Islamic and non-Christian denominations, are shown in Tables A.1.8, A.1.9, and A.1.10. To compare Islamic denominations with Christian denominations and denomi­ nations of other religions each type of religious denomination was coded as a dummy (0/1) variable and the last category was used as the (omitted) reference category.

Education The second control variable was the level of education. The question text was: “What is the highest educational level that you have attained? (Use functional

228 Table A.1.8

Appendix 1 Islamic denominations

Al-Hadis Druse Muslim Qadiani Shia Sunni

Table A.1.9

Christian denominations

Aglipayan Alliance Anglican Armenian Apostolic Church Assembly of God Baptist

Church of christ El Shaddai Evangelical Faith in god

Jesus miracle crusade Lutheran Mennonite Methodists

Ratana Ringatu Roman Catholic Salvation Army

Mita Mormon

Seven Day Adventist Tac

Born again

Filipinista Free church/Non denominational church Greek Catholic

Native

Brgy. Sang Birhen

Gregorian

C & S Celestial

Hussite

Catholic: doesn´t follow rules Charismatic

New Apostolic Church New Testament Christ/Biblist Orthodox

The Church of Sweden The Worldwide Church of God Unitarian

Iglesiani Cristo (INC) Other: Christian com Independent African Church (e.g. ZCC, Shembe, etc.) Independent Pentecostal Church Jehovah witnesses Presbyterian

Christian Christian Fellowship Christian Reform

Jesus is Lord (JIL) Protestant

United United Church of Christ in the Philippines (uccp) Zionist

229

Materials And Method Table A.1.10

Denominations of other religions

Ancestral worshipping

Hindu

Other: Philippines (less 0.5%) Other: Taiwan (taoism, protestant fundam., ancient cults) Paganism

Spiritista

Bahai

Hoahao

Buddhist

Cao dai Confucianism

Israelita Nuevo Pacto Universal (frepap) Jain Jew

Theosofists Wicca

Other

Rosacruz Self Lealisation Fellowship Shenism (Chinese Religion) Sikh

Daolism

Ka-aElica

Other: Brasil: Espirit, candomblé,umbanda, esoterism,occultism Essid

Other: Oriental´

Sisewiss

Spiritualists

Taoist

Yiguan Dao Zoroastrian

equivalent of the following, in given society; IF STUDENT, CODE HIGHEST LEVEL HE/SHE EXPECTS TO COMPLETE)”. The categories of answers are shown in Table A.1.11.

Sex The third control variable was sex. To compare attitudes of men and women, this ­variable was coded as a dummy (0/1) variable (1= Female).

Age The fourth control variable was age. The question text was: “This means you are __ __ years old”. The categories of answers are shown in Table A.1.12.

230

Appendix 1

Table A.1.11

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

Inadequately completed elementary education Completed (compulsory) elementary education Incomplete secondary school: technical/vocational type/(Compulsory) elementary education and basic vocational qualification Complete secondary school: technical/vocational type/Secondary, ­intermediate vocational qualification Incomplete secondary: university-preparatory type/Secondary, intermediate general qualification Complete secondary: university-preparatory type/Full secondary, maturity level certificate Some university without degree/Higher education – lower-level tertiary certificate University with degree/Higher education – upper-level tertiary certificate

Table A.1.12

1 2 3 4 5 6

Categories of education

Categories of age

15–24 25–34 35–44 45–54 55–64 65 and more years

Income The fifth control variable was income. The question text was: “Scale of incomes.” The categories of answers are shown in Table A.1.13.



Index of Micro-Level Variables

Table A.1.14 presents the index of all micro-level variables according to WVS and EVS.

Materials And Method Table A.1.13

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11

Table A.1.14

Categories of income

Lower step second step Third step Fourth step Fifth step Sixth step Seventh step Eighth step Ninth step Tenth step Highest step

Index of micro-level variables in wvs and evs

Variable

Label

E036 E037 E035 E039 E069_01 E069_05 E069_12 E069_14 E069_15 F034 F025 X025 X001 X003R X047

Private vs. state ownership of business Government responsibility Income equality Competition good or harmful Confidence to Churches Confidence to labor unions Confidence to the political parties Confidence to the environmental protection movement Confidence to the women’s movement Religious person Religious denomination Highest educational level attained Sex Age recoded Scale of incomes

231

232

Appendix 1

Operationalization of Macro-Level Data

According to the theoretical framework and research model mentioned above, the aggregate data that were used as macro-level variables in the current study were the democratic experience of the societies as an indicator of political context, their value of Human Development Index as the indicator of socioeconomic development, and predominant religion of the societies as one of the most important cultural factors.



Years of Democracy

To measure the length of democratic tradition of the countries, the data series of POLITY™ IV PROJECT: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2010 were used.4 The Polity IV Project is a research that “continues the Polity research tradition of coding the authority characteristics of states in the world system for purposes of comparative, quantitative analysis.” The Polity conceptual scheme: examines concomitant qualities of democratic and autocratic authority in governing institutions, rather than discreet and mutually exclusive forms of governance. This perspective envisions a spectrum of governing authority that spans from fully institutionalized autocracies through mixed, or incoherent, authority regimes (termed "anocracies") to fully institutionalized democracies. The "Polity Score" captures this regime authority spectrum on a 21-point scale ranging from -10 (hereditary monarchy) to +10 (consolidated democracy). Here we used the Polity scores which is converted to regime categories: … a three-part categorization of "autocracies" (-10 to -6), "anocracies" (-5 to +5 and the three special values: -66, -77, and -88), and "democracies" (+6 to +10); … The Polity scheme consists of six component measures that record key qualities of executive recruitment, constraints on executive authority, and political competition. It also records changes in the institutionalized qualities of governing authority.5 4 inscr Data Page (2010) Integrated Network for Societal Conflict Research, [Online], Available from: http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/inscr.htm [Accessed 05/11/2013]. 5 Marshall, M. G. and Jaggers, K. and Gurr, T. R. (2012) Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2010, [Online], Available from: http://www.systemic peace.org/polity/polity4.htm [Accessed 05/11/2013].

233

Materials And Method

The Democracy indicator is an additive eleven-point scale (0-10). The operational indicator of democracy is derived from codings of the competitiveness of political participation (variable 2.6), the openness and competitiveness of executive recruitment (variables 2.3 and 2.2), and constraints on the chief executive (variable 2.4) using the following weights:

Authority coding

Scale weight

Competitiveness of Executive Recruitment (xrcomp): (3) Election (2) Transitional

+2 +1

Openness of Executive Recruitment (xropen): only if xrcomp is Election (3) or Transitional (2) (3) Dual/election (4) Election

+1 +1

Constraint on Chief Executive (xconst): (7) Executive parity or subordination (6) Intermediate category (5) Substantial limitations (4) Intermediate category

+4 +3 +2 +1

Competitiveness of Political Participation (parcomp): (5) Competitive (4) Transitional (3) Factional

+3 +2 +1

A mature and internally coherent democracy, according to the Polity IV Project might be operationally defined as one in which (a) political participation is unrestricted, open, and fully competitive; (b) executive recruitment is elective, and (c) constraints on the chief executive are substantial.6

6 Marshall, M. G. and Gurr, T. R. and Jaggers, K. (2010) POLITY™ IV PROJECT: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2009, (30 April 2010), pp. 14-15, [Online], Available from: http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/p4manualv2009.pdf [Accessed 05/11/2013].

234

Appendix 1

Table A.1.15 shows the years of democracy from 1800 to 2010 for the 60 compared societies.



Human Development Index

The second macro-level variable was the Human Development Index (hdi). hdi is a statistic which refers to both social and economic development and is composed of three dimensions and four indicators. Life expectancy at birth is the indicator of health; mean years of schooling and expected years of schooling are the indicators of education; and Gross National Income (gni) per capita (ppp$) is the indicator of living standard. hdi values for this study were collected from the Human Development Reports of the United Nations Development Programme.7 To consider the probable

Table A.1.15

Predominant religion, the length of democratic experience, and hdi value of the 60 compared societies

Christian societies

Years of hdi democracy

Islamic societies

Years of hdi democracy

Argentina Australia Brazil Bulgaria Canada

37 110 41 21 144

0.757 0.925 0.681 0.724 0.883

19 0 0 20 0

Chile Colombia Finland France Germany (East)

48 91 92 131 21

0.762 0.658 0.863 0.856 0.881

Albania Algeria Azerbaijan Bangladesh Bosnian Federation Burkina Faso Egypt Indonesia Iran Iraq

2 6 12 0 0

0.670 0.602 0.563 0.390 0.698

Buddhist, Years of hdi Hindu, and democracy folk-religion societies

China Hong Kong India Japan South Korea 0.285 Taiwan 0.608 Thailand 0.568 Viet Nam 0.684 0.583

0 0 61 59 24

0.639 0.842 0.491 0.873 0.851

19 14 0

0.639 0.642 0.547

7 The Human Development Report (2011) United Nations Development Programme (undp), [Online], Available from: http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/HDR_2010_EN_Table2_reprint.pdf [Accessed 05/11/2013].

235

Materials And Method Christian societies

Germany (West) Ghana Great Britain Italy Mexico Netherlands New Zealand Norway Peru Philippines Poland Romania Russian Federation South Africa Spain SrpSkaSerbian Republic of Bosnia Sweden Switzerland Tanzania Ukraine United States Venezuela Zambia

Years of hdi democracy

42

Islamic societies

0.881 Jordan

Years of hdi democracy

0

0.665

12 174

0.443 Kyrgyzstan 0.842 Malaysia

1 16

0.572 0.731

63 14 89 154

0.838 0.698 0.882 0.896

19 0 11 18

0.279 0.551 0.432 0.416

108 34 49 28 15 7

0.937 Saudi Arabia 0 0.715 Turkey 53 0.597 0.775 0.733 0.700

0.732 0.672

99 85 0

0.590 0.857 0.698

94 163 0 19 211

0.885 0.876 0.332 0.703 0.897

48 8

0.637 0.360

Mali Morocco Nigeria Pakistan

Buddhist, Years of hdi Hindu, and democracy folk-religion societies

236

Appendix 1

effects of hdi rank on the attitudes towards the free market economy and civil society the value of hdi of the year of study in every society was taken. In cases in which no hdi value was available for the year of study, the hdi value of the nearest year was taken. In the case of Iraq, the last hdi value, which was available in the report, dates from 1998, and naturally the value of this year was recorded. Table A.1.15 presents the hdi value of the compared societies.



Predominant Religion

The third macro-level variable was the predominant religion of a society. From 60 compared societies, according to the World Christian Encyclopedia (Barrett, Kurian, and Johnson, 2001), the predominant religion in 33 societies was Christianity, in 19 societies Islam, and in 8 societies other religions. Religions of the last category were Chinese folk-religion, Hinduism, and Buddhism. It should be noted that each type of religious society was operationally coded as a dummy (0/1) variable and the last category of religious societies was used as the (omitted) reference category. Table A.1.15 presents the predominant religion of compared societies.



Method of Analysis

As was already mentioned above, the first and second research questions are about the effect of religiosity on attitudes towards free market economics and trust in civil society organizations at the individual level, and the four remaining research questions concern religious, political, and socioeconomic effects at the contextual level, consequently there are two hierarchical levels of analysis: level 1 or micro level of analysis and level 2 or macro level of analysis. Thus, multilevel analysis which is an appropriate statistical method to examine the relations of hierarchical or nested data, was used. To analyze such nested structure of the research data, we formed a two-level model using hlm (Hierarchical Linear and Nonlinear Modeling) program, version 7. The hlm program can fit models to outcome variables that generate a linear model with explanatory variables that account for variations at each level, utilizing variables specified at each level. hlm not only estimates model coefficients at each level, but it also predicts the random effects associated with each sampling unit at every level. While commonly used in education research due to the prevalence of hierarchical structures in data from this field, it is

Materials And Method

237

suitable for use with data from any research field that have a hierarchical structure.8



Missing Data

The question of utility or harmfulness of competition was not asked in these predominantly Islamic countries: Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia. Likewise, the question of confidence in religious institutions was not asked in Hong Kong. The question of confidence in the environmental protection movement was not asked in Algeria and Iraq. The question of confidence in the women’s movement was not asked in Iraq. The question of confidence in labor unions was not asked in Iraq and Saudi Arabia. Also the people in Iraq and Saudi Arabia were not asked how much they trusted political parties. It should be noted that version 7 of hlm program present three possibilities for handling missing data at level 1: “listwise deletion of cases when the mdm file is made, listwise deletion of cases when running the analysis …, and analysis of multiplyimputed data…” (Raudenbush et al., 2011: 43-44). Here the second option, namely listwise deletion of cases, was selected when running the analysis in order to take only the variables included in the model into account. Finally, some limitations need to be considered. First, our mean dataset, the World Values Survey, does not include some predominantly Islamic countries such as Sudan, Yemen, Syria, Niger, Oman, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Libya, Tunisia, Somalia, Senegal, Gambia, Guinea, Lebanon, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, as well as some other countries. In other words, from the 49 countries around the world in which, according to The Pew Research Center’s Forum on Religion & Public Life,9 Muslims comprise more than 50 per cent of the population, only 19 societies were surveyed in the wvs. Indeed, extending the area of the survey to the other predominantly Islamic societies will help to gain further valuable results especially in global cross-cultural comparative studies. In this regard we can turn to the second limitation of the study, namely the lack of societies with predominantly Jewish religion. It could be exciting to study the potential effects of a Jewish context on individual attitudes and compare these with other 8 hlm - Hierarchical Linear and Nonlinear Modeling (2012) Scientific Software International, Inc., [Online], Available from: http://www.ssicentral.com/hlm/ [Accessed 05/11/2013]. 9 ‘The Future of the Global Muslim Population: Projections for 2010-2030’ (2011) The Pew Research Center’s Forum on Religion & Public Life, [Online], Available from: http://www.pewforum.org/ future-of-the-global-muslim-population-muslim-majority.aspx [Accessed 05/11/2013].

238

Appendix 1

r­ eligious contexts. However, although Israel was included in the wvs, many of the variables of the current study were not asked in the questionnaire, and for that reason this country was excluded from the compared societies. In addition it is questionable whether one country alone can be the representative sample of features of a religion in global comparisons in which several societies with the same predominant religion are the samples of a traditional religion. The third limitation was that some of the variables were not asked in certain societies. Furthermore, some questions relating to the ‘economic system in democracy’, which could help to find more comprehensive comparative results about democratic economic values, were not asked in many compared societies, and were therefore excluded from the variable list. The last but not least significant limitation of the research is a common limitation of conducting an empirical survey in authoritarian societies or societies in which the judicial system follows religious codes. In such societies, individuals are not completely free to state their own views and there is always the worry that the expression of some opinions could lead to punishment. To quote one example, in some Islamic societies atheism is punishable according to Islamic Sharia. This reality should be considered when interpreting the low level of atheism in the majority of Islamic counties as found in the present study.

Appendix 2

Additional Descriptive Statistics Table A.2.1

Descriptive statistics of religiosity in the 60 compared societies

Society

N

Religious Unreligious Atheist Min

Max Mode Variation ratio (V)

Albania Algeria Argentina Australia Azerbaijan Bangladesh Bosnian Federation Brazil Bulgaria Burkina Faso Canada Chile China Colombia Egypt Finland France Germany (East) Germany (West) Ghana Great Britain Hong Kong India Indonesia Iran Iraq Italy

955 1190 958 1402 1898 1374 389

68.3 59.0 79.9 51.9 88.3 96.9 70.4

26.2 4.3 17.5 37.5 10.7 3.1 23.7

5.5 36.7 2.6 10.6 .9 – 5.9

1 1 1 1 1 1 1

3 3 3 2 3 2 3

1 1 1 1 1 1 1

31.7 41.0 20.1 48.1 11.7 3.1 29.6

1486 897 1470 2111 980 1969 3021 2993 986 989 1049

88.4 63.4 91.6 69.9 62.7 21.8 80.0 98.7 60.4 46.9 28.5

10.4 31.2 6.9 24.5 33.9 60.3 19.5 1.3 36.4 36.1 41.9

1.2 5.4 1.6 5.6 3.5 17.9 .5 – 3.1 17.0 29.6

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 3 3 3

1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 2

11.6 36.6 8.4 30.1 37.4 39.7 20.0 1.3 39.5 53.1 58.1

901

60.7

34.0

5.3

1

3

1

39.3

1522 1008 1247 1868 1795 2577 2263 977

91.5 48.5 27.3 77.9 84.6 83.7 86.7 88.0

8.0 41.5 67.4 19.5 15.2 16.2 13.3 9.3

.5 10.0 5.4 2.5 .3 .1 – 2.7

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1

8.5 51.5 32.7 22.0 15.5 16.3 13.3 12.0

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2014 | doi 10.1163/9789004274464_007

240 Table A.2.1

Appendix 2 Descriptive statistics of religiosity in the 60 compared societies (cont.)

Society

N

Religious Unreligious Atheist Min

Max Mode Variation ratio (V)

Japan Jordan Kyrgyzstan Malaysia Mali Mexico Morocco Netherlands New Zealand Nigeria Norway Pakistan Peru Philippines Poland Romania Russian Federation Saudi Arabia South Africa South Korea Spain SrpSka-Serbian Republic of Bosnia Sweden Switzerland Taiwan Tanzania Thailand Turkey Ukraine United States Venezuela

958 1200 1023 1197 1473 1551 1172 935 862 1958 1014 1890 1443 1190 970 1739 1886

24.2 91.2 75.2 89.1 97.6 75.4 91.8 57.5 49.8 94.2 41.3 90.7 82.4 79.0 94.1 93.4 63.6

62.1 8.7 22.2 8.6 2.0 21.7 8.2 35.2 43.3 4.7 51.9 9.3 16.2 20.8 4.3 6.0 32.4

13.7 .2 2.6 2.3 .4 2.9 – 7.3 7.0 1.1 6.8 – 1.4 .2 1.5 .6 4.0

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

3 3 3 3 3 3 2 3 3 3 3 2 3 3 3 3 3

2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1

37.9 8.9 24.8 10.9 2.4 24.6 8.2 42.5 50.3 5.8 48.1 9.3 17.6 21.0 5.8 6.6 36.4

1356 2919 1197 1166 786

70.4 83.0 32.3 45.4 76.2

29.6 16.0 40.9 47.2 18.2

– 1.0 26.8 7.5 5.6

1 1 1 1 1

2 3 3 3 3

1 1 2 2 1

29.6 17.0 59.1 52.9 23.8

981 1193 1223 1111 1533 1321 921 1202 1184

33.2 63.3 40.8 94.3 35.5 82.1 82.0 74.5 78.6

49.4 27.7 42.8 4.3 64.3 17.3 15.4 22.5 20.2

17.3 9.1 16.4 1.4 .2 .6 2.6 2.9 1.2

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2 1 2 1 2 1 1 1 1

50.5 36.8 57.2 5.7 35.7 17.9 18.0 25.4 21.4

241

Additional Descriptive Statistics Society

N

Viet Nam Zambia

1463 1377

Religious Unreligious Atheist Min

39.2 89.5

37.3 9.9

23.6 .5

1 1

Max Mode Variation ratio (V)

3 3

1 1

60.9 10.4

note: The numbers in the columns 3, 4, and 5 are percentage. In this question 1= A religious person, 2= A non-religious person, and 3= A convinced atheist. N= size of data set; Min= minimum; Max= maximum. Since France, Great Britain, and Netherlands had 2 different files of data, we used the data of 2006 which is more recent.

