Redefining Greek–US Relations, 1974–1980: National Security and Domestic Politics [1st ed.] 9783030476557, 9783030476564

This book provides the first bilateral study of Greek–US relations during Greece’s transition to democracy in the second

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Redefining Greek–US Relations, 1974–1980: National Security and Domestic Politics [1st ed.]
 9783030476557, 9783030476564

Table of contents :
Front Matter ....Pages i-xiv
Introduction (Athanasios Antonopoulos)....Pages 1-15
A Relationship in Transition: The 1974 Cyprus Crisis (Athanasios Antonopoulos)....Pages 17-53
Mapping a New Strategy: Karamanlis, Ford, and the Turkish Arms Embargo (Athanasios Antonopoulos)....Pages 55-94
Practising Confrontation: DCAs and Aegean Crisis (Athanasios Antonopoulos)....Pages 95-131
Hope on the Horizon: Carter’s Election (Athanasios Antonopoulos)....Pages 133-169
Changing Course: Repealing the Turkish Arms Embargo (Athanasios Antonopoulos)....Pages 171-208
The Final Act: Reintegrating Greece into NATO (Athanasios Antonopoulos)....Pages 209-240
Conclusions (Athanasios Antonopoulos)....Pages 241-250
Back Matter ....Pages 251-272

Citation preview

SECURITY, CONFLICT AND COOPERATION IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD

Redefining Greek–US Relations, 1974–1980 National Security and Domestic Politics athanasios antonopoulos

Security, Conflict and Cooperation in the Contemporary World

Series Editors Effie G. H. Pedaliu LSE Ideas London, UK John W. Young University of Nottingham Nottingham, UK

The Palgrave Macmillan series, Security, Conflict and Cooperation in the Contemporary World aims to make a significant contribution to academic and policy debates on cooperation, conflict and security since 1900. It evolved from the series Global Conflict and Security edited by Professor Saki Ruth Dockrill. The current series welcomes proposals that offer innovative historical perspectives, based on archival evidence and promoting an empirical understanding of economic and political cooperation, conflict and security, peace-making, diplomacy, humanitarian intervention, nationbuilding, intelligence, terrorism, the influence of ideology and religion on international relations, as well as the work of international organisations and non-governmental organisations.

More information about this series at http://www.palgrave.com/gp/series/14489

Athanasios Antonopoulos

Redefining Greek–US Relations, 1974–1980 National Security and Domestic Politics

Athanasios Antonopoulos School of Humanities, Languages and Social Science Griffith University Gold Coast, QLD, Australia

Security, Conflict and Cooperation in the Contemporary World ISBN 978-3-030-47655-7 ISBN 978-3-030-47656-4 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-47656-4 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, express or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Cover illustration: Courtesy Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

To my family

Acknowledgements

The book has been long in the making with plenty of additions and revisions along the way. I would like to thank the editors of the Palgrave Macmillan book series Security, Conflict and Cooperation in the Contemporary World, Dr. Effie G. H. Pedaliu, and Professor John W. Young for accepting my proposal and supporting this project since the beginning. Their feedback along with the reviewers’ reports on the manuscript have sharpened my arguments, analysis, and interpretations. Equally, I would like to thank Dr. Fabian Hilfrich and Professor Juliet Kaarbo for their suggestions, advice, and guidance. I also want to acknowledge Professor Evanthis Hatzivassiliou for his advice and discussions with me on matters of Greek foreign policy during the Cold War. Last but not least, I want to thank my reviewer Dr. Karen Baston, as well as Molly Beck and Maeve Sinnott at Palgrave Macmillan for their continued help. Like any historical research the book is the result of detailed archival research in governmental records. The book I believe offers a unique perspective on the topic because of its multi-archival methodology. The archival collection at the Constantine G. Karamanlis Foundation is priceless for modern Greek historical research and I thank the staff for assisting me in every possible way. Special thanks go to Dr. Christos Anastasiou, Head of the Historical Archive, for his advice and support during all my research visits there. I am also grateful to the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library in Ann Arbor, MI, for awarding me a research travel grant to cover costs of visiting the Library. The archivists at the Presidential Library

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pointed me to the most appropriate collections saving me valuable time. Similarly, I deeply appreciate the support of the staff at the Jimmy Carter Presidential Library in Atlanta, GA. Thanks to their assistance I was able to consult newly declassified records during my 2018 visit, which proved irreplaceable. Finally, I would like to thank my current and past institutions Griffith University and the University of Edinburgh for their support in writing the book. Considering the personal toll that writing takes, completing the book was only possible thanks to the constant support of my family and friends. Above all, I would like to thank my parents Evangelos and Margarita and my aunt Erasmia for their constant encouragement and support.

Contents

1

1

Introduction

2

A Relationship in Transition: The 1974 Cyprus Crisis A History Repeated An Inter-alliance Crisis Kissinger and US Policy Greece Leaves NATO The Impact on Washington The European (Non-)Option The Soviet Card Turning Back to Washington

17 19 22 34 36 39 43 48 52

3

Mapping a New Strategy: Karamanlis, Ford, and the Turkish Arms Embargo A New Government: Advantages and Limitations How Far and How Close? Congress and the Arms Embargo Changing Tactics The White House: An Indispensable Ally New Approaches Emerging

55 56 63 76 82 88 93

Practising Confrontation: DCAs and Aegean Crisis Greek Negotiations, Turkish Agreement

95 97

4

ix

x

CONTENTS

Reacting to the News from Washington Making the Most of It! Tension in the Aegean How to Prevent a Clash? Taking the Dispute to the United Nations End of the Ford Administration

102 109 115 118 123 125

5

Hope on the Horizon: Carter’s Election Carter: The Greek Candidate? Carter in the White House The Clifford Mission: Washington’s Intentions … … Meet Athens’ Objectives Another Failed Cyprus Negotiation Greek–US DCA Negotiations Stalemate Again New President, Old Dilemmas

133 134 147 150 155 159 163 165 168

6

Changing Course: Repealing the Turkish Arms Embargo Progress at Last? A Changing Political Landscape Hopes Dispelled Vance in the Region Decision to Repeal the Arms Embargo Reacting to the News from Washington Working with the White House Working on Capitol Hill End of the Collective Approach

171 172 175 180 183 190 192 197 201 206

7

The Final Act: Reintegrating Greece into NATO A New Special Relationship? How to Deal with Turkey Limits of Confrontation Regional Instability End of the Balanced Approach Carter and Greek Reintegration into NATO

209 210 216 219 229 233 237

8

Conclusions

241

CONTENTS

xi

Bibliography

251

Index

265

List of Abbreviations

AHEPA CGKF CIA CKP CSCE DCA DECA DNSA DPC EAP EDA EDIK EEC EK/ND EP ERE FCO FIR FRUS GRFPL HIRC IBRD ICAO ICJ IMF

American Hellenic Educational Progressive Association Constantine G. Karamanlis Foundation Central Intelligence Agency Constantine Karamanlis Papers Conference of Security and Cooperation in Europe Defence Cooperation Agreement Defence and Economic Cooperation Agreement Digital National Security Archive Defence Planning Committee Evangelos Averoff Papers United Democratic Left [Greek party] Union of the Democratic Centre [Greek party] European Economic Community Centre Union/Movement of the New Political Forces [Greek party] National Front [Greek party] National Radical Union [Greek party] Foreign and Commonwealth Office Flight Information Region Foreign Relations of the United States Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library House International Relations Committee International Bank for Reconstruction and Development International Civil Aviation Organisation International Court of Justice International Monetary Fund xiii

xiv

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

JCPL JP KKE LTDP MBFR MC MFA NARA ND NOTAM NSC OEG OMB PASOK RPP SACEUR SALT SBA TNA UN UNFICYP UNGA UNSC USG WSAG WSBA

Jimmy Carter Presidential Library Justice Party [Turkish Party] Communist Party of Greece [Greek political party] Long-Term Defence Programme Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions Military Committee Ministry of Foreign Affairs National Archives and Records Administration New Democracy [Greek party] Notice to Airmen National Security Council Open-Ended Group Office of Management and Budget PanHellenic Socialist Movement [Greek party] Republican People’s Party [Turkish party] Supreme Allied Commander Europe Strategic Arms Limitation Talks Sovereign Base Areas (Cyprus) The National Archives United Nations United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus United Nations General Assembly United Nations Security Council United States Government Washington Special Action Group Western Sovereign Base Area

CHAPTER 1

Introduction

The book redefines the relationship between Greece and the United States in the 1970s. Greek–US relations have been a hotly debated issue. The collapse of the seven-year-long dictatorship in Greece and the subsequent political transition to democracy during the summer of 1974 signalled the beginning of a distinct period for bilateral relations. The period of military rule heightened anti-American sentiments and the widespread condemnation of Washington’s stance during the Turkish invasion of Cyprus led scholarly arguments about a radical change in Greek–US ties.1 Historians in the late 1970s and 1980s debated whether the Greek conservative governments from 1974 to 1980 pursued a policy independent of US intervention.2 Modern research renders this approach

1 Constantine Svolopoulos, H Eλληνικ η´ Eξ ωτ ερικ η´ Π oλιτ ικ η, ´ 1945–1981 [Greek Foreign Policy, 1945–1981], 8th ed. (Athens: Estia, 2008), Vol. 2, 205–217. 2 Theodore Couloumbis, ‘A New Model of Greek–American Relations: From Dependence to Independence’, in Theodore Couloumbis and John Iatrides (eds), Greek American Relations: A Critical Review (New York, NY: Pella, 1980), 197–206; Theodore A. Couloumbis, Π ρ oβληματ ´ α ελλην o-αμερικανικ ων ´ σ χ šσ εων: π ως αντ ιμετ ωπ ι´ζ ετ αι η εξ αρτ ´ ισ η [Problems in Greek–US Relations: How to Deal with Dependence] (Athens: Estia, 1978); Van Coufoudakis, ‘Greek Foreign Policy since 1974: Quest for Independence’, Journal of Modern Greek Studies, Vol. 6, 1988, 57–78.

© The Author(s) 2020 A. Antonopoulos, Redefining Greek–US Relations, 1974–1980, Security, Conflict and Cooperation in the Contemporary World, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-47656-4_1

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to be outdated.3 Greek foreign policy during the Cold War was more complex than has been previously argued as was the Greek–US alliance. The United States ‘came’ to Greece after the end of the Second World War. In 1947 President Harry S. Truman called on the US Congress to authorise aid for Greece and Turkey to face the communist threat.4 Soviet pressure on Turkey and the Greek civil war became two of the earliest turning points that led to the Cold War. Support for close relations with both Greece and Turkey became one of the foundations of US policy in the Eastern Mediterranean. In the following decades Athens and Washington shared a close yet turbulent relationship. The United States progressively emerged as Greece’s closest ally. During the formative decades of post-war reconstruction and development the United States even became an integral element, otherwise known as a factor, in Greek modern politics. While its role in Greek politics has often been overstated, Washington played an important role. A number of recent works have presented a more detailed picture of post-war Greek foreign policy as well as relations with the Western superpower and the western alliance more broadly. These works emphasise Athens’ ability to pursue and secure its national interest to a greater extent than has previously been recognised.5

3 Eirini Karamouzi, Greece, the EEC and the Cold War, 1974–1979: The Second Enlargement (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014); James Edward Miller, The United States and the Making of Modern Greece: History and Power, 1950–1974 (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2009); Effie G. H. Pedaliu, ‘The US, the Balkans and Détente, 1963–1973’, in Svetozar Rajak, Konstantina E. Botsiou, Eirini Karamouzi, and Evanthis Hatzivassiliou (eds), The Balkans in the Cold War (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 201–203; Sotiris Rizas, ‘Atlanticism and Europeanism in Greek Foreign and Security Policy in the 1970s’, Journal of Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, Vol. 8(1), 2008, 51–66. 4 For background and overview of Greek–US relations see John O. Iatrides, ‘The United States and Greece in the Twentieth Century’, in Theodore Couloumbis, Theodore Kariotis, and Fotini Bellou (eds), Greece in the Twentieth Century (London: Frank Cass, 2003), 69–110; John O. Iatrides, ‘Greece and the Birth of Containment: An American Perspective’, in Svetozar Rajak, Konstantina E. Botsiou, Eirini Karamouzi, and Evanthis Hatzivassiliou (eds), The Balkans in the Cold War (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 3–28. 5 See Alexis Papachelas, O βιασ μ´oς τ ης ελληνικ ης ´ δημoκρατ ι´ας : O αμερικανικ o´ ς Π αρ αγ ´ ων, 1947–1967 [The Rape of Greek Democracy, The American Factor, 1947–1967] 22nd ed. (Athens: Estia, 2017); Evanthis Hatzivassiliou, Greece and the Cold War: Frontline State, 1952–1967 (London: Routledge,

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The book presents a much-needed reevaluation of Greek–US relations during the 1970s. It examines and analyses the bilateral relationship between Greece and the United States focussing simultaneously on both sides’ policies, strategies, and objectives for the first time. It argues that a diptych of national security and domestic politics shaped this Cold War alliance. In the mid-1970s Greek conservative decision-makers perceived that their country faced a dual threat. As a member of the western alliance, Greece confronted a direct communist threat on its northern border. In addition, Ankara’s decision to resolve the Cyprus crisis with the use of military force transformed Turkey into another perceived threat. Greek– Turkish disputes dated back decades and the two Western allies had experienced periods of both tranquillity and tension. The Cyprus crisis of 1974 represented a turning point. Ankara deployed military forces twice, on 20 July and 14 August. The 14 August operation took place amid diplomatic efforts to solve the crisis. The Greek political leadership interpreted Turkey’s military operation as Ankara’s conscious decision to use force to resolve the dispute in its favour. This perception did not bode well for bilateral Greek–Turkish disputes about their common Aegean Sea border. The Greek conservative governments of the 1974–1980 period had to implement a national security doctrine that confronted both perceptions of threat. In the meantime, domestic considerations influenced the Greek decision-making process. Strong national and nationalistic sentiments marked Greek internal and party politics in the post-Junta 1970s.6 US ties with the Greek military dictatorship, which public opinion regarded as the raison d’être for its seven-year-long grip on power, sparked a strong antiAmerican and anti-NATO movement. Washington’s passive public stance during the Cyprus crisis strengthened the anti-American movement. Turkish expansionism and irredentism over the Aegean fuelled national sentiment further. A significant portion of the electorate in the 1974 and 1977 general elections supported parties that objected to any negotiation with Ankara over the bilateral disputes. Similarly, the Greek opposition 2006); Dionysios Chourchoulis, The Southern Flank of NATO, 1951–1959: Military Strategy or Political Stabilization (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2014). 6 For a concise account of Greek party politics see Sotiris Rizas, Π αρατ αξ ´ εις και κ o´ μματ α σ τ ην μετ απ oλεμικ η´ Eλλαδα ´ [Factions and Parties in Post-War Greece] (Athens: Estia, 2016), esp. Chapter 3.

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parties called for limiting Greek–US relations. The Greek governments could not ignore the public attitude without facing significant political costs. Relations with Greece also served US security policy. Incorporating both Greece and Turkey into the western alliance represented a central pillar of US policy in the Eastern Mediterranean. Ongoing Greek–Turkish disputes challenged US relations with both while the Cyprus crisis left NATO’s southern flank in ruins. The Republican administration, which dealt with the immediate implications of the crisis, considered a policy of equal distance as best serving US interests. The subsequent Democratic administration followed the same approach. The clash between the legislative and executive branches of US government about the limits of presidential control over foreign policy further complicated US relations with Greece. The Cyprus crisis caused another conflict between the US Congress and the White House. Following the second wave of Turkish military operations in Cyprus the US Congress enacted an arms embargo suspending all US military assistance to Turkey despite opposition from the White House. The underlying reasons for congressional support for an arms embargo were complex and the relevant chapter below presents them in detail. The arms embargo, however, presented the United States as siding with Greece. Consequently, US domestic politics complicated the policies that both President Gerald R. Ford and his successor President James Earl ‘Jimmy’ Carter developed towards Greece. This monograph untangles their policies and strategies looking at the Greek and US decision-making process simultaneously. Greek–US cooperation represented an unequal relationship between the Western superpower and a junior ally. Accordingly, the book belongs to the wider scholarship assessing the role of smaller states in the Cold War. Publications have predominately approached Greek–US relations in the early Cold War within a patron–client framework. This framework essentially assigns the client state, in this case Greece, the subservient role as being unable and unwilling to challenge the policy, decisions, and interests of its powerful patron, i.e. the United States, for fear of losing its support.7 Geopolitical considerations due to the bipolarity of the Cold War placed Greece firmly in the West, thus intensifying its 7 Jon Kofas, Intervention and Underdevelopment: Greece during the Cold War (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1989).

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necessary dependence on the United States.8 Consequently, the Greek conservative governments of the period could not pursue an ambitious foreign policy that aimed at independence from Washington’s patronage and guidance. For example, based on this interpretation of Greek–US cooperation Kassimeris concludes that ‘Greece was not only committed to the western alliance but also served it submissively—with the occasional outburst necessary to ease public opinion’.9 However, a close examination of Greek and US primary sources paints a different picture. Between 1974 and 1980 Greek governments challenged and influenced US policy towards Cyprus, Greece, and Turkey. Greek conservative governments during the period under review did not shy away from pursuing Greek national interests even if they clashed with US policy. Rather, Athens developed policies and strategies aimed at bringing Washington closer to Greek objectives. The research, therefore, concurs with recent conceptual and empirical arguments about the ability of small—or smaller—states to utilise available margins of manoeuvre to safeguard their independence and pursue their interests during the Cold War.10 In recent years there has been significant interest in the foreign policy analysis of medium and smaller states and their interactions with the superpowers.11 These new interpretations move away from the traditional Cold War bipolarity and the dominant role of the superpowers and underline the ability of members of blocs, especially within the western alliance, as well as non-state actors to influence international and regional developments. The case of Greece and the ever-present Greek–Turkish disputes add to this approach. Subsequent chapters demonstrate the margin of

8 Kostas Yfantis, ‘Aναζητωντας ´ Eπιλoγšς: τρατηγικšς εξισoρρ´oπησης και συστημικη´ πoλικ´oτητα [Seeking Choices: Strategies of Balancing and Systemic Conflict]’, in Constantine Arvanitopoulos and Marilena Koppa (eds), 30 Xρ o´ νια Eλληνικ ης ´ Eξ ωτ ερικ ης ´ Π oλιτ ικ ης ´ , 1974–2004 [30 Years of Greek Foreign Policy, 1974–2004] (Athens: Livani, 2005), 430. 9 Christos Kassimeris, Greece and the American Embrace: Greek Foreign Policy towards Turkey, the US and the Western Alliance (London: I.B. Tauris, 2010), 136. 10 Laurien Crump and Susanna Erlandsson, ‘Smaller Powers in Cold War Europe’, in Laurien Crump and Susanna Erlandsson (eds), Margins for Manoeuvre in Cold War Europe: The Influence of Smaller Powers (London: Routledge, 2019), 12. 11 Paschalis Pechlivanis, America and Romania in the Cold War: A Differentiated Détente, 1969–1980 (London: Routledge, 2019); Svetozar Rajak, Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union in the Early Cold War: Reconciliation, Comradeship, Confrontation, 1953–1957 (New York, NY: Routledge, 2012).

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manoeuvre that Greek governments enjoyed vis-à-vis the United States and the western alliance more broadly when pursuing their national security policies. Cold War considerations posed limitations but also provided opportunities for countries like Greece. Decision-makers did not hesitate to seize them. When researching the Greek–US relationship during the 1970s, superpower détente emerges as another factor that complicated this bilateral alliance. The easing of East–West tensions and the apparent cooperation between the competing superpowers influenced Greek decision-makers’ considerations about the country’s standing in the world, the region, and the western alliance. While it aimed to consolidate division of the world, superpower détente challenged internal cohesion within the blocs. The easing of tensions often enabled underlying regional conflicts to rise to the surface. The case of Greece and Turkey confirms that, as Hanhimäki writes, ‘when détente flourished, transatlantic relations suffered’.12 Greece and Turkey prioritised their strictly defined national interests over the imperative of preserving the collective security of the previous decades. In addition to the general impact on the East–West relationship, détente had a unique implication for the Balkans. Balkan states on both sides of the Iron Curtain viewed détente as the superpowers’ conscious disregard for regional national considerations. The early stages of détente gave both Ankara and Athens a sense of ‘abandonment’ by Washington.13 In the name of preserving US–Soviet relations, the Western superpower appeared to wilfully ignore their national sensitivities. During the 1974 Cyprus crisis this sense of abandonment engulfed Greece and the Greek political leadership. A desire to preserve US–Soviet cooperation and to safeguard Turkish–US relations intensified Greek insecurities about Washington’s commitment to the bilateral relationship. These insecurities prompted, as the book explains, the Greek conservative quest for a strategy that guaranteed US solidarity. Détente, though, also influenced US responses to Greek– Turkish disputes.14 The United States’ exclusive focus on the Soviet 12 Jussi M. Hanhimäki, The Rise and Fall of Détente: American Foreign Policy and the Transformation of the Cold War (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2013), 62. 13 Pedaliu, ‘The US, the Balkans and Détente’, 201–203. 14 For an overview on détente and Greek–US policy see Konstantina Maragkou, ‘The

Relevance of D´etente to American Foreign Policy: The Case of Greece, 1967–1979’, Diplomacy & Statecraft, Vol. 25(4), 2014, 646–668.

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Union subsided in the 1970s and Washington allowed more time for accommodating Greece and Turkish requests and objectives. In order to avoid dissatisfying either Athens or Ankara, Washington opted for strict neutrality expecting that in the meantime Greece and Turkey would reach a common understanding on issues affecting their smooth cooperation with their NATO obligations. The end of détente reinvigorated superpower confrontation and the primacy of collective Western interests. Against this background Greek foreign policy entered a new period that was characterised by multilateralism. The Greek government of the post-1974 period sought to develop and expand the country’s European, Atlantic, and Balkan relationships simultaneously. The Greek conservative governments of the period under review in this monograph aimed at maintaining and reforming Greek links with the United States and NATO, strengthening ties with Western Europe through participation in the European integration project, and pursuing a Greek version of Ostpolitik by promoting cross-bloc cooperation in the Balkans and establishing economic ties with the Soviet Union.15 The Constantine Karamanlis governments of the 1970s prioritised participation in the European Economic Community (EEC) and devoted significant time and resources for speedy completion of the application process. Karamouzi highlights the link between this foreign policy goal and the domestic political process and underlines the desire for EEC membership as an integral part of the democratisation process.16 What is more, Cold War considerations about Greece’s future and place within the western alliance influenced collective and individual European responses. At the same time Greek governments utilised the opportunities détente offered to promote Balkan cooperation and establish ties with the Soviet

15 Eirini Karamouzi, ‘Telling the Whole Story: America, the EEC and Greece, 1974– 1976’, in Antonio Varsori and Guia Migani (eds), Europe in the International Arena during the 1970s: Entering a Different World (Brussels and New York, NY: Peter Lang, 2011), 355–374; Eirini Karamouzi, ‘Managing the “Helsinki Spirit” in the Balkans: The Greek Initiative for Balkan Co-operation, 1975–1976’, Diplomacy & Statecraft, Vol. 24(4), 2013, 597–618; Sotiris Rizas, ‘Managing a Conflict between Allies: United States Policy towards Greece and Turkey in Relation to the Aegean Dispute, 1974–76’, Cold War History, Vol. 9(3), 2009, 367–387. 16 Karamouzi, Greece, the EEC and the Cold War, 19.

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Union.17 Athens considered another way of containing Turkey along with economic benefits. The new multilateral foreign policy represented a response to the constant perception and fear of abandonment that underpinned Greek security considerations between 1974 and 1980.18 There is a sense when studying modern Greek politics of a lone power confronting two strong foes: the Soviet Union and its satellite states and Turkey. Anti-American and anti-NATO sentiments threatened to isolate Greece further from its natural allies the United States and Europe. The Greek public viewed Greece’s Western European allies generally favourably thanks to their condemnation of the Greek dictatorship. European integration counteracted such a threat since it placed Greece firmly in the core of Western cooperation: Greek participation in the EEC itself also aimed at acting as a safeguard for Greece’s security challenges. Aspiration to join the EEC did not aim to lessen Greek links with the United States.19 Within this recent interpretation of Greek foreign policy, this new monograph analyses how Greek multilateralism of the 1970s manifested in the country’s relations with the United States. It suggests that a distinction between Greek foreign relations and Greek national security allows a better understanding of Athens’ view of Washington. The Greek approach towards the United States tells only half the story. US administrations of the 1970s pursued their own policy goals and objectives when dealing with Greece. The book’s equal focus on Greek and US policies and strategies adds it to a string of recent publications on US foreign policy during the Ford and Carter years. There is an increasing trend to study the history of US foreign relations in the 1970s collectively.20 This monograph reaffirms the sense of continuity in terms of policy between the Republican and Democratic administrations of the era of détente bringing this argument to relations with Greece

17 Lykourgos Kourkouvelas, ‘Détente as a Strategy: Greece and the Communist World, 1974–1979’, International History Review, Vol. 35(5), 2013, 1052–1067. 18 Yfantis, ‘Seeking Choices’, 432. 19 Rizas, ‘Atlanticism and Europeanism’, 51–66. 20 See Malcolm M. Craig, America, Britain

and Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons Programme, 1974–1980: A Dream of Nightmare Proportions (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017).

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and regional developments.21 However, continuity between Carter and Ford/Kissinger in terms of broader policy objectives did not exclude change.22 In the case of Greek–US relations the two administrations differed in terms of strategy—at least initially. The history of the Greek–US relationship confirms the view that President Ford focussed primarily on domestic politics and emphasised his intention to be remembered as the healer of the nation in the aftermath of the Watergate scandal.23 Scott Kaufman in Ambition, Pragmatism, and Party: A Political Biography of Gerald R. Ford sheds light on the intricacies of the Ford administration on both the domestic and foreign policy fronts.24 It remains an undisputed fact that Ford’s relative inexperience in foreign matters ensured that his Secretary of State and National Security Advisor until 1975 Henry A. Kissinger enjoyed ample influence in shaping US foreign policy.25 The Cyprus crisis of 1974 as well as Greek–US relations during his time in office reflect this argument best. Kissinger played a central role in shaping US policy in the region and his voice was clearly heard on all matters of cooperation between Athens and Washington. President Ford faithfully accepted his recommendations. Moving on to the Carter administration the book challenges the predominately negative view of Jimmy Carter’s accomplishments in foreign policy. It draws inspiration from Nancy Mitchell’s contribution to the Cambridge History of the Cold War edited volumes as well as her recent monumental Jimmy Carter in Africa: Race and the Cold War.26 Recent monographs on aspects of his presidency carry on this 21 Barbara Zanchetta, The Transformation of American International Power in the 1970s (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 10. 22 William Stueck, ‘Placing Jimmy Carter’s Foreign Policy’, in Gary M. Fink and Hugh Davis Graham (eds), The Carter Presidency: Policy Choices in the Post-New Deal Era (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1998), 247. 23 John Robert Green, The Presidency of Gerald R. Ford (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1995), 193. 24 Scott Kaufman, Ambition, Pragmatism, and Party: A Political Biography of Gerald R. Ford (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2017). 25 Jussi Hanhimäki, The Flawed Architect: Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Policy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 362. 26 Nancy Mitchell, ‘The Cold War and Jimmy Carter’, in Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad (eds), The Cambridge History of the Cold War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), Vol. 3: Endings, 66–88; Nancy Mitchell, Jimmy Carter in Africa: Race and the Cold War (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2016).

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new interpretation.27 However, the perception of Carter as an unsuccessful president persists. Significant publications identify a number of causes for his failure. Issues such as inconsistency, inherent contradiction of objectives, and internal conflicts rendered the sole Democratic administration of the 1970s ineffective and inefficient.28 None of these elements, however, are present in the case of Greek–US relations. There is an interesting contradiction in the treatment of the subject. Jimmy Carter spoke frequently on issues relating to Cyprus, Greece, and Turkey both before and during his time in the White House. Yet, the few references that occur focus on his role in the repeal of the arms embargo on Turkey.29 Despite the significance of the arms embargo, US involvement in Greek-related issues during the Carter years was broader than currently presented (as this book highlights). The book is the result of detailed research of Greek, US, and UK governmental records. Westad underlines the importance of multi-archival research for the study of allied relationships. This is the only way to avoid the narrow interpretations that national histories offer and have for far too long dominated the field.30 Similarly, Gaddis argues that a bilateral or multilateral approach is the only means available for measuring the influence of allies on superpower decision-making.31 This applies to the case of the Greek–US relationship between 1974 and 1980. Access to Greek records reveals the full extent and limitations of Athens’ efforts and ability to make its voice heard in Washington. 27 See Daniel Strieff, Jimmy Carter and the Middle East: The Politics of Presidential Diplomacy (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015). 28 See Scott Kaufman, Plans Unraveled: The Foreign Policy of the Carter Administration (DeKalb, IL: Northern Illinois University Press, 2008), 237; Gaddis Smith, Morality, Reason and Power: American Diplomacy in the Carter Years (New York, NY: Hill & Wang, 1986), 245; Jørgen Jensehaugen, Arab–Israeli Diplomacy under Carter: The US, Israel and the Palestinians (New York, NY: I.B. Tauris, 2018). 29 Chris Ioannides, Realpolitik in the Eastern Mediterranean: From Kissinger and the Cyprus Crisis to Carter and the Lifting of the Turkish Arms Embargo (New York: Pella, 2001), 305. 30 Odd Arne Westad, ‘The Cold War and International History of the Twentieth Century’, in Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad (eds), The Cambridge History of the Cold War, Vol. 1: Origins, 1945–1962 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 6. 31 John Lewis Gaddis, ‘On Starting All Over Again: A Naïve Approach to the Study of the Cold War’, in Odd Arne Westad (ed.), Reviewing the Cold War: Approaches, Interpretations and Theory (London: Frank Cass, 2000), 31.

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On the Greek side, the records of the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the first point of call for research in Greek foreign policy, remain inaccessible. Fortunately, the archive of the Greek Prime Minister of the period Constantine Karamanlis provides a valuable alternative and perhaps more than that. Relations with the United States affected key foreign policy questions including Greece’s role in NATO, Greece’s relations with Turkey, and the Cyprus problem. Karamanlis oversaw governmental policy personally and remained informed of all developments. The archive therefore contains many foreign policy documents. These include communications between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and various embassies such as the Greek embassies in Washington, Ankara, and Nicosia and the Greek Permanent Representation in NATO. These communications reveal Greek considerations on numerous issues directly or indirectly affecting Greek–US relations. Similarly, the archive includes internal policy papers for the prime minister’s information on relations with the United States, Turkey, and NATO. The Constantine Karamanlis Papers (CKP) on foreign policy issues provide an invaluable source for looking at internal Greek considerations. An additional valuable source of Greek information comes from the personal archive of the Greek Minister of National Defence of the period Evangelos Averoff-Tossitsa. Limited in comparison to the CKP the Evangelos Averoff Papers (EAP) detail the views of an important minister. While predominately focussing on national defence, the Averoff papers provide significant information on security considerations regarding Greek–US and Greek–NATO relations. The published 12-volume collection of documents from the Karamanlis Archive edited by Constantine Svolopoulos remains a valuable companion to Greek foreign and domestic policies and developments of the post-war period. The collection also includes a significant commentary on the context surrounding the events. The relevant volumes offer an irreplaceable resource for the timeline of events that compliments day-to-day policy records. The available sources are broader for the United States. The focus here is placed on records from the Department of State and the National Security Council. Due to the impact of the Cyprus crisis and Greek– US tensions, relations with Greece often reached the top level in the Ford administration. Hence, President Ford and Secretary Kissinger both closely monitored most aspects related to Greece. The records in the

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Ford Presidential Library provide an important insight into their decisionmaking. The recently declassified ‘Kissinger-Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, 1969–1977’ for the first time provide additional information regarding the handling of the Cyprus crisis between July and November 1974. Online records such as the Digital National Security Archive (DNSA) and memoranda of conversations available via the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library website represent another valuable source. Given the sensitivity of the issues involving Greece such as NATO defence planning and considerations for Greek–US base negotiations a number of records remain classified. The CKP provide greater information on these issues. The relevant documents have been carefully chosen due to potentially sensitive information regarding military capabilities and structures. The book does not focus on technical or military details but on the purely political considerations surrounding US bases in Greece. Sources are significantly more limited for the Carter administration than they are for Ford’s. The Jimmy Carter Presidential Library has declassified a number of records, particularly from National Security Council (NSC) staff. The NSA series the White House Central File, the Zbigniew Brzezinski Collection, and the Plains File, to mention the main collections consulted, all provide important insights on the administration’s approach towards Greece. The records, however, lack detailed internal information compared with the Ford records. The recently published 21st volume of the Foreign Relations of the United States focussing on Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus is a valuable addition to the materials available. Finally, Department of State telegrams up to 1979 fill in gaps such as Cyrus R. Vance’s considerations and policy objectives that originated from the Department of State and not the White House. The book also benefits from access to relevant records at the British National Archives. Greece and the United States maintained close cooperation and used direct channels of communication without the need of intermediates such as Britain. However, records relevant to NATO remain either classified or inaccessible. For instance, there is limited information in US records about discussions amongst the remaining NATO members—excluding Athens—during negotiations for Greek reintegration into NATO in line with restrictions on NATO documents. British records provide such information in relevant diplomatic dispatches from officials reporting back to London. Therefore, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) records, especially FCO 9 on Greece and FCO 46 on NATO, offer some valuable information for Chapter 7.

