Reinventing social solidarity across Europe 9781847427281

Table of contents :
Reinventing Social Solidarity across Europe
Contents
List of figures and tables
Preface and acknowledgements
Preface
Acknowledgements
Notes on contributors
1. Introduction: social solidarity in Europe: the fourth pillar
Globalisation and social solidarity in Europe: continuity and loss
Situating theories of social solidarity within European integration
Europe on the edge
The aims of this book
2. The concept of solidarity in the European integration discourse
3. Solidarity at the margins of European society: linking the European social model to local conditions and solidarities
Introduction
Solidarity and social capital in the Czech society
The approach to social inclusion
Conclusions
4. Towards a globalisation of solidarity?
Introduction
The concept of solidarity
Globalisation
Individual solidarity and globalisation
Institutionalised solidarity and globalisation
Conclusions
5. Contested terrains and emerging solidarities within childcare law, policy and practice in Europe
Introduction
Childcare law, inequality and the politics of social solidarity
Co-determining local and transnational solidarity
Conclusion
6. Embedding European identity in context: changing social solidarities in Europe
Introduction: setting the context
Racing to the bottom or moving to the top?
The poverty of representation and the recovery of politics
Concluding thoughts
7. Intra-European energy solidarity at the core of the European integration process: future possibilities and current constraints
Introduction
Energy, security and solidarity
Intra-European energy solidarity reflected in policies and networks
Conclusions and perspectives: will the global crisis speed up the realisation process?
8. Social solidarities and immigration integration policies in South-Eastern Europe
Communist solidarity: imposed, but impossible
Post-communist solidarity: marginalised, but possible
Reinventing solidarity: new relations in a new field
Solidarity versus security
Conclusion: the new topoi of solidarity
9. Normative power Europe: a tool for advancing social solidarity within and beyond Europe?
Introduction
Normative power Europe: the concept
Critiquing NPE: Eurocentrism and hypocrisy?
The synergy of norms and interests: NPE and international solidarity (or the lack of it)
Conclusion
10. Social solidarity in post‑socialist countries
Theoretical starting points
The notion of Central and Eastern Europe
The Inform-bureau crisis8 and the emergence of self-management
Socio-economic transition in the Eastern-Central Europe region
Selected cases of the new solidarity
Conclusion
11. Trade unions, NGOs and social solidarity in Romania1
Social solidarity
Trade unions, NGOs and solidarity
Contextual factors and research questions
The data and its limitations
Dimensions of solidarity in Romania
The prospects for European solidarity
Membership in trade unions and NGOs and feelings of solidarity in Romania
Conclusion
12. Social solidarity and preferences on welfare institutions across Europe
Introduction1
Attribution of success and the role of competition
Decommodification of healthcare and education
The state in the business
Public expenditure
Conclusions
13. Social solidarity, human rights and Roma: unequal access to basic resources in Central and Eastern Europe
Introduction
Theoretical framework
Analyses of public policy documents
Access to resources and social solidarity in the human rights framework: the case of Roma settlements
Conclusion
14. Conclusion: the future of social solidarity in an enlarged Europe: key issues and research questions
Introduction
Towards a more unified theory of social solidarity
National to transnational social solidarity
The ‘dialectical circularity’ of governance and social solidarity across Europe: from an individual to a societal vision of freedom
Index

Citation preview

Reinventing social solidarity across Europe Edited by Marion Ellison

REINVENTING SOCIAL SOLIDARITY ACROSS EUROPE Edited by Marion Ellison

First published in Great Britain in 2012 by The Policy Press University of Bristol Fourth Floor Beacon House Queen’s Road Bristol BS8 1QU UK Tel +44 (0)117 331 4054 Fax +44 (0)117 331 4093 e-mail [email protected] www.policypress.co.uk North American office: The Policy Press c/o The University of Chicago Press 1427 East 60th Street Chicago, IL 60637, USA t: +1 773 702 7700 f: +1 773-702-9756 e:[email protected] www.press.uchicago.edu © The Policy Press 2012 British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data A catalog record for this book has been requested. ISBN 978 1 84742 727 4 hardcover The right of Marion Ellison to be identified as editor of this work has been asserted by her in accordance with the 1988 Copyright, Designs and Patents Act. All rights reserved: no part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise without the prior permission of The Policy Press. The statements and opinions contained within this publication are solely those of the editors and contributors and not of The University of Bristol or The Policy Press. The University of Bristol and The Policy Press disclaim responsibility for any injury to persons or property resulting from any material published in this publication. The Policy Press works to counter discrimination on grounds of gender, race, disability, age and sexuality. Cover design by The Policy Press Front cover: image kindly supplied by www.alamy.com Printed and bound in Great Britain by TJ International, Padstow

For my husband James ‘The past we inherit the future we build’

Contents List of figures and tables Preface and acknowledgements Notes on contributors

vii ix xi

one

Introduction: social solidarity in Europe: the fourth pillar Marion Ellison

1

two

The concept of solidarity in the European integration discourse 17 Józef Niz˙nik

three

Solidarity at the margins of European society: linking the European social model to local conditions and solidarities Tomáš Sirovátka and Petr Mareš

29

four

Towards a globalisation of solidarity? Menno Fenger and Kees van Paridon

49

five

Contested terrains and emerging solidarities within childcare law, policy and practice in Europe Marion Ellison

71

six

Embedding European identity in context: changing social solidarities in Europe Jim Barry, Elisabeth Berg and John Chandler

83

seven

Intra-European energy solidarity at the core of the European integration process: future possibilities and current constraints Annamária Orbán and Zoltán Szántó

99

eight

Social solidarities and immigration integration policies in South‑Eastern Europe Anna Krasteva

121

nine

Normative power Europe: a tool for advancing social solidarity within and beyond Europe? Andy Storey

139

v

Reinventing social solidarity across Europe ten

Social solidarity in post‑socialist countries Damir Josipovicˇ

157

eleven Trade unions, NGOs and social solidarity in Romania Cristina Sta˘nus¸

191

twelve Social solidarity and preferences on welfare institutions across Europe Béla Janky

209

thirteen Social solidarity, human rights and Roma: unequal access to 227 basic resources in Central and Eastern Europe Richard Filcˇák and Daniel Škobla fourteen Conclusion: the future of social solidarity in an enlarged Europe: key issues and research questions Marion Ellison

251

Index 263

vi

List of figures and tables Figures 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5 4.6 4.7 4.8 10.1 10.2 10.3 10.4 10.5 12.1 12.2 12.3

12.4 12.5 12.6 12.7

Social openness and concern about the human race (2006) 57 Trust and concern about Europeans (2006) 57 ODA as a percentage of GDP (1960–2008) 59 ODA as a percentage of GDP (average 2005–09) 60 Nominal change in ODA (as a percentage of GDP) between 61 early 1990s and late 2000s Relationship between size of ODA and trade openness 62 Relationship between size of ODA (percentage of GDP) 63 and GDP per capita Relationship between size of ODA (percentage of GDP) 63 and tax and premium burden (percentage of GDP) Geopolitical setting before 1990 160 Proportion of foreign workers in West Germany and Austria 163 by country of origin (after Grecˇic´, 1975: 50–2, table VIII) European buffer zone ‘in-between Europe’ (rearranged after 164 Tunjic´, 2004) Management structure of organisations of associated labour 165 in socialist Yugoslavia (after Warner, 2001) Economic dependency (measured by foreign trade) of Baltic 170 States in 2009 Hard work brings success – percentage of people who 212 tend to agree with the statement Proportion of people supporting the commercialisation 214 of healthcare and educational services, by country Proportion of people who tend to agree with the 215 statement ‘The state should give more freedom to companies’, by country Percentage of people supporting increased budget spending 218 in various areas, by country Redistributive Attitude Index – the level of support for 219 government intervention, by country Redistributive Attitude Index – differences between men 221 and women, by country Redistributive Attitude Index – differences between the 222 self-employed/entrepreneurs and the inactive population, by country

vii

Reinventing social solidarity across Europe 14.1

Dialectical circularity of social solidarity and governance across Europe (after Sartre, 1976. 1957)

259

Framework of typologies for social solidarity Examples of four types of solidarity Concerns of European citizens Towards a globalisation of solidarity? Conclusions Agriculture as a percentage of GDP in ECE countries Percentage of the labour force employed in agriculture in ECE countries Demographic change 1960–2008 and 1990–2008 in ECE countries Foreign investment and external debt in ECE countries Dimensions of solidarity in Romania, 2009 Solidarity and membership of trade unions and NGOs in Romania, 2009

6 52 56 66 167 168

Tables 1.1 4.1 4.2 4.3 10.1 10.2 10.3 10.4 11.1 11.2

viii

174 175 201 204

Preface and acknowledgements Preface This book is the product of a series of international workshops, seminars and conference streams undertaken by HOPES (How to Progress European Solidarity) Research Network. The HOPES Research Network consists of academics, NGO policy makers and practitioners with specialist interests in transnational social securities, transnational solidarities and the organisation of social protection within and across the European region. Our approach deals with the emergence of contexts and strategies to counter commonly experienced problems of European solidarity, equality, citizenship and freedom within the EU enlargement agenda. The objective is to identify and encourage wider articulation of commonly experienced European issues and policy solutions to sustaining solidarity within an increasingly pressured ‘neoliberalised’ and enlarged Europe within a global economy. The principle of solidarity was central to European integrationist discourse when the European Union was created. The current economic and financial crisis has exacerbated inherent fragilities of European integration, citizenship, orthodoxy and agendas across Europe. This book brings together contributions that aim to develop a framework for discourse, defining and reinventing social solidarity and sustainability (social, economic, religious and cultural) across Europe within a wider global setting.

Acknowledgements This book has been a collective effort and I would like to thank all of my colleagues in HOPES for their inspiring contributions. In particular, I would like to thank my husband James Ellison for his support, advice and highly valued comments during the development of this book. Thanks are also due to Emeritus Professor Adrian Sinfield for his helpful advice and constructive comments. I would like to also thank all of those who reviewed the book on behalf of The Policy Press for their very helpful comments. Appreciation also goes to my Commissioning Editor Emily Watt and to all of the staff at The Policy Press for their consistent advice and valued support from the inception to the final production of this book.

ix

Notes on contributors Jim Barry is a political sociologist, Professor of Gender and Organisation Studies in the Royal Docks Business School at the University of East London, UK, and Guest Professor at Luleå University of Technology, Sweden. Holding editorial board appointments, his research interests include gender, management, higher education, social work, work stress, post-colonialism, identities, business ethics, and lone parenting and employment. He has published in Gender, Work and Organization, Feministiche Studien, International Feminist Journal of Politics, Public Administration, Human Relations, Organization, Public Management Review and the Journal of Management Studies. Elisabeth Berg is Professor of Sociology in the Department of Economy, Technology and Society at Luleå University of Technology, Sweden, and Visiting Professor at the University of East London, UK. Her research has involved gender and organisation in academia and in social work in Sweden, England and the Netherlands as well as Information and communication technology in social work from a gender perspective. She has published in Gender,Work and Organization, Feministiche Studien, Organization, International Journal of Sociology and Social Policy, Public Administration, Public Management Review and Information Technology and People. John Chandler is a Reader in Work and Organisation in the Royal Docks Business School at the University of East London, UK. A sociologist, his research interests are in the fields of public services management, identities, gender at work and social movements. Recent research and publications have been on the theme of management and managerialism in higher education and social care. He has published in the journals Gender, Work and Organization, Feministiche Studien, International Feminist Journal of Politics, Public Administration, Human Relations, Organization, Public Management Review and the Journal of Management Studies. Marion Ellison is Director of HOPES (How to Progress European Solidarity) Research Network and lectures in European Social and Public Policy at Queen Margaret University in Edinburgh. Her research interests and publications are located within the fields of European social policy, governance, public services management and citizenship xi

Reinventing social solidarity across Europe

with a focus upon comparative childcare law, policy and professional social work practice. Menno Fenger finished his PhD on the implementation of social policies in 2001. From 2000 to 2006 he worked as an assistant professor at the Department of Public Administration, Erasmus University Rotterdam. In 2006, he was a visiting scholar at the Centre for European Studies, Harvard University. From 2006 to 2008 he was a senior policy advisor at the Dutch Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment. In 2008, he returned to Erasmus University as Associate Professor in Public Administration. His research focuses on the implementation of social policies, and on processes of policy change in this policy domain. Richard Filcák ˘ has extensive experience as a researcher and social and environmental policy development projects coordinator working in Central Europe, and the Balkan and former Soviet Union regions. He studied at the Lund University, Sweden, and received his PhD from the Central European University in Budapest, Hungary, where he is Senior Researcher at the Institute for Forecasting Studies/Slovak Academy of Sciences. His work and research interests are focused on social, economic and environmental trends and impacts of development in the Central and Eastern Europe –­­ with particular attention to the exposure to environmental and social risks, vulnerability and access to resources. Béla Janky is Associate Professor at the Budapest University of Technology and Economics. He studied sociology and economics in Budapest, finishing his PhD on solidarity and welfare preferences in 2003, and has published a book and several articles on the roots and consequences of norms of solidarity in modern welfare states. His current research focuses on the roles of ethnic stereotypes in welfare preferences, and also on social capital in local communities in Hungary. His research interests also include the integration of the Roma population in Hungary, economic sociology and rational choice models of non-selfish behaviour. Damir Josipovič is a social geographer and demographer. He received his PhD at University of Ljubljana, Slovenia, with a thesis on the impacts of immigration to Slovenia after World War II. Currently, he works as a researcher at the Institute for Ethnic Studies. His former posts include working at the Institute for Geography, Anton Melik Geographical Institute at Scientific Research Centre of Slovenian Academy of xii

Notes on contributors

Sciences and Arts, and at GfK Gral-ITEO. In 2001 and 2002 he also studied in Spain and Great Britain within the European Doctorate Programme. He has (co-)authored five scientific monographs. His expertise includes publications and research on post-socialism, population, migration, socio-economic structure, borders and ethnicity. Anna Krasteva is Director of CERMES (Centre for Refugees, Migration and Ethnic Studies) at the New Bulgarian University in Sofia, Bulgaria. She is doctor honoris causa of the University Lille 3, France, and has been awarded the international scientific honour of ‘Chevalier dans l’Ordre des Palmes Académiques’. She is editor-in-chief of the journal South Eastern Europe (Brill) and a member of the editorial board of Nationalism and Ethnic Politics (Routledge). She is author of more than 70 publications in 13 countries, among which Migrations from and to SEE (co-editor; Ravenna, Longo Editore, 2010) and Communities and identities in Bulgaria (editor; Ravenna, Longo Editore, 1999). Petr Mareš is a Professor of Sociology at the Faculty of Social Studies at Masaryk University in Brno, Czech Republic. He has been involved in several European research projects (for example the EuropeanValues Study- in the Czech Republic) and has contributed to journals such as Social Policy and Administration, Czech Sociological Review and Prague Economic Papers. He is the author of the monographs Nezaměstnanost jako sociální problém (Unemployment as a social problem) and Sociologie nerovnosti a chudoby (Sociology of inequality and poverty). He recently led the research programme on Reproduction and Integration of Society, granted by the Czech Ministry of Education (2005–11) at Masaryk University. Józef Niżnik is Head of the European Studies Unit at the Institute of Philosophy and Sociology, Polish Academy of Sciences. His background is in the philosophy of social sciences and sociology of knowledge. He teaches at the Graduate School for Social Research and in Collegium Civitas in Warsaw. He has over 80 major publications in Polish and English in philosophy, methodology of social sciences, sociology of knowledge and since 1989 in global problems and the problems of European integration. He is also a member of the Committee for Future Studies,‘Poland 2000 Plus’, at the Board of the Polish Academy of Sciences. Annamária Orbán is an associate professor at the Department of Sociology and Communication of Budapest University of Technology and Economics (BME), has an MA in Economics and earned her xiii

Reinventing social solidarity across Europe

PhD in Political Science at the Central European University in Budapest, Hungary in 2003. Her teaching, as well as research interests, are multidisciplinary: ranging from economic sociology through comparative and international studies to European politics, while her main fields of interests are cooperation, trust, social capital, sustainable local/community development, self-help community models, civil society, and energy politics. Professor Tomáš Sirovátka is Professor of Social Policy at the Faculty of Social Studies, Masaryk University in Brno, Czech Republic. He has been involved in several European research projects and has contributed to comparative books on employment and social policies in post-communist countries and journals such as Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis, European Journal of Social Security, International Review of Sociology, International Journal of Sociology and Social Policy, Social Policy and Administration, Journal of Marriage and the Family, Czech Sociological Review and Prague Economic Papers. Recently, he has co-edited (with Rik van Berkel and Willibrord de Graaf) a book on the Governance of active welfare states in Europe, to be published by Palgrave (2011). ˘ Daniel Skobla is a graduate of the Central European University (CEU) in Warsaw where he studied sociology and holds a doctoral degree in Humanities from the Institute of Philosophy and Sociology of the Polish Academy of Sciences. He also worked as a fellow at the Institute of Sociology of the Slovak Academy of Sciences and cooperated with environmental and human rights non-governmental organisations. Currently he is a Social Inclusion Officer for United Nations Development Program at Bratislava Regional Centre. His research has focused on poverty, ethnicity, social exclusion and human development issues. His work has appeared in The Polish Sociological Review and other publications. Cristina Stănus¸ is a political scientist and works as a research assistant at the Department of Sociology of the Babes¸-Bolyai University of Cluj-Napoca, Romania. She is also an associate lecturer at the Lucian Blaga University of Sibiu, Romania. Her research interests include political and civic participation and local government policy-making. Among her recent work we mention The state and non-state provision of compulsory education in Romania (ESP-OSI Working Paper, 2011) and the chapter on Romania in The second tier of local government in Europe (eds H. Heinelt and J. Bertrana Horta; Routledge, 2011, with Daniel Pop).

xiv

Notes on contributors

Andy Storey is a college lecturer at the Centre for Development Studies, School of Politics and International Relations, University College Dublin. His main research interests are neoliberal governance in the European Union (EU) and its impact on EU citizens and on citizens of third countries, including through trade deals such as Economic Partnerships Agreements (EPAs). He also carries out research on conflict in central Africa and on the political economy of the Irish state, including the state’s response to the eurozone debt crisis. He is chairperson of the global justice NGO Action from Ireland (Afri). Zoltán Szántó (PhD, Hungarian Academy of Sciences) is Professor of Economic Sociology at Corvinus University of Budapest, Hungary. He is currently Director of the Institute of Sociology and Social Policy. His main areas of interest are social theory and economic sociology. He has written books and articles on the problems of analytical social theory, such as rationality, micro–macro mechanisms, and interdisciplinarity. His empirical studies of privatisation, local labour markets, economic organisation, financial culture, corruption and tax evasion have often focused on social capital, networks, trust and culture. Kees van Paridon is Professor of Economics at the Faculty of Social Sciences, Erasmus University Rotterdam. He has worked at Erasmus University, CPB Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis, the Scientific Council for Government Policy, and Free University Amsterdam. He was also a guest professor at Wilhems University in Münster, Germany. His fields of interest are labour markets and the welfare state, international economic relations and macro-economic policy.

xv

ONE

Introduction: social solidarity in Europe: the fourth pillar Marion Ellison

Peace, justice and freedom: three pillars of the community of shared values, under the rule of law, which today constitutes the European Union. But there is also a fourth pillar: solidarity. (Barroso, 2008) The European Union (EU) is committed to the principle of solidarity, which is regarded as vital to the notion of a social Europe that is embedded in the European Charter of Fundamental Rights1 and is rendered legally binding by the Lisbon Treaty 2007.2 Connecting social and economic to civil and political rights, social solidarity is articulated by the Solidarity Chapter of the Charter, with articles that include ‘fair and just working conditions’, ‘social security and social assistance’ and the ‘right of collective bargaining and action’. Recently consolidated by a series of European Directives and Programmes,3 social solidarity is firmly established as the ‘fourth pillar’, completing the architecture of ‘indivisible’ values of peace, justice and freedom that constitutes the vision for European integration. Yet, as the UK’s decision to opt out of the Solidarity Chapter illustrates,4 the legitimation of the principle of social solidarity at EU level is located within a polity that is dominated by tensions between closed national and open transnational politico-legal systems and arrangements. Despite this, the historical development of the European polity, civil and public spheres within and across nation-states has been characterised by a philosophical, political and social commitment to institutionalised forms of social solidarity (Esping-Anderson, 1990; Gallie and Paugam, 2000; Stjerno, 2005; Mau and Burkhardt, 2009). Underpinned by the philosophical traditions of the European Enlightenment,5 political and ideological struggles have forged national welfare regimes promoting collective institutionalised social solidarity while culturally embedding values of social and economic justice within public discourse (Maitre et al, 2005; Mau and Burkhardt, 2009). The social contract between the 1

Reinventing social solidarity across Europe

state and the individual has rested upon guaranteed protection from risks connected with the market economy that, in return, requires active participation in the labour market: ‘A lived daily experience of people sharing risks and responsibilities’ (Gray, 1999), where fiscal redistributive mechanisms and welfare services and benefits compensate people for the ‘worst dis-welfares of capitalism’ while giving citizens the opportunity to contribute to the national economic, social, and civil realm (Gough, 1979). However, since the 1990s these ‘broader goals of income maintenance or compensation let alone integration and solidarity have become largely discarded’ (Sinfield, 2005: 17).The vacuum thus created has led to individuals and groups in society being more directly affected by the global market economy, decoupling institutional social solidarity from national social policy development within European states. Lorenz (2005) takes this argument further: The market has become the conceptual and institutional interface between persons stripped to their bare individuality and collectives; a new compromise between fluidity and permanence, chaos and stability, an ephemeral construct that nevertheless becomes institutionally unassailable. It represents radicalised individualism and the necessity of collective action, independence and interdependence all at one. (Lorenz, 2005: 94)

Globalisation and social solidarity in Europe: continuity and loss Widely regarded as ‘the most highly developed and structurally complex of all the world’s regional economic blocs’ (Dicken, 2007), the EU has grown from a membership of six countries in 1968 to the current 25. During this time, the contours of institutional social solidarity across nation-states in Europe have shifted to varying degrees as states filter the imperatives of the global market within distinctive socioeconomic systems of capitalism. But the race to become established as a ‘competition state’ (Cerny, 1997) within an increasingly competitive global market economy has not been run enthusiastically by some member states. While the UK followed the US model during the 1990s in wholeheartedly embracing neoliberal market capitalism, for countries like Germany, Denmark, the Netherlands and Sweden, social and public policy programmes and forms of governance continued to be based upon forms of co-determination and collaboration with and between different actors in the economy. Here, social market capitalism 2

Introduction

is identified with stakeholders beyond the owners of capitalism. By the 1990s it was clear that most European nation-states were seeking to develop their competitive status within the global economy; however, it is also clear that in some states, particularly those within Scandinavia, there was more continuity than loss and the basic principles of social solidarity, which had shaped the Scandinavian social democratic model, were retained. In France, traditions of social solidarity formulated upon the ‘importance of the state as the custodian of the social contract between generations’ were also defended (Clark, 2001). However, the ideological tide of neoliberalism was to wash over all European states. For some states this would result in a complete reworking of the meaning of social solidarity. In the UK, for example, the legitimacy of community solidarity was built upon the post-war settlement founded upon the socialist ideology of collective public responsibility. The Beveridge settlement6 institutionalised rights-based social solidarity, delivering a post-war social agreement that was ideologically predicated upon notions of basic equality, and delivering universal rights and benefits to a people who, in common with all the peoples of Europe, were ‘tired of war’ and had an overwhelming concern to achieve a sustainable peace. The establishment of the European Union itself was an expression of this collective desire. As Józef Niżnik, argues in Chapter Two of this volume, the Schuman agreement, upon which the EU was founded, was based primarily upon the organising discourse of ‘solidarity’. Europe will not be made all at once, or according to a single plan. It will be built through concrete achievements, which first create a de facto solidarity; … All Europeans without distinction, whether from east or west, and all the overseas territories, especially Africa, which awaits development and prosperity from this old continent, will gain benefits from their labour of peace. (Speech made by Robert Schuman at the launching of the Schuman Declaration, 1950) A growing tension between economic globalisation and embedded state/society practices increasingly constitutes the principle terrain of political conflict within, among and across competition states…. the development of this new political terrain in turn hinders the capacity of state institutions to embody the kind of communal solidarity ‘Gemeinschaft’ which gave the modern nation-state 3

Reinventing social solidarity across Europe

its deeper legitimacy, institutionalised power and social embeddedness. (Cerny, 2007)

Situating theories of social solidarity within European integration For the European Union and national governments within Europe, the compromise underpinning governance in the 1990s was underwritten by the politics of the Third Way (Giddens, 1998). Here, communitarian forms of social solidarity designed to construct an ‘espace de solidare’ framed by a shared-values consensus were combined with policy programmes focusing on labour market activation and individual responsibility.Within this paradigm, the value of informal and personal community bonds was elevated (Putnam, 2005). Etzioni (2000) argues that ‘At the core of the Third Way ought to be the recognition that a good society combines respect for individual rights and fulfilment of basic human needs with the expectations that members live up to their responsibilities to themselves, their family and friends, and to the community at large’ (Etzioni, 2000). Embedded within this view is the assumption that standards of justice must be found in the ways of life and traditions of particular societies, and hence can vary from nation to nation. The view is resonant of Durkheim’s theory that during the first modernity of the early 19th century rapid industrialisation led to increasingly complex societies in which the expression of individualism was reliant upon forms of social solidarity forged by a collective consensus of normative values, framed by political judgement and reliant upon the language of reason (MacIntyre, 1978; Benhabib, 1992). As Beck argues, while class and socio-economic divisions were embedded in the lived and shared learned experiences of the first modernity, the 1970s heralded a post-industrial globalised economic era across European societies that was distinguished by contours of individualisation and fragmentation. It is the individualization and fragmentation of growing inequalities into separate biographies which is a collective experience. Under conditions of individualization the point is to work out if and when new collective forms of action take shape what forms they are.The key question therefore is how the bubbling, contradictory process of individualization and de-nationalisation can be cast into new democratic forms of organization. Social inequality is on the rise

4

Introduction

precisely because of the spread of individualization. (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim, 2002: 6) By focusing on contradictory processes of de-nationalisation and individualisation, Beck defines the central challenge for the future of European integration. How can the wider European polity, civil society and public realm connect with newly generated collectivities across Europe? The asymmetrical relationship between European models of social solidarity and globalised, neoliberal economic politics and social welfare politics is revealed as the central tension of social solidarity across Europe. As the typology (Table 1.1) reveals, the range of social solidarity outcomes within distinct forms of governance illuminates the need to move beyond an individualistic approach to the ‘dialectical circularity’ of multilevel governance and social solidarity across Europe. As Jean Paul Sartre maintains, the ‘dialectical circularity’ of multilevel governance and social solidarity across Europe is ‘where man is “mediated” by things as much as things are “mediated by man” – the reciprocal relationship of “situation and project”. The strength of social solidarity depends upon material conditions and normative aspects. Freedom is an ultimate objective of social solidarity; therefore, freedom is a project in itself that comes out of social solidarity that unifies material circumstances into the practical field that in turn gives rise to the same project’ (after Sartre, 1957, 1976). Within the paradigm of a moral political economy, Schwartz (2008) argues that the realities of economic and social inequality cannot be transformed without the development of ‘a politics of social solidarity’ in which citizens embrace social and political movements which seek to bring coherent power behind ‘programmes which address economic inequality’ (Schwartz, 2008). A major question posed by recent socio-economic transitions in Europe relates to the extent to which the journey ahead for European citizens will be forged by global economic forces or by the political practice of individuals and groups. The relevance of previous and current understandings and shared learned experiences of people living in Europe is, as Göran Therborn argues, the European road to and through modernity [which] has also left a certain legacy of social norms, reflecting European experiences of class and gender . . . Collective bargaining, trade unions, public social services, the rights of women and children are all held more legitimate in Europe than in the rest of the contemporary world. They are expressed in 5

Reinventing social solidarity across Europe

social documents of the EU and of the Council of Europe. (Therborn, 2000, p 51, quoted in Habermas, 2001)

Table 1.1: Framework of typologies for social solidarity Solidarity types

Public policy action

Solidarity

Outcome

Authoritarian

• Command solidarity • Elite-controlled policy actions • Relatively low-level national education

• Moral authority formally forced

• Suppressed personally • Negative fatalism

• Authorised solidarity of policy actions in regional, national governments across EU • Positive and negative outcomes for policy initiatives • Neoliberal economics

• Moral authority • Solidarity for EU structural, top-down • Varying degrees of • eg EU transenhancing social European networks solidarity – energy networks • Dynamic local interconnectors and opposition rail networks solidarity, eg Fildertunnel, Stuttgart Station

Democracy negligible Mechanistic

Contrived elitist Chapter Nine democracy

Chapter Seven

Chapter Seven Chapter Ten

Institutionalised • Public and social • Moral authority welfare provision and shared reforms • Institutional • Limited power and resource allocation control • Variations of • Social contract? welfare state public • Keynesian to organization and neoliberal economics governance across EU • Social OMC

• Contested terrains of resources and rights • Manifest from social solidarity out of historical and political contexts

Low intense deliberative democracy

Chapter Five

Chapter Three Chapter Four Chapter Five Chapter Two

Chapter Five Chapter Ten

Dynamic

• Co-determination • Rights and resources • Workforce solidarity

• Social moral authority • Organic bottom up • Egalitarian public action

• Dialectical circularity • Social solidarity • Fraternal spontaneous public towards organized committee action

Intense radical/ derived democracy

Chapter Five Chapter Six Chapter Eight Chapter Eleven Chapter Fourteen

Chapter Five Chapter Six Chapter Ten Chapter Eleven Chapter Thirteen Chapter Fourteen

Chapter Five Chapter Ten Chapter Fourteen

6

Introduction

Recent large-scale demonstrations across Europe testify not only to the scale of social injustice that is felt, but also to the sense of loss as Europeans face the severing of the social contract which guaranteed basic rights in return for their contribution to the economic development of nation-states.The spectre of wide-scale retrenchment within cherished domains of institutional social solidarity such as education, health, pensions and other social security benefits has led to protests which have demonstrated the magnitude and solidarity of feeling across Europe. Here, multi-sector intergenerational social solidarity has been witnessed throughout Europe; as across France, where in Marseille on 28 October 2010 an estimated 200,000 people marched to the slogan: ‘Les jeunes dans la galère, les vieux dans la misère. On n’en veut pas de cette société-là’ (‘Youth in the galley, the old in misery. We do not want this society.’)

Europe on the edge As levels of poverty, inequality and marginalisation in Europe continue to rise,7 the crises in welfare experienced across most European nations in recent decades can be regarded as a crisis in social solidarity, with a harmful impact on the public realm (Ferge, 1997; Korpi, 2000; Lorenz, 2001; Offe, 2003; Clarke, 2004; Mau and Burkhardt, 2009). Tensions and contradictions between the economic and ideological imperatives of globalisation, neoliberalism and the European social model have combined to frustrate the realisation of the principles of social solidarity within an enlarged Europe. In recent months economic instability has been fuelled by increasing public sector deficits across Europe. Here, in an attempt to prevent economic collapse, the public sector has taken on some of the debt burden of the private sector. For eurozone members, the implications of economic crisis are particularly significant at transnational and national levels. At a transnational level, the economic integration and solidarity of eurozone countries are jeopardised by global economic instability. At the same time, institutionalised social solidarity at a national level is being severely tested by varying degrees of reductions in public service spending and provision within all European member states.As Tralan Basescu, the Romanian president, argued:‘The current circumstances generated by the economic crisis are testing, more than ever, the solidarity capacity of the European Union member states.’ Exemplifying this, the near collapse of the economies of Greece and Ireland in 2010 and the subsequent rescue packages provided by the IMF and the EU have acted as a catalyst for the recent announcement of a €60 billion increase in the European Union’s existing balance of 7

Reinventing social solidarity across Europe

payments facility, which was used in 2008 to help Latvia, Hungary and Romania, three non-eurozone countries.This will be extended to cover all 16 eurozone members, forging a European currency union. Here, when a shock occurs to one part of the union, money is transferred across national boundaries. Paradoxically, this example of transnational financial loans, which are designed not only to ensure the functioning of European financial and economic markets but also to aid European solidarity and integration, may in itself threaten social solidarity within and across European nation-states because economic aid is tied to IMF conditions that require sweeping reductions in public spending. For people living within Central and Eastern Europe, the impact of the recent financial crisis has been particularly severe. Rising food prices and high energy costs have combined with political instability and natural disasters to increase levels of need at a time of falling government revenues.8 Across Europe, the global economic crisis has underlined the need for legally enforceable securities and rights at transnational and national levels while threatening ‘the political union that backs the EU as a whole’, and generating a growing recognition that ‘solidarity is at the heart of the debate’.9 Despite this, the recent crisis has also acted as a watershed for the European integration process within an enlarged Europe. As Józef Niżnik (Chapter Two) argues, the reinvention of the principle of solidarity within the sphere of European policy and governance is integral to the successful reorientation of the European integration process. The recent resurgence of the principle of solidarity within European integration discourse has stimulated top-down strategies and policies that are designed to stimulate transnational solidarity and securities. This urgency is exemplified by strategic initiatives such as the EU Energy Security and Solidarity Action Plan10 and the European Economic Recovery Plan,11 based on the fundamental principle of ‘solidarity and social justice’ and its promise ‘to address the longterm job prospects of those losing their jobs, through the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund and an accelerated European Social Fund’. As Menno Fenger and Kees van Paridon (Chapter Four) argue, these strategies are a clear attempt to deal with the global economic crisis’s consequences for solidarity in Europe. Recent EU resolutions have also signalled the importance of solidarity in the governance, management, organisation and distribution of environmental resources such as energy, water and food.12 Indeed, as Annamária Orbán and Zoltán Szántó (Chapter Seven) argue, the latest very severe energy crisis, coupled with the general economic recession and severe winter of 2010, have strengthened the view of EU policy makers that a real, 8

Introduction

common European energy strategy and policy are needed; however, will the new intra-European energy infrastructure deliver transnational energy security and solidarity? What are the implications of these transnational initiatives for social solidarity in Europe? The concept of social solidarity itself is contested, complex and multidimensional. How can we begin to address, analyse and progress social solidarity, both as an outcome of transnational rights and securities and as a process involving emerging solidarities within and across national settings? The ambition of this book is to engage with both of these key areas. This necessitates the adoption of a broad view of both policy discourse and empirical evidence relating to social solidarity. Within this, the relationship between transnational and national solidarity emerges as central. In recent decades, national understandings of and attitudes towards social solidarity within European countries have been forged by neoliberal ideology. As Tomáš Sirovátka and Peter Mares˘ argue (Chapter Three), marginalised groups have found themselves blamed for their own social exclusion, and public attitudes have supported this view. Here, the self-reinforcing nature of these processes has led to a breakdown of trust in institutions and of social trust in general. It may be argued that issues of social trust lie at the very heart of ‘the social’ itself.Taking this approach further, we may begin to view the social as being integral with notions of solidarity when we conceptualise the social as the self-fulfilment of individuals as social beings within the context of the formation of collective identities (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim, 2002). Yet, the contradictory process of neoliberalism has been characterised by the individualisation of the social (Ferge, 1997, Guillemard, 2000; Lorenz, 2001; Sinfield, 2005; Walker, 2005). By intensifying processes of marginalisation and exclusion, the current economic recession has given immediacy to the need to reinvent and reconstruct boundaries of social solidarity. Here, the level of responsiveness and support given by the Social Open Method of Coordination and other transnational policy initiatives to these reinvented forms of solidarity within and across European countries may regarded as pivotal to the sustainability of these bottom-up reconstructions of social solidarity and initiatives. The role of third sector organisations, social movements and networks in the development of national and transnational solidarity within an enlarged Europe is the focus of several chapters in this study. As Christina Stănus¸ (Chapter Eleven) contends, trade unions and nongovernmental organisations play a central role in stimulating the emergence of solidarity and transnational solidarities across Europe. Illustrating this, ‘Solidarity’, the first independent self-governing trade 9

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union in a Warsaw Pact country, was initially constituted as a social movement. In his historical analysis of socio-economic transitions within and across post-socialist countries, Damir Josipovič (Chapter Ten) brings us a deeper insight into the contemporary development of reinvented solidarities. He discusses the emergence of strategies which aim to re-establish former ‘constitutional’, ‘designed’ and ‘lived’ solidarities as they emerge through ‘new networking’, ‘overcoming or accommodating imposed recession in post-socialist countries’. Elisabeth Berg, Jim Barry and John Chandler (Chapter Six) mirror this approach, arguing that multiple sources of solidarity have emerged in the public realms of Europe through the complex networks of social movement interaction both within and across borders, creating a somewhat messy but nonetheless vibrant politics of welfare. Here, social movements are identified as offering alternative identities and opportunities for ‘publicisation’ both within and across European states. Within this model, ‘social movement activity does not just occur on the streets or in political forums external to the welfare state – it also occurs within the state apparatus as welfare professionals sometimes act in concert with others on the basis of values and ideas forged through their broader social movement participation’. Focusing on childcare law, policy and practice across Europe, Marion Ellison (Chapter Five) locates the analysis of solidarity within ‘contested terrains’ involving the emergence of unified resistances to the imposition of neoliberal forms of modernisation within public sector service governance, management, professional practice and the experiences of user groups (Lorenz, 2001; Newman, 2001; Clarke, 2004; Ellison 2007). Her chapter argues that the effective design of a new spatial architecture for social citizenship and solidarity in Europe requires a fuller understanding of the history, dynamics and processes which characterise these contested terrains. Taking this approach, the chapter aims to contribute to understanding and knowledge of the processes underlying the formation of social solidarities. Located at the intersection of social citizenship and national and transnational integration, social solidarity has an integrative role in shaping social policy in Europe (Ferrara, 2008; Keating, 2009). For Anna Krasteva (Chapter Eight), South-Eastern Europe faces the consequences of a liberal paradox rather than the benefits of social solidarity. Exploring the capacity of governments, media and civil society organisations to develop and implement adequate policies for integrating immigrants, the chapter examines the challenges involved in reorientating policies from minorities to immigration, and reveals emergent capacities for creating new public spaces of meeting, mutual 10

Introduction

understanding and dialogue, reinventing social solidarity. Focusing on attitudes and preferences towards the ‘dilemma of public versus marketbased approaches’, Béla Janky (Chapter Twelve) provides a backcloth of the solidarity patterns, ideological attitudes and policy preferences of welfare institutions across Europe. Here, the examination of crosscountry differences in the distribution of solidarity preferences is given added dimension through an analysis of the depth of intra-societal solidarities. For Richard Filčák and Daniel Škobla (Chapter Thirteen), the continuing presence of widespread inequalities across European societies undermines the achievement of social solidarity across Europe. As individuals and families are forced to commit a higher proportion of their incomes to essential resources for daily living such as water, electricity and food, issues relating to poverty and social exclusion are magnified.The chapter draws upon evidence relating to the experiences of marginalised ethnic groups in Slovakia to illustrate the severity and extent of this issue. Here, the equal and fair distribution of basic resources for life such as water and energy becomes central to social solidarity. To overcome these barriers, the chapter highlights the need to build approaches across Europe that are based on social solidarity and integration rather than ‘egoism and exclusion’. Clearly, the equal and universal distribution of environmental resources is a global issue. As Andy Storey (Chapter Nine) argues, strategies and policies relating to social solidarity within Europe are founded upon normative claims to social justice and equality, but what are the implications of this discourse and of policy strategies for social solidarity not only within Europe but also between Europeans and non-Europeans? The contributions in this volume explore social solidarity as a contested, fluid, multilevel and multifaceted concept within the European polity, civil society and the public realm. Social solidarity is explored as a lived experience, a shared learned experience and a normative construct. While the relationship between national and transnational social solidarity/solidarities and the implications of this for European integration are of central concern in this book, the theoretical and empirical analysis of this theme is located within a global economic context. Here the question posed is, ‘What is the relationship between individualisation, inequality and social solidarity within the European Union as a social and economic entity; and further, how do current and future processes of European integration address this relationship?’ Contradictions within the current political design, policy instruments and modes of governance of European integration and the European model itself lie at the heart of this issue. Here, there is an asymmetry between European directives and instruments that are designed to 11

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facilitate the operation of European nation-states as ‘competition economies’ within a global economic environment (Dicken, 2007) and a European social model built upon human rights and designed to ensure that people living within Europe are protected from inequalities arising from the operation of the global economy. Engagement with this question is urgent. Reflected in and defined by the ‘lived’ and ‘shared learned’ experiences of people living across Europe, the current global financial and economic crisis has very deep implications for European social solidarity, which, as the contributions that follow illustrate, is the very necessary fourth pillar of the European Union.

The aims of this book 1. To clarify and develop a conceptual framework for discourse on social solidarity within an enlarged Europe. 2. To bring together research that focuses on the systematic national and cross-national analysis of empirical data within the key areas of social and public policy, to enable critical engagement with the concept of social solidarity within an enlarged Europe. 3. to trace empirical research looking at recent developments in transnational solidarities and social securities within an increasingly austere background in Europe, and identify appropriate methods and processes of development that make a difference in the development of sustainable transnational social securities and solidarities. 4. To examine the relationship between national and transnational social solidarity within Europe and in the wider global socioeconomic context.

Notes 1 European Union (2000) Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Nice European Council, 7 December, Chapter IV; Articles 27–38. Article 6 of the Treaty of the European Union. The 55 Articles of the Charter of Fundamental Rights list political, social and economic rights for citizens of the EU. The Charter is legally binding under the Treaty of Lisbon (except where member states have an opt-out for this provision).The intention of the Treaty of Lisbon is to ensure that the EU regulations and directives do not contradict the European Convention on Human Rights, which was ratified by all EU member states. 2

12

Introduction

2009/52/EC: 2009/326/EC:The Stockholm Programme, Developing a Europe that Protects, 17 July 2009. 3

The United Kingdom has an opt-out from solidarity rights (Chapter IV of the Charter of Fundamental Rights) and so is not legally bound to implement these rights. 4

The European Enlightenment was a period during the 17th and 18th centuries when knowledge itself became accepted as being open to debate rather than a given truth generated by established authorities. This new intellectual approach was driven by leading thinkers such as Jean-Jacques Rousseau, arguing in The Discourse on the Origins of Inequality (1755) that human nature was essentially good but was restricted by the social contexts, shaped by the historical events through which people lived, and David Hume, a Scottish philosopher, historian and economist who in An enquiry concerning human understanding (1748), argued that humans have knowledge only of things that they experience themselves. Other leading intellectuals during this period included: Pierre Bayle (1647–1706); John Locke (1632–1704);Voltaire (1694–1778), and Denis Diderot (1713–84). 5

The Beveridge settlement of 1945 established a welfare state in the UK based on universal rights and egalitarian principles. 6

Council of the European Union (2009) Updated joint assessment by Social Protection Committee and the European Commission of the social impact of the economic crisis and policy responses, 29 May, SOC 362 ECOFIN 392; available at the Council of Europe website: http://ec.europa. eu/employment_social/spsi/docs/social_protection_commitee/ council_10133_2009_en.pdf. See also: European Anti-Poverty Network, Social Cohesion at stake, The Social Impact of the Crisis and of the Recovery Package, produced by EAPN Social Inclusion Working Group, December 2009. 7

N. Sugawara et al (2009) The Crisis Hits Home: Stress-Testing Households in Europe and Central Asia, Washington, DC: World Bank. 8

Thomas Klau, Paris Director of the European Council of Foreign Relations, New York Times, 1 March 2009. 9

13

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2nd Strategic Energy Review Summary: 13 November 2008, Brussels – EU Energy Security and Solidarity Action Plan: 2nd Strategic Energy Review. 10

Commission of the European Communities, Brussels, 26.11.2008 COM(2008) 800 final. 11

European Parliament Resolution on the Common Agricultural Policy and Global Food Security. European Parliament, 13 January 2009. 12

References Barroso, J.M.D. (President of the European Commission) (2008) Solidarity for the Future: Opening Session Solidarnosc Conference, Gdansk, 6 December. Beck, U. and Beck-Gernsheim, E. (2002) Individualisation: Institutionalised individualism and its social and political consequnces, London: Sage Publications. Benhabib, S. (1992) Situating the self: Gender, community and post modernism in contemporary ethics, Cambridge: Polity Press. Cerny, P.G. (1997) ‘Paradoxes of the competition state: the dynamics of political globalisation’, Government and Opposition, 32 (2), 251–74. Clark, G. (2001) Requiem for a national ideal? Social Solidarity, the crisis of french social security, and the role of global financial markets, Oxford: Oxford University Centre for the Environment Working Paper. Clarke, J. (2004) ‘Dissolving the public realm? The logics and limits of neoliberalism’, Journal of Social Policy, 33 (1), 27–48. Dicken, P. (2007) Global shift: Mapping the changing contours of the world economy, London: Sage Publications. Ellison, M. (2007) ‘Contested terrains within the neoliberal project: The re-organisation of services for children in Europe, mapping the dynamics of governance and resistances of welfare users and professionals’, in J. Barry, E. Berg and J. Chandler (eds), Gender, Management and Governance in the Public Sector. Equal Opportunities International, Bingley: Emerald Publishing Group. Esping Anderson, G. (1990) The Three worlds of welfare capitalism. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Etzioni, A. (2000) The Third way to a good society, London: Demos Publications. European Union (2000) Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Nice European Council, 7 December, Chapter IV, Articles 27–38. 14

Introduction

Ferge, Z. (1997) ‘The changed welfare paradigm: the individualisation of the social’, Social Policy and Administration, 31 (1) 20–44. Ferrera, M. (2008) ‘The boundaries of welfare: European integration and the new spatial’, reviewed by S. Leibfried and P. Starke, Socioeconomic Review, 6, pp 175–98. Gallie, D. and Paugam, S. (2000) Welfare Regimes and the experience of unemployment in Europe, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Giddens, A. (1998) The third way:The renewal of social democracy, Oxford: Wiley Blackwell. Gough, I. (1979) The political economy of the welfare state, London: Macmillan. Gray, J. (1999) False dawn:The delusions of global capitalism, London: Granta. Guillemard, A.-M. (2000) Aging and the welfare state crisis, Newark, NJ: University of Delaware Press. Habermas, J. (2001) ‘Why Europe needs a constitution’, New Left Review no 11, September-October. Hume, D. (1748) An enquiry concerning human understanding, new edn 2000, New York: Oxford University Press. Keating, M. (2009) ‘Social citizenship, solidarity and welfare in regionalised and plurinational states’, Citizenship Studies, 13 (5) 501–13. Korpi, W. (2000) ‘Faces of inequality: gender, class and patterns of inequalities in different types of welfare states’, Social Politics: International Studies in Gender, State and Society, 7 (Summer) pp 127–191. Lorenz,W. (2001) ‘Social work responses to New Labour in Continental European countries’, British Journal of Social Work, 31 (4) 595–609. Lorenz, W. (2005) ‘Social work and a new social order: challenging neoliberalism’s erosion of solidarity’, Social Work and Society, 3 (1), www.socwork.net/Lorenz/2005 MacIntyre, A. (1978) Against the self-images of the age, Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press Maitre, B., Nolan, B. and Whelan, C.T. (2005) ‘Welfare regimes and household income packaging in the European Union’, Journal of European Social Policy, 15 (2) 157–71. Mau, S. and Burkhardt, C. (2009) ‘Migration and welfare state solidarity in Western Europe’, Journal of European Social Policy, 19: 213–29. Newman, J. (2001) Modernising governance, London: Sage. Offe, C. (2003) ‘The European nodel of “social” capitalism: can it survive European integration?’, Journal of Political Philosophy, 11 (4) 437–69.

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Putnam, R. (2005) Better together: Restoring the American Community, New York: Simon & Schuster Ltd, New edition. Rousseau, J.J. (1755) A Discourse on the origins of inequality, new edn 2003, London: Penguin Classics. Sartre, J.-P. (1957) Being and nothingness, trans. H. Barnes, London: Methuen. Sartre, J.-P. (1976) Critique of dialectical reason, trans. A. Sheridan-Smith, London: New Left Books. Schwartz, J. (2008) The future of democratic equality: Rebuilding social solidarity in a fragmented America, New York and London: Routledge. Sinfield, A. (2005) ‘The goals of social policy context and change’, in J.G. Andersen et al (eds) The changing face of welfare, Bristol: The Policy Press. Stjerno, S. (2005) Solidarity in Europe:The history of an idea, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Therborn, G. (2000) ‘Europe’s break with itself ’, in F. Cerutti and E. Rudolph (eds) Soul for Europe, vol 2, m. 2000. Walker,A. (2005) ‘Which way for the European social model: minimum standards or social quality?’ in J.G. Andersen et al (eds) The changing face of welfare, Bristol: The Policy Press.

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Solidarity in European integration discourse

TWO

The concept of solidarity in the European integration discourse Józef Niz˙nik This chapter is devoted to the concept of solidarity and its role in European integration discourse. I deliberately use the phrase ‘European integration discourse’ rather than ‘discourse about the European Union’, and the reasons for this will become clear once the meaning of the term has been explained. After initial conceptual analysis focused on a general meaning of the concept of solidarity and its possible divergences, I clarify my understanding of a discourse pointing out that the role of discourse goes well beyond its linguistic expressions. The discourse is presented as a constitutive factor affecting its whole subject matter. Being the basic vehicle of transmission of significance between the material and symbolic reality, the discourse determines the way in which material reality appears in social communication and, in effect, in people’s perception. Within such an approach, the specificity of each discourse is determined by its organising units.The concept of solidarity, as applied to relations among European states, appeared in Schuman’s declaration, in which it was one of the central organising elements of the discourse constituted by that declaration. ‘Solidarity’ has remained an important term in the description of the aims of European integration since then, but its meaning has changed over time, depending on the context. Solidarity of states may imply the responsibility of each state for the security of other states or for their well-being; well-being may refer to quality of life or to the quality of the natural environment or even to people’s satisfaction with the domestic politics of their nation-state. However, the last example might be somewhat confusing. Currently, the term ‘solidarity’ has ceased to be one of those crucial elements that serve as organising units of the discourse and has been replaced in this role by other terms, most recently by the concept of democracy. I attempt to characterise the nature of the tension between these two ideas – solidarity and democracy – and to explain the reasons that led to their clash. Making reference to the most recent changes in the European integration discourse and the reappearance of ‘solidarity’ 17

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within the new context, I attempt to reconstruct the current meanings of the concept of solidarity in order to estimate its potential which could be instrumental in a needed reorientation of the European integration process. The concept of solidarity has for a long time been one of the most useful linguistic instruments that is expected to spontaneously oppose particularism or rivalry, as well as the fight for dominance, and imply cooperation for the common good. Sometimes it even indicates an important moral imperative. Most recently, solidarity has appeared to be a very relevant issue when discussing the moral basis for the idea of a welfare state (Schuyt, 1998; Arts and Gelissen, 2001; Ferrera, 2005) or when looking for the foundations of social cohesion, which is often identified as a ‘social solidarity’ (Widegren, 1997). Kees Schuyt, ranking solidarity at the head of the three main principles of a welfare state, understands it simply as a norm that requires that ‘nobody should drop below the level necessary for a decent existence in a free society’ (Schuyt, 1998: 298). Also, when looking for the normative significance of the idea of community (after all, the idea is well established as one of the main categories of sociology) some authors quite correctly turn their interest toward the concept of solidarity (Mason, 2004). ‘Solidarity’ used also to make an appearance in everyday language to signify an important social attitude, emotional engagement or objective of social action, as in different disciplines of social sciences where – beginning with the thinking of Durkheim – it served specific theoretical functions. Here, the relation between theorising in the social sciences and everyday thinking appears quite relevant for consideration in the present analysis. Since the social sciences, including political science, usually refer directly to social or political reality, many of their technical terms have been useful in the language of practice. Thus, some of the conceptual tools of those disciplines that had formerly been borrowed from everyday language are now returning to common usage – but substantially changed and empowered with normative or ideological significance.There is no doubt that the concept of solidarity is a perfect example of these. Every attempt to classify different meanings of solidarity will probably be far from perfect. For the current analysis, I wish to concentrate on the functions of the concept, and I distinguish the following functions, depending on two different points of view: • from the point of view of motivation (which can be identified behind its use): instrumental and normative functions;

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The concept of Solidarity solidarity in European integration discourse

• from the point of view of its pragmatic value: a descriptive function that can serve either theoretical or rhetorical aims. Those functions of the concept of solidarity can be easily seen in the practical applications of European integration discourse. However, the context that is of interest to us here appears quite complicated because European integration is a multidimensional process. It is certainly an important feature of the European economy, but its political or social aspects are without doubt of paramount importance. The concept of solidarity in European integration discourse may refer to any of those aspects, although in each of them it can have different meanings. On the other hand, in all of its applications there must be something that justifies the use of the same term that clearly adds an important component to the very meaning of European integration, no matter which aspect of the process is under consideration. Also, we should remember that the specificity of different forms of European integration discourse is determined by some of the key terms used in this conceptual network (the terms which function as ‘organising units’ of the discourse), and those different forms of discourse usually express different visions of an integrating Europe. Therefore, the use of the concept of solidarity with a particular meaning may directly indicate a specific vision of Europe. Let me then start with a brief analysis of the very notion of discourse. My use of this idea is closer to the approach of Michel Foucault than to a standard analysis of discourse, which usually has a philological background (Foucault, 1972). I have in mind discourse as a kind of mental structure which – using a specific network of concepts – constitutes the sense of what is to be perceived as ‘reality’. Our spontaneous, ‘natural’ attitude towards the world resembles epistemological realism; we tend to assume that reality is something ‘out there’ which can be correctly perceived by our sensual apparatus. Only a more reflexive approach is able to bring to our attention the whole complexity of the process of cognition. For example, the fact that what we perceive as ‘reality’ is usually one of many possible aspects of our object of perception and that, depending on our ability to see different aspects, our world can at different moments appear quite different (Wittgenstein, 1997).When discussing European integration discourse we focus on a network of concepts that build up a specific perspective of our human affairs in the social or political realm. The discourse that is of interest to us here refers to an especially complex area because it addresses a social reality that – from the epistemological

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point of view – is still more problematic; we are talking about grasping the social world while being part of it. Within such an approach the task of language goes well beyond its role as instrument of communication; language also determines our perception and actions. William E. Connolly formulates this observation quite accurately, saying, ‘The language of politics is not a neutral medium that conveys ideas independently formed, it is an institutionalised structure of meanings that channels political thought and action in certain directions’ (Connolly, 198: 1). The role of discourse, its general impact on our perception of social or political reality and its ability to determine the significance of specific actions, is dependent on the ‘organising units’ of discourse. The role of ‘organising unit’ is usually played by one of the ‘main’ or ‘key’ concepts, as Michael Freeden, writing about political language, has named them (Freeden, 1996). In fact, usually we have no doubt about which concepts in a political theory are important enough to be ‘key concepts’. Among them there are, for example, democracy, justice, power, liberty and freedom.Although all such terms are usually needed in the language of political science in any theoretical or ideological orientation, which of them takes the leading role is very significant in building the sense of a theory or of ideology or of a mission that can be identified behind the political action. In both conservative and liberal ideologies we very often find almost the same words; the essential difference is in the ‘organising units’ of their discourses, and the choice of those units contributes to their conservative or liberal sense, together with different assumptions and different values structures. ‘Solidarity’ has not always appeared as a key concept of discourse. According to Steinar Stjernø, the main currents of thoughts that have developed a specific approach to solidarity are three: Marxist, social democratic and Christian democratic. These ‘three traditions of solidarity’, as Stjernø calls them, have built up different discourses of solidarity, although the term itself has not necessarily appeared in the programmes of political parties. In fact, there are many cases of political language that was aimed at actual solidarity while abandoning the term itself. For instance, a marked characteristic of the origins of the welfare state was the absence from political language of both the concept of solidarity and the concept of the welfare state (Stjernø, 2005: 180). One could speculate that the concepts were the tacit organising units of discourse, that they belonged to the intentions but were not necessarily spelled out. Another way to understand such instances could lead to the distinction between unnamed ‘substantive’ solidarity, intentional or actual, and ‘ideological’ solidarity. Expressed in 20

The concept of Solidarity solidarity in European integration discourse

the language used, it indicates specific ideals or even objectives in the social realm, but may be completely absent in concrete decisions and behaviour. The world communist movement, controlled and directed by the Soviet Union, was a perfect example of such situation up to the point where, in Poland in 1976, a dissident-created Committee for the Defence of Workers openly opposed the policies of the Polish United Workers Party, which was supposed to represent the interests of all workers. In a somewhat similar manner, the concept of ‘solidarity’ was used in the 2005 presidential campaign of the late president of Poland Lech Kaczyński, who pretended to defend a solidarity that was supposedly endangered by the liberal orientation of his competitor. Also in the Polish context, the use of this concept led directly to the national phenomenon of the Solidarity movement in 1980, although the meanings of ‘solidarity’ in that instance had very little in common with the meaning intended in the presidential campaign.1 Describing transition from the Marxist concept of solidarity to a social democratic one, Stjernø shows that it was a move from an instrumental towards a normative meaning of solidarity, although this distinction does not appear in his text: ‘The foundation is not seen as interests, but as ethics, humanism, empathy and compassion.The goal of solidarity is not socialism, but the creation of a feeling of community, social integration and sharing of risks’ (Stjernø, 2005: 199). It is important to note that both in everyday language and in specialised use in the social sciences the meaning of the term ‘solidarity’ is always dependent on the context. Its contextual character contributes to its confusing nature. Thus, ‘solidarity’ in sociological theory reflects a different phenomenon than in political science. Also, solidarity in political matters indicates a different aspect of collective attitudes and sentiments than in social matters. It is easy to imagine that – depending on the context – the word may be used to name quite different if not antagonistic attitudes or patterns of behaviour. For example, the solidarity of a criminal gang is diametrically opposed to the idea of solidarity in the society as a whole. However, this does not mean that the essential meaning of the concept has no common socio-psychological features. I will now examine briefly this socio-psychological core of the concept of solidarity and the attitude that it most often projects. In this sense, solidarity means – first – the feeling of unity of a certain group. Then, it implies the feeling of responsibility of each member for the well-being of the group. Also, it indicates the readiness of the members to give up some of their autonomy for the sake of the well-being of the whole, which means that the interest of the group has been put above 21

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the interest of the individual members. Therefore, we can probably agree that solidarity is a kind of a ‘social feeling’, understood as the sentiment of an individual that is addressed to the specific collective. This is why so often the concept of altruism appears together with the concept of solidarity and their distinction needs some theoretical work (Widegren, 1997: 763;Arnsperger andVaroufakis, 2003). It is important to notice that although in some cases the conditions for solidarity are created through interpersonal relations, this is not a precondition for such an attitude.After all, the word ‘solidarity’ also made an appearance when, in response to the 2010 earthquakes in Haiti and Chile, people around the world spontaneously offered material or, at least symbolic, help and compassion to those affected by the disaster. It is exactly the specific discourse activated at such moments that allows us to see that the feeling of unity of humankind can be a real experience. It is the context that determines what kind of ‘group’ is the object of this unique social feeling and what kind of ‘individual’ is involved. Recalling a variety of applications of this word, we know that the ‘group’ can be a collective of people, of organisations, of states or even the totality of humankind. An ‘individual’ can be a person, but also an organisation or the state. However, no matter what kind of entity might be indicated as a group or an individual, in almost every instance the experience and the effects of solidarity reach human individuals either directly or indirectly. The instruments that are used can be a policy of a state, the rules imposed by an organisation, the norms established in a group of people or simply a shared feeling of compassion. In the most general terms, solidarity appears to be an indispensable condition for any group to be anything more than a collection of individuals. This was exactly Durkheim’s observation when he defined the idea of a social group. The work of Steinar Stjernø analysing the idea of solidarity in social theory, socialist movements and religions appears to be just a study in the history of ideas, with a clear focus on the impact that the concept of solidarity has had on the understanding of society.‘Solidarity’ simply indicates the tendency to put the collective aspect of humankind above the role of the individual, which has been demonstrated, especially, in the sphere of norms. As suggested earlier, reflection on the concept of solidarity should take into consideration descriptive (serving theoretical or rhetorical aims), instrumental and normative approaches to solidarity. In the case of a descriptive approach to solidarity, we are mostly interested in a specific setting – social or political – that promotes certain kinds of social policy that need to be described. It might be created by the very nature of the situation, or simply be a way in which 22

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a particular situation has been characterised without formulating the question ‘why’ it is like that. Pointing to solidarity usually means that we want to profit from the positive connotations of the term. At the same time, however, using the term ‘solidarity’ in a descriptive sense may indicate a substantial level of arbitrariness in understanding its social parameters and usually ignores all the questions about the nature or the motives for solidarity. Of course, this does not mean that there are cases where there are no reasons for solidarity as a form of a ‘social feeling’, or no motives for the specific behaviour that we usually associate with solidarity. In fact, in most cases we may find assumptions behind the descriptive use of this term that indicate its instrumental or normative character. The instrumental approach, by and large, stresses common interest as the reason for solidarity, while the normative approach points to the fact that demonstrating solidarity is simply right – morally correct. Spontaneous compassion with those in sudden difficulty, involving the emotional reactions of people who are strange to one another, somehow escapes this distinction, although it is also often called solidarity. My suggestion, however, would be to use another word in such cases, for example, compassion or empathy.There is no doubt, however, that any form of solidarity, whether instrumental or normative, can be made more effective if it is supported by such emotions such as compassion. Also, it is quite clear that every case of instrumental solidarity has a better chance of practical realisation if it is supported by normative justification. Unfortunately, in most instances what is needed in order to initiate instrumental solidarity is simply knowledge, reasoning and a correct definition of the situation, which are generally very difficult to achieve in the context of political struggles. This is exactly the case of the ideal of solidarity in European integration. European integration offers an exceptional example both of the power of discourse and of its complexity.The concept of solidarity has been used extensively for a long time now, but on many occasions its use was mostly rhetorical. It was simply assumed that ‘solidarity’ would bring positive moral connotations to justify particular political decisions or would add such connotations to the very process of integration. The initial reasons for solidarity, at least those spelled out in the Schuman Declaration of 9 May 1950, were instrumental. The Declaration, however, was presented at a moment of history that could easily underline its normative sense. In the Schuman text there is clear attempt to go beyond the instrumental or merely rhetorical role of ‘solidarity’.The document stresses a ‘de facto solidarity’, which can mean both solidarity demonstrated empirically and solidarity supported by a 23

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moral imperative.The very construction of the Schumann Declaration leaves no doubt that the concept of solidarity was an organising unit of the discourse that was founded by this document. With the further development of European integration, solidarity, initially understood instrumentally as a principle in international relations within Europe, has achieved additional significance regarding relations between the nations involved. It has been quite a natural development because such a course was implied by the discourse used and supported by deliberately designed policy, beginning with the cohesion policy initiated by the Treaty of Rome in 1957. Cohesion policy needed a normative background, which has emerged as European integration has been extended to include the poorer states of Southern Europe, simultaneously justifying the increase of funding to cohesion policy itself. Although the concept of solidarity is constantly in use in the discourse of European integration, at a certain point it lost its position as an organising unit of that discourse. This happened not because solidarity had lost its moral power or instrumental effectiveness. The reason was a general reshuffling within the network of concepts that comprised the general structure of European integration discourse, because of the radical changes that occurred in Europe with the end of communism and within the European Community with the foundation of the European Union. Both facts brought the concept of democracy to public attention and to the centre of political discourse. Unexpectedly, the issue of democracy – so far taken for granted as an obvious feature of the integrating Europe – became a problem. The Treaty on European Union (EU, 7 February 1992) brought the issue to the attention of people and political scientists. The problem of democracy deficit suddenly replaced the permissive consensus, and the taking care of European integration by European political elites was under question. Also, with rapid enlargement of the EU, lack of popular support for the financial instruments of cohesion policy in the countries that are ‘net contributors’ became a problem that affected one of the crucial mechanisms of integration. The problems with multiculturalism that were experienced in some member states added new fears that were clearly very dysfunctional for the progress of solidarity (Amin, 2004). All of these developments created conditions for euro-sceptical arguments that immediately became useful in political fights for power in most of the EU states. The crucial value needed in such situation was democracy, and its role was greatly exacerbated by the fall of communism in Europe. Steinar Stjernø quite correctly noticed that ‘the meaning of solidarity changes not only according to 24

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how the different aspects of solidarity are combined, but also through the different meanings of these other key concepts and how these are related to the different meanings of the concept of solidarity’ (Stjernø, 2005: 245). In fact, the problem with the concept of solidarity was not its meaning but its role in the discourse. In effect, of the changes mentioned, ‘democracy’ became the organising unit in the European integration discourse, reorienting the whole discourse and, later on, the whole process of European integration. Of course, ‘solidarity’ has remained among the most important concepts of this discourse but its role appears to be mostly rhetorical. In public debates in many EU member states European matters have been used more and more often by domestic politicians to justify unpopular decisions. The discourse developed around the concept of ‘democracy’ rather than ‘solidarity’, appeared to be safer and more effective in dealing with dilemmas such as social security versus economic effectiveness or national unity versus European integration. Since the ideal of democracy has been established as a leading political value that does not need any justification all other values, including solidarity, have been placed under its reign (Niżnik, 2008). It was in this situation that in 2005 ratification of the Constitutional Treaty failed in two founding member states of the European Community. As a result of such a reorientation of discourse, the European Union is facing problems with decision making in strategic areas concerning, for example, further development of its cohesion policy or EU enlargement. Political leaders of all member states are increasingly aware of European structural problems – for example, its aging population – as well as difficulties in the world economic situation and the impact of those factors on the future of the so-called ‘European social model’ – which in fact is another name for the idea of the welfare state. However, in popular understanding, openly supported by populist politicians in some EU countries, the ‘welfare state’ is threatened by supposedly excessive contributions to the EU budget and cheap labour available in the poorer new member states. Thus, in the course of European integration the principle of solidarity is clashing with the principle of democracy. At the same time, the normative power of the welfare state, which is supposed to fight the structural conditions for exclusion, seems to be weakening too.Writing already 10 years ago about the prospects for post-industrial solidarity, John Andersen suggested the need for an instrumental approach to solidarity, writing that ‘we must emphasize the dysfunctionality of exclusion and discuss the positive functions of inclusion’ (Andersen, 1999: 384). Andersen has perceived ‘postindustrial meritocratism’ as the reason for the failure of the politics of 25

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inclusion. Although I do not share his view on the role of meritocratic social stratification, I do tend to agree with his instrumental approach to solidarity. Both the domestic policies of the member states and in the EU strategy for the progress of solidarity, however conceptualised, are equally beneficial for the member states as for the EU itself. And satisfaction from doing ‘the right things’ may in future become an additional social achievement of the EU.

