Regime Resilience in Malaysia and Singapore 9781498575850, 9781498575843

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Contents

Regime Resilience in Malaysia and Singapore

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Regime Resilience in Malaysia and Singapore



Contents

Regime Resilience in Malaysia and Singapore

Edited by

Greg Lopez and Bridget Welsh

LEXINGTON BOOKS Lanham • Boulder • New York • London

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Regime Resilience in Malaysia and Singapore

Published by Lexington Books An imprint of The Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group, Inc. 4501 Forbes Boulevard, Suite 200, Lanham, Maryland 20706 www.rowman.com Unit A, Whitacre Mews, 26-34 Stannary Street, London SE11 4AB Copyright © 2017 Greg Lopez and Bridget Welsh First published in Malaysia in 2018 by the Strategic Information and Research Development Centre. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form or by any electronic or mechanical means, including information storage and retrieval systems, without written permission from the publisher, except by a reviewer who may quote passages in a review. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Information Available Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data ISBN: 978-1-4985-7584-3 (cloth : alk. paper) ISBN: 978-1-4985-7585-0 (electronic) The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of American National Standard for Information Sciences—Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI/NISO Z39.48-1992. Printed in the United States of America



Contents

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Contents

List of Acronyms Acknowledgments

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Chapter 1

Introduction: Rethinking Regime Resilience in Malaysia and Singapore 1

Chapter 2

Change without ‘Change’: Malaysia after GE 2013 17

Chapter 3

Change and Elections: 1969 and 2013 Similarities 47

Chapter 4

After GE13: What happened and now what? 63

Chapter 5

Bersih and Civic Empowerment in Malaysia 75

Bridget Welsh & Greg Lopez

Bridget Welsh

John Funston

Clive Kessler

Gaik Cheng Khoo

Chapter 6 Gaps between the Singapore Government and the Electorate 85 Bilveer Singh Chapter 7

Policy and Political Reform in Singapore 99

Chapter 8

PAP’s Communication Strategy 113

Chapter 9

New Media, Old Rule in Malaysia

Lily Zubaidah Rahim

Terence Lee

Ross Tapsell

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Chapter 10 Chapter 11 Chapter 12 Chapter 13 Chapter 14 Chapter 15

The Curious Incident of the Seditious Dog Training Video 145

Amanda Whiting

Malaysia’s Management of Petroleum Resources

Wee Chong Hui

The Politics of Malaysia’s B40 177

Steven C. M. Wong

Managing the Malaysian Economy after the Watershed GE 2008 187

Greg Lopez & Mohamed Ariff

Economic Growth, Democratic Participation and Social Welfare in Singapore

Lee Soo Ann

203

Representation, Literacy and ‘Gladiatorism’ in Malaysian Politics 225

A.B. Shamsul

Coalitions in Malaysia: Comparing Party Networks and Dynamics 235

Chapter 16

Meredith L. Weiss

Chapter 17

R. Rueban Balasubramaniam

Chapter 18

David Martin Jones

Chapter 19

161

Dislodging Malaysia’s Culture of Domination 245

Rule by Law in Malaysia and Singapore 259

Conclusion: Challenges to Resilience in Malaysia and Singapore 285

Bridget Welsh & Greg Lopez

Bibliography 297 About the Authors 309



Acronyms

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List of Acronyms

1MDB 3R ABS AFC ASEAN B40 BA BEEP Bersih BN BR1M CLC CM CPF CTP DAP DRC EAFC EASE EC EDB Ekuinas EO45 ETP FDI FTP GDP GE GE 2011

1Malaysia Development Berhad Reading, writing and arithmetic Asian Barometer Survey Asian Financial Crisis Association of Southeast Asian Nations Bottom 40 per cent of society based on income Barisan Alternatif/Alternative Front Bumiputera Economic Empowerment Programme Coalition for Clean and Fair Elections Barisan Nasional/National Front Bantuan Rakyat 1Malaysia/1Malaysia Citizens’ Assistance Communities Liaison Committee Chief Minister Central Provident Funds Community Transformation Programme Democratic Action Party Dependency ratio ceilings East Asian Financial Crisis Enhancement for Active Seniors Election Commission Economic Development Board Ekuiti Nasional Berhad (National Equity Corporation) Emergency (Essential Powers) Ordinance, No. 45 Economic Transformation Programme Foreign Direct Investment Fiscal Transformation Programme Gross Domestic Product General Election General Election 2011, Singapore vii

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GE 2013 General Election 2013, Malaysia GE 2015 General Election 2015, Singapore GE04 Fourth General Election, Malaysia, 1974 GE10 Tenth General Election, Malaysia, 1999 GE11 Eleventh General Election, Malaysia, 2004 GE12 Twelfth General Election, Malaysia, 2008 GE13 Thirteenth General Election, Malaysia, 2013 GE14 Fourteenth General Election, Malaysia (due in 2018) Gerakan Parti Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia/Malaysian People’s Movement Party GLC Government-linked Corporations GLIC Government-linked Investment Corporations GNP Gross National Product GRC Group Representation Constituency GST Goods and Services Tax GTP Government Transformation Programme HDB Housing Development Board ISA Internal Security Act ITE Polytechnic and Institute of Technical Education JAIS Jabatan Agama Islam Selangor/Selangor Islamic Religious Department JAKIM Jabatan Kemajuan Islam Malaysia/Department of Islamic Development Malaysia JR Jalinan rakyat/community liaison LDS Less developed states MCA Malaysian Chinese Association MCMC Malaysian Communications and Multimedia Commission MIC Malaysian Indian Congress MNCs Multinational corporations MRT Mass Rapid Transit MTAB Majlis Tindakan Agenda Bumiputera/Bumiputera Agenda Action Council MTDC Malaysian Technology Development Corporation NCMP Non-constituency Member of Parliament NEAC National Economic Advisory Council NTP National Transformation Programme OSC Our Singapore Conversation



Acronyms

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PAN Parti Amanah Negara/National Trust Party PAP People’s Action Party PAS Persatuan Islam SeMalaysia/Persatuan Islam Se-Tanah Melayu/Pan Islamic Party of Malaysia PBB Parti Pesaka Bumiputera Bersatu Sarawak/Sarawak United Bumiputera Heritage Party PCI Per capita household income criterion PEMANDU Performance Management and Delivery Unit PESAKA Parti Pesaka Anak Sarawak/Children of Sarawak’s Heritage Party PETRONAS Petroliam Nasional Berhad/National Petroleum Corporation PH Pakatan Harapan/Alliance of Hope PIC Productivity and Innovation Credit PKR/Keadilan Parti Keadilan Rakyat/People’s Justice Party PM Prime Minister PMD Prime Minister’s Department PMO Prime Minister’s Office PPP People’s Progressive Party PR/Pakatan Pakatan Rakyat/People’s Alliance PTP Political Transformation Programme RTAs Regional Trade Agreements SCA Sabah Chinese Association SEC Special employment credit SG50 Singapore 50 SLA State legislative assembly SMC Single-member Constituency SMEs Small and medium scale enterprises SNAP Sarawak National Party SPDP Sarawak Progressive Democratic Party STP Social Transformation Programme SUPP Sarawak United People’s Party TEKUN TEKUN Nasional/TEKUN National Foundation TERAJU Unit Peneraju Agenda Bumiputera/Bumiputera Economic Empowerment Unit TeraS Syarikat Bumiputera Berprestasi Tinggi/High Performing Bumiputera Company

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TPPA Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement UK United Kingdom UMNO United Malays National Organisation UPKO United Pasokmomogun Kadazandusun Murut Organisation USA United States of America USNO United Sabah National Organisation WCS Wage Credit Scheme WIS Workfare income supplement YA Year of assessment YWM Yayasan Wakaf Malaysia/Malaysian Waqf Foundation



Acknowledgements

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Acknowledgements

This book is a collaborative effort of many individuals that began at the Malaysia and Singapore Update 2013 that was held on the 21 and 22 of August, 2013 at the Australian National University. This book began as a collection of the papers that were presented at the conference, but have been revised and updated through 2016-2017. The authors have diligently and patiently worked with us to make this collection a timely and substantive contribution to understanding contemporary Malaysia and Singapore. We would like to acknowledge those who have made this publication possible. Firstly, we would like to thank all the contributors for their hard work and cooperation. It is cliché but without the contributors, this book would not be possible. The contributors are all specialists working on Malaysia and Singapore; some of them for decades. Gratefully, they went out of the way to find time to update and revise their essays. We would also like to thank the ANU for its support of the update and the collection. In particular, we would like to acknowledge, Professor Michael Wesley, the Director of the Coral Bell School of Asia Pacific Affairs, Professor Andrew Walker (now at Monash Malaysia), Associate Professor Greg Fealy and Dr. John Funston of the College of Asia and the Pacific and Professor Robert Cribb from the School of Culture, History and Language. We would also like to thank Professor Craig Reynolds for the important feedback he gave us on the collection. In getting the book to publication, we would like to thank Alp Eren Topal who assisted with the formatting of the essays, Kay Lyons for the copy-editing and Janice Chong for the formatting and cover design. We are grateful to Pak Chong for his support of the book at SIRD and to Brian Hill at Lexington Books (am imprint of Rowman and Littlefield) for publishing the collection. We would also like to thank the anonymous reviewers for their support of the collection. Special and heartfelt thanks are extended to Charles Brophy at SIRD who shepherded the book to publication in the final xi

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stages. Without his hard work the publication would not have been possible. Bridget Welsh would like to thank Ipek University in Ankara and her Turkish colleagues for their support during the period where the initial revisions for the collection were made. While the Erdogan government has since closed the university, the spirit of comradery remains as does the shared commitment to a freer and fairer world. Gratitude is extended to her current colleagues at John Cabot University in Rome where the final tasks associated for the book were completed. Finally, the editors would like to thank our families and friends. Greg Lopez would especially like to thank Francis and Denise for their understanding and endless love. Greg Lopez and Bridget Welsh



Rethinking Regime Resilience in Malaysia and Singapore

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Chapter 1

Rethinking Regime Resilience in Malaysia and Singapore Bridget Welsh and Greg Lopez

In July 2015 the Wall Street Journal revealed that nearly $700 million dollars from the Malaysian government-owned development company 1Malaysia Development Berhad (1MDB) had been deposited into Prime Minister Najib Tun Razak’s personal bank account.1 Subsequent revelations pointed to $4.5 billion in questionable allocations, as part of one of the worst moneylaundering scandals in history, in a company with nearly $11 billion in debt that was founded on a Malaysian government guarantee. Over two years later, Najib remains in office, having appeared to weather the allegations of corruption and kleptocracy. Within Malaysia he has been cleared of any wrong-doing, and while internationally 1MDB legal proceedings remain on-going, Najib remains in power. In fact, his coalition, Barisan Nasional (BN, National Front), seems poised to win re-election in 2018, returning his party, United Malays National Organisation (UMNO), to power. While Brazil and South Korea have seen their leaders jailed for corruption, in Malaysia the leader survives, and arguably has emerged in greater control of the levers of executive power than before the scandal. Najib has shown himself to be of the political resilience mould long honed by his political party – at least so far.

1

For more details on the 1MDB scandal, see: http://www.wsj.com/specialcoverage/ malaysia-controversy and Kerstin Steiner, ‘Economics, politics and the law in Malaysia: a case study of the 1MDB scandal’, in Sophie Lemiere (ed.), Illusions of Democracy: Malaysian Politics and the People Volume II (Petaling Jaya: SIRD, 2017), pp. 245–70.

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Further south across the Causeway, Singapore echoes a similar story of resilience. While allegations of criminal wrong-doing have not been levied against its Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong (LHL), criticism of Lee’s stewardship and that of his party, People’s Action Party (PAP), has grown in recent decades. The most controversial reprove of late has come from unexpected sources, that of Lee’s own family. His siblings have accused him of using his office for personal gain – to oppose the wish of Lee Kuan Yew (his father, who founded and governed Singapore for over thirty years) to demolish the family home on Oxley Road – and allegedly protect the family legacy for the current prime minister and his children’s political interests.2 The ‘Oxleygate scandal’, as it has been dubbed, raises questions about the deeply embedded personal relationship between the Lee family and political power in Singapore. This comes on the back of the 2011 election, in which the PAP lost nearly 40 per cent of the popular vote and an unprecedented number of parliamentary seats.3 The party was able to bounce back in the 2015 general election, winning a thumping victory on the sentiment surrounding the death of Lee Kuan Yew and the country’s fiftieth anniversary.4 Two years later, however, the shine over the victory has faded with a slowing economy, prominent governance problems in areas such as transportation, and public uncertainty about the future leadership of Singapore. Nevertheless, this criticism has done little to fundamentally challenge the PAP’s predominant political position. While fewer years in office, the PAP and its leadership are secure and ever resilient in power. Globally, Malaysia and Singapore stand out as among the longest incumbent regimes in office. While Malaysia has been officially governed

2

For more details see coverage in the South China Morning Post: http://www.scmp. com/week-asia/politics/article/2100795/lee-family-feud-key-questions-singaporespm-faces-grilling and Michael Barr, ‘Squabbling Lees highlight Singapore’s dynastic dilemma’, The Diplomat, 27 June 2017. https://thediplomat.com/2017/06/ squabbling-lees-highlight-singapores-dynastic-dilemma/ 3 See Kevin Y.L. Tan and Terence Lee (eds), Voting in Change: Politics of Singapore’s 2011 Election (Singapore: Ethos Books, 2011). 4 For discussion of the 2015 Singaporean election see: Terence Lee and Kevin Y.L. Tan. Change in Voting: Singapore’s 2015 General Election (Singapore: Ethos Books, 2016); James Chin, ‘The 2015 Singapore General Elections (Ge): Lee Kuan Yew’s Last Hurrah?’, The Round Table 105(2) (2016): 113–17; and Bridget Welsh, ‘Clientelism and control: PAP’s fight for safety in GE2015’, The Round Table 105(2) (2016): 119– 28.



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through the BN coalition, the dominant party, UMNO, has been effectively in control since the country received independence in 1957. UMNO is essentially Malaysia’s government, with the other incumbent coalition members increasingly irrelevant or marginalised. Singapore’s PAP, on its part, has been unquestionably in control of the island since 1959 (and of the nation since it separated from Malaysia in 1965). Over half a century since decolonisation, Malaysia and Singapore have yet to experience an alternative party in national government. Views of governance by these political parties in these countries vary. There are those who point to high economic growth numbers and political stability, giving credit to the dominant parties’ stewardship. They tout the success of these countries on multiple fronts, from managing ethnic tensions to their models of economic expansion.5 Kent Calder’s book, for example, highlights the embrace of technocratic knowledge as crucial for the city state’s success.6 North of the Causeway, Malaysia continues to be showcased for its management of ethnic relations, as it has avoided broad ethnic violence for nearly fifty years since the tragic May 1969 riots. At the same time, there are those who see the pattern of governance very differently, as one of exclusion, authoritarian rule and uneven distribution of economic gains.7 Malaysia and Singapore are among the most unequal societies in Southeast Asia (along with Thailand).8 And while ethnic conflict is not on the streets, ethnic relations and inequalities remain serious concerns in both countries.9 Within these societies, citizens are also sharply divided over how they 5

6 7 8 9

Malaysia, for example. has been featured as an example of multi-ethnic cooperation. See Arend Lijphart ‘Consociational democracy’, World Politics, 21(2) (1969): 211–14. Singapore has received the most accolades, largely for its economic achievements. See, for example, Henri Ghesquiere, Singapore’s Success: Engineering Economic Growth (Singapore: Cengage Learning, 2007). Kent Calder, Singapore: Smart City, Smart State (Washington DC: Brookings Institution, 2016). See, for example, Garry Rodan, Transparency and Accountability in Southeast Asia: Singapore and Malaysia (London: Routledge, 2004). World Economic Forum, Inclusive Growth and Development Report 2017 (Geneva: World Economic Forum, 2017). See, for example, Muhammed Abdul Khalid, The Colour of Inequality: Ethnicity, Class, Income and Wealth in Malaysia (Kuala Lumpur: MPH Books, 2014) and Garry Rodan, ‘Capitalism, inequality and ideology in Singapore: New challenges for the ruling party’, Asian Studies Review 40(2) (2016): 211–30.

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perceive their quality of governance by the dominant parties and leaders. This polarisation is evident in the electoral results of the last two national elections in both countries. In Malaysia, public support for the incumbent party has been declining, with the 2008 and 2013 general elections key indicators of this drop. In 2008, the BN lost its two-thirds majority in parliament, and in 2013, it lost the majority of the popular vote. The opposition coalition, Pakatan Rakyat, won 50.9 per cent of the popular vote compared to UMNO/BN’s 47.4 per cent despite unprecedented efforts by the ruling coalition to woo the electorate and heightened efforts to break up the opposition.10 In Singapore, the 2011 election was a wake-up call, as 40 per cent of citizens abandoned PAP. While this did not yield a large share of the seats, due to the manipulation of the electoral system, it provoked strong reactions within the system to rebuild support.11 PAP managed to win back 10 per cent of the vote in the September 2015 general election, but over 30 per cent stayed opposed to PAP rule and support for a political alternative and viable opposition remains high. As shown in Figure 1, broadly, since independence, in both countries public support for the incumbent dominant parties has been on a downward trajectory. Despite the overall decline, however, PAP remains comfortably strong, having recorded 60 per cent or more popular support in all eleven general elections, while UMNO has only overcome the 60 per cent threshold of popular support in four of the thirteen general elections to date. Of the two dominant parties, UMNO is facing the greater decline in support, with more challenges ahead for its leaders to hold onto power.12 This collection of essays looks at how and why the dominant parties in Malaysia and Singapore have been so successful in staying in office. With its focus on developments in the last ten years, the collection draws attention to recent measures leaders and parties in these countries have adopted to ensure they maintain their dominant political positions. In engaging the

10

For discussion of the GE 2013, see James Chin (ed.), ‘Malaysian General Elections 2013’, The Round Table: The Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs, 102(6) (2013) and Bridget Welsh, ‘Malaysia’s elections: a step backward’, Journal of Democracy 24(4) (2013): 136–50. 11 Netina Tan, ‘Manipulating electoral laws in Singapore’, Electoral Studies 32(4) (2013): 632–43. 12 For more details, see Bridget Welsh (ed.), The End of UMNO: Essays in Malaysia’s Dominant Party (Petaling Jaya: SIRD, 2016).



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Figure 1: UMNO/BN and PAP’s popular votes at the general elections 90.0 85.0

86.7

80.0 74.1

popular vote (%)

75.0

75.3 74.1

70.0

69.8

70.4

64.8

65.0 60.7

60.0

58.5

63.2

66.6 63.9

61.0 55.8

57.2

55.0 50.0

60.5

65.2

65.0

56.5

60.1

53.4

51.8

54.1

49.3

47.4

45.0 40.0

GE1

GE2

GE3

GE4

GE5

GE6

% of popular vote BN

GE7

GE8

GE9

GE10

GE11

GE12

GE13

% of popular vote PAP

Source: Adapted from Wong, Chin and Norani (2010), N. Tan (2011), Welsh (2013) & Chin (2016).13

areas where these regimes have proved resilient, the essays also touch on sources of resistance and weaknesses of these governments. This collection is distinguished from others in that it draws from a variety of disciplines and perspectives, moving our understanding of regime resilience outside of the traditional rubric of political science. Importantly, the essays incorporate a better understanding of society, the law and economy in how these factors are intertwined with the resilience of the regimes. They also serve as an important update on earlier studies of regime resilience in both countries, developed below. Finally, in laying out a broad understanding of the different sources of regime resilience in these two countries, the book points to areas where challenges persist and are likely to arise in the future. Despite their long records of political dominance, PAP and UMNO are both facing greater political uncertainty than they have in the past.

13

Wong Chin-Huat, James Chin, and Norani Othman. ‘Malaysia: Towards a topology of an electoral one-party state’, Democratization 17(5) (2010): 920–49; Netina Tan, ‘Turn of tide: Singapore’s watershed election 2011’, Asia Pacific Memo 17 (2011): Bridget Welsh, ‘Malaysia's elections: a step backward’, Journal of Democracy 24(4) (2013): 136–50; James Chin, ‘The 2015 Singapore general elections (GE): Lee Kuan Yew’s last hurrah?’, The Round Table 105(2) (2016): 113–17.

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New and Old Theoretical Approaches The issue of regime resilience has gained salience in political science over recent decades. As democratisation has slowed, scholars have moved to understand how hybrid regimes (those combining democratic and authoritarian features) have persisted rather than democratised. More broadly, scholars have challenged the view that countries across the world are moving toward democracy. With labels ranging from ‘competitive authoritarianism’ to ‘democratic decay’, there has been an avid study of two interrelated areas – how authoritarian regimes persist and how more democratic regimes become more (or less) democratic. With regard to democratisation, these two questions move in opposite directions but, given the focus on this ambiguous ground between authoritarianism and democracy, they both offer insights into the nature of power in these ‘hybrid’ regimes. Malaysia and Singapore fall into this ambiguous rubric. Both countries have consistently ranked in the ‘partly free’ category in Freedom House for decades, reinforcing their ‘hybrid’ character.14 Malaysia has often been classified as ‘semi-democracy,’ with limits on civil liberties and serious obstacles for the opposition to gain national power.15 Since 2013 Malaysia has been seen as moving in a more authoritarian direction, experiencing further democratic decay.16 Singapore is seen as similarly hybrid, although its level of control over society (in part shaped by its small size) and the more unfavourable options for the opposition have often put Singapore more towards the authoritarian pole. It has, however, consistently scored higher than Malaysia in areas of governance and service delivery.17 Since 2015, Singapore has also experienced a more authoritarian trajectory.18 Many Singaporean scholars contend the label of authoritarian for their country,

14

See https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2017 William Case, ‘Semi-democracy in Malaysia: withstanding the pressures for regime change’, Pacific Affairs 66(2) (1993): 183–205. 16 Human Rights Watch, Deepening the Culture of Fear: The Criminalization of Peaceful Expression in Malaysia, 12 October 2016 https://www.hrw.org/report/2016/10/12/ deepening-culture-fear/criminalization-peaceful-expression-malaysia 17 For example, see the World Bank Governance Indicators. http://databank. worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=Worldwide-Governance-Indicators 18 Human Rights Watch, Kill the Chickens to Scare the Monkeys, 12 December 2017, https://www.hrw.org/report/2017/12/12/kill-chicken-scare-monkeys/suppressionfree-expression-and-assembly-singapore 15



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suggesting that Singapore has its own brand of democracy that is suited to its own values.19 Malaysia’s incumbent national government similarly justifies its positions on race and dominance appealing to values and (re) interpretations of history.20 The role that national narratives play in shaping the resilience of these regimes is just one of the many means by which PAP and UMNO stay in power explored in this collection. Among scholars the main approach to understand regime resilience in Southeast Asia, and globally, has focused less on narratives than on state power. Scholars argue that governments use the bounty of state resources, control and centralisation of the levers of power, and capacity of leaders, bureaucrats, political parties and their decision-making and performance to stay in power.21 What has distinguished Malaysia and Singapore from other countries in the region such as Indonesia is the comparative greater strength of these states arising from the legacy of colonialism and favourable position of fiscal revenues.22 State resources are tied to distribution of patronage and provision of services. Singapore’s PAP is long held to traditionally derive its public support from its expansion of public housing. In Malaysia, patronage through UMNO and, later, connected to the state-based affirmative action policy known as the New Economic Policy has served the party well, allowing it to address the claims of inadequate attention to its base that emerged in the late 1960s. Authors in this collection identify changes in the nature of patronage in the contemporary period, pointing to the use of cash transfers and targeted disbursements. The most prominent explanations of regime resilience focus on the second dimension, control of the levers of power. Power in both countries is 19

Chua Beng-Huat, Communitarian Ideology and Democracy in Singapore (London: Psychology Press, 1997). 20 Norani Othman, Mavis Puthucheary and Clive S. Kessler, Sharing the Nation: Faith, Difference, Power, and the State 50 Years after Merdeka (Petaling Jaya: SIRD, 2008). 21 See Jason Brownlee, Authoritarianism in an Age of Democratization (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007); Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way, Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes after the Cold War (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010). 22 See Dan Slater, ‘Strong state democratization in Malaysia and Singapore’, Journal of Democracy, 23(2) (2012): 19–33 and Dan Slater and Sofia Fenner, ‘State power and staying power: infrastructural mechanism and authoritarian durability’, Journal of International Affairs, 65(1): 15–29.

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highly centralised around the prime minister, who dominates the executive in line with levels often found in presidential systems. This centralisation has its roots in the feudal elite orientation of Southeast Asian states, but in Malaysia and Singapore was consolidated during the strongmen eras of Lee Kuan Yew (1965-1990) and Mahathir Mohamad (1981–2003). The checks on executive power have eroded over time, especially with regard to the judiciary. Both countries have a limited number of legal decisions that conflict with the executive. The power of the executive remains a defining feature of how these regimes stay in power, as institutions and individuals are controlled, minimising elite challenges for power. Both Najib Tun Razak and Lee Hsien Loong have used the executive to stay in office, and define their leadership priorities and policies. From the selective use of repression to communication strategies, centralisation serves to both perpetuate and actualise the persistence of power. This has been recognised by scholars in the control of the traditional media, through alliances with government/party-linked companies. E. Terence Gomez’s recent book on control of government-linked companies illustrates how control of the executive in tandem with the Ministry of Finance has strengthened Najib’s hand.23 Scholars have zeroed in on electoral manipulation and integrity as a means for the regimes to distort elections to their advantage, from PAP’s last-minute delineations to the massive gerrymandering, malapportionment, cracking and packing favouring UMNO in Malaysia.24 This is buttressed by the selective use of repression, in occasional arrests, charges and more broadly intimidation, notably of government critics or opposition figures. Malaysia’s leading opposition leader Anwar Ibrahim has been jailed (for the second time) since 2015. Authors in this volume look at how that control has shifted in the media environment with the expansion of the Internet and social media. This collection furthers the discussion of control to extend to how the law is currently being used to perpetuate power. The decisive role that the control of the state plays in maintaining control of the state cannot be understated. In Singapore primarily, attention has centred on who comprises government and the executive as a whole. PAP continues to tout that it is

23

24

Edmund Terence Gomez, Ministry of Finance Incorporated (Petaling Jaya: SIRD, 2017). Kai Ostwald, ‘Malaysia’s Electoral Process: The Methods and Costs of Perpetuating UMNO Rule’, Trends in Southeast Asia No. 19. (Singapore: ISEAS, 2017). https:// www.iseas.edu.sg/images/pdf/TRS19_17.pdf



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made of ‘the best and brightest’ and this is derived from the meritocracy bulwark that has assured ‘good governance’. With criticisms of distant elitism in elections, favouritism in appointments and even corruption within the bureaucracy, the meritocracy claim has come under challenge. This has been especially the case with the appointment of a race-based president in 2017. Nevertheless, the broader point that the capacity of leaders to lead and make decisions accounts for regime resilience remains. From the strongmen of Mahathir and Lee Kuan Yew to their successors, leadership is a common frame used to explain the longevity of these regimes. This collection looks at the role of both current premiers in determining their party’s future, with the prognosis pointing to greater uncertainty rather than continuity. Closely connected to leadership capacity is a focus on the political parties themselves. Studies of PAP and UMNO have repeatedly pointed to issues of renewal, adaptability and institutional strength.25 It is argued that crises and elections serve to transform the parties, further entrenching their dominance. This is particularly the case in analyses of Singapore’s PAP. In a pioneering work on the party, Chan Heng Chee (who later became a government ambassador) argued that PAP was able to recruit new leaders and introduce new forms of engagement with citizens.26 This paradigm is often used to understand Singapore politics, as the way PAP evolves is seen to be decisive. Scholars are less sanguine about the effectiveness of these political parties in the contemporary era, pointing to elitism, weakening institutional ties and mismanaged citizen engagement.27 Voter engagement is seen as crucial to the success of these regimes.28 This collection showcases different views of the capacities of PAP and UMNO. The single most important area of performance of these regimes has been the economy. Following in line with developmental states identified in East Asia broadly, and building on the successful experiences of

25

See, for example, Diane K. Mauzy and Robert Stephen Milne, Singapore Politics under the People’s Action Party (London: Psychology Press, 2002). 26 Chan Heng Chee, The Dynamics of One Party Dominance: The PAP at the Grassroots (Singapore University Press, 1976). 27 See, for example, Michael Barr, The Ruling Elite of Singapore: Networks of Power and Influence (London: IB Tauris, 2014). 28 See, for example, Dan Slater, ‘Revolutions, crackdowns and quiescence: communal elites and democratic mobilization in Southeast Asia’, American Journal of Sociology, 115(1) (2009): 203–54.

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development in both countries, scholars repeatedly highlight the legitimacy from the economy as the main reason these regimes have been around for so long. High growth numbers, service provision and poverty reduction are most frequently mentioned, but explanations extend to the management of economic crises, policies and alliances in the political economy. The old adage ‘it’s the economy, stupid’ has served both parties well. Singapore has joined the higher-income countries, with Malaysia among the middleincome countries with a much greater population. Growth has not come without costs, however, and it has been an uneven process.29 Some of that unevenness has been the product of government policies and practices of exclusion. The attention to inequality stands out among this collection’s authors, with the economy more of a weakness than a strength for these regimes. They are not alone in this dynamic, as global economic conditions have made uncertainty certain. The challenges for both Malaysia and Singapore ironically are in a traditional area of strength. The nexus between ‘strong states’, institutions and their performance has been the dominant approach in understanding regime resilience in Malaysia and Singapore, but it is by far not the only explanatory rubric. Both countries were at the centre of the ‘Asian values’ debate, with governments claiming that the norms and values of these societies supported the centralisation of authority, minimal freedoms and prioritisation of order.30 The debate showed how crude these leaders and their spokespersons were in essentialising and oversimplifying the rich and varied attitudes within Malaysia and Singapore in their Machiavellian responses to criticisms of human rights. Research has since shown that there is greater diversity in attitudes in these societies than was described, and that the Asian values explanation has faded with the end of the strongmen eras.31 This said, there continues to be strong conservative orientations among large shares of these societies, reinforcing the view that values do in fact matter. Essays in this collection address how both PAP and UMNO galvanise these conservative views for support. The role that government plays in educating and socialising

29

See, for example, Jonathan Rigg, Challenging Southeast Asian Development: The Shadows of Success (London: Routledge, 2015). 30 Bilahari Kausikan, ‘Governance that works’, Journal of Democracy, 8(2) (1997): 24–34. 31 Mark Thompson, ‘Whatever happened to ‘Asian Values’?’, Journal of Democracy 12(3) (2001): 154–65.



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society through its control of the mainstream media further enhances the effect of values on regime resilience. Education or the lack thereof of politics serves these governments well. Conservatively, it is fair to assume that values are a crucial societal factor accounting for regime resilience. A third and closely connected explanatory rubric focuses on forces from below, the strength of alternatives, especially the political opposition.32 Studies of the opposition in Malaysia and Singapore have repeatedly emphasised weakness.33 This weakness comes from conditions within the opposition itself, such as poor leadership, infighting, ideological differences and an inability to cooperate, to the conditions the opposition faces, such as restrictions on organising and campaigning. There is comparatively less attention paid to the constraints of the regime on the ability of opposition to organise and mobilise. This collection discusses how the opposition has reformulated itself in both Malaysia and Singapore, and its challenges. Analyses ‘from below’ have included assessments of civil society, as well as the more formal opposition political parties.34 This collection brings attention to the changing role of citizenship and citizen mobilisation. As implied above, this collection expands the analysis further. The authors engage regime resilience in different ways, building on their varied expertise. Many of the essays bring in the views and behaviour of ordinary citizens to understanding regime resilience. From perspectives of political literacy to conceptions of citizenship, authors show that regime resilience in Malaysia and Singapore cannot leave out the role of citizens. Another key understudied area has been that of political economy. While there is a rich body of scholarship examining economic policy and how these ‘developmental’ states brought about economic growth and reduced poverty, there are still gaps in the connections between the management of the 32

See Jason Jesudason, ‘The resilience of one-party dominance in Malaysia and Singapore’, in Hermann Giliomee and Charles Simkins (eds), Awkward Embrace: One-Party Dominance in Industrializing Asia, (London: Routledge, 1999). See also Allen Hicken and Erik Martinez Kuhonta, Party System Institutionalization in Asia: Democracies, Autocrats and the Shadows of the Past (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016). 33 See, for example, Walid Jumblatt Abdullah, ‘Bringing ideology in: differing oppositional challenges to hegemony in Singapore and Malaysia’, Government and Opposition 52(3) (2017): 483–510. 34 See, for example, Meredith Weiss, Protest and Possibilities: Civil Society and Coalitions for Political Change in Malaysia (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2006).

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economy, state resources and regime resilience, especially in contemporary conditions. The authors in this collection help fill this void by looking at economic policies and their effects on citizens. The process leads to a better understanding of not only why these regimes have stayed in power, but also why challenges to these regimes remain. A third current connects these regimes with the law, or rather how the law is used to dominate and legitimate incumbents as well as shape societal norms. While in these areas the collection breaks new explanatory ground, the themes in the collection also revisit the traditional approaches towards regime resilience in new ways. Authors look at contemporary changes by the incumbent parties, the opposition and engagement by parties with voters. In doing so, they bring traditional analyses up-to-date and provide a valuable lens to understand the increasing complexities of Malaysia and Singapore. We now better understand how race and religion are being used by UMNO, for example, as well as how PAP has adapted its communication strategy. Revisiting traditional approaches allows a deeper understanding of regime resilience in Malaysia and Singapore.

The Path Ahead The collection contains seventeen essays, all written in accessible style, offering different perspectives and covering a range of topics. The book begins with an essay by co-editor Bridget Welsh, who has been researching on Malaysia and Singapore since the early 1990s. She outlines ten fundamental political shifts that are taking place in Malaysia in political parties, the political economy and in society. She concludes that the emerging picture is one of fragmentation where leaders across the political spectrum will need to prioritise ‘Malaysia’s national interest and the needs of the citizens’ and that for now, UMNO remains in the driving seat of power, despite being weakened and weakening. A veteran of Malaysia and Singapore studies, John Funston, compares Malaysia’s 1969 general election – which Funston witnessed first-hand – with GE 2013 with some startling conclusions. It was no surprise that the political parties competing remained the same with the only change being the formal opposition alliance. The support levels for each coalition were also similar, and in both GE, the ruling coalition lost the two-thirds majority. However, despite the ‘success’ of UMNO in GE 2013, Funston’s detailed investigation



Rethinking Regime Resilience in Malaysia and Singapore

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shows that popular support for the long-standing ruling regime fell. The findings of this historical comparison have important implications for understanding how resilient UMNO is (or isn’t). In the fourth essay, Clive Kessler, an anthropologist who has been observing Malaysia since the 1960s, examines the legitimation strategies adopted by UMNO surrounding Malaysia’s 2013 general election. He notes that UMNO deliberately undertook a specific campaign strategy that resulted in the BN emerging weaker, but UMNO becoming stronger, as least in terms of seats and control of the political narrative around race and religion. Kessler’s focus on ideas, communication and the transformation of UMNO’s political ideology offers insights into the trajectory for UMNO’s future. In the fifth essay, Gaik Cheng Khoo analyses the discourse taking place on the ground after GE 2013, specifically the recent mobilisations of Bersih 4.0 in 2015. Drawing on her earlier work on citizenship and the discourse around democracy, she argues that the popular discourses of identification are shifting and provide resistance to the regime in Malaysia. The sixth essay turns our gaze to Singapore where Bilveer Singh examines the gaps in expectations between the people and the government in light of both GE 2011 and GE 2015 in this island city state. Singh argues that the widening gap between the perception-expectation from Singaporeans of their government can be traced to PAP governance, and that its ability to narrow the expectation gap is also governance related. This essay ties PAP’s regime resilience to PAP’s contemporary policy engagement with the electorate. The subsequent essay by Lily Zubaidah Rahim takes an alternative view. Lily Zubaidah Rahim details the tight control that PAP continues to exercise over Singapore and Singaporeans, and shortcomings in meeting expectations and engaging in reform. Her essay points to weaknesses rather than strengths in PAP governance. Two authors in the collection examine the media, Terence Lee and Ross Tapsell. Terence Lee analyses PAP’s communication strategy and finds deficits, despite the gains in GE 2015. These challenges in communication for PAP highlight both a strength and weakness of the governing party. Ross Tapsell looks at the social media in Malaysia before and after GE 2013. Tapsell argues that while social media may provide for democratic space in the short-to-medium term, media convergence – the synchronisation of media platforms (such as online, broadcasting, print and video) – into media

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conglomerates will benefit the incumbent rather than oppositional forces. He also points out that the control of resources and levers of power have enhanced BN’s control over the political narrative. In the tenth essay we follow with Malaysia; Amanda Whiting explores public pronouncements of law reforms in Malaysia by Prime Minister Najib Tun Razak with a focus on the legal rights of a Muslim woman charged with sedition. The outcome has been less than satisfactory, with the woman coming in the cross-hairs of emboldened guardians of Islam and political authorities. This case is used to illustrate the problematic dimensions of Malaysia’s sedition law, and how it is being used to buttress the regime. The four subsequent essays address the economy and its management. Wee Chong Hui, Steven CM Wong and co-editor Greg Lopez writing with Mohamed Ariff discuss different dimensions of Malaysia’s political economy and their implications for regime resilience. Wee analyses the management of petroleum resources through the lens of federal–state relations and public finance, while Steven CM Wong discusses the politics of the ‘Bottom 40’, the poorest Malaysians. Lopez and Ariff highlight the economic reforms of Prime Minister Najib, but argue that these reforms have not achieved as much as promised or projected. All three essays illustrate the challenges in managing public policy and utilising state resources efficiently. At the same time, they show BN’s success and weaknesses in using resources and its incumbency to its advantage. A weakened BN government has had to resort to populist measures to remain popular with the electorate, yet it is not prepared to devolve its highly centralised economic powers to the states or to engage in meaningful reforms that restructure the political economy. UMNO’s central control of resources lies at the heart of regime resilience in Malaysia. Lee Soo Ann, focusing on the economy and social welfare policy in Singapore, provides a detailed treatment of how PAP has ensured economic growth and social welfare despite being a small open economy. His essay contrasts with the others as it highlights the regime’s effective use of resources. He provides the economic logic to how policies such as housing, immigration, wage and increasing productivity have contributed to the economic prosperity of many Singaporeans. He also identifies recent policy initiatives to address the frustration of Singaporeans after GE 2011 and the approaches to managing the current challenging economic environment. All four essays flesh out the important implications of political economy for regime resilience, with different conclusions.



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Malaysia continues to remain under focus as we turn to look at dynamics in society. One of Malaysia’s leading intellectuals, political anthropologist A.B. Shamsul, attempts to look beyond psephology to make sense of Malaysian politics. He addresses political literacy and representation. He argues that, with the absence of political literacy, a political system such as parliamentary democracy has not found fertile ground. In turn, representation through acts of ethnic ‘gladiatorism’ has become the preferred form. Shamsul concludes by asking if the political cockfighting (gladiatorism) can really raise the level of political literacy among Malaysian voters. Meredith Weiss examines both political party coalitions in Malaysia. This essay, based on her fieldwork around GE 2013, argues that the election signals a new phase in Malaysian electoral history, in which an alternate coalition presents not just different policies and personalities, but also a new way of conceptualising and engaging in politics. She highlights some of the challenges of maintaining cooperation after GE13. R. Rueban Balasubramaniam takes to legal philosophy to unpack UMNO’s ethnocratic rule in Malaysia. He explains how views of the law and use of the law have contributed to BN’s hold on power. He goes further and, by appealing to the Federal Constitution, provides a framework to dislodge the culture of domination in Malaysian politics, suggesting a way to strengthen resistance to the BN. David Martin Jones concludes the book, comparing the resilience of both these regimes. He highlights the fact that party states such as Malaysia and Singapore present a challenge to Western models of democratisation. Jones is pessimistic that turnover will be possible in both Malaysia and Singapore as their ability to use the levers of power have been successful. In keeping with the diversity in the volume, these essays point to different projections for regime resilience. There is both optimism and pessimism over the future of these regimes, with the authors pointing to varied trajectories and factors contributing to these paths. As with Malaysia and Singapore themselves and studies of their political development, there is little consensus. For scholars following these countries, this should not come as any surprise. What should, however, offer insights is how these essays, as a collective, enrich understanding of what will be the drivers of change, and whether in fact the parties in power will stay in the driving seat. This is the topic we return to in the conclusion.

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Change without ‘Change’: Malaysia after GE 2013

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Chapter 2

Change without ‘Change’: Malaysia after GE 2013 Bridget Welsh

Four years have passed since the historic May 2013 polls where the incumbent Barisan Nasional (BN or National Front) coalition held onto power. Prime Minister Najib Tun Razak received a maiden mandate, a weak one clouded with legitimacy issues in a seriously flawed electoral process, but one nevertheless that left power in the hands of the party that has governed the country for over 60 years.1 He is Malaysia’s sixth elected premier, who subsequently received the blessing of his party in an uncontested election for the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) presidency in October 2013. He is now Malaysia’s third longest serving leader. On the surface, it would appear that there is more of the same – the status quo remains in which the country is deeply politically polarised and the world’s longest serving political coalition remains in power. Real challenges of governance from addressing corruption and multi-ethnic inclusion to improving economic development and providing quality services remain. A closer look, however, reveals that GE 2013 marked some fundamental shifts in the national political landscape that profoundly shaped political dynamics. On many levels, GE 2013 brought change, although these 1

For a discussion of the elections see James Chin (ed.), special issue of The Round Table: The Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs, Volume 102/Issue 6, 2013; Andreas Ufen (ed.), special issue of the Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs, Volume 32, Number 2, 2013; Khoo Boo Teik (ed.), 13th General Election in Malaysia: Issues, Outcomes and Implications, IDE-Report. October 2013, accessed 15 March 2016, http://www.ide.go.jp/English/Publish/Download/Report/2013/2013_malaysia. html; Bridget Welsh, ‘Malaysia’s Elections: A Step Backward’, Journal of Democracy 24(4) (October 2013): 136–50.

17

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changes do not necessarily promise a strengthened, more inclusive and democratic polity, at least in the short term. In this essay I identify ten fundamental political shifts that took place in three different areas – within political coalitions, in governance and within Malaysian society – and point to potential trends and implications for democracy and regime resilience in Malaysia. I tie these changes to GE 2013, although some of these developments were rooted before the election and have been exacerbated since the election. The picture that emerges is one of fragmentation, where greater burdens are being placed on leaders across the political spectrum to prioritise Malaysia’s national interests and the needs of its citizens. Despite Najib’s 2013 electoral victory and UMNO’s resilience in power, conditions for regime change continue to remain promising, although short term these prospects are less optimistic than in the recent past.

Reconstituted Political Coalitions I. An UMNO Malay ‘Insecure Victory’ GE 2013 represented the first election where Malaysia’s dominant party UMNO had no real internal non-Malay checks on its political power within the governing coalition. While UMNO has been the de facto dominant party in BN since 1969, and the voices of alternative parties have been overshadowed and in some cases outright dismissed, GE 2013 effectively removed meaningful internal non-Malay dissent from within. Malay parties – UMNO and Sarawak’s Parti Pesaka Bumiputera Bersatu (PBB or United Bumiputera Heritage Party) – comprise 77 per cent of the share of parliamentary seats of the post-GE 2013 government, while within BN nonMalay parties comprise only 23 per cent. Although UMNO did not increase its share of the popular vote in GE 2013 (now at 29.3 per cent) and studies of electoral results have shown that its vote share of Malay support rose by a modest 1.5 per cent, UMNO holds the lion’s share of seats.2 This is in the context of a minority government, where 51 per cent of the popular vote 2

This is based on an unpublished Merdeka Center study reported in the media. ‘Did UMNO Really Scare up Strong Malay Support, Not Quite’, The Malaysian Insider, 13 August 2013, accessed 15 March 2016, http://bmalaysia.com/pages/16384060-didumno-really-scare-up-strong-malay-support-not-quite.



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was won by the opposition, and 70.7 per cent of the popular vote was not won by UMNO. This oxymoron dynamic – with carte blanche within BN but a limited base of support within society at large – is a UMNO ‘victory’ laden with ‘insecurity’. Malaysia’s political history teaches us some of the patterns that occur in similar situations. The first dimension is ‘victory’. When there is the perception of an UMNO Malay victory, as occurred in 2004 when premier Abdullah Badawi gave UMNO the largest number of seats in Malaysian history (109 of 219), the effect was to fuel conflict within UMNO and contribute to alienation from other political parties. A ‘victorious’ UMNO expects more, and contenders emerge within the party to demand more. Ultimately, a victorious UMNO is one that fights within itself. Indeed, splits within the party have been evident since immediately after the GE 2013 results, in which Najib had to return home on a 2013 vacation to quell a revolt against his leadership to the open defections from his party in the wake of 2015 revelations of inadequately accounted funds deposited into Najib’s personal account associated with the 1MDB scandal.3 The most striking illustration of dissent within UMNO has been the 2016 purge of leaders –former Deputy Prime Minister Muhyiddin Yassin and former Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad – who openly called for Najib to step down. Despite holding onto his position, Najib constantly has to worry about challengers from within. UMNO’s divisions are no longer just among the elite party leaders, but extend to open rebellion by the grassroots.4 A victorious UMNO also pushes its coalition partners around. Post-GE 2013 there is the perception that non-Malay parties are no longer relevant for UMNO power. As such, BN partners no longer hold the veto power they once held in BN’s long-touted ethnic power-sharing arrangement.5 In

3

Based on interviews conducted with UMNO delegates, 2013–16. Open dissent in the party was reported after the 1MDB scandal broke in July 2015, with the eventual dropping of former Deputy Prime Minister Muhyiddin Yassin on 28 July 2015. 4 A series of police reports and protests against Prime Minister Najib have occurred. For example, see: ‘Now Johor UMNO member lodges report against Najib over RM2.6 million’, Today Online, 6 September 2015, accessed 15 March 2016, http:// www.todayonline.com/world/asia/now-johor-umno-member-lodges-reportagainst-najib-over-rm26-billion. 5 Arend Lijphart, The Politics of Accommodation: Pluralism and Democracy in the Netherlands (University of California Press, 1968).

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fact, arguably the influence of the non-Malay parties – Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA), Gerakan and Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC) – has dropped with these parties no longer fully autonomous in the selection of their party leaders and their ability to advocate for non-Malay issues diminished. An illustrative example is that of the responses around the September 2015 Himpunan Rakyat Bersatu (United Citizens Rally) rally, in which Malay chauvinists funded by the government engaged in anti-Chinese vitriol.6 The concerns of non-Malay parties were publicly dismissed.7 A similar dynamic occurred with the introduction of the RUU355 Bill in April 2017 which has the potential to open the way for the introduction and implementation of Sharia law. The test ahead will be whether Najib can manage these internal UMNO and BN tensions, as these divisions open up the way for the opposition to make gains at the polls and are a critical condition if BN is to lose power, moving Malaysia toward greater democracy. Yet, there is another dimension present in UMNO’s results, the insecurity of a party that has not won over the public at large and has challenges with public confidence. The image of ‘UMNO’ as a party has not significantly improved, and a large section of society remains alienated from Najib himself.8 This is where UMNO will continue to turn to the modus operandi it knows best – the use of Malay identity (aka racial politics) to attempt to galvanise and maintain support.9 The 2015 Himpunan Rakyat Bersatu rally was a clear example of increasing Malay chauvinism, but these practices of targeting Malaysian Chinese have increased in this era of insecurity. Anti-Chinese sentiment has been most virulently used in the attacks at the Democratic Action Party (DAP), which is portrayed as 6

Joseph Sipalan, ‘Condemning ‘red shirts’ rally, MCA calls for end to public protests’, The Malay Mail Online, 24 September 2015, accessed 15 March 2016, http://www. themalaymailonline.com/malaysia/article/condemning-red-shirts-rally-mca-callsfor-end-to-public-protests#sthash.nI082UvC.dpuf. 7 Syed Jaymal Zahid, ‘You want more? Make the Chinese back BN, Najib tells MCA’, The Malay Mail Online, 11 October 2015, accessed 15 March 2016, http://www. themalaymailonline.com/malaysia/article/you-want-more-make-the-chinese-backbn-najib-tells-mca#sthash.DkMsKqSX.dpuf. 8 See Shannon Teoh, ‘Approval Sinks for Malaysian PM Najib’s Government’, Straits Times, 17 October 2015, accessed 15 March 2016, http://www.straitstimes.com/asia/ se-asia/approval-sinks-for-malaysian-pm-najibs-government. 9 See the essay by Clive Kessler in this volume.



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challenging Malay political dominance. The use of Malay identity has more overtly included religion, a phenomenon that has long historic roots but played a prominent role in the GE 2013 campaign as messages were sent that a vote for the opposition would undermine the position of Islam. PAS leaders believed this was the factor that most undermined their support, along with collaboration with DAP.10 In the wake of the election, there was an open call for ‘Muslim unity’, which has extended into calls for a ‘Muslim tsunami’ after anti-Chinese sentiment was effective in unseating Jakarta Governor Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (Ahok) in 2017. Najib has expanded the powers and resources of Islamic religious agencies, allowing more bureaucratic activism in promoting a more conservative brand of the faith. The prime minister’s lack of moral standing has encouraged the practice of shoring his religious credentials through his office. At the same time, the implication has been a deepening of conservative Islamisation.11 This has, in turn, created difficulties for the opposition that has attempted to bridge more secular and conservative Islamist views. UMNO’s mythology is deeply rooted in the idea of Malay/Muslim unity and believes that this approach puts pressure on the opposition while simultaneously keeps its base together.12 This combination of ‘victory’ and ‘insecurity’ is dangerous, in that it brings out the arrogance and division within UMNO itself and, at the same time, contributes to a party that is less ethnically tolerant vis-à-vis society and ethnic minorities. As UMNO moves forward the conflict inside the party will exacerbate the tendency to use race and religion in national politics, fostering ethnic conflict and political uncertainty. II. Rise of East Malaysia The BN coalition has changed in another important dimension. After celebrating the 50th Malaysia Day in 2013, marking the formation of the

10

Interview PAS leaders, Kelantan and Terengganu, June 2013. Amanda Hodge, ‘Moderation under Threat as Malaysia Faces Islamic Tide’, The Australian, 17 August 2017. http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/inquirer/ moderation-under-threat-as-malaysia-faces-islamic-tide/news-story/341d55d040ce 90e55baf62d590ab13c1 12 See Clive Kessler, ‘UMNO: Then, Now — and Always?’ in The End of UMNO? Essays on Malaysia’s Dominant Party, ed. Bridget Welsh (Petaling Jaya: SIRD Publications, 2016). 11

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Federation of Malaysia, it is fitting to highlight the increased power of East Malaysia in national politics. Much has been made of East Malaysia as having greater political power due to the 1963 agreement.13 This has been intertwined with the discussion of malapportionment, as analysts have pointed to the 25 per cent of the seats for these states derived from the 20-point agreement to join the Federation and argued that these states, which together now comprise almost 20 per cent of the nation’s population, have smaller constituencies. The reality is that malapportionment is a national phenomenon, and even occurs within Sabah and Sarawak.14 In fact, many in East Malaysia feel that they lack political power and their inputs have not been adequately valued and views respected.15 These issues influence voting behaviour in these states, where a larger share of votes in GE 2013 was given to non-BN alternatives, up nearly 8 per cent from 2008. In the wake of GE 2013, however, the fundamental shift in the role of East Malaysia in national power has more to do with the share of their victory within BN itself.16 East Malaysia holds the king-maker’s position, with 25 per cent of BN’s share of seats in parliament. The majority of these are held by the long-serving and powerful former Sarawak Chief Minister (now Governor) Taib Mahmud’s party, PBB. The reality of East Malaysian influence can be seen in the 35 per cent of seats they hold in the post-GE 2013 Cabinet. These elites continue to hold the balance of power in their hands, with their loyalties determining who holds national power. This will give BN East Malaysian leaders more autonomy in decision-making, greater access to national funds and place a greater responsibility on these leaders to take on national mantles of leadership, especially in the areas of ethnic relations. It is thus not a surprise that the Sarawak 2016 election saw the state’s then Chief Minister, Adenan Satem, build a successful campaign

13

See Andrew J. Harding and James Chin (eds), 50 Years of Malaysia: Federalism Revisited (Kuala Lumpur: Marshall Cavendish, 2014). 14 Kai Ostwald, ‘How to Win a Lost Election: Malapportionment and Malaysia’s 2013 General Election’, The Round Table, 102(6) (2013): 521–32. 15 See the 2016 Merdeka Center Poll: ‘Poll: 54pc feel Sarawak treated unfairly by Putrajaya’, The Malay Mail Online, 6 April 2016, accessed 11 April 2016, http://www. themalaymailonline.com/malaysia/article/poll-54pc-feel-sarawak-treated-unfairlyby-putrajaya#sthash.TzdVui9M.dpuf. 16 James Chin, ‘Malaysia in 2013: Najib’s Pyrrhic Victory and the Demise of 1Malaysia’, Southeast Asian Affairs, 2014: 175–89.



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around state autonomy and empowerment.17 Even though Adenan passed away in January 2017, the demands for autonomy have not dissipated. At the same time, East Malaysian leaders face greater challenges from their own constituents. What is not fully appreciated is that the opposition’s main gains in GE 2013 were largely from East Malaysia, where it picked up five seats in these increasingly competitive states. The opposition as a whole won another seven parliamentary seats in these states, but fragmentation among opposition parties contributed to BN victories. Sabah and Sarawak are now two battleground states. Sarawak state elections traditionally played an important role in signalling the mood of voters in its state polls in 2006 and 2011.18 While the Sarawak 2016 poll was a decisive victory for BN, in which the coalition retained two-thirds and picked up seats from the opposition, largely through gerrymandering and movement of voters, much of the victory can be seen to be a credit to Adenan’s leadership, a factor that is no longer present. Many of the East Malaysian leaders are seen to be too distant from their young populations, elitist and relying heavily on their personal power in their constituencies. Passing the political baton to family members is a feature common throughout Malaysia, but particularly prevalent in East Malaysia, limiting the ability of new elites to emerge and representation to broaden. Governance challenges, especially corruption, are increasingly being discussed in public in East Malaysia – with the perception that wealth is not being adequately distributed. The federal government is often blamed. With greater urbanisation and social media, there has been an expanding political awareness evolving in East Malaysia; voters from these states now understand that they have greater clout to determine electoral outcomes.19 While elites continue to hold power in East Malaysia, and will likely do so in the short term, GE 2013 marked a change in the relationship

17

Sulok Tawie, ‘10pc of Sarawakians want referendums on state autonomy, NGO says’, The Malay Mail Online, 5 January 2016, accessed 15 March 2016, http://www. themalaymailonline.com/malaysia/article/10pc-of-sarawakians-want-referendumson-state-autonomy-ngo-says#sthash.XAeVfETR.dpuf. 18 James Chin, ‘Exporting the BN/UMNO Model: Politics in Sabah and Sarawak’, in Routledge Handbook of Contemporary Malaysia, ed. Meredith Weiss (London: Routledge, 2014), pp. 83–92. 19 Bridget Welsh and Tan Seng Keat, Embracing Democracy in Malaysia? The Findings of the Asian Barometer Survey, 2006–2014 (Petaling Jaya: SIRD Publications, 2018). Forthcoming.

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between political elites and citizens in Sabah and Sarawak. They expect more. This assures that both these states will remain highly contested and politically fluid. While pressures have persisted to bring these East Malaysian states into the national orbit, placing the national brand of politics on Sabah and Sarawak, these have been resisted. East Malaysia’s growing political awareness has reinforced regional identities that are only to become enhanced as both leaders and voters in these states wield their influence and expectations rise. Whether this involves freedom of religion, the potential entry of UMNO into Sarawak, oil and gas royalties or fiscal allocations, East Malaysians will expect greater autonomy over their own affairs and resist federal encroachment. The 2014 Asian Barometer Survey found that 21 per cent of Sabahans and 11 per cent of Sarawakians wanted to separate from Malaysia.20 This will enhance the on-going process of political decentralisation of power, while simultaneously making federal–state relations contentious. Najib has faced a more demanding East Malaysia. By choosing to work primarily through the elites in the state, rather than with citizens as large, Najib risks alienation and growing political dissent in East Malaysia. III. Shifts in Multi-ethnic Representation Along with the changes in regional power, the nature of ethnic representation in Malaysia has undergone a major recalibration. For decades BN has been touted as the multi-ethnic inclusion coalition, an example of power-sharing bringing non-Malay parties under its umbrella. Now all of the Chinese and Indian-based parties within BN have lost their political bases. The erosion of Chinese support has been evolving since 2008, with an estimate of over 70 per cent of Chinese voting against BN in 2013.21 MCA won only seven parliamentary seats, moving away from its position as the second largest party within the BN coalition. While MIC won a greater share of the seats contested, it only held onto four parliamentary seats, despite BN losing over 60 per cent of the Indian vote. The decline of support for MIC began earlier in 2008 with the rise of a Hindu-rights movement and through 20

21

Ibid. Lee Kam Hing and Thock Ker Pong, ‘Thirteenth General Elections (GE13): Chinese Votes and Implications’, Kajian Malaysia, 32, Supp. 2 (2014): 25–53.



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the calculated process of fragmentation of the Indian community by using financial inducements and shoring up different leaders.22 The decision to bring representatives of the opposition group HINDRAF into the Cabinet after GE 2013 illustrated the weakening of MIC as the chosen representative for the Indian community within BN itself. The subsequent decision of the HINDRAF-linked minister to leave the BN coalition in February 2014 revealed the weaknesses of even alternative Indian Malaysian voices within the incumbent government.23 As Malaysia moves toward its next polls, to be scheduled before August 2018, the viability of the non-Malay parties to speak for their communities remains severely hampered. The possibility of fielding ethnic minorities as BN-direct candidates is in the offing, potentially further decimating the political influence of non-Malay parties.24 Much of the weakness of the non-Malay BN parties within the coalition is of their own making. Questions persist about the non-Malay parties’ ability to represent non-Malays within the coalition as their leaders have often been openly humiliated and dismissed by UMNO. Whether this is the responsibility of the leaders of the non-Malay parties within BN or UMNO is a matter of debate. The public perception is that non-Malay parties within the coalition have not stood their ground on key issues affecting their respective ethnic communities. To make matters worse, the non-Malay BN parties are internally divided, as illustrated by the fractious post-GE 2013 party leadership contests.25 While infighting is the norm in political parties, the bitter personalised pre- and post-GE 2013 contestation within the traditional component non-Malay BN parties has exacerbated their 22

Vijay Devadas, ‘Makkal Sakthi: The Hindraf effect, race and postcolonial democracy in Malaysia’, in Race and Multiculturalism in Malaysia and Singapore, eds. D.P.S. Goh et al. (London: Routledge, 2009), pp. 86–104. 23 Loshana K Shagar, ‘Hindraf: Waytha Moorthy to quit as deputy minister’, The Star, 8 February 2014, accessed 15 March 2016, http://www.thestar.com.my/news/ nation/2014/02/08/hindraf-wahthamoorthy-resigns/. 24 For the use of BN candidates, see the Sarawak 2016 election. Baradan Kuppusamy, ‘Direct BN candidates might solve intractable disputes’, The Sun Daily, 15 February 2016, accessed 15 March 2016, http://www.thesundaily.my/news/1693672. 25 For background on the turbulent party contests, see: Suganthi Suparmaniam, ‘Analysis: The MIC crisis’, Astro Awani, 5 February 2015, accessed 15 April 2016, http://english.astroawani.com/malaysia-news/analysis-mic-crisis-53394 and Audrey Edwards, ‘Liow calls for end to infighting in MCA’, The Malay Mail Online, 2 February 2016, accessed 15 March 2016, www.themalaymailonline.com/malaysia/ article/liow-calls-for-end-to-infighting-in-mca#sthash.6G87BKLm.dpuf.

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decline, fuelling a dynamic of fighting over spoils rather than regenerating and regrouping. The test ahead will be whether they can win back respect, beginning with their own members. Immediately after GE 2013 non-Malay parties were inward-looking, tackling battles inside their own parties and with UMNO, without a clear focus on how to win back their support base. They have lost their autonomy over their role in national power, playing second fiddle to a dominant party that increasingly sees these parties as less impactful and their issues as less relevant in controlling national power. A conflicting pattern has emerged, with the non-Malay parties opposing the opposition and, in some cases, opposing UMNO to maintain attempts at credibility.26 Non-Malay parties are thus engaged in political battles on two fronts. They vacillate from adopting the position of issues of the opposition, and at the same time struggle with defending and adopting the positions of the UMNO-led government. MCA has turned to ally itself with the Chinese government, with the hope of strengthening its links and financial resources within Malaysia. This opens them to more vulnerability and internal dissent. Longer term, a tipping point may come over an issue or a set of issues that will force these parties to abandon the BN coalition. There are already factions within these parties calling for more independent positions and BN-separation.27 This dynamic will likely only divide and splinter these non-Malay parties further. Post- GE 2013, the mantle of multi-ethnic representation turned to the opposition. Across the three opposition parties in Pakatan Rakyat (PR), seats were won with greater multi-ethnic support. PR held the largest number of multi-ethnic seats in parliament; of the 21 seats held by PAS, for example, thirteen were won by Chinese support, including the seats of some of the party’s conservative leaders such as Nasrudin Hassan Tantawi of Temerloh and Idris Ahmad of Bukit Gantang. Both of these seats had over 20 per cent of Chinese voters and were won by slim margins. Winning through 26

‘Shut your mouth’, Umno man tells MCA critics of call to abolish vernacular schools’, The Malay Mail Online, 7 October 2014, accessed 15 March 2016, http://www. themalaymailonline.com/malaysia/article/shut-your-mouth-umno-man-tells-mcacritics-of-call-to-abolish-vernacular-sc#sthash.QFLhumf1.dpuf. 27 George Chang, ‘MCA Caught in a Cul-d-sac’, The Malaysian Insider, 11 September 2015, accessed 15 March 2016, http://www3.themalaysianinsider.com/opinion/ george-chang/article/mca-caught-in-a-cul-de-sac.



Change without ‘Change’: Malaysia after GE 2013

27

support across ethnic lines was even more pervasive for PKR and DAP, as fewer than a handful of seats could be seen as gleaned from one ethnic community. The opposition’s future depends heavily on maintaining support from all of the different communities through leadership, accommodation and compromise. One of the opposition’s main challenges involves cooperating across ethnic communities. This is a serious internal hurdle on multiple levels. The opposition has traditionally appealed to ethnic-based constituencies. PAS and DAP have attempted to cross the ethnic divides, but remain hampered by deeply entrenched assumptions, suspicions and misunderstandings of the ‘other’ as well as a political base that expects their ‘own’ ethnic demands to be advocated. Both were successful in winning support outside of their own ethnic base in GE 2013, but this did not sit well within their own parties. Not only did PAS view cooperation in Pakatan as ‘zero-sum’ – contributing to losses in their own Malay ground – it saw its relationship with the Chinese-dominant DAP (and the UMNO label that PAS was under Chinese control) as negatively affecting its ability to represent its Malay base. When DAP repeatedly demanded that PAS abandon its traditional demand for religious law, notably hudud, this fuelled distrust, anger, and ultimately the break-up of the opposition in June 2015.28 For DAP, cooperation in Pakatan has been a ‘win-win’ shoring up the party. Ironically, this strength bolstered calls within DAP for its partners to fall in line with their own positions on secular government, feeding a perception of DAP (framed in an ethnic lens as Chinese) arrogance and bullying. While the DAP leadership has pushed for Malay inclusion and greater acceptance of ethnic differences, some in DAP have seen these moves as an abandonment of traditional ‘Chinese’ issues, such as challenging affirmative action, protecting Chinese education and defending minority rights, including religious freedom.29 The response was calls to shore up Chinese support and to break with PAS – a development that also contributed to the end of the Pakatan Rakyat partnership and extends into preparations for GE14. Pakatan Rakyat

28

Bridget Welsh, ‘In Search of Hope in Pakatan Harapan’, Malaysiakini, 22 December 2015, accessed 15 March 2016, https://www.malaysiakini.com/news/324180. 29 ‘DAP Retreat Discusses Challenges to Endear Party to All Races’, The Malaysian Insider, 16 January 2016, accessed 15 March 2016, http://newsflash.hol.es/2016/01/ dap-retreat-discusses-challenges-to-endear-partyto-all-races/.

28

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proved unable to deal with ethnic differences and ‘survival’ priorities within their own political parties, least of all with the challenge of multi-ethnic representation for the public at large. Part of the reason lies with the racialised post-GE 2013 climate. With an election labelled as a ‘Chinese tsunami’ and active exploitation of both race and religion by UMNO, there has been a rise in racialised discourse. The traditional ethnic frame of politics has overshadowed alternative multiethnic lens. Politicians increasingly speak of the ethnic composition of a particular rally, as in the case of Bersih 4 in August 2015, or the need to reach out to specific communities, especially Malays, rather than adopting broader notions of citizenship and identity. For the opposition, the mode has been one of reaction and defensiveness, as its efforts at building bridges across communities have been placed on the back burner by an effective UMNO offence. Short term, this has contributed to ethnic-tied crises that test the opposition’s institutional resilience and leadership, with mixed results. Longer term, the opposition will face the decision of following the ethnic consensus model set by BN or moving away from ethnic politics, to change from mirroring a political structure set by BN to a more substantive alternative. A dynamic of clearly articulating a political discourse that brings together Malaysians across communities, rather than buying into the divisive racial and religiously polarised politics, remains a serious hurdle for all the political parties. Ethnic politics within political parties continues to define and delineate the parameters of democracy and representation in Malaysia. IV. An Unfocused-Divided Opposition The hurdles for expanding democracy do not stop there. The viability of Malaysia’s opposition has emerged as one of the most pressing issues postGE 2013, as the opposition has splintered, reformulated and remained fragmented and unfocused. Despite winning the majority of votes in 2013, the trajectory for the opposition has been negative, at least in the short term. The reasons for the opposition’s weaknesses are multi-faceted, but can be boiled down to two issues: the effective use of the state of repression and division by the Najib government and defensive silo-posturing of opposition parties and leaders themselves, reflecting ideological and personal differences. Analyses of June 2015 Pakatan Rakyat’s break-up place heavy blame on the opposition itself, notably the decision on hudud by PAS president Hadi



Change without ‘Change’: Malaysia after GE 2013

29

Awang to make an opposition coalition intractable.30 Little attention has been paid to the Najib government’s adept strategies to ‘divide and rule’. The most obvious measure involves the imprisonment of the opposition leader, Anwar Ibrahim, who was jailed again for sodomy in a highly tainted politically-laden legal process in 2015. Less discussed are the incentives that have been provided to PAS to break away from Pakatan, including enticements to introduce hudud, potential gains in Malay seats which could improve the party’s chances, and financial allocations to opposition leaders and causes. At the same time, the Najib government has systematically arrested younger prominent national leaders, with charges ranging from corruption and sedition to the violation of official secrets and travel bans.31 Not only have these arrests been serious distractions, they have curtailed the ability of the opposition of organise and mobilise and, in some cases, damaged the reputations of opposition leaders. Finally, the Najib government has exacerbated the ideological and personality differences within the opposition, over hudud, Malay rights, the role of rulers and religious rights, through its positions on issues and use of incentives. It knows that these issues place strain on the broader ideological umbrella of the opposition, and that these differences tap into divides among individual politicians. The regime knows that a divided and distracted opposition is essential for its survival. The ‘divide and rule’ strategy would not be so effective if it were not for the inherent differences within the opposition. GE 2013 resulted in significant imbalances in winning seats among opposition political parties. While history has shown that the fortunes of individual opposition parties fluctuate widely in different elections, Pakatan Rakyat was formed with equality for all three political parties based on the principles of mutual respect and consultation. The post-GE 2013 unevenness of representation of different parties in the opposition strained this dynamic. Post-GE 2013,

30

Asrul Hadi Abdul Sani, ‘Break-up of Malaysia’s Opposition Bloc Pakatan Rakyat: What Happened and What Happens Next’, Straits Times, 18 June 2015, accessed 15 March 2016, http://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/break-up-of-malaysiasopposition-bloc-pakatan-rakyat-what-happened-and-whats-next. 31 Human Rights Watch Report, Creating a Culture of Fear: The Criminalization of Peaceful Expression in Malaysia, 26 October 2015, accessed 15 March 2016 https:// www.hrw.org/report/2015/10/26/creating-culture-fear/criminalization-peacefulexpression-malaysia.

30

Regime Resilience in Malaysia and Singapore

DAP was (and is) seen as too dominant among the opposition parties, including by the new Amanah party comprised of former PAS leaders.32 The position and power of different opposition parties to determine the stance and leadership of other parties has created tensions, from the leadership of Hadi Awang of PAS to the role of Anwar’s wife, Wan Azizah Wan Ismail. The differences go beyond equality among parties to the leadership of the opposition as a whole, an issue that remains unresolved after the imprisonment of Anwar Ibrahim. The contestation for leadership is not just among the different opposition parties, but within parties as younger leaders are jockeying for position and power. There are those who hold onto Anwar, with others hoping to replace him as leader. Some leaders refuse to work with other leaders, as trust and confidence has eroded. With the entry of Mahathir Mohamad and his party Parti Pribumi Bersatu Malaysia into the opposition in June 2017 and Mahathir’s subsequent appointment as chairman of the new broad opposition coalition Pakatan Harapan, the issues of leadership, trust and credibility remain significant. The response of the opposition parties and many of its leaders has been defensive, to the attacks by the Najib government as well as to each other. The opposition has moved away from expanding its support towards consolidating its base, and opted to operate primarily in silos. The media headlines have often repeatedly featured opposition party attacks on each other rather than UMNO and BN, with the relationship between parties soured. The creation of Pakatan Harapan and resolution of its leadership line-up in July 2017 was supposed to reduce tensions, but these too have exposed divisions within the opposition. They extend not only to questions of leadership and political alliances, but to positions on democratic reform, political Islam and ethnic politics, namely the position of the Malay community. The main unifying core of Pakatan Harapan is opposition to Najib, which is a narrow agenda to engage the electorate. Post-GE 2013, the role of representing the public and effectively engaging their concerns has diminished as the opposition has been inwardly focused, and is finding its footing in new alliances.

32

Interviews with Amanah Party leaders, December 2015.



Change without ‘Change’: Malaysia after GE 2013

31

Reshaped Governance V. Weakened Political Institutions Malaysia’s GE 2013 also profoundly changed governance. Foremost, it has further politicised the country’s political institutions, inhibiting their capacity to govern as professional bodies and effective arbitrators of conflict. The most attention has centred on the Electoral Commission, whose reputation was severely dented in the run-up and aftermath of the polls. A large share of Malaysians has little faith in the EC’s ability to carry out the redelineation exercise and administer polls fairly.33 Malaysia’s electoral administration has been openly questioned since the emergence of Bersih (Coalition for Clean and Fair Elections) in 2007 and this contestation has been heightened after GE 2013 as the election brought to light the impact of administrative bias on the outcome.34 The twelve major legal cases challenging the EC have further illustrated its bias towards the regime. GE 2013 also brought other political organisations into the spotlight for professionalism, including the police force and the judiciary. The latter has weakened in the wake of arbitrary dismissal and inconsistent handling of over eighty electoral petitions. The courts have adopted primarily a path of conservative judicial restraint, but their decision-making has set worrying precedents in their dismissal of issues of bribery, mishandling of ballots and due process – all of which have undermined the standing of the judiciary and the practice of the rule of law.35 Under Najib the main political arbiters of the rule of law – the judiciary and the police – have been further compromised. His tenure has been

33

Bridget Welsh and Tan Seng Keat, Embracing Democracy in Malaysia? The Findings of the Asian Barometer Survey, 2006–2014 (Petaling Jaya: SIRD Publications, 2018). Forthcoming. 34 Max Grompeng, ‘Southeast Asia’s Elections Worst in the World’, New Mandala, 19 February 2015, accessed 15 March 2016, http://asiapacific.anu.edu.au/ newmandala/2015/02/19/southeast-asian-elections-worst-in-the-world/ and Report of the People’s Tribunal on Malaysia’s 13th General Elections, 25 March 2014, accessed 15 March 2016, http://www.bersih.org/report-of-the-peoples-tribunal-onmalaysias-13th-general-elections/. 35 Charles Hector, ‘Shocking Dismissals of Election Petitions’, Aliran, 14 October 2013, accessed 15 March 2016, http://aliran.com/aliran-monthly/2013/2013-5/shockingdismissals-of-election-petitions/.

32

Regime Resilience in Malaysia and Singapore

wracked with political cases, from the Perak state takeover in 2009 to the post-GE 2013 decisions on sedition and the imprisonment of the leader of the opposition, Anwar. The judiciary has been perceived to be manipulated for political ends, rather than justice. The legal cases extend beyond politicians. Post-GE 2013, Najib allowed the cases on religious issues that he placed in cold storage during his early years in office before gaining an electoral mandate to move forward, thus placing the courts in the frontline of religious tensions. In particular, controversy revolves around the October 2013 kalimah Allah (use of the word Allah) decision, which involved the right of non-Muslims to practise their faith in their mother language.36 The January 2015 appeal on the case overturned the right of non-Muslims to use the word. Similar cases involving possession of Bibles, child custody and the right to change one’s own faith have also come to the courts, with decisions largely running against an expansion of religious freedom and an erosion of rights in the Federal Constitution. Rather than address this issue directly through compromise and engagement, Najib has left the courts to decide, undermining their credibility across Malaysians. Legislative measures to address problems arising from courts, such as unilateral conversion, have also failed to date. The challenges of Najib’s governance have most publicly played out through the 1MDB scandal. Revelations by the Wall Street Journal in July 2015 revealed that deposits reaching nearly $700 million had been deposited in the prime minister’s personal account. Subsequent reports and investigations extending to over six countries have shown that the funds have been spent on personal purchases, involve multiple jurisdictions and shell companies and embroil the sovereign fund in a series of questionable transactions.37 The amounts involved extend beyond $4 billion. Charges of corruption, embezzlement and mismanagement have emerged, with calls for Najib to resign. The loudest critic is former premier Dr. Mahathir. A wide range of institutions have been caught in the evolving scandal, from Bank Negara (Central Bank), the Attorney General’s office (as the former 36

Jaclyn Neo, ‘What’s in a Name? Malaysia’s ‘Allah’ Controversy and the Judicial Intertwining of Islam with Ethnic Identity’, Singapore: NUS Law Working Paper 2014/08, accessed 15 March 2016, http://law.nus.edu.sg/wps/pdfs/008_2014_Jaclyn_ Neo.pdf. 37 For background on documentation associated with 1MDB see: http://www. sarawakreport.org/.



