Religion in the Post-Yugoslav Context 9781498522489, 9781498522472

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Religion in the Post-Yugoslav Context

Religion in the Post-Yugoslav Context Edited by Branislav Radeljić and Martina Topić

LEXINGTON BOOKS Lanham • Boulder • New York • London

Published by Lexington Books An imprint of The Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group, Inc. 4501 Forbes Boulevard, Suite 200, Lanham, Maryland 20706 www.rowman.com Unit A, Whitacre Mews, 26-34 Stannary Street, London SE11 4AB Copyright © 2015 by Lexington Books All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form or by any electronic or mechanical means, including information storage and retrieval systems, without written permission from the publisher, except by a reviewer who may quote passages in a review. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Information Available Library of Congress Control Number: 2015939221 ISBN: 978-1-4985-2247-2 (cloth: alk. paper) ISBN: 978-1-4985-2248-9 (ebook) TM The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of American National Standard for Information Sciences Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI/NISO Z39.48-1992.

Printed in the United States of America

Contents

Acknowledgments Introduction Branislav Radeljić List of Abbreviations

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Religion and the Yugoslav Wars (1991–1999) Paul Mojzes 2 Religion in the Yugoslav Successor States at the Beginning of the Twenty-First Century Raymond Detrez 3 Church-State Relations in Slovenia: Constant Tensions Sergej Flere, Miran Lavrič, and Danilo Jesenik 4 Holocaust Denial in the Croatian Catholic Church Martina Topić 5 Religion and Politics in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Illustrations from the Postwar and Post-Socialist Transition Dino Abazović and Ivan Cvitković 6 Autocephaly, Log Burning, and Legitimacy: The Montenegrin and Serbian Orthodox Churches in Conflict Kenneth Morrison 7 Religious Polarization of Macedonian Modern Society Ružica Cacanoska 8 The Role of Religion in Serbian Society and Politics Marko Nikolić 9 The Transformation of Islam in Kosovo and its Impact on Albanian Politics Isa Blumi 10 Islamic Doctrine and European Values: The Case of the Islamic Community in Serbia Aleksander Zdravkovski 11 Self-Evident Belonging and Incompatibility of Identities: Public Discourse by Churches in Croatia, Serbia, and Slovenia on European Integration (2000–2012) Angela Ilić v

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Index About the Contributors

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Acknowledgments

It is not an overstatement to say that discussions about the presence and interference of religion in our society have become of great relevance. As witnesses in the post-communist context, clergy representatives have managed to secure more access to the public sphere, seeing it as an opportunity to spread their ideas, but also to affect decision-making processes at the national level. Members of the ruling elite tend to ignore this tendency, as long as their own position is not seriously challenged. For scholars, the almost contractual relationship between the Church and state structures is problematic given its capacity to affect education, civil sector, democratic progress, and so on. This volume seeks to elaborate on some of the dominant issues. Accordingly, the editors would like to express their sincere thanks to the contributing authors, as without their hard work this volume could not have happened. Some portions of their valuable research have already been presented and discussed at various international conferences and workshops. In addition to the authors, it is a great pleasure to thank Brian Hill, Brighid Stone, and Megan DeLancey of the History, Asian Studies, and Slavic Studies at Lexington Books for their support throughout the publishing process. Also, it is important to thank the colleagues and anonymous reviewers for giving detailed feedback and suggestions on the outline of the volume and individual chapters. Finally, it is imperative to acknowledge that working on this book was partially supported by a research grant received from the University of East London’s School of Social Sciences. Branislav Radeljić Martina Topić

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Introduction Branislav Radeljić

Religion has been the focus of academic attention for a long time. Still, as we have witnessed, the interest in the phenomenon has further increased with the turn of the new millennium, given the obvious incapacity of secularization to fully take place. 1 In Europe, once scholars had become aware of the trend, they started offering explanations, leading to the establishment of some rather influential views. For example, some accounts argue that although the level of religiosity has increased, the nature of religion can be described as “believing without belonging,” which means that Europeans are believers but they do not belong to institutional religious institutions. 2 On the other hand, Danièle Hervieu-Léger states that Europeans belong without believing, suggesting that Europeans only officially belong to institutional religion and declare they are believers, while they do not actually cherish their religions, or actively participate in religious life. 3 Europe is generally seen as secularized; however, this does not mean that it is entirely freed from religion, and even most secular European societies are founded on Christianity. 4 Contrary to all these positions, former advocate of the secularization theory Peter Berger insists that the theory failed, and that religious communities are as influential as ever even though they did not make an attempt to adapt their system of beliefs to the needs of the modern world. 5 In the case of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY), the outbreak of the state crisis in the late 1980s and the consequent fighting accentuated the relevance of religious denomination across the country. 6 Indeed, religious affiliations, apart from being associated with differences in doctrine (“this is possibly the least important aspect”), culture, and historical boundaries, they had “much to do with ethnic make-up, in the case of Serbs, Croats, Muslims (in the ethnic sense), and to a certain extent in the case of Macedonians.” 7 Accordingly, as suggested by Srdjan Vrcan, “[t]he role of religion . . . is to be assessed by taking into consideration the words and deeds of institutions, governments, parties, movements, organizations, groups, outstanding personalities and others who, identifying themselves as believers and belongers, have been interpreting or legitimatizing their actual acts in religious terms.” 8 In the context of the Yugoslav crisis, “[a] return to the nationalism or ethnification of poliix

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tics goes hand in hand with a religious revival and an entry of religion into the naked public square.” 9 Very importantly, “religious rhetoric was widely used by all sides; religious mobilization was a common enterprise both in the power struggle and on the battle field.” 10 While the dominant political figures perceived religious representatives as potential advocates of their policies, the clergy understood such a relationship as an opportunity to strengthen its own position within the society. This apparently win-win arrangement seemed even more attractive due to its capacity to spread both locally and internationally, and therefore contribute to the internationalization of the Yugoslav drama. More precisely, while on the one hand, the Serbian leadership relied on support from the Greek and Russian Orthodox Churches, on the other hand, the Slovenian and Croatian authorities expected backing from the Catholic Church. Similarly, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, apart from two Christian beliefs, a strong Muslim presence was important for the overall separation, with each section hoping for external attention and understanding for its own activism in the process of new nation-states formation. When considering the relevance of religion for politics and decisionmaking processes, the literature has clearly demonstrated that the former is capable of affecting the latter. Jonathan Fox offers three ways in which this can happen: “First, foreign policies are influenced by the religious views and beliefs of policymakers and their constituents. Second, religion is a source of legitimacy for both supporting and criticizing government behavior locally and internationally. Third—many local religious issues and phenomena, including religious conflicts, spread across borders or otherwise become international issues.” 11 In Yugoslavia, with the intensification of the fighting and a pressing need for a solution, denominational differences between warring parties came to occupy an important place in European Community (EC) sessions debating the future of the Yugoslav federation. By looking at a variety of primary sources, the chapter will show that the Catholic republics of Slovenia and Croatia, while benefiting from their clergy contacts in Western Europe and in particular the Vatican, managed to secure attention and support powerful enough to influence European Community officials to recognize them as independent states on January 15, 1992. RELIGION AND POLITICS IN THE CONTEXT OF THE YUGOSLAV CRISIS Following the death of President Josip Broz Tito in 1980, various motions and consequent debates hosted by the European Parliament started to reveal that many of its members understood the Yugoslav federation as a rather divided entity, facing serious challenges. For example, while ex-

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pressing “profound sympathy with the people of Yugoslavia on the death of their esteemed President,” they urged the representatives of the then nine EC member states to express “their profound concern for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Yugoslavia” and to stress that cooperation between the EC and Yugoslavia “would be severely jeopardized if instability was to set in across the region.” 12 Soon after, another motion and debate—following the earlier 1981 confrontations between students of the University of Priština and the local police which had resulted in a state of emergency and the sealing of Kosovo’s borders— called the representatives of EC member states “to express their concern to the Yugoslav Government and to press for the Albanian section of the population of Yugoslavia to be guaranteed equal opportunities for development in the economic, social, cultural and structural spheres.” 13 With regard to the question of religion, the Kosovo crisis was an opportunity for the Vatican to stress its policy toward some of Yugoslavia’s constituent peoples. For example, Radio Vatican, the Croatian Church press, and various Catholic representatives approved of the Kosovo riots and the Albanian drive for greater autonomy in Kosovo. 14 As a matter of support against the Serbs, Radio Vatican decided to broadcast a number of programs in Albanian and Croatian. Still, the Vatican became aware of Yugoslavia’s ethnic diversity to the fullest extent only after Agostino Casaroli, the Cardinal Secretary of State, had paid a visit to the Yugoslav leadership in the summer of 1985 with the aim of advocating greater religious freedom. During the meeting with Milka Planinc, the Prime Minister of Yugoslavia, he became fully aware of the existence of ambitions across the Yugoslav federation to create a Greater Croatia, Greater Serbia, or Greater Macedonia. 15 As I pointed out in my 2012 book, although Casaroli himself decided to elaborate on the risk of a link between nationalism and religion he did, however, deny any involvement of religion in fostering political or nationalistic sentiments. 16 This being the case, Casaroli’s standpoint is disputable for the simple reason that he tried to ignore or, more dangerously, contradict something that was already evident across the SFRY—religious denomination had already started developing into a key characteristic of the appeal of politicians and, more precisely, nationalists. In his memoirs, Casaroli personally noted how peculiar the situation in Yugoslavia was. After his visit, he concluded that his heart “was full of contrasting feelings: joy, hope, some sort of worry, and real nostalgia for the country with many latent problems—a dear country and even dearer now once some of its problems have already exploded.” 17 To complement the range of Casaroli’s feelings, I identify two events that fostered the religious component within Serbian society and clearly questioned future relations between the Orthodox and Catholic churches in Yugoslavia. The first event relates to the publication of the 1986 SANU Memorandum, a document produced by the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts,

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arguing that decentralization was threatening the unity of the Yugoslav state in which the Serbs were already discriminated. 18 Alongside the Serbian media that understandably welcomed its content, the Serbian Orthodox Church also acknowledged the relevance and accuracy of the document. In his analysis, Mojzes goes even further and warns that its role was far more relevant than its content: “It galvanized the Serbs to become militant in demands to remake Yugoslavia and frightened non-Serbs.” 19 The second event relates to the visit Slobodan Milošević paid to Kosovo in April 1987. The Serbian Orthodox Church supported Milošević’s speech to Kosovo Serbs, and his famous words “No one is allowed to beat you!” were aimed at protecting their position in the province. 20 The media enthusiastically reported friendship between the Church and politics. Another scholar noted that there was nothing strange about this connection given that “the Serbian Church views itself as identical with the Serbian nation since it considers that religion is the foundation of nationality.” 21 Thus, while on the one hand, Milošević needed support for his future political engagement, on the other hand, the Serbian Church, which remained deprived of its basic rights for almost half a century, felt empowered and backed Milošević’s policies—an involvement of decisive relevance and measure as the Serbian Orthodox Church managed to bridge the gap between church and state. 22 Therefore, as observed by Perica, this whole period was “the catalyst of the crisis” due to the presence of various factors that contributed to and strengthened the antagonism between the opposing parties; for example, as soon as the federal government agreed upon democratization of religious affairs in 1987, Catholic Slovenia “whose political leaders did not worry about ethnic minorities, rushed to inaugurate religious liberty without restrictions.” 23 In contrast, this scenario was not possible in ethnically and ideologically heterogeneous Croatia where the campaigning candidates were interested in securing support from different religious institutions. Nevertheless, in the winter of 1989 the Croatian Catholic Church openly welcomed the foundation of the ethnic and nationalistic Croatian Democratic Union with Franjo Tudjman as its leader. 24 The link between religion and politics was further accentuated when the Church decided to offer its full support to Tudjman as the new president, elected in the spring of 1990. In his book, Mojzes examines the events surrounding the elections and concludes that the Catholic Church showed significant support to “the new regime’s super-patriotic Croatianism”; in fact, members of the Croatian church attended the inauguration of the Parliament of Croatia and “did not fail to use photo opportunities in order to be seen together in the media, and much was done to reinforce the notion of the church, nation, and state.” 25 As could have been predicted, the Ninth theological congress scheduled for September 1990 in Serbia did not host any representatives from the Faculty of Theology of Zagreb. In truth, the absence of Croatian dele-

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gates was due to the growing discord between the two Churches at the time—a discord that was further fuelled by Serbian accusations that the Croatian Catholic Church was responsible for the genocide of the Serbian population during World War II. 26 Perica also notes growing disputes in both the Catholic and Orthodox press over holy places as both parties felt entitled to religious sites that could serve as a testimony of their long presence in specific regions. 27 To illustrate this enmity, Perica shows how in the summer of 1991 Serb militants destroyed numerous Catholic churches in predominantly Serbian areas of Croatia. 28 In fact, various paramilitary leaders perceived themselves “as reincarnations of crusaders for a ‘Greater Serbia.’” 29 So, by this point, it became clear that some joint attempts that had called for understanding and prevention rather than division and conflict, when compared to the general approach adopted by the dominant churches in each of the Yugoslav republics which sided with the regime, were absolutely ineffective. 30 In terms of clergy contribution to the internationalization of the crisis, the Serbian Orthodox Church strengthened its contacts abroad, “to function as conduits for an agenda primarily political in its substance and, in this sense, almost indistinguishable from that of the Belgrade regime.” 31 However, once news and reports about the fighting had begun to fill the front pages in the West, the type of narrative promoted by Orthodox representatives hardly proved convincing. In the case of Croatia, as I already discussed in my earlier work, its bishops became involved by contacting other bishops around the world. 32 For example, in their February 1991 letter, they suggested that the Croatian Catholic Church “sees a new political framework which would be based on the people getting their independence, as a possibility for acting more freely and for more peaceful coexistence in a pluralist society, including ecumenical relations.” 33 In their view, the political program advocating the continuation of socialism was misplaced: “The forces advocating this program are the leading Serbian politicians, army officers (mostly Serbs) and unfortunately certain leading figures in the Serbian Orthodox church. Thus, the communist ideology, greater Serbian aspirations and military force have found common goals and for this reason they are firmly opposing the western cultural tradition, and the republicans with a pronounced West European tradition.” 34 By insisting on the distinction between the two denominations, the bishops’ statements gained significant attention within the European Community due to its own religious outlook. In order to secure as much support as possible, Tudjman himself visited the Vatican in May 1991. On his return to Croatia, Tudjman talked enthusiastically about the great support he had been promised by the Vatican. In his study, Alex Bellamy broadens the debate over the relationship between the Croatian republic, the Croatian Catholic Church, and the Vatican and concludes that Tudjman perceived the Catholic Church as a Croatian Church, while the Vatican considered itself as a global Church, thus con-

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cerned about both Croats and non-Croats. 35 Tudjman’s idea of giving equal importance to the Catholic and Croatian Churches was a strategic move that strengthened the overall objective. Furthermore, neither the state nor the Church had a problem with being associated with the other as long as they shared a common objective. In fact, as acknowledged by Bellamy: “The Croatian Catholic Church played a vital role in redefining Croatian national identity in the 1990s.” 36 In the European Community, the members of the European Parliament were well aware of the growing tensions. For example, during a debate on the situation in the Yugoslav federation held in February 1991, Franz Schönhuber from Non-Inscrits insisted that what remained in Yugoslavia after Tito were “the ethnic, cultural and religious differences, and they [were] growing stronger”; as he put it: “They can no longer be overcome. If we are serious not just about a Europe of nation states but also of the regions, then in my party’s view there can only be one solution: since there is no single Yugoslavian nation state, we have to help regions like Croatia, Slovenia and Kosovo achieve their independence.” 37 In Germany alone, the Christian Social Union of Bavaria called the state to recognize Slovenia and Croatia, “partially out of solidarity with fellow Catholics and partially out of indignation at the brutal actions of the Yugoslav army which are unconstitutional and against international law.” 38 Such statements become even more relevant when considered alongside Fox’s analysis suggesting that “[m]any policy-makers are religious and it is likely that their religious beliefs influence their actions. Whether they truly believe or not, they often find it useful to draw upon religion to justify their actions, which indicates that religion is a source of legitimacy on the international stage.” 39 In late November 1991 Hans-Dietrich Genscher, German Foreign Minister, visited the Vatican and expressed his attitude regarding the future shape of the Yugoslav federation. In his memoirs, he wrote that the Vatican agreed that the Serbs represented the greatest threat to “the peaceful coexistence of the peoples of Yugoslavia,” but “[w]hen it came to recognizing Croatia and Slovenia, the Vatican displayed extreme reluctance.” 40 Although Genscher remains silent about his private conversation with the Pope, the Vatican’s initial refusal to recognize the two republics appears even more surprising in view of the fact that it was among the first to recognize the two states. 41 Further to this observation, Mario Nobilo, the chief foreign policy advisor to President Tudjman, analyzed the Vatican’s behavior and points out that it was actually the Vatican that used the Catholic Church in Germany to influence the German government to recognize Slovenia and Croatia. 42 In fact, communication between Germany and the Vatican continued, as Genscher paid another visit to the Holy See on December 24, 1991. 43 However, he does not mention this encounter in his memoirs. The day after his visit, the German government decided to recognize the two republics.

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RELIGION IN THE POST-YUGOSLAV CONTEXT Looking at the existing research, it is possible to argue that the postYugoslav societies are generally more religious than the ones before the Yugoslav state crisis. To list just a few examples, in Serbia the Serbian Orthodox Church has managed to regain its institutionally recognized role, which was lost during Tito’s Yugoslavia. Religious catechism was reintroduced to school curricula, the Faculty of Theology again became part of the University of Belgrade, priests became involved in taking care of the religious needs of the Serbian army, and Church’s property that was confiscated by the communist regime had been returned. 44 Different analyses have demonstrated that the Serbian Orthodox Church is an institution enjoying the highest trustworthiness in Serbia, and this is not only the case with older generations but also the youth. 45 The return to religiosity also represents a return to tradition and belonging, both disrupted with official atheism enforced by the Communists. 46 The situation is not significantly different in the neighboring Croatia where the Catholic Church took over its position, largely marginalized previously due to the communist rule. As it happens, the level of religiosity has increased, with the Catholic Church managing to position itself as an important player in Croatia’s society and politics. Various authors have shown that in the period 1968–1990 people were less religious than after 1990, meaning that religiosity increased after Yugoslavia’s dissolution. 47 When it comes to individual religiosity, Croatia has scored high—in fact, this trend has not significantly changed in the new millennium. 48 Still, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the situation is far more complicated since it is not a nation-state of Bosnian people, but a country with three constitutive groups (Serbs, Croats, Bosniaks), and national minorities (Jews, Roma, etc.). While the Serbs and Croats remain attached to their nation-states, granting them also citizenship, as well as to Orthodoxy (Serbs) and Catholicism (Croats), the position of Bosnian Muslims is more complex. It is because of this aspect that researchers are more preoccupied with the notion of identification in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The term Bosniak was ascribed to Bosnian Muslims in 1993 to give them national identity. However, not all Bosnian Muslims declare themselves in this way; some of them identify as Bosnians or Muslims. 49 Needless the say, views on Bosnian identifications are divided. For example, SaračRujanac argues that Muslims were affirmed as an ethnic group by Tito’s Yugoslavia during the 1970s, and the Communist party treated the Islamic Community as more loyal to Yugoslavia than the Serbian Orthodox or Croatian Catholic Church. 50 This makes sense, for it was only the people in Bosnia who actually opposed the dissolution of Yugoslavia, suggesting that the Islamic Community did not actually work on building strong Muslim identity during the lifetime of the former federation. The identification concerns are also found in Macedonia, just to a different extent.

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While Bosniaks have problems with determining the name of their nation and a national language due to the internal divisions, Macedonians have experienced external problems because of the name of their state (as objected by Greece), language (as objected by Bulgaria), or the Macedonian Orthodox Church (as objected by Serbia). Macedonia is, however, also largely divided along religious lines due to turbulent relations between the Macedonian Orthodox population and Albanian Muslim population. Following the fall of communism, Macedonians have largely identified with Orthodoxy and as believers, even though their worldviews largely failed to fit within the Christian framework of a particular set of beliefs such as divine creation of mankind and others. 51 On the other hand, Albanians largely identify with Islam; in fact, the increasing and more obvious identification with Islam is often seen as a means of opposing the Orthodox threat. 52 Book-length contributions focusing on the post-Yugoslav political context have not paid enough attention to the presence and relevance of religion, in terms of religious denomination and religion-inspired discourse. In fact, various religious representatives have managed to promote themselves to the extent they are now prominent actors in public debates, with standpoints capable of influencing national policies. Accordingly, this edited volume provides a critical examination of the presence and involvement of religion in the post-Yugoslav political context. The contributors, interested in the relationship between religion and respective governments and societies, seek to tackle some crucial questions and complement the existing scholarship. 53 To begin with, in chapter 1 Paul Mojzes explains how the position of religion in the post-Yugoslav states has undergone a tremendous transition from being legally and socially restricted to re-emerging into the public sphere. At first there were expectations of complete religious freedom for all, but because of the wars of the 1990s and subsequent claims of privileged status by the dominant religious communities, a number of smaller religious communities became marginalized and even repressed. However, given that the collapse of communism and the Yugoslav state took place at the same time, many religious communities emerged not only more free but also more politically assertive. Certain religious communities became symbols of ethnic self-affirmation, i.e., ethnoreligiosity. Many people declared themselves religious in the context of re-sacralization of the public sphere (politicization of religion and religionization of politics), and, as pointed out, religion was mostly being experienced as “belonging rather than believing and/or practicing.” Mojzes notes that churches and religious leaders became more trusted than politicians and government and sometimes swapped places with politicians; politicians tended to sermonize, whereas religious leaders presented themselves as defenders of national interests. Relationships between churches and religious communities became contested, with some trying to maintain traditional claims of

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monopoly on truth and primacy in protecting national interest, while others advocated dialogue. The way in which official texts (especially school books) of some religious communities depicted the Other(s) pointed to diametrically opposed interpretations of the past and the present, and hence is also clouding up the future. In chapter 2, Raymond Detrez focuses on the dynamic of the first decade of the twentieth century. According to his analysis, the existence of a close link between the church and politics is most evident in Croatia and Serbia, where religion has positioned itself to represent a decisive component of national identity. In Slovenia, where language appears the most important feature of national identity, the church occupies a less prominent role in the political context, but still it is very much concerned with its own reputation and religion-related issues. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, there are three major national and religious communities and the state cannot be identified with one particular religion, though the perception exists that Islam is the dominant religion. In addition, while the republics of Croatia and Serbia are characterized by one dominant creed and religion does not actually play an important part in the competition between political parties, in Bosnia and Herzegovina the parties tend to emphasize their religious affiliation. In Macedonia, religious differences play only an additional role in the ethnic rivalry between Orthodox Macedonians and Muslim Albanians. In Kosovo too, religious differences play only a secondary role in the antagonism between Serbs and Kosovo Albanians. Sergej Flere, Miran Lavrič, and Danilo Jesenik elaborate on the situation in Slovenia. In chapter 3, they argue that tensions between the church and politics could be described as conflict between the pro-clerical right and the liberalist left. After a rather calm period following on from the Slovenian attainment of independence, the then new Archbishop Franc Rode decided to lead the Church to a much more aggressive stance toward the state and especially liberal elites, intensifying ideological discourse, since the Archbishop’s statements challenged the bases of secular society; for example, he claimed that education without religious instruction was equal to “dog training.” According to the authors, the privileging of the Catholic Church seemed particularly evident by the 2007 Religious Freedom Act, which was later declared unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court. A new draft that was presented by the left-wing Pahor government advocated radical separation of state and church, whereas the right-wing Janša government advocated only changes in terms of strict interpretation, as requested by the Constitutional Court. However, none of the proposals was adopted. As noted, in the meantime the position of the Catholic Church in Slovenia has become less prominent, with an obvious decline in attendance of Catholic rituals, often explained by the Church’s strategic orientation, closely associated with the re-accumulation of material wealth.

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In chapter 4, Martina Topić argues that since the breakup of the Yugoslav federation, the Catholic Church in Croatia has managed to regain its special position, previously lost under the communist rule. In particular, she is interested in the Holocaust denial by the Church; accordingly, she juxtaposes her findings against the legal system that regulates the matter, as well as against the general status of the Catholic Church in Croatia that some authors label as “the most Catholic country in Europe” due to its overall influence over Croatian national policies. As clearly demonstrated, the Church participates in organizing commemorations of the alleged Bleiburg massacre, which is given a significant space in Croatian official narrative as well as in history textbooks, presenting it as the largest Croatian martyrdom although there is no evidence that the massacre really happened, nor are there lists of people who lost their lives there or mass graves. Moreover, Bleiburg commemorations are always full of Nazi iconography and, in fact, some Catholic priests openly praise the Nazi regime, and thus deny the Holocaust in Croatia. Even though not all priests have taken part in this, it is nonetheless striking that those priests who praise the notorious regime and deny the Holocaust face no sanctions from the Church. For the author, it is even more striking that state authorities ignore laws banning expression of hatred and the Constitution that declares anti-fascism as its highest value. Chapter 5 addresses the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Dino Abazović and Ivan Cvitković point out that during the war religion became a powerful tool, capable of mobilizing one ethnic community against the so-called ethnic enemies. Later, in the post-conflict period, the faith-based identities have remained nationalized and reduced to ethnicity, and thus the process of post-conflict social reconstruction continues to depend on (non-)intervention of key actors, including religious representatives. As illustrated throughout the chapter, Bosnia and Herzegovina is faced with a diverse set of issues, but the underlining paradox is that the institutional framework, established by the 1995 Dayton Peace Accords, has favored political options which are the least supportive of its implementation. The design of political institutions does not encourage cross-ethnic cooperation; it rather institutionalizes ethnic discrimination. In the face of failures and limits of the Bosnian political institutions (state), some sort of establishment should fill the gap. With this in mind, the authors discuss the role of organized religion in Bosnia and Herzegovina, including the Islamic Community, the Serbian Orthodox Church, and the Catholic Church. Kenneth Morrison examines the conflict between the Montenegrin and Serbian Orthodox Churches. As pointed out in chapter 6, in the Balkans Orthodox Churches have, in some instances, aligned themselves to nationalist political parties or governments that have sought to create homogenous states. With this in mind, perhaps the most striking example is the Serbian Orthodox Church. In Montenegro, regarded by the

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Serbian Orthodox Church as the “second Serb state” or the “Serbian Sparta,” they have been one of the key instruments utilized to maintain the Serbian identity of the Montenegrins. In 1993 however, the Montenegrin Orthodox Church, autocephalous until it was merged with the Serbian Church in 1920, was re-established and made a claim for autocephalous status. A cornerstone of the subsequent conflict was the question of autocephaly, but the conflict was not one simply based upon ecclesiastical matters; it was, and remains, essentially a political conflict that goes to the heart of the question about Montenegro’s independence and the national identity of the Montenegrins. Accordingly, Morrison analyzes the historical roots and the more recent, post-Yugoslav, trajectory of the conflict, placing a particular focus on the political role played by the churches, issues of autocephaly, and arguments over ownership of property. In chapter 7, Ružica Cacanoska looks into religious polarization of Macedonian modern society. She argues that the long transitional period, the switching of actors on the social stage, and the changes within religious communities have largely contributed to the orientation toward right-wing political structures. In this context, the function of religion is seen primarily through its role as the guardian of the national identity, which strengthens its symbolic function. Some recent events, especially the ethnic conflict in 2001, emphasize this role of religion in Macedonian society and they appropriately carve the religious polarization. As it is demonstrated, revitalization of religion in the Macedonian society is characterized with its specific entrance and action in the public arena; accordingly, religious issues are getting more and more present and relevant—an aspect further confirmed by the penetration of religion into the media. With such a trend in place, one can evade neither the issue of introduction and the one of abolishment of religious courses or theology instruction, nor the issue of processing and returning the nationalized religious real estate, such as the restoration of the old religious buildings and erection of new ones, all of interest to the believers and citizens in general. By spurring these issues, the religious polarization in the modern Macedonian society can be discerned either in a direct or in an indirect way. Chapter 8 deals with the status of religiosity in Serbia. Marko Nikolić, while aware of both the divisions and cooperation attempts between the Catholic and Orthodox Churches, argues that religious content and representatives should, indeed, be included in the processes requiring strategic and political decision-making in advisory and critical-corrective terms. As pointed out, religious believers in Serbia tend to believe that by becoming a member state of the European Union, the country’s religious and national identity would not be affected negatively. Given the religious representatives’ capacity to contribute to building more harmonious social relations in mind, Nikolić argues that they have the right to be loud

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when expressing their standpoints. However, aware of the previous tensions and problematic relations, he concludes that it would be helpful to think of relations between religious communities (church) and state(s) as built on new foundations—such a revisited arrangement does not imply the change of roles but a basis for greater cooperation, also contributing to the consolidation of identity in the present time. Isa Blumi examines the transformations of Islam in Kosovo and its impact on Albanian politics. In chapter 9, he writes about the commodification (or politicization) of religion, as seen in the continued use of religious institutions as a totem of political legitimacy and the evocation of Islam in particular as a monolith within various societies. This is especially the case in highly charged political environments such as Kosovo, where international forces remain key players in daily affairs of Albanians’ relationship with Islam (and Catholicism). As pointed out, the primary reason behind this is the fact that religion continues to be mobilized by stakeholders whose political opportunism seeks to shape communitybuilding agendas and gain leverage in domestic and international settings. In the process of highlighting some of the important shifts taking place among various Muslim constituencies since 1999, this chapter also suggests that conjunctures of strategies and political expediency may contribute to future instabilities in largely neglected corners of the region. As warned, one especially dangerous trajectory is the new mainstream roll granted Muslim fundamentalists—Salafists—as Kosovo becomes an EU-sanctioned recruitment zone for radical mercenary operations infiltrating Libya, Syria, and beyond. In chapter 10, Aleksander Zdravkovski discusses the position of the Islamic community in Sandžak. While noting that participation in various aspects of religious life (such as Friday prayers, pilgrimages to Mecca, and fasting) peaked in the early 2000s in the Serbian part of the Sandžak region, he examines the values promoted by the Islamic community within the broadly defined theory of civic values. The chapter mainly focuses on the relationship between Islam and politics, the rights of women, freedom of speech, and attitudes regarding important historical events and tolerance. Accordingly, the main aim of Zdravkovski’s contribution is to give evidence to the claim that some Islamic values promoted in Sandžak are fully in harmony with the concept of civic values. However, in addition, his research shows that other values that are part of the Islamic dogma are in stark conflict with civic values and could possibly create obstacles in terms of Serbia’s accession to the European Union and NATO. With this in mind, this chapter identifies the most salient points of disharmony and enlists several recommendations that could provide tools for mitigating the dangerous influence of religious conservatism on free society. Finally, chapter 11 elaborates on public discourse of Christian churches in Croatia, Serbia, and Slovenia with regard to the process of

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European integration. Angela Ilić is interested in concrete and abstract representations of Europe, reactions and comments by the selected churches to specific developments in the integration process, as well as support for, or opposition to, integration based on religious perspectives. She analyzes official publications by the selected churches that are distributed at the national level, as well as official speeches and statements by church leaders or commissions. The results are evaluated not only from the perspective of each state, but also presented comparatively in a transnational perspective in order to examine whether and to what extent the central issues for the churches reflect not only national but also regionally important matters. While concluding that all churches distance themselves from the communist past, with each seeing itself as a victim in the then Yugoslavia, Ilić, on the other hand, stresses that most churches perceive secularization as having gone too far, capable of affecting the overall relevance and influence of religion in the Christian European Union. NOTES 1. As José Casanova has put it, there are three understandings of secularization: “the decline of religious beliefs and practices in modern societies, often postulated as a universal, human, developmental process; the privatization of religion, often understood both as a general modern historical trend and as a normative condition, indeed as a precondition for modern liberal democratic politics; and the differentiation of the secular spheres (state, economy, science), usually understood as ‘emancipation’ from religious institutions and norms” (“Rethinking Secularization: A Global Comparative Perspective,” The Hedgehog Review 8, nos. 1–2 [2006], 7). In addition to this and other works by Casanova, see Steve Bruce, God Is Dead: Secularization in the West (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002) and Robert W. Hefner, “Multiple Modernities: Christianity, Islam, and Hinduism in a Globalizing Age,” Annual Review of Anthropology 27, no. 1 (1998), 83–104. 2. Grace Davie, Religion in Modern Europe: A Memory Mutates (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); Grace Davie, Religion in Britain since 1945: Believing Without Belonging (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994). 3. Danièle Hervieu-Léger, “Religion und sozialer Zusammenhalt in Europa,” Transit: Europäische Revue 26 (2003), 101–19. 4. Willfried Spohn, “Multiple Modernity, Nationalism and Religion: A Global Perspective,” Current Sociology 51, nos. 3–4 (2003), 265–86. 5. Peter L. Berger, “Reflections on the Sociology of Religion Today,” Sociology of Religion 62 (Special Issue: Religion and Globalization at the Turn of the Millennium), no. 4 (2001), 443–54; Peter L. Berger (ed.), The Desecularization of the World: Resurgent Religion and World Politics (Grand Rapids, MI: William. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1999). 6. For the position and importance of religion and religious institutions before the crisis, see Stella Alexander, Church and State in Yugoslavia since 1945 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979); Larry A. Dunn, “The Roles of Religion in Conflicts in the former Yugoslavia,” Religion in Eastern Europe 16, no. 1 (1996), 13–27; Paul Mojzes, Yugoslavian Inferno: Ethnoreligious Warfare in the Balkans (New York: Continuum, 1994); Marko Nikolić, Ekumenski odnosi Srpske pravoslavne i Rimokatoličke crkve, 1962–2000. Godine (Beograd: Službeni glasnik, 2011); Vjekoslav Perica, Balkan Idols: Religion and Nationalism in Yugoslav States (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002); Pedro Ram-

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et, “Factionalism in Church-State Interaction: The Croatian Catholic Church in the 1980s,” Slavic Review 44, no. 2 (1985), 298–315; Pedro Ramet, “Catholicism and Politics in Socialist Yugoslavia,” Religion in Communist Lands 10, no. 3 (1982), 256–74; Sabrina P. Ramet, Balkan Babel: The Disintegration of Yugoslavia from the Death of Tito to the Fall of Milošević (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2002), part 2; Srdjan Vrcan, “Transition, War and Religion,” Archives de sciences sociales des religions 43, no. 103 (1998), 153–72; Srdjan Vrcan, Od krize religije ka religiji krize (Zagreb: Školska knjiga, 1986); Michael W. Weithmann, “Renaissance der Religion auf dem Balkans,” Gewerkschaftliche Monatshefte 46, no. 12 (1995), 753–68. 7. Sergej Flere, “Explaining Ethnic Antagonism in Yugoslavia,” European Sociological Review 7, no. 3 (1991), 191. 8. Vrcan, “Transition, War and Religion,” 153. 9. Ibid., 161. As further explained, “[t]he nationalist political strategies . . . have obtained a religious legitimacy primarily because they were considered to be the most promising political, ideological and cultural shock therapies capable of dismantling in a radical way the Ancien Régime and its ideological, cultural and symbolic ingredients, and to create a new national state supposed to be the necessary protective political roof to a distinct national identity and a distinct national culture with the respective religious confession staying in its center or axis and acting as its sacred canopy. Such strategies would lead in the optimal manner to the construction of an independent nation-state and religious freedom. Therefore, it would function as the shortest way out of the previously imposed and induced privatization and ghettoization of religion; it would transform religion from a form of theism with no public function, into another form of theism with an important public function, occupying the very center of the otherwise naked public square. At the same time such strategies would turn churches into the major cultural operator, the main political legitimizing institution able to give and withdraw a specific kind of numinous politically relevant legitimacy” (165–66). 10. Maria Falina, “Svetosavlje: A Case Study in the Nationalization of Religion,” Schweitzerische Zeitschrift für Religions—und Kulturgeschichte 101 (2007), 509. 11. Jonathan Fox, “Religion as an Overlooked Element of International Relations,” International Studies Review 3, no. 3 (2001), 59. 12. European Parliament, “Motion for a Resolution: Yugoslavia after Tito,” May 19, 1980 (European Parliament, 1–170/80). 13. European Parliament, “Motion for a Resolution on the Situation in Kosovo,” July 2, 1981 (European Parliament, 1–337/81). 14. Perica, Balkan Idols, 145. 15. Agostino Casaroli, Il martirio della pazienza: La Santa Sede e i paesi comunisti, 1963–89 (Torino: Einaudi, 2000), 248. 16. Branislav Radeljić, Europe and the Collapse of Yugoslavia: The Role of Non-State Actors and European Diplomacy (London and New York: I. B. Tauris, 2012), 155–56. 17. Casaroli, Il martirio, 249. 18. For a detailed analysis of the SANU Memorandum, see Jasna Dragović-Soso, Saviours of the Nation: Serbia’s Intellectual Opposition and the Rise of Nationalism (London: Hurst, 2002), 177–95. 19. Mojzes, Yugoslavian Inferno, 162. 20. Badredine Arfi, International Change and the Stability of Multiethnic States (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2005), 143. 21. Ramet, Balkan Babel, 162. 22. Perica, Balkan Idols, 138. A similar point is offered by P. H. Liotta, stating that “[f]rom 1991 to 1998, Slobodan Milošević always attempted to manipulate the Serbian Orthodox Church to his advantage. Long disgruntled by the various ways in which the Yugoslav communist regime has shunned it, the church immediately warmed to Milošević’s tactical overtures, such as his praising the church in the regime-controlled Politika newspaper or replacing Marxism with religious instruction in school curricula

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(P. H. Liotta, Dismembering the State: The Death of Yugoslavia and Why It Matters [Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2001], 240, footnote 25). 23. Perica, Balkan Idols, 138. 24. Ibid., 140–41. 25. Mojzes, Yugoslavian Inferno, 133. In his study, Nikolić also analyzes the position of the Catholic Church in Croatia; in addition to openly approving the new leadership, it also supported the expulsion of members of the Orthodox clergy in Croatia, due to the policies employed by the Milošević regime and the Yugoslav People’s Army (Nikolić, Ekumenski odnosi, 480). 26. Tomislav Zdenko Tenšek, “L’ecumenismo cattolico: dal ‘Glas Koncila’ alla ricerca della riconciliazione dopo la guerra nella ex Jugoslavia,” in Luciano Vaccaro (ed.), Storia religiosa di Croazia e Slovenia (Milano: Centro Ambrosiano, 2008), 473. 27. Perica, Balkan Idols, 152–53. 28. Ibid., 153. 29. Donna Winslow, “Religion, Conflict and Reconciliation in Bosnia and Herzegovina,” in Jerald D. Gort, Henry Jansen, and Hendrik M. Vroom (eds.), Religion, Conflict and Reconciliation: Multifaith Ideals and Realities (Amsterdam and New York: Rodopi, 2004), 349. In addition, see Ger Duijzings, Religion and the Politics of Identity in Kosovo (London: Hurst and Co., 2000), 200. 30. Some of the attempts to overcome the problems between the Churches are mentioned and analyzed in Marko Nikolić, Ekumenski odnosi Srpske pravoslavne i Rimokatoličke crkve, 1962–2000. godine (Beograd: Službeni glasnik, 2011), 479–82, and Vjekoslav Perica, “Interfaith Dialogue versus Recent Hatred: Serbian Orthodoxy and Croatian Catholicism from the Second Vatican Council to the Yugoslav War, 1965–1992,” Religion, State and Society 29, no. 1 (2001), 53–57. 31. Philip J. Cohen, “The Complicity of Serbian Intellectuals in Genocide in the 1990s,” in Thomas Cushman and Stjepan G. Meštrović (eds.), This Time We Knew: Western Responses to Genocide in Bosnia (New York: New York University Press, 1996), 42. 32. Radeljić, Europe and the Collapse, 159–60. 33. Glas Koncila, “Our Bishops Warn the World,” March 24, 1991, 2. 34. Ibid. 35. Alex J. Bellamy, The Formation of Croatian National Identity: A Centuries-old Dream? (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2003), 159. 36. Ibid., 163. 37. European Parliament, “Yugoslavia: A Joint Debate on the Crisis in Kosovo, on the Situation in Yugoslavia and on the Crisis and Human Right Violations in Kosovo,” February 21, 1991 (European Parliament, in Official Journal, No. 3–401/270–2). 38. Foreign Broadcast Service, “Possible Recognition of Croatia, Slovenia Urged,” July 13, 1991. In addition, see William Paterson, “The German Christian Democrats,” in John Gaffney (ed.), Political Parties and the European Union (London: Routledge, 1996), 64. 39. Fox, “Religion as an Overlooked Element,” 72. 40. Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Rebuilding a House Divided: A Memoir by the Architect of Germany’s Reunification (New York: Broadway Books, 1998), 91. 41. For anticipating the decision of the European Community to recognize Slovenia and Croatia as independent states, the Vatican was subjected to severe criticism. In his letter to the Pope, Serbian Patriarch Pavle wrote: “You made great diplomatic and political efforts that many other European countries might do the same, immediately after you. In doing so, you employed not only the Vatican state mechanism, but also the organism, structures and institutions of the Roman Catholic Church” (“Letter presented at the Holy assembly of bishops of the Serbian Orthodox Church, held in Belgrade,” January 17, 1992). 42. Mario Nobilo, Hrvatski Feniks (Zagreb: Globus, 2000), 170. 43. Rachel Paul, “Serbian-American Mobilization and Lobbying: The Relevance of Jasenovac and Kosovo to Contemporary Grassroots Efforts in the United States,” in

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Thomas Ambrosio (ed.), Ethnic Identity Groups and U.S. Foreign Policy (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2002), 108. 44. Martina Topić and Dragan Todorović, “Religious Identities in Croatia and Serbia: Failure or Advantage in Building the European Identity?,” in Daniel Sinani (ed.), Antropologija religije i alternativne religije: Kultura identiteta (Belgrade: Faculty of Philosophy, 2011), 67–123. 45. Dragoljub B. Djordjević, “Veroispovest,” in Aljoša Mimica and Marija Bogdanović (eds.), Sociološki rečnik (Beograd: Zavod za udžbenike, 2007), 652; Zorica Kuburić and Ana Kuburić, “Stepen medjusobnog poverenja na Zapadnom Balkanu i u Bugarskoj,” Religija i tolerancija 8, no. 13 (2010), 5–26; Bora Kuzmanović and Nebojša Petrović, “Vrednosni ciljevi kao činioci političkih stavova i mnjenja mladih,” Sociologija 50, no. 2 (2008), 153–74; Vesna Trifunović, “Identitet, religijska kultura i mlada generacija,” in Ljubiša Mitrović, Dragana Zaharijevski, and Daniela Gavrilović (eds.), Identiteti i kultura mira u procesima globalizacije i regionalizacije Balkana (Niš: Centar za sociološka istraživanja Filozofskog fakulteta Univerziteta u Nišu, 2007), 361–67. 46. Marko Blagojević, “Religioznost stanovništva u Jugoslaviji (Prezentacija delimičnog pregleda iskustvenih istraživanja),” in Milan Vukomanović and Nemanja Krajčinović (eds.), Crkva, država i civilno društvo (Beograd: Centar za demokratiju, 2000), 23–35. 47. Nikola Skledar and Dinka Marinović-Jerolimov, “Uloga religije i religioznosti u integracijskim procesima u Hrvatskoj: Teorijsko-metodologijske mogućnosti istraživanja,” Politička misao 34, no. 2 (1997), 177–91; Topić and Todorović, “Religious Identities.” 48. See, for example, Željko Boneta and Boris Banovac, “Religioznost i nacionalizam na hrvatskoj periferiji: Veliki scenariji za male zajednice,” Migracijske i etničke teme 23, no. 3 (2007), 163–84; Gordan Črpić and Siniša Zrinščak, “Dinamičnost u stabilnosti: Religioznost u Hrvatskoj 1999. i 2008. Godine,” Društvena istraživanja 19, nos. 1–2 (2010), 3–27; Loek Halman and Veerle Draulans, “How Secular is Europe?,” The British Journal of Sociology 57, no. 2 (2006), 263–88. 49. For more details on this, see Dino Abazović, Bosanskohercegovački muslimani izmedju sekularizacije i desekularizacije (Zagreb: Synopsis, 2012). 50. Dženita Sarač-Rujanac, Odnos vjerskog i nacionalnog u identitetu Bošnjaka od 1980. do 1990. Godine (Sarajevo: Institut za istoriju, 2012). 51. Duska Matevska, “The Relationship between the Political and Religious Elite in Contemporary Macedonian Society,” Politics and Religion / Politologie des religions 5, no. 1 (2011), 129–40. 52. For more details, see Gëzim Krasniqi, “The ‘Forbidden Fruit’: Islam and Politics of Identity in Kosovo and Macedonia,” Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 11, no. 2 (2011), 191–207; Nora Repo, An Islamic Mosaic: Women’s Identities in Transition— Albanian Muslim Women in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (Abo: Abo Academy University Press, 2012). 53. In addition to the contributors’ own previous accounts, some insightful explanations can be found in Mirko Blagojević and Dragan Todorović (eds.), Orthodoxy from an Empirical Perspective (Niš: Yugoslav Society for the Scientific Study of Religion, 2011); Dragoljub D. Djordjević (ed.), On Religion in the Balkans (Niš and Sofia: Yugoslav Society for the Scientific Study of Religion and Ivan Hadjyiski Institute for Social Values and Structures, 2013); Vanja Hamzić, “Religious Developments in the Western Balkans: Transitional Religion,” Shift Magazine 12 (2007), 14–18; Reinhard Henkel, “Religions and Religious Institutions in the post-Yugoslav States between Secularization and Resurgence,” Acta Universitatis Carolinae, nos. 1–2 (2009), 49–61; Ina Merdjanova and Patrice Brodeur, Religion as a Conversation Starter: Interreligious Dialogue for Peacebuilding in the Balkans (New York: Continuum, 2009); Gorana Ognjenović and Jasna Jozelić (eds.), Politicization of Religion, the Power of State, Nation and Faith: The Case of Former Yugoslavia and its Successor States (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014); Radmila Radić, “Serbian Orthodox Church: The Sole Winner of the Transition in Serbia,” in Johann Marte, Vincenc Rajsp, Karl W. Schwarz, and Miroslav Polzer (eds.), Religion

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und Wende in Ostmittel-und Südosteuropa, 1989–2009 (Innsbruck: Tyrolia Verlag, 2010), 131–48; Milja Radović, “Citizenship and Religion in the Post-Yugoslav States,” CITSEE Working Paper Series 35 (2013), 1–18; Sabrina P. Ramet (ed.), Religion and Politics in PostSocialist Central and Southeastern Europe: Challenges since 1989 (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014).