Note 1 The 1980 Polish movement that adopted the name of Solidarity was initially intended to unite ’national opinion against communist repression, but it soon became a demonstration of solidarity among the majority of Poles for the demands formulated by the Gdansk shipyard workers, and later developed into a general demand for democratic freedom, thus initiating the fall of communism in Europe. References Amin,A. (2004) ‘Multi-ethnicity and the idea of Europe’, Theory, Culture & Society, 21 (2) 1–24. Andersen, J. (1999) ‘Post-industrial solidarity or meritocracy?’, Acta Sociologica, 42 (2) 375–85. Arnsperger, C. and Varoufakis,Y. (2003) ‘Toward a theory of solidarity’, Erkenntnis, 59 (2) 157–88. Arts, W. and Gelissen, J. (2001) ‘Welfare states, solidarity and justice principles: does the type really matter?’, Acta Sociologica, 44 (4) 283–99. Connolly,W.E. (1983) The terms of political discourse, Princeton: Princeton University Press. Ferrera, M. (2005) The boundaries of welfare: European integration and the new spatial politics of social protection, Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press. Foucault, M. (1972) The archeology of knowledge and the discourse on language, New York: Pantheon Books, pp 21–30. Freeden, M. (1996) Ideologies and political theory. A conceptual approach, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Mason,A. (2004) Community, solidarity and belonging: Levels of community and their normative significance, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Niżnik, J. (2008) ‘Discourse and social communication: the case of “democracy” in the European integration discourse’, in J. Langer (ed) Forces shaping the EU: Social science approaches to understanding the European Union, Frankfurt am Main/Berlin/Bern/Bruxells/New York/Oxford /Wien: Peter Lang, pp 215–28. 26

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Schuyt, K. (1998) ‘The sharing of risks and the risks of sharing: solidarity and social justice in the welfare state’, Ethical theory and moral practice, no 1: 297–311. Stjernø, S. (2005) Solidarity in Europe:The history of an idea, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Widegren, Ő. (1997) ‘Social solidarity and social exchange’, Sociology, 31 (4) 755–71. Wittgenstein, L. (1997) Philosophical investigations, Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, Part two, ch XI.

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THREE

Solidarity at the margins of European society: linking the European social model to local conditions and solidarities Tomáš Sirovátka and Petr Mareš

Introduction The European Union (EU) social model promoted primarily by the new ‘soft instruments’ of the ‘Social Open Method of Coordination’ (Social OMC) is built around the idea of social solidarity between and within nations of the EU. At the same time, since social policy is based on the principle of subsidiarity, the success of the Social OMC depends on ‘national solidarities.’ It is also confronted both at the EU and national level with other issues/agendas of the EU, such as hard instruments of economic/market integration. Focusing on how the Social OMC is forged within the national understanding and level of solidarity in the Czech Republic, and on influences upon the design and implementation of policies in social inclusion, this chapter argues that the general principles and objectives of the Social OMC have been redefined within national policies and national understandings of solidarity principles, which have been strongly influenced by prevailing neoliberal policy discourse within Europe.This discourse has emerged in the context of political practices of blaming marginalised groups and is mirrored in attitudes among the public. As a result of these mainstream discourses, policies and practices, people endangered by social exclusion are marginalised in policy making, while the policy approach based on blaming and sanctioning reinforces the barriers that result in their social inclusion. The ongoing economic recession has made the processes of social marginalisation even stronger, although some bottom-up policy initiatives of NGOs have acted as catalysts for the improvement of social capital and solidarity. The reinvention and reconstruction of the boundaries of solidarity seems to be an urgent, 29

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however uneasy, precondition for the implementation of the Social OMC. Many commentators regard the success of the EU social model as a necessary pre-requisite for the success of the European integration project itself (for example Scharpf, 2002; Jacobsson and Schmid, 2002; De la Porte and Pochet, 2002 and others). National as well as transnational solidarity in the field of social policy seems to be a precondition for the creation of a ‘cohesive society’ whose members can form a ‘community of risk’ within the uncertain world. Pooling of risks as well as levelling of living conditions and smoothing of social inequalities at the EU level could help to contribute to the strengthening of linking social capital and social cohesion. Otherwise, the EU will become a mere economic space open to competition and prone to social dumping, lacking any integrative tendencies: high social polarisation (ethnic, political, religious or income differences) increases individual and group rent-seeking activities that undermine trust. Putnam (2007) assumes that social diversity produces distrust, social isolation and anomie rather than conflict (constrict hypothesis): in the short run, diversity strengthens bonding social capital, while precluding the creation of bridging social capital. It might be argued that people living at ‘the margins of European societies’ have the most at stake.The recent global financial crisis has accentuated the levels of poverty and social exclusion of people living at the margins of European society. However, since social policy is based on the principle of full national competences, the success of the Social OMC, which embodies generally solidaristic policies, is dependent on ‘national solidarities’. In Czech society, the communist regime destroyed the basis of solidarity to some extent: this is reflected in the low level of trust in institutions and in other people in post-communist societies in general (Howard, 2003; Wallace and Pichler, 2007). On the other hand, informal social networks within families and close circles of friends (often hostile to the regime) represented a strong instrument for defending peoples’’ identity and their preferred mode of living. In such a social environment the process of market transformation paved the way for a further decay of social capital and solidarity in favour of individual freedoms under the ‘flag of democracy’ (compare Offe, 1996; Ferge et al, 1997). Nevertheless, even though solidarity has declined, the role of social policy has still been as crucial as it was in the communist era, since the new political elites have continued on the path of the ‘emergency welfare state’ (Inglot, 2008). Real or expected social impacts have pushed them towards pragmatic policies aimed at maintaining the peaceful process of transformation by alleviating its negative social 30

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consequences and by dividing the potential protest groups within the populace through a strategy of differentiated and targeted welfare provisions (Vanhuysse, 2006a). In the case of the Czech Republic, this strategy has been unique in two respects: on the one hand, the gradualist version of transformation enabled the preservation of jobs for the core labour force and prevented unemployment from rising until 1997 (the so-called ‘Czech miracle’), while the effective income protection strategy prevented the growth of poverty (Sirovátka and Mareš, 2006; Sirovátka, 2007; Saxonberg and Sirovátka, 2009). This means that although social policy has not been based so much on the principles of solidarity and social/citizenship rights, pragmatic responses have led to redistributive policies, and these have been supported by citizens (compare Ferge, 1995 [1997 in refs];Van Oorschot, Sirovátka and Rabušic, 1999). The subject of this chapter is how the Social OMC is framed by the national understanding and level of solidarity in the Czech Republic, and how this understanding has influenced the design and implementation of policies in some specific fields of social inclusion. The chapter has three sections: the first deals with the national understanding and boundaries of solidarity.The second section discusses how the policies of the EU Social OMC are redefined and implemented in the Czech Republic.The third and final section summarises the findings and assesss the role of the ideas and instruments of the ‘European’ agenda of the Social OMC in the Czech Republic, within the context of broader factors which shape social solidarity and social policies.

Solidarity and social capital in the Czech society Social capital and trust The subject of our analysis is social capital as a kind of public good (Coleman, 1988, 1990: 315): ‘Social capital can be aggregated, which means that it cannot be treated solely as a characteristic of individuals and their relations, but also as a property of countries and regions.’ Van Oorschot,Arts and Gelissen (2006) used a measurement of social capital based on the assumption that it has three dimensions: networks – passive and active participation in voluntary organisations and sociability; trust – generalised trust1 and trust in institutions; and civic involvement – trustworthiness and political engagement (p 153). Trust is a communicative medium that reduces the complexity of society (Luhmann, 1979), considered as a condition for maintaining society’s cohesion and integrity and the inclusion of individuals and 31

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groups (not only ‘ours’, but also ‘others’, excluded or marginalised ones). We may trust those who are most like ourselves, or we may take greater risks for a more general form of trust. Trust, democratic support and civic engagement are assumed to be the strongly interconnected and fundamental pillars of a healthy civil society that strongly advocates voluntary involvement. Social trust is believed to be strongly associated with civic engagement and, vice versa, civic engagement creates social trust (Dekker, Ester and Vinken, 2003: 243).2 The authors of the third wave of the European Values Study (2001), describing the geographical distribution of social capital across Europe, have grouped the Czech Republic together with the other post-communist countries: Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia (Oorschot, Arts and Gelissen, 2006: 155). This corresponds to the finding of research by the European Values Study in the Czech Republic and in other postcommunist countries. The low level of trust lies in the very low level of political culture in the Czech Republic, and also in the suspicion of the population that the system is corrupt. The public’s alienation from the government is also implied in the high ratio of agreement with the statement ‘it is useless to turn to officials, because they don’t understand the problems of ordinary people’ (15% fully agreed and 43% tended to agree).3 Nevertheless, this may be the result of a longlasting process in a society where civil society is underdeveloped and social trust is weak. Bonding social capital ‘Bonding’ social capital is solidarity turned inward towards members of one’s own group, and (to a great extent) it consists of vertical solidarity across strata (solidarity of wealthy with the poor, the powerful with the more powerless, etc.). The communist regime was based on an egalitarian ideology and the strong role of an authoritarian state.A large part of the population accepted this and ‘the paternalistic expectations that [the] population had become accustomed to persisted beyond 1989’ (Večerník, 2009: 42). From a marked preference for freedom ahead of equality, which was characteristic of the first years of social change after 1989, the accents on freedom and equality began to even out. While the first wave of the European Values Study in 1991 agreed with the statement that ‘personal freedom is more important than equality’ (61% agreed and 31% disagreed), in 2008 agreement and disagreement were nearly the same, at 46% and 42%.The move over that period towards an accent on equality was especially marked among older people, people 32

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with less education (and among people combining these characteristics) and among people in rural and small town areas. To a certain extent this also explains the relatively high degree of vertical solidarity across social strata, in relation to the unemployed and the poor. Solidarity on the vertical axis is relatively strong (from those above towards those below) and, in the Czech Republic, desired – especially in the form of massive redistribution (agreement with progressive taxation, non-addressed transfer payments and resistance to various forms of fees for state-provided services – tuition, surcharges for medicines paid for by social insurance), which provide a relatively high standard of living. The level of participation by residents of the Czech Republic in voluntary associations or non-governmental organisations (NGOs) is not high.This includes labour unions. In 1989 some 80% of employees in Czechoslovakia were members of a trade union. Since that time, union membership has been steadily waning. In 2009 the Czechoslovak Chamber of Labour Unions (ČMKOS) included a mere half million or so of some 5 million employees (that is, about 10%). Bonding social capital has positive effects for members belonging to closed social groups or networks; nevertheless, it has generally negative effects for society as a whole – where bridging social capital has a positive effect (Beugelsdijk and van Schaik, 2003). Bonding social capital also has negative consequences – sectarianism, ethnocentrism, corruption (Putnam, 2000). Bridging social capital Bridging social capital is considered to mean solidarity with the ‘others’. It is a question of horizontal solidarity (especially with those who live outside of society or on its periphery). Putnam (2000) defines bridging social capital as bonds of connectedness that are formed across diverse social groups, whereas bonding social capital connects homogenous groups. Bridging social capital expands solidarity beyond the boundaries of our own group4 (Putnam, 2000). Generally, it is assumed that contact with other cultures leads to greater mutual tolerance, and thus to a growth in bridging social capital, and thus to greater social solidarity. However, the current population of the Czech Republic has achieved, through the forces of history and its ‘own doing’, a degree of homogeneity (from the standpoint of nationality, ethnicity, religion and culture) that is stultifying. First the Jews disappeared from everyday life, then the Germans and finally the Slovaks. Thus the country lost its enriching experience with intertwining cultures and the conflicts 33

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between them. There are few non-Czech peoples in the Czech Republic, and so far they do not threaten the status of members of the majority population on the employment market. Moreover, most nonCzech peoples in the Czech Republic are from cultural and religious surroundings close to those of the majority population.5 Perhaps this is partly why they are not subjected to hostile attitudes and solidarity with them is not much different from the degree of solidarity among the members of majority society. Of the Roma, who came in after the Second World War, especially from Slovakia,6 between 200,000 and 300,000 live in the Czech Republic. One problem of the low degree of bridging social capital in Czech society is the absence of contacts beyond the boundaries of one’s own community (Šafr and Häuberer, 2008). The social networks of the majority population and the Roma do not overlap – they do not live, work or spend free time together (mostly from childhood). Despite the various efforts and measures applied, the Roma continue to face social exclusion owing to combination of several handicaps: often long-term or recurring unemployment, a large number of children, welfare dependency, poor access to secondary, and tertiary education, and high rent for low-quality housing conditions. (Večerník, 2009: 59)

The approach to social inclusion Policy discourse and general approach In the Czech Republic after 1989, the key factors shaping the development of the welfare state were the economic pressures on public finance. New political and economic elites were able to take advantage of the vacuum provided by the legacies of a communist past dominated by top-down policy making, a safety-net model of welfare and a lack of pressure from civil society. Aided by economic recession, low social capital and the low legitimacy of ideas of solidarity, the new elites deliberately manipulated public discourse in favour of simplified neoliberal ideas. The Czech welfare state has been slowly moving in a more residualist, individualised direction, a process that has come about by slow decay rather than through radical, thought-out policies (see Saxonberg and Sirovátka, 2009) – firstly, because policy makers have not had such a well thought-out strategy and secondly, because they have been politically 34

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pragmatic. A salient feature of this process has been the contradiction between the rhetoric and practice of policy making. From the beginning of the 1990s, the welfare state has often been criticised in principle, and welfare dependency has been cited, along with a discourse on the ‘individualisation’ of its causes. In contrast, actual policy practice has tended to follow the opportunistic protest avoidance strategy (Vanhuysse, 2006b): ‘the path of slow reform’, of ‘bank socialism’ accompanied by a strong social safety net and minimum-income schemes. Because of this contradiction, public opinion has blamed the marginal social groups dependent on social assistance. Finally, the targeting of benefits towards low-income groups has provoked a feeling that the respective distributive interests of the majority and marginal groups of society are being violated, which in turn has decreased support for social policies (Saxonberg and Sirovátka, 2009). In this overall societal climate and policy discourse context, the agenda of social inclusion was unable to gain much explicit support and legitimacy. However, folloeing accession to the EU, the government’s first policy document, entitled ‘The National Action Plan on Social Inclusion 2004–2006’ (NAPSI), displayed compliance with the general principles of the EU social model and social inclusion. It was also in line with the election programme of the Social Democrats, who were the leading party in government from 1998 to 2002. The NAPSI 2004–2006 promised to both ‘support and stimulate the long-term unemployed to actively seek employment’. However, these ‘declarative’ objectives were formulated only vaguely, while operationalised objectives or binding indicators of policy effort were almost absent, as was an actual determination of the resources needed in order to achieve the objectives (compare Sirovátka and Rákoczyová, 2009). Other policy documents (the National Reform Programme 2005–2008 and the NAPSI 2006–2008) entailed fairly strong preferences for increased conditionality, curtailing of benefits and improvement of work incentives. After the parliamentary elections in mid-2006, the new centre-right coalition changed the policy priorities, restricting the scope of redistribution; introduced co-payments in healthcare; aimed to privatise the hospitals; and reformed the pension system by enabling participants to contract out. The new National Strategy Report on Social Protection and Social Inclusion (NSRSPSI) 2008–10 has been decidedly explicit in abandoning the social inclusion perspective of a balanced and comprehensive approach. The individualisation of the social inclusion agenda has even been increased, and with it the causes of poverty have been individualised through the use of the strong moralist discourse (Lister, 2004) 35

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To summarise, we observe that there was some degree of formal compliance with the agenda of social inclusion during accession to the EU and under political circumstances that were favourable to that agenda (a Social Democratic government being in power). However, during the period following accession, domestic priorities have either changed the principles of the social inclusion strategy or made it less important. We will now focus on the real changes that have followed in the wake of specific policies most relevant to social inclusion and solidarity. The policies of social inclusion Social inclusion represents a broad complex of measures in different policy fields. We will look first at two key areas related to protection against poverty and social inclusion for people of working age: minimum-income protection, and active labour market policies aimed at vulnerable groups. We will then examine the current approach to social inclusion for some of the most transparently excluded groups: the homeless, the Roma and immigrants. In accordance with the pragmatic ‘blame avoidance’ strategy during the first stage of market transformation, the Czech government paid great attention to the protection of vulnerable groups against poverty. In November 1991, the introduction of the Living Minimum Act7 and the closely related Act on Social Need8 granted social assistance benefits in cases of insufficient income. These two acts introduced a social assistance scheme that responded quite well to the impacts of the market transformation and was comparable to schemes in other European countries. It remained in effect (with small adjustments) until 2006. In contrast to the above, accession to the EU was the ‘catalyst’ for the implementation of a new law in 2006 (MPSV–MLSA, 2006). It provided a guarantee of ‘adequate minimum standards’ while increasing incentives to work by ‘activating’ welfare recipients. Eligibility conditions for young people and the long-term unemployed were tightened, and families began to carry the main burden of caring responsibilities. Means testing excluded many young people from the entitlement. Further, an ‘existence minimum’, meant to cover basic survival needs, was implemented. This is applied in cases where willingness to work or cooperation to improve income is assessed as being deficient. The social assistance reforms implemented since 2006 (MPSV– MLSA, 2006) have reduced the number of recipients by more than 50% 36

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(MPSV, 2009; Jahoda, Kofroň and Šimíková, 2009). Since January 2009, after six months recipients of social assistance have been entitled to an ‘existence minimum’ rather than the ‘living minimum’. In August 2009, out of a total 123,000 claimants on living allowance, 24,000 were shifted to a lower level of benefit corresponding to the existence minimum. The Ombudsman criticised the new welfare arrangements and changes to the Act have been recommended to parliament (Ombudsman, 2010). Until recently the social assistance scheme, in combination with the other social transfers, has been effective in alleviating poverty (Sirovátka and Mareš, 2006); according to Eurostat data, until 2008 the at-risk-of-poverty rate in the Czech republic amounted to no more than 10%, one of the lowest in the EU (Czech Statistical Office, 2009a). However, there was a key change in the trend in 2006–08, with the turn away from the protection process of social assistance (which was consistently emphasised during the 1990s and after) and towards neoliberal ‘activation’ and strong workfare requirements. Unemployment protection and labour market policy With accession to the EU, employment legislation had to be harmonised. Unemployment benefits have been increased for the second three months of unemployment, from 40% to 45% of the previous wage,9 and EU citizens were provided with rights to unemployment protection and public employment services. Although the unemployed are activated mainly through repressive measures – which correspond to the ‘individualisation discourse’ on the causes of unemployment – they get little support for their employability. The definition of a ‘suitable job’ in the Act of 2009 includes jobs lasting for longer than three months and equivalent to 80% full-time employment. In the case of the long-term unemployed, the job may last for an even shorter length of time, provided that it corresponds to no less than 50% full-time employment. Refusal to accept a temporary job (even in public works) or noncompliance with Individual Action Plan commitments may result in loss of benefit entitlements for a period of six months. Active labour market policies are under-financed in the Czech Republic: they range in the long term between 0.12 and 0.15% of GDP (OECD, 2009). An important intention of the National Action Plan on Employment for 2004–06 was to improve the offer of active employment policy measures by increasing the level of resources allocated to this sector (MPSV–MLSA, 2004). During 2006 and 2007 European Structural Fund projects allowed an increase in the relative 37

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numbers of active labour market policy (ALMP) participants, from 19% to nearly 32% and then to 39% of unemployed people (thus more than doubling the roll). During 2007–08 the centre-right government focused more vigorously on neoliberal ‘activation’ measures, and approved a proposal for access to unemployment benefits to be reduced to only five months for people below 50, eight months for people aged 50–55, and eleven months for people above 55 (in each case this is one month less than before). During 2007 and 2008 more than a quarter of those who left the unemployment registers each year were those who were excluded due to ‘misconduct’, while in 2004 the proportion had been only about 11%. Another problem is that due to inadequacies in the programmes and poor targeting of existing measures, participation by vulnerable groups in active labour market policy programmes is lower than that of the better-equipped groups of unemployed (Hora, Sirovátka, Tomešová and Vyhlídal, 2009). Policies towards the most threatened groups: the homeless, Roma and immigrants In the Czech Republic, the homeless and Roma are the two groups which are the most visible examples of multidimensional exclusion. Immigrants represent another group, although their problems are less visible because they are isolated from mainstream society. Policies aimed at exclusion from housing Both Kolektiv (2007) and Hradecký (2008) consider the Czech Republic to be a typical case of a ‘statist’ regime, characterised first by low government social welfare spending (both generally, and on homelessness specifically), and second by the low level of the non-profit sector, but with a large influence of state funding on non-profit social services (including those for the homeless). The key processes in the housing market after 1989 were restitutions, transfers of the ownership of housing stock from the state to municipalities, privatisation of the housing stock and, since 2006, also deregulation of rents. Since the early 1990s municipalities have preferred to increase their revenues and minimise their operating costs by selling to private owners a major portion of the housing stock that had been transferred to them from the state. Consequently, there is now a lack of adequate and financially accessible housing for low-income households (Ministry for Regional Development, 2005). In order to punish households 38

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that do not pay their rents, municipalities began to build a category of substandard municipal housing to which those in arrears with their rent payments are being removed.These substandard estates are not defined in legislation. Often, such housing takes the form of one room with a concrete floor, coal heating, cold water only and shared toilet and showers in the corridors (Hradecký, 2006: 8), and there is insufficient housing available for the homeless (Hradecký, 2008: 187–8). The Czech Republic included the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms in its Constitutional Act of 1991; however, it has not ratified the Revised Charter, which in article 31 guarantees the right to housing and prevention of homelessness, which are both vitally important for social solidarity. Hence, the right to housing is a declaratory right, not an enforceable one. The protection of rented housing is only partial, and a tenant’s inability to pay rent may lead to homelessness, with no guarantee of assistance from public bodies. Three types of NGOs – international agencies, existing church agencies and new civil society agencies – occupy a pivotal position because they provide the prevailing share of social services and shelters for the homeless. The capacity of half-way houses is only about 330 places, of which 140 belong to state/municipal bodies (the rest belong to NGOs), while more than 1,000 youngsters are released from children’s homes every year. And while there are about 460 places in hostels for the homeless, where residence is limited to one year, the chances of getting into municipal social housing afterwards are rare. There are only a few dozen places for women with children in emergency housing facilities, and no places for men with children (Hradecký, 2008; MPSV–MLSA, 2008). Social inclusion of the Roma minority According to estimates, the Roma represent between 2 and 3% of the population: their social exclusion and multiple deprivation result in an accumulation of social problems that is uncommon in the majority population. A solution to their problems (including lack of access to education, employment and housing, financial deprivation and indebtedness) would require concentrated and strong measures. Since 1997 there has been a government body for solving the problems of the Roma community, and several strategic documents on the inclusion of the Roma have been drawn up since the late 1990s. In reality, social exclusion, multiplied by the ‘concentration effect’ upon the Roma, has continued.

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Gabal (2006) has identified about 300 socially excluded Roma communities in the country, of different types and sizes. About 90% of them have emerged since 2000, and local authorities, which tend to displace and concentrate the Roma into specific areas, have negatively influenced the growth of about 60% of them. In order to address this problem, in 2007 the government established a special agency to tackle the problems of socially excluded Roma communities, with the help of EU structural funds. During 2008 the local bodies of this agency monitored the situation in Roma excluded communities and carried out several research projects on issues such as employment opportunities, health, indebtedness. In addition, they have supported local partnerships in 12 localities where pilot projects have been started with the municipalities as principal agents (109 municipalities, 50 NGOs, 14 schools, 8 local employment offices and 7 departments of police were involved). Altogether 62 projects were prepared, and 23 were implemented in 2008, aimed at about 700 users. Most of the activities have been supported through European Structural Fund and implemented by the NGOs.10 However, government funding is not increasing, giving rise to questions as to how effective the agency’s initiatives can be, in the face of serious and multiple problems, if it (and the municipalities) is not given real competencies and a regular flow of resources. Similarly, the segregation of Roma children in the educational system is addressed only to a limited extent. While the Roma represent less than 5% of pupils in primary schools, they account for about half the pupils in remedial classes,11 and the government estimates that about 75% of Roma children are enrolled in such classes. In its concluding observations dated 1–2 March 2007 on the Czech report on the issue of discrimination, the UN Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination stated that ‘the State party does not seem to fully acknowledge this problem’, and recommended that the methodological tools used to determine whether children should be enrolled in special schools should be reviewed.The numbers of public administration field workers working in Roma communities are not increasing fast (there are less than 100 in the country), nor is the number of school assistants (less than 400).12 Immigrants from third countries The social integration of non-Czech people from third countries – mainly those who are settling in the Czech Republic for a longer period of time – is becoming a pressing problem. In 2006, the amended 40

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Immigrant Act improved the situation in several respects (in line with EU Directive 2003/109/EC), with positive effects for EU citizens in particular. Data (Czech Republic Statistical Office, 2009b) show that between 2004 and mid-2008 the number of non-Czechs with a residency permit of at least 3 months increased from 256,000 to 410,000 (about 4% of the population); the largest numbers of non-Czechs come from Ukraine, Slovakia, Vietnam, Russia and Poland. Many others work and/or live illegally in the country, and estimates range from 40,000 to more than 200,000 (Drbohlav and Lachmanová, 2007: 14).Their position is extremely vulnerable and integration policies are underdeveloped. Existing findings show that both the government and municipalities have neglected the issue of integrating immigrants (Vyhlídal et al, 2008). A less visible form of social exclusion is that of migrant workers, both illegal and legal, and results from institutional factors and the restrictive nature of the 2008 Immigrant Act, in combination with the lack of an integration strategy. Incorrect approaches by employers and illegal practices in hiring foreign workers are not effectively countered by the state administration (Rákoczyová and Trbola, 2009). Only the new Act on Assistance in Cases of Material Need of 2006 provides immigrants with entitlements to social assistance benefits and basic social counselling services in order to resolve or prevent cases of material need. During the economic crisis of 2008–09 it was mostly immigrants who were the first to be laid off. The government has been pushed to launch a new programme to enable them to return home (a free flight plus a lump sum of €500, later €300) and to apply stricter rules on the employment of workers from third countries. Little attention has been paid to their complicated living situations: they often live in extreme poverty and lack legal housing, while returning to their home country is hardly possible because they fall into the hands of corrupt local job agents and have huge debts that they are supposed to pay from their expected earnings.

Conclusions Social capital within Czech society was to a great extent destroyed during communism, with negative consequences for solidarity. Today, the marginal groups of society in particular do not receive much solidarity or benefit from it, and the legitimacy of the support that they receive from public policies is perceived to be weak. Clearly, the causes of poverty have been individualised through the use of a strong moralist 41

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discourse (Lister, 2004).The effects are evident both in the attitudes of the public and in policy documents and policy making.The pragmatic and targeted policies adopted during market transformation have also contributed to the current weakness of solidarity within society and within the welfare state. Under these circumstances, the EU agenda of social inclusion has been continuously deformed and narrowed, along with individualisation of the causes of poverty and an expression of distrust towards the affected groups as a result of prevailing neoliberal policies. At the level of the real policy making, mainstream policies such as minimum-income protection or labour market policies tend to promote ‘activation’ by means of repressive sanctions rather by support for skills. Policies aimed at marginal groups such the homeless, the Roma and immigrants are neglected, and the measures adopted seem more like ‘placebo’ policies. If examples of good practice exist, thanks to the efforts of NGOs and financial support from the European Structural Fund, they rarely influence mainstream policy making. The dynamic of public attitudes and mainstream policy making does not support the assumption that social capital and solidarity will improve rapidly under the influence of democratic society. True democracy consists not only in the establishment of key democratic institutions such as free elections, parliament and basic/political citizenship rights. It requires the gradual building of civil society in terms of general social trust, trust in institutions, linking social capital and civic engagement as the basis for national as well as transnational solidarity. Such processes presume not only structural change in institutions but also a cultural change in thinking and social practices. We are inclined to agree with Ralph Dahrendorf ’s thesis that such a change would require time, at least over the period of one generation. Up to now, we see some signs of this change, such as the initiatives for bottom-up policies by the NGOs, which are now the key actors in policies aimed at marginal social groups. Nevertheless, the NGOs face multiple barriers – mainly public legitimisation of support for the marginal groups, lack of financial support from the government and gaps in legislation. In the conditions created by the current economic crisis, these actors are also exposed to cuts in government support because of shrinking public budgets and their perceived lack legitimacy when competing with other claims. The Social OMC is aiming in the right direction when it promotes empowerment of these actors and of people with experience of poverty and social exclusion, when it recommends their direct participation in designing the NAPSIs, and when it provides European Structural 42

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Fund resources to the projects, raising awareness of poverty and social exclusion and/or projects aimed at preventing/alleviating it. On the other hand, the Social OMC is too ‘soft’ a ‘soft instrument’ when it is confronted with the ‘negative integration’ instruments of the EU, such as the demands of the Stability and Growth Pact and promotion of the principles of general (economic) freedoms by the European Court of Justice, as well as with lack of legitimacy and the commitment to undertake substantial measures at the national level. However, there is probably no other way to push through more effective measures, when other instruments are not widely accepted within the EU. Nevertheless, there is an obvious need to strengthen discussion on the principles of solidarity and social cohesion at the EU level. We can expect a ‘longue, longue marche vers l’Europe sociale’ (Barbier, 2009) in the enlarged Europe.

Acknowledgement This study was written with the support of the Ministry of Education of the Czech Republic (MSM 0021622408 ‘Social Reproduction and Social Integration’). Notes 1 Generalised trust (corresponding to bridging social capital) flourishes in democracies, while particularised trust (corresponding to bonding social capital) is more typical of authoritarian and totalitarian societies (Uslaner, 1999: 122). Although it is a question whether democracy creates trust or trust creates democracy. 2

Data from the Solidarity Survey taken in 2006 by the Institute of Sociology, Czech Republic from a representative sample of the population of the Czech Republic (more in Tuček, 2008: 111). 3

The differentiation between bonding and bridging capital logically brings Putnam to consider the harmful impacts of bonding social capital.What reinforces solidarity and loyalty between members of the group can more or less seriously harm those who are not members of that group (Keller, 2009). 4

In 2007 there were officially some 400,000 non-Czechs in the Czech Republic (of which 31% were Ukrainian and 14% Slovak). 5

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The Holocaust carried out by the Third Reich during the Second World War destroyed not only the Jews, but also the Gypsies in the Czech lands. Of the original Roma population living in Czechoslovakia before 1939, only 3,000 or so remained in 1945. 6

7

Living Minimum Act (Act No 463/1991 Coll).

8

Act on Social Need (Act No 482/1991 Coll).

The Czech unemployment benefit scheme was somewhat residual: it provided the unemployed with 50% of their former wage for three months and 40% for the next three months, with a ceiling of 2.5 times the living minimum for a single individual. 9

10

See http://www.socialni-zaclenovani.cz/.

11

Unpublished data from the Ministry of Youth, Education and Sports.

12

Unpublished data from the Ministry of Youth, Education and Sports.

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Saxonberg, S. and Sirovátka, T. (2009) ‘Neoliberalism by decay? The evolution of the Czech Welfare State’, Social Policy and Administration, 43 (2) 186–203. Scharpf, F.W. (2002) ‘The European social model: coping with the challenges of diversity’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 40 (4) 645–70. Sirovátka,T. (2007) ‘New social risks and social exclusion as a challenge to Czech social policy’, European Journal of Social Security, 9 (1) 55-77. Sirovátka, T. and Mareš, P. (2006) ‘Poverty and social exclusion and social policy in the Czech Republic’, Social Policy and Administration, 40 (3) 288-303. Sirovátka,T. and Rákoczyová, M. (2009) ‘The impact of the EU social inclusion strategy: the Czech case’, in A. Cerami and P. Vanhuysse (eds) Post-Communist welfare pathways:Theorising social policy transformations in central and eastern Europe, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, pp 199–214. Tuček, M. (2008) ‘Spravedlnost, důvěra, legitimita v názorech a postojích veřejnosti’, in M. Tuček (ed) Soudržnost v diferencující se společnosti, Praha: Sociologický ústav, pp 113–151. Uslaner, E.M. (1999) ‘Democracy and social capital’, in M. Warren (ed) Democracy and trust, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp 121–150. Vanhuysse, P. (2006a) ‘Czech exceptionalism? A comparative political economy interpretation of post-Communist policy pathways’, Czech Sociological Review, 42 (6) 1115–36. Vanhuysse, P. (2006b) Divide and pacify, Budapest: Central European University Press. Van Oorschot, W., Sirovátka, T. and Rabušic, L. (1999) ‘Solidarita a podpora sociálního státu. Srovnání České republiky a Nizozemí’, Sociologický časopis, 35 (3) 247–68. Van Oorschot, W., Arts, W. and Gelissen, J. (2006) ‘Social capital in Europe: measurement and social and regional distribution of a multifaceted phenomenon’, Acta Sociologica, 49 (2) 149–167. Večerník, J. (2009) Czech society in the 2000s: A report on socio-economic policies and structures, Prague: Academia. Vládní návrh zákona o pomoci o pomoci v hmotné nouzi (Proposal by Government of the Act on Assistance in Material Need) (2005) Available from: www.psp.cz/sqw/text/orig2.sqw?idd=14460> (accessed 8 January 2009). Vyhlídal, J., Rákoczyová, M., Trbola, R, and Kofro ň, P. (2008) ‘Zaměstnávání cizinců v ČR a jejich integrace’ (Employment of the foreigners in the Czech Republic and their integration), Fórum sociální politiky, 2 (2) 19–22. 47

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Wallace, C. and Pichler, F. (2007) ‘Bridging and bonding social capital: which is more prevalent?’, European Journal of Social Security, 9: 29–54.

48

FOUR

Towards a globalisation of solidarity? Menno Fenger and Kees van Paridon

Introduction Ever since Emile Durkheim introduced the concept of solidarity into the social sciences, many authors have evaluated this topic, often with quite different views. The question of whether or not communities, nations or other systems have enough ‘solidarity’ has been the source of numerous fierce scientific (and societal) debates.This has not changed in the era of globalisation. Again, opinions differ greatly on the impact of globalisation on solidarity. Some authors perceive globalisation as a threat to domestic solidarities (see, for instance, Brunkhorst, 2007), whereas others point to the possibilities that globalisation offers for solidarity within or beyond the current realms (see, for instance, Gould, 2007). The recent ‘credit crunch’ crisis clearly demonstrated the interdependencies between the open economies of the world. As a consequence of these interdependencies, social and financial challenges extend beyond traditional regional and national realms.This was illustrated by concerted efforts to deal with the consequences of the credit crunch both on the global level and on different continental levels (see Hemerijck, 2009).Within the European Union (EU), efforts are aimed at increasing the level of solidarity and social cohesion both within and across European member states. The beginning of the unitary market – initiated with the Treaty of the Hague in 1986 – impelled the EU also to pay attention to the social dimensions of the process of European integration. This led to the introduction of social cohesion as an important goal of the Treaty of Maastricht (1992). This treaty contains the following objective: ‘promote economic and social progress which is balanced and sustainable, in particular through the creation of an area without internal frontiers, through the strengthening of economic and social cohesion and through the establishment of economic and monetary union’ (Article 2).The Treaty of Lisbon (2007) stated further that, based upon a highly competitive 49

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social market economy, the EU will aim at full employment and a high level of protection, combat social exclusion, promote social protection, and solidarity between generations and protect the rights of the child. Finally:‘It shall promote economic, social and territorial cohesion, and solidarity among Member States.’ Of course, solidarity is not only affected by EU policies. As stated earlier, it is affected by issues of globalisation that go beyond the EU’s social policies. The question is to what extent citizens are willing and able to express solidarity within global contexts. Do Europeanisation and globalisation extend solidarity beyond the realm of the traditional community, or do they erode solidarity by weakening the social ties within communities? These are important questions for determining and assessing European initiatives aimed at increasing solidarity. In this chapter, we try to develop a framework for assessing the impact of globalisation and solidarity and provide an overview of existing evidence on this relationship. Our analysis is structured as follows.The next (second) section deals with the concept of solidarity and its different interpretations and proposes a distinction between four types of solidarity: moral individual solidarity, reciprocal individual solidarity, moral institutionalised solidarity and reciprocal institutional solidarity. The third section focuses on the concept of globalisation. Here we argue that this concept refers to four developments which are closely interrelated but clearly distinguishable: the globalisation of autonomy, the globalisation of economics, the globalisation of risks and the globalisation of ideas. In the subsequent sections we explore the impact of globalisation on the types of solidarity identified in the second section. The final section reflects on the impact of globalisation on solidarity. This chapter is based on a review of existing literature and an analysis of available data.

The concept of solidarity Discussions on the concept of solidarity almost invariably start with Durkheim’s now famous distinction between mechanical and organic solidarity. Mechanical solidarity ‘pertains to the relation among members of traditional communities where each member is similarly characterized in terms of identities and perspectives, and stands in the same relation as others to the community as a whole’ (Gould, 2007: 150). ‘This holistic interpretation is contrasted with the more modern “organic” solidarity, where people are linked in interdependent relations with others through an extended division of labor. Here their ties to each other occur almost behind their backs, especially proceeding via 50

Towards a globalisation of solidarity?

their economic interrelations, in which they function as differentiated parts of a large organism’ (Gould, 2007: 150; compare Durkheim, 1997). In our analysis, we define solidarity according to the ‘organic’ approach. In modern societies with a high level of division of labour, people are willing to take more risky decisions only if they know that there is at least a basic level of solidarity. In the case of bad a outcome the person or his/her family still receives an income or other resources by which to participate in society. Partially following De Beer (2005), we distinguish between moral and reciprocal solidarity, and between individual and institutional solidarity. This enables us to identify four types of solidarity. For each of these types, we will analyse the way in which it is affected by globalisation. First, solidarity can be either individual or institutional. Individual solidarity refers to situations in which single persons decide to contribute to the well-being of others. Institutional solidarity refers to forms of solidarity that have been institutionalised. This involves a certain amount of pressure, a certain degree of organisation and the presence of a set of formal or informal rules. Second, solidarity differs according to the motives that people have in contributing to the common good. A rude distinction can be made between ‘morality’ on the one hand and ‘reciprocity’ on the other. Morality refers to all situations in which people contribute to the common good without expecting something in return because of their own conviction that such solidarity is a decent thing. Reciprocity refers to situations in which contributing to others or to the common good also improves or might improve the individual’s own situation, either now or in the future. In his famous book Care and the State, De Swaan (1988) argues that well-understood self-interest is responsible for a lot of arrangements that have created the modern welfare state, including social housing and social medical care.This idea is also present in Rawls’ opinion that solidarity blossoms only under a ‘veil of ignorance’ (cf Rosanvallon, 2000). Based on these two distinctions, four types of solidarity might be identified. First, moral individual solidarity refers to individuals contributing to the common good because they feel a moral willingness or obligation, without expecting something back. Charity is the most prominent example of this type. The second type, reciprocal individual solidarity, refers to individual acts of solidarity that people do to improve their own situation. As De Swaan (1988) illustrates, most arrangements of our current welfare states are based on this type of solidarity, although many of them have evolved into institutionalised arrangements. Third, moral institutionalised solidarity refers to more or 51

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less organised communities (states, local communities, churches) that contribute to the common good without expecting something back. Development aid is to some extent a good example, and also the good deeds of numerous national and international civil society organisations, such as the International Red Cross (IRC). Finally, reciprocal institutional solidarity represents forms of solidarity that involve some degree of institutionalisation and to which members contribute both because they are obliged to do so according to institutional arrangement and because they expect to get something back if they are in a situation of need. Table 4.1 summarises the four types of solidarity. Table 4.1: Examples of four types of solidarity Motive Level

Morality

Reciprocity

Individual

Charity

Neighborhood watch

Development aid

The welfare state

Institutional

The identification of four types of solidarity enables us to be more specific in our statements about the impact of globalisation on solidarity. However, the concept of globalisation is almost as fuzzy as the concept of solidarity.Therefore, before arriving at the key part of this chapter, in which we analyse existing evidence, in the next section we elaborate on the concept of globalisation.

Globalisation As stated earlier, the concept of globalisation refers to a set of complex, interrelated developments. In our opinion, globalisation refers to four developments. Fading autonomy Hinted at by Castells (2000), globalisation is a process that we label as ‘fading autonomy’. In the global era, the autonomy and sovereignty of nation-states is shrinking because of several developments. First, economic, social and environmental problems are increasingly interrelated on a worldwide scale. Second, as a consequence of modern ICTs, communications, media and financial transactions are hardly controllable any longer by national governments. And third, the development of international systems of law and regulation has diminished the autonomy and sovereignty of nation-states. In Europe, 52

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the impact of the EU on national autonomy is high, while on the global level the International Court of Justice in The Hague is a good example (Morris, 1998; Fenger and Cachet, 2004). Economic globalisation According to Castells (2000: 102), the global economy is ‘an economy whose core components have the institutional, organizational, and technological capacity to work as a unit in real time, or in chosen time, on a planetary scale’ and ‘it was only in the late twentieth century that the world economy was able to become truly global on the basis of the new infrastructure provided by information and communication technologies, and with the decisive help of deregulation and liberalization policies implemented by governments and international institutions’ (Castells, 2000: 101). The globalisation of risks The process of globalisation leads to global physical, economic and social risks.The flows of (agricultural) products, of services and of people all around the globe, the necessity to have international transportation and communication links and the dependency on foreign markets, money, people and ideas – all these elements have increased these risks. The current financial and economic crisis has once again made very clear, in its speed and its size, how heavily countries, sectors, firms and individuals depend on each other, and what dramatic financial and economic consequences this situation can have for growth, budget, unemployment and poverty all over the world, in places that have nothing to do with the problems that caused the crisis. Globalisation of ideas In the global era, the meaning of cultural differences seems to be declining. Universal concepts of liberty, democracy and welfare spread throughout the world.The proliferation of the concept of fast food and of products such as the iPod contributes to this increasing uniformity (compare Fukuyama, 1992; Ritzer, 1995). Alternatively, De Beer and Koster define globalisation as increasing cross-border interactions. They distinguish three forms of interactions: economic – flows of goods, services and capital; social – cross-border flows of information, ideas and people; and political – bilateral relations between countries

53

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as well as membership of larger international or supranational bodies (De Beer and Koster, 2009: 107–8). In short, globalisation is a broad process, influencing many systems of society, and equally, countries, sectors, firms and individuals. Among these systems, social security seems to be one of the most threatened ones. So the question arises: what does globalisation mean for solidarity? In this chapter, we tentatively explore and synthesise current evidence about the impact of globalisation on solidarity. In the next (fourth) section we discuss the impact of globalisation on individual solidarity and in the fifth section we focus on institutional solidarity.

Individual solidarity and globalisation To what extent do the processes of Europeanisation and globalisation affect individual solidarity? As might be expected, scholarly opinions on the relationship between globalisation and solidarity do differ. Koster (2007) has summarised two positions in this debate. On the one hand, it might be argued that globalisation limits willingness to help others because of more porous national boundaries and lower social cohesion. Furthermore, the more globalised the world becomes, the greater the chance of heterogeneity between individuals and groups, the less individual solidarity can be expected.The circle of people that ‘deserve’ the help of others in a community (be it local, regional or national) will decline, because a bigger community is less homogeneous, people are less recognisable, one from another, and therefore are less strictly defined in a globalised world. On the other hand, globalisation might also strengthen local structures and increase awareness of mutual the interdependence of people within a community.The current financial crisis might serve as an example of this newly recognised mutual interdependence within national communities. In addition to this debate, which focuses on ‘traditional’ communities, we can also extend the potential impact of globalisation on solidarity beyond national borders. Whenever humanitarian or natural disasters have occurred, a large stream of help from private initiatives from all over the planet is organised. In 2009 the IRC spent about 943 million Swiss francs on all kinds of assistance. About 39% went to Africa, 27% to Asia and Oceania, 21% to North Africa and the Middle East and 14% to Europe and the Americas. At the same time, Europe and the Americas alone contributed more than 85% of the total IRC budget (ICRC, 2010). This illustrates that feelings of solidarity can extend beyond national borders. This leads to two questions. First, to what extent do people in a globalised world extend their feelings of solidarity 54

Towards a globalisation of solidarity?

and deservingness beyond national borders? Second, if this occurs, is it at the expense of ‘national’ solidarity? In this section we will first deal with the relationship between globalisation and solidarity within national communities, and then we will deal with the question of whether globalisation implies an extension of the realm of deserving people. The best means to assess the impact of globalisation on individual moral solidarity is to relate longitudinal data on globalisation to the indicated and actual levels of solidarity in countries. The absence of longitudinal data in this area forces us to a second-best solution: to analyse the relationship between solidarity and levels of openness in countries, and to infer the impact of globalisation from individuallevel studies. In an insightful and thorough multilevel analysis, Koster (2007) analysed the relationship between countries’ social and economic openness and their citizens’ indicated willingness to help others. It appears that willingness to help others is not negatively related to the economic and social openness of countries. Using data from the European Values Study, Koster concluded that these two kinds of openness are unrelated to willingness to help the sick and disabled, and that they are positively related to willingness to help migrants (Koster, 2007).This led Koster to reject the claim that globalisation undermines social structures and willingness to assist others.This conclusion implies that the opposite assumption – a positive relation between globalisation and solidarity at the community level – needs to be rejected as well. Koster’s approach is based on studies in which people indicate their willingness to help other people. Moral individual solidarity can also be measured by taking into account people’s charitable gifts.Again, there is no clear dataset that enables us to analyse whether or not the circle of donations has increased geographically, so we need to rely on inductive arguments. When analysing the impact of globalisation on charitable giving, it is important to note that such giving has been found to be strongly associated with individual ‘objective’ factors, such as education, gender, race and income (see, for instance, Bielefeld et al, 2005). This group of factors is not affected in any way by globalisation. In addition, there is a relationship between charitable giving and individual attitudes, religious affiliation and political ideologies. Again, all these factors that seem to be more or less immune to globalisation. If globalisation is to have any effect on individual moral solidarity, it is by enlarging the concept of community. In a speech to a symposium on global charities, Brodhead (2004: 5) stated that ‘[t]he history of human progress is in large measure about how our notion of community has grown from the family to the clan to the ethnic 55

Reinventing social solidarity across Europe

or religious group we belong to, to the nation-state and finally to the emergent global society of which we are all part’. At first sight, this sense of a global community seems to be reflected in the immediate and worldwide responses to large-scale humanitarian disasters, such as the Haitian earthquake in 2010 and the Indian Ocean tsunami in 2004. For instance, Americans made record donations to the Haitian cause: more than $500 million was raised within two weeks. In the Netherlands, €111 million was raised. However, these figures are, at best, only circumstantial evidence for the emergence of a global community. The scarce data that are available on individual donations to international development organisations seem to suggest that they form a small proportion of total donations. In the UK, about a quarter of private individual donations go to international development charities, in the Netherlands about 15% and in the US an even smaller 2%.The only exception is Germany, where 60% of all charitable donations are destined for international causes (Micklewright and Wright, 2004). Although the amount of evidence is too limited for us to come to final conclusions, the conclusion from this exploration is that charitable giving with the aim of raising the well-being of people in other countries is rather low, compared to domestic charitable giving. Regarding individual solidarity, there remains the question whether globalisation has extended the realm of people with whom people do feel connected. In general, people tend to have fewer feelings of solidarity with people at a greater geographical distance. Table 4.2 illustrates this, using the European average. Due to increasing globalisation and Europeanisation, we might expect that Europe and the world have become ‘flatter’, bringing Europeans and other people closer to individuals’ realms of concern. Again, there are no longitudinal data available to answer this question.Therefore we rely on a cross-sectional analysis at the country level.We have performed two preliminary analyses (Figures 4.1 and 4.2). Figure 4.1 presents the Table 4.2: Concerns of European citizens (percentage of population much or very much concerned about …) European average Your immediate family

83.9

People in your neighbourhood

29.6

People in your region

21.1

Your fellow countrymen

25.3

Europeans

13.1

Humankind

26.4

Source: EVS (1999), see also De Beer and Koster (2009)

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relationship between the level of social openness (measured by using the KOF Index of globalisation) and concern about the human race. There appears to be no relationship between these concepts. This implies that in more open countries people do not feel significantly more concerned about people in other countries. Figure 4.2 illustrates the relationship between trust in the EU and concern about Europeans. Again, there appears to be no relationship between these concepts. This implies that even if people feel more related to the EU, they are not more inclined to help fellow Europeans than people that have less trust in the EU. And from Table 4.1 we

Social openness

Figure 4.1: Social openness and concern about the human race (2006) 50 45 40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0

0

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Figure 4.2:Trust and concern about Europeans (2006)

People that have trust in European Union (%)

80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0

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People that express concern about fellow Europeans (%) 57

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might conclude that the initial inclination to help fellow Europeans is remarkably low, in comparison to other communities. There is one final element regarding individual solidarity that needs to be discussed. Instead of people within a nation-state, acts of solidarity might, and actually do, reach people throughout the world. This may be seen in networks of people with something in common: ideology, sexual orientation or hobbies. Gould (2007) views these networks as mechanisms for transnational solidarity. We follow Gould in her opinion that these forms of solidarity do occur. Logically, we might expect these networks to become more important in an era of globalisation. But we have no data available to confirm or reject this idea. So a preliminary conclusion is that there is hardly any evidence for a relationship between globalisation and individual solidarity. The behaviour and opinions of individuals concerning solidarity are not much affected by globalisation.

Institutionalised solidarity and globalisation As in the preceding section, we use the distinction between moral and reciprocal institutional solidarity in relation to the globalisation process. Regarding moral institutional solidarity, the best example to mention here is that of development aid.After the Second World War a movement developed, partly fed by feelings of regret and sorrow about earlier colonial behaviour, also partly inspired by religious feelings, to send money to so-called third world countries to stimulate their economic development. From 1960 onwards, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) published data on Official Development Assistance (ODA). Part of these ODA funds are grants. Figure 4.3 shows the development over time of ODA as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP). For the non-European countries, for the original EEC-6 and for the OECD overall, ODA has been quite stable over time. Only for the Scandinavian countries a strong increase can be observed, from 1960 until the late 1980s.The social and financial crisis that then affected the Scandinavian countries caused a decline in ODA, but since 1995 Scandinavian ODA has again been quite stable. It remained at a much higher level than elsewhere in the OECD. Figure 4.4 shows ODA as an average of the last 5 years. The ODA target for developed countries is at least 0.7% of GDP, has been met by only a few countries, namely Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. The next group of countries, from Belgium to Germany, has an ODA somewhere between 0.4 and 0.5%.At the lower 58

0.00 1960

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Figure 4.3: ODA as a percentage of GDP (1960–2008)

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59

60

s m d m d s g a a y y in y y d e e ic n k n d ia d ia d al ly ic de our rwa mar land do elan lgiu nlan str rlan anc man Spa nad elan alan tral tug tate Japa Ita ubl eec ubl rke gar lan ore e o n r u r g u a r p b i p s S K T u P Ic Ze u Po d A itze F er G Re C Sw em No Den ther Kin Ir Be F H Re A G x w k w e ed ite h u a e c S n N it v L U N ze n C Slo U

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Reinventing social solidarity across Europe

Towards a globalisation of solidarity?

end, we find a number of Central and Eastern European countries. A possible explanation for these differences in ODA as a percentage of GDP could be the possession of colonies before 1960. Because of continuing economic and social contacts, because of a policy to tie former colonies to their own sphere of influence (dominions in the case of the UK, Francophone countries in the case of France) or because of regret about the colonial past, it could be that countries with such pasts do show a higher ODA. That is not the case. The Netherlands scores high, with 0.81%, but Belgium, France and the UK have much lower scores. Figure 4.5 shows the changes in levels of ODA between the early 1990s (average 1990–94) and the late 2000s (average 2005–09). On the whole the changes are modest, but three countries (Luxembourg, Ireland and Austria) show a very strong increase in ODA during this period. For Ireland, this might be explained by its very strong economic development, but for the other two countries no direct explanation is available. This raises the question of what explanations can be given for these differences in level and development over time. We use data of the 15 countries that were members of the EU around 1990. Data are from OECD and Eurostat, and are as recent as possible. The first explanation deals with the degree of openness. Smaller countries normally are more open economies, because their businesses need more foreign markets in order to realise a sufficient scale of Figure 4.5: Nominal change in ODA (as a percentage of GDP) between early 1990s and late 2000s 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4

Germany Netherlands Australia Portugal Japan Italy Finland Canada Norway Denmark France

0.3 0.2 0 –0.1 –0.2

Luxembourg Ireland Austria United Kingdom Spain Belgium Turkey Switzerland Korea Sweden New Zealand United States

0.1

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production.At the same time, they are also more dependent on products from abroad. This increased dependency makes these countries more aware of the importance of positive economic development abroad. That could stimulate them to contribute to ODA. Figure 4.6 shows a certain relationship. The correlation coefficient is 0.62. A second explanation could be that richer countries, having once generated sufficient money for their basis needs, have more possibilities for spending their extra money on other goals, such as environmental protection, labour safety and development assistance. The data, as shown in Figure 4.7, are in line with this suggestion. The correlation coefficient is 0.71. A third explanation could be that countries with a bigger welfare state, normally with higher tax and premium rates, are more willing to contribute more to ODA. The argument runs as follows: the greater the size of the welfare state, the higher the public expenditures for social security, education, housing and so on, the higher also the level of institutional solidarity. This could contribute to greater acceptance of more ODA expenditure. At the same time, the argument could also run in the opposite direction. Having already paid so much in taxes and premiums, citizens of countries with higher expenditures for social security might be less willing to pay something extra for solidarity with people somewhere abroad. The higher the domestic level of institutional solidarity, the higher or the lower the international level of solidarity will be. Figure 4.8 shows a positive but rather weak relationship between the size of ODA and the collective tax burden, Figure 4.6: Relationship between size of ODA and trade openness

Trade openness (X + M as percentage of GDP)

180 160 140 120 100 80 60 40 20 0

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Towards a globalisation of solidarity? Figure 4.7: Relationship between size of ODA (percentage of GDP) and GDP per capita 80,000 70,000 60,000 50,000 40,000 30,000 20,000 10,000 0

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that is, taxes and premiums paid as a percentage of GDP.The correlation coefficient is 0.39. On the basis of this analysis the conclusion is that globalisation seems to increase institutionalised moral solidarity. However, it must be clear that the analyses performed here are simple and preliminary.They need to be scrutinised at a later stage. Regarding reciprocal institutionalised solidarity and globalisation, the fear that globalisation undermines national welfare states through a process of tax competition is widespread.The main argument that is Figure 4.8: Relationship between size of ODA (percentage of GDP) and tax and premium burden (percentage of GDP) 55 50 45 40 35 30

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used for this expectation is usually as follows: national governments are forced to lower taxes on labour and on capital so as to be attractive as a place of employment and a place of residence for global companies. This is supposed to be a ‘race to the bottom’: the country with the lowest tax levels is the most attractive in the global market. Low taxes imply extensive cuts in the welfare state, implying in turn lower levels of benefits and protection. The ‘race to the bottom’ hypothesis even includes competition in the areas of environmental protection and labour standards. Specifically in the area of national welfare states, much research has been performed to analyse the relation between national welfare states and globalisation. Koster (2009) found that 19 out of 27 studies support the hypotheses that there is no clear relationship between globalisation and welfare state retrenchment, whereas eight studies seem to confirm the hypothesis. However, the comparability of these studies is limited because of different countries, different time frames and different indicators for both the dependent and the independent variable. This brings Koster to conclude that ‘welfare states are not necessarily in danger because of economic openness…. [Equally, it does not mean that] economic openness is positively related to the welfare state, considering the large number of studies showing that they are not related at all’ (Koster, 2009: 160). Koster’s findings confirm many other analyses that stress the importance of political preferences and ideologies in welfare state retrenchment (see, for instance, Schwartz, 2001; Castles, 2004; Navarro et al, 2004).This brings us to the conclusion that there is no relation between globalisation and institutional reciprocal solidarity at the national level. However, from a European perspective it is interesting to notice that in recent years some new initiatives of transnational solidarity have been developed inside the EU.The first initiative is meant to cope with the negative consequences of cross-border economic developments. In 2006 the European Council decided to establish the so-called European Globalisation Adjustment Fund (EGAF), aimed at showing solidarity with, and providing support to, workers made redundant as a consequence of major structural changes in world trade patterns. Assuming net positive benefits of open trade with regard to growth and employment, this fund could reconcile those workers, the most vulnerable and lowest-skilled ones who would be adversely affected by these developments. In 2009 the rules of this fund were adjusted to cope with the consequences of the financial and economic crisis. In the period between 2007 and mid-2010, 63 applications for support were received by the European Commission, from 15 member states 64

Towards a globalisation of solidarity?

