Religion and political culture in Kano 9780520017382

Table of contents :
Frontmatter
INTRODUCTION: POLITICAL CULTURE AND THE KANO CASE STUDY (page 1)
The Concept of Political Culture (page 1)
The Kano Context (page 14)
Fulani and Hausa Orientations Toward Authority and Community (page 32)
PART I. PATTERNS OF RELIGIOUS AUTHORITY AND COMMUNITY
1. RELIGIOUS IDENTITY AND STRUCTURE (page 43)
2. THE TRANSITION FROM TRADITIONAL TO REFORMED TIJANIYYA (page 73)
3. THE CONSOLIDATION OF REFORMED TIJANIYYA (page 105)
4. QADIRIYYA, MAHDIYYA, AND USMANIYYA (page 146)
5. COMPARATIVE ORIENTATIONS TOWARD AUTHORITY AND COMMUNITY (page 190)
PART II. PATTERNS OF POLITICAL AUTHORITY AND COMMUNITY
6. EMIRATE AUTHORITY AND COMMUNITY (page 213)
7. THE IDEOLOGICAL BASIS OF EARLY EMIRATE REFORM (page 273)
8. THE TRANSITION TO KANO STATE (page 306)
9. AUTHORITY AND COMMUNITY IN KANO STATE (page 337)
10. COMPARATIVE ORIENTATIONS TOWARD AUTHORITY AND COMMUNITY (page 373)
CONCLUSION: RELIGION AND POLITICAL CULTURE IN KANO (page 387)
The Authority Dimension of Political Culture (page 388)
The Community Dimension of Political Culture (page 390)
Conclusions (page 396)
APPENDIXES
1. Bakin Ruwa Ward (Kano City) Religious Survey, 1965 (page 399)
2. Succession to Selected Clan and District Headship in Kano Emirate (page 405)
3. Electoral Succession in Kano (page 410)
4. Kano State Movement Debates (page 412)
5. Authority Structures in Kano State, 1969-1970 (page 416)
GLOSSARIES
1. Hausa Terms Used in Text (with Arabic and English Equivalents) (page 423)
2. Hausa Muslim Names (with Arabic Equivalents) (page 429)
3. Kano Emirate Titles Mentioned in Text (page 432)
BIBLIOGRAPHY (page 436)
NAME INDEX (page 443)
SUBJECT INDEX (page 451)

Citation preview

Religion and Political Culture in Kano

’

Religion and Political Culture in Kano John N. Paden

nerbeley vray of California Pres

University of California Press Berkeley and Los Angeles, California University of California Press, Ltd. London, England Copyright © 1973, by The Regents of the University of California ISBN: 0-520~-01738-2

Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 74-153548 Printed in the United States of America

| Designed by Eileen Lavelle

This book is dedicated to the mallams of Kano and to their sons

?

Contents

INTRODUCTION: POLITICAL CULTURE AND THE KANO

CASE STUDY . Coe, Coe, Ce, I The Concept of Political Culture. . . oo . . I

The Kano Context. . . . . Lo, . . I4 Fulani and Hausa Orientations Toward Authority and Com-

munity. . . . . , . . ; Lo, 31

PART I. PATTERNS OF RELIGIOUS AUTHORITY AND COMMUNITY

I, RELIGIOUS IDENTITY AND STRUCTURE .. ae . 43

Ethnicity and Religious Identity .. . Lo, . . 45

The Mallam Class in Kano . . . . ; ; . , 56 The Structure of Islamic Law . . . . . . . 61 Mysticism and Brotherhood Identity. . . . . . 65 Patterns of Islamic Reform . . , . . ; , . 70 2. THE TRANSITION FROM TRADITIONAL TO REFORMED TIJANIYYA . 73

The Authority and Community of Umar Futi_. . . . 74 The Realignment of the Fulani Mallam Class. . . 82 The Realignment of the Hausa Mallam Class . . . . 86 Salgawa Doctrines of Authority and Community. . .. go | Early Linkages Between Fulani and Hausa Mallam Classes. 94

vitt , oe Contents 3. THE CONSOLIDATION OF REFORMED TIJANIYYA . © ws s—i——sST'S

The Structure of Authority in Kano. , , Lo, . 106 The Structure of Authority Beyond Kano. . . . ‘20

Functions and Doctrines of Authority. ©. . . . . 12%

Structures and Doctrines of Community . . . . . «I

4. QADIRIYYA, MAHDIYYA, AND USMANIYYA . . . . . . 146 Early Ethnic Structures of Authority and Community in

Qadiriyya . . . . . . . . . . 147 The Transethnic Authority Structure of Reformed Qadiriyya . 152 Doctrines of Authority and Community in Reformed Qadiriyya . _160

Authority and Community in Mahdiyya_. . . , . 169 Authority and Community in Usmaniyya . . . . .~ 199 5. COMPARATIVE ORIENTATIONS TOWARD AUTHORITY AND COMMUNITY . — 190

Orientations Toward Authority . . . . . . . ~~ 190

Orientations Toward Community . .. . . . 196 Epilogue: Religion in Kano State . . . . . 204

PART II. PATTERNS OF POLITICAL AUTHORITY AND

COMMUNITY |

6, EMIRATE AUTHORITY AND COMMUNITY. . | . . 213

Doctrines of Emirate Authority and Community , (213

The Structure of Emirate Authority . , . | . 226 The Structure of Emirate Community Soe 238 The Emergence of Emirate Identity . .. oo, . 251 Crises of Emirship Legitimacy _. So, Soe 260 7. THE IDEOLOGICAL BASIS OF EARLY EMIRATE REFORM. ok 293

The Reformers . , . . . . . . . 273

The Ideological Basis of Authority Reform. , , . 278

The Ideological Basis of Community Reform _ . . - , 291

The Style and Symbols of Reform. Doe, . 294 Interpretation of the Quranic Paradigm . . . . . 298

8. THE TRANSITION TO KANO STATE. . . . . . . 306 The Continuity of Authority in the Era of Party Politics . . 307

The Growth of the Sabon Gari Community __.” . . 313 The Idea of a Northern Regional Community . . . . 322

The Emergence of Kano Nationalism. Ce 329

The Crisis of Community . , | | . . . . 333

Q. AUTHORITY AND COMMUNITY IN KANO STATE... si esti‘ .Ct*«S8

The Restructuring of Authority . Coe, 338 The Restatement of Emirship Legitimacy . Ce BF45

The Reconstruction of Community . . . . . . 354

Contents 4x

The Growth of National Identity . . Co, . 366

IO. COMPARATIVE ORIENTATIONS TOWARD AUTHORITY AND COMMUNITY . 373

Comparative Orientations Toward Authority . . . . 3973 Comparative Orientations Toward Community . . . . 378

The Nature of Crisis and Reform . . . . . 381

CONCLUSION: RELIGION AND POLITICAL CULTURE IN

KANO . . ; . . ; . , . , , . 387 The Authority Dimension of Political Culture . . . . 388 The Community Dimension of Political Culture . , . . 390

Conclusions , , . . , , , ; , . 396 APPENDIXES 1. Bakin Ruwa Ward (Kano City) Religious Survey, 1965 . . 399

Emirate , , . . , . ; ; , 405 3. Electoral Succession in Kano . . . . . . . «410 2. Succession to Selected Clan and District Headships in Kano

4. Kano State Movement Debates. Lo, Ce GID 5. Authority Structures in Kano State, 1969-1970 . Lo, . 416

GLOSSARIES

1. Hausa Terms Used in Text (with Arabic and English

Equivalents) . . . . . . . . ; . 422 2. Hausa Muslim Names (with Arabic Equivalents) . . . 429 3. Kano Emirate Titles Mentioned in Text. , , . 4 432 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . 2... 436 NAMEINDEX. . .. . . ee 443

SUBJECT INDEX . . . Lo ; ; ; , ; . 451

Figures 1. Dynastic Succession to Authority of Umarian Tijaniyya in Kano

Province, ca. 1860-1960. . . . . , . . , 81

2. Ibrahim Niass: Dynastic Succession to Authority . . .. 96 3. Ethnic Integration of Reformed Tijaniyya Authority Structure in

Kano, 1935-1965. oo, . . , . ; . . 14

4. Authority Structure of Reformed Tijaniyya in Kano, 1960-1965. ~——115 5. International Authority Structure of Reformed Tijaniyya, 1960-1965 116 6. Qadiriyya: Ethnic Integration of Sa’adian Authority Structure in

Kano, 1903-1933. . . . , . . . . . 153

7. Qadiriyya: Ethnic Integration of Sa’adian Authority Structure in

SUBJECT INDEX .._. oo, Co, ok GST

x Contents 8. Qadiriyya: Ethnic Integration of Shaziliyya Authority Structure in

Kano, 1937-1965. . . . . . . , . . 155

g. Reformed Qadiriyya: Authority Sources of Nasiru Kabara_. . 161 10. Mahdiyya: Authority Linkage Between Nigerian and Sudanese

Branches, 1885-1965 Lo, . Lo, Lo, . . 170 11, Fulani Succession to Emirship: Kano Emirate. . . 236 12. Aminu Kano: Maternal Line . . . . ; | . 295 13. Aminu Kano: Paternal Line . . . ; . . . . 2

| Maps

14. The Structure of Government in Kano State, 1970 . , , . 346

1. Northern Nigeria: Administrative Units, 1962. . . . . 15

2. Kano Urban Area, 1970 . «we ee, 16 3. Kano City Wards, 1970 . «ww, , 21

4. Kano Province: Major Inter-Urban Linkage, 1959 . . . 29 5. Nigeria: Selected Inter-Urban Linkage, 1961 . ©. . . 30

6. Africa: Selected Inter-Urban Linkage . |. |. . . . 33 7. Kano City: Mallam Class Locations . . . . , . 195 8. Kano Emirate: Fulani District Headships, 1970 . . . = . ~~ 252

9. Iwelve-State System in Nigeria. . . . . . . 338 Tables 1. Estimated Income by Traditional Occupation, 1926 . . . 24

1926 . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

2. Income Distribution in Kano City by “Relative Deprivation” Ratio,

3. Northern Nigeria: Religious Affiliation by Province, 1952. . 44 4. Nigeria: Religious Affiliation by Region, 1952 and 1963. 32. ws 44

5. Distribution of Qur’anic Schools in Northern Nigeria, 1964 . 59

6. Distribution of Ilm Schools in Northern Nigeria, 1964 . . . 60 7. Students in the Zawiya of Sharif Ahmad: Kano, 1965 . 143 8. Ethnic Integration of Reformed Qadiriyya Authority Structure in

Kano, 1960-1965. . . . . . . . . . 162

g. Contemporary Bases of Brotherhood Legitimacy . . . . 192

Contents xt 10. Summary: Ethnic Integration within Brotherhood Authority

Structures, Kano Urban Area, 1930-1965 Coe 14

11. Candidates for the Office of Kano Emir: Twentieth Century. . = 235

1970 Lo, ee 7.7.1

12. Ethnic/Clan Affiliation of District Heads in Kano Emirate, 1806-

13. Characteristics of Residential Sectors in Kano Urban Area, ca. 1965 314

14. Sabon Gari Ethnic Composition, 1954-1955 . . . . . 315 15. Comparison of Kano City and Sabon Gari Markets, 1965 . 318

16. Emirate Title Holders, 1970. . , , . . . . 348 17, Aspects of Community Identity in Kano... . . 382

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Acknowledgments

The original research for this book was undertaken in 1964 and 1965 on a grant from the Foreign Area Fellowship Program. I am grateful to my dissertation advisers at Harvard, Professors Rupert Emerson and Martin Kilson, for their encouragement throughout the course of this work; to Dr. David Arnott of the School of Oriental and African Studies (University of London) for assisting in preliminary Hausa language studies in 1963; to the Emir of Kano and his Council for permission to live, with my family, inside the walled city of Kano from June 1964 to September 1965. I was able to return to Kano for six months in 1970 on a Fulbright-Hays grant. I am indebted to the Program of African Studies at Northwestern University for support in the typing, and retyping, of this manuscript.

Within Nigeria, more people helped me than I can begin to mention. At Abdullahi Bayero College (Kano), the Provost, Shehu Galadanci, has been gracious in every way, and many of the staff members have read draft portions of this manuscript and have offered comments and corrections: John Lavers, Muhammad al-Hajj, Dandatti Abdulkadir, Ibrahim Mukoshy. At

Ahmadu Bello University (Zaria), Professors Abdullahi Smith and James O’Connell have encouraged my studies of northern culture. Dr. Murray Last

read the entire draft manuscript closely and from the beginning has been a friend and inspiration in this work. Similarly, Professor Ernest Gellner en-

xiv Acknowledgments couraged me by his interest in this study from our first meeting in Kaduna, and portions of the manuscript have reached him on three continents. These sections without fail have benefited from his mature judgment and keen eye for detail.

I could not have undertaken the initial field research in Kano without the cooperation of student scholars, many of whom are currently working in institutions of higher learning: Umaru Faruk Ladan, Muhammad Mijinyawa, Isa Kurawa, Muhummad Uba Adamu, Ahmad Getso, Mahmud Tukur, Ibrahim Yaro Yabaya, Abdurrahman Adam, and others. Many in Kano have opened their doors and have gone out of their way to make this study possible: Husaini Sufi, Ahmadu Trader, Aminu Kano, Ado Bayero, Maitama Sule, Alfa Wali, Dahiru Wali, Mudi Salga. I am especially indebted to those friends and colleagues who have read major portions of this manuscript at various stages of preparation: John Chamberlin, Brad Martin, Haroun Adamu, and Abdullahi Mohammed. Colleagues at Northwestern University have also encouraged this study and contributed their ideas, especially Professors Ronald Cohen and Ivor Wilks. Ann Paden has worked

with me on all phases of this book from the field research to the index. She is more a part of this effort at cross-cultural understanding than she will realize or acknowledge. I would particularly like to express my gratitude to those mallams, situated in the area from Senegal to Nigeria, who have shared their time and interest

in discussing the substantive issues in this book: Limamin Kano Dalhatu; Wazirin Kano Abubakar Dokaji; Babban Mallami, Ibrahim; Limanin Yola; matar Wali Suleiman, Saudata; Muhammad Dan Amu; Nasiru Kabara; Ahmad b. Ali; Tijjani b. Usman; Shehu Maihula; Sharif Ahmad; Abubakar Atiku; Faruk Salga; Said Hayatu; Abba Sa’id; Garba Sa’id; Sayid Nuru Tall (Senegal) ; Ibrahim Niass (Senegal) ; Aliyu Sisi (Senegal) ; Muhammad al-Hadi

(Mauritania); Tijjani b. Ibrahim (Senegal); Mawla’i Idris (Fez); Modibo Kari (Adamawa); Umaru (Zinder); Muhammad dan Maradi (Maradi); Babban Makaranta (Kumasi); Ibrahim Diop (Senegal); Babba Diasse (Senegal) ; Wazirin Sokoto, Junaidu; Sultan of Sokoto, Abubakar; Muhammad Sidi; Husaini Adamu; Abubakar el-Nafety; Mudi Sipikin; Naibi Wali; the staff members of the School for Arabic Studies, Kano; the staff of Shahuci Judicial School, Kano; the staff of the Arabic ‘Teacher Training College, Sokoto; representatives from each of the traditional mosques in Kano; Na‘iya (Zaria); Muhammad Ghali (Hadejia). I am grateful to the staff of the Nigerian Archives, Kaduna (NAK), for their help. I would like to thank, too, Kabiru,

Abu, Bashiru, Umaru, Abba, and Nuhu. | , , ,

An author must reserve in the end a special measure of gratitude for the

Acknowledgments xv gift of a talented secretary. Mrs. Anne Potter has typed several versions of this book with skill and humor. As a personal note, I would like to record for all those who have asked our son, Audu, where he got his nickname that it was given him by our neighbors in Kano. Amy, his sister, was born after we left Kano, but we call her Amina because that is the name these friends would have chosen for her. The problems of cross-cultural research, especially participant observation, will be clear in reading this book. Any errors of judgment or fact are entirely

my own responsibility. I have drawn heavily on primary written sources wherever possible, and have included many excerpts in this book, not only to illustrate the style of Kano culture, but as a corroboration of more personal interpretations based on oral data and observations. In Kano, the line between public knowledge and private knowledge is often not well defined, and I have tried not to violate the confidence of those with whom I have worked. I have dedicated this book to the mallams of Kano, who have allowed me to record a part of their history. I have also dedicated this book to their sons, who will help to shape the destiny of modern Africa partly by the way in which they evaluate the legacy of their fathers.

Note on Language Use and Transliteration

Throughout this book I have used Hausa orthography rather than English or Arabic in the spelling of personal names, place names, and substantive vocabulary words. In those cases where a Hausa word is based on an Arabic root, I have included the Arabic word in parentheses the first time the Hausa word is used. Where such exist, I have preferred an anglicized form over Hausa or Arabic spellings, as with tariqa, imam, etc. In cases where North African or Arab names are mentioned I have transliterated from the Arabic, but have followed Hausa orthography for all persons, including Arabs, who have lived in Kano or are associated with Kano history. I have included in the glossary a list

of Hausa words and names used in the text, with their Arabic and English equivalents.

With regard to transliteration, there are no diacritical marks other than the apostrophe in Hausa, but there are certain glottalized consonants which are expressed orthographically as hooked letters, namely, b, d, and k. I have not used hooked letters in this text because there is little possibility that a Hausa word would be misconstrued. With regard to Arabic transliteration I have used the standard forms (as outlined in Cataloging Service, Library of Congress, “Arabic Romanization,” Bulletin 91, September 1970) except on certain matters of capitalization (where I have used anglicized style) and ordering of segments of proper names (where I have not used nisbahs initially but rather have listed authors alphabetically by first name).

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eee

Introduction: Political Culture

This introductory chapter will consider the concept of political culture (including the idea of culture and society, the dimensions of political culture, and the relationship of religion to political culture); the Kano case-study context (including the socioeconomic factors of urbanization, ethnicity, class, and con-

nectivity); and Fulani and Hausa orientations toward authority and community. THE CONCEPT OF POLITICAL CULTURE

In the comparative study of government, attempts are often made to identify the underlying values, symbols, and premises of society that influence political behavior. Such values may include the entire cultural experience of a society.

Yet certain cultural dimensions are particularly relevant to the processes of political life: for example, the nature of authority and the way in which decisions are made; the criteria used to distinguish communities; the manner in which conflicts or disputes are resolved or managed; and orientations toward history or toward innovation. Such dimensions may be regarded as part of the political culture of a society, as distinct from the general culture.’ 1 Gabriel Almond used the term “political culture” in 1956 in describing his observation that “every political system is embedded in a particular pattern of orientations to political action.” He “found it useful to refer to this as the political culture” (“Comparative Political Systems,” Journal of Politics 18 [August 1956]: 296). S. H. Beer and A. B. Ulam use the

term in a narrower sense: “Certain aspects of the general culture of a society are especially concerned with how government ought to be conducted and what it should try

2 Religion and Political Culture in Kano The orientations toward such dimensions within a society are in most cases not distinctive to any single sector of society but tend to be found in all sectors (military, economic, social, religious, political). Changes in orientation within any one sector, which may occur for a variety of reasons, may produce similar changes in other sectors. Thus, the political culture of a society is not static. In certain situations, change in political culture is brought about through revolution.” In most cases, it is brought about incrementally. The question of how such incremental change occurs is of major importance. In this respect, several

of the terms and theoretical assumptions of the present study should be briefly elaborated.

Culture (excluding material items) is a combination of beliefs and values. Beliefs refer to propositions that are regarded as true, as distinct from false, and values refer to things that are preferred, either of a specific or general nature.® The term “moral values” distinguishes values that refer to the quality of human relationships from values that may be aesthetic or spiritual. The term “ideology” may be used in a variety of ways, but like “culture” refers essentially to a combination of values and beliefs; unlike culture, the notion of ideology may contain an explicit imperative to a course of action that would change existing values and patterns of behavior. Ideology may be manifest, as in the writings of individuals, or latent, in the sense of inarticulated orientations.* The term “doctrine” refers to explicit statements of values or beliefs by those who are in positions of authority within a community. Culture and ideology are often expressed in symbolic terms. Symbols represent a range of meanings that goes well beyond the intrinsic qualities of the symbol itself. Words as well as objects and behavioral patterns may be regarded as symbols. Symbols become socially and politically relevant when they to do. This sector of culture we call political culture. As with the general culture of society, the principal components of the political culture are values, beliefs, and emotional attitudes” (Patterns of Government, 2d ed. [New York: Random House, 1962], p. 32). For a review of the use of the concept since that time, see Y. C. Kim, “The Concept of Political Culture in Comparative Politics,” Journal of Politics 26, no. 2 (May. 1964). For applications of the concept in cross-national research, see Lucien W. Pye and Sidney Verba, eds., Political Culture and Political Development (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965).

2 See Richard R. Fagen, The Transformation of Political Culture in Cuba (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1969).

3 For a discussion of beliefs, see Milton Rokeach, The Open and Closed Mind (New York: Basic Books, 1960). For a discussion of values, see William A. Scott, Values and Organizations (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1965); Kurt Baier and Nicholas Rescher, eds., Values and the Future (New York: Free Press, 1969). 4 See Robert Lane, Political Ideology (New York: Free Press, 1962); Aristide Zolberg, Creating Political Order (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966).

Introduction 3 gain widespread usage and are fitted into a cognitive framework that allows for experiences to be shared and communicated by members of a society. Much

of the power of symbols, however, is in their ambiguity and in the fact that individuals can interpret symbols in terms of their specific experiences.” The notion of society essentially implies an interactional system of persons

who share certain core values. In a plural society, interaction may be limited | to the economic sector, and the core values may be limited to matters of re- | ciprocity and conflict management. In an integrated society the interaction extends to political structures, and the core values must include some agreement on how and where political decisions should be made. In a homogeneous society there is interaction in all spheres (including religious and social), and the people share a common culture; in most cases they also share a common identity. In the study of societies, the concept of differentiation is central. The interactional patterns that define society may be regarded as role relationships (or

structures) which are organized around particular functions. A role may be defined as “a set of norms and expectations applied to the incumbent of a particular position.” ® Differentiation may be defined as “the processes whereby

roles change and become more specialized or more autonomous or whereby new types of roles are established or new structures and subsystems emerge or are created,” “ The process of differentiation implies change. In some societies the internalized expectations of persons or the gap between ideal behavior and

actual behavior may be modified to the point where the structures of a society are completely reoriented. Such change, however, does not need to occur in

linear progression from a diffuse, pre-differentiated situation to a highly differentiated pattern. A particular system may differentiate in response to particular situations and may then de-differentiate. The concept of differentiation is relevant to the study of political culture in several respects: in the initial inquiry into the existence of separate structures in the performance of social, economic, political, and religious functions; in the examination of specific political roles in terms of their broader social functions; and in the assessment 5 See Hugh Dalziel Duncan, Symbols and Social Theory (New York: Oxford University

Press, 1969); idem, Symbols in Society (New York: Oxford University Press, 1968); Murray Edelman, The Symbolic Uses of Politics (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1964); Richard L. Merritt, Symbols of American Community, 1735-1775 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966).

6 Michael Banton, Roles: An Introduction to the Study of Social Relations (New York: Basic Books, 1965), p. 29; see also Bruce J. Biddle and Edwin J. Thomas, eds., Role Theory: Concepts and Research (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1966). 7 Gabriel Almond and G. B. Powell, Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach (Boston: Little, Brown, 1966), p. 22.

4 Religion and Political Culture in Kano of the development of a political culture zone over time as such a zone may

be a residue from the processes of differentiation. , The selection of functions that are the basis of identifying roles may be analytical or phenomenological, the latter being perceptions which are “selfanchored” within the particular system. Anthropologists frequently suggest the following analytical categories which may be identified in all societies: religion, politics, economics, and recreation. Within most societies, however, even at the subsistence level, there is some perception of functional differentiation, and in most societies there is a corresponding division of labor (or role differentiation or specialization) which reflects such perceptions of function. The term “sectors” with regard to society refers to the broad analytical categories of function. In cases of societies with low differentiation, the political, economic, and religious sectors may all be parts of a single structure. In cases of high differentiation, independent roles are performed in the different sectors. In all societies the relationship between sectors is highly interactive. The political sector, however, because of its centrality in determining basic power distribution in society, is in most cases intimately linked with the military, economic, and religious sectors. At the same time, the translation of power into authority by the political sector (which is necessary to some extent in all but the most coercive systems) requires some process of legitimation which usually involves a much broader segment of society than those who are actively

involved in the political sector. | The concept of legitimation, or justification and approval, is fundamental to all the dimensions of political culture. Authority must be legitimated; community boundaries must be legitimated; decision-making and conflict-resolving processes must be legitimated. A withdrawal of legitimacy may result in revo-

lutionary action by those who feel they should assume power or may result | in rebellion by those who wish to secure greater autonomy or even separation from the community. According to Talcott Parsons, legitimation is “the appraisal of action in terms of shared or common values in the context of the involvement of the action in the social system.” Parsons further suggests that “the process of legitimation is the bridge by which values are joined to the differentiated subsystems of

action.” Karl Deutsch writes that “legitimacy is the assurance of the compatibility of a value pursuing course of action with other key values.” According to T. Shibutani and K. M. Kwan, “Unless power is justified by linking it

to accepted values, the governed are less willing to obey and question the 8 See Aidan Southall, “An Operational Theory of Role,” Human Relations 12 (1959): 17-34; see also S. F. Nadel, “The Concept of Social Elites,” International Social Science Bulletin 8, no. 3 (1956): 431-40.

Introduction b) right of others to hold power.” ® In short, legitimation is the process by which

actions (and structures) are justified in society. The manipulation of this process is clearly in the interests of those with power but is equally important to those who are trying to reform the power structure or oppose those in power. In this study the discussion of legitimation will be directed to the values utilized in the justification of authority and community and the patterns of behavior that characterize the application of such values. Insofar as a particu-

lar stratum or class within society (such as the religious leadership) has a special role in influencing legitimation, attention will be directed to the manner in which such a class communicates its value judgments to other groups or classes in society and the manner in which such a class legitimizes its own right to this function. A second aspect of legitimation considered here is the degree to which the agents of legitimation and the society at large apply to the process of social and political change established criteria for judging social and political situ-

ations—the ways, that is, in which traditional roles are used to assess the legitimacy of institutions, processes, or collectivities that result from the process of social change and differentiation.

While the process of legitimation is an underlying concern in the study of political culture, it is necessary to focus on the application of legitimacy to particular dimensions. The selection of dimensions within political culture may be done on analytical grounds, or it may be done by examining a particular society and trying to determine which dimensions are of most relevance.’ In this volume, two broad dimensions of political culture will be examined: ® Talcott Parsons, Structure and Process in Modern Societies (New York: Free Press, 1960), p. 175; Karl W. Deutsch, “The Commitment of National Legitimacy Symbols as a Verification Technique,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 7, no. 3 (1963): 360; T. Shibutani and K. M. Kwan, Ethnic Stratification (New York: Macmillan, 1965), p. 241.

10 Much of the work by Western social scientists has focused on the dimension of participation, which is closely related to political mobilization. An examination is made of which people become involved in political life and which issues become politically relevant—that is, which people are regarded as legitimate participants in the political system and what is regarded as the legitimate scope of governmental activity. See, for

example, the studies in Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, eds, The Civic Culture (Boston: Little, Brown, 1965). At present, Verba is directing a four-nation cross-cultural study of attitudes toward political participation. Verba elsewhere focuses on four dimensions: concepts of national identity, patterns of identification with one’s fellow citizens, acceptable types of government output, and the processes of decision making. Lucien Pye in the same work also suggests four dimensions: trust and distrust, hierarchy and equality, liberty and coercion, and universal versus particular loyalties (Pye and Verba, Political Culture, pp. 526-27). Robert LeVine has been concerned with attitudes toward authority, intergroup behavior, participation in politics, and change and innovation; Robert LeVine, “Political Socialization and Culture Change,” in Old Soctettes and New States, ed. Clifford Geertz (New York: Free Press, 1963).

6 Religion and Political Culture in Kano authority (including succession to and protest of authority) and community formation (including formation and consolidation of community identities and boundaries). These dimensions were selected partly because they represent

at an analytical level the essential or core requirements for a political community to sustain itself, and partly because these have been the issues of primary concern to the people within the case-study context. The influence of religious

ideas and behavior on the development of these dimensions will be assessed. It will be argued that changes in religious culture have produced changes in political culture.

The study of authority requires attention to the locus and procedure of decision making, whether within the particular sectors, within the component segments in a plural society, or within the polity as a whole. It also requires attention to the process of succession (or recruitment) to leadership. The process of legitimation in the establishment of authority may be assessed in terms of

the types of justification invoked and in terms of the procedure by which individuals seeking legitimation are accorded or denied such status. A distinction will be drawn here between charismatic authority and bureaucratic authority. Charismatic authority is based on personal powers that are perceived to be of an extraordinary nature. Bureaucratic authority is based on the functioning of an administrative cadre whose powers derive from an institutional base rather than from the characteristics of any individual. The notion of tra-

ditional authority will be used sparingly in this study, since dynastic rule in practice tends to be either charismatic or bureaucratic.

“Succession to authority” means the processes by which candidates are selected or validated and the manner in which a final choice is made. The distinction between succession based on ascribed criteria as opposed to achieved

criteria will be used in this volume,”’ although in most cases, succession is based on a combination of such criteria. The reverse of succession—that is, deposition—is also important to an understanding of authority. There are usually explicit attitudes toward the justifica-

tions for removal from office and the status of individuals who have been re-

moved from office. |

The concepts of reform, protest, and dissent are closely related to the idea of authority. The acceptability of those who hold opinions different from those in authority varies considerably in different cultures. In a theocratic state differences of opinion may not only constitute treason but also heresy. Reformist types of protest frequently attempt to manipulate or redefine the existing symbols of legitimacy. Attitudes toward the exercise of coercion or violence 11 See Banton, Roles, p. 25.

Introduction 7 by authority are relevant in those cases where governmental force is used against protest and dissent.

The second broad dimension, community formation, refers to orientations toward maintenance, expansion, or contraction of system boundaries and to the criteria used to define such boundaries.’ A major factor in the formation of a community is its relationship with nonmembers of the community, that is, the way in which the external environment defines it. The integration of communities may be regarded analytically as spectrum that includes cooperative interaction, structural interdependence (including interlocking authority systems), value congruence, and identity congruence.

In this study the three major types of communities under consideration will be ethnic, religious, and political. The development of rationales to accommodate multiple membership (or identity) will be of special interest. An ethnic community may be defined analytically as one in which the quality of internal relationships is diffuse rather than specific. An ethnic community is based on

kinship, or kinship-like, relationships in which there is a common core of cultural values and in which there are particularistic symbols of group identity. In most cases these include an assertion of common ancestry, a common language, and some degree of geographic proximity. Ethnic identity is invariably based on social definitions, however, and the criteria of ethnic inclusion become an empirical question.

Ethnic pluralism refers to a situation in which two or more ethnic groups occupy a particular environment and are interactive in the economic sphere but not in the social, political, or religious spheres. This was a common occurrence in the colonial world where the colonial power acted as arbitrator or political broker between different ethnic groups. The consolidation of an ethnically pluralistic society into a more fully interactive community usually occurs through the linkage of particular sectors. Such linkage may initially develop through structural interdependence and value congruence but may later emerge into identity congruence. The religious sector is particularly important in this process because religious integration usually precedes social integration. Furthermore, the transformation of ethnic identity has frequently been a transition to the formation of broader political communities. (Although in some situations, political integration may precede religious integration.) The linkage of religious sectors may result in a sharing of values which may con-

tribute to the formation of a general political-culture zone (as distinct from political-culture dimensions, which crosscut the various sectors) and hence facilitate the linkage of political sectors. 12See David W. Minar and Scott Greer, eds., The Concept of Community (Chicago: Aldine, 1969).

8 Religion and Political Culture in Kano The conceptual relationship of ethnicity to nationality is largely a matter of definition. A nationality is a people who exhibit the characteristics of community cohesiveness, but is usually of “significant” size. Nationalism refers to the demands for political autonomy by such a people. Nationalism may be based on ethnicity, religion, or various combinations of political criteria. In this study the end result of ethnic and religious integration has been a type of city-state nationalism which eventually was accommodated through separate statehood within a national federation. The emergence of political culture patterns at the local level within a national context is clearly related to the process of national integration. This is the case

with regard to both national mass-elite integration and national interethnic integration. James S. Coleman and Carl G. Rosberg write, “In the new states, the politically relevant cultures are . . . those of the hundreds of heterogeneous ethnic communities and tribal societies arbitrarily bunched together within the artificial boundaries imposed during the colonial period.” Conversely, according to Claude Ake, “The essence of the problem of political integration is one of developing a political culture and inducing commitment to it.” The process of linkage of communities within a national context may be illuminated by examining this process at a local level. The relationship of religion to political culture has been referred to at various points above. The argument is put in its basic form by Parsons: “The justification factor of legitimation is most promi-

nent ... where commitment to the relevant values is directly linked with highly explicit transcendental religious beliefs.” 1 The logic of the relationship between religion and political culture will be examined below. Religion may be defined as beliefs, values, and action based on ultimate con-

cern. The concept of ultimate concern, as developed by Paul Tillich and by Robert Bellah, has two aspects: meaning and power—‘“meaning in the sense of the ultimate meaning of the central values of a society or sub-group of it, and power, in the sense of ultimate, sacred, or supernatural power which stands behind those values.” ** In this broad sense, religion might be regarded as the basis of both ideological and cultural values. In its social manifestations (as distinct from personal or theological manifestations) religion usually posits a division of behavior and meaning into two categories: sacred and profane. 13 James S. Coleman and Carl G. Rosberg, eds., Political Parties and National Integration in Tropical Africa (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1964), p. 2; Claude Ake, 4 Theory of Political Integration (Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey Press, 1967), p. 1; Parsons, Structure and Process, p. 176. 14 Robert Bellah, “Religious Systems,” in People of Rimrock: A Study of Values in Five Cultures, ed. Evon Z, Vogt and Ethel M. Albert (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,

1966), p. 227. ,

Introduction 9 The boundaries between the sacred and profane in any society may be partly reflected in structural differentiation. According to Parsons, “It is well known

that in primitive societies ...no clear cut structural distinction could be made between religion and secular aspects of the organization of society; there has been no ‘church’ as a differentiated organizational entity.” ** Some scholars have regarded the scope of religion as the major empirical indicator distinguishing between types of societies. Other scholars have suggested that religion is

the major component in the value and identity cohesion of society. Georg Simmel asserts that “co-existence and sharing of human interests is not possible with people who do not share one’s faith.” Colin M. Turnbull defines ethnicity primarily in religious terms. Friedrich Engels equates “tribal and national religions” with particularistic communities in the pre-bourgeois era.*®

The close conceptual relationship between ethnicity and religion has resulted in the typological distinction of religions as universalistic and particularistic. A universalistic religion may be joined by anyone, regardless of ethnicity. A particularistic religion is ascriptive in that only persons of the ethnic group can participate in the religion. Ethnic religions (such as the Yoruba, Nupe, or Ashanti religions) are restricted to ethnic members. Transethnic religions (such as Christianity or Islam) are not restricted in membership. In certain cases, however, both Christianity and Islam may be regarded as particularistic religions. Historically, certain clans regarded Islamic identity as coterminous with their ethnic identity. Certain Christian sects have likewise been associated with ethnic groups and are essentially closed rather than open

groupings. |

_ The structural differentiation of church and state did not necessarily occur with the introduction of universalistic religions. Within the Christian empires, the idea of political secularity and separation of church and state developed only in the late Middle Ages.’’ In the Islamic areas, the notion of political 18 Structure and Process, p. 304.

16 See Emile Durkheim, The Elementary Forms of Religious Life (New York: Free Press, 1965); this is discussed by Talcott Parsons, The Structure of Social Action (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1949), pp. 409-50. See also Charles Y. Glock and Rodney Stark, Religion and Society in Tension (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1965), p. 171, and chap. 9, “Religion and the Integration of Society”; Georg Simmel, Conflict and the Web of Group Affiliations (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1955), p. 157; Colin M. Turnbull, “Tribalism and Social Evolu-

tion in Africa,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 354 (July 1964): 25, 29; Friedrich Engels, “I. Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy,” On Religion (Moscow: Foreign Language Publishing House, 1955), p. 240. 17 See Leo Pfeffer, Church, State, and Freedom (Boston: Beacon Press, 1967); Guy E. Swanson, Religion and Regime: A Sociological Account of the Reformation (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1967); Thomas G. Sanders, Protestant Concepts of Church and State (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1964).

10 Religion and Political Culture in Kano secularity did not develop significantly until the twentieth century.’® The idea of separation of church and state was more evident in the multinational centralized empires prior to the rise of empires based on universalistic religions.’ The modern concept of secularism developed in Europe as structural differentiation began to occur, primarily in the Protestant countries after the Reformation.”°

The direct influence of religion on politics varies partly with the degree of differentiation in society. In highly differentiated societies, religious actors may or may not participate in the political sector.2* In a pre-differentiated society the political actors and the religious actors may be one and the same. This study will be less concerned with the direct involvement of religious personnel in political life than with their indirect influence on political values and forms

of organization. Transferences of values from the religious sphere to the political sphere and the extent to which the particular dimensions of political culture are affected by religious values, beliefs, and actions will be assessed. This study is also concerned with theocracy. This type of political system posits a transcendental source as the repository of political values. The term “political religion” refers to the transfer of the sacred qualities associated with religious collectivities and the incorporation of ritual, sacred objects, procedures of excommunication, value orientations, and charismatic authority pat-

terns into the political sphere.?* |

18 See Max Weber, The Sociology of Religion (Boston: Beacon Press, 1964), p. 233; Malcolm H. Kerr, Islamic Reform (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1966).

19 See S. N. Eisenstadt, “Religious Organizations and Political Process in Centralized Empires,” Journal of Astan Studies 21, no. 3 (May 1962): 271-94, especially 272, 273, 278. Eisenstadt notes that in the case of Islam, the religious and political structures are formally

undifferentiated. |

20 For a discussion of the history of the concept of secularism, see Niyazi Berkes, The Development of Secularism in Turkey (Montreal: McGill University Press, 1964), pp. 6-7. 21 According to Gabriel Almond and James S, Coleman, “only when a religious group makes claims upon the political system through religious authorities, or through specialized

structures such as religious interest groups, religious political parties, or a religious press, | do the intermittent political actions of the clergy, or the regular action of the specialized religio-political structures become part of the political system” (The Politics of the Developing Areas [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960], p. 9). 22 For a discussion of theocracy, see David Apter, The Politics of Modernization (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965): “In theocracies, leadership is shared through a priesthood. Many forms of leadership are therefore possible. ... [The leaders] are repre-

sentatives of the diety. Their authority derives from [this] quality, even if they are selected by the public at large. For the members of theocracies there is no sharp distinction

between the natural universe and the state, the living and the dead, or the real state and the transcendent state, that is, between the kingdom of man and the kingdom of God”

Introduction 11 Yet the degree of structural differentiation in society between the religious and political sectors is not necessarily a guide to the religious basis of authority and community within the polity. In some states a structural linkage between church and state has remained long after religion ceased to be the basis of authority and community. In other states there has been structural differentiation, but religion continues to be a definitional element in community membership. In still other states there is an official state religion that is apparently intended to indicate the source of values (as distinct from identities) within the state.

The relationship of religion to the two selected dimensions of political culture—authority and community—is fundamental. The concept of charismatic authority is etymologically derived from religious phenomena;”* Bellah suggests that “any existent system of authority is based to some extent on charisma (another word for the sacred power mentioned as one aspect of ultimate control) of a more or less routinized form.” ** Even bureaucratic authority: may entail a direct or symbiotic relationship with the explicitly religious elements in society. Thus Weber discusses the rejection of irrational religion by the bureaucratic classes, yet stresses their “recognition of the usefulness of this type of religion as a device for controlling people.” > The religious patterns of ruling elites are frequently different from those of the masses, yet mass-elite integration may be achieved to some extent through the manipulation of common religious symbols. Conversely, religion may be used by a ruling class to explain class differences. According to Shibutani and Kwan, “whenever conspicuous differences of rank lead to embarrassing questions, ideologies emerge to explain the gradation. One of the most effective ways of justifying the status quo is by religion.” 7° There is a considerable body of literature on religious protest and authority. The “disinherited” have frequently been attracted to certain types of religious movements, especially messianic cults.?”

Religion may be related to concepts of community formation in two ways (p. 286). For a discussion of political religion, see Apter, “Political Religion in the New Nations,” in Geertz, Old Societies and New States, pp. 57-104; see also Apter, Politics of Modernization, pp. 180-81, 267, 291-95, 305-6, 322-23, 413-14. Apter draws on J. L. Talmon, Political Messianism (London, Secker and Warburg 1960), for many of these concepts.

23 See A. R. Willner and D. Willner, “The Rise and Role of Charismatic Leaders,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Soctal Science 358 (March 1965): 77. 24 “Religious Systems,” p. 228. 25 Sociology of Religion, p. 89. 26 Ethnic Stratification, p. 241.

27 See, for example, Vittorio Lanternari, The Religion of the Oppressed: A Study of Modern Messianic Cults (New York: Knopf, 1960).

12 Religion and Political Culture in Kano that are relevant to this study (apart from ethnic situations in which religion may be coterminous with community): the establishment of urban-rural linkages and interurban linkages, and the reinforcement of nationalism.

With regard to urban integration, the migration of diverse persons from rural areas to urban areas presents special problems of community formation. Religious organization has often been developed or utilized to accommodate the scale-expanding process which urbanization represents. Weber suggests that Christianity developed in Europe as an urban religion: “it was the city which, in earlier times, was regarded as the site of piety. Actually, early Chris-

tianity was an urban religion. ... In the Middle Ages too, fidelity to the church, as well as sectarian movements in religion, characteristically developed

in the cities. It is highly unlikely that an organized congregational religion, such as early Christianity became, could have developed as it did apart from the community life of the city.” Weber further suggests that this phenomenon may have developed in response to the need for a network of social cohesion larger than the family unit: “the congregational type of religion has been intimately connected with the urban middle classes of both the upper and lower levels. This was a natural consequence of the relative recession in the importance of blood groupings, particularly of the clan within the occidental city.” 7°

With regard to interurban linkage, it is clear that urban centers are nodes in a larger system of interactions. Transportation and communication patterns exist between cities, and ideas and information are exchanged between cities. Strangers and migrants reside in cities. This produces pressure for a universalistic form of religion in urban centers, as distinct from a particularistic form.

Where interurban trade is important, religion may be used in establishing trust or confidence between trading partners and may facilitate interurban marriages which are frequently used to consolidate business relations. In the above processes, community integration may occur within the urban site as well as between urban sites. With regard to nationalistic community formation, religion may be influen-

tial in three ways: by forming the basis of separatism, by forming the basis of merger, and by consolidating a nationalist movement not involving merger or separatism. Separatist movements are seldom purely religious, although religion may be a surrogate factor for other types of cultural or economic grievances. In situations where a universalist religion does not recognize the legitimacy of religious pluralism, a separatist movement may develop. Mergers,

by contrast, may result either through the positive or negative influence of 28 Sociology of Religion, pp. 84, 96.

Introduction 13 religion. In some nations, religion has been a force that has helped link geographical areas. In other situations, it has been the absence of religion or the secularization of political institutions that has allowed for merger.”® The relationship of religion to nationalist movements is usually complex and

is affected to a large measure by the degree of secularization in a society at the time. Emerson and Kohn have suggested that “the rise of nationalism . . «1s likely to be preceded by a revival and reformulation of basic religious principles and outlooks.” Emerson also calls attention to “the appearance of religious sects of protest and politico-religious movements of a messianic variety

where the time is not yet ripe for full-blown nationalism, or where political activity is barred by the colonial authorities.” 9° In the case of the Islamic world,

there have been frequent attempts to link nationalist movements with an Islamic ideology. In several cases, nation-states have emerged that have represented particular orientations or sects within Islam. Similarly, after the Refor-

mation in Europe, nation-states emerged that were clearly associated with particular orientations within Christianity. In any study of the relationship of religion to political culture, it is necessary to identify those in society who have explicitly religious roles. Even in relatively diffuse societies, at an early stage a class of persons tends to develop that undertakes primary responsibility for managing the organization and ritual of religion. In the particularistic as well as universalistic religions, elements of a clerical class (imams, shamans, priests, rabbis, ministers) usually exist, whether officially recognized as such or not. In some cases a clerical class will act as an

intermediary between a ruling class and the common people. This intermediary function is strengthened if differentiation has occurred between religious and political functions, that is, if political leaders have residual religious authority and if religious leaders have residual political authority. Of central importance to the assessment of political culture, however, are the patterns of relations within the religious sector. Simmel writes, “the relationship between

believers and priests involves representation and leadership, control and cooperation, veneration and provision of material sustenance.” ** It is precisely such patterns which may, in varying degrees, influence comparable patterns within the political sector.

Several hypotheses may be suggested at this point. First, a belief system 29 Simmel suggests that the union of Scotland and England in 1707 required such secularization: “Only the separation of Church and State made the amalgamation of political interests between the two countries possible; otherwise the ecclesiastical interests would not have tolerated it” (Conflict and the Web of Group Affiliations, pp. 159-60). 30 Rupert Emerson, From Empire to Nation (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,

1960), pp. 159-60. | 31 Conflict and the Web of Group Affiliations, pp. 161-62.

14 Religion and Political Culture in Kano must have at least three characteristics if it is to survive and facilitate interethnic community formation: a credible universality, some internal justification for adaptation to new circumstances, and some criteria for identifying those persons qualified to render value decisions. Second, the processes of inter-

ethnic community formation may be facilitated by example, if a major nonpolitical group in society (for example, a religious group) integrates its authority structures. Third, the occupational category of cleric, with its primary function of teaching and providing access to ultimate values, has a role in the process of political-culture formation that is inherently more salient than those of other major occupations (farmers, craftsmen, traders, or administrators). THE KANO CASE STUDY

The selection of Kano State (formerly Province) as a case-study unit is partly

due to the importance of Kano City as an urban center in West Africa and partly due to the religio-political significance of Kano Emirate. Kano Province

was a major component in the former Northern Region system, and as one of the twelve new states of Nigeria (the only one with a homogeneous HausaFulani population) Kano may be influential in the future course of national integration. During the period of the postindependence Nigerian civilian regime (1960-1966), Kano reflected many of the problems of the federation as

a whole: establishing a broadly acceptable central authority; handling succession and deposition crises; balancing ethnic, urban, regional, and national loyalties; judging the appropriate limits of dissent. During this period Kano served as the predominant center of political reformism and social change in the north.

Kano also has become perhaps the major center of Islamic learning and reformism in Nigeria. Islam has been the basis of transethnic political communities in northern Nigeria and the Western-Central Sudan for several centuries. The Sokoto Empire, for example, was preserved by the colonial policy of indirect rule in northern Nigeria and formed the basis for much of the Northern Region. The Kano case study may provide some insight into traditional political culture in the Muslim areas of northern Nigeria. It may also indicate the manner in which political culture itself is modified over time, under the impact of socioeconomic change and urbanization, and how such

_ modification relates to the larger processes of national integration. At this point, four aspects of the socioeconomic structure in Kano will be examined: urbanization, ethnicity, class, and connectivity. Kano State is situated in the central part of northern Nigeria and is bordered

by Bornu on the northeast, Bauchi on the southeast, Zaria on the southwest, and Katsina on the west. To the north, a common frontier exists with Niger

Introduction 15

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that is, about 4.9 million persons. Three other emirates—Kazaure, Gumel,

Hadejia—constituted the remainder. | Kano City has been the predominant urban site in the Western-Central Sudan since the early nineteenth century.** Within Hausaland, Katsina City, a rival

to Kano in size and importance until the early nineteenth century diminished | 82 “The Kano urban area (city and township) has a permanent population of 89,000, swelled by an estimated 25,000 during the harvest season, and by an additional daytime increment at that period of another 25,000. In all the Sudan only Khartoum-Omdurman, at the confluence of the White and Blue Nile, has more people. In the Western Sudan the District of Dakar, with about 50,000 people, is the only other urban area with a population of more than 20,000, and there are few of more than 10,000” (D. Whittlesey, “Kano: A Sudanese Metropolis,” Geographical Review 27, no. 2 [April 1937]: 177); see also Murray Last, The Sokoto Caliphate (London: Longmans, Green, 1967).

16 Religion and Political Culture in Kano

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18 Religion and Political Culture in Kano considerably after the Jihad and the establishment of the Hausa successor state in Maradi.** Sokoto, which was founded at the time of the Fulani Jihad, has

never been large. With the establishment of colonial rule in 1902-3, Kano was not only the largest city in northern Nigeria but increased in size at a higher rate than any other urban center. By the time of the 1952 census, Kano

was almost three times larger than any other northern city. Between 1952 and 1962, migration into Kano increased to the point where the urban area nearly doubled in population. By 1963-64 the Kano urban area had an estimated

population of 260,687 and a population density of 40,000 per square mile,** the |

| highest in Africa south of the Sahara. During the latter part of the colonial era, there were three distinct districts

within the Kano urban area (see Map 2). These included (1) Kano City (165,455), the traditional walled city, which was predominantly Muslim HausaFulani; (2) Waje (83,584)—the “new town”—which consisted of Fagge, origi-

nally a camping site for Niger caravans in the nineteenth century but later a modern Hausa district and commercial center, Sabon Gari (consisting mainly of Ibo and Yoruba immigrants and including a large market), and Tudun Wada and Gwagwarwa, both recently settled areas of northern (Muslim) immigrants; (3) Township (9,246), formerly the Government Residential Area and later populated by Nigerian civil servants and expatriate commercial residents.

The mean annual rates of growth from 1958 to 1962 for the sectoral components in the Kano urban area were as follows: Kano City, 11.5 percent; Fagge, 14.5 percent; Sabon Gari, 5.6 percent; Tudun Wada, 28.9 percent; Gwagwarwa, 33.0 percent; Township, 11.5 percent. The areas of highest growth 83 See M. G. Smith, “A Hausa Kingdom: Maradi Under Dan Baskore, 1854-75,” in West African Kingdoms in the Nineteenth Century, ed. Daryll Forde and P. M. Kaberry (London; Oxford University Press, 1967), pp. 93-122. 84 Of the urban centers in northern Nigeria from 1911 to 1921 with populations over 20,000, the following percentages of population increase or decrease were recorded: Kano, 26.8 increase; Ilorin, 6.4 increase; Bida, 20.4 increase; Zaria, 14.7 decrease; Sokoto, 10.8

decrease (C. K. Meek, The Northern Tribes of Nigeria [London: Oxford University Press, 1925], 2:169-262, especially 179). In 1952 urban centers in northern Nigeria with populations over 30,000 included the following: (1) Kano, 130,173; (2) Yelwa, 54,636; (3) Zaria, 53,974; (4) Katsina, 52,672; (5) Sokoto, 47,643; (6) Ilorin, 40,994; (7) Gusau,

| 40,202; (8) Kaduna, 38,794; (9) Jos, 38,527; (10) Okene, 32,602 (Northern Nigeria Statistical Yearbook, 1964 [Kaduna: Government Printer, 1965], p. 17). For the Kano | urban area the 1952 figure of 130,000 and the 1961 figure of 250,000 are used in Gavan McDonell, “The Dynamics of Geographic Change: The Case of Kano,” Annals of the Association of American Geographers 54, no. 3 (Sept. 1964): 358. Unless otherwise noted, Kano urban data sources are drawn from B. A. W. Trevallion, Metropolitan Kano: Report on the Twenty-Year Development Plan, 1963-1983 (Glasgow: Greater Kano Planning Authority, 1966); for population densities see p. 10.

Introduction 19 were Tudun Wada and Gwagwarwa, both essentially northern Muslim communities; but the rate for Kano City (11.5 percent) is extremely high when weighted for population base. The Sabon Gari community grew at the lowest rate in this period. Northern Muslim migrants expanded the urbanization figures rather than southern Christians. Much of this northern Muslim increase was drawn from rural areas within Kano Province, but part of it represented immigration from other northern provinces. In short, Kano has evidenced an extremely high rate of urban migration in the twentieth century. On the basis of census figures over a fifty-year period (1911-62), the Kano urban area has increased in size by 650 percent. Furthermore, this increase was from a significant starting point, for Kano City was clearly the largest urban center in Sudanic West Africa in the nineteenth century. Within Kano City there are administrative areas, or wards, each of which has a clear social base. In the nineteenth century, Kano City was not formally subdivided into wards, although there were sections of the town that consisted of particular ethnic, clan, or occupational groups. At the turn of the century there were ten sections in Kano City: Zango, Gwauron Dama, Madabo, Chediya, Jingau, Sheshe, Darma, Makama, Shetima, and Chigari. Within these broad sections were subsections with distinctive characteristics (which, to a large extent, became the wards of the twentieth century). Thus the Madabo area included Hausa clans and groups such as the Zaitawa, Dukurawa, and Sankawa which had migrated to Kano before the Jihad from “Wangara.” Chediya included the important Hausa area of Bakin Ruwa, a triangle stretching west from the market toward Gwauron Dutse and containing descendants of some of the original peoples of Kano. Chediya also contained most of the Arab quarter, and especially those Arabs who had left Katsina for Kano after the Fulani Jihad. Sheshe was identified with a pre-Jihad migrant group from Birnin Shem, reputedly of Arab origin. Darma included several of the Fulani clans (such as Kurawa and Yolawa) as well as the Sharifai area containing the descendants of the North African al-Maghili. This area also contained migrant groups of Nupe (Nufawa section) and Tuareg (Agadasawa section).

The areas of Makama, Shetima, and Chigari were principally the Fulani quarters. 85 See R. Mansell Prothero, Migrant Labour from Sokoto Province, Northern Nigeria (Kaduna: Government Printer, n.d.); M. B. Cleave, “The Changing Frontiers of Settlement in the Uplands of Northern Nigeria,” Nigerian Geographical Journal 8, no. 2 (December 1965); M. J. Mortimore and J. Wilson, Land and People in the Kano CloseSettled Zone, Occasional Paper no. 1 (Zaria: Ahmadu Bello University, Department of Geography, 1965); M. J. Campbell and J. Wilson, eds., Report on the Conference on Problems of Urbanization in Northern Nigeria (Zaria: Gaskiya Corporation, 1962).

20 Religion and Political Culture in Kano In the course of the twentieth century, the ten sections were subdivided into

126 wards. These wards constitute four districts (fuskok:): South (Kudu), East (Gabas), North (Arewa), and West (Yamma). Within these four districts, the Hausa ethnic groups are primarily settled in the West and North, and the Fulani groups in the South. Thus, Kano South (52,098) is the main area of Fulani clan settlement (with the exception of the Dambazawa who are in Kano East) and is the seat of emirate government. Kano East (40,596) is the location of the central market and is inhabited by laborers and traders; Kano North (32,060), while containing some of the oldest Hausa areas (such as Madabo and Dala), is characterized by fields formerly used for cattle grazing. Much of this unoccupied land was:given by Kano emirs to the new class of Hausa businessmen in the past fifty years. Kano West (40,383), a center of the original Hausa settlement (especially the Bakin Ruwa area) is inhabited by craftsmen and traders. (See Map 3.)

7 (With District Noted: North, South, East, West)

1. Adakawa(N) 43. Gwammaja (N) 85. Manladan (W) 2. Agadasawa (E) 44. Gwangwazo (S) 86. Mararraba (W)

3. Aikawa (N) 45. Gyaranya (W) 87. Marmara (S) 4. Akwa (W) 46. Hausawa (W) 88. Masakar Kuda (N) 5. Alfindiki (S) 47. Indabawa (S) 89. Masukwani (E) 6. Alkantara (E) 48. Jingau (W) 90. Mazan Kwari (E) 7. Arzai (N) 49. Jujin ’Yanlambu (EF) g1. Rijiya Biyu (N)

8. Ayagi (W) 50. Juma (N) 92. Rijiya Hudu (W) 11. Cedi (E) 53. Kabuwaya (N) 95. Sagagi (S) 9. Bakin Ruwa (W) 51. Kabara (S) 93. Rimin Kira (S) 10. Bakin Zuwo (E) 52. Kabawa (N) 94. Sabon Sara (W)

12. Cediya (N) 54. Kaigama (W) 96. Sanka (W) 13. Cediyar Fero (E) 55. Kangiwa (N) 97. Sarari (N)

14. Cediyar Kuda (E) 56. Kankarofi (S) 98. Satatima (E) 15. Chiranci (W) 57. Kantudu (N) 99. Sharfadi (E) 16. Chiromawa (E) 58. Kofar Kabuga (W) roo. Sharifai (E) 17. Daganda (E) 59. Kofar Mata (S) 1o1. Shatsari (N) 18. Dala (N) 60. Kofar Mazugal (N) 102. Sheshe (S) 19. Dambazau (E) 61. Kofar Nasarawa (S) 103. Shirawa (N) 20. Dandago (W) 62. Kofar Wambai (E) 104. Soron Dinki (S) 21. Dandali (N) 63. Koki (E) 105. Sudawa (W) 22. Daneji (S) 64. Kududdufawa (E) 106. Takalmawa (E) 23. Darma (E) 65. Kurawa (S) 107. Tudun Makera (N) 24. Daurawa (N) 66. Kurmawa (S) 108. Tudun Nufawa (E)

25. Dausayi (W) 67. Kurna (E) 109. Tudun Wada (E) 26. Diso (W) 68. Kwalwa (E) 110. Tudun Wazirci (S)

27. Dogarai (S) 69. Kwarin Mabuga (E) 111. Unguwar Gini (S) 28. Dogon Nama (W) 70. Lallakin Lemo (E) 112. Uwariyo (N)

29. Dorayi (S) “1. Limanci (N) 113. Warure (W)

30. Dukawa (E) 42. Lokon Makera (W) 114. Wudilawa (S)

31. Dukurawa (N) 73. Madabo (N) 115. Yakasai (S)

32. Durumin Arbabi (E) 74. Madigawa (W) 116. Yalwa (W) 33. Durumin Daje (N) 75, Mandunguru (W) 117. "Yan Awaki (E) 34. Durumin Iya (S) 76. Magashi (W) 118. ’Yandoya (E) 35. Durumin Zungura (S) 47, Magoga (W) 11g. "Yan Muruci (E)

36. Gabari (E) _ 78. Mai Aduwa (W) 120. "Yan Tandu (N) 37. Galadanci (W) 79. Makafi: (N) 121. "Yarkasuwa (W) 38. Gangamau (N) 80. Makafin Kofar Wambai (E) 122. Yola (E) 39. Garangamawa (W) 81. Makwalla (N) 123. Zage (S)

40. Garke (N) 82. Makwarari (E) 124. Zaitawa (E)

41. Gidan Sarki (S) 83. Mallam Ganari (E) 125. Zango (S)

42. Gwale (W) 84. Mandawarn (W) 126. Zangon Barebari (E)

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156 Religion and Political Culture in Kano Qadiriyya, both the authority structures and the community membership overlap several of the branches. Since about 1958 Nasiru Kabara has been considered the leader of all branches of Qadiriyya in Kano. The lines of authority within the leadership structure, however, may be viewed in terms of both the individuals whose authority extends over several branches and the particular patterns within each branch. - |

Nasiru Kabara received his original authority in Kuntiyya and Ahl al-Bayt from Ibrahim na Kabara, who was the dominant figure linking nineteenthand twentieth-century Qadiriyya in Kano.’® Ibrahim (ca. 1867-1941) was Fulani and his grandfather was originally from Katsina. He learned a wide range of subjects from his father: law, theology, literature, logic, and grammar. He learned astrology from Mahmud Kabara; law (the Mukhtasar) from the babban mallami, Abdurrahman al-Sayudi; and sufism (especially Qadiriyya) from his father and from Ibrahim of Zaria, who had come to Kano. By the age of thirty, he had become a legal adviser to Emir Aliyu. He was offered the position of alkali but refused on the conviction that mallams should not be involved in government. He did not travel outside Kano and continued his position as legal adviser under emirs Abbas, Usman, and Abdullahi Bayero. He was also the personal mallam of Emir Usman. Ibrahim did not write books, although he did possess his own written commentaries on the Mukhtasar.™ His home in Kabara ward was a center of higher learning in Hausaland. One section of his compound was set aside for studies of theology and mysticism,’®

and another section was set aside for studying law. He was not an ardent proponent of solitude (khalwa). Although there were other leaders of traditional Qadiriyya in Kano during this period,’® Ibrahim’s authority was reinforced by his personal qualities of piety and knowledge and by his effectiveness as a teacher of mallams. He was not succeeded in this authority by his son but by his student Nasiru Kabara, who exhibited these same qualities.” Nasiru Kabara was “given” to Ibrahim na Kabara as a child and grew up in his household. As a Fulani, Nasiru has had access to the Traditional Qadiriyya 16 Ibrahim na Kabara was the son of Ahmadu, who was the son of A?isha, who was the daughter of Muhammad Kabara. Nasiru Kabara is indirectly related to Ibrahim na Kabara, since Nasiru is the son of Mukhtar, who was the son of Nasiru Addini, who was

the son of Mai Zaure, who was the son of Muhammad Kabaraa 17 Nasiru Kabara reports that as a young student he drank the ink washed. from slates on which these commentaries were written. Although the commentaries: no longer exist,

Nasiru‘is regarded as having obtained “blessing” by the act. = Sb

Jihad books on sufism. ! :

18 The principal sufi book taught was al-Hikam by Ibn al-Tha’ila. Also taught were the

19 For example, Ahmadu, father of Ibrahim; Abubakar Chiroma; and Faruk. 20 Ibrahim had three children, two daughters and one son. The son, Muhammad Inuwa,

was a disciple but not a mallam, — | , 2

Qadiriyya, Mahdiyya, and Usmaniyya 157 mallams in Kano. Through his abilities as a scholar and teacher, he became the

likely heir to Ibrahim na Kabara.”* |

During the period from 1935 to 1955, Nasiru was successful in establishing direct contact with the primary sources of Qadiriyya authority in Khartoum,

Timbuktu, and Baghdad; and thus he became increasingly independent of Traditional Qadiriyya lines of authority. His trip to Baghdad in 1953 was a turning point in his career. It established his authority directly within the international headquarters of Qadiriyya; while in Baghdad he studied classical

and modern aspects of Qadiriyya, and subsequently he introduced or interpreted much of this material for a Nigerian audience;** his sole traveling companion to Baghdad was the wealthy merchant, Sanusi Dantata.”* As a result of the trip, Nasiru secured the financial support for his campaign to reform Qadiriyya and extend it to a mass level.

Upon his return from Baghdad, Nasiru opened his own Qadiriyya mosque and declined to attend the mosque of Muhammad Sidi. By 1956 most of the leadership and laity had aligned with Nasiru and a rapprochement was reached with Muhammad Sidi. During this period Nasiru traveled throughout northern Nigeria opening mosques and appointing muqaddams. He also nurtured his contacts in the Arab world, returning twice to Baghdad and visiting Khartoum, Cairo, Beirut, Damascus, Tehran, and Amman. In 1958 he was appointed headmaster of Shahuci Judicial School and Library in Kano. In 1961 he opened

his own Islamiyya Senior Primary School in Gwale ward and has continued teaching advanced subjects in his own home. In 1949 Nasiru was appointed to the emir’s Council of Advisers by Abdullahi Bayero. When Muhammad Sanusi became emir in 1954, however, Nasiru was

replaced on the council by Reformed Tijani mallams. During the reign of Sanusi, Nasiru served as a legal consultant to the Northern Muslim Court of Appeal and continued as one of the two tafsir readers in the palace.** With the appointment of Ado Bayero as emir in 1963, Nasiru again became an adviser

to the emir. Since 1963 he has been a member of the Kaduna Council of 21 For further discussion of Nasiru Kabara, see Muhammad Uba Adamu, “Some Notes on the Influence of North African Traders in Kano,” Kano Studies 1, no. 4 (1968): 43-49.

22For example, Nasiru brought back from Baghdad certain ritual variations such as the amfasu (anfas), a zikiri which consists entirely of heavy breathing. 23 Sanusi Dantata is the senior son of Alhassan Dantata. This was a major link for

Nasiru Kabara with the wealthy Hausa merchant class in Kano. The Dantata family itself was split in its brotherhood affiliation: Mahmud, the brother of Sanusi, had married the daughter of Ibrahim Niass. 24 Tafsir, the rendering of the Qur’an into Hausa, is done primarily during the month of Ramadan. Loudspeakers are set up inside the palace, and an average of 20,000 people gather nightly for the three-hour sessions. The second tafsir reader in the palace, by tradition, has been a Reformed Tijani (see chapter 7).

158 Religion and Political Culture in Kano Mallams and has been on numerous local and regional committees, ranging from the Kano Native Authority Committee on Prostitution to the Northern Nigerian Special Committee on Education’ in Kano Province. Despite his involvement as a government mallam, Nasiru Kabara has maintained a base of authority independent of the administrative structures in Kano and northern Nigeria. He has been largely responsible for making Qadiriyya acceptable to the common man, both Fulani and Hausa, and has been an im-

portant intermediary between the Fulani ruling class and the Hausa commoner. He has translated the theology and mysticism of Qadiriyya into the Hausa idiom. He has also been a primary force of resistance to Reformed Tijani evangelism in Kano, largely by instituting the same kinds of reforms. In fact, the administrative and doctrinal functions of the Reformed Qadiriyya

leaders have been similar to those in Reformed Tijaniyya. In addition to the functions of initiation, training, and intermediation, the leadership in Kano has responsibility for financing and organizing the various activities of the brotherhood and for communicating with all segments of the brotherhood, local and national. In the transformation of the brotherhood from an elite to a mass organization, a major leadership function has been the inspiration and administration of ritual.

Most of the Reformed Qadiriyya members do wuridi in groups led by an

imam. The exact nature of the wuridi varies with the subgroup within Qadiriyya.”” The total time expended in each group would be about thirty minutes per day. Some Qadiriyya (Salamiyya) imams also lead bandiri sessions 25 One of the standard Qadiriyya wuridis in Kano consists of the following (in Arabic): (1) After each of the five daily prayers: repeat 200 times, “God sufficeth me; he is the ultimate in dependability”; repeat 200 times, “I seek forgiveness from God”; repeat 100 times, “There is no god but God”; repeat 100 times, “Oh God, bless our lord Muhammad and the companions of Muhammad and give them peace.” (2) After the morning (asuba) and evening (maghrib) prayers (added to the above): repeat 3 times, “Oh God, accept

the soul of the intercessor of both men and jinn, our leader ‘Abd al-Qadir, and our shaykhs from his time until the present”; repeat 7 times, “There is no god but you, and may you be glorified; I am a transgressor”; repeat 7 times, “Oh God, I pray for leniency from your moral law”; repeat 7 times, “God, the one, the unique, the ever present, the

beneficent, breathe on me a wind of fortune that will make me independent from all others except yourself, for you are capable of everything”; repeat 24 times, “Oh God, bless me now and forever.” There are two additional, but voluntary, prayers that may be added to the above. The walaha (duha) is done between 8:30 a.m. and 10:00 a.M. After first rak‘a repeat the first chapter of the Qur’an (sura fatiha) and another chapter of the

Qur’an (sura washshamsi waduhaha), After the second rak‘a repeat 10 times the first chapter of the Qur’an and another chapter of the Qur’an, after which repeat the following: “He who illuminates, he who inspires, illuminate my heart with the light of your knowl-

edge; open for me the gates of your mercy and spread before me the treasures of your mercy. Do what you will.”

Oadiriyya, Mahdtyya, and Usmaniyya 159 about twice a week in the evenings.” During these group prayer sessions the leader-follower nexus is strongly reinforced, partly by the traditional relationship of an imam to those who “pray behind.”

Reformed Qadiriyya has placed a special emphasis on group celebration of the founder’s birthday (Mauludin Abdulkadir) 2" This ceremony is specifically

identified with Reformed Qadiriyya and was initiated in Kano by Nasiru Kabara in about 1959. It serves as a yearly meeting for brotherhood leaders and members from throughout northern Nigeria. Delegations from each of the major northern cities congregate in Kano for a full day of prayers and activities. The central feature of the day is a group procession, arranged by area delegations, from the home of Nasiru Kabara in the Jarkasa area of Kabara

ward to the Kano Qadiriyya burial ground west of Kano City, where prayers are said over the graves of Kano Qadiriyya saints.?8 The procession also serves as the only time in the year when men, women, and children all participate in

the same worship service. The order of procession indicates roughly the | hierarchy of authority within the Qadiriyya elite; there is an inner core of muqaddams who accompany Nasiru Kabara during this period. Many people in Kano believe that the Reformed Qadiriyya procession was initiated as a response to similar innovations by the Reformed Tijani; but many aspects of

the procession, including the use of flags and uniforms, are also distinctly parallel to the political processions of the two major political parties before they were banned in 1966.7"

From the patterns of authority and community within Qadiriyya in Kano several points may be summarized: (1) Association with Qadiriyya in the nineteenth century was limited to Fulani mallams and administrators (who derived their authority from the leaders of the Fulani Jihad) and to North African Arabs (who did not integrate themselves religiously into the Kano 26In Kano the Salamiyya sessions are arranged by the individual muqaddams. In 1964-65, however, the major sessions were held on Monday and Thursday evenings, from about 7:30 P.M. to 10:30 P.M. (or later).

Kabara. 27 The author was permitted to observe this ceremony in July 1964, July 1965, and June 1970 and estimates that about 15,000 persons participated each year. The procession

left the home of Nasiru Kabara at about 8:00 4.M., arrived at the burial ground by

10:00 a.M., and left the burial ground (still in procession) around noon. 28 Such prayers are believed by some to have a curative effect on physical ills as well as to bestow spiritual bessing. Earth from the graves is often rubbed in patterns on the faces of women and children for blessing. This practice has been discouraged by Nasiru

29 For example, during the Mauludin Abdulkadir, men angi children dress in green and white uniforms which are made specially for the occasion. Also, each ward, or town,

has a flag that is carried with its unit during the procession, and local enthusiasm is encouraged.