N

961 1192 896 1389 1909 1409 394 1473 957 1199 2034 911 1331 3015 3000 997 1503

Society

Albania Algeria Argentina Australia Azerbaijan Bangladesh Bosnian Federation Brazil Bulgaria Burkina Faso Canada Chile China Colombia Egypt Finland France

20.8 23.2 7.1 11.6 14.1 26.9 20.8 16.8 6.4 14.3 11.8 5.5 6.0 15.1 5.7 4.8 19.7

1. Private ownership

3

13.4 16.6 7.0 5.8 2.5 4.2 4.0 11.7 5.1 7.6 1.5 2.3 6.6 12.7 5.4 7.1 8.3 8.3 6.2 6.0 9.6 17.7 2.1 4.7 5.0 5.0 5.3 4.4 5.7 8.0 7.6 16.8 8.2 12.4

2

14.5 6.1 5.0 11.0 8.1 4.3 10.2 8.2 7.7 11.8 13.6 7.4 4.7 3.9 5.1 15.9 10.8

4

13.4 15.3 16.9 29.4 21.1 24.7 20.6 18.3 18.5 27.3 20.8 18.1 12.7 14.4 11.7 28.1 32.2

5

7

8

9

5.1 6.0 4.5 2.6 10.7 6.7 3.8 5.8 7.1 6.7 11.9 4.9 10.3 7.7 7.3 2.2 6.4 7.6 6.4 5.9 6.6 4.8 3.8 1.3 7.1 2.8 2.3 1.5 6.9 6.7 9.8 6.6 10.1 11.1 9.7 7.8 8.7 4.8 7.2 4.5 9.3 6.6 6.1 2.4 14.7 13.6 11.6 8.3 12.4 8.0 14.9 13.1 5.0 4.8 9.3 10.7 6.7 6.4 13.6 17.4 8.9 7.6 7.1 1.6 5.1 4.3 3.7 1.1

6

3.0 15.7 33.6 4.8 17.5 23.7 15.5 14.2 12.1 9.4 2.0 13.9 18.3 26.9 19.7 1.5 2.6

Variance

3.85 5.894 5.06 10.200 6.95 8.407 4.88 5.396 5.57 9.061 5.31 11.231 4.64 8.932 5.41 9.195 5.79 7.259 5.06 7.197 4.35 4.974 6.35 6.074 6.63 7.455 6.31 10.931 6.68 8.240 4.68 3.855 4.03 4.925

M

Descriptive statistics of attitudes toward private vs. government ownership of business in the 60 compared societies 10. Government ownership

Table A.2.2

2.428 3.194 2.899 2.323 3.010 3.351 2.989 3.032 2.694 2.683 2.230 2.464 2.730 3.306 2.871 1.963 2.219

SD

.745 .186 −.536 .202 .048 .100 .550 .032 −.047 .233 .408 −.295 −.510 −.364 −.507 .349 .425

−.182 −1.252 −.861 −.303 −1.146 −1.293 −.755 −1.197 −.994 −.705 −.376 −.525 −.775 −1.313 −1.029 −.100 −.062

Skewness Kurtosis

242 Appendix 2

Germany (East) Germany (West) Ghana Great Britain Hong Kong India Indonesia Iran Iraq Italy Japan Jordan Kyrgyzstan Malaysia Mali Mexico Morocco Netherlands New Zealand Nigeria Norway Pakistan

999 877 1517 901 1162 1433 1807 2619 2325 926 862 1085 1032 1201 1364 1453 1012 969 881 1951 1009 1259

6.8 7.0 10.7 7.1 1.5 23.2 8.4 12.9 3.2 7.3 7.5 28.6 15.4 3.5 12.0 20.2 5.0 7.3 13.8 17.5 3.3 3.9

3.7 9.6 4.1 6.0 3.5 7.4 7.4 5.7 4.2 4.0 4.8 9.2 8.9 9.8 5.0 2.6

7.7 5.1 8.7 5.8 13.4 12.4 4.0 7.5 9.3 2.8 4.8 10.6 15.2 18.3 8.4 10.8 9.5

4.2 8.8 8.7 15.2 10.3 8.7 10.8 10.7

8.8 30.5 11.8 8.6 14.1 24.2 11.7 7.4 4.8 4.7 6.3 3.4 10.7 31.9 8.4 8.2 54.5 41.0 22.1 13.8 5.8 19.3 14.2 11.2 6.6 13.7 6.9 7.1 4.1 11.4 6.5 12.9 13.6 23.2 16.7 6.9 15.4 35.4 16.7 3.8 3.1 11.8 3.0 3.1 6.6 8.8 10.0 7.8 9.3 18.6 16.7 14.2 7.3 25.9 5.9 6.5 5.0 14.7 9.0 7.0 11.4 30.2 11.3 8.7 18.7 27.9 9.0 7.0 15.1 21.2 10.3 5.2 5.4 7.9 8.7 6.0 14.7 26.4 11.2 12.5 12.2 43.6 11.4 7.2 8.5 7.5 10.3 10.2 19.6 18.9 7.2 2.5 2.3 .7 7.6 9.2 10.9 6.9 12.1 4.5 7.5 4.5 11.8 5.8 7.0 2.6 4.1 1.0 3.5 .7 9.1 8.0 10.4 2.9 8.7 .8

9.4 4.0 7.4 2.5 11.2 13.5 6.5 2.9

7.0 1.8 26.3 2.9 3.0 33.1 16.4 14.0 13.5 3.0 2.2 22.2 18.9 6.1 23.5 17.6 8.4 .6 3.0 19.3 3.0 .2

5.42 4.70 6.36 4.78 5.36 5.85 6.13 5.58 6.93 4.89 4.64 5.32 5.75 5.70 6.04 5.63 5.35 4.37 4.15 5.55 5.30 5.01

5.438 4.492 11.149 4.780 3.055 12.143 7.313 9.428 6.167 4.633 3.238 13.195 10.154 5.110 8.993 10.232 5.266 3.458 4.656 11.024 4.216 2.712

2.332 2.120 3.339 2.186 1.748 3.485 2.704 3.070 2.483 2.152 1.799 3.633 3.186 2.261 2.999 3.199 2.295 1.860 2.158 3.320 2.053 1.647

.115 .270 −.363 .263 .400 −.105 −.229 −.027 −.737 .199 .155 .052 −.125 −.064 −.123 −.131 .317 .225 .516 −.015 .148 −.098

−.379 −.356 −1.451 −.281 −.382 −1.425 −.782 −1.331 −.409 −.245 .958 −1.637 −1.347 −.561 −1.085 −1.295 −.258 −.055 .087 −1.477 −.345 .419

Additional Descriptive Statistics

243

8.9 6.2 4.0 17.8 4.5 7.8 12.2 5.3 3.1 14.4

7.3 7.3 7.7 33.4 4.6

N

1375 1184 949 1656 1960 1441 2898 1200 1063 794

979 1147 1213 1165 1531

Society

Peru Philippines Poland Romania Russian Federation Saudi Arabia South Africa South Korea Spain SrpSka-Serbian Republic of Bosnia Sweden Switzerland Taiwan Tanzania Thailand

1. Private ownership

5.2 6.1 5.9 11.5 3.8 11.0 8.0 12.3 10.3 12.5

3

8.1 12.8 8.1 13.6 5.2 11.0 5.5 4.6 3.3 4.0

3.5 3.2 4.1 13.8 1.8 6.5 11.8 5.2 5.8 6.4

2

14.2 11.4 8.4 3.3 4.2

5.2 5.7 6.2 9.1 4.2 5.4 7.7 8.2 9.4 13.4

4

9.7 12.2 8.1 4.1 9.0 15.6 10.0 14.8 9.7 6.8

6

11.8 8.0 7.7 6.1 7.1 11.9 7.9 14.0 14.7 6.5

7

9

2.7 2.0 2.7 2.7 6.7

12.3 7.2 13.4 7.5 13.4 10.2 7.5 7.7 12.6 7.9 11.9 5.2 8.1 7.7 12.5 5.8 8.9 2.3 5.0 3.9

8

25.8 11.1 8.8 7.5 33.3 8.8 6.2 5.6 28.1 13.4 8.4 7.6 12.5 3.5 1.6 1.9 16.7 14.7 20.7 19.6

13.0 18.8 17.1 12.1 19.1 18.0 12.2 18.2 30.3 25.7

5

1.8 3.7 7.5 30.8 5.4

23.3 18.9 23.3 10.3 29.9 6.6 14.1 3.8 5.6 5.4

8.283 7.175 7.318 9.356 7.054 6.258 9.152 5.318 4.584 6.138

Variance

4.78 4.514 4.72 4.559 5.25 5.624 5.15 14.460 6.28 4.779

6.54 6.41 6.75 4.76 7.07 5.51 5.44 5.54 5.43 4.63

M

−.458 −.295 −.398 .380 −.523 −.092 .061 −.111 .167 .401

−.368 .053 −.381 −1.643 .045

−.866 −.829 −.934 −1.205 −.704 −.789 −1.270 −.706 −.292 −.413

Skewness Kurtosis

2.125 .192 2.135 .383 2.372 .188 3.803 .205 2.186 −.624

2.878 2.679 2.705 3.059 2.656 2.502 3.025 2.306 2.141 2.478

SD

Descriptive statistics of attitudes toward private vs. government ownership of business in the 60 compared societies (cont.) 10. Government ownership

Table A.2.2

244 Appendix 2

1263 947 1216 1159 1384 1444

8.2 4.0 20.3 20.0 19.8 12.1

5.5 7.2 3.5 6.1 10.0 17.5 6.3 5.1 6.2 6.4 6.3 7.3

8.6 5.6 17.2 5.1 7.6 6.6

14.6 14.5 22.5 10.4 20.5 9.8

15.1 12.4 7.1 12.1 10.8 10.3

8.9 10.8 8.7 12.3 8.7 12.9 10.8 21.6 2.1 1.6 .4 1.3 5.7 7.2 7.7 20.4 5.6 6.4 6.6 10.1 8.5 10.0 7.1 22.0

5.89 7.335 6.75 6.956 3.61 3.772 5.64 10.950 5.00 8.565 6.07 9.696

2.708 2.637 1.942 3.309 2.927 3.114

−.153 −.423 .515 −.088 .168 −.231

−.927 −.810 .335 −1.393 −1.044 −1.251

note: The numbers in the columns 3–12 are percentage. In this question 1= strongly agree with private ownership of business and 10= strongly agree with government ownership of business. N= size of data set; M= mean; SD= standard deviation.

Turkey Ukraine United States Venezuela Viet Nam Zambia

Additional Descriptive Statistics

245

246

Appendix 2

Table A.2.3

Comparison of the frequency distribution of agreement with the increase of government ownership of business among 60 societies

Rank Society

Government ownership of business

Rank Society

Government ownership of business

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15

Iraq Ghana Egypt Argentina Russian Federation Colombia Poland China Ukraine Peru Philippines Zambia Jordan Kyrgyzstan Nigeria

52.0 51.0 50.7 50.4 50.4 46.9 46.9 46.3 45.3 42.8 39.8 39.1 39.0 36.7 36.4

31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45

25.5 25.3 23.7 23.1 22.7 22.1 21.1 20.7 19.3 18.0 17.8 16.8 16.3 14.3 14.3

16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30

Mali Tanzania Venezuela Mexico Iran Chile India Indonesia Turkey Thailand Brazil South Africa Azerbaijan Bulgaria Bangladesh

35.5 35.4 35.3 35.2 34.5 33.8 33.1 32.4 31.8 31.7 30.6 29.9 29.8 29.6 28.8

46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60

note: The numbers are percentage.

Romania Algeria Saudi Arabia Viet Nam Malaysia South Korea Burkina Faso Germany (East) Bosnian Federation Morocco Taiwan Spain Norway Australia SrpSka-Serbian Republic of Bosnia Italy Great Britain Sweden Germany (West) Switzerland Canada Finland Albania Pakistan France New Zealand Netherlands Japan United States Hong Kong

12.7 12.3 12.0 11.7 11.3 10.5 10.2 10.1 9.7 7.4 7.2 5.7 5.2 3.3 3.0

Additional Descriptive Statistics

247

As can be seen from the table more than 50 per cent of those who answered the question in Iraq (52.0 per cent), Ghana (51.0 per cent), Egypt (50.7 per cent), Argentina (50.4 per cent), and the Russian Federation (50.4 per cent) agreed relatively strongly with an increase of the role of the state in trade. For Colombia (46.9 per cent), Poland (46.9 per cent), China (46.3 per cent), Ukraine (45.3 per cent), and Peru (42.8 per cent) the agreement was more than 40 and less than 50 per cent and for 16 other countries between 30 and 40 per cent. These countries were the Philippines (39.8 per cent), Zambia (39.1 per cent), Jordan (39.0 per cent), Kyrgyzstan (36.7 per cent), Nigeria (36.4 per cent), Mali (35.5 per cent), Tanzania (35.4 per cent), Venezuela (35.3 per cent), Mexico (35.2 per cent), Iran (34.5 per cent), Chile (33.8 per cent), India (33.1 per cent), Indonesia (32.4 per cent), Turkey (31.8 per cent), Thailand (31.7 per cent), and Brazil (30.6 per cent). The least support for government ownership of business was found in Hong Kong with 3.0 per cent, the United States with 3.3 per cent, Japan with 5.2 per cent, Netherlands with 5.7 per cent, New Zealand with 7.2 per cent, France with 7.4 per cent, and Pakistan with 9.7 per cent.

N

995 1252 969 1383 1933 1413 397 1488 984 1425 2118 990 1720 3021 3000

Society

Albania Algeria Argentina Australia Azerbaijan Bangladesh Bosnian Federation Brazil Bulgaria Burkina Faso Canada Chile China Colombia Egypt

5.5 12.1 16.1 9.7 5.4 24.7 13.9 8.7 4.8 8.4 7.8 8.7 10.5 14.7 4.7

1. Responsibility of people

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

4.0 8.3 11.3 7.0 13.5 10.9 11.2 7.9 20.4 5.0 4.7 5.7 13.1 16.6 6.9 7.4 6.2 22.4 3.6 8.4 5.0 5.6 16.4 4.9 7.4 6.2 26.5 4.8 15.3 15.4 11.1 14.0 8.5 8.1 3.5 9.7 2.6 4.4 5.0 5.0 13.5 7.2 10.3 7.9 38.7 1.8 6.2 6.6 4.3 20.2 4.2 3.3 1.8 26.8 4.0 6.0 6.8 7.6 17.1 8.3 10.1 2.0 24.2 3.7 6.5 4.9 5.2 17.1 9.2 8.4 9.1 27.2 2.8 6.4 5.1 7.1 14.0 9.8 13.5 13.2 23.3 3.8 6.8 5.6 6.6 19.0 7.7 6.4 8.9 26.8 7.0 16.7 14.8 10.4 16.9 8.0 7.0 4.9 6.5 3.6 7.2 5.7 11.1 16.6 12.2 11.0 6.4 17.6 10.3 10.6 7.4 10.1 10.2 6.5 9.7 9.4 15.3 4.7 4.8 4.4 4.7 14.2 6.5 7.1 8.2 30.8 6.5 8.5 5.2 7.4 13.4 8.7 13.4 14.0 18.1

2

2.770 3.014 3.280 2.629 2.798 3.432 3.091 2.951 2.665 2.945 2.493 2.765 3.043 3.296 2.778

Variance SD

6.40 7.675 6.11 9.083 6.09 10.759 5.19 6.910 7.41 7.829 5.56 11.776 6.07 9.556 6.69 8.706 6.98 7.102 6.59 8.676 5.05 6.216 6.22 7.644 5.65 9.262 6.48 10.866 6.58 7.718

M

−.275 −.237 −.248 .254 −.827 −.022 −.243 −.517 −.641 −.419 .295 −.318 −.010 −.455 −.455

−1.027 −1.074 −1.319 −.818 −.432 −1.407 −1.130 −.892 −.584 −.973 −.731 −.836 −1.331 −1.208 −.971

Skewness Kurtosis

Descriptive statistics of attitudes toward responsibility of individuals vs. government responsibility in providing for people in the 60 compared societies 10. Government responsibility

Table A.2.4

248 Appendix 2

Finland France Germany (East) Germany (West) Ghana Great Britain Hong Kong India Indonesia Iran Iraq Italy Japan Jordan Kyrgyzstan Malaysia Mali Mexico Morocco Netherlands New Zealand Nigeria Norway

1009 1586 1054 961 1530 981 1212 1646 1912 2643 2325 984 1063 1151 1041 1201 1447 1508 1156 1000 911 1979 1016

4.9 6.7 18.3 17.4 10.3 24.7 8.1 13.8 9.5 21.4 3.7 2.0 6.4 6.4 7.8 2.5 4.7 9.8 10.6 10.1 10.3 6.2 12.0 6.5 4.6 12.2 12.3 12.6 14.8 19.6 .8 14.6 21.4 10.1 14.3 6.1 8.8 8.8 11.3 4.9 4.9 6.5 5.0 5.1 3.0 5.2 6.4 4.6 2.8 3.3 3.8 8.0 10.5 13.2 2.5 2.0 5.6 6.3 10.0 8.3 2.5 2.9 2.2 4.3 12.2 4.0 6.9 6.3 6.7 5.1 5.8 11.4 13.5 13.2 16.4 3.7 9.5 4.4 4.9 19.0 7.8 8.6 4.7 6.9 1.2 1.0 3.4 3.5 4.6 8.1 6.7 17.0 16.8 17.7 13.1 8.2 15.6 14.4 9.3 9.8 4.3 6.7 4.4 9.0 2.7 2.5 10.0 13.5 13.0

15.4 9.5 9.5 4.1 6.7 4.9 5.2 1.9 17.1 11.7 13.7 11.5 14.2 10.8 13.0 12.4 6.0 7.3 11.3 14.4 8.5 7.1 6.1 3.4 72.0 20.2 6.9 14.9 6.4 6.8 5.6 12.3 6.4 10.7 17.3 8.9 5.0 15.4 20.6 17.2 11.5 10.9 7.2 17.1 10.9 14.3 7.0 14.5 3.9 3.8 9.2 8.5 8.5 7.8 8.3 16.7 8.9 8.6 7.7 18.7 8.8 3.8 6.9 12.8 4.0 3.6 5.4 11.9 6.1 11.2 18.3 10.7 12.1 8.5 1.6 16.4 5.7 7.5 3.4 7.9 7.5 8.5 10.7 18.8 14.2 12.6 6.3

3.9 3.8 19.9 12.0 21.3 3.4 12.5 41.5 16.9 26.8 27.9 14.5 24.3 48.4 30.6 9.1 22.9 27.1 38.8 .8 6.5 31.2 6.5