(European Commission, 2010). This support can be used for active labour market measures, from job search and training to outplacement and entrepreneurship. In 2009, 30 applications were received, for a total amount of €166 million. Targeted at almost 30,000 workers, this meant a contribution out of the EGAF of almost €6,000 per worker. Assuming that yearly about 8% of the labour force has to find a new job (about 20 million people or so), the impact of the EGAF at this stage is still small. The second initiative is directly linked to the financial and economic crisis. In this situation, the European Commission, together with the European Central Bank and the International Monetary Fund, created the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF). It has a budget of about €440 billion to help those countries with loans that otherwise are no longer able to attract sufficient money on reasonable terms as a result of exceptional circumstances beyond national member states’ control (EFSF Framework Agreement, 2010). The funds of the EFSF were provided by member states according to their GDP. In almost all countries the budget deficit increased dramatically, but some countries were harder hit than others. In Greece the deficit exceeded 12%. It was feared that in the near future Greece would no longer be able to service its debt and the EFSF was needed to prevent another blow to the already unstable international financial system. After Greece, Portugal, Spain and also Ireland were viewed as other potentially financially unstable countries. Both schemes can be judged as new ways of exerting cross-border solidarity between countries.Those countries that are harder hit by the globalisation process or the recent economic and financial crisis, or that have used inappropriate social or budgetary policies, can receive support from other nations. Of course, this support is not unconditional, and is not based solely on feelings of international solidarity. The possible impact of slow growth and high budget deficits on the economic development of the whole euro area and the consequences for member states’ own financial institutions are much stronger arguments for this support. Still, they can be viewed as first signs of transnational reciprocal solidarity within the EU and the eurozone in difficult times.

Conclusions In this chapter we have argued that, in order to assess the impact of globalisation on solidarity, we need to identify more clearly the meaning as well as the emprical origins and the development of each concept.We therefore focused our research effort on a set of individual relationships 65

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that are all part of the broader concepts of solidarity and globalisation. It was made clear that in modern societies, with their high level of division of labour, Durkheim’s ‘organic’ approach fits best. Four types of solidarity were distinguished on the basis of differences in motives and in level of solidarity. The different aspects of globalisation were then described, and connected to the scheme above. Then, in the empirical part of the chapter, some sketchy evidence was presented regarding the respective relationships between individual and institutionalised solidarity and globalisation. In Table 4.3 we summarised the main conclusions of this analysis. At the individual level, there is hardly any evidence at all for a relationship between solidarity and globalisation. Ongoing globalisation does not seem to stimulate acts of individual solidarity, but at the same time it does not undermine it. At the institutionalised level, we need to distinguish between reciprocal and moral solidarity. Regarding the reciprocal type of solidarity at this level, there are two relevant developments. First, at the European level, initiatives have been undertaken to anticipate new social and financial risks that are caused by increased worldwide interdependencies, most notably the European Monetary Fund to combat the effects of the credit crunch, and the European Globalisation Fund to deal with the effects of losses of employment at local and regional levels.These initiatives clearly indicate an upward shift in responsibility. This has become necessary because of the magnitude of the challenges that are caused by globalisation. The nation-state level is not equipped to deal with these challenges. Second, with regard to the traditional institutions of the welfare state, hardly any effects of globalisation have become visible. Neither the long-feared ‘race to the bottom’ nor the evolution of a single European Social Model has become true, or appears likely to become true in the near future. Table 4.3:Towards a globalisation of solidarity? Conclusions Motive Level

Morality

Reciprocity

Individual

• No increased feelings of solidarity within European context • Slight increase in cross-border giving but very selective based on media-coverage and ‘pity-factor’

• No evidence that European citizens experience increased pooled risks within European Union or globalised world

Institutional

• Open countries spend more money on development aid

• European Union tries to anticipate on the effects of globalisation through EMF and EGF • No clear impact of globalisation on national welfare states

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This chapter has aimed to analyse the impact of globalisation on solidarity.This is an important issue both within Europe and worldwide. The EU aims at increasing solidarity between European nations and citizens. However, from our analysis it appears that at the individual level, the traditional circles of family and community remain the most important realms through which individuals exchange solidarity, in both its moral and reciprocal forms. At the institutional level, the most important conclusion is that the EU itself anticipates the consequences of globalisation. We have argued that the social and financial risks in a globalised world require responses that extend national capabilities.The emergence of institutionalised forms of solidarity at the transnational level can therefore be explained by the inadequacy of traditional forms of institutionalised reciprocal solidarity at the national level. In addition, we have found no other evidence of globalisation undermining modern welfare states. This leads to the conclusion that globalisation demands additional forms of transnational institutionalised solidarity without significantly affecting existing forms. Concerning the moral form of institutionalised solidarity, we have observed some influence of trade openness and GDP per capita on official development aid. However, in the near future this relationship could easily be neutralised because of major cuts in public expenditures to redress the huge deficits caused by the economic and financial crisis. There is another factor that could exert a stronger influence in the years to come, namely the use of ODA as a means of gaining political and economic influence in other countries, either because of the presence of natural resources or because of their strategic position. In recent years China has built up many contacts, especially in Africa, for precisely these reasons. It can be expected that other countries, like the United States or the EU, also dependent on these scarce resources, will use similar strategies to regain or improve their positions. To describe it in the key concepts of this chapter, we might expect – although we have not yet observed it – a shift from moral to reciprocal solidarity with regard to the relationship with developing countries.

References Beer, P. de (2005) ‘Hoe solidair is de Nederlander nog?’, in E. de Jong and M. Buijsen (eds) Solidariteit onder druk? Over de grens tussen individuele en collectieve verantwoordelijkheid, Nijmegen: Valkhof Pers, pp 54–79. Beer, P. de and F. Koster (2009) Sticking together or falling apart? Solidarity in an era of individualization and globalization, Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press. 67

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Bielefeld,W., Rooney, P. and K. Steinberg (2005) ‘How do need,capacity, geography, and politics influence giving?’, in A.C. Brooks (ed) Gifts of time and money in America’s communities, Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, pp 127–57. Brodhead, T. (2004) Philanthropy in the era of globalization, Speech to ‘Community Foundations: Symposium on global movement’, Berlin, 2-4 December 2004. Brunkhorst, H. (2007) ‘Globalizing solidarity: the destiny of democratic solidarity in the times of global capitalism, global religion, and the global public’, Journal of Social Philosophy, 38 (1) 93–111. Castells, M. (2000) The rise of the network society, Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. Castles, F.G. (2004) The future of the welfare state: Crisis myths and crisis realities, Oxford: Oxford University Press. De Swaan, A. (1988) Care of the state: Health care, education and welfare in Europe and the USA in the modern era, Cambridge: Polity Press. Durkheim, É. (1997, original 1893) The division of labour in society, with an introduction by L.A. Coser, New York: Free Press. EFSF Framework Agreement (2010) Luxembourg, 7 June. European Commission (2010) Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the activities of the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund in 2009, COM (2010) 464 final. Fenger, M. and L. Cachet (2004) ‘Slotbeschouwing’, in L. Cachet and M. Fenger (eds) BZK in strategisch perspectief, Amsterdam: Rozenberg, pp 169–80. Fukuyama, F. (1992) The end of history and the last man, New York: Avon Books inc. Gould, C.C. (2007) ‘Transnational solidarities’, Journal of Social Philosophy, 38 (1) 148–64. Gould, C.C. and S.J. Scholz (2007) ‘Introduction’ in: Journal of Social Philosophy, 38 (1): 3–6. Hemerijck, A. (2009) ‘ The institutional legacy of the crisis of global capitalism’, in A.B. Hemerijck, B. Knapen and E. van Doorne (eds) Aftershocks: Economic crisis and institutional choice, Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, pp 13–51. ICRC (International Committee of the Red Cross) (2010) Annual Report, Geneva: ICRC. Koster, F. (2007) ‘Globalization, social structure, and the willingness to help others: a multilevel analysis across 26 countries’, European Sociological Review, 23 (4) 537–51. Koster, F. (2009) ‘The welfare state and globalization: down and out or too tough to die?’, International Journal of Social Welfare, 18: 153–62. 68

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Micklewright, J. and A. Wright (2004) Private donations for international development, London: Centre for Economic Policy Research Discussion Paper No 4292. Morris, C.M. (1998) An essay on the modern state, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Navarro, V., Schmitt, J. and J. Astudillo (2004) ‘Is globalisation undermining the welfare state?’, Cambridge Journal of Economics 28: 133–52. Rosanvallon, P. (2000) The new social question: Rethinking the welfare state, Princeton: Princeton University Press. Ritzer, G. (1995) The McDonaldization of society, Newbury Park, CA: Pine Forge Press. Schwarz, H. (2001) ‘Round up the usual suspects! Globalization, domestic politics, and welfare state change’, in P. Pierson (ed) The new politics of the welfare state, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp 17–44.

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Childcare law, policy and practice in Europe

FIVE

Contested terrains and emerging solidarities within childcare law, policy and practice in Europe Marion Ellison

Introduction The ‘lived’ and ‘shared learned experiences’ of children and young people across Europe most clearly define and reflect the condition and contours of the European public realm. Largely shaped by the dynamics of institutionalised social solidarity and delivered through universal education and welfare services, their integration within and across European society pivot on a definitive balance between public and private responsibility (Lorenz, 1998; Lister, 2006; Midgely, 2008). For children in care across Europe, lived and learned experiences lie at the intersection of this balance, revealing how states mediate the relationship between the ‘dis-welfares’ (Gough, 1979) generated by the global economy and the national ‘particularisms’ which shape the implementation of childcare law, policy and practice. Within this context the crises experienced in welfare in recent decades can be regarded as a crisis in social solidarity, with a deleterious impact on the public realm across European settings (Lorenz, 2001; Offe, 2003; Clark, 2004). The majority of children who become ‘looked after’ by the state have experienced various levels of poverty and deprivation (Lister, 2006; Garrett, 2010). Equally, the link between family crises and poverty is also well documented (Madge and Attridge, 1996; Munday, 1996; Munday and Ely, 1996; Lister, 2006; Ellison, 2007). Indeed, contours of inequality across European countries mirror the levels of children taken into public care: Despite the lack of consistent data, it can be roughly estimated that around 1% of children are taken into public care across the EU [European Union] – approximately one million children.This proportion of course varies between 71

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countries. In Latvia around 2.2% of children are taken into public care. In Sweden approximately 0.66% of the child population is affected. In Romania, approximately 1.6% of the child population is under special protection more or less unchanged since 1997 (1.66% of children). (Eurochild Report, 2010) In Britain, where levels of inequality are among the highest in Europe (UNICEF, 2007), the recent austerity measures introduced by the Coalition government are forecast to lead to ‘an increase in absolute poverty in 2013–14 by about 300,000 children’ (Joyce, 2010). As a result, rising numbers of children are living in alternative care in Britain, with an unprecedented increase between 2008 and 2009 (Fostering Network, 2010). Across Europe, the number of children in institutions is stable or even rising in several EU countries. Approximately one million children are living in alternative care across Europe. The practice of placing children under the age of three in institutions still exists in several member states, despite the fact that placing infants in institutional care for several months causes irreversible damage to brain development (Eurochild Report, 2010). For ethnic minority children living at the margins of European society, the risk of being placed in care is disproportionate. In Bulgaria, Roma children account for approximately 45% of children in care. In the Czech Republic, in 2007, 24% of children in baby homes were Roma. The institutionalisation of children with disabilities is also a major concern in many countries of the EU. We know the root cause for many children entering the care system is poverty and social exclusion. We need a high level political commitment to end child poverty and must mobilise more resources for early intervention and prevention, strengthening families and access to quality services (Jana Hainsworth, Eurochild Secretary General, in Eurochild Report, 2010)

Childcare law, inequality and the politics of social solidarity The operationalisation of high-level political commitment to ‘end child poverty’ in Europe requires the acceptance and promotion of a paradigm of ‘moral political economy’ Schwartz (2008). The daily routine of deprivation and suffering experienced by children and families who 72

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are consigned to the worst ‘dis-welfares’ of global capitalism cannot be transformed without a change in the power relations of societal bodies and an increase in rights of access to knowledge to enable a process of reversal of inequality. At the same time, the organisational and professional reconfigurations within the public sphere across European societies have been characterised by fragmentation (Lorenz, 2001; Clarke, 2004; Ellison, 2007; Adams, Dominelli and Payne, 2009; Newman and Clarke, 2009). Here, privatisation is associated with ideologies that call for the ‘desocialisation’ of services and the transformation of the public sphere (Clarke, 2004; Lister, 2006). At a micro level, the standardisation of social services has compounded this fragmentation as unified theories of social work are atomised into component parts such as activation, counselling and protection (Lorenz, 2008; Newman and Clarke, 2009). The fragmentation of the theory and method of social work critically undermines the holistic humanity that has historically characterised social work professional practice (Harding, 1991; Houston, 1996; Hellinkxz and Colton, 1998; Jack, 2000). The impact of this on professional identities has also been well documented (Newman, 2003; Berg et al, 2008). Lorenz evokes the wider implications within professional social work of neoliberal models operationalised via new public management: Professional social work can never be reduced to a matter of social engineering … the contribution our profession makes to the creation and organization of social solidarity under conditions of modernity where social bonds, obligations, rights and responsibilities are never simply ‘given’ and selfevident. (Lorenz, 2006a) Attempts to de-socialise childcare professional social work across Europe have been impeded to an extent by unified principles of childcare law, derived from universal rights of children and their families. The importance of childcare law as a socialising instrument within professional childcare social work practice cannot be overstated. The implementation of right-based policy and practice within social work is consistent with the humanistic approach, which unifies rightsbased law, theory, method and practice. National and transnational legal frameworks such as the Human Rights Act 1998 (UK), the European Convention on Human Rights (European Commission for Human Rights, 1953), and the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC) (United Nations, 1989) underpin the architecture 73

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of childcare policy organisation, governance and practice across Europe. Critically, the active engagement of social work practitioners in the local, subnational and supranational reporting within the monitoring process of the UNCRC provides an active mechanism and process for transnational social solidarity within a rights-based framework. Local social work professionals can actively ‘contribute their professional experience to the pool of evidence upon which further necessary policy changes may be made, whether at local, national or transnational levels of governance’ (Williams, 2008: 2). For Williams this mechanism acts a means of ‘looking beyond current barriers to the implementation of universal rights of the child’ (Williams, 2008: 2). Within a human rights-based approach to social solidarity this form of reporting and monitoring is a proactive act of transnational social solidarity between professionals and user groups within the local and European ‘public sphere’. Here, the day-to-day encounters and relationships between professionals and children and families are revealed through the articulation of breaches of human rights occurring within local social spheres of socio-economic activity. While the discourse of the neoliberal economic agenda extols the ethics of the market as the basis of all human action, proclaiming the inevitability of reconfigured public welfare boundaries (Harvey, 2005), previous work has revealed that these encounters and relationships are experienced within the context of ‘contested terrains’ forged within the ‘particularisms’ of national socio-political, legal and cultural contexts (Clark, 2004; Mooney and Poole, 2004; Lister, 2006; Ellison, 2007; Newman and Clarke, 2009).

Co-determining local and transnational solidarity A human rights model of social solidarity based upon reformed ‘codetermination’ frameworks and experience (pace Pulignano, 2007; Whittall et al, 2007) enables the meaningful articulation of both individual and collective human rights in childcare law, policy and practice. Reinvented ‘co-determination’ concerns the shared power relationships within and across the organisation and governance of public child welfare services, enhancing ‘shared learned’ experiences. Sartre (1957, 1976) infers that the ‘dialectical circularity’ of social solidarity and governance is possible across Europe, through the reciprocal relationship of ‘situation and project’ as praxis, which engenders strength in social solidarity, freedom and human rights. Plainly, this has relevance across the public realm for social solidarity.

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The Scottish Government has set the agenda for this with the ‘Solidarity Purpose Target 5’: To increase overall income and the proportion of income earned by the three lowest income deciles as a group by 2017…. The healthy development of our society depends on reducing inequalities and sharing the future benefits of growth among people and communities, removing the personal and social costs of poverty … by learning, skills and well-being: a focus on giving every child a strong start in life, as well as in school education, enabling them to gain the skills they need to succeed. (Scottish Government, 2010) Child social work professionals mediate social solidarity between local and national levels. A human rights approach to transnational social solidarity is informed by and enables the communication of ‘lived’ and ‘learned experiences’ within local settings in Europe.The significance of this is threefold. Firstly, by predicating social solidarity as based upon universal human rights that are legally sanctioned within an international setting, it overcomes the closed national discourses which seek to legitimate the reconfiguration of local welfare arrangements on the grounds of ‘the inevitability of austerity measures’, ‘neoliberal ideology’ or ‘activation policies’. Secondly, the process itself enables welfare professionals to engage with and articulate their experience of human rights as social praxis, articulating the ‘lived’ and ‘shared learned’ experiences of children and families who often experience the worst ‘dis-welfares’ of the global market arising from structural inequality, poverty and marginalisation.Thirdly, this involves a reflexive and critical involvement in the communicative process, which has the capacity to liberate professionals and children and their families from dominant discourses of welfare (Habermas, 1987, 1996). Crucially, the realities of the social realm become emergent inventions and reinventions of communicative actions.The view that the social realm is not a civil or moral entity, but an emergent invention and reinvention of communicative actions, also gives political scope to emergent transnational social solidarity (Habermas, 1998). The location of transnational social solidarity within a transnational human rights framework necessitates local and national dialogue that is free from cultural and political manipulation yet reflects the diversity of local populations and enables the possibility of the transformation of local reality through social solidarity. Endorsing this, the Eurochild network calls upon the EU to reduce the risk of social exclusion by 75

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ensuring that no child is taken into care because of poverty, disability or ethnic origin (Eurochild Report, 2010). Despite this, the capacity of international bodies such as the UNCRC to influence policy development within Europe is limited by the constitutional asymmetry within European integration that elevates policies that promote economic competitiveness and market efficiency above human rights, equality and social solidarity (Scharpt, 2002). In attempting to reconcile this asymmetry, the European Social Open Method of Coordination seeks only to influence and not to redistribute power within childcare policy and practice at national levels.The consequent disconnect between the lived realities of ‘looked after’ children and their families and local and transnational responses is evidenced by disparities in levels of child poverty between redistributive and ‘residualist’ welfare regimes in Europe (UNICEF, 2007). Even in its dynamic form, the concept of ‘citizenship’ does not provide an adequate analytical lens through which to view the changing relationship between children and young people and local and transnational settings characterised by ‘multilevel interactions between different tiers within and beyond the nation state (Newman, 2003: 6).The recent widespread demonstrations which characterised the response of young people and children to the marketisation of higher education, such as in England and Wales, indicate how the dynamic and fluid nature of social solidarity mediated within education as a ‘lived’ and ‘shared learned’ experience goes beyond national citizenship and speaks to a wider European and global social and knowledge economy. Since the 1990s, childcare policy across European states has to varying degrees adapted to changes in strategies of governance emerging within a paradigm imported from the private sector.The fragmentation of the public domain and transformations within civil society have elevated the significance of the need to move to new forms of governance (Clarke, 2004; Born and Jensen, 2005; Newman and Clarke, 2009). The socio-psychological and social impacts of recent transformations in welfare within different European contexts are often translated into resistance within the public realm, characterised by a connectivity between different levels of social solidarity and individual action. The specificity of welfare settings within Europe renders power and governance as spatial contexts. ‘Continuity’ links public and private spheres, bringing relevance to and articulating distinct and divergent social solidarities. The human need for continuity, providing meaning and sustenance to social consciousness, against changing welfare regimes may have been greatly understated (Haldane, 2006). More broadly, continuity of rights and material certainty is becoming a scarce resource. 76

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Arguably, the psychological need for continuity is often overlooked in the analysis of transformation impacts on children, families and welfare professionals (Ellison, 2004). Most of us chose this career because we’re caring people. But it’s because we care that we’re on strike. (Lisa Harrow, childcare social worker, Liverpool, Guardian, 24 November 2004) For Lisa Harrow, the decision to become one of the 150 childcare social workers in Liverpool who went on strike for four months in 2004 was premised upon individual and collective ethical and professional identity. During November 2004, Carola Fischbach-Pyttel from the European Federation of Public Service Unions, which represents 217 unions and 8 million public service workers, co-chaired a session at the European Social Forum on public services and the welfare state. This session allowed trade union activists to argue in favour of the upgrading of quality public services.There had been ongoing disputes in France, Germany, Italy, Finland, Bulgaria, Hungary, Portugal and Greece. The meeting called for political solidarity with the Liverpool social workers, members of the Liverpool city branch of UNISON, who had been on strike since 24 August 2004. For childcare social workers in Liverpool, the contradictions between personal and collective professional and ethical identities and values and the imposition of new public management had led to the emergence solidaristic resistance in the form of strike action. In a target-driven environment you’d think there would be room for dialogue between social workers and managers. But we’re faced with diktat and that’s because it’s so target driven. More is expected of fewer people.We don’t believe that what’s demanded of us is workable. It’s putting children’s lives at risk. (Joe Boothby, childcare social worker, Liverpool, Guardian, 24 November 2004) Across Scotland in August 2008, public sector workers joined forces and went on strike for similar reasons related to erosion of conditions and services. Most social work services in Scotland were closed, providing only emergency cover (Glasgow Evening Times, 19 August 2008). The fundamental belief that ‘children’s lives’ are ‘at risk’ as a result of the imposition of new public management within childcare social work practice illustrates the seriousness of dilemmas faced by childcare 77

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social work professionals within the context of the reorganisation of childcare social services and working practices. It has been argued that these dilemmas articulate a widespread and profound attempt to reorder social relationships within the public sector according to neoliberal ideas (Clarke, 2004; Storey, 2004; Lorenz, 2005; Ferguson and Lavalette, 2006). Indeed Lorenz questions the meaning of the ‘social’ in the context of this reordering of relationships in the public sphere. How can social workers fulfil their role as ‘guardians’ of the ‘social dimension of public life’ (Lorenz, 2005)? It might be suggested that the formal collective solidaristic organisations within the third sector, such as trade unions and credit unions, will play an important role in the development of a credible local, national and transnational infrastructure for sustainable social solidarity within Europe. Illustrating this there, is evidence of growing involvement of trade unions and credit unions within childcare service provision. Glasgow Pollok Credit Union, for example, has extended its support and services and provides support for a local nursery, school and project for new mothers (Mooney and Scott, 2005). Similarly, trade unions are beginning to initiate welfare schemes in collaboration with community organisations and interest groups.

Conclusion New forms of governance developed through reformed ‘codetermination’ in a human rights framework, involving shared power relationships within mutually decided policy and practice, offer a roadmap away from top-down constraints, ensuring a more sustainable form of social solidarity. Within an enlarged Europe this requires substantial political and economic investment from above.The capacity for the growth and reconstruction of the European public realm at a local level is contingent upon the power and communicative action of interlocking solidarities at a micro-political level. By investing in local initiatives through reformed ‘co-determination’, national and transnational solidarity systems are rendered more sustainable and integrative. For children and young people across Europe, reformed codetermination brings renewed capacity and meaning to ‘lived’ and ‘shared learned experiences’. The recent economic crisis has brought renewed urgency to addressing the condition and contours of the European public realm.At stake is the well-being of children and young people, who reflect the outcomes of current policies and governance and future probabilities within the European socio-economic domain. 78

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Education and welfare systems across Europe are the arteries that have carried the network of knowledge and social solidarity required for European social and economic integration. Recent severe retrenchment in public welfare and education systems across Europe threatens to sever this network, threatening the social and economic future of Europe. Compounding this, the prospect of increasing levels of economic inequality puts more children, young people and their families at risk of personal crisis. Childcare law policy and practice is, by definition, framed by public responsibility, requiring an architecture of governance that simultaneously balances the human rights of children and their families with the normative and social expectations of political and economic contexts.As we have seen in the UK, the imposition of targetdriven processes, coupled with a lack of resources within childcare professional social work practice, has tipped the balance away from the human rights of children and their families and towards normative expectations derived from and for the operation of the market economy. The consequences of this cannot be overstated. In the words of one childcare professional social worker (see p 77), the ‘diktat’ has replaced ‘dialogue’, ‘putting children’s lives at risk’. The responsiveness of child welfare organisations and professionals to emerging solidarities at the level of practice will be pivotal to the articulation of European child and family-centred practice within a human rights framework, contributing to the reconstruction of a sustainable social solidarity within an integrated Europe. By calling for ‘more resources for early intervention and prevention to strengthen families’, childcare professionals and organisations recognise the vulnerability of children, young people and their families within the current economic crisis. Equally, the wider structural economic inequalities that create these vulnerabilities also need to be addressed. As Schwartz argues, this requires the development of the politics of social solidarity in which a majority of citizens who believe themselves capable of agency embrace social and political movements that seek coherent power behind a coherent programme to redress inequality. (Schwartz, 2008: 4)

References Adams, R., Domenelli, L. and Payne, M. (2009) Practising social work in a complex world, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

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Berg, E., Barry. J. and Chandler, J. (2008) ‘New Public Management and social work in Sweden and England: challenges and opportunities for staff in predominantly female organizations’, International Journal of Sociology and Social Policy, 28 (3/4) 114–28. Born, A.W. and Jensen, P.H. (2005) ‘Individualising citizenship’, in J.G. Andersen, A. Guillemard, P.H. Jensen and B.P. Effinger (eds) The changing face of welfare, Bristol: The Policy Press. Clarke, J. (2004) ‘Dissolving the public realm? The logics and limits of neoliberalism’, Journal of Social Policy, 33 (1) 27–48. Ellison, M. (2004) ‘Delivering continuity for European siblings in care, visions prospects and possibilities for child and family law, practice and health and social care policy within Denmark and the UK’, in J. Chandler and J. Barry (eds) Dilemmas facing the public sector: Issues for professionals, managers and users, London: University of East London Publications. Ellison, M. (2007) ‘Contested terrains within the neoliberal project :The re-organisation of services for children in Europe: gender, citizenship and the forging of New Public Management within professional childcare social work practice in Europe’, Equal Opportunities International, 26 (4) 331–51. Eurochild Report (2010) Children in alternative care, National Surveys European Commission for Human Rights (1953) European Convention on Human Rights, Strasbourg: European Union. Ferguson, I. and Lavalette, M. (2006) ‘Globalisation and global justice: towards a social work of resistance’, International Social Work, 49 (3) 309–18. Fostering Network, (2010) The (2010) survey of foster care services in the UK, August, London: The Fostering Network. Garrett, P.M. (1999) ‘Producing the moral citizen: the “Looking After Children” system and the regulation of children and young people in public care’, Critical Social Policy, 19: 291–311, August. Garrett, P.M. (2010) Transforming children’s services, social work, neoliberalism and the modern world, Bury St. Edmunds: Arena. Habermas, J. (1996) Between facts and norms: Contributions to a discourse theory of law and democracy, Cambridge: Polity Press. Habermas, J. (1998) ‘Struggles for recognition in the democratic state’, in C. Cronin and P. De Greff eds) The inclusion of the other, Cambridge MA: MIT Press, pp 215–20. Haldane, J. (2006) ‘Public reason, truth, and human fellowship’, Journal of Law, Philosophy and Culture, 1 (1). Harding, L.F. (1991) Perspectives in child care policy, London: Longman.

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Harvey, D. (2005) A brief history of neoliberalism, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Hellinkxz, W. and Colton, M. (1998) International perspectives in family support, Bury St Edmunds: Arena. Houston, S. (1996) Setting quality standards for social work practice in residential childcare: A collaborative approach, Belfast: Eastern Health and Social Services Board. Jack, G. (2000) ‘Ecological influences on parenting and child development’, British Journal of Social Work, vol 30, pp 703–20. Joyce, R. (2010) Child and working age poverty from 2010 to 2013, London: Institute of Fiscal Studies. Lister, R. (2006) ‘Children (but not women) first: New Labour, child welfare and gender’, Critical Social Policy, 26 (2) 315–35. Lorenz, W. (1998) ‘Children and European social policy traditions’, in BAAF (ed) Exchanging visions: Papers on best practice in Europe for children separated from their birth parents, London: BAAF, Lorenz,W. (2001) ‘Social work responses to New Labour in continental European countries’, British Journal of Social Work 31, 595–609. Lorenz (2005) ‘Social work and a new social order: challenging neoliberalism’s erosion of solidarity’, Social Work and Society, 3 (1), www.socwork.net/2005/1/debate/468 Lorenz, W. (2006) Perspectives on European social work: From the birth of the nation state to the impact of globalisation, Portland: Intl Specialized Book Service Inc. Lorenz, W. (2006a) ‘Doing history: Memory and contemporary professional practice’, Address to the IFSW World Conference, Munich, 31 July 2006. Lorenz,W. (2008) ‘Towards a European model of social work’, Australian Social Work, 61 (1) 7–24, March. Madge, N. and Attridge, K. (1996) ‘Children and families’, in B. Munday (ed) Social care in Europe, Guildford: Prentice Hall. Midgley, M. (2008) ‘Perspectives on globalisation and culture: implications for international social work practice’, Journal of Global Social Work Practice, 1 (1) November/December. Mooney, G. and Poole, L. (2004) ‘A land of milk and honey? Social policy in Scotland after devolution’, Critical Social Policy, 24: 458–83. Mooney, G. and Scott, G. (2005) Exploring social policy in the new Scotland, Bristol: The Policy Press. Munday, B. (1996) ‘Introduction: definitions and comparisons in European social care’, in B. Munday and P. Ely (eds) Social care in Europe, London: Prentice Hall.

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Munday, B. and Ely, P. (eds) (1996) Social care in Europe, London: Prentice Hall. Newman, J. (2003) From new managerialism to progressive governance? New leadership values, choices and dilemmas, Paper for the 7th International Research Conference ‘Dilemmas for Human Services’, Staffordshire University, September 2003. Newman, J. and Clarke, J. (2009) Publics, politics and power: Remaking the public in public services, London: Sage Publications. Offe, C. (2003) ‘The European model of “social” capitalism: can it survive European integration?’, Journal of Political Philosophy, 11 (4) 437–69. Pulignano,V. (2007) ‘Co-ordinating across borders: the role of European industry federations within European Works Councils’, in M.Whittall, H. Knudsen and F. Huijgen (eds) (2007) Towards a European labour identity: The case of the European Works Council, London: Routledge, pp 74–93. Sartre, J.P. (1957) Existentialism and human emotions, New York: Philosophical Library. Sartre, J.P. (1976 [1960]) Critique of dialectical reasoning, Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press. Scharpt, F.W. (2002) ‘The European social model’, Journal of Common Market Studies, vol 40, pp 645–70. Schwartz, F.W. (2008) The future of democratic equality: Rebuilding social solidarity in a fragmented America, New York: Routledge. Scottish Government (2010) Solidarity Purpose Target 5: Edinburgh. Scottish Government Publications, www.scotland.gov.uk/Topics/ Statistics/About/NotesSP/TechnicalNotesSPPT5 Storey, A. (2004) The European project: dismantling social democracy, globalising neoliberalism, Paper for conference ‘Is Ireland a democracy?’, 2-3 April 2004. UN General Assembly (1989) Convention on the Rights of the Child, 20 November 1989,Treaty Series, vol 1577, New York: United Nations, p 3. UNICEF (2007) Child poverty in perspective: An overview of child wellbeing in rich countries, Innocenti Report Card 7, Florence: UNICEF Innocenti Research Center. Williams, J. (2008) Child law for social work: Policy and practice, London: Sage Publications. Whittall, M., Knudsen, C.H. and Huijgen, F. (eds) (2007) Towards a European labour identity:The case of the European Works Council, London: Routledge, pp 74–93.

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Embedding European identity in context: changing social solidarities in Europe Jim Barry, Elisabeth Berg and John Chandler

Introduction: setting the context In this chapter we are concerned with contributing to an understanding of challenges facing an enlarged European Union (EU), with a focus on issues of social cohesion and solidarity, linked to the idea of a collective European identity. This is of considerable importance because, in a context in which geographical expansion renders Europe increasingly diverse – culturally, economically and politically – there is no theorisation of European society at the present time in studies of Europeanisation that is ‘comparable to the theory of the state’ (Delanty and Rumford, 2005: 1). At first sight the difficulties confronting those seeking a theorisation of European integration and identity seem almost intractable, with fluidity in patterns of migration seeming only to aggravate tensions on the ground.Yet, it is argued here that it is the very character of these tensions that may create opportunities to build solidarity as much as division, not just between nations but between citizens of the EU. The political context for this analysis is the prevalence of an insistent neoliberalism, which some see as so pervasive that it is becoming the dominant discourse (Harvey, 2005). This, while giving priority to markets and capital, mobilises a strategy of governance that intrudes its tentacles into civil society through partnerships and a variety of consultative networks designed to steer and coordinate while, ultimately, retaining control. Meanwhile public sector organisations are charged with the responsibility of delivering social services and securities in increasingly efficient and accountable packages (Hood, 1995; Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2000). Yet, such approaches from political and managerial elites, in offering top-down prescriptions for change to accommodate the demands of 83

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neoliberalism, fail to engage electorates and public sector employees. This results in a mismatch with considerable consequences, since it elides the issue of involvement central to decision making in a democratic public sector. Little wonder, perhaps, that on the one hand political endeavour has met with electoral apathy and a concomitant rise in social movement activity (Todd and Taylor, 2004: 3) as those in civil society seek to make their oppositional voices heard, while on the other hand the managerial delivery mechanisms through the vehicle of new public management reforms have been contested by those implementing them (Barry et al, 2007). Such developments offer challenges to proponents of neoliberal reforms and the integration of an enlarged Europe alike, to take account of those involved. Dominant strategies do not occupy an empty landscape. They have to overcome resistances, refusals and blockages. For many reasons the public realm (and the attachments that it mobilises) is part of the ‘grit’ that prevents the imagined neo-liberal world system functioning smoothly. It makes a difference of our view of the world if we start by looking for the grit – taking notice of the recalcitrance, resistance, obstruction and incomplete rule – rather than throwing them in as a gestural last paragraph after the ‘big story’ has been told. (Clarke, 2004: 44–5) This is an important reminder of the need to take full account of those affected by changes in contemporary societies at both civil society/grassroots and organisational levels within the state itself. This is because nation-states have not simply created social policy and welfare provision by desire, design or decision; instead, it seems that nation-states have been constituted by the very character of their approach to social policy and welfare (Clarke, 2005: 407). It might be said, in short, that much of what we know about nation-states derives from what we know about the approach to welfare and social policy that has developed within their territorial borders. This also holds for the organisational delivery of such provision, with the organisations involved constituted by members of different local civil societies who are employed by or otherwise connected to them. The challenge, therefore, is to engage with the ‘contested terrains’ (Ellison, 2007) embedded within the social processes and networks of European civil society, recognising and respecting difference of view, interest and values in ‘conflictual democracy’ (Balibar, 2004: x). In this way, solidarity and integration might take root from within a plurality of diverse societies, 84

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with conflict resolution transparent and worked through in real time. Involvement and identification with such processes may just help to build a European identity created by those affected as they actively engage in the ongoing developmental processes. Recognition that 19th- and 20th-century social policy and welfare provision were the fruit not necessarily of elite design, or concession in order to maintain control (Saville, 1957–58), but of agonistic labour movement struggle achieved at a price (Thompson, 1958), indicates where to look today for the new drivers of social policy: partly through user panels and area committees as orchestrated through state activity, or governance (Newman, 2004: 203, 217), but also the autonomous organs of civil society in the guise of new social movements such as the women’s and environmental movements. Such a context also renders recent debates on the idea of democracy particularly salient. There is certainly a wide intellectual gulf between those, such as Habermas (1995), who contend that the procedural aspects of reason and an open discourse of ideal speech offer the best route to democratic consensus and those like Mouffe (1997), who argue that this represents the worst of all compromises, with agreements fragmenting even as they form. In this debate we consider Mouffe’s position the more persuasive, involving, as she contends, the acceptance of difference and the play of social and political conflict through what she terms agonistic pluralism. For Mouffe, this involves recognition of the messy character of compromise that involves winners, losers and inequality. However, in this chapter we are seeking to link these issues of social cohesion and solidarity to the idea of a collective European identity. Firstly, there is of course a history in Europe where solidarities between particular countries existed, but these were often fragile and fleeting and often occurred in the context of war, or of the threat of war, that has ravaged Europe throughout its history. New national borders have been drawn, and people have been part of various cultural formations during the years which have brought together groups of people and created a sense of belonging. Secondly, Europeans are not, unlike the North Americans, members of a state that was formed by waves of migration; they are more of a fixed population (Delanty and Rumford, 2005). Americans are characterised by hyphenated identities, IrishAmericans, Spanish-Americans, Chinese-Americans; and there is no equivalent for Europeans (Delanty and Rumford, 2005), even if the history of early and medieval Europe, in particular, did involve migration and conquest. This history and the continuing importance of nation-states and national identity is an important barrier to the 85

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creation of a collective European identity. However, it is precisely this that has been pursued within the European Community (EC). In 1973, for example, a ‘Declaration on the European identity’ (Tengström, 2004) was agreed, with the EC indicating in 1988 that ‘Europe is not only an association of economic interests but also a cultural unit’ (Tengström, 2004: 15). Leaving aside for now issues concerning the existence of a European identity, the question was intensified in the 1990s when the EC became the EU; but that was also followed by critical comments that a focus on European collective identity(-ies) could lead to difficulties for non-European immigrants who might not feel included in the union (Tengström, 2004: 15). Key questions became how, for whom and for what identity is designed. For Castells, Identity design uses building blocks from history, from geography, from biology, from productive and reproductive institutions, from the collective memories and personal fantasies, from power and religious revelations. (Castells, 2000: 21) This is one way to understand identity, but such identity construction is often undertaken in relation to some ‘Other’ and is a means of distinguishing between ‘us’ and ‘them’.As Hall (1996: 17) puts it:‘Above all … identities are constructed through, not outside difference. This entails the radically disturbing recognition that it is only through the relation to the Other, the relation to what it is not, to precisely what it lacks … that the ‘positive’ meaning of any term – and thus its identity – can be constructed’. It is these issues of contention and solidarity that this chapter considers. For while we would argue that neoliberalism does not need or actively promote solidarity – indeed its application tends to individualise, isolate and divide – people, as citizens, are not necessarily simply passive victims; they may also engage in collective struggles and forms of resistance which depend on solidarities that may be hostile to neoliberalism. It is these solidarities, not the abstract solidarity of a private European citizen, to which we wish to draw attention here. We begin by considering the context within which the processes of Europeanisation are taking place as they relate to economic harmonisation, before considering notions of equity and inclusion.This is followed by some reflections on recent considerations of democracy and the limitations of the principle of representation. In exploring the place of social movements, a case is made for a conceptualisation of European public spaces and a configuration of the public realm to 86

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broaden the idea of aggregation and move beyond the post-political present as a way of realising a more inclusive future.

Racing to the bottom or moving to the top? One of the concerns about neoliberalism in Europe, connected to its global reach, derives from what has been dubbed the ‘race to the bottom’ (Hirst, 1998: 2), a concern voiced by Gray (1998), who sees the consequences as placing such considerable strain on social market economies that they will be unable to renew themselves in the face of pressures to downward harmonisation. As he puts it, To imagine that the social market economies of the past can renew themselves intact under the forces of downward harmonization is the most dangerous of the many illusions associated with the global market. Instead, social market systems are being compelled progressively to dismantle themselves, so that they can compete on more equal terms with economies in which environmental, social and labour costs are lowest. The question social market economies face is not whether they can survive with their present institutions and policies – they cannot. It is whether the adjustments that are imperative will be made by a further wave of neo-liberal reforms which harness markets to the satisfaction of human needs. (Gray, 1998: 92) It might have been thought, if processes of procedural regulation were operating consensually at the European level, that welfare provision in countries of a social democratic persuasion like Denmark and Sweden, and those more favourably inclined to neoliberalism, such as England, might be likely to converge over time through processes of harmonisation, with the former experiencing reductions in benefits and services and the latter extending coverage. It could equally well have been surmised, if a more conflictual approach had been taken, that traditional elements of provision would resist forces for change and that differential patterning might emerge. But neoliberalism is here portrayed as so persuasive a discourse, even if it takes differing forms, that it has come to dominate thinking as the common sense of the age, overseeing, as Harvey puts it, withdrawal from welfare, with associated reductions in ‘health care, public education and social services’ (Harvey, 2005: 76). This is despite the pressures, noted by Hirst, from ageing populations, unemployment, growing complexity and cost of 87

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healthcare, family break-up and growing demand for welfare (Hirst, 1998: 2). But Hirst also notes pressures favourable to welfare across Europe, including more solidly embedded traditions of solidarism and corporatist management of economies. Welfare has, in short, enabled workers to bear the cost of external shocks … and … build political support for consensus policies. Thus a high level of international exposure does not automatically require the response of cut-throat competition between firms and the slashing of welfare provision. (Hirst, 1998: 4) The so-called credit crunch, along with increased fuel and food prices that started to be felt in 2008 in different parts of the world, might, however, suggest further pressures against continuing acceptance of consensus. In any event, increasingly ‘open’ societies, where finance can be shifted across ‘borders’, suggest that pressures on welfare are likely to mount in a post-corporatist direction, squeezing solidarity as difficult choices about ‘who pays’ come to the surface (Hirst, 1998: 6). There are of course differences between countries, whose historical legacies are likely to affect the ways in which response is made to change, with implications for solidarities both nationally and at the European level, but there do appear to be forces favourable to welfare. Hirst’s comments, for example, suggest that while responses can vary, social democratic countries like Denmark and Sweden, with strong solidaristic traditions, have proved themselves adaptable: Danish citizens and organized interests seem to have been willing to adapt to crises, making sacrifices in periods of economic difficulty. Undoubtedly, equality and inclusion help to promote such solidaristic and public-minded behaviour, citizens and organized interests have a high degree of influence in the political process and a reasonable expectation of fairness in the behaviour of governments and other political actors. Unlike polarized societies in which the losers can expect to be penalized in distributional conflict, solidaristic behaviour in this situation is a rational choice. (Hirst, 1998: 21) Strong traditions of solidarity have been in evidence not just within but also between Nordic countries. For example, Sweden has rules on childcare allowances for parents who are resident in the other Nordic countries:‘The Government may order the temporary parental benefit, 88

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even to a parent who is resident in Denmark, Finland and Norway for the care of children resident in one of these countries’ (SOU, 2005: 73). But there is also evidence that suggests a sense of European solidarity that extends beyond Nordic borders, realised for example through higher education policy that, in Sweden, is financed by taxes for Swedish nationals and also for nationals of other EU countries who pay no fees. This extends to students from countries outside the EU. However, the Swedish government, since 2006 a neoliberal coalition between right-wing parties, tabled a bill in which fees for students outside the EU, from the academic year 2011–12, would be payable – although this proposal is complemented with a scholarship programme.1 Even in Sweden, it seems, neoliberal influences are exerting a strain on solidarities and pulling welfare provision in a downward direction. There are clearly a range of forces at work and in contention in these examples that show how differing solidaristic legacies and neoliberal configurations, even within Nordic countries, can result in a variety of settlements forged through time.Yet it is also clear that solidarities and neoliberalisms are pulling in different directions. The forces of neoliberal reform might thus seem to work against any kind of pan-European solidarity, which as we have seen are in any event tenuous. However, linkages of affective relationships forged around values and orientations, of the kind found in social movements for example, and connected with the notion of transnational solidarities where the emphasis is on justice and inclusiveness (Gould, 2007: 156, 159), may indicate a way forward. While this is not to suggest that solidarity, perhaps like consciousness of social class, necessarily emerges from a sense of shared oppression (Gould, 2007: 159), it does enable those who have found themselves – or those whom they consider to be like them – excluded and/or feel a sense of injustice of the kind that fuels anti-globalisation movements, to be inclined to solidarity with those beyond their own national and regional borders.This may extend to those concerned perhaps about the needs of strangers (Ignatieff, 1984) and favourable to reciprocity in giving and possibly receiving at some time in the future, for example, the ‘gift’ of blood (Titmuss, 1970).This may prove helpful in ensuring cooperative and meaningful harmonisation and settled relations even with former neighbours who find themselves excluded from Europe. The importance of values and orientations should not be underestimated in contemporary Europe as faith in conventional party politics and government wanes (Todd and Taylor, 2004), with solidarity forged in the new politics of social movement engagement. It is in this context that social individuals find themselves shifting ‘among the 89

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regions of experience’ (Melucci, 1997: 62) as they draw on a range of identities to find their place and make their mark in the world. Just as this can cross conventional politics, so it can cross borders: Aspirations for greater international solidarity must be founded in transnational movements that have sufficient presence in particular states to compel these polities to adopt foreign economic and diplomatic policies that enhance global labor, environmental, and human rights conditions. Just as the moral horizons of democratic polities have expanded only through the struggles of formerly excluded social groups, so will the transition from national to regional to international solidarity occur more through political contestation than by means of abstract philosophical argument. (Schwartz, 2007: 132) Schwartz writes from a North American context where, from ‘the Reagan administration onward, neoliberal political hegemony has nearly obliterated from the public mind the ideals of social rights and social insurance’, with a deleterious effect on ‘associational life’ (Schwartz, 2007: 142–4). By contrast, the ‘ideology and values of democratic social movements, evident in the US Labour and Civil Rights Movements, consciously cultivate broader notions of solidarity’ (Schwartz, 2007: 134). In a European context a wide variety of social movements might be seen as relevant to a reshaping of the future of welfare as women, young people, pensioners, the disabled, as well as members of the labour movement, mobilise and interact. As should be clear by now, however, Schwartz’s democracy does not presuppose a consensual path to social solidarity, since there is nothing ‘innately particularist or inherently universal’ about the processes; instead this evolves ‘through democratic contestation’ (Schwartz, 2007: 136). And it is precisely this that leads Schwartz, among others it has to be acknowledged (cf Benhabib, 2002), to question the very basis of Rawls’ heuristic of justice that has so influenced Habermas (1995) and his notion of consensus through deliberative democracy. For Schwartz, the assumption of consensus as prevailing in human affairs breaks down not least during periods of war or other national crises, during and following which social movements for change make their mark. Notions of originary positions, procedural regulation, communicative rationality and consensus are thus abstractions that do not account for everyday life, where differences of values and interest are worked through agonistically in real time (Mouffe, 1999). 90

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Of course any transnational solidarity is fragile and fraught with difficulties. The divisions of language and history cannot be simply brushed away.Yet the history of Europe, with its shifting borders and greater and lesser periods of cultural uniformity, demonstrates the arbitrariness or at least contingent nature of national frontiers and their territorial domains.These can be seen as exclusionary devices enforced from above and thereby contrived arrangements that can be unsettled and may fragment through time, as Mouffe (1997) suggests. This is an important insight into the nature of social and political compromise and suggests that agreements over national identities and borders are conflictual rather than consensual and subject to contestation and change, since they reflect unease and tension that has been, and remains, barely concealed beneath the surface. If solidarism derives from inclusion, equality, expectation of fairness in the behaviour of governments and public-mindedness, as Hirst contends, the polarities of neoliberalism do not augur well. There is, however, no reason to accept that neoliberalism will succeed in driving welfare standards down in a ‘race to the bottom’ if we accept Clarke’s (2005) argument that welfare is appropriately conceived as the historical creation of ordinary citizens, and not the result of top-down social re-engineering by political elites and their managerial counterparts within the state.Welfare provision, in this sense, reflects the values and orientations of those below, at the grassroots level, and their concerns for those around them. Under the impact of neoliberalism, conflict rather than consensus will come to be the order of the day, with much of this conflict likely to concern the future of welfare.Yet it seems to us that those engaged in new forms of social solidarity will mobilise in favour not of a race to the bottom that results in a depletion of welfare provision, but rather of its enhancement in a countervailing movement to the top in pursuit of equality, inclusion and fairness. How might this be achieved?

The poverty of representation and the recovery of politics The concept of democracy is an important one. Its definition has Greek roots, connecting people (demos) with power (kratos) (Crick, 2002). However, in applying the term, reference is often made to its direct and indirect representational forms, although its deployment for political purposes, as for example in the former Soviet Union’s notion of ‘democratic centralism’ (Waller, 1980), is indicative of a variety of interpretations that prevail according to context and relationships 91

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of power. In considering this, Balibar (2004: 8) focuses on different notions of the people, ‘that which the Greek language and following it all political philosophy calls ethnos, the “people” as an imagined community of membership and filiation, and demos the “people” as the collective subject of representation, decision making and rights’. The latter invokes notions of universality and procedural regularity, the former, abstractions. Yet, real or imagined, the people are located within a context marked by relations of power (kratos). There are clear implications for European solidarities in this, as well as for the building of welfare, since, as we have seen, Europe is an unfinished project, with a number of at best unsettled borders transposed across its terrain. It is in this context that Mouffe (1999) asks why it is that right-wing politics have gained ascendancy in Europe in recent years. Mouffe’s contribution to the debate on democracy is an interesting one: not only timely, but ontologically compelling. In particular, it takes issue with the Habermasian (1995) notion of ‘deliberative democracy’, which itself draws liberal inspiration from the work of Rawls. Habermas contends that procedural regulation and ideal speech are best able to ensure a shared discourse of rationality and enable the building of legitimacy and consensus. Here, the procedural aspects of reason and an open discourse of ideal speech offer the best route to democratic consensus. Yet for Mouffe (1997) this elides the messy compromises of everyday democratic life, realised in real time to the advantage of some and the disadvantage of others. It is not possible to ignore impediments of ideal speech because, she argues, they form the very substance of democratic relationships and cannot be conceptualised out of existence.They are responsible, moreover, for messy and incomplete compromises, with those involved scheming their reconfiguration before they are made. For her, agreements fragment even as they form. Better, she contends, to accept difference and the play of social and political conflict through what she terms agonistic pluralism, involving recognition of the messy character of compromise that involves winners, losers and inequality. Of considerable interest in this debate about the character(s) of democracy is the shift of emphasis away from state to civil society, and Mouffe’s re-centring of politics in what is seen as an alarmingly post-political, neoliberal world. Here, representational politics is cast as epiphenomenal, deriving its legitimacies and forms from the very civil society that threatens to undermine state authority and restore power to its citizens. In developing the issue of representation raised by both Todd and Taylor (2004) and Balibar (2004), noted earlier, Melucci and Avritzer (2000: 508) contend that representative democratic politics, which seek 92

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to speak on behalf of majorities, face a legitimation crisis because they do not meet expectations for inclusion, with the 1960s cycle of protest attesting to this. Reminiscent of Todd and Taylor (2004), they explain, Social movements introduce a complementary form of dealing with politics: they supplement the principle of representation with the principle of belonging … [they transform] … the fact of belonging to different cultural groups into a political issue … [which] … tends to present itself in public as that aspect of social life which is irreducible to representation … [hence] ... the public sphere constitutes an alternative political space for the face-to-face interaction among citizens that is differentiated from the state. (Melucci and Avritzer, 2000: 509) It is accordingly the public sphere where solidarities thrive (Melucci and Avritzer, 2000: 510). From a North American political process social movement approach that focuses on visible activism, there are clear costs and benefits of acting in the public sphere, with social players either ‘resourceful or resourceless, included or excluded’ (Melucci and Avritzer, 2000: 515–16), while from a European new social movement perspective, it is participation in the networks of movement processes that provides individuals with a sense of involvement and belonging, and politics with a public dimension. In citing Giddens and Beck, Melucci and Avritzer (2000: 519) explain that within ‘contemporary societies, solidarity involves the self reflexive act of identifying a common condition with a distant other’, with ‘publicization’ enabling ‘the affirmative act of naming in a different way’; as, for example, in the case of the anti-AIDS movement, which empowered those labelled ‘patient’ to be more active in demanding increased access to drug treatment. Such conflictual struggles may be considered merely symbolic, but they represent political contention that questions ‘racialised … fears of the “Other”’ (Stevenson, 2006: 485), in recognition of difference through common humanity, and is vibrant with meaning and significance for the identities of those involved who act to take some measure of control over their everyday lives. Here, politics is power, enacted through the social relationships of civil society: The public space that emerged out of the bourgeois era is being transformed into a pluralistic and conflictual space which allows movements to contest the definition of what is political, that is of what belongs to the polis.The function 93

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is to broaden the code of the political by transforming what used to remain private into politics as well as by re-politicizing what has been left out of the process of aggregation of majorities. The primary aim of the public space is to enable movements to bring to the public the issues they raise as well as the political forms they practise. (Melucci and Avritzer, 2000: 524) The potential of social movements is thus considerable. They offer opportunities, yet to be fully realised, for citizens at grassroots level to map out boundaries of identification and belonging in the public space.

Concluding thoughts In this chapter we have sought to examine the prospects for solidarity in a Europe under the sway of neoliberal reforms. It might be argued that a Europe characterised by varieties of neoliberalism undermines solidarities by upsetting the very social conditions that sustain them – those of inclusion, equality, expectation of fairness in the behaviour of governments and public-mindedness that constitute the robust solidarities found in Nordic countries. Under the sway of markets and capitalism there is, it can be argued, no need for any kind of solidarity, since rampant individualism and a drive or ‘race to the bottom’, in which welfare provision is reduced to a minimum, renders it unnecessary. Under such circumstances, if the people of Europe share a collective European identity it might be seen as one of a passive as well as possessive individualism. In such circumstances existing solidarities and social cohesion might increasingly come under threat. To the extent that this threatens the very conditions for successful capitalist accumulation, such a lack of cohesion might be managed by ‘topdown’ policies and plans, at local, regional, national and European level, orchestrated by a managerial cadre that provides the organisational glue necessary to govern what is, in effect, a disparate and dispersed state. There is, however, an alternative view – or rather many alternative views – whose outline can be seen in the very conditions that threaten solidarity and that might provide the motivation to create new solidarities or enhance existing ones, both within and across national borders. In this we contend that social movements are central to the creation of identities alternative to those that neoliberalism so generously offers. These identities might form different bases for European identities and integration. These would not bring about a homogeneous ‘European’ subject but would criss-cross nations in 94

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complex webs of relationships engaged in a messy politics of welfare. Such a politics provides no certainty of ‘winning’ or ‘losing’, but rather a contingent set of unpredictable outcomes. It does not render conventional local, national party politics or parliamentary governments entirely redundant, but does offer a wider battleground on which to engage in struggle. Such a politics is likely to incorporate both a negative politics of reaction to proposed welfare reform from above, and a positive politics of welfare which promotes new ways of working and new provision from below. It is likely to be an extremely fluid form of politics, with no fixed aims, organisational forms, membership or boundaries; but such is the nature of social movements. It is also likely to contain elements of both cooperation and contention between different movements.This is not a homogeneous, neat, managed, stable and coherent European identity but, rather, a diverse, vibrant set of European identities based on multiple sources of solidarity and complex networks of social interaction within and across national borders. It is also likely to be a rich source of reflection and creative thinking.

Note 1 www.studyinsweden.se/Home/News-archive/2010/Tuition-feesfrom-2011/20100301. References Balibar, E. (2004) We, the people of Europe?, Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press. Barry, J., Chandler, J. and Berg, E. (2007) ‘Women’s movements and New Public Management: higher education in Sweden and England’, Public Administration, 85 (1) 103–22. Benhabib, S. (2002) The claims of culture: Equality and diversity in the global era, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Castells, M. (2000) The power of identity, Göteborg: Daidalos. Clarke, J. (2004) ‘Dissolving the public realm? The logics and limits of neoliberalism’, Journal of Social Policy, 33 (1) 27–48. Clarke, J. (2005) ‘Welfare states as nation states: some conceptual reflections’, Social Policy and Society, 4 (4) 407–15. Crick, B. (2002) Democracy: A very short introduction, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Delanty, G. and Rumford, C. (2005) Rethinking Europe: Social theory and the implications of Europeanization, London: Routledge.

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Ellison, M. (2007) ‘Contested terrains within the neo-liberal project – The re-organisation of services for children in Europe: gender, citizenship and the forging of New Public Management within professional child care social work practice in Europe’, Equal Opportunities International, 26 (4) 331–51. Gould, C. (2007) ‘Transnational solidarities’, Journal of Social Philosophy, 38 (1) 148–64. Gray, J. (1998) False dawn: The delusions of global capitalism, London: Granta. Habermas, J. (1995) ‘Reconciliation through the public use of reason: remarks on John Rawls’s political liberalism’, The Journal of Philosophy, XCII, 3, 109–31 (March). Hall, S. (1996) ‘Who needs identity?’, in S. Hall and P. Du Gay Questions of cultural identity, London: Sage. Harvey, D. (2005) A brief history of neo-liberalism, New York: Oxford University Press. Hirst, P. (1998) Can the European welfare state survive globalization? Sweden, Denmark and the Netherlands in comparative perspective,Working Paper series in European Studies, 2, 1, London: Birkbeck College, University of London. Hood, C. (1995) ‘The ‘New Public Management’ in the 1980s: variations on a theme’, Accounting, Organizations and Society, 20 (2/3) 93–109. Ignatieff, M. (1984) The needs of strangers, London: Chatto and Windus. Melucci, A. (1997) ‘Identity and difference in a globalized world’, in P. Werbner and T. Modood (eds) Debating cultural hybridity: Multi cultural identities and the politics of anti-racism, London: Zed Books, pp 58–69. Melucci, A. and Avritzer, L. (2000) ‘Complexity, cultural pluralism and democracy: collective action in the public space’, Social Science Information, 39 (4) 507–27. Mouffe, C. (1997) ‘Democratic identity and pluralist politics’, in R. Bontekoe and M. Stepaniants (eds) Justice and democracy: Cross-cultural perspectives, Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, pp 381–94. Mouffe, C. (1999) ‘Deliberative democracy or agonistic pluralism?’, Social Research, 66 (3) 745–57, (Fall). Newman, J., Barnes, M., Sullivan, H. and Knops, A. (2004) ‘Public participation and collaborative governance’, Journal of Social Policy, 33 (2) 203–23. Pollitt, C. and Bouckaert, G. (2000) Public management reform: A comparative analysis. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Saville, J. (1957–58) ‘The welfare state: an historical approach’, New Reasoner, vol 3, pp 5–25. 96

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Schwartz, J.M. (2007) ‘From domestic to global solidarity: the dialectic of the particular and universal in the building of social solidarity’, Journal of Social Philosophy, 38 (1) 131–47. SOU (Statens Offentliga Utredningar [Government Official Reports]) (2005) Reformerad föräldraförsäkring – Kärlek, omvårdnad, trygghet. Stevenson, N. (2006) ‘European cosmopolitan solidarity: questions of citizenship, difference and post-materialism’, European Journal of Social Theory, 9 (4) 485–500. Tengström, E. (2004) På spaning efter en Europeisk identitet. [On search after a European identity] Det antika Rom. Den Europeiska unionens historiska fundament. Stockholm: Santérus förlag. Thompson, D. (1958) ‘Discussion: the welfare state’, New Reasoner, 4: 125–30. Titmuss, R. (1970) The gift relationship: From human blood to social policy, London: Allen and Unwin. Todd, M.J. and Taylor, G. (2004) (eds) Democracy and participation: Popular protest and social movements (viii–xviii) London: Merlin Press. Waller, M. (1981) Democratic centralism: An historical commentary, Manchester: Manchester University Press.