1

INTRODUCTION

13

Personal accounts and memoirs of the protagonists also provide important evidence. One of the most significant contributions to Greek foreign policy comes from the late Director General of the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs Ambassador Angelos Vlachos.32 His memoir emphasises his last days in public service during the crucial transitional period, while offering an interesting perspective on the internal conflicts that occurred within the national unity government. Greek Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the period Dimitrios Bitsios and Georgios Rallis also recount their experiences in handling the country’s external affairs. The career diplomat Bitsios remains particularly careful in his testimony on Greek–US cooperation revealing mainly his considerations towards US actors rather than the intricacies of the decision-making process.33 Nonetheless, at times he reveals his personal considerations regarding US actions that complement official records. Rallis emphasises the months leading to his becoming Prime Minister in 1980 following Karamanlis’ election to the Presidency of the Republic and his short period in office.34 Rallis oversaw Greece’s return to NATO and provides an insightful account of his party’s considerations regarding this decision. Another noteworthy contribution comes from a senior Greek Ambassador Vyron Theodoropoulos who served in the Greek Foreign Ministry, NATO, and the EEC. In a published interview Ambassador Theodoropoulos recounts and reveals the Greek government’s considerations regarding NATO within the broader context of superpower détente and Greek–Turkish tensions.35 Greek memoirs, however, are generally scarce and there is a tendency to focus on either Greek negotiations to enter the EEC or purely domestic developments36 for which the Karamanlis governments sought credit as a significant success.

32 Vlachos Angelos, Aπ oϕ oι´τ ησ η 1974: 25 Ioυλ´ιoυ–17 Noεμβρ´ιoυ [Graduation 1974: 25 July–17 November] (Athens: Oceanida, 2001). 33 Dimitris Bitsios, Π šρα απ o´ τ α σ  ´ ν oρα, 1974–1977 [Beyond the Borders, 1974– 1977], 2nd ed. (Athens: Estia, 1983); Dimitris Bitsios, Φ ´ λλα απ o´ šνα ημερ oλ´oγ ιo [Sheets from a Diary] (Athens: Estia, 1978). 34 Georgios Rallis, Ωρες ´ Eυθ ´ νης [Times of Duty] (Athens: Euroecdotiki, 1983). 35 Vyron Theodoropoulos, Διαδρ oμšς , O B ´ ρων Θε oδωρ o´ π oυλoς αϕηγ ε´ιτ αι σ τ ην Iν ω´ Aϕεντ o´ λη [Paths, Vyron Theodoropoulos Narrates to Ino Afendouli] (Athens: Potamos, 2005), 87. 36 Giannis Varvitsiotis, Oπ ´ ως τ α šζ ησ α, 1961–1981 [As I Lived It, 1961–1981] (Athens: Livani, 2012).

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There is a significant difference on the US side. Although primary sources leave no room for doubt that relations with Greece dominated the Ford and Carter administrations, personal accounts have devoted little attention to the Eastern Mediterranean. Kissinger provides more information than most on the Cyprus crisis and subsequent relations with Greece. However, his intention primarily lies on justifying his own actions and shifting the blame onto Athens on a number of factors that contradict the findings of this thesis as primary sources present the events.37 The same contradiction emerges in memoirs from the Carter administration.38 Carter, who spent much of his time during the 1976 campaign and after the election talking about the Cyprus problem, discusses it very little in his White House Diary. The former president mainly emphasises the difficulty he faced in trying to balance between Greek and Turkish pressures39 but he does not provide any insights on his considerations regarding the Eastern Mediterranean. Similarly, Secretary Vance singles out his personally appointed Counsellor to the Department of State Matthew Nimetz.40 Nimetz oversaw the administration’s policy towards the Cyprus problem and served as a crucial link with the Greek government—issues that Vance entirely overlooks in his memoirs. The starting point for the book is Greece’s transition from dictatorship to democracy that occurred in July 1974. The change amid critical times required the incoming Greek political leadership to redefine the country’s relationship with its principle ally the United States. The very fact that the incoming leaders turned to Washington for support underlined the continued importance they attached to the United States. The book concludes with Greece’s return to full NATO membership in October 1980. The election of 1981 could have been an alternative flashpoint. The Greek conservatives lost the election and the strongly anti-American socialist party PASOK came to power. Greek–US relations had once more to be redefined. Similarly, 1983 was another option since it was when Greece and the United States concluded a new agreement covering US

37 Kissinger, Years of Renewal, 235. 38 See, for example, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National

Security Adviser, 1977 –1981 (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1983). 39 Jimmy Carter, White House Diary (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 2010), 51. 40 Cyrus R. Vance, Hard Choices: Critical Years in America’s Foreign Policy (New York:

Simon & Schuster, 1983), 43.

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INTRODUCTION

15

bases in Greece. However, Greek reintegration into the military structure of NATO represents a more appropriate endpoint. With the return of Greece to full NATO membership, relations with the United States closed a circle that started with public tension and ended with public reconciliation. Greece left NATO in 1974 as a rejection of its allies’ positions, especially that of the United States, during the Cyprus crisis. The return, despite the lack of a resolution about Cyprus, signalled public acceptance from Athens and the United States and played a central role in Greek considerations in a changed and increasingly unstable global environment. As détente officially collapsed a new Greek government assumed power and a new president arrived at the White House. Greek and US relations entered a new period. Greek–US relations have operated on a new basis since the end of 1980. The book is arranged chronologically. The next three chapters cover the Ford presidency and the remaining ones analyse the Carter presidency. During the Ford administration Greece pursued an offensive approach. Greek policy-makers actively pushed the US administration to ensure it complied with their expectations. The public perception of the US administration having abandoned Greece in its time of need helped the Greek cause. Washington had to take steps to improve relations with Greece. The election of Carter enabled the United States to set the agenda on Greek–US relations. Carter was the pro-Greek candidate; hence, Athens had no reason not to work with Washington. Greece adopted a defensive stance that aimed to preserve its past gains. The book, therefore, addresses the complex relationship within the balance of power, internal considerations, domestic politics, and an ever-changing Cold War environment in the Eastern Mediterranean and the broader region.

CHAPTER 2

A Relationship in Transition: The 1974 Cyprus Crisis

Cooperation between the United States and Greece after the collapse of Greece’s military dictatorship represented a transitional phase. This period acted as a bridge between old and new approaches and strategies for both states. Intense Greek–Turkish tensions, Greece’s withdrawal from NATO’s military command, and a new wave of anti-Americanism marked a new era in Greek and US relations. Both states faced new challenges that required new responses that served their respective national interests. Upon assuming power in July 1974 Greece’s new political leadership turned to the country’s closest Cold War ally the United States for support. Athens hoped for Washington’s involvement in defusing the Cyprus crisis and preventing it from escalating into a Greek–Turkish war. This in turn would allow for a smooth political transition or metapolitefsi from authoritarianism to democracy. The sudden collapse of the military dictatorship left a political vacuum that pre-1967 political leaders stepped into fill. They faced an enormous task of safeguarding the democratisation process amid an unfolding crisis in Cyprus. Political figures from the right and centre–left of the political spectrum prioritised the need for establishing a direct link with the US Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger. Their preoccupation with enlisting his personal support reflected their conviction that Washington would and should assist Greece in a crisis. Kissinger did not disappoint; he made strong efforts to prevent escalation of a crisis that endangered the stability of © The Author(s) 2020 A. Antonopoulos, Redefining Greek–US Relations, 1974–1980, Security, Conflict and Cooperation in the Contemporary World, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-47656-4_2

17

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the western alliance. But, naturally, his primary preoccupation remained safeguarding US national interests. Turkish invasions of Cyprus on 20 July and 14 August and Greece’s withdrawal from NATO’s integrated military structure forced the US administration to review and reconsider its policy in the region. Superpower détente and the ensuing easing of East–West tensions allowed Greece and Turkey to prioritise their strictly defined national objectives. According to the US Department of State, Athens and Ankara viewed their interests over Cyprus as ‘far more vital than their collective interests in NATO and Western Europe’.1 This conclusion posed some hard questions about how the United States could respond to the Greek–Turkish crisis. To make matters worse the Cyprus crisis coincided with the US administration transitioning from President Richard M. Nixon to Gerald R. Ford. Kissinger, however, retained his central role in the Ford administration that ensured continuity in Washington’s response to the crisis. He directed a strictly defined balanced approach between Greece and Turkey as the best and only way to safeguard US bilateral relations with both of its allies. The balanced approach entailed Washington refraining from openly and publicly condemning, criticising, siding, or supporting either party. The US approach, particularly Washington’s response to the resumption of hostilities on 14 August 1974, disappointed the Greek government, but Washington’s response was better than none at all. In the following months the Greek leadership recognised that no other Western power was willing to engage with Athens’ expectations about responding to Turkey’s aggression. Meanwhile, Moscow and Washington maintained a common understanding towards the Cyprus crisis and Greece and Turkey more broadly. Hence, Greek decision-makers concluded that the United States remained the only ally that could and would play a role in the region. At the same time it was clear that simply expressing its requests, as Athens did before the second Turkish invasion of Cyprus, was not enough to ensure Washington’s support. The Greek government needed to develop a new strategy to force US support in matters related to Cyprus but above all on Greek–Turkish disputes more 1 Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library [hereafter GRFPL], National Security Adviser, Kissinger–Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, 1969–1977 [hereafter Kissinger–Scowcroft], Box 8, Cyprus Crisis (37), 8/14/74, Cyprus WSAG Meeting, 14 August 1974.

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generally. The events of the summer of 1974 caused detrimental and far-reaching implications for Greek and US relations that characterised the entire period between 1974 and 1980.

A History Repeated On 24 July 1974 military rule in Greece officially ended. This paved the way for democratisation in the country. The transition from military rule to civilian governance coincided with the realisation that neither the military leadership nor its puppet government could adequately deal with a crisis of their own creation—the 1974 Cyprus crisis. In 1967 a group of military colonels assumed power by overthrowing the democratic Greek government days before scheduled general elections.2 The colonels’ regime exercised power directly. Colonel George Papadopoulos, for example, became Minister of National Defence and shortly afterwards Prime Minister. Eventually, Papadopoulos rose to the office of ‘President of the Republic’ following the decision to abolish the monarchy. In late 1973 Brigadier Dimitrios Ioannides overthrew Papadopoulos following student demonstrations on 17 November known as the Polytechnic Uprising. Ioannides and his group of military officers held power, but they largely ruled from the shadows. Ioannides appointed figures loyal to him as the new Greek government. General Phaedon Gizikis therefore became ‘President of the Republic’ and lawyer Adamantios Androutsopoulos was named as ‘Prime Minister’. A few months later the regime triggered a military coup in Cyprus.3 On 15 July 1974 top Greek military officials set in motion a plan to intervene in the independent Republic of Cyprus. Their principal goal entailed overthrowing the elected Greek-Cypriot President of the Republic Archbishop Makarios III who had been in power since 1960. They intended to install a regime loyal to Athens. The coup in Cyprus

2 Alexis Papachelas, O βιασ μ´oς τ ης ελληνικ ης ´ δημoκρατ ι´ας : O αμερικανικ o´ ς Π αρ αγ ´ ων, 1947 –1967 [The Rape of Greek Democracy: The American Factor, 1947– 1967], 22nd ed. (Athens: Estia, 2017), 315–324. Papachelas offers a detailed look into Washington’s role during the 1967 coup. 3 See Richard Clogg, A Short History of Modern Greece, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986); Christopher Montague Woodhouse, The Rise and Fall of the Greek Colonels (London: Granada, 1985).

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triggered a reaction from Ankara.4 The reason for this was the complex constitutional and security agreements that underpinned the Republic of Cyprus. Following years of Greek-Cypriot guerrilla fighting against British colonial rule, Cyprus was proclaimed a republic under the treaties of Zurich and London in 1959.5 Political power was shared in the new republic between two ethnic communities the Greek-Cypriot majority and the Turkish-Cypriot minority.6 The two communities, although they usually formed separate settlements, were not geographically divided. This detail complicated subsequent efforts for a solution based on two separate ethnically based communities. A bizonal solution on a geographical basis requires permanent population exchange thus precluding refugee resettlement. A separate treaty guaranteed the status, constitution, and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus. Greece, Turkey, and Britain collectively accepted the role of guarantor powers. Following the actions of the Greek junta the Turkish government recalled its right under the Treaty of Guarantee of 1960 to deploy forces to the island for the protection of Turkish-Cypriots. However, unilateral actions were excluded from the Treaty as was the option of military intervention given that the Republic of Cyprus had become a member of the United Nations.7 During the 1960s the Republic of Cyprus frequently experienced domestic instability and intercommunal clashes. The tension between Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots often, if not always, resulted in tension between Athens and Ankara. The threat of war between these two NATO allies remained a possibility. As leader of the western alliance and both Greece and Turkey’s closest ally, the United States was expected to prevent a Greek–Turkish clash. It was for this reason that the United States, despite Washington’s reluctance, became involved in the Cyprus

4 Stavros Phycharis, Tα π αρασ κ ηνια ´ τ ης Aλλαγ η: ´ Io´ λιoς 1974 [Behind the Scenes of the Change: July 1974], special ed. (Athens: To Vima, 2013), 85. 5 William Mallinson, Cyprus: A Modern History (London: I.B. Tauris, 2009), 21–30. 6 Van Coufoudakis, Cyprus: A Contemporary Problem in Historical Perspective

(Minneapolis, MN: Modern Greek Studies, University of Minnesota, 2006), 75. 7 Angelos Vlachos, Δšκα Xρ o´ νια Kυπ ριακ o ´ [Ten Years of the Cyprus Problem], 2nd ed. (Athens: Estia, 2003), 268.

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question. During the 1964 crisis, the Johnson administration put Washington at the centre of the Cyprus–Greece–Turkey triangle.8 In 1963 Archbishop Makarios proposed amendments to the Cyprus constitution mainly regarding the distribution of power between the two communities. The Turkish government rejected the proposals outright without providing Turkish-Cypriots with any time for consideration. Clashes soon erupted between the two populations. Mediation efforts failed and by the summer there was speculation that the Turkish government was prepared for a military intervention. On 5 June the US President Lyndon B. Johnson warned the Turkish Prime Minister Mustafa ˙ ˙ Ismet Inönü against deploying Turkish forces on the island. Johnson’s letter cautioned Ankara that a unilateral action could prompt retaliation from Moscow. In such an event the United States would reconsider ˙ its obligation to support Turkey. Johnson’s letter restrained Inönü and avoided a Greek–Turkish clash, but the action harmed Turkish–US relations for years to come.9 In 1974 the United States faced a similar situation. Greek military actions on the island offered Ankara a compelling justification to launch an invasion. The Turkish government did not hesitate. On 20 July Turkish forces invaded the northern part of the island.10 This time Secretary Kissinger did not intend to repeat an action that endangered Turkish–US relations. Unable to prevent eruption of the crisis Washington focussed on managing it.11

8 H. W. Brands, Jr., ‘America Enters the Cyprus Tangle, 1964’, Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 23(3), July 1987, 349–350. 9 William L. Cleveland and Martin Bunton, History of Modern Middle East (Boulder,

CO: Westview Press, 2013), 266; Monteagle Stearns, Entangled Allies: U.S. Policy toward Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus (New York, NY: Council of Foreign Relations Press, 1992), 37. 10 Mehmet Ali Birand, Aπ o´ ϕασ η Aπ o´ βασ η [Decision Invasion] (Athens: Floros, 1984), 124. 11 Henry A. Kissinger, Years of Renewal (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1999), 219.

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An Inter-alliance Crisis From the early stages of the crisis the US Department of State observed the situation in the Eastern Mediterranean hourly as events unfolded.12 The Cyprus crisis coincided with the impact and implications of the Watergate scandal. Coming days before Nixon’s resignation events in the Cyprus–Greece–Turkey triangle coincided with transition to the Ford administration. The timing of the crisis has long fuelled speculation about the failure of the United States to play an active role in the prevention and early de-escalation of the crisis.13 Kissinger argued in his memoirs that he was unable to play a constructive role.14 However, it is also true that Nixon’s absence allowed Kissinger to strengthen his grip on US foreign policy decision-making.15 Scholarship continues to debate Kissinger’s role in the Turkish invasion of Cyprus and whether he did encourage outbreak of the crisis as some scholars claim.16 The focus here remains on the US policy after 23/24 July 1974 when the new civilian government in Greece assumed power. The book does not address the Secretary’s prior role in the Cyprus–Greece–Turkey triangle. However, now available US records show that Kissinger strived to defuse the Cyprus crisis, supported the ceasefire, and warned against a Greek–Turkish war from late July onwards. Despite the turmoil at the White House, the Department of State monitored the crisis closely. It set up the Cyprus Crisis Task Force and the Washington Special Actions Group to coordinate the US response immediately.17 In addition to Kissinger, other US officials, who were deeply

12 Sotiris Rizas, Oι Hνωμšνες Π oλιτ ε´ιες , η δικτ ατ oρ´ια τ ων σ υντ αγ ματ αρχ ων ´ και τ o Kυπ ριακ o´ ζ ητ ´ ημα, 1967 –1974 [The United States, the Colonels’ Dictatorship and the Cyprus Question, 1967–1974] (Athens: Patakis, 2002). 13 Christos Kassimeris, Greece and the American Embrace: Greek Foreign Policy toward Turkey, the US and the Western Alliance (London: I.B. Tauris, 2010), 95. 14 Kissinger, Years of Renewal, 219. 15 Jussi Hanhimäki, The Rise and Fall of Détente: American Foreign Policy and the

Transformation of the Cold War (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2013), 357. 16 William Mallinson, Kissinger and the Invasion of Cyprus: Diplomacy in the Eastern Mediterranean (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2016), 83–120; Andreas Constandinos, America, Britain and the Cyprus Crisis of 1974: Calculated Conspiracy or Foreign Policy Failure? (Milton Keynes: Author House, 2009). 17 On 15 July 1974 the first WSAG was convened with Kissinger acting as chairman. See GRFPL, Kissinger–Scowcroft, Davis, Box 7, Cyprus Crisis (3), 07/15/1974, Memorandum for Secretary Kissinger, ‘Minutes of the Washington Special Actions Group

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involved with efforts to mediate between the guarantor powers, included the Assistant Secretary for European Affairs Arthur A. Hartman and the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Joseph J. Sisco. Sisco travelled to the region and shuttled between Athens and Ankara during the early stages of the crisis.18 His visits aimed at better facilitating dialogue between the two governments and pushing both sides to accept London’s invitation for trilateral negotiations.19 The White House and Department of State monitored day-to-day developments not only in Cyprus but also in the broader region as well as possible. Facing criticism about the US administration’s ongoing handling of the Cyprus crisis, on 3 August 1974 the Department of State reviewed its procedures for crises management.20 This significant inter-alliance crisis required the US government to learn from its shortcomings. In Athens the Greek government—which had been the façade of the military regime during previous months—had virtually disappeared following Turkey’s successful operation on Cyprus beginning on 20 July.21 On 23 July the party leaders from before the 1967 coup and most senior political figures in Greek post-war politics arrived at the office of President Gizikis to discuss formation of a civilian government. The Greek generals with the exception of Ioannides were eager to relinquish power. Ioannides’ ambiguous position intensified uncertainty about where the real power lay in the following days and encouraged rumours of a potential new coup.22

meeting held on July 15 1974 to discuss Cyprus’, 16 July 1974. WSAG continued to meet regularly throughout the crisis. Regarding the Task force see GRFPL, Kissinger–Scowcroft, Box 7, Cyprus Crisis (4), 07/16/1974, Department of State, Operations Centre Cyprus Task Force, Situation Report 1, 16 July 1974. 18 Phycharis, Behind the Scenes, 109–178. 19 James Edward Miller, The United States and the Making of Modern Greece: History

and Power: 1950–1974 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2009), 193. 20 GRFPL, Kissinger–Scowcroft, Box 8, Cyprus Crisis (27), 08/03/1974, Ingersoll to the Secretary, 3 August 1974. 21 Angelos Vlachos, Aπ oϕ oι´τ ησ η 1974: 25 Ioυλ´ιoυ-17 Noεμβρ´ιoυ [Graduation 1974: 25 July–17 November] (Athens: Oceanida, 2001), 11. 22 For Evangelos Averoff’s later account of events see Phycharis, Behind the Scenes, 222;

´ ως τ α šζ ησ α, 1961–1981 [As I Lived It] (Athens: Livanis, 2012), Giannis Varvitsiotis, Oπ 259.

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During their talks the Greek political leadership agreed to the ‘Karamanlis solution’. Politicians eventually asked Constantine Karamanlis the experienced former Prime Minister (1955–1963) in self-exile in Paris to form a national unity government. The new government was to be supported by and consist of right and centre political factions. Karamanlis was sworn in as Prime Minister in the early hours of 24 July 1974. The centrist George Mavros became Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs. The conservative Evangelos Averoff-Tossitsa took over the Ministry of National Defence. Political figures belonging to the centre–left and centre–right filled the Greek cabinet.23 Throughout the deliberations Greek leaders invited foreign diplomats from Greece’s closest allies such as France, Britain, and West Germany to attend meetings and secure their countries’ recognition of the new legal representatives of Greece. The only diplomat mentioned by name in most accounts of the events, however, was the US Ambassador in Athens Henry J. Tasca. Tasca emerged as a central figure since he facilitated direct contact between the Greek leadership and Kissinger. The Greek political figures gathered at Gizikis’ office prioritised establishing a communications channel with the US Secretary of State.24 Late on the evening of 23 July, while senior figures of Greek predictatorship parties gathered for the second time that day in the office of Gizikis, Tasca joined them. During that meeting Tasca received Greek politicians’ pleas for cooperation. They insisted that only Kissinger with whom they had already had a telephone call ‘can save the peace and give the democratic government of Greece now assuming power the kind of success they need to get going in the lengthy and difficult process of restoring democratic and representative government in Greece’.25

23 See Evanthis Hatzivassiliou, Eυ αγ ´ γ ελoς Aβ šρωϕ-Toσ ι´τ σ ας : Π oλιτ ικ η´ Bιoγ ραϕ´ια, 1908–1990 [Evangelos Averoff-Tossitsas: Political Biography, 1908–1990] (Athens: Sideris, 2004), 147–148; Christopher Montague Woodhouse, Karamanlis: The Restorer of Greek Democracy (Oxford/New York: Clarendon Press, 1982). 24 Kanellopoulos’ account of the events, in Phycharis, Behind the Scenes, 208. 25 GRFPL, Kissinger–Scowcroft, Box 8, Cyprus Crisis (16), 7/24/74, Tasca, tel. 4892

Athens to State, 24 July 1974. Despite its date the telegram narrates the events of 23 July and the talks between the Greek political leaders before Karamanlis’ return to Athens in the early hours of 24 July as well as their telephone call to Kissinger. For confirmation of this call see Digital National Security Archive [hereafter DNSA], The Kissinger Telephone Conversations: A Verbatim Record of U.S. Diplomacy, 1969–1977 : Cyprus Crisis

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The new government in Greece faced some grim challenges. The collapse of the dictatorship did not resolve the Cyprus crisis. Instead, the crisis added additional baggage to the already heavy burden of the democratisation process that the new government encountered. Having assumed power Prime Minister Karamanlis repeated the need for close cooperation with and support from Washington. In his first meeting with Tasca, Karamanlis stressed that his country ‘faced serious problems indeed and he counted on the aid of its great friend, the US, during [the] difficult period ahead’.26 These vague requests for assistance reflect Greece’s almost instinctive choice of turning to the United States for support. In the following days and weeks the decision-makers articulated their specific requests and expectations from Washington. These reflect a Greek belief that only the US administration could deliver what the new governors of Greece needed. The need for a short delay until the trilateral conference convened in Geneva emerged as the most pressing Greek concern. Since the Turkish invasion of 20 July Britain and the United States had focussed on getting Athens and Ankara to agree to the cessation of hostilities on the island and getting negotiations going at the earliest date.27 On 22 July Greece and Turkey agreed a ceasefire and their representatives were to join the British Foreign Secretary for talks.28 The new Greek government needed more time for Mavros and his team to prepare and travel to Geneva. Both London and Ankara appeared to be unwilling to wait for Greece. To secure a short delay Athens turned to Washington. Kissinger immediately demonstrated his full comprehension of the Greek position. In an initial in-depth assessment of the situation in Athens after the collapse of the dictatorship he rejected the British suggestion

[hereafter Kissinger Transcripts], Telcon, Mr. Connollopoulos [sic Kanellopoulos] and Secretary Kissinger, 23 July 1974 at 6:25 p.m. 26 GRFPL, Kissinger–Scowcroft, Box 8, Cyprus Crisis (17), 07/24/1974, Tasca, tel. 4962 Athens to State, 24 July 1974. 27 John Clarke, ‘“A Minor Disagreement Within the Family”: Henry Kissinger and James Callaghan during the Cyprus Crisis of 1974’, in Catherine Hynes and Sandra Scanlon (eds), Reform and Renewal: Transatlantic Relations in the 1960s and 1970s (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2009), 158. 28 ‘Kαταπαυσις ´ πυρ´oς εις Kπρoν´ υνoμιλ´ιαι εις ενεην ´ [Ceasefire in Cyprus— Talks in Geneva]’, To Vima, 23 July 1974, 1.

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that James Callaghan the British Secretary of Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs and Turan Güne¸s the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs could meet in Geneva before Mavros arrived. Kissinger in a telephone call with the British Ambassador in Washington Peter Ramsbotham strongly condemned what the British embassy in Greece had evidently told the Greek government. London appeared ready to ‘start a conference without them [the Greeks] and that reflects U.S. support’. Kissinger stressed that Washington ‘cannot under any circumstances support a conference’ on Cyprus without the Greeks, even if it meant a delay. The US Secretary underlined Washington’s policy stating that ‘we strongly support a conference on Cyprus with Greek representation [but] you cannot count on our support for a conference which excludes the Greeks’.29 A conference without the Greek representative would only intensify Greek suspicion about a ‘U.S.-UK-Turk gang-up on Greece’ that potentially could topple the new government.30 This might appear a minor issue, but for the Greek government now assuming power gestures of candour from its partners could strengthen its domestic standing. Kissinger’s support for this aspect was indicative of his willingness to cooperate with his new Greek counterparts. Following these initial contacts Athens and Washington worked closely during the trilateral negotiations in Geneva. The Geneva talks lasted from 25 July to 1 August and again from 8 to 13 August hours before the second Turkish invasion of Cyprus.31 During both phases of the talks the United States sent an observer. Ambassador William B. Buffum attended the first round of talks and Under Secretary Arthur A. Hartman the second. Kissinger in Washington received reports about the progress of the trilateral talks and maintained direct contact with all three capitals. The role that the Greek government foresaw for the US administration during the talks was twofold. The Greek Foreign Minister and the British

29 DNSA, Kissinger Transcripts, Telcon, Ambassador Ramsbotham/Secretary Kissinger, 23 July 1974 at 3:16 p.m. 30 Memorandum of Conversation, 23 July 1974, 2:30 p.m., The Cyprus Crisis, Kissinger, Sisco, McCloskey et al.; Laurie Van Hook and Edward C. Keefer (eds), Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976 [hereafter FRUS], Vol. XXX, Greece; Cyprus; Turkey, 1973–1976 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2007), doc. 119. 31 For an overview of the negotiations see Nikos Christodoulidis, Tα σ χ šδια λ ´ σ ης τ oυ Kυπ ριακ o´ (1948–1978) [Plans for Solution of the Cyprus Problem, 1948–1978] (Athens: Kastaniotis, 2009), 192–196.

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Foreign Secretary expected that the US representative would mediate with the Turkish representative.32 Both London and Athens frequently expressed their frustration with the Turkish position. The two governments hoped that Kissinger could exhort concessions directly from the Turkish government since the delegation in Geneva insisted that their room for manoeuvre was restricted by their mandate for negotiations. In other words, Güne¸s was seen as a pragmatist but his views conflicted with Ankara’s rigid attitude.33 In addition to mediation with the Turkish government, the Greek government or more accurately a faction of the Greek government considered that US observers in Geneva could play a role mending internal Greek differences. The Greek government despite efforts to appear united remained divided at the top. Overall the Greek government maintained the need for the negotiations to continue and succeed in reaching a compromise. Karamanlis and Mavros, though, had different goals and objectives. Angelos Vlachos, who for a brief period had served under Mavros in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs until he was transferred to the Office of the Prime Minister, paints the Greek Foreign Minister as driven by party politics and ever conscious of his political capital.34 Vlachos in his memoirs argues that Mavros was unwilling to move towards a conciliatory stance with Güne¸s for fear of harming his standing on the Greek political stage. Vlachos’ account is hardly objective. He does not hide his low opinion of Mavros that derived from their mutual antipathy. However, his portrait of the Greek Foreign Minister coincides with US reports from officials visiting the region.35 Reporting on day-to-day developments in the trilateral talks the US observers pointed out that Mavros not only lacked an incentive to engage wholeheartedly in the process, he also frequently threatened to abandon

32 GRFPL, Kissinger–Scowcroft, Box 8, Cyprus Crisis (23), 7/30/74, Dale, tel. 4915 Geneva to State, 30 July 1974, and Cyprus Crisis (22), 7/29/74, Davies, tel. 1968 Nicosia to State, 29 July 1974, and Cyprus Crisis (22), 7/29/74, Abrams, tel. 4878 Geneva to State, 29 July 1974. 33 GRFPL, Kissinger–Scowcroft, Box 8, Cyprus Crisis (35), 8/12/74, Dale, tel. 5174 Geneva to State, ‘for the Secretary from Hartman’, 12 August 1974. 34 Vlachos, Graduation, 66, 90. 35 GRFPL, Kissinger–Scowcroft, Box 8, Cyprus Crisis (30), 8/07/74, Tasca, tel. 5446

Athens to State, 7 August 1974, on behalf of Hartman regarding his meeting with Karamanlis and Mavros.

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the negotiations due to the Turkish hard line.36 Naturally, this development could cause grave implications. The rest of the Greek delegation and the Greek-Cypriot officials attending the process discussed their concerns about Mavros’ stance with the US delegation. Athens hoped that the US representative, while having frequent meetings with Mavros, could persuade him to stay and demonstrate a constructive attitude in the negotiations.37 The primary expectation of the Greek government throughout the period of the trilateral negotiations, however, was that Kissinger would ensure that the Turks observed the ceasefire in Cyprus.38 Even though the three parties had gathered in Geneva to find a political solution, in Cyprus the situation between the Turks, the Greek-Cypriots, and the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) remained fragile. There were conflicting reports daily regarding incidents that violated the ceasefire.39 These were hard to verify because of a difficulty in communications. The uncertainty intensified Greek concern regarding Turkish intentions. Athens expected the Western superpower to ensure that Ankara would draw back its forces to maintain peace and stability. This was clearly a humanitarian request to end the suffering of Greek-Cypriots. It was also a matter of survival for the Greek government. Greek ministers described the impact that the resumption of fighting could have for their nascent government. The civilian government 36 GRFPL, Kissinger–Scowcroft, Box 8, Cyprus Crisis (22), 7/29/74, Davies, tel. 1932 Nicosia to State, 29 July 1974. It is worth noting Clerides’ attitude towards the negotiations. While he develops a direct link with Washington, he mentions that ‘Mavros [is] reluctant to identify himself with substantial concessions too [sic] the Turks which any realist would recognize must be made’; GRFPL, Kissinger–Scowcroft, Box 8, Cyprus Crisis (19), 7/19/74, CIA, Intelligence Memorandum, Cyprus, Situation Report Number 13, 26 July 1974. 37 GRFPL, Kissinger–Scowcroft, Box 8, Cyprus Crisis (19), 7/26/74, Abrams quoting Buffum, tel. 4810 Geneva to State, 26 July 1974, and Cyprus Crisis (28), 8/05/74, Davis quoting Hartman, tel. 2176 Nicosia to State, 5 August 1974, and Cyprus Crisis (22), 7/29/74, Abrams, tel. 4980 Geneva to State, 29 July 1974, US representative’s meeting with Mavros following the UK’s request. 38 GRFPL, Kissinger–Scowcroft, Box 8, Cyprus Crisis (16), 7/24/74 (1), Tasca, tel. 4892 Athens to State, 24 July 1974, and Cyprus Crisis (22), 7/29/74, Dale, tel. 4900 Geneva to State, 29 July 1974. 39 For instance, GRFPL, Kissinger–Scowcroft, Box 8, Cyprus Crisis (20), 7/27/74, Central Intelligence Agency, Situation Report 33, 26 July 1974, and Central Intelligence Agency, Situation Report 35, 27 July 1974, reporting on Turkish military operations.