Change without ‘Change’: Malaysia after GE 2013

33

AG Abdul Gani Patail was replaced), the Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission (MACC) and numerous government-linked companies. Funds from 1MDB were reportedly used for GE 2013, part of the large amount of funds that were used to shore up Najib’s electoral position through votebuying and influence peddling.38 Malaysia is now ranked among the most corrupt regimes in the world, with the scandal serving as a catalyst to reveal the poor quality of governance of Najib’s government.39 At the same time, the scandal has showcased how political institutions have been comprised for a leader’s political survival. VI. The Populist ‘Reform’ Najib’s pre-GE 2013 years were marked by attempts to portray himself as an economic reformer, to do the opposite of what has happened after his mandate, to showcase his leadership as sound management. He touted himself as an economic liberaliser, opening up the economy to greater competition, investment and restructuring. His pro-business liberalising policies were in response to repeated criticisms of Malaysia’s entrenched position in the middle income trap, a situation where incomes have not risen to a more developed status. His initiatives included the New Economic Programme (NEP) and Economic Transformation Programme (ETP). Najib’s actual liberalising reforms before GE 2013 were much more modest in scope, involving measures such as a relaxation of investment requirements. Many of the initiatives proposed did not get off the ground and were part and parcel of a carefully marketed packaging of himself as a reformer as opposed to actual reform. Where substantive reforms did occur was in fiscal allocations. His preGE 2013 tenure marked an expansion of populist cash transfer programmes directly tied to winning votes. His use of state resources to shore up political support was unprecedented. Before the election he spent an estimated RM58 billion (then US$20 billion) on politically targeted cash transfers, with the actual campaign spending estimated to exceed $1 billion.40 Cash hand38

Tom Wright and Bradley Hope, ‘The 1MDB and the Money Network of Malaysian Politics’, The Wall Street Journal, 28 December 2015, accessed 15 March 2016, http:// www.wsj.com/articles/the-money-network-of-malaysian-politics-1451355113. 39 Ian Bremmer, ‘These 5 Facts Explain the State of Global Corruption’, Time, 17 March 2016. 40 Bridget Welsh, ‘Buying support – Najib’s “commercialisation” of GE13’, Malaysiakini,

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Regime Resilience in Malaysia and Singapore

outs took the form of BR1M (a needs-based hand-out of RM500–1000 per recipient) and vouchers for schoolbooks and smart phones, among many others – many placed under Najib’s 1Malaysia banner. These initiatives using public funds to be ‘popular’ were seen as vote buying, with the process highly targeted and politicised. Along with government spending, there were other slush funds used to woo voters, including dinners, concerts and additional hand-outs, especially to the UMNO political base.41 The tainted 1MDB funds were part of this spending. GE 2013 became the most expensive campaign in Malaysian history. The impact of Najib’s high spending in GE 2013 is two-fold. The use of populist cash transfers in GE 2013 squarely intertwines budgetary issues with electoral politics, bringing Malaysia into a cycle of public electoral spending and goodies and subsequent fiscal recoveries. The link between the use of state finances and elections has played a role in electoral support for some time, but GE 2013 brought this to a new level, one that has fundamentally shifted how state resources were spent. This cyclical electoral spending will curtail alternative options for development strategies, ordinary governance and simultaneously connect public perceptions of elections with rewards rather than responsibilities. This dynamic will also curtail Malaysia’s leadership, tying it to cash transfer spending. Ironically, Najib himself will be hampered in his ability to diversify spending and change priorities as a result of his GE 2013 spending pattern of reforms. BR1M allocations are now part of the yearly budget. The second dimension involves the raising of additional cash through ventures like 1MDB. Traditionally, political parties relied on domestic funds for campaigning. Through 1MDB, funds were raised globally, outside of Malaysia. Moreover, rather than rely on private sector donations, funds were generated by holding office and forming a government-linked fund, with the incumbent using his office to stay in power and abusing his office to prevent a thorough transparent review of campaign spending and publicly-linked funds. This use of his office for campaign funds takes the use of public funds in elections to new heights. Beyond the negative governance effects of 1MDB, the large fiscal public

41

23 April 2013, accessed 15 March 2016, https://www.malaysiakini.com/news/227713. ‘Malaysia's PM hopes to survive most hotly contested elections’, The Guardian, 1 May 2013, accessed 15 March 2016, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/ may/01/malaysia-hotly-contested-elections.



Change without ‘Change’: Malaysia after GE 2013

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outlays of funds to win political support have placed strain on government finances. This is especially the case as Najib has continued BR1M outlays. Post-GE 2013, the Najib government was forced to make cutbacks in spending and increase revenues. The impact of cutbacks has been most evident in the decline in development expenditure, the area where Najib has reduced the most spending in his tenure. Unlike his father, Malaysia’s second premier Tun Abdul Razak Hussein, Najib has not opted to significantly focus on development beyond using hand-outs. The 11th Malaysia Plan announced in April 2015 was striking in its lack of a coherent development programme.42 Cutbacks have also affected service delivery, as government departments have had their budgets repeatedly slashed. The revenue position is perhaps where there are the most changes. To raise funds, in April 2015 the government introduced the Goods and Services Tax of 6 per cent on the public, a measure that has especially hurt the poor. With the sharp drop in oil prices from 2015, revenues have also dropped for the national oil company, Petronas (which provides over 40 per cent of national revenues). While the decline in prices has allowed the Najib government to cut subsidies on petrol, it has undermined the government’s revenue position, especially in light of the record high levels of the Najib administration’s debt. This country’s debt has been compounded by the need to make 1MDB payments. Unlike his predecessors, Najib is no longer in the same position to use pump-priming to stimulate the economy and woo political support. The choices Najib faces in terms of spending are difficult, especially given his promise of yet again further outlays around elections. He will increasingly be forced to turn to funds from outside Malaysia. This is exactly what has happened in 2016–17, as the Chinese government has provided liquidity, including funds to assist with the 1MDB payments. VII. New and Old Political Economy Alliances Najib’s governance also involves some fundamental shifts in alliances in the economy. What distinguishes Malaysia’s political economy is the large role 42 Government

of Malaysia, 11th Malaysia Plan, 2016–2020 (Kuala Lumpur: Government of Malaysia, 2015), accessed 15 March 2016, http://rmk11.epu.gov. my/index.php/en/. For a discussion of the plan, see Ramesh Chander and Bridget Welsh, ‘Malaysia’s 2020 Missed Opportunity’, New Mandala Inquirer, June 2015, accessed 15 March 2016, http://asiapacific.anu.edu.au/newmandala/wp-content/ uploads/2015/06/20150626-NMInquirer-June2015-11MP.pdf.

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of the state in the allocation, distribution and arbitration in the economy. Najib has transformed these areas as well. The first dimension was noted above, in the use of cash transfers. Not only has the use of populist cash transfers affected spending, it has redefined his relationship with citizens along class lines. One of the ironies of Najib’s populist spending is that it is the largest needs-based initiative not based on race, a trend not witnessed after his father’s tenure from 1969 onwards. Najib has consciously appealed to lower-class voters, especially those in rural areas, recognising BN’s decline in support among middle-class and urban voters. While ethnic divisions remain the paramount frame for understanding voting behaviour in Malaysia, GE 2013 also brought to the fore the salience of class divisions in voting patterns.43 Populist cash transfers/vote buying were buttressed by an intensification of BN mainstream media propaganda and advertising, more salient in remote areas of Malaysia and among the less educated. Even within urban constituencies, class dynamics were present, with middle-class support more inclined to the opposition and lower-class support less riskadverse and won over by the effectiveness of the BN campaign. Along with Najib’s pre-election appeal to the lower classes, his administration called in cards during GE 2013 from those who have benefited from state contracts and allocations. While voting patterns do suggest that non-aligned upper-class voters, especially professionals, are less inclined to support the incumbent government, those who get their income from the state remain more loyal. This resulted in BN holding onto the base of political support from the overwhelming majority of civil servants, for example. It also reflected in the unprecedented interventions by statelinked private sector – aka cronies – directly intervening in the GE 2013 campaign through sponsoring dinners and campaign spending. Reports point to organisations going as far as demanding their workers vote for BN.44 Broadly, this link between state-linked companies and BN underscores the deeply intertwined relationship between the incumbent government and domestic business interests within Malaysia. This relationship has become 43

Zurairi A., ‘Class, gender divide seen in GE13 voting trends, says Merdeka Center’, Yahoo! News Malaysia, 16 May 2013, accessed 15 March 2016, http://www.merdeka. org/media/276-160513.html. 44 See Azeem Ibrahim, ‘Election Fraud in Malaysia’, The Huffington Post, 7 May 2013, accessed 15 March 2016, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/azeem-ibrahim/malaysiaelection-fraud_b_3211954.html. Also interviews conducted after GE 2013.



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more apparent with the scandal revelations, such as 1MDB. This tie has been long-standing, having its roots in the privatisation exercises of the late 1980s. In GE 2013 the links were made explicit – you support me for your survival. He called in these loyalties for political support. Najib, however, supplemented this relationship with favoured domestic capitalists by portraying himself as pro-business, more generally. Arguably more than any premier in Malaysian history, Najib has emphasised that he is open to foreign capital and will provide a policy environment to attract capital. These are the dominant messages in his economic programmes developed by the well-paid consultancies in PEMANDU. From his proactive support for the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPPA) to his promise to reduce corporate taxes, Najib is a pro-business-friendly PM. It is not a coincidence that in the wake of GE 2013 Malaysia was ranked among the top twenty emerging economy countries as a good place to do business by the World Bank, as Najib’s government is seen to attract and accommodate business interests.45 It is also interesting to note that the World Bank has opened an office in Kuala Lumpur, and is a client of Najib’s government. These economic links with foreign capital reflect Najib’s understanding of how he believes he can promote growth in the economy. His right-wing economic approach – aka Thatcher- and Reagan-inspired – is based on a trickle-down conceptualisation of economic growth and a prioritisation of growth in the economy. His support for a less progressive tax such as the GST is illustrative. This pro-business orientation also reflects a political relationship, where an alliance between his government and foreign capital is tied to his political fortunes. In GE 2013 Najib used a well-honed tactic of portraying his leadership as necessary for economic success in the international arena. Pakatan Rakyat, in contrast, was portrayed as less effective for economic management and stability. Both domestically and internationally, Najib’s second political alliance was to tie himself to business, with his leadership crucial for their success. The nexus between control of Malaysia’s government and the economy is

45

World Bank press release, ‘World Bank Among Top 20 Best Economies and Frist Among Emerging East Asia Economies for East in Doing Business’, 28 October 2015, accessed 15 March 2016, http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/pressrelease/2015/10/28/malaysia-among-top-20-best-economies-and-first-amongemerging-east-asia-economies-for-ease-of-doing-business.

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Regime Resilience in Malaysia and Singapore

strong, with political power tied to economic power. While Najib’s alliances with lower classes and business interests seeking contracts, approvals and licences were well developed around GE 2013 there was another thread present in the alliance relationships – the need to accommodate those demanding more economic opportunities from the government–business nexus, especially within his own party UMNO. Throughout Najib’s campaign he kept many of those within his party demanding greater economic opportunities through contracts and capital allocations at bay by delaying decisions over bids and projects, promising results to UMNOlinked businessmen and UMNO members after GE 2013.46 For some deals, given the uncertainty of the election outcome, relationships were sealed by last-minute signing of contracts. The need to protect and provide for domestic capital interests involved a balancing of distribution, promises and negotiations. This delicate management of accommodating demands and selecting beneficiaries is a third dimension of Najib’s changing political economic relationships around GE 2013. Through the election Najib managed this dynamic well, keeping his political base united – a factor that was crucial to his electoral success. Post-GE 2013, the situation became more complicated. On the one hand, Najib needed to accommodate ‘old’ beneficiaries – many of whom are the very domestic capitalists whom he needed support from in the GE 2013 campaign. This involved appeasing the interests of those linked to former premiers, especially Dr. Mahathir. Many of these groups opposed a liberalisation of the economy, preferring greater protection and limited competition from foreign entrants. On the other hand, Najib was pressured to distribute benefits to a ‘new’ generation who expected to benefit from winning political power. This new group involves not only shoring up Najib and his allies’ support, but expanding the distribution to those who provided support in the GE 2013 campaign. The September 2013 introduction of the Bumiputera Economic Empowerment Programme (BEEP) – the promised allocation of RM30 billion of projects – reflects this balancing of satisfying demands from those expecting to feed off the government trough. BEEP extended other programmes focused on expanding contracts for Bumiputeras, such as the TERAS programme introduced in November

46

Confidential interviews conducted in KL, April–July 2013.



Change without ‘Change’: Malaysia after GE 2013

39

2012.47 The political impact of these programmes is to further deepen the business links between UMNO members/supporters and the government, to create a larger cadre of loyal supporters for Najib whose premiership in the economy has been driven by his goal of winning allies. This use of funds to maintain support inside his party expanded further after the 2015 1MDB scandal. Post-GE 2013, the challenge for Najib has been to maintain his alliances – lower classes, domestic state-linked capital, foreign investors and both ‘old’ and ‘new’ UMNO state-linked beneficiaries. The interests of these groups are not the same, and in many ways conflicting. For example, liberalising Malaysia’s economy will negatively affect his relations with the lower classes – through the reduction of subsidies, for example – and ‘old’ UMNO business groups, who prefer a more closed, less competitive economy. Yet, as the same time, a failure to open and liberalise the economy will decrease potential investment and much-needed capital to promote growth. Najib has had to make stark choices as he navigates his efforts to win political support by using his control of the state’s high level of involvement in the economy. From 2015, three important developments indicate the choices Najib is making. First of all, he is opting to further liberalise the economy. The most obvious indication of this is the support for the TPPA agreement, approved by Parliament in January 2016. This agreement would have increased competition and reduced government procurement. President Donald Trump’s withdrawal of the US from the deal has made the agreement defunct, as least for now. Nevertheless, Najib’s intention to liberalise the economy is clear. In this liberalisation process, Najib has consciously moved away from ‘old UMNO’ allies and companies, especially as the split with Mahathir has deepened. Second, in Thatcherite fashion he has opted to continue a pattern of passing the burden onto ordinary citizens, with the introduction of GST and other cost hikes for services, such as tolls, illustrative. Finally, he has deepened his links with the UMNO-linked elite to stay in office. Ironically, the 1MDB scandal revealed that funds were given to UMNO leaders, and it is because of this scandal that the funds to party-linked elites to maintain their support continue to flow. Through GE 2013 Najib aimed to please everyone in his alliances, but in the post-election 47 See

http://etp.pemandu.gov.my/16_November_2012-@-TERAS_Programme.aspx, accessed 15 March 2016.

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Regime Resilience in Malaysia and Singapore

context he has made choices that reveal how he plays his hand. Ironically, the choices are contradictory, as liberalisation does not go hand-in-hand with expanding political patronage. At the same time, the choices provoke responses as they have led to increased opposition to his leadership while at the same time codified a core of loyalists around him.

Societal Shifts and Sentiments VIII. From Formal to Informal Politics Changes after GE 2013 are also taking place within society at large. After the 12th general election of March 2008, politics increasingly moved outside of the traditional electoral arena to exposés and protests. Malaysians have joined civil society and local organisations more frequently, while membership in political parties has declined. The ABS 2014 survey shows that the share joining political parties has declined from 34 per cent in 2011 to 27 per cent in 2014, with civil society expanding as over 50 per cent now join organisations, and 15 per cent now participate in protests.48 Politics has now extended to the everyday, with high levels of contestation in Malaysia’s two-party system, and regular clashes in the media and cyberspace. GE 2013 has acted as a catalyst to accentuate this trend. A key reason has to do with how the elections were conducted and the unfairness of the outcome. Many are losing faith in the electoral process and, to a lesser extent, political parties themselves. While GE 2013 represented the pinnacle of political participation in Malaysian elections, with turnout reaching 80 per cent, ironically it also marked a turning point in the confidence of the election results to reflect the people’s will. GE 2013 was couched by the opposition as the opportunity to change the government, and it failed. The sense of disappointment for opposition supporters, the majority of the population, remains palpable, even years later. Many Malaysians see the playing field as not only being skewed, but redesigned with new sets of rules. They look to the post-election redelineation exercise with suspicion. Others are less inclined to blame the system, but the opposition itself, especially the underperformers within Pakatan Rakyat. The 48

Bridget Welsh and Tan Seng Keat, Embracing Democracy in Malaysia? The Findings of the Asian Barometer Survey, 2006–2014 (Petaling Jaya: SIRD Publications, 2018). Forthcoming.



Change without ‘Change’: Malaysia after GE 2013

41

latter has been accentuated by the break-up of the opposition alliance of GE 2013. Cynicism with formal politics is deepening. Part of the move from formal to informal politics has to do with the dynamics within political parties. In BN, the focus on grassroots has ebbed, in part due to the change in the nature of campaigning outside of the traditional party machinery.49 More of UMNO’s citizen base, for example, are cut off from the party, turning to government-linked civil society organisations in their political activities and for their patronage. The 1MDB scandal has also widened the divide between the party elites and grassroots. The opposition post-GE 2013 is similarly not focused on building its machinery or societal links, and a national agenda. Political parties appear out of touch with the people, locked in a one-upmanship political battle with each other, losing ground with ordinary people and their needs. The practice has been to engage in attack salvos against each other or, in some cases, internally. The intensity of attacks has increased post-GE 2013, nastier, and more destructive. Beyond the increased aggression in politics, infighting within political parties across the political spectrum feeds this mode of political engagement, a mode seen as disengaged from the needs of citizens. These practices are turning off voters who see political parties as interested only in power rather than serving the people, as indicated by declining membership. This is contributing to more moves away from formal electoral politics, with those interested in governance change taking power into their own hands rather than investing in electoral politics. IX. From Loyalty to Exit: One dimension of this move away from formal politics is increasingly more Malaysians are turning away from politics altogether. More citizens are expressing disgust with politics, and disgruntlement with their leaders. This is perhaps most evident in social media, but it is also reflected in other public arenas. The intense political competition surrounding GE 2013 has had the effect of diminishing faith in the country’s leaders. The attacks on leaders across the political spectrum have had an impact, damaging leaders as a whole. Malaysian politics appears more vested in bringing people down than 49

Bridget Welsh, ‘A Weaker UMNO: Crisis, Connectivity and Reform’ in The End of UMNO? Essays on Malaysia’s Dominant Party, ed. Bridget Welsh (Petaling Jaya: SIRD Publications, 2016).

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in working towards solutions for better governance. More Malaysians believe that politics is the bastion of greed and lies, rather than public service and honesty. The moral decay of Malaysian politics, fed by repeated scandals – sometimes fabricated – and paid hatchet men cybertrooper attackers, is moving citizens away from the political arena altogether.50 This alienation leading to apathy and disengagement is accentuated by a lack of faith in the opposition as well, as more often voters view Pakatan as increasingly replicating the pattern set by BN, especially Pakatan in government. The scandal over the house purchase by Penang Chief Minister Lim Guan Eng is illustrative.51 Some Malaysians have moved beyond apathy and disengagement to exit. This option can take three forms – the first is through leaving the country. Exit visa applications post-GE 2013 to places such as Australia, Singapore and New Zealand have increased in number.52 Malaysians have left the country since 1970, and the brain drain remains a serious challenge.53 Post-GE 2013 there is a political drain fed by lack of hope within the country for ‘change’.54 This is more pronounced among middle- and upper middle-class Malaysians who have the skills and resources to go abroad. For others, another exit option looms, including the Islamic State.55 Among those who lack faith in elections to achieve their hopes of a better Malaysia, they are wooed by more extreme alternatives. When an electoral system is so blatantly unfair, this delegitimises electoral politics, contributing to frustration, anger and disengagement. GE 2013 and the refusal to address deep-seated flaws in the system have encouraged more ‘exit’ of another kind, potentially even more destructive. 50

51 52

53

54 55

See Ross Tapsell’s essay in this collection. ‘Lim Guan Eng and what we know of his house purchase’, Malaysiakini, 23 March 2016, accessed 11 April 2016, https://www.malaysiakini.com/news/334863. Ong Kian Ming, ‘7828 Individuals Who Won’t be Spending Chinese New Year as Malaysians’, 5 February 2016, accessed 11 April 2016, http://ongkianming. com/2016/02/05/article-7828-individuals-who-wont-be-spending-chinese-newyear-this-year-as-malaysians/. Malaysia Economic Monitor: Brain Drain (Bangkok: World Bank, April 2011), accessed 15 March 2016, http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/ WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2011/05/02/000356161_20110502023920/ Rendered/PDF/614830WP0malay10Box358348B01PUBLIC1.pdf. Interviews with former Malaysian citizens, Singapore and Australia, 2016. Greg Fealy and John Funston, Indonesian and Malaysian Support for the Islamic State (USAID Report, January 2016), accessed 15 March 2016, http://www.globalsecurity. org/military/library/report/2016/PBAAD863.pdf.



Change without ‘Change’: Malaysia after GE 2013

43

More generally, the exit option is a product of the rise of the right in Malaysia, greater conservatism and political intolerance. This is a global phenomenon, but in Malaysia the right is controlling the political narrative as more people are exiting from democracy. The right involves not only religious conservatism, but is tied to exclusionary ideas of Malay nationalism. Liberal ideas are not to be tolerated, as they are seen as threatening. Najib’s administration has fanned this exclusionary politics to shore up his position, but it is buttressed by a combination of political and economic insecurities as well as an unchecked ultra-conservative religious bureaucracy. These exit options reflect an increasing unchecked anger in Malaysia, within society and with the system itself. GE 2013 was a campaign that mobilised anger on both sides of the political divide. While the opposition aimed to promise a different future, they used negative campaigning as part of their electoral arsenal, capitalising on disdain with corruption and fears of exclusion. UMNO similarly tapped into anger in mobilising its base using fear, anxiety and hyped-up threats over losses of political and economic power to their advantage. Their mobilisation effort included the activation of thugs and paramilitary citizen groups, who remain active post-GE 2013. The anger in politics continues to simmer, reactivated with attacks in the political arena, frustrations and insecurities. The Himpunan Rakyat Bersatu is a good example of the mobilisation of negativity. Anger represents a psychological exit from the multi-ethnic tolerant fabric of Malaysia. Exit – from apathy and disengagement and departure and extremism to the psychological abandonment of the idea of Malaysia – has grown. X. The Divided Silent Nationalists Amidst these negative sentiments after GE 2013 there remains a silent majority of Malaysians who are deeply frustrated with the evolution of the political environment, who bemoan the intolerance and worry over the country’s direction. Despite the on-going changes, they remain resigned and committed to strengthening the country, to improving governance and deepening citizenship. This group of Malaysian nationalists remains the silent majority. Malaysians are very proud of their country, as shown in the 2014 ABS findings with over 85 per cent recording pride in their country.56 56

Bridget Welsh and Tan Seng Keat, Embracing Democracy in Malaysia? The Findings

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Regime Resilience in Malaysia and Singapore

They are not the participants who move into informal politics as activists, nor are they those opting for exit. Instead, they are the citizens who hold onto hope with a devout love of their country despite the difficulties of the period in the wake of GE 2013, Malaysian loyalists. They are not a unified group, as they fall across the political spectrum supporting both BN and Pakatan. One pole envisions a return to strongman leadership, a Mahathir-like era. This authoritarian nostalgia runs deep for those uncomfortable with the current confrontational style of politics, apparent lack of decisive leadership not evident in Najib’s woo-all support, and unease with greater economic liberalisation. On the other side, there are citizens who want even more openness, decentralisation of authority and people’s empowerment, with particular attention to economic inequalities and multi-ethnic tolerance. Both poles expect more from politicians, although their expectations vary. These poles represent very different views of Malaysia’s future, but they are united in a commitment to a stronger nation, a future where the country and its citizens and governance are stronger and better, respectively. They look for glimmers of hope in the political landscape, often seeing these glimmers quite differently but through a common Malaysian nationalist purpose. GE 2013 short term may have revealed the polarisation in the political landscape, but it reinforces a shared commitment to the country. Forces and leaders that divide the country rather than bring it together are increasingly rejected by the silent nationalist majority. If anything, this nationalistic core is perhaps the most permanent non-changing element surrounding GE 2013. They are not dominating the national narrative, however.

Concluding Reflections Over the last decade Malaysia has experienced considerable attention to its problems, but few credible options for its solutions. Whether Malaysia’s leaders move toward better governance and representation will be the key test ahead. Post-GE 2013, the battles over reform in the post-Mahathir era persist, and have yet to offer clear forward-looking alternatives. For now, the UMNO-dominant regime remains resilient.

of the Asian Barometer Survey, 2006–2014 (Petaling Jaya: SIRD Publications, 2018). Forthcoming.



Change without ‘Change’: Malaysia after GE 2013

45

The changes within political coalitions, for governance and in society suggest difficult times ahead for democracy in Malaysia. The country’s history has shown that democratic change is not a linear process. Increasingly the forces of democratisation are likely to come from below, rather than the top; from the people rather than leaders. Leaders, however, will have an important role to play. Both sides of the political divide, BN and Pakatan (including PAS), will need to engage in substantive retrospection and reform in order to meet the rising expectations of Malaysians. With the focus on reacting to on-going political contestation and weakening political institutions, this is challenging. The trends suggest that on all fronts the burden on leaders to perform and go beyond personal interest will increase. Despite the election result returning the BN coalition to power, changes are on-going and will likely continue, as Malaysian politics remain fluid and in this fluidity the aspirations of Malaysians remain alive.

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Change and Elections

47

Chapter 3

Change and Elections: 1969 and 2013 Similarities John Funston

Malaysia’s first nation-wide election, begun in 1969, and its most recent, on 5 May 2013, have many things in common. Similar government and opposition parties battled each other. The geographical distribution of support for the two sides was much the same. And in both elections the ruling party lost the popular vote, and failed to gain a two-thirds majority. These similarities notwithstanding, the outcomes were substantially different. The ruling party did much better in 1969 than in 2013. While the 1969 election result was a surprise, the 2013 election result was not. The majority of Malaysians consciously decided to reject the ruling National Front (Barisan Nasional), despite its domination of the key determinants of elections – the ‘3Ms’ of money, media and machinery. The government still won a comfortable parliamentary majority, demonstrating its resilience. However, as popular support erodes it may in the future need to assert the powers of incumbency even more forcefully to retain power.

First Nation-wide Election In 1969 Malaysia was ruled by the Alliance, a coalition of ethnically based parties of which the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) was the largest. UMNO’s main allies on the peninsula were the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) and the Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC). The broader Alliance also had a presence in East Malaysia, but it did not at that stage include any of the peninsula Alliance members and, in circumstances where most parties had only been established around the 1963 formation of Malaysia, party structures were fluid. In Sarawak,

47

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Regime Resilience in Malaysia and Singapore

Alliance members included the Malay-based Parti Bumiputra, the Sarawak Chinese Association, and the small Iban-based PESAKA (Party Pesaka Anak Sarawak); Sabah members were the Malay-based United Sabah National Organisation (USNO) and the Sabah Chinese Association. Opposing the Alliance on the peninsula were the predominantly Chinese Democratic Action Party (DAP), the Malay Pan Malayan Islamic Party (Persatuan Islam Se-Tanah Melayu, PAS),1 the multi-ethnic Gerakan (Parti Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia), and the Perak-based Indian-led, but predominantly Chinesesupported, People’s Progressive Party (PPP). Opposition parties in Sarawak were the Iban-based Sarawak National Party (SNAP) and the Chinese-based Sarawak United People’s Party (SUPP) – though immediately after the election SUPP agreed to cooperate with the Alliance. Analysing the 1969 election is complicated by the fact that with the outbreak of communal violence in Kuala Lumpur on 13 May, elections were suspended two days later. The election could not be completed in Sabah and Sarawak, and the Melaka Selatan constituency in Malacca, until more than a year later. In addition, most accounts of the election confuse membership of the Alliance, and so give a misleading impression of the results.2

1

PAS changed in 1973 to Parti Islam Se-Malaysia (Pan Malaysian Islamic Party) but with the acronym retained. 2 A frequently cited source on the 1969 election outcome is Kevin Y.L. Tan, ‘Malaysia’, in Elections in Asia and the Pacific, A Data Handbook. Vol II, South East Asia, East Asia and the South Pacific, eds. Dieter Nohlen, Florian Grotz and Christof Harmann (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001). This states that the Alliance won 77 seats, a figure said to include 3 seats won by the Sabah Chinese Association in Sabah (p. 174, table 2.8). In fact, in addition to these 3 seats 77 is the sum of 67 on the peninsula and 7 in Sarawak (Bumiputra 5, Sarawak Chinese Association 2). However, this neglects to include the United Sabah National Organisation (USNO) which obtained 13 seats, and PESAKA in Sarawak with 2. Wikipedia also accepts the figure of 77 seats, but strangely reaches this by awarding 51 seats to UMNO and 13 each to MCA and MIC. (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Malaysian_general_election,_1969.) Elections in Malaysia, A Handbook of Facts and Figures on the Elections 1955–1986, by the NSTP Research and Information Services, Kuala Lumpur, 1990, does not include USNO, the Sabah Chinese Association or PESAKA in the Alliance (see p. 52). The official Election Commission’s Report on the Parliamentary (Dewan Ra’ayat) and State Legislative Assembly General Elections 1969 of the States of Malaya, Sabah and Sarawak, Kuala Lumpur, 1972, does not include PESAKA in the Alliance. I also neglected to include PESAKA in John Funston (ed.), Government and Politics in Southeast Asia (Singapore: ISEAS Singapore and London: Zedbooks, 2001), p. 182, table 5.1. Another recent mistake is the claim by former Prime Minister Mahathir



Change and Elections

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Following the 10 May voting on the peninsula the Alliance emerged with 66 of 103 seats (64.1 per cent), and had 48.4 per cent of the popular vote. UMNO won 51 of 67 contested seats, MCA 13 of 33 (a sharp fall from 27 of 33 in the previous election) and MIC 2 of 3. Opposition parties won 37 seats – DAP 13, PAS 12, Gerakan 8, and PPP 4. Alliance strength was particularly located in Johor where it won all 16 seats, Pahang (all 6 seats) and Kedah (9 of 12 seats); in more urban areas, and the PAS heartland of Kelantan, the opposition performed strongly. (Further details in Appendix 1 and Table 1.) Table 1. Parliamentary Seats 1969 vs 2013 Alliance/BN 1969

Opposition

2013

1969

2013

Perlis

2

3

Kedah

9

10

3

5

Kelantan

4

5

6

9

Terengganu

4

4

2

4

Penang

2

3

6

10

Perak

9

12

11

12

Pahang

6

10

Selangor

9

5

K.L. Fed Territory

2

Putrajaya F.T.

1

Negeri Sembilan

3

4 5

17 9

5

3 1

3

Malacca

3

4

Johor

16

21

Sabah

16

22

Sarawak

9

25

15

6

Total

92

133

52

89

Labuan F.T.

2 5

1 3

In the contest for state assemblies the opposition won or provided a strong contest in five states. PAS won in Kelantan, with 22 compared to

Mohamad that the Alliance won only 74 seats. See entry in his blog Chedet – Tun Dr Mahathir, ‘Multiracial Malaysia’, 6 January 2014, accessed 15 April 2016, http:// chedet.cc/?p=1178.

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UMNO’s 8 seats. Gerakan won in Penang with 16 seats while DAP won four and UMNO four. Opposition parties won 21 seats in total in Perak (PPP 12, DAP 6, Gerakan 2, and PAS one), while the Alliance won 19 (UMNO 18 and MCA one). In Selangor each side won 14 seats, DAP 9, Gerakan 4 and one to an independent candidate; for the Alliance UMNO won 12 seats while MCA and MIC each won one. In Terengganu, UMNO narrowly defeated PAS, winning 13 of 24 seats. But these statistics do not accurately reflect Alliance support. First, they do not include the Melaka Selatan constituency, where voting was suspended when a candidate died just before election day. The Alliance (UMNO) won with a comfortable majority of 9,287 in January 1971, increasing peninsular support to 48.6 per cent. More importantly, the Alliance won 9 seats without contest. In the 1964 election the Alliance had large majorities in virtually all these constituencies, meaning that, had they been contested, the average would certainly have exceeded 50 per cent. By winning 64 per cent of peninsular seats, the Alliance fell just short of a two-thirds majority. Nonetheless, at the time voting for Sabah and Sarawak was suspended on 15 May, the Alliance had also won 10 seats in Sabah uncontested – meaning that of the 113 seats concluded at this time the Alliance had indeed won a two-thirds majority (67 per cent). Whether or not this majority could be maintained depended entirely on results in remaining electorates once voting resumed. Polling in Sabah was from 21–27 June 1970, and in Sarawak from 6 June till 4 July. The Alliance won all 16 seats in Sabah (11 uncontested), but only 9 of 24 seats in Sarawak. The final Alliance tally after the Melaka Selatan election in January 1971 was 92 of 144 seats (64 per cent). However, for some time before the election Alliance leaders had been negotiating with SUPP to establish a coalition at state and federal levels. Formal agreement was reached just three days after voting ended.3 The five SUPP parliamentarians gave the government 66.6 per cent of the seats, and the coveted two-thirds majority (subsequently increased by one seat – to 67.4 per cent – after the Melaka Selatan by-election). In terms of the popular vote, Alliance strength in East Malaysian states was again not accurately reflected because it won 11 of 16 seats without 3

Michael B Leigh, The Rising Moon: Political Change in Sarawak (Sydney: Sydney University Press, 1974), p. 144.



Change and Elections

51

contest in Sabah. Indeed, the Alliance won only 40.4 per cent of the popular vote in Sabah and Sarawak, though the addition of SUPP lifted that to 66 per cent. Combining the popular vote for the whole country, the Alliance won 47.6 per cent, while opposition parties and one independent won 52.4 per cent. But if SUPP is added to the Alliance vote it did indeed gain a majority of 50.63 per cent. Again, however, the fact that 20 seats were won uncontested by the Alliance means that popular support for the coalition was considerably higher than these figures indicate.

Elections, May 13 and Political Change What role did the elections play in the tragic racial riots that began on 13 May 1969? Perhaps the first point that should be made is that it was not – as sometimes implied – government failure to secure a two-thirds majority that was responsible. As noted, at the time the riots began the ruling party did have such a majority in the 113 seats decided, though the final outcome awaited further polling. But the elections did contribute in other ways. Communal tensions were heightened during the campaign period, building on pressures developed in the previous years, particularly during the period of Singapore’s membership in the federation. When results for the peninsula were announced Alliance members were concerned, while opposition parties were delighted, particularly with results for the state assemblies in Selangor and Perak. Opposition parties held celebratory marches in Kuala Lumpur. These were seen as provocative by UMNO, which organised its own counterdemonstration that quickly got out of hand. Internal party conflicts also played a part. A younger faction within UMNO was convinced that Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman’s conciliatory policies towards non-Malays were at the heart of Alliance setbacks, and organised to change UMNO’s course – though whether this was pursued opportunistically or through planned violence remains contested.4 May 13 was a watershed in Malaysia’s political development. Above all else, it led to a reorganisation of the state in a way that was more Malay and UMNO oriented, corporatist, and less democratic. Among the changes: 4

Philip Bowring, ‘Digging up Malaysia’s Racial Past’, Asia Sentinel, 17 May 2007, accessed 9 July 2015, http://www.asiasentinel.com/politics/digging-up-malaysiasracial-past/.

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Regime Resilience in Malaysia and Singapore

• Government leaders declared that Malays, through UMNO, were the teras (foundation) of politics in Malaysia. All key decisions had to be decided by it, and the bureaucracy had to implement UMNO’s wishes. One example of particular relevance to future elections was greater control over the supposedly independent Election Commission. Former EC head, Tan Sri Abdul Rashid Abdul Rahman, who presided over the last three electoral redistributions, declared that his actions had ensured that Malays remained in power – though he claimed it was done in ‘a proper way. Not illegally.’5 • To enhance UMNO influence over coalition partners, and reduce politicking, UMNO sought alliances with former adversaries. On 1 June 1974 the National Front (Barisan Nasional, BN) was established, comprising existing Alliance members on the peninsula and East Malaysia, plus PAS, Gerakan, PPP, and SUPP.6 The coalition with PAS broke down when PAS internal divisions forced its exit from BN in November 1977, but the others have been sustained. BN subsequently expanded its influence in Sarawak by absorbing SNAP and, after it was deregistered in 2002, the Sarawak Progressive Democratic Party (SPDP) and the Sarawak Peoples’ Party (PRS). In Sabah BN was strengthened by the move there of UMNO in 1991 (replacing USNO) and, after turbulent years, incorporation of the Kadazan-based United Sabah Party (PBS) and the United Pasokmomogun KadazandusunMurut Organisation (UPKO). •

5

UMNO strengthened its control over the media, adding to its takeover of the major Malay paper Utusan Melayu in 1961 by purchasing the rival Berita Harian, and from the same stable the major English paper the Straits Times (rebranded as the New Straits Times) in 1972. At the same time, UMNO ensured that government-dominated radio and television services were mobilised for party purposes.

Muzliza Mustafa, ‘Ex-EC chief joins Perkasa, says goal is to help Malays retain power’, The Malaysian Insider, 15 November 2013, accessed 25 November 2013, http://www.themalaysianinsider.com/malaysia/article/former-ec-chief-joinsperkasa-says-goal-is-to-help-malays-retain-power. 6 Diane K. Mauzy, Barisan Nasional: Coalition Government in Malaysia (Kuala Lumpur: Marican & Sons, 1983), p. 77.



Change and Elections

53

•

UMNO also moved to strengthen its position by participating directly in other business activities, taking over or establishing many of Malaysia’s major corporate players.

•

Several changes promoted Malay economic interests (notably the New Economic Policy), and enhanced support for Malay education, culture and Islam.

•

Democratic practice was severely curtailed, with all politics disallowed for several months when a National Operations Council ruled by decree, then re-introduced in a limited form.

• In a bid to ensure future government dominance over Selangor, the capital Kuala Lumpur (predominantly non-Malay) was made a separate federal territory. These changes, aided generally by rapid economic growth, put BN and UMNO in a strong position to dominate future elections. This it largely did for many years, until the economic crisis in 1997, and the shocking sacking, detention and humiliation of Deputy Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim in 1998, interrupted this trend. These events gave rise to the Reformasi movement, a popular movement that opposed increasing restrictions on democracy, widespread corruption, and disregard of human rights and the rule of law. Reformasi paved the way for cooperation between PAS, DAP and the new multi-racial Keadilan (Justice, later People’s Justice Party, PKR) as the Barisan Alternatif (Alternative Front, BA) for the election in November 1999 – the first time the governing party faced an opposition coalition campaigning on a common platform. The result was a strong win for BN (148 of 193 seats) thanks to non-Malay support, but a great setback for UMNO. Its parliamentary seats declined from 94 to 72. PAS was the main beneficiary, tripling its representation to 27 seats, becoming leader of the parliamentary opposition, and scoring massive majorities in Kelantan and Terengganu state assemblies. Keadilan gained 5 seats and some 12 per cent of the vote. Around half the Malay vote went to the opposition – indeed,

54

Regime Resilience in Malaysia and Singapore

some UMNO leaders put the party’s share at less than 40 per cent.7 After 1999 developments in both the opposition and government sides moved in the government’s favour. The opposition coalition fell apart as DAP and PAS split over PAS’s efforts to pursue a more Islamist agenda. The eventual retirement of Dr Mahathir in favour of the more popular Abdullah Badawi, and Abdullah’s promise to pursue a reformist policy similar to that of the opposition, were widely welcomed. In the 2004 election BN won 64 per cent of the votes and 91 per cent of all parliamentary seats. PAS just managed to hang on in Kelantan, but lost Terengganu and won only six parliamentary seats, while Keadilan retained a single seat. However, UMNO’s gains were short-lived. When Abdullah failed to advance his reform agenda, the opposition ‘tsunami’ in the March 2008 election reversed the gains of 2004. Organised in an informal coalition – DAP, PAS and Keadilan agreed to avoid electoral contests, and jointly signed a manifesto, the ‘People’s Declaration’ – the opposition won 82 of 222 seats, leaving the government with 140 parliamentary seats, short of a two-thirds majority. The opposition also won power in five states (Kelantan, Kedah, Penang, Selangor and Perak – although it soon lost the latter when three PR assemblymen changed sides). Opposition parties formalised their coalition as the People’s Front (Pakatan Rakyat, PR) three weeks after the election, on 1 April. As the election loomed in 2013, speculation focused on whether PR would be able to sustain its gains, or even oust BN from power. Both represented a substantial challenge, as hitherto elections in which opposition parties had performed well were always followed by a substantial swing back to the ruling party. New Prime Minister Datuk Seri Najib Tun Razak was also a formidable protagonist. Seeking to appeal to all, he wooed non-Malays with his ‘1Malaysia’ slogan and promises of a moderate Islam, appealed to the Reformasi generation by withdrawing several repressive laws including the Internal Security Act (though new laws were sometimes as restrictive), played to Malay insecurities by aligning with extremist groups such as Perkasa, and made extensive use of the mainstream media and government machinery for handouts and maximising opportunities for the BN.

7

Datuk Azmi Khalid, Minister for Rural Development Reported in ‘Ku Li diminta pegang hasrat asal kembali ke Umno’, Berita Harian, 13 March 2000.



Change and Elections

55

2013 Election – Opposition Makes Incremental Gains The opposition did even better in 2013 than it had in 2008, though the first past the post voting system, and weighting given to both rural seats and Borneo states, did not see this accurately reflected in the results. As shown in Appendix 2, BN won 133 of the 222 parliamentary seats (60 per cent), and the opposition 89 (40 per cent). On the peninsula the figures were 85 to 80 (the same as 2008), while for Sabah and Sarawak (and the federal territory of Labuan) 48 to 9. UMNO improved its performance, increasing its seats from 79 to 88 (73 on the peninsula and 15 in Sabah/Labuan), winning back the state assembly in Kedah and narrowly maintaining power in Perak. MCA was the big loser, declining from 15 seats to 7, MIC went from 3 to 4, Gerakan from 2 to 1, and other coalition members in Sabah and Sarawak 34. For the opposition PR, DAP increased its seats from 28 to 38, while Keadilan declined from 31 to 30 and PAS 23 to 21. (Further details in Appendix 2 and Table 1.) Particularly notable in this result was that, although the opposition made small inroads, BN still prevailed overwhelmingly in the so-called ‘fixed deposit’ states, winning 21 of 26 in Johor, 23 of 26 in Sabah/Labuan, and 25 of 31 in Sarawak – a total of 69 from its 133 seats. Other particular areas of strength were Pahang (10 of 14) and Kedah (10 of 15). Elsewhere, the opposition swept all before it in Selangor and the Kuala Lumpur Federal Territory, and performed strongly in other more urbanised states and the PAS heartland of Kelantan and neighbouring Terengganu. For state assemblies the picture also looked similar to 1969, with the opposition performing strongly in the same five states. It retained power in Kelantan, Penang and Selangor, and lost narrowly in Terengganu and Perak – despite polling better in Perak than it had in 2008 when it won the state (before losing power when three members defected).8 As for the popular vote, for Malaysia as a whole BN won 47.4 per cent,

8

In 2008 BN obtained 46.1 per cent, and PR 51.1 per cent, with BN gaining 28 assembly seats and PR 31; in 2013 BN gained 45.25 per cent of the votes, against PR’s 54.75 per cent, and won 31 seats against 18 for DAP and 5 each for PAS and PKR. Other results were: in Kelantan PAS won 32 seats and PKR one, against 12 for UMNO; Penang, DAP won 19 seats, PKR 10, PAS one, and BN 10; Selangor, both PAS and DAP won 15 seats, PKR 14, and BN 12; Terengganu, BN 17, while PAS won 14 and PKR one.

56

Regime Resilience in Malaysia and Singapore

down from 50.9 in 2008. Indeed, the difference was greater than apparent because BN won 8 seats uncontested in 2008. PR won 50.9 per cent, a three per cent increase on its 47.9 per cent in 2008. Keadilan won 20.5 per cent, up from 18.93 per cent, DAP went from 13.59 per cent to 15.7 per cent, while PAS declined marginally from 15.40 per cent to 14.67 per cent. On the peninsula the figures were BN 45.8 per cent to PR 53.3 per cent (compared to 49.1 per cent and 50.5 per cent in 2008), while in Sabah and Sarawak BN won 60.9 per cent and PR 39.1 per cent.

1969 and 2013 Compared With the changes introduced after May 13, and the pendulum expected to swing back to the government following setbacks in 2008, few anticipated 2013 election results would resemble those of 1969. But in many respects they did. First, as most often observed, in both cases the ruling party lost its twothirds parliamentary majority and the popular vote. Second, the political parties contesting in 2013 closely resembled those of 1969. BN was similar to the Alliance of old, and PAS and DAP were still important members of the opposition. While Gerakan and PPP had all but disappeared, the multi-racial PKR closely resembled Gerakan in 1969, before Gerakan shifted towards representing more specific Chinese interests. Third, the distribution of support for the government and opposition parties was very similar. The key areas of support for BN were the ‘fixed deposit’ states of Johor, Sabah/Labuan and Sarawak, together with Kedah and Pahang. The opposition was strong in Kelantan, Terengganu, Penang, Selangor, and Perak, though in both cases at the state assembly level BN narrowly prevailed in Terengganu and Perak. Finally, Malays and other indigenous groups in Sabah and Sarawak were crucial in ensuring victory for the ruling party. Chinese voters provided strong support to the opposition, with MCA losing half of its seats in each election, leading to an initial decision in both cases to withdraw from the Cabinet. But besides these continuities, some striking differences are also apparent. In 1969 the Alliance failed to secure a two-thirds majority and won a majority of the popular vote only in a narrow statistical sense. At the time voting was suspended the Alliance did have a two-thirds majority, and



Change and Elections

57

fell short of this by less than 3 per cent once voting in Sabah and Sarawak was concluded. Further, three days later it reached this figure by forming an alliance with SUPP. In 2013 BN fell short by nearly 7 per cent. The Alliance also received greater support in terms of the popular vote. On the peninsula in 1969 the party won 48.6 per cent, but only 45.8 per cent in 2013 and, as noted, the 1969 figure was artificially low because 9 peninsula seats were won by the Alliance without contest. For the country as a whole, the Alliance vote was 46.3 per cent (or 49.3 per cent if SUPP is added). And, as noted, with 20 seats uncontested the real support was much higher. In 2013 BN won only 47.4 per cent . The opposition, by comparison, had its best electoral result ever. While opposition parties and one independent may have won a majority of the popular vote in 1969, they were not a united opposition. The 2013 election was the first time a united opposition won a majority of the popular vote, and it was also the first time ever that opposition parties won 40 per cent of parliamentary seats. For Malaysia’s party system, the most important change was that the opposition contested as a united coalition, establishing an embryonic two-party system. That remains fragile, but this is the first occasion that an opposition coalition has remained united over two successive elections. BN also differed from the Alliance in two important respects. Because of the post-1969 changes UMNO assumed a much more dominant role in the coalition than it had in the Alliance. UMNO parliamentary success has also contributed to this – 51 of 92 Alliance seats in 1969 compared to 88 of 133 BN seats in 2013. And secondly, BN was strengthened by UMNO’s move to Sabah and its incorporation of all major local parties in Sabah and Sarawak, bringing these states more firmly into the governing orbit. Notwithstanding similarities in the geographical distribution of party support, the opposition made significant gains in urban areas, particularly around Selangor, Kuala Lumpur and Penang. Incremental gains were also been made in areas such as Pahang and the ‘fixed deposit’ states. A further change has been the ability of PAS to gain support in more urbanised areas. In Selangor, for example, PAS had little support until recent years, and in 2013 won 15 of the 56 state assembly seats. Finally, Malay and other indigenous support was critical to BN success, but less so than in 1969. Some have talked up UMNO’s success in this

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election – at times in ways that were quite incorrect9 – but, although its seats increased from 79 in 2008 to 88, its popular vote remained unchanged (29.33 per cent in 2008 and 29.32 per cent in 2013). Since UMNO did not have a presence in Sabah in 1969, the comparison can only be made with results on the peninsula. In 1969 UMNO won 52 of 104 seats (50 per cent); in 2013 it won 73 of 165 seats (44 per cent). Overall it is striking that in spite of enormous advantages – dominance of the traditional determinants of electoral success, money, machinery and the media – BN’s performance was not as impressive as that of its Alliance predecessor in the 1969 election. The opposition, by contrast, had its best result ever, and has strengthened claims to represent a credible alternative government.

Prospects for the next general election The 2013 election has placed the opposition within striking distance at the next general election, due in 2018. If parliamentary constituencies remain much the same as they were in 2013, a swing of 5–6 per cent would defeat the BN government.10 Is this a realistic prospect? A further drop in the BN vote of 5 per cent, after the 3.5 per cent decline in 2013, is indeed conceivable. BN’s vote in the safe seat of Rompin in a May 2015 by-election declined by 6 per cent. Since then UMNO has been divided by acute controversy over massive losses of around RM42 billion at the government finance agency, 1Malaysia Development Berhad, and payment of over $690 million into a personal bank account of Prime Minister Najib in five tranches between March 2013 and February 2015. In July 2015 Najib sacked his deputy, Muhyiddin Yassin, and other critics, from Cabinet, and the following February UMNO’s Supreme Council suspended Muhyiddin as deputy party leader until the next party elections. Najib has so far retained the support of key party power brokers, but faces strong opposition from the

9

10

A Bernama report on 6 May 2013 (‘Umno remains BN’s pillar’) incorrectly claimed UMNO won 109 seats, an increase of 23 per cent over the 79 it won in 2008. Jocelyn Tan in ‘PAS Elections: Testing time for the Ulama’, The Star, 17 November 2013 incorrectly claims an increase of 19 seats, from 70 to 89. See Liew Chin Tong, ‘The Peninsula dominoes’, Malay Mail Online, 10 July 2015, accessed 14 August 2015, http://www.themalaymailonline.com/what-you-think/ article/the-peninsula-dominoesliew-chin-tong.



Change and Elections

59

rank and file. Former Prime Minister Mahathir led the opposition within the party until his decision to quit UMNO on 29 February 2016. Economic slowdown, the imposition of an unpopular 6 per cent Goods and Services Tax in April 2015, and rising inflation, have added to the government’s difficulties. Polling by the Merdeka Centre in October 2015 found the government’s approval rating was 23 per cent, the lowest since polling started in 2012. Only 31 per cent of Malay voters were satisfied, down from 52 per cent the previous January.11 However, divisions in opposition ranks have helped BN. The death of PAS spiritual adviser Nik Aziz in February 2015 paved the way for the rise of a conservative ‘ulama’ faction in the party. PAS’s focus on the introduction of Islamic criminal law (hudud) in Kelantan led to a falling-out with DAP and close cooperation with UMNO, which declared support for Kelantan hudud. At the PAS assembly in June 2015 conservatives scored a clean sweep against more liberal ‘professionals’ in party elections, and PAS severed relations with DAP. Under the leadership of President Tuan Hj Abdul Hadi PAS then moved even closer to UMNO, declaring support for Najib remaining in office and offering itself as an adviser to the government.12 These developments mirrored those after the 1999 election, but this time the ‘professionals’ broke away from PAS and established their own Parti Amanah Negara (National Trust Party, PAN) in September 2015. A few days later PAN was incorporated in a new opposition alliance with DAP and PKR, Pakatan Harapan (Alliance of Hope). PAS remains with the PKR-led coalition government in Selangor, but its exit from the opposition coalition, and new-found closeness to UMNO, will not help the opposition in the next election. Disunity within PKR and troubled relations between PKR and DAP have also diminished opposition chances of challenging BN. Above all, the advantages of incumbency, in particular influence over the EC, ensure UMNO and BN resilience, and make them likely to win the next election. The EC can achieve a great deal by re-arranging voters within existing constituencies. It will be able to do much more if PAS supports 11

‘Poll: Malay approval for Najib's gov't hits all-time low’, Malaysiakini, 17 October 2015, accessed 19 October 2015, https://www.malaysiakini.com/news/316055. 12 ‘PAS wants Najib to stay, offers Putrajaya help, says report’, The Malaysian Insider, 1 November 2015, accessed 2 November 2015, http://www.themalaysianinsider. com/malaysia/article/pas-wants-najib-to-stay-offers-putrajaya-help-saysreport#sthash.0SyGfJnz.dpuf.

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Regime Resilience in Malaysia and Singapore

BN’s desire to undertake a wholesale reorganisation of parliamentary constituencies, including establishing new ones. New constituencies need constitutional change, and if PAS votes with BN the required two-thirds majority is possible. Moreover, if the government feels its electoral majority is under any threat, the new National Security Council Act passed in late 2015 – enabling the Prime Minister to declare an emergency and rule by decree in a part or all of the country13 – provides a convenient mechanism for the government to postpone elections indefinitely. Appendix 1. 1969 election results, by party Party

Votes

% Popular vote

Seats

% Seats

67

64.42

[Peninsular Malaysia] Alliance

1025144

48.6

UMNO

52

MCA

13

MIC

2

Pan Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS)

501123

23.74

12

Democratic Action Party (DAP)

286606

13.58

13

Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia (Gerakan)

178971

8.48

8

80756

3.83

4

People’s Progressive Party

[Sabah & Sarawak] Sabah Alliance

16

United Sabah National Organisation (USNO)

13

Sabah Chinese Association

3

Sarawak Alliance

9

Parti Bumiputra

5

Sarawak Chinese Association

2

Party Pesaka Sarawak (PESAKA)

2

13

‘Speech by Steven Thiru, President, Malaysian Bar at the Opening of the Legal Year 2016’, Kuala Lumpur, 8 January 2016. See also the ‘Joint Open Letter to the Prime Minister’ on the NSC Act, by the Malaysian Bar, Advocates’ Association of Sarawak, and Sabah Law Association, 6 January 2016, and Steven Thiru, President Malaysian Bar, Press Release: ‘The National Security Council Bill 2015 is a Lurch Towards an Authoritarian Government’, 3 December 2015.



Change and Elections

Sarawak United People’s Party (SUPP)

5

Sarawak National Party (SNAP)

9

Independent

61

1 [Total Malaysia]

Total Alliance Total opposition

1109446

92

72754

52

Total

63.89

144

Alliance + SUPP

1182200

49.34

97

67.4

Source: Election Commission, Report on the Parliamentary (Dewan Ra’ayat) and State Legislative Assembly General Elections 1969 of the States of Malaya, Sabah and Sarawak, Kuala Lumpur, 1972

Appendix 2. 2013 election results, by party Votes

% Popular vote

Seats

% Seats

Barisan Nasional

Party

4,322,939

45.75

85

51.52

People's Alliance (PR)

5,035,611

53.3

80

48.49

Pan Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS)

1593065

16.86

21

12.73

Democratic Action Party (DAP)

1492191

15.79

31

18.79

Keadilan (PKR)

1950355

20.64

28

16.97

23

88.46

3

11.54

Other

89986

0.95

Sabah BN

434522

55.03

PAS

9673

1.23

DAP

64103

8.12

2

7.69

PKR

210089

26.61

1

3.84

Other

71227

9.02

481,038

58.86

25

80.64

6

19.36

PAS

19418

2.38

DAP

179973

22.02

5

16.12

PKR

105117

12.86

1

3.22

PR

BN Sarawak PR Sarawak

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Regime Resilience in Malaysia and Singapore

Other

31681

3.88

BN

902866

56.87

PR

684826

36.65

67.4

Other

102908

6.48

BN

5237699

47.38

133

PR

5623984

50.88

89

PAS

1622156

14.67

21

DAP

1736267

15.7

38

PKR

2265561

20.49

30

Other

192904

1.71

Source: Election Commission statistics.



After GE13

63

Chapter 4

After GE13: What happened and now what? Clive Kessler

Barisan Nasional (BN) emerged from GE13 even weaker than before (with 133 of 222 seats, as against 140 at GE12 in 2008). But United Malays National Organization (UMNO) domination of the governing BN coalition, of Parliament, public policy and national life generally was enhanced.1

1

This essay expands on commentary analysing the GE13 after the election. See, for example, Clive Kessler, ‘Malaysia’s GE13: What happened, what now?’ Part 1, New Mandala, 12 June 2013, accessed 1 June 2016, http://www.newmandala. org/malaysias-ge13-what-happened-what-now-part-1/ and Part 2, 13 June 2013, accessed 1 June 2016, http://www.newmandala.org/malaysias-ge13-what-happenedwhat-now-part-2/. This essay also draws directly from my previous scholarship. On the deep sources of the PAS Islamist drive – originally as a rural populist, anti-state separatist movement, rather than in its post-1970s form as a middle-class, urbanled movement devoted to state capture and state-reconfiguration on Islamist terms – see Kessler, Islam and Politics in a Malay State: Kelantan 1838–1969 (Ithaca NY: Cornell U.P., 1978). On UMNO’s culturally ‘archaizing’ style of Malay politics and political communication, see Kessler, ‘Archaism and Modernity: Contemporary Malay Political Culture,’ in Fragmented Vision: Culture and Politics in Contemporary Malaysia, eds Joel S. Kahn & Francis Loh Kok Wah (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1992), pp. 133–57. On the sources of UMNO’s post-2008 dilemmas during the Mahathir and Abdullah Badawi years, see Kessler, ‘The Mark of the Man: Mahathir’s Malaysia after Dr. Mahathir,’ in Reflections: The Mahathir Years, ed. Bridget Welsh (Washington, DC: Johns Hopkins University, 2004), pp. 15–27; ‘Islam, the State and De-secularization: The Islamist Trajectory during the Badawi Years’ & ‘Conclusion: “A Shared Nation” – Constitutionalism, the “Social Contract”, Mutuality and the “Negotiation of Belonging’’’, in Sharing the Nation: Faith, Difference, Power and the State 50 Years After Merdeka, eds Norani Othman, Mavis C. Puthucheary & Clive Kessler (Petaling Jaya: SIRD, 2008), pp. 59–80 & 81–90. On the immediate postGE12 situation, the challenge that it posed to UMNO and the choices that UMNO

63

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Regime Resilience in Malaysia and Singapore

While BN’s total numbers were down, UMNO increased its numbers from 79 to 88, or about two-thirds of the total BN delegation of 133. Support for UMNO’s long-term coalition partner parties on the peninsula – the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) and the Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC), going back to pre-independence times, and, since the 1970s, Gerakan – and with it their parliamentary representation collapsed. UMNO now dominates the national government. Provided it can decide what it wants to do, it is now in a powerful position to have its way on all significant political and policy issues. Behind all its archaising ceremonialism and cultural nostalgia, politics and political thinking within UMNO are nothing other than Realpolitik of the most ruthlessly pragmatic kind. In national government, an era of unprecedented UMNO domination – and an era of increasing, and increasingly Islamising and even Islamist, Malay political assertion – now seems in the offing. then faced, and fatefully declined, see Kessler, ‘Can BN Win Again? Malaysia’s Next National Elections: A Last Hurrah?’ Off The Edge 49 (January 2009): 52–63. On developments in the period leading to GE13, especially the growing assertiveness of doctrines of Malay-Islamist primacy and supremacy, see Kessler, ‘Why Hudud Law Is Everybody’s Business’, Off the Edge 50 (January 2009): 10–13; ‘The Confidence Game. The (Still Rumbling) Ideas of “Ketuanan Melayu” and The Malayan Social Contract’ [original title, ‘Political Philosophy in Malaysia: Ketuanan Melayu – The Origins and Career of a Concept’] Off The Edge 62 (February 2010): 50–7; ‘Regime crisis, not just a “race riot”’, The Malay Mail Online, 3 September 2013, accessed 1 June 2016, http://www.themalaymailonline.com/what-you-think/article/regimecrisis-not-just-a-race-riot-clive-kessler#sthash.CpUtHxgk.dpuf. On the MalayIslamist ‘push’ in since GE13, especially its legal and constitution-redefining dimensions, see Kessler, ‘Strange Reasoning’, The Malay Mail Online, 16 October 2013, accessed 1 June 2016, http://www.themalaymailonline.com/what-you-think/ article/strange-reasoning-clive-kessler; ‘‘‘Almost there!”: The end of democratic Constitutionalism in Malaysia?’ The Malay Mail Online, 24 January 2014, accessed 1 June 2016, http://www.themalaymailonline.com/what-you-think/article/almostthere-the-end-of-democratic-constitutionalism-in-malaysia-clive-kess#sthash. XGj8d8eH.dpuf; ‘The vulnerability of Malaysia’s legal discourse’, New Mandala, 23 July 2014, accessed 1 June 2016, http://asiapacific.anu.edu.au/newmandala/2014/07/23/ the-vulnerability-of-malaysias-legal-discourse/; ‘The Dhimmi and an old new “rationale”’, New Mandala, 24 July 2014, accessed 1 June 2016, http://asiapacific. anu.edu.au/newmandala/2014/07/24/the-dhimmi-and-an-old-new-rationale/; ‘Where Malaysia stands today’, The Malay Mail Online, 14 May 2014, http://www. themalaymailonline.com/what-you-think/article/where-malaysia-stands-todayclive-kessler



After GE13

65

Facade campaigns The key to the election result was UMNO’s success in its head-on clash with the Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS) for Malay votes in the Malay heartlands – for the ‘core Malay vote’. UMNO/BN’s was a multi-level campaign. One level projected Najib’s image internationally as an economic reformer and religious moderate. As an intelligent and polished progressive in a land where progressives were not conspicuously plentiful in official circles. The second was a campaign that kept Najib – or his carefully constructed image – prominent in the public eye. But only through very controlled and tightly managed situations. It projected him as a man less with a mission than with a wonderful ‘magic pudding’ that might continually, without ever becoming exhausted, be parcelled out and distributed to the people for their enjoyable and cost-free consumption. This second campaign, a media construct or artefact, was largely a diversion and a distraction. It was devised to create a plausible appearance of dynamism and momentum to what had become, among the world’s notable political parties, an ungainly, lumbering and sclerotic dinosaur. It was staged to divert unwelcome attention from the real campaign. Those two ‘show campaigns’ occupied and entirely seized the attention of the international media. Meanwhile, the real campaign was conducted with unremitting determination, even ruthlessness, beneath the ‘foreign radar’, out of view of most overseas reporters and commentators.

The ‘Real’ Campaign The nature of UMNO/BN election strategy was clear. Intelligent political analysts in the party’s campaign ‘engine room’ could see that the vast bulk of non-Malay voters were lost to BN, and were unlikely to be won back, no matter what the old ruling party bloc did or promised. So the strategy of the real campaign was focused elsewhere. It was a battle for Malay votes. In comparison, nothing else really mattered much at all. The key question was whether UMNO/BN, and especially UMNO itself, could win enough peninsular Malay votes, and enough of them in the right places – in the right local constituencies – for UMNO, in association with its

66

Regime Resilience in Malaysia and Singapore

Sarawak and Sabah allies, to secure a clear parliamentary majority. The campaign was focused and conducted where it mattered. It was conducted in Malay terms and directed to a Malay audience. The campaign was projected in the daily Malay-language press, notably the UMNO’s own Utusan Malaysia, and via the Malay-language programming of the television channels with the greatest Malay reach, principally TV3 and RTM. It was a campaign conducted for the votes of Malays, mainly the more ‘traditionally-minded’ Malays in the Malay rural heartland areas. The UMNO campaign was simple: ‘all is at risk!’ There is no protection, it kept hammering away, for you and your family, for all Malays, for the Malay stake in the country, for Islam or for the Malay rulers who are the ultimate bastion of our Malay-Islamic identity and national primacy – other than UMNO. It was a campaign that appealed to their anxious sense of Malay identity and of Malay centrality to national life. It sought to suggest how tenuous the basis of Malay identity had now become in national life, how insecure the Malay grip upon the Malay stake in the nation had become. Everything that was distinctively Malay about Malaysia, it was suggested, was now under threat. The UMNO campaign cultivated and then appealed to a Malay sense of political and cultural peril, even crisis. It was a campaign of managed panic: that the Malays were now beleaguered in their own land, the tanah Melayu. Their historic stake in the nation was being whittled away. The Malays and their way of life were beleaguered, and, central to their way of life, Islam was in jeopardy. It was not fanciful, but realistic, to imagine that Malays might soon ‘hilang di dunia’, that they might disappear from the face of the earth. Everything that mattered to the Malay majority and its conventional loyalties was now at risk, UMNO suggested. It was threatened by the opposition Pakatan Rakyat coalition – of which, of course, the Islamic Party PAS was a key component. In the division of political labour between the Pakatan partners, it fell to PAS to wage the direct contest against UMNO for votes in the nation’s Malay heartlands core. So, above all else, the national election – an election that would decide the prime minister’s and his party’s future – turned upon a contest for ‘the national Malay soul’ between UMNO and PAS. That was the real campaign. It was the campaign that won the election for UMNO/BN.



After GE13

67

Perkasa Rejected? GE13 was a less than explicit, and often inchoate, engagement, or contestation, between two rival views of the Malaysian nation: of what it is and where it was, or might be, headed. On the one side, UMNO/BN, and especially in its appeals to its own power base in the core Malay electorate, maintained incessantly that the country is and has always been tanah Melayu – Malay land and the land of the Malays – and that the country’s defining Malay identity would now have to be upheld by a reaffirmation and, if necessary, even an expansion beyond previously existing understandings of what that characterisation as tanah Melayu might mean.2 On the other side, the Pakatan Rakyat coalition stuck to the terms of the agreement binding together its three partners. In a less than fully worked-out way they insisted that Malaysia was, or must become, a land of and for all Malaysians, and was now ready to do so. Or at least to make a common start on that journey – that quest for a shared future based upon a new national understanding and, under the existing Constitution, a new principled foundation. That was the choice that was placed on offer to the voters. Much has been made of the fact that the two members of the Malay ethno-supremacist pressure group Perkasa whom UMNO directly or indirectly endorsed – Zulkifli Noordin in Shah Alam and Ibrahim Ali in Pasir Mas – lost to their adversaries. Some commentators suggested that the GE13 results signalled a clear repudiation by the national electorate as a whole, Malay and non-Malay, of Perkasa and what it stands for. But the matter is not so simple. True, two Perkasa men who received UMNO/BN backing were defeated. But, more important, 88 UMNO candidates won. They won on the ‘Malays in danger, Islam under threat’ campaign waged in the Malay media that, as its main election effort, UMNO directed at the nation’s Malay voters. The Perkasa position is in effect, as some put it, ‘Malays on top, now and

2

Rustam A. Sani, Failed Nation? Concerns of a Malaysian Nationalist (Petaling Jaya: SIRD, 2008).

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Regime Resilience in Malaysia and Singapore

forever. That is Malaysia, love it or leave it!’ It is a hard, uncompromising position. Yet that, if in slightly more polite and modulated terms, was the essence of the UMNO campaign that was projected daily, with ever-increasing determination and disquieting effect, by Utusan and its media consociates to the ever more fearful Malay voters in the rural heartlands. Two outright, upfront card-carrying Perkasa candidates lost, even though they enjoyed UMNO support. But UMNO ran, and won handsomely upon, a campaign which can simply be described as ‘Perkasa Mild’. UMNO’s was a Perkasa-type campaign detached from the perhaps dubious or extreme reputation of Perkasa itself. A ‘Perkasa line’ not, like the original, angry but fearful, one for the more polite and genteel. Some might hesitate to be publicly identified with Perkasa and its extremism. But UMNO is mainstream. And if that was what UMNO was saying, if that was its campaign, well, that line and that campaign, being UMNO’s, could not really be extreme. That, for some, was the psychology of supporting ‘Perkasa Mild’. It proved a winning campaign. A winning campaign, certainly, for UMNO. And also, though in a different way, for Perkasa. A winning campaign for Perkasa despite the loss of the two high-profile Perkasa members whose candidacy UMNO endorsed. In UMNO’s 88 victories, Perkasa and its stance were lent an official respectability, ‘normalised’, and given a kind of vindication. Or at least political and moral absolution. That is how so-called ‘ginger groups’ – radical pressure groups operating from outside a party upon like-minded ‘true believers’ and sympathisers within it – operate and succeed. In France in the 1950s one such group – the forerunner of the Le Pen movement – for a while rode high.3 The Poujadist movement influenced and infiltrated the mainstream conservatives. As they succeeded in doing so, their strength declined. Challenged by a journalist that his movement had failed, one Poujadist leader powerfully responded: ‘Not so! We have not failed, we have succeeded! We have succeeded in ‘Poujad-ising’ the moderates!’ 3

See J.G. Shields, The Extreme Right in France: From Pétain to Le Pen. Routledge, 2007.



After GE13

69

Perkasa, too, may soon be able to make the same boast. With its theme-tune borrowed from Perkasa but played in a minor key, UMNO in difficult times did not just hold on to what it had, but significantly increased its number of parliamentary seats. The costs of its doing so were paid by the plummeting plausibility of its long-term non-Malay BN partner parties. They may never recover. But for UMNO it worked well. UMNO’s number of seats increased by nine, a number not far short of what is now the combined MCA, MIC and Gerakan parliamentary presence of 12. BN representation from the nation’s primary zone in Peninsular Malaysia is overwhelmingly an UMNO parliamentary presence: 88 of 100. The old partner parties –MCA, MIC and Gerakan – are now in no position to restrain UMNO or to resist its demands. From the viewpoint of the practitioners of UMNO Realpolitik it is a very satisfactory outcome – one that was delivered by the success of their ‘Perkasa Mild’ strategy.

A ‘Chinese Tsunami’? Recourse to that strategy came, as indicated, with a cost. It entailed a substantial ‘writing off in advance’ of much of ‘the Chinese vote’ – of the votes of the vast majority of Malaysian citizens of Chinese origins and cultural background. It deprived the leaders of the Chinese partner parties MCA and Gerakan of ‘face’ and credibility. It stripped their parties of what was left of their political plausibility. When the massive falling away of government support became clear, BN in the peninsula was left looking very much like a club with only one member attended by a few bemused janitors. The official response, orchestrated by Utusan, was that what had happened was a ‘Chinese tsunami’. The Chinese had defected, it was claimed; they had abandoned UMNO/ BN. The Chinese were to blame. ‘What more can the Chinese possibly want?’ was Utusan’s furious banner headline.4 The expression ‘Chinese tsunami’ was a polite – meaning inexplicit – way of saying that the Chinese community had rebelled against Malay rule. Those who use the expression ‘Chinese tsunami’ are trading subliminally

4

‘Apa Lagi Cina Mau?’ (front page), Utusan Malaysia, 7 May 2013.

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Regime Resilience in Malaysia and Singapore

in this notion of Chinese treason (derhaka Cina). The expression may be rhetorically evocative. But it is empirically dubious, and its use is politically and morally inexcusable.

Back to Old Business Once more, UMNO simply returned to the business of governing, in its own distinctive and increasingly anachronistic way. But after GE13, it was now placed to do so unleashed from some old constraints. It is now far more able to do what and as it pleases. The opportunities that now present themselves involve some longstanding objectives and aspirations grounded in the cramped, exclusionary mind-set of early and mid-twentieth century Malay nationalism. The case for prudent reflection – rather than the hurried seizing of the moment and of whatever easy prizes it may have to offer – is not easy to make. After GE13 Malaysia finds itself subject to the enhanced domination of a weakened BN, led by an UMNO that now looms large, even gargantuan, over all its partners but which at other times – while fancying itself as the institutional epitome of the ‘towering Malay’ – often seems to stagger along like a tottering old giant. Despite all the embittered talk of a ‘Chinese tsunami’, it is clear that a turn away from the BN government at GE13 was a far more widespread phenomenon or tendency in many of the peninsular states. Though uneven, it was spread across and through many sectors of Malaysian society, not only its Chinese component. Even the long-term support of the increasingly diversified, urbanised, individualistic, non-deferential and modernised parts of the Malay majority in the peninsula is no longer assured. Ensuring that peninsular Malay society remains loyal to UMNO and BN, without imprisoning most of its inhabitants in rural backwaters and in a narrow and sentimentally ‘archaising’ Malay cultural mind-set, will be a huge challenge. Yet it is one that the UMNO’s main vehicle of political communication, Utusan Malaysia, seems determined to refuse.