160 Religion and Political Culture in Kano milieu). (2) With the establishment of colonial rule, elements in the Kano Arab community reaffirmed their own spiritual links with North African sources of spiritual authority. (3) Members of the Hausa mallam class began to associate with this renewed form of North African Qadiriyya and were recruited into leadership positions within one generation. (4) Part of the success of Qadiriyya in the Hausa sector was due to an emphasis on group worship and the focusing of activities within local mosques. (5) The “legitimate” successor

to the leadership of traditional Fulani Qadiriyya in Kano (Nasiru Kabara) affliated with independent lines of Qadiriyya authority as a reinforcement of his “inherited” authority and sought to consolidate the Arab, Hausa, and Fulani sections of Qadiriyya. (6) This was accomplished partly by extending Qadiriyya from an elite base to a mass base. In this process, the support of wealthy Hausa

merchants was essential. On the mass level, Reformed Qadiriyya was also a reflection of emerging Kano nationalism which demanded that religious authority be shifted from Sokoto and North Africa to Kano itself. (7) Because of the mass base of Reformed Qadiriyya, it was no longer possible for the Qadiriyya elite to identify completely with the Kano ruling class. Thus, while brotherhood leaders might act as advisers to the ruling class, they have usually guarded their status as nongovernment mallams. (8) Perhaps as a consequence of the shift from an elite to a mass base, the brotherhood leadership became involved in two relatively new functions: the interpretation of doctrine for local

use and the inspiration, through ritual and ceremony, of group and mass

worship.

calendar. |

A summary of the sources of authority of Nasiru Kabara is contained in

Figure 9. A summary of the elite structure of Reformed Qadiriyya, with ethnic correlations, is contained in Table 8, which is in part reflected in the Qadiriyya

DOCTRINES OF AUTHORITY AND COMMUNITY IN REFORMED QADIRIYYA

Whereas Traditional Qadiriyya in Kano relied heavily on the nineteenthcentury Jihad writings as the major sources of Qadiriyya doctrine,®° the leaders 30 For translations of Jihad literature, see the following: Muhammad al-Hajj, “The Fulani Concept of Jihad: Shehu Uthman dan Fodio,” Odu 1 (1964): 45-58; E. J. Arnett, “A Hausa Chronicle,” Journal of the Royal African Society 9 (1909): 161-67; A. D. H. Bivar, “The Wathiqat ahl al-Sudan: A Manifesto of the Fulani Jihad,” Journal of African History 1, no. 2 (1960): 235-45; I. Hamet, “Cheikh Otmane ben Mohammed ben Otmane dit Ibn-Foudiou: Nour-El-Eulbab (Lumiére des Coeurs),” Revue Africaines (1897), pp.

298-320; M. Hiskett, ‘rab al-farq: A Work on the Habe Kingdoms Attributed to

Uthman dan Fodio,” Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 23, no. 3 (1960): 558-78; M. Hiskett, Tazyin al-Waraqat: A Study of the Life and Times of Abdullah Ibn Muhammad, First Emir of Gwandu (Ibadan: Ibadan University Press, 1963); M. D. W. Jeffrey, “Two Arabic Documents: Diyya as-Sultan and Tazyin al-Wara-

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162 Religion and Political Culture in Kano TABLE 8 Erunic INTEGRATION OF REFORMED Qapiriyya AUTHORITY STRUCTURE

In Kano, 1960-1965

Level and Type of Authority Elite Ethnic Identity I. Head of Nigerian Reformed Nasiru Kabara Fulani Qadiriyya

II. Representative of Qadiriyya subgroups

(a) Sa’adian Qadiriyya Muhammad Sidi Arab/Hausa

Cb) Shaziliyya Sidi Muhammad Arab/Hausa

(c) Arosiyya Ahmad b. Ali Hausa

III. Western Region, Nigeria, Ahmad Rafa’i C‘‘al-Fasalati’’) Yoruba Cllorin)

‘“Regional Representative”’

IV. Deputies (muqaddams ) 1, Yusufu Makwarari Hausa located in Kano 2. Abubakar Tudan Nufawa Hausa/Nupe Cno rank order implied) 3. Ibrahim Makwarari Hausa

, 4. Bashiru Naqib Kabara (cousin

of Nasiru Kabara) Fulani 5. Shehu Dan Lagos Arab 6. Musa b. Sa’ad (brother of Muhammad Sidi) Arab

7. Na-Adamu Jos Hausa 8. Abdurrahman Hausa

9. Sharif Ahmad Nabade Hausa/Arab | 10. Sharif Haddad Hausa 11. Tanku Tudan Nufawa Hausa 12. Khamis Dorawar Bebeje Hausa

13. Dan Yelwa, Kabara Hausa 14. Balaja Musukwani Hausa

15. Sadik Alfindiki Hausa

16. Maisahani, Bakin Zuwo Hausa

17. Nababa, Mandawari Hausa — qat,” African Studies 9, no. 2 (June 1950): 77-85; H. R. Palmer, “Western Sudan History: The Raudthat ul Afkari,’ Journal of the African Soctety 15 (1915-16): 261-73; H. R. Palmer, “An Early Fulani Conception of Islam,” Journal of the African Society 13 (1913-14): 407-14, and 14 (1914-15): 53-59, 185-92; H. F. C. Smith, “Correction,” Bulletin of News, Htstorical Society of Nigeria 6, no. 4 (March 1962): 3-4. B. G. Martin, “A Muslim Political Tract from Northern Nigeria: Muhammad Bello’s Usul al-Siyasa,” in Daniel F. McCall and Norman R. Bennett, eds., Aspects of West African Islam (Boston: African Studies Center, Boston University, 1971), pp. 63-86.

For a listing and discussion of Jihad manuscripts, see the following: A. D. H. Bivar, “Arabic Documents of Northern Nigeria,” Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African

Qadiriyya, Mahdiyya, and Usmantyya 163 of Reformed Qadiriyya have themselves been prolific writers. Like the Fulani

Jihad writers, the contemporary Qadiriyya writers are concerned to relate classical Islamic thought to local circumstances. In the interim period between

the Jihad writings and the contemporary writings, there was a dearth of Qadiriyya literature in Kano. None of the major leaders during this period— Ibrahim na Kabara, Ali Musa, Sa’ad b. Ahmad, Sharif Garba, Sidi Muhammad,

and Muhammad Sidi—wrote on Qadiriyya. The Reformed Qadiriyya movement, associated with Nasiru Kabara and Ahmad b. Ali, has not only produced its own literature but has revived an interest in the Jihad classics,** has introduced works on Qadiriyya from the Arab world,** and has inspired local Hausa “praise poets” ** to express themselves on brotherhood matters. Studies 22, no. 2 (1959): 324-49; A. D. H. Bivar and M. Hiskett, “The Arabic Literature —

of Nigeria to 1804: A Provisional Account,” Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 25, no. 1 (1962); M. Hiskett, “Material Relating to the State of Learning Among the Fulani Before Their Jihad,’ Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African

Studies 19, no. 3 (1957): 550-77; J. O. Hunwick, “A Collection of MSS Belonging ) to the Kano Native Authority,” Bulletin of News, Historical Society of Nigeria 7, no. 2 (n.d.), supplement; W. E. N. Kensdale, “Arabic Manuscripts in Northern Nigeria,” Lysbrary Record (Ibadan University) 5, no. 5 (February 1954); W. E. N. Kensdale, “The Arabic Manuscript Collection of the Library of the University College of Ibadan, Nigeria,” West African Language Association News 2, no. 2 (June 1955): 21-25; W. E. N. Kensdale, A Catalogue of Arabic Manuscripts Preserved in the University Library, Ibadan (2nd ed.; Ibadan: Ibadan University Press, 1958); Murray Last, The Sokoto Caliphate (London: Longmans, 1967); Khalil Mahmud, “The Arabic Collection of Ibadan University Library,” Libri (Copenhagen) 14, no. 2 (1964): 97-107; Vincent Monteil, “Les manuscrits historiques arabo-africains,”’ Bulletin de Institut Fondamental d’ Afrique Noire, series B, 3, no. 4 (July-October 1965): 531-42; Northern History Research Scheme, “A Short Catalogue of Arabic Texts Preserved on Microfilm at Ahmadu Bello University,” First Interim Report (Zaria, 1966), pp. 22-55; Northern History Research Scheme, Second Interim Report (Zaria, 1967); H. F. C. Smith, “A List of Books Written by the Khalifu Muhammad Bello,” Bulletin of News, Historical Society of Nigeria 3, no. 4 (1959), sup-

plement; Georges Vajda, “Contribution 4 la connaissance de la littérature arabe en Afrique occidentale,” Journal de la Société des Africantstes 20, no. 2 (1950): 229-37. 31 For example, Nasiru Kabara has edited and published a work on sufism named after and based on a work by Sultan Muhammad Bello, Al-sila al-miftahi [A key to genealogy]

(Kano: Adebola Printing Press, ca. 1965). A number of obscure works from the Jihad period are circulated in manuscript form, for example, that of an anonymous disciple of Usman dan Fodio, “Diwan al-asnad” [Collection of chains of authority], and Abdullahi Jibril b. Muhammad Bello, “Jawab al-risala al ghuribiyya” [A reply to those who oppose saints]. 32 For example, Ismai‘l b. Sayyad Muhammad Sa‘id ‘Abd al-Qadir, Al-fuyitid al-Rab-

bantya [Divine benefits], followed by Al-qasidat al-khamriya [Wine poem] (Cairo: Mustafa al-Babi al-Halabi and Sons, n.d.).

83 For example (anonymous), “Madhu Annabi Muhammad” [Praise for the Prophet Muhammad]; Ibn Badis, “Al-nafahat al-qudsiyya” [Divine breezes]; Usman, disciple of Abdulkadir, “Ya Alla kai mana gafara” [May God forgive us]; Yahaya b. Salih al-Kadiri, “Khawass al-asrar” [Special secrets]; Muhammad Dantatai, Ya tsere saa basu cimma ba [He cannot be rivaled by his friends] (Kano: n.p., n.d.).

164 Religion and Political Culture in Kano Nasiru Kabara is said to have written about 150 works in all, a figure that is comparable to the number of works by Ibrahim Niass.

The amount of systematic theology in the writings of Nasiru Kabara has been minimal; his primary purpose seems to be to relate the history and elements of the brotherhood in terms understandable to contemporary Kano society and to stimulate an identification with the saints of the brotherhood. The writings of Ahmad b. Ali cover many of these same topics. There is no specific praise of the Shaziliyya way, as distinct from Qadiriyya, and much of

the literature contains poems that are sung at worship gatherings. Another Reformed Qadiriyya leader in Kano, Adamu na Ma’aji, seems mainly concerned

with chains of authority and conditions of initiation.*4 | _ The writings of brotherhood leaders such as Nasiru Kabara and Ahmad b. Ali espouse the community and authority of Qadiriyya on two major grounds: afiliational (primarily on the basis of direct personal experience) and communal

(primarily on the basis of loyalty to the nineteenth-century Jihad tradition).

Within the category of affiliational appeal, there have been five areas of doctrinal exposition: the origins and spread of Qadiriyya, the elements and requirements of Qadiriyya, the benefits and blessings for those who follow Qadiriyya, personal praise of the Qadiriyya saints, and general preaching.

With regard to the spread of Qadiriyya, Nasiru Kabara describes in Alnafahat the Qadiriyya shaykhs in history and the distribution of Qadiriyya among the continents of the world.* In Naf‘ al-‘ibad, he discusses the Qadiriyya caliphate throughout history.** In [thaf al-khal@ig he presents the genealogy of

the founder, ‘Abd al-Qadir, and a considerable amount of biographical data. He also mentions some of the successors of ‘Abd al-Qadir in the contemporary world.*? Ahmad b. Ali presents much of this same historical material in question and answer form.*®

With regard to the requirements of Qadiriyya, Nasiru Kabara elaborates in Al-nafahat the details and the nature of the brotherhood ceremonies.®® In the Naf: al-tbdd he describes the Qadiriyya daily voluntary prayers.*° In the Ithaf 34 “Fad#il al-Qadiriya [Excellent things of the Qadiriyya]. 35 Al-nafahat al-Nasiriyya [The breezes of Nasiru] (Zaria: Gaskiya Corporation, n.d.; writing completed 1957).

88 Naf‘ al-Sbad [An aid to God’s servants] (Kano: National Authority Press, 1955),

chap. 3.

31 Téhaf al-khal@iq [A warning to all creatures] (Cairo: n.p., 1948). On p. 1 he lists some of the contemporary successors: Hayk al-Asamadani (Shaykh Muhammad Mustafa, son of Habar, in Medina); al-Arif al-Shaykh Sa’adun (son of Kaduf, living in Shingit,

that is, Mauritania); Shaykh al-Fati (of Omdurraman). : 38 1lzm al-ahbab [A declaration to the brothers]. | -

38 Chapter 8. , 40 Chapter

1. | ,

Oadiriyya, Mahdiyya, and Usmaniyya 165 al-khala@’iq he discusses the necessities and voluntary aspects of ablution, washing,

taimama (symbolic washing with dust), prayer, prostration, giving of alms, fasting, pilgrimage, and other Islamic rituals for those who follow Qadiriyya. In Da‘wat al-ghawth he elaborates on the conditions for following Qadiriyya.**

Ahmad b. Ali in various works also discusses the conditions of Qadiriyya.* With regard to the benefits of Qadiriyya, all of the above-mentioned writings refer to the personal satisfactions and blessings that accrue to those who follow Qadiriyya. Nasiru describes the “glorious benefits” for the followers of Qadiriyya*® and assures them of “the best reward.” * With regard to the praise of Qadiriyya saints, it is clear that instead of being

a perfunctory gesture it is a culmination of the past that is directed into the brotherhood experience. In Naf* al-‘tbad, Nasiru inscribes the prayer he offered while at the tomb of ‘Abd al-Qadir in Baghdad, and Ahmad b. Ali has written at least three Hausa poems in praise of ‘Abd al-Qadir.*®

The praise of a primary saint, ‘Abd al-Qadir, should not obscure the central : fact of all the reformed brotherhoods: an individual is encouraged to do addw’a (al-du‘a), that is, to pray directly to God. Nasiru exemplifies the passion and symbolism of such a prayer in the Subhat al-anwar. He uses the metaphor of the alphabet, which is significant in its reinforcement of the merits of literacy: Oh God, build for us a law and put a foundation under us. We are like letters of the alphabet, to be arranged as you wish. You mark our vowels; it is your fatha [“a” vowel mark] we pray for. But if you lay Rasra [“i” vowel mark] on us it is your will. And if you bring damma [“u” vowel mark] after it, we thank you. You are our sources of love. . . . Arrange us as you will... . Oh Joseph, do not think I am a philosopher. It is only the wave of love that weakens the eyes of Jacob. We would be like Moses in searching for Medina. . . . In my

structure, I am a lowly Kano shaykh. I used to beat bandiri when the love of God rose from me. I read the poems while beating the drum. Sometimes in the reading of the poem, I used amfas [controlled breathing]. I seek my strength in obedience. Ja Musa appeared to us in a dream, and Bar Musa, and Bar Ajasusa also appeared to us.*®

41 Da‘wat al-ghawth [The call of the spiritual leader] (Cairo: n.p., 1951); this work was reprinted later (Kano: Northern Maktabat Press, 1964). In this book Nasiru discusses the reward that a member of Qadiriyya will receive, the position of Shaykh ‘Abd al-Qadir, and conditions regarding the brotherhood. 42 See, for example, Fath al-salam [Divine revelation]; this work also includes a silsila. 43 Nasiru Kabara, Al-nafahat [Breezes], chap. 4. 44 Nasiru Kabara, Naf‘ al-ibad [An aid to God’s servants], chap. 4; Subhat al-anwar [Morning of light] (Kano: Native Authority Press, n.d.). 45 “Ya Shaykh ya Kailani” [Oh Shaykh, Oh Kailani]; “Qad bada’atu” [I have begun]; “Ciwan kirji ga mai hassada” [A chestache to him who is envious].

46 Subhat al-anwar [Morning of light], p. 50; the full prayer is to be found on pp. 72-123.

166 Religion and Political Culture in Kano Nor is it only the leaders who can pray directly to God. The following excerpt from a recent Hausa poem illustrates not only the direct approach to God but the pattern of praising the primary saint, ‘Abd al-Qadir, and the articu-

lation of the spiritual succession to authority of the current leader, Nasiru Kabara. The author of the poem is a middle-aged Hausa-Beriberi petty trader who sells suitcases and flour from a stall in Sabon Gari. The poem may be paraphrased as follows:

. . «Oh God, Oh God, Oh God, intoxicate me with the love of Shehu Abdulkadir. You endowed us surely when you sent us Shehu Abdulkadir, and you brought us before Shehu Muhammadu [Nasiru Kabara], reliable vessel of Abdulkadir. After the leader of believers, the reformer [mujaddadi]| our father

Usman servant of Abdulkadir; after our father dan Fodio had gone he left Shehu Abdulkadir’s orphans; after Shehu Abdullahi had also gone he left Shehu Abdulkadir’s orphans; after Muhammad Bello had also gone and left Shehu Abdulkadir’s orphans. ... Then, oh God, you gave us our father, Muhammadu Nasiru, the patient ox of Abdulkadir, the kind one who guides the children of Saint Abdulkadir. I testify with God that he has inherited [the children] and he has even added more in restoring [gyara] the way of Abdulkadir. . . . His life [Nasiru’s] will end with its strength serving Abdulkadir. He has written more than one hundred books on the tariqa of Shehu Abdulkadir, apart from the ones he did in our language [Hausa], one after the other in praise of Abdulkadir. We are sure that nobody surpasses him in knowledge and belief in Abdulkadir. . . . Nobody can be a rival to him because of Shehu Abdulkadir’s power [karama]; you, the jealous one, if you are doubting come and learn of Shehu Abdulkadir’s power. He [Nasiru] surpasses his enemies and he has said that his shield is Abdulkadir.*?

Finally, general preaching has always been a function of the religious authorities who try to induce conversions through individual volition. Such preaching is invariably in the vernacular language (in this case Hausa); and if it can be fashioned into poetry, it will be sung by minstrels near and far. Nasiru Kabara has been particularly successful in his general preaching.*®

The other broad approach to reinforcing community loyalty—through an 47 Ibrahim Makwarari, Begen Shehu Abdulkadir [Praising Shaykh Abdulkadir] (Kano: ; Northern Maktabat Press, 1968).

48 For example, Nasiru Kabara, Al-gqasida al-mubaraka [The blessed poem] (Kano: Adebola Printing Press, ca. 1964). Also, many of the poetic works of Nasiru have been anthologized by Alhaji Umar Trader and Alhaji Hassan na Alhaji Ali Bakin Zuwo: Diwan [Anthology] (Zaria: Gaskiya Corporation, n.d.). Also see, Nasiru Kabara, Mangumat kifayat al-Nabi [Poem of the skill of the Prophet] (Zaria: Gaskiya Corporation, 1968); and Nasiru Kabara, Mangumat l-asma‘ al-Nabi [Poem on the names of the Prophet] (Kano: Northern Maktabat Press, 1968).

Qadirtyya, Mahdiyya, and Usmaniyya 167 appeal to communal factors—has been centered on two appeals: to the memory of Usman dan Fodio, who was Qadiriyya, and to the doctrine that it is impossible to change brotherhoods. As mentioned earlier, Nasiru Kabara has identified in the Subhat al-anwar

five branches of Qadiriyya in Hausaland, one of which is Usmaniyya.*® In various other works, he refers to “Usmaniyya al-Fudawiyya”™’ and identifies himself with this branch. In the Naf al-‘tbdd he includes the prayer he read when he visited the tomb of Usman dan Fodio,* and it is clear that he regards Muhammad Bello, son of Usman, as among the founders of Usmaniyya. Nasiru writes that he hopes to visit Bello at Wurno (the assumption being that Bello

is not dead).°? While Nasiru does not include any reference to special ritual associated with Usmaniyya, it is clear that the Jihad leaders are considered to be of special importance. The continual identification of them with Qadiriyya is clearly intended to remind their descendants not to desert the “faith of their fathers.” The Hausa poem by Ibrahim Makwarari (Begen Shehu Abdulkadir)

is illustrative of the way in which Nasiru is regarded as the successor to the : Jihad leaders.

With regard to the alleged doctrinal prohibition against change of brotherhood, there has been an attack on mallams who encourage such conversion, primarily those associated with Reformed Tijaniyya. The doctrinal basis of this attack is stated by Nasiru Kabara in Al-nafahat, where he suggests that the Tijani mallams are “fabricating” if they assert that one tariga is better than

another.’ He argues for a strict prohibition against leaving the Qadiriyya brotherhood, supporting his argument with verses from the Qur’an and traditions of the Prophet. He asserts that when a person has promised to do something religious, such as follow a brotherhood, he must keep that promise. He criticizes the Tijaniyya specifically for assuming it can convert persons from

other brotherhoods, suggesting that this was not the policy of the original Tijani leaders and that the practice is a false modern innovation. | In order to reinforce this prohibition, the Reformed Qadiriyya mallams have not gone to Sokoto doctrinal sources but to Kano sources. The most significant attempt in the 1950s and 1960s to use such internal material against changing 49 The Usmaniyya mentioned here is not that propounded by the sardauna of Sokoto, to be discussed later in this chapter. 50 See Da‘wat al-ghawth [The call of the spiritual leader], p. 11. 51 Chapter 2.

52 Al-sila al-miftahi [A key to genealogy]. Most brotherhood members believe that a saint (of whatever brotherhood) does not die, but merely “hides” (ya faku). 53 Chapter 1. 54 Chapter 7.

168 Religion and Political Culture in Kano brotherhoods was a manuscript, in wide circulation among the mallam class, allegedly by Emir Aliyu of Kano. The introduction to this manuscript contained the following advice: This book concerns the behavior of our masters who are blessed in the tariqa. Also, this book includes a criticism of the introduction of innovations into the affairs of the tariqas to gain selfish benefit. Our predecessors did not intend us to introduce innovations but only to try to improve ourselves through Islamic tradition and the Qur’an and to destroy the innovations of Satan. One who is an adherent of a false tariqa practices it out of jealousy for the real tariqas. The reader should know that my intention is to present my advice to the Usmaniyya community concerning the characteristics of the faithful ones, and to serve as a guide to those who claim to have more favor, or who claim that one wali excels others in rank and position. The intention is not to imply that some other people are committing this sin but as a warning to all. . . . This book contains an introduction and three chapters. There are many brotherhoods, but there is only one that is most realistic. All those who follow this tariqa are one. . . . Yet there can be differences in belief. One called Abu al-Qasim al-Junaidi said all the brotherhoods are exalted

so long as the members emulate what the Prophet did. One called Sahal b. | Abdullahi said, “Our origins in the brotherhood were based on six things: (1) the Qur’an; (2) the traditions of the Prophet: (3) eating things recommended; _ (4) keeping away from what is forbidden; (5) abandoning sin; (6) asking God for pardon and practicing what is true.” Abu Hamza al-Baghdadi said, “One who knows the authentic tariga, God will make things easy for him.” He also said, “There is no point in adhering to a brotherhood unless one is following the Prophet in actions. . . . You should know it was the Prophet Muhammad who ranked all the messengers of God, before he was created. That is how the saints got their rank.” Shaykh al-Suhrawardi said, “It is necessary for you to get a shaykh who will guide you in a tariqa and who will train you away from evil characteristics.” The conditions of the shaykh must be that he is honest and well intentioned and be a representative of the Prophet. He should also be a follower of another shaykh with his chain of authority to the Prophet. He should also be a knowledgeable man, for an ignorant man cannot be a guide. He should not be worldly but pious. He should also be the sort of person who trains his mind and who has litttle time for food or sleep. Also he should speak only a few words, but say many prayers. He should be exemplary in good deeds and praising God. It is hard to find men like this, but I have a shaykh with these qualities. If you get a shaykh like this you should be his servant and keep his secrets. You should adhere to faithful people, as it says in Sunna. You should always remain in union with God, but if this is impossible, you should remain in the company of one who is in company of God. This man will link you to union with God. Another tradition says that a shaykh and his community are like the Prophet and his community. Anybody who likes to be well guided should first try to do all his necessary activities perfectly and try to do his required things. He should

Oadiriyya, Mahdiyya, and Usmaniyya 169 do voluntary prayers. He should avoid sins and avoid what his mind desires. Also he should try to abandon weakness,®5

Apart from the question of the authenticity of this document, several important symbols are clearly being invoked by the use of Emir Aliyu’s name. First, he is an especially significant figure to the Kano Qadiriyya, since he was the last Fulani emir before the colonial conquest, which in this case resulted in Emir Abbas being initiated into Tijaniyya. Second, he fought against Sokoto in

the Kano civil war and hence could be considered one of the first “Kano nationalists.” Yet later he tried to reestablish relations with Sokoto when confronted with the British. Third, he was a matrilineal descendant of Muhammad Bello. The arguments propounded by Aliyu are almost secondary to the symbolic impact of the apparent alignment of Aliyu himself with Qadiriyya. In the doctrines of Reformed Qadiriyya with regard to authority and community, there has been a need to balance and incorporate the traditional ele-

ments with the modern elements of the brotherhood structure. The combination , of affiliational doctrines of personal persuasion with communal doctrines of ancestral loyalties has been characteristic of the attempt to bridge this gap. AUTHORITY AND COMMUNITY IN MAHDIYYA

The Mahdiyya of Nigeria is based in Kano and is identified with the Hayatu

family of the Toronkawa clan of the Fulani. The Mahdiyya community at present is largely limited to those with some family connection with Hayatu. The rural Fulani (dororro), however, continued to revere Hayatu because he was descended from Usman dan Fodio (see Figure 10). The loyalty of the Hayatu descendants to the religious beliefs of their forefathers has come to distinguish them in certain respects as an ethno-religious group.

The Mahdiyya movement, based on the claim of Muhammad Ahmad b. Sayyid Abdullahi of the Sudan (d. 1885) to be the awaited Mahdi of Islam, is significant in Kano history for several reasons: (1) Its coincidence in time with the coming of the British in northern Nigeria was fundamental in shaping British policy toward all religious brotherhoods in northern Nigeria. (2) It was integrally connected with “Fulani nationalism” in northern Nigeria. (3)

Many of the Nigerian Mahdiyya were converted to Tijaniyya during the period 1915-25, and hence a study of Mahdiyya is a useful supplement to a 55 [Aliyu Babba b. Abdullahi (Emir of Kano)], “Rad‘ al-jahla” [A hindrance to igno-

rance]; the manuscript has been in the possession of Ahmad b. Ali, who obtained it from Muhammadu, grandson of Aliyu. Assuming authenticity, the work is of major significance. In chapter 1 the author discusses the value of hailala; in chapter 2 he discusses the position of ‘Abd al-Qadir; in chapter 3 he writes a silsila of Shehu Usman dan Fodio.

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Oadiriyya, Mahdiyya, and Usmaniyya 171 study of Tijaniyya. (4) Mahdiyya writings form an important part of the anticolonial literature of Nigeria. (5) Since 1946, the leadership of Mahdiyya in Nigeria (and the Central-Western Sudan) has resided in Kano. The Mahdiyya technically is not a sufi brotherhood, since the appearance of a Mahdi is believed to supersede all existing brotherhoods. Yet the authority

and community patterns of Mahdiyya in Nigeria are comparable in many respects to that of a traditional brotherhood, and some members refer to them- | selves as constituting a brotherhood. The actual number of Kano people involved in Mahdiyya has always been limited.

The Mahdiyya community with international headquarters in Khartoum must be distinguished from the widespread acceptance of the concept of Mahdiyya found in all brotherhoods in Kano. In both nineteenth- and twentiethcentury Kano as the end of a Muslim century approached—a.H. 1300 (A.D. 1882) and A.H. 1400 (A.D. 1979)—the anticipation of the coming of the Mahdi

has been high.°® (It was believed that the Mahdi would come at the end of a | century.) The coming of the Mahdi would signify the imminent end of the world. The exact period of time, however, between his coming and the end of the world has never been specified. The expectation of the Mahdi was evident in the writings of all the Fulani Jihad leaders. One such work by Sultan Muhammad Bello, still circulated in Kano, is representative of this belief:

If you say, has the Mahdi been born or not, God knows best. Contrary to imamship, the Mahdi is expected by all authors of hadith, with the exception of Ibn al-Hassan al-Fakhar Kari, after the year a.H. 1200 [1785]. Sufis also believe in this. It is also said he will be born in the first thirty years of the thirteenth century. When he appears he will be sixty years old; others say he will be forty. It is also said he will be born in a.H. 1233 and will appear at the age of sixty-three, or in the year a.H. 1273. Others say he will be born in a.H. 1235 and will appear at the age of sixty-five. Others say he will be born in a.H. 1236 and will appear in 1266. Others say he will appear in the year a.H. 1276, or A.H. 1288. .. . The signs of the coming of the Mahdi will be: (1) a battle will take place on the River Euphrates; (2) the fame of Sufyan will spread, his army will reach the desert; (3) there will appear a certain disease in Egypt; (4) there will be an attack of the Sudanese [blacks] against the land of Hijaz [Arabia]; (5) there will appear some people from the West against Egypt; (6) the Berbers will rise against Syria; (7) the Arabs will rise against Jordan; (8) the destruc56 For a discussion of the general expectations of Mahdiyya in the Niger-Chad Region, as well as the broader context of Sudanese Mahdiyya, see Saburi Biobaku and Muhammad al-Hajj, “The Sudanese Mahdiyya and the Niger-Chad Region,” in I. M. Lewis, ed., [slam

in Tropical Africa (London: Oxford University Press, 1966), pp. 425-41; Muhammad al-Hajj, “The Thirteenth Century in Muslim Eschatology: Mahdist Expectations in the Sokoto Caliphate,” Research Bulletin, Centre of Arabic Documentation (Ibadan) 3, no. 2 (July 1967), 100-15.

172 Religion and Political Culture in Kano tion of a certain place in Syria called Hursta will occur; (9g) there will be destruction of the mosque of Kufa; (10) there will be rising of a black and violent wind in Baghdad; (11) there will be a great war in which many people will lose their lives; (12) a voice in the middle of the night will be heard by the people during Ramadan; (13) during the month of Dhu’l-hijja there will be war, and this will not allow people to do their pilgrimage; (14) someone will appear from Kinda [Yemen] who is lame, also someone from Maghrib who is lame; (15) there will be war in most big countries; blood will appear and onethird of the people of the world will be killed; (16) there will be pure souls who will be killed and God will be angry with the killers. Then the Mahdi will come to the people. . . . All this is found in the hadith of the Prophet.57

At the time of the British conquest of northern Nigeria, there was a revival of belief that the Mahdi was about to come. Also, during the 1930s and 1940s in Kano, perhaps under the pressures of the world economic depression and the chaos of World War II, many mallams felt they were witnessing signs of the coming of the Mahdi. One example of such feeling in Kano was a book written in 1941 by a Kano Hausa trader:

There is clear evidence indicating the imminent appearance of the Mahdi. Among these proofs are the coming of the Europeans to Hausaland. Emirs have no power, but they go to Kaduna, some in cars, some on horseback. Also there is an increase in sin and rapid development of pagan towns such as Umuahia and Owerri. . . . All this is what God has already laid down, and it will occur among his servants. Those things to come will be the appearance of the Mahdi, and he will come very soon. A boy will not be obedient to his parents, and one

who is learned will not tell the truth. . . . Legal cases will not be dealt with by the Qur’an, and emirs will not go for Jihad... . Many women will go about with their heads uncovered, and they will have no husbands. . . . Sons of ‘ulama become like pagans, walking from one end of the country without any

guidance, They cut their hair like Christians... . Another proof is that trade has fallen down, and traders come back without provisions. Emirs go to Kaduna like sheep. . . . Every nationality on earth will increase in population, just like grasshoppers. The sun will appear from the West, and woe to the children of

earth. Yajuju and Majuju [Gog and Magog] will appear. They will destroy everything that comes in their way. The seas will not be enough for them and no plants will remain in any valley. Finally, the anti-Christ [Dajjal] will come. Men of Katsina, Sokoto, Kano, and Zaria will be scattered all over the world, some of them going to Agege, some to Douala, some to Fernando Poo. They

don’t pay attention to what is legal or illegal... . The Christians have prevented things from being brought into the country, hoping to destroy things. We don’t get letters from the post office. The Europeans prevent people from selling things without registration and stamp taxes. They close off all the ways whereby traders can sell things. They brought taps of water because of their fear of thirst. The Christians prevent all things. They prevent people from going 57 Muhammad Bello, “Ifadat al-ikhwan” [Information for the brothers].

Oadirityya, Mahdiyya, and Usmantyya 173 to Port Harcourt. They prevent kola nuts from being brought from the south to Hausaland. . . . Clerks and laborers have caused calamity in the country; and their senior master, Azikiwe, has called people to the work of Christians, with all his vigor. He will tell them to work hard to get more money. They don’t know that they don’t have any power under the rule of Europeans in the country. Their leader Azikiwe will say to work harder to get better pay, but the people run away from fear. They wrote to the governor in Kaduna regarding their grievances. He said to them, you will not get any reply from me, even King George will not reply to you.5®

There was widespread feeling among the Hausa mallams and traders in Kano that the Europeans were a sign of the end of the age. The disruptive consequences of two world wars, the depression, the reorientation of the entire

economy, the rise of “southern nationalism,” and the apparent relaxation of morals by the younger generation were regarded, by a generation versed in Mahdi theory, as signs that the Mahdi would come soon. The dramatic rise of

the Reformed Tijaniyya brotherhood in Kano was partly attributable to the | promise by Shaykh Tijani that the Mahdi would come from his brotherhood. The dramatic rise to Tijani leadership of Ibrahim Niass is partly attributable to his meeting certain preordained requirements of the anticipated Mahdi."®

Toward the end of the thirteenth Muslim century (av. 1882), there was widespread anticipation of the Mahdi in the Western Sudan. When “the Mahdi” did announce himself at Aba Island (in the Sudan), he was well aware

of this anticipation in West Africa and contacted a member of the Sokoto ruling family for support.®° That person was Hayatu b. Said, a grandson of 58 Ishaq, “Dala?il al-Mahdi” [Evidences of the Mahdi].

59 For example, it is believed that the father of the Mahdi will be named Abdullahi. 60 Mahdi Ibrahim Muhammad al-Mahdi b. Sa’id Abdullahi to Shaykh Hayatu b. Sa‘id, son of the Commander of the Faithful Muhammad Bello, son of Shaykh ‘Uthman b. Fodio: “Know my friends that God has conferred upon me the great caliphate, and the leader of creation informed me that I am the long-awaited redeemer, the Mahdi. He has made me sit down on his chair several times in the presence of caliphs; Aqtab and Agwath made me play with them. God helped me with angels who are messengers among prophets and saints from the time of Adam up to this time; likewise, the faithful among the jinn. At the time of war I will come together with them. The leader of my army is the messenger of God in person. He gave me the sword of victory in the presence of the Prophet, and I know that nobody will gain a victory over me as long as I am with him. ... | am writing to you because I have a high opinion of you. I inform you of a revelation in which there is no lie. I am not imagining things. Nor am I deluding myself. It is really true. The messenger of God said to me: ‘Anyone who disbelieves in your claim of Mahdi has become an infidel.’ He said this to me three times. Now my friends, if you understand what I have said, leave all that you are doing and answer someone who calls in the name of God and his messenger. Come to me as the messenger of God has commanded. This is necessary as stated by the Qur’an and Sunna. . . . Those who come, become of God. If they are tormented, God will give them accommodation. .. . If this letter reaches you, hurry and come to me” (Jos 571/S [J123], Muharram 1300 [A.p. 1882].

174 Religion and Political Culture in Kano Sultan Muhammad Bello. Due to family succession disputes in Sokoto, Hayatu had been living in Balda, near Maroua in preparation for pilgrimage to Mecca. According to Hayatu family papers, The message from the Mahdi was received [by Hayatu], who sent a letter to console the new sultan [of Sokoto] on the death of his uncle Ma’azu, and to

pay homage to the new sultan... . The sultan at first was interested in the message about the Mahdi; he was even said to have risen from his throne and declared that he [the Mahdi] was the tenth sultan. But the name of his cousin made him lose interest. So after referring to Waziri Bukhari, he declared that the Mahdi belonged to Hayatu, his cousin.®!

During the 1880s in Kano the supporters of Hayatu included Abubakar dan Suleiman Mai Jaki of Dambatta, who later moved to Maradi; Limam yar Musa from Dutse; and Alhaji Abjara from Minjibir (who migrated to the Sudan).

During the confrontations with emirate authorities, Limam yar Musa was arrested and sent to Sokoto and later exiled to Bauchi. Contemporary members

of the Mahdiyya in Kano believe that the emir of Kano, Abdullahi Maje Karofi (d. 1882), had been persuaded by Abubakar dan Suleiman of the validity

of the Mahdist claim and was on his way to Sokoto to discuss the matter with the sultan when he died at Karofi. Abubakar migrated from Dambatta to Kazaure, and then to Katsina and IIlela, with about forty men. He was killed during the confrontation with emirate authorities, and the remnants of his men fled to Dikwa. The emir of Kano, Muhammad Bello, was interested in Mahdiyya to the extent of having his scribe write a summary on the subject but was supportive of the Sokoto position.

The factors in Adamawa and Bornu that led to the exile of Said b. Hayatu and his subsequent establishment in Kano may be summarized as follows: Hayatu had come to Adamawa early in the reign of the second son of Modibbo Adama, whose name was Umaru Sanda. Hayatu was received as a grandson of Usman dan Fodio and settled in Yola. Later he moved to the Maroua area and still later settled in the town of Balda in Maroua [Marwa] Emirate (in presentday Cameroon), where he declared himself to be independent of Adamawa. Umaru Sanda did not challenge this secession, partly because of his respect for the Sokoto affiliation of Hayatu and partly because he was having trouble with other district chiefs during this period. When Sanda died, however, he was replaced by Zubairu, who was an Adamawa nationalist and who spent The correspondence between Hayatu and the Sudanese Mahdi may be found in Al-khitabat al-mutabadila bayn al-Imam al-Mahdi wal Shaykh Hayatu (Khartoum: n.p., 1962). 61 From a typescript manuscript in English prepared by the two senior sons of Sa’id b. Hayatu, Alhaji Abba and Alhaji Garba, “The Life History of Sa’idu ben Hayatu, Exiled Since 1923” (n.d.), p. 8.

Oadiriyya, Mahdiyya, and Usmaniyya 175 most of his reign trying to reassert authority over the outlying areas of Adamawa. He communicated with Sokoto and received permission to deal with Hayatu. In the war that followed, Hayatu defeated Zubairu, but Zubairu had captured and held hostage the family of Hayatu. Zubairu also burned Balda to the ground. By agreement, Zubairu returned Hayatu his family, and Hayatu left Adamawa in December 1892 to join the Mahdist military leader Rabih in Manjaffa (Bagirmi). He returned to Balda but later joined Rabih in the wars with Bornu.

Hayatu was made an imam by Rabih and was given the daughter of Rabih in marriage. The alliance between Rabih and Hayatu was short lived, for Rabih became suspicious of the “Fulani”; Hayatu was shot by Fadlallah b. Rabih. At

the same time all the sons of Hayatu were killed with the exception of the youngest, Said b. Hayatu, who is believed to have been miraculously saved from the bullet. Thus, Sa’id b. Hayatu came to inherit the position of Mahdi

leadership in the Sokoto Empire that his father had held. : | Said lived in Yola until the end of World War I when he decided to return to Sokoto. En route, he passed through Fika Emirate (Bornu Province) and was persuaded by the moi, Disa (a friend of his father), to settle in the village of Dumbulwa. About 3,000 of his father’s followers joined him. Four years later the moi of Fika died, and his successor was maneuvered into

opposition to the Fulani Mahdist group. There was also growing fear by French and British colonial officers of a revival of Mahdiyya. During World War I Zinder had been a major center of Mahdiyya, and after the war French policy there became so punitive that many of the Mahdiyya migrated to Kano.

At this same time the British in Nigeria sensed a revival of Mahdiyya in Khartoum and became worried about the remnants of Mahdiyya in northern

Nigeria. Perhaps as a result of these factors, Said b. Hayatu came under

Hayatu family papers, |

suspicion and in 1923 was exiled to Buea (British Cameroons). According to The Resident of Bornu, Mr. H. R. Palmer, came to Potiskum and asked him [Sa’id] which sect of Islam he was following. He replied that he was practising Mahdism which he inherited from his father, M. Hayatu. Palmer asked whether he had received a letter from Khartoum. He replied that he had received a letter from Sir Sayed Abdurrahman El Mahdi Pasha, the son of the Mahdi. Sa’id had informed the Emir of Fika about the letter... . Then a policeman was given an order, and he handcuffed Sa’id and put him in a car to be brought to Kano. He was thrown into a cell at the Police barracks. The treatment was so harsh that he was forced to break his fast, for it was Ramadan. . . . By the end of Muharram, 1923, he was transferred to Abinsi for eight months, and then transferred to Makurdi. . . . From there they took him to Port Harcourt, and then to Buea, British Cameroons. He was given a house and asked to report to the

176 Religion and Political Culture in Kano police monthly. In 1946 he was transferred to Kano, but under the same conditions, ®?

During the exile of Said, many of his followers came to Kano but were understandably reluctant to make known their affiliation. For example, in about 1925, one of the Mahdist leaders of Zinder, Dan Babba, came to Kano and settled in Soron Dinki ward (he later moved to Birnin Kudu). Certain of the Mahdiyya converted to Tijaniyya at this time. Those who continued to believe in Mahdiyya apparently did so privately.

In 1946 the colonial government approached the Sokoto and Bornu native

authorities regarding the possible return of Said to either of those areas. Allegedly, both sets of authorities refused. The emir of Kano, however, agreed to the return of Sa’id and offered to give him land. Sa’id established residence in Kano City (Kofar Mata ward) with most of his family. He was held in the

highest respect by the Kano mallams; and during the lifetime of Emir Abdullahi Bayero, Said visited the emir every Friday afternoon. Other remnants of Mahdiyya came to Kano at this time.

Yet, despite the advocacy of northern parliamentarians such as Ibrahim Imam, it was not until October 1959 that Sa’id was officially released from detention.™ In 1957 he had been allowed to visit Mecca, but with the stipulation

by the colonial administration that he not stop in Khartoum to visit the son of the Mahdi, Sidi Abdurrahman, who had succeeded to his father’s position of authority. By various means (mainly through his sister Maryam who was living in Sudan) Sa’id was able to spend thirteen days with Sidi Abdurrahman,

and he reestablished contact with the remnants of Mahdism in the Sudan. Said reconfirmed his allegiance to Sidi Abdurrahman and, in turn, was reconfirmed as “Caliph of the Western Sudan, to the end of all the rivers to the west.” %®

With Nigerian independence in 1960 the Premier’s Office in Kaduna offered

to build Said a house in Sokoto on the original family site. In 1963 Said became a member of the Kaduna Council of Mallams. In 1964 he visited Khartoum again. He has used his Kano residence, however, as his headquarters for Mahdiyya, assisted by his two senior sons, Alhaji Garba (formerly 62 Thid.

63 “Re it enacted by the legislature of the Northern Region of Nigeria as follows: 1. this

law may be cited as the Mallam Said (Deportation and Detention) Repeal law, 1959. 2. The Mallam Sa’id (Deportation and Detention No. 2) Ordinance of 1924 is repealed” (Northern Region Nigeria Gazette 8, no. 51 [October 8, 1959], Kaduna). 64 Sidi Abdurrahman died in 1959. He was succeeded by his son Siddik, who had been educated in England. Siddik died in 1962 and was succeeded by his brother Sayyid Imam Hadi, who was leader of international Mahdiyya until his death in 1970. 85 Interviews with Sa’id b. Hayatu, June 1965, Kano.

QOadiriyya, Mahdiyya, and Usmaniyya 177 an executive officer in Zaria Native Authority; later an executive in the Ministry of Health, Kano State) and Alhaji Abba (formerly Chief Scribe, Kano Native Authority Division Office; later storekeeper, Nicco Sweets Company, Kano).™

Because of the nature of Mahdiyya, there is no need for a mugaddam to initiate and perform special functions of worship. For this reason, the leader-

ship structure of Mahdiyya is relatively simple. Said remains leader for Nigeria and the Central-Western Sudan, assisted by his two senior sons. In the areas of Nigeria where loyalty to Hayatu has continued, there are senior mallams who have maintained direct contact with Said. Most of this support, however, is in Fulani areas that have family reasons for supporting Said. There

has been little widespread support in Kano Province for the Mahdiyya of Hayatu, perhaps due to its links with Sokoto. The authority structure of Nigerian Mahdiyya is summarized in Figure ro. Certain aspects of Mahdiyya doctrine are relevant to the themes of authority

and community. To have gained and sustained support, the basic position of | Nigerian Mahdiyya—that the Mahdi has come and that the end of the world is near—requires an elaborate system of beliefs. Yet there are no special books of doctrine used by the Mahdiyya,® except edited collections of hadith (called the Rath). In addition to the claim of having superseded all brotherhoods, the Mahdi was believed to have encompassed all four Islamic legal schools. Sa’id b. Hayatu wrote one major work that is fundamental to understanding Nigerian Mahdiyya thought in the twentieth century.®® It is addressed to the sultan of Sokoto and is basically concerned with establishing the link between Nigerian Mahdiyya and the Fulani Jihad leaders:

Our forefathers followed the Mahdi blindly, but we are following him with clarity. We shall not alter the opinions of Shaykh “Uthman on this subject. The idea of the Mahdi is well known in Islam all over the world. It has been supported by many authentic traditions of the Prophet. Also Shaykh ‘Uthman confirmed on an authentic chain of authority that there would be no other authentic reformer from him until the time of the Mahdi. From that time, my father came forward looking for him. Then he saw the truth and followed him. We found

our father in this religious state. ...In the Infaq al-maisur, Muhammadu Bello said at the battle of Yandoto, “TI will tell you what Shehu has been telling

me about the nearness of the period in which the Mahdi will appear.” When 66 Sa’id had eleven children, including: Abba Sa’id, Garba Sa’adu, Umaru Sa’adu (senior technical officer post and telegraph, Kaduna), Usman Sa’adu (Sa’id’s driver), Ali Sa?adu (tailor), Nuradeen Sa’adu (driver), Atiku Sa’adu (in school), and Abdullahi Sa’adu (in school). In 1970 Sa’id was eighty-four years old and still active. 87 Certain miscellaneous writings by Hayatu himself are extant. See, for example, Jos,

571/S (J1323), which includes a poem in Fulani by Hayatu praising the Mahdi and a prayer on wuridi. 88 Sahih al-khabr [Honest news] (Khartoum: n.p., 1957).

178 Religion and Political Culture in Kano they heard this they were delighted and put much effort into the battle, morally and financially. ‘“Uthman died in a.H. 1232, and we are now in A.H. 1358, so it

is evident that the Mahdi must have appeared by now... . Hayatu said that ‘“Uthman did not mention who would be the followers of the Mahdi, but Hayatu said that most of the followers would be from Western Sudan. He mentioned this to me in private. Umar b. Ali was sent by the Mahdi to prepare for his coming. He was telling people of this when Hayatu heard him and fol-

lowed him. . . . It is known that the waziri of Sokoto, Junaidu, in his book Dabt al-multaqatat said that when people paid allegiance to Mu‘az, Shaykh ‘Uthman was there. After his death, although people paid allegiance to the sultans of Sokoto, it was felt that they were really paying allegiance to Shaykh ‘Uthman, who returned from his grave for the occasion. After the time of Sultan Mu‘az, it was felt that ‘Uthman stopped coming back from his grave because the Mahdi had appeared by then. Shaykh Muhammad Bello said in his book Aljafr wa’l-khawaft that the Mahdi would appear fifty-seven years after the death

of “Uthman. The Shaykh died in 1232. Therefore the Mahdi appeared in 1280. ... Many miracles have appeared from Muhammad b. Abdullah, the Mahdi. Shaykh ‘Uthman had already told us some of them, such as winning the

battles against enemies. In this connection we should be satisfied for he defeated the British and Egyptian troops, and the people of his army were few. Shaykh ‘Uthman said that when the Mahdi was about to appear, a star with a tail would appear. This was seen. Then Shaykh ‘Uthman said that allegiance to

the Mahdi was necessary. ... We should follow the religion of our forefathers. ®®

In the twentieth century the major point of doctrinal clarification has been on the relationship of Mahdiyya to the Islamic brotherhoods. According to Said, Because. of the appearance of Mahdi, all sufi brotherhoods were canceled; Shaykh Muhammad Bello said in his book Kashf al-khaft min akhbar al-Mahd: that he discouraged the principle of consensus as a source of Shari’a and that people should refer to the Qur’an and the traditions of the Prophet. He also said that with the coming of the Mahdi, all sufi brotherhoods would be ineffective. This is what happened when Mahdi came. Shaykh “Uthman speaking to members of the Qadiriyya brotherhood said that when Mahdi appears, all members

of Qadiriyya brotherhood must listen to this poem to support the Mahdi... . Also ‘Umar b. Futi said in Al-rimah, chapter 43, that when Mahdi comes he would found his own tariqa, and all other tarigas would join together and be one. Anyone who remains up to that time would see this, and Shari’a would be one, and Islam would prevail.”°

This doctrinal position is supported in principle by the brotherhoods in Kano, yet they maintain that the Mahdi has not yet appeared. They would disagree 69 7bid., chap. 1. 10 [bid., chap. 8.

Qadiriyya, Mahdiyya, and Usmaniyya 179 with Sa’id on the following: “The Mahdi did not become a member of any tariqa, as Shaykh Tijani had hoped. Instead he canceled them all and founded his own heavenly one. He founded his own with direct communications with the Prophet. Because of this, Sa’id Hayatu went in search of the Mahdi, so that he might see the truth. . . .”

At the time Said published his book (1957) there was widespread confusion in northern Nigeria over the difference between Reformed Tijaniyya and the Mahdiyya, since both communities were seen to pray with arms crossed. Also, since the Battle of Burmi (1903) the colonial regime had suspected a close link between Tijaniyya and Mahdiyya. Yet the relationship between Reformed Tijaniyya and Mahdiyya had always been strained, especially since Mahdiyya

was losing membership to the Tijaniyya. Thus, Sa’id addressed the sultan of Sokoto:

What the members of the Tijaniyya brotherhood have caused regarding pray- | ing with arms crossed has reached me. Also I have heard what you are trying to do to stop this problem which is spreading. Surely you are responsible for stopping it. May God help you and reward you for this work. As you know, the followers of the Mahdi say their prayers with their arms crossed, but I hope you will not blame us for that. We are not among those who are causing problems. We seek God’s protection. We are only copying what our forefathers did. We only ask you to forgive us and not to cast any suspicion on us. You are quite aware that the colonialists tried to stop us from doing this. They punished us and oppressed us and sent us away from our homes and country. Up to now we have been in prison for about thirty years but we still have the conviction that we should not give up our faith. This is what God has destined for us.”

The limited strength of the Mahdiyya community in the postindependence period has been due partly to doubts regarding the claim that the Mahdi has come and gone and partly to the rise of reformed brotherhoods. The policy of the postindependence northern Nigerian government toward Sa’id’s authority was to welcome him as part of the religious establishment and as a direct descendant of Usman dan Fodio. AUTHORITY AND COMMUNITY IN USMANIYYA

The emergence of Usmaniyya as a transbrotherhood religious community in the independence era was complementary to the policy of regional solidarity in

northern Nigeria, which asserted that northerners derive from a common cultural heritage and ought to consolidate their northern identity and loyalty. The complexities of northern regional government and politics during the

71 [bid., chap. 1. ,

180 Religion and Political Culture in Kano civilian regime (1960-66) will not be explored in this study.’* According to compositional indicators, the governing party (The Northern People’s Congress), of which the sardauna (Ahmadu Bello) was chairman, was clearly not a religious-based political party but a coalition of many northern elements. There were several Christians at the ministerial level in the regional government, in-

cluding Daniel Ogbadu (Igbirra), Abutu Obekpa (Idoma), and Michael Audu Buba (Yargam), plus several “animists” including the Aku Uka of Wukari, and Atoshi Ogbumanu II (chief of the Jukun). During the period under consideration (1960-66), the major ethnic groups in northern Nigeria tended to follow identifiable patterns of religious affiliation: the Fulani, Hausa, Kanuri, and Nupe were predominantly Muslim; the Idoma and Tiv included almost no Muslims; the majority of Igbirra and Igala were Muslims but with signifcant numbers of animists; of the plateau ethnic groups, only the Hausa were Muslim; the Jukun and the Yoruba included Muslim, Christian, and animist

affiliations equally; the Bachama were primarily animists but with a few Muslims and Christians. Out of this ethnic and religious mélange, the premier of the Northern Region tried to weld a community. Such a community, however, could not be described in classical ethnic terms.

A surrogate was found by returning to the “religious” basis of the Sokoto Empire and reformulating it in modern terms. The result came to be known as “Usmaniyya,” that is, heirs to the legacy of Usman dan Fodio. Usmaniyya was propounded in certain respects as a communal loyalty: any Muslim born in the north was born into the community of Usmaniyya. It was also an afhliational loyalty insofar as an attempt was made to present Islamic brotherhood-like activities as being attractive to modern-sector personnel. To some extent it was a movement by the Northern Region civil service. In both its communal and affiliational dimensions, Usmaniyya attempted to extend the boundaries of traditional ethnic and religious loyalties. The doctrines of Usmaniyya clearly relate to the themes of authority and

community. In 1964 the sardauna of Sokoto and premier of the Northern Region, Ahmadu Bello (1910-66), published a bilingual (Arabic and Hausa) anthology of works purportedly by his great-great-grandfather, Usman dan Fodio.™ The central piece in the anthology was Wa lamma balagtu, in which 72 For discussion of northern political development, see B. J. Dudley, Parties and Polttics in Northern Nigeria (London: Frank Cass and Co., 1968); also, Sylvester Whitaker,

The Politics of Tradition: Continuity and Change in Northern Nigeria, 1946-1966 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970). Also see chapter 8, below. 73 For autobiographical details, see My Life (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1962); a Hausa version appeared entitled Rayuwata (Zaria: Gaskiya Corporation, 1964). 7 Usman dan Fodio, Littattafai uku a hade [Three books combined] (Zaria: Gaskiya Corporation, 1964).

Oadiriyya, Mahdiyya, and Usmantyya 181 Usman dan Fodio claims to be “head of all the saints” and proposes a specific wuridi that would guarantee entry into paradise. The work does not mention tariqa, nor is any mention made of Qadiriyya wuridi. Yet the work was widely interpreted in northern Nigeria as an attempt to attribute to Usman dan Fodio the creation of a new, simplified, all-encompassing tariqa. According to Usman, When I was thirty-six years old, God gave me certain powers of sight and hearing and smelling and also certain powers of taste. God also gave me a special power in using my hands and feet, and my body was supernaturally fit. It was made possible for me to see in any distant place in the world as if it were near. . . . I saw on the right part of my ribs a special writing that said, “Praise be to God” ten times, “Peace and blessing on the Prophet Muhammad and his disciples” ten times, and “I seek Almighty God’s forgiveness” ten times. This

writing was divinely written: I was extremely surprised at the sight... .7 When I was forty years and five months [I met God], who promised me a

certain blessing. At this encounter were present the holiest of all creations, Mu- | hammad, his disciples, and all of the saints and prophets. Then my shaykh, ‘Abd al-Qadir Jailani, brought a green garment which was decorated with writ-

ing which said, “There is no god but God, and Muhammad is his Prophet,” and “God is one.” ‘Abd al-Qadir gave them to the Prophet who embraced them to his breast, and then passed them to Abubakar Siddik, who passed them to Umar al-Faruk, who passed them to Usman Zunuraini, then to Aliyu, then to Yusufu, who returned them to my shaykh, ‘Abd al-Qadir. In unison, all present gave a command, “Clothe him, turban him, and give him a name that will distinguish him. . . .” 78 ‘Abd al-Qadir seated me and clothed me and turbanned me and named me “Head of all the Saints.” He then advised me to be kind and avoid the forbidden. He gave me a divine sword which I slung by my side and also told me to have no mercy on the unbelievers. They all advised me about what I should do and then commanded me to pass on to the people the wuridi [which was written on my ribs]. They promised that whosoever clung to this, God would give him salvation. This is the meaning of the inscription on my ribs. It is incumbent upon us to be grateful to God. Because of the weakness of human nature, God

reduced the number of recitations [of each phrase] to ten... .7 Anyone who hears of these recitations should embrace them for they are the simplest of all wuridi. May God bless anyone who likes it, or looks at it, or

hears it, or talks in its favor. This blessing is to be everlasting.”® The publication of the anthology was followed closely by the sardauna’s bilingual (Hausa and Arabic) publication of another work by Usman dan Fodio on the origins of sainthood.”® Again, this work does not mention tariqa

3 Ibid., p. 2. 76 Ibid., p. 3. 7 [bid., p. 4. , 78 Ibid., p. 20.

78 Usul al-wilaya [Origins of sainthood] (Zaria: Gaskiya Corporation, 1964); see p. 15

for conditions of tarbiyya, p. 16 for the origins of wusuli, and p. 18 for conditions of disciplehood.

182 Religion and Political Culture in Kano but espouses a form of tarbiyya and wusuli similar to that of Reformed Tijaniyya. The characteristics of what came to be known as Usmaniyya were its simplified wuridi, its emphasis on emotional commitment, the assertion of supremacy by the founder, and the fact that the movement was almost entirely identified with the sardauna of Sokoto.

The public emergence of Usmaniyya prior to the federal elections of 1964 was regarded by many Kano mallams as an attempt to unify the north around the memory of Usman dan Fodio and as an attempt by the sardauna to assume some of the religious authority held by the sultan of Sokoto, who had become identified with the more parochial Traditional Qadiriyya. Early in 1964 the sardauna had conferred the Order of Usmaniyya (similar to an MBE or OBE award) on the prime minister, Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, for his contribution to northern unity. The idea of Usmaniyya was seen by many in Kano as an attempt to neutralize some of the antagonism manifested by the Reformed Tijaniyya toward the sardauna. After the deposition of Kano Emir Sanusi (1963), who had been a political and religious rival to the sardauna, the leader of Reformed Tijaniyya, Ibrahim Niass, refused to enter Nigeria. A political party was formed in Kano, the Kano Peoples Party (KPP), which was largely supported by the Reformed Tiyani and dedicated to the reinstatement of Emir Sanusi. This activity led to northern government reprisals, and the KPP remained essentially underground until

its merger with the opposition party, the Northern Elements Progressive Union (NEPU) in January 1964. In September 1964 the president of NEPU, Aminu Kano, had flown to Kaolack for consultations with Ibrahim Niass (see chapter 8). This was widely interpreted as an attempt to consolidate Kano opposition to the sardauna. The potential defection of Kano was a clear threat to northern solidarity in the December elections. The anthology of works by Usman dan Fodio appeared in October 1964 and was distributed by the sardauna to major mallams throughout northern Nigeria.

Its appearance coincided with other pressures put on the northern Nigeria mallam class to unify around the memory of Usman dan Fodio (see chapter 8). In the election, however, only one of the Kano muqaddams of Reformed Tijaniyya supported the sardauna. A major difficulty in inaugurating Usmaniyya as a community was the prior commitment of most of the northern Nigeria mallam class to either Qadiriyya

or Tijaniyya. In Kano only a few came to identify with Usmaniyya. Yet the support of the sardauna gave this community a power base that had been a critical element in the survival of all other brotherhood movements in Nigeria. Because the sardauna himself was not acceptable as an advanced Arabic

Qadirtyya, Mahdtyya, and Usmaniyya 183 scholar, he depended heavily on the waziri of Sokoto, Alhaji Junaidu, for liaison with Sokoto and on the grand khadi, Alhaji Abubakar Gummi, for liaison with Kano. The emergence of Usmaniyya, however, was regarded at the popular level as an attack on the tariqa system of northern Nigeria, that is, an attempt to nationalize the existing tariqas and to unify northern Nigeria

around a new and undemanding wuridi. Those involved with Usmaniyya understood that to neutralize the existing tariqas it would be necessary to base

a mass appeal on the same type of emotional commitment found in the reformed communities of Tijaniyya and Qadiriyya.

The early preparation for the emergence of Usmaniyya began immediately after Nigerian independence and received new impetus with the deposition of Emir Sanusi in 1963. Between 1960 and 1964 the sardauna established two

distinct transbrotherhood organizations for the promotion of Islam in northern | Nigeria: the Society for the Victory of Islam (Jama’atu Nasril Islam) and the

Kaduna Council of Mallams (Kwamitin Bada Shawara Kan Alamuran | Musulunci). By 1963 the sardauna himself had become active in an “Islamic campaign” of conversion throughout northern Nigeria and had emerged as a liaison between northern Nigeria and international Islam. He became an active proponent of Arabic and Hausa literacy. Many of these activities may be seen as a direct response to the success of Reformed Tijaniyya. The rivalry between Ibrahim Niass and the sardauna became a prominent feature of the postinde-

pendence period. |

The Usmaniyya authority structure led by the sardauna became involved in certain specific functions, all of which were designed to consolidate a northern Muslim community: establishment of transbrotherhood religious organizations, neutralization of the existing tariqa leadership, the promotion of literacy and written communications, initiation and conversion, and international religious contact.

With regard to the establishment of a transbrotherhood religious organization, the sardauna founded the Jama’atu Nasril Islam on January 15, 1961. Its terms of reference, according to the official journal, were as follows: It was agreed that every Moslem of Northern Nigeria, male and female, young and old is deemed to be a member of the Jama’a. It only remains for him or her to choose whether to be an active member or a sleeping member. But every member of the society shall be prepared to agree to perform such duties as the Supreme Council or its Committee may from time to time, in the interest of the Jama’a, assign to him.

It was further resolved that at this point a Central Caretaker Committee composed of men who can easily assemble should be appointed to proceed at once

184 - Religion and Political Culture in Kano with the spade work. The membership of the first Central Caretaker Committee was as follows: Alhaji Abubakar Gummi, Deputy Grand Khadi; Alhaji Abubakar Imam, Chairman, Public Service Commission; Alhaji Haliru Binji, Deputy Grand Khadi; Alhaji Ali Akilu, Secretary to the Premier; Ahmed Talib, Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Finance; Alhaji Abubakar el-Nafaty,

the Controller of the Northern Nigeria Broadcasting Corporation; Alhaji Ahmadu Joda, Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Information.®°

The central committee consisted of the most powerful civil servants in Kaduna

and met regularly on the last Tuesday of each month in Kaduna. Yet the influence of the Jama’a at this stage was limited to civil servants in Kaduna and to certain mallams in nearby Zaria. Not until March 9, 1964, was the inaugural meeting of the Jama’a held in Lugard Hall, Kaduna, under the chairmanship of the president, waziri of Sokoto, Alhaji Junaidu. The meeting was attended by the sultan of Sokoto and by representatives from each of the provinces. The sardauna, patron of the society, addressed the society and called for a jihad against ignorance.8* The Jama’atu Nasril Islam subsequently was able to publish

a journal, build a headquarters in Kaduna, establish an Islamiyya school in Kaduna, and prepare for the Islamic conversion campaign of the sardauna.*? With regard to the neutralization of existing tariqa leadership, the sardauna sought to organize the mallam class of northern Nigeria through a Kaduna council of mallams, or the Advisory Committee on Islamic Affairs. A committee of forty-six mallams was constituted in 1963 under the chairmanship of the waziri of Sokoto, Alhaji Junaidu. Fourteen of the mallams were identified with Sokoto and six with Kano.? The council was appointed by the

sardauna and reported directly to him. In theory, the sardauna was empowered to convey the advice of the council to the Regional Executive Council. The first meeting of the council was August 23-25, 1963. The sardauna opened

northern Nigeria: .

the meeting with an appeal for unity among Muslims from all tariqas in Difference in tariqa or group will not prevent us from coming together to see what will help to better our religion, just as it does not prevent us coming together in Friday mosque. ... It is there that Muslims protected their reli80 Nural Islam 1, no. 1 (April 1965): 1, English section. The journal, published in Zaria by the Gaskiya Corporation, is trilingual (Arabic-Hausa-English). 81 Ibid., p. 2, Hausa section. 82 After the dissolution of the Northern Region in 1967, the Jama’a ceased to receive government support but continued as a voluntary association led by Abubakar Gummi. It is concerned with Islamic unity in Nigeria and within the broader international context, and is no longer identified with the late sardauna (see chapter 5).

83 Those from Kano were: Nasiru Kabara, Tijjani Usman, Sani Kafanga, Sa’id b. Hayatu, Shehu Maihula, and Shehu Galadanci.

Oadiriyya, Mahdiyya, and Usmaniyya 185 gion from the criticism of others. Tariqas and groups differ, but they have the same goal. . . . We must not allow ourselves to break into groups, Our religion instructs us to serve God according to our ability, not according to our feeling. . . . Because you are the mallams that people imitate, it is necessary that we stand on one thing and not be divided, to be laughed at by non-Muslims. .. . The government of which I am leader will not do anything outside of Muslim law. You must know that I myself have no strength except the strength of our religion. I will not agree to anything that is against our religion. [For this reason] we shall always come to seek your advice.®4

The issues selected for discussion, such as pilgrimage, alms, dowry, and fasting, were not controversial among tariqas. Significantly, discussions on these topics frequently included the opinions of Usman dan Fodio, and these opinions usually prevailed.®

The second meeting of the council of mallams was held August 1-3, 1964,

while the sardauna was out of the country. After certain routine business, two | controversial matters arose: praying with arms crossed and the franchise of women.®® Alhaji el-Nafaty introduced a discussion of kablu (praying with arms crossed) and sadlu (praying with arms at ease). He suggested that the council should not discourage people from praying with either kablu or sadlu,

but that the mallams should explain their respective positions “since great troubles that had led to quarrels and even killings [had occurred] and this was a shameful thing among Muslims.” ®* After considerable debate, it was finally

agreed that both were traditional [sunna]. A committee to investigate the matter was set up, consisting of Abubakar el-Nafaty, Nasiru Kabara, Tijjani Usman, and Husaini Adamu (secretary). The third meeting of the council was held on June 18, 1965, to discuss the “religious riots” in Argungu (Sokoto Province),®* which were incorrectly assumed by many to be Tijani inspired. It was decided at the same meeting by majority vote that imams should not be allowed to pray with arms crossed. The 84 Rahoton, taron kRwamitin ba da shawara kan aPamuran Musulunct [Report, meeting of the committee on Muslim affairs] (Kano: Native Authority Press, 1963), 1:4-5, Hausa. For full proceedings in Hausa see Rahoton, 1963. For English language newspaper summaries, see “Islamic Committee’s First Report,’ Nigerian Citizen, October 9, 1963, p. 1; “Advisory Committee on Islamic Affairs Summary Report of First Meeting Is Out,” Daily Mail, October 5, 1963, p. 1; “Sardauna Addresses Islamic Committee,” Nz1gerian Citizen, August 28, 1963, p. I. 85 Including the insertion into the record of some Fulani poetry by Usman dan Fodio in support of giving zakka (“tax”) from groundnuts. 86 The franchise issue was deferred for further research. 87 “Rahoton, taron kwamitin ba da shawara kan al’amuran Musulunci” [Report, meeting of the committee on Muslim affairs], August 1964 (mimeograph), p. 3, Hausa. 88 See Hamidu Alkali, “The Mahdi of Toranke,” Kano Studies 1, no. 4 (1968): 92-95.

186 Religion and Political Culture in Kano Reformed Tijani mallams would not agree to this restriction. When news of the decision reached Kano there was a considerable amount of apprehension and tension on the part of both the mallams and the ordinary membership of Reformed Tijaniyya. Owing to the death of the sardauna in January 1966, the issue was never resolved.

With regard to literacy and social communications, the sardauna established the Committee for the Publication of Jihad Manuscripts on July 25, 1962. The waziri of Sokoto, Alhaji Junaidu, was appointed chairman, and Na‘ibi Wali, secretary.°? The committee was established under the authority of the Northern Region Ministry of Education and was located in the office of the organizer of Arabic studies. The committee had the power to recommend manuscripts for publication by the government-controlled Gaskiya Corporation in Zaria.

The purpose of the committee was the “publication of works written either within or outside Nigeria by leaders of the Jihad, such as Shehu Othman Dan Fodio, Abdullahi Gwandu, Sultan Bello, Waziri Gidado, and M. Abdul Qadir Mustafa, etc.” *°

While the purposes of this committee were clearly educational, academic, and cultural, the impact on the religious sector of northern Nigeria was to make available inexpensive copies of literature that provided an intellectual and spiritual legitimacy to the authority of the sardauna. The sardauna had previously undertaken to publish privately selected Jihad manuscripts of particular significance. One of the earliest of these private publications was the Ihy@ al-Sunna by Usman dan Fodio, which was especially relevant as a criticism of innovation in sufistic practices.”*

In 1962 the sardauna published privately (through Gaskiya Corporation) his

own “chains of spiritual authority” (sésila), plus anonymously authored descriptions of the tombs of Muhammad Bello and Usman dan Fodio.? He also published separately two of the three works that were to appear in the 1964 anthology of Usman dan Fodio.** The third work was published separately in 1963 by a mallam from Sokoto.** In addition Sokoto mallams continued to 89 Na’ibi Wali was secretary of the Hausa Language Board (Kaduna) and son of Wali Suleiman of Kano. 90 Circular letter from office of organizer of Arabic studies, July 25, 1962. 91 [hya al-Sunna [Revival of the Sunna] (Cairo: al-Mashhad al-Husaini, 1957). 92 Hubbaren Sarkin Musulmi Bello [The tomb of leader of the Muslims Bello] (Zaria: Gaskiya Corporation, 1962); Hubbaren Sarkin Musulmi Shehu Dan Fodio [The tomb of leader of the Muslims Shaykh Dan Fodio] (Zaria: Gaskiya Corporation, 1962).

