Religion and Rebellion in Iran: The Iranian Tobacco Protest of 1891-1982 [1 ed.] 071461971X, 9780714619712

Table of contents :
Dedication
Contents
Note on Transliteration
Glossary
Bibliography
Preface
I Background
II Beginnings of Unrest
III The Large-scale Protests
IV Conclusion-The Aftermath of the Tobacco Protest
Appendix I
Appendix II
Appendix III
Appendix IV
Appendix V
Appendix VI
Index

Citation preview

RELIGION AND REBELLION IN IRAN THE TOBACCO PROTEST OF 1891-1892

RELIGION AND REBELLION IN IRAN The Tobacco Protest of 1891-1892

NIKKI R. KEDDIE

FRANK CASS & 1966

co.

LTD.

This impression first published in 1966 by Routledge FRANK CASS & CO. LTD. This edition published by Routledge - 2012 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon, OX14 4RN 711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business Transferred to Digital Printing 2005 Copyright ©1966 Nikki Keddie ISBN: 978-0-714-61971-2 (hbk) ISBN: 978-1-136-26018-6 (ebk)

TO MY PARENTS

CONTENTS

page ix

Note on Transliteration Glossary

xi

Bibliography

xiii

Preface

xix

1 35

I Background II Beginnings of Unrest

65

III The Large-scale Protests IV Conclusion-The Aftermath of the Tobacco Protest

114

Appendices I

136

II

141

III

145

IV

148

V

152

VI

155 157

Index

vii

A NOTE ON TRANSLITERATION AND ON PERSIAN PERSONAL TITLES IN general the system of transliteration follows the pronunciation of the Persian word rather than indicating through diacritical marks what Arabic letter is represented. Arabic letters with identical pronunciation in Persian are not distinguished. The letters 'ain and hamza are both represented by an apostrophe, or, when unpronounced, as at the beginning of a word, not at all. Some words that have become current in English in their Arabic, or modified Arabic, form, have been left that way: i.e., fatwd, Muslim, imam, ulama, kdfir, not fated, Moslem, emdm, olama, kdfer. Persian governmental and other important figures were, until recently, generally known by their titles rather than by given names. When the text lists a man's title after his name, the title is put in italics; otherwise it is in Roman type: i.e., Yahya Khan Moshir od-Dowleh, but (the) Moshir od-Dowleh.

ix B

GLOSSARY UNLESS otherwise indicated, the first spelling is transliterated from the Persian, and the parenthetical spellings are some alternatives found in documents quoted in the text.

Andarun. Harem: the inner quarters of a house or palace reserved

for women, small children, and eunuchs. Bdbi. A follower of Sayyed Ali Mohammad of Shiraz, who in

1844 declared himself to be the gate (bab) to the twelfth imam. He subsequently began to preach a new, millenarian dispensation. In 1863 the Bdbis split into two branches: the Azalis who retained most of the original teachings, and the Baha'is, who changed them in a moderate and internationalist direction. Bast. Asylum, sanctuary (usually in a shrine). Caliph. (Ar., Pers. Khalifa). For the Sunni Muslims, leader of the entire Muslim community. Traditionally the caliph had to come from Muhammad's tribe, but increasingly, from 1774 on, the Ottoman Sultans claimed to be the caliphs of the entire Muslim world. Dastkhatt. Handwritten document (command, decree, letter, etc.) Farman. (firman) Royal command, order, decree. Fatwd. (Ar.), (Pers.fatva). Authoritative opinion or decree given, among Shi'ites, by a mojtahed. Hejri. Dating from the migration (Ar. hijra) of Muhammad from Mecca to Medina in a.d. 622. Imam. In Shi'i usage, the title of the hereditary successors of Muhammad through the line of his son-in-law, Ali. Imam Hosain. The third Shi'i imam, killed in battle near Karbala, Iraq, which thenceforth became a leading Shi'i shrine city, along with nearby Najaf, site of the tomb of Hosain's father, Ali. Imam Jom'eh. The leader of the communal Friday prayer in the leading mosque of each city. The chief governmental appointee among the ulama of each city. Imam of the Age. In Twelver Shi'i usage, the twelfth and last imam who disappeared over 1000 years ago and will return at the end of time as the mahdi (messiah). Jehdd (Ar. jihad). Holy war, war against infidels. xi

RELIGION AND REBELLION IN IRAN

Kdfir. (Ar.) (kafar). Infidel, unbeliever. Malek ot-tojjdr. "King of the Merchants", the title of the head of

the merchant or guild organization of each city. M.esqdl imuskdl). A weight; about 5 grams. M ojtahed. The highest religious appellation in Iranian Shi'ism, held by those who have achieved the highest degree of religious scholarship and whose right to be called mojtaheds is recognized by their peers and followers. M ojtaheds may give authoritative opinions on questions of religious law. M olld. A man with a religious education who carries out the functions for which this education has prepared him. Qandt (kanat). Underground irrigation canal. Ra'iyat (rayyat, rayot). Subject(s), common people, peasant(s). Ramazdn. The 9th month of the Muslim year, during which fasting is prescribed from dawn to sunset. Sayyed (Ar. Sayyid). Descendant of Muhammad. Serdt, Path to paradise. Shaikh (sheikh). Learned man, elder. Shari'a (shariat). Law of God, Muslim law. Shi'a (Ar.). The minority group within Islam who believe that succession to leadership within the Islamic community passed by heredity in the family of Muhammad's son-in-law, Ali. One branch of Shi'ism has been the state religion of Iran since ca. 1500 a.d. Shi'i. Adj. from shi'a. Sunni Islam. The majority branch of Islam, whose followers hold that succession to the leadership of the Muslim community, or caliphate, passed not by hereditary succession among the descendants of Muhammad, but by other means. There are also legal and doctrinal differences between the Sunnis and Shi'is. Tanbdku (tonbaku). Tobacco: usually water-pipe tobacco, as distinct from tutun, pipe tobacco. Twelver Shi'ism. That branch of the Shi'ites whose last imam was the twelfth, who is said to have disappeared but will return as the mahdi (messiah) at the end of time. The state religion of Iran. Ulamd (Ar. pI. The plural "ulemas" in some of the documents is a redundancy.) Religious scholars, teachers, and jurists. Vaqf, (Ar. waqf). Unalienable endowed property, pious foundation..

xii

BIBLIOGRAPHY I.

GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS: France. Archives du Ministere des Affaires EtrangeresPerse, 1890-1896. Government of India. Political and Secret Home Correspondence, vol. 97. Great Britain, Parliament. Sessional Papers, (1873), LXXV, C. 803; (1891), LIX. (1892), LXXIX, C. 6707, Correspondence respecting the Persian Tobacco Concession, pp. 205-297. Great Britain, Public Record Office. Documents in the following series: F~O. 60, 371. Original diplomatic despatches to and from Persia. F.O. 65. Original despatches to and from, or pertaining to, Russia. Some despatches from, or pertaining to, Persia are to be found here and not in the F.O. 60 series. F.O. 248, 251. Archives of the British Embassy in Tehran. F.O. 539. Confidential Prints, Persia materials. F.O. 800/14. Lascelles Papers. Hertslet, Sir Edward. Treaties and Conventions concluded between Great Britain and Persia and between Persia and other Foreign Powers. London, 1891. Parliamentary Debates, 4th Series, IV, (3 May to 26 May, 1892), pp. 1944-1961.

'II.

BOOKS AND ARTICLES IN WESTERN LANGUAGES: Afghani, Jamal ad-Din, Refutation des materialistes. Trans. A. M. Goichon. Paris, 1942. Anonymous, (Mirza Aqa Khan Kermani), "Controverses persanes," trans. A. L. M. Nicolas, Revue du monde musulman, XXI, (December, 1912), pp. 238-260. Avery, Peter W., Modern Iran. London, 1965. Banani, Amin, The Modernization of Iran. Stanford, 1961. Basetti-Sani, G., "Sayyid Jamal ed-Din at-Afghani: Saggio sul suo concetto della religione," Orientalia Christiana Periodica, XXV, 1-2 (1959), pp. 5-34. xiii

RELIGION AND REBELLION IN IRAN

Bausani, Alessandro, Persia Religiosa. Milan, 1959. Bent, J. Theodore, "Village Life in Persia," The New Review, V, (1891), pp. 355-366. Berkes, Niyazi, The Development of Secularism in Turkey. Montreal, 1964. Blunt, Wilfrid Scawen, Gordon at Khartoum. London, 1912. Brockway, Thomas P., "Britain and the Persian Bubble, 1888-1892," Journal of Modern History, XIII, 1 (1941), pp.36-47. Browne, Edward G., "Bab, Babis," Encyclopedia ofReligion and Ethics, II. New York, 1926. Pp. 299-308. - - - - - , Materials for the Study of the Bdbi Religion.

Cambridge, 1918. -----,

The Persian

Revolution of 1905-1909.

Cambridge, 1910. - - - - - , The Press and Poetry of Modern Persia.

Cambridge, 1914. - - - - - , A Year Amongst the Persians. London, 1893. Churchill, Rogers Platt, The Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907. Cedar Rapids, Iowa, 1939. Cottam, Richard W., Nationalism in Iran. Pittsburgh, 1964. Curzon, George N., Persia and the Persian Question.

London, 1892. II vols. Davison, Roderic, Reform in the Ottoman Empire, 18561876. Princeton, 1963. Eastern and Western Review (Diya al-Khiifiqain). Trans. and ed. by Habib Anthony Salmone, London, 1892. Feuvrier, Dr. (Jean-Baptiste), Trois ans a la cour de Perse. (New edition). Paris, 1906. Fraser, James B., Historical and Descriptive Account of Persia. New York, 1843. Frechtling, L. E., "The Reuter Concession in Persia," Asiatic Review, XXXIV, (July, 1938), pp. 518-533. Frye, Richard N., Iran, New York, 1953. Gibb, H. A. R. and Harold Bowen, Islamic Society and the West, I, 1, 2. London, 1950, 1957. Gibb, H. A. R., Modern Trends in Islam. Chicago, 1947. Gordon, Sir Thomas E., Persia Revisited. London, 1896. Greaves, Rose Louise, "British Policy in Persia, 1892-1903," Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies University of London, XXVIII, 1 (1965), pp. 24-33;

XXVIII, 2 (1965), pp. 284-307. xiv

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- - - - - , Persia and the Defence of India, 1884-1892. London, 1959. Haim, Sylvia, Arab Nationalism. Berkeley, California, 1962. Hourani, Albert, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 17981939. London, 1962. Kazemzadeh, Firuz. Advance copy of MS. on AngloRussian relations in Iran and Central Asia. - - - - - , "Russian Imperialism and Persian Railways," Russian Thought and Politics, IV. Cambridge, Mass., 1957. Pp. 355-373. Keddie, Nikki R., "Afghani in Afghanistan," Middle Eastern Studies, I, 4 (1965), pp. 322-349. - - - - - , "British Policy and the Iranian Opposition: 1901-1907," (brief version in Proceedings of the 1964 Congress of Orientalists, New Delhi; longer version to appear elsewhere). - - - - - , Historical Obstacles to Agrarian Change in Iran. Claremont, California, 1960. - - - - - , "Religion and Irreligion in Early Iranian Nationalism," Comparative Studies in Society and History, IV, (April, 1962), pp. 265-295. - - - - - , "Symbol and Sincerity in Islam," Studia Islamica, XIX, Paris, (1963), pp. 27-63. Kedourie, Elie, "Nouvelle Iumiere sur Afghani et 'Abduh," Orient, 30 (1964), pp. 35-57; and 31 (1964), pp. 83-106. - - - - - , "Further Light on Afghani," Middle Eastern Studies, I, 2 (1965), pp. 187-202. Kosogovskii, V. A., Iz tegeranskogo dnevnika polkovnika v. A. Kosogovskogo. Moscow, 1960. Lambton, Ann K. S., "Dustur; iv, Iran," Encyclopedia of Islam. (New edition), II. Pp. 649-657. - - - - - , Islamic Society in Persia. London, 1954. - - - - - , Landlord and Peasant in Persia. London, 1953. - - - - - , "Persian Political Societies 1906-11," St. Antony's Papers, No. 16, London, (1963), pp. 41-89. - - - - - , "Persian Society under the Qajars," Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society, XLVIII, 2 (April, 1961), pp. 123-139. - - - - - , "Secret Societies and the Persian Revolution of 1905-6," St. Antony's Papers, No.4, London, (1958), pp.43-60.

xv

RELIGION AND REBELLION IN IRAN

- - - - - , "The Tobacco Regie: Prelude to Revolution," Studia Islamica, XXII, Paris, (1965), pp. 119157; and XXIII, (1965), pp. 71-90. Lamsdorf, V. N., Dnevnik V. N. Lamsdorfa (1886-1890). Moscow, 1926. Landau, Jacob M., "Prolegomena to a Study of Secret Societies in Modern Egypt," Middle Eastern Studies, I, 2 (1965), pp. 135-186. Landes, David S., Bankers and Pashas. London, 1958. Lantenari, Vittorio, M ovimenti religiosi di liberia e di salvezza dei popoli oppressi. Milan, 1960. Lewis, Bernard, The Emergence of Modern Turkey. London, 1961. - - - - - , The Middle East and the West. London, 1964. Malcolm, Sir John, The History of Persia from the Most Early Period to the Present Time. (New edition, revised). London, 1829~ II vols. Malcom Khan, "Persian Civilization," Contemporary Review, LIX, (February, 1891), pp. 238-244. Mardin, Serif, The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought. Princeton, 1962. 'Marlowe, John, Anglo-Egyptian Relations, 1800-1953. London, 1954. Meyendorff, Baron A. (ed.), Correspondance diplomatique de M. de Staal (1884-1900). Paris, 1929. II vols. Minorsky, Vladimir, "Iran: Opposition, Martyrdom, and Revolt," in G. E. von Grunebaum (ed.), Unity and Variety in Muslim Civilization. Chicago, 1955. Pp. 183206. Mochaver, F., L'etolution des finances iraniennes. Paris, 1938. Newspaper clipping collection, private, covering Iran, 1889-1906. Cited are articles from the Daily News, Financial Standard, Globe, Manchester Guardian, Pall Mall Gazette, Revue Diplomatique, Times, Truth. Qajar, Ali Khan, Zahir od-Dowleh, "Assassinat de Nasred-Dine Chah Kadjar," Revue du monde musulman, XII, (December, 1910), pp. 591-615. - - - - - , "Tarikh-i mukhtasar-i sakhikh-i bi-durug Ali..k hana Kadzhara Zahir od-Doule Safi Ali-shakha," Ocherki po istorii russkogo vostokovedeniia, V. Trans.

xvi

BIBLIOGRAPHY

into Russian by Iu. E. Borshchevskii. Moscow, 1960. Pp.63-115. Rawlinson, Sir Henry, England and Russia in the East. London, 1875. Rosen, Friedrich, Oriental Memories of a German Diplomatist. London, 1930. Safran, Nadav, Egypt in Search of a Political Community. Cambridge, Mass., 1961. Shuster, William Morgan, The Strangling of Persia. New York, 1912. Smith, W. C., Islam in Modern History. Princeton, 1957. Stroeva, L. V., "Bor'ba iranskogo naroda protiv angliiskoi tabachnoi monopolii v Irane v 1891-1892 gg," Problemy istorii natsiona/'no-osvobodite/'nogo doizheniia v stranakh Azii. Leningrad, 1963. Sumner, Benedict H., Tsardom and Imperialism in the Far East and Middle East, 1880-1914. London, 1942.

Taqizadeh, Sayyed Hasan, "The Background of the Constitutional Movement in Azerbaijan," Middle East Journal, XIV, (Autumn, 1960),trans. by Nikki R. Keddie, pp. 456-465. Thornton, A. P., "British Policy in Persia, 1858-1890," English Historical Review, LXIX, (October, 1954), pp. 554-579; and LXX, (January, 1955), pp. 55-71. Upton, Joseph M., The History of Modern Iran: An Interpretation. Cambridge, Mass., 1960. von Grunebaum, G. E., Modern Islam. Berkeley, 1962. Warriner, Doreen, Land and Poverty in the Middle East. London, 1948. Watson, Robert Grant, A History of Persia: From the Beginning of the Nineteenth Century to the Year 1858.

London, 1866. Wilson, Samuel G., Persian Life and Customs. Edinburgh and London, 1896. Wolff, Sir Henry Drummond, Rambling Recollections. London, 1908. Vol. II. III.

PERSIAN ARTICLES, BOOKS, AND DOCUMENTS: Afghani (Asadabadi), Sayyed Jamal ad-Din, Maqdldt-e jamdliyeh. Tehran, 1933. Afshar, Iraj, and Asghar Mahdavi (eds.), Majmu'eh-ye asndd va maddrek chap nashodeh dar bdreh-ye Sayyed

xvii

RELIGION AND REBELLION IN IRAN

Jamal ad-Din mashhur be Afghani (Documents inedits concernant Seyyed Jamdl-al-Din Afghani). Tehran, 1963. Amin od-Dowleh, Mirza Ali Khan, Khdterdt-e siydsi-ye Mirza Ali Khan Amin od-Dowleh. Ed. H. FarmanFarmaian. Tehran, 1962. Asadabadi, Shaikh Lotfollah Khan, et ale Sharh-e hal va dsdr-e Sayyed Jamal ad-Din Asaddbddi ma'ruf be "Afghani". Tabriz, 1327/1948-9. Karbala'i, Shaikh Hasan, Qardrddd-e rezhi 1890 m. Ed. and introd. by Ebrahim Dehgan. Arak, Iran, ca. 1955. Kasravi, Ahmad, Tdrikh-e mashruteh-ye Iran. (2nd edition). Tehran, 1319/1941. Kermani, Mirza Aqa Khan, Correspondence with Malkam Khan. Bibliotheque Nationale, Oriental Mss., Supplement Persan, No. 1996. Kermani, Nazem ol-Eslam, Tdrikh-e biddri-ye Irdniydn. (2nd edition). Tehran, n.d. Malekzadeh, Mahdi, Tdrikh-e enqeldb-e mashrutiyyat-e Iran. Tehran, n.d. Vol. I. Malkam Khan, Qaniin (1890-1896). Molk Ara, Abbas Mirza, Sharh-e hal-e Abbas Mirza Molk Ara. Ed. Abdol Hosain Nava'i, Tehran, 1325/1946-7. Taimuri, Ebrahim, Tahrim-e tanbdku. Tehran, n.d. Taqizadeh, Sayyed Hasan, "Sayyed Jamal ad-Din," Kdoeh, II, (1921), No.3, pp. 5-11; and "Takammoleh," Kaveh, II, (1921), No.9, pp. 10-11.

xviii

PREFACE THIS MONOGRAPH is the first book to result from a larger project, undertaken in 1959, on the background and course of the Iranian Constitutional Revolution of 1905-1911. As often happens, the sources for this larger undertaking turned out to be unexpectedly rich, so that instead of one book, several are now projected. The present work analyzes and gives details about a movement which was the most important precursor of the Constitutional Revolution. The next book, now nearing completion, is a full biography and analysis of Sayyid Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani (1838/9-1897), the Pan-Islamic leader whose career spanned the entire Middle East and Muslim India. In the 1880's and 1890's he helped awaken the Iranians, contributing significantly to the tobacco protest of 1891-1892, and his ideas and tactics were adopted by many of the leaders of the Constitutional Revolution. Subsequently, the immediate background and early years of the Revolution will be discussed. Earlier versions of this monograph were read by Professors Amin Banani of the University of California, Los Angeles, Firuz Kazemzadeh of Yale, and Elie Kedourie of the London School of Economics. To all of them I am most grateful for their intelligent and helpful suggestions, and for freely given assistance going far beyond their careful criticism of the manuscript. Many thanks are also due to Professor Gilbert Lazard of the Ecole des Langues Orientales Vivantes, Paris, and Heshmat Moayyad of the Istituto Orientale of Naples, who helped me with difficult Persian correspondence; and to research assistants: Dr. John Reudy, now of Georgetown University, who helped incorporate footnote material into the text; and F. T. Foley and Shannon Stack of V.C.L.A., who checked the footnotes, and helped with proofreading and indexing. I would also like to thank my publisher, Frank Cass, for his aid and encouragement. All of these people gave invaluable assistance; while errors and defects which remain are my own. Financial help for the larger project of which this book is a part was generously given by several sources. I am most grateful to the Social Science Research Council for a post-doctoral fellowship to Iran and Europe in 1959-1960; to Professor G. E. von Grunebaum and the U.C.L.A. Near Eastern Center for travel

xix

RELIGION AND REBELLION IN IRAN

grants to Europe in the summer of 1962 and 1964; and to the John Simon Guggenheim Memorial Foundation for a Fellowship in 1963-1964. I wish to express special thanks for the unfailing helpfulness and courtesy of the library staffs of the libraries I used in Oxford, Cambridge, and London-particularly that of the London School of Oriental and African Studies. I would also like to express deep gratitude to a number of persons who have shared freely of their outstanding intelligence and knowledge and contributed immeasurably to my work over the past several years. Chief among these are Professors G. E. von Grunebaum of U.C.L.A.; Joseph R. Levenson of the University of California, Berkeley; Albert Hourani of S1. Antony's College, Oxford; Bernard Lewis and Ann K. S. Lambton of the London School of Oriental and African Studies; T. Cuyler Young and Martin Dickson of Princeton; H. A. R. Gibb, Richard Frye, David Landes, and Benjamin Schwartz of Harvard. So many other colleagues and friends have given significant aid and encouragement that it would be impossible to record my debt of gratitude to all of them.

Los Angeles, California December, 1965.

xx

Chapter I BACKGROUND THE MOVEMENT against the concession of a Tobacco Monopoly to an English company which took place in Iran in 1891-1892 presents in microcosm many of the features which were to reappear in the Persian Constitutional Revolution of 1905-1911. Although the movement has been discussed in various Persian and Western works, no analysis of it has yet appeared in a Western language which draws attention to the complex political factors which found expression in this successful mass rising, and to its relations to the later development of Iranian political life. * Some indication of its importance can be seen in the following points: The protest against the tobacco concession was the first successful mass movement in modem Iranian history, and led to a defeat of the government and triumph of the protesters in their demand for a total cancellation of the concession. This success undoubtedly gave courage to the conscious opponents of the government and of foreign encroachments, and led many to see for the first time that it was possible to defeat the government, even on a matter involving European interests. The movement involved the first successful alliance between the ulamd, modernizing reformers, and the discontented population of Iran, particularly the merchants-an alliance which was to reappear in later protests and to come to fruition in the Constitutional Revolution. The movement also marked a watershed in Iran's foreign relations. The government, having tried to rely on Great Britain in the late 1880's, could no longer resist the increasing pressure of Russian power. The same prime minister who had been known for his Anglophil policies had his position so shaken by this opposition movement that he saw no alternative, if he were to save his post, to coming to terms with the Russians, which he did immediately after the tobacco fight was lost. Later he became notorious for his Russophil policies, and when, after a period out of office he was recalled in 1907 as prime minister, he was assassinated by extreme • This monograph was written before the author had a chance to consult Ann K. S. Lambton's article on the tobacco movement in Studio Islamica, beginning in No. XXII (1965).

1

RELIGION AND REBELLION IN IRAN

revoluntionaries who considered him a tool of Russia. * The transition to Russophil government brought a significant change in the opposition-whereas the tobacco protest had been supported by the Russians as a lever against the Anglophil policies of the government, later it was the British and not the Russians who occasionally had a hand in protest movements, and who, for example, gave money to a leader of the ulama, Sayyed Abdollah Behbehani, early in the twentieth century to be used to encourage a religious movement against a further Russian loan.' The tobacco protest was also a watershed in Persian financial history, since up to that point the Persian government, through heavy taxes, grants of concessions, and neglect of public works or expenditures, had been able to avoid foreign debt. Compensation to the English company for the cancellation of the concession was paid through the contraction of the first foreign loan, a £500,000 loan from the British-owned Imperial Bank of Persia. This was to be followed by larger and more onerous loans from Russia which were also spent unproductively and which finally led to the acute financial crisis that was one of the immediate causes of the Persian Revolution. Many of the points discussed would have developed even in the absence of a tobacco concession, but the latter brought many trends to a head and pointed the path to the future. The tobacco concession both increased and gave focus to a series of discontents which had been accumulating in the nineteenth century. Eyewitness accounts of foreigners make it clear that the Qajar dynasty had been extremely unpopular from its beginnings. In addition to their arousing the skepticism and hostility with which the Iranians have reportedly regarded rulers for many centuries, considering them, with some justice, to be motivated only by desire for self-enrichment and power, the Qajars were a particularly unattractive lot-for the most part cruel, reactionary, and having minimal concern for the welfare of the population. From the early nineteenth century on there were many observers who expected the dynasty to be overthrown soon, and later British observers sometimes implied • As will be shown in my book on the Iranian Constitutional Revolution, Mohammad Ali Shah probably helped instigate this assassination, as he considered his Prime Minister too accommodating to the constitutionalists, but the Shah sought and found willing assassins among the extreme revolutionaries, and it was the revolutionary group which rejoiced at the assassination.

2

BACKGROUND

that the main reason why the dynasty lasted so long in face of universal discontent was that it was in essence propped up and its position guaranteed by Great Britain and Russia. As in other Asian countries where treaty privileges had been obtained from weak governments, the European powers had a vested interest in the continuation of a dynasty which had granted them special rights that might not be recognized by a successor. When one ruler died, for example, peaceful succession of the heir apparent was assured by a show of military force on his behalf by the British and/or the Russians. 2 However much and however sincerely the British may have spoken of a desire for reform in Iran, they also wanted the ruling dynasty and their own vested interests to remain intact, so that they were unwilling to support the only kind of movement which had a real interest in reform-a nationalist one which would demand financial independence and economic selfdetermination. When such a movement actually appeared in the course of the Constitutional Revolution the British finally opposed it. British hostility to Morgan Shuster in 1911, for example, was not based only on a desire to placate the Russians, but also expressed opposition to a nationalist movement which would ignore British interests and privileges." Dislike of the reforming 'ultra-nationalists' or 'extremists' runs through the British diplomatic correspondence during the Revolution. Russian hostility to nationalist reformers was even greater. The above point indicates that there was an interconnection between Qajar misrule, popular discontent, and the activities of foreign governments in Iran. One can also speak of the Western impact in a more general sense as a motive force of discontent. The problems to be discussed existed to some degree in all Asian countries which felt Western influence in the nineteenth century, but the situation of Iran was in some ways particularly unfortunate because it had the worst of both worlds-the economic and social dislocations brought by Western impact were experienced without partial compensation in the form of government reform, modernization, and efficiency. The existence of the Western powers made possible increasing exploitation by a government already noted for its almost purely exploitative interests. At the same time the West formed a model to be emulated for reformers as well as a threat to be feared by both reformers and conservatives. In this situation it is not surprising that popular discontent came to a dramatic head. 3

RELIGION AND REBELLION IN IRAN

Aside from its effectsin propping up an unpopular government, the nineteenth century Western impact appeared in various ways, including a degree of modernization and intellectual awakening. For the immediate origins of the tobacco boycott most important was the widespread granting of concessions. While traditional Asian governments had been somewhat limited in their exploitative possibilities, perhaps by fear of overthrow and certainly by the amount of cash and goods they could actually extract from their populations, both these limits were weakened in the nineteenth century. On the one hand the European powers more or less guaranteed the continuation of the dynasty, and on the other European concessionaires and lenders offered ready cash immediately, while repayment was made to appear easy and distant. The Midas touch of European lenders and concessionaires was all-pervasive. It helped bring Egypt to bankruptcy, European financial, and finally political, control; the Ottoman Empire was put largely under European financial control because of inability to repay debts; and Iran was ultimately brought to the brink of revolution partly from the same cause. To an Asian ruler accustomed to consider the accumulation of large sums as a primary goal the temptation was almost irresistible. Thus we find Naser ed-Din Shah piling concession on concession once he had discovered the trick. The series of concessions, chimerical and practical, successful and abortive, granted by Naser ed-Din Shah, have often been listed and it would take too long here to go over their whole, often incredible, history. For the background of the tobacco movement it is perhaps sufficient to concentrate on the extraordinary Reuter concession, which called forth a protest movement foreshadowing the larger revolt of 1891. The concession negotiated in 1872 by Baron Julius de Reuter, of news agency fame, with the encouragement of some members of the Iranian government, has been vividly and accurately summarized by Curzon as follows: When published to the world, it was found to contain the most complete and extraordinary surrender of the entire industrial resources of a kingdom into foreign hands that has probably ever been dreamed of, much less accomplished, in history. Exclusive of the clauses referring to railroads and tramways, which conferred an absolute monopoly of both those undertakings upon Baron de Reuter for the space of seventy years, the concession also handed over to him the exclusive working 4

BACKGROUND

for the same period of all Persian mines, except those of gold, silver, and precious stones; ... the exclusive construction of canals, kanats, and irrigation works of every description; the first refusal of a national bank, and of all future enterprises connected with the introduction of roads, telegraphs, mills, factories, workshops, and public works of every description; and a farm of the entire customs of the empire for a period of twenty-five years from March 1, 1874, upon payment to the Shah of a stipulated sum for the first five years, and of an additional sixty per cent. of the net revenue for the remaining twenty. With respect to the other profits, twenty per cent. of those accruing from railways, and fifteen per cent. of those derived from all other sources, were reserved for the Persian Government. Such was the amazing document that fell like a bombshell upon Europe just before the Shah started upon his first foreign journey in 1873.4 After travelling to St. Petersburg and London, where he found the Russian government hostile to the concession and the British government lukewarm, the Shah returned home to find a protest movement, verging on revolt in some areas, directed against the concession and the prime minister who had suggested it. The Shah yielded to force majeure and cancelled the concession on a technicality. Russian and local protests were factors which were to combine again at the time of the tobacco concession. Their operation in 1873 has been variously described, with some sources stressing Russian pressure on Naser ed-Din Shah during his visit to St. Petersburg and Russian intrigue in Iran as the main reasons for cancelling the concession, while others stress local opposition." On the whole the description given shortly after the event by Rawlinson still holds up. Speaking of the Grand Vizier who thought up the scheme of granting an exclusive concession to a single foreign company, Rawlinson says: He miscalculated the serious character of Russia's opposition; he miscalculated the extent of England's indifference, and above all, he failed to appreciate the determined-the almost indignant -resistance of his own countrymen ... . . . the Shah, indisposed to the concession by the pressure exerted against it in Europe, acted under 'force majeure' in his final act of authority; for the popular feeling against the surrender of his royal powers into the hands of foreigners which had been fanned and fed, directed and intensified, during 5

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His Majesty's absence in Europe, by certain powerful malcontents at court, declared itself so strongly on his return that it could not be prudently resisted. It is indeed a matter of notoriety that the Shah's crown was in jeopardy for some weeks after his return to Persia, an insurrection in the capital being imminent, and the two declared objects of the public rancour being the .Grand Vizier and the Reuter concession, on both of which heads His Majesty was compelled to yield, before he could venture to leave his palace and resume his ordinary avocations of pleasure or of business. The Shah hurried his return to Persia in consequence of rumours of intrigue and disaffection, and he had no sooner landed on the shore of Ghilan than the threatened explosion took place. Elements of opposition, discordant in their nature, but each of considerable power had confederated to force the Grand Vizier from office, and for the first time in the present reign the authority of the sovereign was set at naught. 6 Whatever the relative strength of the factors involved in cancellation, there is no doubt that the Reuter concession called forth an internal protest which shook the Iranian government and forced the Shah to act in ways distasteful to himself. In many ways the story of the Reuter concession foreshadows the more dramatic history of the tobacco movement. In both cases greed for royalties and bribes caused the Shah and high officials to sign away important Iranian resources to British concessionaires for relatively small sums. In both cases the Russians were aroused both to direct protest and to intrigues with the opposition. In both cases the Iranian opposition involved a heterogeneous group whose only real point of accord was opposition to the sale of Iran to foreigners. Religious and other conservatives who opposed any influx of Christian Westerners and their customs helped lead the anti-foreign feeling of the masses, and both patriots and disgruntled elements at the court joined the opposition. As noted by Rawlinson: The malcontents ... consisted of the following dissimilar parties and factions. Firstly, the reigning Sultana ... who was bitterly incensed against the Grand Vizier.... Secondly, the fanatical party-headed by the Ulema and the Finance Minister -who repudiated any attempt to Europeanize Persia, and denounced the Grand Vizier on this account as a traitor to his country. Thirdly, the Princes of the Blood.... Fourthly, the 6

BACKGROUND

Russian party in a body, guided by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, who was, moreover, a personal rival of the Grand Vizier's; and fifthly, the so-called national party, inspired and led by Ferhad Mirza who had been left by the Shah as Regent at Teheran, and who, although naturally of an enlightened, humane, and thoughtful disposition, and throughly loyal to his sovereign, had been nevertheless provoked almost to frenzy by the threatened Reuter monopoly of Persian industry and commerce. Before these antagonists the Grand Vizier fell and for a time it was even doubtful if the tragedy of 1852 might not be repeated; but the danger was only temporary. 7 The successful opposition to the Reuter concession, unlike that to the tobacco concession, had its way cleared by the fact that the British government refused to back Reuter's unrealistic scheme. Another difference between the two situations is that the tobacco movement took place two decades later, when Iranian nationalism was beginning to be expressed by a small group of modernists and reformers, and Iranian merchants were also far more directly involved in the second movement than in the first. The prime minister who backed Reuter's concession was a modernizer, and his opponents were mostly reactionary, whereas during the tobacco movement the leading modernizers in the central government and elsewhere were an important part of the opposition coalition. It was the tobacco movement, not the protest against the Reuter concession, which was the first profound mass movement in Iran, but the coalition which supported the tobacco movement owed something to the earlier victory against the Reuter concession. In general, concession-hunting in Iran was a game of speculators and adventurers, out for quick profits, whose wits were matched against those of wily courtiers and the Shah, who equally wanted to get as much money with as little trouble as possible. Serious plans for productive economic enterprises seem to have played a very minor role on either side, and since both the British and the Russians often brought pressure on the Persian government not to grant concessions to the nationals of other countries, or at least not to allow actual construction to take place, it is not surprising that very little economic development came out of the feverish concession-granting activity. 8 The adventurist character of the concessionaires and the fact that the only results of their activity were usually negative combined to reinforce

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traditional prejudices against European Christians. Curzon with his usual vividness describes the concession-granting atmosphere in Iran from 1865 to 1890: It was said at the time of the Reuter Concession that one of the reasons for confiding powers so enormous to a single individual or to a single company, was the desire of the Persian Government to escape from the conflicting offers of a horde of foreign speculators, who, ever since the opening of the Indo-European Telegraph in 1865, had settled down upon Persia, and were clamouring for a share in the division of the spoils. For a time the collapse of the Reuter scheme frightened away these harpies; but as confidence was re-established, and more especially when, under the friendly pressure of the British Government, concessions such as those for the navigation of the Karun river and the Imperial Bank were granted, they began to reassemble; and on the return of the Shah from his last European journey a crowd of these interested applicants descended like a flight of locusts upon Teheran. The air was full of rumours of concessions for the exclusive introduction, or manufacture, or growth of wine, sugar, glass, telephones, electric light, and in one instance for a monopoly of all agricultural produce! To a temperament and to tastes such as those of the Shah, these proposals are peculiarly seductive; for, in any case, they mean the payment of a lump sum down to his own account; if successful, they augment the annual revenue; and if the reverse, they only implicate foreigners in failure. . . . The first concessionary usually thinks of little but selling his monopoly, and realising a good profit for himself. He is not uncommonly an adventurer, and sometimes a rogue. By the failure of such bogus undertakings, good capital is frightened away from the country, and the natives themselves form an unfavourable impression of European conduct and honesty. 9 Arguing against official encouragement of concessionaires, a British official visitor in 1891 noted: an influx into Persia of European adventurers, whose only object has been to obtain from the Government privileges which they could forthwith part with for cash to European speculators, while the Shah himself has been tempted to introduce a system of indiscriminate granting of Concessions for monopolies. . . . the inhabitant of the country is not likely to benefit much in the long run by the encouragement of such 8

BACKGROUND

enterprises, and it is to be feared that a reaction may ensue alike disastrous to the national influence as to the pockets of the shareholder, when it is found that the only means of making ends meet is to raise the price of the particular article of commerce for which the Concession has been granted.!? The concessionaires of course claimed to have Iran's interest at heart. For example, in writing to the F.O. in September, 1872 to ask it to protect his interests, Baron de Reuter said that his interest in the concession was to promote the economic and social development of Iran and forward British national interests. No such crass interest as making money was breathed of in this eloquent exposition.P Although they sometimes commented on the shady character of even their own concessionaires, British diplomats in Iran after 1888 generally welcomed the efforts of their nationals to seek concessions and were more inclined to support than to admonish them. Those who stress the often-voiced British desire for reform in Iran should note also that many Britishers, and notably Sir Henry Drummond Wolff, had a naive Victorian confidence that opening up Iran to foreign commerce and industry would automatically bring progress and reform, and favored concessions on these grounds. Concession granting was thus a cause of Iranian discontent even before 1890. Concern was intensified in 1888-89, during the vigorous ministry of Sir Henry Drummond Wolff, with the opening of the Karun River to navigation and the launching of the British owned Imperial Bank of Persia, which also was given the exclusive mining rights of the Reuter concession. When, in 1890, a concession granting full monopoly control over the production, sale, and export of all tobacco in Iran was granted to a British concessionaire, it was seen as a further sign that the country was being sold to foreigners. Particularly when employees of the Tobacco Company swarmed to Iran in 1891 and numerous merchants and growers were made to meet their terms, the direct effect of such a concession on people's lives and economic interests was felt as never before. It was thus resented not only on religious and nationalist grounds, but also because of its interference with people's lives and livelihood. For many reasons the time was ripe for protest. Naser ed-Din Shah, who. had ruled since 1848, had become increasingly autocratic, reactionary, and money-loving in his later years. Compared 9

RELIGION AND REBELLION IN IRAN

to other Asian rulers of the time, his reform efforts were minimal. Even the usual first step of conservative reformers-army improvement-was lacking in Iran. Aside from the small Russiantrained Cossack Brigade the army was essentially a paper organization which existed for the purpose of providing large sums of money and commissions for a few influential men, including the Shah's third and favorite son, head of the army and governor of Tehran, Kamran Mirza Ndyeb os-Saltaneh. Large sums were appropriated for the army, but what troops did exist were virtually unpaid and unarmed, and had to make their living by following a trade in the town where they were stationed. These troops, like other unpaid or underpaid employees of the government, were often more a source of discontent than of protection. The other 'modernized' aspects of the government, such as the ostentatiously introduced Council of State, were generally equally mythical in significance.12 Governorships and other high posts were up for auction, often annually, and the governors, who were usually stronger locally than the distant shah, similarly subfarmed local offices. This system seems to have become more oppresive in the nineteenth century. The European impact opened new avenues to profit, such as the export of raw materials, as well as new uses for large incomes, such as European luxuries and trips abroad, so that incentives to exploitation, though never lacking, were probably increased. At the same time European protection and loans were extended to private individuals, and this enabled them to operate with more than usual impunity. In addition, religious feeling against the government was clearly on the increase through the nineteenth century. The reasons for this have not been studied, but it is clear that the Qajars never had the religious aura or control over the religious classes which characterized the Safavids, who had established Twelver Shi'ism as the state religion of Iran. The tendency of this religion to regard all merely temporal rulers as usurpers, while legitimate rule, pending the return of the twelfth imam, can only be exercised by those leaders of the ulama who are competent to interpret his will, came to the fore in the nineteenth century. The location then of the chief ulama in Ottoman Iraq put them beyond the power of the government, and made a split between the ulama and the government, and an independent policy by the ulama, easier in Iran than in other Islamic countries. Mass discontent was reflected by the ulama, who were themselves resentful of the 10

BACKGROUND

growing power of unbelievers in trade and government, and who feared possible absorption by European powers. As Ann K. S. Lambton notes, speaking of the oppositional secret societies in Iran in the years after 1896: ... their members seem to have been drawn predominantly from the middle ranks of the 'ulamd. . .. As long as the overthrow of the state by violence was not contemplated ... it was natural that the leaders of any movement for reform should come mainly from the religious classes, and natural too that the efforts of any group aiming at reform should strive to win over those classes in the first instance. It is true that many of the latter were obscurantist, that they often made common cause with the official classes in exploiting the people, and that in so far as they received stipends from the state their independence was limited. But in spite of these factors the religious classes enjoyed more respect than any others; and since some of their leaders at least acted as a shield for the people from the exactions of the government, it was to them the people looked for protection. The religious classes further had a virtual monopoly of the dissemination of learning through the religious colleges and schools, so that the people also looked to them for guidance; and the intuitive clinging of the common people to Shi'ism made it almost inevitable in any case that the mullds should be their natural leaders. 13 Naser ed-Din Shah's encroachments on the legal and other powers of the ulama also alienated them from his government.':' Discontent was also focused on the Prime Minister, the Amin os-Soltan. A clever and able man who led the Persian government for most of the period from 1882 until his assassination in 1907, he followed an opportunistic policy directed mostly toward keeping himself in power. To do this he acceded to the Shah's desires to acquire money and avoid trouble, by accepting numerous concessions and loans. All-powerful with Naser ed-Din Shah, he naturally attracted a host of enemies at court who resented the curtailment of their previous or potential power and income. At the same time both the reformers and the religious party opposed him for carrying out the (Shah's) policy of granting concessions and influence to foreigners. His youth, his Georgian origin, his humble birth, and his scant regard for Islamic orthodoxy were all seized on by his opponents.