List of Abbreviations

BCY

Bishops Conference of Yugoslavia

BIK

Islamic Community of Kosovo

BSA

Bosnian Serb Army

CPC

Montenegrin Orthodox Church

DPS

Democratic Party of Socialists

EC

European Community

EU

European Union

EUSR

European Union Special Representative

FRY

Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

HDZ

Croatian Democratic Union

ICTY

International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

IKA

Catholic Press Agency

IPTF

International Police Task Force

ISPJR

Institute for Sociological, Political and Juridical Research

JUL

Yugoslav United Left

KFOR

Kosovo Force

KLA

Kosovo Liberation Army

KPM

Justitia et Pax Commission

KSHS

Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes

LGBT

Lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender

LSCG

Liberal Alliance of Montenegro

MOK

Muslim Youth Club

NATO

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NDH

Independent State of Croatia

NGO

Non-governmental organization

OHR

Office of the High Representative

OSCE

Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe xxvii

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List of Abbreviations

RCC

Roman Catholic Church

RFA

Religious Freedom Act

RSK

Republika Srpska Krajina

SANU

Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts

SDA

Party for Democratic Action

SDS

Serbian Democratic Party

SFOR

Stabilization Force

SFRY

Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

SKCG

Montenegrin League of Communists

SPC

Serbian Orthodox Church

SPS

Serbian Socialist Party

UN

United Nations

UNMIK United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo US

United States

ONE Religion and the Yugoslav Wars (1991–1999) Paul Mojzes

It is so well known that all expressions of religion were repressed under communism that this knowledge has resulted in inaccurate generalizations. The fact that the former Yugoslavia was among the least repressive communist countries regarding religion was less well known in the West, except among field experts. Nevertheless, in the period between 1945 and 1990 religion was brutally persecuted at first, but then “merely” repressed and controlled, and certainly marginalized in regard to its societal position. This observation points to a process of gradual governmental and ideological relaxation, which was conducive to greater religious freedoms between the 1960s and 1980s for individuals as well as institutionalized religion. Many religious institutions used this increased maneuverability to gradually emerge from the period of severe restrictions and persecutions. In this chapter, the author will assume the readers are already familiar or will become so in regards to the dynamics of the transitional period from communism to post-communism, except to point out several major events in this “coming out from the cold” process, as described by a number of local and international scholars. 1 The communist government sought to separate religion from nationalism and keep both under control. But as greater religious liberties were being granted, the religious communities (primarily the Orthodox Church, the Catholic Church, and the Islamic Community) having all been characterized already in the distant past as ethnoreligious (but with religion as the primary identity of their followers), became now the logical focus for the expression of resurgent national aspirations and identifi1

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cations in the multinational and multireligious, but monoideological Yugoslav federation. The revival of religion was as much a response to the suppression of religiosity as it was a response to the repression of excessive nationalistic or ethnic self-affirmation. When the “building of a new socialist man (and woman)” stalled and finally collapsed in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the question in the minds of many Yugoslav citizens—as no Yugoslav national identity had been successfully created— became “Who am I?” An option existed to look forward toward an evolutionary transformation into a multiethnic democratic civil society but instead the vast majority chose to look sideways (toward Western capitalist consumerism) and even more so backward, to the ethnic self-awareness, created during the ascent of nationalism in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Given that open political opposition to the regime was impossible and as most of the political and intellectual elite had to give lip-service to the socialist ideal, most of those who thought differently were attracted to the churches. 2 Expressions of ethnic identity had been nurtured by the national churches—not only the Orthodox, which was traditionally organized into autocephalous church structures, but even the Catholic Church, which claimed universal connection through the papacy, nurtured extremely strong ethnic affiliations. The Serbian Orthodox Church used the Kosovo conflict and the 600th anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo in 1989, the touring of the relics of Prince Lazar to Kosovo, and the memory of concentration camps and excavation of the victims of genocide by the Ustasha during World War II to awaken the slumbering Serbian nationalism. 3 The Catholic Church used the Eucharistic Congresses and Marian Pilgrimages as well as papal visits to draw masses into collective manifestations of Croatian national pride (interestingly, no similar actions were organized by the Slovenian hierarchy). 4 As people of Muslim heritage in Bosnia and Herzegovina matured into nationhood by refusing to identify themselves either as Croats or Serbs, the Islamic religious institutions served as a rallying point in affirming their nascent ethnicity. 5 After years of striving, the government of President Josip Broz Tito accorded to them a status of a nation, which at first they called Muslim (in distinction to the religion, which they spelled with a low case: muslim), but a few years later, during the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, they adopted the name Bošnjak for which I will use the anglicized spelling—Bosniak. Prior to that war, Bosniaks had no other outlet for their national aspirations but to align themselves with the Islamic religious institutions and symbols, whether they were believers and practitioners or not. 6 Ethnic Albanians did not have to rely primarily on Islam even though they were predominantly Muslims because there were sufficient linguistic, cultural, and other distinguishing marks that distanced them from their enemies, the Serbs and Macedonians. Slavic Macedonians were helped by the declaration of autonomy and autocephaly by

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the Macedonian Orthodox Church, which the Serbian Orthodox and other patriarchates have not recognized as canonical but Macedonian; even when they are atheist, they are usually labeled as Orthodox Macedonians. It took about five years after Tito’s death in 1980 for Yugoslavia to begin unraveling, which had a major impact on religion. 7 In five short years the process of disintegration of the federation coincided with the demise of communism in all of Eastern Europe, and by the beginning of the 1990s a series of wars broke out which lasted throughout the decade. Needless to say, an enormous amount of journalistic, eyewitness, and scholarly works have been produced about the wars of the 1990s. While some people see it as a single complex war, I view it as a series of interconnected wars of various durations and various intentions. 8 To begin with, the Slovenian independence war (1991) was of very short duration, with a low number of casualties. This was a war of the Yugoslav federal government against the Republic of Slovenia. It was a fizzled Blitzkrieg in which inexperienced Yugoslav People’s Army recruits were quickly defeated by the veterans of the Slovenian National Guard. The result was that Slovenia was allowed to secede from the federation, which became an omen of the fate of Yugoslavia. Religion seems to have played a scant or no role in this war. The Croatian war (1991–1995) ended only in 1998 when the last vestiges of breakaway Serb-held territories were reincorporated into Croatia. It was a war between rebel Serbs of Croatia, supported by the Yugoslav People’s Army and Serb paramilitaries, against secessionist Republic of Croatia. Croatia’s Serbs argued that if Croatia had the right to secede from Yugoslavia, then they had the right to secede from Croatia. This was a protracted war with high numbers of casualties including ethnic cleansing of large territories, about 10,000 dead and many more wounded, destruction of cities and villages, plunder and other war atrocities, at first performed mostly by Serb forces. United Nations (UN) peacekeeping forces and international negotiators had limited success in keeping ceasefires. With alternating success on battlefields, the war ended abruptly in 1995 with the Croat forces mounting an offensive named Storm, which resulted in a massive expulsion of about 300,000 Serbs from the central parts of Croatia. Serb secessionists continued to hold territories in Western Slavonia until international negotiators persuaded them to peacefully withdraw from contested territory and Croatia’s regained control of all the lands of the former Republic of Croatia. Both Serbs and Croats actively utilized their religious affiliation with the majority church of their nation, namely, the Serbian Orthodox and Roman Catholic Churches, respectively. The war in Bosnia and Herzegovina (1992–1995) was a war of the Yugoslav People’s Army against this newly declared independent country, which morphed into a three-way civil war between Serbs, Croats,

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and Muslims/Bosniaks with frequently changing alliances. It became the bloodiest of the Yugoslav wars with ethnic cleansing, genocide, concentration camps, about 100,000 killed, many more wounded, genocidal rape of about 10,000 women (mostly Bosniak and Croat), exile and deportation of about two million out of a population of four million people. The single most horrendous event—the genocide of about 8,000 Bosniak men at Srebrenica, and the largest mass grave in Tomašica discovered in 2013, were both caused by Serb military and paramilitary units. 9 The war produced many war criminals who tended to be regarded as heroes by their own ethnic group. All three religious communities became deeply enmeshed in heightening the antagonisms. Neither the international community nor the UN with its peace forces were able to achieve meaningful negotiations until the very end of the war that was brought about by means of the Dayton Agreement and the Paris Peace Conference in the fall and winter of 1995. The territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina was formally preserved, but the country remained awkwardly organized into many cantons and two entities: the Bosniak-Croat Federation and the Republika Srpska. The war over Kosovo took place in the spring of 1999. In fact, the earliest outbreak of post–World War II ethnic violence happened in Kosovo in the 1980s, which at times reached a level of a low-intensity war between the minority Serbs and the majority ethnic Albanians but was reduced to passive resistance by the Albanians. As observed elsewhere, “Albanian discontent in Kosovo was ethnic rather than religious in essence. According to the official reports, not a single imam, teacher, or student of the medrese (religious school) participated in the demonstrations of 1981.” 10 Later, given that the Serbian government of Slobodan Milošević was unable or unwilling to resolve the demands of ethnic Albanians for more autonomy and even independence, an extremist group called the Kosovo Liberation Army began a terrorist or national liberation struggle (depending on one’s vantage point), escalating the conflict. NATO, encouraged by the United States, decided to cut the “Kosovo knot” by giving an ultimatum to the Milošević government. Milošević’s decision to resist led to a seventy-day bombing campaign of Serbia (including Kosovo) and Montenegro (at the time still federated as one country). This was an all-out war between Serbs and ethnic Albanians in Kosovo, which caused an enormous exodus of about 800,000 Albanians into neighboring Albania, Macedonia, and Montenegro. War crimes were committed on both sides, with an estimated 10,000 casualties. Once Milošević had caved in, international forces occupied Kosovo and nearly all refugees returned, causing, however, the mass exodus of Serbs and other ethnic minorities fearful of Albanian revenge, which had indeed started to take place sporadically. As negotiations over the status of Kosovo were not delivering results that the US administration expected, in 2008 Kosova (as spelled in Albanian) declared itself as an independent

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country, receiving broad but not unanimous diplomatic recognition with Serbia definitely unwilling to accept the status quo. Finally, the war over Kosovo caused much disruption in the only former Yugoslav republic, Macedonia, which had managed to avoid war in the 1990s. Ethnic Albanian Macedonian extremists, seeing that violence succeeded in Kosovo, began terrorist actions against Slavic Macedonians. A low-level war of 2001 ensued with about 100 people killed and many more exiled from their habitations. Due to the wise policies of Macedonia’s President Boris Trajkovski, assertive international diplomatic and limited military intervention, as well as commencement of interreligious dialogue, the situation quieted down. Concessions were made to the Albanian minority, amounting for 20–40 percent of the population. 11 RELIGION AND THE WARS Religious communities emerged from the private sphere where they used to be relegated by persecution and repression just prior to the outbreak of the Yugoslav wars. In many of the communities, the leadership had no real experience or savvy on how to deal with public challenges. Suddenly they were thrust into the public arena with the squabbling politicians looking for allies in the increasingly intensive ethnic confrontations. On the one hand, the clergy members were pleased to find themselves in the public eye (lots of photo opportunities with well-known politicians) and, on the other hand, they instinctively felt there would be an institutional advantage if the religiously inert masses became activated, in a sense converted, by the ethnoreligious symbiosis. 12 The clergy was used to play the role of pastors or shepherds due to the task of protecting their flock. 13 As the crisis increased, they instinctually accentuated their role; still, they had not been trained in the prophetic or the sage function of religion. Just as the people in times of threat quickly fell into the herd instinct so did the clergy grasp almost intuitively the pain and the threat to its own community with relatively little empathy and understanding of the Other. As its members perceived it, “their” community was not the broader Christian, religious, or even human community but only their denominational followers. For the majority of the religious communities of the former Yugoslavia (Orthodox, Catholic, Islamic, Jewish, and Protestant, with the exception of “free church” neo-Protestants), their membership did not merely consist of those who actively practiced, but of all those who by their ethnonationality were traditionally affiliated with the respective religious community. Thus the religious and even political leadership not only sought to attract the unchurched members of their own ethnic group, but simultaneously regarded others, who in some way appeared to proselytize members of that ethnicity as the natural enemies of the nation and church, thus guilty of treason and apostasy.

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Correspondingly, people in search of identity and protection naturally gravitated to the religious community of their ancestors. Suddenly there was a massive return to the churches, mosques, and synagogues even by people who did not (yet) believe in God and knew very little about the teachings and practices of the religion, but nevertheless wanted to be baptized or in some way introduced to and activated in their ancestral religion. For the time being, attendance—at least on holy days—mushroomed and there was a desire to repair and build religious buildings. But few new buildings were built before hundreds of existing religious buildings were demolished during the wars either as a result of collateral damage or, much more frequently, deliberateness and malice. Places of worship along with cemeteries and other religious structures had become hated symbols for the enemies’ venting of their hatred for all things belonging to the Other. Hundreds of mosques, turbes (graves of prominent Muslim leaders), Catholic and Orthodox churches, monasteries, graveyards, and other religious monuments were targeted by artillery fire, snipers, arson, looting, and by obscene desecration. Graffiti for “our” side or against “their side” became omnipresent; for example, “Bog čuva Srbe” (God protects the Serbs), “Bog i Hrvati” (God and Croats), and “Allahu Akbar” (God is great) were seen all over towns and cities. Military units sought chaplains; clergy blessed weapons and troops and preached sermons and speeches, often more patriotic than religious. One Orthodox priest offered a statement: “It is a greater sin to forgive a killer than to kill.” Another Orthodox priest sent off the Red Beret unit into the battles by wishing them victory over the enemy and a safe return. As the soldiers approached individually and kissed a cross they were sprinkled with holy water. Later in the video segments filmed by this unit one can see them at first abusing and “having fun” with half a dozen captured Bosniak boys and then murdering them in cold blood without the slightest evidence of regret or guilt-feelings. 14 Some Catholic Franciscan friars accompanied Croat troops with guns in their hands. On the Bosniak side, there were special Muslim military units that were trained under an explicitly religious Muslim regime of behavior and uniforms. When one listens to tapes of sermons or speeches of that period, one hears an incredibly vulgar “theology” which has little to do with authentic Christianity or Islam, but much more with the abuse of religion, provoking violence and ethnic cleansing. Were the wars of the 1990s religious? Opinions on this question are quite divided. While most religious people and their leaders have tended to deny it, many non-religious people have tended to affirm it. Among the religious people there were those who stated that their own religious community did not promote the war, but that the other religious communities’ leaders did. According to the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Ljubljana, Alojzije Šuštar, both the Serbian Orthodox Church and the Catholic Church of Croatia acted as nationalist entities and contributed to the

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war. 15 For the Catholic Bishop of Skopje, Joakim Herbut, “[i]t is hard to tell whether these are ethnic or religious conflicts, but ethnic conflicts can be conducted under the aegis of churches, so they take the appearance of religious wars.” 16 My firsthand experience as well as interviews conducted during the Yugoslav wars convinced me that, despite denials by some prominent religious leaders, the religious factor was quite significant, although it would not be appropriate to conclude that the wars of the 1990s were religious wars in the classical understanding of the term. Politicians, journalists, and scholars also offered their interpretations of the role of religion during the Yugoslav wars. For example, Radovan Karadžić, the political leader of the Bosnian Serbs, gave an interview in which he stated that no decision had been made by him and the Bosnian Serb political leadership without first consulting the Orthodox bishops. 17 Presumably this would mean they approved ethnic cleansing and the years-long siege and bombing of Sarajevo. As reported by The Guardian, “[t]he Orthodox hierarchy in Serbia maintained its uncritical alliance with Karadžić to the end of the war, and beyond (as did the Croatian Catholic bishops with their own holy warriors). The Orthodox Churches of Greece and Russia were equally fulsome. In Athens in 1993, the Greek bishops feted Karadžić, proclaiming him a Christian hero.” 18 When looking at scholarly explanations, Jelena Vukoičić wrote that “[i]n regard to the Serbian national community, the Serbian Orthodox Church and its religious symbolism were firmly imbedded into real and mythic historical events. It was the basic moving force behind the return of identity to its people, who had been lost because of the fear of communism. The role of the Serbian Orthodox Church in the war was of great meaning, as was its role in previous wars in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The role of the church in social and political life of the nation started to increase from the moment when the communist system began to collapse.” 19 Vukoičić made the above statement not merely analytically but approvingly. The very same observation can be applied to the remarks of the Catholic Church regarding Croats, to the Islamic Community regarding Bosniaks, the Macedonian Orthodox Church regarding Macedonians, and others. Religion, indeed, was both the main difference among the warring groups as well as the most important cohesive element of each ethnic group. Clergy played a great mobilizing role by urging the followers to actively support the war. On the whole, the clergy representatives uncritically supported their national regimes at least in regard to the war; however, the Serbian Orthodox Church in Serbia occasionally opposed Slobodan Milošević because he did not hypocritically pretend to be a believer which one suspects many other politicians (such as Franjo Tudjman) did out of opportunism. 20 Similarly, in Croatia sociologists of religion have concluded that even during the communist period Croats showed a greater attachment to the Catholic Church than the other ethnic groups. After the fall of commu-

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nism a more obvious revitalization of religiosity among Croats had become visible. During the war years and subsequently “Croatia has been facing the revival of a traditional role for the Church and religion. The population has come to identify almost completely with religion and the church which places Croatia among the countries and regions with the highest level of religiosity in Europe,” with nearly 90 percent of the population declaring themselves Catholics—an aspect that Srdjan Vrcan identified as the re-gathering around ecclesiastic institutions by strengthening a collectivist type of religiosity through the Catholic Church. 21 Like the Orthodox priests who claimed that the Serb army fought God’s war against their enemies, Croat Catholics also attributed divine approval for the actions of the Croat army. As Josip Beljan has put it, “God has, by way of his Church, by way of the Holy Father, looked at his faithful people, spoken out on their behalf, directly intervened in history, in the struggle, warring together with his people for their liberation. . . . With this war God has also returned to his people, in its heart and home. [God] returned to the entire mass media, political, social, and state life of Croatia, from where He was driven out forty-five years earlier. The cross of Christ stands next to the Croatian flag, Croatian bishop next to Croatian minister of state. Croatian priest and teacher are again together in the schools. Present at masses in churches are officers and Croatian soldiers. Guardsmen wear rosaries around their necks. . . . This was truly again a real war for ‘the honored cross and golden liberty,’ for the return of Christ and liberty to Croatia. The Church is glad for the return of its people from the two-fold slavery—Serbian and communist. This is a great ‘kairos’ of God’s grace for the entire Croatian people. Here was not a battle for a piece of Croatian or Serbian land but a war of good and evil, Christianity and communism, culture and barbarity, civilization and primitivism, democracy and dictatorship, love and hatred. . . . Thank God, it all ended well, due to the Pope and Croatian politics.” 22 Muslim religious and political leaders often stated that the war requires a jihadi response and that Muslims who gave their lives fighting for the defense of Bosnia and Herzegovina were shehids (martyrs whose entry into paradise is guaranteed) and gazije and hamze (heroic fighters and conquerors). In addition to regular units of the Bosnian Federation Army, there were special religious Muslim units (such as the Seventh Muslim brigade, Crni labudovi [Black Swans], Green Berets, Green Legion, El Mujahid, and Patriotic League), dressed in special uniforms and green headbands, strictly following Muslim religious obligations, shouting “Tekbir: Allahu akbar” (Call for the response: “God is great”). Their commander, in the presence of the President of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Alija Izetbegović, urged them to pray to Allah for the defeat of their enemies, declaring that the West is collapsing and that returning to Islam and unity with all Muslim countries would secure victory. 23 Muslim religious extremists were advocating pan-Islamic ideals, the return to sharia

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law and traditional Muslim prohibitions of alcohol and pork, the veiling of women, and even polygamy. 24 Some of these fundamentalist notions arose under the influence of foreign mujahideen, whose exact number remained unknown but was estimated at about 3,000, most of whom arrived with rigid Islamist ideas. For them, the more moderate practices of Bosnian Muslims were so objectionable that it is said that they sometimes even attacked the locals. The battles against Bosnian Serb and Croat forces were sometimes being described as battles against infidels. The speeches of the Muslim military and political leaders were almost identical to the speeches by the Catholic Croat and Serbian Orthodox leaders. All of them urged the return to the origins of their respective faiths. Some of the religious leaders were particularly aggressive in promoting nationalism. Mustafa Cerić, even though he was not an extremist, he nevertheless was strongly promoting the Islamization of Bosniaks. Out of the three major leaders—Slobodan Milošević, Franjo Tudjman, and Alija Izetbegović—the latter was the most authentically religious, and despite his many assertions that he was for a multiethnic and multireligious Bosnia and Herzegovina, his previously written Islamic Declaration gave rise to many malicious misinterpretations. A careful and non-alarmist reading of it has given pause even to thoughtful and sympathetic readers as to whether Izetbegović thought that democracy was compatible with a state in which the majority of inhabitants were Muslims—and Bosnia and Herzegovina in the 1990s was 49 percent Muslim. Archbishop Franjo Kuharić of Zagreb, while not particularly combative nevertheless meddled in politics as he saw himself as the protector of Croats not only in Croatia but also in Bosnia and Herzegovina and urged the establishment of the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) in Bosnia and Herzegovina, surely knowing that such an act would contribute to the ethnic disintegration of the republic. He also urged the exclusive use of the Croatian language and the Latin script, which clearly threatened the status of the Serb population in Croatia. As Jure Krišto explained, the Cardinal skillfully steered the Croatian people toward sovereignty: “Unlike his communist compatriots, the Cardinal was not timid about the defense of national sovereignty. Catholic bishops were convinced that by defending national Croatian sovereignty they were doing something good. Hence, they used every opportunity to stand in defense of Croat national interests. One such opportunity was the debate about constitutional amendments concerning the name of the official language of the Republic of Croatia.” 25 One of the evidences of the close linkage of religion and the war was the destruction of a great number of places of worship and persecution of clergy. The discrepancies in the reports of the total number of mosques, Catholic churches, Orthodox churches, and other sacred objects are large and tendentious as well as incomplete. 26 It is fair to say that the largest number of destroyed objects were Islamic. The same uncertainty is true of

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the number of clergy who were killed, placed into concentration camps, or exiled (some were self-exiled, others deported), with Muslims being the most numerous victims as was also the case in the total number of the Muslim population that was killed, raped, and exiled. In some of the reports, particularly Serb, there is a tendency to mix the destruction and casualties of World War II and the wars of the 1990s because in the minds of many Serbs the wars of the 1990s were either a continuation of World War II or a preemptive strike to prevent the same fate as back in the 1940s. Likewise the exact number of mosques and churches destroyed in Kosovo during the years of unrest and fighting in 1999 is unknown, but it is clear that about 30 Serbian Orthodox churches were destroyed by Albanian mob action in 2004. 27 The number of clergy members who were forced to abandon their parishes or mosques after the war is also unknown. While on the surface it might seem that all three major religious communities had an identical entwinement with their nationalists, in reality this was not the case. In Serbia, the Orthodox Church awakened a slumbering Serbian nationalism. Serbian nationalism was traditionally hegemonic. Having achieved its goal of all Serbs in one country (Yugoslavia) in which they numerically dominated and also were more than proportionately represented in the Communist Party and Yugoslav People’s Army they had become passive and self-satisfied until they became threatened by the impending break-up of Yugoslavia. Serbs had up to that point been the least overtly religious. The Orthodox Church along with some nationalist intelligentsia and remnants of četnik ideology jarred them into feeling aggrieved and unappreciated for their sacrifices on behalf of Yugoslavia. Thus, the Serbian Orthodox Church became a dynamo for the reawakening of Serb nationalism and belligerence. In Montenegro, the Communist ideology played a more thorough role and religion was not needed to stoke Montenegrin identity. Their issue was national, namely, whether they were Serbs living in Montenegro or whether Montenegrins were a distinct nation. At first Montenegrin and Serb interests were very closely related, but with the wars ending badly for the Serbs many Montenegrins leaned toward independence. While most consider themselves Serbian Orthodox in terms of religion, a growing movement favors an autonomous and perhaps even an autocephalous Montenegrin Orthodox Church. This desire has led to a schism with the Serbian Orthodox Church. In Croatia, the Roman Catholic Church did not need to reawaken Croat nationalism because this nationalism had continued to smolder under the surface, playing a separatist role during the entire historical experience of Yugoslavia. Croat separatism had already been hitched to Croat nationalism before and during World War II. Some Catholic leaders stoked that nationalism both before and during the wars while others were wise and restrained, and perhaps under papal advice, tried to pro-

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tect the Church from the Ustasha ideology and extremism. In the case of Slovenian nationalism, it did not need the support of Catholicism. Surrounded by Catholic countries, religion was not as distinguishing a mark as language and cultural traditions were. Slovenes were highly secularized, not because of ideological reasons but because of their proximity to Western lifestyles. In the case of Bosniaks, prior to the war Islam was a mark of their identity since they had no other distinct institution around which to coalesce. During the war, as they had been least prepared for it and at first were sustaining enormous losses, the role of Islam greatly increased as it could be used by political and military leaders to rally the population for more effective defense. Thus, the Muslim religious identity of Bosniaks was strengthened during the war as they were threatened with extermination not for being Bosnians but for being Muslims. However, Bosniaks remained diverse regarding how much they wished to mix their nationalism with Islam. Albanians living on the entire territory of ex-Yugoslavia and especially in Kosovo—even though most of them were Muslim and only a minority Catholic and Orthodox—had no need for religion to stoke their ethnonationalism as they differed in language, culture, customs, and general experience of social oppression and poverty. These factors were sufficient to marginalize the role of religion (despite a fairly high percentage of religious identification). Their political leadership realized their cause would be weakened by the Serb accusation that Albanians are Muslim fundamentalists prone to terrorism. For this reason, religion was kept marginalized except in the intolerance toward Serbian Orthodoxy and their sacred objects that were particularly plentiful in Kosovo. Macedonian nationalism, like that of Bosniaks, was one of the latest to emerge. Over the centuries Macedonians have been considered western Bulgarians, southern Serbs, or northern Greeks. Tito comprehended the longing of the Macedonians to be themselves and first allowed the creation of a federal unit, named Republika Makedonija, and then encouraged the creation of their literary language and permitted the Macedonian Orthodox Church to seek autonomy from the Serbian Patriarchate and then proclaimed autocephaly, especially since they declared independence in 1991. They faced instantaneous opposition from Greece (in regard to the name of the country) and resentment and rebellion by their large ethnic Albanian population. Macedonian Communists supported the autonomy and autocephaly of their Church and the Macedonian Orthodox Church has given full support to all subsequent governments of Macedonia irrespective of their political orientation. Despite some constitutional and political accommodations the tension between the Slavic Macedonians and Muslim Albanians continues to be high, with religion being sucked into this rivalry.

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THE POSITIVE ROLE OF RELIGIONS It is important to remember that Churches and religious communities did not solely play a destructive role during the Yugoslav wars. There were numerous attempts to either prevent war from breaking out or attempt to end it or minimize the casualties, and in a few cases to accomplish reconciliation. For example, in the summer of 1991 Hamdija Jusufspahić, the mufti of Belgrade met with Patriarch Pavle of the Serbian Orthodox Church during which time they agreed that religion should not be misused for nationalistic purposes. Patriarch Pavle (Stojčević) and Cardinal Franjo Kuharić of Zagreb met in Sremski Karlovci, in Serbia (May 1991) before the outbreak of the war, then they met during the war in Slavonski Brod, in Croatia (August 1991), in St. Gallen and Geneva, in Switzerland (both meetings in 1992). Cardinal Vinko Puljić of Sarajevo was accompanied by Reis Jakub Selimoski on a trip to the Vatican to speak with Pope John Paul II. As reported by the Vatican, “the Cardinal held interreligious meetings in October 1993 in Sarajevo with Cardinal Roger Etchegaray, President of the Pontifical Councils of Justice and Peace and ‘Cor Unum’; with the Apostolic Nuncio in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Archbishop Francesco Monterisi; with the Catholic, Orthodox, Jewish and Muslim religious leaders of the city and of the country. And also, a meeting on May 17, 1994, at Sarajevo airport, with the Patriarch of the Russian Orthodox Church, Alexis II, Patriarch Pavle of the Serbian Orthodox Church, and Cardinal Franjo Kuharić, Metropolitan Archbishop of Zagreb.” 28 Reis Cerić was also supposed to take part but absented himself because Patriarch Pavle did not consent to apologize for Serbian war crimes prior to the meeting. Still, another meeting was held between Puljić, Cerić, and Orthodox Bishop Atanasije in Geneva, in January 1995. The appeals and statements issued at these meetings were well crafted and deeply religious. While condemning rape and war crimes, and clearly underscoring that those who insisted they were carrying out crimes in the name of God were committing the greatest crime against their own religion, the statements insisted on an urgent cessation of hostilities, protection of holy places, liberation of war prisoners and closure of concentration camps, cessation of ethnic cleansing, return of deported and exiled persons, free access of clergy to their flock, access to humanitarian aid, and so on. 29 Regretfully, these declarations did not have much effect on the ground: while they received some circulation abroad they were not widely circulated domestically. The highly positioned religious officials were willing to condemn the various evils no matter who committed them, but none of them were willing or able to specifically condemn crimes perpetrated by their own forces. Yet in many arenas they freely criticized the misdeeds of others.

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We should briefly mention smaller religious communities that were not directly involved in the war often held ecumenical prayer meetings for peace. Members of the Adventist Church engaged in a remarkably courageous service of taking mail to combat areas when the post office no longer provided services. Almost all churches provided humanitarian services but there was a sense that the Orthodox humanitarian services were primarily for Serbs, Catholic for Croatians, Muslim for Bosniaks. Women from mixed marriages were sometimes shuttled back and forth being told they should go to the Others as they did not really belong there. For that reason the Protestant humanitarian services, in particular the United Methodist Committee for Overseas Relief, made sure they employed staff from all nationalities and religions in order to serve all people in need more effectively. CONCLUSION In interpreting the role of religion in the Yugoslav wars, one can see that an amalgam of folkish mythology of the alleged glories of each of the ethnoreligious groups was mixed with the blessing of the armed struggle by major or minor clergy that emphasized the victimization of one side only and overlooked the suffering that particular side had perpetrated against the others. Political and military leaders manipulated this process for their own strategic secular goals. It should be noted that among the Muslims, Orthodox, and Catholics there were many who severely criticized Western democracy and felt it to be incompatible with their traditional values. Verbally the leaders spoke favorably of democracy, but in their governing behavior they showed strong dictatorial penchants, especially Milošević and Tudjman. While some trends leading to the disintegration of Yugoslavia and a dramatic return of religion to the public sphere were already discernible in the 1970s and 1980s, few expected it to be so violent. The unraveling of communist antagonism to religion could have brought about liberation from the strictures imposed upon religion and a blossoming of both individual and collective religious liberty. That the ethnoreligious symbiosis would make many people accessories to ethnic cleansing and genocide was neither predictable nor necessary. Conditions of war were conducive to homogenization along ethnoreligious lines because, when threatened, the herd instinct for safety becomes extremely powerful. Religion was not merely a specific group’s way to relate to their God and their co-religionists’ community but became again a tool for the expression of identity. During the war such expression was often pathological. With the end of the war and the beginning of the new millennium there was a chance for a much healthier rediscovery of the meaning of religion in the individual and collective lives of the people of the former Yugoslavia.

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NOTES 1. See, for example, Dino Abazović, Religija u tranziciji (Sarajevo: Rabic, 2010); Klaus Buchenau, Orthodoxie und Katholizismus in Jugoslawien, 1945–1991: Ein serbischkroatischer Vergleich (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, 2004); Ivan Cvitković, Encountering Others (Niš: Yugoslav Society for the Scientific Study of Religion, 2013); Ina Merdjanova, Rediscovering the Umma: Muslims in the Balkans between Nationalism and Transnationalism (USA: Oxford University Press, 2013); Vjekoslav Perica, Balkan Idols: Religion and Nationalism in Yugoslav States (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002); Radmila Radić, Verom protiv vere (Belgrade: INIS, 1995); Sabrina P. Ramet, Balkan Babel: The Disintegration of Yugoslavia from the Death of Tito to the Fall of Milošević (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2002); Michael Sells, The Bridge Betrayed: Religion and Genocide in Bosnia (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1996); Mitja Velikonja, Religious Separation and Political Intolerance in Bosnia-Herzegovina (College Station, TX: Texas AandM University Press, 2003). 2. Radmila Radić, “Crkva i ‘srpsko pitanje,’” in Nebojša Popov (ed.), Srpska strana rata: Trauma i katarza u istrijskom pamćenju (Belgrade: Republika, 1996), 303. 3. Perica, Balkan Idols, 123–32. 4. Ibid., 56–73. In addition to Perica, see Melissa K. Bokovoy, Jill A. Irvine, and Carol S. Lilly (eds.), State-Society Relations in Yugoslavia, 1945–1992 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997); Klaus Buchenau, “What Went Wrong? Church-State Relations in Socialist Yugoslavia,” Nationalities Papers 33, no. 4 (2005), 547–67; Mient Jan Faber (ed.), The Balkans: A Religious Backyard of Europe (Ravenna: Longo Editore, 1996); Miroslav Volf, “Church, State, and Society: Reflections on the Life of the Church in Contemporary Yugoslavia,” Religion in Eastern Europe 10, no. 1 (1990), 1–16. 5. Zdenko Rotter, “Yugoslavia at Crossroads: A Sociological Analysis,” Religion in Eastern Europe 8, no. 2 (1988), 11–24; Zdenko Rotter, “The Position of Believers as Second-Class Citizens in Socialist Countries: The Case of Yugoslavia,” Religion in Eastern Europe 9, no. 3 (1989), 1–17. 6. Velikonja, Religious Separation, 220, 223–24. 7. Arthur B. Keys, Jr., “A Time of Transition for Religion in Yugoslavia,” Religion in Eastern Europe 11, no. 3 (1991), 1–20. 8. Paul Mojzes, Yugoslavian Inferno: Ethnoreligious Warfare in the Balkans (New York: Continuum, 1995), 125–51. For details about the genocides and ethnic cleansing, see Paul Mojzes, Balkan Genocides: Holocaust and Ethnic Cleansing in the Balkans (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2011), 131–220. 9. Eldar Emrić, “Mass Grave may be Biggest yet in Bosnia,” The Philadelphia Inquirer, November 1, 2013, A6. 10. Aydin Babuna, “The Albanians of Kosovo and Macedonia: Ethnic Identity Superseding Religion,” Nationalities Papers 28, no. 1 (2000), 72, 78. 11. Mojzes, Balkan Genocides, 231–35. The percentages are contested by opposite claims between the official government figures of few ethnic Albanians and ethnic Albanians claiming a much larger number. 12. For the sake of brevity I include under this term not only Christian but also Jewish and Muslim religious functionaries. 13. Paul Mojzes, “The Camouflaged Role of Religion in the War in Bosnia and Herzegovina,” in Paul Mojzes (ed.), Religion and the War in Bosnia (Atlanta, GA: American Academy of Religions, 1998), 74–98. 14. Škorpioni (nemontiran materijal) http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=84_Ld FAA3c0, accessed August 16, 2012. However, when attempting to access the video in 2013 there was a notification that the video had been removed for alleged copyright violations. Several versions of excerpts are still available on YouTube under “Skorpioni” http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=84_LdFAA3c0, accessed August 16, 2013. 15. Author’s interview with Archbishop Šuštar, in Ljubljana, on September 1, 1993. 16. Author’s interview with Bishop Herbut, in Skopje, on August 23, 1993.

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17. Paul Mojzes, “The Religiosity of Radovan Karadžić,” Religion in Eastern Europe 15, no. 4 (1995), 17–22. 18. Marcus Tanner, “Karadžić’s ‘Holy War’,” The Guardian, March 2 2010, http:// www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/belief/2010/mar/02/karadzic-holy-war-bosnia, accessed August 15, 2013. 19. Jelena Vukoičić, “Religija i nacionalni identitet Srba u Republici Srpskoj i Bosni i Hercegovini,” Religija and Tolerancija 10, no. 18 (2012), 230. Translated from Serbian by Paul Mojzes. 20. Alija Izetbegović was clearly an exception because he had been imprisoned under communism for his Muslim convictions and writings, of which the most important and controversial is The Islamic Declaration. 21. Ankica Marinović, “Images of the Religious Other in Religious Instruction Textbooks in Croatia,” in Christian Moe (ed.), Images of the Religious Other: Discourse and Distance in the Western Balkans (Novi Sad: CEIR, 2008), 75, 77. 22. Josip Beljan, “Priznata vjernost,” Veritas 9–10 (1992), 24–25. Translated from Croatian by Paul Mojzes. 23. See http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HWVUMkzEMg0, accessed August 19, 2013. 24. Velikonja, Religious Separation, 278–79. Velikonja’s book (185–295) contains the largest amount of data about the interaction of religion and nationalism in the war in Bosnia and is among the most astute analyses. 25. Jure Krišto, “Diverse Functions of Catholicism and Orthodoxy in Social Upheaval (1989–1992),” unpublished manuscript, 7–8. 26. In most instances those who provided the estimates tended to focus one-sidedly only on the destruction wrought by Serbs or conversely that carried out by Bosniaks or Croats, usually in a particular area, from which it is incorrect to extrapolate the total losses on the entire territory of ex-Yugoslavia. 27. See http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=anzV_07bN_U, accessed August 18, 2013. 28. See http://www.vatican.va/news_services/press/documentazione/documents/ cardinali_biografie/cardinali_bio_puljic_v_en.html, accessed August 18, 2013. 29. For a more complete quote from the 1992 Geneva declaration, see Mojzes, Yugoslavia Inferno, 147–48. The full text can be found in Occasional Papers on Religion in Eastern Europe 12, no. 5 (1992), 50–51.

TWO Religion in the Yugoslav Successor States at the Beginning of the Twenty-First Century Raymond Detrez

With the turn of the century, a new stage began in religious life in the Yugoslav successor states. In the previous decade, religious institutions and religious leaders had often played an active role in supporting or at least justifying the nationalist and irredentist policies of their respective governments. In exchange, political leaders helped the church—and for that matter the mosque—to recover from the damages suffered under the communist regime and ultimately to acquire a privileged position in the state. As Mitja Velikonja noticed, commenting on the alliance between religious institutions and state power, “national, political, and, ultimately, military mobilization of these societies could not be achieved without religious legitimation, while, on the other hand, religious communities were unable to achieve their goals without the active support of nationalist parties and politics in general.” 1 Five years after Dayton, with the June 1999 Military Technical Agreement signed between Serbia and the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR), concluding the war in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and the August 2001 Ohrid Agreement, the nationalist conflicts in the Western Balkans finally came to an end. About the same time, there occurred among both political and church leaders a number of staff changeovers: in 1997 Franjo Kuharić, the Croatian archbishop and true ally of President Franjo Tudjman, retired and was succeeded by Josip Bozanić; in 1999 Tudjman died; in Serbia in 2000, Slobodan Milošević was dethroned and replaced by Vojislav Koštunica. The consequences of these changes were not in all cases identical and not 17

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always unfavorable to the churches. The religious institutions had now acquired a position of power that enabled them to focus on their evangelic mission—the dissemination of the traditional moral values proper to their creed, including love of one’s neighbor, while remaining the conscience of the nation. They did so with such a zeal that in some of the Yugoslav successor states the secular nature of the state was seriously endangered. CONSOLIDATION OF THE LEGAL STATUS After the disintegration of Yugoslavia, the religious institutions—Christian and Muslim alike—were facing the complex task of reacquiring the legal position, moral authority, and political influence, the (immovable) properties and in some cases the jurisdiction they had lost under the communist regime. As the new independent states considered religious freedom as an aspect of the democratic societies they were eager to establish, religious freedom in the framework of a secular state was constitutionally granted to all citizens in each of them. Most of the legal provisions were initiated already in the 1990s, when the new constitutions were voted. 2 Although these constitutions explicitly proclaim the separation of state and church and reject religious discrimination, in practice in most of the successor states one particular religious institution enjoys a privileged position as a “traditional creed,” which is not uncommon in several Western countries either. This is most discernibly the case with the Catholic Church in Croatia and the Orthodox Church in Serbia and Macedonia, to which a crucial role in the nation and state building process is attributed. This privileged position transpires most strikingly from the methodical and arresting presence of representatives of those “traditional churches” at various official occasions, which is a symbolic, but nevertheless significant infringement of the proclaimed secular character of the state. The legal provisions regulating the position of the religious institutions were amended or expounded in the 2000s. In Serbia the Constitution reserves no privileged place to the Orthodox Church. However, article 10 of the Law on Churches and Religious Communities (Zakon o crkvama i verskim zajednicama), voted on April 20, 2006, by the Serbian Assembly after long public debates and after the text was endorsed by the Patriarchate, makes a distinction between, on the one hand, “traditional churches and traditional religious communities that have in Serbia an age-old continuity and whose status as a legal subject is based on particular laws,” and on the other hand, “confessional communities.” 3 Traditional churches are the Serbian Orthodox Church, the Roman Catholic Church, the Slovak Evangelical Church (Augsburg Confession), the Reformed Christian Church, and the Evangelical Christian Church (eventu-

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ally, after protests from Bucharest, the Romanian Orthodox Church was added to the list). Traditional religious communities are the Jewish and the Muslim communities, which cannot be termed as churches. Article 11 of the Law, descriptively rather than prescriptively, points out “the extraordinary historical, state building and civilizational role of the Serbian Orthodox Church in the formation, the safeguarding and the development of the identity of the Serbian nation” and singles out the Serbian Orthodox Church as a primus inter pares. So-called “confessional communities” are all the others—mainly neoProtestant or Evangelistic churches as Jehovah’s Witnesses, Mormons, Methodists, Seventh-Day Adventists, and suchlike—which, at variance with the “churches and religious institutions,” have to apply for official registration. Traditional churches and religious communities are not obligated to register—a discrimination that in fact legalizes a kind of hierarchical distinction between “traditional churches and communities” and “religious confessions.” Obviously the provision that “confessional communities” need to register aims at protecting more specifically the Serbian Orthodox Church against the neo-Protestant communities, which make converts mainly among the Orthodox flock. The “traditional churches and religious communities” as a rule do not proselytize among each other. Registration can be refused, as provided in article 3 of the Law on Churches and Religious Communities, which echoes article 44 of the Constitution: “The Constitutional Court may ban a religious community only if its activities infringe the right to life, the right to mental and physical health, the rights of the child, the right to personal and family integrity, public safety and order, or if it incites religious, national or racial intolerance.” In practice, neo-Protestant churches are frequently branded as “sects” and prevented from registration, or deprived of many of their rights. 4 Similar restrictions on “sects,” however, exist in many European countries, although they are not applied in a similar discriminatory way; the US is more tolerant, as a rule. Most protests against violations of the religious freedom of neo-Protestant communities seem to come from organizations in the US. Article 41 of the Croatian Constitution states that “[a]ll religious communities shall be equal before the law and shall be separated from the State.” In the 2002 Law on the Legal Position of Religious Communities (Zakon o pravnom položaju vjerskih zajednica) no denominations are mentioned by name. Article 5, clause 1 of the Law specifies that religious communities can gain legal status when they become enlisted in the register, and they can get enlisted in the register called evidencija upon making an official application. Clause 2 also states that only communities that worked for five years as legal entities can apply to obtain an official legal status. This means that a religious community is not obligated to apply for a legal status, but if it fails to do so it does not have the same rights as those that did register.

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In Bosnia and Herzegovina, relations between the state and the religious communities are regulated by the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which came as Annex 4 with the 1995 Dayton Agreement and was agreed upon by the signatories. Amendments were made in 2009 under the supervision of the international community. Both entities in Bosnia and Herzegovina, created by the Dayton Agreement, the (Bosniak-Croat) Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska, have additional constitutions of their own. The Constitution of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina grants religious freedom, paralleling the rather unspecific phrasing of the Dayton Agreement. 5 The 1992 Constitution of the Republika Srpska proclaimed in Article 10 the freedom and equality of all religious creeds, but specified in paragraph 3 of Article 28 that “[t]he Serbian Orthodox Church shall be the church of the Serb people and other people of Orthodox religion.” Paragraph 4 of Article 28, however, stating that “[t]he state financially supports the Orthodox Church, cooperates with it in all domains, and particularly with the end of preserving, tending and developing the cultural, traditional and other spiritual values” was removed by Amendment LXXII after the conclusion of the Dayton Agreement. 6 The 2004 Law on Freedom of Religion and Legal Position of Churches and Religious Communities in Bosnia and Herzegovina stipulates, among other things, that the state may not accord the status of state religion nor that of state church or religious community to a church or any religious community, that no church or religious community or their officials may obtain any special privileges from the state as compared to any other church or religious community or their officials, nor participate formally in political institutions, that no laws and doctrines of churches and religious communities shall have any civil-legal effect or shall be forcibly imposed by the public authorities. Newly formed churches and religious communities acquire legal personality by the act of registration. 7 In Macedonia, the Constitution was amended in a way that at least formally put an end to the legal favoritism of the Macedonian Orthodox Church as a primus inter pares. Article 19 of the first 1992 Macedonian Constitution stipulated that “[t]he freedom of religious confession is guaranteed. The right to express one’s faith freely and publicly, individually or with others is guaranteed. The Macedonian Orthodox Church and other religious communities and groups are separate from the state and equal before the law. The Macedonian Orthodox Church and other religious communities and groups are free to establish schools and other social and charitable institutions, by way of a procedure regulated by law.” Mentioning only the Macedonian Orthodox Church by name, the suggestion was made that it occupies a more prominent position in the state visà-vis the other religious communities and groups remained nameless. Implementing article 19, paragraphs 3 and 4 of the 2001 Ohrid Agree-

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ment, 8 and even enlarging them to additional religious communities not mentioned in the Agreement, article 19 of the Macedonian Constitution was by the end of 2001 amended as follows: “1. The Macedonian Orthodox Church, as well as the Islamic Religious Community in Macedonia, the Catholic Church, Evangelical Methodist Church, the Jewish Community and other Religious communities and groups are separate from the state and equal before the law; 2. The Macedonian Orthodox Church, as well as the Islamic Religious Community in Macedonia, the Catholic Church, Evangelical Methodist Church, the Jewish Community and other Religious communities and groups are free to establish schools and other social and charitable institutions, by way of a procedure regulated by law.” 9 Relations between the state and the religious institutions and communities in Macedonia were finally regulated in the same pluralist spirit by the 2007 law on the legal status of church, faith community, and religious group (Zakon o pravnata položba na crkva, verska zaednica i religiozna grupa). 10 Both the 2006 Montenegrin and the 2008 Kosovo Constitutions state that the state is secular and neutral in matters of religious beliefs. Thus, the constitutions of all Yugoslav successor states emphasize the secular character of the republic that means the strict separation of church and state, in combination with an almost unlimited religious freedom. In practice, however, in most of them there is a “traditional church” that for historical reasons occupies a particular, privileged position. The extent to which this privileged position is made explicit in the constitution itself in some cases seems to depend on the scope of external pressure. As all Yugoslav successor states aspired or still aspire one day to become members of the European Union (EU), they have all tended to adapt their legislation to EU criteria. Those constitutions appear to be the most liberal that are designed in circumstances of considerable dependence on—or pressure from—the international community, as for instance in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1995, in Macedonia after 2001, and in Kosovo in the years preceding independence in 2008. Conversely, the privileging of one particular religious institution is most noticeable in the constitutions designed or voted by parliaments that were reluctant or even hostile to foreign interventions, as for instance the Serbian parliaments in Serbia and the Republika Srpska. The amendments to the constitutions of the Republika Srpska and of Macedonia are the result of direct intervention of the Office of the High Commissioner in Sarajevo and of the EU and the US mediators, respectively, in Ohrid. Whether these legal provisions are actually implemented or not also seems to depend to a large extent on international monitoring.