93 Wuridin Shehu Usman [The wuridi of Shehu Usman]; and Wa lamma balagtu [When I was thirty-six] (Zaria: Gaskiya Corporation, 1962). 94 Usulud dint [Origins of religion] (Zaria: Gaskiya Corporation, 1963).

Qadirtyya, Mahdiyya, and Usmantyya 187 publish privately (through Gaskiya Corporation) the works of Usman dan Fodio;®> a number of other Jihad writings were also being published at private printing facilities. Many of these works were bilingual (Hausa and

Arabic), and as with both the reformed brotherhoods (Tijaniyya and Qadiriyya) the demand in Usmaniyya for the printed word was great. With regard to initiation and conversion, the sardauna began an Islamic conversion campaign in 1963. A typical procedure was for a village or district chief in the north to write the premier’s office, asking the sardauna to visit his area and officiate at the conversion of people in his area. The team of officials who accompanied the sardauna usually included regional ministers or high-level civil servants.?* The journal Nural Islam published testimonials by converted officials?’ and rendered practical advice to those who were undergoing the process of conversion.”® The conversion tours were less frequent during 1964, due to the demands of the federal election. It was recorded officially,

however, that 100,000 persons in Zaria and Niger provinces converted during , this period.®® The primary area of concentration prior to the election was in 95 For example, Sidi Modi, published Dala’tlu Shehu Usman [The proofs for Shehu Usman] and Nur al-albab [Light of the heart] (Zaria: Gaskiya Corporation). 86 According to the Nigerian Citizen, “The Sardauna’s campaign team comprised of such devout Moslem leaders such as the Emir of Katsina, Alhaji Sir Usman Nagogo, the

Minister of Information, Alhaji Ahmadu Fatika, Sarkin Fadan Zazzau, the Minister of Justice, Alhaji Muhammadu Nasir, the Minister of Water Resources and Community Development, Alhaji Ibrahim Biu, the Minister of Native Authorities Finances, Alhaji Ma’azu Lamido, a Minister of State, Alhaji Abba Karim, the Minister of Works, Alhaji Shehu Usman, Sarkin Maska, the Katsina Provincial Commissioners, Alhaji Jamtari Belel, the Kano Provincial Commissioner, Alhaji Usman Liman, the Minister of Social Welfare and Co-operatives, Alhaji Umaru Babura, Sarkin Fulani Ja’idanawa and his Parliamentary secretary, Alhaji Shehu Cigari” (April 28, 1965, p. 9). 97 See, for example, the speech by the Emir of Kuta, Alhaji Ahmadu, on the first anniversary (September 1964) of the conversion of his people (Gwari) to Islam: “Before the coming of the honorable premier the Sardaunan Sokoto to Kuto, there were about 1,000 Moslem converts in the town, but since the 15th September, 1963, when I announced the proposed visit of the Premier on Tuesday 17th September, 1963, to meet the new converts, the news got noised abroad that the occasion was a very important one; more than 500 people came forward and asked to be cleansed and purified for initiation into the Moslem

faith even before the actual visit took place. While he was in Kuta, over 200 people embraced Islam” (Nural Islam 1, no. 1 [April 1965]: 7, English). 98 See for example, the article by deputy grand khadi, Haliru Binji, regarding change

of name, the ritual ablutions of conversion, reducing the number of wives to four, and circumcision in certain cases: “A full grown man who embraces Islam will not be circumcised by somebody else, because Islam does not allow seeing the private parts of other people. He can perform the circumcision by himself on condition that he knows how to do it” (Nural Islam 1, no. 1 [April 1965]: 6, English). 99 Nigerian Citizen, April 28, 1965, p. I.

188 Religion and Political Culture in Kano the Middle Belt. After the federal election, the conversion campaign was directed at the far north itself: Katsina, Sokoto, and finally Kano. During April 22-27, 1965, the sardauna preached in Katsina and Sokoto provinces,’°° including Argungu division, where he is reported as stating, I was in Mecca when the recent religious disturbance occurred. I now come here personally to console you on behalf of myself and the Northern Government,

and at the same time, to warn you against doing anything that may disturb unity and peace. We should forget our past differences, if any, and work relentlessly to uphold our cherished unity and understanding in order to preserve our religion. I am a political leader as well as a religious one. Today, however, I am here as a leader in Islam. I am also here to satisfy those who have expressed their desire to join us as brothers in Islam.

The parallel of the conversion campaign to the Jihad of Usman dan Fodio was not lost on observers: “The campaign, which is a reminiscence of that of his great ancestor, Sheikh Othman dan Fodio, Africa’s 13th century Islamic Crusader, has sent forth a revival impetus throughout Northern Nigeria, the largest single Moslem Bloc in Africa South of the Sahara.” 1°?

Since the deposition of Kano Emir Sanusi, the sardauna had not visited Kano. In June 1965, however, he made a political visit and returned in August as part of the Islamic campaign, during which he had minor success in converting some villagers in Kura. The visit was a symbolic gesture more than anything else. The religious authority of Usmaniyya required establishment in Kano Emirate. With regard to the ties between the Usmaniyya community in northern Nigeria and the international world of Islam, the sardauna was personally active in his travels. During the period 1960-65, he made three major tours of Islamic areas: North and West Africa, Pakistan, and the Middle East (mainly Jordan and Iraq). He also attended the Congress of World Islam. During October and November 1963, the premier visited North and West

Africa, including Morocco (where he visited the tomb of Ahmad Tijani), Senegal (where he met with the descendants of Umar Futi),*°? and Guinea (where he visited Labé, “the traditional holy city of Islam”). In December 100 ‘During the five day tour... a total of 11,085 persons have been converted to Islam. Of this number 7,435 are in Katsina Province, and 3,650 in Sokoto Province. The figure for Sokoto Province includes 2,400 from Argungu division” (“Sardauna’s 20th Century Islamic Crusade in Northern Nigeria,” Nigerian Citizen, April 28, 1965, p. 1). 101 Morning Post, April 26, 1965, p. I. 102 Nigerian Citizen, April 28, 1965, p. I. 108 See Afrique mon pays, no. 10 (1964), special issue on Senegal, p. 11. A photograph

was included of “Sir Alhaji Amadou Bello, Prime Minister of Northern Nigeria, accom-

panied by Alhaji Seydou Nuru Tall, grandson of Shaykh Omar of Futa Toro, with Alhaji Maki Habibou Nourou Tall, nephew of the Grand Marabout Seydou Nuru Tall.”

Qadiriyya, Mahdtyya, and Usmaniyya 189 1963 the premier visited Pakistan and addressed the Institute of International Affairs on the topic, “Northern Nigeria and the Impact of Islam.” According

to Pakistani reports the premier is quoted as saying that his region was “focusing attention not quite on the reformation of Islam, but on maintaining the Islamic traditions and values in their pure form and as practised by our

forefathers. ... Many people try to dilute Islam but we try to avoid it.” The same report continued, “Alhaji Bello stated that as head of the government

in the region it was also his responsibility to see to religious activities. Hundreds of mosques had been built, Islamic studies and training at the university level, publication of Islamic literature were in progress to foster understanding of Islam and promote missionary work. He revealed that recently in the North, 36,000 persons embraced Islam in a period of three weeks. He promised that the conversion programme would eventually be extended to other parts of Africa.” 14

In August 1964 during his trip to the Dome of the Rock (Jerusalem), the | premier hoped to “strengthen the already existing Islamic relationship between Nigeria and [Jordan].” *°° Also, according to Nigerian reports of the trip, The Sardauna of Sokoto Alhaji Sir Ahmadu Bello, premier of Northern Nigeria, has called for the setting up of an Islamic league which would embrace all

Moslems throughout the world. The Premier said that the present Moslem League of the Arab speaking countries should be extended to African Moslem countries. . . . The Sardauna claimed to have preached to some one hundred

thousand Moslems in Northern Nigeria recently on the doctrine of Islam... . } The Premier said that he is a direct descendant of the holy prophet through a nephew of the holy prophet, Ahmed Talib.1°6

After leaving Jordan, the premier flew to Iraq, where he visited the tomb of ‘Abd al-Qadir in Baghdad. __ The full impact of Usmaniyya remains to be evaluated, although the division of the north into six states in 1967 appears to have stemmed the tide of northern regionalism and reinforced those, as in Kano, who were asking for local autonomy, both religious and political. Yet Usmaniyya may have contributed to the many aspects of a northern regional community: an authority structure consisting mainly of political figures and civil servants was established;

a central committee of mallams was set up; doctrinal sources were produced; and the energies of an heir to the Jihad legacy were directed toward the task

of forming a new community out of the ethnic and religious pluralism of northern Nigeria. 104 Muslimnews International [Karachi], January 1964, p. 6. 105 Daily News [Nigeria], August 7, 1964. 106 Daily Times, August 28, 1964.

O

Comparative Orientations Toward Authority and Community

In the preceding chapters, doctrines and structures of authority and community have been described for the major religious identity groups in Kano: Traditional Tijaniyya, Reformed Tijaniyya, Traditional Qadiriyya, Reformed Qadiriyya, Mahdiyya, and contemporary Usmaniyya. In this chapter, an attempt will be made to assess the degree to which there are similar or dissimilar orientations toward authority and community within the religious groups. It

will be argued that the reformed brotherhoods (plus Usmaniyya) represent changes in attitudes toward authority and community. ORIENTATIONS TOWARD AUTHORITY

“Within each of the brotherhoods or movements there have been clear, though changing, expectations about the nature of legitimate authority. In all groups

the leadership must exhibit spiritual power and in some way fulfill the role

of spiritual intermediary. Leadership in this context requires more than charisma; it requires a conceptual framework to which unusual powers can be related. The sufi hierarchy of “stages,” the idea of Islamic “reformer,” and

the expectations of the coming of a Mahdi provide such frameworks. It is regarded as preordained that legitimate authority will arise within these conceptual categories; the determination of legitimacy is primarily a matter of testing the claim of the aspirant by means of a comparison with expectations. All of the religious groups seem to require distinct chains of authority (silsila) which are evaluated in terms of the directness of their relation to an original,

Comparative Orientations 191 or historic, source. The only exception to these chains of authority is the founding saint, who receives his authority through direct communication with God or the Prophet. Most of the brotherhoods, however, have some concept of the “seal of the saints,” which limits the emergence of new founding saints. The patterns of succession to authority within the brotherhoods may be di-

vided into those that implicitly reflect kinship criteria (such as Traditional Qadiriyya, Traditional Tijaniyya, Mahdiyya) and those that are based more on achievement criteria (Reformed Tijaniyya, Reformed Qadiriyya). Yet even within the multiethnic religious brotherhoods, there have been clear patterns of pyramidal rather than hierarchical authority. In all cases the actual pattern of succession to leadership within the brotherhoods has been either father to son, father to brother, or master to disciple.

All of the religious communities have leaders who are from the ruling classes in Kano (or northern Nigeria). The leaders of Traditional Qadiriyya, Mahdiyya, and Usmaniyya are all related by blood to the sultans of Sokoto. The Reformed Qadiriyya, Reformed Tijaniyya, and Traditional Tijaniyya have | elite structures that include both ruling- and nonruling-class elements. Ibrahim Niass is the only major authority who comes from a low social class (a black-

smith caste) and whose social mobility was achieved by religious means. (Blacksmith clans, however, are often attributed special powers of dealing with the supernatural.) At this point it may be useful to summarize the succession to authority patterns within each of the brotherhoods.

The original basis of Traditional Qadiriyya authority in northern Nigeria was both direct (based on communication with God) and indirect (based on spiritual lineages, or silsila). Its succession patterns, however, have been dynastic and have been coterminous with political authority in the Sokoto Empire. The original basis of Traditional Tijaniyya authority in northern Nigeria was both direct and indirect. Succession patterns have been dynastic in the © case of the Umarians, but in other cases the issue of succession does not arise. The original basis of Mahdiyya was direct, and its succession patterns have been entirely dynastic.

The emergence of Reformed Qadiriyya has been based on silsila authority,

yet with an expanded number of silsila linkages. Nasiru Kabara is not regarded as a “reformer” but as caliph within Nigerian Qadiriyya. The international sources of his authority (in Baghdad, Khartoum, and Tripoli) have made no attempt to preempt his authority within the Nigerian context. Ibrahim Niass, by contrast, is very much the leading authority of Reformed Tijaniyya, in Nigeria as well as internationally.

Major authorities within all brotherhoods claim descent from the Prophet Muhammad. Such claims, however, are usually contested; even those of Usman

dan Fodio and Ibrahim Niass have been challenged on the grounds that the

192 Religion and Political Culture in Kano link between West African lineages and North African sharifai is not verifiable.

All brotherhoods have leaders who claim some form of legitimacy in terms of descent from the Jihad leaders. Of the brotherhood elites, the Reformed Tijaniyya has least claim to actual descent, but the group is careful to nurture such links that do exist and has been especially concerned to claim that Mu-

hammad Bello was converted to Tijaniyya (and that his daughter married Umar Futi). The most primary form of legitimacy, direct communication with God, is regarded as having occurred at some point in history and provides the beginning of the chain of authority for each brotherhood muqaddam. Of the present

leaders, however, only Ibrahim Niass has claimed direct communication. These patterns are summarized in Table 9. TABLE 9 Contemporary Basgs or BrotHERHOOD LzcrTimacy 1. Descent from Prophet

Reformed Tijaniyya: Ibrahim Niass (by means of Ridha) Traditional Qadiriyya: Usman dan Fodio (maternal and paternal) Nigerian Mahdiyya: Usman dan Fodio (maternal and paternal) 2. Descent from Fulani Jihad Traditional Qadiriyya: Direct descent from Usman dan Fodio

Reformed Qadiriyya: Spiritual descent from Usman dan Fodio Nigerian Mahdiyya: Direct descent from Usman dan Fodio Usmaniyya: Direct descent from Usman dan Fodio Traditional Tijaniyya: Spiritual and direct descent from Muhammad Bello Reformed Tijaniyya: Spiritual descent from Muhammad Bello 3. Direct Communication with God and/or the Prophet

Reformed Tijaniyya: Present, through Ibrahim Niass; past, through Ahmad Tijani © Nigerian Mahdiyya: Past, through Mahdi in Sudan Usmaniyya: Past, through Usman dan Fodio Traditional Tijaniyya: Past, through Ahmad Tijani and Umar Futi Traditional Qadiriyya: Past, through Usman dan Fodio

Reformed Gadiriyya: Fodio, and others Present, through Nasiru Kabara; past, through Usman dan

Two sociogeographic factors, ethnicity and geographic identity, are particu-

larly relevant to patterns of succession. Within the doctrinal systems of the brotherhoods, these factors are regarded as irrelevant; but in the actual development of elite structures they have been of major significance.

With regard to the ethnic factor, three of the brotherhood authority structures, reflecting the composition of the religious communities, are clearly multiethnic: Reformed Tijaniyya, Reformed Qadiriyya, and Usmaniyya. The other

Comparative Orientations 193 structures are primarily associated with a single ethnic group. Traditional Qadiriyya and Mahdiyya are almost exclusively Fulani, drawing on Fulani clans who participated in the nineteenth-century Jihad. There is no evidence at this time that any of the Traditional Qadiriyya muqaddams in Kano in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries were Hausa. Nigerian Mahdiyya, in many respects, may be regarded as an ethnic branch of Traditional Qadiriyya, although it has independent links with religious communities in Khartoum. The Traditional Tijaniyya elite in Kano has been both Hausa and Fulani but

with little interaction between these two structures. Umar Futi, a Tukulor, established Tijaniyya in Kano City mainly in the Hausa wards. Throughout the nineteenth century in Kano, Tijaniyya was distinctly non-Fulani. With the conversion of Emir Abbas, a line of Tijaniyya was begun (including the imams of Kano) that drew its leaders from the Fulani mallam class.

The international leadership of Reformed Tijaniyya (Ibrahim Niass and the four kutub) are all Wolof from Senegal. Within the international struc-

ture of Reformed Tijaniyya, the component segments to some extent have continued to be organized around ethnic groups (the Salgawa are HausaBeriberi; the followers of Abdullahi Bayero and Wali Suleiman were Fulani). This is partly a reflection of the process by which Reformed Tijaniyya emerged

—that is, by incorporating existing Tijaniyya communities, based largely around ethnic groups, into a transethnic international structure. Within this context, there has been a significant number of interethnic marriages. The major muqaddams in Kano represent all ethnic groups and are completely integrated into the overall structure.

The same pattern has occurred in Reformed Qadiriyya, for Nasiru Kabara has integrated Hausa, Fulani, Arab, and other ethnic groups into a centralized authority structure. It is significant that the highest authority should be Fulani, although Nasiru Kabara himself is concerned to point out that while he is mainly Fulani, he is also descended from Hausa and Arab sources. By contrast, contemporary Usmaniyya was transethnic in its authority structure but cannot be said to have had a communal base, except insofar as northern identity was coming to have communal implications. Although its leadership was predominantly Fulani, this reflected the structure of the northern civil service and political class rather than local religious structures. The ethnic patterns in the brotherhood authority structures are summarized in Table 1o. With regard to geographic factors, certain patterns are relevant to the emergence of brotherhood communities and authorities in Kano. Within Kano City at the time of British conquest, the East and South sectors followed Traditional Qadiriyya, while the North and West were non-Qadiriyya. During the period of Emir Abbas and Muhammad Salga, Traditional Tijaniyya became established in Kano East and Kano West, but with little contact between

194 Religion and Political Culture in Kano TABLE 10 SumMMaARY: Etranic INTeGraTION WiTHIN BrorHERHOOD AUTHORITY STRUCTURES,

Kano Ursan Arga, 1930-1965 Ethnic

Identities of Degree of Elite

Brotherhood — Primary Elites Ethnic Integration References I. Traditional Hausa Little interaction between Ibrahim (Hausa) Tijaniyya Fulani Hausa and Fulani sectors Dalhatu (Fulani) Dan Amu (Fulani)

II. Reformed Hausa High degree of structural Salga (Hausa)

Tijaniyya Beriberi integration Mijinyawa (Beriberi)

|

Fulani Tijjani (Beriberi) Tuareg Suleiman (Fulani) YorubaNupe Sanusi (Fulani) Sharif Ahmad (Arab)

Ill. Traditional Fulani No significant structural No explicit structure after

Qadiriyya integration conversion of Sullu-

, bawa royal family to Tijaniyya

IV. Reformed Hausa High degree of structural Ahmad (Hausa)

Qadiriyya Fulani integration Nasiru (Fulani)

Arab Muhammad Sidi (Arab) Yoruba

, Nupe

V. Mahdiyya Fulani Little integration within Sa’id Hayatu (Fulani) Hausaland; linkage with Sudanese Arabs

them. By contrast, the reformed brotherhoods have adherents throughout Kano City (see Map 7).

Within the northern Nigeria context, there has been an identification of brotherhoods with particular provinces. Traditional Qadiriyya is clearly associated with Sokoto Province (present Northwest State). Mahdiyya has had historic connections with Adamawa Province (present Northeast State). Traditional Tijaniyya became associated with Kano, Katsina, and Zaria; but after the emergence of Ibrahim Niass it remained identified primarily with Zaria and Katsina (the present North-Central State). Reformed Qadiriyya and Reformed Tijaniyya became identified with Kano (present Kano State). Usmaniyya became centered in Kaduna and identified with Kaduna. Bornu has remained relatively impervious to all the brotherhoods, except in the Nguru area (which

/ ‘\

\ a ( / \ / iis Kt |N i;| ‘\[i \\| |SRia an aT \ Sc i we . ‘\ ¢ \I 9\ / f q8 _ feof, e7 ‘a [ H 30 K Nope

Comparative Orientations 195

Loe ~ \ , or aa ay

I\\ Fa4 | @ a 1 FAGGE

|\ _— an.we aie/ —— ,‘\«||po ee Ji. Nisa Y Pra Housa "] ~~~ as, “ of —— Fulani = *ee® . °*

e eee°ees»s* e74e Map 8. Kano Emirate: Fulani District Headships, 1970

Kano relations with Sokoto and the transition to Kano Emirate identity may be viewed in three periods: the period of Kano Emir Abdullahi Maje Karofi

1855-82), the period of the Kano civil war (18 and the prenationalist colonial period (1902-45). Between these periods there were temporary efforts

toward rapport with Sokoto, for example, the reign of Muhammad Bello

e *** °*es e e * * e se¢

(1882-93), the alliance between Emir Aliyu and Sokoto in response to colonial conquest, and the consolidation of the north during the early stages of northernization” (1956-61). In short, Kano was structurally linked with Sokoto tor most of the nineteenth century. These institutional bonds were reinforced by

ization” inked with Sok {

value congruence and political loyalties, although Kano identity was never completely submerged within the caliphate. Kano identity was strengthened 9

Emirate Authority and Community 253 as the structural linkages with Sokoto were broken and as Kano values came to be regarded as distinct from Sokoto values.

By mid-nineteenth century a rivalry developed between Kano and Sokoto for power within the empire. This rivalry came to a semiclimax during the time of Kano Emir Abdullahi Maje Karofi and became a symbolic reference point at the time when the Kano State Movement (1964-65) was gathering strength. According to a Hausa publication from this recent period in Kano, History has demonstrated what developed between the Kano people and the authority of Sokoto, which was once the headquarters of the Fulani empire. During a conference of emirs in Sokoto, the people of Sokoto decided to demonstrate their power to the people of Kano, The rulers of Sokoto could dismiss any

ruler at that time. After the conference, all the emirs [and their councillors |] were dismissed except the Kano delegation, at which point the Kano delegation excused itself and left Sokoto. When the sultan of Sokoto heard this, he begged the Kano delegation to return and be officially dismissed. At that point, the emir

of Kano read the famous passage from the Daliyya. He said, Wa’l-dadu min allah, wa la ana min dadi [“disappointment is from God, but I am not to be disappointed” ]. The meaning of this passage is, “I don’t tolerate nonsense, and I don’t come from a people who tolerate nonsense.” The delegates who related this story said that after their return from Sokoto they vowed never to accept or listen to any call from Sokoto. In this condition they administered their own affairs until Sokoto apologized. Then they agreed to attend further conferences in Sokoto. It was during a journey to such a conference that our Emir Abdullahi died at a certain placed called Karofi in Katsina Province.”

The Kano civil war, which was partly a reaction against Sokoto authority, is discussed in this chapter. According to recent interpretations, The civil war was a rebellion in which the people of Kano organized against the Sokoto administration when the latter had tried to appoint a Kano emir without consultation. The war began in the following manner. After the death of Emir of Kano Muhammad Bello, the waziri of Sokoto came to Kano with

the message that the Sarkin Musulmi had appointed a new emir... . The Kano people gathered together to rebel against the emir who had been installed against their wish. In turn, they installed their own emir and gave themselves full authority to govern themselves [mulkin kai]. It was during this period of Kano self-government that the Europeans came to Kano."

The exact nature of Kano tribute (gaisuwa) to Sokoto during the nineteenth century is a matter that requires further research. The centrality of authority in Sokoto was generally recognized within the caliphate as a whole. This was 72 Lawan Danbazau, Muryar Kano [The voice of Kano] (Kano: Comet Press, Ltd., 1964), p. 2. 13 Ibid., p. 3.

254 Religion and Political Culture in Kano especially relevant when part of the empire came under external attack and military coordination was necessary. The original authority of Kano emirs was also seen in Kano to have emanated from the appointments of Usman dan Fodio; yet throughout the nineteenth century, the Sokoto appointment of Kano emirs increasingly became a formality and finally came to an end with the Kano civil war.

The early colonial officers tried to assess the nature of the relationship of Kano to the Sokoto Empire as a basis for administrative reorganization of the north. A confidential report by Kano Resident Festing in 1907 records colonial perceptions of this relationship, including the religious aspect: I am informed that for the first 30 years of the Fulani rule, the Gaisai [ gatsuwa |

which had its origin in a contribution to Dan Fodio’s Jihad, was paid voluntarily, all being satisfied with the new and just state of affairs that existed. Then

commenced the oppression of the people by the Fulani, and the fleecing of each other and this gaisai became nothing more than a recognized tax levied by Sokoto and just like any other tax became unpopular. For many years past it has had no religious significance whatever. Now as regards the status of the Sarkin Musulmi as religious head, I am quite certain that no religious bond whatever exists between him and the other Emirs. He is the head of the house of Shaifu to which most of them belong and as such it is to his and their interest to keep together, but he is by no means looked upon as the head of the Kadirawa sect to which his house belongs—and is completely ignored by all other sects from every religious point of view. So far as I can gather, with the exception of Daura, none of the Emirates pay what can be called the gaisai, as we

understand it... . This bond of unity, the house of Shaifu and all connected with it for obvious reasons wishes to be put down to Religion. All other sects and really all Kadirawa not belonging to this house ignore it—moreover as a matter of fact we are informed that the religious favour that once existed for Dan Fodio himself has waned and the Kadirawa themselves no longer look upon him as an inter-mediary to the future state of blessedness. Taking all this into consideration when the present Emir, formerly Durobi Mahama, was installed, I requested the Acting High Commissioner to make no allusion whatever in his speech to the Sarkin Musulmi. If I had told Mahama, who is a Tijani, that the Sultan of Sokoto whom he simply regards as a brother Emir had been consulted as to his election, it would not have been understood and would probably have

given offense. . . . In conclusion, I would add that all the inquiries that Mr. Palmer and myself have made on this subject have been made with the greatest caution. Nothing that could possibly injure the dignity of the Sultan has ever been suggested. At the same time it appears to me that no good purpose can be served by our giving support to a fable that the Mohammadan population of this country have ceased to believe.”4

*£Major Arthur Festing, Acting Resident, Kano, to the Resident Sokoto, NAK (64/ 1907) February 22, 1907.

Emurate Authority and Community 255 Only during the nationalist era in colonial history (1945-60) was the sultan of Sokoto resuscitated by the British as the religious leader of northern Nigeria. Thus, the governor general of Nigeria, Sir James Robertson, wrote in 1956: “The administrative and spiritual position of the Sultan of Sokoto before the advent of the British in the North was unique, and to the present day remains of paramount importance, as the Sultan is still the religious and political pilot

of the North.” Among the early Kano residents and officers, Sokoto was regarded simply as another emirate, probably of less importance than Kano. The issue of Sokoto status within northern Nigeria arose in specific form in

the first few years of colonial rule, when it was decided to include Katsina Emirate in Kano Province rather than Sokoto Province. This was resented by Sokoto but preferred by Katsina and Kano. According to H. R. Palmer, then acting resident of Katsina, in a letter to Resident Kano: In talking of things the Emir [of Katsina] without any prelude said to me, “If Katsina was to be under the Resident Sokoto instead of Kano I don’t know what I should do; the intrigues would be fearful; not a day would pass without either the Waziri’s or the Galadima’s boys coming and trying to start some game or

other.” . . . I am quite sure that in his mind there is an idea that the Serikin Muslimi and the Resident Sokoto are scheming to get Katsina under them. Probably this idea originated in the machinations of the Sokoto interpretors during Yero’s time, and it is rather striking in this connection that Capt. Laing asked me, “if Katsina ought to be under Sokoto.” I can hardly believe that anybody who knows what Katsina is could advocate such a step, as it would result in a perfect whirlpool of intrigue and trouble. . . . The Emir informed me that last year Yero was told confidentially from Sokoto that Katsina was to be put under Sokoto, and Daura and Kazaure under Katsina.?®

In the same letter, Palmer suggests that Sokoto was trying to undermine the authority of Emir Abbas in Kano by directly supporting the remnants of the Tukur supporters. Palmer also suggests that because of the means by which

Emir Abbas was centralizing control in his own hands, there was growing resistance to him on the part of certain branches of the royal family and their supporters : As regards Kano, I am very fairly certain from many circumstances that there is a growing leaning towards the Tukr family in Kano, I saw the Serikin Shanu today at Kaudawa, and I noticed that he is a good deal better off than he was. This means that people of some wealth are giving him dashes [gratuities]. I have also received information that some time ago the Sarkin Muslimi went so far as to promise an adherent of Tukr that he would get back the kingdom. 1 Nigerian Citizen, December 5, 1956. 76 Palmer to Resident Kano, NAK (44/1909), August 20, 1907.

256 Religion and Political Culture in Kano This is all no doubt partially known to Serikin Kano, and possibly accounts for his mistaken policy of trying to crush out the big Kano families. That they do not like him has been known for some time, but instead of giving them free access to the white man and trusting to the Resident’s discrimination he is trying to crush out every man who is not, so to speak, in his pocket. The result will be that he will make Tukrites of them all and in the long run defeat his own purposes,”7

Palmer also states in the letter that he has “absolute proof that Serikin Kano is not sending any gatsua to Sokoto.” Except for the brief reconciliation between Emir Aliyu and Sokoto at the time of British conquest, the relations between Kano and Sokoto continued to be severely strained in the early colonial period. During the nationalist phase of the colonial period there was an official effort to create unity in the north and to emphasize the centrality of Sokoto. While there was considerable support in Kano Emirate for “northernization” (discussed in chapter 8), this support turned to disaffection when it was apparent that Sokoto was dominating the political community of the north. The impact of colonial rule on Kano linkage with Sokoto may be viewed within a broader context than the specific values, loyalties, and identities that characterized the direct relationship. The original basis of the Sokoto caliphate was religious, and intracaliphate integration was to some extent based on that fact. British rule in northern Nigeria and colonial rule throughout West and

North Africa did not fundamentally challenge the idea of an Islamic community (wmma) but did allow for the broadening of socioreligious communication networks. The twentieth-century growth of the religious brotherhoods in Kano and the transnational character of their community boundaries have been discussed in chapters 2 through 6. Colonial policy, apart from that toward the brotherhoods, facilitated the emergence of a broader Islamic identity

in Kano which in real terms obviated the significance of Sokoto caliphate identity. This process began to emerge during World War I, when British planners tried to relate their interests in the Middle East to their interests in West Africa. The process continued during the 1930s, when pilgrimage routes

were opened up between northern Nigeria and Saudi Arabia. The process

reached new intensity during World War I, when Kano was used as a staging post for the campaign in north Africa. Out of this process came a strengthening of Kano identity insofar as Kano people could see themselves as a discrete part of a worldwide Muslim community. On the eve of World War I, the colonial administration was concerned that traditional (albeit limited) links between northern Nigeria and North Africa might facilitate the transfer of some of the tensions in the Maghrib to northern 7 Thid.

Emirate Authority and Community 257 Nigeria. In a confidential letter to the resident Kano in 1912, the chief secretary wrote, I am directed to inform you that His Excellency wishes you to pay special attention to the acquisition of information as to any anti-Christian propaganda which

may be covertly circulating in your Province. In view of the long duration, without definite result, of the Turco-Italian war, His Excellency considers it to be reasonably certain that some Emissaries from the Moslem leaders have by

this time arrived in Northern Nigeria, and while he does not wish to convey that there is any cause for alarm, he wishes to impress on you the importance of collecting information regarding their movements.”8

At about the same time, Acting Resident Gwandu called attention to the effect of the North African situation on trade in Kano: “A trader from Kano reports that the Tripoli trade with Kano is at a standstill and that merchants now say that all trade must come from the south via Lagos or Accra.” ® During World War I, the British Foreign Office actively tried to persuade emirate leaders in northern Nigeria of the “un-Islamic” nature of the Germans. Two examples of this were the circular regarding the resignation in 1916 of the Turkish Shaykh al-Islam under German pressure and the publication of captured German documents from East Africa purported to be plans for the suppression of Islam.®° Both of these efforts were felt by the local administrative officers in Kano to have had a different effect from that intended. They served to make northern Nigerians more aware of Muslims in other parts of the colonial world. Regarding the resignation of Shaykh al-Islam, the Kano resident wrote, Unless you direct me so to do, I do not propose to convey more of [the circu-

lar’s] contents than that the Shaikh-ul-Islam of Turkey has resigned. The Fulani and Hausa have little acquaintance with and take no interest in the internal affairs of Turkey. The Khalifate of Constantinople and its Shaikh-ulIslam have never been to them more than a distant legend. They would not 78 Acting Chief Secretary, Zungeru to Resident Kano, NAK (93/1912), September 3, 1912.

79. A. Brackenbury, Acting Resident Gwandu to Resident Sokoto NAK (93/1912), July 18, 1912.

80 Bonar Law to Sir F. D. Lugard, “Resignation of Shaikh-ul-Islam,” NAK (121/1916), June 27, 1916; Central Secretary, “Anti-Islamic German Documents,’ NAK (180/r1916), September 2, 1916. One example of these documents, captured by General Smuts at Moshi, was a decree from the German imperial governor of Urundi, as follows: “I respectfully beg the local authorities to report to me within three months what means appear possible in each locality to counteract efficaciously Islamic propaganda by means of Government officials and especially teachers in Government schools. Does it appear feasible to enforce an order on such persons by which Islamic propaganda would be entirely prohibited? Could we eventually contemplate the issue of a decree by which teachers would be forbidden to perform circumcision unofficially, the duties of Imam in mosques, etc?”

258 Religion and Political Culture in Kano acknowledge the Shaikh-ul-Islam as being more than the head religious functionary in Turkey. The Ruling classes are so far impressed with their own position and leading in the Islamic world visible to them that they care little what becomes of the Turkish Empire. They do care however about the actual position of Islam and Moslems in their own country and their own future. As it happens, the resignation of the Shaikh-ul-Islam of Turkey arose from and is connected with questions which still remain unsettled here, and are almost as delicate and capable of arousing hostility among the Moslems here as in Turkey. The mere recital of the facts noted in the first few paragraphs of the Secretary of State’s despatch cannot fail to suggest to our Mallams reflections and discussion as to what the policy of this government has been toward Islamic Institutions.®!

The German documents were translated into Hausa, Yoruba, Nupe, and Kanuri and were made known to the northern emirate leadership. Once again, the Kano resident recognized the side effects of such propaganda: My reason for considering the circulation of the documents referred to inadvisable is that I think they would do more harm than good. . . . They would be likely to lend themselves, in the hands of the disaffected, to a demonstration of the dangers to Islam of amy Christian or European rule. . . . From the view of the vast majority of the Mohammadans in Nigeria, the Germans have been definitely defeated, their relations and friends have in many cases had ocular demonstrations of this, and the war is now far from their doors. Quieta non movere, is, 1 think, the policy best applicable to the present juncture.®? By decisions of the higher level colonial authorities, aspects of the situation in

the Middle East and Muslim Africa were made known in Kano during the war. Yet, since there was little direct contact between Kano leaders and Muslim

political leaders outside of northern Nigeria, the impact of the broader world of Islam was not strongly felt until the 1930s when colonial policy encouraged emirate authorities to undertake the pilgrimage and to visit the various Middle Eastern countries.

The policy of encouraging pilgrimage had a profound effect on opening channels of communication between Kano authorities and international Muslim

leaders. The first pilgrimage undertaken by a Kano emir was in 1937.8? As 81 Resident Kano to the Secretary, Northern Provinces, NAK (121/1916), August 5, 1916.

82 Resident Kano to the Secretary, Northern Provinces, NAK (180/1916), November 27, 1916.

es “Barly in the year, the Emir of Kano, accompanied by the Galadima Abdul Kadir, the Ma’aji Mallam Suleiman and certain other members of his household performed the pilgrimage. On their return from Mecca they visited Jerusalem and stayed some time in Egypt to see the Pyramids and other places of interest. The Journey had a great significance for all the party as well as a purely religious value. The broadening of outlook of the chiefs and the readiness with which they apply their experiences on their travels to the problems in their own Emirate is very noticeable’ (Kano Provincial Report, 1937

Emurate Authority and Community 259 mentioned earlier, it was on this journey that Emir Abdullahi Bayero came into contact with Ibrahim Niass. The example of the emir’s pilgrimage encouraged

other Kano people to undertake the journey, either by boat from Lagos, by air from Kano, or overland from Kano to Khartoum. Written accounts of the pilgrimage began to appear in Hausa, which further encouraged persons of wealth and status to undertake the journey. (One example of such a book is by the late waziri.5*) Pilgrimage officers were established in the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, and Kano men such as Ahmadu Metteden were posted in these areas to assist northern Nigerian travelers.’ The number of registered pilgrims from Kano dwindled during the war but increased greatly thereafter.

During World War II, Kano was directly involved in the allied effort. American and British air force contingents and a detachment of Free French tanks were located in Kano. Kano was the railhead for the Free French logistic route from Fort Lamy to Murzik in the Fezzan (Libya).°* The British Foreign Office utilized the same type of propaganda regarding the German position toward Islam that they had utilized in World War I. Modern communication devices were used to circulate the propaganda on a mass as well as an elite [Kaduna: Government Printer, 1938], p. 33). According to the Hausa biography of Abdullahi Bayero, “In 1937, the emir of Kano, Abdullahi, went to Mecca by car. There were forty-nine persons in his entourage, including his junior brother, the galadima of Kano, Abdulkadir. After the emir had completed the pilgrimage, he visited certain Arab countries to see for himself how they managed their affairs. He visited Egypt and Palestine. During this journey the emir met many of the Arab leaders and made strong friendships. The emir met the king of Mecca, who expressed pleasure at his coming. When the emir reached Egypt he found the country being ruled by an acting king, Muhammad Ali. The real successor to the throne, Faruk, had gone to England to finish his schooling. The emir met Muhammad Ali, who was like an uncle to Faruk. “While on the pilgrimage, the emir had been in contact with leaders from Palestine. Thus, when the pilgrimage was over he went to see them. The leaders of Palestine are not called kings but muhuts. In all these countries, the emir was taken to interesting places and saw interesting architecture, including mosques. As soon as he returned to Kano he began building a mosque which is second to none in Nigeria. “Regarding the new mosque, the people [of Kano] began to grumble, saying ‘if the old mosque is demolished the emir will not last for one year before he follows the mosque.’ The foundations were completed, however, and the building was erected. The emir opened the mosque in the presence of thousands of people. The emir then impressed the people greatly. Instead of addressing his people in Hausa, he did so in Arabic. Later it was translated to other people in Hausa” (Sarkin Kano Alhaji Abdullahi Bayero, C.M.G., C.B.E. |Zaria: N.R.L.A., 1954; Hausa], p. 22).

84 Abubakar Dokaji [Gidado], Yaye duhun wahami na zuwa Makka [Clearing the darkness of sadness by going to Mecca] (Zaria: Gaskiya Corporation, n.d.). 85 Ahmadu Metteden was one of the first Kano men to graduate from Katsina College. He is of North African (Arab) family origins, was active in the NPC, and was a senator in the federal government. He retired after 1966 and settled in Fagge. 86 For a first-hand account of Kano during 1942-46, see Stanhope White, Dan Bana: The Memoirs of a Nigerian Official (London: Cassell, 1966), pp. 159-93.

260 Religion and Political Culture in Kano level. Regarding one such bulletin, the resident Kano wrote, “The Emir of Kano was so struck with its usefulness that the Kano Native Administration is pro-

ducing one on similar lines in Hausa. The success of the experiment will depend on the ability of the Kano Press to cope fast enough with the printing.” °? During the war, the common people of Kano became more aware of the Middle Eastern context. Because of the colonial orientation during the war

toward the north and west, the infrastructural linkage between Kano and Sokoto was not developed to any extent.

During the colonial period as a whole, the context in which communities were defined and in which community loyalties were balanced was extended in scale. Channels of communication and transportation were developed between

the communities of northern Nigeria and those of the Middle East, with the effect of creating some awareness of a larger context of Muslim community identity. During this same period, however, the Nigerian context itself came to be of major significance at the national, regional, and provincial levels. The basic unit of authority and community in Kano within these nonemirate political contexts, however, was the emirate community as it had emerged in the nineteenth century. Kano identity developed during the colonial period as Sokoto caliphate identity became less important and as Kano came to play a more significant role in the international context. People from Kano took pride in their identity as Kanawa, contracted their political loyalties to the emirate structure, and regarded themselves as sharing in a value context that included the broader Islamic world. CRISES OF EMIRSHIP LEGITIMACY

The two major crises of emirship legitimacy in the nineteenth and twentieth

centuries (excluding colonial conquest) were both related to Kano-Sokoto relations: the Kano civil war, or basasa,®® of 1893-94; and the forced resignation

of Emir Sanusi in 1963. Both illustrate how the symbols of legitimacy are em87 His letter was in reply to a memorandum to Kano Provincial Office, “War Propaganda Circulars,” NAK (4494), July 17, 1941. Part of one circular reads as follows: “Grim Fate of Moslems under Nazi Heel: The grim fate of the Moslems of Europe under the Nazi heel is described by Mahmoud El Hashimi, writing in the Star of India: ‘With the overrunning of the Balkans, Hitler’s hordes have reached the very threshold of the Moslem states of the Near and Middle East. If he is allowed to have his way, all vestige of Islamic culture and civilization and all its sacred shrines and monuments will be swept off the face of the earth. Already two of the Balkan states which have a large proportion of Moslem population lie crushed under the heels of the Gestapo: Albania and

Yugoslavia... .In the philosophy of the Nazi there is no room for tolerance of any religious ideal or belief!’ ”

88 Basasa is the Hausa name given to the civil war, derived from the Arabic for the year in which the war began (a.H. 1311)

Emurate Authority and Community oO | 261 ployed in situations where there is no agreement as to what constitutes established authority and when the jurisdiction between communities at different levels becomes a matter of dispute.

The historical details of the civil war have not yet been fully researched. In brief, the son of Kano Emir Abdullahi Maje Karofi, Yusufu, had expected to succeed his father in 1882. Instead, the brother of Abdullahi, Muhammad Bello, succeeded but with the apparent agreement that Yusufu would succeed Bello. On the death of Bello in December 1893, the sultan of Sokoto appointed the son of Bello, Tukur, rather than Yusufu. The civil war occurred between the supporters of Tukur and the supporters of Yusufu; and the brother of Yusufu,

Aliyu, succeeded to the emirship. Aliyu conquered Kano City in September 1894. Tukur fled and was killed in March 1895. A Kano resident, W. F. Gowers, describes the resultant break with Sokoto: “Aliyu succeeded in 1894, aged 36.

Four months after his succession the Waziri of Sokoto visited Kano with the

object of investing Aliyu with the turban of office. The Kano people, full of resentment against Sokoto for the most injudicious appointment of Tukur, and all the troubles that resulted from it, refused to allow this—an indication that the power and authority of Sokoto over the nominally subordinate Emirates had been greatly shaken.” *°

The indigenous accounts of the civil war reflect on the manner in which legitimacy was argued. Thus, an ex post facto Tukurite account given to Palmer argues for the legitimacy of Tukur by trying to demonstrate the religious piety of Bello:

Bello’s generosity was great, as was his firmness on Shari'a law, and his insistence on fulfilling God’s commands. . . . He spent his wealth on charity... . There has never been an emir who controlled wickedness as did Bello. He divided the year into three parts of four months each, and instructed the district heads to bring wealth [at these intervals] for charity, for the sake of God.

. .. What he gave to the learned mallams [was so great] no one knows but God. . . . He punished in accordance with the Shari’a and returned property to 89 There are a few secondary and some primary sources and documents on the civil war. See J. M. Fremantle, “The Kano Civil War,” in History of the Region Comprising the Katagum Division of Kano Province (reproduced from Journal of the African Society, IQ1I), pp. 62-64; Abubakar Dokaji [Gidado], Kano ta Dabo Cigari [The Kano of Dabo Cigari] (Zaria: Gaskiya Corporation, 1958), pp. 60-67; C. N. Ubah has a section on the

civil war in “Kano Emirate in the Nineteenth Century” (M.A. thesis, University of Ghana, 1965); Last, The Sokoto Caliphate, pp. 134-37. There is one traveler’s account of the civil war, based on first-hand observations: William Wallace, “Notes of a Journey Through Sokoto Empire and Borgu in 1893,” Geographical Journal, 1896, p. 211. Two primary documents from the Tukurite point of view are anon., Basasan Kano [|The Kano civil war], written in Hausa (Sokoto dialect) transcribed by H. R. Palmer; and Muhammad Aminu, “Faid al-qadir” [The divine flood]. 80 Gazetteer of Kano Province (London: Waterlow and Sons, Ltd., n.d.), p. 14.

262 Religion and Political Culture in Kano the owners. He did not receive bribes, and would not pass judgment except in accordance with the law.®!

Muhammad Aminu, a scribe in the court of Bello, argues for Tukur’s legitimacy in terms of Bello’s religious piety and popularity, Tukur’s assistance to the sultan of Sokoto in the wars against non-Muslims, and Yusufu’s “rebellion”: [Bello] gave out to mallams what he could. All that Bello got he gave to the mallams and the poor, and the strangers who came to him. All people continued to praise him. He gave me twenty slaves, and what he gave to the judge of Kano, Mallam Bafta, was more than he gave to me. What he gave to his disciples before he became the emir was uncountable. He died a.x. 1311, the fourth month. As for Yusufu, he rebelled against Usmaniyya. He claimed that he was emir. He sent his people to all the people who were interested in the civil war . . . and gave them horses and slaves. Were it not for his short life he would have caused great trouble in Kano. As such his sins will be increased, as God said in the Qur’an [quotes Qur’an]. What Bello sent to Sokoto was so great it couldn’t be counted. If you want to see the amount he gave, read Altalif aljams‘ and account of what happened between him and Alhaji Abdullahi, who used to go to Sokoto with his wealth. . . . As for his son, Tukur, who succeeded in A.H. 1311, he ruled for sixteen months, and didn’t go out for any expedition even once. People were sent by Muhammad Tukur to defend Kano against Yusufu. Most of the southern districts followed Yusufu, and the Emir sent Ibn Sara to ‘Yarkibiya [Rano] to defend it. . . . He directed Sarkin Dambatta to Garko for the same purpose. To Gano he sent his brother Chiroma Umar. To Kogin Turaki he sent Zakariya. The emir remained in the city, thinking out a way he could avert the evil of Yusufu and his brothers. He gave to mallams a great amount of wealth. He was greatly disturbed because his village heads were angry with him and refused to send him help. They were even trying to make other people avert him, encouraging people to follow Yusufu, until his help became less and his strength weakened until finally, it made him flee. [Tukur] went out from the city of Kano intending to go to Katsina, thinking that he might be helped there. His thought failed him. He died a martyr. May God be pleased with him for his generosity to the mallams to defend him from the evil of Yusufu. As for myself, he gave me 15,000 sets of cowrie.92 Contemporary oral tradition in Kano has legitimized the succession of Yusufu in several ways, including the assertion that Emir Bello failed to follow certain

religious injunctions and hence the failure of his son was ordained by God. The following oral account by the na’ibi Muhammad Dan Amu illustrates the role of the mallam class in establishing the legitimacy of an emir: Abdullahi Maje Karofi was the father of Yusufu. Yusufu was already a maturc man during the reign of his father, and Yusufu thought that he should be the next emir, Yusufu even sent a letter to Sokoto saying Abdullahi was weak and 91 Anon., Basasan Kano, p. 6. 92 “Raid al-qadir.”

Emirate Authority and Community 263 shouldn’t be emir. Muhammad Bello, the turaki of Kano, was brother to Abdullahi, and Yusufu was galadima. The galadima was next to the emir in status. At the death of Abdullahi, the sultan of Sokoto asked Yusufu to be patient because Bello was an old man and after the death of Bello, Yusufu would be emir. This agreement was in a formal letter, and Yusufu assented to it. Then, after he was emir, Bello called all the learned people to a meeting to ask if there were any way his own son, Tukur, could be emir. All the mallams said no. Then an unknown mallam came from somewhere, and when Bello asked him if his son could succeed, he also said no. But then he stood up and pointed

to a wall and said, “is there a door in this wall here.” Bello said, “No.” The mallam replied, “But could you make one if you wanted?” Bello was very happy and asked the mallam how he could make Tukur emir. The mallam said to dig a big hole in a certain spot in the house. He then brought a charm and tied it around the neck of a bull. Then he told the emir to bring all the people while the bull was forced to run into the hole. This happened, and the hole was filled over with dirt, and a room was built on top of it. The mallam said that this was the place where Tukur must sleep if he was to become emir. Whenever he was inside the city he must sleep in this room, but if he was away from the city it didn’t matter.

Then Bello died. A letter was written to Sokoto saying he died. The sultan of Sokoto went to the waziri of Sokoto to appoint Yusufu as emir. It was a twelve-day trip from Sokoto to Kano. After the waziri had left for Kano, the son of the sultan, Abdu Mahe, came to his father and asked him of news of Kano. The sultan said Bello had died. Abdu Mahe then suggested that Tukur should be appointed emir, because Tukur had been very important in the development and spread of Islam in the wars against the pagans. Even at the Battle

of Argungu, Tukur had saved the sultan’s life. At this moment, the sultan changed his mind and decided to appoint Tukur. So he sent an ambassador to Kano at once. Meanwhile the waziri had arrived in Kano and everybody was told informally

that Yusufu would be emir. This was expected and popular. Everyone knew of the signed agreement between Yusufu and the sultan. But in the middle of the night the second ambassador arrived and told the waziri that Tukur, not Yusufu, must be appointed. The following morning was the time for the official announcement. Only the waziri and the ambassador knew of the second letter. When the waziri read the sultan’s letter that night, he said, “Does the sultan

want me to be slaughtered here because of this alteration?” Then the waziri told the people of Kano to come to the mosque in the morning. He chose the mosque because it was a place of sanctuary. When all the people had gathered in the mosque, the waziri read the second letter.

Now Abdullahi had forty sons, that is, Yusufu had thirty-nine brothers, all fine horsemen. When they heard the announcement, they stood up and condemned Sokoto. During the reign of Bello, all the brothers of Yusufu had suffered. They had lost their appointments. Even Yusufu’s sisters had been divorced, on order of Bello, and had come to live in Yusufu’s house. Then Yusufu went home and the brothers said to him, “Are you going to stay in Kanor” So Yusufu and his supporters went out of the city. And Kano became divided into

264 Religion and Political Culture in Kano Tukurawa and Yusufawa. Those who supported Yusufu but stayed in the city were slaughtered by Tukur. Nine-tenths of the common people were in favor of Yusufu, and almost all the mallams, although some of the mallams supported Tukur under compulsion. Yusufu went out and tested the various Kano district heads. Those who did not follow him, he killed. The district heads appointed him emir. But Yusufu became ill and was carried on a hammock. After conquering Gaya he went to Wudil, and from there was about to come to Kano. Yusufu died in Garko, but before he died he called all his brothers together, including Aliyu. He told them that although Aliyu was the youngest, he was also the most senior. Now Aliyu was the grandson of Sultan Bello on his maternal side. His mother was Saudatu, daughter of Aliyu Mai Sagi, son of Sultan Bello. Yusufu said that if Aliyu were emir, Sokoto would not be able to kill him because of his ancestry, but if any other brother were appointed, Sokoto must wage war and try to kill him. When Yusufu finished his speech he died. Aliyu made plans to conquer Kano. Tukur rode on his horse to face the peo-

ple of Aliyu. But that night he had forgotten to sleep in the special room built over the charm. In the morning he remembered he had not slept in that room and felt afraid. Aliyu and his people came to Kano, and Tukur rode away to Katsina, where he was caught and killed by Aliyu’s brother [and successor ] Abbas. The Kano people gave Aliyu great support.*®

The Kano civil war affected the structure of the entire Fulani emirate system** and in certain respects laid the ground for the British conquest. Within Kano City, the fabric of the community was severely split: “While we were at Kano, civil war held the entire province in its grasp. Every few days batches of prisoners were butchered in the market place with the customary indignities to the dead, parts of the body being utilized as medicines and for poisoning arrows and the remains left to the dogs and vultures. Numbers of women were strangled simply because they belong to the rebel party.” °° Rebel property was 93 Interview, Kano, November 8, 1964, Hausa. Dan Amu’s family supported Tukur and fled to Sokoto after the civil war but returned to Kano during the time of Abbas. 94 “The Yakin Yusubenchi, or Kano Civil War of 1893, of course affected all the neighboring provinces, and did more than anything else to weaken the Sokoto influence. Sarkin Gumel alone gave active assistance in the fighting. Sarkin Hadejia gave his support to Yusufu, who promised him the district of Miga and Kwenda if he should be successful. Sarkin Gumel, Abu, was also on Yusufu’s side, but Gumel and Hadejia were not on such good terms that they cared to fight as allies; when therefore they met Yusufu at Gunduawa, Sarkin Hadejia returned home and only send gifts of horses and weapons, receiving return presents of slaves captured in the war; but on his journey to Hadejia he did some pillaging on his own account. A great number on both sides were enslaved; as many as from ten to twenty slaves were given for one horse; and, corn being very scarce, 30,000 or 40,000 cowries were enough to buy a slave. Katagum took no part, but a certain amount of trade was carried on secretly with Yusufu’s people” (Fremantle, “The Kano Civil War,” p. 62). 95 Wallace, “Notes of a Journey,” p. 211.

Emirate Authority and Community 265 redistributed to Tukur supporters and later returned to Yusufu supporters. The exodus of Tukurites to Sokoto resulted in continuing ill will between Kano and Sokoto during the first part of the twentieth century. In part, the legitimacy of Sokoto was on trial, and in retrospect the prevailing Kano Fulani rejected this legitimacy. As mentioned earlier there was a temporary reconciliation between Sokoto and Kano during the British conquest, when

Aliyu (of Kano) and Attahiru (of Sokoto) both resisted (Aliyu was the sultan’s minister of war). The civil war resulted in the succession of Emir Aliyu.®*® Aliyu, as one of the younger brothers, would not normally have been considered for the emirship. He had dedicated his early energies to becoming a religious mallam and is still considered to have been one of the most religiously knowledgeable of

the Kano emirs. The legitimacy of Aliyu was based on several elements: he was directly related by blood (maternal side) to the sultans of Sokoto; he was

a brother of Yusufu; he was probably the most religiously learned of the sons of Abdullahi Maje Karofi; and he was successful militarily.

In short, the civil war was an assertion of local control over succession processes and marked the obsolescence of many of the structural linkages between Kano and Sokoto. The systemic weakness of the incumbent-brothernephew succession pattern is also clear, apart from the issue of Sokoto domination, insofar as this pattern sets up strong rivalries between the sons of the incumbent and the sons of his brother. Given this structural stress, which re-

occurs again in the twentieth century, the means of consolidating public opinion in resolving the succession is of prime importance. The support of district heads was necessary for material assistance, and the support of the mallam class was necessary for spiritual legitimation. The blessing of the mallam class was invoked on both sides in the conflict. Those mallams supporting

Tukur seem to have relied on legalistic arguments: obedience to the law, 96 “Aliyu, the 7th Emir about whose history you are enquiring, first came into prominence during the civil war of 1893-94. ... During the civil war Aliyu, though a good deal younger than his brother Yusufu, emerged as one of the leading personalities among the rebels. When Yusufu died in 1894, he nominated Aliyu to succeed him in the leader-

ship of his faction. In doing this, he was no doubt influenced by the fact that Aliyu, through the female line, was a grandson of the Sultan of Sokoto, Aliyu Babba. If the rebellion proved successful, this kinship would make a reconciliation with Sokoto easier. Under the leadership of Aliyu, the rebels carried the war to a successful conclusion. The

Emir Tukur was driven out and killed and Aliyu succeeded to the vacant throne. His success however, was never recognized during the lifetime of the Sultan of Sokoto, Abdu,

who was deeply offended with him for driving out and killing his own nominee. After the death of the Sultan Abdu, Aliyu was able to bring about a reconciliation with this successor, Sultan Attahiru” (Resident Kano, “History of Aliyu, Seventh Emir of Kano,” NAK [5992/51], September 30, 1954).

266 Religion and Political Culture in Kano generosity in giving alms, and the need to support the established system (including Sokoto). Although written documents supporting Yusufu are not available, at least some of the contemporary arguments by mallams supporting Yusufu include reference to the justice of Yusufu’s claim, the failure of Tukur in following a mallam’s instructions, and the religious training of Aliyu. (As

mentioned in chapter 4, Aliyu was the author of a major work on sufism.) Some of the legitimacy issues of the civil war are blurred in contemporary oral history by the split between the house of Aliyu, which was excluded from power after Aliyu was sent into exile by the British, and the hovce of Abbas, which has provided the emirs of the twentieth century. The second crisis of emirship legitimacy in Kano was the forced resignation or deposition of Emir Sanusi.2” On March 28, 1963, the emir of Kano, Muhammad Sanusi, resigned as a result of the 144-day Commission of Inquiry into the Financial Affairs of Kano Native Authority by the Northern Nigeria Regional Government. In addition, fourteen senior Kano executive officers, including the emir’s son Ado Sanusi, were suspended from all duties and restricted to residence outside Kano Emirate. The deposition of Emir Sanusi was

the first major crisis of legitimacy in northern Nigeria in the independence period. It revolved around the issue of the power of the major emirs, succession to emirate leadership, the basis of emirate legitimacy, and the responsibility of emirate leadership to larger political systems.

Political structure and process during Emir Sanusi’s reign (1954-63) had been in a state of rapid change, both on the emirate level and on the regional and national levels (see chapter 8). Sanusi’s attempt to control political succession and authority within Kano Emirate resulted in a direct confrontation with new political elements, even within his own political party.°® He had also alienated some of his traditional councillors, who were often slighted in favor of persons with a personal, political, and religious allegiance to Sanusi.”? De97 For discussion of Northern Region political relationships related to the deposition, see C. S. Whitaker, Jr.. The Politics of Tradition: Continuity and Change in Northern Nigeria, 1946-1966 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970), pp. 279-82.

88 Including Musa Gashash, of Tripolitanian extraction (minister of lands and survey, Northern Region, and regional president of the NPC), and Sule Gaya (minister of local government, Northern Region). The immediate cause of alienation in the above cases was the emir’s attempt to oppose land reforms and local government reforms. Land tenure and local government both had religious overtones as well as deep political implications.

99 In particular, two of the kingmakers: the madaki, Shehu Ahmad, and the sarkin dawaki mai tuta, Bello Dandago. In both cases, Sanusi had been partly responsible for their succession, in return for their support for his own succession. As chiroma, in 1952 Sanusi

was instrumental in appointing Bello Dandago (who had been his private tutor in English) who was the first titleholder not descended from Jammo. In turn, Bello Dandago supported Sanusi’s candidacy in 1954. Likewise, as chiroma, Sanusi was instrumental in

Emirate Authority and Community 267 spite the disaffection of some of the above elements, Sanusi had been able to control the nomination of Kano members of the federal Parliament and the Northern House of Assembly in the 1956, 1959, and 1961 elections and was in a strong position in Kano. The deposition of Sanusi was primarily the result of a rivalry for power and authority with the premier of the Northern Region, Ahmadu Bello, of Sokoto. This rivalry was publicly noticeable during 1961, when Sanusi was acting governor of the Northern Region and was regarded in some quarters as behaving in a manner that exceeded his status. In 1962 the establishment of the provincial commissioner system in northern Nigeria, which was strongly urged by the premier, was resented by Sanusi as a direct threat to his power in Kano. Sanusi and Bello were clearly the two dominant figures in northern politics at the beginning of the 1960s. To a large extent, Bello’s strength lay in his control of the bureaucratic structure of the north, while Sanusi’s strength lay in his dominance of Kano Emirate and his broader charismatic appeal as a religious leader. The decision by Bello to encourage Usmaniyya (discussed in chapter 4) as a counterforce to Reformed Tijaniyya brought both men into direct competition in the area of revitalistic religion. The strong geographic identity of Bello with Sokoto and Sanusi with Kano reinforced what might have been a personal conflict by placing it in the context of the historical rivalry between Kano and Sokoto. In the direct confrontation that emerged in 1962-63, Bello prevailed largely because of his control of the legal and budgetary levers of the Northern Region, which by this time had surpassed Kano Emirate in all areas of resources.

The procedure of the inquiry was set up by the Northern Region government and was to deal, ostensibly, with the finances of Kano Emirate. On September 18, 1962, “The Northern Government decided to appoint a senior Administrative Officer, Mr. D. J. M. Muffett, the sole Commissioner, to start his inquiries immediately into the deteriorating financial position of the Kano Native Authority.” *°° Muffett was asked to report to the northern minister the succession of Shehu Ahmad upon the death of his uncle, Madaki Ibrahim, in 1953 with the explicit understanding that the functions of the chiroma would be handled by the madaki. Later, as emir, Sanusi alienated both of these individuals by assuming many of their functions and by recognizing them merely as “advisers.” Reputedly, the madaki’s advice to petitioners bearing gifts was to divide the gift into four parts: one-fourth should be given to Ado Sanusi who was extremely close to his father; one-eighth should be given

to the shamaki, Inuwa, a servant of the emir who handled appointments with the emir; one-half would be given to the emir himself; and one-eighth should be given to two other

palace servants, the dan rimi (Gugguru) and the sallama (Abin Fada). With the commission of inquiry in 1963, both the shamaki and dan rimi (plus Ado) were suspended. 100 Daily Mail (Kano), September 19, 1962, p. 1. Muffett had served in the Northern Nigeria Administrative Service for seventeen years. He was regarded as having particularly

268 Religion and Political Culture in Kano for local government, Sule Gaya. By late September, certain Kano officials, notable supporters of Sanusi, were suspended, including the councillor for health and land, Ado Sanusi (dan iya of Kano), who was restricted to Lagos for the duration of the inquiry; the chief alkali of Kano, Umaru, who was

restricted to Gwarzo and later to Birnin Kudu; the district head of Kano Waje (mai unguwar mundubawa), Shehu Kazaure, who was restricted to Kazaure; and the Native Authority councillor for education, Ahmadu Rufa’t Daura, who was restricted to Daura. Throughout October and November other suspensions followed.’ The imam of Yolawa mosque, a religious adviser to the emir, was suspended on December 3 and restricted to a village near Kano. On December 13, Emir Sanusi appeared before the commission to testify on allegations brought against his administration.‘°* On January 7, the

district head of Rano was interrogated, and further arrests were made.” Occurrences of violence began in Kano City.1°* By mid-February, the inquiry close relations with the premier, Ahmadu Bello. In 1947 he was A.D.O. in Sokoto, until his appointment as regional census officer in 1952. He was appointed district officer for Numan in 1955 and for Igala in 1957. In 1957 he was posted to the Ministry of Trade and Industry as senior assistant secretary. In 1958 he was the officer responsible for the government case on the Minority Commission and in 1959 was chief federal electoral officer. In the same year he went to London as an adviser in the Nigerian Constitutional Conference. In 1960 he became resident in the trust territory that became Sardauna Province in 1961. In 1962 he became “special duties officer” in the Premier’s Office in Kaduna. He became permanent secretary, Ministry of Land and Survey, before being called in August 1962 to act as sole commissioner to look into the financial affairs of the Kano Native Authority.

101 These included the assistant district head of Dawakin Tofa, Mansir (galadiman makama); bursar, Provincial Secondary School, Abdurrahman Enagi; the district head of Wudil (dan kadai); sarkin kasuwa, Sabon Gari, Dan Tsoho; the chief printer of Kano Native Authority Printing Press, Abdu Bici (restricted to Birnin Kudu); and chief binder at the N.A. Press, Mallam Husaini. The Head of Native Authority Works, Shehu Mai Mota (wakilin sana’a), was sentenced to two years in jail for corruption. Criminal charges of corruption were brought against Usman Tofa, Zanna Kano, and the chairman of the Native Authority Plot Allocation Board. On December 12 the “cattle drover” of the emir

was arrested on charges of receiving a gratuity of two cows from the village head of Karfi.

102 At his Nassarawa Palace, the emir “held a session of his court and later led the crowd in after Azahar prayers, just before he was to appear before the Sole Commissioner... . For 42 minutes the Emir was in Muffett’s office, in the presence of six others: Muffett and his secretary, the Provincial Commissioner and his secretary, the Madaki, and Sarkin Shanu. He was believed to have testified and answered not less than 25 questions put to him by the Sole Commissioner, Mr. Muffett” (Dasly Mail, Kano, December 15, 1962, p. 1).

103 Daily Mail, Kano, January 8, 1963, p. 1. Proceedings were brought against the district head of Rano, Alhaji Abubakar, regarding misappropriation of Native Authority funds involving a total of £1,868.

104 The shamaki of Kano was suspended, along with three of his assistants: Ibrahim Maisunan Malam, Alhaji Awalu, and Maikano Yola. According to a report in the govern-

Emirate Authority and Community 269 had ended and the report was submitted to the Ministry of Local Government. In March, 1963, the results of the inquiry were made public, although the report itself was closely guarded. The repercussions from the conclusion of the inquiry included the resignation of the emir, the reorganization of the Kano Native Authority, the selec-

tion of a new emir, and the formation of a political party dedicated to the return of ex-Emir Sanusi. The resignation of Emir Sanusi and his subsequent move to Azare (Katagum

Emirate, Bauchi Province) occurred after a conference in Kaduna between the emir and the governor of the Northern Region, Sir Kashim Ibrahim. According to the government statement, “It was necessary for Alhaji Sir Muhammadu Sanusi to take this step in order to make the way clear for reforms which the Government intends to carry out in Kano Emirate, following consideration of the report of the recent Commission of Inquiry.” *” The proposed reorganization of the Kano Native Authority Council, which was not fully brought into effect, was based on a combination of ascriptive and achieved criteria. The official government statement issued at the end of April

recommended the following changes in the council: “The new full Council when appointed will be composed as follows: (1) Emir of Kano, (11) two members from the Royal family, (iii) three traditional members, (iv) four District and Village Heads, (v) seven members who are Native Authority Officials (including two Ministers who are on leave without pay), (vi) five elected members, (vii) three members representing special interests. The Council procedure is to be modernized.” *°°

The selection of Inuwa as emir was probably intended by his selectors as an interim measure. Yet his natural death within seven months confirmed in the

Kano public mind that he was “not meant to be emir.” The burden of ment press, “The Emir of Kano, Alhaji Sir Muhammadu Sanusi’s head messenger, Alhaji Inuwa Dan Indo, Shamakin Kano, was reported on January 7th to have organised a mob

that mercilessly manhandled the Sole Commissioner’s aides in Kano City...” (Daily Mail, Kano, January 15, 1963, p. I). 105 Daily Mail, Kano, March 29, 1963, p. 4.

106 Nigerian Citizen, May 1, 1963, p. 1. By the end of May, the new council had been

selected and included the following portfolio councillors: Shehu Ahmad (madaki), senior councillor and councillor for local government and coordination; Abubakar Gidado (waziri), councillor for judiciary, and land and survey; Muhammadu Sani (sarkin

Shanu), councillor for city, Waje, police and prisons; Sule Minjibir (sarkin ruwa), councillor for finance; Usman Gwarzo (sarkin yaki), councillor for natural resources; Sani Gezawa, councillor for education, medical and health, and public enlightenment;

Muhammad Also (dagacin rabah), councillor for works; and Muhammad Munir (mutawalli), councillor for social welfare and cooperatives. Elections were not held as intended.

270 Religion and Political Culture in Kano establishing the legitimacy of Inuwa was handled in several ways: it was argued by a few that the original succession of Sanusi had been illegitimate and that Inuwa, as brother of Abdullahi Bayero, should have succeeded in 1954; it was argued that Sanusi had betrayed his religious responsibility by not

establishing justice in Kano Emirate;'°" it was argued that Sanusi was not “deposed” but had voluntarily resigned, as was his prerogative. It remained for Emir Ado Bayero, who succeeded Inuwa, to face the real problems of establishing the legitimacy of his succession. His means of achieving this end —including the fostering of a nonreligious type of Kano nationalism—will be

considered in chapter 8. | The crisis of legitimacy after the resignation of Sanusi was institutionally

perpetuated through the formation of the Kano Peoples Party (KPP) in April 1963, which was dedicated to the return of ex-Emir Sanusi or to the succession of his son, Ado Sanusi. The Kano Peoples Party (Jam*iyyar Mutanen

Kano)—also called the Sanusi Party (Jam’iyyar Sanusi), the Community of Kano (AlUmmar Kano), and the Muslim Party (Jam’iyyar Musulmi)—was formed after the deposition of Sanusi. The executive officers otf KPP were jailed almost immediately for abusing the sardauna. During the first year the leadership level was suppressed almost completely and was divided by internal factions (see chapter 8). Yet the popular basis of support was considerable.

Almost all of the mallams of the Reformed Tijaniyya lent support to the movement. The party symbol became a set of prayer beads. A later split in the KPP resulted in the selection of a second party flag, a picture of Dala Hill.

This symbol was also associated with Reformed Tijaniyya because ot the identification of Dala Hill with the ceremony of takutaha. Both flags were prohibited by the Kano senior district officer.

The manifesto of the Kano Peoples Party lists the major concerns of the people involved. The manifesto, which was apparently published only in Hausa, may be paraphrased as follows: to free the country from one-man rule [mulkin mutum daya]; to ensure that mallams are respected and that religion is not subverted; to ensure respect [daraja] for all persons; to ensure respect for all Muslim religious leaders and to free [yanchi] the country from autocracy; to put an end to selfishness [son kat], hypocrisy [munafunct|, terror 107 This was the argument of Emir Inuwa: “The newly sworn-in Emir of Kano, Alhaji Muhammadu Inuwa, broadcasting to the people of Kano Emirate, yesterday prayed to God to forgive the ex-emir, Alhaji Sir Muhammadu Sanusi, and all others involved in the Commission of Inquiry, for all their misdeeds that led to the ex-Emir’s resignation. ... The Emir appealed to all the learned and religious Malams to make their contribu-

tions towards the defence of their religion and its progress throughout the country” . Emir p. I). Prays to God for Ex-Emir’s Forgiveness,” Daily Mail, Kano, April 9, 1963,

Emurate Authority and Community 271 [tsorataswa], and deceit [yaudara]; to unify all the people; to ensure that trade is controlled by the people, not by foreigners; to work for the people and for

Allah; to ensure that all crops are bought for fair prices; and to ensure that the area gets more industry. In January 1964 the KPP formally merged with the opposition party in the north, the Northern Elements Progressive Union (NEPU). When the Kano State Movement (KSM) was formed in July 1965, most of the KPP supporters channeled their energies into this new party, which espoused the creation of a separate Kano state (see chapter 8). The parallel between the succession crisis of 1893 and the deposition crisis

of 1963 was a subject of widespread comment in Kano during the period 1963-65. It was argued that in both cases an external power (Sokoto) had tried

to determine the nature of emirate authority in Kano. The Kano reaction in both cases was organized protest, and a resurgence of “Kano nationalism,” or separatism. In both cases, those emirs who had succeeded “illegitimately” (Tukur and Inuwa), died within a short period after the succession (which was regarded as a vindication of “the Kano position”) and were succeeded by young men (Aliyu and Ado) who were not expecting the office. On another level, the 1963 crisis may be viewed as a conflict between bureaucratic authority (the ministers at the regional level plus the Kano councillors)

and charismatic authority (Sanusi). Charismatic authority, by definition, attempts to centralize and to refrain from specialized responsibility. It usually draws to some extent on religious symbols. Bureaucratic authority on the other hand, attempts to differentiate functional controls on power and usually tries to secularize the basis of authority. The confrontation of charismatic and bureaucratic authority in Kano led to a deposition crisis. Yet, with the charismatic leader living in exile, the issue was regarded by many in Kano as unresolved.