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SEVEN

Intra-European energy solidarity at the core of the European integration process: future possibilities and current constraints Annamária Orbán and Zoltán Szántó

Introduction One of the basic aims of the European Union (EU) is to be among the most competitive regions of the globalised world economy. The aim of all welfare states in the EU is to provide a good quality of life for their citizens. To be competitive economically and to provide a good quality of life in a modern welfare state requires – among other things – a very important resource: energy, which should be secured. This means that energy provision for Europe is a security question in all senses, ranging from the economic to social security. However, the EU is very far from being self-sufficient in energy resources, while its economies and societies consume a constantly increasing amount of energy, leading to strong dependency on energy imports. Moreover, Europe has already faced two oil crises (in the 1970s) and a gas crisis (in January 2009). For more than three weeks in January 2009, many member states, mostly the Central and East European countries Hungary, Slovakia, Austria, Romania and Bulgaria, were cut off from their Russian gas supplies because of Russian–Ukrainian gas price disputes.This latest, very severe energy crisis, worsened by the general economic recession, has strengthened the view of EU policy makers that a real, common EU energy strategy and policy is needed, based on principles such as overall security and intra-European solidarity. From a historical point of view we can say that the matter of energy constituted the very basis and background of the European integration process, since the very first steps were connected to energy, with the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 99

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1951 and the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) in 1957. Nonetheless, the ideological and political preparations for integration had already been made in 1950 by the French foreign minister, Robert Schuman, who made both direct and indirect references to both energy and intra-European solidarity in his 1950 Declaration,1 later called the Schuman Declaration. He had idea vision of a peaceful and united Europe, achieved through concrete steps and achievements towards de facto solidarity. In his view, both the guarantee of long-term peace in Europe and any development in the direction of a united Europe lay in the elimination of the age-old rivalry between France and Germany, and could be achieved through the establishment of a supranational organisation and authority, the ECSC, responsible for common coal and steel production and controlled by the UN. ‘The solidarity in production thus established will make it plain that any war between France and Germany becomes not merely unthinkable, but materially impossible.’2 Solidarity constitutes the moral basis of the welfare state and the foundation of social cohesion and integration. Although there are still debates among philosophers, social and political scientists about the exact meaning of solidarity, there is common ground in all interpretations, namely a kind of devotion towards community, empathy, a feeling of responsibility for other members’ well-being in this community, placing the community’s interest before that of the individual. Without these, we cannot speak of social cohesion or integration, either within the nation-state or within the community of European nations. As mentioned above, the aim of all welfare states in the EU, as well as of the EU itself, as a community, is to provide a good quality of life for its citizens by means of its material and nonmaterial assets. However, this is becoming harder and harder since the 2008–09 financial and economic crisis, which has caused a recession, high unemployment rate, inflation and fast-rising energy prices. Two years on, we cannot say that Europe has recovered from the crisis, and what is more, severe belt-tightening and public expenditure-cutting policies have been enacted in most countries – and not only in the weakest economies, such as Greece or the Central European countries, but also in Germany, the strongest economy of the EU. Therefore cooperation and solidarity among the EU member states to lighten the burden on all EU citizens, realised through smart common economic policies, is most essential. Nevertheless, to return to the history of energy policy, it is thoughtprovoking and even alarming to realise that until the first, 1973, oil crisis there wasn’t any kind of common European energy strategy. Only 100

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afterwards, in 1974, did the European Council adopt a programme3 that prioritised getting energy from as many different sources as possible.As an initial conclusion we can say that since then, despite many attempts – policies and plans, starting from the Energy Green Papers up to the recent EU Energy Security and Solidarity Action Plan (2008) – it is still questionable whether a common, comprehensive and strategic EU energy policy exists. The main question addressed in this chapter is whether recent policies and instruments, such as the TEN-E energy infrastructure networks, including the for example Southern Gas Corridor and the Nabucco gas pipeline project, are part of a coherent and strategic European energy policy by means of which a physically and technologically higher level of intra-European energy solidarity can be realised among the EU member states; or whether they represent, rather, a patchwork of plans and intentions, sometimes even competing with each other for available EU financial resources. It is clear that without serious supranational public interventions and incentives – in this case on the part of the highest EU political leadership – the market will not necessarily provide the public good of a secure energy supply in the form of the necessary network investments, which in our view represent an important aspect of intra-European solidarity.

Energy, security and solidarity First let us define and introduce the three most important terms in our study. The word ‘energy’ probably originates from the ancient Greek ‘energeia’, used by Aristotle in his philosophy to describe the working dimension of substances. Thus, not surprisingly, in modern physics energy is one of the main characteristics of substances, a physical quantity, meaning the capacity of doing work, which can exist in potential, kinetic, thermal, electrical, chemical, nuclear or other various forms.The modern meaning of the term has developed over the last two centuries, probably first being referred to as power by G.W. Leibniz.4 However, energy in our everyday language is a unique resource, a source of power used for transportation, heating, lighting, manufacturing goods of all kinds, and without which a good quality of life is unattainable. We could say, rather pathetically, that without the appearance and use of the first energy resource – probably a piece of wood lit incidentally by a lightning storm, thus providing heat and light – human beings could not have survived until now and human civilisation would not have developed. The story of Prometheus in Greek mythology – the giving of fire to mankind, who would otherwise be unable to survive 101

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in this rather alien world equipped with no warming hair against the cold and so on – is a kind of evidence in support of this hypothesis. There is a so-called Prometheus-technical strategy of mankind that aims to control the whole physical world, in other words, to use all the available resources in order to create an artificial and insulated world where humans can live a convenient, protected and secure life (Hankiss, 2007). This last word, ‘secure’, leads us toward our next term, because energy is primarily a security issue not only for the EU, but all over the globalised modern world. Security, in our interpretation, has a complex meaning related to all aspects of quality of life, from the most basic human needs of heating, lighting and preparing food, through transportation, to the production of sophisticated, high-quality medicines, thus covering almost all branches and fields of a modern society and economy. Securing energy is primarily an international political security and strategic question. It is not by chance that the most severe international conflicts and wars since the Second World War happened in those regions which have – or are strategically connected to – the most important energy resources and fields: let us think of the 1956 Suez crisis, or most conflicts in the Middle East region, especially the 2003 war in Iraq. Nonetheless, this does not mean that securing energy resources in the post-war period has not happened mostly in a peaceful way, in the field of economy, through trade relations and markets. Competition on the energy market, however, is becoming more fierce because primary non-renewable energy resources are scarce, while global energy demand is becoming higher and higher. There are two huge camps of energy-consuming countries. The OECD member countries have accounted for the largest share (51%) of world energy consumption until recently, and since 2006 there has been a shift between the OECD and non-OECD countries – the other group of large consumers. Within another 20 years, the non-OECD countries’ consumption will be much higher (with a rapid growth of 2.3%) than that of the OECD countries (with a slower growth of 0.6%), and according to a prognosis by the US Energy Information Administration (EIA) energy5 the OECD share will fall to 41% in 2030. Within the non-OECD camp, the two emerging and fastest-growing economies, China and India, will be the key world energy consumers in the near future. Their combined share in the world’s total energy consumption has almost doubled between 1990 and 2006, from 10% to 19%, and, in contrast to most OECD countries, strong economic growth is predicted in both countries. Thus, based on the continued assumption of rapidly increasing energy usage, their combined share 102

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will make up 28% of world total energy consumption, in contrast to the US, where it will fall from 21% (in 2006) to about 17% in 2030.6 Although at present the 2008–09 worldwide economic recession continues to have a negative impact on world energy demand, in long run an economic recovery is anticipated after 2010, according to the energy prognosis of the International Energy Agency (IEA).7 Most nations will return to the ‘normal’ trend and  demand for energy will increase again, most of it (77%) still coming from fossil fuels and driven primarily (93%) by economic growth in fast-developing countries, such as the earlier mentioned China and India. The IEA’s prognosis leads us to our third term, as we try to connect security with solidarity issues in a global context. Increasing energy usage and consumption during the last 150 years has generated another severe security problem that can be tackled only globally: namely, its environmental impact, manifested in global climate change. In this case, security in its purest sense means securing the lives of citizens against unforeseen natural disasters, such as hurricanes, tsunamis, heavy snow and rainfall, floods and so on. Unfortunately climate change is no longer a scientific debate: it is reality, because there is no year or even month without unusual climatic phenomena, or even natural disasters, happening worldwide, including in Europe, that relate to the increasing levels of greenhouse gas emissions. In Copenhagen, in December 2009, there was an opportunity for the world, or more precisely, for the political representatives of most countries of the world, to find solutions and make an agreement on combating global climate change.8 Politics – in general – is about tackling and solving the collective problems of communities – whether a small village or the international community of the nations of the world. Basically, it can be modelled as an N-person Prisoner’s Dilemma game or international collective action problem (Hardin, 1971), in which the question is about ‘cooperation’ or ‘defection’: that is, opting for the (seemingly) rational and advantageous outcome of the egoist strategy or performing self-control, solidarity and finding a cooperative solution, resulting in a Pareto optimum outcome for the whole global community (Orban, 2003). Unfortunately, many times – including the previous climate agreement, the Kyoto Protocol9 of 1997 – some of the largest international players in the game (the largest energy users) chose the ‘defect’ strategy, as did the US, of not ratifying the Kyoto agreement. Similarly, almost the same thing happened in Copenhagen in 2009, with the ‘only and slight difference’ that eventually no agreement was made. Although expectations were high and very optimistic, huge international diplomatic efforts having been made before and 103

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during the Copenhagen Climate Summit, it was, according to most representatives, a huge international failure, even a shameful event, and the worst development in the history of climate change negotiations.10 By the same token, it was a political failure for the EU itself, as the history of Copenhagen started more than three years ago at the spring 2007 European Council meeting, when José Manuel Barroso, President of the European Commission, with great enthusiasm announced the new climate targets: cutting the EU’s greenhouse gas emissions by 20% and setting a binding overall goal of 20% for renewable energy sources by 2020, compared to the actual 6.5%. Moreover, the intention of the EU was even greater, as it said that it would cut the greenhouse gas emissions by 30% if the US, China and India – the largest energy consumers – made similar commitments.11 Nonetheless, there is not much time for debate. In a Copenhagen press conference12 Nobuo Tanaka, executive director of the IEA, warned that severe cuts in energy use13 are needed by 2030, the majority of which should happen in non-OECD countries because they mean primarily decreasing use of fossil fuels, especially coal. On the other hand, to replace ageing coal-fired power plants with alternative energy sources needs not only time, but also huge financial and infrastructural investment, which in the case of the developing world is very questionable. Overall, it would mean the global revolutionising of the energy industry, because to reach the EU-advocated target concentration of CO214 would require building either 17 nuclear power plants or 17,000 wind turbines by 2030 in Europe, according to the IEA estimation.15

Intra-European energy solidarity reflected in policies and networks Unfortunately, the Copenhagen Climate Summit has brought into question the basis of worldwide environmental cooperation and energy solidarity. But what can we say about Europe? We will now examine our central questions in more detail: (1) What does energy solidarity mean in an intra-European context? (2) How it is reflected in EU policies and networks? Europe had already experienced several energy crises, as was mentioned in the introduction. Recent events have strengthened the general view that Europe is dependent on energy imports and vulnerable. Moreover, rising energy prices and consumer bills, even in peaceful times and without any crisis, are another huge problem for all member states, including the old and strongest EU member countries, 104

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such as Germany, France and Britain. According to recent EU energy statistics,16 the energy consumption17 of the 27 member states was 1,806 Mtoe18 in 2007, of which the majority was oil and gas (36% and 24%), with 18% solid fuels, 13% nuclear energy, 8% renewable energy and 1% other resources. The largest consumers are Germany, France and Britain, their shares of the total being 18%, 15% and 12% respectively.19 The more telling ‘import dependency’20 data were 53% for all fuels, including 83% of oil and 60% of gas in 2007.21 Thus, the majority of all EU energy consumption, meaning oil and gas, is largely imported from outside the EU, which puts the EU in a very vulnerable position in terms of security. Moreover, if we look at the final energy consumption22 statistics from the point of view of the various sectors, it turns out that the largest consumers are households and services with 37% (of which households consume the larger part, 62%), transportation (33%), industry (28%) and agriculture (2%).23 Finally, we can say that within total energy consumption the largest direct end users are EU citizens themselves (households), using energy for their everyday high quality life. In conclusion, securing energy both directly (households) and indirectly (transportation, industry, agriculture and services) for EU citizens is a central issue in the EU that is reflected in the recent developments of the energy policy initiatives. As mentioned in the introduction, the first steps in the integration and development process of the EU were connected to energy issues, with the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) Treaty in 1951, and the Euratom Treaty (European Atomic Energy Community) in 1957. Nonetheless, the most recent initiatives of the EU in the field of energy security are the 2006 Green Paper,24 followed by the 2007 Energy Policy,25 then the revised 2008 Green Paper coupled with the EU Energy Security and Solidarity Action Plan,26 the latter of which contains our two most important research terms in its title. We will now provide brief overview, comparison and evaluation of these documents, without losing sight of our main enquiry, whether these documents constitute and reflect a coherent European energy policy, including our most important topic, intraEuropean solidarity or whether they remain in the field of the desires and unrealised future plans that have been represented many times in phrases and slogans repeated from one year to the next. Green Paper (2006) The European Commission, a truly supra-national executive political body and institution of the EU, has already issued several so-called 105

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‘Green Papers’ dealing with energy supply and security questions,27 but the 2006 Green Paper28 was intended to be a cornerstone in the development of a common European energy strategy and policy. Primarily, it tried to overview and restructure the previous, quite dispersed energy policies into a common one, triggering a public debate in the most important political decision-making bodies, the European Council and the Parliament. It was not by chance, however, that its title was ‘A European strategy for sustainable, competitive and secure energy’, compiling the three most important overall objectives of the EU. The Green Paper focuses on its environmental aspect, in particular, combating climate change by promoting renewable energy sources and energy efficiency. It should be noted that some months later in that year, the European Council revised the 2001 Gothenburg Strategy on Sustainable Development,29 which mentions the EU’s global and intergenerational solidarity in the holistic context of sustainability. As far as the other areas, competitiveness and security of supply, are concerned, the first means a truly competitive internal energy market, by opening and liberalising still protected national markets, especially the gas and electricity market. For instance, policy makers intended that from July 2007 consumers should have the legal right to purchase gas and electricity from any supplier in the EU. However, realising the idea of a free and competitive internal energy market requires first of all additional investment in the energy infrastructure, such as linking the various national energy networks, most of which are still not adequately interconnected. From our point of view, the third target area, security of supply, is very important, because it is here that the document first mentions the solidarity of member states, referring to Europe’s severe dependence on imported energy and fluctuations in demand. It suggests better coordination and harmonisation of the EU energy market, coupled with the establishment of effective mechanisms to create emergency stocks and rapid support measures in cases where a member country’s supply is in crisis – for example, because of damage to the infrastructure or other reasons (see the 2009 example of the Central and Eastern European countries). To realise this goal – among others – the Commission proposed setting up a European Energy Supply Observatory to monitor the energy market and identify potential shortfalls.30 Energy policy (2007) As a follow-up, in 2007 the European Commission issued its ‘Energy Policy for Europe’,31 which was a strategic review of the 106

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actual European energy situation and introduced a complete set of European Energy Policy measures, called the ‘energy package’. The introductory section more or less repeats the findings of the 2006 Energy Green Paper, listing the serious energy challenges the EU faces, from greenhouse gas emissions, through the security of supply, to the effective implementation of the internal energy market. Here we can read about the previously mentioned enthusiastic EU goals to lead a new industrial revolution and create a high-efficiency energy economy with low CO2 emissions, which can stand as a model for other countries and regions.To meet this goal and respond to all these challenges, a European Energy Policy is needed, named as such for the first time. However, the document acknowledges that the EU is unable to achieve these objectives alone and that cooperation with many other key players, international energy consumers and producers, in both developed and developing countries, is necessary.As we now know the results of Copenhagen, we know that there is still a question of future international political debates and compromises. The other target areas are very similar to those of the Green Paper, mentioning the competitive but integrated EU energy market, the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions, energy efficiency, the increasing use of alternative, renewable energy resources etc. As far as these latter aspects are concerned, here we find the ‘famous’ EU emission reduction goals, stating that the EU is committed to reducing its own emissions by at least 20% by 2020. To reduce greenhouse gas emissions involves using less energy; thus, at the same time, the EU sets its other ‘20% goal’, namely, reducing its energy consumption by 20% by 2020. This latter goal had already appeared in an earlier document of the Action Plan for Energy Efficiency (2007–2012),32 which, critically, mentions that not only should energy-efficient techniques, products and services be developed, but at the same time – and perhaps more difficult – the consumption habits of EU citizens should be changed in order to achieve substantial energy savings parallel with maintaining the same quality of life. This quality of life aspect leads us back to the original question, because from the individual EU citizen’s point of view there is one important section in the 2007 Energy Policy, which deals with the question of ‘energy poverty’ and also relates to the issue of solidarity at the lowest, micro-personal level. According to this, the EU will fight energy poverty by developing an Energy Customers’ Charter that encourages the implementation of aid schemes for the most vulnerable citizens in the face of increasing energy prices.33

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Green Paper (2008) and the energy networks34 From the general viewpoint of our study, an important step towards the physical realisation of the idea of intra-European solidarity was the next step in the policy process, with the appearance of the 2008 revised Green Paper,35 which placed the energy network policy in prime position by declaring that all the previously mentioned ‘20-2020’ EU climate and energy objectives36 could be achieved only with an immediate change in this area. Therefore the 2008 Green Paper tries to review all the solutions for the promotion of new energy networks, using all the instruments at the EU’s disposal, among others the so called TEN-E, the Trans-European Networks for Energy, which is one of the main EU energy policy instruments, set up already in 1996. Originally TEN-E37 was planned to be an internal market incentive instrument for players in the energy market, whereby the EU funds primarily the preinvestment feasibility studies for specific projects identified by member states, while the energy investments are made by the energy market players (who, obviously, later pass on their costs to their consumers). Retrospectively, the original TEN-E initiative cannot be regarded as very successful; it had many revisions, new guidelines issued by the EU Parliament and Council in 2006,38 regulations in 2007,39 and a report on its implementation between 2002–06 was also published.40 Based on these evaluations as well as referring to the self-critical remarks in the 2008 Green Paper, we can conclude that further revision and development of the concept, strategic goals and budget of TEN-E are needed, because when it was designed in the mid-1990s the EU was considerably smaller and faced completely different energy challenges as compared to those of today. Therefore the Commission suggested both widening the scope of TEN-E to the full spectrum of the energy transportation network, and replacing it with a totally new instrument, called the EU Energy Security and Infrastructure Instrument. Not surprisingly, the document repeats the previously mentioned most important energy targets: the long-desired completion of the internal energy market, achievement of the EU’s renewable energy objectives and guaranteeing the EU’s security of energy supply, through new infrastructure projects both within and outside of the EU. On the other hand, there are some new, more concrete elements in the document that are designed to improve the coordination and transparency of the internal energy market as well as to help the market players and the national transmission system operators (called TSOs) and regulators. For instance, the Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER) is mainly responsible for 108

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the optimum use of existing networks, while the European Networks of Transmission System Operators (ENTSOs) focuses on network planning, research and innovation. Although all these energy market coordination and administrative institutions are very important, the real problem of the interconnection of national energy networks is not solved yet. To cure the, the Commission has called for the initiation and completion of a great number of strategic energy network projects, with the help of which the EU could strengthen its intra-European solidarity and security of supply. For example, it mentions the New Europe Transmission System (NETS) as a highly promising initiative aimed at integrating gas transmission operators across Central and South-Eastern Europe, creating a sufficiently large regional gas market to attract other new investors, thus significantly reducing the operating and investment costs. It has also emphasised the necessity of specific initiatives to interlink isolated parts and regions of the EU, as well as to incorporate new forms of energy into the network. Political priority should be given to such areas in the EU as the Baltic Sea region, the Mediterranean or South-Eastern Europe, and therefore such flagship projects are listed as the Baltic Interconnection Plan, the Mediterranean Energy Ring or the Southern Gas Corridor, among others. But how these political initiatives – sometimes unfortunately only slogans – are put into action is a question of future cooperation – or rather contest – among the member states and various energy stakeholders for EU funds. In our view, the real obstacle to the realisation of an intra-European network of solidarity is nothing other than severe financial problems, related not only to the limited budgetary resources but also to the fact that there are many projects competing for those resources. As proof, we will just mention that the originally quite modest TEN-E budget, covering more than 300 projects,41 has not increased much for the last ten years, and the policy makers themselves remark quite critically that this amount of money not only limits the impact of the programme but calls into question its overall goal. It is clear that without serious supranational public interventions and incentives, in this case on the part of EU political leadership at the highest level, the market will not necessarily provide the public good of a secure energy supply in the form of the necessary network investments, which in our interpretation represents an important aspect of intra-European solidarity. Although an increase of the budget is not directly mentioned, there is already a positive element in the document, promising better coordination of other resources, such as the Structural and Cohesion Funds, allocating €675 million to TEN-E projects for the period 2007–13, which means 109

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an indirect but quite substantial increase.42 As we shall see in the last section, as an unintended side-effect, future events will help – partly – to override long-lasting financial debates. EU energy security and solidarity action plan The energy policy development process accelerated from the end of 2008 and reached its highest level so far in 2009: at the highest policy and judicial level, for the first time in the EU history, the Treaty of Lisbon43 contains a special section on energy with the same aforementioned objectives. From our study’s point of view, however, an important aspect mentioned directly by the EU legislators is the principle of solidarity in an energy context, along with the climate change challenges.44 This new, highest-level EU political approach to the energy security and solidarity question was elaborated in more detail by the European Commission in November 2008, when it proposed a new EU Energy Security and Solidarity Action Plan45 in accordance with the previously mentioned ’20-20-20’ climate change proposals.46 Here we can find the predecessor of the above-mentioned, the Lisbon Treaty solidarity issue, stating that notwithstanding the fact that each member state is responsible for its own security, in the case that any of them face severe difficulties in the supply of energy and their national solutions are not sufficient, other member states will help them. Nonetheless, to secure enough energy for Europe as a whole, and moreover to build the basis of energy solidarity among member states, first of all additional and revamped policies on various fields of the energy sector are needed.47 Thus, along with short-, medium- and long-term general objectives, the Commission distinguished five definite areas where more action was needed to secure sustainable energy supplies. Although each of these is strategically important, now we focus on two of them, which are more strongly related to the question of solidarity. The most important target area in meeting the EU’s rising energy needs is the diversification of energy supplies and development of the energy infrastructure. However, our initial assumption – that in reality not too much happens from one year to the next – is proved again, since almost the same target areas and projects are listed as in the revised 2008 Energy Green Paper.Among others, we can read about the development of the North–South gas and electricity interconnections within Central and South-East Europe, the development of a Baltic Interconnection Plan, completion of the Mediterranean Energy Ring. Also not a new element, there is the LNG (liquefied natural gas) project, contributing 110

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to the diversity of gas supplies and also strengthening solidarity, stating that sufficient capacity should be available to all member states on the basis of solidarity arrangements. As far as the oil and gas stocks – another target area of the action plan, but also highly important from our intra-solidarity point of view – are concerned, the Commission proposed the revision of the EU’s strategic oil stocks legislation as well as of the Directive on Security of Gas Supply (this latter planned to happen in 2010), but unfortunately did not provide any concrete suggestions on emergency gas stocks or mechanisms. Another important target area was to make better use of indigenous energy reserves, currently providing about half of the total energy (46%) used in Europe. Fossil fuels are still among these, but the use of coal should be in harmony with the EU’s climate (CO2 reduction) initiatives. Therefore in the long run highly efficient coal plants should prevail in Europe, using the so-called carbon capture and storage (CCS) technique. Further cost-effective initiatives and environmental friendly access to indigenous EU fossil fuels are regularly discussed by EU energy politicians and the market players in the framework of the ‘Berlin Fossil Fuel Forum’.48 However, the greatest potential source of indigenous energy is renewable energy, accounting for about 9% of final EU energy consumption today (but planned to rise to 20% by 2020). Contrary to solar or wind energy, the newly emerging nuclear energy divides the EU community and is without a common EU policy, because each member state has to decide whether or not to invest in nuclear energy. However, nuclear safety and security are a public good phenomenon and problem and therefore a common legislative framework on the safety of nuclear installations and the management of nuclear waste is indispensable. Acknowledging this necessity, in June 2009 the EU adopted a Council Directive establishing a Community framework for the safety of nuclear installations, by which the EU became a model for other countries, providing a binding legal framework on the matter.49 This issue reminds us of the previously mentioned inter-generational solidarity aspect of sustainability; to cite the words of a high-ranking energy officer: ‘continuous development of nuclear safety is not only a responsibility for Europe, but for the whole world, not simply for our, but also for the coming generations’.50

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Conclusions and perspectives: will the global crisis speed up the realisation process? So far, we have tried to review briefly, with the help of documentary analysis, the intentions of EU energy policy makers, as presented in various policies of past years, as to how to solve the problems of energy security and solidarity at the same time. However, we have seen that most of these documents are very similar in content, more or less repeating from one year to the next the same problems and target areas in the energy sector: decreasing the EU’s vulnerability and dependence on external energy sources by largely increasing the use of alternative energy (especially indigenous) resources; reducing overall consumption through new, smart technologies; making better use of the internal energy market; building the basis of a more cooperative energy sector by improving interconnections between the member countries, with the help of various energy networks, for example in the form of the Central European, Baltic or Mediterranean networks. Moreover, we can find many other suggestions for decreasing the risk of energy crises and shocks and for increasing solidarity by building new emergency energy stocks (see the LNG project); setting up new monitoring techniques; improving harmonisation and cooperation between various energy sector actors – especially in the provision of the necessary information on actual stock levels (see the European Energy Supply Observatory). However, it is not an easy task to put these good-sounding ideas into action. First of all, it needs a huge amount of money both from the EU and from individual member countries, including their public and private energy sectors. Many good initiatives – like the Nabucco or the LNG projects – have been discussed for many years, but almost nothing has happened so far. Then the unforeseen worldwide economic crisis erupted at the end of 2008, severely affecting countries throughout the EU, including the strongest economies, such as Germany.Although the crisis started in the financial and banking sectors, which were aided immediately by huge financial rescue packages from EU emergency funds and national governments, it spread to the industrial sector and did much more severe damage to such industries as construction or automobile manufacturing, causing a rapid increase in unemployment rates all over Europe. On the top of that, in January 2009 Europe facesd another crisis, directly connected to the problem of energy security. Because of price disputes between Ukraine and Russia, the supply of gas from Russia via Ukraine was cut for many weeks, and thus many member countries – mostly Central and Southern East 112

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European countries like Hungary, Slovakia, Austria, Bulgaria and Greece – were without one of their main energy resources.51 Here arises the problem of heavy energy dependency and of security, because Russia – the world leading gas exporter – provides about one third of all EU consumption, and at the same time is strengthening its energy connections with China.52 To decrease this dependency, supply from alternative sources has been a security question for a long time. Thus, such initiatives as the INOGATE programme53 to foster energy cooperation between the EU and the littoral states of the Black and Caspian Seas and their neighbouring countries, covering the areas of oil, gas, electricity, renewable energy and energy efficiency, are really essential and welcome. Nonetheless, there is a good side to everything, and these critical events gave an impetus to European policy makers to reach decisions in long-lasting debates such as the Nabucco project.54 Without knowing of the gas crisis that was to come in 2009, in November 2008 the EU Commission issued its Second Strategic Energy Review,55 where its new gas security rules appeared, stating that all member states should take effective action well in advance to prevent and mitigate the consequences of potential disruptions to gas supplies and also create mechanisms to work together, in a spirit of solidarity, to deal effectively with any major gas disruptions.Therefore energy infrastructure building projects such as the Southern Gas Corridor, including the Nabucco project, became highly important and received a more positive evaluation from top EU decision makers, and even financial support from EU budgets.56 In March 2009, European Union leaders approved a plan to allocate €2.3 billion, the highest in allocation in EU history, to different energy (mostly gas and electricity) projects aimed at increasing Europe’s security of supply and ending long-lasting debates between EU member states over which projects should receive funding.57 This energy infrastructure package was part of the so-called European Energy Programme for Recovery initiated by the European Council and Parliament to aid economic recovery by granting €3.98 billion of Community financial assistance to projects in the field of energy.58 Finally, drawing our overall conclusion on the basis of our previous findings, we can say that on a policy level and in the form of declarations the EU has tried to reinvent – not simply revitalise – solidarity within a coordinated European energy policy, although it is still very far from being realised. It needs a long time, and moreover the investment of substantial financial resources in such projects as the Baltic, Mediterranean or Central European energy networks, which

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could represent intra-European energy solidarity in both its physical and it metaphysical meaning.The first steps have been taken towards it.

Notes 1 The Schuman Declaration was made in Paris on 9 May 1950, which subsequently became ‘Europe Day’. See http://europa.eu/abc/ symbols/9-may/euday_en.htm. Schuman Declaration, http://europa.eu/abc/symbols/9-may/ decl_en.htm. 2

3

http://www.civitas.org.uk/eufacts/FSENV/ENV3.htm.

Magyar Nagylexikon (Great Hungarian Encyclopaedia) (1998) Budapest: Magyar Nagylexikon Kiadó, vol 7, pp 319–20. 4

US EIA, ‘International Energy Outlook 2009’, www.eia.doe.gov/ oiaf/ieo/world.html. 5

US EIA, ‘International Energy Outlook 2009’, www.eia.doe.gov/ oiaf/ieo/world.html. 6

IEA, ‘Energy Revolution Required to Combat Climate Change’, www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=iea-energy-climatechange. 7

‘Copenhagen Summit Ends in Blood, Sweat and Recrimination’, 20 December 2009, www.telegraph.co.uk/earth/copenhagen-climatechange-confe/6845892/Copenhagen-summit-ends-in-blood-sweatand-recrimination.html. 8

The Kyoto Protocol is an international agreement linked to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change which entered into force in 2005, when 184 nations finally ratified it. http://unfccc. int/kyoto_protocol/items/2830.php. 9

For example, according to the opinion of Lumumba Stanislaus Di-Aping, leader of the G77 group of 130 developing countries, Greenpeace’s representative John Sauven and Tim Jones of the World Development Movement: Telegraph, 20 December 2009, www. telegraph.co.uk/earth/copenhagen-climate-change-confe/6845892/ Copenhagen-summit-ends-in-blood-sweat-and-recrimination.html. 10

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‘European Agreement on a New Energy Policy’, www.ec.europa. eu/energy/energy_policy. 11

IEA, ‘Energy Revolution Required to Combat Climate Change’, www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=iea-energy-climatechange. 12

13

Reduction of 13.8 billion tonnes in greenhouse gas emissions.

450 parts per million (ppm), associated with a 2-degree Celsius rise in global average temperatures. 14

IEA, ‘Energy Revolution Required to Combat Climate Change’, www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=iea-energy-climatechange. 15

EU Commission 2007 Energy Statistics, http://ec.europa.eu/energy/ publications/doc/statistics/part_2_energy_pocket_book_2010.pdf. 16

Measured in Gross Inland Energy Consumption (GIC), which is the quantity of energy consumed within the borders of a country and calculated using the following formula: primary production + recovered products + imports + stock changes - exports - bunkers (that is, quantities supplied to sea-going ships) (http://ec.europa.eu/ energy/publications/doc/statistics). 17

1 Mtoe =1,000,000 toe.Tonne of oil equivalent (toe) is a conventional standardised unit for measuring energy, defined on the basis of a tonne of oil, with a net calorific value of 41,868 kilojoules/kg (http:// ec.europa.eu/energy/publications/doc/statistics). 18

EU Commission 2007 Energy Statistics, 2.2.2. Gross Inland Consumption, http://ec.europa.eu/energy/publications/doc/statistics/ part_2_energy_pocket_book_2010.pdf. 19

Energy dependency (the extent to which a country relies upon imports in order to meet its energy needs) = net imports / (gross inland consumption + bunkers) (http://ec.europa.eu/energy/publications/ doc/statistics). 20

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EU Commission 2007 Energy Statistics, 2.2.3. Import Dependency, http://ec.europa.eu/energy/publications/doc/statistics/part_2_ energy_pocket_book_2010.pdf. 21

Final energy consumption is the energy finally consumed in the transport, industrial, commercial, agricultural, public and household sectors (excluding deliveries to the energy transformation sector and to the energy industries themselves) (http://ec.europa.eu/energy/ publications/doc/statistics). 22

EU Commission 2007 Energy Statistics, 2.2.7. FEC by Sector, http:// ec.europa.eu/energy/publications/doc/statistics/part_2_energy_ pocket_book_2010.pdf. 23

EU Commission Green Paper of 8 March 2006, ‘A European Strategy for Sustainable, Competitive and Secure Energy’, http:// europa.eu/legislation_summaries/energy/european_energy_policy/ l27062_en.htm. 24

EU Commission, ‘An Energy Policy for Europe’, 10 January 2007, http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/energy/european_energy_ policy/l27067_en.htm. 25

26

www.europa-eu-un.org/articles/en/article_8300_en.htm.

For example, the Green Paper, ‘Towards a European Strategy for the Security of Energy Supply’, 29 November 2000 (COM (2000) 769), or the Green Paper, ‘Energy Efficiency – or Doing More with Less’ (COM (2005) 265), 22 June 2005. 27

EU Commission Green Paper, ‘European Strategy for Sustainable, Competitive and Secure Energy’, 8 March 2006, http://europa.eu/ legislation_summaries/energy/european_energy_policy/l27062_ en.htm. 28

29

http://ec.europa.eu/sustainable/sds2006/index_en.htm.

EU Commission Green Paper, ‘European Strategy for Sustainable, Competitive and Secure Energy’, 8 March 2006, http://europa.eu/ legislation_summaries/energy/european_energy_policy/l27062_ en.htm. 30

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‘An Energy Policy for Europe’, http://europa.eu/legislation_ summaries/energy/european_energy_policy/l27067_en.htm. 31

http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/energy/energy_efficiency/ l27064_en.htm. 32

http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/energy/european_energy_ policy/l27067_en.htm. 33

This section is based on documents found at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/ LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2008:0782:FIN:EN:PDF and http://ec.europa.eu/energy/strategies/consultations/doc/2009_03_ 31_gp_energy/2009_executive_summary_com_2008_782.pdf. 34

Green Paper, ‘Towards a Secure, Sustainable and Competitive European energy Network’ (COM (2008) 782). 35

Reducing Greenhouse Gas Emissions by 20%, Increasing the Share of Renewables in the Energy Consumption to 20% and Improving Energy Efficiency by 20% by 2020. 36

37

Part of the other TEN initiatives of the EU.

Decision No 1364/2006/EC of the European Parliament and the Council, 6 September 2006, laying down guidelines for trans-European energy networks and repealing Decision 96/391/EC and Decision No 1229/2003/EC, OJ L 262, 22.9.2006, http://ec.europa.eu/ten/ energy/legislation/doc/2006_09_22_ten_e_guidelines_2006_en.pdf. 38

Regulation (EC) No 680/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council, 20 June 2007, laying down general rules for the granting of Community financial aid in the field of the trans-European transport and energy networks, OJ L162/1, 22.6.2007. 39

Report on the implementation of the Trans-European Energy Networks Programme in the period 2002–06, COM (2008) 743. 40

From €148 million in 2000–06 to €155 million in the 2007–13 EU budgetary period. 41

http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM: 2008:0782:FIN:EN:PDF. 42

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http://eur-lex.europa.eu/JOHtml.do?uri=OJ:C:2007:306:SOM: EN:HTML. 43

44

www.euractiv.com/en/future-eu/treaty-lisbon/article-163412.

www.europa-eu-un.org/articles/en/article_8300_en.htm, www. europa-eu-un.org/articles/en/article_8301_en.htm. 45

By 2020 reducing greenhouse gas emissions by 20%, increasing the share of renewables in energy consumption to 20% and improving energy efficiency by 20%. 46

47

www.europa-eu-un.org/articles/en/article_8300_en.htm.

http://ec.europa.eu/energy/oil/berlin_forum/berlin_forum_ en.htm. 48

49

http://ec.europa.eu/energy/nuclear/safety/safety_en.htm.

Energy Commissioner Andris Piebalgs commenting on this new directive. http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference= IP/09/1039&format=HTML&aged=0&language=en&guiLanguage= en. 50

51

www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,599796,00.html.

52

www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/sep/13/russia-oil-exports-eu.

53

www.inogate.org/inogate_programme/about_inogate.

The Nabucco project will be the first gas pipeline connecting the world’s richest gas regions, the Caspian region, the Middle East and Egypt with the European natural gas markets, starting at the Eastern border of Turkey, running through Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary to Austria (Baumgarten near Vienna) over a distance of 3,300 km and with a final annual capacity of 31 billion cubic metres and estimated construction costs of €7.9 billion.Approximately 30% of the investment will be paid by the consortium partners and 70% will be lent by financial institutions such as the European Investment Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development.According to the original plans, construction will start in 2011, and the first gas will flow in 2014: 54

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www.nabucco-pipeline.com/press-public-news/presentations-amprelated-documents/main-page-presentations.html. 55

http://ec.europa.eu/energy/strategies/2009/2009_07_ser2_en.htm.

Nabucco received proportionally the largest amount of EU support, €200,000,000, from the recovery programme: http://ec.europa.eu/ energy/eepr/doc/i10_231_en.pdf. 56

For instance, besides the above-mentioned Nabucco, the Skanled/ Baltic gas pipe received €150,000,000 and an LNG terminal in Poland received €80.000.000 within the gas projects: http://ec.europa.eu/ energy/eepr/doc/i10_231_en.pdf, www.euractiv.com/en/energy/ eu-aims-solve-southern-gas-corridor-puzzle/article-181959. 57

58

http://ec.europa. eu/energy/eepr/doc/i10_231_en.pdf.

References Hankiss, E. (1997) Az emberi kaland (The human adventure), Budapest: Helikon Kiadó. Hardin, R. (1971) ‘Collective action as an agreeable N-person prisoners’ dilemma’, Behavioral Science, 16: 472–81. Magyar Nagylexikon (Great Hungarian Encyclopaedia) (1998) Budapest: Magyar Nagylexikon Kiadó, vol 7. Orban, A. (2003) ‘How to solve international collective action problems? Cooperation for preserving the global environment’, Society and Economy in Central and Eastern Europe, 25 (1) 97–111.

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EIGHT

Social solidarities and immigration integration policies in South-Eastern Europe Anna Krasteva

Communist solidarity: imposed, but impossible Pavlik Morozov was a Soviet youth who lived in the first decades after the Bolshevik revolution.A fervent participant in the youth communist movement, he denounced his father by accusing him of supporting the enemies of the revolution by selling forged papers. His family could not forgive Pavlik and murdered him. This young man’s dramatic story and the choice he made take us straight to the heart of the Bolshevik idea of solidarity. Pavlik’s story became part of the mainstream art of the time – his short and tragic life was glorified in six biographies, several theatre plays, many songs, a symphony and even an opera – it was one of the pillars of communist propaganda. The case presents a synthesis of the three pillars of the communist understanding of ‘solidarity’: • Demolition of the traditional source of solidarity – the family.Trust, affection and mutual support are perceived as being natural in the close interpersonal relationships between relatives. Family is at the centre of traditional society and at the core of the communitarian ideal of social solidarity. It plays such a significant role that even liberal thinkers such as John Rawls and J.S. Mill acknowledge that small communities are a benign environment for social capital and morals. • ‘Expropriation’ of solidarity from the social and its inclusion in the political. Spontaneous displays of solidarity are punished while its formal manifestations are encouraged.

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• Introduction of a radically different idea of solidarity based on political and party loyalty rather than on interpersonal relationships. The communist understanding of solidarity is paradoxical. On the one hand, it is promoted to a significant position in official ideology. Its remarkably high ranking is related to its close interconnection with the concept of ‘homogenising’ the social individual.The purpose of the gradual diminution and elimination of differences between workers, peasants and intellectuals was widely promoted. The more homogeneous the society, the more quickly the variety of interests would disappear and solidarity and mutual support would become natural and widespread.The communist ideal1 ‘From each according to his ability, to each according to his needs’ represents the utopian vision of perfect solidarity; there is no obvious direct connection between inputs and outputs, between contribution and benefits. It creates a vision of a social world based on the principle of solidarity. Solidarity was stifled in those places where it had originated and flourished most spontaneously – in the family and small communities. Various free associations (clubs, cooperatives, guilds, etc) did exist, but they were anything but free. In both instances the third characteristic of the communist model of solidarity is manifested – the ‘top–down’ approach. This contradictory ideal led to an ambiguous result: the more that solidarity was imposed from the top, the more the micromechanisms that turn solidarity into a producer of trust and social capital were strangled.

Post-communist solidarity: marginalised, but possible Post-communism turned the situation upside down. Solidarity was no longer a priority, but there were no restrictions on the development and spread of its spontaneous and varied forms. Three groups of factors determined the attitude of people living in post-communist states towards solidarity: ideological, sociological and political. The first is related to the dominant role of liberalism, the second to the widespread display of individualism and the third to the peculiarities of post-communist social democracy. A typical characteristic of the post-totalitarian transition was that the ruling communist ideology was replaced not by actual pluralism, but by a swing of the pendulum in the opposite direction – towards liberalism, including its extreme, libertarian versions. Liberties – both positive2 and negative3 – and not solidarity are at the centre of the universe of liberal political philosophy. It is important to highlight the 122

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fact that the post-communist departure from solidarity is part of the more general tendency of liberal scepticism towards the concept, which Klaus Rippe defines as ‘diminishing solidarity’ (1998): A look at the modern classics of liberalism (such as Ronald Dworkin or John Rawls) appears to confirm that justice, and not solidarity, individual rights and not social ties or mutual obligations are the central themes of these theories. (Rippe, 1998: 355–6) The sociological factor is linked to the rise and flourishing of individualism. In ‘The Care of the Self ’, Michel Foucault (1994) identifies three aspects of individualism : individualistic attitudes; the absolute value attributed to the individual; the intensity of the relation to the self in order to transform, correct and purify oneself. The new, post-communist individualist is less tempted by the existential dimension and is much more attracted by the liberation from social commitments and the proud assertion of the self as the centre of his/her own world. There is a slogan that illustrates this ambitious credo: ‘Some observe the rules, we create them’ (Krasteva, 2008). The post-communist individualist transgresses the moral standards of society in order to announce his/her own rules. In such an egocentric world there is no room for solidarity. The third factor is related to the absence of a convincing political discourse on solidarity. In the early stages of transition, post-communist socialist and social democratic political parties did not explicitly observe left–right distinctions; they tended to promote a specific vision of social change that relied on gradual and not radical transformations, rather than one of social justice. Solidarity never became one of the key messages of the left-wing parties.

Reinventing solidarity: new relations in a new field Is solidarity possible in a society that does not place collective values and shared responsibility on a pedestal – either before or after democratic change? The invention of solidarity presents a challenge to post-communist states. The new situation is a mirror image of the previous regime; solidarity is not part of the new ideology, but does not interfere with it on a social level. On the one hand, political and social priorities promote liberalism and individualism. On the other hand, the developing pluralism – both political and social – differentiates society and creates room for alternative political values. In brief, the ever more 123

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democratic political scene in Eastern and South-Eastern Europe does not promote solidarity as a key value and mobilising factor, but it does provide the room required for its development. In this chapter, the ‘reinvention of solidarity’ in the spheres of migration and integration will be discussed, with reference to particular case studies, for three sets of causes: ontological, symbolic and cultural. The ontological causes are linked to the extremely intensive population flows of the 1990s that made the West Balkans the most dynamic region in Europe. The Balkans constitute one of the most remarkable regions of the world because of the complexity and extent of their recent refugee and migration movements. In the Balkan Peninsula between 1990 and 2000, over 10 million people moved – out of a total population of some 80 million. Furthermore, these population movements, unusually, had ramifications for security both within the Balkans and for Western Europe, thus implicating both the EU and NATO (Baldwin-Edwards, 2005: 31). Every second inhabitant of Bosnia and Herzegovina joined the flow of people seeking asylum. Many other citizens, both voluntarily and under duress, became migrants of all sorts – refugees, internally displaced persons or economic migrants. Various types of migration can be differentiated: forced, ethnic, circular, labour, trafficking.4 The pattern of migration in the Balkans is rather interesting for both its typological and its diachronic aspects, and the beginning of the 21st century was marked by new tendencies, from forced migration to return, from ethnic to economic logic, from permanent to temporary migration (Krasteva, 2010). The second set of causes – the symbolic – is related to the excessive production of foreignness. Over a period of a few years Yugoslavia disintegrated into seven separate states. Also, new borders cut through the already fragmented territories, so that, in addition to the larger number of national borders, we now have the European ones too, of Slovenia, Bulgaria and Romania. Free movement around the territories of the former Yugoslav federation has now been transformed into migration, and fellow citizens have become foreigners.This multitude of new borders, divisions and estrangements needs to be counterbalanced with bridges and new relationships. The third set of causes is cultural. The ethno-cultural differences in the Balkans have traditionally been regarded in terms of minorities, of populations who have lived in the territories of South-Eastern Europe for decades or for hundreds of years. Since 2000, a new phenomenon has started to unfold – immigration. The Eastern Balkans, and also Croatia and Slovenia, have started to attract immigrants. In the new 124

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member states of the EU this process of immigration is complemented by the free movement of citizens from other European countries.This new source of ethno-cultural differences demands the creation and implementation of new types of integration policy, the invention of new forms of solidarity. What these three sets of causes share is the novelty of the phenomenon, and the aim of this chapter is to examine solidarity as a new value in relation to the new trends in migration.5 I will discuss the relationship between solidarity and migration in three problematic areas: • solidarity versus security • solidarity versus individualism • solidarity versus citizenship. At the centre of each of these areas will be a specific issue related to migration, as follows: human rights; remittances; return. Each area will analyse the manifestations of solidarity in a different section of society: the first, in civil society; the second, in interpersonal relations; and the third, in state–citizen relations. Solidarity is about identifying a condition which makes those who ‘suffer’ it worthy of one’s concern independently of (a) who those people are (b) whether or not one cares for them personally. (Arnsperger and Varoufakis, 2003: 158) Migrants can be members of our family, friends and relations, but as a general rule they are strangers, who often lead lives completely different from our own. This is why it is essential to understand one other dimension of solidarity, namely its impersonal character: Solidarity may, of course, coexist with reciprocity, person specific sympathy and Kantian duty.The point is, however, that solidarity motivates generosity independently (that is, even in the absence) of these other-regarding motivations. (Arnsperger and Varoufakis, 2003: 171)

Solidarity versus security Arevik, a young Armenian woman from Armenia, and David, an young Armenian man from Bulgaria, meet on the internet. Arevik visits David in his country, virtual love 125

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becomes real and she cannot imagine life away from her beloved. Love is blind – in this case the saying has a real power to describe the situation: the two young people in love forget the fact that they do not have the required papers.6 The romance is brutally interrupted, the girl’s visa has expired and she is held in a temporary detention centre. This is where Arevik realises that she is pregnant. She lives through hard times, but is not discouraged.A student in fine art, she fills her time in detention by drawing portraits – of other detained migrants and of the superintendents. Civil society in the country engages in a widespread campaign in support of Arevik – a young lawyer specialising in migrant rights advises her, a campaign appears on the internet, activists organise demonstrations outside the detention centre. The story is sufficiently beautiful and romantic to engage the media as well. The pressure grows in scale and power and the institutions give in. The girl is set free.7 This contemporary story of a Romeo and Juliet of migration clearly singles out several elements that are essential to the present analysis: • Concerns about security come first and are a priority in migration policy. Even in cases where there is no threat whatsoever to national security, the strictest measures provided by the law are applied, such as expulsion orders or detention, rather than lighter measures, such as daily reporting to the local police office. • Civil society, and not the state, is the main proponent of the values of human rights and displays a high level of mobilisation to support them. • The protagonists of the story are very young, beautiful, and so much in love that they unquestionably provoke strong sympathy and this explains the support ‘front’ that appears spontaneously among the non-governmental sector, the media and the population. The question remains whether civil society would demonstrate the same levels of maturity and solidarity if the migrants were not so irresistibly attractive. This case is an introduction to the first problematic area in which the relationship between migration and solidarity are analysed through the prism of human rights.The analysis is structured in three parts: Europe and the concept of human rights; the three waves of non-governmental 126

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organisations in Eastern Europe; and the typology and characteristics of the migration NGOs. Europe’s contradictory signals Zhelju Zhelev, the first Bulgarian president, promoted Husserl’s idea of Europe not as a geographic reality, but as a spiritual entity whose intellectual substance was philosophy and whose political realisation was democracy.The post-communist transition was inspired by the high ideal of a Europe seen as the birthplace of human rights.The adoption of international mechanisms for the protection of immigrant rights was perceived as part of the democratisation process.The International Convention of the UN on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families was signed on 18 December 1990. It declares that signatory states should provide ‘sound, equitable, humane and lawful conditions’ in relation to the management of migration flows. It regards migrants not merely as workers or economic units, but also as social subjects who have families and ‘have the right to have rights’.8 The overlap between the beg inning of post-democratic democratisation and the adoption of the international legal framework concerning migrants is a historical contingency, but it has a significant symbolic importance for the present analysis. The Convention’s merits can be seen to work in several directions: • It is a sublimation of the philosophy of human rights that emerged gradually after 1948, stating that fundamental rights should be accessible to all, irrespective of nationality or status. • It complements, and renders more specific, other international documents, such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. • It acts in counterbalance to a globalisation that is powered by and mainly benefits large corporations. The problems and rights of migrants are consigned to the periphery of globalisation, and the convention aims to be a corrective to this injustice (Batistella, 2008; Gauchteneire and Pecoud, 2008; Taran, 2008). • It supports the idea that irregular migrants also have rights. The Convention plays an invaluable role for all citizens, organisations and institutions that strive to carry out and implement policies for

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the integration of migrants based on the respect of human dignity and rights. The signals that the European Union (EU) sends out to its member states and to candidate countries in South-Eastern Europe are contradictory. On the one hand, the EU is a geopolitical area that not only gave the world the idea of human rights but still provides the highest standards for their observance. On the other hand, it adopts policies that lead in the opposite direction. Markets and security are the two pillars of EU policy. Both of them seriously undermine the normative and political significance of the Convention of 1990, as well as the holistic approach to the protection of human rights.The market seeks labour that is cheap, obedient, temporary and easy to dismiss.The market approach treats migrants merely as labour force to fulfil the demands of the labour market only when and to the extent needed. Security has been elevated as an unquestionable priority and is at the centre of EU policies. Migration is discussed from the perspective of control, sanctions and the criminalisation of irregular migrants. An expression of this restrictive approach is the unwillingness of EU member states to ratify the Convention of 1990; and the fact that new member states readily adopt the security approach is indicative. A thorough explanation would require a separate analysis, but here we can note briefly that the communist regimes relied on security, and this is why post-communist elites master this lesson much more easily and quickly than they do the message of solidarity and human rights. How are these contradictory signals understood and ‘translated’ in South-Eastern Europe? The waves of the civil sector The undisputable bearer of the ideal of and discourse on human rights in the post-communist countries is the civil sector.A panoramic view of its development would reveal four aspects. It could be examined both typologically – according to the priority areas on which the efforts of NGOs are concentrated – and chronologically – as periods or waves, each one focusing on a specific issue: • Minorities and conflict resolution. From the beginning of the transition, ethnic and religious tensions typified the conflicts that escalated into wars and ethnic cleansing in the former Yugoslavia. It is only natural that reconciliation activities should be the main focus of civil organisations that aim to restore trust, build bridges and display solidarity. 128

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• Anti-corruption. Lack of responsibility and accountability in the dealings of the various elites needs to be counterbalanced by the civil sector. • Environment. Civil society’s ‘going green’ has stretched the boundaries of solidarity to include the environment and our responsibility to future generations. • Migration. The civil society organisations in this area are closest to the first group, and this is why they are often their logical continuation. They face a new challenge: to formulate, defend and realise a new understanding of solidarity that includes not just ‘our own’ but also ‘the foreign’. NGOs focusing on migration: diversification of the forms of solidarity A great variety of associations, organisations and initiatives operate within the civil sector: solidarity is their trademark. I would differentiate between five types of migration NGO: humanitarian, those for human rights, information hubs, those for intercultural dialogue and migrants’ own organisations. Humanitarian organisations are the preferred field of action for religious charities and they focus on the most vulnerable migrant groups: those seeking asylum, internally displaced persons and victims of forced migration.They are of primary importance, playing an active part in the process of reconciliation and in the creation of spaces for dialogue between the different communities in post-war Bosnia and Herzegovina. In 1995 Jelena Šantić, a famous ballet dancer and the founder of numerous networks for cooperation between non-governmental peace organisations in the region, set up Group 484, an organisation to help 484 refugees and their families who had found asylum in Serbia after fleeing from Krajina and the Croatian army’s Operation ‘Storm’. She was awarded the Pax Christi International Annual Peace Prize in 1996. The organisation is a vivid example of the vitality of civil society, where people can achieve formidable results. Relying on their willpower, their desire for solidarity and their ability to mobilise others, they work with the younger generation, actively directing them towards the formation of tolerant and open attitudes towards cultural differences. Group 484 has so far been able to help over 100,000 displaced people, refugees and migrants. The second group of NGOs is those focusing on migrants’ rights. We should stress here that all migration organisations are based on the philosophy of human rights and develop various initiatives to protect 129

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them. However, there is one group of NGOs for which this is central. A typical example is the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights. It has branches in all the Balkan countries. Its activities are directed against discrimination of all types, including ethnic and religious. Some of the national branches have departments dedicated to dealing with the problems of migrants. Two organisations in Sofia, the Legal Clinic for Refugees and the Center for Legal Aid Voice in Bulgaria are the creations of young legal professionals who work pro bono to provide free legal advice to asylum seekers. There is a huge discrepancy between the lack of substantial financial support and the significant public activity that such small organisations undertake. An important strand in these organisations’ activities is the sensitising of public opinion and the exertion pressure on parliament for the stricter application of human rights standards in legislation. The third group of organisations could be defined as information, coordination and migration policy development hubs. They are not typical of the region and are a relatively new phenomenon. Their emergence has been determined by the geopolitical fragmentation of the Balkans and by the need to establish mechanisms for coordinated activity and policy. The members of MARRI (Migration, Asylum, Refugees Regional Initiative), formed in 2003, are Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Croatia. Based on the Stability Pact and the concept of solidarity, it aims to develop the Balkan countries’ capacity to cooperate and to align their policies, contributing to the stabilisation and development of the region. Intercultural understanding and dialogue is the distinctive feature of the migration phenomenon in South-Eastern Europe. CERMES, the Centre for Refugee and Migration Studies in Sofia,9 is a characteristic example of this type of organisation. Its primary mission is the overturning of research priorities: the great amount of research on emigration needs to be complemented by the study of immigration (Krasteva, 2004, 2005). Here it is essential that the actors for solidarity do not become ‘lost in the translation’ of intercultural differences in their need to accumulate expertise, research and analyses on which to base an understanding of migrants. The aim is to discover new forms of solidarity and to make use of new forms of intercultural difference through immigration, that is, to make a transition from loss of the ‘own’ to welcoming the foreign, from identity to solidarity. The other mission of the organisation is to provide immigrants with a voice so that, rather than being the subject of public debates,10 initiatives11 and forums, they are active initiators and implementers. 130

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What is essential to analyse is the diversification of activities along two axes: the types of solidarity and its subjects.The problems of asylum seekers, irregular immigrants and refugees are so different from those of economic migrants that they are usually the focus of specialised NGOs. They face the very challenging task of relativising security by complementing it with solidarity, of asserting the idea that every person has rights – even if they have entered the country and stayed there without the necessary papers. Thus, activities fall into three groups: legal, informational and intercultural. In the first, solidarity is related to migrant rights; in the second, to policies and the need for them to apply the standards of human rights; and in the third, to the integration, inclusion and empowerment of migrants. Civil society: the discourse that provides a connection Political theory and political ethics rarely look in the same direction. H.G. Gadamer points to one of the key areas in which they diverge: Our public life appears to be defective in so far as there is too much emphasis upon the different and the disputed, upon that which is contested or in doubt. What we truly have in common and what unites us remain, so to speak without a voice. (Gadamer, 1967, in Walhof, 2006: 571) Politics puts too much emphasis on the sources of differences between people and of tension and conflict. The normative approach is to seek voices that can unite. Civil society is the alternative voice that performs the mission of creating topoi of solidarity in post-communist societies. Its efforts are twofold. On the discursive level, the discourse of security is opposed to the discourse of human rights. If the one legitimates and consolidates borders (national, ethnic, symbolic), the other overcomes them with the idea that the highest level of human security is contained in an environment of sharing and solidarity. Here the creation of solidarity is in the relationship between the receiving societies and migrants, in the accumulation of experiences and the multiplication of practices of intercultural understanding and dialogue. Civil society in South-Eastern Europe has a long way to go before it achieves the high goals it has set for itself, not least because of the weaknesses of its own processes and functions.12 Given the general flux of society, the mission will be hard to achieve in the foreseeable

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future. It is essential that, despite all its deficits, civil society should be the herald of solidarity, much more so than the state. Solidarity versus individualism I had the opportunity to work as an engineer abroad. I sent 1,000 dollars to my wife, son, daughter, brother, sister and best friend each. I did not make any savings, but times were like that. These were years of scarcity for Bulgaria: hyperinflation, complete uncertainty about what might happen the next day. A thousand dollars was a considerable sum, a breath of air until the crisis was over. (Interview with a former migrant, aged 45) The above excerpt from an interview leads us to the next type of solidarity, which sees the migrant as a person concerned with the survival of the people closest to him/her – relatives and friends – rather than as an atomised individual seeking personal prosperity. One of the antidotes to individualism is sibling solidarity. Here, researchers highlight two key elements: that kinship functions as a social network, and that the significance of kinship solidarity transcends the narrow limits of the family and corresponds to important social values: ‘While some aspects of kinship organisation appear antithetical to many social institutions in modern society, sibling solidarity is consonant with the equalitarian ethic’ (Graham, 1977: 177). Remittances are one of the points of intersection between sibling solidarity and migration. Unlike many other forms of sibling solidarity, where geographical proximity plays an important role, with remittances, lack of proximity diminishes, solidarity is enhanced between the migrant and the non-migrants belonging to his/her family. Remittances can vary within an extremely wide range.According to the calculations of the World Bank, in the decade 1996–2005 they represented almost one third (29%) of the GDP of Bosnia and Herzegovina, a considerable part of Albania’s GDP (16%) and a smaller part of that of Bulgaria (3.6%) and Croatia (3.3%)13 (Roberts et al, 2007). Remittances have value as a mechanism for solidarity because they play a significant role in guaranteeing the education children or a decent life for parents when they reach old age, and in sustaining the calendar of family activity. This mechanism has its historical roots in gurbet – a migration practice of the inhabitants of the Balkans, which could be understood today as circular or temporary migration: the head of the family works abroad during the summer or for a set period of time in order to support the 132

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family. Despite the much more developed forms of individualism that the migrant enters into in the receiving country, the mechanism of kinship solidarity continues to operate.A second peculiarity is revealed by the way in which solidarity develops into diverse and multiple forms characterised by gender and generational variations. The significance of remittances to the family is invaluable in the material sense of survival, in supporting a decent life and in raising levels of well-being. Their importance in a symbolic sense is even greater and all-embracing: they are a specific token of kinship solidarity, which transcends the separation of place and affirms a real alternative to individualism. Solidarity versus citizenship “I want to return to die at home.” This is the typical attitude of the first sociologically significant group of returnees to the new countries that succeeded the former Yugoslavia.14 It illustrates clearly the interconnection between the existential and the political and shows the extent to which the most personal of impulses can depend on the successful application of returnee policies. Every policy of return is based on solidarity. As a rule, it is generally perceived as ‘natural’ and is seen as being unproblematic: they are our compatriots who are returning and they will reintegrate without any trouble. The case that I shall analyse is the exact opposite. Regrettably, return and reintegration are far from being a ‘natural’ and smooth continuation, especially in postconflict situations. All fixed concepts of identity, belonging, and territorialisation should be deconstructed. (Mesic and Bagic, 2010: 134) The wars in the former Yugoslavia produced a huge number of refugees and internally displaced people. Contemporary Serbia hosts the largest number of refugees and internally displaced persons in Europe: At the climax of armed conflict among former Yugoslav nations in 1993, there were around 2.5 million refugees and displaced persons in the region, which made up 1/5 of the total number of forced migrants in the world (15 million). (Bobic, 2010)

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This complex and traumatic situation makes return a long and intricate process. It is not possible to reduce it to a one-off act and the process is a subtle one that takes time. In this type of return, solidarity is two-edged: on the one hand, it is problematic because of the ambiguity of meaning of ‘own’ and ‘foreign’ and the intricate transitions between the two; on the other hand, it presents a condition that is fundamental in order for the actual return to take place and be sustainable. The challenges, from the point of view of returnees, are of two major types: • Lowering of social status. Some returnees lived formerly as one of the majority nations in the federal state of Yugoslavia, but they return to the status of a minority in a newly formed state. Two-thirds of the Serbian returnees to Croatia are dissatisfied with their position as a national minority (Mesic and Bagic, 2010). • Homogenisation of social space. Having grown up in a more mixed environment in terms of ethnicities and religions, returnees return to a more homogeneous one. The weaker the return, the more ethnically ‘pure’ the environment remains: before the war, 73,000 Croatians lived in the Bosnian town of Banja Luka, but today15 they number a mere 6,500; out of 39,000 Serbs who left Herzegovina, only 9,000 returned to their homes (Marinkovic, 2007). Both the status of minority and the altered environment of ethnic culture weaken the traditional mechanisms of solidarity and require the creation of new ones. In a post-conflict society, the major proponents of solidarity – and guarantors of its application – are the international community and states such as Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia. The latter need to accept as their ‘own’ those who, during the wars, were defined as ‘foreign’; for example, Croatia has set up programmes for the sustainable return of Serbs. Returnees are expected to display loyalty to the new state, and the state is required to show solidarity towards its new minorities. This type of solidarity is at the very heart of the new Balkan citizenships. They are formed with a strong nationalistic charge. To be acceptable to the EU, this ethnic nationalism has to be coloured and balanced by a moderate policy towards minorities, returnees and immigrants. Solidarity presents a major challenge and is a key condition for the evolution of the civil spirit from an ethnic to a civic model.