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RECOVERY AND MORE The first concern of the religious institutions after independence was to restore the material and moral position they had held in society before the establishment of the communist regime. The concordats (agreements with the Vatican) concluded by Croatia in 1996 and 1998 and by Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2006 greatly restored the competences of the Catholic Church in the country and the entity not merely to an extent considered normal in Western secular states, but consolidated a process of increasing de-secularization of Croat society. In Croatia, a wide autonomy was granted to the Catholic Church; religious education in schools was introduced in 1991 and the church acquired access to the army, the police, hospitals, prisons, the media, and so on. Religious education in schools was on a voluntary basis, but pupils who did not attend the classes reportedly were discriminated against or ostracized. Catholic catechism teachers would be paid by the state; the state would also take care of the maintenance of church buildings. The archbishopric was entitled to open its own schools, high schools, seminaries, and universities which were to be co-financed by the state; these church schools would grant valid diplomas. A marriage performed in the church was accepted as valid by the state authorities, as was an ecclesiastical annulment of a marriage. Church-issued certificates of baptism had the same validity as state-issued birth certificates. 11 In 1998 an additional agreement was reached, stipulating that the state would pay a part of the salaries of priests and other people employed by the church. 12 The favors offered to the Catholic Church in education, political, and social life enabled the church to embark on activities that were then seen by many as a form of proselytism, 13 the more so as an agreement with the other religious communities was reached only in 2002 with the Law on the Legal Status of Religious Communities (Zakon o pravnom položaju vjerskih zajednica). The 1998 Concordat provided for the restitution of all Catholic Church property (mainly land and buildings), confiscated by the communist regime after 1945, or compensation for the Church when restitution was impossible. 14 In 2003 the Church asked for property restitution worth about a hundred million euro. In 2004, it had received about 30 percent of it. Although many properties have not yet been restituted—and probably never will as many local authorities are opposed to it—in 2005 the Catholic Church in Croatia was already among the five wealthiest organizations in the country, exceeded only by oil and communications companies. 15 The Church does not pay taxes on income as all other citizens and companies do. In 1997, when Archbishop Franjo Kuharić retired after almost thirty years of service, the Croat Democratic Union (HDZ) lost its main supporter. His successor, Josip Bozanić, brought in a more moderate and ecumenical accent which was to overcome the perception of a church too

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blatantly involved in party politics and worldly affairs. When President Franjo Tudjman died in December 1999, the Croat Catholic Church lost its chief ally. In 2000, the HDZ for the first time since 1990 lost the parliamentary elections and had to cede power to a center-left coalition. From 2003 to 2011, the HDZ was in power again. Although it too had become more restrained, neither the social democrats, who ruled from 2000 to 2003, nor the current center-left Kukuriku coalition have dared to seriously challenge the position of power the Catholic Church established in the 1990s. In Slovenia, the Catholic Church initially did not acquire the same prominent position in society as it did in Croatia. Slovenia had a sound secular tradition, rooted in the Reformation and in nineteenth-century anticlerical liberalism. At variance with the situation in Croatia, a large majority of Slovenians are opposed to church involvement in politics. 16 This does not mean, however, that there is no conservative element in Slovenian society, which is in favor of a more potent Catholic Church. With the enthronement of Monsignor Franc Rode as archbishop of Ljubljana in 1997, this element gained momentum. In 2000, during the shortlived cabinet of the central-rightist Prime Minister Andrej Bajuk 17 among other things the introduction of optional obligatory classes on religion or ethics in Slovenian schools was considered. 18 These classes, the contents of which remained vague, were likely to be monopolized by the Catholic Church and therefore provoked huge resistance among uncompromising proponents of the separation of church and state. 19 In addition, it was feared that optional religious instruction would open the door for nonCatholic students being ostracized, as often happened in Croatia. 20 The eventual outcome was a compromise—an elective course called “Religions and Ethics”—that was, nevertheless, indicative of the influence the Catholic Church had acquired in Slovenia too. 21 The situation in Serbia is not different from that in Croatia. Although Patriarch Pavle (1990–2009) initially supported the nationalist policy of Slobodan Milošević, the Serbian Church failed to be rewarded immediately. Milošević and the Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS) leadership were still too much old-school communists to cede much power to the church. The program of the SPS explicitly rejected clericalism, considering Orthodox Christianity useful only as a “counter-ideology” to Catholicism and Islam. 22 The Serbian Patriarchate acquired a position of power only after the fall of Milošević in October 2000. His successor, Vojislav Koštunica, a more conventional Serbian nationalist and convinced Orthodox Christian, was prepared to agree upon a more prominent role of the Patriarchate in Serbian society. After fierce debates, religious instruction as a multidenominational and optional subject for students of the first grade of elementary school and high school was introduced by a governmental regulation published on July 27, 2001. 23 Pupils could choose between religious education and civic education, or select neither of them. The

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options, as Miroslava Malešević noticed, not only reflected but deepened the dichotomy in Serbian society concerning traditional, patriarchal Serbian values and modern, democratic European ones. 24 In the course of the following years, religious instruction was enlarged: by 2005 both religious education and civic education received the status of mandatory elective subjects for the entire duration of education. The traditional churches and religious communities were entrusted with the organization of religious instruction in public schools. 25 The Orthodox Theological Faculty was incorporated in the State University of Belgrade. 26 Rada Drezgić offers a long list of other encroachments of the Serbian Church in public life: the appointment of priests to the governing boards of public companies, the increased presence of religious content in the media, the performance of religious ceremonies for the inauguration of municipality leaders, the celebration of religious services in the army, the establishment of a chapel in the main dormitory of the University of Belgrade, and public celebrations of patron saints (slava) by institutions ranging from political parties to trade unions and betting and gambling companies. 27 In Bosnia and Herzegovina, by demand of all dominant religious communities—Croats, Muslims, and Serbs—religious education had already been introduced by 1994. 28 In the (Bosniak-Croat) Federation of BosniaHerzegovina, religious instruction is an elective subject in elementary and secondary schools; in the Republika Srpska it is taught in elementary schools. A Framework Law on Elementary and Secondary Education in Bosnia and Herzegovina was agreed upon in 2003. Article 9 stipulates that “pupils shall attend religious classes only if latter match their beliefs or beliefs of their parents” and wisely adds that “[s]tudents who do not wish to attend religious education classes shall not in any way be disadvantaged compared to other students.” 29 Religious developments within the Muslim community in Bosnia and Herzegovina roughly follow the Croat and Serb models. The smooth cooperation of the Party for Democratic Action (SDA) with the Islamic Community is a reminder of the understanding and mutual support of the Catholic Church with the HDZ and the Serbian Patriarchate with the SPS. 30 Since the Islamic Community of Yugoslavia in 1993 fell apart in national communities, the Islamic Community (Islamska Zajednica) of Bosnia and Herzegovina, led by reis-ul-ulema Mustafa Cerić (1993–2012), has become the “own” religious institution of the Bosnian Muslims and has increasingly been committed to the defense of the national interests of the Bosnian Muslims. The same year, these “Muslims in the ethnic sense” (Muslimani u etničkom smislu) as they were called in the former Yugoslavia adopted “Bosniaks” (Bošnjaci) as their official name, finally effectuating the same merging of nation and faith as exists among Croats and Serbs. 31 While the Islamic Community of Bosnia and Herzegovina provided the SDA and the Bosniaks with a national ideology, the SDA defended the interests of Islam and presented the Islamic society with a

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moral authority that, similarly to what happened in Croatia and Serbia, went against the mandatory secular character of the state. 32 The Islamic Community of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a religious institution has pursued the same policy as their Croat and Serb Christian counterparts. Among the Muslim claims were the restoration of religious holidays, the restitution of vakufs (immovable properties held by religious foundations), confiscated by the communist regime, the building of new mosques, the introduction of halal food in schools, hospitals, barracks, and prisons, and so on. 33 Other demands were the introduction of religious instruction in schools, of moral and religious consultants in the army, spaces for prayer in public buildings, the opening of a Faculty of Islamic Studies in Sarajevo, for religious teachers colleges in Zenica and Bihać, and of a number of new madrasas. 34 Muslim religious scholars increasingly hold important public offices, which represents a violation of the principle of the separation of religion and state, 35 although many members of the SDA who hold important public functions have a religious training. However, like the Catholic Church in Croatia and the Orthodox Church in Serbia, the Islamic community in Bosnia and Herzegovina is not almighty: the establishment of sharia courts was not even seriously taken into consideration and vakufs have only partly been restituted. A timid prohibition on the sale of alcohol in restaurants during Ramadan is poorly implemented. THE AFTERMATH OF NATIONALISM As religion—in the broadest sense of the word, including culture, specific historical bonds, and suchlike—constitutes the basic component of the national identity of Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs making them different nations, it is understandable that religious institutions and religious leaders continue to play an important role in the process of nation and state building even after the establishment of their respective nation-states. The Serbian Patriarchate still considers itself as the protector of all Serbs, not only those living in the Republic of Serbia, but also those in Croatia, in the Republika Srpska in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in Kosovo, Montenegro, and Macedonia, in fact all over the world. A particular Serbian “nationalized” variety of Orthodoxy called “Svetosavlje” (“Holy-Savahood,” after Holy Sava, the early thirteenth-century founder of the Serbian Church) stands for the merging of nation, church, and state. The Croat Catholic Church also ascribes to itself the role of savior of the Croat nation, but at the same time remains conscious of its belonging to a worldwide ecclesiastical organization to which it is accountable. The Vatican supports Croatian (and Slovenian) nationalism of a Catholic brand, but also exerts, together with a number of Catholic organizations abroad (for instance, Pax Christi), a moderating—and therefore not always wel-

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comed—influence on extreme and aggressive nationalism. 36 Among the Bosniaks, a pan-Islamist current has been very strong, but, as we saw, a nationalist interpretation of the “Bosniakhood” ultimately prevailed. 37 Religion has also to a large extent determined the mutual perception of Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs. They not only attribute a great importance to their own creed, but often also ascribe particular, mostly negative characteristics to the creeds of others. To the Croats, Catholicism is a superior European religion, which profoundly distinguishes them from “the Balkan” or “Byzantine” or “Asian” part of Europe. 38 Orthodoxy is seen as primitive and aggressive, and Orthodox Christians as essentially unreliable. 39 Many Serbs consider the Catholic Church as a major enemy, not so much for dogmatic reasons, but because they regard it as an internationally organized, retrograde and reactionary force, and most of all because of the involvement of Croatian Catholic priests in the Ustasha regime. Serbs consider their being (Orthodox) Christians as an undeniable indication of their Europeanness and perceive Islam as an even more retrograde, an “Oriental” religion that is incompatible with Christianity to the extent that Muslims and Christians allegedly cannot live within the borders of the same state. 40 Both Croats and Serbs—in spite of the latter’s anti-Western rhetoric—attach great importance to religious identity also because they consider their being Christians as an indication of Europeanness and as an argument for EU accession, while, paradoxically, the EU itself refuses to be identified exclusively with Christianity and insists on a religiously and ethnically “unmarked” European citizenship. 41 There is another paradox: as Serbian anti-Westernism is mainly a legacy of Russian Slavophilia with much deeper roots than the 1999 NATO military intervention, Bosniaks usually appear to be less burdened with antiWestern feelings than the Serbs. In spite of a few common communiques of the Franjo Kuharić and Patriarch Pavle during the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in which they openly declared themselves against the outrages committed by the belligerents against civilians, in fact they almost unconditionally supported Tudjman’s and Milošević’s nationalist and irredentist policies. Although since the enthronement of Josip Bozanić in 1997 the Croat Catholic Church as a whole has become more restrained and less unanimous in its sustaining of extreme forms of nationalism, though the archbishop continues to ignore ultra-nationalistic bishops glorifying former Croat fascist leaders, minimizing Croat war crimes as “incidental excesses” and to justifying Croat “national heroes,” indicted of war crimes. 42 Bozanić himself never visited the Holocaust memorial in the Jasenovac concentration camp. The Catholic priest Vjekoslav Lasić celebrated commemorative masses for Ustasha leader Ante Pavelić, but was eventually reprimanded. 43 The Serbian Patriarch Pavle initially supported the Milošević regime, considering it a genuine defender of the threatened Serbians in Kosovo,

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Croatia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Milošević’s increasing compliance with the demands of the international community with regard to the Serbs in the Croatian Krajina and in Bosnia and Herzegovina was considered by the patriarch as treason. Pavle repeatedly defended Serbs indicted of war crimes and pleaded against their extradition. He disapproved of Milošević’s policy in Kosovo, as its failure became obvious, but was a fierce opponent of Kosovo independence. This attitude was shared by Artemije (1991–2010), bishop of Raška and Prizren (Kosovo), who in the late 1990s condemned the atrocities committed by both Serbs and Kosovars, but also remained firmly opposed to Kosovo independence. After the peace agreement in June 1999, Artemije cooperated with KFOR and the UN Mission in Kosovo to the end of improving the living conditions of the Serbs that had remained in Kosovo after 1999, however, avoiding contacts with the Kosovo authorities as much as possible. In spite of its distancing from extreme nationalism, the Serbian Patriarchate had not denounced its traditional anti-Western feelings and conservative, not to say reactionary political sympathies. In 2003, the Patriarchate canonized Bishop Nikolaj Velimirović, a notorious anti-Semite and great admirer of Dimitrije Ljotić, the Serbian fascist leader and collaborationist, who enjoys great popularity in Serbia. It appears that in Croatia nationalist extremism in the church has remained limited to individual priests or particular organizations that often find a breeding ground in official views of the church, while in Serbia nationalist stances of representatives of the church have a more theological, almost mystical character and more explicitly reflect official views of the Patriarchate. Like Bozanić in Croatia, the new Serbian patriarch Irinej has adopted more moderate stances. Although he disapproves of the international recognition of the independence of Kosovo and defends the interests and the unity of the Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, and Croatia, he has been supportive to the pro-Western policy of the recent Serbian cabinets. Religion played a crucial role in the accelerated ripening process of a Bosniak national consciousness in the 1990s. 44 Important additional factors behind this ripening were the concern to maintain the territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina, perceived as the “fatherland” of the Bosniak nation, and the warfare and ethnic cleansing, which produced a strong feeling of solidarity and commonality on a religious and national basis. These events have decisively contributed to the Islamic Community of Bosnia and Herzegovina acquiring its authoritative position among the Bosniaks. However, many features that may strike a Western watcher as indications of a thoroughgoing Islamization of contemporary Bosniak society do not differ in essence from similar phenomena among Catholic and Orthodox Christians. Some of these features, as the massive construction of mosques, the wearing of headscarves by girls and women, the prohibition to drink alcohol and to eat pork, are likely to catch the

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attention of a Christian observer more than the mushrooming of chapels and churches in Croat- and Serb-inhabited regions to which s/he is more acquainted. The financial support of Iran and Saudi Arabia and the presence of five–six hundred or some thousands (according to the sources) of “Afghans” (mujahideen) 45 certainly have led to a more strict and in some cases even fundamentalist observing of religious obligations. Bosniaks probably perceived the war in Yugoslavia much more in religious terms than Croats and Serbs: they often labeled it a “džihad” (jihad) or “Holy War,” and the term “šehid” (shahid) or “martyrs for the sake of faith” for Bosniak war casualties was even more widespread. 46 However, Iranian and Saudi Arabian cultural meddling, which came with the arms deliveries during the war, often turned out to be alien to the Bosniak way of “being Muslim” and, in addition with the (more familiar) Turkish influences divided Bosniak society rather than permeating it with radical Islamist convictions. When the war was over the international community, and in particular the US, made successful efforts to push back especially in regard to Iranian interference in Bosniak affairs. 47 In spite of Iran and Saudi-Arabia massively supporting the construction of mosques and madrassas in Kosovo as well, Kosovo Albanians have remained rather lukewarm Muslims. The large-scale deliberate destruction of Orthodox churches and monasteries in the aftermath of the war and during the outbursts of Albanian aggression in 2004, occurring methodically to be reduced to individual terrorist acts, was nevertheless inspired by the nationalist determination to remove all traces of Serbian presence in Kosovo, rather than by religious intolerance. RELIGIOUS MINORITIES Every Yugoslav successor state contains numerous minor religious communities, which legally enjoy the same rights as the “dominant” religion but are actually treated as foreign bodies within the border of the nationstate which is considered as “private property” of one particular ethnoreligious community. In Serbia, the most important of them are listed in the Constitution and in the abovementioned Law on Churches and Religious Communities. These religious minorities are divided over nearly thirty ethnic groups. 48 The right to religious instruction in schools is granted exclusively to those religious communities that are nationally or ethnically based, for instance, Islamic instruction to Muslims/Bosniaks; 49 Catholicism to Croats and Hungarians, et cetera. This excludes the neoProtestant creeds, which are not linked to a particular ethnic group, from being entitled to religious instruction in public schools. 50 The Serbian Patriarchate sustains some form of dialogue with all churches and religious communities, except for the neo-Protestant ones, which are—not without reason—blamed for proselytizing and being financed from

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abroad. 51 As they constitute less than 0.7 percent of the population, the apprehension of the Patriarchate is probably exaggerated. 52 “Protestantization,” that means conversion to one of the neo-Protestant churches, is particularly widespread among the Roma population. 53 On the one hand, the mostly foreign priests have no bias against them and readily accept them within their communities; on the other hand, membership of these communities allows the Roma to boost their poor social status. Among the Muslim population, as we observed in Kosovo, Sufi brotherhoods used to play a similar role. The situation of the Catholics—mainly of Hungarian, Croat, or other non-Serb ethnic origin—in Serbia to some extent depends on the relations of the Serbian state and the Serbian Patriarchate with the Vatican and with neighboring Catholic Croatia. After the war, the Serbian government, trying to escape from its position of international culprit, was disposed at improving relations with Rome. Representatives of the Holy Seat visited Belgrade in May 2001 and their visit was returned by a delegation of the Serbian Patriarchate in February 2003. 54 However, the reluctance of the Croat Catholic Church and the Vatican to publicly apologize for the massacres of Serbs in the Independent State of Croatia during World War II appeared to be an insuperable obstacle to the normalization of the relations. During his visit to Banja Luka in Bosnia and Herzegovina in June 2003, Pope John Paul II asked “from this city, marked in the course of history by so much suffering and bloodshed . . . the Almighty God to have mercy on the sins committed against humanity, human dignity and freedom also by children of the Catholic Church, and to foster in all the desire for mutual forgiveness.” 55 To the dissatisfaction of the Serbs, the subtle use of the word “also” made clear that the Pope did not blame solely the Croats for these “sins.” John Paul II repeatedly expressed his desire to visit Belgrade, but neither he nor his two successors so far did. The Muslims in the Serbian Sandžak, who in general now call themselves Bosniaks, represent a greater challenge to the Serbian state than the Catholics. During the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the local SDA worked for the integration of the Sandžak in Bosnia; after the war, some Sandžak-Bosniak politicians were prepared to cooperate with the Serbian government, whereas others were less inclined. In 2007 the Islamic Community of the Sandžak changed its name into Islamic Community in Serbia (Islamska Zajednica u Srbiji), with a mešihat (local office) of the Islamic Community in Sarajevo, though. Since 1993, when it separated from the Islamic Community of Yugoslavia, the leader has been mufti Muamer Zukorlić, an assertive Muslim who campaigns for the recognition of the Sandžak Muslims as Bosniaks by the Serbian government. From 1994 on, there has existed also a rivaling official Islamic Community of Serbia (Islamska Zajednica Srbije), led by reis-ul-ulema Adem Zilkić

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and covering Serbia without Kosovo, which understandably is not recognized by the Islamic Community in Serbia, and vice versa. 56 Since 1993, an Islamic Community of Kosovo (Bashkësia Islame e Kosovës) has defended the interests of the Kosovo (Albanian and Slav) Muslims. To complete the picture, mention should be made of a Council of the Islamic Community of Kosovo for Preševo, Bujanovac, and Medvedja, founded in 1971, which is subordinated to the Islamic Community in Serbia. In addition, in 2003, an Islamic Community for Preševo, Bujanovac, and Medvedja was founded, which is part of the Islamic Community of Serbia. 57 Macedonia after the 2001 Ohrid Agreement offers a rare example of ethno-religious community, with the Muslim Albanians that have enjoyed an equal status with the majority ethno-religious community, the Orthodox Macedonians. This was due to de-mediation of the international community during the negotiations on the Ohrid Agreement and is much to the dissatisfaction of the majority group. People belonging to a minority religious community are not by definition subjected to discrimination, but they can fall victim to considerable social pressure and ostracism as they are considered as not fully belonging to the nation and potentially disloyal to it. People who belong to such a minority religious community or have a spouse from another ethnic origin, or are born in an ethnically mixed family may escape unfair treatment opting for one of the small, new, or traditional Protestant churches that do not belong to one particular nation. In the Serb-populated region of the Croat Banovina, Orthodox Christians occasionally join the Baptist Church, in the same way as they previously used to declare themselves “Yugoslavs” instead of Croats or Serbs. 58 In Bosnia and Herzegovina, relations with minor religious communities are regulated by the constitution, which came with the Dayton Agreement. Eager to regulate the relations between Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs, the authors of the Agreement overlooked that there are still other ethnic/religious groups in the country. In 2006, the Roma Dervo Sejdić and the Jew Jacob Finci, both being constitutionally ineligible to the Presidency and the House of Peoples of Bosnia and Herzegovina, started a lawsuit with the European Court for Human Rights. The latter in 2009 decided that the provision was discriminatory, as a result of which the Bosnian Parliament initiated a constitutional reform. To some Bosniak politicians (among whom, the late Izetbegović), the relations of the Muslim community with the Orthodox and Catholic communities might appropriately be based on the Islamic or Ottoman tradition of the dhimma in a modern version. 59 According to the concept of the dhimma, the Muslim majority or dominant group offers protection to Christians and Jews (socalled ahl al-kitab, “People of the Book”) in exchange for submission. Bernard Lewis and Benjamin Braude in their authoritative Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire define dhimma more adequately as “discrimination

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without persecution.” 60 Not surprisingly this Muslim approach to religious pluralism failed to inspire confidence to people that remembered the dhimma as the “Turkish yoke.” Some groups like the Torbešes and the Gorani, Slav Muslims in Macedonia and Kosovo, respectively, hesitate in giving prevalence to their ethnic or religious affiliation. However, as their leaning toward a Turkish identity suggests, the latter identification seems after all to predominate. 61 ECCLESIASTICAL TERRITORIAL CONFLICTS A particular aspect of the churches’ involvement in nationalist struggles represents the issue of ecclesiastical jurisdiction. There are no disagreements among the Catholic archbishoprics of Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina concerning the jurisdiction over their dioceses. The borders between these dioceses have been established centuries ago by the Vatican in accordance with the then political borders. The Patriarchate of Serbia, however, has serious disagreements with the recently (re)established churches of Montenegro and Macedonia. The Montenegrin Church dates itself back to 1217 as a diocese of the autocephalous church of Serbia and promoted to the rank of metropolitanate in 1346, when the Serbian Church became a separate Patriarchate. In 1463, most Serbian dioceses passed under the jurisdiction of the Patriarchate of Constantinople; the Metropolitanate of Montenegro though was assigned to the Autocephalous Archbishopric of Ohrid. In 1553, it passed again under the jurisdiction of the re-established Patriarchate of Peć. After the latter was abolished in 1766, the Metropolitanate of Montenegro was not included in the Patriarchate of Constantinople as the other Serbian dioceses, but became an autonomous Montenegrin church with a seat in Cetinje ruled, from the beginning of the eighteenth century, by prince-bishops from the Montenegrin Petrović-Njegoš dynasty. After Montenegro was absorbed by the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenia in 1918, the Metropolitanate of Montenegro (extended with two dioceses at the coast, hence the addition “and the Littoral” to its name) merged with the Patriarchate of Serbia. In 1993, Montenegrin nationalists working for Montenegrin independence, referring to the autonomy of the Metropolitanate of Montenegro in the period from 1766 to 1920, unilaterally re-established the Montenegrin Orthodox Church. According to the Patriarchate of Serbia, however, the Metropolitanate of Montenegro might have been autonomous de facto, but canonically had always belonged to the Serbian Patriarchate. The Metropolitan of Montenegro, Amfilohije (from 2007 to 2009 also performing the duties of the bed-bound Patriarch Pavle), is a politically active Serbian nationalist who strongly opposes the establishment of an independent Montenegrin Church. The issue has turned into a ma-

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jor bone of contention between the pro-Montenegrin Liberal Union of Montenegro and the pro-Serbian Socialist People’s Party of Montenegro, and between Montenegrin nationalists and pro-Serbian Montenegrins in general. An application for the registration of the Montenegrin Orthodox Church was duly submitted to the Montenegrin authorities and was granted in 2000. The initiative had been backed by several Montenegrin politicians, among whom President Milo Djukanović himself. Currently, both churches—the Montenegrin Orthodox Church and the Serbian Metropolitanate of Montenegro and the Littoral—exist juxtaposed, which causes serious problems, all the more so as the new Montenegrin Church claims the properties of the Metropolitanate, which means of the Serbian Patriarchate. For the time being, none of the other Orthodox Patriarchates in the world has recognized the Montenegrin Church, as is canonically required. Moreover, the Serbian Patriarchate still seems to enjoy a considerable moral authority, not only among the many Montenegrins with a Serb national consciousness. The credibility of the Montenegrin Church has been somewhat damaged by the questionable biography of its leader, Metropolitan Mihailo, who was excommunicated by the Serbian and the Constantinopolitan Patriarchates (allegedly for adultery, embezzlement, and insubordination) in 1995 and was ordained in 1998 by Patriarch Pimen of an equally canonically unrecognized alternative Bulgarian Orthodox Church. 62 The Serbian Patriarchate is involved in a similar conflict in Macedonia. From the beginning of the eleventh century until 1767, there existed an Autocephalous Archbishopric of Ohrid. In 1767, its dioceses were included into the Patriarchate of Constantinople; in 1913, after the Balkan Wars, the dioceses on Serbian territory became a part of the Serbian Patriarchate. After a Republic of Macedonia was created within the Tito’s federal Yugoslavia in 1944, Macedonian nationalists demanded the establishment of a Macedonian Church in the form of the restored Autocephalous Archbishopric of Ohrid. In 1958, the creation of a Macedonian Church, led by an “Archbishop of Ohrid and Skopje and Metropolitan of Macedonia,” was officially proclaimed. This could not happen without the support of the Yugoslav communist government, which obviously tried to curtail the mighty Serbian Patriarchate. In 1967, the Macedonian Church leader assumed the title of “Archbishop of Ohrid and Macedonia,” explicitly claiming independence on the same footing as the Patriarch of Serbia. The Patriachate of Serbia refused to recognize the Macedonian Church, as did any other Orthodox Patriarchate in the world. 63 After the Republic of Macedonia became an independent state in 1992, negotiations about a canonical recognition were started between the Serbian and Macedonian Churches and state leaders, but to no avail. In 2002 an agreement reached in Niš, leaving only a symbolic authority of the Serbian Patriarchate over the Macedonian Church, was eventually rejected by the

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Macedonian side. This created a new and even more complicated situation, reminiscent of the deadlock in Montenegro; in addition to the Macedonian Orthodox Church supported by the government in Skopje, the Patriarchate of Serbia created its own autonomous Archbishopric of Ohrid with its seat in Niže Pole near Bitola, which was to administer the dioceses of the Serbian Patriarchate in Macedonia. Archbishop Jovan of the Serbian Ohrid Archbishopric has been considered a traitor by the Macedonian Orthodox Church and has frequently been harassed by the Macedonian authorities. 64 Both conflicts involve complicated canonical questions in which both sides have valid arguments. However, the Serbian view goes against the Orthodox tradition of state churches, especially after Macedonia and Montenegro gained independence in 1992 and 2006, respectively. Moreover, both the Macedonian and to a lesser extent the Montenegrin Church have long historical traditions that support their claims. Neither the Macedonians, nor the Montenegrins (at least the majority of them) are Serbs. It seems as if the idea of a Greater Serbia has somehow survived in the territorial aspirations of the Serbian Patriarchate. CONCLUSION Since the end of the 1980s, the number of believers in Yugoslavia and later in the Yugoslav successor states has spectacularly increased. While the number of non-believers amounted to 31.6 percent in 1987, in 2002 only 2.7 percent of the overall population of the Yugoslav successor states were declared atheists or not religious, and the number of “atheists/not religious,” as they were labeled in the inquiries, would have been almost zero, if there were not 13.8 percent of them in Slovenia and 5 percent in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 65 This sudden increase of religiosity cannot be explained exclusively by the need of spirituality after four decades of allegedly compulsory atheism. Widespread atheism or agnosticism or lukewarm belief in “some power” was a result not so much of communist propaganda, but mainly, as in Western Europe, of modernization, materialism, and consumerism in a legally secularized society. What really occurred in the late 1980s and the 1990s, during the process of disintegration of the multinational federal Yugoslavia and the creation of new ethnic nation-states, was that religion turned into what Mirko Blagojević calls a “defensive, integrative, homogenizing means of ethnic mobilization” (zaštitno-integrativna, homogenizujuća, etnomobilišuća funkcija religije). 66 This was particularly the case with Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs, between whom religion was the chief national distinctive feature. When, though, among Slovenes and Kosovars religion was redundant as a national distinctive feature—because language served that purpose—it occupied a much more modest place in national identity building and con-

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sequently in politics and society in general. The seeming increase of religiosity was due to the fact that displaying religious belief and participating in religious practices was regarded as an expression of ethnic belonging and a token of loyalty to the nation. As Paul Mojzes phrased it in the previous chapter of this volume, religion was a question of “belonging rather than believing and/or practicing.” Sometimes the term “cultural religiosity” is used to denote this massive, but rather declarative belonging to a religious community, while the number of churchgoers and authentic believers remains limited. 67 Although reliable figures are hard to obtain and often contradict each other, there appear to be considerable discrepancies between the number of self-declared Catholics, Orthodox Christians, and Muslims and the number of people who declare they believe in God and follow the teachings and commandments of their faith. The number of churchgoers (on Sundays, on special occasions as Easter and Christmas) is easier to establish, but not very reliable as in the case of mass attendance especially in small rural communities where social pressure plays an important part. In the early 1990s, 92.8 percent of the Serbs in Serbia thought of themselves as religious. While in 2010, 77.9 percent of the population of Serbia declared to be Orthodox Christians, only 63.2 percent believed that “a God” exists and only 27.8 percent declared that they unreservedly believe in the doctrine of their church. Tellingly, 39.1 percent labeled themselves as “traditional believers” (tradicionalni vernici), who “participate in some rituals of his faith and observe its customs, but are not active in her/his religious community.” 68 The concept of a “traditional believer,” however, seems to suggest also that the historical bond with national religious traditions prevails over authentic religiosity. In Croatia too, the number of “real” believers is much lower than that of the self-declared Catholics. 69 In fact, surfing the wave of nationalism Catholic, Muslim, and Orthodox religious institutions themselves contributed to reducing religiosity to a mere component of national identity, instead of elevating it to a genuinely ecumenical source of spirituality and morality. All this is not to minimize the number of people who feel a genuine need for a spiritual dimension in their lives. In this respect the relative revival of monastic life among Croats and Serbs is indicative. 70 However, cloisters and monasteries are often perceived as strongholds of national identity as well. Some people in search for an apostolic Christianity turn to the neo-Protestant churches that had not compromised themselves with nationalism and worldly power. Moreover, one may assume that as a result of the religious instruction in schools the number of religious people is growing and largely compensates for those who, after the ebbing away of nationalist fervor, inevitably display less religious zeal. Religious authorities of whatever creed in the Yugoslav successor states defend traditional family values. They prefer the role of women in society to be limited to the kids and the kitchen and condemn homosexu-

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ality, gay marriages, and abortion. 71 Although they seem to have the approval of a large segment of the population, they nevertheless stimulate conservatism and intolerance in political and social life. The problem, as Richard Farkas points out, is partly in the contradiction between religion and democracy: “At its roots, classic liberal democracy is grounded in the idea that man can define and pursue his interests in the framework of a tolerant and constrained political community. Religion, in point of fact, is a necessarily prescriptive and standard-setting phenomenon supported by a hierarchy with unyielding confidence in its own perceptions . . . The various peoples of Southeast Europe have come to recognize this discrepancy and have articulated their concern about the intimacy of church and state and the destination that this portends for society. Their instincts tell them the church may prevail and, in doing so, neutralize the effort to develop democratic forms of politics.” 72 However, none of the Yugoslav successor states unquestioningly follow the program of their religious leaders. Whether by personal conviction or under pressure from international institutions, politicians are prepared to take into account the secularist reserves that many people foster concerning too powerful a role for the religious institutions in the state. NOTES 1. Mitja Velikonja, Religious Separation & Political Intolerance in Bosnia-Herzegovina (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 2003), 287. 2. The Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Article II, 3; Constitution of the Republic of Croatia, Articles 14 and 41; Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo, Articles 8, 38, 39; Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia, Articles 9, 19, 48; Constitution of the Republic of Serbia, Articles 11, 43, 44; Constitution of the Republic of Slovenia, Articles 7, 14, 41; Constitution of the Republic of Montenegro, Articles 14, 46. See http:/ /legislationline.org/documents/section/constitutions, accessed December 27, 2013. 3. For Zakon o crkvama i verskim zajednicama, see http://www.puma.vojvodina .gov.rs/dokumenti/zakoni/Zakon_crkve_vz.pdf, accessed December 27, 2013. 4. Mirko Blagojević, “Religijsko-konfesionalna identifikacija i vera u Boga gradjana Srbije,” Filozofija i društvo 23, no. 1 (2012), 47; Reinhard Henkel, “Religions and Religious Institutions in the post‑Yugoslav States between Secularization and Resurgence,” Acta Universitatis Carolinae Geographica, nos. 1–2 (2009), 55. 5. The Constitution of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina was proclaimed in 1994, prior to the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, included as Annex 4 in the Dayton Agreement. It was repeatedly, but not fundamentally amended. The last version dates from 2009. 6. It reads: “Država materijalno pomaže pravoslavnu crkvu, saradjuje sa njom u svim oblastima, a naročito na čuvanju, njegovanju i razvijanju kulturnih, tradicionalnih i drugih duhovnih vrijednosti.” In the Serbian version of the constitution (available on www.legislationline.org), this paragraph has not been removed. 7. For “Freedom of Religion and Legal Status of Churches and Religious Organizations in Bosnia and Herzegovina,” see http://host.uniroma3.it/progetti/cedir/cedir/ Lex-doc/Bos_l-2004a.pdf, accessed December 27, 2013. In addition, see Fikret Karčić, “The Regulation of Relationships between the State and Religion in Bosnia and Herzegovina,” http://fikretkarcic.wordpress.com/2009/07/22/relations-between-the-state-

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and-churches-and-religious-communities-in-bosnia-and-herzegovina/, accessed January 5, 2014. 8. For the Framework Agreement, see http://www.ucd.ie/ibis/filestore/Ohrid %20Framework%20Agreement.pdf, accessed January 4, 2014. 9. Both the 1992 Constitution of Macedonia and the (many) amendments to it can be found on www.legislationline.org. 10. See Služben vesnik na Republika Makedonija 63, no. 113 (2007), http://www .slvesnik.com.mk/Issues/B73B1AE48C6A854D9F63ECE819984E43.pdf, accessed January 4, 2014. 11. When the Church issues a birth certificate, it has the same validity as a stateissued one even though it does not contain all valid information such as change of names and surnames. Since Croatia has a law that allows people to change their names to Croatian ones to “integrate,” these people then take their certificate on baptism from the Church to avoid revealing information they converted, which is not the case with state-issued birth certificates that reveal all changes toward personal statuses. I am indebted to Martina Topić for this information. 12. Thomas Bremer, “The Catholic Church and its Role in Politics and Society,” in Sabrina P. Ramet, Konrad Clewing, and Reneo Lukić (eds.), Croatia since Independence: War, Politics, Society, Foreign Relations (München: Oldenbourg Verlag, 2008), 259–60. 13. Vjekoslav Perica, “The Most Catholic Country in Europe? Church, State, and Society in Contemporary Croatia,” Religion, State & Society 34, no. 4 (2006), 314. 14. US Department of State (Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs), “Property Restitution in Central and Eastern Europe,” http://2001–2009.state.gov/p/eur/rls/or/ 93062.htm, accessed December 16, 2013. 15. Perica, “The Most Catholic Country,” 314. 16. Danica Fink-Hafner and Sabrina P. Ramet, “Slovenia since 1988: Building Democracy and Liberalism,” in Danica Fink-Hafner and Sabrina P. Ramet (eds.), Democratic Transition in Slovenia: Value Transformation, Education, and Media (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 2006), 43–44. 17. Just like Franc Rode, Andrej Bajuk as a child emigrated to Argentina because his parents feared communist reprisals after World War II. After half a century spent abroad, both returned to Slovenia in the late 1990s. 18. Ivan Iveković, “Nationalism and the Political Use and Abuse of Religion: The Politicization of Orthodoxy, Catholicism and Islam in Yugoslav Successor States,” Social Compass 49, no. 4 (2002), 529–30. 19. For details and the relevance to EU requirements, see Zachary T. Irwin, “Sweden and Slovenia: Civic Values and the EU on the Periphery,” in Fink-Hafner and Ramet (eds.), Democratic Transition in Slovenia, 113–15. 20. Danica Fink-Hafner and Sabrina P. Ramet, “Values, Norms, and Education,” in Fink-Hafner and Ramet (eds.), Democratic Transition in Slovenia, 17–18. 21. Matjaž Klemenčič, “Conclusion: Slovenia between Liberalism and Clericalism,” in Fink-Hafner and Ramet (eds.), Democratic Transition in Slovenia, 272. 22. Siniša Malešević, Ideology, Legitimacy and the New State: Yugoslavia, Serbia and Croatia (London and Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 2002), 211–12. 23. Zorica Kuburić and Milan Vukomanović, “Religious Education: The Case of Serbia,” Sociologija 47, no. 3 (2005), 230. 24. Miroslava Malešević, “‘Opravoslavljenje’ identiteta srpske omladine,” Glasnik Etnografskog Instituta SANU 53 (2005), 178–80. 25. Kuburić and Vukomanović, “Religious Education,” 249. 26. Radmila Radić, “Religion, Kirche und Staat nach dem Zerfall der Sozialistischen Föderativen Republik Jugoslawien,” in Walker Lukan, Ljubinka Trgovčević, and Dragan Vukčević (eds.), Österreichische Osthefte 47, nos. 1–4 (2005), 483–84. For more details about the influence of the Serbian Patriarchate on education, see Malešević, “‘Opravoslavljenje,’” 141–44. 27. Rada Drezgić, “Religion, Politics and Gender in the Context of Nation-State Formation: The Case of Serbia,” Third World Quarterly 31, no. 6 (2010), 966.

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28. Kuburić and Vukomanović, “Religious Education,” 250. 29. For Framework Law on Primary and Secondary Education in Bosnia and Herzegovina, see http://www.oscebih.org/documents/osce_bih_doc_2003071115212674 eng.pdf, accessed December 16, 2013. 30. Xavier Bougarel, “L’islam bosniaque, entre identité culturelle et idéologie politique,” in Xavier Bougarel and Nathalie Clayer (eds.), Le Nouvel Islam balkanique: Les musulmans, acteurs dupost-communisme 1990–2000 (Paris: Maisonneuve et Larose, 2001), 90. 31. Srdjan Barišić, “Institucionalizacija Islamskih Zajednica nakon raspada SFR Jugoslavije,” Filozofija i društvo 19, no. 2 (2008), 121. The mešihats (local offices) in Slovenia, in Croatia, and in Serbia depend on the Islamic Community of Bosnia and Herze govina. 32. Bougarel, “L’islam bosniaque,” 118. 33. Ibid., 88. 34. Barišić, “Institucionalizacija,” 121. 35. Bougarel, “L’islam bosniaque,” 117–18. 36. Iveković, “Nationalism and the Political Use,” 527–28. 37. For the discussions among nationalists and pan-Islamists, preceding this renaming, see Bougarel, “L’islam bosniaque,” 90. 38. Malešević, Ideology, Legitimacy and the New State, 241–42. 39. Ibid., 251. 40. Ibid., 213–14. 41. Alex Jeffrey, The Improvised State: Sovereignty, Performance and Agency in Dayton Bosnia (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2013), 164. 42. Iveković, “Nationalism and the Political Use,” 528–29. 43. Bremer, “The Catholic Church,” 261. 44. Tone Bringa, “Islam and the Quest for Identity in Post-Communist Bosnia-Herzegovina,” in Maya Shatzmiller (ed.), Islam and Bosnia: Conflict Resolution and Foreign Policy in Multi-Ethnic States (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2002), 32–33. 45. Iveković, “Nationalism and the Political Use,” 531. 46. Bougarel, “L’islam bosniaque,” 110. 47. Ibid., 119, 122–23. 48. Dragoljub B. Djordjević, “Religije i veroispovesti nacionalnih manjina,” Sociologija 47, no. 3 (2005), 193–212. 49. That means officially Muslims in the ethnic sense, but most of them now call themselves Bosniaks. 50. Kuburić and Vukomanović, “Religious Education,” 250. 51. Srdjan Barišić, “Medjureligijski dijalog u lokalnoj sredini: Primer Beograda,” Sociologija 47, no. 3 (2005), 269. 52. Blagojević, “Religijsko-konfesionalna identifikacija,” 47. 53. Djordjević, “Religije,” 198, 205–6. 54. For more details about the rapprochement of the Vatican and Serbia, see Radić, “Religion, Kirche und Staat,” 493–96. 55. Vesna Perić Zimonjić, “Religion-Bosnia: Pope’s Apology Brings New Hope,” June 23, 2003, http://www.ipsnews.net/2003/06/religion-bosnia-popes-apology-bringsnew-hope/, accessed December 30, 2013. 56. Barišić, “Institucionalizacija,” 123–24. 57. Ibid., 125. 58. Reinhard Henkel and Laura Šakaja, “A Sanctuary in Post-Conflict Space: The Baptist Church as a ‘Middle Option’ in Banovina, Croatia,” Geografiska Annaler: Series B, Human Geography 91, no. 1 (2009), 39–56. 59. Iveković, “Nationalism and the Political Use,” 531. 60. Benjamin Braude and Bernard Lewis, Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire: The Functioning of a Plural Society, Vol. 1 (New York: Holmes & Meier Publishers, 1982), 3.

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61. Ali Dikici, “The Torbeshes of Macedonia: Religious and National Identity Questions of Macedonian-Speaking Muslims,” Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs 28, no. 1 (2008), 27–43. 62. Radić, “Religion, Kirche und Staat,” 478–82. 63. Jovan Belčovski, Avtokefalnostta na Makedonskata Pravoslavna Crkva (Skopje: Studentski zbor, 1985), 148–56. 64. Radić, “Religion, Kirche und Staat,” 476–78. 65. Henkel, “Religions and Religious Institutions,” 53. 66. Mirko Blagojević, “Revitalizacija religije i religioznosti u Srbiji: Stvarnost ili mit?” Filozofija i društvo 20, no. 2 (2009), 114. 67. Ibid., 100. 68. Blagojević, “Religijsko-konfesionalna identifikacija,” 46–47, 49. The latter figures refer to all creeds in Serbia (without Kosovo), but there is no reason to assume that the proportions should be different among Orthodox Serbs. 69. Bremer, “The Catholic Church,” 256. 70. Ibid., 252. In addition, see Večernje novosti, “Stalno stižu novi monasi,” December 20, 2011, http://www.novosti.rs/vesti/naslovna/aktuelno.290.html:358617–Stalnostizu-novi-monasi, accessed December 22, 2013. 71. For Serbia, see Drezgić, “Religion, Politics and Gender,” 966–67. For an analysis of the Serbian Patriarchate’s discourse on homosexuality as “a sin,” “an abnormality,” or “a mental illness,” see Miloš Jovanović, “Silence or Condemnation: The Orthodox Church on Homosexuality in Serbia,” Družboslovne razprave 29, no. 73 (2013), 79–95. 72. Richards P. Farkas, Democratization in the Balkans: Prescription for a Badly Scarred Body Politic (Boston, MA: Northeastern University Press, 2007), 46–47.