In conclusion, explicitly religious concepts of political authority and community formed the basis of the emirate structure in Kano. This legitimation of structure in terms of Islamic doctrines dates from the time when the Hausa emirs were converted to Islam (late fifteenth century) and was reinforced at the time of the Jihad (early nineteenth century). During the colonial period, the policy of indirect rule recognized this basis of legitimation and, in many ways, strengthened the central authority within the emirate structure. In the twentieth century succession to the emirship became restricted to members of a particular family within the royal Sullubawa clan (the Abbas family), and the influence of the Kano emir on succession to authority in the other Fulani clans and in the rural districts became determinative. The crisis of succession in the late nineteenth century, which resulted in civil war, may be regarded in part as factionalism within the Fulani clan system and in part as a reaction to external authority. The crisis of authority during the deposition of Emir

272 Religion and Political Culture in Kano Sanusi in the independence period represented a challenge to the basis of authority within Kano Emirate. Just as mallams were used to justify one side or the other in the Kano civil war, so mallams became involved after 1963 in assessing the legitimacy of Emir Sanusi as opposed to that of the premier, Ahmadu Bello. The “Usmaniyya” promoted by the premier posed the question of whether the emirate community or the regional community should be the appropriate unit to establish and confirm real authority.

7

The Ideological Basis of Early Emirate Reform

In the 1940s and 1950s a number of individuals in Kano began to question

the premises of the emirate state and to protest against various aspects of emirate authority and the idea of emirate community. In this chapter, five themes will be discussed: the reformers, the ideological basis of authority reform, the ideological basis of community reform, the style and symbols of reform, and interpretation of the Qur’anic paradigm. THE REFORMERS

The young men in Kano who came to argue for change in the Native Authority system represented all ethnic groups: Fulani (for example, Magaji Dambatta, Lawan Danbazau, and Tanko Yakasai), Hausa (for example, Mudi Sipikin), and Beriberi (for example, Abba Maikwaru). They represented all

classes and many different occupations: tailors (Tanko Yakasai), traders (Mudi Sipikin), and even members of the royal Sullubawa, especially from the line of Aliyu which had been excluded from the administration. Because of the pressures on employees within the Native Authority system, some of the young men, such as Maitama Sule, continued to work within the establishment while sharing many of the views of the more publicly articulate spokesmen for reform. In retrospect, however, the three major figures that influenced thinking with

regard to emirate reform were westernized members of the mallam class:

274 Religion and Political Culture in Kano Aminu Kano," Sa’ad Zungur,”? and Isa Wali? They were trained in Western and Arabic schools. They were from Fulani mallam families with emirate connections: Aminu’s father (Yusufu) was scribe to the chief alkali and was later acting chief alkali; Sa’ad’s father was imam of Bauchi; and Isa’s father (Suleiman) was wali of Kano (see chapter 2). Aminu had a family home in

Sudawa ward (during 1967-68 he built a new home in Gwammaja ward near the road to Fagge); Isa had a home in Durimin Iya ward as well as Bompai. Sa’ad lived near the School of Hygiene in 1938-39, and later in Zaria and Bauchi he maintained close contacts with Kano. Aminu and Sa’ad were actively involved in party politics, although Isa, because of his civil-service status,

was not a direct participant in the northern political system. Aminu and Sa’ad provided the main intellectual thrust against emirate authority and the idea that primary political loyalties centered on emirate boundaries. Although these men espoused a secular national state based on “progressive” principles, in their confrontation with emirate authority they frequently used symbols and metaphors adapted from their religious heritage. Aminu Kano (b. 1920) 1s Gyanawa (Fulani) on his father’s side and Bornu Fulani-Beriberi on his mother’s side. During the time of Emir Suleiman, Mamman Zara had come from Kukawa (in Bornu) to become a palace mallam. He was later imam of Kano. From Mamman Zara descended a line of learned people, including Aminu’s mother (see Figure 12). On the Gyanawa side,

Abdulaziz had been a teacher and an associate of Usman dan Fodio. His descendants included a number of alkalis and mallams (see Figure 13). Aminu’s grandfather, Hassan, was a mallam in Yakasai ward, specializing in hadith and tafsir. He was also a wealthy merchant. Members of the Gyanawa clan, as mentioned earlier, have had a special place in Kano as specialists in

Islamic law. In the twentieth century, three of the five walis (Suleiman, Bashiru, and Abubakar) have been Gyanawa, as have several mallams involved in advising emirs (for example Muhammad Dan Amu) and several high-level

alkalis (such as Abubakar Bashir Wali, chief justice of the Shari’a Court of Appeal, Kano State; and Umar Bashiru, inspector of courts, Kano State), as well as some successful businessmen (such as Inuwa Wada). Although the family home was in Sudawa ward, Aminu was raised from 1 For biographical details on Aminu Kano, see Lawan Danbazau, Aminu Kano (Zaria:

Gaskiya Corporation, 1963; Hausa); also Aminu Kano, Motsi ya fi zama [Motion is better than standing still] (Zaria: Gaskiya Corporation, 1955).

2For biographical details on Sa’ad Zungur, see Dandatti Abdulkadir, “The Modern Hausa Poetry of Sa’ad Zungur” (M.A. Thesis, University of Wisconsin, 1970). 8 There is no published biography of Isa Wali. The author is grateful to Dahiru Wali, Alfa Wali, and Na’ibi Wali (brothers of Isa) for discussions regarding the career of Isa and for making available portions of Isa’s personal papers.

pe

Ideological Basis of Early Emirate Reform 275 Figure 12

Aminu Kamo: Matemal Line

[ERAHIM (™) HAIMA GADANGAVA KUNDI

MYHANWAO ALU A6UBHAR ASHA.- DAHIEV (SA HAA NATD SAFIYA Py) YA HATHIYA HALILV SAVDATU

say easio AMINA FATIMA ASAMA'VY (TWINS) KEY: (M)= MARIA

Figure 13

Amina Kano: Paternal ine : ABDULALZ (WAtLAM)

GANAN ZANGL (ALKALL) |

ASHAFA (ALFALLD TAN CIBINDL (MALLAM)

| HASSAN (MALLAM AND MERCHANT)

MAZAD ae CACTING CHIEF ALFALL) (Twins) =ASAMA'V HALILY (TWINS) AMIN KANO MyStAfA GOAL SAN DIE |

276 Religion and Political Culture in Kano the age of two in the home of Alkali Ja’afaru of Soron Dinki ward. He remained with Mallam Ja’afaru while attending Shahuci Primary School and Kano Middle School. From Kano he went to Katsina College for one year

and then to Kaduna (now Barewa College, Zaria), where he finished his teacher training. At that point he was assigned to teach in the Bauchi Provincial Secondary School under Headmaster Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, later prime minister of Nigeria. In 1946-47 he joined the second group of northern Nigerians to study in England, where he undertook advanced work at the London University Institute of Education.* While in London he helped found the Northern Teachers’ Welfare Association, and on his return home he convened the first meeting of the association in 1948. He was assigned as acting education ofhcer in charge of the Teacher Training College in Maru (Sokoto province). In 1950 he resigned from teaching and helped to found the Northern Elements Progressive Union, of which he later became life president. His involvement in the political life of Nigeria since that time is well

known. Aminu studied Arabic with his father, with Alkali Ja’afaru, and with Cigari dan Waziri. At Shahuci he studied under Alhaji Mallam Gado da Masu, in middle school under Mahmud na Bajir, and in Kaduna under Bello Kagara.

His strength was in the area of Arabic literature and interpretation of the Qur'an (tafsir). Aminu’s mother and father were both members of Tijaniyya. His father encouraged him to join, but he postponed initiation on the grounds that the tariqa required too much time. Yet his family connection with Reformed Tyaniyya, especially through Wali Suleiman, contributed to his rapport with the Hausa-Beriberi mallam class in Kano which was important in establishing some of his early political support. The earliest writings of Aminu Kano criticizing the emirate system were the Hausa plays he wrote while at Kaduna College in 1938-39. In Kai, wanene

a Rasuwar Kano da ba zaa cuce ka ba [Whoever you are, you will be duped in Kano market] he dramatized the exploitation of the rural peasants who come to the city to buy cloth and are cheated by the urban merchants.

In Karya fure take bata ’yaya [Falsehood gives flowers but never fruit] he portrayed the emir’s court as a collusion of district heads who extort money * The first group in 1945-46 included Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, Bello Kano, Yahaya Gusau, and Shettima Ajirai. © See Richard Sklar, Political Parties in Nigeria (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963); B. J. Dudley, Parties and Politics in Northern Nigeria (London: Frank Cass, 1966);

C, S. Whitaker, Jr., The Politics of Tradition: Continuity and Change in Northern Nigeria, 1946-1966 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970).

Ideological Basis of Early Emirate Reform 277 from the peasants and some young colonial officers who come on the scene to connive with the “native rulers.” In addition to these two full-length plays, during 1939-41 he wrote about twenty short plays for schools; these ridiculed various local customs and Native Authority practices. He also wrote a pamphlet

entitled “Kano under the hammer of native autocracy.” He submitted the plays for publication to Gaskiya Ta Fi Kwabo but they were subsequently “lost.”

During the period 1941-43, he focused his attack on high salaries and cor-

ruption in the Native Authority and on the way in which the emir “kept people in the dark.” During the 1943-46 period, he participated in the Bauchi Discussion Circle and began to focus on national issues. Articles by Aminu appeared in the West African Pilot but were signed “Bauchi,” a pen name for the entire group of Bauchi Discussion Circle members. Parallels were drawn between German fascism and Fulani-British overrule. At the same time, he

undertook seriously his confrontation of the emirate system and began to articulate a religious basis of his ideological protest.

The relationship between Aminu Kano and Sa’ad Zungur was very close and stemmed from their joint teaching experience in Bauchi during the 1940s. After completing a course at Yaba College, Sa’ad (1915-58) came to Kano in 1938 and taught for two years at the Kano School of Hygiene. At that time he was a proponent of Ahmadiyya and also Egyptian patterns of Islamic reform. He later dropped his afhliation with the sect. In 1948 Sa’ad became first secretary of the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC) but in

August 1950 broke with the NCNC over its apparent insensitivity to the problems of reform in the North. From 1951 to 1954 he worked for the Northern Peoples Congress (NPC) in Kaduna, recruiting party members from the House of Assembly. In 1954 he broke with the NPC and became organizer of the NEPU branch in Bauchi. Until his death in 1958 he was active in NEPU affairs throughout the north.

Isa Wali (1929-67) completed the Qur’an at the age of seven. After the death of his father in 1939, Isa was raised by Abubakar na Wali, an Arabic teacher in Yakasai ward who was an adviser to the emir and a Tijani muqaddam. Isa attended Kwaru Primary School (1936-40), Kano Middle School

(1940-43), and the School for Arabic Studies (SAS) in Kano (1943-48) where he was the top student in his class. While at SAS he concentrated on hadith and tafsir. He was also an avid reader of newspapers that dealt with “modern” problems (Gaskiya Ta Fi Kwabo and the West African Pilot in particular). When he finished SAS he went to Kaduna as interpreter in the House of Chiefs and House of Assembly. In 1951 he went to London for nine months to study parliamentary procedure in the House of Commons

278 Religion and Political Culture in Kano and House of Lords. When he returned to Kaduna, he was clerk assistant to the House of Assembly. During the period 1951-56 Isa became increasingly involved in criticism of various aspects of northern political and religious life, particularly anything he felt represented suppression. Isa Wali was particularly influential among the Western-educated class in northern Nigeria, although he tended to speak in private rather than in public. He argued for changes in the emirate system, particularly for more accommodation for all classes of northerners within the native authority system and less discrimination against southerners. He worked out a scheme to reduce the emir’s salary and tried to bring the Native Authority under civil-service regula-

tions. He also argued for the independence of the local courts and for a “friend in court” system, since lawyers were not allowed. He was a proponent of northern culture—not an imitation of the West, but a culture that was not chained to the past. He was not a member of any brotherhood despite his close family connections with Tijaniyya. He argued that they were not necessary in Islam even though he respected the learning and knowledge of many of the brotherhood mallams.

Partly because of his close personal links with Aminu Kano during his Kaduna period and the considerable controversy that ensued after the publica-

tion of his articles in 1956 on the status of women, he transferred to Lagos in 1957 and joined the foreign service. From 1958 to 1961 he was Nigerian representative at the United Nations in New York. In 1961 he returned to Lagos and was in charge of the African Affairs Bureau. In 1964 he was appointed Nigerian high commissioner to Ghana, where he remained until his untimely death (due to high blood pressure) in 1967. THE IDEOLOGICAL BASIS OF AUTHORITY REFORM

Many of the writings of Aminu Kano attacked ethnic (Fulani), feudal, and colonial rule, and he often referred to the emirate rulers as an “Anglo-Fulani aristocracy.” ° One of the earliest existing documents by Aminu Kano is entitled “°Yan tande” [Exploiters-colonialists] and was written in 1943 while he was teaching in Bauchi. He submitted the document for publication to Gaskiya Ta Fit Kwabo, but the manuscript was rejected. Consequently, he used

it as the basis of speeches during this period.’ The document, in Hausa, is addressed to a Hausa-Fulani audience and uses the metaphor of a family to describe the authority patterns between emirs and the common people during 6 See Aminu Kano, “Review of Dr. Miller’s ‘Have We Failed in Nigeria?’ ” (typescript,

Kano, 1953). The author is grateful to Aminu Kano for making available this manuscript. 7 Interview, Aminu Kano, London, March ¥, 1970.

Ideological Basis of Early Emirate Reform 279 the colonial era. “”Yan tande” does not condemn the office of emir but rather the corruption of that office. The manuscript is paraphrased below; major portions are presented so that the overall line of reasoning will not be distorted. In the opening section, Aminu states that the colonialists have perpetrated three deceptions on the people of northern Nigeria: The First Deception: Do you believe the Europeans [turawa] came suddenly?

Not at all. The European hid first behind the scene, watching and observing, looking at our strengths and weaknesses, and looking for a way to prevent us from walking other than on all fours or crawling on our bellies. Only after he had overthrown us did he say, “Peace be unto you” [salamu alaikum]. All of us living here [in the north] are lying on the ground. The European has taken care to divide us. And since conquering us what has he done apart from cheat-

ing [mugunta|? (A cheating which we shall never forget!) . . . Only God can intercede for us. Let me illustrate this cheating.

Let us imagine you have come and found a father with his ten children, and each of them has his own house and wives and children. They never do anything except after consultation with their father. If a foreigner [bare] assaults one of them, especially if it is the father, they all come together to protect him. In short, they were living in an atmosphere of peaceful well-being [zaman arziki]. They would set a date in a particular month to go and see the father and greet one another and renew their kinship [zumunta]. None of them ever deviated from the instructions of the father. One day the father died. Then they decided that the eldest among them, or at least one of them who had the qualities of a wise man [dattijo], should enter the house of the father and reside there, and they would owe him allegiance [su bi shi] as if nothing had happened.

One day they started to disagree among themselves. Each insisted on having things his way. The senior brother started to display qualities unworthy of a wise man. The small children started to suffer. Formerly whenever any child went to the house of his uncle [kawu], it was as if he were in his own father’s house. But now, even if his father mistreats him, he has no place to appeal.® Everybody began to treat his children in any way he felt like. They [the fathers |

did not start exchanging blows among themselves but did start saying such things as “you are lying” or “you are not fit to do that.” Meanwhile the Europeans are observing all this without saying a word. They

are aware that they are stronger, having more people and better equipment [Rayan aiki]. And they know the people are not united [gama kaz]. One day they picked out one of the sons and struck him. And he fell, just like that. Meanwhile, the brothers are just looking on and saying that is his due, he deserves it. But some are preparing themselves in case they are turned on. Meanwhile the colonialists [’yan tande] are saying they have struck the first son and would strike all the others because their ways were evil. Before you could bat an eye, the colonialists had defeated them all. Well then! One day the colonialists

8 The implication here is that you can report your father to your grandfather if he does wrong. There are no legitimate means of protest, however, if the grandfather does evil or is dead.

280 Religion and Political Culture in Kano gathered the sons together in order to “reconcile” [zumunci] them. The first thing they said was, “Let all live without fighting; no one is concerned with anybody else; each of you is autonomous [gudan kansa] in his own right. No one has the power [:ko] to command anyone else. Let each go and live peacefully with his family. You, the senior, who are now living in the place of your father, you have no power above anyone, except your immediate family. You have no power to tell your juniors anything. Live in kinship. Peace.” Really, the colonialists are excellent at reconciliation! Well, brothers [jama’a], that is the condition of our country. And this is what the European has done to it. Sokoto is the senior brother. The rest of the provinces are the junior brothers. The reason why the European indulged in this division by hypocrisy and refused to reconcile one province with another or to reconcile the provinces with Sokoto was that he did not want them to be a unity. He did not want us to learn too quickly what he was teaching us, for the lesson would have started with our fathers. His exploitation of us would not have endured long, for it was this ex-

ploitation that brought him. Today you can see a diminutive territory, which really amounts to nothing, and yet has its own Native Authority. Its emir will assume that he has no superior and that he exists as such in his own right. In former days, it would have been demonstrated to him that the sultan of Sokoto was his superior in every way. Today he [the small emir] has no superior. Where have you even seen a people achieve anything worth achieving when everybody is conscious of his autonomy? May God curse that which has brought

about such a situation. This is why the youth of this country are in revolt... . The Second Deception: You have heard about the first deception which has been inflicted on us, which has been like separating blind men from their sticks and asking them to go home without missing their way or falling into a ditch or asking the way. What else could they do but to crawl along, feeling their way, or walk on their feet and plunge into ditches. That is how we are today. Let us go on to the second deception. You surely know the second. Are you

aware of the fact that our love for the emirs in former days was far greater than it is today? Do you know why today we don’t care at all for the emirs? Come, draw nearer that J may tell you. Let’s go back to our metaphor in the first deception. After the colonialists had told the sons what to do, each of the sons

went back home wondering if the colonialists were not plotting again him. At home the child would go to its father and say, “Papa, here I am, accept me. Let us put our heads together. And with your aid and God’s, nothing will befall us as regards this man [the colonialist]. You are the senior member of our family, and it is you who knows what we should do. Make us do what you know

will be to our advantage.” |

Yet suddenly it turns out that the parents of these children have teamed up with the colonialists whom the children fear. There you are! Undoubtedly the friend of your enemy is your enemy. The friend of what you fear is himself an object of fear to you. Hence, the children held back, and refused to heed whatever their parents said to them. Let me make it short for you. Fear, suspicion, and disrespect set in between the children and their parents. Matters got worse to the point where the parents started to blame the children, accusing them of

lack of integrity. This is the position today between us and the Christians

Ideological Basis of Early Emirate Reform 281 [wasara] and the emirs.® Every progressive [dan zamani] today detests whatever brings him into contact with the emirs, unless he has sold out and is licking their boots in order to be given a share in the booty. In days gone by, in accordance with the administrative legacy of this country, the emir was the leader in every way, including matters of religion [addint]. He had the authority to interfere in everything religious. That is to say, if a man married more wives than he could support, the emir had a right to interfere, since he was the commander of the faithful. I challenge you today to convince me that the emirs are at all interested in such matters. At any rate, how can he interfere when it has been established that no one has authority above anyone else. And you, how will you respect him when you know he has no power above you. In fact, is it surprising if our behavior is baffling? Has there ever been a people who were united without having a leader? How can we be accused of failing to make progress, of failing to be united, when in fact our heads have been cut off at the necks?

Today there is no good relationship between us and our emirs. So far as the emirs are concerned, it is the Europeans and they themselves that matter. They look up to the European because he is making things easy for him, because it was he who installed them, with or without our consent [so]. The emirs are not concerned with anybody or whatever may befall anybody, so long as they are fulfilling the commands of the European. And the European, for his part, out of sheer hypocrisy stands aloof and overlooks and pretends that he does not know what crimes have been committed in the course of doing his bidding. He seems to believe that so long as no one screams aloud, no one is suffering. He doesn’t know that the Hausa man does not make his complaints to God until he is alone in his room. Apart from the European, the emir is not concerned with anything apart from his own children and his property. That is to say, if an emir knows that his children have work, or are ruling, and if he knows that a person he likes will succeed him, he gives thanks to heaven. Are people suffering or not? Who cares? In fact, he would rather they are suffering, for he doesn’t respect nonrelatives [bare] out of goodwill, but of necessity. The Third Deception: Oh dear friend, have you ever for a single moment paused to ponder and see if there is anything wrong with our emirs today? Really, what is an emir? Are you aware that “emir” does not simply mean “chief” but “commander of the faithful,’ which is to say that the emir of each territory is also the imam of the people of that territory? When the Shehu gave people like Suleiman, Yakubu, and Umaru Dallaji flags to go and conquer the territories of Kano, Bauchi, and Katsina, he meant that after the conquest they should be the leaders of religion [shugabannin addini| there. And that was what happened. No one can tell us that he is an imam when we know he lacks the knowledge; that is to say, an ignorant person cannot be a chief in accordance with the Islamic constitution. Therefore, a true chief has knowledge and is doing what religion says he should do for his people. But if it turns out that his son has not been blessed with Islamic knowledge [/min Muhammadtya| 9 Nasara is used in this context to mean “Europeans,” rather than “Christians” in the religious sense.

282 Religion and Political Culture in Kano he must hold back at the time of succession, If there is anyone who can quote to us an example where God or the hadith sanctions the rule of an ignorant person over Muslims, our ears are open; let us hear it. Oh ye people, isn’t what is happening a sufficient lesson to us that with respect to succession to Muslim rulership [ gadon sarautar Musulmi| the law has been disregarded? Let us go back to the emirs. From what we have seen of the emirs, only a few deserve to be on their thrones at present, if we maintain that our present constttution is fashioned both theoretically and in practice on what was laid down in former days [at the time of the Jihad]. Apart from our government today, where else has there ever been a blind man leading the sighted, a one-eyed man laughing at the two-eyed, and an ignorant man occupying a position reserved for the knowledgeable? Is this what we have inherited from Fulani rule? Or is it that even before the Europeans came our emirs had started being ignorant and concerned only with power? But then who says that [Shehu] agreed those were to be our emirs? In accordance with what the Shehu said and did, and what he left behind, no one can tell us that Abdurrahman Danyen Kasko was fit to be leader of the Muslims [sarkin musulmi].1° Those were the dark ages, the days when the Fulani emirs themselves had been conquered by the desires of their hearts, to the point where they became indistinguishable from, or even worse than, the Habe emirs that they had ousted. But if it is admitted that we

are being ruled in accordance with the legacy of the Habe emirs [i.c., syncretism |, let us not deceive ourselves.

In these days how can it be said that a leader does not know what goes on under him? If it is said that this is the Christian [nasara] era, why have the rulers not been forced to know the modern way of ruling? All you see is that an old, ignorant man is brought forward and dubbed the ruler of the people. If we complain, we are then told that this is our legacy. May God curse such a thought.14

The legitimation of authority in “”Yan tande” is clearly in terms of religious knowledge and responsiveness to the people. The references to Usman dan Fodio and the metaphor of the family are reminders that at this early period (1943) the community within which authority was to be exercised was not any particular emirate but the broader domain of Usman dan Fodio. There is strong criticism of “Fulani rule” as opposed to “rule by the knowledgeable.” The attitude toward colonial rule, which is regarded as based on naked force and divide-and-rule tactics, is distinguished from a notion of the “Christian era” which is implicitly regarded as “modern.”

In the early writings of Sa’ad Zungur, the same criticisms of emirate authority appear. Zungur argues that religious knowledge is the basis of au19 Abdurrahman was the sultan of Sokoto who precipitated the Kano civil war by his appointment of Tukur.

M“Yan tande” [Exploiters-colonialists]. The author is grateful to Aminu Kano for making available this manuscript. The term tande (with hooked “d”) literally means to , take something sweet very quickly.

Ideological Basis of Early Emirate Reform 283 thority; rather than abolishing the office of emir, he called for its fundamental

reform. Perhaps his most famous poem (in Hausa) is “Jumhuriya ko mulu-

kiya” [Republicanism or kingship], written just after his break with the NCNC in 1950:

. . . Ignorance has eaten deep into our marrow and put chains around our neck. It has put handcuffs around our hands and chains around our feet. Our mouths have been muzzled. There is no eloquence and we are left with the love of pleasure. Oh God, come to our aid, so that we shall escape worldly disgrace! All useful knowledge depends on our religion; if ever our religion 1s injured there is no good within this world. . . . Oh Emir Alhaji Bayero, here are the sons of the city, the Kano people, who from the time of Bagauda laid the foundations of Kano and started trading in wealth. During the time of Alwali

[last Hausa emir] the roots of truth grew stouter; it is this new order that I shall describe and not the rationalizations of the people of Gaya [pre-Islamic period in Kano]. Suleiman was our leader, and Dabo followed in his truthful steps. What statesmanship! What knowledge! This was justice, the law of truth [shariar gaskiya]. Then, paganism [arnanci] reared its head, as if forever there would be no relenting. Oh Emir Abdullahi help us. Here is Chiroma Sanusi with discipline [tarbiyya]. Take care of the whole of your community, so that our land [kasarmu] will persist as a kingdom. The city, Fagge, as well as Tu-

dun Wada, the villages, and the huts of qur’anic mallams do not allow the pagans to penetrate them that they may spread the poison of republicanism [jumhuriya]. ... There is a great difference of intention over the constitution of Nigeria. The intention of the south, if it triumphs, is that the whole country should revert to republicanism; but our intention is that there should be internal division, so that the north may choose kingship. . . . The flags of the reformer

Shehu are twelve in Nigeria. [Sultan] Siddiku Abubakar, here is the north suffering. Oh ye Shehu al-Kanemi at Yerwa, would you allow the destruction of kingship? The Hausa and the Beriberi are surely bound by trust [amana] and peace. Shehu al-Aminu, he and the renovator [Dan Fodio], have left us a legacy of dignity in the world. Shall we be careful enough to leave our progeny their rightful inheritance? Oh ye descendants of the two shehus, you have to pick up your flag of truth. The burden of all people [Aadilol:] is on your shoulders. May you bear it well. Your overlordship above the believers, and the others,

may you bear it well. . . . You emirs, you had better wake up and make provi-

sions for justice and avoid oppression. Learn from the burning beards [of chiefs] elsewhere, that you may get water to wet yours so it will not catch fire. If you become obstinate and cling to the ways of yesterday, you will sing the

song of “if I only knew.” . . . May God protect you from having to say so. May he protect the whole of the north. The flags of the reformer Shehu will never be republican. God willing, let us rededicate in the hope that we shall follow the narrow path of truth, for there is certainly danger to the north. . . . As

long as the north contains prostitutes; so long as we are courting disgrace in the world; as long as there are young hoodlums and homosexuals, madames, young men drunk with money, and entertainers in taverns, there is no doubt that the sons of the south will ride the horse of Nigerian government. They will

284 Religion and Political Culture in Kano go on riding over us roughshod, even if we were to beg for conciliation. As long as our children are begging “may God give you [grace] that we may find our soup” [Alla ba ku, mu samt abin miya] in city houses as well as the villages and in the qur’anic schools where they are clad in the skin of a he-goat, there is no doubt we shall have to suffer. As long as there are so many helpless beggars—the blindman and the blindwoman, who have no decent place within the Hausa society—roaming the whole of Nigeria, the northerner will have no self-respect and will be disgraced in this world! In the north, fellowship is dead, there remains only the love of pleasure and excessive indulgence, only boasts and propensity to recount [the exploits of the past], arrogance, and fashionable dress, superstition, and more superstition, false and mundane mallams cheating the unsuspecting and showing off. There he is wearing a dirty cap, . . . boasting of origins [asalz] and wealth as if he were the descendant of the Prophet.

... Such a community [al-umma], what will it ever achieve? Well, emirs, I think you better wake up that you may cure your country by means of truth. It is God who will contribute the rest and take care of the north as a whole. We thank God, he alone, for he is the King of Truth.1*

Zungur became discouraged with the intransigence of the northern emirs and, during the period 1951-54, came increasingly to feel that the emirs could not be reformed. He began to see the dangers of the north isolating itself, and

he broke with the NPC in 1954 to join NEPU. Writing prior to the 1956 election, he said, “The next three years will surely see the northern region cut off completely from the rest of Nigeria, under the aegis of a theocratic, oneparty fascist government built on the remains of the present feudal autocra-

cies.”** The emphasis in the writings of Zungur shifted from reform of emirate authorities to a call for the destruction of the emirate system. Meanwhile, the experience of Aminu Kano in London during 1946-47 had considerable impact on his views of authority. He turned from the idea of a highly centralized authority system—albeit a “reformed” Islamic system—to an emphasis on the decentralization of authority. He writes, The Native Administration at its present form is not capable of doing much in this campaign against “girl’s illiteracy” in particular. It must be decentralised. I cannot tell you how advanced a country must be before it adopts a county council system as in England, but I feel that there is too much centralisation of authority in Kano which not only makes it impossible for one man to see the real fight but demoralises the minds of the masses and takes away any form of initiative. People become submissive and slavish under such administration. Therefore, there must be a delegation of power from the present autocratic au12In Wakokin S@adu Zungur [The poems of Sa?adu Zungur] (Zaria: Gaskiya Corporation, n.d.).

18 Unpublished memo preliminary to the formulation of the NEPU Political Memorandum of 1956 (English); the author is grateful to Aminu Kano for making available this manuscript.

Ideological Basis of Early Emirate Reform 285 thority to the people. It is impossible to promote the status of women and men (I now like to say women and men) in this 20th century while still retaining this medieval form of government. Each district must be given enough power to realize its problems and design means of solving them.!4

authority: )

Aminu suggested that mass participation in decisions affecting local matters is not only a way of mobilizing the people but is also an effective system of Centraltsation has been misinterpreted in its purpose and scope. Instead of serving its purpose it consciously or unconsciously saps the initiative of the native rulers and the people as a whole. It has caused a terrible injustice to be done to

individual districts, as I have shown with Dawaki and Hadejia, and has left people with nothing more than the mere feeling of a subject-class whose duty is to bow to the dictates of a medieval prince and rajah. The system has woefully

failed to make the people democratic-minded rather than mere recipients of orders. The inevitable result is the total absence of social feeling and social sacrifice. Everyone is for himself. There is no public opinion in the true sense of the word, Everyone seems afraid to introduce something new. Such a state of affairs makes a society static. But today, as events show, no society can remain static if that society aspires to share of the fruits of world organisation and world democracy. The eternal tribal and traditional methods which combine to make a stag-

nant society—and which has made Kano as such—must therefore give way. There must be a revolution from within. To get this the people must be free from the political shackels in which they are fettered.15

The attacks by Aminu Kano on the indirect-rule system after his return in 1947 were 1n some respects reminiscent of Palmer’s criticisms when the system

was first instituted. During the early postwar period, Aminu concentrated on the inadequacies of colonial rule. In 1953, he used the occasion of the publication of a book by Walter Miller, a Christian missionary in Zaria, to attack

many aspects of emirate rule. This review constitutes one of the earliest English-language criticisms of indirect rule by a northern Nigerian: Dr. Miller lays great stress on the administrative failure and the social decay in the country. To criticise [Dr. Miller’s] book sitting comfortably on an armchair is one thing; to go into the nooks and corners to see the real life of the Northern people is another. Dr. Miller has shown how inefficient is the administrative system, how lacking in initiative, how dilatory, how corrupt and how aimless and unimaginative. The movement of files through labyrinthine channels, the laborious nothings, the noisy unsystematic native court proceedings, the out of date men in stately splendour, the degrading state of the peasantry, the sleepy self-satisfied ways of dealing with matters, the discouragement of the cultural 14Aminu Kano, “The Problem of Girls’ Education in Kano” (unpublished essay; London, 1947), p. 12. The author is grateful to Aminu Kano for making available this manuscript. 15 Thid., p. 20.

286 Religion and Political Culture in Kano activities springing from the people, the aura of mystery round the residencies

and traditional palaces—these and other teams of bitter facts are sufficient enough to support the author’s investigations and findings.

When dealing with this administrative failure and political cowardice common in this Anglo-Fulani feudal and omnipotent bureaucracy Dr. Miller reveals and asserts that an administrator in this Nigeria told him, “If you keep the country quiet and stir up no dust, write a good annual report of the condition of the province which you administer, however bad it may have been, and conclude with the formulas—the relationship between the Government and the Native Administration has been all that could be desired—then you are sure to get a promotion, probably acceleration.” But woe to the man who sees defects, who criticises, who realizes failure and

is honest enough to record it, who doubts whether everything is best in this best of all possible worlds, who sees oppression, injustice, robbery and even slavery under another name. Such men have to be sent to places where their critical faculties would be innocuous, if indeed they are not quietly retired. Such is the eclipse of Indirect Rule in Northern Nigeria. Such is a statement (a true statement from the point of view of what we experience) from a very high official of this Government.

Dr. Miller’s book has made us doubly sure that this special Northern system of training for a democracy is ludicrous and faked. It is a political bluff fashioned solely for the purpose of maintaining law and order to collect revenue and gather the harvest of economic exploitation. It seems to have no philosophy of nation building behind it. The system is expert in preserving ancient institutions which conflict at every juncture with modern life and thereby makes the progress towards independence infinitely slow. Nothing is dynamic or progressive. Orders are given in gruff voices and without explanation. People see no distinction between the European and the Native Authorities because the latter authorities derive ther power and support from the former: “Dokar sarki” and

“Dokar bature” [the order of the emir and the order of the European] are synonymous terms in every village and town in Northern Nigeria.

No Northerner can point with certainty or confidence the goal this aimless and un-Islamic system of rule is taking us to. Nepotism, poverty in its nakedness, disease, slavery under another garb, injustice and shameless greed are as common as they had been before the abrupt advent of the rgth century imperialism. The promotion or appointment of illiterate men, young or grey bearded, to high

offices of state usually for the mere accident of birth or for the “hypocritical nearness’ is not only enough to rob the people of their intelligence and initiative but also a proof to show that this organised autocracy is a replica of the native un-Islamic rule which the British imperialism premeditated not to abolish.

The very sudden changes that are now introduced show nothing but how belated the British have been in the improvement of the country at large. The introduction of the House of Assembly and House of Chiefs, for example, is a compound political bluff designed, in a hurry, to lead the country to believe in a much newer fallacy which has been characteristic of the Anglo-Fulani regime; for it is obviously redundant to have the two houses side by side since the first officially represents the second. And since the setting up of these Siamese twins

Ideological Basis of Early Emirate Reform 287 the Government has failed to create any enthusiasms amongst the people without

which the new change cannot work. No wonder that it [the Government] is contemplating to make some more changes long before the official time for reviewing the New Constitution. I believe, as thousands of my fellow Northerners do believe, that Dr. Miller’s book describes much of the real state of affairs in this oppressed land. All of us who find time should read it.1®

Some of the NEPU writings of the early 1950s were addressed to the common people and some were addressed to the emirate authorities. In both cases, many of the same themes and symbols appear but are presented in different styles. The earliest and perhaps most dramatic confrontation between Aminu

Kano and the Kano Emirate authorities was in October 1953, when Aminu Kano was asked by the emir of Kano, Abdullahi Bayero, to answer charges by Kano mallams (especially Nasiru Kabara) that the principles of NEPU were contrary to Islamic religion. A document in Hausa was submitted by Aminu Kano to the emir’s council and then “debated” by Aminu Kano in the council. This document, among other things, defends the symbolism used by NEPU and tries to give Islamic references legitimating the existence of a movement such as NEPU, especially with reference to its alliance with non-Muslim elements. Major portions are paraphrased below: We do not doubt that the meeting of the Emir’s Council of Kano with the Sawaba Branch of NEPU is history of great weight. We do not doubt that this kind of debate will pave the way for better understanding. This is the wish of everyone who loves this country. . . . (1) On meeting the emir and his council on Tuesday, October 27, which is the eighteenth day of the month of Safar, we are happy because it gives the emir a chance to hear our story from the source. .. . We must make certain things clear before we are able to advise how to stop these riots and troubles in the future. Unfortunately, the committee established to mediate on these troubles did not meet with those of us from the new NEPU-Sawaba. They met only with the old branch of NEPU which has the name “The Party for Northern Progress” [Jam°*tyyar ci gaban arewa).

After the 1952 Maiduguri conference, we came to understand how important

it was to define our goals because of the appearance of new things and the pace of changes. Because of this, a committee was formed to define aims. The aims were established and approved, and 2,000 copies were printed and distributed to the branches. It is now time to give the Native Authority a statement of these new aims so that they can see where we have set our present goals. We have heard that our motto, Sawaba [freedom and human dignity], has been maligned. This rumor greatly surprised and shocked us. We have been critical of many things, yet recognizing this tendency we gave great thought to our motto. 16 “Review of Dr. Miller’s ‘Have We failed in Nigeria?’ ” (typescript, 1953).

288 Religion and Political Culture in Kano Our name is Jam’tyyar Neman Sawaba [The party searching for freedom].

But the original name that is in the book is Jam’iyyar Kwatowa al-Umar Arewa Sawaba [The party retrieving the freedom of the northern people]. This lengthy name is what brought about the abbreviation, Jam’iyyar Neman Sawaba.

We want to make it known to the authorities that the rumor that we have given this name to our party as an innuendo against someone in particular or that the party was made for only one city is false. It wasn’t the thought of freedom that created the old system of government. If it was for purposes of innuendo that we took the name Sawaba, what made us compile this poem: “Freedom to the mallams and to the emir alike,/freedom to the farmers and traders,/

freedom to NEPU and to Nigeria, . . .” Why do we take all men and say to them, “freedom.” Are we making innuendoes against the whole world? If we do this, with whom would we want to live? In this thing there is no innuendo at all. We are not the only ones interested in freedom. The members of the Jam’iyyar Tajiran Kano [Kano wealthy party] are not the only wealthy people, nor are they only people from Kano. Not all members of the NPC are northerners. Other people besides Ansar Adeen [Helpers of religion] are helping religion. It is not only the mallams who teach who have knowledge. Likewise, not only the members of Sawaba are fighting oppression. In our name there is no innuendo at all. This accusation is ridiculous.

(2) A certain learned man has commented to the emir that our business is childish and that even if the leaders are not children they behave as such. To us this is not sarcasm. What is the fault of “children” if they are in fact taxpayers? What is childish in asking how one’s money is being spent? Those people who bring new ideas will always be criticized as childish.

(3) It was also explained to us that not everybody can advise a leader on the needs of the public. Well, is there any authority beside speaking the truth, provided that the person doing so is an adult and a devoted Muslim? Insofar as a

man is of age, he is equal to anybody. Whether such a person cares for the world or not, if he tells the truth, it must be accepted. Being a coward is no guarantee that your advice must be accepted when it is not the truth. , (4) The learned mallam has also commented that any organization that aims at reform among Muslims or aims at criticizing the authority of the emir is not right. We don’t intend to refute the mallam but in our understanding as students who are always curious, we strongly depend on what we learned about the Prophet and his caliphs. We certainly believe that we are in the right, inasmuch as the present situation is, insofar as Islam is concerned, similar to the time when the tribe of Kuraish united to prevent oppression during the /ahzltyya period [pre-Islamic period of “ignorance’]. That organization included Muhammad himself. Even when he became a Prophet, Muhammad praised that organization saying, “Could I be summoned even now, I would certainly agree.” Well, we cannot say that what Muhammad did during the Jahiliyya period is questionable because he is trustworthy. If that is the case, what is wrong with

an organization that opposes a Muslim who is a traditionalist, or an opportunist? We believe that there is no other form of equality than Islam, pure Islam. “Equality” in Arabic means dignity.

(5) The idea that our manifesto, which means “freedom,” is a break away

Ideological Basis of Early Emirate Reform 289 from Islam is not true. This word “freedom” [sawaba] is the word that God chose for the blessed ones in paradise. . . .

(6) One of the things mentioned the other day was the accusation of innuendo in our manifesto. We want to explain this further. . . . Everybody knows that Usman dan Fodio said that an innuendo has a specific meaning in the legal sense. According to Muslim law, an innuendo can be treated as a direct and open affront. For instance, in the course of having an argument with someone, if you say to him, “7 am not a bastard” or “J am not an adulterer,” the law will take it that you have called the other fellow a “bastard” or an “adulterer.” But when someone simply says, “I am not a bastard” or “I am not a thief or an oppressor,” or he points out to some people that they are beaten or oppressed, this is not an innuendo insofar as there is no trace of defamation and thus this has no place in law. As this situation is very confusing, it is necessary that the police and the local informers be enlightened so that they will be aware of the nature of defamation and thus be prevented from making personal cases out of these matters.

(7) This opportunity of meeting the council which has been given to the political parties should be maintained and continued. We believe that there is nothing better since this would enlighten the politician as well as emphasize that the administration, or emir, is for all. An administrator should not entertain any prejudice toward any section of the community because of its beliefs, especially

today when new ideas are evolving. In our opinion, a leader should embrace those of his subjects who oppose his ideologies, as in so doing his grace may bring them closer to him. If politicians have the right to advise the administrators of what they feel, we believe this would reduce bickering and other unsatisfactory vices.

(8) With regard to display of political symbols, we believe that a party follower shouldn’t make a display of party symbols or slogans unless there are reasons such as conventions or other important party meetings which would con-

vene with the permission of the Native Authority Council. In case a party has any other form of a meeting, flags should not be flown or symbols used without the written permission of the council. Using political symbols or flags should be prohibited on any other occasions—religious festivals or entertain-

ments... .

We have already suggested that a “peace-making” committee should be formed which would consist of party representatives, the police, and the Native Authority Council representative. This committee may be under the chairmanship of the administrative secretary. This committee should sit regularly to explore the ways and means of bringing any opposing parties to a peaceful conference table. If such a committee should fail, however, these matters should be referred to the Native Authority Council. In conclusion, the ideology of an individual should be respected. At the same time similar respect is necessary for a party. We need to note the difference between criticism and misuse of language. I certainly deny the accusation that my lectures are derogatory. Unfortunately, some people have taken criticism to mean defamation of character.+7 17 “Shawarwari tsakanin NEPU-Sawaba, Reshen Kano, da Majalisar na’abucin Girma

290 Religion and Political Culture in Kano During the early 1950s Aminu stressed that the real essence of “un-Islamic” power was colonialism. He coined the term maguzanci [“paganism”] to refer to “imperialism.” He argued that accepting medals from the Queen was “un-

Islamic.” (When Nasiru Kabara was asked to make an official reply to the charge, he argued that Joseph had accepted a medal from Pharoah.) During the 1956 election the major NEPU leaders, including Aminu Kano and Sa’ad Zungur, came to regard their political campaign as a jihad against the emirate authorities. Zungur entitled many of his memorandums during this campaign as “Jihadi 131”—referring to the 131 seats that NEPU was contesting. This theme appears in both the English and the Hausa writings. The jihad was to be against ignorance and against the “un-Islamic feudalism” of the emirate structure. One of the subsidiary themes that emerged at this same time in the ideologi-

cal attack on emirate structure was with regard to the political position of women, especially their right to exercise authority. While this issue never registered the same positive response as such symbols as “freedom,” “jihad,” “reform,” or “justice,” it was an early and basic concern of Aminu Kano, as

was evident in his writings while at the Institute of Education in London during 1946-47. The person who became most identified with the status of women, however, was Isa Wali.

During the summer of 1956, Isa Wali wrote a series of articles in the Nigerian Citizen which provoked a wide-ranging debate throughout northern Nigeria. In some of the articles, he discussed the proper role of women in positions of public authority: As for public life, there is nothing in Islam which prevents a woman from following any pursuit she desires. There is no distinct prohibition against her taking part in public leadership—as Aisha the Prophet’s widow and her leading women colleagues (the “Mothers of Believers”) had demonstrated. . . . Moslem History, in fact, is full of the account of Moslem women in many countries who had been glorious rulers, counsellors, jurists and great public servants. They commanded armies, and, when necessity arose, fought as soldiers as they did in early Islam—before the end of the tenth century.1®

In a later article, Isa Wali specifically discussed the figure of A’isha, wife of the Prophet: When discussing the rights and scope given to women by Islam I touched, if lightly, on some leading Moslem women such as Aisha and the “Mothers of Sarkin Kano” [Matter between NEPU-Sawaba, Kano Branch, and the Council of the Emir

of Kano] (typescript, Kano, 1953). The author is grateful to Aminu Kano for making available this manuscript. 18 “The True Position of Women in Islam,” Nigerian Citizen, July 18, 1956, p. 6.

Ideological Basis of Early Emirate Reform 291 Believers,” the wives of the Companions of the Prophet, and their successors, who played a full and active part in public life, education, and leadership in Moslem history.

I propose now to conclude this series by spotlighting some of the activities of such women in history and in the contemporary Moslem world today. Among such women, Aisha obviously comes to one’s mind first, not only because of the all-engrossing roles she played as an active, energetic and beloved housewife, but also because of the most spectacular influence she exerted for something like half a century after the Prophet’s death, on the affairs of the new

Moslem state... . As a widow, she proved that she still had the greater part of her own life

ahead of her; she turned her energies and talents more and more into political channels until, for a time at least, she came to dominate the political situation with great spirit and energy. In the field of spiritual influence, she was consulted on all religious and state matters, and she gave fatwas, or decisions on sacred law or custom.?®

In summary, the ideological basis of protest against emirate authority during the 1950s tended to be phrased in terms of Islamic reform. The stress on knowl-

edge, literacy, and modernization presents a parallel to some of the reform movements occurring during this period within the brotherhoods. The symbols and arguments employed were those of “reform” rather than “revolution.” THE IDEOLOGICAL BASIS OF COMMUNITY REFORM

The early reference by Aminu Kano to a northern Muslim community was clear in “*Yan tande.” This northern Muslim orientation was modified sub-

stantially in the immediate postwar period, when Aminu was studying at the Institute of Education in London. During this period Aminu came to focus his concern on three distinct communities: Kano, Nigeria, and Africa. His autobiography records his impressions of this period and is scattered with references to these three communities.*” In his course writings at the Institute of Education he chose to concentrate especially on the problems of women’s education in Kano. In so doing, he elaborated his views of the role of ethnicity,

religion, and class in community formation." With reference to Kano, he recognized the ethnic pluralism of the society, the increasing intermarriage, and the entrepreneurial talents of the Hausa. With regard to the religious basis of community in Kano, Aminu describes an almost complete homogeneity. It is the nature rather than the fact of the Islamic community in Kano that was 19 “The True Position of Women in Islam,” Nigertan Citizen, August 4, 1956, p. 5. 20 Motst ya fi zama. 21 See “The Problems of Girls’ Education in a Moslem Emirate, Kano, Northern Nigeria” (1946); “The Problems of Girls’ Education in Kano” (typescript, 1947), p. 1. The author is grateful to Aminu Kano for making available these manuscripts.

292 Religion and Political Culture in Kano his concern. He suggested that “the reactionary authorities are still strongly

antagonistic to modern and Islamic social ideals’** and stressed that the Islamic conception of “Help yourself, you get one reward; help your neighbour, and you get ten rewards” must be inculcated in the minds of the children.” Aminu stresses the idea of a “Kano community” by contrasting it with the situation under “foreign” conquerers: “Unfortunately, Kano was nearly always under foreign domination: the Songhay, the Gobir, the Kanuris, Kebbi, the Kwararrafa, the Fulani, and last of all, the British.” ** The result of such foreign rule, according to Aminu, has destroyed the individual’s sense of participation in a community: “The people have been made so docile through a long autocratic system of government that even today, with the bare spread of freedom, they are not fond of or they are afraid of organizing clubs or participating in social work, developing co-operative enterprises and forming associa-

tions. The result is that working together today is unknown... . Everyone works for himself in his own way.” *° As a means of furthering education and creating a greater sense of community, he suggests more intensive teaching

in the Hausa language: “Here I refer to the teaching of the mother tongue. The present day method of teaching this is inadequate as its importance seems to be overlooked. As all children’s thoughts are expressed in the mother tongue greater emphasis must be laid on its proper use in writing and expression.” 7° In the 1950s Aminu Kano’s interests continued to shift from a northern and Muslim orientation to a Kano and Hausa orientation partly as a reflection of that thrust in Nigerian nationalism which challenged the community boundaries created by colonial rule. Sa’ad Zungur also exhibited this shift in perspective. By the mid-1950s he had come to characterize the North-South dichotomy in Nigeria as the basic problem in the legacy of colonialism. In a 1956 memorandum he wrote,

The boundary of 1921 was set up as an exact line of demarcation. ... The critical and intelligent reader of this memorandum may note that there was no mention at that time of any line of religious demarcation between the North

and the South. However, in actual practice the inhabitants of the so-called Moslem emirates of the North were taught actively and extensively to regard all their Southern brethren, Christians and otherwise, as arna and kafirai [pa_ gans and infidels], with whom association and contact, political, social and otherwise, were forbidden “religiously and administratively.” And paradoxically enough, Northerners were actively taught to regard and address all British men and women as turawa, a term originally applied only to Tripolitan and Al22 “The Problem of Girls’ Education in Kano,” p. 3.

23 Thid., p. 13. 24 Thid., p. 2. 25 Ibid., p. 12.

26 Thid., p. 18.

Ideological Basis of Early Emirate Reform 293 gerian Arabs of North Africa (British officers serving in Northern Nigeria in those days strongly detested their being addressed and referred to by Northern Moslems as nasara, the Moslem name for Christians in the language of the Holy Qur’an ), because of the psychological implications the name had in the minds of Moslems generally. Furthermore, and paradoxically enough, the non-Moslem elements of the North were not to be despised but regarded as underdogs and members of the lower classes and therefore sources of forced labour and drudges of all works. Those were the heydays of British cum Moslem chiefs, naked exploitation and political suppression of the Northern masses and underdogs. . . . The British were only then concerned with the ethnic and religious differences be-

tween Northerners and Southerners, which differences they knew they could exploit imperialistically with advantage. . . . They devised two sets of different education codes; one for the North (Moslem) and the other for the South and the colony. The pagan children from the South were refused admission (under any circumstances) into the Northern schools, and vice versa.27

Zungur came to see the colonial problem as essentially one of relations between racial communities: The Anglo-Nigerian problem is part of the crucial and world wide problem of the relations of the white and the Negro races, Nigeria being the most impor-

tant, popular and populous Negro country in the world... . The failure of the dominant European civilization to rise above force as a principle in human relations and to transcend the limitations of race and colour is reflected in the long delay in genuine Nigerian reform. . . . In politics there is profound significance in Alfred Adlar’s thesis, in contradiction to Freud, that complexes are due not to the past, but to fear of the future. Besides, a consciousness of unfulfilled possibilities always generates a feeling of frustration, and oppression.?®

Zungur also wrote specifically on the relationship of ethnic and religious communities to political communities. In essence, he rejected religion as the basis of political community but maintained that ethnic units could be used as the building blocks of national consciousness. Of religion, he writes, “A religious or social cleavage must be recognized in politics, but it is unsafe to make it the foundation of a superstructure and to give a separatist turn to the search for security and power. Corporate life cannot be built on the basis of differences. The art of creative politics consists in opening new avenues of cooperation and integrating the differences into a new synthesis.” ?°

With regard to ethnic units, he seems to have gone against the tide of most other reform leaders in his espousal of ethnic representation: It is much easier to equalize and maximise opportunity within ethnic groups in the establishment of our system of dynamic social justice. The first practical 27 Sa’ad Zungur, unpublished notes in English preparatory to the formulation of the NEPU Political Memorandum of 1956, pp. 8, 11.

28 Tbid., p. 5. 29 Thid., p. 1.

294 Religion and Political Culture in Kano step towards that is to establish in our federation a bi-cameral legislature at the

center comprising two houses: i., (1) the House of Nationalities (ethnic groups); (2) the House of Representatives. Each zone shall have equal representation of members in the House of Nationalities and the House of Representatives. In the Northern region four ethnic zones should be established on geographical, economic and partly cultural bases in addition to the primarily

ethnic one: 1. the Northern zone (comprising Kano, Katsina and Sokoto provinces); 2. the North Eastern zone (comprising Adamawa, Bauchi and Bornu provinces); 3. the Middle Central zone (comprising the Plateau, Benue and Zaria provinces); and 4. the South Western zone (comprising Niger, Ilorin and Kabba privinces). The communal or tribal proportion (from each zone) in the federal legislature, shall be determined by a consultative assembly of representatives of all tribal groups within each zone. Apart from the four largest tribal groups, Hausa, Fulani, Kanuri, and Tiv, there are over 200 miscellaneous

Northern tribes which fall into less than 20 groups occupying distinct and limited areas.?°

Because emirate communities during the 1950s were coalescing into a northern community, the protest against emirate communities became closely linked with protest against a northern community. Yet the growth of “north-

ern” identity was closely related to the increased perception of “southern Nigeria” as the major political and economic competitor. THE STYLE AND SYMBOLS OF REFORM

The style and symbols of reform during the 1950s reflected the religious heritage in Kano, just as did much of the ideological expression. In this brief section, two examples will serve to illustrate this pattern of style and symbol usage: poetry and party slogans.

One characteristic of the Jihad had been the extensive use of poetry to convey the messages of the reformers. The rise of the reformed brotherhoods in Kano during the 1950s was also accompanied by an increase in the use of written pamphlets, including poetry. Such poetry was sung on the streets on special occasions and was an extremely popular medium of expression. Five of the leading political reform figures in the Kano area were outstanding Hausa poets: Sa’ad Zungur, Mudi Sipikin, Akilu Aliyu, Abba Maikwaru, and Aminu

Kano. Isa Wali was an avid admirer of the poetry of Saad Zungur and on several occasions discussed this poetry on radio programs. Mudi Sipikin used his poetry to attack the system of colonial rule.*t Akilu Aliyu wrote poems directly attacking the NPC. Both Sipikin and Aliyu also wrote extensively in praise of Reformed Tijaniyya. Abba Maikwaru, who was a tafsir mallam and 30 Tbid., pp. 20-21.

31 For a discussion of Sipikin, see John N. Paden, “Kano Hausa Poetry,” Kano Studies no. 1 (1965): 33-39.

Ideological Basis of Early Emirate Reform 295 a strong supporter of Reformed Tijaniyya, wrote the ten-line NEPU poem for which he and Aminu Kano were arrested in the mid-1g50s. Zungur used his poetry originally to warn the emirs of the north of the necessity for reform, as illustrated in “Jumhuriya ko mulukiya.” He later used his poetry to appeal directly to the common people. In his memorandum to Aminu Kano in 1956, he suggested the following poem as a possible frontispiece to the NEPU platform pamphlet: Ina Jama’ar Talakawa, ku duba! Ku karfafa himma, ku toshe musiba, Ta Mulkin zalama da daular azaba. Ku zabi wakilai na NEPU-Sawaba; Ku tabbata nasara ga mai gaskiya.**

One of the earliest poems written for a northern political party was by Aminu Kano; it was entitled “Wakar ’yancin NEPU-Sawaba” [Freedom poem for NEPU-Sawaba] and was published in 1953 but written and circulated earlier. It was put into final form by Isa Wali and stands as an early statement of Nigerian nationalism. An interpretive translation is as follows: Oh God, merciful King, with determination our help is with you. Oh Master of Heaven; we stand up to gain freedom of existence and justice. Oh celebrated God, Nigeria is in your hands.

We appear and are not afraid of difficulties: One gives way for a bull. Oh you careless people, the time is ours; there can be no carelessness. We shall leave everything and endure hardship. Oh celebrated God, Nigeria is in your hands.

We shall sacrifice wealth and life. We are of today and we are men of work. We follow on the rightful road. We warn all those who suppress the common man. Oh celebrated God, Nigeria is in your hands.

Time has changed the things of yesterday. We have taken the flag of nationhood

to honor our mother Nigeria, and we will leave our name in this world. Oh celebrated God, Nigeria is in your hands,°?

The manner in which these poems were circulated and sung is relevant to the social communications network that developed in the north among those who were trying to reform. A network similar to the zawiya structure of the reformed brotherhoods was developed. Members of NEPU referred to each 32“Qh Common people, look!/Strengthen your determination and overthrow your curse,/The rule of oppression and the government of tribulation./Vote for the candidates

of NEPU-Sawaba;/Assure victory to those on the side of truth” (unpublished notes preparatory to the formulation of the NEPU Political Memorandum of 1956). 33 Aminu Kano, Wakar >yancin NEPU-Sawaba [Freedom poem for NEPU-Sawaba] (Kano: Comet Press, November 1953).

296 Religion and Political Culture in Kano other during this period as “brothers” (yan uwa). Travelers from one city to another carried messages and poems. Much of this poetry was not published because of the libel laws—any verbal attack on an emir was sufficient to incriminate both the poet and the publisher—but was circulated in handwritten

form. An example of this general pattern is found in a personal letter from Sa’ad Zungur in Bauchi to Aminu Kano in Kano dated May 16, 1956. The actual poem referred to was never published (despite Zungur’s request) because of its “libelous” references to Bauchi individuals, Zungur probably wrote

the poem himself, although he attributes it to someone else. The letter (in Hausa) reads as follows: Malam Aminu Kano, President General of NEPU, may it please your leadership. I write this letter in order to introduce this emissary of mine, Mallam Hassan Kosashe, a tailor from Bauchi, who is accompanying his father, Mallam Ahmadu, to Kano to see you and acquaint you with my message—a letter. Mallam Ahmadu, the father, has come in order to prepare for the pilgrimage—to be innoculated. Mallam Hassan is coming to pay you a visit and to carry my message to you. I hope that the people in the Kano branch of NEPU will receive

him as a real brother [dan uwa] and treat him with dignity. Under the umbrella of your leadership [girmanka] and your excellence [martaba], he is a bona fide NEPU man of tireless effort. I am particularly glad that he is going to Kano for he will be able to explain properly to you the situation here in Bauchi. He carries with him a NEPU poem from Bauchi, and I hope you will make it possible for him to sing it in front of an important gathering of the Kano NEPU branch so that real cooperation will emerge in the production of poems in our struggle [j:had] for dignity and freedom [sawaba]. I hope this poem will impress our brothers in the gathering of NEPU at Kano. We are hoping that he will be given the full opportunity to read it from beginning to end. We also hope that the Kano branch will provide him with a chorus of about twelve youths, for that is how we do it here. I implore our brethren in Kano to be tolerent of our differences [between the Kano and Bauchi branches

of NEPU], which are manifest in the poem, and also to be tolerant of the voice in which Mallam Hassan will sing it. I hope on the strength of your reverence and position Mallam Hassan will be entertained and will be shown solidarity. He cannot use roman script [ajamin turawa], but writes in the Arabic script. All the same he is a fully enlightened man. We are also asking for another favor besides that of allowing Mallam Hassan

to read his poem. We want help in rendering two copies of this poem: one in roman script and the other in the proper script [Arabic]. We hope that the copy in roman script will be printed in about 5,000 copies. This printing we shall count as an act of comradeship and we hope that he [Hassan] will bring us the bill. This poem is majestic [haiba] and impressive [Rwarjini]. It is the first in a series of poems that we intend to compose as an aid in our struggle for freedom. The north is at the stage where it is extremely receptive to the message of serious political songs.

Ideological Basis of Early Emirate Reform 297 This is only one of the poems that are in our possession, but we are in such a hurry to take it to you that we have not made more copies apart from “the corrected draft” [quoted in original]. Please help us with the services of those who are really proficient in writing Hausa, so that the copying will be done immediately before this one is destroyed, since it had started to deteriorate before he left Bauchi. The poem has about three hundred lines. Choose the easiest method of “printing,” we are not particular. It can be arranged in a single or in double lines, as follows:

Oh God, Oh single King,/ Lead the north out of danger. [Ya Allah ya Sarki witiri / ka fitar da arewa cikin hadari]. In addition, there are many things we have decided on at the Bauchi NEPU divisional conference. Because he [Hassan] was in a hurry we did not obtain “typed copies” of the deliberations on the provincial constitution [of NEPU]. However, here are the English and Hausa copies of Sawaba Creed which we have prepared and are working with. We hope you will review it properly and if you agree with it, please help us in getting headquarters to accept it and print thousands of copies and distribute or sell it. We have no rights with regard to that. Ours is only to produce. Again, here is the copy of a “circular letter” which

is being sent out inviting all political parties in Bauchi Province dedicated to the achievement of freedom. We shall later make available to headquarters [in Kano] a full report on the conference and all that was decided upon there. P.S. “Please sir,” I reiterate my appeal to you or the party to help us with: one hundred tablets of Sonalgin; two hundred tablets of APC codine; 400 (“very

small tablets’) of isonicotinic acid (not isoniacid): I am extremely grateful, “Yours fraternally,” [Signed] Sa’ad Zungur.*4

With regard to the symbols of reform, a number of examples are clear from the reform literature cited above. The use of slogans with religious connotations—such as jahiliyya (“ignorance”), maguzanci (“paganism”), sawaba (“dignity and freedom”), and jthad (“struggle”)—has been mentioned above, as has

the use of pictures of prayer beads and Dala Hill on the flags of the Kano Peoples Party. When the KPP and NEPU (and UMBC) merged in January 1964 to form a new political party, the Northern Progressive Front (NPF), a new and important symbol appeared. In the Hausa name for NPF, Jam’tyyar Hamayya (literally, “northern opposition”), the term Aamayya connoted “rivalry.” The word hamayya, however, is interchangeable with hayayya which

can be used as a play on words with haye. The term haye, according to Bargery, refers to “anything learnt or acquired by oneself, but not inherited from one’s family.” °° In short, one of the symbolic connotations of the op34 Letter from Sa’ad Zungur to Aminu Kano, May 16, 1956 (Hausa). Phrases enclosed in quotation marks were written in English. The author is grateful to Aminu Kano for making available this manuscript. °° G. P. Bargery, A Hausa-English Dictionary and English-Hausa Vocabulary (London: Oxford University Press, 1934; 3rd impression, 1957), p. 462.

. 298 Religion and Political Culture in Kano position party title was to suggest that authority should be achieved rather than ascribed. INTERPRETATION OF THE QUR ANIC PARADIGM

Critics of the emirate system who have based their proposed reforms on Islamic grounds have invariably turned to the Qur’an itself for support. The Qur’an is regarded as the basis of Islamic life and provides the paradigm of values, historical interpretations, and orientations toward authority and community. As mentioned above, those scholars who have mastered the Qur’an to a level whereby they are recognized by the community as being the legitimate interpreters of the Qur'an are known as tafsir mallams. In Kano many major brotherhood figures as well as many outstanding legal figures have been

tafsir mallams. Since part of the nature of reform is reinterpretation of the basic framework of society, it is not surprising that many of those engaged in reevaluating the nature of government should be trained as tafsir mallams. In Kano, tafsir may be studied throughout the year, yet the major activity occurs during the month of fasting, or Azumi (Ramadan). During this period, tafsir mallams meet with their students and neighborhood people, and interpret (in Hausa) the Qur’an. Most tafsir mallams meet with their people every night after the fast has been broken. They may speak from half an hour up to three or four hours. Some mallams try to give brief interpretations and go through the entire Qur’an in the course of the twenty-eight days. Other

mallams (such as Tijjani Usman) try to do one section (izifi) a night, and hence the entire Qur’an (sixty sections) requires two years of tafsir readings. (The sections vary in terms of number of chapters [sura] and in the number of verses [aya] in each chapter.) Other mallams may proceed at whatever pace seems appropriate, or may emphasize selected suras.

Of the Jihad leaders Abdullahi dan Fodio wrote most about the proper nature of government and also wrote tafsir.°° Usman dan Fodio, by contrast,

wrote very little on the nature of government and did not write tafsir. In the 1950s many of the major reformers (such as Aminu Kano, Sa’ad Zungur, Isa Wali, and Abba Maikwaru) were tafsir mallams. Aminu actually did tafsir readings in his home during Azumi. Sa’ad made several attempts to translate

the Qur’an into Hausa. Isa did not do tafsir readings, but specialized in tafsir at the School for Arabic Studies. The father of Isa, Wali Suleiman, had

specialized in tafsir and, during the month of Ramadan, read tafsir in his home and also (later in the evening) at the palace. The senior brother of Isa, 36 Abdullahi dan Fodio, Diy@ al-t@wil [The light of interpretation], 4 vols. (Cairo: Matba‘t al-Istiqama, 1961).

Ideological Basis of Early Emirate Reform 299 Ujidud, specialized in and taught tafsir at the School for Arabic Studies until his death in 1955. The parallel between Abdullahi dan Fodio and Aminu Kano is noticeable in several respects: both were less involved in brotherhood activities than their counterparts (Usman dan Fodio, Muhammad Bello, Muhammad Sanusi, Ibrahim Niass); both wrote from a position slightly apart from the central power structure (although they later assumed power); both were concerned with the nature of proper government; and both were tafsir mallams. In recent years, many tafsir interpretations by Aminu Kano have stressed the centrality of justice in Islam (interpreting justice mainly in terms of equality), the centrality of education in Islam (the sixth pillar of Islam is regarded by Aminu as “read,” a reference to God’s command to Muhammad in the cave of Mount Hira when the Qur’an was handed down), and the need for tolerance between people of the book (Muslims, Christians, Jews). The tafsir readings are not used to make specific references to the contemporary political scene but rather to underscore certain principles of belief and action. Aminu has been concerned with the problem of helping people define what it means to be a Muslim in a time of social change. On the opening night of Azumi in 1967, the interpretation by Aminu Kano was given at the home of Ahmadu Trader and was tape-recorded. The tafsir lasted half an hour and was given in colloquial Hausa. The following paraphrase of that tape may illustrate how orientations toward authority (for example the sovereignty of God vis-a-vis temporal authority) and community (for example, what it means to be a Muslim) are engendered through interpretation of the Qur’an. Ahmadu Trader: Oh people [jama’a], peace be with you. Listen. Although I have seen a lot of people gathered and Mallam has not come yet, we are informed that he will come at 9:00 p.m. Be patient and wait for him. Yesterday we got several letters from people asking questions of Mallam. He has asked me to tell you that he will not answer the questions because they concern politics; he says that there is no room for politics here. Mallam is just about to come. Greetings on breaking the fast. No talking please in the place of reading. Listen so that you may gain.

[Mai Jan Baki (reader of the text) reads the first chapter of the Qur’an, Surat fattha al-kitab, in Arabic }.37

87 The Arabic pronunciation and spelling is slightly different from the Hausa used by Aminu Kano. The segments of the sura to be interpreted include: Bism-Allah/ al-Hamdu _ Lyllahi Rab al-‘Alamin/ al-Rahman [al-Rahim]/ Malik yaum al-din/ Iyyaka na‘abudu/ Wa lyyaka nasta‘in/ Ihdina al-sirat al-mustaqim/ Sirat al-ladhina ‘an’amta ‘alaihim/ Gair al-magdib ‘alaihim/ Wala al-dalin.

300 Religion and Political Culture in Kano Mallam Aminu Kano: Oh people, we have often said it is not beneficial to do a quick reading of the Qur’an. Explanation of the implications of each verse [aya] is what is beneficial. Whenever we begin reading, we start with Fatiha, which is the most important chapter [sura]. It is the mother of the book. It is the opening of the Qur’an. Its importance can be seen in that we use it in saying

our daily prayers. It is required that every Muslim must at least know the Fatiha in saying his prayers. It is compulsory in the saying of prayers. That is why I will translate [ fassara] this chapter.

The name of the chapter is Suratu fatihatul kitabi [Sirat fatiha al-kitab, “Beginning chapter to the book” ]. Instead of calling it “the door,” we call it “the key” to opening the door. Without a key you cannot enter through a door. It is

called the key to the Qur’an. Some students may ask what is in the Fatiha. Really, there are many rewards. All the things that come into the Qur’an are contained in this chapter. It has only seven verses. There are many reasons for this, but we ought not to worry about these reasons. I am going to read it clearly, word by word, so that people will understand it. If you understand it, then any time you say it, you will know what it means.

We start with Bismillahi [“in the name of God”], then Alhamdu Lillahi Rabbil Alamin [“Praise be to God, Lord of Creation” ]. This is praise. It is not the praise that praise singers perform for human beings but praise showing that you believe there is One greater than you, not because you are in chains but be-

cause of the honor and respect you feel. All of this praise belongs to God. Therefore, even if your king or your mallam or a rich man or your father is praised, the final praise is reserved to God. Our final thanks is to God. Even dur-

ing the time of slaves and even now at work, people may ask, “Who is your master [ubangizi|?” You may say a particular government or a particular Euro-

pean [ature]. Because ubangifi means both “master” and “god,” we should understand which ubangiji is being referred to. That Ubangiji is he who is

Rabbil Alamin [“Lord of Creation”] or Ubangijin Alam [master of all things” ]. Alam includes talakai [“ordinary people”]. In Hausaland, we understand talakai to mean myself, you, women, and everybody. Human beings are not the only creatures in the world, and the world is not the only created thing. There are trees, mountains, insects, animals of the land and water. There are nonliving things: air, light, stars, moon, oil, the sky, and a host of things that God has created. If you say that God is only a God of human beings, then who

is the God of these other things? Creation is all these things together: the world, the hereafter, the angels, the insects, the human beings. God, then, is God of these things, which collectively we call alam. You must wonder at the huge stars and the moon giving you light and the sun appearing every day. They have times for setting and rising. These are part of what is called alam. The God of Creation is the one we are referring to, not any other ubangiji. The king of your town [sarkin garinku] should not think we are speaking of him, since that king himself is a part of alam.