Postscript: After GE13 – A Third Political Era Malaysia’s first post-Merdeka political framework, one of liberal democratic form, collapsed in 1969: not, as is often said, in ‘race riots’ but in their



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underlying source. In a moment of electorally-created regime crisis, implosion and collapse. Malaysia’s second framework, that of the New Economic Policy and its enabling political vehicle, the BN partnership, lasted beyond 1990 until it finally fell apart at GE12 in March 2008. After enjoying an unnaturally long ‘afterlife’, the BN formula was then simply abandoned by most of those who had long rallied to UMNO’s BN partners to maintain it. BN was no longer serviceable, since it was no longer a partnership. Its future was bleak. It could not be relied upon to deliver the majority that might provide an UMNO-led BN government with clear, broadly-based public legitimacy. That ruling formula collapsed mainly because of the determined promotion by elements within UMNO, especially after GE11 in 2004, of the ketuanan Melayu doctrine. Doing so may have pleased some, even many, among UMNO’s Malay supporters, but it disgusted most of BN’s long-term non-Malay loyalists. And, after biding their time, they said so quietly with their votes at GE12. The exhausted old BN political formula collapsed. Not violently, as in 1969. It just crumbled. The GE12 results left an impasse, a deadlock. UMNO decided that it must, at least in the short run, abandon the political centre and consolidate its mass Malay base, its sustaining roots within the conventional Malay sociocultural world. It was to that key, primary political constituency that the GE13 campaign was pitched. And it worked. GE13 produced a transformed situation. BN emerged even weaker than it had from GE12, but UMNO was now far stronger. In absolute numbers and, even more, in relative terms. Politically, if not numerically, it was now dominant. It was now beyond restraint from its old BN partner parties and, within the national political system and culture, beyond challenge from the opposition. The only effective restraint upon the government’s political core, meaning peninsular UMNO, was from that core’s East Malaysian political partners: the very ‘like-minded’ UMNO of Sabah and Labuan and Parti Pesaka Bumiputera Bersatu (PBB) of Sarawak. Post-GE13 politics have centred upon and consisted of UMNO’s attempt, based upon this new dominance, to assert and impose the ketuanan Melayu ideology – in an Islamically ‘sacralised’ form, and with an added ‘new royalist’ legitimation – as the nation’s operative political doctrine, its defining

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identity. That is why, after the post-GE12 period of political immobility and deadlock, the post-GE13 period is so intensely contested and bitterly confrontational. It is a test of wills. A test over the UMNO attempt to ‘make ketuanan Melayu real’. UMNO clearly hopes and intends to make it so, now while it has the political opportunity and advantage, and in that way to transform totally the national political ‘landscape’ before it goes to GE14. As it seeks to do so, it faces two sources of resistance. First, from a very ragged and disorganised opposition. And second, and more difficult, from the inherent difficulties of the idea itself. The years since GE13 have witnessed UMNO’s attempt to ‘memPERKASAkan’, meaning ‘to give force and effect to’, the ketuanan Melayu doctrine by means of a decision to ‘memPERKASAkan’ itself, meaning ‘to make itself ever more Perkasa-like’. ‘Tiger-riding’ is usually dangerous, more to the rider than to the tiger. UMNO’s attempt will either prove successful, as recalcitrant reality is gradually prodded and forced to align itself in conformity with this new characterisation of Malaysian national identity and destiny. Or, even while making its best effort to do so under optimally favourable conditions, UMNO will fail. It may fail because of the inherent incoherence of the ketuanan Melayu idea and its inappropriateness to, or anachronistic ‘lack of fit’ with, the human and historical situation to which UMNO seeks to apply that idea. We are all watching to see how it turns out. It will be a titanic struggle. Not just of UMNO against its opponents. More, of a ‘procrustean’ political doctrine against a richly complex social reality that exceeds that doctrine’s limited imagination and horizons.

A JULY 2017 AFTERWORD I have been surprised to hear the question repeatedly asked over recent years, since GE13, ‘why is all this, which is not supposed to be happening at all, suddenly happening now?’ I hear it voiced, apprehensively, by politicians, social activists and NGO people, scholars and lawyers. Why, they keep wondering, this renewed push since GE13 for Malay ascendancy, boldly



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justified and promoted in the name of Islam? Why this drive not just to advocate but politically to embed and entrench ketuanan Melayu now? Why the suddenly relentless ‘constitutional revisionism’ redefining the meaning of Article 3 of the Federal Constitution – as a charter for Islamist dominance and eventually an Islamic state operating under and implementing shari’ah law – that is now being spearheaded from within the Prime Minister’s Office by JAKIM’s ‘in-house’ Islamic strategic analysis and policy think-think IKSIM? I am surprised that they are surprised. As I pointed out immediately following the election, and repeatedly thereafter, the election results had produced a peculiar new parliamentary and political arithmetic: BN was relatively weaker but UMNO greatly strengthened within it, and no longer constrained either by its BN coalition partners or the opposition – nor by anybody else on the national political stage. So the opportunity and temptation to ‘go hard’ on ‘making ketuanan Melayu real’ were there; and doing so, or doing some such thing anyway, would be necessary from very early after GE13 if UMNO was to prepare the ground for victory at GE14. From GE13 UMNO emerged strong – strengthened and emboldened – as the political guardian of a national Malay constituency that, despite its numerical and demographic preponderance, felt politically weak, vulnerable, beleaguered, imperilled and threatened, above all by non-Malay political interests and forces. Hence the post-GE13 Islamically sanctified pro-Malay ‘push’ that many people, surprisingly, have found so surprising. Over the last few months one final or further piece in this overall strategy has fallen into place. After years of placing unceasing pressure on the old popular front opposition and its component parties, UMNO finally succeeded – by goading PAS and its leaders to be and act as a ‘real’ Islamic party rather than a ‘patsy’ for non-Islamic interests – in detaching PAS from that opposition front. Since then, and with UMNO support, PAS has again been pushing for the implementation of its shari’ah punishments policy in Kelantan and elsewhere and for amending Federal Act 355 that limits the punishments that, with federal consent, the state governments may impose through their Islamic courts. The situation has been clarified. UMNO and PAS are now working together. Long rivals, the two main Malay political parties are now

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‘complicity partners’. UMNO is in deep and dubious complicity with PAS on what is now a common agenda of sharia’h-law promotion. That is the deal that they have struck. Under it UMNO gets PAS’s Malay support, if the UMNO-led government runs PAS-congenial ‘sharia’h-minded’ policies. In this UMNO is driven not so much by fear of God or sin but of PAS: of the power that it wields, and that it can potentially wield against UMNO (as it often has), over a large part of the votes of the politically preponderant Malays. UMNO knows the score: that it can rule for ever, so long as PAS wants it to and lets it do so. PAS knows that too. That is the basis of how both sides now work – sometimes together, sometimes not, but always in concert. These days the old rivals are wink-and-nudge ‘complicity partners’. When GE14 comes, so some people think, the new inter-party amity will be bad electorally for PAS. This view is misconceived. PAS voters will recognise, or be encouraged to understand, that for them it will be a ‘win-win’ situation: by voting for PAS they will be able both to support an UMNO-led Malay government and also to increase the pressure upon it to implement PAS’s ‘shari’ah-minded’ agenda. This situation will be congenial to PAS. It will also be very acceptable, even pleasing, to UMNO.



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Chapter 5

Bersih and Civic Empowerment in Malaysia1 Gaik Cheng Khoo

On the Sunday night of 30 August 2015 the neon-lit streets around Dataran Merdeka (Independence Square) in the heart of Kuala Lumpur city, usually ghostly empty at this time of day, shone a golden amber; its normal haunted pallor harkened to the tired colonial institutions made monumental by the adjacent majestic high court building and the secular laws it enshrined that the British left behind. But this night was special: the satellite photograph reflects the gleaming streets glowing in the dark. A closer look shows that the golden stream consists of hundreds and thousands of tiny yellow specks that are actually Malaysian protestors clothed in banned yellow T-shirts. It is nearing the end of the 34-hour mass demonstration that the organisers of Bersih (Coalition for Free and Fair Elections) called and the crowd is as tired as the secular laws that have been sorely tested that they are out here to uphold. They are tired but euphoric because there is nothing as political as gathering on the streets en masse to make one’s collective voice heard. In that sense, they embody Hannah Arendt’s definition of politics and power. For Arendt, power is something that ordinary people have the potential to produce, since action is part of the human condition of being born.2 Politics, on the other hand, is ‘the organisation or constitution of the power

1

This paper uses the same concepts first expounded in an earlier in-depth book chapter published in Worlding Multiculturalisms: The Politics of Inter-Asian Dwelling (Political Theories in East Asian Context), ed. Daniel P.S. Goh (London: Routledge, 2015), pp. 109–26. 2 Elizabeth Young-Bruehl, Why Arendt Matters (New Haven; London: Yale University Press, 2009), p. 86.

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people have when they come together as talking and acting beings’.3 The space that enables them to do so – to share their opinions and potentially bring their ideas into a compromise with those of others during the process of discussion and debate – is the public sphere. This can take shape on social media and online forums, and offline, for example, as public street demonstrations like Bersih’s. Bersih (meaning ‘clean’ in Malay) is a coalition of over eighty NGOs that initially consisted of political opposition party leaders and civil society representatives. It held its first public rally in 2007 as a result of allegations of corruption and discrepancies in the electoral system that favoured the ruling coalition, Barisan Nasional. The non-partisan Bersih of today was constituted in April 2010 before the second mass rally that year (hence the current committee is known as Bersih 2.0). So far, the coalition has held five mass rallies, the fourth alluded to in my introduction. Bersih’s demands for clean elections, a clean government, the right to protest, and strengthening parliamentary democracy have, since 2015, expanded to include ‘saving Malaysia’s economy’ and demanding Prime Minister Najib Razak’s resignation due to the 1MDB scandal. These calls resonate with the middle and lower classes who are at the brunt of Malaysia’s inflated national debt, waste and rising levels of economic disparity through mismanagement. At any Bersih demonstration, the public sphere encompasses Malaysians from diverse towns and states, of diverse ethnicities, ages, educational backgrounds and professions, of different political orientation and varying agendas who meet one another, perhaps for the first time, to focus on a set of shared demands. In the 2007, 2011 and 2012 rallies, ‘transethnic solidarities’4 and ‘intergenerational togetherness’5 played out among protestors who were confronted by water cannons, tear gas and police brutality during peaceful street demonstrations. Reports about people helping one another regardless of their differences were part of the discourse, one made surprising only due to the heightened levels of segregation and racialisation over the years. This 3

Ibid., p. 84. Sumit Mandal, ‘Transethnic solidarities in a racialised context’, Journal of Contemporary Asia 33(1) (2003): 50–68. 5 Gaik Cheng Khoo, ‘Bersih dan Ubah: citizenship rights, intergenerational togetherness and multicultural unity in Malaysia’, in Worlding Multiculturalisms: The Politics of Inter-Asian Dwelling, ed. Daniel P.S. Goh (London: Routledge, 2015), pp. 109–26. 4



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visualisation and formulation of a common cause transcends individual agendas and differences as well as party politics. As a series of three handmade placards make clear: ‘No Matter We Are [sic] Malay, Chinese [or] Indian, we Bersih 4 Future’.6 Protestors are able to draw connections between their present material and political circumstances with a larger abstract concept of the shared future. Most studies on Bersih acknowledge its value as a social movement that has been successful in uniting Malaysians across ethnic boundaries and as integral to advancing Malaysian civil society.7 Others discuss the role of the internet/social media in Bersih’s success,8 evaluating Bersih’s effects on voting behaviour and institutional change.9 Smeltzer and Paré, on the other hand, focused on the rallies on the ground as opposed to how the movement is built via social networks and online activism, perceiving such ‘embodied politics’ as ‘a form of Habermasian communicative action’.10 Similarly, this chapter touches on Bersih’s capacity to create what Arendt calls ‘a space of appearance’ wherein acts of citizenship are enacted.11 Citizenship and a sense of common purpose are engendered and

6

Accessed 15 April 2016, http://www.gettyimages.com/galleries/photographers/ charles_pertwee 7 Anantha Raman Govindasamy, ‘Social movements in contemporary Malaysia: The cases of BERSIH, HINDRAF and Perkasa’, in Routledge Handbook of Contemporary Malaysia, Meredith Weiss ed. (New York: Routledge 2015), pp. 116–26; Khoo Ying Hooi, ‘Electoral Reform Movement in Malaysia: Emergence, Protest, and Reform’, SUVANNABHUMI 6(2) (2014): 85–106; Bridget Welsh, ‘People Power in Malaysia: Bersih Rally and its Aftermath’, Asian Pacific Bulletin 128 (10 August 2011); Meredith Weiss, Politics in Cyberspace: New Media in Malaysia (Berlin: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2012), p. 45. 8 Melanie Radue, ‘The Internet’s role in the Bersih movement in Malaysia – a Case Study’, International Review of Information Ethics 18 (2012): 60–70; Pauline Leong Pooi Yin and Carmen Nge Siew Mun, ‘From PicBadge to Street Protest: Social Media and Youth Activism in Bersih 2.0’, Conference paper at 21st Asian Media Information and Communication Conference, Concorde Hotel, Shah Alam, Malaysia. (2012). 9 Weiss, Politics in Cyberspace; Leong and Nge. 10 Sandra Smeltzer and Daniel J. Paré, ‘Challenging electoral authoritarianism in Malaysia: the embodied politics of the Bersih movement’, Interface: A Journal for and about Social Movements 7(2) (2015): 120–44. 11 See also Julian C.H. Lee, ‘Jom Bersih! Global Bersih and the enactment of Malaysian citizenship in Melbourne’, Citizenship Studies 18(8) (2014): 900–13.

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reinforced by ‘acts of citizenship’ constructed during Bersih rallies.12 According to Isin, ‘acts of citizenship’ constitute the actor as an activist citizen at that moment of performance: ‘those acts through which [they] emerge not as beings already defined but as beings acting and reacting with others’.13 Isin distinguishes between the active citizen who follows a script (such as voting) and the activist citizen who creates the script; the latter may invoke rights vested in the Constitution, exercise democracy in non-prescribed ways, or do something extraordinary (i.e. outside routine habit) that constitutes them as beings with claims. When answerable and responsible, acts of citizenship are ethical and, in forming solidarity and affiliation, they are social.14 In a Western liberal context, Bersih 2.0, in galvanising citizens to demand electoral reform, could be regarded as merely creating active citizens. But I argue that in authoritarian Malaysia where electoral democracy is the sole permissible expression of one’s democratic principles15 due to numerous laws restricting rights and freedoms,16 organising and participating in Bersih street rallies, and committing civil disobedience are ‘acts of citizenship’. Even the simple act of wearing a banned yellow ‘Bersih 4’ T-shirt in public becomes an act of citizenship, never mind sitting in (Bersih 3.0) and camping overnight (Bersih 4.0) on the streets or bringing children, a clear violation of the Peaceful Assembly Act (2012). Because past Bersih rallies were so multi-ethnic in character, the low 20 per cent turnout of Malay relative to Chinese supporters at Bersih 12 13 14

15

16

See Engin Isin, ‘Theorising Acts of Citizenship’, in Acts of Citizenship, eds Engin F. Isin and Greg M. Nielsen (London: Zed Books, 2008), pp. 15–43. Ibid., p. 39. Khoo, ‘Bersih dan Ubah’. For example, the 2007 Minister of Information Zainuddin Maidin suggested that since Malaysians can exercise democracy through elections, there was no need for street protests (hence they are made illegal). See Helen Ang, ‘The TurningPoint Rally’, in March 8 Time for Real Change, ed. T.C. Kee (Singapore: Marshall Cavendish, 2010), p. 176. Draconian laws restricting the freedom of speech and assembly over the decades such as the Printing and Publications Act, Internal Security Act, University and University Colleges Act, Police Act reduce the space for rational debate and discussion. These repressive Acts have either been abolished or amended under Najib but critics argue that laws such as the Peaceful Assembly Act (PAA, 2012) that have replaced them further reduce the basic right to protest. See Andrew Khoo, ‘Najib’s mixed human rights record’, The Nut Graph, 27 April 2013, accessed 28 April 2014, http://www.thenutgraph.com/najibs-mixed-human-rights-record/.



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4.0 – attributed to the Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party’s (PAS) withdrawal of support – was the predominant focus in the media.17 However, I would prefer to concentrate on those who were present – rather than absent – to argue that civic support for Bersih 4.0 manifests neither only in the visual spectacle of PAS’s red-uniformed and disciplined Unit Amal nor as banner-carrying Opposition supporters but in more mundane ways: food and water donations, 2.6 million ringgit collected from 27,000 donors and the general ‘goodwill’ of the people.18 In fact, if the predominant reason for PAS members attending Bersih rallies has been their unquestioning loyalty to their political leadership rather than to their own critical discretion, then it is also unclear if they would make the kind of civic subjects Arendt envisioned, particularly under the new PAS leadership that has made a political about-turn and left the Opposition coalition. The restrained police and well-behaved protestors meant a peaceful, mostly incident-free protest (even though it was deemed ‘illegal’ and Bersih 4.0 T-shirts outlawed under the Printing and Publications Act).19 In such a calm environment, protestors had little chance to enact the kind of active collective solidarity and unityunder-duress that was in response to the firing of tear gas and water cannons and police brutality. Rather than focus on little acts of kindness during mass spectacles of violence, we could consider how Bersih 4.0 organisers attempted to generate a civic space by holding the event over 34 hours to encourage deeper and more meaningful interaction between participants. Teach-ins were held near Dataran Merdeka to provide an opportunity for demonstrators to share their struggles, goals, strategies and techniques with one another.20 In addition, rallies were also organised in two cities in East Malaysia: Kota Kinabalu and Kuching, again in the broadening interests of inclusion and recognition of diversity. Indeed, the speeches at Kota Kinabalu focused very much on local issues like persistent irregularities

17

Abdillah Noh, ‘Political change in Malaysia: Will there be a new normal?’, The Straits Times, 9 November 2015, accessed 15 April 2016, http://www.straitstimes.com/ opinion/political-change-in-malaysia-will-there-be-a-new-normal. 18 Accessed 15 April 2016, http://www.bersih.org/pembentangan-akaun-rm-2-6-jutabersih-4/. 19 ‘Gov't bans wearing of Bersih 4 T-shirts’, Malaysiakini, 28 August 2015, accessed 18 April 2016, https://www.malaysiakini.com/news/310336. 20 FAQ – Answering concerns about BERSIH 4. Accessed 15 April 2016, http://www. bersih.org/answering-concerns-about-bersih-4/.

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in the electoral roll despite the Royal Commission of Inquiry into illegal immigration into Sabah.21 While it is difficult to fathom how many people stayed for the full 34 hours and participated in the teach-ins and other events on the programme to gain more meaningful ties, at least a sense of civic empowerment prevailed. Citing Arendt, this active citizen-making and democratic consciousness needs to be constantly invoked and reiterated since acts of citizenship are essentially performative, and the power of people coming together is the realisation of potential. Without the ‘space of appearance’ (the public sphere), that potential remains untapped and fragile. In that sense, and as acknowledged by speakers and protestors alike, the struggle for social and political change and to define (and find) a better Malaysia did not end with Bersih 4.0.22 Instead, Malaysians need to form and participate in public spheres on social media, online forums and offline, in civic educational workshops like the Bersih Boot Camp where they learn the basics of democracy, elections and mass mobilisation.23 In this regard, Bersih 2.0 the coalition has been very active in promoting civic activism beyond Bersih 4.0. Its energies have continued to be channelled into the push for clean and fair elections, with eight on-going campaigns listed on its website. For example, in the 2016 Sarawak state election, it conducted voter education via its Facebook page, Youtube videos as well as in three cities in the East Malaysian state, and also mobilised and trained volunteers to become election monitors. Ninety election monitors were involved in the Sarawak state election and their recordings of irregularities and offences were collected and issued in a media statement.24

21

The author is speaking from experience as she attended Bersih 4.0 at Kota Kinabalu. http://www.themalaysianinsider.com/malaysia/article/irregularities-still-in-sabahelectoral-roll-after-rci-advice-says-bersih. Accessed 15 April 2016. See more at http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:cK-4vjz9_egJ:www. themalaysianinsider.com/malaysia/article/irregularities-still-in-sabah-electoral-rollafter-rci-advice-says-bersih+&cd=7&hl=en&ct=clnk#sthash.AI6xVPM7.dpuf. 22 Mohan Ambikaipaker, ‘We are the leaders we are waiting for’, Malaysiakini, 2 September 2015, accessed 15 April 2016, https://www.malaysiakini.com/news/310768. 23 Accessed 15 April 2016, http://www.bersih.org/bootcamp/. 24 ‘Media Statement (13 May 2016): 11th Sarawak State Election marred by Votebuying, treating and illegal campaigning’, accessed 29 May 2016, http://www.bersih. org/media-statement-13-may-2016-11th-sarawak-state-election-marred-by-votebuying-treating-and-illegal-campaigning/.



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Public outreach and civic empowerment projects continue in the form of the Bersih Boot Camps offered in various states (Penang, Perak, Sabah) targeting Malaysians between the ages of eighteen to forty-five. These boot camps are meant to equip volunteers and activists with the tools to build democracy and promote the struggle of electoral and institutional reform in their local communities. I was informed by Fadiah Nadwa Fikri, a Bersih steering committee member, that out of the thirty participants in the Penang boot camp, the majority were ethnic Malays in their twenties who were very interested in networking with others.25 This high number is notable in Chinese-majority Penang and perhaps speaks to the state of anxiety that critical-thinking Malay youth are feeling, and their alienation from the current regime,26 and perhaps even from the Opposition coalition, which has collapsed due to disagreements among the component parties. But aside from targeting more specific age groups to foster young activists, Bersih also held a broader public four-day event, the Yellow Mania Festival, in January 2016 that used fun and entertaining activities ‘to reach out to citizens and raise awareness on democratic reforms’.27 These included stand-up comedy, music, colouring contest for children amidst talks and a photography exhibition. While slightly dampened by the deportation of invited guest speaker Indonesian reformasi activist Mugiyanto, who was not allowed by the political authorities to enter Malaysia, organisers managed to feature him on his panel via Skype. The fear of repercussions of civic empowerment and an emboldened citizenry are certainly reflected not only in restricting foreign activists from entering the country, but also in travel bans on vocal government critics and Bersih activists (in the case of Maria Chin Abdullah, to claim a human rights prize in Gwangju, S. Korea in May 2016), in the crude clampdown on 25

In conversation with the author, 23 May 2016, Kuala Lumpur Teaching Centre, University of Nottingham, Malaysia. 26 A 2016 survey conducted by an ‘anti-Najib group’ found that 89 per cent of university students in Malaysia (mainly from public universities) did not like the Prime Minister. The group, Challenger, surveyed 5,006 students and found that 4,460 of them do not think Najib is a leader with integrity, while only 304 students (six per cent) supported Najib. ‘Anti-Najib group survey finds 89 pct of students don't like the PM,’ Malaysiakini.com, 12 April 2016, accessed 30 May 2016, https:// www.malaysiakini.com/news/337500. 27 ‘Yellow Mania Festival’, in Bersih Programme Updates (January–March 2016), 8 April 2016, https://www.bersih.org/bersih-programme-updates-january-march-2016/.

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alternative media28 and targeting of individuals circulating parodic materials on social media, including artist Fahmi Reza,29 an odd-job worker (14 October 2014), a dancer who dropped Bersih balloons at an event attended by Najib, and a woman who insulted Najib for signing the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement.30 To that end, the idea of regime change and power play among political parties has little to do with the ordinary discerning and rational subject attending Bersih who must continue to press for change regardless of who is in power. Certainly, regardless of Bersih’s positive on-going civic empowerment projects that foster activist citizenship, the decision taken by former and current chairpersons Ambiga Sreenevasan and Maria Chin Abdullah respectively in their individual capacity to endorse the former PM Mahathir Mohamad’s Citizens’ Declaration asking for Najib’s removal from office has been greeted with disbelief, disappointment and ambivalence by some Bersih supporters and coalition members themselves.31 Aside from the notion of collaborating with the person who set in motion many of the processes that led to the country’s current political and economic miasma, journalist Gayathry Venkiteswaran expressed disappointment that there was little citizens’ input or popular consultation before key members of Bersih signed up.32 Despite claims that they signed the petition as individuals,33 it 28

The three month suspension of the daily and weekly financial newspaper The Edge in mid-2015 and blocking access to Sarawak Report and The Malaysian Insider, which are all related to coverage of the 1MDB scandal. 29 ‘‘‘Clown-face” Najib lands artist under police probe’, Malaysiakini, 23 February 2016, accessed 15 April 2016, https://www.malaysiakini.com/news/331367. 30 Cinnaboy, ‘Malaysia: Woman Charged by MCMC for Insulting Najib’, The Coverage, 19 February 2016, accessed 15 April 2016, http://thecoverage.my/news/malaysiawoman-charged-by-mcmc-for-insulting-najib/. 31 Din Merican, ‘No to Citizens’ Declaration: Mahathir Document’, 11 March 2016, accessed 30 May 2016, https://dinmerican.wordpress.com/2016/03/11/ no-to-citizens-declaration-a-mahathirian-document/; Alyaa Alhadjri, ‘Critics grill signatories over Dr. M’s role in Citizens’ Declaration’, Malaysiakini, 24 March 2016, accessed 30 May 2016, https://www.malaysiakini.com/ news/335034#ixzz43mbHT5RK; ‘Dissent emerges within Bersih over Citizens' Declaration’, Malaysiakini, 12 March 2016, accessed 30 May 2016, https://www. malaysiakini.com/news/333894. 32 Gayathry Venkiteswaran, ‘Why I will not sign the Citizens’ Declaration’, Free Malaysia Today, 6 March 2016, accessed 30 May 2016, http://www.freemalaysiatoday. com/category/opinion/2016/03/06/why-i-will-not-sign-the-citizens-declaration/. 33 ‘Maria Chin signed Citizens’ Declaration in own capacity, says Bersih’, The Malaysian



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is difficult for most people to disassociate them from their influential roles in Bersih and civil society in general. On the other hand, this crossover from a neutral position within civil society into overt partisan politics may reflect the populist pragmatic concerns and fears of average Malaysians that the power and gains of civil society are constrained by political structures that stubbornly remain authoritarian and non-democratic;34 and that political change requires civil society actors to take a more pro-active stance. Indeed, the disproportionate scale of corruption spawned by the 1MDB scandal both at home and abroad35 and the state’s poor handling of the case, the weakening of the ringgit, continuous crackdown on dissent have registered in a backlash against Najib, as reflected in the record-breaking 1.2 million signatures collected in support of the Citizens’ Declaration. It is clear from online discussions that Malaysians are torn between civil society and the Opposition adopting pragmatic political strategies that tend to have shortterm and temporary outcomes, and more idealistic ethical goals that would take a much longer time to bear fruit. Whatever the case, there is no discounting the fact that civic empowerment and popular dissent are at levels high (or threatening) enough to seduce its authoritarian detractors, past and present, to appropriate civic discourse and tactics. Witness Mahathir’s historic appearance at the Bersih 4.0 rally and, then, the Citizens’ Declaration by which he strategically positions himself as a fellow citizen rather than a politician in relation to others (in a nod to Benedict Anderson’s conceptualisation of liberal nationalism as a ‘deep horizontal comradeship’):36 ‘I am not campaigning with or for UMNO, I am campaigning for the citizens in this country to remove Najib.’37 At the 4 March press conference, he insisted that the group, made up of former UMNO members and those in the Opposition as Insider, 12 March 2016, https://sg.news.yahoo.com/maria-chin-signed-citizensdeclaration-114237408.html 34 Smeltzer and Paré, ‘Challenging electoral authoritarianism in Malaysia’, p. 136. 35 See The Wall Street Journal’s special coverage, ‘Malaysia Controversy’. Its series of news articles are here: ‘Malaysia Corruption Scandal, 1MDB & Najib Razak Latest News’, Wall Street Journal, http://www.wsj.com/specialcoverage/malaysiacontroversy 36 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London: Verso, 1991), p. 50. 37 ‘11 questions Dr M did and did not answer’, Malaysiakini, 4 March 2016, accessed 30 May 2016, https://www.malaysiakini.com/news/332777.

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well as civil society, were not ‘here as representatives of parties and NGOs (non-government organisations). We are here as citizens of Malaysia.’38 It is hoped that the ideal Arendt subject can see through these linguistic acts of legerdemain to forge an alternative script that retains transformative power and real possibility for Malaysia, given the current lack of alternatives in political leadership on both sides.

38

Trinna Leong, ‘Malaysia's Mahathir and opposition sign declaration to oust Najib’, Straits Times, 4 March 2016, accessed 30 May 2016, http://www.straitstimes.com/ asia/se-asia/mahathir-and-opposition-sign-declaration-to-oust-najib.



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Chapter 6

Gaps between the Singapore Government and the Electorate Bilveer Singh

Introduction As a society develops, and with a more discerning electorate, there are bound to be gaps between the government and the public, especially in terms of expectations involving public policies. This is especially true in Singapore, a society that has seen mammoth changes all-round, where the economy has been transformed from the ‘Third to the First World’ and yet, where politics continue to be dominated by one predominant hegemonic political party.1 In general, public policies in Singapore refer to policies that the elected People’s Action Party (PAP) government makes in response to an identified problem or challenge, be they political, economic or sociocultural in nature. Governments anywhere, including Singapore, usually make choices based on values and norms, and how these are adopted in the context of an identified challenge or situation. To that extent, public policies can also be viewed as ‘policies aimed at bridging the gap between these values and norms and a situation’.2 Having come to power as part of a ‘united front’ government in 1959, and solidly entrenched ever since the destruction of its left-wing ally in 1963, public policies in Singapore tend to be highly decision-centric and goaldriven in the context of a political elite that believes it knows, and is doing, 1

Lee Kuan Yew, From Third World to First: The Singapore Story: 1965–2000, Memoirs of Lee Kuan Yew (Singapore: Singapore Press Holding, 2000). 2 Thei Geurts, Public Policy Making in the 21st Century Perspective (The Netherlands: Be Informed, 2011), p. 6.

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the best for the electorate.3 This approach and formula have largely worked despite continuous low-level ineffectual opposition and some unhappiness in the society as a whole. Not surprisingly, due to the overwhelming power position of the ruling party, sterling all-round performance and deliverance of public goods, weak opposition, and general happiness and contentment of the electorate at large, PAP’s political position remains largely unchallenged to this day despite some nibbling away of its parliamentary power. However, in view of the generational change within the PAP leadership and electorate at large, the changing regional and global political values and norms and, most importantly, the rise of new type of challenges in ‘First-World’ Singapore, there is the perception that the empathy and distance between the ruling PAP and the electorate are widening. This has forced the ruling party to come up with new policies and make adjustments aimed at bridging the gap between the government and the public to ensure that the ruling party’s power remains unchallenged even though the near-total predominance of the past is unlikely to be maintained in the new political environment.

Evidence of the Gap That there are gaps between the government and the public is not surprising as this is something normal in any political system. After all, in a democracy one only needs to win a simple majority to gain power. One need not go far to understand this, as has been experienced in Australia in the last few years. However, the issue of gap or gulf becomes all the more pressing and pertinent in a political system and culture where the ruling party has been in power since 1959. The issue of gaps between the government and the public is also important as it leads one to wonder whether these gaps are what caused the then Minister of Foreign Affairs and Minister of Law, Mr S. Shanmugam, to once wonder whether the Singapore ruling party will be able to survive as the government for more than seven decades continuously as no political party has succeeded in doing so thus far.4

3

R.O. Tilman, ‘The Political Leadership: Lee Kuan Yew and the PAP ‘team’’, in Management of Success: The Moulding of Modern Singapore, eds. Kernial Singh Sandhu and Paul Wheatley (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1989), pp. 53–69. 4 Z. Hussain, ‘Educate Students about Politics, says Shanmugam’, The Straits Times, 19 December 2009.



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The evidence of gaps between the government and the public is clear on a number of accounts. First, PAP’s dominance since 1959 has not been without opposition or rejection, especially since the 1980s, as about 40 per cent of the electorate have always consistently voted against PAP in every general election, and since 1981 there has always been a token opposition presence in parliament. Second, and most poignantly, the 2011 general and presidential elections clearly showed that the Singapore ruling party was capable of making mistakes and that the public was prepared to reject it, at least partially. This was clear from PAP’s loss of a group representative constituency at Aljunied and the electoral victory of another opposition member; this was PAP’s worst electoral performance since 1965. PAP’s former deputy prime minister was barely voted in as the elected President in 2011, garnering less than one per cent more votes than his closest rival. Third, the continued public rejection of PAP was evident in the ruling party’s defeat in two subsequent by-elections: Hougang on 27 May 2012 and Punggol East on 26 January 2013. Fourth, as further evidence that the public’s unhappiness in the 2011 and 2012 elections was not a chance development, the public’s robust rejection and response to the government’s White Paper on Population also clearly signposted that wide real and perceptional gaps exist between the government and the public.5 There was also a public demonstration against the White Paper, signalling to the government that ‘enough is enough’, forcing it to back down partially by introducing amendments to the White Paper, and various ministers suggesting that these were only proposals and suggestions and that nothing was cast in iron. Further, the government was forced to back down on its original plan of population planning and conceded that ‘the 6.9 million population figure in 2030 is not a target and the Government is not deciding now on any specific population size for beyond 2020’.6 Finally, at the same time, the emergence of ‘I am sorry’ and ‘we can make mistakes’ culture in Singapore’s politics, with the ruling party admitting mistakes and distancing itself from its culture of infallibility that it steadfastly held in the past, has also made it clear that the public believes that the government is no longer what it used to be and that, 5

Population White Paper, A Sustainable Population for a Dynamic Singapore (Singapore: National Population and Talent Division, 2013). 6 ‘Parliament Endorses Population White Paper’, The Straits Times, 8 February 2013.

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through challenge and pressure, it can be made to change its position and policies, as was done with regard to various housing, educational, health and immigration policies. For instance, during the 2011 general election campaign, Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong apologised along the following lines: Some of the government’s initiatives have resulted in ‘side effects’, such as problem gambling among Singaporeans due to the opening of the Integrated Resorts... These are real problems, we will tackle them. But I hope you will understand when these problems vex you or disturb you or upset your lives, please bear with us, we are trying our best on your behalf… And if we didn’t quite get it right, I’m sorry but we will try better the next time. We made a mistake when we let Mas Selamat run away. We made a mistake when Orchard Road got flooded. No government is perfect… we will make mistakes. But when it happens we should acknowledge it, we should apologise, take responsibility, put things right. If we are to discipline somebody, we will do that, and we must learn from the lessons and never make the same mistake again. If the government knew there would be a sudden surge in demand for HDB flats in mid-2009 and that foreigners would have created such congestion on the roads, it would have ramped up plans for more flats and MRT lines… We’re sorry we didn’t get it exactly right, but I hope you will understand and bear with us because we are trying our best to fix the problems.7

Key Gaps between the Government and the Public While it is easy to identify various issues and gaps between the government and the public, probably the ‘why’ will be the most difficult to explain. In any public policy issue, four steps are usually necessary to explain how and why a particular policy is adopted. First, in the context of existing norms and values and the challenges thrown up by the situation, there is the need to recognise the issue that must be addressed. What is the problem? Second, with the problem identified, what needs to be done? What policies need to be adopted to solve the problem? This involves the formulation of policies to overcome the problem, challenge or threat. Following this is the implementation of the adopted policies to manage the problem or challenge.

7

Leong Wee Keat, ‘We have made mistakes: PM Lee’, The Straits Times, 4 May 2011.



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Finally, as part of good governance, there is the continuous need to review and improve upon the implemented policies. Hence, when discussing the issue of ‘gap’ between the government and the public, one can posit that gaps can exist at any one, or more, or even all, of the stages of public policy making. While the Singapore government has been credited with immense allround achievements, transforming the republic from a ‘Third’ to a ‘First World’ state, at the same time PAP’s decision-centric model of government and decision making has led to a top-down political system with the electorate largely being on the receiving end of policies and decisions made by the ruling government. While very often this has produced beneficial results, it has also had its downside, leading to much anger, unhappiness and antipathy towards the government, especially with regard to certain policies, be it the Graduate Mother Scheme, late withdrawals from the Central Provident Funds and, of late, the government’s migration policies.8 However, due to the ‘very powerful state’ and ‘very weak society’, this asymmetrical power relationship has meant that very little could be done in terms of objecting to or opposing the ruling party (except for some protest votes during elections), leading to the rise of apathy, unhappiness and a society somewhat in a state of ‘waiting-for-change-at-the-right-time-underthe-right-circumstances’. For some, the possibility of a strong change is much nearer today than ever before, partly due to the apparent weaknesses of the ruling party, a much better organised opposition and an electorate that is prepared to ‘say no’ to the ruling party in the context of a multitude of problems that it faces almost on a daily basis. One reason for the widening gap between the government and the public is the plethora of issues that have surfaced, affecting almost every strata of society, particularly the middle- and lower-income-earning Singaporeans. These issues are perceived and interpreted as symptoms of the ruling party’s failures and, hence, the greater willingness to object and oppose the ruling party under certain circumstances, especially when there is an organised opposition (e.g., during elections) or through various public

8

Bilveer Singh, Politics and Governance in Singapore: An Introduction, 2nd edn (Singapore: McGraw-Hill Education, 2012), pp. 194–205; Bilveer Singh, Understanding Singapore Politics (Singapore: World Scientific, 2017), pp.113–26.

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discourses, especially the social media, on issues such as housing, income disparities and foreign migrants. Some the key issues that have demonstrated a divide between the government and the public include: •

Political representation and consultation: issues of limited democracy and lack of alternative policies and options

•

Economic disparities: the single-minded pro-growth policies that have dangerously widened income disparities among Singaporeans

•

Social cohesion: with the single-minded goal of economic growth at all costs, the big question of what had happened to nation building is constantly asked, especially with regard to what constitutes the Singapore Core?

•

Infrastructural malfunctions: with success and growth, instead of moving forward, Singapore seems to be suffering various ‘Third World diseases’ such as congestions and breakdowns that have inconvenienced the public while the government continues to boast of Singapore being in the league of the extraordinary and exceptional.

•

Housing shortage and costs: affordability, especially for first-time buyers, who are often also younger voters, has emerged as one of the main time-bombs facing the ruling party.

•

Rising costs, especially healthcare: issues of all-round affordability of basic needs, especially in a society with an increasing greying population and minimal social security network, have led to increasing social anger against the ruling party’s policies of growth at all costs and where the benefits are not seen to be distributed fairly.

•

Education system and bottlenecks: the stress on parents and the increasingly elitist tendencies, often couched in terms of promoting meritocracy, have raised one of the loudest voices against the ruling party, especially from parents with school-going children.

•

Quantum of foreign immigrants: the ‘mother’ of all issues, the government’s liberal policies of importing foreigners, despite public objections, best evident in the 2013 White Paper on Population, is symptomatic of a government that listens but never hears.



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Explaining the Gaps between the Government and the Public, including Diverging Expectations Singapore is an extremely successful state on almost all fronts. However, there are issues and difficulties that need to be addressed and when one discusses gaps, these should be proportionately viewed as the present Singapore system is not broken and is not about to collapse. Rather, what has become evident is that the ‘noise’ and ‘voices’ of dissent, unhappiness and opposition have increased, brought about by a multitude of factors, partly due to an increasingly educated and informed population who have become more enabled by modern technology, the rise of a more credible opposition and civil society groups and, probably most important, the fact that the government actually allows this unhappiness to surface, thereby creating an environment where everything does not seem honky dory, partly as an escape valve for those who oppose government policies and partly as an admission that there are limits to what a government can really do. The government is also suffering from a serious leadership deficit as it has been unable to replace many of its charismatic leaders who have left the scene and, in a situation of intense politics, ‘technocrats’ are not necessarily the best people to connect the government with the people. In short, a new political culture seems to be emerging even though its actual shape remains to be seen. Still, the main driver of the gaps between the government and the public stems from the ruling party’s approach in undertaking various public policies. Due to its long entrenched position as the ruling party in Singapore, in addition to inertia, self-confidence and belief that ‘it knows what is best for Singapore’, the core belief system stems from a goal-oriented development mind-set that almost all problems and challenges can be solved by ensuring that continuous economic growth takes place in the Republic. This has remained the primary imperative, and all other considerations are relegated to a secondary tier, best evident from the integrated resorts or immigration policies. While these policies have brought about unparalleled economic benefits to Singapore and many Singaporeans, at the same time the government is increasingly paying a price, especially a political price, as more Singaporeans suffer the deficits, liabilities and downside of these policies, thereby widening the gap between the government and the public. Equally important is the realisation that the past control mode of government decision-making has become increasingly irrelevant in the

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current highly complex environment. In the past, the strong position of the ruling party, the weak opposition, the dire all-round challenges and threats, and the success of the ruling party in delivering the manifold political and non-political goods of stability and growth, created a unique political compact that led the public to strongly support and endorse the government. This succeeded in creating a single-party-dominant state. However, in the current setting emerging political, social and economic complexities have made the past approach and model largely arcade and irrelevant. PAP’s past control mode of operation in an environment that was said to be dominated by manifold vulnerabilities has been overtaken by the rise of diverse viewpoints, worldviews, in turn demanding new values and norms to deal with the public who want to be viewed as an important stakeholder and partner that should be consulted in decision making. In the new setting of multiple stakeholders to promote Singapore’s interests, the ruling PAP is but one of the many stakeholders and the public expects real consultations and participation in any major policy decisions. The lack of, or minimal, consultation or, worse, rejection of public inputs has created intense ground anger, best evident with regard to the government’s policy on immigration. This has been worsened by the rise of new vulnerabilities and governmental weaknesses, be they the repeated global economic crises in which Singapore is closely intertwined and, more importantly, the rise of information technologies such as the Internet and the social media that have literally destroyed the government’s monopoly of information and led to the surfacing of alternative views and analysis, thereby undermining the government-led narratives that had dominated political discourses in the past. In short, the government’s viewpoint on an issue or policy is no longer the only one, with many new options and alternatives being put forward, often leading the government to be placed on the defensive. In view of these developments, unlike the past approach of overcoming multiple vulnerabilities, the new political, economic and social-cultural climate calls not for control, but adaptive competencies to deal with continuous change, and where the government is not always in a position to solve the fast emerging problems. The new technologies have also placed greater spotlight on the government and its personnel, with many of its negative outcomes more easily exposed than in the past, in turn undermining the government’s image in the public’s eyes. The new



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challenges also call for a leadership that is not only resilient but also forward- and outward-looking and in a position to respond quickly to unforeseen situations. In short, the government’s past ‘control mode’ of operation is an antithesis to the new environment of continuous change and challenges. If anything, control is the enemy of change, and this, more than anything else, has placed the government on the defensive, in turn forcing it to make many u-turns and changes in policies that it held dear in the past.

Government’s Response to the Perception and Reality of the Widening Gap with the Public While there have been increasing problems and challenges in Singapore afflicting almost all sectors of society – many of them problems stemming from successes, and others from shortfalls and failures – and where there is an emerging vocal minority opposing and criticising various governmental policies, the government has also undertaken various policies in response. This is to dilute, defray and neutralise the lost ground and attempt to win back support from various sectors of the society, especially the youth, middle class and the economically underprivileged or those who have been left behind and marginalised by Singapore’s prosperity, progress and new directions. If anything, one of the most marked shifts has been the willingness of the government to slay various ‘sacred cows’ of the past in order to reach out and narrow the divide between itself and the public at large while trying to address and solve problems and issues that have surfaced in the last few years. This is evident from a number of perspectives, including the willingness to reframe the public policy-making approach to some extent and more importantly, undertaking policy shifts and tweaks to demonstrate that the government is ‘listening, hearing and willing to change’ in view of the public demands for new policies that must be more people-oriented rather than simply aimed at championing economic growth in general. This is clearly evident in new policies with regard to housing, healthcare, education, helping the lower-income Singaporeans and the willingness to tighten immigration into Singapore. One of the clear shifts of this policy was announced during the Prime Minister’s National Day Rally Speech on 18 August 2013, signalling a more responsive, kinder, gentler and caring

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government.9 This was partly evident from the various policy initiatives involving housing, education and healthcare.

The 2015 General Election and Regime Resilience Theorists on a one-party dominant state are divided on how political parties of this nature would respond to challenges. Maurice Durverger postulated that dominant parties that fail to adapt to changes and challenges pragmatically will eventually lose power. In his words, ‘the dominant party wears itself out in office, it loses its vigour, its arteries harden. It would thus be possible to show… that every domination bears within itself the seeds of its own destruction.’10 Alan Arian and Samuel Barnes, however, believe that dominant parties have the capacity to be pragmatic and opportunistic. In the quest to be in power continuously, such parties ‘will move with long term shifts in public opinion regardless of its ideology’.11 Thus, in contrast to Durverger, they argue that to retain power, something which they have tasted for decades, these parties are capable of pragmatic change and adjustments. Dominant parties, argue Arian and Barnes, are ‘perennially pragmatic, flexible, responsive and with proper leadership, capable of political adaptation’.12 That PAP was cognisant of this challenge was clearly made evident by Mr. K. Shanmugam, then a backbencher, later to become the republic’s Minister for Foreign Affairs and Minister for Law, and currently, Minister for Home Affairs and Minister for Law. In a commentary in Petir, the PAP’s magazine in November–December 2009, he wrote: The PAP has become one of the most successful political parties in history. But even as we acknowledge its exceptional success, it is necessary to be mindful of another powerful lesson from history: In the modern

9

Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong, ‘National Day Rally Speech 2013’ last updated 6 November 2014, accessed 16 April 2016, http://www.pmo.gov.sg/mediacentre/ prime-minister-lee-hsien-loongs-national-day-rally-2013-speech-english. 10 M. Durverger, Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State, 2nd edn (London: Methuen, 1959), p. 312. 11 A. Arian and S.H. Barnes, ‘The Dominant Party System: A Neglected Model of Democratic Stability’, Journal of Politics, 36 (3/4) (1974): 592–614. 12 E.S. Krauss and J. Pierre, ‘The Decline of Dominant Parties: Parliamentary Politics in Sweden and Japan in the 1970s’, in Uncommon Democracies: The One-Party Dominant Regime, ed. T.J. Pempel (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990), p. 228.



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era, no party has succeeded in staying in power continuously for more than seven decades. In democracies which came into existence in the 20th century, this pattern has repeated itself: Parties sweep into power, filled with idealism. But the zeal fades over time, the trappings of power corrupt, there is a reluctance to renew within the party and inevitably, the electorate seeks a change.13

Clearly, following the shocks that the PAP suffered in the 2011 general and presidential elections, and the two by-elections since then, the PAP would appear, in line with the arguments of Arian and Barnes – and taking cognisance of Shanmugam’s warning – to have undertaken measures to align itself with the changing public opinion in Singapore, demonstrating pragmatism and flexibility, and under proper leadership, responsiveness through apt political adaptations. The outcome of these measures was PAP’s resounding win in the 2015 general election, when its overall popular vote rose by about 10 per cent compared to the 2011 general election.14 What happened and how did the PAP pull off one of its best electoral victories despite being heavily criticised in the previous election? What did the PAP do to reinforce its regime resilience and security? On 25 August 2015 it was announced that Singapore’s fourteenth general election would be held on 11 September 2015. However, the anger and general unhappiness that pervaded the 2011 election were largely absent in the 2015 hustings. Moreover, new developments greatly affected the electoral outcome. One was the death of Lee Kuan Yew in March 2015. For the first time, the PAP and Singapore were without the anchor personality who had shaped the republic’s politics for more than 50 years. The PAP, the opposition parties and the Singapore electorate had never faced such a situation. The 2015 election also saw the largest number of voters. The number of registered voters rose from 2,350,257 in February 2011 to 2,460,977 in 2015, an increase of 4.7 per cent. Most of these were young first-time voters, with some new citizens. The 2015 election also saw the largest number of electoral wards – 89. There was one more single member constituency (SMC) (13) and group representation constituency (GRC) (16) compared to the last GE 13

14

K. Shanmugam, ‘Challenge of Communication’, Petir, November–December 2009. See Bilveer Singh, Understanding Singapore Politics (Singapore: World Scientific, 2017), pp. 137–8.

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but more four-man GRCs, with all seats being contested. As expected, PAP contested all constituencies. The 2015 election was also expected be one of the most competitive in recent years. With the rise of new political leaders, two new political parties, a more discerning political generation and, most importantly, issues that affect almost every political generation, this was a political contest that was to determine how dominant the PAP would be and how much support the opposition could garner. PAP’s track record advantaged the ruling party. While PAP cemented its relationship with the electorate, especially with the SG50 jubilee anniversary celebrations, the party was also expected to reap the public goodwill for a job well-done. There was also the expectation of public sympathy at the death of Lee Kuan Yew, who would have been 92 on 16 September 2015, five days after the polling day. The changed political terrain, new leaders, wideranging challenges of a developed society and matured electorate’s mind-set provided the sinews for a sea change to occur. The election, it was postured, would decide how Singapore innovated politically and economically through greater democratic space and welfare programmes that would set the road ahead for the next 50 years. Most importantly, it would also signpost who was likely to be the PM-in-waiting for a state where leadership is the key driver of politics and development. Yet, at the same time, an effective opposition was desired by the electorate as a check and balance to the PAP as well as something positive for Singapore’s international image. Hence, the key question was – by what margin would the ruling PAP win? PAP won 83 of the 89 seats, securing 69.9 per cent of the valid votes. This increased PAP’s seats in Parliament by two. More importantly, there was a 9.7 per cent swing in favour of PAP compared to the 2011 general election. The 2015 results were the best for the PAP since 2001 when it captured 75.3 per cent of the valid votes. PAP even won the Punggol East SMC that it had lost to the WP in the 2013 by-election. All the opposition parties suffered a dip in their results, especially in comparison to the 2011 election. While PAP’s win was expected, the margin and emphatic nature of its victory was not. The strong victory for PAP and general decline of support for the opposition came as a surprise to all, including the ruling party and its political opponents. Why did the PAP win big? First, three sets of factors advantaged the PAP. The first included the passing of Lee Kuan Yew, which provided not just sympathy votes but also the nation’s gratitude to a man and his party that had helped to construct modern Singapore. There were



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also the year-long SG50 celebrations, showcasing fifty years of independence and what the PAP had achieved over the years. Finally, there were the various policy shifts and tweaks that ‘sweetened the ground’, in line with Aron and Barnes, that demonstrated PAP’s survival instincts and resilience, which Deputy Prime Minister Tharman Shanmugaratnam dubbed as ‘left of centre’ policies. Since the 2011 election the government had made a plethora of changes in housing, education, transportation, health and even immigration policies to accommodate the demands of Singaporeans, and these ‘adaptations’ benefited PAP in the 2015 election. The second key factor involved the quality of the opposition. Prior to the election the Workers’ Party (WP) was embroiled in the issue of mismanaging the Aljunied-Hougang-Punggol East Town Council. Compared to PAP, the poor electability of many opposition parties’ members became extremely glaring. This vastly advantaged the PAP. Not only could the opposition not put up a united front, but the quality and credibility of many of those contesting against the PAP candidates made it obvious that the voters literally had no choice but to vote for the tried and tested PAP. In this regard, even though the WP performed the best among the opposition parties and won six seats, it also suffered a backlash from the voters who favoured PAP over the opposition. This was also reinforced by the fear of ‘what if ’ the weak opposition parties won, leading to the massive swing in favour of the PAP. The third factor that favoured the PAP was the increasingly hostile and uncertain international environment. The downturn in the global economy and the increasing uncertainties in the politics of Malaysia and, to some extent, Indonesia did impact on the Singapore’s voters, influencing them to throw their lot with the PAP which had guided Singapore for more than half a century.

Conclusion In a way, the 2015 general election was a freak election in favour of PAP and a protest vote against the opposition. The 2015 GE showed a nationwide swing against the opposition, largely explaining the 10 per cent surge in PAP’s votes compared to the 2011 general election. The opposition did not benefit from a ‘by-election effect’ as every seat was contested. While by itself it did not create a fear that the ruling party would lose, mainly due to the general weakness of the opposition, still it made the voters cautious with

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their votes. While the public preferred to have some opposition presence in parliament, it was, however, not prepared for an opposition government. Somehow there was a sentiment, stemming from the overwhelming public attendance at the opposition rallies of the WP and the discourses in the social media about the desirability of a strong opposition to punish the ruling party for its failures, that created the perception that there was a chance that the WP might perform exceptionally well, thereby threatening PAP’s rule. As the public was not prepared for a big swing that would have caused a serious dent in the ruling PAP government’s power standing which the public was rather comfortable with, most of the voters became conservative with their voting, casting votes for the ‘devil they knew’ rather than the ‘devil they did not really know’. It would appear that Singaporeans developed a ‘cold feet syndrome’, fearing that the PAP might lose badly, and decided to support it, reversing their earlier political behaviour of giving more support to the opposition so that an effective ‘system of checks and balance’ would develop in the political system. The role of the swing voters was also important. Due to various factors, many in this group voted for PAP. Hence, there was a ‘national tsunami’ of support for PAP in almost all constituencies, accounting for the 10 per cent surge in PAP’s support compared to the 2011 general election. The 2015 general election result has helped to entrench the one-party dominant state in Singapore at a time when democratic consolidation seems to be the norm in First World states and even in developed states in Asia. Singapore’s exceptionalism in this regard stands out and this is due to PAP’s resilience that has entrenched a one-party dominant system in Singapore.



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Chapter 7

Policy and Political Reform in Singapore Lily Zubaidah Rahim

Following the 2011 electoral backlash against the People’s Action Party’s (PAP), when it suffered from the worst electoral performance since independence in 1965, a humbled Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong assured Singaporeans that there would be a more open and transparent style of governance, an acceptance of different views and closer engagement with the populace. At the post-election Cabinet swearing-in, Lee affirmed the government’s commitment to ‘evolve in tandem with our society and our people ... accommodate more views, more debate and participation’.1 In his National Day Rally speech in August 2011, Lee appealed to Singaporeans to join him in writing the ‘next chapter’ of the Singapore Story as the citystate embarked on a process of re-invention.2 To facilitate this process, a ‘Singapore Conversation’ forum distilled public concerns and aspirations. Lee also guaranteed Singaporeans that the government would do more to help lower- and middle-income Singaporeans own homes3 – in recognition that cost-of-living pressures, soaring real estate market, slowing of social mobility, wage stagnation, infrastructure bottlenecks and labour market pressures, owing in large part to the influx of foreign workers and migrants, contributed to the electoral backlash against the PAP. Put simply, the 1

Cited in Eugene Tan, ‘Singapore: Transitioning to a New Normal’ in a Post-Lee Kuan Yew Era’, Southeast Asian Affairs 2012 (Singapore: ISEAS, 2012), p. 271. 2 Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong, ‘National Day Rally Speech 2011,’ last updated 6 November 2014, accessed 16 April 2016, http://www.pmo.gov.sg/mediacentre/ prime-minister-lee-hsien-loongs-national-day-rally-2011-speech-english-sunday14-august. 3 Seah Chiang Nee, ‘A Changing Trend’, The Star (Malaysia), 24 August 2013.

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PAP government promised to re-calibrate economic and social policies to facilitate ‘growth with equity’. The government also promised greater political space and the promotion of transparent governance. The essay examines the extent to which the PAP government has delivered on these post-2011 promises of social policy and political reforms and the forces driving and inhibiting the PAP’s reform agenda.

Election-driven Policy Reforms: 2011 and 2015 Electoral Swings Shortly after the 2011 election a committee to review the controversial issue of exorbitant ministerial salaries was established to temper public wariness about the salaries of government ministers. For example, in 2011 Prime Minister Lee’s annual salary of S$3.8 million was six times higher than the president of the United States. Including the bonus, Lee earned a whopping S$11.4 million that year.4 In line with the commission’s recommendations, the prime minister’s salary was cut by 36 per cent and reduced to S$2.2 million per year, while the salary of Cabinet ministers dropped by 37 per cent to S$1.1 million per annum. Despite these cuts, the prime minister of one of the smallest city-states retains the status of one of the highest, if not the highest, paid heads of government. In mid-2012 the PAP government announced that it would be reducing the intake of immigrants and foreign workers. This intake had markedly expanded since the 1990s and is generally believed to have depressed the wages of skilled Singaporean workers. More broadly, the influx of new immigrants is commonly thought to have contributed to the sharp increase in housing prices, infrastructure bottlenecks, pressure on social services and the erosion of a cohesive national identity. Deputy Prime Minister Tharman Shanmugaratnam urged employers to scale back their dependence on foreign workers, focus on improving productivity or relocate if they cannot adapt to the restructuring, and pronounced that there would be ‘no U-turns in our [revised] foreign manpower policies’.5 The Fair Consideration

4

Singapore Democratic Party Policy Unit, Ethical Salaries for a Public Service Centered Government (2011), accessed 16 April 2016, http://yoursdp.org/_ld/0/2_ ethical-salarie.pdf. 5 Singapore Government, ‘Budget Speech 2012: An Inclusive Society, a Stronger Singapore’, last updated 7 February 2012, accessed 16 April 2016, http://www.



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Framework, established in 2013, was supposed to ensure that employers hire Singaporean workers before hiring foreign employment pass holders.6 Skills Future, launched in 2015, provided credits, subsidies and awards to assist Singaporeans at different phases of their career and provide support for the cost of skills development and training. While the foreign labour intake may have slowed down, there remains a growth in absolute numbers. A substantial cutback, particularly in low-wage foreign labour, would increase business costs and thus reduce the profits of GLCs (governmentlinked companies), SMEs (small and medium-size enterprises) and MNCs (multinational corporations).7 To temper the public fury with the hasty passage of the 2013 White Paper on Population, particularly its population projection from 5.3 million to 6.9 million by 2030,8 the government claimed that the 6.9 million projection was not a target, but a mere ‘planning parameter’ for infrastructure planning.9 To appease senior citizens who have been burdened by the economic pressures of living in one of the most expensive cities in the world and, not surprisingly, strongly supported the opposition parties in the 2011 election, the S$8 billion Pioneer Generation Package (PGP) was rolled out just a year before the 2015 election. The PGP offers healthcare subsidies for Singaporeans aged 65 years or older. The Silver Support Scheme, for the younger aged, includes Medisave top-ups. Increased allocations in healthcare led to reduced costs and a considerable relief to the elderly. Medishield Life, a state-supported healthcare insurance programme, was announced just before the 2015 election. Reforms to housing include subsidies for firsthome buyers and increases in the supply of HDB flats. Subsidies associated with childcare were increased in 2013. The Kindergarten Fee Assistance Scheme was introduced in 2014, augmenting an increase in the number

6

7 8 9

singaporebudget.gov.sg/budget_2012/speech_toc/download/FY2012_Budget_ Statement.pdf. Singapore Ministry of Manpower, ‘Fair Consideration Framework’, last updated 23 March 2016, accessed 16 April 2016, http://www.mom.gov.sg/employmentpractices/fair-consideration-framework. Garry Rodan, ‘Capitalism, Inequality and Ideology in Singapore: New Challenges for the Ruling Party’, Asian Studies Review 40(2) (2016): 5. Population White Paper, A Sustainable Population for a Dynamic Singapore (Singapore: National Population and Talent Division, 2013). Linda Lim, ‘Singapore’s Success: After the Miracle,’ in Handbook of Emerging Economies, ed. Robert Looney (London: Routledge, 2014), p. 209.

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of childcare centres. Inter alia, low-wage workers were given income supplements under an expanded workfare programme. A progressive wage model in sectors such as cleaning and security was initiated in 2015.10 The middle classes did not miss out on these pre-election social programmes. In 2015 a tax rebate was rolled out for middle-income households. Civil servants received a half-pay bonus and a cash payment, while 700,000 senior citizens received transportation vouchers.11 These social policy reforms and one-off giveaways have been criticised by economists and other social scientists for being inadequate and thus in keeping with the PAP government’s long-standing aversion to substantive social protection support. Moreover, these social policy reforms, strongly driven by electoral considerations, have had a minimal impact on poverty alleviation, narrowing income inequality and rectifying many of the neo-liberal policy measures that were instituted from the 1980s. These include the GICs ‘privatisation’ and corporatisation of social services such as hospitals, public transport, education and other public goods. Many of these social services are now managed by corporatized GLCs that are strongly driven by profitmaking rather than public interest considerations.12 The selective implementation of neo-liberal policies, whilst maintaining state and GLC dominance of the national economy, has unravelled the post-colonial social compact based on ‘growth with equity’ owing to the narrowing of public policy priorities, elevating capital accumulation and diminishing social redistribution considerations. 13 However, the implementation of neo-liberal priorities has threatened to undermine the PAP’s political and ideological hegemony – as starkly evidenced by the 2011 electoral backlash against the PAP. Economist Linda Lim maintains that the myriad challenges confronting Singapore’s authoritarian developmental state are strongly a product of the PAP government’s failure to develop a model of sustainable growth in the 21st century. Singapore’s GDP growth has largely been driven by 10

Bridget Welsh, ‘Clientelism and Control: PAP’s Fight for Safety in GE2015’, The Round Table, 105(2) (April 2016): 126–7. 11 Ibid., 126. 12 Lily Zubaidah Rahim, ‘Reclaiming Singapore’s Growth with Equity Social Compact’, Japanese Journal of Political Science, 16(2) (2015): 160–76. 13 Garry Rodan and Caroline Hughes, The Politics of Accountability in Southeast Asia: The Dominance of Moral Ideologies (UK: Oxford University Press, 2014).



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increasing inputs of capital, labour and land rather than productivity. The approach may have been appropriate for a developing ‘catch-up’ economy, but problematic for a high-income economy at the global technological frontier and lacking a robust local private entrepreneurship.14 Singapore is now even more strongly dependent on foreign labour and ‘talent’, foreign capital and technology and less egalitarian than it was in the decades after independence. Lim notes that Singapore is more heavily reliant on MNCs than other Northeast Asian states such as South Korea, Taiwan and Japan where robust local private enterprises have developed. The Singapore economic model in the 21st century has, according to Lim, disproportionately benefited international business and local elites rather than the average Singaporean.15 Highlighting the neo-liberal policy shifts of the PAP leadership through the decades, former National Wages Council Chairman, Lim Chong Yah, frankly noted at a forum in February 2016, ‘When I was Chairman of the National Wages Council, I said we had to have growth with equity. Later on, the emphasis was on more growth and less on equity. The result was that equity measures by GDP deteriorated tremendously, frighteningly.’16 In 2012 Lim Chong Yah controversially called for a narrowing of the wage gap in view of the widening Gini coefficient (which measures income inequality) and recommended that the monthly salary of Singaporean workers who earn less than S$1,500 a month be raised by more than 50 per cent over three years. Lim pointed out that Singapore’s lowest paid workers were underpaid more than 100 per cent than their counterparts in Hong Kong, Japan and Australia and that the low wages of Singaporean workers were only made possible by the influx of cheap foreign workers.17 Former Chief Economist of the GIC (Government of Singapore Investment Corporation), Yeoh Lam Keong, is also of the view that much more can be done to substantively address poverty and strengthen social safety nets. More specifically, Yeoh purports that the relatively low taxes could be raised to fund increases in social protection for the poor and aged. He also makes

14

Lim, pp. 206–7. Ibid., 213–17. 16 Cheong Suk-Wai, ‘Face Up to Slower Growth and Productivity Push: Swee Say’, The Straits Times, 27 February 2016. 17 Seah Chiang Nee, ‘Row Over Wage Shock Call’, The Star (Malaysia), 21 April 2012. 15

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the salient point that, compared to other developed OECD countries, Singapore has one of the lowest rates of public spending on healthcare, education and unemployment protection.18 The PAP’s 2015 election campaign, which drew heavily on its post-2011 social policy reform initiatives, paid off – at least in the short-term. The 10 per cent swing to the PAP in 2015 can be attributed to a sizeable portion of Singaporean voters signalling their support for PAP’s social policy reform initiatives, which resonate with the ‘growth with equity’ social compact of the 1960s, 1970s and part of the 1980s. The PAP government has been at pains to promote the view in the local papers that the growing income inequality phenomenon, as expressed in the Gini coefficient index, has improved – albeit marginally. Supposedly improved incomes of the bottom 10 per cent (but with at least one working member) have been strongly attributed to the progressive wage model, initiated in only a few sectors such as security and landscaping.19 Despite the systematic ‘talking up’, if this social policy reform initiative is not sustained, and economic pressures on the Singaporeans are not substantially ameliorated and social mobility remains problematic, there are likely to be future electoral backlashes against the PAP. In other words, the PAP is very much on notice.

Technocratic Governance The PAP’s declining electoral fortunes in 2006 and 2011 can be attributed to its technocratic leadership that appears increasingly out of touch with the public mood for greater public consultation, transparent governance, political pluralism and economic equity. However, the depth of this public mood had not been fully appreciated by the technocrats parachuted into the party largely from the civil service, military and statutory boards. Long used to policy-making based on minimal and superficial public consultation, promises of reform and greater consultation, especially after the 2011

18

Yeoh Lam Keong, ‘Comments on DPM Tharman’s Speech’, available at http://m. facebook.com/lamkeonh.yeoh/posts. 19 Examples of the PAP government and the mainstream media ‘talking up’ on the social and income inequality issue, refer to Walter Sim, ‘Policy Changes Helped Boost Wages at Bottom’, The Straits Times, 27 February 2016; Chong Zi Liang, ‘Household Income Up, With Biggest Rise for Poorer Families’, The Straits Times, 27 February 2016.



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election, appear to have lapsed into the familiar ’I know what’s best’ stance. This technocratic orientation has been reinforced by the party’s continued veneration of well-educated technocrats who are purportedly ‘above politics’ when serving the national interest. This technocratic style of governance is supposedly impartial, objective, scientific and rational compared to democratic forms of governance, which have been projected as adversarial, unruly, short-sighted20 and criticised for contradicting consensus-based and communitarian ‘Asian Values’. Garry Rodan asserts that this consensusbased form of governance is also premised on a moral ideology of political accountability which emphasises the virtues of political leaders rather than democratic institutions.21 Political leaders are projected as moral guardians of society based on their moral virtues and meritocratic credentials. Inter alia, this form of governance rejects the principles of citizenship rights, popular sovereignty and transparency. This notion of moral accountability is central to PAP’s technocratic authoritarian governance.22 Since the retirement of the PAP ‘old guard’ from the 1980s, the party increasingly resembles the Leninist cadre system. In this system, MPs and the party rank-and-file have minimal clout in policy formulation. Senior party leaders select members who are given cadre status with voting rights, who in turn select the leadership to the Central Executive Committee (CEC). The cadre system appears to have hindered the rise of factionalism and the development of bottom-up democratic processes within the party. Long-standing party activism, public service and strong connection with the public are not key requirements in climbing up the PAP hierarchy23 – even though this was a common attribute of the first generation or ‘old guard’ PAP leadership. Instead, the PAP has relied strongly on grassroots organisations, such as the People’s Association (PA), Citizen Consultative Committees (CCC) and Resident Committees (RC), which operate in public housing estates where about 80 per cent of Singaporeans reside, for information on the public mood. As the 2011 electoral backlash highlighted, 20

Kenneth Paul Tan, ‘The Ideology of Pragmatism: Neo-Liberal Globalisation and Political Authoritarianism in Singapore’, Journal of Contemporary Asia, 42(1) (2010): 87. 21 Rodan, p. 3. 22 Rodan and Hughes, pp. 4–15. 23 Ang Yong Guan, ‘Fear No More’, in A Nation Awakens: Frontline Reflections, ed. Tan Jee Say (Singapore: Ethos Books, 2011), p. 5.

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this grassroots network may have been giving the PAP leadership sanitised feedback. Private polling and surveys undertaken by the PAP and state agencies may not have effectively captured the depth of public discontent, prompting suggestions that independent surveys may be required to accurately gauge the public mood.24 Typical of long-serving authoritarian regimes operating in an echo chamber, the PAP leadership is inclined to believe its own propaganda, thereby failing to fully appreciate the groundswell of discontent. The party appears to have difficulty attracting public intellectuals and others with a solid record of community service, due in part to a topdown recruitment process which includes psychometric tests which tend to favour political novices and technocrats. The few public intellectuals who have been co-opted into the PAP appear to have been transformed by the party’s authoritarian political culture rather than transforming it. The group representative constituency (GRC) electoral system, introduced in the mid-1980s, has made it relatively easy for technocrats and senior military personnel with limited political experience and skill to be elected to Parliament. Instructively, the PAP’s selection process has resulted in the under-representation of ethnic minorities and women, particularly at the more senior levels of government. The 2011 electoral backlash suggests the need for a major overhaul of the PAP’s internal party structure and selection process if the governing political party is to attract a critical mass of genuine politicians within its ranks. Leaked Wikileaks diplomatic cables revealed that the party has been fielding ‘second and third tier candidates’ since the 2006 election.25 Not surprisingly, technocrats and others from the public and private sectors who are disinclined to engage in the rough and tumble of the increasingly competitive political environment in Singapore have become less attracted to joining the PAP. With the eclipse of the large-scale electoral walkover phenomena prevalent in the past, there is greater recognition that contesting as a PAP candidate will no longer guarantee victory. The 2011 election demonstrated that the past strategy of using a minister as an ‘anchor’ in heading the multi-member GRC constituency may no longer be effective. 24

25

Matt Miller, ‘S’pore’s Next Frontier’, The Washington Post, 9 May 2012. Seah Chiang Nee, ‘No More easy Polls for PAP’, The Star (Malaysia), 3 December 2011.



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In the increasingly volatile electoral landscape, technocrat politicians with minimal political experience, but helicoptered into senior positions within the PAP front bench, are likely to falter due in part to their generally poor political skills and inability to communicate effectively with the increasingly sophisticated electorate. The 2011 election setbacks and subsequent byelection losses and the repeated gaffes of ministers in the lead-up to and during the 2015 election26 demonstrate that the PAP needs to recruit more women and politically savvy and grassroots activists who are able to relate to the aspirations of the masses. Psychometric tests and stellar academic credentials cannot be relied upon to identify those genuinely committed to public service. The opposition parties have in the more recent elections been able to attract politically savvy candidates with impressive academic and public service credentials. In contrast to the PAP’s rookie candidates from stock backgrounds (such as the civil service, military and National Trade Union Congress), opposition party candidates hail from more diverse settings including the NGO sector, small and medium size enterprises and the corporate world. Many opposition candidates exhibit a refreshing boldness in their ideas and are able to communicate these ideas effectively27 – in sharp contrast to the generally wooden persona and uninspiring oral deliveries of PAP candidates. The opposition parties have, since the 2006 elections, attracted many electorally savvy candidates with excellent academic and social communication skills. Is the PAP leadership, led by the technocratic Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong, up to the political challenge of substantively reforming its elitist and paternalistic style of governance that is increasingly out of sync in the 21st century? Following the resignation from the PAP Central Executive of former Prime Ministers Lee Kuan Yew and Goh Chok Tong and four other PAP stalwarts after the 2011 electoral setbacks, Lee acknowledged the need for party reform: ‘The party has much work ahead if it is to strengthen its roots, extend its outreach, and convince a new generation 26

Refer to Lily Zubaidah Rahim, ‘Fear, Smear and the Paradox of Authoritarian Politics’, The Conversation, 28 September 2015, accessed 15 April 2016, http:// theconversation.com/fear-smear-and-the-paradox-of-authoritarian-politics-insingapore-47763. 27 Eugene Tan, ‘Election Issues’ in Voting in Change: Politics of Singapore’s 2011 General Election, eds. Kevin Tan and Terence Lee (Singapore: Ethos Books, 2011), p. 31.

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of voters to support its ideals, vision and programs.’28 At a PAP convention in November 2011, Lee appealed to 1,500 party activists in attendance to build a new PAP.29 Years after Lee’s post-2011 proclamations on the need for change, the PAP government’s record of substantive policy reform in the areas of healthcare, education, housing and immigration remains piece-meal and chequered. The speeches of PAP ministers such as former Major General Chan Chun Sing, who currently heads the National Trade Union Congress and is touted as a likely future prime minister, have left political observers pessimistic about PAP’s political reform agenda. At the PAP convention in 2013, Chan reminded party members that ‘We will have to do battle everywhere as necessary.... If we do not stand up for what we believe, others will occupy the space and cast us into irrelevance. We must not concede the space- physical or cyber.’30 It is worth noting that some of the more savvy PAP MPs have more recently begun to reach out to the masses by projecting a more approachable and less elitist image. However, these grassroots-oriented MPs tend to be a small minority within the PAP, hail disproportionately from ethnic minority communities and are generally not elevated to Cabinet ministerial status. While social policy reforms may have been implemented under the technocratic leadership of Lee Hsien Loong, certain policies have remained relatively intact. These include the continued high-growth population policy based on a reliance on high levels of immigrants and foreign labour. After the 2011 election, public expectations that the government would scale back on the huge infusion of immigrants were dampened when Lee Kuan Yew rationalised the continued high intake of immigrants by claiming that the biggest challenge facing the nation was the falling birth rate. Instructively, the Sino-centric Lee lamented the decline in the Chinese birth rate, which at 1.08 is significantly below the replacement rate of 2.1, and if not addressed ‘the population of Chinese Singaporeans in the next generation – 18 to 20

28

The others who resigned were Lim Boon Heng, Wong Kan Seng, George Yeo and Lim Hwee Hua. See Netty Ismail, ‘LKY Leaves PAP’s Central Executive Committee’, Bloomberg News (Singapore), 6 October 2011. 29 Seah Chiang Nee, ‘No More easy Polls for PAP’, The Star (Malaysia), 3 December 2011. 30 Cited in Kevin Lim, Seah Chiang Nee, ‘Is Singapore Turning Back the Clock’, The Star (Malaysia), 21 December 2013.



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years will halve’.31 It is worth noting that from the 1980s, Lee consistently advocated that the numerical dominance of the Chinese be maintained, ostensibly to fuel Singapore’s economic dynamism. Malaysian and PRC Chinese continue to make up the largest and second largest groups of immigrants.32 Surprisingly, the racialist agenda underpinning the highgrowth population policy has not been systematically analysed by many academics and observers of Singapore politics. What has been more readily discussed is the manner in which the high growth immigration policy is also closely intertwined with the electoral calculation of the PAP leadership – consistent anecdotal evidence suggests that more than 20,000 new citizens each year are likely to vote for PAP. By the 2015 election there were approximately 125,000 new citizens who make up 5–6 per cent of the total electorate – enough to tip some tight electoral contests in multi-member and single-member seats in favour of PAP. Affirming his father’s longstanding preoccupation with maintaining Chinese numerical dominance and boosting population levels, Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong in 2012 claimed that Singapore’s current population of more than five million could accommodate another million. ‘In the future, six million or so should not be a problem.’33 The hasty passage of the White Paper on Population, with minimal public consultation and continued large inflows of foreigner workers, suggests that PAP’s high-growth population policy, like its long-standing high defence expenditure, represents a policy fundamental and is thus non-negotiable. It is worth noting that Lee’s 2015 National Day Rally speech conspicuously made no reference to tackling income inequality or of reforming the eugenics-based early streaming in the education system. It appears that the latter may be another non-negotiable policy.34

The Politics of ‘Relative Democracy’

31

Sumitra Sreedharan, ‘Singapore Needs to Accept Immigrants’, Reuters, 4 February 2012. 32 Lily Z. Rahim, Singapore in the Malay World: Building and Breaching Regional Bridges (UK: Routledge, 2009), pp. 43–77. 33 Cited in Yahoo, 23 September 2012. 34 Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong, ‘National Day Rally Speech 2015’, last updated 28 August 2015, accessed 16 April 2016, http://www.pmo.gov.sg/mediacentre/primeminister-lee-hsien-loong-national-day-rally-2015-speech-english.