THREE Church-State Relations in Slovenia Constant Tensions Sergej Flere, Miran Lavrič, and Danilo Jesenik

It may help to understand the crux of the Slovenian situation if we begin with the sociological analysis of David Martin who speaks of Catholic monopolies or the “Latin pattern,” as the specific path to secularization. Within this pattern, “the union of the Church with the political right” is typical during entry into modern society, along with the Church demonstrating official militancy despite having been truly relegated to a subordinate posture in its relations to the right-wing political forces in power. 1 In such a situation, all cultural attempts at cross-breeding are understood by Catholic forces as “traitorous.” 2 As a consequence, opposition to Catholic forces brings about “a split endlessly reproductive of itself.” 3 Slovenia clearly fits into Martin’s category of Latin pattern in terms of its political organization of religious affairs. The Latin pattern arises in the absence of denominational plurality and with the Roman Catholic Church (RCC) enjoying a position beyond the hegemonic one, being almost a monopolist. Martin claims that “[e]nlightenement and religion clash” in the crux of the pattern. 4 This goes for practically all areas of social and cultural life and energizes political life. There has historically also been a Lutheran minority, limited to the region of the country in the North East which historically belonged Hungary, and not impacting critically on the picture. In early modernity (from the sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries) the Habsburgs practically disallowed religious minorities. 5 Subsequently, in the development of modern society in the nineteenth century there arose the pattern of Catholicism being the only his39

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torical religion of Slovenians, as well as all its neighbors (Italians, Austrians, Hungarians, and Croatians). Catholicism was also the major institutional structure; since Slovenia was divided administratively into different Habsburg crown lands it was politically disunited, which represented a major obstacle to its political and cultural growth. Modern political development began under the Catholic aegis, the first political party being the Catholic sponsored Slovenian People’s Party. It was established in 1892, remaining the most influential party in Slovenia until World War II. The liberals followed by establishing the liberalist National (Progressive) Party in 1894, followed by the Yugoslav Social-Democratic Party in 1896 (the two formed the political part of the anti-clericalist camp). Prior to World War II, the liberals, flanked by the Socialists (and Communists), never attained majority support. However, the cultural forces behind the two camps have fed the basic cultural and political conflict in Slovenia, dynamizing and energizing political life and raising issues that defined and articulated the matter of dispute on the public scene throughout the modern period, with the partial exception of the communist period (1945–1990). Liberals were not necessarily atheists or proponents of atheism; their major goal was to diminish and sideline the public nature of Catholicism and to enable political discourse to be freed of religious and clericalist tutelage. It was usually Catholic thought that articulated the subject of the contest: at the end of the nineteenth century, it promoted the ideas of society being established by estates, of the arts needing to promote Christian values as interpreted by the RCC, of political life being defined by the Church, and of authority originating from RCC authority alone. 6 Liberal artists and thinkers were attacked and stigmatized in a drive for the separation of spirits, meaning that isolation of everything not under Catholic control became the main objective (an idea advanced and practiced under the leadership of Bishop Mahnič around the turn of the twentieth century). The Catholic Church dominated all cultural/artistic societies, disallowing their becoming religiously neutral; the same went for the press. The liberals found ways to assert themselves, however, through professional organizations. The teaching profession was a focus of interest for both sides, as was public elementary and secondary education, which was continuously religiously permeated and controlled. 7 On the sensitive issue of ethnic identity the authoritative and authoritarian Bishop Mahnič stated (allegedly speaking for all Catholic Slovenians): “German and all other Catholics are closer to us than Slovenian liberals.” 8 This may sound convincing from certain varieties of Christian points of view, but the essence of the communication was to strip Slovenian liberals of any legitimacy. On the other hand, political Catholicism before World War I denied the possibility that ethnic Slovenians could be anything other than Catholics. 9 Setting aside the niceties and details of the debate on the strength of the Catholic hegemony was, we note, only

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that in 1891 the liberal novelist Ivan Tavčar published a satiric novel, 4000, on how Slovenia would remain under Catholic authoritarian hegemony in the year 4000. 10 In the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, clericalist politics was still dominant in Slovenia and at home declaring its intentions to win autonomy for Slovenia, while conceding that it was not possible “at that moment.” In Belgrade, the capital where political life was concentrated, Slovenian politicians of the Slovenian People’s Party played well within the centralist governmental orchestras and even took positions of prime minister and minister of the police. 11 Indeed, during the entire period prior to World War II, the crux of the cultural conflict between the clericalists and anticlericalists was muddled by the fact that Slovenia was not an independent state and both sides needed to present themselves as the true combatants for Slovenian emancipation (although it could not be said that Slovenia was in a subjugated position during Tito’s Yugoslavia). This issue was particularly acute where it involved the relationship toward the traditional hegemon, the Germans. Both the liberals and the clericalists considered themselves as true combatants for Slovenian emancipation. However, during the period ending with the World War II, the clericalists were the dominant factor in the discourse, articulating it and defining the terms. Simultaneously, both sides needed to coalesce with extra-Slovenian political entities and to present that to the Slovenian public as acceptable. We shall not enter into the details of the history. The issue is well summed up by the historian Pleterski, himself evidently siding with one camp, in depicting the logic of the clericalist camp: “In the motto ‘A Germanophile (Nemškútar) is preferable to a Young Slovenian (liberal), because a Germanophile and Christianity do not exclude each other, whereas Young Slovenianhood means Atheism,’ the subjects are to have changed: the Young Slovenian is replaced by the Slovenian Partisan [member of Tito’s armed forces during World War II], whereas the Germanophile is replaced by the ‘Occupier’ and in a new era (during and after World War II) the old conclusion is adapted: fascism and Christianity do not exclude each other, whereas partisanhood means atheism.” 12 During the communist period, public discourse radically changed and conditions for religious life for the RCC were severely limited. However, conditions for religious life continuously improved after initial attempts to radically suppress, although not completely to do away with religious life. A certain amount of suppression would be understandable, given that three major religions operated in the federal communist state, having also major shares in the population, among which inter-confessional relations were inimical, at least until the Second Vatican Council in the 1960s. 13 The history of relations between the three groups (in the wider region) was full of bloody conflict in modern times. With governmental privileging, the first Yugoslav state symbolically identified with Eastern

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Orthodoxy (via the dynasty) and genocide and generalized interethnic and interreligious strife during World War II. 14 However, the initial suppression after the war set aside such objective reasons and tended toward complete marginalization and persecution of religion, on the basis of an initial attempt to introduce communist totalitarian rule. 15 By the 1960s, the situation had changed and accommodation seemed on the horizon. Besides tolerating strictly religious activities (but not public ones, with a limited exception for charity), the situation changed by allowing the entry of new entities on the religious scene. Initially, these were mainly protestant groups originating from the United States, which availed themselves of religious liberty and the possibility of publishing brochures. 16 Religious activities were governed as of the 1970s by republic and provincial laws, which limited their activities mainly to spiritual affairs, but this formed the framework in which religious activities and constructions grew and the press flourished. Accordingly, this chapter is concerned with the structure of the religious scene, the legal position of religious entities within independent Slovenia, and the questions of national reconciliation issue, religion and education, religion and family, financial and property issues of the RCC, which merits special treatment. All issues will be presented taking into account the fact that the RCC is the major, almost monopolistic religious player, and considering conflict between the laity and the clergy as the main axis of division. PLURALIZATION OF THE RELIGIOUS SCENE Since 1976, there has existed a register of religious communities, operated and published by the Slovenian Government. 17 At the beginning of 2014, forty-four religious communities (forty-three of which are active) were registered in Slovenia. Most of these are historically new, both substantively and in terms of their presence in Slovenia. Besides the RCC, the Lutheran Evangelical Church, the Calvinist Reformed Church (now almost extinct) and marginally, the Serbian Orthodox Church, can be considered as historically rooted. 18 The communities indicate a wide variety, including some communities about which more information cannot be attained publicly (such as the Mithraic Gnostic Religious Community). Besides those that can easily be considered Christian, there are two Islamic communities registered and a number of faiths established internationally in the twentieth century (the Unification Church, Church of Scientology), as well as Buddhist and Hindu communities. Some of these groups substantively arrived from the United States, even though their roots and paths may be more complicated (the Christian Baptist Church, Christian Adventist Church, Jehovah’s Witnesses). Sixteen groups were registered before the attainment of Slovenia’s independence (1991), the majority

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being registered after this. Demographically the RCC, the Islamic communities, the Serbian Orthodox Church, and the Lutheran Evangelical Church are the most significant ones. The proportion of Muslims was 2.2 percent in 2002. Numerically, the RCC remains approximately twentyfour times more numerous than the second group, the Islamic Community. Thus, the scene remains not only a predominantly Catholic one, but almost a monopolistic one. LEGAL POSITION OF RELIGIOUS ENTITIES WITHIN INDEPENDENT SLOVENIA Slovenia attained independence and democratic pluralism rather gently, if not quite in a “velvet” manner with little conflict, particularly in comparison to the other Yugoslav successors. 19 As to the position of religion, important factors were the newly adopted Constitution of 1991 and the Religious Communities Act of 1976, which remained in effect with slight changes until 2007 (one provision is still in force). The Constitution holds typical liberalist provisions on separation of church and state and on equality of religious communities. The Act of 1976, however, proved to be surprisingly adaptable to new conditions, with some supervisory provisions set aside and some considered irrelevant. This, along with the liberal spirit of the 1990s, enabled the establishment of a large number of religious communities in Slovenia. As Lesjak and Lekić state, this structural change did not basically alter the religious demographic picture of Slovenia, but enriched the religious scene. 20 The Religious Freedom Act (RFA) Adoption On the legislative front, under Vatican pressure the Slovenian Government entered into an agreement with the Holy See in 2004. 21 The Agreement does not stipulate substantive obligations on either party but envisages entering into other agreements and there are practically no commitments on the part of the state. However, there are agreements between two states, creating a special situation. The Slovenian Constitutional Court interpreted the Agreement as valid insofar as it is interpreted in accordance with Slovenian Constitution, Article 7, i.e., religious communities being equal before the law and the state and the RCC observing the Slovenian legal order. 22 Basically, it was a test to see how far Slovenia would go in conceding to demands for RCC ideological hegemony. Slovenia adopted a statutory Act on Religion (RFA) in 2007. 23 This was undertaken under the rightist government led by Janez Janša, with Lovro Šturm being the Minister of Justice in charge of the matter. In fact, the first draft was prepared by a private institute previously headed by

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Šturm. There were some public discussions on the draft, mainly promoting liberalist objections to the draft, but the Ministry held strong to its original positions. The RFA was adopted with a small majority: except for deputies belonging to rightist parties, the votes of the national minority deputies were needed, a rare situation in Slovenian parliamentary history indicating a division in Parliament and in society as well. The main provisions, also the ones that would become contentious, are listed below: On the symbolic level, the RFA systematically adopts the wording “churches and religious communities,” although not granting to the former any particular legal advantages, it symbolically differentiates between the two. More substantial discrimination is to be found in Article 5, where the RFA states: “Churches and other religious communities promoting spirituality and human dignity in private and public life, also promoting extending meaning to existence in the area of religious life and simultaneously also having a significant role in public life by developing their educational, charitable and other activities in the area of the welfare state, enriching national identity, thus discharging a significant social role, shall be generally beneficial organizations.” This generally beneficial nature of certain religious organizations does not automatically imply any specific privileges. Nevertheless it is a provision symbolically granting precedence to certain organizations. The legislator does introduce a difference summing it up as “a general social beneficial nature” of some, evidently the traditional ones. Except for the Lutheran Church, it can hardly be expected that the legislator would be prepared to designate any other as such, along with the Roman Catholic Church. The Act allows for these generally beneficial organizations to receive further state aid, within a discretionary supplementary concept. (Article 29, para. 3) The Act governs provision of organized religious services in total institutions, in particular in prisons, hospitals, police units, and within the military. (The RFA does not deal with the situation in education, which had previously been governed in statutory manner.) The solution is a novel one (not a continuation of previous regulations); Articles 24 and 25 provide for the employment of priests by the respective ministries for tending those hospitalized and incarcerated, meaning that the state would also pay their salaries where an appropriate number of people needed such care. Similarly, the state would take care of the religious needs of policemen and the military, particularly with a view to duty abroad. The provision dealing with providing policemen with such services is particularly vague, as they would be entitled to such state provided services whenever “the practice of religious freedom becomes difficult,” not indicating whether this would be at services abroad only. (Article 23) The registration of religious communities is provided for as a new requirement of the Act; Article 13 provides for registration of a new community if 100 members have subscribed, the members being citi-

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zens or permanent residents of Slovenia, and for the community to have operated for ten years (without registration, i.e., without the capacity of a legal entity). The supplicants also need to submit a large number of supplements to the request for registration, including a description of the community’s teachings in the Slovenian language, its rituals and its “worship of God,” thus presupposing a monotheist notion of religion. Although there are European countries with stricter conditions, in the Slovenian situation these conditions are rather strict, as evidenced by a lack of registration on the basis of this Act. 24 The Act, to some surprise, left in force one portion of the 1976 Act. This is the portion dealing with payment of retirement, disability, and health protection insurance by the state to priests and monks of registered communities. (The history of the state’s accepting the burden of these payments is a lengthy one, involving the attempts of Tito’s regime to domesticate the major religious communities.) 25 The 1976 Act in Article 20 allowed for state discretion in financial support for religious communities, in a provision which did not define either the limits or the intent of the funds. Upon independence, the Slovenian state continued to extend such support, although without undertaking any legal precisions. 26 This provision remained in force after the adoption of the 2007 Act. However, the Act envisages taking care of these benefits within a “reasonable proportion” of 1 priest/monk per 1000 registered community members. (Article 27, para. 4)

Developments upon the Adoption of RFA Upon the Act’s adoption the State Council, a chamber adjoined to the Slovenian Parliament, immediately (March 21, 2007) submitted a motion to the Constitutional Court alleging several unconstitutional provisions in the Act. The State Council contested all provisions of the Act that could be considered suspicious from the point of view of a strict understanding of separation of church and state. So, financial support of religious groups, since the Act allegedly introduces no criteria for such support; differentiation among religious groups in employment by the state for the purpose of religious services, as being at variance with the principle of religious freedom; the failure to clarify which religious group deeds would be inadmissible as intervening in state sovereignty; the imprecise definition of the “general beneficial nature” of certain religious groups; state dialogue only with registered religious groups would be at variance with the principle of equality of all religious groups; religious officials being dutiful to observe their highest ecclesiastic authority, but not also state regulations in mixed areas—all this is considered to have offended state sovereignty. Not long thereafter general elections in 2008 brought into power a leftist government, headed by Borut Pahor. Aleš Gulič, a colorful liberal personality, was appointed head of the Office for Religious Communities. By itself this is of little relevance today, but it is instructive how the RCC reacted. “Even the [Communist] Party would not

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dare such a provocation!” stormed Cardinal Rode, then the head of the Slovenian RCC. 27 Furthermore, on this behalf the Slovenian Prime Minister was not received in the Vatican by the Pope. Both these events are indicative of how arrogantly the RCC attempted to regain its hegemonic position. The Constitutional Court passed a decision on the move by the State Council in a grand manner, contributing decisively to a swing of the pendulum to ideological hegemony, although as at the beginning of 2014 the decision is yet to be fully implemented in legislation. The decision tackles the issue of constitutionality of the Act radically, in terms of technical conformity of the Act with the Constitution, but also with European Court of Human Rights case law and standards. 28 The basic point of departure of the Constitutional Court is to deal with religious matters as part of worldview matters, i.e., religious beliefs are placed on the same level as irreligious and philosophical, i.e., worldviews. It pursues from this premise that religious and irreligious groups are all of the same nature, thus all should be granted legal entity status. On the other hand, the state has no obligation to finance or otherwise support any of them, particularly not without specific criteria. Furthermore, the beneficial nature of religious and irreligious groups should be granted to all of them and in no way should the state be called to judge their nature in this respect (pt. 131 of the Judgment). By this, the most important building block of the RFA was knocked down. Registration should not be the criterion for awarding funds (nor the “general beneficial nature,” now generalized to all communities), but other criteria should be set, pertaining to the purpose of the funds (pt. 134). As to total institutions, the state is obligated to tolerate and to facilitate religious activity as this is a right, but it has no duty to finance it and even less to allow identification of state and religion by employing priests to discharge religious services. In criticizing the legislator, the Constitutional Court stated: “The legislator’s inclination toward (financial) support of individuals’ religious life may not reach the limits set by the principle of separation of religious communities and state, particularly the guarantee of state neutrality” (pt. 146). The Constitutional Court did not accept all the State Council’s objections, but it did make considerable inroads in the philosophical discourse on the position of religion in public life, particularly state-church relations, more so than ever in Slovenian history. This is the second such instance where the Constitutional Court moved Slovenian public life into new grounds of human rights affirmation (the first being the issue of the “erased”). The leftist government in power at the time planned to adopt major changes to the Act, to achieve conformity with the Court’s decision. Owing to situational circumstances, the draft was proposed by some of the parties in the governing coalition (Zares, Liberal Democracy,

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and Pensioners’ Party). However, neither this nor other drafts to replace the voided Religious Freedom Act was ever adopted by the Parliament. 29 The draft was consistently separation motivated, allowing for some limited relations of cooperation. The potentially most hurtful issue for the RCC was the envisaged provision on state financing: it would not be limited as to areas of financing, in comparison to the present, but it would pursue only from explicit income tax apportionments by individuals of 0.5 percent of the income tax with which all individuals dispose of, indicating a voluntary, charitable purpose. 30 Taking into consideration that most people do not avail themselves of this discretionary power, this would mean a substantial decrease in the subsidies received by the RCC. The tensions caused by attempts to govern the issues in a more liberalist manner were always met by strong statements on the part of the RCC and rightist parties. For example, on September 8, 2011, Jože Jerovšek, considering this draft at a Parliamentary commission, stated: “The more I listen to the discussion on issues from the draft, the angrier I feel, discerning how literally Stalinist sediments have remained in our space [Slovenia]. Ideological hatred and intolerance that are typical forms of Stalinism are still active.” 31 On the other hand, there are a few or no individual objections to the constitutionality of the draft, just a generalized expression of disgust. Bypassing the fact that the Act had been found unconstitutional, Archbishop Stres pleaded for legal stability and safety in an attempt to stop the legislative initiative even before the draft was entered, again warning about “the great quantity of intolerance against the Roman Catholic Church in Slovenia.” 32 THE PRESENT SITUATION At present (the beginning of 2014), Slovenia is still awaiting full implementation of the 2010 Constitutional Court decision. A small portion of the Act was amended in 2013 (Act on Amending RFA), 33 mitigating conditions for registration of new religious communities. Now, ten subscribers of the appropriate age and citizenship would suffice, and the documents describing faith and practice submission have been omitted. However, full implementation is yet awaiting sufficient political resolve. By itself the declaration of the invalidity of the provisions privileging the RCC turned the ideological hegemony pendulum toward a stricter understanding of separation as the only legitimate option. Of course, as many authors have clearly explained, some degree of state-church cooperation is inevitable in contemporary circumstances, 34 and one can hardly expect the implementation of the provision covering social security payments by the state to be withheld after 50 years of practice under very varied political regimes. Šturm is right in claiming that this has become an “acquired right,” 35 despite its contravention of the separation clause.

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The same goes for the presence of the RCC in public media to a certain extent, i.e., considering its majority nature. The National Reconciliation Question Events during World War II, particularly the conflict between armed groups in Slovenia, are still the subject of political discourse and usually the issue set on the agenda by political entities associated with the RCC. The issue is whether during the war Tito’s partisans were the only antifascists who also did away physically with adversaries at the end of the war. Besides the partisans, another force did exist: the Slovene Home Guard (Slovensko domobranstvo) based on the remains of anti-communist village sentries (Vaške straže); these were active between September 1943 and May 1945, officially supported by the RCC and by the German forces. The main issue is who should ask forgiveness from whom for the conflicts among them and particularly for the indiscriminate executions of home guards by the partisans at the end of the war. Frequently, with much emotional rhetoric the RCC, while demanding national reconciliation, supposes that the crux of reconciliation lies in the fact, as stated by Bishop Glavan, that “due to communism and the revolution, which was the gravest crime committed against the Slovenian nation, they began to kill each other.” 36 The conclusion is that, although killings were committed by both sides, the primary blame lies with the partisans. All this despite the home guard being a quisling organization, having sworn allegiance to Hitler, and the partisans being the main and successful antifascist armed organization (in union with other partisan units within the then Yugoslavia). In an interview, given for the national Radio Slovenia on August 14, 2013, Cardinal Franc Rode said that his fellow citizens are today even more divided than they were ten years ago. In his opinion, the members of the Slovene Home Guard were not traitors but just men who loved freedom, since they were not against the Slovenes but against a communist organization which used terrorist methods in order to take power in Slovenia in an arbitrary way. 37 The Religion and Education Question By its nature, the educational system is a focus of ideological hegemony disputes. One of the central issues in the discourse on the public school was the question of reintroduction of the confessional religious education. 38 The RCC proposed religious instruction, not necessarily a strict catechism; however, the new subject would be under the competence of the RCC itself. The reasoning behind this proposal is the Church’s conviction that there is no true morality without religiosity, and the fear that without this recognition Slovene schools would produce

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pupils “with top-heavy heads and empty hearts.” 39 Of course, at a basic level, it had to do with ideological hegemony. During the Liberal Democratic Government of Janez Drnovšek in the 1990s, a strict separationist institutionalization of public schools took effect, despite RCC opposition. The concept of “the autonomy of the school space” (autonomy from influences on the part of the RCC, as well as of other explicit worldview positions) came into effect, disallowing any confessional activities within public schools. The then RCC Metropolitan Archbishop of Ljubljana Rode stated in a bellicose manner: “I promise you, we will knock down this school democratically, at the first opportunity.” 40 He also compared school without religious instruction, as envisaged in the government reform plan, to “the drill for German sheep dogs.” 41 According to the Organization and Financing of Education Act adopted in 1996, religious communities may set up educational institutions and schools at all levels. As a rule, the state co-finances the activities of such nursery schools and other schools up to 85 percent of the program’s expenses in a comparable public institute if the institutions are organized in compliance with the law and carry out suitable programs. In the proportionate size of the private school sector, Slovenia takes last place in the European Union: in 2012, private secondary schools represent 2.4 percent, while primary schools only 0.2 percent of the pupil population. 42 The three private catholic secondary schools operate on the basis of concession agreements and are thus predominantly publicly funded, while the fourth one, along with the only private Catholic elementary school (since 2008), is partially funded. The RCC also has a Faculty of Theology (forming part of the state University of Ljubljana) for the education of theologians, particularly priests, being the only such institution in Slovenia. A non-confessional subject called Religions and Ethics is taught as an elective in elementary schools, but does not attract much interest. The RCC vehemently protested against this arrangement of educational system in Slovenia. Speaking of the educational arrangement, theologian and academician Jože Krašovec called on the faithful “to return to catacombs and remain there until self-styled ideologues do not dissolve in their contradictions.” 43 The Religion and Family Law Question The family, again, is a focus of ideological disputes as to what type of family and coupledom are allowed, considered moral, and what types are contrary to morality. The RCC (as well as the Islamic Community and the Serbian Orthodox Church) countenanced only the traditional family model. 44 Slovenia has recognized registered partnerships for same-sex couples since July 2006. The law allows for same-sex partners to access

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one another’s pensions and property. In July 2009, the Constitutional Court of Slovenia found that it was unconstitutional to treat registered partners differently from married partners. A new Family Code was drafted and adopted in 2011 under the government of the left, not introducing major changes but stirring public controversy, mainly because it did not disallow the possibility of adoption by partners within same-sex unions. A special RCC sponsored Civil Initiative “for the family and the rights of children” was launched, and much hot air was vented against the Family Code adopted in 2011. 45 A referendum for its nullification was held in 2012, supported by the RCC and requested and launched by the Civil Initiative, which was established for this purpose. This referendum was a test of the power and hold of traditional morality. The voter turnout was 30.1 percent; the Code was rejected, with 55 percent of voters against the law. 46 The mobilization of traditional morality sponsored by the RCC proved a success and produced a legal effect. Although the Bill passed included many non-contentious provisions, among them the prohibition of corporal punishment, the establishment of a children’s rights ombudsman, and mediation structures, the focus of debates immediately turned to gay couples being granted the same rights as heterosexual couples. That proved to be a call to arms for conservative groups. Although the RCC officially declared it would not take part in the referendum campaign, it extended its entire infrastructure to the disposal of the campaign, and the RCC representatives became passionately engaged in it. They argued the intention of the new Family Code was to weaken the value of the family. According to the Slovenian Bishops’ Conference, the redefinition of the family and marriage would have negative long-term consequences. Furthermore, the Code would make possible abuse and trafficking with children and women. 47 FINANCIAL AND PROPERTY ISSUES: CAN THE CHURCH EVER BECOME TOO RICH? On attaining independence, Slovenia carried out the restitution of property nationalized and confiscated after World War II. The RCC was one of the main beneficiaries of restitution, because of its once extensive property in the form of woods, real estate, and other assets. 48 By 2012, the value of property reacquired by the church was estimated at around 200 million euro, while all the real estate owned by the RCC is estimated at 800 million euro. 49 At the time, the RCC leadership defined a set of new historic goals, among which a crucial role was attributed to the restoration of economic power, as it existed prior to World War II. 50 Beyond restitution, this included a struggle for budgetary assistance and waiving

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of taxation. Most importantly, the focus was on an entrepreneurial orientation for the Church. Over the first fifteen years of Slovenia’s independence, RCC efforts resulted in the rapid accumulation of economic power by the RCC. According to Prinčič, most of the new historic goals regarding material wealth were achieved by 2004. 51 Most importantly, within the denationalization of state property, RCC regained the vast majority of its claimed real estate, together with substantial reimbursements for the inability to use them during the prior Communist regime. Partly also due to the declining amounts of funds collected by donations from adherents, the RCC strived to find new ways to increase its income and to strengthen its achieved position. Some of these goals were included in the draft of the RFA, as referred to above. While the Church gained quite substantial wealth in the form of real estate through denationalization, it still lacked the income required to strengthen pastoral activity. On top of that, since the middle of the 1990s church attendance has been in gradual decline, causing a concomitant decline in donations by worshippers as an important financial source. As Prinčič points out, the Church was quite successful in compensating for this decline through donations by large sponsors, such as the national oil company Petrol, and increasingly also through profits from its financial investments. 52 The story of RCC financial investments reaches back at least to 1993, when the Krek Bank (Krekova banka) was established on the initiative of the Slovenian Bishops’ Conference, who stated that “[t]he bank shall play an important role in the creation of a new economic basis for the future activities of the Church in Slovenia.” 53 A year later, the Krek management company (Krekova družba za upravljanje) was established, with the primary mission of collecting ownership certificates, vouchers distributed by the state to citizens as a form of symbolic compensation within privatization. Another important step was made in 1997, with the establishment of a company called Gospodarstvo Rast (Growth Economy) by the Maribor Archdiocese, with Mirko Krašovec as executive manager. In 2002, the RCC sold the Krek Bank for about 35 million euro. The money was used by Gospodarstvo Rast to buy the majority of shares in Zvon Ena (Bell One), a holding of the Krek management company. This holding was chiefly an instrument for managing shares in Slovenian companies that were mainly acquired by collecting ownership certificates from citizens. One of the most widely known investments of the Bell One holding was the hi-tech media company T-2, a network provider that offered landline and mobile telephone services, digital TV, and broadband Internet access to users everywhere in Slovenia, entirely through company-owned networks. This investment, on the one hand, clearly reflected the Church’s ambition to strengthen its position in the area of mass media. On the other hand, it was quite notorious for some time

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because it broadcast pornographic material. In 2003, Bell One acquired a sister company called Zvon Dva (Bell Two), a holding with Church-related entities owning about a quarter of all shares. In 2005, the values of Bell One and Bell Two were estimated at about 100 million and 21 million euro, respectively. 54 The two Bells thus became the focus of the new economic endeavors of the RCC in Slovenia, especially for the Maribor Archdiocese through the Gospodarstvo Rast company. By 2008, the value of assets in the two Bells had increased enormously. However, parallel to this growth, holdings accumulated huge debt for new investments. Thus, in 2008, Bell One had substantial shares in fifty major Slovene companies. Such an expansionist economic policy and explosive growth did not pass without opposition within the RCC. However, sceptics of “the Maribor economic miracle” were often dismissed with the argument that they did not understand “the new economy.” 55 In 2008, the Church’s financial empire began to feel the effects of the emerging financial and economic crisis. The value of assets began to decrease and profits were shrinking. In 2010, Bell One accumulated a huge loss that substantially surpassed the value of its assets and it became insolvent. After a year of various attempts to deal with both Bells, the Maribor court declared bankruptcy for them in February 2012. The same destiny had befallen Gospodarstvo Rast a few months earlier and the Krek management company about a year later. In fact, the collapse left behind tremendous financial and moral consequences. As to the former, the accumulated debt of Church-related firms amounted by some estimates to a staggering 800 million euro. 56 Most of the losses fell on the shoulders of major Slovenian state banks and some 65,000 small stakeholders. 57 Severe damage was also felt by some, previously successful Slovenian companies such as Helios and Cinkarna Celje, which were partly owned by the Bells. It should be added that the losses of these banks were eventually (by December 2013) covered by tax-payer money. This means that almost all the losses created by the speculative transactions were paid for by the ordinary citizens of Slovenia. To put it in more religious language, ordinary people appeared to be paying for the sins of the Church. Of course, the consequences were also very serious for the Church itself. In February 2012, the Archbishop of the Maribor diocese, Franc Kramberger, resigned and was immediately replaced by Marjan Turnšek. A year later, the bank accounts of the archdiocese were blocked, and a few months later banks began to seize pieces of Church property. The diocese turned for help to the Austrian Graz-Seckau diocese, which appeared to be a potential buyer for some properties. 58 In April 2013, Pope Francis invited Anton Stres, the Archbishop of Ljubljana, and Marjan Turnšek, the Archbishop of Maribor, to resign and publicly apologize for the financial scandal, which they did at the end of July. Although the economic, and for many involved also the personal, fallout from the affair is colossal, its moral consequences may be more

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far-reaching. Firstly, many Slovenes became stakeholders in the two funds, because the RCC recommended that they do so, or at least because they put their trust in the Church as a conservative institution which should therefore be especially careful with their investments. The Archbishop of Ljubljana, Anton Stres, when he resigned, denoted the whole affair as an accident and, regarding the calamity of the Maribor Archdiocese, famously stated: “It was not the Archdiocese that sank the Bells. It was the Bells who sank the Archdiocese.” 59 Thus, the Church tried to distance itself as far as possible from the financial scandal and pointed the finger at the Bells and specifically at a minor RCC official. So far, the Church has expressed no regret for placing such a high emphasis on acquiring economic wealth and social power. Rather, there was much of apology for “the accident” and blame being shifted to the executives. It is clear that the temptations of speculative capitalism made Slovene society pay a very high price regardless of Church affairs. During the period of transition, the Church has missed its first opportunity to play the role of moral force preventing such social deviations. Instead, it fell into the same trap, which is undoubtedly an important factor in the substantial decline of trust in the Church and the overall decline in its primary activities (see figures 3.1 and 3.2). Some empirical evidence for the essential impact of financial affairs on the decline in trust in the Church was found by Slovene sociologist Marjan Smrke, who noted that the decline was significantly sharper in regions comprising the Maribor Archdiocese. 60 CONCLUSION Historically speaking, much has changed since the beginning of the twentieth century when Anton Bonaventura Jeglič, the Catholic Archbishop of Ljubljana, recommended that marriage should be contracted as early in the morning as possible, so that the newlyweds could spend as much time as possible praying before physical union, while accusing the liberals of lax morality. 61 But the traditionally arrogant attitude of the RCC seems to have remained its predominant manner of expression, along with its rightist leanings, despite the actual social situation having changed radically. In terms of marriage, Slovenia falls among the very lowest percentages for contracting marriage in the world. Additionally, the entire political conflict in Slovenia has become secularized, lay forces taking over the major task of upholding rightist, authoritarian, and particular positions, with the RCC acting more as their moral support than being the primary bearer of the conflict. Although taking part in public discourse and even launching initiatives, as in the case of the Family Code nullification referendum, the main roles in public decision making and debate are not articulated directly by the RCC institution.

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Figure 3.1. Attendance of religious services and trust in the Church, 1992–2012. Data from Slovene public opinion (SJM).

There is, however, a thread connecting the periods of conflict between the two forces playing the primary roles in Slovenian political conflict, in as much it is not a mere power distribution struggle. The thread involves positions on traditional morality, the interpretation of Slovenian identity, and the interpretation of history. Communism as such can be understood as an instance of victory for anti-clericalist forces, at least on the surface. The clericalist forces were badly beaten, at least within “official culture.” Today, the RCC concedes often that nothing much has changed in the struggle between the two camps, as illustrated. Basically, this speaks of an in-depth secularization. This is not to say that Slovenian public and cultural discourse contains nothing outside this conflict, but the conflict can be traced as a vital common factor. Allowing for presence of the conflict, dividing and feeding energy into public and cultural life one can say, however, that there has been a significant swing since the beginning of the twentieth century. One can no longer speak of domination by clericalist forces, although one cannot speak of pure victory for liberalist forces either, at this moment. The situation with the RFA is the best example. The law privileging the RCC was adopted in 2007 and substantively declared null in major provisions, those privileging it, by the Constitutional Court in 2010. However, since then all attempts by liberalist forces to achieve adoption of a law on the basis of the decision, in line with its separationist longings, have failed. This would speak for at least a temporary stalemate in this historical struggle. On the other hand, issues regarding the school system can be seen as an example of liberalist victory. Furthermore, secularization is the general framework of trends in Central and Eastern Europe, despite official participation of churches in

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Figure 3.2. The dynamics of church weddings and baptisms, 1965–2012. Data from the Statistical Office of Republic of Slovenia and from archives of six dioceses in Slovenia.

political legitimation. Such instances are to be found in Hungary, where government ministers defend publicly Christian values at the beginning of the school year on church premises and to schoolchildren. 62 A further instance can be found in Bulgaria, where the Constitution states that “Eastern Orthodox Christianity shall be considered the traditional religion in the Republic of Bulgaria” (Article 3, passed in 1991). Such instances are unthinkable in Slovenia. It is even improbable that the Slovenian Constitutional Court would accept the presence of the cross on school premises, which was upheld by the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights in Lautsi vs. Italy, bearing in mind the strict Slovenian statutory provision on “confessional activity being prohibited in public schools.” 63 In contrast to the Slovenia envisaged in Tavčar’s novel 4000 as an eternal land of Catholic social, cultural, and political hegemony, today’s Slovenia may, in spite of a struggle not fully decided, be on the way to fulfilling the words of Mancini and Rosenfeld, who prescribed modern liberalist state, “neither favoring nor disfavoring (religion) within the public sphere, and equally protective of citizens freedom of and from religion within the private sphere.” 64 It certainly is more secular and separationist in comparison to its neighboring states and the states of the former Yugoslavia, where there is religious instruction to be found in public schools, without exception, which can be considered an important indicator of ideological hegemony. Cooperation between state and church (religious communities) in the world today is advancing and omnipresent, owing to the increased com-

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plexity of the social system, almost irrespective of constitutional declarations. 65 That said, in our case we are still dealing with a basically Latin pattern and a post-communist situation. The institutional situation in Slovenia—despite many instances of church-state relations and associations, besides unresolved matters—remains basically a separationist one. On the other hand, from Rodney Stark’s market point of view, the situation is close to a monopolistic economy owing to RCC predominance. In line with this situation, it is the arrogance on behalf of the RCC which Stark sees to be typical of the monopolistic situation. For example, Cardinal Rode called for “the historical memory to be needing to change,” naming the major names in Slovenian cultural history needing to be reevaluated. 66 Theologian Jože Krašovec went even further when declaring that “outside religion there is no art.” 67 The situation will probably continue to lack ideological unipolarity, far (and probably ever farther) from Tavčar’s depiction of Catholic authoritarian hegemony in 4000. It is probable that clericalist–anti-clericalist disputes will continue in the future and fuel political, cultural, and public life. On the other hand, cooperation will certainly continue also and, as we see it, a de facto privileged position for the RCC cannot possibly be eliminated in the near future. Slovenia can in no case become a land of strict separation. 68 For example, it cannot be expected that priests of the major group (and a few others alongside) will remain without state-financed retirement and health insurance, even less that garbage will cease to be collected in front of churches with public funds. Not even the liberalist draft of Gulič foresaw such benefits and church-state entanglements as ceasing. Even more questionable are the issues of RCC property taxation, a matter yet to be addressed. NOTES 1. David Martin, A General Theory of Secularization (London: Blackwell, 1978), 37–38. 2. Ibid., 39. 3. Ibid., 40. 4. David Martin, On Secularization: Towards a Revised General Theory (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005), 20. 5. Marko Vidic (ed.), Ilustrirana Zgodovina Slovencev (Ljubljana: Mladinska knjiga, 1999). 6. Aleš Ušeničnik, Sociologija (Ljubljana: Katoliška bukvarna, 1910). 7. Ervin Dolenc, Kulturni boj: Slovenska kulturna politika v Kraljevini SHS (Ljubljana: Cankarjeva založba, 1996). 8. Mahnič cited in Janko Pleterski, Dr Ivan Šušteršič, 1863–1925 (Ljubljana: ZRC, 1998), 38. 9. Srečo Dragoš, Katolicizem na Slovenskem: Socialni koncepti do druge svetovne vojne (Ljubljana: Krt, 1996), 136–37. 10. Ivan Tavčar, 4000: Č asu primerna povest iz prihodnjih dob / po vzorih dr. Ničmaha napisal dr. Nevésekdo (Ljubljana: Narodna tiskarna, 1891).

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11. Mihailo Konstantinović, Politika sporazuma: Dnevničke beleške 1939–1941, Londonske beleške 1944–1945 (Novi Sad: Mir, 1998). 12. Pleterski, Dr Ivan Šušteršič, 4. 13. Stella Alexander, Church and State in Yugoslavia since 1945 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008). 14. Vladimir Dedijer, Ivan Božić, Sima Ćirković, and Milorad Ekmečić, History of Yugoslavia (New York: Harcourt McGraw Hill, 1972). 15. Radmila Radić, Država i verske zajednice, 1945–1970 (Beograd: Institut za noviju istoriju Srbije, 2002). 16. Alexander, Church and State; Sergej Flere, “Da li je Titova država bila totalitarna?” Političke perspektive 5, no. 1 (2012), 1–21. 17. Arhivsko spletno mesto, “Register cerkva in drugih verskih skupnosti (2012),” http://www.arhiv.uvs.gov.si/si/delovna_podrocja/register_cerkva_in _drugih_verskih_skupnosti/, accessed March 11, 2014. 18. Miran Komac et al., Srbi u Beloj krajini: Vrlinići, Radojčići i Kordići bili su prvi naseljenici (Niš: Studentski kulturni centar, 2013). 19. Sabrina P. Ramet, The Three Yugoslavias: State Building and Legitimation (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center, 2006). 20. Gregor Lesjak and Davor Lekić, “Država in verske skupnosti: Kronika odnosov med letoma 2008 in 2011,” Teorija in praksa 50, no. 1 (2013), 154–71. 21. See “Sporazum med Republiko Slovenijo in Svetim sedežem o pravnih vprašanjih,” January 28, 2004, http://www.legirel.cnrs.fr/spip.php?article469andlang= fr, accessed March 11, 2014. 22. Constitutional Court, “Mnenje o Sporazumu med Republiko Slovenijo in Svetim sedežem o pravnih vprašanjih,” November 19, 2003, http://odlocitve.us-rs.si/usrs/usodl.nsf/o/DF0893E08CA14C0DC1257172002A2D5E, accessed March 11, 2014. 23. See “Zakon o verski svobodi,” February 16, 2007, http://www.pisrs.si/Pis.web/ pregledPredpisa?id=ZAKO4008, accessed March 11, 2014. 24. Lesjak and Lekić, “Država in verske skupnosti,” 159. 25. See Alexander, Church and State. 26. Lesjak and Lekić, “Država in verske skupnosti,” 159. 27. As cited in Slovenian Press Agency, “Franc Rode: Imenovanje Guliča je provokacija, ki si je niti partija ne bi dovolila,” September 17, 2009, http://www.dnevnik.si/ clanek/1042299960, accessed March 11, 2014. 28. Constitutional Court, “Odločba Ustavnega sodišča o ustavnosti ZVS,” April 15, 2010, http://odlocitve.us-rs.si/usrs/us-odl.nsf/o/525A00D4A9080D2AC12577 36004527 C4, accessed March 11, 2014. 29. Lesjak and Lekić, “Država in verske skupnosti,” 160. 30. Urad vlade Republike Slovenije za verske skupnosti, Izhodišča za pripravo zakona o verskih in svetovnonazorskih skupnostih (Ljubljana: Vlada Republike Slovenije, 2010), 31. 31. Jerovšek cited in Aleksander Kolednik and Barbara Grm, “Jerovšek: Tipične oblike stalinizma še delujejo; Gulič: Zakon o verski svobodi ni sovražen,” September 8, 2011, http://www.rtvslo.si/slovenija/jerovsek-tipicne-oblike-stalinizma-se-delujejogulic-zakon-o-verski-svobodi-ni-sovrazen/265809, accessed March 11, 2014. 32. Stres cited in Ana Mavsar and Marko Weilguny, “Stres: Nestrpnost do Katoliške cerkve je resnično velika,” November 16, 2010, http://www.rtvslo.si/slovenija/stresnestrpnost-do-katoliske-cerkve-je-resnicno-velika/244042, accessed March 11, 2014. 33. See “Zakon o spremembi in dopolnitvi Zakona o verski svobodi (ZVS-A),” December 6, 2013, http://pisrs.si/Pis.web/pregledPredpisa?id=ZAKO6753, March 11, 2014. 34. Jonathan Fox, “World Separation of Religion and State into the 21st Century,” Comparative Political Studies 39, no. 5 (2006), 537–69.

.

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35. Lovro Šturm et al., Oblikovanje strokovnih podlag za normativno ureditev področja verskih skupnosti v Republiki Sloveniji (Ljubljana: Inštitut za pravo človekovih pravic, 2004). 36. Glavan cited in Bogomir Štefanič, “Ponudimo roko sprave,” Družina, June 10, 2007, http://www.druzina.si/icd/spletnastran.nsf/all/20623A8B8B7A48AFC12572F 2002C7D00?OpenDocument, accessed March 11, 2014. 37. Franc Rode, Spomin, zavest, načrt Cerkve na Slovenskem (Ljubljana: Družina, 1995), 133–38. 38. For a good overview see Marjan Smrke and Tatjana Rakar, “Religious Education in Slovenia,” in Zorica Kuburić and Christian Moe (eds.), Religion and Pluralism in Education: Comparative Approaches in the Western Balkans (Novi Sad: CEIR, 2006), 9–38. 39. Anton Stres, “The Church in a Democratic State after the Model of Slovenia,” Religion, State and Society 28, no. 3 (2000), 297. 40. Rode cited in Ali H. Žerdin, “Dresura za nemške ovčarje,” Mladina, February 8, 1999, 26–28. 41. Boris Šuligoj, “Šola, ki jo je treba zrušiti,” Delo, January 20, 1999, 4. 42. The Commission on Education at the Slovenian Bishops’ Conference, “Statement on the Resolving the Crisis and the Financing of Private Schools,” April 17, 2012, http://katoliska-cerkev.si/resevanje-krize-in-financiranje-zasebnih-sol, accessed March 11, 2014. 43. Jože Krašovec, “Edinost po Svetem pismu,” Družina, August 26, 2001, 4. 44. Tomo Ćirković, Anton Stres, and Nedžad Grabus, “Religious and Cultural Values are Best Transmitted in a Family Environment: A Statement,” March 22, 2012, http://en.katoliska-cerkev.si/religious-and-cultural-values-are-best-transmitted-in-afamily-environment, accessed March 11, 2014. 45. Stres cited in Bogomir Štefanič, “Rešitev so predčasne volitve,” June 26, 2011, http://www.druzina.si/icd/spletnastran.nsf/all/ E73EC88D2D160508C12578B700305ED0? OpenDocument, accessed March 11, 2014. 46. Državna volilna komisija, “Referendum on The Family Code, Held on March 25, 2012,” April 2012, http://www.dvk-rs.si/index.php/si/arhiv-referendumi/zakonodajnireferendum-o-druzinskem-zakoniku, accessed March 11, 2014. 47. Saje cited in Barbara Hočevar, “Cerkev proti zakoniku: Prepričevanje ali zavajanje?” March 10, 2012, http://www.delo.si/novice/druzinskizakonik/cerkev-protizakoniku-prepricevanje-ali-zavajanje.html, accessed March 11, 2014. 48. Jože Prinčič, Križ in kapital (Ljubljana: Modrijan, 2013), 258–59. 49. See http://www.bogastvo-cerkve.org/nepremicnine-2/. 50. Prinčič, Križ in kapital, 189. 51. Ibid., 191. 52. Ibid., 272. 53. Bishops’ Conference cited in Ali H. Žerdin, “Korporacija RKC d. d.,” Mladina 52, December 29, 2005, http://www.mladina.si/94820/korporacija-rkc-d-d/, accessed March 11, 2014. 54. Ibid. 55. Cestnik cited in Vanessa Čokl, “Pohlep je greh: Intervju z Brankom Cestnikom,” August 10, 2013, http://web.vecer.com/portali/vecer/v1/default.asp?kaj=3andid= 2013081005944797, accessed March 11, 2014. 56. Emiliano Fittipaldi, “The Holy Crash,” January 21, 2011, http://espresso .repubblica.it/palazzo/2011/01/21/news/the-holy-crash-1.27619, accessed March 11, 2014. 57. Mali delničarji, “Zvon ena v stečaj pahnilo cerkveno rivalstvo,” February 28, 2012, http://www.rtvslo.si/?andc_mod=pdaandop=viewandid=277825, accessed March 11, 2014. 58. Ranka Ivelja and Vesna Vaupotič, “Graška nadškofija bo kupovala v Mariboru,” September 5, 2013, http://www.dnevnik.si/slovenija/graska-nadskofija-bo-kupovala-vmariboru, accessed March 11, 2014.

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59. Anton Stres, “Izjavi ob objavi papeževega sprejema odpovedi cerkveni službi ljubljanskega in mariborskega nadškofa metropolita,” August 6, 2013, http://sps.rkc.si/ 423/, accessed March 11, 2014. 60. Marjan Smrke, “Učinki ‘svete polomije’ na zaupanje v cerkev,” Teorija in praksa 49, no. 1 (2012), 27. 61. Anton Bonaventura Jeglič, Mladeničem (Ljubljana: Katoliška tiskarna, 1910). 62. Eva S. Balogh, “The Growing Influence of the Catholic Church in Hungary,” September 1, 2013, http://hungarianspectrum.wordpress.com/2013/09/01/the-growinginfluence-of-the-catholic-church-in-hungary/, accessed March 11, 2014. 63. See “Zakon o organizaciji in financiranju vzgoje in izobraževanja,” February 6, 1996, http://www.uradni-list.si/1/objava.jsp?urlid=199612andstevilka=567, accessed March 11, 2014. 64. Susanna Mancini and Michel Rosenfeld, “Unveiling the Limits of Tolerance: Comparing the Treatment of Majority and Minority Religious Symbols in the Public Sphere,” in Lorenzo Zucca and Camil Ungureanu (eds.), Law, State and Religion in the New Europe: Debates and Dilemmas (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 165. 65. Jonathan Fox, A World Survey of Church and State (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008); Maria Grazia Martino, “We Need to Promote Dialogue between Christians and Protestants: State, Church and Religious Minorities in Greece, Italy and Sweden,” Journal of Church and State 54, no. 4 (2011), 526–50; Axel Freiherr von Campenhausen and Heinrich de Wall, Staatskirchenrecht: Eine systematische Darstellung des Religionsverfassungsrechts in Deutschland und Europa (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 2006). 66. Rode cited in Sergij Pahor et al., Kristjanovo politično tveganje (Trst: Društvo Slovenskih izobražencev, 1993), 119–36. 67. Jože Krašovec, “Kjer je na delu vera, tu niso potrebni advokati,” Naši razgledi, October 30, 1996, 3. 68. Winfried Brugger, “On the Relationship between Structural Norms and Constitutional Rights in Church-State Relations,” in Winfried Brugger and Michael Karayanni (eds.), Religion and the Public Sphere: A Comparative Analysis of German, Israeli, American and International Law (Berlin: Springer, 2007), 21–86.