Yet what kind of god is the God of Creation? God is Arrahaman [“Beneficent’ ]. If your king [sarkin garinku] is kind and is praised you may think his charity is beyond compare. Yet sometimes the king is angry with you and will pass you by in the distribution of gifts. Or he may not favor you in some other

Ideological Basts of Early Emirate Reform 301 way. God gives you gifts [Ryauta], wealth [arztki], and he gives you a throne [sarauta], but not just because you follow him. He is not like a human being [dan adam] who retaliates; not like a king who honors you only when you honor him. If you cheat that king, he cheats you. If the common people [talakaz] don’t like the king, he tries to imprison them. God does not behave in that way. God is Arrahaman. God does not punish man because man does not do what God

wants. He is Arrahaman. The Jews do not like to hear us refer to God as Arrahaman. Whether you call him God or Arrahaman it is all the same, since Arrahaman is his other name. Jews assume that God is their god alone. If they are good, he is good to them. If they are not good, then he is not good to them. They assume they are better than everybody in the world, and hence they assume they are the only people that God will love. They assume that God will not like Arabs, Europeans, Hindus, and others. That is why they quarreled with the Prophet—because they don’t want God to be referred to as Arrahaman. Although God is Arrahaman to everybody in the world, he never forgets the goodness one has done in the world. If you have done good deeds in this world, you will see his mercy in the next world.

The chapter continues: Which Ubangiji? The Ubangiji is Malki Yaumiddin

[sovereign on the Day of Judgment”]. On the Day of Judgment or even in this world, if we want to see the importance of things, we must see things from the religious point of view. For example, people may begin to make trouble concerning inheritance [gado] or property. If we do not refer to God, there would never be a settlement. Even if somebody leaves the matter, if he has not seen God in the settlement he will try to bring trouble again. On the Day of Judgment, God is the only Ubangiji. The chapter continues: lyyaka Na’abudu [“thee alone do we worship’ ]. You who pray, direct your prayers to God. Do not pray in hopes of gain but out of respect. It is thee alone, oh God, that we, your servants, worship. In school, the boys often read from the Qur’an and make the mistake of saying zyaka. Rather, it should be pronounced ee-yah-ka. The word should be emphasized. Iyaka is the word used by women and blind people. If you say Iyyaka Naabudu and do not stress the ee-yah-ka, it means “the sound of the rain during the day,” implying that you are worshipping the sun. But when you say Ee-yah-ka N@abudu it means, “Thee alone, God, do we worship.” Then we continue: Wa Iyyaka Nasta@in [“from thee alone do we seek help” ]. You help us in our lives, in the world, and in the next world; help us with our food, our clothing, our health, and everything. When we stand up to say our prayer, we continue with [Aidina Siradal Mus-

takima [“guide us on the right path”]. Guide us on the path that is right, which does not lead to the left, which does not go on forever, and which does not lead into the bush.

Guide us on the road of those Siradal Lazina An’amata Alathim [“the road of those whom God has prospered” ]. This is the prosperity of knowing the truth, not the prosperity of money or property. To know the truth is to follow a straight religion, a divinely created religion, a religion brought by the five prophets: Adam [Adamu], Noah [Nuhu], Abraham [Ibrahim], Moses [Musa], and Jesus [Isa]. These are the flagbearers of the Islamic religion. The Prophet

302 Religion and Political Culture in Kano Muhammad made final what these five prophets brought. It is the religion of human beings (yan adamu), and it is the most moderate road. We should not follow Gairil Magadubi Alaihim [“those on whom wrath is brought” |, the road walked by those with whom he is angry. Yet we should never consider God as truly angry with anybody. If we do that, we are disobedient and show disrespect to God. The Jews say that any prophet who comes

must be a king or they will not trust him. For example, when the Prophet David [Dauda] or the Prophet Solomon [Suleiman] came and were kings, the Jews followed them. But they did not believe other prophets, such as Jesus and Muhammad, who did not come to rule and hence were not acceptable to them. They are talking nonsense because they go against one of the rules of Islam

[kawa'idul islam|. To them the Prophet Muhammad is not the last of the prophets, and they are still waiting for a prophet to come.

In saying Wala Zalina [“not of those who go astray” ] you ask God to save you from the road of those who go astray and will never go right, for example, the mission or messianic people [mishan ko kuma masihu|. In Hausa, “mis-

sion” [mishan] or “Christian” [Nasara] refers to “European” [Bature], although Europeans are not the only followers of “mission.” Mission belief is worse than that of the Jews because they refer to Jesus as the “Son of God” and Mary also as a god. Thus, there are three gods. There is the real God [Allah Allah] who is Rabbil Alamin [“the Lord of Creation”] and the god Jesus and the god Mary. These are the trinity [salathatina]. There has never been such nonsense. The reason they call Jesus the son of God is because they never saw him with a father. On that basis, why don’t they say that the Prophet Adam and [his wife] Eve were gods because they did not have a father? The Prophet Jesus even has a mother, while Adam and Eve do not. Now this is the backbone of the Fatiha, but let’s review. I have told you that

in this chapter is everything of the Qur’an. What the Qur’an has brought are the laws, the way of finding sustenance and prosperity, and belief in the Day of Judgment. As the beginning, Alhamdu Lillahi is said. When we say Arrahaman Arrahim, we should believe that God is one [La Ilaha Illa Lahu]. This is our theology [tauhidi], the belief in one God. In Fatiha we find theology. In Malzk Yaumiddin, we say that God is King on the Day of Judgment and is responsible for the Day of Judgment. In Iyyaka Na’abudu, we say he is the one who

has given us prayers, fasting, and the other pillars of Islam. In Wa Iyyaka Nasta’in we refer to one’s life in the world. You must find sustenance and prosperity in the world and know how to manage your wealth and how to give alms [zakka] out of it. In saying Ihidina Siradal Mustakima we are trying to accept the rules brought by Islam, including obedience, worship, and the rules of responsibility (for example, husband to wife, and wife to husband). All this is included in Ihidina Siradal Mustakima, or “guide us on the right path.” These few words refer to all the rules brought by Islam. We are asking God to help us in these matters.

In this chapter, we find theology, belief in the Day of Judgment, and respect for the rules of worship, such as prayers and pilgrimage. We find help from God in what he wants us to do. Even the answer to how we should be ruled is contained in this chapter, because Islam is the correct path. Also here we ex-

Ideological Basis of Early Emirate Reform 303 press our belief in the prophets; we gave the examples of Adam, Abraham, Noah, Moses, and Jesus. And in this chapter there is a request to God to guard us against the paths of those who have gone astray. You must cut yourself off from the path of the Christians and Jews. There are even other religions in the world, such as Hinduism and Maliya [sic]. If a religion has a book, it is either that of the Jews or the Christians. If it has no book it represents paganism | maguzanct|. But you are not concerned with paganism or animism [shirku]. Acceptance of this chapter means acceptance of all that the Prophet has brought. Try to understand this translation so that when you say your prayers, you know what you are saying.

When you say your prayers, you must do the following. You must purify your body [tsarki] because you are going near God and you know God is pure. Let me talk plainly. Suppose you are a butcher and you want to get married; you know your body is smeared with blood and you are covered with stench. You must wash yourself and put on perfume so that you smell nice. Also, for example, if you plan to visit your mallam, you try to go looking good. It is important to look your best when you are visiting a person who is senior to you. How much more important is meeting God! You are in need of his guidance. You beg his pardon for what you have done. Therefore you must wear your best clothes, clean your body, and pray in a clean place. That is why ablution is performed at the beginning of prayers. In Hausaland, we are told to perform our ablutions by rinsing water in the mouth, inhaling and exhaling water from the nostrils, and washing the face and hands and feet. We are seldom told the reasons for doing these things. There are reasons. For example, when you put on good clothing, you clean your shoes and put oil on your body. If the person is a woman, she puts on makeup so that she will be attractive. Why do you do all these things? If you wash your hands, your hands will bear witness to your intentions; and the water will bear witness, and even the angels will bear witness that you have not left your hands dirty when you are going to meet God. Washing your mouth will bear witness that you do not talk in a foul manner and you do not say things forbidden by God. If you wash your face, it shows

that you do not use your eyes to look at prohibited things. If you wash your head, you witness that you do not think evil thoughts about people. If you wash your ears you are trying to forget things that are bad: If you wash your feet . . . [ recording tape is blank at this point for about two minutes ]. When everybody is standing up you are bearing witness that there is no one superior to God. That is the reason why you stand at certain points during the prayers. When you bow with hands on knees, it means that God is superior to all four-legged creatures, even the huge elephant. When you put your forehead to the ground, you are bearing witness that God is superior to everything that crawls on the ground. At each movement of your body, you say Allahu Akbar | Ailah al-Ak bar “God is superior to all’’].

We should also understand the origins of prayer. There are many stories nar-

rated by ignorant people asserting that when the Prophet—on whom is the peace and blessing of God—was in the world and when prayers were to be intro-

duced, the Prophet ascended [zsra’z] into heaven with the angel Gabriel. He was given fifty prayers by God. He then met a certain prophet—Jesus, or was it

304 Religion and Political Culture in Kano Moses? And he was told by Moses to go back and request a lesser number because the next generation of people could not perform as many as fifty prayers. The ignorant storytellers convey an insult in this story. They suggest that Moses knows better than God what human beings should do. But God is the one who

created human beings and knows best what they can do. A variation of this ignorant narration suggests that God called the Prophet to him and told him what the people should do. Then, on the way back to earth, the Prophet was told to return and request fewer prayers.

The real origins of the five daily prayers are as follows: The first prayer [asuba] at dawn was first performed by the Prophet Adam. When he was in paradise he committed a single sin, and God expelled him from paradise into the world [duniya]. When he was in the world he stood in darkness, trembling, and was sorry for what he had done. He was accustomed to the luxury and brightness of paradise. He stood in darkness and yearned for warmth and light. Then

he looked up and saw the first rays of dawn, and he raised his head to thank God. Every morning thereafter he repeated these two raka’as [“genuflexions” ]. This is the origin of the dawn prayer.

Next came the Prophet Noah. He and his people were saved from the flood by God. The time was early afternoon [azahar], and he did four raka?as to thank God. It became his custom to say these four raka’as as well as the two raka’as as initiated by the Prophet Adam.

Then, during the time of the Prophet Abraham, there was a plot to kill him. He was taken and plunged into burning fire. But the angel Gabriel came to his rescue and he was saved from the plot of the unbelievers. He thanked God for having saved him from this tragedy which threatened his life. He prayed four raka’as. These four are the origin of the mid-afternoon prayer [asar]. He inherited two sets of prayers from the prophets Adam and Noah, and he added his own.

Then, during the time of the Prophet Moses, there was danger to his people, and God told Moses to leave the land of Egypt. He came to the river Nile and crossed it. Pharaoh chased him but was drowned in the river. When Moses reached the other side of the Sinai it was almost sunset. After performing the mid-afternoon prayers, which was his custom, he decided to add another prayer to thank God for having saved him from the evil intentions of Pharaoh and for having saved the Muslim religion. He did three raka’as. That is the origin of the sunset prayer [almuru] or, as we say, the magariba [“western”] prayer. Moses continued the other prayers and added his own. Then the Prophet Jesus appeared. He was about to be crucified but was saved when God substituted somebody else in his place. The time was after the maga-

riba prayer, and Jesus did five raka’as to thank God. This is the origin of the evening prayer [/isha]. That is why we say, “God guide us just as you have guided those whom you have chosen.” The prayers of the prophets Adam, Noah, Abraham, Moses, and

Jesus are the prayers which the Prophet Muhammad constituted as the five daily prayers. This is the origin of the five prayers we inherited from them. This,

in short, is the meaning of the chapter Fatiha. We are going to stop here and start reading. Peace be upon you. [End of tafsir. ]

Ideological Basis of Early Emirate Reform 305 Ahmadu Trader: This has brought us to the end of today’s reading. Tomorrow, God willing, anybody who joins us here for tafsir should move closer [to the house] to make way for vehicles and pedestrians. Vehicles are finding it difficult to pass. Please do not sit on the road. Come here by the side of the wall or by

the place of reading. It is not your fault, but results from our being a large crowd. Greetings on breaking your daily fast. May God give us blessing.®®

The tafsir of Aminu Kano illustrates certain patterns and principles of interpretation. First, there is an affirmation of the fundamental precepts of Muslim community. Distinctions are drawn between it and other religious communities, and the centrality of ritual prayer in Islam is stressed. Second, there is an emphasis on natural rather than supernatural explanations of issues such as the origins of prayer. Islam is portrayed as moderate, rational, and rooted in human experience. Third, there is stress on God as the source of moral, social, and legal behavior. Observations are made on the temporal nature of human government and the omnipotent nature of God. Finally, there is encouragement of direct individual communication with God and on understanding the meaning of the rituals. The tafsir of Aminu Kano confirms the Hausa expression, “there is no king except God” (ba sarki sai Allah), rather than the Hausa expression, “the king

is the shadow of God” (sarki zillullahi ne). Respect for human authority is implicit in the tafsir, but a higher moral code is depicted that has precedence over anything human and hence fallible. A tafsir mallam deals with the fundamental source of values and meaning— the Qur’an. In so doing, he establishes his right to interpret human behavior

and social institutions in the light of the paradigm of the Qur’an. Many reformers in Kano have used the Qur’an to challenge orientations toward authority and community which, they feel, are based on custom and superstition and not on the revealed word of God. 38 Aminu Kano, “Tafsir” (tape recording, Kano, 1967, Hausa). The author is grateful to Ahmadu Trader for making available this tape recording.

8 oye The Transition to Kano State

During the 1950s and 1960s in Kano the structure of authority remained rela-

tively constant, but the boundaries of political communities underwent continuous change. In retrospect it can be seen that these changes directly contributed to the establishment of Kano State in 1967-68. This chapter will not describe the actual political processes of this period, since studies have been done on the growth of regionalism in northern Nigeria, the emergence of modern politics in the north, and the inception of military rule.’ The general pattern may be summarized as follows. An annual Conference of Emirs and Chiefs of Northern Nigeria was set up in 1931 which later became the House of Chiefs for the Northern Region. The MacPherson National Constitution of 1951 provided for an elective House of Assembly to be set up in the Northern Region. Thus an upper and lower house formed the basic legislative body in northern Nigeria during the period 1951-66. With the Independence Constitution of 1958, the basic structure of northern regional politics was set. There was an appointed governor, who was the chief executive officer, and a council 1 See C, S. Whitaker, Jr.. The Politics of Tradition: Continuity and Change in Northern Nigeria, 1946-1966 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970); B. J. Dudley, Parties and Politics in Northern Nigeria (London: Frank Cass and Co., 1968); S. K. Panter-Brick, ed., Nigerian Politics and Mtlitary Rule (London: The Athlone Press, 1970); Robert Melson and Howard Wolpe, eds., Nigeria: Modernization and the Politics of Communalism (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1971).

The Transition to Kano State 307 of ministers appointed by the governor and presided over by a premier who could be selected from either house. In 1962, with the Provincial Commissioners

Act, certain powers were delegated from the regional level to the provincial level. With the military coup in January 1966, the constitution was suspended, and many of the regional powers were co-opted by the national administration in Lagos. After the countercoup in July 1966, various experiments in provincial

groupings were undertaken; and in May 1967 a twelve-state system was instituted in Nigeria which divided the former Northern Region into six separate states, of which the former Kano Province was one. The MacPherson Constitution had also set up a federal House of Representa-

tives, and in 1951 elections were held in northern Nigeria for the first time. The prospect of elections had resulted in the formation of the two major northern political parties: the Northern Peoples Congress (NPC) (Jam‘iyya Mutanen Arewa) and the Northern Elements Progressive Union (NEPU) (Jam’iyyar Neman Sawaba). Competition between these two parties dominated Kano politics during the period 1951-64, although a number of splinter groups

and minority parties made their appearance during this period. In 1964 the NPC formed the major segment in a national coalition—Nigerian National Alliance—and NEPU formed the northern segment in a competing national coalition—United Party Grand Alliance. After the 1964 election in Kano, many

elements from both parties came together to form the Kano State Movement (KSM) which was formally incorporated as a political party in July 1965. All political parties were banned after the coup in January 1966. This chapter will focus on five themes related to authority and community during this period: the continuity of authority in the era of party politics, the growth of the Sabon Gari community in Kano, the idea of a northern regional community, the emergence of Kano nationalism, and the crisis of community. THE CONTINUITY OF AUTHORITY IN THE ERA OF PARTY POLITICS

The basic innovation with regard to authority during the era of the political parties (1951-66) was the idea of electoral succession to leadership. It is important to assess the degree to which the experiment in electoral succession actually affected the composition of the authority structure in Kano. The idea of popular elections as a means of selecting political leadership had no precedent in Kano, except with regard to village heads and ward heads who were chosen by a consensus of adult males. The concept of an electoral college, however, did have a parallel in the Kingmaker Council which selected emirs, but the kingmakers themselves held appointive rather than elective positions. In all, there have been seven major elections in Kano for positions at various levels of government, from city council to federal parliament.

308 Religion and Political Culture in Kano The 1951 elections for federal and regional offices were indirect.? The fouror five-stage electoral process was such that the final result of the election for representatives in the national and regional assemblies confirmed two distinct types of leadership: traditional Fulani clan rulers and certain members of the merchant community.? In the former category were the sarkin shanu (Shehu Ahmad, later madaki); an education officer (Bello Kano, later makama); the

chiroma (Sanusi, later emir); the wakilin waje (Bello Dandago, later sarkin dawaki mai tuta); and the district head of Ungogo (Abubakar Dokaji, later waziri). Those elected from the merchant class included Alhaji Nabegu (trader) and Inuwa Wada (businessman). In the 1954 federal election all of those elected in 1951 were returned with the exception of the madaki, the waziri, and Sanusi, who withdrew to work in Native Authority administration (as emir) and did not compete. Voting was still indirect, but in two or three stages. A significant development was the

widespread involvement of rural voters at the first stage of the election.“ Political parties began to compete significantly for the first time. The electoral college, which made the final selection, consisted of sixty-nine Native Authority officials and sixty-three nonofficials.° The occupational and educational char2For description of this indirect system, see Supplement to Nigerta Gazette 38, no. 37 (July 19, 1951): 815-86. Also, Richard Sklar, Nigerian Political Parties (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), pp. 28-37. 3 According to Sklar, “In 1951 every Native Authority, typically an emir, was permitted to ‘nominate’ a number of persons equal to 10 percent of the final electoral college who were ‘injected’ into the college. It was understood that these nominees included the choices of the emir and various pressures operated to induce the members of the final colleges to vote for them. Thus in Kano Emirate not one of the twenty persons elected to the House of Assembly by the final electoral college had been elected by the voters at a lower stage;

in fact, ten of them had been defeated in the earlier balloting. On the other hand, four candidates of the radical Northern Elements Progressive Union who had been successful at the intermediate stage were defeated in the final college by previously defeated nominees who were injected into the college by the Native Authority under the ro percent rule” (Nigerian Political Parties, p. 30).

4For example, those elected at the first stage in Dawakin Tofa District included farmers, 70; village heads, 29; craftsmen, 7; Qur’anic teachers, 5; traders, 4; miscellaneous, 4. There were 118 constituency areas, each with an average of 300 electors (NAK [8605], 1955).

5 The 1954 electoral college in Kano consisted of 132 persons: senior Native Authority officials, 12 (including 10 nominated by the Native Authority); district heads, 18; village heads, 25; district scribes, 7; village scribes, 2; Native Authority forestry assistants, 1; Native Authority school teachers, 1; alkalis, 2; court scribes, 1; other mallams, 16; farmers, 25; traders, 7; tailors, 6; journalists, 1; political party organizers, 2; unknown, 6 (NAK (6661/5, 23], 1954). According to Sklar, “For the federal election of 1954 the regulations were altered to permit any ten members of a final college to nominate non-members as candidates. In Kano Emirate sixteen of the eighteen successful candidates were so nominated” (p. 30). There were a number of complaints about the actual voting process. A

The Transition to Kano State 309 acteristics of the successful nominated candidates is given in Appendix 4. The

overwhelming majority were Native Authority officials. Western-educated teachers were involved, however, and the most important single contest was between Maitama Sule, a Kano Middle School teacher identified with the Yolawa clan,® and Aminu Kano (who was defeated).

The 1956 regional election was also dominated by Native Authority officeholders. The dan iya, the waziri, the madaki, the turaki, and the makama all

competed successfully. Aminu Kano (NEPU) was defeated by the present emir, Ado Bayero (NPC). Rural electors (male taxpayers) voted again in stages, allowing final candidates to make further nominations. In the urban areas of the north, however, male taxpayers were allowed for the first time to vote directly for final candidates."

In the 1958 Kano City Council election the 1956 procedure was again employed. Each ward in the city had its own representative, and hence over one hundred seats were involved. Each ward head was election chairman for his ward. The development secretary, Mahmud Bayero (present wakilin asibiti), was chairman of elections. Nasiru Kabara (leader of Reformed Qadiriyya) and Aminu Kano were both successful candidates. The election involved party competition, and the NPC won a considerable majority. (This experiment in local urban government was discontinued in 1963 when the life of the council expired and a caretaker council was appointed without new elections.) The 1958 election was a significant innovation in the succession system, for it provided a direct link between all sections of the city and the emirate authority. (The Waje Council is discussed later in this chapter.) file of election complaints for the 1954 elections in Kano is contained in the Kaduna Archives (NAK [6661/5.20]). These complaints were received from sources both in the Sabon Gari and in the Old City. Those from the city tended to focus on the fact that voters were watched by policemen during the voting procedure. According to one complaint from Zaitawa ward, dated November 19, 1954, there were three irregularities in the voting: “1. The returning officers did not check up the number of voters to correspond with the number of votes... . 2. The voting was not secret because policeman #75 was standing near the ballot box and occasionally picked up the voting card to hand over to the voters... . 3. After the voting was finished, the returning officer came out and waited for 30 minutes (still expecting some voters) but leaving Policeman #75 in the room with the (voting) box and voting papers” (NAK [8605/5.2] ). 6 Maitama Sule (b. 1927) is the son of a servant of the madaki’s family. On his mother’s

side he is Ningi, stemming from the Fulani-Ningi wars in the nineteenth century. His situational identities thus include Ningi, Habe, Yolawa, Fulani, and Hausa. 7 There were four seats in the Kano urban area that were filled by direct election in 1956. The results were as follows: (1) Kano East: NPC, 2,119; NEPU, 1,776. (2) Kano West: NPC, 3,252; NEPU, 1,229. (3) Kano South: NPC, 2,928; NEPU, 499; Independents,

“4. (4) Kano Waje: NPC, 2,082; NEPU, 1,793 (Whitaker, The Politics of Tradition, P. 375).

310 Religion and Political Culture in Kano In the 1959 federal election there was direct and universal male suffrage for the first time in Kano. Also for the first time, violence on a significant scale occurred between followers of NEPU and followers of NPC in the city. The

categories of persons who were successful in the election were traders and teachers, such as Alhaji Ahmadu Mai Kwatashi, Inuwa Wada, Maitama Sule,

and Aminu Kano. With the significant exceptions of the dan amar (Bello Kano) and the sarkin dawaki mai tuta (Bello Dandago), the administrative class focused its attention on local and regional offices rather than federal.

In the 1961 regional election, two groups of persons emerged as successful candidates; they were to have a considerable effect on later politics in Kano: . merchants from the “modern sector” who did not have traditional roots in the city and younger members of the royal family who were, to some extent, in competition with one another. The first group included two figures of particular significance: Ibrahim Musa Gashash, of Tripolitanian extraction, who was involved in groundnuts and transportation; and Haruna Kassim, of Beriberi extraction, who was involved in a variety of wholesale and retail businesses. Both of these men later challenged the power and authority of Emir Sanusi on land tenure, and the issue they raised contributed to his deposition. The second group included Aminu Bayero, who had been recently removed by Emir Sanusi from the district headship of Bici, and Ado Sanusi, who aligned himself with his father’s position. Also during the 1961 election, certain politicians appear to have made conscious attempts to manipulate religious-group loyalties. This tendency increased during the 1961-64 period.° 8 The efforts of Obafemi Awolowo (Action Group Party) and Ibrahim Imam to secure the support of Ibrahim Niass in the 1961 election and thereafter is discussed in the transcript of the trial of Awolowo in 1962 (See Criminal Appeal, Record of Appeals from the High Court of Lagos to the Federal Supreme Court of Nigeria, High Court charge no. LA/68C/1962 [Lagos: Registrar, High Court, 22 volumes, 1962] ). According to the testimony of Ibrahim Imam, “I visited Senegal on two occasions. .. . I visited Shehu Ibrahim Nayas in Kaolack, Senegal. I met him in 1956 or earlier. When I and others accompanied you [Awolowo] on a visit to Ghana in 1961, we met this man in Ghana, It might be we left for Ghana on gth June, 1961. I acted as interpreter between Shehu Nayas and yourself because I speak Arabic. . .. He is the head of the Tijaniyya

sect. I told you he had considerable followings in different parts of Africa including Nigeria. I said that he had considerable followings all over the Federation. He has greater followership in the North than any other part of the Federation because there are Muslims in the North. I did not tell you that the Emir of Kano was one of his followers, I never mentioned any specific name. I spoke to you sometime in June or July, 1961, that the relationship between the Emir of Kano and the Sardauna of Sokoto had been strained. It was an open secret. We did not discuss about the advantage we can make of this rift. 1 never discussed with you that if we could get Shehu Nayas to ask his followers to sup-

port the Action Group then our position would be strong in the North. What we discussed was the question of prayers to be said by Shehu Nayas. I believe as a Moslem in the

The Transition to Kano State 311 During the 1964 federal election the tension of the nation as a whole was reflected in Kano. Electoral constituencies continued to coincide with adefhcacy of prayers. ... The prayers were for the success of the Action Group in the North. Shehu Nayas was to pray for the Action Group and you in particular. You sent me to Kaolack to Nayas as you were then under restriction. It is not correct that I was sent to Kaolack to Shehu Nayas to get his followers in the North, who are the masses, to support the Action Group. What you sent me for was to solicit his prayers for you, especially what was happening between you and Chief Akintola. During the 1959 Federal Elections you never sent me to him. It was in 1961 when you first saw him in Ghana that

we first met him. I told you during your restriction that it is high time that we should solicit for his—Nayas—prayers. You told that some Alhajis came to you whilst at Ikenne and prayed for you and you gave them £25. It was then I suggested to you about Shehu Ibrahim Kaolack. You then told me that one of your brothers knew this Shehu Nayas. The 22nd accused was the person who arranged for the persons to follow me to Kaolack. The question of prayers by Shehu Nayas was discussed after we met him in Ghana. I discussed with you before you met him, the political influence Shehu Nayas has in the whole of West Africa. I never told you that if he sent a message to his followers in the North they will rally round the Action Group. ... The name of the Shehu Nayas just came out during the Elections, It is not correct that the main object of our discussion was

to rally his followers in the Far North... . About 75% of the population in the Far North are Moslems. I have always held the view that the appeal of the Action Group to the sentiment of the Moslems in the North was not all that good. It was not because of this that I brought in the name of Shehu Nayas. It was about his prayerful influence. I think I went to Shehu Nayas first in July 1962, and secondly in August, 1962. On the first occasion one Mr. Raka gave us our tickets and 3rd accused also gave us £200 to take to

Shehu Ibrahim Nayas. I made a claim for {75 for the Koran which I said I gave to Ibrahim Nayas. This claim was paid and I issued a receipt” (2:167-71). According to the testimony of Obafemi Awolowo, “According to the 4th Prosecution

Witness [Ibrahim Imam] Shehu Ibrahim Nayas is the head of Tijaniyya sect of the Mohamedan Religion in West Africa. He told me repeatedly before August 1962 that the Shehu had considerable influence over the majority of the Moslems in the North who also belong to the Tijaniyya sect. He and I met Shehu Nayas in Ghana in 1961. He acted

then as interpreter between me and Shehu Nayas. He insisted that if I would send a message to the Shehu Nayas, he would instruct his religious followers in the North to embrace the Action Group. Shortly before the declaration of Emergency in the Western Region, 4th Prosecution witness informed me that the relationship between the Emir of Kano who is of the Tijaniyya sect and the Sardauna of Sokoto who does not belong to that sect had become considerably strained. He thought that it would be wise for the Action Group to exploit the situation. He raised the matter again in August 1962 and I agreed that he should go to see the Shehu. I am a believer in prayers to God no matter by whom they are offered but it was solely and wholly of the political advantage which the Action Group might gain in the North that I had asked 4th Prosecution Witness to go to Senegal to see the Shehu so that the latter might send words to his followers in the North to embrace the Action Group, It is not true that in August 1962 I told the 4th Prosecution Witness that people were worrying me to give my blessings to a coup d’état against the Federal Government and that I needed the backing of himself and 22nd accused. The only discussions I had with 4th Prosecution Witness in August 1962 were in connection with his visit to the Shehu Ibrahim Navas. As far as I can remember he went again to see the Shehu in September 1962 all at the expense of the Action Group. In August 1962

312 Religion and Political Culture in Kano ministrative districts.? The most significant single contest was between Aminu

Kano (who lost) and Mahmud Dantata, a former NEPU sympathizer who

had been married to the daughter of Ibrahim Niass. The candidacy of Mahmud Dantata was illustrative of a general trend in Kano politics for former opposition leaders to realign themselves with the government party (NPC) and thus form a new dimension in the government party itself. The result of this realignment was twofold: the earlier groupings by ethnicity, class, and religious denomination were crosscut, and both parties contained representatives from all segments of society; and members of the government party and the opposition party were not really divided on issues that affected Kano itself. A de facto merger of elements from both parties occurred to some extent after the federal election, when the Kano State Movement party was formed (July 1965). Apart from formal party affiliation, the actual coalition of interests

in Kano during 1964 saw a minority Kaduna faction, which supported the sardauna, and a majority Kano faction, which supported a combination of local Kano interests (political, economic, and religious). During the 1964 election campaign the political implications of Usmaniyya were felt in Kano (see chapter 4), and to some extent this election had religious undertones that were not apparent in any previous election in Kano. The only campaign posters being used in Kano City by the NPC were photographs of the sardauna with a diagrammatic rendering of his spiritual and lineage descent

from the Prophet Muhammad. During the campaign Aminu Kano (NEPU) telephoned the premier directly to suggest a more clearly defined separation of religion and politics. Yet eventually NEPU decided to employ a similar style

within Kano City, and the principal campaign posters were photographs of Aminu Kano being blessed by Ibrahim Niass in Kaolack.”® It was clear that by the 4th Prosecution Witness informed me that certain non-Fulanis and non-Hausa groups in Sokoto province known as the Zamfara wanted to declare en masse for the Action Group. He wanted money for the Koran which he presented to the Shehu and for the purchase of membership cards for members of the Zamfara Peoples Party” (7:29-51). ® Federal Ministry of Information, Report of the Constituency Delimitation Commission, 1964 (Lagos: Printing Division, 1964); for Kano constituencies, see pp. 18-21. 10 The trip to Kaolack by Aminu Kano took place in September 1964. According to the

press report, “The Leader of the Northern Progressive Front, and President-General of NEPU, Alhaji Aminu Kano left Lagos yesterday by air for Senegal on a seven-day visit to Kaulaha [Kaolack] as a guest of Shaikh Ibrahim Kaulaha [Ibrahim Niass], a wellknown Moslem Leader. Alhaji Aminu is accompanied by five important personalities including Abubakar Zukogi, the NEPU General Secretary, Alhaji Salihu Na-Kande, national

patron of the NEPU and the party’s member in the Northern House of Assembly, Alhaji Ahmadu Trader, Assistant National Treasurer of the party [later chairman of the Kano State Movement] and Alhaji Sharif Ali, a well-known preacher in Islam from Sokoto Province. While in Kaulaha, Alhaji Aminu and his entourage will be guests of Shaikh Ibrahim Kaulaha and shall perform a number of religious activities with the

The Transition to Kano State 313 1964 both northern political parties were manipulating Islamic ideas and symbols in support of their positions. The electoral succession system that developed in Kano during 1951-64 was

clearly dominated by the Native Administration structure in both the preand postindependence periods. Two new groups of persons, however, did emerge through this system: merchant-businessmen and teachers. The patterns of succession resulting from the seven elections mentioned above (excluding the merchant and teacher element) were not significantly different from the patterns evident in emirate succession—a combination of dynastic principles and nondynastic political manipulation. This was partly due to the direct influence of the emir of Kano (Sanusi) on the selection of candidates. In retrospect, it is clear that the system of electoral succession—following a modified Westminster model of single-member constituency representation—added a form of

Western legitimation to the existing authority structure in Kano, although teachers and businessmen did become incorporated into the structure. Eventually this coalition of authorities was displaced not through electoral means but by military rule. THE GROWTH OF THE SABON GARI COMMUNITY

The greater Kano urban area (Waje) which has grown up to the east of Kano City is comprised of five district residential sectors. Each of these sectors has been distinctive in terms of ethnicity, standard of living, and recency and rate of immigration. These characteristics are summarized in Table 13. Fagge is the “new” Hausa sector, populated by merchants, traders, and young men who settled just outside the Old City because of their apparent need for a more modern style of life. Most of the Lebanese community lives in Fagge south.

Tudun Wada and Gwagwarwa are locations where many northern (Hausa, Fulani, Beriberi) migrants settled during the period 1950-65. They were physically separated from the Fagge (Hausa) and city (Hausa) sectors by the Sabon Gari. To some extent there was a spillover from the Sabon Gari into Gwagwarwa in the early 1960s, making this sector the only mixed Hausa-Ibo area. The Sabon Gari consisted of Ibo and other southern Nigerian ethnic groups settled in a densely populated area. The Sabon Gari was established in the early colonial period as a residential area for nonindigenous Christian semiskilled labor attracted to meet the needs of the colonial administration in Kano. The Township was originally the area where colonial administrators and expatriate businessmen lived. During the independence period, many Nigerian civil servShaikh” (“Aminu Kano and Envoy off to Senegal on Visit to Kaulaha,” Daily Comet, September 1, 1964, p. 4). The author is grateful to Ahmadu Trader for allowing him to view the 8-mm film taken during this trip.

314 Religion and Political Culture in Kano TABLE 13 CHARACTERISTICS OF RESIDENTIAL SEcTORS IN Kano Ursan Area, ca. 1965 Waje

Variable Kano City Fagge Tudun Wada Gwagwarwa Sabon Gari Township

1. Population 165,455 21,190 7,980 10,800 40,000 9,250 (1964)

2. Ethnic Hausa/ Hausa/ Hausa Hausa/Ibo Ibo and European/

identity Fulani Arab/ Southern = Lebanese/

Lebanese N. Civil Ser.

3. Income level mixed mixed low low mixed high

4. Date of 10th late 19th Post- Post-WW II early 20th early 20th

founding century century ww I century century

(1958-62) "

5. Population 11.5% 14.5% 28.9% 33.0% 5.6% 11.5% growth p.a.

6. Number of 27,000 3,325 1,160 920 1,700 1,550 houses (1964)

7. Persons per 1.4 3.0 1.8 2.0 7.0 1.4 room (1964)

Source: B. A. W. Trevallion, Metropolitan Kano: Report on the Twenty-Year Development Plan 1963-1983 (Glasgow: Greater Kano Planning Authority, 1966).

ants chose to live in this modern and affluent sector, along with the British commercial class.

The Sabon Gari (“new town”) has been especially important in the development of community identities in Kano. In 1954 the Sabon Gari was approximately 60 percent Ibo; this figure probably increased to 80 percent by 1965. Yet there were at least sixteen distinctive groups in the Sabon Gari (see Table 14). In terms of out-group perceptions, the Sabon Gari came to be regarded as including three ethnic categories: Ibo, Yoruba, and “other.” The factors of lan-

guage and religion were, as in Kano City, important reinforcements to communal identities. English was the lingua franca in the Sabon Gari, just as Hausa was the lingua franca in the city. With regard to religion, the Ibo were distinctive in their adherence to Roman Catholicism and “Nigerian national churches,” while the Yoruba tended to be identified with the orthodox Protestant denominations or evangelical churches such as the Aladura. (Many Yoruba families were Muslim, but were followers of the Ansar-Udeen and Ahmadiyya, which are not widely supported by northerners.) Despite the association of

persons in the Sabon Gari with Christian religious identities, the northern perception of the Ibo was that they were only nominal Christians and thus in

reality were pagans.

The Transition to Kano State 315 TABLE 14 SaBon Gari Etrunic Composition, 1954-55

Ethnic Classification Men Women Boys Girls Total — Percent

1. Ibo 3,670 3,758 2,844 2,496 12,770 59.05 2. Yoruba 1,484 1,710 928 1,046 5,174 23.92 3. Urhobo and Itsekiri 360 400 108 67 935 4.32

4, Efik and Ibibio 279 530 48 49 906 4.18 5. Benin, Ishan, and Kukuruku (Edo) 168 144 74 60 446 2.06

6. Ija (Okirika and

Kalabari) 195 101 33 20 349 1.61 7. Nupe and Igala 105 210 40 24 379 1.75

8. Idoma and allies 80 131 16 8 235 1.08

Dahomean 48 34 20 15 117 54 10. Hausa and Fulani 16 74 8 6 104 -48 9. Gold Coast, Togo, and

11. Sierra Cameroonian 37 12. Leonean20 1030 20 15 10 88 73 48 22

Sudanese-Arab 12 3 21 5 41 18 14. Chadian 18 10 6 4 38 17 13. Tripolitanian and

15. Kanuri 3 4 7 03 16. West Indian 2. 2 01

Total 6,470 7,165 4,171 3,814 21,624 100.00

Source: ‘“Tribal Population Statistics,’’ NAK Kano Province (5908) 1954/55.

The growth of the Sabon Gari may be dated from 1912, when the railway linked Kano to southern Nigeria. The administrative amalgamation of northern and southern Nigeria in 1914 had the effect of encouraging immigration to the north. During the period 1913-18, approximately 320 plots were established

in the Sabon Gari area to accommodate southern migrants, many of whom were associated with the railroad. By 1936 there was a total of 560 plots in the

Sabon Gari. By the outbreak of World War II, the number of plots had increased to 1,472. In terms of ethnic distribution of population growth, the 1921 census indicated

that there were fewer than 2,000 residents in the Sabon Gari, of which 1,478 were Yoruba. At that time, Ibos were so few that they were not mentioned in the census. In 1921 there were only 3,000 Ibos in the whole of northern Nigeria, although this figure rose to 12,000 by 1931. Not until after World War II did Ibos begin to outnumber the Yoruba in the Kano Sabon Gari. This same period

witnessed the continued growth of the Sabon Gari, reaching a peak in the

316 Religion and Political Culture in Kano period 1954-64, when the population doubled from 21,000 to 40,000. The timing of this development will be considered later in assessing ethnic competition and

conflict in Kano. Two points should be noted, however; the immigrants who came to Kano after World War II were born outside Kano and hence had a different legal and social status from those in the Sabon Gari (mainly Yoruba) who had been born in Kano, and the dramatic increase in immigrants during the 1950s coincided with the growth of political parties in northern Nigeria and

was interpreted by many northerners as an attempt to take over northern Nigeria through political means. From the beginning, the administration of the Sabon Gari was distinct from that of Kano City. The colonial policy of indirect rule required that the local emirate system serve as “Native Authority” and handle all matters of law, taxation, and land use within the emirate. Yet the colonial administration could not attract southern migrant labor to Kano under conditions whereby migrants would be subject to Islamic law and authority. Commercial enterprise could not be attracted for precisely the same reasons. In 1912, when non-Muslims were

prohibited by the emir from living inside Kano City, it was clear that other residential arrangements were necessary. Thus, a reserved area called the Town-

ship was set up (outside of the walled city), which was not subject to Native Authority jurisdiction. In 1918 a regulation was enacted that made it possible for southern Nigerians to hold title to plots in the Township area. Legal affairs were handled by a Kano Station magistrate, subordinate to the High Court. Thus, Sabon Gari residents were directly under the European local authority. In 1925 the Sabon Gari plots were re-ordered into their present gridlike pattern. In 1934 the Sabon Gari area was enlarged. Meanwhile, the Sabon Gari was still part of the Township area. An unofficial

Township Advisory Board had been set up; and by 1936 two Africans (from Sabon Gari) were serving on the board. In 1940 an administrative decision was made to excise the Sabon Gari from Township administration and to “return” it to Native Authority jurisdiction. This was done in 1941, and the Sabon Gari became part of the larger area known as Waje [“outside”]. In 1956 an urban council was established in Waje. Council members had certain real control over financial matters. In 1958 the Waje Council was dealing with a budget of £41,267. A portion of this budget was directed to improving the Waje market. A series of disputes arose with the Native Authority over matters of market jurisdiction. In 1959 the three-year term of office for members to the Waje Council expired, but new elections were postponed so they would not conflict with Nigerian federal elections. Although the Waje Council budget

had increased to £60,000, the colonial administration began to fear that the council committees might “tend to over-step the limits of their power and usurp

The Transition to Kano State 317 functions which are the prerogative of the Native Authority.” 7’ An alliance of

NCNC and NEPU members held a majority in the council. In May 1960, elections to the Waje Council were held, and the result was a reversal in the political composition of the council. The controversial elections produced a majority for the NPC. In retrospect, it is perhaps most important that at the time of Nigerian independence there was no truly integrated decision-making institution and no central mechanism for conflict resolution within the Kano urban area as a whole. This dualism may have resulted from colonial necessity, but it was hardly conducive to cooperation between the Sabon Gari and the City.

By 1965 the Kano urban area approximated the classic Furnivall model of a plural society. The three major communities—northern Nigerian, (Hausa and

Fulani), southern Nigerian (Ibo and Yoruba), and expatriate (British and Lebanese) were linked together through the central commercial zone but were not integrated in social and political spheres. The commercial area even served as a physical buffer zone between the three communities. Although in many ways the expatriate community commercially dominated the urban area, the economic competition between the northern and southern communities in Kano is more relevant to the process of community formation. The three major types of competition were markets, employment, and land.

The Kano City market has been the major emporium of the Western and Central Sudan throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. In the early postindependence period, however, the Kano Sabon Gari market began to surpass the city market in terms of volume of business. To a certain extent the two markets served their respective communities in terms of staples; yet there was price competition, and the Sabon Gari market increasingly came to dominate the total market of modern types of consumer items, especially imported textiles, canned food, and footwear. By 1965 the Sabon Gari market had surpassed the city market in number of traders, in the value of turnover, and in the average profit per trader. This reversal of status (see Table 15) strained relations between the two markets. City traders complained that profits from the Sabon Gari were sent to eastern Nigeria rather than remaining in Kano. Many of the larger Hausa merchants, however, were no longer doing business through the petty market system, but were establishing wholesale businesses in competition with the expatriate community. Thus, the relative decline of the city market had more impact on the middle- and lower-class Hausa traders than on wealthy families.

Competition for employment was as acute as market competition. The two 11 Northern Nigeria, Provincial Annual Reports, 1959 (Kaduna: Government Printer, 1962), Pp. 94.

318 Religion and Political Culture in Kano TABLE 15

Comparison OF Kano City anp Sason Gari Markets, 1965

Variable Sabon Gari Market City Market

1. Total number of traders 3,571 1,902

2. Total stock (£1,000) 794.5 212.7

3. Average stock per trader per month (f) 222 112 4. Monthly sales (£1,000) 519.7 160.2 5. Average sales per trader per month Cf) 145 84 6. Average profit per trader per month (f) 28 15

Source: B. A. W. Trevallion, Metropolitan Kano: Report on the Twenty-Year Development Plan, 1963-1983 (Glasgow: Greater Kano Planning Authority, 1966).

main areas were white-collar jobs and semiskilled work in light industries. The original demand met by southern labor was for clerks literate in English. Employers included the railroad, the banks, the post office, the colonial administration, and the expatriate companies. During the 1930s Lebanese businessmen came to Kano, settled in Fagge, and engaged in light industry and wholesale merchandising. During World War II, many new industries were initiated in Kano.”* By the end of the war Kano had the largest modern sector in northern Nigeria,’ and the manpower for this sector was drawn largely from southern Nigerian immigrants who settled in the Sabon Gari. From 1954 to 1962 a considerable number of new industries were established in Kano. Yet the Kano Labor Exchange reports make it clear that by the end of the 1950s the overwhelming majority of persons seeking semiskilled work in the modern sector were northerners. The high rate of immigration from northern

rural areas into the Kano urban area placed a premium on employment and thus increased competition for jobs, despite the general expansion of light industry. Tension regarding job competition was heightened during this period by two additional factors: the political leverage of the northernization policy which give employment preference to persons born in the north, and the near monopoly by Ibos of clerical and semiskilled jobs in the postal service, banks, and railway. The maintenance of this latter pattern, despite the policy of northernization, was felt by northerners to be due to nepotistic hiring practices. These tensions were offset to some extent by the fact that the Kano economy See “Wheat Mills at Kano, 1940-42,” NAK/SNP (5/1:3338); “Beeswax Industry, 1939-48,” NAK (3182); “Soap Industry, 1937-53,” NAK (4183). ‘8 See Bryan Sharwood-Smith, Kano Survey (Zaria: Gaskiya Corporation, 1950), Pp. 39. For background to this survey, see “Kano Economic Survey, Minutes, 1950,” NAK/SNP (5/6991); “Kano Native Treasury Five-Year Plan, 1949-54,” NAK/SNP (7014); “Kano Province Economic Survey, 1950-54,” NAK/SNP (7173)

The Transition to Kano State 319 was growing rapidly during this period. In 1963, however, this process began to

slow down. During 1963-65 virtually no new industries were established in Kano, partly because of the regional government policy of encouraging industrial location in Kaduna and partly because Kano had received a disproportion-

ate share of industries in northern Nigeria in the late 1950s. The shift of industrial strength from Jos to Kano had been dramatic during the period 1956-60. In 1956 Jos had 233 industrial establishments (21 percent of the northern

total) employing over ten persons, while Kano had 170 such establishments (15 percent of the northern total). In 1960 Jos had but 191 such establishments (13 percent of the northern total), while the number in Kano had risen to 231 (22 percent of the northern total). The tensions in Kano after 1963 resulting from the slowdown in industrial development provoked anger in the Kano Hausa community toward the Ibos (who dominated semiskilled work) and toward the regional government in Kaduna. This frustration was a factor in the establishment of the Kano State Movement (KSM) in the summer of 1965; this movement incorporated major elements in the Kano northern community and demanded separation of Kano from the Northern Region administrative framework (to be discussed later in this chapter).

The establishment of light industries in the Kano urban area had three effects on the ethnic division of labor: nonindigenous ethnic groups (from southern Nigeria) dominated skilled and semiskilled positions in the modern sector; the Fulani administrative class in Kano held lucrative advisory positions in the management structures of the new industries, which tended to exacerbate

Fulani relations with the Hausa lower class; and northern ethnic groups became associated with unskilled labor but increasingly came to compete for semiskilled occupations in the modern sector.

At the core of these employment patterns was the language and education issue."* Except in the Sabon Gari, Christian mission education was prohibited in Kano by the colonial administration. As late as 1952, the total number of persons literate in English in Kano Province was 23,000 (out of a population of 3.4 million); approximately half of this number were nonnortherners. According to an official report in 1953, “In consequence, both in terms of Government

Departments and of Commerce, the Region has been very largely dependent for its clerical staff and for technicians and artisans on the Southern Region.” © 14 See John N. Paden, “Language Problems of National Integration in Nigeria: The Special Position of Hausa,” in Language Problems of Developing Nations, ed. J. A. Fish-

man, C. A. Ferguson, and J. Das Gupta (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1968), pp. 199-213.

15 Northern Regional Government, Report on the Kano Disturbances: 16th, 17th, 18th, and 19th, May 1953 (Lagos: Government Printer, 1953), p. 2.

320 Religion and Political Culture in Kano The disparity between Kano City and the Sabon Gari in Western education and English facility is illustrated by the official figures for percentage of children (of the appropriate age group) attending Western schools in 1965: Kano City, 5 percent; Sabon Gari, 98 percent.’®

The matter of Western education became almost a symbol of communal identity in Kano. The major sociopolitical organization of the Sabon Gari, the Ibo Union, sustained as a matter of highest priority the private educational facilities that provided access into the employment structure of Kano. According to the Kano Twenty-Year Plan, The Ibo people of Sabon Gari and elsewhere in Kano identify themselves primarily with the Ibo Union. This organization makes provision for a variety of activities including well-run and staffed primary schools and one secondary school. The establishment of schools which cater almost exclusively for Ibo children was probably forced upon the community through lack of educational facilities provided by the local education authority. However, while the Ibo Union performs a valuable function, its existence, as with any other organisation catering solely for a significantly large ethnic group, is disadvantageous. It indirectly stands in the way of the identification of the people with their town."”

The policy of northernization, initiated in the late 1950s by the premier of the Northern Region, attempted through political means to balance the importance of the English language with an increased use of the Hausa language. It also set restrictions on employment of persons who were not born in the north. Thus, in situations where there was a northerner available for a job, he would take precedence over a southerner. At the same time, efforts were made by the government to increase the amount of Western education available to the northern community. Yet English language was not a crucial indica-

tor of attitudes toward modernization. Many Ibos in Sabon Gari were traditional in the sense of adherence to ethnic cultural values, and many Hausa

traders in Kano City (some of whom were literate in Hausa and many in Arabic as well) were modern in their aspirations and organization. Conversely, many of the Hausa and Fulani elite who were impeccable in their use of English were among the most traditional elements in the north. The final category of ethnic economic competition in Kano was in regard to Jand rights and use. Colonial ordinances confirmed the traditional practice whereby all land in Kano Emirate was crown land, and the emir granted rights of usufruct. As noted earlier, the original purpose of establishing the Kano Township was to remove control of certain land from the Native Authority. 16B, A. W. Trevallion, Metropolitan Kano: Report on the Twenty-Year Development Plan, 1963-1983 (Glasgow: Greater Kano Planning Authority, 1966). 17 Tbhid., p. 38.

The Transition to Kano State 321 Except for the Township, land could not be given or sold to persons not “originally” resident in northern Nigeria. According to the 1946 Commission on Land Tenure in Kano, “It is . . . doubtful whether . . . any persons not of Northern Nigerian origin who live in the Emirate but outside the Sabon Gari have any title [to land] the Ordinance recognizes.” *®

During the period of northernization, this ordinance was interpreted to exclude from land ownership all persons not born in the north. This policy was resented by southerners living in Kano (as was the policy of job restriction, and the result was an overcrowding of the available land in the Sabon

Gari. The average number of persons per room in Sabon Gari was seven compared to an average of 1.9 for the other five urban sectors (including Kano City). The Kano Twenty-Year Plan described the Sabon Gari in 1965 as “overcrowded” and “uniformly dirty and untidy.”*® The report further interpreted the organization of this ethnic ghetto as dysfunctional to family and community stability: The vast majority of people are Ibo. There is no evidence of sub-divisions which

are socially meaningful, such as the Ungwa [ward] in the City. Similarly the family is less of a unit and of less social importance. The Ibo people appear to feel as strangers to Kano despite the duration of their stay, often a lifetime. . . . Excessive overcrowding and the relatively large numbers of families in one house, the numerous “stranger” lodgers, and the separation of the real family between Kano and the home town in Eastern Nigeria, act disadvantageously against close family life.*°

Despite the degree of economic competition and social tension in Kano, prior to 1966 there were relatively few instances of overt violence between

the northern and the Sabon Gari communities. The major instance of violence occurred in May 1953. In April 1953 the northern delegates to the federal budget session in Lagos felt themselves harassed by street mobs.”# In retaliation, when Mr. Akintola of the Action Group proposed a speaking tour of Kano, several NPC officials arranged a protest march. In the events that followed, although the occasion was one of Yoruba politicians visiting Kano, the violence that developed focused almost exclusively on the Ibo community. Of the twenty-one southerners killed, none was Yoruba; and of the 18C, W. Rowling, Report on Land Tenure, Kano Province (Kaduna: Government Printer), p. 25. 19 Trevallion, Metropolitan Kano, p. 48. 20 Thid., p. 37-38.

21 Report on the Kano Disturbances, p. 2.

322 Religion and Political Culture in Kano seventy-one injured, only two were Yoruba. The Sabon Gari and the city and Fagge areas seemed to expect trouble at the time of the impending Action Group tour: There were signs of growing tension in the City. . . . Messrs. Leventis had sold 172 machetes to Southerners on Friday afternoon and there had been a considerable theft of scrap iron, and the U.A.C. Motor Department had reported that their grind-stone had been worn right down overnight by being used for sharpening matchetes and scrap iron. The Senior District Officer, Kano also reported

that the Ibo Union had asked for protection against Northerners who were stated to be coming into the town from nearby villages, many carrying weapons.2?

The actual fighting began on Saturday evening: More and more Northerners in small groups now began to concentrate in Sabon Gari and by 15:30 there was an estimated crowd of about 2,000, many mounted

and the majority armed in some way or other. . . . At about 16:00 hours the crowd started to get out of hand and the first act of violence took place: an Ibo who was riding by on his bicycle being assaulted and his bicycle smashed. Thereafter any Southerner seen in the area between Fagge and Sabon Gari was attacked.}8

The fighting continued sporadically until Tuesday, when police reinforcements, many of them southerners, established order and a reconciliation committee was established consisting of leading representatives of the Sabon Gari,

Fagge, and the city. The memory of the riots remained strong in Kano throughout the 1950s and 1960s. In many ways this violence crystallized the sense of northern and southern communities in Kano. THE IDEA OF A NORTHERN REGIONAL COMMUNITY

The phenomenon of northern nationalism was a response to the emergence of a national political framework. Most contact between northern and southern Nigeria occurred after World War II. Not until 1951 was there significant contact between political representatives of both territories. After the war,

there was an increase of southern migrants in the north because of the economic opportunities. Competition between northerners and southerners occurred economically, culturally, and politically. The organized response to such competition by northerners was the policy of northernization. Under this policy, only Nigerian citizens born in the north could own land, hold certain jobs, and avail themselves of preferential economic policies. Apart from the 22 Thid., p. 9.

23 bid.

The Transition to Kano State 323 policy itself, a set of community loyalties developed that were intended to. encompass all groups in the north. Northern apprehension regarding southerners, was evident even before the initiation of modern politics. In the Northern House of Chiefs, emirs began to raise the issue of external control of the northern economic system. One specific issue was the control of basic food commodities which was debated in 1949. According to the emir of Kano, Abdullahi Bayero, “The practice of hoarding corn in order to resell it at an exorbitant profit is both contrary to our religion and harmful to society. Complaints are so wide-spread that I feel compelled to move this resolution.” The emir of Zaria, Ja’afaru, proceeded

to identify those communities involved in the hoarding: “By Muhammaden law, this practice which we are now discussing, is expressly forbidden... . It is not the local people but the Southerners and Lebanese who are the worst offenders, for they buy the corn cheaply from the producers and then either hoard it until prices rise, or export it to another province and sell it there.” The emir of Misau affirmed this sentiment: “It is true that Southerners and Lebanese buy up large quantities of corn and export it elsewhere in order to make huge profits. It is very necessary that Government should take steps to prevent this.” 74

The concern of northerners regarding economic domination by “outsiders” continued throughout the postindependence period. Some of the specific economic issues included employment in commercial firms, control of produce exportation, government contracts, civil service, and credit and money lending. These issues are evident from the Northern House of Assembly debates. It was maintained that northerners were not being employed and that the government

should correct this situation. According to Yusuf Bayero (Representative, Sumaila District, Kano), “There is no firm [in Kano] where you can find a Northerner in a responsible post. If you see a Northerner in it, he must be a labourer and not an important officer.” *° Aminu Dantata (Representative, Kura District, Kano) spoke on government establishment of factories: “I have some suggestions to make: first, after the industries are established, I would like to see that Northerners are given work.” *° And Muhtar A. Bello Yola (Representa-

tive, Dawakin Tofa East District, Kano) asked, “As most of the Commercial Firms seem to have no regard to the Northernization Policy of the Government

of Northern Nigeria would the Honorable Premier cause the system of employment in Commercial Firms [to be] investigated and necessary action 24 Northern House of Chiefs, Debates, September 13, 1949, p. 4. 25 Northern House of Assembly, Debates, March 13, 1963, p. 292. 26 Ibid., March 19, 1963, p. 476.

324 Religion and Political Culture in Kano taken to make them change their attitude towards Northernization Policy?” 7"

It was maintained that northerners needed government assistance in reorienting control of exports away from expatriates. According to Aminu Dantata, “I therefore want the Government to buy the whole of B.C.G.A. [British Cotton Growers Association] and give it to the Co-operative Societies. The best thing for the Government to do, I suggest, is to hand over all these

trading [firms] to the Co-operative Societies instead of leaving them to the foreigners. The gain all goes to the foreigners and I therefore suggest that the

Minister should take over all the trading from the foreigners and give it to the Co-operative Societies.” 8

It was maintained that government contracts should be let to northerners. Pressure was constantly brought on the regional government. Baba Nabegu (Representative, Rano District, Kano) put the rhetorical question to the northern regional government: “Can the Minister of Finance tell the House the number of . . . contractors registered for Regional contracts? How many are (a) Northerners; (b) Non-Northerners; (c) Expatriates?” *8 There was a considerable pride in the rate of northernization of the civil service. According to the northern minister of establishment and training, Northernization is pursued at the utmost speed consistent with rising standards and efficiency. On the first day of Regional Independence, there were no North-

ern Permanent Secretaries, no Deputy Permanent Secretaries, and only five Senior Assistant Secretaries. The position today [1964] is as follows:*°

Post North Expatriate Others _ Total

(1) Permanent Secretary 12 3 — 15

(2) Deputy Permanent Secretary 2 6 — 8 (3) Senior Assistant Secretary 21 12 1 34

35 21 ] 57

It was maintained that the government should extend credit facilities to northerners and correct the “inequities” of expatriate lending procedures. According to Aminu Dantata, I would like to talk about the Commercial firms. The Minister should see about their transporting system. They do not give anything to indigenous borrowers but to foreigners, who, after taking heavy interests, lend to the Northerners a small part. I am suggesting that power to import and export be given to traders. The traders have not got sufficient money to trade with; I hope that before the 2” Ibid., March 12, 1963, p. 204. 28 Ibid., March 3, 1965, p. 222. 29 Ibid., September 25, 1964, p. 84-85. 80 Thid., p. 118-19.

The Transition to Kano State 325 erection of the [northern government] bank, the Minister should help traders so that they should be guaranteed [the financing] to import and export.?!

The policy of northernization was primarily the creation of the premier of the Northern Region, Ahmadu Bello. He was clearly supported in the economic aspects of the policy by the indigenous Kano trading community. The premier himself stressed two particular issues regarding the economic side of northern regionalism. First, economic domination by outsiders was due to the colonial situation which allowed and encouraged southern migration to the north. The premier described this situation as follows: “Any person who brings a stranger into the house [should expect that] when the owner of the house has gone, the stranger too should pack up and go.” ** Second, the consequences of outside domination of the economic system were a matter of practical concern to all areas and classes in the north: “The Northernisation Policy does not only apply to Clerks, Administrative Officers, Doctors and others. We do not want to go to Chad and meet strangers catching our fish

in the water, and taking them away to leave us with nothing. We do not want to go to Sokoto and find a carpenter who is a stranger nailing our houses. I do not want to go to the Sabon-Gari Kano and find strangers making the body of a lorry, or to go to market and see butchers who are not Northerners.” **

The political aspects of northern nationalism were derivative from the economics of the situation. Within the north, political means were used to enforce the policy of northernization. Within the national context, political means were employed to ensure that the north continued to control federal allocation of resources. Due to the particular population imbalance of regions within the national federation, the political unity of the north was regarded as

the single most important determinant of national control. The political integration of the north was partly based on a combination of subregional economic interests. ‘The most dramatic of these was the advantage to the middle

belt of the preferential employment policy, since Western education in that area had produced a considerable reservoir of skilled manpower. Economic interests, however, were only one part of the political integration of the north. An effort was made to develop a sense of communal loyalty both in religious terms (discussed in chapter 4) and even in ethnic terms. The principle of kinship was resuscitated, both with regard to the Muslim ethnic groups (Hausa, Fulani, Beriberi) and with regard to the non-Muslim 31 Tbid., March 19, 1963, p. 476.

i. Nomnern House of Chiefs, Debates, March 19, 1965, p. 55. id.

326 Religion and Political Culture in Kano middle-belt peoples. There had been a tendency, partly for political reasons, for Western-educated elite sectors of smaller ethnic units in the middle-belt area to combine. As mentioned earlier, these middle-belt groups came to be known in Kano as the “thin” or “minority” tribe [¢strarin kabilu|. One early example of this was the combination of Kwararrafa groups under the generic designation of “Apa” in 1959:

At the annual general conference of the Kwararrafa Congress held in Oturkpo recently, it was unanimously decided to change the name of the Congress from

Kwararrafa Congress to Apa National Congress, following a motion by... the general secretary of the Congress that the Alago, Igala, Igbirra, Idoma, Jukun and Ankwei tribes that made up the one time powerful Kwararrafa kingdom,

be grouped together and henceforth known as Apa... . He explained that the people were aware that they came from the same origin, though presently scattered all over the Northern Region. They would like to revive their past heritage and reunite themselves in spite of distance and diversity of languages.*#

By such amalgamation small ethnic groups could relate more easily to the major groups. Official proponents of northern nationalism claimed that even such ethnic groups as the Tiv were related by blood to the Hausa and Fulani:

“The truth is that the Tiv are kith and kin of the Fulani and Hausa, a cultural tie that could never be broken by the protagonists of hate against their brothers and sisters. One North, One People, One Destiny. ... The politics of the UMBC [United Middle Belt Congress] will fail in the long run for blood is thicker than water.” *° Another major dimension of northern regionalism was the extension of the legal structure from an emirate level to a regional level. There were problems in such an endeavor, since the northern legal community consisted of both Muslims and non-Muslims. A device of “opting out” was instituted which partly met this problem. In the precolonial era, the area administered under Sharia law by a particular emir was coterminous with the boundaries of his political community. After the Jihad, there was a theoretical possibility of appeal from Kano to Sokoto on judicial matters, but the actual instances of this appear to be few. With the inception of colonial rule, Shari’a law (entitled “Native Law and Custom”) was continued. The Native Courts Proclamation of 1906, which authorized resident officers to establish alkali courts

or judicial councils, remained substantively unchanged until the northern Nigeria legal reforms of 1959. The Native Courts Law of 1956 did little to 84 “The Kwararrafas to Be Known as Apas—Decides Congress,” Nigerian Citizen, January 14, 1959, p. 5. For a discussion of the historical merits of this issue, see Richard Gray, “Christian Traces and a Franciscan Mission in the Central Sudan, 1700-1711,” Journal of African History 8, no. 3 (1967): 373.

35 Mohammed Maigari, “The Land of Tivs,” Nigerian Citizen, June 24, 1964, p. 9.

The Transition to Kano State 327 alter the substantive powers of the courts. The question of jurisdiction was interpreted in the Nigeria Order-in-Council, No. 16, of 1934. Thus, the courts of a particular emirate had jurisdiction over persons with an indigenous way of life (Muslim or non-Muslim). More specifically they had control over (a) All persons—(i) who permanently reside on land within the area of jurisdiction of a native authority with the permission, express or implied of the native authority. . . . (ii) whose general mode of life is that of the general native community. (b) All persons not permanently resident within the area of jurisdiction of a native authority but who are within such an area and whose general mode of life while therein is that of the general native community. (c) All natives of Nigeria—(i) who reside or are on land within the area of jurisdiction of a native authority as tenants or employees of any person holding such land... (ii) whose general mode of life is that of the general native community.*®

Although appeals could be made through the resident to the governor, such appeals in Kano were infrequent. Thus, the effect of British policy was to sustain the particular emirates as more or less integrated subsystems on legal matters, with jurisdiction over their inhabitants. The northern Nigerian legal reforms of 1959 assigned five categories of law (criminal, status-of-persons, land, subversion, and taxation) to the regional

level of government and incorporated them into a civil law code that was, theoretically, legislated and secular. A sixth category, family law, was consolidated on the regional level but remained essentially religiously based. Such a reform affected matters of legal structure but did not entail major substantive changes in the scope of law. Also, it did not affect the pattern of succession to judgeship, so on the local level the incumbent alkalis continued to interpret the new statute law. Since representatives of the emirate authority system controlled the regional system of government, there was no apparent loss of authority over the legal system by those in the Kano emirate structure. On January 17, 1959, a committee of northern Muslim jurists was established

in Kaduna to examine all aspects of the reform bill for acceptibility to the northern Muslim community. The major point of dissatisfaction was the matter of diya, or “blood-money,” payable to the family of a homicide victim. On May 17, 1959, the emir of Kano and the chief justice of the Sudan (who had been a member of the panel of jurists) met with the committee in Kaduna to resolve the issue. When the bill was later debated in the House of Chiefs the motion for the second reading was seconded by the emir of Kano.*?

In May 1962 the panel of jurists returned to northern Nigeria to assess 36 J, N. D. Anderson, Islamic Law in Africa (London: H.M.S.O., 1954), p. 176. 37 Northern House of Chiefs, Debates, August 29-September 2, 1959, cols. 102-109 and 125-142.

328 Religion and Political Culture in Kano the extent of the legal reform that had been effected. Its major conclusion dealt

with alkali system itself: “approval of the appointment of Judicial officers should be sought before the officers assume duty and likewise before they are dismissed or in any other way administratively punished.” ** This recommendation directly affected the powers of the emirs, since a major means of political control over the rural areas had been the control of the judicial system by the emirs. The recommendation for regional control of judicial appointments is widely believed to have been resisted by Emir Sanusi of Kano. In summary, the traditional principle of law as defining political community

was continued during the independence period, but the community was extended from an emirate base to the Northern Region as a whole. Likewise, an attempt was made to centralize the powers of appointment and deposition on the regional rather than on the emirate level. The substance of the law was not changed, although the problem of religious pluralism had to be dealt with on a regional level in a way that was not seen to be necessary on the emirate level. In this respect, a dual system of courts was instituted in the north in

the area of family and personal law. Non-Muslims in northern Muslim emirates could “opt out” of a Muslim court and demand hearing in a nonMuslim court. The styasa [“political”] powers of the courts were increasingly used in support of the regional system rather than the emirate system. Thus, “abuse of the sardauna” became a more frequent cause of legal incarceration than “abuse of the emir.”

One side effect of the regional legal reform, however, was to extend the degree of tolerance for non-Maliki Islamic legal systems. ‘The northern legal code was based explicitly on the Sudanese code, which incorporated not only

Maliki law, but Shafi and Hanifi law as well. The contact by northern jurists with Pakistani and Sudanese jurists and the confrontation of different Islamic legal systems were major steps in the cooperation of northern Nigeria with other Islamic communities throughout the world. In Kano emirate theory, governmental authority is established to promote justice. This tenet was accepted by both those who criticized and those who supported emirate authority. With the extension of this aspect of emirate authority to the regional level, the same theoretical justification was employed. The legal adviser to the Northern Region government (Junaidu, waziri of Sokoto) emphasized this position as late as 1965:

Many people have been saying that religion is different from justice and I have been wondering very much that those people have not been living among other people. It is a well-known fact that religion and justice are the same. .. . We 38 Northern House of Assembly, Debates, March 19, 1963, p. 511.

The Transition to Kano State 329 have been working with the holy Quran which gives justice. For instance mar-

riage is what Allah has ordained from the very beginning and whoever has done this is following what Allah has said. Division of assets is in the Quran and whoever is working with the Quran will agree with this. The constitution of authority and other important bodies have come from the Quran and what the Quran has brought is called religion and what is called religion is also called

justice. It is God who ordained that there can be chiefs and rulers, that they should be respected and he has commanded them that whatever they do and say is justice of Allah. . . . Anybody who follows God’s words as in the Quran is following the path of justice. This is why I have risen to explain clearly the difference [sic] between religion and justice. . . . Therefore we are working in conjunction with what God has said. For instance, if somebody is ordered to do

such and such a thing, if he did it, he is against the law of Quran. We must do things according to how it has been laid down in the Quran. If you are afraid to lead the course of justice, you are committing sin. Because there was confusion between religion and justice that is why I rose to clarify the position.®®

Yet the fundamental relationship of law to government remained at much the same regional level as it had been at the emirate level. Partly in response to the religious claims of the regional government, Kano nationalism began to emerge as a forceful movement during the period 196465. Many of the loyalties and vested interests in a regional community remained, however, and even after the demise of the Northern Region in May 1967 there were a significant number of persons in Kano who continued to think of themselves as northerners. THE EMERGENCE OF KANO NATIONALISM

The growth of Kano nationalism in the 1960s was a result of economic, political, religious, and historical factors. It was argued that since the time of Dabo, Kano had opposed domination by Sokoto. Abdullahi Maje Karofi had defied Sokoto, and Yusufu and Aliyu had defeated in battle those who felt their primary allegiance was to Sokoto. The removal of Sanusi was seen as Sokoto interference in the affairs of Kano. The industrial location policy of the

government in Kaduna was seen as an active attempt to undermine the economic preeminence of Kano. One of the major public arguments of the Kano State Movement was based on the allegation that, of the Kano taxes paid to the regional government, only about one-fourth were returned to Kano in some form of benefit. On the positive side, Kano people prided themselves on their commercial skill, on their cosmopolitan nature and tolerance for many different peoples (citing the examples of Arabs, Tuareg, Beriberi, and

Nupe). Because of the social integration occurring between the northern 39 Junaidu, Northern House of Chiefs, Debates, 1965.