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A major impediment to genuine reform is the commanding legacy of former Prime Minister (1959–1990) Lee Kuan Yew and the Lee family. Lee Kuan Yew may have died, but the PAP government has ensured that his legacy continues to wield substantial influence. Members of the Lee family continue to retain pivotal positions in state agencies such as the sovereign wealth fund Temasek Holdings, Government of Singapore Investment Corporation (GIC) and government-linked companies (GLCs). In Singapore’s ‘relative democracy’ helmed by Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong, father Lee Kuan Yew was senior advisor of the GIC, wife Ho Ching is CEO of Temasek Holdings, cousin Kwa Ching Seng is Deputy Chairman of Temasek Holdings, brother Lee Hsien Yang is head of the Civil Aviation Authority of Singapore and CEO of the GLC Fraser and Neave. Other close relatives hold important positions in GLCs.35 As Barr notes, Lee Hsien Loong is very much at the core of a political dynasty built by his late father who had ‘placed him at the centre of all webs of social and political power in Singapore’.36 The dominance of the Lee family and their trusted associates in key state agencies has spawned an authoritarian culture of governance based on a lack of transparency and accountability. Acutely sensitive to allegations of nepotism and dynastic politics levelled against the Lee family, the PAP leadership has regularly sued international papers and Singaporeans to preserve their claim to moral authority and purported commitment to meritocratic principles. In a 2010 interview with the American journalist Charlie Rose, Lee Hsien Loong insisted that ‘The whole of our system is founded on a basic concept of meritocracy... And if anybody doubts that I as Prime Minister am here not because I’m the best man for the job but because my father fixed it...then my entire credibility and moral authority is destroyed.’37 Ironically, Prime Minister Lee’s attempts to dispel local and international perceptions of dynastic politics was contradicted when younger sister, Lee Wei Ling, accused him of having ‘no qualms abusing his power’ and seeking to establish a political dynasty by exploiting the death of their father, Lee 35

See Tan Boon Seng, ‘Why it May be Difficult for the Government to Withdraw from Business’, 10 February 2002, accessed 15 April 2016, http://www.singapore-window. org/sw02/020210gl.htm. 36 Michael Barr, ‘The Lee Family Project: A Dynasty by Merit?’ (Paper Presented at the ASAA Conference, University of Western Sydney, July 2012), p. 7. 37 Cited in ‘Singapore’s Political System a One-Legged Stool’, accessed 15 April 2016, http://www.yawningbread.org/index2.html.



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Kuan Yew. Warned Lee Wei Ling, ‘LKY’s daughter will not allow LKY’s name to be sullied by a dishonourable son.’38 Prime Minister Lee promptly responded to these damaging but long-standing charges of dynastic politics and the demise of meritocracy in the increasingly elitist Singaporean society by claiming, ‘The idea that I should wish to establish a dynasty makes even less sense… Meritocracy is a fundamental value of our society.’39 This very public family feud within the House of Lee has undoubtedly dented the moral authority of Lee Hsien Loong and the broader PAP technocratic government.

Conclusion Alongside the PAP government’s social policy reform initiatives, reminders have also been repeatedly issued about the importance of ‘getting the politics right’ – a synonym for the rejection of adversarial style politics typical in plural democracies – well before the 2015 election. It thus appears that while the PAP leadership is willing to strategically partake in some social policy refinements, the political arena will remain closely monitored and parameters tightly patrolled. The PAP’s ‘carrot and stick’ approach appears to be based on extending social policy reforms and benefits whilst resisting the pressure for substantive political reform. There has been a re-regulation of the internet, increased harassment of opposition politicians, and greater pressure on social media and civil society activists who have been subject to legal suits. Reflecting this political backsliding, Singapore’s press freedom ranking by Reporters Without Borders slipped to 149 in 2013, from 135 in 2012. Human Rights Watch has also criticised the tightening media censorship and cautioned the PAP government that these restrictive measures could undercut Singapore’s status as a financial centre.40 Blogger Roy Ngerng was sued and convicted for enquiring whether Singapore’s sovereign wealth funds have tapped into the reservoir of CPF funds, even though this enquiry is an important public issue. Sixteen-year-old Amos Yee was prosecuted for his social

38

‘Singapore’s Lawsuit-Happy Lee Family’, Asia Sentinel, 12 April 2016. Jeevan Vasagar, ‘Singapore’s First Family Plays out Feud on Facebook’, Financial Times, 11 April 2016. 40 Eveline Danubratain, ‘Ónline Media Licensing Undercuts Singapore’s Financial Status: Report’, Reuters, 7 June 2013. 39

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media comments about Lee Kuan Yew’s legacy and served time in a mental institution for his audacity. Given the entrenchment of authoritarian governance, the PAPs social policy reform initiatives appear to be primarily driven by strategic considerations rather than a broader ideological shift towards the left or a return to the party’s social democratic roots. It appears that the long-standing mode of technocratic and authoritarian governance has been refined but remains intact. If these social policy initiatives do not result in a return to the ‘growth with equity’ development paradigm of the post-independence decades, the PAP can expect further electoral volatility and backlashes from an increasingly demanding citizenry willing to put one of the longest serving electoral authoritarian regimes on notice.

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Chapter 8

PAP’s Communication Strategy Terence Lee

Introduction On 7 May 2011 politics in Singapore surprisingly came of age when a record number of six opposition members – out of a total of 87 seats – were elected into parliament at Singapore’s 12th general election since it attained independence in 1965. Statistically, 60.1 per cent of voters remained loyal to the People’s Action Party (PAP) government and were happy to see the ruling party maintain its unbroken dominance. However, 39.9 per cent of voters, a record showing for the Opposition, desired alternative voices in parliament.1 These percentages were not reflected in the eventual parliamentary make-up since the simple plurality or ‘first-past-the-post’ electoral system – comprising an eclectic mix of multi-member candidates known as group representation constituencies (GRCs) and the basic single member constituencies (SMCs) – allowed the incumbent PAP to capture an overwhelming 81 out of 87 seats. A further three opposition candidates (comprising the best ‘losers’) entered Parliament via Singapore’s unique nonconstituency MP (NCMP) scheme.2

1

Kevin Y.L. Tan and Terence Lee, ‘Political Shift: Singapore’s 2011 General Election’, in Voting in Change: Politics of Singapore’s 2011 General Election, eds. Kevin Y.L. Tan and Terence Lee (Singapore: Ethos Books, 2011), pp. 9–25. 2 See P.E. Lam, ‘The Voters Speak: Voices, Choices and Implications’, in Voting in Change: Politics of Singapore’s 2011 General Election, eds. Kevin Y.L. Tan and Terence Lee (Singapore: Ethos Books, 2011), pp. 131–44; Kevin Y.L. Tan, ‘Legal and Constitutional Issues’, in Voting in Change: Politics of Singapore’s 2011 General Election, eds. Kevin Y.L. Tan and Terence Lee (Singapore: Ethos Books, 2011), pp. 50–65.

113

114 Regime Resilience in Malaysia and Singapore

While the records registered by the Opposition at the election would be deemed irrelevant and unremarkable in any liberal democracy, what was significant at this event was that the Singaporean electorate – known variously until then as an apathetic, frightened and socio-politically disengaged lot – ‘spoke up’ and made their voices heard in virtually all mediated channels possible.3 This prompted Catherine Lim, one of Singapore’s best-known novelists cum political commentator, to recount in her book – unmistakably entitled A Watershed Election – that a combination of elements had sparked a seemingly permanent socio-political shift at GE 2011.4 As she rhetoricizes: The Singapore General Election of 2011 (GE 2011) gripped me like no other. It was truly a watershed election on so many counts: the emergence of a younger, more sophisticated and articulate electorate, an overall mood of voter discontentment, the tremendous power of the Internet, the appearance of a stronger, bolder opposition, all combining to force the People’s Action Party (PAP) government to launch a stunning programme of reforms that would change the Singapore political landscape forever.5

In the weeks and months following Singapore’s general election of May 2011 (GE 2011), various descriptors were propounded to explain the palpable shift in Singapore’s electoral landscape. GE2011 was described as a political, social and cultural ‘game-changer’, a political ‘awakening’ and, perhaps the single most over-used term, a ‘watershed’.6 While Lim highlights some aspects of this shift in the above quote, many Singapore political watchers found it difficult to put a finger on what this entailed. Professor Kevin YL Tan, a Singaporean constitutional lawyer and legal historian, and this author sought to capture the immediacy of GE 2011 by putting together an edited collection of analyses penned by well-regarded intellectuals and academic colleagues based in Singapore and elsewhere. The bestselling book, entitled Voting in Change: Politics of Singapore’s 2011 General Election and launched just a month after GE 2011, evaluated the impact of the ‘historic’ election

3

Terence Lee, The Media, Cultural Control and Government in Singapore (Oxon: Routledge, 2010). 4 See Catherine Lim, A Watershed Election: Singapore’s GE 2011 (Singapore: Marshall Cavendish, 2011). 5 Ibid., p. 5. 6 Tan and Lee, ‘Political Shift’.



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form the perspectives of law, history, politics, media and sociology.7 In the concluding chapter of the book, political scientist Lam Peng Er identified communication as a problem that had to be addressed by the ruling PAP government in what became subsequently known as the ‘new normal’: GE2011 may pave the way to a more ‘normal’ democracy in Singapore in which there is greater representation of alternative voices in Parliament, and where the people fearlessly articulate and assert their preferences in policy formulation and implementation. […] It will require the party leadership to change its mindset towards citizens: instead of talking ‘down’, ‘at’ or ‘to’ subjects, the PAP needs to talk ‘with’ people and listen to them.8

Lam, in fact, pre-empted the PAP’s own ‘post-election’ review. This took place at PAP’s party convention in November 2011 that ended up becoming a ‘post-mortem’ of what went wrong in GE2011. PAP chairman and Housing Minister Khaw Boon Wan delivered a speech at the convention entitled ‘We hear you, we’ll change, and improve your lives’ which identified the need to ‘communicate and connect’ with the people via all media (and nonmedia) platforms.9 Communication Minister Yaacob Ibrahim responded with a speech of his own that concluded that Singapore’s ‘government communication style must evolve’.10 The following sections in this essay address the issue of the communication deficit in Singapore by arguing that the only solution to a communication problem or deficit is to ‘normalise’ communication such that it is a genuinely two-way praxis.11 Unfortunately, this has not been forthcoming. The PAP government’s long-standing insistence that communication – encompassing the terms of political engagement and control of the means and channels of mediated communication – must be in its own hands is precisely the problem that must be resolved.

7

Kevin Y.L. Tan and Terence Lee (eds), Voting in Change: Politics of Singapore’s 2011 General Election, (Singapore: Ethos Books, 2011). 8 Lam, pp. 178, 192. 9 B.W. Khaw, ‘PAP: We hear you, we will change’, The Straits Times, 21 November 2011, accessed 30 December 2011, www.straitstimes.com.sg. 10 Ibid. 11 Terence Lee, ‘Government Communication in Singapore’, in Government Communication: Cases and Challenges, eds. Karen Sanders and Maria Jose Canel (London: Bloomsbury, 2013), p. 254.

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This essay makes the point that the authoritarian premise for government communication in Singapore, with just about every communication inlet and outlet historically controlled by the authorities, has gone past its use-by-date and is in desperate need of an overhaul.12 Yet one of the hallmarks of authoritarianism is precisely the overt rejection of alternative voices that would open up new discourses, especially those with democratic aspirations. It is therefore clear that for PAP, regime resilience involves ensuring that all communication channels relating to political discourse in Singapore are kept on a tight leash, with rhetoric of openness, increased engagement, feedback and other forms of public communication performing the role of pulling dissent, disagreements and disgruntlement back into the ambit of the PAP’s control. With this understanding, one can see that while the early signs in the months following GE2011 pointed to some communicative shifts – some of them seemingly monumental then – many of these had dissipated well before PAP regained its electoral dominance at Singapore’s 13th general election in September 2015. GE2015 saw PAP amassing 69.9 per cent of the popular vote, winning 83 out of 89 parliamentary seats, including the single member constituency (SMC) seat of Punggol East (that had been lost at a by-election in January 2013), and even came close to toppling the Workers’ Party in the Aljunied group representation constituency (GRC).13 It was PAP’s best performance since GE2001, which saw PAP receiving a popular vote of 75.3 per cent against the backdrop of a world gripped by terrorism fears following 9/11. Does the emphatic victory at GE2015 mean that PAP has overcome its communication deficit? Has PAP finally developed a responsive and potent communication strategy? This essay contends that one of the most overlooked aspects of regime resilience is communication, which involves getting the mode, the style, as well as the timing of communication as precise as possible. Following GE2011, while PAP sought to score a better grade for its ‘Communication 101’ course at GE2015, it only managed to apply it masterfully at the Bukit Batok by-election of May 2016. While this

12

13

Ibid., p. 243. Terence Lee, ‘The Pragmatics of Change: Singapore’s 2015 General Election’, in Change in Voting: Singapore’s 2015 General Election, eds. Terence Lee and Kevin Y.L. Tan (Singapore: Ethos Books, 2016), p. 9.



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does not mean that PAP will always get its communication strategy right, for the regime to remain resilient it has to, one way or another.

Talking and Listening: Communication 101 For more than 170 years, Singapore has been well-served by its flagship daily newspaper, The Straits Times.14 Not only has it been able to remain profitable amidst global technological challenges, The Straits Times has been able to thrive and increase circulation almost yearly since the advent of online journalism in the 1990s. In should come as no surprise then that GE2011 saw record circulation of mainstream newspapers, with The Straits Times registering an increase in daily sales of 5.1 per cent or 17,500 copies over the campaign period.15 The online news sites of the Singapore Press Holdings (SPH) group also performed remarkably well, with a total of 116 million page views and about 7.9 million video views on its key sites: straitstimes. com, Stomp, AsiaOne, The Straits Times RazorTV, Zaobao.com and omy. sg (Ibid.). The Internet rose another notch at GE2011 with video uploads, more ‘twits’ (via twitter), more Facebook profiles and ‘likes’, more citizen journalism reports, blog entries, posts and comments and, by the same token, more online vitriol on new candidates.16 Not only were Singaporeans using, consuming and ‘prod-using’ both the traditional and online media in greater depth and degree;17 they were also attending on-site election rallies in droves,18 and publicly articulating their thoughts on a range of personal and national issues. Unlike previous elections where municipal issues and self-interests – led most prominently by upgrading and refurbishment of public housing 14

Linette Lai, ‘Major revamp for The Straits Times as it celebrates 170 years’, The Straits Times, 6 January 2015, accessed 14 March 2015, http://www.straitstimes.com/ singapore/major-revamp-for-the-straits-times-as-it-celebrates-170-years. 15 Terence Lee, ‘Mainstream Media Reporting in the Lead-up to GE2011’, in Voting in Change: Politics of Singapore’s 2011 General Election, eds. Kevin Y.L. Tan and Terence Lee (Singapore: Ethos Books, 2011), p. 141. 16 C. George, ‘Internet Politics: Shouting Down the PAP’, in Voting in Change: Politics of Singapore’s 2011 General Election, eds. Kevin Y.L. Tan and Terence Lee (Singapore: Ethos Books, 2011), pp. 145–60. 17 Ibid. 18 T. Chong, ‘Election Rallies: Performances in Dissent, Identity, Personalities and Power’, in Voting in Change: Politics of Singapore’s 2011 General Election, eds. Kevin Y.L. Tan and Terence Lee (Singapore: Ethos Books, 2011), pp. 116–17.

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estates that would translate to asset-enhancing benefits for home-owners – dominated, GE2011 had a more nationalistic agenda where government mistakes and mishandling of national issues were top on the list. These were made manifest in issues such as cost of living and an expanding income gap, housing affordability, inadequate national infrastructure and overcrowded public transport, ministerial budget overruns, escape of a terrorist, immigration (mainly increase in foreigner population), all of which were topped off by highly-paid ministers’ lack of accountability.19 While most of these issues had existed in the past – particularly during the elections of 2001 and 2006 – back then the government could easily sidestep these issues via pork-barrelling tactics and promises of discounted or free estate upgrades. In addition, the government could employ communication strategies that involved the assiduous management and control of information such that most Singaporeans would never receive the full picture. This was the same strategy employed during the ‘Great Casino Debate’ that ran between March 2004 and April 2005, although the sensitivity of the casino debate left a somewhat bitter after-taste because, despite 50 per cent of the population opposing, the government decided to proceed with the construction of two casinos nestled within the mega-integrated resorts that subsequently became known as Marina Bay Sands and Resorts World Sentosa. Not sensing that there was on-going disquiet amongst Singaporeans who felt that the government was merely paying lip-service to citizen consultation, the government’s Feedback Unit even audaciously declared that the ‘Great Casino Debate’ was ‘the mother of all consultations’ or an exemplary showpiece for open government communication.20 Instead of informing the debate, the viewpoints of Singaporeans became fodder for the management of dissent and disgruntlement once the decision was made. This has been the modus operandi of PAP’s communication strategy for a long time and, indeed, is a critical reason why the regime has stayed so resilient in spite of 19

See Kevin Y.L. Tan, ‘Legal and Constitutional Issues’, in Voting in Change: Politics of Singapore’s 2011 General Election, eds. Kevin Y.L. Tan and Terence Lee (Singapore: Ethos Books, 2011), pp. 50–65; Michael Barr, ‘Singapore’s Election Shift’, The Diplomat, 10 May 2011. 20 Terence Lee, ‘Gestural Politics: Mediating the “new” Singapore’, in Political Regimes and the Media in Asia, eds. Krishna Sen and Terence Lee (Oxon: Routledge, 2008), pp. 170–87.



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technological shifts and demographic changes to the electorate. In 2011, however, government communication in Singapore came under unprecedented pressure with the flow of communication disrupted as soon as the election campaign started. Although the mainstream media led by The Straits Times continued to echo partisan biases and prescribed agendas in favour of the ruling PAP right up to nomination day,21 many Singaporeans diligently sought their versions of ‘truth’ via the Internet and by communicating about politics at the community/grassroots level. The Internet was thus a major factor, not so much in actually transmitting new information, but rather in facilitating the search for corroborating facts and information, and also signifying that there can be an alternative (or alternatives).22 This marked a certain shift in political consciousness among the Singapore populace. GE2011 thus became a ‘watershed’, paving the way for Singapore to embrace some semblance of a ‘normal’ democracy in which the ruling PAP has to heed the people’s desire for genuine political consultation and participation, and with genuine alternative voices in Parliament.23 Although it can be argued that the swing back to PAP in GE2015 has given pause for a political rethink, I would argue that GE2011 remains significant as it has demonstrated that voters can send tremors to jolt the establishment. The impact of GE2011 on the communication discourse in Singapore was seismic by both Singaporean and global standards. Barely one week after the polls, PAP elders Lee Kuan Yew and Goh Chok Tong, then aged 87 and 70 respectively, resigned from the Cabinet. Lee Kuan Yew, who passed away in March 2015 and who is recognised as the founding father of modern Singapore, stepped down that year after 52 years in Cabinet. Often compared to a towering banyan tree in Singapore politics, and known for his decisive, uncompromising and authoritarian brand of leadership which underpinned the country’s rapid economic development and affluence, his retirement marked a new dawn in Singapore politics.24 It would not be inaccurate to say that the post-Lee Kuan Yew era in Singapore politics 21

Lee, ‘Mainstream Media Reporting’, p. 142. C. George, Contentious Journalism and the Internet: Towards Democratic Discourse in Malaysia and Singapore (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2006); C. George, Freedom from the Press: Journalism and State Power in Singapore (Singapore: NUS Press, 2013). 23 Lam, p. 175. 24 Ibid., p. 177. 22

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commenced in 2011, and not just after his passing in 2015. Additionally, shortly after the resignation of MM Lee and SM Goh, PM Lee retired three of the most unpopular ministers from his Cabinet: Raymond Lim, Mah Bow Tan and Wong Kan Seng, who were responsible for mis-steps over public transportation, public housing and home security respectively. All three polled less than the PAP’s national average of 60.1 per cent in their constituencies. Acknowledging that the weaker poll results were the motivating factor, PM Lee acted decisively in heeding the voters’ voice by boldly getting rid of the weakest links in his Cabinet, and giving it a complete overhaul by bringing in two fresh faces: Heng Swee Kiat as Education Minister and Major-General Chan Chun Sing as Acting Minister for Community Development, Youth and Sports (CDYS) and Minister of State for Information, Communication and the Arts. Following GE2011, PAP leaders, ministers and MPs identified communication as the weakest link in PAP’s style of governance. This was preceded by an unprecedented public apology for the government’s policy failures issued by Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong himself towards the latter part of the GE2011 campaign.25 While public contrition as a form of political communication would be well-received by some as an expression of genuine regret, for others it would be an invitation to continue their activism against PAP. Regardless, it was necessary for the PAP government to develop a better communication strategy to engage the citizenry. Although there would have been many intra-governmental meetings on this subject, the most tangible external outcome was the appointment of Janadas Devan as Chief of Government Communications from 1 July 2012. According to the Ministry of Communication and Information’s press release, Janadas’ job was to ‘coordinate the Government’s public communication efforts and lead the Information Service in enhancing its public communication network across the public sector’.26 Janadas – who was already the Director of the government-funded think tank, the Institute of Policy Studies (IPS), and as Associate Editor of

25

Lee, ‘The Pragmatics of Change’, p. 10. of Communications and Information (MCI) ‘Appointment to the Government Information Service’, press release, 27 June 2012, accessed 10 December 2013, http://www.mci.gov.sg/content/mci_corp/web/mci/pressroom/categories/press_ releases/2012/appointment_to_thegovernmentinformationservice.html.

26 Ministry

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The Straits Times at the time – would become the Singapore government’s official ‘spin doctor’. While the appointment of a current journalist as the government’s communications adviser is by no means unusual anywhere, what was different in the case of Singapore was that politically-endorsed individuals with in-demand skills are often co-opted to wear many different, even conflicting, hats. In this case, any conflict of interest would have been overlooked given the urgency of the task (in that the appointment was made shortly after the PAP again lost the single constituent seat of Hougang in a May 2012 by-election). It was quite apparent by that time that the government knew it had been deficient in its dialogic relationship with citizens, and was bent on improving its communications strategy. The only problem was that the Singapore government did not have a strong strategic base from which to deploy a fool-proof communication strategy. It had to rely on advice from the Chief Government Communicator Janadas Devan, who in turn had to rely on the government’s extant competency: in conducting a nationwide consultation exercise, but with some tinkering of styles and approaches. From 2012 to 2013 this took the form of what became known as ‘Our Singapore Conversation’.

Our Singapore Conversation On 26 August 2012, in his annual address to the nation at the National Day Rally speech, Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong announced that a year-long nationwide ‘listening’ exercise, adopting the format of an open-ended or unstructured focus group conversation, would be headed by newly-minted MP and education minister Heng Swee Keat. Known as Our Singapore Conversation (OSC), its aim was to ‘reach out to as many Singaporeans as possible, from all walks of life [and] to understand each other’s perspectives and aspirations’.27 The OSC’s report Reflections (published in August 2013) proudly declared that 47,000 Singaporeans had participated in more than 660 small group dialogue sessions. Along with 1,331 email threads and more than 4,000 Facebook posts and messages, the government was able to tap into the concerns and core aspirations of Singaporeans. The collective findings

27 See

Heng in OSC, Reflections of Our Singapore Conversation (Singapore: Government of Singapore, 2013).

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of the exercise would, according to the minister, be digested and inform policy reviews (not policy-making per se) via relevant government agencies. At first glance the OSC seemed like a fair attempt to re-engage with the electorate and understand more intimately the concerns of everyday Singaporeans. However, a government-initiated dialogue with the citizenry was by no means new. OSC was really the latest then in a series of similar ventures designed to gauge sentiments and socio-political pulses. Singapore 21: Together We Make the Difference28 had also framed itself as having the elements of consultation by incorporating the voices of ‘people from all walks of life’. The names of all participants were recorded and emblazoned in fine print throughout the covers of the report. The Report of the Remaking Singapore Committee,29 which the OSC comes closest to replicating, also bore the hallmarks of consultation with grassroots conversations, albeit not as extensive as the OSC. Like the OSC, the Remaking Singapore project was assigned to a then novice minister, Vivian Balakrishnan, to increase his visibility and thrust him into the political leadership space for future redeployment. Despite the attention, Remaking Singapore was forgotten (and never to be re-invoked) as soon as the electoral cycle ended, making it nothing more than a talkfest to assuage certain concerns at the time. Without sounding too cynical or dismissive, it is fair to say that, like previous consultation exercises, OSC has already been consigned into history. The OSC exercise, however, enabled the PAP government to maintain a high degree of visibility as it attempted to reconnect with voters and test new policy options while, at the same time, the real policy reviews and rollouts of new government incentives were carried out in the respective government ministries and agencies. Indeed, in an interview with The Australian daily, Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong himself attributed the improved showing of the PAP government at GE2015 to the government’s hard work and visibility in addressing problems on the ground. As The Straits Times reported, ‘Although we have not solved all the problems, people could see we were working at it, and things were getting better,’ he [PM Lee]

28

Singapore 21: Together We Make the Difference (Singapore: Government of Singapore, 1999). 29 Remaking Singapore Committee, Changing Mindsets, Deepening Relationships: The Report of the Remaking Singapore Committee (Singapore: Government of Singapore, 2003).

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said. ‘They gave us credit for trying.’30

General Election 2015: Pragmatic Communication It appears that in the process of seeking to arrest its vote decline following GE2011, the PAP government identified a workable solution to its longheld communication deficit problem. PAP’s communication strategy – for want of a better word – is really about ensuring that government bodies and representatives enhance their presence among the electorate at critical junctures, whether in the form of a consultation exercise or in demonstrating an effort to improve policy outcomes. Importantly, it must make sure that as many Singaporeans as possible are privy to these activities. In the current post-media age, this strategy is even more crucial as news sources have diversified well beyond traditional or mainstream media outlets. The Internet and social media, which have become the preferred source of news for younger voters, must either reflect and echo the positive work of the PAP government or deflect criticisms about its failings. It is nevertheless impossible to accurately quantify the success or otherwise of PAP’s communication strategy based on the outcome of GE2015 because in 2015 the PAP government’s emphatic victory at the polls appears to have been aided by two unprecedented communicative events: the resurgence of nationalism following the demise of founding Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew in March 2015, and the feel-good factor of SG50, the year-long celebration of Singapore’s Golden Jubilee.31 One line of argument suggests that these events spoke to Singaporean voters of the Confucianist value of extending gratitude to Lee Kuan Yew and, by extension, the party he built and led for the majority of his life, by giving the PAP a resounding mandate at the polls. In all likelihood, however, the success of PAP’s GE2015 campaign could be attributed to its targeted policy responsiveness following GE2011 – and indeed its ability to start communicating more strategically to its citizen stakeholders. Perhaps the most pertinent example is the government’s ‘Pioneer Generation Package’ welfare assistance, designed to alleviate rising healthcare costs and day-to-day living expenses for 450,000 30

31

Cited in Lee, ‘The Pragmatics of Change’, p. 17, emphasis is mine. See C.L. Goh, ‘Big Bash “for all” as little red dot turns 50’, The Straits Times, 25 January 2014, accessed 26 January 2014, http://news.asiaone.com/news/singapore/ big-bash-all-little-red-dot-turns-50; Lee and Tan, Change in Voting.

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aged Singaporeans born before 31 December 1949, that was rolled out from September 2014 with strong mainstream and online media coverage.32 The media coverage even mobilised selected Chinese dialects, last invoked during the height of the severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) crisis in 2003, to reach out to the dialect-speaking ‘pioneer generation’ and their families. Just as GE2011 showed us, PAP’s electoral success at GE2015 may not necessarily be replicated. If anything, the resilience of the PAP regime will be tested once again as Singapore braces itself for challenging economic times that are predicted to continue through the course of the next electoral cycle (2015–2021). The PAP leaders and strategists would do well to remember that government–public communication has never been its strong suit. Its ability to implement a strong communication strategy in 2015 was very much a response to its failures on several policy fronts in 2011, with many of the areas still not fully resolved. In addition, the ‘supporting’ national events of 2015 – Lee Kuan Yew’s death and SG50 – were opportunistic, and they do not foreground communicative successes for future years. Nonetheless, PAP would have learned during this period that the crafting and fine-tuning of a communication strategy is necessary to maintain regime resilience. The opportunity to test this ‘new’ approach to its communication strategy came in 2016 when PAP was compelled to call a by-election in the Bukit Batok single-member constituency (SMC) in May 2016 following the sudden resignation of its MP David Ong on 12 March 2016 over an alleged extramarital affair. Unlike the preparations for GE2015, this by-election came after the PAP’s leadership had been affirmed by the citizenry with its strong results. This meant that not much was at stake in terms of PAP’s electoral majority and popular support. However, the Bukit Batok by-election held on 7 May 2016 proved to be compelling to watch as it was seen by Singaporeans and political observers as a bellwether of ‘heartland’ or working-class sentiments – and, thus, a case study of how successfully political candidates and parties communicate their political pitches to the electorate.33

32

33

See: https://www.pioneers.sg/. M.H. Chua, ‘Five things to watch out for in Bukit Batok by-election’, The Straits Times, 24 April 2016.



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Communication Case Study: Bukit Batok By-Election 2016 On 12 March 2016 PAP announced that its MP David Ong was resigning as the Member of Parliament for Bukit Batok, and from the party, due to a personal indiscretion. Although this was never explicitly proven, it became public information that he was having an adulterous affair with one of his female grassroots activists as she was named in the report.34 As soon as the news broke, the PAP moved swiftly to control the messaging, ensuring that the news did not descend into a scandal. The Prime Minister’s statement made it clear that a by-election would be called in due course, and sought to ensure that MP Ong’s indiscretion would be negated by releasing both the letter of resignation and the Prime Minister’s reply, which centred on Ong’s stellar service as an MP since 2011 and how it was in the best interests of all parties concerned that his resignation was accepted.35 Within an hour of the announcement, a press conference was helmed by Deputy Prime Minister Tharman Shanmugaratnam, arguably the most popular PAP MP and minister, and also the anchor minister of the neighbouring Jurong group representation constituency (GRC). Tharman’s key message was that the PAP’s first priority was to make sure that all Bukit Batok residents were taken care of. To this end, he announced that Jurong GRC MP Desmond Lee would be mobilised immediately to look after the physical and municipal needs of residents, while fellow MP Ang Wei Neng would act as chairman of the Jurong-Clementi Town Council (a position that disgraced MP David Ong also had held).36 The combination of Prime Minister Lee’s media release and Deputy Prime Minister Tharman’s press conference demonstrated communicative pragmatism, and had the effect of neutralising cynical responses that most would come to expect, especially the online community.37 Indeed, the Internet was abuzz with speculations and photographs about the possible identity of the female activist involved in the liaison, but such salacious information was already quelled by the 34

J. Heng, A. Au-Yong and Y. Tham, ‘Bukit Batok MP David Ong resigns, leaves PAP due to personal indiscretion; SDP says it will contest by-election’, The Straits Times, 12 March 2016, accessed 12 April 2016. http://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/ bukit-batok-mp-david-ong-resigns-leaves-pap-due-to-personal-reasons-byelection-to-be-held. 35 Ibid. 36 Ibid. 37 Lee, ‘The Pragmatics of Change’.

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time most Singaporeans learned of the episode. From a communication management perspective, this was skilfully executed considering that a similar episode involving PAP’s former Parliamentary Speaker and MP for Punggol East, Michael Palmer, led to PAP losing its seat to the Workers’ Party’s Lee Li Lian in a by-election in January 2013. By the afternoon of 12 March 2016 all meaningful information was already published either by the government or by the local media. What became more fascinating was the announcement – that same afternoon – by the Secretary-General of the Singapore Democratic Party (SDP), Chee Soon Juan, that it would field a candidate to contest the by-election. With that ‘claim-staking’ statement, the speculation turned towards whether the other opposition parties would also seek to contest the seat, which candidate PAP would field and whether the much-maligned Chee would have another tilt at resurrecting his political career. After all, Singaporeans who had observed Chee during the GE2015 hustings, especially at the political rallies, would have been impressed with his rehabilitated image and his milder approach to politics.38 Although the SDP did not win a single seat in GE2015, Chee’s own communication strategy would be seen as successful insofar as his personal makeover was concerned. It would make for a nail-biting by-election if Chee was to run for the by-election – which he did. The Bukit Batok by-election in May 2016 pitted SDP’s Chee Soon Juan against PAP’s Murali Pillai, a commercial litigator and a former PAP grassroots branch secretary in Bukit Batok from 2007–2011. Although Murali had contested in another constituency (in the opposition-held Aljunied GRC) with the PAP in GE2015, the choice to field him back at his original stomping ground was expedient as he already had prior exposure and rapport with residents in the ward. This is, after all, a ward of ‘heartlanders’, comprising a working-class population of 45,900 and 25,727 voters, with the vast majority living in public housing; only 4.2 per cent live in private homes.39 Murali was deemed to have the experience and demeanour to connect with the community. The fielding of Murali also demonstrated PAP’s confidence of not only

38

Chong, T. ‘At the Rallies in 2015’, in Change in Voting: Singapore’s 2015 General Election, eds. Terence Lee and Kevin Y.L. Tan (Singapore: Ethos Books, 2016), pp. 227–8. 39 M.H. Chua, ‘Five things to watch out for’.



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retaining the seat, but minimising the effect of race since Murali was an ethnic Indian competing against Chee, a Chinese, in a constituency with a higher than average number of Chinese voters. This was aided by PAP’s ‘big guns’ – various high-profile ministers – campaigning and speaking at political rallies on behalf of Murali, with several attempting to suggest that Chee was looking to play the race card, even though much of this was unsubstantiated. In essence, PAP was seeking to discredit Chee from the beginning of the campaign by etching in the minds of voters that he was unreliable and not to be trusted, a strategy it had also used in GE2015 with some success.40 PAP did so by attempting to rake up Chee’s history of adversarial politics and democracy advocacy via civil disobedience, thus negating, or at least minimising, his newfound moderate image. Even as Chee maintained his mild composure in response to the mudslinging, PM Lee Hsien Loong himself weighed in with an insinuating but powerful Facebook response on 1 May 2016: Character goes to the heart of the fitness of a candidate, whether it be an MP, or indeed to hold any public office. Is he honest? Does he have integrity? Is he loyal? Is he committed to serve the people? What are his basic motivations? These come first, before we even talk about how able he is, what experience he brings or what policies he proposes. This is so for PAP candidates. Good character and integrity is the first requirement, and it should be so for opposition parties too. It is understandable why SDP, and particularly Dr Chee Soon Juan, should wish it to be otherwise. But anyone standing for public office should be prepared to have his past actions examined, transparently and honestly, so that voters can make informed, responsible decisions as to who is fit and best qualified to represent them in Parliament.41

In communication terms, it did not matter that the by-election was the result of the character failure of a PAP MP. It also did not matter that PAP leaders were seen by observers as being somewhat over-the-top in their concerted attacks on Chee’s character and personality. What mattered was that in a series of speeches and statements, voters were being incessantly urged not to ‘complete’ Chee’s rehabilitation by voting him in – perhaps articulating in 40

41

T. Chong, ‘At the Rallies in 2015’. R. Au-Yong, ‘Bukit Batok by-election: Chee has not changed, says PM Lee Hsien Loong’, The Straits Times, 1 May 2016, accessed 2 May 2016, http://www.straitstimes. com.sg.

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the process that, while he would be a formidable MP in Parliament, he was not or wanted or needed. The 2016 Bukit Batok by-election was an excellent communication case study, with positive and negative campaigning examples for both sides of the political divide, and it showcased the ways in which PAP has (finally) begun to understand that political communication is a craft that requires constant adjustment and finessing. In the final analysis, not only did it retain the Bukit Batok SMC seat with 61.2 per cent of the vote, PAP overturned a 37year ‘hoodoo’ of losing every by-election since 1979. Political experts term this the ‘by-election effect’ where opposition parties win in a by-election on the basis that the PAP government would not be unseated if they lose the seat.42 The PAP government can now claim to have triumphed over the ‘byelection effect’, a banal claim that could be used to potent psychological and communicative effect in the future.

Conclusion Without a doubt, the significance of the task of political and public communication has risen in Singapore over the past decade. This has coincided with technological shifts as well as the ways in which Singaporeans now access their news and information, often bypassing mainstream media sources. Whilst the mode and style of the delivery of messages as well as the content are important, what is most important in the context of Singapore (and in many other polities) is the timing of specific content that has to be re-affirmed with actionable policy outcomes. From 2015 to 2016, while the Singapore government came closer to addressing its communication deficit that showed up during GE2011, there are no guarantees it will elicit the same outcome in the future. If the PAP regime is to remain resilient, it must continue to pay ever closer attention to how it communicates internally as well as externally, especially to the astute and intelligent Singaporean voters. For better or worse, it needs to continue to execute its communication strategy just right.

42

Z.L. Chong, ‘Five key insights from the Bukit Batok by-election’, The Straits Times, 15 May 2016.

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Chapter 9

New Media, Old Rule in Malaysia Ross Tapsell

The changing nature of communications technologies, including the increasingly dynamic capacity of the Internet to connect and transmit information, has contributed to rapid changes around the world. ‘New media’ technologies have been utilised to organise mass rallies, assist with clean elections and have generally provided a space for greater freedom of opinion and expression on a variety of issues and events throughout the region. At the same time, digitalisation of media content has seen existing media business models thrown into disarray. As Internet penetration increases, newspaper circulation generally declines. From the deterioration of quality journalism in democracies, to assisting the so-called ‘social media revolutions’ in authoritarian regimes, the impact of digital media is a hotly debated topic amongst scholars and the general public. In 2016 Thomas Carothers from the Carnegie Endowment of International Peace articulated what is now a crucial issue for many scholars of media and democracy. He described our current times as a ‘paradox’ and argued: The first fifteen years of this century have been a time of astonishing advances in communications and information technology, including digitalization, mass-accessible video platforms, smart phone, social media, billions of people gaining internet access, and much else. These revolutionary changes all imply a profound empowerment of individuals through exponentially greater access to information, tremendous ease of communication and data-sharing, and formidable tools for networking. Yet despite these changes, democracy – a political system based on the idea of the empowerment of individuals – has in these same years become stagnant in the world. The number of democracies today is basically no greater than it was at the start of the century. Many democracies, both long-established ones and newer ones, are experiencing serious

129

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institutional debilities and weak public confidence. 1

Malaysia provides an exciting yet complex case study of this ‘paradox’. Despite the advancement in new technologies described by Carothers, Malaysia’s ruling coalition, Barisan Nasional (BN), has remained in power. Malaysia’s political system has been described as ‘electoral authoritarianism’2 where the ruling coalition, BN, ‘has refrained from grossly rigging or stealing elections, instead perpetuating its dominance through subtler stratagems for more than three decades’.3 One of these stratagems has been restrictions on freedoms of the press, where the mainstream media in Malaysia is ‘shackled’4 and subject to ‘stringent controls’.5 Former Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad’s decision in 1996 not to regulate or censor the Internet meant strict laws on the printing press were less relevant to those producing news and views online. Malaysia’s online media are not exempt from legal pressure; other laws such as sedition and defamation charges have still been used to intimidate those who criticise the regime through the Internet. However, Malaysia’s online media have become a largely free and vibrant space, clearly distinct from the more restricted, largely pro-government mainstream media. The arrival of the Internet created a space for openness and debate in Malaysia during its protest movement (Reformasi) period from September 1998. Since that time, scholars and pundits, and even government officials, have pointed to online news portals Malaysiakini, and later The Malaysian Insider, as examples where opposition views are regularly published and where government policy is held to account, even criticised. Cherian George describes these sites as spaces for 1

2

3

4 5

Thomas Carothers, ‘Why Technology Hasn’t Delivered More Democracy’, Foreign Policy, 3 June 2015, accessed 30 May 2016, http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/06/03/ why-technology-hasnt-delivered-more-democracy-democratic-transition/ Andreas Schedler, ‘The Logic of Authoritarianism’, in Electoral Authoritarianism: The Dynamics of Unfree Competition, ed. Andreas Schedler (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2006), pp. 1–23. William Case, ‘Manipulative skills: How do rulers control the Electoral Arena?’ in Electoral Authoritarianism: The Dynamics of Unfree Competition, ed. Andreas Schedler (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2006), p. 312. Mohd Azizuddin Sani, ‘Media Freedom in Malaysia’, Journal of Contemporary Asia, 35(3) (2005): 341–58. Jason Abbott, ‘Electoral Authoritarianism and the Print Media in Malaysia: Measuring Political Bias and Analyzing Its Cause’, Asian Affairs: An American Review, 38(1) (2011): 16.



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‘contentious journalism’, where the Internet has been used to ‘democratize public discourse’.6 Total Internet penetration in Malaysia increased from 1,718,500 in 2008 to 5,839,600 in 2012. 7 By 2016, Malaysia’s Internet penetration rate was 68 per cent of the population, and well over 80 per cent in urban areas.8 As such, many of these sites have become more relevant to Malaysians seeking a range of news and views online. In the second decade of the twenty-first century, the young, urban population are increasingly accessing news through social media. This is particularly evident in Southeast Asia due to the prominence of mobile hand-held devices. In the lead-up to Malaysia’s 2013 election, 64 per cent of Facebook users in Malaysia were aged 18–34 years, while 62 per cent of the total unique visitors to the Internet were aged 15–34 years old.9 Social media has played a prominent role in mobilising events such as the Bersih [Clean] rallies which called for free and fair elections (amongst other reforms) and in the flourishing of anti-government material spread through young, urban communities. Indeed, as Meredith Weiss has argued, Malaysia’s young voters’ ‘political identities will have been moulded in a fundamentally different discursive environment than those of their elders’,10 in no small part due to the changing nature of information disseminated via digital media platforms. By 2016 Malaysia had 18 million social media accounts.11 Yet, as this book explains, the BN regime remains resilient in its ability to maintain power. If a large reason for the stability of an electoral authoritarian regime is to limit freedom of expression, how has the regime survived (so far) throughout the unprecedented change in communications technologies? This chapter examines how BN has managed (or not

6

Cherian George, Contentious Journalism and the Internet: Towards Democratic Discourse in Malaysia and Singapore (University of Washington Press, 2006). 7 See James Gomez, ‘Malaysia’s social media election is already over – James Gomez’, The Malaysian Insider, accessed 29 March 2013, http://www.themalaysianinsider. com/sideviews/article/malaysias-social-media-election-is-already-over-jamesgomez. 8 ‘We Are Social Digital Yearbook 2016,’ accessed 2 February 2016, http://www. slideshare.net/wearesocialsg/2016-digital-yearbook. 9 Data accessed from website Social Bakers (2013) Country Profile – Malaysia, accessed 20 June 2013, http://www.socialbakers.com/facebook-statistics/malaysia. 10 Meredith Weiss, ‘Parsing the power of “New Media” in Malaysia’, Journal of Contemporary Asia, 43(2) (2013): 19. 11 Ibid.

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managed) the rapid onset of new media technologies in Malaysia, with particular reference to the 2013 general election (hereafter GE13). It argues that the BN regime has been slow to adapt to new forms of mass communications introduced by digital media platforms, but it has evolved to see these spaces as important areas of political contestation. The regime has introduced and implemented many initiatives which hinder the use of new media platforms, but has created its own content to polarise political discourse online. Despite the regime’s initiatives, digital media platforms remain a key avenue to bring about social and political change in Malaysia. This chapter also argues that, despite new digital technologies creating social media-driven information and citizen journalism-style reports, quality independent journalism produced by mainstream industrial media remains a significant threat to the reign and legitimacy of the BN regime.

‘New media’ and the regime After the BN won the 2008 election but lost their crucial two-thirds majority,12 then Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi stated that his government ‘lost the Internet war, the cyber war’ and said of new media: ‘We didn’t think it was important. It was serious misjudgement. We thought the newspapers, the print media, the television were important but young people were looking at text messages and blogs.’13 The 2008 election was seen as encouraging for media liberalisation in Malaysia because of the role played by the Internet and social media in circumventing government controls. In what became one of the most studied electoral contests in the Southeast Asia setting, it was seen broadly as a ‘victory for the opposition’.14 While blogging did not begin in 2008, bloggers were important contributors to political discourse for this election. One study found that 77 per cent of blogs in the 2008 election period belonged to opposition candidates, suggesting a political advantage when appealing to urban voters with Internet access.15 12

To change the constitution, a two-thirds majority in parliament is required. Yvonne Lim, ‘PM: GE13 will be Malaysia’s first ‘social media election’, The Star, 27 February 2013, accessed 10 January 2016, http://www.thestar.com.my/news/ nation/2013/02/27/pm-ge13-will-be-malaysias-1st-social-media-election/. 14 William Case, ‘Transition from Single-Party Dominance? New Data from Malaysia’, Journal of East Asian Studies, 10(1) (2010): 111. 15 Rachel Gong, ‘Internet Politics and State Media Control: Candidate Weblogs in Malaysia’, Sociological Perspectives, 54(3) (2011): 307–28. 13



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Abdullah Badawi was replaced as prime minister in April 2009 by Najib Razak (hereafter Najib). Many BN officials believed the Najib government was inadequately adept in the space of Internet news and views in 2008, and were looking to maintain a greater presence in the realm of online media in the leadup to GE13. With first-time voters making up approximately 30 per cent of the 13.3 million registered voters in Malaysia for GE13, online and social media were considered an important tool in influencing youth voter choice, particularly in urban areas. In the lead-up to GE13, Najib said to a group of ‘netizens’ that the election will be ‘Malaysia’s first social media election’.16 If the regime was to survive, it would have to enter the realm of new media, if nothing else to counter the anti-government messages being circulated widely. The ruling government, who had often felt defeated by the opposition in previous elections in this space since 1998, became increasingly determined to develop initiatives using new media platforms. They are seen as a new challenge for political parties (in particular by UMNO, the dominant party of the BN coalition) rather than a mechanism to enhance greater political or media liberalisation. The realm of online and social media became increasingly manipulated by political party discourse during GE13. A so-called ‘cyber-war’ during GE13 involved allegations of ‘cybertroopers’, ‘fake’ twitter accounts, deep-packet inspection and network traffic filtering. Social media often became a place of polemic argument, partisan viewpoints, manipulation and distortion. This distortion was often encouraged by employees of political parties, particularly paid new media strategists within UMNO. The government produced considerably more ‘pro-BN’ content through social media and online than it had in previous elections. The ‘UMNO Cybertroopers Club’, officially established in 2004 but without much support, was moved within a special new media unit (Unit Media Baru UMNO) headed by UMNO Youth leader and now Minister of Sport, Khairy Jamaluddin. The club was estimated to have at least 45 paid fulltime workers, 175 part-time, and 750 volunteers. Tun Faisal, the Head of this unit, said: ‘The Internet has previously been dominated by the

16

‘Social media crucial in election campaign’, Free Malaysia Today, 4 September 2013, accessed 13 June 2013, http://www.freemalaysiatoday.com/category/ nation/2013/04/19/social-media-crucial-in-election-campaign/.

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opposition. It allows them so much space. Now we have a presence. Our bloggers, our cybertroopers, are on the ground too. We post on issues, we provide information.’17 He said the creation of a more systematic and extensive group of cybertroopers for GE13 was necessary because ‘the opposition were releasing lies through Facebook, Twitter and through blogs’ and it was important the government be able to ‘counter false news more quickly’ through social media.18 In addition to social media, blogging took on a more formalised media strategy within UMNO during GE13. Former Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad’s blog was again a popular choice for many Malay-language readers during GE13, while many Malaysian government MPs maintained a blog, including Najib himself at www.1Malaysia.com.my. But it was the rise of many pro-government bloggers such as Papa Gomo, Rocky’s Bru, The Choice and The Mole who were a feature of GE13 blogging activities. Previous anti-opposition online campaigns had focused around the distribution of fake sex videos of opposition candidates, including opposition leader Anwar Ibrahim. GE13 also saw attempts at numerous ‘smut’ videos, yet polling by both the government and opposition showed the sex videos were no longer believed by the majority of people. The opposition also increased its role in the social media realm during GE13. Some MPs hired social media strategists who spent time championing the MPs’ causes online, and spreading anti-government content. The Democratic Action Party (DAP) and the People’s Justice Party (PKR) put a significant proportion of their advertising funds into Facebook advertisements, and managed a small team of about four people whose role was solely to work on new media tactics. Those within the party admitted there were ‘grey areas’ where PKR would seemingly encourage the spread of anti-government slogans and rhetoric through their own social media platforms, admitting to fuelling the fire on many occasions.19 After the election, Shahidan Kassim, a minister in the Prime Minister’s Department, called for a Royal Commission of Inquiry into the opposition’s use of social media – in particular DAP’s ‘cybertroopers’, popularly known as ‘The Red

17

Interview with the author, Putrajaya, 15 June 2013.

19

Ross Tapsell, ‘Negotiating media “balance” in Malaysia’s 2013 General Election’, Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs, 2 (2013): 39–60.

18 Ibid.



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Bean Army’.20 The term was pushed by blogger Helen Ang, and by progovernment newspapers Utusan Malaysia, The Star and The New Straits Times.21 Some websites even published a list of Facebook pages and names of the people involved in so-called ‘Red Bean Army’. After the election, Home Minister Zahid Hamidi told Parliament that ‘the Red Bean Army and its ilk’ of 3000 ‘cybertroopers’ should face criminal and civil action for spreading lies through the Internet.22 The existence of the group has been strongly denied by DAP, who argue it is made up by pro-government media. The so-called ‘Red Bean Army’ was more likely a group of pro-oppositionists who were regularly active online and social media political networks, who certainly slandered the government online, but were unlikely to be paid by the political parties. Nevertheless, their campaign was reasonably successful, particularly within the Chinese online community. One pro-DAP Facebook page ‘We Fully Support DAP’ had Chinese language commentary and photos and as of July 2013 had over 460,000 ‘likes’, only slightly less than the main DAP Facebook page (510,000). This is not to say that the new media were the most important determinant of GE13’s outcome; in hindsight, PM Najib’s ‘social media election’ prediction seems overstated. GE13 saw political parties more active in hindering and manipulating information online and in social media, but broader BN public relations ‘machines’ in rural areas, where large amounts of money were spent on flags, banners and the general ‘campaign trail’, were crucial. Furthermore, the campaign was conducted by highly paid consultants and much focus on advertising was through traditional 20

Ibid., p. 46. See also Malaysia Chronicle (2013), ‘UMNO-BN’s ‘fatal obsession’ with Red Bean Army online’, accessed 13 August 2013, www.malaysiachronicle.com/ index.php?option=com_k2&view=item&id=127231:umno-bns-fatal-obsessionwith-red-bean-arm y-kit-siang-questions-zahids-intelligence&Itemid=2#axzz2dQO Kqm8z,> 21 For example, ‘Beware of DAP’s cyber-troopers’, New Straits Times, 5 June 2013; ‘DAP’s ‘Red Bean Army’ firing on all cylinders’, 3 June 2013 and ‘Cybertroopers stooping low with personal attacks and wild celebrations’, 3 May 2013, both published in The Star; ‘DAP upah Red Bean Army ‘bunuh orang’’, 3 May 2013 and ‘DAP taja ‘Red Bean Army’ burukkan kerajaan’’, 4 May 2013, both published in Utusan Malaysia. 22 ‘UMNO-BN’s ‘fatal obsession’ with Red Bean Army’, Malaysia Chronicle, accessed 13 August 2013, http://www.malaysiachronicle.com/index.php?option=com_ k2&view=item&id=127231:umno-bns-fatal-obsession-with-red-bean-army-kitsiang-questions-zahids-intelligence&Itemid=2#axzz2dQOKqm8z.

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media.23 Nevertheless, while it is true that the effect of social media on political change in Malaysia is ‘more likely to be subtle and gradual rather than immediate and cataclysmic’,24 there is little doubt political parties in Malaysia and elsewhere in the region are embracing new media forms as a way to get their message out, and to dominate political discourse. Due to the general unpopularity of censoring or controlling online viewpoints in a relatively free online environment that Malaysians have become accustomed to, the government’s social media strategy in GE13 was focused around utilising resources to produce more pro-BN content. Furthermore, given their lack of exposure in the mainstream press, Malaysia’s opposition political parties have consistently used online networks to disseminate content which is favourable to their cause. The result was a predominantly polemic and polarised political discussion facilitated through the new mediums, but ultimately one in which the BN were now fully involved in encouraging this polemic space. But it was, for the most part, a space where those with Internet access were allowed to present a range of views, and many examples of open hostility against the regime were posted online and shared via social media platforms. Despite not gaining the overall majority of votes (47 per cent), BN gained 133 seats in GE13, allowing it to win the election, but under allegations of malapportionment. For the second consecutive general election, BN failed to gain a two-thirds majority in parliament. But perhaps the most striking result of GE13 was a discussion around the urban vote –described as a ‘tsunami’ of urban residents in the Peninsula who voted for the opposition.25 Given Internet access was more widespread in urban areas, it seems citizens with Internet access were more likely to vote for opposition candidates. In response, some UMNO leaders preferred to describe this as an ethnic-based movement, even a ‘Chinese tsunami’. In the aftermath of GE13 social media continued to be an important avenue to organise – and subsequently share images of – ‘Bersih’ rallies. As has been argued previously, effective organisation of a modern-day mass rally depends on the 23

Bridget Welsh, ‘Malaysia’s Elections: A Step Backward’, Journal of Democracy, October 2013: 143. 24 Weiss, ‘Parsing the Power’, p. 19. 25 See for example, Mong Palatino, ‘Malaysia’s Election Tsunami’, The Diplomat, 10 May 2013, accessed 28 January 2016, http://thediplomat.com/2013/05/malaysiaselection-tsunami/.



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dissemination of information via social media platforms such as Facebook and Twitter. Throughout Malaysia’s Bersih4 rally in 2015 organisers kept everyone up to date about events and instructions, and ‘ordinary’ citizens at the rallies became ‘prod-users’26 (someone who produces, as well as consumes, media). All of these ‘crowd-sourced’ images from the rally are important, providing details and images of a groundswell of political and social activism where mainstream media would (or could) not.27 PostGE13, the Malaysian Communications and Multimedia Commission (MCMC) has become a formidable force in restricting online opinions and threatening controls. More recently, a special task force was created and run by the Minister of Communications and Multimedia to tackle ‘social media abuse’. Speaking at ‘Social Media Week 2016’ in Cyberjaya, Minister Salleh Said Keruak said, ‘It is a safeguard and pre-emptive measure to avoid social media from causing unnecessary havoc by spreading lies, hatred and religious extremism, among others.’28 Despite defamation and racial vilification laws already in existence in Malaysia, the Minister deemed it crucial to have a taskforce, and warned ‘Stern action will be taken against those who use social media for the purpose of defaming, abusing or inciting others to belittle the position of or instil hatred towards the institutions of government.’29 While the regime was in many cases responsible for the spreading of a variety of political material online, including vitriolic and scandalous content in the 2013 election, in post-election-years it now seems determined to enforce its rule by clamping down on it.

Mainstream media While new, participatory media technologies have tested the regime’s ability to control and massage the flow of information in Malaysia, BN has maintained control over traditional media production in the country. Despite media freedom groups trying to push for greater independence, 26

Axel Bruns, Blogs, Wikipedia, Second Life, and Beyond (Peter Lang, 2008). Ross Tapsell, ‘The medium of people power’, New Mandala, 31 August 2015, accessed 29 January 2016, http://asiapacific.anu.edu.au/newmandala/2015/08/31/ the-medium-of-people-power/. 28 Sumisha Naidu, ‘Malaysia to take stern action against social media abuse’, Channel News Asia, 20 January 2016, accessed 12 February 2016, http://www. channelnewsasia.com/news/asiapacific/malaysia-to-take-stern/2441588.html. 29 Ibid. 27

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BN has largely been adept at flushing out dissenting voices in Malaysia’s mainstream media environment.30 The problem for the regime is that traditional media are in rapid decline. Newspaper circulation has decreased in government-owned newspapers Utusan Malaysia, The Star, The New Straits Times and Berita Harian. In The New Straits Times, for example, circulation dropped from 120,770 in 2008 to only 74,711 in 2014.31 While some have argued these figures show Malaysians are tired of governmentsponsored messages veiled as actual news, print media circulation is dropping in most countries around the world where Internet penetration is rising. In Malaysia, the relevance of print media is in decline in urban areas where Internet access is widespread, particularly in the Peninsula. Advertising revenues in Malaysia have rapidly declined in the print media, and also declined somewhat in free-to-air television. Total advertising expenditure failed to grow at all in Malaysia in 2014, the first time this has occurred since the Reformasi period of 1998.32 The disruption to traditional media business models has seen companies form ‘digital conglomerates’: national, multi-platform companies who are now grasping to acquire platforms on which they previously did not produce; television stations; online news sites; radio stations, and many more. They believe that to survive financially in the digital era, a media company must swiftly morph into a multi-platform conglomerate. The process of conglomeration and concentration has occurred due to the digitalisation of media content, and there is increased importance of acquiring new communications infrastructures which disseminate this multi-platform content. The largest media players in Malaysia include Astro Malaysia Holdings Berhad, Star Media Group, Media Prima Berhad and Media Chinese International Ltd, which are swiftly becoming multi-platform oligopolies. Put simply, digitalisation has enabled big media companies to become bigger. Mergers, acquisitions, amalgamation and consolidation are now a feature of national .

30 Ross

Tapsell, ‘The media freedom movement in Malaysia and the electoral authoritarian regime’, Journal of Contemporary Asia, 43(4) (2013): 613–35. 31 Malaysia Audit Bureau of Circulation, cited in Malaysia Media Planning Guide 2015 (Perception Media), p. 57. 32 Advertising revenue for newspapers dropped from 60 per cent of the market share in 2004 to 30 per cent in 2014, while free-to-air television was 36 per cent in 2008 and 26 per cent in 2014. Nielsen data, sourced in Malaysia Media Planning Guide 2015 (Kuala Lumpur: Perception Media, 2015), p. 10.



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media companies, all of which is made possible by digital technologies and the convergence of platforms. Meanwhile, expanding their business models in the digital era is far more difficult for media companies more independent from the government. BFM Radio is only allowed to broadcast in Kuala Lumpur and its surrounds, and so does not reach rural voters. Malaysiakini was forced to take the government to court in an attempt to obtain a print licence, and BN remains highly selective in issuing print licences. Yet much of the urban population was scanning for more credible and reliable journalism. On election day in 2013, independent online news source Malaysiakini drew 2.6 million unique visitors, while The Malaysian Insider saw a 55 per cent jump to nearly a million visitors. In contrast, The Star, which is 42.5 per cent owned by the MCA, saw its online visitors drop 22 per cent to 1.4 million.33 The Malaysian Insider was forced to close down in 2016, officially citing financial limitations; however, its founder Jahabar Sadiq said sites like his had become ‘too free for the government of Malaysia’.34 Other mainstream media companies have attempted to be more ‘balanced’ in their coverage of politics as they saw commercial opportunities in appealing to a broader readership or audience.35 These included The Edge Media Group, owner of The Edge Financial Daily and BFM radio (English), as well as newspapers Sinar Harian (Malay), The Oriental Daily (Mandarin) and even (to some extent) cable television station AstroAwani. Media owners still need to maintain close ties with influential elites in order to keep their licences, but there is evidence of these organisations rejecting slanderous ‘anti-opposition’ pieces. The government has continued show-cause letters and pressure from officials to attempt to limit balanced coverage of the opposition. In a media monitoring project conducted during the polls, the Centre for Independent Journalism (CIJ) and the Malaysian

33

‘Malaysia’s media firms click to next page’, The Sunday Times, 23 July 2013, accessed 30 May 2016, http://news.asiaone.com/news/asian-opinions/malaysias-mediafirms-click-next-page. 34 Jahabar Sadiq, ‘The press has become too free for the government of Malaysia,’ The Guardian, 16 March 2016, accessed 31 May 2016, http://www.theguardian. com/world/2016/mar/16/the-press-has-become-too-free-for-the-government-ofmalaysia?CMP=share_btn_tw. 35 Ross Tapsell, ‘Negotiating media ‘balance’ in Malaysia’s 2013 General Election’, Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs, 2 (2013): 39–60.

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campus of the University of Nottingham have shown that during GE13 the mainstream media overall was considerably biased toward the government, in particular by producing many reports which attacked the opposition.36 For many Malaysian journalists, the balance between trying to report a situation or event fairly and avoiding the wrath of the regime remains a delicate predicament. While this may have been more relaxed in the leadup to GE13, the regime hardened its stance in the aftermath of the election. Post-GE13 it has been the mainstream media that has most tested the resilience of the BN regime. In 2015 The Wall Street Journal reported that USD700 million from state-owned investment firm 1Malaysia Development Berhad (1MDB) ended up in the bank account of Prime Minister Najib. Malaysia’s The Edge Financial Daily had reported on irregularities pertaining to 1MDB in 2013 and 2014, and in the aftermath of the recent scandal it continued to boldly uncover details of the case. It was a path which Edge Group founder Ho Kay Tat said was ‘one that we knew will be fraught with risks to ourselves personally and to our organisation, which now faces the possibility of action by the Home Ministry’.37 The Edge Group was immediately suspended from publishing, with the excuse that it ‘threatened public order’, while Najib claimed the allegations were a ‘political conspiracy’ against him.38 The decision to suspend The Edge was later overturned by the Malaysian High Court, but the message was clearly sent to the rest of the mainstream media when covering the 1MDB scandal: publish and you may perish. Another casualty was the alternative online media site The Sarawak Report, whose founder Clare Rewcastle-Brown was banned from entering Malaysia in 2013; in July 2015 the site was blocked in Malaysia for its further coverage of the 1MDB scandal.39 In early 2016 the US-based website Medium.com could not be accessed in Malaysia because it republished the 36

Nottingham University in conjunction with the Centre for Independent Journalism Malaysia, ‘Watching the watchdog: monitoring media coverage of the 13th General Elections’, accessed 27 June 2015, http://pilihanraya.info/bilikmedia/wtw. 37 Media Statement by Ho Kay Tat, Publisher & Group CEO of The Edge Media Group, 21 July 2015. 38 ‘Malaysia’s The Edge Media group loses bid to lift printing ban’, Channel News Asia, 14 August 2015, accessed 29 January 2016, http://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/ asiapacific/malaysia-s-the-edge-media/2050408.html. 39 ‘1MDB backed Jho Low’s 1Billion London Hotel Bid! Exclusive Expose’, The Sarawak Report, 2 May 2014, accessed 2 February 2016, http://www.sarawakreport. org/2014/05/1mdb-backed-jho-low-with-uk1billion-exclusive-expose/.



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material from The Sarawak Report. The MCMC asked medium.com for clarifications and requested the material be taken down, which the website ignored.40 For his part, Najib believed that the 1MDB scandal was a ‘trial by media’.41 If the 1MDB scandal was not enough to test the regime’s resolve, another scandal continued to make international news in 2015: the story of murdered Mongolian model Altantuyaa Shaariibuugiin at the hands of the Prime Minister Najib’s former bodyguards. In May 2015 The Sydney Morning Herald interviewed one of the bodyguards in detention in Sydney, which put Najib’s ‘already unstable tenure on even shakier ground’.42 In response, Najib said the Herald’s report was defamatory and threatened legal action. Not long afterwards, an Al-Jazeera documentary covered the story; the presenter and journalist Mary Ann Jolly was later banned from entering the country. These responses have become a theme of Najib’s regime post-GE13. News reports which threaten the legitimacy of Najib’s rule have been threatened with legal action; local media organisations have had their permits withdrawn; websites have been blocked; citizens have been warned that sharing ‘misinformation’ via social media sites could lead to police intervention. In world rankings which measure freedom of the press, Malaysia has not improved. Malaysia’s 2016 global ranking for freedom of the press was 149 out of 199 countries and is still regarded as ‘not free’. The 2016 report made explicit comments on how the Malaysian government ‘made extensive use of sedition charges to clamp down dissent’, given that Amnesty International stated that 91 people were charged, arrested, or investigated under the sedition law during 2015.43 Was this a sign of careful and methodical regime 40

‘Medium Stands Up to Malaysia’s Attempt to Take Down Investigative Reporting; Gets Entire Site Blocked in Malaysia’, TechDirt, 27 January 2016, accessed 12 February 2016, https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20160127/06323233440/mediumstands-up-to-malaysias-attempt-to-take-down-investigative-reporting-gets-entiresite-blocked-malaysia.shtml. 41 ‘Stop IMDB’s trial by media, says Najib’, Malaysian Insider, 21 October 2015. 42 Eryk Bagshaw, ‘Sirul Azhar Umar: Who ordered the brutal murder of Atlantuyaa Shaariibuu?’, The Sydney Morning Herald, 9 May 2015, accessed 11 February 2016, http://www.smh.com.au/national/sirul-azhar-umar-who-ordered-the-brutalmurder-of-atlantuyaa-shaariibuu-20150411-1mj5ce.html. 43 Freedom House world rankings for ‘Freedom of the Press’, accessed 31 May 2016, https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/freedom-press-2016.

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resilience, or a sign that the regime was increasingly resorting to desperate measures to reduce media content that threatens its legitimacy?

Conclusion As we have heard, one argument is that a ‘complacent’44 BN lost its popular support in 2008 due in no small part to the new ways of political campaigning online. Given this failure, seen in many quarters as a ‘victory’ for the opposition, BN needed to have a greater presence in the online space, and did so through its own production of pro-government content. This ultimately led to a more polarised and polemic online media landscape. At the same time, BN cracked down on media organisations which were considered to be writing a little too freely. William Case has argued that the regime ‘hardened’ in its mid-cycle of the previous election (2011), a tactic which ultimately strengthens the electoral authoritarian regime.45 The regime is likely to give the impression that it is liberalising closer to the election in an attempt to satisfy some of the reform-minded Malaysians who are wary of bringing the opposition to power. This ‘liberalising’ of the regime may even include a leadership change. For example, having replaced Abdullah Badawi, new Prime Minister Najib invited Malaysians to ‘walk with him in his journey to transform Malaysia’.46 Critics later labelled this ‘moon-walking’, giving the illusion of moving forward but in fact the person is going nowhere.47 The post-GE13 ‘hardening’ of media in 2015 and 2016 will soften in the lead-up to the next election. For example, prior to GE13, the Malaysian government amended the controversial PPPA, cut the ISA (which was often used against journalists) and restrictions seemed less stringent in some media organisations. After the election, the regime ‘hardened’ again, leading to stricter controls over the media through sedition and defamation laws, and by threatening further crackdowns on online 44

Jacques Bertrand, Political Change in Southeast Asia (Cambridge University Press, 2013), p. 102. 45 William Case, ‘Electoral Authoritarianism and Backlash: Hardening Malaysia, Oscillating Thailand’, International Political Science Review, 32(4) (2011): 438–57. 46 ‘Walk with me in transforming Malaysia, says PM’, Office of the Prime Minister of Malaysia, 12 April 2012, accessed 28 June 2016, http://www.pmo.gov.my/home. php?menu=newslist&news_id=9649&news_cat=13&cl=1&page=1731&sort_ year=2012&sort_month=. 47 The Malaysia Chronicle, 2 June 2012.

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and social media commentary. But clearly the resilience of his rule was paramount: ‘This is not fair. When any [false or slanderous] news comes out about the opposition, people think it’s not true. When any news is spread about us, people immediately think it’s true’, Najib said in August 2015.48 He was losing his battle with the media; in turn, the legitimacy of the regime was under threat. There is little doubt that the regime finds it more difficult to control the flow of information in the digital era, and the control which can be mastered over the traditional media which requires licensing is less possible over social media platforms. Nevertheless, the regime seems determined to find ways to implement a culture of self-censorship within Malaysian society which permeates the digital realm. As Internet access improves throughout the country, and a new generation of Malaysians become more accustomed to greater freedom of expression online and on social media, the regime is becoming increasingly strict, perhaps even desperate. If it is to survive, the regime will have to adapt to more effectively massaging an increasingly transparent media and political sphere in the digital era. Media organisations in Malaysia (and elsewhere) are looking to become multi-platform news services, rather than specific print publications, television stations or radio stations. As all platforms converge, so too will the distinction between the so-called ‘new media’ of online and social media and the traditional, mainstream media. This will be a key space of contestation as the next general election in Malaysia draws near. The rise of online news, opinion sites and bloggers and social media platforms has created a vastly more vibrant space for opinion and comment in Malaysia. Many Malaysians place hope in the role of new, digital media platforms to assist them in bringing about greater transparency and even political change, but BN’s decision to respond with harsh retaliations has ushered in a more ruthless and resilient authoritarian regime. Whether they have negated pro-democracy forces in the country, or silenced some of them temporarily, remains to be seen.

48 Jennifer

Gomez, ‘Media crackdowns won’t help Najib, say pressure groups’, Malaysian Insider, 5 August 2015, accessed 2 February 2016, http://www. themalaysianinsider.com/malaysia/article/media-clampdown-wont-help-najib-saypressure-groups. Reproduced in Yahoo online available at https://sg.news.yahoo. com/media-clampdown-won-t-help-082512418.html

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The Curious Incident of the Seditious Dog Training Video 145

Chapter 10

The Curious Incident of the Seditious Dog Training Video Amanda Whiting

On 15 September 2011 Najib bin Abdul Razak, leader of the ruling United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) and Prime Minister of Malaysia, announced an ambitious legal transformation programme to convert Malaysia into ‘a functional and inclusive democracy where public peace and prosperity is preserved in accordance with the supremacy of the constitution, the rule of law and respect for basic human rights and individual rights’.1 Accordingly, in December 2011 the Dewan Rakyat (Lower or Peoples’ Chamber of Parliament) passed a motion to annul the Proclamations of Emergency of 1966, 1969 and 1977. Over the following months the Parliament passed bills to repeal or amend several of the socalled ‘draconian laws’ that for decades had curtailed Malaysians’ enjoyment of their constitutionally guaranteed civil and political rights and freedoms, such as the Police Act 1967 (used to limit freedom of assembly), the University and University Colleges Act 1971 (used to prevent students participating in politics) and the Printing Presses and Publications Act 1984 (used to muzzle the press). At the same time, Najib specifically promised to repeal the repressive Sedition Act 1948 and replace it with a more benignsounding ‘National Harmony Act’. He even convened a National Unity Consultative Council to assist.2 By June 2012 all the emergency ordinances and regulations made 1

‘Full text of PM’s Malaysia Day Speech’, Malaysiakini, last updated 16 September 2011, accessed 15 April 2016, https://www.malaysiakini.com/news/175970. 2 ‘New harmony laws being drafted, Putrajaya says in defence of Sedition charges’, The Malaysian Insider, 2 September 2014.

145

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pursuant to the repealed Emergency Proclamations were deemed to have lapsed, in accordance with the constitutional provision for winding up an emergency (Article 150(7)). By July 2012 the widely-feared Internal Security Act (ISA) had been repealed, thus (temporarily, as it soon transpired) removing the looming threat of indefinite detention without trial that had been used so effectively by the UMNO regime to terrorise its opponents and critics – for example during the 1987 Operasi Lalang crackdown when 106 regime critics were detained, and again in the early years of this century to detain Reformasi activists and supporters of Anwar Ibrahim.3 Najib’s limited and indeed internally contradictory legal reforms were deeply flawed, as lawyers, opposition politicians, independent media campaigners and activist civil society organisations were quick to demonstrate. Furthermore, the government soon filled the void left by the ISA’s repeal with a suite of equally repressive statutes including the Security Offences (Special Measures) Act 2012, the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2015 and amendments to the Prevention of Crime Act 1959 and the Penal Code, to the consternation and condemnation of the aforementioned critics.4 Nevertheless, since mid-2012 regular constitutional rule has formally returned and Malaysia has ceased, from the legal point of view, to be in a constitutionally recognised state of emergency. Yet a pervasive sense of crisis endures. Politically, socially, if not legally, the country remains in the casualty ward. This is especially apparent in the aftermath of the May 2013 general election, when the Barisan Nasional (BN) coalition, which UMNO has led since before independence in 1957, lost the popular vote (garnering only 47.4 per cent) but nevertheless remained in government because of widely recognised, and condemned, distortions in the electoral system.5 In the ensuing recriminations, as UMNO warlords 3

Contemporaneous reporting of Operasi Lalang includes: ‘Security swoop third largest’, New Straits Times, 29 October 1987; and ‘More held under ISA. Another 16 detained. Total now 79’, New Straits Times, 30 October 1987; regarding Reformasi era detentions, see, e.g. Aliran Press Statement, ‘Let the Reformasi six enjoy their legitimate freedom’, 30 May 2003, accessed 16 April 2016, http://aliran.com/ archives/ms/2003/0530.html 4 The extent and limitations of these legal changes, and popular reaction to them, are evaluated in Amanda Whiting, ‘Emerging from Emergency Rule? Malaysian Law Reform, 2011–2013’, Australian Journal of Asian Law 14(2) (2013): Article 9: 1–55. 5 Max Gromping, ‘Southeast Asian elections worst in world’, New Mandala, 19 February 2015, accessed 15 April 2016, http://asiapacific.anu.edu.au/newmandala/2015/02/19/



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scrambled to consolidate their ethnic voting bloc by invoking the Party’s historic mission to rescue Malays from the ubiquitous threat of immigrants, infidels and outsiders, Malaysian public life collapsed into yet another episode of what American historian Richard Hofstadter famously termed the ‘paranoid style’ of politics, expressed through ‘heated exaggeration, suspiciousness, and conspiratorial fantasy’.6 With depressing frequency since the end of the Emergency one reads in the Malaysian mass media a steady stream of official stupidity and populist spite, from the vicious and vapid hate speech uttered by delegates to the UMNO annual congress in December 2013 directed towards crushing the imagined conspiracy of religious, political and sexual deviants (Shia Muslims, liberal lawyers and human rights campaigners, and members of the gay, lesbian, bisexual and transgender communities, respectively),7 to the Attorney-General’s plan, announced in February 2016 in the midst of unrelenting disclosures concerning the staggeringly large financial scandal engulfing Najib in his dual capacities as Finance Minister and Prime Minister, to impose life imprisonment and corporal punishment upon whistle-blowers and others who come within the capacious ambit of the Official Secrets Act.8 The government seems deaf to rational requests for genuine reform – the fulfilment of Najib’s 2011 ‘functional and inclusive democracy’ promise – and the massive Bersih demonstrations pressing for democratisation and electoral reform in 2011, 2013 and 2015 have been met with police brutality and criminal prosecution under assorted public order laws, including the new Peaceful Assembly Act 2011.9 In this superheated context, as unprecedented numbers of Malaysians were investigated for or charged with sedition offences,10 Najib broke his promise to replace

6 7

8 9 10

southeast-asian-elections-worst-in-the-world/ Richard Hofstadter, ‘The Paranoid Style in American Politics’, Harper’s Magazine (November 1964): 77–86. Nigel Aw, ‘Muhyiddin warns Malays of foreign threats’, Malaysiakini, 3 December 2013, and Nigel Aw, ‘LGBTs exist to purge the bad, says UMNO’, Malaysiakini, 7 December 2013. ‘AG mulling life imprisonment for those who leak secrets’, Malaysiakini, 6 February 2016. Of the many examples, see ‘Maria Chin fails to strike out Bersih 4 charge’, Malaysiakini, 18 April 2016. See generally: Human Rights Watch, Creating a Culture of Fear: The Criminalization of Peaceful Expression in Malaysia (2015) www.hrw.org.