FOUR Holocaust Denial in the Croatian Catholic Church Martina Topić

Since the collapse of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the Catholic Church has secured its special position in Croatia, previously lost under the communist rule. Nowadays it participates in organizing commemorations of the alleged Bleiburg massacre, which is given a significant space in Croatian official narrative as well as in history textbooks, presenting it as the largest Croatian martyrdom. Bleiburg commemorations are always full of Nazi iconography and, in fact, some Catholic priests openly praise the Nazi regime, and thus deny the Holocaust in Croatia. Even though not all priests have done this, it is nonetheless striking that those priests who praise the notorious regime and deny the Holocaust face no sanctions from the Church. It is even more striking that state authorities ignore laws banning expression of hatred and the Constitution, which declares anti-fascism as its highest value. Accordingly, this chapter will examine the denial of the Holocaust by the Croatian Catholic Church, juxtaposing the findings against the legal system that regulates the matter, as well as against the general status of the Catholic Church in Croatia that some authors label as “the most Catholic country in Europe” due to its overall influence over the Croatian national policies. 1 Holocaust denial among Catholic clergy is analyzed based on the public speeches of the Catholic clergy available in the national media. In identifying radical clergy, I use the classification offered by moderate Catholic portal Križ života (The Cross of Life) that advocates abandonment of glorification of the Ustasha regime, and identifies the most radi61

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cal clergy. 2 Accordingly, speeches and views on the Holocaust among clergy the portal identified (Marin Barišić, Mile Bogović, Djuro Hranić, Ante Ivas, Juraj Jezerinac, Stanislav Kos, Vlado Košić, Vjekoslav Lasić, Valentin Pozaić, and Marin Srakić) are examined. In order to find articles with speeches of selected clergy, I used key words such as the name and surname of the bishop or archbishop and terms “(Ante) Pavelić” and “Nezavisna Država Hrvatska (NDH).” Newspapers and portals that are included in the analysis belong to the national media that either advocate protection of minority rights and oppose the glorification of fascism, or they are moderately attached to the right while newspapers and portals that belong to the Croatian ultra right were excluded from the analysis since their coverage can be a subject of special analysis on media glorification of Nazism. Examples of problematic speeches cited in the chapter are selected based on the discourse analysis of the selected media articles, following Ruth Wodak’s notion of discursive topoi, which appears as the dominant argument in the talk of the actors. 3 THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE POST-1991 CROATIAN STATE When Croatia declared independence from Yugoslavia on June 25, 1991, it placed anti-fascism at the core of the statehood idea and, thus, enforced Constitution that defines legitimacy of the Croatian state as founded on anti-fascist struggle against the Independent State of Croatia (Nezavisna Država Hrvatska, established in 1941), and the decisions of the AntiFascist Council held in 1943, Constitutions from 1947, 1963, and 1990. In other words, the present Croatian state is founded on anti-fascism as one of its most important values together with historical statehood that the Constitution emphasizes in the same chapter. 4 It is worth noting that Croatian historical statehood which the Constitution emphasizes has nothing in common with Nazi-like policies because Croatian national activists until World War II did not enforce radical exclusivist policies. 5 It was during the war that Croatia, as a Nazi ally, enforced racial laws and prosecuted its Serbian and Jewish population. In present-day Croatia, it is often argued that Croats did not vote for NDH, but that NDH was imposed on them by force and, thus, represented a quisling state. While this is true, it is also true that the Croat population embraced the fall of Yugoslavia and welcomed NDH, 6 and that the Catholic Church strongly embraced the Ustasha regime and collaborated with it. 7 It is also often argued that Croatia had the highest number of anti-fascists who stood up against the fascist regime. While this is true, it is also true that many embraced the regime but very few faced any prosecution apart from a few highly positioned collaborationists who faced prosecution from the Communist regime that gained power after NDH’s defeat. It is also true that present Croatia, led by the Catholic Church, glorifies and romanti-

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cizes the notorious Ustasha regime, and this time it is certainly not imposed from the outside. There is also some similarity between the present Croatia and Nazi Croatia, i.e., when Croats became disappointed with NDH a loud minority kept imposing anti-Semitism and Serbophobia and prosecuted even Croats who opposed the regime. 8 In the same way, in the present Croatia a loud minority led by the Catholic Church—as in the case of NDH—expresses anti-Semitism and Serbophobia, and intimidates Croats who think differently by accusing them of being Yugo-nostalgic even though many citizens disagree with the high influence of the Church in political affairs. 9 On the other hand, the Criminal Offenses Act regulates matters in regard to hatred toward minority groups and offenses against the image and dignity of the country. 10 Croatia’s Criminal Offenses Act does not regulate Holocaust denial as in some other countries in Europe or the United States; however, the Criminal Offenses Act does regulate the socalled public encouragement of violence and hatred, as well as genocide denial. In that, Article 325, clause 1, states that a person “using the press, radio, TV, computer network or Internet in a public gathering or in some other way publicly encourages or makes available to the public leaflets, pictures or other materials that call for violence or hatred directed toward groups of people or a member of a group because of their racial, religious, national or ethnic belonging, background, skin color, sex, sex commitment, gender identity, invalidity or any other characteristics, will be punished with three years of imprisonment.” The same punishment, as regulated in the same article (clause 2), is reserved for those who “publicly approve, deny or significantly downplay criminal acts of genocide, crimes of aggression, crime against humanity or war crime, all directed toward a group of people or member of a group because of their racial, religious, national or ethnic belonging, background or skin color, in a way that is appropriate to encourage violence or hatred against that type of group or members of that group.” According to clause 3 of the same article, there is no possibility to escape prosecution: “For committing criminal offense from clauses 1 and 2 from this article, the perpetrator will be punished.” Furthermore, in Article 87, clause 20, the Criminal Offenses Act states that the hate crime is “a criminal act committed because of racial belonging, skin color, religious beliefs, national or ethnic background, invalidity, sex, sexual commitment or gender identity of the other person.” The Criminal Offenses Act also regulates crimes against humanity and human dignity, including genocide of national, ethnic, racial and religious groups (Article 88), prosecution of a definable group or community based on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, sexual, or other basis (Article 90, clause 8), discrimination based on race, ethnic origin, skin color, sex, language, religion, political or other belief, national or social background, property, birth, education, social position, marital

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or family status, age, health condition, invalidity, genetic inheritance, gender identity, expression, sexual commitment, or other characteristics, prosecution of individuals or organizations because of their advocacy for equality of people (Article 125), violation of freedom of expression of the national belonging regulating that right of national minority to free expression of national belonging and cultural autonomy is unquestionable, and any violation of that right will be subject to prosecution. This rule applies to free use of letter and language of national minorities, which is protected by all relevant laws and cannot be limited (Article 126). The Criminal Offenses Act also regulates violation of peace of the dead where the Act bans all forms of destruction of cemeteries (Article 332). Finally, it is important to mention that the Criminal Offenses Act protects the Republic of Croatia from violation of its dignity. In Article 349, it states that the person who publicly exposes the Republic of Croatia to mockery, despises or robustly puts down its flag, coat of arms, or anthem, will be punished with imprisonment of up to one year. Apart from the Constitution and the Criminal Offenses Act, there are other acts that regulate similar matters such as the Criminal Offenses Act. For example, Act on Coat of Arms, Flag and Anthem of the Republic of Croatia, and Flag and Sash of the President of the Republic of Croatia protects the dignity of the mentioned symbols of the country. 11 The Minor Offenses Act regulates circumstances according to which someone can be prosecuted such as Article 4 that states nobody can be prosecuted for minor offenses if s/he is not guilty, and this article is often used for initiating prosecutions. 12 THE POSITION OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH IN CROATIA During the course of national struggles in the nineteenth century, Catholic priests actively engaged in creation of the Croatian national identity, national unification, and some of them openly advocated the idea of Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia was envisaged as a federation of south Slavs that will enable them to preserve their national identities threatened by Austrian imperialism and Hungarian nationalism. 13 In their agitation, Catholic priests expressed no hatred toward non-Croatian ethnic/religious groups. For example, one of the most prominent national activists in nineteenth-century Dalmatia, Catholic priest Mihovil Pavlinović, did not pay attention to Jews while he was offering all rights to Serbs in what was to become an independent Croatian state that would join the Yugoslav federation. 14 The situation remained the same during the twentieth century when prominent national agitators such as Ante Starčević and Stjepan Radić continued to advocate spiritual Croatism according to which a Croat is everyone who has Croatian spirit (Starčević) and political nationalism

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based on agrarian politics and inclusion of peasants in ruling the country (Radić). 15 Starčević’s ideas were later exploited by ultra-nationalists and the World War II regime because he also talked about the ultimate enemies of the Croatian statehood which he called “slavoserbs”; however, the idea behind this was the spiritual Croatism that these groups did not have. The “slavoserbs” encompassed not only Serbs, but also Austrians and everybody who opposed the idea of an independent Croatian state. 16 The role of the Church was not significant during this period, and those priests who were active in national agitation were not enforcing nationalistic exclusivist policies. However, during World War II the Ustasha regime was enforced, and Croatia became the Independent State of Croatia. Upon taking the power, the new regime immediately enforced racial laws similar to the ones in Nazi Germany, 17 and Ustasha concentration camps included even camps for women and children (in Stara Gradiška), unseen in other parts of Europe under the Nazi rule. 18 NDH applied a mixture of German Nazi and Italian fascist policies; however, its policies were more similar to Nazi Germany, and prosecution of Serbs and Jews was well planned even before the Ustashas took power in Croatia. 19 According to some data (although these are not definite numbers), in the area occupied by NDH there were approximately 38,000–39,000 Jews, and some 9,000 survived World War II. 20 The Ustasha regime placed the Catholic Church in a special position, and the Church participated in prosecutions of Serbs and Jews. 21 There is a collection of sources (newspapers and documents from the period of NDH) that prove the Catholic Church collaborated with the Ustashas. It was first published as a collection of documents edited by Joža Horvat and Zdenko Štambuk in 1984 in Germany. The Croatian edition was published in Croatia in 2008 by sociologist Svetozar Livada who had difficulties in finding a publisher due to the atmosphere of fear since the Catholic Church holds a special position in the present Croatian society. The Church and pro-Catholic historians labelled the book as propagandistic material. 22 Surely the most prominent figure of the Ustasha regime was Archbishop Alojzije Stepinac who was later sentenced by the communist regime in Tito’s Yugoslavia. 23 The primary focus of the Ustasha regime was the Serbian population because of the alleged lack of loyalty to the idea of an independent Croatian state, while Jews were annihilated as a means of mass genocide similar to what was ongoing in Nazi Germany—on the sole ground they were Jews. The populist argument according to which Serbs are not loyal to Croatia is something that has circulated in the public sphere in Croatian territories since the nineteenth century, and it was particularly abused during the 1990s. The real truth is that only one part of the Serbian population in the nineteenth century objected to the creation of an independent Croatian state, and asked for equal and not only political status, 24 while the others embraced the idea of an indepen-

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dent Croatian state. 25 Nonetheless, the Ustashas took this “reason” for committing Holocaust over the Serbian population that was not only brutally slaughtered, but in some cases even forcibly converted to Catholicism and then annihilated. Brutality of the Ustasha regime in Jasenovac and other concentration camps in Croatia surprised even the Germans. 26 In Tito’s Yugoslavia, which enforced atheism as an official doctrine, the Church was pushed on margins, and appearances of the clergy in public and political spheres were strictly banned. Collaborationists with the Ustasha regime were sentenced in the trials which the Church labelled as political trials, and up to today the Church insists they have been targets of prosecution and discrimination. Since the attainment of independence in 1991, the Catholic Church has regained the position it had during World War II, and started to divide citizens according to ethnic lines. In that, the Church has also taken part in creating the problematic term of Croat-Catholic, implying that Croats can be only Catholics. By doing so, the Church largely defined Croatia as an ethnic nation where all non-Catholics appear as Others. 27 Such an approach was complemented with radical ethnic policies and campaigns to give birth to ethnic Croats, and all newly founded minorities became Others. The Catholic Church advocated even enforcement of the law on mothers-caregivers, according to which women would be encouraged to stay at home, and raise ethnic Croats. 28 Today, the Church exercises significant influence over politics where it openly agitates for nationalistic parties. Priests sit on committees for approving history textbooks, which impose too much content related to the Catholic Church. 29 Nonetheless, Croatian history textbooks have been subject to criticism because they emphasize Croatian history only in a revisionist way by underlining the Bleiburg massacre while downplaying the Jasenovac concentration camp and other places of suffering for non-Croats. 30 In December 2013, the non-governmental organization For Family, supported by the Church, organized a referendum for diminishing the rights of the LGBT population. 31 This referendum crowned the Church’s interference in Croatian political affairs after they previously attacked the current government for introducing health education as a mandatory subject to schools by calling for military overthrowing of a legitimately elected government 32—an anti-Constitutional and illegal move which faced no sanctions. Even though Croatia has not witnessed large-scale anti-Semitism nor are Jews being intimidated as they are in some other European countries, this does not mean their situation has been fully resolved. 33 For example, senior representatives of the Catholic Church refuse to send representatives to the Holocaust commemorations, but they instead organize commemorations in Bleiburg where the alleged massacre of Croats occurred. 34 The real truth is that the alleged massacre could have happened only against Croatian Ustashas who refused to surrender to the partisans

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and made an attempt to surrender to the British, and this certainly cannot belong to Croatian martyrdom. Yet, this “martyrdom” has a special place in Croatian history textbooks and society, while crimes committed by Croats during World War II are being either denied or downplayed. 35 The far right Croatian Pure Party of Rights (Hrvatska Čista Stranka Prava) openly praises the notorious Ustasha regime, depicting it as legitimate in its fight for Croatian independence. 36 Even though this party cannot meet the minimum number of votes needed to enter Parliament, it still holds relevance for the relativism of Croatian history given that the discourse about World War II it has enforced is very similar to the discourse advocated by the Catholic Church. HOLOCAUST DENIAL AND THE CATHOLIC CHURCH When it comes to the Holocaust denial in the Catholic Church, the clergy does not openly claim the Holocaust did not happen like is presently the case in some Arabic countries where regimes have gone as far as to state that Jews themselves invented the Holocaust. 37 In other words, in the Catholic Church in Croatia, nobody openly denies that the Holocaust happened but this is done in a hidden way, i.e., priests do not openly say the Holocaust did not happen or that Jews invented the whole thing; however, Catholic representatives do not attend Holocaust commemorations while they regularly attend Bleiburg commemorations, and one part of the Catholic clergy openly praises the Croatian Ustasha state and denies any wrongdoing from the side of the Croats and the Catholic Church, ignoring the annihilation that accompanied the Croatian Ustasha regime. With this, they claim the regime from World War II was a favorable regime and something Croats should surely be proud of. While this is against the Criminal Offenses Act that bans denying and downplaying genocides, no member of the clergy has ever faced any sanctions. The praise for the Ustasha regime is primarily expressed by organizing commemorations for the birthday of the Croatian führer (called poglavnik) Ante Pavelić, on December 28. On this day, priests attend a memorial service celebrating his birthday even though he was fully responsible for the Holocaust in Croatia. Even though this goes against the Constitution that is, as already explained, founded on anti-fascism, and various protests organized by anti-fascists, the service is regularly held each year and attended by a large number of people. 38 Authorities do not hold the Church responsible for organizing this kind of commemoration, even though this can also be considered a violation of dignity of the Republic of Croatia, as prescribed in the Criminal Offenses Act and even though this presents genocide denial. However, when someone calls Croatia as an Ustasha or Nazi state, and uses symbols of the Ustasha state, that person is prosecuted for violating the dignity of Croatia. For

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example, on December 1, 2013, when Croatia held the For Family–initiated referendum, the Catholic clergy kept telling the citizens how to vote. 39 For Family initiated the referendum by suggesting the notion of marriage as a “biological community of man and woman” be incorporated in the Croatian Constitution. Once the outcome had showed that 65.87 percent of citizens were in favor, 40 the news portal Index.hr placed a swastika on the Croatian flag in an article entitled “Croatia decided as it used to decide: 65 percent for discrimination,” stating this is yet another proof of the rise of fascism in Croatia. 41 Matija Babić, the author of the article and also responsible for the picture, ended up being interrogated by the police, and prosecuted against the Law on Coat of Arms, Flag and Anthem of the Republic of Croatia and Minor Offenses Act, Article 4. 42 It is indicative that he was not prosecuted against the Criminal Offenses Act which also bans the exposition of Croatia to mockery or humiliation. The same Act, as already mentioned, bans genocide denial—a criminal act regularly committed by the clergy. Nonetheless, only a few weeks after the incident with the swastika, the Catholic Church organized a commemoration of the poglavnik Pavelić, and when anti-fascist groups came to protest the Church was already guarded by the Croatian police, so people interested in attending the service could still proceed without being interrupted by anti-fascists. 43 In other words, Croatian police protected the Church so the clergy could freely commit a criminal act of genocide denial, while Babić was prosecuted for violating the dignity of Croatia but not against the Criminal Offenses Act. Another example regards Croatian football player Joe (Josip) Šimunić who shouted the Ustasha official motto (“Za dom spremni!” [“For Home—Ready!”]) after the qualifying match between Croatia and Iceland. 44 The decision to fine him and not to interrogate or prosecute him for criminal offense, even though he glorified the Ustasha regime, downplayed the act of genocide. 45 As expected, his act was interpreted as an expression of widespread ignorance among the public that often sees the Ustasha motto as a Croatian historical greeting and therefore, as many nationalists tend to claim, see nothing offensive in it being shouted. Incidents like this one clearly show that the position of the Church in Croatia as well as the official Croatian position on the Holocaust are often downplayed or justified as a unique struggle of the Croatian people for self-determination. Even though it is only the Croatian Pure Party of Rights that has openly supported behavior and policies corresponding to the Ustasha regime, other parties are not sanctioning these practices either, making the whole trend become almost mainstream. Still, some of the most rigorous members of Catholic clergy are those holding services for Ante Pavelić, such as Stanislav Kos and Vjekoslav Lasić. Lasić states that he is convinced that Pavelić is in Heaven, while Kos claims that Pavelić is “a father and friend,” and that celebrating his birthday is “the best way to give him credit for everything he had done

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for us [the Croats].” 46 When asked by the media about his sympathy for Pavelić, of whose past he must be aware, Lasić explained: “There is no crime. God is so merciful and full of love that there is no sin He would not forgive if men sincerely cried because of his sins. Who gave you a guarantee that he [Pavelić] did not cry over what you call a crime? If he did that, then he is certainly in Heaven.” 47 When asked if he would also hold a service for a communist who committed crimes, he clarified: “My community so far never asked for a service for Josip Broz. As a priest, I am ready to hold that service too, but then I would make one scientific introduction to that service. I would show with pure evidences that Tito was the ultimate criminal, and that Jesus wants us to pray for him.” 48 But then, when asked why he never made any scientific introduction to Pavelić’s crimes, he stated that he is celebrating the service for Pavelić because he is a sinner, without counting his sins, and added: “If the Poglavnik had killed 5,000 people with his hand, today’s enemies of the Croatian people—and you know who they are—would invent five million. Everything is known about Josip Broz. I have an encyclopedia in German about crimes in the twentieth century, and he is in 10th place.” 49 Apart from serving commemoration services for Pavelić, Lasić is famous for his speech at the funeral of Dinko Šakić, a former commander of the Jasenovac concentration camp, where he stated that the Ustasha movement on April 10, 1941, re-founded the Croatian state, and that the NDH is a foundation of the Croatian state for which Archbishop Alojzije Stepinac, another Ustasha collaborationist, gave his life. In a same manner, every decent Croat should be proud of Šakić’s name. 50 With this, Lasić clearly denied the genocidal nature of NDH; however, he faced no sanctions from the Church or authorities even though the media expected prosecution. When it comes to the commemorations held in Bleiburg, this event was in receipt of an equal amount of funding from the state as both the Jasenovac memorial center and the Day of anti-fascist rebellion. 51 It was the government led by the Social Democrats that decided to stop sponsoring the Bleiburg commemoration, in 2012; however, they have been targets of the Church ever since, and the Church is leading those commemorations even without funding. Bleiburg commemorations did not start when Croatia gained independence in the 1950s, and were led by Ustasha immigration. 52 Church officials are leading commemorations including Croatian Archbishop Josip Bozanić, Bosnian Archbishop Vinko Puljić, and many others. In 2008, a day of celebration was changed from Sunday to Saturday so more priests would be able to attend, and this contributes toward an even stronger recognition of Ustasha soldiers as martyrs. This practice is clearly anti-Constitutional, since the Constitution claims that Croatia is founded on anti-fascist rebellion as opposed to the NDH, and it is a clear sign of genocide denial. Not only is there no prosecution, but politicians from right-oriented parties often acknowl-

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edge Bleiburg as a place of Croatian martyrdom, or even attend commemorations that are always full of Ustasha iconography. Catholic priests have continuously ignored the Holocaust and murder of the Serbian and Jewish populations in Croatia during World War II, which is against the Criminal Offenses Act. For example, Vlado Košić, a bishop from the region of Sisak (that encompasses the Jasenovac concentration camp), in all of his public speeches has attacked all Croatian governments for not investigating crimes committed by the communist regime at the end of World War II; still, he never mentions crimes committed during the war that led to the alleged crimes of the communist regime. 53 Košić is also active in leading and attending commemorations in Jazovka where NDH soldiers were killed by the communists. Members of the Croatian ultra-right organize commemorations on June 22, which is the official day of anti-fascism, meaning that they equate Nazism with communism. In one of those commemorations, Košić said that all governments have kept ignoring Jazovka and “the other Jazovka that is in Croatia,” drawing a parallel between World War II and the Croatian war from the 1990s, and enforcing Croatian martyrdom, while at the same time he ignored the atrocities Croatia itself had committed, and, in fact, the true nature of victims in Jazovka, i.e., Croatian NDH soldiers who were defeated. 54 Zagreb’s Bishop Valentin Pozaić has compared communism with Nazism and called for rebellion against the communists who are currently in power, 55 referring to Social Democrats, even though they have nearly nothing to do with communism, or even left-oriented policies, due to the fact that they are in favor of neo-liberal policies and have almost no social sensitivity. It is the current government which allowed for a discriminatory referendum that violated the rights of the LGBT community to take place, even though it was officially opposed to it and stated it would vote “no.” 56 While Pozaić’s calls represent a clear declaration for violation of the constitutional order, there is no prosecution from authorities who are all intimidated with the power the Church has had since the inception of the nationalist regime in 1991. Back in 2004, Pozaić also signed a petition for a new trial for Mile Budak, an Ustasha Minister responsible for racial laws and Holocaust in Croatia. 57 Because of his role in the Holocaust, Budak was sentenced to death by the communist regime, and Croatian ultra-right asked for a new process, hoping to set him free, which is another indication of genocide denial and downplaying of responsibility. The Bishop of Šibenik, Ante Ivas, is often in charge of leading commemorations in Bleiburg, presenting the Bleiburg battle as the greatest massacre of Croatian people that has happened since World War II, in which Croats are victims and never perpetrators. 58 He also wrote one song for Marko Perković Thompson, an ultra-right oriented singer who openly praises the Ustasha regime. This singer is the only person who got

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a divorce authorization from the Catholic Church, even though the reason for divorce was the third person, and he is generally protected from any prosecution because of his views and statements, due to his close relationship with the Catholic Church. 59 The Criminal Offenses Act does not apply to his performances, his Nazi greetings and Ustasha iconography at his concerts. Back in 2012, Ivas said the following: “I condemn every crime. We have to respect victims of Jasenovac, but we should not forget victims from Bleiburg and Križni put.” 60 With this statement, he equalized victims of Nazism and Ustasha soldiers who refused to surrender after defeat, and this has been the policy of the Catholic Church since Croatia’s independence. Even though this can be considered as downplaying of the genocide, according to the Criminal Offenses Act, no sanction was ever applied. Nonetheless, Archbishop Marin Barišić has also equalized communism with Nazism, and glorified Croatian war criminals convicted of war crimes over the civilian population in the 1990s. 61 For example, at the Bleiburg commemoration in 2013, he noted that “human evilness took lives of thousands of peoples, not only in Bleiburg, but also Jasenovac, Vukovar and Škabrnja.” 62 By saying this, he equalized the crime of Nazism with the defeat of the Ustasha army and Croatian war of the 1990s, and the Bleiburg battle has been shown as the biggest martyrdom of Croatian people. Bishop Marin Srakić shares the same view, and states that pupils should be taken to Auschwitz, Jasenovac, but also Bleiburg. 63 Bishop Mile Bogović went even further, by saying that Jasenovac is the symbol of the attack on the Church. 64 Even though the policy of undermining or, even more problematically, denying the Holocaust has been the policy of the Catholic Church since 1991, an increase in radicalization occurred in 2010, when priest Ivan Turić at one commemoration openly glorified Ante Pavelić and justified his policies: “In the year 1941, Croatia was made by Croats, our poglavnik and the Ustashas. The Chetniks wanted to kill us so that we disappear. Tito and the partisans helped them in that. That is why the Chetniks did kill our people on this day 68 years ago . . . Josipović 65 says that the partisan’s hat is beautiful, but I am telling him that the Ustasha’s hat is even more beautiful. They are knitting me that hat today. There have been fewer crimes committed under the Ustasha’s than under the Partisan’s hat.” 66 This incident happened only a year after Archbishop Josip Bozanić had led a large pilgrimage to Jasenovac concentration camp for the first time since independence. The Church went into the pilgrimage not in April when the Jasenovac commemoration is officially held but in September. Official explanation for the delay was that the event is too politicized; still, it should be noted that Bozanić went to Jasenovac only after Prime Minister Ivo Sanader (of Tudjman’s Croatian Democratic Union) had asked the Church to finally pay a visit the previous year. 67 However, the pilgrimage included not only the Jasenovac concentration camp, sub-

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camp for women and children in Stara Gradiška, but also the town of Petrinja, although Petrinja has no connection with World War II but with the one of the 1990s, when it was destroyed. The fact that the Church visited Petrinja was an attempt to shift responsibility and remind the participants of the Croatian war from the 1990s. In the speech the Archbishop held during the pilgrimage, he spoke not only against fascism but also against communism with which he again undermined the purpose of commemorating World War II, and even though the Church likes to state that Holocaust commemorations are largely politicized, in the same way the Church politicized the pilgrimage. In his speech, Bozanić also emphasized that the Church had nothing to apologize for and insisted that the Jasenovac concentration camp is regularly abused as a means of stigmatizing Croatian people as genocidal. 68 He also called for prosecutions of crimes committed by the communists, enforced something that the Church has always insisted on—the alleged prosecution of the Church during the communist rule and equalization of Nazism and communism. 69 Bozanić’s speech provoked a response from Slavko Goldstein, a Jasenovac survivor, who reminded him that at the beginning of the Ustasha rule, many clerics of the Catholic Church greeted the Ustasha regime enthusiastically. 70 The Church’s behavior and the fact that it has faced no punishment for its actions even though it has acted against the Constitution and the Criminal Offenses Act, fits into a larger framework of the culture of memory and revitalization of the Ustasha regime in the Croatian society since the 1990s. During the 1990s, the commemorations of April 10 were led by Dobroslav Paraga, from the Croatian Party of Rights, 71 and nowadays they are led by the Croatian Pure Party of Rights, embracing much of the Ustasha iconography and symbols. 72 With all this in mind, April 10 has become a day of commemoration of the foundation of the Ustasha state, and even though these commemorations are not official but attended by ultra-right parties that are not present in the Parliament, they still contribute to the divisions over the politics of memory in Croatia and further Holocaust denial. CONCLUSION Putting everything together, it is evident that the Church has enjoyed a special position and exercised significant influence within the Croatian society. Its status goes so far that the clergy can violate a whole set of laws without sanctions. On the other hand, when journalists or ordinary citizens violate similar laws, they are likely to face prosecution. What is particularly striking is that Matija Babić faced prosecution because he humiliated Croatia for placing a swastika on its flag. In this case, authorities considered it offensive that Croatia was equalized with Nazism.

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However, they are not reacting when the clergy praises that very same regime. What is even more striking is that Matija Babić was not prosecuted against the Criminal Offenses Act but against the Act that regulates appropriate ways to use the Croatian flag, anthem, and the coat of arms. It is difficult then to avoid the question as to whether Babić had not been prosecuted against the Criminal Offenses Act because such a decision could have generated anti-fascist protests and lawsuits demanding prosecution of the Church for violating the very same Act by downplaying or, even worse, denying the Holocaust. NOTES 1. Vjekoslav Perica, Balkan Idols: Religion and Nationalism in Yugoslav States (USA: Oxford University Press, 2002). 2. Marijan Vogrinec, “Crkva u Hrvata i Bog pod ustaškom kapom,” Križ života, January 1, 2014, http://www.kriz-zivota.com/crkva-u-hrvata-i-bog-pod-ustaskomkapom/, accessed February 20, 2014. 3. Ruth Wodak, The Discursive Construction of National Identity (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1999). 4. Sabor Republike Hrvatske, “Constitution of the Republic of Croatia,” http:// narodne-novine.nn.hr/clanci/sluzbeni/232289.html, accessed February 20, 2014. 5. On this particular issue, see Davorka Matić, “Je li nacionalizam stvarno toliko loš: Slučaj Hrvatske,” in Sabrina P. Ramet and Davorka Matić (eds.), Demokratska tranzicija u Hrvatskoj: Tranformacija vrijednosti, obrazovanje, mediji (Zagreb: Alinea, 2006), 261–85; Mihovil Pavlinović, “Tajni program ‘Hrvatska misa,’” (1869), reprinted in Nikša Stančić (ed.), Mihovil Pavlinović: Izabrani politički spisi (Zagreb: Golden marketing and Narodne Novine, 2000); Mihovil Pavlinović, “O narodnosti obzirom na JugoSlovjenstvo,” Narodni list 59 (1862), reprinted in Nikša Stančić, Hrvatska nacionalna ideologija preporodnog pokreta u Dalmaciji: Mihovil Pavlinović i njegov krug do 1869 (Zagreb: Institut za hrvatsku povijest, 1980); Nikša Stančić, “Između političkog nacionalizma i etnonacionalizma: Od hrvatske staleške ‘nacije’ (natio croatica) do hrvatskoga ‘političkog naroda’,” in Tihomir Cipek and Josip Vrandečić (eds.), Nacija i nacionalizam u hrvatskoj povijesnoj tradiciji (Zagreb: Alinea, 2007), 33–56; Nikša Stančić, “Hrvatska nacionalna integracija u 19. i 20. stoljeću: Ritmovi, ideologije, politika,” in Hrvatska politika u XX stoljeću: Zbornik radova sa znanstvenog skupa Matice Hrvatske održanog 27–29. travnja 2004 (Zagreb: Matica Hrvatska, 2006), 9–34; Nikša Stančić, Hrvatska nacija i nacionalizam u 19. i 20. stoljeću (Zagreb: Barbat, 2002); Martina Topić, Primjenjivost teorije Anthonyja D. Smitha na formiranje nacionalnoga identiteta u Dalmaciji (unpublished PhD dissertation) (Zagreb: Faculty of Philosophy, 2013); Martina Topić, “Rod i nacija: Očuvanje (i kreacija) nacionalnog identiteta kroz rodno diskriminacijsku nacionalističku politiku (Slučaj Hrvatske iz devesetih),” Sociološki pregled XLIII, no. 2 (2009), 185–207. 6. Ivo Goldstein, “Nezavisna Država Hrvatska 1941. Godine: Put prema katastrofi,” in Hans-Georg Fleck and Igor Graovac (eds.), Dijalog povjesničara/istoričara 10/1 (Zagreb: Friedrich Naumann Stiftung, 2008), 137–53; Vjeran Pavlaković, “Opet za dom spremni: Desetotravanjske komemoracije u Hrvatskoj nakon 1990,” in Sulejman Bosto, Tihomir Cipek, and Olivera Milosavljević (eds.), Kultura sjećanja: 1941 (Zagreb: Disput, 2008), 113–29. 7. Vladimir Dedijer, The Yugoslav Auschwitz and the Vatican: The Croatian Massacre of the Serbs During World War II (Buffalo, NY: Prometheus Books, 1992); Vladimir Dedijer, Vatikan i Jasenovac (Beograd: Izdavačka radna organizacija Rad, 1987). 8. Goldstein, “Nezavisna Država.”

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9. Martina Topić and Snježana Vasiljević, “Identity Construction Programs of the State and the EU: Case Study Phase II” (WP6, Academic research report to the European Commission, part of FP7 EC project entitled Identities and modernities in Europe, 2011); Martina Topić and Snježana Vasiljević, “Identity Construction Programs of the State and the EU: Case study Phase III (Citizens and Modernities: Between National and European Paths in Croatia)” (WP7, Academic research report to the European Commission, part of FP7 EC project entitled Identities and modernities in Europe, 2011). 10. Sabor Republike Hrvatske, “Criminal Offenses Act of the Republic of Croatia,” http://narodne-novine.nn.hr/clanci/sluzbeni/2011_11_125_2498.html, accessed February 20, 2014. 11. Sabor Republike Hrvatske, “Act on Coat of Arms, Flag and Anthem of the Republic of Croatia, and Flag and Sash of the President of the Republic of Croatia,” http://narodne-novine.nn.hr/clanci/sluzbeni/253505.html, accessed February 20, 2014. 12. Sabor Republike Hrvatske, “Minor Offenses Act of the Republic of Croatia,” http://narodne-novine.nn.hr/clanci/sluzbeni/329374.html, accessed February 20, 2014. 13. Topić, Primjenjivost teorije. 14. For a more detailed discussion, see the works listed in endnote 5. 15. Drago Roksandić, “Agrarne ideologije i teorije modernizacije u Jugoslaviji 1918–1929,” Naše teme XXXIII, no. 5 (1989), 1135–50; Martina Topić, Snježana Vasiljević, and Stevo Djurašković, “The State of the Art: Various Paths to Modernity— Croatia’s Case Report” (WP4, Academic research report to the European Commission, part of FP7 project entitled Identities and Modernities in Europe, 2009). 16. See, for example, Mile Starčević, Dr Ante Starčević i Srbi (Zagreb: Matica hrvatska, 1936). 17. Robert Blažević and Amina Alijagić, “Antižidovstvo i rasno zakonodavstvo u fašističkoj Italiji, nacističkoj Njemačkoj i ustaškoj NDH,” Zbornik Pravnog fakulteta Rijeka (1991) 31, no. 2 (2010), 879–916; Olga Milković, “Intervju—Alen Budaj, direktor Margelovog instituta iz Zagreba: Ugroženo dostojanstvo jasenovačke žrtve,” Patriot online, 2008, http://www.patriotmagazin.com/arhiva/0269/media/001.htm, accessed February 22, 2014. 18. The fact that the Ustashas had a camp for children is often emphasized by antifascists; however, the ultra-right and the Church ignore this fact. Even the Croatian Jasenovac memorial site is acknowledging this fact despite the official undermining of the number of atrocities in the Jasenovac concentration camp. See Jasenovac Memorial Site, “Djeca u logorima Nezavisne Države Hrvatske,” 2014, http://www.juspjasenovac.hr/Default.aspx?sid=5464, accessed February 25, 2014. 19. Goldstein, “Nezavisna Država.” 20. Ivo Goldstein, “Istraživanje židovskih žrtava: Razmatranja o Zagrebu i Hrvatskoj,” in Hans-Georg Fleck and Igor Graovac (eds.), Dijalog povjesničara/istoričara 5 (Zagreb: Friedrich Naumann Stiftung, 2001), 445–63. 21. Dedijer, The Yugoslav Auschwitz; Dedijer, Vatikan i Jasenovac; Carlo Falconi, The Silence of Pius XII (London: Faber, 1970); Irina Ognyanova, “Religion and Church in the Ustasha Ideology (1941–1945),” CCP 64 (2009), 157–90. 22. Jutarnji list, “Zločini klera u NDH,” April 24, 2008, http://www.jutarnji.hr/ template/article/article-print.jsp?id=247834, accessed February 25, 2014. 23. He remains a contested figure because the Catholic Church sanctified him as a martyr while Jews and Serbs object to his sanctification stating there is evidence he was a collaborationist with the Ustasha regime. Nonetheless, he is included in Croatian history textbooks, and he remains a figure highly appreciated within the clergy even though the citizens object to the imposition of the Church in secular history textbooks. To quote only one example, it is enough to remember that the Archbishop received a medal from the Ustasha regime in 1944 for his collaboration, and because he was exposing so-called outlaws from the regime (Drago Pilsel, “Democroacia: Lijepa naša fašistička,” 2013, http://www.autograf.hr/lijepa-nasa-fasisticka/, accessed February 25, 2014). In addition, see Fred Singleton, Twentieth-Century Yugoslavia (New York: Columbia University Press, 1976); Jozo Tomasevich, War and Revolution in Yugo-

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slavia, 1941–1945: Occupation and Collaboration, Vol. 2 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001). 24. Tihomir Rajčić, “Srpski nacionalni pokret u Dalmaciji u XIX stoljeću,” Radovi Zavoda za povijesne znanosti HAZU u Zadru 47 (2005), 341–61; Tihomir Rajčić, “Slika Hrvata u nacionalnoj ideologiji Srpske stranke u Dalmaciji 80–ih godina XIX stoljeća (Srpski list/glas o Hrvatima),” Radovi Zavoda za povijesne znanosti HAZU u Zadru 45 (2003), 357–74; Tihomir Rajčić, “Odnos srpskog lista (glasa) prema autonomašima u Dalmaciji 80–ih godina XIX stoljeća,” Radovi Zavoda za povijesne znanosti HAZU u Zadru 43 (2001), 375–88. 25. Topić, Primjenjivost teorije. 26. Edmund G. von Horstenau, Zapisi iz NDH (Zagreb: Disput, 2013). 27. Martina Topić and Dragan Todorović, “Religious Identities in Croatia and Serbia: Failure or Advantage in Building the European Identity?,” in Danijel Sinani (ed.), Antropologija religije i alternativne religije: Kultura identiteta (Belgrade: Faculty of Philosophy, 2011), 97–123; US Department of State, “Croatia: International Religious Freedom Report 2010,” http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2010/148924.htm, accessed March 26, 2014; US Department of State, “Croatia: International Religious Freedom Report 2009,” http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2009/127304.htm, accessed March 26, 2014; US Department of State, “Croatia: International Religious Freedom Report 2008,” http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2008/108440.htm, accessed March 26, 2014. 28. Biljana Bijelić, “Žene na rubu rodne jednakopravnosti,” in Sabrina P. Ramet and Davorka Matić (eds.), Demokratska tranzicija u Hrvatskoj: Tranformacija vrijednosti, obrazovanje (Zagreb: Alinea, 2006), 241–61; Vesna Kesić, “Od štovanja do silovanja ili od majke domovine do hrvatske ‘posrnule’ žene,” Kruh i ruže 1 (1994), http://postjugo.filg .uj.edu.pl/baza/texts_display.php?id=322, accessed March 18, 2009; Topić, “Rod i nacija.” 29. Wolfgang Höpken, “Izmedju gradjanskog identiteta i nacionalizma: Udžbenici povijesti u postkomunističkoj Europi,” in Sabrina P. Ramet and Davorka Matić (eds.), Demokratska tranzicija u Hrvatskoj: Tranformacija vrijednosti, obrazovanje, mediji (Zagreb: Alinea, 2006), 143–69; Heike Karge, “Istraživanja školskih udžbenika u Jugoistočnoj Europi: Problemi, projekti, perspective,” in Hans-Georg Fleck and Igor Graovac (eds.), Dijalog povjesničara-istoričara 4 (Zagreb: Friedrich-Naumann Foundation, 2001), 17–31; Martina Topić, “Deconstruction of the Religious Narrative: Antemurale christianitatis and the Construction of Difference,” in Nikola Knežević, Srdjan Sremac, and Goran Golubović (eds.), Demitologizacija religijskih narativa na Balkanu:Uloga Religija u (post) konfliktnom društvu i pomirenju (Novi Sad: Center for Research of Religion, Politics and Society, 2012), 47–77. 30. Ibid. 31. Srdjan Sremac, Zlatiborka Popov Momčilović, Miloš Jovanović, and Martina Topić, “Eros, Agape and Ethnos: Proposal for a Critical Analysis of the Public Discourse on Religion, Homosexuality and Nationalism in the Context of the Western Balkans,” in Dinko Gruhonjić (ed.), Uloga medija u normalizaciji odnosa na Zapadnom Balkanu (Novi Sad: Faculty of Philosophy, 2014), 247–70. 32. Dražen Ciglenečki and Irena Frlan, “Crkveni rat protiv ‘pogubnog Jovanovićevog kurikuluma—Pozaić: Hrvatski narod se mora organizirati i u novoj Oluji svrgnuti komuniste s vlasti,” Novi List, January 9, 2013, http://www.novilist.hr/ Vijesti/Hrvatska/Pozaic-Hrvatski-narod-se-mora-organizirati-i-u-novoj-Oluji-svrgnuti -komuniste-s-vlasti, accessed March 25, 2014. 33. Robert Fine and Glynis Cousin, “A Common Cause: Reconnecting the Study of Racism and Antisemitism,” European Societies 14, no. 2 (2012), 166–85; Fundamental Rights Agency, “Report on Antisemitism in 2012,” http://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/ files/fra_uploads/2215–FRA-2012–Antisemitism-update-2011_EN.pdf, accessed February 13, 2014; Philip Spencer, “European Marxism and the Question of Antisemitism,” European Societies 14, no. 2 (2012), 275–94; Philip Spencer, “The Left, Radical Antisemitism, and the Problem of Genocide,” The Journal for Study of Antisemitism 2, no. 1 (2010),

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133–53; Hannah Rosenthal, “Global Trends in Anti-Semitism,” Remarks before the 2011 South Florida Luncheon of the US Holocaust Memorial Museum, Washington, DC, February 1, 2011, http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/rm/2011/161746.htm, accessed February 25, 2014. 34. In 2009, Archbishop Josip Bozanić led a large group of priests to a pilgrimage in Jasenovac. This was the first time a delegation from the Church visited the most bestial concentration camp Croatia ever had. 35. See the works listed in endnote 9. 36. Martina Topić, “European Identity and the Far Right in Central Europe: A New Emerging Concept or a New European ‘Other’?,” in Branislav Radeljić (ed.), Debating European Identity: Bright Ideas, Dim Prospects (Oxford: Peter Lang, 2014), 229–70. 37. Kenneth S. Stern, Anti-Semitism Today: How It Is the Same, How It Is Different and How to Fight It (New York: American Jewish Committee, 2006); Martina Topić, “A European Intifada? On the New Form of an Old European Anti-Semitism in the New Millennium,” in Martina Topić and Srdjan Sremac (eds.), Europe as a Multiple Modernity: Multiplicity of Religious Identities and Belonging (Newcastle Upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2014), 35–72; Robert Wistrich, Muslim Anti-Semitism: A Clear and Present Danger (New York: The American Jewish Committee, 2002), http://www .jewishfederations.org/page.aspx?id=77823, accessed March 10, 2014. 38. Novi List, “Prosvjed Centra Simon Wiesenthal—Zuroff: Misa za Pavelića je sramota hrvatske crkve, vlasti moraju zabraniti takve dogadjaje,” January 2, 2012, http:// www.novilist.hr/Vijesti/Hrvatska/Zuroff-Misa-za-Pavelica-je-sramota-hrvatske-crkvevlasti-moraju-zabraniti-takve-dogadaje, accessed February 24, 2014; Viktorija Macukić, “Puna Crkva—Za dušu ustaškog zločinca: Unatoč prosvjedu, misa za Pavelića ipak održana!,” Jutarnji list, December 28, 2013, http://www.jutarnji.hr/ unatoc-prosvjedu-gradana--misa-za-pavelica-ipak-odrzana/1150387/, accessed February 24, 2014. 39. Slobodna Dalmacija, “Naputak svećenicima biskupa Košića: Na misama uputite vjernike da izadju na referendum i glasuju za,” November 12, 2013, http://www .slobodnadalmacija.hr/Hrvatska/tabid/66/articleType/ArticleView/articleId/227219/ Default.aspx, accessed February 25, 2014. 40. Državno Izborno Povjerenstvo, “Rezultati referenduma o definiciji braka,” December 1, 2013, http://www.izbori.hr/2013Referendum/rezult/rezultati.html, accessed February 25, 2014. 41. Index, “Hrvatska odlučila kao nekad: 65 posto za diskriminaciju,” December 1, 2013, http://www.index.hr/vijesti/clanak/hrvatska-odlucila-kao-nekad-65–posto-zadiskriminaciju/714255.aspx, accessed February 25, 2014. 42. Tportal, “Razgovor na policiji: Optužni prijedlog protiv Matije Babića zbog svastike,” December 2, 2013, http://www.tportal.hr/vijesti/crnakronika/302202/MatijaBabic-na-obavijesnom-razgovoru-u-policiji.html, accessed February 25, 2014; Danko Radaljac, “Pozvan u Heinzlovu zbog ironične fotomontaže: Zbog ilustracije sa šahovnicom u obliku svastike, osnivač Indexa Matija Babić završio u policiji,” Novi List, December 2, 2013, http://www.novilist.hr/Vijesti/Hrvatska/Zbog-ilustracije-sasahovnicom-u-obliku-svastike-osnivac-Indexa-Matija-Babic-zavrsio-u-policiji, accessed February 25, 2014. 43. Macukić, “Puna Crkva.” 44. Aleksandar Holiga, “Za dom spreman: “Josipe Šimuniću, imaš se čega stidjeti!” Tportal, November 20, 2013, http://www.tportal.hr/sport/nogomet/299724/JosipeSimunicu-imas-se-cega-stidjeti.html, accessed February 26, 2014. 45. Macukić, “Puna Crkva.” 46. Danas.hr, “Vjekoslav Lasić: Ante Pavelić je u raju,” December 29, 2010, http:// danas.net.hr/hrvatska/vjekoslav-lasic-ante-pavelic-je-u-raju, accessed February 25, 2014. 47. Ibid. 48. Ibid. 49. Ibid.

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50. Slobodna Dalmacija, “Dominikanac neće biti crkveno kažnjen za veličanje ustaštva: Pateru Vjekoslavu Lasiću prijeti zatvorska kazna,” July 26, 2008, http://www .slobodnadalmacija.hr/Hrvatska/tabid/66/articleType/ArticleView/articleId/16381/ Default.aspx, accessed February 26, 2014. 51. Novosti, “Katran and perje: Crkvi ponovno prijeti crvena ugroza,” February 18, 2012, http://www.novossti.com/2012/02/11545/, accessed February 25, 2014. 52. Mark Biondich, “Kontroverze u vezi s Katoličkom crkvom u Hrvatskoj tijekom rata 1941–1945,” in Sabrina P. Ramet (ed.), Nezavisna Država Hrvatska 1941–1945 (Zagreb: Alinea, 2009), 131–66. 53. Tihomir Ponoš, “Opća praksa Tihomira Ponoša: Diskvalificirani pastir Košić,” Novi List, June 28, 2013, http://www.novilist.hr/Komentari/Osvrti/Diskvalificiranipastir-Kosic, accessed February 26, 2014. 54. Politika Plus, “Obljetnica – Biskup Vlado Košić kritizira: Vlada i mediji ignoriraju Jazovku!” June 22, 2013, http://www.politikaplus.com/novost/81332/biskup-vladokosic-kritizira-vlada-i-mediji-ignoriraju-jazovku, accessed February 27, 2014. 55. Index, “Biskup Pozaić prozvao Vladu komunistima, usporedio ih s nacistima i pozvao na ‘novu Oluju’,” http://www.index.hr/black/clanak/biskup-pozaic-prozvaovladu-komunistima-usporedio-ih-s-nacistima-i-pozvao-na-novu-oluju/656262.aspx, accessed February 27, 2014. 56. Jutarnji list, “Referendum o gay braku—Pusić: Treba izići i glasati protiv, to je prvi korak prema diskriminaciji,” November 17, 2013, http://www.jutarnji.hr/pusic-oreferendumu-o-gay-braku--treba-izici-i-glasati-protiv--to-je-prvi-korak-premadiskriminaciji-/1140304/, accessed February 27, 2014. 57. Robert Bajruši, “Smjena biskupa u Zagrebu: Valentin Pozaić najvjerojatnije nasljednik Josipa Bozanića,” Nacional, February 15, 2005, http://www.nacional.hr/clanak/11295/ valentin-pozaic-najvjerojatnije-nasljednik-josipa-bozanica, accessed February 28, 2014. 58. Tomislav Novak, “Crkva napala vladu na Bleiburgu—Biskup Ivas: Zašto vlast važne zakone donosi bez demokratske rasprave?,” Jutarnji list, May 12, 2012, http:// www.jutarnji.hr/biskup-ivas-na-bleiburgu--zasto-vlast-donosi-zakone-o-obitelji-idjeci-bez-demokratske-rasprave-/1027737/, accessed February 28, 2014. 59. Martina Topić and Srdjan Sremac, “Former Nazi in United Europe? Significance, Meaning and Expressions of Radical Bands in Croatia,” in Jason Lee and Andrew F. Wilson (eds.), Extremism, Nationalism and Transgression (Derby: University of Derby Press, forthcoming). 60. Marko Čubrilo, “Mesić o Bleiburgu: To je udar na razum i istinu te veličanje NDH,” Večernji list, May 12, 2012, http://www.vecernji.hr/hrvatska/mesic-o-bleiburguto-je-udar-na-razum-i-istinu-te-velicanje-ndh-408747, accessed February 28, 2014. 61. Drago Hedl, “Čudne poruke hrvatskih biskupa,” Osservatorio Balcani e Caucaso, August 29, 2007, http://www.balcanicaucaso.org/bhs/zone/Hrvatska/Cudne-porukehrvatskih-biskupa-38622, accessed February 28, 2014. 62. Večernji list, “Barišić: Od ljudske zloće stradale su tisuće ljudi na Bleiburgu,” May 11, 2013, http://www.vecernji.hr/hrvatska/barisic-od-ljudske-zloce-stradale-sutisuce-ljudi-na-bleiburgu-552083, accessed February 28, 2014. 63. Darko Pavičić, “Mons. Marin Srakić: Učenike treba voditi na Bleiburg i druge jame,” Večernji list, April 25, 2012, http://www.vecernji.hr/hrvatska/mons-marinsrakic-ucenike-treba-voditi-na-bleiburg-i-druge-jame-402573, accessed February 28, 2014. 64. Darko Pavičić, “Hrvatski biskupi: Nećemo u Jasenovac dok i Crkvu okrivljuju,” Jutarnji list, June 15, 2006, http://www.jutarnji.hr/hrvatski-biskupi--necemo-ujasenovac-dok-i-crkvu-okrivljuju/223510/, accessed February 28, 2014. 65. Croatian president appointed in 2010, and of very liberal orientation. Because of his peaceful messages and advocacy for regional reconciliation, some ultra-right organizations have labelled him as the leader of the Communist “Red Action.” For more details, see Hrvatska Uljudba, “Proglas,” April 10, 2012, http://www.hrvatskauljudba. hr/, accessed February 28, 2014.

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66. Maja Belušić, “Svećenik u propovijedi veličao ustaštvo: Tko ne voli pokradenu RH, nek’ ide,” dalje.com, August 31, 2010, http://dalje.com/hr-hrvatska/svecenik-upropovijedi-velicao-ustastvo--tko-ne-voli-pokradenu-rh-nek-ide/320022; Tportal, “Kome se ne svidja pokradena Hrvatska nek’ se gubi iz nje,” http://www.tportal.hr/vijesti/ hrvatska/84166/Kome-se-ne-svida-pokradena-Hrvatska-nek-se-gubi-iz-nje.html, both accessed March 1, 2014. 67. Anita Belak Krile, “Sanader: Kardinal treba otići u Jasenovac, SAB-ovci na Bleiburg,” Slobodna Dalmacija, October 22, 2008, http://www.slobodnadalmacija.hr/Split/ tabid/72/articleType/ArticleView/articleId/27082/Default.aspx, accessed March 1, 2014. 68. Glas Koncila, “Propovijed kardinala Josipa Bozanića u Župnoj crkvi u Jasenovcu: Žrtve nas obvezuju na traženje istine,” October 4, 2009, http://www.glas-koncila.hr/ index.php?option=com_phpandItemid=41andnews_ID=17472, accessed March 1, 2014. 69. See the works listed in endnote 9. 70. Tportal, “Goldsteinovo pismo Bozaniću: Zašto se niste pomolili u Jasenovcu kao papa u Auschwitzu?,” September 29, 2009, http://www.tportal.hr/vijesti/hrvatska/ 37493/Zasto-ste-niste-pomolili-u-Jasenovcu-kao-papa-u-Auschwitzu.html, accessed March 1, 2014. 71. Pavlaković, “Opet za dom spremni.” 72. Topić, “European Identity.”