350 Religion and Political Culture in Kano Muslim groups in Kano, most Kano people regarded themselves as homogeneous. The growth of Kano nationalism in the 1950s and 1960s may be seen as occurring in three stages: the early reactions in Kano to northernization; the reactions to northernization after the deposition of Emir Sanusi; the reactions of the reformers, many of whom were identified with NEPU, after their defeat in the 1964 federal elections.

The economic centrality of Kano within the Northern Region was clear from the very inception of the northern legislative system in 1951. Within the first few years, there began to develop in Kano a sense of pride in the status of the province, particularly in the wealth and productivity of the people. There was some disatisfaction with the redistribution of wealth within the Northern Region, which was regarded as a subvention by Kano to the poorer northern provinces. With the accession of Sanusi to the emirship in 1954, these views began to be articulated. According to Sanusi in 1954, We wish also to complain to the Government that of the amount of money allocated to various provinces for development works, Kano does not get a fair share, because we contribute 200,000 tons of groundnuts whilst, from groundnuts, Government gets £200,000 produce tax, which is divided equally among the provinces in the region. We consider this is unfair. Fairness dictates that Kano should get a fair proportion of what it contributes. People say that Kano is rich and this is true but if we consider the population in Kano and the vastness of the area, we can see that the development works do not measure with the development works in other minor areas. There are still many areas in Kano Province which are backward. We still ask the Government to reconsider this,

| particularly the allocation of this money so that we can carry on with our development projects no less than other provinces. Before I close I do not advise the Government to indulge in giving other provinces the lion’s share. Under the

present allocation many of the provinces who contribute most get a small amount.??

Part of the popular support in Kano for Emir Sanusi was his open advocacy of developing economic facilities in Kano. With the deposition of Sanusi in 1963 Kano lacked power to lobby in Kaduna for economic and industrial development.

The idea of a separate Kano state began in late 1962 and early 1963, when Musa Gashash and Aminu Kano discussed the possibility of closer cooperation between the NPC and NEPU in Kano. Many of those who supported the newly formed Kano People’s Party (KPP) after the deposition of Sanusi in 1963 were former NPC members (including the emir’s servants and bodyguards, certain of the councillors, and several of the younger members of NPC) who felt that with Sanusi gone there was no need to support the NPC 40 Northern House of Chiefs, Debates, September 14, 1954, p. 29.

The Transition to Kano State 331 or its basic policy of “One North.” The original leaders of KPP were Bello

Minjibir, a Native Authority policeman, and Ramalan, who worked for Leventis Technical. Initially, the KPP was a protest party but did not actively call for separation. During the fall of 1964 there was a split in the party as NEPU members became more actively involved. Bello Minjibir was maneuvered out of leadership—he later reactivated his membership in NPC—and was replaced by Isa Fara, a NEPU man from Fagge. The NPC victory in the federal election (December 1964) made it possible for those NPC members

from Kano who were supporting the idea of “One North” for national political reasons to refocus on intraregional issues. Early in 1965 the Kano State Movement became a reality.

In July 1965 KSM became a political party. An attempt was made to incorporate all Kano elements into the movement. The Kano People’s Party was invited to participate in the movement, since the KPP, under NEPU influence, had come to call for a Kano state within the federal system. The issue had divided the KPP; and although Bello Minjibir did not support the movement, most of the membership did. The original plan of KSM was to form a committee with three members from NPC, three from NEPU, and three from KPP, plus one representative each from Hadejia, Gumel, and Kazaure emirates.“ The NPC declined to send representatives, partly because the Kaduna government was strongly opposed to the movement. A committee was established, however, despite this setback. The official committee maintained close contact with those politicians and officials who could not support the movement publicly. Although many of the officials were also leaders of

NEPU,* it was widely believed that certain major figures in the NPC were supporting the movement.**

One of the internal factors stimulating the KSM, was the need felt in Kano to heal the wounds caused by the deposition of Emir Sanusi. For this reason, a variety of suggestions were made regarding the future position of Sanusi within the proposed Kano state. Among those who did not want to upset the 41 Interview with Alhaji Ahmadu Trader, chairman of KSM, Kano, August 11, 196s. 42 The chairman of KSM was Ahmadu Trader of Gwammaja ward, near Dala Hill. He had been active in politics for about fifteen years and was associated with NEPU. He had studied leatherwork in England and on his return formed the Kano Leatherworkers’ Union (1954). He traveled widely throughout Nigeria, maintaining contact with the Hausa trading communities in different cities. The secretary of the KSM was Tanko Yakasai, who had been involved in organizing the youth wing of NEPU for several years and had been editor of the Hausa section of the Daily Comet. The “adviser on political affairs” of the KSM was Aminu Kano, president of NEPU. 43 Including the emir of Kano, Ado Bayero; the sarkin dawaki mai tuta, Bello Dandago; and such federal ministers from Kano as Inuwa Wada and Maitama Sule.

332 Religion and Political Culture in Kano emirship of Ado Bayero, suggestions for Sanusi ranged from making him governor of the region to appointing his son, Ado Sanusi, as governor. The Kano State Movement tried to capitalize on a century of conflict be-

tween Sokoto and Kano and was a separatist movement in this sense. The internal factors in Kano nationalism included the increased degree of sociopolitical integration between northern ethnic and class groups in the Kano urban area, which had resulted in an increased identification with “Kano” per se, and the need to consolidate Kano political forces, which had been split by the Sanusi affair. Certain Kano businessmen, such as Haruna Kassim, opposed the movement,

and several of the Kano NPC parliamentarians came up from Kaduna to lead anti-KSM rallies. They argued that the KSM was simply sour grapes on the part of the NEPU after having lost the election. They also argued that the north had indeed become unified as a result of the northernization policy. They tried to introduce the slogan agama meaning “together.” By contrast, the KSM selected the slogan aware, meaning “to separate” or “to set aside.” Occasionally another slogan, araba, meaning “to cut into pieces”

was used to recall the earlier use of that term by the United Middle Belt Congress in their demand for a separate state. The degree of popular support for the spirit of Kano nationalism was considerable by all indicators. Important segments of each social class within Kano came to see the movement as part of the answer to their own particular problems. The Kano State Movement was debated at all levels (national, regional,

and local); much of the debate occurred in the newspapers. Aminu Kano tended to work through the national newspapers.4* The northern regional newspapers (Nigerian Citizen and Gaskiya Ta Fi Kwabo) clearly supported the regional government position of opposition to the KSM. The local Kano newspaper, the Daily Comet, was closely identified with NEPU and strongly supported the KSM. Writers in the Daily Comet tended to emphasize the economic rather than the political arguments for a Kano state.” The newspaper arguments in oppsition to a Kano state, by contrast, suggested that the KSM was merely a political maneuver and that the economic dislocation in Kano was a temporary phenomenon.*® By the fall of 1965 the idea of a Kano state had received wide currency in Kano. The assassination of the Northern Region premier in January 1966 did not, however, lead to the immediate demand in Kano for a separate state. Rather, by the spring of 1966 most of the political leaders in Kano, including Aminu Kano, were seriously concerned about the apparent domination of the

44 See Appendix 4. 45 See Appendix 4. 46 See Appendix 4.

The Transition to Kano State 333 federal government by certain groups of southern Nigerians. Consequently, there was a revival of the idea of northernism as a counterbalance to the centralization of the Ironsi regime in Lagos. With the countercoup in July 1966, which was led primarily by northern troops, the south was no longer perceived as a major threat in Kano. Partly because of the influence of middle-

belt officers in the new federal government, the idea of “breaking up the north” and creating new states began to regain currency. The earlier pressure

in Kano for a Kano state may have contributed to the generally favorable response to the announcement of the new state system in May 1967. Yet the Kano State that emerged in 1967 was quite different from the Kano of 1965, for in the spring and fall of 1966 Kano had undergone its most serious crisis of community since the civil war of 1893. THE CRISIS OF COMMUNITY

For various reasons it is not possible to attempt an assessment of the riots that began on May 29, 1966. Reliable data does not exist at present. A commission of inquiry was appointed by the government to produce details on the Kano riot; but this commission, which was to have reported on August 2, 1966,

did not report because of the countercoup at the end of July. A preliminary interpretation, however, may serve as a background to the reconstruction problems of Kano State.

The first military coup of January 1966 was greeted with relief and expectation in many parts of Kano, for the political tension with Kaduna had nearly reached a breaking point. No Kano leaders or politicians had been killed in the coup, although the commanding ofhcer of the Nigerian Army in Kano (Lieutenant Colonel Odumegwu Ojukwu, later leader of the Biafran

forces) did arrest and hold in detention temporarily the emir of Kano, Ado Bayero. It was not until April and May that disillusionment with the military regime of General Ironsi began to be noticeable in Kano. Public posters were circulated of the executive advisers to Ironsi, and it was apparent that most of them were Ibo. At the same time, the prevailing interpretation of

the new military regime in the Sabon Gari was that it represented an Ibo victory over the Hausa. The relief and pride felt by the Ibos at this status reversal was evident. Also, with the “unification” of the civil-service decrees by Ironsi on May 24, it was clear to the Hausa and Fulani elite in Kano that

their administrative future both in the north and in Nigeria was seriously jeopardized, which may have accounted for the important role played by students in the peaceful demonstrations that preceded the riots of May 29.

On Saturday morning, May 29, some students at the Abdullahi Bayero College, the Provincial Secondary School, the School for Arabic Studies, and

334 Religion and Political Culture in Kano the Technical Training College in Kano received permission to demonstrate peacefully against Ibo domination of the national government. This included an orderly visit to the emir’s palace. The demonstrators left the city through Kofar Mata, one of the gates leading to the Sabon Gari. The next day lower-

class and unemployed Hausa young men in the Kofar Mata area threw stones at some Ibo workers who were going to work in the city. Tensions were high in both the city and the Sabon Gari on Sunday, and that evening the *yan banza (“hooligans”), ’yan iska (“uprooted young men”), and *yan haya (“bicycle renters”) streamed from the city toward Sabon Gari (down Ibo Road and Airport Road). An incident occurred, and fighting began. Apart from the Sabon Gari, the locations where violence developed in the next three or four days were places where Ibos were known to dominate the employment structure: the post office, the railway station, and certain commercial areas.

The exact number of persons killed during this period is hard to estimate, but in Kano it was probably between 100 and 200 persons. (The New York Times estimate for the entire north was 600 killed.) The Kano figure includes Hausa and rural Fulani who were killed when caught inside the Sabon Gari market when the trouble began. Order was restored within three to four days.

During June and July, tension built in both the Sabon Gari and the city. With the northern military coup against General Ironsi on July 29, full-scale Ibo emigration from Kano began. The disengagement of the Ibo community from Kano, which occurred in August, September, and October, was paral-

leled by the division of the Nigerian Army by region of origin (including the departure from Kano of Ibo troops, and the return of Hausa troops). The disruption and tension of this period culminated in the massive killings of October 1966, which in certain respects may be viewed as the first volley in the civil war.

There are several conclusions that may be drawn regarding the role of the Sabon Gari in the development of community consciousness in Kano. First,

with regard to colonial-sponsored migration (that is, the creation of the Sabon Gari and provision of jobs), colonial authority had removed the necessity for accommodation with the host community; and the removal of colonial

authority produced tensions with the Sabon Gari. The protection of the colonial regime made the establishment of workable relations with the host community unnecessary during the colonial period. Other major groups in Kano—such as Arabs, Beriberi, Nupe, Yoruba, Tuareg—and a host of smaller ethnic groups had worked out some accommodation with the host community. Second, in the narrow type of pluralism described by Leo Kuper and M. G. Smith, the ethnic communities in a location share a common economic system,

The Transition to Kano State 335 yet maintain separate social and political institutions. This was clearly the case in Kano. The Sabon Gari had its own legal, decision-making, and educational institutions. It is not possible to regard a community as integrated without some common institutions for decision making and conflict resolution.

The inherent instability of such a situation became clear when the colonial superstructure was removed. Third, the regulation of competition, whether through self-imposed rules of the game or through some external arbitrator, is necessary to avoid breakdown of economic interaction. Such rules are normally established through political means. In the case of Kano, the growth

of northern rule meant that substantial modifications in the rules could be made through political means. The policy of northernization was an attempt to affect the competitive economic position of ethnic groups in northern Nigeria. While this policy was resented by nonnortherners, it is clear that some political effort to redress the imbalance of economic power created by the colonial situation was a political necessity. Northernization established the predominance of politics over economics, which made political competition at the national level

a matter of primary concern. Fourth, the competition that stemmed from economic modernization added a further dimension to situational ethnicity in

Kano. The emergence of the “northerner” and the “southerner” as ethnic identities were, in both cases, amalgamations of other types of ethnicity. This new ethnicity was reinforced by the factors of language and religion, but it was basically a result of the expansion of the relevant sociopolitical context, and the development of immigration patterns that established new we-they boundaries. This does not imply that other types of ethnicity were abandoned. It meant an increase in the scope of multiple identities. Once this new identity became established it became associated with an ethnic stratification system which was reinforced by patterns of economic competition. Fifth, with regard to matters of economic well-being, the values of the Hausa and Ibo communities in Kano were very similar. The Hausa community in Kano was the center _ of a trade network that extended from Algeria to Congo, and from Senegal to Sudan. The development of an Ibo trade network was seen as a direct threat to Hausa dominance in the field of commerce. Partly because of Ibo social networks in southern Nigeria, they emerged as stronger competitors for markets in the north than even the Hausa traders. This status reversal was difficult to accept in the Hausa community. Of equal importance was the competition that began to emerge in the field of semiskilled industrial and clerical occupations. When economic development in Kano did not progress at an 47 Leo Kuper and M. G, Smith, eds., Pluralism in Africa (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1969).

336 Religion and Political Culture in Kano even rate, the competition for jobs became acute and ethnic loyalties were used to secure jobs.

The crisis of community in Kano during 1966 was in part a failure to develop new types of mechanisms for the integration of ethnic communities and in part a failure to develop a sufficient degree of loyalty toward the state of Nigeria as a whole. The consolidation of Kano nationalism during the early 1960s made it almost impossible to handle the situation in which the Sabon Gari community, which had little identification with Kano, was seen to represent the segment of the national community that had emerged to political preeminence through military means and was threatening both Kano and the north. The civil war that followed the events of 1966 continued to reorient identities in Kano. The reorientation was to be a new balance of local pride and national identity.

9

Authority and Community in Kano State

The twelve-state system in Nigeria was established by decree of the Federal Military Government (FMG) on May 27, 1967. Six states were created in the

former Northern Region; of these only Kano State retained the administrative and territorial boundaries of a former province. The formal declaration of Kano State occurred on April 1, 1968, at which time the military governor of Kano State, Audu Bako, outlined the structure and policy of his government and addressed the Kano people as follows: Praise be to the Almighty God who has spared our lives to reach this day of Monday the first of April, 1968, on which we are witnessing the re-birth of the former Kano Province into a State of its own. We have emerged this morning as one people more closely knit together than before, and have taken our rightful place as one of the twelve states created by His Excellency, the Head of the Federal Military Government, and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, Major General Yakubu Gowon to form the Federation of our beloved country, Nigeria.?

In this chapter, four themes will be considered for the period 1968-70: the restructuring of authority in Kano State, the restatement of emirship legiti1 Address by the Military Governor, His Excellency Alhajt Audu Bako, at the Kano State Launching Ceremony on ist April 1968 (Kano: Information Division, Military Government Office, Kano State, 1968) (Hausa and English). Also Audu Bako, Policy Statement Broadcast April 1, 1968 (Kano: Information Division, Military Government Office, Kano State, 1968) (Hausa and English).

338 Religion and Political Culture in Kano

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macy, the reconstruction of community in Kano State, and the growth of national identity. (See Map 9 for twelve-state system.) THE RESTRUCTURING OF AUTHORITY

Each of the twelve states has a military governor and a civilian commissioner

appointed by the FMG. A twenty-four-man Federal Executive Council was thus formed to conduct affairs of state, consisting of the twelve commissioners and twelve military governors who normally meet once a month. This coun-

Authority and Community in Kano State 339 cil is distinct from the Supreme Military Council—composed of selected civilians and military leaders—which was specifically responsible for policy toward the Biafran secession and for subsequent reconstruction. In October 1970 the FMG announced its intention to turn over government completely to civilian rule in 1976. The constitutional relationship between the twelve

states and the federal government is regarded as temporarily based on the first republic federal constitution, with the twelve states holding the powers of the four former regions. Ultimate authority, however, is vested in the Federal

Military Government, by right of coup d'état. In Kano State there are two figures of national authority: the military governor, Audu Bako, who had been deputy commissioner of police in charge of all Native Authority police in the former Northern Region of Nigeria,” and the civilian commissioner, Aminu Kano, who had been president of NEPU and was given the portfolio for communications in the Federal Executive Council. Yet there are three distinct levels of authority in Kano State: the state level (including the governor, the Executive Council, the civil service, the judiciary, and the territorial administrators); the emirate, or Local Government Authority (LGA), level (including the emir, the LGA Council and General Purposes Committee); and the Administrative Area level. Each of these will be discussed in more detail below. At the state level, decision-making authority is vested in the military governor who acts on the advice of the Kano State Executive Council, which consists of from ten to fifteen commissioners. The appointment of commis-

§y

sioners is made by the governor, with the exception of two members—the com-

missioner of police and the commander of the local batallion—who are appointed by the Federal Military Government. The specific portfolios assigned to commissioners varies from state to state, and even within Kano State these have changed over time. The governor is president of the Executive Council, which follows cabinet principles: there is discussion and consensus within the meetings, and decisions appear as unanimous and are issued in the name of overnor as edicts.” The Executive Council normally meets once or twice a 2 Audu Bako was born in 1924 at the Kaduna police barracks. His father had served in the Nigerian police force for thirty-six years and had been president of the Kaduna mixed

court and chief of the Sabon Gari, Kaduna. Audu Bako was educated at the Kaduna Government School and Zaria Middle School. He joined the police force in 1942. He Was an instructor in police law at the Kaduna Police College before becoming deputy commissioner of police. Since his appointment as military governor, he has been promoted to the rank of commissioner of police. Audu Bako is of Hausa background and although his family was originally from Argungu (Sokoto Province), a branch of his family lives in Mariri, in Kano Emirate.

3 All edicts are published in the Kano State of Nigeria Gazette. These gazettes are published continuously but are bound and published in toto at the end of each year.

340 Religion and Political Culture in Kano week. The composition of the Executive Council is balanced to reflect the various ethnic, locational, and political identities in Kano State. Yet the mem-

bers of the council are relatively young and are Western educated (see Appendix 5). Each of the commissioners is responsible for a ministry and is assisted by a permanent secretary. (The office of parliamentary secretary was not carried over from the Northern Region period.) The permanent secretaries are appointed by the military governor with the advice of the Public Service Commission. Under the permanent secretaries are division heads and the full range

of civil-service positions. The effectiveness and authority of the Executive Council depends very much on the civil service. The transition from a regional civil service to a Kano State civil service began to occur after May 1967 and

was largely completed by April 1968. The Public Service Commission in Kaduna deployed individuals, and the newly created Kano Public Service Commission accepted them. A majority of the civil servants assigned to Kano came from the professional ranks (for example, education) rather than from the administrative ranks, and a number of them were working in the federal ministries in Lagos rather than in Kaduna. Although state of origin was not

the only criteria in deployment, it was the major one; and all Nigerians at the permanent-secretary level are from Kano. The Kano State Civil Service as a whole is staffed almost entirely by Kano people. Initially there was some tension in Kano between those civil servants who fully accepted the idea of states and those who wanted some return to northern regionalism. The latter group were either persuaded or replaced, and since 1969 this tension has been less evident. Since April 1968 the civil service has been increasing in size at a rate that reflects the general increase in services in Kano, the increase in the number of qualified civil servants available, and the favorable financial position of Kano State.

The four major executive functions that continued to be handled on a regional basis were radio and television, marketing, some development finance, and university education. Although the national broadcasting service (Nigerian Broadcasting Company) is planning to have facilities in each state capital, the alternative service (Radio-Television Kaduna) which was formerly owned by

the Northern Region, came to be owned jointly by the six northern states. (Kano State and North Central State, however, have come to have de facto control of the television facilities.) With regard to marketing, it was decided that each northern state should not have its own marketing board since this For example, see Annual Volumes of the Laws of Kano State of Nigeria, 1967 and 1968 (Kaduna: Government Printer Kaduna, 1969).

Authority and Community in Kano State 34] might result in produce moving to whichever state was offering the highest price. Discussions have taken place regarding a national commodity board which might replace the regional board. The Northern Nigerian Development Corporation, plus Ahmadu Bello University and Advanced Teachers College (Kano), continued to operate under the Interim Common Services Agency. Since 1970 there have been some modifications in the scope of the ICSA, and,

for example, in 1972 the federal government assumed responsibility for all universities.

The most dramatic shift of functions from both the regional and the emirate

levels to the state level was with regard to the judiciary. The Area Courts Edict of 1967 established the basic powers and structure of the judiciary in Kano.* The former alkali courts were transformed into area courts, and the emir’s court was abolished. (The emir, however, has continued to resolve disputes informally.) There has been at least one area court in each district; and two upper area courts (formerly provincial courts) in the Kano metropolitan area serve as appeal courts for the entire state. The High Court of Appeal and the Shari’a Court of Appeal have continued to function in Kaduna

on a temporary basis, but each northern state is scheduled to have its own : high court and Shari’a court in the future. In June 1970 a branch of the Shari’a Court of Appeal was established in Kano, and Abubakar Bashir Wali was appointed judge. The final court of appeal—the Supreme Court—is located in Lagos. The appointment of judges is likewise scheduled to become a state matter (although initially appointments continued to be made by the chief justice in Kaduna). All salary decisions are determined by the State Public Service Commission, and neither the emir nor the waziri have control over salaries or appointments. The office of waziri in Kano was no longer officially responsible

for alkalis and, although technically responsible for local police, much of the real supervision was conducted by the Kano State police commissioner. In the future all prospective judges are scheduled to complete a course of study at the Institute of Administration in Zaria to be eligible for appointment. Approximately 80 percent of all court cases at the district level, however, are matters of civil law (marriage, divorce, inheritance, custody of children) and are covered by Islamic law, so training in this area continues to be of primary importance. Of the forty-one area court and two upper area court judges serving in Kano in 10969, all were trained as Arabic scholars? (only thirteen are #See “The Area Courts Edict, 1967,” Annual Volumes of the Laws of Kano State of Nigeria, 1967 and 1968, pp. A5-A34.

5 For a list of area court judges in 1969, see Nuhu Usman, Administration of Justice: Kano State (Kano: Ministry of Information, Kano State, 1969) (Hausa and English).

342 Religion and Political Culture in Kano English speaking). Certain “judicial families” (especially the Gyanawa and the family of the waziri) continued to produce judges in Kano.° Since 1959 all local court records have been kept in Hausa rather than Arabic. Responsibility for the police in Kano State has continued to be divided between federal and emirate authorities. Since the former regions were prohibited from having police forces, it is regarded as unconstitutional for the states to have police forces. The federal government, however, announced plans in early 1970 to merge federal and emirate police forces and to place this merged body under the control of the commissioner of police in each state

(who is a federal appointee). By 1971, this was accomplished, and the emirate authorities no longer have any responsibility for police or prisons. There have also been structural changes in territorial administration. On November 11, 1968, the military governor announced extensive reforms in territorial administration and local government.’ The districts in Kano Emirate were grouped into five larger administrative areas, with headquarters in Rano, Birnin Kudu, Dambatta, Gwarzo, and the Kano metropolitan area. The remaining three administrative areas consist of the emirates of Kazaure, Gumel, and Hadejia. In each of the eight administrative areas a district officer was appointed who is responsible to the secretary to the military governor. The district officers have been well educated and are relatively young (see Appendix

5). The district officer has responsibility for touring the villages in his area and explaining government policy. Many of the district officers have followed the practice of convening all inhabitants (not just village heads) and hearing complaints or requests. Reports of such meetings are sent to the military governor, to the local government authority, and to the district itself. If complaints

deal with the district head, the matter is called to the attention of the local government councillor responsible for district heads (the madaki). Each district officer is to be assisted by technical staff from each of the appropriate state ministries (for example, agriculture, water, health, education). Within Kano Emirate, the district officers also preside over administrative area council meetings. The second level of authority in Kano is the emirate, or Local Government

Authority (LGA), structure. In the reforms of November 1968 the term “Native Authority” was replaced by “Local Government Authority”; it refers essentially to emirate administration. The main structures of the LGA are the 6 For example, in 1970 five of the brothers of the waziri of Kano were area court judges (in Jahun, Gezawa, Tudun Wada, Dawakin Tofa, and Gaya).

*Audu Bako, Kano State Local Government Reform (Zaria: Information Division, Kano State; Gaskiya Corporation, 1968) (Hausa and English).

Authority and Community in Kano State 343 Emirate Council and the General Purposes Committee. The Emirate Council consists of forty persons, plus the emir, who is chairman. Of these persons, two-thirds are representatives of districts and will eventually be chosen by election, and one-third are regarded as representatives of special interests and traditional families and will continue to be appointed. The special interests are primarily religious, business, and administrative. There is no fixed formula for the exact composition of special-interest representatives. The ethnic balance between Hausa and Fulani council members is greater than in the past (see Appendix 5). The Emirate Council is intended to be a legislative body after the return to civilian rule. Initially the entire council was appointed by the military governor. The council meets once a month and issues a report of its proceedings to the military governor. To date there has been no voting in the council; decisions have been based on “consensus.” In about January 1970 the emir ceased attending the council meetings after an encounter with certain of the more radical members over the issue of the role of the emir. Subsequently, he has resumed his role as chairman. The executive functions of the Emirate Council are conducted by the General Purposes Committee (GPC), which consists primarily of councillors with portfolio and chairmen of working committees. Councillors have tended to be traditional administrators, and chairmen have tended to be drawn from the modern sector. The functions of the chairmen and the councillors are parallel; this combination is regarded as an experiment. The chairmen and the coun-

cillors are appointed by the governor. The GPC meets once a month and discusses matters referred to it by the Emirate Council. The councillors are 8In late 1969 the portfolio councillors were as follows: (1) Districts Administration, Shehu Ahmad (madaki); (2) Finance, Sule Minjibir (marafa); (3) Health and Social Welfare, Sarki Uba Ringim; (4) Education, Public Enlightenment, and Information, Sule Gaya (sarkin fada); (5) Community Development and Cooperatives, Tijjani Hashim; (6) Agriculture, Ibrahim Kiru; (7) Establishments, Muhammadu Gwarzo; (8) Land and Survey, Umaru Yola; (9g) Works, Also Wudil (dallatu); (10) Forest and Livestock Resources, Sarki Abbas (dan iya).

In late 1969 the chairmen of working committees were as follows: (1) General Council, Ado Bayero (emir); (2) All Purposes Committee, Ado Bayero (emir); (3) Gen-

eral Administrative Committee, Musa Iliyasu; (4) Finance, Bello Dandago (sarkin dawaki); (5) Health and Social Welfare, Ibrahim Musa Gashash; (6) Education and Community Development, Abubakar (waziri); (7) Agriculture and Natural Resources, Umaru Babura (sarkin Fulani); (8) Establishments, A. A. Koguna; (9) Town Planning, Inuwa Wada; (10) Works, Dr. I. D. Ahmad.

As of April 1970 the General Purposes Committee consisted of the following: emir, madaki, waziri, sarkin dawaki mai tuta, dan iya, dan isa, marafa, sarkin fada (Suleiman Jibir), dallatu, durbi (Koguna), Muhammad Gwarzo, Umaru Yola, Sarki Usman, Ibrahim Kiru, I. D, Ahmad, Ahmadu Trader, Musa Iliyasu, Nasiru Kabara, Tijjani Usman.

344 Religion and Political Culture in Kano responsible for departments which parallel, more or less, the ministries at the state level. Each of the state ministries has a representative to the appropriate LGA department who acts as an informal supervisor and coordinator. The role of the emir is most important at the LGA level. The major curtailment of the emir’s power is in the judicial field. The emir, in a technical sense, is also limited in his legislative functions to a single vote in the LGA council and then only in case of a tie in his capacity as chairman, although his influence remains significant. The emir, however, continues to have the authority to appoint all district heads, and the district heads are regarded as his executive arm in territorial administration, with particular responsibility for maintaining law and order and for tax collection. In 1970 there were discussions regarding a local government service commission which might be set up to parallel the Public Service Commission on the state level, and which would regulate the appointments and salary structure of the district and village heads. The emir continues to dispense land within his own jurisdiction, although a general land committee has been set up under the Ministry of Works which handles the bulk of land allocation. The parallel of functions between Kano State and LGA levels of authority has led to certain misunderstandings and apprehensions. Consequently, in 1970 the governor appointed a committee to “examine the relationship between the state government and the four local government authorities in the state.”® Among other things the committee traveled to other states to see how similar problems were handled. The committee recommended the creation of a civil service board for local govern-

ment functionaries but did not suggest changes in the manner of appointment of traditional district or village heads.?° °“Kano Appoints Government and L. G. Review Panel,” New Nigerian, April 14, 1970, p. 12. The chairman of the committee was Suleiman Baffa, permanent secretary, Local Government Division, Governor’s Office.

10 Commenting on the committee report in April 1972, the military governor said: “The Local Government Division will continue to work toward the perfect implementation of the local government reforms. This year also will see my Government’s White Paper on the recommendations submitted by a committee which I appointed to look into the activities of the Local Government Authorities vis-a-vis those of the State Government, with a view to avoiding unnecessary duplication of effort. In the White Paper you will find that there are a number of highlights such as the review of Local Government service conditions including those of Village Heads, District Heads and Mai Unguwas. There will also be appointed a Local Government Service Board which will be responsible for appointments and discipline in a much more improved manner than hitherto. My Government will also, in keeping with the recommendations of the committee appointed, take over certain functions from the Local Government Authorities with a view to improving on them in the interest of the general public. All employees of the Local Government Authority in the State will receive similar treatment and emphasis will be placed more on their career in the Service of the Local Government Authority, and loyalty to it, so as to ensure and

Authority and Community in Kano State 345 The third level of authority in Kano State is the administrative area level which exists within Kano Emirate only, since the other three emirates are coterminous with an administrative area. An autonomous council for each administrative area consists of three representatives from each component district. The representatives are appointed by the governor but are scheduled to be elected by district councils, which in turn will be elected by the population at large after a return to civilian rule. The district officers serve as chairmen of the administrative area councils, and the district heads are ex-oficio members. The establishment of administrative area councils has been a conscious attempt to decentralize functions away from Kano City to the rural areas. Within the Kano metropolitan administrative area, there has been an attempt to establish a city-council type of government not dependent on the emir or the emirate structure. The representatives on the Kano Metropolitan Council

(the emir is not a member) gather for three different types of meetings: regular (the first Thursday of each month), special (which may be called by the chairman), and emergency (which may be called by any member). The representatives may raise matters that have been brought to their attention by their constituents. Such matters have included regulations regarding lorry parking, public bathing, mosquito control, rubbish removal, and street cleaning and the need for public toilets. There are subcommittees within the council that deal with particular functions and call problems to the attention of the appropriate state ministries or LGA departments. Since one representative from each district in the administrative area council is also a representative on the Emirate Council, there is close cooperation between the two levels of councils. The composition of the Kano Metropolitan Council reflects both a mixture of representatives from the two former political parties and a mixture of Hausa and Fulani elements (see Appendix 5). The Waje representatives clearly represent the Fagge area, and the lack of Yoruba or Ibo representatives is publicly justified on the grounds that they now have their own states. (For summary of governmental levels in Kano State, see Figure 14.) THE RESTATEMENT OF EMIRSHIP LEGITIMACY

The role of the emir of Kano has been determined during the Kano State period by many factors—structural, situational, and personal. The structural reforms of 1968 followed a series of crisis situations for the emirship in Kano: strengthen that feeling of belonging to a Service which is not so well pronounced under present-day conditions. By so doing, my Government will strengthen the position of our Emirs and they will continue to play their traditional role of religious leaders and the embodiment of our rich culture” (Alhaji Audu Bako, Policy Statement Address, 1972/73, Kano: Kano State Ministry of Information, 1972, pp. I-2).

346 Religion and Political Culture in Kano

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384 Religion and Political Culture in Kano volved a combination of religious and ethnic communities; the Kano civil war involved family and lineage communities; the colonial conquest involved racial, religious, language, and cultural communities; the Sabon Gari riots involved newly emergent broad-based ethnic communities whose identities were reinforced by religious, cultural, and language factors. These groups were also the participants in the demise of regionalism and the national civil war. In all cases, institutional structures were nonexistent or inadequate to deal with some dispute within the pluralistic context. In all cases there was an assessment on the part of the initiators of violence that power and authority was not being shared, and that they were being excluded completely from such power and authority. In part this assessment was premised on the hierarchical authority structure which by definition restricted participants in the decision-making process.

Thus, at the time of the Jihad, Fulani were excluded from government; at the time of the Kano civil war, the Yusufawa were being excluded from government; the Sabon Gari riots were related to apprehensions that the HausaFulani were going to be excluded from power at the national level; and the demise of regionalism and the national civil war were related to Ibo fears of being excluded from national power. Since power is usually translated into economic status, it is not necessary to differentiate between political and economic factors of communal conflict. Communal identities have been reinforced by multiple criteria in situations where power relationships were at stake. In situations where the cultural value premises of the competing communal groups were similar (for example, the belief that modernization is a good thing, that decisions should be made by a small group, or that individual conflict should be resolved by coded law), there have been instances of sociopolitical integration (for example, among the northern Muslim groups in Kano). At the same time there has been evidence of conflict if certain key values appropri-

ate to a situation of homogeneity are applied in a situation of communal pluralism. Thus, interaction between two communal groups with hierarchical decision-making processes may result in easy assimilation or in open conflict. It may also result in value change, particularly in the direction of a pyramidal decision-making structure based on an amalgamation of the respective decision-making institutions. In the Kano experience, the basic cultural premises of the Hausa and Fulani during the Jihad were very similar, as were the value premises of both sides during the Kano civil war. The Hausa-Ibo confrontation during the Sabon Gari riots and at the national level was, despite appearances, based on similarity rather than dissimilarity of orientations toward modernization. At the same time, the inability of Hausa and Ibo partisans to have agreed on common decision-making institutions may be related to differences in their cultural authority patterns (hierarchical vs. segmental).

Comparative Orientations 385 In all crises, the context of communal pluralism has been of critical importance. Crises of community have occurred when some expansion or contraction was going on in the scale of the community. The Jihad established a caliphate that encompassed the various Hausa emirates and considerably expanded the scope of the political system. The Kano civil war was essentially

an attempt to contract the political context by separating from the Sokoto caliphate system. The colonial conquest extended the scale of the political system to a regional and national level. The crises of the 1950s and 1960s are related to the simultaneous contraction of the regional context (to the state

context) and the increased salience of the national context. As mentioned earlier, charismatic leadership may be successful in avoiding crises of change in community scale, but, as will be discussed below, change in community scale also tends to produce crises of authority legitimacy, whether or not such crises are accompanied by violence.

There have been six major crises of authority in Kano Emirate in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries: the Jihad, the Kano civil war, the colonial conquest, the nationalist attack (1945-64), the regionalist transfer of power (1959-06), and the Kano State reforms (beginning in 1967). During the Jihad, the Hausa rulers were dethroned and discredited as backsliders. The Fulani rulers tried to enjoin a religious purpose to their cause, and to a large extent they were successful. During the Kano civil war the deadlock between factions of the ruling family resulted in appeal to various traditional types of legitimacy, including dynastic and religious. The colonial conquest resulted in the appointment of the half-brother of the incumbent, and it was not until World War I that he was able to consolidate support throughout the emirate. In the era of nationalism, the attack by northerners on emirate leaders began in the mid-1g4os and took a variety of forms, most notably the organization of a political party which came under the leadership of Aminu Kano. The emirate leaders were criticized both in terms of traditional religious standards (especially

with regard to the administration of justice and the need for knowledgeable leadership) and in terms of newer standards (especially with regard to the need for leadership in modernization and anticolonialism). The regionalist period, during which Emir Sanusi resigned, was the most formidable threat to emirate legitimacy since the Jihad, since most of the bases of legitimacy were being transferred from the emirate to the regional level. The Kano State reforms have forced a reconsideration of the modern and traditional bases of emirate leadership but the ability to translate Islamic ideals into a contemporary setting is a highly valued leadership trait. The parallel between the crises of community and the crises of authority is

clear, both in point of time and in terms of causal factors. In most cases the

386 Religion and Political Culture in Kano crises of community, and especially change in the scale of community, have resulted in crises of authority. Since the basic legitimacy of the emirate state is religious, the crises of authority encourage a perpetuation of the use of religious symbols by all parties.

At the same time, most crises of authority have been followed by reforms within the structure of the emirate. The demands for reforms often preceded the crises of legitimacy. The Jihad literature is essentially a catalogue of demands

for reform, and many reforms were instituted in the early era of Fulani rule. The crisis of the Kano civil war was not followed by structural reforms, mainly because of the colonial conquest. (The major structural reform of the civil war was severance of systemic relations with Sokoto.) The early colonial period

witnessed many reforms, most importantly the administrative reforms of 1907-08 whereby most rural fiefdoms were broken up and redistributed to mem-

bers of the ruling family. There were certain reforms of judicial institutions, but mainly in the area of penal codes rather than in substance or procedure. During the nationalist period, the demands for reform were largely unheeded, although they reached fruition during the Kano State period. The regionalist period witnessed the legal reforms of 1959 and the provincial structure changes

of the early 1960s, but these reforms were more in the nature of transferring emirate functions to the regional level. The Kano State reforms have essentially set up a parallel structure to the emirate structure, while at the same time trans-

ferring some of the emirate functions to decentralized administrative areas. These reforms threaten the emirate authority structure primarily by making it appear redundant.

Despite the various reforms during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the emirate structure has persisted in Kano. The concept of reform implies continuity. Even after the “reformers” (mujaddadat) \ed a violent attack on the Hausa authorities during the Jihad, the people of Kano have emphasized the continuities rather than the discontinuities of their political history and have termed such continuity “reform.” The concept of reform has an acceptable status in the political vocabulary of Kano. It is a concept that implies the act of improving or repairing (gyara). Yet the concept rests basically on the normative principles of Islamic society, especially the notion of justice and the notion of ensuring opportunities for living life according to Islamic principles. Thus, the debates engendered by demands for reform have tended to be holistic rather than fragmentary and have tended to be tied to the question of core values in society, even when the reforms appear to be purely administrative.

Conclusion: Religion and Political Culture in Kano

In Kano Emirate the congruence between political and religious subsystems has been high. At various times the emir has served as imam, as leader of the dominant brotherhood, as final Shari’a Court of Appeal, as chief repository of religious symbols, as maintainer of the “Islamic constitution,’ and as contact with the international world of Islam. The periods in which political and religious roles have been relatively undifferentiated have usually been when the community is threatened or when there has been a fundamental change in the scale of community (for example, during the reigns of Suleiman, Dabo, Aliyu,

Abbas, Abdullahi Bayero, and Sanusi). In all periods there has been an assumption that the administration of Shari'a law has been the prime responsibility of the state (although after 1959, the Shari'a law became only one portion

of the legislative code). The question whether the administering unit should be emirate, region, or state was resolved in 1959 and 1967. Yet at the same time, the active religious life of the Kano community came to be centered not in the state but in the Islamic brotherhoods. The extent to which emirate leader-

ship and sufi leadership have coincided has been discussed throughout this study, but the peak period was clearly during the reign of Sanusi. Since that time, the separation of church and state has increased, mainly because the locus of government has shifted away from emirate authorities and toward political or military leaders, and because religious authority has shifted away from the incumbent emir. The rise of the reformed brotherhoods in Kano in the 1950s and 1960s may have facilitated the transition to the relatively secular community of Kano State, since religious identities shifted from ethnic and

388 Religion and Political Culture in Kano emirate communities, which had political boundaries (ethnic pluralism was often encapsulated in a local-level administrative boundary), to the brotherhoods, which do not have political boundaries. In this chapter the authority and community patterns in the religious and political sectors will be compared, and an assessment will be made of the interactive influence of the one sector on the other. THE AUTHORITY DIMENSION OF POLITICAL CULTURE

Change in the scale of community has fundamentally affected the structure

of political authority in Kano. Viewing Kano Emirate over time from the nineteenth century through the creation of Kano State, the actual authority structure has shifted from segmental to pyramidal to hierarchical to pyramidal. A segmental system is common in plural societies: the segments of society are joined together for certain functions (especially war) but make most decisions independent of each other. Until late in the nineteenth century Kano Emirate

was characterized by significant autonomy of societal segments, both with regard to major ethnic units (Hausa and Fulani) and subethnic units (the various Fulani clans). The centralization of rural fiefdoms through the office of the emir began to occur at the end of the nineteenth century and continued during the early twentieth century. The resultant authority structure may be regarded as pyramidal. By the middle of the twentieth century (the period of Sanusi) this tendency toward centralization had reached the proportions of a hierarchical structure: all major appointments were made by the emir, and all major segments of society were directly responsible to him. The decentralization

of emirate structure in Kano State reflects a pyramidal model of authority. (The emir participates as a member of a council.)

The religious authority system in Kano Emirate was also segmental until the end of the nineteenth century. Clans were responsible for their own religious affairs and did not recognize, to any great extent, higher authority except on a symbolic level. The spread of reformed brotherhoods during the twentieth century resulted in a pyramidal authority structure: distinct branches of the brotherhoods were represented by spokesmen but were linked together by a central leader who did not monopolize decision-making functions. During the Sanusi period the process of centralization had reached a point within Reformed Tijaniyya where the structure could be characterized as hierarchical.

Changes in succession patterns of both the religious and political sectors reflected this shift to hierarchical authority. Succession to leadership in the segmental systems tended to follow dynastic principles. In the hierarchical systems, leaders emerged because of their personal qualities, and succession to lower levels of authority was strongly influenced by the central authority. Suc-

Conclusion 389 cession to district headship became increasingly an appointive matter dependent on the emir’s discretion. This was accomplished partly by increasing the number of districts and then controlling appointment to the new offices. Succession to leadership in the ethnic brotherhoods has tended to be dynastic, while suc-

cession in transethnic brotherhoods has tended to be more elective in that it was based on merit. As with the district headships, central authority in the reformed brotherhoods influenced lower-level succession partly by increasing the number of mugqaddams. New muqaddams were, almost by definition, appointive positions, usually based on achieved rather than ascriptive qualities.

Partly as a result of the Jihad, the idea has developed that religious-based political authority should take precedence over dynastic-based political authority. The religious authority of Usman dan Fodio was in sharp contrast to the dynastic ascription of authority established in the Hausa political system.

The religious attributes of the first Fulani emir of Kano (Suleiman) are the only basis of his authority preserved in Kano oral tradition. His successor was

not from his family but from among his disciples. As a result of this early religio-political experience, two aspects of Kano political culture have emerged: the valuing of religious-based charismatic authority over traditional or dynastic authority in situations where there is a choice, and the association of charismatic

authority with religious brotherhood leadership rather than legal leadership. The reemergence of this theme occurred in the twentieth century when Reformed Tijaniyya was linked with major elements of the Fulani ruling class. The confrontation with traditional authority took the form of Emir Sanusi’s opposition to the regional government in Kaduna, which was perceived as dominated by representatives of traditional emirate governments, especially those from Sokoto. (The attempt at charismatic religiously based leadership of Usmaniyya by Premier Ahmadu Bello was perceived in Kano as incongruous, since his real power was bureaucratic.)

The boundaries between authority and succession orientation in Kano have been closely related to the political culture patterns mentioned above. Charismatic figures succeeded to ultimate religio-political authority by virtue of their personal qualities and not solely on the basis of inherited qualities. Yet the initial reservoir of candidates from which religious and political authority has been drawn was largely defined by traditional types of inherited ascriptions. Thus, most charismatic leaders were also capable of being traditional leaders.

This was true of Muhammad Sanusi, Aminu Kano, Nasiru Kabara, Ado Sanusi, and even Ibrahim Niass. Religio-political figures do not necessarily come from families with histories of involvement in government. The peculiar relationship between the mallam class and the government class has allowed mallams to enter or withdraw from the political scene as circumstances war-

390 Religion and Political Culture in Kano ranted. Thus, orientations toward succession in Kano political culture are based

on and reinforced by congruent modes of political and religious succession: the prerequisite of mallam-class identity (and preferably, a family history of mallam-class identity) for candidature; the preference for legal training as an

initial basis for candidature; and the subordination of all other criteria to sufistic training which, if successful, may endow a person with special qualities deemed essential to the highest forms of authority.

The charismatic aspect of authority often developed after the initial succession to office. Succession occurs at several stages and may include a process of consolidation to the point where a new level of authority has been attained.

In cases where initial authority is based on indirect linkages to an earlier source of authority, the shorter the connection between the candidate and the source, the higher the transference value of the authority. The most powerful emirate authority in twentieth-century Kano has been Muhammad Sanusi, the

son of an emir who was initiated directly by Ibrahim Niass (regarded by many in Kano to be in the category of a primary saint). Colonial authority in Kano tended to support traditional legalistic bureaucratic authority and to discourage sufistic or charismatic authority. Yet most of the colonial period was dominated by emirs who had strong sufistic claims to legitimacy vis-a-vis the indigenous people of Kano. By contrast, the most important reformers of emirate authority in nineteenth- and twentieth-century Kano (Abdullahi dan Fodio and Aminu Kano) were trained in law and sufism but were specialists in the basis of Islamic society—the Qur’an. THE COMMUNITY DIMENSION OF POLITICAL CULTURE

The community dimension in Kano political culture has historically been based on the notion—applicable in Hausa ethnic society, emirate society, and religious brotherhood society—that the primary boundaries of communal loyal-

ties are religious. The colonial era modified the political implications of this concept by adding geographical boundaries of a secular nature. Yet the social communications patterns encouraged by the colonial regime increased the Kano scope of consciousness to the Muslim world as a whole. Out of this increased awareness of the larger Muslim community came the notion of transethnic and transnational religious brotherhood communities. During the late colonial period the reformed brotherhoods organized on a national basis as well, thus reinforcing the idea of national boundaries. The primacy of religious boundaries did not preclude economic relations with the non-Muslim communities in Nigeria. Defined relationships of cooperation were possible with people-of-the-book; and from the Kano view, the important characteristic of pagan communities in Nigeria was the potential for Islamization rather than

Conclusion 391 the actual degree of Islamic affiliation. The process of community formation, however, at both the ethnic and transethnic and the brotherhood levels was heavily dependent on the external context and the manner in which that context defined the community in question. The consolidation of community loyalties within a changing external context has usually entailed the leadership of a strong charismatic leader. Only under such leadership have loyalty boundaries been significantly extended or consolidated.

The stages or sequence of Hausa, Fulani, and Beriberi community integration in Kano may be summarized as follows: During the 1920s a significant degree of economic integration occurred with the establishment of the groundnut economy and the creation of new types of urban-rural interdependency. During the 1930s, integration of the religious authority systems began to occur. During the 1940s, greater social integration occurred, as was evident from the increasing incidence of interethnic marriage. During the 1950s, polztical integration began to occur, with the development of transethnic political parties. The combined result of these integrational dimensions was to produce in the 1960s, a community nationalism in Kano. From historical evidence, religious integration clearly preceded both social and political integration. Also, while the Kano community was becoming more functionally differentiated in terms of modern roles, the prevailing reformist type of religion produced a fusion or dedifferentiation of values and beliefs, which may have counterbalanced some of the unsettling aspects of social change. Once the social reorientation was well underway, the reformist type of religion became functional in reinforcing community nationalism against “outside forces.”

In the mid-1960s these outside forces were perceived in three categories: geographical centers of political power within the Northern Region (Sokoto, Kaduna); composite ethnic communities living inside Kano, but regarded as outsiders (southern Nigerians, Europeans, Lebanese); and finally, an ambiguous objectification of the forces of westernization. These categories were perceived as coalescing into a menacing front during the period 1963-65. Within this framework of defensiveness, reformed religion began to function as a sort of religion of the oppressed. This religion incorporated both mass and elite sections of the Kano community. The Western observer, noticing only the considerable disparity in income levels within the Kano community, might overlook the even larger gap between that community as a whole and the outside forces which confronted that community. With the creation of Kano State, outside forces were defused: the Northern Region ceased to exist; the bulk of the Ibo community left Kano, and the European and Lebanese communities were stringently controlled by the national government (especially by means of visa and currency regulations); and westernization seemed less

392 Religion and Political Culture in Kano threatening as the younger generation of Kano people came to fill positions in teaching, civil service, and modern business that had previously been filled by outsiders.

The causal linkage between religious integration and political integration is not possible to prove without considering alternative pressures for political integration. Yet the nature of the religious sector in Kano made this linkage highly probable. Within the Kano context, it was the religious brotherhoods that had experience with transethnic integration. Furthermore, their belief systems were universalistic in principle and were capable of interpretation by the mallam class. Significantly, the mallam class was a natural link between the economic classes and the political classes. Symbols of religion may be used either to reinforce differences or to emphasize similarities. Within the Kano emirate context, the use of religious symbols was situational. Internally, the symbols of the reformed brotherhoods were used to heighten a sense of com-

munity cohesion; in confrontation with external forces, they were used as differentiators.

Turning to a more specific summary, the religious sector in Kano has affected three types of community integration: mass-elite, territorial, and ethnic. Owing to patterns of ethnic stratification in Kano, a major element in mass-

elite (vertical) integration has been ethnic (horizontal) integration. The religious situation in Kano, however, and in particular the development of reformed brotherhoods, has affected mass-elite integration in four principal ways, independent of horizontal influences: by providing a subsystem in which status reversal could occur; by facilitating social mobility within the existing social

system; by establishing nonpolitical and noneconomic social bonds between disparate points on the social spectrum; and by extending the absorptive capacity of the urban center with regard to rural migrants, and hence neutralizing the tendency toward an urban poverty-level class of unemployed.

Status reversal may occur when elite members of the administrative class participate in brotherhood activities where religious elites take status precedence. Many of the mallam elites have been from poor or low-status families. A major example of this has been Ibrahim Niass, who by traditional standards was of the lower-class blacksmith caste (even though the blacksmiths had a special status as masters of the occult).

Social mobility within the social system may occur through achievement in brotherhood activities. An example of this was the case of Nasiru Kabara,

who was given to his guardian mallam and who rose, largely through his own achievements, to act as leader of Reformed Qadiriyya.

The establishment of religious bonds between disparate points on the social spectrum was a major means through which various elements in Kano so-

Conclusion 393 ciety were at least brought into communication contact. Where these disjunctions had been reinforced by ethnic loyalties, the religious channel became a most significant means of bridging the gap. The urban zawiya system has been of considerable importance in absorbing

rural migrant elements. This has been particularly important with regard to younger men and boys. Educational facilities and often employment were provided through the zawiya system, and whatever poverty or affluence existed within the brotherhood was shared to some extent.

Three further aspects of the reformed brotherhoods are germane to the closure of the mass-elite gap in Kano Emirate. First, many of the authority figures in the emirate system have been regarded by the poorer classes as be-

longing to the “we” category rather than the “they” category because of brotherhood identities. Second, the brotherhood community itself provided a sense of identity which in many cases superseded the emirate community and hence the emirate social status system. Third, the brotherhoods provided not only a vehicle for legitimizing socioeconomic protest but for organizing effectively in order to realize the demands of reform.

Brotherhood elites have affected territorial integration in two major ways: by providing a mechanism for urban-rural linkage and by providing a channel for interurban linkage. Rural-urban migration has not been a one-way process. It is seasonal to the extent that urban people frequently return to rural areas for the planting and harvest periods; it is circumstantial to the extent that urban people frequently have relatives in the rural area, and various family circumstances may require returning to the rural areas for periods of time; rural youth may come to the city for Islamic education, with the understanding that they will return to their rural areas after the completion of their studies; and urban traders have come to permeate most of the rural market systems. Thus, the urban religious movements have several social channels by which they could extend themselves to the rural areas, and they have utilized all of them. Also important has been the political pressure on rural district-level authorities to identify themselves with their urban counterparts. The brotherhood system has been a major means of facilitating social and political linkage between the urban and rural areas in Kano Emirate.

The interurban linkages established by the brotherhood system and the travel patterns of the brotherhood elites have been major factors in the sense of increased territorial community in Kano. These patterns have been in all directions: north (into Niger), south (to Lagos and Ibadan), east (to Adamawa), and west (to Senegal). The long-term effects on national and supranational integration remain to be seen, but the potential for such integration is strong.

394 Religion and Political Culture in Kano The reformed religious brotherhoods have influenced ethnic integration in six major ways: division of labor, transaction flow patterns, value congruence, authority and succession patterns, community delimitation, and law and protest patterns.

With regard to division of labor, the growth of the groundnut industry in Kano reoriented the traditional relations between the Hausa farmer and the prime sources of urban wealth (Arab, Hausa, Beriberi, and Fulani). Brotherhood elites were instrumental in creating the bond of trust and confidence between these new urban-rural partners. Less directly, the effects of the reformed brotherhoods on Kano nationalism in recent years have facilitated interethnic business and commercial relationships, even between members of different brotherhoods in Kano. One example of this has been the Kano Citizens Trading Corporation, on whose Board of Direction served Aminu Kano (unaffiliated, Fulani), Nasiru Kabara (Qadiriyya, Fulani), Tijjani Usman

(Tijaniyya, Beriberi), and Baba Danbappa (Tijaniyya, Hausa). Although there have been instances of cooperative-type arrangements within the brother-

hoods, there is no parallel to the situation in Senegal in which the religious leaders actually control the major groundnut cooperatives.

With regard to transaction flow patterns, the establishment of the Reformed Tijaniyya along the major rail, road, and air terminals, not only in northern Nigeria but throughout West Africa, has created an interethnic social network whose implications are increasingly evident. The social communication patterns extending through the brotherhood zawiya system have created new patterns of interethnic relations and new boundaries of community loyalty. With regard to value congruence patterns, the reformed brotherhoods in Kano have espoused values and doctrines that are essentially similar. These attitudes and dispositions have included both an intellectual and an emotional dimension; this has strengthened the movements on a mass level and created a commonality of religious approach between the various ethnic segments in the Kano community. While the concept of tarbiyya is explicitly associated with the Reformed Tijaniyya, it is also characteristic of the Reformed Qadiriyya. Since both brotherhoods incorporate members from all ethnic groups in Kano, brotherhood pluralism and competition serves to intensify the commonality of approach and hence the degree of community value congruence on religious matters.

With regard to authority and succession patterns, the ethnic integration that occurred in the reformed brotherhood leadership structures has been perhaps the single most important factor in the ethnic integration of the Kano community. The processes of succession that resulted in such authority patterns were significant in that they combined the principles of inherited authority

Conclusion 395 with achieved authority. Strong local leaders emerged to replace the Arab and Fulani clan dominance of the religious structures in Kano. The symbolic impact of the intensely close personal relationship of the brotherhood elites, representing a spectrum of ethnic identities, was widespread and deep. With the increase in young migrants to Kano City, the number of ethnically mixed disciple-mallam sets appears to have increased. Since Hausa and Arabic were the languages of communication, other ethnic languages did not complicate the process of integration. Although this process of ethnic integration within the mallam class has some historic precedents in the Kano context (for example, Hausa-Beriberi mallams after the Jihad and Hausa-Fulani mallams before the Jihad), it was not until the reformed brotherhoods turned the process of sufism from an individual to a group affair and extended it to all levels and categories of society that the full impact on Kano community integration was realized. Since ethnic identifications became outmoded and dysfunctional in many situations, they were increasingly replaced with an urban (or emirate) locational identification: Kanawa. This identification, in turn, reinforced certain aspects of Kano nationalism which included a more secular set of interests, as well as the common identification with tarbiyya type of religion. The relationship of the Kano Muslim community with the Sabon Gari non-

Muslim community has been discussed in broad terms rather than in detail in this study. The Reformed Tijaniyya had precedents in Senegal for cooperation with Roman Catholic elements in the local communities and on the national political level. In Kano the external pressure of the non-Muslim com-

munities (British, Lebanese, southern Nigerian) was clearly a factor in the consolidation of the Kano Muslim community. Yet, except in situations perceived as national emergencies (1953, 1966), the propensity to view immigrant ethnic groups in terms of religious as well as ethnic categories may have actually facilitated the relatively good relations between Muslims and people-of-thebook (mainly Christians) in Kano. The establishment of transethnic religious communities in Kano helped consolidate the sense of urban, emirate, and state identity in Kano and also helped extend the scope of possible transethnic types of community loyalties, including both loyalties to the nation-state and to a transnational regional community.

The experience of transcending lineage and language as a basis for values and loyalties has had a profound impact on orientation toward community. With regard to law and protest, it was apparent by the late colonial period that a strict adherence to Maliki law in northern Nigeria would present impossible conflicts of jurisdiction and community loyalties. The effect of the reformed brotherhoods has been to mitigate the primacy of law, both as a guide to human behavior and as a principle of community delimitation. The

396 Religion and Political Culture in Kano process of legal reform in northern Nigeria and Kano did not consist of a single dramatic act of externally imposed legislation. Legal reform has been a gradual process, which has been long under way in the Kano urban area. In assessing the speed with which legal reform is undertaken, two points are of special importance. First, the policy of indirect colonial rule in northern Nigeria resulted in a situation whereby traditional legal practices were continued and encouraged but were extended to meet certain modern situations. Second, the sufi leaders, especially those with tafsir training, have been the group in Kano society with authority to both challenge and modify the legal system. The key role played by Wali Suleiman in legal change in Kano is an example of this influence.

Acceptable channels of protest and dissent may well be essential to an integrated community. If protest is disallowed, the pressures within a community may reach the point of permanent fissure. The religious sector has served as the major channel of protest in Kano society. Such protest has been violent and nonviolent. During the Fulani Jihad of Usman dan Fodio, the Qadiriyya organization set the basic precedent for violent protest against established authority. The adoption of Mahdiyya by Hayatu was originally a protest against some of the clan succession processes of the Sokoto ruling elite. The development of Tijaniyya in Kano after the colonial conquest was clearly an indication of protest, most often nonviolent, against Sokoto domination. In more recent times, the reformed brotherhoods have functioned as channels

of nonviolent protest against dominance of the Western-educated elite in northern Nigeria. The brotherhoods have served to express the grievances of the common man, both with regard to his exclusion from decision-making positions on the basis of language qualifications (English) and with regard to his general economic status and personal integrity. In this respect, the brotherhoods have aided in the consolidation of the vast majority of the Kano population who have frequently been classified by outsiders as illiterate and unworthy of dignity. CONCLUSIONS

A plural society by definition is restricted in the amount of contact between the social and political systems of the respective communal units. In such a society, the process of sociopolitical integration may be facilitated if linkages between the religious sectors have been established. In Kano the merger of religious systems historically preceded the political integration of Kano Emirate. The eventual integration of the political system occurred only with the introduction of the modern political context of regional and national politics. The

orientations in Kano toward the political authority structure have been es-

Conclusion 397 sentially similar in the ethnic, emirate, regional, and state political contexts, even though shifts from one context to another have resulted in layered authority structures. ‘The contemporary political context has allowed Fulani, Hausa, Beriberi, and Arab elements in Kano an opportunity both for political

representation and for alignment of political interests on nonethnic lines. Political parties in Kano have been ethnically mixed since about 1961, and with the establishment of Kano State the balance of representation was reflected in an appointive council. Political integration was clearly preceded by religious integration and the development of a zone of political culture orientations that overlapped both sectors. This overlap is due to a lack of differentiation, to residual differentiation, and to transference of role expectations. The mutual reinforcement of the hierarchical authority patterns in the political and religious sectors from 1954 to 1964 encouraged integration through the process of centralization. The hierarchical authority systems in Kano also formed subsystems within broader political contexts (the Northern Region and Nigeria) and may have made it more difficult to integrate into these broader contexts than a pyramidal or even segmental system would have done. Kano nationalism (or separatism) within the Northern Region context may have been a by-product of its own successful internal integration. The pyramidal authority patterns in Kano State (both religious and political) may facilitate the process of linkage with the national system. When political and religious authority roles are embodied in the same actors,

the question of a political-culture zone becomes redundant to some extent, depending on the degree to which the actors can establish distinctive boundaries between these two sets of roles. If the political or religious authorities are of the charismatic variety, role boundaries tend to be blurred. This may facilitate community consolidation for a particular time period but seems to set up reactions in the community by those, particularly the bureaucracy, who are adversely affected by the fusion of all authority into a single source. The evidence from Kano would suggest that, despite the pressures for bureaucratic routinization and differentiation, the periods of community crisis (and in a plural society this is related primarily to interethnic tensions) can only be resolved by authority figures with fused roles (especially religious and _political). The subsequent differentiation of these roles allows for bureaucratic consolidation of the new-scale community.

Appendix 1 Bakin Ruwa Ward (Kano City) Religious Survey, 1965

The author surveyed religious affiliation and socioeconomic patterns in one ward (Bakin Ruwa) within Kano City in April 1965. This ward, in the western part of the city, is predominantly Hausa, was the locus of pre-Maguzawa religion in Kano, and has been a center of Reformed Tijaniyya in Kano. Because of the sensitivity and operational difficulty of distinguishing between “reformed” and “traditional” orientations within both Tijaniyya and Qadiriyya, this question was not asked. On the basis of personal observation however, I would estimate that more than go percent of the affiliates of each brotherhood were “reformed.”

According to 1964 tax receipts in Bakin Ruwa, there were 10,087 persons in the ward, including 457 (male) taxpayers, living in 397 separate compounds. People in 100 compounds were interviewed at random. All interviewing was conducted in Hausa, and all questions were open-ended. The ten questions were as follows: (1) What is the brotherhood affiliation of head-of-compound? (2) What was the brotherhood affiliation of the father of head-of-compound? (3) What is the occupation of head-of-compound? (4) What was the occupation of father of head-of-compound? (5) What is the occupation of the senior son of head-of-compound? (6) What is the age of head-of-compound? (7) In what language(s) is the head-of-compound literate (Arabic, Hausa, English, Fulani)? (Literacy was defined as ability to read at simplest level.) (8) How many wives has head-of-compound? (g) Where has head-of-compound traveled in the past year? (10) Where did the grandfather of head-of-compound come from? Of the 100 heads-of-compond interviewed, 74 percent were members of Tijaniyya,

14 percent were members of Qadiriyya, and 12 percent were unaffiliated with any

400 Religion and Political Culture in Kano brotherhood. Cross-tabulations between brotherhood affiliation and selected variables are given in figure 1. The full data display is contained in figure 2. TABLE 1 BakIn Ruwa BrotTHerHOOoD AFFILIATION AND SELECTED SOCIOECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF HEaps-oF-COMPOUND

(n = 100) Brotherhood Affiliation (Head-of-Compound )

Tijantyya Qadiriyya Unaffiliated Total

Variable (n = 74) (n = 14) (n = 12) (x = 100) (1) Brotherhood Affiliation

same as father 70 (94%) 12 (85%) 11 (91%) 93 (93%)

(2) Occupation

trader 35 (47%) 2 (14%) 10 (83%) 47 (47%)

mallam 21 (29%) 5 (35%) — 26 (26%)

tailor 9 10%) (12%) — 3 (21%) — 12 12%) driver 1 (8%) 2 (2%) washman 11%) 1 (7%) — 2 3%)

blacksmith 11%) 17%) —22(2%) (2%) laborer 2 B%) — — miscellaneous 4 (6%) 2 (14%) 1 (8%) 7 7%) (3) Occupational , relationship to father

trader son of

trader 16 (n = 35) (46%) 1m=2)60%) 8(n=10)(80%) 25(n= 47) (53%) trader son of

mallam 16 (n = 35) (46%) 1(n=2)60%) 1(n=10)(10%) 18(n = 47) 38%) mallam son of

mallam 15(n = 21)(71%) 4(n= 5)(80%) — 18 (n = 26) (73%) mallam son of

trader 3(n = 21) (14%) — — 3(n = 21) 14%)

tailor son of

tailor 1(n= 9)(11%) OCG =3)00%) — 1(n = 12)(8%)

tailor son of

mallam S5m= 9)655%) 2m= 3) (66%) — 7 (n = 12) 58%)

tailor son of

trader 2(n= 9)022%) 1(n= 3)33%) — 3(n = 12)(25%)

(4) Age Group

20-30 years old 6 (8%) — — 6 (6%) 31-40 years old 38 (51%) 8 (57%) 433%) 50 (50%)

41-50 years old 16 (22%) 2 (14%) 2 17%) 20 (20%) 51-60 years old 8 (11%) 2 (14%) 3 (25%) 13 3%)

61 and over 6 (8%) 2 (14%) 3 (25%) 11 1%)

Appendixes 401 TABLE 1 (Continued) Brotherhood Affiliation (Head-of-Compound)

Tijaniyya Qadiriyya Unaffiliated Total

Variable (n = 74) (n = 14) (2 = 12) (n = 100) C5) Literacy

Hausa 14 (20%) 6 (43%) 8 (67%) 28 (28%)

Hausa, Fulani 10%) — — 10%) Hausa, Arabic 56 (76%) 8 (57%) 3 (25%) 67 (67%) English 3 (4%) — 1 (8%) 44%) Hausa, Arabic,

none 2 G3%) — 1 (8%) 3 3%)

(6) Number of wives

one 42 (57%) 6 (43%) 8 (67%) 56 (56%)

two 27 37%) 7 (50%) 3 25%) 37 37%) three —— GB%) four 3—(4%) 17%) —3 10%) (7) Location of

Kano City 61 124 91 82 (82%) Kano Province 1 6 Northern Nigeria 5 1 2 8 (6%) (8%)

Grandfather

Lagos 4 — — 4 (4%)

ec Se

402 Religion and Political Culture in Kano TABLE 2

Baxin Ruwa Survey: Futyt Data Dispitay

(Respondents listed within each brotherhood category by age)

Location

Father's Father's Son's Number of

Re- — Brother- Brother- Occu- Occu- Occu- of Grand-

spondent hood hood pation pation pation Age Literacy Wives Travel father

72 T T M TrLD TrLD 100 H,A 2 no KC

23 T T M M sch 65 H,A H,A 12 no no KC KC 21 T T M M M 65 66 T T F TrLD Ta 65 H,A 1 no KC

27 T T — — — 65 H 1 no KC 65 T T TrLD M Ta 65 H,A 1 no KC

88 T T Ta M sch 55 H,A 2. no KC 72 T T Ta M — 55 H,A 2 no KC 64 T T M M Tr 55 H,A 23no NNK 48 T T Tr Tr Ta 55 H,A no KC 58 TT TT Ta TaFMTa—5555H,A H 11 no KC 49 no KC 18 T T M M C 55 H,A 2 no KC 10T TMTM Tr— H 45 — 55 H 21 no no KC KC , 62 T60 H,A T T M M sch 45 H,A 2 no KC 47 T T M M — 45 H,A 22 no KC 32 T T M M Tr 45 H,A no KC 74 T T M Tr — 45 45 H,A H,A 22 no no KC KC 75 T T M M — 82 T T Tr Tr — 45 H,A 3 no KC 73 TrTrLD M ——4545H,A 81 TT TTM H,A32no no KC KC 69 T T Tr FTrMR 45 H,A H,A 2 2 no KC 79 T T Tr — 45 no KC 77 T T Ta Tr — 45 H,A 1 no KC 24 M MMsch no KC KC 6 TTTTTrM M 45 45 H,A H,A 1 1 no 67 T T Tr TrLD — 45 H,A 1 no Lag 51 T T Tr Tr — 45 H,A 1 NNB KC 91 T none M CW sch 40 H,A,E 1 no KC

1 TTTTMTrMMTa—3535H,A 2 no no KC KC 19 H 0 37 T T M F— 35 H,A 0 no no KC KP 20 T T C M — 35 4H 2 84 T Q TrOS M — 35 H,A 2 no KC

39 T TT T Tr Tr — 35 H,A 22 no KC 42 Tr Tr — 35 H,A no KC 50 T T Tr TrLD — 35 H,A 2 KPGe KC

Appendixes 403 TABLE 2 (Continued) Location

Father's Father's Son's Number of

Re- — Brother- Brother- Occu- Occu- Occu- of Grana-

spondent hood hood pation pation pation Age Literacy Wives Travel father

70 TTTTTr TrLD — 35 35 H,A 2nonoNNY Lag 12 Tr Tr sch H 2 57 T T TrM M sch 35 H,A 2 no KC 99 T T TM M — 35 H,A,E 2 no KC 100 T T TrM M — 35 H,A 2 no KC

56 TT T Ta TrM M — 35 H 21 no KC 86 T M — 35 H,A no KC 40 T T TT MR Ta Tr — 35 H,A ]1 no Lag 68 Tr — 35 H,A no KC 4] T T M F sch 35 H,A 1 no NNK 31 TT T LDTr M— sch3535H,A H 11 no KC 35 T no KC 25 TTTMMMMsch —35 35H,A H,A11no noKPK KC 7 T 28 T T § S sch 35 H 1 no KPT 16 L LTa —sch 35 H KPRG 9 TT TT Ta 351 H 1 no KPG KC

92 T none IrM Ta — 35 H,A 1 no KC 95 T none TrM M — 35 H 1 no KC 87 T T TrOS M sch 35 H,A,E 1 no KC 54 TTTTrM TrMM M— — 35 35 H,A H,A 11 no no KC KC 3 T 2 TTTTTrM M sch 35 H,A H,A 1] no KC 36 TrM M — 35 no KC 93 T T TrM TrLD — 35 H 1 no KC 15 T TT Tr Tr sch 35 H,F 1no noNNY NNA 11 T Tr Tr — 35 H 1 83 T T TrLD Tr — 35 H,A 1 no KC

78 TTTTa Tr M Tr — — 25 35 H,A H,A 11 no no KC KC 8 T 4 TT TT M 25 4H,A H,A 11 no 34 MM M— — 25 no KC KC 44 T T W Tr — 25 4H,A 1 no no KC Lag 33 T T Tr M — 25 H,A 1 43 T T Tr Tr ~— 25 4H,A 1 no KC 63 Q Q CW CW - sch 65 H 4 no KC 89 Q Q M M sch 65 H,A 2 no KC 26 Q Q Wm M — 55 H 2 no KC

5 Q T § S sch 55 H 2 no NNB 96 Q Q TrM M sch 45 H 2. no KC 76 Q Q M M — 45 H,A 2 no KC 85 Q Q_ Ta M sch 35 H,A 2 no KC

404 Religion and Political Culture in Kano TABLE 2 (Continued) Location

Father's Father's Son's Number of

Re- — Brother- Brother- Occu- Occu- Occu- of Grandaspondent hood hood pation pation pation Age Literacy Wives Travel father

46 Q Q M M — 35 H,A 2 no KC 45 Q Q Ww Tr — — 35 35 H,A H,A 11 no KC 80 Q Q_ Tr Tr no KC 55 Q none M F — 35 H,A 1 no KPGa 59 Q Q MTa —M—— 3535 H,A 1 no no KC KC 53 Q Q_ H 1 29 Q Q_ Ta Tr Ta 35 H ] no KC

98 none none TrM TrLD — 65 H 1 no NND 94 none none TIrM TrLD sch 65 H 1 no KC 61 none none TrM TrLD — 65 H 0 no KC

52 none none Tr Tr — 55 H,A 1 no KC 30 none none Tr M sch 55 H 1 no KC 90 none none TIrM — sch 55 H 2 no KC 38 none T Tr Tr — 45 H,A 2 no KC 71 none none Tr TrLD — 45 H 1 no KC 97 none none D M sch 35 H 2 no KC

17 none none Tr Tr sch 35 H 1 KPH KC 13 none none Tr F sch 35 H,A,E 1 no NNZ 14 none none Bu F sch 35 HA 1 KPKa KPR

Key: Occupations (continued ) Brotherhood affiliation F = farmer T == Tijaniyya H = laborer hunter Q Qadiriyya L = N = None M = mallam

Language of Literacy MR = machine rentier

H ==Arabic HausaschS ==insmith A school

E = English Ta = tailor F = Fulfulde Tr = trader (general)

Occupations TrLD = trader Cong distance) Bu = builder TrM = trader Cmarket) C = carpenter TrOS = trader (oil seller) CW = corn weigher W = washman D = truck driver Wm = watchmaker Locations

KC = Kano City; KP = Kano Province; KPG = Kano Province (Godiya); KPGa = Kano Province (Gaya); KPGe = Kano Province (Gezawa); KPH = Kano Province (Hadejia); ‘“KPK = Kano Province (Kura); KPKa = Kano Province (Kabo); KPM = Kano Province CMadobi); KPR = Kano Province (Rogo); KPRG = Kano Province (Rimin Gado); KPT = Kano Province (Tofa); Lag = Lagos; NN = Northern Nigeria; NNA = Northern Nigeria (Adamawa); NNB = Northern Nigeria (Bornu); NND = Northern Nigeria (Daura); NNK = Northern Nigeria (Katsina); NNY = Northern Nigeria (Yalwa); NNZ = Northern Nigeria (Zaria).