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according to Averoff and George Rallis Minister to the Prime Minister remained weak and faced a threat to its survival from the army.40 It could not afford to appear weak in public by not standing up to Turkish aggression since continued violence against the Greek-Cypriot population would be interpreted. Tasca expanded on Greek views and summarised the political climate in Athens based on his almost daily discussions with top Greek decision-makers. The US Ambassador underscored that the army remained in full control of the situation. The military leaders agreed to allow Karamanlis to govern for the time being. However, Tasca warned that ‘if the military leaders become convinced that, in fact, Karamanlis has nothing better to offer than the government which he replaced, the alternative of civilian government itself may be fully discredited’. Such a development would pose a grave danger to Greek–Turkish relations and could result in Greece leaving NATO.41 The expectations from a new civilian government undoubtedly included progress towards a mutually acceptable solution at the diplomatic level that the military regime was unwilling or unable to secure. Refraining from further advances and bringing suffering to an end in Cyprus also counted on assessing the success of the new government. To ensure the Turks observed the ceasefire the Greek government insisted that Washington should not be appealing only to Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit. The United States ought instead to use its contacts with the Turkish military and urge the Turkish colonels to adhere to bilateral agreements and UN resolutions against violence on the island.42 During the crisis the Greek and Turkish governments retained direct contact. Dimitiros Kosmadopoulos the Greek Ambassador in Ankara often met

40 GRFPL, Kissinger–Scowcroft, Box 8, Cyprus Crisis (20), 7/27/74, Department of State, Cyprus Task Force, Situation Report No. 22, Situation in Cyprus as of 08:00 (EDT), 27 July 1974, about situation in Athens, and Cyprus Crisis (22), 7/29/74, Tasca, tel. 5143 Athens, 29 July 1974; National Archives and Records Administration [hereafter NARA], General Records of Department of State, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1973–1979, Electronic Telegrams 1974, Tasca, tel. 5111 Athens to State, 27 July 1974. 41 GRFPL, Kissinger–Scowcroft, Box 8, Cyprus Crisis (17), 7/24/72 (2), Tasca, tel. 4967 Athens to State, 24 July 1974. 42 GRFPL, Kissinger–Scowcroft, Box 8, Cyprus Crisis (19), 7/26/74, Tasca, tel. 5031 Athens to State, 26 July 1974.

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Ecevit for honest and constructive talks as he described them.43 However, Greek–Turkish contacts could not provide a substitute for the influence that Kissinger could exert on Ecevit and the Turkish political and military leadership more generally. As leader of the western alliance the US political and military establishment enjoyed the unique ability to exercise pressure on Turkey at least according to the Greeks. In Washington Kissinger noted the Greek requests and attempted to extract the strongest possible commitments from the Turks. He undoubtedly concurred with Greece’s view regarding the role and significance of the Turkish military. In conversation with the Secretary-General of the United Nations Kurt Waldheim, Kissinger discussed Ecevit’s limited control over the forces stationed in Cyprus.44 From the initial stages of the crisis the US Embassy had been approaching high-ranking Turkish military officials only to face their objections about getting involved in politics.45 Therefore, the only available option for US decision-makers remained cooperation with Ecevit. Kissinger stayed in direct contact with Ecevit, his former student at Harvard, warning him from early stages in the negotiations about the negative implications collapse of the ceasefire would have.46 Despite these efforts collapse of the precarious ceasefire was only a matter of time. On 14 August Turkey launched a second wave of military operations in Cyprus as a result of negotiations in Geneva reaching a stalemate. Turkish forces extended their area of control further to the south. Until the very last hour Kissinger had devoted his efforts to averting this development. He repeatedly warned Ecevit about the grave implications for Turkish–US relations and possible Soviet involvement should Ankara resume military operations. Tension over Cyprus was evidenced during the days surrounding Nixon’s resignation and Gerald R. Ford’s

43 See Constantine G. Karamanlis Foundation [hereafter CGKF], Constantin Karamanlis Papers [hereafter CKP], Folder 1B, Kosmadopoulos, tel. 1250/354/1895 Ankara to Ministry of Foreign Affairs [hereafter MFA] for the Prime Minister, 27 July 1974. 44 GRFPL, Kissinger–Scowcroft, Box 8, Cyprus Crisis (17), 7/24/74 (2), Department

of State, Memorandum of Conversation, Secretary Kissinger, Kurt Waldheim et al., 24 July 1974. 45 GRFPL, Kissinger–Scowcroft, Box 8, Cyprus Crisis (16), 7/24/74 (1), Macomber, tel. 5805 Ankara to State, 24 July 1974. 46 GRFPL, Kissinger–Scowcroft, Box 8, Cyprus Crisis (18), 7/25/74, Kissinger, tel. 161223 State, 25 July 1974.

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assumption of office on 9 August. Swearing in of the new president offered Kissinger an opportunity to repeat his warnings to the Turkish Prime Minister about the negative impact on the new president’s attitude towards Turkey should Ankara decide to resume hostilities against the Greek-Cypriots or the UNFICYP only days after his inauguration.47 As the negotiations in Geneva came closer to collapse Kissinger intensified his appeals to Ecevit. The US Ambassador in Ankara William B. Macomber Jr. was instructed to meet with the Turkish Prime Minister on 11 August and hand over a personal message from Kissinger. Reporting about his meeting with Ecevit to the Department of State, Macomber described Ecevit’s reaction to Kissinger’s personal message. According to his account Ecevit’s ‘face was flushed and his effort to suppress anger was not altogether successful’ after reading Kissinger’s message. Macomber continued emphasising that Ecevit ‘was clearly the most upset that I have ever seen in all my dealings with him’. In his first remark after reading the text the Turkish Prime Minister stated that ‘if that is America’s attitude […] “there is no hope”’.48 Unfortunately, the telegram containing Kissinger’s instructions about what the US Ambassador was to say to Ecevit is missing and probably still classified. Ecevit’s response indicates that it contained strong wording against military action on Cyprus since as was widely discussed at this stage there was a strong suggestion of compromise with the Greeks and Greek-Cypriots both of whom Ecevit accused of intransigence. Immediately after the second invasion of Cyprus, Kissinger reminded Ecevit that he had warned him about the implications of such an action, which offers another glimpse of the warning that earlier message had contained. Ambassador Macomber pointed out to Ecevit that Kissinger ‘had also told you in all candor that we [the US] could not accept as justifiable the continuation of military action on Cyprus. […] However, for the United States to play such a role, the military actions on Cyprus must be brought to an immediate halt’.49 Although many records remain classified, the evidence suggests that Kissinger tried to dissuade the Turkish government from resuming its 47 GRFPL, Kissinger–Scowcroft, Box 8, Cyprus Crisis (34), 8/11/74, Kissinger, tel. 175382, 11 August 1974. 48 GRFPL, Kissinger–Scowcroft, Box 8, Cyprus Crisis (34), 8/11/74, Macomber, tel. 6412 Ankara to State, 11 August 1974. 49 GRFPL, Kissinger–Scowcroft, Box 8, Cyprus Crisis (37), 8/14/74, Kissinger, tel. 177679 State to US Ankara, 14 August 1974.

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military operations. His red line remained the unprecedented action the Johnson administration took in 1964. Kissinger also condemned the Turkish actions as ‘completely unjustified’ in a message to Karamanlis.50 The Greek Prime Minister argued that the US interest in Cyprus came too late as did the US offer for support. The crisis was an event that the United States could have prevented and he and the Greek people felt betrayed.51 These were the reasons that Athens strongly criticised the United States.52 The Greek government undoubtedly expected the US administration to contain Turkey. Washington’s failure to do so disappointed and frustrated the Greek government, especially the proUS political figures around Karamanlis.53 Were the Greeks merely being unreasonable for wanting something that the Western superpower could not deliver? The US administration viewed the insistence on Washington’s failure to support Greece during the crisis as pressure tactics. Karamanlis strongly opposed such a description.54 Whilst the Greek government undoubtedly used its disappointment and frustration, especially in the following years, to secure US support for its views, Greek sentiments in the summer of 1974 were genuine. In fact, Ambassador Tasca’s loose talk had added to them. Ambassador Tasca had been very liberal with disseminating official information and personal opinions to Greek officials regarding the US role during the crisis. Tasca consistently criticised Kissinger’s policy towards the military regime and had a troubled relationship with him. From March 1974 onwards Tasca had been trying to get US support for democratisation.55 Tasca retained a very close relationship with the

50 GRFPL, Kissinger–Scowcroft, Box 8, Cyprus Crisis (37), 8/14/74, Kissinger, tel. 177680 State to US Athens, 14 August 1974. 51 Karamanlis verbal comments to Ambassador Tasca, 14 August 1974; Constantine Svolopoulos (ed.), Kωνσ τ αντ ι´ν oς Kαραμανλης ´ : αρχ ε´ιo, γ εγ oν o´ τ α, και κε´ιμενα [Constantine Karamanlis: Archive, Events and Texts, Hereafter Karamanlis ] (Kathimerini: Athens, 2005), Vol. 8, 90. 52 Unofficial leak from the Greek government, in Svolopoulos (ed.), Karamanlis, Vol. 8, 110. 53 Dionysios Chourchoulis and Lykourgos Kourkouvelas, ‘Greek Perceptions of NATO during the Cold War’, Southeast and Black Sea Studies, Vol. 12(4), 2012, 505. 54 Telegrams from the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State, Athens, 9 and 11 September 1974, FRUS, Vol. XXX, doc. 147 and 149. 55 Miller, Modern Greece, 174.

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new Greek government and Greek officials, as Vlachos’ account indicates, while appearing to ignore explicit instructions from Kissinger. On 25 July Kissinger sent Tasca guidance about what he should say in his discussions with the Greeks adding that he did ‘not ask that you give the Greeks textually what follows’.56 However, during a meeting with Karamanlis, Tasca left a note on which a Greek official wrote ‘Kissinger’s thinking’ and concluded that it reflected the US position towards the Cyprus crisis.57 Tasca also commented in early July on what ways the British Ambassador envisaged the US could prevent Turkish activities. Tasca argued that Washington should ‘resort to a convincing threat of force’ and that US forces had to ‘make it clear in military terms to the Turks that violations must stop, and the convincing way of doing this is through the appropriate deployment of the U.S. Sixth fleet’.58 Tasca evidently discussed these views with Greek officials who advocated this line of action.59 Tasca was hardly alone in holding such views since European diplomats expressed similar expectations regarding the role the United States could and ought to play in preventing escalation of the tension to comply with UN resolutions.60 Tasca’s comments placed the US administration in a precarious position. His views created unfounded expectations in Greece, while Kissinger appeared unwilling to take radical steps to help Greece against Turkey. Aware of the views circulated in allied capitals US diplomats set the record straight. Ambassador William Tapley Bennett Jr. of the US Mission to the United Nations stated that the ‘US was not about to go to war with Turkey more than the British and French were’, as the suggestions for a US use of force implied.61 On the contrary, Washington was 56 GRFPL, Kissinger–Scowcroft, Box 8, Cyprus Crisis (18), 7/25/74, Kissinger, tel. 161369 State, 25 July 1975. 57 See relevant entry in Svolopoulos (ed.), Karamanlis, Vol. 8, 37; CGKF, CKP, Folder 1B, Note, Top Secret, 26 July 1974. 58 GRFPL, Kissinger–Scowcroft, Box 8, Cyprus Crisis (17), 7/24/74 (2), Tasca, tel.

4967, 24 July 1974. 59 Vlachos, Graduation, 64. 60 GRFPL, Kissinger–Scowcroft, Box 8, Cyprus Crisis (19), 7/26/74, Bennett, tel.

2579 USUN to State, 26 July 1974; Callaghan discussed the possibility of further military operations in Cyprus but Hartman refused to explicitly state what the US reaction would be, in GRFPL, Kissinger–Scowcroft, Box 8, Cyprus Crisis (34), 8/11/74, Dale on behalf of Hartman, tel. 5163 Geneva to State, 11 August 1974. 61 GRFPL, Kissinger–Scowcroft, Box 8, Cyprus Crisis (19), 7/26/74, Bennett, tel. 2579 USUN to State, 26 July 1974.

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committed to diplomatic efforts in order to ensure stability on Cyprus. National interest, as Bennett’s comment revealed, guided US policy during and following the Cyprus crisis. It was this policy that drove Greek disappointment.

Kissinger and US Policy US policy, as Kissinger described in a conversation with Hartman, could be summarised as appearing strictly neutral between Greece and Turkey. Throughout the negotiations Kissinger instructed US representatives to avoid leaking details about the substance of his communications or US diplomatic services in general with the other parties.62 Kissinger explained his choice of conducting diplomacy with Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus by stating that ‘we [the US] should tell each party just what is possible with respect to the other party’ adding that the United States ‘can always make adjustments of our own as needed’. Above all, Kissinger underlined the need to avoid any ally feeling isolated or that Washington favoured any party.63 This approach required an extreme decree of secrecy to succeed. Kissinger wanted to establish a climate of confidence and provide assurances. The US Ambassador argued that any suggestion and advice given to the Turkish government would remain confidential. Washington recognised that appearing to impose a solution on Ankara could only humiliate the Ecevit government domestically.64 In practice, Kissinger’s approach precluded Athens from receiving information about his appeals to Ankara. Days before the second invasion of Cyprus, Hartman argued that the US administration needed to share information with Athens to ‘show that we don’t just deal with Ankara’.65 Kissinger acted similarly towards Callaghan in Geneva. His preference for dealing with each side separately meant

62 GRFPL, Kissinger–Scowcroft, Box 8, Cyprus Crisis (34), 8/11/74, Kissinger, tel. 175383, 11 August 1974. 63 DNSA, Kissinger Transcripts, Draft Memorandum of Conversation, Sec. Kissinger and Assistant Secretary Hartman, 3 August 1974. 64 GRFPL, Kissinger–Scowcroft, Box 8, Cyprus Crisis (34), 8/11/74, Macomber, tel. 6412 State to Ankara, 11 August 1974. 65 GRFPL, Kissinger–Scowcroft, Box 8, Cyprus Crisis (35), 8/12/74, Abrams, tel. 5192 Geneva to State, 12 August 1974.

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that his actions remained in the background. While it could instil confidence, secrecy also eroded this approach. Athens knew nothing of the substance of Kissinger’s messages to Ankara. Thus, the Greek government concluded that the Ford administration remained a passive observer of Turkish aggression in Cyprus. This new interpretation of Kissinger’s position towards Athens since the regime change in Greece contradicts various studies that claim he perceived the civilian government and the democratisation process in Greece negatively. Kissinger has been portrayed as abandoning the Greek political leadership and not doing enough to help stabilise the nascent regime.66 He has also been described as overly preoccupied with the possibility of the left being unleashed following the end of military rule in Greece.67 However, in a conversation where he speculated about the threat from the left Kissinger also appeared to be comfortable with the government change. He stated that ‘a right-of-centre government’ was a ‘fine’ development for Washington and dealing with a democratic government in Greece offered domestic benefits to the administration.68 Reviewing appointments to the Greek cabinet the relevant CIA report noted that the political orientation of the new government indeed remained centre–right.69 The Nixon administration consistently faced a backlash in the United States for normalising relations with the Greek junta and for its public support culminating in Vice President Spiro Agnew travelling to Greece in 1971. What is more, the Greek dictatorship had not always sided with US objectives.70 The Cyprus crisis proved that the unpredictable Greek dictators hardly represented Washington’s most loyal and preferable allies. However, it is also true that Karamanlis represented an unknown factor. Despite his being a towering figure in Greek

66 Miller, Modern Greece, 197. 67 Sotiris Rizas, The Rise of the Left in Southern Europe: Anglo-American Responses, 1st

ed. (London: Pickering & Chatto, 2012), 61. 68 Memorandum of Conversation, Kissinger, Sisco, McCloskey et al., 23 July 1974, 2:30 p.m., FRUS, Vol. XXX, doc. 119. 69 GRFPL, Kissinger–Scowcroft, Box 8, Cyprus Crisis (19), 7/26/74, Central Intelligence Agency, Intelligence Memorandum, Cyprus, 26 July 1974. 70 John Sakkas, ‘The Greek Dictatorship, the USA and the Arabs, 1967–1974’, Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans, Vol. 6(3), 2004, 257.

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politics in the late 1950s and the early 1960s, the Nixon administration had little to no contact with the self-exiled Karamanlis in Paris.71 Kissinger manoeuvred to secure a ceasefire in Cyprus and made broader efforts to move closer to a solution that reflected his overall approach towards Greece and Turkey. Kissinger was willing to assist with Greek requests, but he was not willing to do so at the expense of US bilateral relations with Turkey. This approach remained the same throughout the Ford administration. Washington based its policy towards the Cyprus negotiations and Greek–Turkish disputes on what can be described as a balanced approach towards both Athens and Ankara. The policy was intended to preserve relations with both Greece and Turkey. The Greek government did not necessarily oppose this approach since it suspected Washington wanted to preserve its relationship with Turkey. The Greek government, however, interpreted the balanced approach differently. The Greeks maintained that Washington should restrain Turkey, which the Greek leaders considered as the aggressor. In their perception the United States ought to support Greece as the weaker party of the two thus restoring a balance of power, political and military, between Athens and Ankara. These contradictions resulted in disagreements between Athens and Washington that were first expressed in the immediate aftermath of the second invasion of Cyprus.

Greece Leaves NATO In the early hours of 14 August news of a second wave of Turkish military operations reached Athens. During the previous weeks the armistice between the two sides was not strictly observed. The decision of the Turkish army to move southwards formally violated this precarious ceasefire. The Greek government announced its decision to withdraw its forces from NATO’s military command later that morning. Since NATO primarily represented a military alliance for defence purposes for Greece the decision to remain in the political side of the alliance amounted to little.

71 Konstantina Maragkou, ‘Anglo-American Attitudes towards Karamanlis during the Greek Colonels’ Era, 1967–1974’, in Constantine Svolopoulos, Konstantina Botsiou, and Evantis Hatzivassiliou (eds), O Kωνσ τ αντ ι´ν oς Kαραμανλης ´ σ τ oν εικ oσ τ o´ αιωνα ´ [Constantine Karamanlis in the 20th Century] (Athens: CGK Foundation, 2008), 281.

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In its official press statement the Greek government emphasised the alliance’s failure to intervene in order to secure negotiations towards a solution in Cyprus and to provide stability on the island as the reasons for the withdrawal. Athens also lambasted Brussels’ rejection of Greek requests for an extraordinary summit of NATO foreign ministers to discuss Cyprus after the first round of the Geneva talks ended on 30 July.72 In a later account of the decision Panayiotis Lambrias, Deputy Minister to the Prime Minister and one of Karamanlis’ closest aides, stressed that the decision to leave NATO represented ‘the only available option in the then circumstances’ for a number of reasons, not least because it satisfied public sentiment in Greece.73 Vlachos’ version of the events presents them as a more calculated decision. The Greek leadership discussed the possibility of leaving NATO on 13 August. Vlachos highlighted that it was in the Greek government’s interest to satisfy domestic anti-American and anti-NATO opinions, particularly from the left, while putting pressure on Greece’s partners.74 Since the collapse of the dictatorship, anti-Americanism ruled the day in Greek society because of Washington’s ties with the previous authoritarian regime and the CIA’s alleged involvement in the junta’s accession to power.75 Although recent scholarship has largely discredited arguments about official US support for the coup, such views remain.76 Washington’s public stance during the Cyprus crisis intensified these views.77 Kissinger addressed the anti-American protests and demonstrations in Athens and Nicosia. In a press conference following the fatal shooting of

72 Note regarding contacts between the Greek government and Secretary General Joseph Luns, in Svolopoulos (ed.), Karamanlis, Vol. 8, 89. 73 Lambrias’ account regarding the withdrawal from NATO, in Svolopoulos (ed.), Karamanlis, Vol. 8, 89. 74 Vlachos, Graduation, 69. 75 Thomas W. Gallant, Modern Greece: From the War of Independence to the Present,

2nd ed. (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2016), 285. 76 Louis Klarevas, ‘Were the Eagle and the Phoenix Birds of a Feather? The US and the Greek Coup of 1967’, Diplomatic History, Vol. 30(3), 2006, 476. 77 Konstantina Botsiou, ‘Anti-Americanism in Greece’, in Brandon O’Connor (ed.), Anti-Americanism: History, Causes, and Themes, Vol. 3: Comparative Perspectives (Oxford: Greenwood World Publishing, 2007), 231.

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Roger P. Davis, the US Ambassador to Cyprus, by protesters, Kissinger commented that such demonstrations were ‘unjustified by our record’.78 Other considerations that appeared to dominate the Greek thinking behind the NATO announcement focussed on the practical benefits of the withdrawal. Leaving the integrated command allowed the Greek government to exercise control over its available forces immediately including those earmarked for NATO purposes.79 On numerous occasions over the following years, particularly during the efforts to secure a new special relationship with NATO, Karamanlis emphasised that the 14 August decisions represented Greece’s only alternative to war with Turkey.80 Despite his statements, the Greek Cabinet frequently discussed the possibility of war with Turkey, a much stronger military power.81 Thus, placing all Greek forces under national control served Greek military planning in the event of a Greek–Turkish conflict. However, in addition to any practical benefits the Greek decision to leave the integrated command remained principally political. The announcement aimed at placing the alliance under pressure to act on Athens’ side. Similarly, if not primarily, the action was intended to increase pressure on the United States to support Greece. As mentioned above, Greek officials, particularly Karamanlis, expressed the disappointment they felt from the US and western stance during the Cyprus crisis as one of the factors causing them to leave NATO’s military structure.82 Greek officials also rejected any views that the decision was reversible. Instead, a number of high-ranking officials questioned

78 Secretary Kissinger’s News Conference of 19 August 1974, Department of State Bulletin, LXXXI, no. 1837, 9 September 1974. 79 Ioannis Valinakis, Eισ αγ ωγ η´ σ τ ην Eλληνικ η´ Eξ ωτ ερικ η´ Π oλιτ ικ η, ´ 1949–1988 [Introduction to Greek Foreign Policy, 1949–1988], 4th ed. (Athens: Paratiritis, 2003), 218. 80 Memorandum of Conversation, ‘President’s [Carter] Meeting with Prime Minister Caramanlis [sic]’, London, 10 May 1977; David Zierler and Adam M. Howard (eds), Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977 –1980 [hereafter FRUS], Vol. XXI, Greece; Cyprus; Turkey (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2014), doc. 166. 81 CGKF, CKP, Folder 2B, Ministry of National Defence, Brief Memorandum of Conversation regarding the capability of the armed forces, Participants: Prime Minister Karamanlis, Minister of National Defence Averoff et al., 25 August 1974. 82 GRFPL, Kissinger–Scowcroft, Box 8, Cyprus Crisis (37), 8/14/74, CIA, Report, Cyprus, 14 August 1974.

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the future of US military bases in Greece in the aftermath of the withdrawal from NATO.83 Greek governments in the 1950s and 1960s had granted the United States the ability to establish and operate military facilities under bilateral agreements. Greece’s withdrawal from NATO did not automatically affect these agreements. Any such statements probably aimed to persuade the United States about the sincerity of Athens’ decision. The Greek government was very much interested in the impact the announcement caused not only on the US administration but also the US Congress and American media.

The Impact on Washington The Greek Embassy in Washington, especially after the arrival of the new ambassador Menelaos Alexandrakis, observed, assessed, and reported the domestic reaction to Kissinger’s handling of the Cyprus crisis and the deterioration of Greek and US relations. In the US Congress, particularly those members of Greek decent (as the Greek Embassy noted), took the lead in criticising Kissinger’s ability to guide US foreign policy successfully.84 The House Committee on International Relations grilled Secretary Kissinger and Under Secretary Hartman about their actions and policies in the Cyprus crisis.85 At least according to Greek information about their testimonies the Committee was strongly critical of US diplomacy. Members of Congress soon voiced calls for an arms embargo on Turkey. The Greek Embassy in Washington also noted that the broad criticism and condemnation of Kissinger’s policies in response to the Cyprus crisis and Eastern Mediterranean developments, in general, had eroded his standing. The best proof of this, according to Greek diplomats, was President Ford’s supportive references to Kissinger in his September 1974 United Nations speech. Ford stressed that, ‘it should be emphatically understood that the Secretary of State has my full support and the 83 GRFPL, Kissinger–Scowcroft, Box 8, Cyprus Crisis (37), 8/14/74, Tasca, tel. 5693

US Athens to State, 14 August 1974, and Cyprus Crisis (37), 8/14/74, CIA Intelligence Memorandum, 14 August 1974. 84 CGKF, CKP, Folder 2B, Nomikos, tel. 1230/274 Washington to MFA, 16 August 1974. 85 CGKF, CKP, Folder 2B, Nomikos, tel. 1230/1257 Washington to MFA, 21 August 1974, and Nomikos, tel. tel. .125/462/1279 Washington to MFA, 23 August 1974.

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unquestioned backing of the American people’.86 The Greek interpretation argued that Ford offered his support publicly because: […] Kissinger is considered the only one responsible for the policy towards the current crisis in the alliance, consequently there has been increasing criticism against him not only in the media but also in Congress where members utilise his unfortunate handling of the Cyprus problem in order to push forward their desire to remove him from office.87

The Greek reading of the impact of Athens’ decision to partially withdraw from NATO and the prolonged Cyprus crisis emphasised Kissinger’s diminished prestige. The diplomatic service considered that the reaction had been successful since ‘it surprised the US government leading to consideration and concern about foreign policy and defence issues’.88 Even if securing Washington’s involvement was not the primary aim of the withdrawal, the result led the Greek government to contemplate the impact its stance had on US domestic politics. Domestic criticism for his actions and a desire to secure Greece’s position in the western alliance led Kissinger to alter his approach progressively. He chose to demonstrate a genuine understanding of the Greek position. The first step he took to move closer to the Greek government related to the resumption of negotiations regarding Cyprus. In the immediate aftermath of the second invasion Kissinger had insisted on the need for Greece and Turkey to begin negotiations immediately. Karamanlis explicitly rejected this suggestion at least until a ceasefire could be guaranteed and Turkey had undertaken some goodwill actions such as evacuation of their forces from the city of Famagusta located near the demilitarised zone in the east.89 Despite the Greek rebuff, Kissinger seemed committed to starting negotiations as a means of preventing any further internationalisation of the crisis. In securing this

86 Gerald R. Ford, ‘Address to the 29th Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations’ (18 September 1974), available at Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley (eds), The American Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/256616. 87 CGKF, CKP, Folder 2B, Nomikos, tel. 1230/275 Washington to MFA, 16 August 1974. 88 Ibid. 89 Karamanlis’ message to Secretary Kissinger, 16 August 1974, in Svolopoulos (ed.), Karamanlis, Vol. 8, 97.

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goal Kissinger contemplated working with the Europeans to persuade Athens to participate in the negotiations.90 By late September Kissinger evidently abandoned this aim and accepted Greek assessments of the situation. Following consultations with Greek officials and particularly after Mavros visited New York in September, Kissinger accepted that meaningful talks would have to wait until after Greece’s general elections.91 In a discussion with President Ford and Archbishop Iakovos of the Greek Orthodox Church of North and South America, Kissinger presented the agreement as a significant request from Athens to avoid complicating the Greek election, which Washington accommodated.92 The US Department of State then emphasised actions aiming at confidence building with Athens. Washington initially developed the approach around personal contacts with the Greek leadership. Washington acted quickly after 14 August and got Kissinger to invite the Greek Foreign Minister and President Ford to invite the Greek Prime Minister to visit Washington for direct talks. Karamanlis rejected both invitations citing the need for him to stay in Athens but also mentioning Kissinger’s previous unwillingness to meet with Mavros in early August. In any event the invitations came too late. However, Mavros’ address to the UN General Assembly (UNGA) meeting in September 1974 offered an opportunity for him to have a number of bilateral meetings with Kissinger. In New York in a tense meeting Kissinger emphasised his government’s support for the national unity government and stressed Washington’s interest in Mavros and Karamanlis succeeding in the forthcoming elections.93 Kissinger argued that he understood the need for the Greek government to court anti-Americanism at least until the elections. He twice said to the Greek Foreign Minister: ‘It is not in your interests to have the United States as the villain. I understand what you have to do, but if anti-Americanism becomes the organizing principle of Greek policy,

90 GRFPL, National Security Advisor, Memoranda of Conversations 1973–77, Digitised Collection [hereafter Memoranda of Conversations], The President, Secretary Kissinger et al., 24 August 1974, and the President, Kissinger, Scowcroft, 26 August 1974. 91 GRFPL, Memoranda of Conversations, Secretary’s meeting with Foreign Minister George Mavros, 30 September 1974. 92 GRFPL, Memoranda of Conversations, The President, Archbishop Iakovos, Kissinger et al., 7 October 1974. 93 GRFPL, Memoranda of Conversations, Secretary’s meeting with Foreign Minister George Mavros, 29 September 1974.

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Papandreou will be the winner. […] We cannot be the villain in Greek politics. Temporarily is O.K., because we want you to win the election’.94 Rather than merely being rhetoric to please his Greek counterpart Kissinger recognised the need for anti-American statements from Athens, although he considered them necessary only for the short term.95 Kissinger did not abandon his plan to have closer contact with Karamanlis. Consequently, in early September 1974 he approached the Greek government suggesting the need to establish a direct channel of communication via a special emissary, namely Ambassador William R. Tyler.96 Once Karamanlis accepted this invitation in principle, Athens and Washington worked closely to coordinate the visit’s details that included the absolute need for it to be kept secret from the public. The mission focussed on facilitating a direct link between the two sides that otherwise could not be achieved and an open exchange of views based on confidence. It was a trust-building effort and a practical demonstration that the US Department of State was committed to Greek requests. Kissinger personally placed great emphasis on ensuring Karamanlis’ request for absolute secrecy. The mission was carried out almost completely in secret and has rarely been mentioned, if at all, in the secondary literature. Tyler arrived in Athens in early September and met with Prime Minister Karamanlis.97 Reversing his earlier tactics Kissinger opted for greater transparency in his dealings with both Athens and Ankara. He demonstrated the new approach best at the Brussels NATO summit in December 1974. US Secretary of Defence James R. Schlesinger described as being the approach of an honest broker.98 Therefore, the US Secretary acted as a bridge between the Greek and Turkish foreign ministers. It was the first

94 DNSA, Kissinger Transcripts, Secretary’s meeting with Foreign Minister George Mavros, 24 September 1974. 95 GRFPL, Memoranda of Conversations, Meeting on Cyprus, Kissinger, Sisco, Hartman et al., 17 August 1974. 96 GRFPL, Kissinger–Scowcroft, Box 9, Cyprus Crisis (55), 9/01/74, Kissinger, tel.

192485 State to US Greece, 1 September 1974, and Box 9, Cyprus Crisis (56), 9/1/74, Tasca, tel. 6325 Athens to State, 2 September 1974. 97 Telegram from the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State, Athens, 9 September 1974, ‘Cyprus: First Caramanlis–Tyler Meeting’, FRUS, Vol. XXX, doc. 147. 98 GRFPL, Memoranda of Conversations, Kissinger, Schlesinger, and Scowcroft, 30 August 1974.

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NATO summit that the new Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs Dimitrios Bitsios attended. The election of November 1974 allowed him to discuss details of how to move forward to resumption of Cyprus negotiations. In his report to the Greek Prime Minister, Bitsios significantly accentuated his impression of Kissinger’s honesty in conveying Greek and Turkish views.99 Kissinger proved his willingness to cooperate with the Greek government to overcome a difficult period in Greek–US relations. It is unclear what impact and impression his new approach had on the Greek government and whether it helped shape a positive attitude towards the Ford administration. However, another element played a crucial role in the Greek strategy toward Washington in the aftermath of the 14 August developments. This was the Greek interpretation of the positions of two other international actors, namely the European powers and the Soviet Union. The general conclusion in Athens was that no one was willing to condemn Turkish aggression explicitly and side openly with Greece—at least no more than the half-hearted condemnation by the United States.

The European (Non-)Option The partial withdrawal of Greece from NATO represented a watershed development in the country’s relations with its Western allies. The Greek government coupled this announcement with stronger emphasis on the country’s European as opposed to Atlantic ties. On 22 August Athens officially requested unfreezing the 1961 Association Agreement with the European Economic Community (EEC). Less than a year later Athens formally applied for full EEC membership.100 Accession to the EEC became the proclaimed goal of the two Karamanlis premierships and the

99 CGKF, CKP, Folder 3B. Although there is no creator’s name, it is written in the first person singular indicating it came from Bitsios, 11 December 1974. 100 Karamanlis to G. FitzGerald, 12 June 1975, in Fotini Tomai (ed.), H Συμμετ oχ η´ τ ης Eλλαδας ´ σ τ ην π oρε´ια π ρ oς τ ην ευρωπ α¨ικ η´ oλoκληρωσ ´ η [Greece’s Participation in the European Integration Process], Vol. 2: Aπ o´ τ o π αγ ´ ωμα τ ης σ υμϕων´ιας σ ´ νδεσ ης σ τ ην šντ αξ η σ τ ις ευρωπ α¨ικ šς κ oιν o´ τ ητ ες (1968–1981) [From the ‘Freezing’ of the Association Agreement to Accession to the European Communities] [hereafter: Greece and European Integration] (Athens: Foreign Ministry and Papazisis, 2006), doc. 22.

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essential pillar of Greek multilateralism in the 1970s.101 Rizas accurately points out that the European powers did not encourage the view that European integration could substitute transatlantic cooperation. Hence, EEC membership remained a secondary pillar to Greek foreign and security strategies that would add to relations with the United States and NATO.102 What is more, the Greek government in the aftermath of the Cyprus crisis recognised that both the EEC and prominent European powers had little to offer in its conflict with Turkey. The European reaction disappointed Athens. European NATO members were no more willing than Washington to condemn the Turkish actions in Cyprus or offer anything more than sympathy to Athens. The experience in these months of the Cyprus crisis informed Greece’s national and security policies for the following years. During the early hours of the second invasion of Cyprus the Greek government turned to the British asking for options to prevent further Turkish advances. On 17 August Athens officially requested British air cover for naval transportation of a division of the Greek army to Cyprus. Prime Minister Harold Wilson denied this request.103 Greek disappointment with the British government continued in early 1975. On 15 January London announced its decision to allow Turkish-Cypriots who had found refuge in the Western Sovereign Base Area (WSBA) to move to the northern Turkish-controlled part of Cyprus. The Greek government condemned this decision as contributing towards the permanent division of Cyprus.104 It consolidated the division of the island into two geographical ethnically homogenous areas that the Greek and Cypriot governments rejected. The collective European response of the nine EEC member-states also concerned the Greek government. The French government, holding the rotating presidency of the European Council, issued a démarche to both

101 Eirini Karamouzi, Greece, the EEC and the Cold War, 1974–1979: The Second Enlargement (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 19. 102 Sotiris Rizas, ‘Atlanticism and Europeanism in Greek Foreign and Security Policy in the 1970s’, Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, Vol. 8(1), 2008, 54. 103 Wilson’s message to Karamanlis, in Svolopoulos (ed.), Karamanlis, Vol. 8, 99. 104 Karamanlis’ press statement, in Svolopoulos (ed.), Karamanlis, Vol. 8, 294.