5.05 5.301 2.302 3.99 6.303 2.511 6.87 6.280 2.506 6.30 6.354 2.521 6.28 10.123 3.182 4.45 5.728 2.393 6.89 2.730 1.652 6.53 12.394 3.521 5.54 9.151 3.025 7.08 8.026 2.833 7.42 7.336 2.709 6.23 6.164 2.483 6.97 6.060 2.462 7.64 8.933 2.989 6.54 10.398 3.225 5.62 6.346 2.519 5.90 10.288 3.207 5.67 11.945 3.456 8.07 5.021 2.241 4.68 4.458 2.111 4.74 6.763 2.601 6.77 9.783 3.128 5.91 4.880 2.209

.295 .559 −.522 −.206 −.336 .431 −.317 −.462 .031 −.703 −.942 −.113 −.437 −1.032 −.442 .094 −.174 −.016 −1.133 .133 .359 −.549 −.046

−.709 −.426 −.545 −.996 −1.371 −.497 1.290 −1.278 −1.178 −.742 −.362 −.816 −.629 −.213 −1.208 −.859 −1.277 −1.510 .465 −.685 −.744 −1.066 −.607

Additional Descriptive Statistics

249

18.9 14.0 6.3 9.0 5.0 10.5 10.5 2.6 2.4 3.9

8.2 9.1 5.8 12.2

N

1647 1430 1196 954 1725 2009 1456 2950 1200 1169 793

997 1231 1223 1185

Society

Pakistan Peru Philippines Poland Romania Russian Federation Saudi Arabia South Africa South Korea Spain SrpSka-Serbian Republic of Bosnia Sweden Switzerland Taiwan Tanzania

1. Responsibility of people

2

8.4 6.7 5.2 1.9

.4 6.6 6.6 3.6 8.8 2.0 6.8 7.2 2.5 1.8 4.4

4

5

6

7

8

9

M

20.1 17.2 12.9 15.3 7.3 5.7 18.3 12.9 10.2 15.4 6.6 9.1 12.2 7.9 11.0 17.7 10.1 10.0 3.7 3.0 5.3 10.8 1.8 2.5

3.674 9.762 8.499 7.592 8.979 7.089 6.798 9.468 5.784 5.217 7.422

2.185 2.572 2.640 3.304

1.917 3.124 2.915 2.755 2.996 2.662 2.607 3.077 2.405 2.284 2.724

Variance SD

2.5 2.3 4.53 4.773 5.3 6.4 5.03 6.613 7.9 12.2 5.89 6.969 4.3 54.6 7.48 10.913

3.8 4.7 4.6 29.8 16.9 13.7 8.3 17.8 7.13 10.3 10.3 8.3 10.3 7.8 6.8 5.7 14.8 5.17 9.7 7.1 11.6 17.7 7.9 5.7 6.1 13.5 5.41 11.2 9.3 9.1 17.8 7.9 8.7 8.8 17.3 6.14 8.5 6.1 4.4 17.2 7.9 10.3 9.6 18.1 6.07 4.8 4.6 7.2 18.4 7.6 12.1 8.3 30.1 7.13 11.7 11.5 13.0 16.8 7.1 9.7 6.3 6.5 5.20 9.7 7.6 8.3 9.9 7.6 9.1 11.8 18.2 6.00 5.5 5.0 4.0 8.1 12.3 22.2 16.6 21.3 7.38 4.4 11.5 10.0 20.4 12.4 13.7 10.3 13.3 6.58 6.9 6.3 10.8 18.8 6.8 9.0 7.2 25.9 6.68

3

.408 .278 −.084 −.913

−.109 .163 .049 −.140 −.247 −.650 .098 −.185 −.961 −.269 −.318

−.371 −.859 −.955 −.689

−.539 −1.271 −1.077 −1.039 −1.205 −.490 −.892 −1.313 .098 −.558 −.950

Skewness Kurtosis

Descriptive statistics of attitudes toward responsibility of individuals vs. government responsibility in providing for people in the 60 compared societies (cont.) 10. Government responsibility

Table A.2.4

250 Appendix 2

1534 1314 975 1215 1197 1464 1459

3.6 7.1 3.8 13.3 21.1 14.5 11.7

7.5 18.2 20.1 14.0 12.4 6.4 5.9 3.6 8.4 4.8 8.3 8.4 11.0 11.9 12.0 10.0 9.4 17.1 2.2 5.7 7.6 8.7 14.2 9.3 12.6 12.2 23.7 6.6 13.2 13.0 10.3 15.7 9.0 7.5 3.0 8.6 9.7 6.7 5.7 8.0 7.4 6.5 5.8 5.8 23.2 8.5 11.3 7.9 15.9 13.3 5.6 5.3 4.0 13.6 4.6 6.0 6.3 9.6 8.0 7.3 7.5 9.7 29.3

5.06 5.766 6.21 7.790 6.97 6.750 4.99 7.179 5.45 11.974 5.10 8.488 6.52 10.228

2.401 2.791 2.598 2.679 3.460 2.913 3.198

.580 −.254 −.537 .226 .047 .262 −.420

−.468 −1.012 −.683 −.852 −1.530 −1.005 −1.210

note: The numbers in the columns 3–12 are percentage. In this question 1= people should take more responsibility and 10= the government should take more responsibility to provide for people. N= size of data set; M= mean; SD= standard deviation.

Thailand Turkey Ukraine United States Venezuela Viet Nam Zambia

Additional Descriptive Statistics

251

252 Table A.2.5

Appendix 2 Comparison of the frequency distribution of agreement with government responsibility to provide for people among 60 societies

Rank

Society

Government responsibility to provide for people

Rank

Society

Government responsibility to provide for people

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22

Morocco Iraq Jordan Tanzania South Korea Azerbaijan Iran Russian Federation Nigeria Bulgaria Ukraine India Ghana Kyrgyzstan Zambia Colombia Japan Egypt Germany (East) Brazil Burkina Faso SrpSka-Serbian Republic of Bosnia Argentina Pakistan Albania South Africa Romania Germany (West) Spain Turkey

68.3 63.9 61.4 61.4 60.1 56.9 54.8 50.5 50.4 50.0 48.5 48.4 47.0 46.7 46.5 46.1 45.6 45.5 45.1 44.7 42.1 42.1

31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52

Bosnian Federation Mexico Algeria Chile Poland Venezuela China Mali Italy Bangladesh Taiwan Indonesia Peru Malaysia Norway Philippines Viet Nam Saudi Arabia Australia Switzerland United States Canada

36.3 36.1 36.0 35.0 34.8 34.8 34.4 33.6 32.6 31.9 30.1 29.3 27.3 25.4 25.4 25.3 22.9 22.5 21.3 20.8 19.1 18.4

40.1 39.8 39.5 39.1 38.0 37.4 37.3 36.5

53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60

Thailand Finland New Zealand Great Britain Hong Kong France Netherlands Sweden

17.9 17.5 17.4 12.9 12.5 10.9 10.9 10.5

23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30

note: The numbers are percentage.

Additional Descriptive Statistics

253

As can be seen from the table more than 60 per cent of respondents in 5 countries, namely Morocco (68.3 per cent), Iraq (63.9 per cent), Jordan (61.4 per cent), Tanzania (61.4 per cent), and South Korea (60.1 per cent) remarked that the ­government should take more responsibility to ensure that everyone is ­provided for. This rate was 56.9 per cent for Azerbaijan, 54.8 per cent for Iran, 50.5 per cent for the Russian Federation, 50.4 per cent for Nigeria, 50.0 per cent for Bulgaria, 48.5 per cent for Ukraine, 48.4 per cent for India, 47.0 per cent for Ghana, 46.7 per cent for Kyrgyzstan, 46.5 per cent for Zambia, 46.1 per cent for Colombia, 45.6 per cent for Japan, 45.5 per cent for Egypt, 45.1 per cent for East Germany, 44.7 per cent for Brazil, 42.1 per cent for Burkina Faso, 42.1 per cent for SrpSkaSerbian Republic of Bosnia, and 40.1 per cent for Argentina. In 18 other societies more than 30 per cent supported this attitude. Japan was the first industrial country in the table with 45.6 per cent support for government responsibility. East Germany with 45.1 per cent and West Germany with 37.4 were the second and third advanced societies respectively in this regard, and ranked nineteenth and twenty-eighth positions in the table. The least support for government responsibility in providing for citizens came from Sweden with 10.5 per cent, France with 10.9 per cent, the Netherlands with 10.9 per cent, Hong Kong with 12.5 per cent, and Great Britain with 12.9 per cent.

N

985 1261 974 1391 1800 1411 398 1490 987 1408 2111 989 1679 3013 3000 1008 1599 1037 924

Society

Albania Algeria Argentina Australia Azerbaijan Bangladesh Bosnian Federation Brazil Bulgaria Burkina Faso Canada Chile China Colombia Egypt Finland France Germany (East) Germany (West)

2

3

7.3 3.1 8.0 4.7 1.7 1.5 24.3 4.1 6.9 10.0 3.6 8.1 10.5 4.9 6.9 8.0 .7 1.1 9.0 2.0 5.5 15.4 6.4 7.7 9.1 7.6 7.7 7.2 2.9 2.3 8.4 4.9 8.7 22.9 6.2 10.0 13.0 10.5 7.5 23.5 6.3 6.3 2.6 1.2 1.6 8.2 7.1 14.6 20.6 7.8 10.7 19.0 11.7 20.2 8.2 8.7 14.8

1. Income equality

7.7 2.0 4.1 7.5 9.2 2.2 7.0 7.4 10.7 4.5 8.9 8.5 4.2 5.6 .8 11.9 6.9 11.9 11.9

4

14.2 6.3 13.8 17.5 18.8 14.0 22.1 12.1 13.5 11.8 14.4 13.1 8.7 10.6 3.1 17.2 15.8 14.8 15.3

5

11.0 6.8 6.9 11.1 6.4 7.4 9.3 6.4 9.2 8.1 11.6 8.0 8.5 3.7 3.7 10.8 4.6 8.1 10.4

6

20.9 9.6 7.9 15.7 9.4 9.1 14.3 8.7 12.6 9.9 17.2 7.8 8.5 4.9 10.4 15.4 8.8 5.6 12.7

7

9

13.6 5.8 7.9 9.8 9.4 3.6 14.5 4.3 10.1 4.9 7.6 3.5 9.8 3.0 12.7 7.4 11.2 7.0 14.3 11.7 15.7 5.1 8.7 7.3 14.5 11.6 9.9 7.4 23.1 20.8 9.3 3.4 11.6 3.9 5.0 1.5 12.4 4.3

8

8.3 49.8 19.0 7.6 18.8 46.5 17.8 15.8 11.3 27.3 5.1 7.6 13.0 21.7 32.8 2.1 9.3 2.3 1.3

5.96 8.09 5.33 5.67 5.90 7.56 6.08 5.68 5.67 7.07 5.64 4.78 5.77 5.50 8.23 4.98 4.85 3.89 4.96

M

6.114 6.613 11.041 6.521 8.534 8.153 7.255 9.667 7.674 7.722 6.122 8.893 9.600 12.127 4.208 5.291 8.869 5.367 5.560

Variance

−.609 .916 −1.398 −.746 −1.104 −.188 −.737 −1.307 −1.057 −.442 −.784 −1.199 −1.356 −1.553 3.264 −.810 −1.191 −.246 −.989

Skewness Kurtosis

2.473 −.341 2.572 −1.346 3.323 .030 2.554 −.234 2.921 −.085 2.855 −.932 2.694 −.181 3.109 −.112 2.770 −.076 2.779 −.758 2.474 −.276 2.982 .220 3.098 −.209 3.482 −.016 2.051 −1.766 2.300 .037 2.978 .220 2.317 .642 2.358 .043

SD

Descriptive statistics of attitudes toward desirability of income equality vs. larger income differences in the 60 compared societies 10. Income difference

Table A.2.6

254 Appendix 2

Ghana Great Britain Hong Kong India Indonesia Iran Iraq Italy Japan Jordan Kyrgyzstan Malaysia Mali Mexico Morocco Netherlands New Zealand Nigeria Norway Pakistan Peru Philippines Poland Romania Russian Federation

1529 974 1211 1643 1828 2643 2325 987 1030 1141 1036 1201 1444 1503 1175 1000 900 1942 1017 1461 1487 1196 941 1701 1956

5.6 3.8 2.9 5.4 7.7 10.5 9.1 40.2 7.8 3.7 .8 1.8 26.0 14.3 11.3 14.1 11.1 8.6 7.4 4.1 6.6 5.3 1.6 4.4 19.7 2.4 1.8 16.3 7.1 9.0 2.6 2.0 4.9 9.0 1.2 .5 20.4 3.9 3.2 12.6 9.7 7.6 2.6 2.7 6.7 11.8 5.4 9.2 10.1 5.3 6.7 8.3 8.2 11.2 24.9 5.8 14.6 7.7 2.0 2.5 6.9 3.4 4.3 5.8 3.4 4.8 17.7 11.7 14.3 7.1 3.4 5.3

3.0 2.3 11.9 15.7 57.7 14.7 2.1 11.1 6.6 10.7 5.1 11.3 6.4 15.0 4.3 14.4 2.2 5.0 5.4 11.1 5.3 13.7 1.9 11.5 2.5 10.2 6.4 16.6 8.2 13.0 8.2 14.0 4.4 6.4 12.3 16.8 7.7 26.9 3.4 5.9 5.4 15.8 5.8 9.7 9.2 12.6 7.0 17.5

3.5 8.4 9.3 11.8 31.4 10.4 13.3 14.4 6.2 6.6 6.8 8.8 13.8 18.3 26.9 18.0 1.9 4.6 12.9 6.3 14.2 17.8 5.3 9.4 7.5 6.9 8.7 11.0 15.5 22.6 10.6 16.3 5.4 6.4 10.0 16.5 8.8 7.4 5.3 11.5 12.3 9.7 6.9 13.8 4.8 5.5 7.2 11.2 18.9 6.8 15.2 16.5 16.3 9.2 12.5 18.2 11.4 12.4 12.8 21.1 14.6 16.6 12.2 2.5 17.1 13.9 23.5 10.1 14.1

8.5 4.0 11.4 4.8 2.7 15.6 5.8 12.9 11.0 9.8 6.7 4.3 3.4 9.6 2.7 1.4 10.2 7.6 9.1 6.7 6.0

16.7 19.8 12.4 8.2

34.4 20.7 17.1 7.4 21.3

33.9 7.0 1.8 26.8 25.3 7.5 7.8 7.2 6.2 37.5 13.6 8.3 38.8 23.2 8.0 3.3 6.4 29.0 1.9

7.76 5.60 4.78 4.79 7.37 4.17 5.42 5.94 6.15 6.97 5.44 6.66 7.53 6.11 5.35 6.18 5.43 6.78 5.07 3.83 7.48 6.56 6.78 4.66 6.46

7.272 6.488 3.694 13.837 5.264 8.734 9.012 5.921 4.345 12.503 9.311 4.724 8.081 11.353 7.892 4.101 6.881 9.852 5.377 4.626 7.693 7.377 6.801 8.540 7.654

2.697 −1.328 2.547 −.005 1.922 .122 3.720 .330 2.294 −.820 2.955 .589 3.002 −.089 2.433 −.402 2.084 −.559 3.536 −.797 3.051 −.028 2.173 −.549 2.843 −1.067 3.369 −.378 2.809 −.041 2.025 −.550 2.623 −.174 3.139 −.617 2.319 −.076 2.151 .139 2.774 −1.076 2.716 −.424 2.608 −.696 2.922 .390 2.767 −.353

.629 −.985 −.068 −1.514 .385 −.932 −1.371 −.521 .459 −1.037 −1.259 −.152 .084 −1.328 −1.129 −.135 −.935 −1.032 −.889 −.937 .128 −.738 −.430 −1.119 −.877

Additional Descriptive Statistics

255

6.9 3.1 7.7 22.5 13.9 20.6 3.7 3.0 3.7 39.0 3.1 2.6 3.1 .8 1.1 17.9 11.1 10.7 4.6 3.9 4.1 4.9 1.7 4.8 22.2 6.8 5.9 16.2 3.8 5.2 12.3 4.0 5.1

991 1229 1223 1170 1534 1319 967 1211 1192 1455 1458

5

6

7

8

11.2 11.4 12.2 11.1 9.5 9.1 10.1 17.4 8.8 11.8 9.7

11.2 5.2 11.7 4.6 12.6 7.4 10.5 18.5 7.9 8.6 11.5

17.3 6.2 17.9 3.6 27.7 7.9 15.1 19.2 5.6 9.7 12.6

21.4 4.6 22.2 3.9 26.1 9.7 16.1 14.0 8.5 12.8 13.2

4.9 15.9 15.7 13.0 14.4 6.7 9.9 8.0 8.7 11.9 5.3 7.5 8.4 19.0 22.9 8.1 14.6 9.7 14.8 15.1 5.7 23.6 9.8 13.2 12.9 8.1 12.0 3.0 2.1 1.6 8.9 4.8 6.4 4.9 5.2 5.1

4

7.1 1.3 7.9 3.2 8.7 6.6 11.3 4.7 7.8 8.8 10.2

9.5 9.6 12.0 5.2 7.8

9

6.2 2.3 14.6 26.8 8.9 10.8 19.4 8.3 21.6 17.8 16.5

16.6 14.8 9.0 8.1 11.9 6.09 3.63 6.85 4.98 7.07 4.97 6.88 6.18 5.58 5.98 6.23

6.72 5.67 6.59 5.65 6.11

M

5.988 5.420 5.385 14.408 3.550 9.398 6.577 4.827 11.851 9.723 8.617

5.684 9.833 5.987 6.860 6.551

Variance

−. 414 −.129 −.708 −.166 −.299

−.599 −.032 .041 −1.635 1.927 −1.292 −.406 −.015 −1.515 −1.192 −.948

−.433 −1.352 −.373 −.935 −.590

Skewness Kurtosis

2.447 −.495 2.328 .822 2.321 −.702 3.796 .217 1.884 −1.068 3.066 .222 2.564 −.654 2.197 −.378 3.442 −.062 3.118 −.309 2.935 −.445

2.384 3.136 2.447 2.619 2.559

SD

note: The numbers in the columns 3–12 are percentage. This question has been scaled from 1–10 in which 1= strongly agree that incomes should be made more equal and 10=strongly believe that we need larger income differences as incentives. N= size of data set; M= mean; SD= standard deviation.

2.6 4.1 9.1 6.3 3.1 7.8 5.7 10.1 2.1 4.6

3.3 15.0 4.8 8.7 8.3

1474 2926 1199 1180 796

3

Saudi Arabia South Africa South Korea Spain SrpSka-Serbian Republic of Bosnia Sweden Switzerland Taiwan Tanzania Thailand Turkey Ukraine United States Venezuela Viet Nam Zambia

2

N

Society

1. Income equality

Descriptive statistics of attitudes toward desirability of income equality vs. larger income differences in the 60 compared societies (cont.) 10. Income difference

Table A.2.6

256 Appendix 2

257

Additional Descriptive Statistics Table A.2.7

Comparison of the frequency distribution of agreement with income equality among 60 societies

Rank

Society

Income equality

Rank

Society

Income equality

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11

Switzerland Iran Germany (East) India Pakistan Tanzania Romania Turkey Chile France Colombia

57.0 51.6 50.9 48.0 45.3 44.7 43.7 39.7 39.1 39.1 36.1

31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41

22.1 22.0 21.7 21.4 18.4 18.1 17.7 16.5 15.8 15.7 15.0

12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30

Argentina Venezuela Iraq Kyrgyzstan Germany (West) China South Africa Finland Morocco Brazil Norway Mexico New Zealand Viet Nam Spain Bulgaria Jordan Great Britain Azerbaijan

35.3 34.9 33.8 32.4 31.7 31.0 30.4 29.9 29.9 29.5 27.7 27.5 26.4 25.2 24.5 24.4 23.9 23.6 22.3

42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60

Nigeria Canada Australia Zambia Albania Italy Sweden Bosnian Federation Russian Federation South Korea SrpSka-Serbian Republic of Bosnia Philippines Poland Ukraine Burkina Faso Ghana Peru Netherlands United States Japan Mali Taiwan Saudi Arabia Bangladesh Malaysia Hong Kong Algeria Indonesia Egypt Thailand

note: The numbers are percentage.

