Regions and National Integration in Thailand 1892-1992 3447036087

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Volker Grabowsky (ed.)

Regions and National Integration in Thailand 1892-1992

1995 Harrassowitz Verlag • Wiesbaden

Printed with financial support of the German Research Association (DFG)

Die Deutsche Bibliothek - CIP-Einheitsaufnahme Regions and national integration in Thailand1892-1992/ Volker Grabowsky (ed.). - Wiesbaden : Harrassowitz, 1995 ISBN 3-447-03608-7 NE: Grabowsky, Volker jHrsg.]

© Otto Harrassowitz, Wiesbaden 1995 This work, including all of its parts, is protected by copyright. Any use beyond the limits of copyright law without the permission of the publisher is forbidden and subject to penalty. This applies particularly to reproductions, translations, microfilms and storage and processing in electronic systems. Printed on acid-free paper. Printing and binding by MZ-Verlagsdruckerei GmbH, Memmingen Printed in Germany ISBN 3-447-03608-7

CONTENTS Preface (Bernhard Dahm) Editorial Note Acknowledgements Introduction (Volker Grabowsky) I.

H.

VII IX X 1

The North (Lan Na)

13

A Brief History of Lan Na (Hans Penth)

15

Northern Thailand: The Natural Region and the Cultural Landscape (Harald Uhlig)

22

Notions of Equity in Lan Na: Insights from Literary Sources (Harald Hundius)

46

Administrative Reforms and National Integration in Northern Thailand (M.R. Rujaya Abhakorn/David Wyatt)

68

When the Young Cannot Speak Their Own Mother Tongue: Explaining a Legacy of Cultural Domination in Lan Na (Thanet Charoenmuang)

82

The Hill Tribes of Northern Thailand: Current Trends and Problems of their Integration into the Modern Thai Nation (Roland Mischung)

94

The Northeast (Isan)

105

The Isan up to its Integration into the Siamese State (Volker Grabowsky)

107

The "Problem-Region" Northeastern Thailand (Harald Uhlig)

130

Administrative Reforms and National Integration: The Case of the Northeast (Paitoon Mikusol)

145

Hegemony and Resistance in Northeastern Thailand (Charles F. Keyes)

154

Regional Identity versus National Integration Contemporary Patterns of Modernization in Northeastern Thailand (Hans U. Luther)

183

VI IK.

The Malay South (Patani)

193

Tradition and Cultural Background of the Patani Region (Worawit Baru alias Ahmad Idris)

195

Southern Thailand and its Border Provinces (Harald Uhlig)

211

National Integration and Resistance Movement: The Case of Muslims in Southern Thailand (Wan Kadir Che Man)

232

TV. The National Perspective

251

National Integration: Summary and Perspectives for the Future (Ekavidya Nathalang)

253

Thailand's Cultural Relations with Its Neighbours (Khien Theeravit)

265

Glossary Index

282 288

Maps and Figures 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14.

Thai monthon, 1907/8 Northern Thailand. Topographical orientation and approximate distribution of the ethno-linguistic groups Landscape profile of Northern Thailand Schematic highland-lowland transect for Northern Thailand Spatial relations and migration of the ethnic groups in Northern Thailand Glutinous rice as a staple crop Ethnic groups in Northeastern Thailand Khorat Plateau. Elevations and tectonic structure; annual precipitation in mm and variability of rainfall Administrative transformation of Patani Thai government administration for Muslim Malays in Thailand Regional development promotion in Thailand Rural population density (excl. municipal areas) and main rice-growing areas in South Thailand Muslim minorities in the cangwat of Southern Thailand Seven Malay principalities

3 28 30 32 38 109 109 131 200 207 212 218 221 235

PREFACE Bernhard Dahm, University of Passau The present volume contains the papers presented at the Sixth International Symposium on Southeast Asia Studies at Passau University in June 1992. For the first time a Passau conference was focussing on Thailand, and the topic selected for the discussion of noted scholars and experts on Thailand in the beautiful environment of SchloB Neuburg was "Regions and National Integration in Thailand 1892-1992". Regionalism and national integration are crucial issues in many of the modern Southeast Asian states and in most cases the former colonial powers are, in part at least, responsible for the conflicts arising from artificially drawn borders, from new administrative units, from privileges of ethnic or religious minorities in the various states, etc.. But, as the case of Thailand demonstrates, similar problems existed also in regions which were never colonized. The conference discussed developments in Lan Na (Northern Thailand), Isan (Northeast Thailand) and in Patani (South Thailand). Volker Grabowsky took the burden of editing the book, going over the various contributions again and again, inviting new chapters and finally succeeded in presenting a well structured and highly readable volume: A brief history of the respective regions is followed by a discussion of the geographic setting before we learn about the consequences of the administrative reforms aimed at centralization and the establishment of national unity in Northern, Northeastern and Southern Thailand since 1892. The importance of Prince Damrong's administrative reforms in the context of Thai history is discussed in Grabowsky's comprehensive introduction, which comments also on some major points of the contributions. An early highlight of the conference was the announcement during the opening ceremony of the creation of a professorship for Thai and Lao Languages and Literatures in Passau by the President of the University. Thus it was indicated that this first Passau conference on Thai Studies, the .contributions to which are herewith handed over to the public, will have its sequels in years to come. We thank the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft for financial support of the conference and for a grant for the publication of its proceedings. Our thanks go also to the Thai-German Cultural

vin

Bernhard

Dahm

Foundation in Bangkok and to the Deutsch-Thailandische Gesellschaft in Bonn for additional scholarships for Thai colleagues from the various parts of Thailand. Their presence in Passau greatly enriched the discussions because of their intimate knowledge of the regions and they thus helped, together with the noted experts from other parts of the world to make the conference a full success.

EDITORIAL NOTE 1 . Throughout this volume, with the exception of two contributions, a broad phonetically oriented transcription is used to romanize Thai names and words. This system follows - with some minor modifications - the Thai Royal Academy's "General System of Phonetic Transcription" (see Journal of the Siam Society, vol. 33, pt. 1 (1941), pp. 49-65). Diacritics have been held to an absolute minimum, thus blurring the distinction between o and p. Only the German ii is used (ii instead of u', and iia instead of u'a). 2. Official or widely used orthography in forms like Vientiane, Luang Prabang, Chakri, Chulalongkorn, etc., has been maintained. Romanized spellings of personal names are, if known, given in the form used or preferred by their holders. 3. A glossary has been added to explain the most important Thai (and Malay) terms. Whenever possible, their spelling in the Thai alphabet is also given. 4. Surnames are a twentieth-century innovation in Thailand, introduced during the reign of King Vajiravudh in the early 1920s. Even at present, the Thai usually are referred to by their given name. This general practice is followed in this volume, too. Former Prime Minister Chatchai Chunhawan is referred to as PM Chatchai, not PM Chunhawan.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS Many people have contributed to the final publication of this volume. Bernhard Dahm, my teacher over many years, gave helpful and critical comments on the introduction. Harald Hundius, Chatyupha Sawaddipong and Ubonphan Wannasai were especially helpful on linguistic matters. I am further much indebted to Barbara Heuschkel, Markus Hahneiser and Florian Walling for their help in preparing the index and for proof-reading the manuscript. Steve Milosevic and Paul Kelemen took great pains in polishing the English of various articles. Several maps and charts were skillfully drawn to my specifications by Gunther Moosbauer. Finally, I also wish to thank the German Research Foundation (DFG) for providing financial support of publishing this book.

Introduction Volker Grabowsky, University of Passau During the first two or three decades after independence, policies of national integration had top priority everywhere in Southeast Asia. The ruling Elites in the newly independent states were, by and large, preoccupied with "nation-building". In most cases that implied the restructuring of centralized bureaucracies and the promotion of "national" cultures. Political stability was to be achieved and economic prosperity ensured by these means. Regional traditions and the rights of minority groups were often neglected because of fears that they would hamper or even undermine national integration. It seems not too far-fetched to attribute such centralizing policies to the colonial legacy, for the European powers - like Britain, France and the Netherlands - either had built up centralized systems of civil administration in their Southeast Asian colonies or, at certain times, had turned to classical divide-et-impera policies by supporting separatist movements against "national", anti-colonial Elites.1 In countries like Indonesia and Laos the requirements of a modern nation-state have yet to be satisfactorily reconciled with regional traditions and identities. In Burma this dilemma could not be resolved; it exploded into a bloody civil war with no solution in sight. In Southeast Asia, Thailand is the only country which had successfully resisted colonial domination. Therefore, it might be worthwhile to examine whether Thailand encountered similar problems of national integration as experienced by its unlucky neighbours and how it solved these problems. For this purpose, an international symposium on "Regions and National Integration in Thailand, 1892-1992" was convened at the University of Passau in June 1992. Well-known Thai experts from Europe, North America and Thailand itself came together to discuss the process of the integration of the outer regions in the various fields of culture, 1

In 1947 and 1948 the Dutch pushed ahead with a federal solution in the areas under their control. Autonomous states were created in East and South Sumatra, Madura and West Java (Pasundan). In the end there were fifteen federal states each shortlived. See M.C. Ricklefs. A History of Modern Indonesia Since 1300. London: Macmillan, 21993 (1983), p. 226; see also Bernhard Dahm. History of Indonesia in the Twentieth Century. London: Pall Mall Press, 1971, pp. 128ff.

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society, politics and economy. The articles in this volume are mostly revised versions of papers presented at the colloquium. In addition, Harald Uhlig contributed articles on the geographical and environmental conditions of each of the three regions under discussion. He also elaborated in detail on socio-economic and demographic aspects, thus providing a better understanding of regional particularities. 1892 was chosen as the point of departure for the discussions because that very year marked the beginning of a "modern", i.e. Westernized, provincial administration (thesaphiban 2 ). In 1892, Prince Damrong Rachanuphap, King Chulalongkorn’s younger half-brother, took over the Ministry of the Interior (mahatthai) which he restructured along functional lines. The old system of provincial hierarchies based on different relationships between various categories of "provinces" (miiang) or semi-independent principalities (prathetsarat) and the capital was abolished. It was replaced by a system that imposed central administrative control and legal authority over each miiang equally regardless of its distance from the capital. Various miiang were united as "circles" (monthon) and placed under the supervision of superintendent commissioners (khaluang thesaphiban) who were agents of the Ministry of the Interior in Bangkok. The new system of provincial administration was first introduced by Prince Damrong in 1893 in the provinces surrounding Bangkok and, some years later, also established in the former autonomous prathetsarat.3 Although the changes resulting from King Chulalongkorn's reforms could be observed throughout the kingdom, they were most conspicious in the outer regions. These zones shared common borders with the expanding colonial powers, the British (Burma, Malaya) and the French (Laos, Cambodia). They had the most to lose in terms of political autonomy and cultural identity. Therefore, it made sense that the participants of our symposium concentrated their attention on developments in Lan Na (Upper North), Isan (Northeast) and Patani (Lower South). Furthermore, the experts were

2 3

Thesaphiban literally means "the protection over (SktJ Pali: abhipala) land (deSa): The comprehensive study of the thesaphiban system i s Tej Bunnag's seminal work The Provincial Administration of Siam, 1892-1915. Kuala Lumpur [etc.]: Oxford University Press, 1977.

Introduction

3

Thai monthon, 1907/8

100 km Phayap

Udon

& O I

Nakhon Ratchasima

Nakhon Chaisi

Prachin Buri

0

Isan

v Burapha 1

Chanthaburi

.

Krung Thep Chumphon 0

Kelantan

Trengganu Borders of Thailand until 1904 ------------ until 1907 - ----------- until 1909

Drawn by Gunther Moosbauer

4

Volker Grabowsky

asked to present their views not from a Bangkok-centred perspective but from a regional one. By focusing on the outer regions, one can not only realize the persistence and uniqueness of local traditions, other than Siamese, throughout Thai history, but the history of Thailand itself gains a more complete and balanced shape. Traditional historiography outlines Thai history as the succession of four Siamese (i.e. Central Thai) empires named after their respective capitals: Sukhothai (c. 1240-1351), Ayutthaya (1351-1767), Thonburi (1767-1782), and Bangkok (since 1782). This view fails to acknowledge that until the last quarter of the 18th century the political influence of Siam was confined to roughly two-fifths of Thailand's present-day territory. Moreover, the Kingdom of Sukhothai, centred at the northern fringes of the Cao Phraya basin, was a rival rather than a predecessor of Ayutthaya. Both powers fought a number of fierce wars until Sukhothai finally lost its independence in the mid-15th century. As to various aspects of culture, language, and social organization, the Thai of Sukhothai resembled more the Tai Yuan of Lan Na, than the people of Ayutthaya where Thai culture was most heavily branded by the Angkorean Cambodia. The founder of Lan Na, King Mangrai (r.1258-1317), was a contemporary and a close ally of Sukhothai's famous King Ramkhamhaeng (r.1279?- 1298). Later on, the rulers of Lan Na regarded the northern part of the Cao Phraya basin as their own sphere of influence. Throughout the last half of the 15th and the first two decades of the 16th centuries, Ayutthaya and Chiang Mai fought against each other for control of the Sukhothai-Phitsanulok region. Although the struggle was eventually won due to the larger economic and demographic resources of Ayutthaya, that did not imply any subordinate role of Chiang Mai. At least in theory, both Thai states handled their bilateral affairs on an equal footing. Even after Lan Na had disintegrated into numerous smaller political units, following the Burmese conquest of 1558, Ayutthaya hardly managed to gain any significant foothold in the Upper North, even at times when Burmese domination was dwindling. Siamese influence in the Isan before the mid-18th century was limited as well. Apart from Khorat (Nakhon Ratchasima), the Khorat Plateau belonged to the Lao sphere of influence. Throughout the 16th and 17th centuries Siam (Ayutthaya) and Lan Sang (Vientiane) regarded each other as equals, mutually respecting

Introduction

5

partners. The latent animosity between Lao and Thai is obviously the result of developments in a much later historical period, especially, when under Bangkok’s king Rama in (r.1824-1851), the political autonomy and the cultural self-assertiveness of the Lao were systematically destroyed by the Siamese ruling elite. Unlike in Lan Na and the Isan, Siamese influence in the Peninsula began to spread already during the late Ayutthaya Period. By the turn of the 15th century, Siam firmly controlled the Peninsula as far as Songkhla, which would serve as the southernmost Thai-Buddhist outpost in the Malay-Muslim world. The once powerful sultanate of Patani, around 1680 still the main commercial and cultural centre of the Malays, fell afterwards, step by step, under Ayutthaya’s sphere of influence. However, Patani was fully subjugated by Siam only during the reign of the dynamic King Rama I, founder of the Chakri dynasty which still reigns Thailand today. With the inclusion of the outer regions of Lan Na, Isan and Patani by the late 1780s, Thai history was entering a new stage. Lan Na, the country of "one million paddy fields", is considered one of the heartlands of Tai speaking peoples since their first appearance in present-day Thailand roughly a millennium ago. As Hans Penth points out, Lan Na was not a unified Kingdom but a conglomerate of Northern Thai city states, mostly under the leadership of Chiang Mai, which was founded in 1296. The dominant Yuan or Northern Thai population of Lan Na created a unique Buddhist culture that flourished in the 14th and 15th centuries A.D. and even spread to neighbouring Laos and the eastern Shan States. Its distinctiveness from Central Thai (Siamese) culture was reinforced during the two centuries Lan Na had fallen under Burmese rule (1558-1774). However, the Yuan eventually liberated their country by forging a close alliance with a resurgent Siam under King Taksin and the later King Rama I. The Northern Thai principalities of Chiang Mai, Lampang, Lamphun, Phrae and Nan maintained their independence in internal affairs throughout most of the 19th century. Harald Hundius demonstrates, using the richness of traditional Northern Thai literary sources, that notions of equity in Lan Na reflected a much closer relationship between rulers and ruled than was the case in Siamese society at that time. Hundius, a specialist of Lan Na language and literature, argues for the use of traditional literature, largely

6

Volker Grabowsky

neglected so far, as important source material for the understanding of Thai intellectual history. In this respect, his new approach is breaking ground for historians of other parts of Thailand as well. Anyway, the Northern Thai rulers never seriously questioned Siamese suzerainty. But problems arose when the Western imperialist powers encroached upon areas situated in the backyard of Chiang Mai (e.g., Chiang Tung) or Nan (e.g., Chiang Khaeng). The rulers in the Northern Thai principalities strained the relations between Siam and Britain by mishandling commercial relations with British (teak) companies. As a result the British blamed the government in Bangkok for all legal disputes in Lan Na. M.R. Rujaya Abhakorn and David K. Wyatt argue that the Northern Thai ruling lines were not accustomed to the Western concept of international and commercial law. To come to terms with these problems the Siamese government had to tighten its political and judicial control over "Lan Na, the front-line state in the encounter with the expansionist West". Finally, by the turn of the twentieth century, Lan Na had lost its status of prathetsarat and became the "Northwestern Circle" (Monthon Phayap), an integral part of Siam. The Isan shares some characteristics with Lan Na, but differs in other respects. The huge majority of the local population are Lao (80%) who are ethnically related to their brethren on the eastern side of the Mekong. Since the 17th century the Lao kingdoms of Luang Prabang in the North, Vientiane in the Centre, and Champassak in the South, gradually extended their control over the present Isan. Unlike the Northern Thai principalities, the Lao did not voluntarily join the Siamese orbit. They were forced to do so by military power. The destruction of Vientiane and Champassak in the aftermath of the so-called Cao Anu rebellion (1827) led to an early Siamese presence in the region (see the contribution of Volker Grabowsky). Paitoon Mikusol describes how administrative reforms in the Northeast began as early as 1882. Compared to Lan Na, the integration of the Isan into the Siamese state met strong, sometimes even violent, local resistance as the "Holy Men Rebellions" (khabot phu mi bun of 1901/2 clearly demonstrate.4 The various phu mi bun uprisings did occur independently from one another and spread over a vast area of the Lao and Khmer speaking regions. It took the Thai troops, sent from Nakhon Ratchasima (Khorat), several months to crush the armed resistance. The so-called "Shan rebellion of Phrae" {khabot ngiao miiang phrae) that also took place in 1902 in the

*

Introduction

7

However, the most sensitive region, in terms of national security, has been Patani which as an historical region roughly comprises the three southernmost provinces of Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat. 5 Up to three quarters of its population are Muslims. In modern Thai terminology they are labelled "Thai Muslims". Indeed, this label is misleading because the Muslims of Patani are not ethnic Thai; they speak Malay and are closely linked to the Malay world on the other side of the border, in Kelantan and Trengganu. Therefore, Ahmad Idris, himself a native of the region, calls them "Malay Muslims" as opposed to "Thai Buddhists" in his article on the cultural traditions of Patani. Since the beginning of the 15th century Patani was a vassal state of Ayutthaya. However, this tributary relationship was, for the most part, limited to the supplying of armies in times of war and every three years - to the sending of the so-called "Golden and Silver Flowers" (Malay: bunga mas dan perak)6 i n token of submission. Unlike Lan Na, but like Vientiane, Patani resisted the tightening of tributary relations in the Early Bangkok Period. After an unsuccessful revolt against Siamese supremacy in 1808/9, Patani lost its privileged status as a vassal state and was divided into seven independent mini-states. The Siamese called them the cet huamiiang khaek, the "Seven Malay Provinces". 7 Even decades after its destruction as a state, Malay intellectuals throughout the peninsula considered Patani still to be their cultural centre. When King Chulalongkorn died in 1910, Siam had lost one third of its territory to France and Britain. The loss of the Lao territories on the eastern bank of the Mekong (in 1893) was

5

6 7

North was violent as well, but limited in its duration (two weeks) and geographic extent (Phrae and parts of Lampang). Tej Bunnag (Khabot r.s. 121 "The Uprisings of 1902.” Bangkok: Thai watthana phanit, 21957) analyzed, as one of the first Thai scholars’ background, course and results of the uprisings - both in the Isan and in Lan Na - in detail. "Pattani" is the Thai spelling for the Malay name "Patani". Therefore, "Pattani" will be used to designate the Thai province of the same name while "Patani" will designate the larger historical sphere of the Malay sultanate. Here I used Ahmad Idris as precedent. In Thai: tonmai ngoen tonmai thong, literally meaning "The Silver and Golden Trees". Khaek means in Thai literally "stranger" or "guest" by which the Thai in general mean the brown-skinned, predominantly Islamic peoples of Asia, such as the Malay (khaek malayu), Cham (khaek cam), Indians (khaek thet) and Persians (khaek phoesia).

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Volker Grabowsky

particularly painful. After the 1893 crisis the King fell into despair, but ultimately recovered according to the account of one of his courtiers: "The loss of those margins along the border of the phraratcha-anacak [royal kingdom], which we could not look after anyway, was like the loss of our finger tips. They are distant from our heart and torso, and it is these we must protect to our utmost ability." 8 The implementation of the thesaphiban system in the aftermath of the 1893 crisis appears to have been the answer to the Western challenge. In the end, Siam not only protected its heart (Bangkok) and torso (Siam proper), but, more than that, succeeded also in extending the zones under the king's effective control into some of its vassal states. The "loss" of various others was therefore more than compensated. On the whole, Siam gained from its post-1892 policies more than it lost. By extending administrative control to its outer regions in order to defy Western expansionism, Siam behaved not unlike an indigenous colonial power. Or to put it more favourably, Siam changed from an Asian empire into a modern nation-state. In this respect, Siam resembled Ethiopia, the only African state which had never been colonized. The Ethiopian emperors had at various times exercized a shifting and often uneasy control or jurisdiction over large tracts of East Africa. To counter European, i.e. British and Italian, expansion in the last quarter of the 19th century, Emperors Yohannes IV (1871-89) and Menelik II (1889-1913) modernized the outdated administrative system in Ethiopia proper (the Amhara-Tigre core area in the northern highlands) with the help of European advisers. Furthermore, territorial expansion into the southern lowlands occurred mostly under Emperor Menelik whose reign coincided with the European "Scramble for Africa".9 Seen from the central governmental perspective, both Ethiopia and Siam had to modernize and expand in order to come to terms with a changing world dominated by Western concepts of national sovereignity and 8

9

Khachorn Sukhabhanij [Khacon Sukphanit], Khomun prawattisat samai bangkok [Historical Accounts of the Bangkok Period, Bangkok 1981, p. 252; quoted after Thongchai Winichaikul, "Siam Mapped: A History of the Geo-Body of Siam", Ph.D. diss., Sydney 1988, p. 317. See M.B. Akpan, "Liberia and Ethopia, 1880-1914: The Survival of Two African States", In General History of Africa, vol. 7 ("Africa under Colonial Domination 1880-1935"), ed. A. Adu Boahen. London: Heinemann, 1985, pp. 254ff.

Introduction

9

territorial integrity. If one adopts the regional perspective instead, the verdict of "inner colonialism" does not appear fully unjustified. In 1932, a coup d'etat by young officers and civil servants abolished the absolute monarchy (rabop somburanayasitthiraf) because it had turned out to be an impediment to the political and social changes which the monarchy itself had initiated some decades before. Siam then adopted a Western-style constitutional system that was challenged repeatedly by authoritarian military rule in the following six decades. By 1933, the restructuring of the administration, both on the national and the provincial levels, had come to a close. The metamorphosis from an empire to a centralized nation-state was formally acknowledged by the country's new name: Thailand (since 1939). Administrative reforms as such were not sufficient to create a centralized polity, since the outer regions possessed unique cultural characteristics, such as language, script and - in the case of Patani - religion that favoured regional instead of national loyalties. Therefore, a uniform educational system based on Central Thai language and worldview was imposed on the whole kingdom. Thanet Charoenmuang describes how in Lan Na the regional language (kam miiang) and script (tua miiang) had been suppressed until the 1950s. He views the promotion of tourism in the North, since the late 1970s, as a further evil because it encouraged the influx of Central Thai capital and commercial interests into the North. On the other hand, however, tourism helped the Northern Thai to become conscious of their traditions. Moreover, tourism has also made the (non-Tai) hill tribes a focal point of interest. With two exceptions (Karen, Lua), the hill tribes are recent immigrants making up almost one tenth of the population in the Upper North. Roland Mischung elaborates on the hill tribes' dual or triple identities in a plural Thai society: their consciousness of their own proper traditions and their integration into the lowland Yuan (Northern Thai) and Central Thai societies. Another contribution concerning itself with multiple identities, is Charles F. Keyes' article on cultural hegemony and political resistance in Northeastern Thailand. Keyes argues that the modern educational system instituted throughout Thailand by the late 1930s oriented the Lao of Isan toward Bangkok rather than Vientiane. But at the same time, "it also continued to stimulate awareness among Northeasterners of their disadvantaged position within Thai society."

10

Volker Grabowsky

Many Northeasterners began to identify themselves as Khon Isan ("People of the Northeast") rather than Lao. Even the most radical elements among them, the communists, sought an improvement in living conditions within the Thai state. As a rule, they did not call for separation from Thailand and union with Socialist Laos. During the last two decades the Thai economy developed rapidly. Thailand is now one of the five East Asian "tigers" approaching the status of a "Newly Industrialized Country" (NIC). The Northeast has profited, and is still profiting, from this economic boom, as HansUlrich Luther explains. With the world-wide decline of communism, the Lao People's Democratic Republic (LPDR) looks with admiration at the Isan on the other side of the Mekong. Laos is considered by the Thai government to be a pillar of its new foreign policy. For the fiscal year of 1992, for example, the care-taker government of Anand Panyarachun allocated funds of 175 million Baht for economic and technical cooperation with neighbouring countries of which the lion's share, 43.3 million Baht or almost 25% of the total, was allocated for Laos (see contribution of Khien Theeravit). Like the Isan, the Thai-Malaysian frontier zone has been at an economic disadvantage for many decades. However, the political and. social tensions in Patani are not primarily attributable to economic exploitation, as Wan Kadir Che Man emphasizes, "but what seems to be at issue is a conflict of cultures between the Patani Muslims and the Thai intruders." Patani Muslims have close family ties with their Malay brethren in the economically more developed state of Kelantan which is part of the Malaysian federation. Che Man does not reject the possibility that Islamic fundamentalism, which is already flourishing in Kelantan, could spill over the border and revive the separatist movements in Patani.10 10

At present, the Muslim community in Patani shows great interest in the fate of the Bosnian Muslims who are fighting a civil war against "Serbian Christian fundamentalists" (khristian hua runraeng chao soebia). During a recent visit to Patani (in April 1993) I was told that local Muslims have collected several hundred million Baht to support the Muslims in former Yugoslavia, far away from Southeast Asia, with medicine and weapons. In early 1993, an Islamic publishing house in the province of Narathiwat (AlJihad) published the pamphlet "The Geo-History and Present Events in Bosnia-Hercegovina" [Phumi-prawattisat lae hetkan patcuban nai bosnia hoesegowina] by Abdullah Abru and Abdullah Lomaen. The question is whether and to what extent the Malay Muslims of Patani will compare the situation in their country to that of former Yugoslavia (before the war).

Introduction

11

On balance however, when compared to neighbouring countries like Burma and Indonesia, policies of national integration in Thailand appear to have been quite successful. The contributors of this volume provide a number of reasons: the unifying character of Thai (Siamese) kingship as the pivotal national symbol; the flexible, modernizing policies of the King and the political elite; the relative ethnic homogenity of the Thai population; and a remarkable ability of Thai culture to assimilate alien nationalities. However, problems still exist, especially with regard to the Malay Muslims of Patani. As a modern Thai nation-state has been established successfully, Ekavidya Nathalang believes that tensions between regions and the centre would calm down, if Bangkok adopts a more flexible policy regarding its ethnic and religious minorities. National integration, by no means an end in itself, enabled Thailand to cope with the colonial threat and Western imperialism. Now approaching the twenty-first century, the citizens of the Kingdom of Thailand should be allowed to be proud of their own regional cultures and at the same time of being members of a single Thai nation. Such an attitude should not endanger national unity.