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Athens and Ankara.105 The context of the two texts caused Greek dismay. The Greek Ambassador in Paris Pheadon Kavalieratos raised the issue with President Valéry Giscard d’Estaing underlining the Greek perception that the wording did little to restrain Turkish aggression. Agreeing with Kavalieratos, Giscard d’Estaing implied that he would explore and potentially support some form of economic pressure on Turkey.106 When Mavros visited Paris for official talks in early September, there was no change towards the direction that the French president had indicated.107 The French Foreign Minister Jean Sauvagnargues argued that the EEC had limited means to get involved in a process aimed at finding a Cyprus solution. Sauvagnargues further underlined that the Community was not planning to intervene between Greece and Turkey—at least not until ‘the involved parties’ asked Brussels to do so.108 The Greek government noted the clear European reluctance to side with Greece against another NATO member and—for that matter—another country that held an Association Agreement with the EEC. European impotence in Paris was obvious. The former French Prime Minister Michel Jean-Pierre Debré explained the thinking in European capitals vis-à-vis Cyprus and the Greek–Turkish disputes more freely than the French officials. When the Greek Ambassador visited him, Debré stressed that the Community in general followed Washington’s lead rather than opting for an alternative path.109 Karamanlis had worked with Debré during his first premiership in the late 1950s and probably valued his views.110

105 Andrew Mango, ‘Turkish Foreign Policy’, in Ahmet Evin and Geoffrey Denton (eds), Turkey and the European Community (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 1990), 98. 106 CGKF, CKP, Folder 2B, Stathatos, Note for the Prime Minister, 14 August 1974. 107 Mavros, Foreign Minister, to Karamanlis, Prime Minister, Paris, 5 September 1974,

in Tomai, Greece and European Integration, doc. 17. 108 CGKF, CKP, Folder 2B, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Note for the Prime Minister regarding Foreign Minister Mavros’ meetings in his visit to Paris (5–6 September 1974) and Bonn (9–10 September 1974). 109 CGKF, CKP, Folder 2B, Kavalieratos, Letter F4331.4/12/232, 18 August 1974. 110 Evanthis Hatzivassiliou, Greece and the Cold War: Frontline State, 1952–1967

(London: Routledge, 2006), 118.

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Mavros’ visit to Paris was part of his European tour and the next stop was Bonn. The West German government made even clearer that the Europeans were not prepared to distance themselves from Washington’s approach. During his meeting with Mavros on 9 September 1974 West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt explicitly argued that only the United States could play a constructive role in the Cyprus crisis. The Greeks concluded after the talks in Bonn that the only positive element in the West German position was their willingness to exercise pressure on Turkey to demonstrate a concessionary stance but not ‘substantial’ pressure. The latter statement was not further explained. Overall, Athens’ assessment of West German intentions emphasised Bonn’s instance on ‘treating Greece and Turkey in a similar manner, despite the latter’s violations’, which did not satisfy Greek objectives.111 Unbeknown to the Greeks, the French and German responses to the Greek requests were the result of a coordinated effort with Washington. Kissinger was concerned about the possibility that Greek actions would create tensions within the alliance. He impressed upon his European counterparts the need to maintain a common front towards the Greek government and to avoid any attempts to exploit the Greek government’s anti-American sentiments to strengthen their own bilateral relations. In his communication with the West German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Kissinger was even more explicit regarding Washington’s expectations of its European allies: I am further disturbed by the encouragement being given by the Greek authorities to a growth in anti-American and anti-NATO feelings. This can only lead to a strengthening of leftist forces in Greece who will not have the same interests in keeping Greece firmly in the Western camp. I am equally concerned that efforts by our European friends to engage in entirely laudable efforts to support the Karamanlis government may be misinterpreted by that government as evidence of European support for Karamanlis as a counterweight to American support for Turkey. The end result will inevitably be a further polarization of the situation and a strengthening within Greece of the extreme left. […] We welcome moves by our European friends to strengthen their links with Greece and we hope that they will take similar steps to build their ties with the government 111 CGKF, CKP, Folder 2B, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Note for the Prime Minister regarding Foreign Minister Mavros’ meetings in his visit to Paris, 5–6 September 1974 and Bonn, 9–10 September 1974.

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of Turkey as well. But we hope that such efforts will be accompanied by the expression of a strong cautionary word to the Greek government that they do not believe it is in the interest of the Greek government to encourage anti-American sentiment or any further moves to withdraw from NATO.112

Kissinger’s message to Genscher and the lack of a similar one to his French counterpart has been cited as evidence of closer cooperation between the United States and West Germany, as well as Britain, during the early stages of the Ford presidency. Based on this analysis France was ‘excluded’ from what is described as ‘a pattern of growing consultation and discussion’ among Washington, Bonn, London, and Paris that developed over the following years.113 The Cyprus crisis is not a suitable case study for overarching conclusions regarding transatlantic cooperation. A number of records are still classified or missing. There is sporadic evidence of contact between Paris and Washington. For instance, in the immediate hours after the second Turkish invasion Sauvagnargues and Kissinger talked over the phone discussing the text of the French-sponsored UN resolution in response to the collapse of the ceasefire in Cyprus. During the call the French minister appeared eager to secure Kissinger’s support who promised to carefully consider the advance copy of the text.114 Tension between the two capitals existed. While he collectively warned the Europeans against capitalising on anti-American sentiments in Greece, Kissinger remained primarily suspicious of the French. Briefing President Ford on Cyprus Kissinger argued that while it was important to keep Greece in the West: ‘It must not be the French being the scavengers riding on an anti-American wave in Greece. I hope that the French will cooperate in keeping it [the Cyprus crisis] out of the Security Council’.115 This was a dominant concern that both Ford and Kissinger raised in respective

112 GRFPL, Kissinger–Scowcroft, Box 9, Cyprus Crisis (47), 8/24/74, Kissinger, tel. 186668 State to US Bonn, 24 August 1974. 113 N. Piers Ludlow, ‘The Real Years of Europe? U.S.–West European Relations during the Ford Administration’, Journal of Cold War Studies, Vol. 15(3), 2013, 148. 114 DNSA, Kissinger telephone conversations, 1969–1977, Transcript of telephone conversation, 15 August 1974. 115 GRFPL, Memoranda of Conversations, Ford, Kissinger, and Scowcroft, 24 August

1974.

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meetings with the French Ambassador to Washington Jacques KosciuskoMorizet.116 Similar to the advice given to Genscher, Washington urged Paris to safeguard relations with Turkey too. Contacts continued during the following months with Ford meeting the French Foreign Minister on the margins of the annual UN General Assembly.117 The Greek government was unaware of these behind-the-scenes transatlantic communications. Moreover, any insignificant differences between Washington and its European allies mattered little to Athens. Overall, the Greek government concluded that the Europeans’ sympathetic rhetoric towards the Cyprus crisis was nothing more than maintaining a neutral stance between Greece and Turkey. What concerned the Greeks was that the European position could not but indicate their stance in wider and more substantive Greek–Turkish bilateral differences. Hence, the European powers either collectively at the EEC level or at the individual level could not be considered an alternative to the United States.

The Soviet Card The Greek government also considered whether engaging with the Soviet Union offered any benefits. Athens closely observed Soviet reactions to the unfolding crisis. Moscow avoided direct condemnation of Turkish actions.118 As a result the Greek government was convinced that the real Soviet intention was to keep the crisis alive rather than facilitating its solution. The Cyprus crisis remained a distraction for the western alliance. Reviewing the reaction of major powers the Greek Foreign Ministry prepared a detailed briefing dated 1 January 1975. Greek diplomats assessing the Soviet role in the crisis noted that ‘there is credible information that Moscow encouraged Turkey’s action […] there has also been a reversal in USSR’s stance in our favour, but not to the extent

116 GRFPL, Kissinger–Scowcroft, Box 9, Cyprus Crisis (47), 8/24/74, Kissinger, tel. 86675 State to US Embassy Paris, 24 August 1974; GRFPL, Memoranda of Conversations, President Ford, Kissinger, Kosciusko-Morizet et al., 24 August 1974. 117 GRFPL, Memoranda of Conversations, President Ford, Kissinger, and Foreign Minister Sauvagnargues, 28 September 1974. 118 Sotiris Rizas, Tα Bαλκ ανια ´ και η Eλλαδα ´ σ ε Mετ αβασ ´ η: Aπ o´ τ oν Ψ υχ ρ o´ Π o´ λεμo σ τ ην /Uϕεσ η, 1960–1974 [The Balkans and Greece in Transition: From Cold War to Détente, 1960–1974] (Athens: Sideris, 2006), 199.

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that it would endanger its relations with Turkey’.119 To Athens’ dismay, during the second Turkish invasion the Soviet Union avoided openly condemning Turkey opting instead for a vague call for stability in the region. Fragments of conversations and referenced documents that are now missing indicate that the January paper reflected the views of the government regarding Moscow during the crisis. The Greek government considered approaching Moscow or, more accurately, appeared to accept there could be a Soviet role in defusing the crisis as a pressure tactic. According to Greek calculations, assenting to a Soviet proposal for a solution in Cyprus would persuade the US administration to expedite negotiations by persuading Turkey to demonstrate concessions.120 Both before and after the 14 August developments the Greek government intensified its contacts with the Soviet Union. On 8 August Karamanlis received the Soviet Ambassador for the first time since the collapse of the junta. The atmosphere at the meeting was tense. Karamanlis alleged Moscow was displeased with the return to parliamentary democracy in Greece. He also termed the Soviet response to the Turkish invasion of Cyprus as ‘vague and conflicting at times’.121 The meeting, though, was significant in terms of public relations. Amid the Geneva negotiations and the Soviet Union’s effort to internationalise the dispute the Greek leader discussed matters directly with Moscow. Following the second invasion of Cyprus the Greek government appeared more receptive to Soviet interference. On 22 August Moscow unveiled another plan that in practice provided a greater role for Moscow. The Soviet plan called for the direct involvement of the UN Security Council.122 The Greek government publicly announced that in principle it agreed with Moscow’s plan and the Greek Foreign Minister welcomed the Soviet initiative.123

119 CGKF, CKP, Folder 4B, MFA, Note, 29 January 1975. 120 CGKF, CKP, Folder 1B, MFA, Note about ‘Geneva I (25–30 July 1974)’, 16

October 1976. 121 CGKF, CKP, Folder 1B, Makrantonatos, Note on the Prime Minister’s meeting with the Soviet Ambassador, 8 August 1974. 122 For the full text of the Soviet announcement detailing Moscow’s plan for future negotiations on 22 August 1974 see Svolopoulos (ed.), Karamanlis, Vol. 8, 116–117. 123 Press statement, Greek response to the Soviet proposal, 26 August 1974, in Svolopoulos (ed.), Karamanlis, Vol. 8, 19.

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Greek communications with the Soviet Union prompted a reaction from Washington. The White House realised that Greece intended to use the Soviets as ‘blackmail’ to force Washington to side with Greek positions.124 In response Kissinger warned Karamanlis about the implications of Soviet interference.125 Karamanlis reacted strongly to Kissinger’s letter delivered by Tasca by repeating insistently, ‘Why are you giving us advice instead of assistance?’ The experienced prime minister of a Cold War frontline state stressed that he ‘does not need counsel’ on the dangers posed by the Soviets and that he had been ‘the most firm anti-communist of all political figures in Western Europe’. Karamanlis continued complaining that while he had been ‘consistently pro-US’, now Washington ‘instead of helping Karamanlis you are pushing him and his people to the Russians’. On US requests objecting to any Soviet involvement Karamanlis wondered how he could ‘reject any proposal coming from outside interested parties if we receive no help from our Allies?’.126 Greek contact with Moscow continued with the Greek government welcoming the Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister in Athens the following month.127 The United States, meanwhile, trusted Karamanlis to maintain a pro-US attitude.128 Greek statements and its posture toward Moscow, though, complicated the US response to the crisis. The Greek government’s acceptance of the Soviet plan is seen as a failure of détente since Kissinger was unable to use his direct channel with Moscow to dissuade any Soviet response.129 Despite the Soviet effort to capitalise on the crisis, Washington remained determined to maintain détente while preventing any Soviet meddling in an inter-alliance affair. Indicative of

124 GRFPL, Memoranda of Conversations, President Ford, Kissinger and Scowcroft, 24 August 1974. 125 Kissinger letter to Karamanlis, 25 August 1974, in Svolopoulos (ed.), Karamanlis, Vol. 8, 131. 126 GRFPL, Kissinger–Scowcroft, Box 9, Cyprus Crisis (48), 8/25/74, Tasca, tel. 6068 Athens to State, 25 August 1974. 127 CGKF, CKP, Folder 2B, Memorandum of Conversation between Foreign Minister Mavros and Deputy Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union Ilitchev, 15 September 1974. 128 Paper prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency, 29 August 1974, ‘Athens’ Frustration with the US and Prospects for the Greek Left’, FRUS, Vol. XXX, doc. 22. 129 Effie G. H. Pedaliu, ‘“A Sea of Confusion”: The Mediterranean and Détente, 1969– 1974’, Diplomatic History, Vol. 33(4), 2009, 748.

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the US approach to the Soviet Union is Kissinger’s guidance for Ambassador Buffum, the US representative, in the first round of talks in Geneva instructing him that: ‘you should treat the Soviet observer in a manner friendly, tactful, seemingly cooperative but aloof. You should keep him at arm’s length and essentially a lap behind the events’. Kissinger’s effort to limit Soviet involvement emphasised the need for all parties involved in the crisis including the Greek-Cypriots to reject any formal Soviet role rather than Washington openly preventing Soviet involvement.130 In addition to the superpower’s approach towards détente in their relations another element weighed heavily on Greek decision-making. This was the Greek interpretation of the common approach between Washington and Moscow. The Greek government focussed on Kissinger’s visit to Moscow and the Vladivostok Summit on Arms Control in November 1974 noting the joint US–Soviet Communiqué that crafted a balanced approach calling for a ‘just settlement’ in accordance with UN resolutions.131 Following conversations with the Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister the Greek Ambassador in Moscow voiced his concerns about the Soviet stance. He pointed out that Soviet officials’ implied support for the US approach towards the crisis ‘could reveal a common Soviet– American understanding regarding Cyprus, negative for our aims’. The Greek Ambassador also noted the paradox that the Soviets ‘while trying to get involved in a settlement for the Middle East, in the case of Cyprus they adopt the same approach as the 9 [EEC countries], who express their sympathy to us [Athens] but they point [our request] to Washington’. In his discussion with the US Ambassador, he also argued in favour of the existence of common ground between the superpowers.132 The Greek Ambassador’s views reveal that the common European perpetual concern with détente continued and questioned whether the superpowers were willing to sacrifice their alliance interest to ease tensions. The Greeks were in fact reasonably suspicious of the common front presented in all corners that precluded them from trying to play the superpowers against each 130 GRFPL, Kissinger–Scowcroft, Box 8, Cyprus Crisis (21), 7/28/74, Kissinger, tel.

163995 State to US Geneva, 28 July 1974, and Box 9, Cyprus Crisis (47), 8/24/74, Kissinger, tel. 180087 (unclear) State to US Nicosia, 24 August 1974. 131 GRFPL, The White House Press Release Unit, Box 5, Press Releases, 18 November– 14 December 1974, Joint US–Soviet Communiqué, 24 November 1974. 132 CGKF, CKP, Folder 3B, Dimitropoulos, tel. 39.1176 Moscow to MFA, 28 November 1974, and Stoforopoulos, tel. 39.1181 Moscow to MFA, 29 November 1974.

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other. In bilateral discussions Kissinger and the Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko agreed on a balanced approach to Greece and Turkey as the best way to encourage them to try and find a solution.133

Turning Back to Washington It became clear to Athens that Washington was the only actor who could mediate between Greece and Turkey. By late 1974 the exiled President of Cyprus Archbishop Makarios was arguing to the Greek government that Washington was the primary player in the Cyprus solution. Makarios, who participated in person in or at least was kept informed about meetings when Athens–Nicosia coordinated their approach to the Cyprus negations, argued that ‘Washington holds the key of Cyprus Solution’, as conveyed by Bitsios in his own words.134 While all the international players were looking at the US administration in the White House, support for Greek interests emerged in Washington in Congress. In parallel with making approaches to European powers the Greek government remained fully briefed about Congressional upheaval in the United States and advocated support for Greece on Capitol Hill. Furthermore, the Greek government noted the efforts of a group of US Representatives and Senators to impose an arms embargo on Turkey.135 Instead of attempting to persuade other powers to support Greek positions regarding Turkey, the Greek government concluded that working with the US Congress offered better opportunities. By doing so Athens could potentially influence the US administration’s approach towards both Athens and Ankara. With the November elections in sight, though, the Greek government seemed unable to capitalise on this opportunity. After the general elections and a referendum on whether the monarchy ought to be restored the Greek government was able to focus on foreign policy decision-making. The Karamanlis government concluded a new

133 GRFPL, NSA, Kissinger Reports on USSR, China, and Middle East Discussions, Box 1, 23–24 November 1974, Vladivostok Summit (2), Memorandum of Conversation, ‘Salt II, Cyprus’, President Ford, General Secretary Brezhnev et al., 24 November 1974. 134 CGKF, CKP, Folder 3B, Bitsios, tel. 2K 2081 MFA to Nicosia, 15 December

1974. 135 CGKF, CKP, Folder 2B, Nomikos, tel. .230/1249 Washington to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 19 August 1974, and Nomikos, tel. .125/462/1279, Washington to MFA, 23 August 1974.

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national security doctrine designed to deter Turkish and Soviet threats thereby placing the United States at the centre of the policy. However, to achieve this goal the Greek government realised the need to implement a new strategy to ensure the desired support from Washington. The strategy began with siding with Congress against the US administration. This developed into a more complex relationship that historians and political scientists have systemically overlooked.

CHAPTER 3

Mapping a New Strategy: Karamanlis, Ford, and the Turkish Arms Embargo

In the aftermath of the Cyprus crisis the new Greek government and the US administration had to confront the direct by-products of the crisis. In Greece the government faced the task of governing—not merely responding to events. In terms of foreign policy it was now the time for the new government to outline its interpretation of the national security doctrine. Turkish intransigence and expansionism, as expressed by the invasion of Cyprus, added to Greece’s perception of a threat from Warsaw Pact countries. Since the end of the Second World War and the Greek Civil War the United States had been at the centre of Greek defence planning. Now Greek decision-makers had to factor in stronger and more widespread anti-American sentiments. Athens sought a balance between alienating and aligning with Washington. Although confronted with these complex problems and questions, the first elected post-junta Karamanlis government enjoyed a significant advantage. Karamanlis secured an overwhelming victory for his new party in the first free elections. Soon after the 1974 election a referendum resolved the divisive issue of the monarchy in Greek politics by resoundingly rejecting the institution. Both events paved the way to political transition ending and stable governance beginning. In Washington the Ford administration—perhaps against its will— remained preoccupied with the Cyprus–Greece–Turkey triangle.

© The Author(s) 2020 A. Antonopoulos, Redefining Greek–US Relations, 1974–1980, Security, Conflict and Cooperation in the Contemporary World, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-47656-4_3

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Although the conflict in Cyprus came to a standstill, the Turkish invasion fuelled an ongoing clash between the White House and Congress for control of US foreign policy. A group of US Representatives and Senators proposed and eventually enacted sanctions against Turkey. The Turkish arms embargo was part of a congressional challenge to presidential authority in the aftermath of the Vietnam War. It also represented consolidating human rights considerations as a factor in US diplomacy. President Gerald R. Ford and the US Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger opposed the arms embargo legislation and led continuous efforts for its repeal. Athens viewed the arms embargo as a deterrent to the Turkish threat. The Greek government worked closely with both supporters of the legislation in Congress and the US administration to further its objectives. Thus, the arms embargo became an element of Greek–US relations in its own right. In October 1975 the House of Representatives and the Senate passed legislation easing the terms of the embargo but fell short of repealing it. Partial lifting of the legislation ended the period when it dominated contacts between and policy planning in Athens and Washington. Nonetheless, this experience shaped Greece’s attitude towards the United States for the following years.

A New Government: Advantages and Limitations The national unity government in Greece had the special purpose of handling the Geneva negotiations about Cyprus and paving the way for democratisation. The events of August 1974 put an end to the trilateral negotiations about Cyprus in Geneva. The restoration of democracy went hand in hand with a mandate from the electorate. The prospect of the first post-junta general elections triggered a series of developments. First, it thwarted a new round of Cyprus negotiations. The UN General Assembly (UNGA) of September 1974 brought Cypriot, Greek, and Turkish leaders to New York and offered an opportunity for bilateral meetings with the US administration. Greek Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs George Mavros informed Secretary Kissinger about his government’s intention to hold a general election at an early

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date. During their talks Mavros convinced Kissinger of the need to postpone any negotiations about Cyprus until the election had taken place.1 Delaying negotiations with Turkey shielded the main political leaders from any political cost. Second, the announcement of general elections on 17 November 1974 led to a number of internal developments in Greece. Greek Prime Minister Constantine Karamanlis formed a caretaker government while Mavros resigned to focus on the campaign. Karamanlis therefore promoted Dimitrios Bitsios as Minister of Foreign Affairs. Meanwhile, new political parties and political formulations emerged on the Greek political stage. Karamanlis founded the Nea Dimokratia (ND “New Democracy”) party. The ND represented the traditional right of the Greek political spectrum. This new party included most of the political members and supporters of Karamanlis’ pre-dictatorial party Ethiki Rizospastiki Enosis (ERE “National Radical Union”). At the November 1974 general election the ND topped the polls with 54.4% of the popular vote gaining 220 of the 300 seats in the Greek parliament. The result meant that Karamanlis’ conservative party could form a government on its own. In a party that relied heavily on its leader the results constituted a personal victory for him. Mavros presided over the coalition party Enosis Kentrou (EK “Centre Union”) and Kinima ton Neon Politikon Dynameon (“Movement of the New Political Forces”) or simply the EK/ND. The EK/ND party came second with 20.4% of the vote and 60 seats. As a result Mavros became leader of the opposition in the Greek parliament. The remaining seats were distributed between two leftist parties. The newly founded Panellinion Sosialistikon Kinima (PASOK “Panhellenic Socialist Movement”) of Andreas Papandreou attracted 13.6% of the popular vote. Papandreou was the son of the late Prime Minister Georgios Papandreou. Andreas Papandreou—or simply Andreas—relied heavily on anti-American and anti-Western rhetoric. Finally, the last political force to enter parliament was the Enomeni Aristera (IA “United Left”) described as an electoral formation. The formation existed only for the purposes of the election. It brought together the recently legalised communist party the Kommunistiko Komma 1 Athanasios Antonopoulos, ‘Justified at Last? Kissinger’s Cyprus Legacy, 1974–76’, International History Review, Vol. 41(3), 2019, 477.

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Elladas/esoterikou (KKE “Communist Party of Greece”/interior), considered similar to European communist parties in the West, the orthodox pro-Soviet KKE party, and the Eniaia Dimokratiki Aristera (EDA “United Democratic Left”), the main pre-1967 political formation on the left. The IA attracted 9.5% of the vote. Given the reinforced proportional system of representation that favoured the main parties, PASOK and the IA only received 12 and 8 seats, respectively.2 In a county without a tradition of coalition governments the Karamanlis majority government enjoyed a decisive advantage over a national unity government. The divisions between Mavros and Karamanlis were plainly visible. US intelligence reported on the benefits from a majority government in a projection it made a few days before the elections. The CIA in particular expected that a majority government under Karamanlis ‘would be more flexible on Cyprus and more favorable to US and NATO interests than would a coalition, which would be forced to strike a compromise between differing personalities and policy views’.3 Indeed, the result afforded Karamanlis the ability to appoint a cohesive cabinet. The first post-1974 Karamanlis government included ‘like-minded’ figures of the Greek right and centre–right, particularly in the realm of foreign policy.4 Karamanlis retained Bitsios and Evangelos AveroffTossitsa in the government as Minister of Foreign Affairs and National Defence, respectively. Historiography has predominately adopted a Karamanlis-centred view of government policy of the period. Karamanlis is seen as solely responsible for the country’s direction in domestic and foreign policy aspects. However, research now argues in favour of there being a leading circle at the top of Greek decision-making.5 The influence 2 Richard Clogg, Parties and Elections in Greece: The Search for Legitimacy (Durham,

NC: Duke University Press, 1987), 59–70. 3 Intelligence Memorandum, ‘The Greek Elections’, 5 November 1974; Laurie Van Hook and Edward C. Keefer (eds), Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976 (hereafter FRUS), Vol. XXX, Greece; Cyprus; Turkey, 1973–1976 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2007), doc. 28. 4 Kyriakos Mitsotakis, Oι σ υμπ ληγ αδες ´ τ ης εξ ωτ ερικ ης ´ π oλιτ ικ ης ´ : Eσ ωτ ερικ šς και διεθ νε´ις π ιšσ εις σ τ ις ελλην oαμερικανικ šς διαπ ραγ ματ ε ´ σ εις γ ια τ ις β ασ ´ εις , 1974–1985 [The Clashing Rocks of Foreign Policy: Domestic and International Pressures in Greek–US Negotiations on the Bases, 1974–1985] (Athens: Patakis, 2006), 77. 5 Hatzivassiliou discusses the misperception of Karamanlis as acting alone as opposed to the recent and more accurate description of a ‘leading group/circle’ at the top level in post-1974 Greek governance. See Evanthis Hatzivassiliou, Eλληνικ o´ ς Φιλελευθ ερισ μ´oς :

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of cooperation between leading figures of the Greek cabinet and civil service, particularly on issues of foreign policy and national security, is profound. Greek–US relations reflected this approach. Karamanlis remained fully involved in all aspects of Greek policy towards the United States and coordinated decision-making with Bitsios and Averoff. Prominent figures of the Greek bureaucratic and diplomatic services assisted them. They included Secretary General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Ioannis Tzounis, General Director of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Vyron Theodoropoulos, and Director of the Office of the Prime Minister Petros Molyviatis. The Greek Ambassador to the United States from 1974 to 1979 Menelaos Alexandrakis played a significant yet often overlooked role in coordinating and pursuing Greek strategies towards Washington during the period. It is worth mentioning here that most post-1974 Greek political and diplomatic figures had previously worked together in Karamanlis’ first premiership during the 1950s and early 1960s. What is more, many held key roles regarding the Cyprus question when it first emerged in the late 1940s and 1950s.6 There was therefore a significant level of cohesion and common understanding about national interest, security, and objectives. While the general election represented a significant milestone, the question of the constitutional form of the Greek state remained. Regime change in 1974 did not resolve the question of the monarchy, a polarising issue in modern Greek politics. When the national unity government was formed, it restored the 1952 constitution in its entirety except for those articles that referred to the monarch as head of state. In the plebiscite of 8 December 69% of the Greek electorate opposed the prospect of restoring the monarchy. The way the constitutional question was settled—rather than the actual result—strengthened the new Karamanlis government. The right-wing ND included in its ranks as supporters, members, and candidates a number of staunch royalists. The τ o ριζ oσ π ασ τ ικ o´ ρε ´ μα, 1932–1979 [Greek Liberalism: The Radical Wave, 1932–1979] (Athens: Patakis, 2010), 479. 6 For former ambassadors’ contributions to the Cyprus problem see Menelaos Alexandrakis, Vyron Theodoropoulos, and Evstathios Lagakos, To Kυπ ριακ o´ : μ´ια ενδ oσ κ o´ π ησ η [The Cyprus Question: An Endoscopy] (Athens: Elliniki Euroekdotiki, 1987). See also Fotini Tomai-Constantopoulou (ed.), H Συμμετ oχ η´ τ ης Eλλαδας ´ σ τ ην π oρε´ια π ρ oς τ ην Eυρωπ α¨ικ η´ oλoκληρωσ ´ η [Greece’s Participation in European Integration] (Athens: Foreign Ministry and Papazisis, 2006). See Vols. 1 and 2 for a rare compilation of biographical information about Greek diplomats and political figures.

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question of the monarchy had the potential to create internal dissatisfaction or even a schism. The universally acknowledged fair election process and, above all, Karamanlis’ own neutral stance prevented any significant internal divisions.7 Coupled with the plebiscite it offered the Karamanlis government stability. It allowed the new democratic government to move forward with the necessary constitutional and political reforms and bring the period of metapolitefsi (political transition) to an end. In June 1975 the new parliament approved the new constitution introducing the Third Greek Republic.8 These two developments enabled the Greek cabinet to focus on foreign policy decision-making. There were pressing questions regarding Greek foreign policy and, above all, national security policy in the aftermath of the Cyprus crisis. During past decades the United States had been at the centre of both. The disappointment the Greek leadership felt from Washington’s response to the second Turkish invasion of Cyprus challenged this well-established view. The democratically elected government could not ignore the antiAmerican movement that spread throughout the country and infiltrated all partisan affiliations. The United States’ passive stance during the invasion of Cyprus coupled with the perception of unconditional support for the dictatorship, particularly during the Nixon years, strengthened anti-Americanism. In the past the left had predominately opposed close relations with the United States and participation in NATO. After 1974 a broader portion of the electorate including conservative voters questioned the benefits of maintaining bilateral relations with Washington. In the months leading up to the general election frequent anti-American and anti-NATO protests and demonstrations took place in Athens and other major cities.9 The demonstrators called for national independence from American patronage. It was not a surprise therefore that in the leadup to the general election all the political leaders including Karamanlis addressed the public’s concerns about Washington. Greek leftist parties predominately evoked anti-American sentiments. PASOK based its platform on anti-American, anti-NATO, and anti-West 7 Panos Kazakos, Aν αμεσ ´ α σ ε Kρ ατ ´ oς και Aγ oρ α: ´ Oικ oν oμ´ια και oικ oν oμικ η´ π oλιτ ικ η´ σ τ ην μετ απ oλεμικ η´ Eλλαδα, ´ 1944–2000 [Between State and Market: Economy and Fiscal Policy in Post-War Greece, 1944–2000], 9th ed. (Athens: Patakis, 2003), 293. 8 Hatzivassiliou, Greek Liberalism, 478. 9 Mitsotakis, Foreign Policy and Bases, 79.

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proclamations. Papandreou built his foreign policy vision around severing Greece’s ties with the United States. He advocated complete withdrawal from NATO and the unilateral annulment of any Greek–US agreements and defence arrangements. The party’s founding charter explicitly endorsed this foreign policy approach. Similarly, the communist alliance explicitly condemned US imperialism.10 Mavros for his part maintained a moderate approach towards the United States within the broader Greek left. He emphasised the need for deepening relations with ‘eastern countries and our northern [communist] neighbours’ while saying as little as possible about Washington.11 Despite his carefully delivered message in his last rally before the election, Mavros also courted the anti-American vote. This was a tactical approach rather than an ideological conviction as his discussions with Kissinger in New York show. The Greek right was not immune to anti-American sentiments either. They were best reflected in the enthusiasm expressed towards Karamanlis’ decision to withdraw from NATO’s integrated military command, for example.12 During the election campaign Karamanlis did not ignore the anti-American movement. His general triptych of foreign policy included three interconnected concepts: national independence, national security, and national respect. When it came to specifics, however, Karamanlis maintained a degree of caution. He emphatically stressed that Greece ‘belonged to the West’, but he appeared to be more comfortable when talking about relations with its European partners than the United States. He claimed that the country ‘wanted to belong to Europe’ underlying his government’s intention, if returned as prime minister, to apply for full membership of the European Economic Community (EEC).13 When NATO was mentioned, it was within the context of explaining why Greece chose to partially quit the alliance. Moreover, Karamanlis

10 Illias Illiou, Final election rally, 13 November 1974, in Constantine Svolopoulos (ed.), Kωνσ τ αντ ι´ν oς Kαραμανλης ´ : αρχ ε´ιo, γ εγ oν o´ τ α, και κε´ιμενα [Constantine Karamanlis: Archive, Events and Texts, hereafter Karamanlis ] (Kathimerini: Athens, 2005), Vol. 8, 211. 11 For Mavros’ main foreign policy goals, 12 November 1974, see Svolopoulos (ed.), Karamanlis, Vol. 8, 211. 12 Dimitris Psathas, commentary on Karamanlis’ speech delivered on 1 September 1974 in Thessaloniki, in Svolopoulos (ed.), Karamanlis, Vol. 8, 139. 13 Karamanlis’ campaign speech in Thessaloniki, 27 October 1974, and in Larissa, 3 November 1974, in Svolopoulos (ed.), Karamanlis, Vol. 8, 191, 200.