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the Sedition Act and instead, in early 2015, presented a Bill to make it even harsher.11 This short essay analyses the role of sedition law in maintaining UMNO’s grip on power, and briefly discusses the earnest – but so far futile – campaign to soften or remove sedition from the statute books. Rather than catalogue the horror story that is the history of sedition accusations, investigations, prosecutions and convictions in Malaysia – a task that would take many more pages than I have been allocated – I will use a single event that received prominent but fleeting treatment in the Malaysian news media in 2013 to illustrate the extent of the problem At the end of July 2013 during the holy month of Ramadan, professional dog trainer Maznah Mohamad Yusof, ‘Chetz’ to her friends, was identified as a threat to the security of the nation and was remanded into police custody for two days. Apart from the shock and distress this caused her, it was a massive inconvenience because although she lives in Bukit Beruntung, Selangor, about 40 minutes’ drive to the north of central Kuala Lumpur, she was delivered to a police cell in Segamat, Johor, 270 kilometres and more than 3 hours’ drive to the south, because that was where the first police report against her had been lodged. What had she done that so undermined public safety? Three years previously, to celebrate the end of the fasting month, Chetz, who at that time maintained a sanctuary for stray dogs, filmed and posted on the Internet a video containing a Hari Raya greeting to her fellow Muslims that featured footage of herself training, walking, and bathing some of her animals. Without her knowledge or permission, the video was reposted to Youtube in 2013, apparently to encourage outraged viewers to flock to the police with complaints that someone had mocked Islam by mimicking ritual ablutions on inherently unclean animals. There was even some nasty media speculation that she was both sexually and religiously deviant: a ‘tomboi’, since she wears short hair and short pants; or that she was a cultist or, worse, a Shiite.12 11

The provisions of the new law, which is not yet in effect, are analysed in Amanda Whiting, ‘Strengthening Sedition’, ‘Strengthened Sedition’, and ‘Fortifying Sedition’, New Mandala, 21–23 April 2015, accessed 15 April 2016, http://asiapacific.anu. edu.au/newmandala/2015/04/20/fortifying-authoritarian-rule-in-malaysia/; http:// asiapacific.anu.edu.au/newmandala/2015/04/21/strengthening-sedition/; http://asiapacific.anu.edu.au/newmandala/2015/04/22/strengthened-sedition/. 12 A Malaysiakini KiniTV news story, including an interview with Chetz’s lawyers



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The Deputy Communications and Multimedia Minister directed the Malaysian Communications and Multimedia Commission (MCMC) to investigate because ‘the video could offend Muslim sensibilities’13 and then Deputy Prime Minister Muhyiddin Yassin stated that the person in the video must be a non-Muslim, and he asked fellow Muslims rhetorically whether ‘some quarters’ assumed that Muslims ‘are weak’ and ‘afraid to react when others insult the sanctity of Islam’’.14 While the MCMC deferred to JAKIM (the Malaysian Department of Islamic Development) on the question of whether Islamic sensibilities had been offended,15 Chetz was detained and investigated by the police for commission of two criminal offences: sedition, contrary to Section 4 of the Sedition Act, and causing disharmony on religious grounds, contrary to Section 298A of the Penal Code.16 Police reports were lodged against her in police stations all over the country, including Sabah,17 she received threats texted to her mobile telephone and was nearly assaulted by the local imam,18 and JAKIM publicly concluded that she had insulted Islam and should be punished to ‘serve as a lesson to her, in particular, and to society as a whole’.19 In response to all this, Chetz stated that she loves both her religion and her dogs and meant no disrespect, and that she was surprised and disappointed at the ‘outrage’ expressed by the imam at her local mosque – ‘as far as I am concerned, my religion does not forbid me from keeping dogs …. Doesn’t he know about Islamic laws?’20 Her lawyers labelled the Deputy Prime Minister’s comments a usurpation of the judicial function, ‘mischievous’ and ‘prejudicial’ and threatened him with a defamation suit,21

and incorporating portions of the video that is the subject of the complaint, can be viewed here: 2 August 2013, accessed 15 April 2016, https://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=aG6RSmsv-pg. 13 ‘MCMC ordered to prove ‘insulting’, YouTube video’, Malaysiakini, 31 July 2013. 14 ‘DAP lodges report over DPM’s ‘seditious’ remarks’, Malaysiakini, 2 Aug 2013. 15 ‘MCMC to refer to Jakim on controversial Raya video’, Malaysiakini, 1 August 2013. 16 Ibid. 17 ‘Dog trainer to be released’, Malaysiakini, 2 August 2013. 18 ‘Stop harassing dog trainer, says Ambiga’, Malaysiakini, 2 August 2013. 19 ‘Jakim finds controversial clip ‘insulting to Islam’’, Malaysiakini, 2 August 2013 and ‘Jakim: Punish Mazhan to teach a lesson’, Malaysiakini, 6 August 2013. 20 ‘I did not insult Islam, says dog trainer’, Malaysiakini, 31 July 2013. 21 ‘Lawyers tick off deputy minister, JAKIM for not letting sleeping dogs lie’, The Malaysian Insider, 3 August 2013.

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the chairman of the local branch of the opposition Democratic Action Party lodged a sedition police report against him, and the Malaysian Indian Progressive Association announced it would, too.22 There was no further media coverage of this episode, so it appears that Chetz, who continues her animal welfare work, has not been further troubled by the authorities. From the elements of this episode I draw out two items for further analysis: the malleable and ever-expanding definition of sedition,23 and the invocation of race and religion in matters of sedition and what this means for UMNO’s authority. Space does not permit an examination of the theme of public denunciations and police reports by individuals and pressure groups eager to display their civic virtue and loyalty to the regime by denouncing fellow Malaysians as seditious and deviant. Suffice it to say that these ‘accusatory practices’, as they are understood in the scholarly literature, bear an unhealthy resemblance to similar self-serving conduct during the terror of the French Revolution and to accusations made to the secret police in Soviet Russia, Nazi Germany and the German Democratic Republic.24 The sedition law currently in force in Malaysia is, with one crucial change to be considered below, the same as the law passed by the Federal Legislative Council in 1948, at the time when a state of Emergency was proclaimed to deal with the communist insurgency. Although now frequently derided as a ‘colonial era’ law – an epithet selected to underscore its antiquity and irrelevance – the Sedition Ordinance 1948 has been emphatically embraced by the post-colonial Malaysian government, again in circumstances of an Emergency (the 1948 one having ended in 1960). 22

‘DAP lodges report over DPM’s ‘seditious’ remarks’, Malaysiakini, 2 Aug 2013. The overlap of sedition with Section 298A of the Penal Code is a complex and technical legal question, beyond the scope of this chapter. Suffice it to say that Malaysian courts have drastically curtailed the reach of this Penal Code provision (in Tan Jye Yee & Anor v PP (2015) 2 CLJ 745, applying Mamat Daud & Ors v The Government of Malaysia [1988] 1 CLJ 11), and no one has been prosecuted under it, but this does not seem to deter the police from trying. 24 For a taste of this literature, see: Timothy Tackett, The Coming of the Terror in the French Revolution (Cambridge, Mass: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2015; Lynn Hunt, Politics, Culture and Class in the French Revolution (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), p. 46; Colin Lucas, ‘The Theory and Practice of Denunciation in the French Revolution’, The Journal of Modern History 68 (1996): 768–85; and Sheila Fitzpatrick and Robert Gellately eds. Accusatory Practices: Denunciation in Modern European History, 1789–1989 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997). 23



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In April 1970, eleven months into the state of Emergency proclaimed to deal with mayhem of the May 1969 election riots, revisions made to the Sedition Ordinance 1948 were gazetted and brought into effect. Some of the alterations made by the Commissioner of Law Revisions were trivial (such as the substitution of ‘Yang di-Pertuan Agong’ for ‘His Britannic Majesty’, and ‘ringgit’ for ‘dollars’). The crucial alternation was in retitling the Sedition Ordinance as the Sedition Act, even though it was not, as a matter of fact, an enactment of Parliament. Then, in August of that year, a significant enhancement was made to the definition of ‘seditious tendency’ by Clause 2 of the Emergency (Essential Powers) Ordinance, No. 45 of 1970 (hereafter ‘EO45’), a piece of executive law-making issued by the Agong on advice of the National Operations Council, the Parliament being in abeyance from the beginning of the Emergency until February 1971. In other words, like the 1948 Ordinance, rebranded as an Act, this modification, too, was not an Act of Parliament. In order to appreciate fully the draconian nature of Malaysia’s sedition law, and the additional complexity created by the 1970 modification, a little comparative history is necessary. Sedition emerged as a common law offence in England in the early seventeenth century. Essentially its purpose was to criminalise spoken or written criticism of government and the ruling elite, regardless of the intention of the speaker or the truth of the statements, on the basis that criticism of public authority would necessarily lead to public disorder and hence threaten the established government. Its origins, then, lie in the period of absolute monarchy and the divine right of Kings. Over the course of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries the English common law courts came to recognise various defences sourced in the intention of the accused, and, consistent with the spread of democratic social and political values, latitude was increasingly given for free speech as inseparable from freedom of religious and political belief and expression. The Whiggish history of Anglo-American political liberty can, in part, be told through the story of sedition prosecutions and the heroic stature of the accused, for example Tom Paine’s prosecution in absentia in London in 1792 for authoring The Rights of Man. Ultimately the offence fell into abeyance in the early twentieth century, and it was abolished by statute in 2010. Despite this apparent story of the rise of English liberties from the ashes of despotism, uncertainty and imprecision regarding what conduct constitutes sedition and in what circumstances, and incoherence in judicial

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decision-making, mark the entire history of sedition law in Britain, as divergent strands of judicial authority contradicted and clashed with each other. Modern commentators agree that as an essentially political crime sedition is oppressive, anachronistic, a constant temptation for executive over-reach, and entirely incompatible with democracy.25 The story of sedition law in the Empire is considerably different from the ‘rise of liberty’ narrative in the metropole.26 In the case of Malaya, the version of English sedition law given statutory form under tutelage of the colonial authorities – at a time when sedition was falling into disuse in Britain – was not the more liberal strand of the English common law that had developed by the early twentieth century, but a harsher, and arguably inaccurate, version sourced from the nineteenth-century codification in James Fitzjames Stephen’s Digest.27 Amongst the British liberties gifted to the Empire, democratic freedom to criticise government was a notable omission. The convoluted and circular definition of ‘seditious tendency’ set out in Article 93 of the Digest was transported wholesale into the definition section (Section 3) of the Federation of Malaya Sedition Ordinance/Act 1948. Essentially, Section 3 defines ‘seditious tendency’ so broadly that the utter or publisher of practically any comment critical of a public official or the courts can be liable for prosecution for ‘exciting disaffection’ against authority and bringing it into ‘hatred or contempt’. This is only to be expected because of course punishing people for holding and expressing views contrary to the government of the day is the historical purpose of the law of sedition, which was originally designed precisely to preserve the 25

Roger Manning, ‘Origins of the Doctrine of Sedition’, Albion 12(2) (1980): 99–121; Michael Lobban, ‘From Seditious Libel to Unlawful Assembly: Peterloo and the Changing Face of Political Crime, c 1770–1820’, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 10(3) (1990): 307–52; C.S.R. Russell, ‘Sedition in a Democratic State’, Political Studies 13 (1965): 372–6; Graham McBain, ‘Abolishing the Crime of Sedition Part I’, Australian Law Journal 82 (2008): 543–79; Lawrence W. Maher, ‘The Use and Abuse of Sedition’, Sydney Law Review 14 (1992): 287–316; Australian Law Reform Commission, Fighting Words: A Review of Sedition Laws in Australia Report 104 (Canberra: July 2006), www.alrc.gov.au. 26 To take two instances: for India, see Janaki Bakhle, ‘Savarkar (1883–1966), Sedition and Surveillance: the rule of law in a colonial situation’, Social History 35(1) (2010): 51–75; and for Australia, see Lawrence W. Maher, ‘The Use and Abuse of Sedition’, Sydney Law Review 14 (1992): 287–316. 27 James Fitzjames Stephen, Digest of the Criminal Law, Crimes and Punishments (London: MacMillan, 1877), articles 91–94.



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status quo. In her insightful study of sedition in contemporary Singapore, Jaclyn Neo characterises this axis as the vertical relationship between individual and the state.28 Additionally, Section 3 penalises spoken and written words that tend to ‘promote feelings of ill-will and hostility between different races or classes of the population’. This offence, which exists along a horizontal plane in Neo’s model, has been housed within sedition since the sixteenth century because class or racial tensions are regarded as having a tendency to cause public disorder, and thus destabilise the state. In this way the political values of the Age of Absolutism are readily apparent in modern Malaysia. Importantly, according to this definition, the prosecution does not need to establish that an accused actually intends to incite violence or public disorder by the words uttered, or that any violence or unlawful resistance to authority ever took place; simply uttering words that have a ‘seditious tendency’ is sufficient to ground the offence.29 Given the presentation of Chetz’s ‘offence’ in the media reports, the broad yet nebulous definition of ‘seditious tendency’ in Section 3 of the Sedition Act, and the tight coupling of Islamic institutions and state authority in Malaysia, it is easy to see why JAKIM, the UMNO ministers and Chetz’s numerous, enraged accusers felt she must have been seditious and deserved to be prosecuted and punished: after all, they had been aroused to anger by their interpretation of her conduct, they expressed hostility towards her, and imagined that non-Muslims must feel hostility towards them, surely disharmony, even race riots, could eventuate if Chetz were not ‘taught a lesson’. The statutory definitions of ‘seditious tendency’ invite such a conclusion; indeed, they positively create the situation that anyone the authorities do not like can be regarded as ‘seditious’, and clearly some powerful authorities felt threatened by Chetz’s quiet defiance of their expectations of a good Muslim. Importantly, the ease with which sedition accusations could be laid was further enabled by changes to the definition of ‘seditious tendency’ in Sedition Act Section 3 made by EO45. In essence, EO45 enlarged 28

Jaclyn Neo Ling Chien, ‘Seditious in Singapore: Free Speech and the Offence of Promoting Ill-will and Hostility between Different Racial Groups’, Singapore Journal of Legal Studies (2011): 351–72, 363. 29 Public Prosecutor v Param Cumaraswamy (No 2) [1986] 1 MLJ 518, and cases cited therein. See also footnote 39, below, for a potential judicial corrective to the prevailing strict liability interpretation.

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the definition to include a new ground in Section 3(1)(f), ‘to question any matter, right, status, position, privilege, sovereignty or prerogative established and protected by’ the constitutional provisions about citizenship, the national language, the ‘special position of the Malays’ and the sovereignty of the Malay Rulers.30 In Malaysian shorthand, this is referred to as questioning the ‘sensitive issues’. At the time, in the aftermath of the May 1969 riots, the government justified this additional ground of sedition as ‘necessary to remove questioning of sensitive issues from the political arena’ and the measure was supported by the multi-racial National Consultative Council and a Straits Times editorial.31 However, it did not receive universal approval. No less a figure than the Chief Justice H.T. Ong of the High Court of Malaya expressed the hope ‘that, as and when the justification no longer exists for banning fair comments on matters of public interest, the 1970 amendments to the Sedition Act will be removed’.32 The Chief Justice’s remarks strongly suggest he viewed the new provision as a transitory rather than a permanent amendment to the Sedition Act. Indeed, I contend there are good reasons for viewing it that way. First, EO45 provides that the Sedition Act ‘shall be read subject to the modifications and amendments’ set out in the schedule. The direction to ‘read subject to’ is quite different from ‘shall amend’ and suggests an interpretative guide for the duration of the emergency, rather than a permanent alteration. Second, Article 150(7) of the Constitution expressly provides that once an emergency is brought to an end, any ordinance made during the emergency will cease to be in effect six months after that date. In other words, in the constitutional schema, emergencies and their legal instruments are foreseen as temporary. As already mentioned, the effect of Article 150(7) is that by the end of June 2012, EO45 had lapsed because the Emergency Proclamations were annulled by December 2011. But it seems that the Emergency, like a zombie virus in the body politic, lives on after it has been declared legally dead. This appears to be so because the modifications made by EO45 to the Sedition Act during the Emergency in 30

These matters are protected respectively in the Federal Constitution, Part III, and Articles 152, 153 and 181. 31 ‘Sensitive Issues’, Straits Times, 31 July 1970, p. 12. 32 In the case of Melan bin Abdullah & Anor v Public Prosecutor [1971] 2 MLJ 280, at paragraph 22; the statement was also reported in the press: ‘Chief Justice hopes for removal of amendments to Sedition Act’, Straits Times, 3 November 1971, p. 9.



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1970 are accepted as if they were ‘amendments’ to the Act, and so endure after the ‘amending’ ordinance has lapsed. This is taken to have been achieved by virtue of two amendments to the Constitution – also made during the Emergency. The first permits Parliament to pass a law limiting the Article 10 constitutional right to free speech in the same terms as the new paragraph (f), i.e. to prohibit ‘questioning of the ‘sensitive issues’. The second removes parliamentary immunity from criminal prosecution from any parliamentarian who questions the ‘sensitive issues’.33 Although the Parliament has never passed such a law limiting free speech in these terms (paragraph (f) was issued by the executive, not Parliament, and this was done before, not after the constitutional amendment), nevertheless the courts seem – wrongly, in my respectful view – to have interpreted this set of events as retrospectively providing a ‘stamp of constitutional approval’ on the changes wrought by EO45.34 In this way it seems that an emergency, by definition a temporary disruption to regular constitutional life, has inserted itself – to paraphrase a once well-known philosopher – ‘like a nightmare on the brains of the living’.35 The combined result of the alterations to the definition and ambit of sedition law introduced under cover of the Emergency through EO45 and the 1971 constitutional amendments is that UMNO has been able to insert its ethno-nationalist mission to perpetuate Malay rule in Malaysia into the very fabric of the criminal law while also entrenching the Malay special privileges beyond possibility of removal, whereas in the original constitutional negotiations these privileges were envisaged as temporary measures, to last 15–20 years at most. 36 In this way the vertical and horizontal axes of sedition, mentioned above, form an iron cage, preventing and punishing critical scrutiny, let alone advocacy of the removal, of the 33

Constitution (Amendment Act) 1971 (Act A30), inserting a new Clause (4) into Article 10 (the freedom of expression article), and a new Clause (4) into Article 63 (the parliamentary immunity article). 34 This was the Federal Court’s ruling in Mark Koding v Public Prosecutor [1982] 2 MLJ 120, at paragraph 93. In the recent challenge to the constitutionality of the Sedition Act (PP v Azmi Sharom [2015] 8 CLJ 921), the Federal Court, in rejecting the challenge, did not consider these issues in full. 35 Karl Marx, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte (New York: International Publishers, 1963), p. 1. 36 Joseph M Fernando, The Making of the Malayan Constitution (Kuala Lumpur: Malaysian Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, 2002), p. 127.

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pro-Malay policies that guarantee UMNO’s continued rule. Essentially then, where politics is conducted along communal lines, and political parties are primarily race-based, criminalising speech about racial issues or race-based grievances serves to protect the ethnic interests safeguarded by the political party forming government. Because in Malaysia all politics is saturated with race – and race with religion because of the constitutional requirement in Article 160 that all Malays are Muslim – the race-based party that rules can cloak its racial speech in the mantle of government, to be protected by sedition from criticism, thus positioning all opposition speech as stirring up racial sensitivities and sentiments, contrary to the sedition law. For this reason also, Malay ultra-supremacists in UMNO and the medley of ethno-nationalist and Islamist vigilante groups that hover on the fringes of the party lamented that once preventive detention under the ISA had gone, and if the Sedition Act were to be repealed as Najib had promised, it would be impossible to preserve the sanctity of Islamic institutions, the supremacy of the Malay Rulers and the sovereignty of the Malay race (the concept of ketuanan Melayu).37 Unsurprisingly, they got their wish. The bill to amend the Sedition Act tabled in Parliament in April 2015 partially fulfilled Najib’s guarantee to liberalise Malaysian political space by removing criticism of government and the administration of justice from the definition of ‘seditious tendency’. But it also pandered to the Malay ethnosupremacists within and outside UMNO by inserting a new sedition offence, the promotion of ‘ill-will, hostility or hatred … on ground of religion’ and by retaining the offence of exciting disaffection against the traditional Malay Rulers. These measures are concerning for several reasons. ‘Protecting the sanctity of religion’, in the words of the Explanatory Memorandum to the Bill, is not the same thing as preserving religious (or any other) harmony, particularly when viewed through the increasingly Islamist lens of contemporary Malay-Muslim politics that considers religious pluralism or formal legal equality of faith communities as akin to apostasy. Next, the definition of ‘religion’ in the Act excludes ‘deviant teachings’ – such as Chetz the dog handler was accused of practising. By implication then, the amended Act will condone hostility towards Islamic minorities while doing nothing to lessen the mounting intolerance of non-Muslim faith groups. Third, as 37

For example, Perkasa leader Ibrahim Ali, who called for the Act to be reinforced: ‘Ibrahim Ali welcomes repeal of ‘weak’ Sedition Act’, Malaysiakini, 13 July 2012.



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the Malay rulers have a constitutional right and obligation to protect Islam and Malay custom, ultra-Malay-Muslim groups, for example Perkasa, have been quick to denounce criticism of Islamic courts or bureaucracies as seditious on grounds of sowing inter-communal hostility (that is, making them angry) and also on the basis that to criticise the administration of Islam is to criticise the Rulers as guardians of Islam.38 The amendments passed both houses of Parliament by May 2015 and the bill has received the royal assent and been gazetted. However, it has not been brought into effect, and there is no indication from the government regarding when it will be. Meanwhile, regime critics continue to be investigated and prosecuted for the seditious tendency of criticising the government or the courts, even though these grounds have been removed from the gazetted, but not yet enforced, Sedition Act. To conclude, challenges to the continued existence of the sedition law and to the way that UMNO has wielded it to distort the constitutional framework and Malaysian democracy have been markedly unsuccessful. Court challenges to the constitutionality of the Sedition Act have largely failed 39 and few people charged under the Act have been acquitted. Conversely, regime critics have been unsuccessful in persuading the Public Prosecutor (always an UMNO loyalist) to lay charges against UMNO members or ethno-nationalist agitators whose conduct clearly falls within the wide scope of ‘seditious tendency’.40 Criticism from domestic and 38

This critique of the Sedition Act amendments is advanced and illustrated further in Amanda Whiting, ‘Strengthening Sedition’, ‘Strengthened Sedition’, and ‘Fortifying Sedition’. 39 Failed attempts to have provisions of the Act declared unconstitutional include Mark Koding v Public Prosecutor [1982] 2 MLJ 120 and PP v Azmi Sharom [2015] 8 CLJ 921. By contrast, at the end of 2016 the Court of Appeal unanimously ruled that section 3(3), which stipulates that the accused’s intention is irrelevant, is unconstitutional and hence inoperative (Mat Shuhaimi Shafiei v Kerajaan Malaysia [2016] 1 LNS 1119). While this progressive decision is both welcome and, considering the historical timidity of Malaysian courts in defending constitutional rights against executive incursion via draconian laws, somewhat surprising, it does not necessarily signal a permanent weakening of Sedition law’s repressive power. This is so because the Public Prosecutor has appealed the decision to the Federal Court which, at the time of writing, has reserved its decision. 40 Some of the few acquittals include: then-Bar Council Vice President, Param Cumaraswamy (Public Prosecutor v Param Cumaraswamy (No 2) [1986] 1 MLJ 518), DAP MP Tian Chua (‘Court upholds Tian Chua acquittal of sedition charge’,

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international human rights monitors falls on deaf ears – apart from the short-lived, half-hearted and aborted project to replace the Sedition Act with a National Harmony Law, mentioned above. Perhaps the most spectacular campaign against sedition has been that mounted by the Malaysian Bar in 2014 in response to a fresh sedition crackdown targeting Opposition politicians, human rights lawyers and online media practitioners. In early September the National Young Lawyers’ Committee launched a public campaign to #Mansuh Akta Hasutan (Repeal the Sedition Act), using social media and road shows to spread the message,41 and on 19 September a well-attended Extraordinary General Meeting of the Bar voted to hold a peaceful protest. The march, titled ‘A Walk for Peace and Freedom’ occurred on 16 October. Bar President Christopher Leong called upon all members of the profession ‘to please attend the Walk and express your aspirations and support for a better Malaysia, premised on peace, harmony …. And freedom from intimidation and extremism,’ and a large crowd of lawyers and supporters marched to Parliament to hand to a bureaucrat in the Prime Minister’s Office a memorandum against sedition and for constitutional rights to free expression.42 The Walk for Peace and Freedom was a media

Malaysiakini, 2 March 2016 and DAP Penang Assemblyperson R.S.N. Rayer, acquitted of two separate charges (‘Sessions Court rules Rayer’s ‘celaka’ remark not seditious’, Malaysiakini, 29 April 2016 and ‘Seri Delima rep acquitted on ‘celaka Umno’ sedition charge’, Malaysiakini, 28 July 2016). Most other high-profile government critics have been convicted, for example DAP leaders Ooi Kee Saik (Public Prosecutor v Ooi Kee Saik & Ors [1971] 2 MLJ 108), Fan Yew Teng (Fan Yew Teng v Public Prosecutor (1975) 2 MLJ 235), Lim Guan Eng (Lim Guan Eng v Public Prosecutor [2000] 2 CLJ 541) and Karpal Singh (‘Karpal's sedition conviction a setback for rule of law’, Malaysiakini, 25 February 2014). Other recent convictions include those of social activists Hishamuddin Rais and Haris Ibrahim: see ‘High Court sentences Hisham to 9 months’ jail for sedition’, Malaysiakini, 15 January 2016, and ‘Court's decision to jail, not fine Haris alarming’, Malaysiakini, 16 April 2016. 41 Speech by Christopher Leong, President of the Malaysian Bar, at the Public Forum to Launch National Young Lawyers’ Committee’s #MansuhAktaHasutan’, Kuala Lumpur, 4 September 2014 and Shahredzan Johan, ‘Time for Action’, The Star, 8 September 2014. 42 Malaysian Bar, ‘Open Memorandum to the Prime Minister, Malaysia: Towards a peaceful, united and harmonious Malaysia’, 16 October 2014, accessed 15 April 2016, http://www.malaysianbar.org.my/bar_news/berita_badan_peguam/ malaysian_bars_open_memorandum_to_the_prime_minister_%7C_towards_a_ peaceful_united_and_harmonious_malaysia_16_oct_2014.html.



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success, but political commentators speculated that government would ignore the Bar, as it so often has in the past. They were correct. Within a month, Najib announced at the annual UMNO General Assembly that the Sedition Act would be retained and strengthened in order to make Malaysia more ‘peaceful, stable and harmonious’.43 And so it would appear that in the current political climate, deprived of the wide-ranging powers to detain opponents without trial under the repealed ISA, and absent the extraordinary legal powers permitted under a State of Emergency, the Sedition Act is one of UMNO’s strongest weapons in its quest to remain in power into a seventh decade. It is difficult to see it surrendering this tool anytime soon.

43

Bar Council, Press Statement ‘Repeal of Sedition Act 1948, a promise unfulfilled’, 28 November 2014.

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Malaysia’s Management of Petroleum Resources 161

Chapter 11

Malaysia’s Management of Petroleum Resources Wee Chong Hui

Petroleum revenues substantially finance public services and underscore regime legitimacy in Malaysia. The gradual reduction of the fuel subsidy from 2008 has accelerated inflation and reduced support for the ruling coalition. The federal government gets most of its petroleum revenues in opposition-controlled states and states with strategic parliamentary representation in the ruling coalition, making the contestation over petroleum highly political. The ruling coalition has used revenues directly to garner support through patronage and negotiations, including during elections. Petroleum revenue transparency is important as petroleum resources contribute substantially to government revenues, although revenue funds have declined since the 2013 election. Although the share of the petroleum contribution in the government revenue has been decreasing, the resource will continue to feature in the political economy. Petroleum resources earn revenue in many ways beyond the sale of oil and gas. Downstream production activities generate economic growth and stimulate supportive activities. The federal ruling coalition controls and manages petroleum resources to its advantage while the producing states are interested in petroleum-related revenues and benefits from petroleum-related activities. This resource thus plays a major role in shaping Malaysian politics.

Petroleum in the National Economy Malaysia is a leading exporter of liquefied natural gas (LNG) and a net exporter of crude petroleum. The petroleum resource mining industry generated some 10 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP) in 2012.

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Malaysia has been dependent on commodities and manufactured exports; crude petroleum and LNG formed 12 per cent of these exports in 2012.1 Malaysia exports high-grade petroleum and imports lower-grade petroleum to process for domestic use. In 2013 Malaysia produced 675,000 barrels of oil per day and 6,271 million standard cubic metres of natural gas per day. It had reserves of 3.7 billion barrels of oil and 38.8 trillion cubic feet of natural gas.2 The Petroleum Development Act (PDA, 1974) vests the ownership and control of petroleum resources in the government-owned company, Petroliam Nasional Berhad (PETRONAS). As the sector grew, petroleumrelated government revenues gained significance. Such revenues were estimated at 31 per cent of government revenue in 2013.3 PETRONAS also forgoes much revenue from price regulation for gas sold and this tops up the revenue to some 40 per cent.4 Worldwide, the petrol ringgit financed one of the highest subsidised fuels for transport, electricity and petroleum products for residential and industrial use from the early 1980s. One-third of the fuel subsidy was enjoyed by the needy, while two-thirds benefited the high- and middleincome groups.5 Leakages to neighbouring countries through smuggled cheaper diesel are publicised. 6 However, foreigners buying the large manufactured exports (80 per cent of total exports in 2015) also enjoy subsidised energy used in their production. Direct subsidy allocations and tax revenue exemptions increased from 10 per cent of government revenue in 2004 to 15 per cent in 2008, and fluctuated back to some 10 per

1 2

3

4

5

6

Calculated with data from Bank Negara Malaysia. See http://www.bnm.gov.my/ The economic numbers in this essay are drawn from this source. ‘The Oil & Gas Year: The Who’s Who of the Global Energy Industry – Malaysia 2015,’ accessed 25 July 2016, http://www.theoilandgasyear.com/content/uploads/2015/04/ TOGY_MALAYSIA_2015.pdf; and Bank Negara Malaysia (http://www.bnm.gov. my/) Syakirah bt Md. Nor, ‘Petroleum Fiscal Regime – Malaysia’s Experience’, Ministry of Finance, Malaysia, 12 August 2015, accessed 3 July 2016, www.imf.org/external/np/ seminars/eng/2015/natrestax/pdf/syakirah/pdf. In 2013, subsidy forgone from regulated gas price was RM24.9 billion (PETRONAS Annual Report, 2014), which was 11.7 per cent of federal government revenue of R 213.4 billion (http://www.bnm.gov.my/). ‘Subsidy rationalisation a bold step for future: Naib’, Sin Chew Jit Poh, 17 July 2010. Azman Ujang, ‘Fuel Subsidy Removal a brilliant move’, The Sun Daily, 27 November 2014.



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cent in 2012. These subsidy and tax exemptions were about 10 per cent of government expenditure and 2.5 per cent, 3.5 per cent and 2.5 per cent of GDP respectively. The 2008 petroleum price hike included a significant subsidy reduction, resulting in an immediate 40 per cent increase in the retail petrol price and 63 per cent increase for diesel. Transport comprises 15 per cent of household expenditure and impacts inflation. Though internationally low, the consumer price index more than doubled from 2.1 per cent in 2007 to 5.4 per cent in 2008. The inflation rate also increased from 1.6 per cent in 2012 to 2.0–2.5 per cent in 2013. The government proposes to gradually further reduce subsidisation. Higher premium petrol, presumably used by the better-off, is to be subsidised less. Local demand for energy grew with the economy to 1.623 million tonnes of oil equivalent by 2007, behind demand for Singapore and Brunei and more than that for Thailand and the Philippines at that time. Industry and transport each made up 38 per cent, while the balance went to residential and commercial use.7 As a source of energy consumption, oil fell from 94 per cent in 1980 to 39 per cent in 2011, while gas rose from 0.6 per cent to 37 per cent. Gas has been especially important in generating electricity, contributing to 51 per cent capacity compared to coal’s 35 per cent and hydro’s 10 per cent in 2012.8 Although hydroelectricity has been promoted as ‘renewable’, its generation necessitates flooding, and there have been protests from communities whose land is affected.9 Malaysia is planning for sufficient long-term supply of energy for domestic use – a mix of oil, gas, coal and hydroelectricity – with exploration and the adoption of technology to increase petroleum reserves and production. It is promoting green technology for environmentally sustainable development. In 2010 the Malaysian government launched the New Economic Model (NEM) of sustainable inclusiveness, with a high per capita income goal of USD15,000–20,000 by 2020 to be achieved through the Economic

7

Hamdan Mokhtar, ‘Malaysian Energy Situation,’ (paper presented at Seminar on ‘COGEN 3: A Business Facilitator’, Grand Bluewave Hotel, Shah Alam, Malaysia, 2 September 2002). 8 ‘Malaysia – Analysis’, (U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2013). 9 One of the protests is against the Baram dam project in Sarawak, see Ruekeith, Geryl Ogilvy, ‘Baram dam project halted indefinitely’, Borneo Post, 19 November 2014.

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Transformation Programme (ETP).10 The National Key Economic Areas in the ETP include the oil, gas and energy sector, with the goals of sustainable production, encouraging downstream activities and growing supportive services. In short, oil and gas plays a vital role in the economy, and its role is recognised in government programmes.

Expanding Petroleum Sector Under the ETP, spurring deepwater exploration, enhanced oil recovery and the development of marginal fields by tax incentives and risk-sharing contracts aim at sustainable production. Resources in Sarawak, Sabah and Terengganu are highlighted to attract foreign and local investments. Infrastructure development strategies for Malaysia envision a regional storage and trading hub to encourage downstream activities. By 2013 new storage, supply, fabrication, LNG regasification, petrochemical, refinery and port facilities in Pengerang, Johor were ready for investors. Support services in engineering, operation and maintenance, manufacture of equipment, training, research and consultancy are promoted with joint ventures, mergers and acquisitions involving foreign and local investors, private or government-linked. PETRONAS Petroleum Technology Institute of Learning and Training in Terengganu and PETRONAS University of Technology in Perak specialise in human resource and technology development, while Kuala Lumpur and Selangor are advertised for consultancy and port facilities. Under the PDA (1974) legislation, PETRONAS negotiates for joint production with private, mainly foreign, corporations, before embarking on shipping, refining, exploration, production and distribution of oil, gas and petroleum products. The production facility of 25.7 million tonnes per annum in the Bintulu PETRONAS LNG Complex in Sarawak is the world’s largest. It plays a key role in the ETP. Besides the states above, petroleum is refined in Negeri Sembilan and Melaka. The ETP prepares for the peninsula’s future demand and assists new participants with its LNG re-gasification facility in Melaka. The national petroleum infrastructure includes petrochemical complexes in Kuantan, Pahang and Terengganu, as well as a joint venture with Yayasan Sabah in Kimanis Power Sdn Bhd to improve Sabah’s electricity supply. 10

See http://etp.pemandu.gov.my/



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PETRONAS has expanded mining, production and trading operations and assets to Southeast Asia, Asia Pacific, Africa and the Middle East, Europe and America. It is now a Fortune 500 company contributing government revenues exceeding the rates for other international companies.

Government Finance Petroleum-related government revenue increased to over 40 per cent for 2003–7, but fell to 30 per cent by 2013. Tax exemption for petroleum products was 5–7 per cent and 10 per cent respectively.11 As a large revenue earner, petroleum resources are important in the government budget. Total government revenue has generally exceeded current expenditure, but development expenditure has contributed to an overall deficit. The federal government has borrowing power, and debt has transformed in recent years. Its operating expenditure for debt servicing increased from 15 per cent in 1976 to 50 per cent in 1989 and decreased to 10 per cent in 2013. The government has primarily opted to borrow domestically, increasing the amount from 66 per cent in 1971 to 99 per cent in 2011. The absolute amount of foreign debts also decreased in 1987–97 and 2003–9. Foreign borrowings increased to 45–50 per cent in the recessionary early 1980s. LNG exports first became significant and crude oil earnings were substantial and relatively stable at that time,12 hence reducing the adverse fiscal impact of the recession. Oil and gas reserves and production serve as a key asset and revenue source. However, public debts represent an increasing portion of GDP, growing from 41 per cent in 2008 to 53 per cent in 2013. Petroleum revenues include income tax, PETRONAS dividend, royalty and export duty. The main source is the petroleum income tax, which the constitution assigns to the federal government. The tax grew from 1 per cent of federal government revenue in 1970 to 36 per cent in 1986, but declined to 14 per cent in 2013.

11

Anas Alam Faizli, ‘Is PETRONAS an Ungrateful Child of Malaysia?’ last updated 12 July 2012, accessed 25 June 2016, http://aafaizli.com/is-petronas-an-ungratefulchild-of-malaysia/; Syakirah bt Md. Nor, op. cit.; Calculated with data from PETRONAS, Bank Negara Malaysia and ‘Penjelasan Mengenai Subsidi dan Bantuan Kerajaan Kepada Rakyat,’ (Economic Planning Unit, Prime Minister’s Department, 11 February 2008). 12 Calculated with data from Bank Negara Malaysia.

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In calculating the income tax, cost recovery is assigned to the producer, generally at 20 per cent of gross output for oil and 25 per cent for gas. Of the remaining 70 or 65 per cent, 70 per cent is assigned to PETRONAS and 30 per cent to the producer. The latter is subject to income tax, for which tax incentives are currently provided where deemed necessary to increase production from marginal fields and increase efficiency. The PETRONAS dividend increased from 1 per cent to 3 per cent in 1970–2013. As its sole owner, the federal government determines the annual dividend rate. The federal government and the state governments which own the resources get an equal amount of royalty. According to former Sarawak State Chief Minister (CM) Abdul Rahman Ya’kub, the discussions on the 1974 PDA legislation included a royalty review. However, the royalty has been 5 per cent since the enforcement of the PDA. Malaysia is a highly centralised federation. The federal government has collected at least 75 per cent of consolidated federal and state government revenues from 1963, its share increasing to 90 per cent in 2013. Given the limited revenue base of state governments, an increase in petroleum revenue such as the royalty would increase the fiscal capacities of the state governments concerned. The increase would be significant as petroleum resources are onshore and offshore in the less-developed states (LDS) of Sabah, Sarawak, Terengganu, Kelantan and Pahang for which development funds are important.

Federal–State Relations Petroleum revenue to states has been increasing. The Sabah government revenue from royalty increased from 19 per cent in 2008 to 26 per cent in 2013.13 In Sarawak, it increased from 17 per cent in 1995 to 23 per cent in 2013. In Terengganu, it increased from 22 per cent in 1979 to 57 per cent in 1995. In Terengganu the royalty payment was diverted to a federal-controlled fund in 2001–9. The Terengganu government felt that the diverted fund was RM2.8 billion14 or RM0.3 billion per year. This amounted to some 15 per cent of the state government revenue in the period around 2000.15 13

Calculated with data from Sabah state government budgets. ‘Petronas says not involved in Terengganu oil royalty settlement’, accessed 27 April 2012, http://duniandt.blogspot.my/2012/04/petronas-says-not-inmvolved-in.html. 15 Estimated from Terengganu government budgets, 2012–14. 14



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The Terengganu government sued the federal government for nonpayment of royalty and stated that the payment stopped after the opposition party, Parti Islam Se-Malaysia (PAS), won control of the state in the 1999 election. The court ruled that the Terengganu government had no rights over the petroleum resources, which were in the continental shelf, over which the Malaysian government had declared ownership – unlike for Sabah and Sarawak, which declared ownership under British Crown orders in 1954, prior to their joining the Malaysian federation.16 The federal government argued that the transfer of the royalty to a fund away from the state government was based on compassionate grounds for the poor. The ruling coalition, Barisan Nasional (BN) won back Terengganu in 2008 and the royalties for 2000–8 were paid to the BN-led Terengganu government just before a 2009 by-election there. Opposition party PAS had the same experience in its long-time stronghold, Kelantan. In 2010 the Kelantan government filed a suit against PETRONAS for non-payment of royalty for production in its adjacent continental shelf from 2005. The Kelantan Sultan indicated support for the claim. As in the case for Terengganu, the federal government also claimed ownership of the continental shelf and declared sole rights over the petroleum resources. Otherwise, Kelantan would have received royalty estimated at some RM400 million a year.17 Meanwhile, Pahang, under BN control, has been promised a special payment of RM100 million a year once oil production starts in its adjacent continental shelf.18 In August 2012 the Prime Minister (PM) announced that a committee was to be set up to identify the peninsular east coast states eligible for petroleum royalty payments and the related amount(s). The committee was to be chaired by former chief justice Tun Abdul Hamid Mohamad and comprise legal experts from Malaysia and foreign countries, as well as representatives of the Pahang, Kelantan and Terengganu state governments consented to by their respective Sultans. Like the pro-BN diversion of royalty to the federal-controlled fund in Terengganu, the formation of

16

J.C. Fong, Constitutional Federalism in Malaysia (Petaling Jaya: Sweet and Maxwell Asia, 2008). 17 Shukri Rahman, ‘Kelantan intent on claiming RM4.5b oil royalty’, The Ant Daily, 28 July 2014. 18 ‘Oil discovered in Pahang’, The Star, 31 October 2012.

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the committee may have given the impression of concern for these states. However, there is no known public report of the committee’s work to date. Sabah and Sarawak’s petroleum royalties have also been contentious. The Borneo states were the earliest producers. In 1969 the Sarawak CM claimed that the federal government assured that Sarawak could have all revenue from offshore petroleum for accepting a lower federal grant. Insofar as the Constitution was perceived to be silent on the matter then, the federal claim was construed as annexation.19 In the 1990 election campaign, the then CM of Sabah, Joseph Pairin Kitingan – whose government defected to the opposition then – said that royalty should be increased to 50 per cent. Over the years, some in Sabah and Sarawak have also been critical of the petroleum revenue outflows from the states despite their need for development funds, including for road construction and upgrading. The petroleum royalty for 5 out of 13 state governments promises little financial gain for the majority, and even career politicians, in the states concerned. Coalitional politics favoured the federal government until the 2008 general election. The alternative coalition (Pakatan Rakyat) pledged an increase of 20 per cent in the 2008 election campaign. Subsequently, the leader of a component party of the ruling BN in Sarawak was reported to say that larger federal development allocations were preferable to increased royalty. The Sabah and Sarawak’s BN members of Parliament (MPs) added 22.1 per cent of the seats in parliament to give the BN a 56.8 per cent majority in the 2008 election. Sabah and Sarawak maintained their strategic representations in the BN in the 2013 election. With their strategic number of MPs in BN, the states have been renewing efforts for increased royalty. The BN Sabah CM for 1976–185, Harris Mohd Salleh, wrote to both Sabah and Sarawak’s CMs and assemblymen, saying that it was an opportune time to ask for an increase in royalty to 25 per cent.20 More petroleum industries have been located in the peninsula, including

19

Reece cited in Michael Bechett Leigh, The Development of Political Organization and Leadership in Sarawak, East Malaysia, PhD dissertation, Cornell University, 1971. 20 ‘Sabah, Sarawak should demand 25 per cent oil royalty: Harris’, The Star, 6 September 2008.



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those processing petroleum from the less industrialised Borneo states, from where some criticism has arisen. In 2008 a Sabah MP objected to Sabah supplying gas for the LNG plant in Sarawak. The gas could otherwise be used for Sabah’s industries, electricity generation and other development projects. The Cabinet agreed that a petrochemical industry would be implemented in Sabah and excess gas would be piped to Sarawak. 21 However, the pipeline for the purpose went through Sarawak’s native customary land (NCL). As in logging and hydroelectricity projects, the loss of NCL has a direct, detrimental impact on some rural communities (who use NCL for watershed, jungle produce, agriculture, housing) compared to petroleum royalty, which the state government may not allocate for their direct benefit.

Petroleum Governance PETRONAS is an off-budget agency answerable to the PM. Its accounts are neither public nor available to Parliament. The 2008 petroleum price hike and accompanying inflation saw Pakatan calling voter attention to petroleum revenue transparency and governance. As the government reduced the petrol subsidy that would have increased its financial burden with the petroleum price hike, it provided RM500 for each car owner, presumably to ease the burden of the petrol price increase. It stated its intention was to improve public transport as an alternative. After negative reactions from Sarawak, where river transport is the only option in the absence of rural roads, the government subsidised river transport. The government also explained that it would divert funds for targeted assistance to the poor. In late 2011 the government announced Bantuan Rakyat 1Malaysia (BR1M), a cash assistance initially of RM500 to heads of household or individuals with income below RM3000 a month. The challenge lies in prioritising poor households – with a monthly income below RM800 in 200922 – and the poor’s access to BR1M. For example, Sabah and Sarawak should have large allocations for the largest number of poor households, but the poor in remote rural areas served by a 21

Kevin Koo, ‘Kimanis-Bintulu pipeline project – On!’ Petrol Malaysia, accessed 3 July 2016, www.petrolmalaysia.com/2008/11/kimanis-bintulu-gas-pipeline-project-on. html 22 Tenth Malaysia Plan, p. 397.

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poor transport system may have problems accessing BR1M. Some opined that public transport improvement, promised from petrol subsidy reduction earlier, would be centralised in the Peninsula, ignoring the Borneo states. The BN has also used petroleum revenue to finance development projects. It has practised developmentalism from the 1990s, promising better services and development projects for supporters.23 In this regard, the federal Ministry of Finance organised its first historic meetings with government agencies and non-government organisations in Sabah and Sarawak in July 2013 to get feedback on the 2014 federal budget. While allocations for all states have increased over the years, Sabah’s allocation continuously improved in rank from the 6th highest for the Sixth Malaysia Plan (1991–1996) to the highest for the Ninth Malaysia Plan (2006–2010). Sarawak climbed from 8th position in the Fifth Malaysia Plan (1986–1990) to the top for the Sixth, Seventh and Eighth plans. A 55 per cent increase in funds for Sarawak placed it 3rd in the Ninth Plan. However, the rank for Kelantan, which has been ruled by the opposition since 1990, declined from 5th in the Fifth Plan to 10th in the Seventh Plan, improving to 8th only in the Ninth Plan, despite it being one of the poorest states. Transfer of constitutional grants to the state was also delayed and federal support through loans was reduced though some of its financial problems arose from the previous BN government.24 After Penang and Selangor fell under opposition control in the 2008 election, funds were channelled to Federal Development Offices in these states instead of the state district offices as before. Further, parliamentary funds are given to BN MPs for constituency development, but denied to opposition MPs. The allocation for each MP in 2013 was RM2 million.25 More specifically, there has been an increasing number of Sarawak and Sabah MPs holding federal ministerial posts, with access to ministry funds, in keeping with their strategic importance in the BN coalition. The state-based newspapers have reported these appointments as justified for their representation in BN. 23

Bridget Welsh, ‘Malaysia Elections: A Step Backward’, Journal of Democracy 24(2) (2013): 143. 24 Mohammad Agus Yusuff, ‘The Politics of Malaysian Federalism: The Case of Kelantan’, Jebat 28 (2001): 1–24. 25 Jo-Ann Jong, ‘Assessing Pakatan Rakyat in Selangor,’ The Nut Graph, 20 September 2010; ‘Sarawak Chinese lost RM125 mil’, Free Malaysia Today, 27 July 2013.



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In 1988 the government established Kumpulan Wang Amanah Negara (KWAN), a national trust fund of contributions from entities involved in business, research and development activities related to depleting resources. It is envisioned as a saving from depleting petroleum resources. In 2013 KWAN had RM9.5 billion, of which RM6 billion was from PETRONAS and RM3 billion from KWAN’s investments and assets. KWAN’s fund then was 1.5 per cent of PETRONAS’s revenue for 1988–2013. The only known withdrawal of RM42 million was for a wetland sanctuary project.26 There is a need to improve the effectiveness of KWAN’s savings objective and governance. For example, there are no regulations on the amount or timing of contributions to KWAN. KWAN’s managing panel is appointed by the Finance Minister (FM), who has been the PM since the currently imprisoned Pakatan leader Anwar Ibrahim was fired from the post in 1998. The PM-cum-FM approves withdrawals and directs the type of investments.27

Conclusion Malaysia has generated value-added and export earnings from petroleum resources since the 1970s. The federal government has used petroleum revenues to finance one of the highest world subsidies for transport and electricity to benefit commuters, households and industries. Petroleum revenues have also financed development. Nonetheless, benefits have been inequitably distributed. The major portion of subsidies has been enjoyed by the relatively well-off states. The petroleum-producing states are amongst the poorest. Petroleum resources are controlled by PETRONAS, which is only answerable to the PM. The long-ruling BN has used funds to garner support while withholding or delaying fund transfer to the opposition, including petroleum-producing states. Contrary to opposition MPs, BN MPs are given constituency funds. Whilst increasing world prices of petroleum-related products over the years increased revenues, they also increased government subsidy 26

Sri Murniati, The New Face of KWAN: Proposals to Improve Malaysia’s Natural Resource Fund (Kuala Lumpur: Institute for Democracy and Economic Affairs, March 2015). 27 Sri Murniati, op. cit.

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spending. The government reduced subsidisation after the 2008 price hike, exacerbating inflation. The consolidated Pakatan then raised the issue of petroleum revenue governance and courted petroleum-producing states which only receive 5 per cent petroleum royalty or have no claim over petroleum resources in their adjacent continental shelves. While the withdrawal of fuel subsidy was thought to be influential in the 2008 election, there were less publicised voter reactions to petroleum resource management in the 2013 election. State royalty rights raised by politicians, state government agencies and those concerned with regional (under-)development and federalism continued with limited participation. The federal–state contest for petroleum royalty seems limited to some (not all) producing states and the Pakatan manifesto. Nevertheless, petroleum revenues continued to benefit the ruling coalition and its supporters. However, the perceived need for better governance, including that for petroleum resource revenues, led to voter support for Pakatan. The government and PETRONAS are technically efficient in managing petroleum resources and extracting good revenues, with private and international participation. Given voter expectations, the government has to (at least) be perceived as allocating or likely to allocate revenues for the well-being of various voters’ groups (e.g. rural, urban, ethnic, employees, business). Sabah and Sarawak’s strategic position in the ruling BN also necessitates the federal government’s entertaining these petroleumproducing LDSs’ demands.

Postscript Even after the 2013 election, the contestation of petroleum revenue continued. In 2014 the Sarawak State Assembly unanimously adopted a resolution to demand an increase in petroleum royalty from 5 per cent to 20 per cent. Sarawak CM Adenan Satem, who assumed the post in March 2014, was vocal on state rights and devolution of power. On 22 July 2014 the state held a ceremony to commemorate Sarawak’s independence from the British on 22 July 1963. Contrary to (federal) police statements, he stated his support for a ‘Sarawak for Sarawakians’ rally held on the same day. One of the key demands of this movement is an increase in petroleum royalty and equal partnership in Malaysia. It was reported that the PM and the Sarawak CM agreed on more



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administrative autonomy for the state, including consulting it on federal laws affecting the state, its representation in the Public Service Commission and the Education Commission – which recruit federal employees – and increasing the ratio of Sarawak teachers in the state (Ling, 2016).28 PETRONAS contract allocations to Sarawak companies and spending corporate social responsibilities in Sarawak were also highlighted. However, there has been no concrete development in the negotiations for an increased petroleum royalty. Before the March 2016 Sarawak state assembly election that saw increased BN representatives for new constituencies, and reduced representatives and majority votes for Pakatan, the PM said that the time was not right for negotiations.29 Nonetheless, Sarawak CM Adenan Satem soon said that the state is regulating the seabed and subsoil activities of PETRONAS. He pointed out the need to safeguard state rights by amending the Territorial Sea Act (2012) that enables federal control. Further, states are empowered to regulate petroleum-related activities on land as it is constitutionally a state matter.30 Throughout the 2016 state campaign, the CM called for higher revenue, a call rejected by the PM for the time being. Looking ahead, if production decreases with a lower petroleum price, the royalty would be less attractive to the producing states. The more significant direct revenue remains the petroleum income tax, for which there is no public record of discussions. There have been concessions to the louder calls from the Borneo states for petroleum revenue. PETRONAS is awarding a 10 per cent stake in MLNG Plant Train 9 to the 5 per cent stake in LNG1 and 10 per cent stake in LNG2 and LNG3 to the Sarawak government as well as allocating RM2.1 billion contracts to Sarawak companies and natural gas to the state. It is also adding 10 per cent in PETRONAS Train 9 to the 25 per cent participating interest in two production contracts awarded in 2014 to the Sabah government.31 28

Sharon Ling, ‘Not perfect but not bad: Adenan scores some successes in initial talks on devolution of powers’, The Star, 23 January 2016. 29 ‘Time not right for oil royalty talks, says Najib’, Daily Express, 5 May 2016, accessed 3 July 2016, www.dailyexpress.com.my/news.cfm?NewsID=109426. 30 Sulok Tawie, ‘Sarawak seeks to regulate Petronas activities within state’, Malay Mail, 15 June 2016. 31 Anak Sarawak, ‘Negotiation on increase of oil, gas royalty progressing well’, New

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These deals include an equity stake in petroleum businesses for LDS with the resources on- or off-shore conferring ownership rights. The states can now share net gains or losses from the resources over time. This arrangement also avoids payments of cash, handling liquidity problems for both the federal government and PETRONAS for their efficient functions. The future for petroleum revenues remains uncertain. The average export prices for crude oil price and LNG fell by 36 per cent and 26 per cent respectively in 2015. Despite some 25 per cent increases in export volumes, the export values of Malaysian crude petroleum and LNG dropped by 20 per cent and 26 per cent. Federal government oil-related revenues continued to fall – from 31 per cent in 2013 to 29 per cent in 2014 and an estimated 27 per cent in 2015.32 The federal government has nonetheless taken advantage of this decline. Savings from the rationalisation of fuel subsidy in 2015 were estimated at 5 per cent of current expenditure. The new, general sales tax (GST) for 2015 added 18 per cent to federal government revenue and federal current surplus was estimated to double from RM1 billion in 2014 to RM2 billion in 2015, while government debt increased by 1 per cent of GDP.33 In response to the falling oil price from world over-supply in early 2016, the federal government reduced the 2017 budget allocation by 3.6 per cent and announced various strategies ‘to protect people’s welfare’. Meanwhile, capital expenditure in the petroleum industries, including PETRONAS, is to be reduced. The impact of these reductions is unknown, but it indicates a new fiscal reality for petroleum in Malaysia’s political economy. Some applaud Malaysia for its handling of recent fiscal challenges. However, the long-term current surplus declined from RM21 billion in 1997 to RM2 billion in 2015, and government debt was an estimated 54 per cent in 2015. This is a macroeconomic problem, requiring improved fiscal management which includes the management of petroleum resources and KWAN. Cheaper shale oil is a competitor for fossil oil, including Malaysia’s. Governance and distribution of petroleum revenue are now more important than ever.

Sarawak Tribune, 1 June 2016; Doncon Wang, ‘And The Winner Is Sabah, Thanks To Musa – Declares Sarawak Opposition’, Sabah Kini, 13 December 2014. 32 Syakirah bt Md. Nor, op. cit. 33 Calculated with data from Bank Negara Malaysia. See http://www.bnm.gov.my/



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Petroleum resources can still earn revenues, and will continue to play an important political role in the future. Petroleum downstream activities promise economic growth per se besides stimulating supportive activities. Petroleum resources and their management will remain an important tool for developmentalism for the federal ruling coalition and a concern of the narrow revenue-based producing states interested in the benefits of petroleum-related activities. In fact, the number of states without petroleum resources but having productive capacities for petroleum refining, processing and related activities have increased with the ETP. BN will continue to rely on these funds, with questions of legitimacy and political contestation continuing to shape Malaysia’s future. Ultimately, petroleum resource management should be a widespread concern, not only in federal–state relations, but also for the public at large.

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The Politics of Malaysia’s B40 177



Chapter 12

The Politics of Malaysia’s B40 Steven C. M. Wong

Malaysia’s 13th general election on 5 May 2013 was waged on a number of heatedly contested grounds. As expected, Pakatan Rakyat’s (PR) attempt to unseat the government in power was based on a potent mixture of political corruption, abuse of power, lack of accountability and waste of public funds. In the face of stinging accusations, Barisan Nasional (BN) leaders had little response except to issue flat denials and attempt to sue and harass their detractors. BN’s case for re-election, as in its manifesto, hinged on two bases: one, that it had provided political and social stability and, two, that it had delivered economic growth and people-centred development. PR was able to point out the flaws by highlighting the poor conditions of the vulnerable working and underclasses, although, try as it might, PR was unable to create its own set of coherent economic policies. In the months and weeks approaching GE13, the two coalitions competed for the same constituency – the bottom 40 per cent (B40) of the 6.4 million households in 2012.1 PR had strong arguments and voter support but very little competitive advantage. BN’s dominant party, the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO), had evolved from a grassroots to an increasingly elitist Malay party, but remained highly adept at political patronage, had well-oiled nationwide machinery and considerable funds at its disposal. With incumbent’s advantage, BN was able to mobilise massive resources, an onslaught that PR was never going to be in a position to withstand. 1

The term ‘B40’ originates from the Department of Statistics’ Household Income Surveys, which aggregates data of the lowest (or bottom) 40 per cent, the middle 40 per cent and the top 20 per cent of total households. Although initially known among select statisticians and economists, since 2013 the term has gained currency and is commonplace in policy discussions.

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By some accounts, more taxpayer dollars were spent in GE13 than any other election in the country’s history.2 With the weight of government machinery behind it, BN was also better able to explicitly address the insand-outs issues of the sources of economic growth and how its populist programmes were to be funded. Aspiring PR candidates, most lacking specific knowledge of government workings, had to rely more on ‘by the seat of the pants’ arguments. In trying to trump its political opponent’s promises of populist measures, PR could do no more than to state that better governance would open more opportunities for business and welfare programmes would be financially sustainable by plugging the leakages of corruption and wastage. B40 households had been recognised to be a critical political constituency for quite some time. Under the Abdullah Ahmad Badawi administration, Regional Economic Corridors (essentially a modern retake on the old Regional Development Authority idea) were formed to more equitably spread investment and income growth across the country, particularly in less developed northern and east coast states of the Peninsula, and in Sabah and Sarawak. Under Najib Tun Abdul Razak’s Economic Transformation Programme (ETP), economic growth was given much higher priority, but still appeared to rely on trickle-down effects to distribute the gains. Criticisms were heard that the ETP would not significantly change the Malays, Bumiputera, working-class and marginalised communities, and the Najib administration was pressured to respond with the creation of two new institutions, Unit Peneraju Agenda Bumiputera (Teraju), to look after Bumiputera economic interests, and Ekuiti Nasional Berhad (Ekuinas), a government-funded Bumiputera private equity firm. As the government’s term drew to a close, however, it was clear to Najib’s policy advisors that policies directly targeting the B40 were essential if BN was to have any chance of retaining power, given widespread disaffection among the urban middle-class and even the upper-middle class. In Budget 2012 the government thus announced, amidst PR cries of ‘vote buying’, a cash payment of RM500 known as BR1M (or Bantuan Rakyat 1Malaysia), together with a slew of other 1Malaysia branded programmes

2

Bridget Welsh, for example, has estimated politically-targeted spending from 2009– 12 at RM57.6 billion, with 1Malaysia programmes accounting for RM11 billion: See, ‘Buying Support – Najib’s ‘Commercialisation of GE13’, Malaysiakini, 23 April 2013.



The Politics of Malaysia’s B40 179

targeted at individuals earning less than RM3,000 a month. Originally intended as a one-off payment, BR1M was found to be so popular that it was again paid in February 2013 (BR1M 2.0). The number of individuals who received BR1M 1.0 and BR1M 2.0 were 4.8 million and 6.8 million, and the cost to the taxpayer was RM2.6 billion and RM2.9 billion respectively. (In 2016, 7.1 million applicants were approved for BR1M payments ranging from RM1,050 to RM800 depending on household income category.)3 The actual impact of BR1M and other financial support schemes for low-income households announced prior to GE13 (including 1AZAM, KAR1SMA and so forth) on swinging election results is debatable. While welcomed, at RM500 the payment was not overly generous and, unlike many other government schemes, eligibility to receive payments was nondiscriminatory. PR seemed able to puncture any political capital BN might have gained with the argument that BR1M was paid out of public funds and therefore a voter owed no obligation to the BN government. What BR1M did was bring to the fore searching questions about patterns of income distribution that have been the legacy of economic development over the preceding five decades and the New Economic Policy (NEP).4 PR was able to ask how effective and equitable Malaysia’s development was if so many individuals (6.8 million under BR1M 2.0 and 7.1 million in 2016) were eligible to receive payment. This important issue will be addressed in ensuing paragraphs but, first, a closer examination of the B40 is warranted. In 2013 the government had taken pride in announcing that average monthly household incomes had doubled to RM5,000 in 2012 from around RM2,500 a decade or so earlier.5 They did not loudly trumpet the fact that 71 per cent of households earned less than the RM5,000 average, with 52 per cent earning less than RM3,000 a month. In the B40 cohort, numbering 2.6 million households in 2012, the average income was RM3,050 a month or an average RM1,847 a month per income earner (i.e. 1.7 income earners per household). The difference between the average and median household incomes

3

Accessed 18 April 2016, https://ebr1m.hasil.gov.my/ The NEP was introduced as a solution to the socio-economic conditions after the 13 May 1969 riot, although the latter was clearly politically-inspired and motivated. 5 The Household Income Survey 2012 (Department of Statistics, Malaysia: 2013). Data cited in the following paragraphs are from this source unless otherwise stated. 4

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clearly shows that income distribution is skewed towards the lower income ranges. Another way to show the stark unevenness is to examine the share of total household income. The B40 accounted for just 14.8 per cent of the total, whereas the top 20 (T20) households garnered 48.6 per cent. The middle 40 per cent (M40) share was the balance of 36.6 per cent. These proportions were replicated in the major three ethnic groups, except for Indians where T20 households account for even more (over 50 per cent) of this cohort income. The share of B40 was only slightly higher in rural areas (17.1 per cent of the total) than in urban (15.6 per cent), indicating that income distribution in the latter was more problematic. These features were not apparent from the Gini coefficient which, according to official sources, saw a slight improvement to 0.431 in 2012 from 0.443 in 1999.6 We can conclude from this that the patterns of income distribution have been relatively stable over time and that increases in household incomes have not disproportionately benefited the B40. Interesting questions can be asked about the social and political consequences of such income disparities. For example, in the decade or so after Independence, the Gini worsened (apparently) from 0.41 in 1957/58 to 0.51 in 1970. Of the 2.6 million B40 households, 75.5 per cent were Bumiputera, indicating that there was still a heavily ethnic predisposition in the problem of low incomes – not just Malays but, importantly, also the indigenous communities of Sabah, Sarawak and Peninsular Malaysia. Sarawak, in particular, stood out in that its income lagged behind not just Peninsular Malaysia, but also Sabah, over the past decade. As pointed out earlier, however, low incomes were no longer a predominantly rural phenomenon. More than half of the B40 (56.1 per cent or 1.43 million households) resided in urban areas, where the variability of incomes was much higher. Urban areas produce 82.8 per cent of total household income which, at an average RM5,742 in 2012, is significantly higher than rural incomes at RM3,080. Today, over 70 per cent of all Malaysians today live in urban areas, compared to just 26 per cent in 1957/58 and 34 per cent in 1980. Under Mahathir Mohamad the NEP accelerated this shift through wider educational opportunities for those in poverty-prone sectors and their 6

Department of Statistics and Economic Planning Unit. Note: The Gini coefficients calculated by the World Bank are different from official sources.



The Politics of Malaysia’s B40 181

employment in urban areas, not least in the public sector, which has grown substantially in numbers. While location as a factor cannot be seen in isolation, its socio-political implications on the current and future Malaysian landscapes cannot be overemphasised. Under the National Physical Plan 2, the urbanisation rate is expected to climb steadily to at least 75 per cent by 2020 and over 80 per cent by 2030.7 Another telling feature of the B40 is that 94.3 per cent of household heads had no more than a Sijil Pelajaran Malaysia (SPM) qualification (i.e. 11 years of schooling). Education levels are robust determinants of income and this appears to be overwhelmingly so in the case of the B40. This is mitigated to some degree by the fact that 27.9 per cent of household heads in B40 were older than 60 years and were thus of schooling age before secondary schools and tertiary education had become as widespread as they are today. To a large extent, however, the blame must also fall on the long-standing weaknesses of the technical vocational education and training (TVET) systems which, though given emphasis and public investment especially in the NEP period, have failed to deliver the goods. As a result, the Najib administration shifted education spending away from tertiary institutions, which can be argued to be hugely over-provided, towards TVET in Budget 2014. Given the low levels of education, it comes as no surprise that 60.7 per cent of the B40 were in low-paying employed positions, while the rest were self-employed. One can take a step back to reflect on these outcomes: how did the country arrive at this point? After almost six decades of development planning, five of which were devoted to the implementation of the NEP, the B40 numbers represented a significant, albeit hitherto largely unrecognised, contradiction and source of embarrassment. Malaysia has been internationally hailed as a development success, a case of ‘growth with equity’; in the mid-1990s the World Bank included it among the ‘East Asian miracle’.8 On paper, this seems justified, with absolute poverty rates falling from more than 50 per cent of households in the 1960s to less than 1 per 7

Second National Physical Plan, 2010–2020 (Federal Department of Town and Country Planning, Malaysia, 2010). 8 See Nancy Birdsall et al., The East Asia Miracle: Economic Growth and Public Policy (Washington, DC: World Bank Publications, 1993), available at: http://documents. worldbank.org/curated/en/1993/09/698870/east-asian-miracle-economic-growthpublic-policy-vol-1-2-main-report

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cent at present. The Malaysia Plans have taken front-and-centre place in every administration since the time of Tun Abdul Razak and an elaborate bureaucratic machinery has grown to support them. The Malaysia Plans, however, have focused largely on federal government allocations and expenditures for development projects and subsidies. Cash transfers such as BR1M have not been a significant component of the policy framework at all. (Mahathir Mohamad, who held office for 22 years (1981–2003), was well known for his opposition to income transfers on the grounds that it made Malaysians ‘lazy’ and posed a burden to public finances.) Apart from payments to the handicapped, native Malaysians (Orang Asli), fishermen, single mothers and the like, administrative structures had hitherto not evolved to handle a nationwide system of cash transfers. It is instructive that a national database on needy households (e-kasih) has only been operational since 2008 and that the key driver of the Prime Minister’s National Transformation Policy, PEMANDU, was only relatively recently enlisted in the task. Not surprisingly, the legacy of relying on government development expenditure has greatly widened the scope for government inefficiencies, policy (institutional) capture and, of course, the private rent-seeking that one witnesses in many developing countries. As noted earlier, this has given fuel to critics of the BN government in general elections up to 2013. International policy advisors had long been urging the government to dismantle price support and subsidy schemes in favour of transparent and targeted cash transfers, something which the Najib administration, in his search for performance legitimacy, has accepted and implemented. He has also largely had to sidestep a self-serving bureaucracy, establish PEMANDU and hire a slew of international management consulting firms and private sector personnel to drive a process that would otherwise be the responsibility of the public sector. While these have (arguably) worked reasonably well in promoting economic growth initiatives, the tasks of promoting greater equity and the B40’s fortunes have proven to be another matter, particularly in the timeframe that impacts Najib’s political fortunes. The data show that households were being lifted out of poverty and B40 incomes were growing faster than the national average, but only just; the majority were still not able to make the transition to the middle class. To his credit, the Abdullah administration recognised this and upped the ante on human resource



The Politics of Malaysia’s B40 183

development. This, however, took the form of straightforward development allocations to increase the number of tertiary educational institutions rather than the more demanding task of raising educational standards and quality. The ETP promised the creation of four million middle-class jobs but it remains to be seen if these can be realised. Compounding the B40’s woes is the issue of foreign workers in lowpaying jobs. Foreign workers had been on the rise since the mid-1990s, but increased significantly in 2005 after Abdullah’s Cabinet, pressured by private industry, approved the establishment of outsourcing companies. World Bank economists asked by the EPU to study this issue have concluded that foreign workers have taken on 3-D jobs (dirty, dangerous and difficult) and freed Malaysians to take on higher paying work.9 This finding, however, can be debated as it could be true for the labour market as a whole but still have a negative impact on the specific B40 cohort. The conclusion also assumes wages and incomes for ‘3D’ jobs are relatively fixed, whereas we know from international experience that these can also rise, leading to an increase in domestic labour supply. That a limit to the number of foreign workers taken must be drawn seems obvious, but is not the reality with a breath-taking target of well over one million in the near term. Other factors have impacted wages of the B40. The opening of China, for example, has led to a global stagnation or even reduction in manufacturing wages. Trade unions have also argued that the Abdullah administration’s decision to license outsourcing companies (most of whom employ foreign workers) has eroded the position of already lowly paid employees. The Najib administration’s primary response was to rush through the minimum wage, a measure seen to increase the incomes of up to a quarter of the 13.5 million workforce. The minimum wage for Peninsular Malaysia was set at RM900 a month and RM800 a month in East Malaysia. (This was revised to RM1,000 and RM900 respectively in 2015.) Since coming into force on 1 January 2013, however, employers were allowed to apply for exemptions. Small and medium enterprises hiring foreign workers were exempted from paying minimum wages until December 2013 and larger companies had until 30 June 2013 to apply for exemptions.

9

World Bank, Malaysian Economic Monitor: Immigrant Labour (December 2015), accessed 1 June 2016, http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/malaysia/publication/ malaysia-economic-monitor-december-2015-immigrant-labour.