Appendix 2 succession to Selected Clan and District Headships in Kano Emirate

Key to figures

— = indirect relationship; m. = married to; d. = daughter of; ( ) = order of succession to authority; [ ] = information about family relationships or dates in office; DH = district head. Key to tables

Relationship of successor to predecessor: 0 = none; 1 = son; 2 = brother; 3 = nephew; 4 = cousin; 5 = uncle; 6 = father.

TABLE 1 SUCCESSION TO AUTHORITY: SELECTED PrEcOLONIAL District HEapsuips Sequence of Successtons

District 1-2 2-3 3-4 4-5 5-6 6-7 7-8 8-9 9-10 10-11 11-12 12-13 13-14

1. Birnin Kudu 1 1 6 1 1 4 4 4 4 2 3 2. Wudil/Sumaila 4 1 2 3 £5 3 5 4 4 2 4 2 1 3. Dambatta 1141 4 4 4 3 J]

4. Dutse O 1 2 0 2 0 2 3 4 4 #O OO 3

Summary: Distribution of succession relationships: none = 4;son = 10; brother = 6; nephew = 5; cousin = 13; uncle = 2; father = 1. Selected sequences of relationships: incumbent to brother to nephew = 3. Total number of successions: 39.

R y a a ue | * , Se VIS

S | |e : nS e* : : > S| ue .

8 Nak8 U8 S Use SIN)

‘alSIS8 se | SSS sf §

» & s a a] 3 a Py] e} || SS at

S| , 3s ase au :| e—_ S| 8 wv NES sees us|

if oS .S Shi ! y-S8-8 = S88

S'S Sy zy

‘ Lo i _ S SRS aut

S/S US OVA

e QSES8

a SEES

Appendixes | 407

| | Figure | Succession to Authority (Office of Sarkin Gar) Dambazaua Clan, (806-1970

, MUHAMMAD INUWA

(2) seule THEO (1608-1845) ,

(aM KWAEANGA | { ABA ABDURRAHMAV (45-186)

(3) MUKA Ag AUIYU, ()ABDSHAM ()ABWULKADIR (6) MUHAMMAZ

BASUAE, (B4U/107) (406%) DKKO

(1006-1693) (1126-42)

nT / ,

(7) MUKAMMAD ADANAND

(6) MUHAMMAD MUHTARL

((954-FRESENT)

408 Religion and Political Culture in Kano Figure 3 bisinet Heads and chiets of Birnin Kudu (Ofice of Sarkin Kuda): Local Filan, (619-1970 D)_SVLEIMANY

CO | Cat2y) MULAMMAP

ee ma pee eee (1630-1844, RETIED; REMFOINTED (852-1654)

Ane OO |

(3) MUHAYWAD SAN 4) AGOULLALY GALADIMA YUMA

b) Muy ©) YAKUBU (0 MUHAMMAD NAAT

(1067-1873) nee (1093-44)

@ MAMMA MAZY $0) Sth Y__- (QZAKAET

nine (930-452) (10#-1679)

(12) YAKVBY ((952- PRESENT)

TABLE 2

Succession TO AUTHORITY: SELECTED Districr Heapsures CREATED AFTER 1903 Sequence of Successions

District 1-20 230 34 45 5-6 6-7 7-8 8-9 9-10 10-11

1. Tudun Wada 0 0 0 1 0 2. Jahun 0 1 0 4 0 0 3. Gabasawa 0 0 2 3 3 4. Oo .Q 5.Gwaram Kiru 304 00 02¢)30 oe . :,

6. Kumbotso 0 @) 2 2 3 1 0 0 020 4, 7. Ringim 8.Kura Babura 9. 3 4 1 4 0 0 / | SO

10. Dawakin Kudu 0 0 0 4 5

11. Minjibir 12. Ungogo2021342 4) @) 3 4 41 4

SumMary: Distribution of succession relationships: none = 32; son = 5; brother = 8; nephew = 8; cousin = 10; uncle = 1. Selected sequences of relationships: incumbent to brother to nephew = 4. Total number of successions: 54.

Appendixes 409

3

| SS &XS a= | we NS

MS

Ny > NS 8 XY | Ys S w| 3 NS

SSE

“NX As

Ss ¥ Qe; OY Vi NS LSS ae | YS Os \>oS e ys ~ Wr Na '~& x 3S Na Seis cESp R moe & ~ 8 Xu

SS la) $7} 8) SSS Lye pa BS | 8 VY Tae | Rt Qa RY SS Las Qs

eQ S Si S, Ry SS SIS ET RS S~N® Ws LAS SSS SS NS BIN we Ss3|S ¥&tt Sa

Appendix 3 e ein Kano Electoral Succession

TABLE 1 FEDERAL Exsctions, 1954: CHaracreristics or KaNo NoMINATED CANDIDATES Political

Birth Eth- Occu- Career to Positions

Name Date nicity Education pation 1954 Since 1954

1. Maikano Dutse 1915 =F} SJS; KMS; NA? NR Assem.; NR Min. LG;

Kat Pres. NPC Sarkin Dutse (Kano) (19584

2. Baba Daradara 1919 N SJS; KMS NAS NR Assem.; MP until 1966;

NPC LGA treasury 3. Mudi Kazaure 1918 HF KMS;PWD NA® NPC died 1958 Tech. Sch.

4. Umaru Gumel 1913 HB KPS;Kat; NA’ NPC MP until 1961;

Sch. NApharmacy; until 1963; Pharm. KSC

5. Rilwanu Abdullahi 1919 HF SJS;KMS NA§ NPC MP until 1966; LGA sup. land

Kad LGA sup.

6. Mahmud Bayero ca.1932 ~F® SAS; KMS; NA? NPC MP until 1966;

Kad KSC

hospitals

7. Baba Danbappa 1920 H"™ SJS; KMS; trader NPC MP until 1966; 8. Adamu Danguguwa ca.1916 F KPS; Kat; NA” NPC retired from

Ag. Sch. politics, 1961; Samaru NA Ag. officer; KS Marketing Board

9. Muhtari Sarkin Bai 1926 F% KMS;CTC NA" NPC MP until 1966

(Zaria) (chief whip, NPC); KSC

i

NY

Appendixes 411 TABLE 1 (Continued)

Political

Birth Eth- Occu- Career to Positions

Name Date nicity Education pation 1954 Since 1954

Kad until 1964;

10. Maitama Sule 1927. HF SJS;KMS;_ teacher® NPC Sec. NTAK; MP Fed. Min. Mines & Power until 1966; KSC

11. Ahmadu Rufa’i 1917 H KMS; Kat; teacher!® NPC MP until 1964;

IE LonNAC; FO don (Saudi Arabia)

eee nnn VELOSO KS dev. off.

Notes: 1. Father was district head of Dutse. 2. 1935, Kano N.A.; 1936-39, district scribe of Bict; 1943-46, senior assistant chief clerk, district administration of Kano; 1946-49, N.A. supervisor of hospitals Cwakilin asibiti); 1949-53, chief clerk, central district administration. 3. Elected member of Northern Assembly in by-election, January 1953; President of Kano branch of NPC after May 9, 1954. 4. In 1958, Maikano Dutse gave up his position as Northern Region minister of local government to succeed his father as Sarkin Dutse. 5. 1948, treasury clerk, Kano N.A.;1948-51, chief cashier, Kano N.A. Treasury; 1951, supervisor Kano N.A. buses. On February 15, 1954, was elected member of Northern Assembly in by-election. 6. 1936-38, N.A. road overseer in training; 1938-42, councillor for works, Kazaure; 1945-48, surveyor of bridge construction; 1948-52, building supervisor; 1952-54, N.A. councillor of works. 7. 1936-51, water analyst; 1951-54, medical storekeeper, city hospital. 8. 1940-54, N.A. legal department. 9. Royal Sullubawa; father was emir of Kano, Abdullahi Bayero. 10. 1953-54, N.A. works department. 11. Father was Alhaji Danbappa Maifata. 12. 1934, N.A.

farm center; 1935-50, N.A. senior agricultural assistant; 1950-52, chief agricultural assistant;

1953-54, N.A. senior service officer. 13. Leader of the Dambazawa clan. 14. 1945-46, junior scribe, Dambatta; 1947-48, assistant chief scribe, Kano City office; 1948-50, N.A. treasury; 1950-53, senior

scribe Dambatta; 1954, development inspector and district head, Dambatta. 15. 1947-54, teacher in Kano Middle School. 16. 1938-49, teacher in Kano Middle School; 1952-53, headmaster, Kano Middle School; 1954, senior visiting teacher, Kano Province.

Key: 1. Ethnicity: F = Fulani; H = Hausa; HB = Hausa-Beriberi; HF = Hausa/Fulani; N = Nupe. 2. Education: Ag. Sch. Samaru = Agricultural School, Samaru; CTC = Clerical Training College (Zaria); IE London = Institute of Education, London University; Kat = Katsina College; Kad = Kaduna College; KMS = Kano Middle School; KPS = Kano Provincial School; PWD Tech. Sch. = Public Works Department, Technical School; SAS = School of Arabic Studies; SJS = Shahuci Judicial School. 3. Occupation: NA = Native Authority employee. 4. Political Career: Ag. = Agricultural; dev. off. = development office; Fed. Min. = federal minister; FO = foreign office; KS = Kano State; KSC = Kano State commissioner; LGA = Kano Local Government Authority; MP = Member of Parliament (Lagos); NA = Native

Authority employee; NAC = Native Authority Councillor; NPC = Northern Peoples Congress; NR Assem. = member of the Northern Region Assembly; NR Min. LG = Northern Region Minister; Sec. NTAK = Secretary, Northern Teachers Association, Kano Branch; sup. = supervisor.

Appendix 4 Kano State Movement Debates

According to one article, “The president of the Northern Elements’ Progressive Union and chairman of the Northern Progressive Front, Alhaji Aminu Kano, has declared that the demand for a Kano State was prompted by ‘evidence of injustice under the Nigerian Constitution.’

“The NEPU leader who was addressing a news conference at the NEPU headquarters in Kano at the week-end, added that new states are ‘not created by law but by evolution.’

“Sometime last week, Alhaji Aminu had, at a mass rally of his party supporters, called for the creation of a separate Kano State. “Alhaji Aminu pointed out that ‘as far back as four years ago, the people of Kano

province had spotted a deliberate plan to relegate Kano, as a state, to the background.’

“He said that the plan went to such an extent that projects and industries scheduled for Kano at the request of investors were either turned down or shifted somewhere else.

“The NEPU leader also spoke of discrimination against people of Kano origin in the public service of Northern Nigeria, while in commercial field, Kano traders and merchants are not given a sizeable share of Government aid. “Speaking about the economic viability of a Kano State, Alhaji Aminu pointed

out that Kano with a population of six million people without tribal or religious groupings, produces more than half of the tonnage of groundnut from which the revenue of the Northern Nigeria Government accrued.

“He stated that the natural resources of the state have not yet been tapped and with tin, bauxite, uranium and enough space for cultivation, irrigation and rearing of cattle, the new state could be ‘the Texas of Nigeria.’

Appendixes 413 “The demand for the state, he further stressed, is not against any individual and

is not a political question” (“Aminu Kano: Why I Want a Kano State,” Daily Times, April 20, 1965, p. 2).

The types of arguments used within the Kano context are illustrated in an article by Sadiq Zukogi, general secretary of NEPU, in May 1965: “From my close range knowledge of Kano people and more particularly the industrious peasant farmers and craftsmen all over this most populous province of the whole Region, the creation of Kano State would give extra industrial impetus to the hard-working people to the extent of not only making the state viable but an exemplary state in the Federation—very compact and financially sound with abundant goodwill that Kano now enjoys in and outside Africa. “I have already spoken to very many Kano businessmen now operating at differ-

ent places all over the North, East, West and Lagos areas who have shown high pride and keen interest in the creation of Kano State and have shown willingness to sink as much as half of their present total capital in gigantic projects of national magnitude.

“In this way 2,000 Kano rich men with business sense contributing £1,000 towards the central capital could easily raise {2,000,000 for such projects without having to ask for partnership.

“I know there are more than 5,000 Kano rich men scattered about the country who could very easily and very conveniently contribute £1,000 to raise £5,000,000 to cover all kinds of projects of major products and productions processing to actual manufacture.

“I will not be surprised if only 5 years after the creation of the Kano State, the state could budget for its annual expenditure, a sum equal or more than what the Regional Government could now afford to budget— £27 million. “It is also alleged that on more than one occasion, the Kano N.A. had to lend money to some institutions in Nigeria and if this allegation is true, there is no reason why Kano State with the full co-operation of the Kano merchants and the true friends of the Kano people could not be a model state in the Federation.

“Apart from that fact, there is no doubt that the Kano people being the most travelled elements in the North, with semi-permanent settlements and habitations not only in the other sections of the Federation but through the total length and breadth of Africa, would be proud to return home and use their business and political as well as sound ideas to the full benefits of the new state and its people. “Tt is also now quite clear that unless the Kano people very solidly support the creation of this new state, the Kano City which is now very heavily over-crowded and unclean could not be developed and brought into the same level with Accra, Conakry, or Lome or Cotonou. “Again, I could notice that even in the British days here, Kano had more areas covered with modern mechanised farming than is the case today. “In those old days one could see bullocks and ploughs at work here and there all over the country side.

414 Religion and Political Culture in Kano “But today, I could see none nearby.

“With a Kano State such mechanised farming schemes could be introduced in

large scale. | “It is also noticed that large number of Kano people spend their winters or Bazara in vegetable raising, and these people could be only fully encouraged by the Kano State in being relieved of the hard labour now involved and higher and higher and better yield ensured which means better earnings. “But the most important thing is that the creation of Kano State would be a great honour and pride to the present Government of the Region because it would make some of the Northern politicians now in power more reasonable and constitutional and fairly democratic and almost coming to the level of other political parties of Governments that tolerate public opinion and operation on due democratic processes. “It is very ugly for the outside world and even our friends laugh when they learn that our single Region is more than twice that of the other three Regions and that the party in power would not encourage creation of more states however viable. “They will also laugh louder and more openly when they hear that our women

folk are not enfranchised and that the party in power is just keeping them as a reserve force for the Presidential elections.

“IT will continue by comparing the ratio of Kano people holding offices both in the Region and the Federation in relation to the Provinces” (“Why I Support the Creation of Kano State (1),” Daily Comet, May 15, 1965, p. 2). Opposing the idea, “Most of you have heard the controversy over the demand for the creation of Kano State. The demand was spearheaded by Alhaji Aminu Kano’s Northern Elements Progressive Union. “Political observers from all parts of the country have made the Kano State issue the main talking-point within the last few days. First, let us consider the issue as we see it. Kano is certainly one of the leading Provinces in Northern Nigeria. Indeed in terms of commercial importance, Kano is rightly regarded as the cynosure of Northern Nigeria. Unlike other provinces which depend on agricultural products, Kano is noted to thrive mainly on commerce. This being the case, its dependence on the rest of the Federation is not only significant but inevitable.

“The only argument put up by Alhaji Aminu Kano to justify the creation of a Kano State was that the province was being exploited and suppressed by the Northern Nigeria Government. So, he and his misguided followers thought the only way out was to carve the province out of the region and make it a separate state. “Certainly that would not solve the issue for the simple reason that Kano is mainly a commercial centre and as, we said above, its dependence on the whole of Nigeria and to some extent the outside world, is necessary for the province to survive. “We reject Alhaji Aminu Kano’s argument that the province was relegated to the background simply because, as he argued, the people were not encouraged by the Northern Government. This assertion is, to say the least, an errant nonsense. After all, Kano Province is still the wealthiest, if not the most progressive in the whole of Northern Nigeria. “What encouragement do we want again? Even the current slight economic de-

Appendixes 415 pression which is reported to be hitting the province was not caused by the Government. It was mischievous of Alhaji Aminu Kano to use it as a basis of his campaign for the creation of Kano State. Since Kano is mainly a commercial centre, it is subject to commercial ups and downs. Just as mainly agricultural centres could be economically hit by the depression of some sort or by natural phenomenon. “The truth is that Kano is not hated by anybody. Its prestige as the leading centre of Northern Nigeria is not only accepted as a matter of course, but is always enhanced.

“The only conclusion we can arrive at is that the NEPU leader and his henchmen are frustrated, following the woeful defeat they suffered during the recent Federal elections as well as those of the Northern House and even local ones. It was certainly because of this frustration that the NEPU men wrongly thought they were not accepted as genuine Northerners. This is nobody’s fault. The NEPU men are to blame. Even the demand for a Kano State was believed to have been engineered by the UPGA-controlled Eastern Government, simply because the NCNC thought by so doing they could make a capital out of this political defeat in Northern Nigeria.

“But even then, we are wondering why Alhaji Aminu Kano could not see the NCNC indifference to the creation of more states in Eastern Nigeria. The Calabar/ Ogoja Rivers State which has for many years been demanded by the indigenes of the area was so violently opposed by the NCNC. Unlike a Kano State, which has no

racial or cultural difference with the rest of the North, the C.O.R. people were linguistically and ethnically divergent with the Ibo-speaking sector of Eastern Nigeria.

“The difference of the C.O.R. with the Ibo-speaking East is even more marked than the one existing between the Mid-West and the Yoruba-speaking Western Nigeria and yet it was the NCNC which vigorously fought for the creation of the Mid-West. But at the same time the party not only kept silent over the C.O.R. State demand issue, but openly oppressed and victimized the exponents of the state. Honest people should spotlight this obvious hypocrisy of the NEPU to Kano people so that this so-called demand for Kano State could easily be nipped in the bud. “We also learned that his demand for Kano State was secretly engineered by some

NPC top-notchers. That was why we were not surprised when we heard Alhaji Aminu Kano saying that once the State was created, he was not interested in whichever party could control the Government of the State. It could be even the NPC, he was reported to have said. This merely strengthens our speculation that some NPC

men from Kano might be behind the move for the creation of the Kano State— apparently for some selfish motives.

“As usual, we appeal to the Hon. Premier, Alhaji Sir Ahmadu Bello, the Sardauna of Sokoto, to look into this speculation with great seriousness, We point it out in good faith, and we hope it would be considered carefully. “Finally, we appeal to the entire Kano community not to allow themselves to be deceived by Alhaji Aminu’s sugar-coated propaganda and the so-called Kano State

demand” (“Kano State Agitation: Forward or Backward?” Nigerian Citizen, April 24, 1965, p. 1).

Appendix 5 Authority Structures in Kano State, 1969-70

Key to tables:

1. Ethnicity: Bu = Buzu CTuareg); E = Edo; F = Fulani; H = Hausa; HA = Hausa-Arab; HB = Hausa-Beriberi; HF = Hausa-Fulani;Ig = Igala; Ka = Kanakuru; RF = Royal Fulani. 2. Education: ABC = Abdullahi Bayero College (Kano); BSS = Bauchi Secondary School; DEAS = Dantata English and Arabic School (Kano); Kad = Kaduna College; Kat = Katsina College; KMS = Kano Middle School; HCB = Higher College; Oxon = Oxford; RHS = Royal Hospital, Sheffield; ZMS = Zaria Middle School. 3. Former political identity: KPP = Kano Peoples Party; NEPU = Northern Elements Progressive Union; NPC = Northern Peoples Congress. 4. Administrative terms: DH = district head; DO = district officer; KSC = Kano State commissioner; LGA = Local Government Authority; NA = Native Authority; PSC = Public Service Commission; SO = sanitary officer; VH = village head. 5. Age: d = dead; M = middle (41-55 years old); O = old (56 years old or more); Y = young (30-40 years old). 6. Occupations: admin = administrator; amb = ambassador; bus = businessman; but = butcher; doc = doctor; exec = executive; grad = graduate; law = lawyer; LBA = licensed buying agent; lib = librarian; mal = mallam; MB = marketing board; min = minister; PM = pay-

master; print = printer; rel = religious leader; store = storekeeper; tail = tailor; teach = teacher; trade = trader; trans = transporter; vet = veterinarian.

Appendixes 417 TABLE 1 ComMIssIONERS: Kano State Executive Councir, 1969 Former

, Birth Political Ethnic — Locational Portfolio Name Date Education Party Identity Identity 1. Military Governor Audu Bako 1924 ZMS none H Kaduna

2. Finance Muhammadu 1915 Kat NPC F Hadejia Gauyama

3. Works and Survey Muhammadu, 1917 KMS NPC H Kazaure Magajin Garin Kazaure

4. Planning and Aminu Dantata 1931 DEAS NPC H Kano City Development 5. Health and Social Sani Gezawa 1929 Kat NPC F Kano Welfare

6. Establishment and Baba Danbappa 1920 Kad NPC H Kano City Service Matters

7. Civil Service Audi Howeidy 1923 Oxon NPC HA Kano City (Ghadames)

8. Local Government Yusufu Maitama 1929 Kad NPC HF Kano City Sule

Development |

9. Education and Muhtari, Sarkin 1926 KMS NPC F Kano City

Community Bai

10. Home Affairs Umaru Gumel 1914 Kat NPC HB Gumel 11. Information Tanko Yakasai 1926 HCB NEPU HF Kano City 12. Natural Resources Inuwa Dutse 1929 RHS none HF Dutse and Cooperatives

13. Solicitor General Nuhu Usman ca. 1934 legal none Ig Okene training

14. Rear Commander Muhammadu ca. 1940 BSS none Ka Numan 5th Battalion Mongoro Nigerian Army, Kano

15. Police F.H.E. Brisbe ca. 1925 police none E mid-west training Notes: During 1969-70, several changes occurred in the composition of the council: (1) Maitama Sule became commissioner of Forestry, Community Development, and Cooperatives; (2) the solicitor general (Nuhu Usman) died in November 1969 Cin a plane crash) and was replaced by Sani Aikawi

Cb. ca. 1938, lawyer, Fulani, Kano); (3) the commander of the 5th battalion (Captain Mongoro) was replaced by Garfiya, and later Major Dada (b. ca. 1938, minority group, Potiskum); (4) the police commissioner (Brisbe) was replaced by Isa Adejo (b. ca. 1928, Igala, Iddah).

418 Religion and Political Culture in Kano

enn SSNS NNT TABLE 2

CROCE District Orricers IN Kano State, 1969

Former

Birth Political

District Name Date Occupation Party Ethnicity

1. Kano West Lawan Tudun Wada 1937 vet none H 2. Kano

Metropolitan Sani Bala 1936 lib none H

3. Kano South

West Zubairu Chedi 1924 vet none F

nnn Ie 4. Kano North

Central Muhammad Uba Adamu 1935 grad ABC none RF

5. Kano South

East Ibrahim Bello ca. 1935 grad Cairo none RF

6. Hadejia Sa’ad Muhammad ca. 1940 exec PSC none F 7. Gumel Salihi Muhammad ca. 1930 PMLGA none F

8. Kazaure Shittu Gaya 1935 AO none F

Notes: During 1969-70, several changes were made in assignments: (13 Sa’ad Muhammad became DO in Gumel and Hadejia; (2) Salihi Muhammad became DO in Kazaure and North Central; (3) Sani Bala went to the Kano State Ministry of Finance; (4) Wada Muhammad (b. ca. 1941, a Fulani from Gaya and student at ABC) became DO Kano West and later went into the Public Service Commission;

(5) Ibrahim Bello was transferred to the Military Governor's Office, in charge of security; (6) Uba Adamu, after a course at the Institute of Administration, Ife, became DO Kano Metropolitan district.

Appendixes 419 TABLE 3

Kano Emirate Councir, 1969 Former

Political Eth-

Representing Name Age Occupation Party — nicity I. Traditional Kingmakers

C1) Madaki Shehu Ahmad QO admin Cin NPC F charge of all DH)

(2) Makama Bello Kano OQ DH Dawakin NPC F Tofa

(3) Sarkin Bai Muhammad Muhtari M_ KSC (educa- NPC F tion) (4) Sarkin Dawaki Mai

Tuta Bello Dandago O DHKanoCity NPC HF

II. District Representatives

(5) Ungogo Dahiru (Mustafa)

Muhammad Y law none F (7) Waje I. D. Ahmad Y doc none HF (6) Kano City Ahmadu Trader M trade NEPU H

(8) B. Kudu Da’u Aliyu Y teach NEPU F

(9) Jahun MuhammaduDanKwano M_bus none HF (10) Gwaram Bayero Na AliGwaram O _ bus none F

(11) Gaya Sule Gaya M teach NPC F

(12) Sumaila Tijjani Hashim Y admin NPC RF

(13) Dutse Yahai Baranda O bus NPC HF

(14) Gwarzo Maikano M bus NEPU- F

(15) Dawakin

Tofa Garba Dawakin Tofa O teach; MB none H

(16) Bici Garba Bichi M bus NPC H

(17) Karaye Ibrahim Nagodi Y nurse none F

(18) Rano Sani Barkum O _ibus NPC H (19) Dawakin Kudu Yusufu Dawakiji O bus NPC F

(20) Kura Yusufu Nadabo Y = print NEPU, F NPC

(21) Wudil Also Wudil M VH none F (22) Tudun Wada Aminu Kofar Gabas Y bus NPC H (23) Kiru Ibrahim Kiru M SO none F

(24) Dambatta Abdulkadir A. Koguna M_ bus; amb NPC F

(25) Minjibir Sule Minjibir M_ admin none HF

(26) Gezawa Sani Gezawa M admin NPC F

420 Religion and Political Culture in Kano TABLE 3 (Continued) Former

Political Eth-

Representing Name Age Occupation Party —nicity (27) Babura Umaru Babura QO DH Garki; NPC F NPC min (28) Ringim Sarki Usuman Ringim M bus none RF

(29) Gabasawa Ahmadu Rufai Y bus NPC HF

(30) Garki Shimali O trade NPC H

III. Other Interests

(31) Qadiriyya § Nasiru Kabara M rel NPC F (32) Tijaniyya Tijjani Usman M tel KPP HB (33) Business Ibrahim Musa Gashash M__ bus NPC HA (34) Business Sanusi Dantata M bus NPC H (35) Business Inuwa Wada M trans NPC F (36) Business Musa Iliyasu M trade NEPU H (37) Local

Government Muhammadu Gwarzo O admin NPC F

(38) Local

Government Sarki Abbas Dan Iya Y admin NPC RF

(39) Local

Government Abubakar Waziri O- admin NPC F

(40) Local

Government Umaru Yola M_ admin NPC F

Appendixes 421 TABLE 4 Kano MeErTROPOLITAN ADMINISTRATIVE AREA Councit, 1969 Former

Political

Representing Name Age Occupation Party Ethnicity I. Ungogo

District Dahiru (Mustafa) Muhammad* Y law none F

Ibrahim Dan Fulani Y store KPP F

Hassan Rafin Mallam O VH scribe NEPU H II. Kumbotso

District SaniNono* MaririYY#MB but NEPU Abdu NEPU H H

Yusufu Jajira Y bus ? HB III. Kano City Ahmadu Trader* M trade NEPU H Maude YO bus Sani Zango busnone NPC F H IV. Waje

District Ibrahim Datti Ahmad* Y doc none F Mahmud Haido Y mal NPC Bu Muhammadu Dangalan Y tail NEPU H

* Member of emirate council.

a

ee

422 Religion and Political Culture in Kano TABLE 5 Kano ALUMNI OF Katstna CoLieGE, 1921-42

Number Year Ethat KC Name Entry Politicalof Career nicity 4. Ahmad Abdullah Metteden 1921 civil service; senator HA

5. Abubakar Waziri (Dokaji) Cd) 1921 waziri (Kano) F

12. Bello dan Barawa 1921 makama (Kano) regional minister F

31. Sani dan Chiroman Yola (Cd) 1921 F 33. | Umaru dan Sarikin Kadeni Cd) 1921 F 53. Usman (d)Cd) 1922 66. Ibrahim danGwarzo Sarkin Dirani 1922F F 67. Yahaya dan Danko Cd) 1922 F 74. AmardanHaddejia 1925 ?F 75. Abubakar Sarkin Tsakuwa 1925 85. Shehu Ahmad 1926 madaki (Kano) F

94. Jibir Daura 1926 ?

130. Umar Tofa Cd) 1928 HB 114. Bello Dandago 1927. sarkin dawaki mai tuta (Kano) F 131. Muhammad Gwarzo 1928 councillor, LGA (Kano) F 132. Adamu dan Guguwa 1928 Kano Marketing Board F 133. Tijani Kano Yari 1928 scribe for sarkin dawaki mai tuta F

134. Ibrahim Kiru 1928 councillor, LGA F

152. Madugu Hadejia 1929 F F 153. Mustafa Daneji 1929 154. Muhammad Hadejia 1929 F

155. Ahmadu Rufa’i Daura 1929 foreign service H 164. Muhammad Zungur Sabo Hadejia Cd) 1929 ?

165. Sule Mainika Gwarzo (d)service 1929 H F 166. Haruna Daura 1929 foreign 181. Abdu dan Gurdo, Daura 1929 ? 184. Umaru Gumel 1929 commissioner (Kano State) HB

199. Inuwa 1931 ? 200. Bukari Daura 1931 201. Mustafa 1931 ??

185. Mamman Kwami 1929 village head (Gwarzo) F

nn 222. Abdulkadir Waziri Cd) 1933 Gaskiya Corporation (brother to5) F

223. Ahmadu Rufa’i 1933 foreign service (same as 155) H 224. Umaru Babura 1933 regional minister; district head F

225. Inuwa Wada 1933 federal minister F 226. Audu (Maikano) Dutse 1933 district head F 227. Maidaura Daura 1933 regional minister F

228. 1933 H 294.Zakari GarbaKazaure Kano 1936 ?

295. Ishiaku Kuru 1936 F 317. Aminu Kano 1937 federal commissioner F

318. Shehu Kazaure 1937 railway corporation H 319. Aliyu Gwarzo 1937. LGA revenue officer F

328. Mudi Ringun Cd) 329. Muhammad Akuna (d)1938 1938 ?2

337. Audi Howeidy 1939 secretary to military governor HA 352. Musa Gumel 1939 permanent secretary Kano State H

339. Baba Abubakar Dantata 1939 ?

367. Hamisu Kano 1940 regional veterinary officer H 369. Kano Dutse1942 1940H ? 378.Ibrahim Abdu Kazaure

383. Ahmadu Karaye 1942 ?

Glossary 1

Hausa Terms Used in Text (with Arabic and English Equivalents)

The glossary is arranged alphabetically by Hausa singular forms. Hausa plural forms are given in parentheses, where appropriate. In cases where there

1s an alternative Hausa word (e.g., both a vulgate and classical word), the alternate word is given as well. The Arabic singular forms follow; and in a few cases where the Arabic plural form has been relevant to the text, this ts given in parentheses. In many cases, there are connotations to the Hausa word that differ from the Arabic root. The English equivalent refers to the Hausa meaning. adalci; ‘adl; justice addini (addinai); al-din; religion addu’a; al-du‘4; prayer

ahali (ahaloli); ahli; secret (or people of). The term ahali is also used as a term of greeting between “brothers” in the Tijaniyya. ahalul kitabi; ahl al-kitab; people of the book (i.e. Christians and Jews) albarka; baraka; blessing alhaji (m), alhajiya (f) (alhazai); al-hajj; a man who has done pilgrimage aljanna (aljannoni); al-janna; paradise alkali (alkalai); al-qadi; judge almubazzaranci; al-mubadhdhir; waste or extravagance aP?uma or a’umma (al’umomi), also umma; al-umma; community alwala; wudii‘; ablution

424 Religion and Political Culture in Kano amana; amana; contract, trust amfasu; anfas; deep breathing, or hyperventilation, on ritual occasions aniya (niyyoyi), also niyya; al-niyya; intention annabi (annabawa); al-nabi; prophet arifi (arifai); ‘arif; knower of God (lit. “learned”) arne (arna); kafir (kafiriin); pagan asali; asl; ancestral home asiri (asararu, asraru or asirai); sirr; secret, especially used with reference to protective “medicine” attaura; al-tawra; Old Testament of Moses bakin bature (bakaken turawa); awriibi aswad; black European bakin mutum (bakaken mutane); insdn aswad; black man basasa; harb ahliyya; civil war basira; basira; free-will, intelligence, insight bature (turawa); awribi; European bayahude (yahudawa); yahiid; Jew bege; baghay; love bidi’a (bidi’o’i); bid‘a; innovation (also, excessive ceremony ) birni (birane); madina; city biyayya; ta‘a; obedience ceto; ingadh; the act of intercession or rescue dabi’a (dabi’o’1); tabi‘a; moral behavior dahara, also tsarki; tahara; purification of the body with water dalili (dalilai); dalil (dal@il); proof dangi; nisba; extended family, or relation dan kasa (yan kasa); watani; son of the land or indigene, local person dan *uwa (*yan uwa); akh (al-ikhwan); brother, used in religious and familial sense daraja (darajoji); daraja; rank, value, respect. Also refers to the ranks within sufism. darika (darikoki); tariga (turuq); sufi brotherhood diwani (diwanoni); diw4n; a collection or anthology of books duniya; dunya; the world of man fa’ida (fa’idodi); fa’ida; benefit, useful information faida; faid; overflowing, i.e., a sufi term for the outpouring of love by God farilla (farillai); fard; obligatory act

farillan ainihi, also farlu aini; fard ‘ain; obligations on the individual (e.g. five daily prayers) farillan kifaya, also farlu kifaya; fard kifayah; obligations on the community fasaha (fasahohi), also fasihi (fasihai); fasaha; intelligence

fasiki (fasikai), also mai sabo (masu sabo); fasiq (fasiqiin); sinner. Fasiki is sometimes used in the more specific sense of an immoral act with women, while mai sabo is sometimes used in the broader sense of anyone who offends against the laws of God.

fata (fatu); jild; skin

Glossaries 425 fatwa; fatwa; legal decision or ruling; any proclamation of authority on a religious issue

fiddakai, also fid da kai; sadagat al-fitr; compulsory alms given at the end of

Ramadan to certain persons ,

fikihu; figh; legal principles embodied in qur’an and hadith (jurisprudence) fusadi; fasad; corrupt, spoiled, pagan, sometimes with connotation of adultery fuska (fuskoki); muqata‘a; district gaisuwa ( gaishe-gaishe); tahiyya; tribute or greeting garin haihuwa, or haifuwa, also mahaifa; watan; place of birth gaskiya; sidq; truth gausu (gausosi); ghawth (aghwath); spiritual leader of sufis gida (gidaje); bayt (buyit); house or household gyara (gyare-gyare); ghayyara; reform or change or repair hadimi (hadimai); khadim; servant of a mallam or an advanced pupil of a mallam hadisi (hadisai); hadith; utterances of the Prophet Muhammad hailala; tahlila; the phrase “there is no god but God” (1d ilaha illa Allah) hajj or haji; hajj; pilgrimage hakki (hakukuwa); haqq; state responsibility or due halifa (halifofi); khalifa; spiritual successor or caliph halwa; khalwa; solitude, or recess haraji; kharaj; common tax haram; haram; forbidden hatimwul auliya’a, also cika makin waliyyai; khatam al-awliya; seal of the saints hijira; hijra; flight hisabi; hisab; astrology, soothsaying, numerology hubbare; qubba; tomb huduba (hudubobi); khutba; sermon hukuma (hukumomi); hukim; government structure hululu, also hudud; hudid; (1) legal offenses in general and (2) a specific category of minor offenses idi; ‘td; a religious festival i1jma°i; ijma‘; consensus

iko; daula; power ilimi; ‘ilm; knowledge imam, also limam (limamai); imam; leader of prayer imani; Iman; faith iska (iskoki); masrubat rithiya; spirit istingifari; istighfar; seeking forgiveness iyali (iyalai); al-‘iyal; family or dependents Ja'izi; j@°1z; permissible behavior

jama’a; jama‘a; community jam’ iyya (jam*iyyoyi); jam‘iyat; group or party jan hankali; jadhb; attraction, sufi trance

426 Religion and Political Culture in Kano jasadi; jasadi; legal offenses of bodily harm

jihadi (jihadodi or jihadai); jihad; holy war jiziya; jizya; annual head tax paid by conquered non-Muslims jumma’a; al-jum‘a; Friday kabalu; qabd; praying with arms crossed kabila (kabilu); qabila; tribe kabilanci; kabili or qabiliyya; tribalism kaddara; qadar; fate or destiny kadi; qadi; judge kaffara; kaffara; atonement, or earthly punishment kafin alkalami; kaff al-qalam; gift given to mallam before he writes prayers kafirci; kafara; to engage in apostasy, or act like an infidel (kafircewa is the act of apostasy )

kafiri (kafirai); kafir (kafiriin); pagan ka’idar mulki, also shirin (or tsarin) mulkin kasa; dustir; constitution karama (karamomi); karama; religious power kari; quwwa; physical power kasa (kasashe); watan; land or country kishin kasa; wataniyya; nationalism kiyama; qiyadma; day of judgment kudra; qudra; omnipotence or might of God kulle; hijab; wife seclusion kur’ani; quran; Qur’an (Koran) kutub; qutb (aqtab); deputy kutubul maktum; al-qutb al-maktiim; secret deputy

lada; j@iza; gift to mallam after he has done prayers on behalf of a person (also, payment for any services) lahira; akhira; the next world lazimi; lazim; individual prayers in Tijaniyya linjila; injil; the New Testament of Jesus ma’aji; amin al-mal; treasurer madahu; madh; praise mahadi; mahdi; madhi or messiah who will herald the end of the age mai gudun duniya (masu gudun duniya); kha’if al-dunya; one who runs away from the world, 1.e., a sufi

mai unguwa (masu unguwa); ra’is al-jihha; ward head majalisa (majalisu); majlis; council majazubi; majdhiib; an advanced state of mysticism, a sufi state of trance makaru; makrih; discouraged or reprehensible behavior mala’ika (mala’iku); malaika; angel

mallam or malam (m), mallama or malama (f) (mallamai or malamai); mu‘allim; Islamic teacher

mandubi (mandubai); mandib; recommended behavior

Glossaries 427 marthiyya; marthiyya; elegy mauludi; mawlid; birthday mazahabi (mazahabobi); madhhab; Islamic legal school mudannabi; mudd al-nabi; units of food given to mallams at “id al-fitr

mufti, muhti, or mufuti (mufutai); muhallif (al-muhallifin); scribe to judge, or judicial assessor

mujaddadi (mujaddadai); mujaddid; reformer

mukaddami (m), mukaddama (f) (mukaddamai); muqaddam; initiator into a sufi brotherhood, local head

mulki; hukum (mulk); ruling, state munkiri (munkirai); munkir; doubter muridi; murid; disciple musulincin gaskiya; islam haqiqi; “true Islam” musulmi (musulmai); muslim (muslimiina); Muslim na ibi (na*ibai); na’ib al-imam; deputy imam nasara; nasr; success nasara (nasarai or nasaru); nasrani; Christian rahama; rahma, also shafa‘a; to go to paradise (also, compassion)

taka’a (raka’o’i); rak‘at; bending down during prayers, including the two prostrations

ranar sunan annabi, also takutaha; naming day of the Prophet ridda; ridda; to deny one’s faith, apostasy risala (risaloli); risala; message rukwu; ruki‘; bending down during prayers sabaru, also hakuri; sabr; patience sabo; dhawb; sin sadalu; sadal; praying with arms at side sadaka; sadaqat; alms sahabi (sahabai); sahib (ashab); companion sake ginawa, also sake ginin kasa; tajdid al-bina; reconstruction of a country salik; salik; a stage of communication with God, associated with sufism, sufi salla (salloli); salat (salawat); prayer sallama; sallama, also i‘tarafa; to submit or to follow sarauta (sarautu); sultan (sultantun); ruler, authority, power sarki (sarakuna or sarakai); amir, also sultan; ruler shahada; shahada; declaration of faith shari’a (shari’o’1); shari‘a; Islamic law sharif (sharifai); sharif; descent of the Prophet shehu (shehunai); shaykh; spiritual leader shugaba (shugabanni); q#id; leader siffa, also sifa (siffofin) ubangiji; sifat Allah; characteristic(s) of God silsila, also sarka (salasil); salasil, or silsilat al-ma‘rifa; chain or line of authority siyasa (siyasosi ); siyasa; politics, government

428 Religion and Political Culture in Kano sufantaka, also sufanci; tasawwuf; the practice of sufism sufi (sufaye); sifi; a mystic sunna (sunnoni); sunna; highly desirable acts tafsiri; tafsir; interpretation of the Qur’an tahazibi; tadhahib; offenses against the authority of the state taimama; tayammun; symbolic washing with dust, or sand talaka (talakawa); jumhir; common person tarbiyya; tarbiyya; training in religious matters (used in sufi literature to mean emotional training and discipline) tauhidi; tawhid; systematic theology tawili (tawiloli); tawil; reason or excuse ubangiji; al-lah; God unguwa (unguwanni, also unguwoyi); ghurfa; ward wajibi ( wajibai); wajib; compulsory behavior wakili (wakilai); wakil; representative wazifa; wazifa; group prayer in Tijaniyya (in traditional Tiyaniyya, done individually) waziri (wazirai); wazir; adviser to Muslim ruler wuridi (wuridai); wird; brotherhood ritual wusuli; wusul; arrival or rebirth, or union with God wutar lahira; jahannam; hell yaki (yake-yake); harb; war *°yancin talakawa; hurriya; freedom

zabura; zabir; the testament of David (psalms) zakka; zakat; alms zawiya; zawiya; a lodging house or religious center (lit. a “corner’’) zikiri; dhikr; ritual repetition of the name of God ziyara; Ziyara; visit (to a spiritual leader), money gift given during such a visit Zuhudu; zuhd; asceticism zuriya, also zuria; dhuriyya; descent group or offspring

Glossary 2 Hausa Muslim Names Mentioned in Text (with Arabic Equivalents)

The Hausa spelling of names is used for persons who have some contact or tdentfication with Kano. Arabic spelling is used for other persons with Muslim or Arab names. The following glossary lists alphabetically the Hausa Muslim names used in this volume and provides the Arabic equivalents. Increasingly, Hausa scholars are dropping the final “u” in their names, and in certain cases this practice has been followed in this book.

HAUSA ARABIC HAUSA ARABIC Abba Abi Abdussamadu ‘Abd al-Samad Abbas ‘Abbas Abu (see Zainabu)

Abdu (Audu) ‘Abdallah Abubakar Abu Bakr Abdulazizu ‘Abd al-“Aziz Adamu Adam Abdulkadir ‘Abd al-Qadir Adananu ‘Adnan Abdulkarimu ‘Abd al-Karim Ado (short form of

Abdullahi (Abdu) ‘Abdallah Adamu)

Abdulmajidu ‘Abd al-Majid Ahmadu Ahmad

Abdulmalik ‘Abd al-Malik A’isha ‘A’isha Abdulsalamu ‘Abd al-Salam Akilu ‘Aqil Abdulwahid ‘Abd al-Wahid Aliyu “Ali Abdurrahmanu ‘Abd al-Rahman Amina (f) Amina

430 Religion and Political Culture in Kano HAUSA ARABIC HAUSA ARABIC

Aminu (m) Amin Kabiru Kabir

Ashiru ‘Ashir Lamin (or Laminu) al-Amin

Audu (short form Lawal (or Lawan, al-Awwal

of Abdu) Lawwali)

Auwalu Awwal Mahmud (or Ma- Mahmid

Ayyuba ‘Ayyub muda)

Bashiru (Bashari) Bashir Makki Makki

(f) mud )

Bilkisu (or Bilki) — Bilqis Mamudu (Mah- Mahmid

Dahiru (or Tahir) Tahir Manu (Suleimanu, Sulayman

Dalhatu (or Tsal- Talha or Sule)

ha) Mudi (see MahDauda David miid)

Faruku Fariiq Muhammadu Muhammad Garba (short form Muhtari (Mutari) Mukhtar of Abubakar) Munir (or Muniru) al-Munir

Gali al-Ghali Musa Miisa Habiba (f) Habib Mustapha Mustafa

Habibu (m) Habib (Mustafa) Hadi Hadi Nasiru Nasir Hadiza (or Dije) Khadija Nuhu Nah (f) Nuru (or Nura) Nir Hafizu Hafiz Rabi’u Rabi‘u

Halidu (or Haladu) Khilid Rafa’1 Rifas Halilu Khalil Rakiya (£) Ruqayya Hamidu Hamid (or ‘Abd Sa’adu Sa‘d al-Hamid) Sadisu (or Sadi) al-Sadis Hannah al-Khanaf Saidu Sa‘id

Hashimu Hashim Salihi (Sale, Salihu) Salih

Hassan (or Hasan) Hasan Saminu Thamin Husaini (or Usaini) Husayn Sani Thani Ibrahim (orIbra- =‘ [brahim Sha’aibu (Sha’ibu, Shu‘aib

is Iro Sidi Sayyid and Biraima) Suleimanu (Sule,or Sulayman hima; short form Shi’aibu )

[liyasu Ilyas Suleiman, or Su-

Isa [sa laimanu) Isiyaku Ishaq Suyudi (or Siyudi) al-Suyiti

Ismaila Isma‘il Tijjani Tiani Jibirilu Jibril Umaru ‘Umar Jaafaru (or Jafaru) Ja‘afar Ujidudi (or Ujidu) Ujidud

Glossaries 431

HAUSA ARABIC HAUSA ARABIC Ummulkulthum (f) Umm Kulthim Yusufu (orIsuhu, Yiisuf

(or Katime) Yusi) Umulhairi (f) Umm al-Khair Yusha’a Yushi* Usumanu (Usman) ‘Uthman Zailani (Jailani) Jailani

Yahuza Yahudha Zainabu (Abu) Zainab

Yakubu Ya‘qub Zakari Zakar Yunusa (or Inusa) Yunus

Glossary 3 Kano Emirate Titles

Mentioned in Text

A title is normally given for life, although a titleholder may be deposed. A deposed titleholder may continue to be called by his title, with the qualifier tubabbe (“deposed”) added. The polite form in such cases would be to use the qualifier murabus (“retired”). Most of the titles had original meanings that are different from their meanings today. Thus, for example, the sarkin dawaki tsakar gida was the “chief of the horses in the middle of the [emir’s| compound,” and the barde was a general in the army. The etymologies of titles have not been included in this glossary. “Present office holder” refers to 1970. barde: A title that has alternated between Sullubawa and Yolawa. It is not associated with any particular district. The present titleholder is Sullubawa (a brother to the present emir, who appointed him) and is district head of Kura.

barde kerarriya: A Sullubawa title not in use in the twentieth century until the Sanusi period, when it was given to the brother of the emir, who was in the federal foreign service.

chiroma: A Sullubawa title, usually associated with the senior son of the emir. In the twentieth century it has been associated with the district headship of Bici. dallatu: A title imported from Zaria in the twentieth century. The first (and present) titleholder has been councillor of works, Kano Local Government Authority. dan amar: A Sullubawa title, usually a son or brother of the emir. It is not associated with any particular district.

Glossaries 433 dan buram: A Sullubawa title, usually given to the emir’s son or brother. It is not associated with any particular district. dan darman: A Sullubawa title, usually a senior son of the emir. The present titleholder, however, is Jobawa (a son of the former makama, who was demoted during the Sanusi period and sent to Ungogo). The present titleholder is district head of Wudil, his father’s district when he was makama. dan kadai: A Yolawa title, which has been associated from earliest times with the district headship of Tudun Wada. dan isa: A Sullubawa title, usually associated with a senior son or brother of the emir. It is not associated with any particular district. The present titleholder is councillor for social welfare and cooperatives in the Kano Local Government Authority.

dan iya: A Sullubawa title, usually associated with a senior son of the emir. In the twentieth century it has been associated (along with the title of chiroma) with

the district headship of Bici, although the present titleholder is councillor of forestry and natural resources, Kano Local Government Authority. dan lawan: Although the present madaki (Yolawa) was once dan lawan, the title is associated with the Sullabawa and usually is given to a brother of the emir. In the past the title has been associated with the district headship of Minyibir, although not necessarily. The present dan lawal is district head of Gezawa. dan maje: A Sullubawa title, usually given to a brother of the emir. It 1s not associated with any particular district. The present titleholder is district head of Minjibir. (He had been demoted during the Sanusi period and sent to Kumbotso.) dan makwayo: A Sullubawa title usually given to the emir’s brother. It has not been used since the death in 1968 of the titleholder who was district head of Gaya. (The title of sarkin gaya was restored at that time.) dan masani: A title given to a trusted person, who may or may not be from the royal family, and who in the past acted as spokesman for the emir. The present titleholder is Kano State commissioner of forestry, natural resources, and community development. dan tube: A Hausa title no longer in use. dokaji: A non-Sullubawa, nonkingmaker Fulani title, not associated with any particular district.

durbi: A title imported from Katsina. It is not associated with any district. The first (and present) titleholder was formerly Nigerian high commissioner to Pakistan and is at present a councillor without portfolio in Kano LGA. galadima: A pre-Fulani title taken over by the Sullubawa and usually reserved for a senior son or brother of the emir. The title has been associated with district headship of Dawakin Kudu. Muhammad Inuwa was galadima when he became emir in1963, and the title was not used until the period of Emir Ado Bayero. It was given to a brother of the emir, district head of Gwarzo. madaki: A Yolawa title of major importance. Present titleholder is responsible for all district heads.

434 Religion and Political Culture in Kano mai unguwar mundubawa: A local Fulani title associated with the district headship of Gezawa. The present titleholder is Kano State commissioner for health and social welfare.

makama: A Jobawa title, associated with the district headship of Wudil. During the period of Emir Sanusi the title was given to a Yolawa who later became district head of Dawakin Tofa. makaman gado da masu: A title given to a trusted person outside the royal family and not associated with any particular district. The present titleholder is district head of Waje. marafa: A title imported from Sokoto during the period of Emir Inuwa and given to the councillor of finance. mutawalli (matawalle): An imported title given to the councillor for social welfare during the period of Emir Sanusi. Since the death of the titleholder, the title has not been used.

sarkin bai: A Dambazawa title, formerly associated with the district headship of Dambatta or Babura and later just Dambatta. The present titleholder is Kano State commissioner for education. sarkin dawaki mai tuta: Most of the holders of this title have been nonroyal Sullubawa. The titleholder is usually a close personal and political friend of the emir. The title is associated with district headship of Gwarzo, although the present titleholder is district head of Kano City.

district. ,

sarkin dawakin tsakar gida: A Sullubawa title not associated with any particular sarkin dutse: The local Fulani district head of Dutse.

sarkin fada: A title given to a most trusted servant or follower of the emir, outside his own family. sarkin fulant jaidanawa: A Dambazawa title, usually associated with the district headship of Garki. sarkin gaya: The local Fulani district head of Gaya. The title was restored after the death of the dan makwayo in 1968.

sarkin karaye: The local Hausa district head of Karaye. sarkin kudu: The local Fulani district head of Birnin Kudu. sarkin rano: The local Fulani district head of Rano. In pre-jihad times, it was the youngest son of the Hausa emir. sarkin shanu: A pre-Fulani title mentioned in the Kano Chronicle. Later, a Yolawa title, not associated with any particular district and usually having some relationship to Kano City administration. The present titleholder is district head of Kiru.

sarkin yaki: In the nineteenth century, the emir’s councillor for war. In the twentieth century the title has been associated with Kano urban administration, usually education. There has been no replacement since the titleholder died in 1968. tafida: A Sullubawa title usually associated with the son of an emir. It has come to be associated with Ringim, mainly because the present titleholder has been district head of Ringim since the 1920s.

Glossaries 435 turaki: A pre-Fulani title, taken by the Sullubawa and usually given to a brother of the emir. It is not associated with any particular district, although in the past it has had connections with Kiru. The present titleholder is district head of Jahun. wambai: A Sullubawa title, usually a senior son of the emir. Formerly it was associated with district headship of Kura. The present titleholder is district head in Bici.

wali: A title created in the twentieth century as an alternative to waziri. During the Sanusi period, wali and waziri titles were both used, with the wali assisting the waziri in the judicial office. The wali was deposed in 1963, and the title has not been used since then.

waziri: Chief advisor to the emir on legal matters. In the twentieth century the title has come to be associated with non-Sullubawa nonkingmaker clans and was given to a legal expert who (until the 1967 reforms) was in charge of the emirate judicial system.

Bibliography

ABDULKADIR. Nar al-faid [The light of help]. Zaria: Gaskiya Corporation, 1961. ABDULLAHI DAN Fopro. “Bayan al-arkin wa’l-shurit li-tariq al-siiftya al-khalwatiya”

[Exposition of the fundamentals and conditions of the Khalwati brotherhood].

From the library of Umaru Faruk Ladan, Kano, n.d. | ——. Diy@ al-hukkam [The light for governors]. Zaria: Gaskiya Corporation, 1956 (originally written, a.v. 1805-08). Also published in Hausa as Liya’ul hukkami [The light for governors]. Zaria: Gaskiya Corporation, 1964. —— , “Diya? al-siyasat” [The light of politics]. Museum Library, Jos, 5a, j1279 (originally written, a.p. 1819-20).

——. Diy@ al-t@wil [The light of interpretation]. 4 vols. Cairo: Matba‘t alIstiqama, 1961. —_—. “Diya? al-umma” [The light of the community]. From the library of Umaru Faruk Ladan, Kano (originally written, a.p. 1811).

—— . Ida al-nusikh [Cancellation of the copies]. Zaria: Gaskiya Corporation, 1958.

—__—., “Sabil al-salama fl-imama” [The flawless way in the imamate]. From the library of Aminu Kano, Kano (originally written, a.p. 1816).

——. “Sabil al-najat” [Road of salvation]. From the library of Umaru Faruk Ladan, Kano, n.d. ABDULLAHI JIBRIL. “Jawab al-risala al-ghuriibiyya” [A reply to those who oppose saints]. From the author’s collection, Evanston, Ill, nd.

Bibliography 437 ABUBAKAR ATIKU. “Abyat raqiga fi tahni’at bin “Umar” [Delicate verses congratulating Bin ‘Umar on his arrival]. From the author’s collection, Evanston, Ill., 1948.

———. Al-faid al-hami [The protecting abundance]. Cairo: al-Muniriyya, 1956, printed for Alhaji Sahibu. ———. Al-fath al-niirani [The shining victory]. Cairo: Matba‘t Mustafa al-Babi al-Halabi and Sons, 1958.

——. Al-risdla al-mufida [The handy treatise]. Ibadan: Shukr Allah Press, 1962. —_—. Asl al-amani [The origin of hope]. Cairo: al-Muniriyya, 1956, printed for Muhammad Bala. —_——. Panat al-balid [ Assistance for the stupid]. Zaria: Gaskiya Corporation, 1965.

—_—. Ibrig al-faid [The jugful of profit]. Zaria: Gaskiya Corporation, 1963. —_—— , I fadat al-murid [ Advice to disciples]. Kano: Northern Maktabat Press, 196r.

——— . Ifadat al-mu‘taqidin [Advice to believers]. Ibadan, n.p., 1960, printed for Yan Baki, no. 1110, Ibadan. —_— . Inhaf al-azkiy@ | Weakening of the sinless]. Cairo: n.p., 1938.

—__—., “Irshad al-ahibba’” [Guidance for the beloved ones]. From the library of Abubakar Atiku, Kano, 1956.

———. ltikhaf alikhwan [A warning to the brethren]. Cairo: n.p., 1960, printed for Ahmadu Rafa’i. ———. Qatf al-thimar [Picking the fruit]. Cairo: n.p., 1946, printed for al-Zawiya al-Tijaniyya.

—_—. Risala fi tahdhir al-isaba [A warning against factionalism]. Kano: n.p., 1958.

—_——. Risalatu nash al-ahbab [A message of admonition to the brothers]. Kano: Native Authority Press, 1956. —_—. Sirat khatam al-awliy@ [Biography of the seal of the saints]. Abeokuta: al-Mubaraka, 1945 (original, 1938). (Also, Cairo: Matba‘t Mustafa al-Babi alHalabi and Sons, 1960.) ABUBAKAR DOKaJI [GipADO]. Kano ta Dabo Cigari [The Kano of Dabo Cigari] Zaria: Gaskiya Corporation, 1958.

———. Yaye duhun wahami na zuwa Makka [Clearing the darkness of sadness by going to Mecca]. Zaria: Gaskiya Corporation, n.d. ABUBAKAR MiyiNyAwA. “Anwar al-baraka” [The light of blessing]. From the library

of Abubakar Atiku, Kano, n.d. —_——. “Al-fuyiid al-Ahmadiyya” [The Muhammadan abundance]. From the library of Abubakar Atiku, Kano, 1940. —_———., Al-nafahat al-rahmantyya [Divine breezes]. Cairo: Matba‘t al-Sunniyya, n.d., printed for Shaykh Abdullahi Karim.

__——, “Nafahat al-qadir” [Celestial breezes]. From the library of Abubakar Atiku, Kano, n.d. ADAMU NA MA’AgI. “Fad@il al-Qadiriya” [Excellent things of the Qadiriyya|. From the author’s collection, Evanston, IIl., 1960.

438 | Religion and Political Culture in Kano AHMADU B. ABDURRAHMAN. “Kashf al-hijab” [Removal of the curtain]. From the

library of Abubakar Atiku, Kano, n.d. ——., “Targiyyat al-sulik wal wusil” [Advancements on the way and union with God]. From the library of Abubakar Atiku, Kano, n.d. ———., “Qasidat rawdat al-fawakih al-janniya” [Poem on the heavenly fruit orchard]. From the library of Abubakar Atiku, Kano, n.d. AHMAD B. ALI. “Ciwon kirji ga mai hassada” [A chestache to him who is envious |. From the library of Ahmad b. Ali, Kano, n.d.

—__—. “Fath al-salaém” [Victory of peace]. From the library of Ahmad b. Ali, Kano, n.d.

—__—. “Ilim al-ahbab” [A declaration to the brothers]. From the library of Ahmad b. Ali, Kano, 1950.

———., “Qad bada’tu” [I have begun]. From the library of Ahmad b. Ali, Kano, 1949.

—_—, “Ya Shaykh ya Kailani” [Oh Shaykh, oh Kailani]. From the library of Ahmad b. Ali, Kano, n.d. AHMAD B. SALIHU. I/tig@ al-liwad al-maknin [Encountering the banner of existence]. Ibadan: Shukr Allah Press, 1955. AHMADU BELLO. Rayuwata [My life]. Zaria: Gaskiya Corporation, 1964. AuMaD TIJANI Risdla [Treatise]. Kaolack: n.p., ca. 1963, printed for Ibrahim Niass. axitu B. ALIvU. Marthiyyat ustadhina Alhaji Abdullahi 6. al-Shaykh Muhammadu

Salga [Elegy for our master, Alhaji Abdullahi son of Shaykh Muhammadu Salga]. Zaria: Gaskiya Corporation, 1962. ALFA HASHIM AL-FoTI. “Hadiyat al-khalaf’ [A gift for descendants]. From the library of Abubakar Atiku, Kano, n.d. ALIvU B. ABDULLAH. “Irshad al-ikhwa4n [Spiritual advice to the brothers]. From the library of Muhammad Dan Amu, Kano, n.d. —_——. “Rad‘ al-jahla” [A hindrance to ignorance]. From the library of Ahmad b. Ali, Kano, n.d. auryu sist. Bughyat al-salikin [The hope of those seeking union with God]. Ibadan: Shukr Allah Press, n.d. AMINU KANO. Motsi ya fi zama [Motion is better than standing still]. Zaria: Gaskiya Corporation, 1955. _____, “Shawarwari tsakanin Nepu-Sawaba” [Consultations among Nepu-Sawaba ]. From the library of Aminu Kano, Kano, 1953.

———. Wakar yancin Nepu-Sawaba [Freedom poem of Nepu-Sawaba]. Kano: Comet Press, 1953.

Kano, 1943. |

——_—. “Yan tande” [Exploiters-colonialists]. From the library of Aminu Kano, ANON. (DISCIPLE OF USMAN DAN Fopio). “Diwan al-asnid” [Collection of chains of

authority]. From the author’s collection, Evanston, Ill, nd. anon. “Madhu annabi Muhammad” [Praise for the Prophet Muhammad]. From the author’s collection, Evanston, IIl., n.d.

Bibliography 439 ANON. Shamsiyyat al-ikhwan [Umbrella of the brothers]. Zaria: Gaskiya Corporation, ca. 1958. BARAU MADABO. Qasiddt al-Shaykh Muhammad Alhaji Sanusi [Poems for the Shaykh,

Muhammad Alhaji Sanusi]. Kano: Northern Maktabat Press, n.d., printed for Abubabar Husaini, no. 31, Dausayi Ward, Kano. DANDATAI MUHAMMAD. Ya tsere saa basu cimma sa ba [He cannot be rivaled by his

friends]. N.p. (ca. 1964), printed for Alhaji Isa Idris al-Qadiri. IBN BABA AL-ALAWI AL-MAGHRIBI AL-MALIKI AL-TIJANI. Munyat al-murid [Hopes of

the disciple]. Kano: Oluseyi Press, n.d. (also, Zaria, Gaskiya Corporation, printed for Abdullahi Yassar and his partner Suleiman b. Usman, of Kano). iN BADIS. “Al-nafahat al-qudsiyya” [Divine breezes]. From the author’s collection, Evanston, IIL., n.d. IBRAHIM DABO. Kaff alakhwan [Abstention of the brothers]. Kano: Native Author-

ity Press, ca. 1955, IRBAHIM MAKWaRARI. Begen Shehu Abdulkadir [Praising Shaykh Abdulkadir]. Kano: Northern Maktabat Press, 1968. IBRAHIM NIASS. Arba‘u gas@id [Four poems]. Kano: Northern Maktabat Press, 1964.

———. Al-faid al-Ahmadi [The abundance of Ahmad (Tijani)]. Kano: Northern Maktabat Press, 1964, printed for Sani na Maidamara, Kano. ——. ljabat al-fatwa [A reply to the decree]. Kano: Northern Maktabat Press, 1964, printed for Alhaji Muhammad dan Gwaggo of Kano. ———. Kashf al-ilbis [Removal of the clothing]. Cairo: Matba‘t Mustafa al-Babi al-Halabi and Sons, 1931 (2d ed. 1961). ——. Khutba jaliyya [A bright sermon]. Lagos: Times Press, 1960, printed for Mahmud b. Muhammad Salga, Kano. ——. Majmii thalath ajwiba [A compendium of three answers]. Cairo: Matba‘t al-Mashhad al-Husaini, ca. 1954, printed for Ibrahim Babala b. Alhaji Nagulu. ———. Majmi gas@id al-mawlid al-Nabawi [Seven poems for the birthday of the Prophet]. Kano: Northern Maktabat Press, 2d ed. 1964. ——. Magqamat al-din al-thalatha [The three stages of religion]. N.p., n.d., printed for Isa Fari Abubakar Dandibi, p.o. 3262, Kumasi, Ghana. ———., Nass al-kalima [Text of address]. Zaria: Gaskiya Corporation, 1962, printed for Alhaji Baban Kabo Sanka, Kano. ——.. Raf‘ al-mu‘allim [The raising of the teacher]. Cairo: Matba‘t al-Mashhad alHusaini, n.d. ——. Rihlat Hijaziyya wa rihlat Kanawiyya [Journey to the Hijaz and to Kano]. Kano: Native Authority Press, 1960. —_—. “Tawsiyat al-ahbab” [ Advice to the brothers]. From the author’s collection, Evanston, IIl., 1955. iHAQ. “Dal#il al-mahdi” [Evidences of the Mahdi]. From the author’s collection, Evanston, IIl., 1941. ISMAIL B. SAYYAD MUHAMMAD SAD ‘ABD AL-QADIR. Al-fuydd al-rabbantya [Divine

440 Religion and Political Culture in Kano benefits] and Al-gasidat al-khamriya [Wine poem]. Cairo: Matba‘t Mustafa alBabi al-Halabi and Sons, n.d. LAWAN DANBAZAU. Muryar Kano [The voice of Kano]. Kano: Comet Press, Ltd. 1964.

LIMAM BALARABE. Madh Ibrahim [Praise of Ibrahim]. From the author’s collection, Evanston, IIl., n.d. MUDI SIPIKIN. Furen kanshi [A sweet-smelling flower]. Kano: Northern Maktabat Press, 1968. MUHAMMAD B. ‘ABD AL-KARIM AL-MAGHILI. “Risalat al-muluk” [Message to kings].

Kaduna, Nigerian Archives, no. 9069. MUHAMMAD AL-MIN B. AL-IMAM ‘UMAR MALIK AL-FOTI. “Tanbih al-ikhwan” [Warn-

ing to the brothers]. From the library of Abubakar Atiku, Kano, n.d. MUHAMMAD AMINU. “Faid al-qadir” [The divine abundance]. Federal Museum, Jos, no. 51, n.d. MUHAMMAD BELLO. “Ifadat al-ikhwan” [Information for the brothers]. From the author’s collection, Evanston, Ill. (originally written, a.p. 1835). ———. “Raf* al-ishtibah” [Removal of doubt]. From the library of Umaru Faruk Ladan, Kano (originally written, a.p. 1835).

——. “Tahgiq al-muribin” [Confirmation for the doubtful]. From the library of Abubakar Atiku, Kano, n.d. MUHAMMAD HapDI. “Risdla” [Message]. From the author’s collection, Evanston, IIl.,

14th of Muharram, a.H. 1367 (1947); scribe, Muhammad al-Khamis b. Shu‘aib al-Kanawi al-Tijani. MUHAMMAD INUWA. Marthiyyat al-shaykh Salga [Elegy for Shaykh Salga]. Kano: Oluseyi Press, n.d. MUHAMMAD MAJDHUB MUDATHTHIR. Ta’rikh al-shaykh Alfa Hashim al-Futi |'The

history of Shaykh Alfa Hashim al-Futi]. Khartoum: Matba‘t Mindil, 1932. MUHAMMA~D MijinyAwa. Kashf al-ghumma [Removal of sorrow]. Kano: Northern Maktabat Press, 1963. MUHAMMAD AL-NAZIFI. “Yaqitat al-farida” [The matchless sapphire]. From the lbrary of Abubakar Atiku, Kano, n.d. Also, Kano: Oluseyi Press, n.d.; and Kano: Native Authority Press, n.d., printed for Abdullahi Salga. MUHAMMAD RAJI B. ‘ALI. “Risala” [Treatise]. From the library of Abubakar Atiku,

Kano, n.d., scribe, Ahmad b. al-Hasain b. Ibrahim b. Abubakar. Also, Paris: Bibliothéque Nationale, arabe 5716, f. 66. MUHAMMa~D SsALGA. Al-swal wa@'l-jawab [Questions and Answers] Zaria: Gaskiya Corporation, 1958. NASIRU KABARA. Al-nafahat al-nasiriyya [The breezes of Nasiru]. Zaria: Gaskiya

Corporation, n.d. (writing completed 1957). ———. Al-qasidat al-mubaraka [The blessed poem]. Kano: Adebola Press, n.d. (ca. 1964). —_— . Da‘wat al-ghawth [The call of the spiritual leader]. Cairo, n.p., 1951. Also,

Bibliography 44] Kano: Northern Maktabat Press, 1964, printed for Shaykh dan Lagas, Box 46, Kano. ——. Ithaf al-khala@iq [ A warning to all creatures]. Cairo: n.p., 1948. ———. Manzimat kifayat al-Nabi [Poems on the capabilities of the Prophet]. Zaria: Gaskiya Corporation, 1969.