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Ranged in opposition to the Amin os-Soltan, who had helped turn the government from its former Russophil policy to a more Anglophil one, were also the Russian government and its local representatives. The rapid succession of the Imperial Bank concession, the agreement to open the Karun river to navigation, and the tobacco monopoly caused alarm among the Russians. Although the Russians succeeded in forcing counter-concessions, they felt the British were gaining the advantage. * They were thus prepared to throw in their lot with the opposition in order to change the orientation of the Iranian government as well as to try to cancel the tobacco concession. Many were the Persian officials who, out of partiality to the Russians, dislike of Amin os-Soltan, or both, were willing to support, or be neutral toward, an opposition movement which, although it threatened their own government, might be useful to curb Amin os-Soltan and the British. Some specifics about the Russian campaign to change Iranian policies by unseating Amin os-Soltan can be found in the archives of the French Foreign Ministry in this period. In many cases these provide direct reports from the Russians concerning their activities. In March 1890 the Russian charge d'affaires, Speyer, confided to his French counterpart details of his intrigues to overthrow the Amin os-Soltan.!" Speyer told of his irreconcilable enmity to the Amin os-Soltan, whose temporary absence from Tehran 'he has exploited to set in motion, against him, a whole series of rather bizarre intrigues, which do more honor to the fertility of his mind than the delicacy of his scruples.' Speyer had himself told of these intrigues, and also that he considered the fall of the Amin os-Soltan indispensable for restoring Russian influence. At this point Speyer believed that the Amin os-Soltan was so tied to Wolff that any agreement with him was impossible,

* Iranian concessions to Russia in 1889 to compensate for concessions to the British, and the continued Russian anger over the latter are documented in F.O. 539/41, 42, and 43. Firuz Kazemzadeh, MS. on AngloRussian relations in Iran and Central Asia, transport chapter, notes that the Tsar was also angry at the Shah because Russian Intelligence had intercepted British telegrams proving that the Shah consulted Wolff on all matters and told him of (the Shah's) negotiations with Dolgorukii, the imperious Russian Minister. The British documents show that the Shah, probably for his own protection, did communicate constantly with the British about his dealings with the Russians, usually through the Amin os-Soltan. The later also sometimes made revelations not authorized by the Shah. 12

BACKGROUND

and that since the British had engaged in intrigues it was right for the Russians to do so. Speyer related that women were first used against the Amin os-Soltan, Two women of high position were directed to incite the Shah's favorites against his Prime Minister. The women used were two whose husbands had ties to the Russians-a daughter of the Shah who was married to the Minister of Justice (Yahya Khan Moshir od-Dowleh) and the wife of the Minister of Press (E'temad os-Saltaneh). When this assault failed, Speyer tried· another route. Late at night when the Shah had long been asleep a man in the livery of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs came to the palace, saying he had an urgent letter from his Ministry for the Shah. This Ministry was the only one given the right to present notes to the Shah at any hour, provided they were pressing matters of foreign affairs. A servant took it to the Shah, and when the Shah opened it he found it to be 'a most insolent factum against his Grand Vizier, a factum in which, not content with denouncing him in the most bitter terms, the Shah was threatened with vengeance against himself ifhe hesitated to break with him.' When the Shah sent to find the bearer of the message he had disappeared, and it was later determined that he had no connection with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Russians also made use of an ulama-led protest against the British in Isfahan. On this matter, the French representative reported of Speyer: 'In the intrigues of the Russian representative, still on his own avowal, the ulama should play an important role for which its bitter jealousy against all innovations, its fear of Protestant proselytism ... particularly designs it.' Speyer had also said quite accurately that the Grand Vizier's youth, his plebeian origin, and his great power had all made him many enemies, among whom the strongest were the Minister of Posts [the Amin od-Dowleh] and the Minister of Justice [the Moshir od-Dowleh]. He claimed that these two 'were the first to offer themselves as instruments to the Russians. The Vizier and the English Minister were naturally not slow to realize the campaign being prepared against them, and both are naturally very preoccupied with it.' The day before Wolff had complained of Speyer's maneuvers, had said that the Russian attitude was intolerable, and that Russia should remember that England had shown her power against Russia at San Stefano and might in the future enter the Triple Alliance.!" This despatch is interesting for the light it sheds on Russian intrigues with the opposition,

13

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but it should be realized that these intrigues became less blatant when Speyer's superior, the diplomatic Biitzov, who replaced the blustering former minister, Prince Dolgorukii, arrived. Wolff's behavior here as elsewhere was rather peculiar, from the point of view of the representatives of nations other than Great Britain. On the one hand he was pushing to the utmost British and other foreign commercial enterprises in Iran, and at various times expressed his view to the French and others that this was being done largely in order to encourage a greater degree of foreign resistance to a possible Russian takeover of all or part of Iran. At the same time both his despatches and his memoirs show that he saw himself as an architect of possible Anglo- Russian accord, possibly justifying this contradiction on the basis that Russia would become so worried by British advances in Iran as to want to come to some agreement. As indicated above, he went around making threats to the Russians in the same period that he was engaging them in talks about an Anglo-Russian agreement. Wolff's activity, largely planned and supported by the Foreign Office,was one cause of the outbreak of an anti-concession movement which helped bring about a decline in British influence. It is also probably true that Wolff's absence on account of illness at the time the movement broke out, when British affairs were in the hands of a charge d'affaires, weakened the British position.!" The above French despatch is one of several indications that working with the Russians against the Amin os-Soltan and his policies were such influential figures as the liberal and reformminded Minister of Posts and head of the Council of State, the Amin od-Dowleh; the ex-Foreign Minister, now Minister of Justice, Yahya Khan Moshir od-Dowleh; and the Minister of Press, the E'temad os-Saltaneh. The Russians had also established contact with some of the leading ulama, particularly in such religious cities as Tabriz and Isfahan. Since, as noted below, the Russians also had ties to the most influential anti-governmental agitator, Sayyed Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani, they were in a position to work effectively with several different types of influential persons in Iran when the opportunity arose to encourage mass opposition to the granting of concessions to the British. Reformers and liberals inside and outside the Iranian government were also opposed to the policies of the Shah and his prime minister. There existed a small group of men with some knowledge of European conditions who hoped to reform and 14

BACKGROUND

strengthen the Iranian government against imperialist encroachments. Since English concessions then appeared to be the bigger danger to Iran, many of these men followed a 'pro-Russian' policy. After the government became Russophil the same or similar men became 'pro-British', while from the time of the Anglo-Russian Treaty of 1907 through the First World War the Iranian nationalists were often 'pro-German'. In all these cases the label is misleading, the policy of the nationalists being based more on the principle 'the enemy of my enemy is my friend' than on any fundamental or permanent alliance of interest or principle. Even Sayyed Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani, who to British officials was a Russian agent, and who had indeed travelled to Russia in 1887-89 to talk to leaders there about common action against England, was apparently not motivated by any basic pro-Russian feeling. IS If the alliance of Russians and reformers was a strange one, so was that between the radical reformers and the ulama, Indeed perhaps nowhere does the maxim that politics makes strange bedfellows find better illustration than in Persia from 1890 through 1911. The creation of an alliance between the ulama leaders and reformers was a tactic begun by Sayyed Jamal ad-Din at-Afghani, achieving its first success in the tobacco movement, and carried on through the Iranian Revolution. Advanced reformers were willing to put their own liberal, freethinking, or heretical notions into the background in order to achieve an active alliance with ulama leaders against the government. Afghani and others recognized that only the ulama were powerful and influential enough to lead a successful mass movement, in the absence of widespread demand for modernization, and that the use of religious language and appeals was necessary to move the masses.P There were, too, many reformers who were sincere Muslims and their feelings were also considered by the more radical. The true nature of Afghani's life and activities has been distorted in .the various biographies of Afghani, nearly all of which trace ultimately to biographical notices by his Arab disciples and admirers, who generally reported what Afghani wanted the public to believe about his life, religious beliefs, and activities. Independent research shows that Afghani was far from being the religious figure he tried, for tactical reasons, to present to the Islamic world in his later years. It can now be proven how much Afghani distorted the facts about his life, probably influenced by Islamic esoteric and philosophical traditions which indicated that what

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is useful to tell the public may be something other than the literal truth. Thus Afghani was not, as he claimed, born in Sunni Afghanistan, but in Shi'i Iran. Through most of his life he was consistent in working for the independence of Muslim states from foreign rule, but his emphasis was almost always particularly anti-British, perhaps because of early experiences in India. The tactic of presenting himself as an orthodox figure and of working with the ulama seems to date particularly from about 1881, when Afghani wrote the Refutation of the Materialists and began to try to get in the good graces of the pan-Islamic Ottoman Sultan, Abdul Hamid. During his two stays in Iran in the period 18861891 Afghani established contact with some of the leading ulama as well as with various radicals and reformers, and the pointedly Islamic tone of even documents emanating from the radicals during the tobacco movement surely owes something to Afghani's influence.P'' The tobacco movement was made to order not only for Afghani's religious tactics, but also for his anti-British proclivities. Afghani's activities regarding Iran from 1886 through 1892 can now be well documented, thanks to a recently published Persian catalogue of his papers plus Persian and British eyewitness accounts. Although Afghani was born and raised in Iran, and returned there at least once, in 1865-66 before going to Afghanistan, many Iranians heard of him first when he published the Arabic newspaper al-' Urwa al- Wuthqd in Paris. Documents in the new catalogue include letters from various Iranians praising this newspaper and requesting copies. Among the writers of such letters was the Iranian Minister of Press and Publications, the E'temad os-Saltaneh.P- According to the recently published memoirs of the Amin od-Dowleh, the E'temad os-Saltaneh, who used to translate foreign newspapers for the Shah, translated the anti-British al-iUrwd al-Wuthqd for him. The Shah, perhaps tired of British pressure and preachings, was pleased enough to have the E'temad os-Saltaneh invite Jamal ad-Din to Tehran. 22 The Amin od-Dowleh implies that this invitation was made while Jamal ad-Din was outside Iran, but other Persian sources indicate that he was invited to Tehran after the E'temad os-Saltaneh was informed that Afghani had come to the southern Iranian port city of Bushire, in 1886. It seems probable that Jamal ad-Din came to Bushire without any special intention of staying in Iran, but rather on his way to Russia, where he had been invited by the prominent Russian 16

BACKGROUND

chauvinist editor and publicist, Katkov, who apparently saw Jamal ad-Din in Paris. That Jamal ad-Din planned to go to Russia in 1886 is indicated by information that reached the British Foreign Office.P Also, in a careful note about Jamal ad-Din's Russian stay, one of his companions there, Mirza Sayyed Hosain Khan Adalat, says: 'After the stopping of 'Urwa al-Wuthqd Sayyed Jamal ad-Din set out for Petrograd, but on the urging of E'temad os-Saltaneh, Naser ed-Din Shah desired to meet him.'24 Jamal ad-Din's last recorded adventure before he reached Bushire may have reinforced his already fiercely anti-British bent. This was a scheme fathered by Wilfrid Blunt to have Jamal ad- Din accompany Sir Henry Drummond Wolff on his mission to Istanbul and Egypt to try to achieve a settlement of the Egyptian and Sudanese problems. Wolff talked with Afghani and then rejected the idea, and Afghani left England in a huff in November, 1885. 25 From then until his appearance in Bushire in May, 1886, his whereabouts are undocumented. Abbas Mirza M olk Ara, a liberal and modernizing brother of Naser ed-Din Shah, says in his memoirs that Afghani before coming to Iran had been in Najd (or Aden),26 and he may in fact have been in Arabia toying with his occasional scheme for an Arab caliphate. This might explain the choice of Bushire as a stop on the road to Russia, though it may also have been chosen because Afghani's students had sent his books there after his expulsion from Egypt in 1879. According to one eyewitness account, the reason Jamal ad-Din stayed in Bushire for several months was ill health.s? The son of Jamal ad-Din's host in Bushire writes that Afghani arrived there in May, 1886, and that in August a telegram arrived from the E'temad os-Saltaneh on behalf of the Shah inviting Jamal ad- Din to Tehran and including the substantial sum of 1000 tomans. In the same month Jamal ad-Din set out for Tehran via Shiraz.P" On his way to Tehran Jamal ad-Din stopped in Isfahan and talked with Prince Zell os-Soltan, the oldest and most powerful son of Naser ed-Din Shah, who at this time ruled most of Southern Iran. Jamal ad-Din stayed with the Zell os-Soltan's friend, Hajji Sayyah, a landowner from the Mahallat region. The latter had travelled extensively (Sayyah means 'the traveller'), had apparently met Afghani in Egypt, and had corresponded with him about al-'Urwa al-Wuthqd.i" Hajji Sayyah considered himself a modernizer and had dealings with Afghani's more radical 17

RELIGION AND REBELLION IN IRAN

followers; although some suspected he was working mainly for the succession to the throne of the Zell os-Soltan."? The latter, although the Shah's eldest son, was not crown prince because of his mother's low birth. Some Persian accounts tie Jamal ad-Din to the Zell os-Soltan's ambitions to succeed his father. Jamal ad- Din's companion in Russia, Adalat, who is usually accurate, says: After the stopping of 'Urwa al-Wuthqd Sayyed Jamal ad-Din set out for Petrograd, but, on the urging of E'temad os-Saltaneh, Naser ed-Din Shah wanted to meet him, and while the Sayyed was on his way to the Iranian court he met with the ZeU osSoltau, He stayed in Isfahan a month and a half. Although he did not describe his interviews with Zell os-Soltan to me personally, however, from a number of his reports along with an examination of some facts about his stay in Isfahan that have been told to me, I deduce that the late Sayyed expressed a part of his opinions which were in accord with the thoughts of the Zell os-Soltan to him, and on certain points a unity of views was achieved, so that from that date the ZeU os-Soltan assumed the expenses of his stay in Petrograd.P! Probably basing himself partly on this report, Sayyed Hasan Taqizadeh says in his rather careful biography of Afghani in the Persian newspaper Kdoeh: In Isfahan he saw Zell os-Soltan, who honored the Sayyed in the hope of becoming crown prince and Shah and even, it is said, later when the Sayyed went to Russia, sent him money in the hope that he would influence the leaders of the Russian government in his favor. 32 It must be admitted that the recent Afghani catalogue contains no record of correspondence or money from Zell os-Soltan, while it does show that Afghani's Tehran host, Hajji Mohammad Hasan Amin oz-Zarb, sent him money in Russia. The Amin oz-Zarb was a prominent merchant who was making a fortune out of farming the Persian mint and issuing depreciated coinage, and was a client of the very powerful prime minister, the Amin os-Soltan, Afghani was apparently put in touch with the Amin oz-Zarb by his hosts in Isfahan, the Amin oz-Zarb's city of origin.?" The E'temad os-Saltaneh's diaries show him angry that Jamal ad-Din chose to stay not with him but with the Amin oz-Zarb, and that the Shah chose the Amin oz-Zarb instead of him to bring Afghani to a royal audience.i" His entries

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indicate that at this time Jamal ad-Din and his introduction to the Shah were considered matters of some importance at court. Both the E'temad os-Saltaneh and the Amin od-Dowleh note that soon after Jamal ad-Din arrived in Tehran he revealed that he was not an Afghan, but was from the village of Asadabad, near Hamadan in Iran.:" Just as a mythical Sunni Afghan background was useful for Afghani in Sunni countries, it may be assumed that Afghani found it more useful when in Iran to avow his Shi'i and Iranian origin. Exactly what Afghani expected to do at the Iranian court is unclear. According to the Shah's brother, Molk Ara, the E'temad os-Saltaneh had told the Shah that Afghani's presence was needed to help him write the official newspaper, Iran, and a history of Iran.P" Afghani fairly clearly expected the Shah to give him some important duty, though it is doubtful that the Shah had any such intention, various Arab biographers of Afghani to the contrary notwithstanding. Both Molk Ara and Amin od-Dowleh, who were at court at the time, agree that Afghani displeased the Shah on his very first interview, shortly after his arrival. According to Amin od-Dowleh at this interview Afghani offended the Shah by speaking of the need for law, order, and reform in Iran.:" According to Molk Ara, Afghani said he was like a sharp sword in the Shah's hand; and whatever important work the Shah would give him, or against whatever government he would throw him, Afghani would be a powerful weapon. The Shah took fright at this manner of speech and did not invite him again.P" The Amin od-Dowleh, whose admiration for Afghani was not unqualified, gives the best account of Afghani's considerable influence in Iran and its causes. Like other witnesses, the Amin od-Dowleh notes that many Persians of all classes came to hear Afghani on this visit to Iran. He says that Afghani's knowledge of practical and theoretical matters was far from perfect, and was mostly based on a powerful memory; and that most of what he said was repeated from others and from newspapers. However, in a country like Iran, where the Shah had deliberately left the people in darkness and superstition, his knowledge was by comparison tremendous. Since he was also, as universally attested, an extraordinarily powerful and magnetic speaker to both large and small groups, he was able to have a considerable influence on nearly all who heard him. According to the Amin od-Dowleh, Afghani spoke of the need for law and for the recognition of 19

RELIGION AND REBELLION IN IRAN

human rights; freedom of thought and the press; and security of life and property. The longer he stayed in Iran the more clearly he saw how bad conditions were there, and he spoke openly to his friends against the government. His enemies told the Shah what he was saying, and the Amin os-Soltan, a friend of the British, also worked against him.s" A similar but briefer account of Afghani's speaking to large numbers of people of the need for freedom and reform is given by Molk Ara. 40 Afghani was probably the first person to speak either so openly or so eloquently on such matters in Iran. Both Molk Ara and the Amin od-Dowleh think the British Minister helped influence the Shah to exile Afghani in 1887 (as well as in 1891). There is no documentary evidence of this. The British Minister does not mention Afghani's 1887 visit in his despatches, while the British Foreign Office was at this time addressing inquiries about Afghani to Russia, under the misapprehension that he had gone there in 1886.41 The mistake of Molk Ara and the Amin od-Dowleh about the British Minister should not discredit the rest of their stories, as it was a common error. The Amin os-Soltan and the Shah were fond of justifying their acts by attributing them to inescapable foreign pressures. Afghani also frequently blamed the British for his troubles. The Shah evidently felt it difficult directly to exile someone whom he had invited to Iran, and so suggested to the Amin oz-Zarb that he convince Afghani to leave. 42 Afghani was probably willing to go, since he still had Katkov's invitation to Russia, which was a better base for the anti-British part of his schemes than was Iran. In any case, Afghani left Tehran in late April, 1887, having been in the capital about four months. He went with the Amin oz-Zarb to Mazanderan, and then to the Caucasus, and arrived in Moscow early in the summer of 1887.4 3 Katkov's newspaper, the Moscow Gazette, began to publish articles about him almost immediately upon his arrival; and Jamal ad-Din wrote to the Amin oz-Zarb that Katkov had arranged for him to meet the Tsar.v' Unfortunately for Afghani, Katkov died soon after his arrival, and so he had to make his way without this expected support. The British Foreign Office began to make inquiries about Afghani in Russia even before he arrived, on the basis of information reaching them late in 1886 that he had gone to Russia. The F.O. informed the British ambassador at St. Petersburg, Morier, when they heard that Afghani, whom they knew as an enemy,

20

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had gone to Russia. They said that it had been heard that Afghani had been appointed to a post in Turkestan. Morier asked the Russian Foreign Minister, Giers, about this in March, 1887, still before Afghani had arrived and the latter denied the report. On July 20, 1887, Morier enclosed a report which said, in part: The Moscow Gazette of the 1/13 July 1887 announces the presence in Moscow of the Afghan Sheikh Djemal-Eddin.... The Sheikh is alleged to have stated that his object in visiting Russia was to make himself practically acquainted with a country on which 60,000,000 Indian Mussulmans place sole reliance, and which they hope will afford them protection and emancipate them from the detested English yoke.s" A month later, Morier reports his own conversation with the Turkish ambassador, who; mentioned that he had been informed of the presence at St. Petersburg of Jemal-ed-din, with whose antecedents he seemed thoroughly well acquainted. He had been curious to ascertain what this literary Sheikh was about .... had evidently had him very closely watched, said that he had come to Petersburg after the death of Katkow, by whom he had been attracted to Moscow, in the hope of being well received by the Russian Government but that he had been much disappointed at having failed in his attempts to see official persons, who had in a marked manner given him the cold shoulder. Strangely enough however there had been one exception, that of M. Pobedonostzow, the Proctor of the Holy Synod who had paid him a visit and interviewed him at great length. 46 A Government of India Minute on this despatch notes Pobedonostsev's strong ties both to the Tsar and to Katkov.v through whom Jamal ad-Din had presumably met him. The Government of India also kept track of various anti-British articles which Afghani wrote in the Moscow Gazette in the summer of 1887.48 After 1887, the F.O., the Government of India, and Morier cease to write about Afghani's activities in Russia during the time he remained there. The best first-hand account of these activities is by Mirza Sayyed Hosain Khan Adalat, who was in St. Petersburg at the time and became friendly with Afghani there and did some translating for him. He says that Afghani went to Russia after he had lost the favor of the Shah on his first Iranian trip, partly with the hope of working for the freeing of India from the 21 D

RELIGION AND REBELLION IN IRAN

British. He had become acquainted with Katkov in Paris, and Katkov had invited him to Russia. Katkov died soon after Afghani's arrival, however, and Afghani had to go alone to St. Petersburg to fulfill his plans. He hoped to encourage a war between Russia and Great Britain, which would create an opportunity for an uprising by the Muslims under British rule, but the Russians had recently finished a war against the Ottoman Empire, and. had financial troubles, and so .expressed little interest in this idea. Afghani had several interviews with Zinoviev, the head of the Foreign Ministry's Asiatic Department, but the latter would not express support for his plan. Afghani tried but failed to get an official interview with the Tsar. One of Afghani's writings noting that the opening of the Karun River was a gain for England at the expense of Russia was translated into Russian and caused feeling against Naser ed-Din Shah in Russia;" When the Shah came to St. Petersburg in 1889 Jamal ad-Din tried to see him, hoping, then as later, to deny some of the newspaper articles attributed to him by the Iranian Minister in St. Petersburg. 50 There are conflicting reports on whether he saw the Shah, though he did succeed in talking to three of his own friends in the Shah's entourage-Amin od-Dowleh, E'temad os-Saltaneh, and Mokhber od-Dowleh (who also had a liberal reputation). 51 Having failed in his anti-British schemes in Russia, and having apparently run out of money, Afghani may have been encouraged to try to get another invitation to Iran from the Shah. The Amin od-Dowleh and the E'temad os-Saltaneh, both of whom were in the Shah's entourage at the time, both report that Afghani succeeded in seeing the Amin os-Soltan in Munich, when the Shah was 011 his way back from Europe to Iran. They agree that the Shah and the Amin os-Soltan again invited Afghani to Iran, and the E'temad os-Saltaneh attributes this invitation to a desire to flatter, or appease, the Russians.P This seems a plausible attribution, since the Russians were then very angry at the Shah and the Amin os-Soltan over the concessions recently made to the British, and Afghani probably presented himself to the Shah as someone who could smooth over the trouble he was having with the Russians. It also seems possible that the Amin os-Soltan wanted to get Afghani out of Russia, where he was attacking Iranian governmental policy. Before coming to Iran again, Afghani went first to Russia briefly. According to a letter Afghani later wrote to the Shah,

22

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he had been deputed to go to Russia by the Amin os-Soltan in order to settle the tensions between Iran and Russia. As indicated in the text of Afghani's letter itself, the Amin os-Soltan denied having given him any such mission. In this letter Afghani claims that he had carried out the mission of the Shah and the Amin os-Soltan of helping to restore the Anglo-Russian balance after the recent concessions to England. He says that in spite of his success in seeing Giers more than twenty times in two months, and talking with Zinoviev, and the satisfactory results of these talks, the Amin os-Soltan had never asked him for the results of the talks, and had even refused to hear the Russian answers to his inquiries. Afghani accuses the Amin os-Soltan of falsely denying that he had sent Afghani to St. Petersburg or had given him messages for the Russian leaders. 53 Since both Afghani and the Amin os-Soltan were given to embroidering the truth, it is difficult to know what had actually happened. It seems possible that in talking with Afghani in Munich the Amin os-Soltan had said something about the need to improve relations between Russia and Iran, and that Afghani had magnified this into an official mission. It is clear that after the Munich encounter the Amin os-Soltan decided to have nothing to do with Afghani. The catalogue of Afghani documents gives several instances of the Amin os-Soltan's refusal to see Afghani in Tehran. On the other hand, it also shows that the Shah did give him an audience, and that the Amin os-Soltan responded to the Amin oz-Zarb's inquiry as to where Afghani should stay by saying, 'Your home is especially for my intimates.' 54 These last points are further indications that the Amin od-Dowleh and the E'temad os-Saltaneh are correct in saying that the Shah and the Amin os-Soltan had invited Afghani to return to Iran. To Sir Henry Drummond Wolff the Amin os-Soltan seems to have misrepresented matters somewhat, as he often did. On December 21, 1889, shortly after Afghani's arrival, Wolff telegraphed to the Foreign Office, 'Sheikh Jemaledeen is here. The Shah is much annoyed.'55 Yet there is no record of Wolff's having seen the Shah recently about the matter, and it seems probable that Wolff's statement about the Shah's annoyance rested on a recent discussion between the British Oriental Secretary and the Amin os-Soltan. This discussion was described in a despatch written by Wolff on December 20, the day before he sent the telegram. Wolff had heard a rumor that the E'temad os-Saltaneh was to be dismissed as Minister of Press and that the 'well known 23

RELIGION AND REBELLION IN IRAN

Sheikh Jemaleddin' was to be the new Minister. In reply to an inquiry by the British Oriental Secretary, the Amin os-Soltan implied that Jamal ad-Din had come to Iran against the wish of the government, although he seems to have been careful not explicitly to deny a governmental invitation. The Amin os-Soltan said: that he had not seen the Sheikh since his arrival at Tehran; that Jemaludin had written to His Excellency from the frontier informing him of his projected sojourn at Tehran; that the Amin had replied that everyone was free to come to Persia who liked, no permission was required. He understood what Sheikh Jemaludin wished to intimate, that he had been trying to avoid any contact with the man, whom he stigmatized as an intriguer of the vilest type. When the Sheikh arrived at Tehran he went to stay outside the town, about five miles away, at a house belonging to Haji Muhammad Hassan, Amin dar-uzZarb, adjoing the Mint. This Haji is a dependent of the Aminus-Sultan. From there the Sheikh wrote to the Amin-us-Sultan, saying that he was his guest, longing to pay his respects to him and awaiting his instructions. The Amin put him off by saying that he was accompanying the Shah to Jajurd and had no time. The Amin os-Soltan then asked a Russian Legation agent if it were true, as Jamal ad-Din was implying, that he had a mission from the Russian government. After inquiring of St. Petersburg the agent said it was not true. Wolff's despatch continues: Since this communication from the Russian Legation the Aminus-Sultan perceives a change in the language used by Sheikh Jemaludin, who no longer advertises himself as the agent of the Russian Government to the people of Persia. 56 The Amin os-Soltan also said there was no truth in the report that the E'temad os-Saltaneh was to be dismissed. It was natural enough that Iranians hostile to Afghani should speak to the British mainly of his Russian ties and proclivities, ignoring the other aspects of his program. Nevertheless is seems clear that Afghani, who liked to magnify his official connections and missions, was in this period claiming high-level Russian support. Even after the reported denial from St. Petersburg that Jamal ad-Din was under Russian protection, Afghani evidently, continued to advertise his Russian connections. On February 17 1890, Morier reported home a conversation with the Iranian Minister in St. Petersburg, who was a bitter opponent of Afghani's: 24

BACKGROUND

Mirza Mahmoud Khan, my Persian colleague, has now informed me in the strictest confidence and with great anxiety lest it should appear that the information came from him, that he had reason to know that the Sheikh was at present in Persia and doing much mischief there. He knew for certain that when here the individual had been frequently in communication with Monsieur Zinovieff. He is now posing at Teheran as under the protection of Russia, and is undoubtedly trying to further Russian interests there. Mirza Mahmoud has reason to know that he was the author of the sensational telegram from Tiflis descriptive of the presentation to the Shah of a Persian Bible by Sir Henry Wolff, the consequent riot and the flight of H.M. Minister to Tabreez. 56a Since the false telegram from Tiflis was sent in January, 1890, when Afghani was in Iran, the last charge seems improbable. 57 On Apri114, 1890, Wolff sent home a confidential report from a secret source listing the notables who were working against Amin os-Soltan with the support of the Russian legation, including Afghani's contacts, the E'temad os-Saltaneh and the Moshir od Dowleh. The informant added: I hear that the Shah has invited Seyyed Jamal u din to Tehran but until now nothing has been done for him. People of all classes visit this Seyyed, he has been praising the Russians. It appears that as he despaired of the Persians he is now appealing to the Russians through Mohammed Hussein Mirza. Very likely the Russians may take some steps to obtain money for him from the Persian Government. He talks of his intentions to start for Mashad and thence to proceed to Sarakhs, Merv and Bokhara and afterwards to go to Russia. 58 After receiving this report and a copy of Morier's despatch, Wolff talked with the Amin os-Soltan again about Afghani. The Amin os-Soltan 'said that he had seen as little as possible of the Sheikh and had instructed the Hadji [Amin oz-Zarb] to give him a hint to leave Tehran as he could gain nothing by remaining.' 59 Wolff does not report what he himself said on any of the occasions when he discussed Afghani with Amin os-Soltan, Since Wolff had met Afghani and was aware of his anti-British activities, it seems possible that he encouraged his friend the Amin os-Soltan to be hard on Afghani. This is all the more possible in view of Wolff's record of giving strong advice on all sorts of matters beyond the usual diplomatic purview to the

25

RELIGION AND REBELLION IN IRAN

Iranian government. The Amin os-Soltan had begun to snub Afghani before Wolff had discussed the matter with him, however, and scarcely needed much encouragement in this. If a hint was indeed given to Afghani to leave, he did not take it. Instead he went back to talking to people against the government and its Anglophil policy and in favor of reform. This is described by the Amin od- Dowleh and by Nazem 01- Eslam Kermani, who got his evidence from eyewitnesses, some of whom he names. Their descriptions indicate that Jamal ad-Din's talks went much beyond the Russophil sentiments which were naturally seized on in the British reports. Kermani notes that Afghani held secret meetings in which he discussed his ideas for combating autocracy and achieving reform. Kermani lists those who were in accord with Afghani's ideas, and his list includes some of the leading ulama and merchants as well as the Amin od-Dowleh, the Moshir od- Dowleh, and the E'temad os-Saltaneh. Kermani says that Jamal ad-Din's apparent aim was the unity of Islam, but that he was really for republican and constitutional government, and in his secret sessions discussed means of awakening the people, 'but after his exile from Tehran he ordered his followers to dissimulation and concealment of their goals.'60 The Amin od-Dowleh notes that Jamal ad-Din was angry at the Shah's and Amin os-Soltan's treatment of him, and regarded it as a breach of promise-a point supported by Afghani's letter to the Shah. After being disappointed in them Afghani began to speak openly of the bad state of Iran and the evil administration of the Shah and the prime minister.P! In July, 1890, the Shah ordered Afghani to go to the city of Qom, but he apparently got advance word of this and so took refuge instead at the shrine of Shah Abdol Azim, near Tehran.:" From here he wrote his letter of complaint to the Shah. Receiving no satisfaction, he began to engage in more and more open attacks on the government. Amin od-Dowleh notes that large numbers of people saw him there, that a society formed around him, and that he taught the oppressed the way to their salvation. Not content with simply speaking, he also wrote letters to his acquaintances throughout Iran, and in every way won people over to be his partisans. Amin od-Dowleh also says that discontented people of all sorts trusted in him, and that he sowed the seed for the tumult that was soon to come. He gave people the idea of their worth and rights, and also popularized the idea of the fatherland. 63 26

BACKGROUND

Though the Amin od-Dowleh may exaggerate some, contemporary Persian accounts are in agreement about the important influence of Jamal ad-Din. As an eloquent speaker voicing ideas which had rarely been heard in public, and expressing the discontents felt by many Iranians, Afghani must have had a considerable impact. In the situation of Iran in 1890, his pro-Russian and anti-British orientation would have added to his appeal to Iranians concerned over the recent spate of concessions to the British. Afghani's experience with methods of oppositional secret organization and propaganda was also imparted to his followers. Kermani and others specifically speak of a secret society he set up and left behind him in Iran after his expulsion from the country in January, 1891. The various references in the Persian sources to Afghani's speaking to different people on different levels imply his use of orthodox appeals to the religious, and the instruction of his followers in this technique. Although the alliance between the radicals and the religious opposition had various bases in the Iranian experience, Afghani and his followers were the first in Iran to encourage this alliance through the tactical use of religious attacks on the government and its concession-granting policies. The whole Iranian situation was peculiarly suited to Afghani's methods at this time. If 1890 and 1891 were crucial years for Afghani's influence in Iran, even apart from the tobacco question, so were they for Mirza Malkam Khan. This European-educated son of an Armenian convert to Islam had for many years represented the Persian government abroad, and for eighteen years was the Persian Minister in England. In 1889 he was dismissed from his post after the Persian government had to withdraw a lottery concession he had arranged, partly because of religious opposition to gambling, and there ensued a quarrel over compensation. Malkam, who had previously not tried to publicize his liberal views too widely in Iran, now began to publish an influential Persian journal, Qdnun (The Law), from London. Although the exact influence of Malkam Khan can no more be measured than that of Afghani, it is clear that both had a considerable following, which was strengthened by the fact that both had many prominent friends in Iran. The Shah was very afraid of both and repeatedly asked the English government to expel both from England, to suppress Qdnun, and to aid in preventing the entrance of their works into Iran. 6 4 27

RELIGION AND REBELLION IN IRAN

Evidence that Malkam Khan, Afghani, and other reformers were deliberately adopting an Islamic tone in their writings in order to influence the religious classes and masses has been given elsewhere.:" Qdnun, like the writings of Afghani, adopted the argument that the legal and other reforms it advocated were really a return to the basic principles of Islam. In a talk to an English audience in 1891, while he was publishing Qdnun and the year in which Afghani joined him in London, Malkam stated frankly that Iranian reformers had agreed together that the only means of making European reforms acceptable to Persians was to present them in an Islamic guise. After noting the great hostility of Muslims to all things European because of the general Muslim belief that the Europeans were trying to impose Christianity and to harm Islam, Malkam Khan went on: Then how would you benefit this people, and bring them to adopt the benefits of modern civilization, which they really want as much as you do? That question has been studied by some of our people who have been educated in Europe, and we have arrived at this conclusion .... except that one thing of polygamy, there is not a single point in which Islam is really in contradiction with your civilising principles. As then Islam, as I have said, is an ocean in which are accumulated all the sciences of the past times of Asia-(there is a wonderfully helpful though negative peculiarity in Islam, there being no established church, especiallyin Persia, every learned doctor having the power to examine for himself, as the traditions are an ocean)-then for any new law or new principle you wish to promulgate, you can find in that ocean many precepts and maxims which support and confirm what you want to introduce. As to the principles which are found in Europe, which constitute the root of your civilisation, we must get hold of them somehow, no doubt; but instead of taking them from London or Paris, instead of saying this comes from such an ambassador, or that it is advised by such a Government (which will never be accepted), it would be very easy to take the same principle, and to say that it comes from Islam, and that this can be soon proved. We have had some experience in this direction. We found that ideas which were by no means accepted when coming from your agents in Europe, were accepted at once with the greatest delight when it was proved that they were latent in Islam. I can assure you that the little 28

BACKGROUND

progress which we see in Persia and Turkey, especiallyin Persia, is due to this fact, that some people have taken your European principles, and instead of saying that they came from Europe, from England, France or Germany, have said: "We have nothing to do with Europeans; these are the true principles of our own religion (and, indeed, that is quite true) which have been taken by Europeans!" That has had a marvellous effect at once.s? Reading of Malkam's Qdnun (in E. G. Browne's collection of Persian newspapers at the Cambridge University Library), indicates how strictly Malkam followed this group policy of attributing modern legal and political ideas to Islam. The argument, stated above by Malkam to be expedient, that modern notions were first taken by Europeans from Islam, was a favorite of Afghani's. Malkam's parenthetical remark that European principles are those of Islam appears to be a self-protective afterthought. The issue of the tobacco concession was to afford the reformers an excellent chance to apply their policy of using religious appeals to mobilize the ulama and the masses against the government of Naser ed-Din Shah.

29

FOOTNOTES Chapter I For documentation on occasional British relations with early 20th century movements of opposition to the Shah, see my forthcoming 'British Policy and the Iranian Opposition: 1901-1907', a brief version of which will be in the Proceedings of the 1964 Congress of Orientalists, New Delhi. 2 See, for instance, George N. Curzon, Persia and the Persian Question (London, 1892), Vol. I, p. 406, on outside aid in the last two accessions, in 1834 and 1848. 3 British documents indicating British governmental, opposition to the Shuster mission are in F.O. 371/1197. 4. Curzon, Ope cit., I, pp. 480-481. An abstract of the Reuter concession is in Sir Henry Rawlinson, England and Russia in the East (London, 1875), pp. 391-394. The best scholarly studies are L. E. Frechtling, 'The Reuter Concession in Persia', Asiatic Review, XXXIV (July, 1938), pp. 518-533, and the chapter on the concession in the forthcoming book by Firuz Kazemzadeh on Anglo-Russian relations in Iran and Central Asia. Professor Kazemzadeh has been kind enough to show me an advance copy of his MS. 5 There is disagreement even among those who base themselves largely on the same British F.O. documents. Thus Frechtling, Ope cit., pp. 52728, denies that Russian opposition was important, while Rose Louise Greaves, Persia and the Defence of India, 1884-1892 (London, 1959), p. 96, mentions Russian rather than local opposition as a cause for cancellation. The Kazemzadeh MS., which uses some new sources, makes it clear that the Russians were involved, but that local factors were also important. This conclusion is supported by documents in F.O. 539/10, 'Correspondence respecting the Reuter and Falkenhagen Concessions 1872-75'. II Rawlinson, Ope cu., pp. 126, 128. 7 Ibid., pp. 133-44. The Kazemzadeh MS. notes the continuation of the pattern set by the opposition at this time in later decades. 8 Russian obstruction to economic development is frequently cited both in British documents and in secondary works; the most notorious example being the secret railway agreement of 1890, renewed ten years later, which bound the Iranians not to build railways for two successive ten year periods. Less often cited is British obstructionism. F.O. documents show more F.O. satisfaction than discontent with the lack of railways which is usually blamed on the Russians, and Frechtling, Ope cit., shows that the F.O. used Reuter's claims for compensation from 1872 to 1889 in order to prevent other concessions from being granted, especially for railroads, by claiming prior claims for Reuter. Frechtling's interpretation is perhaps oversimplified, but is an important corrective to exaggerated claims of British interest in Persia's development: 1

30

BACKGROUND The story of the Reuter concession illustrates in a lucid and concise manner the policy pursued by the British Government toward Persia in the nineteenth century. From the time when Persia was drawn into the realm of European politics until the Anglo-Russian agreement of 1907, the statesman in London had constantly and consistently conceived that England's interest in the Middle East would be satisfied if the status quo was preserved .... Although the British Government could be persuaded of the necessity for telegraph lines and of their comparative ineffectiveness in affecting the status quo, they took an entirely different attitude toward transportation channels. Only a few years before, the Suez Canal had been opened, and already it had become apparent in inner circles that such an important portion of the new route to India could not remain under non-British control. If another line to India overland through Persia were developed, the drama of the Suez would be played over again with Persia rather than Egypt as the background. This the British Government was determined to forestall, and hence gave no encouragement to a project which in another time and another place would have received full Government approbation and support. Instead they used the Reuter concession to defeat the attempts of would-be concessionaires to wring other railway contracts from the Shah. Eventually such a policy became so unreal that it collapsed of its own weight, for even British power could not prevent the introduction of Western economic influences into this attractive undeveloped land. In the late 1880's Whitehall finally realised that they could no longer maintain a wall around Persia high enough to exclude the onward drive of expanding capitalistic states, and, trying to make the best of the altered situation, the Government at last changed their policy and used the Reuter concession as an effective counter in the scramble for control of the development of Persia, which continued at a high pitch until 1907 and even beyond to the Great War. (pp. 532-533). The obstruction of Iran's economic development by both Great Britain and Russia is stressed by M. E. Yapp in his review of Greaves, Ope cit., BSOAS, XXIII, 2 (1960), pp. 402-03. 9 Curzon, Ope cit., I, pp. 483-484. For a comparable and more complete description of the dubious character of European concessionaires in the Middle East, see the brilliant chapter 'Klondike on the Nile' in David S. Landes, Bankers and Pashas, (London, 1958). 10 F.O. 539/54, C. E. Biddulph, 'Memorandum on a visit to Persia', No. 93, 1891. Crown copyright material in the Public Record Office, London, has been reproduced by permission of the Controller of H.M. Stationery Office. 11 Great Britain, Parliament, Sessional Papers, 1873, LXXV, C. 803. 12 On the state of the army and the various abortive reforms of Naser ed-Din Shah see especially Curzon, Ope cit., chs. 13-15, 17. British diplomatic documents also contain vivid descriptions and analyses. One of the best is 'Notes on Persian Administration'. Appendix 1, August 31, 1895, by Lt. Col. H. Picot, of F.O. 539/72, 'Memorandum by Sir M. Durand on the Situation in Persia'.

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RELIGION AND REBELLION IN IRAN 13 Ann

K. S. Lambton, 'Secret Societies and the Persian Revolution of 1905-6', St. Anthony's Papers, No.4 (New York, 1959), p. 49; see also her 'Persian Society under the Qajars', JRCAS, XLVIII, 2(1961), pp. 123-139. 16 See my 'Religion and Irreligion in Early Iranian Nationalism', Camparative Studies in Society and History, IV (April, 1962), pp. 265-295, for a preliminary discussion of the reasons for the growth of discontent among the ulama. Curzon, op. cit., I, pp. 391,453-54, discusses the attacks on legal and economic prerogatives of the ulama during the reign of Naser ed-Din Shah. On p. 460 he gives an instance of successful ulama opposition to one such attack: In 1875, after the return of the Shah from his first visit to Europe, he introduced councils of Administration [in part] to counteract the legal prerogative of the clergy. But the mullahs, who saw their reign threatened, succeeded in persuading the people that such European innovations would deprive them of the slender protection they now enjoyed against the arbitrary government of the official classes, and created such a storm of opposition that the project was abandoned. 15 Archives du Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres, Perse, 1890, No. 13, Mar. 17. Since these volumes contain only correspondence of the French charge and Minister, references will be to A.E., with no names. 16 A.E., loco cit. 17 For Sir Henry Drummond Wolff's aggressive and temporarily successful policy, particularly regarding concessions, see, in addition to the F.O. and A.E. documents during his ministry, Greaves, Persia and the Defence of India, chs. VIII-XII, and App. VI; and Sir Henry Drummond Wolff, Rambling Recollections (London, 1908), Vol. II, chs. LXIII-LXVII. i8 The question of Afghani's relations with the Russians will probably not be fully answered until the Russian documents are examined. Questioning Soviet scholars in 1960, I could not find that anyone there was working on Afghani. 19 For a fuller statement of the argument on Afghani and his followers, see my 'Religion and Irreligion', pp. 275-289, and p. 291, n. 31. In addition to the sources cited there, see the section on Afghani in Sylvia Haim, Arab Nationalism (Berkeley, California, 1962), pp 6-14, which argues that Afghani was a religious skeptic; and G. Basetti-Sani, 'Sayyid Jamal ed-Din al-Afghani : Saggio sul suo concetto della religione', Orientalia Christiana Periodica, XXV, 1-2 (1959), pp. 5-43, which shows how completely political and pragmatic was Afghani's concept of religion as expressed in the Refutation of the Materialists. (Since this was written two important works, based on new primary research, have lent further support to my views of Afghani. They are, Elie Kedourie, 'Nouvelle lumiere sur Afghani et Abduh', Orient, 30 (1964), pp. 37-57, and 31 (1964), pp. 83-106; and Niyazi Berkes, The Development of Secularism in Turkey (Montreal, 1964), especially pp. 183-188). The contradictions in Afghani's arguments according to the audience he was addressing are shown not only by comparing Afghani's Refutation

32

BACKGROUND

with his French 'Answer to Renan', but also by the internal contradictions in his Persian articles, brought together as M aqiiliit-e jamiiliyeh (Tehran, 1933). Some of these contradictions are noted in Appendix I of this article. 20 In addition to the sources noted in n. 19 and below, much more documentation will be found in my forthcoming biography of Afghani. 21 Iraj Ashfar and Ashgar Mahdavi, eds. Maimu'eh-ye asniid va madiirek chap nashodeh dar biireh-ye Sayyed Jamal ad-Din mashhur be Afghani (Tehran, 1963), plates 43-44; photographs 93-95. 22 Khiiteriit-e siyiisi-ye Mirza Ali Khan Amin od-Dowleh, ed, H. FarmanFarmaian (Tehran, 1962), p. 128. 23 F.O. 60/594, Baring to Iddesleigh, No. 424, Cairo, Oct. 23, 1886, Secret. 24 Appendix by Adalat in Shaikh Lotfollah Khan Asadabad] et al., Sharh-e hal va iisdr-e Sayyed Jamal ad-Din Asadiibiidi ma'ruf be 'Afghani' (Tabriz, 1327/1948-9), p. 98. 25 Wilfrid Scawen Blunt, Gordon at Khartoum (London, 1912), pp. 473487, 500-501. Elie Kedourie has told me that the F.O. papers on the Wolff mission do not even mention Afghani. Various documents in Afshar, op, cit., show that Afghani and his friends attached much importance to the scheme, however. 26 Sharh-e hal-e Abbas Mirza Molk rrra (Tehran, 1325/1946-7), p. 111. 27 Article in the Persian newspaper Kiiveh, II, 9, p. 10, n. 1, citing a book by Mirza Forsat Shirazi Dabestiin al-Forseh, which records the author's meeting with Afghani in Bushire. 28 Kiiveh, II, 9(1921), p. 11, gives the contents of a letter to the newspaper by Sadid os-Saltaneh, who encloses a letter from Afghani to his father to prove the latter was Afghani's host in Bushire. The letter from Afghani is photographed in Kiiveh. 29 Afshar and Mahdavi, op, cit., p. 30, document 112; plate 39, photograph 87. 30 See the interrogation of Mirza Reza Kermani after he killed Naser ed-Din Shah, in E. G. Browne, The Persian Revolution of 1905-1909 (Cambridge, 1910), p. 74. 31 Adalat in Lotfollah, op. cit; p. 98. 32 Kaveh, II, 3(1921), p. 8, n. 5. 33 Afshar and Mahdavi, op. cit., p. 112, no. 1. 34. Dairy excerpted in ibid., p. 149. 35 LoC'. cit., and Amin od-Dowleh, op. cit., p. 128. 36 Abbas Mirza Molk Ara, op. cit., p. 111. 37 Amin od-Dowleh, op. cit., p. 128. 38 Molk Ara, op, cit., pp. 111-112. 39 Amin od-Dowleh, op. cit., p. 129. 40 Molk Ara, op. cit., p. 112. 4.l See the correspondence about Afghani dating from late 1886 and early 1887 in the case volume on Afghani, F.O. 60/594. 4.2 Molk Ara op. cit., p. 112. '3 Afshar and Mahdavi, op. cit; p. 116, notebook sheet 122; p. 118, sheet 261; p. 120. " Ibid., plate 77, photograph 169. 4.5 F.O. 60/594, Morier to Salisbury, No. 253, July 20, 1887, Secret, enclosure.