FIVE Religion and Politics in Bosnia and Herzegovina Illustrations from the Postwar and Post-Socialist Transition Dino Abazović and Ivan Cvitković

“Bosnia. A small country, a large word,” wrote the Bosnian Franciscan Ljubo Hrgić in his diaries. 1 The tragedy of Bosnia and Herzegovina at the turn of the millennia did not (only) lie in its peoples but its leaderships that misled, rather than led the citizens. They led them to war (1991–1995) that destroyed whatever common consciousness Bosnia and Herzegovina used to possess, making the conflict years a fertile ground for the disappearance of “national interests.” While one world was disappearing, the other was failing to be born; old illusions were fading away, and there were no builders to build new (common) ones. What remained are the ruins of factories, bridges, and, worst of all, people. The war pushed Bosnia and Herzegovina into the chasm of political, moral, but also intellectual havoc. As one proverb puts it, “one cannot come to the Balkans and leave it from the same country.” Almost twenty years after the end of the war, Bosnia and Herzegovina has not managed to overcome the gap, “created by hatred, too often led by misinterpretation and the destructive abuse of religion.” 2 This chapter will focus on the relationship between religion and politics, in terms of results of interaction between political decision-makers and organized religion. In the context of Bosnia and Herzegovina, certain stakeholders of key political and societal processes have failed to understand that the 79

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times of “autochthonous” nations and nations’ “historical missions” belong to the past. Hence the ongoing disputes about Bosnia and Herzegovina, and within it. To use Hrgić’s words from 1936: “And my Bosnia? Bosnia does not belong to anyone! Bosnia should be its own, since they see her as someone else’s, as a land the possessor of which is unknown. A sad land!” 3 This largely applies today, as well. Indeed, it would be an oversimplification if one considered Bosnia and Herzegovina in purely ethnic terms and therefore as an ethnically divided society; its very recent history—portrayed by one of the most horrible wars and mass atrocities in Europe since World War II—has outlined the country’s much more specific character. The 1995 Dayton Peace Accord 4—a compromise that brought the war to an end and established some sort of peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, has contributed greatly to the creation of fertile soil for political intervention with the prefix “ethno-national.” At present, the politico-institutional structure of Bosnia and Herzegovina is that of a state comprised of two entities (the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Republika Srpska), each with a very high level of autonomy. In itself, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina consists of ten cantons. The town of Brčko, which was the subject of international arbitration, now has the status of a district and was under the direct supervision of a special international envoy till 2012. As the current state infrastructure was established through an international agreement, for the purpose of implementation and particularly in view of maintaining peace, the “Office of the High Representative (OHR) is an ad hoc international institution responsible for overseeing implementation of civilian aspects of the accord. . . . The High Representative, who is also EU Special Representative (EUSR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina, is working with the people and institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the international community to ensure that Bosnia and Herzegovina evolves into a peaceful and viable democracy on course for integration into Euro-Atlantic institutions.” 5 Other international organizations were “intended for facilitating the domestic decision-making process by insuring adequate security for citizens (SFOR, IPTF), creating the economic framework for successful governance (EU, UN) and by promoting democratic and more tolerant institutions and processes (OSCE).” 6 The complex structures of state organization of Bosnia and Herzegovina can (irrespective of international interventionism aimed at achieving peace) ultimately be subsumed under the model that contemporary sources define as consociational. In order to accommodate conflict, stabilization, and democratic development, key elements of consociationalisim (such as a grand coalition, proportionality, mutual veto, and segmental autonomy) 7 have already been implemented. As we have already explained elsewhere, 8 as far as Bosnia and Herzegovina is concerned, things are quite clear—a grand coalition is determined by election legislation (and results of all the elec-

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tions thus far) and the process of establishment of the executive comprising key parties and based on the principle of ethnic representation; proportionality is simply the three-member Presidency, as well as election of members of Parliament (following ethnic and entity criteria, let alone the House of Peoples), composition of the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and so on; the mechanism of protection of vital national interest used in parliamentary practice is, in effect, the mutual veto; and finally, the segmental autonomy is reflected, first and foremost, through institutions and policies (in the widest sense) of entity structures of the state, i.e., through cantons of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (five with majority Bosniak population, three with majority Croat population, and two socalled mixed cantons). However, law still does not rule in Bosnia and Herzegovina. There are too many examples of inconsistencies in the application of law, judicial space remains partly fragmented, reforms are not fully implemented, and confidence in law and its defenders is still rather weak. The legal system of Bosnia and Herzegovina de facto consists of four legal systems: the legal system of the State of Bosnia and Herzegovina, legal systems of the Entities (Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Republika Srpska), and the legal system of the District Brčko. It can be claimed there are actually five legal systems taking into account that cantons within the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina have certain constitutional authorities in terms of passing laws and its implementations. Therefore, the complex system with the number of parliaments and governments at different levels in Bosnia and Herzegovina makes implementation of the rule of law a very difficult challenge. Prior to all it is visible in mutual vertical and horizontal conformity of legislation that is enforced. The existence of multiple laws that are in different ways regulating civil and criminal issues are directly reflecting an inequality of citizens’ access to justice. 9 Despite the effort of a number of domestic and regional entrepreneurs, the economic sphere is in many aspects disjointed, proper legal preconditions for functional joint economic space are not fulfilled, and there are no major foreign investments. Furthermore, the media still suffer from dubious professional standards (with the exception of a few printed media) very much influenced by political oligarchies. As in the majority of other fields, division along ethno-national lines is clearly visible in the media field too. The Public Service Broadcasting system in Bosnia and Herzegovina is a case in point: “Ethnic-based viewing strongly affects all three PSB channels. . . . Bosniaks watch Sarajevo-based channels (Federal TV, BHT 1, OBN), Serbs watch RTRS and Belgrade-based programs, while most Croats are dependent on and oriented toward programs from Croatia.” 10 In summary, the so-called post-Dayton Bosnia and Herzegovina fits into very basic criteria to be considered as a democracy (multiparty system and free elections) but in its nature it is an illiberal democracy. 11 The

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regime in Bosnia and Herzegovina is democratically elected, but often in routine matter ignores its constitutional obligations, and even worse, deprives its fellow citizens of basic human rights. Besides free and fair elections, to be considered as a liberal democracy, the political system should be characterized by separation of powers, rule of law, and protection of basic rights such as free speech, freedom of association, religion, and private property. 12 Unfortunately, Bosnia and Herzegovina does not count on the positive end of the continuum in that respect. It is worth noting that a related debate about consociational representation was triggered by the ruling of the European Court of Human Rights in the case Dervo Sejdić and Jakob Finci v. Bosnia and Herzegovina from 2011 (Applications Nos. 27996/06 and 34836/06 of December 22, 2009) who filed a lawsuit to the European court against the Bosnian system which enables only three constitutive peoples (Croats, Serbs, and Bosniaks) to hold elected positions. In brief, as Hodžić and Stojanović have noted, “the judgment . . . established that there is systemic constitutional discrimination of all persons not belonging to the constituent peoples on account of their inability to stand as candidates for positions in the Presidency of BiH [Bosnia and Herzegovina] and the House of Peoples of the BiH Parliamentary Assembly, has posed a veritable challenge not only to Bosnia’s constitutional system, but also to the theory and practice of constitutional engineering in divided societies.” 13 Nonetheless, “the institutionalization of ethnic power-sharing on a state level on the basis of territorial strongholds of nationalist forces in the Entities prevailed over the civic principle, so almost every aspect of state and society became seen through the ethnic lens. This, however, did not contribute to establishing mutual trust and interethnic cooperation and foster reconciliation and the formation of a common state identity, but prevented effective state reconstruction and nation-building.” 14 If the political setting of Bosnia and Herzegovina is unambiguous, the current relationship between religion and politics is not so specific. In recent, repeated, discussions about the role of religion in the public space, Jürgen Habermas primarily focused on the need for a new understanding of the “political,” indicating also the problem of the peculiar revival of the “political theology” understood in Carl Schmitt’s terms. 15 Namely, Habermas recalls Schmitt’s concept which is an existentialist version of interpretation, i.e., continuance with the common essentialist characteristics of the traditional concept of the “political.” Simply put, the collective identity is no longer defined in the legal terms of a sovereign state but in the ethno-national concept of political romanticism. The common features of the ancestors, tradition, and language cannot ensure the social cohesion solely based on the assumed organic nature—therefore, the political leadership must continuously mobilize the nation against the internal and foreign enemies. In this regard, religion can be used as an additional reservoir of legitimacy in such policies. In the case of Bosnia and

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Herzegovina, “[b]y treating religion as important source of political legitimacy as well as by acting as national, political first-class instances of legitimization, all three religious communities [in former Yugoslavia— Serbian Orthodox Church, Catholic Church, and the Islamic community] provided and have been providing the respective nationalistic strategies with additional legitimacy. And that legitimacy has been a very particular one since it has been the legitimacy of national nature ‘from above’, the legitimacy of a sanctified nature. In this way, all of the dominant nationalistic strategies acted under the certain ‘sacred canopy.’” 16 THE CONTEXT OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA The specificity of the social and political milieu of Bosnia and Herzegovina is particularly reflected in the ethnic and confessional population structure. What is often mentioned as general knowledge in the history of the state is the role of religion in the process of primary (self-)determination of its dominant ethnicities. Historical subjectivity of Bosnia and Herzegovina did not achieve a singular nominality of space and nation, but traditional componency of its peoples; there was never a single nation formed but national pluralism, i.e., national triality. In the process of national differentiation of domicile population, religions and confessions in fact played a key role (“faith” is what managed to connect externally and disconnect internally), and even today most people find religion and confession the strongholds for determining their identity, as well as individual and collective consciousness—both of themselves and of the others. Unlike the previous social and political order of the socialist type (found in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia), where there were terms such as “theisms with no public roles,” 17 today we are witnessing an established system primarily ethno-political in its nature, with theisms of highly significant public roles. It is a separate question to what extent the representatives of organized religions have been and still are ready to respond to equally high expectations set before them. In any case, according to the latest available population census data (1991), 18 Bosnia and Herzegovina was populated by 43.3 percent ethnic Muslims (today called Bosniaks), 31.2 percent Serbs, 17.4 percent Croats, and other nationalities. 19 In terms of confessional belonging, the majority were Muslims (42.7 percent), followed by Orthodox Christians (29.3 percent) and Roman Catholics (13.6 percent). Why is the religious/confessional self-identification so high in Bosnia and Herzegovina (95 percent of the population stated in the 1991 census that they have religious/confessional self-identification)? Is it due to religious and confessional pluralism (Muslims, Orthodox Christians, Roman Catholics, and others) that the populations strongly affiliate to religious self-identity and participate in religious activities? However, we find similar processes (high degree

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of religious self-identification) also in the dominantly uni-confessional states (such as Croatia, Poland, Ireland, and others) where the “confessional competition” is not as strong as in Bosnia and Herzegovina. One of the possible answers is that the religious and confessional identity is pretentiously represented as the “powerful identity,” not only in Bosnia and Herzegovina, but in contemporary society in general. Is it all really true? For hundreds of years Bosnia and Herzegovina was home to three stable religious identities (Jewish-Christian-Islamic) and four confessional identities (Jewish, Catholic, Orthodox Christian, and Islamic). Disputes arise not because of the identities, but about their place and role in the state that (legally) claims to be secular. Of course, there exists no state in which all of its citizens have a common belief, a shared worldview, but the neutrality of the state with regard to the question of a worldview is essential. But how can it be achieved? A democratic state is the one in which citizens are equal; a state neutral toward religion; where freedoms exist for all religious communities; and where tolerance and separation of religion and politics is the path to guarantee the equality of citizens. The politics in Bosnia and Herzegovina base its links to religion upon historical symbiosis of ethnicity and confessions in this region. Namely, even today, most people in Bosnia and Herzegovina fail in making the key distinction between the ethnic/national and confessional identity, thus enabling political decision-makers to apply the feudal imperialistic conception matrix—a complex scenario corresponding to Olivier Abel’s analysis, according to which each community and each territory has its religion and every individual belongs to the community first and only then to the political space. 20 Additional confusion is created by the determination of the political space in the context of politics and religion. Nominally and legally, the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina is secular, but the basic principles of such an order are often completely misinterpreted and as such, articulated in the public space. Unlike the social and political setup of the relation between the state and religious communities in the socialist period, where the first period was marked by ideologically forceful and compulsory imposition of atheisation upon society, and the one after that by dominantly political and state-protected rigid secularism, present time abounds in examples of clericalism and privileged positions of organized religion of dominant religious communities in the public space. Both in the previous and current period the concept of the secular is interpreted quite particularly and, to say the least, wrongly. This, of course, is not the case only in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and it is therefore noteworthy to quote Charles Taylor who, in his 2007 book The Secular Age, warns us that we think that secularism (or laïcité) has something to do with the relationship between state and religion, which is true in part, but in fact it is about a democratic state having the right response to diversity. 21 Indeed, as Talal Asad has put it, the secular is not in opposi-

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tion to religion; the secular is an epistemological category. 22 A completely different issue is secularism, which is certainly a political doctrine. Part of the problem, in Bosnia and Herzegovina as well, is that the secular is wrongly understood as something in the continuum with the religious (or the last phase of something sacral), i.e., something opposing the sacral and negating it, which of course is not the case. Therefore, those who indicate that secularization today should be a way of life with the postmodern revival of religion in the public space, in the most democratic manner, are right. However, it is noteworthy that Taylor and other others in their deliberations assume a very important prior element—democracy itself. In this regard, speaking about secularization obviously assumes a social framework of the consolidated and stable democracy that Bosnia and Herzegovina most certainly is not. The installment of consociation arrangements by the Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (the Dayton Peace Accords) resulted in an active political system dominated by the negative consensus of ethno-political elites in power, supremacy of the collective over individual rights, including violation of human rights as part of the system. Finally, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, it is not about the personal relationship with the supernatural, but about political community: “End of religiousness for oneself, rise of religion for the other. Religion thus becomes a matter of state.” 23 What we have witnessed over the last twenty years or so is that religion also became a solid political fact in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and that the position of organized religion in the public sphere significantly changed. Putting Bosnia and Herzegovina to the side, the turn of the centuries was marked by the globally strong processes of religious revivalism, or the reawakening of the religious where it seemed not to be the case in a given period in the so-called West. What are then the relevant sociological characteristics of Bosnia and Herzegovina society in terms of relations with religious communities and the emerging circumstances? First, it is impossible to ignore the role of religious communities in the collapse of the previous system for which they received credibility of the governing structures. In fact, the ruling politics needed them to justify their own credibility. Therefore, in the beginning of the 1990s, three leading religious communities (Catholic Church, Serbian Orthodox Church, and Islamic Community) and three ruling political (national) parties— Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), Serbian Democratic Party (SDS), and Party of Democratic Action (SDA)—found a common interest. Before the first multiparty elections held in Bosnia and Herzegovina (1990), the three religious communities, treating religion as an important source of political legitimacy and acting as national, politically legitimizing instances of the first order, supplied the respective national/nationalistic political strategies with additional legitimacy. 24 It is difficult to avoid the impression that it will be possible to shape the relations of the state and

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religious communities even without taking into account the roles that the three religious communities respectively played in the recent war. 25 One may not forget the fact that the three religious communities in the postsocialist period did not build their identities individually, but in close cooperation with the three leading national parties (i.e., state administrative authorities in three areas controlled by three party armies). The second aspect regards the notion of multiconfessionality. The relationship and the historical experience of these religious communities toward the state differ. They varied and vary from those that would like to seize control over the state power (or to have everything in the state according to their views) to those on the opposite pole not wishing to have anything to do with the state, negating also its symbols (flag, coat of arms, and so on). Between the extremes we can find the in-between viewpoints about the relation of religious communities and state. One should not forget wartime and postwar influx of new religious missions and organization from Islamic and other countries on the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as the arrival of missionaries with various roles from the West and the East. All of the above should be taken into account when searching for a model in which the state will determine its relations toward religious communities. Another important aspect regards pluralism of political parties. Some of the political parties drafted their programs close to the principles of the religious community their supporters belong to. By taking sides with such political parties (with due respect to some recent minor departures), the religious community(-ies) abandoned the rule that its members can belong to different political movements and parties, and have the same faith (which is the basis for their uniting in the community). Politics (and political parties) always strived to achieve legitimacy. Often it proved to be (and seems to apply to today as well) that legitimacy is given through support of the confession. Even Max Weber pointed to the typology of relations between politics and church emphasizing the close linkage of governing political and religious institutions in the society. 26 Weber excluded the possibility of a ruling party selecting a model of relations that would lead to confrontation. For the functioning of the state this would prove to be a failure. Therefore, most common solutions are compromises acceptable to both the ruling politics and the religious community. Weber’s analysis of the ideal types leaves out a type of separation of religious communities and the state, the type we shall later come back to. Fourth, we must acknowledge the trend of religionization of politics and politicization of religion, visible from the actions of religious leaders in war and postwar periods. This process was supported by sacralization of nation and nationalization of religious community. Thus, nation(s) emerge(s) as one of the factors influencing the relations of the state and religious community(-ies) in this region. There is no doubt that dominant religious communities in the Balkans encourage—as is visible in the be-

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havior of their leadership—the formation of nation-states. This is linked to the so-called awakening of nations, strengthening of national consciousness, adjusting of the manner of organizing religious community to the manner of organizing state structure (after the recognition of the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bishops’ Conference of Bosnia and Herzegovina was established, a re-established Assembly of the Islamic Community of Bosnia and Herzegovina was held, and so on). 27 The awareness of the deeper rootedness of (the three) religious communities in (the three) nations was built as well as awareness that national culture, and particularly national politics, cannot survive without it. That is why it is necessary to equate nation and religious community, as well as national belonging and confessional belonging. Linking to the previous aspect, the existing status in the state built by the three religious communities in the areas controlled during the war by three armies, deserves attention. Each of them almost built a status of state confession in those areas, and the remaining two areas ended in a position of minority (if at all). Therefore, in some areas Eid and Christmas tacitly became state holidays (non-working days and in some places in Bosnia and Herzegovina they even imply longer school breaks). Finally, and also of crucial relevance, we have to consider the return and revitalization of religion in post-socialist societies. Scholars have questioned whether the return to religion, that also affected Bosnia and Herzegovina, was the result of an increased number of believers or a freer and desirable expression of religious feelings. According to one study, there were two processes synchronously ongoing in the territory of former socialist Yugoslavia in the post-socialist time—one is the return of religion into the public sphere while the other was the process of return to the religion. 28 Data that sporadically appear show that it is both. 29 The return of religion in the public sphere was most evident in the area of politics (via national parties in many cases) and in the field of education (through inclusion of confessional catechism into state schools in the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, and Serbia). The former was much stronger than the latter. As Petar Jeleč has put it: “Overnight, we have found ourselves in an all-wanted and social-political overall presence of religiousness from the paradigm of privileged atheism. Nowadays, we have the entire spectrum of ‘newborn’ members and actors of the former system filling churches and talking about the change in their own lives. They preach to all those who do not see the ‘depth’ of these conversions, together with patrons of the church. Nevertheless, it rarely refers to a personal and free belief, religious addressing and it is a similar case with the political scene. It is profitable to be religious, not to be a believer.” 30 True, they are more inclined to support the thesis of a freer sociological expression of religious feelings; and, it seems to us, also of the social desirability of the religious. 31 If we can say that atheism was desired in the previous system, and theism undesired, it

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is not the same absurdity applicable today: undesired atheism and socially desired theism. In addition, the return to religion happened through “neo-politicization” of religion and “neo-clericalization” of politics. 32 In fact, the last decade of the twentieth century did not see the rise of religion in Bosnia and Herzegovina, but its defeat: wading, slurring, and underrating the religious differences of the other. How else can we mark this but as defeat of true religion and genuine devoutness? Many of those with an areligious worldview, or non-church religiousness, observed the church/religious community from the outside. After 1990, they came closer to it and became acquainted with it from the inside. The question is whether this Church/religious community they have come to know— conservative and somewhat greedy for privileges (such as re-appropriation of nationalized property, religious education in school, support to respective national parties, and so on)—is likely to be accepted by many? Or, will there be an even greater disappointment and distancing from the religious communities? RELIGION AND POLITICAL ELECTIONS In a state with more than one religious and confessional identity that has been in conflict, there is no shortage of disputes over religious symbols. Religious symbols represent expressions of a common belonging. One could say that generally two symbols stand out: religious and national symbols. People treat these symbols in a specific way. The religious symbol serves as more than an expression of religious identity, it also acquires characteristics of cultural identity. Therefore there will be a higher degree of unison in the defense of Christian or Islamic symbols than the number of practicing believers among them. The moment they became symbols of certain identity in Bosnia and Herzegovina, they became the means to protect national identity and thus also the motive for disputes and conflicts. In short, in this region, similarly to the Polish example, 33 religious symbols were first profaned and then resacralized, but as national symbols of the first instance. Religious symbols are also part of the elections decorum. The overall situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina could have been affected by the lack of security (once the Yugoslav identity started falling apart), increased unemployment, crisis of morality, confession shifted from the private-legal to the public status in society, when religion had started being deprivatized, when political and other elites declared publicly they were believers and rushed to the houses of worship. Devoutness became a comprising part of grace and a new type of devoutness emerged (fall of socialism and first multiparty elections). It also encouraged everyday citizens to publicly declare their religiousness. Confessions turned to the struggle for national rights and the issues surround-

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ing devoutness and religion were increasingly present in the media. Are those correct when claims that only the attitude toward confession changed, and not the content of religiousness (it remains “folklore religiousness”)? As Mirko Blagojević has pointed out, “it was only in the early 1990s that quite obvious revitalization of all religious practices emerged in the territory of the former socialist Yugoslavia . . . General ambiance, the crisis and the war largely contributed to a rapid and predominantly instrumental revitalization of the public role of traditional religions and churches in confessional homogenization, mobilization, and protection of national and religious communities in the territory in question. This means that the above-mentioned desecularization of society was mostly caused by socio-political reasons rather than by spiritual ones. That is the only way to account for desecularization, since social events in the early 1990s did not go in the direction of general spiritual quest, personal appeasement and social peace, but on the contrary: in the direction of destruction, general uncertainty, fear and suffering.” 34 Why is it essential to have in mind national and confessional affiliation of the population when political elections are subject to sociological analysis? Primarily, this is due to the role that confession in Bosnia and Herzegovina played in the emergence and development of the national consciousness. As long as there are nationally marked political parties, we should count on religious and confessional factors when elections happen. It is another matter that in the circumstances such as the ones in Bosnia and Herzegovina, national or confessional bases of social life can hardly be effective. Post-socialist return to religion and nation happened in mutual support: hence the strong religious/confessional nationalisms. 35 The return to nation was not the return to it as a secular formation. The return to nation went through “religious roots.” 36 It led to the mutual linkage of religions/confessions and nationalisms. In the area of Bosnia and Herzegovina many items can serve to represent identity, including food and drinks. Organized religion may affect the elections policy through the use of religious symbols (cross, rosary, misbaha/tespih, and others), photographs of religious community leaders, fragments from the holy scripts, and similar elements found in election posters and messages. There are also the pre-election campaign speeches by religious leaders in which they suggest to believers, most often indirectly, to vote for a specific party. We globally find such examples of using religion and religious communities in party confrontations, or using them as tools of political mobilization, particularly before the elections. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the support is given to “one’s own” candidates. Candidates also count on the votes of their communities. To some, especially at the local level, closeness to religious community brings election points. Candidates for the parliament can also look for support in the religious groups. Many of them only remember their religion at the time of an election. 37 In relig-

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iously plural societies such as the one in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in which three religious identities dominate (Muslim, Orthodox Christians, Catholics) linked to the three national identities (Bosniak, Serbian, Croatian), there is a clear tendency for more support to be given to religious and national political parties, than those classified as secular. This is how it came to the use of religion and religious communities by supporters of national parties. Generally, research shows that in this region, the voter of national parties and parties of the rightist political spectrum are the most religious. 38 The three confessions (Islamic, Christian Orthodox, and Catholic) are the most influential institutions in society. This is common knowledge to the leaders of national parties and political elites and they are therefore careful not to provoke any hard feelings among the leaders of those confessions, ingratiating themselves with them in all possible ways. Religious elites have their favorites among the political parties (of course, always “our” national party). Both the state and the political parties have their religious policies (all formally advocate religious freedoms but in practice there are huge differences in the application of this principle). Are the analysts right when they say that, in times of socialism, confessions were an open force, while today they represent a conservative political force? For example, Bosnian Franciscan Ivo Marković said: “[I]n Bosnia and Herzegovina, we have three traditional religions dominated by non-democratic tradition, i.e. traditions of monarchist, despotic, feudal societies. And now problems arise with these communities in the democratic environment. Religions have the task of advocating democracy, but cannot witness it and thus defend themselves saying that they are such by the divine order, and that is not true.” 39 The problem is that political pluralism was introduced in Bosnia and Herzegovina as national/confessional pluralism. Its essence was constituted by three national parties (SDA, SDS, HDZ), each with strong support of “its own” confession (Islamic Community, Serbian Orthodox Church, and Roman Catholic Church, respectively). And until desacralization and secularization of the nation is achieved, until we return to the principle of secularity in society, traditional religious bases producing election votes will not weaken. RELIGION, RELIGIOUS COMMUNITY, AND POLITICS Has the monopoly of religious truth in politics come to an end, at least in Western European societies? Can religious communities in the Balkans, and in Bosnia and Herzegovina for that matter, get used to such a fact that would distance them from politics and bring them back into the religious sphere? Political and spiritual influence of religious communities is correlated. Whenever the political influence of religious communities increases, their

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spiritual influence decreases, and vice versa. In the politically illiterate societies, in those not having a developed political culture of citizenship, there is a higher possibility for the religious community to influence politics. Religious communities have always inclined toward certain political tendencies. They had not been, apart for exemptions, politically neutral. This “mutual instrumentalization of religion and politics did not and does not produce anything but the wasteland for freedoms and equality.” 40 Religious communities have very often identified with obsolete politics, which made them only a little sensitive to the sufferings of citizens. What is important for contemporary times is that religious communities may not “fight with the means of political power.” 41 There are also those who introduce religious principles into the political sphere and those who introduce the principles of the political into the religious space. In this model, the religious interest becomes secondary and the political interest is predominant. Religious communities (either Christian or Islamic) historically failed to repel (and discard) the challenge of manipulation of religion and religious communities for the political purpose. Today we also have political believers, yesterday’s communists who have put on new clothes, changed the symbols (instead of a red five-pointed star now they have a cross or the crescent) but they have not changed. They were ideological in thoughts and still are, and therefore we call them political believers. They need religion and religious community not because of faith but because of their political promotion. In post-socialist countries in which legal regulation of relations with religious communities took place, it greatly expressed the requests and interests of the religious leadership rather than the interests of the state. This was evident in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the discussions about introducing religious education in public schools (private schools are a different topic, even those organized by religious communities). This, and the state of affairs in practice, proved that the state does not have clear goals in the policy toward religion(s) and religious community(-ies). The issue of the confessional education in public schools, or more precisely the issue of the mono-confessional education in Bosnia and Herzegovina introduced in curricula during the war (in 1993), is still a very active topic in public debates. In democratic societies religious education is a matter of forum internum, thus, the human rights of parents to decide what is in the best interests of their children when it comes to religious education as well. Accordingly, the mono-confessional education is a fundamental human right as long as the implementation of such educational practice in the public schools does not end in discrimination. However, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the problem is that in the majority of schools there are no alternative subjects (e.g., ethics, history of religions, or similar non-confessional subjects that deal with religion-related themes) to be taught to children that do not attend mono-confessional education. Organizationally wise, the classes of mono-confessional sub-

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jects are often positioned in the middle of scheduled teaching hours, so children that are not attending those classes are usually waiting in the school corridors in order to join the classmates and continue with the rest of teaching hours for a given day(s). Therefore, parents often request from the school authorities and state ministries of education to end such a discriminatory practice. Other than that, there is no empirical research that would challenge the main arguments of those who claim that monoconfessional education contributes to the ethnical and religious divisions and tensions, as well as of those who claim that mono-confessional education makes children more aware and respectful of universal ethnical and moral norms immanent to religious teachings. In fact, based on a 2009 study about religion and schooling, 42 there is space for improvements within the existing model of religious education, so that it can become more beneficial for both groups, the majority who attend monoconfessional education and the minority who do not. So, what are the known sociological models of relations between the state and religious communities? In whichever way the state regulates relations with religious communities, it must take care not to jeopardize anyone’s religious freedom, because freedom of religion is one of the basic human rights and freedoms. Every person should be free not only to manifest the religion he/she wants, but also to spread it and change it, naturally without coercion of any sort. It is unacceptable, as is the practice in some post-socialist states, to limit the freedom to manifest and spread religion by the number of its followers (if there are fewer followers than the state prescribed—all activities shall be prohibited!). If there exists a single follower of a religion, he/she must have the freedom of action. Otherwise the state cannot claim to guarantee the freedom of religion. All religions and religious communities must be equal before the law but also in practice. Any legal or actual differences between citizens conditioned by their religious beliefs are unacceptable. Religious tolerance and citizens’ equality have become the sanctity of the modern world. Adherent of any confession, especially when in position of the minority, needs more than tolerance. He expects to be accepted, respected, and acknowledged regardless of whether he belongs to a minority community or not. Do we need to repeat that in the postwar Bosnia and Herzegovina, members of all confessions in at least two (out of three) of its demographic parts found themselves in the status of minority? Social cohesion and reintegration of the society of Bosnia and Herzegovina will greatly depend upon the behavior and attitude toward the minority. With this in mind, it is difficult to foresee the future development of the relationship between state and religious community. Probably, both the state and religious communities will have to adjust to the changes of the twenty-first century that we mark as the path to a new, open, civil society.

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It is more or less acknowledged that a number of attempts have been made to define a civil society and as is the case with many other contemporary phenomena, all these theories have found their purpose in various reflections or empirical research across the world. Here it is useful to consider the standpoint offered by Jeffrey Alexander in his binary discourse of a civil society, in which a civil society is determined as a society’s subsystem analytically and to a certain extent empirically separated from the spheres of political, economic, and religious life: “Civil society is a sphere of solidarity in which abstract universalism and particularistic versions of community are tensely intertwined. It is both a normative and real concept. . . . Civil society depends on the resources, or inputs from these other spheres, from political life, from economic institutions, from broad cultural discussions, from territorial organization, and from primordiality. . . . Civil society is constituted by its own distinctive structure of elites, not only by functional oligarchies that control the legal and communication systems, but by those that exercise power and identity through voluntary organizations (‘dignitaries’ or ‘public servants’) and social movements (‘mouvements intellectuels’).” 43 However, the reason we find this theory suitable for grasping the Bosnian and Herzegovinian context is due to the understanding that a binary discourse, as explained by Alexander, becomes apparent on three levels—social motives, social relations, and social institutions—all being characterized by symbolic codes and their counter codes. Regarding the level of social motives or urges, democracy depends on self-control and individual initiative, and the individuals within democratic surroundings recognize each other according to symbolic codes, for example, activism and autonomy, and not passivity and dependence. Other axiomatic qualities fall within a binary discourse such as rationality, reasonableness, calmness, self-control, and realism, while their counter (democratic) codes include irrationality, hysteria, excitement, passion, and madness. The level of social relations is an immediate consequence of individual behavior—where individuals nurture democratic symbolic codes where they are able to develop open social relations based on trust, honesty, honor, truthfulness. Individuals who follow counter codes of social motives are characterized by secrecy, suspicion, calculation, greed, and other negative traits. Consequently, discourse structures of the social institutions can be characterized by democratic or counter-democratic symbolic codes: on the one hand, there are institutions based on the rule of law, equality, inclusiveness, impersonality, and contractual relations, while on the other, there are arbitrary, power-based, hierarchical, personalized, and ascriptive loyalty-based institutions. It is not difficult to identify binary discourse symbolic codes within the post-Dayton Bosnia and Herzegovina. Civil society should be determined by—let’s claim this is one of its primary characteristics that makes it civil—democratic symbolic codes. As “society against the state,” we

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can establish the state of freedom, but also cultural experiments, intellectual excellence, and political innovation through the activities of a civil society. 44 Of course, this is true as long as within the dichotomy civil society/state both these entities exist as realities. However, in the case of post-Dayton Bosnia and Herzegovina the problem of the realities can be set as “civil society against what?” In other words, it can be said that there are far fewer problems with the reality of civil society and many, many more with the reality of the type of state. So, if we, for example, understand civil society within the reduced prism of non-government organizations (NGO), which is quite true in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, it seems that the main function of NGOs is, almost paradoxically, maintenance of an already extremely bad situation, considering the state will not or cannot fulfill compensation of the function. Needless to say, none of the NGOs work with this goal in mind, and the situation they are in reflects on the fact that the state hardly functions; individuals are left with no other choice but to organize themselves in this way in order to alleviate the consequences of such a situation. In addition, if we take into account the facts that the majority of the non-governmental sector receives funding from foreign donors, and as time goes by strategies of local NGOs are basically donor-driven and have little to do with the real circumstances and needs, the situation becomes even more pessimistic. All the more as the international community in Bosnia and Herzegovina keeps insisting that NGOs are the central segment of civil society regarding non-political action aimed at situation change. 45 Is it not plausible, then, to ask the following: What will happen with NGOs when the state surpasses its “Frankenstein” construction and meets conditions for accession to the EU? Hasn’t a civil society reduced in this way (and the causes should be found within the aid framework, almost colonial in its character and orchestrated from abroad) in advance and irretrievably buried the possibilities of development of a majority of other modes of civil participation (any other mode which does not include NGOs)? Is it fair to expect emergence of civil groups or movements with explicitly undemocratic symbolic codes—for example, Euro-skeptics based on the political right-wing ideologies? Is the next phase going to be even more determined by the discourse of repression, because we should keep in mind the following: “The potential for dependent and irrational behavior, moreover, can be found even in good citizens themselves, for deceptive information can be provided that might led them, on what would seem to be rational grounds, to turn away from the structures or processes of democratic society itself. In other words, the very qualities that allow the civil societies to be internally democratic—qualities that include the symbolic oppositions that allow liberty to be defined in any meaningful way—mean that the members of civil society do not feel confident that they can deal effectively with their opponents, from either within or without. The discourse of repression is inherent in the

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discourse of liberty. This is the irony at the heart of the discourse of civil society.” 46 If things do not change considerably in this phase, the future framework regarding civil society does not necessarily have a positive outlook in Bosnia and Herzegovina. At the same time, on the global stage ultra-modern does not mean less religious, as Jean-Paul Willaime tends to claim, 47 but differently religious as ultra-modernity appears as secularized modernity where secularization applies to the secularizing forces themselves. Considering secularization as a specific European characteristic, Danièle Hervieu-Léger pointed out that for a long time there was a (wrongful) belief that decrease of religious practice means a parallel decrease of representation of religious belief (caused primarily by the technical rationalism and affirmation of the autonomy of individuals). 48 According to her, deregulation of institutional religion in European countries (individualization of faith that results in the personal credo and individualization of religious practice without significant influence of religious community structures) did not mean that religious traditions have simultaneously lost their cultural relevance in European society. In fact, the conventional religious traditions started serving as a special repository of meaning available to individuals to use them subjectively and diversely. 49 However, in modern Europe religious identity has rapidly become a matter of personal choice, most vividly portrayed by the phrase “believing without belonging,” 50 which is not surprising as the Europe we see today has been forged in the fires of religious wars. The contemporary (liberal) democratic societies show that it is not about opposition or anti-religious secularization anymore, but about secularization as political commitment that emerges as the reality of life in a multireligious world. The lucky paradox of secularization, according to Željko Mardešić, lies in the fact that it weakens the political nature of religion, opening at the same time free space for strengthening the religiousness of religion whether outside or within the religious institutions themselves. 51 Finally, aware of the importance of this issue for contemporary processes, the institutions of the European Union (more precisely, the then president Romano Prodi) decided to establish an expert group in 2002— Reflection Group on the Spiritual and Cultural Dimensions of Europe— in order to deliberate topics related to the spiritual and cultural dimension of Europe through a range of seminars, conferences, and thematic discussions. The group focused especially on the relevance of spiritual, religious, and cultural values for the future unity of Europe. A number of important findings have been presented in the 2004 Final Report of the Group; here, it is particularly significant to emphasize that the European cultural space cannot be defined in the opposition to national cultures. European culture cannot be defined in opposition to a particular religion (such as Islam). Considering this as an exceptionally important issue of the public role of religion, regardless that it seems that modernization

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and secularization are inseparable processes in Europe, the conclusion is that public life is unimaginable without religion. But this objective importance that religious beliefs have in maintenance of communities should be supported and developed in a way to serve as a positive factor of cohesion in the new Europe. However, the risks of such a policy may not be neglected, as the space might open for an invasion of the public sphere by religious institutions, as well as religion being abused to justify ethnic conflicts. The emergence of religion in the public sphere is thus also defined as deprivatization and this process is considered key for the period from the 1980s until today. José Casanova lists four global events as illustrations supporting the deprivatization thesis: the Islamic Revolution in Iran, the Solidarity movement in Poland, the role of Catholicism in the Sandinista Revolution and in other political conflicts in Latin America, and strengthening of the Protestant fundamentalism as a political force in the United States. 52 In short, according to Casanova (and we find similar claims among some other authors such as Peter Berger or Jeffrey Haynes), 53 deprivatization is reflected in the fact that “religious traditions throughout the world are refusing to accept the marginal and privatized role which theories of secularization had reserved for them. Social movements have appeared which either are religious in nature or are challenging in the name of religion the legitimacy and autonomy of the primary secular spheres, the state and market economy. . . . Religions throughout the world are entering the public sphere and the arena of political contestation not only to defend their traditional turf, as they have done in the past, but also to participate in the very struggles to define and set the modern boundaries between the private and public spheres, between system and life-world, between legality and morality, between individual and society, between family, civil society, and state, between nations, states, civilizations, and the world system.” 54 Steve Bruce, who is, along with Karel Dobbelaere and Brian Wilson, one of the last “guardians of the secularization thesis” also distinguishes situations in which modernity does not undermine religion; when he assigns important social roles to religion—these are situations of cultural defense and cultural transition. 55 According to him, cultural defense emerges when two or more communities are in conflict, and their supporters have different religious traditions (Protestants and Catholics in Northern Ireland; Serbs, Croats, and Bosniaks in the former Yugoslavia). That is when religious identity can attain social importance and serve as an invitation to ethnic unity and pride. A similar situation occurs when one community is dominated by another (of different religion or without religion) and the religious institution takes the role of defender of culture and identity of the people under domination. While in situations of cultural transition, religious institutions have the role of helping people deal with the changes they face.

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Be that as it may, contemporary scientific discourse on religion in the modern world inclines toward the thesis that religion will most probably continue to play an important role in the construction of the world’s future. Therefore, Mardešić is right: “What to say in the end. . . . Not much. However, one should hope that times to come will not keep bringing the choice between two extremes: to accept the sacred driven mad by fear of the profane or consent to the indifferent profane that has forgotten about the sacred. Certainly, this gives no choice at all; it gives us great misfortune and new slavery for humankind. That is why pluralism of worldviews and dialogue of religions become the last hope of belief in a better tomorrow.” 56 Finally, the shift from religion by inheritance to religion by choice prevents the revival of “political theology” within Schmitt’s frame of friend-enemy distinction, 57 in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as elsewhere. Of course, whoever neglects the influence of religion on politics (and vice versa in Bosnia and Herzegovina) can easily be contradicted. NOTES 1. Ljubo Hrgić, Životni krug: Dnevnik (Sarajevo: Svjetlo riječi, 2005), 167. 2. Peter Kuzmič, Vrijeme i vječnost (Osjek: Matica Hrvatska, 2006), 66. 3. Hrgić, Životni krug, 110. 4. The Dayton negotiations, that took place at the Wright Patterson Air Force Base in Dayton, in Ohio, started November 1 and ended November 21, 1995. The result was the signature of the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (GFAP), colloquially known as the Dayton Peace Accords. It is composed of eleven annexes, namely: Annex 1A—Military Aspects of the Peace Settlement, Annex 1B—Regional Stabilization, Annex 2—Inter-Entity Boundary, Annex 3—Elections, Annex 4—Constitution, Annex 5—Arbitration, Annex 6—Human Rights, Annex 7—Refugees and Displaced Persons, Annex 8—Commission to Preserve National Monuments, Annex 9—Bosnia and Herzegovina Public Corporations, Annex 10—Civilian Implementation, and Annex 11—International Police Task Force. 5. See http://www.ohr.int/ohr-info/gen-info/default.asp?content_id=38519, accessed April 10, 2014. 6. Florian Bieber, “Bosnia–Herzegovina: Developments Towards a More Integrated State?,” Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs 22, no. 1 (2002), 213. 7. Elements suggested by Arend Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Explanation (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1977). 8. For more details, see Dino Abazović, “O konsocijaciji: Konsocijacijom protiv konsocijalizma,” Puls demokratije, February 21, 2007, http://arhiva.pulsdemokratije.net/ index.php?id=170andl=bs, accessed April 10, 2014. 9. For more details, see Sevima Sali-Terzić and Ramiz Huremagić, “Vladavina prava i pristup pravdi: Da li su država i društvo konstantno podložni zakonu?,” in Fond otvoreno društvo, Procjena razvoja demokratije u Bosni i Hercegovini (Sarajevo: Fond otvoreno društvo, 2006), 41–67. 10. Amer Džihana and Tarik Jusić, “Bosnia and Herzegovina,” in Sandra BašićHrvatin, Mark Thompson, and Tarik Jusić (eds.), Divided They Fall: Public Service Broadcasting in Multiethnic States (Sarajevo: Mediacentar Sarajevo, 2008), 90. 11. Fareed Zakaria, The Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 2003). 12. Ibid.

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13. Edin Hodžić and Nenad Stojanović, New/Old Constitutional Engineering? Challenges and Implications of the European Court of Human Rights Decision in the Case of Sejdic and Finci v. BiH (Sarajevo: Analitika—Center for Social Research, 2011), 15. 14. Joseph Marko, “Bosnia and Herzegovina: Multi-Ethnic or Multinational?,” in Council of Europe (ed.), Societies in Conflict: The Contribution of Law and Democracy to Conflict Resolution (Strasbourg, Science and Technique of Democracy, Issue 29, 2000), 92–118. 15. Jürgen Habermas, “‘The Political’: The Rational Meaning of a Questionable Inheritance of Political Theology,” in Eduardo Mendieta and Jonathan VanAntwerpen (eds.), The Power of Religion in the Public Sphere (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011), 15–34. 16. Srdjan Vrcan, “Faith and State: The Exemplary Case of Former Yugoslavia,” Transeuropeennes 23 (2003), 56. 17. Srdjan Vrcan, Vjera u vrtlozima tranzicije (Split: Dalmatinska akcija, 2001). 18. A new population census was organized in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2013; the preliminary results are expected to be released by the end of 2014. 19. Roma, Albanians, Ukrainians, Hungarians, Italians, Czechs, Poles, Germans, Jews, Ruthenians, Slovaks, Turks, for example. 20. Olivier Abel, “Vjerski konflikt—utemeljivač Evrope,” in Gilles Clamens (ed.), Savremena politička filozofija u Evropi: Francuski pogledi (Sarajevo: Forum Bosnae, 2005), 67–82. 21. Charles Taylor, The Secular Age (Boston, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007). 22. Talal Asad, Formations of Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003). 23. Mišel Onfre, Ateološka rasprava: Fizika metafizike (Beograd: Rad, 2005), 255. 24. Vrcan, Vjera. 25. On the role of religious communities in Bosnia and Herzegovina, see Scott R. Appleby, The Ambivalence of the Sacred: Religion, Violence, and Reconciliation (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2002); Ivan Cvitković, Konfesija u ratu (Sarajevo: Svjetlo riječi, 2004); Paul Mojzes (ed.), Religion and the War in Bosnia (Atlanta, GA: The American Academy of Religion, 1998); Vjekoslav Perica, Balkan Idols: Religion and Nationalism in Yugoslav States (USA: Oxford University Press, 2004); Michael Sells, The Bridge Betrayed: Religion and Genocide in Bosnia (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1998); Mitja Velikonja, Religious Separation and Political Intolerance in Bosnia and Herzegovina (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 2003). 26. Max Weber, Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie, edited by Marianne Weber (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1988). 27. However, due to the difference of the Bishops’ Conference of Bosnia and Herzegovina in that it has no jurisdiction over Catholics living outside the country, the Islamic Community of Bosnia and Herzegovina has its organizational units and jurisdiction over the Bosnian Muslims living in Croatia, Serbia (a part of Montenegro), Slovenia and in some other Western European countries in which they are perceived as diaspora. 28. Ivan Cvitković, “Has the ‘Return’ of Religions Occurred or ‘Return’ to the Religion?,” in Danijela Gavrilović (ed.), Revitalization of Religion: Theoretical and Comparative Approaches (Niš: Yugoslav Society for the Scientific Study of Religion, 2009), 15–23. 29. For a good review of empirical research on religiosity in Southeast Europe, see Danijela Gavrilović (ed.), Revitalization of Religion: Theoretical and Comparative Approaches (Niš: Yugoslav Society for the Scientific Study of Religion, 2009); Zorica Kuburić, “Revitalizacija religije na Balkanu,” Godišnjak Filozofskog fakulteta u Novom Sadu 34, no. 2 (2009), 251–64. 30. Petar Jeleč, “No man’s land,” Dani, December 19, 2008, 24. 31. There are many of those obsessed with “tediously excessive and publicly emphasized adherence to religious rules” (Bela Hamvas, Kršćanstvo: Sciencia Sacra II [Zagreb: Jesenski i Turk, 2003], 112). 32. Johann Baptist Metz, Politička teologija (Zagreb: Kršćanska sadašnjost, 2004).

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33. For a detailed analysis, see Genevieve Zubrzycki, The Crosses of Auschwitz: Nationalism and Religion in Post-Communist Poland (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2006). 34. Mirko Blagojević, “Empirical (Re)evaluation of Revitalization of Orthodox Christianity,” in Danijela Gavrilović (ed.), Revitalization of Religion: Theoretical and Comparative Approaches (Niš: Yugoslav Society for the Scientific Study of Religion, 2009), 65. 35. For more details, see Dino Abazović, “Rethinking Ethnicity, Religion and Politics: The Case of Bosnia and Herzegovina,” European Yearbook of Minority Issues 7 (2010), 317–26. 36. Anthony D. Smith, Nationalism and Modernism (London: Routledge, 1998). 37. As Tošić has put it: “[D]emagogues, you know, think one should always be close to the Church, as if that gives them more votes. They are the majority, they cross themselves both when it serves the purpose and when not . . . [O]ur government now displays a wonderful situation: a huge number of devotees, churchmen, covert or overt fundamentalists . . . [I]t is comical if you want to go to Europe. I always give the example of Kohl. Have you ever seen Kohl, the head of the Catholic party in Germany, kissing somebody’s hand or kneeling?” (Desimir Tošić, “Lutanja, ispadi i ćutanja,” Peščanik 3 [2005], 73). 38. Vrcan, Vjera. 39. Ivo Marković, “Interview,” Svjetlo riječi, January 29, 2006. 40. Luis Pena-Ruiz, Što je laičnost (Zagreb: Politička kultura, 2004), 193. 41. Metz, Politčka teologija, 23. 42. Ahmet Alibašić, Sabina Ćudić, Zlatiborka Popov-Momčinović, Amina Mulabdić, and Emina Abrahamsdotter, Religija i školovanje u otvorenom društvu: Preispitivanje modela religijskog obrazovanja u Bosni i Hercegovini (Sarajevo: Fond Otvoreno društvo, 2009). 43. Jeffrey C. Alexander, “The Binary Discourse of Civil Society,” in Steven Seidman and Jeffrey C. Alexander (eds.), The New Social Theory Reader (London and New York: Routledge, 2001), 193–94. 44. Rastko Močnik, “Civilno društvo i alternativne kulture,” ZaMirZINE, 2005, http://www.zamirzine.net/article.php3?id_article=1929, accessed April 15, 2014. 45. See more in Sevima Sali-Terzić, “Civil Society,” in Žarko Papić (ed.), International Support Policies to South-East European Countries: Lessons (Not) Learned in BiH (Sarajevo: Open Society Fund/Mueller, 2001), 138–59. 46. Alexander, “The Binary Discourse,” 201. 47. Jean-Paul Willaime, “Ultramoderne rekonfiguracije,” Europski glasnik 12, no. 12 (2007), 97–106. 48. Danièle Hervieu-Léger, Religion as a Chain of Memory (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2003). 49. The discussion about European Constitution could be interpreted in this light— the proposal to introduce a sentence in the preamble stating that Europe rests on Christian roots. 50. Grace Davie, Religija u suvremenoj Evropi: Mutacija sjećanja (Zagreb: Tehnička knjiga, 2005). 51. Željko Mardešić, “Religija u postmodernitetu: Nestanak ili povratak svetog?,” in Dragoljub Djordjević (ed.), Muke sa svetim (Niš: Niški kulturni centar, 2007), 21–38. 52. José Casanova, Public Religion in the Modern World (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1994). 53. See, for example, Peter L. Berger, “The Desecularization of the World: A Global Overview,” in Peter L. Berger (ed.), The Desecularization of the World: Resurgent Religion and World Politics (Washington, DC: Ethics and Public Policy Center, 1999), 1–18; Jeffrey Haynes, Religion in Global Politics (London and New York: Longman, 1998). 54. Casanova, Public Religion, 5–6. 55. Steve Bruce, Religion in the Modern World: From Cathedrals to Cults (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996). In addition, see Karel Dobbelaere, Secularization: An Anal-

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ysis at Three Levels (Brussels: P. I. E Peter Lang, 2004); Bryan Wilson, Religion in Sociological Perspective (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982). 56. Mardešić, “Religija u postmodernitetu,” 38. 57. Carl Schmitt, Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1985).