———. Manztimat li-asma al-Nabi [Poems on the names of the Prophet]. Kano: Northern Maktabat Press, 1968. ———. Naf‘ al-ibad [An aid to God’s servants]. Kano: Native Authority Press, TQ55-

———. Subhat al-anwar [Morning of light]. Kano: Native Authority Press, n.d. NASIRU KABARA (ED.) (SELECTIONS FROM MUHAMMAD BELLO). Al-sila al-miftahi [A

key to genealogy]. Kano: Adebola Printing Press, ca. 1965. swAD zuNGUR. Wakokin S@adu Zungur [The poems of Sa’adu Zungur]. Zaria: Gaskiya Corporation, n.d. SAID B. HAYATU. Sahih al-khabr [Honest news]. Khartoum: n.p., 1957. TIJJANI UsMAN. “Al-nasa@ih al-murshida” [Sincere and correct advice]. From the author’s collection, Evanston, Ill., n.d. UMAR FALKE. “Al-rihla al-Falkiyya” [The journey of Falke]. From the author’s collection, Evanston, Ill., 1948.

——. “Asm4‘ nisbati fil-‘ilm wa’l-tariqa” [My chains of authority in religious knowledge and brotherhood]. From the author’s collection, Evanston, Ill, 1938. ——.. “F@idat al-ishriina ayat” [The benefit of the twenty Qur’anic verses]. From the author’s collection, Evanston, IIl., n.d. UMAR FUTI. Rimah hizb al-rahim [The spears of the blessed party]. Cairo: Matba‘t Mustafa al-Babi al-Halabi and Sons, 1963 (originally written, A.p. 1845). UMARU TRADER AND ALHAJI HASSAN NA ALHAJI ALI BAKIN zUwo (Eps.). Diwan [Col-

lection]. Zaria: Gaskiya Corporation, n.d. USMAN (DISCIPLE OF SHEHU ABDULKADIR). “Ya alla kai mana gafara” [May God forgive us]. From the author’s collection, Evanston, IIl., n.d. USMAN DAN Fopio. “Bay4dn al-bid‘” [Explanation of undesirable innovations]. From the author’s collection, Evanston, IIl., n.d.

———. Ihy@ al-Sunna [Revival of the Sunna]. Cairo: Matba‘t al-Mashhad alHusaini, 1957 (original, 1817). ——. Littattafai uku a hade [Three books combined]. Zaria: Gaskiya Corporation, 1964.

——., “Sawq al-siddiqin” [The mobilization of the truthful]. From the library of Umaru Faruk Ladan, Kano, n.d. —_— .. Usa] al-wilaya [Origins of sainthood]. Zaria: Gaskiya Corporation, 1964. WALI UMARU. Mablagh al-amani [Scope of safety]. Kano: Native Authority Press, 1959, printed for Muhammad Bello, disciple of Shaykh al-Hadi, and his partner Alhaji Uba Myinyawa, Kano. YAHAYA B, SALIH AL-Kapiri. “Khawass al-asrar” [Special secrets]. From the author’s collection, Evanston, IIl., n.d.

442 Religion and Political Culture in Kano YAHUZA 8B. SA‘D. “Al-qasida al-mimiyya al-Ibrahimiyya” [Poem ending in m for Ibrahim]. From the author’s collection, Evanston, IIl., 1947. ———. “Matlab al-khillani fi fiqh ahkam wird al-Tijani” [The khillanian quest con-

cerning the understanding of the Tijani way]. From the author’s collection, Evanston, Ill., 1955.

——. Tabshir al-ihhwan [Good news to the brothers]. Zaria: Norla, 1949.

Name Index

The following index of names has been alphabetized by given name in the case of Muslims (following the practice in Kano) and by surname in other cases. A Muslim surname that is important to the identification of an individual appears with a cross reference to the given name. Because of its optional use in many Hausa names (for example, Ahmadu, Muhammadu, Umaru), the sufhix “u” has been disregarded in the alphabetization. Diacritical marks have been similarly disregarded. Arab names using the prefix “al-” have been alphabetized under the element following this particle. In cases where a person is known by several names, the alternative forms, more complete name, or variant spelling is given in brackets.

Abba Maikwaru, 273, 294, 298 Abdulkadir Jailani [SAbd al-Qadir Jilanil],

Abba Sa’id [Hayatu], 170 68, 128, 165, 166, 181

Abbas (emir) [Muhammad], 54, 73, 80 n, Abjara [Alhaji], 174 82-83, 87, 169, 236, 243, 251, 255, 387. See Abdullahi Barja (emir), 243

also Subject Index, Abbas (emir) [Mu- Abdullahi Bayero (emir), 69, 82 n, 83, 94,

hammad | 98, 107 n, III-I2, 152, 176, 193, 201,

Abbas Sanusi, 118, 234, 235, 348 232-33, 235, 236, 248, 258-59, 287, 323, “Abd al-‘Aziz bu-Talib, 97, 98 374, 375, 377, 387. See also Subject Index,

“Abd al-Wahhab al-Ahmar, 98 Abdullahi Bayero (emir)

‘Abd al-Wahib Ujidud (shaykh), 82-83, 84, Abdullahi dan Fodio, 66, 147, 166, 214-21,

87, 137 227, 298, 299, 390

Abdulkadir [Zaria], 122 Abdullahi Maje Karofi (emir), 174, 236, 249,

Abdulkadir (dan iya), 250 253, 261, 265, 329

Abdulkadir, Sidi. See Sidi Abdulkadir Abdullahi Niass (father of Ibrahim), 95, 96, Abdulkadir Abubakar Koguna, 121, 343 n, 98

348, 419 Abdullahi Niass (son of Ibrahim), 115, 123

444 , Name Index Abdullahi Salga, go, ror, 102, 103, 114, 116 Ahmadu Shehu, 79, 80, 84, 197

Abdullahi Suka [Thiqa], 148, 161 Ahmad b. Salihu [Sharif Ahmad; Ahmad Abdurrahman, Mulli. See Mulli Abdurrah- al-Anwar], 114, 126, 130, 142, 194

man Ahmad b. Sidi Muhammad, 111

Abdurrahman al-Sayudi, 156 Ahmad Tijani, 66, 68, 74, 82 n, 88 n, 89 n, Abubakar Atiku, 77, 82 n, 85, 88, 89, 89 n, 97, 98, tor n, 108, 109 nN, 125, 129, 135, QIN, 99-100, 109 N, 113, 114, 116, 125 nN, 137, 139, 192 131, 135, 136, 139, 143, 144, 200, 201, 209, Ahmadu Trader, 299, 305, 312, 331 N, 343 0,

227 N 359, 360, 419, 421

Abubakar Bashir Wali, 274, 341 A?isha (wife of the Prophet), 290-91 Abubakar dan Suleiman Mai Jaki, 174 ‘A’isha b. Khadija, 100 Abubakar Dokaji [Abubakar Gidado; Abu- Ake, Claude, 8 bakar Waziril, 45, 46, 62 n, 227 n, 228, Akilu Aliyu, 294

259, 269 n, 308, 343 n, 349, 420 Akintola, S. L., 331 n, 321 Abubakar Gummi, 131, 183, 184, 200, 208 al-‘Alami, 87-89, 95

Abubakar Mai Cirimbi, 249 al-Alawi, 88 n

Abubakar Maisajen Jamus, 228 n Alfa Hashim, 74, 81, 84-87, 100, 106, 117 n, Abubakar Mijinyawa, 85, 89, 90, 100 n, 103, 139 N, 197

103 nN, 116, 139 N, 194 Alfa Nuhu, 85 Abubakar Musa, 100 n Alhassan Dantata, 27 Abubakar el-Nafaty, 184, 185, 208, 209 n Ali Musa, 151-52, 161, 163

Abubakar Sanusi, 233, 234, 237, 349 Ali Siyala, 151, 153, 154 Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, 181, 276 Ali al-Tamasini, 98, 137

Abubakar Usman, 232-33 Ali al-Tayyib (shaykh), 85

Abu al-Hassan as-Sammani, 149 Aliyu ( emir), 53, 54, 68, 168-69, 227, 234,

Abun-Nasr, Jamil, 108 n 236, 237, 251, 253, 256, 261, 264-66, 271, Adamu, Na’ibi. See Na’ibi Adamu 329, 374, 3755 3775 387

Adamu na Ma?’aji, 153, 154, 164 Aliyu dan Sidi, 75 Ado Bayero (emir), 89 n, 117, 118, 205, 210, Aliyu Sisi, 115, 123, 196

234-37, 270, 271, 309, 331 , 333, 343 n, Aliyu b. Usman, 80 345-59, 377. See also Subject Index, Ado Allah Barsarki, 62 n

Bayero (emir) Almond, Gabriel, 1 n, 5 n, 10 n

Ado Sanusi, 114, 118, 209, 234, 235, 266, Alwali (emir), 241, 242 n

267 n, 268, 270, 310, 389 Aminu Bayero, 233, 235, 310

Ahmad Abdullahi, 98 Aminu Dantata, 129 n, 323, 324, 358, 417

Ahmad b. Abdurrahman, 86 Aminu Kano, 25, 113 n, 141, 182, 205, 207, Ahmad Ahi, 152, 155; 162, 163, 164-65, 194 210, 233, 274-305, 309, 312, 330, 339, 351;

Ahmadu Aminu [Modibbo], 121 355, 356, 363, 366, 360-77, 385, 389, 390,

Ahmadu Bello (sardauna), 69, 119, 144, 394, 412, 414-15. See also Subject Index, 146-47, 170, 180-89, 267, 325, 374, 375; Aminu Kano 389, 415. See also Subject Index, Ahmadu Aminu Sanusi, 234, 235, 348

Bello [Sardauna] Apter, David, 10 n Ahmad Gabari, 87 Asode [Alkali], 148

81 Audi Howeidy, 417

Ahmadu Madaniyo [Modani], 74, 79, 80 n, Attahiru (sultan), 53, 54, 55

Ahmadu Mahmud, 84 Audu Bako, 337, 339, 344 0, 417

Ahmadu Mai Kwatashi, 310 Awolowo, Obafemi, 310 n Ahmadu Metteden, 259

Ahmad na Barde, 87 Baba Danbappa, 394, 410, 417

Ahmadu Niass, 123 Baba Nabegu, 324

Ahmadu Rafa’i [al-Fasalati], 149, 162 Babacar Diasse, 123

Ahmadu Rufa’i [Daura], 268, 411 Bako, Audu. See Audu Bako

Name Index 445 Bala [Alhaji], 152 Falke, Umar. See Umar Falke Barau Madabo, 118 n Faruk Salga, 113, 114, 116, 141, 209 Barbushe, 45, 46 Fati b. Gharballa (shaykh), 149

Bashiru [Alhaji Sarkin Bai], 51 n Futi, Umar. See Umar Futt Bashiru (sarkin tijaniyya), 79-80, 81 Fye. See Muhammad Fye [Muhammad Bayero. See Abdullahi Bayero; Ado Bay- Kabir Fye]; Umar Fye (shaykh) ero; Aminu Bayero; Ibrahim Cigari Bay-

ero; Mahmud Bayero; Yusuf Bayero Galadanci. See Kabir Galadanci; Sani Gal-

Bayi (shaykh), 149 adanci; Shehu Galadanci

Behrman, Lucy, 97 n Garba [Sharif], 151, 152, 155, 163

Bellah, Robert, 8, 11 Garba Sa’id [Hayatu], 170

Bello, Ahmadu (sardauna). See Ahmadu al-Ghali, Muhammad. See Muhammad al-

Bello (sardauna) Ghali

Bello Dandago (sarkin dawaki mai tuta), al-Ghali bu-Talib [Sayyid], 98 266 n, 308, 310, 331 n, 343 n, 349, 369 Ghulam Ahmad, 207

Bello Kano, 276, 308, 310, 348, 419 Gidado, Muhammad [Waziri]. See Mu-

Bello Minjibir, 331 hammad Gidado [Waziri] Bello, Muhammad (emir), See Muham- Goshi (imam), 51 n mad Bello (emir) Gowon, Yakubu, 363 Bello, Muhammad (sultan). See Muham- Greenberg, Joseph, 47

mad Bello (sultan) Gummi, Abubakar, See Abubakar Gummi

Bello Zubair [Alhaji], 51 n

Binji, Haliru. See Haliru Binji Haddiri (sarkin fulani), 240 Bin Umar (shaykh), 108-9 Hadi, Muhammad. See Muhammad Hadi

Buba, Michael Audu, 180 Hadir (father of Abubakar Atiku), 100 n

Hadiza (mother of Wali Suleiman), 83 n Haliru Binji, 187 n

Coleman, James S., 8, 10 n Hashim Abbas, 233

Hashim, Alfa. See Alfa Hashim

Dabo Dambazau. See Muhammad Dabo [1assan Gwarzo, 205

Dambazau Hassan Kafanga, 87

Dabo, Ibrahim (emir). See Ibrahim Dabo Hassan Kosashe, 296-97 _

(emir) Harazim, Muhammad Ali, See Muham-

Dalhatu (imam), 104, 194, 203, 227 n, 228 mad Ali Harazim Danbappa, Baba. See Baba Danbappa Haruna Kassim, 310, 332, 358 Dan Amu, Muhammad. See Muhammad Hayatu. See Abba Said [Hayatu]; Garba

Dan Amu Said [Hayatu]; Said b. Hayatu

Dan Fodio, See Usman dan Fodio; Abdul. Hayatu b. Sa’id, 169, 170, 173-76, 178

lahi dan Fodio Husaini Adamu, 185

Dan Guri (emir), 242 n Husaini Sufi, 83 n, 108

Dantata. See Alhassan Dantata; Aminu Dan-

tata; Mahmud Dantata; Sanusi Dantata Ibn Abi Zayd al-Qayrawani, 61

Dan Tunku, 240 Ibn “Asim, 63

Deutsch, Karl, 4 Ibrahim (babban mallami), 104

Dikko (emir), 83 Ibr ahim (dan iya), 250

Dokaji, Abubakar Gidado. See Abubakar !brahim (madaki), 267 n Dokaji [Abubakar Gidado; Abubakar [brahim Cigari Bayero, 235, 348

Waziri] Ibrahim Dabo (emir, 49 n, 51, 66, 67, 100 n, 234, 230, 242 N, 374, 377, 387

Ibrahim Diop, 123

Eisenstadt, S. N., ron Ibrahim Imam, 310 n Emerson, Rupert, 13 Ibrahim al-Khalil, 86

446 Name Index Ibrahim Mai Riga Fata, 87 Kuper, Leo, 334

Ibrahim Musa Gashash, 266 n, 310, 330, Kwairanga (imam), 50n

343 Nn, 420 Kwairanga (sarkin bai), 51 n

Ibrahim na Kabara, 156, 161, 163, 196 Kwan, K. M., 4, II

Ibrahim Niass (shaykh), 69, 73, 81, 84, 90, 94-104, 107, 109-13, 117-18, 123 n, 126- Lawan Danbazau, 273 29, 131-33, 135-36, 138-40, 144-45, 148, LeVine, Robert, 5 n 173, 182-83, 193-96, 205, 209, 259, 310, Levtzion, Nehemia, 70 n 312, 389, 390, 392. See also Subject Index, Limam yar Musa, 174

Ibrahim Niass (shaykh) Lugard, F. D. (Sir), 54 n, 61 n

Ibrahim Niass Nwagul, 120 n, 353

Ibrahim Umar [Alhaji], 48 n Madaniyo, Ahmadu. See Ahmadu Mad-

Ibrahim Usman, 49 n aniyo [Modani|]

Ilyasu Katsina, 121 Magaji Dambatta, 273

Imam Abubakar, 51 n al-Maghili, Muhammad. See Muhammad

Inuwa (of Sokoto), 152 al-Maghili

Inuwa Galadanci, 228 n Mahmud Bayero, 309, 410 Inuwa, Muhammad (emir). See Muham- Mahmud Dangogo, 113

mad Inuwa (emir) Mahmud Dantata, 113, 312

Inuwa Wada, 308, 331 n, 343 n, 348, 358, Mahmud Kabara, 156

369, 420 Maihula, Shehu. See Shehu Usman Maihula

Inuwa Wudilawa, 228 n Maigari [Limam], 50 n

Ironsi, Aguyi- (general), 205, 333, 334 Maitama Sule [Yusufu Maitama Sule],

Isa [Sidi Fari], 52 207, 210, 273, 309, 310, 331 n, 348, 369, Isa Wali, 274, 277-78, 290-91, 295, 298, 374 411, 417

Isa Warure, 75, 80, 82 n Mamadu Abdul N’Diaye, 123, 129 Isma?il (father of Wali Suleiman), 83 n Mamadu Diallo (shaykh), 95 Isma’ila (sucessor to Tijjani Usman), Mamman Mai Ruwa, 248

210 n Mandikko, 240-41 Iya [Alhajiya], 138 M?Baye Niass, 115, 122 Michie, C. W., 74

Jaafaru [Alkali], 276 Mijinyawa, Abubakar. See Abubakar MiJa’afaru (emir of Zaria), 122, 132, 202, 323 jinyawa

Jalli [Wali], 51 Miller, Walter, 278 n, 285-87 Jammo (mai tuta), 241 Morland (captain), 54

Jibrella [Mallam], 55 n Mudi Salga, 89, go, 114, 116, 119, 125 n, 140

Jibril b. Umar, 148, 223 n, 206, 209

Jibrin (Yolawa patriarch), 239 Mudi Sipikin, 128, 273, 294 Junaidu (waziri of Sokoto), 183, 184, 186, Muffett, D. J. M., 267

198, 328 MuhammaduMuhammadu (dan isa), 250 (sultan), 234

Kabara, Nasiru. See Nasiru Kabara Muhammadu (Sarkin Ayagi), 357

Kabir Galadanci, 51 n, 205 Muhammad (tafida), 248

fanga [Muhammad]

Kafanga, Muhammad Sani. See Sani Kae Muhammad Abbas. See Abbas (emir)

Kano, Aminu. See Aminu Kano Muhammad Abu al-Nadr, 98

Kashim Ibrahim (Sir), 269 Muhammad Ahmad b. Sayyid Abdullahi,

Khadija b. Muhammad, 89 n, too 169

Koguna, Abdulkadir. See Abdulkadir Muhammad Ali Harazim, 98, 100

Abubakar Koguna Muhammad Bakatsine, 240 Kohn, Hans, 13 Muhammad Bello (emir), 51, 174, 236, 261

Name Index 447 Muhammad Bello (sultan), 49, 66, 67, 76- Muhammad Uba Adamu, 418 79, 81, 131, 166, 167, 170, 171, 174, 178, Muhammadu Usman, 232-33, 234, 235, 237, 186, 192, 215-21. See also Subject Index, 249, 349

Muhammad Bello (sultan) Muhtar A. Bello Yola, 323

Muhammad bu-Talib, 97 Muhtari [Adanan; Muhammad Muhtari Muhammad Dabo Dambazau, 51, 239-40 Sarkin Bai], 348, 369, 410, 417, 419

Muhammad Dahiru, 110 Mukhtar al-Sagir, 148

Muhammad Dan Amu, 75 n, 104, 112, 194, Mulli Abdurrahman, 87

202, 205, 228, 262, 274 Mumar Niass, 95

Muhammad Dangogo, 87 Munir, Muhammad. See Muhammad Munir Muhammad Fye [Muhammad Kabir Fye], Musa [Jalubawa], 242

115, 123 Musa lliyasu, 343 n, 420

Muhammad al-Ghali, 74, ro1 n, 110, 137 Musa Mai Risala, 99 n Muhammad Ghali b. Umar (sarkin tiyjan-

iyya), 80, 81 Nababa Badamasi, 129 n

116, 227 n Nafety

Muhammad Gidado (waziri), 62 n, 89 n, el-Nafaty, Abubakar. See Abubakar el-

129 Na’ibi Shehu, 228 n

Muhammad Hadi, 104, 107, 115, 119, 124, Na ibi Adamu, 83, 227 n Muhammad Inuwa (emir), 117, 203, 228 n, Naibi Wali, 186, 205, 208

233, 236, 269-71, 375 Na?iya [Mallam], 75 n

Muhammad Kane, 103 Nasiru Kabara, 61, 69, 82 n, 110, I1I, 136, Muhammadu Kumbari, 243 143-44, 149, I5I-52, 155, 156-58, 161, Muhammad al-Kunti, 148 162, 164-67, 184 n, 185, 192-94, 196, 201, Muhammad Lawal, 49 n 204, 205, 227 n, 228 n, 287, 290, 309, 343 Muhammad al-Maghili, 19, 52, 61 n, 213- n, 353, 389, 392, 304, 420. See also Sub-

17 ject Index, Nasiru Kabara

Muhammad Muhtari (sarkin bai). See al-Nazifi, Muhammad. See Muhammad al-

Muhtari Adanan; Muhammad Muhtari Nazifi

Sarkin Bai Niang [Shehu], 123

Muhammad Munir, 114, 130, 140 n, 269 n Niass. See Abdullahi Niass (father of

Muhammad Mustafa, 49 n Ibrahim); Abdullahi Niass (son of Ibra-

Muhammad Nasiru Kabara. See Nasiru him); Ahmadu Niass; Ibrahim Naiss;

Kabara M’Baye Niass, Muhammad Niass; Mu-

Muhammad al-Nazifi, 83 mar Niass; Tijani Niass Muhammad Niass, 97 n Nuhu dan Mustafa [Alhaji], 50 n

Muhammad Raji b. Ali, 77, 78 n Nuru Tall [Sayid], 81, 82 n, 94, 188 n

Muhammad Rumfa (emir), 51, 213

Muhammad Salga, 83, 86-87, 99-104, 194, Obeka, Abutu, 180

197, 227 n Ogbadu, Daniel, 180

Muhammad Sani (imam) 103 n, 227 n Ogbumanu, Atoshi, 180 Muhammad Sani Kafanga. See. Sani Ka- Ojukwu, Odumegwu, 333 fanga

Muhammad Sanusi (emir), 69, 105, 110- Palmer, H.R., 30, 47, 48, 66 n, 175, 230, 243, IQ, 124, 130, 132, 145, 182-83, 188, 194, 254) 255-56, 261, 285 201, 203, 209, 219, 227, 233, 235, 236, 260, Parsons, Talcott, 4, 8, 9 266-72, 310, 313, 327, 330, 374, 376; 377; 385, 387, 389, 390. See also Subject Index, Rabih, 53, 175

Muhammad Sanusi (emir) Raji, Muhammad. See Muhammad Raji b.

Muhammad b. Shehu [Sharif], 87 Ali

Muhammad Sidi, 151-54, 157, 162, 194 Reuke, Ludger, 47

448 Name Index Ringim, Uba. See Uba Ringim Sidi Abdulkadir, 75

Rosberg, Carl G., 8 Sidi Khalil, 61

Rufa’i Mahmud, 206 n Sidi Muhammad, 151, 152, 155, 162, 163 Rumfa, Muhammad. See Muhammad Simmel, Georg, 13

Rumfa (emir) Sipikin. See Mudi Sipikin; Thani Sipikin

Ruxton, F. H., 61 n, 217 Sisi, Aliyu. See Aliyu Sisi Sklar, Richard, 308 n

Saad b. Ahmad (shaykh), 150, 151, 152, Smith, M. G., 75 n, 334

153, 161, 162, 163 Sukayraj [Shaykh], 89, 95, 97, 98 Sa’adu b. Dahiru, 87 n Sule Gaya, 266 n, 268, 349 Saad Zungur, 274, 277, 282-84, 292-94, Suleiman (emir), 49 n, 50, 60, 226, 231, 236,

296-98, 374 240, 374, 377, 387, 389

Sadiq Zukogi, 413 Suleiman Nadoji, 241

Said (imam of Wudilawa), 51 n Suleiman, Wali. See Wali Suleiman

Sa’id Banupe, 87 Sword, Captain, 55 Sa’id b. Hayatu, 170, 175-79, 184 n, 194, Sy [Malik], 94 196

ae fot: ai Manyal, 2 3 Taieb Sefinai, 95

Seni Ona dunce «tn an), 24 Tall, Nuru [Sayid]. See Nuru Tall [Sayid]

Sani Ganuwa 6 ? Tamasini, Ali. See Ali al-Tamasini Sani Gezawa, 269 n, 348, 369, 417, 419 aanke Yakasal, 273» 331 Ds ae Sani Kafanga [Muhammad], 103, 106, 114, Tac S ‘1G 2 252 79> 239 24

116, 141, 184 n, 205, 209, 210 Thiesierno puss 129 Diop, 124 2

Sani Yakubu, 112, 124 Tierno Ahmadu, 95

Salga. See Abdullahi Salga; Faruk Salga; Tijani, Ahmad. Sec Ahmad Tijani

Mudi Salga; Muhammad Salga Tiiani Niass. I1€. 110. 122. D0. 2

, ; . ijjani Usman, 89 n, 99, 101-2, 106, 107,

Sanusi. See Abbas Sanusi; Abubakar San- Ti ; » ETD» TED» 1235 129) 209 usi; Ado Sanusi; Aminu Sanusi; Muham-

113, 114, 116, 119, 125, 130, 141, 184 n,

mad Sanusi (emir) 185, 194, 196, 204, 205, 209, 298 n

Sanusi Dantata, 157, 205, 206, 358, 420 > ae 992 204s 205) 2095 29% 343 Ds Saturu (daughter of Muhammad Bello), Tillich, Paul, g

79s 51 ; Trevallion, B, A. W., 18 n

Sayyid al-Tayyib, 98 Trimingham, J. S., 7

Sharif Ahmad. See Ahmad b. Salihu 5,1... (emir) iMamman] 526. 2eK. 261

[Sharif Ahmad; Ahmad al-Anwar] 66. 271 > 230s 259s Sharif Garba. See Garba [Sharif] »77 Shehu (imam of Dambazawa), 51 n

Shehu Ahmad (madaki), 266 n, 269 n, Uba Ringim, 129 n, 359

308, 343 n, 419 Ujidud. See ‘Abd al-Wahib Ujidud (shaykh)

Shehu Galadanci, 51 n, 184 n, 205 Umaru [Alkali], 117, 228 n, 268

Shehu Kazaure, 268 Umar (babban mallami), 48 n Shehu Muhammad, 48 n Umaru (galadima), 250

Shehu Niang, 115 Umar Bashiru, 274

Shehu Umar, 48 n, 76 - Umar Falke, 99, 101-2, 106, 114, 116, 127, Shehu Umar Touré [Umar Touré], 123 130, 142 Shehu Usman Maihula, 89 n, 102-3, 114, Umar Faruk Ladan, 208

116, 140, 141, 184 n, 209 Umar Futi, 66, 68, 73, 74-79, 81, 82, 84, 86,

Shehu Waziri, 227 n, 228 93-95, 103, 136, 178, 192, 193, 196. See

Shettima Ajirai, 276 n also Subject Index, Umar Futi Shibutani, Tomatsu, 4, 11 Umar Fye (shaykh), 111

Name Index 449 Umaru Gumel, 356, 410, 417 Weber, Max, 12

Umaru Sanda, 174 Whittlesey, D., 15 n Umar (imam of Dambazawa), 51 n

Umaru (madaki, Dawakin Tofa), 239 Yahuza b. Sa‘d, 122, 202 Umaru (patriarch, Jobawa clan), 240 Yakubu, Sani. See Sani Yakubu

Usman (emir), 232, 235, 236, 375 Yahaya Gusau, 276 n Usman dan Fodio, 66, 68, 68 n, 69, 77, 83 Yaro [Alhaji], 75 n n, 99 n, 131, 136, 147, 149, 161, 166, 169, | Yusufu (emir), 261-66, 329, 375, 376 170, 174, 177-78, 180-82, 186, 192, 196, Yusuf Bayero, 323

215, 222-23, 231, 241, 254, 298, 389 Yusufu Maitama Sule. See Maitama Sule

Usman (wambai), 249 [Yusufu Maitama Sule]

Verba, Sidney, 5 n Zakari Yau, 249

Zubair (emir of Yola), 53, 174-75

Wali Suleiman, 82 n, 83-84, 98, 107, 112, Zukogi, Sadiq. See Sadiq Zukogi 116, 139 N, 149, 193, 194, 276, 298, 369 Zungur, Sa’ad. See Sa’ad Zungur

Subject Index

Abagayawa people, 45, 46 relations of, with brotherhood leaders, Abdullahi Bayero (emir), 82, 107 n, 152, 205; and restatement of emirship legit176, 193, 232-33, 235-36, 248, 287, 323, imacy, 345-54; selection of, as emir, 234-

374, 375, 377, 387; affiliation of, with 37 Reformed ‘Tijaniyya, 69, 83, 201; and AG (Action Group), 310 n, 311, 321-22, consolidation of Kano mallam class, r11- 360 12; pilgrimage of, 258-59; relationship Agadasawa ward, 19, 50 of, with Ibrahim Niass, 94, 98, 111, 259 Agatawa clan, 246, 251

Abdullahi Bayero College, 51 n, 64, 72, Agege, 149 204, 205, 206, 208, 356, 365, 369 Ahl al-Bayt, 68, 148, 149, 156

Abdullahi Bayero Mosque, 205 Ahmadiyya, 207, 314, 358

Abeokuta, 149 Ahmadu Bello (sardauna), 69, 119, 144, Adahama clan, 75 146-47, 170, 325, 374, 375, 380, 415;

Adamawa Province, 104; as center for claims to spiritual authority by, 186-87; Umarian Tijaniyya, 82; association of, conversion campaigns of, 187-88; idenwith Mahdiyya, 194; Hayatu in, 174-75; tification of, with Usmaniyya, 180-87; Qur’anic and ilm schools in, 59, 60; Re and international Islam, 183, 188-89; formed Tianiyya in, 120, 121; religious rivalry of, with Muhammad Sanusi, 267

affiliation of, 44 Ahmadu Bello University, 64, 206, 208, 341

Administration. See Fulani: administrative Akwa ward, 151 class; Kano Emirate, administration of; Alfindiki ward, 151 Kano State, administration of; Reform: Amana (contract), concept of, 224

administrative, of 1968 Aminu Kano, 25, 113 n, 141, 182, 207, 210, Ado Bayero (emir), 89 n, 117, 118, 210, 233, 274-305, 309, 312, 330, 330, 351, 355; 270, 271, 309, 331 N, 333, 343 0, 3773 356, 363, 366, 384, 390, 304, 412, 414-15; development of the office of emir under, background and early training of, 274347-59; and international Islam, 352-53; 76; relations of, with Ibrahim Niass, 182,

452 Subject Index Aminu Kano (continued) legitimation of; Authority, deposition 205, 312; tafsir by, 298-305; views of, on from; Emir, office of; Imamship colonialism, 278-86, 290; views of, on Ayagi ward, 357

Nigerian nationalism, 369-72 “Ayn Madi, 124, 136n

Angels, 64, 93 n Azare, 117, 269

Anniya. See Intention, doctrines of al-Azhar University, 123 Apa National Congress, 326

Arabs, in Kano, 19, 52, 70, 150, 159 Ba’awi clan, 148

Arab League, 145 Babban mallami, office of, 48, 74, 229

Arab World, links between northern Ni- Babura District, 243, 245, 250, 408, 420 geria and, 145, 152, 157, 256-57. See also Babura Town, 249

Kano links with Muslim world Bagauda, 46

Arabic language, 50, 139-40, 141, 187 Bakin Kasuwa area, 82

Arewa district (Kano City), 20 Bakin Ruwa ward, Ig, 20, 60, 89, 89 n, 101 Argungu, 121, 185, 188, 199-200 n, 106, 127 n, 137, 139, 140, 142, 398-404 Arosiyya, 148, 149, 151, 152, 162 Barewa Old Boys Association, 363

Astrology, 100 n Bauchi Discussion Circle, 277

Authority, concepts of, 6-7, 11, 388-90; Bauchi Province, 14, 44, 59, 60, 75, 296-97 articulated by Sa’ad Zungur, 282-84; in Bauchi Provincial Secondary School, 276 classical Islamic theory, 214-21, 373; in Bayero, See Abdullahi Bayero (emir); Ado Hausa society, 35-36; in Kano Emirate, Bayero (emir) 213-26; in Mahdiyya doctrine, 169-79; Benue Province, 44, 59, 60 in Reformed Qadiriyya, 160-69; in Re- Bici District, 51 n, 113, 239, 243, 246, 250,

formed Tijaniyya, 135-37; in rural 354, 419 Fulani society, 32-34; in Salgawa doc Bidi’a. See Innovation trine, 92. See also Authority, deposition Birnin Kudu district, 23, 238, 240, 242, 247, from; Authority, legitimation of; Au- 250, 342, 405, 408, 419

thority, sucession to Blacksmith cult, 45, 46, 95

Authority, crises of, 260-72, 385-86. See Blessing (baraka), 137, 138 also Civil war, Kano; Colonial conquest; Bort, 47

Jihad Bornu Province, 14, 44, 45, 53, 59, 60, 74,

Authority, deposition from, 6, 220-21, 375, 152, 175, 194 376; of Muhammad Sanusi, 111-17, 119, | British community in Kano, 359 182, 188, 203, 219 n, 260, 266-72, 329, Brotherhoods, 52, 67-70, 79-82, 90-91, 121, 376, 385. See also Authority, succession to 147-48; colonial policy toward, 169, 17I-

Authority, legitimation of, 4-5, 141, 221, 73, 175, 179, 198; ethnic integration 278-82; in brotherhoods, 190-92; in within, 192-94; determination of legitKano Emirate, 271-72, 345-54, 376. See imacy in, 190-91; relations between, 143also Authority, deposition from; Au- 44, 197-202; geographic factors related to, thority, succession to; Charisma; Elec- 194-96; patterns of dynastic succession tions; Reform, concepts of; Silsila in, 196-97; relationships within branches

(chain of authority) of, 197-98, 202-3; succession to authority

Authority, structures of, 284-85, 384, 388- within, 91-97. See also names of 1in90, 397; in Kano Emirate, 226-38, 373; dividual brotherhoods in party politics, 307; in Qadiriyya, 52, Burmi, Battle of, 55-56, 78-80, 84, 86, 103 147, 159-60; in reformed brotherhoods, Burumburum, 241 204; in Reformed Tijaniyya, 104-20 Authority, succession to, 6, 219, 221, 265- Caliphate, concept of, 217, 376 66, 270, 375; in brotherhoods, 192-96; Cedi ward, 50 dynastic, 196-97, 216-17; electoral, 307- | Cediya section, 19 13, 410-11; patterns of, 232-35, 270, 375, | Cediyar Kuda ward, 152 388-90, 394, 407-8. See also Authority, Charisma, 6, 11, 271, 377

Subject Index 453 Chiranci ward, 83 n cation in, 139-42; process of, 197; reliCigari section, 19 206-7, 282, 36-37, 293, 378, 392. See also Christianity, 9, 12, 13, 53, 44, 314 gion as a basis of, 11-13, 71, 113, 141-42,

Civil war, Kano, 49, 50, 57, 231, 253, 261- Differentiation; Community identity;

66, 271, 381, 384-85, 386 Nationalism; Northernization; Plural-

Civil war, Nigerian, 206, 350, 352, 354, ism, ethnic; Reform

355-56, 366-68, 381, 384 Community identity, 378; in Kano, 113, Clerical class. See Imamship; Mallam class 354-66, 383-84, 390; growth of national, Colonial conquest, 49, 53-54, 265, 381, 385, 366-72. See also Community, concepts of;

386 Community, ethnic

Colonial period, 53-56, 326; attitudes to- Conversion, sardauna’s campaigns of, 183,

ward the Mahdist movement during, 187-88. See also Initiation, doctrines of 171-73, 175; attitudes toward Qadiriyya Cosmology, Reformed Tijaniyya doctrines during, 147-48; attitudes toward Tijan- concerning, 134-35 iyya during, 79, 121, 179, 198; British Council of Advisers, Kano Emirate, 229 rule in Kano Province during, 232-33; Council of Mallams, 200, 228 French policy in Zinder during, 79, 175; Coups: January 1966, 307, 332, 333; July relations between Kano and Sokoto dur- counter-coup 1966, 307, 334 ing, 254-56, 260, 265; tensions between Culture, definition and expression of, 2-3 British and emir during, 230, 231 n. See

also Colonial policy Dabi District, 249 Colonial policy, Aminu Kano’s views on, Dala Hill, 20, 45, 46, 270, 297 278-82, 285, 290; of indirect rule, 230- Dambatta District, 51 n, 113, 240, 246, 342, 31, 271, 283-85, 316; in relation to Kano 405, 419 succession process, 234-37; of sponsored Dambazawa clan, 20, 22, 51, 51 n, 231, migration to the north, 315, 334; toward 239-40, 241, 244-46, 248, 251, 355, 407 Middle East and Muslim Africa, 256-58 Dambazawa Mosque, 50-51

Committee for the Publication of Jihad Dandalin Turawa ward [Dandali], 104,

Manuscripts, 186 150, I51, 152

Community, concepts of: in classical Islamic Danejawa clan, 246, 251

theory, 221~23; in Kano Emirate, 213- Danguguwa area, 50 n 26, 238-51, 271-72, 378; in Mahdiyya Darma ward, 19, 50 doctrine, 169-79; in Reformed Qadiriyya, Daura Emirate, 254 159, 160-69; in Reformed Tijaniyya, Dawakin Kudu District, 243, 246, 248, 250, 137-45. See also Community identity 354, 408, 419 Community, crises of, 281-85, 334-36. See Dawakin Tofa District, 239, 241, 246, 419 also Civil war, Kano; Colonial conquest; Dawanu area, 50n

Coups, Jihad; Riots, Sabon Gari Deposition. See Authority, deposition from Community, ethnic, 7-9, 37, 378, 392, 394- Deputyship, concept of, 136, 137, 218, 220,

95; Hausa orientations toward, 36-39; 373-74

Fulani orientations toward, 39-40; gov- Differentiation, of political and_ religious ernment policies with regard to, 363-66; subsystems, 3-4, 9-13, 221-23, 387, 391, in Kano, 317, 354; and occupational 392, 396, 397. See also Political culture specialization, 23-25; and religion, 9, Direct communication, doctrines of, 165-

180. See also Pluralism, ethnic 66, 191

Community formation, as a dimension of District system. See Kano Emirate adminpolitical culture, 7-8; attempts at, through istration of Usmaniyya, 180, 182, 189; initiation as Doctrine, definition of, 2

doctrine of, go-91; integration in, 6, 11- Drumming (bandiri), 150, 158, 165 , 13, 71, 366-72, 391-97; internal and ex- Dukurawa clan, 19 ternal factors of, in Kano, 378-81, 383- Durbawa clan, 244, 251 84, 391-92; function of literacy and edu- Durumin Kaka area, IOI n

454 | | Subject Index Durumin Iya ward, 274 Gabas district (Kano City), 20

Dutsawa clan, 245-47, 251 Gabasawa District, 23, 244, 248, 408, 420 Dutse District, 23, 238, 240, 242-43, 247, Galadanci Mosque, 50, 51

405, 409, 419 Galadanci ward, 51

Garki District, 245, 250, 355, 420

Economic development. See Kano economy Gausu, concept of, 135-36 Education, Islamic, 58-60, 64, 102 n, 103 n, Gaya District, 23, 37, 62 nm, 113, 240, 242, 140-42; Western, 319-20; of women, 138, 243, 247, 264, 355, 410

278. See also Arabic language; Hausa General Purposes Committee (GPC), 343 language; Literacy; and names of indi- Gezawa District, 244, 248, 419

vidual schools Gombe Emirate, 120

Elections: 1951 federal, 308; 1954 federal, Government. See Authority, concepts of; 308-9, 410; 1959 federal, 310; 1964 fed- Authority, structures of; Kano Emirate, eral, 113 n, 182, 188, 311-13, 330-31; 1956 administration of; Kano State, adminis-

regional, 309; 1961 regional, 310; 1958 tration of Kano City Council, 309; 1956-60 Waje, Greater Kano Planning Authority, 360

316-17 Groundnuts, effect of, on Kano economy,

Emir, office of, 226-29; Administrative 27-29

functions of, 243-50, 344, 374; effects of Gumel Emirate, 15, 53, 342, 418 1968 reforms on, 344, 347, 349-51; devel- Gusau, 120, 121 opment of, under Ado Bayero, 347-48, Gwagwarwa, 18-19, 313, 314 351-54; patterns of succession to, 232-35, | Gwale ward, 157 238, 261-66, 270, 375; religious functions Gwammaya ward, 274, 359 of, 202, 209-10, 347; restatement of legiti- Gwaram District, 244, 250, 408, 419

macy of, 377; selection of, 231-32, 235-37, . Gwaram Town, 250 , 254. See also Kingmaker Council Gwarzo District, 113, 241, 247, 342, 354, 419

Emirship. See Emir, office of Gwauron Dama section, 19

Ethnicity. See Community, ethnic; Com- Gwauron Dutse, 19, 46 munity formation, processes of; Fulani; Gyanawa clan, 57, 83 n, 138, 244, 251, 274,

Hausa; Hausa-Fulani; Pluralism, ethnic 342

Fagge, 71, 313, 314, 360 Habe. See Hausa

Fagwalawa District, 250 Hadejia Emirate, 15, 53, 74, 79, 80, 110, 251,

Faith, declaration of, 64n; in reformed 342, 418

Tijaniyya doctrine, 130-31 Halla Halla Mosque, 150-51

Fate, 64 n, 133 Hausa: ethnicity, 22, 35, 49 n, 355, 378, 380; Fez, Tijani zawiya at, 95, 98, 108 n, 1109, areas of settlement of, in Kano City, 20;

123, 124 nationalism, concepts of, 37-38; orienta-

Fika Emirate, 175 tions of, toward community, 36-39; oriFive-Year Development Plan (Kano), 26 entations of, toward authority, 35-36;

Flagbearers, 231, 239, 240, 241 participation of, in political life, 355; preFulani: administrative class, 23, 25, 32, 220, colonial relations of, with the Fulani, 22238-51, 354-55 (see also Fulani clans); 23. See also Hausa-Fulani identity; Hausa-

mosques, 50-51; orientations toward au- Ibo relations; Hausa language; Hausathority, 32-35; orientations toward com- Yoruba relations munal identity, 39-40; people, 22-23, 32; | Hausa-Fulani identity, 22, 354, 355, 365, relations of, with the Hausa, 22-23 (see 379. See also Hausa language

also Fulani language; Jihad Hausa-Ibo relations, 356-57, 365-66, 384

Fulani clans, 19, 22, 50-51, 229, 238-51, Hausa language, 22, 38, 50, 140, 205-6, 355, 354-55. See also names of individual clans 362, 365, 378; literature in, 141, 166, 187,

Fulani language, 31 n, 40, 49-50, 355 278

Subject Index 455 Hausawa Mosque, 49 lamic law; Reform: Islamic; and the foiHausawa ward, 49 lowing doctrines: Amana (contract), conHausa-Yoruba relations, 357-58, 365-66, 379 cept of; Blessing (baraka); Deputyship, concept of; Direct communication, doc-

Ibadan, 29, 149 trines of; Faith, declaration of; Fate;

Ibo, 22, 314; reintegration of, into Kano, Gausu, concept of; Initiation, doctrines 356-57, 363-64; relations of, with Hausa, of; Innovation, concepts of; Intention, 356-57, 365-66. See also Hausa-Ibo rela- doctrines of; Jihad, concept of; Khalwa tions; Kano, economy of; Sabon Gari (solitude); Paradise; Pilgrimage; Salva-

Ibo Union, 320, 359 tion; Tarbiyya (religious training); TaIbrahim Niass (shaykh), 69, 73, 81, 90, 94- waye (rebellion)

104, 107, 117-18, 148, 173, 182-83, 193- Islamic brotherhoods. See Brotherhoods 96, 209, 310, 389, 390, 392; accession of, Islamic education. See Education, Islamic

to the caliphate, 97-98; authority of, in Islamic law, 64, 126 n, 326-29; and alkalai Kano, 84, 97-104, 107, 123 n; as gausu, system, 62-63; application of, in Kano 135-36, 137; identification of, with inter- State, 326-29, 341-42; impact of, on renational Islam, 144-45; as leader of West formed brotherhoods, 203-4; structures African Tijaniyya, 94, 97, 123 n; mar- of, 61-65. See also Maliki law; Shari?a riages of, 113; as master of arts of protec- law tion, 128-29; personal travel of, to Ni- Islamic reform. See Reform: Islamic geria, 104, 109-113, 118, 182, 205; pil- Islamiyya Senior Primary School, 157 grimages of, 109-112, 259; praise literature of, 127, 128-29, 136-37; as reformer, Ja’awa clan, 83 99, 136, 137; relationship of, to Aminu Jahun District, 23, 244, 408, 419 Kano, 185, 205, 312; relationships of, to Jahunawa clan, 22 emirs of Kano, 94, 98, 111, 112, 117, 259; _Jalli Mosque, 50, 51

relationship of, to Sardauna of Sokoto, Jama?atu Nasril Islam (Society for the Vic183; spiritual lines of authority of, 95, 97, tory of Islam), 147, 183-84, 205, 208-9,

98, 135, 137; views of, on education, 210, 352

140; views of, on faith, 131; views of, Jihad, concept of, 221, 222-25, 379 on innovation, 131 n, 132-33; views of, Jihad, 45, 49, 70-71, 83 n, 99, 99 n, 146, 242,

on literacy, 139-40; views of, on prayer 380, 381, 384-85; leadership of, 22, 68, with arms crossed, 126; views of, on 70 n, 82, 167, 177-78; literature of, 160-

status of women, 138-39 63, 186-87, 214, 215-25, 294, 386; QadiIdeology, definition and expression of, 2-3 riyya identification with, 147, 167

Ilm schools. See Education, Islamic Jingau ward, 19, 150, 151 Horin Province, 29, 44, 59, 60, 149 Jobawa clan, 20, 51, 231, 239, 240-41, 246-

Imamship, 48-51, 217-20, 227, 373-74 47, 251 Independence Constitution, 306-7 Jos, 120, 152 n, 319

Indirect rule. See Colonial policy of indi-

rect rule Kabara ward, 63, 75, 100 n, 156

Indorawa clan, 251 Kaduna, 29, 32, 59, 60, 120, 194

Industry, in Kano. See, Kano economy, in- Kaduna Council of Mallams, 152, 183, 184-

dustrial development in 85

Initiation, doctrines of, 90-91, 138 Kaduna College, 276. See also Katsina Col-

Innovation, concepts of, 131-33 lege Intention, doctrines of, 133 Kafanga area, 103

Institute of International Affairs, 189 Kankarofi ward, 228 n Intercession, doctrines of, 67 n, 135 Kano, Advanced Teachers College, 207, 341 Islam, 9, 13, 43-44, 51 n, 65. See also Kano Airport, 28-29, 206, 366 Brotherhoods; Education, Islamic; _Is- Kano, Aminu. See Aminu Kano

456 , Subject Index Kano City, administrative structure of, 1g- Kano Peoples Party (KPP), 182, 270-71,

20, 251, 419, 421; as center of Hausa 297, 330-31 language and culture, 362; characteris Kano Province. See Kano State tics of residential sectors of, 19-20, 193- Kano Provincial Secondary School, 334. See 94, 314; demographic characteristics of, also Kano State Secondary School 18-22; history of, 45-56; income distribu- Kano School for Arabic Studies, 63-64, 277, tion in, 25-26; market, 317; as a religious 333. See also Kano Law School center, 29, 43, 63, 99, 103-4, 129, 141, 145, Kano-Sokoto relations, 35, 252-56, 260, 267,

174-75, 206, 271, 362 (see also Kano 271, 329, 332, 362, 379 links with Muslim world); as an urban Kano State, administration of, 339-40, 342, center, 14, 15, 18-19. See also Kano, econ- 374, 377, 385, 418; community formation

omy of; Kano Emirate; Kano State in, 204, 354, 357-60, 365, 366-68, 379; Kano civil war. See Civil war, Kano demographic characteristics of, 14-18,

Kano Chronicle, 47, 243 n 361; development projects in, 29, 360-61; Kano economy: employment patterns in, as Islamic center, 43, 44, 59, 60, 69, 204317-20; growth of, 25-28, 318-19, 361; 10; judiciary in, 326-29, 341-42; nationalindustrial development in, 27, 318-19, ism, 361-62, 381 (see also Kano State 358-59; interethnic competition in, 317- Movement [KSM]); national orientations 21; 333-36, 358; land ownership in, 320- within, 366-72; transition to, 14-15, 30621; structure of, 27-29, 317-25, 335, 361. 37; transportation network in, 28-31, See See also Lagos; Transportation systems also Kano economy Kano Emirate, administration of, 226-38, Kano State Civil Service, 340 243-50, 266-67, 269, 342-44; structure of, Kano State Movement (KSM), 35, 253, 271, 238-51; demographic characteristics of, 307, 319, 312, 329-33, 412-15 15, 22; district system in, 228-29, 238-51, | Kano State Public Service Commission, 340 342, 344 (see also names of individual Kano State Secondary School, 207. See also

districts); doctrines of authority and Kano Provincial Secondary School community in, 213-26, 221-72, 345-54, Kano State Rehabilitation and Reconstruc386; emergency of identity of, 113, 251- tion Committee, 356 60, 354-66, 379-80, 383-84, 390; involve. Kano urban area (Kano Metropolitan ment of, in World War II, 259-60; Local Area), administration of, 345, 360; demo-

Government Authority (LGA) in, 342- graphic characteristics of, 18-19, 317; 43, 351; legal system in, 326-29; Native ethnic pluralism in, 317-36, 356-58, 360 Authority (NA) in, 26, 151, 266, 269; re- (see also Kano economy, interethnic form movements in, 273, 294; reformula- competition in); Twenty-Year Plan for, tion of legitimacy of, 345-54, 386; title- 320, 321. See also Fagge; Gwagwarwa; holders in, 348-49, 432-35. See also Kano Kano City; Sabon Gari; Township

State, administration of Kaolack, 84, 94, 95, 97, 101, 106, 108; as Kano Emirate Council, 343 international center for Reformed TyaKano Labor Exchange, 318 niyya, 97-101, 106-9; Hausa community Kano-Lagos railway, 28 at, 112, 124; relations of, with Kano, 104, Kano Law School, 63. See also Kano School Ig

for Arabic Studies (SAS) Karaye District, 113, 241, 247, 250, 419

Kano links with Muslim world, 29, 85, 89, Katsina City, 14, 15-18, 28, 62 n, 75, 86, 100, 103, 104, 108, 141, 144-45, 157, 188- 120, 152 89, 256, 258-60, 390. See also Arab world, Katsina College, 276, 363. See also Barewa

links between northern Nigeria and; Old Boys Association ‘Ayn Madi; Fez, Tijani zawiya at; Kao- Katsina Province, 59, 60, 113, 255

lack; Pilgrimage; Zawiyas Kazaure Emirate, 15, 342, 379, 418 Kano Metropolitan Council, 345 Khalwa (solitude), 66 n, 92-94, 156 Kano Metropolitan Development Board, 364 Kingmaker Council, 229, 237, 307, 375

Kano Middle School, 276-77 Kinship, 7, 375; in Fulani concepts of com-

Subject Index 457 munal identity, 39-40; in Fulani orienta- Mahdi, the, 55 n, 68, 85, 146, 169, 176; tions toward authority, 34; in Hausa coming of, 171-73, 178-79, 190. See also concepts of communal identity, 35-37; Mahdiyya in northern political integration, 325-26. Mahdiyya, 55, 68, 70, 75, 82, 85, 146, 169-

See also Authority, succession to 79, 193; leadership structure of, 170, 177, Kiru District, 245, 249, 355, 408, 419 191; link of, to brotherhoods, 178-79;

Kiru Town, 249 link of, to Jihadi leadership, 177-78; sig-

Kofar Mata ward, 63, 176 nificance of, in Kano history, 169-71. See

Kofar Wambai ward, 75 also Mahdi, the; Name Index Hayatu b. Koki ward, 75, 87, 206 Said; Name Index, Saib b. Hayatu Kudu district (Kano City), 20 Maiduguri, 28, 121

Kumbotso District, 51 n, 63, 243, 245, 248, Makama, office of, 51, 229, 240, 419, 434

355, 408, 421 Makama section, 19

Kuntiyya, 69, 148-49, 156 Makwarari ward, 151 Kunya District, 248 Maliki law, 61-62, 131. See also Islamic law Kura District, 22, 243, 245, 248, 408, 419 Mallam class, 52, 56, 63, 103, 106; functions

Kura Town, 249 of, 124-30, 158-60, 221; in Kano, 56-61; Kurawa clan, 19, 247, 251 linkages between Hausa and Fulani, 94Kurawa ward, 83 n 104; organization of, through Kaduna Kutub. See Deputyship, concept of Council, 184-85; relationship of, to po-

litical authority, 13, 57, 262-66; realign-

Lafiya, 120 ment of, to Reformed Tianiyya, 82-90;

Lagos, 32, 29, 149, 368 size of, in northern Nigeria, 58-60; Land ownership, 320-21 women in, 138. See also Education,

Lebanese community in Kano, 26, 27, 313, Islamic; Imamship; Tijaniyya, Reformed,

318, 323, 358-59, 365 leadership of

of Mamman Zara, 274

Legitimation. See Authority, legitimation Mallawa clan, 75 Literacy, 183, 139-41, 165, 183. See also Ed- Méasina, 53

ucation; Literature Middle belt, 325-26

Literature, in Arabic, 141, 187; anticolonial, Minjibir District, 243, 246, 248, 408, 419 171; effect of printing on distribution of, Misau, 79 140-41; of the Jihad, 186, 215-26, 294, Modernization, 71, 131, 352, 384

386; in library of Umar Falke, 102 n; of | Mujaddadi. See Reformer, concept of political reform, 276-77, 295-97; of Muhammad Bello (sultan), 49, 66, 67, 81, Qadiriyya brotherhood, 161-69; of Re- 131, 166, 167, 170, I7I, 174, 178, 186, formed Tijaniyya, 139-40; of religious 192; question of brotherhood initiation doctrines in Hausa, 117. See also Arabic of, 76-79; writings of, 215-21 language; Hausa language; Praise poetry Muhammad Sanusi (emir), 105, 117, 130, Local Government Authority (LGA). See 132, 145, 194, 209, 227, 233, 235, 236, 310, Kano Emirate, Local Government Au- 313, 327, 330, 374, 377, 387, 389, 390;

thority (LGA) in, deposition of, 111-17, 119, 182, 183, 188,

Lokoja, 53 203, 219 n, 260, 266-72, 329, 376, 385; deposition of, as crisis of emirship legitt-

Ma’aji, office of, 229 macy, 266; deposition of, and formation

MacPherson National Constitutions, 306-7 of KPP, 270; deposition of, and Muffett Madabo ward, 19, 20, 48 n, 63, 75, 86 n Commission, 267-68; deposition of, and

Madabo Mosque, 48 suspension of government officials, 266, Madaki, office of, 50 n, 229, 239, 406, 419, 268; deposition of, and proposed reorgan-

433 ization of Kano NA, 269 (see also Au-

Magajin mallam, office of, 49, 49 n thority, deposition from); as leader of

Maguzawa, 37, 46, 47, 48 Reformed Tijaniyya, 69, 111-13, 124, 201;

458 Subject Index Muhammad Sanusi (emir) (continued) Northern Marketing Board, 28 political authority of, in relation to reli- Northern Muslim Congress, 141 gious authority, 111, 112 n; rivalry of, Northern Nigerian Development Corpora-

with Ahmadu Bello, 267 tion, 118

MukAtasar, 61, 86, 156 Northern Teachers’ Welfare Association, Mundubawa clan, 22, 102, 244, 251 276 Muslim Lecturers and Administrative Staff NPC (Northern Peoples Congress), 180,

(association ), 208, 210 226 n, 284, 294, 307, 317, 331, 360, 410 Muslim Students’ Society of Nigeria, 206- Nufawa section, 19

8, 210, 352 Nural Islam, 187

Muslim unity, international, 352-53 (see

igeria, 206-10 . tae es

also Kano links with Muslim world); in Obligations of Princes, The, 213-17 |

Muslim World League, 145 Occupations, specialization in, 23-25, 317-

Mysticism. See SufismOluseyi 20 Press, 141

Na’ibi, office of, 227-28 ,

Nasiru Kabara, 61, 69, 82 n, I10, III, 149, Panel of Jurists, 327 155» 162, 184 n, 185, 192-04, 196, 204, Paradise, 67 n 227 n, 228, 287, 290, 309, 343 0, 353, 389, Party system in northern Nigeria, 308-13. 3925 394, 420; and consolidation of Qadi- See also names of individual parties riyya authority, 151-52; involvement of, Pilgrimage, 28 n, 29, 145, 258-59. See also in government, 157, 201, 205; relations Ibrahim Niass, pilgramages of; Kano Airof, with Tijaniyya, 143-44; sources of au- port thority of, 136, 161; writings of, 164-67 pjateau Province, 44, 59, 60 Nationalism, 8, 13, 37-38; Kano, 160, 329- Pluralism, ethic, 7, 22, 58, 317, 354, 381,

33, 359, 361-66, 391, 395, 397 (see also 236 Kano State Movement [KSM]); Ni- political culture, authority dimension of, gerian, 295, 359, 366-72; northern, 322- — 3888: community dimension of, 38829 (see also Northernization, policy of) 90; concept of, 1-14; in Islamic state 214Native Authority (NA). See Kano Emirate, 26. See also Authority, concepts of; Au-

Native Authority (NA) in thority, structures of; Community, con-

Native Authority Press, 140-41 cepts of, in classical Islamic theory; Com-

Native Courts Law, 326-27 munity formation, as a dimension of poNative Courts Proclamation, 326 litical culture NCNC (National Council of Nigeria and praise poetry, 109 n, 117 n, 127, 128-29,

Cameroons), 277, 283, 317, 360 136-37, 163, 166

NEPU (Northern Elements Progressive prayers, g1-92, 127 n, 131, 150, 158, 159 n, Union), 113 n, 198, 219, 222 n, 226 a, 164, 303-5; with arms crossed, 109, 126, 237, 271, 276, 277, 287, 295-97, 307-13, 379, 185-86, 200-201

| 317, 331, 332, 360. See also Sawaba Predestination. See Fate Niass. See Ibrahim Niass - Prophet, the, 38, 64, 85, 95, 131, 137, 181, Nigerian army, 367-68. See also Civil war, 191; birthday of, 124-25, 129, 134; place

Nigerian of, in Reformed Tijaniyya cosmology,

Nigerian Broadcasting Company, 340 134-35

Nigerian Enterprise Promotion Decree, 359 protest. See Reform Niger Province, 44, 59, 60, 187 Ningi, 241, 242, 243, 251

Niyamalfilatu, 120 Qadiriyya, 65, 68, 69, 420; afhliation to, 68-

Northernization, policy of, 252, 318, 320- 70, 146, 164, 193; bases of authority of,

25, 330, 358, 380 161, 191; branches. of, 148-52, 155-56;

Northern Makabat Press, 141, 209 colonial attitudes toward, 147-48; doc-

Subject Index 459 trines of authority and community in, Road linkage, 29-30, 358 147-52, 160-69; and Fulani ruling class, Roles, social, 3-5 121, 193; leadership of, 111, 167, 191; lit-

erature of, 161-63; and spiritual author- Sabon Gari, 18-19, 313, 314, 358, 360, 379; ity of Sokoto, 99, 146, 148, 167. See also administration of, 316; ethnic composi-

Arosiyya; Brotherhoods; Islam; Kun- tion of, 22, 315; growth of, 313-17; Ibo tiyya; Qadiriyya, Reformed; Salamiyya; return to, 356-57, 363-64; market in, 317,

Sammaniyya; Shaziliyya 365. See also Hausa-Ibo relations; Riots,

Qadiriyya, Reformed, 69, 146; affiliation to, Sabon Gari; Waje area 70, 158, 160, 192-94; doctrines of 164-69; Sabon Sara ward, 113 leadership of, 158-60, 191, 204-5 (see also Saints, 165, 168 Nasiru Kabara); literature of, 163-69; Salgawa, 90, 91 n, 92, 112, 138, 193, 196; patterns of authority and community 1n, young malams and, 99-104; doctrines of

152-56, 159-60, 191; relations of, with authority and community in, go-94 Tiyaniyya, 167-69, 197-202; rituals in, Salamiyya, 148, 150, 159 158-59, 164-65. See also Brotherhoods; Salvation, 67 n

Islam; Qadiriyya Sammaniyya, 148, 149

Qur’an, translation of, 205-6 Sankawa clan, 19

Qur’anic schools. See Education, Islamic Sanka ward, 86, 100, 112, I51 Sanusi, Muhammad (emir). See Muham-

Racial groups, Hausa-Fulani concepts of, mad Sanusi (emir)

39-40 Sanusiyya, 150

Radio Cairo, 145 Sardauna Province, 59, 60

Radio-Television Kaduna, 340 Sarkin bai, office of, 229, 239, 407, 419, 434

Ramadan, 93, 125, 298 Sarkin dawaki mai tuta, office of, 229, 239, Rano District, 23, 241, 242, 247, 354, 419 241, 419, 434 Recruitment, into Reformed Tijaniyya, 201, Sarkin yaki, office of, 229, 434

142-44 Satima ward, 50

Reform: administrative, 339-54; commu- Sawaba, 287-89, 297 nity, 291-94; concepts of, 70-72, 132, 136, Secrets of protection, 126-27 145, 221, 277-91, 386; Islamic, 99, 136, Shahuci area, 232 n 137, 190; legal, 203-4, 326-29; literature Shahuci Judicial School and Library, 61 n, of, 278-99. See also Qadiriyya, Reformed; 63, 83, 157

Reformer; Tijaniyya, Reformed Shahuci Primary School, 151, 276 Reformed Qadiriyya. See Qadiriyya, Re- Shamus, 45

formed Shari’a law, 230, 326, 387, 395. See also

Reformed Tijaniyya. See Tijaniyya, Re- Islamic law

formed Sharifai Mosque, 48, 51

Reformer: concept of, 136, 190; in Kano Sharifai ward, 19, 47, 52, 76 Emirate, 274-78. See also Reform; Ta- Shatsari ward, 151, 152

waye (rebellion) Shaziliyya, 68, 148, 151, 152, 162

Religion. See Authority, concepts of; Au- Sheikh Sabbah College, 208 thority, legitimation of; Community, con- Shellam, 120 cepts of; Community formation; Islam Sheshe section, 19

Ryiya Hudu ward, 152, 208 Shetima section, 19

Ringim District, 120, 243, 245, 249, 408, 420 Shinqitiyya, 148

Riots, Sabon Gari: May 1953, 321-22; May Shira, 37 1966, 333-34, 350, 353, 381; October Sidi fari, office of, 52 1966, 334, 381. See also Argungu, Zam- Silsila (chain of authority), 68, 74, 190-91;

fara of Ahmadu Bello, 186-87; of Ibrahim

Risala, 61 Niass, 95, 97, 137; of Umar Falke, 102 n;

Risalat al-maliik, 214, 215 of Uthman dan Fodio, 169

460 Subject Index Slavery, 33-34 QI N, 92-94, 124-27, 130-37, 143 (see also Society, 3, 4, 8 Authority, concepts of; Islam); extension

Society for the Victory of Islam. See of, in Nigeria, 110-11, 120-22, 127, 194-

Jama’atu Nasril Islam 96, 202; financial organization of, 129-

Society of Young Muslims in Nigeria, 119- 30; international authority structure of,

20 122-24; leadership of, 84-90, 101, I1I-

Sokoto, 18, 30, 44, 62 n, 74, I2I, 152 n; II7, 120-21, 124-30, 137, I9QI, 193, 209affiliation of Said Hayatu with, 174-76; 10 (see also Ibrahim Niass; Muhammad as center of Qadiriyya authority, 68-99, Sanusi; Index of Names, Tiyjiani Us147; relations of, with Kano, 31-32, 69, man); literature of, 139-40; message of 231-32, 251-60, 267, 329, 332 (see also Shaykh Hadi to, 107-8; multiethnic naCivil war, Kano); religious authority of, ture of, 84, 105, 122-24, 192-94; and 146-47, 160, 180, 191, 253, 256; Qur’anic prayer with arms crossed, 109, 126, 179,

and ilm schools in, 59, 60 185-86, 200-201; recruitment patterns of, Sokoto, sultan of, 147, 255. See also Cali- 104, 108-9, 113, 120, 142-44, 201; rela-

phate, concept of tionship of, to Mahdiyya, 173, 179; rela-

Solitude. See Khalwa (solitude) tionship of, to Traditional Tianiyya, 73, Soron Dinki ward, 176, 276 82-90, 109, 202-3; relations of, with ReSouthern migrants, See Sabon Gari formed Qadiriyya, 197-202; Salgawa as Succession. See Authority, succession to supporters of, 90, 99; status of women Sufism, 65-68, 377; concept of gausu in, in, 138-39; Umarian links of, 86, 94,

135-36; ranks of 135-37, 190 137; in West Africa, 123, 124, 129 (see

Sullabawa clan, 22, 51, 121 n, 231, 238, 239, also Kano links with Muslim world); 241, 244-47, 251, 354, 376; in district and and zawiya network, 106-7, 141-42. See emirate administration, 241, 243-51, 271 also Tijanityya Sumaila District, 240, 241, 247, 405, 419 Timbuktu, 148-49 Title system, 241, 348-49, 432-35

Tafsir, 100, 157, 298-305 Tivaouane, 94

Tamburawa District, 250 Tobacco, prohibition against, 133 Tarbiyya (religious training), 65 n, 132, Torobe clan, 73 n

200, 394 Toronkawa clan, 70 n, 169

Taura District, 249 Township (GRA), 18, 313-14, 316, 320-21 Tawaye (rebellion), 225, 26 Transnational communications. See Kano Theocracy, 10, 35, 215, 229 links with Muslim world Tianiyya, 69, 77, 80-82, 91, 95, 104, 109 n, Transportation systems, 28-32 124, 136 n; afhliation to, in Kano, 68-70, Tsakuwa District, 248, 250 193; and Battle of Burmi, 55-56, 79-80, | Tsumburbura, 45, 46

103; colonial attitudes toward, 79, 87, Tudun Wada area (Waje), 18-19, 314 89, 103, I09, III, 179, 198; and consolida- Tudun Wada District, 22, 23, 244, 355;

tion of mallam class, 84, 94-104, 193; 408, 419 initiation of Emir Abbas into, 73, 82-83, Tukulor, 74 169; Kano as a center of, 99, 103-4; lead- T'welve-state system, 307, 337-39, 366, 370 ership of, 104, 112, 191; Mahdi conversions to, 169, 176; in Nigeria, 75, 84, 202; Umar Futi, 66, 68, 73, 74-79, 81, 82, 84, 86,

question of initiation of Muhammad 93-95, 103, 136, 178, 192-93, 196; conBello into, 76-79; Umarian, 74-82, 94, versions by, in Kano City, 75-76; as link 104; Zawiya of, at Fez, 95, 98, 108 n, 119, between Tijaniyya and Qadiriyya brother123, 124. See also Kano links with Mus- hoods, 79, 82

lim world; Tijaniyya, Reformed Ungogo District, 22, 63, 243, 246, 248, 408, Tyaniyya, Reformed, 69, 70, 94, 106, 119, 419, 421 201, 270; authority structure of, 106-30; Urban-rural linkages, 29, 122 consolidation of, 84-90, 117; doctrines of, Usmaniyya, 70, 146, 148, 149, 179-89, 191,

Subject Index 461 272, 380; conversion campaigns of, 187- Yakasai ward, 51, 51 n, 274, 277 88; and creation of simplified tariga, r80- Yalwa ward, 151 81; emergence of, 179-80, 183; multieth- |Yamma district, 20

nic nature of, 192-93; and other tariqas, Yan Leman, 80-82 182-85; political implications of, 267, Yerimawa clan, 244, 248, 251 312. See also Ahmadu Bello (sardauna) Yolawa clan, 19, 50, 231, 238, 239, 241, Usmaniyya (of dan Fodio), 167, 262. See 244-46, 251, 355, 406

also, Sokoto, religious authority of Yolawa Mosque, 50 Yola Town, 53, 120

Village head, functions of, 229 Yola ward, 50

Yoruba, 22, 314, 357-58, 365-66, 379. See

Waje area, 18, 63, 316, 419, 421 also Sabon Gari Wayje Mosque, 204-5, 227-28, 354

Wakar Bagauda, 58 Zaburma, 53

Wangarawa, 47 Zaitawa clan, 19

Wazifa. See Prayers Zakirai District, 248 Wazirci ward [Tudun Wazirci], 57, 227 n Zakirawa clan, 247, 251 Waziri, ofhce of, 62, 218, 229, 341, 374, 435 Zamfara, 198

Westernization, 71, 140, 391 Zangon Barebari, 101

Wife seclusion, 49, 138 Zango section, 19

Women, status of, 138, 185, 278 Zarawa clan, 57, 246, 251 World Muslim Congress, 144, 145 Zaria, 14, 62 n, 75, 152; Reformed Tija-

World War I, 256-57 niyya in, 122, 202; religion in, 44, 59, 60, World War II, 28, 30, 172, 259-60 187

Wudil District, 51, 240, 241, 246, 405, 419 Zawiyas, 122, 140, 142, 143

Wudilawa Mosque, 50, 51 Zinder, 28, 175