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F.O. 60/594, Morier to Salisbury, No. 299, August 27,1887. Government of India, Political and Secret Home Correspondence, Vol. 97, File 930, Minute on copy of Morier despatch. '8 I bid., translations of articles in File 938. 49 Adalat in Lotfollah, Ope cit., pp. 99-101. 50 Amin od-Dowleh, Ope cit., p. 139. 51 Adalat in Lotfollah, Ope cit., pp. 101-102. 52 Diary of E'temad os-Saltaneh in Afshar and Mahdavi, Ope cit., p. 150; Amin od-Dowleh, Ope cit., p. 140. 53 The letter is reprinted in Nazem ol-Eslam Kerrnani, Tiirikh-e bidiiri-ye lriiniyiin, 2nd ed. (Tehran, n.d.), pp. 65-67. 54 Afshar and Mahdavi, Ope cit., pp. 127-130. 55 F.O. 60/594, Wolff to Salisbury, Tel. No. 182, Dec. 21, 1889. 56 F.O. 60/502, Wolff to Salisbury, No. 241, Dec. 20,1889. 56a F.O. 60/594, Morier to Salisbury, No. 40, Feb. 7, 1890, Secret. 57 The Times, Jan. 28 and Jan. 30, 1890. 58 F.O. 60/511, Wolff to Salisbury, No. 124, April 14, 1890, Secret. 59 F.O. 60/594, Wolff to Salisbury, No. 146, April 24, 1890. 60 Kerrnani, Ope cit., p. 64. 61 Amin od-Dowleh, Ope cit., p. 144. 62 Kermani, Ope cit., p. 62; Afshar and Mahdavi, Ope cit., p. 110, reprints the Shah's order for Afghani to go to Qom, dated July 11, 1890. 63 Amin od-Dowleh, Ope cit., pp. 145-146. 64. Several appeals from the Shah to the British to punish or expel Afghani are included in F.O. 60/594. 65 See the sources cited in note 19, above, and Appendix I of this article. 66 Malcom Khan, 'Persian Civilisation', Contemporary Review, LIX (February, 1891), 238-244; the quotation is on pp. 242-243. '6

U

34

Chapter II BEGINNINGS OF UNREST THE CONCESSION for full monopoly over the production, sale, and export of tobacco for fifty years was granted to Major G. F. Talbot in March, 1890.He agreed to pay the Shah an annual rent of £15,000, and a quarter of the annual profits after the payment of all expenses and of a five per cent dividend on the capital. There was evidently no official original payment for the concession, though both British and Persian documents note large bribes to the Shah and high officials. The concession stated that dealings in tobacco could only be carried out with permits from the concessionaire. The latter promised to pay the cultivators cash for their crops, and might also make advances on the crops at a low interest rate. 1 Sir Henry Drummond Wolff, who was still British minister in Iran in 1890, had earlier introduced Talbot to the Shah." Beyond this it is highly probable that Wolff played an important role in encouraging the concession." Support for this surmise comes not only from various sources, but also from a knowledge of Wolff's general policy of aggressively backing British enterprise in Iran. His encouragement of the concession is specificallyalluded to in a French despatch of April 30, 1890,4 and is implied elsewhere in the correspondence of the French Minister, de Balloy. It is thus possible that the story told by Ebrahim Taimuri in his book, Tahrim-e tanbdku, of the negotiation of the concession during the Shah's third trip to Europe is largely true. Unfortunately the activities of Wolff and the Shah while they were both in England are mostly unrecorded in the Foreign Office documents. According to Taimuri, Talbot and Wolff together helped convince first the E'temad os-Saltaneh, then the Amin os-Soltan, and then the Shah of the advantages to themselves-largely financial-of the concession, after which the Shah returned to Iran and Talbot followed. With the help of large bribes he got the most important governmental figures on his side. Taimuri believes the British government was behind these negotiations, which seems to be untrue, though since Wolff appears personally to have been backing Talbot, it was not unnatural that Iranians should get 35

RELIGION AND REBELLION IN IRAN

this impression. Taimuri gives information coming from Persian memoirs of the dealings between the Shah, Talbot, Wolff and others while the Shah was in England in 1889, which receives some support from later British newspaper accounts. 5 It seems unlikely that the Foreign Office was as involved in the concession as the Persian and British opposition later claimed, though it was not entirely free of such involvement. It is true that Salisbury, the British Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, was, as later parliamentary debate revealed, a distant cousin of Talbot's as well as being a friend and close associate of Wolff's. After the cancellation of the tobacco concession the British government denied any prior knowledge of the concession and also denied that the relationship between Salisbury and Talbot had any connection with the concession. A document which may suggest something different is in the British Embassy Archives of Tehran, now in the Public Record Office. It records an interview between Talbot and the Shah in late March, 1891, after Talbot had made arrangements to set up the tobacco monopoly, or Regie, and was about to leave Tehran for England. The Shah on this occasion asked Talbot to thank Salisbury personally for his interest in Persia, a request which at least shows that the Shah had reason to regard the two as closely connected. 6 Additional light is shed on the whole problem of the role of the Salisbury government and Wolff's activity by an 1892despatch of de Balloy. In it he stated that: Very recently I have had very curious details on his [Wolff's] manner of proceeding, which seem almost unbelievable. According to my informant who seems well informed, the Foreign Office never knew anything about what its agent was doing here. He at one time addressed to the Persian Government threatening notes to obtain the privilege of the Regie [tobacco concession], and at another time threatened to occupy the islands of the Persian Gulf to lift the Reuter concession. 7 The latter referred presumably to the second Reuter concession for the Imperial Bank, etc., given partly in compensation for Reuter's losses on the first concession. If there is any truth in this report by the French Minister, which seems not improbable in view of Wolff's self-confident and aggressive mode of operation, then too much weight should not be placed on Wolff's comparative reticence about his contacts with Talbot and the tobacco concession in his officialdespatches. 36

BEGINNINGS OF UNREST

Even these despatches occasionally reveal such contacts and also Wolff's advisory role to the concessionaires. Thus, on January 10, 1890, Wolff had telegraphed: I have advised the Imperial Bank and Major Talbot, who is now here representing a strong Syndicate, not to compete with each other for Concessions, and thus throw them into the hands of other nationalities, but to act in concert. They are telegraphing in this sense to their respective groups in London." On April 30, soon after the tobacco concession was granted, the French Minister reported home, giving a summary of Wolff's aggressive pro-concession policy. He claimed that Wolff had managed to create a program for the Shah on his last trip to Europe which increased the Shah's time in England by fifteen days, and that this time in England was utilized to emit the Imperial Bank shares and to obtain new concessions. (This possibly supports Taimuri's story, based on Persian sources, that negotiations for the tobacco concession were begun during the Shah's stay in England, though Wolff in one of his despatches says that they were begun in Paris and Vienna.) De Balloy goes on to note that Wolff's policy was to encourage foreign economic interest in Iran as a bar to Russian conquest. De Balloy says that Wolff, after outlining his Persian projects to him, said, 'I want to make of this country from the industrial and commercial point of view a second Belgium.' (!) and asked French participation in getting new concessions. De Balloy advised his government against encouraging such participation, partly because in general the concessionaires' 'only aim is to coin money in Europe with a firman from the Shah, without caring the least if the business they propose is viable and can give benefits." On the whole it seems likely that Wolff actively promoted the concession, but that the Foreign Office knew little about it in advance. Wolff was convinced that his policy of encouraging concessions and heavy British investment in Iran would both increase British influence there and help shore up Iran against growing Russian penetration. He was constantly promoting British concessions and investment, a policy which some more experienced observers, such as de BaIloy, thought could culminate only in Russian counteraction which would ultimately hurt the British position. Such views were also held by the British ambassador to Russia, Sir Robert Morier. 37 E

RELIGION AND REBELLION IN IRAN

On April 3 Woltf further indicated contact with the concession when he said he had advised Talbot to encourage foreign capitalists to enter his project. In the same despatch, with his usual optimistic confidence that progress followed the pound, and what was good for the British investor was good for the Persian, Wolff noted, among other points about the tobacco concession: It will be perceived that this Concession is verymuch in favour of the cultivator. He is to be paid in cash for his tobacco, and is entitled to advances on his crops. At present he is obliged to accept all kinds of payments for the produce he sells, and his borrowings can be negotiated only on a very high scale. I have little doubt that when the system is explained and in operation, the agriculturists will find that they are greatly benefited by the Regie. The Concession also gives to the Regie the right of making advances on growing crops besides tobacco, which will be a great advantage to cultivators, who are now ground down by the exactions of native usurers. * Events were to show that the provisions in question helped alarm the. merchants and money-lenders without having corresponding beneficial effects on the attitude of the peasants. In the same despatch, written two weeks after the concession was granted, Wolff notes that the Russian charge d'affaires had complained to the Amin os-Soltan about the concession, and said it would raise the price of Persian tobacco to an exorbitant extent. The concession was soon 'sold' to a dummy syndicate of Talbot's, after which it seems to have remained inactive and largely unknown until the autumn of 1890 when it was sold to a group calling itself the Imperial Tobacco Corporation of Persia. Various rather convincing charges were later made in British parliamentary debates and newspapers that the corporation was essentially Talbot himself, who then went about promoting shares in his new corporation. The point is of some importance,

* F.O. 539/60, Wolff to Salisbury, No.3 (104), April 3, 1890. The concession's text is enclosed. The conditions of the concession are given in E. G. Browne, The Persian Revolution of 1905-1909 (Cambridge, 1910), pp. 33-35, where the prospectus of the Imperial Tobacco Corporation of Persia is also quoted. (Whether the Regie actually made loans to the peasants seems unclear, but it did pay cash in full, unlike many Persian merchants). 38

BEGINNINGS OF UNREST

since the sum paid for this 'purchase' was later successfully included by the Tobacco Company in its demands for compensation, but it seems difficult to arrive at the exact truth about such transactions on the basis of existing documents.l" There may have been no true sale, and in any case Talbot must have come out ahead. He may well have pocketed if not £300,000, then much of what was paid for shares actually sold. The very favorable financial terms granted the concessionaire were noted in a prospectus issued by the Imperial Tobacco Corporation in November, 1890. The prospectus contrasted the £630,000 paid annually by the Turkish Tobacco Regie to the Persian Company's £15,000 per annum, a contrast also later seized upon by opponents of the concession. Wolff's first report of the concession in March notes the desire to keep it secret. 11 Whether from fear of Russian reaction, local opposition, or both, the Persian government did its best to withhold information on the subject. Thus, the concession at first was not widely known of in Iran, and the first record of Persian complaints against it comes in the autumn of 1890. Earlier in the year, however, there were already signs of serious discontent with the policies of the Shah and his government. It was against this background of rising protest that the tobacco movement was to gain strength. In May, 1890, the holy month of Ramazan, the Tehran mollas preached publicly against the Shah and his followers, criticizing among other things the profiteering of the head of the mint from the issuance of improperly alloyed coins. The rise in prices of the necessities of life was reported to be causing growing discontent and there was much suffering among the poor. In May also the Shah evidently received a letter complaining of the conduct of Amin os-Soltan which upset him. And E'temad os-Saltaneh, the Minister of Press and Publications, who was friendly with Afghani and the Russians, was reported to have complained to the Russians of the overwhelming influence of the British Minister, Sir Henry Drummond Wolff, on the Shah, and to have said that the Shah would be in great danger of being deposed except that people knew that his sons were incompetent. *

* Confidential Report from a secret agent, enclosed in F.O. 60/511 Kennedy to Salisbury, No. 201, June 3, 1890, Secret. In the absence of Persian archives, the British F.O. documents on events in official circles are often better than any Persian accounts. This is particularly true in this

39

RELIGION AND REBELLION IN IRAN

In July, 1890, the Shah made one of his many complaints against Malkam Khan's Qdnun. In August Wolff reported on the opposition to the Prime Minister which the latter believed was led by the Shah's third son, Kamran Mirza Ndyeb os-Saltaneh, head of the army and Governor of Tehran: ... The Naib-es-Sultaneh has, it would appear, been foremost in the opposition to the Grand Vizier. A fanatical mollah had preached and written against His Highness, [The Grand Vizier, Amin os-Soltan] and the Naib, as Governor of Tehran, had been instructed by the Shah to expel him. His Royal Highness had, however, given a hint to the Mollah who at once took sanctuary at Shah Abdul Azim where he continued his invectives against the Amin-es-Sultan.P In the same despatch Wolff said that the Nayeb os-Saltaneh had informed the Russian Minister that if the latter chose to press for it he could get the Amin os-Soltan dismissed, but that he had reportedly replied that Russia did not intervene in the internal arrangements of friendly states. (Wolff appears not to have known the extent of Russian discontent or of their plots against the Amin os-Soltan, mentioned earlier.) The Shah then wrote the Nayeb (continuedfrom p. 39)

period, when the Shah and particularly the Amin os-Soltan often gave confidential information to the British ministers, although in some cases Amin os-Soltan's accounts, especially of Russian doings, should be treated with scepticism. The British also had secret agents working for them, and the above report comes from one of these who seems to have been an employee of the Russian Legation, judging from internal evidence. The words of E'temad os-Saltaneh, who was reported to be in the confidence of the Russian Legation, were spoken to the First Dragoman of the Russian Legation in the hearing of the agent. As to Mohammad Hasan Khan, E'temad os-Saltaneh, the generally reliable Mirza Mohammad Qazvini says in a note to Browne's Persian Revolution: 'Although Sayyid Jamalu'd-Din apparently thought highly of the l'timiidu's-Saltana, in the opinion of others he was a charlatan and a scoundrel, ignorant, illiterate and pretentious. He could not even spell decently, and the works published in his name were written by men of learning acting under compulsion and prompted by fear of his malice.' (p. 405). Judging from E'temad os-Saltaneh's diaries, this seems an exaggeration. Mirza Reza Kermani, quoted on p. 92 of the same book, says of him, 'He was a cunning fellow, and pretended great devotion to the Sayyid, who, however, used to say of him, "He is a bad-hearted man, and no confidence should be reposed in him".' The books printed under his name are listed in Browne, The Press and Poetry of Modern Persia (Cambridge, 1914), pp. 164-166.

40

BEGINNINGS OF UNREST

an autograph reprimand, stating that in attacking the authority of the Grand Vizier he was attacking the Shah. Against this background of general discontent and of intrigue in opposition to the Grand Vizier came the first strong protest to the tobacco concession, originating from the Russians in September, 1890. Already at the time of the grant of the concession Wolff's despatches noted Russian opposition, as did those from Ambassador Morier in St. Petersburg. Reports of a Russian protest came from Wolff in September, 1890. The protest against the tobacco concession was part of a list of Russian grievances put forth by the newly arrived Russian Minister in Tehran, Biltzov. At a private audience with the Shah on August 31 Biitzov said he did not wish to negotiate with the Amin osSoltau, as he knew that the Amin os-Soltan told Wolff everything the Russians said. He cited as proof for this a recent conversation between the Russian charge d'affaires, Speyer, and the Amin os-Soltan, This was almost immediately reported by the British Ambassador in St. Petersburg, Morier, to the Russian Foreign Minister, Giers. (In fact the Russians had known for some time that both the Amin os-Soltan and the Shah consulted Wolff about their talks with the Russians; but since this information came from intercepted telegrams between Wolff and Salisbury the Russians presumably waited for a case not depending on such interception to lodge their complaint.) Biitzov finally agreed to deal with the Amin os-Soltan if he would change his behavior in the future. In his first interview with the Amin os-Soltan, Biitzov complained of the Karun and Imperial Bank concessions. In a further talk on September 3, Biltzov 'began his interview by protesting energetically against the "Regie." He said it was against Treaty, that Russian subjects would be forced to purchase tobacco from Englishmen, etc.' Despite Biitzov's warnings, all this was immediately reported to Wolff by the Amin os-Soltan, along with a plea that the British be more careful in the future not to reveal to the Russians that Wolff was getting such information from him. * Russian anger at the situation in Iran was

* F.O. 65/1394, Wolff to Salisbury, No. 271, Very Secret and Confidential, September 3, 1890. This despatch was printed, but is not included in the F.O. case volumes on the tobacco question-perhaps because it was considered too confidential. Russian interception of telegrams from Wolff to Salisbury showing how much was told Wolff by the Shah and the Amin os-Soltan is reported on various dates in the diary of Lamsdorf, Giers' assistant. Cf. Dnevnik V. N. Lamsdorfa (1886-1890) (Moscow, 1926), pp. 168-169, 214. 41

RELIGION AND REBELLION IN IRAN

increased by their knowledge that such information was passing to Wolff. On September 14 Wolff telegraphed: At yesterday's interview with Shah H.M. said that Russian Minister is determined in his protest against the tobacco regie, & at interview with Amin-es-Sultan at His Majesty's request which followed I was informed that Russia isbent on asserting exclusive [ ? influence] (sic) in Persia, & is preparing to demand cancelling of all the late concessions given to the English & others, mention being made by the Russian Minister of the Karun, Bank, Mines, Road, Matches, Oil, & Soap, & any others, he said, of which there was not yet knowledge. Amin-es-Sultan says intention is that Russia shall be towards Persia as she formerly was, all-powerful, & the Minister demands that no concessions be given to any foreigner without Russian counsel and consent.P In another telegram on September 16, Wolff noted that the Russian Minister had made a formal protest to the Regie, 'and has asked that it be rescinded on the ground that it is against the Treaties and adverse to the Commerce of the country.' An F.O. Memo on this telegram by T. H. S(anderson) states, 'The concession is clearly a monopoly.... We have objected to an opium monopoly as contrary to certain Treaty provisions and I do not see how we can logically defend a tobacco monopoly.'* The British protest to a proposed Russian opium Regie referred to by Sanderson is recorded in Salisbury to Wolff, April 13, 1890: The grant of the opium monopoly appears to be contrary to the provisions of the IIIrd Articles of the French Treaty of 1855, the Dutch Treaty of 1857, the Italian Treaty of 1862, and the Swiss Treaty of 1873, and you may oppose it accordingly.

* F.O. 60/553, Wolff to Salisbury, No. 231, Telegraphic, Sept. 16, 1890. T. H. S. Memo, Sept. 17, 1890. This is one of the useful case volumes on the tobacco concession which do not, however, contain all the F.O. documents on the subject. Others are to be found in the general F.O. 60, Persia, sequence; in the Tehran Embassy Archive F.O. 248 series; in case volumes on Afghani and Malkam Khan; in the F.O. 65, Russia, series; and in the F.O. 539, Confidential Print series, including the case volume, F.O. 539/60. The F.O. 539 documents have two numbers, first that in the volume, and second that of the original document, given by me in parentheses.

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You should tell the Amin-us-Sultan, as you suggest, that we cannot allow our merchants to be prevented from dealing wheresoever they choose.P As this despatch shows, it was Wolff himself who had proposed protesting any limitation on the trade of British merchants. Nevertheless he upheld the validity of a similar tobacco monopoly and rejected appeals made by the Russians and Ottomans, who cited the same treaty guarantees of free trade that the British had successfully cited in the case of the proposed opium Regie. Wolff then reported that the Shah had decided not to give way to the Russians on the tobacco or other concessions. He enclosed copies of two Russian protests with the Shah's answers. The Russian objections were based on the promise of freedom of trade in the preamble of the Treaty of Turkmanchai signed between Russia and Iran in 1828. Amin os-Soltan was strongly in favor of the concession and was trying to reassure the tobacco merchants who were worried that it might interfere with their interests. Some Persian ministers, however, like the Amin od-Dowleh (the rival of the Amin os-Soltan, a liberal and friend of Afghani's), were now opposing the Regie, and Wolff thought they were working with the Russians."! (In later years, when Amin os-Soltan favored the Russians, Amin od-Dowleh was an Anglophil.) The British tendency to see the Russian hand everywhere may have entered into Wolff's judgment on Amin od-Dowleh, though it is true that he was frequenting the Russian Legation. One of the features of Wolff's pro-concession policy was that it alienated some of the more honest and liberal members of the government, like the Amin od-Dowleh, while attracting those who liked receiving money from the concessionnaires, like the Amin os-Soltan, Both before and after the Tobacco movement, the British themselves recognized the superiority of the Amin odDowleh to the Amin os-Soltan, A British Memo of 1889 says, in part, of the Amin od-Dowleh : Before the Amin-us-Sultan supplanted him he enjoyed supreme power.... He is President of the Council of Ministers, a member of the Council of 5, Minister of Pensions and Church Property and Minister of the Post. The Amin-ud-Dowleh is a formidable rival to the Amin-usSultan, and has a crowd of warm adherents. His partizans complain of his want of energy, but everyone acknowledges his 43

RELIGION AND REBELLION IN IRAN

ability.... He is full of liberal ideas and schemes for progress, and is trustworthy. In contrast, 'The Amin-us-Sultan is very ambitious, very vain, and excessively susceptible. It cannot be said that he always tells the truth, or that he is absolutely sincere,"!" In a later opinion on the Amin od-Dowleh, whom the British documents of this particular period tended to denigrate because of his opposition to the Regie, the French Minister, de Balloy, says: He is certainly the best of all the Persians I know. He has a straight and sure judgement, perfect manners, great honesty; he is universally esteemed and considered as highly by the Persians of all conditions as by the mollahs and foreigners. Unfortunately he is a timid man who will never be able to put himself on the first plane. He alone if anyone could save the situation. 17 In a despatch of September 17, 1890, the French Minister agreed with the opinion of the new Russian Minister, Biitzov, that the tobacco concession was probably against the Persian treaties which guaranteed freedom of commerce. IS On October 30 de Balloy reported that Biitzov had succeeded in getting the Persian government to agree that the tobacco monopoly would not be applied to Russian subjects, who would remain free to conduct trade in tobacco. De Balloy also quoted a high Russian functionary as saying, 'We have the whole population with US.'19 If the Persian government in fact agreed to exempt Russian subjects the British were ignorant of this, as they later complained of tobacco dealings by Russians. In the same period Persian newspapers entering the country from abroad were focusing discontent against foreign concessions. Already in July, 1890, Malkam Khan's Qdnun had made a general complaint against concessions of the patrimony of the Muslims to foreign adventurers. In November, another liberal newspaper, the Akhtar, published in Istanbul, printed a long attack on the tobacco concession. The article quoted an item from the Turkish newspaper, Sabdh, showing that, on the basis of estimates by the Controller-General of Customs of the amount of tobacco consumed and exported, the concessionaire should make a net annual profit of £500,000, and noting the low return to the Persian government. The Persian Regie was unfavorably compared with the Turkish one. Akhtar added a note saying it intended to publish

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its own analysis of the concession as soon as it got adequate information. 20 On January 12, 1891, Akhtar carried a further article which caused the Shah to forbid its import into Iran. Up to this point Akhtar had been somewhat cautious in approach, probably in order to avoid prohibition. This article is interesting in showing once again the ties of the liberals to the Russians in this period, as it opens with praise of the educational and other progress taking place among the Muslims of Ashkabad under Russian rule. The article goes on: We hope that our officialswill do their best for the improvement of our country, and will not leave it to remain in a state of misery and will follow the example of their neighbours in discharging their duties. One can easily judge the reason of the gradual emigration from Khorassan and the constant increase of the population of Askabad; a country that has no laws to govern the authorities will soon be abandoned and become a prey to poverty and misery. I do not see the results of the Shah's journey and that of his ministers in Europe. Did they not see the glory of those countries which dazzles the eyes of the spectators? If they saw it why did they not partake of it? ... Foreigners have held Bank, Railway, and tramway concessions in our country for some time, and the British Government in Zanzibar, the French in Dahomey, and the Italians in Abyssiania, in spite of their influence, cannot obtain such concessions under such simple conditions. Does not the person who transacts business realize that he is selling the rights of the public and that he must consult with Ministers who are representatives of that public? When all business is transacted secretly what is the meaning of the Imperial Council ? This name like others will also remain merely a name. It is clear enough that, under the present system no improvement can be made, on the other hand the country will go to ruin.s! It was in this same month, January, 1891, that the first signs of an organized campaign against the government appeared. This movement, like the Akhtar article quoted above, did not concentrate exclusively on the tobacco concession, but rather made broader charges. This is one of many indications that the movement was a general one, with causes and goals going beyond the question of the tobacco concession. Concentration on the 45

RELIGION AND REBELLION IN IRAN

tobacco question was reflected by the reformers only after it became clear that this was the question which most agitated the Iranians and on which activity against the government could be most easily and broadly aroused. Early in January, 1891, the Shah received an anonymous letter abusing him for having surrendered Persian interests to England. Convinced that it emanated from Sayyed Jamal ad-Din alAfghani, he sent armed men to take him from sanctuary at the shrine of Shah Abdol Azim and to escort him rapidly and forcibly to the Iranian frontier. This degrading and unusual treatment figured prominently in Afghani's later appeals to the ulama to oppose and depose the Shah, and was a factor in the decision of his follower, Mirza Reza, to assassinate the Shah, which he did in 1896. * The letter which had incensed the Shah was probably the same in content as an anonymous leaflet circulated at night in the mosques and madrasas to which Abbas Mirza M olk .J.rii attributes Afghani's expulsion. According to Molk Ara hundreds of copies of the leaflet were circulated.P His brief description of their contents makes it clear that they were the same leaflets that were translated and sent home by the British charge, Kennedy, who took on ministerial duties during Wolff's illness and absence from Iran. The leaflets were addressed to the Persian authorities, and had very much the tone of attacking the government's policy on Islamic religious principles that was used by Afghani. They were addressed to the Iranian authorities, and declared that the enemies of the Islamic faith: have found an opportunity for ruining this country and nation under various deceitful pretexts. One under the name of the * In his letter to Mirza Hasan Shirazi complaining against the Shah and Amin os-Soltan, Afghani said, 'As for my own story and what that ungrateful tyrant did to me ... the wretch commanded me to be dragged, when I was in sanctuary in the shrine of Shah 'Abdu'l-Azim and grievously ill, through the snow of the capital with such circumstances of disrespect, humiliation and disgrace as cannot be imagined for wickedness (and all this after I had been plundered and despoiled) .... Thereafter his miserable satellites mounted me, notwithstanding my illness, on a packsaddle, loading me with chains, and this in the winter season, amidst the snow-drifts and bitter, icy blasts, and a company of horsemen conveyed me to Khaniqm, guarded by an escort ...' (Transplated in Browne, Ope cit., p. 20). And Mirza Reza in his testimony similarly complained of Afghani's ignominious treatment, ibid., pp. 70--71, but reported that Afghan! had changed his mind about Amin os-Soltan's responsibility, deciding that the Nayeb os-Saltaneh was responsible for his exile (p. 79).

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Police Chief (Count Monteforte) another under the pretext of being the Director of the Customs (Monsieur Kitabgi) one calling himself instructor (General Adreini or Russian officers) another saying he is a priest (Dr. Torrance and American Missionaries) another under the excuse of hiring the mines (English Mining Company) another of establishing a Bank (Imperial Bank of Persia) and another under the plea of having the monopoly of the tobacco trade (Major Talbot) are taking away the resources of the country and in time they will take possession of the country itself, when it will be the beginnings of your misfortunes. Before you become the slaves of the foreigners like the natives of India you may find a remedy. Your silence and endurance have caused a great surprise to the Ulema and the people. The former have always protected the religion should you show any energy they are ready to help you. If you do not fear for the destruction of the religion you may, at least, care for your worldly affairs and fear the misfortunes of your friends, the evil speaking of historians, the curses and derision of your descendants and the contemptuous laughter which the foreigners now cast on you. . . . As you are the officials of the Govt of Islam you have to protect the religion and the Govt, you are positively responsible to God. It is most abominable that 18 krores of people should be in trouble and only a fewin comfort. Having pity for the Islamic nation and in order to encourage the powerful (people) I ventured to write this paper. 23 Kennedy, whose information about Afghani's expulsion came from an interested party, the Amin os-Soltan, reported of the incident after a conversation with the Amin os-Soltan: His Majesty refused to listen to the Amin-es-Sultan's advice that this expulsion should be effected in a quiet and unostentatious manner, so as to avoid a possible disturbance . . . . A slight disturbance was caused by the Syed and his supporters, who endeavoured to resist.... Some letters have been found in the possession of the Syed which compromise several prominent personages, the most notable of whom is the Amin-ed-Dowleh, Minister of Posts and President of the Council, who is one of the Amin-es-Sultan's chief rivals. These letters speak in terms of contempt and derision of the Shah, the Amin-es-Sultan and other Ministers....

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P.S. January 15. Yesterday the Amin-es-Sultan informed me that Monsieur Grego revitch, Dragoman of the Russian Legation, had called upon him and complained that the Syed had been arrested and banished at the instigation of the British Legation. This idea which is generally current in Persian circles had been suggested to Monsieur de Biitzow by the Amin-edDowleh.s! When the Amin os-Soltan denied British interference, and said that Sayyed Jamal ad-Din was an Iranian subject, and that Russian interference for him made that Legation morally responsible for his secret agitation, the Russians disavowed any protective interests. That the correspondence found in Afghani's possession actually compromised the Amin od-Dowleh, as the Amin os-Soltan was so anxious to have the British believe, seems untrue. According to the diary of the E'temad os-Saltaneh, the Amin od-Dowleh was not afraid when his letters to Afghani were shown to the Shah, since he never wrote compromising letters. The Amin od-Dowleh's memoirs say that the Amin os-Soltan was eager to seize Afghani suddenly in order to take his papers, and to show them to the Shah. But his plan misfired as the papers did not implicate any important or governmental figures in Jamal ad-Din's activities. 25 These stories seem credible, as neither the Amin od-Dowleh nor anyone else was jailed or even deprived of his position as a result of the seizure of Afghani's letters, as they surely would have been if anything actually implicating them in oppositional activity had been found. Russian and local protest to the harsh and unusual treatment of Afghani evidently reached the ears of Naser ed-Din Shah very soon. The Shah, who was very easily frightened by opposition, now apparently decided that milder treatment of Afghani, who had not yet reached the Persian border, was in order, and asked Amin os-Soltan to have him kept at Hamadan until the severe winter weather was over, and asked that a friendly letter and a money present be sent to him in the Shah's name. On January 20, however, Kennedy reported: The Amin-us-Sultan endeavoured to dissuade the Shah, but His Majesty insisted upon his wishes being carried out. His Highness [Amin os-Soltan] informs me that he has not yet obeyed His Majesty in this matter and that he will avoid if possible doing so, as the Seyed is in the enjoyment of excellent 48

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health and there is no danger of his succumbing to the hardships of the journey and of giving rise in consequence to the public scandal which the Shah seemed to dread. 26 After Afghani was expelled his followers continued to meet, and soon after began to act. Afghani apparently left behind a secret society which aimed at reform and lessening foreign influence in Iran. Soon thereafter Iranian opposition began to center more specifically on the tobacco concession. Late in January Akhtar published its promised further article on the concession. Reporting a conversation by the author, one of the editors, with Major Talbot, the article noted the great disadvantages to Persian growers, merchants, and exporters in having to deal with a monopoly. It again compared unfavorably the Persian concession with that of Turkey, where the government received far more revenue and the Regie had no export monopoly. The article went on: It is clear enough that the concessionnaire will commence the work with a small capital and will purchase the tobacco from the cultivators and sell it to the merchants and manufacturers for higher prices, and all the profit will remain in the purse of the English. As the Persian merchants have no right to export tobacco from Persia those who were formerly engaged in this trade are now obliged to give up their business and find some other work for themselves. The concessionnaire does not take into consideration how many merchants who were formerly engaged in this business will be left without employment and will suffer loss in finding other occupations. We made all these remarks to Major Talbot and then went away. We cannot give details of all the loss which the Government may suffer in the present copy and in future we will try to make them known to our readers;" Akhtar's two early articles against the tobacco concession helped to arouse Iranians on the subject and these articles as well as the suppression of Akhtar's entry were referred to in later proclamations by participants in the opposition movement. In February, 1891, Talbot came to Iran to install the Regie, as the monopoly was called. The tobacco concession was announced publicly for the first time by the Shah, and opposition within Iran began to express itself almost immediately. A petition from tobacco merchants protesting the Regie was presented to the 49

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Shah by the Amin od-Dowleh. At this early stage the Shah and the Amin os-Soltan treated the opposition severely. A Council of Ministers was called on February 21 at which the Shah bitterly reproached any minister who opposed the concession, and support for the concession was voiced not only by the Amin os-Soltan, but unexpectedly by the hitherto pro-Russian Yahya Khan Moshir od-Dowleh. The Amin os-Soltan told the British the complaint was not genuine and was instigated by the Russians, and he took advantage of the occasion to discredit his rival, the Amin od- Dowleh, in British eyes. The Amin os-Soltan and the Shah were, however, aware of strong local opposition to the concession, as indicated by the warnings they now made to Talbot and repeated to his representative Ornstein, who arrived in April, that Regie agents should proceed with great tact and circumspection and not insist at first on the full enforcement of their legal rights. That Company Agents in fact behaved tactlessly and oppressively in many cases despite this warning is asserted not only by Iranians, but by the British Oriental Secretary and in confidential reports to the Legation by the British agent in Shiraz.s" The then British Oriental Secretary and Military Attache, T. E. Gordon, says in his Persia Revisited: 'An imprudent beginning was made in exercising the right of search in a manner which alarmed some people for the privacy of their homes, a dangerous suggestion in a Mohammedan community.'29 And Kennedy on October 6, 1891, telegraphed that the Company's 'agents, who, with one or two exceptions, are not, unfortunately, the class of men successfully to perform the delicate task intrusted to them, should be told to moderate their zeal.'30 The fact that such charges were made by sympathetic members of the British Legation staff lends weight to at least some of the more detailed and stronger charges which are made in Persian sources. However the Regie agents behaved there was bound to be opposition to the handling of an item of intimate use by unbelievers. According to the stricter Shi'is, close contact with an article handled by unbelievers was defiling. This was one of many grounds on which trouble might have been anticipated. As early as February, 1891, there was a most perceptive warning, printed in the Financial Standard, March 7, 1891 (and in the French Revue Diplomatique of February 28, 1891). It emanated from: A correspondent and personal acquaintance, holding a high official position in Persia, and whose sympathies are entirely 50

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with England, having received his education in one of the foremost universities in this country. The description seems to fit only the Oxford-educated Naser ol-Molk, as the Shah was so adamant against letting his subjects be educated abroad that there was apparently only one high official with the named education. The letter begins by acknowledging Drummond Wolff's great activities in behalf of English interests, but goes on to note that his successes, such as the Bank, the Karun opening, etc., may not help England in the end: It is difficult to prejudge whether the adoption of these measures will be favourable or prejudicial to English influence in future. Able and experienced diplomatists think that the interference of the Foreign Office in Persian affairs will excite the competition of Russia, and already a commencement of activity on the part of the latter Power is noticeable. She is at this moment represented in Persia by one of the most practical and astute diplomatists, Monsieur de Butzow, who has a thorough knowledge of the Orientals, proceeds leisurely and with prudence. Having none of the funds which they dispose of in London, the Russians endeavour actually to impede the establishment of English enterprises and create difficulties for their working. Moreover, they are trying their best to do in the North of Persia what the English have desired to do in the South. They are actually employed in the formation of a company for the construction of roads joining Teheran and the Caspian Sea on one side, and the Tauris and Tillis on the other. They are also going to found a Mont-de-Plete and Insurance Companies in Persia. But their great effort will be brought to bear upon the tobacco monopoly granted to an English company six months ago. The Russians deny that Persia has the right to grant monopolies; that is to say, especial privileges to one Power or one individual to the exclusion of others. The text of the treaties offers matter for discussion upon this subject. . . . It appears that Persian statesmen have allowed themselves to be allured for this concession, as, indeed, for many others, beyond the limits of what they could and should have conceded. Having no experience of the laws and usages of Europe, the Persians who only consult immediate interests are always exposed to the perils of signing with European contracts, the purport of which they do not understand, nor do they

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consider the consequences. Such has been the contract signed with Major Talbot for the tobacco monopoly. Undoubtedly, then, this will be a matter of dispute in the near future. It will create for the Persian Government a thousand and one difficulties and embarrassments, without counting the great losses which it will cause to the Persian agriculturalists and merchants. 30a The prediction began to be fulfilled almost immediately. In March a secret Iranian informant told the British Legation that the concession was causing much excitement, that sixty tobacco merchants had met at the home of the leader of the merchants, Malek ot-Tojjar, and had written a petition to the Shah offering to pay a tobacco tax which would give him more income than the concession-presumably the petition noted above. Later: On March 6th all the tobacco merchants and dealers assembled in the Masjed-Shah and then proceeded to Shahzadeh Abdul Azim where they took sanctuary and wrote a petition to the Shah saying that they would not submit to the English Company. The Shah is much disturbed and very probably H.M. will repudiate the Concession given to the said Company. 31 This is the first of several reports of the Shah's desire to repudiate the concession in face of opposition, a course from which he was deterred by British advice and pressure. On March 18 de Balloy reported Talbot's efforts to win over the Persian tobacco merchants and producers by promising them no loss in their profits, but added that Talbot's talks with the merchants seemed to have had no effect: as petitions to the Shah follow each other without interruption. A few days ago the petitioners, led by Seyyids and mollahs, dared to go to see the King at the moment when he returned to town from one of his excursions. The Shah then held several sessions of the Grand Council where the question was discussed if it would not be better to repay Talbot his expenses and withdraw the concession. Opinions were very divided, the financial beneficiaries favoring continuing the concession. This confirms the above report that cancellation was considered by the Shah as early as the first serious petitions and Russian pressures in March, 1891. De Balloy then notes that if Russia wanted to fan the flames they could make the situation untenable for the Regie agents, and adds that as time went on 52

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one saw more and more 'how much the policy of Sir Drummond Wolff was dangerous for both Persia and his own country.?" In March the Shah was also greatly upset by the continued wide circulation in Iran of Malkam Khan's Qdnun, and by Malkam's 'treasonable' correspondence with several leading Persian statesmen. When one of these, the Moshir od-Dowleh, formerly hostile to the Amin os-Soltan, but recently reconciled with him, showed the Shah a letter discouraging him (Moshir od-Dowleh) from accepting office until the ministerial offices were reformed so as not to leave all power in the hands of the Grand Vizier: The Shah at once summoned a Council of Ministers and of Princes of the Royal House, before whom His Majesty openly denounced Malkom Khan as a traitor to his sovereign and his country, and declared that any Persian who should hold correspondence with him would be branded and treated as a traitor. An order was given that all Malkom Khan's decorations should be withdrawn .... The Shah, who has been thrown by Malkom Khan's proceedings into one of those paroxysms of irritation and alarm to which His Majesty is liable when he makes discoveries which seem to threaten, either externally or internally, his sovereign power and authority, specifically asked that Her Majesty's Government would take steps to expel Malkom Khan from London and to suppress his newspaper.... The Amin-us-Sultan confidentially added that the Shah, who had for a long time been dissatisfied with the general conduct of his Ambassador at Constantinople, had decided to recall him. The latter who is a friend of Malkom Khan's and closely connected by marriage with one of the Amin-us-Sultan's chief rivals, the Amin-ud-Dowleh, appears to have to a great extent aided and abetted the various schemes and intrigues which are constantly being set on foot against the Amin-us-Sultan.P Enclosed in this despatch from Kennedy is a translation of Qdnun, No.7, which notes that Iran is one of the few countries of Asia which still has no laws, which have been pushed even into Bokhara on Russian bayonets. It is inevitable that Iran should get laws, and it will be done either internally or through foreign conquest. The paper calls on the readers to help open the eyes of others to the truth, and to form assemblies with the goal of '53 F

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effecting reform. Illustrating the Islamic tone noted above, Qdnun goes on: Our ignorant and unjust statesmen have put aside all the laws of our religion and trampled over them, and the laws of God cannot be reformed unless we, the inhabitants of this country, be united together, and by the doctrines of our religion we may then establish laws.... We do not desire to invent new laws. Our desire is that our learned people and the chiefs of our religion may meet together and have the laws of our God carried out in a proper way. The paper goes on to give high praise to Yahya Khan Moshir od-Dowleh, and quotes a member of the ulama as saying that nothing good can be accomplished in Iran without the assistance of the ulama, whose ablest members must be sought out as leaders of the people. Also enclosed in the same despatch is the text of Malkam's letter to Moshir od-Dowleh, which has a milder tone.s! The pro- Russian Moshir od-Dowleh had recently been removed as Foreign Minister under British pressure, but had now begun to court the favor of the British and the Shah. In November, 1890 he told Kennedy that he had worked for the recent concessions to the British, and in March, 1891 he was given an important gift by the Shah and the Amin os-Soltan. Kennedy reported: The Mushir-ud-Dowleh has been anxiously expecting this gift since last November, and the support which he has afforded to the Tobacco Regie... was given in the hope of securing in return some pecuniary reward. 35 At the end of March the Shah was reported to be still much upset by the circulation of Qdnun in Iran, as he dreaded its effect on leading Persian statesmen believed to hold liberal views and also on the people, whose eyes might be opened to existing vices.36 In March also the Shah tried to close the Western-style school of the Alliance Francaise, which he had formerly sanctioned, out of fear that Western education would raise the level of discontent in Iran. Kennedy reported: The Shah is at the present moment disposed to look upon all foreign schools in Persia with dislike and suspicion, as he fears they may innocently or designedly develop the "revolutionary" seed which is being sown by Malkom Khan, by the Moeen-ulMulk, ex-Ambassador at Constantinople, and by the Amin-ud-