***

The present volume is regarded as an attempt to analyse comprehensively the problems of national intergration in Thailand from a regional point of view. However, due to the proceedings of the conference and the particular interests of the scholars involved not all aspects of region-centre relations could be discussed satisfactorily. Legal aspects of the national integration process have largly been neglected. The same holds true to the demographic changes as direct or indirect results of this process. These issues are too complex to be briefly addressed in this introduction. However, one should keep in mind that, unlike Vietnam, Thailand never tried to colonize its vassals and outer regions physically by large population transfers. The resettlement of ethnic Siamese in Malay Patani during the early Bangkok period, as mentioned by Ahmad Idris, was carried out on a rather low scale and had no counterparts in other regions. Up to the last quarter of the 19th century it was Thai tradition not to colonize newly aquired territories but, vice versa, to deport parts of the "conquered" populations as war captives (chaloei) for resettlement in the comparatively underpopulated Siamese heartland of the Cao Phraya basin.

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Volker Grabowsky

After World War H, however, the right-wing ultra-nationalist Sarit government (1958-63) initiated a so-called "Self-Help Settlement Project" in the southern border provinces to increase the number of Thai Buddhists in this Malay Muslim dominated region. Later on, during the 1970s and 1980s, thousands of people from the impoverished Isan immigrated into the economically more prosperous South, Thai Buddhist (Hat Yai/Songkhla) as well as Malay Muslim areas. In Pattani, industrial workers and fishermen are today predominantly ethnic Lao. These recent Lao immigrants are considered less trustworthy than the earlier established Thai and Chinese population. Nevertheless, immigration does not seem to have changed the ethnic balance in the Patani region to any significant degree. The national census figures of 1947 and 1980 indicate only a marginal decline in the numbers of Muslims who live in the Patani core region (1947: 78.2%; 1980: 74.2%). Only the small province of Satun, situated on the west coast and historically a part of the Sultanate of Kedah, has experienced a substantial decline in its Muslim population (1947: 86.6%; 1980: 66.0%). n Whether the papers of the colloquium discuss new developments or introduce new methods of research, they will, we are convinced, stimulate further discussion of the process of national integration in Thailand, its impacts on regional traditions and the reconciliation of these two, seemingly contradictory, political goals.

11

See Volker Grabowsky. "History of the Muslims in Thailand." In Domestic Architecture of the Thai Muslims, ed. Martin Ortmeier, pp. 26-34. Passau: Freilichtmuseum Massing, 1993.

I. THE NORTH (LAN NA)

A BRIEF HISTORY OF LAN NA Hans Penth, Social Research Institute, Chiang Mai University Lan Na or Lan Na Thai is the name of a conglomerate of Thai city states which, mostly under the leadership of Chiang Mai, covered about the area of modern Northern Thailand and extended its influence far into the neighbouring regions. The earliest known mention of the name Lan Na occurs in a stone inscription of 1553 where Lan’ is spelled with a mai tho and where the name means "one million paddy fields". In the same inscription occurs the name Lan Chang, an old alias for the city state of Luang Phra Bang, which means "one million elephants”. But the origin of both names is unknown and also what they really mean or imply. Lan Na was inhabited by humans already in early prehistoric times, about one million years ago, as is attested by stone tools found in geologically datable sites in the provinces of Lampang and Phra. In the provinces of Nan and Phra still lives a people which until about 1950 had an ancient prehistoric culture of the huntergatherer type; these are the Mrabri or Phi Tong Luang "Spirits of the Yellow Leaves". But it is unknown whether they are descendants of the local prehistoric oldtimers or whether they are more recent immigrants. Probably descended from one of the younger local prehistoric peoples are the Lawa with a culture of the gatherer and gardener type and a traditional knowledge of iron working. Nowadays they are as modern as the average upcountry Thai. The first 'high culture', i.e. a culture that uses writing and has an administration that reaches beyond local villages, came to Lan Na in around A.D. 750 when a rishi (hermit) of unknown origin founded the town of Hariphunchai (modern Lamphun) and invited the Mon princess Jam Thewl from Lop Buri to become its first ruler. She brought with her a good number of monks and craftsmen. The monks represented a Theravada Buddhism which was mixed with animistic beliefs and Mahayana ideas such as the passing on or sharing of merit, still an important element of modern Thai Buddhism. During the lifetime of Queen Jam Thewl, Khelang was founded, the predecessor town of modern Lampang. In around 1050, a cholera epidemic forced the Lamphun Mon to emigrate for about 6 years to the Mon towns Thaton and Pegu in

16

Hans Penth

south-central Burma. Later, both Mon centres stayed in contact: After their return to Lamphun, the Lamphun Mon once a year floated ceremonial presents downriver to their distant relatives, a variant form of modern Loi Krathong; and the Burmese Mon often emigrated to Lan Na when in difficulties at home. The last major influx of thousands of Mon occurred in the early 19th century; King Rama I ordered King Kawila of Chiang Mai to send them down and settled them near Bangkok. There still are old people in the Lamphun area who speak Mon and whose parents or grandparents immigrated around 1910. The first Thai probably arrived soon after the cholera epidemic of 1050. A chronicle mentions for c.1150 a Thai village on the Ping River near Lamphun. About one hundred years later, c.1250, an official of Thai descent but in Mon service revolted at Lampang and occupied Lamphun for a short period of time. During these two centuries, from about 1050 to 1250, small groups of Thai slowly infiltrated Lan Na from northern directions. Some may have lived by themselves (there was empty space enough for Lawa, Mon and Thai) but others seem to have sought and received protection from Lawa chiefs. Perhaps in grateful return for that, the later kings of Chiang Mai, until the 19th century, granted the Lawa special rights and reduced taxes. One particular group of Thai which came to settle in Lan Na was called by its neighbours Yuan, Yun or Yon (Yonaka in Pali texts, re-thaiized as 'Yonok'). Previously, the Yuan had lived in the area where now the three countries, Burma-Laos-Thailand, meet, or somewhat further north. Their first known fully historical ruler, Phaya ("King") Mang Rai, was a relative of the Thai Lii house of Chiang Rung in Yunnan. He founded Chiang Rai "King Mang Rai's City" in 1263 and occupied Lamphun in around 1290-92. Lamphun's last Mon ruler fled south, but his people stayed on. By now, the Thai were much more numerous and the Mon of Lamphun would have been absorbed in the Thai population had not Mon repeatedly immigrated from Burma, as already mentioned. In 1296, Mang Rai founded Chiang Mai "New City", in 1327 one of his successors founded Chiang San "King San Phu's City", and soon after the Thai principality of Phayao also came under the house of Chiang Mai. By around 1350, most of Lan Na was ruled by the Yuan and was directly or indirectly controlled or influenced by Chiang Mai. Nan and Phra, at first oriented perhaps more

A Brief History of Lan Na

17

towards Sukhothai, became an integral part of Lan Na some decades later. The Yuan were not illiterate when they arrived in Lan Na, they probably were not unfamiliar with Buddhism either, and their political and social organization was far more refined and powerful than those of local tribes. Yet, their culture was not quite a 'high culture' but soon became one after close contact with the Lamphun Mon. By about 1350-75, they had developed the features of their own new culture: an old Thai substratum with a Mon topping. They typically used two scripts and two languages: an old Monderived Thai script (fak kham "tamarind pod letters") for their Yuan dialect, and a newer Mon script (tham "dhamma letters"; also called tua miiang "local letters") for Buddhist Pali texts. Later, they used the tham letters also for their vernacular and for secular purposes. These rounded tham characters are still regarded as one of the characteristics of Northern Thailand; they are found on nearly all of the many surviving palm-leaf manuscripts. This period of Lan Na's build-up, which lasted for about 100 years from c.1300 to c.1400, was followed by Lan Na's golden age which lasted for about 130 years, from c.1400 to c.1530. Already from about 1330 on, the princes and people had become deeply attracted to Buddhism, and after 1400 there were many monks, in particular the learned forest-dwelling monks, who doubted the purity of the local traditional Buddhism and wished to cleanse it. Monks and even royally sponsored envoys travelled to Ceylon and to India to study Buddhism at its root, and one of the highlights was when in 1477 the 8th Buddhist council opened in Wat Jet Yot in Chiang Mai with the aim to purify the canonical scriptures from aberrations. Unfortunately, the resultant cleansed text version seems to have been lost. Spiritual development was paralleled by material development. There were a well-organized government bureaucracy; supra-regional and infrastructure projects such as a network of roads and irrigation canels; a strong army; skillful craftsmen; exploitation of natural resources, such as lacquer, resinous oils and salt; learned monks who wrote famous books and treatises; gifted poets; a high percentage of literacy because young men often entered the monkhood for a period of time; probably outstanding musicians but about whom we know next to nothing; medical specialists; laws and regulations, based on the Mon rajafastra and previous royal

18

Hans Pentb

decisions, providing a background of justice with room for private initiative; moderate taxes and corvee labour for the princes who often used the income to donate monastery buildings, Buddha images and even entire monasteries complete with manpower and permanent income. All this made Lan Na until after 1500 a flourishing community. Monarchs and princes had absolute power but usually consulted extensively with officials and monks, and the ordinary people enjoyed much personal independence. Lan Na was not a single country. It consisted of several countries much as a modern country is made up of districts or partly self-governing states. The basic unit was a settlement called ban "village" (modern Thai: "house"), often a cluster of houses belonging to one family. The leader of the village was the senior relative or otherwise locally elected. A number of villages formed a district, pan na "1,000 paddy fields". An important village could be fortified by a rampart and a moat; such a settlement was called a wiang "town". If a town was inhabited by senior royalty, the wiang was called a chiang "city". Several ban with a wiang or a chiang formed a miiang "country; city state". A miiang was an area bordered by hills. Beyond the hills would be another miiang. A wiang typically was located on a little hill close to the mountains surrounding a major valley. It often had a triple rampart with dry moats on the slope, not at the foot of the hill. Sometimes several fortified hills were interconnected by two rows of ramparts and moats so that the town consisted of two or more compartments. A new compartment could also be added by simply enclosing a plot of land outside the old rampart. The principle of building compartment towns later was largely abandoned but never quite disappeared. Even Chiang Mai, with its square layout in a flat area has a compartment added to it by the so-called kamphang din "Earth Wall" in the east and south. The king (phaya), advised by an administrative council (kao s a n a m ) , administered the country through a bureaucracy of appointed officials who were ranked in a command scale. The lowest rank was nai ha "chief of 5". The next higher ranks were chief of 10, 50, 100, 1,000, 10,000, and 100,000. From 1,000 on up, the official was no longer addressed as nai but as jao "prince". In earlier times these figures probably indicated power of command over groups of people but in Lan Na's golden age they merely denoted rank in government service; the Minister of Records, for

A Brief History of Lan Na

19

instance, had the title miin nangsii "Ten Thousand, (Ministry of) Documents". The title san "100,000" was rare and usually was reserved for posts of a more ceremonial role. The real power was with the jao miin "prince of ten thousand" who governed key city states like Lampang, Chiang San or Fang. Above all was the king who was beyond any number and who in theory owned everything. Female administrators were not unknown and in the 16th century there were even two female phaya, ruling queens. While government work was carried out through appointed officials, local day-to-day administration was in the hands of locally elected persons: Village chiefs, irrigation directors, monastery lay administrators, etc. Important issues were sent up through channels to higher levels for decision; issues like the establishment of uposatha premises had to go all the way up to the royal court were they were processed and returned through the proper channels to the place of origin. Certain major decisions were officially engraved on stone and were placed in public view at the locality concerned. These stone inscriptions, mostly written in the secular, official fak kham script and Yuan dialect, are unique historical documents. Monasteries and their accumulated treasures served as banks: A person could borrow money from a monastery. Upon default, he became a so-called money-slave of the monastery until the debt was cleared. Being a monastry slave was a tax shelter: You were automatically exempt from taxes and corvee labour. Although there was frequently some kind of warfare between Lan Na and central Thailand, this did not hinder intensive commercial and religious interchange between the two regions. Lan Na also maintained an exchange of ideas and commercial goods with all her other neighbours and here again was an importer as well as an exporter. The Burmese, for instance, took over from the Yuan a certain type of lacquered container which is still called 'yun* in Burma. Chiang Mai 'exported' her purified Buddhism to Chiang Tung, Chiang Rung and Luang Phra Bang, On the other hand, the Yuan took over features of Burmese and Shan popular Buddhism including, for instance, ficticious travels of the Buddha in Lan Na. Main elements of the chronicle of the Buddha relic in Jdm Thong were imported from Burma in 1514; the background material for the chronicle of Phra That Doi Tung came from Ceylon via Muang Yong in the Shan States.

20

Hans Pentb

Incidently, the so-called Burmese monasteries in Lan Na date back only to the 19th century when Burmese merchants in Lan Na, chiefly under British protection, became rich in the wood and timber trade and wished to make merit. A general decline or recession began in the years after 1500, caused by government actions in the fields of economy, finance, country administration and foreign policy, and compounded by internal strife. All factors combined gave rise to end Lan Na's independence for good. It may be thought that an old-time economy was something primitive and rather stable, that price increases were subject only to perhaps a one-time bad harvest, automatically rectified in the following year. In the case of Chiang Mai, however, there is evidence of direct financial manipulation by one or two kings who probably needed more money chiefly for expensive religious construction projects. This led to an inflation of more than 40% within about 40 years which must have been a calamity for a national economy that was chiefly based on agriculture for local consumption with relatively little production of goods for export. When the Burmese attacked Chiang Mai in 1558 the country was more or less bankrupt, the people were disinclined to fight, and the city surrendered without serious opposition. Soon after, the whole of Lan Na was a Burmese sub-kingdom. The Burmese, though now military masters of the Yuan, respected them highly. Until 1578, when the dynasty of Mang Rai became extinct, they allowed Yuan princes on the throne of Chiang Mai; thereafter, they sent several of their own royal princes. In 1565, the Burmese military commander of Chiang Mai had a huge bronze Buddha image cast, under participation of the Chiang Mai royalty, and called it 'Buddha Miiang Rai 1, obviously in memory of Phaya Mang Rai. The image still exists in Wat Chai Phra Kiat. It is of pure Yuan style and exemplifies the observation that the Burmese occupation of Lan Na had no or very little influence on the art of Lan Na. At the latest since about 1600 the Yuan tried to shake off the Burmese occupation forces but due to internal disunity and intervention from the outside, notably Ayuthaya, were unable to do so. This resulted in about 200 years of intermittent warfare within Lan Na which ruined the country economically and culturally. The huge population shifts and the desertion and decay of many of its formerly splendid towns date from that period.

A Brief History of Lan Na

21

It was only after the Burmese had devastated Ayuthaya in 1767 that some far-seeing military commanders in Lan Na (Prince Kawila and governor Ja Ban) and in central Thailand (King Tak Sin, generals Surasi and Jakfi, the future King Rama I did realize that they had to pool their resources in order to defeat the Burmese. The idea for this new strategy came from Lan Na, and the Lan Na princes agreed to place themselves under the king of Siam. The strategy worked. Chiang Mai was liberated in 1775; the last stronghold of the Burmese, Chiang San, was retaken in 1804. Other northern city states, such as Nan, also placed themselves under Bangkok. All these states were independent as far as their inner administration was concerned. But they were not allowed to negotiate with foreign powers and their rulers had to be officially nominated by the king of Siam. They lost part of their former possessions under pressure from England and France which resulted in the present borders with Burma and Laos. In due course, these formerly semi-independent city states of Lan Na were slowly incorporated into the Kingdom of Siam and now form an integral part of Thailand, details of that process are the subject of this conference. The King of Thailand and the royal Thai court protocol still acknowledge the Northern Princes, jao nai fai niia, and thus honour and remember those northern princes of old who were pivotal in the creation of modern Thailand. The so-called hill tribes, Mao (Miao, Mong), Akha, Lisu etc., are more recent immigrants who have been arriving from Burma and Laos since the end of the 19th century; a possible exception are the Karen who may have lived in the western hills for centuries.

1

NORTHERN CULTURAL

THAILAND: THE NATURAL LANDSCAPE

REGION

AND THE

Harald Uhlig, University of GieBen The Natural

Environment

Northern Thailand's2 relief is dominated by a pattern of mainly North-South striking mountain ranges, separated from each other by 1 2

This introduction to the conference on 'Regions and National Integration in Thailand', Passau 1992, is based on contributions of the author to the discussions, extented to three regional essays. A comment might be useful to the notion of 'Northern Region'. Several years ago, the National Statistical Office of Thailand extended the traditional meaning of 'Northern Region' to include large parts of northern Central Thailand, in this version the 16 northernmost cangwat (provinces) of the country (see map, fig. 11). This is causing not only some confusion, but means likewise a loss in more detailed published statistical information. Historically and as a distinctive natural region, however, the meaning of the 'North' proper should be restricted to the mountainous area of the former kingdom of Lan Na, clearly distinguished from the historically Sukhothai-dominated 'Upper Central Thailand', or the 'Upper Central Region', which comprises the upper floodplains, river terraces, foothills and marginal uplands of the Cao Phraya River system (cangwat of Tak, Sukhothai, Uttaradit, Phitsanulok, Kamphaeng Phet, Phichit and Phetchabun). Although the higher mountains of the Phetchabun Range (and the tectonic 'Graben'-valley of the Pasak River) on the eastern, as well as the western border ranges towards the Burmese frontier geologically belong to the same older mountain-systems of the North, densely forested and partly inhabited by hill tribes too, the larger parts of Upper Central Thailand are dominated by that open, fairly flat floodplain and terrace country around the core of the ancient kingdom of Sukhothai. The historical border-area against Lan Na coincides fairly well with the natural delimitation of the more mountainous and higher 'true North'. There seems to be a well founded understanding in the literature to retain this older definition of the Northern Region, comprising the eight cangwat of Chiang Mai, Lamphun, Lampang, Chiang Rai, Phrae, Phayao, Nan and Mae Hong Son. Together, they cover an area of some 85,852 km 2 (with a population of 5,09 million (59.3 inhab. per sqkm; 1990), about 9.3% of the total of Thailands population (54.5 mio, 1990) and ca. 17.5% of the kingdom's surface), bordered by Burma ('Myanmar') on the western, and Laos on its eastern flank (whereas historically, Keng Tung towards the north (Burma), larger tracts under former rule of Nan in present-day Laos, and Keng Hung (or Chiang Rung) in the Sipsong Panna of Yunnan (China), were linked to kings of Chiang Mai (Lan Na) during certain periods up to the spread of British and French colonial power in the late 19th century (see: Rujaya Abhakorn and D.K. Wyatt in this volume). All population figures according to: Preliminary Report. 1990. Population and Housing Census, National Statistical Office, Office of the Prime Minister.

Northern Thailand

23

longitudinal intermontane basins and valleys, interrupted by shorter river-courses through narrow and steeply flanked gorges. Preconceived by tectonics, these basins have been deepened, laterally extehted and later filled up again with a relatively thin cover of alluvial deposits by the fairly parallel running rivers of the upper Cao Phraya system, complemented by parts of the Salween system in the west, and of Mekong River tributaries in the north. Usually, the rivers flow in meanders entrenched into their own fluviatile deposits of the intermontane valleys. Cutting through gorges or narrow valley sections, they flow with a much higher gradient, currents and rapids over the outcropping bedrock. This 'suggests a drainage superimposed from former peneplained surfaces’ (W. Credner; R. Pendleton, quoted after W. Donner 1978). Some basins measure c.30 km in length and over 10 km in width, others are smaller, restricted to a somewhat wider section of a stream-valley, others are extented more than 100 km in length and 30 km in width if one adds those of Chiang Mai, Lamphun and Com Thong into one unit, or into wide plains of up to 70 km, like that stretching from Chiang Rai towards the Mekong River. Fluvial erosion by the rivers dissected their own deposits within the intermontane basins into higher and lower terraces on both sides of the actual, periodically flooded alluvial plains in the centre of these basins. The level of the floor of the basins varies between 380-500 m and 180-200 m at the lower end towards Central Thailand. Bound to the course of the rivers, most of these basins appear to be lined up like a huge chain, to mention as an example those of the Ping River system; Phrao (430 m above sea level), Chiang Dao (393 m), Chiang Mai (314 m), Lamphun (280 m), Com Thong (285 m) [W. Donner 1978]; or likewise those along the Wang, Yom and Nan River systems respectively. The basins of Fang, Chiang Rai, Phan, Phayao, Chiang Kham and Thoeng are draining towards the Mekong River, those of Pai (500 m), Mae Hong Son and Mae Sariang westwards into the Salween. These intermontane basins are the basic areas of settlement, land use and territorial organisation of Northern Thailand. Offering good alluvial soils in periodically inundated flood-plains (excellent for rice-cultivation), bordered by more permeable river terraces and levees (for settlement cum garden-, tree- and dryland-cultivation) and (at least originally) surrounded by slopes with ample supply of forest products and grazings, in an

24

Harald Uhlig

agreeable climate, surrounded by the natural 'water reservoirs' of the higher, forested mountains, providing for a reliable supply of water (and irrigation), they are seen as the naturally given 'Lebensraum' for the rural cultures of Lan Na (meaning: "One million ricefields"). Secluded by the passages through the narrow gorges and enclosed by large tracts of forested mountains, these valleys and basins provided a natural setting for the formation of several smaller and somewhat larger regional entities, from groups of hamlets and villages in valleys 'behind the forest' up to principalities and smaller kingdoms, like Nan, Phrae, Phayao etc., finally, and not undisputed, subjugated under Chiang Mai. A similar natural pattern and a comparable historical development prevailed in the adjacent Shan Highlands (Lan Na is regarded historically as its eastern extension) as well as in Laos and Yunnan. Some older authors were assuming that the great river gorges of the Salween, Mekong or Yang-tse and their tributaries should have been the routes, guiding the gradual, historical immigration of the Thai and related people into their present lands. This can hardly be supported, if one considers the wild and inaccessible gorges of the upper reaches of these rivers. However, crossing the mountain ridges and gradually 'hopping' from one intramontane basin to the next of these more hospitable 'settlement chambers', and from there gradually extending into the last valley pockets with some irrigatable riceland, seems to be the most likely and geo-ecologically convincing way of gaining new lands. This natural qualities are part of the factors, distinguishing the Northern Region from the much poorer Northeast, the "Isan", where settlement and land use were gradually spreading out over wider ranges of fairly uniform and level lands, but, of course, naturally less favourably endowed, as compared to those basins of the North. So far, we have dealt mainly with the valleys and basins which constitute Lan Na proper, the heartland of the Northern Thai (or Khon Miiang - see below). However, a hypsometric analysis of the North (W. Donner 1978, table 140) results in 41.5% of the Northern territory being elevated ground between 500 and 1,000 m plus 19% above 1,000 m , i.e. more than 60% are of mountainous nature. This stands against only 36.5% land between 200 m and 500 m (and 3% below 200 m). As the floors of the valleys and intermontane plains of the North vary between 150 m and 500 m, the land available to the Khon Miiang, (wet)rice-cultivators of the

Northern Thailand

25

flood plains, was less than half of the territory. Therefore, population pressure grew, and in recent periods also Thai settlement and land use spilt over to the hills. The latter had been occupied by various hill tribes, on the average up to 1,600 m. The mountain ranges are separated from each other by the series of roughly parallel, N-S running, longitudinal valleys, intermontane basins and plains. The former consist mainly of broad and rounded ridges, dissected peneplains' and several higher (e.g. granitic) domes, like Doi Inthanon (2,565 m), Thailands highest summit. But also sharp peaks stand out, usually limestone ridges (especially bold in the areas of Mae Hong Son/Pai, Chiang Dao, and Chiang Mai) also containing caves and subterranian rivers, Karst dolines and poljes (some of them cultivated). Some more peaks in the western and most eastern ranges elevate above 2,000 m , the majority culminates between 1,500 m and 1,900 m . Geologically the western ranges belong to the older, folded palaeocoic orogenesis of Mainland South East Asia's central ridge, the southward continuation of the Central Asian systems (crystalline rocks like granits, diorites, gneisses and some older phyllites and other sediments, including the palaeocoic limestones). The central ranges, somewhat lower (roughly between Wang River and Yom River) consist mainly of mesocoic sediments (shales, sandstones, limestone, igneous rhyolites and tuffs), whereas the border ranges towards Laos, part of the middle-palaeocoic orogene of the so-called 'Annamite Cordillera', rise again in Jurassic and Triassic sediments with conspicious ridges up to 2,100 m , a formidable natural barrier. Despite of numerous named peaks, there is little (or varying) usage of common names to designate these larger ranges and systems, also the official survey maps refrain from naming the mountain chains. In some sources, the frontier range towards Laos is called Phi Pan Nam mountains, (the Mekong River forming another part of the boundary); the Thanong Thong Chai and Tenasserim ranges comprise the western frontier (mainly in the Salween River system, the Salween itself marks the border for a relatively short section only). The western mountain ranges continue southward, forming a true 'border wilderness' with Burma, with passages over a few passes or through river-valleys only, and further into the peninsula. The Laos border mountains continue southwards into the Phetchabun range, outside Lan Na already, but much similar to the Northern mountains. The name 'Inthanon Range'

26

Harald Uhlig

is sometimes applied to the mountains west of the Ping River, including Doi Suthep above Chiang Mai. The monsoonal climate favours the valleys and intermontane plains again, as the High ranges catch heavy rainfall on the exposed western flanks, but promote rain-shadow ('Fohn'-effect) for the basins, and the forested mountains preserve the moisture, to release it gradually into the valleys and their irrigation systems. The onset of the rain may vary by one month or more in May or June. Whereas irrigation is assured in the large catchment basins, rice fields relying on rainfall, swiddens and fields in the smaller upstream valleys may suffer from variations in water supply. Although the irrigation systems are constantly enlarged and improved, one should bear in mind that considerable areas on sandy soils (of the pleistocene terraces) are still restricted to rice on impounded rainfall, providing but one, not always reliable, crop during the wet season. This applies to many areas, from larger tracts in the Ping valley east of Chiang Mai and Lamphun, right over to Nan. According to the relief, the rainfall figures during the wet season (mainly July to September) vary between 1,000-1,400 mm in valleys and 3,000 mm on the mountains; 1,248 mm is given as the average for Chiang Mai. The dry winter months are fairly cold at night, frost has been reported above 1,500 m. The author has witnessed hoarfrost on Doi Inthanon by the end of December. Whereas the valleys and plains have been cleared for agriculture almost completely, the hills are occupied by various forest types, according to elevation, precipitation and soils. Evergreen Lower Montane forest covers the elevations from 1,000 m upwards, under a constant humidity and annual rainfall of 1,500-2,000 mm, especially on red granitic or brown-black calcareous soils (Tern Smitinand, Sanga Sabhasri, P. Kunstadter 1978). An edaphic type on steeper slopes and ridges, exposed to erosion and leaching on greyish sandy, brownish gravelly or lateritic soils are the rather open Coniferous forests (Pinus merkusii and P. Kesiya), providing resine and paper pulp. The lower hills and peneplains and galleries along the streams bear the Dry Evergreen forest on granitic or calcareous soil (rainfall 1,000-2,000 mm). Most of it are remnants of a formerly extensive forest cover, gradually cleared or devastated. Bamboo, rattan, timber for building, forest grazing, charcoal and fire wood have been exploited.