SIX Autocephaly, Log Burning, and Legitimacy The Montenegrin and Serbian Orthodox Churches in Conflict Kenneth Morrison

Since the collapse of communism in the late 1980s, Orthodox Churches in Southeast Europe have been intimately connected with the region’s dominant post-communist ideology (nationalism) and actively engaged in national politics. 1 An important factor in this politico-religious character is the structural organization of Orthodox Churches. With no centralized structure within Orthodoxy, churches become a symbol of the national being, and thereby rather politicized. “National” churches, with specific national characteristics, can develop with relative autonomy. In Southeast Europe the febrile political climate of the 1990s dictated that Orthodox Churches have, in some instances, explicitly aligned themselves to nationalist political parties or governments that have sought to create ethnically homogenous states. 2 Conversely, however, these apparent symbols of the nation have often been burdened by internal splits, factionalism, and offshoot churches that seek to undermine their authority. Perhaps one of the most striking examples is the case of the Serbian Orthodox Church (Srpska pravoslavna crkva—SPC) 3 in Montenegro. In the early 1990s the SPC had been one of the primary mechanisms for underpinning what the church argued was the Serbian identity of the Montenegrins, their clergy conveying the narrative that Montenegro was the “second Serb state” and the “Serbian Sparta.” As a challenge to this narrative, 101

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however, the canonically unrecognized Montenegrin Orthodox Church (Crnogorska pravoslavna crkva—CPC), supporters of which claim it was autocephalous until it was merged with the SPC in 1920, was re-established. The (ongoing) conflict between the SPC and CPC thus began in earnest. Montenegro is a multi-confessional country, though Orthodoxy Christianity remains the dominant religion. There are four principal religious communities in Montenegro: the SPC, the CPC, the Roman Catholic Church, and the Islamic community (other registered religious communities include the Seventh-day Adventist Church, Jehovah’s Witnesses, and the Evangelical Church). While relations are generally good between the Orthodox Churches (the SPC and CPC) and other religious communities in Montenegro, relations between them in the Orthodox Churches has been non-existent. A cornerstone of the SPC–CPC conflict is the question of autocephaly, but the conflict is not one simply based upon ecclesiastical matters; it was, and remains, essentially a political conflict that goes to the heart of the question about the national identity of the Montenegrins. It is a struggle of a more political nature and one underpinned by the struggle between those who define themselves (in national terms) as Montenegrins and are advocates of Montenegro’s independence and those who see Montenegro as a “Serb state” and the Montenegrins as part of the Serbian national corpus. It is a conflict that was a key component of the debates over Montenegrin statehood in the decade prior to the reestablishment of Montenegro’s independence following the closely contested independence referendum of May 2006, and has been one of the key battlegrounds in the post-referendum period. This chapter analyses the historical roots and the more recent trajectory of the conflict, placing a particular focus on the political role played by the churches, issues of autocephaly, and arguments over ownership of property. THE HISTORICAL ROOTS OF THE SPC–CPC CONFLICT The roots of the current conflict can be traced back to the early years of the existence of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (KSHS), which was established on December 1, 1918. The previous month, during the so-called Podgorica Assembly, Serbia and Montenegro had united in advance of wider South Slav unification. But the contested nature of the Podgorica Assembly led to an armed conflict between the Bjelaši (Whites), who supported unification with Serbia, and Zelenaši (Greens), supporters of Montenegro’s exiled royal family who sought the preservation of a semblance of independence within the KSHS. In the latter years of this conflict, the Metropolinate of Belgrade sought a union of all Orthodox Churches within the new state; after all, they argued, Serbs and Montenegrins were branches of the same (Serb) nation and as they had

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united politically, they should unite under the umbrella of a unified church. Immediately after the creation of the KSHS, Prince Regent Aleksandar Karadjordjević assisted in the organization of a conference of bishops. 4 The following year, on May 26, 1919, a second conference of bishops was held during which the preparations for unification of the churches were made. The decisions of the conference were confirmed by the decrees of Prince Regent Aleksandar and the Serbian government on June 17, 1920. By decree, on August 30, 1920, they proclaimed the unification of the churches. Prince Regent Aleksandar Karadjordjević simultaneously proclaimed the formation of the Serb Patriarchate and that the head of this patriarchate bear the title “Serb Patriarch of the Orthodox Church of the KSHS.” Following the unification of 1920, therefore, the Metropolitanate of Montenegro and the Littoral was the sole Orthodox body in Montenegro, with its administrative center in the Cetinje Monastery. The SPC played an instrumental role in consolidating the Serbian identity of the Montenegrins, casting Montenegrins as “the best and purest of Serbs,” descendants of those Serbs who had migrated to the rocky hinterland of Montenegro in the wake of the Battle of Kosovo in 1389. There, according to this narrative, they settled in the rocky crags of Stara Crnagora (Old Montenegro) where they struggled to keep the flame of Serbian identity alive while fighting to survive in a harsh, unforgiving environment. Montenegro was cast as the Srpska Sparta (Serbian Sparta), an island of Serb freedom amid a sea of Ottoman repression; Montenegro thus plays a pivotal role in the preservation of Serbian identity. Myriad symbols and myths have been embellished by the SPC in order to consolidate this collective national (Serbian) identity with a sense of a shared history, community, and destiny, and thus children baptized in Montenegro were predominantly, until the re-establishment of the CPC, baptized into the SPC. 5 Given the contested nature of the Podgorica Assembly and the subsequent Bjelaši-Zelenaši conflict, resistance to the unification of the churches would have been met with resistance. Not so, say the SPC. Despite the existence of political disputes over the nature of the post-war union with Serbia, dissention within the Orthodox clergy was rare. (There were some exceptions—the Archimandrite Nikodim Janjušević, for example, kept the Montenegrin Orthodox Church alive in Detroit for several years after unification.) Montenegrin bishops voted unanimously to unite with the SPC. The leading voice for unification in Montenegro, Archbishop Gavrilo Dožić, became the Serbian patriarch in 1938. During the existence of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY), within which Montenegro was one of the six republics of the federation, the Serbian patriarchate became increasingly anxious about a regime-driven schism, a position seemingly vindicated, given the Yugoslav Communist Party’s perceived nurturing of ecclesiastical separatism, a policy the party had promoted strongly during the early post–World

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War II years. 6 Thus the SPC continued to pursue the argument that despite Montenegro’s status as a republic within the SFRY, Montenegrins were, in essence, Serbs. The SPC often argued that attempts to attack the unity and integrity of the church were led by the government’s alleged policy of “encouraging of separatist priests in Montenegro.” 7 In 1970 the then Serbian Patriarch German left little doubt how he perceived the identity of the Montenegrins, stating that they were simply “Serbs by another name.” 8 The most serious conflict between the SPC and the Montenegrin League of Communists (Savez Komunista Crne Gore—SKCG) came in 1972, fuelled in a large part by the latter’s decision to destroy the small church on top of Lovćen (hosting the remains of Petar II Petrović Njegoš) and replace the existing monument with a secular mausoleum built by the Croat sculptor, Ivan Meštrović. 9 It was perceived by the SPC as an attack upon their very being by the SKCG. (Conversely, the small church destined to be destroyed was seen as a symbol of the Serbian domination of Montenegro by advocates of a separate CPC.) The SPC remained the sole Orthodox body in Montenegro, though its influence was limited until the late 1980s. However, as nationalist sentiment among Serbs throughout the SFRJ increased following the rise to power of Slobodan Milošević in 1987, the SPC supported groups that engaged in the so-called anti-bureaucratic revolution (during which the SKCG faced an onslaught intended to undermine their legitimacy). Between 1987 and 1990 the SPC re-emerged as a more potent spiritual (and political) force in Montenegro, becoming even more so following the election of Risto Amfilohije Radović as head of the SPC in Montenegro. Amfilohije is a Montenegrin, born in Bare Radovića in the Morača area, and was well suited to the task—he understood the mentality of the Montenegrins and, equally, understood the underlying currents in Montenegrin society. His illustrious career began at Sava’s Seminary and then at the Theological Faculty of Belgrade University (where he later taught after completing a doctorate in Greece). After a spell as Bishop of Banat in the 1980s, he was elected as the Metropolitan of Montenegro and the Littoral in December 1990 as Montenegro entered a period of significant flux. 10 His appointment coincided with a wider mobilization of Serbs throughout Yugoslavia, a process in which the SPC was enthusiastically engaged. Marking Montenegro as Serb territory included the building of new churches (the largest being in Podgorica) and the rebuilding of old churches adorned with Serb saints and symbolism. There was also an attempt to Christianize the population using corpses and bones to mobilize the faithful and heal spiritual wounds. 11 The relics of St. Basil were cut and sent to monasteries of the SPC outside Montenegro, while in new churches in Montenegro pieces of “martyrs” from Jasenovac 12 were brought in order to further stir anti-Croatian sentiments. 13 Amfilohije’s program also included the opening of a theological school in Cetinje, a radio station and a publishing house, the construction of a new church in

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Podgorica and the reconstruction of many churches that had fallen into disrepair. Amfilohije thus became the leading proponent of Srpstvo (Serbdom) in Montenegro while overseeing a flourishing of the institution. He increased the number of priests, monks, nuns, and the faithful and, despite the often troubled relationship with the Montenegrin government, continued to lobby energetically for religious instruction (by the SPC) to be compulsory in Montenegrin schools. His views on Montenegrin nationhood were simple: he regarded the Montenegrin nation as an invention of separatists and communists who were attempting to tear Montenegrins from their Serb roots, and he openly referred to Montenegrin autocephalists in the CPC as crnolatinaši (a derogatory term for Catholic priests dressed in black robes). 14 Moreover, Amfilohije soon demonstrated that his talents extended beyond the realm of the spiritual. He initially supported the policies of the Serbian President, Slobodan Milošević, and later became a vociferous supporter of the Serb nationalist cause during the wars in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. He played the gusle 15 (choosing verses from the epic poem, “The Battle of Mojkovac”) for Montenegrin troops on the Dubrovnik front in 1991 16 and often praised the Bosnian Serb leader, Radovan Karadžić, and his deputy, Biljana Plavšić. He invited the Serbian paramilitary leader Željko Ražnatović Arkan and his paramilitary group Tigrovi (the Tigers) to “protect” the Cetinje Monastery (from CPC supporters) on badnjak (Christmas Eve) 1992. 17 He also acted as an arbiter in intra-party conflicts within and inter-party conflicts between pro-Serb political parties. Indeed, Amfilohije’s political influence increased and while his relationship with the Bosnian Serb leadership remained strong, his relationship with Milošević soured after the Serbian President’s break with the Bosnian Serb leadership in 1994 (following the latter’s rejection of the Vance Owen Peace Plan). Thereafter Amfilohije became one of Milošević’s fiercest critics. In August 1995, while Croatian forces were conducting the latter stages of Operation Storm in the Serb breakaway region within Croatia (Republika Srpska Krajina—RSK) and the Bosnian Serb Army (BSA) were losing territory as the result of NATO airstrikes and a joint Muslim-Croat offensive in central Bosnia, Amfilohije addressed the Montenegrin Assembly, berating delegates there for their continued support of Milošević and demanding that they reverse their decision to impose sanctions on the Bosnian Serbs. 18 Amfilohije’s opposition to Milošević meant Amfilohije found, albeit briefly, common ground with Milo Djukanović when the Democratic Party of Socialists (Demokratska Partija Socijalista—DPS) split into pro- and antiMilošević factions in 1997. 19

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THE RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF THE MONTENEGRIN ORTHODOX CHURCH In the early 1990s those advocating Montenegro’s independence sought to re-establish the CPC as a part of an endeavor to aid the consolidation of a distinct Montenegrin national identity. 20 These supporters of an autocephalous CPC claimed the SPC had little influence over events in Montenegro during the long period in which Serbia proper had been occupied by the Ottoman Turks. Over time, they argued, the CPC had developed its own peculiarities—in particular the role of the Vladika (Prince-Bishop)—quite different from the SPC. Moreover, they argued that the CPC had been forcibly and illegally absorbed into the SPC in 1920. 21 They also sought to portray the newly anointed Amfilohije as a dangerous fundamentalist intent on imposing the SPC on all Montenegrins of the Orthodox faith. 22 It was an argument well received by those parties that advocated Montenegro’s independence, and thus the issue of the CPC was used by politicians and parties with a pro-independence agenda. Indeed, the re-establishment of the CPC was openly supported by pro-independence parties, the most influential of which was the Liberal Alliance of Montenegro (Liberalni savez Crne Gore—LSCG), a party led by the charismatic former public prosecutor, Slavko Perović, with significant backing from other pro-independence parties and individuals. 23 The LSCG was particularly strong in Cetinje, the heartland of Stara Crnagora (Old Montenegro) within which there was a strong sense of Crnogorstvo (Montenegrin-ness), though it was the base of the SPC in Montenegro. As early as 1990, messages such as “Long live the Montenegrin Autocephalous Church” began to appear in the town 24 and by June of that year the LSCG had organized a conference in Cetinje with the objective of debating the subject of the CPC’s autocephaly. By December, a group led by Sreten Zeković announced their intention to re-establish an autocephalous CPC. 25 On January 6, 1991, an All-Montenegrin National Synod was held, during which a commitment to restore an autocephalous CPC was stated. 26 Their stated desire was that the re-establishment of the CPC would serve to unite Montenegrins through the worship of specifically Montenegrin saints. 27 (This, they hoped, would aid their objective of establishing an independent Montenegrin state, with the church acting as the central pillar of a distinct Montenegrin nation.) They quickly became more assertive, and on both Badnjak and Petrovdan (St. Peter’s Day—June 29) 1991, supporters of the CPC clashed with police and supporters of the SPC in Cetinje. By early 1993 the LSCG, who were among those to open the debate about the autocephaly of the CPC in 1990, had officially recorded their support for the re-establishment of the church as a step toward their ultimate objective of an independent Montenegrin state. 28 And soon after, on St. Luke’s Day (October 18) 1993, the CPC would indeed be re-

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established. 29 An estimated 15,000 people gathered in King Nikola’s Square to celebrate it, firing guns into the air in celebration. 30 Antonije Abramović, a clergyman of the American Orthodox Church in Toronto, was consecrated as the head of the CPC. 31 He established his headquarters in a house on the outskirts of Cetinje; the so-called Vladičanski dom. From the outset, the SPC sought to discredit him; rumors were abundant regarding his alleged lack of moral fiber, and the SPC sought to capitalize on any doubt there may be regarding Abramović’s idiosyncrasies. The SPC acknowledged that he had, during the 1950s, spent time in Kosovo with the Bishop of Ras and Prizren, Gojko Stojčević (later the Serbian Patriarch “Pavle,” 1990–2009), followed by a spell as Abbot of Savina in Herceg-Novi, but by the early 1960s, he had been asked to leave the SPC, due to alleged homosexual activity. 32 Some questioned whether Abramović had ever been consecrated as a priest. 33 The SPC then claimed that Abramović fled to Greece before migrating to Canada, where he remained until 1993 whereupon he returned to Montenegro. Abramović led the CPC until his death in November 1996, to be succeeded by Miraš Dedeić, known to the CPC faithful as “Metropolitan Mihailo.” He was chosen as Abramović’s successor by the Montenegrin Synod in January 1997 and was ordained as a bishop by Patriarch Pimen of the Bulgarian Alternative Synod in Sofia in March 1998, before being formally ordained as the Metropolitan of the CPC in October. From the outset, the SPC were unrelenting in their criticism of Dedeić. According to them, Dedeić was, as a student, viewed with deep suspicion by his fellow Orthodox priests who, it is alleged, doubted his commitment to Orthodoxy. “Unclerical behavior” on Dedeić’s part led to him being defrocked, ex-communicated, and finally anathematized by the Ecumenical Patriarch in Constantinople. Rejecting these accusations, Dedeić, of course countered that he would not accept criticism from an organization that has forcibly merged the CPC into the SPC in 1920, which, he claimed, represented a theft of Montenegro’s identity, an imposition of Serb identity in Montenegro, and an occupation of the CPC’s sacred buildings. 34 Moreover, he claimed, the CPC had existed as an independent entity since 1603, an autonomy which they claim had been recognized in 1766 by both the Holy Russian Synod and the Patriarchate of Constantinople. 35 He cast the SPC as occupiers who had imposed themselves upon Montenegro after the CPC had been forcibly dissolved against both the 1905 Montenegrin constitution and canon law. 36 Montenegro’s ruling DPS considered the CPC–SPC conflict an ecclesiastical matter, and they kept their distance. 37 However, the political flux in Montenegro from 1997 would give the issue new momentum.

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THE DPS SPLIT AND THE INTENSIFICATION OF THE SPC AND CPC CONFLICT Between 1990 and 1997, Montenegrin politics had been characterized by the absolute dominance of the DPS, which took a largely pro-Belgrade line. In 1997, however, the DPS split into two factions: one that continued to support the Serbian President, Slobodan Milošević (led by the thenPresident Momir Bulatović) and one opposed to continued cooperation with his regime (led by Prime Minister Milo Djukanović). 38 This conflict soon developed into a de facto struggle between supporters of continued union with Serbia and those advocating independence for Montenegro. 39 Assessing that Milošević’s time may be nigh, Djukanović gambled that his own political survival would be best achieved by denouncing his erstwhile ally. The opportunity presented itself in the wake of the Serbian elections in late 1996, during which opposition parties had accused the Serbian president of electoral fraud. As protests in Serbia, known as the Zajedno (Together) escalated, some within the DPS observed this with interest. Splits emerged as the three key actors within the DPS (Momir Bulatović, Milo Djukanović, and the vice-president of the DPS, Svetozar Marović) became increasingly divided. While Bulatović threw his support behind Milošević, Djukanović and Marović saw an opportunity to exploit the Serbian president’s weakness. For Milo Djukanović, in particular, this was a matter of both the personal and the political. His relationship with Slobodan Milošević had been strained since late 1993, and his sparring with Milošević‘s wife, Mira Marković, had increasingly made him persona non grata with Serbia’s most powerful political family. 40 Djukanović had criticized Mira Marković’s Yugoslav United Left (Jugoslovenska udružena levica—JUL) as a party “devoted to an ideologically retrograde and abstract society.” Marković responded by accusing Djukanović of being “a smuggler employed as a prominent politician.” 41 The fuse was lit by Djukanović‘s implicit support for the Zajedno (Together) coalition-led anti-Milošević protests taking place throughout Serbia in the wake of the alleged electoral fraud. Djukanović chose his moment to act. Utilizing the widely read Belgrade political weekly Vreme, he boldly asserted that Milošević was an “obsolete politician” who lacked “the ability to form a strategic vision of the problems this country is facing.” 42 Conversely, however, Montenegro’s President, Momir Bulatović, calculated that Milošević would overcome the crisis; and thus he opted to remain committed to the Serbian President. Consequently, tensions increased between Djukanović and Bulatović. Publicly the party retained a visage of unity, with senior party officials emphasizing that although there may be disagreements between Djukanović and Milošević, there was no conflict within the DPS itself. 43 Despite the rhetoric of unity, however, a division was becoming increasingly manifest, and by March 1997 the party was in crisis. Relations became so strained that

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on March 24, during the first DPS main board meeting since Djukanović’s Vreme interview, a vote was called that would ultimately determine the future direction of the party. 44 Ostensibly arranged to discuss matters pertaining to wider political, economic, and social issues in Montenegro, the meeting instead became a debate on the implications of Djukanović‘s actions. 45 The direction of the discussions demonstrated that the majority of senior members of the DPS were unconvinced of the wisdom of generating an open confrontation with Belgrade. 46 Consequently, Djukanović was criticized by a number of his colleagues for his Vreme interview and following lengthy discussion and argument, the main board voted. Bulatović‘s pro-Milošević stance was convincingly confirmed. 47 This seemingly overwhelming endorsement suggested a confirmation of Bulatović’s strength within the DPS (and the continuation of the party’s pro-Belgrade position). However, of the seven who voted for Djukanović and amid those who had abstained were some of the most powerful individuals in Montenegrin politics. Crucially, Vukašin Maraš, the chief of Montenegrin state security (Služba državne bezbjednosti) and Svetozar Marović both backed Djukanović. 48 Both men would be factors in convincing wavering DPS members that the party’s interests were best served by distancing themselves from Milošević. 49 Djukanović’s faction applied significant pressure on those deemed pliable, breaking down most of those who had initially voted against him, and succeeding in building a powerful coalition of the key individuals. Collectively, they wrested control of the party in advance of the second crucial meeting of the DPS main board. 50 That meeting, held on July 11, 1997, was the last time they would meet as a single unit. The majority, albeit a slim one, had confirmed Djukanović’s ascendency. 51 The two factions of the DPS now claimed ownership of the party while seeking to consolidate their respective power bases. Djukanović’s faction entered into “anti-Milošević front,” while Bulatović sought to strengthen his relationship with the Serb People’s Party and Milošević’s Socialist Party of Serbia. Power blocs established, both Djukanović and Bulatović sought to win the presidency. The result proved to be exceptionally close. In the first round Bulatović was victorious, winning by a narrow margin of only 2,200 votes with a 67 percent turnout. It was not a result decisive enough to deliver a final victory. With a second round of voting required, Djukanović’s electoral team embarked upon an energetic pre-election house-to-house campaign that brought significant results. Consequently, Djukanović won the vote in the key municipality of Nikšić, while improving his share of the vote in other municipalities. The overall winners in each municipality remained as in the first vote, with Djukanović winning majorities in Kotor, Ulcinj, Plav, Cetinje, Bar, Rožaje, and Tivat, while Bulatović retained the traditionally conservative and Serb-oriented municipalities of Berane, Pljevlja, Bijelo Polje, and Herceg Novi (the latter being the only coastal municipality won by Bulatović). 52 The final margin was narrow with

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Djukanović gaining 5,884 votes more than Bulatović (who immediately cried foul). 53 The struggle between the former DPS allies became the crucial faultline in Montenegrin politics; while at this stage the main dynamic was the struggle between pro- and anti-Milošević forces, it soon transposed into one pitting advocates of continued union with Serbia against those agitating for Montenegro’s independence. In the immediate period following Djukanović’s inauguration as Montenegrin President in January 1998 (during which Djukanović had received blessings from Amfilohije), the conflict between the SPC and the CPC increasingly served as a point of reference for expressing national identity and attitudes toward the state; in essence, the continuation of political struggles by proxy. Djukanović may have received blessings from Amfilohije before his inauguration as president in January 1998, but the Montenegrin President’s shift toward an increasingly independent position in subsequent years ensured their understanding was brief. Indeed, Amfilohije would become one of his most vocal opponents as he continued to attempt to consolidate the position of the SPC in Montenegro. The bitter public exchanges between the SPC and the CPC extended beyond the matter of unification to arguments over the ownership of Montenegro’s religious buildings and related property (such as the remains of St. Peter of Cetinje and the right hand of St. John the Baptist, both held at the SPC-administered Cetinje monastery). The CPC began to assert their claim to 650 churches across Montenegro which had been requisitioned in 1920 and were being administered by the SPC. By the late 1990s, the CPC claimed to have had gained, by plebiscites held among parishioners, legitimate possession of a number of churches which had previously been run by the SPC, the majority of these being located around Cetinje and Njeguši. The CPC’s stated objective of repossessing these churches sometimes required controversial actions to be undertaken. In December 2000, for example, supporters of the CPC attempted to take possession of the Vlaška Church in Cetinje, a building with much historical significance. 54 Their objective was to stop the SPC renovating the church (thereby, claimed the CPC, eliminating evidence that the church was originally Montenegrin). In protest against the appropriation of the church by the CPC, an SPC priest, Radomir Nikčević, barricaded himself inside the building and embarked upon a hunger strike as a protest against the actions of the CPC. The conflict over ownership and control of religious buildings was only one aspect of what was a multifaceted conflict. Amfilohije’s opponents continued to accuse him of endeavoring to provoke the Montenegrin government and the CPC. 55 On the ground, tensions between supporters of the respective churches became most acutely manifest during festivals and religious holidays, in particular during the aforementioned burning of the Yule log. The SPC protested vehemently that this “Serbian

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tradition” had been hijacked by the CPC. 56 In Cetinje, both held ceremonies were held in close proximity of each other—supporters of the SPC outside the Cetinje Monastery and supporters of the CPC in nearby King Nikola’s Square. The first of these parallel events took place in 1991. 57 They became quasi-political meetings, marked by the presence of nationalist symbols, and often marred by low-intensity violence. Supporters of the SPC carried banners and flags adorned with Serbian national symbols, SPC iconography, and portraits of Slobodan Milošević and King Aleksandar Karadjordjević. The faithful of the CPC would, conversely, display symbols of the old Montenegrin state and portraits of King Nikola I Petrović. The rival groups used traditional means of intimidating each other, singing nationalist songs, fistfighting, and occasionally firing weapons—albeit only into the air. 58 These incidents were not confined merely to Cetinje. In Berane, a traditional stronghold of the SPC, a number of violent incidents took place as the CPC attempted to hold their own Badnjak celebrations in the town. 59 Six months later, followers of the SPC were forbidden from holding ceremonies in the village of Njeguši (the birthplace of Petar II Petrović Njegoš), near Cetinje. 60 In the midst of these conflicts, the Montenegrin government sought, at least publicly, to defuse tensions between the churches although their position was often opaque. However, Milo Djukanović courted controversy in 2000 by sending, for the first time, Easter greetings to the CPC as well as the SPC (the latter subsequently accusing him of encouraging separatism). 61 Djukanović frequently implied support for the CPC’s quest for autocephalous status but adopted an ambiguous position, largely because the church issue was one which divided the DPS. 62 Svetozar Marović, the then Speaker of the Montenegrin Parliament and (then) a close ally of Djukanović, condemned the CPC for attempting to seize two churches on an island in Lake Skadar. Given the obvious intra-party differences, their position remained rather ambiguous. But as relations between ruling elites in Belgrade and Podgorica cooled with the preparations of a referendum on Montenegrin independence, relations likewise worsened between the SPC and CPC. Indeed, the church conflict became one of the key facets of the debates over Montenegrin identity and Montenegro’s statehood, though the CPC claimed they were not engaged in politics per se. 63 Pre-existing tensions between the SPC and CPC (and the SPC and the Montenegrin government) were further exacerbated by the appearance, in June 2005, of a small tin church on the peak of Mount Rumija near the town of Bar. Mount Rumija has traditionally been a place of pilgrimage for Montenegro’s main religious communities (Orthodox, Catholic, and Muslim). Every August, pilgrims from these faiths climb to the peak in honor of St. Vladimir, who died fifty years before the split between the Eastern and Western branches of Christendom in 1054. The tradition is a symbol of inter-religious and inter-ethnic cooperation. But less than a

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year before Montenegro’s independence referendum (held on May 21, 2006), the SPC, with the help of a helicopter flown by the Army of Serbia and Montenegro, placed a prefabricated tin church on the peak. Its appearance was immediately interpreted by pro-independence parties and organizations (such as the CPC) as a threat to those who wished to “tear Montenegro from its Serb roots.” They argued that this was, once again, proof of the SPC’s misuse of religion for political ends. 64 Indeed, in advance of the May referendum, Amfilohije played a significant role in the Movement for a Joint State of Serbia and Montenegro and was often considered a more effective articulator of Montenegrin Serb interests than the de facto leader of the bloc, Predrag Bulatović. In April 2006, Amfilohije railed at the CPC for attempting to force their way into the St. Nikola church in Bajice, near Cetinje, stating explicitly that he believed the Montenegrin government to be supporting the actions of the CPC. As it transpired, the issue of the CPC was only a marginal theme in the respective (pro- and anti-independence) campaigns, though the CPC would use Montenegro’s independence to argue that the church, too, should be a pillar of any independent Montenegrin state. THE SPC–CPC CONFLICT IN INDEPENDENT MONTENEGRO The result of the Montenegrin independence referendum, held on May 21, 2006, though very close (55.5 percent in favor of independence, 44.5 percent in favor of state union) delivered the independence that the DPSled coalition had sought. In the wake of the declaration of independence on June 3, 2006, supporters of the CPC grew in confidence; they assumed that the position of the CPC would be much stronger in an independent Montenegrin state and were determined to capitalize on the new political reality. 65 Conversely, the SPC was uncertain of what the new political environment would mean for them and for Serbs in Montenegro. On April 9, 2007, the CPC announced a plan to take control of all Orthodox Churches in Montenegro, with or without the help of the government. The latter’s reaction was that it would protect the SPC in the event of an attempt to seize control of churches, further fuelling the CPC’s growing perception that the state and the SPC were engaged in a joint endeavor to deny the CPC freedom of worship. 66 It was in this context that around 300 supporters of the CPC attempted, on April 18, to force their way into Cetinje monastery. 67 Unable to pass the police cordon surrounding the monastery, the CPC held a service outside the nearby Ćipur church (where King Nikola and Queen Milena Petrović are buried), which they were unable to enter because it had been occupied by the Serb Orthodox Youth Brotherhood. Three months later, in July, the CPC announced they would hold a service outside the Church of St. Archangel Michael in Nikšić, a church administered by the SPC. 68 Again, however, they were

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forbidden from doing so by local police. In September 2007 the SPC’s Bishop Filaret of the Mileševa diocese (the center of which is the Mileševa monastery in Prijepolje) created controversy by camping out on the Serbian-Montenegrin border and embarking on a hunger strike, having been denied entry into Montenegro by the government on the basis that he had provided assistance to war crimes fugitives wanted by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY). His protest exacerbated tensions between the SPC and CPC and, therefore, between Serb and Montenegrin nationalists. Eventually, in an attempt to defuse tensions, the Montenegrin government agreed to allow Filaret to enter Montenegro. 69 Two months later, however, Amfilohije’s attentions were drawn back to Belgrade with the decline and death of Serbian Patriarch Pavle. In November 2007, Amfilohije was elected by the Holy Synod of the SPC to take over Pavle’s duties, a role he undertook until the election of Bishop Irinej of Niš at the new Patriarch in January 2010 (the CPC making it clear that they expected little from Irinej, who is a strong proponent of the unity of the SPC). In Amfilohije’s absence, the CPC intensified their activities. In January 2009, they announced that they intended to take possession of monasteries and churches built before 1920. This time, however, their actions would lead to legal proceedings being taken against them. On January 20, Montenegrin police placed a cordon around the Church of St. John the Baptist in Bajice, near Cetinje, to deny access to priests from both the SPC and CPC, both of whom were preparing to conduct services in the church. A legal struggle over the ownership of the church began. Less than a month later, the SPC filed charges against members of the CPC for changing the lock on the church and thus violating the rights of the SPC to hold services there. The judge in Cetinje, however, dismissed the case as groundless, opting instead to open an inquiry over accusations levelled against two SPC priests, Obren Jovanović and Gojko Perović, who stood accused of illegally entering churches to hold services. Incidents continued throughout the summer of 2009 and upon Amfilohije’s return, rhetorical exchanges between the SPC and the CPC intensified, this time fuelled by the SPC’s construction of a new church on Sveti Stefan, a development opposed by the CPC. 70 Debate also continued to rage about the fabricated church on Mount Rumija, an issue that became a problematic one for the then Montenegrin Prime Minister Igor Lukšić. 71 His predecessor, Milo Djukanović, in the midst of his retirement, again implied support for the CPC, stating that although the SPC in Montenegro was autonomous (from Belgrade) it was “still part of the Serbian Orthodox Church” and thus “not sufficiently in line with Montenegro’s national interests.” 72 He hinted also at a future unification of the churches in Montenegro, something Amfilohije rejected as impractical; indeed, a matter of days later, the SPC demonstrated it was in no mood to compromise. On May 20, 2011, the SPC filed a lawsuit against the Mon-

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tenegrin state at the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg, primarily for property allegedly seized from them after the end of World War II. The case was eventually rejected by the court on the grounds that “the key provisions of the law which they had relied on had been declared unconstitutional before they filed their request.” 73 Since then, however, there have been very few positive developments. The SPC and Montenegrin government have engaged in discussions about how best to improve church-state relations. Montenegro’s ruling DPS have suggested that they will strive for the creation of a single, organizationally independent Orthodox religious community in Montenegro as a way of overcoming the divisions between the SPC and CPC. 74 Their then Chairman, Milo Djukanović, stated that this offered the best possible solution, while Ranko Krivokapić (an arch adversary of Amfilohije) expressed the view that such a solution represented the best way to “correct the historical injustice” of 1920. 75 Krivokapić also suggested that property currently under the control of the SPC (the most symbolic of which is Ostrog monastery near Nikšić) should be “reclaimed” and handed over to the CPC. In this climate the struggle between the SPC and the CPC continued unabated. On May 21, 2011 (the fifth anniversary of the Montenegrin independence referendum), Krivokapić stated, after laying a wreath at the tomb of Petar II Petrović Njegoš on Mount Lovćen, that the Montenegrin government had the right to take back property from the SPC. 76 In the same month, Amfilohije was put on trial in Podgorica, charged with “hate speech” or, more precisely, with “cursing all of those who wished to destroy the church on Mount Rumija” during a speech on Orthodox Christmas. The long drawn-out affair led, in November 2012, to Amfilohije, who had rejected the accusations as unfounded, being cautioned. 77 In 2013 Amfilohije endeavored to proclaim Petar II Petrović Njegoš a saint, but his action met opposition both from Montenegrin authorities and (more importantly) by the Holy Synod of the SPC. In 2013, the DPS became closer to the SPC, participating in the grand opening of Podgorica’s Church of the Resurrection of Christ on the occasion of the 1700th anniversary of the Edict of Milan, which gathered in one place Serb, Russian, and Constantinople and Jerusalem patriarchs. Among the newly painted frescoes many visitors recognized Djukanović and Amfilohije while Tito and the Speaker of the Montenegrin Parliament, Ranko Krivokapić, were portrayed as being dragged into the depths of hell. 78 By way of demonstrating neutrality, the DPS sent two of its ministers to be present for the ceremony of building a new church for the rival CPC on Cetinje the following day (though the small delegation was not as visible). 79

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CONCLUSION The conflict between the CPC and the SPC has lasted for over two decades and continues unabated to this day. While debates over autocephaly and Montenegrin identity and statehood were inextricably linked in the period prior to Montenegro’s declaration of independence in June 2006, other matters have subsequently dominated the political agenda. Aside from the recent (DPS-led) suggestion that the churches should unite, the Montenegrin government has largely sought to keep their distance from the issue. Proposed legislation on religious communities should, however, demonstrate which path the state intends to take to resolve the SPC–CPC conflict. The existing Law on the Legal Position of Religious Communities of 1977 is outdated and does not sufficiently regulate the relationship between religious communities and the state or, indeed, between religious communities. In lieu of this, both the SPC and CPC have sought to cast themselves as victims. The SPC has, for example, continued to argue that their position in Montenegro was the worst among Serbia’s neighboring states and that the Montenegrin government have actively sought to undermine their already tenuous position in the country—as bad, claimed the episcopal Dean of the Bay of Kotor, Momčilo Krivokapić, “as the period of hardline communism” though the current approach “was more perfidious.” He argued, moreover, that their clergy are subject to significant provocations from the Montenegrin state (primarily in the form of denying residency of clergymen and their families). The CPC, too, have sought to cast themselves as such. During his Easter message in April 2014, Metropolitan Mihailo stated that the Montenegrins had “for the bulk of their history been crucified with a crown of thorns” and, in a thinly veiled attack on the Montenegrin government, that the CPC had been “forgotten, humiliated and insulted by those who are supposed to represent the law and protect the constitutional organization of our state.” 80 There may, however, be possibilities ahead for resolving the CPC–SPC conflict, though these remain limited for the time being. Given the advancing ages of Amfilohije and Mihailo, respectively, the prospect of new religious leaders for both the CPC and SPC might serve to usher in a new and potentially more positive era in SPC–CPC relations. In the meantime, however, there seems little prospect of resolving the SPC–CPC conflict in the near future. NOTES 1. Michael Radu, “The Burden of Eastern Orthodoxy,” Orbis 42, no. 2 (1998), 283. 2. See, for example, Mirko Djordjević, “The Balkan God Mars: The Religious Factor in the [Yugoslav] Wars 1991–1999,” in Dragica Vujadinović et al., Between Authoritariansism and Democracy: Serbia, Montenegro, Croatia, Vol. II—Civil Society and Political Culture (Belgrade: CEDET, 2005), 133–43.

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3. For a succinct account of the role of the SPC in modern Serbian society and political life (since 1989), see Radmila Radić and Milan Vukmanović, “Religion and Democracy in Serbia since 1989: The Case of the Serbian Orthodox Church,” in Sabrina P. Ramet (ed.), Religion and Politics in Post-Socialist Central and Southeastern Europe: Challenges since 1989 (London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2014), 180–211. 4. These were: the autocephalous Serb Orthodox Church with five episcopates; the autocephalous Orthodox Church in Vojvodina (the Metropolitanate of Karlovac) with seven episcopates; the autocephalous Montenegrin Orthodox Church with three episcopates; and the autonomous church in Bosnia and Herzegovina (under the formal jurisdiction of the Patriarchate of Constantinople) with four episcopates. 5. Novi list, December 4, 1993, 8. 6. Sabrina P. Ramet, Balkan Babel: The Disintegration of Yugoslavia from the Death of Tito to the Fall of Milošević (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1999), 109. 7. Monitor, December 3, 1993, 9. 8. Ramet, Balkan Babel, 109. 9. The existing monument on Lovćen was built to house the bones of Njegoš, whose bones were moved there from nearby Cetinje in 1925. The event was attended by King Aleksander Karadjordjević and numerous members of the SPC hierarchy. See Andrew Baruch Wachtel, Making a Nation, Breaking a Nation: Literature and Cultural Politics in Yugoslavia (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998), 105. 10. In December 1990 Pavle was elected patriarch of the SPC despite the fact that his predecessor, Patriarch German, was still alive. At the same congress, Amfilohije Radović was elected Metropolitan of Montenegro and the Littoral and Irinej Bulović was elected the Episcope of Bačka. Six months later, in May 1991, Bishop Artemije was elected Episcope of Raška and Prizren, and Atanasije Jevtić was elected the Episcope of Banat. 11. One such event was in May 1996, when the bones of Saint Vasilije Ostroški were paraded through the Montenegrin town of Nikšić. According to Ivan Čolović, “In the eyes of the church, the earthly remains of saints, martyrs or prominent priests and reliquaries (the boxes in which their remains are kept) like their graves and parts of their clothing, have supernatural, miraculous power. They heal sickness of the body and spirit. This is the power, for instance, of the sanctorum reliquiae of Saint Vasilije Ostroški. When his relics were carried recently in a religious procession through Nikšić, it was conceived and carried out as a kind of collective therapy. The organizers explained that through the miraculous power of the holy relics they wished to influence the spiritual state of the inhabitants of that Montenegrin town, where over the last few years there had been an exceptionally large number of murders and suicides. See Ivan Čolović, The Politics of Symbol in Serbia (London: Hurst and Co., 2002), 166. 12. Jasenovac was a concentration camp in the Independent State of Croatia (NDH) where hundreds of thousands of Serbs, Roma, Jews, and moderate Croats were imprisoned between August 1941 and April 1945. The number of those killed in Jasenovac remains a matter of significant conjecture. 13. Vijesti, September 16, 2002, 6. 14. In this context, the term “Black Priest” is a derogatory term used to describe radical Croat Catholic priests. For Amfilohije’s comments on the Montenegrin language, see RTS, “Amfilohije: Crnogorski jezik izmišljen,” January 14, 2011, www.rts. rs/page/stories/sr/story/11/Region/826460/Amfilohije%3A+Crnogorski+ izmi%C5%A1ljen+jezik.html, accessed October 12, 2013. 15. The gusle is a traditional single-stringed instrument associated with the Serbs (though Herzegovinian Croats have also been known to play the instrument). The instrument has traditionally been used to accompany the recitation of epic poems, many of which are associated with cathartic events in Serbian history. The instrument became something of a symbol for nationalist Serbs and enjoyed a revival in the late 1980s and was often played to motivate the troops before battle. For an assessment of the use of the gusle in the political context, see Ivo Žanić, Flag on the Mountain: A Political Anthropology of War in Croatia and Bosnia (London: Saqi Books, 2007).

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16. Vešeljko Koprivica, Amfilohijeva sabrana ne-djela (Podgorica: Monitor, 1999), 25. 17. Šerbo Rastoder, “Religion and Politics: The Montenegrin Perspective,” in Dragica Vujadinović et al., Between Authoritarianism and Democracy: Serbia, Montenegro, Croatia, Vol. II—Civil Society and Political Culture (Belgrade: CEDET, 2005), 124. 18. Ibid. 19. Both Djukanović and Amfilohije became high-profile critics of Milošević. In the Serbian weekly Vreme, Djukanović referred to the Serbian President as “an obsolete politician.” He also openly supported the Zajedno protests in Serbia in the winter of 1996/97. Amfilohije, for his part, joined the anti-Milošević protestors on the streets of Belgrade. 20. Monitor, December 3, 1993, 9. 21. For detailed analyses of the CPC, see Novak Adžić, Kratka istorija Crnogorske pravoslavne crkve (Cetinje: Dignitas, 2000); Veseljko Koprivica, Amfilohijeva sabrana nedjela (Podgorica: Monitor, 1999); Branko Nikac, Crnogorska pravoslavna crkva: Članci— rasprave—studije (Cetinje: CDNK, 2000); Danilo Radojević, Iz povijesti hriscanskih crkava u Crnoj Gori (Podgorica: CDNK, 2000); Sreten Zeković, Crnogorska pravoslavna crkva (Cetinje: CKK, 1997). 22. The demonization of Amfilohije became something of a cottage industry in the 1990s, with a number of publications appearing that were hugely critical of him. See, for example, Veseljko Koprivica, Amfilohijeva sabrana ne-djela (Podgorica: Monitor, 1999) and Milorad Tomanić, Srpska crkva u ratu (Beograd: Medijska knjižara Krug, 2001). LSCG leader, Slavko Perović, described Amfilohije as “an instrument of the militant greater Serbian politics in Montenegro,” and, according to Miodrag Perović, the editor of the pro-independence weekly Monitor, he “agitated for war, took part in it, and after its conclusion continues to fight for the ideas that led to war.” 23. Borba, December 28, 1990, 15. The program was also supported by the Social Democratic Party and by pro-independence intellectuals. According to Miodrag Perović, the editor of Monitor weekly, “I was asked, as the editor of Monitor, to support the CPC and I supported it. We were hardly alone. The LSCG and the Social Democrats (SDP) also supported it.” Author’s interview with Miodrag Perović, Podgorica, June 17, 2007. 24. Sreten Zeković, Nauk(a) o samobitnosti Crnogoraca V: Crnogorski autokefalni pokret (Cetinje: Crnogorska prijestonica, 2003), 233. 25. NIN, August 20, 1993, 20. 26. Ibid., 21. 27. Sharyl Cross and Pauline Komnenich, “Ethnonational Identity and the Implosion of Yugoslavia: The Case of Montenegro and the Relationship with Serbia,” Nationalities Papers 33, no. 1 (2005), 18. 28. NIN, August 20, 1993, 22–24. However, the LSCG President, Slavko Perović, argued that his party was not an instrumental factor in the re-establishment of the church, stating that, “the LSCG had nothing to do with the project except on the basis that the party supports human rights.” See Novi List, December 4, 1993, 9. 29. The CPC was not an official ecclesiastical body. It was registered as a nongovernmental organization (NGO) and simply called the Vjerska zajednica Crnogoraca istočnopravoslavne vjeroipovesti (The Religious Community of Montenegrins of Eastern Orthodox Confession). 30. Novi list, December 4, 1993, 8. 31. In a letter to Bartholomew I, Patriarch of Constantinople, Istanbul, from Theodosius, Archbishop of Washington, Metropolitan of All America and Canada, the latter claimed that “on October 28, 1993, His Holiness Patriarch Pavle informed us that a retired cleric (Archimandrite Anthony Abramovich) was falsely representing himself as an auxiliary (vicar) bishop of Edmonton (Canada) of the Orthodox Church in America. He has (as we have been officially informed) become involved in and supporting the uncanonical and un-Christian action of causing schism and division in the Holy Serbian Orthodox Church. On October 29, 1993, we faxed a response in which we affirmed that Anthony Abramovich was never consecrated by us or, to my knowledge,

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by any other canonical Orthodox church.” See “Letter to Bartholomew I, Patriarch of Constantinople, Istanbul, from Theodosius, Archbishop of Washington, Metropolitan of All America and Canada,” in Budimir Aleksić and Slavko Krstajić, Trgovci Dušama (Nova Varoš: Bonart, 2003), 36. 32. Despite this being “common knowledge” within the SPC, there is no substantial proof that Abramović was a homosexual. 33. Aleksić and Krstajić, Trgovci Dušama, 36. 34. Sreten Zeković, Nauk(a) o samobitnosti, 163. 35. Author’s interview with Metropolitan Mihailo, Cetinje, September 11, 2004. In addition, see Novak Adžić, Kratka istorija Crnogorske Pravoslavne crkve (Cetinje: Dignitas, 2000). 36. Monitor, December 3, 1993, 10. 37. Helsinški odbor za ljudska prava u Srbiji, Srpska Pravoslavna Crkva i novi srpski identitet (Beograd: Helsinški odbor za ljudska prava, 2006), 5–11, http://www.helsinki. org.rs/serbian/doc/Studija-Kupres.pdf, accessed March 20, 2014. 38. For a detailed analysis of the DPS split, see Ljubiša Mitrović and Aleksandar Eraković, Sto dana koji su promijenili Crnu Goru (Podgorica: Daily Press, 1997). 39. For an analysis of Montenegrin politics in the 1990s, see Kenneth Morrison, “Montenegro: A Polity in Flux 1989–2000,” in Charles Ingrao and Thomas A. Emmert (eds.), Confronting the Yugoslav Controversies: A Scholars’ Initiative, 2nd edition (West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press, 2013), 427–56. 40. An ongoing feud, played out through the media, had strained relations between the Milošević and the Montenegrin Prime Minister. Mira Marković had alleged that Djukanović was enriching himself and his associates by indulging in shadowy economic activities (cigarette smuggling) during UN sanctions. See Lenard J. Cohen, Serpent in the Bosom: The Rise and Fall of Milošević (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2002), 330. 41. AIM Press, October 4, 1995. 42. Vreme, February 19, 1997, 3. 43. Pobjeda, February 22, 1997, 4. 44. The main board of the DPS consists of 99 members. For more details, see Mitrović and Eraković, Sto dana, 21–22. 45. Ibid., 22. 46. Monitor, May 16, 1997, 8. 47. Mitrović and Eraković, Sto dana, 22. 48. Monitor, April 4, 1997, 9. See also Pobjeda, April 24, 1997, 2. 49. Monitor, June 20, 1997, 10. 50. Monitor, May 16, 1997, 10–11. 51. For a more detailed account of the July 11 DPS meeting, see Mitrović and Eraković, Sto dana, 337–44. 52. AIM Press, October 23, 1997. 53. See Momir Bulatović, Pravila ćutanja (Belgrade: Narodna knjiga—Alfa, 2005), 259–74. 54. The Vlaška church in Cetinje is famous for its perimeter fence made from Turkish guns captured by Montenegrins during the late nineteenth century. The CPC and SPC both claim ownership of it. 55. See, for example, Matica crnogorska, “Kontinuitet provokacija Srpske Pravoslavne Crkve,” Godišnjak Matice crnogorske (1999/2000), 132–33. 56. Aleksić and Krstajić, Trgovci dušama, 73. 57. Šerbo Rastoder, “Religion and Politics,” 120. 58. Vjekoslav Perica, Balkan Idols: Religion and Nationalism in Yugoslav States (USA: Oxford University Press, 2002), 175. 59. Institute for War and Peace Reporting, “Balkan Crisis Report,” No. 309, January 17, 2002. 60. Petar II Petrović Njegoš was Vladika (Prince-Bishop) until his death, from tuberculosis, in 1851 at the age of 37. As Vladika he played a pivotal role in uniting Monte-

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negro’s pleme (clans) and as a politician he was a proponent in uniting the Serbian nation (as well as an early proponent of Yugoslavism). As a poet he was best known for Gorski vijenac (The Mountain Wreath), which is considered to be one of the most important pieces of South Slav literature. Both the SPC and the CPC have claimed Njegoš as “their saint.” For a detailed account of the life of Petar II Petrović Njegoš in English, see Milovan Djilas, Njegoš (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1966). 61. As a result he faced protests by the SPC and the Orthodox Youth, which tried to organize a Montenegrin version of the Serbian youth organization Otpor (resistance) in order to oust Djukanović. 62. Ibid. 63. In an interview with the author in 2004, Metropolitan Mihailo rejected claims that the CPC were more motivated by political than religious objectives. “I am aware,” he stated, “of the accusations regarding our objectives. The Serbian Orthodox Church claim that we here are a political organization—they recognize or acknowledge nothing; they say that Montenegro is Serbia and that the Montenegrin Church is the Serbian Church. I cannot say that this [the CPC] is the most spiritual church, but there are believers here, and this serves as a Christian church, an Orthodox Church. No-one here has a political objective, only spiritual.” See Kenneth Morrison, Montenegro: A Modern History (London: I. B. Tauris, 2009), 139. 64. Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty, “Balkan Report,” vol. 9, no. 23, August 12, 2005, http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1340952.html, accessed April 20, 2014. 65. For an overview of Montenegro’s first five years of independence, see Kenneth Morrison, “Change, Continuity and Consolidation: Assessing Five Years of Montenegro’s Independence,” LSEE Papers on Southeast Europe 2 (2011), http://www.lse.ac.uk/ europeanInstitute/research/LSEE/PDFs/Publications/MontenegroPaper-web.pdf, accessed April 20, 2014. 66. Dan, April 11, 2007, 1. 67. Vijesti, April 19, 2007, 1. 68. While the CPC railed against the government for providing support to the SPC, the government showed that they were willing to adopt a combative stance with both churches. In early August 2007, the SPC’s controversial Bishop Filaret was asked to leave Montenegro on the basis that he had entered the county illegally. As justification for the actions, the then Montenegrin Prime Minister Željko Sturanović stated that the bishop had been asked to leave Montenegro because he was on a Hague Tribunal list of persons suspected to be aiding indicted fugitive war criminals. Dan, Podgorica, August 3, 2007, 1. 69. Monitor, September 14, 2007, 26. 70. Pobjeda, April 25, 2011, 3. 71. For an analysis of these debates, see Kenneth Morrison, “Little Church Causes Big Trouble in Montenegro,” Balkan Insight, February 21, 2011, www.balkaninsight .com/en/article/little-church-causes-big-trouble-in-montenegro, accessed March 20, 2014. 72. Balkan Insight, “Djukanović Supports ‘Independent Church in Montenegro,’” May 18, 2011, www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/djukanovic-supports-independentchurch-in-montenegro, accessed March 20, 2014. 73. European Court of Human Rights, “Decision in the Case of Eparhija Budimljansko-Nikšića and Others v. Montenegro (Application no. 26501/05),” Press Release, ECHR 387 (2012), October 19, 2012, http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search .aspx?i=003–4125009–4857539, accessed October 13, 2013. 74. In response to the DPS “initiative” Amfilohije said: “It is astonishing that questions of church unity should be made part of the program of a secular party. It is not clear, either, how it is possible in a country where state and church are separate under the law that politicians should make statements of this kind that constitute interference in the internal affairs and organization of the church. The Metropolitanate of Montenegro and the Littoral has existed for eight centuries. It is only in our times that some politicians in Montenegro, for the sake of their own ideological and partisan

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ends, are trying to violate the law and constitution to deny the legal identity and continuity of the Metropolitanate. I am sure these are just the growing pains of Montenegrin society and that it will grow out of them” (Večernje novosti, May 19, 2011, 6). 75. Vijesti, May 17, 2011, 2–3. 76. Pobjeda, May 23, 2011, 10. 77. Dan, November 20, 2012, 3. In May 2012, Amfilohije submitted a request for retirement, though a spokesperson for the SPC stated that he would continue to conduct religious services. See VIP Daily News Report, May 10, 2012, 4. 78. Ranko Krivokapić incurred the wrath of the SPC on numerous occasions. In November 2009, for example, he stated that the behavior of SPC clergymen in Montenegro had been “disgraceful.” During a visit of the SPC Patriarch Irinej, Krivokapić refused to apologize for his comments, claiming he was irritated by the patriarch’s statements that he believed questioned Montenegro’s independence. 79. Despite the government’s attempts to remain relatively neutral, both the SPC and the CPC are generally critical of the government’s alleged practice of favoring one side over the other, claiming the government’s behavior is not impartial. 80. Vijesti, “Mihailo: Crna Gora i CPC imaju vlastitu Golgotu,” April 17, 2014, http:// www.vijesti.me/vijesti/mihailo-crna-gora-cpc-imaju-vlastitu-golgotu-clanak-196645, accessed April 20, 2014.