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Dowleh, and which finds secret favour in the eyes of many leading Persians, who sigh under the personal and exacting despotism of their sovereign. The Shah is looked upon by many of his subjects, who have lived or travelled abroad as the Representative of the most stationary and selfish form of Conservatism, and none of them would venture to broach to His Majesty any ideas which would imply a modification however slight of the present system of personal despotism with all its inherent vices well knowing that it would merely excite His Majesty's angry suspicions, and that no dependence can be placed upon the loyal cooperation of those who secretly profess similar liberal views;" De Balloy made a similar report on the Shah's fear of Western education. 3 7a In late March and April a group of followers of Afghani began to send anonymous hostile letters to high members of the government denouncing the government's policy of concession-granting and noting the evils of the tobacco concession, and anonymous placards began to circulate against this policy in both Tehran and Tabriz. These were written very much in the orthodox, Islamic style utilized by Afghani, and emanated from men he had influenced on his last trip to Iran. The Shah was very upset and ordered a number of arrests of men found to be in secret correspondence with Malkam Khan and Afghani, who were believed to be plotting against the government with their Iranian followers. According to information reaching the British Oriental Secretary and Military Attache, T. E. Gordon, the various printed opposition sheets emanated from a secret society which had been set up by Jamal ad-Din, and which was exposed to the Iranian government by an informer. Among those arrested, against all protocol, was an Iranian employee of the Austrian Legation: The press used for printing was a lithographic one, and one of the Mirza's employed by the Austrian Legation having been drawn into Jemal's secret society, he was induced to set it up in his own house. The usual informer accomplice was found, or offered himself, for the purpose of betraying his brethren, and the police became so keen on capture that, oblivious of the privilege enjoyed by the employe of a foreign Legation, they entered the Mirza's house and arrested him in the act of printing treasonable papers from the lithographic press. The Mirza was carried off to prison before the Minister knew of the 55

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occurrence, but, on being informed, he promptly made a strong remonstrance against the violation of international privilege. 38 Gordon adds that the police then released the man, but when an inquiry convinced the Austrian Minister of the Mirza's culpability, he was dismissed and rearrested. Among others arrested at this time were Mirza Reza Kermani, who later assassinated the Shah; a former employee of the Iranian Legation in London; Hajji Sayyah ; and several Babis who possibly had no connection with the opposition movement. They were sent to jail in Qazvin. The French diplomatic documents give further details on the opposition movement and arrests of April, 1891. On April 30 the French Minister, de Balloy, wrote home that the stripping of Malkam Khan's ranks and honors: occurred at a time when everyone was already excited over the establishment of the tobacco regie, and it had the effect of exciting people still further. Qanun got only more vogue and the petitions demanding the suppression of the regie continued uninterrupted. I cannot say that Russia counts for nothing in this movement. A few days ago the malcontents, perhaps feeling themselves supported by this Power, had placed in the gardens of the Shah derogatory placards accusing him of selling his country to foreigners, of not occupying himself with public affairs, which he abandoned to the hands of an inexperienced favorite, of dreaming only of his pleasures, without concern for the good of his impoverished and unhappy people, and that such a state of affairs could not continue; if he did not change his conduct he would be killed. 39 The despatch continued that the Shah was very frightened and saw a relation between the placards and Qdnun. He decided to see who in Iran was in correspondence with Malkam Khan and began seizing letters and then arresting people. The E'temad os-Saltaneh was reported to have been frightened at seeing one of his employees arrested and to have taken bast (sanctuary) for 24 hours. While the Austrian Minister had allowed his employee to be arrested, Biitzov had protected as Russian subjects others of the accused. Arrests had by late April reached about thirty. Later despatches from the French Minister give reports of torture of some of the accused which are also given in some of the Persian accounts. They also indicate that some of the 56

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opposition circulars were sent in from London by Malkam Khan.s? though other reports show that some at least were run off locally in Tehran. In the same period, which was the holy month of Ramazan, the mollas were preaching against the sale of Iran to the infidels, and there was already the beginning of the strange alliance between the religious and the radical parties which was to continue to be so important throughout the tobacco movement and beyond. On April 29, Kennedy reported in detail on the situation and noted: Among the persons arrested is a pedlar of the name of Mirza Ali Reza. [He later assassinated the Shah.] His secret correspondence proved him to be one of Seyed Jamal-ud-Din's chief Agents, and to be his mouthpiece in propagating the belief that England is an oppressive Ruler, by whom the natives of India are cruelly used, and that it is to Russia that Persians should look for assistance and protection.... These occurrences, as may be supposed, have caused a good deal of excitement, more especially as they have taken place during the month of Ramazan. There appear to be two distinct and opposing causes for these disturbances. On the one hand the partisans of Malkom Khan who share his "liberal" and "reforming" views, chiefly perhaps for the purpose of attacking the Shah's Chief Minister, are trying to open the eyes of the nation to the tyrannical and corrupt form of Govt under which they are living, and to imbue the people with an idea of democratic power; on the other, the fanatical Mollahs, taking advantage of Ramazan, are preaching everywhere against the surrender of the Faithful into the hands of the Infidels. Trade of all kinds, Mines, Banks, Tobacco, Roads, are, it is said, sold to Europeans, who will gradually obtain corn land and even Mussulman women. To quote an expression used in a letter by a certain Seyed at Shiraz to the Prince Governor of Fars, and sent by the latter to the Shah: "Mussulman lambs are being devoured by European wolves." It is unfortunate that this strong feeling should have arisen just at the time the Director of the Persian Tobacco Regie has arrived at Tehran and is preparing to begin operations. . . . 41 The names of the most important men arrested were included in the despatch, along with the claim, probably false, that Mirza 57

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Reza when arrested had with him two loaded revolvers which he declared to be destined for the Shah and the Amin os-Soltan, Enclosed in the despatch was a translation of one of the protest letters, this one addressed to the Naser os-Saltaneh, the chief of the court of justice at Tabriz. The 'Afghanian' tone of the letter can be seen from the following excerpt: How could we pass the Serat ... while we have yielded the path of the Moslems to the Infidels? How could you appear before the Prophet while you have caused such oppression on his followers? ... These few pounds of Tobacco, which were produced with labour and which a few men with much trouble used to export in order to obtain a piece of bread have been coveted and they have been granted to the infidels and forbidden to the followers of the Prophet.... On great human beings don't you know yourselves? When are you going to wake up? They have suppressed the "Akhter" who through pity used to criticise us; others are not blind .... It is not the fault of the Ulema who are the representatives of the Prophet, why reproach them? . . . Who is the executioner of this people? The Ministers who are the lowest of European gardeners, who have the privilege of being received in private places .... 41a In a telegram of April 27, Kennedy noted the Amin osSoltau's claim that: there are grave reasons for suspecting, in consequence of the confessions of some of the prisoners, that M. Gregorovitch, Oriental Secretary of the Russian Legation, has been privy to the present seditious movement. 42 However, no further proof is given of this charge in the more detailed despatches. British charges against Grigorovich and Speyer were later reiterated, but again without apparent proof. Since these two on other occasions did exceed their instructions from St. Petersburg, they may also have done so during the tobacco protest. In this early stage of the opposition movement, the Shah's reactionary and powerful son, Nayeb os-Saltaneh, actually contributed to the spread of alarm. Mirza Reza, one of the men arrested and the later assassin of Naser ed-Din Shah, always maintained that he had been tricked into sending the Shah complaints about the state of Iran by the Nayeb os-Saltaneh, who had a personal grudge against him. One version of Mirza

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Reza's story, as given by Hajji Sayyah, who spent time in jail with him, is, with much omission of details as follows: The Nayeb os-Saltaneh had a grudge against Mirza Reza over a shawl the latter sold him. Mirza Reza had been recommended as a personal servant to Sayyed Jamal ad-Din by Hajji Mohammed Hasan Dar oz-Zarb, at whose home Afghani was staying. Mirza Reza became a devoted follower ofAfghani's and news ofhis unhappiness at Afghani's expulsion reached the Nayeb os-Saltaneh. The latter swore on a Koran to help secure Afghani's return to Iran, but said it was necessary for Mirza Reza to write letters of complaint to the government, so the Shah would know that the people were unhappy and wanted Afghani's return. Upon his writing the letters he was arrested by the Nayeb os-Saltaneh, who thus not only paid off old grudges, but succeeded in terrorizing the Shah and stressing his own loyalty and ability through this and other arrests.:" The same story with fewer details was given by Mirza Reza at his interrogation after he assassinated the Shah, but there he makes it clear that many of the other followers of Afghani who wrote letters of complaint at this time did so without any instigation from the Nayeb os-Saltaneh.v Whatever the truth of this story, which seems not improbable in view of the general veracity of Mirza Reza's testimony and of the Nayeb's capacity for Oriental intrigue, the general conduct of the Nayeb at this time is independently testified to by Kennedy: . . . Much of the excitement caused by the numerous arrests which have been made in connection with the "revolutionary" movement recently discovered, is to be attributed to the conduct of His Royal Highness, the Naib-us-Sultaneh, Governor of Tehran, who is, I understand, aided and abetted by Count de Monteforte, Chief of the Tehran Police. Both these officials work successfully upon the alarm and natural timidity of the Shah and, while professing to be actuated by a great zeal in defence of His Majesty's Person and Rights succeed at the same time in extorting sums of money from the unfortunate people whom they arrest or threaten to arrest on the slightest provocation.... *

* F.O. 60/523, Kennedy to Salisbury, No. 120, May 7, 1891. The same despatch notes that opponents of the Amin os-Soltan were taking advantage of the movement to undermine his position, and that the Russian Minister was deliberately encouraging the dissemination of false rumors that the Amin os-Soltan's position had been shaken and that his fall was imminent. 59

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Events were to show that the Nayeb, who probably also used the opposition movement as a tool to undermine the Amin os-Soltan, was playing with fire, and the movement went far beyond anything he or the other official opponents of the Grand Vizier could have wished for. On May 14, 1891, de Balloy announced that the Shah was still terrified by threats to his life, and that on this account even leading men in the government were afraid of the Shah's vengeance: The day before yesterday it was Amin ed-Dowleh, President of the Council and Minister of Posts who, suddenly called at night to the palace, went there trembling; a few days before someone came to demand on the part of the Shah that he deliver his correspondence with Malkom Khan. The Amin od-Dowleh's papers were searched, de Balloy reported" without anything compromising being found, but 'at the home of one of his mirzas there was discovered a packet of circulars sent by Malkom Khan and destined to be distributed in the provinces....' De Balloy repeats the British report that part of the excitement was enflamed by the Nayeb os-Saltaneh and the Italian police chief. Warning the French Foreign Minister against possible attempts by Talbot to sell shares in the Tobacco Corporation in France, de Balloy reiterated: 'The very existence of the Regie in Persia is illegal and against the letter and the spirit of the treaties which assure the nationals of the contracting Powers freedom of trade.' He predicted months before the actual cancellation that in view of Russian and popular hostility the Regie 'seems to me to have very little chance of success.'46

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FOOTNOTES Chapter II F.O. 539/60, Wolff to Salisbury, No.3 (104), April 3, 1890, and E. G. Browne, The Persian Revolution, pp. 33-35. 2 F.O. 539/40, Wolff to Salisbury, No. 125 (242), Nov. 3, 1888. 3 This is indicated by Wolff in F.O. 539/47, same to same, No. 15 (10), Jan. 10, 1890, Telegraphic, quoted below; and F.O. 65/1378, same to same, No. 102, Very Secret, April 4, 1889, reporting the Shah's request to Wolff to draft a concession 'on the lines discussed with Major Talbot'. , A. E., Perse, 1890, No. 16, April 30. 5 Ebrahim Taimuri, Tahrim-e tanbiiku (Tehran, n.d.), pp. 24-29. Though this is a recent and interesting book, its infrequent mention of sources has led me to make only sparing use of it. It is partly based on an account of an Iranian eyewitness, Shaikh Hasan Karbala'i, Qariirdiid-e rezhi 1890 m. (Arak, Iran, ca. 1955). Taimuri quotes the Shah's published diary of his third trip to Europe describing his contact with Talbot in England. Both Taimuri and Karbala'i note the close ties between Talbot and Salisbury. Taimuri's claim that the concession was negotiated mainly during the Shah's stay in England may receive some support from British press reports. Thus Truth, May 26, 1892, says, 'When the Shah was over here, Mr. G. F. Talbot (a son of the late Vicar of Hatfield) was placed on his staff. Subsequently Mr. Talbot went out, or was sent out, to Persia, to obtain a concession. A later issue of Truth (of which the date is not included in the clipping collection I used, but which must date, from its position in the collection, from the summer of 1892), says: 'The Concessionaire is on the Stock Exchange, and I am told that he got the concession through Mr. Cloete, then Persian Consul-General [in London], and now an inmate of one of her Majesty's prisons. Mr. Cloete -so the story runs-was told to buy some pictures for the Shah when he was over here. He bought the pictures, which were not of the kind that would have found favour in the eyes of Mr. MacDougall. They so pleased the Shah, that Mr. Cloete became a persona grata to him'. The final story may not be true, but it is one of many echoes of the apparent fact that much of the dealing for the concession was done in a period, largely unrecorded in the British documents, when the Shah was in England. 6 F.O. 248/530, Nawab to Charge, March 31, 1891, record of an interview with the Shah and Talbot. 7 A. E., Perse, 1892, No. 74, Dec. 17. 8 F.O. 539/47, Wolff to Salisbury, No. 15 (10), Jan. 10,1890, Telegraphic. 9 A. E., Perse, 1890, No. 16, April 30. F.O. 65/1393, Wolff to Salisbury, No. 105, April 1, 1890, Secret and Most Confidential, has Wolff's denial to the Russians of personal ties to the tobacco concession. 10 The chief parliamentary debate in which charges were made against Salisbury and Talbot was recorded essentially verbatim in the Times 1

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of May 27, 1892, and additional comments by various newspapers and journals appeared at that time or shortly thereafter. In the debate Mr. Labouchere said that on Nov. 3, 1890 Talbot sold the concession, for which he had paid nothing, to the Imperial Tobacco Corporation for £300,000 and on the same day a prospectus asking the public to subscribe capital was issued. Mr. Lowther for the government stated that the concession had been granted without the government's knowledge. Truth on May 26, 1892 charged that Talbot did not really sell the concession. On May 14, 1891 de BaUoy had reported that Talbot had failed in attempts to sell the concession and so had had to form his OWl) company in which he still held the majority of shares, which he was trying to sell. A. E., Perse, 1891, No. 20, May 14. 11 F.O. 539/47, Wolff to Salisbury, No. 102 (70), March 21, 1890, Very Secret, Telegraphic. 12 F.O. 60/512, Wolff to Salisbury, No. 259, Very Confidential, August 6, 1890. On the Nayeb's further incitment of the opposition, including possibly the instigation of letters of complaint to the Shah, see below. The Shah's complaint on Malkam is in F.O. 60/512, Wolff to Salisbury, No. 251, Most Confidential, July 30, 1890. In a despatch of August 5, No. 257, Confidential, Wolff reported that the Shah, while 'promising for his own safety to let Sir Henry Drummond Wolff know all that the Russian Minister submitted to him', begged that this be kept strictly secret. 13 F.O. 60/513, Wolff to Salisbury, No. 227, Telegraphic, Sept. 14, 1890. Documents in this volume also show the following about Russian pressures: In the same period the Russians were pressing the Shah to agree not to allow any railways to be built for ten years. The Shah did not want railways, as he feared they would lead to further foreign penetration' but on the other hand he feared British reaction. The British did not want railways either, as they feared they would give Russia an advantage, but on the other hand protested control of this question going into the hands of the Russians. In early November, however, the Shah signed the Russian railways agreement, and he and the Amin osSoltau were reported to be in a state of nervous dread vis-a-vis the Russians. This fear of crossing the Russians in face of possible aggressive action on their part was also a factor in the Shah's reaction to the protests against the to bacco concession. On the railroad question, see Firuz Kazemzadeh, "Russian Imperialism and Persian Railways," Russian Thought and Politics, IV (Cambridge, Mass., 1957), which is excellent on the Russian position, but should be supplemented by a realization that neither the Shah nor the British wanted railroads in Iran at this time either. u F.O. 539/48, Salisbury to Wolff, No. 25 (42), London, April 13, 1890. 15 F.O. 60/553, Wolff to Salisbury, Tel. No. 234, Sept. 17, 1890. 16 F.O. 539/43, No. 48, 'Memorandum by Mr. S. Churchill Respecting the Principal Personages in Persia.' On the reforming activity of the Amin od-Dowleh, see Browne, Persian Revolution, pp. 417-418, summarized from the longer treatment in Kermani, Tiirikh-e bidiiri, pp. 121-126. Kermani notes Amin od-Dowleh's friendship with Afghani and his Pan-Islamic beliefs, pp. 125-126. Mahdi Malekzadeh, Tiirikh-e enqeliib-e mashrutiyyat-e Iriin (Tehran, n.d.), I, pp. 148-153, 220-221,

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while praising Amin od-Dowleh's reform activity, cites a document showing that Naser ed-Din Shah knew he gave government secrets to the English. 17 A. E., Perse, 1892, No. 65, Oct. 24, 1892. 18 A. E., Perse, 1890, No. 28, Sept. 17. 19 Ibid. No. 34, Oct. 30. 20 The article is quoted in Browne, Persian Revolution, pp. 46--48. 21 Translation of Akhtar, issue no. 22, enclosed in F.O. 60/522, Kennedy to Salisbury, No. 47, Feb. 25, 1891. On the great influence of Akhtar, F.O. 539/68, Extract from Col. Yate's Diary, enclosed in Greene to Kimberley, No. 48 (167), Aug. 8, 1894, says: 'This paper is published weekly in Constantinople, and has a large circulation in Persia and Central Asia. In fact ... it has the principal circulation, and is preferred to all other papers in Persian, whether of Tehran, Isfahan, or Bombay. I found the Governor of Herat reading it, and he, like many others, takes it regularly and bases his opinions on it, and the general impression in Persia is that whatever appears in the "Akhtar" is true'. On issues other than the tobacco concession Akhtar sometimes took an anti-Russian and pro-British stand. 22 Molk Arii, op. cit.. p. 113. 23 F.O. 60/522, Kennedy to Salisbury, No. 15, Jan. 16, 1891. The parenthetical words are additions by the translator. A Persian crore is 500,000. (I have changed a few of the worst renderings of Persian, here and elsewhere.) 240 F.O. 60/594, Kennedy to Salisbury, No. 11, Jan. 12, 1891. Further details about Afghani's expulsion are in various documents in Afshar, op. cit. 25 Amin od-Dowleh, op. cit., pp. 150-151; Afshar, op, cit., pp. 151-152. 26 F.O. 60/594, Kennedy to Salisbury, No. 20, Jan. 20, 1891. 27 Translation enclosed in F.O. 60/522, Kennedy to Salisbury, No. 105, April 15, 1891. 28 On the misbehavior of the company agents in Shiraz, see n. 38, below. 29 T. E. Gordon, Persia Revisited (London, 1896), p. 27. 30 F.O. 60/553, Kennedy to Salisbury, Telegram No. 203, Oct. 6, 1891, Secret. 30a Financial Standard, March 7, 1891. 31 Abstract of Confidential News, F.O. 248/530. Cf. F.O. 539/60, Kennedy to Salisbury, No.9 (25), Feb. 23, 1891, Telegraphic. The points above this are in i bid., Kennedy to Salisbury, No. 12 (50), Feb. 25, 1891 with enclosures; ibid., same to same (85), April 22, 1891, Telegraphic. 32 A. E., Perse, 1891, No.5, Mar. 18. 33 F.O. 60/522, Kennedy to Salisbury, March 10, 1891. 340 Loc. cit., enclosures. 35 F.O. 539/53, Kennedy to Salisbury, No. 95 (62), March 5, 1891; F.O. 539/50, same to same, No. 82 (321), Nov. 20,1890. 36 F.O. 60/522, Kennedy to Salisbury, No. 84, March 30, 1891. 37 Ibid., Kennedy to Salisbury, No. 85, April 1, 1891. Persian works are full of stories illustrating the Shah's hostility to modem education, and point out that almost nothing was done to advance it in his 48 year rule. See especially Malekzadeh, op, cit., I, pp. 134-143. 37a A. E., Perse, 1891, No. 19, May 12.

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T. E. Gordon, Persia Revisited, p. 186. See also the names and details given in the testimony of Mirza Reza Kerrnani, in Browne, op. cit., p.88. 39 A. E., Perse, 1891, No. 14, April 30, 1891. '0 Ibid., No. 20, May 14, 1891. n F.O. 60/522, Kennedy to Salisbury, No. 116, April 29, 1891. 41a Enclosure in ibid. 4.2 F.O. 539/53, Kennedy to Salisbury, No. 129 (91), April 27, 1891, Most Secret, Telegraphic. 4.3 Hajji Sayyah's story appears in the memoirs of Ali Khan Qajar Zahir od-Dowleh, which have been partially published in both Russian and French translations: Iu. E. Borshchevskii, 'Tarikh-i mukhtasar-i sakhikh-i bi-durug Ali-khana Kadzhara Zakhir od-Doule Safi Alishakha', Ocherki po istorii russkogo vostokovedeniia, V, Moscow, 1960; and 'Assassinat de Nasr-ed-Din Chah Kadjar', Revue du monde musulman, XII (December, 1910), pp. 591-615. 44 Browne, Persian Revolution, p. 88. 45 A. E. Perse, 1891, No. 20, May 14. Amin od-Dowleh, Ope cit., pp. 152155, discusses the spring protests and says that the Amin os-Soltan tried to use them to discredit his enemies. 38

64

Chapter III THE LARGE-SCALE PROTESTS MASS PROTESTS against the tobacco concession broke out in the major cities in Iran beginning in the spring of 1891. About this time company agents began to arrive in the various cities and to post a six months' deadline for the sale of all local tobacco to the Company and for the end of trade in tobacco except by merchants with authorizations from the Company. * When this happened the vast implications of the concession were for the first time borne home on the Iranians, many of whose livelihoods were dependent in whole or in part on tobacco cultivation or trade. Although the specific form of protest varied from city to city, there were certain common features in all cities. Everywhere it was the merchants, many of whom could expect to lose their income from the tobacco trade if the concession came into force, who were the most directly affected and who took a leading part in the opposition movement. In the tobacco growing areas the peasants were also made to believe that they would suffer great losses, although the Company, in order to forestall opposition, declared that it would buy tobacco at prevailing rates and for cash. Along with the merchants the ulama were the group most hostile to the concession. Partly this reflected their ties to merchant families and merchant guilds and their interest in tobacco grown on their private or vaqfland, but partly also they had their own reasons for opposition. The entry of large numbers of tobacco company employees into Iran was seen as a wedge for

* F.O. 539/60, Kennedy to Salisbury, No. 23 (125), May 13, 1891, reports the Shah's instructions to all governors to publicize edicts under which merchants would be allowed to dispose of their crops for six months only. Ibid., same to same, No. 43 (200), Sept 2, 1891, enclosed report of Ornstein to Shah, which is one of the few items in the British documents with definite figures. The report says that at that time there were 266 Regie employees, and that soon 1800 would be employed. One third of the money spent for tobacco was expected to be spent in Azerbaijan, with Shiraz and Isfahan coming next-an indication that the strongest provincial anti-Regie movements, not surprisingly, broke out just where the tobacco crop was the largest. 65

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un-Islamic practices and beliefs. * A generalized opposition to the sale of Iran to foreigners, noted above, was also operative among all classes. Although the main leaders of the opposition in all cities were members of the ulama, they were often acting partly as representatives of others, and particularly the merchants. Russian agents were apparently also involved in many of the protests, but the exact extent and nature of Russian activity is difficult to determine. From the beginning, there was some organized liaison between various cities, and Jamal ad-Din's and Malkam's followers played an important role. Among the documents indicating this role and the organized liaison among the various anti-Regie forces are the following: Military Attache and Oriental Secretary, T. E. Gordon, speaks of a secret society left behind by Jamal ad-Din as being responsible for the notices attacking the Shah and the Amin os-Soltan in the spring of 1891. A report from the British Shiraz agent of Apri118, 1891 in discussing the first anti-tobacco movement, that in Shiraz, says the mollas had had communications from Tehran telling them not to allow the execution of the tobacco concession. The governor had told the British agent that these 'letters were sent by some of Malkom Khan's partisans for the purpose of exciting the people against the government.' 1 Also in the British Embassy Archives, it is recorded that the Amin os-Soltan in relation to the second great anti-Regie outburst, that of Tabriz, said: that it is now proved that the Mujtahid at Tabriz has played a great mischief all through the late Regie disturbance, he had held communications with the Chief Mujtahid at Samara and

* A most interesting document on the nature and intensity of religious anti-Western feeling is the recently published eyewitness account by a student of Shirazi's, Shaikh Hasan Karbala'i, Qariirdiid-e rezhi 1890 m., ed. and introd. by Ebrahim Dehgan (Arak, Iran, ca. 1955). Karbala'i combines economic and religious arguments, saying that foreigners were taking over Iranian trade and industry, causing the ruin of handicrafts and loss of work; and that they were corrupting religious beliefs and practices and undermining morality (pp. 4-14). There is no mistaking the author's impassioned and serious concern that Iranians were beginning to abandon old ways and beliefs as a result of the European influx, and that as a result Islam itself was in danger. He claims too that tobacco company agents were domineering and economically oppressive, a claim also made elsewhere. Both Karbala'i and Ebrahim Taimuri Tahrim-e tanbaku (Tehran, n.d.), admit the important involvement of Russia in the opposition movement.

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the Ulemas of Mashad, and that he has secret communications with the Russian Consul-General at Tabriz." The attested fact that partisans of Malkam Khan and Jamal ad-Din helped circulate both their anti-Regie attacks in Qdnun and the printed copy of Jamal ad-Din's letter to Shirazi against the Regie and other concessions also indicates some degree of organization. Other evidence is given in the course of the narrative below. In April 1891, a movement of serious proportions against the tobacco concession began in Shiraz, which, along with Tehran and Tabriz, was to be a main center of opposition. As a major tobacco growing center, Shiraz early felt the effects of the concession. A leading molla, Sayyed Ali Akbar, began preaching with great effect against the Regie and at the end of April the Shah ordered the governor of Shiraz to have him expelled to Karbala-an unusual step to take against a sayyed and molla, On May 17 the sayyed was seized in Shiraz and escorted out of town. This event caused great unrest in the mosques and the bazaars. On the 18th the ulama of Shiraz sent a telegram to the government asking the return of Sayyed Ali Akbar, and crowds gathered at the telegraph office threatening to cause a disturbance if they did not get a favorable reply. The Shah, as usual, became very nervous and asked Amin os-Soltan to order the Governor of Shiraz to have the Sayyed brought back, saying that he had been sufficiently punished. The Amin os-Soltan argued with him that this would be a surrender to the mollas, who would become stronger than ever, and he finally convinced the Shah not to send this order. At this point Mr. Binns, the local manager of the tobacco Regie, arrived at Shiraz, and people began to say that the Sayyed had been expelled because of the newly-arrived infidel. The people and the mollas gathered in large numbers at a shrine and at the telegraph office, where they sent a message to the Amin os-Soltan, The Prince-Governor ordered soldiers out to disperse the crowd, and when the latter refused to move the soldiers fired upon them, and two or more people were killed.P On May 20 Kennedy reported optimistically on the Shiraz situation, saying that he had offered the Amin os-Soltan sincere congratulations on the suppression of the Shiraz opposition, and noting that the Governor General of Fars had acted 'with spirit and energy. . . . This defeat of the fanatical mollah party in

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Shiraz, where they are a numerous and influential body is in the highest degree beneficial to European interests.' 3 This enthusiasm was a bit premature, however. Although the Governor continued to be firm, expelling other members of Sayyed Ali Akbar's family, the Shiraz movement was not over. Many of the mollas of Shiraz refused to enter the mosques until Mr. Binns left town, and asked the people to do the same. The complaints expressed by the mollas included the fact that the increased entry of Europeans under the concession and their constant intercourse with Persians would undermine their religion. There was also great apprehension in Shiraz as elsewhere that Iranian merchants and growers would either lose their positions completely or suffer great losses as a result of the Regie. In addition, there may have been special interests involved in fomenting the movement-Amin os-Soltan claimed the Russians were behind the Shiraz disturbances, while the British agent at Shiraz said that large Lari merchants and the powerful mayor of Shiraz, Qavam 01- Molk, were secretly inciting trouble. Representatives of the British and of the tobacco corporation tried to allay local fears by statements indicating that local merchants would keep their positions, and that the country would not be flooded with Europeans. However, local allegations that company agents acted improperly and oppressively were borne out by secret reports from the British agent in Shiraz.! On June 3 the British agent in Shiraz reported that the ulama had not yet gone to the mosques, but the town was orderly. Sayyed Ali Akbar had not yet left the country, but was still in the port of Bushire. Since it had turned out to be impossible to have the tobacco concession announced from the mosques, as first planned, the British agent had copies made and distributed, as he did with the assurance from Ornstein, the head of the tobacco company in Iran, that Europeans would not replace Iranians and that tobacco prices would not rise. The agent also reported: The merchants, being much dissatisfied with the Imperial Bank have formed a Company for establishing a bank. There are 4000 shares and each share is sold for 25 tomans. This undertaking will be completed in a few days when the merchants will neither sell nor buy bills from the Imperial Bank. The Bank, more than the Regie, has caused dissatisfaction among the people here. 5 De Balloy also describes the first Shiraz movement, saying

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that Sayyed Ali Akbar's speeches seemed to have been inspired by the Akhtar article on the Regie. He notes that, even after calm was restored in Shiraz, company agents were boycotted and not sold anything. In the same period he reports a meeting of the main Tehran traders at the home of Moshir od-Dowleh to protest the privileges given to the British Imperial Bank of Persia, especially the exclusive right to issue banknotes, as well as other practices by the Bank which hurt them. 6 Although the Shiraz disturbances now died down for a while, they gave something of an example to other cities. They also had an important indirect result, as Sayyed Ali Akbar, when he left Iran, went to see Afghani who was being held under surveillance at Basra, discussed matters with him, and went from there to Samara to see the leader of the Shi'i ulama, Hajji Mirza Hasan Shirazi, later to become important for his fatwd forbidding the use of tobacco until the concession was withdrawn. 7 It was on the urging of Sayyed Ali Akbar that Afghani now wrote his famous letter to Shirazi against the concessionary policy of the government-a letter which many saw as a key factor in Shirazi's boycott fatwd. The letter says that the Persians are being made desperate by oppression and the sale of their country to foreigners, but that they lack a leader, and are waiting for Shirazi to direct them. Afghani continues, in the religious tone he used when addressing the ulama: Verily the King's purpose wavereth, his character is vitiated, his perceptions are failing and his heart is corrupt. He is incapable of governing the land, or managing the affairs of his people, and hath entrusted the reins of government in all things great and small to the hands of a wicked freethinker, a tyrant and usurper, who revileth the Prophets openly, and heedeth not God's law, who accounteth as naught the religious authorities, curseth the doctors of the Law, rejecteth the pious, contemneth honourable Sayyids and treateth preachers as one would treat the vilest of mankind. Moreover sincehis return from the lands of the Franks he hath taken the bit between his teeth, drinks wine openly, associates with unbelievers and displays enmity towards the virtuous. Such is his private conduct; but in addition to this he hath sold to the foes of our Faith the greater part of the Persian lands and the profits accruing therefrom, to wit the mines, the ways leading thereunto, the roads connecting them with the frontiers of the country. . . .

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Also the river Karlin and the guest houses which will arise on its banks and the highway from Ahwaz to Tihran.... Also the tobacco with the chief centres of cultivation, the lands on which it is grown, and the dwellings of the custodians, carriers and sellers, wherever these are found. He has similarly disposed of the grapes used for making wine, and the shops, factories and wine-presses appertaining to this trade throughout the whole of Persia; and so likewise soap, candles and sugar, and the factories connected therewith. Lastly there is the Bank: and what shall cause thee to understand what is the Bank? It means the complete handing over of the reins of government to the enemy of Islam, the enslaving of the people to that enemy, the surrendering of them and of all dominion and authority into the hands of the foreign foe.... Then he offered what was left to Russia as the price of her silence and acquiescence (if indeed she will consent to be silent), namely the Murdab (lagoon) of Rasht, the rivers of Tabaristan, and the road from Anzali to Khurasan, with the houses, inns and fields appertaining thereto. But Russia turned up her nose at this offer, and declined to accept such a present; for she is bent on the annexation of Khurasan and the occupation of Azerbaijan and Mazandaran, unless these agreements be cancelled and these compacts rescinded-agreements, namely, which involve the entire surrender of the kingdom of Persia into the hands of that most contentious foe. Such is the first result of the policy of this madman. In short this criminal has offered the provinces of the Persian land to auction amongst the Powers, and is selling the realms of Islam and the abodes of Muhammad and his household (on whom be greeting and salutation) to foreigners. But by reason of the vileness of his nature and the meanness of his understanding he sells them for a paltry sum and at a wretched price. (Yea, thus it is when meanness and avarice are mingled with treason and folly!) And thou, 0 Proof, if thou wilt not arise to help this people, and wilt not unite them in purpose, and pluck them forth, by the power of the Holy Law, from the hands of this sinner, verily the realms of Islam will soon be under the control of foreigners, who will rule therein as they please and do what they will.... And thou knowest that the 'ulamd of Persia and the people thereof with one accord (their spirits being straitened and their hearts distressed) await a word from thee wherein 70

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they shall behold their happiness and whereby their deliverance shall be effected. How then can it beseem one on whom God hath bestowed such power as this to be so chary of using it or to leave it in abeyance? I further assure Your Eminence, speaking as one who knoweth and seeth, that the Ottoman Government will rejoice in your undertaking of this effort and will aid you therein.... [Amin os-Soltan] had previously written to the WaH (Turkish governor), requesting him to remove me to Basra, knowing well that, if he left me alone, I should come to thee .... For he knew for a certainty that, should I succeed in meeting thee, it would not be possible for him to continue in his office, involving as it does the ruin of the country, the destruction of the people, and the encouragement of unbelief.... Moreover his conduct was made more culpable and mean in that, in order to avert a general revolt and appease the popular agitation, he accused the party whom zeal for religion and patriotism had impelled to defend the sanctuary of Islam and the rights of the people of belonging to the Babi sect. ... Wherefore, seeing myself remote from that high presence, I refrained from uttering my complaint.... But when that learned leader and mujtahid Hajji Sayyid 'Ali Akbar came to Basra, he urged me to write to that most high Pontiff a letter setting forth these events, misfortunes and afflictions, and I hastened to obey his command, knowing that God will effect something by thy hand. * Several points in this letter deserve comment. First, it indicates that the opposition movement had far broader aims and grievances than those centering on the tobacco concession, and indeed the stress put on the English bank, rather than the tobacco concession, tends to support the statement above by the British agent in Shiraz that it was the bank which was causing the most discontent

* Translated in Browne, Persian Revolution, pp. 15-21. Browne says the letter 'must have been written immediately after Sayyid Jamalu'd-Din's expulsion from Persia', but internal evidence shows it dates from several months later, since Sayyed Ali Akbar has already been to see Afghani but has not yet reached Shirazi. Afghani says, 'and thou wilt shortly hear what these cruel miscreants did to the learned, pious and righteous mujtahid Hajji Sayyid 'Ali-Akbar of Shiraz'. (p. 20). The despatch from Sir F. Lascelles, No. 14, Tehran, Jan. 19, 1892, in F.O. 60/594 is closer in saying that the letter, which had recently been circulating in Tehran, was written probably in May, 1891. British despatches give conflicting opinions on the extent of this letter's influence on Shirazi, and the state71

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·there. The reasons for discontent with the bank are not set forth. It obviously cut into banking operations, thus reducing the income of private bankers, while its monopoly of paper currency issue was also resented by local interests, who at various times tried to circumvent this monopoly by issuing private promissory notes which played the role of currency, and which were suppressed several times upon complaints by the Imperial Bank. The appearance in rapid succession of the Karun and bank concessions, with the latter's monopoly on minerals, followed by compensatory concessions to the Russians were, along with the tobacco concession, causes of general discontent and apprehension of foreign control. As shall be seen, even when the movement became more specifically focused on tobacco, its leaders tried to force a cancellation of all concessions, not only the tobacco concession. Second, the letter indicates that Afghani was not absolving the Russians from blame or acting in favor of their control of Iran, as some, particularly Britishers, seemed to think. His remarks about Russian evil designs on Iran are unequivocal. Third, there is the hint of cooperation from the Ottoman Sultan, foreshadowing the period from 1892 on when the Sultan brought Afghani to Istanbul and encouraged him and his followers to write letters to the Shi'i ulama in all countries promising gifts and favors in return for support of his position as Caliph and leader of all Muslims. Finally, Afghani takes great pains to assert the religious quality of the opposition to the Shah, to deny that they have any connection with the Babis, and to turn the charge of irreligion against Amin os-Soltan and the Shah. In the more complete translation of the letter included in the British F.O. documents, in fact, Afghani says that Amin os-Soltan is 'unquestionably a Babi.' 8 The exact influence of the above letter on Shirazi cannot be stated, but it must have been one factor, as the visit of Sayyed Ali (continued from p. 71)

ment quoted by Browne from Muhammad Rashid (Rida) which ascribes Shirazi's [atwii to this letter alone is probably an exaggeration, as might be expected from such a strong admirer of Afghani's. (See Browne, op, cit., pp. 22-23.) It seems clear that interviews with Sayyed Ali Akbar and correspondence from leaders of the Iranian ulama helped provoke Shirazi's jatwii. Afghani's printing and circulation of the letter in Iran did help arouse the Iranian ulama. The allegation in Afghani's letter that the Russians demanded and were granted concessions in compensation for the Karon and Bank concessions negotiated during Wolff's minstry is correct.

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Akbar to both Afghani and Shirazi was another, in Shirazi's later action against the concession. When he went to London, Afghani printed the letter and sent it to Iranian friends for distribution. Afghani's letter to Shirazi also complains of the mistreatment of those arrested in Tehran in the spring of 1891, some of whom he names, and of the disrespect shown by the government to Sayyed Ali Akbar and another mojtahed, Hajji Faizollah Darbandi. The latter, according to the Amin od-Dowleh's memoirs, was expelled from Tehran to Iraq for preaching against the Shah and the Amin os-Soltan, The Amin od-Dowleh recalls sending a note to the Shah at this time pointing out the error of exiling Afghani and two mojtaheds to Iraq, where the Shah had no power over them and where they could consult with the leading Shi'i ulama, whose orders were followed in Iran.? In fact, this turned out to be a serious error by the Shah, which Afghani and other leaders of the opposition were able to exploit. It is true that there was no prior example of the Shi'i ulama of Iraq giving leadership to a movement of political opposition to the government. However, the exile of Sayyed Ali Akbar could have been expected to cause difficulties, if only because Shirazi happened to be a close relative of his. And Afghani had caused the Iranian government enough annoyance after his courteous exile of 1887 to give warning of what he might do after a violent and discourteous expulsion. The existence of many grounds for popular discontent and protest in 1891 is indicated by the problem of profiteering by high officials in the necessities of life, which became acute in Tehran at this time. Early in May, Kennedy reported: In the course of several conversations which I have held with the Amin-us-Sultan on the subject of the seditious plot which has been discovered in Tehran I have advised His Highness to take steps for removing one very legitimate cause of discontent, namely the high prices charged for the necessaries of life, bread, meat, fuel etcetera. To give Your Lordship some idea of the oppressive conduct of those who farm the taxes in this country, I may mention that bread and meat are bought in the bazaars at exactly double the price which is paid by the members of His Majesty's Legation, who purchase outside Tehran and pay no duty on articles coming into the town.

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The officials who are responsible for this state of things in the capital are His Royal Highness the Naib-us-Sultaneh, Governor of Tehran, and his father-in-law the Vazir Nizam, a man of low origin, who administers on behalf of His Royal Highness. The Amin-us-Sultan said he was perfectly well aware of the truth of my remarks, but that it was a very delicate matter for him to complain against the Shah's son, and he asked if I would put my remarks in writing, in order that he might pass my letter on to His Majesty without any observations from himself. 10 After Kennedy sent such a letter, a conversation with the Amin os-Soltan was reported in which the latter said that Kennedy's note to the Shah: had due effect. H.M. has now ordered that a meeting shall be held consisting of Ulemas, merchants, heads of guilds and some of the Ministers of State to discuss the question and come to some satisfactory decision with regard to lowering the rates of bread, meat, fowl etc. H.H. remarked privately to me that, although it is satisfactory to see that H.M. does take interest in such friendly private intimations, yet as long as the administration of the guilds and the Governorship of the town remains in the hands of the Naib-us-Sultaneh and his uncle Vazir Nizam no good can be expected to be derived out of such meetings. Naib-us-Sultaneh will of course preside at this meeting and he in reality, in conjunction with Vazir Nizam, is the cause of these high rates on the necessaries of life. In May the movement against the tobacco concession began to gather steam in Tabriz, the second largest city in Iran, which was under strong Russian influence, and which also had the greatest contact with the outside world. The combination of Russian influence, especially on the Governor, the Amir Nezam, and the chief mojtahed, Hajji Mirza Javad Aqa; the influence of progressive thought through contacts of the Turkish-speaking Azerbaijani population with Russian Azerbaijan and Turkey; the importance of tobacco growers and traders; and the great influence of the ulama on the religious masses of Tabriz all made the city a natural spot for serious outbreaks against the concession. In early May it was reported that the Regie was the all-engrossing subject of conversation in the bazaars and in homes. Enlightened Tabrizis were saying that, in view of the widespread

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growth and consumption of tobacco in Iran, the profits of the Regie should amount to £800,000 a year, and were pointing to the very bad terms of the Persian Regie as compared to the Ottoman one. People were also saying that if the people of Azerbaijan stood out against the Regie the latter would be doomed, a prediction which turned out to be reasonably accurate. * Although the Tabrizis were still reported hostile later in May, public opposition activity did not become serious until July. Late in July, 1891, the Persian Tobacco Corporation issued an official notice, and in reply an anonymous placard threatening death to those who cooperated with the Company was posted in Tabriz. The Amin os-Soltan told Kennedy he believed the Russian Consul General in Tabriz had instigated publication of the placard, whose text ran as follows: Ulema of the town! Law is the law of religion and not the laws of the Europeans! Woe to those Ulema who will not cooperate with the nation! Woe to those who will not spend their lives and property! Anyone of the Ulema who will not agree with the people will lose his life. Woe to anyone who may sell one muskal of Tobacco to the Europeans! Woe to the Europeans who may wish to enforce these customs of the Infidels. We will kill the Europeans first and then plunder their property. Woe to the Armenians who will be killed and will lose their property and their families! Woe to those who will keep quiet! We write this in answer to the Notice. Curses on the father of anyone who may destroy this notice.P The protest movement in Tabriz continued to grow in August, with menacing sermons being given from the mosques and threatening telegrams and mass petitions being sent to the Shah. The British representative at Tabriz reported on August 15: Haji Mirza Yusuf Aga Mutchdeheid (sic) on the 12th instant preached very strongly against the Regie saying, among other things, that the Kaffirs had come here to interfere in the Tobacco business and any Mussulman who joined them was also a Kaffir and deserving of death. It is also said by reliable • F.O. 60/553. Acting Consul General Paton to Kennedy, Tabriz, May 6, 1891; enclosed in Kennedy to Salisbury, No. 123, May 11, 1891. It was perhaps a peculiar bad stroke of fortune for the British that the tobacco agitation broke out not only when their minister was absent from Tehran, but also when their Consul General was absent from Tabriz.