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Conclusion: the new topoi of solidarity Among the tasks of politics today, I think a top priority should be to make us more generally aware of our deep solidarities. This is particularly crucial in the age of interrelated foreignness, where we do not even know our neighbors. (Gadamer, 1999, in Walhof, 2006: 572) Gadamer singles out solidarity as a key political priority. In the spirit of that understanding, this chapter has unfolded what, on the one hand, provides proof of solidarity’s political role, and what, on the other, connects its understanding to otherness. Migration is one of the areas where the difficulty of producing solidarity is greatest because, as a rule, solidarity is bound to nationality. Even more problematic is its appearance and protection in post-conflict countries or in societies in transition that are not sufficiently prepared for or focused on the integration of migrants. It is this less favourable context that makes the identification of new topoi of solidarity in the new sphere even more significant. One of these is the family. Remittances are a mechanism of solidarity that unfolds on the level of the social structure of society and creates antidotes to the growth of individualism in both sending and receiving countries. The other mechanism of solidarity – the provision of conditions for the return of individuals who have been forcibly displaced or have left as a result of ethnic conflict and wars – is realised on the level of public reintegration policies. It involves two key political subjects: the national state and the international community. The third mechanism of solidarity – the protection of migrants’ rights and the forms of intercultural understanding and dialogue – is fundamental because it contributes to the development civil society. It is fundamental for three reasons. First, because it covers the huge social space between individuals, on the one hand, and the state, on the other. Second, because, especially in a civil society, immigrants can be actors in and not just subjects of integration practices. And third and most substantially, because it is the civil society in post-communist countries that proclaims the noble mission of producing a public discourse of connectedness and solidarity.

Notes 1 This ideal remained totally divorced from the actual social situation, from the very beginning until the end of the communist regimes.

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According to Isaiah Berlin, the positive concept of liberty attempts to answer the question ‘What, or who, is the source of control or interference that can determine someone to do, or be, this rather than that?’ (1969: 122). 2

The negative concept of liberty refers to the question:‘What is the area within which the subject – a person or group of persons – is or should be left to do or be what he is able to do or be, without interference by other persons?’ (Berlin, 1969: 122). 3

The Balkans have also become the main route for human trafficking, but detailed discussion of this issue would take us away from the current analysis. 4

The migration profile of the West and East Balkans during the communist regime was very different: Bulgaria and Romania (also Albania) were typical closed countries, rarely allowing and strictly controlling both inward and outward movement of people; Yugoslavia’s policy was much more open. These differences are not the subject of the present analysis. 5

David has lived in Bulgaria for 18 years; his parents – Armenian immigrants – are honest citizens who pay their taxes and have never broken the law; David still has no identity papers or leave to remain in Bulgaria. 6

7

The detention is replaced by daily reporting to the police.

8

Pace Hannah Arendt’s famous expression.

9

Founded and managed by the author of this chapter.

CERMES organises regular public debates to strengthen relationships between the migrant communities and the receiving society: ‘Being a refugee in Bulgaria’, ‘Being a foreign woman in Bulgaria’, ‘Being an Afghan in Bulgaria’, and many others. 10

Such as intercultural festivals of the migrant communities, focusing on open and active forms of participatory art. 11

See Krasteva (2009) on the imbalance between professionalisation and civic engagement and on other weaknesses of civil society. 12

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The difficulties of measuring remittances and the unreliability of most of the data, including those of big international organisations, are not the subject of the present analysis. 13

One in three Serbs returning to Croatia (37%) is aged over 65. Of those registered as returnees after 1996, 11% have now died (Mesic and Bagic, 2010). 14

15

Data from 2007.

References Arnsperger, C. and Varoufakis,Y. (2003) ‘Toward a theory of solidarity’, Erkenntnis, 59 (2) 157–88. Baldwin-Edwards, M. (2005) ‘Balkan migrations and the European Union: patterns and trends’, The Romanian Journal of European Studies, 4: 31–43. Battistella, G. (2008) ‘La naissance d’une Convention: Les difficiles relations entre migrations et droits de l’homme’, Hommes et migrations, 1271: 20–31. Bobic, M. (2010) ‘Serbian unfinished business: refugees and IDPS’, in A. Krasteva, A. Kasabova and D. Karabonova (eds) Migrations from and to Southeastern Europe, Ravenna: Longo Editore. Foucault, M. (1994) Histoire de la sexualité.Tome. 3. Le souci de soi, Paris: Gallimard. Gadamer, H.-G. (1967) ‘The limitation of expert’, quoted in D.R. Walhof (2006) ‘Friendship, otherness and Gadamer’s politics of solidarity’, Political Theory, 34 (5) 569–93. Gadamer, H.-G. (1999) ‘Friendschaft und solidaritat’, quoted in D.R. Walhof (2006) ‘Friendship, otherness and Gadamer’s politics of solidarity’, Political Theory, 34 (5) 569–93. Gauchteneire, P. de and Pecoud, A. (2008) ‘La Convention des Nations unis sur les droits des travailleurs et migrants’, Hommes et Migrations, 1271: 6–19. Graham, A. (1977) ‘Sibling solidarity’, Journal of Marriage and Family, 39 (1) 177–84. Krasteva, A. (2004) (ed) From ethnicity to migration, Sofia: NBU. Krasteva, A. (2005) (ed) Immigration in Bulgaria, Sofia: IMIR. Krasteva, A. (2008) ‘L’individualisme post-communiste’, in J.-P. Payet and A. Battegay (eds) La reconnaissance a l’épreuve. Presses Universitaires de Septentrion, pp 295–302.

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Krasteva, A. (2009) ‘Being a citizen – not a profession, but a commitment’, in K. Hristova-Valtcheva (ed) New actors in a new environment: Accession to the EU, civil society and multilevel governance, Sofia: BECSA, pp 35–43. Krasteva, A. (2010) ‘Introduction’, in A. Krasteva, A. Kasabova and D. Karabonova (eds) Migrations from and to Southeastern Europe, Ravenna: Longo Editore, pp 9–14. Marinkovic, D. (2007) ‘Strengthening cross-border cooperation in the Western Balkans regarding migration management: the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina’, in Migration flows in Southeast Europe:A compendium of national perspectives, Belgrade: Group 484, pp 43–75. Mesic, M. and Bagic, D. (2010) ‘Serb returnees in Croatia – the question of return sustainability’, International Migration, 48 (2) 133–60. Rippe, K. (1998) ‘Diminishing solidarity’, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 1 (3) 355–74. Roberts, B. et al (2007) A study on determinants and remittances flows in Macedonia, Skopje: Centre for Economic Analyses. Taran, P. (2008) ‘La Convention, symbole d’une approche alternative des migrations internationales’, Hommes et Migrations, 1271: 32–41. Walhof, D.R. (2006) ‘Friendship, otherness and Gadamer’s politics of solidarity’, Political Theory, 34 (5) 569–93.

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Normative power Europe: a tool for advancing social solidarity within and beyond Europe? Andy Storey

Introduction The concept of social solidarity was given both instrumental and normative significance at the inception of the European Community by the Schuman Declaration in May 1950, which established a basis for the cohesion policies endorsed by the Treaty of Rome in 1957. Some analyses appear to suggest that social solidarity as a normative concept within European discourse has declined significantly in recent decades (Józef Niżnik, Chapter Two of this volume; Arts and Gelissen, 2001). Manners (2008), however, argues that social solidarity is still represented as at least a subsidiary (but vital) norm, closely linked to associated human rights, within European discourse, and that this is a constitutive component of the European Union’s (EU) ‘normative power’. Is this the case? And, if it is, what are its implications for the practice of social solidarity between Europeans, and between Europeans and non-Europeans? This chapter first describes what is meant by the idea of the EU as a ‘normative power’ and then offers a critique based on charges of Eurocentrism and the claimed failure on the part of the EU to ‘walk the (normative) walk’. It outlines a political-economic understanding of the ways in which ‘norms’ and interests are intermeshed, with particular reference to the EU’s negotiation of Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) with developing countries. It is concluded that the EU’s claim to represent a ‘normative power’, promoting relationships of social solidarity in a positive and idealist sense, is problematic; the EU does seek to promote and support certain norms and these may or may not be constitutive of genuine social solidarity.

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Normative power Europe: the concept The concept of normative power Europe (NPE) was developed by Ian Manners as something to be distinguished from more traditional conceptions of military and civilian power. According to Manners (2002: 241): The EU has gone further towards making its external relations informed by, and conditional on, a catalogue of norms which come closer to those of the European convention on human rights and fundamental freedoms (ECHR)1 and the universal declaration of human rights (UDHR) than most other actors in world politics.The EU is founded on and has as its foreign and development policy objectives the consolidation of democracy, rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. Crucially, the norms promoted by the EU are seen as universal, and the EU is claimed to be unique in this regard (compared, for example, to the US, which is seen as seeking to project specifically American values and norms). Manners (2002: 241) can thus assert that ‘the EU is normatively different to other polities with its commitment to individual rights and principles’ which, however, are globally shared (if not also practised by other powers). For Manners, the core norms are peace, liberty, democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights, with ‘minor’ norms of social solidarity, anti-discrimination, sustainable development and good governance.While initially billed as ‘minor’ norms, the references to social solidarity and anti-discrimination constitute vital claims in the context of this present volume: they open up the possibility that a ‘normative’ perspective might allow for the practice of strong forms of solidarity between Europeans, and also between Europeans and non-Europeans. Bicchi (2006: 289) notes that ‘the normative value of Europe’s power rests on the universal character of the principles it promotes’; or, as Manners himself (2006b: 174) puts it,‘It is the lack of exceptionalism, rather than the claim to being special, which characterizes most of the normative claims in the EU.’ If the values being upheld are shared by Europeans and non-Europeans alike, then genuine solidarities based on these shared values might appear as more practicable projects than has hitherto been the case. As to why it so happens that the EU is uniquely positioned to embody and embrace these norms, Manners (2002: 240) identifies three distinctive, relevant characteristics of the EU (see also Sjursen, 140

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2006a: 242). The first is its historical context – the commitment of Europeans to pool sovereignty in the wake of the Second World War as a means of curbing the excesses of nationalism. The second is its unique form of polity, which combines international and supranational forms of governance.2 The third is its legal–political constitution, which formally embodies the principles of democracy, the rule of law, respect for human rights etc. Thus, the EU’s international role is determined not so much by ‘what it does or what it says, but what it is’ (Manners, 2002: 252). Manners (2006b: 174) has also suggested that Europe’s ‘historical context of reflexive humility’ – a willingness to acknowledge past practices such as colonialism and the Holocaust – helps to mould NPE. These norms are diffused through the very procedures of EU membership and application for membership – for example, states seeking to join the EU must move to abolish the death penalty. NPE also has a wider ability ‘to shape conceptions of the ‘normal’ in international relations’ (Manners, 2002: 239), that is, to alter what is seen as appropriate behaviour on the part of others and to bring them more into line with the EU’s own (happily universal) norms (see also Diez, 2005: 615). This can be done through diplomatic means or through less overt methods – Manners (2006b: 176) speaks of ‘the contagion of norms through imitation (mimétisme) and attraction’. As Diez points out, there is a form of hegemonic power at work here – ‘the power to shape the values of others’ (Diez, 2005: 616).This can also be interpreted in Foucauldian terms (Diez and Pace, 2007: 2): NPE acts a discourse, ‘a specific way of thinking about the world, a particular form of knowledge … which does not reflect but actually constructs reality. In doing so, it closes off alternative ways of thinking and so constitutes a form of power’ (Kiely, 1999: 31, emphasis in original). The NPE discourse is, in these Foucauldian terms, about ‘disciplining difference, establishing what the norm is and what deviance is’ (Munck, 1999: 68), a point that will be returned to below. Crucially, the norms are not imposed on others through coercion (Manners, 2006a: 184), nor do they need to be (in part because, as Manners sees it, they are universally shared to begin with). Indeed, the diffusion of the norms is seen as an act of solidarity rather than of imposition. One specific way in which normative power is exercised is through the EU’s willingness (and/or the willingness of its member states) to ratify, and bind itself to, cosmopolitan treaties on matters such as human rights and environmental protection: ‘important symbolic and public demonstrations of international commitment’ (Manners, 2006b: 173). Choosing to submit itself to ‘internationally binding law … 141

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provides a guarantee that the EU will enforce the norms it promotes in the international arena’ (Scheipers and Sicurelli, 2007: 452) and distinguishes the EU from the type of power exercised by, especially, the US (a much less enthusiastic signer of such treaties). Manners argues that NPE ‘was, and is, a statement of what is believed to be good about the EU; a statement which needed to be made in order to stimulate and reflect on what the EU should be doing in world politics’ (2006b: 168, emphasis in original). It is ‘a normative claim with a normative aim’ (Manners, 2006b: 179), the claim resting on the fact that while the EU is by no means a perfect normative power, it is more so than most other actors in world politics.3

Critiquing NPE: Eurocentrism and hypocrisy? Eurocentrism and uncritical thinking Part of the reason for Manners’ adoption of the NPE concept lies in his rejection of the notion that Europe has a unique set of values and principles which it can, or should, seek to export to the rest of the world: ‘Any and all of the norms discussed in the NP approach are not uniquely European, and neither is Europe itself ’ (Manners, 2006b: 180). Aware of the critique posed by post-colonial theory to any Eurocentric claim to be ‘civilising’ the world (Manners, 2006a: 184), Manners sees NPE as ‘an attempt to escape civilizing missions’ (Manners, 2006b: 175). The intent seems admirable, but it is difficult to see how Eurocentrism has been avoided in practice. Bicchi (2006: 287) asks:‘Is the EU a “normative power”, promoting universal norms, or is it a “civilising power”, projecting its own understanding of norms onto the rest of the world?’, and answers that it is much more the latter than the former.4 There is an indeed an inescapably strong whiff of Eurocentrism about the NPE project, not least because it accords so closely with EU policy makers’ own stated understanding of themselves and their (positive) roles, an understanding often shared by journalistic commentators5 and some academics.6 Former French Prime Minister Lionel Jospin has argued that ‘Europe is much more than a market. It stands for a model of society’ (cited in McGrew, 2002: 357). Romano Prodi, former President of the European Commission and Prime Minister of Italy, suggests that ‘Europe in the course of its history has had a great heritage to live up to, a heritage which still forms the richest store of culture and knowledge amassed by mankind’ (in Hansen, 2004: 58), although, given the history of colonial exploitation, one is obliged to 142

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ask: amassed from whom? Indeed, contrary to the claims of Manners (see above), European leaders typically display little inclination to deal self-reflexively with subjects such as the legacy of colonialism (Hansen, 2004: 58). Instead, they more commonly emphasise the claimed positive dimensions of European history and invoke these to justify European efforts to change the wider world, as evidenced again by Prodi: Europe needs to project its model of society into the wider world. We are not simply here to defend our own interests: we have a unique historic experience to offer. The experience of liberating people from poverty, war, oppression and intolerance … It is not imperialism to want to spread these principles and to share our model of society with the peoples of southern and eastern Europe who aspire to peace, justice and freedom. (In Hansen, 2004: 60) The idea of (European) norm diffusion as an act of almost selfless solidarity is very clearly evident here. The dangers of this approach are recognised by several scholars, including Bicchi (2006: 287), who describes EU foreign policy as ‘often unreflexively Eurocentric ... mirroring the deeply ingrained belief that Europe’s history is a lesson for everybody’. Academics who endorse the idea of Europe as a civilising, ethical or normative power leave themselves ‘vulnerable to the charge of being unable to distinguish between their own sympathy for the European project and their academic role as critical analysts’ (Sjursen, 2006b: 170). Pace (2007b: 1045) focuses on the dangers of an uncritical adoption of the EU’s own ‘liberal narrative’.7 Whether it involves a claim that superior European values should be exported, or a claim that Europe best embodies universal global norms (Manners’ position), this approach too easily slips into an assumption that Europe is, in one way or another, simply ‘doing good’ in international affairs, or at least attempting to do so (Sjursen, 2006b: 171).8 Walking the walk? Following on from the above section, Diez and Pace (2007: 2) describe NPE as ‘first and foremost a discourse in which EU actors ... construct themselves as “model citizens”’. As Diez and Pace also point out, a crucial question concerns the effects this discourse generates – and these might not be negative, however ‘imagined’ its origins. In other words, the EU could actually be ‘doing good’ (for others as well as itself) through its representation of itself as a normative power, provided that 143

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it proved willing and able to live up to the claims that it makes for itself. Indeed, the claims themselves may provide ‘a platform for activists, civil society organizations and NGOs to use rhetorical and symbolic tools, including shaming tactics, to get their political leaders to comply with the values, norms and ideals that EU actors advance’ (Diez and Pace, 2007: 6) or claim to advance. In particular, those pursuing ‘solidaristic’ strategies – campaign groups and others – could seek to hold the EU accountable to the normative claims it makes for itself as a lever to advance their struggles for social justice and equality. In that vein, some of the literature that has engaged – implicitly or explicitly – with the idea of NPE asks a variant of the following question: ‘Europe talks the talk, but does it walk the walk?’, or can it at least be pressured to do so? Diez (2005: 624) highlights ‘charges of bias and arbitrariness’ in the application of EU human rights policy, and these are further expanded on below. The disjunction between the EU’s claimed commitment to the promotion of democracy and its refusal to recognise the democratically elected government of Palestine is another obvious case in point (Pace, 2007b). However, some empirical studies appear to suggest that the walk is indeed walked. For example, in their analysis of the trade and political agreement signed by Mexico and the EU in 2000, Szymanski and Smith relate the insertion of a provision for suspension for human rights abuse in the agreement to ‘the centrality of human rights as a European cultural norm’ (2005:178). Previous EU agreements with third countries had included provisions for political dialogue around issues of democracy and human rights, but had not contained provision for automatic suspension in the event of violations. EU negotiators were, it is claimed, willing to abandon the agreement altogether rather than abandon human rights principles (Syzmanski and Smith, 2005: 175). By contrast, the North American Free Trade Agreement between Mexico and the US (and Canada) contained no reference to human rights (Syzmanski and Smith, 2005: 173). Szymanski and Smith conclude that there may be ‘a growing acceptance of the EU as a force for long-term global peace, prosperity and stability through its use of principled co-operative development programmes with poorer countries’ (Szymanski and Smith, 2005: 190), implying that the EU is constructing and institutionalising new forms of international solidarity. However, a more recent assessment argues that the development impact of the EU-Mexico agreement has been negative for Mexico, increasing the penetration of imports into that country, damaging its industrial and service sectors, and heightening its dependence on foreign capital, thus raising the possibility that economic and social 144

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rights were sacrificed even as political and civil rights were perhaps strengthened (World Development Movement, 2008; see also Dur, 2007).This refers back to a critical conceptual point raised earlier: could such a differentiated approach to rights, where political and civil rights are promoted whereas economic and social rights are, at the very least, deprioritised represent a specifically European (or Western) norm that is not universally shared? If so, the claim that NPE’s uniqueness lies in its embodiment and promotion of universal norms is challenged (see above). Other studies that are, broadly speaking, supportive of the impact of NPE include that by Scheipers and Sicurelli (2007), which sees NPE in action in the institutionalisation of the International Criminal Court (ICC) and in the development and ratification of the Kyoto Protocol. Scheipers and Sicurelli (2008) also argue that the EU’s campaign to have African states sign up to the ICC and the Kyoto Protocol empowered African countries – by enhancing their international identities (signing up gave these states recognition and legitimacy); by the direct provision to them of legal and technical expertise so that they could participate in discussions on, and implement, the agreements; and by material aid, as a conditional quid pro quo, being made available to African signatories. While this last form of support is acknowledged to run counter to the rhetoric of EU–African relationships consisting of a solidaristic ‘partnership of equals’, the authors nonetheless conclude that African countries have been empowered by the EU’s international promotion of its core norms.9 They acknowledge that this did not occur for reasons of altruism (for example, the EU had an interest in positioning itself as a world leader on these issues vis-à-vis the US),10 and they also acknowledge that making some development aid conditional on African (and other) countries’ ratifying the Kyoto Protocol (and other agreements) caused some African state agents to speak of a ‘new colonialism’ (Scheipers and Sicurelli, 2008: 617). The fact that some countries had to be thus ‘bribed’ to adopt these instruments again raises the possibility that certain (claimed) European norms (on human rights and environmental sustainability) are not necessarily shared universally – or not understood in the same way.

The synergy of norms and interests: NPE and international solidarity (or the lack of it) Contrary to the studies cited above that claim to find the EU walking the normative walk, many other studies highlight the extent to which EU actors pursue their economic, security or other interests on issues 145

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ranging from biotechnology regulation to trade policy and diplomatic relations with countries such as Russia (Forsberg and Herd, 2005; Hyde-Price, 2006; Falkner, 2007; Zimmerman, 2007; Robles, 2008). Is the whole rhetoric of norm diffusion then simply a guise for the (overt or covert) pursuit of European economic and/or strategic interests? Is the EU’s claim to be acting in solidarity (with the world’s poor, among others), for example, a smokescreen for simple self-interest? This is an important question, and yet it may also imply a somewhat reductive, binary opposition – norms versus interests. For Youngs (2004: 420), it is not possible to clearly differentiate between norms and interests: ‘Norms based on material interests can assume normative authority; norms are woven into material interests.’ Diez (2005: 622, 625) also makes the point that ‘interests and norms cannot easily be separated’ and that ‘the assumption of a normative sphere without interests is itself nonsensical’.Youngs argues that the EU’s normative concerns for human rights and social solidarity are underpinned by strategic interests. For example, vis-à-vis Afghanistan, EU states made aid conditional on the establishment of a Human Rights Commission, but they also tolerated the rule of local warlords and agreed to the postponement of elections on the grounds of ensuring ‘stability’ (Youngs, 2004: 425). In the aftermath of 9/11, the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (an EU programme) targeted Pakistan for increased funding on the grounds of its centrality in the global ‘war on terror’ (Youngs, 2004: 428–9).Which rights are supported (if at all), and where (with whom – if anyone – one is in solidarity) depends, not surprisingly, on the strategic assessments and interests of European governments.11 Progressive norms promotive of genuine solidarity can still be diffused, but for strategic reasons. Norms are always likely to be derived from interests, albeit not in a necessarily direct and clear-cut manner (Storey, 2006). Interests may refer not only to the short-term commercial agenda of a particular corporation, or the security considerations of an EU state, but rather to the broader political economic concerns of European capital, EU governments, the European Commission and others. For example, the EU may promote a norm of economic liberalisation because it is committed to the extension and reinforcement of global capitalist relations – which it may or may not genuinely see as the best route to development for poorer countries – even if it does not envisage any immediate profits accruing to specific European companies from specific liberalising measures (Cammack 2005). Thus, the EU may promote a norm of ‘good governance’ (including market liberalisation) for reasons that combine both (long-term, perceived) self-interest and 146

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normative commitment. That the EU acts in this way in terms of the internal economic governance of Europe is already a commonplace in the burgeoning neo-Gramscian literature on EU political economy (Gill, 2001; Van Appeldoorn, 2001; Bonefeld, 2002; Cafruny and Ryner, 2007; Storey, 2008). While norm diffusion may, on occasion, simply be a hypocritical smokescreen for the pursuit of naked and short-term economic or strategic gain, it may also constitute an attempt to project onto other countries and actors a specific model of behaviour. Crucially, regardless of whether the motivation is explicitly self-serving or not, this model of behaviour could be ill suited to those others’ needs and priorities. Storey (2006) addressed these issues through an analysis of the EU’s negotiating positions vis-à-vis the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) being put in place with African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries. Was the EU really promoting norms in these negotiations? And if norms were being promoted or diffused, were they appropriate to African countries and populations? According to the then EU Trade Commissioner, ‘EPAs are not about Europe trying to force open markets for our benefit’ (Mandelson, 2005). Nonetheless, critics were sceptical on this point. Critics of the EU’s (allegedly self-serving) agenda highlighted the following elements of the EU’s negotiating stance vis-à-vis the EPAs: • demands for liberalisation of public procurement in the ACP states (allowing EU firms to bid for public works contracts there and not allowing ACP governments to support or prioritise local contractors); • movement towards liberalisation of all service sectors; • pressure to ensure that European firms received at least as favourable treatment as local ones in the ACP countries, meaning that ACP governments would not be allowed to discriminate in favour of locally owned firms or require European companies to abide by special conditions with regard to local employment or procurement. The Commission denied that these demands were based on European commercial self- interest and defended the very wide agenda of the negotiations: EPAs are part of the overall effort to build up the economic governance framework, the stable, transparent and predictable rules necessary to lower the costs of doing business, attract fresh domestic or foreign investment and 147

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make ACP producers more diversified and competitive. This is why the EPAs must be comprehensive, dealing with all the rules and issues that concern private investors and traders.... As a result, issues such as competition policy and investment rules are no luxury but fundamental factors that affect the decisions of traders and investors. (Commission of the European Community, 2005: 32) Critics remained unconvinced by the attempt to extend the agreements beyond trade policies and into areas of what they saw as domestic economic governance.They noted that it was precisely these ambitions on the part of the EU, to push the so-called ‘Singapore issues’ (investment, competition and public procurement) into trade agreements, that had been rejected by most developing countries at World Trade Organisation (WTO) negotiations (Curtis, 2005: 12–13). The Commission recognised the point, but was unapologetic: We recognise the concern among NGOs that the EU is ‘trying to reintroduce the so-called Singapore issues by the back door’. However, everyone should acknowledge that investment, public procurement and competition policy are essential parts of successful economic governance. (Commission memorandum, January 2005, cited in Curtis, 2005: 13, emphasis added) The phrase ‘everyone should acknowledge’ is particularly telling in the context of NPE – the EU was here making a universal claim about a particular (European?) norm concerning (good?) economic governance. But not everyone did acknowledge the universality of this norm, nor did they see why they should. They saw instead an attempt on the part of the Commission to lock ACP states into a particular model of economic governance, reflecting a longer-term shift in EU–ACP relations from ‘a redistributive, interventionist approach to one founded on the principles of free trade and neoliberal orthodoxy’ (Nunn and Price, 2004: 213), that is, a move away from a certain version of social solidarity (partially corresponding to ‘reciprocal institutional solidarity’, as outlined by Fenger and van Paridon, Chapter Four in this volume) and towards relationships founded on hierarchical and market principles. Flint (2008: 79) refers to the EPAs being ‘perceived as a diktat rather than a true partnership agreement’ (see also Langan, 2009). Following Munck (1999: 68), a norm of neoliberal governance was being discursively and materially established, as was ‘deviance’ – deviance in 148

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this case being defined as consisting of more interventionist economic policies. Storey (2006) concluded that NPE was indeed in action on the EPA issue – diffusing, however, a particular and controversial norm of good governance, narrowly focused on specific conceptions concerning liberal democracy and market economics (Abrahamsen, 2000) rather than on broader conceptions of human rights and social solidarity.This was far from guaranteed to yield positive outcomes for African and other ACP countries, and thus can hardly be classed as an act of genuine solidarity.12

Conclusion The potential of normative power Europe as a vehicle for the reinvention of social solidarity within and beyond Europe is weakened by the extent to which it is Eurocentric and functions as a smokescreen for the pursuit of self-interest on the part of European corporations and/or states. But, as Diez and Pace (2007) rightly stress, what may be most important about the NPE discourse is the effects it generates, and that the effects could be positive and pro-solidarity even if the discourse itself were illusory or ‘constructed’; this seemingly paradoxical situation may be counted as one of the many ‘tensions and contradictions’ (Ellison, Chapter Five this volume) attending EU actions vis-à-vis solidarity. Equally, as this chapter has argued, EU actors may genuinely subscribe to a particular set of norms – concerning, for example, liberal democracy and market economics – but the effects could be negative for those with whom the EU enters into ‘partnership’. In other words, the EU could actually be ‘doing bad’ (for others as well as itself) through its representation of itself as a normative power even if (indeed, especially if) it is willing and able to live up to the claims it makes for itself. This is not only true of EU relations with non-EU countries. Keune (2009) examines the social impact of EU enlargement and finds that there is a certain (normative) commitment to the export of the EU ‘social model’ to the new member states, but that this is undermined by, among other things, the requirements of economic and monetary union (EMU), which the new member states must also adopt, and which have generated downward pressure on wages,‘flexibilised’ labour markets and threatened social expenditures. But this should not simply be seen as the abandonment of (social) norms of solidarity in favour of economic concerns – those latter concerns themselves constitute a certain type of (governance) norm, and one to which the EU has long adhered (Storey, 2008).

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The current financial and economic crisis has seen core eurozone countries move to bail out their own banks while insisting on savage austerity programmes being implemented by the governments of peripheral countries (Lapavitsas et al, 2010a, 2010b). What has been demonstrated is ‘a profound lack of solidarity among the members of the Eurozone’ (Lapavitsas et al, 2010b: 30, emphasis added). It is also appropriate to think of this particular crisis in terms of the chickens coming home to roost on a particular normative vision of EMU, through which it was always intended that, denied the options of credit expansion or devaluation, member states would be obliged to respond to a crisis by cutting wages or the ‘social wage’ of the welfare state (Bonefeld, 2002; Storey, 2008).That, at the time of writing, this vision was still being (partially at least) adhered to even at the risk of causing the collapse of the eurozone and turning a recession into a full-scale depression illustrates the extent of the normative commitment to it (Lapavitsas et al, 2010a, 2010b). EU reality may often not live up to the rhetoric – the realist may trump the normative. Equally, reality and rhetoric may chime perfectly – the realist and the normative may march in step. In this latter case, the question then becomes whether what is being rhetorically espoused and practised in reality is for the good or ill of those at the receiving end – in or outside of Europe. In a variant of the poet W.B. Yeats’ line that ‘the best lack all conviction, while the worst are full of passionate intensity’, the EU may precisely do most harm when it (and its journalistic and academic supporters) is most convinced that it is doing good. In any event, there is little to be gained by adhering to the idealist elements of the NPE thesis, such as focusing on ‘what is believed to be good about the EU’ (Manners, 2006b: 168). Instead, we can accept that the EU sometimes acts as a normative power, but that these norms are not necessarily universal, and that their pursuit may either advance or retard relationships of genuine social solidarity between Europeans, and between Europeans and non-Europeans. As Falkner puts it, ‘In a field of study that is at constant risk of moral hyperbole … we need to retain a critical perspective on any claim that power serves global interests and universal values’ (Falkner, 2007: 522, 520). Certain interests are always prioritised over others, including through the espousal of particular norms, and social solidarity may be promoted or undermined in the process.

Notes 1 The reference to the ECHR might be argued to limit the claimed universalism of the norms. 150

Normative power Europe

This is echoed in the argument of Habermas and Derrida (2003) that the EU’s distinctiveness lies, in part, in a model of post-national governance, a means of reconciling national identity with a wider (in this case regional) identity which supersedes national allegiances and dilutes national rivalries. 2

Manners (2006a: 190), however, has expressed fears that the emergence of an EU military capability designed for ‘robust intervention’ subverts the normative approach vis-à-vis sustainable peace:‘given the prioritization of military intervention over non-military conciliation, I have little doubt that normative conceptions of the EU are being undermined’ (Manners, 2006a: 194). An increasingly security-driven approach to migration could be considered another such ‘falling-off ’ from normative standards (Diez, 2005: 624). 3

On the tensions between the idea of the EU promoting ‘its rules, standards, values and institutions’ and the idea of ‘“shared norms” and “common values”’ vis-à-vis relations with the Mediterranean, see Pace (2007a: 662, 665, emphasis added). 4

5

A colourful example is Rifkin (2004).

To take just two examples (and they could be multiplied many times over), McSweeney (2002: 362) casually refers to ‘European values of peace and security’, while Wylie (2002: 131) hones in on ‘the best of the political ideas which have their provenance in Europe, such as democracy and liberty’. Manners would reject such overt claims to European exceptionalism, but the idea that Europe happens to best embody universal norms is, arguably, little different. 6

Pace (2007b), for example, highlights how this liberal narrative neglects the disjunction between the (claimed) values and norms of a European élite and the cultural values and norms of various actors in the Middle East conflict. 7

8

See also Smith (2005) and Hyde-Price (2006).

9

See also Bicchi (2006: 289).

Likewise, Oberthur and Roche Kelly (2008: 43) attribute EU leadership on international climate policy to the fact that it allowed EU institutions to better legitimise the European integration project 10

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– because environmental protection was a very popular concern, the EU was able to attract support for integration by positioning itself as a global leader on this issue; concern about energy security also helped prompt increased EU attention to issues such as energy efficiency and alternative energy sources. EU human rights aid projects tend to channel money to civil society groups that are most ‘Western’ in character rather than, in the case of the Middle East and North Africa, to religious (especially Islamic) or clan-based groups; this does not mean that the groups funded might not be playing a politically progressive role in certain respects (Youngs, 2004: 427). 11

This relates to wider debates within economic development about the claimed ‘shrinking of development space’ (Wade 2003) – the way in which trade and other agreements serve to preclude countries from pursuing the types of interventionist policies which, it is claimed, stimulated economic development in the now-developed economies (Chang, 2008). 12

References Abrahamsen, R. (2000) Disciplining democracy: Development discourse and good governance in Africa, London/New York: Zed Books. Arts, W. and Gelissen, J. (2001) ‘Welfare states, solidarity and justice principles: does the type really matter?’, Acta Sociologica, 44 (4) 283–99. Bicchi, F. (2006) ‘‘Our size fits all’: normative power Europe and the Mediterranean’, Journal of European Public Policy, 13 (2) 286–303. Bonefeld, W. (2002) ‘European integration: the market, the political and class’, Capital and Class, 77: 117–42. Cafruny,A. and Ryner, M. (2007) ‘Monetary union and the transatlantic and social dimensions of Europe’s crisis’, New Political Economy, 12 (2) 141–65. Cammack, P. (2005) ‘The governance of global capitalism: a new materialist perspective’, in R. Wilkinson (ed) The global governance reader, London/New York: Routledge. pp 156–73. Chang, H.-J. (2008) Bad Samaritans:The guilty secrets of rich nations and the threat to global prosperity, London: Random House. Commission of the European Community (2005) The trade and development aspects of EPA negotiations, Commission Staff Paper (Directorate-General for Trade, Directorate-General for Development, and EuropeAid), Brussels (October). 152

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Curtis, M. (2005) 17 ways the European Commission is pushing trade liberalisation on poor countries, Report commissioned by Christian Aid for the European Movement for Trade Justice (November). Diez,T. (2005) ‘Constructing the self and changing others: reconsidering ‘normative power Europe’, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 33 (3) 613–36. Diez, T. and Pace, M. (2007) Normative power Europe and conflict transformation, )aper for presentation at the 2007 EUSA conference, Montreal, 17–19 May. Dur, A. (2007) ‘EU trade policy as protection for exporters: the agreements with Mexico and Chile’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 45 (4) 833–55. Falkner, R. (2007) ‘The political economy of “normative power” Europe: EU environmental leadership in international biotechnology regulation’, Journal of European Public Policy, 14 (4) 507–26. Flint,A. (2008) ‘The end of a “special relationship”? The new EU-ACP economic partnership agreements’, Review of African Political Economy, 36 (119) 79–92. Forsberg, T. and Herd, G.P. (2005) ‘The EU, Human Rights, and the Russo-Chechen Conflict’, Political Science Quarterly, 120 (3) 455–78. Gill, S. (2001) ‘Constitutionalising capital: EMU and disciplinary neoliberalism’, in A. Bieler and A.D. Morton (eds) Social forces in the making of the New Europe:The restructuring of European social relations in the global political economy, Basingstoke: Palgrave, pp 47–69. Habermas, J. and Derrida, J. (2003) ‘February 15, or what binds Europeans together: a plea for a common foreign policy, beginning in a core of Europe’, Constellations, 10 (3) 291–7. Hansen, P. (2004) ‘In the name of Europe’, Race and Class, 45 (3) 49–62. Hyde-Price, A. (2006) ‘Normative’ power Europe: a realist critique’, Journal of European Public Policy, 13 (2) 217–34. Keune, M. (2009) ‘EU enlargement and social standards: exporting the European social model?’, in J. Orbie and L.Tortell (eds) The European Union and the social dimension of globalisation: How the EU influences the World, Oxford: Routledge, pp 45–61. Kiely, R. (1999) ‘The last refuge of the noble savage? a critical assessment of post-development theory’, The European Journal of Development Research, 11 (1) 30–55. Langan, M. (2009) ‘ACP-EU normative concessions from Stabex to private sector development: why the European Union’s moralised pursuit of a ‘deep’ trade agenda is nothing ‘new’ in ACP-EU relations’, Perspectives on European Politics and Society, 10 (3) 416–40.

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Lapavitsas, C., Kaltenbrunner, A., Lindo, D., Michell, J., Painceira, J.P., Pires, E., Powell, J., Stenfors, A. and Teles, N. (2010a) Eurozone crisis: Beggar thyself and thy neighbour, RMF Occasional Report (www. researchonmoneyandfinance.org). Lapavitsas, C., Kaltenbrunner, A., Lambrindis, G., Lindo, D., Meadway, J., Michell, J., Painceira, J.P., Pires, E., Powell, J., Stenfors, A. and Teles, N. (2010b) The Eurozone between austerity and default, RMF Occasional Report (www.researchonmoneyandfinance.org). McGrew, A. (2002) ‘Between two worlds: Europe in a globalising era’, Government and Opposition, 37 (3) 343–58. McSweeney, B. (2002) ‘After September 11th? A reflection on Irish neutrality’, Studies, 91 (362) 144–51. Mandelson, P. (2005) ‘For real trade justice, barriers must come down gradually’, Guardian, 3 October. Manners, I. (2002) ‘Normative power Europe: a contradiction in terms?’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 40 (2) 235–58. Manners, I. (2006a) ‘Normative power Europe reconsidered: beyond the crossroads’, Journal of European Public Policy, 13 (2) 182–99. Manners, I. (2006b) ‘The European Union as a normative power: a response to Thomas Diez’, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 35 (1) 167–80. Manners, I. (2008) ‘The normative ethics of the European Union’, International Affairs, 84 (1) 45–60. Munck, R. (1999) ‘Dependency and imperialism in the new times: a Latin American perspective’, The European Journal of Development Research, 11 (1) 56–74. Nunn, A. and Price, S. (2004) ‘Managing development: EU and African relations through the evolution of the Lomé and Cotonou Agreements’, Historical Materialism, 12 (4) 203–30. Oberthur, S. and Roche Kelly, C. (2008) ‘EU leadership in international climate policy: achievements and challenges’, The International Spectator, 43 (3) 35–50. Pace, M. (2007a) ‘Norm shifting from EMP to ENP: the EU as a norm entrepreneur in the south?’, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 20 (4) 659–75. Pace, M. (2007b) ‘The construction of EU normative power’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 45 (5) 1041–64. Rifkin, J. (2004) The European dream: How Europe’s vision of the future is quietly eclipsing the American dream, Cambridge: Polity. Robles, A.C. (2008) ‘EU FTA negotiations with SADC and Mercosur: Integration into the World economy or market access for EU firms?’, Third World Quarterly, 29 (1) 181–97. 154

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Scheipers, S. and Sicurelli, D. (2007) ‘Normative power Europe: a credible utopia?’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 45 (2) 435–57. Scheipers, S. and Sicurelli, D. (2008) ‘Empowering Africa: normative power in EU- Africa relations’, Journal of European Public Policy, 15 (4) 607–23. Sjursen, H. (2006a) ‘The EU as a normative power: how can this be?’, Journal of European Public Policy, 13 (2) 235–51. Sjursen, H. (2006b) ‘What kind of power?’, Journal of European Public Policy, 13 (2) 169–81. Smith, K.E. (2005) ‘Beyond the civilian power EU debate’, Politique Européene, 17: 63–82. Storey,A. (2006) ‘Normative power Europe? Economic partnership agreements and Africa’, Journal of Contemporary African Studies, 24 (3) 331–46. Storey, A. (2008) ‘The ambiguity of resistance: opposition to neoliberalism in Europe’, Capital and Class, 96: 55–85. Szymanski, M. and Smith, M.E. (2005) ‘Coherence and conditionality in European foreign policy: negotiating the EU-Mexico global agreement’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 43 (1) 171–92. Van Apeldoorn, B. (2001) ‘The struggle over European order: transnational class agency in the making of “embedded neoliberalism”’, in A. Bieler and A.D. Morton (eds) Social forces in the making of the new Europe: The restructuring of European social relations in the global political economy, Basingstoke: Palgrave, pp 70–89. Wade, R.H. (2003) ‘What strategies are viable for developing countries today? The World Trade Organisation and the shrinking of “development space”’, Review of International Political Economy, 10 (4) 621–44. World Development Movement (2008) ‘Raw deal: the EU’s unfair trade agreements with Mexico and South Africa’, London (April). Wylie, G. (2002) ‘The future of the European Union: what, how and why?’, Studies, 91 (362) 125–33. Youngs, R. (2004) ‘Normative dynamics and strategic interests in the EU’s external identity’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 42 (2) 415–35. Zimmermann, H. (2007) ‘Realist power Europe? The EU in the negotiations about China’s and Russia’s WTO accession’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 45 (4) 813–32.

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TEN

Social solidarity in post‑socialist countries Damir Josipovicˇ This chapter argues that recent socio-economic transitions have led to the erosion of social solidarity in post-socialist countries within Central and Eastern Europe. It is argued that the economic imperatives of capitalism have forced governments to abandon previous policy and welfare arrangements, and access to local labour markets, resulting in the attrition of legally granted social rights.This unexpected dissipation of social rights has led to dramatic changes in the demographic structure of the whole region, weakening social solidarity by fragmenting established social networks. Focusing on Central and Eastern European countries and placing special emphasis on the Yugoslav case of the so-called ‘third way’, the chapter argues that five types of accommodation to this kind of change can be distinguished.The first type is found in the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary and is chiefly characterised by the extensive privatisation of key economic ‘stilts’. Within this type of accommodation, governments quickly abandoned their responsibility for social provision during the early 1990s and strategies for the development of social solidarity were slowly taken up nongovernmental organisations – usually other than churches.The second type of accommodation emerged in Poland where the Catholic church claimed exclusive ownership of perceptions of solidarity through the Concordat, an agreement between Poland and the Holy See of the Roman Catholic Church (Concordat enacted on 25 April 1998). The third type of accommodation is exemplified by Romania and Bulgaria, where extensive black market activity, especially along the borders, dominated during most of the 1990s.The fourth and fifth types pertain to the former Soviet Union.The fourth area, the Baltic States, is somewhat similar to the so-called Visegrád1 group and is distinguished by an uneven pattern of settlement and large Russian minority with few social rights. Importantly the existence of this minority, forced to live in such conditions, represents the denial of transnational social solidarity, connecting also with Russian minorities stretching across the Baltic States and beyond, into Russia. Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine 157

Reinventing social solidarity across Europe

and Russia represent the fifth type of accommodation. Russia, as the Soviet core area, still plays an important role, exerting its power over the other three states through a systematic regional influence that is enabled by networks and economic dependency continuing from the former Soviet period. This fifth type is characterised by strong social statism, marked social differences, a huge state administration and widespread corruption. This chapter argues that informal strategies of solidarity have developed within specific countries and across the new political-economic setting, enabling the potential recovery of former social rights. Both legal and illegal strategies have been developed to re-establish the former constitutional, designed and lived solidarity. By means of a comparative analysis of distinct clusters, that is, EU countries versus non-EU countries, new EU countries versus old EU countries, the chapter discusses the development of reinvented solidarities as they have emerged through the new networking, highlighting the practices and strategies used to overcome or accommodate the imposed recession in post-socialist countries. Beginning with a consideration of historical and political settings, the chapter also compares the paths and shapes of transition in postsocialist countries. Here it is argued that the current politico-economic situations in successor states vary considerably. Different paths of capital movement in the region are shaped within and by distinct socioeconomic conditions that are characterised by varying levels of socioeconomic austerity. In turn, these specificities shape the possibilities and strategies for the development of reinvented social solidarities both within these states and across post-socialist states more generally. As the chapter reveals, analysis of the varying strategies for re-establishing former constitutional, designed and lived social solidarity in postsocialist countries has import both for post-socialist countries and for social solidarity within and across an enlarged Europe.

Theoretical starting points One of the theoretical starting points is a paradigm of post-socialism. Although it has a great variety of definitions (cf Hann et al, 2002: 17), in this chapter post-socialism is conceptualised as an array of social and economic practices that were designed to replace the economic approaches of centralised state planning with an idealised, westerntype free market economy.The process of economic restructuring led post-socialist countries in Europe to undergo very different paths of transition, and this has resulted in rich geographies of accommodated practices (cf Smith and Stenning, 2006). Despite the variations, it 158

Social solidarity in post‑socialist countries

can be argued that each of these transitions has been challenged by restraints emanating both from external, western power-related pressure and from growing internal constraints and contestations, which have impeded the transition to western types of free market economy. Here, as many authors have shown (for example, Pečjak, 2005; Standen, 2006; Brščič, 2009), the emergence of nostalgia2 movements and feelings of betrayal, combined with growing awareness of exploitation by wealthy westerners3 intent on increasing their own wealth, has been accentuated by the recent recession.The growth of apathy and fatalism among populations already traumatised by the erosion of their social benefits and rights, has led to a state of ‘paralysed community’. Some authors refer to the situation in post-socialist countries as a state of ‘necrocapitalism’ (Gržinić, 2008) – derived from the doctrine of ‘necropolitics’ (Mbembe, 2003). Nonetheless, most authors have argued that the result of these transitions is a hybridised socio-political system that aims to follow the western type of capitalism but perpetually fails to do so (for example, Grabher and Stark, 1997: 6). Thus, it might be convenient to adjust the notion of ‘crony capitalism’ (for example, Cohen, 2003: 152) to ‘unfriendly crony capitalism’, since there is a wealth of literature supporting the idea of ‘communitarianism’ among political stockholders in post-socialism (Šumi, 2010). Undermining any meaningful or constructive understanding of the term ‘social capital’,4 the newly formed upper social class has engaged in the privatisation of significant social networks, thus confirming its hegemonic political position, while the majority of the population has faced a rapidly deteriorating welfare state (Hribar, 2010; Šumi, 2010; cf Pezdir, 2008; Bećirović, 2009). However, while the so-called ‘new elites’ have taken individual ownership of what was formerly collective property and means, they have been unable to deploy their new-born fortune beyond so-called ‘plastic Armani’ assets5 (Šumi, 2010). It may be argued that this combination of economic and social constraints, contested terrains and contradictions which has characterised socio-economic transitions in post-socialist countries has severely hampered the development of feasible socio-economic strategies at government level across Central and Eastern European countries.

The notion of Central and Eastern Europe Central and Eastern Europe is primarily a geopolitically constructed region, designed to distinguish a specific socio-political and socioeconomic system. As the so-called planned economy had a number of subtypes, one can roughly differentiate between the members of the 159

Reinventing social solidarity across Europe

Warsaw Pact and their successors, on one hand, and other countries and their successor states, on the other hand (cf Pavić, 1987; Klemenčić, 1997). In post-war Europe there was a very complex political dichotomy, as we will see. Along a north–south axis between the White, Baltic and Adriatic Seas, the divide defined the countries of Europe, with the sole exception of Greece, as either western or eastern. The politics of non-alignment and being ‘somewhere in-between’ rewardedYugoslavia with exclusion from a closer political partnership with the Soviet Union and its allies in 1948, through the famous ‘Inform-bureau’ crisis (Djilas, 1973; Kardelj, 1980: 131). This was one of the first and most important ruptures with the Eastern bloc. In the 1990s, there were vigorous debates about the definition and understanding of the newly emerging notion of the Eastern-Central Europe (ECE)6 region. Some of the successor states of Yugoslavia, especially Slovenia and Croatia, avoided labelling as Eastern or South-Eastern European countries. Instead, they proposed the reinvention of ‘Mitteleuropa’,7 an old name for regions belonging to the Habsburg empire or, in its misused variant, to ‘the German Europe’ (Schmidt, 2001).The renaissance of the notion Figure 10.1: Geopolitical setting before 1990

160

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of Mitteleuropa was useful to former socialist countries diverging not only from the Soviet Union and Russia, but also from Austria, the ‘western-bound’ Habsburg successor, – especially, as it carried the idea of the restoration of the once-decisive German influence in the region (Jordan, 1993; Klemenčić, 1997). Apart from Serbian hegemony, allocation of resources (cf Murrell, 1991) was perhaps the most important reason for the collapse of Yugoslavia. Some argue that the break-up of Yugoslavia was also a moral question, for it had failed to adopt the position of guardian of Central Europe (Kačerauskas, 2009). Consequently, Central Europe helped to dismantle it, relying largely on the naivety of the two westernmost republics, Slovenia and Croatia. After the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, countries within Central and Eastern Europe were forced to accommodate the new power relations, which transformed internal administrative boundaries within the nation-state.While there has been an initial ‘thickening’ of the nationstate in the new European East, the European West had already started the process of ‘de-nationalisation’ (cf Sassen, 2003). After the initial post-1989 phase, which continued into the late 1990s, it is analytically possible to trace the so-called ‘peripheral crescent’ (Josipovič, 2009b), which stretches from the Adriatic to the Baltic basin. In the present economic recession it is foreseeable that the absence of historically stable centres and core areas respectively will drive Slovenia from one former periphery state to a transitional pseudo-centre of political stability, thereby returning it to the contemporary Western European periphery.

The Inform-bureau crisis8 and the emergence of selfmanagement Yugoslavia’s split with Stalinism during 1948 dramatically changed the geopolitical scenery of Eastern Europe. It progressively promoted political non-alignment, which resulted further in the softening of border regimes with both Italy and Austria in 1949, immediately after ‘Inform-bureau’ crisis. Through bilateral agreements, Yugoslavia was able to establish a flexible border regime which enabled people to cross the border on a daily basis at numerous crossing points. In 1982,9 Yugoslavia and Italy signed an agreement in Udine/Videm which established further facilities.Yugoslavia also entered the European labour market through a bilateral agreement with West Germany, as early as 1963 (Grečić, 1975; Klinar, 1985). German statistics from this time show that workers from the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) represented the highest proportion of guest workers, at more 161

Reinventing social solidarity across Europe

than 20% (Grečić, 1975; Figure 10.2). It is indicative that Yugoslav ‘guest-workers’ in ‘neutral’ Austria were an absolute majority, at more than 70% (Grečić, 1975). Besides the Warsaw Pact, the importance of which was mainly in relation to geo-strategic and geopolitical issues, Yugoslavia was given full membership of the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON/MEA) in 1948, but retained its status as an observer country until the late 1980s (for example, Pribićević, 1989).Yugoslavia was the only socialist country that was part of so-called ‘in-between Europe’ (after Tunjić, 2004). The notion of ‘in-between’ Europe is ascribed to a kind of buffer zone between East and West. At the time, it consisted of Yugoslavia, Austria, Switzerland, Sweden and Finland. All of these countries were either neutral or non-aligned, and located along the East–West frontier. The above-mentioned distinctions clearly mark out Yugoslavia and its successor states as a specific area which developed a genuine form of socialist system (see Figure 10.3). Among other elements, one can distinguish distinct approaches to legal regulation based on selfgoverning.The founder of social self-governing10 was the socio-political theorist Edvard Kardelj, who was also one of the closest collaborators of Josip Broz – Tito. (It can be argued that the Swedish model of local self-government actually adopted core elements of the Yugoslav social self-governing system in the 1970s [cf Miroshnyk, 2009; Park, 2009]). The hallmark of social self-governing was the so-called bottom-up incentive, which relinquished many aspects of decision making to the lower level of the so-called societal structure and superstructure (cf Riddell, 1968; Kardelj, 1979). Figure 10.4 shows an example of bottom-up incentives within businesses, which were instead called ‘organisations of associated labour’. Furthermore, a delegate system enabled workers to work and to be representatives to workers’ councils at the same time, without having to give up their primary working position (Kardelj, 1979). In its medial position, Yugoslavia became a natural leader and promoter of the non-aligned movement. During the 1960s, and especially in the 1970s, the unique socio-political system of ‘selfgovernment’ (self-management) was well developed. The system had an important impact on politically defined, enforced and reproduced solidarity. It enabled federal entities (Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro and Macedonia, and to some degree Vojvodina and Kosovo as autonomous provinces under the central government of Serbia) to introduce and develop genuine types of social interconnectivity based on communal bottom-up incentive. 162

Social solidarity in post‑socialist countries Figure 10.2: Proportion of foreign workers in West Germany and Austria by country of origin (after Grecˇic´, 1975: 50–2, table VIII) West Germany, 1971 Other countries 7.74% France 2.01% Portugal 2.55% The Netherlands 2.96%

Yugoslavia 21.63%

Austria 4.29% Spain 8.51% Turkey 19.57% Greece 12.06% Italy 18.68%

Austria, 1971 Spain 0.17% Greece 0.34% Italy 0.92% FRG 2.98%

Other countries 6.53%

Turkey 12.74%

Yugoslavia 76.32%

163

Reinventing social solidarity across Europe Figure 10.3: European buffer zone ‘in-between Europe’ (rearranged after Tunjic´, 2004)

The federation gradually became a loose political superstructure with a number of important cohesive roles (army, currency, social transfers, foreign policy, foreign trade, etc), and matters of social policy were handed over to lower political levels – and thus creating conditions for the federation’s eventual dissolution.11

Socio-economic transition in the Eastern-Central Europe region This section compares the paths and patterns of transition in postsocialist countries, especially in former members of the Warsaw Pact. It begins with a discussion of historical and political settings in postsocialist countries. Some authors argue that the collapse of the socialist system in Eastern Europe was the direct consequence of a global market economy emerging in the 1980s as a result of the economic recession in 1970s (for example, Ramet, 1995: 7). Apart from Yugoslavia and the 164

Bureau of information and documentary services

Executive committee of workers’ council

Executive committee of workers’ council

Workers’ council

Disciplinary commission

Workers’ supervisory commission

Basic organisations of associated labour

Committee for national defence and social self-protection

Executive committee of workers’ council

Workers’ council

Workers’ council

Disciplinary commission

Workers’ supervisory commission

Work organisations

Committee for national defence and social self-protection

Workers’ meetings

Disciplinary commission

Workers’ supervisory commission

Composite organisations of associated labour

Other committees

Committee for national defence and social self-protection

Labour relations committees

Committees

Committees

Administrative support

Managerial organ. (general manager or board of management)

Administrative support

Managerial organ. (general manager or board of management)

Administrative support

Managerial organ. (general manager)

Figure 10.4: Management structure of organisations of associated labour in socialist Yugoslavia (after Warner, 2001)

Social solidarity in post‑socialist countries

165

Reinventing social solidarity across Europe

specific case of Albania,12 there were five distinct types of transition outcome in the former socialist countries of Europe.13 The first type of socio-economic transition occurred in the so-called Visegrád14 countries, represented by the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary. It was characterised by the massive privatisation of key economic ‘stilts’. In the early 1990s governments within this type of transition rapidly relinquished their responsibility for social provision and strategies for the development of social solidarity slowly transferred to non-governmental organisations, which were usually independent of organised religious groups and church organisations. In early 1948, all of the non-communist parties in Czechoslovakia left the government, enabling the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia to secure victory with 89% of the vote. The federation of Czechs and Slovaks joined the MEA in the following year and co-founded the Warsaw Pact15 in 1955. The rigid regime did not permit any initiatives to be taken outside the state’s formal five-year economic plan. Consequently, the reforms introduced by Communist Party leader Aleksander Dubček in 1968 were violently terminated by Soviet troops. In December 1989 a ‘velvet revolution’ brought political democratisation and the first democratically elected president, Václav Havel. On 1 January 1993, Czechoslovakia divided peacefully into the Czech and the Slovak republics. Political development in neighbouring Hungary followed a similar route. In 1944 the Communists had already formed the first government, in coalition with the Social Democrats and the Peasants’ and Small-owners’ parties. Following the political alliance between the Communists and the Social Democrats in 1948, Mátyás Rákosi introduced a rigid Stalinist regime, which caused great tension among the population. The revolution of 1956 brought Imre Nagy briefly to political power, but only a month later János Kádár restored the Stalinist regime with the help of Soviet troops. Eventually, after 1968, Kádár loosened the grip of his regime and, as a result, Hungary was the first Eastern European country to liberalise its economy and introduce market principles. By 1989, it had begun the process of privatisation and denationalisation. Czechoslovakia faced similar developments; that is, all three countries (including Slovakia) had nationalised their agricultural sectors during the socialist period and only about 1% of agricultural land remained in private ownership. Industries had undergone similar processes and consequently many national giants were either privatised or split into smaller businesses during the early 1990s. Despite being heavily indebted, all three countries rank economically16 at the top end of former socialist countries (cf. Table 10.1). 166

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The second type of transition is a subgroup of the first type. It emerged in Poland, which is also part of the Visegrád group, but where the Catholic church claimed exclusive ownership of perceptions of solidarity, through the concordat. Post-war Poland under Władisław Gomułka attempted to interpret socialist development in a way that was tailored to specific national conditions. Compulsory collectivisation was abandoned and a settled relationship with the Catholic church was developed. The 1970s were characterised by rising tensions and the appearance of illegal political groups. After the riots in 1980, the trade union Solidarność was legalised and became the strongest opposition to the ruling party. In 1989, the first post-war democratic elections returned Solidarność to the national parliament and in the following year Lech Wałęsa, the leader of Solidarność, became the president of the Polish Republic. Throughout the second half of the 20th century, a significant proportion of Poland’s primary economic sector was in private ownership. A relatively high proportion of the labour force continued to be employed in agriculture until the 2000s, creating an Table 10.1: Agriculture as a percentage of GDP in ECE countries 2008

2000

1995

1990

1980

Albania

20.8

29.1

55.8

35.9

33.6

Belarus

9.8

14.2

17.5

23.5

no data

Bosnia-Herzegovina

9.1

11.0

20.7

no data

no data

Bulgaria

7.3

14.2

14.5

17.0

14.6

Croatia

6.4

8.4

9.6

10.9

no data

Estonia

2.9

4.8

5.8

16.6

no data

Hungary

3.0

5.4

7.1

14.5

19.1

Kosovo

12.0

33.3

no data

no data

no data

Latvia

3.1

4.6

9.1

21.9

11.8

Lithuania

4.2

6.3

11.4

27.1

no data

Macedonia (FYR)

10.9

12.0

13.2

8.5

no data

Moldova

10.9

29.0

33.0

36.1

no data

Montenegro

8.8

12.5

no data

no data

no data

Poland

4.5

5.0

8.0

8.3

no data

Romania

7.1

12.5

21.4

23.7

no data

Russia

5.0

6.4

7.2

16.6

no data

Serbia

13.0

20.6

no data

no data

no data

Slovakia

3.1

4.5

5.9

7.6

no data

Slovenia

2.1

3.3

4.4

5.6

no data

Czech Republic

2.5

3.9

5.0

6.2

no data

Ukraine

8.3

17.1

15.4

25.6

no data

Source: WDI

167

Reinventing social solidarity across Europe

important buffer against the emergence of social tensions (Tables 10.1 and 10.2). The third type of transition is exemplified by Romania and Bulgaria, where extensive black market activity, especially along the borders, characterised most of the 1990s. The socio-political situation in Romania and Bulgaria differed significantly from that of the abovementioned four countries. While Romania was well known for the complete collectivisation of its economy and the radical leadership of Nicolae Ceaus¸escu, who came into power in 1965, a similar form of Sovietisation was introduced in Bulgaria during the time of Georgi Dimitrov (1946–49). In comparison to Bulgaria, which remained strongly attached to the Soviet Union even during the period of Todor Živkov (1962–89), Romania systematically withdrew, to become one of the most isolated countries. Nevertheless, during the late 1990s both countries were able to achieve high rates of agricultural production within their national GDP, as a direct consequence of economic restructuring (Table 10.1).The fourth and fifth types of transition are Table 10.2: Percentage of the labour force employed in agriculture in ECE countries 2008

2000

1995

1990 no data

Albania

58.0 (2006)

71.8

68.4

Belarus

10.7 (2005)

no data

21.2

21.6

9.8 (2006)

11.0

no data

no data

Bulgaria

19.9 (2009)

13.1

23.9

18.5

Croatia

12.8 (2007)

14.5

19.9

no data 21.0

Bosnia-Herzegovina

Estonia

3.7

7.2

10.2

Hungary

4.5

6.5

8.0

18.2

no data

no data

no data

Kosovo

no data

Latvia

7.7

14.5

18.5

17.4

Lithuania

7.7

18.7

20.7

no data no data

Macedonia (FYR)

12.0 (2009)

23.9

no data

Moldova

32.8 (2007)

50.9

45.5

33.8

8.6 (2005)

9.0

no data

no data

Montenegro Poland

14.0

18.8

22.6

25.2

Romania

28.7

42.8

40.3

29.1

14.5

15.7

13.9

25.1

24.0

no data

no data

Slovakia

4.0

6.7

9.2

no data

Slovenia

8.6 (2009)

9.5

10.4

no data

Czech Republic

3.3

5.1

6.6

12.9

23.4

22.5

19.8

Russia Serbia

Ukraine Source: WDI

168

9.0 (2007)

16.7 (2007)

Social solidarity in post‑socialist countries

part of the so-called ERCOMER – the former republics of the Soviet Union. The fourth group, the Baltic States, differs from the Visegrad group in having an uneven settlement pattern and a large Russian minority with few rights, connecting Russian minorities who inhabit an area which stretches across the Baltic States (especially across Latvia and Estonia) and beyond, into Russia (for example, Boldane, 2003; Volkov, 2009; cf Elsuwege, 2004). Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia were heavily industrialised and de-agrarianised during the Soviet period and many people migrated to urban centres, resulting in depopulation of the rural areas. Many people from other soviet republics settled in the Baltics as part of a planned Russification (cf. Lulle, 2003). Despite the relatively successful transition to a market economy and integration into the European Union (EU), social solidarity within these states was greatly undermined by the institutional denial of the rights of whole communities, especially those of eastern Latvia (Volkov, 2009). The governments of Latvia and Estonia have systematically denied the right to Latvian and Estonian citizenship respectively for more than half of the predominantly Russian-speaking population, on the grounds of their immigration during the Soviet period.This outrageous violation of human rights is somewhat similar to the violation of human rights in Slovenia after its independence. In 1992, the Slovenian government electronically erased more than 25,000 permanent residents on the grounds of their ‘presumed’ Serbian ethnic origin or Yugoslav affiliation. This action was politically justified as a ‘necessity’ because of ‘their’ avoidance of application for Slovenian citizenship. This explanation just confirms the initial idea of a planned ‘e-genocide’ of members of former Yugoslav ethnic groups residing within Slovenia (cf. Josipovič, 2006; Šumi and Josipovič, 2008). Among all three Baltic States, Estonia has achieved the highest rates of economic growth, not only through foreign investments but also as a result of the reduction of social rights (cf. Dyson, 2007). Economically, Estonia has relied heavily on Finland, and to some extent on Sweden, while Latvia has placed heavy economic emphasis on Germany and on some Scandinavian countries. Importantly, Lithuania has retained almost one third of its dependence on imports from Russia (Figure  10.5). Nevertheless, all three states have built strong economic ties within the EU. The fifth transition group, represented by Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine and Russia, has developed similar informal strategies of social solidarity. Apart from within Russia itself, the black and grey economy is widespread throughout these states (for example, Frelih, 2010; cf Politkovskaia, 2004; Nemcov and Milov, 2010). Besides the deindustrialisation of out-dated 169

Reinventing social solidarity across Europe Figure 10.5: Economic dependency (measured by foreign trade) of Baltic States in 2009 Estonia, 2009 import from: Finland 14% Other countries 28% Lithuania 11%

The Netherlands 4%

Latvia 10%

Poland 6% Sweden 8%

Germany 10%

Russia 9%

Estonia, 2009 export to: Finland 18%

Other countries 35%

Sweden 13%

USA 4% Lithuania 5% Germany 6%

Latvia 10% Russia 9% (continued)

Source: WDI

170

Social solidarity in post‑socialist countries Figure 10.5: Economic dependency (measured by foreign trade) of Baltic States in 2009 (continued) Latvia, 2009 import from: Lithuania 16%

Germany 11%

Other countries 38%

Russia 11% Italy 4%

Finland The Netherlands 4% Sweden 4% 4%

Poland 8%

Latvia, 2009 export to: Lithuania 15%

Other countries 31%

Russia 13%

United Kingdom 3%

Estonia 13%

Finland 3% Denmark 4% Poland 4%

Sweden 6%

Germany 8% (continued)

Source: WDI

171

Reinventing social solidarity across Europe Figure 10.5: Economic dependency (measured by foreign trade) of Baltic States in 2009 (continued) Lithuania, 2009 import from:

Russia 30%

Other countries 43%

Germany 11% Latvia 6%

Poland 10%

Lithuania, 2009 export to: Russia 13%

Latvia 10%

Other countries 43%

Germany 10%

Poland 7% Estonia Belarus 7% 5% The Netherlands 5% Source: WDI

172

Social solidarity in post‑socialist countries

industries and the very slow restructuring of institutions, a key problem is the drastic demographic change that has taken place during the post-Soviet period (Table 10.3). Russia, as the Soviet core area, is still a dominant partner of the other three states. Economic and political attachment to Russia is particularly high in Belarus. In 2008, 60% of its imports came from the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Similarly, Ukraine and Moldova have a high level of dependency on the CIS, from where more than 40% of their imports come.17 Networks and economic dependency remaining from the former Soviet period are a source of Russian influence. In consequence, the whole region suffers from economic depression and a deteriorating social situation, with few optimistic prospects. The first former socialist country to liberalise its economy was Hungary. Already in 1988 it allowed foreign investments, and it was also the country with the highest level of external debt. By 1980 this debt had reached US$10 billion rising to US$20 billion by 1988 (Natek and Natek, 2000). Romania was the second most indebted country in 1980, with almost the same level of debt (Natek and Natek, 2000). Nicolae Ceaus¸escu, the Romanian leader, decided to repay these debts, plunging the country into the most serious crisis since the immediate aftermath of the Second World War.While the state became insolvent as a result, it started to export industrial and agricultural products, which drastically worsened the already austere social and health conditions (for example, Gabanyi, 1992; Semenza and Maty, 2007; Pitigoi et al, 2008).The debt was eventually repaid by mid-1989,18 shortly before the impoverished people of Romania rose against the Ceaus¸escu regime in the December revolution (Natek and Natek, 2000).