Northern Thailand

27

Three types of Deciduous Forest occur. The moist, mixed type in higher elevations up to 600 m on loamy soils (1,000-1,500 mm rainfall) used to contain valuable teak, greatly reduced and under re-afforestation. Dry Mixed Decidous is scattered on sandy and lateritic soils with less rainfall. The commercial species of timber are abundant and under forestry control. The open Dry Decidous Dipterocarp Forests on the undulating peneplains and ridges on sandy or lateritic soils were subject to leaching and annual burning (to rejuvenate the grazing). Thus, a climax type resulted in which Dipterocarp and other fire-resistant species prevail. Besides commercial timber and firewood, these forests are able to coppice free and thus a valuable resource for the local population, too. Of special value are the laquer tree (Melanorrhea usitata), source for the typical laquer ware manufacture, and certain species used for (illegal) tapping of wood-oil to mention only a few examples for the many forest resources used by the farmers at various levels. Ecologically favourable is the accumulation of humidity in the forests, lasting well into the dry season. Condensing water vapour causes dew and morning fogs and maintains green leaves and moisture. To preserve the water supply from the forests is of great concern to the rice-farmers. Thus, slash and burn cultivation causes one of the conflicts between the Khon Miiang of the valleys and the Khon Doi (people of the mountains). It is fair to add, however, that swiddening, squatting on spontaneous clearings in the forests and heavy logging, enforced by the many new mountain roads is likewise due to Thai encroachers, and the hill tribes cannot be exclusively blamed for this. Discussing problems of national integration, the large areas inhabited by the hill tribes, an ethnically widely varying population (fig. 1), should not be omitted. In the contrary, despite of fast growing highland-lowland interactions, they certainly represent some of the major problems for a national integration in the North. Cultural Landscape and Ethnicity Roughly speaking, up to the sixties the traditional structure of settlement and land use prevailed, characterized by the 'classic* dichotomy of sedentary rice-cultivators throughout the valleys and intermontane plains, and swiddeners on the hills, of different ethnic origin. The German geographer W. Credner, travelling in the North still on foot and elephant in 1927-29, laid the foundation for a

Harald Uhlig

28

98° E

KX>°E

Tibefo Birmans Meo-Yao

BIRMANIE

LAOS

-2O°N

iKhmu

IMUANi

HOI

None

Campon Lomponq Phrae

ia°N

t i >

i ,Tck

&

l a Phiisonutok

S1AMO1S

9 10

I \ ’-x I I % / »

Tlokoa Samon

0

100 km

Fig. 1. — Les groupes

ethno-linguistlques

de ThaHande septentttoaale.

1. Origins des ethnics les plus r&emment arrivees (pas plus de 200 ans). 2. Frontiere. - 3. Meo. - 4. Lisu. - 5. Khmer. - 6. Lahu. • 7. Lua (Lawa). - 8. Karen. 9. Thai (toutes ethnies). - 10. Yao. - 11. Akha. - 12. Limite entre Khon Muang, Lao et Siamois. H.Sruntw uadi (Source : d’apres F.M. Le Bar, G.C. Hickey, J.K. Musgrave, in « Ethnic groups of Mainland Southeast Asia*, New-Haven, H.RA.F.P.. 1964) Fig. 1 : Northern Thailand. Topographical orientation and approximate distribution of the ethno-linguistic groups. From: M. Bruneau; Ethnies, peuplement et organisation de I'espace en Thailande septentrionale. Les Cahiers d'Outre Mer, 1 0 8 , 1 9 7 4

Northern Thailand

29

more detailed classification, tripartite, according to the different ecological environment, ethnic composition and land use techniques in three altitudinal zones (1935). This model was part of a sequence from the Malay peninsula up to the northern Shan States, further extended to Yunnan by H. von Wissmann (1942). The present author carried this on into a more detailed landscape profile of Northern Thailand (Uhlig 1969; see fig. 2). Referring to the many changes caused by the fast growing mobility and modernization of the more recent past, P . Kunstadter (1980) strongly opposed this conventional layered structural approach and advocated a more functional view of the social and economic development, migrations, urbanization and other modernization processes. However, deviations from the general structure and early changes had been explained already by Credner himself. There can be no doubt about these dramatic changes (and a few earlier exceptions from the traditional structure, too), but it cannot be denied that these profile-'models' depict the original cultural and ecological typology. Not alone for the historical situation, but as an initial point to explain the modern changes, this tripartite model remains valid and reflects the 'ideal-typical' basic setting of many areas of the North still today. Of course, it is indirectly implied in Kunstadter/Chapman's own 'schematic Highland-Lowland transect1, which explains by darts the growing extension of the migrations and of the vertical ranges of the various groups (fig. 3). Despite of all modern lowland-highland interactions, three characteristic zones persist: 1) Predominantly sedentary cultures (wet-rice and rotation crops, complemented by orchards, vegetables, tobacco etc. in the valleys and plains), with a well developed infrastructure, fast growing urbanization (with Southern Thai, Chinese and hilltribe immigration). Khon Muang prevail in the rural and urban structure, i.e. Northern Thai, (in the Northwest of Shan [Thai Yai] and in the East of Lao extraction). 2) A zone of intermediate elevation with a mixture of land rotation and permanent agriculture, occupied mainly by Karen, Lawa (Lua) as well as by upward migrating Khon Miiang populations (e.g. the 'Miang' collectors [wild and propagated tea of the forests, fermented to chewing-tea] in 400-800 m , more recently the commercial production for Thailand's supply of green and of black tea; and the fast growing spontaneous (squatter) Thai settlement for

70%

10-50%

Fig. 1: Glutinous rice as a staple crop

100 km

Drawn by Gunther Moosbauer

Khmer, Kui

Fig. 2: Ethnic groups in Northeastern Thailand

The Isan up to its Integration 109

Volker Grabowsky

110

First, in which stages has the Isan been occupied and settled by Lao immigrants, after Khmer political domination dwindled in the 13th century? Second, which role did the Cao Anu rebellion (1827/8) and its suppression by Siamese troops play in the region's accelerated political integration?

n. Ethnic Formation 1 . Human settlements have been established in the Isan since earliest times. Discoveries in Ban Chiang (Sakon Nakhon province) show some of Southeast Asia's earliest pottery, metallurgy and developed (wet-swidden) rice cultivation roughly 2,000 years ago. Archaeological evidence suggests that not only the Sakon Nakhon basin in the north but also the basins of the Mun and Chi Rivers further to the south, have supported a rice-growing population in prehistoric times. 8 Between the 6th and 12th centuries A.D. Indian culture and religion, both Hinduism and Mahayana Buddhism, spread into the Isan. Large parts of the Khorat Plateau came under the influence of which is often called the Dvaravati civilization which flourished in Central Thailand between the 6th and 9th centuries. Various moated sites, such as Miiang Serna (Khorat province), Miiang Fa Daet (Kalasin province) and Miiang Nakhon Campa Si (Mahasarakham province) were built as religious centres during that period.9 However, it seems that no larger political entities had emerged before the eleventh century. Under Suryavarman I (1002-1050) the Khmer Empire of Angkor expanded westwards into the Cao Phraya basin and northwards into the Khorat Plateau. The lowland Khmer spread their culture and strengthened their political hegemony and economic influence by building towns and religious sanctuaries as far north as Nong Khai and Vientiane (Wiang Can). 10

8

9 10

See Welch 1989:17. As Uhlig (see article in this volume) points out, "the much later emergence of the present ethnic groups may hardly be connected by any continuity to these early cultures. In the early periods, there may have been slightly better pre-conditions on untouched ecosystems, including the possibility of somewhat moist climatic periods." Srisakaral990:147. Srisakara (1990:217) stresses the economic dimension of Khmer expansion: "... it may become obvious that the Khmers during King Jayavarman VIIs reign were more interested in building commercial and economic

1*1

14

The Isan up to its Integration

111

In the early 13th century the power of the Khmer had passed its zenith, the empire of Angkor declined. The lowland Khmer of Cambodia proper gradually shifted the country's political, economic and demographic base to the lower Mekong basin. They abandoned towns and outposts in the Northeast. Large parts of the interior were left uninhabited for centuries to come. The areas south of the Mun River, 11 however, were still occupied by "Upland Khmer" (Kui) who returned to traditional forms of political and social organization. 2. One important factor that contributed to the decline of the Khmer Empire was the demographic and political expansion of Thai and Lao speaking peoples. During the 11th and 12th centuries these peoples had already penetrated the Cao Phraya basin. Whether their settlements had reached the northern part of the Khorat Plateau, too, is less certain. Some Thai scholars, like Srisakara Vallibhotama, identify the Siem mentioned in Khmer and Cham inscriptions of the 11th and 12th centuries with Lao groups which lived in the vicinity of Vientiane. 12 The famous Sukhothai inscription No. 1 of (King) Pho Khun Ramkhamhaeng (dated 1292 A.D.) mentions Vientiane as a vassal state of Sukhothai. 13 Obviously, close political and trade relations between the Thais of the Cao Phraya basin and their Lao brethren in the middle Mekong basin had already been established. In the early 14th century, Lao immigrants had most probably penetrated the present-day provinces of Nong Khai, Udonthani and Nakhon Phanom. Moreover, Lao outposts were established by Fa Ngum (1353-1373), the founder of the Lao kingdom of Lan Sang (Thai: Lan Chang), 1-* during the second half of the 14th century in such

11 12 13

14

relationships with those northeastern towns than expanding their political powers." A large navigable river that probably formed the major route across the Khorat Plateau in east-west direction. Srisakara and Sucit 1991:118-122. Griswold and Prasert 1971:218-219; Vientiane (in the inscription Wiang Cann Wiang Kham) was the most distant of Ramkhamhaeng's tributaries to the east. Literally: "(The country of) one million elephants". The name is an equivalent to Lan Na, "(the country of) one million paddy fields". However, the correct etymology of Lan Chang/Sang is still a moot point. Some Lao scholars argue that each of the two syllables lan and chang should be read without the mai tho, in that case referring to a "river (lan)

*

112

Volker Grabowsky

places like Miiang Roi-et Pratu (Roi-et province) and Miiang Phon Phiing Daen (Kalasin province). 15 These early and isolated Lao settlements notwithstanding, the interior of the Khorat Plateau, which today is one of the most densely populated rural areas of Thailand, remained then a demographic vacuum. There were no significant population movements into this area, it seems, before the start of the 18th century. 3. By the turn of the 17th century, the Lao Kingdom of Lan Sang was disintegrating; at the same time, the southward expansion of the Lao people was accelerating. King Suriyawong, whose nearly six decades on the throne are generally regarded as Lan Sang's "golden age", died in 1694 16 . The confusing and bloody struggle of succession that followed his death culminated in the separation of Luang Prabang, the old Lao capital, and Vientiane (1707) 17 , moreover it also forced fairly large numbers of Lao who had come into conflict with a usurper on the Lao throne to leave their homesteads. Under the leadership of Phra Khru Phon Samet, an extremely popular local monk, 3,000 people took their belongings and migrated down the Mekong passing Nakhon Phanom. They finally reached the region of Champassak where they settled down.18 The different versions of the "Chronicle of Champassak" agree on the takeover of the region by Lao immigrants. Around 1700, Champassak was an important centre of the Kui who still recognized the Cambodian king in Banthai Phet as their overlord. After several years of turmoil the city's female ruler, Nang Phaen, abdicated and handed government affairs over to Phra Khru Phon Samet who in 1713 made Cao Nokasat, a descendant of King

15

lfi

17 18

having a strong current (chang)", i.e. the Mekong, Lan Chang's life-line. See Sichana 1989:129. Nonglak 1981:10. According to Lao chronicles, King Fa Ngum of Lan Sang and King U Thong of Ayutthaya agreed to a border line running from the mountain chains of Phaya Fat and Phaya Po to Miiang Nakhon Thai (in the present-day province of Phitsanulok), leaving most of the Khorat Plateau under Lao influence. See Maha Sila Viravong 1964:34-35. Wyatt 1984:122. Other sources mention 1690 as the year of King Suriyawong's death. See Phongsawadan Lan Chang 1963:174; also Maha Sila Viravong 1964:75. For details see Maha Sila Viravong 1964:83-85; Phongsawadan miiang luang phabang [Lao version] 1969:32-34. "Tamnan miiang nakhon campasak, chabap amorawong wicit" (TMNC-AW) 1970:191.

The Isan up to its Integration

113

Suriyawong, King of Champassak. The new king's name was Cao Soi Sisamut.19 That was the second founding of Champassak. The southernmost of the three Lao states comprised a polyethnic population of "Lao and Khmer who... settled in different localities mixed with Kha20 and Kui groups according to appropriate places of settlement." 21 Under the energetic Cao Soi Sisamut, Champassak expanded its influence in all directions reaching Attapii22 (East), Stung Treng23 (South), Ubon Ratchathani24 (West) and Roi-et 25 (Northwest). The founding and rise of Champassak undoubtedly facilitated the rapid spread of Lao culture in the southeastern parts of the Isan. For example, in 1713, Soi Sisamut ordered one of his trusted men, 19 20

21

22

23

24 25

TMNC-AW 1970: 192f.; see also "Tamnan miiang nakhon campasak, chabap phraya maha-ammattayathibodi" (TMNC-PMA) 1970:171-173. "Kha" is a defaming notion literally meaning "slave" in the Lao language. The lowland Lao use the word "Kha" to name all upland tribes of MonKhmer stock. Under the socialist regime of the Lao Democratic People's Republic, "Kha" has been replaced by the not less chauvinistic label "Lao Thoeng" ("Upper Lao"). TMNC-AW 1970:191 ("... ttlum'iuarntxnnmnuuanliJwunflmuBg m nma") Ranis duntiattntmimn ma fnwjuErnu'imJEUiFrn..."). The original designation "Lao Kao" for Monthon Isan (see footnote 1) did reflect, the polyethnicity of the former kingdom of Champassak. If we follow Sitthiphon’s argument (1992:157), kao should be intepreted as a combination of kuai (Kui) and lao, the two largest ethnic groups in Champassak and the southeastern parts of the Khorat Plateau. Attapii is considered to be the heartland of Mon-Khmer speaking groups ’ ("Kha"). By the arrival of the French it has been estimated "that in the productive Province of Attopue alone there is a population of 36,000 Khas and 6,000 Laos", and there should be "every reason to believe that the Khas are far more numerous than is generally supposed." Quoted from R.D. Beckett's report of 1893 (Public Record Office, F.O. 881/6365, p. 82) Stung Treng, or Chiang Taeng, now belonging to Cambodia, has until present a sizable Lao population. The Lao are a major ethnic group in the Cambodian province of the same name. More than 30% of the provincial papulation can be considered of Lao origin. In 1893, when the left bank of the Mekong fell under French rule, R.D. Beckett (Public Record Office, F.O. 881/6365, p. 90) reports that Stung Treng was "a mere village, and the total number of registered males is 340, 20 or 30 of whom can speak Cambodian. At Meuang Taraboriwat, on the right bank of the Mekong, opposite the mouth of the Se-Kong, the inhabitants are almost all Cambodians, with the exception of a few Laos who have married women of Sipandawn. Both the Cambodian and Lao dialects seem to be spoken indiscriminately along a line drawn eastward from this point along the SeChan. Westward of Chiengteng, along the right bank, the language used seems to be Cambodian and Kui rather than Lao." For instance Miiang Kham Thong Luang and Ban Amnat Kao. Miiang Thong, district of Suwannaphum, province of Roi-et.

114

Volker Grabowsky

Thao Can Kaeo, a descendant of the old dynasty of Vientiane,26 to take 3,000 followers (phrai) and establish himself in Miiang Thong (Roi-et). 27 Later, Champassak attracted further waves of refugees from Vientiane. The author's theory is that the political fragmentation of Laos (Lan Sang) since the early 18th century helped foster the migration of the Lao southwards along the Mekong, their main route of communication. Political dissidents, e.g. those members of ruling dynasties who felt being excluded from power, took their followers in search of land and founded their own miiang. They were the driving force for what the Thai and Lao call "the founding of villages and towns (kan sang ban paeng miiang). By no means the author does want to suggest that Lao people had migrated to the South only in marginal numbers before 1700. A continuous influx of Lao settlers the Mekong downstream had occurred since the early days of the Lan Sang Kingdom. Political unrest always provoked dissident groups to leave their homeland and search for new land. When after King Sai Setthathirat's death Saen Surin, a general and non-aristocrat, crowned himself king in 1572, disgruntled noblemen and their followers fled to regions as far as Roi-et and Champassak.28 However, the disintegration of the unified Lao Kingdom of Lan Sang, and the founding of Champassak in particular, gave the Lao movement to the South a new, decisive impetus.29 III. The Cao Anu Rebellion and the Establishment of Siamese Rule 1 . In 1778, the Lao principalities of Luang Prabang, Vientiane and Champassak, were forced to recognize the Siamese suzerainty. Under 26 27 28 29

A grandson of King Suriyawong of Vientiane and a son-in-law of the ruler of Nan, a Northern Thai principality. Toem 1987:185-186. See Maha Sila Viravong 1964:69-70; Wyatt 1984:120. This general assessment is also shared by Paitoon (1984:53) who states: "The migration of the Thai-Lao people into the Khorat Plateau evidently began in the late part of the Ayudhya period." Chalong (1986:146) stresses: "Since the late 17th century the Lao people began to migrate from the Mekong basin that had been the important political and economic base of Lan Sang for many centuries... In the process of this migration, following the crisis of power in Lan Sang during the 18th century, communities were founded. These communities expanded, became large and important muang in an area "which is now the northeastern region of Thailand, e.g. Ubon Ratchathani, Roi-et, Sakon Nakhon, Yasothon, and other (miiang).”

The Isan up to its Integration

115

King Taksin (1767-1782), the Siamese restored not only the old Ayutthayan Empire, hut extended its borders to the North and Northeast forcing the Yuan and Lao principalities to accept the overlordship of Thonburi, and later of Bangkok. 30 Before the second fall of Ayutthaya (1767) Siamese influence hardly reached beyond Khorat. Situated in the southwestern corner of the Isan, Khorat had been founded by King Narai in 1657 on recently conquered Khmer territory. It was inhabited mainly by a Siamese dialect ("Thai Khorat") speaking population of mixed Siamese-Khmer origin.3 1 For more than a century, Khorat marked the northeastern border of Siam. At the beginning of the Rattanakosin (Bangkok) period Khorat became vitally important for Bangkok's political expansion into the Isan. Khorat, often called pratu khao su isan ("door entering the Isan"), was ruled by a local dynasty with close ties to the Chakris. Khorat served as Bangkok's agent in the Isan. A number of smaller Lao miiang established tributary relations with Bangkok via Khorat instead of continuing to recognize the overlordship of Vientiane or Champassak, now mere vassals (prathetsarat) of Siam. Certainly, there was a strong incentive for Lao villages, many of them, as we have seen, founded by immigrants from Vientiane and Champassak, to seek recognition as miiang. The higher prestige associated with the status of a miiang - the cao miiang were awarded titles which reached as high as phraya - accomodated the political aspirations of the local Lao elite. Since the founding of a miiang and its recognition by Bangkok required a minimum number of commoners (phrai) under the leadership of a local ruler (cao miiang), the Isan experienced a considerable increase of population and of areas under rice-cultivation. In some cases, however, the elevation in status from village to miiang may have been formal rather than reflecting increases of population. On balance, there should be no doubt, available manpower and cultivated ricelands expanded. The number of miiang in the Isan increased between 1778 and 1826

30 31

See Maha Sila Viravong 1964:100-102. A detailed account of the founding of Khorat is given by Toem 1987:3-16. To the author's understanding Siamese immigrants from the Central Plains, including demobolized soldiers, mixed with the local Kui/Khmer population and Khmer war captives from the Angkor region.

116

Volker Grabowsky

from 13 to 35 .32 For the development of the interior, the founding of Kalasin (1793) 33 and Khon Kaen (1797)34 proved to be crucial. This impressive development can best be demonstrated by comparing the routes the Siamese armies took during their two military campaigns against Vientiane, in 1778 and 1827 respectively. In 1778, the Siamese troops under the command of Phraya Chakri, the later King Rama I, had to march from Khorat the Mun River downstream to Champassak; from there they turned northwards up the Mekong and finally reached Vientiane via Nakhon Phanom. Half a century later, in April/May 1827, the main Siamese army commanded by the later Cao Phraya Bodindecha, Rama Ill's most able general, took the shortest route across the Khorat Plateau via Kalasin. 35 By 1778, this route had obviously still been unaccessible. 2. When in 1824 King Rama HI ascended to the throne, the Siamese control over the Isan faced severe challenges by the resurgence of Vientiane. Under its strong and dynamic ruler Cao Anu (r.1804-1828), Vientiane, the largest and most populous Lao principality, sought to regain firm control over the north-central 32

33

34 35

These figures are based on a list of northeastern miiang published by Paitoon 1984:229-245. This list is obviously an adaptation of another one compiled by Toem 1987:349-366. See Toem 1987:302-304; "Phongsawadan huamiiang monthon isan” 1963:217-219. According to Phongsawadan miiang kalasin the "Phraya Somphamit" (i.e. rulers) of two miiang (Saen Khon Pong, Saen Thana Ngam) near Vientiane controlled more than 5,000 noblemen and commoners ('... Sn'ni'KtnmlvnTiinJssim 150

49>25

149 >100

24 > 0

Rural population density (excluding municipal areas) and main rice growing areas i n South Thailand. From: South Thailand Regional Planning Study, Vol. 2, 1973

Southern Thailand

219

The climate, intermediate between equartorial and tropical monsoon types, with constantly high temperatures but no excessive heat, has little risks of mansoon failures which are very critical in Northeastern Thailand. It is the narrowness of land between two seas which represents sufficient and reliable rains, but also dry seasons for the ripening of rice and fruits. More amenable, and akin to Malayas climate with longer cropping seasons, it is a factor of the naturally given agricultural prosperity of the region. Rainfall is divided into two different seasons, according to the site on the eastern or western coast. The southwest monsoon (May to October), heralded by heavy thunderstorms, covers the western provinces, pouring most excessive rainfall on their northern sections, with a close proximity of mountains and the sea, and the longest duration of the rainy season (Ranong, Phang-nga). In Phuket, the climate is similar but less extreme. It becomes more uniform and less seasonal the further one moves south. The heaviest rainfalls occur during the monsoon transitions in May and October, nearly over all the peninsula. Sheltered by Sumatra, the western coast is hit by the southwest monsoon far less heavily compared to the northeasterly winds on the open east coast. There, the northeast monsoon, normally less important in the rest of Thailand, hits the coast with severe storms and heavy rains from November to March. The sandy beaches of that coast witness the heavy wave-action, in contrast to the closed mangrove belts and larger mud-flats along the western coast. Consequently, the main season for rice-cultivation, but also for coastal fishing and, of growing importance, for the best tourist season, changes in the monsoonal rhythm between the peninsula's two sides. Most rice is grown in the east, due to the natural combination of larger alluvial plains and lower terraces, a shorter rainy season but natural flooding of larger areas and water resources to extend irrigation. This means further that the longestablished Muslim population is more densely concentrated on the eastern side. From the Samui Islands to Pattani the east coast has a prolonged northeast monsoon and a somewhat later dry season compared to the more northerly areas, whereas towards Narathiwat in the south the monsoon rains get stronger in the luff of the hills. There they may spill over the hills also during the southwest monsoon. The central lowlands of Krabi and Surat Thani receive

220

Harald Uhlig

less rain, but it is more equally distributed because precipitation there is yielded from both monsoons. The soils of South Thailand are not favoured due to strong leaching. This limits the fertility and water retention. The recent alluvial soils are good for the ricelands, whereas the sand-ridges and beach-swamps support coconuts, some fruits and vegetables, and livestock. The upland soils vary from grey to red-yellow podzolics. Whereas they carry a luxuriant tropical rainforest (growing eutrophically, i.e. mainly on the upper layers, created by its own organic matter), they are fast depleted and eroded after clearing. Taken into cultivation, mainly by recent uncontrolled and spontaneous settlement , the steeper slopes may be hit by catastrophic land-slides during periods of heavy rain. This was dramatically shown by the desaster in Nakhon Si Thammarat province in November 1988, where the worst hit Amphoe Phibun (on the foothills and eastern slopes of the abruptly rising, mainly granitic mountains of the Khao Luang National Park, 1,300-1,835 m), experienced seven days of continuous rain. The deeply weathered, lateritic soils there, normally fairly stable, were so thoroughly soaked, that hundreds of landslides went down, devastated young rubber plantations and covered settlements and rice-fields in the adjacent valleys with heavy mud-flows. Obviously, this disaster was caused by the fast extension of young rubber small-holdings, replacing the forest cover of extremely steep slopes (measuring more than 45 degrees in various cases). Subsidized schemes of rubber extension and the hunger of land of many pioneer farmers had supported that hazardous expansion of clearing and planting on uncovered soil, whereas rubber plantations on the lower hills and a more moderate relief are less sensitive to the soil conditions, because the Hevea Brasiliensis trees themselves are derived from a similar environment of tropical forests. Population,

Habitat

and Agriculture

From the total population of the Southern Region of 7 Mio inhabitants (1990 - density: 99 inhabitants/km2 ), about 75% of the working population is still belonging to the sector of agriculture and fishing. The growing urban population (c.13%), working in the "secondary" and the much stronger "tertiary sector", i s predominantly of Thai origin, plus the urban Chinese. This again aggravates the inter-cultural tensions, most expressively in the two

Southern Thailand

221

South Thailand Percentage of the "Thai Islam" (Malay) Population per cangwat

Internationa! border Border of the Planning Region South Thailand 78-83% 61% 38%

Surat Thani

12-19% Nakhon Si

2-8% 0% lung

0

Saturn

0

100 km

Cartography:

MALAYSIA Source: Population Census I 9 6 0 ;

Draft: H.Uhlig A. Schreiner, K . Wegner-

quoted after W. DonnerJ!