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men that the chief Mutchdeheid had telegraphed to the Shah with the knowledge and approval of the Amir-i-Nizam, informing him that the entire population of Azerbaijan are dissatisfied with him on account of the Regie, and that if it is maintained by the Shah he cannot answer for the order of the district and fears riots. There is also a rumour to the effect that the chief Mutchdeheid has said if the Regie goes on he anticipates a "Jehat" [jehad, holy war].... It would be extremely difficult how to put the blame of the agitation on any particular individual as it is not confined to one sect but has evidently been taken up strongly by the whole population, high and low, as an attempt to interfere with their national and religious rights and it is quite apparent that what the heads of the religious sect fear is that this is the first step towards introducing liberal reforms in which case their religious hold on the people will be crippled. I understand that the principal Mutchdeheids, who are said to be men of sense, consider that the Shah is not acting fairly as the affair is good for him but not for the people and their religion.... I am given to understand that the four principal Mutchdeheids are decidedly against the Regie. . . . Another thing that helps to fan the flame is the fact that many letters have been received here from Tehran and the South of Persia by the Chief Mutchdeheids stating that all hopes of stamping out the Regie are rested on the people of Azerbaijan . . . I believe the plan adopted is to give [the anti-Regie petition] to the head of each trade and instruct him to receive the signatures of those engaged in his calling. IS The same despatch, noting two possible reasons for the special power of the movement in Tabriz-the strength of religious power and feeling in the town, and the civil authority's incompetence in keeping order due to incapacity or unwillingness in the face of Russian compulsion-concludes: 'Of the two... I certainly think the religious question is the more serious.' The traditional religious tone of the petition circulated in Tabriz is interesting. It begins by saying that after Mohammad had preached the word of God, he told the people that he had given them two sacred truths, the Koran and his family, and said: Ye will respect both and submit them to no changes. We know that by his Family he meant his twelve sacred descendants who successively followed him.... The Khalifs 76

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of Bani Abas and those of Bani Omaye (may the wrath of God descend on their souls) put an end to the existence of this Holy Family one by one either by poison or by sword. The last one of the number, through dint of wickedness of the people was obliged to disappear from among them. There remained among the people after that the Koran alone, which now some of the ministers of the Empire are showing the way to his Majesty to put aside. Our Sovereign has been ruling over us for over forty years in perfect justice. We know not how some of his ministers have caused his course to be changed and follow the routine of misrule and cruelty. He is bent upon abolishing the Sacred Laws of the Koran. [Logically either "He" should be "They", or, more likely, the "some" in the previous sentence should be "one".] God says in his Book 'God will not allow the Moslems to be under the influence of Kafars,' and our religious laws affirm that when a Moslem owes a sum of money to a Kafar, the sum can only be called for by the creditor himself and in case of absence he cannot appoint a Kafar ... to act for him.... After giving other examples from religious law, the petition continues: If we must admit that the above facts are all true, we plainly see that the Kafars in no way can exercise a mastery over the Moslems. We are therefore utterly bewildered to see that our Sovereign is selling the whole body of Moslems, like slaves, to the Kafars. The Tobacco Regie is an example of this illegitimate superiority for unbelievers, and all transactions under it will be illegal according to the Koran, since the consent of the seller will not exist.t- This petition received several pages of signatures, and greatly disturbed the Shah. By August, 1891, the British Foreign Office was worried. A perceptive confidential 'Memorandum on position and prospects of the Imperial Tobacco Corporation of Persia' written for them by a member of the Foreign Department of the Government of India who had Persian experience, was printed at this time. The report noted the general dislike of the Persians for the concession, and broke down the attitudes by classes, saying that the officials were uninterested; the religious classes all opposed the Regie as an infidel innovation which would hurt their interests; the mercantile classes were naturally unfriendly;

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and the lower classes were neutral, hoping for better prices or a cheaper article. The report went on: The universal corruption of the official classes very much simplifies the relations of the Corporation as regards the degree of assistance to be met with at their hands, individually, or that of the support which may be expected of them, as a body .... It is only when sums are given and received for the most flagrant cases of miscarriage of justice that the transaction is looked upon as a scandalous one, or that such sums would be described as "bribes". The religious classes are by no means so easy to deal with, for, while their influence throughout the country is far greater than that of any others, it is more difficult to approach them by such means on account of the high moral character which they affect, though they are not one bit less susceptible to its influences than any other. Whereas, therefore, the officialclasses will readily and openly receive sums of money for the purpose of supporting the enterprise, and even bargain for such amounts as they consider their claims in this respect entitle them to, negotiations of a pecuniary character with the religious classes will have to be carried on with great delicacy and caution, and probably through the medium of several go-betweens in order to throw dust in the eyes of the people. The mercantile class, if not socially or numerically very influential, is one which can do great harm to the undertaking on account of its wealth, which would always be a powerful lever in a country such as Persia, and from the strength of the tie of common interests which binds its members together. The injury sustained by this class is of course a very serious one, and such as could not but provoke great ill-feeling upon their part, and it is my opinion that from every motive of policy the Corporation should do all that is in its power to mitigate this injury.... [The Corporation] must divest itself of all idea that it will obtain any support from the Governing body except such as is purchased, or that the latter will be the least actuated in its demeanour towards the enterprise by any consideration of the public welfare, for a more selfish and short sighted policy than that of the Kajar Dynasty and the present regime in Persia, it would be difficult to imagine even in an Asiatic country. The sole object of the Monarch, as of every Prince or Official, is to

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accumulate as much money as possible entirely regardless of the means adopted; as for spending any sums on the erection of works for the public benefit or even on the maintenance of such as its more liberal-minded predecessors have left behind, such an idea has never entered the head of any member of the family now reigning in Persia, and in spite of the fictitious interest supposed to be taken by the present Monarch in the development of the resources of his country there never was a period in its existence when its real interests were taken into less serious consideration. The population have fully appreciated the character of their rulers and understood the value of the pretext upon which the policy of granting concessions has been entered upon (to the effect that it is for the national benefit); these they accordingly look upon with the greatest jealousy and suspicion, and it would, as I understand, only require a little injudicious handling or a further prosecution of the same policy to provoke in many parts a general rising against the existing Government, such is the degree of unpopularity which it has attained.P The memo lends support to the view widely held in Persia that the complaisance of officials from the Amin os-Soltan on down was bought by the Tobacco Corporation with large bribes. Indeed, this fact and the size of Amin os-Soltan's bribe are discussed elsewhere in the F.O. documents. Feuvrier, the Shah's French doctor, discusses the large size of the bribes spent by the company, and Malekzadeh says that Sayyed Abdollah Behbehani, one of the few leading ulama to oppose the tobacco movement, received a large bribe.l" The latter is probable in view of his susceptibility to British 'gifts,' as ·documented in the F.O. records. On the other hand, Sayyed Abdollah's position was fairly consistently in support of the British and of Amin os-Soltan-e-at the time of the tobacco movement he opposed their opponents, while during the revolution he helped lead the popular cause at a time when the British and the Amin os-Soltan were out of favor. The memoirs of Abbas Mirza Molk Ani, the Shah's brother, say that Behbehani got a bribe of £1000. Molk Ara also notes bribes by the Company to several high government officials, and says that the officials' dislike of cancelling the concession was partly based on fear that they would have to restore what they had taken.F In the end, as usual, the money was kept by the 79

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recipients, despite demands by the opposition that the Company be compensated through the return of such bribe money, and it was the Iranian people who had to pay. The prescience of the British memorandum was revealed in subsequent events. As Feuvrier, who knew of events at the court in some detail, reported later, 'In my opinion the clergy never patronized such a popular cause.' On August 21 he noted that the Shah had sent a special envoy, the Amin-e Hozur, to Tabriz to try to handle the situation. 18 The Shah's reaction to the Tabriz events was reported in detail by Kennedy, who said that the Shah had been so upset by the Tabriz petition that he contemplated cancelling the concession, but was dissuaded by the Amin os-Soltan: who warned him of the disastrous results, both as regards the internal administration of the country and his relations with England, which would ensue were he to give way to the present threats. 19 The Shah then decided rather to send letters to the Heir Apparent, who resided in Tabriz, and to the leaders of the ulama saying that the concession could not be cancelled and would not be harmful to Muslims, that he had to grant it along with the Bank in order to annul the dangerous Reuter Concession, and that they should not by threatening him play into the hands of the Russians. On September 1 Kennedy sent home a long and alarmed telegram: By Shah's order, Amin-es-Sultan sent for me in great haste, hearing the contents of telegrams just received from the governor and the chief (?) (sic) of Tabreez. They declare that Tabreez is like a forest covered with naptha, which the slightest spark will set in a blaze, that there is danger of an attack on Europeans, and that the authorities are powerless, as the troops cannot be counted upon. They report that Shah is being publicly denounced as an infidel merchant, who has sold his country, and that the life of the heir apparent may be endangered. A dog has been paraded through the streets, with a letter attached to its neck, which is declared, in derision, to be Shah's envoy bearing H.M.'s autograph. Governor of Tabreez informs Shah that unless his envoy is authorized to declare tobacco concession cancelled, he will be forcibly prevented by the people from entering the city. 80

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I pointed out to Shah, who was in an adjacent apartment, through Amin-es-Sultan, that it was not tobacco concession, but H.M.'s own sovereignty, which was being attacked, and that if he gives way, the revolutionary spirit will rapidly spread through Persia, as the other provinces are looking to Azerbaijan for the "mot d' ordre". H.M. was most anxious to cancel concession, and offered to give some other valuable concessions as compensation. I said nothing could be given as equivalent, and that Shah would be committing an act of political suicide. No capitalists would ever again embark in Persian enterprizes, and the country would be left to decay, which is what the Russians desire.... I could not press for more ... without endangering Amin-esSultan's position with the Shah, who is nervously averse to adoption of any strong measures which may lead to disturbances and Russian intervention in Azerbaijan. Both Shah and Amin now fully admit that governor of Tabreez has been a pliant tool in Russian hands, and H.M. fully intends to remove him at the first favourable opportunity. This conspiracy, which has been ably planned, could not have been organized without his knowledge and secret support. 20 In a letter of September 3, giving further details, Kennedy said that Amin-os-Soltan's: loyal and courageous support of British interests deserves to be brought to the special notice of Her Majesty's Government.... In order to ensure the Amin Houzour being received with proper respect at Tabriz and to calm the dangerous and growing excitement of the population, and the Shah being averse to the use of force except as a very last resource, a telegram en clair was sent to Tabriz for communication to the mob, saying that His Majesty was endeavouring to make arrangements for suppressing the Tobacco Regie. At the same time cypher messages were sent to the Heir Apparent, the Governor General and the Chief Mujtahed telling them that the Regie could not and would not be abolished, although His Majesty would discuss with the Director means for making it less distasteful to the people of Azerbaijan, when once it was clearly shown what were their legitimate grievances. This somewhat crafty proceeding has so far proved successful that the excitement appears to be calming down, and the immediate danger of riots, which if once they broke out would

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rapidly develop into the murder and plunder of the European and Armenian residents, seems to have been removed. This movement has been, by the Governor General's own admission, secretly plotted for some months. The Mujtahed and leading Ulemas have been steadily rousing the religious fanaticism of the people, and the Governor General, Amir Nizam, whose friendly relations with Russia are notorious, cannot but have been privy to if not an actual supporter of the conspiracy. . . . The movement as it gained in force got beyond the control, first of the Governor General and then of the Ulemas. It became therefore absolutely necessary for the Central Government to suppress it.... It is the intention of the Shah to remove from Tabriz Amir Nizam, who is a strong opponent of the Amin-us-Sultan. His Majesty is now convinced that the Governor General has been either treacherous or incompetent. 21 The F.O. minutes to this letter say that Kennedy is to be instructed to convey to the Amin os-Soltan assurances that his loyal attitude to British interests 'is thoroughly appreciated by Her Majesty's Government.' Reports from Tabriz in the same period confirm the menacing picture conveyed from Tehran. On August 29 it was reported that Persian employees of the Regie had been threatened in placards with death unless they resigned, which many were doing. People were arming themselves and storing provisions for the anticipated struggles. And, the British representative continued: I fear this Tobacco Concession has done much to raise a hostile feeling against the British who till recently were undoubtedly looked upon by very many here as friends of Persia and quite disinterested. Now however they are suspected by the mass of trying to introduce their customs and bye and bye themselves in a surreptitious fashion to them, and their opinion of the British appears to have undergone a complete change and every vile epithet is used towards them. It seems to me that the Persian Government is greatly at fault for not taking a determined stand at once .... the people seem to have no fear of the Shah while supported by the Mujtchids (sic). As the Government seems to be powerless here it is difficult to see how the affair can go on under such conditions, and on the other hand, if the Shah gives in, it is tantamount to acknowledging the

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superior strength of the Mujtchids, as I am satisfied all rests with them and I should say, if His Majesty gives in, his hold on Azerijan (sic) is not worth a day's purchase. 22 Russian diplomatic reports about the tobacco movement are quoted or summarized in a recent Soviet scholarly article. These, along with the reports of the French Minister at Tehran, who was given information by both the British and the Russians as well as by Iranians, often supplement the information given in the British and Persian sources, and at a few points force a revision of the picture given by them. According to the reports of the Russian Consul General in Tabriz, cited in the Soviet article, the monopoly was to come into operation there on September 4, but on that day a large crowd, which had earlier been supplied with arms, filled the streets. The Tabrizis apparently had a plan for an armed uprising, and the armed men were divided into three sections, one of which was to go to the crown prince, one to the Amir Nezam, and one to the European quarter. The use of arms was averted only by the arrival of the Shah's telegram promising cancellation. Molk Ara, quoting the Amin-e Hozur, confirms this picture of Tabriz in the hands of armed rebels. 23 The French Minister, de Balloy, gives further details about the Shah's telegram, apparently drawing on information coming from the British, Russians, and Iranians. De Balloy on September 17 wrote home that the telegram sent to calm Tabriz had been edited with great diplomacy, 'and it is interesting to compare the diverse meanings attributed to it by the Amin os Soltan according to whom he is addressing.' To the English he said that it was a maneuver to calm the people but that the Regie would not be suppressed. He said if it had to be suppressed in Azerbaijan, this was in order to save it elsewhere-a point of view to which Kennedy, though not Ornstein, seemed resigned. To the Russians the Amin os-Soltan was saying that the Iranian government had decided in principle on the suppression of the Regie and were proclaiming this in Tabriz, but were waiting to achieve an economical settlement with the Company. 24 The same despatch supports the charge that Russian representatives were helping to arouse popular discontent and agitation, and says that they were not only voicing their open hostility to the company representatives, but also telling de Balloy of their determination to ruin the Imperial Bank after the tobacco agitation succeeded. On September 5 the British representative in Tabriz reported 83

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that serious trouble had been avoided only by means of the trick of the Shah's telegram promising cancellation. The city was full of armed men, and the local authorities had taken no effective action. The Armenian Archbishop of Tabriz had said that: he knew from documentary evidence that at first the chief Mujtahed was inclined, through gratitude, to assist the Aminus-Sultan, who had been instrumental in saving his life the last time he was called to Tehran, but the Amir Nizam sent a message to him that he would work hand in hand with him to ruin the Tobacco Regie and since then they have been working underhand together. Whether this is absolutely correct or not I cannot say, but since I returned ... the thing that has struck me most is that though men have been speaking openly against the Regie and inciting the people against the promoters, and also talking open treason against the Shah, not one has been arrested or the slightest attempt made to stop it. If this does not point to supineness or indifference, if not downright connivance, on the part of a Governor who is famous for his iron rule, I don't know what would show it ... [the local troops] won't lift a finger against the orders of their religious chiefs and they will be the first to join in the plunder.... [A local high official] also ascribes the present state of affairs to the Amir Nizam, who, he says, suggested to the Mujtahed that this is the first step towards introducing European reforms and law which will very materially affect the religious power. 25 Meanwhile in Tehran the Shah, despite the slight momentary lull in the Tabriz rising caused by his telegram, was feeling increasing pressure for cancellation. According to Feuvrier's diary entries of September 4 and 5, the Russians were insisting on cancellation, and the Shah authorized the Russian Minister to telegraph the Russian consul in Tabriz that the concession would be withdrawn as soon as an agreement on indemnity could be signed.?" Whether this telegram was serious, a trick, or, more likely, a stall for time in the hope that the British could be talked out of the stubborn position so far maintained by Kennedy, is unclear. The French despatch of September 17, cited above, implies that perhaps even the Iranian government did not yet know which course it would have to follow and thus was staving off British and Russian pressure with conflicting promises to each. 84

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In a private telegram to Salisbury of September 4, Kennedy reported that excitement at Tabriz had partially subsided owing to the Shah's delusive telegram, but said that the Shah had been further alarmed on learning that the tobacco dealers of Mashhad, the major city of the Northeast and a shrine city, had appealed to a Mashhad mojtahed against the Regie. Kennedy noted that both the Shah and the Amin os-Soltan were doing all they could on behalf of the Regie, but: Shah and Amin urgently ask for Y.L.'s advice as to whether if all peaceable means fail, concession should be maintained by force or whether it should be cancelled, compensation being given to the Company in shape of other concessions or pecuniary indemnity by installments. . . . Shah and Amin fully foresee complications which may ensue if concessions be cancelled. On the other hand they dread the possible prospect of a revolution.P?

An F.O. note on the back of this despatch says that the main question is the 'maintenance of the Shah's authority, which we should greatly regret to see threatened.' On September 6 Salisbury telegraphed Kennedy that it was impossible to judge from London what course was most in the Shah's interest. 'We do not wish to assume the invidious position of urging vigorous measures in order that foreigners may make money.' Could not something be done which would be much short of cancelling, as, 'So conspicuous a retreat might encourage a general onslaught on foreigners. Can he not discover some excuse for suspending its operation for the present in the most excited districts ?' 28 On the 9th of September Kennedy replied in a private telegram that the Shah was pleased with Salisbury's advice, but that he, Kennedy, feared the prospects of the Regie were dark; and that the company would have to take heavy initial losses before the people of northern Persia might be reconciled to it. 28a In an official telegram of the same date he reported that the Governor of Tabriz had telegraphed the Shah that he could not bring the opposition to reason, and that placards had been posted calling upon the Shah's special envoy to leave: Shah has telegraphed, bitterly upbraiding Governor for his incapacity, and has directed his Envoy to return to Tehran. Amin es Sultan informs me that Shah proposes making Heir Apparent Governor Genl with absolute powers, if he will undertake to make Shah's authority respected and to establish

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Regie; if not, other measures will be adopted. In the meantime Shah says Regie operations must be temporarily suspended in Azerbaijan, and he will give orders to prevent the entry into that province of tobacco from other parts of Persia, as well as its exportation. His Majesty believes that this step which will entail heavy losses upon the merchants will bring them to reason and induce them to accept the Regie, with which the Director offers to associate them on advantageous terms.P The extent of Russian pressure for cancellation of the Regie in this period is indicated by the French documents. On September 7, de Balloy reported that the Russian Minister had been consulted by the Amin os-Soltan, who asked what should be done to restore calm in Azerbaijan. Biltzov advised the recall of the Amin-e Hozur and the cancellation of the Regie. De Balloy adds: The Shah has written the Russian Emperor an autograph letter in the humblest terms supplicating him to have pity on him and placing himself under his generosity to help him get out of the bad position in which the English have put him. Butzov, from whom this information presumably came, told de BaIloy it was unlikely that the Tsar would soften his position.s? This prediction was confirmed, since de Balloy soon reported that Btitzov had received stronger instructions than ever and had insisted to the Shah on cancellation of the Regie. The Shah said the indemnity would be too large and that Kennedy had spoken of occupying Bushire as a guarantee for the indemnity. (This is apparently untrue and it probably stems from the Amin osSoltau's tactic of trying to scare the Russians by exaggerating British claims.) Biltzov said the Shah could reply that in this case Russia would take Mashhad and the territory bordering Afghanistan. The Shah, hearing this tone, 'almost decided to suppress the regie.'31 Russian pressure on the Persian government was apparently known of in less detail by the British. Kennedy reported on September 19: The Russian Minister took advantage of the late dangerous excitement at Tabriz directed against the Tobacco Regie to press personally upon the Shah the necessity of cancelling the whole Concession and of appointing the Mushir-ud-Dowleh (Yahia Khan) Minister for Foreign Affairs, as by the adoption of these two measures the friendship and support of the Russian Government would be secured.

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The British were told that the Shah had replied that cancelling the concession was impossible, though after hearing Salisbury's private advice the Shah was pleased and, with the tacit concurrence of Ornstein, the head of the Tobacco Corporation in Iran, decided temporarily to suspend operations in Azerbaijan: This step, which at once led to the general belief that the Regie was entirely abolished, a belief which it was not considered politic to disturb, gradually but completely restored quiet to the population of Tabriz. The Russian Minister then threatened that the Russian government would not remain neutral in the face of the tobacco concession or similarly important concessions which might be given in compensation for it. His note and the Shah's reply, which the Shah had permitted Kennedy to see, were enclosed in Kennedy's despatch. The Amin os-Soltan told Kennedy: He designedly hinted to the Russian Minister that Her Majesty'S Government might ask for some concessions of a disagreeable nature to Russia, such as a Railway, as compensation for the Tobacco Concession, were the latter abolished, in order to put a stop to Monsieur de Butzow's constant and wearisome pressure. 32 This tactic had limited success, however. The French documents also note the continuation of various Russian efforts against the Regie, and on September 17 de Balloy reported that the Russians were still enflaming sentiment in Tabriz. This despatch also contains a story which may possibly be the germ of Nazem ol-Eslam Kermani's tale of a party at which the Russians insulted Ornstein, the head of the Company, though the latter may have referred to another occasion. De Balloy says: the day of the fete of the Emperor I went to congratulate M. de Butzow with all my staff when the director of the Regie accompanied by his subdirector entered to pay his compliments to the Russian Minister. Seeing them arrive, Mme. de Speyer, the wife of the First Secretary of the Legation, cried loud enough to be heard by her neighbors, 'I trust that soon we will be rid of these people.' In a postscript, de Balloy adds that he has now been told by a very good source that the Shah was trying to save the Regie. 33 The measures taken by the Shah quieted the Tabriz situation 87

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for a time, but his telegram to Tabriz and suspension of the Regie there were ultimately to backfire. Opponents of the Regie industriously spread the news throughout Iran that it had been cancelled, and the Amin os-Soltan was forced to issue circulars to the governors of all provinces but Azerbaijan contradicting these reports and enjoining them to support the Regie. The circular from the Amin os-Soltan to the governors read in part: now that it is the time of the tobacco harvest, and the time for buying and selling it, I have to inform you, in accordance with the urgent Imperial command, that you must be most careful to carry out the former orders and give necessary assistance to the agents of the Regie. Should you act otherwise you will be reprimanded. Any kind of news regarding the cancelment of the Concession which may have reached that province is false and without foundation, and not worthy of notice.v' Further trouble was to break out almost immediately. Both the inhabitants of Isfahan and the chief mojtahed of the Iraq shrine cities, Hajji Mirza Hasan Shirazi, now entered the fray. Amin os-Soltan was sure that even during the Tabriz disturbances, the chief mojtahed there had been in constant communication with Shirazi as well as with the Russian Consul-General. 35 And on September 22, Feuvrier noted that Shirazi from the shrine cities: who holds there all the strings of the insurrection, has written a long letter to the Shah to prove to him, Koran in hand, that the concession of any monopoly to foreigners is against the holy book. I do not believe His Majesty is much concerned with the reasoning of the mojtahed, but he knows his influence and must take account of it. The Persian consul at Baghdad has been sent to Karbala with the aim of acting on the mojtahed. It does not appear that he has succeeded in modifying the convictions of the holy man.s" The telegram referred to condemns the interference of foreign subjects in the internal affairs of Muslim peoples, and specifically names the English Bank, the Tobacco concession, and railroad concessions; and speaks of the killing and wounding of a number of Muslims in Shiraz, and the exile of Sayyed Ali Akbar, as manifestations of the bad results of such policies. It calls for the end of all concessions, showing again that this broader aim was held by some of the leaders throughout the tobacco movement. The text of this telegram was later translated in one of de Balloy's despatches. A translation from the French follows: 88

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Up to the present I have only addressed myself to His Majesty with wishes of happiness, but because of the various news which has reached me and which is against the rights of Religion and Government I ask permission to say: The entry of foreigners into the interior affairs of the country, their relations and trade with Muslims, the concessions such as the Bank, Tobacco Regie, Railroads, and others are, for many reasons, against the exact sense of the Koran and God's orders. These acts weaken the power of the Government and are the cause of the ruin of order in the country, and they oppress the subjects. The proof is in what has just occurred in Shiraz, where there has been disrespect for the tomb of the venerable Imamzadeh Ahmad ibn Musa, a great number of Muslims have been killed and wounded, and His Excellency Sayyed Ali Akbar chased in the grossest fashion-all this is the consequence of what I said above. It is certain that His Majesty has not been informed of it. He who wishes only the prosperity of his subjects would have been very dissatisfied and would not have allowed today these affairs which in the future will provoke troubles and paralyze Religion and Government, which will, God forbid, lose the glorious renown acquired for many years. I have the highest confidence in the generosity of His Majesty who, if the country's Ministers have authorized these affairs, will show the foreigners that the whole population is united to reject them, and so calm will be reestablished. I have also confidence in seeing His Majesty grant once more his favor to the venerable personage expelled from Shiraz with so little respect and who took refuge in the holy places. The mollas will pray again for His Majesty and confidence will be restored among the subjects. The decision is in the hands of His Majesty."? Despite the milder tone, as befitting a letter sent to the Shah, the similarity of the grievances to those outlined in Sayyed Jamal ad-Din's earlier letter to Shirazi, quoted above, is striking. It thus seems that Sayyed Jamal ad-Din's letter, plus what he may have conveyed personally through Sayyed Ali Akbar, did have an immediate effect on Shirazi, who, as his telegram states, had not previously addressed the Shah on political questions. Taimuri gives details of the Shah's and Amin os-Soltan's efforts, via telegrams and a personal visit of the Iranian representative at Baghdad to Shirazi, to change the latter's position. In the

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same period Shirazi was receiving telegrams and letters from all parts of Iran asking him to help cancel the concession, and he did not yield to any of the government's arguments. He also continued pressure for the lifting of Sayyed Ali Akbar's exile, in which he succeeded ultimately. 38 The continuous telegraphic communication in this period between Shirazi and the leaders of the Iranian ulama, between Shirazi and the Shah, and among the leaders of the Iranian ulama, helped make the tobacco movement perhaps the first coordinated national movement of Iranians. Partly this coordination was due simply to the introduction of the telegraph, an infidel innovation which the ulama did not scorn to use. The coordination also owed something to new ideas and to the simultaneous impact of the growth of foreign influence in Iran. The restrictions on native banking caused by the Imperial Bank were felt quickly in several cities, while the simultaneous arrival of agents of the Tobacco Corporation who forced growers to sell to them, and in many cases behaved badly, also brought a series of immediate reactions. Russian encouragement of the opposition was also coordinated. Because the leaders of the ulama in each city could be the most effective spokesmen, discontented merchants and growers turned to them. Top direction within Iran was confided in the most respected leader of the Tehran ulama, Hajji Mirza Hasan Ashtiyani, and he and others turned for support and direction to the even more respected leader of the shrine ulama, Shirazi. Few of the leading ulama remained aloofin Tehran only Sayyed Abdollah Behbehani, a partisan of the English and of the Amin os-Soltan, and accused of taking bribes from the Company, and the Imam Jom'eh of Tehran, a relative of the Shah's, refused to back the protest. In September the anti-Regie movement spread to Isfahan, where the mollas, led by the powerful and unscrupulous Aqa Najafi, began to preach in the mosques against the Regie, and the merchants, encouraged by the example of Azerbaijan, presented a petition against it to the Zell os-Soltan, The Zell os-Soltan being an Anglophil, and not a Russophillike his counterpart at Tabriz, gave a threatening answer to the merchants which restated his traditional autocratic pretensions: Your petition through the Imam Juma' has reached us. You deserve to be summoned and have the consequences of your impertinence meted out to you, namely, such as bastina90

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doing punishments, and truly to have your heads cut off, in order that no one else be able to say "Why?" and "Wherefore?" in Government affairs, but out of respect for the Imam Juma' we have let you off this time, conditionally on your desisting from such impertinence and opposition to Government orders. H.I.M. the Shah is the master of the inhabitants of Persia and their property and knows better what is the "rayots'" advantage. You have no right to make such objections. Mind your own business without impertinence and let such matters alone.P''

In sending home the Zell os-Soltan's answers to the Imam Jom'eh of Isfahan, Kennedy reported approvingly, 'His Royal Highness acted with great firmness in checking this movement ...' Despite the Zell os-Soltan's threats, however, trouble was to break out again in Isfahan in November. After the September troubles, the French Minister was more skeptical about the Regie's prospects than was Kennedy. On September 30, 1891, de Balloy doubted the Shah's determination to save the Regie, though he says that everyone in the Council except the Amin od-Dowleh favored resistance to the suppression demand. On October 1 de Balloy says that the Russians had become still firmer in their attitude since their good relations with France were cemented by the recent visit of the French fleet to Kronstadt.s" The next anti-Regie movement, in the Northeastern shrine city of Mashhad, is described in more detail in the Russian documents of the period in the British sources. Here in late August the governor, the Saheb Divan, forced all who might be involved to sign a form saying they would not buy or sell tobacco without company permission under pain of a definite punishment. Early in October serious disturbances broke out, apparently starting when many of the merchants and leading men of Mashhad went to the chief mojtaheds of the city and declared that the tobacco concession would ruin them, and asking the mojtaheds' backing. The mojtaheds refused to take action and the Russian Consul General, as eager to see British plotting as the British were to see Russian, attributed this refusal partly to the fact that one of them was an Anglophil and paid by the British. The same night, however, a crowd gathered in the chief mosque and remained in refuge in that famous shrine. The Saheb Divan, who came there to admonish them, also apparently promised to telegraph the Shah with a request for the 91

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removal or postponement of the monopoly. The crowd, however, refused to disperse, and continued to shout against the British Bank as well as the Regie. There were threats from the crowd to shut down all trade in the region and to stop paying taxes. They remained in the the mosque overnight, with mollas haranguing them, and soon the disturbances embraced the whole city. The bazaars were closed and the streets full of people. The following day the crowd in the mosque attacked both a sayyed who had been deputed to read the Shah's order and a mojtahed who tried to calm them. There were threats of revolt against the government, and even a telegram from the Shah offering to postpone the Regie for six months did not quiet the crowd. The next day all shops were closed and the streets full of menacing people, who were further enflamed by the Saheb Divan's attempt to have the police force the opening of shops. Only when the Saheb Divan finally decided to call on all his military resources to disperse the crowds and was backed up by a most menacing telegram from the Shah was the movement, which had seen the city on the verge of revolt for five days, broken up for the time being.v' The telegram from the Shah to the governor prescribing appropriate treatment for the protesters read in part: I strictly command you that, if they do not go about their business at once and do not cease these absurdities, you should summon all the cavalry and infantry of Khorassan . . . to Meshed, and you should arrest all the rebels without exception and have 100 of them blown from guns and curse their fathers. What does this kind of impertinence and presumption mean 74 2 The British representative in Mashhad reported privately, rejoicing over the salutary effects of this threat, and describing the situation: It goes without saying that the Russians are at the bottom of most of what occurred. Monsieur Vlassow called on me on Sunday and predicted that there would be a disturbance on the following day. He expressed doubts as to whether the Sahib Divan would be able to cope with it.... The talk of the people at first was all about the tobacco, but they gradually began to direct all their ill-feeling against the English who, they had been told, meant under cover of trade to seize Persia as they did India and Egypt. This was first put about by some Turks from the Caucasus, Russian subjects .... Sahib Divan ... 92

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informed the mob that unless they dispersed he had orders from the Shah to put them to death. This had a wonderful effect and in a very short time the crowd disappeared, the shops were re-opened, and all was perfectly quiet. 43 The people were said to be recognizing that the Russians had spread false stories and realizing the consequences of possible Russian intervention. The optimistic construction put by the British on the Mashhad occurrences probably reflects in part what they were told by Iranians who were trying to pacify them. The British do not report that the Mashhad protesters had won from the Shah a six months' delay in application of the Regie, so that the government's victory was somewhat qualified.v'" During the Mashhad trouble, the Amin os-Soltan again asked Kennedy if it would be possible to arrange amicably for the end of the Regie, with monetary compensation, since British trade and influence was suffering. Kennedy said abolition would be very difficult, and that it was too soon to despair of the Regie. 44 In October and November word circulated of a minor religious revolt linked to the tobacco protest and led by a Sayyed Alamgir. Although the story of a self-professed prophet leading such an uprising gained wide currency at the time and thereafter, the French documents discredit the movement as a slander campaign conducted against the sayyed by some of his enemies, and it is unclear whether the sayyed in fact ever led a prophetic rising. 45 In November the new British Minister, Sir Frank Lascelles, who replaced the ailing Wolff, reached Tehran. Lascelles, possibly because of his higher rank, seems to have been more able than Kennedy to combat the rigid position and impossible demands of the Tobacco Company. He also was more realistic than Drummond Wolff about the dangers of too aggressive a British policy in Iran. In November the approach of the six months' deadline for dealing in tobacco without company authorization brought on new protests. On November 24, 1891, de Balloy noted that Iranian merchants had earlier been given a grace period up to the previous day to cede their tobacco stocks, after which the Regie monopoly on tobacco possession was to come into force. By then, however, the Regie had been suspended in Azerbaijan 93

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due to the movement there, and the Mashhad movement had won a further six months' delay for Khorasan merchants. In Tehran there had been petitions from the merchants to the Shah before November 23 but the Shah had: sent to the regie the most recalcitrant, about fifty. In the presence of the highest functionaries of the Government they were informed that they would be immediately imprisoned if they resisted and they were offered excellent conditions for the repurchase of their merchandise. The Company then bought their stock and resold it to them as its agents at a very small profit, a subterfuge which the Regie was forced to adopt to avoid a rising in Tehran. In addition, the Regie was paying high prices for tobacco everywhere to calm discontent, which would probably mean a financial loss in the current Regie operations at best. De Balloy told a Regie official who complained about this that if he were the Shah, risking his throne, he would not hesitate to withdraw the concession, as one man in the court party [the Amin od-Dowleh] was recommending. The Turks were now claiming the same exemption for their subjects as the Russians. 46 As the deadline for buying and selling tobacco without Company authorization approached in November, fresh protests broke out in Isfahan. This city was noted for its religiosity, and was often the center of movements against European infidels. Such movements were sometimes tied to the opposition of its trading classes to European competition. Since Isfahan was in the center of an important tobacco growing region, strong local feeling against threatened Company displacement of merchants' functions was natural. Earlier complaints by the merchants and petitions to the Prince Governor, the Zell os-Soltan, had been temporarily quelled by his threats of violence, as noted above. The Isfahan merchants now apparently decided to resume protests in cooperation with the leading ulama of the town, and the approaching deadline on tobacco dealings helped rouse mass feelings. Although the various reports of the Isfahan events differ in some details, there were apparently two large demonstrations organized by the leading mollas, Aqa Najafi and his brother, Shaikh Mohammad Ali, where they attacked European concessions and declared tobacco to be unclean. After one of these all those present took an oath to stop smoking-the first use of a 94

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general boycott-and the crowd then surged through the bazaars smashing water pipes. Between the two meetings the Zell osSoltau forbade all sermons and meetings, ordered sentries and cavalry to be ready for trouble, and apparently threatened Aqa Najafi and frightened him out of appearing at the announced second demonstration. The second meeting was held in defiance of the Governor's order, however, and Shaikh Mohammad Ali preached, calling for the boycott of British enterprises, as a result of which the business of the British owned Persian Gulf Trading Company was halted along with tobacco business. Later Aqa Najafi preached that all tobacco was religiously unclean, as were the servants and employees of Europeans. One large Isfahan merchant burned all his tobacco stock rather than surrender it to the Company-a move which apparently impressed the population greatly. Following the lead of their ulama Isfahanis now became the first to boycott trade in, and smoking of, tobacco. Within the city smoking and trade in tobacco evidently ceased almost completely after the leading ulama announced their religious prohibition. Europeans were insulted in the bazaars and placards signed by Aqa Najafi were posted declaring all employees of the Regie to be unclean, and saying that they should not be allowed into public places. The Isfahan ulama apparently wrote to Shirazi in Samara for corroboration of their tobacco boycott, and rumors spread of a boycott order from Shirazi. 47 In December de Balloy reported that the Zell os-Soltan had demanded more troops to reestablish order in Isfahan, but the Shah feared he would use them for his own aims, and instead ordered him to restore order without extra troops. Isfahan had helped to inspire Tehran, where at the end of November the mollas, including even the royalist Imam Jom'eh, began to preach against the Regie.s" Late in 1891 new protests also began in Tabriz, where there were rumors of attempts to reintroduce the Regie, which had been suspended there. In December, 1891 the nationwide protest reached its culmination in the boycott of tobacco. Although this had already begun sporadically, and was being carried out especially in Isfahan, and rumors of an order from Shirazi were current, the boycott reached nationwide proportions only when a fatwd was announced from Shirazi directing all believers to abstain from smoking. The text read simply, 'In the name of God, the Merciful, the Forgiving. Today the use of tanbdku and tobacco in any form 95

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is reckoned as war against the Imam of the Age (may God hasten his glad Advent!)' Although doubts were cast upon the authenticity of this document, it was widely reproduced and universal observance began almost immediately. Shirazi had been appealed to for some such action not only by Sayyed Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani and Sayyed Ali Akbar of Shiraz, but also in letters, telegrams, and visits from other members of the ulama. He had earlier written to the Shah to protest the concession-granting policy, but had received an unsatisfactory reply. The Shah had also sent the Iranian agent at Baghdad to argue that the concession was both unavoidable and beneficial, and that cancellation would be impossible, but this had had no apparent effect. The text of the fatwd may have been drafted in Iran, perhaps by the leader of the Tehran ulama, Hajji Mirza Hasan Ashtiyani, who headed the anti-Regie movement there. Because of his outstanding prestige, Ashtiyani was appealed to by the ulama and merchants, and he joined in asking Shirazi to prohibit smoking. A letter from Shirazi confirming the order was announced and rapidly distributed at the beginning of December. Whether or not the announced fatwd was originally his, he subsequently reconfirmed the order in answers to several telegrams. * The universality of the observation of the boycott amazed Iranians and foreigners alike. Eyewitnesses told of even the Shah's wives and servants refusing to smoke, and nobody dared be seen on the street selling or using tobacco. Even Christians and Jews were said to observe the religious ban. Already on December 3, right after the announced confirmation of the ban by Shirazi, Feuvrier noted: A letter has come from Karbala, by which the mojtahed recommends making the tobacco company fall by abstention, * There is not agreement as to whether Shirazi issued the original jatwii, though he had probably written approving a boycott, and he later confirmed authorship of the fatwa, British documents express conflicting opinions about Shirazi's authorship. Taimuri supports it, as does Karbala'i, but the latter's editor's introduction by Dehgan says it is an open question, and suggests that Shirazi approved a boycott, but that the text was written in Tehran. Kerrnani, Tiirikh-e bidiiri-ye Iriiniyiin, 2nd ed. (Tehran, n.d.), p. 12, similarly suggests that Ashtiyani drafted the fatwa and sent it to Shirazi for approval. The government's efforts to discredit the fatwa were ineffective, particularly since Shirazi telegraphed confirming his authorship. The fatwa is translated in Browne, Persian Revolution, p. 22, n. 1.

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by no longer smoking, and immediately, with perfect accord, all the tobacco merchants closed their shops, all the waterpipes have been put aside, and no one smokes any more, neither in town, nor in the entourage of the Shah, nor even in his andarun. What discipline, what obedience, when it concerns submission to the advice-veritable orders-of an influential mojtahed of some renown! The mollas are really the masters of the situation. It was in vain to make the head of the merchants, Hajji Mohammad Hasan, responsible for the closing of the shops, and exile him to Qazvin, everyone knows it would be necessary to strike elsewhere if one wished to cut the evil at its roots.s" The last-named individual, whose name is given in Persian sources as Kazem, not Hasan, was better known by his title, Malek ot-Tojjar. He was seized by the government, who claimed that he had forged the prohibition, and kept imprisoned in Qazvin for several days, probably in the vain hope of frightening the opposition. In fact, however, the movement continued to grow, and it was the Shah who became increasingly frightened. On or about December 10, a week after the prohibition was confirmed, a meeting was held between the leaders of the government and of the ulama, which Ashtiyani, however, declined to attend, because, he said, of illness. The ulama explained the Islamic basis of their contention that a foreign monopoly was illegal, and the discussion apparently became heated, with the ulama representatives saying that the Company should be indemnified by having some of those present and others return the bribes the Company had given them. Finally, however, the Amin os-Soltan promised to work to remove the concession if the ulama after its annulment would make smoking lawful. 50 By now the British government realized that the monopoly could not be maintained, and finally in fact began to pressure the company to drop its fantastically high compensation terms. On December 15, Salisbury telegraphed: The demands made by the Company, if we are rightly informed, are quite excessive. Remember that the first thing we have to care for is the maintenance of the Persian State and of the Amin's position. We must support no demand which would run risk of compromising either. 51 After this Lascelles pressured the Company to accept the inevitable. This change in the British official position, however, came 97

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too late to preserve their advantage, as was often to be the case in the following years. If the French documents are accurate, it is not surprising that Salisbury considered the Company's demands excessive, since they included compensation equalling anticipated profits for the next fifty years. 52 The British documents include a telegram from the Imperial Tobacco Company of Persia to Ornstein, on December 15, 1891, authorizing negotiation for compensation for loss of the internal monopoly only, which says, 'Compensation for loss of internal monopoly must not be less than 100,0001. yearly, and guaranteed by the Persian Government.'. The yearly probably refers to the fifty year period mentioned by de Balloy-indeed an 'excessive' sum. Since the British Minister would not back such a demand and the Iranians would not hear of it, company demands were later scaled down. The same company telegram tells Ornstein to, 'Negotiate subject to approval of terms by Lascelles and shareholders, and upon condition precedent that Concession is to remain in full force till negotiations completed.' This probably explains why company employees remained active even after the Shah announced the cancellation of the internal monopoly, a circumstance which aroused the suspicions of the Iranians. 53 Judging from his remarks to Lascelles, the Amin os-Soltan now felt (though he apparently had no promise of it), that the opposition would be called off if only the internal monopoly were removed, leaving the Company with an export monopoly. He and the Shah agreed to take this step, but matters proved not to be so simple. At a further meeting of the same ulama and government men plus Ashtiyani and some of the merchants on December 18, the Amin os-Soltan said that with great effort he had succeeded in abolishing the internal monopoly, that it was impossible to abolish the external monopoly, and that the ban on smoking should be withdrawn in line with previous agreements. A violent discussion ensued in which Ashtiyani and others said that this step did not meet the demand for cutting the influence of foreigners over Muslims, and maintained that the ban on smoking could be lifted only by the man who had issued it. Complaints about other concessions to Europeans were also made. Sayyed Abdollah Behbehani, who generally supported the Amin os-Soltan and the British, reportedly argued unsuccessfully against Ashtiyani. 5 4 Describing the whole course of events since the boycott, Lascelles wrote on December 22: 98

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No sooner ... had the prohibition against smoking been issued by the Mollahs and faithfully observed by the people, than the Shah and the Amin-us-Sultan found themselves absolutely powerless to assert their authority and were compelled to submit to the dictation of the Mollahs .... [the Amin os-Soltan] led me to understand that if he were able to announce the abolition of the internal monopoly, all agitation would cease and there would be no difficulty in securing the monopoly of exportation and a fair compensation to the Company. When however he announced to the Mollahs that the internal monopoly was abolished and requested that they would withdraw the prohibition against smoking, they replied that they must communicate with the Chief Mujtahed of Kerbela who resides at Samara, and await his reply before withdrawing the prohibition, and in the telegram which was addressed to the Chief Mujtahed, no mention was made of the external monopoly and it is probable that he will understand that the whole Concession has been cancelled. . . . I have been informed by persons long resident in Persia that they have been astonished at this assertion of power on the part of the Mollahs, both as regards their opposition to the Government and the implicit obedience which the people have yielded to their commands with regard to an article which is not forbidden by the religious law... It has been explained to me that it would have been impossible for the Mollahs to have obtained this power had it not been for the general discontent which prevails throughout Persia which has led the people to hope that by following their advice some remedy may be found for the grievances from which they undoubtedly suffer. . . . It is evident that a severe blow has been dealt at English influence in Persia .... 55 The telegram sent Shirazi by the ulama leaders, under the eyes of the government, on December 18, was indeed ambiguous as to what exactly had been suppressed. On the other hand some private telegrams were evidently sent to Shirazi telling him that the export monopoly remained and complaining about the continued power of European unbelievers in Iran. 56 The Nayeb os-Saltaneh was reported by Lascelles to be still involved in the opposition to the Prime Minister, and the Zell os-Soltan to be among the many working, apparently with increasing hope of success, for the fall of the Amin os-Soltan.