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Yet other factors play key roles in determining the incomes and welfare of B40 households. The relatively low level of female labour participation (46 per cent of the labour force in 2012), the still high number of dependants (those younger than 15 years and older than 64 years of age) (48.5 per 100 of the working age population in 2012), low savings rates and restricted access to social safety nets such as old age pensions, educational scholarships and public housing compound the problems of this cohort. Despite years of policy emphasis, we have yet to establish what each of these contributes to the determination of household incomes. For example, how much does lower female labour force participation of one particular group account for income differences? How much higher are incomes of those who do not work in the civil service and therefore do not have access to pensions and must save? Upward social mobility is difficult in the best of times, what more with policies and practices (40 years of New Economic Policy notwithstanding) that were intended to benefit the masses. In practice, however, resources have ended up favouring the Top 20 per cent (T20) and, to a lesser extent, the Middle 40 per cent (M40). This is apparent in the current income distribution patterns. For most of the Mahathir years, development contradictions were largely held in check, where necessary by political and state suppression. Poverty and income distribution data were not publicly available. With the fracturing of UMNO in 1998 and in later years other component parties of BN, the B40, especially disenfranchised urban segments, became empowered and began to find greater political voice. The B40’s highly vulnerable socio-economic conditions have now become the focus of attention in national politics, particularly in view of GE13. The ETP has greatly attracted the attention of the international and domestic business community but it has lacked strong traction among BN politicians, particularly at the rural grassroots level. Economic liberalisation, public expenditure management and financial consolidation are necessary to ensure economic stability, but these are viewed as popularity sapping rather than winning. With the emphasis now on inclusive development, once again BN politicians can be seen to be active in dispensing the government largesse and political patronage that have been the traditional hallmarks of BN governments, in the hopes of strengthening and widening their support bases. Post-GE13 politics raised policy priorities for equity and social welfare above that of even the economic growth imperative. The administration



The Politics of Malaysia’s B40 185

has taken the hugely unpopular task of reducing greatly public expenditure (including subsidies), introducing the Goods and Services Tax (GST) and reining in public sector (as opposed to federal government) debt (which was more than 100 per cent of GDP in 2012). These have obviously had dampening effects on economic growth, although development spending has shifted from the federal government to government-linked investment companies (GLIC) and their subsidiaries and associates, many of which are deemed to be private companies. One could also witness the palpable tensions in the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) negotiations that Malaysia concluded with eleven other countries, including the United States in 2015. Although Malaysian negotiators, being sensitive to domestic pressures and concerns, had been careful in the handling of the 30 chapters over the previous rounds (Malaysia joined in the third round), public opposition to the TPP reached full-blown proportions. While CSOs had voiced their disagreement as far back as the aborted US– Malaysia Free Trade Agreement in 2006–07, opposition members of parliament only capitalised on public sentiment after GE13 to challenge Prime Minister Najib’s TPP initiative. (The US’s withdrawal from the TPP following President Donald Trump’s inauguration has made the prospects for the 11 remaining countries going forward doubtful.) Dualistic economic policy formulation and implementation is present to some degree in most democracies that attempt to cater to the demands of multiple constituencies simultaneously. In Malaysia, this tendency is exacerbated by the fact that while the rural–urban shift has been significant – compare the urban population of 26 per cent urban in 1957/58 with the 71 per cent of 2010 – the system of political representation continues to be firmly locked in the past. In order to ensure political dominance, over 60 per cent of the 222 Federal parliamentary seats continue to be highly ruralbased, with practices such as malapportionment, voter reassignment, ‘new voter’ registrations and so forth serving to entrench rather than reduce rural dominance. It is no great surprise, therefore, that many political elites continue to be drawn from rural constituencies and are therefore beholden to them. The composition of the present Cabinet reflects this to a great degree, with over a third of the membership from small East Malaysian constituencies. The fact that there is no elected member from Kuala Lumpur, Selangor or Penang, territories and states that account for virtually half of Malaysia’s

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GDP, is quite telling, as is the fact the Prime Minister has had to appoint two new ministers (via the Senate) to shore up his ‘transformation team’. BN’s strength, which has been to apportion power among its component parties, looks increasingly vulnerable performance-wise. In the drive to ensure regime resilience and continuity, the Malaysian state is being pressured to address the social welfare imperative by more direct means than has hitherto been the case. Living standards of lowincome households and cost of living have been adopted as National Key Results Areas under the Government Transformation Programme since 2011 and have been a major policy preoccupation since. Under the 10th and 11th Malaysia Plans (2011–2015, 2016–2020), elevating B40 households to middle-income status was a stated goal.10 BR1M and the other 1Malaysia initiatives have become emblematic of this. There is even mention of a National Social Safety Net, although this is still short of details. It is very clear even at this stage that BN intends to contest GE14 at the populist B40 level. And yet the BN government clearly does not have everything its way. After the public sector blowout of 2012, fiscal consolidation was very much needed and with the precipitous decline in oil prices from mid-2015 even more so. Economic reforms such as the removal of food and energy subsidies and the introduction of the Goods and Services Tax (GST) in 2015 have been met with fierce opposition, as has the country’s participation in the TPP. With the external sector further depressing economic growth rates, the balancing of equity, economic growth and financial sustainability considerations, all amidst a highly polarised society, may well be beyond the capabilities of the national leadership. It may well, as has been the case in other countries, take a political economic crisis or a series of crises before hard decisions are made and followed through and a new equilibrium can be established.

10

Accessed 20 April 2016, http://rmk11.epu.gov.my/pdf/strategy-paper/Strategy%20 Paper%2002.pdf.

Managing the Malaysian Economy after the Watershed GE 2008 187



Chapter 13

Managing the Malaysian Economy after the Watershed GE 2008 Greg Lopez and Mohamed Ariff

On 8 March 2008 (GE 2008) Malaysians unexpectedly delivered a stunning blow to Malaysia’s long-standing ruling coalition, Barisan Nasional (BN), at the twelfth general election. Although it won the election, BN lost its psychologically important two-thirds majority in parliament which allows it to change the Federal Constitution at will. The blow was all the more devastating as the Anwar Ibrahim-led informal coalition of Parti Keadilan Rakyat (PKR/People’s Justice Party), Democratic Action Party (DAP) and Parti Se-Islam Malaysia (PAS/Pan Islamic Party of Malaysia) managed to form state governments in almost all states in the developed western parts of Peninsular Malaysia with citizens of the two most industrialised states (Selangor and Penang), as well as Kedah and Perak, joining Kelantan (the poorest state on the peninsula) on the opposition side. BN was also wiped out almost entirely from the Federal Territory of Kuala Lumpur with the opposition winning ten of the eleven parliamentary seats. All of these suggest that urbanites had deserted BN in droves. BN, nevertheless, was formidable in its birthplace, the state of Johor, and in the two resource-rich, but poor, states of Sabah and Sarawak while winning the states of Perlis, Negeri Sembilan, Malacca, Pahang and Terengganu with differing margins.1 1

In 2007 Sabah was the poorest state, with poverty rates at 23 per cent, followed by Terengganu (15 per cent), Kelantan (11 per cent) and Sarawak (8 per cent). The 2013 Malaysian Human Development Report noted that, ‘Sabah has the most poor people compared to any other state. More than half of its population are Bumiputera minorities. Bumiputera minorities in Sabah and Sarawak and the Orang Asli of Peninsular Malaysia remain the most vulnerable ethnic groups in Malaysia, lagging far behind the Malays, Indians and Chinese in benefitting from the country’s

187

188 Regime Resilience in Malaysia and Singapore

Several arguments have been put forward as to why BN fared so badly at GE 2008. Primary among them were: high-profile corruption scandals, deteriorating ethnic relations and worsening economic conditions.2 This essay explores the economic factors that contributed to BN’s reversal of fortunes at GE 2008 and looks at how Prime Minister Najib Razak (henceforth Najib), who replaced Prime Minister Abdullah Ahmad Badawi as Finance Minister in September 2008, and as Prime Minister in April 2009, went about attempting to change these conditions. The essay concludes that Najib’s economic strategies failed to deliver the required votes for BN to stay in power. Although it suffered further electoral setback at the thirteenth general election in 2013 (GE 2013) despite the massive gerrymandering, Najib’s successful marshalling of economic resources and strategic use of them – in part – has ensured his continued survival as president of UMNO and as Prime Minister of Malaysia.

The political economy challenge Najib had inherited an economy built on a political economy model that, while successful in the past, was now showing signs of stress with growth on a downtrend since the East Asian Financial Crisis of 1997/98 (EAFC 1997/98). This ‘odd model’ linked a highly interventionist ‘developmental state’ (e.g. industrial policies, exchange rate management, state-owned enterprises, etc.), archetypical non-interventionist liberal programmes (e.g. support of and for neo-liberal economic institutions and ideas such as privatization, etc.) with affirmative action programmes for Bumiputeras.3 With some variation under the different administrations (beginning with the Mahathir administration in 1981) and changing global and local conditions, this ‘odd model’ is widely regarded as a success story. Since independence from the British in 1957, the Malaysian economy has grown at an average of about 6 per cent per cent annually while per capita income

progress.’ United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Malaysia Human Development Report 2013 (Kuala Lumpur: UNDP, 2014). 2 G.K. Brown, ‘Federal and state elections in Malaysia’, Electoral Studies 27(4) (2008): 740–4; B. Singh, ‘Malaysia in 2008: The elections that broke the tiger's back’, Asian Survey 49(1) (2009): 156–65; T.B. Pepinsky, ‘The 2008 Malaysian elections: an end to ethnic politics?’, Journal of East Asian Studies 9(1) (2009): 87–120. 3 Edmund Terence Gomez and Surinder Kaur, Struggling for Power: Policies, Coalition Politics and Elections in Malaysia, (Ann Arbor, 2014).



Managing the Malaysian Economy after the Watershed GE 2008 189

increased from about US$330 in 1957 to US$10,900 in 2014.4 This economic model raised Malaysia from a ‘low-income’ economy to an ‘upper middleincome’ economy (as per World Bank classifications) in the early 1990s. Economic growth was also broad-based. It led to full employment and reduced poverty rates to below 2 per cent in 2014 from about 50 per cent in the early years of independence.5 These achievements are all the more remarkable given the widespread ethnic, regional and class cleavages and the robust use of these factors as identity politics. Through growth and affirmative action policies (which enabled social mobility for Bumiputeras and nonBumiputeras), but also through coercive means, social stability and broadbased development were achieved. The EAFC 1997/98 introduced a break to this model. Malaysia’s stellar growth rates took a hit, with real GDP contracting by a massive 7.5 per cent in 1998. Although the economy recovered, the average annual growth rate for 2000–12 was only 5.1 per cent compared to 8.6 per cent during 1986–96.6 Despite (the limited) reforms introduced by successive prime ministers (Dr Mahathir Mohamad, Abdullah Badawi and now Najib Razak) since the crisis, the Malaysian economy continues to underperform when compared to past achievements. During 2000–14, the Malaysian economy grew at an average annual rate of 5.3 per cent.7 The reasons for the lacklustre economic performance are disparate yet inter-related. An important factor is that the success of the existing political economy model (the ‘odd model’) that BN had developed and deployed over the decades makes any fundamental economic reform to the model impossible.8 The increasingly volatile external environment (three major

4

H. Hill, T.S. Yean and R.H.M Zin eds., Malaysia’s Development Challenges: Graduating from the Middle (Vol. 11) (Routledge, 2013); Prema-chandra Athukorala, ‘Economy (Malaysia)’ Europa World, accessed 4 April 2016, http://www. europaworld.com/entry/my.ec. 5 Athukorala. 6 Ibid. 7 Ibid. 8 R.F. Doner, ‘Success as Trap? Crisis Response and Challenges to Economic Upgrading in Export-Oriented Southeast Asia’, in The Second East Asian Miracle? Political Economy of Asian Responses to the 1997/98 and 2008/09 Crises, JICA-RI Working Paper (JICA Research Institute, 2012); B.K. Ritchie, Systemic Vulnerability and Sustainable Economic Growth: Skills and Upgrading in Southeast Asia (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2010).

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economic crises in the last two decades: the EAFC 1997/98, the dot.com bubble 2001 and the Great Recession 2008/09) had also contributed to making economic reforms harder as the regime and its supporters closed ranks to protect the core of the model. Yet, the consensus view is that at the current stage of Malaysia’s economic development (that of an upper middle income economy but with low human capital development, high levels of inequality and regional disparity) under current lethargic global economic conditions, this model (a strong interventionist state with an inbuilt patronage system premised on affirmative action) no longer works.9 These were the challenges Najib had to face.

The terrain Najib came into power under difficult economic and social conditions. The Great Recession (2008/09) began in the US sub-prime mortgage market but soon spread globally. Malaysia was hit hard by the global downturn. The economy contracted for the first time in a decade. GDP declined by 7.8 per cent between the fourth quarter of 2007 and the first quarter of 2009.10 Private investment declined by 21.8 per cent although this was compensated by public investment which increased by 12.9 per cent. Real exports declined by 12 per cent and imports fell by 13.1 per cent. FDI inflows declined by 13 per cent between 2007 and 2008, and in 2009 were estimated to decline by another 60 per cent. Productivity also worsened by 3.1 per cent between 2008 and 2009.11 Malaysia also suffered from serious fiscal problems. The tax base was small, with only one million out of 11 million workers paying income tax. As a result, only 49.4 per cent of government revenues came from direct taxes, 17.7 per cent from indirect taxes and 32 per cent from non-tax revenue. The worry was that individual income tax only contributed about 18 per cent of direct taxes, when compared to 45.5 per cent from corporate tax and 30.80

9

The challenges Malaysia faced were also captured by a quasi-government report: National Economic Advisory Council (NEAC), New Economic Model for Malaysia Part 1 (Kuala Lumpur: Percetakan Nasional Malaysia, 2010). 10 Diego Comin and John Abraham, ‘Malaysia: People First?’, in Diego Comin, Drivers of Competitiveness (World Scientific, 2016), pp. 81–121. 11 Comin & Abraham, 2011.



Managing the Malaysian Economy after the Watershed GE 2008 191

per cent from petroleum tax.12 Although the Malaysian government has a remarkable ability to manage crises,13 the toll of the various crises (beginning from the fiscal crisis of 1985) on different sectors of the economy and on Malaysian society had been significant. The privatisation exercises that began in the late 1980s in response to the 1985 fiscal crisis, and also driven by Mahathir’s fascination with Thatcherism, had raised the costs of basic services (e.g. utilities, health, higher education, etc.),14 but also contributed to job losses for unskilled and semi-skilled Malaysians as the privatised entities sought cheaper foreign labour made possible through government labour policies that began in 1992. Added to these were poorly developed and managed human capital development policies and innovation policies that entrenched a low-wage, labour-intensive business model for the nation.15 These (together with other factors) contributed to high levels of income inequality in Malaysia. Although poverty rates have been reduced dramatically – in 2012, hard-core poverty was only 0.3 per cent for Bumiputera, 0.2 per cent for Indians, and poverty was 2.2 per cent for Bumiputera, 0.3 per cent for Chinese and 1.8 per cent for Indians – inequality has been stubbornly persistent. Since 1970 inequality (measured by the Gini co-efficient) has only dropped by about 16 per cent, from 0.51 to 0.43 in 2012.16 Inequality is highest among the Indian community (0.44) and higher in urban areas than rural areas. In 2009 the mean income for the top 20 per cent of urban households was approximately RM11,312, while in the top 20 per cent of rural households it was RM6,028. Around 90 per cent of Malaysians had no savings and 14 per cent had no wealth. The bottom 80 per cent of individuals held only 5 per cent of total financial assets while the top

12

Inland Revenue Board of Malaysia, Annual Report 2010 (Kuala Lumpur: Percetakan Nasional Malaysia Berhad, 2011). 13 Athukorala in Hill et al. (2012). 14 J. Tan, Privatization in Malaysia: Regulation, Rent-seeking and Policy Failure (London: Routledge, 2008). 15 G.P. Lopez, Malaysia and the Middle-income Trap: Institutional Challenges in Human Capital Development and Income Inequality in the Manufacturing Sector (PhD diss., Australian National University, 2013); E.S. Devadason and C.W. Meng, ‘Policies and laws regulating migrant workers in Malaysia: a critical appraisal’, Journal of Contemporary Asia 44(1) (2014): 19–35; R. Rasiah, V. Crinis and H.A. Lee, ‘Industrialization and Labour in Malaysia’, Journal of the Asia Pacific Economy 20(1) (2015): 77–99. 16 Malaysian Human Development Report, 2013.

192 Regime Resilience in Malaysia and Singapore

20 per cent held nearly 95 per cent of private assets.17 The ratio of income difference between ethnic groups and location had fallen from 2.3 (1970) to 1.4 (2012) for Chinese: Bumiputera, from 1.8 (1970) to 1.4 (2012) for Indians: Bumiputera and remained relatively stable between Chinese and Indians (1.3 in 1970 and 1.2 in 2012). Yet the greater movement towards income congruence among the major ethnic groups and rural–urban groups did not translate into better race, religious or regional relations. The Islamisation of Muslims in Malaysia is considered to be a primary cause for this outcome;18 Abdullah Badawi’s tenure ushered in greater openness. Yet, this openness was better captured by the more strident Islamic forces in society. Right-wing groups in society coalesced with Muslim public servants and Islamic state and federal bureaucracies’ (selected judges, Muftis, federal and state religious departments such as JAKIM and JAIS) views that Islam should have a far greater role in Malaysia.19 Demands to respect the Federal Constitution by minorities were taken as a threat by these right-wing groups. Goaded and taken advantage by politicians from UMNO and PAS, the Abdullah Badawi administration was left impotent. On the political front, Najib had (over his long career) not only witnessed, but been a part of, former Prime Minister Dr Mahathir’s team that took down key opposing UMNO leaders (Musa Hitam, Tengku Razaleigh Hamzah, Anwar Ibrahim and Abdullah Ahmad Badawi). Najib had to ensure the same did not happen to him. To address these issues, Najib undertook several measures to impress the international and domestic stakeholders. The Najib administration used the ‘middle-income trap’ concept (a country whose low-cost business model could not compete with other low-cost countries, but neither having the human capital, technology and innovation culture to compete with the more advanced nations), a term introduced by World Bank analysts, to rally for economic reforms. A quasi-official secretariat (National Economic Advisory Council/ NEAC) comprising ten individuals of high standing was set up to diagnose Malaysia’s economic challenges (NEAC, 2010). Although the diagnosis argued 17

Gomez and Kaur, 2013. J.C. Liow, Piety and Politics: Islamism in Contemporary Malaysia (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009). 19 A. Fauzi Abdul Hamid and M.T. Ismail, ‘Islamist Conservatism and the Demise of Islam Hadhari in Malaysia’, Islam and Christian–Muslim Relations 25(2) (2014): 159–80. 18



Managing the Malaysian Economy after the Watershed GE 2008 193

against ‘business as usual, i.e. the current model’, the ultimate policy response was simply an extension of the existing system albeit with several fundamental liberalisation measures countered with payoffs to key stakeholders impacted by those reform measures. These reforms ultimately saw greater power and resources accrued to the Prime Minister and the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO), and greater support given to right-wing groups while simultaneously playing the moderate Malaysian card or the ‘Prime Minister for all Malaysians’ to middle-of-the-road Malaysians.

The reforms20 ‘I must execute or be executed.’ 21 As noted earlier, Najib and UMNO’s survival rested on him returning BN’s fortunes to what they had been accustomed to prior to GE 2008 at GE 2013. This was to be done by revitalising the Malaysian economy, distributing wealth – especially to poorer Malaysians – and ensuring the patronage system did not get in the way of the first two and, more importantly, did not create alternative power centres. To this end, Najib took several actions. Firstly, to overcome the global economic slowdown, he implemented two economic stimulus packages amounting to RM67 billion (RM7 billion in November 2008 and RM60 billion in March 2009) along with interest cuts by Bank Negara Malaysia.22 The stimulus spending focused on infrastructure spending (32 per cent of the second stimulus plan), assistance to vulnerable groups (17 per cent), re-skilling and up-skilling (3 per cent) and also the private sector (almost 48 per cent were to be directed as bank guarantees for SMEs; RM3 billion as tax incentives and RM10 billion for strategic investments by Khazanah Nasional).23 The top

20

This section uses information gleaned from the World Trade Organisation (WTO), Trade Policy Review Malaysia (Geneva: WTO, 2014). 21 Najib Razak (speech given by Prime Minister of Malaysia, at Asian Investment Conference, Hong Kong, 23 March 2010) cited in Comin and Abraham. 22 S. Nambiar, ‘Malaysia and the global crisis: impact, response, and rebalancing strategies’, in The Global Financial Crisis and Asia: Implications and Challenges, eds. Masahiro Kawai, Mario B. Lamberte and Yung Chul Park (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012). 23 M.Z. Abidin and R. Rasiah, The Global Financial Crisis and the Malaysian Economy: Impact and Responses (Kuala Lumpur: United Nations Development Programme,

194 Regime Resilience in Malaysia and Singapore

priority was to stimulate private sector growth. The growth rate for the first quarter of 2010 was 10.1 per cent, an impressive rebound. To address Malaysia’s slowing FDI and worsening fiscal condition, Najib sent signals to the international market committing to liberalisation of selected sectors24 and to reducing the fiscal deficit from 5.3 per cent of GDP in 2010 to less than 3 per cent in 2015. The most significant were the changes made to Bumiputera equity rules. The Foreign Investment Committee (FIC) that regulated the 30 per cent Bumiputera equity quota was suspended. Instead, a new mechanism, Ekuiti Nasional Berhad (Ekuinas) was created to achieve the 30 per cent equity target. A total of 27 services sub-sectors were also allowed full foreign equity ownership. Najib also continued to support negotiations at the regional level, including the Trans Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPPA). During Najib’s administration’s prior to GE 2013, seven new regional trade agreements (RTAs) came into force, leading to incremental liberalisation in selected industries with selected countries. Efforts to achieve the ASEAN Economic Community also brought incremental liberalisation as three agreements – the ASEAN Trade in Goods Agreement, the ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement and the ASEAN Agreement on Customs – came into force. Malaysia also relaxed several long-standing foreign exchange policies allowing exporters and importers to freely determine the currency of settlement for international trade in goods and services. To strengthen signals to the international market, Najib also gave importance to fiscal consolidation. He expanded the subsidies rationalisation plan first begun under the Abdullah administration. To improve competition domestically and improve governance, Najib introduced several measures. The Competition Act was introduced in 2010 while the Corporate Governance Blueprint and the Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance were introduced in 2012 along with the Corporate Integrity Pledge (in 2011) and the Whistleblower Protection Act. He also continued the Abdullah administration’s GLC and GLIC Transformation Plans.25

2009). Najib had already introduced liberalisation in the financial and services sector as soon as he became Prime Minister in April 2009. 25 GLC: government-linked corporation; GLIC is government-linked investment corporation. 24



Managing the Malaysian Economy after the Watershed GE 2008 195

One of the key reasons why Malaysia was in the middle income trap was its reliance on low-wage labour. To address labour market issues, Najib introduced several measures. In 2011 the 6P scheme was introduced to register foreign workers residing in Malaysia. This was followed by a minimum wage law that came into effect partially in January 2013 (and was fully implemented in 2014). To address the skilled labour shortage, Talent Corp was established, a Talent Roadmap 2020 was introduced and several supporting initiatives (such as the Returning Expert Programme, easing the qualifications for a residency pass – a 10-year renewable multiple entry visa that enables foreign talent to continue to reside and work in Malaysia, raising the retirement age for private sector workers to 60). To address affected groups in society, but also to counter Pakatan Rakyat’s populist and class-based strategies, Najib introduced several direct transfer programmes for these key stakeholders, particularly the bottom 40 per cent (B40) of Malaysian households.26 These initiatives included BR1M (direct income transfers to the poor), Klinik 1Malaysia (GP services), Menu Rakyat 1Malaysia (affordable food & beverages), Kedai Rakyat 1Malaysia (affordable groceries) and Kedai Agrobazaar Rakyat 1Malaysia (affordable fresh food/ farmers’ produce). Targeted items also included transfers to taxi drivers, fisher folks, Orang Asli, transport discounts for students, etc.27 These direct transfers were necessary as the subsidy rationalisation plan was being introduced simultaneously to reduce the fiscal deficit. These initiatives were implemented through his newly introduced slogan, ‘1Malaysia, People First, Performance Now’ which encapsulated the National Transformation Policy (NTP).28 The NTP covered three programmes: Government Transformation Programme (GTP) which aimed to improve public sector delivery in key areas of public concern;29 Economic

26

See Steven C.M Wong’s essay in this volume. Bridget Welsh, ‘Malaysia's Elections: A Step Backward’, Journal of Democracy, 24(4) (2013): 136–50. 28 Najib Razak, ‘National Transformation Policy: Welfare for the Rakyat, Well-Being of the Nation’ (2012 Budget Speech). 29 Seven National Key Result Areas (NKRAs) were identified to lead in the transformation: (i) reducing crime; (ii) fighting corruption; (iii) improving student outcomes; (iv) raising living standards of low-income households; (v) improving rural basic infrastructure; (vi) improving urban public transport; and (vii) addressing the cost of living. 27

196 Regime Resilience in Malaysia and Singapore

Transformation Programme (ETP) to drive Malaysia towards a high income nation30 (and was the priority programme); and the Political Transformation Programme to make Malaysia a world class democracy, which has since been conveniently forgotten.31 The NTP implemented through the 10th and 11th Malaysia Plans was to be the final leg towards achieving the holy grail of developed nation status specifically by overcoming the ‘middle-income trap’ that Malaysia was caught in. At the same time, greater government support was provided to the Bumiputeras (particularly Malay entrepreneurs on the Peninsula). A Bumiputera Transformation Roadmap was introduced in the 10th Malaysia Plan (2011–2015) to further the Bumiputera development agenda. This included setting up of the Majlis Tindakan Agenda Bumiputera (MTAB), chaired by Najib himself under the Prime Minister’s Unit Peneraju Agenda Bumiputera (TERAJU). After GE 2013, with the perceived rejection by the Chinese, this was further enhanced through the Bumiputera Economic Empowerment programme. Many initiatives were introduced, including the formation of a Bumiputera Economic Empowerment Unit in every ministry. TEKUN, one of the government-linked bodies that provided loans, disbursed a total of RM8.6 billion to approximately 415,000 micro and small Bumiputera businesses. Majlis Amanah Rakyat (MARA), Perbadanan Usahawan Nasional Berhad (PUNB) and Yayasan Wakaf Malaysia (YWM) have built or purchased 458 business spaces, particularly in strategic locations.32 The Malaysian Technology Development Corporation (MTDC), Malaysia Venture Capital Management Berhad, Malaysia Debt Venture Berhad and Multimedia Development Corporation provided a total of RM495 million to 760 Bumiputera SMEs. A total of RM71 million was allocated to 574 entrepreneurs.33 An older programme, the Vendor Development 30

The twelve areas of focus under the ETP known as National Key Economic Areas (NKEAs) include 11 industries and one geographic area: (i) oil, gas and energy; (ii) palm oil; (iii) financial services; (iv) tourism; (v) business services; (vi) electronics and electrical; (vii) wholesale and retail; (viii) education; (ix) healthcare; (x) communications, content and infrastructure; (xi) agriculture; and (xii) Greater KL. 31 In the run-up to GE 2013, Najib Razak introduced important legislative reform that improved civil and political liberties. These gains were, however, reversed after the election. See Whiting (this volume) for flavours of these reforms and reversals. 32 EPU, Strategy Paper 3: Enhancing Bumiputera Economic Community Opportunities to Increase Wealth Ownership, (EPU: Putrajaya, n.d.). 33 Ibid.

Managing the Malaysian Economy after the Watershed GE 2008 197



Programme under the Ministry of International Trade and Industry and government-linked companies, continued to be implemented for Bumiputera entrepreneurs. A total of 2,923 vendors with 16 anchor companies in key industries such as oil and gas, engineering services as well as electrical and electronics GLCs and GLICs also had extensive programmes for Bumiputera entrepreneurs. 34 TERAJU also had a special programme – Syarikat Bumiputera Berprestasi Tinggi (TeraS) – to provide business opportunities and financing for high potential Bumiputera firms. By 2014 a total of RM920 million had been approved for 265 companies. In the 10th Malaysia Plan EKUINAS, which was allocated RM3.1 billion, had invested RM2.4 billion in 33 companies in strategic and growth industries.35 All of these were a masterstroke as the two most important over-arching programmes, the GTP (institutional reforms) and ETP (microeconomic reforms) were centralised within the PMO in a newly created agency called the Performance Management and Delivery Unit (PEMANDU). Many other new implementing agencies were also housed in the Prime Minister’s Department. Furthermore, with 30 ministers and 38 deputy ministers (a Cabinet larger than that of India), and with Najib himself holding the portfolios of Prime Minister and Finance Minister, with five ministers in the Prime Minister’s Department (PMD), and one minister in the PMO; Najib was fully in control of the levers of powers and resources in Malaysia. This allowed Najib to take a presidential approach to GE 2013.

Reform outcomes Despite a slowdown in total factor productivity growth during 2008–12, Najib’s overall economic reforms achieved respectable outcomes. Annual average GDP growth was 4.3 per cent from 2009–13, a respectable achievement by global and regional standards as domestic demand offset weak external demand. Private and public investment stimulated by Najib’s reforms was the key driver of the expansion, supported by favourable financing conditions and the effects of large projects under the ETP. Between 2008 and 2012 Malaysia’s FDI stock rose by 58.8 per cent, equivalent to investment abroad by Malaysian firms.36 34 Ibid. 35 Ibid. 36

WTO, 2014.

198 Regime Resilience in Malaysia and Singapore

Malaysia’s officially low inflation rate rose steeply from 2009 (0.6 per cent) to 2011 (3.2 per cent) due to the removal of subsidies and also higher energy and commodity prices. However, inflation rates fell to below 2010 level at 1.7 per cent, one of the lowest in the Asia Pacific region. Fiscal deficit declined from 6.7 per cent of GDP in 2009 to 4.5 per cent in 2012. Although in 2012 spending exceeded original budget projections by 2 per cent of GDP (due to wages, pensions, fuel subsidies, and transfers to target groups), this was offset by higher than expected revenues, lower development expenditures and higher-than-expected GDP growth.37 Malaysia’s overall economic competitiveness improved to 14 (in the World Competitiveness Yearbook ranking)38 and to 18 (in the Global Competitiveness Report ranking)39 in 2015. Although the economic numbers were good, there were several downsides. The expansion of the Bumiputera programme constrained the economic reforms that Najib had introduced. Despite efforts to streamline the public sector, it remained sizeable. Employing 4 per cent of the population and 10 per cent of the labour force (1.5 million civil servants in 2014), the public sector was a fiscal drag. Furthermore, with only an estimated 10 per cent of the public sector being non-Malays, efforts to reform the sector were always going to be fraught with political challenges. The same results were seen in the GLC and GLIC reform measures – as they continue to dominate the Malaysian economy, crowding out opportunities for others.40 Extremely high levels of illicit financial flows also raised questions about the usefulness of the various economic and governance reform measures.41

37 Ibid. 38

IMD International (IMD), The World Competitiveness Yearbook 2015 (Lausanne: IMD, 2016). 39 World Economic Forum (WEF), Global Competitiveness Report 2015–16 (Geneva: WEF, 2016), available at: http://reports.weforum.org/global-competitivenessreport-2015-2016/. 40 J. Menon, Malaysia’s investment malaise: What happened and can it be fixed? Economics Working Paper No. 312 (Manila: Asian Development Bank, 2012). 41 ‘Malaysia again No. 5 in illicit financial flows’, Malaysiakini, 24 December 2015, accessed 1 June 2016, https://www.malaysiakini.com/news/324458.



Managing the Malaysian Economy after the Watershed GE 2008 199

Consolidating core support? Yet, after spending an estimated US$20 billion on populist measures42 and other development programmes (described above), at GE 2013 the majority of Malaysians voted against Najib and BN. Pakatan Rakyat (PR), the opposition coalition, won 50.9 per cent of the popular vote to BN’s 47.4 per cent and improved on the total number of parliamentary seats by seven, including making inroads into the UMNO stronghold of Johor. Although it lost the states of Perak and Kedah, it improved its performance in Selangor and Penang. Although PR has control of only three states, it won 230 of the 505 state legislative assembly seats (approximately 46 per cent). The majority of the ‘urban’ votes went to PR43 as did those of the nonMuslims, particularly the Chinese44 although the actual reasons could be more complex.45 PR extended its reach into the UMNO heartland when it won five (out of 26) parliamentary seats and 18 (out of 56) state seats in Johor.46 Overall, BN remained strong in rural Malay areas. Out of the 99 Malay majority rural seats, BN won 78, while it captured only five of the 22 urban Malay majority seats.47 Most telling is the fact that although UMNO has 88 parliamentary seats, it has only 29.3 per cent of popular votes due to the size of rural seats. This raises the important question of why Najib’s reforms did not gain traction among the vast majority of the Malaysian electorate. It is entirely plausible that the economic reforms did very little to increase support, but prevented further defection. This suggests that the plausible reasons for electoral support lie in non-economic areas. Several are discussed in this publication, and a few are highlighted below: (a) Najib had taken a presidential style approach to GE13. While he was more popular than his party or coalition, he certainly was no match for

42

43 44 45 46

47

Welsh, ‘Malaysia's Elections: A Step Backward’. J.W.J. Ng et al., ‘The 2013 Malaysian Elections: Ethnic Politics or Urban Wave?’, Journal of East Asian Studies 5(2) (2015): 167–98. A. Noh, ‘Malaysia 13th General Election: A short note on Malaysia's continuing battle with ethnic politics’, Electoral Studies 34 (2014): 266–9. Welsh, ‘Malaysia’s Elections: A Step Backward’. Noh, ‘Malaysia 13th General Election’. Mohamed Nawab Bin Mohamed Osman ed., The 13th Malaysia Elections – Issues, Trends and Future Trajectories, RSIS Monograph No. 30 (Singapore: RSIS, 2014).

200 Regime Resilience in Malaysia and Singapore

the opposition leader – Anwar Ibrahim – when it came to charisma. Despite more than a decade of hounding by the government, Anwar Ibrahim was certainly welcomed by more Malaysians than Najib; (b) In Peninsular Malaysia, where PR did better than BN, it may be the case that these economic reforms (e.g. direct transfers) were no longer effective to win votes; and (c) Perhaps most importantly, the double messaging strategy taken by UMNO as discussed by Kessler (this volume) turned off urban Malaysians, particularly the Malaysian Chinese. It is clear that, despite a commendable performance in the economic sphere (e.g. better targeted policies in transfers to vulnerable groups to compensate for broad-based subsidy rationalisation, microeconomic reforms to make Malaysia more competitive, human capital development plans and institutional reforms to improve government service delivery, etc.), the majority of Malaysians appear to no longer look to economic performance alone to make decisions on which party to support. Much was made of Najib’s intended institutional reforms and economic transformation that would catapult Malaysia from middle- to high-income economy befitting his presidential approach towards leadership and strategy. However, high expectations only led to huge disappointments as actions did not match words. This may have significantly contributed to BN’s further reversals at GE13, reminiscent of Badawi’s performance at GE12. The subsequent backpedalling may also be attributed to Najib’s sense of insecurity, especially after the damning 2013 election verdict. The only way he could hang on to power was to shore up the support of UMNO, the dominant party in the BN coalition. The further expansion of Bumiputera-related programmes (discussed earlier) and reversal in democratic gains (see Whiting this volume) only attest to this. It is also becoming patently obvious that Najib’s proposed and implemented liberal reforms have not gone down well with UMNO, as the party’s preference was to maintain the status quo which protected its own rentseeking privileges. Najib apparently opted to trade-off his promised reforms (notwithstanding the economic reforms that he had already put through) for his own political survival within UMNO, which has made him popular within the party and unpopular among the majority of the domestic stakeholders (especially the urban voters) and also international stakeholders. To Najib,



Managing the Malaysian Economy after the Watershed GE 2008 201

it is UMNO and rural votes that matter most. Given the gerrymandering, rural votes can be won easily with small hand-outs and needed development programmes, and hence the slogan ‘Cash is King’.48 While he survived GE13, the Prime Minister’s fortunes at the next general election is far from certain. Two issues - GST and 1MDB - hang like the Sword of Damocles over him. The GST introduced sneakily on April 1, 2015 (after GE13) has been a source of relentless anger for most Malaysians. Secondly, the exposures and international investigations into the 1MDB scandal, including the RM2.6 billion deposited into the Prime Minister’s personal account, despite his denial of any wrongdoing, continue to keep the Prime Minister in a precarious position as exposures of alleged misdeeds become public knowledge. These two issues have provided political capital to the opposition and will certainly be important factors influencing the outcomes of GE14. All this, unfortunately, suggests that the central party in government is primarily a rural party; and that Malaysia is on a slippery slope with democracy taking the backseat and authoritarianism taking the wheel.

48

S.L. Boo, ‘Dr. M: Najib told me, ‘cash is king’,’ The Malay Mail Online, 13 June 2015, accessed 1 June 2016, http://www.themalaymailonline.com/malaysia/article/dr-mnajib-told-me-cash-is-king.

202 Regime Resilience in Malaysia and Singapore



Economic Growth, Democratic Participation and Social Welfare in Singapore 203

Chapter 14

Economic Growth, Democratic Participation and Social Welfare in Singapore Lee Soo Ann

The last decade saw the slowest economic growth in Singapore for the last five decades. In the first two decades after Singapore separated from Malaysia (1965–85) economic growth was 9.2 per cent per annum. In the next decade, 1986–97, growth was 8.6 per cent. In the fourth decade, 1998–2008, growth was 5.0 per cent per annum. In 2008, growth was 1.4 per cent, and 2009 growth was negative at -2.0 per cent.1 The 2010 budget was the first in a series of ‘productivity budgets’. Figure 1: GDP Growth in Singapore GDP Growth Rate (%) 14 12 10 8 6 4

2 0

1992 Slowdown

First oil shock

Asian Financial Crisis

1985 Recession

Global financial crisis

-2

1

Singapore Department of Statistics, Yearbook of Statistics (Singapore, 2013).

203

204 Regime Resilience in Malaysia and Singapore

While it is obvious that an economy as open as Singapore has to contend with global factors like the 2008–9 global financial crisis, it is also known that policy makers in Singapore deliberately chose external factors to drive the economy. In the 1970s, policy makers chose multi-national companies. Foreign business services and finance were chosen as the sectors which could be grown by not only MNCs but also foreign firms of any size, which were allowed to be established in Singapore without any requirement for local shareholders to have a share. Today GNP is only two-thirds that of GDP, GNP being the income of nationals, corporate or personal, of the country, while GDP is the income of all persons and companies in the geographic area that makes up Singapore.2 In the 1990s foreign labour was chosen to drive the economy. Over a million foreign workers were allowed in, and today the workforce is made up of about 2 ¼ million Singaporeans and 1 ⅓ million foreigners.3 The large number of foreign companies and foreign workers means that Singapore has a productive capacity greater than what its citizens can support. In the past this was also so, but the foreign component is now different from that in the past. Before 1965 the foreign component was made up of British and Malaysian capital and labour. British capital initially came through its trading houses linked to the spice trade which made it attractive for the British East India Company to establish a trading settlement on the island in 1819. In the late 19th and early 20th centuries British tin and rubber companies mined tin and cultivated rubber in the peninsular hinterland, then known as nine Malay States and the British settlements in Penang and Malacca. These companies were headquartered in Singapore which was governed by the British as a Straits Settlement colony together with Penang and Malacca. As a result of the policy of centring transport and communications in Singapore, Singapore became a processing centre for rubber and tin: Singapore also housed insurance and shipping companies, necessary components of a business hub. After 1965 the foreign component changed to include Japanese,

2

3

Lee Soo Ann, Singapore: From Place to Nation, 3rd edn (Pearson, 2014), p. 193. Yap Mui Teng, ‘Singapore’s Demographic Transition, the Labour Force and Government’, in Singapore’s Economic Development, Retrospection and Reflections, ed. Linda Lim (Singapore: World Scientific Publishing, 2016).



Economic Growth, Democratic Participation and Social Welfare in Singapore 205

American, German and other European capital.4 Today there are also Chinese companies due to the growth of the Chinese economy after its restructure and reform in 1979. Foreign workers used to be Malaysian, but today they also include workers from Indonesia, the Philippines, Bangladesh, Thailand and the People’s Republic of China itself. As foreign labour before 1965 came largely from Malaysia which also had Chinese, Tamil Indians and Malays in its population, the foreigners in Singapore were integrated by its four official language policy of English, Chinese, Tamil and Malay, with Malay being the national language. Now, however, even the Indian component has diversified to include northern Indians, as contrasted with the Tamil Indians from south India. Hindi is now taught in Singapore schools because of this (students have to pick a second language besides English). In terms of democratic participation, does this mean that Tagalog (the language of most Filipinos) will also be taught? Every year about 20,000 foreigners are given citizenship and their children enrolled in Singapore schools have to study a second language, known as the mother tongue.5 By and large, however, the foreign labour component is not as well integrated with local labour as in the past. Singapore and Malaysia had a common heritage of being British-governed as a British colony (the Straits Settlements, including Singapore, were a British colony, and Sabah and Sarawak became British colonies after 1946, before becoming part of Malaysia when it was formed in 1963) and as a British protectorate (the nine Malay states). Indians and Chinese were foreigners, and after World War II they were integrated through the grant of permanent residence and citizenship in the independence granted to the Federation of Malaya in 1957 and the internal self-government granted to Singapore in 1959. Today, however, the 1 ½ million foreigners are treated separately from Singapore citizens in their rights to marriage, to citizenship and even the right to stay in Singapore, as employment passes and work permits have to be renewed. Needless to say, foreigners who can bring in large sums of

4

Lee Soo Ann, ‘Governance and Economic Change in Singapore’, in Singapore’s Economic Development, Retrospection and Reflections, ed. Linda Lim (Singapore: World Scientific Publishing, 2016). 5 Strictly speaking, it is a father tongue policy as the language chosen has to be that of the father.

206 Regime Resilience in Malaysia and Singapore

money or technological know-how are treated more favourably. Singapore does not allow dual citizenship, and Singapore citizens have to do military service at age 18. A low birth rate of about 1.1 per cent means that Singapore needs foreigners, but not all foreigners fit the requirements for citizenship; most are in Singapore for the jobs they can obtain. Economic growth attracts foreigners to Singapore, but national cohesion is needed for them to stay long-term. If insufficient foreigners become citizens annually, long-term economic growth is hindered by the turnover of foreign workers. Economic growth depends not only on capital being re-invested, but also on people staying on so that what they learn can contribute to long-term productivity growth. The falling economic growth rate makes productivity improvement more imperative, but there has to be sufficient long-term labour force growth to ensure such improvement. Given the variety of people in Singapore, national cohesion requires multi-lingual language communication and, given the small size of Singapore, a long-term commitment from its citizenry arising out of the necessity for military conscription. As there are 3 ½ million Singaporeans and 2 million foreigners (the majority of whom are workers), the economic and political requirements of the economy differ. Economically, Singapore needs foreign workers but as the large number of foreign workers does not translate to an equally large number of foreign citizens, it means that Singapore citizens must bear the burden of protecting foreign workers. Citizens participate democratically through elections at 4–5-year internals, at the national level, of a national parliament from whom a national government of elected members is formed from the ruling party. There is no local government, as the town councils of electoral constituencies are appointed by the party which wins the parliamentary seats. The 2011 election saw the first group representation victory by an opposition party, in addition to its single seat representation victory. The 2015 election saw the PAP make gains in the popular vote and pick up one of the seats it lost in a by-election. Singapore is still very much a top-down society in terms of political governance.



Economic Growth, Democratic Participation and Social Welfare in Singapore 207

General Election 2011 In this context, the 2011 general election (GE) was ‘a profound political change unimaginable in the fortnight before Polling Day’.6 Held on 7 May 2011, two million votes were cast in this GE, the largest number of persons ever. Only 5 of the 87 seats in Parliament were not contested, in the group representative constituency of Tanjong Pagar (where Lee Kuan Yew stood as a PAP candidate). Most of the parliamentary seats are in group representation constituencies (GRCs). Many of those elected are not in contested GRCs, so many in parliament and also in the Cabinet have never faced competition at the ballot box. It is easier for the opposition to contest in singlemember constituencies, but it is the government which decides how many parliamentary constituencies are to be single-member ones. The 2011 loss of a group representation constituency to the opposition, the first time ever, means that the GRC pattern of past elections can work to the disadvantage of the ruling party. Six seats fell to the opposition at one stroke. More single-member constituencies will mean more contestation at the ballot box, which would be good in bringing out tested political leaders. In the 2006 GE there were only 1.2 million voters and in 2001, the figure was 675,000, because there were no opposition candidates in many constituencies. Every GE in Singapore except those in 1959 and 1963 had walkover constituencies because of the dominance of the People’s Action Party (PAP). In 1959 and 1963 over 500,000 persons voted and every constituency was contested. In 1968, however, only 78,000 persons voted because a few years earlier, Barisan Sosialis (Socialist Front), the main opposition party, decided to boycott political participation. Thereafter, only a handful of people chose to enter politics and contest seats. At best, only one or two seats went to the opposition. The 2011 GE can well be considered a ‘watershed’ election, in both the number of seats won by the opposition (5) and the proportion of persons voting for the first time (about two-thirds). Yet although the PAP was returned to power with 82 out of the 87 seats in Parliament, they obtained only 60 per cent of the vote, due to the ‘first-past-the-post’ system. The 6

Kevin Y.L. Tan and Terence Lee, ‘Political Shift: Singapore’s 2011 General Election’, in Voting in Change: Politics of Singapore’s 2011 General Elections, eds. Kevin Y.L. Tan and Terence Lee (Singapore: Ethos Books, 2011).

208 Regime Resilience in Malaysia and Singapore

opposition share of the vote increased from 35 per cent in 2006 to 40 per cent in the 2011 general election.

Aftermath of the 2011 General Election By 2011 the economy had fully recovered from the 2008 recession, as can be seen from Table 1. PAP could not have chosen to hold a GE. Its failure to hold on to its share of the popular vote was not due to a weak economy but to popular discontent over micro-issues such housing prices, the transport and education systems, the large share of foreigners in the economy, rising income inequality as well as perceived arrogance of the PAP leaders. The prime minister, Lee Hsien Loong, did something his predecessors, Goh Chok Tong and Lee Kuan Yew, never did: at an election rally in the final days of the nine-day election campaign he apologised for PAP’s shortcomings. but it came too late to prevent a rise in the opposition’s share of the vote. The need for political leaders tested at the ballot box comes at a time when goals are being reset for the Singapore economy as a whole. No longer is a high economic growth rate being put forward as a target. The past economic drivers of MNCs and foreign labour bring in their wake external factors which work against the improvement in productivity which is necessary to sustain the economy in a robust way. Singapore is not reproducing itself with its 1.1 per cent birth rate, which means that the total population number will level itself and may ultimately decline at around 3.7 million.7 Foreigners become citizens at the rate of about 0.5 per cent a year, which may stave off a decline in the long-term resident population.8 Singapore is not a Dubai which can grow on foreign labour. Dubai has ample oil reserves to keep the economy going. Singapore has foreign reserves, but its income from those is only a small percentage of the budget needed to sustain Singapore. In its 2012 and 2013 budgets the PAP government attempted to address some of the popular discontent. Economic growth continued to be positive: it was 1.4 per cent in 2012 in real terms and growth was 4.6 per cent in 2013, also in real terms.

7

Yap in Lim & & Lee (2016).

8 Ibid.

Economic Growth, Democratic Participation and Social Welfare in Singapore 209



Table 1: Gross Domestic Expenditure (GDP) & its components, 2008–20129 $ billion at 2005 market prices Gross Domestic Product percentage change over previous year Private Consumption

2008

2009

2010

2011

252

250

286

301

+2 per cent

-0.8 per cent

+14.4 per cent

+5.2 per cent

96

96

101

106

Govt. Consumption Expenditure

25

26

29

29

Gross Fixed Capital Formation

67

65

68

73

6

-7

-8

-4

Exports of Goods & Services

Change in Inventories

608

561

666

689

Less: Imports of Goods & Services

-549

-488

-565

-586

-1

-3

-5

-6

Statistical Discrepancy

Eugene Tan analysed the five issues raised by the PAP leadership during the GE as a) leadership renewal or the imperative to put Singapore’s fourth generation (4G) leadership in place; b) type of political system – one party dominant or two-party: c) the economy – minding the income gap’; d) housing affordability; e) immigration.10 Four budgets have been approved by Parliament since the 2011 GE and these, among other steps, reflect the PAP government’s reaction to GE 2011 results in three out of these five election issues: a) the economy – minding the income gap; b) housing affordability; c) immigration foreigners. However, PAP was also mindful of (a) leadership renewal and (b) type of political system, as seen in those elements of the budget which looked into the long-term issues, rather than merely short-term issues. These elements concern the need to improve productivity so that the Singapore economy can remain internationally competitive. PAP sought to win back the voting population to the view that a one-party dominant system was the way for Singapore to go, as only through a PAP government can productivity be sustained in the long run. Leadership renewal is necessary for the implementation of productivity changes. Such productivity changes will also address the issue of the income gap, housing affordability and immigration,

9

10

Table 6.3 in Department of Statistics, Yearbook. Eugene Tan, ‘Election Issues’, in Voting in Change: Politics of Singapore’s 2011 General Election, eds. Kevin Tan and Terrence Lee (Singapore, Ethos Books, 2011).

210 Regime Resilience in Malaysia and Singapore

through real wages being able to be raised, housing payments to be afforded and dependence on foreigners reduced.

Minding the Income Gap The then Finance Minister, Tharman Shanmugaratnam, was at pains to point out that the median Singapore household income per household grew by 17 per cent in the past five years, after adjusting for inflation. Those in the lowest 20th percentile of households experienced 14 per cent real growth in income per household member.11 He reminded Parliament in his 2012 budget speech that the Workfare Income Supplement (WIS) which had been introduced in 2007 topped up the wages of low-income workers by as much as 25 per cent each year. There was also a one-off Workfare Special Bonus: through these two schemes, the minister pointed out, 400,000 Singaporeans have benefitted to the tune of $590 million per year. In his 2013 budget speech, the minister announced an expansion in coverage of the WIS scheme to $1900 from $1700 (when it was started in 2007, the figure was $1500). This expansion meant that 30 per cent of the citizen workforce (480,000 Singaporeans) would benefit. Further, for workers aged 45 years and older, the maximum pay out for a person earning $1000 a month increased by $700 a year, while those between 35 and 45 got less. The minister pointed out that a 60-year old cleaner in the bottom 10th percentile of incomes, earning $1000 a month, would get $3,500 in WIS annually, the equivalent of 3.5 months of additional income or a 29 per cent top-up of his normal pay. Of this, $1,400 would be paid in cash. Both his healthcare and retirement savings would also receive a boost. Overall, the enhanced WIS meant increases of 25–50 per cent in maximum pay outs. More significantly, workers were to receive 45 per cent of WIS in cash and 55 per cent in their Central Provident Fund (CPF) account. Previously, recipients received 29 per cent of WIS in cash. On the other hand, WIS criteria were to be tightened to exclude recipients who own second properties or have spouses who earn more than $70,000 a year. It was pointed out that only a small percentage of current WIS recipients fell into these categories. On balance, the annual cost of WIS would be about 44 per cent higher than the previous year. 11

The minister admitted that this could be because more members of the household obtained jobs.



Economic Growth, Democratic Participation and Social Welfare in Singapore 211

Deputy Prime Minister Tharman then introduced a permanent GST voucher scheme. This would fully offset the 7 per cent GST that the lower half of retiree households pay, while it would offset half of other lowerincome families’ GST bills. A cash component of the GST voucher scheme was to be paid to those whose incomes fell within the bottom 40 per cent and who live in HDB flats or the bottom 15 per cent of private properties, i.e. those with an annual income of up to $20,000. There was also a GST Medisave component to benefit those above 65. Last but not least, a U-Save component of the GST voucher scheme is paid through offsetting utilities bills, which varies according to HDB unit type. To ensure that this GST voucher scheme is for the long-term, a GST Voucher Fund was set up from which pay outs were to be made annually so that it is not a scheme of temporary offsets. In 2012 this scheme would cost $680 million so $3.6 billion was allotted to this Fund. In the 2013 budget, the minister topped up the GST Voucher Fund by another $3 billion, so that the government could make the yearly GST voucher pay outs up to 2020. The minister then announced the raising of the per capita income household income criterion (PCI) for the granting of pre-school and Ministry of Education Financial Assistance. The income ceiling was raised from $1500 to $2500 a month, so 40,000 more students, or twice the original number, could be fully subsidised for their school fees, uniforms and textbooks, as well as a 75 per cent subsidy on their exam fees. For preschool, the child care fee was now $20 for each child in child care instead of $110, assuming they attend a HDB Childcare Centre costing $620 a month. For older children who need Student Care, the PCI was raised to $3500 for monthly household income: a family would typically see the amount they pay for student care reduced from $200 to $80 a month. In the 2013 Budget, Minister Tharman provided an extra GST voucher on top of the permanent voucher, i.e. all eligible Singaporeans were to get double the usual amount. This was estimated to benefit 1.4 million Singaporeans and cost an extra $680 million. The 2013 Budget also provided 1–3 months of service & conservancy charges (S & CC) to HDB flat dwellers, depending on unit size. The 2012 and 2013 budgets adopted the same principle of targeting subsidies to specific needs when it came to medical care, in order to bridge the income gap. In the 2012 budget, Medishield, which covers major hospital bills, was extended from age 85 to 90. A one-off Medisave top-up was given

212 Regime Resilience in Malaysia and Singapore

to all Singaporeans currently on Medishield to help them adjust to the premium increase. The 2012 Budget increased subsidies to those in community hospitals, so that lower-income patients receive a 75 per cent government subsidy. Those above the median income, who previously did not receive any subsidy, are now able to obtain a 20–50 per cent subsidy. Subsidies were also raised for those in the middle-income group who are in nursing homes, day care and rehabilitation facilities as well as receiving home-based care packages. Two-thirds of Singaporean households would then qualify for subsidies. As the elderly often do not themselves have income, this effectively meant that about 80 per cent of the elderly would qualify. The minister gave the example that for a middle-income family with an elderly parent in a private nursing home, the new subsidies would bring down their costs from about $2,800 to $1,700 a month.12 Subsidies would bring the cost of a home-based care package from about $1,400 to $700 a month. The minister commented that hopefully this would allow one out of two frail seniors to enjoy home-based care instead of moving to a nursing home. A grant of $120 was also given to families hiring a foreign domestic helper to help care for elderly family members who are unable to perform three or more activities of daily living. This was in addition to the $95 concession in the foreign domestic worker levy that all households with elderly persons enjoyed. The 2012 Budget launched an Enhancement for Active Seniors (EASE) Programme in which each citizen household with an elderly member could get home modifications worth about $2,000 so long as they paid no more than $250 themselves. This programme was expected to benefit 130,000 households and cost about $260 million in the following ten years. The absorption of GST for class B2 and class C patients in acute hospitals was extended to subsidised patients in the long-term care sector (community hospitals, nursing homes and home care services), benefiting about 40,000 Singaporeans. Medifund, to which those who cannot pay hospital bills can apply for aid, was topped up in the 2012 Budget by $600 millions to enable pay outs from Medifund by over 20 per cent.

12

T. Shanmugaratnam, ‘Budget speech to Parliament 2012’ (Singapore Government, 17 February 2012), accessed 28 July 2016, http://www.singaporebudget.gov.sg/ budget_2012/pe.html#



Economic Growth, Democratic Participation and Social Welfare in Singapore 213

The 2013 Budget expanded the existing Seniors’ Mobility Fund and Enabling Fund to cover a much wider range of assistive devices such as hearing aids, shower chairs and motorised vehicles. Subsidies of up to 80 per cent were also provided for lower-income elderly to help defray the cost of consumables for the many frail elderly living at home. It was pointed out that an elderly patient in need of milk feeds could save up to $2000 per year. The Fund was topped up from $10 to $50 million. In addition, Medifund was topped up by $1 billion, bringing the total fund size to $4 billion.13 The ElderCare Fund was topped up by $250 million, bringing the total size of the fund to $2.75 billion.14 Monthly cash assistance from the Public Assistance Scheme was raised;15 a couple would receive an additional $90, making $790 in cash assistance, while a single-person household recipient would receive $450 in cash. PA recipients continued to receive free services like medical treatment in polyclinics and restructured hospitals, primary and secondary education and access to a broad range of social services such as home help and day activity centres. The concessionary foreign domestic worker monthly levy was reduced in the 2013 Budget from $170 to $120 a month. The personal income tax rebate of 30 per cent granted in 2012 was extended by another year in the 2013 Budget: those aged 60 or above were given a higher rebate of 50 per cent, subject to a cap of $1,500. The minister estimated that 1.3 million resident tax payers would benefit from this move which would cost the government $615 million. Last but not least, in narrowing the income gap, the 2013 Budget included a $200 top-up in the Medisave accounts of all Singaporeans aged 45 and above, which cost the government $300 million.

Housing Affordability The 2012 Budget introduced a Silver Housing Bonus of $20,000 for older 13

Medifund is the third ‘M’ in health care, to provide financing to those who cannot draw on their MediSave (that part of CPF savings dedicated to meeting medical expenses) and Medishield (an insurance scheme for catastrophic illnesses) accounts to meet their medical expenses. 14 This Fund supported patients in subsidised nursing homes and other long-term care services. 15 Public Assistance Scheme is for those who are destitute, without property, savings or support from family.

214 Regime Resilience in Malaysia and Singapore

Singaporeans who wished to sell their existing flats and purchase 3-room or smaller HDB flats. Under this scheme, $15,000 was to be provided in cash and $5,000 in the CPF account. Proceeds from the sale of their previous home had to be used to top up their CPF savings to the prevailing minimum sum. Any amount above the minimum sum could be withdrawn in cash. More studio apartments were also to be built by the HDB in blocks with amenities like Senior Activity Centres which residents could enjoy. The 2012 Budget also enhanced the Lease Buyback Scheme, which is another way Singaporeans could get money out of their homes. All HDB flats are sold on a 99-year lease and this scheme enabled residents to sell part of their lease back to the HDB. As the scheme had not been very attractive in the past, the 2012 Budget doubled the incentive from $10,000 to $20,000 – $15,000 to be paid in cash, a similar quantum to the Silver Housing Bonus. Furthermore, participants could now receive proceeds above the prevailing minimum sum in cash; previously all proceeds had to be used to purchase a CPF Life Plan. Many steps were taken by the government to cool the HDB resale market but as they were taken over the course of the year, these were not spelled out in the budget. The supply of HDB flats was ramped up to help first-time buyers book their flats faster as well as ease prices in the resale market. Government land sales had the effect of increasing the supply of private housing. These measures were spelled out by the Minister for National Development when the budget was taken through the Committee of Supply in detail. As almost all HDB flats are purchased through the CPF, the 2013 Budget restored the employer and employee contribution rates for low-wage workers fully to the same level as higher-income workers as from 1 January 2014. The minister pointed out that with the increase in WIS pay outs, the employee CPF contribution rate for low-wage workers could be raised without any reduction in take-home pay for most of them. Their contribution rates were reduced in 2007 to enhance their employability. The increased CPF would also help them with their retirement and medical needs. The example was given of a 45-year old earning $800 a month: his employee reduction rate was to be raised from 16.5 per cent to 20 per cent, while the employer contribution rate was to be restored from just below 11 per cent to 16 per cent as from 2014. He would have $15,000 more in his CPF at age 65. The 2013 Budget also addressed the cost of owning property through



Economic Growth, Democratic Participation and Social Welfare in Singapore 215

the reduction in property tax rates for low-end owner-occupied properties. The minister stated that he was especially mindful of the retirees who do not have sufficient cash resources even if the homes they live in may be of significant value. A new property tax schedule would enable some 950,000 owner-occupied residential properties to enjoy some tax savings. All 1- and 2-room owner-occupied HDB flats continued to pay no property tax. Although the more progressive structure tax for owner-occupied residential properties is a net revenue loss of about $19 million once fully implemented, this is more than offset by the increase in property tax of $72 million for non-owner-occupied residential properties.

Immigration In his 2012 Budget statement, then Finance Minister Tharman Shanmugaratnam explicitly stated that the first task of the government was to upgrade and restructure the economy, so that; we can grow by becoming more productive, and can rely our workforce… our aim is to achieve productivity growth of 2 to 3 per cent per year, in total 30 per cent productivity growth over a decade … we have to reduce our dependence on foreign labour, our increasing dependence on foreign workers is not sustainable … the availability of foreign labour will reduce the incentives for our companies to upgrade, design better jobs and raise productivity.16

Tharman reminded Parliament that in 2010 the Economic Strategies Committee had recommended the foreign workforce proportion not exceed one-third. Budget 2010 had increased foreign worker levies and these were extended in Budget 2011. Nevertheless, he admitted that the foreign workforce had grown by 7.5 per cent per year over the previous two years17 and was already one-third of the total workforce in 2012. As levies had not worked, the minister then proposed a calibrated reduction in dependency ceilings (DRCs) in the manufacturing and services sectors. The DRCs specify the maximum proportion of foreign workers that companies can hire. From 1 July 2012, the manufacturing DRC was reduced from 65 to 60 per cent and the services DRC from 50 to 45 per 16

17

Shanmugaratnam, ‘Budget Speech 2012’. This 7.5 per cent per year foreign workforce growth excludes foreign domestic workers.

216 Regime Resilience in Malaysia and Singapore

cent. The 2013 Budget reduced this to 40 per cent. The S Pass sub-DRC was reduced from 25 to 20 per cent for all sectors from 1 July 2012. The S Pass is between the foreign worker permit category (below $2000 a month) and the foreign worker Employment Pass for professionals (above $2500 a month). However, the 2013 Budget increased the minimum S Pass from $2000 to $2200 a month as from July 2013. The 2013 Budget reduced the numbers of S Pass allocations further to 15 per cent. A two-year time period was given for companies to adjust to the new DRCs. The man-year entitlement (MYE) quotas for the construction sector were reduced by 5 per cent by July 2012: levies for basic skilled workers hired outside the MYE quotas were raised. The levy increase in the 2013 Budget was $300. The 2013 Budget gave until June 2015 for companies to comply with regard to existing foreign workers. In 2012 600 manufacturing and 8,500 services companies were affected by these DRC changes. The 2013 Budget increased levies for work permit holders by $150 between July 2013 and July 2015. The overall DRC for the marine sector was reduced from 1:5 to 1:3.5. This was to take place in two stages, one in January 2016 and again in January 2018. An incentive to employ older Singaporean workers was also given in a Special Employment Credit (SEC) of 8 per cent of wages for all Singaporean workers above 50 years old and earning up to $3,000 a month; the incentive was lower for workers with a monthly wage of $3,000–$4,000. The SEC covered almost 350,000 workers or 80 per cent of older Singaporean workers. It replaced the Jobs Credit Scheme (a one-off, counter-recessionary measure of a grant given when Singaporean workers are employed) in 2009 and put in place in the five-year period of 2012–16 to enable employers to plan ahead in employing older workers. Under the SEC, employers were provided with benefits of about $470 million a year, which is more than twice the increase in their wage bill of $190 million as a result of higher CPF employer contributions mentioned earlier.

Steps to increase productivity Small and medium enterprises (SMEs) have to be assisted to adjust to the changes in the foreign labour quotas, and so a one-off grant of 5 per cent of their revenues was to be given to those that qualified (SMEs that pay CPF contributions to at least one non-shareholder employee), capped at a



Economic Growth, Democratic Participation and Social Welfare in Singapore 217

pay out of $5,000. Further enhancement was made to the Productivity and Innovation Credit (PIC) scheme which had been launched the previous year. This provided for a 400 per cent tax deduction on up to $400,000 spent on a broad range of productivity-related expenses, such as training or investment in equipment. The minister commented that one in three small companies had taken advantage of the scheme.18 They have seen their taxes come down by 40 per cent on average. The 2013 Budget introduced a new government scheme to help businesses raise their employee wages, and to incentivise employers to share their productivity gains with their employees. Under the Wage Credit Scheme (WCS), the government co-funded 40 per cent of wage increases for Singaporean employees over the following three years, for workers earning up to a gross monthly wage of $4,000. There is no need to apply for the WCS: wage credits are now automatically paid out to employers annually. The 2013 Budget gave a dollar-for-dollar matching cash PIC bonus of up to $15,000 over the three years of assessment YA 2013 to YA 2015. There was a minimum qualifying expenditure of $5,000 to encourage small businesses to undertake meaningful productivity investments. This bonus was expected to cost $450 million over the three years. The range of investments that can qualify for PIC benefits was broadened. As businesses also face other cost pressures such as higher rentals, the 2013 Budget gave a special Corporate Income Tax rebate from YA 2013 to YA 2015, of 30 per cent of tax payable up to $30,000 per year of assessment. To encourage SME collaboration with large enterprises to enable coinnovation, capability upgrading and sharing of best practices within the supply chain, the 2013 Budget broadened and enhanced the Partnerships for Capability Transformation (PACT) scheme which had been previously initiated in the manufacturing sector. Estimated to cost $60 million over three years, this complements support for collaborative industry projects which were estimated to cost $100 million over three years. To help individual firms, a land productivity grant ($60 million) was given to support companies which intensify their use of land in Singapore. Help was also given to those who chose to relocate some operations offshore,

18

T. Shanmugaratnam, ‘Budget speech to Parliament 2013’ (Singapore Government, 25 February 2013), accessed 28 July 2016, http://www.singaporebudget.gov.sg/ budget_2013/budget_speech.html.

218 Regime Resilience in Malaysia and Singapore

while retaining core functions in Singapore. SMEs were also linked to public-sector research institutions and private sector technology providers to identify and develop productivity solutions that give them a competitive advantage ($51 million). Grants were also to be made ($10 million over two years) for the adoption of land set aside for integrated construction and precast hubs. Enterprise Development Centres were to be enhanced into one-stop integrated SME Centres and the EDB was to set aside $500 million over the following five years to support a Future of Manufacturing Plan. The emerging satellite industry in Singapore was supported by a $90 million Satellite Industry Development Fund. The Lifelong Learning Endowment Fund was topped up by $500 million. Polytechnic and Institute of Technical Education (ITE) students were to be encouraged by an SME Talent Programme to join SMEs upon graduation. The Opportunity Fund was topped up by $72 million; it was to give up to $275,000 for secondary schools and $150,000 for primary schools which have a large number of students from less advantaged backgrounds. A new autonomous agency, the Early Childhood Development Agency, was aimed to drive improvements over the entire pre-school sector. It combined the pre-school teams within the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Social and Family Development to be overseen by both ministries. Spending on the pre-school sector was more than doubled over the following five years to over $3 billion. More was promised for the Anchor Operator Scheme, a programme that provides funding to selected preschool operators to enhance early childhood education, especially for children from lower income backgrounds. As productivity is affected by transport and its efficiency, the 2012 Budget made the surprising announcement that the government would provide funding for 550 buses, while public bus operators would add another 250 buses. These 800 buses over the following five years represented a 20 per cent increase. In the past, it took the public transport operators close to twenty years to grow the public bus fleet by 800 buses. Sixty per cent of all passenger trips are made on buses, and this significant increase in bus capacity reduced crowding and waiting times. This change will enable almost all feeder buses to run every ten minutes or less for two hours during morning and evening peak hours instead of a one-hour peak capacity. A further $1.1 billion was set aside for a Bus Services Enhancement Fund.



Economic Growth, Democratic Participation and Social Welfare in Singapore 219

Rail capacity was also to be improved. The planned Downtown Line, Tuas West Extension, Thomson Line and Eastern Regional Line are to be completed in the following decade. The target was to have 400,000 housing units within 400 metres of MRT stations, double the number in 2012. Health is another area where productivity rests, and in his 2013 National Day Speech, the Prime Minister made the bold announcement that the coverage of MediShield, which provides insurance for catastrophic illness, would be made compulsory.19 Many Singaporeans fear dying, rather than death itself, because of the high cost of acute health care. What they have in Medisave is not enough and Medifund is only for those who are poor. In 2016 the government spelt out the details of this insurance scheme. The Finance Minister presented the 2012 Budget as a budget for the future, in preparation for the 2015 general election. This can be seen in the many budget expenditure items expressed as a transfer to funds of various sorts. A fund is a capital sum, and expenditure from it is spread over a number of years. The government clearly does not believe in spending money immediately. As disbursement from funds takes time, the benefits from such disbursement also take time to be seen. Although measures were taken in both the 2012 and 2013 Budgets to reduce the inflow of foreign workers, measures were also taken in these budgets ‘to provide broad-based support to help as many businesses as possible retain their roots in Singapore and grow, and to help Singaporean workers who may be displaced to find jobs’.20 The minister stated that in 1980 it took 27 workers to produce $1 million worth of output (at today’s prices).21 Today it takes only 10 workers to produce the same value of output. He went on to say that the median Singapore worker now earns three times as much as 30 years ago, after taking inflation into account.22 The clear intention was to make Singapore as productive as the US or Switzerland. The minister stated that the same value

19

Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong, ‘National Day Rally Speech 2013’, last updated 6 November 2014, accessed 1 June 2016, http://www.pmo.gov.sg/mediacentre/primeminister-lee-hsien-loongs-national-day-rally-2013-speech-english. 20 Shanmugaratnam, ‘Budget Speech 2012’. 21 S.K. Heng, ‘Budget speech to Parliament 2016’ (Singapore Government, 24 March 2016), accessed 28 July 2016, http://www.singaporebudget.gov.sg/budget_2016/ BudgetSpeech.aspx. 22 Ministry of Finance estimates, as quoted in the 2012 Budget Statement.

220 Regime Resilience in Malaysia and Singapore

of output produced by 10 workers in Singapore takes only seven workers to produce in the US or six in Switzerland . In his 2013 Budget Statement, the minister stated Singapore is behind global leaders in manufacturing and transport though well ahead in productivity compared to other economies in Asia apart from Japan. In construction, Singapore productivity is about one-fifth below Hong Kong and South Korea and much further below that of Japan and other international leaders. In many service industries, like food & beverages and retail, Singapore is also about one-fifth behind Hong Kong. Unless Singapore succeeds in the present new transformation phase, Singapore will lose ground to emerging cities in Asia which are catching up quickly. While moderation in the growth of the foreign workforce is necessary, it is not across the board. The minister pointed out in his 2013 Budget Statement that those sectors which are most dependent on foreign workers are also the ones furthest behind international standards of productivity. The tightening of foreign worker policies is therefore aimed mainly at reducing reliance on manpower, not merely replacing foreign workers with locals. Industries like food and beverages and retail that have been most reliant on foreign workers are also where there are low wages and low wage growth for local workers. The management of the economy since the 2011 GE has been for the long-term.

Update on the 2016 Budget In late March 2016 a new Minister of Finance, Heng Swee Keat, presented the 2016 budget.23 Normally the budget is presented in February in time for the start of the financial year on 1 April. However, he requested extra time to present his first budget as Finance Minister as his appointment came after the September 2015 general election (GE). Parliament approved a transitional budget for April and May 2016 to cover expenditure for those two months as the debate in Parliament would only be concluded in midApril 2016. PAP won the GE with 70 per cent of the vote compared to 60 per cent in the 2011 GE. What confidence it had lost, it regained. The 2016 budget was refreshing compared to the previous budgets which had been presented by Tharman Shanmugaratnam who, as Deputy Prime

23

S.K. Heng, ‘Budget Speech 2016’.



Economic Growth, Democratic Participation and Social Welfare in Singapore 221

Minister, is now the coordinating minister for finance and economic policy ministries. He was the previous Finance Minister for several budgets, his budget in 2010 being the start of a focus on productivity. The other Deputy Prime Minister, Teo Chee Hean, is also a coordinating minister, but for the security and home affairs ministries. Neither runs a single ministry as before, but coordinate others, under the overall supervision of all ministries exercised by the Prime Minister, a fitting recognition of their past excellent individual performances. The 2016 budget was refreshing in three ways: (1) the targeting of encouragement to local industries (2) the targeting of social support and (3) a greatly increased reliance on the income obtained from accumulated reserves. Local industries were targeted for assistance in the 2016 budget principally through an SME (small medium enterprise) working capital loan scheme (50 per cent risk-sharing with the Ministry of Trade and Industry) and additional corporate income tax rebates (increase from 30 to 50 per cent of tax payable). The broad-based productivity and innovation credit scheme launched in a previous budget as the response to the 2008 global financial crisis is to be phased out in 2018. Firms will now be individually encouraged through an automation support package and a national robotics programme: on a national level, firms will be assisted by the setting up of a national trade platform and a business grants portal so that SMEs can mutually support each other and obtain financial assistance to expand along the lines of an industry transformation map for the economy. In the Singapore context of limited labour supply, sectoral manpower plans will be generated. To attain these sectoral plans there will be social support for individuals to improve themselves through SkillsFuture Earn and Learn Programmes to complement previously announced SkillsFuture Credits (a policy initiative announced in the Prime Minister’s 2015 National Day Rally speech which Singapore citizens can spend in attending various types of training courses).24 Individuals with low incomes will be helped by a raising of the qualifying income ceiling in the Work Income Supplement Scheme (WIS) (from $1,500 to $2,000 a month). Pay outs will be raised to $3,600 24

Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong, National Day Rally Speech 2015, last updated 21 June 2016, accessed 30 June 2016, http://www.pmo.gov.sg/mediacentre/primeminister-lee-hsien-loongs-national-day-rally-2015-speech-english.

222 Regime Resilience in Malaysia and Singapore

a year, payable monthly rather than quarterly, benefiting some 460,000 Singaporeans in 2017. Support for children (up to 6 years old) will be initiated through a KidStart initiative while a Fresh Start Housing Scheme will help families living in public rental housing to own a home. There will be top-ups to individual Medisave accounts in the CPF as well as the building of a new general hospital and a new community hospital. Seniors will benefit from an enhanced Silver Support scheme first announced at the 2014 National Day Rally.25 A National Silver Academy will provide 10,000 learning places where there will be interaction with younger students. As all these initiatives will cost money, how are they to be paid for without violating the balanced budget principle enshrined in the constitution that each parliamentary session (customarily five years between general elections) must not incur a deficit? Income from the government reserves held in Temasek Holdings will now be tapped. Previously only the income from the reserves held in the GIC (Government Investment Corporation) and the MAS (Monetary Authority of Singapore) was tapped. As a consequence, the 2016 budget has a net investment returns contribution of $14.7 billion compared to $9.9 billion in the 2015 budget, out of total expenditure of $73.3 billion. In other words, some one-fifth of budgetary income will come from the reserves, admittedly only the ‘income’ from reserves but it was nowhere stated in the budget how much the total income would be. Some of the $14.7 billion may in reality come from reducing the reserves themselves since the value of reserves fluctuates with global stock and bond market conditions, and the income from reserves, too. The 2016 Budget is indicative of the resilience of government policy in the face of falling GDP growth (estimated to be 1.5 per cent for 2015): the economic prospects for 2016 are not expected to be much better than those experienced in 2015. The confidence obtained from the positive 2015 General Election resulted in FY 2016 total government expenditure being $73.4 billion as compared to an actual $46.6 billion in FY 2011. Operating revenue in FY 2016 was $68.7 billion compared to an actual $51.1 billion in FY 2011. Projected operating revenue in FY 2016 was estimated to be $68.4 billion compared to an actual $51.1 billion in FY 2011, so there had

25

Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong, National Day Rally Speech 2014, last updated 21 June 2016, accessed June 2016, http://www.pmo.gov.sg/mediacentre/primeminister-lee-hsien-loongs-national-day-rally-2014-speech-english.



Economic Growth, Democratic Participation and Social Welfare in Singapore 223

to be reliance on the net investment returns from reserves to bridge the gap. Government policy in building up its reserves since GIC was formed in 1981, and Temasek soon after that, has proved right for Singapore.