Selected cases of the new solidarity After the break-up of Yugoslavia, virtually all the successor states focused on developing a market economy and establishing democracy through multi-party systems. The remaking of histories and regional geographies greatly hindered this process, and the territory of the former Yugoslavia disintegrated into seven areas. It is impossible to predict the future development of this region while tensions remain, particularly in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, Vojvodina, southern Serbia and Macedonia. However, the long period of disintegration has had a critical effect on the timing of the socio-economic changes that have taken place.We are now dealing with very different patterns of transition, from socialist environments to various European or supranational integrations. In this section, we explore in more depth 173

174

5.407

2.021

10.424

46.258

Slovenia

Czech Republic

Ukraine

3.633

Moldova

Slovakia

2.041

Macedonia (FYR)

7.350

3.358

Lithuania

Serbia

2.266

Latvia

141.950

1.795

Kosovo

Russia

10.038

Hungary

21.514

1.341

Estonia

Romania

4.434

Croatia

38.126

7.623

Bulgaria

Poland

3.773

Bosnia-Herzegovina

622

9.681

Belarus

Montenegro

3.143

Albania

2008

49.176

10.273

1.989

5.389

7.516

146.303

22.443

38.454

670

4.145

2.009

3.500

2.372

1.700

10.211

1.370

4.502

8.012

3.787

10.005

3.080

2000

51.512

10.331

1.990

5.364

7.739

148.141

22.681

38.588

624

4.339

1.963

3.632

2.515

2.029

10.294

1.437

4.669

8.400

3.332

10.194

3.134

1995

51.892

10.363

1.903

5.283

7.586

148.292

23.207

38.119

587

4.450

1.998

3.698

2.671

1.862

10.189

1.569

4.773

7.726

4.362

10.161

3.277

1990

Table 10.3: Demographic change 1960–2008 and 1990–2008 in ECE countries

29.561

9.554

1.580

3.994

4.140

119.897

18.403

27.509

467

3.004

1.216

2.129

1.580

947

8.327

1.216

3.240

7.048

2.779

8.198

1.607

1960

156.5

109.1

127.9

135.4

177.5

118.4

116.9

138.6

133.2

120.9

167.8

157.7

143.4

189.5

120.5

110.3

136.9

108.2

135.8

118.1

195.6

2008/1960

89.1

100.6

106.2

102.3

96.9

95.7

92.7

100.0

106.0

81.6

102.2

90.8

84.8

96.4

98.5

85.5

92.9

98.7

86.5

95.3

95.9

2008/1990

175.5

108.5

120.4

132.3

183.2

123.7

126.1

138.6

125.7

148.1

164.3

173.7

169.1

196.6

122.4

129.0

147.3

109.6

157.0

123.9

203.9

1990/1960

Reinventing social solidarity across Europe

Source: WDI (2009)

Albania Belarus Bosnia-Herzegovina Bulgaria Croatia Estonia Hungary Kosovo Latvia Lithuania Macedonia (FYR) Moldova Montenegro Poland Romania Russia Serbia Slovakia Slovenia Czech Republic Ukraine

2008 3.188 12.299 8.316 38.045 48.584 11.255 107.677 no data 42.108 31.719 4.678 3.787 1.490 218.022 104.943 402.453 30.918 27.085 no data 39.719 92.479

2000 1.061 2.140 2.773 11.212 12.438 2.569 29.520 no data 4.855 4.723 1.469 1.690 no data 64.834 11.160 159.993 11.499 12.140 no data 21.602 12.190

1995 456 1.694 no data 10.379 3.830 286 31.649 no data 463 769 1.277 695 no data 44.080 6.832 121.401 10.785 5.744 no data 16.218 8.429

US$ (million) 

Table 10.4: Foreign investment and external debt in ECE countries 1990 349 no data no data 10.890 no data no data 21.202 no data no data no data no data no data no data 49.364 1.140 59.340 17.792 2.008 no data 6.383 no data

2008 7.62 3.58 5.70 18.45 6.92 8.32 40.59 no data 4.02 3.74 6.29 11.70 19.20 2.81 6.94 4.34 5.98 3.28 3.51 5.04 6.05

% of GDP 2000 3.88 0.93 2.74 7.95 5.2 6.82 5.79 no data 5.27 3.31 4.87 9.9 no data 5.45 2.8 1.05 0.28 7.15 0.68 8.79 1.9

1995 2.89 0.11 no data 0.69 0.49 4.63 10.76 no data 3.43 0.95 0.21 1.48 no data 2.63 1.18 0.52 no data 0.94 0.72 4.65 0.55

1990 no data no data no data 0.02 no data no data no data no data no data no data no data no data no data 0.15 no data no data no data no data no data 0.21 no data

Social solidarity in post‑socialist countries

175

Reinventing social solidarity across Europe

some novel strategies of substituting constitutional, designed and lived social solidarities within the former Yugoslavia. The case of Slovenia is probably the most illustrative of these reinvented social solidarities. In common with other republics of the former Yugoslavia, Slovenia had a very well-developed system of public and nationally financed welfare which covered areas such as healthcare, education, pensions, social security and so on. The chief underlying principles of this social welfare system were affordability and accessibility for all. Each republic contributed funds to the federal administration in proportion to its GDP, and these funds were redistributed evenly throughout the country ‘according to needs’. Everyone received free schooling, social care, healthcare, disability pension, retirement pension and maternity allowances. Further, every citizen could have stable, longterm employment. Contributions to the federal treasury were made via a compulsory system of flat-rate taxation of businesses, regardless their ownership.19 Interestingly, despite extensive privatisation, Slovenia has retained most of the features of the former socialist welfare state. However, there has been considerable retrenchment and the quality of welfare provision has eroded significantly with the introduction of a parallel private system.The most blatant case of dismantling of the public system is exemplified by the health system (see for example, Hostnik, 2007). Here, for example, the government has introduced concessions that allow doctors to work in the public health service while also working in private practice (Hostnik, 2007). Further, with regard to the retirement system, current political debate reveals the convoluted logic propagated by political elites.The Social Democrats (SD), the leading party in the ruling left-centre coalition, have initiated a massive campaign for reform of the pension system, whereby pensions will be reduced to less than 70% of current average wages. The authors of reform proposal argue that it is the only way to retrieve lost intergenerational solidarity (for example, Berk Skok, 2010; Stanovnik, 2010). According to them, the reform will increase solidarity by lowering the current burden on the younger, economically active population of financing future pensions (Berk Skok, 2010; Stanovnik, 2010). Such interpretations are strongly opposed by the trade unions and some political parties, for instance the DeSUS.20 They claim that the government wants to reduce public expenditure, to endanger the standard of living of pensioners and to reduce the social rights of workers and the young (see for example, Semolič, 2010).The main problem lies in the fact that the demographic structure is unable to sustain the existing pension system.The generation now in their fifties is too large to be supported by a generation in their 176

Social solidarity in post‑socialist countries

twenties or thirties that is only half the size.The authors of the reform claim that it will level the burden between generations (for example, Stanovnik, 2010). Eco-social solidarity A small group, comprised initially of 16 people and led by Aleš Pevc and Petra Matos, established an eco-social solidarity group called ‘Let’s clean Slovenia’. This group organised the biggest one-time clean-up project, involving more than 250,000 people.21 With little financial support and minimal advertising, the project received a massive response throughout Slovenia – 12% of the population, including children. Many elementary schools participated, and designated the clean-up day22 as a school day. Although it was not addressed to them specifically, many politicians felt the urge to participate as individuals – it would have been a pity to miss the ‘photo-op’. The project exposed the inability of national environmental policy to deal with the growing problem of pollution. The success of the bottom-up approach was evidence that civic motivation was capable of shaking the foundations of institutionalised practice and existing legal arrangements respectively. Some commentators argued that it was actually time for something even bigger to happen because something really important happens every 20 years or so (for example, Žerdin, 2010). While the slogan of the late 1960s was ‘Be reasonable, demand the impossible!’ by the late 1980s it had been reversed:‘Be impossible, demand the reasonable!’ But the slogan of late 2000s has become entirely operational:‘Be reasonable, do it yourself!’ (Žerdin, 2010). Before we analyse the broader impact of this civically inspired promotion of solidarity, we will look at another such action in another post-socialist setting. Rainer Nolvak and Toomas Trapido initiated a similar ‘ecological solidarity’ action in Estonia in 2008. This action was earlier than the Slovenian one, and involved a different kind of networking (the organisers in Slovenia admitted that they had been inspired by the Estonians). After the initial stages one of the Skype founders, Ahti Heinla, joined the group and developed the idea of publicising the action via the internet. According to Matos, the Slovenian eco-social solidarity group rejected this kind of approach because it would have involved the participation of e-giants (Žerdin and Mazi, 2010). Nevertheless, the main differences between the Slovenian and Estonian voluntary actions were that the Slovenian organisers were able to activate a quarter of a million participants, compared to 50,000

177

Reinventing social solidarity across Europe

in Estonia, and the participation of school children was much higher in Slovenia, even though it was not compulsory. In considering the above comparison between Estonia and Slovenia, it can be argued that the Yugoslav version of ‘self-managing’ socialism provided a foundation for much more determined, bottom-up inspired action. The two cases had one thing in common – the successful mobilisation of considerable numbers – but the age groups involved differed significantly: the Slovenian action attracted people of all ages, while the Estonian action involved mostly the younger generations, perhaps those more inclined to use new technologies. In the Slovenian case it seems that people became tired of the government’s lack of organisation in the area of environmental protection and felt compelled to do something that would have a real, visible impact. The massive involvement in this civic action may be a clear indication of a shift in public responsibilities. Again, the roots of such behaviour may lie in specific socio-historical settings: in 1980s, many bottom-up incentives were organised, so-called ‘self-contributions’ aimed at directing people’s abilities and means towards achieving a variety of ‘communal’ goals. For example, if a local community wanted a new primary school, it would achieve this eventually by contributing a certain amount of money and working hours. Similarly, in the case of eco-solidarity people contributed their time and worked for the benefit of the whole community. In the 20 or so ‘transitional’ years there was no similar kind of action. A direct consequence of the Slovenian environmental action was the announcement of changes in environmental legislation by the current minister, Žarnić. Farmers’ solidarity in Prekmurje The rural population of Slovenia was badly affected by the Second World War.The post-war period saw nationalisation, agrarian reforms and state-sponsored industrialisation. As a result, many farmers abandoned farming and agriculture and moved to the cities to work in industry.The post-war period, up to the break-up of Yugoslavia, was thus marked by a major depopulation of the Slovenian countryside (Vrišer, 1994; Belec, 1999; Josipovič, 2004).The socialist state began to promote agricultural production only during the late 1970s and 1980s, to mitigate the worst effects of the global economic crisis (Marić, 1985). During this period, farmers used agricultural cooperatives as a means to repurchase land from the state.They were also able to secure favourable loans and so on. After 1991, many of the agro-combines 178

Social solidarity in post‑socialist countries

were privatised, closed or dismantled. Thus, many farmers were left on their own and this often resulted in the abandonment of farms and farming. To deal with this situation, some parts of North-Eastern Slovenia (Goričko, Prekmurje, Trans-Mura region) have developed informal methods of reciprocal help such as financial loans, exchange of vehicles and agricultural machinery, and by individual farmers providing mutual help to one another. North-Eastern Slovenia has traditionally been agriculturally oriented. Although large-scale industrialisation pushed people into factories across the region and many people moved to the cities, a significant proportion of the population remained rural. Following the break-up of Yugoslavia, the industrial collapse forced people to return to smallscale farming, but low prices on a global level kept many of them out of the competition. Because the government wasn’t keen to stimulate larger-scale agricultural production, farmers were forced to develop informal practices of solidarity based on mutually engaged unpaid work and sharing of machinery and arable land. This kind of solidarity has reinvented many elements of the former ‘self-managing’ socialist agricultural cooperatives of the 1960s and 1970s. It sustains farming as one of the most important future economic sectors in the region. Romany groups: cross-border ‘ethnic’ solidarity The Romany population is a relatively small group of people, numbering around 12,000, living in dispersed communities across Slovenia. Apart from urban Roma, living predominantly in the city of Maribor, two regions have a considerable proportion of the Romany population: the North-Eastern Slovenian region of Prekmurje (the Trans-Mura region) and the South-Eastern Slovenian region of Dolenjska (historically named Lower Carniola).Although each of these groups numbers around 4,000, the communities are very different.They speak at least three languages, which are almost unintelligible between the groups. Because of the different forms and directions that their migration into present-day Slovenia has taken, the Prekmurje Romany population consists of five subgroups which are distinguishable among the Roma themselves (Josipovič and Repolusk, 2003). Interestingly, the easternmost subgroup of around 200 people living around the town of Lendava23 is the only one to have cross-border relations with other Romany groups in Croatia or Hungary. Among the Prekmurje Roma they are known as the enfant terrible of the family. Historically, the first Romany settlers moved to the Lendava woods around the end of the First World War to escape the raging hostility 179

Reinventing social solidarity across Europe

directed against them in central Hungary. Eventually, the new border between Hungary and the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes was drawn close to their temporary settlement. Thus, the Lendava Roma could not return home to Hungary after the war’s end. They had no choice but to stay, and what was initially intended to be a temporary shelter has become a settlement that now numbers around 200 inhabitants. The Lendava Roma have quite distinct marriage patterns from the other Prekmurje Roma groups. Being initially a very small community, they used a strategy of bringing in spouses, mostly from abroad (Croatia, Hungary) and to a lesser extent from the other Romany communities of Prekmurje. This practice seems to have been very successful – the settlement’s population has risen tenfold, not only on account of high fertility but predominantly because of the high rate of immigration. During the socialist period, social ties with friends and relatives in Hungary were severely weakened. On the other hand, the ties between the Lendava and the Medjimurje Roma in Croatia were considerably strengthened. After 1991, the Lendava Roma re-established relations with their Hungarian relatives, who helped them to enter the labour market in northern Italy.The post-socialist period has produced massive ethnically based unemployment, which was much lower among the Roma during the socialist era. Throughout the 1990s, and especially after the imposition of the Schengen regime between Slovenia and Hungary, on the one hand, and Croatia, on the other hand, family ties were the source of a unique kind of reciprocal help. The Lendava Roma supported their relatives in Croatia, who were even harder hit by the recession and experienced very little social support24 and were also denied the right to travel freely, and who thus had to employ semi-subversive practices in order to survive all manner of shortages of resources. The lived experiences of Romany groups are very significant within the current political and economic setting across Europe because they are a litmus of the lowest socio-economic standards. Comparison among various Romany groups across ex-communist Europe exposes the large-scale, formerly hidden anti-Roma intolerance of majority populations, and blatant discrimination (cf Šumi and Josipovič, 2008; Josipovič, 2009a). As might be expected, this intolerance has risen to dangerous levels across the EU, not least in France. First, the socioeconomic situation in the new EU member states is significantly worse than in the ‘older’ member states. Second, the Romany population, probably the most vulnerable macro-group in Europe, is forced to move place to place in order to escape the position of scapegoat. And 180

Social solidarity in post‑socialist countries

third, solidarity among EU member states is severely threatened by the ‘egoistic’ French rejection of pan-European appeals against deportation. However, current developments provide new opportunities for the whole EU to rethink its position and to re-establish provisions for reciprocal solidarity.

Conclusion The recent socio-economic transitions have led to the erosion of social solidarity in post-socialist countries. Here, the economic imperatives of capitalism have compelled governments to discard previous political and legal arrangements, including access to local labour markets. It seems unlikely that such developments will change without a range of precisely focused actions at the pan-European level. After the break-up of Yugoslavia and the introduction of the market economy, the successor states suffered a long, still ongoing, process of transition from a semi-planned to a market economy. Under conditions of permanent shock, each of successor states has been trying to deal with economic insecurity. In the immediate aftermath of the post-Yugoslav wars, which were notorious for massive human rights violations, many communities were forced to develop hidden networks of reciprocal help. Thus, some new parallel elements were added to already existing third sector. On the other hand, the current politico-economic situations in the successor states vary considerably. As there were different paths of capital movement in the region, so are there various levels of socio-economic austerity.These specificities, in turn, have shaped the possibilities and strategies for the development of reinvented social solidarities in these states, and across post-socialist states more generally. Nonetheless, there is evidence of great potential in the informal third sector, although it has little systematic support on a supranational level, creating a risk that it will develop in undesirable directions.Although European strategies provide for regional incentives, there is a consistent lack of legal provisions to support bottom-up approaches. The analyses presented here have clearly distinguished Yugoslavia and its successor states as a specific area in Europe that developed an innovative ‘self-managing’ socialist system. Despite the fact that the former Yugoslavia suffered from many other problems (for example, unsettled ethnic relations, a history of brutal wars, geopolitical splits, economic shortages, regional inequalities and so on), it introduced a system that assured a high level of regional local autonomy in decision making. On many occasions this system prevented harmful, 181

Reinventing social solidarity across Europe

centralistic, top-down decisions.The EU could learn from theYugoslav multinational and federal experience, not by making the same mistakes but by implementing those things that have proved to be beneficial. The goal should be to establish a legal environment that would balance bottom-up incentives and prevent the interference of regional governing structures, and thus making them viable or more successful. The specifics of ‘self-management’ that have been presented here may be applicable on the pan-European level, providing the means to fulfil needs that cannot be met by other mechanisms. As we have shown in the cases of ethnic group solidarity or farmers’ solidarity, such practices may have already been adopted elsewhere. All of the cases of reinvented solidarity analysed here resemble core elements of the original ‘self-managing’ socialist principle. It might thus be argued that specific historical developments within the (nominally) same socio-economic and political environment (that is, socialist/ communist regime) have produced grounds for the emergence of distinctive political group behaviour. The analysis of varying strategies for re-establishing former constitutional, designed and lived solidarity in post-socialist countries has importance both for post-socialist countries and for solidarity within an enlarged EU. In exploring the implications for the reinvention of social solidarity within and across other European countries, it is necessary to draw on documented activities and their results.According to the situations and problems described above, EU institutions should invest more time and energy in a systematic search for sustainable solutions that are based on various ‘good’ multi-form practices, rather than sticking to uniformity, which has little capacity to deal with the great regional and social disparities of an enlarged Europe.

Notes 1 The Visegrád group consists of four states: the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia. See notes 15 and 16. As Mr Debeljak in Amy Standen’s report (2006) said: ‘In the early 1990s, when the war for Yugoslav succession continued to rage, to pronounce yourself aYugonostalgic person meant sticking it out, meant putting your reputation at risk because Yugonostalgia was in the early 1990s dismissed as the smoke screen for those that cannot let go of the political heritage of former Yugoslavia.’ Another example of nostalgia has been witnessed in the former German Democratic Republic, where Berliners refused to give up the ‘Ampelmännchen’ – an East German 2

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traffic light signal and a symbol of Ostalgie (source: New York Times, 15 October 2009). Interviewees pointed mostly against ‘Americans’ and ‘Brussels’ having roles in this imagined West. 3

Robert D. Putnam, for instance, describes social capital as the collective value of all social networks and the inclinations arising from these networks for people to do things for each other (cf Putnam, 1995, 2000). 4

These include a big house, expensive car, yacht, a second home on a beach and an expensive Armani-like suit exclusively styled for the nouveaux riches (cf Šumi, 2010). 5

The region of Eastern-Central Europe is sometimes confused with the Central and Eastern Europe region (cf, for example, Gati, 2007). 6

Mitteleuropa = Middle or Central Europe, a concept first introduced by German physical geographer August Zeune in 1808. In a political and geographical sense, the term was introduced by another German, Georg Friedrich List, in the mid-19th century (Klemenčić, 1997).The term was later employed in the ideology of a Greater Germany (cf Ash, 1990; Le Rider, 2008) and, curiously enough, was revived uncritically in Slovenia and Croatia. 7

8

Also referred to as the Cominform crisis.

Agreement between the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) and the Republic of Italy on the regulation of cross-border passenger traffic, and land and sea transport within the cross-border region was signed on 15 May 1982 (Official Gazette of SFRY, International agreements, year 42, nr. 10 (1986), pp 26–39). 9

The policy of self-governing is often called self-management. Depending on different translations, it appears with various attributes as ‘workers’ or social self-governing/government/management’, but these all basically mean the same thing (cf Gorupić and Tornquist, 1970; Broekmeyer, 1977; Wilson, 1978; Clark and Clark, 1987). 10

The third and last Yugoslav Constitution, of 1974 (six years before Tito’s death), granted the status of sovereign republic in a voluntary association to all six member republics of the Yugoslav federation. 11

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Albania was an isolated country with rare contact with the outside world. After the political conflict with the Soviet Union shortly after the Second World War, Albania found a new strategic ally in China. Until the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the consequent wave of democratisation in numerous countries of the Eastern bloc, Albania remained closed and politically isolated, with a specific Stalinist social order. 12

The German Democratic Republic, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria and the Soviet Union. 13

The Visegrád group now consists of four countries which signed the agreement inVisegrád in February 1991: the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia (www.visegradgroup.eu/main.php?folderID=938, accessed: 30 April 2010). Initially a group of three, the Visegrád group becameV4 after the agreed division of Czechoslovakia on 31 December 1992. 14

The Warsaw Pact (Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance) was established as a formal response to the integration of Western Germany into NATO. It was formed in 1955 by the Soviet Union, German Democratic Republic, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria and Albania (for example, Pavić, 1987; 1991). 15

According to GDP measured through Purchase Power Parity (PPP), the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary rank numbers second, third and fifth among 19 ECE countries including Russia (source: World Development Indicators, 2007). 16

17

Source: World Development Indicators 2009.

In the following year, the foreign debt of Romania had already risen to US$1.14 billion. It had surpassed US$10 billion USD by 2000 and peaked at US$85.38 billion by the end of 2007 (World Development Indicators, 2009). 18

Yugoslavia actually allowed private property, but it was limited to small businesses.The distinction between state and public property was defined during this period as the difference between state ownership and public ownership of the means of production. Here, public property involves the ownership of industry by the people who are 19

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working within the industry itself whereas state ownership is defined as the ownership of industry and other property by the state. DeSUS (Democratic Party of Slovenian Pensioners) is a parliamentary party with 7% of the vote and is a member of the ruling coalition. 20

21

Dnevnik newspaper, cited after STA, 18 April 2010.

22

The action took place on Saturday 17 April 2010.

23

Lendva in Hungarian; Lindau in German.

Despite the unenviable living conditions of the Lendava Roma, their cross-border support included small financial contributions, housing, food and medical supplies, job hunting and so on. 24

Bibliography Ash, T.M. (1990) ‘Mitteleuropa?’, Daedalus, 119 (1) 1–21. Bećirović, Z. (2009) in M. Jančar (ed) Kapitalizem, tranzicija, demokracija, Ljubljana: Inštitut dr. Jožeta Pučnika, p 149. Belec, B. (1999) ‘Sozioökologische Struktur der Landwirtschaftsbetriebe in Slowenien und europäische Integration’, in A. Aubert and M. Miszler (eds) Internationale Geographie-Konferenz 1998 im Themenkreis von Globalisation – Regionalisation, Regionalismus, Pécs: Janus Pannonius, pp 124–31. Berk Skok, A. (2010) ‘Pokojninski sistem potrebuje večje spremembe od napovedanih’, E-revir, available at: www.erevir.si/Moduli/Clanki/ Clanek.aspx?ModulID=1&KategorijaID=11&ClanekID=861. Accessed: 10.09.2010, 17:54. Boldaˉne, E. (2003) ‘Latvians’ ethnic stereotypes regarding the ethnic and cultural minorities in Latvia’, Pro Ethnologia, 15, pp 197–206. Broekmeyer, M.J. (1977) ‘Self-management in Yugoslavia: Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science’, Industrial Democracy in International Perspective, 431: 133–40. Brščič, B. (2009) in M. Jančar (ed) Kapitalizem, tranzicija, demokracija [Capitalism, transition, democracy] Ljubljana: Inštitut dr. Jožeta Pučnika, p 149. Clark, C. and Clark, J. (1987) The gender gap in Yugoslavia: elite versus mass levels’, Political Psychology, 8 (3) 411–26. Cohen, S.B. (2003) Geopolitics of the world system, Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers Inc, p 435. 185

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Djilas, M. (1973) Memoir of a revolutionary, New York: Hartcourt Brace Jovanovich, p 402. Dyson, K. (2007) ‘Euro area entry in east-central Europe: paradoxical Europeanisation and clustered convergence’, West European Politics, 30 (3) 417–42. Elsuwege, P. van (2004) Russian-speaking minorities in Estonia and Latvia: problems of integration at the threshold of the European Union, European Centre for Minority Issues, Working Paper No 20, p 68. Frelih, P. (2010) Belorusija ni takšna država, kot jo slikajo mediji. Pišite o tem [Belarus is not the way the media picture it.Write about this.] Ljubljana: Delo Newspaper, 06 April 2010, 06:30. Gabanyi,A.U. (1992) ‘Nationalismus in Rumänien – vom Revolutions­ patriotismus zur chauvinistischen Restauration’, in M. Mommsen (ed) Nationalismus in Osteuropa – Gefahrvolle Wege in die Demokratie, München/Munich: Beck, pp 143–67. Gati, Ch (2007) Backsliding in central and eastern Europe, Testimony prepared for The House Foreign Affairs Committee.Washington, DC. Gorupić, D. and Tornquist, D. (1970) ‘Trends in the development of workers’ self-management in Yugoslavia’, Eastern European Economics, 8 (2) 107–82. Grabher, G. and Stark, D. (1997) Restructuring networks in post-socialism: Legacies, linkages, and localities, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p 349. Grečić,V. (1975) Savremene migracije radne snage u Evropi [Contemporary Migration of Labour Force in Europe], Belgrade: Institut za međunarodnu politiku i privredu, p 311. Gržinič, M. (2008) ‘Rearticulation of the state of things or Euroslovenian necrocapitalism’, Reartikulacija, 3, Ljubljana, pp 3–5. Hann, C.M. et al (2002) ‘Introduction: postsocialism as a topic of anthropological investigation’, in C.M. Hann (ed) Postsocialism: Ideals, ideologies and practices in Eurasia, London: Routledge, p 345. Hostnik, M. (2007) Vse več nezadovoljstva z Bručanovimi (ne)ukrepi [More and more dissatisfaction with Bručan’s (in)efectiveness] Dnevnik Newspaper, 23 June 2007. Hribar, S. (2010) Kaj bomo s seboj? Nobena vlada doslej ni znala parirati sesutju prejšnjega sistema [What shall we do with ourselves? None of the governments could have handled the crush of the former system] Ljubljana Finance, 167/2010, 30 August 2010. Jordan, P. (1993) ‘Perspektiven des Fremdenverkehrs im östlichen Mitteleuropa. Einige Orientierungspunkte zur Einführung’, in P. Jordan and E.Tomasi (eds) Perspektiven des Fremdenverkehrs im östlichen Mitteleuropa,Vienna, pp 9–25.

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Josipovič, D. (2004) Dejavniki rodnostnega obnašanja v Sloveniji [Factors of Fertility Behaviour in Slovenija] Ljubljana: Založba ZRC, p 160. Josipovič, D. (2006) Učinki priseljevanja v Slovenijo po drugi svetovni vojni [Effects of Immigration to Slovenia after WWII] Ljubljana: Založba ZRC, p 348. Josipovič, D. (2009a) ‘Mesto Romov v strukturi recentnih etnodemografskih sprememb v Prekmurju’ [‘Roma population in the structure of ethno-demographical changes in Prekmurje’], in T. Kikec (ed) Pomurje, Ljubljana:Association of Geographers of Slovenia, Pomurje Geographical Society, Murska Sobota, pp 168–82. Josipovi č, D. (2009b) ‘Razprava o odnosu center – periferija: peripanonski slovensko-hrvaški stik v sistemu širitve EU’ [‘Treatise on centre – periphery relationship: Peripanonian Slovenian-Croatian contact in the system of EU Enlargement’] in A. Gosar (ed) Razvojne priložnosti obmejnih območij Slovenije, ZRS Koper, University of Primorska, Založba Annales, Annales Majora, pp 197–211. Josipovič, D. and Repolusk, P. (2003) ‘Demographic characteristics of the Romany in Prekmurje’, Acta Geographica Slovenica, 43 (1) 127–49. Kačerauskas, T. (2009) ‘Central Europe as an imagined region’, Limes, 2 (2) 106–15. Kardelj, E. (1979) Sistem socialističnega samoupravljanja v Jugoslaviji [System of socialist self-management in Yugoslavia] Ljubljana: Zbrana dela, DZS, pp 411–54. Kardelj, E. (1980) Boj za priznanje in neodvisnost nove Jugoslavije 1944– 1957 [Fight for the Recognition and Independence of the New Yugoslavia 1944–1957] Ljubljana: DZS, p 267. Klemenčić, M. (1997) ‘Regija, regionalizacija, regionalizam’ [‘Region, regionalization, regionalism’] in M. Klemenčić (ed) Atlas Europe, Zagreb: Leksikografski zavod Miroslav Krleža, pp 196–201. Klinar, P. (1985) Mednarodne migracije v kriznih razmerah [International Migration in Circumstances of Crisis], Maribor: Založba Obzorja, p 212. Le Rider, J. (2008) ‘Mitteleuropa, Zentraleuropa, Mittelosteuropa: a mental map of central Europe’, European Journal of Social Theory, 11, (2) 155–69. Lulle, A. (2003) Replacement migration: Is it a solution for Latvia’s ageing and declining population?, Oxford: Green College, Reuters Foundation Paper No 214, p 48. Marić, Đ. (1985) Geografija zavičaja [Geography of Homeland], Sarajevo: Svjetlost, p 130. Mbembe, A. (2003) ‘Necropolitics’, Public Culture, 15 (1) 11–40. Miroshnyk, O. (2009) Institute of local self-government in Sweden, National Security and Defence, 1: 37–39. 187

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ELEVEN

Trade unions, NGOs and social solidarity in Romania1 Cristina Sta˘nus¸ This chapter explores the role played by trade unions and nongovernmental organisations in stimulating the emergence of solidarity from below. Focusing on connections between different forms of citizen participation and social solidarity, it attempts to establish whether there is a link on an individual level between social solidarity and membership of trade unions and non-governmental organisations, given that both kinds of organisations are recognised as important agents of social solidarity (Gallin, 2000). Social solidarity is identified as a key element of modern democracy, and it is argued that globalisation, (European) integration and democratisation have given impetus to the reinvention of social solidarity on multiple levels (subnational, national and transnational).The chapter draws upon research across Europe, and locates a descriptive and exploratory approach to social solidarity in Romania within a comparative perspective. The starting-point of this investigation stresses the importance of solidarity as a key element of modern democracy, which is far more than the political form involving elections, votes and decision-making rules.Alexander (2006) states that democracy depends on the existence of solidarity bonds that extend beyond political arrangements. Solidarity is deeply linked to identity and to belonging to a particular political community. This is actually one of the four dominant perspectives in the study of modern citizenship (see Brodie, 2002). Solidarity is even more important if one takes into account its obvious linkage with the distribution crisis of modern society (see Fisichella, 2000)/ the crisis of the welfare state. But the prospects for solidarity are quite positive because, despite the pressures to which it is being subjected, the European welfare states have proved remarkably resilient, and the necessary changes to their architecture do not seem to have had an impact on the views of citizens, who remain committed to a ‘mild egalitarianism’ (Taylor-Gooby, 2004). In the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe, solidarity is a term with different meanings, first and foremost because, having been 191

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appropriated by the communist regimes, it is loaded with memories of those past regimes and is in need of reinvention. Second, because it is shaped (similarly to Western democracies) by factors such as consumerism, individualism, the rolling back of the communist welfare state and globalisation.Third, because the actors channelling solidarity are different from their counterparts in Western societies – political parties, trade unions and civil society organisations (CSOs) are generally weak, poorly institutionalised and still searching for identity. The following sections detail the definition of solidarity informing this investigation; discuss the linkage between solidarity (as a political practice concept) and the policy and practice of trade unions and NGOs; and delineate the research questions that form the basis of the chapter. There is then a brief description of the data used and discussion of the limits of the present investigation. The next sections are dedicated to data analysis and interpretation and the final section discusses the results.

Social solidarity Solidarity may be considered a rather loose concept, because it has many meanings in both social theory and political practice, and those meanings have evolved over time. In terms of social theory, the concept of solidarity has evolved from a linkage with the normal type of Gemeinschaft as expressed by Tönnies, to a multifaceted concept adapted to modern society. In terms of political practice, over time a multitude of concepts of solidarity have been used by different European political groups (Stjernø, 2004). Theorists emphasise several key components of social solidarity.The first component is the integration/identification of the individual with the collective (Segall, 2005) or the feeling of connectedness to every member of a community – national, regional, or international (Alexander, 2006). At this point, the balance between individualism and collectivism seems to be equally important, because the individualism linked to the expansion of the market and market ideology is deemed to be one of the main challenges facing solidarity.A second and highly important component is inclusiveness (Stjernø, 2004). Inclusiveness is a key characteristic of democracy (Dahl, 2000). While Dahl refers to the political aspects of inclusion, it must also be viewed in social and economic terms because a political form (democracy) cannot be separated from the society in which it exists. In terms of citizenship, social components are no less important than civil and political components of citizenship (Ferrera, 2005).The goal involved (Stjernø, 2004) or whether there is commitment 192

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to the common good is another component of social solidarity (Segall, 2005). A fourth component stresses empathy, or concern for the wellbeing of others (Segall, 2005). The last component emphasises trust as a key element of solidarity (Stjernø, 2004). An operational definition of solidarity, based on an extensive study of political party discourse throughout Europe, sees solidarity as the preparedness to share resources with others, by personal contribution to those in struggle or in need and through taxation and redistribution organised by the state (Stjernø, 2004: 2), including both an individual and an institutional component. Preparedness to help others is of course a function of the extent to which an individual is concerned for the well-being of other people. Addressing also the issues of inclusiveness and connectedness mentioned earlier, this is a key measure of social solidarity (see Kankaraš and Moors, 2009), these others being identified as the respondent’s immediate family, people in the neighbourhood, region, country, Europeans, humankind in general, as well as immigrants, the elderly, the sick and disabled and the unemployed. Based on these aspects, three dimensions of solidarity in Europe have been identified: local, social and global (see Kankaraš and Moors, 2009). Alternatively, the same feelings of sympathy and commitment towards fellow citizens are measured by other authors using a series of measures of support for general principles such as: a) elimination of income differences; b) guaranteeing that everybody’s basic needs are met; c) concern about the living conditions of fellow countrymen; d) view on the right of unemployed people to refuse jobs; and e) opinions about the causes of poverty in one’s country (Janmaat and Braun, 2009). Another important aspect is the inclusion of measures of support for the welfare state in the operational definition of social solidarity. Some authors argue that social solidarity should be distinguished from support for the welfare state, since, mainly because the latter may very well be motivated by rational self-interest (Janmaat and Braun, 2009), the welfare state may well be undermining solidarity (see (Stjernø, 2004). Social solidarity is part of the broader distinction between left and right materialist orientations, which oppose, among others, economic liberalism, market competition, resistance to government regulation and opposition to the notions of social and economic equality (right) to active government, economic security, solidarity, equality of income and living conditions (left) (Van Deth, 1998: 10).Any operational measure of social solidarity should account for both the individual (one’s feelings, beliefs) and the institutional (support for institutions) components. Another important aspect is related to the territorial frame of reference that is used. Solidarity is traditionally linked with national 193

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welfare policies. But recent work has pointed to a redrawing of the ‘boundaries of welfare’ (Ferrera, 2005) as a result of European integration processes and decentralisation/regionalisation.While there was some expectation that such processes might lead to a ‘race to the bottom’ in terms of welfare spending, and undermine solidarity, there is some evidence that this is not actually happening (see Keating, 2009).

Trade unions, NGOs and solidarity A very influential work by Linz and Stepan (1996: 7) defines civil society as self-organising groups, relatively autonomous from the state, which attempt to articulate values, create associations and solidarities and advance their interests.Theorists and practitioners alike assume that participation in such groups helps to build public space democratically, on the basis of a set of democratic values. People’s values are highly influenced by the social environment and by their position in that environment (Van Deth, 2006: 6), so that the right mix of associational attachments should help to provide more democracy (Warren, 2001: 60). Even critics limit themselves to pointing out that only the more engaging forms of citizen participation seem to have an effect on trust, social solidarity or civic commitment (Segall, 2005).This chapter tries to go beyond the general assumption that civil society organisations foster democratic values and help democratisation, and looks at two specific institutionalised expressions of civil society – trade unions and NGOs – and their role in channelling social solidarity. The traditional channels of solidarity – religious organisations, political parties and trade unions – are being complemented by the rise of social movements and third sector organisations. The decline of trust in and membership of political parties has created room for social movements capable of performing the articulation of interests function both in national political systems and on a more global level. Trade unions have historically reflected broader social and political concerns, as demonstrated by their role in establishing both the universal franchise and basic social protection mechanisms in many countries. After the Second World War, trade unions in the Western world seemed to have retreated from voicing such broad concerns and focused more on specific issues such as collective bargaining and wages, while their Eastern European counterparts (with the notable exception of Poland) were reduced to being ‘transmission belts’ for the communist regimes. In the Western world, this gap was initially filled by NGOs and it is presently, and increasingly, being filled by cooperation between trade unions and NGOs. Gallin (2000) discusses the necessary relationship 194

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between trade unions and NGOs, derived from their shared agenda for the improvement of society, and exemplifies it with cases of cooperation between trade unions and NGOs in areas such as human rights in general and workers’ rights. In post-communist Eastern Europe this task lies with social and political actors who are still in the process of rebuilding/reinventing or simply institutionalising themselves. Trade unions may be seen from two different perspectives. On the one hand, they are at the same time members of the socio-economic system (dominantly in the US) and actors in the political process (as aggregators of interests and because of the close connections between trade unions and political parties in many European countries) (Fisichella, 2000: 191). From this position, and outwardly oriented, they are able to participate in the improvement of the political system and of society by promoting civic engagement and solidarity. Another perspective sees trade unions as psychological defence mechanisms against industrialisation and its effects, and mentions the affective solidarities created by trade unions (Poole, 1981 in Fisichella, 2000).This inwards orientation, demonstrated by the withdrawal of unions from broader social and political concerns and their focus on defending the specific interests of their members, definitely promotes solidarity between trade union members, but it is debatable whether it promotes solidarity outside the trade union. On the other hand, participation in associations is said to instil support for democratic values, enhance political behaviour, develop organisational, political, cognitive and deliberative skills and generally improve democracy and society (Theiss-Morse and Hibbing, 2005; Warren, 2005; Uhlin, 2009). Of course, these aspects are moderated by distinctions within the broader category of NGOs, such as those between organisations independent of and in opposition to the state and organisations that are deeply embedded in state structures and engaged in close cooperation with state authorities; voluntary and nonvoluntary organisations; large and small organisations; organisations with or without a certain degree of internal democracy; and organisations mainly involved in social or political activities and other organisations (see Uhlin, 2009). But at the same time, participation in associations might not be a good foundation for citizenship, because people usually join homogeneous rather than heterogeneous groups and not all groups promote democratic values (see Theiss-Morse and Hibbing, 2005). A study of the democratic effects of civil society organisations in Estonia distinguishes between two types of civil society: advocacy civil society, made up of large, membership-based organisations involved in social and political activities focusing on representing the interests of their members and largely producing effects on the institutional 195

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side (checking state power, interest articulation); and recreational civil society, made up of small, apolitical organisations that produce effects on the level of the individual by acting as ‘schools of democracy’ (Uhlin, 2009). Homogeneity is especially important in our present discussion because it definitely promotes solidarity within the group/organisation, but it may not promote solidarity outside the particular group with which the individual identifies.

Contextual factors and research questions Addressing this topic implies, first and foremost, a critical approach to the current meaning of social solidarity in Romanian society. While the reinvention of social solidarity is usually mentioned in relation to the European project, it has a special relevance in the eastern part of Europe.The term ‘social solidarity’ reminds us of defunct regimes that emphasised its collective component, while the idea of transnational solidarity may remind many of the ‘brotherly help’ in the form of Soviet tanks rolling into Budapest or Prague. The specificity of this part of Europe is underlined by the results of research focusing on the link between post-materialism and social solidarity. Janmaat and Braun (2009) find a positive correlation between post-materialism and social solidarity at the individual level in Western European countries. They also find that, in Eastern Europe, post-materialism is negatively correlated with support for general solidarity principles, and they consider this a result of the fact that the communist past has made issues of social solidarity more controversial in Eastern Europe. Beyond the controversial character of the term, this is primarily a matter of how value change is produced – in a changing environment (arguably, such as that in post-communist Central and Eastern Europe) values are not simply replaced by other values, but people adjust to new values without giving up every element in their previous orientations (Van Deth, 1998: 4). Consequently, the first question guiding the rest of this chapter is this: • What are the main dimensions of social solidarity in Romania? To what extent are they similar to those discerned in cross-national research? As in other countries in Central and Eastern Europe, Romanian trade unions are relatively weak (because of decreasing trade union density, low collective bargaining coverage and unemployment) and still in the process of acquiring legitimacy and becoming autonomous 196

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representative organisations (Trif and Koch, 2005; Meardi, 2007). The issue of independence is, as in other countries in the region, probably the most important, because of the much-debated relationship of trade union leaders with political parties (Vasiliu, 2000; Meardi, 2007: 180). The reformist and democratic tendencies of trade union leaders were diminished, at least in the 1990s, by an increased social distance between trade union bureaucrats and union members (Vasiliu, 2000: 171). This must be seen in relation to the fact that, during the communist regime, trade union membership was compulsory; trade unions had no functions related to labour relations and were merely providers of services for holiday making and entertainment (Vasiliu, 2000; Chebrea, 2005). The most important characteristic of Romanian trade unions, as shown by empirical research, was their tendency in the 1990s to act as representatives of threatened groups and to display an internally oriented defensive solidarity as Romanian society became increasingly perceived as a hostile environment (see Vasiliu, 2000). Among the symptoms of this tendency the mineriade (mineriads)2 or the 1990s post-privatisation strikes (some of which ended with the cancellation of a privatisation) may be mentioned. On the other hand, NGOs are relatively weak as well. The emergence of post-1989 NGOs is certainly driven by foreign donor intervention. The withdrawal of the main international donors after Romania’s accession to the European Union (EU) in 2007 left many NGOs struggling to find new sources of finance for their activities, the success stories coming mostly from solidarity-based organisations or environmental ones, which have benefited from increased media coverage and public acknowledgement. The environment in which these organisations operate is a difficult one because one heritage of the communist regimes is a general lack of trust in public organisations (Uhlin, 2009: 274), aggravated by the fact that Romania never had an organised opposition to the communist regime.An interesting measure of NGOs’ strength in Romania is the extent to which they are able to attract funding based on the so-called ‘two per cent mechanism’ (percentage designation system).The ‘winners’ in this are organisations such as denominational charities (accounting for approximately a third of all percentage designation in Romania), Save the Children, the Red Cross and Children in Need. This does suggest that Romanian NGOs act as channels of solidarity for Romanian society and that they fill a gap by responding to broader social and political problems not approached by trade unions; but it does not tell us whether there is a link between membership in these organisations and solidarity. Based on these aspects, the second question posed here is: 197

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• Is there a link between membership in NGOs and trade unions and feelings of social solidarity? Romania’s accession to the EU in 2007 introduced new dimensions into discussions about social solidarity. European integration has created a constitutional asymmetry between policies promoting market efficiency and policies promoting social protection and equality (Scharpf, 2002), with the obvious conclusion that specific Europeanlevel policies of social solidarity will not come any time soon (see Streeck, 1999). Delanty (2007) sees European citizenship associated with a deficit in the values of solidarity and social justice, while Follesdal et al (2007) suggest that there is a repoliticisation of social policy discourse within the EU, which is a barrier to envisioning European solidarity and developing a stronger European social agenda. This state of affairs became more and more obvious as the EU continued to enlarge and (mostly through immigration) European countries became more and more diverse. Approaching transnational solidarity within the EU from an identity perspective, White (2003) identifies the existence of differences in popular feelings of solidarity from one issue area to the next. In this perspective, social solidarity is linked with European citizenship. Given the democratic deficit of the EU, the emphasis falls on subjective aspects of identification with the EU as a political community. The question then becomes one of whether there is a European component to social solidarity in Romania, or in any other country. The third and last question approached here focuses on this, and is formulated as follows: • Is there a transnational (European) dimension to feelings of solidarity in Romania? The next section of this chapter briefly presents the data and methods used to answer these three questions.

The data and its limitations This chapter is attempting to answer the three research questions outlined in the previous section, based on panel survey data collected in the framework of the Romanian Presidential Study 2009 (Babes¸Bolyai University of Cluj) and Electoral Reform and Electoral Studies (Soros Foundation Romania) projects.The questionnaire for the third wave of the survey included a few questions focused on social solidarity in Romania. One of the limits of the present investigation stems from 198

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this fact, since this quantitative investigation provides us with only a minimal picture of social solidarity in Romania and does not allow us to approach issues of causality. This chapter focuses on the micro (individual level), taking into account several aspects. First, most studies on social solidarity focus on the provision of welfare and do not take into account the gap that might exist between the welfare arrangements desired by citizens and what the state is actually capable of offering (see Janmaat and Braun, 2009); consequently, the existence of empathy and the degree of inclusiveness marking feelings of solidarity at the individual level are more relevant than the existence of specific welfare policies at national (or even supranational) level. Secondl cross-national studies of solidarity lose within-country specificities. This can be exemplified here by the adequacy of including a measure of the concern felt towards the wellbeing of immigrants when measuring solidarity in a society with little or no immigration, Romania being such a case. Add to this the need to specifically assess the inclusiveness component of social solidarity, taking into account key groups in a given society – such as the Roma population in many Eastern European countries. The analysis is somewhat descriptive and exploratory in character, a fact reflected by the choice of method. The chapter uses descriptive statistics, principal components analysis, correlations and significance testing to describe data and answer the questions. The next section discusses the dimensions of social solidarity in Romania, as identified by this investigation.

Dimensions of solidarity in Romania As mentioned in the second section, the starting-point in this investigation is a minimal definition of social solidarity, emphasising concern for the well-being of others and support for the welfare state. The use of concern for the well-being of other people as an operational definition of solidarity is conditioned, in cross-national research, by the issue of measurement equivalence (Kankaraš and Moors, 2009). The question of the measurements used should probably be taken further, so as to take into account a broader debate in the literature about the impact of ethnic and racial diversity, as such on social solidarity and the welfare state, doubled by a more recent focus on the effects of multiculturalism policies, which apparently are gradually eroding the interpersonal trust, social solidarity and political coalitions that sustain the welfare state (Banting and Kymlicka, 2006). For example, a question referring to concern for the welfare of immigrants might 199

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mean very little in a country with little or no immigration and, in a society with significant ethnic minorities, it might be useful to include a measure of solidarity with members of these groups. In order to account for the ‘inclusiveness’ component of solidarity, the standard list of reference groups used in cross-national surveys when assessing concern for the well-being of others has been amended to include some specific aspects related to Romanian society. Two separate categories were included, focusing on Roma and other ethnic minorities. The category on ‘immigrants’ was excluded because Romania is more of an emigration country, and was replaced with a measure of tolerance towards immigration.A general measure of support for the welfare state was used, focusing on agreement with the idea that the state should redistribute income from the rich to the poor. The univariate analysis shows significant differences in terms of inclusiveness. Unsurprisingly, the strongest solidarity is oriented towards one’s family (mean of 9.65 on a 0 to 10 scale). Second strongest is the social component, concern with the well-being of categories such as pensioners or the unemployed. This is followed by a national level of solidarity, manifested in concern for the well-being of neighbours and Romanian citizens.An aspect very specific to Romania is the relatively low level of solidarity with one’s neighbours, chiefly deriving from Romanians’ specific experience of the surveillance methods of the communist regime. The weakest solidarity is oriented towards Roma and other ethnic minorities (4.67 and 4.92 means respectively, with the mode at 0).There is low solidarity with Europeans or people from the entire world; however, this is accompanied by a relatively high level of acceptance of immigration. Support for the welfare state is relatively high, with a 6.84 average, which was to be expected, given the general economic situation and the fact that data were collected during a period of crisis. Support for Romania’s involvement in international aid and development is high, but with a clear preference for involvement in aid (which is probably perceived as a must, since natural disasters cannot be controlled) over development (which implies aiding countries that might be poor ‘by their own doing’). A hierarchy of inclusiveness would see inner/family-oriented solidarity come first, followed by social solidarity with the unemployed and pensioners and then by the national dimension of solidarity. Solidarity with Europeans is quite low, a possible explanation being the perception that most Europeans are better off than Romanians and concern should be oriented towards people who are in relative need.

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The next step involved testing whether or not solidarity as a concern for the well-being of other people can be structured into something similar to the three dimensions of solidarity (local, social and global) identified in cross-national investigations. The principal components analysis showed that no such structuring exists. This suggests a strong social component of solidarity in Romania, which seems to cover the subnational, national and supranational levels. The next step was to include the measures of support for the welfare state as well as the transnational solidarity variables. In this step three main dimensions of solidarity in Romania are identified (results in Table 11.1), following a different pattern from the one expected.3 The first component involves feelings of concern for other people’s welfare, with no significant differences among categories, except maybe for the Roma population and other ethnic minorities. The factor resulting from the principal components analysis is loaded by variables measuring concern for the welfare of neighbours, people from the same locality, Romanian citizens, Roma, other ethnic minorities, Table 11.1: Dimensions of solidarity in Romania, 2009 Concern Transnational Selffor the solidarity interest well(oriented and lack of being of towards support for other poorer the welfare people countries) state Allow people of different race or ethnicity to come to live and work in Romania

0.603

State should redistribute income from the rich to the poor

–0.579

Romania should give humanitarian aid to other countries in cases of natural disaster or epidemic

0.842

Romania should help poor countries to develop

0.827

Concern towards the welfare of: one’s family

 0.742

neighbours

0.791

people from the same locality

0.877

Romanian citizens

0.905

Roma

0.833

other ethnic minorities

0.865

the unemployed

0.852

pensioners

0.800

Europeans

0.876

people from the entire world

0.877

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the unemployed, pensioners, Europeans and people from the entire world (variance explained 47.49%). This suggests the existence of a social component of solidarity that covers the subnational, national and supranational levels.This component is probably greatly affected by the view of solidarity included in the official discourse of the communist regime, which emphasised a worldwide vision of solidarity. The same might also apply to the second component: transnational solidarity oriented toward poorer countries (variance explained 14.31%). The factor is loaded by variables measuring support for allowing people of different races and ethnicities to live and work in Romania, whether Romania should give humanitarian aid in cases of natural disaster and whether Romania should help poor countries to develop. Notice that support for the immigration into Romania of people of different races or ethnicities is substantially lower and less important in the definition of this component. The third component brings into discussion a tension between personal welfare and support for institutionalised welfare, and links concern for the welfare of one’s family and a lack of support for redistribution by the state. This is the single most important result, contradicting previous research results and assumptions from theory, because other authors (Janmaat and Braun, 2009) see a link between support for the welfare state and material self-interest. In this case, selfinterest vested in concern for one’s family is linked with low support for the welfare state. The explanation is probably linked to increasing mistrust in the Romanian state and the operation of its institutions and political decision makers that has been documented by various investigations over the past few years.

The prospects for European solidarity Citizenship is sometimes seen as the battlefield on which issues of identity clash with issues of solidarity (Donati, 1995: 308). Solidarity is (or should be) intertwined with individuals’ identification with a political community.The next step in this analysis looked for differences in terms of the solidarity function of an individual’s identification as a citizen of his or her locality, region or country, a citizen of Europe or a citizen of the world. The dominant identifications in Romania are local (41.9%) and national (42.2%), with identification as a European citizen at the opposite end (3.7%) and the other two categories also placed at the lower end (5.1% regional, 4.8% world). Citizenship and political community are located at the national level (or within national

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boundaries), so we can expect solidarity also to be located at national level (see Keating, 2009: 504). When the respondents identify themselves as citizens of their locality or Romanian citizens, there is no significant departure from the solidarity patterns identified for the general population.The same three dimensions – concern for people, transnational solidarity focused on poorer countries and a tension between personal and institutionalised welfare – persist. Given their incidence in the population, differences in terms of solidarity for individuals identifying themselves primarily as citizens of their region, Europe or the world were impossible to test. The data does suggest an opening towards solidarity across borders, outside the boundaries of the state, but not a European solidarity. However, assuming that identification with a political community is a precondition for solidarity, the incidence of identification as European citizens does tell us something about the prospects for solidarity toward Europeans among Romanian citizens. Data collected soon after the 2009 European Parliament elections show that Romanians feel proud of their country’s accession in the EU, but also feel treated like secondclass citizens. Policies such as transitory restrictions on the freedom of movement, much debated in the Romanian media during 2008 and 2009, and the more recent discussions on the expulsion of Romanian citizens of Roma nationality from France probably help to aggravate this feeling.

Membership in trade unions and NGOs and feelings of solidarity in Romania The previous section identified the main dimensions of solidarity in Romania.The next step in this investigation is to assess whether there is a link between solidarity and membership of trade unions and NGOs. The data available to us do not allow for investigations/assumptions of causality but do enable us to tell whether effort should be put into more detailed investigations that would cover causality as well. Bivariate analysis (correlations) is used to assess the link between the different dimensions of solidarity as well as the link between these dimensions and membership in trade unions and NGOs. Data in Table 11.2 indicate that there is no significant relationship between NGO membership in Romania and any of the dimensions of solidarity identified. This piece of information tends, without bringing any decisive and systematic evidence, towards the assumption of Theiss-Morse and Hibbing (2005) that the homogeneity of NGOs is incompatible with a foundation for good citizenship (social aspects 203

Reinventing social solidarity across Europe Table 11.2: Solidarity and membership of trade unions and NGOs in Romania, 2009 Concern Transnational Selffor the solidarity interest well(oriented and lack being of towards of support other poorer for welfare people countries) state NGO membership (N = 1087)

Pearson

0.039

–0.033

0.016

Sig. (two-tailed)

0.201

 0.283

0.603

Trade union membership (N = 1083)

Pearson

0.001

 0.043

0.087**

Sig. (two-tailed)

0.961

 0.154

0.004

included).At the same time, it also indicates the need for a more detailed approach, because there may be a differentiation function of specific characteristics of these NGOs, in line with the findings by Uhlin (2009). There is a slight significant relationship between trade union membership and the third dimension of solidarity, self-interest and lack of support for the welfare state. A more detailed analysis, focusing on the two components of this dimension (support for the welfare state and concern for the well-being of one’s family), identified a significant difference between union members and non-union members in terms of support for the welfare state (t = 2.6, df = 1315, sig. two-tailed = 0.008, mean difference = 0.8 when equal variances are assumed, but there is a finding of significance by either variance assumption): trade union members tend to display more support for the welfare state. But this slight relationship is not enough for us to state a link between trade union membership and solidarity feelings in Romania. It is, however, enough to suggest further investigation into the attitudes and beliefs of trade union members in Romania.

Conclusion This chapter has aimed to explore the role played by trade unions and NGOs in the reinvention of solidarity in post-communist Romania. There are two possible ways in which these actors might contribute to channelling solidarity: upward, by influencing policy and the public agenda; and downward, by promoting democratic values among their membership. The latter is addressed in this chapter in a particular context marked, together with globalisation and EU integration, by the specifics of the revitalisation of post-communist trade unions, as well as by the patterns of a donor-driven process of NGO building. The definition of solidarity used here emphasises the feeling of concern for 204

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the well-being of other people as well as support for the welfare state. Accounting for the projected effects on solidarity of globalisation and (European) integration processes, the possible surge of a transnational component of solidarity is also explored. Twenty years after the fall of the communist regime, data suggest that, in terms of feelings of solidarity, the impact of the regime is still quite strong.The expectation was that dimensions of social solidarity would be identified in Romania (local, national, and global) similar to those identified by cross-national research. Instead, we found a concern for the welfare of other people outside one’s family, encompassing the local, national and global levels, and reminiscent of the global solidarity that was part of the rhetoric of any communist regime. Of course, within this dimension there are different degrees of concern, with the Roma, other ethnic minorities, or Europeans among the marginal categories. Striking, but unsurprising, is the low degree of concern with the welfare of the Roma. Use of the traditional solidarity scale employed in cross-national research would have omitted this very important piece of information and given a pretty undifferentiated view of the solidarity feelings of Romanian citizens.There are grounds for arguing that social solidarity is better assessed when a society’s critical social inclusion problems are reflected in the measurement.Another element suggesting the impact of the communist regime is evident from the low (as compared to other European countries) level of solidarity expressed toward one’s neighbours, which is certainly linked with a trust problem deriving from experience of the surveillance methods of the communist regime. Two other dimensions of social solidarity were identified: a tension between personal and institutionalised (state) welfare; and a transnational solidarity focused on poorer countries.The transnational dimension includes acceptance of immigration and support for Romania’s involvement in international aid and development and seems to be oriented strictly towards people and countries perceived as being poorer. It does not include an element of European solidarity, because ‘European’ is a term generally associated in Romanian public discourse with ‘better off ’, the ideal of wealth and development to which Romania aspires. The lack of a European dimension to the transnational solidarity feelings of Romanians must be linked with the issue of citizenship. The literature suggests that the Europeanisation of some social citizenship rights (Keating 2009), as well as the alterations of the boundaries of welfare (Ferrera, 2005), is a departure from the traditional linking of national identity and social solidarity. This does not seem to be happening in Romania, where local and 205

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national identifications are stronger and the incidence of transnational (European) ones is relatively low because Romanians tend to feel that they are treated as ‘second-class’ citizens. European solidarity is deeply linked to the difficult project of building a European citizenship outside the nation-state, but the EU is still a distant and hard-to-understand structure that it is unable to take the place of the nation-state. The last question posed in this chapter was related to the extent to which NGOs and trade unions influence their membership in terms of feelings of solidarity. Apparently they do not, because members of such organisations do not seem to be any different in terms of feelings of solidarity when compared to the general population. We were able to identify only a very weak linkage between trade union membership and support for the welfare state. While the upward effects of trade unions and NGOs in terms of influencing policy do not seem to be contested, we are doubtful about their downward effects. In a broader context, the fact that NGOs and trade unions do not seem to have any influence on their membership in terms of solidarity adds up to the findings which suggest that the role of CSOs in promoting democratic values should not be taken for granted, because it is highly dependent on their characteristics.