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In response to this situation Salisbury telegraphed to Lascelles on December 24: I think it worth while making a strong effort to save Amines-Sultan. You should see the Shah and press upon him that though his ordinary political arrangements are no concern of ours the overthrow of a popular and successful Minister because he has favoured English enterprise will produce the worst possible effect in England; and will give a dangerous encouragement to Russia. After such a victory there will be an alliance between Russia and the Mollahs which will practically take the Shah's kingdom out of his hand. 57 On December 23 de Balloy reported on the events of the month, adding to material discussed above the fact that Ornstein was frightened enough to forbid his employees to leave the European quarter or to smoke in the streets. Ornstein had asked the Shah for protection for the company employees, but the Shah said he could do nothing. Discussing the first meeting between the ulama and the government, de Balloy says that with the Shah's approval the Amin os-Soltan invited the main mollas to a meeting of the Grand Council at Nayeb os-Saltaneh's home, and most accepted. The Ministers tried without success to show the mollas that the Regie was not against Islam and to get them to write to Shirazi to withdraw the interdiction on tobacco. The Shah saw there was no hope of budging the mollas, and that he would have to cede.s!" (This meeting is also described, with slight variation, in other sources.) In the same days a new movement was threatened from Tabriz upon indications that the Regie intended to return there. The Shah at this point withdrew the internal monopoly only and, according to de Balloy, the Shah himself telegraphed to Karbala asking for a withdrawal of the interdiction on tobacco. (This seems probable, as the ulama's telegram, as noted above, did not actually mention this crucial point.) De Balloy also reports a petition from many mollas and merchants of Tehran asking the removal of the Amin os-Soltan, The same despatch notes that the first fact emerging from recent events was the immense power of the ulama, of which not only foreigners but probably they themselves were unaware. De Balloy claims, possibly accurately, that the new British Minister, Lascelles, had said to him: 'This is the heritage of the baneful policy of Sir Drummond Wolff. This man thinks only of making a 100

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noise and fame for himself.' Lascelles had added that with Russia's superior power in Iran Great Britain should have pacified Russia to gain time instead of exciting her. De Balloy adds, accurately enough, that it seemed that Lascelles was not instructed to save the Company. 58 On December 25 the crisis deepened when placards were put up in the bazaars threatening that unless the concession were withdrawn a holy war would be declared after two days. Falsely claiming authorization from Shirazi, one version of the announcement apparently read simply, 'According to the order of the proof of Islam Aqa Mirza Shirazi next Monday is the jehdd. Let the people be prepared'. 59 A much more detailed version of the placards is included in the Tehran Embassy Archives and in the French documents. It begins by appealing to Muslims who assert that had they been present with the martyred Imam Hosain at Karbala, they would have participated in the jehdd, and says that the time for jehdd had now returned. It also declared against any association with Europeans and gave instructions for thejehiid. 60 On January 4, 1892, de Balloy reported on the placards of December 25 threatening foreigners, including an explanation of the different text of the placards given by various sources. There were apparently different placards, some simply proclaiming the jehdd to begin in forty-eight hours, while others went into detail, one saying that at that time all shops must close and everyone should gather in the Shah mosque and follow the orders of a man on horseback who would arrive. It did not say whether action was to be directed against the Shah, the Regie, or Europeans, but, Persians were saying action was to be against the Regie, the Belgian trams and railroad, and that it had been ordered by Shirazi. De Balloy also reported that Biitzov at a British Legation ball that night had blamed the Regie for these troubles, and the next day he asked an audience with the Shah. De Balloy said he had a text (apparently from Biltzov) of what occurred there. Biitzov said that the Shah had done nothing but wrong for two years, and that this had now ended in threats to the European population, and that he, Butzov, had orders to telegraph St. Petersburg upon the least danger and that a Russian army corps would enter Iran to restore order. He added (accurately enough) that the population did not believe in the announced suppression of the Regie since they saw Regie men still working. He demanded that the Shah publish notices of the Regie's suppression the next day and 101 J

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take military precautions, and also asked for the removal of the inexperienced young Amin os-Soltan, who he said was the cause of the trouble. The Shah promised to publish news of the Regie's suppression, to post troops in town, and to call in new regiments. 61 After the posting of the jehdd notices, in addition to Russian pressure, the Shah was subject to even more severe pressure from the Tehran ulama and populace. In the same period, fear of popular reaction seems to have aroused other Europeans against the Tobacco Company. Responding to the placards, many Tehranis actually did prepare to fight, gathered arms and provisions, and said goodbye to their families. Some of the foreigners in Tehran were naturally upset enough to appeal to the Iranian government for protection. As a result several of the leading ulama were apparently called to a meeting with men in high governmental positions to try to solve the question. At this meeting the ulama reportedly remained adamant, declaring that monopoly concessions were against the shari'a, and refusing to accede to government arguments to the contrary. Finally the Amin os-Soltan had to agree to the complete removal of the concession but made it a condition that the ban on smoking should also be removed and the jehdd announcement annulled.s" The ulama did preach against the jehdd, but did not legalize smoking, and were not completely convinced that the concession would be annulled. The jehdd notices were apparently also the immediate cause of a bitter exchange of letters between the Shah and Ashtiyani, in which the Shah reproached Ashtiyani for not coming to the first meeting, for discussing the Imperial Bank and railroads at the second meeting, and for not announcing the resumption of smoking. The Shah asked Ashtiyani if he did not know that if it were not for the government the Babis would behead the ulama.s" It was the Shah who had to give in, however. With the removal of the jehdd order, the tense situation now quieted somewhat, but far from completely. Smoking was not resumed, pending permission from Shirazi. On December 28 Feuvrier reported: On the demand of the diplomatic agents, military posts have been established in various parts of the European quarter, and the Shah has resigned himself to having placards posted stating that "his love for his people has led him to withdraw definitively the tobacco concession". 102

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These measures have had an immediate effect at least of stopping the execution of the threats contained in the posters. However, it is impossible to believe that the mollahs, who have seen their first attempt crowned with success, and realize their strength, will stop at this single attempt. Everyone says that the trouble will only stop with an authentic official act which leaves no shadow of doubt, and that simple promises will no longer suffice. Besides, the mojtahed of Karbala has not replied to the request to lift the interdiction on smoking; and, as long as this prohibition continues, the situation will remain unchanged. 64 The Shah's posters announcing the Regie's suppression helped calm Tehran, and the day of the threatened jehdd passed calmly. But new troubles broke out in Qazvin, Yazd, and Kermanshah. And since the Company had not yet conceded cancellation and was keeping its employees in Iran, there was justifiable uncertainty as to whether the Regie had really been suppressed. This uncertainty was apparently conveyed to Shirazi at Samara in private telegrams. The Shah and his followers were hoping that the situation would be calmed and smoking authorized when Shirazi responded to telegrams sent by the ulama, The expected telegram from Shirazi arrived on January 1, in answer to the telegram from the Tehran ulama on December 18 following the abrogation of the internal monopoly. The December 18 telegram had not explicitly referred to the ban on smoking, but told Shirazi that traders, growers, and others would no longer be subject to the concession within Iran, leaving the question of the external monopoly ambiguous, and asked him to express his thanks to the Shah. Shirazi's answer thanked the Shah and expressed the hope that foreign hands would be removed from Iran. According to the French documents, the Shah had sent his own telegram to Shirazi, asking him to lift the ban. In any case, Feuvrier and other observers make it clear that the Shah was anticipating an end to the boycott, and was furious at its omission. Later telegrams from Shirazi show that he was still suspicious, and also hoping for greater gains. Several Iranians had apparently written him telling him that the Regie had not in fact been fully cancelled. 65 Early in January the most serious disorders broke out in Tehran. Since smoking had not been resumed, and since people were still expressing uncertainty that the concession had really ended, the government sent an envoy to Ashtiyani demanding

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that he either begin to smoke or leave Iran. Ashtiyani replied that he would leave, but the news spread and people began to plan action. The next day, January 4, 1892, nearly all the ulama gathered at Ashtiyani's house, while the people began to close their shops and surge into the street. A snowballing crowd of men and women, led by sayyeds, and shouting religious slogans and threats against the Shah, surged towards the governmental palaces and threw stones at the palace of the Nayeb os-Saltaneh. After a brief appearance at the head of his troops, the Nayeb beat a hasty and cowardly retreat, falling on his face in the mud in the process. Either on his own or upon orders from the Nayeb os-Saltaneh, the head of the troops guarding the area gave orders to shoot, and although the first force refused to fire on unarmed Muslims, a second group did fire and dispersed the crowd. Seven or more persons, including some sayyeds, were killed and several others wounded. Crowds continued to gather, and the danger apparently subsided only after a message from the Shah to Ashtiyani saying he did not have to leave or to order smoking resumed. The Shah also reiterated that the concession was definitively abolished, a point on which there remained doubt as long as it was not confirmed by the Company itself. The Shah may also have threatened to fire again on the crowd if it did not disperse. Ashtiyani told the crowd to disperse, saying that people could act again if all was not settled within two days. Popular reaction to the shooting remained very strong, however, and the corpses were carried around town, threats of a jehiid circulated, and Europeans were very frightened, many of them fleeing Tehran or hiding. Smaller hostile crowds continued to occupy the streets. *

* Taimuri, op. cit., pp. 150-167, has a detailed description of the day quoting various witnesses. See also Dr. Feuvrier, Trois ans a La cour de Perse (Paris, 1906), pp. 292-298; Kerrnani, op. cit., p. 13. The account given by the Amin os-Soltan to Lascelles differs from Feuvrier's account in denying the Shah's responsibility for both the order to Ashtiyani and the shooting, but the Shah may have been eager to disclaim such responsibility. F.O. 60/554, Lascelles to Salisbury, Paraphrase of Telegram No.5, Jan. 4, 1892: 'The Amin-es-Sultan ... has sent his secretary to give me further details concerning today's riots. 'Yesterday evening, without the Shah's knowledge the Naib es Sultaneh informed the leading Mollah that smoking should be resumed, or he must leave the capital. Thereupon the Mollah prepared to go, when the people rose to prevent his doing so. His Majesty expressed his disapproval of the Naib's action and promulgated a Decree abolishing, both internally and externally, the entire tobacco monopoly. The Shah also sent to the Mollah to request him to calm the popular excitement. The latter answered that 104

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Russian complicity is indicated by the Russian head of the Cossack Brigade's reported refusal to obey the Shah's orders to defend Tehran during this uprising. This is vividly described by the next head of the Cossack Brigade, Kosogovskii. He says the Russian Colonel, after getting the Shah's order, asked his Cossacks which ones were for the Shah and which for the ulama, After this a subordinate passed out wine among the Cossacks, and another began shooting practice, adding to the panic in the city. This enabled the unworthy Nayeb os-Saltaneh and his still more unworthy favorite to pose successfully as the only military saviours of the Shah.?" There is, however, a conflicting report, that the Nayeb os-Saltaneh failed to respond to the Colonel's offer of help."? These events marked the definitive end of the concession, as it was only now that Ornstein, the local head of the Tobacco Company, was forced to agree to cancellation and to stopping operations. On January 5, the day after the riots, the Shah sent men to negotiate with Ashtiyani. The latter had dispersed the threatening mobs the evening before only after saying that they should gather again on January 6, and if the ulama's demands had not been met by then they could take further action. The very real threat of further popular revolt was used by Ashtiyani to assure immediate victory, though he apparently had to back down on a demand to the Shah's negotiators that all concessions be removed. According to information reaching Lascelles: The impossibility of putting an end to concessions, such as the Bank and Tramways having been pointed out to him he finally put forward three conditions which he said should satisfy the people, but if they were not granted there would be a further rising tomorrow, as well as a demonstration in front of the (continued/rom p. 104)

he should now demand the abolition of all concessions granted to Europeans, mentioning by name the Regie, the tramways and the Bank . . . . On the assurance being given by the Mollahs that they would formulate their claims the day after tomorrow the crowd dispersed, but in the meantime another lot had approached the Palace. 'The Naib es Sultaneh, whom the Shah sent out to calm them, was threatened and gave the order to fire upon the people, with the result that six were killed, four of them being Seyyeds. 'The Shah, in the opinion of the Amin-es-Sultan, is convinced that his son is implicated in this movement, that the killing of the Seyyids will indispose the people towards him, and will convince Europeans that Persian troops will, when ordered to do so act against the people'.

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Russian Legation, and he would not be able to prevent this. The three conditions put forward were compensation for the families of the men killed in yesterday's riot; that the leaders of the movement should be assured against punishment; and that a notice should be issued by the Tobacco Corporation informing merchants who have sold tobacco to the Regie that they are at liberty to re-purchase at the price paid to them, as the Government had abolished the monopoly. I received a message from the Amin-es-Sultan who remains at the Palace asking me to press Mr. Ornstein to issue this notice, and after having strongly urged him in writing to agree, he finally promised to do SO.68 Ornstein telegraphed to the Imperial Tobacco Corporation in London that he had yielded to the demand for a proclamation only upon Lascelles' insistence that 'we were in presence of revolution and that my refusal might occasion bloodshed and endanger lives of European Colony, and that there was not time to wait telegraphic instructions.' Although the F. o. documents lack crucial material on the behavior of the Company during the crisis, this telegram is reasonably indicative. Ornstein says that an ultimatum was conveyed to him through Lascelles; 'I refused to comply, stating I had no instructions from my Board, and that demand was so preposterous that I could and would only yield to force.... '69 On January 5 de Balloy described the serious outbreak which had just occurred, adding some details which he seemsto have had at first hand of the negotiations between the Shah's representatives and Ashtiyani after the shootings and popular upsurge. The Shah had first sent a dastkhatt (decree) rescinding his order that Ashtiyani leave Iran and sending rich presents, but both were refused. At the second meeting Ashtiyani posed three conditions: a bloodprice for those killed, the impunity of other participants in the demonstration, and the removal of all foreign concessions. The first two were granted, but the Shah said the third was impossible. After long negotiations the two sides agreed to the complete suppression of the Regie, including its export privileges. In the course of the discussions the Shah's envoy asked why Ashtiyani was fighting his sovereign, and his reply is given as follows: Because I am the representative of the people, who are tired of all his exactions. If I made peace before having received all the 106

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guarantees I demand, the people would put a cord around my neck and lead me before the door of the Russian Legation to implore aid and protection. On these conditions I promise to have read Wednesday in all the mosques the proclamation of Mr. Ornstein [announcing the Regie's withdrawal], and the people will calm down. If they are not accepted I do not answer for the consequences. De Balloy says that these words by Ashtiyani prove Russian complicity in the movement. He says that the events of January 4 were 'not an uprising but a revolution'. 70 Even after the Shah agreed to the complete suppression of the Regie, de Balloy wrote that new placards had been posted threatening death to the Shah, the Amin os-Soltan, Ornstein, and Rabino (the manager of the British owned Imperial Bank), and also demanding the suppression of the Russian Bank after the destruction of the English establishments.r! Btitzov now evidently worked to quiet the situation, though the Russians rejected a somewhat tactless British complaint that seemed to blame Russians for the recent disorders. 72 Although the situation soon quieted considerably, the ban on smoking was not lifted pending instructions from Shirazi. The latter telegraphed that, although he had perfect confidence in the Shah, telegraphic communications were not to be trusted and therefore asked for a written statement that the concession was completely abolished and would never be given out again before he agreed to lift the ban. Despite this telegram, however, Amin os-Soltan was able to convince Ashtiyani to lift the prohibition, and on January 26 the town crier announced the end of the ban. AShtiyani based his action on an earlier telegram from Shirazi saying smoking could resume once the concession was cancelled. 73 With the resumption of smoking late in January, the mass protest against the Regie came to an end. An interesting, if obscure, footnote to the story of the tobacco protest is the role played by the Azali branch of the Babi sect, many of whose members engaged in oppositional political activity in this period and through the time of the Constitutional Revolution. Azali Babis were among the editors of Akhtar and among Sayyed Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani's followers, and there were also Babis among the group arrested for sedition in Tehran in the spring of 1891, though some at least of these were of the Baha'i branch, Already at this time there was a decisive political 107

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split between the oppositional Azalis and the quietist Baha'i branch of the Babis, which continued through the Constitutional Revolution. The concern of the Baha'is to dissociate themselves from the opposition is indicated by a report from Lascelles in February, 1892, saying that the Amin os-Soltan had stressed that: all the enemies of the Persian Government had taken the opportunity of the opposition to the Tobacco Corporation to join together in an attempt to overthrow the Government of the Shah. Among these enemies of the Government the sect of the Babis is not the least influential element. The Amin-es-Sultan has been careful to explain to me that the Babis are divided into two branches, one of which, the Bahais, are inoffensive, and abstain from any interference in the affairs of State; whereas the other branch, known as the Azelis, seek for the destruction of all existing institutions, and are similar to the Nihilists in Russia. His Highness has communicated to me a letter addressed to him by the exiled Babis belonging to the Baha branch, who are living at Bombay, expressing their loyalty to the Shah, and pointing to the Sayyid Jmal-ud-Din (sic) and his followers as the fomentors of trouble and disaffection. Enlarging on this point, an enclosed Memo on the Babis says the Amin os-Soltan states that from their letters: it appears that the Bahai Babis accuse the Azelis of Socialism in its most virulent forms. A letter from the Babis of Bombay, which the Amin-es-Sultan has communicated to the Legation, contains expressions of sincere loyalty to the Shah, repudiates all suggestions that they have any connection with the disturbers of the public peace, and points to Sayyid Jmal-ud-Din and his followers as the fomentors of trouble and disaffection towards the Shah and his sovereignty. 74 The Bombay letter was an appeal for the release of unjustly arrested Baha'is. As at the time of the Constitutional Revolution, the Government tried to exploit religious feeling against Babis and radicals in order to discredit the popular movement. Thus, the Amin os-Soltan wrote to Shirazi saying that among the protesters were Babis, materialists, and such people, who were putting on religious clothing and setting Muslim against Muslim for their own ends. They were out to create trouble in Iran and to hurt both the 108

THE LARGE-SCALE PROTESTS

state and religion.f" Despite the probable presence of Babis and atheists in the tobacco movement, the ulama leaders seem to have been confident enough of their own hegemony to remain unmoved. Although their numbers were too small to be decisive, it seems likely that Azali Babis did join the tobacco protest. In January and February a movement against the Tobacco Company continued in Isfahan. There was public agitation against employees of the Company and tobacco growers were demanding to buy back cheaply tobacco which they said the Company had forced them to sell. By mid-February the trouble had subsided somewhat. With the resumption of smoking and Shirazi's failure to extend the protest, the tobacco movement ended. Its results were portentous for Iran's future.

109

FOOTNOTES Chapter III T. E. Gordon, op. cit., p. 186. F.O. 248/533 (Tehran Embassy Archives, now in the P.R.O.), report from Shiraz agent, April 18, 1891. 2 F.O. 248/531, Nawab to Kennedy, Interview with Amin os-Soltan, Oct. 29, 1891. 2a A full description of the events in Shiraz is in Taimuri, op. cit., pp. 68-73. Details of the case of Sayyed Ali Akbar are given by Molk Xra, op. cit., pp. 115-116. Sayyed Ali Akbar went to the minbar, took a sword from his cloak, and said that now jehiid was a duty of Muslims. 3 Details on the Shiraz events are in F.O. 60/523, Kennedy to Salisbury, No. 129, May 20, 1891, which encloses Amin os-Soltan's description of the situation, and in Karbala'i, op. cit., pp. 28-31. • F.O. 60/553, Enclosed report from Shiraz agent, Confidential, in Kennedy to Salisbury, June 10, 1891, No. 143. F.O. 248/534, reports from Shiraz. In two despatches of Nov. 11 the agent said: 'I must inform you most confidentially that the members of the Regie Agency here are mostly the cause of these difficulties'; and 'I must inform you confidentially that instead of trying to gain the people's esteem Mr. Binns annoys the people. He is trying to purchase tobacco for smaller prices than the last years'. As will be seen, complaints against the behavior of the Regie agents in other cities also got some support from British sources. 5 F.O. 60/523, Enclosed report from Shiraz agent, June 3, in Kennedy to Salisbury, No. 149, June 13, 1891. 6 A. E., Perse, 1891, No. 25, June 12. 7 Malekzadeh, op, cit., I, p. 128. 8 Enclosed in F.O. 60/594, Lascelles to Salisbury, No. 14, Jan. 19, 1892. 9 Amin od-Dowleh, op. cit., pp. 150-151. 10 F.O. 60/523, Kennedy to Salisbury, No. 117, May 2,1891, Confidential. 11 Loc. cii., enclosed Memo by Nawab Hasan Ali Khan of a conversation with Amin os-Soltan. Also enclosed is the text of Kennedy's letter to the Shah. 12 Translation enclosed in F.O. 60/553, Kennedy to Salisbury, No. 180, July 27, 1891, Confidential. I have changed the double plural 'Ulemas', though when British vagaries involve only spelling and not the sense I leave the original. 13 Paton to Kennedy, Aug. 15, 1891, enclosed in F.O. 60/553, Kennedy to Salisbury, No. 202, Sept. 3, 1891. Vivid descriptions of the revolutionary quality of the popular movement are also found in Docteur (Jean-Baptiste) Feuvrier, Trois ans a fa cour de Perse, New Edition (Paris, 1906). 14 This text, which the Shah and the Amin os-Soltan did not want to show Kennedy, but which he later got from a secret source, is translated and enclosed in F.O. 60/553, in Kennedy to Salisbury, No. 225, Oct. 5, 1891. 1

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15 F.O. 60/555, 'Memo on position and prospects of the Imperial Tobacco Corporation of Persia', by C. E. Biddulph, Asst. Commissioner, Berar; Foreign Department, Government of India. 16 Feuvrier, op. cit., p. 271; Malekzadeh, op. cit., p. 129. 17 Molk Ara, Ope cit., pp. 116, 119. 18 Feuvrier, Ope cit., p. 272. In A. E., Perse, 1891, No. 36, Sept. 3, de Balloy reports on the Tabriz disturbances, saying that the Amin-e Hozur was sent to Tabriz by the Shah 'to find and punish all the signatories of the seditious telegram'. 19 F.O. 60/553, Kennedy to Salisbury, Tel. No. 172, Aug. 17, 1891. 20 F.O. 60/553, Kennedy to Salisbury, Tel. No. 177, Sept. 1, 1891. Taimuri, Ope cit., pp. 73-77, also vividly describes the successful Tabriz insurrection. 21 F.O. 60/553, Kennedy to Salisbury, No. 202, Sept. 3, 1891. 22 Ibid., Paton to Kennedy, Tabriz, Aug. 29, 1891. 23 Documents cited in L. V. Stroeva, 'Bor'ba iranskogo naroda protiv angliiskoi tabachnoi monopolii v Irane v 1891-1892 gg.', Problemy istorii natsional'no-osvoboditel'nogo dvizheniia v stranakh Azii (Leningrad, 1963), p. 168. Molk Ara, Ope cit., p. 115. 24 A. E., Perse, 1891, No. 39, Sept 17. 25 F.O. 60/553, Paton to Kennedy, Sept. 5, 1891, enclosed in Kennedy to Salisbury, No. 207, Sept. 12, 1891. 26 Feuvrier, Ope cit., pp. 272-274. 27 F.O. 60/553, Kennedy to Salisbury, Private, Sept. 4, 1891. 28 F.O. 60/553, Salisbury to Kennedy, Sept. 6, 1891, Confidential. Various French despatches tell of an idea by the Amin os-Soltan to solve the Azerbaijan difficulties by having the local tobacco merchants there set up their own company, which would be franchised by the British Company. The sum demanded by Ornstein for this was so high that the merchants refused, according to A. E., Perse, No. 49 of Nov. 5, 1891. 28a F.O. 60/553, Kennedy to Salisbury, Private, Sept. 9, 1891. 29 F.O. 60/553, Kennedy to Salisbury, Tel. No. 184, Sept. 9, 1891. 30 A. E., Perse, 1891, No. 37, Sept. 7. 31 I bid., No. 38, Sept. 9. 32F.O. 60/524, Kennedy to Salisbury, No. 211, Sept. 19, 1891. 33 A. E., Perse, 1891, No. 39, Sept. 17. 34 F.O. 60/553, Kennedy to Salisbury, Tel. No. 187, Sept. 16, 1891; and F.O. 539/60, Inclosure 2 in Kennedy to Salisbury, No. 50 (208), Sept. 17, 1891. 35 F.O. 60/524, Kennedy to Salisbury, No. 214, Sept. 24, 1891. 36 Feuvrier, op: cit., p. 276. 37 A. E., Perse, 1891, enclosed in No. 64 of Dec. 23, 1891. The undated Persian text of this 'First Telegram' from Shirazi to the Shah is in Kermani, Tiirikh-e bidiiri, p. 24. Feuvrier speaks only of 'the mojtahed of Karbala', but it is clear that Shirazi is intended. 38 Taimuri, Ope cit., pp. 89-98. Several texts of telegrams are included. 39 F.O. 60/553, Zell os-Soltan to the Merchants of Isfahan, enclosed in Kennedy to Salisbury, No. 210, Sept. 19, 1891. '0 A. E., Perse, 1891, No. 40, Sept. 30; and No. 42, Oct. 1. '1 Stroeva, Ope cit., pp. 172-174. Stroeva uses old calendar dates which are changed here. See also A. E .. Perse, 1891, No. 57, Nov. 27.

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F.O. 60/553, Telegram from the Shah to the Saheb Divan, Confidential, Oct. 6, 1891; enclosed in Kennedy to Salisbury, No. 227, Oct. 10, 1891. 4.3 F.O. 60/553, Kennedy to Salisbury, No. 228, Oct. 19, 1891, Confidential, quoting private letter from Gen. MacLean, Oct. 10, 1891. 43a A. E., Perse, 1891, No. 57, Nov. 24. u F.O. 60/553, Kennedy to Salisbury, Tel. No. 204, Oct. 7, 1891. 4.5 Details of the story, together with the appraisals of a British journal and the French Minister at Tehran have been collected in Appendix II. 4.6 A. E., Perse, 1891, No. 57,Nov. 24. 47 F.O. 60/553, Preece to Lascelles, Telegram, Nov. 20, 1891, enclosed in Lascelles to Salisbury, No. 241, Nov. 23, 1891; Taimuri, op. cit., pp. 78-79; Karbala'i, op. cit., pp. 51-60; and A. E., Perse, 1891, No. 57, Nov. 24. 48 A. E., Perse, 1891, No. 64, Dec. 23. 49 Feuvrier, op, cit., p. 284. 50 Taimuri, op. cit., pp. 121-124. The same meeting is described in the French documents below. It is also incompletely described by the Amin os-Soltan in F.O. 248/531, Nawab to Lascelles, Dec. 19, 1891. 51 F.O., 60/553, Salisbury to Lascelles, No. 62, Dec. 15, 1891. 52 A. E., Perse, 1892, No.3, Jan. 3. De Balloy mentions the sum demanded in tomans, equalling about £100,000 a year for fifty years. 53 F.O. 539/60, No. 62, enclosed telegram from Imperial Tobacco Company of Persia to Ornstein, Dec. 15, 1891. 54 Kermani, Tiirikh-e bidiiri, p. 12; and Taimuri, op. cit., pp. 105, 125-128. 55 F.O. 60/553, Lascelles to Salisbury, No. 261, Dec. 22, 1891. 56 Karbala'i, op. cit., pp. 84-85, mentions these telegrams and gives the full text of one. 57 F.O. 60/553, Salisbury to Lascelles, Tel. No. 63, Dec. 24, 1891. 57a A. E., Perse, 1891, No. 64, Dec. 23. 58 Ibid. 59 Kermani, Tiirikh-e bidiiri, p. 36, and Taimuri, op. cit., pp. 133-134. 00 The original and translation are in F.O. 248/531. 61 A. E., Perse, 1892, No.3, Jan. 4, which encloses translations of the Dec. 25 placard and other documents. 62 Kermani, op. cit., pp. 37-38. The British documents do not record these events while de Balloy, as noted above, stresses Russian in addition to local pressure on the Shah. saTaimuri, op. cit., pp. 135-141, has the texts of this exchange, which are also in Kermani, op. cit., pp. 14-20. 64 Feuvrier, op. cit., p. 290. 65 The texts of the telegram from the Tehran ulama of Dec. 18, 1891, and of the one received from Shirazi on Jan. 1, 1892, are in Kermani, op. cit., pp. 25-26, with their dates according to the lunar heiri calendar. Feuvrier's remarks are in op. cit., pp. 290-291. Taimuri, op, cit; pp. 130-131, cites messages from Iranians to Shirazi warning him not to end the boycott as long as the external monopoly continued. 66 V. A. Kosogovskii, Iz tegeranskogo dnevnika V. A. Kosogovskogo (Moscow, 1960), PP. 124-125. This Tehran diary by Kosogovskii is an

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important original source for events in Iran in the 1890's, not only because of its Russian outlook, but also because the Colonel was an acute observer with wide interests. 67 This comes from the Colonel, quoted in Molk Ara, op. cit., p. 118. 68 F.O. 60/554, Lascelles to Salisbury, Paraphrase of Telegram No.6, Ian. 5, 1892. Further details on the events of these days are in F.O. 539/60, Lascelles to Salisbury, No. 90 (2), Ian. 14, 1892. Lascelles states that it now seemed that at least ten persons were killed in the I anuary 4 shooting, and also describes the alarm of the European community. Persian sources generally give even higher numbers of persons killed, though some state that no accurate count was made. 69 F.O. 60/554, copy of telegram from Ornstein to I.T.C.P. Ltd., received Ian. 6, 1892. 70 A. E., Perse, 1892, No.4, Ian. 8, postscript of Ian. 5. 71 Ibid., No.6, Ian. 31, 1892. 72 See the exchange between Morier and Giers, St. Petersburg, Ian. 6, 1892~ in F.O. 65/1434. This exchange is published in A. Meyendorff, ed., Correspondence diplomatique de M. de Staal (1884-1900), II, pp. 150151. F.O. 65/1434, Lascelles to Salisbury, No.6, Ian. 17, 1892, encloses the translation of a letter from the Persian Minister at St. Petersburg. to the Amin os-Soltan, saying that when Giers had been shown a telegram from the Amin os-Soltan he asked for proof of the implication of Grigorovich and Speyer at Tehran in the opposition movement, after which the Russian government would investigate. The letter also says that Butzov had written that it was not in the interest of Russia that Persia be in disorder. 73 F.O. 60/554, Lascelles to Salisbury, No. 15, Telegraphic, Ian. 25, 1892; Feuvrier, op. cit., p. 301; Taimuri, op. cit., p. 191. 74 F.O. 539/56, Lascelles to Salisbury, No. 124 (35), Feb. 16, 1892; with enclosed Churchill Memorandum. The text of the letter, which aimed at freeing unjustly jailed Baha'is, is in F.O. 248/553. 15 Text in Karbala'i, op. cit., pp. 115-117.

113

Chapter IV CONCLUSIONTHE AFTERMATH OF THE TOBACCO PROTEST THE MAIN STORY of the tobacco movement was over by the end of January, 1892. A sustained protest which had found expression in nearly every major city, and had reached revolutionary proportions first in Tabriz and then in Tehran, had succeeded in winning a clearcut and major victory against the Shah and his government. The first nationally coordinated movement of Iranians had succeeded in uniting the ulama, the city populations, and court and foreign influences currently out of favor in a coalition whose elements were to reappear in later protests up to the Constitutional Revolution. Basing itself on varying interpretations of a strongly believed religion, the movement combined a religious appeal with realistic fears of the growing influence of foreigners and the self-interest of those who would be hurt by the tobacco concession. The independent position of the Iranian ulama and their increasing alienation from the shahs both promoted ulama leadership in the tobacco protest and were promoted by the success of this movement. An ambiguous legacy of this success was an increase in the ulama's political power in subsequent years. The government was able to keep the anti-concession movement from going even further than it did by sowing division among the Tehran ulama, and between Ashtiyani and Shirazi, by a combined use of threats and favors. The favors had the more lasting results-further enriching and strengthening the ulama, For a time, however, the divisions fostered among the ulama helped obviate further disturbances. Even after smoking was legitimized by Ashtiyani, Shirazi continued to send telegrams to the leading mollas of the principal cities of Iran stating that the ban on smoking was in force until he had definite proof of the complete abolition of the concession. As Lascelles reported on February 11: ... On the receipt of these telegrams at the Telegraph Office in Tehran they were at once taken to the Amin-es-Sultan, who communicated them to me secretly and asked whether, in my 114

CONCLUSION

opinion, they should be delivered to the persons to whom they were addressed. His Highness also pointed out that it was now evident that the prohibition of smoking had really emanated from the Chief Mujtehid and that he could no longer doubt the genuineness of the telegrams stated to have been received from Samreh. I at once requested the Nawab Hassan Ali Khan to inform the Amin-es-Sultan that in my opinion the telegrams should be delivered. They would certainly become known sooner or later and the Government, by withholding them now would merely lay themselves open to the charge of having suppressed them .... Amin os-Soltan replied that he would follow Lascelles' advice of trying to get Ashtiyani to persuade Shirazi to lift the ban, but that he considered it dangerous to allow the telegrams to be delivered in the provinces: more especially at Ispahan, where an attempt had been made, evidently with the connivance of the Zil-es-Sultan, to close the Depots of the Company. His Highness subsequently informed me that he had given orders that the telegrams should be delivered to Mirza Hassan Ashtiani, to whom he had also sent a message to the effect that the Govt would be prepared to act with great severity if any further disturbances took place, and at the same time holding out hopes to him of the Shah's favour if he assisted the Government in this matter. It appears that Mirza Hassan Ashtiani was disposed to assist the government as far as he could, and I have the honour to enclose translation of a telegram and a letter which he has addressed to Mirza Mahommad Hassan [Shirazi], in which he explains the matter and speaks in terms of high praise of the Amin-es-Sultan. In his letter he also refers to the Bank and other European enterprises and suggests that no allusion to their abolition should be made in the Mirza's correspondence. * • F.O. 60/554, Lascelles to Salisbury, No. 28, Feb. 11, 1892, Secret and Confidential. Enclosed are translations of the telegrams which, especially in view of the difficulty of the Persian originals (texts in Kermani, op. cit.), are worth reproducing. They are in Appendix III. The text of the Ashtiyani's letters to Shirazi are also in Appendix III. They are full of praise for the Shah and the Amin os-Soltan, perhaps because they were to see them.

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In fact, the Amin os-Soltan had Shirazi's telegrams held back from delivery until the danger was past. In one of his letters of reply to Shirazi, Ashtiyani pointed out that at one time Shirazi had written that as soon as the concession was completely removed the ban on smoking could be lifted. In accordance with this order the ban had been lifted, and so it was not desirable to announce publicly the contents of Shirazi's latest telegrams against smoking. Ashtiyani also told Shirazi to stop referring to other European concessions. It is clear that at this point Ashtiyani's position was milder than Shirazi's, possibly because of the combination of threats and promises Ashtiyani was receiving from the Amin os-Soltan, Later reports speak of gifts and pensions from the Amin os-Soltan to the leading ulama as helping to quiet them at this time. On government threats to Ashtiyani, Lascelles had reported in January: Another uncomfortable symptom is the complete want of confidence in the assurances given by the Shah and the Government. I am informed that, now that the Mollahs are no longer united, Mirza Hassan Ashtiani, and his colleagues, who took a leading part in the recent movement, are afraid that vengeance will be taken upon them, and dare not leave their houses for fear of being arrested. I am bound to confess that their fears are not unreasonable, because in the audience I had of the Shah ... His Majesty said that it would be necessary to twist the ears and tweak the noses of the Mollahs. I have strongly urged upon the Amin-es-Sultan the necessity of restoring confidence in the Government, and that it would be hopeless to expect to do so if the assurance given by the Shah, that the Mollahs should not be molested on account of recent events, were broken." The above-mentioned split in the ranks of the mollas was described in more detail by de Balloy on January 9. He then reported: The role of the Imam Jom'ehwas subsequently [after January 6] most useful. It was he who sowed division among the mojtaheds, as I telegraphed, and it was thanks to this circumstance that tranquility could be restored. According to de Balloy, Ashtiyani had said he would address the 116

CONCLUSION

people from the great mosque controlled by the Imam Jom'eh, but the latter denied permission, thus averting a further occasion of popular excitement. Ashtiyani and another leading mojtahed then anathematized the Imam Jom'eh and he did the same to them. In the same despatch de Balloy notes as a sign of the Shah's weakness his authorization of the return of the exiled Shiraz Sayyed, Ali Akbar. 2 Shirazi and others had protested against his exile, and the Shah had had to give in on this point also. Despite the rise in ulama power, it seems that Ashtiyani continued for a time to be subject to threats from the government, and was apparently even contemplating leaving Iran until he came to terms with the Amin os-Soltan, On March 17, 1892, de Balloy noted a letter from Shirazi commenting unfavorably on several subjects. He added: These remonstrances were inspired by Mirza Hasan Ashtiani who, having been the cause or the occasion of the rising on Jan. 4, feared the revenge of the Shah. He had lately made advances to the Regie which Mr. Ornstein thought he should not accept. Seeing himself rejected on this side, he thought the best means to assure his security was to intimidate his adversary. With this aim he set the Grand Mujtahed of Kerbela in motion." (This of course may only be de BaIloy's interpretation.) On March 31, de Balloy said that Ashtiyani, who was becoming more and more afraid of governmental reprisals, had decided to leave Tehran and go to Karbala, after assuring his position and its emoluments to his son.! Ashtiyani, if he really had planned to leave, changed his mind later. This change of plans seems to be tied to a reconciliation or agreement between Ashtiyani and the Amin os-Soltan beginning in the fall, of 1892 which is suggested both in the French documents and in the British Embassy Archives. 5 With the Russians, as noted below, having come to an accord with the Amin os-Soltan in February, it was probably in any case difficult for the leading ulama to mount effective opposition to him and his policies at this time. Light is shed on the new mildness of some of the ulama by the later head of the Persian Cossack Brigade and friend of the Amin os-Soltan, Col. Kossogovskii, who says that the Amin os-Soltan at this time to stop the mouths of the ulama increased many of their pensions, made many hereditary, and added new ulama to

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the pension list, thus adding a permanent drain to the Iranian treasury." Only a very temporary loyalty was gained by these means. It is possible that Ashtiyani was among those paid for complaisance. The references in the British documents to governmental promises of favor if Ashtiyani complied seem to imply this. In general the leaders of the shrine ulama were considered far more incorruptible than the frequently worldly ulama of Iran. * The cracks in the alliance which had carried on the tobacco movement were also noted by the Russians. On February 14 de Balloy reported conversations with Speyer which confirmed de Balloy's view that the Russians now intended to concentrate on making the Imperial Bank fail. Both the Russian Loan Bank and a campaign against the Imperial Bank's notes were expected to be used with this aim. De Balloy quoted Speyer as saying (almost surely with some exaggeration or distortion) that the Russians had wanted an uprising so that they would have an excuse to intervene and reestablish order. Speyer had also said, according to de Balloy: 'Unfortunately the Mojtaheds are divided and now they are afraid. If there had been one who had a bit of energy, he would march against the palace and overthrow the Shah.' Speyer, who was more of a firebrand than his Minister, Biltzov, said that he had given up on his earlier schemes to overthrow the Amin os-Soltan, Since Biitzov, as noted below, had by now in fact reached an accord with the Amin os-Soltan, it seems likely that Speyer's more extreme statements do not represent official Russian policy. They are interesting as showing one line of Russian thought,

* The corruptibility of Xshtiyani, as well as the position of Sayyed Abdollah Behbehani, are discussed in a British memo of May 1897, concerning an ulama-led agitation against the governor of Arabistan: 'The Government now proceeded to sap the strength of the combination by sowing intrigue among its members, the Chief Mushtahed of Tehran, Hadji Mirza Ashtiani, being separated from the others by a heavy bribe. 'Seyyid Abdullah, a Mushtahed, who stood by this Legation at the time of the Regie, and with whom we are still on excellent terms, took the place of Hadji Mirza Ashtiani, and at once sent me messages to ask the views and wishes of the Legation, adding that he would throw cold water on the whole affair if he were so minded .... To Seyyid Abdullah, a reply was given that the aim of this Legation was to support His Majesty the Shah, and that he should discourage the Mollahs in their present course'. F.O. 539/76, Memo by Lt.-Col. H. Picot, enclosed in C. Hardinge to Salisbury, May 7, 1897. 118

CONCLUSION

however, and it does seem probable that the Russians were involved in later attacks on the Imperial Bank. * The government's success in sowing division among the ulama probably helped keep the tobacco uprising from going even further than it did. On the other hand, since the movement had already achieved its major aim by early January, and since the Russians stopped supporting the opposition in February, 1892, it seems unlikely that the protest would in any case have gone much further. The split in the ranks of the ulama was ultimately to be much less important than the tobacco movement's legacy of greatly enhanced political power for the ulama, According to one source, the Shah now promised the ulama to consult them more in the future, and also promised not to give any more concessions to foreigners." Whatever the truth of this, it is a fact that the great age of concession granting was now over in Iran, and the shahs must have been influenced in this matter by the tobacco affair. Until the oil concession foreign influence increased rather through loans, control of the customs, and by other means than concessions. The tobacco victory was thus somewhat more general than might at first appear, although it notably failed to achieve its broader aim of lessening foreign control in Iran. The change in the positions of Great Britain and Russia in Iran which followed the tobacco movement was one of its important legacies. Throughout the agitation against the tobacco concession, there was clearly Russian backing for the movement, although exactly how much is difficult to determine. There are several specific instances cited, including one report of an open party given by the Russian Minister, de Biltzov, for the diplomatic community and Ornstein in which de Biitzov pointed out that the Regie agitation was damaging all European interests, and got all to put pressure on Ornstein to withdraw." The French Minister also wrote of Russian support for the movement, as noted above.