Comparison of PAP policies 1995–2001 and post-2011 to date A bigger government budget than at present is required because the stagnant population is significantly aging. The Prime Minister’s 2013 National Day Rally speech brought out the need of the young for assistance in obtaining first-time housing, the need of the old for medical care and the need of the middle income group for both housing and medical care.26 Deputy Prime Minister Tharman Shanmugaratnam referred in a speech to a shift to the left in PAP policy. In other words, there is now a need for social welfare in the Singapore economy. It is not a shift to a welfare economy, but rather a shift to targeted assistance to certain groups in the country based on those drawing low wages or becoming old or being priced out of the housing market due to wage growth being not substantial in recent years due to the slow-down in economic growth. In his 2013 National Day Rally speech the Prime Minister made no mention of economic growth, the first time economic growth had been omitted in 48 years of National Day Rally speeches. In recent government speeches, reference has been made to modest economic growth targets of 3–5 per cent annually compared to 5–7 per cent previously.27 Implied in this is a reduced dependence on foreign workers. As for the role of MNCs, the driver now seen to be more stable rather than volatile is small-medium enterprises (SMEs). Encouragement to SMEs can come from more contest in political elections as these bring members of parliament who are active in grassroots activities and can win over audiences rather than being parachuted into national policy making. The past political mode of GRCs being dominant is a parallel to the time when MNCs were the drivers of economic growth, decision-making in MNCs being similar to that in a top-down run economy. With SMEs designated to be the next set of drivers in the Singapore economy, a more bottom-up approach is needed in economic activity

26 27

Lee Hsien Loong, National Day Rally Speech 2013. Lee Hsien Loong, National Day Rally Speech 2015.

224 Regime Resilience in Malaysia and Singapore

and this can be encouraged by political contestation in single-member constituencies as the spirit of entrepreneurship is common to both. More democratic participation can anticipate more SME-driven economic activity, both being needed in Singapore for the next few decades.



Representation, Literacy and ‘Gladiatorism’ in Malaysian Politics 225

Chapter 15

Representation, Literacy and ‘Gladiatorism’ in Malaysian Politics A.B. Shamsul

Beyond psephology As a voter and an observer of elections in Malaysia since the 4th General Election in 1974 (GE04), and as a commentator since the elections in 1999 (GE10), I find the majority of the analyses and literature on the event has been overwhelmingly psephological – focusing on the statistical study of elections and trends in voting.1 For most analysts interested in number crunching, this is where the bread and butter is. Since the GE10 1999, the interest amongst analyst has gone deeper than just statistics, to look seriously and systematically at politics beyond elections and ethnic-related issues. This was the result of a ‘mass conscientisation’ process brought about, partly by the Reformasi movement, where political issues have gone beyond ethnicity and the activists who, as a group, were multi-ethnically bonded by shared concerns on larger social issues rather than on narrow ethnic ones, and partly with the expansion of urban the middle-class, and partly the extensive use of the Internet.2

1

Stephen E. Fienberg, ‘Memories of Election Night Predictions Past: Psephologists and Statisticians at Work’, CHANCE 20:4 (2007): 8–17. Also read Charis Quay’s exposition on this issue in New Mandala titled, ‘Ways of seeing Malaysia – deconstructing demographic violence’, accessed 15 April 2016, http://asiapacific. anu.edu.au/newmandala/2013/05/17/ways-of-seeing-malaysia-deconstructingdemographic-violence/ 2 Hadar N. Gumay et al., Assessing Democratic Evolution in Southeast Asia (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2002).

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The impact of the ‘mass conscientisation’ upon the Malaysian public raised significant epistemological and analytical questions regarding Malaysian politics as a phenomenon, one of which is political literacy, namely the interconnectedness of political ideas and political institutions and their understanding by society. Rather, can political institutions be introduced and flourish without the underpinning political ideas being understood because the society is highly illiterate. This brief presentation is an attempt at an analytical exploration of the state of political literacy in Malaysia that we believe has not received the attention it deserves in the overall study of Malaysian politics.

Political literacy: a concept and practice Historically, modern electoral politics in Europe and the US is an integral component of the larger modernisation project of each of the democratic nation-states. Political literacy therefore is required of citizens of a democracy to ensure the individual and social rights.3 In order for them to become politically literate they have to acquire the basic skills to understand socio-political ideas, institutions, language, form of thought and argument, for which they have to be educated. In other words, political literacy is central to citizenship education.4 A pre-condition to political literacy is of course basic literacy, that is, for one to be able to read, write and understand both political ideas and institutions before one can make an informed political decision on public matters. This means one has to go to school to learn and acquire those basic reading, writing and arithmetic (3R) skills. Eventually, one becomes educated and may acquire a university degree, in any academic and professional field one chooses. However, having a university degree doesn’t guarantee one is politically literate. This has been pointed out clearly in a report by Crick & Porter based on a study in the UK.5

3

Fredric G. Gale, Political Literacy: Rhetoric, Ideology, and the Possibility of Justice (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1994). 4 Darren E. Lund and Paul R. Carr eds., Doing Democracy: Striving for Political Literacy and Social Justice (New York: Peter Lang, 2008). 5 Bernard R. Crick and Alex Porter, Political Education and Political Literacy: The report and papers of the evidence submitted to the working party of the Hansard Society’s Programme for Political Education (London: Longman, 1978).



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It was recommended that one is to be formally educated on political matters to become politically literate, especially on political ideas and on knowledge of political institutions.6 It is necessary to be embedded in the formal curriculum of the political literacy classes, from primary to secondary school level. There are four capacities that shall generate and provide solid foundation for political literacy7 and they are: •

successful learners who can make reasoned evaluations

•

confident individuals who can communicate their own beliefs and views of the world

•

responsible citizens who make informed choices and decisions

•

effective contributors who apply critical thinking in new contexts

From the above, it is obvious that developing political literacy involves conscious detailed and systematic citizenship education especially by the government of the day. In the UK and USA such an effort was taken up in earnest only in the 1960s, even though, for instance, the idea of democracy and the introduction of institutions related to it were already operating since the 17th century. In Malaysia, citizenship education, or political literacy education, takes various forms and the main one has been in the form of ‘civic education’ class at primary and secondary school level.8 This effort hasn’t really borne fruit and has been perceived, perhaps unfairly, by some as a ‘promotion campaign’ for the ruling government. Critical comments have also been made regarding the ‘moral education’ subject taught to non-Muslim students, which is taught parallel to the subject on ‘Islamic religious education’ for Muslim students. Ironically, the debate amongst parents on

6

Ted Huddleston, Citizens & Society: Political Literacy: Teacher Resource Pack (London: Hodder Education, 2004). 7 For an elaboration on the concept of ‘four capacities’ introduced recently by the Scottish Education Department, see, ‘Curriculum for Excellence: Political Literacy,’ in CfE Briefing No. 14, accessed 3 March 2014, http://www.educationscotland.gov. uk/resources/c/genericresource_tcm4813895.asp. 8 For a recent study and critical analysis on the state of citizenship education in Malaysia, see Nur Atiqah Tang Abdullah, Citizenship and Citizenship Education in Nation Building in Malaysia (PhD diss., University of Malaya, 2014).

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the teaching of these two subjects has had some form of ‘political literacy’ impact in the public sphere. However, equally important to note is the fact that Malaysia’s basic literacy rate of the total population was very low, hovering around 55 per cent, before independence in 1957. By 2013 it had risen to 93 per cent,9 but the moot question remains, ‘has political literacy also risen at the same pace?’ This is not certain for no countrywide study has been conducted in Malaysia thus far on this matter, except a minor exploratory one conducted by a team from Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, in 2009, on ‘political literacy among students in selected public universities’.10 The study revealed that an overwhelming majority of the students got ‘educated’ on various aspects of Malaysian politics from parent and family members. When they entered the university the role of their peers become more critical in shaping their political aptitudes and perspectives. Social media and alternative online news also has had impact on shaping their political views but only as a source to elaborate narratives and explanations offered by their peers. In this context, it is interesting to read accounts on the so-called ‘deteriorating democracy’ or ‘quasi-democracy’ in Malaysia based mainly on ‘smart guesswork,’ popular comments and by massaging the statistical results from psephological analysis of various elections without establishing first and foremost the level of political literacy in Malaysia.11

Modern electoral politics: An import Election and electoral politics as a modern idea and institution born in Europe is a colonial import to British Malaya. As mentioned above, one has to be literate first, or able to read and write, to understand the meaning of election as an idea as well as its philosophical underpinnings and, subsequently, its articulation as an institution which involves complex processes, including voting. Then, one has to be politically literate to 9

See http://www.indexmundi.com/malaysia/literacy.html. Accessed 10 April 2014. The study was conducted by a team led by Prof. Mansor Mohd Noor, the Institute of Ethnic Studies, Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, in 2009–10. The study indicated that political literacy figure among the students was around 60 per cent. There is a need for such studies to be broadened in scope and population. 11 See, for instance, recent comment by Azeem Ibrahim, ‘Deteriorating Democracy in Malaysia’, Huffington Post, accessed 3 April 2014, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ azeem-ibrahim/deteriorating-democracy-i_b_4813259.html. 10



Representation, Literacy and ‘Gladiatorism’ in Malaysian Politics 229

appreciate the significance of the idea and meaningfully participate in the institution that has had in the last four centuries defined the way the modern society has been governed.12 In Malaya, an election, the institution, was introduced first before its underpinning ideas got transmitted orally to a society that was generally illiterate. To the majority, election then had no real significance to the illiterate majority. It was simply an exercise of putting crosses in boxes against coloured virtual symbols on a ballot paper. One may consider this exercise as the embedding of a practice established through ‘colonial knowledge’.13 It was not until the 1980s, when national literacy rate was above 90 per cent, that an election, the idea, became more widely understood by the public through texts (Constitution, manifestos, pamphlets, etc.), which, in turn, increased to a certain extent, albeit slowly, political literacy, at least among the young and educated. Similar stories are told about other colonised country’s experience. A report produced by the Commonwealth Policy Studies, London documented in detail such experiences in former British colonies.14 Indeed, the report highlighted the significant fact that many members of the Commonwealth, especially the poor countries, are still striving hard to make democracy as ‘a way of life’ among the population. In Latin American countries, similar experiences have also been recorded and analysed. This is rather a surprise to many, as we are all aware that for decades ‘liberation theology’ has been active in conducting democratic ‘concientisation’ campaigns at the grassroots.15 It has been claimed that the success of the campaign has resulted in rebellions and popular uprisings, in countries such as Mexico, El Salvador and Bolivia. 12

See Gale, Political Literacy; and Carol A. Cassel and Celia C. Lo, ‘Theories of Political Literacy,’ Political Behavior, 19(4) (1997): 317–35. 13 A.B. Shamsul and S.M. Athi, ‘Ethnicity and Identity Formation: Colonial Knowledge, Colonial Structures and Transitions,’ in Routledge Handbook on Contemporary Malaysia, ed. Meredith Weiss (London: Routledge, 2015). 14 Kwadwo Afari-Gyan, Asma Jangahir and Tim Sheehy, Democracy in the Commonwealth: A Report of Democracy in the Commonwealth Eighteen Years after the Harare Commonwealth Declaration (London: Commonwealth Policy Studies Unit, 2009). 15 Gian Luca Gardini, Latin America in the 21st Century: Nations, Regionalism and Globalisation (London: Zed Press, 2012).

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In the Malaysian case, when modern electoral politics was introduced and elections were first held at the local council level, in 1952, it was to serve as a political instrument, strategic and pragmatic, in two ways: first, as a non-violent control mechanism of a potentially volatile inter-ethnic contestation, and second, as a socialisation instrument for negotiation and bargaining between the different ethnic groups represented by elites from each group. It was indeed a strategic and pragmatic decision by the British in the light of the widespread of anti-colonial rebellions and revolutions in Southeast Asia. It was meant to protect their massive economic interests in Malaya, too. A significant historical event was also unleashed globally then, that was the Cold War, which, in turn and as a result of, introduced Emergency (1948-1960) in Malaysia.16 In fact the first general election in British Malaya was held in July 1955. The first post-Independence general election was carried out in 1959. Both were conducted during the Emergency period that observed strict curfew rules and allowed only a limited election campaigning. In other words, the introduction of election in Malaysia was not informed by some lofty political ideas such as ‘democracy, social justice, human rights and civil society’. Indeed, no colonial government practiced those ideas let alone cherished them. This is the significant point that has been missed or ignored by psephological analyses on general elections in Malaysia. Recently conducted comparative political studies between Malaysia and Indonesia revealed that the colonial experience on so-called democracy, may be theoretically fulfilling the Western definition of democracy. However, in reality it was, first and foremost, a colonial strategy of ensuring peace and harmony in the aftermath of the Second World War and in the face of fierce nationalist onslaught,17 whether in the form of ‘revolusi bambu runcing’ (lit.

16

Leon Comber’s book on Sir Gerald Templer, the famous British High Commissioner and Director of Operations of the Emergency (1952–54) reveals interesting ‘democratic moves’, including elections at the local and federal level, made by the British to maintain peace and order in the country (Leon Comber, Templer and the Road to Malayan Independence, Singapore: ISEAS, 2015). 17 See Hidayat Marican Fairuz, ‘Colonial Legacy and the Nature of Democracy in Southeast Asia: Comparative Study of Malaysia and Indonesia’ (MA thesis, International Islamic University Malaysia, 2006), and Roslaine Zeeman, ‘Colonization and Post-Colonial Democracy: Development in Indonesia and



Representation, Literacy and ‘Gladiatorism’ in Malaysian Politics 231

revolution of sharpened bamboo) or the Communist insurgency in Malaya.

Organising representation When modern electoral politics was introduced in British Malaya, mainly to serve that peace and order purpose, ‘ideology-less’ political parties were created by converting existing community-based organisations into political parties. For instance, a Chinese lottery and funeral association became Malayan Chinese Association (MCA). An assembly of Malay associations of all sorts (lawyer, silat and kuda kepang groups) became United Malays National Organisation (UMNO). However, it is yet to be confirmed whether MIC was really ‘Malayan Indian Congress’ or an association of ‘Malayan Indian Chettiars’ (it was meant to be a pun) because the leadership team consist of Indians from the Chettiar mercantile caste. The most significant event that marked the beginning of modern electoral politics in Malaysia was the establishment of the Communities Liaison Committee (CLC), established informally by the British in 1949. It was a hugely significant body, but often under-rated in the study of Malaysian politics, that shaped and charted, subsequently, the pattern of representation through modern electoral politics, hence the political landscape, in Malaya and, later, Malaysia. One of the best account to-date on CLC is by Fernando.18 In his essay he described in detail the genesis of what we know today at ‘coalition politics’ in Malaysia. The British endured that the members of CLC were carefully selected from the elite group of the Malay, Chinese and Indian communities. They worked towards finding solutions to sensitive divisive issues such as federal citizenship, national identity, education and language, and Malay economic backwardness. The debates within CLC were apparently highly animated and contentious, often resulting in one party boycotting the other, which the British had to mediate to bring them back together. In other words, the comprehensive history of the CLC is yet to be written. The CLC was indeed the ‘silent’ prototype model of multi-ethnic political power-sharing formula in Malaysia, what is now known as ‘coalition

18

Malaysia’ (Master of Public Administration thesis, Tilburg University, 2012). Joseph M. Fernando,‘Elite intercommunal bargaining and conflict resolution: The role of the Communities Liaison Committee, 1949–1951’, Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, 43(2) (2012): 280–301.

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politics’, thus giving birth to the Alliance, then Barisan Nasional and, the latest, Pakatan Rakyat. Representative democracy in Malaysia had since been labelled as ‘consociational democracy’. However, unlike the Alliance, BN and PR, CLC was a ‘private elite club,’ with 16 members, but had a wider public impact because colonial government eventually took up and implemented many of CLC’s recommendations. The consultation and agreement arrived in the CLC was a form of elite representation that, later, gave birth to the establishment of a wider public institution of representation institution, namely, modern electoral politics and elections in Malaysia. The CLC set what became the ‘BN Formula’ (Bargaining & Negotiation Formula) for Malaya then Malaysia. It was successfully reproduced in both Sabah and Sarawak after the formation of Malaysia in 1963.19

‘Gladiatorism’ and the contest for the perception space Inevitably, leaders of the major ethnic groups have to shoulder the heavy responsibility of representing the interests and the hope of the whole community. This has, in turn, institutionalised the top-down approach in the way modern electoral politics in Malaysia has been conducted. This situation also has created ‘ethnic heroes,’ leaders who used ethnicity as the main social and political capital, generating distance and distrust, not only between ethnic groups but also within each ethnic group. From the late 1950s to late 1970s, because the general public was still highly illiterate, both in basic and political literacy sense, the voters survived solely on others’ interpretation in reaching a decision which party to vote. So, slogan such as ‘UMNO itu kerajaan, kerajaan itu UMNO’ (‘UMNO is the government, the government is UMNO’) became the perception-defining mantra. This mantra was entrenched in the mind of the Malay electorate until late 1990s. So, the contest for UMNO leadership, and UMNO elections, took a national stature, perceived as more important than the general elections, especially between the late 1970s to the late 1990s. Ethnic heroes, or gladiators, appeared in UMNO, contested openly for the coveted top positions in UMNO to have the title ‘the champion of the 19

See A. Jawan Jayum, The Iban Factor in Sarawak Politics (Serdang: UPM Press, 1993), and James P. Ongkili, Nation-Building in Malaysia, 1946–1974 (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1985).



Representation, Literacy and ‘Gladiatorism’ in Malaysian Politics 233

Malay cause’. In the July 1978 there was a contest between Hussein Onn & Suleiman Palestine, in 1981 and 1984, it was Tengku Razaleigh vs. Musa Hitam, then in 1987, between Team A (Mahathir’s) vs. Team B (Tengku Razaleigh’s), later in 1993 between Anwar Ibrahim & Ghafar Baba. By the end of the 1990s the contest was between Mahathir, the then President of UMNO, vs. Anwar Ibrahim the sacked UMNO leader, who then was leading the Reformasi movement. Although MCA and MIC has had their leadership challenges made public in the same period, they were merely sideshows. Since 2009, ‘the battle of the gladiators’ has been between Anwar and Najib, as perceived by the public, mediated through the electronic and digital media, with a range of gatekeeper groups involved in the whole battle. However, viewed from a wider global context, some thought that they were not really gladiators. They said, almost Geertzian in tone, Anwar and Najib were just two cocks fighting in the ring, with many watching, betting and investing energy and money on their perceived winner.20 Did the political cockfighting really raise the level of political literacy amongst Malaysian politicians and voters? Or, did it reinforce personalitybased political polarisation amongst the voters? They are at least four major aspects of Malaysian politics one has to take note of in any attempt to have a sense of the state of political literacy and its influence of perception making, namely, the personalities, interethnic issues, intra-ethnic matters, federal-state difference and general contemporary issues. Each represents the base or origin of perception making in Malaysia. For instance, many electoral contest at the level of state legislative constituency or parliamentary seats, the local grassroots’ perception of the election candidate’s character often becomes the influential factor in the decision making process of the voters of whom they should vote. What is argued here is the fact that the election as an institution was introduced and practiced for at least three decades before the knowledge about democracy became generalised amongst the population of voters, before literacy about the political institutions and parties became the main frame of the ‘partial’ political literacy most Malaysians experienced.

20

See Clifford Geertz, The interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays (New York: Basic Books, 1973).

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Building political literacy In a public forum at a local university in 2012, which had three speakers in the forum panel, one of the speakers, a Member of the State Legislative Assembly (SLA) of a particular state (negeri), who belonged to UMNO, was asked by one of the students in the audience on his main task as a politician. He answered, ‘My main job is to help and serve people as much as I could during my term.’ Another member of the panel, an MP from Parti Islam, contradicted by saying that ‘his role, first and foremost, is to serve the religion (Islam), then only the people.’ It never crossed their minds that as an SLA Member and as an MP, in the modern electoral system, they are, first and foremost, legislators. The other duties come second. Perhaps the Malaysian voters, particularly who live in urban areas, are more mature and politically literate than some of their politicians. They have been fed with unprecedented amount of information through the Internet and smartphones on the state of politics and the economy in Malaysia. Many indeed were involved in street demonstrations countrywide. So, democracy, human rights and social justice are not lofty ideas anymore. However, the amount of information is not really important. What is significant is to what extent they can make sense of such information and how it has helped them individually to reach a conscious decision, motivated by idealism and self-interest, as to which party they vote for finally at the polling booth. It doesn’t matter which party they have decided to vote for as long as they understood the ideas that underpin the institution called election well, especially the process of casting votes and its wider significance that, in turn, helped them to make the all-important final choice.

Coalitions in Malaysia: Comparing Party Networks and Dynamics 235



Chapter 16

Coalitions in Malaysia: Comparing Party Networks and Dynamics1 Meredith L. Weiss

Malaysia is one of the world’s few remaining ‘hybrid’, or pseudo-democratic, regimes.2 Part of what made GE13 so pivotal was that an opposition coalition formed with sufficient ballast truly to take on the perenniallydominant Barisan Nasional (BN). Unlike in neighbouring states such as Indonesia, Thailand, and the Philippines, strongly institutionalised political parties, not just strong personalities, fundamentally shape Malaysian political contests and loyalties. That pattern has not changed. The key structural innovation of GE13 was the seemingly sustainable development of a two-coalition system. I focus here rather narrowly on that system, sketching out very briefly why I see this development as occurring, how these parties and coalitions function, and the implications for specifically electoral contests and, more broadly, political participation.3 I would argue that even if the specific composition of the two coalitions changes, Malaysia will heretofore look a bit more like other electoral regimes 1

Originally presented at the Australian National University’s Malaysia and Singapore Update 2013, an extended version of this piece appears as ‘Coalitions and Competition in Malaysia – Incremental Transformation of a Strong-party System’, Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs 32(2) (2013): 19–37. 2 Larry Diamond, ‘Thinking About Hybrid Regimes’, Journal of Democracy 13(2) (2002): 23. 3 Evidence for the claims offered here is primarily from ethnographic data collected nationwide during GE13, both by the author and her colleagues, and by a team of researchers. (See Weiss, Electoral Dynamics in Malaysia: Findings from the Grassroots (Petaling Jaya & Singapore: ISEAS/SIRD, 2014) for in-depth case studies of selected constituencies.) The research is part of a four-country study on ‘money politics’ in Southeast Asia; primary funding for this component came from the University of Malaya.

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with majoritarian voting rules, in which two basically centrist parties fight for the middle ground. The single most important reason – though of course, not the only reason – for this shift is the overshadowing of mutually exclusive communal identities as the primary explicit or implicit basis of partisan alignment and policy preferences, with more permeable, nonexclusive class identities and economic priorities. The majority of Malaysians consistently cited economic issues – the cost of living, straitened economic opportunities, misuse of public resources, and the like – as their chief priorities in this election, not communal rights and privileges.4 Moreover, the fact that both coalitions responded with broadly inclusive, populist responses – 1Malaysia handouts for the BN and a basket of subsidies for Pakatan – suggests the extent to which both coalitions recognised that basically non-communal structure of preferences.5 When pushed to differentiate themselves, however – a necessary part of the electoral game – BN resorted to the communal framework around which it is formed, whereas Pakatan emphasised issues of governance and, simply, ‘change’. Imagining Malaysia in the most basic Anthony Downsian terms: Malaysia has shifted from a multipolar balance in which no party representing any one cluster could win, to something approximating a statistically-normal distribution of voters.6 The residual power, both instrumental and discursive, of communalism, traceable in the makeup of the extant parties, still mandates multi-party, explicitly cross-racial coalitions rather than lone contenders. That said, the importance of parties shows no sign of diminishing; Malaysia’s pattern of fixed, predetermined coalitions, rather than the common parliamentary process of forming coalitions after the polls, serves to strengthen coalition component parties through complementarity.

4

See Merdeka Center, ‘Peninsular Malaysia Voter Survey, 28 December 2012: Issues of Voter Concern’, 11 Jan 2013, accessed 15 April 2016, http://www.merdeka.org/ pages/02_research.html, 10; and Merdeka Center, ‘Public Opinion Survey 2013: Peninsular Malaysia Voter Survey’, 3 May 2013, accessed 15 April 2016, http://www. merdeka.org/pages/02_research.html, 8. 5 For a comparison of coalition platforms see Cassey Lee, ‘Malaysia’s 13th GE: A Tale of Two Manifestos’, ISEAS Perspective 24 (22 April) (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2013). 6 See Anthony Downs, ‘An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy’, Journal of Political Economy 65(2) (1957): 135–50.



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In Malaysia, even those candidates who win or lose based on how well they work the ground as credible patrons rely immensely on their party machinery and coalition framework. But these parties themselves are less discrete entities than sturdy exoskeletons over networks of organisations: supporters’ clubs, residents’ associations, chambers of commerce, communal associations, advocacy organisations and more. Those organisations help to keep core supporters in line, allowing the party to focus on cultivating less-sure constituencies, but also lend the party material and moral support. A well-honed party machine, in other words, has a number of cogs quite external to the core. These elections revealed clearly, though, the real fragility of even Malaysia’s strongest parties. BN in particular, indomitable though it has been, seemed to rely more heavily in certain constituencies on the image and persona of Prime Minister Najib than on the merits of the party itself. While Pakatan campaigns tended to focus less heavily on the image of Anwar, they did draw more consistently than BN on ‘rockstar’ ceramah, featuring the leading lights from the coalition as well as other speakers and endorsers. Moreover, parties in both BN and Pakatan suffered from damaging factional splits or rivalries between coalition members in the run-up to the election. Even as component parties competed as coherent coalitions, then, intra- and inter-party rifts disrupted these patterns. The solidification of a two-coalition system comes through clearly, all the same.7 Beyond the scarcity of three-cornered fights on the peninsula, the most solid evidence of this shift comes from Sabah and Sarawak. There, regional parties were nearly wiped out – a significant departure from a prior pattern of split support for national and state-specific contenders. Pakatan candidates, all from national parties (primarily the DAP and PKR), touted the same states’-rights issues as regional parties in their state-specific manifestos, but argued – apparently convincingly – that voters in Sabah and Sarawak should vote for Pakatan in order to effect changes at the federal level. In other words, however different campaigns may look in Peninsular versus East Malaysia, a two-coalition system is now a reality nationwide. That pattern is not to deny or diminish the importance of the ground game. Observers of Malaysian politics have long stressed the salience 7

On earlier efforts toward this end, see Meredith L. Weiss, Protest and Possibilities: Civil Society and Coalitions for Political Change in Malaysia (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2006).

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of ‘machinery’ in elections – both the BN’s endemic use of government resources in the course of their campaigns, and the resources through which it commands loyalty more generally. In this vein, we find that much of what seems to explain BN’s dominance in constituencies are its candidates’ webs of allies and supporters, from both within the party and outside. Those small, rural constituencies showcase the power of party canvassers and mobilisers; as others have also argued, the apparent urban–rural divide in the election outcome may have more to do with parties’ organisation on the ground than with a distinctive ‘rural’ or ‘urban’ mind-set. BN candidates tend to have dense networks of agents who work the ground before and during the campaign – the ketuai rumah (longhouse heads) and village headmen who helped to sway residents in and around Sibu, for instance, or the staff of BN candidate Johari Abdul Ghani’s selffunded service centre in Titiwangsa in Kuala Lumpur, who could greet each of those they had served by name. Supporter ‘clubs’, including well-funded ‘1Malaysia groups’, provided free meals and BN-supporting paraphernalia in Johor, Penang, and elsewhere. Business leaders and organisations – for instance, contractors in Arau and taxi drivers in Pulai – supplied material or were urged to rally votes. And BN candidates in particular mobilised communal organisations – for example, of Dusun Suang Lotud and Bugis in Tuaran, of Sikhs in Kota Kinabalu and of Kimaragang in Keningau – to provide yet another platform for legitimation. These organisations also perform a certifying function not limited to the BN side. For instance, Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party’s (PAS) non-Muslim supporters’ association, Dewan Himpunan Penyokong Rakyat, mobilised to help PAS reach out to non-Muslims, and Bersih’s Ambiga Sreenivasan signalled her approval by speaking at various Pakatan ceramah, even as she insisted on her lack of partisan affiliation. Given voters’ expressed preference for a candidate with a long-term presence in the community, as well as the tremendously labour-intensive short campaign period, these networks and endorsements are critical. Women’s participation in these partisan networks is particularly striking. Women’s representation in formal political office in Malaysia has been and continues to be limited. However, women play a pivotal role in election campaigns, especially through organisations such as Wanita UMNO and PAS’s counterpart, Muslimat. Wanita UMNO, for instance, organised troops of women as jalinan rakyat (JR) – the current rebranding of the old kepala



Coalitions in Malaysia: Comparing Party Networks and Dynamics 239

10 system – each responsible for checking up on a set number of households and making sure they vote BN (for instance, by giving voters slips with their polling station information and ensuring they could get there). Members of these corps also accompanied candidates on walkabouts and otherwise facilitated their access to constituents. This often overlooked dimension to women’s political engagement in Malaysia encourages reassessment not just of how active women are politically, but also of why women’s service to their parties seems less commonly a channel to becoming a candidate than it is for male candidates (perhaps because women’s role is premised on and explained in terms of their function and daily routine as housewives). Meanwhile, voters ask candidates, as patrons, for personal favours, before, during, and after the polls. Candidates in many constituencies demonstrated their capacity to perform favours that require pull. For instance, former Chief Minister Abdul Ghani Othman in Gelang Patah had built loyalty among the local Chinese community by ensuring that donations toward a new building for a Chinese school would not be taxed, as well as by clearing the way for another school to acquire the land to expand. Similarly, UMNO’s Rashidi Ibrahim, candidate for a state seat in Lumut, had used his position in the Perak Chief Minister’s office to help constituents with applications and other assistance. Several candidates (for instance, in Tuaran, Balik Pulau and Titiwangsa), from both BN and Pakatan, ran medical or legal clinics to serve clients in a more literal sense – in the process, engaging with them as voters. These instances suggest that voters seek a candidate who has and is willing to use personal influence, apart from whether that candidate has access to funds. These favours, though, were not all cost-free. Simply running an effective campaign was expensive, all the more so when candidates dispensed even small ‘goodies’. Parties incurred costs not just for hanging enough posters and banners to compete with the visual maelstrom, but also for renting space for bilik gerakan and other functions, hiring audio equipment and chairs for ceramah, securing vehicles to move candidate and coterie throughout the constituency and so forth. BN candidates generally received substantial financial and material allocations from their party organisations, in addition to sponsorship from businesses and associations of various sorts. Khairy Jamaluddin, for instance, standing in Rembau, explained that he welcomes donations from small businesses not just materially (and hopes to reward them in turn), but for the vote of confidence they indicate.

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Pakatan candidates also received an allotment from their party, but far less. Many of the latter supplemented party funds not just with their own resources, but especially with donations, for instance, from attendees at ceramah. Just as party-branded handouts both curry favour and double as advertising, this public collection of donations, as well as candidates’ acknowledgement of anonymous donations dropped off at their offices or deposited in their party bank accounts, both fed the campaign machine – helping to compensate for Pakatan’s deficit in resources compared to BN – and signalled endorsement: specifically anonymous endorsement, more often than not, indicating a lack of ‘strings’ or conditionality. (Meanwhile, candidates without a strong party machine or other financial backers behind them were out of luck.) In other words, their different campaign finance mechanisms did not just determine how much the parties could spend, but really helped to define the coalitions. To caricature only somewhat: the BN used its vast resources to reward voters for their support; cash-strapped Pakatan not only eschewed such inducements, but asked voters to give to the party, rather than vice-versa. More broadly, the solidification of a two-party system both furthers and reflects a restructuring of political engagement. The space and scope for organised, mobilised civil society has been growing since at least the mid-1980s.8 Especially since the Reformasi period of the late 1990s and the incremental launch of today’s Parti Keadilan Rakyat, the lines between civil society and political society have been increasingly porous. We might think now of a typology of engagement that includes partisan and nonpartisan alignment, ideological and instrumental motivations, and legislative and normative objectives. A single-party dominant system – the status quo ante BN, or Singapore’s PAP, narrows those channels to a more stark insider– outsider framework, in which rewards flow through a fused party–state, and ideological or normative calls, regardless of specific timbre, are pressed to the margins since inherently challenging to regime premises and legitimacy, not just policies. A two-party system still hardly makes equal space for all comers. Yet it fundamentally opens the playing field and, it seems, recommends legislative solutions to make a splash among the unconverted rather than hard-to-sustain targeted pay-outs9 to prove that your side loves 8

9

For details see Weiss, Protest and Possibilities, 2006. Bridget Welsh estimates that BN spent nearly RM58 billion on budget items tailored



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X best. Even if both coalitions, for instance, relate in basically similarly personalised, particularistic ways to their constituents, as individuals and as organised interests; if both share hierarchical patterns and battle factional rifts; if both allow the concrete, financial costs of competition to spiral; if both subtly and unsubtly encourage the co-optation of civil society into partisan camps, the fact of this new framework has moved ideology back to centre-court, from its anxious niche along the sidelines. All told, then, GE13 signals a new phase in Malaysian electoral history, in which a second coalition presents not just a different palette of policies and personalities, but a new way of conceptualising and engaging in politics.

Postscript, July 2016 As another general election looms, with snap polls widely anticipated before they are due in 2018, we might ask whether the structural patterns of GE13 are likely to recur in GE14. Prime Minister Najib is no longer so strong and popular; UMNO’s non-Malay and non-peninsular partners have threatened desertion; and Pakatan has been dissolved and reborn as Pakatan Harapan, after a split in PAS – while the latter party stands alone, for now. Both BN and Pakatan Harapan are weak as coalitions, in terms of recognised leadership behind whom the full base can confidently rally, strong trust and sense of mutual commitment among member parties, and agreement on both guiding principles and more fine-grained details. Even so, the coalitional imperative persists, and a national contest between two ideologically differentiated fronts seems the most likely development. The chief mystery now is which parties will fall in which coalition: whether PAS decides to throw its lot in with UMNO, for a Malay-unity coalition, thus likely driving out some or all of the original Alliance partners (Malaysian Chinese Association, Malaysian Indian Congress), Parti Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia (Gerakan, the Malaysian People’s Movement Party), and parties from Sabah and Sarawak (possibly even the pivotally strong Parti Pesaka Bumiputera Bersatu, PBB, United Bumiputera Heritage Party). Sparking this potential crisis has been, most importantly, the resurfacing of hudud, styled either as a reworking of Malaysia’s criminal-law framework to build support among key constituencies in the run-up to the campaign, see Bridget Welsh, ‘Buying support – Najib's ‘commercialisation’ of GE13’, Malaysiakini, 23 April 2013, accessed 15 April 2016, http://www.malaysiakini.com/news/227713.

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or more narrowly, as an expansion of state authority in matters of syariah penalties. That debate brought to a head tensions within Pakatan, but also may yet push non-Muslim partners to leave the BN; the issue is divisive in itself, but also falls within a series of political conflagrations over issues of religious freedom. In the meantime, UMNO itself has been in crisis since allegations surfaced – publicised particularly by the online, London-based Sarawak Report and the US-based Wall Street Journal – of puzzling deposits into Prime Minister Najib’s personal accounts, as well as the disastrous performance and dubious partnerships of sovereign-wealth fund 1Malaysia Development Berhad, 1MDB. Najib has claimed that the funds he received, most of which he then returned, were not from 1MDB, but a campaign contribution from Saudi royalty, to help ensure a BN win in 2013. The revelations, as well as the government’s torturous and largely blocked investigation into the developments, led many to assume Najib would be forced out of office. The scandal has rocked UMNO and resulted in the ouster of key figures from the party, from former Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad and his politician son Mukhriz, to Najib’s deputy, Muhyiddin Yassin. Regardless, UMNO itself still stands, and Najib is effectively unopposed and vindicated, however much personal support he may have lost. We might interpret these developments in terms of the patterns seen in 2013. However many politicians from across parties might wonder at these allegations and revelations of currency flows and massive ‘donations’, those from BN themselves stand to benefit from the injection of funds for campaigning and on-going constituency support. Moreover, the framework of the party, with branches down to the grassroots level and dense machinery for outreach, allows a high level of information control and persuasion – including through targeted patronage. Najib and UMNO continue, too, to draw upon networks outside the party proper, in particular, right-wing Malay-Muslim organisations; these groups have also critiqued Najib, sometimes sharply, yet help to shift attention back to communal rights (including a states’-rights, verging on secessionist, backlash in Sabah and Sarawak), thus re-orienting the public sphere around its prior ideological dispute and away from more difficult matters of fiscal probity and accountability. Meanwhile, Pakatan struggles in its own right, given the re-incarceration of coalition leader Anwar Ibrahim, leadership struggles in Keadilan,



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disputes over seat allocations in the Sarawak state elections and peninsular by-elections, corruption allegations against Penang chief minister and DAP leader Lim Guan Eng and entry into the coalition of former Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad and his Malay-based Parti Pribumi Bersatu Malaysia. Moreover, PAS’s departure from the coalition, and the launch of Parti Amanah Negara (Amanah, National Trust Party) to supplant PAS in Pakatan Harapan, leaves three-cornered fights all but inevitable – although the realities detailed above suggest PAS will fare poorly on its own. In light of the 1MDB issue, the exit of Mahathir and others from UMNO, and wider tensions, both social activists and opposition party leaders have edged toward a broader opposition-front approach, roping in both civil society organisations and political parties. That effort, which builds on the decadeold Bersih initiative and framework, foregrounds the continuing salience of extra-party networks and supporters as the lattice upon which Pakatan largely rests, but risks a potentially limiting partisanisation of civil society (already well in train since at least 2008). In the midst of these developments, and importantly for the upcoming polls, the space for critical political discourse has narrowed. On the one hand, embattled but still firmly empowered, Najib and his government have aggressively assailed opposition party leaders, media and arts figures, and social activists with sedition and other charges, often for bewilderingly trivial ‘misdeeds’. Even if the cases come to naught, they may have a deterrent as well as diversionary effect, and clearly sap the many defendants’ time and resources. On the other hand, the continuing and even heightened emphasis on what amounts to an ideological distinction – communal, and specifically Malay-Muslim rights as the premise for government and society, versus a more secular state and emphasis on good governance and democratic legitimacy – heightens polarisation, particularly given curbs on Malay-Muslims’ voicing differences of interpretation or opinion with regard to state and societal Islamisation (beyond their personal praxis). We might then expect the next elections and subsequent political landscape to continue the pattern set before, albeit likely marked by shifts in which parties fall where within that two-coalition matrix. Both BN and Pakatan Harapan are brittle and bruised, yet the imperative of working in coalition, and of defining those camps in terms of visions of the political order – ideology – rather than just policies and leaders, is perhaps even sharper now than before.

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Dislodging Malaysia’s Culture of Domination 245

Chapter 17

Dislodging Malaysia’s Culture of Domination R. Rueban Balasubramaniam

There is a popular belief that the source of the problem of authoritarian rule in Malaysia is fundamentally political: the problem of authoritarianism derives from ethnocratic rule – where the role of the state is to defend the ethical and political identity of the state as principally a Malay-Muslim state by reference to the doctrine of ‘Malay dominance’. The popularity of this belief explains why the call for ‘reformasi’ has been so popular in Malaysia as opposition parties claim that the problem of authoritarianism can be overcome if officials subscribe to alternative modes of political rule. In this paper I argue that critics of ethnocratic rule under the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) government fail to appreciate that there is a distinctly legal or jurisprudential basis to ethnocratic and authoritarian rule in an inherently authoritarian philosophy of law called ‘the culture of domination’. The culture of domination involves the use of law as a tool of domination over citizens to construct a stable legal-political order governed by an aspiration to ‘social unity’. My worry is that the popular criticism of ethnocratic rule also reflects the features of the culture of domination. Therefore, critics risk reproducing the dangers of authoritarianism, discrimination and general hostility to democracy associated with such rule. To overcome this problem, they need a different conception of social stability as rooted in a different notion of ‘social compromise’ and an attendant view of law more amenable to the ideal of democracy. Fortunately, the basis for this view is already immanent in Malaysia’s wider political culture and offers an attractive interpretation of the Malaysian Constitution.

245

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The Culture of Domination Elsewhere I have called the culture of domination ‘Hobbism’.1 My account of the culture of domination follows the earlier analysis. The culture of domination flows from the assumption that in any societal context marked by the fact of pluralism, deep disagreements of value between citizens, there is a serious threat to social stability because such disagreements are apt to lead to open social conflict, chaos, or disorder. To overcome this danger, the culture of domination assumes that it is necessary to construct a legally unlimited and authoritarian government capable of imposing its judgments of right and wrong upon citizens. The role of the sovereign is to enact an ethically homogeneous state where the state both defines the values that make up the ethical and political identity of the state in a way that also ensures there is no deep disagreement between citizens about the appropriate ends of personal and political life. If there is such a state, then the thought is that there will be a very strong basis to long-term social cooperation and social stability because the state will no longer be threatened by the destabilising fact of value pluralism. Law is the primary instrument for achieving this goal. Legal commands are used to transmit official articulations about the ethical identity of the state to citizens who must absolutely obey these commands. Legal commands are deemed valid by virtue of their status as legal commands, not content, and when confronted by such commands, citizens are not to rely on their own judgments of right and wrong. The law operates as content independent and peremptory reasons for action, thus rendering the citizen a passive recipient of legal authority. Throughout it is deemed rational for citizens to absolutely obey the law because it is always rational to prefer order to chaos regardless of the values that constitute that order. And if citizens are unwilling to obey for this reason, it remains rational for them to do so for fear of sanction. Hence, law operates as a tool for creating the social and cognitive conditions that incentivise the creation of a shared ethical identity that might allow for social unity and thus social stability. By corollary, the law works to wipe out, or at least tame, the fact of pluralism so that there are

1

R. Rueban Balasubramaniam, ‘Hobbism and the Problem of Authoritarian Rule in Malaysia’, Hague Journal of the Rule of Law, 4(2) (2012): 211–34.



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no deep disagreements of value in society that may threaten social stability. The intended result is to create an ethically homogeneous and socially stable context. The culture of domination thus assumes that the citizen’s perspective is irrelevant in judgments about what law and politics require. That perspective is deemed dangerous; citizens are prone to destabilising disagreements of value. Therefore, the primary perspective in law and politics is the official viewpoint, with the consequence that the culture of domination does not contain the conceptual resources needed to ground any duty of official accountability to citizens, thus enabling officials to arbitrarily exercise power over citizens and to dominate them.2 Official domination is necessary and justified because such domination is necessary to overcome the destabilising fact of pluralism. Those who subscribe to the culture of domination will tend to favour a dictatorial form of government. They will resist any form of government that imposes constitutional/ legal limits on state power. For them, such a framework is an institutional mistake because it imposes blocks that interrupt the role of law as a transmitter of official judgments of right and wrong to citizens. And where the framework contains a bill of rights that affirms moral values like ‘equality’ and ‘liberty’, the mistake is especially serious because the bill of rights re-introduces precisely the destabilising disagreements of value that the culture of domination seeks to overcome. Those who prefer the culture of domination will thus be attracted to authoritarian rule and be resistant to notions like the separation of powers, the principle of federalism, judicial review, and, more broadly, the ideal of constitutional democracy or constitutionalism. In a situation where officials have such a preference but are caught within a constitutional framework that is amenable to these ideals, they will experience a measure of cognitive dissonance. Where there is a supreme written Constitution with a bill of rights, officials will be forced to pay lip service to the Constitution as a constraint on state power but they will actively find ways to limit or ignore such limits, a familiar problem in Malaysia.

2

Philip Pettit, Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), Chapter 2.

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The Culture of Domination in Malaysia The culture of domination explains the history of authoritarianism, ethnocracy, and general failure of constitutionalism in Malaysia.3 Despite the fact that Malaysia has a supreme written Constitution that imposes legal limits on state power, officials, including judges, have internalised the assumptions of the culture of domination and have thus worked to ensure that the government is relatively unshackled by constitutional limits. For example, since the inception of the Constitution in 1957, the document has been amended over fifty times, leading one commentator to note that the document has been treated in ‘cavalier fashion’.4 The culture of domination is traceable to colonial rule, but for present purposes it is sufficient to note that the culture of domination supplies the conceptual basis to ethnocratic rule. The rationale for ethnocratic rule is that such rule, while undemocratic, is nevertheless justified as appropriate to enabling social stability in a deeply pluralistic context as opposed to forcible expulsion or genocide.5 In Malaysia, this idea is reflected in the ethnocratic claim that Malaysian law and politics should reflect a consensus about the ethical identity of the state as a primarily Malay-Muslim state because that is necessary to ensure social stability.6 Hence, ethnocrats in UMNO characteristically argue that their programme mandates a principle of ‘Malay dominance’, which they claim is integral to the Malaysian Constitution. And they defend that principle and absolute fidelity to their programme as central to national security and social stability. The culture of domination is the conceptual backbone to the ethnocratic programme as ethnocratic values merely supply the content needed to constitute the basis of social unity. Due to its long history in Malaysia, the assumptions about law and politics associated with the culture of domination are well entrenched in the Malaysian context. Indeed, they are largely unquestioned even by critics of ethnocratic rule, to the extent that such critics assume that the key to social

3

R. Rueban Balasubramaniam, ‘On the Brink of Nasty, Brutish, and Short: An Essay on Malaysia’s Social Contract’, The B-Side, 1 (2012). 4 H.P. Lee, Constitutional Conflicts in Contemporary Malaysia (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 119. 5 Sammy Smooha, ‘The model of ethnic democracy: Israel as a Jewish and democratic state’, Nations and Nationalism, 8(4) (2002): 481. 6 Mahathir Mohamad, The Malay Dilemma (Singapore: Federal Press, 1971).



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stability in Malaysia is the need to articulate a set of higher order values that reflect the collective ‘Malaysian’ identity of the state, thus enabling social unity. This unreflective claim leads critics to embrace a ‘liberal’ response to ethnocracy. Liberalism is a broad church, but I have in mind a kind of liberal nationalist perspective.7 As per this perspective, the fact of pluralism is deemed a threat to social stability, so it is vital to use law to construct an artificial consensus about the priority of liberal principles of justice, perhaps an ideal of equal political citizenship and the secular state. These principles are to be made immune from ordinary political challenge so that all citizens should either actively accept or acquiesce to such principles in shaping their privately held ethical, moral, or religious perspective. The liberal nationalist wants to chasten ordinary politics so that political disagreement does not threaten the priority of the principles of liberal justice to be affirmed by a liberal constitutional court. The problem with liberal nationalism is that it retains the key assumptions of the culture of domination. It assumes that the fact of pluralism is dangerous to social stability and has to be resolved through the use of law to construct a basis to social stability in social unity about the collective identity of the state as a liberal state. Structurally, the liberal nationalist perspective is thus identical to the ethnocratic perspective. The two differ as to the values that should constitute the collective identity of the state, but both have the same goal of seeking to overcome and tame political disagreement by engaging the quest for social unity. This causes a serious problem for critics of ethnocracy in Malaysia. Integral to the fact of pluralism in Malaysia are groups who believe that politics should reflect a theocratic dimension because religion is central to their conception of both personal and political identity. As Habermas has pointed out, this poses a problem for the liberal nationalist perspective.8 For such groups in Malaysia, the liberal state will appear alienating, dominating and oppressive, and a threat to their sense of personal and political identities because the state works to effectively screen out the religious perspective

7

John Rawls, Political Liberalism Expanded (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005). 8 Jürgen Habermas, ‘Religion in the Public Sphere’, European Journal of Philosophy, 14(1) (2006): 1–25.

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as salient to social and political life. Indeed, these concerns partly explain why ‘liberalism’ has become a bad word in Malaysian politics and is seen as posing a threat to Malay religious and political identity. The irony is that critics of ethnocracy, who espouse an ideal of equal political freedom for all citizens, may find themselves advancing a position that carries politically unequal consequences. For critics of ethnocratic rule, this is a very serious problem. Practically speaking, if these critics wish to win general elections, it is perhaps THE problem that they must confront. At the 2013 election, UMNO emerged resurgent precisely because it was able to gain the support of rural Malays who fear the rise of the liberal state, reflecting the concerns noted above. Therefore, those drawn to the liberal critique of ethnocracy must renovate their political programme so that it can accommodate the views of those who worry that the rise of the liberal-secular state will be socially and politically marginalising to them if they are to secure enough support to win the next election. The answer, I think, is for liberals to more squarely embrace the ideal of ‘democracy’, interpreted to mean that each citizen should possess the right to equal participation in legal-political decision-making, and that means also accepting the fact of pluralism as integral to political life. The democratic ideal affirms the right of each citizen to participate in legal and political decision-making regardless of his or her specific ethical, moral, religious, or political beliefs. It is a procedural ideal intended to set out channels for legal and political participation congenial to social cooperation to operate despite the fact of pluralism; these channels allow for on-going and deep disagreement in society without determining questions about the collective identity of society.9 Of course, any claim to sharply distinguish between process and substance is illusory. Likewise, an insistence on procedure may be inherently substantive. In this case, my insistence on the notion of procedure is grounded in deeper substantive considerations about the character of social stability in Malaysia. As I will now argue, the democratic ideal may be understood as a procedural ideal in Malaysia if yoked to an alternate conception of social stability: ‘social compromise’. If critics of ethnocracy 9

Lars Vinx, Hans Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law: Legality and Legitimacy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).



Dislodging Malaysia’s Culture of Domination 251

would give up the quest for social unity in favour of social compromise, they are better positioned to avoid reproducing the culture of domination and to more meaningfully advance the ideal of democracy.

Social Compromise Social compromise begins from the idea that deep political disagreement is not antithetical to social cooperation and social stability; it finds a foothold in any context where disagreeing parties have roughly equal bargaining power and cannot be confident that they can seize power forever.10 In such a context, parties will find it rational to engage in social cooperation on the basis that the goods of social cooperation outweigh the costs of open social conflict. But that does not mean that either side should give up their respective agendas forever. Rather, social compromise anticipates that they can place disagreeing elements of their respective agendas temporarily on the ‘back burner’ until these may be advanced without endangering social cooperation. Unlike the culture of domination where the role of law is to create a higher order consensus about the ethical identity of the state capable of superseding the fact of pluralism, thus requiring parties to give up disagreeing elements of their particular beliefs forever, the role of law within social compromise is to create a political space within which parties can continue to intensely disagree while ensuring that it remains rational and reasonable for them to engage in social cooperation. All this requires an appropriate legal framework that ensures citizens enjoy an equal right to political participation and is protected from public domination by the state or by other powerful groups. This means a legal framework with pertinent protections of fundamental rights and interests, as well as some measures designed to promote the relative socio-economic equality of citizens. The role of the legal framework is to protect those conditions that make it rational for parties to engage in social compromise, thus aspiring to ensure their relatively equal bargaining power and ensuring their equal right to political participation. Throughout, the legal framework will not be hostile to the fact of on10

Christian Arnsperger and Emmanuel Picavet, ‘More than modus vivendi, less than overlapping consensus: towards a political theory of social compromise’, Social Sciences Information, 43(2) (2004): 167–204.

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going pluralism. Parties may continue to disagree, but they must articulate their political paradigms within a properly constituted political space where these paradigms may compete for popular support. Of course, the parties thus risk losing in the political competition, but there are no direct and hard limits on the quality and character of the political paradigms that they may advance in that space. However, they have to be mindful of the fact that citizens prefer to compromise rather than engage in open social conflict so there will apt to be political pressures that militate against political paradigms that threaten the basis of social compromise. The basis of social compromise in Malaysia rests in the Constitution and in the broader societal context.11 To start with the Constitution, the document protects individual rights and important group interests all within a rubric of legal equality; it contains provisions designed to prevent the excessive concentration of power in any single organ of government (via the principles of federalism and the separation of powers). The Constitution also embodies notions of reciprocity and tolerance, and clarifies the priority of a form of government expressive of ‘constitutional democracy’ in mandating that the government should represent the interests of the citizenry subject to legal limits on its power designed to serve those interests. These constitutional features are congenial to a legal framework that protects citizens from public domination and that ensures their rough equality, necessary to sustain social compromise. Then, there is a basis to the notion of social compromise in the wider political culture: the ideal of social compromise offers an attractive explanation of the relative social stability that Malaysia has enjoyed over the last six decades. It is plausible to suppose that citizens tacitly endorse the ideal of social compromise as an interactional norm of social cooperation.12 It is reflected in a general embrace of a principle of toleration and reciprocity in sustaining social cooperation. And as political science indicates, even the UMNO government must compromise with others with whom it disagrees so that it must practise at least ‘semi-authoritarian’ politics. There is a broader societal basis to social compromise. At this stage these are bare assertions that need further development 11

12

Balasubramaniam, ‘On the Brink of Nasty, Brutish, and Short’. Lon L. Fuller, ‘Human Interaction and the Law,’ American Journal of Jurisprudence, 14 (1969): 1–36.



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and justification. But even this sketch is sufficient to suggest that a vision of law and politics expressive of social compromise may offer a powerful response to the ethnocratic position, a response that would also avoid the perils of the culture of domination. Immediately, it would be possible to argue that since social compromise militates against the attempt to engage in any kind of domination and discrimination, then ethnocrats have a serious problem. And to the extent that ethnocrats want to rely on the Constitution to justify their chosen political paradigm, they cannot do so. It is plain that the ethnocratic perspective and the principle of Malay dominance would be unconstitutional. This response escapes the trap of the culture of domination because of its normative basis in the societal context and its practical bite. Because social compromise may be regarded as a tacit norm of social interaction or even an unwritten constitutional principle, critics of ethnocracy can address the genuine concerns that now sustain UMNO’s ethnocratic politics. Those who fear that a vote against UMNO will mean jeopardising one’s socio-economic and thus political position in society and one’s sense of personal, religious, and cultural identity, need not fear because social compromise calls for a roughly egalitarian social-political framework where all citizens should be recipients of legally protected fundamental rights including the freedoms of conscience, speech, religion, and association. They can be shown how an ethos of social compromise directly engages these worries and that continued endorsement of social compromise will work to their benefit. As well, an important practical effect of social compromise is that, unlike the liberal nationalist perspective that requires courts to impose hard legal limits that screen out any political position that violates the principles of liberal justice as in violation of ‘higher’ liberal law as unconstitutional and invalid, the court may only make a declaration of incompatibility while fully setting out the reasons why the particular norm is at odds with legal norms that sustain social compromise. The court acts as a ‘weatherman’ by signalling to the legislature or executive that it has exercised a legally suspect power.13 But the final responsibility for correcting this problem will fall back on the democratic legislature, the rationale being that within social compromise it is up to citizens and their representatives to sort out 13

David Dyzenhaus, The Constitution of Law: Legality in a Time of Emergency (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 11.

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competing interests through appropriate democratic channels. Again, this is in keeping with the status of social compromise as a tacit interactional norm that underpins social stability and emphasises the role of citizens as the primary guardians of the legal framework as affirming social compromise. In these ways it is possible to take the sting out of the case for ethnocratic rule without re-inscribing the culture of domination because critics of ethnocracy can show that Malay dominance is illegitimate from the point of view of social compromise as a tacit norm of social stability and at odds with the Constitution. And critics can show how a properly constituted legal-political space designed to sustain social compromise will be attuned to concerns about equality and identity. These arguments would significantly weaken UMNO’s case for ethnocracy, which presently trades on these concerns and the claim that the Constitution upholds ethnocracy. Most significantly, this view dislodges the primacy of the culture of domination as a ruling philosophy of law that works to sustain ethnocracy and to weaken the response to ethnocratic rule. The view of law and politics explicated here does not guarantee against the rise of authoritarian and/or discriminatory political paradigms. Since social compromise is congenial to deep political disagreement, it is always possible for groups to be drawn towards an authoritarian political paradigm. Nevertheless, my belief is that a view of law and politics rooted in social compromise remains a powerful response to these dangers in Malaysia precisely because the present socio-political and constitutional context can sustain that ideal and the ideal of social compromise supplies the key to meaningful progress towards the ideal of democracy. For there to be such progress is not only a break from the assumptions of the culture of domination but also the development of a sound interpretation of important ideals of political morality and an articulation of how these ideals supply a vision of law and politics that may be widely endorsed. A conception of law and politics as grounded in social compromise supplies a way to build such a vision.

Postscript: Regime Resilience and Social Compromise Malaysian politics is now increasingly ethnocratic and authoritarian. Since the 2013 general election the UMNO led-government has strengthened its grip on power in a bid to permanently entrench the ethnocratic political paradigm and the culture of domination. In part it has benefited from



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the peculiar political arithmetic that emerged after the election. UMNO emerged with increased support, relying on a heavily ethnocratic political strategy that played up its role as a defender of Malay identity and interests, but its principal coalition partners within Barisan Nasional, the Malaysian Chinese Association and the Malaysian Indian Congress, lost substantial voter support. Consequently, UMNO need not moderate its ethnocratic stance by reference to the needs of these partners and can engage in a full court press to entrench that stance. Simultaneously, UMNO faces little meaningful political opposition. Since the election, Pakatan Rakyat (PR) has been split by internal conflict. A key member of the coalition, the Parti Se-Islam Malaysia (PAS), a party devoted to enacting an Islamic state, has left PR because of disagreements about the status of Islamic law in Malaysian law and politics. To worsen matters, the ruling government has again imprisoned PR’s founder and leader, Anwar Ibrahim, a key unifying force within the coalition. Meanwhile, other key opposition figures are being kept on the back-foot by the government’s use of anti-sedition laws. PR is in disarray. Indeed, Malaysia is witnessing the rise of executive dictatorship. The current Prime Minister, Najib Tun Razak, is implicated in a financial scandal involving the misappropriation of substantial state funds. Despite great pressure to leave office, Najib has defended his position by sacking officials who might be hostile to his interests and replacing them with individuals more congenial to these interests. The government has also imposed greater authoritarian controls over the citizens’ freedom of speech. It has attempted to block access to alternative online news critical of the government and aggressively used anti-sedition laws against netizens who criticise the government through blogs or social media. The general consensus is that Najib is immune from democratic forces and has a secure position within government. The rise of executive dictatorship and the corresponding demise of opposition politics could be interpreted as a serious challenge to the prospects of social compromise and constitutional democracy. Recall that the basis of social compromise depends on the willingness of citizens to engage in such compromise. If UMNO enjoys a measure of actual support from a substantial segment of the population who desire ethnocratic and authoritarian rule, then perhaps that segment rejects social compromise. They see no need to accept the strictures of constitutional democracy and

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a legal-political framework that protects citizens from being dominated by government and other powerful groups because they believe they will emerge winners. Indeed, this view finds some support in the rising belief that the nonMalay-Muslim perspective no longer matters in Malaysian politics, which now seems defined by ‘Muslim’ politics.14 In fact, as PR now tries to reinvent itself and avert total collapse, it is exploring the concept of ‘maqasid syariah’, a kind of moderate political Islam, to draw rural Malay-Muslim votes away from UMNO. PR’s exploration of this concept might suggest that alternative conceptions of politics that do not place Islam at its core are irrelevant, implying that the majority of voters are drawn to some variant of ethno-Islamist rule as expressive of the ethical and political identity of the state. That the opposition is now compelled to perhaps offer a milder version of ethnocratic rule might suggest that there is now no more room for social compromise. There are two reasons to resist this suggestion. First, even if Malaysian politics is increasingly defined by a narrow political competition between groups who disagree about what political paradigm gives best expression to Malay and Muslim interests, political disagreement will remain. And since these groups will still need to engage in social cooperation, social compromise under a legal-political framework that protects each group from being dominated by each other remains relevant. Second, regardless of what citizens may believe about what political paradigm should govern law and politics and how that paradigm should define the ethical and political identity of the state, they must make a prior choice about the form of government: dictatorship or democracy? The choice between dictatorship and democracy is conceptually and practically independent of political disagreements about the ethical and political identity of the state. To see why, consider Dr Mahathir Mohamad’s recent conversion from defending dictatorship to defending democracy. His long-standing view was that dictatorship best ensures social stability and the ethical and political identity of the state as an ethnocratic state that serves the

14 Kok-Hin

Ooi, ‘The rise and rise of Muslim politics’, The New Mandala, 1 February 2016, accessed 2 March 2016, http://asiapacific.anu.edu.au/ newmandala/2016/02/01/the-rise-and-rise-of-muslim-politics/.



Dislodging Malaysia’s Culture of Domination 257

Malay political community.15 However, this view is odd because it calls for an ‘accountable’ dictatorship. For Dr Mahathir, the dictator must possess adequate personal traits to facilitate the systematic pursuit of ethnocratic rule for the benefit of the Malay political community. The dictator must display character that shows attentiveness to the needs of that community, which is to display a personal sense of accountability to that community. As Dr Mahathir consistently discovered in expressing disappointment with each of his successors, mere reliance on the personal traits of the dictator is not sufficient to ensure such accountability. But this is an impoverished notion of accountability because it depends on the internal character of the dictator, not external controls. Indeed, as he has also discovered in experiencing the difficulty of ousting Najib from office, the concept of an ‘accountable’ dictator is incoherent. If a dictator fails to perform the task of delivering on a specific political paradigm, it is very difficult to control him. To achieve such control and meaningful accountability, there must be a legal-political framework expressive of the ideals of democracy and legality that makes a government systematically responsive to external legal and political controls that transcend the personal character of officials. Dr Mahathir’s recent conversion from preferring dictatorship to democracy reveals that only a constitutional democracy can be made to systematically realise that political paradigm. This truth suggests that even if race and religion remain salient factors within Malaysian law and politics and debates about the ethical and political identity of the state, the need to engage in social cooperation between parties who disagree about what it means for law and politics to reflect these factors will not override the importance of social compromise and a corresponding legal-political framework expressive of an ideal of constitutional democracy. As the example of Dr Mahathir shows, citizens have a prior and mutual interest in ensuring a democratically accountable government whatever they think about politics. Indeed, if there is a silver lining to the present political predicament in Malaysia, it is that citizens should clearly see that the choice between dictatorship and democracy is at hand. They need to decide how far they are willing to tolerate an autocratic UMNO regime in defence of democracy.

15

Mahathir Mohamad, ‘Benevolent Dictator the Solution in Iraq, Dr. Mahathir says’, Bernama Press, 12 April 2006, accessed 2 March 2016, http://www.puterismusings. net/2006/04/benevolent-dictator-solution.html.

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Rule by Law in Malaysia and Singapore 259

Chapter 18

Rule by Law in Malaysia and Singapore David Martin Jones

For over half a century since decolonisation, the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) and the People’s Action Party (PAP) have sustained single-party-dominant regimes in Malaysia and Singapore respectively. September 2015 witnessed PAP taking 83 of the 89 elected seats in Singapore’s twelfth parliamentary election since independence in 1965. Its share of the vote increased to 70 per cent after having fallen to a historically low 60 per cent in September 2011. Meanwhile, in May 2013, the UMNO-led Barisan Nasional (BN), in coalition with smaller Indian and Chinese ethnic parties, won 133 of the 222 seats in the federal parliament (Dewan Rakyat) in the thirteenth federal election held in Malaysia since independence. Despite opposition challenges of varying seriousness to the incumbent party, at no time over this electoral period since 1963 has either PAP or UMNO lost control of the political process or the institutions of these post-colonial states. Indeed, it has been via a process of regular elections combined with adjustments to the constitution and the judiciary that the party state in both Malaysia and Singapore has facilitated political order, one-party rule and economic development over time. These modern Southeast Asian states are, in fact, party creations. As a consequence, the parties have adapted the electoral and constitutional processes in a manner that enables them to ride the challenge of oppositional politics and establish quasi-legitimate, marketoriented rule with constrained electoral competition. In both cases this process has become increasingly fraught. Before delineating the growing challenges to single-party dominance in both states, first the difficulty that the comparative politics literature has experienced 259

260 Regime Resilience in Malaysia and Singapore

in accounting for sustainable party state systems, particularly in Southeast Asia, will be outlined. Subsequently, the manner in which ‘competitive authoritarian regimes’ have leveraged democratic processes to skew the political playing field in favour of the incumbent regimes in Singapore and Malaysia will be discussed.1

The party state challenge to Western models of democratisation The comparative study of elections, elite pacts and political parties is notably neglected in Southeast Asia. Only 4.3 per cent of articles in the peak comparative politics journals have focused on the region.2 Omitting the Southeast Asian region from the democratisation paradigm has led to a distorted understanding of political change in Asia and a scholarly bias towards weak multi-partism and against forms of elite guidance via singleparty rule.3 The continued prominence of dominant party systems in both Malaysia and Singapore challenges, then, the modernisation and subsequent democratisation paradigm that holds that once a state achieves a middle-income level of economic development, together with an educated, urban middle class, a process of liberalisation and democratisation inexorably follows.4 Even the more pragmatic elite theory of political behaviour that focuses upon the rules of the electoral game assumes a relatively straightforward process of liberal democratic transition, where elites ‘learn to lose’.5 From

1 2 3

4

5

Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way, Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes after the Cold War (Boston, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010), p. 3. G. Munck and R. Snyder, ‘What has comparative politics accomplished?’, APSA-C 15(2) (2004): 26–31. E.M. Kuhonta, Dan Slater and T. Vu eds., Southeast Asia in Political Science: Theory, Region and Qualitative Analysis (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2008), p. 326. See R. Dahl, Democracy and Its Critics (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989); G.A. O’Donnell and P.C. Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986); Lawrence Whitehead, ‘Dominant Parties and democratization’, in Political Transitions in Dominant Party Systems: Learning to Lose, eds. Edward Friedman and Joseph Wong (London: Routledge, 2008). Edward Friedman and Joseph Wong eds., Political Transitions in Dominant Party Systems. Learning to Lose (London: Routledge, 2008).



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this perspective, elites in times of crisis make choices and alliances that lead to popular elections that ultimately result in representative rather than single-party democratic outcomes.6 Existing theories of electoralism and democratisation thus prove surprisingly unhelpful in explaining the divergent development of Southeast Asian state and regime institutions. There are few works, therefore, that compare elites and the political parties they form and permit in Southeast Asia or that discuss electoral behaviour in a comparative framework. Equally, there have been few Southeast Asia-focused works that have had a major impact on the study of elites, political parties and elections in political science generally. As Hicken notes, ‘the relative lack of theorising and comparative analysis has hindered the accumulation of knowledge about how elections and parties operate in developing democracies’.7 Equally, there is little accumulated knowledge about how elites control parties and shape elections and constitutions, thereby sustaining non-liberal or illiberal political outcomes. This lacuna reflects the fact that, although there is no necessary incompatibility between Southeast Asian studies and political science, there has been a limited amount of overlap between these disciplines in developing a comprehensive understanding of Southeast Asian and, more particularly, Malaysian and Singaporean political development in comparative context.8 In other words, Malaysia and Singapore, given their close geographical ties, shared colonial histories, and different but related patterns of political development after 1965 represent an obvious case for comparative analysis as states where robust single parties sustain electoral dominance and durable, collective elite rule.9 Dominant parties such as UMNO and PAP, once institutionalised, develop distinctively non-liberal pathways, drawing business, media, academe, the judiciary and military elites into a collective 6

See G. Di Palma, To Craft Democracies: An Essay on Democratic Transition (Berkeley CA: University of California Press, 1990); T. Pempel ed., Uncommon Democracies (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University, 1990), E. Friedman, The Politics of Democratization: Generalizing East Asian Experiences (Boulder CO: Westview Press, 1994); A. Przeworski et al., Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-being in the World 1950–1990 (Cambridge UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003). 7 Kuhonta et al., p. 81. 8 Donald Emmerson, ‘ASEAN’s Black Swans’, Journal of Democracy, 19(3) (2008): 70– 83. 9 William Case, Politics in Southeast Asia: Democracy or Less (Richmond: Curzon, 2002).

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development pact or, more accurately, what Michael Oakeshott termed an enterprise association in contrast with a rule of law governed, political or civil association.10 Sustaining elite guidance through dominant single parties and regular elections ultimately crafts a form of technocratic guidance rather than representative democracy. The capacity to adjust law to the perceived needs of the party state facilitates a form of techno-managerial rule. It reached its apotheosis in Singapore which, under its founding father Lee Kuan Yew, eschewed pluralist, participatory ‘democratic politics in both principle and in fact’11 in order to build an ‘administrative state’.12 Moreover, although there has developed a recent literature on authoritarian durability and resilience,13 there is little attention paid, within this research tradition, to the creative use of elections and election law in a competitive authoritarian framework. Elections, electoral laws and the manipulation of the constitution more generally privilege elite agency in crafting representative institutions and sustaining non-democratic forms. Although electoral politics can enhance state penetration and alter elite practice, it does not necessarily undermine elite power, as elections held regularly in Singapore and Malaysia since the Asian Financial Crisis (AFC) of 1997 attest. In this governance style, elections give credence to elite protection pacts that ensure stability against the threat, nurtured by the media and ruling party, of ethno-religious or class violence. In fact, regular elections enable long-established dominant parties to reframe these protection pacts that constitute the basis of authority and require an always present fear of potential political disorder, economic collapse and ethno10

Michael Oakeshott, Rationalism in Politics (London: Methuen, 1975). M. Chew, ‘Human Rights in Singapore: Perceptions and Problems’, Asian Survey, 34(11) (1995): 933–49. 12 H.C. Chan, ‘Democracy Evolution and Implementation,’ in Democracy and Capitalism: Asian and American Perspectives, eds. R. Bartley et al. (Singapore: ISEAS, 1993). 13 B. Geddes, ‘What Do We Know about Democratization after Twenty Years?’, Annual Review of Political Science, 2 (1999): 115–44; V. Hadiz, ‘The rise of neo-third worldism? The Indonesian trajectory and the consolidation of illiberal democracy’, Third World Quarterly 25(1) (2004): 263–83; William Case, ‘Low-quality democracy and varied authoritarianism: Elites and regimes in Southeast Asia today’, The Pacific Review, 22(3) (2009): 255–69; Dan Slater, ‘Democracy and Dictatorship Do Not Float Freely: Structural Sources of Political Regimes in Southeast Asia,’ in Southeast Asia in Political Science. Theory, Region and Qualitative Analysis, eds Kuhonta et. al. (Stanford University Press, 2008). 11



Rule by Law in Malaysia and Singapore 263

religious conflict in these multi-racial and multi-ethnic post-colonial states. This fear, based on the riots and strikes in Singapore between 1955–65 and serious inter-racial riots in Malaysia in May 1969, authorised singleparty electoral dominance in the national interest after 1970. This electorally reinforced form of a Hobbesian social contract sustains the political process and legitimates both its institutional norms and its strengthening of the executive branch at the expense of constitutional checks and balances afforded in the Westminster-style constitutions the British colonial authority bequeathed to the new states between 1957–63. In return, the party guarantees security and offers the prospect of sustainable export-led growth with relatively equitable distribution, classically exemplified by the post-1971 New Economic Policy (NEP) in Malaysia that sought to advance the poorer, rural, Malay Bumiputera (sons of the soil) population. In order to take illiberal outcomes arising from these institutional processes seriously, rather than as indicators of incomplete or semidemocracy,14 UMNO and PAP exemplify the interaction between elections, party organisation and elite faction and fragmentation, and the role this interactivity plays in establishing developmental coalitions and mass mobilisation towards nationally achievable goals. As Levitsky and Way argue, such regimes constitute a hybrid type and are more accurately termed competitive authoritarian rather than an adjectivally qualified form of democracy.15 The party elites in Singapore and Malaysia therefore maintain power and craft political arrangements to suit their preferences, sustaining their economic and political domination via party guidance of a non-liberal character, but under conditions of regular elections that afford a form of legitimation that unaccountable autocracy or rule by a military junta, as in contemporary Thailand since 2013, cannot. This notwithstanding, electoral checks and constitutional balances upon arbitrary state power have, at best, only modestly increased the public accountability of the party state model in both Singapore and Malaysia. At the same time, the revolution in political communications afforded by the emergence of social media as a forum for debate and criticism has exposed the limitations of the model in ways that 14 Marina

Ottaway, Democracy Challenged: The Rise of Semi-Authoritarianism (Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2003), p. 3. 15 Juan J. Linz, Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes (Lynne Rienner, 2000), p. 34.

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may complicate, but not necessarily undermine, elite political guidance via a historically institutionalised single-party system. Since the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis (AFC) questioned the economic legitimacy of the authoritarian development pact, neither PAP nor UMNO has relinquished their single-party dominance despite, in the latter’s case, periods of intra-party elite friction. The People’s Action Party (PAP) regime has retained and adapted its hold over the city-state of Singapore despite the loss of the Aljunied group representation constituency (GRC) in the 2011 and 2015 elections to the opposition Workers’ Party. Singapore enjoys developed state status and the highest gross domestic product (GDP) per capita (US$56,200) in the region and seventh highest in the world.16 Whilst not as economically successful as Singapore, Malaysia is the third wealthiest ASEAN economy with a GDP per capita in 2015 of US$11,800. Malaysia, different to Singapore because of the geographical, ethnic and religious differences between urban and rural Malaysia and between Peninsular and West Malaysia, is ruled by UMNO in a multi-ethnic coalition which has sustained its political dominance despite the emergence of an opposition that secured sizeable gains in the 2008 general election and limited the majority of the BN (Barisan Nasional) to less than the two-thirds it requires to alter the constitution at will. The opposition subsequently improved upon this result in the 2013 general election. Although the opposition coalition (Pakatan Rakyat) consisting of Anwar Ibrahim’s Keadilan, the Islamic party Parti Islam Se-Malaysia (PAS) and the largely ethnic Chinese Democratic Action Party (DAP) took more than 50 per cent of the popular vote in 2013, the gerrymandering of constituency boundaries that gives undue representation to the rural, Bumiputera constituencies in Peninsular Malaysia ensured UMNO’s political ascendancy.17 Elections and historically institutionalised parties like UMNO and PAP thus retain political relevance for illiberal as well as liberal democracies, even as they serve different political functions and agendas. Elections and elite behaviour and the control of the judiciary sustain dominant or majoritarian parties and their role in state development. Modifying Diamond’s spectrum

16

See ‘Econ Stats: Economic Statistics and Indicators by Country and Region,’ accessed 15 April 2016, http://www.economywatch.com/economic-statistics/country/. 17 Kai Ostwald, ‘How to Win a Lost Election: Malapportionment and Malaysia’s 2013 General Election’, The Round Table, 102(6) (2013): 521–32.

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of five policy types to classify and compare political regimes,18 Singapore and Malaysia seemingly exemplify the capacity of elites and single parties to maintain oligarchical guidance over time whilst addressing pressures from above and below as well as from external sources or linkages that seek to promote liberalisation. What impact, then, have recent elections since 2008 had upon elite party state rule in Singapore and Malaysia and the evolving nature of enduring competitive authoritarian polities?