14.6 14.0 12.6 12.4 12.3 12.2 12.0 11.4 11.3 10.7 10.4 10.0 9.8 9.5 9.1 7.9 6.3 5.4 5.0

258

Appendix 2

To gain a better perspective of those who voted for income equality in different countries, points 1 and 2 and 3 of the scale were added together. As can be seen from the table more than half the respondents interviewed in Switzerland (57.0 per cent), Iran (51.6 per cent), and East Germany (50.9 per cent) said that incomes should be made more equal. This proportion was 48.0 per cent in India, 45.3 per cent in Pakistan, 44.7 per cent in Tanzania, 43.7 per cent in Romania. The scores for the subsequent countries were as follows: Turkey 39.7 per cent, Chile 39.1 per cent, France 39.1 per cent, Colombia 36.1 per cent, Argentina 35.3 per cent, Venezuela 34.9 per cent, Iraq 33.8 per cent, Kyrgyzstan 32.4 per cent, West Germany 31.7 per cent, China 31.0 per cent, and South Africa 30.4 per cent. On the other hand, Thailand with only 5.0 per cent, Egypt with 5.4 per cent, Indonesia with 6.3 per cent, Algeria with 7.9 per cent, Hong Kong with 9.1 per cent, Malaysia with 9.5 per cent, Bangladesh with 9.8 per cent, and Saudi Arabia with 10.0 per cent all demonstrated little sympathy for income equality.

N

961 0 959 1386 1842 1399 395 1472 959 1385 2108 972 1526 3020 0 1013

Society

Albania Algeria Argentina Australia Azerbaijan Bangladesh Bosnian Federation Brazil Bulgaria Burkina Faso Canada Chile China Colombia Egypt Finland 8.8 21.4 11.2 5.5 11.9 10.5 15.6 10.0 18.7 9.2 16.8 8.2

7.4 14.2 21.6

5.0 11.5 10.0 7.1 9.4 9.3 18.7 14.5 14.9 5.6 19.8 9.0

6

6.0 6.1 4.0 5.4 4.1 5.4 5.2 5.8 6.6 9.6 7.6 3.8

9.8 3.3 17.5 15.4 19.7 13.7 15.4 16.1 17.7 16.8 15.2 21.4 11.1 14.6

5

20.1 17.0 8.4

8.0 16.5 8.0 5.1 12.9 10.7 12.6 12.6 15.5 13.9 7.5 7.7

4

26.4 17.7 34.3 53.2 41.8 26.6 21.2 30.7 16.1 15.0 24.6 38.8

3

12.7

2

31.3 16.9 19.4

1. Competition is good

5.0

5.7 4.3 4.3 4.5 1.0 5.2 2.7 2.4 5.1 7.0 4.5 3.0

2.4

7

4.0

5.4 3.8 2.8 2.3 1.5 4.3 2.2 2.6 4.5 8.7 4.5 3.4

1.9

8

1.4

2.1 1.2 .9 .4 .5 3.2 1.7 1.9 2.1 3.0 1.8 3.4

1.1

9

.8

15.0 2.1 4.8 2.9 1.5 8.7 2.4 2.7 1.4 6.7 1.8 7.9

1.2 9.895 4.662 6.510 6.123 4.342 8.308 4.837 5.602 4.828 6.708 5.519 8.655 4.04 3.689

4.71 3.77 3.51 2.87 2.88 4.19 3.51 3.41 3.84 4.86 3.47 3.67

1.921

.620

3.146 .376 2.159 .758 2.551 .872 2.474 1.138 2.084 1.046 2.882 .617 2.199 .924 2.367 .897 2.197 .682 2.590 .235 2.349 .879 2.942 .875

.135

−1.094 .275 .018 .325 .854 −.692 .555 .225 −.088 −.686 −.085 −.420

1.344

Skewness Kurtosis

2.029 1.212

Variance SD

2.97 4.118

M

Descriptive statistics of attitudes toward Utility vs. harmfulness of competition in the 60 compared societies 10. Competition is harmful

Table A.2.8

Additional Descriptive Statistics

259

N

1585 1062 954 1527 969 1207 1594 1872 2650 0 969 1043 1151 1043 1201 1450

Society

France Germany (East) Germany (West) Ghana Great Britain Hong Kong India Indonesia Iran Iraq Italy Japan Jordan Kyrgyzstan Malaysia Mali

6

7

7.1 3.7 6.7 3.0 1.5 3.6 8.9 2.9

5

11.6 12.5 13.6 12.6 21.2 11.6 8.2 8.7 17.9 19.6 27.8 7.2 57.7 13.5 5.2 4.9 8.2 3.4 38.3 9.0 11.7 7.5 8.3 8.4 13.2 12.0 19.2 12.9 14.4 12.2 39.4 9.3 7.0 7.7 15.0 3.4

4

6.2 3.3 5.5 .9 6.4 6.2 6.0 4.1 2.4

3

12.6 9.9 23.1 21.1 16.5 17.0 22.3 18.1 14.9 11.9 9.8 5.0 16.7 15.1 21.5 80.1 8.2 14.3 11.1 10.7 10.7 14.1 19.6 13.2 8.8 8.9

7.3 15.7 14.4 18.2 15.0

2

5.4 6.0 9.7 2.1 6.0

16.2 14.0 7.1 44.7 11.6 13.3 63.9 34.3 36.4

1. Competition is good

4.3 2.5 1.5 4.1 4.5 3.7

3.7 3.1

7.8 3.1 4.4 1.9 4.3

8

9

2.0 1.2 1.3 3.1 1.7 3.0

1.4 1.7

4.1 .9 2.0 2.0 1.4

4.0 3.9 3.0 5.9 1.1 8.6

7.4 2.3 1.6 3.7 2.1 .4 7.6 2.8 2.2 4.42 4.30 2.44 3.59 4.15 3.68

4.73 3.75 4.15 2.69 4.08 3.81 2.78 3.44 2.96

M

5.412 4.117 5.339 8.077 4.800 8.874

7.285 4.299 4.218 5.477 4.632 1.868 7.769 6.071 5.268

2.326 .451 2.029 .757 2.311 1.763 2.842 .867 2.191 .369 2.979 .872

−.291 .952 2.378 −.416 −.606 −.451

−.776 .639 .067 2.421 −.049 2.981 .910 −.155 1.075

Skewness Kurtosis

2.699 .359 2.073 .851 2.054 .680 2.340 1.736 2.152 .586 1.367 .017 2.787 1.437 2.464 .816 2.295 1.315

Variance SD

Descriptive statistics of attitudes toward Utility vs. harmfulness of competition in the 60 compared societies (cont.) 10. Competition is harmful

Table A.2.8

260 Appendix 2

Mexico Morocco Netherlands New Zealand Nigeria Norway Pakistan Peru Philippines Poland Romania Russian Federation Saudi Arabia South Africa South Korea Spain SrpSka-Serbian Republic of Bosnia Sweden Switzerland Taiwan Tanzania Thailand Turkey 25.5 23.5 20.6 5.0 16.2 12.6

15.2 14.3 14.3 5.3 10.6 11.7

5.4 4.8 6.6 2.5 3.2 3.8 3.4 1.1 8.0 5.5

5.0 4.7 3.6 2.5

3.7 2.7 4.3 4.5 6.4 8.6 2.5 2.8 3.5 4.9

12.7 4.0 3.4 15.6 6.1 2.9 20.1 5.0 3.5 8.9 2.5 .8 17.0 13.2 11.7 15.1 11.4 6.3

16.8 13.1 16.6 57.9 10.9 19.5

997 1219 1221 1151 1533 1284

18.1 16.6 13.4 5.2 7.3 11.5

7.0 7.0 8.2 5.3

10.9 11.2 10.2 9.5 11.1

26.1 17.3 12.1 8.6 11.6 10.5 18.7 22.5 13.7 14.8 9.3 9.5 20.1 16.5 23.7 33.4 13.2 16.0 10.1 14.8

10.6 10.6 13.0 12.9 13.8

4.2 3.3 3.6 7.9 7.0 6.0 9.4 10.0 6.4 4.1 2.7 1.5 5.4 1.8 2.3 4.2 3.7 2.0 5.1 11.6 8.0 3.6 5.6

13.1 10.1 10.2 20.3 6.6

35.7 22.9 13.0 31.4 27.3

7.2 5.3 8.9 14.2 7.9 17.7 16.6 20.7 20.1 21.6 14.5 12.3 11.4 8.7 7.2 25.5 18.6 14.7 10.7 19.4 17.6 14.0 20.9

7.4 12.1 7.6 16.9 14.0 17.1

50.5 21.9 5.3 23.3 43.6 13.2

1512 1025 994 910 1987 1017 0 1419 1190 915 1632 1849 0 2920 1200 1157 796 4.1 .8 1.2 2.0

4.6 4.5 8.5 1.5 4.8

6.8 2.1 2.0 2.6 4.2 .6

.3 .8 1.7 2.5 1.0 2.0 1.3 12.0 2.9 2.3 2.8 3.6

2.8 2.6 1.2 .3

2.8 1.1 4.5 1.6 1.5

2.6 3.1 1.8 .3 1.4 .5

3.38 3.79 3.74 3.10 4.75 4.20

3.76 3.88 4.20 3.14

3.41 4.06 4.89 3.09 3.90

3.22 4.03 4.68 3.27 2.94 3.49

3.580 4.647 4.414 9.754 5.454 6.349

6.996 4.432 3.859 4.730

6.939 6.201 7.576 4.829 6.489

8.571 6.244 4.177 4.272 6.158 3.169

.776 .739 .431 .990 1.892 .913 2.156 .927 2.101 .761 3.123 1.303 2.335 .131 2.520 .463

2.645 2.105 1.964 2.175

2.634 1.009 2.490 .512 2.752 .328 2.198 1.109 2.547 .665

2.928 1.109 2.499 .482 2.044 .396 2.067 1.155 2.482 1.369 1.780 .789

.734 .571 .424 .267 −.764 −.626

−.437 −.057 .037 .587

.080 −.401 −.919 .693 −.249

−.070 −.718 −.206 1.449 1.087 .732

Additional Descriptive Statistics

261

938 1206 1186 1424 1431

Ukraine United States Venezuela Viet Nam Zambia

15.1 21.3 34.0 27.0 30.9

10.0 14.3 11.0 7.7 10.1

2

4

5

12.5 13.0 16.7 20.2 15.8 15.6 11.9 8.2 8.9 7.2 11.2 30.3 10.9 9.7 6.6

3

6

9.6 5.5 7.2 8.8 8.2

7

5.8 6.6 3.1 2.2 2.7 3.4 2.7 1.9 5.3 5.9

8

4.6 6.1 1.0 1.1 2.8 10.1 .9 2.2 4.1 8.3

9

4.61 3.43 3.84 3.78 4.09

M

6.983 4.005 9.092 4.982 9.110

2.643 2.001 3.015 2.232 3.018

Variance SD

.411 .789 .847 .373 .628

−.727 .470 −.529 −.250 −.901

Skewness Kurtosis

note: The numbers in the columns 3–12 are percentage. This question has been scaled from 1–10 in which 1= strongly agree that competition is goodand 10= strongly agree that competition is harmful. N= size of data set; M= mean; SD= standard deviation.

N

Society

1. Competition is good

Descriptive statistics of attitudes toward Utility vs. harmfulness of competition in the 60 compared societies (cont.) 10. Competition is harmful

Table A.2.8

262 Appendix 2

263

Additional Descriptive Statistics Table A.2.9

Comparison of the frequency distribution of agreement with harmfulness of competition among 60 societies

Rank

Society

Competition is harmful

Rank

Society

Competition is harmful

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18

Argentina Poland France Chile Zambia Ukraine Venezuela Brazil Mali Colombia Tanzania Thailand Kyrgyzstan Mexico South Africa Turkey Morocco Russian Federation Italy Netherlands Peru Philippines Azerbaijan China South Korea Canada Germany (West) Switzerland Indonesia Nigeria

22.5 21.6 19.3 18.4 18.3 17.3 16.3 16.2 15.3 14.7 14.4 13.2 13.1 13.0 11.9 11.9 11.2 11.2

31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48

7.8 7.6 7.6 7.6 7.3 7.2 7.1 7.0 6.4 6.3 6.3 6.2 6.0 5.9 5.8 5.6 5.0 4.8

10.3 10.2 10.1 10.1 8.5 8.1 8.1 8.0 8.0 8.0 7.9 7.9

49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60

Great Britain Ghana India Japan Malaysia Burkina Faso Australia Iran Taiwan Bulgaria Germany (East) Finland Spain Romania Jordan Bangladesh Viet Nam SrpSka-Serbian Republic of Bosnia New Zealand Sweden United States Albania Bosnian Federation Norway Hong Kong Algeria Egypt Iraq Pakistan Saudi Arabia

19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30

4.4 4.3 4.3 4.2 3.5 3.1 0.4 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.

note: The numbers are percentage. The question of attitudes toward utility vs. harmfulness of competition was not asked in Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia.

264

Appendix 2

This table clearly reveals that the idea that competition is harmful overall was not common. Argentina and Poland were two countries which, with 22.5 per cent and 21.6 per cent respectively, strongly agreed or agreed more than other societies that competition brings out the worst in people. Likewise, France with 19.3 per cent, Chile with 18.4 per cent, Zambia with 18.3 per cent, Ukraine with 17.3 per cent, Venezuela with 16.3 per cent, Brazil with 16.2 per cent, Mali with 15.3 per cent, Colombia with 14.7 per cent, Tanzania with 14.4 per cent, Thailand with 13.2 per cent, Kyrgyzstan with 13.1 per cent, and finally Mexico with 13.0 per cent strongly agreed or agreed that competition is harmful. Only a minority (between 10.1 per cent and 11.9 per cent) of those surveyed in South Africa, Turkey, Morocco, the Russian Federation, Italy, the Netherlands, Peru, and the Philippines felt that competition is harmful and brings out the worst in people. All other societies had a proportion smaller than 10 per cent. Remarkably, only 0.4 per cent of participants in Hong Kong, 3.1 per cent in Norway, 3.5 per cent in the Bosnian Federation, 4.2 per cent in Albania, 4.3 per cent in Sweden and the United States, 4.4 per cent in New Zealand, 4.8 per cent in SrpSka-Serbian Republic of Bosnia, and 5.0 per cent in Viet Nam felt that competition is harmful. What is interesting here is that France was the first developed country in the ranking in which a significant minority (19.3 per cent) indicated that competition brings out the worst in people. The next developed countries in the ranking were Italy and the Netherlands with approximately 10 per cent difference.

N

984 1238 986 1396 1837 1495 391 1495 956 1478 2098 992 1188 3013 2988 1002 972 1015 937

Society

Albania Algeria Argentina Australia Azerbaijan Bangladesh Bosnian Federation Brazil Bulgaria Burkina Faso Canada Chile China Colombia Egypt Finland France Germany (East) Germany (West)

32.4 63.2 21.5 6.9 17.4 90.0 7.4 29.6 19.9 46.9 21.6 30.7 8.9 54.5 51.0 13.4 11.2 5.6 10.5

A great deal

34.0 25.8 29.3 31.9 54.8 8.6 32.2 48.2 40.9 33.0 41.6 37.2 29.1 25.9 33.0 50.3 35.6 22.3 37.9

Quite a lot

18.2 7.0 31.2 46.1 20.3 1.3 44.5 14.0 24.8 15.2 27.9 21.4 38.0 13.5 13.0 29.8 27.0 39.1 36.3

Not very much

15.3 4.0 18.0 15.0 7.5 .1 15.9 8.2 14.4 4.9 8.9 10.7 24.0 6.1 3.1 6.5 26.2 33.0 15.4

None at all

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

Min

4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4

Max

Table A.2.10 Descriptive statistics of confidence in religious institutions in the 60 compared societies

2.16 1.52 2.46 2.69 2.18 1.12 2.69 2.01 2.34 1.78 2.24 2.12 2.77 1.71 1.68 2.29 2.68 3.00 2.57

M

1.094 .628 1.038 .651 .646 .133 .682 .766 .911 .768 .793 .935 .836 .840 .661 .606 .967 .778 .763

Variance

1.046 .793 1.019 .807 .804 .364 .826 .875 .954 .877 .890 .967 .914 .917 .813 .778 .983 .882 .874

SD

.474 1.561 .017 −.175 .537 3.402 −.161 .723 .281 .876 .267 .469 −.232 1.073 .987 .264 −.040 −.483 .020

Skewness

−.967 1.837 −1.116 −.444 .019 12.308 −.509 −.030 −.834 −.125 −.678 −.767 −.807 .088 .196 −.257 −1.103 −.606 −.707

Kurtosis

Additional Descriptive Statistics

265

N

1532 956 0 1784 1972 2653 2218 999 1034 1172 1033 1201 1476 1554 1191 957 866 1946 1016 1993

Society

Ghana Great Britain Hong Kong India Indonesia Iran Iraq Italy Japan Jordan Kyrgyzstan Malaysia Mali Mexico Morocco Netherlands New Zealand Nigeria Norway Pakistan

21.7 31.4 29.1 25.2 31.1 29.2 50.4 7.2 22.6 37.4 36.5 21.9 31.9 24.3 21.6 33.5 17.8 40.6 16.9

54.3 69.2 43.9 47.8 24.4 1.6 71.2 30.1 54.4 71.0 38.5 66.6 8.7 7.4 65.4 9.9 71.3

Quite a lot

68.6 13.9

A great deal

12.1 5.0 22.3 16.7 20.3 41.8 5.5 24.7 8.5 5.4 20.3 7.6 39.4 43.0 11.3 36.2 10.5

8.6 40.1

Not very much

4.5 .7 2.7 6.3 4.9 49.4 .8 7.8 .7 1.7 9.3 1.5 30.3 16.2 5.5 13.3 1.3

1.1 14.6

None at all

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

1 1

Min

4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4

4 4

Max

1.67 1.37 1.84 1.82 2.06 3.39 1.36 2.10 1.55 1.38 2.01 1.44 2.91 2.68 1.57 2.53 1.42

1.42 2.55

M

Table A.2.10 Descriptive statistics of confidence in religious institutions in the 60 compared societies (cont.)