Notes 1 Research for this chapter was supported through the CNCSISUEFISCSU PNII-IDEI 2174/2008 grant for the Romanian Presidential Study 2009 project and is based on data collected jointly with the Soros Foundation Romania as part of its Electoral Reform and Electoral Studies project. The author wishes to thank Mr Ovidiu Voicu, programme manager at the Soros Foundation Romania, for facilitating access to the data. The term refers to very violent protest actions by Romanian miners which took place in Bucharest and were aimed at obtaining policy changes or simple material advantages from the political regime. In total five mineriade occurred between January 1990 and 1999.The term is frequently used to refer to the June 1990 mineriad, which involved the suppression by the miners of sit-in protests against the government elected in May 1990 and ended with seven dead and hundreds injured. 2

Principal components analysis, Varimax rotation with Kaiser normalisation, KMO = 0.871, Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity – Chi-square = 12679.832, df = 91, sig. = 0.000, total variance explained = 69.165%. 3

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All variables included are measured on a 0 to 10 scale. Factor loadings of less than 0.4 were excluded.

References Alexander, J. (2006) The civil sphere, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Banting, K. and Kymlicka,W. (eds) (2006) Multiculturalism and the welfare state: Recognition and redistribution in contemporary democracies, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Brodie, J. (2002) ‘Citizenship and solidarity: reflections on the Canadian Way’, Citizenship Studies, 6 (4) 377–94. Chebrea, G. (2005) ‘Social dialogue in Romania: from a forgotten tradition to a renewed practice’, South-East Europe Review for Labour and Social Affairs, 3: 41–6. Dahl, R.A. (1971) Polyarchy: Participation and opposition, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Delanty, G. (2007) ‘European citizenship: a critical assessment’, Citizenship Studies, 11: 63–72. Donati, P. (1995) ‘Identity and solidarity in the complex of citizenship: the relational approach’, International Sociology, 10 (3) 299–314. Ferrera, M. (2005) The boundaries of welfare: European integration and the new spatial politics of social protection, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Fisichella, D. (2000) S¸tiinţa politică. Probleme, concepte, teorii [Political science. Problems, concepts, theories], Chis¸inău: Universitatea de Stat din Moldova. Follesdal,A., Giorgi, L. and Heuberger, R. (2007) ‘Envisioning European solidarity between welfare ideologies and the European social agenda’, Innovation:The European Journal of Social Science Research, 20 (1) 75–89. Gallin, D. (2000) Trade unions and NGOs:A necessary partnership for social development, Geneva: UNRISD. Janmaat, J.G. and Braun, R. (2009) ‘Diversity and postmaterialism as rival perspectives in accounting for social solidarity’, International Journal of Comparative Sociology, 50 (1) 39–68. Kankaraš, M. and Moors, G. (2009) ‘Measurement equivalence in solidarity attitudes in Europe’, International Sociology, 24 (4) 557–79. Keating, M. (2009) ‘Social citizenship, solidarity and welfare in regionalised and plurinational states’, Citizenship Studies, 13 (5) 501–13. Linz, J. and Stepan, A. (1996) Problems of democratic transition and consolidation, Baltimore, MA: Johns Hopkins University Press. Meardi, G. (2007) ‘Multinationals in the new EU member states and the revitalisation of trade unions’, Debatte: Journal of Contemporary Central and Eastern Europe, 15 (2) 177–93. 207

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Poole, M. (1981) Theories of trade unionism:A sociology of industrial relations, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Scharpf, F.W. (2002) ‘The European social model’, JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, 40 (4) 645–70. Segall, S. (2005) ‘Political participation as an engine of social solidarity: a skeptical view’, Political Studies, 53: 362–78. Stjernø, S. (2004) Solidarity in Europe:The history of an idea, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Streeck, W. (1999) MPIfG Working Paper 99/8, Competitive solidarity: Rethinking the ‘European social model’, Cologne: Max-Planck-Institut für Gesellschaftsforschung.Available at: www.mpifg.de/pu/workpap/ wp99–8/wp99–8.html [accessed 7 March 2010]. Taylor-Gooby, P. (2004) ‘Open markets and welfare values: welfare values, inequality and social change in the silver age of the welfare state’, European Societies, 6 (1) 29–48. Theiss-Morse, E. and Hibbing, J.R. (2005) ‘Citizenship and civic engagement’, Annual Review of Political Science, 8 (1) 227–49. Trif,A. and Koch, K. (2005) MPIfG Working Paper 05/7, Strategic unionism in eastern Europe: The cse of Romania, Cologne: Max-Planck-Institut für Gesellschaftsforschung.Available at: www.mpifg.de/pu/workpap/ wp05–7/wp05–7.html [accessed 7 March 2010]. Uhlin, A. (2009) ‘Which characteristics of civil society organisations support what aspects of democracy? Evidence from post-communist Latvia’, International Political Science Review, 30 (3) 271–95. Van Deth, J.W. (1998) ‘Introduction: the impact of values’, in J.W.Van Deth and E. Scarbrough (eds) The impact of values, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp 1–19. Vasiliu, F. (2000) Sindicate ¸si sindicalis¸ti. O analiză sociologică a reconstrucţiei sindicalismului din România [Trade unions and trade union activists: A sociological view on the reconstruction of trade unionism in Romania], Sibiu: Editura Universităţii ‘Lucian Blaga’ din Sibiu. Warren, M. E. (2001) Democracy and association, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Warren, M.E. (2006) ‘Democracy and deceit: regulating appearances of corruption’, American Journal of Political Science, 50: 160–74, doi: 10.1111/j.1540-5907.2006.00176.x White, J. (2003) ‘Rethinking transnational solidarity in the EU’, Perspectives. Review of International Affairs, 20: 40–57.

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TWELVE

Social solidarity and preferences on welfare institutions across Europe Béla Janky

Introduction1 Old notions of solidarity face serious challenges in a transforming European Union (EU). Some developments in the current economic crisis highlight the increasing demand for Europe-wide social protection policies in a globalising economy.This, in itself, challenges the existing legal framework of the EU (Habermas, 2001; Scharpf, 2002). What is more, the very same developments (for example, increasing migration, enlargement of the EU, growing anxiety among the middle class), which call for a more encompassing concept of solidarity, are often blamed for the supposed erosion of once-solid traditional European principles of solidarity (Delanty, 2008). Among the above trends, the possible impacts of immigration and ethno-cultural heterogeneity on social solidarity have attracted much scholarly attention since the mid-1990s. This interest may have stemmed from accumulating evidence about US voters’ overwhelming hostility towards certain welfare transfers (for example, Gilens 1995). However, Alesina and Glaeser’s (2004) provocative hypothesis about a coming era of welfare state retrenchment, following mass immigration in Europe, prompted a new line of research on the other side of the Atlantic.2 Cross-country investigations of attitudes and welfare spending provide only scant evidence for the detrimental effect of heterogeneity on solidarity in Europe.3 Nonetheless, the question of the future of European solidarity is still open because recent findings on the moderate average influence of heterogeneity on attitudes may indicate upcoming changes in the political climate of some European countries (van der Waal, 2010). This chapter aims to contribute to the research on the reinvention of solidarity in Europe by presenting a fresh look at recent evidence 209

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on cross-country variance of articulation of social solidarity in attitudes towards social policy. We are particularly interested in the empirical base of any plea for more coordination in the social policy field in the EU (for example, Habermas, 2001; Scharpf, 2002). From this perspective, large cross-country differences in particular policy questions do not by themselves undermine the common ground for the development of a European concept of social solidarity. On the other hand, differences that are stable and coherent across issues and along cultural and institutional cleavages would question the efforts for more coordinated policy actions. Our point of departure for any comparison is institutional variance. Regime design appears to be both a consequence of popular attitudes4 and, at the same time, one of the factors that account for attitudes towards welfare (for example, Arts and Gelissen 2001). Cross-country differences in welfare regime characteristics are significant even within Europe. Esping-Andersen’s (1990) seminal study classified welfare regimes into three major categories, based primarily on the level of ‘decommodification’, that is, state interference in the market and competition.5 More recent analyses have, however, arrived at different conclusions in many respects, and the use of quantitative methods has not fostered consensus either.6 The past decade has, furthermore, seen the emphasis shift from traditional typologies to an exploration of variation (interpreted as a continuum), as measured by various indicators (for example, Scruggs and Allan 2006; Soede and Vrooman 2008). In the absence of an unequivocal regime typology, in what follows the countries will be grouped on the basis of traditional geocultural criteria (Southern Europe, the British Isles, Scandinavia, the post-socialist countries and continental Europe).7 We find that simple institutional or cultural explanations cannot account for the observed differences in raw distributions of survey responses among EU countries. First, the relative position of any country along the scale of decommodification attitudes may vary substantially from question to question. So a typical pattern of country ranking is not apparent, at least. Second, recent economic and political trends do seem to interfere, influencing attitudes on certain issues.Third, traces of institutional and cultural traditions appear in the variance of a composite indicator, but not as independent factors. We suggest that there is an interplay of the broader cultural and specific welfare institutional traditions. We analyse the data of some international surveys, including the WorldValues Survey (WVS) and the data collected for the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) surveys.The investigation is restricted 210

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to EU countries. Below, we look first at attitudes towards two general questions. Then we turn to preferences on decommodification of healthcare and education, following which we investigate opinions on the role of the state in business. The last issues that we analyse are the dilemmas of public spending in different areas. In this section, a composite indicator is introduced and intra-societal cleavages are also investigated. The last section is a short conclusion.

Attribution of success and the role of competition We start by discussing two issues concerning general principles rather than specific dilemmas in social policy. The fifth wave of the WVS looked at people’s opinions concerning the relationship between hard work, fate and success, on the one hand, and the desirability of competition (in general), on the other. Half of all respondents (and 74% of Finnish respondents) said that hard work usually brings success (values 1 to 4 on a 10-point scale), while barely a third (32%) of Polish respondents were of the same opinion (Figure 12.1).These two extremes do not match the pattern expected on the basis of differences between the welfare regimes (cf. Alesina and Glaeser, 2004). One possible framework for interpreting this result is the cultural contrast between the predominantly Protestant countries in the North-West, which adopted capitalism some time ago, and the Catholic countries of Europe, which tended to start their development later. In terms of the country-group means, the results correspond, by and large, to our expectations: support for work is highest in the Scandinavian countries (Finland and Sweden), followed by Great Britain. Lower down the scale we find the countries of continental Europe (France, the Netherlands and Germany) and those of Southern Europe (Cyprus, Italy and Spain), with no significant difference between the two group means. The cultural contrast between the North and the South would be even more clearly marked if we assigned France (where just 37% of the population believe in the value of hard work) to a ‘Latin–Greek’ grouping. The data from the post-socialist countries (Bulgaria, Poland, Hungary, Romania and Slovenia), however, are difficult to interpret in this framework: the Romanians, for instance, have roughly as much confidence (72%) in the rewards of hard work as do Finnish respondents, while only 45% of Dutch believe that hard work brings rewards. It seems reasonable to assume that, in addition to the cultural roots discussed above, attitudes are also influenced by personal experience and by people’s evaluation of their country, as shaped by the economic and social processes that occurred in the years preceding the survey. This 211

Reinventing social solidarity across Europe Figure 12.1: Hard work brings success – percentage of people who tend to agree with the statement 80 70 60 50 % 40 30 20 10 0

FI RO

SI ES UK SE DE EU BG HU NL CY FR

IT PL

Source: Author’s calculations based on WVS, wave 5, 2005. Notes: Percentage of respondents who chose values 1 to 4 on a 10-point scale in reply to the question: ‘Now I’d like you to tell me your views on various issues. How would you place your views on this scale? 1 means you agree completely with the statement on the left; 10 means you agree completely with the statement on the right; and if your views fall somewhere in between, you can choose any number in between.’ In the long run, hard work usually brings a better life

1

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Hard work doesn’t generally bring success – it’s more a matter of luck and connections

factor may have had an effect on the results observed in Finland (which recovered from the deep recession of the 1990s with unexpected speed and has been cited as an exemplar in several respects) and in Romania, which showed spectacular development as it approached EU accession. (It may also have influenced Slovenia and Spain, which display the next highest levels of support for hard work – 59% and 57%, respectively.)8 The figures concerning the utility of competition are less clearly structured than are the data on attitudes to hard work. Some 59% of the total sample of 14 countries approve of competition (they chose values of 1 to 4 on the 10-point scale). The highest levels of support are observed in Sweden (75%), Romania (74%) and Bulgaria (68%), while the lowest values are to be found among the French (41%), the Poles (46%) and the Dutch and Italians (50% each). In this case, 212

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regional-level cultural and institutional explanations are of little help in interpreting the data. It is possible that attitudes towards competition are also affected by recent – in this case institutional – changes. Neither the populations of the Scandinavian countries (where the welfare systems were successfully configured through a reform process incorporating certain market principles) nor those of the post-socialist countries of the Balkans region (where market reforms have been implemented more recently) have any old prejudices or recent negative experiences that might feed scepticism about competition.

Decommodification of healthcare and education Moving on to preferences regarding social policy, we find a different pattern of response.The ISSP survey of 1999 included two questions on the issue of whether it is fair that rich people can buy better healthcare and educational services. The responses to these questions (from a slightly different sample of countries) show a better match with the regional – cultural and institutional – cleavages. Looking at the whole sample, 28% of the population were willing to accept privileged access to healthcare, and the same proportion felt this way about educational services (choosing values of 1 to 3 on a fivepoint scale) (Figure 12.2).The substantial variation across the countries, however, shows slightly different patterns for the two questions. By far the highest level of support for the commercialisation of these services (62%) is to be observed in Great Britain. The post-socialist countries come next, with the (according to the WVS figures) market-sceptic Poland (together with Latvia) in the lead. In six of the seven postsocialist countries, the commercialisation of healthcare receives more support than in any EU15 country other than Great Britain.The only post-socialist country that shows as little support for differentiated access as most of the EU15 states is Hungary. We may assume that the strong market preference among the post-socialist countries is explained by people’s dissatisfaction with the public services inherited from the socialist regimes. It is difficult to compare the continental, Southern and Northern European regions, as only a single Scandinavian country is included in the survey and, of the three southern countries (Cyprus, Portugal, Spain), Portugal produces outlying figures of opposing directions for the two questions (8% support commercialisation in healthcare and 31% in education). Whereas in each EU15 country that participated in the survey the commercialisation of education receives at least as much support as differentiated healthcare, in the post-socialist region there is not a single country where privileged 213

Reinventing social solidarity across Europe Figure 12.2: Proportion of people supporting the commercialisation of healthcare and educational services, by country 70 Health

60

Education

50 40 %

30 20 10 0

GB LV PL SK SI EU BG CZ SE DE CY AT PT HU ES FR

Source: author’s calculations, based on ISSP (1999) data. Notes: Percentage of people choosing values 1 to 3 on a five-point scale. The countries are arranged in decreasing order by the sum of the two percentages. The questions: ‘A) Is it just or unjust – right or wrong – that people with higher incomes can buy better healthcare than people with lower incomes? ‘B) Is it just or unjust – right or wrong – that people with higher incomes can buy better education for their children than people with lower incomes?’

access to education is more popular than a market-based approach to health services. The reason behind this pattern may be rooted in the different organisation of health and education services under state socialism and the market economies.

The state in the business It is not only public services where restrictions on market processes and competition may be desirable. In modern welfare states, the business world is also under strong state control. The WVS of 1999 includes two contrasting statements regarding the relationship between the state and the economy: the state should give more (or, on the contrary, less) freedom to companies. Some 61% of Swedes and 59% of Austrians said that companies should have more rather than less freedom (they chose values of 1 to 4 on a 10-point scale) (Figure 12.3). This attitude is shared by only 15% of Latvian and Slovak respondents. On average, increased freedom in the world of business receives more support among the countries of continental Europe than in the group of Anglo-Saxon 214

0

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Source: author’s calculations based on the WVS, wave 4 (1999) data. Notes: Percentage of people choosing values 1 to 4 on a 10-point scale. The question: ‘Now, I’d like you to tell me your views on various issues. How would you place your views on this scale? 1 = The state should give more freedom to firms. 10 = The state should control firms more effectively.’

%

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Figure 12.3: Proportion of people who tend to agree with the statement ‘The state should give more freedom to companies’, by country

Preferences on welfare institutions

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countries, and the populations of the Scandinavian countries are the most likely to approve of a shift towards more liberal economic policy. The highest proportion of people who favour more rather than less state control in the business sector is to be found among the people of the post-socialist countries.The results therefore suggest that, in the post-socialist countries, public dissatisfaction with public services has the effect of increasing the acceptability of market solutions, while people’s reservations about private sector actors serve to increase the popularity of state control (cf Figures 12.2 and 12.3). In the fifth wave of WVS questionnaires, 11 of the current EU member states included a question concerning people’s preferences on the matter of the share of private ownership, or of state ownership, being increased in the economy. Across the 11 countries, an average of 37% of respondents favoured the growth of private ownership (choosing values of 1 to 4 on a 10-point scale). The cross-country differences show a pattern that differs from those observed for the questions discussed above: it seems closest to the results of the question on the worth of hard work. Privatisation receives the highest level of support among Romanian (52%), Finnish (45%), Swedish (42%) and Slovenian (42%) respondents.The countries with the least support for private ownership are Poland (19%), Hungary (24%) and Spain (29%). Recent successful or promising changes in the economy or in economic policies as possible reasons for cross-country differences have already been mentioned in connection with the questions discussed above.We also find some inconsistencies, however: Bulgarian respondents, for instance, are more opposed to privatisation than the average European, even though they are among the most committed supporters of market competition. Spaniards have confidence in the rewards of hard work, but are somewhat less keen on competition than average, and on the matter of privatisation, their relative position moves further towards statism. The 2006 ISSP survey includes a section of six questions on the role of the state in the business world. The first question approaches the issue indirectly, enquiring about cutting public expenditure. The remaining items are direct questions on government measures in support of the economy: specifically, the financing of projects aimed at job creation, greater control over business activities, support for research and development (R&D), aiding declining industries and regulating (reducing) the working week. The share of those who oppose government intervention varies greatly across the different areas: two-thirds of respondents chose to reduce government expenditure, but only 17% were against the financing of job-creation programmes. Besides cuts in government 216

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spending, another popular policy is deregulation (53% in favour) – as long as the question is worded in general terms. Among the more specific intervention measures, a reduction in the working week in an effort to create jobs is unpopular (59% against); while support for R&D is as popular as investment (only 17% are against). We also find substantial differences from country to country: cuts in government spending, for instance, are supported by 29% of Finnish respondents but 95% of Latvians. Looking at job-creation investments, pro-market attitudes are displayed by 4% of the Spanish population but 32% of German respondents. The complex relationship patterns across the issues and countries studied remain opaque – even after the respondents’ latent motivations are revealed, using mathematical and statistical methods.9 An examination of the cross-country differences in the average numbers of pro-market responses, however, uncovers some interesting patterns. The Czech, Dutch and German respondents oppose government intervention in the highest number of areas, while the most committed supporters of government intervention are the Portuguese, the Irish and the Spanish. At first sight, it seems surprising that Germany is followed by France in the list of pro-market countries, and the three countries at the bottom of the rankings are directly preceded by Great Britain. Individual post-socialist countries are scattered along the line, with large gaps between them.

Public expenditure Returning to public services, the above survey also included questions on the areas in which the respondents expected more government spending. The eight budget items given in the questionnaire emerge in remarkably similar preference order among the populations of the various European countries. Healthcare, education and old age pensions are the top priorities. These are followed by spending on the environment, law enforcement and culture. The least popular areas of spending are unemployment benefits and defence. There are few differences of any note between the orderings produced by the various countries. Law enforcement ranks second in Sweden, while a considerable proportion of Finns say that spending should be increased in various areas other than the education system. While there are no notable differences within Europe in the level of support shown for individual items relative to other items, the frequency of pro-spending responses varies a great deal from country to country. In France, 42% of respondents would not like to see increased spending 217

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in more than two areas, and only 6% approve of more spending in at least six of the eight areas (Figure 12.4). In both Portugal and Spain, by contrast, only 7% of the population support more spending in fewer than three areas, while 51% would be willing to increase at least six items of expenditure.The data displayed in Figure 12.4 are very similar in structure to those involving the restriction of business activities (cf. Figure 12.2). After the responses were summed within individual sections and factor analyses run, the 14 items of the above section were used to create a ‘Redistributive Attitude Index’ as suggested by Tóth (2008a, 2008b).10 The index shows the strength of people’s preference for government responsibility. In the following figures, a higher index value indicates a stronger preference for government intervention or redistribution. (Increased) government intervention encounters the highest levels of resistance in the Netherlands, the Czech Republic and France (Figure 12.5). Ireland, Spain, Poland and Portugal are the countries where the Figure 12.4: Percentage of people supporting increased budget spending in various areas, by country

max. 2

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Source: Author’s calculations based on the ISSP (2006) data. Note: The countries are arranged in decreasing order, by the share of respondents supporting an increase in no more than two items of spending. The question was as follows: ‘Listed below are various areas of government spending. Please show whether you would like to see more or less government spending in each area. Remember that if you say much more, it might require a tax increase to pay for it.’ The areas were: the environment, health, the police and law enforcement, education, the military and defence, old age pensions, unemployment benefits, culture and the arts.

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Preferences on welfare institutions Figure 12.5: Redistributive Attitude Index – the level of support for government intervention, by country 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 –1 –2 –3 –4 –5

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EU UK FI DK SE DE FR CZ NL

Source: Author’s calculations based on the ISSP (2006) data. Note: A higher index value indicates a stronger preference for government intervention or redistribution.

state is expected to play an increased role. One possible explanation is that the results reflect discrepancies between the institutional system and cultural traditions. Extensive government responsibility tends to be most vigorously opposed in countries where strong civil traditions are coupled with a wide-ranging and moderately reformed welfare regime. The highest level of support, by contrast, tends to be seen in countries where a relatively limited state sits over a society that is accustomed to more traditional values of solidarity. Those patterns may have significant implications within the current economic crisis because many of the countries aspiring to the state’s playing an increased role are states that are more vulnerable to the recent economic crisis. This may mean that they require an economic bailout package with austerity measures attached. This would seem to be in opposition to public attitudes that support more state intervention. A further question that is explored here is the within-society variation in attitudes towards different issues – that is, the contribution of gender, age, educational level and labour-market status to differences in respondents’ preferences. The different societies of Europe are characterised by varying levels of political and economic division, and the various welfare regimes differ in their degree of success in creating a consensus among groups with conflicting interests.To make matters 219

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worse, new cleavages may be triggered by recent major reforms and fast-paced social transformations. In what follows, two issues will be analysed: attitudes towards the value of work, and preferences for government spending.The two main conclusions drawn from the data are: first, that there is less variation between major social groups than there is between different societies; and second, that the cross-country differences in cleavages show no well-structured pattern. It is clear from the figures that there is no difference between generations in terms of their attitude towards work. It is certainly not the case that younger generations have abandoned the fatalist attitude of the previous generations of Europeans. In most countries, the group most likely to see work as a path to success is the oldest cohort. In Cyprus, those over 65 years of age are 44 percentage points more likely to stress the importance of work than is the most worksceptic generation of 35- to 49-year-olds. No similar gap can be found, however, in the other countries (although a difference of 31 percentage points is observed in Italy and 28 percentage points in Poland). A more surprising result is that no major cleavage emerges between the educated and the uneducated in most countries. Nonetheless, British graduates are considerably more likely to have confidence in the rewards of work than are uneducated Britons. It is somewhat unexpected, however, that among the Polish population the share of uneducated people who value hard work is significantly higher than the corresponding proportion of graduates (33%, as against 21%). The differences observed between the various groups defined by labour-market status are no more substantial. Although in Bulgaria entrepreneurs are 40 percentage points more likely to have confidence in work than the inactive population, the other countries do not display differences of this magnitude. Furthermore, inactive Dutch respondents see more sense in hard work than do their entrepreneurial compatriots (40%, as against 32%). The divergence in preferences related to government expenditure is measured here using the Redistributive Attitude Index, calculated from the 2006 ISSP database and controlling for random variation observed for individual questions.The index reveals clearer patterns than do the responses to the individual questions in isolation. The mean values of the index show more substantial cross-society variation than within-society variation between the major social groups. We also see that, on the whole, intra-societal cleavages tend to be stronger wherever there is a higher degree of opposition to government intervention. This pattern surfaces most clearly in the difference between the genders (Figure 12.6). Men are more cautious 220

Preferences on welfare institutions Figure 12.6: Redistributive Attitude Index – differences between men and women, by country 8 6 4 2 0 –2 –4 –6

IE

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PT HU LV

SI

UK

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DK SE DE FR CZ NL

Source: Author’s calculations based on the ISSP (2006) data. Note: A higher index value indicates a stronger preference for government intervention or redistribution.

about government intervention in all the countries, but the difference is greatest in Sweden, the Netherlands and the Czech Republic. The difference between men and women is roughly similar to the variation across age groups. This indicates that there is no major generation gap with respect to attitudes towards the welfare institutions in Europe. We nevertheless find greater than usual variation in the post-socialist countries: younger people are less supportive of state intervention than are older people. The education-based cleavages are somewhat more substantial. The largest intra-societal differences are observed across different labour-market groups. The societies of Portugal, Hungary and Spain are not divided along this dimension (Figure 12.7). In Sweden, Denmark and the Netherlands, however, the self-employed are far less supportive of government responsibility than is the inactive population, for instance. With the exception of Ireland, a higher-than-average level of support for state intervention is accompanied by a greater-than-average degree of variation across groups of different economic status.

221

Reinventing social solidarity across Europe Figure 12.7: Redistributive Attitude Index – differences between the self-employed/entrepreneurs and the inactive population, by country 8 6 4 2 0 –2 –4 –6 –8

IE

ES

PL

PT HU

SI

UK

FI

DK

SE

DE

FR

CZ NL

Source: Author’s calculations based on the ISSP (2006) data. Note: A higher index value indicates a stronger preference for government intervention or redistribution. No data available for Latvia.

Conclusions This chapter has looked at people’s attitudes towards government intervention. In the welfare states of Europe, there is a fairly high level of support for government control. Our analyses have shown, however, that the level of support is not uniform across Europe and across the issues related to welfare institutions. The starting-points for our analysis were the typologies of European welfare regimes and the differences between the cultural and political traditions of the various regions. One of the most important conclusions of our study is that these factors alone are of little help in interpreting the cross-country differences in attitudes. First, the data suggest that the cross-country variation in the responses to individual questions may be explained by a distinct set of factors in each case. Consequently, the relative position of a country along the scale of public versus market solutions may vary substantially, depending on the individual question. Moreover, in addition to relatively long-standing cultural and institutional traditions, it is also worth considering the implications of the recent economic and political processes as potential explanatory factors, such as European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF Framework 222

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Agreement, 2010). It has a budget of about €440 billion to assist countries out of indebtedness. In this respect, even our fairly recent data may be outdated because the current economic crisis may have significantly reshaped attitude patterns across Europe. The above findings may support the view that Eurosceptic claims about the lack of any common ground for a Europe-wide social policy framework are unfounded and based on misinterpretation of cross-country polls. However, the effects of the institutional and cultural traditions surface more clearly in the cross-country pattern of the generalised Redistributive Attitude Index, which underlies the preferences shown for individual questions. These traditions are not reflected in a single uniform indicator – what we find instead is an interplay of the broader cultural and specific welfare institutional traditions. Some countries with strong civil traditions have developed welfare regimes that are overly ‘mature’ for their cultural attitudes and are therefore relatively unpopular. Other countries are in the opposite position: their welfare states are ‘underdeveloped’ relative to the preferences of the population. The ambiguous evidence calls for a new generation of cross-country surveys that address explicitly the emerging social policy dilemmas of the increasingly interlinked European societies.

Notes 1 Remarks and suggestions by the editor of this volume are gratefully acknowledged. The chapter is based on an earlier analysis of welfare attitudes for the European Social Report of TÁRKI Social Research Institute (Janky, 2009; see also Albert and Dávid, 2009; Lelkes, 2009). I am grateful for helpful comments on an earlier version of the paper by István György Tóth, Endre Sik and the participants in the ‘Societal culture and economic development’ conference in Budapest, 12 October 2009. I am indebted to Tamás Keller, who gathered the databases for the analysis, and to Anna Babarczy, who provided the English version of my first report on the issue. The author’s work was supported by research grant OTKA K-76223. Peter Taylor-Gooby (2006) presented one of the first direct reactions to the hypothesis. For the most recent findings see: Bang Petersen et al (2010), Mau and Burkhardt (2010) and Van der Waal et al (2010). 2

For example, Soroka et al (2004), Finseraas (2008), Mau and Burkhardt (2010). See Stichnoth and Van der Straeten (2009) for a review. 3

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For an overview of the literature on policy responsiveness, see Brooks and Manza (2006). 4

The three groups are liberal, conservative and social democratic.The countries of Southern Europe were assigned a special status, and the (post-)socialist societies were not included at all in Esping-Andersen’s typology. 5

For an overview of the research findings for the first decade following the publication of Esping-Andersen (1990), see Arts and Gelissen (2002). 6

There is, in fact, a typology of European welfare systems that essentially corresponds to our classification (Bonoli, 1997). 7

One should note that our data do not reflect the most recent trends. The current economic crisis, along with the austerity measures and public debates on neoliberal principles that have followed it in some countries, may have reshaped attitude patterns across Europe. 8

The most important factors behind the responses can do no more than distinguish questions based on their wording; it is difficult to find a substantive interpretation for them. 9

We are grateful to István György Tóth for making the computation algorithm available. 10

References Albert, F. and Dávid, B. (2009) ‘Individual versus government responsibility’, in I. Gy Tóth (ed) European Social Report 2009, Budapest: TÁRKI, pp 31–47. Alesina,A. and Glaeser, E.L. (2004) Fighting poverty in the US and Europe, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Arts, W. and Gelissen, J. (2001) Welfare states, solidarity and justice principles: does the type really matter?’, Acta Sociologica, 44 (4) 283–99. Arts, W. and Gelissen, J. (2002) ‘Three worlds of welfare capitalism or more? A state-of-the-art report’, Journal of European Social Policy, 12 (2) 137–58. Bonoli, G. (1997) ‘Classifying welfare states: a two-dimension approach’, Journal of Social Policy, no 26, pp 351–72.

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Brooks, C. and Manza, J. (2006) ‘Social policy responsiveness in developed democracies’, American Sociological Review, 71 (3) 474–94. Brooks, C. and Manza, J. (2007) Why welfare states persist, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Delanty, G. (2008) ‘Fear of others: social exclusion and the European crises of solidarity’, Social Policy and Administration, 42 (6) 676–69. EFSF Framework Agreement (2010) Luxembourg, 7 June 2010. Esping-Andersen, G. (1990) The three worlds of welfare capitalism, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Finseraas, H. (2008) ‘Immigration and preferences for redistribution: an empirical analysis of European survey data’, Comparative European Politics, 6 (4) 407–31. Gilens, M. (1995) ‘Racial attitudes and opposition to welfare’, Journal of Politics, 57: 994–1014. Habermas, J. (2001) ‘Why Europe needs a constitution’, New Left Review, 11: 5–26. Janky, B. (2009) ‘State and market’, in I. Gy Tóth (ed) European Social Report 2009, Budapest: TÁRKI, pp 49–61. Lelkes, O. (2009) ‘Attitudes to inequality’, in I. Gy Tóth (ed) European Social Report 2009, Budapest: TÁRKI, pp 17–30. Mau, S. and Burkhardt, C. (2009) ‘Migration and welfare state solidarity in Western Europe’, Journal of European Social Policy, 19 (3) 213–29. Petersen, B., Slothuus, R., Stubager, R. and Togeby, L (2010) ‘Deservingness versus values in public opinion on welfare: The automaticity of the deservingness heuristic’, European Journal of Political Research, 50: 24–52. Sharpf, F.W. (2002) ‘The European social model: coping with the challenges of diversity’, JCMS, 40 (4) 645–70. Scruggs, L. and Allan, J. (2006) ‘Welfare-state decommodification in 18 OECD countries: a replication and revision’, Journal of European Social Policy, 16 (1) 55–72. Soede,A. and Vrooman, C. (2008) ‘A comparative yypology of pension regimes’, Enepri Research Report, No 54, April, Brussels. Soroka, S.N., Johnston, R. and Banting, K. (2004) ‘Ethnicity, trust, and the welfare state’, in P. Van Par1/4s (ed) Cultural diversity versus economic solidarity, Brussels: De Boeck. Stichnoth, H. and Van der Straeten, K. (2009) Ethnic diversity and attitudes towards redistribution: A literature review, Discussion Paper No. 09-036. Mannheim: Centre for European Economic Research. Taylor-Gooby, P. (2005) ‘Is the future American? Can left politics preserve European welfare states from erosion through growing “racial diversity”?’, Journal of Social Policy, 34 (4) 661–73. 225

Tóth, I.G. (2008a) Tolerance of inequalities and the demand for redistribution, Paper presented at 38th IIS World Congress, Budapest, 26–29 June 2008. Tóth, I.G. (2008b) ‘The demand for redistribution: a test on Hungarian data’, Czech Sociological Review, 44 (6) 491–509 Van der Waal, J. (2010) Stedelijke economieën in een tijd van mondialisering. Arbeidsmarktkansen en etnocentrisme van laaggeschoolden in Nederlandse steden, Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press. Van der Waal J. et al (2010) ‘“Some are more equal than others”: economic egalitarianism and welfare chauvinism in the Netherlands’, European Journal of Social Policy, 20: 350-63.

THIRTEEN

Social solidarity, human rights and Roma: unequal access to basic resources in Central and Eastern Europe Richard Filcˇák and Daniel Škobla

Introduction Inhabitants regularly, especially in the summer time, suffer from lack of water and they usually travel to the cooperative farm for water, carrying it back to their houses.This is labor usually performed by women and children.They often take water from streams in the forest, which is of doubtful quality, especially after the rains when the streams contain mud and the water is of yellow or brown color. (Filčák, 2007) The continuing presence of unequal access to basic resources1 and widespread socio-economic inequalities in Europe works against the achievement of social solidarity and integration across European societies (Bulpett, 2002; Madanipour et al, 2005; Filčák, 2007). Conversely, it may also be argued that the displacement of ‘social solidarity’ in favour of ‘democracy’ within European integrationist discourse has contributed to the partial eclipse of human rights approaches focusing on ‘equality’ and ‘social inclusion’ within public policy rationales. Previous work has clearly revealed linkages between social inequality and exclusion, and social integration (Barry, 1998; Popay et al, 2006).The examination of social solidarity implies studying processes of integration, or the degree and types of social interactions present within society. In this chapter, attention is focused on governmental actions influencing living conditions and social differences within society.There are several ways in which governments can influence social differences, cohesion, inequalities and relational levels of social solidarity in society. It can be done via economic policies (such as capital accumulation, 227

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investments), fiscal policies (such as taxation) and public policies (such as social and welfare policies), or via the building of legal frameworks such as anti-discrimination policies. For the sake of clear argument, in what follows we abstract from an analysis of the general economic and fiscal attributes of the functioning of society and their link with cohesion or inequalities, and focus our attention on public policies and the way they influence the integration or division of society. We assume that public, especially social, policies in any country may tend to be either residual or universalistic. In reality, the situation is always a mix of these ideal types because, in order to gain support among the broad public that is targeted, social policies are often based on a universal system of social protection (CoE, 2001). However, basic features of how these policies are arranged and towards which ideal type they incline are clearly recognisable. Access to a clean and safe environment is significantly influenced by the social and economic characteristics of households, and poverty increases the risk of exposure to pollution or to natural dangers such as floods (Filčák, 2007; Steger et al, 2007). Previous research has identified increasing disparities in access to important resources for daily living when a higher proportion of income has to be spent on water, gas and electricity, thus decreasing the marginal utility of income (Filadelfiová, Gerbery and Škobla, 2007; Filčák, 2010a). The continuing impacts of economic crises amplify these trends, providing a focal area of public policy concern within Europe.With the liberalisation and privatisation of water and energy markets, there have been significant changes in tariffs. Hence, problems related to access to basic resources arise, as a form of poverty and social exclusion resulting from a combination of complex institutional and structural challenges. Barriers to access to these basic resources are a significant problem for marginalised ethnic groups. This chapter draws upon research and data from Central and Eastern Europe, and Slovakia in particular, to highlight the need for approaches to overcoming these barriers that embed notions of social solidarity within public policy discourse and rationale. We define social solidarity as a set of policy principles and measures within the public sphere that aim to redistribute accumulated wealth and enable distribution of basic resources by securing access to them and equalising the positions of different groups. First, we evaluate the content of the relevant documents on policy action to support the ethnic Roma minority in general and its access to water and a clean environment in particular. Second, the chapter provides empirical facts on the living conditions of the Roma minority population, a group affected by multiple exclusions and poverty. In this section we describe 228

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the Roma’s access to basic resources such as potable water and a safe living environment free from dangers (for example, floods, toxins).We have selected the Roma population as the subject of our analysis in order to test the cultural diversity argument, which holds that society hesitates to support redistributive policies if it considers the recipients to be outsiders and not of their own ethnic or cultural origin.2 The situation of the Roma in Central and Eastern Europe, in our opinion, can be viewed as an example of lack of social solidarity and that of breakdown in the European approach to social integration.Thus, while the general goal of this analysis is to shed light on solidarity in the public policy sphere on the matter of access to natural resources, the specific goal is to investigate the extent to which social solidarity principles are shaping the living conditions of this most excluded group. Many authors have already observed that there is a dynamic of social development in the Central European region in which poverty correlates with ethnic marginalisation and exclusion (for example, Barany, 1994, 1998; Emigh and Szelenyi, 2001; Szelenyi, 2001; Varmeersch, 2003). Thus, the case of the Roma population in Slovakia provides a good opportunity to analyse ideas about solidarity in the realm of public policy. The next part of this chapter introduces and discusses the theoretical framework of our approach. The aim is to identify how solidarity is understood and to assess the relevance of the notion of solidarity. In the third part we build on available empirical data about the living conditions of the Roma population in Slovakia in order to identify and describe differences in access to basic resources along ethnic lines and elevate the issue of solidarity and inequality to the perspective of human rights.This perspective, in our opinion, provides a viable frame of reference for the solution of the problems that we describe, not only conceptually but also in the realm of practical policies.

Theoretical framework Our assumption is as follows: contemporary interventionist social policies within the EU member countries can be understood as a safeguard against the eruption of conflicts that are innate to the capitalist mode of production.3 In essence, state interventions in contemporary societies are responses to the contradictions of economic processes. Thus, we may understand the role of the interventionist state as being to contain conflicts and keep them latent, through the mechanism of a range of policies. Emil Durkheim claims that solidarity existed even before ‘social contracts’ came into being and that society is based on a collective 229

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ethic, and not on rational self-interest. As members of society, people have a collective consciousness, a sense of belonging to a community and a feeling of moral obligation that complies with societal demands. Thus, solidarity in the Durkheimian tradition is understood as social ties, forms of gathering, cohesion and integration in society (Durkheim, 1997; Kusa and Kostlán, 2009). Theorists in the neo-Marxist tradition state further that there are substantial differences in power among the various groups in society and that this division leads to inequalities (pace Wright Mills, 2000). Factors such as class, gender and ethnicity are of major importance in this respect (Wallerstein, 1997, 2005). Smith and Laitinen (2009), in their analyses of the works and writings of Charles Taylor, summarised three main contexts in which to understand solidarity. The first concerns the political allegiance of the citizens of democratic states. This is the kind of solidarity that is required to hold together regimes that view themselves as selfgoverning liberal democracies. The second concerns the union of the members of a particular social world as beneficiaries of and contributors to the common good of a particular society. The third concerns the moral ties that bind all human beings together as part of humanity, or what binds the universal, boundary-less community of moral subjects (Smith and Laitinen, 2009). In their recent publication,Wilkinson and Pickett (2009) illustrate just how long the issue of inequality has been recognised.The demand for liberty, equality and fraternity appeared during the French Revolution, while fraternity, a desire for greater mutuality and reciprocity, is reflected in social relations and solidarity today. Large inequalities produce all the problems associated with social differences and the prejudices that go with them, and also weaken community life, reduce trust and increase violence (Wilkinson and Pickett, 2009). Solidarity as expressed through redistribution is not an act of mercy or justice, but more a tool of selfdefence to mitigate latent conflicts in capitalistic societies.4 Factors such as class or ethnicity and their impacts on solidarity have been at the core of many theoretical and research approaches (Alesina and Glaeser, 2004; Goodhart, 2004; Taylor-Gooby, 2005). Some investigations into the classic problem of the formation and maintenance of social solidarity within differentiated social structures suggest that agreements on issues, objectives and standards (related to solidarity action) are based on networks of interpersonal ties that link actors in different parts of the social structure and on the flows of information and influence within these networks (Bourgeois and Friedkin, 2001). Sabbagh (2003) points out that social solidarity is also

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important for distributive justice. In the absence of solidarity, we may face unequal opportunities and differentiated access to natural resources. Many emphasise that solidarity should be based not on charity but on effective welfare policies implemented within a framework of strong enforcement of human rights and principles of non-discrimination. As Galeano (2000) puts it, unlike solidarity, which is horizontal and occurs between equals, charity is top-down, humiliates those who receive it and never challenges the implicit power relations. According to Wilensky (1975), the (minimum) standard of living assured as a social right – not as charity – is central to comprehending the notion of the welfare state. Power relations and access to decision making are at the core of inequalities.Any meaningful solidarity might therefore be encompassed by rights, participation and access. Although, solidarity is often seen by its critics as liability, it is also an important asset that protects society from disintegration and anomie, and facilitates the use of human resources that would otherwise be lost.Wilkinson and Pickett (2009) emphasise that reducing inequality is the best way of improving the quality of the social environment, and so the real quality of life (p 29). ‘The best way of responding to the harm done by high levels of inequality would be reduced inequality itself … Far from being inevitable and unstoppable, the sense of deterioration in social well-being and the quality of social relations in society is reversible’ (pp 31–2). According to structuralist theory, because of its necessity, solidarity gradually becomes institutionalised (Kritikos et al, 2007); and solidarity arises from the sharing of common material interests, as within social classes (Hechter, 2001). Kritikos et al (2007) define solidarity as a process by which an individual in a group contributes to a series of actions aimed at a reallocation of scarce resources. Yet, they amplify that willingness to contribute is mainly influenced by the efficiency of the objective of the solidarity action, and is enhanced by feelings of mutual exchange (solidarity) within a group. Film-maker Andrzej Wajda’s Man of Iron, a semi-documentary shot on location at the Gdańsk shipyard and showing the Solidarity labour movement and its initial successes at the height of the strikes during summer 1980 is most telling. From the interviews with the shipyard workers it can be seen that the class-felt alienation from the state resulted from three interwoven reasons: (i) a (perceived) low standard of living; (ii) the restriction of basic freedoms – mainly freedom of religion; and (iii) the existence of social inequalities. The third reason is recurrent in the interviews.5 This historical context is important for

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understanding the present redistribution policies and perception of solidarity in Central Europe. Some important new factors entered the picture during the 1990s. First was the rather dominant position in public discourse of the neoclassical perspective on economic and social policies. Second, the EU policy framework became the most important factor in the formulation of national policies (see, for example, Atkinson, 2002; Atkinson et al, 2004).This EU policy framework has been dominated by the European Commission’s (EC) thinking on social cohesion (see for example, Józef Niżnik, Chapter Two, this volume). Experience from Spain and Ireland suggests that there were some positive redistributive effects under the EU policy framework, as well as growth; but national, institutional and political configurations determine the distinctive outcome (Farrell, 2004). We will now analyse key public policy documents developed under the EU policy framework.

Analyses of public policy documents There are many ways in which governments influence solidarity, cohesion and inequalities in society. In this section we focus on a review of public policies, or more precisely, a review of the basic documents on which these policies are based in areas such as welfare, environment, EU funds absorption and cross-sectoral policies. In all sector areas we pay special attention to measures and provisions on Roma-related issues and we use social solidarity as a set of principles and measures.Thus, focusing on the policy documents in Slovakia we consider their relevance for understanding solidarity, the redistribution of basic commodities and the use of basic resources. The political landscape in Slovakia (as in all the new member states in Central and Eastern Europe) has been decisively influenced by the EU enlargement and integration process. Since the beginning of the 1990s – and more importantly, during the pre- and post-accession period – the EU integration framework has become a key determinant and the single most important driver in the development of new EU policies (see, for example, Barnes and Barnes, 1999; Jordan, 2005).6 These economic and social cohesion policies are supported by substantial financial resources, estimated to be €11.588 billion net between 2007 and 2013, and the subject of political disputes and differing group interests.These policies are expected to comply with the EC’s requirements (and also, indirectly, its values and practices) and are endorsed by the EC’s beliefs on how the economy should be arranged and what the attributes of social cohesion, as promoted by the EC, should be. 232

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Most of public policy documents that we analyse were developed within the framework of the EC’s requirements, via the means of acquis communautaire transposition, the Open Method of Coordination (OMC), or via the use of other instruments. The documents that we analyse include the Slovak National Sustainable Development Strategy (NSDS) and the main programming policy documents for the formulation and implementation of EU cohesion. In what follows, we try to identify an organising unit in the discourse of the public policy documents selected for analysis.We analyse these texts from two perspectives: (i) whether the policies are focused on and deal explicitly with the notion of solidarity, and, if not, (ii) what the most often used ‘derivative’ notions are and how these notions are operationalised.We pay most attention to the references to Roma communities. The Slovak National Sustainable Development Strategy (2001) is seen by some as a genuine attempt to formulate national priorities and policies – done with reference to the EU framework, but bottom-up and independently of EU legal requirements (Filčák, 2007).The NSDS was purposely developed as a document on which the most important subsequent social, environmental and development policies generally were to be based. Solidarity is mentioned explicitly as one of the key principles of sustainable development.Within the NSDS two criteria are listed for solidarity: (i) implementation of tolerance and understanding; (ii) support for mutual help and co-responsibility. The NSDS further mentions solidarity among the population as one of the fundamental values in the pursuit of sustainable development. Among the priorities is the need for action in ‘social policy leading to increased individual participation and responsibility of citizens, accepting principles of social solidarity and preventing social disadvantaging, respectively exclusion and poverty’ (p 16). Thus, solidarity is understood here as an ethical or moral issue. However, there is a missing link between the norm of solidarity and more concrete proposals on how to achieve it. Specific items relate to how the NSDS addresses problems faced by the Roma ethnic minority. It fails to recognise the inequalities in society and how are they reflected vis-à-vis the environment, basic commodities and the distribution of natural resources. The National Strategy Report on Social Protection and Social Inclusion 2008–2010 (NSRSPSI), a basic reporting framework in the field of social inclusion, does not explicitly mention the word ‘solidarity’. On the other hand, the report’s introduction calls for ‘the intensified effort to raise the visibility of the EU’s social values’ – without, however, operationalising what these values stand for (p 5). Generally, throughout the NSRSPSI report archetypal tenets of neoliberal thought 233

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are declared, stating that social protection systems and social inclusion policies can ‘contribute essentially to the employment growth and to the sustainable economic growth, … based on the growth of productivity and on competitiveness as a pre-condition of sustainability of social protection systems and social inclusion policies’ (p 5). The ‘modernisation’ of social protection systems is neither explained nor described in the report. We have good reason to suspect that the word is used to disguise approval of social spending cuts as part of an aim to steer universalistic welfare policies towards a residual system (Skobla and Lesay, 2007).7 However, the NSRSPSI report identifies the Roma as a ‘group afflicted by multiple exclusions’ (p 9).Wordings such as ‘social cohesion’, which is used only infrequently in the report, and ‘social inclusion’, in line with Durkheimian theorising, can be considered here as ‘derivatives’ of the word ‘solidarity’. This is very similar to the dominant EU social policy discourse of Brussels provenance. The National Action Plan of the Slovak Republic Regarding the Decade of Roma Inclusion (NAPS ROMA) 2005–2015, which is a basic document on the implementation of the ‘Decade of Roma Inclusion’ in Slovakia8 does not explicitly mention the word ‘solidarity’ at all. The NAPS ROMA does not have a clear focus, conceptualising the social exclusion of the Roma largely in terms of negative images held by the majority of the population, and appeals to the majority to change their attitude. It may be suggested that a more appropriate and effective approach would involve an educational approach initially utilising the school curricula: ‘The inclusion of the Roma population into Slovak society relies upon the gradual reversal of negative attitudes exhibited by the majority population. An educational initiative based upon the school curriculum would enable the gradual reversal of negative attitudes towards the Roma population’ (NAPS ROMA, p 1). The Medium-term Concept of the Development of the Roma National Minority in the Slovak Republic 2008–2013 Solidarity – Integrity – Inclusion (MCD ROMA), on the other hand, is an exception among the programme documents selected for our analysis because solidarity is explicitly mentioned both in its subtitle and at the beginning of the text.9 In the remaining text, solidarity is explicitly referred to in the section on housing: ‘The support of housing for marginalized Roma communities reflects the level of solidarity with these groups of the population, the economic level of the state and the respect for international documents which anchor the right to adequate housing’ (p 19). With unusual openness, MCD ROMA states: ‘The level of solidarity with those marginalized and poor in Slovakia in the case of the Roma is complicated by the cultural and structural racism 234

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of the population.’ Barriers in access to basic commodities such as energy, public lighting and potable water are mentioned in the sections on health and housing: ‘This unhealthy situation is a consequence of insufficient hygiene and the worsening living conditions of inhabitants living in blocks of houses which are disconnected from basic resources (heating, water, gas, electricity), with the non-availability of sources of potable water in some isolated and segregated localities’ (p 14). However, the MCD ROMA was harshly criticised by nongovernmental organisations on the grounds that the strategy ‘had not been subject to wide consultation with Romani community and civil society’ and that ‘the policy is drafted in broad terms ... [and] … as such, it does not constitute a comprehensive strategy to address the systemic causes of the social exclusion faced by the Romani minority. It lacks clear objectives and concrete methods for implementation. It does not identify the bodies responsible for its implementation, nor does it identify the financial resources necessary for its timetabling and realization’ (NGO, 2008). The most important policy document for planning and investment in the environment is the National Strategic Reference Framework (NSRF). The latest one adopted is valid for the period of 2007–13. The NSRF has several main characteristics from the perspective of solidarity. It focuses on human resources, on narrowing the gap in regional disparities and on the environment. The three horizontal priorities identified are: (i) the marginalised Roma communities; (ii) equal opportunities; and (iii) the information society. The Roma ethnic minority (and specifically the marginalised Roma communities) is identified as a primary target for actions to increase employment and education levels and for improvement in living conditions. Operation Program Environment (OPE) is designed for NSFR implementation in the environmental sector. The Roma are again defined as the priority target of the OPE. The document declares a focus on improvement of the environment and living conditions of inhabitants by ensuring access to the environmental infrastructure, including among the marginalised Roma communities. Priority is given to support for separated waste collection and waste recovery activities. In the investment priority there is no reflection of the problem of access to water, or of the problem of Roma settlements exposed to floods or toxic environments. In both the NSRF and the OPE, Roma-related issues are treated not as integrated problems, but in individual chapters.The goals of the OPE are in harmony with the Regional Operational Programme (ROP), which is focused on providing access to water in Roma communities. 235

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The ROP is, from this perspective, a more targeted document because it gives priority to water supply, waste water and the regeneration of settlements in places where the Roma population lives. Two other governmental documents are important from the perspective of solidarity and integration. As well as access to natural resources, they are important from the perspectives of Roma minority housing, integration, access to water and its low quality, and the problem of the degraded environment in the marginalised settlements. The Long-Term Strategy for Housing prohibits segregation of living space, and the Fundamental Thesis of the Slovak Government Policy (April 2003) also states that appropriate housing must contain access to potable water, to energy and heating. It also describes appropriate housing as a place away from contaminated land and not exposed to sources of pollution presenting a health risk to inhabitants. We can conclude that solidarity does not appear as one of the primary concepts in the segment of discourse analysed here; instead, terms such as ‘social cohesion’ are used more frequently. However, the public policy documents that we analysed can be understood as enhancing solidarity and contributing to social cohesion. They directly address the problems of the Roma population, as a distinct and marginalised ethnic group, as being the biggest public policy challenge in Slovakia.10 Therefore, in order to alleviate Roma poverty and to redistribute of the substantial financial resources designated in the documents, the EU structural funds are to be used for the so-called ‘horizontal priority’ in the marginalised Roma communities in Slovakia; all operational programmes must comply with this priority. On the one hand, we have public policies that are clearly based on the redistributive mechanism, mostly relating to the use of EU funds. In our view this may contribute decisively to enhancing social solidarity across society. On the other hand, the wording, and the use of the notions of social cohesion and social inclusion in the documents, is more reminiscent of lip-service to EU mainstream policy. Here the central arguments articulated within the documents are underpinned by neoliberal principles, such as the importance of competition and the adoption of an individualistic approach, which espouse the survival of the fittest. By implication, any justification of policies designed to support the most vulnerable people in our society relies upon a utilitarian conceptualisation of welfare. The main object of the cohesion policies has become the very visible problem of segregated Roma settlements, while more complex actions to tackle poverty, including its less visible forms and its causes, are missing. For example, structural unemployment among the 236

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impoverished Roma is not seen as part of the wider problems of the functioning of the capitalist economy; rather, it is seen as frictional unemployment that can be reduced by temporary measures such as requalification or quasi-labour market measures. This is not the only reason why so much attention is given to the principles of ‘activation’ and ‘welfare to work’ in Slovak labour market policies.11 We noticed a very important missing link in the more complex understanding of poverty and social exclusion vis-à-vis access to basic resources. For example, technical measures such as connection to the water supply and sewage, which are acknowledged in the policy document, are important, but they are ineffective if people cannot afford to pay for these services. Another observation made by us is that the EU policy framework is the main driver in outlining measures and policy approaches to address the situation of the marginalised Roma population; but most of the measures targeted at the Roma and addressed in the policy documents analysed here are designed so as to be financed from EU funds and not the state budget. Solidarity strengthens ties in society through the reallocation of resources. However, targeting financial resources at Roma problems and making Roma issues a horizontal priority in operational programmes does not necessarily mean that a goal of integration is being followed. In many cases, the results can be the reverse, and the use of earmarked funds for the Roma can result in solutions that are based on segregation. This is the case with new housing projects, where references to floods or to contaminated land have justified investment in the construction of new social housing – yet the houses were built outside existing villages and without taking account of desegregation principles (for example, in Eastern Slovakia, villages in Rudňany and Hermanovce).

Access to resources and social solidarity in the human rights framework: the case of Roma settlements Social solidarity in modern societies requires a respect for human rights. Relationships between the environment, health and human rights are repeatedly affirmed by several United Nations (UN) agencies, including the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women and the Committee on the Rights of the Child. A clean environment and access to natural resources have also been increasingly recognised as a fundamental human right. The United Nations Conference on the Human Environment (Stockholm 1972) is often held up as the foundation for modern international environmental law. It lists access 237

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to basic natural resources among the basic human rights. Principle 1 of the Stockholm Declaration declares the ‘fundamental right to freedom, equality and adequate conditions of life, in an environment of quality that permits a life of dignity and well-being’. In March 1995 the World Summit for Social Development was held in Copenhagen.The Copenhagen Declaration on Social Development that was adopted and the Programme of Action called for the sustainable provision of access to safe drinking water in sufficient quantities, and proper sanitation for all, and called for investment in water infrastructures on the basis of principles of solidarity. In July 2010 the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution GA/10967, which recognises access to clean water and sanitation a ‘human right that is essential for the full enjoyment of life and all human rights’. Access to a clean and safe environment is explicitly mentioned in the Slovak Constitution as a right to a healthy environment. However, empirical data supports the observation that many Roma settlements are deprived of this right. Ethnicity thus plays an important role in the distribution of environmental risks and in access to natural resources such as water. Contaminated sites in many localities are the legacy of past industrial and economic development and are symptomatic cases. Among the symptoms of the inequalities between the Roma and non-Roma is access to potable water. As outcome result of such inequalities, people suffer health problems and their opportunities for social or geographic mobility are restricted. The houses they own cannot be sold because of contamination and flood risk, and as information about the problem spreads, so the properties fall in value. Environmental conditions also impact on agriculture, tourism and other sources of income.12 The marginalised position of the Roma population in Slovakia has been described by many independent researchers (for example, Varmeersch, 2003; Vašečka, 2003; Filadefiová et al, 2007; Kusa, 2007; Filčák, 2010). According to a Slovak governmental document: a large part of the Roma people belongs to the most vulnerable inhabitants of the Slovak Republic.Their social situation has for a long time been determined by a high rate of unemployment, in particular, long term dependency on benefits from the social system, a low level of education and housing. (Slovak National Action Plan for Social Inclusion 2004–2006)

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Data on the Roma population are scarce in Slovakia.As in other Central European countries, data collection on ethnicity is a controversial issue (for more on ethnic data collection see Škobla et al, 2009), and major national statistical surveys (such as EU-SILC, Labour Force Survey, household budget and so on) do not collect data on ethnicity. The same applies to the data held in administrative registers (Bureaus for Labour, Social Affairs and Family). One exception is the Census, where respondents must declare their ethnicity, but here the number of Roma is greatly understated.13 Our analysis is therefore based on data collected by specific research conducted among Roma communities either by a variety of agencies (Governmental Plenipotentiary for the Roma Communities, UNDP, World Bank) or by us. According to the Atlas of Roma Communities (ATLAS, 2004), there are 1,575 Roma settlements in the Slovak Republic. Out of these settlements, 149 can be considered segregated, in the sense that they are located outside of towns/villages, do not have access to a water supply and have more than 20% of illegally built houses. Of the Roma settlements that have been identified, 91% have electricity, 39.4% have running water, 12.9% have sewerage and 15.1% have a gas supply. In 46 settlements outside towns or municipalities, with a total population of 4,460, there is practically no infrastructure at all (ATLAS, 2004). UNDP’s Report on the Living Conditions of Roma in Slovakia (2007) has pointed to several important aspects of Roma households’ access to water. This survey evaluates the distance between the main water source and the dwelling by settlement type.14 The proportion of households connected to the public water supply or to water piped from a well in the yard is 54.8% for the Roma and 85.9% for the general, non-Roma population; 45.2% of Roma households use a water source located outside their home; and 20% of Roma households in segregated settlements have to fetch their water from a distance of more than 50 metres. Based on data from research done by a methodology called rapid rural appraisal (Filčák, 2007), in only 10 villages out of a sample of 30 in Eastern Slovakia can Roma settlements be considered to have to equal access to water. The usual pattern is that Roma dwellings are not connected to the public water supply or other infrastructure networks (Steger et al, 2007). It is common for Roma settlements to get their water from local rivers and streams, a dangerous practice, given that settlements are mostly located downstream from the villages, most of which have no sewage treatment plant. In settlements such as Chminianske Jakubovany or Svinja, the inhabitants use water that

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is contaminated by household sewage and run-off from agriculture upstream. Roma who do not have access to clean water suffer a higher incidence of gastro-intestinal and skin diseases. Infant mortality is much higher (34.8 per 1,000, as compared to 14.6 per 1,000 for non-Roma) and life expectancy is much lower (WB, 2000). Infectious diseases are also widespread in Roma communities (Grellier and Šoltésová, 2003; Šaško, 2003). According to the Ministry of Health coordinator for the PHARE (Poland and Hungary: Assistance for Restructuring their Economies; a European funding programme designed to assist preaccession states during their preparations for joining the EU), some districts with high Roma populations have no access to doctors. A related problem is access to a safe and clean environment. Filčák (2007) identified contaminated sites in Rudňany and Krompachy in Eastern Slovakia where the local Roma population is exposed to a greater range of environmental threats than is the majority population. Roma were attracted to factories needing an unskilled workforce and they soon formed settlements.The non-Roma population moved away from these areas as they deteriorated environmentally, with help from the local authorities, which provided them with alternative housing. In addition to contaminated land, Roma settlements are often vulnerable to flooding because of inequities in resources and land-use planning (Filčák, 2007). The most recent evidence is from the floods in Eastern Slovakia in May and June 2010. These widespread floods affected Roma settlements in small villages. In Svinja, around 500 Roma took temporary shelter from the high water in a local school. The shanty town in Svinja has been known for decades as an area that floods regularly, and is located on the outskirts of a village that is built on a nearby hill. Similar situations, where hundreds of people were forced to move out of Roma settlements, were reported in Kuzmice, Chminianska Nova Ves, Hlboké and in several places in Bardejov district.15 Poverty brings people to the contaminated sites and poverty keeps them there. In addition to the direct health impact, this disproportionate environmental burden has implications for the Roma’s social situation, limiting their opportunities and contributing to a ‘vicious circle’ of deteriorating conditions. This can lead to conditions of social anomie in Roma settlements. Contamination causes the decline of agriculture, tourism and soft industries and ‘locks’ people into their localities. Our empirical findings have been corroborated by several researchers (Filadelfiová et al, 2007; Filčák, 2007; Steger et al, 2007). Looking at the situation from a spatial perspective, we see that Roma in segregated 240

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settlements are worse off than surrounding villages in terms of access to water (Filčák, 2007). In comparison to the general non-Roma population, three main characteristics of the Roma’s situation can be identified: (i) they are worse off in terms of land-use planning, housing, availability of potable water and other socio-economic indicators, in both rural and urban areas; (ii) the situation is worse for those living in segregated settlements than for those living dispersed among the majority population; (iii) in terms of housing, access to water, health and all other dimensions, there is a direct correlation between the Roma’s subjective assessment of their situation and the objective facts (Filadelfiová et al, 2007: 86).