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was eager to restate the reasons for withdrawal from integrated military command. On relations with Turkey he portrayed Ankara as an aggressive and expansionist power, but remained committed to a solution in Cyprus that was ‘nationally acceptable’.14 However, during the campaign he did not elaborate on specific policies he intended to implement. Having won the election Karamanlis presented his government’s policies to the Greek parliament seeking a vote of confidence. During a three-day debate he indicated his government’s official approach towards the United States for the first time. Karamanlis acknowledged once more that: ‘Geographically, politically and ideologically, Greece belongs to the West’. However, he also reiterated the Greek government’s allegations against the United States and NATO regarding their inability and unwillingness to prevent and respond to the Turkish invasion of Cyprus concluding that: Greece unquestionably withdrew from NATO’s military structure. In order to apply this decision my government begins the process of practically withdrawing from the military structure and, second, [initiates] the review of agreements regarding US [military] bases in Greece.15

Although the end goal was not clearly stated, the negotiations indicated a new form of association with NATO and Greek–US relations would be set on a new basis. The Greek government clearly intended to address anti-Americanism and take steps to demonstrate to public that it listened, acknowledged, and addressed the expectation of change. Nonetheless, the US Embassy remained fairly optimistic regarding the Greek government’s attitude towards Washington. The new US Ambassador to Greece Jack Kubisch days after the election commented that ‘the tide [public opinion]’ had started to turn ‘in favor of improved US–Greek relations’. It was a slow yet promising process and provided those in Washington were prepared to ‘conduct our policies and activities in Greece skilfully, and with prudence and restraint, I look for the tide to move strongly in our favor again during 1975’. This development represented ‘the most

14 Karamanlis’ speech in Thessaloniki, 31 August 1974, and Karamanlis’ final rally before elections in Athens, 15 November 1974, in Svolopoulos (ed.), Karamanlis, Vol. 8, 138, 215. 15 Karamanlis government’s policy statement in the Greek parliament, 11 December 1974, in Svolopoulos (ed.), Karamanlis, Vol. 8, 258.

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favorable context in which to re-negotiate the large number of bilateral agreements we have with Greece and best serve[s] U.S. security and other interests here’.16 In reality the Greek government’s considerations towards relations with NATO and Washington were more complex. The public’s antiAmericanism was not the only factor that guided the government’s approach to transatlantic relations. In the aftermath of the Cyprus crisis, cooperation with the United States did not automatically serve Greek security doctrine as it had done in the early stages of the Cold War. Greek perceptions of threat were expanding. The invasion of Cyprus solidified Turkey as a threat to Greek sovereignty and this became an integral element of Greek defence planning.17 Turkey had resorted to the use of power to resolve a bilateral and international dispute. Athens questioned whether Turkey would resort to the use of force as a means of settling other ongoing Greek–Turkish disagreements, especially those related to the Aegean Sea.

How Far and How Close? In the immediate aftermath of events in Cyprus the Greek government began to consider its options regarding the relationships it had with NATO and the United States within the context of the 14 August declaration. Averoff emphasised in a letter to Karamanlis that … our participation in the political structure only of the alliance [NATO] is just a symbolic reflection of our commitment to [the] Western World. It does not commit us to NATO nor NATO to us either in the event of an

16 Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library [hereafter GRFPL], Presidential Country Files for the Middle East and South Asia [hereafter Presidential ME & SA], Box 11, Greece, State Department Telegrams, to SECSTATE- NODIS (4), Kubisch, tel. 8323 from US Athens to SecState, 20 November 1974. 17 Athanasios Platias, ‘Eλληνικη ´ Aμυντικη´ πoλιτικη´ μετα´ τo 1974’ [Greek Defence

Policy After 1974], in Konstantinos Arvanitopoulos and Marilena Koppa (eds), 30 Xρ o´ νια Eλληνικ ης ´ Eξ ωτ ερικ ης ´ Π oλιτ ικ ης ´ , 1974–2004 [30 Years of Greek Foreign Policy, 1974–2004] (Athens: Livani, 2005), 222; Sotiris Rizas, ‘Atlanticism and Europeanism in Greek Foreign and Security Policy in 1970s’, Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, Vol. 8(1), 2008, 56.

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attack from the Warsaw Pact or [provides for involvement] in preparations toward war.18

Before the general elections of November 1974 questions had already been raised within the Greek foreign ministry regarding the meaning of the announcement in terms of policy goals and within broader Greek foreign policy considerations. In October 1974 Greek diplomatic bureaucracy urged a policy review that would clarify whether the Greek government intended to break links with NATO and remove US bases from Greece entirely or, as the creator of the document questioned, whether: ‘we are using both these issues as a demonstration of our displeasure [with NATO/US] and to exercise pressure on both allies and especially on the Americans in order to improve our negotiating position against Turkey?’19 The author of the document presented both options. A radical approach against the western alliance entailed a dramatic shift in Greece’s foreign policy. Such a shift, the author noted, would not serve Greece’s intention to join the EEC since: ‘the Nine do not see any distinction between the Common Market and NATO. The Europeans might disagree on all other issues with the Americans, but on issues of defence their considerations coincide with the United States, given that Western Europe’s survival depends on US nuclear protection.’ A radical Greek approach that was opposed to NATO and the United States could also affect Cyprus negotiations. It was possible that Athens’ US and European partners might become less interested in Greek views. Although there is no reply to the classified top-secret document, based on subsequent developments the Greek government did not opt for the radical option in order to meet its foreign and security policy goals. Within these considerations the Cyprus problem in the dispute between Athens and Ankara occupied a central position in Greek foreign and security policy. Before the elections Greece had opposed meaningful negotiations on Cyprus. After the November 1974 elections the Greek government took steps towards resuming talks on the future of the Republic of Cyprus. The margins of the 1974 NATO foreign ministers’ council in Brussels 18 Constantine G. Karamanlis Foundation [hereafter CGKF], Constantine Karamanlis Papers [hereafter CKP], Folder 67B, Averoff, Brief Commentary on Greece’s Withdrawal from NATO, Views of the Minister of National Defence, 6 January 1975. 19 CGKF, CKP, Folder 20B, No creator name, Note, 16 October 1974.

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offered a prime opportunity for consultations between the Greek and Turkish ministers of foreign affairs. Secretary Kissinger acted as mediator and secured a preliminary agreement on the practical next steps required to revive Cyprus negotiations between the Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot communities soon after the NATO summit.20 Following a series of delays the optimism surrounding these talks soon proved to be unfounded. Differences regarding significant aspects of the solution re-emerged. For example, debate over the exact areas assigned to each community dominated the talks demonstrating how far apart the two sides were and preventing progress on overall negotiations. When the Turkish-Cypriot community proclaimed a Turkish Federated State of Cyprus on 13 February 1975 the talks formally collapsed. The Greek government denounced the action as a sign of Turkish intransigence.21 It also contemplated what the action implied for Turkish intentions regarding the Aegean dispute that remained the main point of conflict between Greece and Turkey despite activity surrounding the Cyprus disagreement.22 The Aegean dispute predated the 1974 Cyprus crisis by a year. The dispute emerged as a point of contention between Athens and Ankara in October 1973. It related to a potential discovery of oil reserves and exploration of the Aegean seabed. At the heart of the dispute lay Greek and Turkish protracted stances in formalising their respective rights.23 Ankara stated that it did not recognise the accepted boundary arrangements of its common maritime front with Greece. The dispute originated when 20 Bitsios, Note on his meeting at the NATO Brussels December 1974 summit, in Svolopoulos (ed.), Karamanlis, Vol. 8, 269. 21 Press statement regarding the conclusion of intercommunal negotiations on Cyprus, 28 January 1975, in Svolopoulos (ed.), Karamanlis, Vol. 8, 305; Karamanlis’ public statement, 13 February 1975, in Svolopoulos (ed.), Karamanlis, Vol. 8, 312. 22 CGKF, CKP, Folder 4B, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), Meeting of 14 February 1975 in Athens between the Greek government (Prime Minister, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Minister of National Defence, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ambassadors Tzounis, Molyviatis, Metaxas) and Cypriot government (Chair of Cypriot Parliament Klirides, Vice-Chair of Cypriot Parliament Papadopoulos, Minister of Foreign Affairs Christofides, former Minister of Foreign Affairs Kyprianou, and the Cypriot Ambassador in Athens Kranidiotis). 23 For a detailed analysis see Angelos Syrigos, Eλλην oτ oυρκικ šς Σχ šσ εις [Greek– Turkish Relations] (Athens: Patakis, 2015); Christos Rozakis, Tρ´ια χ ρ o´ νια ελληνικ ης ´ εξ ωτ ερικ ης ´ π oλιτ ικ ης ´ , 1974–1977 [Three Years of Greek Foreign Policy, 1974–1977] (Athens: Papazisis, 1978), 83.

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Ankara declared its national continental shelf as being to the west of some Greek islands. In doing so Turkey claimed its continental shelf overlapped what had long been considered Greek.24 Following the Cyprus crisis the dispute extended to include differences regarding air traffic control and each nation’s air space over the Aegean Sea. The Turkish government on 2 August 1974 issued NOTAM (Notice to Airmen) 714 requiring all aircraft approaching the Aegean median line to report their position and flight plan to Turkish air control authorities.25 The Turkish action represented manifestation of a Turkish challenge against Flight Information Region (FIR) arrangements covering both sides of the Aegean. Purely as a matter of convenience Athens and Ankara had agreed in 1952—when the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) was established—that the Athens FIR included most of the Aegean, while the Istanbul FIR included the remaining area and that above the Anatolian coast. Although FIR arrangements did not determine the official boundaries of Greek and Turkish airspace, when the Greek government issued its responding NOTAM 1157 it created a particularly complex and unsafe environment for international flights. The issue continually reappeared and dominated the process of Greece’s reintegration into NATO. The Aegean dispute also encompassed Greek and Turkish differences over their maritime boundaries. Revisions to international law of the sea allowed Greece to extend its territorial waters around the Greek islands. If Greece were to do so, then it could claim up to 63.9% of the Aegean Sea, Turkey only up to around 10%, thus significantly reducing the extent of international waters.26 In June 1974 a Turkish aide stated in the press

24 Andrew Wilson, ‘The Aegean Dispute’, in Jonathan Alford (ed.), Greece and Turkey: Adversity in Alliance (Aldershot: Gower for International Institute of Strategic Studies, 1984), 93–94. This offers one of the most comprehensive yet brief descriptions of the dispute as well as its legal aspects. 25 S. Victor Papacosma, ‘Greece and NATO’, in Lawrence S. Kaplan, Robert W. Clawson, and Raimondo Luraghi (eds), NATO and the Mediterranean (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources Inc., 1985), 202. 26 Sotiris Rizas, Oι Eλλην oτ oυρκικ šς σ χ šσ εις και τ o Aιγ α´ιo, 1973–1976 [Greek– Turkish Relations and the Aegean, 1973–1976] (Athens: Sideris, 2006), 11.

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that it would consider any Greek action towards extending its territorial waters as a casus belli.27 Separate but related to the Aegean issue was another irritant in Greek– Turkish relations: militarisation of the Aegean islands. When the Greek government in response to the Cyprus crisis decided to post armed forces on major Aegean islands, the Turkish government reacted.28 Ankara accused Greece of acting in violation of peace treaties such as the Lausanne Treaty of 1923.29 The Aegean dispute greatly concerned Karamanlis and his aides. Intelligence coming from Turkey indicated that Ankara was prioritising it over the Cyprus problem. What made matters worse Ankara was embracing a tough nationalist stance.30 Washington also concluded that tensions over the Aegean represented a significant threat to stability in the region. The US administration concluded that although neither side aimed at escalating tensions, any change in the standstill ‘could easily bring them into an unwanted and explosive confrontation’.31 The Turkish threat did little to distract existing Greek Cold War considerations. Since Karamanlis was a conservative, pro-West, anticommunist politician it is highly unlikely that his government would have underplayed the communist threat to Greece—and the West more broadly—even if there was a global easing of tensions thanks to détente.32 Averoff best expressed Greek security considerations regarding the national threat in a letter to Karamanlis: 27 Ioannis Valinakis, Eισ αγ ωγ η´ σ τ ην Eλληνικ η´ εξ ωτ ερικ η´ π oλιτ ικ η´ 1949–1988 [Introduction to Greek Foreign Policy 1949–1988], 4th ed. (Thessaloniki: Paratiritis, 2003), 209. 28 CGKF, Evangelos Averoff Papers [hereafter EAP], File 27, Averoff, Letter AP P: 40279 to the Prime Minister, ‘Some basic observations and suggestions regarding the Greek defence problem’, 9 May 1975. 29 Richard C. Campany Jr, Turkey and the United States: The Arms Embargo Period (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1986), 27. 30 CGKF, CKP, Folder 4B, Report of Intelligence, 14 January 1975; CGKF, EAP, File 27, Averoff, Handwritten letter AP P: 40178 to Deputy Minister of National Defence, 2 April 1975. 31 GRFPL, National Security Adviser [hereafter NSA], NSC Europe, Canada, and Ocean Affairs Staff, Files, 1974–1977 [hereafter NSC Staff Files], Box 9, Country File, Greece 1975 (3) WH, Clift, Memorandum for Secretary Kissinger, 5 April 1975. 32 CGKF, CKP, Folder 67B, Averoff, Brief Commentary on Greece’s Withdrawal from NATO, Views of the Minister of National Defence, 6 January 1975.

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Personally, I think it most likely that Moscow will not move against the West. However, this is a possibility rather than a probability. Therefore, based on the abovementioned reasons [relating to Turkey] and for wellestablished [Cold War] considerations, we do not face, as many believe, a defence problem only from the East but also one from the North.33

Preparation for the Greek premier’s participation in the Conference of Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), scheduled for the summer of 1975, offered an opportunity for the Greek diplomatic service to review its objectives for the summit. Greek considerations emphasised Athens’ concerns about the international situation in the Middle East, the impact the 1973 economic crisis had inflicted on the defence capabilities of the West vis-à-vis the Soviet bloc, and negotiations for the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) and the Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR).34 Athens’ concerns mirrored those of Western Europe regarding the CSCE and aspects of superpower détente.35 The Greek government therefore proceeded carefully when revisiting its approaches to the United States and NATO. Cold War realities ensured the relevance of NATO for Greek national security. Moreover, the United States and Kissinger personally had been the only power willing to mediate in the Cyprus dispute. Although Washington’s balanced approach did not fully satisfy Greek aims, it remained the only offer available. Despite public proclamations, Greek decision-makers privately appeared less eager after the elections to formalise the country’s withdrawal from the military arm of NATO. In its first cabinet meeting of 1975 the government underlined that it did not plan for outright withdrawal from the military command of NATO. Instead, it aimed to use it presumably as a pressure tactic to secure a satisfactory solution for Cyprus. The cabinet concluded that Athens ‘should conduct the

33 CGKF, EAP, File 27, Averoff, Handwritten letter AP P: 40031 to Chiefs of Staff, 16 January 1975. 34 CGKF, CKP, Folder 22B, Theodoropoulos, Various Notes for the Minister of Foreign Affairs, 8 May 1975. 35 Sarah B. Snyder, ‘The United States, Western Europe, and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 1972–1975’, in Matthias Schulz and Thomas Schwartz (eds), The Strained Alliance: U.S.–European Relations from Nixon to Carter (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 274.

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forthcoming negotiations carefully but we should not try to accelerate their pace’.36 The US administration noted Greece’s cautious attitude towards the alliance. Amid a broader strategy of repairing relations with Greece the Department of State insisted on allowing ample time for the Greek government to clarify its position. Coordinating the administration’s approach to the Greek withdrawal with the US Mission in NATO, the United States Deputy Secretary of State Robert S. Ingersoll highlighted that: Our approach to these negotiations would be to encourage Greece ultimately to resume the fullest possible role in NATO, at the same time seeking to avoid backing Greece prematurely into a corner that would make it formalize, under pressure, a low degree of participation, closing the door on further integration into NATO.37

The remaining NATO allies agreed that slow progress and ‘no rush toward a final agreement’ represented the optimal approach.38 This could prevent the most undesirable outcome: a complete Greek withdrawal from NATO. The alliance, therefore, allowed Athens time to consider its options, review its objectives, and present its vision for any future Greek–NATO relationship. Greek records do not explain the connection Karamanlis and his top ministers made between the Cyprus and Aegean disputes and the Greek– NATO relationship. The Greeks most likely considered that indirect pressures exercised by NATO members on both Greece and Turkey were beneficial to solving the most significant crisis in the alliance’s history. This approach explains the preoccupation of Greek Foreign Minister Bitsios with determining the mood in the alliance towards Greece at the December 1974 NATO summit in Brussels. Bitsios mentioned to Karamanlis inter alia that the attitude towards Greece within the alliance

36 CGKF, CKP, Folder 10B, Prime Minister’s Office, Cabinet Meeting at the Coordi-

nation Ministry, 4 January 1975. 37 Ingersoll, tel. from the Department of State to the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Embassy in Greece, Washington, 15 March 1975, FRUS, Vol. XXX, doc. 38. 38 GRFPL, NSA, NSC Staff Files, Box 9, Country File, Greece 1975 (1) WH, Briefing Item, Future of NATO–Greek security relationship, 17 January 1975.

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had substantially improved. He attributed this change to the positive ‘impression’ that a transition had taken place in Greece and the new government’s clear support for a Cyprus solution based on negotiation.39 Against this background the Greek government carefully studied its options. While the Greek cabinet and the leading circle around Karamanlis considered their alternatives at the political level, the government sought the views of the Council of National Defence. The Council comprised the chiefs of staff whose views determined what shape the future relationship between NATO and the Greek forces best suited the defence needs of Greece. When it came to the Greek military and the Ministry of National Defence more broadly two factors stand out. The first was the long-standing relevance of NATO to the threat posed by the Warsaw Pact countries. The second concerned the benefits and shortcomings of Greece’s partial withdrawal against the background of strong Turkish aggression as the Cyprus crisis demonstrated. The main question the Greek political and military leadership considered was in which NATO organs and committees Greece should continue to participate. The answer would signify how close or loose the Greek– NATO relationship would be. Although withdrawing Greek forces from integrated command during a period of peace—as announced by the Greek government—benefitted Greek defence planning and capabilities against Turkey, downgrading further Greek participation in the alliance’s committees undermined the benefits of the decision. Greek withdrawal from integrated command mirrored a similar decision made by France. Subsequent to that decision the French government concluded a series of bilateral agreements with the alliance. However, according to Greek decision-makers the French model of participation in NATO did not serve Greek interests. For Greece it was a ‘national necessity’ that the country maintained the closest possible relationship with NATO and remain if at all possible in the Defence Planning Committee (DPC) and the Military Committee (MC).40 The justification for such an approach reflects the way the military considered the importance of NATO and relations with the West for Greek security from a purely defence-planning viewpoint. Participating in the organs of the alliance

39 CGKF, CKP, Folder 3B, Bitsios, Note for Karamanlis, 11 December 1974. 40 CGKF, EAP, File 27, Karandreas, Report on NATO political and military structure,

received by Averoff, 7 August 1975.

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would not only allow Greece to observe and alter—given the power of a veto—any decision affecting future planning of the alliance, but also offered purely diplomatic benefits by being given the ability to threaten blocking a decision and preventing and averting ‘Turkish intentions against us’. This implied a greater role in the alliance. The lesser the role the Greek government played in Western defence planning the greater the significance Turkey attracted. This would eventually diminish Western assistance in political and military terms for Greece.41 Early in the process of disentangling Greece’s relations with NATO, Averoff sent a message to Karamanlis stressing another factor that the Greek government ought to consider. This was the economic aid Greece received to meet its obligations on behalf of the alliance. If the Greek role diminished, then so would aid authorised for Greece, particularly from the US government. This was an important consideration since improving military capabilities not only benefitted Greece in standing up to the communist threat, but also bolstered Greek capabilities in general. Since the Turkish invasion of Cyprus the Greek government had undertaken an extensive renewal programme aimed at addressing the deficit its armed forces had compared to the capabilities demonstrated by Turkey. As noted by the Greek Minister of National Defence this required significant funds.42 The government pursued a similar careful approach to the second issue Karamanlis raised in December 1974 relating to renegotiating the agreements that established and governed US military facilities in Greece. US bases in Greece were the most visible elements of Greek–US cooperation and indicated Washington’s presence in Greece. The bases had long drawn public resentment and became the most obvious target of anti-American protests that demanded their removal.43 Despite public demand for agreements covering operation of the bases to be redrafted quickly, the Greek government proceeded cautiously. The importance of Greek government considerations regarding the next steps to take after announcing partial withdrawal from NATO is reflected in the Greek 41 CGKF, EAP, File 27, Armpouzis, Report on Greek withdrawal from NATO (suggested relationship between Greece and NATO), Letter AP P: 40485/17-9-75, 27 September 1975. 42 CGKF, CKP, Folder 67B, Averoff, Minister’s views regarding the five-year programmes of armaments, 4 September 1974. 43 Rizas, ‘Atlanticism and Europeanism’, 62.

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negotiation strategy on US bases. The Greek government rejected a radical approach that would have entailed blanket removal of all US bases. The Greek leadership took the view that Greece could secure benefits from retaining the bases, while insisting on renegotiating the legal framework of these agreements. These negotiations offered an opportunity to remove any presently unwanted provisions in Greek–US defence agreements.44 A few months later the broader consensus within the Greek government was that the current provisions of agreements benefitted the United States rather than Greece. The agreements had been signed during the early stages of the Cold War immediately after Greece’s entry into NATO. Historians have suggested that the Greek government had ‘wanted’ Washington to establish these military bases. According to this interpretation Athens viewed the bases as an additional security guarantee that demonstrated Washington’s practical commitment to protecting Greek territorial integrity.45 In the following decades agreements regulating the bases had developed into a convoluted web of legislation and some provisions were considered out of date.46 For example, a provision of 1956 restricting the jurisdiction of Greek courts over US military personnel offenders was very controversial in terms of Greek–US agreements. In an internal review Foreign Ministry officials termed such provisions as being ‘offensive to national sovereignty’.47 Moreover, the Greek cabinet concluded that US bases belonged to three distinct categories: those that served US interests only; those that served mainly US but also Greek interests; and those that were closely linked to the defence of Greece. Accordingly, the cabinet agreed that in the forthcoming negotiations the principal goal should be to keep those bases that aided Greek defence. The Greek government was determined to remove bases that only served US interests. As for the rest

44 CGKF, CKP, Folder 20B, No creator’s name, Note, 16 October 1974. 45 Evanthis Hatzivassiliou, Greece and the Cold War: Front Line State, 1952–1967

(London: Routledge, 2006), 33. 46 Dimitris Bitsios, Π šρα απ o´ τ α σ  ´ ν oρα, 1974–1977 [Beyond the Borders, 1974– 1977], 2nd ed. (Estia: Athens, 1983), 209. 47 CGKF, CKP, Folder 19B, Activities of subcommittee on legal standing of US military forces in Greece, 13 October 1975.

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Athens would link them to further economic benefits or other tradeoffs in exchange for their presence.48 The claim that some US bases as with NATO membership remained important parts of Greek security doctrine was substantiated by Averoff. The Minister of National Defence noted that NATO forces stationed in Greece had nuclear weapons that, he implied, were stored in US bases. The presence of such weapons suggested that the alliance would defend Greece in the event of war. Nuclear weapons also acted as deterrents against a Soviet attack. These two factors echoed similar views that the first Karamanlis government espoused when it had accepted the stationing of tactical nuclear weapons in Greece.49 As a result of events in Cyprus Averoff added another reason why nuclear weapons served Greek interests. If the weapons were to be removed, then they could be transferred to Turkey. This was an undesirable development ‘that had so many implications that needed no explanation’.50 It was crucial, therefore, for the Greek government to ensure that some US bases remained in Greece. Finally, the Greek government did not overlook the economic benefits that US bases offered, particularly to local economies, and set out to maximise them.51 Despite the importance of such bases, the Greek leadership recognised the need to satisfy public opposition to them. The Defence Minister in conversation with US Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defence Burckold mentioned some steps that Athens expected US forces in Greece to take immediately that could appease public resentment. Averoff argued that: … dissolution of the Ellinko base would have a significant psychological impact given its position [i.e. proximity to Athens]. (In response my counterpart and the Ambassador underlined the technical difficulties […] and also noted that a number of changes could take place such as not raising the American flag, withdrawing the American guard, and having a Greek commander to head the base, etc. […]).

48 CGKF, CKP, Folder 10B, Note on Cabinet Meeting in the Ministry of Coordination, 4 January 1975. 49 Hatzivassiliou, Greece and the Cold War, 94. 50 CGKF, CKP, Folder 67B, Averoff, Brief Commentary on Greece’s withdrawal from

NATO, Views of the Minister of National Defence, 6 January 1975. 51 CGKF, CKP, Folder 19B, Activities of subcommittee on legal standing of US military forces in Greece, 13 October 1975.

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Regarding the Souda base I mentioned that […] there were too many take-offs that intercepted our own aircraft but also many [members of the public?] concluded that the appearance of heavy transporting aircraft during the Greek–Turkish tension [summer 1974] was intended to supply Turkish forces.52

Renegotiations concerning US bases were designed to some extent to satisfy the public’s anti-American feelings. The White House accurately noted that the Greek approach aimed at ‘eliminating the more visible aspects of the U.S. presence […]’.53 Therefore, Averoff’s statement and the view from Washington regarding Greek incentives undermine the argument that public opinion little influenced Karamanlis’ decisions about US bases in Greece.54 Even if it did not constitute its main preoccupation, the Karamanlis government could not afford to and did not intend to ignore anti-Americanism. A democratically elected government had to take steps and demonstrate that it appreciated the views of the electorate. By October and early November 1975 the Greek government had crystallised its demands regarding US bases. Apart from some purely technical considerations regarding the function, location, and accessibility of bases, Greek internal guidelines emphasised that a Greek commander should control all remaining US bases in Greece, end preferential treatment of US personnel, and ensure that US servicemen on the bases faced the same benefits and obligations as personnel from other NATO countries.55 A common element in a number of relevant documents was the need for greater national control over US bases. This was a further response to anti-American demonstrations and allegations that the United States was subverting national sovereignty. Negotiations commenced in autumn 1975 between high-ranking military officials from both sides.56 52 CGKF, EAP, File 27, Averoff, Memorandum of Conversation between the Minister of National Defence with Assistant Secretary Burckold, Letter AP P: 40093, 19 February 1975. 53 GRFPL, NSA, NSC Staff Files, Box 9, Country File, Greece 1975 (1) NSC, Report ‘Averoff Optimistic on NATO, US’, January 1975, heavily redacted. 54 Mitsotakis, Foreign Policy and Bases, 82. 55 CGKF, CKP, Folder 19B, Decision Memorandum of the 30 October 1975 Meeting,

4 November 1975. 56 For a detailed account from the US perspective see John W. McDonald Jr and Diane Bendahmane (eds), U.S. Bases Overseas: Negotiations with Spain, Greece, and the Philippines (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990).

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Such negotiations remained at a technical level even though the Greek government and the US administration observed them closely. The specifics of the negotiations did not reach the ministerial level characterised by bilateral contacts and cooperation between the two sides. Dominant issues at that level remained the Cyprus negotiations and, progressively, the Aegean dispute. Such considerations led the Greek government to believe that the United States should play an active role in the Greek–Turkish dispute. However, Athens questioned the Ford administration’s willingness to exercise pressure on Ankara. Questions surrounding US bases and Greece’s commitment to NATO represented opportunities for Athens to put pressure on Washington as indicated by a number of records. However, the Greek Permanent Representative to NATO Ambassador Vyron Theodoropoulos noted this kind of ‘pressure’ entailed high risk and an end result that was questionable.57 The experienced ambassador warned about the danger Greek threats to leave the alliance might result in a rigid US and NATO stance against Greece and move them closer to Turkey. While the Greek government considered its options and the best strategy to adopt to secure US support for Greek interests, the prospect of an arms embargo on Turkey emerged. Therefore, at a time when Greece’s allies and foes looked to Washington for support and the Ford administration avoided taking sides, Athens welcomed the legislation members of Congress were promoting. The arms embargo on Turkey offered economic and political benefits for Greece. The legislation would restrict Ankara’s ability to obtain US aid for military purposes and in so doing would inadvertently further Greek interests. In the aftermath of the Cyprus crisis Greece and Turkey engaged in an informal arms race. The modernisation and expansion of the Greek military became not only a necessity but also a burden on the national budget. The Minister of Defence noted that the need to pay for purchases in hard currency would cause financial pressure. However, the various US aid programmes for grant credits, low-interest loans, and free assistance support would be valuable in easing such pressure.58 Turkey faced similar if not greater limitations in its efforts to upgrade its armed forces. 57 CGKF, CKP, Folder 20B, Theodoropoulos, Letter Délégation permanente de la Grèce, Brussels to MFA, 14 November 1974. 58 CGKF, CKP, Folder 2B, Averoff, Handwritten summary of cabinet meeting, 25 August 1974.

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The continued Turkish presence on Cyprus came at a high economic price. Thus, any restrictions on economic support for Turkey indirectly benefitted Greece. The arms embargo challenged the balanced approach that Kissinger promoted since it portrayed Turkey as responsible for the Cyprus situation and required it to take steps to secure progress in efforts to find a solution. Legislation presented in the following months placed a strict timeframe on progress. The implications of this had the potential to benefit Karamanlis at home. Karamanlis followed a pro-Western, pro-US policy in the face of anti-American sentiment. When the arms embargo became a reality, Karamanlis did not hesitate to present the legislation as proof of US support for Greece.59 However, the Greek government was not willing to use its role in the arms embargo to boost political support internally. Doing so risked cooperation with the White House, which Athens continued to view as an important ally. The Karamanlis government worked mainly behind closed doors by expressing support for the arms embargo throughout its almost four-year-long duration. The Greek Embassy in Washington played a vital role in this process and one that has rarely been credited—as mentioned above. Ambassador Alexandrakis developed close links with leading supporters of the legislation and ensured that the Foreign Ministry and the Prime Minister’s Office remained fully informed about developments on Capitol Hill.

Congress and the Arms Embargo The second Turkish invasion of Cyprus raised questions about what the US response and reaction ought to be.60 On Capitol Hill US Representatives and Senators went on record calling for sanctions against Turkey.61 In the following weeks and months the Greek Lobby became the driving 59 Karamanlis statement to the Greek Parliament, 17 April 1976, in Svolopoulos (ed.), Karamanlis, Vol. 9, 199. 60 Charles A. Krause, ‘Cyprus War Protested by 20,000 Here’, The Washington Post, 19 August 1974, A1; ‘George Ball Asks Cutoff of Military Aid to Turks’, The Washington Post, 21 August 1974, A4; ‘Ribicoff and Kennedy to Seek Aid Cutoff’, The Washington Post, 19 August 1974, A16. 61 ProQuest, Congressional Record Digital Collection, 93 Congress, 2nd Session, Rep. Bingham, ‘Cutoff of Military Aid to Turkey’, 21 August 1974, H29641; Sen. Abraham Ribincoff (D-CT), ‘The Cyprus Tragedy’, 22 August 1974, S29877; Sen. Lawton Chiles (D-FL), ‘Cyprus’, 22 August 1974, S29986.

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force behind the effort to cut Turkey’s access to US military supplies and aid for defence purposes. Although the Greek Lobby is a broad term, it naturally refers to the Greek diaspora in the United States and their organisations the largest being the American Hellenic Educational Progressive Association (AHEPA). Greek–American organisations were supportive of the embargo and put pressure on their governmental representatives to support the legislation.62 However, the term as used by Kissinger referred to US members of Congress and Senators who became involved and interested in supporting Greek-related issues. Key figures in the group were Representative John Brademas (D-IN), Representative and Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Europe Benjamin Stanley Rosenthal (D-NY), Representative and from 1975 Senator Paul Sarbanes (D-MD), Senator Thomas Eagleton (D-MO), and Senator Claiborne Pell (D-RI). There is evidence of direct contact and cooperation between the Greek government and lobby organisations regarding the US arms embargo on Turkey.63 However, the Greek government directed its embassy to work closely with those members of Congress who Greek records frequently referred to as ‘our friends members of Congress/in Congress’ primarily. To avoid confusion the term Greek Lobby used here will reflect this interpretation meaning ‘members of Congress who supported Greece’. The Turkish arms embargo was a product of its time reflecting political changes in Washington rather than merely being a demonstration of support for Greece and Cyprus. It was part of the broader clash between the executive and legislative branches of the US government in the aftermath of the Vietnam War,64 which represented Congressional empowerment and a manifestation of its intention to play a larger role

62 Chris Ioannides, Realpolitik in the Eastern Mediterranean: From Kissinger and the Cyprus Crisis to Carter and the Lifting of the Turkish Arms Embargo (New York: Pella, 2001), 49. On the role of Greek–American activism see George Kaloudis, ‘The Influence of the Greek Diaspora on Greece and the United States’, International Journal on World Peace, Vol. 25(3), 2008, 40. 63 Van Coufoudakis, ‘The Reverse Influence Phenomenon: The Impact of the Greek– American Lobby on the Foreign Policy of Greece’, in Dimitri C. Constas and Athanassios G. Platias (eds), Diasporas in World Politics: The Greeks in Comparative Perspective (London: Macmillan Press, 1993), 57. 64 Richard A. Melanson, American Foreign Policy since the Vietnam War: The Search for Consensus from Nixon to Clinton, 3rd ed. (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2000).