.735 .373 .743 .863 .641 .480 .386 .852 .457 .445 .962 .489 .860 .690 .805 .714 .532

.483 .819

Variance

.858 .610 .862 .929 .801 .693 .621 .923 .676 .667 .981 .699 .927 .831 .897 .845 .729

.695 .905

SD

1.124 1.593 .570 .847 .472 −.992 1.718 .395 .951 1.857 .584 1.545 −.482 −.119 1.414 .077 1.605

1.547 −.133

Skewness

.395 2.181 −.809 −.342 −.155 .841 2.546 −.759 .239 3.186 −.759 1.819 −.644 −.563 .842 −.612 1.534

1.597 −.761

Kurtosis

266 Appendix 2

32.5 64.3 33.2 59.1 23.6 84.5 55.3 17.2 9.5 21.1

8.9 9.1 3.7 64.8 20.5 27.6 20.7 25.5 53.6 25.5 54.6

1494 1197 988 1767 1915 1486 2959 1199 1185 783

984 1212 1221 1135 1531 1320 889 1212 1200 1372 1482 47.4 39.4 28.0 28.0 48.9 43.1 51.2 41.2 22.9 28.9 32.7

19.7 26.9 38.7 29.0 42.3 12.2 28.6 32.6 23.0 33.6 33.7 37.6 51.8 5.1 27.6 19.9 19.8 26.2 13.3 34.6 12.0

35.5 7.9 23.1 9.5 23.4 2.6 12.7 35.6 41.4 33.5 10.0 13.9 16.5 2.0 3.1 9.4 8.3 7.2 10.2 11.0 .7

12.2 .9 5.1 2.5 10.7 .6 3.4 14.6 26.1 11.9 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4

4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 2.45 2.56 2.81 1.44 2.13 2.11 2.16 2.15 1.80 2.31 1.59

2.28 1.45 2.00 1.55 2.21 1.19 1.64 2.48 2.84 2.36 .626 .707 .558 .471 .587 .839 .714 .782 1.037 .945 .527

1.095 .460 .766 .586 .852 .245 .687 .886 .847 .891 .791 .841 .747 .686 .766 .916 .845 .884 1.018 .972 .726

1.046 .679 .875 .765 .923 .495 .829 .941 .920 .944 .236 .043 −.211 1.624 .183 .513 .526 .327 .985 .065 .923

.074 1.367 .454 1.287 .384 2.870 1.105 −.025 −.415 .074 −.382 −.613 −.264 2.518 −.473 −.521 −.180 −.665 −.319 −1.061 −.107

−1.294 1.199 −.653 1.010 −.668 8.874 .344 −.897 −.651 −.925

note: The numbers in the columns 3, 4, 5 and 6 are percentage. In this question 1= A great deal confidence and 4= None at all confidence in religious institutions. N= size of data set; Min= minimum; Max= maximum. M= mean; SD= standard deviation.

Peru Philippines Poland Romania Russian Federation Saudi Arabia South Africa South Korea Spain SrpSka-Serbian Republic of Bosnia Sweden Switzerland Taiwan Tanzania Thailand Turkey Ukraine United States Venezuela Viet Nam Zambia

Additional Descriptive Statistics

267

N

855 1115 947 1394 1811 1299 394 1478 858 1173 1925 913 1039 2835 2246 983 981 987 888

Albania Algeria Argentina Australia Azerbaijan Bangladesh Bosnian Federation Brazil Bulgaria Burkina Faso Canada Chile China Colombia Egypt Finland France Germany (East) Germany (West)

4.7 5.7 .5 2.8 4.5 15.0 2.8 8.2 3.8 14.0 4.8 5.6 17.8 5.5 23.8 6.8 4.5 2.8 2.6

A great deal

27.8 23.4 6.1 26.0 25.3 56.9 13.2 37.8 19.0 39.2 29.2 31.5 56.5 22.4 43.8 56.2 34.4 25.7 32.2

Quite a lot

37.8 29.3 45.1 50.1 48.5 20.5 65.7 33.0 35.5 33.7 47.3 39.4 19.6 33.7 22.6 31.0 37.9 47.9 45.6

Not very much

29.7 41.5 48.3 21.2 21.8 7.6 18.3 21.0 41.6 13.1 18.6 23.4 6.1 38.3 9.8 6.0 23.2 23.5 19.6

None at all

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

Min

Descriptive statistics of confidence in labor unions in the 60 compared societies

Society

Table A.2.11

4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4

Max

2.93 3.07 3.41 2.90 2.88 2.21 2.99 2.67 3.15 2.46 2.80 2.81 2.14 3.05 2.18 2.36 2.80 2.92 2.82

M

.758 .875 .397 .573 .634 .617 .427 .807 .739 .791 .631 .737 .598 .826 .823 .488 .716 .600 .591

.871 .936 .630 .757 .796 .786 .654 .898 .859 .890 .795 .858 .773 .909 .907 .698 .846 .775 .769

Variance SD

−.282 −.554 −.717 −.213 −.305 .563 −.599 .020 −.656 .086 −.201 −.151 .543 −.537 .418 .428 −.051 −.230 −.028

Skewness

−.828 −.822 .141 −.423 −.384 .128 1.200 −.882 −.478 −.726 −.454 −.774 .185 −.717 −.582 .070 −.858 −.521 −.669

Kurtosis

268 Appendix 2

Ghana Great Britain Hong Kong India Indonesia Iran Iraq Italy Japan Jordan Kyrgyzstan Malaysia Mali Mexico Morocco Netherlands New Zealand Nigeria Norway Pakistan Peru Philippines Poland Romania Russian Federation

1396 894 1146 1558 1828 2437 0 974 881 969 1016 1200 1289 1518 987 937 784 1885 1007 1504 1383 1177 785 1424 1794

36.5 27.2 49.0 31.3 37.5 18.8 32.1 35.8 33.4 33.9 52.2 34.3 25.6 28.8 43.5 25.8 28.7 61.4 15.2 10.1 40.4 24.6 25.6 35.6

13.8 3.2 4.0 23.1 7.7 7.1

2.1 2.0 28.5 5.4 11.8 21.8 5.2 13.1 3.3 2.3 18.9 4.6 10.8 3.3 15.7 3.8 4.1 7.7

46.9 50.7 25.5 40.5 31.4 31.2 35.8 36.9 40.9 49.9 35.6 30.0 49.0 49.4 33.9 52.6 42.6 33.4

39.5 48.0 45.1 30.9 48.0 68.9 18.9 11.5 12.6 20.3 4.5 12.7 33.4 21.3 12.3 22.1 16.8 4.1 25.0 37.2 10.0 19.0 27.7 23.2

10.2 21.6 1.9 14.7 6.8 5.3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

1 1 1 1 1 1 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4

4 4 4 4 4 4 2.83 2.72 2.22 2.76 2.29 2.35 2.97 2.66 2.62 2.92 2.50 2.34 2.88 3.21 2.38 2.87 2.94 2.72

2.46 2.88 2.45 2.37 2.54 2.72 .563 .474 .995 .699 .531 .918 .798 .911 .548 .564 .963 .396 .822 .562 .752 .572 .695 .820

.729 .604 .366 .990 .539 .447 .750 .688 .998 .836 .729 .958 .893 .955 .740 .751 .982 .629 .906 .749 .867 .756 .834 .906

.854 .777 .605 .995 .734 .668 .003 .060 .308 −.074 .200 .126 −.389 −.189 .244 −.190 −.076 .578 −.640 −.821 .102 −.308 −.312 −.048

−.054 −.204 −.089 .101 −.203 −1.034 −.666 −.380 −.988 −.716 −.166 −.945 −.810 −.898 −.505 −.487 −1.009 .353 −.266 .605 −.660 −.182 −.648 −.919

−.641 −.498 −.389 −1.054 −.254 1.105

Additional Descriptive Statistics

269

3.7 2.5 1.1 34.9 3.9 7.7 5.0 4.0 5.7 51.6 11.1

964 1149 1198 1021 1525 1221 832 1203 1180 1381 1308

48.1 40.8 26.0 34.9 30.0 34.2 32.9 25.2 17.4 39.5 21.4

34.7 38.7 26.9 22.5

Quite a lot

39.4 43.0 55.8 23.7 54.8 35.5 44.0 53.4 28.3 8.5 40.1

36.8 49.4 52.5 57.4

Not very much

8.7 13.7 17.1 6.6 11.3 22.6 18.0 17.5 48.6 .5 27.4

16.3 9.2 17.7 16.1

None at all

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

1 1 1 1

Min

4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4

4 4 4 4

Max

2.53 2.68 2.89 2.02 2.74 2.73 2.75 2.84 3.20 1.58 2.84

2.57 2.65 2.85 2.86

M

.499 .543 .463 .849 .499 .804 .650 .562 .848 .444 .907

.816 .467 .538 .526 .706 .737 .680 .921 .706 .897 .806 .750 .921 .666 .952

.903 .683 .734 .725

Variance SD

.315 .210 −.066 .466 −.235 −.085 −.097 −.305 −.841 .827 −.446

−.048 .055 −.192 −.407

Skewness

−.301 −.587 −.372 −.765 −.054 −.865 −.576 −.138 −.369 .001 −.717

−.783 −.303 −.287 .171

Kurtosis

note: The numbers in the columns 3, 4, 5 and 6 are percentage. In this question 1= A great deal confidence and 4= None at all confidence in labor unions. N= size of data set; Min= minimum; Max= maximum. M= mean; SD= standard deviation.

12.2 2.8 2.8 4.0

0 2624 1199 1129 726

Saudi Arabia South Africa South Korea Spain SrpSka-Serbian Republic of Bosnia Sweden Switzerland Taiwan Tanzania Thailand Turkey Ukraine United States Venezuela Viet Nam Zambia

A great deal

N

Descriptive statistics of confidence in labor unions in the 60 compared societies (cont.)

Society

Table A.2.11

270 Appendix 2

N

974 1156 979 1396 1730 1478 398 1485 966 1333 2050 976 1714 2978 2427 996 990 1052 948 1512

Albania Algeria Argentina Australia Azerbaijan Bangladesh Bosnian Federation Brazil Bulgaria Burkina Faso Canada Chile China Colombia Egypt Finland France Germany (East) Germany (West) Ghana

4.0 2.4 .8 .9 18.2 24.9 1.0 1.8 2.4 7.5 2.2 1.3 33.2 2.8 14.1 1.9 1.5 .3 .8 12.0

A great deal

25.4 16.6 6.4 13.4 35.3 54.1 10.3 19.6 15.3 21.1 20.9 17.7 54.6 16.6 36.6 27.2 14.8 8.0 17.4 28.7

Quite a lot

38.5 28.6 43.1 68.8 30.1 18.0 53.3 32.4 42.8 34.7 58.9 37.2 10.2 37.6 31.1 55.0 46.1 50.9 53.9 39.4

Not very much

32.1 52.3 49.6 16.9 16.4 3.0 35.4 46.3 39.5 36.8 18.0 43.8 2.0 43.0 18.2 15.9 37.6 40.9 27.8 19.9

None at all

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

Min

4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4

Max

Descriptive statistics of confidence in political parties in the 60 compared societies

Society

Table A.2.12

2.99 3.31 3.42 3.02 2.45 1.99 3.23 3.23 3.19 3.01 2.93 3.23 1.81 3.21 2.54 2.85 3.20 3.32 3.09 2.67

M

.736 .692 .421 .337 .939 .548 .445 .675 .607 .879 .472 .614 .478 .663 .894 .485 .547 .396 .479 .858

Variance

.858 .832 .649 .581 .969 .740 .667 .822 .779 .938 .687 .784 .691 .814 .946 .696 .739 .629 .692 .926

SD

−.358 −.882 −.843 −.265 .091 .456 −.507 −.641 −.657 −.561 −.312 −.602 .631 −.707 .046 −.126 −.557 −.448 −.271 −.212

Skewness

−.769 −.278 .442 .912 −.964 .042 .115 −.699 −.187 −.677 .130 −.621 .539 −.310 −.918 −.251 −.263 −.317 −.390 −.799

Kurtosis

Additional Descriptive Statistics

271

N

975 1195 1597 1900 2510 0 986 1008 929 1031 1200 1380 1530 1096 1014 864 1855 1015 1702 1467

Great Britain Hong Kong India Indonesia Iran Iraq Italy Japan Jordan Kyrgyzstan Malaysia Mali Mexico Morocco Netherlands New Zealand Nigeria Norway Pakistan Peru

16.0 26.1 27.1 26.6 14.3 15.6 16.9 17.3 21.3 46.8 23.0 20.5 26.8 21.9 14.0 14.3 28.0 14.7 3.4

.9 1.4 16.0 4.4 11.5 13.6 3.5 9.2 .8 .8 10.2 .6 13.2 1.2

Quite a lot

1.8 1.7 19.3 3.9 6.5

A great deal

55.0 56.5 24.3 43.0 33.0 31.4 36.3 36.3 58.0 67.7 39.2 65.0 35.5 45.7

57.2 62.4 33.9 55.1 65.1

Not very much

28.5 25.2 42.3 31.3 8.7 32.0 39.8 27.6 19.3 17.5 36.2 6.4 36.5 49.6

24.9 9.8 19.7 14.4 14.0

None at all

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

1 1 1 1 1

Min

4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4

4 4 4 4 4

Max

Descriptive statistics of confidence in political parties in the 60 compared societies (cont.)

Society

Table A.2.12

3.11 3.06 2.93 3.01 2.39 2.82 3.12 2.82 2.96 3.02 3.02 2.77 2.95 3.44

3.05 2.80 2.54 2.80 2.87

M

.466 .474 1.234 .702 .641 1.063 .726 .883 .443 .347 .913 .316 1.040 .388

.481 .388 1.029 .528 .527

Variance

.683 .688 1.111 .838 .801 1.031 .852 .940 .665 .589 .956 .562 1.020 .623

.693 .623 1.015 .727 .726

SD

−.315 −.329 −.564 −.470 .201 −.379 −.576 −.311 −.115 −.242 −.731 −.202 −.656 −.949

−.403 −.253 −.097 −.292 −.817

Skewness

−.239 −.055 −1.087 −.477 −.394 −1.033 −.594 −.850 −.292 .729 −.391 .068 −.698 1.297

.148 .256 −1.091 −.042 .987

Kurtosis

272 Appendix 2

30.4 22.5 26.1 13.8

9.4 1.3 2.4 2.4

.9 1.0 .7 24.9 3.9 6.3 2.3 1.9 4.4 62.9 8.6

984 1184 1216 1103 1526 1292 868 1209 1194 1409 1429

32.5 26.6 9.6 34.5 19.4 26.6 14.6 13.5 15.7 30.9 18.4

37.1 6.4 11.7 18.2

9.2 .7 1.2 1.2

1173 922 1687 1845 0 2908 1198 1164 791 58.7 60.2 46.2 26.5 63.4 40.6 47.2 69.1 25.6 5.8 44.8

41.1 52.9 55.8 59.8

42.3 50.8 45.6 45.9

7.8 12.2 43.4 14.1 13.2 26.4 35.8 15.5 54.3 .4 28.2

19.1 23.3 15.7 24.0

11.4 42.2 41.4 34.7

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

1 1 1 1

1 1 1 1

4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4

4 4 4 4

4 4 4 4

2.73 2.84 3.32 2.30 2.86 2.87 3.17 2.98 3.30 1.44 2.93

2.70 2.98 2.85 3.05

2.56 3.34 3.27 3.14

.370 .401 .456 .992 .464 .768 .570 .366 .789 .388 .805

.781 .508 .492 .472

.660 .393 .508 .557

.608 .634 .675 .996 .681 .876 .755 .605 .888 .623 .897

.884 .713 .701 .687

.812 .627 .712 .746

−.032 −.090 −.640 .237 −.564 −.313 −.607 −.510 −.999 1.223 −.570

−.192 −.182 −.200 −.517

−.067 −.576 −.655 −.407

−.207 −.081 −.072 −1.001 .725 −.689 −.058 1.395 −.077 .885 −.381

−.691 −.467 −.127 .571

−.491 .187 −.053 −.585

note: The numbers in the columns 3, 4, 5 and 6 are percentage. In this question 1= A great deal confidence and 4= None at all confidence in political parties. N= size of data set; Min= minimum; Max= maximum. M= mean; SD= standard deviation.

Philippines Poland Romania Russian Federation Saudi Arabia South Africa South Korea Spain SrpSka-Serbian Republic of Bosnia Sweden Switzerland Taiwan Tanzania Thailand Turkey Ukraine United States Venezuela Viet Nam Zambia

Additional Descriptive Statistics

273

N

824 0 883 1396 1335 1357 384 1470 793 1264 2052 953 1364 2797 2701 994 986 1032 908 1437

Albania Algeria Argentina Australia Azerbaijan Bangladesh Bosnian Federation Brazil Bulgaria Burkina Faso Canada Chile China Colombia Egypt Finland France Germany (East) Germany (West) Ghana

28.9 52.8 52.1 12.4 51.3 35.7 47.6 37.1 48.0 60.3 43.8 60.9 37.6 41.6 51.0 54.2 49.2 49.6 40.6

7.6 7.9 1.8 32.1 3.6 20.7 6.2 21.3 12.4 18.5 17.6 16.8 35.2 5.5 10.6 4.8 9.5 22.1

Quite a lot

9.1

A great deal

25.6 34.7 42.0 13.7 43.2 24.8 35.7 22.4 23.0 28.1 18.4 27.7 17.5 35.5 28.4 36.5 34.8 30.6

42.4

Not very much

14.0 5.3 43.8 2.9 17.4 6.9 21.1 8.3 4.3 9.7 3.2 17.8 5.7 7.9 6.8 9.4 6.2 6.8

19.7

None at all

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

1

Min

4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4

4

Max

2.46 2.37 3.28 1.88 2.74 2.18 2.72 2.18 2.19 2.29 2.07 2.47 1.94 2.46 2.31 2.50 2.38 2.22

2.73

M

.682 .498 .556 .560 .614 .701 .749 .738 .490 .769 .481 .942 .750 .518 .565 .535 .548 .749

.775

Variance

Descriptive statistics of confidence in the environmental protection movement in the 60 compared societies

Society

Table A.2.13

.826 .706 .746 .749 .783 .837 .865 .859 .700 .877 .694 .971 .866 .720 .751 .732 .740 .865

.880

SD

.470 .232 −.762 .629 .023 .362 .008 .439 .475 .264 .472 .129 .647 .339 .378 .333 .184 .185

−.239

−.454 −.110 .032 .220 −.636 −.397 −.839 −.370 .388 −.605 .485 −.965 −.291 −.191 −.055 −.297 −.223 −.711

−.648

Skewness Kurtosis

274 Appendix 2

Great Britain Hong Kong India Indonesia Iran Iraq Italy Japan Jordan Kyrgyzstan Malaysia Mali Mexico Morocco Netherlands New Zealand Nigeria Norway Pakistan Peru Philippines Poland Romania Russian Federation

968 1218 1262 1817 2577 0 964 965 989 1019 1199 1351 1534 960 1001 797 1721 1014 1322 1398 1184 871 1356 1684

57.3 70.8 31.5 51.5 31.9 58.5 52.1 35.1 38.4 55.1 39.6 43.4 37.7 50.2 46.8 29.9 64.3 26.7 32.2 45.9 52.6 45.0 54.9