Conclusion Analysis of strategic public policy documents confirms that there are clear directives for the redistribution of resources in Slovakia and improvement of access to infrastructure and water. This might be understood as a goal to strengthen social solidarity. Key policy documents in Slovakia address the problems of the Roma minority, and the EU structural funds framework in Slovakia assigns Roma communities a so-called ‘horizontal priority’ – the chief principle to be taken into account in the planning of policy implementation. Our empirical data show that the situation of the Roma – living conditions, access to basic natural resources such as drinking water – is appalling in comparison to that of the majority, non-Roma population. This can be understood as a symptom of an ethnically divided society. The Roma population are an indicator of the scope and scale of the problem of inequality; likewise, they are ‘the canary in the coal mine’: the weakening of the welfare state, deteriorating social conditions and a growing income gap can lead to increasing feelings of alienation and result in disruption in the region. Two important points emerge from this analysis, relating to the validity and justification of social policies in EU member countries and to their implementation.As discussed in the theoretical framework, social policies and interventions can be understood as a safeguard against the eruption of conflicts that are contained in the capitalist mode of production. From this perspective, we can view solidarity as an approach to pacifying latent tensions and class conflicts in society, for instance, the introduction of neoliberal reforms in social welfare resulted in rioting by the Roma in early 2004, when looting of grocery shops and restaurants occurred in several Roma settlements and was suppressed by the police and army.This poses a serious question:‘What 241

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will the impact be of the future gradual introduction of the neoliberal reforms that are so popular in the Central and Eastern European states?’ European economic and social solidarity, as implemented through the structural funds, is extremely important in addressing the problems of marginalised people’s access to basic resources. It is also important to balance the discourse on public policy, which tends to be superficial and is prone to seemingly simple solutions that are far removed from the reality of marginalised people’s social situation. Social solidarity is important for distributive justice. In the absence of solidarity, we can face unequal opportunities and differentiated access to basic resources. Related to this and very important for the future of social solidarity in the EU is the question of policy implementation.We conclude that the mere redistribution and allocation of financial resources does not automatically mean that public policies will pursue a goal of integration and cohesion. In many instances, based on our empirical observations, we see that the opposite is true and that resources are being used for interventions that lead to segregation and exclusion.16 A much more complex framework on solidarity should be used for further research on this topic. Finally, it is useful to link solidarity with universal human rights in order to demonstrate that solidarity and equality are indispensable in contemporary liberal democracies.There is no excuse for governments not to promote and comply with solidarity and human rights and make them available to the whole of society. Human rights provide a suitable framework for advocating redistribution and policy action aimed at achieving greater solidarity and cohesion in society. The location of social solidarity within a human rights framework, as the central organising unit of European integrationist discourse, would encourage the rethinking of public policy approaches across European society and the placing of greater emphasis on equality and social inclusion. Given the findings of this chapter, it might be argued that policies ensuring access to basic resources and guided by social solidarity principles within a human rights framework are a prerequisite for integration within and across European societies.

Notes 1 By ‘basic resources’ we mean water, energy and a clean and safe environment. In addition, the Roma are identified in government policies as a specific target group, and Roma settlements are often clearly isolated 2

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from the majority population, which enables comparison of access to resources and exposure to threats. For more on this see, for example, Offe, 1985; Habermas, 1984, 2006 and many others. 3

If solidarity is a form of integration and ‘sharing’, it may be in opposition to a system of capitalist production and economy, because it goes against competition as the basis of capitalist economic development. 4

Paradoxically, while it seems that now, more than 30 years after the events, Polish governments enjoy more legitimacy than did the former ‘communist’ government, the same classes feels alienated from the state because the restitution of capitalism gave rise to even more inequalities. 5

It is interesting to note that in the accession countries, investors from the old EU member states have become permanent owners of about three-quarters of capital (Garmel et al, 2008). 6

For treatment of the social system’s modernisation in Slovakia see, for example, Gerbery (2008); Škobla and Lesay (2007). 7

The Decade of Roma Inclusion is a joint initiative of Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Macedonia, Romania, Serbia and Montenegro and Slovakia in cooperation with the World Bank and the Open Society Institute, running from 2005 to 2015. Its objective is to extend and speed up the social inclusion of the Roma population, including improvement of their social status. 8

9

Although in a rather awkward linkage with the principle of subsidiarity.

We can only hypothesise about the extent to which the current scope of coverage of the Roma is an outcome of external pressure from the EU. However, based on our participatory observation of the agenda’s development, we would suggest that it is substantial. 10

On activation and welfare to work in Slovakia see, for example, Gerbery (2007). 11

In reality, because of economic hardship, unemployment and increases in housing and energy prices, many urban Roma are moving to these 12

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places because they are looking for cheaper accommodation (Filčák, 2007). In the 2001 Census 89,920 persons – 1.7% of the total population – declared themselves to be of Roma. Estimates by the Demographic Research Centre speak of 380,000 Roma (7.2% of the total population; see Vaňo, 2001). 13

For the purposes of this research, the second and third types of settlement identified in the UNDP report were combined so that Roma households were selected from among three types: segregated (at a distance from a town or village or separated by some barrier), separated (concentrated in a certain part of a town or village) and mixed (living among the majority population of a town or village).The same number of households was selected from each type of settlement. A control group of the general non-Roma population was used for comparative purposes. 14

Based on the following reports: Slovak daily newspaper SME, 4 June 2010, www.sme.sk/c/5406695/slovensko-nicia-povodneevakuovali-stovky-ludi.html#ixzz0ptb9Pwgr; Markiza TV information service 2 June 2010, http://tvnoviny.sk/spravy/regiony/povodnejarovnice-a-svinia-evakuovali-romov-z-osady.html; Web Noviny 16 May 12010, www.webnoviny.sk/trebisov/romov-v-kuzmiciachevakuovali/137391-clanok.html. 15

Construction of social housing is an example. For more see Hojsik (2008). 16

References Alesina,A. and Glaeser, E.L. (2004) Fighting poverty in the US and Europe: A world of difference, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Atkinson,T. (2002) ‘Social inclusion and the European Union’, JCMS, 40 (4) 625–43. Atkinson, T., Mahler, E. and Nolan, B. (2004) ‘Indicators and targets for social inclusion in the EU’, JCMS, 42 (1) 47–75. ATLAS (Atlas Rómskych komunít na Slovensku) (2004) Atlas Rómskych komunít na Slovensku [Atlas of Roma communities in Slovakia]. Iveta Radičová, Martina Jurásková, Elena Kriglerová and Jana Rybová (eds) Bratislava: Úrad splnomocnenkyne vlády SR pre rómske komunity.

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Barany, Z. (1994) ‘Living on the edge: the East European Roma in postsocialist politics and societies’, Slavic Review, 53 (2) 321–44. Barany, Z. (1998) ‘Ethnic mobilisation and the state: the Roma in Eastern Europe’, Ethnic and Racial Studies, 21 (2) 112–36. Barnes, P. and Barnes, I. (1999) Environmental policy in the European Union, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing. Barry, B. (1998) Exclusion, social insolation and the distribution of income, Casepaper Case/12.,London: Centre for Analysis of Social Exclusion, London School of Economics. Bourgeois, M. and Friedkin, N.E. (2001) ‘The distant core: social solidarity, social distance and interpersonal ties in core–periphery structures’, Social Networks, 23 (4) 245–60. Bulpett, C. (2002) Regimes of exclusion in European urban and regional studies 9, London: Sage Publications, p 137. CoE (Council of Europe) (2001) Trends in social cohesion, Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities. Durkheim, E. (1997) Emile Durkheim on the division of labor in society, New York: Macmillan. Emigh, R.J. and Szelenyi, I. (eds) (2001) Poverty, ethnicity and gender in Eastern Europe during the market transition,Westport: Praeger Publishers. Farrell, M. (2004) ‘Regional integration and cohesion-lessons from Spain and Ireland in the EU’, Journal of Asian Economics, 14, (6) 927–46, January. Filadelfiová, J., Gerbery, D. and Škobla, D. (2007) Report on the living conditions of Roma in Slovakia, Bratislava: UNDP. Filčák, R. (2007) Environmental justice in the Slovak Republic:The case of Roma ethnic minority, Budapest: Central European University. Filčák, R. (2010) ‘Local governance and the problem of marginalised people: the case of the Roma ethnic minority’, in K. Bondyra, M. Szczepański and P. Śliwa (eds) From post-communism to the European Union: An attempt at the balance of Polish local government, Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang Press. Filčák, R. (2010a) ‘Concept of ‘energy poverty’ and multi-dimensional perspectives of social inequalities and their impacts: case of the Czech and Slovak republics’, in R. Haas and J. Jílková (eds) Energy for sustainable development,Vol II, Prague: Karolinum Press. Galeano, E. (2000) Upside down: A primer for the looking glass World, New York: Picador. Garmel, K., Maliar, L. and Maliar, S. (2008) ‘EU eastern enlargement and foreign investment: Implications from a neoclassical growth model’, Journal of Comparative Economics, no 36, pp 307–25.

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Gerbery, D. (2007) ‘Aktuálne trendy v sociálnej politike zameranej na boj proti chudobe: úloha a spôsoby aktivácie’ [‘Actual trends in social policy focused on poverty alleviation: role and means of activations’] in Gerbery, D., Lesay, I. and Škobla, D. (eds) Kniha o chudobe. Spoločenské súvislosti a verejné politiky [The book about poverty: Social context and public policies], Ponická Huta: Priatelia Zeme-CEPA. Goodhard, D. (2004) ‘Too diverse?’, Prospects, no 7: pp 30–7. Grellier, J. and Šoltésová, K. (2004) Healthcare policy and provision for Roma in Slovakia and the Czech Republic, Budapest: European Roma Rights Centre. Habermas, J. (1984) Reason and the rationalisation of society (The theory of communicative action,Vol 1), Boston, MA: Beacon Press. Habermas, J. (2006) The divided west, Cambridge: Polity Press. Hechter, H. (2001) ‘Solidarity, sociology of ’, in N.J. Smelser and P.B. Baltes (eds) International encyclopedia of the social & behavioral sciences, pp 14588–91. Hojsík, M. (2008) Evaluácia programu obecných nájomných bytov v rómskych osídleniach [Evaluation of municipal housing programme in Roma settlements], Bratislava: Milan Simečka Foundation. Jordan, A. (2005) Environmental policy in the European Union: Actors, institutions and processes, London: Earthscan. Kritikos, A., Bolle, F. and Tan, J. (2007) ‘The economics of solidarity: a conceptual framework’, The Journal of Socio-Economics, 36: 73–89. Kusá, Z. and Kostlán, D. (2009) Vyhliadky organickej solidarity v del’be spoločenskej práce [Outlooks for organic solidarity in devision of labor in society], Bratislava: Sociologicky ustav SAV. Kusa, D. (2007) ‘The Slovak question and the Slovak answer: citizenship during the quest for national self-determination and after’, in R. Baubock, B. Perching and S. Wiebke (eds) Citizenship policies in the new Europe, Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, pp 185–212. Mandipour A., Cars, G. and Allen, J. (1998) ‘Social exclusion in European cities’, in A. Mandipour, G. Cars and J. Allen Exclusion in European cities: Processes, experiences and responses, London: The Stationery Office, pp 279–88. NGO (2008) Position of non-governmental organisations for the draft of medium-term concept of the development of the Roma national minority in the Slovak Republic 2008–2013 Solidarity – Integrity – Inclusion, January 2008, www.nadaciamilanasimecku.sk/fileadmin/user_upload/ dokumenty/STANOVISKO_MVO.pdf Offe, C. (1985) Disorganised capitalism: Contemporary transfromation of work and politics (Studies in contemporary German social thought) Boston, MA: MIT Press. 246

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Popay, J., Enoch, E., Johnson, H. and Rispel, L. (2006) (SEKN) Social Exclusion and Knowledge Network submitted to the Commission on Social Determinants of Health, World Health Organization. Sabbagh, C. (2003) ‘The dimension of social solidarity in distributive justice’, Social Science Information 42 (2) 255–76. Šaško, P. (2003) ‘Zdravotná situácia rómskej populácie’ [‘Health situation in the Roma population’], in M.Vašečka (ed) Čačipen pal o Roma: súhrná sprava o Rómoch na Slovensku [A global report on Roma in Slovakia], Bratislava: IVO. Škobla, D. and Lesay, I. (2007) ‘Medzinárodné rozvojové organizácie a sociálna politika’ [‘International development organisations and social policy’], in D. Gerbery, I. Lesay and D. Škobla (eds) Kniha o chudobe. Spolocenské súvislosti a verejné politiky [The book about poverty: Social context and public policies], Ponická Huta: Priatelia Zeme-CEPA. Škobla, D. Leončikas,T. and Štepánková, M. (2009) Ethnicity as a statistical indicator fot the monitoring of living conditions and discrimination, Bratislava: UNDP and FES. Smith, N.H. and Laitinen,A. (2009) ‘Taylor on solidarity’, Thesis Eleven 99: 48–70. Steger, T., Antypas, A., Atkins, L., Borthwick, F., Cahn, C., Filčák, R., Harper, K., Malbasic, I. and Medarova, K. (2007) Making the case for environmental justice in Central and Eastern Europe, Budapest, Hungary: CEU Center for Environmental Policy and Law (CEPL) and The Health and Environment Alliance (HEAL). Szelenyi, I. (2001) Poverty under post-communist capitalism: The effects of class and ethnicity in a cross-national comparison, Center for Comparative Research/Department of Sociology Yale University. Draft, October 14, 2001. Paper presented at workshop ‘Culture and Poverty’, Central European University, 30 November–2 December 2001. Taylor-Gooby, P. (2005) ‘Is future American? Or can left politics preserve European welfare states from erosion through growing racial diversity?’, Journal of Social Policy, 24 (4) 661–72. Vaňo, B. (2001) Prognóza vývoja rómskeho obyvatel’stva v SR do roku 2025 [Forecast of the Roma Population development in the Slovak Republic until 2025], Bratislava: Infostat. Varmeersch, P. (2003) ‘Ethnic minority identity and movement politics: the case of the Roma in the Czech Republic and Slovakia’, Ethnic and Racial Studies, 26 (5) 879–901. Vašečka, M. (2003) Čačipen pal o Roma: Súhrná sprava o Rómoch na Slovensku [A global report on Roma in Slovakia], Bratislava: IVO.

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Wallerstein, I. (1997) ‘Liberalism and democracy: Frères Ennemis?’, Fourth Daalder Lecture, Rijksuniversiteit Leiden, Interfacultaire Vakgroep Politieke Wetenschappen, 15 March 1997. Wallerstein, I. (2005) ‘After developmentalism and globalisation what?’, Social Forces, 83: 321–36. WB (World Bank) (2000) Health needs of Roma population in the Czech and Slovak Republics: Final report. Washington DC: World Bank. Wilensky, H. (1975) The welfare state and equality: Structural and ideological roots of public expenditures, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Wilkinson, R. and Pickett, K. (2009) The spirit level:Why greater equality makes societies strong, London: Bloomsbury Press. Wright Mills, C. (2000) The power elite, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Documents Chapter 6, Article 1 of the Constitution of the Slovak Republic, adopted as the Act No 460/1992. Available at: www.nrsr.sk/main. aspx?sid=nrsr/dokumenty [accessed 21 March 2010]. National Strategy Report on Social Protection and Social Inclusion 2008–2010 Slovak National Action Plan for Social Inclusion 2004–2006 National Strategic Reference Framework (NSRF) National Environmental Action Plan, National Strategy Report on Social Protection and Social Inclusion 2008–2010 National Action Plan of the Slovak Republic Regarding the Decade of Roma Inclusion 2005–2015 Medium-term Concept of the Development of the Roma National Minority in the Slovak Republic 2008–2013 Solidarity – Integrity – Inclusion, Regional Operational Programme (ROP) Reports on Social Situation of Inhabitants in the Slovak Republic Operation Program Environment (OPE) Basic Thesis of the Slovak government policy on integration of Roma communities [Adopted by the Slovak Government on April 23, 2003] Long-term Concept of Housing for Marginalised Groups of Inhabitants and Model of its Financing [Adopted by the Slovak Government on 19 January 2005]. Dlhodobá koncepcia bývania pre marginalizované skupiny obyvatel’stva a model jej financovania. Slovak National Sustainable Development Strategy (NSDS) (2001) United Nations Committee for Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. General Observation No. 15 (2002), ‘The right to water’ (Articles 11 and 12 of the International Charter on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights). Geneva, 11–29 November 2002.

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The Stockholm Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm (1972) The United Nations Human Rights Committee passed General Observation No. 15 (2002) Copenhagen Declaration on Social Development, and the Programme of Action (1995) Directive 95/46/ of the European parliament and the Council on the protection of individual with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data. Directive 2000/43 EC implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin.

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Conclusion: the future of social solidarity in an enlarged Europe: key issues and research questions Marion Ellison

Introduction As many of the contributions in this volume have revealed, ‘lived’ and ‘shared learned’ experiences of social solidarity have become culturally embedded across European societies. Historically defined ‘particularities’ of social solidarity across nation-states exist in a European continent where people have shared experiences of war, economic strife, migration, emigration and climatic disaster. But people have also shared philosophical enlightenment and, to a greater or lesser extent, a commitment to ‘institutionalised social solidarity’ as the legitimation of the ‘social contract’.1 These ‘shared learned’ experiences have rendered solidarity central to the identity of the European Union (EU). As Józef Niżnik argues in Chapter Two, solidarity as a normative ideal was the organising unit of the discourse on European union in 1950.The establishment of the physical infrastructures and social and public policy programmes, which designed and sustained ‘institutional solidarity’ within national settings, also enabled transnational solidarity within Europe. Illustrating this, education systems are central to the institutional solidarity of nationstates, enabling a European network of higher education provision, supporting the knowledge economy and facilitating knowledge and cultural exchange and cross-national research and teaching. European programmes such as the Bologna Process facilitate a coherent and compatible system of higher education across Europe. While these ‘concrete achievements’ illustrate the value of the transnational arrangements articulated by a range of European programmes, the recent global financial crisis has brought the contradictions inherent in the EU constitutional framework into sharp relief. Here the constitutional asymmetry within European 251

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integration places a higher value on policies and programmes that promote economic competitiveness and market efficiency over human rights, equality and social solidarity (Scharpt, 2002).Within the context of a competitive, knowledge-based global economy, education is regarded as crucial to the growth of the European economy.The EU’s commitment to the education sector is self-evident, but even here the ‘contingencies’ of the global financial crisis have led to a proposed retrenchment of state intervention in key sectors of education across Europe. The current crisis has highlighted the role of the EU, and has introduced ambivalence into the discourse of social solidarity. As Andy Storey argues in Chapter Nine, in its pursuit of competitive market advantage and ‘vested interests’, the EU may either advance or retard relationships of genuine social solidarity both between Europeans and between Europeans and non-Europeans. The tension and conflicts between embedded, state-designed, institutionalised social solidarity and private economic and financial interests have come about largely as a result of the emergence of a new political terrain which hinders ‘the capacity of state institutions to embody the kind of communal solidarity Gemeinschaft’ (Cerny, 2007). This has been exacerbated in recent years by the growing commodification of welfare states, to varying degrees, across Europe.As Béla Janky (Chapter Twelve) observes, any attempt to understand the impact of this process on attitudes to social solidarity within national settings requires research focusing on the specific social policy dilemmas of ‘increasingly interlinked European societies’. Of equal if not deeper significance has been the process of individualisation (Lorenz, 2005; Beck and Beck-Gernsheim, 2002). Here, despite living in the most ‘highly developed and structurally complex of all the world’s regional economic blocs’ (Dicken, 2007), the inhabitants of Europe are, in common with people around the globe, subject to an existence where the market ‘has become the conceptual and institutional interface’ (Lorenz, 2005: 94). For many, individualisation has led to increased vulnerability to the worst dis-welfares of global capitalism, as illustrated by the ever-deepening contours of inequality both within and across European states (European Commission, 2010). In order to fully understand the implications of this process for social solidarity it is clear that we need to develop a more unified conceptual and theoretical model that will enable us to explore empirical evidence relating to social solidarity; then expound the reinventions of social solidarity across Europe as a lived experience, a normative construct and a political instrument for European integration and the reversal of inequality. 252

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Towards a more unified theory of social solidarity Several contributions in this volume have revealed ‘the individualization and fragmentation of growing inequalities into separate biographies as collective experience’ (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim, 2002). Power, as Richard Filčák and Daniel Škobla argue in Chapter Thirteen, is defined as being central to this process: ‘Power relations and access to decision making are at the core of inequalities. Any meaningful solidarity might therefore be encompassed by rights, participation and access.’ The lived experience of poverty and marginalisation is also linked to issues of power in Chapter Eight, where Anna Krasteva draws upon the experiences of immigrants to show how their voices are often ‘lost in translation’ and urges that we should ‘provide immigrants with a voice so that, rather than being the subject of public debates, initiatives and forums, they are active initiators and implementers’.This issue resonates across several contributions in the book. In Chapter Six, Barry, Berg and Chandler call for a ‘positive politics of welfare which promotes new ways of working and new provision from below … an extremely fluid form of politics, with no fixed aims, organisational forms, membership or boundaries; but such is the nature of social movements’.The implicit conclusion of many of the contributions is that, within the context of a globalised economy, current forms of social solidarity need to amplify, engage and create the conditions necessary for people to emerge as ‘active initiators and implementers’ (Chapter Eight) with multiple sources of solidarity that are already emerging ‘across national borders’ (Chapter Six). The dynamic reinvention of social solidarity across Europe is a vehicle not only for the reinvention of the public realm across European settings but also for political social solidarity. The reinvention of social solidarity and solidarities across Europe goes some way to addressing issues of power and voice. However, also at stake are wider and deeper issues relating to inequality, poverty and marginalisation. As Ellison (Chapter Five) reveals, children and young people are most vulnerable to inequality and marginalisation, signifying the definitive balance between public and private responsibility in societal integration. Children who are in the care of the state experience both marginalisation and inequality, and their voices will remain unheard unless local and European societies enable them to be heard. Here, social work childcare professionals are pivotal not only in providing a voice for looked after children and their families but also by their engagement in communicative action in the context of an international human rights framework. Ellison argues that the import of this action within a European governance setting is limited by a 253

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European Social Open Method (Social OMC) that is constrained by the remit to influence rather than to interfere and redistribute power within childcare policy and practice at a national level. This view is echoed by Tomáš Sirovátka and Petr Mareš (Chapter Three), when they note that the Social OMC is ‘too “soft” a “soft instrument”’. The analysis of reconfigurations and reinventions of social solidarity in this volume has highlighted sources of recent concern with the level and quality of social solidarity across Europe. As Marion Ellison (Chapter Five) and Anna Krasteva (Chapter Eight) observe, the global economic dis-welfares of inequality and individualisation have a deep impact at the level of the self. These psychological and social effects are symptomatic not just of material deprivation but also of isolation and the breakdown of institutionalised forms of social solidarity. A synthesis of theoretical and empirical contributions in this volume has indicated how the reinvention of social solidarities from below within a co-determinate model simultaneously creates political social solidarity with the purpose of redressing inequality and poverty and establishes a basis for the organisation and governance of transnational solidarity within an integrated Europe. Here, Habermas’s linear theory of communicative action is reconciled with Beck’s non-linear notion of individualisation. Critically, as many contributors argue, the key to this social self-governing co-determinate model is to view social solidarity within a human rights framework.

National to transnational social solidarity The relationship between national and transnational social solidarity in Europe has framed most of the contributions in this volume. Complex, multilevel and multifaceted aspects of social solidarity reflect the social and cultural contours of national and transnational European history. Crucially, the asymmetry of the historically configured European models of social solidarity and the globalised, neoliberal economic model lies at the heart of the problem of European integration. The transnational architecture required to redress this problem needs a design strategy that is embedded in the cultural, social and political configurations of Europe’s past and present. The imposition of economic and ideological frameworks which do not arise from this ‘past and present’, as recent demonstrations and resistances across Europe have shown, only serves to reveal Europe to itself. While the nature of social solidarity is revealed as a contested concept in this book, all of the contributors embed social solidarity as a concept, construct or praxis within the cultural, political and social configurations of Europe’s 254

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past and present.The establishment of ‘institutionalised social solidarity’ across Europe connects ‘lived’ and ‘shared learned’ daily struggles with distinct forms of European identity. It is this ‘concrete achievement’ which also distinguishes Europe from other global economic and social units. However, as the contributors in this volume have revealed, social solidarity within and across European states’‘concrete achievements’ is not simply a product of grand political or ideological designs imposed from above. It has been forged within contested terrains and the daily struggles of human existence within the current global economic context. ‘Individualisation’ and ‘inequality’ have rendered these daily struggles as ‘shared lived’ and ‘shared learned’ experiences within and across national settings in Europe that act as a catalyst for transnational social solidarity. Recent demonstrations across Europe have revealed that the paradox of ‘individualism’ within neoliberalist global economics is that human beings experience commonality through experiences of isolation and marginalisation that transcend national boundaries. As history has shown us, feelings of commonality and solidarity have often been expressed as a result of individual suffering. Feelings of commonality were instrumental in forging post-war national welfare regimes across Europe based upon ‘institutionalised social solidarity’. Reflecting this process, Chapter Seven reveals, European transnational solidarity has emerged out of a recent energy crisis, which has forged national and transnational European and energy policies and networks. This tendency to Europeanisation of energy networks in turn strengthens transnational social solidarity towards a ‘European Energy Community’, similar to the European Coal and Steel Community formed out of the Schuman Declaration. The European Commission proposed a new EU Energy Security and Solidarity Action Plan in November 2008.An infrastructural architecture involving a large number of strategic energy networks was designed in recognition of the asymmetry between global market economics and the need to provide a secure energy supply for people across Europe. Within the Action Plan, regions more vulnerable to energy supply disruption arising from the operation of the global energy market were given priority. These areas include the Baltic Sea region, the Mediterranean and South-East Europe. Without this concerted and substantial transnational public policy intervention and incentive from the highest level of EU political leadership, the market would not necessarily have provided a secure energy supply for the public good across Europe. This transnational European energy security and solidarity framework established by the EU represents the translation of the political will for solidarity into an infrastructural framework. Here people will feel the benefits of 255

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transnational secured energy provision across a number of European states, potentially forging increased transnational European social solidarity and benefiting European economic and social integration. As Menno Fenger and Kees van Paridon (Chapter Four) argue, ‘The emergence of institutionalised forms of solidarity at the transnational level can therefore be explained by the inadequacy of traditional forms of institutionalised reciprocal solidarity at the national level.’ While top-down initiatives drive and give a concrete infrastructure for European transnational social solidarity, the sustainability of this form of solidarity relies upon its relevance to the lived and shared dayto-day experiences of people living within Europe. As Damir Josipovič (Chapter Ten) illustrates, a number of social solidarities articulated through new networks, including eco-solidarity and farmers’ solidarity, have emerged across post-socialist countries in recent years in an attempt to re-establish previous ‘constitutional’, ‘designed’ and ‘lived’ solidarity, bringing us deeper insight into the contemporary development of reinvented solidarities. He discusses the emergence of strategies which aim to re-establish former ‘constitutional’,‘designed’ and ‘lived’ solidarity as they emerge through ‘new networking’, overcoming or accommodating imposed recession in post-socialist countries. Here, Josipovič argues, the hallmark of ‘social self-governing was the so-called bottom-up incentive, which relinquished many aspects of decision making to the lower level of the so-called societal structure and superstructure (cf Riddell, 1968)’ (Chapter Ten). Echoing this, Christina Stănus¸ (Chapter Eleven) argues that the establishment of self-governing requires ‘the reinvention of social solidarity on multiple levels (subnational, national and transnational)’. For many people living in Central and Eastern Europe,‘The EU is still a distant and hard-to-understand structure that is unable to take the place of the nation-state’. As Józef Niżnik highlighted in Chapter Two, it is the tension between imposed forms of democracy and solidarity which lies at the heart of the matter.

The ‘dialectical circularity’ of governance and social solidarity across Europe: from an individual to a societal vision of freedom The ‘reinvention of social solidarity on multiple levels’ emerges from this volume as the central challenge for a transnational, cosmopolitan and integrated Europe. The tension of European social solidarity revealed by most authors in this volume is characterised less by conflict between 256

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normative claims relating to social solidarity and distinct national identities within Europe and more by the asymmetry of historically configured European models of social solidarity and the globalised, neoliberal economic model.This asymmetry brings urgency to the need to move towards the ‘dialectical circularity’ of multilevel governance and social solidarity across Europe. For clarity, we repeat Sartre:‘where man is “mediated” by things as much as things are “mediated by man” – the reciprocal relationship of “situation and project”. The strength of social solidarity depends upon material conditions and normative aspects. Freedom is an ultimate objective of social solidarity; therefore, freedom is a project in itself that comes out of social solidarity that unifies material circumstances into the practical field that in turn gives rise to the same project’ (Sartre, 1957, 1976). While a normative and constitutional discourse of solidarity from above is essential to any meaningful transnational economic and political organisation, it is nevertheless ‘contrived’ unless it is in harmony with the praxis of social solidarity from below, as ‘derived’ from ‘shared learned’ experience of material conditions and normative aspects which express the collective consciousness of peoples at national and transnational levels – thereby enabling the progressive redefinition of normative, constitutional and ‘positive welfare’ approaches to social solidarity that reflect changing social realities. Critically, the normative ideals of deliberative democracy may well be regarded as essential to the functional and normative development of a constitution based upon the simultaneous implementation of procedural norms, organisational powers and human rights (Brunkhorst, 2005). However, as several contributions in this volume reveal, it is the contravention of human rights, particularly in the form of inequality and social exclusion, which has led to the emergence of distinct forms of social solidarity from below (Chapters Three, Five, Six, Eight, Nine, Ten, Eleven and Thirteen). In many European states the achievements of the neoliberal economic system ‘contrived’ out of a process manufactured and maintained by global economic vested interests (Storey, Chapter Nine) have rendered deliberative democracy a meaningless engagement for many peoples across Europe. Critically, ‘for those who are denied access to the achievements of the economic system, inclusion of political and human rights is practically worthless’ (Brunkhurst, 2005: 98). The process of transformation within the region of Central and Eastern Europe illustrates the impact of imposed forms of democratic organisation. Here, the imposition of ‘contrived’ forms of democracy has paved the way for the expansion of neoliberal forms of market 257

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capitalism. As Susan Marks argues, ‘with low intensity democracy’ a level of democratisation does occur, but in a way that substitutes and precludes any deeper structural transformation (Marks, 2000). Here, the ideological purpose of imposed forms of democratisation is to create asymmetrical power relations that effectively curtail certain policy orientations and rationales while accepting others. Crucially, collective self-determination is effectively negated by the denial or limitation of procedural rights. This ideological imposition has led to the elimination of previous ‘constitutional’, ‘designed’ and ‘lived’ solidarity across the Eastern European states. However, as Damir Josipovič (Chapter Ten) argues, this has led to the reinvention of social solidarities through ‘new networking, highlighting the practices and strategies used to overcome or accommodate the imposed recession in post-socialist countries’. The significance of these processes cannot be underestimated; as Marks declares, they give rise to ‘emancipatory possibilities that are already present in accepted logics and processes’ (p 111). The realisation of these ‘emancipatory possibilities’ requires a highly developed and synchronous framework of co-determined arrangements and governance which draw upon the reinvention of social solidarities within and across European states. Focusing upon ‘inclusory political communities and equal citizenship’ (p 111), the ‘emancipatory possibilities’ derived from evidence within this volume are based upon a ‘dialectical circularity’ of social solidarity and freedom, crucially marking a conceptual shift from an individualistic to a societal perspective. Freedom exists within a strongly structured region forged by ‘all of history’ and which includes its ‘own contradictions’ (Sartre, 1976).The question of inequality is central to Sartre’s conceptualisation of freedom:‘Society circumscribes a person’s possibilities including his fight against limitations it imposes on him’; in this way some societies block off possibilities for large groups of people, whereas others open up the field of possibilities. Critically for Sartre, it is this process of ‘blocking off ’ which leads to the emergence of feelings of social solidarity. This process is echoed in several chapters in this volume, most notably Anna Krasteva’s (Chapter Eight) and Richard Filčák and Daniel Škobla’s (Chapter Thirteen). It is this process which illuminates the tension between forms of deliberative democracy formulated by individual freedom, in contrast to social solidarity through ‘dialectical circularity’, which expresses the limitations of freedom for groups of people with limited access to the wider resources of societies. Within this theoretical framework the praxis of dynamic social solidarity is located within a process of ‘dialectic circularity’ with a strong focus on material conditions. As the contributions in this volume reveal, the 258

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attainment of ‘dialectical circularity’ between European governance and social solidarity across European states depends upon the recognition of new forms of self-determination expressed through dynamic and institutional social solidarities, new networks, social movements. At its core, this recognition entails the co-determination of transnational structural solidarity initiatives at EU level and social solidarities emerging from below, translated through multilevel institutional practices and governance models. ‘Dialectical circularity’ can create a self-reinforcing process of lived and learned experiences of social solidarity mediated through and strengthened by universal rights to health, education, communication and knowledge. As an exemplar, Chapter Five shows that, in direct contrast to the neoliberal socio-economic policies of the current British government, including the marketisation of the health service, higher education and other components of the welfare state, the Scottish government has recently embedded a ‘Solidarity Purpose’ in governance for the people, with a target to ‘increase overall income and the proportion of income earned by the three lowest income deciles as a group by 2017’ (Solidarity Purpose Target: Scottish Government, 2011). The Scottish government regards this ideological foundation as important because it believes that ‘The healthy development of our society depends on reducing inequalities and sharing the future benefits of growth among Figure 14.1: Dialectical circularity of social solidarity and governance across Europe (after Sartre, 1976. 1957)

Freedom

Human rights

Material conditions Social solidarity

Governance

Normative aspects

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people and communities. Unlocking the economic potential of all individuals will support economic growth by increasing labour market participation and by removing the personals and social costs of poverty’ (Solidarity Purpose Target: Scottish Government, 2011.). As this volume has shown, while this is a complex challenge requiring a sophisticated framework of co-determined arrangements and governance, it is a challenge deserving of a resolute political will at the highest level, primarily because on it depends the future wellbeing of millions of Europeans and non-Europeans, and also because the future of European integration itself is at stake.

Note 1 See J.J. Rousseau (1762), The Social Contract or Principles of Political Right, trans. G.D.H. Cole (public domain). References Beck, U. and Beck-Gernsheim, E. (2002) Individualisation: Institutionalised individualism and its social and political consequences, London: Sage Publications. Brunkhorst, H. (2005) From civic friendship to a global legal community, trans. J Flynn, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Cerny, P. (2007) Paradoxes of the competition state:The dynamics of political globalisation, Chichester: Wiley Press. Dicken, P. (2007) Global shift, mapping the changing contours of the world economy, London: Sage Publications, European Commission (2010) New and growing social inequalities: A challenge for the social, economic and democratic development of the European Union, Report published 11 November, Brussels: European Commission. Lorenz, W. (2005) ‘Social work and a new social order: challenging neoliberalism’s erosion of solidarity’, Work, Employment and Society, vol 3, issue 1. Marks, S. (2000) The riddle of all constitutions: International law, democracy, and the critique of ideology, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Riddell, D.S. (1968) ‘Social self-government: the background of theory and practice in Yugoslav socialism’, British Journal of Sociology, 19 (1) 47–75. Sartre, J.-P. (1957) Being and nothingness, trans. H. Barnes, London: Methuen. Sartre, J.-P. (1976) Critique of dialectical reason, trans. A. Sheridan-Smith, London: New Left Books. 260

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Scharpt (2002) ‘The European social model’, Journal of Common Market Studies, vol 40, pp 645–70. Scottish Government (2010) Solidarity Purpose Target 5, Edinburgh: Scottish Government Publications (www.scotland.gov.uk/Topics/ Statistics/About/NotesSP/TechnicalNotesSPPT5).

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Index Note: The following abbreviations have been used – f = figure; n = note; t = table

A ACER (Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators) 108–9 Act on Assistance in Cases of Material Need of (2006) (Czech Republic) 41 Act on Social Need (1991) (Czech Republic) 36 Action Plan for Energy Efficiency (2007–2012) (EU) 107 Afghanistan 146 African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries 145, 147–8, 149 Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER) 108–9 agriculture 167t, 168t, 178–9, 256 Albania 132, 166, 184n Alesina, A. 209 Alexander, J. 191 altruism 22 Andersen, J. 25–6 Arnsperger, C. 125 Arts, W. 31, 32 Atlas of Roma Communities 239 Austria 162, 163f authoritarian social solidarity 6t Avritzer, L. 92–3, 94

B Babeş-Bolyai University of Cluj 198 Bagic, D. 133, 134, 137n Balibar, E. 92, 93 Baltic Interconnection Plan 109, 111 Baltic States 157–8, 169, 170f, 171f, 172f Barroso, J.M.D. 1 Basescu, T. 7 Beck, U. 4–5, 254 Beck-Gernsheim, E. 4–5 Beer, P. de 51, 53 Belarus 169, 172 ‘Berlin Fossil Fuel Forum’ 111 Berlin, Isaiah 136n

Beveridge settlement (1945) 3, 13n Bicchi, F. 140, 142, 143 Bobic, M. 133 Bologna Process 251 bonding social capital 30, 32–3, 42, 43n Bosnia and Herzegovina 124, 132, 134 bottom-up incentives 162, 178, 181, 182 Braun, R. 196 bridging social capital 30, 33–4, 43n Brodhead, T. 55–6 Bulgaria 132, 136n, 157, 168

C ‘Care of the Self, The’ (Foucault) 123 Care and the State (De Swaan) 51 Castells, M. 52–3, 86 Catholic Church 157, 167 Center for Legal Aid Voice in Bulgaria 130 Central and Eastern Europe 8, 157–9, 181–2, 183n, 191–2, 196, 232 emergence of self-management 161–2, 163f, 164f, 183n human rights 228, 229 labour market 161–2, 163f, 168t, 237 migration and integration 161–2, 163f notion of 159–60f, 161 see also Eastern-Central Europe Centre for Refugee and Migration Studies (CERMES) 130, 136n charitable giving 55, 56, 197 childcare 10, 71–2, 75, 76, 78–9 co-determination frameworks 74–8 inequality 72–4 Christian democratic concept of solidarity 20 citizenship migration and integration 133–4, 137n Romania 191, 202–3 civic engagement 31, 42

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Reinventing social solidarity across Europe civil society 144, 192, 194 migration and integration 126, 128–9, 131–2, 135 Clarke, J. 84, 91 climate change 103–4, 115n, 151–2n ČMKOS (Czechoslovak Chamber of Labour Unions) 33 co-determination frameworks 74–8 collectivism 192 common good 193 communism 24, 26n, 30, 32, 41, 121–3, 131 communitarianism 4 competition, role of 211, 212f, 213 Connolly, William E. 20 ‘continuity’ 76–7 contrived elitist democracy 6t Copenhagen Climate Summit (2009) 103–4, 107 Copenhagen Declaration on Social Development (1995) 238 Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON/MEA) 162 credit unions 78 Croatia 124, 132, 134, 160, 161 ‘crony capitalism’ 159 Czech Republic 29, 30, 34–51, 44n, 72, 84n post-socialist 157, 166 social capital 31–4, 41 social inclusion 34–41 Czechoslovak Chamber of Labour Unions (ČMKOS) 33

D Dahl, R.A. 193 Dahrendorf, R. 42 ‘de facto solidarity’ 23 De Swaan, A. 51 ‘Decade of Roma Inclusion’ 234, 243n ‘Declaration on the European identity’ (1973) 86 Delanty, G. 198 democracy 17, 24, 25, 30, 42, 43n, 84, 85, 91–2, 191–2, 195–6, 257–8 Democracy and Human Rights, European Initiative for (EU) 146 democracy negligible 6t demographic change 174–5t Denmark 2, 88 Derrida, J. 151n descriptive approach to solidarity 22–3 DeSUS (Democratic Party of Slovenian Pensioners) 176, 185n development aid 58, 59f, 60f, 61f, 62f, 63f, 67

264

‘dialectical circularity’ 5, 74, 256–8, 259f, 260 Diez, T. 141, 143, 144, 146, 149 ‘diminishing solidarity’ 123 Directive 2003/109/EC (EU) 41 Directive (Community framework for the safety of nuclear installations) (2009) 111 Directive on Security of Gas Supply 111 discourse, meaning of 19–20 diversity 30 Durkheim, E. 4, 18, 22, 49, 50, 66, 229–30, 234 dynamic social solidarity 6t

E Eastern Balkans 124–5 Eastern-Central Europe 181–2, 195, 196 new solidarity 173, 174f, 175f, 176–81, 183n socio-economic transition 164, 165f, 166, 167f, 168f, 169, 170–2f see also Central and Eastern Europe EBRD (European Bank for Reconstruction and Development) 118n eco-social solidarity 177–8 economic globalisation 53 Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) 139, 147–9 ECSC see European Coal and Steel Community education 40, 71, 78, 252 decommodification of 210, 213, 214f EFSF see European Financial Stability Facility EGAF see European Globalisation Adjustment Fund Electoral Reform and Electoral Studies project (Soros Foundation Romania) 198 electricity resources 11, 106, 110, 113, 228, 235, 239 empathy 193 Energy Customers’ Charter 107 Energy Green Papers (EU) 101, 105–6, 107, 111 Energy Policy (2007) (EU) 105 energy resources 99–101, 112–14, 115n, 116n, 228, 255–6 EU policies and networks 104–11 global economic crisis and 100, 103, 112–14 security and 101–4

Conclusion Index Energy Security and Infrastructure Instrument (EU) 108 Energy Security and Solidarity Action Plan (2008) (EU) 8, 101, 105, 110, 255 ENTSOs (European Networks of Transmission System Operators) 109 environmental resources 8, 11, 103–4, 115n, 151–2n, 129 EPAs see Economic Partnership Agreements ERCOMER 169 Esping-Andersen, G. 210, 224n Estonia 169, 170f, 177–8 Etzioni, A. 4 Euratom see European Atomic Energy Community Eurocentrism 139, 142–3, 149, 151n Eurochild network 75–6 Eurochild Report (2010) 71–2 Europe, social and economic openness 56t, 57f, 58 European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) 100, 105 European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) 118n European Central Bank 65 European Charter of Fundamental Rights 1, 13n, 39 European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) 99–100, 105 European Commission 106–7, 110, 113 European Convention on Human Rights (European Commission for Human Rights) (1953) 12n, 73, 140 European Economic Recovery Plan 8 European Energy Programme for Recovery 113 European Energy Supply Observatory 106 European Enlightenment 1, 13n European Federation of Public Service Unions 77 European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) 65, 66, 222–3 European Globalisation Adjustment Fund (EGAF) 8, 64–5, 66 European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (EU) 146 European integration discourse 17–26 European Investment Bank (EIB) 118n European Networks of Transmission System Operators (ENTSOs) 109 European Social Forum 77 European Social Fund 8 European social model 25, 29–31, 42–3, 66 social capital 31–4, 41

social inclusion 34–41 European Structural Fund 37–8, 40, 42–3 European Union, Treaty on (1992) 24 European Union (EU) 1, 2, 3, 4–5, 8, 11–12, 37, 49–50, 53, 64–5, 67, 75–6 collective identity 83, 85–6, 89, 91, 94 contradictions in migration 128 energy policies and networks 104–11 integration discourse 24, 25–6 public policy documents 232–7 social openness 57f European Values Study (2001) 32, 55, 56t eurozone 8, 150

F ‘fading autonomy’ 52–3 Falkner, R. 150 family, as traditional source of solidarity 121, 122, 135, 200 Fenger, M. 8 Filčàk, R. 227, 239, 240 Finland 162, 169 Flint, A. 148 Follesdal, A. 198 fossil fuels 111 Foucault, M. 19, 123, 141 France 2, 7, 100, 105, 181, 203 Freeden, M. 20 freedom ix, 1, 5, 20, 30, 32, 43, 74, 143, 231, 238, 256–8, 259f Fundamental Thesis of the Slovak Government Policy (April 2003) 236

G Gabal, I. 40 Gadamer, H.G. 131, 135 Galeano, E. 231 gas resources 99, 101, 105, 106, 109, 110, 111, 112–13, 118–19n, 228, 235, 239 Gelissen, J. 31, 32 Gemeinschaft 3–4, 192, 252 Germany 2, 56, 100, 105, 112 Glaeser, E.L. 209 Glasgow Pollok Credit Union 78 global economic crisis 7–8, 9, 12, 30, 78, 88, 150, 251–2 energy resources and 100, 103, 112–14 interdependency and 49, 54 labour market 41, 64–5

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Reinventing social solidarity across Europe globalisation 2–4, 7, 49–54, 65, 66t, 67, 254 individual solidarity 54–5, 56t, 57f, 58 institutionalised solidarity 58, 59f, 60f, 61f, 62f, 63f, 64–5 Gothenburg Strategy on Sustainable Development (2001) 106 Gould, C.C. 58 governance 76, 78, 79, 83, 141, 151n, 253–4, 256–8, 259f, 260 Gray, J. 87 Greece 7, 65, 100, 160 Group 484 (refugee organisation) 129 ‘group’ (definition) 22 gurbet (migration practice) 132–3

H Habermas, J. 85, 90, 92, 151n, 254 Hague, Treaty of the (1986) 49 Haitian earthquake (2010) 22, 56 Hall, S. 86 Harvey, D. 87 healthcare 210, 213, 214f Helsinki Committee for Human Rights 130 Hibbing, J.R. 203, 204 Hirst, P. 87–8, 91 homelessness 38–9, 42 horizontal solidarity 33 Hradecký, I. 38 human rights 144, 227–9, 257 approach to social solidarity 74, 75 migration and integration 127–9, 135 Slovakia 237–41 Human Rights Act (1998) (UK) 73 human rights-based humanitarian organisations 129 Hungary 157, 166, 173, 184n Husserl, Edmund 127

I ICC (International Criminal Court) 145 ICRC (International Committee of the Red Cross) 54 ideas, globalisation of 53–4 IEA (International Energy Agency) 103 IMF (International Monetary Fund) 7, 8, 65 Immigrant Act (2006;2008) (Czech Republic) 40–1 inclusiveness 192, 193, 200 ‘individual’ (definition) 22

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individual solidarity 51, 52t, 54–5, 56t, 57f, 58, 66t, 123 individualism 192, 236, 252, 254, 255 migration and integration 132–3 inequality 5, 11, 72–4, 79, 230, 254, 255 ‘Inform-bureau’ crisis 160, 161, 183n information, coordination and migration policy development hubs 130 INOGATE programme 113 institutionalised solidarity 6t, 7, 51, 52t, 66t, 67, 71, 251, 255, 256 globalisation and 58,59f, 60f, 61f, 62f, 63f, 64–5 instrumental approach to solidarity 23–4, 26, 42 intense radical/ derived democracy 6t International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) 54 International Convention of the UN on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (1990) 127–8 International Criminal Court (ICC) 145 International Energy Agency (IEA) 103, 104 International Monetary Fund (IMF) 7, 8, 65 International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) 210, 213, 214f, 216–17, 218f, 219f, 220, 221f, 222f Ireland 7 Italy 161, 183n

J Janmaat, J.G. 196 Jospin, Lionel 142

K Kardelj, E. 162 Keune, M. 149 kinship solidarity 132–3 Kolektiv autorů 38 Koster, F. 53, 54, 55, 64 Kritikos, A. 231 Kyoto Protocol (1997) 103, 114n, 145

L labour market Central and Eastern Europe 161–2, 163f, 168t, 237 global economic crisis and 41, 64–5 policies 31, 37–8, 42, 64–5 Laitinen, A. 230

Conclusion Index language of politics 20 Latvia 169, 171f Legal Clinic for Refugees 130 Leibniz, G.W. 101 ‘Let’s clean Slovenia’ (eco-social solidarity group) 177–8 liberalism 122–3 Linz, J. 194 Lisbon Treaty (2007) 1, 12n, 49–50, 110 Lithuania 169, 172f Living Minimum Act (1991) 36 LNG (liquefied natural gas) project 110–11 Long-Term Strategy for Housing (Slovakia) 236 Lorenz, W. 2, 73, 78 low intense deliberative democracy 6t

M McSweeney, B. 151n Man of Iron (film) 231 Manners, I. 139, 140–1, 142, 143, 151n Marinkovic, D. 134 Marks, S. 258 MARRI (Migration, Asylum, Refugees Regional Initiative) 130 Marxist concept of solidarity 20, 21 Maastricht Treaty (1992) 49 mechanical solidarity 6t, 50–1 Mediterranean Energy Ring 109, 110 Melucci, A. 92–3, 94 Mesic, M. 133, 134, 137n Mexico 144–5 Migration, Asylum, Refugees Regional Initiative (MARRI) 130 migration and integration 34, 38, 40–1, 42, 43n, 125–7, 135, 136n, 209 Central and Eastern Europe 161–2, 163f citizenship and 133–4, 137n civil society and 126, 128–9, 131–2, 135 human rights and 127–9, 135 individualism and 132–3 non-governmental organisations (NGOs) 126, 128, 129–31 Mitteleuropa 160, 161, 183n Moldova 169, 173 moral individual solidarity 51, 55, 66t, 67 moral institutionalised solidarity 51–2, 58, 66t, 67 morality 51 Morozov, Pavlik 121 Mouffe, C. 85, 91, 92 multi-sector intergenerational social solidarity 7

Mutual Economic Assistance, Council of (COMECON/MEA) 162 Munck, R. 148

N Nabucco project 101, 112, 113, 118–19n National Action Plan on Employment (2004–06) 37 National Action Plan of the Slovak Republic Regarding the Decade of Roma Inclusion (NAPS ROMA) (2005–2015) 234 National Action Plan on Social Inclusion 2004–2006 (NAPSI) 35, 42 ‘national’ solidarity 54–5, 254–6 National Strategic Reference Framework (NSRF) (2007–13) 235 National Strategy Report on Social Protection and Social Inclusion 2008–2010 (NSRSPSI) 35, 233–4 ‘necrocapitalism’ 159 neoliberalism 3, 7, 9, 10, 29, 37, 38, 74, 78, 236, 254, 257 European collective identity and 83–4, 86–7, 89–90, 91, 94, Netherlands 2, 56 New Europe Transmission System (NETS) 109 Niżnik, J. 3–4, 8 non-governmental organisations (NGOs) 9–10, 30, 33, 39, 40, 42, 144 migration and integration 126, 128, 129–31 Romania 194–6, 203, 204t, 205–6 normative power Europe (NPE) 139, 149–50, 251, 257 concept of 140–2 critique of 142–5 synergy of norms and interests 145–9, 152n North American Free Trade Agreement 144 NSRF (National Strategic Reference Framework) (2007–13) 235 NSRSPSI (National Strategy Report on Social Protection and Social Inclusion 2008–2010) 35, 233–4

O Oberthur, S. 151–2n OECD see Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Official Development Assistance (ODA) 58, 59f, 60f, 61f, 62f, 63f, 67 267

Reinventing social solidarity across Europe Open Method of Coordination (OMC) 233 openness, social and economic 54, 55, 56t, 57f, 58, 61, 62f, 64, 67 Operation Program Environment (OPE) 235–6 Orbán, A. 8 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 58, 59f, 102–3 ‘organisations of associated labour’ 162, 165f ‘organising units’ of discourse 20, 25

P Pace, M. 143, 149, 151n Pakistan 146 PHARE (Poland and Hungary: Assistance for Restructuring their Economies) 240 Pickett, K. 230, 231 ‘plastic Armani’ assets 159, 183n Poland 157, 167, 243n post-communism solidarity 122–3, 131 post-materialism 196 post-socialist countries see Central and Eastern Europe; Eastern-Central Europe poverty, protection against 36–7, 41, 107 private sector, state intervention 214, 215f, 216–17 privatisation 73 Prodi, Romano 142, 143 Prometheus-technical strategy of mankind 102 protest avoidance strategy 35 public expenditure, welfare states 217, 218f, 219f, 220, 221f, 222f public policies, human rights and 227–9, 232–7 Public Service Unions, European Federation of 77 Putnam, R.D. 30, 33, 43n, 183n

R ‘race to the bottom’ hypothesis 64, 66, 87–91, 194 Rawls, J. 51, 90, 92, 121, 123 reciprocity 65, 89 reciprocal individual solidarity 51, 66 reciprocal institutional solidarity 52, 63, 64, 66 Redistributive Attitude Index 219f, 221f, 222f Refugee and Migration Studies, Centre for (CERMES) 130, 136n 268

Regional Operational Programme (ROP) 235–6 remittances 132, 133, 135 Report on the Living Conditions of Roma in Slovakia (UNDP) 239, 244n representational politics 86, 91–4 Resolution GA/10967 (UN) 238 returnees, migration and 133–4, 135, 137n Rippe, K. 123 risk, globalisation and 53 Roche Kelly, C. 151–2n Roma minority 34, 42, 44n, 72, 185n, 199, 203, 205, 243–4n cross-border ‘ethnic’ solidarity 179–81 exclusion and 38, 39–40 human rights and 228–9, 233, 234–41, 242–3n Romania 136n, 157, 168, 173, 184n, 196–9, 205–6 citizenship 191, 202–3 dimensions of solidarity 199–200, 201t, 202 trade unions/NGOs 194–6, 203, 204t, 205, 206n welfare state 200, 202 Romanian Presidential Study 2009 (Babeş-Bolyai University of Cluj) 198 Rome, Treaty of (1957) 24, 139 Russia 112–13, 157–8, 169, 173

S Šantić, Jelena 129 Sartre, Jean Paul 5, 74, 257, 258 Scheipers, S. 145 Schuman Declaration (1950) 3–4, 23–4, 100, 114n, 139 Schuyt, K. 18 Schwartz, F.W. 79 Schwartz, J. 5 Schwartz, J.M. 90 Scottish Government 75, 259 Second Strategic Energy Review (2008) (European Commission) 113 security 131 energy resources and 101–4 South Eastern Europe 125–34 self-management 161–2, 163f, 164f, 183n Serbia 133 sibling solidarity 132 Sicurelli, D. 145 ‘Singapore issues’ 148 Sirovátka, T. 9

Conclusion Index Slovak National Action Plan for Social Inclusion (2004–2006) 238 Slovak National Sustainable Development Strategy (NSDS) (2001) 233 Slovakia 157, 166, 184n, 229, 232–7, 238–42 Slovenia 124, 160, 161, 169, 176, 178–81 Smith, M.E. 144 Smith, N.H. 230 social capital 30, 31–4, 41, 42, 43n, 124, 132, 134, 183n social citizenship 10, 76 social democratic concept of solidarity 20, 21 Social Development, World Summit for (1995) 238 social inclusion 29, 34–41 ‘Social Open Method of Coordination’ (Social OMC) 9, 29–30, 31, 42–3, 76, 254 social policy 10–11 social self-governing 162 social solidarity definition of 192–4 ‘dialectical circularity’ of governance and 256–8, 259f, 260 framework of typologies 5, 6t historical development 1–2 national to transnational 254–6 theories of 4–5, 6t, 7 unified theory of 253–4 social trust 31–2, 42, 43n, 193 social work professionals 73–4, 75, 77–8, 253–4 socio-psychological features of solidarity 21–2 solidarity, meaning of concept 17, 18– 19, 20–6, 50–1, 52t, 229–32, 243n Solidarity Purpose Target (Scottish Government) (2011) 75, 259, 260 Solidarity (Solidarnść, trade union) 9–10, 26n, 167 Soros Foundation Romania 198 Southern Gas Corridor 109, 113 Stepan, A. 194 Stjernø, S. 21, 22, 24–5 Storey, A. 147, 149, 252 Structural and Cohesion Funds (EU) 109–10 structuralist theory of solidarity 231 success, attribution of 211, 212f, 213 Sweden 2, 88–9, 162, 169 Switzerland 162 Szántó, Z. 8 Szymanski, M. 144

T Tanaka, Nobuo 104 TEN-E (Trans-European Networks for Energy) 101, 108, 109–10, 117n Theiss-Morse, E. 203, 204 Therborn, G. 5–6 Third Way 4 ‘three traditions of solidarity’ 20–1 ‘top–down’ approach to solidarity 122 Tóth, I.G. 218 trade unions 9–10, 26n, 33, 77, 78, 167 Romania 194–6, 203, 204t, 205, 206n transmission system operators (TSOs) 108–9 transnational social solidarity 11, 12, 74, 75, 78, 91, 157, 198, 251 national social solidarity and 254–6 poorer countries 202, 205, 206 Treaty on European Union (1992) 24 Treaty of the Hague (1986) 49 Treaty of Maastricht (1992) 49 Treaty of Rome (1957) 24, 139

U Uhlin, A. 204 Ukraine 169, 173 unemployment protection 31, 37–8, 44n UNISON (trade union) 77 United Kingdom 1, 13n, 56, 72, 105 United Nations Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 40 Conference on the Human Environment (1972) 237–8 Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC) (1989) 73, 74, 76 International Convention of the UN on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (1990) 127–8 Report on the Living Conditions of Roma in Slovakia 239, 244n Resolution GA/10967 238 United States 56, 85, 90, 93, 140, 144

V Van Oorschot, W. 31, 32 van Paridon, K. 8 Varoufakis,Y. 125 vertical solidarity 33 Visegrád countries 157, 166, 167, 169, 182n, 184n

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Reinventing social solidarity across Europe

W Wajda, Andrzej 231 Warsaw Pact 10, 160, 162, 164, 166, 184n welfare states 7–8, 11, 18, 25, 30, 62, 64, 88, 100, 159, 191, 193–4 attribution of success 211, 212f, 213 childcare 71, 75, 76, 78 Czech Republic 34–5 decommodification of healthcare/ education 210, 213, 214f preferences for 209–11, 222–3 private sector intervention 214, 215f, 216–17 public expenditure 217, 218f, 219f, 220, 221f, 222f role of competition 211, 212f, 213 Romania 200, 202 West Balkans 124–5 West Germany 161, 163f White, J. 198 Wilensky, H. 231 Wilkinson, R. 230, 231 Williams, J. 74 World Development Indicators (WDI) 167t, 168t, 170f, 171f, 172f World Summit for Social Development (1995) 238 World Values Survey (WVS) 210, 211, 212f, 213, 214, 215f, 216–7 Wylie, G. 151n

Y Youngs, R. 146 Yugoslavia 124, 133, 134, 136n, 157, 173, 182n, 184–5n self-management 160, 161–2, 164, 165f, 181, 183n

Z Zhelev, Zhelju 127

270

As Europe’s public realms face upheaval, this is the first book to identify how social solidarity is being reinvented from below and redefined from above. Interdisciplinary transnational approaches provide new insights into the relationship between national and transnational social solidarity across Europe. Valuable to students, policy makers and scholars, it reveals social solidarity as the defining pillar of European integration, bringing a greater dimension and integrity beyond democracy across nation states.

Marion Ellison is Director of HOPES European Research Network and lectures in Social and Public Policy at Queen Margaret University, Edinburgh. She has provided research on governance, policy and practice for looked after children for governments in Europe.

SOCIAL STUDIES / SOCIAL POLICY

ISBN 978-1-84742-727-4

www.policypress.co.uk

Reinventing social solidarity across Europe_PPC.indd 1

REINVENTING SOCIAL SOLIDARITY ACROSS EUROPE • Edited by Marion Ellison

“This is a vital contribution to debates about the contested character of social solidarity within and across Europe. In the face of economic crisis and new dynamics of social inequality and exclusion, this important collection examines the prospects, problems and paradoxes of reconstructing solidarity.” John Clarke, Professor of Social Policy, The Open University, UK

Reinventing social solidarity across Europe Edited by Marion Ellison

9 781847 427274

04/10/2011 14:36:11