* A. E., Perse, 1892, No. 10, Feb. 14. De Balloy also reported a setback for the Russians in the death of their partisan Yahya Khan Moshir odDowleh, whose title and post as Minister of Justice had just been given to Mohsen Khan, lately recalled as ambassador at Istanbul because of his ties to Malkam Khan. The Russians were said to have replaced Yahya Khan as their man of confidence and source of information at the top by E'temad os-Saltaneh, the Minister of Press. De Balloy added there had been at least one good result of the mollas' victory, in that the corrupt and notorious Italian adventurer who headed the Tehran police, the 'Count' di Monteforte, had had to be removed. 119

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The success of the ulama-led agitation against the concession meant a great increase in the prestige and power of the Russians in Iran, and a corresponding decline in the British position. This occurred at a time when Russian communications and trade with Iran were growing rapidly, and apprehension was felt about possible Russian aggression, so that the Russians were to occupy an increasingly commanding position. Seeing the strength of the intrigues against him, which had been manifested by the complaisance in high places regarding the tobacco agitation, and seeing the increased prestige of Russia, the Amin os-Soltan evidently decided to strengthen his own shaky position by coming to terms with the Russians. According to Feuvrier's entry of February 10: There is no doubt that the action of Russia has counted for much in the events which have just taken place. It is the eternal struggle for influence between the Russians and the English. This time the Russians have won beyond all hopes, for the Amin os-Soltan, understanding that the policy he has hitherto followed is condemned, has been clever enough to change it in time to avoid his fall, and to arrive at a good understanding with them. This very day the Prime Minister has effected his conversion, a fortunate result of the withdrawal of the Tobacco Concession, which, it may be hoped, will secure the tranquility of the country. The Amin os-Soltan has returned from the Russian Legation, where he has had an interview with M. de Butzof lasting not less than three hours. He has given to the Russian Minister the most formal assurances of his change of attitude, adding, "You may not believe my words, but my acts will soon prove their sincerity". The Russians ought to congratulate themselves on this result, greatly to be preferred to the fall of the Prime Minister, whom, moreover, the Shah is eager to keep in office. And so M. de Butzof must have been not less sincere than the Amin os-Soltan when he promised him the support of Russia and his own personal assistance in the accomplishment of his task. It may not be superfluous to add that this step was taken by the Prime Minister after the receipt by the Shah from his representatives at St Petersburg and Constantinople of news which has not failed to touch him. The Tsar is said to have promised to intervene with the Sultan to settle the frontier difficulty, and, 120

CONCLUSION

which is much more important to arrange the question of the exportation of tanbaku. On February 11 Feuvrier added: His Maj.esty has received the Russian Minister, and has confirmed the words of his Prime Minister, while expressing his satisfaction at the good understanding arrived at between the Governments of Persia and Russia. The Shah left his audience smiling. It is certain that he has reason to believe his recent troubles, which have not been of minor importance, to be terminated. 9 The Amin os-Soltan evidently felt that it was impossible to hide from the British a conversation which led to an obvious improvement of relations between himself and the Russians. He told of his interview with Biitzov in such a way as to indicate that he had not in any way changed his commitment to close relations with the British, and had not sacrificed any British interest, but Lascelles was not entirely convinced. After the interview with Biitzov, the Amin os-Soltan told Lascelles: The upshot of the conversation ... was that M. de Butzow consented to let bygones be bygones, and expressed his willingness to be on friendly terms with the Amin-es-Sultan, a result which his Highness considered very satisfactory, and which had been obtained at a very cheap price. . . . His Highness reminded me that on more than one occasion I had suggested the advisability of his establishing friendly relations with the Russian Legation, and he had now followed my advice. His Highness has since sent me a message begging me not to suppose that his friendship towards England, or his intention to forward English interests in Persia, have in any way diminished in consequence of the better understanding with the Russian Legation, and the fact of his repeating to me that language held by M. de Butzow was a proof of his desire to keep me informed of what he was doing. It is difficult to avoid the suspicion that M. de Butzow would scarcely have given the assurances above mentioned without obtaining some advantages in return, and both General Gordon and Mr. Churchill, who were present at the interview, carried away the impression that the Amin-es-Sultan was keeping something back from us and that he was unwilling to let us know the price he had to pay for Russian friendship .... on the whole I am inclined to think it more probable that something 121

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definite has either been given or promised by the Persian Government in exchange for M. de Butzow's assurances.!'' Despite Lascelles' note of suspicion here, it took many years for the British to admit the extent of the Amin os-Soltan's commitments to the Russians and the seriousness of the shift in Iranian foreign policy. This diplomatic revolution, though probably inevitable in view of Russia's rising interests in and proximity to Iran, and Britain's unwillingness to answer Russian advances with force, was certainly hastened and abetted by the tobacco movement. The opinion often expressed by the French Minister in his despatches, that Wolff's 'successes' had led to a Russian reaction and defeat for Britain, has some merit. In an amusing despatch of January 8, 1892, de Balloy said that an Englishman had told him on hearing of Wolff's appointment to Spain, 'Sir H. D. Wolff is going to Madrid; we shall certainly lose Gibraltar.' 11 The absence of recorded British criticism of Wolff at this time in the F. O. documents is natural enough, and would not seem to invalidate such reports by de Balloy. F. O. documents from 1888 to 1890 do show apprehension by Morier and other Brtiish officials that Wolff's ambitious schemes for Iran could lead to grief. The change in the policies of the Amin os-Soltan was not so dramatic as Feuvrier's entry might imply. The Amin os-Soltan continued to represent himself to the British as being their partisan, frequently helpless in the face of stronger pressures from elsewhere. The British tended to find the Amin os-Soltan charming and pleasant to deal with, even though they were aware of some of his faults, and this may have colored their reluctance to recognize the extent of his commitment to the Russians. Even after the Iranian government began to follow more Russophil policies, British representatives retained a generally positive feeling towards him. Typical of this attitude are the remarks about the Amin os-Soltan by the then British Minister at Tehran, Sir Mortimer Durand, in December, 1895: It is possible, as some believe, that since 1892 he has secretly gone over to Russia, but he certainly was with us once, and did much to further our interests, and though not a good administrator, he is probably as good as others, while he is personally most pleasant to deal with .... it is better, in my opinion, to leave him in undisturbed enjoyment of the income he makes by ruling the country after Persian methods, and to confine our-

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selves to the objects which we may hope to attain with his cooperation. 12 The British Foreign Office was, however reluctantly, gradually to look upon the great growth in Russian influence after this time as something they could do little to hinder. After the cancellation of the concession there ensued hostile negotiations between the Tobacco Company and the Iranian government over compensation. De Balloy recorded in February the difficulties these negotiations involved. He reported that the Persians had asked Ornstein to make a claim based not on expected profits but only actual expenses. Ornstein claimed £600,000, a large part of which had gone for the Company's purchase of the concession from Talbot and for bribes, and the rest for expenses in Iran. De Balloy said that he and some of his colleagues thought that the £300,000 used to set up the Company should not be counted." Each side presented a one-sided view of the recent events, the Company maintaining that all the agitation was really due to the dissatisfaction of Persians with their government and the weakness of the latter. The Shah and the Amin os-Soltan, on the other hand, stressed the bad behavior of Company officials, on which there had indeed been various reports, as the cause of the agitation. The amount of compensation was eventually fixed at the compromise sum of £500,000, for which the British-owned Imperial Bank of Persia offered a loan at 8 % interest. When the Amin os-Soltan reported the Russian offer of a 6 % loan, which may have been his bluff, the Imperial Bank was forced to lower its terms and the British pressured the Shah into accepting its offer by using threatening language. In April Salisbury telegraphed Lascelles: Inform Amin that it will be your duty formally to protest against the validity of any act by which the Shah alienates to a foreign Government his control over the customs revenue of his southern ports. It would be an alienation of his sovereign rights to which we are entitled to object. Represent to Amin that any loan by the Russian Government, if the interest falls into arrears, will give them an excuse which they will use for seizing a territorial guarantee in Khorassan or elsewhere.P Later the Amin os-Soltan said the Shah had decided to accept the Russian offer, and he asked Lascelles: whether he might inform Shah that Her Majesty's Government 123

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objected to Russian loan, and would consider themselves released from their assurances of support if he granted the loan to the Russians. I authorized him to tell Shah that Her Majesty's Government strongly objected to Russian loan for political reasons, and would consider the grant of it as a most unfriendly act, more especially as they had now given assurances that matter might be settled on terms proposed by Russia. On May 2 Lascelles telegraphed to Salisbury: 'I have stopped Russian loan by carrying out your Lordship's instructions.'15 On April 29, de Balloy stated that the story told by the Persian rulers to Lascelles that they had much better loan terms offered by the Russians than the Imperial Bank would offer was simply a maneuver to force down the Imperial Bank's high interest demands, but that Lascelles had been fooled by it. 16 If the claim of a Russian loan offer at 6 %was really a trick by the Amin os-Soltan, it was in any case carried out very cleverly and effectively. This is shown not only in the ordinary F.O. series but also in the private Lascelles Papers. On April 20, 1892, a Persian translator for the British Legation, the Navvab Hasan Ali Khan, reported on an interview with the Amin os-Soltan, who had said that he could put off Russian importunities to accept their loan, which was favored by the Shah, only for one day more. If he did not receive a reply by then showing that the British would meet the Russian 6 % rate he would be forced to conclude the loan with the Russians: otherwise there will be a great risk for his position both with the Shah and the Russians. I [the Navvab] was with him when he received an autograph from H. M., urging him to conclude with the Russians, and asking him why does he delay the matter ... H.H. [the Amin os-Soltan] said that, in fact the Shah is very keen that the Russians should pay the money, just to annoy the English who, he thinks, caused this loss on him (SiC).17 Since the Navvab was a friend of the Amin os-Soltan (a point to which a later British Minister, Sir M. Durand, alludes unfavorably in his private papers) he was not given to questioning the Amin os-Soltan's actions. Lascelles himself, however, should perhaps have been more wary, though his relatively brief experience in Iran may excuse him. In any case, the deal turned out to be a perfectly good one for the Imperial Bank. 124

CONCLUSION

At one point Lascelles had been inclined to think the Amin os-Soltan was bluffing about a Russian loan, and had evidently written privately to Morier in St. Petersburg about it. This is indicated by Morier's private reply from St. Petersburg on May 2, 1892, in the Teheran Embassy Archives: My particular friends, Ministers for Foreign Affairs and Finance being both dangerously ill I am quite unable to obtain reliable information but I am inclined to share your opinion about bluffing. Persian Minister declares that matter had its origin at Tehran and states positively that it has not been seriously taken up here. It is difficult to see how, in the absence of Minister for Foreign Affairs and Finance it could be so. Persian Minister is very anxious you should insist on Shah paying the required indemnity out of his own private Treasury which he declares would bear it over and over again. As this Treasury yields no interest there would be no interest to pay on any loan. Persian Minister is naturally most anxious that it should not be known that this suggestion comes from him.l" On October 1 de Balloy stated that Speyer still denied that his government had made a 6 % offer of a loan to the Persians, and that Lascelles admitted to him (de Balloy) that if this had been a Persian trick, he was fooled by it.!" Wherever the truth may lie in all this, the Iranians naturally objected to the paying of compensation for expenses of which a large part were accounted for by bribes to private individuals, but the British government, while pressuring the Company to moderate its original demands, backed up the Company's claims for compensation, and the Iranian government had no choice but to comply. The Shah tried to keep the terms of the final agreement secret, however, as he feared further agitation. The failure of the tobacco concession also dampened British enthusiasm for Persian investments. In addition, British newspaper reports on the tobacco affair in 1892 indicate it caused Salisbury's conservative government some minor domestic embarrassment. With the cancellation of the concession came some strong British attacks on Wolff and Salisbury, as well as the whole behavior of the government in supporting the concessionaires and especially their claims for compensation. Truth of May 26, 1892, said that Talbot had been part of the Shah's staff on his visit to England. And in parliament strong charges were made, duly reported in the Times, especially of May 27, 1892. 125

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The opposition doubted that the Tobacco Corporation had really paid £300,000 to buy the concession, as it claimed. The government was strongly attacked for supporting the Company's large concession claim. One opposition member said that, 'Hon. members would have to go back to the old days of jobbery of the East India Company to find anything more atrocious than this transaction,' while another: repeated that this concession in all its circumstances, was not a fair commercial transaction; it was an effort to extort money from Persia for the benefit of a few private persons, and the people of Persia did right in rebelling against it. At the same time the relationship of Salisbury and Talbot was pointed out, and the government statement that this relationship had no connection with the concession was questioned.v'" This debate brought forth some strong newspaper attacks on the government's conduct in the matter, among them one in the Pall Mall Gazette of May 27, 1892. Suspicion was also cast on the fact that Talbot's brother was Resident in Bushire, but this was cleared up by letters pointing out that the latter arrived in Iran for the first time in March, 1891, a year after the concession was granted. After the government published a Bluebook on the case a few months later, attacks continued on the basis of these documents, which opponents said showed that Salisbury misused his power to support the concession, warning the Shah against cancellation and later supporting the Company's exorbitant demands for compensation. Thus some of the British public agreed with the Iranian opposition. Even with the question of compensation settled, the Shah was not to be left at peace. Early in 1892 there circulated in Iran two separate printed appeals from Sayyed Jamal ad-Din to the chief ulama calling upon them to depose the Shah. In one the Sayyed denounced the rapacity of the Shah and cited verses from the Koran favoring the deposition of unjust and unbelieving monarchs. The Shah was declared to be wringing money from the people for the tobacco indemnity, and the defeat of England was declared to be of little help: because the weakness of England means the strength of Russia and the latter will seize Khorasan, when England will not dare to oppose her, being afraid of her designs on India. Only dethronement can make this misfortune pass away. 126

CONCLUSION

The appeal argued that in an absolute monarchy only the sovereign who actually makes an engagement is bound by it. Hence if the Shah were dethroned all the disastrous contracts he had made would be cancelled. It was up to the mollas to rise up and insist on the Shah's dethronement. * Western readers know of Jamal ad-Din's appeals to the Shi'i ulama to depose the Shah primarily from E. G. Browne's Persian Revolution. Browne quotes Rashid Rida to the effect that Jamal ad-Din founded, or helped to found in London a magazine in English and Arabic, named Diyd al-Khdfiqain ('The Light of the two Hemispheres') in which he published the appeals to the Persian ulama, In fact, the contemporary Persian sources and British documents refer to the appeals as printed without any accompanying material, and circulated in that form in Iran and Iraq. A check on Diyd al-Khdfiqain and its English co-publication, the Eastern and Western Review at the British Museum, indicates that Afghani was in no sense a co-editor of this publication, whose general line was a defense of the British Empire, quite in contrast to Afghani's. Afghani's appeals to the ulama to depose the Shah were indeed published there, but also somewhat fortuitously. As explained by the editor of Eastern and Western Review, the appeals reached thatjournal through its correspondent at Baghdad, who noted their wide distribution in Iran. The editor in discussing the appeals apparently does not realize that the author is Jamal al-Din, known to him as the writer of a recent article in English on 'The Reign of Terror in Persia'. Although the editor reprinted in English and Arabic Afghani's first appeal to the ulama; he declined to reprint the second in English, on the ground that he mistrusted its statements-another indication of Afghani's scant connection with the publication. In August, 1892, the editor wrote: At the time of going to press we have received an article from our agency at Bagdad, which is of the same nature and character as those published in the early numbers of the EASTERN AND WESTERN REVIEW, although even more emphatic in its hostility to the present regime in Persia than the preceding articles. At the same time, however, notwithstanding the

* A translation of one of the two appeals to the ulama to depose the Shah is in Appendix IV. They, along with the Arabic originals, are in F.O. 60/594, Lascelles to Salisbury, No. 82, May 11, 1892; and Mirza Mohammad Ali Khan to Salisbury, London, June 22, 1892. A partial translation of the second is in Browne, op. cit., pp. 24-27. 127

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apparent trustworthiness of its strong accusations, we are disinclined to accept, without further proofs, the statements of the alleged cruelties perpetrated in Persia by the Shah and his ministers. Pending further corroborative evidence, we are constrained to arrive at the conclusion that all these statements may possibly be dictated by the leaders of the revolutionary party, who hope to enlist European sympathy and support in their continued attempt to overthrow the present dynasty. * The editor goes on to praise the Shah as a man who has tried to help his country by introducing European enterprise in it. As is so often the case in matters concerning Afghani, an original misstatement by a disciple has been copied by numerous others without any apparent attempt to check the original source. Another interesting point revealed by a reading of the Eastern and Western Review is that the editor and his well-informed Baghdad correspondent both believed that deposition of the Shah was a real possibility, as did some European diplomats in Iran at this time. Afghani's proclamations calling on the ulama to save Iran from complete foreign domination by dethroning the Shah caused the Shah to communicate more of his strong complaints against Afghani to the British. The Shah said that Jamal ad-Din was guilty of the European crime of lese majeste, and that the British should execute him or imprison him for life, 'otherwise how can we believe that the English government is the protector of our Sovereignty and Our Person.' 20 Lascelles forwarded the complaint, although he told the Amin os-Soltan that the British government could proceed only according to law. An F. O. minute on an earlier complaint noted, 'Jemal-ed-Din is a dangerous intriguer-and has been as much opposed to England as to any other Power-But I do not see what action we can take against this paper'. 21

* Eastern

and Western Review (with heading in Arabic on first issue,

Diyii al-Khiifiqa in), II, 3, August, 1892, p. 211. The discussion and re-

printing of Afghani's appeal, with the original signature, al-Sayyid alHusaini, are in I, 2, March, 1892, pp. 57-58; 67. The Arabic and English versions of the Review, which are not identical in content, were both edited by Habib Anthony Salmone, a teacher of Arabic, and the author of a two volume Arabic-English Dictionary. Browne's translation of Rida's misinformation on this is in the Persian Revolution, p. 23. The Arabic appeals are reprinted in nos. 2, 3 and 4-5 of Diyii al-Khiifiqain, clearly headed as reprints of leaflets secretly circulated in Iran.

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The Shah did not calm down, but continued to press his complaints to the English, noting the violent language that Afghani had used against him. On May 11 Lascelles wrote: It is not surprising that the Shah should deeply resent the accusations brought against him by Djemal ed Din and fear the effect which they may produce in the country; more especially as, although there may be some exaggeration of language, there can be little doubt of their substantial truth. 22 The Shah complained that Lascelles had not given an immediate answer to his demand to have Afghani punished, and wrote to the Amin os-Soltan: We cannot accept or admit that the British Government is Our friend or the protector of Our Sovereignty and Ourselves, while they do nothing and allow such a person to write such nonsensical things and then say that England is a free country. 23 After a still further complaint from the Shah in May the Amin os-Soltan suggested to Lascelles that the British government at least say it would do what it could, so that the Shah might retain some hope. Acting on this advice, Salisbury decided to get an opinion from the Law Officers of the Crown stating that no action could be taken by the British, and to show the F. O. request and the answer to it to the Shah in order to prove that the F. o. had done all it could. The Law Officersreported that the facts afforded no grounds for the institution of legal proceedings by the British government, but that Sayyed Jamal ad-Din could be prosecuted by the Shah's minister in England. When this answer was given to the minister he, naturally enough, returned it and asked if it could not be modified so that he would not be blamed for not taking proceedings against Jamal ad-Din which the Law Officers said he could. In the same period, the summer of 1892, the news came that Sayyed Jamal ad-Din had left England for Istanbul, much to the relief, one would imagine, of both the Foreign Office and the Persian minister in London. 24 When Afghani moved to Istanbul in the summer of 1892, the Shah transferred his demands for the Sayyed's imprisonment from the British to the Ottoman Sultan, but got equally little satisfaction there, and the Amin os-Soltan was justly suspicious that the Sultan in fact intended to use the Sayyed against the Persian government. 25 As Lascelles had indicated, the Shah had reason to be worried about the influence of Afghani, since discontent and disorder in 129

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the country did not cease even after the Regie affair was closed. Continuing reports came in of disorders in the provinces, and in the autumn of 1892 Lascelles felt it necessary to sound out people to find out how much basis there was for disturbing rumors of probable further movements against the Shah. He found that strong criticism of the Shah was prevalent among high ministers as well as the ulama and the general population. The mollas retained their position in the popular esteem and might lead further oppositional movements. 26 A major result of the tobacco victory was increased political power for the ulama, Popular riots, intrigue in high places, economic discontent, and anti-governmental activities among the ulama continued in the years after the tobacco movement. A great deal of resentment was directed against the British loan, which increased the financial difficulties of the country and government, and which the Iranians felt had gone to pay an unjustified indemnity. On October 2 de Balloy noted the situation was getting worse internally, with the mollas following the mot d'ordre from the shrine cities to preach against all foreign innovations. Popular feeling against foreigners was said to be growing, and the mollas, feeling their strength, were mixing into all affairs. Some mollas had just forbidden the use of foreign matches, claiming that alcohol was used in their manufacture." By then, however, Ashtiyani seems to have reached some kind of accord with the Amin os-Soltan which somewhat lessened the immediate danger. In a despatch later the same month de Balloy noted the growth of incidents directed at foreigners and at religious minorities. He said the Amin od-Dowleh had admitted that he feared 'revolution against the Shah and excessesagainst the Europeans'. 28 The British documents for 1892record a similar fear of revolution, and show that Afghani's idea of deposing the Shah was not a simple fantasy, and that deposition was regarded as a serious threat by some in the government. As for the economic issue, both British and Persian sources indicate that the mass of Iranians did not benefit from the victory over the Tobacco Company. Although the real threat to the livelihood of many Iranian tobacco merchants which the Company posed was overcome, the peasants were probably worse off after the Company left than they had been during the short period when the Company had bought their crops. Partly to placate the peasants the Company seems to have decided at first to pay relatively high prices, while local merchants now apparently returned 130

CONCLUSION

to old practices of offering low prices in the harvest season, when peasants were forced to sell to meet tax demands. Taxes on the population were further increased in order to payoff the Imperial Bank loan. Thus, the victory against the tobacco concession had in effect solved none of the causes of discontent which had helped start the movement. Although the concession was cancelled, the only broader goal of the movement, that of decreasing the power of foreigners in Iran, and especially a general lessening of foreign economic privileges, was not achieved. On the contrary, in the years before the Iranian Revolution the country fell further and further under outside control, with Russian loans becoming the primary means through which this control was exercised. The British debt incurred to payoff the Regie was the first of a series of foreign loans and advances, henceforth coming chiefly from the Russians, which were to help reduce the improvident rulers of Iran to a virtual state of bankruptcy by 1905. Yet, however illusory the immediate victory of the anticoncession movement proved to be, its results were far-reaching. Iranians saw for the first time that it was possible to win out against the Shah and foreign interests. The strange and unstable coalition of ulama, nationalists, discontented merchants and city populations, and powerful domestic and foreign interests who were opposed to the government of the moment did not disappear after the tobacco movement. Although some of the ulama were influenced or bribed into changing their hostile attitude, and some leaders died not long after the tobacco movement, and the British replaced the Russians as the country out of favor with the government, there is a direct line from the coalition which participated in the tobacco movement, through various lesser movements of the following fifteen years, and culminating in the Constitutional Revolution. The success of the tobacco movement influenced some of the most characteristic features of the opposition movement which culminated in the revolution-leadership by the ulama and tactical use of ulama leadership by the more radical opposition. Before the tobacco protest this was by no means the universal tactic of the opposition, but one can see from documents of the period that the movement's success helped turn the minds of the opposition in this direction. Thus Malkam Khan, who for most of his life, even after his dismissal from government service, had appealed largely to men of the government to lead in a reform program, 131

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now began to speak of Shirazi and the ulama as the proper leaders of reform. Malkam's new acceptance of the leading ulama is seen in his letter to the Pall Mall Gazette, Dec. 30, 1892, in which he somewhat antedates his conversion: During more than thirty years in all my political writings my constant effort has been to show that the spirit of the true Islam is in perfect harmony with the principles of the present and coming civilization of the world, and that the regeneration of Mahommedan countries will never be possible except by the Koran. By what authority is that liberal spirit of Islam going to be interpreted? By the authority of those learned sheikhs and eminent ulemas of Persia and of Kerbela who have formed lately, and for the first time, a national and powerful advanced party, and who are now dictating triumphantly the law of justice to the astonished Ministers of Tehran. Even the freethinking Azali Babi, Mirza Aqa Khan Kermani, who had often attacked the ulama violently in his works, wrote to Malkam that during the tobacco movement even the stupid ulama were won over. * Soon thereafter he began cooperating with Sayyed Jamal ad-Din in Istanbul in writing letters to the Shi'i ulama to bring them over to the pan-Islamic program. One of Mirza Aqa Khan Kermani's letters to Malkam relays a request from Sayyed Jamal ad-Din to Malkam to print a special number of Qdnun for the shrine ulama, calling for the unity of Islam and asking Shirazi to participate further in political affairs.P? Qdnun No. 20, which is undated but may have been written in response to this request, has a petition to Shirazi asking the ulama to call together a grand national assembly (maj/es-e shurd-ye kubrd-ye mel/i) to assure the rights of the people according to the Islamic law. It goes on to say that this program and the protection of Iranians against foreign encroachments are in accord with the fundamentals of Islam, and that all Iranians are now looking to the shrine ulama for protection. It calls for a fatwd which will anathematize the oppressors as unbelieversprobably implying deposition of the Shah. • Correspondence from Mirza Aqa Khan Kermani to Malkam Khan at the Bibliotheque Nationale, Oriental Mss., Supplement Persan, 1996, especially letter No. 82. Letter No. 110 sheds some light on the forging of [atwas, as it discusses a proposal, of which the writer disapproved, to transfer the seal from a genuine [atwii to one which said that the paying of taxes to oppressors in the future was hariim (forbidden) and a sin.

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CONCLUSION

Insofar as the radical opposition was concerned, the tobacco movement was thus a decisive victory for the tactics of Jamal adDin-tactics which might have developed in any case, but of which he was the prime exponent. What the radical opposition did from now on was more than what Malkam Khan had suggested before the tobacco movement, proving reform to be compatible with Islam. After the tobacco movement the reformers made continual attempts to keep the leading ulama involved in oppositional activity. The movement had demonstrated how the leading ulama, from their positions of relative impunity, could mobilize both the resentments and the religious feelings of the masses in a way that the reformers could never hope to duplicate on their own. Profound discontent with economic and administrative oppression, which the people saw had increased pari passu with the encroachments of foreigners, meant that popular reaction was bound to take a largely traditionalistic and anti-foreign form. * If the tobacco movement pointed the way to win victories from the government, it also left the ambiguous legacy of peculiar coalitions of nationalists, reformers, and religious leaders whose opposition to the government masked very different aimsa legacy which still shows strong signs of life as late as the present. Though these coalitions could often achieve specific aims, they were always hampered by the powerful presence of those who had little or no interest in modernizing reforms. The tobacco movement was thus a great victory which helped pave the way for revolution and constitutional government, but it also influenced some of the negative and limiting features of that revolution and the governments to which it gave birth.

* A perceptive analysis of this phenomenon was given confidentially by the Oxford educated liberal Persian minister, Naser ol-Molk, who noted that people saw how Iran had deteriorated in recent years, and remembering that in former times there were no Europeans or European innovations they naturally turned against the foreigners and to their religious leaders. F.O. 251/57, Churchill Memo of conversation with Naser ol-Molk, Jan. 17, 1893.

133 L

FOOTNOTES Chapter IV F.O. 539/60, Lascelles to Salisbury, No. 94 (12), Jan. 18, 1892. E., Perse, 1892, No.5, Jan. 9. 3/bid., No. 15, March 17, 1892. 40 /bid., No. 18, March 31, 1892. 5/bid., No. 59, Oct. 2, 1892. F.O. 248/553, Nawab to Lascelles, Oct. 2. 1892, makes it clear that Ashtiyani and the Amin os-Soltan had been reconciled. 6/Z tegeranskogo dnevnika V. A. Kosogovskogo, p. 115. 1 Taimuri, op. cit., p. 196. 8 Kermani, op. cit., pp. 42-44. The actual words ascribed to the Russian Minister in this description seem highly unlikely, but the gist may be correct. 9 I follow the translation of E. G. Browne, Persian Revolution, pp. 55-56, omitting the paragraph on Feuvrier's own Russian sympathies which does not appear in my edition of Feuvrier. 10 F.O. 539/56, Lascelles to Salisbury, No. 122 (31), Secret and Confidential, Feb. 13, 1892. A similar British joke at Wolff's expense and an equally negative view of Wolff are given by an official of the German Legation, Friedrich Rosen, Oriental Memories of a German Diplomatist (London, 1930), p. 125. 11 A. E., Perse, 1892, No.4, Jan. 8. t2 F.O. 539/72, 'Memorandum by Sir M. Durand on the Situation in Persia', Dec., 1895, Confidential. According to Appendix II of this Memo, the Russian Minister influenced the Shah in favor of Amin osSoltau in 1892. L3 A. E., Perse, 1892, No. 10, Feb. 14. B F.O. 60/578, Salisbury to Lascelles, April 22, 1892, Telegraphic. Details of the negotiations over compensation are in several documents in F.O. 60/554. 15 F.O. 539/60, Lascelles to Foreign Office, No. 196, Telegraphic, May 2, 1892; and ibid., Lascelles to Salisbury, No. 199 (72), Telegraphic, May 3,1892. 16 A. E., Perse, 1892, No. 30, April 29. 17 F.O. 800/14, Lascelles Papers, Persia. 18 F.O. 248/557, Morier to Lascelles, Private, St. Petersburg, May 2, 1892. 19 A. E., Perse, 1892, No. 58, Oct. 1. 19a Parliamentary Debates, 4th series, IV, May 26, 1892, 1944-1960. 20 Autograph of the Shah to Amin os-Soltan, received April 28, 1892, translation enclosed in F.O. 60/594, Lascelles to Salisbury, No. 82, May 11, 1892. 2l/bid., Minute, apparently by T. H. Sanderson, on Morier to Salisbury, St. Petersburg, No. 87, April 27, 1892. 22/bid., Lascelles to Salisbury, No. 83, Secret, May 11, 1892. 1

2 A.

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CONCLUSION 23

I bid., enclosed translation of Autograph of Shah in Lascelles to Salis-

bury, No. 86, May 12, 1892. series of documents from June to September, 1892. 25 I bid., Lascelles to Salisbury, Tel. No. 114, Tehran, August 7, 1892. For Afghani's activity in Istanbul, see my 'Religion and Irreligion'. 26 F.O. 539/65, Memorandum on the Affairs of Persia, August 1892October 1893, by F. Bertie. 27 A. E., Perse, 1892, No. 59, Oct. 2. 28 I bid., No. 65, Oct. 24. 29 Ibid.. letter No. 110. 24 Ibid.,

135

Appendix I THE 'REVOLT' OF SAYYED ALAMGIR IN OCTOBER and November, 1891, there possibly occurred a minor messianic revolt as part of the general disturbances. Though the documentation on it is sparse and contradictory it is worth noting as a sign of the excited state of religious feeling at the time. Iranian protest movements were now midway in time between the traditional messianic movements most recently represented in the Babi uprisings of the mid-century, which had a few proto-modern features, and the Constitutional Revolution of 1905-1911, which retained messianic overtones. At a time of general discontent and excitement of religious feeling, it would not be surprising to find a rebel proclaiming himself a prophet. (On the interrelation between messianic revolt and discontent brought on by the dislocations resulting from the Western impact see my 'Religion and Irreligion,' and Vittorio Lantenari, Movimenti religiosi di liberta e di salvezza dei popoli oppressi [Milan, 1960], which has been translated into English and French.) On October 30 Feuvrier noted that a Sayyed named Alamgir was preaching rebellion even against the religious authorities. 'He is already surrounded by about a thousand adherents who have fortified themselves and are appealing to all believers. Are the scenes of Babism going to be reproduced?' (Feuvrier, op. cit., p.278.) On November 1. Kennedy reported further details, emphasizing the Shah's anxiety: The appearance of the 12th Imaum, the Persian Messiah, and the death of the Shah, both events to take place next year, are being prophesied by a Syed, who has begun to preach in the Province of Mazanderan, and who declares himself to be the 12th Imaum's forerunner. An attempt to arrest the Syed was about to be made by a military officer in the neighbourhood, who collected for this purpose about twenty sowars. The Syed's followers, however, who had increased to about 400, were armed men, assumed the offensive, and succeeded in killing the officer and all his men, whose bodies they burnt.

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This occurrence is causing the Shah much anxiety, and His Majesty is sending troops to the scene of the disturbances, about three day's journey from Tehran. Shah is anxious to conceal the religious nature of the rising, and the Amin-es-Sultan informs me that it will be given out that some tribal feuds having broken out, troops are being sent to restore order. (F.O. 539/54, Kennedy to Salisbury, Tel. No. 124 [212], Nov. 1, 1891.) Early in November the Shah sent out a force against the Sayyed, and on November 16 the government forces suppressed the revolt, which had about 1700 followers. The newly arrived British Minister Sir Frank Lascelles, who now replaced the ailing Wolff, reported that the Nayeb os-Saltaneh told him: that the movement which had been fomented by the so called prophet Seyed Husein and his brother Mohamed in Mazandaran had been completely suppressed. His Highness said that a severe fight which lasted for eight hours had resulted in the complete victory of the Persian troops and that it was fortunate that the Seyed and his brother had been captured alive, as they would be called upon to explain the reasons of their revolt. His Highness added that a number of women and children had fought in the ranks of the false prophet and that this was the first instance in the history of Persian warfare of women taking part in a battle. (F.O. 60/524, Lascelles to Salisbury, No. 239, Nov. 22, 1891.) The following British article has more details about this man than any other English or Persian source I have seen, though its authenticity seems impossible to judge. This report does not connect the prophet's rising with the tobacco movement, but numerous other reports do. Daily News, December 1, 1891. 'An Insurrection in Persia: A New Vicegerent of the Prophet. (From Our Own Correspondent.) Tabreez, Nov. 24'. An insurrection has broken out in the district of Kellar Dasht, in the province of Mazandaran, and is threatening to spread far and wide. A Sayeed (a descendant of the Prophet), it is reported, used to live some years ago at Sahna, a small town in the north-east of Kermanshah and about forty miles 137

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from it. After reaching to manhood he somehow got into his head that the teachings of the established religion had become corrupt, and his fellow-countrymen were being led astray; that the religion required to be reformed and men guided into the true path of Islamism. By dint of ever thinking on the subject he became convinced that he had been designed and called upon by the Almighty to sweep away the existing corruptions and to reform Islamism. Starting from this point he tried to propagate his ideas, but, meeting with no success, he left Sahna and betook himself to Mazandaran. Here keeping his doctrines to himself he took the frock as well as the habits of a true saint. Untiring at daily devotions his words breathed but piety and virtue. After thus making for himself a reputation for sanctity, he began secretly, and little by little, to preach against the corruptions which Islamism has undergone. Everywhere there are people dissatisfied with long-established things, be they good or bad, so a number of such readily joined the Sayeed, and became his staunch supporters in the propagandism of the new doctrines. The man from Sahna, followed by these acolytes, then entered Kellar-Dasht and commenced to preach openly. Rumour says that the Sayeed, in order to show his divine mission, orders, whenever he deems necessary, a big fire to be made, and then traverses it in every way without being in the least hurt. In a short time the whole tribe of Khajavend dwelling in the above district became converted to the doctrines of the Sayeed, who now assumed the title of 'the Last Vicegerent of the Prophet'. It appears that the man aims not only at a religious supremacy but even at a temporal sovereignity. Like the founder of Islamism, the new Vicegerent, whilst on the one hand he propagates his doctrines, on the other he carries the sword. He has till now put to death more than forty persons who have dared to question his authority or argued against his vicegerency. To show with what readiness his proselytes obey him it will suffice to cite the following incidents: - Azdan Kuli Khan, ordered by the Sayeed, made repeated raids into the villages of his brother general, Subhan Kuli Khan. The latter, on hearing of this whilst in Asterabad, hastened with a body of horsemen to one of his villages, and prepared to protect them against further inroads. Azdan Kuli Khan then invited the general to tender his submission to the Vicegerent, and be converted to his doctrines. On the general's refusal he 138

APPENDICES

attacked him in force, and after defeating him put him to death with his own hand. By the murder of Subhan Kuli Khan his villages pass under the rule of the Sayeed. The Governor of Asterabad, finding his forces inadequate to make head against the Sayeed, has applied to Teheran for succour. The central government, after some days preparations, despatched three hundred foot, two hundred horse, and two field pieces under the command of the Field Marshal Habibullah Khan, the Saidud-Dowleh. Now, if the Persian commander succeeds in defeating the pretender, and in capturing him, the insurrection will be crushed in its bud, and the socalled Vicegerent, with his doctrines, will be buried among the many past imposters, but if, unhappily, the Government troops suffer a defeat at the hands of the Sayeed and Azdan Kuli Khan, then a new Mahdi will rise to power and cause much harm to the country for a long time to come. On December 16, 1891 de Balloy gives an explanation of the Mazanderan 'false prophet', different from that in any other consulted source, but it may very well be the correct .one. It might explain why one never reads of the execution or even punishment of the offending Sayyed. (Some of the details of what the Sayyed said are confirmed in the P.R.O. British Embassy Archives from Tehran, though without judgment on the probability of his story.) The Sayyed, says de Balloy, when brought to Tehran after his capture, defended himself very well before the Shah, saying he had not led any insurrection. There had, instead, been an intrigue directed against him by the peasants of the Sa'd od-Dowleh, a high court figure. These peasants were hostile to the Kurdish tribe which had moved into the area-this tribe followed the sectarian but not rebellious Ali Illahi beliefs, and the Sayyed (named Baqer) said he was an Ali Illahi envoy whom the head of the sect sent out regularly to preach and collect alms. The local tribe took advantage of his presence to pick a quarrel once more with the villagers. The latter, supported by Sa'd od-Dowleh in Tehran, presented their rivals as rebels against the Shah. Sa'd od-Dowleh headed the expedition against them, and his men took advantage of it to pillage villages and massacre their inhabitants. On investigation, the Sayyed's story was apparently believed by the Shah as he was reportedly not punished, but instead given presents, while the Sa'd od-Dowleh was disgraced. The reality was thus indicated to be entirely different from the original story 139

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of a revolt led by a false prophet. (A. E. Perse, 1891 de Balloy despatch, Dec. 16.) This story is a fine illustration of how hard it often is to get at the truth in Iranian history. The story of the false prophet appears without any questioning of it in nearly all the contemporary sources and is independently attested by several usually reliable persons. It is still possible that it is the true story, and that the Amin os..Soltan and the Shah spread the second version to avert the danger of religious support for the Sayyed, though this seems the less likely alternative, as in that case the new story should have been better publicized.

140

Appendix II ON THE USE OF PRAGMATIC INCONSISTENT ARGUMENTS BY SAYYED JAMAL AD-DIN AL-AFGHANI AND HIS FOLLOWERS IN ADDITION to the arguments in the sources cited in fn. 19, Ch. I, the following points may be noted. Afghani's Persian M .aqdldt-e jamdliyeh are full of internal contradictions, depending on the audience he was addressing in each talk or article. Contradicting his frequent position that the unity of religion is the most fundamental of ties among men, when addressing an Indian audience he said: there is no doubt that unity of language, or nationality, is more permanent for survival and existence in this world than unity of religion since it does not change in a short time in contrast to the latter. Since we see that a single people of one language in the course of a thousand years changes its religion two or three times without its nationality, which consists in the unity of language, being destroyed, perhaps it can be said that the ties and unity which arise from the unity of language have more influence than religious ties in most affairs of the world. (p. 77) Many of the articles imply that it is wrong to say that science and progress, which are the desiderata, are wholly taken from the West, as this will make the common people followers of the West and easy prey to Western political and religious conquest. In order to strengthen the solidarity and patriotism of the common people, modern ideas must be shown to be compatible with true Islam. The articles also defend philosophy, including modern science and philosophy, by trying to show that true Islam is compatible with philosophic and scientific demonstration and proof. The tone is very different from that of the Refutation ofthe Materialists, and it would seem that Western ideas were opposed only when they threatened to make people lose their solidarity and hostility to foreign encroachments. The pragmatic and political nature of Afghani's Islam can be shown by a close analysis of his Refutation of the Materialists, the openly anti-religious 'Answer to Renan,' and other writings 141

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and speeches. To give but one example of a point which has been discussed at greater length elsewhere, his Persian article 'Commentary on the Commentator' criticizes a modernist interpretation of the Koran (clearly that of Sir Sayyed Ahmad Khan, his favourite opponent) on the purely pragmatic ground that in removing the Islamic Prophet to the plane of ordinary secular reformers, the author has taken away any reason for mass faith in Islam, and thus has weakened the only bond which keeps the Muslim masses from submitting wholly to the Western conqueror. Even false religious beliefs such as those of the Hindus and ancient Egyptians, Chaldeans, Greeks, and Persians, were useful since they helped sustain great civilizations through their encouragement of patriotic zeal: If the purpose of this commentator is, as he himself says, the reform of his community, then why does he try to remove the faith of Muslims in the Islamic religion, especially in this period when other religions have opened their mouths to swallow Islam. Does he not understand that Muslims, in this state of weakness and distress, if they did not believe in miracles, heaven and hell, and considered the Prophet another Gladstone, certainly would soon abandon their group, seen as weak and conquered, and would attach themselves to the powerful conqueror, since then no obstacle and no fear or terror would remain.... When I considered these matters I realized that the commentator could never believe that faith in these true beliefs was the cause of the decline of the Muslims. Because religious beliefs whether true or false have no incompatibility or contradiction with civilization and worldly progress, except if they regard as forbidden the search for knowledge and the acquisition of a livelihood and behavior according to good patriotic principles.... After all these ideas and considerations I saw that this commentator is not a reformer nor is his commentary written for the reform and education of Muslims. Rather this commentator and commentary for the Islamic people in their present situation are like those dangerous evil diseases which occur in times of weakness of the human constitution . . . the aim of this commentator is to serve outsiders by means of this attempt to remove the beliefs of the Muslims. (Maqiiliit-e jamdliyeh, pp. 102-104.) 142

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Not only did Afghani believe that reassertion of an Islam which retained its supernatural sanction while incorporating modern philosophy, science, and politics, was the only way to mobilize the masses against Western encroachment, he also showed in writing and action that he favored trying to work through the ulama, who were the influential leaders of the Muslim community, and he influenced other Iranians to do the same. In 'Religion and Irreligion' I showed that Azali Babis and freethinkers among Afghani's followers and during the Revolution claimed to be the truest Muslims and accused their opponents of irreligion. An interesting additional document showing this is an anonymous pamphlet written by the Babi and later freethinking reformer and follower of Afghani, Mirza Aqa Khan Kermani, called 'The Treatise of 'Enshallah!' ... ' It was translated under the title 'Controverses persanes' in Revue du monde musulman, XXI (Dec., 1912), by A. L. M. Nicolas, who did not know its author. Reference to a description of the ms. in E. G. Browne, Materials for the Study of the Bdbi Religion (Cambridge, 1918), pp. 224-25, confirms the authorship. The work argues that the theological hairsplitting and otherworldliness of the religious leaders is against true Islam, as it divides Muslims and turns them away from self-strengthening. The author continues: The European has taken from us all that is good in Islam and left us the empty name.... The nations of Europe, as long as they were not liberated from the influence of their priests and their Pope, could not progress. A prey to the inanities of their religious leaders, drowned in their imitation, they were a thousand times unhappier than the Persians. Naturally the charlatan ulama will give the order of impiety against whoever speaks as openly as I, and without hesitating. They will declare that it is necessary to kill me! To annihilate me! I who have mocked the Sharia! I am an apostate! Impious! To kill me is simply obligatory! My blood is licit! My goods licit! Because, they think, 'such affirmations ruin our trade.' They open the eyes and ears of men! and from then on they will escape from the burdens we have put upon them. In vain I can cry: 'By God'. I believe that God is one, I believe more than you in the Prophet of God, in the Day of Judgment, in Retribution, in Resurrection, in the Twelve Imams, but what I say here is in the aim of making the Muslims progress, of awakening the ulama from the sleep of ignorance! ... One must speak 143

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the truth, hear it and fear nothing. That will produce fruits as it already has. (pp. 257-58). Many Iranians are aware that their reform leaders were often freethinkers- or Babis, but it is difficult to write about this in Iran. The point that enlightened reformers had to feign orthodoxy in order to disarm fanatical opposition is, however, well made in Malekzadeh, Tdrikh . . . , I, pp. 92-95. In a forthcoming full biography of Afghani I will develop these points at much greater length. Here let it suffice to note that Afghani first appeared in Afghanistan in 1867 as a man who 'Apparently follows no particular religion. His style of living resembles more that of an European than of a Mussulman.' (For documentation see Nikki R. Keddie, 'Afghani in Afghanistan,' Middle Eastern Studies, I, 4 [1965]). Turkish documents from 1870-71 indicate that Afghani's unorthodoxy in this period was clear, and that Muhammad 'Abduh's often repeated report of the contents of the speech that caused Afghani's expulsion from Istanbul is distorted. The same conclusion was reached independently by Niyazi Berkes, The Development of Secularism in Turkey (Montreal, 1964), pp. 182-188, where he unravels the true story of Afghani's expulsion. I do not share Prof. Berkes' surmise that the Refutation of the Materialists indicates a change in Afghani's ideas in a religious direction. It seems rather to have been largely written for tactical reasons, and to have been designed with different levels of meaning for different audiences. The irreligious 'Answer to Renan,' directed at a European audience, was written after the Refutation. For additional evidence on Afghani's use of different arguments for different audiences see Elie Kedourie, 'Further Light on Afghani,' Middle Eastern Studies, I, 2 (1965), pp. 187-202.