SEVEN Religious Polarization of Macedonian Modern Society Ružica Cacanoska

Macedonian society experienced fundamental changes in social structure during the late 1980s and early 1990s. These changes directly affected the positioning and characterization of religion within it. The period of transition allows religious institutions from the margins of society to move and receive appropriate space in the public scene. The change of social order increasingly directed religious institutions to complete the segment that was directly or indirectly related to the corpus of what is called national identification, and consequently act from those positions. By the establishment of the new national states in the Balkans, as well as strengthening of the existing ones, religion became a focal point and developed a major role. Following historical development, religion is a key pillar of the identity of the ethnic communities in the Balkans, indicating it is what provides the specifics of a particular ethnic group. Undoubtedly, in this context one should not neglect the other determinants of identity such as language and the other segments of culture. In the periods when religion becomes public, the role of religious communities in maintaining the national identity (as guardians of the national identity) is more strongly highlighted. When a certain symbiosis between them is achieved, it is most probable that, for example, ethnic Macedonians as a rule declare themselves as Orthodox or the ethnic Albanians as a rule declare themselves as members of the Islamic community. It is in this framework that one recognizes the clear and strong association between religion and nation. Apparently, this positioning and structuring of religion in the Mace121

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donian society is significantly affected by the developments in the immediate and broader surroundings (for example, in the former Yugoslav republics, then in the neighboring countries, as well as in other postcommunist states). Post-socialist reality is characterized by the process of revitalization of religion. In addition to the fact that the revitalization is developed at the level of the national and cultural identity, the development of ideological opposition in terms of the socialist social structure is visible, or the process by which the role of religious collectivities in the transition period is created. The process of revitalization, which includes the revitalization and strengthening of the position of religious entities, primarily the ones that are historically present, dominant collectivities, can be monitored at the level of religious collectivity, on the one hand, and on the other hand, at the individual level, through the religious identification and partly religious practice. The return of the religious mainstream to the Macedonian public scene is reflected directly and clearly through the increased level of representation in the media; gradually displaying their aspirations in the field of religious education, undertaking of a certain amount of social activities depending on the religion, then claiming the “confiscated property,” and closeness of the right-wing political structures (a process of religionization of politics or politicization of religion). This chapter places emphasis on the description of the basic indicators of religiosity and especially their impact on religious polarization, based on ethnicity. The research design of this chapter is basically making a case study of the religious polarization of the Macedonian society which has a longitudinal dimension, because it uses data from different periods, drafting the trends of development of the leading dimensions of religiosity. The study used secondary data sources such as official statistical data from the State Statistical Office of the Republic of Macedonia, then empirical data from the European Values Study, which refer to Macedonia, as well as the inclusion of existing data bases of empirical research of the segment of the religion from projects implemented in the Institute for Sociological, Political and Juridical Research (ISPJR), at the University of Ss. Cyril and Methodius, in Skopje. For the purposes of this chapter, five semi-structured interviews were conducted, including participants in the focus group from the “Desecularization of the Macedonian society” project, pursued in the period 2004–2006. The main research questions on the basis of which the religious polarization of Macedonian society is examined are: (1) What are the basic indicators and characteristics of the dynamics of the Macedonian population religiosity? and (2) How is it funded and what are the dynamics of religious polarization in Macedonian society?

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ANALYZING AND UNDERSTANDING RELIGIOUS POLARIZATION IN MACEDONIA The key theoretical approach used to research religion is the famous thesis of secularization. Secularization is typical of the European background, which is often attributed as Euro-secularization, clearly indicating its specifics, especially when compared to American society. 1 According to the secularization theory, “importance of religion in public life weakens, and religious influences still exist, but are increasingly pushed in the area of privacy.” 2 Secularization as “a dominant structural tendency” is “an inevitable part of modernization and as the world is becoming more modernized, it will automatically secularize.” 3 This thesis develops analytically in three sub-theses. The first indicates the process of functional differentiation, according to which secular activities in the area of politics, economy, and science are developed outside the scope and impact of religion. 4 The second and third sub-theses explain the reduction of the influence of religion in society, through the decline of religious practice, or through migration of religion from the public sphere to the private one. Berger, when referring to the modernization and secularization, indicates that modernization is associated with secularization effects, but that it also conditioned many counter-secularization movements. 5 Existence of religion in the European public sphere is defined as postsecularism in scientific debates. 6 In the period of secularism, religion passes into the private sphere. Believers practice religion individually and in small or larger groups. In this respect it is defined as private, invisible to the public. However, post-secularism highlights precisely the public role of religion, its public practicing, public institutionalization, its power in general terms, found in public life in the local community as well as at the higher level. Habermas, while critically scrutinizing the thesis of secularization, believes that religious communities in Europe could obviously still require space in societies that are largely secularized. In his view, the public awareness in Europe could be described as post-secular, to the extent that today it must adapt itself to the continued existence of religious communities in an increasingly secularized environment. 7 The concept of civil society functionally determines the position of religious collectivities in modern society. The positioning in the civil sector enables it to develop independently, to act autonomously and from that position to be able to critically address the reality, whereby it will be able to gain and retain the confidence of the wider surroundings. This concept represents, according to the words of Casanova, an analytically theoretical and normative challenge of the liberal theories of positioning of religion in modern society as exclusively private. 8 The concept of religious collectivities as part of civil society has more an interpretative func-

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tion, but at times it turns into normative one. In this context, given the empirical “reality,” which confirms the fact that the state churches are less prepared to affect society as a whole, or to act as a sacred “sky,” 9 religious organizations of all kinds not only can, but also should act in the public space. Public religion emphasizes the public life of religion, focusing mainly on ethical issues and the participation in social policy. Herbert examines the relationship of religion and modernization, secularization, civil society, public religion, liberalism, and law. He specifically points out “the surprisingly great power of religion to adapt to changing social conditions.” 10 The main pillars of religion in the civil sector are individualization of faith and religious pluralism. Accordingly, individualization is the key segment of building a religious person, who possesses religious culture, primarily cognizance (knowledge of the faith) and the appropriate level of (individual and group) practice. Treating religion as a private matter of citizens is a principle solution of the position of the state toward religion in the civil society. 11 The modernization identifies the pluralism as “coexistence of different views and value systems, under conditions of civil peace and the conditions under which people come together.” 12 The modernization intensifies the process of pluralism on the religious scene. Religious pluralism is based on the existence of multiple religious collectivities, where an individual can choose their religion. Whether it would be the religion of their ancestors, their folk, or their nation or that of their neighbors or any other entity depends on their own choice, which can be directly linked to the impact of their religious or national collectivity. Religion in the period of transition or after the independence of the Macedonian state is becoming de-privatized. The ideological atheist determinant of Macedonian society in the period of socialism, 13 instead of contributing to the gradual “decomposition or withering away” of religion develops in the opposite direction; it is revitalized and gradually becomes more and more important. De-privatization obtains global dimension, and thus “religion leaves its determined place in the private sphere and passes into a not-defined sphere of the civil society, participating in the revitalized process of competition, interrupted legitimacy and re-marking of its boundaries.” 14 The positioning of religion as public assumes active participation of religious collectivities at three levels: at the state level, the political system, and civil society. The state determines the legal framework and possibilities of the existence and development of simply the life of “religion.” At the politics level, religious collectivities can fight for some positions, according to which they could affect the political developments. Typically, the main determinant of the first two levels suggests the basic defense and movement around the acquired privileges, while the third level is developed on the principle of social justice and defense of the human personality.

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Revitalization of religion, which occurs as a consequence or side effect of the social crisis, 15 shows the opposite trend in terms of secularization, noting that there is a constantly increasing interest in religion. It is visible after the fall of the atheist ideology in the post-communist countries where in simplified terms, the mundane perception of the world is increasingly replaced by the “holy” one. Religion in Macedonian society is revitalized and becomes a significant social entity, which is easily recognizable in everyday social life. In fact, it is being promoted within the nation. In some periods, especially supported by conflicts, religion becomes an identification marker of the nation. The national mark of the political developments in the region involves religion in the political segment, covering a significant level of the legitimacy of national politics. As it has been pointed out elsewhere, “[t]he national leaders of the Balkans . . . repeatedly emphasize the connection of threats to national identity to the threats to the Catholic—Orthodox—Muslim tradition.” 16 The national marker of religion, nested in identity frameworks, develops a stable foundation that conditions the gradual shaping of the strong national or confessional distance, within the community, that is to say everything that is Macedonian is Orthodox or everything Islamic becomes Albanian. The national marker also contributes to the development of strong and clearly defined networks that have a connecting social capital, capital that is based on similarity. The religious map of Macedonia is composed of two major collectivities; the existence of so-called traditional religious collectivities, present through several decades, and a range of minority religious communities of more recent date. 17 Current religious polarization of the Macedonian society is based on the existence of two dominant religious collectivities, Orthodox and Islamic, and minor presence of members of other religions, non-religious people, or atheists. What determines their specific positioning and stability is precisely their connectivity or foundation on ethnic grounds, which results in the possibility of the assumption that the highest rate of Macedonians are Orthodox, while the highest rate of Albanians are members of the Islamic collectivity. In fact, ethnic or national origin is a key factor by which religious polarization is performed. The ethnic dimension of the events resulting in the breakup of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) is visible in the ethnic and religious setting of contemporary Macedonian society. The 2001 conflict in Macedonia was not religious, 18 but religion played a very significant role in it. In this context, the conflict contributed to the “obvious shadowing” of the religiousness of the Macedonian population, which further strengthened its polarization on an ethnic basis. As time since the conflict gradually passes, it is assumed that the ethnic-based framework of religion in the Macedonian society will gradually decrease, and thus one needs to consider the positioning of Macedonian Muslims, Roma, and other ethnic groups, then the action (active missioning) of minority religious collectivities and the like.

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The action of these collectivities is evident, for example, with the Roma population which is characterized by several religions, such as Orthodoxy, Islam, and Protestantism. The religious polarization of the Macedonian society marks “the dominant cleavage between Macedonians and Albanians in terms of two ethnically, religiously, and linguistically separate segments that almost nowhere intersect except in the social status, and this intersection is not politically articulated for their ethnic separation in political organization and activity.” 19 In this context “the private interest instead of res publica,” 20 as a lever that unites Albanian and Macedonian politicians, is profiled. In the period after the breakup of Yugoslavia, after the independence of Macedonia, the transition streams of Macedonian society are more in favor of a political marriage in the Macedonian milieu dynamized by ethno-party elites. These premises very logically lead to the conclusion that ethnocracy “in lesser or greater extent continuously occupies the political system in Macedonia for two decades” 21 and that “democracy receives a dangerous competition in ethnocracy, not only in the government, but also in the civil society.” 22 In other words, that “ethnocracy threatens our young democracy, with tensions along ethnic lines and with struggle for political domination by their own ethnic groups, which holds hostage the reform dynamics.” 23 The emphasis on the ethnic basis of the restructuring of the political establishment, on the one hand, and on the other hand, the distancing from the concept of the former Yugoslav system, contributes to a more clear coloring of the religious polarization of Macedonian society. The political polarization that is developed on ethnic grounds stresses and conditions religious polarization, which basically profiles the statics of religious life of the contemporary Macedonian society. 24 More precisely, high rates of the religious and personal religious identification and the significantly lower rates of religious practice condition and remarkably affect the dynamics of the religious polarization of Macedonian society. Taking into account the characteristics of religiosity followed through the public role of religion and post-Yugoslav social and political context in which the Macedonian state is established, on one hand, as well as the ethnic structure, on the other hand, the basic thesis of this chapter is that the religious polarization undergoes a key impact or it is based on solid ethnic grounds. The intensity of religious polarization can be significantly affected by the sense of endangerment, which may occur as a threat to the religious or ethnic collectivity. When ethnic conflicts occur, the religious polarization gains more intensity. And later, as the conflict period passes, religious polarization is being reduced; therefore, opportunities arise for reviving religious pluralism and gradually developing and multiplying the minority religious potential. But, if on the surface other elements that may threaten the identity of any ethnicity or any religious community appear, religious polarization will probably be kept.

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INDICATORS AND CHARACTERISTICS OF THE DYNAMICS OF RELIGIOSITY OF THE MACEDONIAN POPULATION Statistical Indicators Statistical indicators refer only to the confessional and personal religious identification, and nationality. Data from the European Values Study and the empirical research on religiosity of ISPJR, despite confessional and personal religious identification, also contain data on religious practice. The creation of a database for statistical indicators on the religious affiliation of the population of the Republic of Macedonia starts with the census of 1991. 25 The 1991 census collected data on the religion of the population. 26 The following censuses were held in 1994 27 and 2002. The census of 2011 was stopped due to irregularities and this why it is not included in the analysis here. Table 7.1. Religion of the population of the Republic of Macedonia (absolute figures and percentages) Religion

Census 1991

Census Census 1991 1994 (%)

Irregular Census Census 2002 1994 (%)

Census 2002 (%)

Orthodox

1,355,816

66.66

1,283,689

66.3

1,310,184

64.78

Muslim

611,326

30.06

581,203

30.0

674,015

33.33

Catholic

10,667

0.49

7,405

0.4

7,008

0.35

Members of other religions (Protestants, Jewish, etc.) and atheists

56,756

2.79

-

-

-

-

Protestants

-

-

1,215

0.1

520

0.03

Others

-

-

-

-

30,820

1.52

Other or no religion

-

-

-

-

-

-

Members of religions not stated

-

-

2,786

0.1

-

-

Not religious

-

-

5,641

0.3

-

-

No response

-

-

22,891

1.2

-

-

Unknown

-

-

1,804

0.1

-

-

Christian

-

-

28,400

1.5

-

-

Total

2,033,964

100.00

1,935,034

100.00

2,022,547

100.00

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Table 7.2. Ethnicities based on the population censuses in the Republic of Macedonia Nationality a

Census 1991b

Census Irregular 1991 (%) census 1994

Macedonian

1,328,187

65.3

Albanian

441,987

Turkish

77,080

Roma

Irregular census 1994 (%)

Census 2002

Census 2002 (%)

1,288,330 66.5

1,297,981

64.2

21.7

442,914

22.8

509,083

25.2

3.8

77,252

4.0

77,959

3.8

52,103

2.6

43,732

2.2

53,879

2.7

Vlach

7,764

0.4

8,467

0.4

9,695

0.5

Serbian

42,755

2.2

40,228

2.1

35,939

1.8

Bosniak

-

-

7,244

0.4

17,018

0.8

Other, unknown, did not respondc

-

4.6

36,427

1.9

20,993

1.0

Did not respond

-

-

1,882

0.1

-

-

Total

2,033,964

100.00

1,945,932 100.00

2,022,547

100.00

a

Data for 1991 and 1994 are taken from table 7.1, from the paper of Dušan Bubevski, “The National Composition of the Population in the Republic of Macedonia in the Period 1948–1994, and Some Aspects of Interethnic Relations,” ISP JR Yearbook (1995), 8. b Due to the boycott of the Albanians in this census, the Statistical Office published the results according to their assessments. c It included several nationalities such as Greeks, Bulgarians, Egyptians, and others, which are given in this item as a set.

Generally speaking, in the planning and implementation of statistical censuses, as well as in the use of statistical data the socio-political conditions must be taken into consideration, because censuses in the period after the independence are largely politicized, resulting in boycotts, estimates based on statistical methodologies, acceptance or rejection of census results, and ultimately the inability to conduct the census in 2011. 28 Based on the analysis of official statistics, whether expressed in absolute numbers or percentages, there is a notable diversity among the dominant religious collectivities, which is primarily due to the aforementioned socio-political circumstances and atmosphere of the implementation of the censuses themselves, and the modification of the standards of the census. In the comparison between the last two censuses, it is noticeable that in absolute numbers there is a growth in the Orthodox religion, but the percentage has declined in comparison with the other religions, primarily with Islam. When comparing data of the Islamic collectivity, between the 1994 census and the census of 2002 there is a more noticeable

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difference which amounts to 7.33 percent, which also shows a growth in absolute figures. Certainly the reasons for these dynamics should be sought in the social and political conditions in which the census was conducted, then the declining birth rate primarily among the Macedonian population, and the high birth rate among the Albanian population, and subsequently there is a decline of the number of members of the Orthodoxy, and growth of the number of members of Islam. One should not neglect the unfavorable rates that follow the general migration trends among the entire population, especially the Macedonian. The position of Macedonians vis-à-vis the Muslim religion (Macedonian Muslims) is very important for the polarization of the dominant religious collectivities, Orthodoxy-Islam. During the censuses, due to the different pressures by other ethnic communities, one segment of the Macedonian Muslims declared themselves as Macedonians, some as Albanians, then Turks, Bosniaks, 29 Gorans, and so on. In other words, “a significant number of Macedonian Muslims do not distinguish between religion and nationality—they declare themselves as Turks,” but they do not speak Turkish, nor did their ancestors speak Turkish. 30 On the other hand, “a certain number of Macedonians of the Muslim religion from Western Macedonia, from the areas in which a significant number of members of the Albanian nationality lives, declare themselves as Albanians (for example, in the village of Labuništa),” 31 despite the fact that neither they, nor their ancestors knew or spoke the Albanian language. In Macedonia, “some organizations of Macedonians with Islamic religion led by Fiat Canoski, a member of the parliament, publicly rejected their previous nationality and declared themselves as Torbeshi.” 32 They, by the adopted Torbesh Charter at the First Torbesh Forum, demanded to be included in the preamble to the Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia, as a separate ethnic community, as Torbeshi. 33 Moreover, the Association of Macedonians with Muslim religion has been established and is actively engaged. 34 The various political options contribute to the occurrence of some illogical issues, certain controversies, and especially at the forums to the development of a harsh debate about their status, history, language, customs, and so on. 35 However, in this chapter we should note the fact that their numbers do not exist in the official statistics and that frequently, depending on the source, it is being “auctioned” with certain figures or simple estimates are made. Therefore, no quantitative indicators are listed for the Macedonian Muslims. The rate of Macedonians in the censuses is about 65 percent, and the rates of religion are somehow similar. One should not neglect the fact that in Macedonia the following nationalities declare themselves as Orthodox: Serbs, Vlachs, Bulgarians, Greeks, part of the Roma, and others. Whereas, according to the census results, the rate of the members of Islam is about 30 percent. Not only Albanians (in 2002, 25.2 percent identified themselves as Albanians) declare themselves as members of Islam,

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but also the Turks belong to Islam, then part of the Romas, Bosniaks, Macedonian Muslims, and others. In a comparative analysis of the data on ethnicity, religion, and mother tongue, Dimitrov highlights the absurd situation of Macedonians, namely, in the areas with Muslim Macedonians, in which the Albanian or Turkish language is introduced as a second official language, although the local population does not speak that language. 36 The difference of the declaration of national belonging of the category of Macedonian Muslims requires some fluctuations in religious polarization, since one segment of the Macedonian Muslims declare themselves as members of other ethnic communities. Overall, the statistic data sketch the downward trend in the rate of non-religious or the presence of other religions in the census of 2002. Through these data, the decrease in the intensity of secular trends, which are characteristic of the period of socialism and, of course, the period immediately after the independence of the Macedonian state, is certainly noticeable. However, in the last census considered, the column for modality without religion and others almost disappeared or decreased to a mere 1.52 percent. The slightly larger space that is given to the Macedonian Muslims in this chapter is due to their specific positioning in this polarization and naturally their response to the events and the impact of their national or religious collectivities. It depends on many factors to what extent their national feelings may prevail and give more importance to the Islamic religion, or whether they will gradually change to become less important within the given surroundings, and political trends. Also, we should take into consideration that their separate organization and functioning may give a significant feature to this collectivity, which can articulate their demands and set up as a separate and important entity on the social scene not only in Macedonia but also beyond, in the neighborhood or the region. On an ethnic basis, it can be also set as a landmark in the religious polarization of the Macedonian population. Empirical Indicators from the European Values Study The empirical data from the European Values Study are retrieved from its official website as well as from an article in which some data for Macedonia were also published. 37 Accordingly, quantitative data to determine the confessional identification, the personal religious identification, ethnicity, and religious practice are used. Table 7.3. Confessional (religious) affiliation of respondents of the European Values Study Religious affiliation

1998

2001

2008

Jewish

0.4%

0.1%

-

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Islam (IVZ and Community of 33.8% Bekteshi)

29.5%

19.3% (18.3% & 1.0%)

Orthodoxy

64.6%

69.4%

79.4%

Others

-

0.2%

-

Protestants

0.1%

0.4%

0.1%

Catholicism

1.0%

0.3%

0.4%

Jehovah’s Witnesses

-

-

0.1%

Buddhism

-

-

0.1%

No answer

-

-

0.7%

Total

100% (707)

100% (903)

100% (1,402)

At first glance, according to the European Values Study, the variable rate of members of various religious collectivities is visible in the survey sample. During the comparative analysis of responses to the question of confessional belonging, the obtained data suggest that with each subsequent wave of research, within the research sample, the rate of members of the Orthodoxy (from 64.6 percent in 1998 to 79.4 percent in 2008) is increasing. On the other hand, the rate of members of Islam which in the last period separated into two groups (Islamic Religious Community and the Community of Bekteshi), reduces. It is also noticeable that in the survey samples in different time periods, the cumulation of the dominant religious collectivities together are represented by high rates—98.4 percent in 1998, 98.9 percent in 2001, and 98.7 percent in 2008. In comparison with the census results they almost overlap with the data from 2002, 98.11 percent. 38 But when it comes to the representation of individual religious collectivities, such as the Islamic one, it gradually declines (33.8 percent, 29.5 percent, and 19.3 percent); here, as well, the deviations regarding the census are larger and move in a downward line, decreasing to 19.3 percent. As far as Orthodoxy is concerned, the situation then goes in the opposite direction; more precisely from 64.6 percent in 1998 it climbs to 79.4 percent in 2008. What is striking in the survey sample of 2008 is the presence of representatives of Jehovah’s Witnesses, Buddhism, and individuals participating in the study who did not declare their confessional belonging. Table 7.4. Personal religious identification of the respondents of the European Values Study Modalities

1998

2001

2008

Religious person

66.4%

84.1%

83.9%

Non-religious person

32.0%

15.6%

10.9%

Convinced atheist

1.6%

0.4%

5.2%

Total

100% (804)

100% (1,033)

100% (1,395)

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Figure 7.1. Personal religious identification of the participants in the European Values Study. Data from European Values Study.

Comparing the data for confessional and personal religious identification, a higher rate of declaration of belonging to a particular religion is notable. It probably indicates the relationship of the respondent with the appropriate confession or religion to which they may originate, live, or feel a belonging to. However, their individual feeling, their determination whether they are religious or not, shapes a slightly different profile. It is assumed that, for instance, if 98.7 percent reported that they belong to the dominant religious collectivities in Macedonia, they are religious at the same time. It is certain that in the “puzzle” of religiosity, the item according to which 10.9 percent of respondents declared themselves as non-religious, while 5.2 percent as convinced atheists stands out. Or 16.1 percent of the respondents identified themselves as non-religious and convinced atheists, but at the same time the greatest part of them said that they belonged to a particular religion. 39 On the other hand, when it comes to personal religious identification, the trend for the increase of the rate of religious people, compared to the non-religious or atheists, is notable. There has been a gradual decline of non-religious people, while the rate of convinced atheist rises to 5.2 percent. According to the European Values Study, for a period of three years from 1998 to 2001, the rate of religious people rises considerably by almost 20 percent. In the following period there was a stabilization in this category, slightly decreasing. But secular trends are visible in the movement of rates of non-religious people, which rapidly decreases from 32.0 percent through 15.6 percent to 10.9 percent in 2008. Dynamic category is the category of the convinced atheists, which from 1.6 percent in 1998, marks a fourfold reduction in three years, and then grows, reaching a rate

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of 5.2 percent in 2008. According to Gallup data, 40 which refer to the ten most religious populations in the world, Macedonia is in fifth place, because 90 percent of the respondents claim to be religious, 8 percent claim to be non-religious, and 1 percent as convinced atheists and with no answer (such as “I do not know”). 41 According to the data presented in Table 7.5 it is striking that the data from 2008 differ from the Gallup data, but are stabilized at less than 90 percent of respondents declaring themselves as religious. What is specific and what distinguishes the religiosity of the Macedonian population is, of course, its clear ethnic base. Table 7.5. Ethnicity of respondents of the European Values Study Ordinal No.

Ethnicity

1998

2001

1.

Аlbanian

20.9%

22.4%

2.

Roma

2.3%

1.5%

3.

Мacedonian

72.2%

71.0%

4.

Serbian

1.6%

1.9%

5.

Тurk

2.0%

2.1%

6.

Vlach

-

0.9%

7.

Others

1.0%

0.3%

Total

100% (995)

100% (1,055)

Comparing ethnicity with religious affiliation is difficult because the sample is significantly different concerning different questions. Nine hundred and ninety-five respondents declared their ethnic affiliation, while in the total result of religious affiliation there are only 707 respondents. However, the increase of the rate of Orthodox in the religious affiliation is evident, as well as a small decrease in the rate of Macedonian ethnicity. While the number of respondents who declared they belonged to Islam reduces, the number of Albanians by ethnicity grows. In terms of religious practice, data from the European Values Study for the three stages of research shows there is a considerable continuity in the fourth modality, which refers to the fact that respondents go to religious facilities only on special religious holidays. There is an increase and then a decline of the modalities that relate to more frequent visits, as more than once a week or once a week and the trend in the modality that describes visits as once a month is with considerable jumps at the beginning, and later on with small increases. The rate of respondents who go to religious facilities rarely or virtually never decreases as well. What is characteristic for the Macedonian religious group is that they only visit religious facilities on important religious holidays or key life events (birth, marriage, or death). Therefore, the Macedonian general re-

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Table 7.6. Religious practice of respondents in the European Values Studya

a

Modalities

1998

2001

2008

More than once a week

3.4%

10.2%

5.1%

Once a week

7.5%

11.3%

8.0%

Once a month

6.7%

11.3%

11.9%

Only on special religious holidays

46.6%

42.0%

47.1%

Once a year

6.8%

5.1%

6.3%

Very seldom

14.7%

13.0%

12.8%

Hardly ever

14.2%

7.0%

8.8%

Total

100% (995)

100% (1,055)

100% (1,485)

This analysis does not include ethnicity data for 2008.

ligious group is determined as traditional. Small rates of religious practice show inconsistency or irregularity, which follows the high rates of confessional and personal religious identification. The Macedonian population identifies itself with the religious collectivity, expressing itself primarily as religious, but in reality does not even behave in accordance with the “declared personal religious identity.” Empirical Indicators of the Research of ISPJR Religion in the empirical research conducted in ISPJR is examined several times, starting from 1970, 42 then in 1996, 43 1999, 44 2003, 45 2005, 46 ending with the public opinion survey from 2012. In the composition of the samples for each empirical study in which there was a section on religion, representativeness commonly referred to regional representation, then to gender structure or other indicators. Although religiosity was central to the study, entitled “Desecularization of the Macedonian society,” because the field part was implemented integrally with another project, and here in the compiling of the sample, the representation according to the census data on religion from 2002 was not separately featured. In this section, apart from quantitative indicators, qualitative indicators will be used as well. The elaboration will be performed through the prism, primarily of the latest survey, of 2012. While using the data of the research from 1970 we should consider the fact that the sample on which the study was conducted is not representative for Macedonia, but refers to a particular region. Analyzing the empirical data from the latest public opinion survey (2012), it is noticeable that the majority of respondents declare themselves as members of the Orthodoxy or Islamic religion and belonging to the Catholic or other religious collectivities in the Republic of Macedonia is followed by symbolic rates. Only 3.3 percent of

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135

the respondents stated that they did not belong to any religious collectivity. Table 7.7. Confessional affiliation of the respondents from the empirical research of ISPJR Confes- 1996 sional affiliation

1996 (%)

Muslim

237

1999

1999 (%)

2003

2003 (%)

2005

2005 (%)

2012

2012 (%)

20.99 246

20.5

316

21.6

316

26.3

316

31.6

Orthodox 881

78.03 938

78.2

1157

77.13 798

66.5

618

61.8

Catholic

2

0.18

6

0.5

13

0.86

2

0.2

17

1.7

Protestant

6

0.53

2

0.2

4

0.26

6

0.5

-

-

Some other religion

3

0.27

8

0.7

5

0.13

8

0.7

16

1.6

Do not belong to any of them

-

-

-

-

-

29

2.4

33

3.3

No answer

-

-

-

-

-

-

41

3.4

-

-

Total

1,129

1,200

1,500

1,200

1,000

The comparative analysis of the confessional identification in the previous studies suggests the trend that the dominant Orthodox religious collectivity is represented by a smaller rate with each following survey. While the rate for the second major collectivity, the Muslim group, increases with each following survey. 47 The data clearly show the high rate of positive religious identification, which suggests the large impact of these confessions on the development and structure of the Macedonian social community. The positive religious identification of this heterogeneous religious population speaks about the effect of confessions on the life of the Macedonian people and ultimately, in general, directly conditions the disintegration of the community on this basis, which is burdened with disputes, conflicts, particularly in the period after independence. The high rates of positive religious identification certainly suggest the public role of religion and the decline of secularization trends, 48 which are more typical for the previous social system. The confessional identification has an obvious symbolic and identity framework, which is due to the traditional religious life of the Macedonian people and above all the need to appoint a religious family milestone, which can be seen through the data from previous studies conducted in ISPJR. 49

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The second dimension through which the religiosity of the Macedonian population is being analyzed is the religious self-identification of the respondents. Modalities through which such questions are answered are by default represented by a slightly different vocabulary than in the European Values Study such as a believer, something in between, not believer, and, certainly, the modality “no answer.” The data for this type of a question can be compared to the corresponding ones in the previous research conducted in ISPJR. The comparison shows that in the period of the seventies in the Polog region, there is a relatively high rate of believers, 50 which increases by 10 percent in the post-communist period. The transition process in the pre-conflict period (2001) has the lowest rate of believers in the researched period (65.13 percent). However, after the period of the conflict in 2001, the rate of believers was growing extremely rapidly and peaked at 93.5 percent. In the last survey of 2012, that rate is reduced and stabilized around 77 percent. Through the fluctuation of the personal religious identification rates, the profiling of the religion in Macedonian society can be largely sketched, while measuring the pulse of the central event in the post-socialist period, the conflict in 2001.

Figure 7.2. Rates of believers in different periods of research (1970, 1996/2001, 1999/2000, 2004/2006, and 2012). Data from the research of the ISPJR.

Rates of self-determination of the personal attitude to religion are found as religious nominal rates, stressing the self-perception of citizens about their attitude toward religion. Another important dimension which is clearly visible from the data is the process of overflow of undetermined believers in the religious structure in 2006, and the later re-filling of the same category with 18 percent. To put it in a simpler way, as the believer’s category is growing and the

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137

modality of undetermined is reducing. Therefore, in the research in 2006 it has the lowest rate of 3.4 percent, 51 and the highest one in the preconflict period, at the end of the first decade of the transition period— 25.6 percent.

Figure 7.3. Rates of undecided respondents (something in between) in different periods of the research (1970, 1996/2001, 1999/2000, 2005, and 2012). Data from the research of the ISPJR.

A striking feature is the trend when crossing data on personal religious identification with data on education in the survey of 2012, that as the level of education is growing from primary to university education, so the rate of believers decreases. One hundred percent of those who have not completed their primary education declared themselves as believers, while the lowest rate of believers are with college or university education (70.4 percent). These data to some extent confirm the real effect of the atheist ideology or it is confirmed that the processes are changing slowly, and in the new social circumstances “the assumption to a certain extent continues to be valid,” as it is typical of modernism, that as the educational process develops, as science evolves, the rate of believers will gradually decrease. To a certain degree these data are in favor of this thesis, but the contemporary tendencies need to be explored in more depth. Indicative and noticeable is the approach of young professionals with higher education in religious collectivities; however, their effect should be perhaps, further and separately investigated. In the rates for personal religious identification, the regional characteristics are also reflected, separating the region of Skopje as a region that has seen the lowest rate of religious self-identification (63.6 percent). The rate of the believers who support the party that is part of the current government of Republic Macedonia is definitely high (83.1 per-

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cent), in contrast to the supporters of parties that are not part of the government, the rate of which reaches barely 13 percent. The high rates of confessional and individual religious affiliation are not followed in religious practice. Namely, in terms of practice, the Macedonian population is defined as traditional, which marks most important religious holidays (which become non-working days), at the same time a significant part of the population sometimes goes to the religious facilities (religious services), and marks the main events of their life. This is also the case with Orthodox believers and believers of the Islamic provenance. Table 7.8. Religious practice of the respondents from the empirical research of ISPJR On average, how often do you go to church/mosque/ religious facility?

Number of respondent s 1996/ 2001

1996/ 2001 (%)

Number of respondent s 1999/ 2000

1999/ 2000 (%)

Number of respondent s 2012

2012 (%)

Yes, I go regularly 279

24.71

275

22.9

118

11.8

Sometimes

559

49.51

527

43.9

363

36.3

On religious holidays

235

20.81

344

28.7

393

39.3

I do not recall

-

-

-

-

42

4.2

I never go

56

4.96

54

4.5

84

8.4

Total

1,129

1,200

1,000

Based on the data, the gradual increase of the rate of visits to religious facilities on religious holidays is quite remarkable. The occasional visit to religious facilities decreases from 50 percent to 36.3 percent. According to the comparative analysis the regular visits to religious facilities decreases as well to 11.8 percent. As far as this indicator is concerned, Macedonia is closest to Moldova (12.2 percent of believers go to church every Sunday) 52 and follows the European trends, noting relatively high rates of self-determination as believers, but with significantly lower rates of regular religious practice. According to this indicator of religiosity, Macedonian believers could be described as believers, but not actively to belong to a religion. 53 The religious practice of the Macedonian religious group is associated with the central events celebrating the life of every man, and the celebration of major religious holidays. It is interesting to note that during his last Christmas message, the Head of the MOC-OA Archbishop Stefan stated that he “scolded the believers because they do not attend religious services during holidays.” In the message, he pointed out that “our ancestors selected church holidays for the start of important national works, showing that celebration meant life and that life meant celebration.” This text refers to the fact that this is not the first time church management has discussed the poor practice of its believers. Part of the

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139

blame for poor church attendance in the Christmas epistle text is said to be found within the behavior of the church leaders who should return to the principles of the church because “the church somewhat fails to meet the people,” then there is also criticism, as the text suggests, about the luxury of church officials, the high prices of their services, and similar. 54 In general, religious practice as an important indicator of religiosity of the Macedonian population does not fit or remains inconsistent or inconstant with the high rates of confessional or personal religious identification. FUNDING AND DEVELOPMENT OF RELIGIOUS POLARIZATION OF THE MACEDONIAN SOCIETY The fundamentals and dynamics of the religious polarization are profiled taking into consideration the schemed main characteristics of the religiosity of Macedonian society. This is manifested through confessional identification, personal religious identification, and religious practice, as well as not marginalizing the influence of any of a variety of socio-political circumstances arising after the disintegration of Yugoslavia; certainly the newly shaped relations of the Balkan region in the immediate neighborhood, and beyond. The selected data sources, from statistical and empirical points of view in the European Values Study and the empirical point of view in the research of ISPJR, profile in their own way the basis and dynamics of the religious polarization of Macedonian society. The religious polarization is based on the level of Macedonian society as a whole; the inside religious stratification, fractions, currents, and movements, although appearing through the data, are not subject of this chapter. Religious Polarization Through Statistical Indicators The nature of statistical figures and analysis, especially placed in a sequence, can only refer to the trends or tendencies of how the declaration on religious or ethnic grounds has developed. However, in this context, we must consider the numerous controversies and debates that follow each conducted census in Macedonia in the post-Yugoslav social and political life, i.e., from its independence. On the other hand, comparing the basic indicators of the members of the Macedonian nation and the members of the Orthodoxy and of course the Albanians and members of Islam, deviations in each of the collectivities may be established. However, these aggregate data do not allow for in-depth analysis to indicate the etiology of such tendencies or deviations. In this analysis we cannot accurately analyze any trends of inter-categories such as the Macedonian Muslims, or people of the Macedonian or Albanian ethnicity who identified themselves as members of other religions, which are important for religious pluralism.

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Table 7.9. Comparative presentation of statistical data with deviations of national or religious affiliation Census 1991 Мacedonians 1,328,187 Orthodox

1,355,816

Аlbanians

441,987

Islam

611,326

+% -%

Census 1994

-2.04%

1,288,330 +0.4%

1,297,98 -0.01% 1

1,283,689

1,310,18 4

-27.7%

+% -%

Census 2002

442,914

-23.79% 509,083

581,203

674,015

+% -%

-24.47%

According to statistics viewed globally, there are relatively small deviations from the “ideal type” of Orthodox Macedonians (-2.04 percent for the census in 1991, +0.4 percent for the 1994 census, and -0.01 percent for the census in 2002), which have a tendency to further decrease. They are apparently higher in the ideal type Albanians-Islamists and generally tend to decline (-27.7 percent for the census in 1991, -23.79 percent in the 1994 census, and -24.47 percent for the census in 2002). In general, based on the presented statistical data, a tendency can be followed according to which the highest rate of declared Macedonians belong to the Orthodox religion, whereas the highest rate of Albanians belong to the Muslim religion. The creation and the development, that is the expansion of the minority religious collectivites, some of which are present for longer periods, and some are of a more recent date, according to the statistical indicators are minor and do not affect the religious polarization of the Macedonian society significantly. Religious Polarization through Data from the European Values Study Based on the analysis of the available quantitative data from the European Values Study from the three waves in which Macedonia was represented, the high rates of confessional identification of the Macedonian religious group can be observed. The tendency of the increasing rates of Orthodox religion in the research sample is quite striking, as well as the reduction of the rates of the Islamic members. But what is important for religious polarization is the fact that in cumulation, the dominant religious collectivites are represented with high rates, and those rates on a Macedonian level are almost identical to the statistics of 2002 which basically should serve as a framework for creation of the sample. The small presence of the minority religious or non-religious communities in the sample of the research in the last wave of 2008, accounts for only 1.3 percent. In the analysis of the data for personal religious identification, it may be observed that the rate of respondents who chose to belong to a partic-

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141

ular religion or confession is greater than the individual or personal religious affiliation. Although in the last wave of the European Values Study, 98.7 percent stated that they belonged to the majority religious collectivities in Macedonia or plus 0.7 percent to the minority, and that only 83.9 percent declared themselves as being religious. The difference between these items amounts to 15.5 percent. The contradiction is more evident with 1.61 percent of respondents who identified themselves as non-religious and atheists, who at the same time stated that they belonged to a particular religion. In this comparison a methodology observation or practice must be considered in the presentation of the data from the European Values Study that the total number of respondents varies from one question to another. Perhaps in these differences one may search for the part of the explanation for this tendency. Within the data from the European Values Study, tendencies for gradual increase of the religious rate and the reduction of the rate of nonreligious or atheists are being determined. But, what stands out in this large sample of 2008 conducted on 1,500 respondents are the oscillations in the rate of atheists, which from 1.6 percent in 1998 fell to 0.4 percent in 2001 and increased to 5.2 percent in 2008. The specificity that characterizes the religiosity of the Macedonian population is of course its ethnic conditionality. Due to the fact that this analysis lacks data for ethnicity for 2008, and there are differences in the total number of respondents for each survey question, we can only speak of a possible tendency. According to this, as far as the religious identification is concerned, the rate of Orthodox increases and the rate of ethnic Macedonians slightly decreases. When it comes to religious identification, the number of respondents who declared they belong to Islam decreases, while the number of respondents who declared themselves by ethnicity as Albanians grows. According to the data presented on religious practice, what makes it characteristic for the Macedonian religious group is that they visit religious facilities only on the occasion of the significant religious holidays. Therefore, it is usual to say that the Macedonian religious group is traditional. Generally speaking, according to the European Values Study, the Macedonian religious group almost completely identifies itself with its religious community, in that it differs a little when it comes to personal identification, but shows small rates of religious practice. On the basis of these features, and due to the lack of specific data on the ethnicity of the respondents, only likely trends of religious polarization based on ethnic grounds can be set. Religious Polarization through Data of the Empirical Research by ISPJR The religious polarization can be funded most precisely through the analysis of data from the empirical research of ISPJR. During the elabora-

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tion of this segment, as well as the quantitative, qualitative data will be used. After a brief determination of the basic features of the religiousness of the Macedonian religious group, complemented by selected fragments from the base of qualitative data, the emphasis will be placed on religious polarization, seen through the intersection of data on ethnicity and religion. The high rates of confessional identification indicate the importance that an individual attaches to their religious collectivity, to which they feel they belong or simply identify themselves with. 55 The confessional identification in the research samples moves to 99 percent in some studies, while in the last one it stays at 93.4 percent. The symbolic rate of members of other religions, except for the dominant, Orthodox, Islamic is remarkably striking. The rate of 6.6 percent of respondents who do not belong to any religion or simply did not answer this question is also not negligible. The personal religious identification reflects the relationship of the individual to the religion. 56 The profiling of a religious person definitely complements the religious practice, 57 as a clearly visible manifestation of identification with the religious collectivity or reflection of the personal religious identification. From the empirical research on religiosity, it shows that the rates in the confessional identification are the highest, that they are smaller when it comes to personal religious identification, and that they are the lowest when we talk about religious practice. These specific characteristics significantly influence religious polarization, rooted on an ethnic basis. Religious polarization in this section will be presented in phases starting with the last survey, from 2012. In this research the intersection of the ethnic and religious affiliation suggests that ethnic Macedonians by rule belong to the Orthodoxy, while members of the Albanian ethnicity, by rule belong to Islam. According to them, out of 640 Macedonians, 587 or 91.7 percent belong to the Orthodox religion, while that rate among the Albanian population is higher (from 248 respondents—Albanian, 246 were reported to belong to Islam, or 99.2 percent). Table 7.10. Ethnic membership

Intersection of ethnicity with religion in the survey of 2012. Orthodox

Macedonians 587

Мuslim

Catholic

Other

None

Total (Confession)

5

2

15

31

640 64.0%

Аlbanians

91.72%

0.78%

0.31%

2.34%

4.84%

100.00%

1

246

-

-

1

248 24.8%

Тurks

0.40%

99.19%

-

-

0.40%

100.00%

2

37

-

-

-

39

Religious Polarization of Macedonian Modern Society -

Other

5.13%

94.87%

-

-

28

28

15

1

143 3.9% 100.00%

1

73 7.3%

38.36% Total (Еthnic 618 membership) 61.8%

38.36%

20.55%

1.37%

1.37%

100.00%

316

17

16

33

1,000

31.6%

1.7%

1.6%

3.3%

Pearson Chi-square: 1056.67, df =12, p=0.001

Based on the intersection on the survey data in 2012, it can be concluded that participants with different ethnic backgrounds significantly differ in terms of their religious affiliation (p