Fig. 10: Muslim Minorities in the cangwat of Southern Thailand

978)

222

Harald Uhlig

border provinces of Pattani and Narathiwat, comprising the highest density of a strongly Muslim, predominantly rice-farming or fishing population (see fig. 12). In the other border provinces, this is less apparent. The mountainous cangwat of Yala and Satun are less densely populated, with considerable shares of Thai and ThaiChinese rubber-growers. The fishermen of Satun, moreover, live fairly secluded, in "water settlements" (Uhlig 1979), their remote villages are built on high-stilted platforms in the mangrove swamps. Some groups belong to the Moken (or Chao Nam, "water people" in Thai, Orang Laut ["sea people"] in Malay, popularly called also "sea-gipsies"). Of proto-Malayan stock, they live on their boats or in ephemeral mangrove settlements too. They are scattered over the entire west coast from Malaysia up to Burma's Tenasserim and Mergui islands and coasts. The province of Songkhla, finally, has the most outspoken mixture of Thai/Chinese urban or rubbergrowing and, mainly in the southern parts, of rural Muslim population. Due to the concentration of the educational institutions, services and the modern fishing industry there arose the relatively strongest urban Muslim component; however, already the census of 1960 showed a number of mere 19% Muslim in the province of Songkhla. As D.K. Wyatt put it during the discussion of the symposium, it may be spoken of "three South Thailands": the Thai Muslim (Malay) world, the realm of the Thai (Buddhists) themselves and that of the relatively early immigrated Chinese, hailing mainly from Malaya, based on tin-mining and trade - most noticeable in "Sino-Portugese style", old urban Ranong or Phuket in the west. In the border provinces (including the southern parts of Songkhla) the most densely populated Muslim areas again are found along the coastal stretches. In the case of Pattani, these areas are occupied by fishing villages situated usually on dunes. Other Thai Muslim villages produce coconut and fish on the banks of the lower rivers. Further inland (from the Pattani Delta) follow Muslim (and a few Thai Buddhist) rice-growing villages, with some coconut gardens and fruit-trees (Rambutan etc.) on the river levees. Moreover, there are two quite different exceptions: Pattani township itself, low-lying and partly inundated during frequent floods mainly in the rural quarters occupied by Muslim fishermen and rice-growers, too - and the more urban administrative headquarters, the modern commercial centre, the old crowded business district,

Southern Thailand

223

and the new buildings for higher education. There, members of all three cultural groups meet, in detail again separated in their respective living or trading quarters. The other exception is made up by Thai (Buddhist) charcoal makers, living in huts near the mangrove (Tugby 1973). In their poor social and environmental status, they are exceptional for the Southern Thai. Inland, continuing into Yala and Satun provinces, the hilly land unsuited for wet-rice (and therefore widely untouched until the early 20th century), Thai and also Muslim rubber planters have established themselves; wherever villages have access to suitable wet-rice land, it is planted, too. Dry upland rice is often planted on slopes, and as an initial crop on new rubber plantations. This area is clearly more thinly occupied as the densely populated coastal areas of up to 200 persons/ km2 . The rubber-growing and tinmining areas in the average have some 20-50 inhabitants/km 2 only, with a growing proportion of Thai and Chinese farmers or workers. A socio-economic handicap of the densely concentrated coastal Muslim areas, apart from the poorest soil conditions on the sandy beaches and plains, is the still prevailing self-sufficiency based on rice and fishing. This is detrimental again for social integration. Rice-cultivation, however, has not necessarily to be restricted to those poor socio-economic conditions. The much more intensively worked and irrigated ricelands of central South Thailand, outstanding in cangwat Phatthalung, with some 63% of its cultivated land under rice-cultivation (Hohnholz 1976) may stand for this (see fig. 9). In that cangwat, the Thai Muslim made up for only 8% (census 1960, quoted after Donner 1978) the others are mainly Thai, as compared, e.g. with Pattani and Narathiwat, with 78% Muslim population each (fig. 13). Whereas the ricelands are far more widespread in the east, the western cangwat are dominated by rubber-growing. Uplands, forested slopes and undulating plains, which had little economic value in the traditional economy, were abundant. Before the 20th century reforms, land in theory belonged to the king, who gave the right to occupy it for cultivation in return for a proportion of the resulting taxes (Berkoff 1975). In practice, unofficial occupation of forest land was relatively easy. The traditional rice economy, especially in self-sufficient areas, provided surplus labour. The climate in the south is favorable for the Hevea Brasiliensis, used to equal and moist, inner-tropical conditions, similar to those of Malaya. The

Harald Uhlig

224

rubber tree is fairly tolerant in face of any small-holder malpractices, of course apart from the high yielding modern strains with a sophisticated technology and high inputs, which have been spread only in recent years. A more simple, despite of modest inputs still sufficiently yielding cultivation prevailed until the modern intensifications. Lack of attendance during the immature period did not effect very much these modest yields, but the traditional farmers outside the money-economy were able to ensure an additional income from a non-perishable commodity, easily to be marketed. Rubber-growing was introduced in 1901 from Malaya by a governor of Trang (of Chinese extraction). It was eagerly adopted first by the local Chinese, suffering from a decline of tin prices, and soon imitated by the neighbouring smallholders, Thai, but also spreading from Malaya into the Muslim areas (Berkoff 1975). With a fast growing areal extension - primarily along the less densely settled western side- rubber in the cangwat of Yala e.g. accounted around 1967 for 81% of the agricultural land, in the regional average 50-70%, reaching its maximum on Phuket island (85%). For entire peninsular Thailand, Hohnholz (1976) arrived at the following

Western side Eastern side of the peninsula

Rice

Rubber

30 % 44.5 %

64 % 35.6 %

In the meantime, the overall share of rubber has heavily increased. Foreign investment, aiming for larger plantations in the Malay style, was not permitted in Thailand, rubber- growing remained mainly under small-holder ownership (frequently also Chinese labour, living as tenants or contract labourers in absenteeowners' rubber-gardens). Such estates as do exist, still have sizes closer to the larger small-holdings rather than to the estates in Malaysia. Under these conditions, a mixed structure of Sino-Thai, Thai Buddhist and to a certain extend Thai Muslim smallholder-rubber industry grew, resulting in a loosely scattered settlement and much lower densities of population, as compared to the compact villages in the east.

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In the meantime, rubber-growing has been improved by intensive cultivation practices to be able to reach international standards and to compete with Malaysia and Indonesia; in between them, these three countries hold some 80% of the world rubber production, producing about 2,922,000 t of natural rubber, including Thailands share of 530,000 t in 1982 (Geinitz 1985). Thailand still carries on energetically, whereas Malaysia, the "classical" rubber-land, is gradually replacing much of its rubber by oilpalms and other crops. The lower production-costs in the owner-smallholder plantations against the rising labour-costs in Malaysia's large estates explain this. The Rubber Replanting Project, implemented by the State and the World Bank, aimed successfully towards a fast replacement of the old, low-yielding plantations by younger, high-yielding trees. Large tracts of Southern Thailand are now dominated by these young rubber-stands (mainly smallholders, average size of holdings 2.4 ha). The total area planted to rubber in the entire kingdom rose from 709,102 ha in 1978 to 1,355,812 ha in 1988; from 1978-83 it grew by 37.3%, from 1983-88 by another 16.6%. The vast majority, exceeding 85% of the kingdoms total area under rubber, is located within Southern Thailand. Based on the same, somewhat moister, nearly inner-tropical climate, which favoured the spread of rubber-cultivation, another new cash-crop was introduced recently and gained considerable importance within an amazing short time: the oilpalm. Encouraged by the large-scale development in Malaysia and Indonesia since the last three or four decades, this innovation reached South Thailand in 1969, planted by one private enterprise at Ao Luk and followed by a state-planned settlement project in Satun. In 1973, 3,100 ha were under oilpalms, but soon the successful growth speeded up and the 1988 Intercensal Survey of Agriculture 3 arrived already at some 45,660 ha under oil-palm, planted by no less than 10,316 holdings, the majority smallholders of 10-40 rai (c.1.5-6.5 ha), but some (relatively) larger plantations, too (40-140 rai, c.6.5-22.5 ha). The cangwat of Chumphon (118,634 rai) and Krabi (78.496 rai) including the rapidly growing oil-palm core around Ao Luk - are leading; together with Surat Thani (47,383 rai). These three provinces claim 86% of Thailand’s entire oil-palm area in between them. The growing number of processing plants is served by 3

Figures kindly submitted by K. Husa and H. Wohlschlagl, Vienna.

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tractor-transportation of the fruit-bunches from the fairly scattered holdings, while others are surrounded by more compact plantations. Again, compared to Malaysia, the young Thai oil-palm holdings usually are smaller and more scattered than the big estates and the state-sponsored settlement schemes for oil-palm farmers of that world-wide leading producer. However, South Thailand has demonstrated once more its ability to accept agricultural innovations very fast, as soon as expanding markets offer new chances. Heavily over-exploited are the mangrove forests. This is not only due to (legal and illegal) timber-cutting and charcoal making, but likewise to the growing coastal aquaculture (prawn-ponds, fishraising etc.) on tidal flats, formerly under mangrove. A survey using satellite images (Dept, of Forestry) revealed, that from 19611979, e.g. some 80,600 ha of mangrove forest disappeared. High priority is given therefore to the conservation, management, and control of these valuable eco-systems, the best ranges in the bays of the Andaman Coast are now included into National Parks. A certain amount of charcoal, still an important fuel in a country short of coal and oil, but with some exports also to Singapore, is now made from waste-timber of re-planted rubber plantations. The worst inroads into the mangrove swamps and the entire coastal ecosystems, however, are consequences of the rapid spread of the modern "aquaculture", one section of the recent boom of the fisherery and marine products industries. This applies to all coastal areas of the kingdom, but most notably to Southern Thailand. Up to 1960, the basic Thai diet of rice and fish relied mainly on inland resources, fish caught in rice fields and rivers, and to a modest degree only on the supply of fish and seafood by a predominantly self-sufficient, traditional coastal fishery. In 1960/61, the Deptartment of Fisheries inaugurated far-reaching changes by introducing a modern commercial trawling fishery, supported by German experts (Tiews 1973; K.v.d. Decken 1969). This addition of technically fully-equipped deep-sea exploitation of ground-fish species - in contrast to the traditional use of the coastal and pelagical resources - resulted in spectacular yields and called for heavy investments in a new fishery fleet. The local fishing communities, especially the Muslim and "Chao Nam" (or Moken) of Southern Thailand, lacking in mobility and experience of deep-sea fishing, were more or less "by-passed" by urban and foreign investors, which introduced modern vessels, gear,

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and instruments and hired new crews from outside, especially from the poor Isan. This new trawler-fleet rose from zero to about 10,000 vessels, according to D. Uthoff (1991), who summarized this development (based on Thai statistics and his own observations). Modern fishery-ports and an export-orientated industry for canning or deep-frozen marine products were founded, alongside with a much improved supply to Thailand's own markets. Songkhla, Pattani, and Ranong were soon amongst the four leading Thai fishery ports and processing centres, which provide in between them more than half of the production. Phuket, with its fishery fleet impressing the tourists, and some smaller southern ports contribute considerable shares as well. During the seventies, this economic boom was endangered by the oil crisis, rising the costs of fuel, by the growing losses due to over-fishing in the Gulf of Thailand, and, most notably, by the consequences of the Third UN conference on marine rights (Buchholz 1984). The proclamation of 200-miles-zones of exclusive economic and fishery rights of the neighbouring countries reduced Thailand's own fishery-waters to merely 325,000 km2 in the Gulf and along the Andaman coast. Before that, the Thai deep-sea trawlers used to exploit vast seas off the coasts of Burma, Bangladesh, India, Cambodia, Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines. Now, the new restrictions caused heavy losses, also for the fish-processing industries (D. Uthoff 1991). This had to be overcome by bilateral treaties and joint-ventures with adjacent coastal nations, and by further extension of the fishing-grounds over the Indian Ocean, as far as to African and Arabian coasts, Australia, and parts of the South China Sea. Illegal fishing in foreign waters occurred too, including the risk of the confiscation of vessels and gear and the jailing of crews, in case of their detection. Ship-owners and the government had to pay heavy fines for the release of the vessels and to bail out jailed crews. There were also conflicts between Thai authorities, controlling protected areas and closed seasons, and fishing-crews. These problems provided an additional motivation to encourage the fast spread of the second innovation: the expansion and modernization of aquaculture (supported by the Sixth National Economic and Social Development Scheme 1987-92). Large coastal tracts, partly poor-yielding ricelands, but much more mangrove forests, were converted into thousands of prawn and fishponds. The

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fast rising production of shrimps, prawns, oysters and mussels, and the breeding of fish, again supported by modern marketing and processing installations, cool-houses etc., renewed the economic boom of marine products. Their export- value was rocketed up to the second rank amongst Thailand's foreig-exchange-earning "industries", only behind tourism and now before textiles and the traditionally leading rice-exports, rubber, and the other cash-crops. From 1977-87 the number of Thai aquaculture- "farms" rose from 1,438 to 7,264, the occupied area from 12,419 to 52,148 ha and the production from 1,590 to 23,266 t , steadily growing further (D. Uthoff 1991). Promising is the recent extension of small floating cages made of wood and fishing-nets, installed in shallow waters near fishingvillages, for intensified fish-raising. This provides some chances for the participation of the traditional local fishermen and could release some pressure on the remaining mangrove, whereas the impact of the capital-intensive, bigger enterprises, using heavy construction machinery, sealing land with concrete basins, canals etc., but likewise the numerous medium sized fish- and prawn "farms", enlarge the ecological risks for the coastal regions, most seriously by destruction of the natural coast protection and biological breeding grounds of the mangrove forests. Besides of the exports, a ready market for "sea food" sprung up also with the growth of tourism, now Thailand's most important earner of foreign currency, and again an important factor for Southern Thailand's development. Phuket became the leading destination (next to the tourist capacity of Bangkok, Pattaya and Chiang Mai). Starting with a first tourist resort in 1976 only, in 1988 already 726,000 guests were counted (70% foreigners, 30% inland tourists) and the number of visitors grew by 400% from 1980-88, as compared to 128% of the national average (D. Uthoff 1991b). Besides Phuket's further growth, some other destinations contribute gradually to that development, e.g. the Samui and Phi Phi Islands, Krabi, the impressive tropical Karst towers of Phangnga Bay, some culturally interesting places, like Nakhon Si Thammarat, or the flourishing Malay visits to Hat Yai. There are still more worthwhile places and scenery, but the four southernmost border provinces proper have been only marginally touched by this modern source of income, and likewise by the many associated changes of landscape and live.

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Socio-economic disparities are still existing (figures 9 and 10). The national plans aim for accelerated development. Urban growth and decentralization should ease the dependence on Bangkok. Further industrial, port, and infrastructural improvements are planned. The deep-sea port of Songkhla shall strengthen direct trade connections to the ASEAN partners, Japan, and the European Community. Under discussion is a modernized alternative to the old project of a canal through the peninsula at Kra: deep-sea ports at both terminals of an oil-pipeline crossing the isthmus. This would shorten the tanker routes and release the heavy traffic through the Strait of Malacca. However, besides the technical and financial expenses, ecological hazards and problems have to be considered, e.g. damages and industrial or oil-spoiling of the beaches of Krabi, one of the proposed terminals, but also one of the most scenic and sensitive coastal zones, a zone of great touristical potential. Besides the "Prince of Songkhla University" (with one campus located in Pattani), the equalization of the Muslim religious schools with the Thai schooling system is intended - just one of the various attempts towards national integration. Compared to the ethnic diversity and the scattered habitat of the tribal people in North Thailand, the more compact Muslim population of the South, living adjacent to another state with a similar language, religion and history, and a politically organized opposition, will make this task more difficult here, far remote from the national centre. This can be demonstrated also by a comparison with the higher degree of integration of the considerable Thai Muslim population in the vicinity of Bangkok. Originally descendants of prisoners of war, displaced after the subjugation of old Patani in the 18th century, they became clearly more accustomed to the life within a modern Thai society, as their kind in the far-away southern border provinces. References

Asian Development Bank (A.D.B.). 1985. Thailand Fisheries Sector Study. Bangkok. Berkoff, D.J.W. 1975. "Land Development in South Thailand." Spectrum, vol. 3, no. 5 , pp. 44-56. Buchholz, H.J. 1974. Seerechtszonen im Pazifischen Ozean. Mitteilungen des Institut fur Asienkunde, 137, Hamburg.

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Che Man, Wan Kadir. "National Integration and Resistance Movement: The Case of Muslims in Southern Thailand." In this volume. Decken, K. v.d. 1969. "Thailands Seefischerei". Ph.D. diss., University of Heidelberg. Department of Fisheries. 1989. Fisheries Statistics of Thailand. Bangkok. Donner, W. 1978. The Five Faces of Thailand. London. Ekavidya Nathalang, "National Integration: Summary and Perspectives for the Future." In this volume. Geinitz, D. 1985. Zielgruppenorientierte Forderung der kleinbauerlichen Kautschukwirtschaft in Indonesien und Malaysia. Studien zur integrierten landlichen Entwicklung, vol. 1 3 (Weltarchiv). Hamburg. Hall, D.G.E. 1986. A History of Southeast Asia. London. Hohnholz, J . 1976. "The Agricultural Economy and Landscape of Southern Thailand: An East-West Comparison." Applied Sciences and Development, vol. 8, pp. 66-88. Tubingen. Idris, Ahmad. "Traditions and Culture of the Thai Muslims in Southern Thailand." In this volume. Janisch, P. 1988. "Dezentralisierung und Raumplanung in Thailand, unter besonderer Beriicksichtigung der Entwicklung i n Sudthailand." Zeitschrift fur Wirtschaftsgeographie, vol. 32, pp. 242-248. Kraus, W. 1980. "Die islamische Minderheit in Sudthailand." Internationales Asienforum, vol. 11, pp. 79-89. Lebar, F.M., G.C. Hickey, J.K. Musgrave. 1964. Ethnic Groups of Mainland Southeast Asia. New Haven: Human Relations Area Files Press (ibid: Ethnic Groups of Insular Southeast Asia). Leng, L.Y. 1979. "Offshore Boundary Disputes in Southeast Asia." Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, vol. 10, pp. 175-189. Nantawan Haemindra. 1976. "The Problems of Thai Muslims in the Four Southern Provinces of Thailand (Part 1)." Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, vol. 7 , no. 2, pp. 197-225. National Statistical Office (Office of the Prime Minister). 1988. 1988 Intercensal Survey of Agriculture. Whole Kingdom. Bangkok. Panayotou, Th. and Jetanavanich, S . 1987. The Economics and Management of Thai Marine Fisheries. ICLARM Studies and Reviews, vol. 14. Manila. STRPS: Hunting Technical Services, Ltd. 1973. South Thailand Regional Planning Study, vols. 1 and 2, London. Suhrke, A. 1973. "The Thai Muslim Border Provinces: Some National Security Aspects." In Studies of Contemporary Thailand, eds. R. Ho and E.C. Chapman, pp. 295-312. Australian National University, Canberra, Research School of Pacific Studies, Department of Human Geography, Publ. 8. Teeuw, A. and D.K. Wyatt. 1970. The Story of Pattani. Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff.

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Thompson, M.L. 1975. Political Violence in the Muslim Provinces of Southern Thailand. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Occasional Paper 28. Tiews, K . 1973. "Fishery Development and Management in Thailand." Applied Sciences and Development, vol. 1 . Tubingen, pp. 44-59. Tourism Authority of Thailand. 1985-89. Annual Statistical Report on Tourism in Thailand, 1984-88. Bangkok. Tugby, E. and D. Tugby. 1973. "Inter-Cultural Mediation in South Thailand." In Studies of Contemporary Thailand, eds. R. Ho and E.C. Chapman, pp. 273-294. Canberra: Australian National University, Research School of Pacific Studies, Department of Human Geography, Publ. 8. Uhlig, H . 1979. " Wassersiedlungen in Monsun-Asien." In Siedlungsgeographische Studien, eds. W. Kreisel, W.D. Sick, J. Stadelbauer, pp. 273-308. Festschrift fur G. Schwarz. Berlin. Uhlig, H . 1988. Sudostasien. Fischer Landerkunde, vol. 3 , revised edition. Frankfurt/M. (especially chapter on Thailand, pp. 274323; on plantations, pp. 169-183; on tin, pp. 208-210). Uthoff, D . 1991. "EntwicKlungsphasen und aktuelle Probleme der tliailandischen Seefischerei." In Von der Nordsee bis zum Indischen Ozean, eds. Bruckner, H. und U. Radtke, pp. 221235. Stuttgart: Steiner. Uthoff, D. 1991b. "Tourismus und Kustenveranderungen auf Phuket/ Siidthailand." In Von der Nordsee bis zum Indischen Ozean, eds. Bruckner, H. und U. Radtke, pp. 237-249. Stuttgart. Wyatt, D.K. 1984. Thailand: A Short History. New Haven: Yale University Press.

NATIONAL INTEGRATION AND RESISTANCE MOVEMENT: THE CASE OF MUSLIMS IN SOUTHERN THAILAND Wan Kadir Che Man, University of Brunei 1 . Introduction Minority communities constitute a serious threat to the integrity of many contemporary nation-states. Despite a long experience of multi-ethnicity, there are very few fully successful instances of integration1 of minority communities in ethnically heterogeneous states. Many face the challenges of minority nationalist movements of various forms, ranging from relatively peaceful assertion of separate identity, striving for certain degrees of local autonomy, to violent activities or civil war, demanding separate political independence. Ethnicity and other "cultural markers" are frequently used to underpin a claim to subnational uniqueness. In other words, minority movements base their claims upon reality or myth of unique cultural bonds that serve to demarcate ruled minority from ruling majority. Minority communities may be divided into three categories. The first consists of minority immigrant populations such as the Blacks in the United States, the Chinese in Malaysia, and the Africans in Guyana. They usually have no attachment to specific geographical areas and their main concern is with acceptance within the larger society. The second category constitutes indigenous peoples who, as a result of colonial settlement, have become minorities in their own lands. In many cases, the indigenous communities are struggling for their survival, to limit alien encroachment. Examples include the Aborigines in Autralia, the American Indians in the United States, and the Innuits in Canada. The third category of minorities results from incorporating hitherto autonomous communities under foreign domination. Examples are many, including the Moros in the Philippines and the Malays in Thailand. Some of these minority communities perceive 1

Karl Deutsch (1988:212) defines integration as "a relationship among units in which they are mutually interdependent and jointly produce system properties which they would separately lack".

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separation not only as having a socio-historical logic but also as being a practical possibility if the following conditions exist: (1) coincidence of geography and cultural plurality; (2) distance from the centre of authority; (3) support of sympathetic groups outside the state; and (4) breakdown of central institutions. One of the main cause that makes the integration of minority communities difficult has been the persistence of ethnicity.

2. Persistence of Ethnicity Since the early third millennium B.C., ethnic community has remained as a socio-cultural "model" for human organization (Smith 1987:32). Ethnic communities are defined as "a self-perceived group of people who hold in common a set of traditions not shared by the others with whom they are in contact" (De Yos and RomanucciRoss 1979:9). This shared set of traditions includes myths of descent, place of origin, sense of historical continuity, and distinct cultural practices. Ethnic group cohesion produces a strong sense of belonging and solidarity, which in time of threat or outside presure can override other types of allegiance (Smith 1987:30). However, the persistence of ethnic solidarity has been characterized either as a manifestation of residual loyalties from an early stage of social development, due to dissolve as society becomes more developed, or as essentially a form of economic conflict. Thus, ethnic solidarity is destined to be withered during the modernization process. Central to the argument of modernization literature is the notion that the process of modernization - the spread of market economy, growth of literacy, and improved social communications - leads to a cultural diffusion that cuts across primordial attachments, producing a more or less homogeneous culture within a given territory. In other words, the broad process of modernization affects all cultures roughly in the same manner. As a result, all states composed of diverse ethnic groups will eventually become integrated. The Marxist tradition was consistent with the above view. For Marxists capitalism entails a growing polarization between those who own the means of production and those who do not. Therefore, class replaces ethnicity as the fundamental social division. Dahrendorf (1969) has made a summary of modernization theories and Marxist arguments as follows: "Since the criterion of ethnicity is not functionally relevant for the allocation of authority in

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industrial societies, the likelihood that conflict is based on ethnic boundaries decreases with modernization." The above versions of modernization theory have, however, been challenged by many scholars. Connor (1972), for instance, maintains that a global survey illustrates that modernization appears to have increased ethnic tensions and to be conducive to separatist demands. This is because modernization fosters ethnic competition, especially in the competitive modern sector. Geertz (1963:154) suggests that modernization in the form of increasing social modernization "does not do away with ethnocentrism, it merely modernizes it". From this discussion, it seems that modernization and change create conditions favourable to competitive environment and ethnic organization. If the conditions which catalyse separatist potentials mentioned above exist, ethnic separatism often arises in communities with political grievances or discontent resulting from the dominance of ethnic minorities on the periphery by the core group, as is the case of the Malays in Patani. If left unresolved, such grievances are likely to precipitate social disturbances and separatist movements. Local ruling elites resent their loss of status and the increased prestige of officials of the central government. Ordinary people resent outside influence on their accustomed way of life and fear that the new ruling groups will disturb existing local interests. Thus, they rally behind their local leaders in movements of resistance and opposition to foreign authority. If territory coincides with well-defined boundaries of communal language, religion, or other ascriptive characteristics, the tendency may well be towards secession or civil war, threatening the very existence of the state. Among various primordial factors, religion has played an important role as vehicle for separatist movements. In the case of Muslim minority communities, Islam has been a major ingredient of many movements. In some instances, Islam has become the fundamental ingredient of the struggles; in others, Islamic concepts are integrated into nationalist dogma to provide movements with the necessary religious coloration to appeal to a wider population. In most cases, Islam and nationalism reinforce each other in their rejection of foreign rule. Muslim separatist movements such as those of the Malays in Patani and the Moros in Mindanao are inspired and legitimized in religious terms; and their basic conflict seems to have been cultural

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rather than economic. As Snow and Marshall (1984:134) have argued, "if we examine the rhetoric of revolt, it appears that what is at issue, at least in the mind of the dissidents, is not so much one economic system versus another, but one culture or way of life versus another." Given the fact that Islam does not separate religion and politics, it is only natural that Islam plays its role in all community activities, including revolutionary activity.

3. Thai Integration Efforts From the end of the 19th century onwards, Thailand under King Chulalongkorn gradually incorporated its autonomous tributary territories such as the Patani principalities into the Thai state. Figure 1 shows the transformation of the Patani principalities into the present Thai provinces. When the so-called Seven Malay Principalities (cet huamiiang khaek) were incorporated into Thailand, the first step towards national integration taken by the newly created Ministry of the Interior in Bangkok was to replace the local rulers, the Malay raja, with Thai governors. Some of the Malay raja appealed to the British Governor of the Straits Settlements in Singapore for intervention in their grievances. Because of its own political reasons, Britain chose not to interfere in Bangkok's affairs on Patani region. Figure 1

Saiburi

Patani

Seven Malay Principalities

Nongchik

Yaring

Yala

Raman

Ra-ngae

Circle of Patani, Thailand (1906-1932)

Patani

Saiburi

Yala

Ra-ngae

Malay Provinces of Thailand (1932 - Present)

Patani

Yala

I Narathiwat

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Failure to obtain help from Britain did not discourage the Patani leaders from opposing the concerted effort of Thai integration. The collective resistance against Bangkok's encroachment began when the Malay raja refused to concede their power as rulers of the Seven Principalities. They ordered their subordinates to boycott all meetings with Thai authorities and directed the newly assigned. Thai bureaucrats in the Muslim provinces not to perform their official duties. Joining the nobility in opposing Bangkok were Muslim religious leaders who believed that submission to a nonIslamic regime without resistance was not permissible in Islam. Muslim resistance to this initial step of Thai integration attempts failed, however. The Malay raja were deposed, and all functions of the Seven Principalities were gradually transferred to Thai bureaucrats. The traditional state ritual of sending "Flowers of Gold and Silver" to the Thai king every two and a half years was no longer required because the Patani region was then regarded as an integral part of the Thai state. Another important integration measure taken by Thai authorities after the deposition of the Malay rulers was the replacement of the sharia and adat (customary) laws with Thai laws, except in matters concerning marriage and inheritance. The abolition of the sharia and adat laws stirred the feelings of the Muslims in general for every religiously committed Malay Muslim regards the sharia and adat laws "the axis of his whole existence" (Geertz 1968:111). The resistance against the integration efforts intensified as the effect of Thai control over Malay Muslim society increased. The struggle to regain self-rule as a Muslim community involved both nobility and religious leaders. One of the most serious protests occurred in 1922 after the Thai government had taken the third major step towards integration of the Muslim community by promulgating the Compulsory Primary Education Act in 1921. The Act was viewed by the Malay Muslims as an attempt to stamp out their religion and culture. To many Muslims, it was important that their young children were to be exposed to no other teachings than that of Islam. As a reaction to the Act, the former Malay nobility and some religious leaders ordered the Muslim villagers of Ban Namsai, Mayo district, not to pay taxes to the Thai government. In the following year, Thai authorities were accused of closing the Muslim Quranic schools, causing another Muslim protest. These protests required substantial Thai forces for their suppression.