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in shaping US foreign relations.65 The mid-term elections of November 1974 represented a significant milestone. The Democrats extended their control of the House as a result of having 290 seats and secured the two-thirds majority that enabled it to overrule the President’s veto. The Turkish arms embargo was a divisive issue and most Democrats objected to it. Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield (D-MT) opposed the embargo legislation as a simplistic approach to a complex issue.66 However, the new class of members of Congress elected in 1974 placed a strong focus on human rights and Congressional empowerment.67 They prioritised their perception of the role of Congress. The new Congress members’ willingness to defy their Democratic Congressional leadership proved detrimental to legislation imposing the arms sales cutoff on Turkey from January 1975 onwards succeeding. The new Democrat-led Congress continued the long tradition of Congressional challenges to Kissinger’s support of and cooperation with the Greek military regime.68 As early as 1971 the House Subcommittee on Europe questioned continued US military aid to Greece and Spain because their governments were not democratic.69 Similarly, in the spring of 1974 the Congressional Subcommittee on International Organizations and Movement presented the findings of a recent study mission to Greece reporting that current US policies endangered future relations with Greece.70 This was when calls to cut off military aid first emerged.71 After the second invasion of Cyprus and Greece’s withdrawal 65 Comments by Robert Pastor and Richard Levine on Eagleton’s amendment, quoted in Robert David Johnson, Congress and the Cold War (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 201. 66 Johnson, Congress, 200. 67 Johnson, Congress, 205; Barbara Keys, ‘Congress, Kissinger and the Origins of

Human Rights Diplomacy’, Diplomatic History, Vol. 34(5), 2010, 826. 68 James Edward Miller, United States and the Making of Modern Greece: History and Power, 1950–1974 (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2009), 167. 69 Theodor Couloumbis, … 71 … 74: Σημειωσ ´ εις εν o´ ς π ανεπ ισ τ ημιακ o´ [… 71 … 74: An Academic’s Notes] (Athens: Patakis, 2002), 15, and—for detail of the author’s testimonies before the subcommittee—25. 70 Mogens Pelt, Tying Greece to the West: US-West German-Greek Relations, 1949–74 (Copenhagen: Museum Tusculanum Press, 2006), 340. 71 The best and most detailed account of the Turkish embargo and the legislative process in Greek literature can be found in Panagiotis Theodorakopoulos, To Koγ κρ šσ o σ τ ην διαμ´oρϕωσ η τ ης Aμερικανικ ης ´ Eξ ωτ ερικ ης ´ Π oλιτ ικ ης ´ : O ρ o´ λoς τ oυ σ τ ην

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from NATO, arguments regarding the need to support the newly restored Greek democracy and secure Greek–US ties continued.72 Proposals for action against Turkey came at a time when Congressional patience with Ankara had grown thin. Since at least spring 1974 there had been bipartisan displeasure with the Turkish government due to its repeal of the 1971 poppy seed cultivation ban. The opium epidemic, particularly among Vietnam War veterans, forced US decision-makers to target the main drug-trafficking countries. Turkey was the biggest exporter of poppy seeds. Although they were predominantly intended for medical manufacturing, drug cartels used a significant portion of the crop for the production of heroin. Under US pressure the semi-dictatorial regime of 1971–1973 agreed to a compensation scheme that motivated Turkish farmers to abandon poppy cultivation and convert to other crops. It proved to be a deeply unpopular measure that deprived the rural population of valuable income.73 The agreement came under attack during Turkey’s 1973 election campaign. Leader of the Republican People’s Party (RPP) Bülent Ecevit was committed to its repeal. Once in power Prime Minister Ecevit lifted the ban despite US protestations. The potential US reaction included a trade embargo.74 The Turkish invasion of Cyprus added to this sense of frustration and calls for sanctions intensified. The Greek Embassy in Washington closely monitored public statements on Capitol Hill in favour of an arms embargo. In September the Senate amended the Import–Export Bank Act expressing ‘the sense of the Senate’ that Turkey no longer qualified for US military assistance.75 This non-binding amendment increased political pressure on the administration but did not impose an arms embargo.

π ερ´ιπ τ ωσ η τ ης Eλλαδας ´ [Congress and the Shaping of American Foreign Policy: Its Role in the Case of Greece] (Athens: Sideris, 1996). 72 ProQuest, Congressional Record Digital Collection, 93 Congress, 2nd Session, Rep. J. Elberg, ‘The Problem of Cyprus’, 20 August 1974, H29432; Rep. Sikes, ‘Where Were We When Greece Needed help?’, 21 August 1974, H29720; Rep. Brademas (IN), ‘Personal Statement’, 22 August 1974, Extension Remarks 30167. 73 Campany, Turkey and the United States, 25. 74 Saban H. Çalı¸s, Turkey’s Cold War: Foreign Policy and Western Alignment in the

Modern Republic (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2017), 153–156. 75 ‘Senate Urges Ford to Halt Arms Aid to Turkey’, The New York Times, 20 September 1974, 4.

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The US House of Representatives took a tougher approach towards Turkey and demonstrated its readiness to impose sanctions. Before unveiling the legislative proposal Representative Rosenthal (D-NY) visited Cyprus, Greece, and Turkey on a fact-finding mission. Rosenthal criticised the administration’s response to the crisis. His assessment was particularly grim about Kissinger’s handling of the Cyprus situation and the future prospects for Greek–US relations.76 In Athens he met with Karamanlis and the Minister of National Defence. In front of reporters converging at his meeting with the Prime Minister he emphasised his belief that the arms embargo would soon be a reality. Unfortunately, there is no record of his conversation with Karamanlis. Nor did the US Embassy in Athens provide any details of the meeting. Given his condemnation of the actions of the US administration it is no surprise that Rosenthal kept the then US Ambassador in Greece Henry Tasca at arm’s length. Rosenthal had previously criticised Tasca for his close links with the Greek dictatorship. Nonetheless, sources inside the embassy give insights about Averoff’s attitude in his meeting with Rosenthal. The Greek minister allegedly underlined the Karamanlis government’s conviction that Turkey had ‘imperialistic aims’ that went far beyond its recent actions in Cyprus with the principal Greek concern being Turkish intentions to expand in the Aegean Sea.77 It is more likely than not that Karamanlis shared Averoff’s assessment and expressed support for any measures that could restrain Turkey. Once back in Washington Rosenthal introduced an amendment to House Joint Resolution (H.J. Res.) 1131 regarding a Continuing Appropriation Resolution for the ongoing fiscal year. The amendment explicitly required—if approved—that Turkey be barred from receiving any existing provisions of military and economic aid and any military equipment deliveries until all parties involved in the Cyprus crisis agreed on the future of the Turkish forces stationed there. This amendment to a Congressional resolution reflected the well-established practice of Congress in the

76 Steven V. Roberts, ‘Washington Policy on Cyprus Assailed by Rep. Rosenthal’, The New York Times, 13 September 1974, 7; ‘Mεγαλη ´ Kρ´ιση στις σχšσεις Eλλαδoς-HA´ ιαπιστωνει ´ o κ. P´oζενθαλ’ [Severe Crisis in US–Greek Relations, finds Mr Rosenthal], To Vima, 18 September 1974, 8. 77 General Records of Department of State, National Archives [hereafter NARA], Tasca, tel .6631 Athens to SecState, 11 September 1974, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1973– 1979, Electronic Telegrams 1978, RG 59.

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1970s to put pressure on the executive to give into their demands.78 The resolution would secure continued financing of the federal government. An overwhelming majority of 307 to 90 votes approved the resolution including the amendment despite opposition from both the House Speaker and House Minority Leader.79 President Ford immediately vetoed the bill. The Ford administration was vehemently opposed to the prospect of the embargo on the basis of harming Turkish–US relations.80 The presidential veto did not discourage the House from continuing to include similar amendments to subsequent appropriation resolutions. Time was running out and Ford could not reject the House bill indefinitely. Under pressure the White House accepted H.J. Res. 1167, which became PL 93-448 on 17 October 1974.81 The law amended the Foreign Assistance Act and prohibited any US military assistance to Turkey including cash, credit, guaranty, or any other means. The bill recognised the President’s power to suspend the arms embargo ‘if he determines that such suspension will further negotiations for a peaceful solution of the Cyprus conflict’.82 Although the suspension only lasted until 10 December 1974, the fight against the arms embargo was far from over. The Senate had to pass its own version of the bill. When the bill came before the US Senate the opponents of the legislation were victorious. On 6 December the Senate voted on the corresponding bill to the House appropriation resolution. The bill included a provision to grant more time to the administration before the arms embargo became a reality. A House–Senate conference committee bridged the differences between the two bills.83 The result was Public Law (PL) 93-559 that restricted US aid to Turkey along the lines of the

78 Johnson, Congress, 71. 79 Mary Russell, ‘House Votes to Cut Arms Aid to Turkey’, The Washington Post, 25

September 1974, A2. 80 Yanek Mieczkowski, Gerald Ford and the Challenges of the 1970s (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 2005), 276. 81 Theodorakopoulos, Congress, 130. 82 Public Law 93-448 [H.J. Res. 1167], Congressional Record. 83 Conference Report on Foreign Assistance Act of 1974, 17 December 1974,

https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/cia-rdp79-00957a000100010 011-6 (accessed 19 November 2017).

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House bill but set 5 February 1975 as the deadline for action.84 The 6 December Senate vote forced the Greek government to reconsider its tactics.

Changing Tactics Ambassador Alexandrakis analysed the vote as a failure of the Greek government to make its wishes known despite its contacts with US representatives and senators. For him Senator Edward M. ‘Ted’ Kennedy (D-MA) was an example of the confusion over the Greek position. Despite Kennedy being a critic of Turkey and an ardent supporter of the embargo, he voted in favour of the extension.85 Back in November Karamanlis had arranged a tête-à-tête with Kennedy during his short stopover flight in Athens. Ambassador Kubisch noted that this meeting had not been previously scheduled and took place at Karamanlis’ personal request.86 In a brief statement before the Greek press Kennedy emphasised the need for the United States to play a constructive role in the Cyprus negotiations. As with the Karamanlis–Rosenthal meeting there is no information about Kennedy’s conversation with Karamanlis. However, it is safe to assume from Alexandrakis’ analysis and expectations that Karamanlis had expressed support for the Congressional effort. Kennedy, however, flipped and voted with the administration. Kennedy’s stance did not bode well for the Greek approach on Capitol Hill. The Greek Ambassador believed that Athens had allowed the White House to misrepresent Greek views. Before the Senate vote the White House enlisted the help of Ambassador Kubisch to lobby Congress. He returned to Washington and claimed that the Greek government recognised in reality that the arms embargo was counterproductive to the Cyprus negotiations. According to Kubisch, domestic politics prevented Karamanlis from stating this view in

84 PL 93-559; 88 Stat. 1795; 1974 Enacted S. 3394; 93 Enacted S. 3394, 30 December 1974. 85 CGKF, CKP, Folder 3B, Alexandrakis, tel. .468 Washington to MFA, 6 December 1974. 86 ‘Kennedy Charges “Tilt to Turkey”’, The Washington Post, 14 October 1974, A7; Kubisch, tel. 8245 Athens to SecState, 17 November 1974, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1973–1979, Electronic Telegrams 1978, RG 59, General Records of Department of State, NARA.

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public. When Kubisch’s statements to Congress became known the Greek government issued a strong rebuttal.87 However, the damage was done. A press statement from the Greek government seemed only to confirm Kubisch’s arguments. The Greek government had to find new ways of getting support for the embargo in Washington. On 5 February the Turkish arms embargo became a reality. Between February and October 1975 the arms embargo took on its most severe form. It prohibited all US military assistance to Turkey until a solution was reached regarding Turkish forces on Cyprus or there was clear evidence for progress in negotiations for a solution to the Cyprus question.88 Having failed to prevent the legislation the White House now focussed on its repeal. The Ford administration believed that the Turkish arms embargo would be counterproductive. Ford and Kissinger lobbied Congress to change course and reverse the ban on Turkey. Both frequently met with leaders of the Greek–American community, the Greek Lobby, those members of Congress interested in the issue, and Democratic and Republican Congressional leaders. The administration developed a central theme that Ford and Kissinger advocated in these meetings. Their argument was based on the premise that the embargo hurt the Greek and Turkish governments equally. The administration stressed its unconditional support for the new democratic government in Greece and Prime Minister Karamanlis. However, the Cyprus question represented a major threat to Greek domestic stability and Greek–Turkish relations. Prolonging the dispute only endangered the Karamanlis government’s prospects. Moreover, the arms embargo prevented progress in the negotiations since the Turkish government was not prepared to make significant concessions before the legislation was lifted.89

87 ‘Memorandum from Congress Refutes the US Embassy’, To Vima, 18 December 1974, 8; CGKF, CKP, Folder 3B, Press statement, No date/based on context released either on 5 or 6 December 1974. 88 The arms embargo was based on amendment (x) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. 89 GRFPL, National Security Advisor, Memoranda of Conversations 1973–77, Digitised Collection [hereafter Memoranda of Conversations], President Ford, Secretary Kissinger, Scowcroft, 25 September 1974, and President Ford, Bipartisan Congressional Leadership, 11 December 1974, and President Ford, Secretary Kissinger, Vice President Rockefeller, Bipartisan Congressional Leadership, 3 February 1975, and President Ford, Secretary

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The emphasis on the arms embargo’s negative impact on the Greek government was considered a factor that could force supporters of the embargo to reconsider their adamant position. Some of the most prominent US Representatives and Senators who supported Greek interests in Congress had been vocal about the need to preserve stability in Greece as the best way of preserving bilateral relations. Senator Paul Sarbanes explicitly expressed the Greek Lobby’s concern about relations with Greece during a meeting with Ford and Kissinger.90 Another obvious argument emphasised the negative implications the arms embargo was having on Turkey and Turkish–US relations. The White House highlighted the profound impact that the embargo had on Turkey’s relations with the United States, the West, and NATO.91 Ankara’s reactions in the summer of 1975 acted as a testament to the US administration’s warnings regarding relations with Turkey. Stating that without access to US aid it was no longer willing to accommodate US facilities the Turkish government shut down the 26 US bases in Turkey allowing only the NATO base in Incirlik to continue to operate. Simultaneously, the Turkish government announced its intention to review its bilateral military agreements with the United States.92 Following the Turkish decision on 16 July to shut the bases down Ford and Kissinger building on their earlier warnings moved quickly to exploit the fate of US bases in Turkey and argue for the need to amend the arms embargo legislation.93 Kissinger, Bipartisan Congressional Leadership, 6 February 1975, and President Ford, Secretary Kissinger, Bipartisan Congressional Leadership, 20 February 1975. 90 GRFPL, Memoranda of Conversations, President Ford, Secretary Kissinger, Congressmen Rosenthal, Hamilton, Brademas et al., 19 June 1975. 91 GRFPL, NSA, NSC Staff Files, Box 9, Country File, Greece 1975 (1) WH, Clift, Action Memorandum to Kissinger, 28 February 1975, about proposed President’s meeting with AHEPA; GRFPL, Memoranda of Conversations, President Ford, Secretary Kissinger, Congressmen Lee Hamilton, Charles W. Whalen, Paul S. Sarbanes et al., 23 June 1975. 92 Ay¸se Gul Altinay and Amy Holms, ‘Opposition to the U.S. Military Presence in Turkey in the Context of the Iraq War’, in Catherine Lutz (ed.), The Bases of Empire: The Global Struggle against U.S. Military Posts (London: Pluto Press, 2009), 274; Amy Austin Holms, Social Unrest and American Bases in Turkey and Germany since 1945 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 186. 93 ‘Ford Urges House to Renew Arms Aid to Turkey’, The Washington Post, 20 June 1975, 2; GRFPL Memoranda of Conversations, President Ford with Joint Congressional Leadership, 14 July 1975, and President Ford, Kissinger, Schlesinger, Republican Congressional Leadership, 21 July 1975.

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The Greek government was well aware of the US administration’s moves and followed all its public statements closely.94 Greek officials expressed ‘surprise and justifiable disappointment’ over the administration’s efforts to resume arms deliveries to Turkey without prior attempts to obtain Turkish concessions on either Greek–Turkish issues or Cyprus.95 Athens recognised that stating its frustration would not stop the efforts of the Ford administration. The Greek government decided to intervene actively and confront the administration’s assurances that the embargo was unproductive. Immediately after imposition of the arms embargo and as the administration embarked on efforts to repeal the legislation the Greek government instructed the Greek Embassy to ensure that ‘friendly Congressmen’ were well aware of Athens’ views and considerations. The Greek argument insisted that repeal of the arms embargo could only ‘encourage Turkey’s uncooperative stance [and] prevent any Greek and Cypriot efforts for settlement of the issue. […] On a political level, the resumption of aid would give Turkey the green light to undertake acts of aggression in the Aegean […]’.96 Foreign Minister Bitsios met with Representative Rosenthal and reiterated the Greek views in person. Bitsios stressed the unproductive Turkish position in the negotiations. He also noted in a telegram to Ambassador Alexandrakis that: I stated [to Rosenthal] that there are some signs of Turkish bending and hints made on behalf of the new Turkish government at the beginning of Greek–Turkish dialogue. I attributed this Turkish stance to: • Turkey is beginning to feel the moral isolation that is the result of its own policies and the use of violence and threats • The embargo has begun to produce tangible results affecting the readiness of Turkish military forces.97

94 CGKF, CKP, Folder 11B, Alexandrakis, tel. A.236 Washington to MFA, 5 February 1975, and Alexandrakis, tel. A.238, 5 February 1975. 95 CGKF, CKP, Folder 11B, Bitsios, tel. YOI-792 to Washington, 12 July 1975, and Alexandrakis, tel. A313 to MFA, 14 July 1975. 96 CGKF, CKP, Folder 11B, Bitsios, tel. .3161.24A/84-85I/695I MFA to Washington, 21 February 1975. Note that on 20 February Kissinger argued that the Greek government wished to put the Cyprus issue behind it. 97 CGKF, CKP, Folder 4B, Bitsios, tel. YOI-387 MFA to Washington, 21 April 1975.

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This meeting took place in the middle of efforts to repeal the embargo. In late March the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee endorsed a bill giving the President the ability to repeal the embargo if he considered it to be beneficial to progressing the negotiations.98 The bill reached the Senate floor and was approved by a majority of one vote on 19 May 1975. The next step was to bring the legislation to the House. President Ford personally lobbied most US Representatives to support the bill by underlining Turkey’s strategic importance to US national interests.99 The administration used Ankara’s reaction in an effort to secure bipartisan support for repeal of the embargo. The Turkish government announced the possibility of closing US military bases in its territory if the embargo remained in place. Despite the pressure the House of Representatives rejected the bill putting an end to the administration’s effort.100 In response the Turkish government shut US bases in its territory and proclaimed the existing Turkish–US Defence Cooperation Agreement (DCA) void.101 A week later Ford and Karamanlis met on the margins of the 1975 Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) in Helsinki. Ford attacked Greek activities in support of the embargo. He presented Karamanlis with a letter that Ambassador Alexandrakis had allegedly distributed on the House floor. The letter appeared to have come from Karamanlis urging US Representatives to uphold the embargo. Karamanlis acknowledged the actions of Greek diplomats but justified them as a response to rumours from the White House regarding the Greek stance against the legislation. Karamanlis had to act to shield his government from domestic criticism.102 Ford clearly exaggerated the importance of Alexandrakis’ alleged letter. However, the letter provided a unique opportunity to pressure the Greek government into abandoning its meddling on Capitol Hill. Karamanlis had previously insisted that Athens treat the embargo as a domestic US 98 Theodorakopoulos, Congress, 137. 99 David Binder, ‘Ford Hopes to Sway House on Aid to Turkey’, The New York Times,

9 July 1975, 3. 100 Richard L. Lyons, ‘House Kills Turkey Arms Compromise’, The Washington Post, 25 July 1975. 101 ‘Turkey: US Pact Now Dead’, The Washington Post, 3 August 1975, 21. 102 Memorandum of Conversation, Karamanlis and Ford, Helsinki, 30 July 1975,

FRUS, Vol. XXX, doc. 51.

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issue and did not intervene either in support of or in opposition to the embargo while resisting requests to restrain the actions of Greek Americans and citing Athens’ non-involvement in the process.103 The administration was fully aware of Greek activities on the Hill. However, it lacked concrete evidence to accuse Karamanlis of essentially mispresenting his government’s position. The alleged letter provided an opportunity to dissuade Karamanlis from continuing such involvements. Despite pressure from the White House, the Greek government continued its efforts to keep the embargo in place. The legislative process resumed in September 1975 with the Greek government expecting the Ford administration to use the September intercommunal negotiations on Cyprus in New York to leverage repeal of the embargo. Bitsios instructed Alexandrakis to make it clear that there had been no breakthrough in this round of negotiations.104 However, Ford in his lobbying efforts to Congress claimed that the embargo was responsible for the impasse in the talks. He stressed the Turkish view that lifting the embargo would have ‘a positive effect’ on the talks.105 Following renewed and intense efforts by opponents of the embargo the House in October 1975 approved partially repealing the arms embargo on Turkey. Although some provisions of the law were diluted, the embargo remained in place barring Turkey from qualifying for free US aid. However, the government of Turkey would be able to access Foreign Military Sales Credits and purchase weapons on the free market. The new law provided significant benefits to Greece. The statute amending the embargo’s terms referred explicitly to the need for restraint by Ankara. More importantly, it mandated the President work with the government of Greece ‘to determine the most urgent needs of Greece for economic and military assistance’.106 In the following months the US administration submitted its military assistance requests to Greece, which were largely satisfactory to the Greek government. Finally, partial repeal of the embargo required that the White House report to Congress 103 CGKF, CKP, Folder 3B, Bitsios, Note on Brussels meetings with Kissinger, 11 December 1974. 104 CGKF, CKP, Folder 5B, Bitsios, tel. A.597 MFA to Washington, 11 September

1975. 105 GRFPL, NSA, NSC Staff Files, Box 25, Country File, Turkey, 1975 (22) WH, Scowcroft, President’s meeting with GOP Congressional Leadership, 23 September 1975. 106 Public Law 94-104, 94th Congress, 6 October 1975.

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every 60 days on the steps taken to resolve the Cyprus problem. Such a provision entailed continued US interest in the negotiation process. The Greek government clearly worked closely with Congress in order to ensure that Turkish power and military advantages were kept in check while Greece was in the process of rebuilding its military capabilities. The choice to do so reflected a conscious decision to undermine the Ford administration’s Eastern Mediterranean policy. In parallel with this Athens retained close contacts within the administration. The Greek government did not question the political benefits that cooperation with Washington offered at a time when Greek foreign policy faced major challenges. The Greek government considered Kissinger could play the role of mediator with Ankara. This in turn offered the administration a tool to persuade the Greeks that the embargo also challenged Greek interests while potentially blackmailing Athens in order to prevent its cooperation with Congress. The strategy was risky.

The White House: An Indispensable Ally The Greek government demonstrated a lot of cynicism towards Washington in promoting its national interest. Despite contacts within Congress, Athens expected Washington to mediate with Ankara regarding the Cyprus negotiations and the Aegean dispute. The Ford administration also recognised that it could not walk away from Greek–Turkish issues. Progress towards finding a Cyprus solution would not only restore NATO’s southern flank, it would also strengthen efforts to repeal the arms embargo. To this end the administration specifically expected the Greek government to persuade Archbishop Makarios to support the intercommunal talks and adopt a constructive stance during them.107 Thus, unsurprisingly, bilateral cooperation between the Karamanlis government and the Ford administration remained close despite their confrontation over the Turkish arms embargo. The Greek and Cypriot governments considered the Ford administration—and Kissinger particularly—indispensable to reaching an acceptable Cyprus solution in their talks with Turkey. Athens and Nicosia viewed Washington as a channel that would ensure their proposals got a better 107 GRFPL, Memoranda of Conversations, President Ford, Secretary Kissinger, Schecter (reporter, Time Magazine), 5 September 1974, the relevant discussion with Karamanlis after Schecter left, and President Ford and Secretary Kissinger, 20 January 1975.

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reception from Ankara.108 Kissinger and his Assistant Secretary Arthur Hartman shuttled between Brussels, Athens, and Ankara in efforts to get the parties to agree on an acceptable starting point on Cyprus. The Greek objective emphasised the need for a new ‘forum of negotiations’ in New York instead of Geneva and talks under the auspices of the UN General Secretary.109 The Greek intention was for the Turkish government to agree on a specific proposal in order to initiate the negotiations. Difficulties were exacerbated because the Turkish government had collapsed. The Greek government also anticipated that the US administration would play a similar role in the Aegean dispute. The Greek cabinet concluded that the best way forward regarding the Aegean dispute was through international arbitration. Athens intended to invite Ankara to submit the dispute formally to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) at The Hague.110 In accordance with the Court’s charter the two sides needed to agree to submit a dispute jointly for the Court’s consideration and abide by its decision. Athens concluded that Washington’s explicit support of the Greek proposal coupled with explicit US pressure were necessary to prevent outright rejection and to get Ankara on board. Consequently, the Greek government requested the US administration ‘make a supportive demarche in Ankara’ after the Greek proposal was submitted. Kissinger feared that ‘introduction of the Aegean issue at this stage may take Ankara’s focus off the Cyprus question as we go into the pre-February 5th period’. He expected any progress on Cyprus would help with votes on Capitol Hill. However, he also recognised that ‘it would be misunderstood in Athens if we did not make a supportive demarche in Ankara’ since a ‘peaceful resolution of the Aegean’ served broader US interests.111

108 CGKF, CKP, Folder 4B, MFA, Note on Bitsios and Ambassador Kubisch meeting, 3 January 1975, and MFA, Meeting between the government of Greece and representatives of Cyprus, 14 February 1975. 109 CGKF, CKP, Folder 4B, Bitsios, tel. A1972 MFA to various posts, 11 March

1975. 110 CGKF, CKP, Folder 10B, Prime Minister’s Office, Cabinet meeting at the Coordination Ministry on 4 January 1975. 111 GRFPL, Presidential ME & SA, Box 34, Turkey, State Department Telegrams, from SECSTATE-NODIS (3), Kissinger, Tel. 018433 State to Ankara, 27 January 1975.

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The very request for support by the Karamanlis government offered Washington an opportunity to underline the negative implications of the arms embargo for Greek objectives. Following successive failed attempts to repeal or ease the provisions of the legislation the administration after February 1975 tried to drive this message home in talks with Greek officials. US officials repeatedly complained that their influence in Ankara was limited as a result of the aid cutoff. While visiting Athens in March the Assistant Secretary for European Affairs stated that Kissinger’s impression was that Turkish–US relations had deteriorated permanently despite the resumption of aid transfer to Turkey. He went on to claim that the Secretary of State considered this development a bad omen for Greek–Turkish relations as well.112 President Ford followed a similar train of thought when he first met Karamanlis at the Heads of State Brussels NATO summit in spring 1975. Although the alliance naturally discussed broader geostrategic challenges, bilateral talks focussed on the Greek–Turkish–US relationship. Coming before a major effort in the House to repeal the embargo the issue occupied a significant part of the meeting between Ford and Karamanlis that lasted more than an hour. Talking about prospects for a Cyprus settlement and the role of the United States in the process, Ford underscored the implications of the embargo. Ford argued that the legislation ‘has been harmful to our ability to get concessions from the Turks’. He explained the importance of getting the vote reversed in the Senate as a way to put pressure on the House. He explicitly stated that ‘if Congress retains the limitation [embargo] our influence will be lessened’.113 This was possibly a way of telling the Greek government to stay away from supporting the Greek Lobby. The Ford administration held another card that the Greek government valued. Karamanlis and his ministers counted on economic and military support from the United States. One of the first actions of the

112 GRFPL, NSA, NSC Staff Files, Box 9, Country File, Greece 1975 (5) WH, Department of State, Briefing paper for Kissinger on bilateral meeting with Bitsios during the UNGA, September 1975. 113 GRFPL, Memoranda of Conversations between Greece—Prime Minister Karamanlis, Foreign Minister Bitsios, Ambassador Tzounis, Ambassador Molyviatis—and the United States—The President, Secretary Kissinger, Scowcroft, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs Hartman, Brussels, 29 May 1975.

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Karamanlis government in January 1975 was to request official resumption of US free aid provisions to Greece that the military regime had been denied.114 Various types of US military and economic assistance for the ongoing fiscal year (i.e., 1975) appealed to Athens while it was upgrading its defence capabilities. The Greek military submitted ‘a list of equipment amounting to $800 million, many items of which it wishes to obtain expeditiously from existing USG inventory’ to the US administration. The Greek government also requested financing for capital equipment, raw materials, and agricultural products through the Import– Export Bank and Commodity Credit Corporation as well as US influence and support for Greek requests for loans from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).115 The White House supported such Greek requests in principle.116 The administration, as Kissinger stated, considered that granting US aid to Greece would positively affect other aspects of their bilateral relationship (e.g., in the negotiations concerning US bases in Greece). Kissinger advocated that approval of a programme that met Greek requirements would have a favourable impact on base negotiations and facilities. It could also encourage Greece to return to full participation in NATO.117 Greece’s participation in NATO justified the Ford administration’s decision to approve aid in September 1975 for the following fiscal year.118 However, there was a significant difference between the amount that the administration intended to request Congress to approve for Greece and Greek expectations. The gap between the $86 million in aid either as 114 Valinakis, Introduction, 277. 115 GRFPL, NSA, NSC Staff Files, Box 9, Country File, Greece, 1975 (4) WH, Spring-

steen, Memorandum for Scowcroft, 16 April 1975; CGKF, CKP, Folder 19B, MFA, Note on US military aid as credit sales, 21 November 1974; CGKF, CKP, Folder 4B, MFA, Note on conversation between Greek official (signature only—unclear) and Ambassador Kubisch, 11 March 1975. 116 CGKF, CKP, Folder 4B, MFA, Note on meeting between Bitsios and Ambassador Kubisch, 15 January 1975; Memorandum of Conversation, Bitsios and Kissinger, 7 March 1975. 117 GRFPL, NSA, NSC Staff Files, Box 9, Country File, Greece 1975 (4) WH, Memorandum for the President, ‘US Economic and Military Assistance for Greece’, 29 April 1975. 118 GRFPL, NSA, NSC Staff Files, Box 9, Country File, Greece 1975 (5) WH, Security Assistance Program—Greece, No date [probably September 1975].

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purchases or grant aid that Washington suggested for 1976 was nowhere near the $800 million to $850 million in grant aid that the Greek government requested.119 As the deadline for Congressional consideration of aid provisions approached, the Greek government stressed the significance it attached to it.120 The US administration again hinted at the implications arising from the embargo in this area. When talking with their Greek counterparts on a number of occasions Assistant Secretary Hartman and Under Secretary Sisco argued along the lines that ‘the issue of grants is under consideration but this issue is linked with the arms embargo on Turkey and our strategy towards Congress’.121 The US Ambassador in Greece maintained the same line in his response to repeated requests for clarification regarding the intended aid request that the US administration would put forward to Congress for Greece.122 When partial repeal of the arms embargo became a distinct possibility the US administration opted to make vague statements regarding US levels of economic and military aid. US considerations ran along the lines that Athens could react strongly if the United States appeared to be approving the Greek request before the Congressional vote. Athens could interpret the US stance as a bargaining chip. The White House made it clear that ‘until the embargo is lifted we want to avoid specifying what economic and military assistance we are prepared to provide to Greece’.123 Kissinger also planned to underline that ‘once the embargo is lifted we will be in a position to provide economic and grant military assistance’.124 The White House carefully considered another factor 119 GRFPL, NSA, NSC Staff Files, Box 9, Country File, Greece 1975 (4) WH, Memorandum for the President, ‘US Economic and Military Assistance for Greece’, 29 April 1975. 120 CGKF, CKP, Folder 4B, Prime Minister’s Office, Memorandum of Conversation between PM and the US Ambassador, 31 March 1975. 121 CGKF, CKP, Folder 4B, Memorandum of Conversation between Greek and US delegations, 24 April 1975; CGKF, CKP, Folder 5B, Alexandrakis, Tel. A233 Washington to MFA, 13 May 1975. 122 CGKF, CKP, Folder 4B, Prime Minister’s Office, Memorandum of Conversation between the PM and the US Ambassador, 31 March 1975; Prime Minister’s Office, Note on follow-up conversation between PM and US Ambassador, 7 April 1975. 123 GRFPL, NSA, NSC Staff Files, Box 9, Country File, Greece 1975 (5) WH, Briefing Paper, Greece—Bilateral talks during UNGA (Objectives), September 1975. 124 Ibid., Talking points.

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regarding linkage programmes in which Washington would acknowledge in public that the level of aid to Turkey and the level of aid to Greece were linked (i.e., correlated). The embargo limited US aid to Turkey. The US Ambassador to Greece Jack Kubisch warned that ‘we should avoid giving any indication about our intentions until after Congress settles the Turkish military assistance problem’.125 The conclusion drawn in Athens was that the US administration aimed to influence Congress in the full knowledge that it would cause a strong reaction in Athens. All these factors demonstrated the complexity of relations between the Greek and US governments. After the September 1975 vote Kissinger fulfilled Greek expectations to his credit. The interventions, consultations, and messages of Kissinger between October and December eventually led to the resumption of negotiations between representatives of the Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot communities.126

New Approaches Emerging In 1975 the Turkish arms embargo dominated Greek–US relations. Placed within the broader context of Greek–US relations in the aftermath of the events of 1974, the arms embargo inspired a substantial change in Greek strategy towards the United States. The Greek government pursued a coherent strategy to undermine Ford and Kissinger’s balanced approach towards Ankara and Athens. The arms embargo clearly harmed Turkish–US relations and could force Turkey to compromise and reconsider its readiness to find a military solution to its disputes with Greece. At the same time Karamanlis and his ministers did not lose sight of the role the US administration played as mediator and could play in setting a path to resolve the Cyprus problem and the Aegean dispute. This explains why the exact extent of Greece’s support in keeping a channel open to the Greek Lobby in Congress remained as much as possible in the background. Ford and Kissinger did not accept the arms embargo for the same reasons Athens welcomed it. It was not long before the US administration

125 GRFPL, NSA, NSC Staff Files, Box 9, Country File, Greece 1975 (6) WH, Briefing Item, US Ambassador’s comments on aid mission to Greece. 126 Antonopoulos, ‘Justified at Last?’, 483–484.