12.1 7.4 29.9 13.0 12.8

9.0 4.8 34.3 9.9 11.6 33.2 19.4 25.1 4.7 4.9 21.5 8.4 8.9 14.4 28.5 6.9 5.8 23.6

27.7 37.1 22.1 33.9 28.9 21.2 25.4 25.6 35.8 40.5 34.6 25.7 43.3 39.7 22.0 34.2 33.1 15.4

24.3 20.5 27.8 30.7 51.2 4.8 6.0 8.5 17.9 4.3 6.0 11.9 11.6 9.3 7.8 14.0 1.6 21.1 13.7 3.6 6.3 16.1 6.1

6.3 1.3 10.8 4.8 4.1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

1 1 1 1 1 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4

4 4 4 4 4 2.28 2.44 2.05 2.60 2.26 2.00 2.30 2.24 2.50 2.51 2.41 2.21 2.77 2.53 2.01 2.40 2.59 2.04

2.25 2.16 2.19 2.27 2.47 .479 .463 .903 .797 .512 .784 .835 .915 .530 .504 .953 .363 .778 .812 .651 .505 .680 .631

.555 .307 .971 .555 .587 .692 .680 .950 .893 .715 .886 .914 .956 .728 .710 .976 .602 .882 .901 .807 .710 .824 .794

.745 .554 .985 .745 .766 .427 .324 .499 .044 .284 .517 .315 .308 .370 .201 .009 .313 −.303 −.109 .401 .310 .247 .655

.482 .515 .280 .208 −.468 .225 −.115 −.749 −.798 −.013 −.553 −.681 −.851 −.273 −.261 −1.019 .395 −.610 −.762 −.446 −.094 −.680 .274

.154 1.129 −1.011 −.212 −.459

Additional Descriptive Statistics

275

9.8 8.9 8.3 27.5 3.5 10.7 6.9 5.4 31.8 48.3 14.0

991 1208 1212 995 1524 1238 850 1211 1150 1401 1289

64.4 60.3 48.5 33.9 27.7 45.4 41.3 47.2 36.4 41.3 26.3

34.5 49.2 60.6 51.8 43.4

Quite a lot

23.2 27.1 35.8 26.2 54.1 27.5 38.9 40.1 19.2 9.8 36.9

30.9 26.9 23.4 31.0 36.6

Not very much

2.6 3.7 7.4 12.4 14.6 16.4 12.8 7.3 12.5 .7 22.9

10.9 7.6 5.4 9.2 4.8

None at all

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

1 1 1 1 1

Min

4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4

4 4 4 4 4

Max

2.19 2.26 2.42 2.23 2.80 2.50 2.58 2.49 2.12 1.63 2.69

2.29 2.26 2.24 2.41 2.31

M

.400 .443 .558 .978 .525 .792 .640 .505 .997 .472 .953

.899 .669 .501 .588 .614

Variance

.633 .665 .747 .989 .724 .890 .800 .710 .998 .687 .976

.948 .818 .708 .767 .784

SD

.449 .417 .201 .287 −.235 .255 .095 .185 .506 .765 −.243

.162 .328 .544 .369 −.008

Skewness

.634 .328 −.256 −.976 −.127 −.733 −.517 −.245 −.809 −.056 −.933

−.928 −.336 .405 −.225 −.540

Kurtosis

note: The numbers in the columns 3, 4, 5 and 6 are percentage. In this question 1= A great deal confidence and 4= None at all confidence in the environmental protection movement. N= size of data set; Min= minimum; Max= maximum. M= mean; SD= standard deviation.

23.7 16.3 10.6 8.1 15.2

1310 2662 1199 1134 756

Saudi Arabia South Africa South Korea Spain SrpSka-Serbian Republic of Bosnia Sweden Switzerland Taiwan Tanzania Thailand Turkey Ukraine United States Venezuela Viet Nam Zambia

A great deal

N

Descriptive statistics of confidence in the environmental protection movement in the 60 compared societies (cont.)

Society

Table A.2.13

276 Appendix 2

N

842 1074 784 1383 1264 1355 375 1461 765 1332 1971 907 1409 2717 2673 955 935 961 832

Albania Algeria Argentina Australia Azerbaijan Bangladesh Bosnian Federation Brazil Bulgaria Burkina Faso Canada Chile China Colombia Egypt Finland France Germany (East) Germany (West)

7.7 8.4 3.7 8.6 3.4 28.9 3.5 19.3 5.6 27.5 13.2 16.0 20.4 11.4 31.8 5.5 5.0 5.9 8.9

A great deal

30.4 21.1 34.6 52.6 16.1 51.3 26.1 47.2 36.1 43.8 62.3 43.3 64.0 32.4 42.1 57.4 43.9 49.6 47.1

Quite a lot

38.5 25.5 34.7 33.8 32.7 15.2 48.5 25.7 35.2 20.7 20.7 30.7 13.8 30.8 15.3 30.8 33.8 35.7 32.7

Not very much

23.4 45.0 27.0 4.9 47.8 4.6 21.9 7.7 23.1 8.0 3.8 10.0 1.8 25.4 10.9 6.3 17.3 8.7 11.3

None at all

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

Min

4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4

Max

Descriptive statistics of confidence in the women’s movement in the 60 compared societies

Society

Table A.2.14

2.78 3.07 2.85 2.35 3.25 1.96 2.89 2.22 2.76 2.09 2.15 2.35 1.97 2.70 2.05 2.38 2.63 2.47 2.46

M

.797 .992 .743 .498 .714 .625 .608 .712 .760 .795 .469 .748 .412 .944 .904 .472 .680 .543 .653

Variance

.893 .996 .862 .706 .845 .791 .780 .844 .871 .892 .685 .865 .642 .972 .951 .687 .824 .737 .808

SD

−.197 −.652 −.056 .224 −.835 .643 −.245 .342 −.022 .498 .510 .200 .431 −.120 .655 .513 .227 .306 .254

Skewness

−.784 −.806 −1.023 −.101 −.217 .164 −.438 −.429 −.899 −.472 .576 −.601 .763 −1.029 −.452 .120 −.746 −.254 −.444

Kurtosis

Additional Descriptive Statistics

277

N

1457 818 1169 1281 1823 2475 0 903 890 1003 1022 1199 1389 1524 1017 821 719 1836 995 1385

Ghana Great Britain Hong Kong India Indonesia Iran Iraq Italy Japan Jordan Kyrgyzstan Malaysia Mali Mexico Morocco Netherlands New Zealand Nigeria Norway Pakistan

39.7 55.4 70.1 33.6 54.4 25.5 36.9 37.6 36.4 40.8 56.1 36.7 41.6 28.7 44.2 38.1 31.2 52.5 20.6

4.2 2.4 28.0 9.8 13.8 33.3 23.0 27.8 4.6 3.8 21.3 5.5 8.2

Quite a lot

27.4 12.3 5.0 31.1 12.6 10.3

A great deal

44.5 49.7 24.3 32.8 24.6 22.2 24.0 25.4 40.0 45.5 30.3 36.0 48.9

27.0 26.2 23.4 26.6 29.1 57.9

Not very much

14.4 10.3 11.3 16.6 5.4 7.7 11.5 18.1 11.2 12.7 17.2 6.0 22.4

6.0 6.1 1.5 8.7 3.9 6.4

None at all

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

1 1 1 1 1 1

Min

4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4

4 4 4 4 4 4

Max

2.69 2.68 2.19 2.56 2.22 2.04 2.24 2.34 2.58 2.67 2.43 2.43 2.85

2.12 2.26 2.21 2.13 2.24 2.60

M

Descriptive statistics of confidence in the women’s movement in the 60 compared societies (cont.)

Society

Table A.2.14

.877 .750 .545 .954 .717 .757

SD

.586 .766 .472 .687 .940 .969 .775 .880 .555 .745 .863 .929 .872 .934 1.143 1.069 .561 .749 .550 .742 1.016 1.008 .476 .690 .735 .858

.770 .562 .297 .910 .514 .573

Variance

.024 .075 .360 .111 .416 .492 .356 .188 .205 .059 .061 .316 −.495

.306 .406 .623 .343 .239 −.622

−.503 −.354 −.866 −.753 .080 −.696 −.723 −1.217 −.427 −.441 −1.083 −.096 −.292

−.729 .025 .961 −.911 −.081 −.036

Skewness Kurtosis

278 Appendix 2

15.2 24.0 7.2 5.6 20.1 21.4 21.5 9.9 7.6 14.3

4.3 6.6 7.6 47.6 5.6 15.7 8.0 3.9 16.1 61.4 21.0

1412 1180 805 1270 1727 1321 2791 1199 1113 741

938 1137 1203 1061 1525 1246 737 1206 1083 1454 1374 45.1 53.2 50.2 32.4 33.4 46.3 44.1 49.3 33.8 35.0 30.4

34.8 53.2 46.2 43.1 50.4 22.1 46.1 57.5 50.4 38.6 41.9 32.9 37.1 14.3 47.6 24.6 32.3 39.8 24.6 3.4 31.8

38.5 19.2 36.9 34.1 19.9 24.6 23.9 27.4 31.6 39.0 8.7 7.3 5.2 5.7 13.4 13.4 15.6 7.0 25.6 .1 16.7

11.6 3.6 9.7 17.2 9.7 31.9 8.5 5.3 10.3 8.1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4

4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 2.55 2.41 2.40 1.78 2.69 2.36 2.55 2.50 2.60 1.42 2.44

2.47 2.02 2.49 2.63 2.19 2.67 2.19 2.28 2.45 2.41 .508 .713 .520 .721 .494 .703 .798 .893 .594 .771 .812 .901 .720 .849 .469 .685 1.075 1.037 .321 .567 1.003 1.001

.785 .886 .577 .760 .589 .767 .690 .831 .750 .866 1.288 1.135 .756 .869 .505 .711 .607 .779 .691 .831 .191 .377 .156 .922 −.132 .337 .202 .295 −.002 .986 .030

−.048 .459 .197 .194 .516 −.207 .390 .418 .350 −.035 −.314 −.096 −.170 −.057 −.364 −.631 −.671 −.223 −1.190 .223 −1.070

−.737 −.009 −.360 −.736 −.284 −1.365 −.475 .158 −.316 −.598

note: The numbers in the columns 3, 4, 5 and 6 are percentage. In this question 1= A great deal confidence and 4= None at all confidence in the women’s movement. N= size of data set; Min= minimum; Max= maximum. M= mean; SD= standard deviation.

Peru Philippines Poland Romania Russian Federation Saudi Arabia South Africa South Korea Spain SrpSka-Serbian Republic of Bosnia Sweden Switzerland Taiwan Tanzania Thailand Turkey Ukraine United States Venezuela Viet Nam Zambia

Additional Descriptive Statistics

279

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Index Abbasid  45 Abduh, Muhammad  26 Africa/African  57, 58, 60 Al-Afghani, Jamal al-Din  26, 32, 34 Al-Awwa, Muhammad  32 Albania  76, 78, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 87, 89, 92, 94, 96, 97, 98, 99, 102, 103, 104, 105, 107, 108, 110, 111, 112, 114, 115, 116, 117, 119, 120, 121, 125, 169, 220, 234, 246, 252, 257, 263, 264 Al-Banna, Hasan  46 Algeria  1, 53, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 82, 83, 84, 87, 89, 91, 92, 93, 94, 97, 99, 102, 103, 104, 105, 107, 108, 110, 111, 112, 114, 116, 117, 119, 120, 121, 125, 169, 202, 211, 220, 234, 246, 252, 258, 263 Al-Kawakibi, Abd al-Rahman  32 Allah  31, 38 Al-Turabi, Hasan  32 analysis contextual-level of  67 country level of  6 hierarchical levels of  6, 236 individual level of  6, 12, macro level of  5, 10, 189, 236 preliminary  215 Arab Spring  2, 50, 53 Argentina  76, 78, 80, 83, 84, 86, 87, 89, 91, 92, 93, 94, 96, 97, 98, 99, 102, 103, 104, 105, 107, 108, 110, 111, 112, 114, 115, 116, 117, 119, 120, 121, 125, 220, 234, 247, 253, 258, 264 Asia  63 Central  55 East  18 Pacific region of  57 South  58 Southeast  58 associative life  17, 19, 43, 46, 47, 49, 50, 52, 53, 54, 73 atheist/atheists  3, 74, 79, 80, 151, 158, 165, 181, 189, 199, 206, 222 Australia  76, 78, 79, 80, 82, 83, 84, 87, 89, 92, 94, 96, 97, 98, 99, 102, 103, 104, 105, 107, 108, 110, 111, 112, 114, 115, 116, 117, 119, 120, 121, 125, 204, 210, 220, 234, 246, 252, 257, 263

authoritarian governments/regime  19, 42, 52, 209, 211; See also totalitarian governments/states authoritarian political history  203 authoritarianism  2, 203, 204 authority  14, 15, 17, 19, 25, 32, 34, 36n3, 43, 63, 208, 232, 233 autonomous organizations/groups  19, 41, 42, 46 Azerbaijan  55, 76, 78, 80, 83, 84, 86, 87, 88, 89, 92, 93, 94, 96, 97, 98, 99, 102, 103, 104, 105, 107, 110, 111, 112, 114, 115, 116, 117, 119, 120, 121, 125, 169, 202, 203, 220, 234, 246, 253, 257, 263 Ba’ath/Ba’athist  49 Bahrain  1, 50 Bangladesh  75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 82, 83, 84, 86, 87, 88, 89, 91, 92, 93, 94, 96, 97, 98, 99, 102, 103, 104, 105, 107, 108, 110, 111, 112, 114, 115, 116, 117, 119, 120, 121, 123, 125, 169, 220, 234, 246, 252, 258, 263 banking  40, 68, 72 believers  26, 38, 39, 44, 68, 158, 165, 189, 202, 209, 210, 214; See also pious; religious person/persons Berger, Peter  18, 40, 41, 56 Bosnian Federation  5, 76, 78, 80, 82, 83, 84, 87, 89, 92, 93, 94, 96, 97, 98, 99, 102, 103, 104, 105, 107, 108, 110, 111, 112, 114, 115, 116, 117, 119, 120, 121, 125, 169, 203, 219, 220, 234, 239, 246, 252, 257, 264 Brazil  76, 78, 79, 80, 83, 84, 86, 87, 89, 92, 93, 94, 96, 97, 98, 99, 102, 103, 104, 105, 107, 110, 111, 112, 114, 115, 116, 117, 119, 120, 121, 125, 220, 234, 247, 253, 257, 264 Buddhist, Hindu, and folk-religion societies  12, 74, 75, 127, 128, 130, 131, 135, 136 confidence in political parties in  151 confidence in religious civil organizations in  207, 215 confidence in religious institutions in  103, 147

Index confidence in the women’s movement in  158 democracy in  125 religiosity in  79 Bulgaria  76, 78, 80, 83, 84, 86, 87, 88, 89, 92, 94, 96, 97, 98, 99, 102, 103, 104, 105, 107, 108, 110, 111, 112, 114, 115, 116, 117, 119, 120, 121, 125, 220, 234, 246, 253, 257, 263 Burkina Faso  75, 76, 78, 80, 82, 83, 84, 87, 89, 91, 92, 93, 94, 96, 97, 98, 99, 102, 103, 104, 105, 107, 110, 111, 112, 114, 115, 116, 117, 119, 120, 121, 125, 169, 202, 204, 211, 220, 234, 246, 253, 257, 263 business  8, 16, 26, 29, 30, 31, 33, 38, 74, 93, 169 class  54 decision-making  32 government ownership of  12, 81–86, 129, 130, 136–139, 144, 169–170, 199, 200, 201, 214, 223, 224, 246, 247 modern  29, 38, 71 private ownership of  3, 74, 81–86, 139, 169, 202, 203, 204, 213, 214, 222, 223, 224 privatization of  82 Canada  76, 78, 80, 82, 83, 84, 87, 88, 89, 92, 94, 96, 97, 98, 99, 102, 103, 104, 105, 107, 108, 110, 111, 112, 114, 115, 116, 117, 119, 120, 121, 125, 211, 212n1, 220, 234, 246, 252, 257, 263 capitalism  8, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 31, 32, 34, 35, 36, 38, 39, 40, 43, 44, 71, 201 and democracy  14–18; See also democracy and free market economy and socialism  29, 31, 32 Islamic mode of  40 spirit of  24, 27, 71 capitalist/capitalistic development  16, 17, 63 economy  8, 15, 16, 18 methods  8, 36 system  15, 16, 37, 73 values  27 Casanova, José  44, 65 Catholicism  26, 44, 64 Chile  76, 78, 80, 82, 83, 84, 86, 87, 89, 92, 93, 94, 96, 97, 98, 99, 102, 103, 104, 105, 107,

297 108, 110, 111, 112, 114, 115, 116, 117, 119, 120, 121, 125, 220, 234, 247, 252, 258, 264 China/Chinese  54, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 83, 84, 86, 87, 88, 89, 92, 93, 94, 96, 97, 98, 99, 102, 103, 104, 105, 107, 108, 110, 111, 112, 114, 115, 116, 117, 119, 120, 121, 123, 125, 203, 210, 219, 220, 229, 234, 247, 252, 258, 263 Chinese folk-religion/folk-religionists  77, 201, 236 Christian societies  5, 68, 74, 130, 132 atheists in  79 confidence in labor unions in  151 confidence in NGOs in  165 confidence in political parties in  151 confidence in religious institutions in  103, 147 democracy in  125–126 relationship to democratic experience  127 value of HDI in  124, 127, 129 Church/Churches  74, 205, 222, 224, 228 and state  65 confidence in  4, 101, 103, 105, 147, 205, 215, 224 citizens  9, 11, 20, 21, 54, 58, 59, 212, 253 Arab  53 equality of  44 mobilization of grassroots  46 participation of  20–21 political contribution of  20 rights of  19 state and  19, 210, 216 trust in civil society organizations  123 citizenship  48, 53 civic life  11, 40 experience of  73 civil associations  20, 21, 53 autonomy of  43 traditional bourgeois  49 civil communication  210 civil institutions/organizations  20, 21, 44, 51, 52, 101, 108, 132, 206, 210, 212 as social forces  11 confidence in  165, 189 Islamic  50 modern  207, 215 postmodern  207, 208, 209, 210, 215

298 civil institutions/organizations (cont.) religious  206, 207, 215 traditional  49 civil liberties  7, 51 civil society organizations  6, 71, 208, 209 confidence in modern  4, 225–226; See also confidence in labor unions; confidence in political parties confidence in traditional  4, 74, 135, 144, 210, 225; See also confidence in Church; confidence in Mosque; confidence in Temple; confidence/trust in religious institutions confidence/trust in postmodern  4, 207, 208, 226; See also trust in the women’s movement; confidence in the environmental protection movement confidence/trust in  4, 6, 67, 131, 144–165, 210, 211, 215, 219, 220, 221, 223–226 in cross-national comparison  101–124 in Sunni and Shia Islamic societies  172–199 kinds of  11 civil society  2, 6, 7, 16, 41, 70, 71, 72, 73 and democracy  44, 45 cultural aspect of  20 definition of  8–9 importance for democracy  18–22 in Islamic countries  40, 47–55 in the Arab World  40 Islam and  40–55 Islamists and  46 Lockean  43 Muslim  44 religion and  41, 43, 46, 205 state and  43 Western  43 civility  40, 41, 47, 50, 72 element of  48 of Islamic civilization  47 spirit of  50 civilization/civilizations clash of  1 Islamic vision of/Islamic  40, 42, 47 Western  40 class bourgeois  41, 49 business/merchant/entrepreneur  43, 52, 54