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In 1923, the Bangkok government reassessed its integration policy towards Patani in an effort to lessen conflicts in the region. It was perceived that there was a real threat of losing Patani to Britain if policies for political and cultural integration of the Malay Muslims were carried out indiscriminately. New guide-lines for dealing with the Muslims were issued to redress some of the government regulations and practices that appeared inconsistent with Islam and Malay adat. Taxation of the Malay villagers was also minimized. More importantly, the government's approach of cultivating political loyalties was through economic development and political participation, particularly after the country established its constitutional monarchy in 1932. The less vigorous pursuit of political and cultural suppression by the Thai from 1923-38 was matched by correspondingly less forceful resistance by the Muslims. Moreover, it gradually created a sense of national solidarity among the Malay Muslims. Some Muslim leaders believed that they could gain concessions from the government and maintain their Muslim identity by participating in the existing system, while others, who were doing so, sought to buy time until their bargaining power increased. The Patani leaders were also aware that they could no longer depend on the support of their Muslim "brothers" in the northern states of Malaya, due to the political control achieved by the British over them. In addition, Tengku Abdul Kadir Qamaruddin (the deposed ruler of Patani), who had been the central figure in rallying support for Patani resistance since 1915, died in 1933. Under the ultra-nationalist government of Phibun Songkhram from 1938-44, the relatively peaceful situation in the Muslim provinces ended. The Thai Custom Decree was promulgated by Bangkok in 1939 in an attempt to change the cultural practices of the minority communities and to refashion the social habits of the entire population. Under this decree, the Malay Muslims were forbidden to dress in the Malay fashion, to use the Malay language, and to practice certain aspects of Islam. This policy of forced assimilation resulted in widespread resentment among the Muslims. Tengku Mahmud Mahyudding, the youngest son of Tengku Abdul Kadir, took the opportunity to carry on his father's struggle by organizing a movement in Malaya. It was known as Gabungan Melayu Patani Raya (GAMPAR) or the Association of Malays of Greater Patani. GAMPAR's main objective was to strive for

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irredentism of Patani with the Malay states on the peninsula. At about the same time, Haji Sulong bin Abdul Kadir, a renowned religious teacher, also organized the Patani People's Movement (PPM) in Patani. Both GAMPAR and PPM have been regarded as the founding organizations which initiated the Patani Muslim struggle that has persisted to the present day. Realizing that the compulsory education policy initiated in 1921 and the cultural assimilation programme of 1939 failed to substantially promote the spread of Thai education and culture among the Malay Muslims, the Thai government under Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat initiated in 1961 a programme of "educational improvement" in the Muslim provinces of Narathiwat, Patani, Satun, and Yala. The main objective was to transform the traditional Muslim religious schools (pondok) to registered private Islamic schools (rongrian ekkachon son satsana itsalam). Historically, Muslim religious schools or pondok had played an important role in Islamic education before the Patani region was incorporated into Thailand. In fact, the region was considered as the most important area in the Malay Peninsula for religious education and scholarship in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (Winzeler 1974:266). Pondok were once the most popular education institution in Patani. They provided the Muslims with a knowledge of Islam, which every Muslim is required to learn. They produced religious scholars who were influential and respected within the Patani Muslim society. With Sarit's educational improvement programme, all pondok were required to register and to teach a standard governmentdesigned curriculum with Thai language as the medium of instruction. Religious subjects were allowed to teach, but they had to be conform to the requirements of the Education Ministry. In 1971, there were a total of 535 pondok in the region. One hundred and nine pondok failed to comply with the government policy, and ceased to exist (Songkhram 1975:117). Financial incentive of a total of US$ 800 were allocated, during the first three years of transformation, to each pondok with forty or more full-time students. Pondok with healthy progress in their transformation process received additional financial rewards of financial assistance from time to time. It took the Thai government twenty-five years to complete the process.

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The replacement of traditional pondok with private Islamic schools has had a major impact on Muslim education in the four provinces. Most Islamic schools have been unable to raise the standard of their secular curriculum comparable to that of Thai public schools. In religious subjects, they have lost much of their academic strength used to attain by pondok. Furthermore, students have to pay school fees for both secular and religious education which in many cases cost more than that charged by the public schools. While many private Islamic schools have been struggling to persist, the government has accelerated its efforts to increase the number of public schools in the Muslim provinces. Statistically, private Islamic schools have gradually decreased in number, from 535 to 426 in 1971 and to 189 in 1991. On the other hand, there are 1 ,218 Thai public schools in the area, including a university, a teachers training college, and a number of vocational schools (Education Region II 1991). Nearly every village has a primary school and every district a secondary school. In 1991, there were 312,384 students attending schools in the four provinces. It is estimated that there were 202,972 Muslim students in Thai public schools and only 22,423 in Islamic religious schools. Table 1 shows the population and schools in the four Muslim provinces. Table 1 Population and Schools in Four Muslim Provinces, 1991 Province Population Muslims No. of No. of in % Public Islamic Schools Schools 84 535,953 Narathiwat 399 55 74 Patani 517,646 373 83 Satun 209,618 71 176 13 Yala 77 268 336301 38 Total 76 (0) 1399,718 1,216 189 Source: (Education Region II, 1990, 1991) The decline in number of private Islamic schools in the four provinces is expected. Some of them were unable to meet the requirement of ever-increasing rules set by the Thai government. Others have lost essential characteristics as centres of religious scholarship. Many owners of Islamic schools have difficulties in

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obtaining funds needed to cover the expenses of operating a school. However, there are several large Islamic schools which are successfully upgraded to a foundation in order to secure government financial assistance, though it means more assertion of control by the government. In the final analysis, the transformation of traditional pondok to private Islamic schools can be viewed as the final stage of Bangkok efforts to neutralize the role of pondok which has been seen as an obstacle to the process of national integration. With the introduction of a secular curriculum and Thai teachers in the existing Islamic schools, Thai values and culture have been diffused in the Malay Muslim community. Though Islamic religious schools in the region continue to persist, they may not be able to provide the "cultural fortification" and religious scholarship for the Muslims as pondok once did. In addition to its educational programme, the Sarit government started a so-called "Self-Help Settlement Project" (khrongkan nikhom sang ton eng) to redress the population imbalance between Thai Buddhists and Malay Muslims in the Patani region. Under this project, Thai Buddhists from outside the region were encouraged to migrate to the four provinces by providing each family involved 710 acres of land to settle. The Thai government's target is to make the four provinces a predominantly Buddhist area. In connection with this policy of redressing population imbalance, the Thai autorithies have been tacitly approving the dual (Thai and Malaysian) citizenships obtained by some Malay Muslims in the four provinces. As far as the Thai authorities are concerned, "one can have the people but not the land". In summary, the Thai integration policies towards the Muslims in the region can be listed as follows: 1) Replacement of Malay raja of the Seven Malay Principalities by Thai governors between 19011906. 2) Abolition of the sharia (Islamic law) in the Patani region in 1906. 3) Restructuring of the Seven Malay Principalities into four provinces in 1906.

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4) Signing of the Anglo-Siamese Treaty of 1909 to legitimize the incorporation of the Patani region into Thailand. 5) Promulgation of the Thai Compulsory Education .Act of 1921. 6) Promulgation of the Thai Custom Decree in 1939. 7) Initiation of the policy to transform traditional Islamic educational institutions (pondok) to private modern schools with Thai language as medium of instruction in 1961. 8) Initiation of a so-called "Self-Help Settlement Project" (khrongkan nikhom sang ton eng) to redress the population imbalance between Thai Buddhists and Malay Muslims in the region in 1961. The incorporation of the Patani region into Thailand and the determination of the Thai government to carry out the above mentioned integration programmes have been viewed by the Malay Muslims as internal colonial practice. The internal colonialism is regarded as the worst kind of colonial systems. Unlike regular colonial practice, internal colonialism does not base on cost/benefit calculation. In the case of a usual colony, the colonial masters will assess their cost/benefit factor from time to time. Once the cost exceeds the benefit, the colonial masters will announce to their colonial subjects that they will be given an independence status because, as they are led to believe, they have obtained enough knowledge to rule themselves. In the case of an internal colony, there will be no such an opportunity. This is because the incorporation of an autonomous region into a larger entity is considered as a permanent gain to the colonizers; no other calculations and assessments are necessary. In the case of Patani, its colonization was also legitimized by the British through the Anglo-Siamese Treaty of 1909. This legitimacy became an important asset for the Thai to proceed with their integration policies. However, each step of the integration process was met with vigorous resistance by the Malay Muslims. Their most extreme form of resistance which still persists today has been liberation or separatist movements.

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4 . Muslim Resistance Movement There are four underground Muslim resistance groups currently active in the four southern border provinces of Thailand. They are "Barisan Islam Pembebasan Patani" (BIPP) or the "Islamic Liberation Front of Patani"; "Barisan Revolusi Nasional" (BRN) or the "National Revolutionary Front"; "Patani United Liberation Organization" (PULO) or "Pertubuhan Perpaduan Pembebasan Patani"; and "Gerakan Mujahidin Patani" (GMP) or the "Patani Mujahidin Movement". These liberation fronts are the result of a transformation from a movement largly organized around members of the Malay ruling elites to one with a broad base of support. GAMPAR and PPM (mentioned above) were the first results of this transformation. Both organizations, however, confined their struggle to political activities aimed at irredentism of Patani region with the Malay states in the peninsula. When the top leaders of GAMPAR and PPM died in 1953 and 1954 respectively, both organizations disintegrated. In 1959, the former members of the defunct GAMPAR and PPM formed an organized front under the leadership of the former deputy leader of GAMPAR, Tengku Abdul Jalal bin Tengku Abdul Muttalib or Adul Na Saiburi. The front was known as Barisan Nasional Pembebasan Patani (BNPP) which changed its name to the present BIPP in the early 1980s. The BIPP was the first front to organize armed guerrilla units to support its political resistance. Its objective was no longer irredentism but restoration of independence. Since the BIPP was headed by a former Patani aristocrat and was regarded as ideologically conservative, the more progressive groups of Muslims who were impressed by Sukarno's struggle for Indonesian independence, hesitated to join the BIPP. In 1963, the Muslim progressive group under the leadership of Ustaz Karim Hassan formed the BRN with the aim of establishing a Republic of Patani. In its early years, the BRN leaders placed greater emphasis on political organization than on guerrilla activities. Their main strategy was to penetrate the Islamic institution of the pondok. Within five years, the BRN seemed to be able to influence many pondok in the provinces of Narathiwat and Yala. In 1968, Karim and other BRN leaders went underground and began to organize their guerrilla units seriously.

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In 1968, the third front, PULO, was formed. It was organized by Tengku Bira Kotanila or Kabir Abdul Rahman who had at the time just completed his bachelor degree in Political Science at the Aligarh Muslim University. Soon after the formation of PULO, Tengku Bira moved to Mecca, Saudi Arabia, and focused his recruitment efforts mainly on young, non-committed Patani Muslims by stressing nationalism, differentiating PULO from BIPP's orthodox Islam and BRN's "Islamic socialism". The PULO also cultivated its support among Patani students in various Arab countries, in Pakistan, Malaysia and the homeland. In 1985, Wahyuddin Mohammad, former vice-chairman of the BIPP, and his clique formed the Barisan Bersatu Mujahidin Patani which was renamed "Gerakan Mujahidin Patani (GMP) in 1989. The formation of this new front was an attempt to create an umbrella organization for different Muslim resistance groups. The attempt was not successful when the GMP sponsored meeting - "Conference of Friendly Leaders: Parties, Organizations, and Movements in Patani" - held in Kuala Lumpur on 13-14 June 1986, failed to produce any concrete result. This is because the GMP was viewed by other fronts and Patani Muslim leaders as just another front with n o special unique features, leadership or structural organization, that could attract them to rally behind it. Although the fronts differ in many ways, ideology, strategy, and membership composition, they all view the Bangkok government as a colonial power and stress armed struggle to achieve independence. From 1970 to 1975, the fronts' guerrilla operations were very active. Each front developed its sphere of influence throughout the provinces of Narathiwat, Patani, and Yala. Muslim villagers who lived within these spheres were directly or indirectly involved in the activities of the fronts. The villagers were reminded by the fronts of their obligation to be involved in the struggle and were cited the Hadith that says, "The best of the believers is he who fights in the cause of Allah with his wealth and his life". At the height of their guerrilla activities, the fronts set up ambushes and attacked police check-points and government installations. Extortion and kidnapping for ransom were also part of their operations. Local businessmen were forced to pay "protection money", and the Thai authorities were often reminded of the fronts' existence through various terrorist activities.

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During this period of active Muslim resistance (1968-75), the Bangkok government launched a series of military operations, involving military, police, and voluntary forces. According to the government statistics, the result was as follows: 385 clashes with the Muslim resistance groups; 329 Muslims dead; 165 surrendered to Thai authorities; 1.208 arrested; 1.546 weapons of different types captured; and 250 camps destroyed (Megarat, 1977). Externally, the fronts mobilized Patani students and workers in various Muslim countries such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Pakistan to play their different roles in foreign lands, especially to promote the fronts' struggle as jihad and preserving the Muslim community, not as terrorists or bandits as claimed by the Thai authorities. Generally, the fronts perform two training programmes: military and political. Guerrillas are trained locally and abroad. Local training is conducted by local guerrilla leaders in remote areas. From time to time a group of guerrillas from different fronts is sent abroad for military training. Political training is normally conducted by high-ranking leaders of the fronts. The political training programmes are mainly aimed at familiarizing the members and new recruits with the objective, ideology, and descipline of the fronts. Financial resources come mainly from the contributions of local and foreign members and supporters. Members and supporters of the fronts can be divided into two categories: those who believe in the struggle and those who. want to protect their interests. The fronts major source of income, however, comes from contributions made by various agencies, organizations, and wealthy families in Muslim countries. Most of the funds are given in the form of charity. The fronts spend substantial amounts of their income on operations and management. A good portion of their earnings is used for welfare of their members. Although the fronts are not divided along ethno-cultural lines, conflicts within the Patani struggle occur on the basis of ideology, tactics, educational background, class, and disunity among their supporters. In addition, the fronts have been plagued by internal divisions. These internal rifts seem to be caused mainly by the lack of strong leadership in each front. These divisions among the fronts and within them have been one of the main causes of the fronts' weakness. Throughout their existence there have been many attempts to unite or at least to

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work together in facing common enemy. Some of these attempts were initiated either by the fronts or by the agencies sympathetic to the Patani struggle. However, all efforts towards unity produced unsatisfactory results. On the 31st August 1989, a conference of Patani freedomfigthers was held; the result was that the existing fronts - BIPP, BRN (Congress), GMP, and PULO - made their nine-point declaration jointly and agreed to form an umbrella organization aimed at creating a united front for the struggle. Their nine-point declaration is as follows: "We hereby declared that: 1. The Patani liberation struggle is a struggle to achieve total independence of a Malay Islamic sovereign state; 2. Our struggle is an armed JIHAD which is obligated by Islam and upheld by the Malay people of Patani; 3. We oppose all Thai colonial policies and programmes which persistently attempt to eradicate our faith, race, language, and culture; 4. We condemn all types of oppression, injustice, and violation of human rights, whether in the form of killing, detention without trial, torture, and discrimination; 5. We denounce all forms of cooperation with Thai colonialists in exploiting the economic resources and wealth of Patani; 6. We will take firm action against those who cooperate with Thai colonialists if such cooperation is deemed detrimental to the struggle of the Patani people; 7. We appeal to all Muslims to support our sacred struggle; 8. We call upon freedom-loving nations and organizations to provide their moral and material support for the struggle of the Patani people; 9. We will cooperate with all liberation movements and peace-loving people throughout the world,

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The umbrella organization, known as "United Fronts for Patani Independence" or "Barisan Bersatu Untuk Kemerdekaan Patani" (BERSATU), was formed in October 1991 after the fronts had been coordinated under a committee of joint leadership of the four fronts for more than a year. The newly formed umbrella organization, BERSATU, seems to give new soul to the Patani struggle. This is not only because BERSATU provides the struggle a sense of unity and coordinated planning, but also a new expectation for supporters and sympathizers. With the present international political environment and order, the unity effort may help the Patani struggle to move to a more effective result. On the other hand, the Thai government has used different schemes, both by force and persuasion, to neutralize the Muslim separatist activities. The responsibility of this counterinsurgency seems to rest mainly in the hands of the Fourth Army Region (FAR). Apart from the usual armed counterinsurgency, the FAR has also from time to time attempted to persuade the Muslim separatists to surrender to the Thai authorities. To do this the FAR has employed two main approaches: direct negotiation and individual persuasion. The direct negotiation approach means that the FAR sends its officers to persuade a group of the so-called separatists to surrender to the authorities by offering them certain personal benefits such as jobs in voluntary militia with monthly allowance, a piece of land to settle down and a certain amount of capital to invest, apart from giving them amnesty. At present, for instance, we are witnessing negotiations in the process between the FAR officers headed by Lt. Col. Charint Amornkeow and a group of Patani Muslims called "Fighters for Justice and Freedom of the Malays in South Thailand" (FJFM). Under this negotiation, a twenty-two point proposal was submitted by the FJFM to the FAR officers. Among the points put forwards by the FJFM are as follows: all members of the FJFM must be allowed to return with their families to the four provinces as citizens of Thailand without retaining their past criminal records; they must be given government jobs in Southern Thailand in accordance with their educational qualifications and training backgrounds; and each of them must be

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provided with 10 acres of land, house, and compensation (Fighters for Justice and Freedom of the Malays in South Thailand 1991). This direct negotiation approach has been .quite successful in the view that there have been groups of Patani Muslims surrendering to the authorities from time to time. Nevertheless, most of the Muslim surrenderers were not actual members of the fronts; many of them were common criminals or those who were dismissed by the fronts. In the case of the individual persuasion approach, the authorities usually rely upon government Muslim leaders such as village and commune headmen, members of the Provincial Council for Islamic Affairs, and Muslim judges to persuade members and leaders of the fronts to return to the fold of the authorities. This persuasion method seems to be less successful. This is because the fronts believe that these pro-government Muslim leaders have no actual power to keep their promises made. Secondly, they believe that the government Muslim leaders play such role only for their own personal gains. In fact, there were very few members and leaders of the fronts surrendering to the Thai authorities through individual persuasion of the government Muslim leaders. Be that as it may, the resistance movement has not shown very impressive records. This is due to many reasons. Among them are that the movement consists of loosely organized fronts whose strengths dependent more upon ethnicity and religious motivation than upon the principles of effective organization. Secondly, factional conflicts, among and within the fronts have been one of the main sources of the weakness of the struggle. The factional divisions have deepened as disunity developed among the Muslim states sympathetic to the struggle. Thirdly, the existing fronts have been unwilling or unable to develop their international contacts beyond the Muslim world. Fourthly, the resistance movement of the Malay Muslims in southern Thailand has carried out a struggle against all odds; Thailand has been not only a strong state but also a state with long experience in dealing with minority communities. Finally, Malaysia, as a "big brother", has been unwilling to participate in the movement. Although the separatist movement in the Patani region has not been able to assert a serious threat to Bangkok, it continues to persist. This is because the movement is motivated by ethnicity, religion, and history which cannot simply be removed by 'improvement' of socio-economic ills.

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5 . Conclusion A cycle of ethnic resurgence and decline has been occurring since the dawn of recorded history. Various theories have been suggested for explaining the persistence of ethnic communities. The central argument, however, has been that the ethnic community is one of the main socio-cultural "patterns" of human organization and communication. It holds in common a set of traditions not shared by others. A question remains as to whether the emergence and expansion of the Patani separatist movement in the last few decades was primarily attributable to economic exploitation, as suggested by some writers, or whether it was essentially a response to cultural degradation. Relative economic deprivation has been an element of the situation of the Muslim community in southern Thailand, but what seems to be an issue is a conflict of cultures which is seen as the continuation of centuries of confrontation between the Patani Muslims and the Thai intruders. The Muslim separatist conflict is sustained by the believe that the continued efforts of the centre to consolidate its control over the socio-economic and cultural affairs of the Muslim community will lead to the erosion of their cultural and religious way of life and the disappearance of their identity. There is no multi-ethnic state which so far has proven immune to the surge ot ethnicity. Communist, democratic, federative, and unitary states have all been affected. Nor do the international organizations and alliances decrease the significance of ethnic nationalism. On the contrary, the international economic and political organizations, which stress membership, negotiation, and power only among nation-states, appear to have encouraged minority communities to think in nationalistic terms. Hardly any government of a multi-ethnic state has so far found the solution to the problem posed by the demands for modernization on the one hand and the tendencies of growing ethnic nationalism on the other. Determined to prevent secession and to achieve national integration, many governments tend to resist separatist movements with coercive means, while simultaneously promoting assimilation. Such policies have proved to be unsuccessful. While some segments of the Patani Muslims are gradually absorbed into the Thai mainstream through the process of national

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integration and development, policies which seek to redress the separatist problem through socio-economic measures fail to recognize that ethnic communities tend to perceive their conflict not in socioeconomic terms but as ethnic, religious, and nationalist. Indeed, while Bangkok views cultural autonomy for the Muslim community of the Patani region to be a threat to Thai national territorial integrity, the Patani Muslims regard the concept of “national selfdetermination" as a fundamental right of every people. References Che Man, W.K. 1990. Muslim Separatism: the Moros of Southern Philippines and the Malays of Southern Thailand. Singapore: Oxford University Press. Conference of Patani Freedom-Fighters. 1989. A nine-point declaration made jointly by BIPP, BRN (Congress), GMP, and PULO as a result of their conference held on 31st August 1989. Connor, Walker. 1972. "Nation-Building or Nation-Destroying?". World Politics, vol. 24, no. 3 , pp. 319-355. Dahrendorf, Ralf. 1969. Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society. Stanford: Stanford University Press. De Vos, George and Romanucci-Ross, Lola (eds.). 1975. Ethnic Identity: Cultural Continuity and Change. California: Mayfield Publishing Company. Deutsch, Karl W. 1988. The Analysis of International Relations. London: Prentice-Hall International. Education Region II. 1990. Education Statistics: Privat Islamic Religious Schools. Yala: Education Region II (in Thai). Education Region II. 1990. Operational Plannings. Yala: Education Region II (in Thai). Fighters for Justice and Freedom of the Malays in South Thailand. 1991 . A twenty-two point proposal submitted by the group to the officers of the Fourth Army Region, dated 8 November 1991. Geertz, Clifford. 1963. "The Integrative Revolution: Primordial Sentiment and Civil Politics in the New States." In Old Societies and New States, ed. Clifford Geertz. New York: The Free Press. Geertz, Clifford. 1968. Islam Observed: Religious Developement in Morocco and Indonesia. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Megarat, Manas. 1977. "The Failure in Subjugating Terrorists of the Three Southern Provinces." Research Document, syllabus for police officer course, Group 13 (in Thai). Smith, Anthony D . 1987. The Ethnic Origins of Nations. New York: Basil Blackwell.

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Snow, David A . and Marshall, Susan E . 1984. "Cultural Imperialism, Social Movements, and the Islamic Revival." In Research in Social Movements, Conflicts and Change, ed. Louis Kriesberg. Conneticut: JAI Press. Songkhram Choenphiban. 1975. "Assimilation Policy of Muslims in the Four Southern Provinces." M.A. thesis, Chulalongkorn University (in Thai). Winzeler, Robert. 1974. "The Social Organization of Islam in Kelantan." In Kelantan: Religion, Society and Politics in a Malay State, ed. William R. Roff. Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press.

IV. THE NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE

NATIONAL SUMMARY

INTEGRATION: AND PERSPECTIVES

FOR THE FUTURE

Ekavidya Nathalang, formerly Ministry of Education, Bangkok I. Introduction

Thailand as a nation state has evolved through many changing circumstances internally as well as internationally. Colonialism has now become a thing of the past. Economic and technological imperialism is still appearing strong but is destined to end up with the same fate simply because of the limits of global resources and the deteriorating state of the eco-system. Capitalistic economy, materialism, and consumerism came in package accepted like a new religion, yet well counteracted in Thai cultural context by the embedded Buddhist vision of simplicity, moderation, and the peace of mind. At the same time, Western or Eastern intellectuals alike sense the decline of Cartesian paradigm. Democracy is accepted world-wide as the least evil form of polity. It is, hence, the intention of this paper to study the national integration phenomena compared to the mentioned scenario, and to propose a thesis that national integration of Thailand, as a case study, has almost reached the saturate point. Perhaps, it would be more sensible to reconsider the strategy of national integration through different perspectives because ample evidence pointed to increasing awareness among people of the beauty and value of cultural identities in different regions as well as that of the various ethnic groups. In as much as people in Thailand now are well unified under a single Thai nation sharing the same national culture and the same destiny, the integration policy can be viewed as gaining ground at the watershed where the country is conditioned to change or even reverse the direction for hopefully a better course. If the Thai people can afford to be more relaxed about national integration, they should be able to see the other side of the coin what are the mistakes and/or injustice they have done to their brothers in Lan Na, Isan, Patani, and the Thai people in general, regardless of where they live. We might come across a better stance to respect the beauty and the integrity of local cultures as well as to value the dignity of the small unimportant people. As such, we are bound to enable ourselves to relate things together

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more humanely and holisticly from the individual and local to the national and global levels.

H. Summative Views of National Integration Before presenting perspectives for the future, let us look back briefly why and how national integration of Thailand was achieved. My synthesis'. 1 . Through historical perspective, national integration of Thailand can be summed up as a phenomenon strongly conditioned by the threat of colonialism in the later half of the 19th century and in the first half of the 20th century. The policy of national integration continued to work well until today in spite of the weakening influence of colonialism in the decades after World War H due to the wide-spread nationalism among Asian countries and the new aspiration for nation-building. 2. Thai monarchy, especially of the Chakri House is known to command a pivotal role for national integration. With the Buddhist ideal of kingship, the Thai king rules in subordination to one power only, the Dhamma. The king is, thus, perceived as the dhammaraja - a ruler who turns the wheel of state in the name of justice and provides the material necessities to enable the state's citizens to pursue the religious life unrestrained (Sivarak 1992: 66-67) Empowered also by the Hinduized concept of devaraja - divine kingship - , the Thai monarch has been well adorned with the supreme parami 1 as revered by his subjects. With this concept existing in the mind of people through many successive generations, Thailand managed to be the only country in Southeast Asia that was able to maintain its sovereignty. It is therefore understandable why kingship as an institution has played the most important role for national integration in both ancient and modern contexts. 3. Inheriting the combined authority of the dhammaraja and devaraja, Thai monarchs of the Chakri House, particularly King Mongkut, King Chulalongkorn, King Vajiravudh, and the present King Bhumibol, all lived up, in varying degree however, to the prescribed power and paraml. Especially King Chulalongkorn is widely respected for his successful course of reform. Most crucial 1

Param! - the word has no equivalence in English. So far, it cannot be translated in a proper way. The meaning, however, is close to the combination of power gained from accumulation of merit plus benevolence, respect, popularity, and potentiality to help others.