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attempted to restore a balanced approach towards Greece and Turkey. This was one of the reasons for the Turkish–US Defence Cooperation Agreement that the two sides unveiled in Washington in March 1976. Athens resorted to confrontation and made it public this time to ensure that it received the same treatment Washington gave to Ankara.

CHAPTER 4

Practising Confrontation: DCAs and Aegean Crisis

In 1976—a presidential election year for the United States—two issues dominated Greek–US relations. The first involved a new Greek–US Defence Cooperation Agreement (DCA) that provided for a new legal framework for US bases and military activities in Greece. The second issue was the continuing Greek–Turkish conflict about the Aegean Sea, which escalated between July and August. The need for a new DCA followed Greek calls to update the terms of Greek–US military cooperation. Greek–US negotiations for a new DCA progressed smoothly between 1975 and 1976. However, negotiations took an unexpected turn in late March 1976 mere days before the official conclusion of the new DCA when Washington and Ankara announced a new Turkish–US DCA. The provisions of the Turkish–US agreement differed significantly from the one Greece had negotiated. The Turkish DCA included the highly publicised provision of $1 billion in economic assistance to Turkey to be distributed throughout the four-year-long duration of the agreement. By comparison the Greek DCA was perceived as inferior. The different terms of the two DCAs caused domestic reactions in Greece and a backlash against the government. The Karamanlis government perceived the Turkish DCA as undermining its strategy to contain Turkey. Athens reacted strongly and secured a commitment from the US administration that any future Greek–US defence agreement would be comparable with the one agreed with Turkey. The Greek reaction also © The Author(s) 2020 A. Antonopoulos, Redefining Greek–US Relations, 1974–1980, Security, Conflict and Cooperation in the Contemporary World, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-47656-4_4

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aimed to justify to the Greek public the government’s commitment to a close relationship with the United States. Having settled the DCAs Greece and the United States had to contend with the implications of Turkish activities in the Aegean Sea. Turkish oil exploration activities led to a crisis in the Aegean in the summer of 1976. Athens and Washington now faced the same dilemmas and challenges they had two years earlier. The Greek government was determined not to suffer a national humiliation in the Aegean as happened in 1974 in Cyprus. Despite disappointments and differences, the Aegean crisis of 1976 did not signal returning to the former situation characterised by deteriorating Greek–US relations. Reactions and responses of the Greek public and government to the Turkish–US DCA and the Aegean crisis of 1976 have been studied intensively. The predominant narrative in studies on the Turkish DCA portrays its provisions as efforts by US Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger to circumvent Congress’s Turkish arms embargo and protect Turkish interests.1 Analysis also detects a similar pro-Turkey stance in Washington’s response to the Aegean crisis.2 No attempt will be made to repeat this story in this chapter. Both issues offer another opportunity to study how Greek and US national security and domestic considerations shaped their relationship. The Greek government utilised confrontation as a strategy much more publicly and directly than it had before to advance its objectives. The US administration meanwhile remained committed to maintaining a balanced policy between Greece and Turkey. Kissinger prioritised crisis management as a means to secure US interest. Crisis resolution would inevitably require Washington to side with either Athens or Ankara. Athens and Washington sought to advance their national interests within their own geopolitical parameters.

1 Constantine Svolopoulos, H Eλληνικ η´ Eξ ωτ ερικ η´ Π oλιτ ικ η, ´ 1945–1981 [Greek Foreign Policy, 1945–1981], 8th ed. (Athens: Estia, 2000), Vol. 2, 214. 2 Sotiris Rizas, ‘Managing a Conflict between Allies: United States Policy towards Greece and Turkey in Relation to the Aegean Dispute, 1974–76’, Cold War History, Vol. 9(3), 2009, 367–387.

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Greek Negotiations, Turkish Agreement In early 1976 negotiations between the Greek government and the US administration for a new DCA were well advanced. The two sides expected the agreement to be concluded and speedily ratified in the near future. The surprise announcement—at least for the Greek government— of a new Turkish–US DCA in late March undid most of the progress the two negotiation teams had accomplished. In 1975 Greek Prime Minister Constantine Karamanlis announced his government’s intention to review and update the terms governing Greek–US military cooperation and the operation of US military bases in Greece. Bilateral negotiations accordingly began in February 1975 and aimed at reviewing and updating the legal framework and the scope of operations and activities taking place on US bases, as a Greek press statement hinted.3 Ambassador Petros Kalogeras headed the Greek negotiating team and Minister Counsellor at the US Embassy in Athens Monteagle Stearns headed the US delegation. The two delegations frequently convened in Athens and Washington over the following year, while subcommittees worked in parallel on specific subjects.4 The two negotiation teams adopted different tactics to secure their own goals regarding US bases. The US administration insisted on maintaining ‘home porting’ rights for Sixth Fleet ships stationed in Greece when necessary, but then accepted abolishing this provision in exchange for other privileges.5 The Greek government’s key aim meanwhile was to limit the number of bases while emphasising the need for greater national control over and involvement in US activities taking place on them.6 3 Constantine G. Karamanlis Foundation [hereafter CGKF], Constantine Karamanlis Papers [hereafter CKP], Folder 19B, Press statement on the negotiation process about the US bases in Greece, No date. 4 The relevant US records remain classified. The CKP provide insight into the negotiations and specific, purely technical aspects, although the collection is far from complete. It is a conscious decision not to provide explicit details of the agreements here given this chapter’s focus on political and diplomatic aspects of the negotiations rather than technical details. 5 Memorandum from A. Denis Clift of the National Security Council Staff to Secretary of State Kissinger, 3 April 1975, in Laurie Van Hook and Edward C. Keefer (eds), Foreign Relations of United States [hereafter FRUS], Vol. XXX, Greece; Cyprus; Turkey, 1973–1976 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2007), doc. 41. 6 CGKF, CKP, Folder 19B, Kalogeras, Agenda for the third phase of the negotiations, 17 October 1975.

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By the first quarter of 1976 the two delegations had made significant progress. The two governments appeared ready to conclude a preliminary agreement. A key question remained the legal form and structure of the new agreement. Agreement on this aspect required concessions from both sides and demonstrated their commitment to complete the negotiations timeously (i.e., in good time). The Greek government requested an ‘umbrella agreement’ or a ‘framework agreement’ that according to Greek terminology covered all aspects of military facilities.7 Specific issues related to the bases such as telecommunications and the responsibilities of Greek base commanders were to be dealt with in annexes attached to the umbrella agreement. The Greek government considered this legal arrangement an important detail. Separating the main provisions and the legal framework of the new agreement on bases from purely technical and militarily sensitive issues allowed the Greek government to fulfil its constitutional obligations regarding ratification of the agreement. The head of the legal service in the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs noted that the new Greek constitution mandated that any agreement providing for the presence of foreign military forces in Greek territory required parliamentary approval as did specific issues related to legal provisions such as taxation of products at US bases.8 According to the Greek negotiating team this approach allowed for a relatively accelerated process since the two sides could sign the main provisions while negotiations on more controversial issues continued. Once agreed these texts could then be attached to the main agreement without the need for parliamentary ratification. The Greek government, and the Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs in particular, insisted on the need to expedite negotiations and conclude the agreements ‘as soon as possible’.9 Although this approach seemed the most suitable for the Greeks, the US administration had reservations. Approval of an umbrella agreement 7 Memorandum from A. Denis Clift of the National Security Council Staff to Secretary of State Kissinger, 26 February 1976, FRUS, Vol. XXX, doc. 60. 8 CGKF, CKP, Folder 19B, Kalogeras, Note on ratification requirements, 5 March 1976, and Oikonomidis, Note on the ratification process of Greek–US arrangements and agreements currently under negotiation, 4 March 1976. 9 Memorandum from A. Denis Clift of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft), ‘US–Greek Bases Negotiations—Status Report’, Washington, 26 February 1976, FRUS, Vol. XXX, doc. 60; Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library [hereafter GRFPL], Presidential Country Files for the Middle

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exceeded the President’s executive power and required Congressional ratification. Getting the DCA through Congress complicated matters and was not as simple as the Greeks envisaged. When the Greek representative raised the issue of the ratification process, Stearns and Ambassador Kubisch counterargued that Congressional approval depended on Greece meeting obligations under US law. The law here required the Greek government to earmark a minimum number of forces to NATO for the protection of special armaments, probably implying the nuclear weapons that were to be stored on the bases. In US terminology such forces were called ‘units identified as directly supporting special weapons’. The law called for an explicit number and type of forces to be assigned for them. This requirement was problematic since Greece had just withdrawn its forces from the integrated command of NATO. The Greek government accepted this obligation and detailed the forces Athens intended to assign to NATO for this purpose.10 Accepting the US request posed a challenge for the Karamanlis government. The Minister of National Defence Evangelos Averoff-Tossitsa reluctantly agreed especially since the earmarked units belonged to the country’s most modern forces. This contradicted one of the practical benefits of withdrawing from the military command of NATO: national control over all Greek forces. The Greek government clearly considered this decision a great sacrifice within its broader Greek defence strategy towards Turkey. It was for this reason that the Greek government underlined that in the event of Greece facing an attack not covered by the NATO treaty (i.e., in the event of a conflict with Turkey) such forces were to return to national control immediately. Although the Greek proposals were insufficient and did not meet minimum Congressional requirements,

East and South Asia [hereafter Presidential ME & SA], Box 11, Greece—State Department Telegrams (12) to SECSTATE-NODIS, Kubisch, tel. 2007 Athens, US Embassy Athens to State, 3 March 1976. 10 CGKF, CKP, Folder 19B, Kalogeras, Recommendations regarding the third phase of Greek–US negotiations, 17 October 1975, and Kalogeras, Note on meeting between the General Director of the Greek Foreign Ministry, the US Ambassador, and the head of the US delegation, 16 February 1976; CGKF, Evangelos Averoff Papers [hereafter EAP], File 29(b), Kalogeras, Note on earmarking, 2 March 1976.

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the United States displayed flexibility and accepted them for the time being.11 The two interlinked issues serve as proof that Athens and Washington wanted to reach an agreement. They chose to compromise rather than endanger the negotiations or unnecessarily prolong them. In mid-March the NSC reported Karamanlis’ satisfaction with the US position. A US source quoted Karamanlis as praising ‘the U.S. for its “better understanding than anyone could expect” of Athens’ positions on NATO membership and U.S. bases in Greece and added that the U.S. presence in Europe is vital to European security’.12 The climate was clearly favourable. Days later the Greek team working on the Greek–US negotiations arrived in Washington for a final overview of the agreements.13 The negotiators finalised the agreement and recommended their respective governments to ratify it. Athens and Washington had gone the extra mile in settling controversial issues that had legal and political implications for both sides. For the Greek government an agreement with the United States represented a domestic challenge. It had to fulfil the objectives that Karamanlis set out publicly a few months before. It had above all to demonstrate benefits for Greece that the Greek government could use to counteract attacks from opposition parties and those opposing close Greek–US cooperation, in general. The negotiations, particularly during the final stretch, clearly marked Greek and US limitations. The United States understood Greek sensitivities and had shown flexibility. However, a miscalculation in the Department of State undid the progress that the two negotiating teams had painstakingly made in the previous months. While the Greek delegation was in the United States the Department of State informed the Greek Embassy in Washington about having

11 CGKF, EAP, File 29(a), Kalogeras, Note on Averoff views, 18 February 1976; CGKF, CKP, Folder 19B, Kalogeras, Note on meeting with Ambassador Kubisch and Stearns, 12 March 1976. 12 GRFPL, National Security Adviser [hereafter NSA], White House Situation Room, Presidential Daily Briefings, 1974–1977 [hereafter WH Presidential Briefings], Box 13, Presidential Daily Briefings [hereafter PDB], 3/18/76, Scowcroft, Memorandum for the President, 18 March 1976. 13 Dimitris Bitsios, Π šρα απ o´ τ α σ  ´ ν oρα, 1974–1977 [Beyond the Borders, 1974– 1977], 2nd ed. (Athens: Estia, 1983), 210.

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concluded a Turkish–US DCA.14 The message was received by Ambassador Menelaos Alexandrakis a few hours before the public announcement. The US administration provided details of the new Turkish–US agreement, which the ambassador immediately reported to his government. At first glance the most striking and controversial provision of the Turkish DCA was the granting of up to $1 billion in aid to Turkey during a four-year-long agreement. This provision subsequently became a focal point for the Greek press.15 Parallel with Greek–US negotiations Washington had been in similar talks regarding US bases in Turkey, but chose to keep the two separate.16 The Greek Ambassador explained to Foreign Minister Bitsios that he believed the agreement was an attempt by Kissinger to restore US relations with Turkey.17 This fact explained what the Greek government viewed as the excessive provisions of the agreement. The Ford administration had been concerned for quite some time about the long-term prospects of Turkish–US relations. Despite its partial repeal in October 1975 the arms embargo remained in place. The amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act did not deliver the benefits that Washington had desired. The administration believed the National Security Council of Turkey would reopen US bases immediately after easing the arms sales cutoff. However, when the National Security Council of Turkey convened in late October no such decision was taken. Kissinger expressed his disappointment to the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs ˙ Ihsan Sabrı Ça˘glayangil. Kissinger noted that President Ford had hoped that Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel—who had succeeded Ecevit— would ensure that the bases were opened on a provisional basis pending a

14 CGKF, EAP, File 29(a), Alexandrakis, tel. 382/E.X. Washington to Ministry of Foreign Affairs [hereafter MFA], 27 March 1976. 15 ‘/Eνα δις πα´ιρνει η Toυρκ´ια απ´o την Aμερικη ´ [Turkey Gets One Billion from America]’, To Vima, 27 March 1976, 1; ‘H Eλλας ´ διšκoψε τις συνoμιλ´ιες για τις Bασεις ´ των H..A. [Greece Has Suspended Negotiations about the US Bases]’, To Vima, 30 March 1976, 1. 16 Monteagle Stearns, Entangled Allies: U.S. Policy toward Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus (New York, NY: Council of Foreign Relations Press, 1992), 42. 17 CGKF, CKP, Folder 24B, Alexandrakis, tel. 392E.X. Washington to MFA, 29 March 1976.

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new Turkish–US defence agreement. The prospect of reopening the bases played a role in securing partial repeal of the arms embargo.18 Despite US expectations the Turkish government remained unmoved. The US administration concluded that ‘the future of Turkish–US relations will depend’ on a new agreement regarding US facilities in Turkey.19 Focus in the State Department had been on reaching an agreement with the government of Turkey as a means of repairing bilateral relations and restoring US access to its military bases. The pace of the negotiations was rapid with both sides ready to sign the new Turkish–US Defence Cooperation Agreement by early 1976. Between 24 and 26 March Kissinger and Ça˘glayangil resolved their outstanding issues in Washington.20 To Greek astonishment the agreement was announced the following day.

Reacting to the News from Washington On hearing the news from Washington the Greek government immediately suspended the negotiations and recalled the Greek delegation to Athens for further consultations.21 Greek officials in direct contact with US officials expressed their surprise at the announcement, but the White House robustly rebuffed their allegation of secrecy.22 In a meeting with Ambassador Alexandrakis Kissinger claimed that ‘we have made clear that we were negotiating with Turkey. […] I cannot accept the proposition that this constitutes anything new’.23 Nevertheless, the provisions of the Turkish–US DCA were actually something new.

18 GRFPL, Presidential ME & SA, Box 34, Turkey—State Department Telegrams, from SECSTATE-NODIS (6), Ingersoll, tel. 251020 State to Athens, 22 October 1975. 19 Paper prepared in response to National Security Study Memorandum 222, 15 December 1975, FRUS, vol. XXX, doc. 56. 20 Memoranda of Conversation, Foreign Minister Ça˘ glayangil and Secretary Kissinger, 24 and 26 March 1976, FRUS, Vol. XXX, docs 240, 242. 21 GRFPL, NSA, WH Presidential Daily Briefings, Box 13, PDB 3/31/76, The Situation Room, Memorandum for Scowcroft, ‘Greece Suspends Base Negotiations with US’, 31 March 1976. 22 GRFPL, NSA, NSC Europe, Canada, and Ocean Affairs Staff Files 1974–1977 [hereafter NSC Staff Files], Box 9, Country File, Greece 1976 (2) WH, G. C. Flynn, ‘Greeks Suspend Base Negotiations with US’, 30 March 1976 [possibly a Briefing Item]. 23 Memorandum of Conversation, Secretary of State and Ambassador Alexandrakis, 31 March 1976, FRUS, Vol. XXX, doc. 62.

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Announcement of the Turkish–US defence agreement placed the Greek government in a particularly sensitive and vulnerable position domestically. News about the Turkish–US agreement received front-page coverage in Athens’ daily newspapers. The predominant view considered the Kissinger–Ça˘glayangil agreement as an attempt by Washington to pacify Ankara with unprecedented military and economic support. This was dangerous for Greece in that Washington might be tempted to blackmail Athens and Nicosia to backtrack from their objectives in Cyprus and move closer to the Turkish position. The Greek government was expected to show leadership, defend national interests, and protect sovereignty in an attempt to avert such grave developments.24 The opposition parties put pressure on the government to act decisively and protect the national interest. The main opposition party adopted a careful stance. George Mavros as leader of the Centre Alliance—made up or the Centre Union and New Forces (EK-ND) parties—and leader of the main parliamentary opposition emphasised the need for a new approach to Greek foreign policy and called for all parties to present a common domestic front to developments.25 Unsurprisingly, the staunchly left-wing parties courted anti-Americanism and condemned the United States. They also condemned the Greek government for its pro-US and pro-West policies. PASOK leader Andreas Papandreou called on the Greek government to ‘abandon the illusion that America is a friendly state and that NATO offers any protection to our country’. Similarly, the two communist parties the KKE (interior) and the KKE condemned American imperialism, urged complete withdrawal from NATO, and called for the dissolution of all US bases in Greece.26 Karamanlis was about to make a statement on his government’s response and hold a debate among party leaders in parliament in the immediate future before news of the Turkish–US DCA broke.

24 See

the front-page editorials in the Greek left-leaning To Vima newspaper including ‘H νšα εθνικη´ γραμμη´ [The New National Line]’, 1 April 1976; ‘Mε την αμερικανoτoυρκικη´ συμϕων´ια: O Eκβιασμ´oς Kαι Oι τ´oχoι Toυ [The Blackmail and Its Objective]’, 2 April 1976, 1; ‘Eπιτακτικη´ η αναγκη ´ να εξασϕαλισθoν: ´ Tα  νoρα ´ ´ Kαι Tα Oπλα [Urgent Need to Preserve: Borders and Arms]’, 4 April 1976, 1, etc. 25 ‘Eγγυησεις ´ στo Aιγα´ιo και αναλoγη ´ βoηθεια ´ θα απαιτησει ´ η Eλλας ´ [Greece Will Demand Guarantees in the Aegean and Similar Aid]’, To Vima, 1 April 1976, 1. 26 ‘Kαμια ´ τρoπoπo´ιηση της συμϕων´ιας δεν πρ´oκειται να δεχθε´ι η Toυρκ´ια [Turkey Will Accept No Amendment to the Agreement]’, To Vima, 31 March 1976, 6.

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Announcement of the new Turkish–US DCA came at a critical juncture for Karamanlis’ pro-Western policies. In the previous months his key foreign policies had faced setbacks. On 29 January 1976 the European Commission issued its Opinion regarding Greece’s application for European Economic Community (EEC) accession. The Opinion was less forthcoming than the Greek government had anticipated. While the Greek application was welcomed, the European Commission pointed out the challenges that the accession of Greece would pose for the Community and recommended a pre-accession period.27 The Greek opposition considered such a period to be unfavourable and called for the application to enter the Community to be withdrawn.28 Within weeks the European Council rejected the Opinion and recommended the opening of negotiations with Greece. However, the Commission’s references to Greek–Turkish disputes indicated a certain reluctance to Greek membership. Although the Council of Ministers rejected the Opinion, they did so only after public and private pressure from the Greek government. In mid-February the Greek government submitted its views to NATO regarding future relations between Greece and the western alliance. The proposals were critically received by the opposition. The Greek government appeared eager to have a close relationship with the West at a time when its allies had, or appeared to have, reservations about Athens. The Turkish–US DCA did nothing to improve the situation. The Greek government needed a victory of some sort to justify its pro-Western foreign policy to its domestic audience. As was his custom Karamanlis counselled the public to have a ‘cautious and calm’ response to recent events.29 He stressed the intention of the government to utilise political and economic means to restore the balance of power with Turkey. Finally, he added that the Greek people ‘will not be put in a position of having to face offence and humiliation’.30 The Greek

27 Eirini Karamouzi, Greece, the EEC, and the Cold War, 1974–1979: The Second Enlargement (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan), 46. 28 ‘H Eκτελεστικη ´ Eπιτρoπη´ της EOK εισηγηθηκε ´ αναβoλη´ των συνoμιλιων ´ για αμεση ´ šνταξη της Eλλαδoς ´ [Commission Recommended Postponement of the Accession Talks with Greece]’, To Vima, 30 January 1976, 2. 29 ‘Oι Aντιδρασεις ´ στην Eλλαδα ´ [Greek Reactions]’, To Vima, 2 April 1976, 2. 30 CGKF, CKP, Folder 24B, Bitsios, tel. A245 MFA to Washington, 2 April 1976,

quoting Karamanlis’ statement.

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government needed to translate such rhetoric into action and counteract opposition attacks on close Greek and US relations. The first step was to review exactly what benefits Turkey had secured in the new agreement. Athens evaluated the impact the Turkish DCA would have on the Greek security policy the government had thus far pursued. Relevant departments at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of National Defence studied the information in detail and submitted copies of the Turkish–US DCA to the Greek Embassy in Washington. The surprise the Greek government expressed in its initial reaction did not necessarily mean that it was actually taken aback by such an agreement being concluded. At first glance Greek resentment stemmed from the impressive provision of US aid to Turkey. The text the Greek Ambassador received bound the US government to providing Turkey with ‘defense support consisting of grants, credits and loan quarantees [sic] of 1.000.000.000 during the first four years this agreement shall remain in effect’.31 Current scholarship and the then contemporary press focussed almost exclusively on such economic benefits for the Turkish government and the long-term commitment of the US administration to provide aid to Turkey in exchange for hosting US bases. The latter represented a change in Washington’s approach to its military relationships with its allies. From this point of view the DCA represented an indirect effort to repeal the arms embargo.32 The amount of military and economic assistance to be given to Turkey was impressive. It undermined Greece’s efforts to take advantage of the arms embargo and build up its military capabilities compared with those of Turkey thanks to increased military and economic support. In previous months the Greek government had secured significant levels of military and economic assistance for the 1976 fiscal year.33 Before announcement of the Turkish DCA the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs diligently compared this amount with that for Turkey noting Ankara’s inability to

31 CGKF, EAP, File 29(b), Alexandrakis, tel. 382E.X. Washington to MFA, 27 March

1976. 32 Svolopoulos, Greek Foreign Policy, 214; Ioannis Valinakis, Eισ αγ ωγ η´ σ τ ην Eλληνικ η´ εξ ωτ ερικ η´ π oλιτ ικ η´ [Introduction to Greek Foreign Policy 1949–1988], 4th ed. (Thessaloniki: Paratiritis, 2003), 278. 33 GRFPL, NSA, NSC Staff Files, Box 9, Country File, Greece 1975 (8) WH, Smith, Justification for Greece, 11 November 1976.

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access US funds due to limitations imposed by the embargo.34 Both the House and the Senate considered appropriation requests that reaffirmed the embargo on certain types of US aid to Turkey. The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations suggested that the provisions of the embargo could be extended to ‘credit sales’ and ‘grant aid’ that were still provided to Turkey.35 However, the provisions for military aid or security supporting aid for 1976—terms used interchangeably in records—reveal a crucial element for the Greek government to consider. Based on what the relevant committees and both Houses had voted for the Greek government up to early March 1976 expected aid under various programmes amounting to between $200 million and $250 million. In contrast, aid for Turkey had amounted to $155 million to $175 million with between $25 million to $50 million of it affected by restrictions brought about by the arms embargo.36 The Greek government considered the arms embargo on Turkey as an opportunity to modernise its armed forces at a time when the Turkish government was unable to do so. Even after partial repeal of the arms embargo in 1975 the legislation afforded Greece time to build its military capabilities. The new agreement curtailed such an opportunity. When it came to economic aid for Turkey the Greek Foreign Ministry noted a detail that Athens viewed as important. The Turkish–US DCA’s provisions of aid represented appropriations that as such did not require a first stage of debate in Congress (i.e., authorisation). In contrast, Greece’s agreement had to go through a longer Congressional process since there were no provisions of aid linked to the negotiated DCA. Given Greek cooperation with Congress Athens welcomed as much Congressional involvement as possible. Debates over US aid in the House of Representatives and the Senate coupled with potential differences in the legislation passed offered the opportunity of a bargain that could reduce or increase

34 CGKF, CKP, Folder 19B, Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Note on US aid to Greece and Turkey for FY 1976, No date. 35 CGKF, CKP, Folder 19B, Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Note on US aid to Greece and Turkey for FY 1976 for the Prime Minister’s Office amongst others, 3 February 1976. 36 CGKF, CKP, Folder 19B, Fokas, Note—based on Alexandrakis tel. 64/28.2.1976 from Washington—on aid to Greece and Turkey, 3 March 1976, see together with the Note of 19 February 1976.

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the levels of aid destined for each country.37 The new Turkish DCA would eliminate any such opportunities of reducing US aid for Turkey. The Turkish–US DCA agreement provided additional funds that were linked to the operation of US military bases in Turkey. Even if some of its provisions fell into categories that the embargo explicitly prohibited, Ankara expected to receive considerably more aid than Greece in the following years. Turkey would also receive more US military aid than the Greek government had anticipated and based its defence strategy on. The Turkish–US DCA did not provide anything for Turkey immediately since the DCA required Congressional approval as was the case with the Greek umbrella agreement. The long-term implications of increased funding for Turkey concerned the Greek government. Karamanlis’ warning that the agreement upset the balance between Greek and Turkish forces seemed justified. The Greek government had sought to establish balance since 1974. However, such an interpretation contradicted the reality that Greece was actually receiving more aid from the United States than Turkey. The outcome the Greek government envisaged involved improving Greek military capabilities against Turkey’s perceived military supremacy. Apart from the profound economic advantages that the new agreement offered Ankara, specific practical benefits that Turkey would derive from the agreement were not overlooked by Athens. Greek legal and military experts studied the DCA and found that some of the provisions might supersede the profound disparity in economic assistance. Greek analysis stressed certain provisions favoured Turkey at Washington’s expense. The most profound example was the level of control that Turkey gained over the US bases there. Greek experts felt that numerous provisions of the Turkish–US DCA meant that Turkey gained sovereign rights over the bases as well as control over and involvement in the military and other activities that took place on them. Related to this were provisions regarding the renewal or termination of the agreement that favoured the Turkish government according to Greek analysis. Under the DCA each side maintained the right to request termination of the agreement or to object to its renewal. In such a case any sales of military equipment or services that had already been agreed had to be delivered to meet

37 CGKF, CKP, Folder 24B, Tzounis, Note for the Prime Minister, 29 March 1976.

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economic obligations regardless of the fate of the agreement. Greek officials concluded that such provisions amounted to the ‘institutionalisation of Turkish blackmail’.38 The Greek diplomatic service honed in on the benefits that Turkish military personnel would receive. Such benefits exceeded by far any similar provisions in Greek agreements as they stood. Turkish involvement in activities at bases included training relevant personnel. For example, ‘technical operations and related maintenance and activities of the authorized installations shall be carried out jointly by Turkish and United States personnel’.39 Greek diplomats felt that getting Turkish personnel to perform such roles would by definition require training that in turn would develop their technical skills and give them an advantage over Greek personnel. Secretary General of the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs Ambassador Ioannis Tzounis drew attention to another consideration that Ambassador Kalogeras overlooked. The Turkish military gained the right to ‘fully share’ with US forces ‘raw data’ collected at the bases.40 Such provisions exemplified what Tzounis had described to Karamanlis as far broader than anything the Greek government had so far secured in its agreements.41 Greek officials felt the almost scandalous preferential status that the Turkish government gained over US bases with this agreement was mysterious. In an attempt to find out more about Washington’s motives Kalogeras discussed the matter at the French Embassy in Athens. His contact, known only as Monsieur Deshors, said that the Quai d’Orsay was equally perplexed about the Turkish–US DCA. The French promised to investigate the matter further and contact the French Embassy in Washington. In response to his inquiries the French diplomatic service speculated that the Ford administration had secured some kind of Turkish commitment as a major gesture of goodwill on Cyprus or the Aegean

38 CGKF, CKP, Folder 19B, Machairitsas and Andrikos, Information Note (details of Turkish–US DCA), 5 April 1976, and Machairitsas and Andrikos, Brief Note (on the Turkish–US DCA), 5 April 1976. 39 CGKF, EAP, File 29(b), Alexandrakis, tel. 382E.X. Washington to MFA, 27 March 1976, which quotes the Turkish DCA as distributed to the Greek Embassy by the State Department. 40 CGKF, CKP, Folder 19B, Machairitsas and Andrikos, Brief note on the contents of the Turkish–US DCA, 5 April 1976. 41 CGKF, CKP, Folder 24B, Tzounis, Note for the Prime Minister, 29 March 1976.

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and the White House had rewarded them. However, after the French raised the issue with the US Department of State it became clear that Kissinger and Ça˘glayangil had agreed no specifics prior to conclusion of the Turkish–US DCA.42 The Greek government thus faced a complex problem. The Turkish agreement brought anti-American rhetoric and pressures to the forefront. The Greek government needed some sort of victory that would allow Karamanlis and his aides to pursue and justify their pro-Western foreign policies. Moreover, the agreement represented a direct challenge to Greek security doctrine since it clearly empowered Turkey in multiple ways. The agreement minimised any gains the Greeks had achieved from the arms embargo on Turkey and not only in terms of economic aid. The Greek government clearly needed a strategy to ensure it got the same treatment from the United States—a strategy that would benefit the government both domestically and in terms of security. In an attempt to secure concessions from the Ford administration here the Greek government applied pressure by capitalising on the element of surprise the announcement had evoked.

Making the Most of It! The Greek government decided to take advantage of the surprise the announcement had engendered and place the US administration on the defensive. The US Ambassador in Greece Kubisch noted in a meeting at the Department of State that Karamanlis ‘will get more than he expected from the United States a month ago. He is exploiting the situation’.43 From the first informal announcement of the agreement the Greek government used harsh rhetoric to confront the administration’s decision. In his first official message to the Department of State regarding the Turkish agreement Karamanlis characterised it as ‘upsetting the balance of power between the two countries, which is already in Turkey’s favour, and as such it is possible [for the agreement] to be seen as a hostile act

42 CGKF, CKP, Folder 19B, Kalogeras, Note, 8 April 1976. 43 GRFPL, NSA, NSC Staff Files, Box 10, Country File, Greece, 1976 (6) WH,

Department of State, Memorandum of Conversation, Secretary of State, Sisco, Hartman, Kubisch, William L. Eagleton (not to be confused with Senator Thomas Eagleton), 14 April 1976.

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against Greece’.44 Karamanlis’ choice of words struck a chord with Assistant Secretary Hartman. Moreover, the Greek Ambassador emphasised the complications the Turkish–US agreement created. In his messages to President Ford and Vice President Nelson A. Rockefeller, instead of repeating the same charges Karamanlis stressed that the Turkish–US agreement had potentially severe implications for Greece and endangered peace in the region.45 Ford had to support continuing efforts to defuse what for the Greeks amounted to a crisis. Despite the careful tone he used in his messages to Washington, Karamanlis also sent messages to UK Prime Minister Harold Wilson, West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, and French President Valéry Giscard d’Estaing in which he used stronger language. Karamanlis argued that the Turkish–US DCA made it look as if the US government was rewarding Turkey for the invasion of Cyprus and encouraging further aggression against Greece in the Aegean. This had significant implications domestically and hampered Greek foreign relations.46 The US administration was fully aware of the Greek moves and the NSC underlined Greek expectations that the nine European Economic Community (EEC) member-states would convey Athens’ concerns to the United States.47 In discussions with US officials the Greek government emphasised the impact the agreement had made on the Greek public. This meant any effort to rectify the damage would involve much more than bringing the Greek–US DCA in line with the Turkish–US DCA. It needed to include a public demonstration that the United States valued Greece and remained committed to Greek interests. The Greek government made it clear to the US administration that it was facing a backlash from the public as 44 CGKF, CKP, Folder 24B, Bitsios, tel. ϒOI K 2529 Foreign Ministry to

Washington, 28 March 1976, and Alexandrakis, tel. 392E.X. Washington to Athens, 29 March 1976. 45 Karamanlis message to Ford, 1 April 1976, in Constantine Svolopoulos (ed.), Kωνσ τ αντ ι´ν oς Kαραμανλης ´ : αρχ ε´ιo, γ εγ oν o´ τ α, και κε´ιμενα [Constantine Karamanlis: Archive, Events, and Texts; hereafter Karamanlis ] (Athens: Kathimerini, 2005), Vol. 9, 179; CGKF, CKP, Folder 24B, Bitsios, tel. ϒOI K 2536 MFA to Washington, 5 April 1976. 46 Karamanlis messages to Giscard, Schmidt, Wilson, 1 April 1976, in Svolopoulos (ed.), Karamanlis, Vol. 9, 179. 47 GRFPL, NSA, NSC Staff Files, Box 10, Country File, Greece, 1976 (3) WH, Memorandum for Brent Scowcroft, subject ‘Reply to PM Karamanlis of Greece’, 5 April 1976.