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Appendix III TELEGRAMS BETWEEN SHIRAZI AND ASHTIYANI AFTER THE ABOLITION OF THE TOBACCO CONCESSION between Shirazi and Ashtiyani after the Abolition of the Tobacco Concession. (Translations enclosed in F.O. 60/554, Lascelles to Salisbury, Feb. 11, 1892, No. 28, Secret and Confidential).

TELEGRAMS

1. Shirazi to Ashtiyani, Feb. 2, 1892. I now write to you confidentially that as the Government has taken steps to repair this affair, you must also acquaint yourself with their intentions and should find out the nature of the remedy they are going to adopt, so that it may not lead to any other injury, and so that the religion and the Government may not be led into fresh captivity. It is of course understood that the document which the Government has given to the Franks will be returned in order that the foreigners should not have any other hope in Persia, and that their hopes should entirely be severed. The Government must give full assurances to the rayyats and a strong Firman regarding the eternal abolition of this business must be issued stating that they, the rayyats, are free to buy and sell internally and to export to foreign countries in order that their hearts may be free of anxiety and fright and that they should pray comfortably to, and be grateful to, the Shah-anShah, the protector of Islam (may God grant him victory!) Until your most humble slave distinctly gets news in the above sense from Your Excellency he cannot give permission, and the prohibition must remain in force. It is well that you should find a suitable opportunity to discuss the subject with H.H. the Amin-us-Sultan, and decide the question in the interests of the religion and the Government. 2. Telegrams from Shirazi to mollas of Shiraz, Isfahan, Sabzevar, Tabriz, and Yazd, Feb. 2, 1892. You have asked me regarding my decree concerning the 145

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prohibition of the use of tobacco. Yes, I have done so, and it is prohibited at this moment. Until I correctly learn of the complete removal of (the business of) this Frank internally and externally, the decree remains in force, until I inform you of its removal. It is necessary to refrain from smoking, and no permission is given to do so. 3. Ashtiyani to Shirazi, Feb. 5, 1892. . . . I have written at length by the last post regarding the abolition of the Concession, both internally and externally, without exchange or maintenance in order to assure your noble mind. I now also state that you should not have any doubt in this matter and should not pay any attention to the people round about you, whose statements are founded on prejudice and ignorance. The Arab proverb says, "One who is present sees, one who is absent does not." His Majesty verily has made gracious and extraordinary endeavours in the abolition of this concession, which was out of any other man's power. [Its abolition was thought impossible, because of the opposition of a strong government, the existence of a contract, and the losses of the company.] Nevertheless, in order to make the people comfortable, and through your endeavours for the good of the Government and the nation His Majesty has borne the loss (of the Company) and has abolished it. I will send you the proclamation that the Frank himself has issued in this matter, with a long letter by the next post. H.H. the Amin-es-Sultan, Grand Vizier did his best in carrying out the Royal Commands. In fact he showed much ability in this affair. He even makes great efforts in any important question which may be to the interest of the Government and the Nation ... it is most opportune for you to telegraph or write expressing your thanks and blessings to His Majesty for this generous favour. You should also know that the Government is being strengthened by His Majesty's efforts in supporting the nation. 4. Undated letter from Ashtiyani to Shirazi. [I enclose the Shah's autograph abolishing the concession.] With reference to other events which have happened in this Government, such as the question of the Bank and the railway, it is as well that you should cut it short concerning the abolition

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of these in your correspondence. In the first place the injuries caused by these compared to that caused by the Regie Concession is as a drop of water to the ocean. Secondly the Government is not able to contend with all the Powers all at once. These have grown into existence perhaps by degrees and may perhaps be repaired by the gracious efforts of His Majesty. You should know this much, that His Majesty is not at all disposed for the interference of Europeans in this country, but on account of political advantages they (the Europeans) do interfere a little. I shall investigate the reason and will inform you in my next letter, or if I can go on a pilgrimage, will tell you myself. When after the abolition of the concession your order reached us that there would be no harm in the use of tobacco after the abolition; the order was given for the resumption of smoking in accordance with your order. When your answer to my telegram came, the resumption had taken place, so it was not desirable to proclaim its contents. The above is for your information.

147

Appendix IV ONE OF AFGHANI'S TWO PRINTED APPEALS TO THE SHI'I ULAMA TO DEPOSE NASER ED-DIN SHAH (THE Arabic originals and translations of both are enclosed in F.O. 60/594, Mirza Mohammad Ali Khan to Salisbury, London, June 22, 1892. I have made minor corrections in Persian. terms.) Oppression of the Nation-Supplication of the People In the Name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful. To the Protectors of Muslims, the Leaders of men, the Callers to the House of Peace (Heaven) Chiefs of the Powerful religion, and Pillars of the revealed law. May they never cease to be a glory to the Muslims. Amen. The wicked, believing that the supporters of the religion were weak, dishonoured the bulwark of the law in the posterity of (Mohammed) but God in His justice took vengeance on them by disappointing them and making them contemptible in the world. The Shah during the time of his reign has toiled greedily for money by appropriating the possessions of the widows, plundering the properties of the orphans, despoiling the poor of their sustenance, and confiscating the scant resources of the wretched. He has committed every kind of wickedness and villainy to gather it, and treated the people with every form of severity, and he employed to obtain it such base means that even the souls of the most debased would loathe to use the same and the rabble would not do it. He saw no opening for oppression that he left untried, nor a mean way that he did not essay to walk; when he has caused the inhabitants to be impoverished and their habitations to be deserted, and ruined the country, and scattered the people, his madness drove him to sell the rights of the Muslims and the properties of the believers to (sic) and his atheistic and wicked Vizier the foreigners applauded (this criminal act). And he hurried quickly, with precipitation, and made agreements and covenants with the

148

APPENDICES

Europeans, not caring about what they contain of treachery and dishonour, and without reflecting about the great loss which will be caused by their consequences. As if he had resolved to abandon this country from this day and for ever! Behold God by jealousy for His religion has struck him in the face by the hand of eminent priests and the Venerable High Priests, and clothed him with the garment of disappointment and shame, and exposed him as an example to the world and a by-word among the nations. He raved and showed his fangs, watching to find some means that would enable him to make them his prey one after another. And now he has taken the responsibility on himself (as a fine on his madness and as a sentence on the atheism of his Vizier) to advance to the European Companies Three Millions of Toman.-One million and a half to the first Company (the Tunbak Company) and one million and a half to the second Company, who bought from the first Company the right to sell the Tunbak in the Ottoman Empire. What an awful shame! What an abject humiliation! To amass these heaps of money how many times the collectors dishonoured the believers! how many of the virtuous houses the roughs have destroyed in collecting it! and how many times did the hearts of the believers tremble in being despoiled of it! and to obtain it how many tears were shed by the poor and wretched! and how much of the Mussulman blood was shed in accumulating it, and how many times the hard hearted collectors have snatched away the veils from the women's heads! and how many a time the screams of the infirm went up to heaven! and how many men of refinement slept without a mattress or a cover! One man fearing the lash mortgaged his house, another dreading to be branded by a red-hot iron sold his property, another apprehending the prison borrowed money from neighbours, and another, terrified, gave up his possessions lest he might be punished. These atrocities were committed all over the country and on all the inhabitants to collect these large amounts of money. Then madness has ordered and atheism has decreed to deliver it up in one parcel to the enemies of the religion. Oh Islam! Oh Mohammadenism! 0 Pillars of religion and Leaders of God-fearing men there is no remedy to this great affliction and this awful trouble, there is no one to defend (sic) this wicked dishonour and base action but the dethronement of 149 M

RELIGION AND REBELLION IN IRAN

this (base beast) to protect the Muslims and to protect the rights of the people and to save the religion and its followers from this dreadful difficulty which will be followed by annihilation and ended with dire misfortune. This enormous responsibility which the Shah undertook against himself through his madness will excite the hatred of Russia and will push her to oppose the English by taking possession of Khorassan. The English will not be backward in doing the same fearing that Russia might seize all, and as a precaution, because the boundary of Khorassan touches that of India. Then they will divide the Country, and enslave the inhabitants and (we Muslims) we shall inherit nought of the fits of this madness and the impulsions of this atheism, but sighs and tears! We shall have no excuse then, when we might have taken precaution beforehand. Nothing will put this responsibility aside but the dethronement, and nothing will lift it but dethronement. The Agreements of autocratic Governments (like Persia and others) are personal, and are annulled by the removal of the person who carries them out then if he is dethroned the Companies have no right to demand the successors to fulfil the Agreement which his predecessor undertook by his own will. This saying is the right one, that the dethronement is the only means to save the country of the Muslims out of this predicament. (If the Shah had any affection for his country or feeling for his religion, or a perfect mind, he would have abdicated to save the Muslim party, but will he! will he!) If you protectors of the faith oppose him with righteousness, and men know that to obey this (wicked man) is unlawful according to the religion of God, and that if he is left reigning there is a danger for the Muslims, they will all hasten and upset the throne of his deceit and will depose him from the chair of his madness. You are the protectors of the Nation and the Supporters of the Faith, who will defend the religion except you? and who will-beside you-guard the party? ... to War! ... to War! before we fall into humiliation and smallness. You are answerable for the inhabitants and the country before God the High.... The people are not to blame, because they still execute your orders, and will rise when you rise, what then are you waiting for? Dethrone him! dethrone him! there is no other remedy. I speak as an experienced man who 150

APPENDICES

foresees the future. That to defend the honour of Islam and to guard the kingdoms, and preserve the rights of Muslims depend now on one word, which the tongue of righteousness will utter through jealousy for the faith and its followers ... and that is (Dethrone him). He who utters this word first among the pure guides and the good leaders, will obtain perfect honour and will be victorious with the greatest happiness in this world and the one to come. This is our aim. And peace be on you, and the mercy of God, and His Blessings. [The document is signed as-Sayyid al-Husayni, which was one of the many appellations used by Afghani. His different appellations are listed in one of the indices of the interesting catalogue of newly available documents about Afghani, Iraj Afshar and Asghar Mahdavi, Majmu'eh-ye asndd va madiirek chap nashodeh dar bdreh-ye Sayyed J amiil ed-Din mashhur be Afghani (Tehran, 1963)] (I have made minimal changes in spelling and punctuation in the above, in cases which are too far outside of any ordinary usage.)

151

Appendix V A PETITION FROM IRANIAN REFORMERS TO THE FOREIGN REPRESENTATIVES IN TEHRAN IN EARLY 1892 (THE wording of the petition echoes both Jamal ad-Din and Malkam Khan, and may have been influenced by both. The call for law is especially like Malkam.) Manchester Guardian, April 20 1892. The Liberal Movement in Persia. A Persian correspondent writes: -In previous letters, referring to disturbances in Persia which followed the concession of the tobacco monopoly to an English company, I have shown that the agitation was not directed against English interests at all, but that Persian patriots had seized upon the tobacco question as a favourable opportunity for wringing reforms from the Government. I now subjoin a translation of the essential parts of a petition addressed by the leaders of the Liberal Party in Persia a month ago to the foreign representatives at Tehran, which shows clearly that this is the case. Having received this document from a prominent member of the Persian Liberal Party, I can guarantee its authenticity: 'The destinies of Persia are at this moment in the hands of despotic and inhuman Ministers, executioners for whom nothing is holy-religion, laws, right. Over all things and all men their caprice reigns supreme. Every man lives in fear and trembling, for no man can answer for his own safety. We think it needless to remind you that all offices of importance are concentrated in the inexperienced hands of a few youthful favourites, who are not only ignorant of the duties which they take upon themselves, but ruin our unhappy country by selling it to any man who will satisfy their insatiable greed. Thanks to these men, the whole machinery of the State is out of gear, and Persia stands to-day on the brink of the grave. We are at one with the honoured Ministers of our faith in declaring that the only means of removing the causes of the present national discontent is the immediate dismissal of the present Ministers and the establishment of the organic laws of the land. We, sons of Iran, 11

152

APPENDICES

have this day formed, under the guidance of the heads of our holy faith, a solemn National League. You cannot fail to be aware that every man of education, of learning, of patriotic feeling throughout Persia belongs to this League, and that their one end and aim in life is to realise the ideal which rules their hearts and souls. We aspire only to the minimum of freedom, without which man cannot live, and which constitutes a necessary condition of existence. The freedom of a nation is founded on the stability of its laws, and in the name of justice we ask that our laws should be recognized. When we speak of laws we do not mean to speak of introducing into our country foreign codes, which, despite their great merits, cannot be good for us, because they do not correspond to our national feelings. We believe that the just and human application of our Shariat would be quite sufficient to protect us against the evils of the present state of things and to lead us in the path of universal progress. The Shariat alone can re-establish order in Persia, for the laws of the Shariat have their roots deep down in the feelings of the nation. The spirit of our Shariat has nothing in common with the idea of it which is entertained by Europeans, who judge of it by the deeds and life of the monsters who oppress us. We are far from exaggerating the merits of our religion. We are convinced, however, that it contains that moral force which has led Europe to progress and prosperity. The laws of our Shariat enjoin us to seek dealings and friendship with the other nations of the world and to treat them as brothers. We wish to raise the prosperity of Iran to the level of the prosperity of other civilised countries, and we shall strive after this prosperity by propagating science and all that pertains to civilisation. In endeavouring to realise our sacred ideal we shall employ neither force nor rebellion. The sacred character of the object which we have in view ensures us from being left unsupported. We hope that the enlightened humanitarians in the Western world will not refuse us their sympathy. This we will endeavour to deserve by our conduct. We venture to believe that you find Persia worthy of your sympathy. Is there any other nation which has shown so much vital force in its misfortunes and so much perseverence in the aspirations which have sometimes cost it dear? What nation has undergone so much tyranny and violence and still remained staunch to its ancient traditions? We deserve your sympathy, honourable representatives of the civilised nations, for we have always been 153

RELIGION AND REBELLION IN IRAN

ready to lay down our lives to save our country from the yoke of tyrants. If till now we have been unsuccessful in realising these aspirations it is because till now we had not tasted the divine fruit of union and harmony. Now that by the mercy of the Creator all the patriots of Persia are united by bonds of brotherhood on the common ground of the defence of their country, we have felt all of a sudden that we are a nation like others, and that we can no longer live without laws to guarantee our lives, our honour, and our property. We, sons of Iran, we call for the intervention of the Western Powers at this critical moment. Such an intervention must of course be collective and pacific. The nations of Europe must constitute themselves umpires between the Persian people and the Government. An armed intervention would, on the contrary, be of no avail to anyone, least of all to Persia, already torn by internal feuds. You have no need to take any official step; your influence alone with our oppressor would be sufficient. We cherish and hope that you will respond with sympathy to our call, and thereby render to our country a service which will remain an everlasting monument of your generous policy'. (Among the important points in the petition is the call for European support in favour of a more just regime. This was written in the same period that Jamal ad-Din and Malkam Khan in speeches and articles in England were calling upon the British to make the Shah enforce his own British-inspired order guaranteeing to Iranians security of life and property. Also interesting is the incipient nationalism-for all the appeal to the shariat there is more said about Iran than about Islam. This nationalism was already found in some of the reform party, although in public statements to a mass audience they tended to stress Islamic sentiments more.)

154

Appendix VI THE BRITISH PRESS AND THE TOBACCO MOVEMENT AFTER writing the text of this monograph, I was given access to a collection of clippings from British newspapers about Iran. The main fact which stands out from a perusal of the British press coverage of Iran in this period is how poorly informed the newspapers were, especially the large group which relied on the Reuters news service. The Reuters despatches consistently played down the popular disturbances and usually reported that order had been completely restored and all would be well. There were charges that Baron Reuter's ties with the Imperial Bank of Persia and its allied concessions were responsible for the lack of information in British newspapers. Whatever the truth of these allegations, and the evidence seems to point in that direction, it is striking that the most accurate information in the British newspapers came from letters to the editors and other features, and not in the news columns. The press in May, 1891, carried very brief and optimistic reports on the Shiraz riots. A letter in the Financial Standard on May 30, 1891, described the opposition movement as being much more serious than the press would grant, attacked Lord Salisbury, the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, for calling the Shah enlightened, and raised for apparently the first time in print the fact that Talbot was Salisbury's [distant] cousin. Brief and optimistic reports on the Tabriz troubles were similarly countered, this time in the Globe of September 9, 1891, by someone with information from a friend in the Tehran diplomatic corps. Only in December and January did Reuters begin to give more details, and even then the longest and most accurate stories in the Times came not through Reuters, but indirectly via a correspondent in Vienna. Despite the dearth of news outside the letter columns while the tobacco troubles were occurring, the British press is interesting as showing the essential agreement of some of the British opposition with the Iranian assessment of the Tobacco Concession. It also 155

RELIGION AND REBELLION IN IRAN

gives a few details about the financial activities of Talbot and the Tobacco Company which are not otherwise easily available. Some of these have been inserted into the text and footnotes above.

156

INDEX Abbas Mirza Molk Arii, 17, 19, 20, 79,83 'Abduh, Muhammad, 144 Abdul Hamid II, Ottoman Sultan, 16, 72, 120, 129 Adalat, Mirza Sayyed Hosain Khan, 17, 18, 21 Afghani, Sayyed Jamal ad-Din al-, see Jamal ad-Din at-Afghani, Sayyed Afghanistan, Afghan, 16, 19, 86, 144 Ahwaz,70 Akhtar (Persian newspaper), 44-45 49, 58, 63, 69, 107 Alamgir Sayyed, 93, 136-140 Ali Akbar, Sayyed, see Sayyed Ali Akbar Ali IlIahis, 139 Alliance Francaise, 54, 60 Amin (Dar) oz-Zarb, Hajji Mohammad Hasan, 18, 20, 23, 24, 25, 59 Amin-e Hozur (Shah's envoy to Tabriz), 80, 81, 86, 111 Amin od-Dowleh (Minister of Posts and Head of the Council of Ministers), 13, 14, 16, 19, 20, 22, 23, 26, 27, 43, 44, 47, 48, 50, 53, 54-55, 62-63,73,91,94 Amin os-Soltan (Prime Minister, Grand Vizier), 1-2, 11-13, 14, 18, 20,23,24,25,26,35,38,39,40,41, 42, 43, 44, 46n, 47, 48, 50, 53, 54, 57, 58, 59n, 60, 66, 67, 68, 69, 71, 72,73,74,75,79,81,82,83,84,85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 93, 97, 98, 99, 100, 102,I04n,105n,106,107,108,111, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 128, 129, 130, 134, 137, 140, 145, 146 Amir Nezam (Governor of Tabriz) 74, 76, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85 andarun,97 Azali Babis, 70, 107-109, 132, 143 Aqa Najafi (Isfahan mojtahed), 90, 94,95 Arab, 15, 17, 19

Arabic, 16, 127, 148 Arabistan, 118n armed incidents: in Mashhad, 91-93; in Shiraz, 67; in Tabriz, 82, 83, 84; in Tehran, 104, 113 Armenians, 75, 82, 84 army, Iranian, 10 Asadabad, 19 Ashkabad,45 Ashtiyani, Hajji Mirza Hasan, 90, 96, 97,98,102,103-104,105,106,114118, 130, 134, 145-147 Asterabad, 138, 139 Austrian Legation (in Tehran), 55-56 Azerbaijan, 65n, 70, 74, 75,76,81,83, 86, 87, 93, 111 Babis, 56, 71, 72, 102, 107-109, 132, 136, 143, 144 Baghdad, 88, 89,96, 127, 128 Baha'is, 107-109, 113 Balloy, M. R. D. de (French Minister at Tehran), 35, 36, 37, 44, 52, 55, 56,60,68,83,86,87,88,91,93,94, 95, 98, 100, 101, 106, 107, 112, 116, 117, 118, 119, 122, 124, 125, 130, 139,140 Bank, Russian, 107, 118 banks, Persian, 5, 68, 72 Basra, 69, 71 bast, 56 bastinado, 90-91 Behbehani, Sayyed Abdollah, 2, 79, 90, 98, 118n Berkes, Niyazi, 144 Binns, Mr. (Manager of Regie in Shiraz), 67, 68, 110 Blunt, Wilfrid Seawen, 17 Bokhara,53 Bombay, 108 boycott, of tobacco, 95-100, 102103, 107, 112, 114, 115, 116, 145147 bribes, corruption, 6, 35, 78, 79, 80, 97, 123, 125 British agents, 66, 68, 71

157

INDEX

British government, 5, 7,8,53,81,82, 87, 97, 123, 124, 125, 126, 128, 129 British Legation (in Tehran), 50, 52, 108, 118n, 124 Browne, Edward G., 29, 4On, 7172n, 96n, 127, 143 Bushire, 16, 17, 68, 86, 121, 126 Butzov, E. K. (Russian Minister at Tehran), 14, 41, 44, 48, 51, 56, 87, 101,113,118,119,120,122,134 Caliph, 72, 76 cancellation, abolition of tobacco concession, 1,85,86,87,88,89,93, 96, 102, 105, 107, 123, 126, 145147 Christians, European, 6, 8, 13,28,96 Churchill, S., 121 Cloete, Mr. (Persian Consul-General in London), 61n compensation, indemnity, 85, 93, 97, 98, 112, 123, 125, 126, 134 concessionaires, European, 4, 7-8, 9, 37, 44, 49, 125 concessions, economic, 2,4-9, 11, 12, 14,15,22,27,37,41,42,43,45,51, 55,57,69,70,72,79,81,87,88,94, 96, 105, 114, 116, 119, 131, 155 concessions, monopoly, 8, 12,42,43, 51, 72, 88, 92, 93, 97, 102 Constitutional Revolution, 1905-11, 1, 2, 3, 15, 107, 108, 114, 131, 133, 136, 143 Cossack Brigade, Persian, 10, 105, 117 Council of State, Ministers (Grand or Imperial Council), 10, 14, 43, 45, 50, 52, 91, 100 Curzon, George N., 4, 8 customs, Iranian, 5, 123 Dehgan, Ebrahim, 66n, 96n deposition, of Shah called for, 126128, 130, 132, 148-151 discontent following Tobacco movement, 125-133, 148-151, 152-154 Diyii al-Khdfiqain (Eastern and Western Review), 127, 128 Dolgorukii, Prince N. S. (Russian Minister at Tehran, former), 12, 14 Durand, Sir Mortimer, 122, 124, 134

East India Company, British, 126 Eastern and Western Review (Diyii al-Khiifiqain), 127, 128 Egypt, Egyptians, 17, 92 England, see Great Britain E'temiid os-Saltaneh, Mohammad Hasan Khan (Minister of Press and Publications), 13, 14, 16, 17, 18, 19, 22, 23, 24, 26, 35, 39, 4On, 48, 56, 119n European, Europeans, 4-9, 75, 82, 83,84,94,95,99,100,101,102,104, 105, 106, 113, 115, 116, 119, 128, 130, 133n, 143, 144, 147, 149, 153 Faizollah Darbandi, Hajji, 73 Farhad Mirza, 7 Fars,57 fatwa, 69, 72n, 95, 96, 133 Feuvrier, Dr. (Jean-Baptiste), 79, 80, 84,88,96,102, 103,104n, 120, 121, 122, 134, 136 Financial Standard, 155 Foreign Office, British (F. 0.), 9, 14, 17,20,21,23,35,36,37,39,41,42, 42n, 51, 77, 79, 82, 85, 106, 122, 123, 128, 129 France, French, 13, 14,35,36,37,44, 56,60,79,83,84,86,87,88,91,93, 98,101,103,111,112,117,119,122 France, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 12 Germany, German, 15 Giers, N. K. de (Russian Foreign Minister), 20, 23, 41, 113, 125 Gilan, 6 Gladstone, William E., 142 Globe, 155 God, Allah, 47,69, 71, 76, 77, 88, 95, 96, 143, 148, 149, 150, 151 Gordon, T. E. (Oriental Secretary and Military Attache at British Legation in Tehran), 50, 55-56, 66, 121 Government of India, 21, 77 Governor of Shiraz, 67, 68 Governor of Tabriz (Amir Nezam), 74, 76, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85 Grand Vizier in 1872 (Mirza Hosain Khan), 5, 6, 7

158

INDEX

Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani, Sayyed, 14~ 15-27,28,29, 32-34, 39, 40n, 42n, 43, 46-49, 55, 57, 58, 59, 66, 67~ 69-73, 89, 96, 107, 108, 126-129, 132, 133, 135, 141-144, 148-151, 152, 154 Javad Aqa, Hajji Mirza (Chief Mojtahed of Tabriz), 74, 81, 84, 88 jehdd, Holy war, 76, 101, 102, 103, 104, 110 Jews, 96

Great Britain (England), British (English), 1,3,12,13,14,15,16,17, 19,22,24,25,26,27,28,35,36,37, 38,40,41,43,48,49,50,51,54,57, 58, 60, 69, 71n, 72, 75, 79, 80, 81, 82,83,84,86,87,90,91,92,93,95, 96n, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 107, 112, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 126, 128, 129, 130, 131, 134, 137, 150, 152, 155 Grigorovich, Mr. (Dragoman of Russian Legation), 48, 58, 113 growers, tobacco, 35, 38, 103, 109 Hajji Mirza Javad Aqa (Chief Mojtahed of Tabriz), 74,81,84,88 HaniSayyah, 17,56,59 Hamadan, 19, 48 Hasan Ali Khan, Navvab (Translator for British Legation), 115, 124 Heir Apparent, Iranian (Mozaffar ed-Din), 80, 85 Imam Hosain, 101 Imam Jom'eh of Isfahan, 90-91 Imam Jom'eh of Tehran, 90, 95, 116, 117 Imam of the Age, twelfth imam, 10, 95, 136 Imamzadeh Ahmad ibn Musa, tomb of, 89 Imperial Bank of Persia, 2, 8, 9, 12, 36,37,41,42,47,51,68,69,70,71, 72, 80, 88, 89, 90, 102, 105, 115, 118, 119, 123, 124, 131, 146, 155 India, Indian, 16, 21, 47, 57, 92, 141, 150 Indo-European Telegraph, 8 infidels, kafers, unbelievers, 58, 67, 69,71,75,77,80,90,94,99,132 Iran (official newspaper), 19 Iranian government, see Persian government Iraq, 10, 73,88,127 Isfahan, 13, 14, 17, 18, 65n, 88,90-91, 94-95, 109, 115, 119n, 145 Islam, Islamic, 15, 16, 28, 29, 46,47, 54,55,66, 70, 71, 97, 100, 101, 132, 138, 141, 142, 143, 145, 149, 151 Istanbul (Constantinople), 17,44,53, 72, 120, 129, 132, 135

Karbala,67, 88,96,99, 100, 101,103~ 117, 132 Karbala'i, Shaikh Hasan, 66n, 96n Karun river, opening to commerce, 8, 9, 12,22,41,42, 51, 70, 72 Katkov, M. N., 17,20, 21, 22 Kaveh (Persian newspaper), 18 Kazemzadeh, Firuz, 12n Keddie, Nikki R., 144 Kedourie, Elie, 144 Kellar Dasht, 137 Kennedy, Robert (British charge d'affaires at Tehran), 46, 47, 48,50, 53,54,57,58,59,67,73,74,75,80, 81,82,83,84,85,86,87,91,93,136 Kermani, Mirza Aqa Khan, 132, 143 Kermani, Mirza Reza, 40n, 46, 56~ 57,58, 59 Kermani, Nazem ol-Eslam, 26, 27~ 87, 96n, 104n Kermanshah, 103, 137 Khora5an, 70,92,94,123,126,150 Koran, 59,76,77,88,89,126, 132, 142 Kosogovskii, Colonel V. A., 105, 112-113, 117 Kurds, 139 Lambton, Ann K. S., 1, 11 Lamsdorf, V. N., 41n Lars, 68 Lascelles, Sir Frank (British Minister at Tehran), 71n, 93, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 104n, 105, 106, 108, 113, 115~ 116, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 128~ 129, 130, 137 Law Officers of the Crown, 129 loans (Persian from abroad), 11, 119~ 123, 124, 125, 130, 131

159

INDEX

London,27,28,37, 73,85,106,129; Iranian Legation in, 56; Malkam Khan in, 29, 53, 57; Naser ed-Din Shah's trip to, 5

Malek ot-Tojjdr, Hajji Mohammad Kazem (Hasan), 52, 97 Malekzadeh, Mahdi, 79, 144 Malkam Khan, Mirza, 27-29, 40, 42, 44, 52, 54, 55, 56, 57, 60, 66, 67, 119n, 131-133, 152, 154 Mashhad, 25, 67, 85, 86,91,92 Mazanderan, 20, 70,136,137,139 merchants, British, 43 merchants, Iranian, 7, 18, 38,49, 52, 65,66,68,69, 74, 77, 78,86,90,91, 93, 94, 95, 96, 98, 103, 106, 111, 130, 131 messianic revolt, 136-140 ministers, Iranian, 6-7, 13, 89, 100, 130, 132, 152 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Persian, 13 Mirza A.qga Khan Kermani, 132, 143 Mirza Mahmud Khan, (Persian Minister in St. Petersburg), 22,24-25, 125 Mirza Mohammad Ali Khan (Persian Minister in London), 148 Mirza Reza Kermani, 40n, 46, 56, 57, 58,59 modernizers, Iranian, 7, 17 Mohammad (the Prophet), 58, 70, 76, 142, 143, 148 Mohammad Ali Shah, 2 Mo'in o/-Molk, Mohsen Khan, 54, 119n mojtaheds, 71, 73, 75, 76, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 88, 91, 92, 96, 97, 103, 115, 116, 117, 118n Mokhber od-Dowleh, 22 Molk Ara, Abbas Mirza, 17, 19, 20, 79,83 mollas, Iranian, 11, 39,40,44, 52, 57, 66, 67, 68, 89, 90, 92, 95, 97, 99, 100, 103, 104n, 105n, 114, 116, 118n, 127, 130, 145 monopoly, 8, 12, 42, 43, 51, 72, 88, 92, 93, 97, 98, 99, 102, 103, 106, 112, 152

Monteforte, Count di (Chief of police, Tehran), 47, 59, 60, 119n Morier, Sir Robert, 20-21,24,25,37, 41, 125 Moscow, 20, 21 Moscow Gazette, 20, 21 Moshir od-Dowleh, Yahya Khan (Minister of Justice, ex-Foreign Minister), 13, 14,26, 50, 53, 54, 69, 86, 119n mosques, 92 Munich, 22, 23 Muslim, Muslims (Mohammadans), 21,22,44,45,50,57,58,72,75,77, 80, 88, 89, 98, 101, 104, 108, 110, 142, 143, 144, 148, 149, 150, 151 Naser ed-Din Shah, 4, 5, 7, 9, 12, 23, 26,27,29,32,35,36,37,38,39,40, 41,42,43,44,45,46,48,49,52,53, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 65n, 66, 67, 69,72,73,74,76,77,78,79,80,81, 82,83,84,85,86,87,89,90,91,92, 93,94,96,97,98,99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 107, 108, 111, 112, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 123, 124, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 134, 136, 137, 139, 140, 145, 146, 147, 148, 154, 155; trips to Europe: to St. Petersburg, 5; to England, 1889, 35-36, 37, 61; third trip, 22, 35-36, 37, 45, 61 Naser ol-Molk, 51, 133n Naser os-Saltaneh (Chief of the Court of Justice, Tabriz), 58, 60 nationalist, nationalism, 3, 7, 15, 131, 133, 154 Niiyeb os-Saltaneh, Kamran Mirza (Governor of Tehran and Head of the Army, third son of Naser ed-Din Shah), 10, 13, 40, 46n, 58, 59, 73, 99, 100, 104, 105, 137 newspapers, British, 155-156 nihilists, 108 officials, Persian, 77-78, 79 Ornstein, Julius (Director of Tobacco Company in Iran), 50, 57, 68, 83, 86, 87, 98, 100, 105, 106, 107, Ill, 117, 118, 123

160

INDEX

Ottoman Empire, Ottomans, 10, 22, 43, 71, 75, 129, 149

Pall Mall Gazette, 126, 132 pan-Islam, pan-Islamic, 16, 132 Paris, 22, 37 Paton, Mr. (Acting Consul General, Tabriz),75 peasants, Iranian, 38, 52, 65, 130, 139 Persian government, 2, 7,8,10,11,12, 15,22,23,39,44,49,52,55,73,78, 79,82,84,88,91,93,94,97,98,99, 102, 103, 108, 114, 115, 116, 118n, 119, 122, 125, 131, 133, 145, 146, 152, 154 Persian GulfTrading Corporation, 95 petitions, 76, 77, 80, 152-154 placards, 85, 101 Pobedonostsev, K. P., 21 progress, 45 Prophet, false, 136-140 Qajars, Qajar dynasty, 2, 10, 78-79 Qiinun (Persian newspaper), 27, 28, 29,40,44,52,54,56,67,132 Qavam ol-Molk (Mayor ofShiraz), 68 Qazvin, 56, 97, 103 Qazvini, Mirza Mohammad, 40n Qom,26 Rabino, Joseph, 107 railroads, Persian, 4,5,30-31,62,87, 88, 89, 101, 102, 146 Ramazan, 39, 57 Rasht,70 Rawlinson, Sir Henry, 5, 6 reform, reformers, Iranian, 1, 7, 10, 11, 14, 15, 16, 26, 28, 46, 49, 131, 132, 133, 138, 144, 152, 153 reformist, radical, opposition to the Persian government, 7, 15-29, 32-34, 44-49, 55-60, 69-73, 126129, 131-133, 148-154 Refutation ofthe Materialists, 16, 141 Regie, 36, 38,41,43,44,49,50,52,54, 60, 65n, 66, 67, 68, 69, 74, 75, 76, 77,81,82,83,84,85,86,87,88,89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 100, 101, 102, 103, 105, 106, 107, 110, 117, 118n, 119, 130, 131, 147

religion, Persian, 10-11, 15, 47, 54, 66n, 69, 71, 74, 76, 77, 88, 93, 95, 104, 108, 109, 114, 133, 136, 138, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 149, 150 religious leaders, see ulama religious opposition, religious attacks on the government, 1,6, 10, 11, 13, 27, 29, 32, 39, 40, 133 religious-radical alliance, 1, 11, 57, 131-133 Renan, Ernest: answer to, 141, 144 Reuter, Baron Julius de, 4, 9, 155 Reuter concession, 4-7, 8, 9, 30, 31, 36,80 Reuters news agency, 155 revolution, 85, 106, 107, 110, 130 Rida, Muhammad Rashid, 72n, 127 Russia, Russians, 1,2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 10, 12,13,14,15,16,17,18,20,21,22, 23,25,27,37,38,39,40,41,42,43, 44,45,50,51,52,53,54,56,57,58, 59n,60,62,66,67,68,70,72,74,75, 76, 80,81, 82, 83, 84, 86, 87,90,91, 92, 93, 94, 100, 101, 105, 107, 112, 113, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123~ 124, 125 126, 131, 134, 150 Russian agents, 66 Russian government, 5, 7, 12,21,24, 86 Russian Legation (in Tehran), 24, 25, 43, 48, 58, 106, 107, 120, 121 Sabiih (Turkish newspaper), 44 Sabzevar, 145 Sa'd od-Dowleh, 139 Safavids, Safavid dynasty, 10 Saheb Divan (Governor of Mashhad), 91,92 Salisbury, Marquis of (British Prime Minister and. Foreign Minister), 36, 85, 87, 97, 98, 100, 123, 124, 125, 126, 129, 148, 155; relationship to Talbot and the tobacco concession, 36, 61-62 Samara, 69,95,99, 103, 115 Sanderson, Sir Thomas H., 42 San Stefano, 13 Sayyed Abdollah Behbehani, 2, 79, 90, 98, 118n

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INDEX

Sayyed Ahmad Khan, Sir, 142 Sayyed Alamgir, 93, 136-140 Sayyed Ali Akbar, of Shiraz, 67, 68, 69, 71, 72-73, 88, 89, 90, 96, 110, 117 sayyeds,52,67,69,92, 104, 105n secret societies, 11,49, 55, 66 Shah (Shahzadeh) Abdol Azim, 26, 40,46,52 Shaikh Mohammad Ali, of Isfahan, 94,95 Shari'a, Holy Law, 69, 70, 75, 77, 99, 102, 133, 143, 153 Shi'ism, Shi'i, 10, 11, 50, 69, 72, 73, 127, 132, 148 Shiraz, 17, 50, 57, 65n, 66, 67-69, 71, 88, 110, 145, 155 Shirazi, Hajji Mirza (Mohammad) Hasan (leading Shi'i mojtahed), 46n,66n, 67, 69, 70-71, 72,73,8889,90,95,96,99,101,102,103,107, 108, 109, 111, 114-117, 132, 145147 Shuster, Morgan, 3 socialist, socialism, 108 speculators, European, 7, 8 Speyer, A. N. (Russian charge d'affaires), 12-14, 41, 58, 87, 113, 118, 125 St. Petersburg (Petrograd), 17, 18, 20, 21,22,23,24,41,58,101,113,120, 125 Sudan, Sudanese, 17 Sunni, 16, 19 Tabaristan, 70 Tabriz, 14, 25, 55, 66, 67, 74-77, 80-85,87,88,90,95,100,111,114, 145, 155 Taimuri, Ebrahim, 35-36, 37, 66n, 89, 96n, 100n Talbot, Major G. F., 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 47, 49, 52, 60, 61, 62, 123, 125, 126, 155, 156 Taqizadeh, Sayyed Hasan, 18 Tehran, 8, 12, 16, 17, 20, 23, 24, 25, 26,55,57,66,67,69,70,71,73,75, 76, 82, 84, 90, 93, 94, 95, 96, 102, 103, 105, 107, 112, 113, 114, 117, 125, 132, 137, 139, 152, 155 telegrams, British, 85, 106

telegrams, Iranian, 80, 81, 83, 84, 85, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 96, 99, 103, 107, 111, 112, 114-115, 116, 145147 TifUs,25 Times, 125, 155 tobacco, 38,65,67, 69, 72, 75,86,88, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 98, 100, 106, 110 Tobacco Company (Imperial Tobacco Corporation of Persia), 9, 38, 39, 50,52,60,62,65,68, 75, 77, 78, 79, 80,82,83,85,87,90,93,94,95,96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 108, 109, 111, 115, 123, 125, 126, 130, 146, 149, 156 Tobacco Company agents, officials, 35,36,37,38,39,47,49,52,60,61, 62, 65, 66n, 67, 68,69,90, 110, 123 Tobacco concession, 1, 2, 5, 7, 9, 12, 29, 35, 36, 38, 39, 41, 42n, 43, 44, 45,49,52,55,61-62,65,68,71,72, 74,80,81,85,86,87,88,90,91,97, 98, 99, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 107, 114, 116, 120, 125, 126, 131, 147, 152, 155 Tobacco monopoly, 1, 12, 36, 42, 44,47, 51, 52 Tobacco protest, movement, 1, 2,4, 6,7,15,16,39,43,58,65-109,114, 117, 119, 122, 132, 133, 137, 155 treaties, Persian, 41, 42, 43, 44, 51 Truth (British newspaper), 125 Tsar (Alexander III of Russia), 12n, 20, 22, 86, 120 Turkestan, 21 Turkey, Turks, Turkish, 21, 29, 39, 44, 49, 71, 74, 94 Turks, Caucasian, 92 ulama, 1, 2, 6, 10, 11, 13, 14, 15, 16, 32,47,54,58,65,66,67,68,69,72, 73, 74, 75, 77, 78, 79, 80, 82, 90, 94,95,96,97,98,99,100,102,103, 104, 105, 109, 110, 112, 113, 117, 118, 119, 120, 126, 127, 128, 130, 131, 143, 148 unbelievers, kafers, infidels, 58, 67, 69,71,75,77,80,90,94,99,132 ,Urwa al- Wuthqd, al-, 16, 17, 18

162

INDEX

with Major Talbot and the Tobacco concession, 35-37, 61

Vazir Nezam, 74 Vienna, 37, 155 Vlassov, Mr. (Russian Consul in Mashhad), 92 Western (European) impact (influence), 3, 4, 10, 28-29, 51, 57, 66n, 114, 131, 141, 142, 143, 147, 154 Wolff, Sir Henry Drummond (British Minister at Tehran), 9, 12, 13, 14, 17,23,24,25,26,32,35,36,37,38, 39, 41, 42, 43, 46, 51, 52, 72n, 93, 100, 122, 125, 134, 137; connection

Yahya Khan Moshir od-Dowleh, see Moshir od-Dowleh Yahya Khan Yazd, 103, 145 Yusof Aqa, Hajji Mirza (Tabriz mojtahed), 75 Zell os-Soltan, Prince (oldest son of Naser ed-Din), 17-18, 90, 94, 95, 99, 115 Zinoviev, I. A. (Head of the Asiatic Department of the Russian Foreign Ministry), 22, 23, 25

163