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throughout his reign is the vital question of national survival. While Burma, Annam (Vietnam), Cambodia, Laos, and Malay states were all encroached and eventually annexed by Britain and France, King Chulalongkorn and his advisers were keenly concerned with asserting effective authority over the various parts of the Siamese domain. The 1892 provincial reforms were devised by King Chulalongkorn and his brother, Prince Damrong Rajanubhab who was appointed by the king to head the newly created Ministry of Interior. The main purpose of the reform was to centralize almost all power originally vested in vassal rulers and local lords. The provincial reforms involved a total restructuring of the bureaucracy in Siam for it eliminated the traditional hierachy and replaced it with a very simplified one in which the relationship between the king and his subjects was mediated by only one type of intervening status holder, the kharatchakan. A kharatchakan could play many different functional roles, but all were, as the name indicates, "servants of the king". Through far-sighted leadership of the rulers and their skillful manipulation with the newly instituted kharatchakan as a working system, the people of outlying areas of the kingdom had not only been brought under the control of a centralized state but also felt that they belonged to a common nation. The reform, however, was not implemented without resistance by segments of the indigenous population, especially in Chiang Mai and Patani. It was nevertheless well received by most people and was referred to as a "silent revolution" (Keyes 1987:53). 4 . Cultural matters have been perceived as eminently essential for national integration. From King Chulalongkorn's reign down to the present, "national culture" based on the common root among the ethnic "Tai" peoples of Lan Na, the Isan, the South, and the Central Plain, except the Malay speaking Muslim people of Patani and around, has been reinterpreted and promoted for many successive decades. The common elements, to cite a few, are primarily rice culture, Buddhism, Thai language of various dialects and people's reverence for the Thai monarch as their supreme sovereign with the exception of Lan Na people, however, who formerly counted themselves more align with northern royalties (of Chiang Mai, Lampang, or Nan). What has been identified as Thai national culture, and for that matter Thai nationalism, represents a carefully selective reinterpretation of the traditions and the

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promotion of this reinterpretation as being the tradition of all "Thai" in common. To cite a few aspects, first, the Buddhist ecclesiastical system and Buddhist education were reformed by the institutionalization of the Sangha Order to be well in line with provincial administration reform since 1892. Perhaps the most important measure in the Sangha Organization Act of 1902 was the provision that no monk could ordain other men into the sangha unless he was allowed to do so by the Supreme Patriarch. There was certain resentment particularly in Lan Na but it was well reconciled in later years. The chief architect and leader of the sangha reform is Prince Vajiranana, one of King Chulalongkorn's closest and most able advisers. Second, the standard system of primary education for the whole mass of Thai citizen was organized in 1898 by Prince Vajiranana together with Prince Damrong who was then the first Minister of Interior. Intending to make the system compatible to the traditional practice anywhere in the kingdom, primary schooling was organized in the Buddhist temples. Monks and knowledgable laymen were recruited to teach. A large number of temple schools persist till now. What is known as standard system of education is primarily the "3 R's" and moral education along Buddhist precepts. It was compulsory for teachers to teach in Central Thai. Sciences, social studies, health education and other subjects were added later to make the learners well versed with the modern/Westem world. With this foundation secondary education followed. School rituals and customs were created to set norms, i.e., national flag-salute and prayers in the morning, paying teachers homage, wearing school uniforms and observing polite manners. These common activities were routinized to affect habit formation styled after the Bangkok based notion of "Thainess". After almost one hundred years of this stereotype education, it has been clearly visible that the standard practice has eventually formed the habits of Thai people in general regardless of their place of living. Languagewise and mannerwise, a lot has been taken as a normal pattern further reinforced years after years by radio, TV broadcasts as well as in everyday communication and socialization geared by the kharatchakan. National culture, once continuously promoted, becomes a unifying force for all to feel they belong to one common nation. Other ethnic groups, especially

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the Chinese, are also gradually assimilated in later generations mainly through education and socialization. 5. Another important factor facilitating national integration is the uniqueness of Bangkok, the capital city. As its name suggests, "Krungthep" in Thai means the "City of Angels". It has been the place of royal residence for more than 200 years. Most of the members of the aristocracy and of the nobility lived here, and all kinds of decision-making concerning state affairs have been made here. Being the single largest metropolis of the country, it has been taken for granted that almost everything is conceived, generated, promoted, and exerting impacts from there, in every aspect, political, economic, cultural, spiritual, educational, artistic or anything else. At the turn of this century, diplomatic, commercial, and cultural relations with foreign countries greatly increased, encompassing also the international agencies and missions for the Southeast Asian region - all enhancing Bangkok to play an increasingly pivotal role in many respects. During the last few decades, the country's infrastructure, particularly communication and transportation, has been advanced with high technology. Information flow and mobility of people within and from outside the country has been greatly accommodated. As such, it is evident that Bangkok's power over the rest of the country is excessive. National integration, therefore, no longer needs any extra effort. It became self-generated and it can be unmistakably viewed as something of a "fait accompli". What should be truly needed then is the opposite approach, i.e. nothing else but decentralization if not disintegration. There are many good reasons pointing to the desirability of a greater autonomy for the regions and local communities to look after their own affairs and take pride in their well rooted identities which will, in turn, contribute to a healthier and more democratic integration.

m. Problems and Issues Stemming from National Integration National integration undoubtedly helped Thailand to steer its course for independence and modernization but not without expenses. One needs to look squarely at the other side of the coin. The following points are some of the problems and issues which have been caused by national integration. 1. Through the "top down" political, religious, educational economic, and cultural aspects of transformation, the indigenous

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Thai speaking peoples as well as other ethnic groups in Lan Na, the Isan, the Upper South, and Patani have been more or less deprived of their rights and privileges inherited from their past for many centuries. The ruling classes of the regions have been degraded to obey their Bangkok overlords, thus they lost pride and confidence in themselves. When staying passive and shy, some have gone through either open or underground resistence in trying to gain back their former authority and self-respect. Incidents were known to occur in Lan Na in connection with religious reform, in Patani with political subversion, and in Isan with the so-called phu mi bun rebellions. All were well pacified by Bangkok but not without wounds and chain reactions, particularly in the case of Patani. Even if the present generation of people in these regions feel commonly that they belong to one nation, they also feel alienated from their cultural base and simply enjoy a distance from the notion of Thai nationalism. 2. From a political and administrative angle, the legislative provisions and the administrative measures ordered by Bangkok over the outlying regions and provinces have been, to a significant degree, similar to those used by the colonial powers, namely, Britain and France. The Bangkok appointed commissioners and district officers, the fiscal policy of a centralized state revenue collection, and all kinds of ministerial decrees are viewed all in all by local people as being brought under tight control and, by substance, most of the measures reflect the imitation of colonial bureaucracy. It is something close to be internal colonization. One important difference is that people are not ruled by foreigners and do not feel oppressed or disdained, but they still sense that they are second class citizen. This inferiority complex is widely felt among the Isan and the Lan Na people who count themselves closely akin to the Lao, another ethnic Tai people. Even today Thai people in the central plain still call them casually "Lao" while the people of Patani who share the same complex are called khaek which literally means foreigner or stranger. Only with better understanding and acceptance on both sides on equal footing can the psychological illnesses be eventually cured. 3. Economically, as a consequence of the centralized state revenue collection as well as the yield to the demand of the colonial power on Bangkok's part, people in Lan Na and the Upper South, where natural resources such as timber and minerals abound,

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felt that their provinces were drained or even depleted of their resources. Timber and mining concessions were given to foreign companies who, in turn, paid small portions of their profits as taxes to Bangkok. What bitterly disturbed the local people for generations is twofold: their wealth was digged from their land by aliens; and that was done for the benefit of their Bangkok overlords who monopolized the right for authorization. Secondly, they received, in return, a tiny share of that wealth in the name of nation-wide modernization or development. The case in point is Phuket. For the past few decades they are also alarmed about the fast deterioration of the environment namely the shrinking forest, soil erosion, flood and drought, since these natural phenomena seriously affect their lives in a way they had never before experienced. This has been caused, but not solely, by the companies receiving concession from Bangkok for there are many other parties involved including the local people who should share the blame. However, the weak, greedy, and corrupted management of Bangkok authorities including their officials stationed in the provinces is undoubtedly the major cause. 4. Regarding human resource, Bangkok by virtue of national integration has, for at least several generations, become the prime centre attracting the talented or the best minds from everywhere in the country. This fitted well into the cultural framework of Thai society which is known to be very hierachical with the monarch at the top of the pyramid. The talented and the better educated were recruited to serve the nation by becoming kharatchakan and, by that means, a person was given high social status and prestige. Young capable people who once functioned as state officials received official titles and decorations appropriate to the notable designation in various departments and ministries, including, in the latter decades, universities and institutes - offices that are mostly found in the capital. Trade and industries, on the other hand, have almost always been in the hands of the more enterprising Chinese merchants and foreign companies including eminent multinational corporations during the recent decades. Well facilitated by the universal primary education at the grassroot and "elitist" secondary schools by convention at the city and district levels, the curriculum of which is still composed mainly of the modern subjects and learning materials very much in line with western education, the rural young were then naturally induced to

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adopt the "modern" mentality and felt to be urged to leave their home villages or provinces with high spirit to try their best by having higher education in Bangkok or at least in other urban centres like Chiang Mai, Khon Kaen, Songkhla etc. where they were able to be accepted into the upper level of society after having left college education by virtue of their knowledge and ability. Some in fact bluffed their way up into the official realm beyond their actual knowledge capabilities if they knew how to do that in a country where patron-client relationship is still valued. To be able to become "somebody" in a hierarchical society, is the social value highly treated by most people throughout the country. It is therefore obvious that the regions and provinces have been losing a large proportion of their capable young to Bangkok for many decades. These people are in fact mostly needed for the nation-wide development the state manifested, to implement in their respective home provinces. If national integration simply enhanced an almost one-way-journey for the young and productive people, it is ultimately necessary to divert the trend. 5. More importantly, while national culture is imposed nationwide, indigenous culture, be it in Lan Na, Isan, or Islamic Patani is thereby overshadowed. To date, national culture through the means of national integration, has already tremendously belittled the local wisdom and culture. To study culture, if one should regard that every culture in any given society has its own virtue and its own system that is the result of the interaction between man, nature, and society, any subculture in Thailand should be dealt with respect. This, of course, does not mean that we have to preserve indigenous cultures at any cost, since that will be against the nature of cultural change. Today, people in Lan Na, Isan, Islamic Patani, and everywhere in the country in all ethnic groups seem to be culturally confused whether they should accept the entire Bangkokbased modern culture and disregard their own long rooted culture. It will be much more healthy if people of varied cultural background in Thailand would be allowed to select, interpret, and integrate the "great tradition" into their "little tradition". Consequently, people will then have self-respect and pride in their local culture. If people have confidence in their cultural base, they would then be able to cope with the cultural change brought to them with wise adjustment in the long run.

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IV. Perspectives for the Future National integration, in case of Thailand, is by no means an end in itself. It is evident that national integration was conceived and enhanced to prepare the country to be able to cope with the colonial threat and economic imperialism. To the fact that there have been many very great changes in the world during the past one hundred years especially in international politics and Thailand has managed to evolve through many events, there are indeed many lessons to learn from. Being gradually well integrated, the country has survived very well up to now. As a modern state, Thailand is now a clearly defined unitary entity, politically and economically well steered and poised in the community of nations. But, like a many great countries, Thailand is presently facing many crises and difficulties, i.e. environmental deterioration, political conflicts between the pro-democracy and military dictatorship cum party cliques, social illnesses such as crimes, drug addiction, prostitution, HIV, and many other problems. No matter how serious the problems are, the Thai state, as a result of many decades of achieved national integration, is certain to assume a stable position to deal with its problems in collaboration with other countries. There will never be the case of territorial secession or religious conflict leading eventually to disintegration like what has happened in some other countries. What is still desirable in the future, however, is further development beyond integration in accordance with the rapidly changing context in the interdependent world. Arnold Toynbee, in his famous dialogue with Daisoku Ikeda in 1976, said that almost every state authority faces one dilemma and that is, it is too big to deal with local problems yet too small to deal with big problems which involve many states, be it environmental, economic, political, or cultural. The only sensible way to break through this dilemma is to encourage people in their local units to get organized and decide things for themselves. Besides, what was referred to at the beginning of this paper as "small unimportant people" is in fact the representative of the great majority of people who comprise the states or even the whole world. To our knowledge in Thailand, these people are not as weak, poor, and ignorant as they are supposed to be. They have in fact a lot of wisdom and potentials accumulated through generations of rich experiences. Given them a

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chance to take good care of their own affairs in their own cultural context with good sense of pride and confidence, they are likely able to do many things. Moreover, they always have learning potentials about what is new for them in changing contexts. With better education, better information, better access to modern technologies, individuals as well as their communities anywhere are more or less given a better chance to solve their common problems provided that the state is liberal enough to allow them to run their own affairs. With this rationale, an increasing number of people, especially local people and development workers, believe that it is necessary for the state to restructure its administration and encourage greater self-government among people of various provinces. Diversity should be encouraged while conformity should be relaxed among different regions and provinces throughout the kingdom. Things will change and evolve. In human history, it is indeed rare for the powerful to willingly share their power with the weak. The "top-down reform" initiated and successfully implemented by the great King Chulalongkorn is indeed a rare exception. To follow the normal course of human history, "the weak", the small unimportant people, need to fight for themselves and exert their own wisdom and strength to gain back the dignity of directing their own destiny. For that matter, the small unimportant people almost always have had their own subtle way of fighting. As remarked by Marc Bloch in his writing about French rural history, he said: "Almost invariably doomed to defeat and eventual massacre, the great insurrections were altogether too disorganized to achieve any lasting result. The patient, silent struggles stubbornly carried on by rural communities over the years would accomplish more than these flashes in the pan." (quoted in Scott 1985:28) Besides, democracy, by its essence, provides the opportunity for people to have their participation to get where they want it to go, no matter how long and how painful it would be. In a democratic spirit, national integration does not necessarily mean strong centralizaton. A nation can be well integrated yet fairly diversified, still people are made happier. It is hoped that, by necessity, Thailand is heading along this direction. At the broader perspectives, it is recognized worldwide that many interrelated problems are not restricted to state boundaries as long as the world's environment has none. Anywhere in the world,

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people are breathing the same air. We are influenced by the related climatic changes. We are fighting and exploiting each other to use the same world resources, e.g. air, energy, minerals, food, water, or anything else. We are subject to the same destiny. The tensions will increase in the North-South relationship replacing the Cold War as long as the rich countries with less population are consuming more resources of the world than the poor countries with their much larger population. There are numerous indications pointing to the necessity, or in fact, the urgency for all states in the world to have some kind of effective collaboration and some kind of workable organization to deal with our common problems. It took the European Economic Community several decades to become the European Community. In Southeast Asia, ASEAN members are getting closer together than before. ASEAN membership is likely to cover Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, and Burma in a few years ahead while the Pacific Rim is emerging as we are approaching the 21st century. With no intention to overly romanticize the necessity for closer cooperation among nation states, it is becoming clearer and clearer that we are approaching what can be called, for academic purpose, "international integration", if what we mean by propagating the slogan "environmentally sustainable development" was not just a sheer wishful thinking. References In English Brown, Lester R. 1991. State of the World 1991. A World Watch Institute Report. New York. Brown, Lester R. 1992. State of the World 1992. A World Watch Institute Report. New York. Chris, Dixon. 1991. Southeast Asia in the World Economy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Ekavidya Nathalang. 1990. “The Wisdom of Thai Farmers: Contemporary Efforts for Cultural Reproduction." Paper presented at the 4th International Conference on Thai Studies, Kunming, China. Hart, Gillian et al. 1989. Agrarian Transformations: Local Processes and the State in Southeast Asia. Berkeley: University of California Press. Keyes, Charles F. 1989. Thailand, Buddhist Kingdom as Modern Nation-State. Boulder, Color.: Westview Press.

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Keyes, Charles F. et al. 1991. Reshaping Local Worlds, Formal Education and Cultural Change in Rural Southeast Asia. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Center for International and Area Studies. Scott, James C . 1985. Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance, New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press. Sulaksa Sivaraksa. 1992. Seeds of Peace: A Buddhist Vision for Renewing Society, Parallax Press. Toynbee, Arnold and Ikeda, Daisaku. 1976. The Toynbee-Ikeda Dialogue, Man Himself Must Choose, Tokyo: Kodansha International. Wyatt, David K. 1969. The Politics of Reform in Thailand, Education in the Reign of King Chulalongkorn. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press. In Thai Ekavidya Nathalang. 1991. Wikhro ekkalak thai nai krasae' khwam plianplaeng [The Analysis of Thai Identity in the Flux of Changes]. Bangkok: Office of the National Culture Commission. Ekavidya Nathalang. 1992. Wikhro watthanatham yipun - thai [The Analysis of Japanese and Thai Cultures]. Paper presented at the Symposium on Thai -Japanese Cultures and the Teaching Learning of Japanese in the 21st Century. Thammasat University, Faculty of Liberal Arts, January. Office of the National Culture Commission. 1991. Phumpanya chao ban kap kan damnoenngan dan watthanatham lae kan phatthana chonnabot [Folk Wisdom and the Cultural Aspects of Rural Development], Seminar Proceeding. Bangkok, March. Pracha Pasandhammo, Phra et al. 1992. Cut plian haeng satawat [The Turning Point of the Century; English translation by Fritjof Capra]. Bangkok: Komol Keemthong Foundation. Praves Wasi. 1990. Thang rot [The Way to Survive]. Bangkok: Kled Thai Press. Raphee Sakarik. 1992. "Rakthan kan siiksa thai thi tok yu tai itthiphon rup phap cak watthanatham khong chon tang thin" [Thai Education Base as Influenced by Alien Culture]. Thang mai [New Way], March - April. Saneh Chamarik. 1992. "Kan siiksa thi pen yu mai dai rap chai khon suan yai" [Current Education Does Not Serve the Majority of People]. Thang mai [New Way]. March - April. Sulaksa Sivaraksa. 1991. Kan thotthoi khong prachathipatai thai [Set Back of Thai Democracy]. Lecture presented on the Occassion of the 6th month of NPKC at Thammasat University, August.

THAILANDS'S CULTURAL RELATIONS WITH ITS NEIGHBOURS Khien Theeravit, Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok Introduction Cultural relations are of great importance in inter-state relations. Compared with economics, politics and defence, the cultural dimension of inter-state relations i s relatively subtle and constructive. However, it becomes dominant only in a peaceful atmosphere. It has its uniqueness: it may proceed with or without an institution, and it may be conducted on the initiative of either private or public institutions. In recent years, culture and related factors have increasingly been a major consideration in the formulation of Thai foreign policy. Some may be used as instruments for diplomacy, while others, as vehicles for international understanding beyond cultural diplomacy. In this paper, I will give a brief account of cultural exchanges (e.g. ethnicity, attitudes, arts, expertise) devised by the Thai people in relation to their neighbours (namely China, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Myanmar, and Malaysia). 1 Some thoughts and observations will be given to the impacts on the countries under study and internal impacts on Thailand's foreign policy community. 1 . Cultural Relations From the 1932 revolution up to the end of May 1992, in Thailand, there were altogether 40 government policy statements presented to parliament. Of these, only four included some concepts on cultural policy. The first Chatchai Government policy statement (August 25, 1988) pledged "to promote Thai culture in foreign countries so as to make them understand Thailand and the Thai people better." This was a one-way-flow concept, and it did not aim to achieve mutual understanding. The second Chatchai Government policy statement (January 9, 1991) maintained the above policy. In addition, it further stated: "The government will develop people-to-people relations [with foreign countries] through the exchange of culture 1

China and Vietnam are close but not adjacent neighbours of Thailand. They have been included in this study mainly because culturally they have special relations with Thailand.

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and information and through extending technical cooperation so as to promote mutual understanding." The foreign policy statement of the Anand Government announced to the National Legislative Assembly on April 4 , 1991, also retained a clause on cultural policy. It pledged to foster economic, technical and cultural cooperation 'with all developing countries, especially with close neighbours. The short-lived Suchinda Government had no chance to put its policies into practice.2 Suchinda’s policy statement made four references to cultural factors in the context of foreign policy. First, the policy statement pledged to foster closer cooperation with ASEAN in political, economic, social, and cultural areas. Second, it was committed to promote cooperation with foreign countries in the fields of economics, technology, culture, and human resource development. Third, it pledged to promote a good image abroad by making foreigners understand Thailand and the Thai culture. And finally, it was committed to use cultural relations as a means to promote friendship with foreign countries, both at the governmental level and the non-governmental one. In short, the successive governments of Thailand in the last 60 years have given very little consideration to the use of cultural factors as part of the country's foreign policy formulation. Moreover, the cultural dimension has been included in the policy statements only in the past five years. In diplomacy, however, cultural dimensions have been evident much earlier. The Thai government and its people began to interact passively with dominant foreign cultures, such as those of the U.S., the U.K., France, China, and Japan. Now, Thailand sends and receives cultural attaches to and from the said countries. The patterns of interaction are increasingly and mutually beneficial. With its close neighbours, however, the Thai government's interest is still negligible. From the six neighbouring countries under consideration, only China has exchanged cultural attaches with 2

General Suchinda Kraprayoon was appointed as Thailand's 19th Prime Minister on April 7, 1992, heading a 5-party coalition government. He read his government policy statement to Parliament in May 6 amidst massive demonstrations against him jointly organized by the four opposition parties and the "democratic movement". The demonstrations turned into riots and violent suppressions which resulted in over 50 deaths and nearly one thousand wounded. He was pressured into resigning from the premiership on May 22.

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Thailand. Vietnam, Laos and Malaysia have each exchanged cultural officials with Thailand. Their areas of responsibility include information. Of course, the ambassadors have always had jurisdictions over all areas of inter-state activities which include cultural relations. The objectives common in all these embassies’ activities with regard to cultural and information services have been predominantly propaganda in nature. The officials concerned may have had to struggle within their own minds and among their colleagues as to whom they should serve: to honestly present the facts of their countries as expected in the cultural field, or to present their countries to their targeted groups by means of propaganda as required by the policy. For Thailand, there is a will to increasingly rely on cultural diplomacy to foster closer cooperation with its close neighbours. The younger generation of diplomats (Thai ambassadors to Myanmar, Vietnam and Cambodia are under the age of 50) tend to apprehend the real meaning of cultural diplomacy, and are ready to give higher priority to their diplomatic functions. They have the will to purvey an honest picture of Thailand rather than a rosy one, and they are eager to learn the culture of their host countries. Moreover, they have made it clear that it is their responsibility to promote cultural interactions between the private sector as well. However, the problems as to how to improve the existing diplomatic structure to fit with new demands and aspirations still remain unresolved. It would be unrealistic to anticipate a similar change of attitude in the diplomatic corps of Thailand's neighbouring counterparts. China, Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar all have political systems which require that culture must serve politics. And the Malaysians are still highly nationalistic: to broaden the diplomatic base to include the private sector is still unacceptable. Officially, at least, Thailand's cultural relations with Malaysia are different in status from the other neighbours' under study. As members of ASEAN, Thailand and Malaysia have been blessed by the two agreements which facilitate their cultural interactions: the Agreement for the Promotion of Cooperation in Mass Media and Cultural Activities (Cameron Highlands, 17 December 1969) and the Agreement on the Establishment of the ASEAN Cultural Fund (Jakarta, 2 December 1978).

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The trend in recent years is clear: the Thai government has increasingly paid attention to the utilization of cultural factors to support conventional diplomacy. The driving forces for this move have ranged from an ideal to a realistic one: cultural relations as a means of promoting peace, friendship, better understanding, etc., and cultural relations as a lubricant for trade. This conscious move on the part of the government has its own foundation: the economic base has been encouraging; human resource development has been relatively advanced; and compared with its close neighbours, Thailand has been relatively rich in cultural heritage; moreover, the peaceful environment has provided greater opportunities for inter-state cultural relations in place of politics and force of arms. The more effective means to foster cultural relations is through people-to-people channels. This has been going on from time immemorial, with or without the official sanction, but the impetus of which has just become visible in recent years. Today, cultural interactions in official and unofficial sectors between Thailand and its neighbours consist of numerous components. Exchanges of expertise in various fields are featured prominently at the upper class of society. Presentations of arts can reach various targeted groups. Attitudinal dimension of culture is often at work without giving too much publicity. The cultural values that are inherent in some ethnic groups are often playing significant roles in inter-state relations. Some of these cultural flows deserve clearer examination. 2. Exchanges

of Information

and Arts

Consciously or unconsciously, cultural interactions of these categories will likely promote good-will, mutual progress, and better understanding among the peoples. Among the countries under study, China seems to have received widest attention. Soon after the establishment of diplomatic relations between Thailand and China, the two governments signed, on March 31, 1978, an Agreement on Scientific and Technical Cooperation. Ever since, the policies of the two governments have been to promote exchanges and cooperations of various kinds. During the last 15 years, China and Thailand have carried out over 330 cooperation projects under this agreement. Most of them have been study tours and short-term training programmes in the spheres of

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science, economics, and social development. Only approximately 10% of the cooperation projects belonged to the category of cultural exchanges, such as exchanges of experts, training in language studies, or sports. Cultural exchange activities between Thailand and its six neighbouring countries in the last few years have been too numerous to list, the more popular ones being the exchanges of arts (music, dramas, dances, films, videos, paintings, sculptures, cultural artifacts, literature, etc.), the exchanges of experts (linguists, historians, scientists, administrators on cultural affairs, etc.), the exchanges of fellowships for training and study tours, the exchanges of all kinds of information, cooperation in seminars, conferences, symposia, and sporting activities. They have been carried out at the governmental level, the semi-official level, or in the private sector. The political conditions in Thailand have been in favour of the participation of the private sectors more than that of its governmental counterparts. Thailand has also hosted such activities more often than others. The Anand Government (in office from March 2, 1991 to April 7 , 1992) matched its policy statement with deeds by allocating funds for economic and technical cooperation with neighbouring countries. In the fiscal year commencing on October 1 , 1991, the government appropriated Baht 25 million for this purpose. The budget increased to Baht 175 million in the 1992 fiscal year, ending on September 30, 1992. The allocation was as follows: Laos Baht 43.3 million Myanmar Baht 20.8 million Cambodia Baht 20.6 million Vietnam Baht 21.1 million Baht 20.3 million ASEAN Others Baht 48.9 million Some of the budgets allocated to technical cooperation can also be considered as supporting activities in the realm of cultural cooperation. The prominent activities in this component were the exchange of specialists, fellowships for short-term and long-term training, and study tours. There were some specific guidelines and objectives worthy of mentioning. Religious cooperation was stressed in the case of cultural relations with Myanmar - as the Thai and the Burmese have always been devout believers of Buddhism. Aid

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to Cambodia was instructed to be channelled through the Supreme National Council headed by Samdech Norodom Sihanouk. Priority was given to dispatching Thai experts to help Cambodia's reconstruction effort. Experts had to receive training in advance on Cambodian culture. As for assistance to Laos, the main objective was to inculcate the Lao to adopt a good attitude towards Thailand. The Thai government has made it clear that either in the above technical cultural cooperation programme or other similar activities, the role of the private sector must be supported. Hence, cultural exchanges are now being carried out by numerous channels, government agencies, universities, NGO's, and even private companies. The government officials concerned are ready to render them helping hands. Linkages of institutions in Thailand and those in the other six neighbouring countries have been emerging, though still few compared with their relations with the developed countries. Numerous universities and cultural institutions in Thailand and China have become sister institutions. Peking University and Chulalongkorn University have such an agreement. The Institute of Asian Studies of Chulalongkorn University alone has established similar relations with the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies at Zhongshan University, the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies of the Academy of Social Science of Yunnan, the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies of the National Center for Social Sciences in Vietnam, and the Social Sciences Committee of the Lao People's Democratic Republic alike. These bilateral relations have been carried out with joint activities such as research, seminars, conferences, study tours, short-term training, dictionary compilation, film and slide production. Chulalongkorn University's Institute of Asian Studies also presently serves as the Secretariat of The Mekong Development Research Network which involves China, Myanmar, Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam and Thailand. Meanwhile, Khon Kaen University's Research and Development Institute is serving as Secretariat for Southeast Asian Universities' Agro-ecosystem Network (SAUAN). Khon Kaen University still has many other joint research projects with Lao government organizations. In short, institutional cooperation, bilateral and regional in nature, have been emerging along with various kinds of exchanges. The Thai have been the key players in such patterns of cooperation, as their political system has been more open and their social and

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economic conditions, the most favourable of all countries under investigation.