Index middle  16, 18, 42, 54, 212 structure  16 working  16 collective action/actions  21, 49 Colombia  76, 78, 79, 80, 83, 84, 86, 87, 89, 91, 92, 93, 94, 96, 97, 98, 99, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 107, 108, 110, 111, 112, 114, 115, 116, 117, 119, 120, 121, 125, 220, 234, 247, 253, 258, 264 colonial experience  53, 54 communication  46, 209 between believers  209 civil  210 rights  22 communicational/communicative activities  209 essence  68, 209, 210 possibilities  210 soul of religion  210 comparative approach/perspective  3, 6, 74, 98, 101, 119, 203, 213 comparison/comparisons between Catholicism and Islam  44 cross-cultural  201 cross-national  101 descriptive  12 multivariate  12, 135 of Islamic and capitalist economics  31, 32, 35 competition  4, 20, 29, 30, 32, 37, 59, 60 in Islamic societies  170–172 religion, religiosity and  142–144 utility vs. harmfulness of  12, 81, 96–101, 199, 200, 263–264 competitive election system  2 contextual effect/effects  135, 147, 151, 158, 165, 202; See also country-level effects; contextual level; contextual factors contextual factors  3, 12, 205 contextual level  6, 12, 67, 132, 204, 211, 215, 236 cooperation  20, 21, 30, 59 between traditional and modern civil society  45 traditional networks of  49 corruption governmental/state  17, 22 of Islamic governments  45 country-level effects  139, 147, 151

Index cultural background/backgrounds  3, 62, 219; See also cultural effects; cultural conditions; cultural context cultural beliefs  73 cultural conditions  62, 209 cultural context  15, 52, 73 cultural effects  21, 124 cultural elements  208 cultural heritage  64 cultural impact  11 cultural legacies  62 cultural nature  10 cultural organizations  55 cultural phenomenon  212 cultural problems  40 cultural reference  201 cultural roots  217 cultural setting  32 cultural shift/shifts  63, 65 cultural source  63 cultural system  65, 66 cultural transformation  56 cultural values  209, 216 culture  19, 43, 59, 60, 62 civic  43, 49, 73 economic  203 pluralistic  48 Western  45 Dahl, Robert A.  7, 15 decentralization of economic decisions  8 of religious authority  44, 72 democracy  1, 2, 11, 12, 15, 18, 20, 22, 42, 53, 57, 62, 65, 66, 72 and capitalism  14, 15, 16, 17 and civil society  18–22, 44 and free market economy  14–18, 57, 58 and individual free will  11, 67 as a cultural system  66 as a political concept  2, 214 development of  11, 59 economic  14, 203, 216 experience of  69, 127, 203, 210 extensive definition  212; See also maximalist definition flourishing of  14, 42 foundation of  215 in Islamic and Arab world  2n2, 11

299 Islam and  1–3 maximalist definitions of  7 minimalist definitions of  7 modern  15 non-political principles of  2, 7, 14, 20 parliamentary  22, 51, 211 political  3, 10, 14, 18, 135, 211 practice of  59, 60, 61 preconditions/prerequisites  18, 57 principle/principles of  2, 101 religion and  64, 65 stable  2, 3, 12, 50, 58, 59, 71, 210, 212, 216 theory of  14 transition/transitions to  57, 59 understanding of  2 democratic attitudes  60, 61, 63 democratic civil value  68, 69, 207 democratic culture  15, 20, 58, 59, 60, 62, 67, 211, 212, 213, 216 democratic experience  4, 12, 59, 125, 126, 127, 128, 139, 203, 232 democratic institutions  6, 11, 15, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 203, 215 democratic political system  2, 46, 57, 58, 63, 65, 211, 216 democratic values  3, 4, 14, 21, 41, 45, 58, 59, 60, 67, 69, 70, 71, 128, 135, 203, 211, 212, 213, 214 democratization  16, 18, 19, 40, 57, 58, 59, 60, 65, 67 fourth wave of  1 in Malaysia  54 movement  50 of public life  19 third wave of  44 descriptive statistics  74, 81, 86, 91, 96, 98, 101, 105, 108, 119, 123, 132, 133, 134, 205, 213, 239–279 despotism  9, 20, 52, 208 developed country/countries  38, 82, 93, 98, 204, 212, 264 developing countries/societies  33–34, 86, 88, 91, 93, 96, 204, 212 development in Muslim thinking  202 of a democratic economic culture  203 of Islamic sharia  216 Durkheim, Emile  9, 209

300 ecofeminists  207 economic activities  17, 28, 32, 37, 38, 61 incentives in  91 motivation in  29 role of Islamic states in  202 role of the state in  36n3 economic development  15, 16, 17, 35, 36, 49, 56, 57, 58, 61, 63, 65, 66, 200, 234; See also economic growth cultural source of  63 Western  25 economic ethic/ethics capitalist and Islamic  30 Islamic  24, 31 of Islam  27 economic system  8, 15, 17, 30, 34, 35, 238 capitalistic  24 free  200 in Islamic countries  37 industrial  23 market-based  203 mixed  200 religious  35 socialist  18 economic freedom  14, 27 economic growth  7, 25, 33, 37, 38, 56, 57, 63, 65, 66, 67, 73 economic liberties  8 economic philosophy  23 education  12, 38, 56, 57, 58, 123 civic  20 of democracy  21 professional  56 egalitarianism/egalitarian  38, 44, 67, 72, 200 Egypt  1, 43, 46, 48, 51, 53, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 83, 84, 86, 87, 89, 91, 92, 93, 94, 96, 97, 99, 102, 103, 104, 105, 107, 110, 111, 112, 114, 115, 116, 117, 119, 120, 121, 125, 169, 208, 211, 220, 234, 247, 253, 258, 263 Engels, Friedrich  34 enlightenment  65, 73 environmental protection movement confidence in the  112–118 in Islamic societies  181 religion, religiosity and  158–161 essentialist/essentialists  44, 216 ethics  30

Index Islamic  11, 26, 27, 41, 209 modern business  29 of free market economics  28 of Islam and capitalism  71, 201 public  39 Europe/European  18 Central and Eastern  59 countries  200, 206 enlightenment  73 model of social democratic economy  28 nineteenth-century  19 renaissance  47 everyday life  212 ethic of  24 expression freedom of  7, 18 faith  9, 39, 41 fatalism  25, 39, 71 feminism/feministic/feminists  47, 53, 208, 209, 214 Finland  76, 78, 80, 82, 83, 84, 86, 87, 89, 92, 93, 94, 96, 97, 98, 99, 102, 103, 104, 105, 107, 110, 111, 112, 114, 115, 116, 117, 119, 120, 121, 125, 203, 205, 212, 220, 234, 246, 252, 257, 263 France  53, 76, 78, 79, 80, 82, 83, 84, 86, 87, 88, 89, 92, 93, 94, 96, 97, 98, 99, 102, 103, 104, 105, 107, 108, 110, 111, 112, 114, 115, 116, 117, 119, 120, 121, 125, 212, 219, 220, 234, 247, 253, 258, 264 free choice  11, 70, 203; See also free will of individuals  70 free elections  212, 216 free market economics/economy  2, 8, 10, 11, 12, 28, 31, 57, 70, 71, 74, 136, 200, 201, 204, 222, 223 and democracy  14–18 attitudes towards  3, 4, 6, 12, 81–101, 124, 128, 129, 132, 135, 136, 139, 144, 165, 199, 200, 202, 205, 213, 214, 215, 219, 220, 222, 226, 236 Islam and  11, 22–40, 201 principles of  23, 38, 47, 201 free will  9, 14, 15, 28, 67, 200, 203 freedom  7, 31, 33, 46, 47, 48, 59, 71, 72, 216 individual  16, 21, 30, 47, 53, 200 of choice  65, 67 of expression  18, 47, 51

301

Index of individual choice  14, 35, 72 of opinion  17 of private organizations  7 of will  57 political  18, 211 Friedman, Milton  15 Fukuyama, Francis  1, 20 Germany (East)  5, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 83, 84, 86, 87, 88, 89, 91, 92, 93, 94, 96, 97, 98, 99, 102, 103, 104, 105, 107, 108, 110, 111, 112, 114, 115, 116, 117, 119, 120, 121, 125, 219, 220, 246, 253, 258, 263 Germany (West)  76, 78, 80, 82, 83, 84, 87, 88, 89, 92, 93, 94, 96, 97, 98, 99, 102, 103, 104, 105, 107, 108, 110, 111, 112, 114, 115, 116, 117, 120, 121, 125, 211, 219, 220, 246, 253, 258, 263 Ghana  75, 76, 77, 78, 80, 83, 84, 86, 87, 89, 91, 92, 93, 94, 96, 97, 98, 99, 102, 103, 104, 105, 107, 110, 111, 112, 114, 115, 116, 117, 119, 120, 121, 125, 220, 235, 247, 253, 257, 263 God  27, 28, 29, 30, 35, 36n3, 37, 39, 43, 44, 71, 72, 199, 209 government  7, 8, 15, 35, 37, 46, 61, 71, 73, 208, 212, 213; See also state and economy  32–34 authority of  17, 19, 25 democratic  18, 21, 42, 66, 126, 127, 203, 204, 210 in Muslim societies  26 Islamic  32, 34, 35, 45, 46 minimal or maximal role of  11 responsibility  12, 86, 88, 89, 91, 135, 139, 169, 199, 200, 213, 223 small  30 Great Britain  76, 78, 79, 80, 82, 83, 84, 86, 87, 88, 89, 92, 94, 96, 97, 98, 99, 102, 103, 104, 105, 107, 108, 110, 111, 112, 114, 115, 116, 117, 119, 120, 121, 125, 204, 219, 220, 246, 253, 257, 263 growth  18, 26, 38 of associative life  49 of capitalism  39 of human autonomy  67 Habermas, Jürgen  21 HDI  6, 69, 81, 124, 125, 126, 127, 139, 158, 169, 181, 189, 204, 205, 211, 212 historical context  42

history  35, 52, 72 Middle Eastern  42 of capitalist development  16 of Catholicism and Islam  44 of civil society  45, 53 of communism  210 of democracy  44, 135, 203 of Islamic thought  39 of the development of Islamic sharia  216 of the West  43, 44 of thought  47 political  77, 203 Hong Kong  5, 76, 77, 78, 80, 82, 83, 84, 86, 87, 88, 89, 91, 92, 93, 94, 96, 97, 98, 99, 101, 102, 104, 105, 106, 107, 110, 111, 112, 114, 115, 116, 117, 119, 120, 121, 123, 125, 211, 219, 220, 234, 247, 253, 258, 264 human development  81, 204, 205 Index  4, 6, 124, 232, 234; See also HDI theory of  12, 65, 66, 67 human rights  45, 46, 47, 72 groups  53 institutions  52 Huntington, Samuel P.  1, 18, 44, 56, 62, 64 idealistic philosophy  29 identity  41, 53 in an Islamic society  32 Japanese national  59 of Islamic economics  29 shared sense of  19 ideological monopoly  41 ideological terminology  34 ideology  17, 43 in the Muslim world  11 Islamic  39 Marxist  34 of Islamic thought  35 incentives in economic activities  91, 93 income differences  130, 200, 202, 203, 213, 214 income equality versus income differences in Islamic societies  172 versus income differences  12, 91–96, 139

302 India  59, 76, 78, 79, 80, 82, 83, 84, 86, 87, 89, 91, 92, 93, 94, 96, 97, 98, 99, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 107, 110, 111, 112, 114, 115, 116, 117, 119, 120, 121, 124, 125, 211, 220, 234, 247, 253, 258, 263 individual ownership  8 limitation of  28 individual religiosity  3, 67, 200 effect of  12, 147, 151, 213 individualism/individualistic  8, 14, 27, 35, 41, 43, 45, 64, 71, 73 individual-level data individual-level effects  147, 151, 169, 181, 199 individual-level of analysis  6, 214 individual-level variable  74 individuals  8, 17, 18, 20, 21, 25, 33, 46, 57, 71, 73, 93, 169, 200, 204, 209, 238 autonomy of  46 free will of  200, 203 freedom of  33 isolated  19 ownership rights of  31 participation of  47 religious  2, 151, 165, 181, 189, 201, 214 responsibility of  12, 91, 139 self-interested  29, 71 Indonesia  45, 53, 54, 76, 78, 79, 80, 83, 84, 86, 87, 89, 91, 92, 93, 94, 96, 97, 98, 99, 102, 103, 104, 105, 107, 110, 111, 112, 114, 115, 116, 117, 119, 120, 121, 125, 169, 204, 220, 234, 247, 252, 258, 263 industrial bourgeoisie  15 industrial capitalism/capitalist  14, 24 industrial country/countries  88, 206, 253 industrial democracies  212 industrial economic system  23 industrial societies  96 industrialization  11, 56, 57, 63, 73 of the economy  54, 58 inequality between men and women  208 gender  38 in/of income  8, 38, 200 Inglehart, Ronald  2, 12, 63, 64, 65, 66, 203, 206, 207, 216, 226n3 institution  9 democratic  59, 71 Diwaniyyah  51

Index of religion  206 political  16, 57, 203 sociohistorical  10 institutional democracy  203, 204, 211 institutionalization  17, 60 interests  9, 20, 23, 26, 29, 39, 57, 203, 212 civic  21 individual  30, 41 of people  17 of state  17 private  35 public  30 intermediary associations  20, 70, 210 interpretation objective  26 of Islam  46 of religious resources  44 of the Islamic penal code  53 tradition of  39 violent  41 intervention in business decision-making  32, 71 in the assignment of wealth  33 state  52, 205 Iran  32, 76, 78, 79, 80, 82, 83, 84, 86, 87, 88, 89, 92, 93, 94, 97, 98, 99, 102, 103, 104, 105, 107, 110, 111, 112, 114, 115, 116, 117, 119, 120, 121, 125, 169, 220, 234, 247, 253, 258 Iraq  49, 51, 76, 78, 79, 80, 83, 84, 86, 87, 88, 89, 92, 93, 94, 97, 99, 102, 103, 104, 105, 107, 110, 111, 114, 125, 169, 204, 220, 234, 236, 247, 253, 258 Islam  4, 23, 24, 28, 38, 39, 40, 41, 44, 64, 71, 208, 210, 213, 214, 216, 236 and capitalism  25, 39, 71, 201 and Christianity  25, 68, 77 and democracy  1, 2, 3, 11, 71, 216 and socialism  34 and the West  43, 216 legalistic nature of  71 Islamic banking  72 Islamic capitalism  38 Islamic countries  6, 11, 25, 26, 32, 37, 38, 39, 40, 44, 45, 47, 68, 69, 73, 77, 79, 119, 123, 127, 135, 147, 151, 158, 165, 169, 172, 181, 201, 202, 207, 209, 215 Islamic economics/economy  11, 23, 27, 28, 30, 32, 35, 36, 71, 199 Islamic ethics  11, 26, 27, 31, 41, 71

Index Islamic fundamentalism  46 Islamic government  32, 34, 35, 46; See also Islamic state Islamic law  28, 29, 37, 40, 41, 45 Islamic movements  23, 40 Islamic philosophy  26, 71 Islamic principles  35, 42, 72 Islamic religiosity  3, 172, 181, 214, 215, 216 Islamic resurgence  29, 45, 72 Islamic Sharia  39, 46, 79, 210, 216, 238 Islamic socialism/socialists  23, 34, 35, 72 Islamic societies  1, 3, 4, 12, 25, 41, 68, 71, 74, 75, 79, 103, 124, 127, 130, 131, 132, 135, 147, 151, 158, 165, 169, 172, 181, 189, 199, 201, 203, 204, 207, 208, 209, 213, 214, 216, 217; See also Muslim world Islamic state  33 Islamic teachings  11, 25, 30, 37, 39, 44, 72 Islamic thought  22, 23, 35, 39, 47, 71 Islamic values  37, 202, 208, 216 Islamists  40, 42, 43, 44, 46, 47, 48, 51, 53, 73 Israel  42, 50, 238 Italy  76, 77, 78, 80, 82, 83, 84, 87, 89, 92, 94, 96, 97, 98, 99, 102, 103, 104, 105, 107, 108, 110, 111, 112, 114, 115, 116, 117, 119, 120, 121, 125, 203, 211, 221, 235, 246, 252, 257, 264 Japan  59, 61, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 82, 83, 84, 86, 87, 88, 89, 91, 92, 94, 96, 97, 98, 99, 102, 103, 104, 105, 107, 108, 110, 111, 112, 114, 115, 116, 117, 119, 120, 121, 124, 125, 204, 211, 221, 234, 247, 253, 257, 263 Jordan  1, 51, 52, 75, 76, 78, 79, 80, 82, 83, 84, 86, 87, 88, 89, 91, 92, 93, 94, 96, 97, 98, 99, 102, 103, 104, 105, 107, 110, 111, 112, 114, 115, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 125, 169, 210, 221, 235, 247, 253, 257, 263 justice  28, 29, 39 economic  28, 29 moral principles of  28 social  34, 200, 214 Khomeini, Ruhollah  32, 34 Kuwait  1, 51 Kyrgyzstan  55, 76, 78, 80, 82, 83, 84, 86, 87, 89, 91, 92, 93, 94, 96, 97, 98, 99, 102, 103, 104, 105, 107, 108, 110, 111, 112, 114, 115, 116, 117,

303 119, 120, 121, 125, 169, 204, 210, 221, 235, 247, 253, 258, 264 labor unions  12, 206 confidence in  4, 105–108, 123, 131, 132, 151, 165, 212 in Islamic societies  181–189 Latin America  18, 58 Laud, William  72 law  32, 208 domestic  16 Islamic business  28 Islamic heritage  28 Islamic  36n3, 37, 41, 45 natural  26 of God  43 of inheritance  36n2, 40 of Judaism  64 rational  24 sharia as  51 Lebanon  51, 237 legal protection  71 legitimacy  42, 66 foundation of governmental  42 logic of democracy’s  15 liberal economics individualistic philosophy of  35 liberalization  49 economic  16 Libya  1, 53 Lipset, Seymour Martin  7, 16, 17, 18, 57, 64, 65 macro-level data  232 macro-level effects  144, 151, 169, 172, 181, 189 macro-level hypotheses  68, 69 macro-level of analysis  5, 10, 189, 236 macro-level variables  124, 126, 135, 136, 234, 236 Malaysia  40, 54, 76, 78, 80, 83, 84, 86, 87, 89, 92, 93, 94, 96, 97, 98, 99, 102, 103, 104, 105, 107, 110, 111, 112, 114, 115, 116, 117, 119, 120, 121, 125, 169, 202, 221, 235, 246, 252, 258, 263 Mali  75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 83, 84, 86, 87, 89, 91, 92, 93, 94, 96, 97, 98, 99, 102, 103, 104, 105, 107, 110, 111, 112, 114, 115, 116, 117, 119, 120, 121, 124, 125, 169, 201, 204, 209, 221, 235, 247, 252, 257, 264