Adaptation and elite fragmentation in the Party-state model The following independent variables affect the continued sustainability of UMNO and PAP dominance in Malaysia and Singapore and have become increasingly important in recent elections in the two states. Firstly, economic success and GDP growth, with an acceptable pattern of distribution, legitimate continuing party state dominance. Secondly, the capacity of the ruling party to alter the Westminster-style constitution that provided for checks and balances, in the interest of the party state, control the judiciary and amend the rule of law to rule by law. Thirdly, an anxious, state-dependent, middle-class political culture that codes stability and corporatism positively and liberty negatively, finds party state dominance tolerable. In Singapore the widely observed practice of kiasu-ism (scared to lose) reinforces an anxiously neurotic, rather than open, public sphere. Fourthly, religious and ethnic cleavages and the fear of fragmentation and communal violence favour a predisposition to elite control to ensure racial and religious harmony. In Singapore the Religious Harmony law (1991) exemplifies this predilection, whilst in Malaysia race riots in 1969 and ethnic protests of 2007 reinforced UMNO rule in the interest of what post2008 Prime Minister Najib Razak terms the vision of ‘Satu Malaysia’ (One Malaysia). Fifthly, the capacity of the ruling party to distribute perquisites and financial inducements to the less-well-off as a mass expectation at elections creates a further predisposition to ruling party dependence. The May 2013 general election in Malaysia, in particular, demonstrated a widespread practice of ‘money politics’ and vote buying by the wealthy ruling party to the detriment of a poorly funded opposition coalition.19 18

Larry Diamond, The Spirit of Democracy: The Struggle to Build Free Societies throughout the World ( New York: Basic Books, 2008). 19 The Economist, 11 May 2013.

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At the same time, government control of the traditional mass media and both UMNO’s and PAP’s use of Western political consultancies since 2008 have given the ruling parties a useful propaganda edge for reinforcing their authority and intimidating the opposition. This is further facilitated by the gerrymandering of electoral boundaries and constitutional forms that facilitate ruling party dominance. In a similar vein, in Singapore PAP adjusted the Westminster singlemember constituency model to one of single- and multi-member group representation constituencies (GRCs) after 1988, reinforcing the party’s electoral dominance. Thus, although the PAP vote fell from 75.5 per cent in 1980 to 61.76 per cent in 1988, PAP retained all seats in the GRCamended parliamentary election that year. PAP again amended the number and composition of GRCs in 1997, 2006, 2011 and 2015. Analogously in Malaysia, UMNO’s parliamentary dominance prior to 2008 enabled it to alter constituency boundaries at will to ensure its continuing authority. Thus, whilst in 1969 the UMNO-led Alliance won 48.6 per cent of the popular vote and 63.5 per cent of parliamentary seats, by 1978 and with some astute constituency boundary manipulation, UMNO and its smaller ethnically based coalition partners in the BN coalition won 57.1 per cent of the vote but received 82.5 per cent of parliamentary seats.20 The deep historical roots and leader-follower coalitions with charismatic attachments of these political parties have also affected dominant party support. Thus Mahathir Mohamad in Malaysia and Lee Kuan Yew in Singapore exercised a certain charismatic appeal during their long tenures. In their aftermath, leaders like Goh Chok Tong and Lee’s son Hsien Loong in Singapore or Abdullah Badawi and Najib Razak in Malaysia have struggled to create similar popular attachments.

Rule by law not of law Charismatic or not, the manner in which over time both PAP and UMNO have altered the constitution and exercised control over the formerly independent judiciary has facilitated the concentration of power in the 20

N. Mahmood, ‘Political Contestation in Malaysia,’ in Political Contestation: Case Studies from Asia, eds. N. Mahmood and Z. Ahmad (Singapore: Heinemann, 1990), p. 32; D. Mauzy, Barisan Nasional: Coalition Government in Malaysia (Kuala Lumpur: Marican, 1983), p. 145.



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hands of the party executive and ultimately in the Prime Minister. This process, together with the party’s control of the mainstream media, has removed important constitutional checks on the party state. In Singapore, from the outset the first-generation leadership of the party modified both the common law practice and constitution inherited from the former colonial power. The government abolished trial by jury in 1968, restricted the discretionary power of judges in 1973 and abolished appeals to the Privy Council in London in 1995. In the process the party established effective control over the judiciary.21 Singaporeans subsequently learnt that ‘the only effective means to elicit a response from the government was the use of officially established political channels’.22 Singaporeans underwent ‘steady depoliticisation’.23 Judicial control, the expansion of the Internal Security Act, introduced by the colonial power during the Communist emergency in 1948, to detain an alleged ‘clandestine communist network’ of sixteen young Singaporeans without trial in 1987,24 together with a liberal interpretation of defamation and libel enabled PAP to bankrupt opposition leaders and silence dissent. As its share of the popular vote fell after 1984, PAP went to great lengths to curtail freedom of speech in parliament and alter constituency boundaries in the interest of the party state. Those who resisted, like J.P. Jeyaretnam, a PAP critic who won the Anson constituency in the 1981 general election, and former attorney-general Francis Seow, who was returned as an opposition MP in the 1988 general election, risked bankruptcy and imprisonment. Accused of corruption, Seow fled the country shortly after his election to parliament in 1988, whilst Jeyaretnam was disbarred from parliament for his ‘treasonable’ allegation that PAP had interfered with judicial independence and his implied defamation of Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew cost him $260,000. A similar fate awaited those who contested the second-generation PAP leadership of Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong after 1992. Thus Chee Soon Juan, who

21

Asia Watch Committee, Silencing All Critics: Human Rights Violations in Singapore (Asia Watch, 1989); Francis T. Seow, To Catch a Tartar: A Dissident in Lee Kuan Yew’s Prison (Yale UP, 1994), pp. 173–95; C. Tremewan, The Political Economy of Social Control in Singapore (Palgrave Macmillan, 1996), p. 213. 22 Chan Heng Chee, ‘Political Developments 1965–91’ in A History of Singapore, eds. E. Chew and E. Lee (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), p. 170. 23 Ibid. 24 Seow, p. 67.

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had the temerity to stand against Goh Chok Tong in a by-election in 1992, was subsequently dismissed from his Social Work lectureship at the National University of Singapore for alleged misuse of research funds. Statements made as leader of the Singapore Democratic Party (SDP) at the 2002 general election saw Lee Kuan Yew and Goh Chok Tong sue Chee for defamation. Bankrupted and subsequently imprisoned for speaking without a permit and scandalising the judiciary, Chee was prevented from standing in the 2006 and 2011 elections. In a similar vein, Tang Liang Hong had his assets sequestered and faced 12 charges of libel for remarks made during the 1997 election campaign. Tang, like Francis Seow before him, took the voluntary exile option. Coterminous with the evolution of judicial political and media control, the administrative state has also attempted to implement an inclusionary corporatist strategy of popular management ‘to bond Singaporeans to Singapore’. 25 As early as 1968, the Employment Act established a government-licensed trade union council (NTUC). In the course of the 1980s, the government extended the licensing of approved interest groups to ethnic and religious organisations, whilst a government-approved feedback unit encouraged grassroot opinion. This policy of state-licensed feedback culminated in the appointment of state-nominated MPs to provide statelicensed ‘articulate dissent’ in parliament after 1989.26 Moreover, to forestall perceived but as yet unrealised demands for greater freedom and checks and balances on the party state, the party has, since the 1990s, assiduously attended to re-inventing non-liberal but traditional shared values. Central to this policy has been a critique of individualism, an emphasis on community before self, and consensus and harmony rather than contestation.27 In this context the Ministry of Defence’s (MINDEF) Psychological Defence Unit devotes itself to people-bonding strategies. After 1992 the somewhat Orwellian MINDEF organised and devised a variety of units and programmes to organise every aspect of the Singaporean psyche. Such political managerialism, as we shall see, clearly has implications for any future democratisation of the city state. 25

Goh Chok Tong, ‘National Day Rally Address by Prime Minister Goh Chok Kong’ (speech given at National Day Rally, 18 August 1996), p. 12. 26 H.C. Chan, ‘Democracy Evolution’. 27 J.S.T. Quah, ‘Political Consequences of Rapid Economic Development: The Singapore Case’, in Asian Development and Public Policy, ed. S. Nagel (London: Macmillan, 1994), pp. 91–2.



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A similar process of judicial control and the erosion of constitutional checks and balances occurred in Malaysia, where power over time has become concentrated in the office of the Prime Minister. When the British colonial power granted Malaya merdeka (freedom) in 1957, it bequeathed to the independent state a federal constitution with a complicated machinery of checks and balances that reflected the wishes of both the indigenous Malay population and their traditional rulers in the nine peninsular states of Johor, Kedah, Kelantan, Negeri Sembilan, Perak, Perlis, Pahang, Selangor and Terengganu to negate the possibility of both centralisation and marginalisation in the multi-ethnic state. Consequently, the constitution provided for a king-in-parliament formula that bore more than a passing resemblance to the Westminster parliamentary model. The nine hereditary Sultans of the Malay Peninsula rotate one of their number to be monarch (Yang di Pertuan Agong) for a five-year period. Meanwhile, parliament consists of two houses: a lower house of representatives (Dewan Rakyat) elected by universal suffrage; and an upper house (Dewan Negara) representing state assemblies and special interests. Additionally, each peninsular state and, after they joined the Malaysian Federation in 1963, Sabah and Sarawak, elect their own assemblies for state government and retain either a Sultan or governor as the state executive. However, even more than in Singapore which was ejected from the federation in 1965, UMNO’s one-party dominance has undermined a constitution designed to facilitate multi-partism, the rule of law and federalism. In the course of the 1960s, UMNO ruled in an unequal multiethnic alliance with the Malayan Chinese Association (MCA) and Malayan Indian Association (MIA) as junior partners. At the same time, the largely Chinese Democratic Action Party (DAP) and Malaysian Islamic Party (Parti Islam Se-Malaysia, PAS) constituted an increasingly vibrant opposition. The erosion of the UMNO vote and the loss of control of state assemblies in Penang, Perak and Terengganu in the 1969 general election and the perceived economic disparity between ethnic Malays and urban Chinese sparked inter-communal riots in May 1969. The May 13 riots led to a state of emergency followed by alterations to the constitution ‘removing issues considered sensitive from public discourse’28 and changes to constituency 28

N. Mahmood, ‘Political Contestation in Malaysia,’ in Political Contestation: Case Studies from Asia, eds. N. Mahmood and Z. Ahmed (Singapore: Heinemann, 1990), p. 34.

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boundaries in a way that favoured rural ethnic Malay constituencies.29 In order to extend oligarchical control over central and local government and – via its post-1969 New Economic Policy (NEP) – the economy, UMNO has had increasing ideological recourse to traditional values selectively chosen to reinforce its political dominance. Mahathir Mohamad’s long tenure as Prime Minister (1981–2003) particularly accentuated this tendency to centralise and concentrate authority in the party state and its political elite. Acerbic attacks on Western liberal values and a growing emphasis on paternalistic guidance at the expense of political pluralism – guidance facilitated by press controls and the periodic recourse to the draconic Internal Security Act (ISA) introduced during the Malayan Emergency, but subsequently periodically invoked to forestall opposition. Hence, in 1987 security forces launched Operasi Lalang, arresting 109 people including the leader of the opposition DAP. In 1991 the leader of the indigenous Kadazan Parti Bersatu Sabah (PBS), Joseph Pairin Kitigan, was detained for two years and, on his release in 1993, charged with corruption. Analogously, when in the course of the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis (AFC) Deputy Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim fell out with Mahathir over the response to the crisis and the need for political and economic reformasi, he in turn found himself imprisoned for six years for corruption and alleged sodomy. When, after his release in 2006, Anwar emerged as the leader of a new opposition party Keadilan the charismatic driving force of a revived opposition coalition (Pakatan Rakyat), he was again charged with sodomy and a compliant judiciary sentenced him to a further five years’ imprisonment in 2014. This combination of the erosion of constitutional checks and the recourse to emergency legislation also facilitated an official reassertion of traditional ideas in order to create a balanced and harmonious, Malaydominated Malaysia. Under Mahathir’s tenure, however, the desire to create an economically developed Malaysia also required an untraditional mobilisation of the Malay masses. This also entailed curbs on the independence of the Malay sultans as well as judicial independence. As his 1971 excursion into political philosophy The Malay Dilemma explained, the creation of a new Malaysian identity required strong leadership and an UMNO-dominated, centralised state. The ‘lassitude’ of traditional Malay 29

Mauzy, p. 145; Diane K. Mauzy and R.S. Milne, Singapore Politics under the People’s Action Party (Routledge, 2002), p. 77.



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culture, Mahathir argued, required both an affirmative action programme and more rigorous government intervention.30 To achieve developed status, therefore, an UMNO elite after 1981 severed traditional attachments and constitutional checks and balances that, Mahathir argued, hindered Malay progress, whilst at the same time centralising political authority. In 1983 Mahathir removed the Yang di Pertuan Agong’s power of veto over parliamentary bills and in 1986 he succeeded in curtailing the independence of the judiciary.31 The muzzling of critical debate in parliament before the 2008 election and the strict licensing of the press effectively curtailed criticism of UMNO rule and the concentration of power in the hands of the Prime Minister. By the early 1990s, as Chandra Muzaffar argued, ‘parliament, the judiciary and the royalty’ had been ‘forced to surrender their powers gradually to the UMNO executive … to which everything else in the country is subservient’.32 UMNO further facilitated its increasingly autocratic control through opaque economic ties between UMNO-linked businesses and leading politicians and the widespread use of money politics during elections. As the Association of the Bar of New York observed in 1991, UMNO in Malaysia and PAP in Singapore have systematically intimidated dissenters and limited the independence of the judiciary, ‘resulting in the decline of the rule of law’.33 This notwithstanding, the close ties between UMNO and business in Malaysia and PAP’s depoliticisation of the public sphere suffered in the wake of the 1997 financial crisis that questioned the single-party governance model. It is this questioning and the manner in which the party state responded that will be considered next.

The problems of power exercised without accountability As a number of commentators have observed, elite political fragmentation occurs in circumstances of economic and financial crisis; religious or ethnic 30

Mahathir Mohamad, The Challenge (Petaling Jaya: Pelanduk, 1993), p. 77. Laurent Metzger, ‘Islam Observed: The Case of Contemporary Malaysia’, Studa Islamika, 5(2) (1998): 49–76. 32 Chandra Muzaffar, Human Rights and the New World Order (Just World Trust, 1993), p. 28. 33 Frank, B., Markowitz, J., McKay, R. and Roth, K. ‘The Decline of the rule of law in Malaysia and Singapore Parts 1 and 2. The Record 45 & 46 (Report of the Committee on International Human Rights of the Association of the Bar of New York. 1991), p. 16. 31

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conflict, and the perception of elite peculation and corruption.34 In the political and media climate that has evolved since 2008 in both Malaysia and Singapore, it can be seen how these factors have changed the political landscape and questioned the sustainability of party dominance, particularly in Malaysia without, as yet, undermining the party state. Although both Singapore and Malaysia suffered a loss of economic legitimacy in the financial crisis of 1997, both countries nevertheless recovered strongly after 2003, posting growth in excess of 4 per cent of GDP per annum. Yet, measured against these economic and financial improvements there has developed, in both states, mounting concern over income inequality and middle- and working-class resentment at the employment of foreign workers that undercuts local pay and conditions. As opposition Singapore Democratic Party leader Chee Soon Juan observed, ‘Singapore has a very high cost of living’ coupled with relatively low wages in comparative international terms.35 This sentiment played an important role in both the 2011 Singapore general election and a by-election later the same year and was a focus of opposition campaigning in 2015.36 The opposition Workers’ Party particularly exploited the domestic fear of cheap foreign labour. This contributed to their success in taking, for the first time, a five-member GRC in Alunjied in 2011. Indeed, apart from the aberrant election result of 1997, PAP’s share of the popular vote was in significant decline between 1984 and 2011 even though the opposition parties are small, factionalised, and their leaders bankrupt or subject to prosecution under the state’s draconic libel and defamation laws. The opposition Workers’ Party and Singapore Democratic Party rarely contest all seats in the unicameral legislature. Nevertheless, after 1988 PAP felt constrained to combine the majority single-member constituencies into group representation constituencies (GRC) of 4, 5 or 6 members. The winning party requires a majority across the group to secure the block. By 2011 only 12 of 87 seats were single member constituencies. Thus, despite polling only 60 per cent of the vote in 2011 PAP still secured 80 seats in the 87-seat legislature.

34

See Geddes. Chee Soon Juan, ‘Singapore is not so clean, Mr. Murdoch’, The Guardian, 26 July 2013. 36 Financial Times, 12 September 2015; The Economist, 12 September 2015. 35



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Analogously, in Malaysia, between 2006–13 the opposition coalition of Parti Keadilan Rakyat (PKR), the Chinese Democratic Action Party (DAP) and the Islamic party PAS made much of the limitations of the Malay affirmative action policy that UMNO has practised since 1971. More particularly, the growing marginalisation of the Malaysian Indian community, especially after the retirement of Mahathir Mohamad in 2003, led to serious protests in Kuala Lumpur in 2007 and the emergence of a movement for Hindu rights (HINDRAF). At the same time, there is increasing evidence of middle-class dissatisfaction with both PAP’s and UMNO’s social and political controls. In both Malaysia and Singapore the emergence of social media as a medium for criticism and political mobilisation has modified the dominant party’s control of the public sphere. As PKR MP and vice president Nurul Izzah Anwar explained, the opposition has to be good with social media given UMNO’s control of the press and state television channels.37 Similarly, ethnic cleavages, exacerbated by growing dependence on foreign workers, both legal and illegal, have become more apparent in both states. Singapore, which hosts a million foreign workers representing 20 per cent of the population, witnessed both a strike by bus drivers from China in November 2012 and riots by Indian workers in the Little India district in December 2013, culminating in 27 arrests and the deportation of 53 workers. Such events are unprecedented in Singapore’s recent history where such disruption receives exemplary punishment from the state-managed judiciary. As the Asia Wall Street Journal observed, the bus strike ‘rattled the business friendly governance and industrial harmony’ of the city state.38 Inter-racial and religious tension has also become more apparent and even more electorally significant in Malaysia. The May 2013 general election witnessed what Prime Minister Najib termed ‘a Chinese tsunami’ where the mainly urban Chinese population in Penang, Kuala Lumpur and Johor opted for either the DAP or PKR, effectively eliminating UMNO’s BN coalition partners Gerakan and the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) as a

37

An interview conducted in February 2013. The same points can be found in Nurul Izzah Anwar, Hope for Malaysia: Standing Up for Democracy (Singapore: Marshall Cavendish, 2013), pp. 15–16. 38 Chun Han Won, ‘The strike that rattled Singapore’, Asia Wall Street Journal, 26 August 2013.

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political force. As a consequence, UMNO’s continued political dominance relies increasingly on the Malay heartland, further deepening the recourse to race- and religion-based politics, especially, but not exclusively, within UMNO. This has led to Perkasa, the Malay ultra-faction group seen to be tied to UMNO, stressing Malay rights at the UMNO General Assembly in December 2013. In its wake, UMNO’s renewed emphasis on sharia law and Malay issues in 2014 was designed to persuade PAS MPs, who hold 21 parliamentary seats, to defect from the opposition coalition.39 This strategy ultimately proved effective, as the opposition fragmented at both state and federal level in the course of 2015. UMNO vote buying and manipulation of constituency boundaries and electoral rolls has also witnessed the emergence of Bersih (Clean), an NGO devoted to exposing electoral fraud. Significantly, the May 2013 election saw BN win 60 per cent of parliamentary seats whilst taking only 47 per cent of the popular vote. Opposition leader Anwar Ibrahim called the result ‘the worst electoral fraud in history’.40 Anwar was subsequently re-tried for the alleged assault of a staffer in his apartment in 2008. After a controversial trial, which once again demonstrated UMNO’s control of the judiciary, he was once more imprisoned for five years. His equally charismatic daughter Nurul Izzah, who effectively leads PKR with her colleagues and mother in her father’s absence, has also been subject to extensive state harassment and detention. The weakness of the electoral commission and the absence of Commonwealth observers during the 2013 campaign further contributed to what the Economist reported to be a growing ‘loss of faith in the political process’.41 This loss of faith was further exacerbated in July 2015 by reports in The Sarawak Report and The Wall Street Journal that Prime Minister Najib had seemingly moved hundreds of millions of dollars from the state sovereign wealth fund, 1Malaysia Development Berhad (1MBD), into his personal offshore account, whilst the fund that Najib inaugurated after he became 39

Straits Times, 2 December 2013. Ranjeetha Pakiam and Manirajan Ramasamy, ‘Anwar Vows Battle over Lost Malaysia Vote as Thousands Rally’, Bloomberg, 9 May 2013, accessed 15 April 2016, www. bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-05-08/anwar-to-defy-malaysia-police-withrally-disputing-vote-results. 41 Economist, 11 May 2013. 40

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Prime Minister in 2009 accumulated losses of US$11 billion. Subsequent attempts by Najib’s Attorney General Mohamed Apandi Ali to show that the US$659 million that found its way into Najib’s offshore account was a Saudi Arabian gift to help fund the UMNO election campaign failed to draw a line under the issue as the FBI, Singapore and Swiss authorities began their own investigations into Najib and his business proxy Jho Low’s offshore investments.42 In Australia, Ambank Malaysia (partially owned by ANZ bank Australia) was linked to an obscure Queensland-based company, Bridge Global Capital Management, used to cover up peculation from the 1MDB fund.43 Nor was Najib, it was subsequently revealed, alone in practising this Malaysian version of creative accountancy. Another government fund, Mara Holdings, paid over-the-top prices for Sydney and Melbourne real estate so that its board of investors could skim off the difference between the asking price and what the company actually paid.44 Excluded from this gravy train, former Prime Minister Mahathir called upon Najib to resign. The exposure of the extent of government corruption casts doubt not only on Najib’s political survival, but also that of the ruling UMNO. As a result, the current crisis has not only revealed the kleptocratic practice of a political elite, but also how social media, acting outside the state-policed mainstream media, can expose the limitations of Malaysia’s competitive, but cronyist, authoritarian regime. The manner in which the ruling party has been accustomed to wield its authoritarian grip and the way in which that grip has weakened, therefore, are central to understanding the current political crisis enveloping Malaysia. As has been shown, over almost six decades since independence from British colonialism, the ruling UMNO, in alliance with smaller ethnically based Chinese and Indian parties, has overseen national development through a BN alliance. However, development in the majority, ethnically Malay interest has incurred political and economic costs. Under former Prime Minister 42

The Weekend Australian, 30/31 January 2016.

44

The Sarawak Report, 2 July 2015, accessed 1 September 2015, http://www. sarawakreport.org/2015/05/why-did-usd1-16-billion-of-1mdbs-money-go-intoan-account-controlled-by-jho-low/; ‘Scandal in Malaysia’, The Wall Street Journal, 5 July 2015, accessed 15 September 2015, http://www.wsj.com/articles/scandal-inmalaysia-1436113149.

43 Ibid.

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Mahathir Mohamad’s long dominance of the party state (1981–2003), UMNO determined resource allocation and redistributed assets, where minority Chinese and, to a lesser extent, Indian business interests, had formerly prevailed. Under Mahathir’s guidance UMNO’s New Economic Policy (NEP) redistributed socio-economic goods towards the economically deprived majority Malay community and through this ‘constructive protection’ created a modern, yet somewhat conflicted, ‘Malaysian’ identity. The NEP, nevertheless, transformed resource-rich Malaysia from a commodity-based, agricultural economy of six million people into an urbanised manufacturing economy of twenty-seven million with a per capita GDP of $(US)11,800 by 2015. In the process, the Malaysia Incorporated model co-opted Chinese-owned conglomerates into UMNO business politics, entangled business with politics whilst the expanding and ethnically Malay bureaucracy developed an institutional aversion to public scrutiny. To ‘lubricate and stimulate the economy’ required the party’s omniscient vision. The malleability of the constitution and the money politics that became inseparable from the Malaysian electoral process reinforced single-party rule. The capacity to dominate the multi-ethnic BN coalition in the Malay interest remains central to UMNO’s past and present political thinking. As Mahathir observed in 1970, Malaysia’s internal politics was ‘racial politics’ and its evolving democracy an elite guided one ‘to ensure that the mutually antagonistic races of Malaysia will not clash’.45 To sustain this oligarchical despotism, UMNO eroded any independent sources of constitutional authority whilst increasing the authority of the party in general and the office of Prime Minister in particular. Mahathir was largely responsible for this evolution and during his prime ministership he, like his successor Najib, cultivated close and lucrative business links. The fact that two of his sons are billionaire CEOs of statelinked conglomerates whilst another son, Mukhriz, was seemingly well placed, as Chief Minister of Kedah, until his resignation in February 2016, to assume the presidency of UMNO should Najib fall, thus renders Mahathir’s current criticism of Najib’s practice somewhat ironic. In other words, the current 1MDB scandal is not something new in government financial initiatives. In fact, the current crisis reflects the slow motion collision of the Malaysia Incorporated model and its networks of patronage and nepotism 45

Mahathir Mohamad. The Malay Dilemma (Singapore: Times Press, 1989), p. 32.



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with the social media realities of the online world. The first intimation that all was not well with UMNO’s version of an authoritarian political consensus came with the financial crisis of 1997. The crisis caused a rift within the UMNO elite between Mahathir and his deputy Anwar Ibrahim. Anwar called for reformasi to democratise the Malaysian political process and undermine its ‘mute syndrome’. The political crisis culminated in the six-year imprisonment of Anwar for ‘abuse of power’. It also saw the emergence, after Anwar’s release in 2004, of a functional opposition consisting of Anwar’s PKR party, DAP and PAS in a Pakatan Rakyat (People’s Pact). This unstable alliance came close to winning both the 2008 and 2013 general elections. Najib won the election only by a well-established practice of vote buying. Indeed, his alleged pilfering of the 1MDB fund financed UMNO’s costly campaign. Nevertheless, the dubious 2013 electoral victory eroded UMNO’s legitimacy and exacerbated the communal tensions that UMNO’s BN was designed to heal. In the aftermath of the 2013 election, UMNO played the racial card, exploiting the ethnic and religious differences between the secular Chinese DAP and its coalition partner PAS’s commitment to the promotion of hudud (sharia law). At the same time, Najib resumed the perennial persecution of Anwar. In February 2015 the High Court found Anwar guilty of sodomy, a ‘crime’ that incurred a further five-year sentence. Without Anwar’s presence the opposition disintegrated. Pakatan Rakyat (PR), that Anwar held together, imploded over the selection of the Chief Minister for Selangor, a state held since 2008 by the opposition. As Shannon Teoh observed, the key rift ‘was over hudud’ the Sharia criminal code that PAS seeks to implement but which its PR partner the Chinese-based DAP opposes. A small breakaway faction of PAS, Parti Amanah Negara, subsequently joined a new opposition coalition with PKR and the DAP rebranded, somewhat optimistically, Pakatan Harapan (the Hope Alliance). Yet, despite a weakened opposition, the social media exposés concerning Najib, his stepson and his wife, Rosmah, have clearly exacerbated Malaysia’s political travails. In his vitriolic campaign against Najib, Mahathir also raised unanswered questions about his involvement in the 2006 murder of Altatunya Shaaribuu, an exotic Mongolian model and interpreter. The case involves a heady mixture of sex and kickbacks from the $1-billion purchase of two French submarines from the Thales group when Najib was Defence Minister. In a significant move, French authorities opened an investigation

278 Regime Resilience in Malaysia and Singapore

into the terms of the purchase in February 2016. This loss of faith in the political process is not so apparent in Singapore. Yet, despite its control of the mainstream media and the judiciary, PAP no longer exerts quite the authority it once did. Singapore, like the rest of Asia, has experienced a rapid decline in growth as the China bubble bursts. The middle class who embraced PAP’s version of the social contract that requires the party’s guidance in return for consistent growth have become increasingly concerned at the number of foreign workers and the pressure they exert on local salaries. In 2013 the riots in Little India presaged growing racial tension in the ethnically Chinese-dominated city state. PAP peers nervously over the border at the events unravelling single-party rule in Malaysia. More worryingly still, a younger generation, inured to the good life and Western popular culture, chafe at the restrictions on freedom of speech and social controls in the nanny state. The young Singaporean poet Joshua Ip observed at the Brisbane writer’s festival in November 2015 that in Singapore ‘I hold my own tongue…/I eat my own words/…I shut my own trap’.46 Reporters without Borders rates Singapore 153 out of 180 countries in its World Press Freedom index.47 Despite the desultory attempt to present a more emollient image, the party state imprisoned a sixteen-year-old blogger, Amos Yee, in March 2015 on an obscenity charge for his critical Youtube assault on the legacy of the late Lee Kuan Yew. Interestingly, the most charismatic politicians in Malaysia and Singapore are opposition figures like Chee Soon Juan, who was banned from contesting the 2011 election as an undischarged bankrupt, and Anwar Ibrahim, the former UMNO Deputy Prime Minister who, after his emergence from prison in 2004 and before his re-arrest and imprisonment in 2015, unified and invigorated the reformasi movement in Malaysia. Significantly, the opposition pact began to disintegrate with the re-imprisonment of Anwar. Consequently, both in Malaysia and to a lesser degree Singapore, the dominant party has to manage an anxious and less docile population and face an organised opposition that presents the potential for unseating the incumbent party by electoral means for the first time since independence.

46 47

J. Ip, Sonnets from the Singlish (Singapore: Math Paper Press, 2015), p. 15. See http://index.rsf.org/#!/.



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The enduring sustainability of party rule However, despite the threat posed to their authority by a more effective opposition, and a less compliant populace, the ruling parties and their leadership have proved themselves politically resilient despite evincing signs of elite fragmentation in the Malaysian case since the 2013 election and the 1MDB scandal. In this context, both PAP and UMNO have demonstrated a capacity for leadership renewal, in Singapore from Goh Chok Tong to Lee Hsien Loong and in Malaysia from the ineffectual Abdullah Badawi to the more robust, if increasingly contested, political leadership of Najib. Both parties have, in this context, at times sought to present a more emollient, moderate and less combative political style allowing for adjustments to the political space. Malaysia notably offered to modify its draconian Internal Security Act in 2013 that dated from the colonial era Communist insurgency. After the election, however, it made only made cosmetic changes to the legislation. To present themselves more favourably to an international and domestic audience, both PAP and UMNO have paid sedulous attention to the rebranding of the party state and reframing their political message. Since the late 1990s PAP has attended closely to Singapore’s political image and hired international public relations consultancies like Burson Marsteller and Weber Shandwick to manage the presentation of campaigns from promoting clean toilets, to repairing the image of Singapore’s prisons and managing the city state’s SARS crisis in 2002/03. Both Weber Shandwick and Pelham Bell Pottinger have regional headquarters in Singapore where Weber Shandwick experienced double-digit growth in business between 2010–12. This management of the political space and party image came to the fore in what could have been a ‘watershed’ 2015 general election as current Prime Minister, and son of the founding father, Lee Kuan Yew, Lee Hsien Loong sought to arrest the electoral decline of the ruling party. Consequently, the party state drew on its constitutional capacity to call an early election in August 2015 and sought to exploit the legacy of the recently deceased Lee Kuan Yew to reassert its electoral dominance. In this context its media dominance and its management of the fiftieth anniversary of the city state’s foundation at the National Day celebrations in August, that coincided with the announcement of the election, demonstrated its sophisticated capacity to manage the Singapore brand and use this to reinforce the party’s soft authoritarian guidance.

280 Regime Resilience in Malaysia and Singapore

The 2015 National Day Parade (NDP), held on the padang (field) close by the state parliament, where the city-state’s founding father, Lee Kuan Yew, hosted the first National Day parade in 1966, was therefore particularly interesting from this people-bonding perspective. It celebrated the wealthy city’s fiftieth anniversary as an independent republic that came into inauspicious existence after its expulsion from the infant Malaysian Federation in 1965. It also commemorated the achievement of Lee Kuan Yew. ‘Home’ sung by boy/girl band, The Sam Willows, opened the 2015 NDP. ‘So we’ll build our dreams together /Just like we’ve done before / Just like the river which brings us life /There’ll always be Singapore,’ they winsomely intoned. Penned in 1998 by local singer- songwriter, Dick Lee, ‘Home’ is one of many ballads composed or commissioned by the government’s Psychological Defence Unit to create, as another NDP song put it, ‘one nation, one people, one Singapore’. The state-commissioned ballads play continually over the state-licensed airwaves in the lead up to National Day. Songs saturated in nostalgia like ‘Count on me Singapore’ (1991), ‘Together’ (1999), ‘There’s no place I’d rather be’ (2005) and ‘Our Singapore’ (2014) reinforce ‘people bonding’ and reflect Lee Kuan Yew’s enduring political philosophy. In Lee’s view, inherited by his son Hsien Loong, the current Prime Minister and leader of the People’s Action Party (PAP), PAP cannot allow its increasingly affluent citizens to form their own identity. Instead, the party state does it for them. Central to this vision is Singapore united in one harmonious body guided by the party. The NDP proselytises the message. Hosted by six hip MCs, the spectacle was a curious confection where Eurovision Song Contest met the Nuremberg rally. The 25,000 spectators, all dressed in the national colours, participated in a carefully rehearsed padang ‘wave’. The nation then paid tribute to the dead founding father, symbolically represented by an empty seat. A series of tableaux followed. In 2015 the pageant traced the nation’s history, starting with the island’s troubled ‘beginnings’, then its ‘progress’, via its five pillars of ‘total defence’, that gave the island its ‘strength’ illustrated by Singapore’s state-of-the-art armed forces. ‘Unity’ and ‘Identity’ were the next stages and the mass rally culminated with ‘Onwards’ as the crowd committed ‘with confidence to build a brighter Singapore’. Exploiting the legacy of ‘The Grand Master’, Singapore’s Metropolitan



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Productions staged The LKY Musical in the weeks before and after National Day. This lavish production rehashed in song and dance the myth that passes for the PAP version of Singapore’s post-colonial history. It played to sell-out crowds. Choreographed by London theatre director Steven Dexter and composed by the ubiquitous Dick Lee, the government’s Chief of Communications, Janadas Devan, ‘advised’ on the script in pre-production.48 A paean to LKY, it managed to ignore the more controversial aspects of Lee’s long rule. Beginning with the tearful announcement of Singapore’s separation from Malaysia in 1965, the soap opera takes us back to Singapore’s occupation by the Japanese in 1942, and the struggles Lee and his wife, Kwa Geok Choo, overcame personally and politically to build their tropical utopia. Singapore is the vision, as one song puts it, of ‘the man who stands alone’. LKY, from the psychological defence perspective, harnessed disparate people from different races to a collective goal and created, if not a tropical paradise then Disneyland with the death penalty and the highest GDP per capita in Asia. Riding the wave of this nationalist euphoria, Lee’s son dissolved parliament in August 2015 and called an early general election. The son rising on the father’s coattails is not unknown in South East Asia’s notoriously dynastic politics. Lee’s son sought to milk the nostalgia to revitalise the party state. In this he was surprisingly successful. The mythmaking saw the party capture its highest share of the vote since 1981 and, although the Workers’ Party held on to its one GRC, it was clearly treading water; the momentum and the dominance of the economic, political, media and legal space remained with PAP. Similarly, in Malaysia, since he became Prime Minister in 2009 Najib has particularly focused on UMNO and Malaysia’s political image through the employment of consultancies like McKinsey, APCO and FBC. APCO, which employs Tony Blair’s former advisor, Alastair Campbell, created Najib’s 1Malaysia campaign, whilst FBC advised on modifications to the ISA and sold four documentaries presenting a favourable image of Malaysia to the BBC in the course of 2011. FBC received US$9 million for its services, whilst

48

Andrew Loh, ‘Actor who alleged Gov’t interference in LKY musical removes blog post’, 22 July 2015, accessed 16 April 2016, http://www.theonlinecitizen. com/2015/07/actor-who-alleged-govt-interference-in-lky-musical-removes-blogpost/.

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McKinsey received $11.5 million.49 Prior to the 1MDB scandal the advice on spinning the Malaysian story paid off as Western leaders consistently praised Malaysia as a model of a moderate and mature Muslim democracy in 2013–14. This positive image was far removed, as recent corruption scandals over 1MBD have demonstrated, from the actual reality. Nevertheless, despite a mass protest led by Bersih in August 2015 in which Mahathir participated, Najib has exploited his control of the executive to fragment the opposition, exploit racial and religious division and, it would seem, ride out the scandal. The events of July and August 2015 significantly demonstrated how power has become concentrated in the office of the Prime Minister given that, like Mahathir in the past, Najib has exercised the authority of the office to dismiss both his Attorney-General, charged with investigating the scandal, and his Deputy Prime Minister, Muhyiddin Yassin, who had the temerity to suggest that Najib should ‘clear his name and restore the government’s credibility’.50 Even a rare and explicit intervention in politics by the nine Malaysian sultans in October 2015 calling for a swift and transparent investigation into the 1MDB affair, which they alleged had created a ‘crisis of confidence’ in the country, failed to undermine Najib’s authority in the party.51 Neither, too, did a confidence vote in parliament which Najib won in November undermine his political standing. At the same time, populist Malay forces close to the UMNO leadership styling themselves the Malay Dignity Uprising (Himpunan Maruah Melayu, HMM) began street protests against foreign and Chinese street traders’ Kuala Lumpur’s Petaling Street market. By an interesting piece of regional political metonymy the Malay protesters wore red shirts in contrast to the yellow shirts of Bersih and called for the Chinese ‘to keep their place’. The HMM protests followed a racial riot in Bukit Bintang’s Low Yat Plaza in July.52

49 See

http://www.sarawakreport.org/superarchive/. http://www.themalaysianinsider. com/malaysia/article/putrajaya-paid-rm94m-to-fbc-media-for-global-airtime/ and ‘PEMANDU explains RM64 million expenditure’, Malaysiakini, 18 June 2011, accessed 16 April 2016, www.malaysiakini.com/news/167327. 50 Vietnam News, 6 July 2015, p. 6. 51 Thomas Fuller, ‘State Rulers in Malaysia press for inquiry into Premier’, The New York Times, 7 October 2015. 52 The Edge, 20 July 2015; The Australian, 17 September 2015; The Straits Times, 25 September 2015.



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Given the weakness and division amongst the opposition and the growing recourse of Najib and his supporters to exploit communal politics, it seems unlikely that Najib will be brought down by external or internal political forces. Moreover, even if Najib were to resign, the outcome would be the continuation of elite-brokered UMNO rule. Bitter factionalism within the Malay political elite in the past, whether after the 1969 race riots or the dispute between Mahathir and Tengku Razaleigh’s ‘Team B’ after 1988, failed to create the basis for liberalisation or a more plural politics. Given Malaysia’s importance as one of the world’s few successful Muslim states, it is noteworthy that the Commonwealth media have adopted a broadly indifferent attitude to recent revelations. The Commonwealth failed to send observers to the 2013 election. When independent Australian senator Nick Xenophon tried to observe proceedings, he was refused entry without protest from the Australian government. Moreover, despite the evolving financial scandal, Najib emerged with his international image enhanced after the 27th ASEAN summit in November 2015, held in Kuala Lumpur. Pragmatically positioning himself, in the eyes of the West, as a moderate Muslim leader in the wake of the Islamic State attack on Paris earlier in the month, US President Obama praised his part in the ‘coalition to fight IS’. At the same time, his opening statement to European dialogue partners that ‘we stand with you against this new evil that blasphemes against the name of Islam’ won plaudits from European and Australian leaders alike.53 Looking eastward for growth, UK Prime Minister Cameron also praised Najib’s ‘moderation’. Meanwhile, Najib employs expensive British political consultants to craft his response to recent allegations of peculation. As Anwar’s daughter and opposition MP, Nurul Izzah, observes, the West sends the wrong signals, whilst the opposition’s only recourse is social media.54 UMNO’s postmodern version of competitive authoritarianism then is highly divisive. ‘Once UMNO loses’, Mahathir observed in July 2015, ‘it cannot be rehabilitated’. The fact that Western governments prefer trade deals to encouraging the rule of law means UMNO may have little to fear.

53

‘Full text of PM Najib Razak’s address at 27th Asean Summit’, New Straits Times Online, 21 November 2015, accessed 15 March 2016, http://www.nst.com.my/ news/2015/11/112915/read-full-text-pm-najib-razaks-address-27th-aseansummit?utm_source=nst&utm_medium=nst&utm_campaign=nstrelated. 54 Anwar, pp. 15–16.

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Conclusion Lee Kuan Yew, probably the most impressive competitive authoritarian leader, clearly had little time for representative democracy or freedom of speech. Both Mahathir and Najib in Malaysia share his contempt. In recent years this has presented challenges for PAP’s and UMNO’s political communication in the age of social media. Yet, despite growing electoral pressure, both UMNO and PAP have consistently adapted themselves to contingent external and internal circumstances without relinquishing their oligarchical form of single-party rule. More particularly, in both the Malaysian and Singaporean cases, the party has been able to draw upon state resources to manage the public sphere by a process of naming and framing political debate, even at times of acute instability. The ability to employ international marketing consultancies to sell the party state brand both at home and abroad in an era of social messaging has further facilitated their capacity to frame the message and control the political narrative. In this they operate in a manner that Antonio Gramsci presciently argued had to be the role of the modern mass party, functioning as ‘the collective intellectual’, mirroring the political formula of Machiavelli’s Prince and representing the collective will of the state through the effective and increasingly arbitrary management of the public sphere.55

55

Antonio Gramsci, Letters from Prison (London: Quartet, 1973), p. 186.



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Chapter 19

Conclusion: Challenges to Resilience in Malaysia and Singapore Bridget Welsh and Greg Lopez

This collection shows that the way PAP and UMNO maintain power has changed and is evolving. Contemporary party leaders Lee Hsien Loong and Najib Tun Razak are adopting new strategies and, in the process, transforming political conditions. This raises questions about what this means for both our understanding of these countries and their political futures.

Change and Control: Theoretical Implications Theoretically, this collection points to three important conclusions about understanding regime resilience in Malaysia and Singapore. Foremost, the authors suggest that in order to better understand regime resilience, we as scholars and analysts need to change our interpretive frameworks. For example, in considering how levers of state power are applied, we need to recognise how states have adapted to dominating social media. Less than a decade ago the Internet and social media served to level the playing field and open up opportunities for the opposition. This is not the case to the same degree today. Ross Tapsell shows how in GE 2013 Barisan Nasional was able to turn its resource advantage into an electoral one. The same transformation has taken place in Singapore, as discussed by Terence Lee, who argues that the way PAP used communication affected its performance, especially in the 2016 Bukit Batok by-election. His analysis of new media

285

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echoes other studies examining PAP’s performance in GE 2015.1 Social media space is now being branded by the regimes to their advantage. As Freedom of the Net shows, these governments have taken greater control of cyberspace in recent years.2 Control of the mainstream media is less important than it was in the past, as both governments turn to furthering their dominance of social media space. A similar conclusion can be reached about the control of state resources. Traditionally, the party was the vehicle of patronage. Today, it is the control of the state, its resources and institutions that give the dominant parties their power. Interestingly, these political parties are more dependent on maintaining their position for their future as they cannot be differentiated from the state and their need for resources. Arguably their allies in the economy are dependent on distribution of state-connected favours, becoming what Tommy Koh has aptly called a ‘rentier society’.3 This would not have been the case decades ago, when the ties between these political parties and citizens were direct and not fully dependent on the political position of dominance. Rethinking traditional explanations, both of how maintaining resilience has changed over time and how explanations have changed in importance vis-à-vis each other is critical to understanding regime resilience today. The second implication of this collection is that we need to look beyond traditional explanations to understand regime resilience. An important part of widening our horizon is to move beyond explanations in political science. In particular, the authors in this collection highlight the need to look at society and changes in society as some of the reasons these regimes maintain control. Multiple essays point to the growing salience of religious conservatism in Malaysia as a development that is both being politically mobilised as well as pressuring regimes for accommodation. The political right has become a force in Malaysia, one which the Najib government has tried to stoke and use to its advantage. Rather than use ethnic accommodation to stay in power, the government is using ethnic 1

Weiyu Zhang and Natalie Pang, ‘The Internet and Social Media,’ in Terence Lee and Kevin YL Tan, Change in Voting: Singapore’s 2015 General Election, Singapore: Ethos. 2016, pp. 232-45. 2 See: https://freedomhouse.org/report-types/freedom-net 3 Tommy Koh, ‘Is Singapore at Risk of Becoming a Rentier Society?’, Straits Times, 11 January 2017, http://www.straitstimes.com/opinion/is-singapore-at-risk-ofbecoming-a-rentier-society



Conclusion: Challenges to Resilience in Malaysia and Singapore 287

and ideological polarisation. The rise of more liberal forces is a theme highlighted in Gaik Cheng Khoo’s chapter, as she shows that responses to citizenship also require new engagement and responses. This is also part of the polarisation being used to the BN’s advantage. Another important area is the application of the law, both ideologically and substantively, as shown in the rich essays by Amanda Whiting, R. Rueban Balasubramaniam and David Martin Jones. The law is being used to legitimise the control of the state and control of citizens, rather than as protection or empowerment. This opens up further discussion of the legal system and the independence of the judiciary, especially related to politically sensitive matters such as elections and defamation. Finally, and perhaps more importantly, the explanations in this collection point to the need to further develop our analyses both in individual countries and comparatively. The rethinking of regime resilience needs even greater research, particularly more weighting of different explanations and empirical work. The role of society and norms is just one area that is calling out for further studies. The education systems in both countries reinforce the dominance of the political parties, but exactly how, and how this has changed over time, is not yet known. The same can be said about how social media is impacting regime resilience. Are there echo chambers, or is the greater control and dominance of social media space actually shifting opinions over the longer term? How much of the regime resilience in Malaysia and Singapore is unique to each country and how much of it is shaped by global trends and learning? The need to compare the nature of authoritarian rule in both countries is more pressing than ever, as the success (and failure) of the regimes speak to the broader shifts that are taking place in the contraction of democratic space worldwide. This collection only serves to engender much-needed further debate and research.

Division and Direction: Strains in Malaysia and Singapore At the same time, the collection as a whole raises serious questions about the future of these regimes. Perhaps at no other time in the history of Malaysia and Singapore have these regimes faced the greatest demand to transform and reform. Concurrently, the resistance within the system to reform is more entrenched than ever, pitting the governments against large groups of their citizens. These are indeed politically challenging times. Increasing

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global volatility combined with growth slowdowns and inadequate response from both the regimes to globalisation and domestic pressures have led to widespread dissatisfaction. A recurring theme throughout the collection’s essays is the recognition of these high levels of dissatisfaction with government on both sides of the Causeway. The high levels of dissatisfaction have translated into heightened political engagement through activities by both political parties and civil society movements and ordinary citizens. Bridget Welsh’s essay notes that this contestation has moved outside of the traditional electoral arena, to within society at large. This and the response from the incumbents have led to increasing polarisation in Malaysia. Existing fault lines of race, ethnicity and religion, but also class and regional divide, are being exploited by both sides of the political spectrum in Malaysia. She concludes that the emerging picture in Malaysia post-GE13 was one of fragmentation. In Singapore, where political contestation is less dramatic than Malaysia, the contestation as to who are the ‘Singapore Core’ forms one basis for polarisation, but this also underscores division about PAP and how it governs more broadly.4 ‘Politics’ is widening in both countries, beyond traditional arenas of elections, with political divisions over policies and their implementation more the norm. The electorates have become more sophisticated and complex. For the political parties at the helm, this has meant greater challenges in responding to criticism and greater demands for improved citizen engagement. In short, regime resilience requires more everyday responses. Not all of these responses are inclusive. In fact, the use of division has become a crucial tool for these regimes. Clive Kessler’s essay provides an important perspective on Malaysia’s increasing fragmentation and blames it squarely on UMNO. He argues that UMNO deliberately undertook a specific campaign strategy in GE 2013 that resulted in UMNO becoming stronger in terms of parliamentary seats at the expense of other political parties within the BN. However, the primary reason that UMNO has had to resort to a stronger ethnocratic stance is the steadily declining support from its core. John Funston’s detailed investigation comparing GE 1969 and GE 2013 confirms this as he shows that popular support for the long-standing regime fell even as UMNO gained more seats. UMNO’s strategy was simply 4

Stephan Ortmann, ‘Singapore: the politics of inventing national identity’, Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs 28(4) (2010): 23–46.



Conclusion: Challenges to Resilience in Malaysia and Singapore 289

to win a sufficient number of Malay-majority seats on the peninsula, and in association with Sabah and Sarawak allies, to secure a clear parliamentary majority. UMNO’s strategy of winning the Malay-majority seats has seen it resorting to religious and racial, class and regional-based strategies to divide and rule. Amanda Whiting’s essay is yet another example where the legal institutions are used to divide not only Muslims against non-Muslims but also progressive against conservative Muslims. The use of division by these regimes is an integral part of their resilience. There are costs to adopting this strategy of division, as short-term needs for political survival have blinded governments to the longer-term implications of sowing difference. Even steps such as Singapore’s 2017 decision to require a Malay-only presidency, touted for ‘ethnic representation’, has had the impact of accentuating social divisions and strengthening racial politics in the city state.5 Another important theme identified in the collection involves the economy, which has served to widen divisions in society while simultaneously pressing the management of these political parties to adapt to new forces of globalisation. Chapters by Steven CM Wong and Greg Lopez and Mohamed Ariff investigate the limits of the ‘odd economic development model’ – one that marries neo-liberal economic policies with extensive distributional policies in Malaysia. The development trajectory has led to high levels of inequality and of indebtedness as well as intense vulnerability among Malaysian households. Government measures to address slowing economic growth and fiscal deficits through greater liberalisation and subsidy rationalisation have contributed to rising cost of living while overly liberal and flexible labour markets and poor investment in human capital development have led to stagnating and declining real wages. These and the frequent exposures of financial and moral scandals related to the incumbent regime have provided a significant number of Malaysians with the necessary incentive to engage politically. In contrast to earlier years, economic (mis-)management has now become as source of vulnerability for UMNO. This has been exacerbated by a litany of corruption scandals, primarily 1MDB. The management of the Singapore economy has also become a weakness. Chapters by Bilveer Singh, Lily Zubaidah Rahim and Lee Soo Ann all 5

Garry Rodan, ‘Singapore’s elected presidency: A failed institution’, Australian Journal of International Affairs, 72(1) (2018): 10–15.

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highlight the high levels of dissatisfaction among Singaporeans and, unlike in the past, economic conditions are a part of this dissatisfaction. A primary reason is Singapore’s open economy model which is no longer delivering high levels of growth and, in the process, is deepening inequalities within Singaporean society.6 To drive the economy, PAP had always welcomed foreign labour and capital. This has had consequences; not only has this kept wages down for the majority of Singaporeans, it has also transformed the demographic composition of the society itself. In the past, foreign labour came primarily from Malaysia which had a shared history and culture. In recent years, foreigners have come from an increasingly disparate number of nations. These 1.6 million foreign workers (of Singapore’s total population of 5.5 million) are there primarily to work. Inadequate investment in housing and infrastructure has led to a shortage of affordable housing and strains on infrastructure. The growth slowdown has also limited employment opportunities. The rising cost of living has not been compensated with growth in wages. These high levels of dissatisfaction contributed to PAP’s worst-ever performance in GE2011 and they continue to haunt PAP even after Lee Kuan Yew’s passing. Lee Soo Ann’s essay discusses why it is increasingly difficult for PAP to deliver high rates of economic growth. Singapore, a high income city-state with an open economy, is susceptible to global volatility and in the last decade experienced its slowest economic growth since independence. The government faces the difficult challenge of finding an alternative source of growth, outside of the immigration-growth driven model. There is growing recognition of these challenges. A recent book on inequality by Teo You Yenn, This is What Inequality Looks Like, speaks to the phenomenon as well as the public debate,7 coming after the important discussion of gaps in governance in Singapore Incomplete by Cherian George.8 The issue of division is compounded by concerns about the future direction of both countries. Paramount on this list of concerns is leadership. Since 2017 public debate has swirled in Singapore about who will be the

6

See Sudhir Thomas Vadaketh, and Donald Low, Hard Choices: Challenging the Singapore Consensus. National University of Singapore Press, 2014. 7 Teo You Yenn, This is What Inequality Looks Like. Singapore: Ethos Books, 2018. 8 Cherian George, Singapore, Incomplete: Reflections on a First World Nation’s Arrested Political Development, Singapore: Woodsville News, 2017.



Conclusion: Challenges to Resilience in Malaysia and Singapore 291

next prime minister, as Lee Hsien Loong has pointed to the grooming of the fourth generation of PAP leaders and there has been open public discussion of contenders: current Finance Minister Heng Swee Keat, Minister in the Prime Minister’s Office Chan Chun Sing and Minister for Education (Higher Education and Skills) Ong Ye Kung.9 Despite being the most popular figure and the architect of the reforms discussed in this collection that contributed to electoral gains for the PAP in the 2015 election, Deputy Prime Minister Tharman Shanmugaratnam is not a contender for the position by his own admission.10 He remains popular, however, with proponents arguing for his leadership.11 The question of leadership is not just about the individual, their various sources of support within PAP and the timing of the succession, but what vision the new leader would have for Singapore and whether he has the capacity to navigate Singapore out of the current challenges it faces. Coming from the PAP mould, and largely untested outside of PAP, all of the contenders reflect the mode of Lee’s leadership and appear, at least at this juncture, not willing to engage in either political and economic reform. How much Lee Hsien Loong will continue to lead is also important, as it will set the parameters for change in the system and the pattern of regime resilience. Given the centrality of leadership in Singapore politics, this will likely shape contestation ahead. Political leadership is also at the heart of Malaysia’s future regime resilience, as Najib Tun Razak’s tenure and that of the current opposition leader Mahathir Mohamad will be tested in the next general election. More than in Singapore, the 2013 general election was about Najib, his leadership and direction for the country. The same can be said for the upcoming 14th general election. Scandals and governance issues play off against increases in growth and stability. The issue of who will succeed Najib – if he (and the opposition) does not perform well in the next election – is real and, here too, UMNO will turn to those groomed within the system. Serious questions arise about the calibre of future leaders in UMNO, given that many have opted for the dominant mode of money politics within the party and are also tainted by scandal.

9

See, for example, http://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/selection-process-mayhave-echoes-of-1984 10 http://www.straitstimes.com/politics/dpm-tharman-rules-himself-out-as-nextprime-minister-i-am-not-the-man-for-pm 11 https://mustsharenews.com/tharman-prime-minister/

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What distinguishes Malaysia’s current leadership from Singapore’s is that the former has engaged in greater economic reform – Najib has embraced a more neo-liberal agenda, such as the Goods and Service Tax, and realigned the economy to China, especially in infrastructure. The impact of this is yet unknown, as it is unfolding, but debate surrounds issues of sovereignty, inequality and meaningful growth. Changes to strengthen human capital – in areas such as education – have not been a significant part of Najib’s reforms. Importantly, his reforms have been seriously tainted by corruption and kleptocracy scandals. This has meant a contraction in political space, as more authoritarian measures have been introduced, from the National Security Council in 2016 to intimidation of critics. Greater political openness does not appear to be on the horizon.

Continued Regime Resilience: PAP and UMNO Marching On In fact the authors in this collection show that these regimes are adapting their authoritarianism and mastering new measures to stay in power. UMNO/BN and PAP have been adept at offering some level of competition at the polls and winning large shares of support based on provisions in the economy and security while maintaining dominance. David Martin Jones’ essay comparing Malaysia and Singapore captures this nicely when he notes that the regimes in Malaysia and Singapore should be treated as ‘competitive authoritarian regimes’ rather than ‘an adjectively qualified form of democracy’. His essay traces how the strategies of engagements with citizens in both countries have evolved. Adaptation is a crucial factor of how these regimes have stayed in power. An important dimension of this adaptation involves the accumulation of formal and informal power. The chapters by Bilveer Singh, Lily Zubaidah Rahim and Jones detail the tight control that PAP continues to exercise over Singapore and Singaporeans, while Lee Soo Ann and Terence Lee show how PAP responds through policies that meet the expectations of Singaporeans. These strategic forms of citizen engagement are a crucial part of the PAP’s dominance and are likely to continue. This is echoed in Malaysia. Chapters by Wee Chong Hui, Steven CM Wong and Greg Lopez and Mohamed Ariff all demonstrate how the UMNO/ BN government uses its levers of power to reward and punish the electorate. Populist measures for the Bottom 40 per cent are now the norm in Malaysia, as well as greater accommodation of autonomy demands in Sabah and



Conclusion: Challenges to Resilience in Malaysia and Singapore 293

Sarawak. Another key aspect of new engagement involves communication and new media, which has, to a certain extent, levelled the playing field for oppositional forces. Yet, Ross Tapsell argues that in the long run, the incumbents will triumph. Tapsell argues that while social media may provide democratic space in the short-to-medium term, media convergence – the synchronisation of media platforms – into media conglomerates will benefit the incumbent rather than oppositional forces. He also points out that the control and advantage of resources and levers of power have enhanced the BN’s control over the political narrative, including on social media. In Singapore, Terence Lee argues that PAP has yet to fully master the challenges associated with new media, but by the 2015 General Election the PAP had established a controlling presence on social media platforms. Although he highlights shortcomings in how the PAP communicates – or, rather, fails to communicate – with the public, a similar trajectory from the opposition to the dominant party has occurred. This ability to neutralise challenges, tempered with legal controls to limit open discussion and criticism from alternative media, reflects the adaptation to the regime’s advantage.

Future Challenges: Rise of Alternative Forces This adaptation may significantly favour the dominant political parties, but it also speaks to the rise of new forces and opposition to the regimes. Contemporary resistance to the regimes is multifaceted. It is ‘coming from below’, i.e. from ordinary citizens; it is coming from ‘within’ – splits within the elite class; and it is coming from ‘outside’ as both Malaysia’s and Singapore’s economic model integrates deeper into a lethargic global economic system. In Malaysia, the social movement Bersih – the movement for free and fair elections – is possibly the greatest challenge to UMNO/BN. As Gaik Cheng Khoo argues, Bersih has become the embodiment of moral resistance to the incumbent government. Bersih’s power comes not only from its purpose (free and fair elections) but more so from its ability to act as a platform that connects non-governmental organisations, political parties and ordinary citizens. Through its various activities since its inception in 2007 Bersih has also moved beyond its stated purpose of free and fair elections to a clean government, the right to protest, strengthening of parliamentary democracy; and, since 2015, to saving Malaysia’s economy and demanding

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the resignation of Malaysia’s prime minister due to the 1MDB scandal. An important outcome from Bersih activities has been greater ‘trans-ethnic solidarity’ and ‘inter-generational togetherness’. Bersih has inadvertently strengthened the concept of ‘active citizenship’ among Malaysians (as opposed to being passive spectators), and this is a serious threat to the regime. Among the ten fundamental shifts that Bridget Welsh identifies in her essay, one in particular could undermine Malaysia’s social stability – that of increasing polarisation among the electorate caused by heightened contestation within society. The increasingly tense and potentially violent nature (by Malaysian standards) of this contestation is a cause for concern. AB Shamsul also worries if this gladiatorism shown by politicians will lead to unintended consequences instead of increased political literacy. His focus on the lack of a political-literate electorate speaks to the need to understand dynamics of society in shaping political trajectories. In this context, R. Rueban Balasubramaniam’s argument that an appeal to legal philosophy and Malaysia’s supreme law – the Federal Constitution – to resist UMNO/BN appears counter-intuitive. Although Balasubramaniam explains how UMNO/BN and society’s view of the law and use of the law have contributed to UMNO/BN’s hold on power, and provides a framework to dislodge this culture of domination in Malaysian politics, he outlines a strategy to resist UMNO/BN based on social compromise and inclusion. The task for channelling resistance lies primarily with the opposition. Meredith Weiss examines both the political party coalitions in Malaysia and argues that GE 2013 signalled a new phase in Malaysian electoral history, in which an alternate coalition presented not just different policies and personalities but also a new way of conceptualising and engaging in politics. Resistance is taking on new organisational forms. The opposition’s challenge has been sustainability and compromise. Weiss also highlights some of the challenges of maintaining cooperation after GE 2013. The opposition failed to maintain their cohesion. Najib Razak deftly drove a wedge between PAS and DAP, and in 2015, Malaysia’s most successful opposition coalition collapsed. In place, currently, are several weaker and fragmented opposition groups. Yet, the opposition as a whole remains stronger than in earlier decades and its configuration and approach will determine whether UMNO will continue to rule Malaysia after the next polls. The same could also be said for Singapore as the opposition has become part of the political ‘new normal’ and, while having fewer representatives



Conclusion: Challenges to Resilience in Malaysia and Singapore 295

in parliament, plays an important role in shaping narratives. The Worker’s Party in particular has institutionalised a role for itself, consecutively controlling the Group Representative Constituency of Aljunied, and, as such, has become the target of the PAP government’s ire. Ironically, the attacks have strengthened the party’s national role, confirming that it is indeed a player on the national political scene. How this will play out in Singapore’s next election, given the rising discontent over issues in the economy, a narrowing of political space for alternative views and leadership contestation within PAP, remains fluid.

Conclusion What we do know, however, is that the future of Malaysia and Singapore will likely be shaped by their immediate past. As expected, there has been a combination of strengthened controls, adaptability, increased challenges and contestation as well as rising resistance and rising dissatisfaction with both the incumbents in recent years. The incumbent dominant parties (despite, at times, their apparent decline) have maintained the upper hand, contributing to their record-breaking longevity in office. This collection helps enrich our understanding of why the regimes are indeed so resilient. It also points to sources of vulnerabilities ahead. While all indicators ahead point to continued resilience, the broadening scope of contestation suggests that the political parties will have their work cut out to stay in power in future elections.

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About the Authors 309



About the Authors R. Rueban Balasubramaniam is associate professor at Carleton University. His research is in legal philosophy generally with a view to exploring how the rule of law is constitutive of legitimate political rule and has published widely in this area. Key publications include ‘Has Rule by Law Killed the Rule of Law in Malaysia?’ 8:2. Oxford University Commonwealth Law Journal, 2008: 211-35; ‘Indefinite Detention: Rule by Law or Rule of Law’ in Victor Ramraj ed., Emergencies and the Limits of Legality, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008) and ‘The Karam Singh Case’ in H. P. Lee & Andrew Harding eds., Constitutional Landmarks in Malaysian Law: the First 50 Years, (Kuala Lumpur: Malayan Law Journal/LexisNexis, 2007). John Funston is a visiting fellow in the Department of Political and Social Change, Coral Bell School of Asia Pacific Affairs, Australian National University. He has worked on Southeast Asian politics, particularly Malaysia and Thailand, for over four decades, including fourteen years in the region, at the National University of Malaysia (1972-1976), Brunei University (19861989), and the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore (1997-2001). He has published extensively on the region, including: an edited volume on Government and Politics in Southeast Asia (ISEAS, Singapore and Zed Books, London, 2001); Southern Thailand: The Dynamics of Conflict. (Policy Studies 50. East-West Centre, Washington; Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 2008); and Malay Politics in Malaysia: A Study of UMNO and PAS (Heinemann, Kuala Lumpur, 1980). David Martin Jones is associate professor at the University of Queensland. His research on political theory has focused on two areas: the evolution of English political thinking on ideas of conscience and allegiance and somewhat differently the impact of traditional understandings of political obligation upon statecraft in East and Southeast Asia. In the context of

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English political thought his work resulted in a book Conscience and Allegiance in Seventeenth Century English Political Thought (University of Rochester 1999) which received positive reviews from leading scholars in the field in political studies and history. In addition to publishing several academic pieces on terrorism in Southeast Asia in the highest quality venues, he has made a high profile contribution to public debate through pieces in The Australian Financial Review, The National Interest and The World Today. Clive Kessler first began studying Malay and Malayan society seriously in 1962, as the Malaysia project was beginning to take shape. He is the author of many essays and studies in this field, most notably Islam and Politics in a Malay State: Kelantan 1838-1969 (Cornell U.P., Ithaca NY, 1978). He has held academic positions at LSE: The London School of Economics and Political Science, University of London; at Barnard College, Columbia University, New York; and for twenty-four years served as professor at The University of New South Wales, Sydney, where he now holds the title of Emeritus Professor of Sociology and Anthropology. He has been a visiting professor at a number of Malaysian universities, and has been a visiting academic member at The Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton NJ and at other leading international research institutions. Gaik Cheng Khoo is associate professor at the University of Nottingham Malaysia Campus where she teaches film and television. Recent publications include co-authored book Eating Together: Food, Space and Identity in Malaysia and Singapore (with Jean Duruz, Rowman and Littlefield/SIRD, 2015), and Malaysia’s New Ethnoscapes and Ways of Belonging (co-edited with Julian Lee, Routledge, 2015). She has published extensively on independent filmmaking in Malaysia, and is organised the 9th Association of Southeast Asian Cinemas Conference in Kuala Lumpur in July 19-22, 2016. Her research interests include food and identity, migration and multiculturalism, and cosmopolitan solidarity. She is currently writing on Penang hawker food as intangible cultural heritage, and Korean migrants in Malaysia. Mohamed Ariff, a specialist in international economics, is currently a professor of Economics and Governance at the International Centre for



About the Authors 311

Education in Islamic Finance/INCEIF. Concurrently, he also holds the titles of professor emeritus at the Faculty of Economics and Administration, University of Malaya, and Distinguished Fellow at the Malaysian Institute of Economic Research. His book The Malaysian Economy: Pacific Connections (Oxford University Press, 1991) won the prestigious Tun Razak Award in 1993. Terence Lee is an associate professor in Communication and Media Studies and a Research Fellow of the Asia Research Centre at Murdoch University, Australia. He is an interdisciplinary researcher with an interest in the intersections of media, culture and politics in Asia, especially Singapore. He is the author or editor of several books, including: Singapore: Negotiating State and Society, 1965-2015 (with Jason Lim, Routledge, 2016), Change in Voting: Singapore’s 2015 General Election (with Kevin YL Tan, Ethos Books, 2016), Voting in Change: Politics of Singapore’s 2011 General Election (with Kevin YL Tan, Ethos Books, 2011) and The Media, Cultural Control and Government in Singapore (Routledge, 2010 and 2012). Lee Soo Ann is a retired professor of economics and business policy at the National University of Singapore (NUS). He is still teaching as a part-time senior fellow in the NUS department of economics and the LKY School of Public Policy, besides being on the adjunct faculty of the school of economics in the Singapore Management University. He is the author of The Public Sector and Economic Growth in Malaya and Singapore 1948-60 (Oxford University Press, 1974), Economic Planning and Project Evaluation (1977: Singapore University Press) and Singapore: From Place to Nation (Pearson Singapore, 2007, 2011 & 2014 editions) among other publications. He is currently the president of the Bible Society of Singapore. Lily Zubaidah Rahim is a specialist in authoritarian governance, democratisation and citizenship rights in Southeast Asia and the Muslim world. She is an associate professor at the Department of Government and International Relations at the University of Sydney and is the sole author and editor of three books published by Oxford University Press, Routledge and Palgrave MacMillan. She has authored numerous book chapters and international journal articles and co-edited several special issue journals. Her book The Singapore Malay Dilemma (Oxford University Press) is widely

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regarded as a seminal work on the Muslim community in Singapore and has been translated to the Malay language by the Malaysian National Institute of Translation. In 2012, her sole-authored journal article ‘Governing Muslims in Singapore’s Secular Authoritarian State’ was short-listed for the Boyer Prize by the Australian Journal of International Affairs (AJIA). Greg Lopez is a Research Fellow with the Murdoch University Executive Education Centre. He is also a fellow at the Asia Research Centre and a member of the Centre for Responsible Citizenship and Sustainability, both at Murdoch University’s School of Management and Governance in Perth, Western Australia. He also holds an ongoing visiting fellowship at the Department of Political and Social Change, College of Asia and the Pacific at the Australian National University. Broadly, his research interests are in understanding the links between individuals, institutions, economic growth and sustainable development. More specifically, he is interested in how these links shape the political economy and institutional arrangements of countries ‘stuck in the middle income trap’ in the Indo-Pacific region and Australia’s relationship with these economies. He has been educated both in Malaysia and Australia and holds a PhD in economics from the Australian National University. A.B. Shamsul is professor in Social Anthropology at the Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia (UKM). He was Dean, Faculty of Social Sciences and Humanities (1997-1999), Director, Institute of the Malay World & Civilization (ATMA), 1999-2007, Founding Director, Institute of Occidental Studies (IKON) 2005-2007 and the Founding Director, Institute of Ethnic Studies (KITA), UKM, from 2007 to date. He has published widely locally and internationally on development studies, Islamic modernity, colonialism and knowledge production, nations and nationalism, identity formation and popular culture and edited (2007) the Module on Ethnic Relations, a compulsory university course on ethnic relations, for 21 Malaysian public universities. In 2008 he won the Laureate Academic Prize of the prestigious Fukuoka Asian Cultural Prize, Japan. Most recently he was elevated to the position of Distinguished Professor by the Ministry of Higher Education, Malaysia. Bilveer Singh is an adjunct senior fellow at the Centre of Excellence for National Security (CENS) at the S. Rajaratnam School of International



About the Authors 313

Studies (RSIS) and associate professor at the Department of Political Science, National University of Singapore. He was acting head, CENS from January to December 2010. He graduated with Masters and PhD in International Relations from the Australian National University. His current research interests include studying regional security issues focusing on the rise and the management of Islamist terrorism in Southeast Asia, security issues in Indonesia, especially the challenge of separatism in Papua, the role of great powers in Southeast Asia, especially China and India, as well as the domestic and foreign policies of Singapore. He has published widely, his latest work being on the Rohingyas in Myanmar. Currently, Bilveer is the President of the Political Science Association of Singapore. Ross Tapsell is a lecturer at the Australian National University’s College of Asia and the Pacific. He researches the media in Indonesia and Malaysia. His main research interests include Southeast Asian society, with a particular interest in digital technologies and their relationship to society, culture, media and politics. Upon completion of his PhD in History, Ross was a recipient of the Australian Government Endeavour Post doctorate Award. He has been a Visiting Fellow at The University of Indonesia (Jakarta), Airlangga University (Surabaya) and Indiana University (Bloomington, US). He has previously worked in Indonesia with The Jakarta Post and the Lombok Post. Ross is involved in a number of Southeast-Asia activities at the ANU, including the Indonesia Project, the Southeast Asia Institute, and the academic news/analysis website New Mandala. He is also on the editorial board of the scholarly journal Asiascape: Digital Asia (Brill). Wee Chong Hui was born in Sarawak in 1957. She has a B.Sc in Resource Economics from Universiti Pertanian Malaysia (1981), a masters and doctorate in economics from University Malaya. She has worked on Malaysian development issues – macroeconomic policies, public finance, regional disparities and federalism – for various United Nations agencies, International Labour Organization, Forum of Federations, and research institutes and universities in Malaysia and other countries. She was a professor of economics in Universiti Teknologi MARA before retiring in 2015. Ms Wee has been a volunteer in the Sarawak Women’s Council and Sarawak Counselling Association. She has been a volunteer in the Sarawak Family Planning Association since 1996.

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Bridget Welsh is an Associate Professor of Political Science at John Cabot University in Rome. She specialises in Southeast Asian politics, with particular focus on Malaysia, Myanmar and Singapore. She has edited/ written numerous books including, Reflections: The Mahathir Years (2004), Legacy of Engagement in Southeast Asia (2008), Impressions of the Goh Chok Tong Years (2009), Democracy Takeoff? The B.J. Habibie Period (2013), Awakening: The Abdullah Badawi Years in Malaysia (2013) (a Malay edition Bangkit was published in 2014) and The End of UMNO? Essays on Malaysia’s Dominant Party (2016). She is the Asian Barometer Survey Southeast Asia core lead, and is currently directing the survey project in Malaysia and advising the project in Myanmar. She is also a Senior Research Associate at the Center for East Asia Democratic Studies of National Taiwan University, a Senior Associate Fellow of The Habibie Center, a University Fellow of Charles Darwin University and a Senior Advisor for Freedom House. Meredith L. Weiss is professor of political science at the University at Albany, State University of New York. She is the author of Student Activism in Malaysia: Crucible, Mirror, Sideshow (Cornell SEAP/NUS Press, 2011) and Protest and Possibilities: Civil Society and Coalitions for Political Change in Malaysia (Stanford, 2006), as well as numerous journal articles and book chapters, and editor or co-editor of six volumes, most recently, the Routledge Handbook of Contemporary Malaysia (2015), Electoral Dynamics in Malaysia: Findings from the Grassroots (ISEAS/SIRD, 2014), and Global Homophobia: States, Movements, and the Politics of Oppression (Illinois, 2013). Her research addresses political mobilisation and contention, the politics of development, forms of collective identity, and electoral politics in Southeast Asia. Amanda Whiting is an associate professor with Melbourne Law School’s Asian Law Centre, where she has been Associate Director (Malaysia) since 2004. Her research is primarily in the area of human rights institutions and practices in the Asia-Pacific Region, gender and religion, and Malaysian social and legal history generally. She is the author of several articles and book chapters about the Malaysian Legal Profession, human rights in Malaysia, the colliding and conflicting understandings of secular and religious law in Malaysia (particularly as they affect women and children), and of a monograph about women’s involvement in the seventeenth-century



About the Authors 315

English revolution. At present she is writing a history of the legal profession in Malaysia, focusing on its role as an agent of civil society. Steven C. M. Wong is Deputy Chief Executive of the Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ISIS) Malaysia. He also heads the economics division of the Institute. He has been involved in the public policy arena for more than two decades, 20 years of which has been with ISIS Malaysia. He spent a further eight years in the private sector where he held positions in management consultancy, economic research, fund management, corporate finance and capital markets. He has been published by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the East Asian Institute at the University of California, Berkeley, the Australian National University and the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS), Singapore. His latest publications are on ASEAN-China trade for China Economic Quarterly (June 2013) and a chapter on ‘Malaysia’s financial sector and capital market in Malaysia: Policies and Issues in Economic Development’ published (ISIS Malaysia, 2011).