3. Attitudinal Dimension of Culture In the countries under study, there are diverse cultural traits, even within each society. Inherent in the diversity are the differences in attitudes, values, and beliefs, which are mostly invisible. Some of these cultural traits are instrumental, positively or negatively, to Thailand's relations with the countries involved in this study. Firstly, there was a misconception among outside observers that countries with various brands of socialism (China, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Myanmar) had attained uniformity in their belief system, and the "backward" or "undesirable" elements of culture were gone. That belief is no longer valid. With the decline of communism, cultural diversity is once again re-emerging. This development has created new conditions for Thailand to foster cultural relations with its socialist neighbours. Ideology is still an obstacle, but not an unsurmountable problem. Diversified cultural traits can now interact more freely between the Thai and their neighbours. Secondly, Buddhism remains a strong vehicle for Southeast Asian people to trace their common identity. Thailand’s Buddhist establishment has been relatively stable, compared with its socialist neighbours, so that it has been natural for the Thai to lead in religious diplomacy. Exchanges of visits by religious leaders and exchanges of Buddhist literature have been active in recent years. There is no Mecca Homage for Buddhist fellows, but temples, especially the established ones, in Myanmar, Laos, China, have attracted organized Thai Buddhist groups to visit and perform religious functions. Religion knows no boundaries. In general, Buddhism positively serves as a vehicle for friendship between the Thai and their neighbours. Some of the television programmes in Thailand on the day-to-day lives of the people of the neighbouring countries have made great contributions to this effect. The image of socialist countries, thus, has been greatly improved after the Thai learned from the films that Buddhist life still exists in these troubled countries. On the other hand, the suppression of Tibetan Buddhists by the Chinese authorities have created problems negative to Sino-Thai relations. Hence, political leaders should no longer take it for

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granted that an internal matter can be handled without taking external cultural interactions into consideration. Thirdly, the attitudes of the Thai and their neighbours towards human rights have been traditionally similar: greater emphasis has been given to duty, not right; order and harmony has always been considered more important than pluralism. Due to different historical experiences, however, Thailand has been more receptive to western ideas than its six neighbouring countries. On human rights issues, the difference has been in degree. They shared, more or less a common value. This is why, either individually or sometimes collectively, at times, a different stance had been taken from the West regarding human rights violations in such countries as China, Myanmar, Indonesia and Thailand. The West, therefore, should try to understand that human rights have their cultural roots. 4. Ethno-Cultural Dimensions Each of these countries under investigation is inhabited by a number of racial-ethnic-linguistic groups. The role of these ethnic minority groups has often been crucial to relations between and among states under this study. The ethnic Chinese 3 in Thailand have been highly influential in Thailand's foreign affairs. Their roles in Sino-Thai relations have changed significantly since World War II. The following changes are notable. (1) Prior to World War II, the Chinese government conducted its foreign policy in relation to Thailand on the basis of cultural affinity rather than national sovereignty. Hence, the Chinese agents operated freely, without due respect to the Thai authorities, in rallying support either for Sun Yatsen's revolutionary cause in 19051915 or for China’s war of resistance against the Japanese aggression in 1930-1945. Nowadays, the ethnic Chinese in Thailand no longer have that kind of sense of belonging to their homeland. It would be unimaginable for a similar pattern of behavior to be repeated should the same events occur again. (2) During World War II, the Thai leadership embarked on an expansionist course based on racial affiliation. Phibun Songkhram’s 3

The ethnic Chinese are those Chinese and their descendants who normally speak Chinese and/or behave culturally like Chinese. The number is approximately 2 million out of the 57 million Thai population.

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pan-Thaism schemed to include Sipsong Panna's Thai community in Southern Yunnan into the Thai empire. Similarly, this would be unthinkable under the present conditions. (3) Traditional Chinese believe that a civilized Chinese who departed from his home village should return to die at his place of origin. Today nearly all ethnic Chinese in Thailand no longer observe this tradition. However, they and their descendants are still sentimentally attached to their home towns, located mostly in the southern parts of China. Thus, they have made frequent visits to their home towns. Even those who have already lost their links because of generational distance still seek opportunities to go to Southern China to trace their roots. This is an expression of cultural attachment. (4) Chinese ethnic factors, in the past, have proven to be liabilities when predominant conditions were given to political or security considerations. The episode of World War II and its aftermath was a case in point. After siding with the Japanese aggressors who waged war against China, the Thai government adopted various severe measures against overseas Chinese in many parts of the country. The outcome of the war consequently encouraged many overseas Chinese to create a series of disturbances throughout the country. Another example was when the Thai government in the early 1970s considered recognizing the People's Republic of China as the sole legitimate government in place of the Republic of China in Taiwan. The presence of a large Chinese community was cited as one of the negative conditions. In the last 17 years, since the establishment of diplomatic relations between Thailand and China, East and Southeast Asia's environment have changed significantly. It is difficult to imagine- that similar changes will ever happen again. The ethnic Vietnamese are now mostly living in eight provinces in Northeast Thailand. These people, numbering about 70,000, migrated into Thailand immediately before and after World War H (1930-1954). Although they have never been sizable in terms of number, they have constituted a significant factor in VietnameseThai relations. Culturally, the Vietnamese are a determined and organized race: they are hard working, disciplined, and united. To most Thai in the areas of heavy Vietnamese presence, the Vietnamese are formidable, if not threatening as economic rivals. On one occasion, before the

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collapse of communism, the Thai in the Vietnamese-inhabited areas were most disturbed to discover that despite the Vietnamese displaced persons' patriotism and loyalty to their revered leader, Ho Chi Minh, they were unwilling to return to their own country even after reunification. Subsequently, there have been ill feeling against each other. According to Thai law, these ethnic Vietnamese in Northeast Thailand are illegal immigrants or displaced persons. However, they are now free to settle in any of the eight designated provinces, although they are required to obtain official permits if they want to travel outside the designated provinces. Professional restrictions, nevertheless, have been imposed on them, but law enforcement in this case, as in many others, is highly flexible. In theory, the ethnic Vietnamese are awaiting repatriation, but in reality, they have firmly settled down. During the American Indochina War (roughly between 1962 and 1975), the ethnic Vietnamese in Thailand were perceived as a threat to Thailand's security. The U.S. military installations were largely located in the areas adjacent to Vietnamese settlements, as those eight provinces were adjacent to Indochina. It is not surprising that some of these Vietnamese settlers were engaged in subversive activities as Hanoi's "fifth column" opposing Thai-American military campaigns against their homeland.4 The security agents simultaneously applied repressive measures against them. As a result, the situation in these areas was tense. The American Indochina War ended in 1975 with a communist victory in all Indochinese countries. The pro-Hanoi ethnic Vietnamese had good reasons to rejoice. They celebrated the event in small parties. Furthermore, they sent delegates to Bangkok to welcome Hanoi's official delegation in August 1975, and took the opportunity to demand more freedom of movement. At the same time, the Thai in the Northeast also had good reasons to believe that with peace in Vietnam the "Vietnamese refugees" could be repatriated. Right-wing elements began campaigns against the continued presence of the "Vietnamese refugees." 5 The Thai's expectations never materialized. Between 1976 and 1978, Thai and Vietnamese delegations held numerous meetings to negotiate this 4 5

See Khien Theeravit. "Vietnamese Refugees' Attitudes Toward Thailand." Asian Review, vol. 8, no. 1 (January-April 1987), p. 43. Ibid., p. 45.

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issue. The result was that Hanoi had agreed to accept only 3,000 Vietnamese refugees back to their homeland. The ethnic Vietnamese will probably continue to be a liability to Thai-Vietnamese relations. With the demise of communism and the economic debacle there are no good reasons for the "Vietnamese refugees" to return to their homeland. The issue is now how to make the ethnic Vietnamese a positive factor for mutual interest. In recent years, especially after Hanoi's announcement of a total withdrawal of troops from Cambodia, there have been good indications of a move to integrate most of the Vietnamese settlers into Thai society. The ethnic Vietnamese have increasingly loosened their ideological ties with Hanoi. They have admitted that Thailand can offer them better security, freedom and material comfort than Vietnam. At the same time, Hanoi has also begun to appeal to the ethnic Vietnamese in Thailand to abide by Thai laws. On the Thai part, signs of greater flexibility in granting Thai citizenship to ethnic minorities have been emerging. The Cabinet's decision in early 1992 will enable a great number of ethnic Vietnamese to become permanent residents of Thailand. If Thai-Vietnamese relations continue to improve, ethnic Vietnamese in Thailand will turn to be an asset to Thai-Vietnamese cultural relations. The Thai Muslims constitute a large majority in the provinces of Satun, Yala, Pattani, and Narathiwat, including a large minority in Songkhla. They are not only Muslims, but also speak Malay as their only or primary language. Thus, culturally, their ties are closer to Malaysia than to Thailand. Hence, they tend to identify themselves with Malaysia rather than with Thailand. Therefore, the Thai Muslims have constituted an important factor in ThaiMalaysian relations. How to integrate this ethnic minority into Thai society has been a major national policy consideration since World War II. The Phibun Songkram governments (1942-1944, 1949-1957) adopted a policy of active assimilation, or forced assimilation, which created resentment among the Thai Muslims against Bangkok. This policy and the subsequent tensions continued in the following decade. Without due consideration to cultural forces in the sensitive areas, the Ministry of the Interior under General Praphat's leadership (1957-1973) attempted to reduce the Muslim's cultural influence by replacing street names in Malay by Thai names and by introducing

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Bangkok officials into the lower levels of large Muslim majority communities. As a result, tensions were aggravated further. The Muslim separatist movements were active in the 1960s and early 1970s. There were several groups, but the stronger ones were known as the Patani United Liberation Organization (PULO) and the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN). Their sanctuaries were said to be in Malaysia and they survived with foreign aid. Subsequent governments have been more tactful in dealing with the separatist movements. The authorities changed their previous policy which threatened the Muslim ethnic identity to a policy which recognized cultural pluralism. Hence, the term "Thai Muslims" has since been in use in place of "Malay Muslims". Moreover, the government has sponsored the building of mosques, facilitated pilgrimages of Muslim believers to Mecca, and employed various techniques to honor the Muslim spiritual leader. Another approach has been the attempt to reform local administration simultaneously with new economic development programmes. The most effective approach, however, has probably been the one actively guided by the Royal Family. This approach aimed to reduce the level of foreign aid to the separatist movements by trying to improve Thailand's relations with Muslim states, especially neighbouring Malaysia. Malaysia had its own interest to compromise with Thailand because its security had also been threatened by the Communist Party of Malaya (CPM), most of whose leaders had been based on the Thai side of the border since their expulsion from Malaysia in the late 1950s. Both governments were forced to bargain for each other's security interests by exploiting the other side's minority problem. By the end of the 1980s, Thailand went so far as to unilaterally help Malaysia disarm the CPM and to grant its followers the right to settle down in Thailand. In 1992, both Malaysia and Thailand seemed to have basically resolved their minority problems. For Thailand the Thai Muslim minority will remain a foreign policy issue in its relations with Muslim countries. The Gulf War, for example, was embarrassing to Thailand. The Thai government limited its commitment to the U.S .-led UN military operations partly because it did not want to alienate or antagonize its Muslim brothers in Southern Thailand.

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5. Cultural Relations and Trends for Regional Integration With the help of new information technologies, cultural interactions have been and will be further intensified. What are the impacts and implications of such cultural interactions? What will be the future trends in terms of regional integration? Ideally, cultural pluralism within the country, the region, and the world should be preserved. In reality, however, the cultural identity of a society can hardly survive if it lacks protective mechanisms. With the demise of communism, all countries discussed in this paper, except Malaysia, have tried to learn from Thailand the guidelines for economic development. But economic relations are often carried out along with cultural components. In the past few years, concern has been expressed over Thailand's "cultural imperialism" which has taken place alongside "economic imperialism". There are some elements of truth in these accusations. There have been attempts by some influential groups to transfer their value systems and to hold Thailand's neighbouring countries by economic bondage. Like many people in the developed countries, there have been some who have assumed the superiority and righteousness of their (Thai) system. How Thailand's neighbours have been able to resist or reconcile with Thai socio-economic intrusions is not yet clear. One scenario is that resistance to Thai economic and cultural domination will continue to be as sporadic as before. Certain forces are irresistible. The existing peaceful atmosphere will facilitate economic and cultural flows in reciprocal manner rather than as a one-way traffic. However, under present conditions, the formation of cultural domination seems to work in favour of the Thai values. To take commercialism as a value system, for example, nowadays, most Thai businessmen behave like Japanese capitalists in their customer relations. The producers rely not only on modern media, but also on the cultural values of the targeted consumers, to promote sales. We have witnessed how people living across the border, especially Lao, have learned how to behave like a Thai consumer. Their consumer values have been mainly influenced by propaganda through modern mass media. Language barriers will be one of the biggest obstacles to cultural flows. However, economic force will probably lead the way

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to breaking these barriers down. In any case, Thai-Lao relations do not have this language barrier. Moreover, due to close ethnic ties, Thailand will find no difficulty in transmitting Thai values to the markets of Cambodia and Myanmar. In recent years increasing numbers of Chinese in mainland China have visited their relatives in Thailand. During their visits they were able to witness for themselves the wide gaps in the political and economic systems between Thailand and China. It is difficult, however, to assess how much the differences will affect their thoughts and behaviour in the years to come. 6. Internal Implications In recent years the Thai and their governments have accepted ethnic pluralism. Ethnic groups are now allowed to express their interests as well as their potentials. Their interests sometimes promote causes that are detrimental to the national interests. In such an instance, consensus and reconciliation are essential for societal development. This process is a positive factor that fosters greater participation of the ethnic minority groups. As a consequence, it generates their sense of belonging, opportunity, and freedom, which may be regarded as part of "cultural democracy". The decision-making of Thailand's policy towards the Gulf War was the case in point. The second notable change in Thailand’s internal foreign policy community has been the disappearance of cold war rhetorics. The term "fifth column" used to be applied to every ethnic group in Thailand. The following perception of ethnic Vietnamese was expressed by the Secretary General of Thailand's National Security Council over nine years ago "Vietnam still advances its interests through the Vietnamese refugees. In particular, it uses the refugees as instruments for subversion in and bargaining with Thailand. The refugee community is used as a base for Vietnam's future operations. For this reason, Vietnam has rejected our refugee repatriation programme." 6 : This concept was popular in the cold war era. The policy towards ethnic Vietnamese then was to repatriate them en masse. Assimilation was not acceptable. The change in this attitude has been clear in recent years. Nationalization for ethnic minorities is 6

Prasong Soonsiri. "Foreign Policy Implementation and Security Problem." Saranrom, vol. XI, Special Issue (10 February 1983), p. 31.

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now more open than ever before. This is possible partly because of the disappearance of the external threat and party because economic relations with foreign countries are now taking the lead in foreign policy considerations. Thirdly, the adopted measures towards ethnic minorities have been improved. The concept of assimilation in the early years often meant enforced conformity with the majority's norm of behaviour. The measures applied included occupational restrictions and language study restrictions. These have now been partly liberalized and partly ignored by law enforcement agencies. More positive approaches, greatly beneficial to the minority communities, have been applied by the rural development programmes. A large part of northeast Thailand has been the home of ethnic Lao. The communist insurgents, consisting of Thai-Lao elements, first made the region their base in 1965, at the start of the revolution. The area was most backward economically and the people there had grievances and demanded redress. Furthermore, the selection of this region was also logical in terms of logistic and strategic factors since it was adjacent to areas of heavy communist presence. As a result, the Thai government gave these "sensitive areas", as well as the Thai Muslim communities in the South top priority in the rural development programmes. Although the running of the programmes was not always smooth, the trends for higher standards of living for the people in these areas did improve. Finally, whether Thailand's cultural traits will make its relatively strong economy an aggressive power is not clear. Concerns on this are not groundless when its economic structure is taken into consideration. But culturally, the Thai people are relatively peaceful, especially since World War II. It is rare in history to witness a militarily stronger country accepting border lines as stipulated in the unequal treaties imposed by colonial powers. Although the legacies of these unequal treaties have sometimes given rise to confrontations, Thailand, however, has made it clear that it has always wanted to adhere to the existing unequal treaties. The military clashes with Laos over three disputed villages were revealing. In 1987, a military confrontation took place when a strategic road was extended into the remote villages. Later, proofs revealed that the Thai side had consulted the wrong map, although a point could still be made over the location of the demarcation line through the villages. During the dispute, Thailand proposed to

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conduct a joint technical survey to assertain the exact boundary between Thailand and Laos. Laos rejected the proposal and threatened to obstruct any unilateral effort by a Thai technical team of independent experts. Instead of being firm on the matter which could at least gain international sympathy, Thailand withdrew its troops from the villages. By international standards, such an admission of defeat is now unthinkable.

7. Conclusion Ideally, cultural relations should be independent of direct government control. In reality, however, all governments have their reasons to use cultural factors as instruments of foreign policies and as a means of putting certain restrictions on their people's external relations. Thailand has shared these experiences with other world communities, and has increasingly promoted its people-topeople cultural relations. The trends are in favour of national, regional and international integrations with cultural pluralism. The Thai governments have been using cultural relations as a means to support conventional diplomacy, as an instrument for peace, and as a vehicle for international understanding. It is encouraging to see that young diplomats posted in Thailand's neighbouring countries (ages ranging from 41 to 51) have a good understanding of the genuine cultural relations vis-a-vis propaganda and their implications. They expect less on short-term friendship in favour of long-term understanding. Hence, sending people in both directions to see for themselves is both the best witness and the best guarantee of objectivity; cultural representations abroad can also foster further positive understanding. The government and private business have been working together to promote cultural relations as a lubricant for trade, especially in Indochina and Myanmar. To get to know, and if possible, to affectionate each other through languages, literatures, arts, etc., requires cooperation from the academic communities. The trend towards this joint effort is evident. Competition with other developed countries will be extensive. The moral dilemmas of the academic communities are many: how to balance between the overall interests of Thailand and those of the targeted countries; how to balance mutual interests; how to draw a line between economic imperialism and just economic interactions.

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Cultural relations include the roles and functions of ethnic minority groups. Due to time constraints, the coverage in this paper is far from comprehensive. The impacts on regional integration are not well documented, but the message should get across that cultural flows have a great potential to foster regional integration. The impacts on Thailand's national integration are instrumental in both directions: to strengthen the effectiveness of cultural relations and to enhance the country's democratization. Implicit in this paper is that Thailand's cultural heritage is relatively rich compared with its neighbours others than China, and it has a great potential to contribute to the development of regional culture.

GLOSSARY adat. customs and traditions (in the Malay world). amphoe (HTUia): administrative subdivision, district, made up of tambon. aya si (aoqjod): group of the four highest officials in a Lao miiang, comprising the cao miiang, the upahat, the ratchabut and the ratchawong. baht (inn): basic currency unit in Thailand. For most of the period from the late 1950s through 1980, the exchange rate between baht and dollars remained relatively stable at between 20 and 21 baht to the dollar. In the 1980s, the baht was devalued and allowed to float on the currency markets. In 1993, the baht fluctuated between 24 and 25 to the dollar, and between 15 to 16 to the German mark. ban (untl): house; hamlet or village. barami (utsn), Pali: paraml: the ten Buddhist virtues, i.e. sila (morality), nekkhamma (self-abnegation), panna (wisdom), viriya (exertion), sacca (truth), adhitthana (self-determination), metta (friendliness) and upekkha (equanimity), also called dasaparaml, the ten paraml. bunga mas dan perak. literally, "gold and silver flowers"; but in reality a tree adorned with gold, silver and other precious ornaments sent regularly as tribute from vassal states to the Siamese court; Thai expression: tonmai ngoen tonmai thong. catusadom (snaaAwn): traditional honorific name of the four central ministries: capital (miiang), palace (wang), treasury (khlang) and land, (na). cao chiwit literally "lord of life", title of the kings and rulers in Laos, the Shan States and Sipsong Panna. cao khana yai (W Fitu-l/nqj): regional ecclesiastical chief. cangwat (WK): administrative subdivision, province, made up of amphoe." cao miiang (L’anifiao): the hereditary governor of a miiang or province under the traditional system of government. cao nai (WTinEJ): see khunnang. cao nai fai niia (isnmEJcJnEnuua): the title of the Northern Thai princes as acknowleged by the royal Siamese court after 1782. cao pho (isnna): very influential person (of a district or province). cao phraya (isnvnr tin): the highest of the conferred ranks to people other than royalty, generally conferred upon those who were ministers (senabodi) of one of the six major traditional krom or one of the twelve ministeries (after 1889); also the name of the main river in the Central Plain.

284 chai chakan (TfitianTi’ii): able-bodied men between the age of 18 and 60 years. Chakri (5hi): traditional honorific name given to the head of the Mahatthai. Since the founder of the present dynasty once occupied that position, that dynasty is often referred to as the Chakri (Cakkri) dynasty. chaloei (matJ) : war captive, prisoner of war. chao (nm): people. chao khao (tmitn): literally, "people of the hills"; Thai designation for hill tribes in general. chat nation, nationality, ethnic group. chiang (l ejo): a wiang inhabited by senior royalty. cotmaihet (wmanaiMt;): matter-of-fact account. devaraja (Skt.; Thai: thewarat - vnTm): literally, "god-king", "the king of gods" or "the god who is king"; the conception of old (Angkorian) Khmer kingship that influenced the Ayutthayan empire especially from tne fifteenth century onwards. dhamma (Pali; Skt.: dharma; Thai: tham - fii'sw): the teachings of the Buddha, the way to salvation taught by the Buddha. dhanimaraja (Pali; Thai: thammaracha - tnwrnn): literally, "the just king"; specifies the role of the king as the protector of Buddhism. fak kham (tTnmu): literally, "tamarind pot letters", script used in Lan Na and surrounding regions for secular purposes (e.g. inscriptions). farang (d a): westerner. guru: (Islamic) teacher. Isan (asnu): literally, "northeast, northeastern”, used to refer to the northeastern region of Thailand and to the dominant, Laospeaking people in the region (khon isan). Jataka (Pali; Thai: chadok - win): collections of stories of previous births of the Buddha; there are 547 Jataka stories in the Buddhist canon and more than 230 non-canonical Jatakas. jihad, the Holy War, which is in Islamic concept referring essentially to the spread of the faith through force of arms, but used commonly in the Muslim areas of Southeast Asia in earlier centuries as a cry for unity among fellow Muslims to destroy the Christian Europeans in the region. kalahom (nmlujj): (1) By the fifteenth century, the department (kroiri) of military affairs; (2) in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the department having primarily responsibility for the administration of the southern and western provinces; (3)

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after 1894, the Ministry of War; and (4) the name by which the head of the krom kalahom was known. kamnan (ri'iiru): headman of a commune ( ta m b o n ) , that is an administrative collectivity of villages. kao sanam (imtftriJJ): administrative council in the Northern Thai principalities. khaek (nun): literally, "foreigner, guest"; Thai designation for Malays and all other brown-skinned, predominantly Islamic peoples in Southeast Asia, South Asia and the Middle East. khaluang thesaphiban (tnwmoinH'iriU'ia): a commissioner appointed by the Ministry of the Interior to superintend the administration of a monthon. kharatchakan (mnilfm): "servant of the crown"; official, civil servant. khlang (flfij): (also phra khlang), (1) early in the Ayutthaya period, that krom (and its minister) which served as a ministry of finance; (2) later, the ministry exercising general treasury functions and the administration of the coastal provinces and foreign affairs; (3) after 1875, the Ministry of Finance; and (4) the name by which the head of the krom phra khlang was known. khon doi (RUAfltl): literally, "people of the hills"; Northern Thai designation for all those people living in mountainous areas (including ethnic "upland' Tai); mostly, but not necessarily referring to hill tribes (chao khao). khon miiang (AUtwac): literally, "people of the domains"; selfdesignation used by the Northern Thai; also called Yuan. kong (naa): section, major subdivision of a krom. krom (niJJ): Department of State. Before 1889-1892, most offices of State were termed krom, but after that date this term was reserved for the primary divisions of ministries which included within itself various kong or sections. khunnang (tjuunj): term denoting the general class of the conferred nobility. Lan Na (anuun): literally, "the (country of) one million paddy fields"; the historic kingdom of Chiang Mai comprising the upper north of Thailand and adjacent areas in the eastern Shan States. Langkasuka: name of an ancient kingdom established in the Malay Peninsula probably between 80 and 100 A.D.; its political centre was presumably nearby present-day Pattani. mahatthai (Nvnntnti): (1) by the fifteenth century, the department (krom) charged with the general superintendence of civil administration; (2) in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries,

286 the department having primary responsibility for the administration of the Northern ana Eastern provinces; and (3) after 1894, the Ministry of the Interior, in charge of provincial administration in general. monthon (xinwia) [Skt.: mandala "circle", "orbit"]: Thai provincial administrative unit, a group of miiang or provinces headed by a commissioner, under the form of government inaugurated in the 1880s and formalized by the Ministry of the Interior in the 1890s; see thesaphiban. mo lam (MJJQth): troubadour singers in Laos and Northeastern Thailand. miiang (lijaj); town, city, domain, principality. miin (vitJU): literally, "ten thousand"; high rank in the Northern Thai principalities. muban (viwmu): smallest administrative unit, hamlet or village. na (ui): literally, "paddy field"; one of the four central ministries (see catusadom). nai firm): master, owner, chief. nai amphoe (iMEianiria): chief of a district. nai kong (intinao): appointed overseer of a group paying tax-in-kind. nai thun (tnanu): capitalist, investor. nam mon (uniiuw): sacred, auspicious water. palat (daa): undersecretary of a ministry (krorri). paraml: (Pali), see barami. Patani: name of a Malay sultanate, comprising the present-day Thai provinces of Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat as well as parts of Songkhla Province, after 1809 integral part of the Siamese kingdom. Pattani (ifoenu): province in Southern Thailand. phasi (mw): taxes. phaya (vicyn); see phraya. phra (ms): a title used to indicate that someone or something is sacred in a Buddhist sense, also used as part of the titles of kings. When used alone it refers to or is a title for a Buddhist monk. prathet rachathirat (ikslYlHTrtntfallf): literally, "the country (ruled by) a king who is the overlord of (other) kings"; a powerful kingdom or "empire" exercising control over various vassal states (prathetsaraf). prathetsarat (tlwinfinu): literally, "the country [ruled by] a king"; in the Thonburi and Early Bangkok periods vassal states of Siam (like Chiang Mai, Luang Prabang and Cambodia).