304 market-friendly religions  38 values  201, 204 Marx, Karl  34 Marxism/Marxist  14, 34, 56, 65 Mawdudi, Abul A’la  28, 32, 33 Meiji restoration  61 Mexico  76, 78, 80, 83, 84, 86, 87, 89, 91, 92, 93, 94, 96, 97, 98, 99, 102, 103, 104, 105, 107, 108, 110, 111, 112, 114, 115, 116, 117, 119, 120, 121, 125, 221, 235, 247, 252, 257, 264 micro-level effects  181, 189 micro-level hypotheses  67, 68 micro-level variable/variables  74, 135, 136, 219, 222 middle class/classes  16, 42, 45, 48, 52, 54, 212 Middle East  1, 42, 43 civic culture of  73 civil society in the  47 democracy in the  42 Middle Eastern culture  43 history  42 political discourse  73 social groups  42 studies  42 Mill, John Stuart  20 Miskawayh, Abu ‘Ali  29 modernity  47, 60 modernization  44, 45, 60, 62, 216 condition of  56 cultural school of  62, 63, 73 economic  61 linear approach to  65 socioeconomic  65 theory of political  55–70 theory  3, 11, 57, 73 money  27, 29, 30, 32, 36, 37, 39, 56, 72 monopoly  28 ideological  41 Western  45 moral economy  27, 31, 32 Islamic  26 moral values  23, 29 Jewish and Christian  23 Morocco  1, 52, 75, 76, 78, 79, 80, 83, 84, 86, 87, 88, 89, 91, 92, 94, 96, 97, 98, 99, 102, 103, 104, 105, 107, 108, 110, 111, 112, 114, 115, 116, 117,

Index 119, 120, 121, 123, 125, 169, 204, 221, 235, 246, 253, 257, 264 Mosque  210 confidence in  4, 101, 104, 105, 147 motivation  62, 71, 72, 201, 209 of economic activity  26, 29 movement democratic/democratization  48, 50 feminist  208, 209 Islamic revivalist/revival  44, 51 political  16 protest  50 multilevel analysis/analyses  6, 12, 132, 135, 136, 139, 144, 147, 151, 158, 165, 189, 199, 200, 209, 213, 214, 216, 236 Muslim Brotherhood  46 Muslim world  37, 43, 45, 72, 169, 208, 210, 216 democracy in the  1 Islamic movements/resurgence around the  23, 29 voluntary associations in the  11 Muslims  4, 26, 27, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 37, 39, 40, 43, 44, 71, 72, 77, 169, 181, 201, 209, 210, 216, 217 civil uprisings of  1 Nahdlatul Ulama  54 Netherlands  76, 78, 79, 80, 82, 83, 84, 86, 87, 88, 89, 91, 92, 93, 94, 96, 97, 98, 99, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 107, 110, 111, 112, 114, 115, 116, 117, 119, 120, 121, 125, 203, 211, 219, 221, 235, 247, 253, 257, 264 New Zealand  76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 82, 83, 84, 86, 87, 88, 89, 92, 94, 96, 97, 98, 99, 102, 103, 104, 105, 107, 108, 110, 111, 112, 114, 115, 116, 117, 119, 120, 121, 204, 211, 221, 235, 247, 252, 257, 264 NGOs  11, 19, 21, 47, 48, 50, 189, 199, 210, 211, 214 autonomy of  52 confidence in  165 Islamic  54 marginal role of  55 women’s  207 Nigeria  75, 76, 77, 78, 80, 82, 83, 84, 86, 87, 89, 91, 92, 94, 96, 97, 98, 99, 102, 103, 104, 105, 107, 110, 111, 112, 114, 115, 116, 117,

Index 119, 120, 121, 123, 125, 169, 202, 204, 221, 235, 247, 253, 257, 263 non-governmental organizations  44, 45, 48, 51, 72, 101, 206, 223 non-political associations  20, 21 non-political democratic values  10 non-political institutions  19 non-political principles of democracy  2 Norway  76, 78, 80, 82, 83, 84, 87, 89, 92, 94, 96, 97, 98, 99, 102, 103, 104, 105, 107, 110, 111, 112, 114, 115, 116, 117, 119, 120, 121, 124, 125, 204, 211, 212, 221, 235, 246, 252, 257, 264 not a religious/Non-religious person  74, 77, 151, 199, 209, 214, 216, 222 Oman  1, 50, 51 Ottoman Empire  43, 47 Pakistan  54, 75, 76, 78, 79, 80, 82, 83, 84, 86, 87, 88, 89, 91, 92, 93, 94, 96, 97, 99, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 107, 110, 111, 112, 114, 115, 116, 117, 119, 120, 121, 125, 169, 205, 221, 235, 247, 252, 258 Palestinian civil society  50 parliamentary democracy  22, 51, 211 Parsons, Talcott  24, 202 participation  10, 20, 52, 54 civil  52, 209 in decision-making  66 of government in the economic game  15 patrimonialism/patrimonial structure  24, 48, 71 Peru  76, 78, 79, 80, 83, 84, 86, 87, 89, 91, 92, 93, 94, 96, 97, 98, 99, 102, 103, 104, 105, 107, 108, 110, 111, 112, 114, 115, 116, 117, 119, 120, 121, 125, 221, 235, 247, 252, 257, 264 Philippines  76, 78, 79, 80, 83, 84, 86, 87, 88, 89, 92, 93, 94, 96, 97, 98, 99, 102, 103, 104, 105, 107, 110, 111, 112, 114, 115, 116, 117, 119, 120, 121, 125, 221, 235, 247, 252, 257, 264 pious  26, 158, 189 pluralism/pluralistic  8, 19, 39, 41, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 51, 72 pluralization  49 Poland  75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 83, 84, 86, 87, 89, 91, 92, 94, 96, 97, 98, 99, 102, 103, 104, 105, 107, 110, 111, 112, 114, 115, 116, 117, 119, 120, 121, 125, 221, 235, 247, 252, 257, 264

305 Political background/backgrounds  23, 43, 202, 213, 214 political conditions  34, 72, 147 political context  4, 124, 211, 213, 214, 232 political culture  3, 54, 58, 59, 60, 61, 63 democratic  21, 48, 49, 51 developed  12 traditional  59 political development  54, 57, 61, 62, 216; See also theory of political modernization influencing factors on  11, 64, 73 normative theory of  58 prerequisites of  3 political institutions  3, 7, 14, 19, 33, 61, 73; See also Political organizations democratic  20 political organizations  19, 42 political participation  8, 19, 45, 66, 233 political parties  19, 21, 50, 51, 52, 55, 59 confidence in  4, 12, 101–105, 108–112, 123, 151–157, 165, 181, 189, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 211, 213, 215, 224 political philosophy  7, 19 political sphere  11, 19, 45, 47, 59, 66 political structure  58, 66 Japanese  59 liberal  15 of early Islamic society  24 of Islamic countries  201 political tradition  56, 58–62, 65, 67, 124 Arab  42 democratic  203 political values  1, 58 of democracy  2 Polity IV Project  232, 233 power balance of  73 centralized  208 economic  17, 35 nature of  55 of government/the state  16, 17, 21 of religion  45 political  21, 56, 57, 59 source of  14, 15, 50, 56, 206 to vote  7 private ownership  27, 31, 33, 34, 71, 72 Islam and  34–38 private property  16, 18 private sector  15, 17, 30, 49

306 privatization of business  82 of the economy  16, 49 production  17, 30, 33 control of the  35 means of  56 modern/industrial mode of  26, 32 progress culturally constructed  62 economic  18 human  57, 65, 66n9, 69 material  62 of Turkish civil society  47 social  73 technological  56 Protestantism  25, 26, 63, 64 public good  32, 35, 43, 50 public sphere  8, 9, 19, 20, 22, 32, 48 Putnam, Robert D.  21 Qatar  50 quality of life  207 Qur’an/Qur’anic  26, 27, 28, 33, 38, 39, 43 rationalism/rationality  8, 24, 39, 43, 47, 71, 72, 73 reformist Muslims  216 religiosity  2, 3, 10, 12, 38, 67, 68, 215, 216, 222 and civil society  205–212 and confidence in civil society organizations  165, 166–168 and confidence in labor unions in Islamic societies  181, 183–185 and confidence in labor unions  151, 152–154 and confidence in mosques in Islamic societies  172, 179–180, 181 and confidence in political parties in Islamic societies  181, 186–188 and confidence in political parties  151, 155–157 and confidence in religious institutions  144, 147–150 and confidence in the civil society organizations in Islamic societies  189, 196–198, 199 and confidence in the environmental movement in Islamic societies  181, 189, 190–192

Index and confidence in the environmental protection movement  158, 159–161 and confidence in the women’s movement in Islamic societies  189, 193–195 and confidence in the women’s movement  158, 162–165 and free market economy/ economics  4, 37, 199–205 and income equality in Islamic societies  172, 175–176 and income equality  139, 142–143, 144 and private ownership in Islamic societies  169, 170–171 and private versus government ownership  136–139 and responsibility of people in Islamic societies  169, 172, 173–174 and responsibility of people versus government responsibility  139, 140–141 and utility of competition in Islamic societies  172, 177–178 and utility of competition versus harmfulness of competition  144, 145, 146 in cross-national perspective  74–80 religious authority/authorities  33, 46, 72, 206 religious denomination  70, 123, 135, 136, 165, 169, 214, 227 religious institutions  65 confidence/trust in  101–105, 144, 147–150, 165, 205, 206, 207, 209, 210, 212, 213, 215 religious intellectuals  23, 216 religious person/persons  10, 74, 75, 76, 147, 151, 158 religious societies  4, 6, 12, 68, 69, 74, 77, 126, 128, 131, 135, 144, 147, 151, 201, 207, 210, 213, 215 religious traditions  4, 63, 64, 123, 201 religious values  2, 201, 202 resources, distribution of  33 responsibility of people  3, 74, 81, 86–91, 139, 140–141, 169 revolutionary transition  52 Ribā  28, 37 Rida, Rashid  26 right

Index of private proprietorship  25 of the needy  28 religious  44 rights legal  14 women’s  44, 45, 50, 53, 208 of minorities  22, 54 rituals/ritualistic  10, 24, 64, 209, 210 Romania  75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 82, 83, 84, 87, 89, 92, 93, 94, 96, 97, 98, 99, 102, 103, 104, 105, 107, 108, 110, 111, 112, 114, 115, 116, 117, 119, 120, 121, 125, 203, 211, 221, 235, 246, 252, 258, 263 rule authoritarian  20 by the people  7, 21 of a developed political system  61 of democratic institutions  6, 203 of majorities/majority  22, 43 of the free market economy  37 Russian Federation  76, 78, 80, 82, 83, 84, 86, 87, 88, 89, 92, 93, 94, 96, 97, 98, 99, 102, 103, 104, 105, 107, 110, 111, 112, 114, 115, 116, 117, 119, 120, 121, 126, 220, 221, 235, 246, 252, 258, 263 sacralization  41 salvation  23, 24, 26, 64 salvific merit  26 Saudi Arabia  1, 48, 49, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 83, 84, 86, 87, 89, 92, 93, 94, 102, 103, 104, 105, 115, 116, 117, 119, 120, 121, 123, 124, 125, 169, 202, 211, 221, 235, 246, 252, 258 Schumpeter, Joseph Alois  15 secularism/secularization  44, 65, 202, 206, 207 self-expression values  65, 66, 67, 203 Sharia  32, 39, 46, 48, 210, 216 Shia countries  172, 181, 189 Shia/Shiite  13, 135, 169, 181 denomination  169, 214 Islamic societies  165, 172 Smelser, Neil J.  56 social capital  19, 20, 206, 214 social classes  45, 46, 48 social conflicts  21 Social Democracy  200 social development  57 social engagement  8, 20 social evolution  39

307 social forces  11, 19, 48, 66, 208 social groups  50 Middle Eastern  42 social interaction  8 social movements  47, 52 social network/networks  16, 21 social reaction 42 social solidarity  20, 27, 32, 71, 209 social trust  52, 210 social virtues  11, 21 socialism  31, 34, 35, 199, 200 society  9, 10, 11, 16, 17, 20, 22, 29, 56, 60, 208, 209 Islamic/Muslim  11, 24, 29, 32, 33, 41, 43, 45, 46, 54, 71 democratic  17, 55 theory of  18 socioeconomic conditions  56, 123, 135 socioeconomic context  124 socioeconomic development  4, 12, 56, 66, 67, 69, 204, 213, 214, 215; See also socioeconomic growth; socioeconomic modernization socioeconomic effects  236 socioeconomic growth  3, 11, 57, 213 South Africa  76, 78, 79, 80, 82, 83, 84, 86, 87, 89, 92, 93, 94, 96, 97, 98, 99, 102, 103, 104, 105, 107, 110, 111, 112, 114, 115, 116, 117, 119, 120, 121, 126, 221, 235, 246, 252, 258, 264 South Korea  76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 83, 84, 86, 87, 88, 89, 92, 93, 94, 96, 97, 98, 99, 102, 103, 104, 105, 107, 108, 110, 111, 112, 114, 115, 116, 117, 119, 120, 121, 125, 221, 234, 246, 253, 257, 263 Spain  76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 82, 83, 84, 86, 87, 88, 89, 92, 94, 96, 97, 98, 99, 102, 103, 104, 105, 107, 110, 111, 112, 114, 115, 116, 117, 119, 120, 121, 126, 204, 212, 219n2, 221, 235, 246, 252, 257, 263 specialization of occupation  66 spirit of civility  50 of democratic values  41 spirituality/spiritual  9, 10, 23, 27, 30, 35, 72, 206, 212 SrpSka - Serbian Republic of Bosnia  76, 78, 80, 82, 83, 84, 87, 89, 92, 93, 94, 96, 97, 98, 99, 102, 103, 104, 105, 107, 110, 111, 112, 114, 115, 116, 117, 119, 120, 121, 126, 219, 221, 235, 246, 253, 257, 264

308

Index

state  7, 8, 11, 14, 16, 20, 25, 32, 41, 42, 44, 48, 50, 51, 52, 54, 61, 65, 71, 72, 91, 139, 201, 204, 211 and religion  43 organizations  48 Sudan  32, 53 Sunna  38, 39 Sunni  181 Sunni countries/societies  135, 165, 172, 181, 189 Sunni denomination  169, 172, 181, 189, 214 Sunni Islam  44 Sweden  76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 82, 83, 84, 86, 87, 88, 89, 91, 92, 93, 94, 96, 97, 98, 99, 102, 103, 104, 105, 107, 110, 111, 112, 114, 115, 116, 117, 119, 120, 121, 126, 203, 221, 235, 246, 253, 257, 264 Switzerland  76, 78, 79, 80, 82, 83, 84, 87, 88, 89, 92, 93, 94, 96, 97, 98, 99, 102, 103, 104, 105, 107, 108, 110, 111, 112, 114, 115, 116, 117, 119, 120, 121, 126, 204, 205, 221, 235, 246, 252, 258, 263 Syrian  49

Tunisia/Tunisian  1, 51, 52, 53 Turkey  43, 47, 76, 78, 79, 80, 83, 84, 86, 87, 89, 92, 93, 94, 96, 97, 98, 99, 102, 103, 104, 105, 107, 108, 110, 111, 112, 114, 115, 116, 117, 119, 120, 121, 125, 169, 202, 208, 221, 235, 247, 252, 258, 264 Turner, Bryan S.  24, 25, 41 Tylor, Edward  9

Taiwan  58, 60, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 82, 83, 84, 87, 89, 92, 93, 94, 96, 97, 98, 99, 102, 103, 104, 105, 107, 108, 110, 111, 112, 114, 115, 116, 117, 119, 120, 121, 125, 221, 234, 246, 252, 257, 263 Tajikistan  55 Tanzania  75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 82, 83, 84, 86, 87, 88, 89, 91, 92, 93, 94, 96, 97, 98, 99, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 107, 110, 111, 112, 114, 115, 116, 117, 119, 120, 121, 123, 124, 126, 205, 211, 221, 235, 247, 253, 258, 264 Tanzimat edict  47 Temple confidence in  101, 103, 105, 147 Thailand  76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 82, 83, 84, 86, 87, 89, 92, 93, 94, 96, 97, 98, 99, 102, 103, 104, 105, 107, 108, 110, 111, 112, 114, 115, 116, 117, 119, 120, 121, 125, 221, 234, 247, 252, 258, 264 third way (Islamic economy)  29, 31, 199 Tocqueville, Alexis de  20, 21, 44, 65 tolerance  19, 45, 48, 59, 66, 71, 73 totalitarian governments/states  17, 25, 40 trust  21 between the state and NGOs  54 interpersonal  43, 66 social  52

values non-political democratic  10 post-material  66 postmodern  207, 209 Venezuela  76, 78, 79, 80, 82, 83, 84, 86, 87, 89, 91, 92, 93, 94, 96, 97, 98, 99, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 107, 108, 110, 111, 112, 114, 115, 116, 117, 119, 120, 121, 123, 126, 221, 235, 247, 252, 258, 264 Viet Nam  76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 82, 83, 84, 87, 89, 92, 93, 94, 96, 97, 98, 99, 102, 103, 104, 105, 107, 108, 110, 111, 112, 114, 116, 117, 119, 120, 121, 123, 125, 204, 211, 221, 234, 246, 252, 257, 264 voluntary associations  9, 20, 21, 216

Ukraine  58, 76, 78, 80, 83, 84, 86, 87, 88, 89, 91, 92, 94, 96, 97, 98, 99, 102, 103, 104, 105, 107, 108, 110, 111, 112, 114, 115, 116, 117, 119, 120, 121, 126, 221, 235, 247, 253, 257, 264 ‘Ulamā’  27, 34, 45 Umayyad  45 Umma  41, 44, 73 United States  61, 76, 78, 80, 82, 83, 84, 86, 87, 88, 89, 92, 94, 96, 97, 98, 99, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 107, 110, 111, 112, 114, 115, 116, 117, 119, 120, 121, 124, 203, 204, 210, 221, 235, 247, 252, 257, 264 urbanization  11, 16, 25, 56, 57, 58, 65, 73 Uzbekistan  55

waqf  44 wealth  23, 27, 30, 35, 38, 73 accumulation of  17, 27, 33, 63, 71 distribution of  17, 34, 35, 36, 204 sources of  56, 57 Weber, Max  23, 24, 63, 64, 71, 200, 201 welfare  29, 31, 56, 62, 71 well-being  38, 66 collective  21

309

Index economic  18 social  200 subjective  207 West  15, 24 Islamic world/Muslims/Islam and  27, 39, 43, 216 women  49, 52, 139, 144, 158 emancipation of  119 in Islamic societies  169, 172, 189, 199 in Islamic tradition  41 marginalization of  51 women’s movement confidence in the  119–123, 211

in Islamic societies  189, 193–195 religion, religiosity and  158 trust in the  4, 226 world religions  37, 64, 67, 68, 200 zakat  28, 36 Zambia  76, 77, 78, 80, 83, 84, 86, 87, 89, 92, 93, 94, 96, 97, 98, 99, 102, 103, 104, 105, 107, 108, 110, 111, 112, 114, 115, 116, 117, 119, 120, 121, 123, 126, 204, 221, 235, 247, 253, 257, 264