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phraya (rc»tn): high rank of conferred nobility between cao phraya and phra; during most of the Bangkok period also known as phaya . phrai (Iws): commoner, freeman. phrai luang (Ivnvim’a): commoner, for corvee duties assigned to one of the king’s departments. phrai som (LriTffu): commoner, for corvee duties assigned to a private individual other than the king. phuchuaiwa ratchakan (ytnSQTniinTJ): deputy governor (of a miiang or province). phu mi bun (tJWtjqj): literally, "a person who has merit"; people with extraordinary and/or religious power. phuwa ratchakan (ywinmi): governor (of a miiang or province). phu wiset (NOLfly): literally, "the person who (possesses) magical power’j people with magical and religious power. phuyaiban (wlnaju'iu): village headman, village elder. pondok: n hut" schools, referring to the common practice in the past of pupils errecting huts for accomodation during the perod they studied with an Islamic scholar; traditional Islamic education. rabop somburanayasitthirat ( uauawiJ'Sfuaqji nBi'nf): absolute monarchy (abolished in 1932). rai (h): Thai square surface measure; in Siam equal to 0.4 acres or 1,600 square metres. raja (Skt.: raja): king, ruler. raja muda: heir-apparent in the Malay sultanates, including Patani. ratchabut fmufl‘5): ministerial trank in the Lao and Northern Thai (Yuan) vassal states of Siam. ratchakan (Tinrm): government. (ratcha)phongsawadan (TlWWi’lTJfi'n): dynastic chronicle, mostly those of the Central Thai, i.e. Siamese empires. ratchawong (Tim-aH): ministerial rank in the Lao and Northern Thai (Yuan) vassal states of Siam. rishi (Skt.: r$i; Thai: riisi (qTS): hermit. saen (lutu): literally, "hundred thousand", high rank in the Northern Thai principalities. sakdina (flheiin): ellaborate system of degrees of rank expressed by numbers of rai in land. sangha (Pali, Skt.: samgha; Thai: song EWW) : the Buddhist order; the collectivity of people who have been ordained as monks and novices.

288 sangkharat (ftsinif); Pali: sangharaja: the supreme patriarch of the Siamese sangha; appointed by the King. sharia: Islamic law; in contradistinction to adat which is law based on customs and traditions. senabodi (tamuS): minister of state, head of a ministry. Siyer. Thai Buddhists as called by the Malay Muslims of Patani. Tai (Im): name designating the broad linguistic category of Taispeakingpeoples, of which the Thai are the branch situated in central Thailand. tambon (ehua): administrative subdivision, commune, made up of several muban. tamnan (minu): religious and/or local chronicle. tarekat: Islamic mystical brotherhood. Thai (ImtJ): word with which the people inhabiting central Thailand traditionally have indicated themselves. that (ma); Skt.: dasa: class of slaves. thesaphiban (imRnntna): the system of provincial administration formalized by the Ministry of the Interior after 1894; the chief administrative unit of which was a circle (monthori). tonmai ngoen tonmai thong [piuluwupiulwmaj]: literally, "silver and golden trees"; see bunga mas dan perak. tua miiang (Rhlfla-J): literally, "letters of the miiang*, Northern Thai script, originally used for religious purposes in Northern Thailand, Laos and the Chiang Tung area; also called tua tham. tua tham ((fotraw): literally, "Dhamma letters", see tua miiang. ulama: religious (Islamic) teacher. uparat (ailnfl): literally, "viceroy", the official rank of the occupant of the Front Palace, traditionally the highest office in Siam, second only to that of the king; in the Lao huamiiang: upahat). upahat (adanfi): see uparat. wang (ft): palace. wat (fti): the centre of Buddhist religious practice; includes both shrines to the Buddha (image halls and cedi) and the monastic residence of members of the sangha, thus, "temple-monastery". wiang (IQEI-3): an important settlement fortified by a rampart and a moat, a term used in the Northern Thai, Lao, Lu and Shan areas.

INDEX Abdul Ghafur Muhyiddin Shah of Pahang, 197 Adat, 208, 236-237 Adui Na Saiburi. See Tengku Abdul Jalal bin Tengku Abdul Muttalib AIDS, 168, 186, 261 Akha, 21, 33, 39, 95, 98, 102 Al-Quran, 205 Amnatcaroen, 151 Anand Panyarachun, 10, 174, 176, 179, 266, 269 Ancestor worship, 145 Angkor, 4, 110-111, 135, 139, 145, 169 Anglo-Burmese Wars, 83, 69, 118 Animism, 145 Annam. See Vietnam Annamite Cordillera, 25 Aquaculture, 226-228 ASEAN, 213, 229, 263, 266-267, 269 Association of Malays of Greater Patani, 237-238 Attapii, 113 Ava, 117 Ayutthaya (Ayuthaya), 4-5, 20-21, 115, 124, 146, 196-198 Bakar, 198 Balasankhya-Jataka, 46-47, 49, 56, 60 Ban Chiang, 110, 134, 169 Ban Namsai, 236 Ban Saphil, 151 Bangka, 216 Bangkok, 2, 4-9, 11, 16, 21, 35, 39, 68, 71-75, 77-79, 82-86, 88, .90, 92, 115, 117-120, 122-126, 135136, 140-142, 145, 148, 154, 156-159, 161-162, 164-168, 170171, 173, 176-177, 183-185, 187-191, 198, 214, 228-229, 235-237, 240, 243-244, 247, 257-260

Bangnara, 199 Banthai Phet, 112 Barisan Bersatu Mujahidin Patani, 243 Barisan Bersatu Untuk Kemerdekaan Patani. See BERSATU Barisan Islam Pembebasan Patani. See BIPP Barisan Nasional Pembebasan Patani. See BNPP Barisan Revolusi Nasional. See BRN Battambang, 148 BERSATU, 246 Bhumibol, 254 BIPP, 242-243, 245 BNPP, 242 Bodhisatta, 48-50 Bodindecha, Cao Phraya, 116, 120 Bowring Treaty, 84 Britain, 1, 6-7, 70-72, 83-84, 235237, 255, 258, 266 British, 69-73, 119, 158, 235, 237, 241 BRN, 242-243, 245, 276 Brunei, 208 Buddhism, 12, 15, 17, 19, 46, 48, 52, 57, 70, 76, 79, 110, 145, 150, 152-153, 157, 159, 205206, 213-214, 217, 222-224, 240-241, 253-256, 269, 271 Buddhist council, 17 Buddhists. See Buddhism Bunga mas dan perak, 7, 236 Buriram, 108 Burma, 1-2, 11, 16, 19, 21, 25, 31, 34, 36, 69, 70-73, 75, 79, 8285, 87, 95, 215-216, 222, 227, 255, 263, 265, 267, 269-272, 278, 280 Cambodia, 2 , 4, 83, 111-112, 119120, 130, 138, 148, 164-165, 169, 172, 184, 188, 190, 227, 255, 263, 265, 267, 269-271, 275

290 Cao Cao Cao Cao Cao Cao Cao

Anu, 115, 117-124 Anu rebellion, 6, 110, 118, 122 chiwit, 72 Chun Sirorot, 87-88 Inthaphat, 87 Kaeo Nawarat, 78 muang, 115, 117, 119, 123-124, 145-149, 152 Cao Nokasat, 113 Cao Phraya basin, 4 Cao Phraya River, 11, 23, 54, 110111, 130, 148 Cao Soi Sisamut, 113 Cet huamiiang khaek, 235-236, 240 Ceylon, 17, 19, 83 Chachoengsao, 120 Chai chakan. See manpower Chakri, 5, 254 Cham inscriptions, 111 Chamlong Srimuang, 178 Champassak (Campasak), 6, 112-117, 119, 135, 148 Chana, 195 Chanthaburi, 78 Charint Amornkeow, 246 Chat (nation), satsana (religion), and phramahakasat (king), 30, 152 Chatchai Chunhawan, 173-174, 265 Chawalit Yongchaiyudh, 171, 189 Chenla, 135 Chi River, 110, 132, 138 Chiang Dao, 23, 25 Chiang Khaeng, 6 Chiang Kham (Xieng Khouang), 23 Chiang Khwang, 156 Chiang Mai, 4-6, 15-21, 23-26, 33, 39-41, 47 , 52 , 56 , 63 , 68-73, 75, 77-78, 82, 84, 87-88, 90-91, 99, 101, 125, 141, 175, 255, 260 Chiang Rai (Chiang Rai), 16, 20, 23, 82, 89, 99, 125 Chiang Rung, 16, 19, 68, 70 Chiang Saen (Chiang San), 16, 19, 21

Chiang Tung, 6 , 19, 68-71, 87 Chiao Lan Reservoir, 217 China, 70, 79, 95-96, 196-197, 265266, 268, 270-273, 278, 281 Chulalongkorn, 2 , 7 , 74-75, 145, 147-150, 154-155, 158-159, 199, 235, 254-256, 262 Chumphon, 211, 216, 225 Cochinchina, 148 Colonialism, 1 , 9, 82-83, 241, 245, 253-254, 258, 261 Com Thong (Jim Thing), 19, 23 Commission on National Stability of Thailand, 203 Communism, 10, 99, 158-159, 162, 165, 168, 188, 213, 215, 248 Communist Party of Malaya, 276 Communist Party of Thailand, 164165, 167, 178 Corvee labour, 18-19, 84, 157 Damrong Rachanuphap (Rajanubhab), 2, 74, 117, 123, 151, 154, 156157, 171, 255-256 Dararatsami, 75, 77 Datu Pengkalan, 198 Democracy, 55, 160, 167, 176, 178179, 199, 253, 261-262 Department of Public Welfare, 99 Devaraja, 254 Dhamma, 52, 254 Dhammaraja, 254 Doi Inthanon, 25-26 Doi Suthep, 26 Dutch, 83 Dvaravati, 110, 135, 169 East India Company, 197 Eastern Seaboard, 136, 140-141, 217 Education, 9, 42, 74-76, 78-79, 8788, 91-92, 150, 152-153, 160162, 170, 203-204, 222-223, 238-240, 256 Education Act, 152, 236, 241 EGAT, 172-177 Ekaw. See Akha England, 21. See also Britain

Index English, 78, 88, 170, 197 Environment, 90, 94, 100, 134, 166, 168, 174-177, 187, 190, 261 Europe, 89, 102 European Community, 229, 263 Fa Daet, 110 Fa Ngum, 111 Falcao, 196 Fang (Fang), 19, 23 Fighters for Justice and Freedom of the Malays in South Thailand. See FJFM FJFM, 246-247 Flowers of Gold and Silver. See bunga mas dan perak Forest Department, 100 France 1 , 7 , 21, 71, 83-84, 124, 148-149, 255, 258, 266 Franco-Siamese Crisis (1893), 73, 149 French, 71, 124, 126, 157-158, 160161, 174 Gabungan Melayu Patani Raya. See GAMPAR GAMPAR, 237-238, 242 Gerakan Mujahidin Patani. See GMP GMP, 242-243 , 245 Green Isan Project, 133, 171 Gulf of Bengal, 196 Gulf of Siam, 196 Guru, 203 Hadith, 243 Haji Sulong bin Abdul Kadir, 238 Hariphunchai. See Lamphun Haw, 36 Hinduism, 110, 145, 195, 205, 254 Hmong, 21, 37, 39, 95-96, 98-99, 101-102 Hong Kong, 89 Htin, 33, 36, 95-96 Hue, 117 Ibtidai, 203 Imperialism, 11, 261 India, 17, 69, 71, 83, 110, 197, 227

291 Indochina, 71, 135, 137, 140, 149, 183, 185, 188, 274, 280 Indonesia, 1, 11, 83, 216, 225, 227 Inthanon Range, 25 Isan, 2, 4-6, 107, 110, 130, 133,137, 139-142, 149, 151, 154157, 165-166, 168, 170-171, 178-179, 183, 185-188, 190-191, 253, 255 , 258, 260 Islam, 5 , 7 , 10-12, 201-206, 208, 213-215, 219, 222-224, 226, 229, 234, 240, 243-245, 247248, 255, 275-276, 279 Jansen, Hendrik, 197 Japan, 89, 140, 160, 197, 229, 266, 272-273, 277 Jihad, 244-245 Johor, 195 Jataka, 46-48, 61 Kabir Abdul Rahman. See Tengku Bira Kotanila Kading River, 120 Kalastn, 110, 112, 116, 119, 123, 151 Kam miiang. See Lan Na language Karen, 9, 21, 29, 31, 33-34, 36, 39, 79, 95-98, 100-101 Kariang. See Karen Kasemsima, 150 Kawila (Kawila), 16, 21, 125 Kedah, 12, 72, 147, 196 Kelantan, 7, 10, 147, 195, 202 Keng Hung, See Chiang Rung Kha revolt, 117 Khaek, 7 , 206, 258 Khaluang thesaphiban, 2 Khamen pa dong, 123-124 Khamu, 33, 36, 95-96 Khao Sok National Park, 217 Khao Yai National Park, 130 Kharatchakan, 149, 255-256, 259 Khemmarat, 150-151 Khmer, 108, 110-111, 113, 115, 123-124, 135-136, 139, 145, 156-157, 159, 169

292 Khmer inscriptions, 111 Khon Kaen, 116, 141, 169-170, 186, 189, 260 Khon Isan, 9, 157, 162, 170 Khon Miiang, 4-5, 9 , 16-17, 19-20, 24, 27, 29, 31, 33, 35-37, 39, 41, 79, 82, 102, 115, 125 Khong Chiam, 173 Khorat, 4 , 108, 115-120, 123, 141, 146, 148-149, 151, 153, 158, 178, 189 Khorat Plateau, 4, 107, 110-112, 116, 119, 120-122, 130, 132133, 135-136, 138, 140, 145 Khruba Sriwichai, 76 Khukhan, 119, 124, 148, 151 King's projects, 37 KMT, 31, 36, 39 Krabi, 215, 217, 219, 225, 228-229 Kriangsak Chomanan, 171 Kuala Lumpur, 243 Kuchinarai, 151 Kui, 108, 111-113, 123, 135, 157 Kukrit Pramoj, 170-171 Kuomintang. See KMT Lagrg-Garnier Expedition, 69 Lahu, 31, 95, 98 Lampang (Lampang), 5, 15-16, 19, 82, 87, 125, 255 Lamphun (Lamphun), 5, 15-17, 23, . 26, 31, 52, 82, 87, 125 Lan Na (Lan Na), 2 , 4-7, 9 , 15-21, 24-25, 31, 35 , 46-48, 52-59, 6364, 68-70, 72, 82-88, 91-92, 94, 107, 135, 253, 255-256, 258, 260 Lan Na language, 9, 19, 46-48, 78, 82-83, 88, 91 Lan Na script, 9, 17, 78, 82-83, 86, 88 Lan Sang (Lan Chang), 15, 111-112, 114, 157 Lang-Ya Hsui, 196 Langkasuka, 195-196, 205

Lao,

4-7, 9-10, 12, 29, 33, 108, 110-115, 117-121, 123, 124-126, 135, 145-146, 148, 154-162, 166, 178, 183, 258, 270, 277, 279 Lao communist movement, 161 Lao Issara, 160-161 Lao Kao, 156 Lao Phuan, 156 Lao Wiang, 108, 156 Laos, 1-2, 10, 16, 21, 24-25, 31, 69, 73, 79, 83-85, 95, 114, 120-122, 135, 137-138, 148, 150, 156, 158, 160-161, 165, 172, 184, 188, 190-191, 255, 263, 265, 267, 269-271, 279 Lawa. See Lua Lek. See Ong Thammikarat Lisaw. See Lisu Lisu, 21, 31, 33, 95-96, 98, 101 Loei, 132 Lopburi (Lop Buri), 15, 120 Lower Mekong Project, 137 Lua, 9 , 15-16, 29, 31, 33, 36, 9596, 100 Luang Prabang (Luang Phra Bang), 6 , 15, 19, 112, 115, 126, 135, 157 Luang Si Prakat, 78 Lii, 16, 33 Mae Hong Son, 23, 25, 82, 84, 89 Mae Rim, 88 Mae Sariang, 23 Maha Sila Viravong, 118-119, 161 Mahasarakham, 110, 160, 170 Malacca, 214 Malay, 195, 198-199, 202-203, 205206, 208, 240, 255 Malay language, 195, 197, 201, 204, 208 Malay Peninsula, 83, 195-197, 201202, 206, 238, 242 Malaysia, 10, 195, 202, 208, 211, 213, 215-217, 222, 224-227, 232, 243, 247, 265, 267, 275

Index Man. See Ong Prasat Thong Mandalay, 68, 71 Mangrai (Mang Rai), 4, 16, 20, 52, 62, 82 Mangrai-Thammasat, 52 Manpower, 18, 75, 118, 120, 123 Maoism, 165-166 Marx, 233 Marxism, 166, 178 Mecca, 243 Mekong River, 6-7, 23-25, 69, 71, 111-112, 114, 116-117, 120-122, 124, 132-133, 135, 137, 145, 148-150, 156-158, 172, 175, 188, 191 Melaka 195 Meo. See Hmong Mien, 95, 98, 102 Millenarian revolt, 6 , 150-151, 153, 158, 160, 175, 258 Mindanao, 185, 234 Ministry of Education, 238 Ministry of Finance, 74 Ministry of Justice, 74 Ministry of the Interior, 2, 74, 99, 148, 176, 235, 255 Mo lam, 150 Moken, 222, 226 Mon, 15-17, 51-52 Monarchy, 9, 199, 237, 254 Mongkut, 254 Monsoon, 132, 219-220 Monthon Isan, 149, 154-156 Monthon Lao Kao, 149, 154-155 Monthon Lao Klang, 149 Monthon Lao Phuan, 149, 154-155 Monthon Nakhon Ratchasima, 149 Monthon Phayap, 6 , 86, 154-156 Monthon Udon, 149, 154-156 Moros, 232, 234 Muhammad, 198 Mun River, 108, 110-111, 116, 123, 132, 138, 172, 175 Muslim. See Islam Mussur. See Lahu

293 Mutawassitah, 203 Myanmar. See Burma Miiang Ydng, 19 Nai Pai, 199 Nakhon Campa Si, 110 Nakhon Pathom, 88 Nakhon Phanom, 111-112, 116 Nakhon Ratchasima. See Khorat Nakhon S i Thammarat, 197-198, 214-215, 220, 228 Nam Ngum Dam, 137 Nan (Nan), 5-6, 15-16, 24, 26, 40, 52, 68-72, 74-75, 82, 125, 255 Nan River, 23 Nang Phaen, 112 Narai, King, 115 Narathiwat, 7, 195, 199, 205, 213, 219, 222-223, 238, 242-243, 275 Naresuan, King, 197 National Economic Development Board, 162-163 National integration, 1 , 11-12, 42, 68, 82, 94, 151, 211, 215, 229, 253-254, 261-263 National Student Federation, 167 Nationalism 102, 153, 161, 234, 243, 248, 254-255, 258 Nationalist movement, 158, 160-161 Nattawut Udaysen, 174 NGO, 167-168, 171, 173, 175, 179 Non Nok Tha, 169 Nong Chik, 199 Non-Government Organizations. See NGO Nong Khai, 110-111, 123, 148-149 Northeast Development Plan, 162 Nyakur, 108 Ong Prasat Thong, 150-151 Ong Thammikarat, 150-151 Pak Mun project, .172-174, 177 Pak Mun dam controversy, 171, 178 Paknam Incident. S e e FrancoSiamese Crisis (1893) Palat Chana of Songkhla, 198-199 Palm-leaf manuscripts, 17, 46, 58

294 Pasak River, 130 Patani. See Pattani Patani Mujahidin Movement. See GMP Patani Muslim, 238 Patani People's Movement. See PPM Patani United Liberation Organization. See PULO Patron-client relationship, 75, 185, 260 Pattani, 2 , 5 , 7 , 10-12, 107, 195199, 201-202, 204-206, 208, 213-215, 219, 222-223, 227, 229, 234-238, 243-244, 246-249, 253, 255, 258, 260, 275 Pegu, 15 Pengkalan, 198 Persia, 197 Pertubuhan Perpaduan Pembebasan Patani. See PULO Phanat Nikhom, 151 Phang-nga, 216-217, 219 Phanom Dong Rak, 130 Phanom Rung, 169 Phasi. See taxes Phatthalung, 197-198, 215, 223 Phaya Phap Revolt, 63, 72 Phayao, 16, 23-24, 82, 125 Phayap. See Monthon Phayap Phetchabun Ranges, 25, 107, 130, 133, 140 Phi Pan Nam mountains, 25 Phibun Songkhram, 160, 237, 272 Phichit Prichakon, 148-149 Philippines, 83, 185, 227 , 232 Phimai, 169 Phitsanulok, 4 Phi Tdng Liiang, 15 Phnom Dangrek, 130 Phon Phung Daen, 112 Phra Khru Phon Samet, 112 Phrae (Phra), 5, 15-16, 24, 58, 6872, 74, 82, 85, 125 Phraya Chakri. See Rama I , King Phraya Kalahom Rajasena, 198

Phraya Maha Ammattayathibodi, 72, 147 Phraya Phrom, 119 Phraya Prap Rebellion. See Phaya Phap Revolt Phu Kradung National Park, 132 Phu mi bun. See Millenarian revolt Phu Thai, 108, 157 Phuan, 108 Phuket, 213-217, 219, 222, 224, 227-228, 259 Phulanchang, 151 Ping River, 16, 23, 26, 84, 87 Pondok, 203, 236, 238-242 PPM, 238, 242 Pracak Sinlapakhon, 148-149 Prachinburi, 120, 148 Prachuab Khirikhan, 95, 211 Prasat Thong, King, 197 Prathetsarat, 2, 6 , 115, 155, 158 Prem Tinsulanonda, 171 Pridi Phanomyong, 160 Prostitution, 168 Protestant missionaries, 70, 78 Provincial Council for Islamic Affairs, 247 Provincial Development Program, 171 Puey Ungphakorn, 167 PULO, 242-243, 245, 276 ParamF, 254 Raja Hijau, 196-197 Rajaprabha Dam, 217 Rama I, King, 5, 21, 116, 118, 126, 198-199 Rama II, King, 117, 119, 199 Rama in, King, 116, 118-119, 123 Rama IV, King. See Mongkut Rama V, King. See Chulalongkorn Rama VI, King. See Vajiravudh Rama IX, King. See Bhumibol Ramkhamhaeng, King, 4, 111, 201 Rangae, 199 Ranong, 215-216, 219, 222, 227

Index Relationship between Ayutthaya and Patani, 196 Rice, 23-24, 26-27, 29, 31, 33, 3941, 108, 110, 115, 132-133, 136-140, 157, 163, 188, 214, 217, 219-220, 222-224, 227-228, 255 Rice-cultivation, 132, 134, 136, 139140 Rishi, 15 Roi-et, 112-114, 119, 138, 151, 160161 Royal Forestry Department, 74 Royal Irrigation Department, 39 Royal Thai Airforce, 99 Run .Siphen . See Phraya Maha Ammattayathibodi Saiburi, 199 Sai Setthathirat, King, 114 Sakdina System, 53 Sakon Nakhon, 110, 160 Salween River, 23-25, 69, 84 Samui, island of, 215, 219, 228 San Sai, 62-63 Sanawi, 203 Sangha, 159, 162, 169, 256 Sanphasitthiprasong 148-149, 151 Saraburi, 118-119 Sarit Thanarat 12, 89, 162, 238, 240 Satun, 12, 201, 213 , 215, 222-223, 225, 238 Saudi- Arabia, 185 Sawannakhet, 120 Self-Help Settlement Project, 12, 99, 240-241 Seri Thai movement, 160 Seven Malay Principalities. See Cet huamiiang khak Shalardchai Ramitanondh, 175 Shan, 5 , 19, 24, 29, 33-34, 71, 79, 87 Shan Rebellion of Phrae, 72 Sharia, 236, 240 Shifting cultivation, 27, 31, 33-34, 36-37

295 Silk Road, 54 Singapore, 89, 136, 202, 226, 235 Singkep, 216 Sipsong Panna, 68-69, 71, 273 Siribunyasan, King, 123-124 Sisaket, 108, 119, 124, 146 So, 108, 157 Song, 58 Songkhla, 5 , 12, 195, 197-198, 205, 211, 213-216, 222, 227, 229, 260 South Korea, 89 Spain, 83 Srisakara Vallibhotama, 111, 169, 176 Srivijaya, 195, 205, 214 Stung Treng, 113 Suai. See Kui Suchinda Kraprayoon, 178, 266 Sukarno, 242 Sukhothai (Sukhothai), 4, 17, 111 Sukhothai inscriptions, 111 Sultan Madzaffar Shah, 196 Sunnah, 205 Suphanburi, 118, 120 Surat Thani, 215-216, 219, 225 Surin, 108, 124, 146, 147 Suryavarman, 110 Suwannaphum, 145, 151 Swidden cultivation, 27, 31, 37, 4041, 98, 100, 101 Syeikh Ahmad Muhammad Zein AlFatoni, 201 Syeikh Daud bin Abdullah bin Idris Ai-Fatoni, 201 Syeikh Ismail Daud AI-Fatoni, 201 Syeikh Zeinal Abidin Al-Fatoni, 201 Tai, 5, 9, 69-71, 73, 79, 157, 169, 255, 258 Taiwan, 89, 191 Tak, 100 Taksin flak Sin), 5 , 21, 115, 124 Tambon Development Program, 170 Taxes, 18-19, 52, 55, 73-74, 123, 149, 157, 185, 236-237, 259

296 Tenasserim, 215, 222 Tenasserim ranges, 25 Tengku Abdul Jalal bin Tengku Abdul Muttalib, 242 Tengku Abdul Kadir Qamaruddin, 237 Tengku Bira Kotanila, 243 Tengku Lamiddin, 198 Tengku Mahmud Mahyudding, 237 Thai Yai. See Shan Thailand Rural Reconstruction Movement, 167 Thale Luang, 215 Thanin Kraivichien, 164, 167 Thanong Thong Chai, 25 Thao Buncan, 150-151 Thao Can Kaeo, 114 Thaton, 15 Thawin Udon, 160 Thepa, 195 Theravada Buddhism, 15, 52, 214. See also Buddhism Thesaphiban system, 2, 8, 123, 145, 150 Thoeng, 23, 99 Thonburi, 4, 107, 115, 125 Thong-In Phuriphat, 160 Thiang Sirikhan, 160 Thieng Bhanthao, 174 Tourism, 9 , 31, 35, 42, 141, 170, 191, 217, 219, 227-229 Trade, 20, 34, 54, 70, 84, 111, 117, 197, 222, 229, 259 Trakan Phiitphon, 151 Trengganu, 7 , 147, 195 Tribal Research Centre, 101 Tribal Research Institute, 101 Tua rniiang. See Lan Na script Tung Kula Ronghai, 138

Ubon, 113, 117, 123, 148, 151, 153, 160, 172-173, 176 Ubon Ratchathani. See Ubon Udon, 111, 149, 154-156, 169 Udonthani. See Udon Ungu of Patani, 197 United States of America (U.S.), 89, 232, 266, 274, 276 United Kingdom. See Britain Ustaz Karim Hassan, 242 Vajiravudh, King, 77, 153, 254 Vajiranana, 159, 256 Vientiane, 4, 6-7, 9, 110-112, 114121, 123-124, 135, 156, 161 Vietnam, I I , 69, 83, 119-120, 124, 164-165, 169, 172, 227, 255, 263, 265, 267, 269-271, 273275, 278 Wang River, 23, 25 Wiang Can. See Vientiane Wo family, 123 World Bank, 162-163, 173-174, 177, 225 World War II, 12, 98, 160, 254, 272-273, 279 Xieng Khouang. See Chiang Khwang Yala, 7 , 195, 199, 205, 213, 216, 222-224, 238, 242-243, 275 Yang. See Karen Yao. See Mien Yaring, 199 Yasothon, 119 Yo, 108, 157 Yom River, 23, 25 Yuan. See Khon Muang Yunnan, 24, 29, 31, 36, 69, 270, 273 Yupharat College, 87