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a result of its pro-West and pro-US foreign policies. Washington had an obligation not only to show support for Karamanlis’ policies but also that they were good for Greece. The Greek government aimed to capitalise on concluding the ‘principles of a new Greek–US security agreement’ (the principles agreement). Athens emphasised the need for a celebratory public statement after conclusion of the talks aimed at underscoring the successful completion of meetings in Washington.48 Athens’ tactics placed the Ford administration in a weak position. The US administration aimed to restore relations with Greece that had been ‘strained since the signing of the Turkish–US defence accord’ and hoped that by doing so it would ‘remove a major obstacle for Congress in dealing favorably with the US–Turkish defense agreement’.49 While he rejected Greek allegations about the suddenness with which the DCA was announced, Kissinger’s conciliatory stance was evident in practice. John Day and William Eagleton from the Office of Greek Affairs at the Department of State first presented the Turkish agreement to Greek Ambassador Alexandrakis on 27 March. Since then Ambassador Alexandrakis met almost every day with either Hartman or Kissinger to design the appropriate Greek–US response together and avoid further escalation of the issue. It was agreed at an early stage that the response should be divided into three elements. First, Washington conceded that an agreement with Greece had to be comparable with the Turkish agreement. The two negotiating teams were already working towards updating the existing agreement in this respect. It was also agreed that an early, public demonstration by the United States of its intention and commitment to treat the Greek government similarly to Turkey was crucial. Athens and Washington concluded the much publicised principles agreement. This document described the main elements of the future agreement such as how parity could be achieved between the Greek and Turkish agreements particularly in terms of aid. The Greek government insisted on receiving a similar level of economic support to that offered to Ankara. Washington partially accepted this request by calling the amount of aid ‘comparable’ given the different sizes of Greek 48 CGKF, CKP, Folder 24B, Bitsios, tel. ϒOI K 2529 Foreign Ministry to Washington, 28 March 1976, and Bitsios, Letter to Kissinger, 1 April 1976. 49 GRFPL, NSA, NSC Staff Files, Box 10, Country File, Greece, 1976 (3) WH, Scowcroft, Meeting with Foreign Minister Bitsios of Greece, 15 April 1976, Purpose, Background, Talking Points—Sidenote: ‘The President Has Seen.’

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and Turkish forces.50 Discussions eventually led to the establishment of the so-called 7:10 ratio according to which US military and economic aid would be provided each year to Greece and Turkey.51 Second, the two sides agreed to present their views about current developments and their future relationship in writing publicly. In an exchange of letters the Greek Foreign Minister posed specific questions to which Kissinger replied. Athens and Washington worked together on the texts for this public exchange. The Greek government insisted that the US letter include a strong reference condemning any future Turkish acts of aggression in the Aegean.52 This insistence grew from a statement Kissinger made to this effect to the Greek Ambassador.53 Kissinger attempted to backtrack by arguing that this constituted a security treaty and was thus a complex legal issue. However, the Greek government remained adamant about its inclusion.54 The Greek government got its way despite the wording being carefully crafted to demonstrate a balanced approach between Athens and Ankara. The second paragraph in Kissinger’s response to Bitsios’ letter became another much publicised document that has since frequently been cited. The relevant section reads: You have asked about our attitude toward the resolution of disputes in the Eastern Mediterranean and particularly in the Aegean area. In this regard I should like to reiterate our conviction that these disputes must be settled through peaceful procedures and that each side should avoid provocative actions. We have previously stated our belief that neither side should seek a military solution to these disputes. This remains United States policy. Therefore the United States would actively and unequivocally oppose either side’s seeking a military solution and will make a major effort to prevent such a course of action.55

50 CGKF, CKP, Folder 24B, Alexandrakis, tel. 403E.X. Washington to MFA, 1 April 1976. 51 A detailed analysis and explanation of his view of this 7:10 ratio can be found in Stearns, Entangled Allies, 40–50. 52 CGKF, CKP, Folder 25B, Alexandrakis, quoting Bitsios’ summary of his discussion with Kissinger, tel. 458E.X. Washington to MFA, 13 April 1976. 53 Memorandum of Conversation, The Secretary and Ambassador Alexandrakis, 31 March 1976, FRUS, Vol. XXX, doc. 62. 54 CGKF, CKP, Folder 24B, Bitsios, tel. YOI-305 MFA to Washington, 3 April 1976. 55 Stearns, Entangled Allies, 160.

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Kissinger also sent a letter to US Representative Lee Hamilton (D-IN), member of the House Committee of Foreign Relations. In this letter Kissinger described the official US policy towards the Eastern Mediterranean, the underlying reasons for concluding the Turkish–US DCA, and Washington’s strong opposition to the use of military assistance for anything other than defence purposes.56 Kissinger also referenced the administration’s commitment to the interests of Greece and Cyprus. In agreement with Kissinger, Hamilton planned to make the letter public. On 15 April 1976 the Greek Foreign Minister visited Washington and signed the principles agreement, a gesture that added to what Hartman described as a dramatic element.57 This visit was a compromise on Athens’ behalf since it had previously been proposed that the US Secretary should visit the Greek capital. These developments took place within the space of two weeks and were completed in time for Karamanlis’ appearance before the Greek parliament when he was due to respond to recent events. On 17 April Karamanlis defended his foreign policy and directly challenged the notion that Western powers could ‘mistreat Greece and benefit Turkey’. When it came to the United States he stressed his conviction that Congress had imposed the arms embargo on Turkey in an effort to resolve the Cyprus situation. Whatever the aims of the White House, Greece and Cyprus could count on the support of their friends on Capitol Hill. Perhaps more revealing for broader Greek considerations was his mention of the prospect of ratifying both DCAs. Karamanlis responded to the view circulating that the Greek agreement about its bases paved the way for Congressional ratification of the Turkish agreement. Although Congress retained the right to reject both, it would not ratify the Turkish agreement alone. Karamanlis stressed that Congress would crucially weigh its decision against the interests of the United States and Cyprus. Since the Greek government would not regret the rejection of both the benefits for

56 Although there is no copy available in the US archives, Karamanlis retained a copy. See CGKF, CKP, Folder 24B, US administration’s letter to member of Congress regarding the Turkish–US agreement, No date. 57 GRFPL, NSA, NSC Staff Files, Box 10, Country File, Greece, 1976 (5) WH, Memorandum of Conversation between Greece—Ambassador Alexandrakis, Mr. Tsilis— and the United States—The Secretary, Under Secretary Sisco, Assistant Secretary Hartman, Country Director Eagleton, 1 April 1976, at 3:45 p.m.

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Greece and Turkey remained the same as before.58 He believed Athens had secured an insurance policy. The Greek government did not consider the DCAs to be of principal importance unless Turkey got better treatment than Greece. This attitude was further demonstrated in the following months. When the negotiating teams resumed their meetings in May 1976, Greek unwillingness to progress was evident. The delays affected the prospects of concluding the Turkish–US DCA. Congress made it clear by early September that the two had to be ratified together. Note that it was unlikely Congress would ratify two long-term agreements in a lame duck year. Immediately preceding the announcement of the DCA, Congress linked its ratification to concluding and ratifying a similar agreement for Greece. The link between the two DCAs officially emerged during the hearing of the Senate’s Foreign Relations Committee in September 1976.59 Negotiations about the Greek bases resumed in May and continued in parallel with the developing Aegean crisis.60 They progressed slowly raising suspicion in Washington about Athens’ real intentions. The Greek representatives insisted that their government remained committed to concluding the agreement.61 Facing US complaints about intentional Greek delays in concluding the negotiations, Athens argued that the government had given instructions to the Greek chief negotiator to conclude the negotiations by the end of the month.62 But the Greek team raised a number of technical demands and objected to decoupling the Greek and Turkish agreements, which could accelerate the process.63 In an internal assessment of the process the United States eventually decided that the Greeks had no wish to conclude the negotiations. Shortly afterwards a spokesperson for the Greek government announced Athens’ 58 Karamanlis’ statement in the Greek Parliament, 17 April 1976, in Svolopoulos (ed.),

Karamanlis, Vol. 9, 199. 59 CGKF, EAP, File 29(a), Alexandrakis, tel. Aρ.ρ. A 348 Washington to MFA, 15 September 1976. 60 CGKF, CKP, Folder 19B, Kalogeras, Greek–US negotiations, 4 May 1976. 61 CGKF, CKP, Folder 22B, Stauropoulos, tel. 3K2667 MFA quoting Kalogeras to

New York for Minister Bitsios, 30 September 1976. 62 GRFPL, NSA, NSC Staff Files, Box 10, Country File, Greece, 1976 (4) WH, Clift, Briefing Item (for the President), Greece—settling final differences, 23 June 1976. 63 GRFPL, NSA, NSC Staff Files, Box 10, Country File, Greece, 1976 (4) WH, Clift, Briefing Item, 15 June 1976, Greece.

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intention to sign an agreement with the new administration after the US November elections.64 The Greek government evidently appeared to be satisfied with the handling of the Turkish DCA announcement. In a statement to parliament Karamanlis highlighted the US vow to condemn any acts of aggression in the Aegean. He argued that the US government undertook ‘a political and moral obligation – since as matters stand it could not undertake a legal obligation – to protect peace in the Aegean’.65 He presented the US commitment as a victory for his administration. Although Karamanlis came over as being over-optimistic, in the end he was justified. In the early discussions about how to handle the Turkish-US DCA, his Minister of National Defence doubted that the Greek government would be able to ‘extract from the United States an agreement guaranteeing the security of Greece’s borders in the Aegean’.66 Even if what Greece had secured from Kissinger was not an explicit security guarantee, it came close to it. Before long Athens realised that the US administration was unwilling to act on its commitment and that the wording did not prevent Ankara from provoking Athens.

Tension in the Aegean While Athens and Ankara negotiated with Washington for new bilateral agreements, Greek–Turkish tension over the Aegean Sea mounted once again.67 In early February 1976 Greek and Turkish naval and air forces conducted military exercises in the Aegean.68 These exercises took place amid hyperbolic rhetoric, particularly on behalf of the Turkish 64 GRFPL, NSA, NSC Staff Files, Box 10, Country File, Greece, 1976 (10) WH, Briefing Item, Greek government on base negotiations, 4 October 1976 (the date of the announcement—not document date). 65 Karamanlis’ statement in the Greek parliament, 17 April 1976, in Svolopoulos (ed.), Karamanlis, Vol. 9, 199. 66 GRFPL, NSA, NSC Staff Files, Box 10, Country File, Greece, 1976 (2) WH, Heavily classified document, No date or creator’s name provided [doc. 12], US source discussion with Averoff. 67 Angelos Syrigos, Eλλην oτ oυρκικ šς Σχ šσ εις [Greek–Turkish Relations] (Athens: Patakis, 2015). 68 ‘Aερoναυτικη ´ Aντιπαραταξη ´ στo B´oρειo Aιγα´ιo: ταυτ´oχρoνα ελληνικα´ και τoυρκικα´ γυμνασια ´ την ερχ´oμενη εβδoμαδα ´ [Military Line-Up in North Aegean: Simultaneous Greek–Turkish Exercises Next Week]’, To Vima, 21 February 1976, 1.

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government. Turkish Prime Minister Demirel was quoted as saying that a significant portion of the Aegean belonged to Turkey.69 The area Demirel referred to included Greek islands and territorial waters thus causing Greek uproar. Tension and public exchanges continued throughout the following months. However, it was Turkey’s announcement of more oil research exploration activities in the Aegean Sea and in areas near the Greek islands that instigated a summer of tension.70 The Turkish action mirrored the research exploration voyage of the Turkish ship Candarli that had taken place in 1974. In June of that year Athens and Ankara had come close to war.71 The Cyprus crisis a few weeks later came to overshadow that dispute. Between March and August 1976 the Turkish government persisted in its intention to allow the hydrographic ship MTA Sismik 1 (or Hora as it was previously known) to enter the Aegean. The area designated for research included those parts of the Aegean disputed by Greece and Turkey, otherwise known as grey zones. The dispute involved—as it still does today—legal interpretation of the Law of the Sea and its definitions of ‘continental shelf’, ‘territorial seas’, and ‘seabed’, how they are delineated, and sovereign rights in such areas of neighbouring coastal states such as Greece and Turkey. Between July and August attention focussed on whether the MTA Sismik 1, which was conducting research in the Marmara Sea, would continue its declared mission and enter the Aegean. The vessel eventually sailed into the Aegean and conducted three research trips. During the first two it avoided Greek territorial waters and the Greek continental shelf. However, on 6 August during its third voyage the MTA Sismik 1 surveyed an area that the Greek government considered to belong to the Greek continental shelf.72 69 ‘Nτεμιρšλ: Aυτ´o τo τμημα ´ τoυ Aιγα´ιoυ μας ανηκει! ´ [Demirel: This Portion of the Aegean Belongs to Us!]’, To Vima, 22 February 1976, 1. 70 William Hale, Turkish Foreign Policy, 1774–2000 (London: Frank Cass, 2002), 160. 71 James Edward Miller, The United States and the Making of Modern Greece: History

and Power, 1950–1974 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2009). 72 Andrew Wilson, ‘The Aegean Dispute’, in Jonathan Alford (ed.), Greece and Turkey: Adversity in Alliance (Aldershot: Gower for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1984), 97; see Petros Siousiouras and Georgios Chrysochou, ‘The Aegean Dispute in the Context of Contemporary Judicial Decisions on Maritime Delimitation’, Laws, Vol. 3(1), 2014, 16 for legal aspects of the dispute; Christos Rozakis, Tρ´ια χ ρ o´ νια ελληνικ ης ´ εξ ωτ ερικ ης ´ π oλιτ ικ ης ´ , 1974–1977 [Three Years of Greek Foreign Policy, 1974–1977] (Papazisis: Athens, 1978), 115. Rozakis provides a detailed analysis

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Tension in the Aegean created a significant problem for the Greek government and the US administration. Athens and Washington feared a Greek–Turkish conflict—or even worse—a war resulting from oil exploration activities and nationalistic rhetoric from Greece and Turkey. Since 1975 the NSC had viewed as viable a scenario in which the Greek– Turkish crisis could escalate into a military conflict. Ankara and Athens might drift into war simply because neither side was ready to back down—not because they wanted to do so. Such a danger was best exemplified by frequent Greek and Turkish military exercises in the Aegean. When tensions re-emerged in March 1976 the NSC briefed President Ford warning of the implications for the United States and the western alliance. The briefing concluded that a military engagement between Athens and Ankara threatened disastrous consequences not only for the parties involved but also for NATO and US interests.73 Turkish intentions regarding maritime research in the Aegean Sea deeply concerned the Greek government. Turkey’s activity in the Aegean represented a step closer to conflict for Greece and to some extent was proof of Ankara’s conscious decision to move in this direction. In early March top-level Greek political and military leaders discussed possible scenarios that could lead to a Greek–Turkish conflict. The meeting included the Prime Minister, the Minister and the Deputy Minister of National Defence, the General Chief of Staff, and the Chiefs of the Army, Navy, and Air Force. Karamanlis emphasised the belief within the Greek government that Turkey ‘given the existing tension in our relations and its significant domestic instability’ might be tempted to seek a solution by engaging in ‘external adventures’. Karamanlis asked what would Ankara do that could lead to war should that prove to be the case. The Greek Chief of Staff spoke for the rest of the military leaders and argued that if Turkey decided to wage war, then it would have created the necessary climate of tension by emphasising those issues it regarded as having a reasonable legal footing. Examples included demilitarisation of the Eastern Aegean Islands and exploitation of the continental shelf.

of the legal and foreign policy aspects related to the issue of the continental shelf as it pertains to the mainland and islands from a contemporary point of view; Melek Firat, Oι Toυρκ oελληνικ šς Σχ šσ εις και τ o Kυπ ριακ o´ [Greek–Turkish Relations and the Cyprus Problem] (Athens: Sideris, 2012), 197. 73 GRFPL, NSA, WH Presidential Briefings, Box 13, PDB 1/4/75, Scowcroft, Memorandum for the President ‘Troubled Waters in the Aegean’, 23 March 1976.

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He added that ‘Turkish research and drillings in the Aegean seabed could trigger a chain of events that would lead to war’.74 He did not provide more details about the link between research in the seabed and a possible military confrontation. He had already presented such a scenario in a detailed report to Karamanlis on 14 February 1976. Although the referenced record is not available, their discussion demonstrates a broader concern in Athens about what the Aegean dispute represented for Turkey and what the outcomes might be. Turkish activities seemed to fall into a pattern in which the escalation of tension seemed deliberately designed to resolve problems through force. This was Greece’s interpretation of Turkey’s actions in Cyprus. In addition, tension in the Aegean threatened to derail Greek negotiations for entry to the EEC scheduled to begin in the summer of 1976. Rising tensions in the Aegean vividly reminded the Europeans that Greek accession to the EEC would bring Greek–Turkish tensions to the Community. In its Opinion the Commission underlined the Greek– Turkish relationship as a complicating factor.75 For all these reasons the Greek government had to prevent any escalation of tensions to the greatest extent possible.

How to Prevent a Clash? As tension escalated in the Aegean, Greece and the United States employed strategies designed to prevent a clash and limit broader regional consequences. The Greek government saw the US administration as vital in any effort made to restrain Turkey and defuse the crisis. However, Greek expectations undermined Kissinger’s balanced approach. Turkey claimed that its exploration activities were lawful. Washington would face a strong reaction from Ankara if it pressured the Turkish government to cease such activities. Alienating Turkey, particularly against the background of the arms embargo and recent developments regarding Greek and Turkish DCAs, was not an option. Therefore, Kissinger focussed on managing the unfolding crisis rather than on trying to prevent its outbreak. 74 CGKF, EAP, File 29(a), Arboutzis, Memorandum of Meeting between the Prime Minister, the Minister of National Defence, Chief of Staff et al., 4 March 1976. 75 Sotiris Rizas, ‘Atlanticism and Europeanism in Greek Foreign and Security Policy in the 1970s’, Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, Vol. 8(1), 2008, 63.

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In a pre-emptive move Karamanlis instructed his Foreign Minister Bitsios to draw Kissinger’s attention to the implications of Turkish activities in the Aegean during his visit to Washington in April. According to Karamanlis’ instructions Bitsios was expected to stress that a war in the Aegean could develop into a more generalised East–West confrontation. As evidence of this he was to quote a comment that Bulgarian leader Todor Hristov Zhivkov had made about Greek–Turkish tensions during his official visit to Athens. Zhivkov predicted that in the event of a Greek–Turkish war neither Russia nor Bulgaria would remain silent.76 He suggested that the Warsaw Pact countries would get involved in such a development in the Balkans thereby leading to a broader confrontation between the blocs. This insistence on the repercussions of a war with Turkey served two goals. On the one hand, it made Greece’s request for a security guarantee seem reasonable, especially in light of Turkish actions substantiating Greek claims of ever-increasing Turkish aggression. On the other hand, it reminded Washington of what was at stake in the event of a Greek–Turkish conflict. Any pre-emptive Greek action meant that the US administration would appeal to Turkey first rather than seek the counsel of Greece. The reference to US opposition to provocative actions in the Aegean in Kissinger’s letter to Bitsios in the previous April offered Athens another tool.77 Athens expected Washington to condemn Turkey’s actions as a threat to peace in line with Kissinger’s letters. Once it became clear that the Turkish ship Sismik intended to approach the Greek continental shelf, the Greek government would turn to the United States to prevent this action. Karamanlis expressed his hope that ‘the Secretary will prevail upon the Turks to refrain from any “provocation” during the Sismik’s voyage’.78

76 Karamanlis’ note for Bitsios, April 1976, in Svolopoulos (ed.), Karamanlis, Vol. 9,

187. 77 CGKF, CKP, Folder 13B, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Unsigned, Note on research in the seabed undertaken by the hydrographic ship Hora [Sismik], 1 June 1976. 78 GRFPL, NSA, NSC Staff Files, Box 10, Country File, Greece, 1976 (4) WH, Cliff,

Briefing Item (for the President), 29 June 1976.

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The Greek government capitalised on Turkey’s decision to establish a new military formation called the Aegean Army to persuade the administration that Turkish activities in the Aegean were not isolated. The Greek government insisted that the Aegean Army threatened Greece.79 However, the government internally admitted that the new Turkish military structure did not yet constitute a significant force. The Greek Minister of National Defence suggested that when Bitsios raised the issue he should avoid giving any specific details regarding the size and capabilities of the new army. Information from the Ministry of National Defence and the intelligence services left little doubt that the formation lacked significant forces and did not constitute a fully-fledged ‘fourth’ army. Nonetheless, Ankara could expand its capabilities at any time. Averoff suggested that Bitsios should focus on the fact that Turkish forces were concentrated directly opposite the Greek islands in the Aegean rather than on strength of the formation.80 There was nothing new about the Greek government choosing to portray Ankara as an expansionist power. Since 1974 Athens had used this rhetoric at bilateral meetings with US officials to describe Turkish policies. The Karamanlis government took additional steps to attach substance to its allegations. In 1975 the Greek government proposed that Greece and Turkey should submit their differences to the International Court of Justice (ICJ). The Greek government had requested support from the Ford administration. It also asked the Ford administration to mediate with the Turkish government in the hope of getting a positive response from Ankara. Kissinger’s letter of April 1976 reaffirmed Washington’s support for the Greek initiative. He expressed support for peaceful procedures as a means of resolving the disputes. Prime Minister Demirel agreed with the Greek suggestion when he met Karamanlis at the margins of the 1975 spring NATO summit. However, as of 1976 Ankara still had little interest in taking the dispute to the Hague. In light of limited progress and rising tensions Karamanlis presented another plan to ease Greek–Turkish tensions. During a parliamentary debate on the Turkish DCA and the new Greek–US principles agreement in the Greek parliament, he publicly invited the Turkish government to 79 Karamanlis’ note for Bitsios, April 1976, in Svolopoulos (ed.), Karamanlis, Vol. 9,

187. 80 CGKF, EAP, File 29(a), Letter from Averoff in Athens to Minister of Foreign Affairs Bitsios in New York, 12 August 1976.

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sign a non-aggression pact.81 Although the proposal was primarily aimed at Ankara, it also targetted the international community. If accepted, then the possibility of war would become distant. Outright rejection or Turkey’s reluctance to accept a non-aggression pact would allow the Greek government to charge Turkey with not being willing to work toward a mutually acceptable solution.82 Although the US administration supported such Greek actions, Ford and Kissinger remained suspicious that Turkey or Greece would deliberately escalate tensions and drag the United States into the middle of their disputes. Kissinger feared that the wording in his exchange of letters with Bitsios in April might embolden the Greek government to take action against the Turkish vessel. In his final meeting in Washington about the future of the Greek–US DCA, Kissinger raised the issue of the Aegean. His concern was that the Greek government might declare a 12-mile limit for its territorial waters and the reaction that would cause from Ankara. By 1976 most states claimed their right under the Law of the Sea to expand their territorial waters from 6 miles to 12 miles. However, in the case of the Aegean such a Greek decision would reduce the percentage of international waters significantly and potentially Turkey’s access to the sea.83 Faced with Bitsios’ insistence that it was Greece’s ‘sovereign right to make such a declaration’, Kissinger sought to ensure that the Greek government would avoid any declaration without consulting its ‘friends and allies’ and without considering ‘all possible consequences’. Although Bitsios replied ambiguously, he generally agreed with Kissinger’s statement.84 Kissinger’s position was clear. Having failed to retract his own idea about the security commitment he let the Greeks know that his letter did not give them carte blanche to do as they pleased.

81 Karamanlis’ statement in the Greek parliament, 17 April 1976, in Svolopoulos (ed.), Karamanlis, Vol. 9, 203. 82 GRFPL, NSA, NSC Staff Files, Box 10, Country File, Greece, 1976 (4) WH,

Memorandum of Conversation, Foreign Minister Bitsios, Secretary General Tzounis, The Secretary, Assistant Secretary Hartman, 20 May 1976. 83 Wilson, ‘Aegean Dispute’, 94. 84 GRFPL, NSA, NSC Staff Files, Box 10, Country File, Greece, 1976 (6) WH, Memo-

randum of Conversation, The Secretary, Under Secretary Sisco, Foreign Minister Bitsios, Ambassador Tzounis et al., 15 April 1976.

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As tension in the Aegean escalated Kissinger emphasised Greek and Turkish responsibilities for avoiding war.85 The US administration pointed out that ‘the US and other friends of Greece had been very active in trying to avert a crisis and would not automatically rally to Greece’s side if it acted impulsively or imprudently’.86 The administration similarly manoeuvred around Athens’ insistence that Ankara’s actions constituted provocations.87 In accordance with its careful planning, the Greek government insisted that Turkey’s decision to conduct research fell into the category of ‘provocative actions’ that the letter of 15 April explicitly condemned. Athens insisted that Kissinger and Bitsios had agreed that Turkey’s unilateral research exploration activity in the Aegean within the Greek continental shelf was a provocative action. Bitsios requested that the United States stand by its commitment and prevent any escalation of the crisis.88 Confronted with Kissinger’s denial Bitsios clarified that the relevant portion of the talk had taken place during their private chat at which no note-takers were present.89 The Greek government could do little to prove Kissinger wrong. Despite pressure from Athens, the US Department of State did not give way. Washington claimed that a ship sailing for research purposes did not violate Greek sovereign rights. Violation could only occur if the Turkish exploration mission ‘physically touched’ the seabed.90 This view accorded with international law. Amid public excitement and in a climate where the possibility of war was both privately and publicly considered such arguments appeared irrelevant. Although the US administration

85 GRFPL, NSA, NSC Staff Files, Box 10, Country File, Greece, 1976 (7) WH, Binnendijk, Briefing Paper (for the President), Sismik 1 confrontation in Athens, 11 August 1976. 86 GRFPL, NSA, NSC Staff Files, Box 10, Country File, Greece, 1976 (6) WH, Clift, Briefing Item (for the President), Greece, 30 June 1976. 87 CGKF, CKP, Folder 13B, Alexandrakis, tel. A.. 284 Washington to Foreign Ministry, August 6, 1976, and Alexandrakis, tel. A.. 624E.X. Washington to Foreign Ministry, 11 August 1976. 88 Bitsios, Letter to Secretary Kissinger, 7 August 1976, in Svolopoulos (ed.), Karamanlis, Vol. 9, 272. 89 CGKF, CKP, Folder 13B, Bitsios, tel. YOI-673 MFA to Washington, 6 August 1976. 90 Sotiris Rizas, Oι Eλλην oτ oυρκικ šς σ χ šσ εις και τ o Aιγ α´ιo, 1973–1976 [Greek–

Turkish Relations and the Aegean, 1973–1976] (Athens: Sideris, 2006), 146. Rizas offers a detailed account of the events primarily from the US perspective.

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needed to avert another Greek–Turkish crisis, there were no simple solutions or easy answers. However, tensions remained in check and did not escalate beyond verbal condemnations.

Taking the Dispute to the United Nations Once the Turkish vessel completed its voyage the Greek government took recourse to the UN Security Council and the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on 10 August.91 This action was a carefully planned step. The Greek government did not expect resorting to Washington would resolve the dispute. Appealing to the US administration and emphasising the obligation given in Kissinger’s letter were just the first steps. It had been clear within the Greek government since July that Greece would turn to the Europeans, NATO, and the Security Council to condemn Turkey’s ‘provocative actions’.92 The Greek government also decided to submit the dispute to the ICJ unilaterally in an attempt to persuade the Greek public that it had not spared any effort to avoid war nor had it abandoned any national rights.93 Athens’ primary goal at the United Nations emphasised the need for a resolution that condemned the actions of the Turkish ship. It immediately submitted the dispute to the ICJ.94 During UN proceedings the United States continued its efforts to ensure that the dispute was treated in a balanced manner at the international level with neither side leaving New York as an absolute winner or loser. Greek records reveal that extensive consultations and manoeuvring took place behind closed doors to achieve a favourable UN Security Council resolution. The Greek government pressed the Council to strongly condemn Turkish actions as a threat to peace and explicitly called for the issue to be submitted to The Hague. During the consultations three European members including a non-permanent member Italy concluded a draft resolution acceptable to Athens.95 The Greek

91 Firat, Greek–Turkish Relations, 199. 92 CGKF, CKP, Folder 13B, Tzounis, Note, 19 July 1976. 93 Rizas, ‘Managing a Conflict between Allies’, Cold War History, 381. 94 CGKF, CKP, Folder 13B, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Unsigned, Note on research

undertaken by the hydrographic ship Hora [Sismik] in the seabed, 1 June 1976. 95 GRFPL, NSA, NSC Staff Files, Box 10, Country File, Greece, 1976 (8) WH, Bennett, tel. 3248 USUN from US Mission UN to State, 16 August 1976.

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government suspected that US diplomats including Kissinger blocked this European draft.96 Although the administration officially denied the Greek allegations, the US permanent representative to the United Nations had indeed met with his counterparts from France, Italy, and the United Kingdom. The US administration aimed at finding a resolution that offered something to both sides. US diplomats urged the Europeans to reconsider the wording of the draft and make it acceptable to Ankara. The Turkish government approached the Aegean situation as a diplomatic and political question rather than purely as a legal matter. Ecevit, now out of office, had condemned Greece’s insistence on taking the dispute to the ICJ as standing in the way of bilateral negotiations when he met with Kissinger at an early stage of the crisis. He urged US support for negotiations.97 His view of the Aegean dispute enjoyed broad political support in Turkey. The final resolution had to satisfy both Greek and Turkish expectations to prevent perpetuating tension and conflict within the alliance. Kissinger therefore directed US diplomats to work towards a resolution that met both sides’ minimum requirements.98 Based on Ambassador Kubisch’s reports the Greeks were ready to accept ‘something less e.g. an appeal to both sides to suspend operations while resuming direct talks, plus an endorsement of the ICJ initiative’.99 UN Resolution 395 of 25 August 1976 called for Greece and Turkey to engage in direct negotiations and invited the two governments to take into account ‘the contribution that appropriate judicial means, in particular the International Court of Justice, are qualified to make to the settlement of any remaining legal differences which they may identify in connexion with the present dispute’.100 According at least to 96 CGKF, CKP, Folder 13B, Bitsios, tel. 3161.4B/2163 per Representative UN to Foreign Ministry, 16 August 1976. 97 Memorandum of Conversation, ‘The Secretary’s Meeting with Former Prime Minister of Turkey, Bulent Ecevit’, 29 July 1976, FRUS, Vol. XXX, doc. 244. 98 GRFPL, NSA, NSC Staff Files, Box 10, Country File, Greece, 1976 (8) WH, Binnendijk, Briefing Paper (for the President), Greek–Turkish dispute in the UN Security Council, No date. 99 GRFPL, NSA, NSC Staff Files, Box 10, Country File, Greece, 1976 (7) WH, Binnendijk, Briefing Paper (for the President), Sismik at the UN, 13 August 1976. 100 UN, Complaint By Greece Against Turkey, Decision of August 25, 1976, UN Resolution 395. http://www.un.org/en/sc/repertoire/75-80/Chapter%208/75-80_0817-Complaint%20by%20Greece%20against%20Turkey.pdf, accessed October 2016.

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US diplomatic reports the Greeks were ‘clearly delighted with the Security Council outcome’. Although the assessment was less favourable for the Turks, Ankara’s ‘statesmanlike acceptance of the resolution’ to spare embarrassment was noted.101 In November 1976 the two sides signed the Bern Declaration, which created a framework of behaviour and process to govern negotiations on the continental shelf.102 For example, Athens and Ankara committed to refraining from actions that could endanger these talks and the two sides agreed to intensify and resume talks at the technical level between experts and at the diplomatic level between the two Secretaries-General of the Foreign Ministries. In December 1978 the Greek government’s preference for a solution at the ICJ was dealt a blow when the Court delivered its judgement that the issue fell outside its jurisdiction.103 In terms of Greek and US relations the Aegean crisis manifested each side’s priorities and objectives. The Greek government secured Western including US support for its position in the United Nations even though its effort to brand Turkish exploration in the Aegean as provocation failed. Washington was careful not to condemn Turkish actions. The US administration remained committed to its balanced approach and against being dragged into the dispute. Despite their differences, both sides were unwilling to harm the perception of bilateral cooperation as a result of long-term deterioration of Greek–US relations and allow for such division to play out in public.

End of the Ford Administration The DCAs and the Aegean crisis marked relations between Greece and the United States during the last year of the Ford Presidency. The US election year influenced and shaped Greek and US cooperation on both issues.

101 GRFPL, NSA, NSC Staff Files, Box 10, Country File, Greece, 1976 (8) WH, Clift, Briefing Item, Greek and Turkey weather storm over the Aegean, 26 August 1976. 102 Wilson, ‘The Aegean Dispute’, 99. 103 Greek reaction to the decision is covered in Svolopoulos (ed.), Karamanlis, Vol.

10, 413. For an evaluation of the Greek preference for ICJ involvement in the dispute see Harry Tzimitras, ‘Alternative Forms of Nationalism: Superiority through Law in Greek Foreign Policy’, in Ayahan Aktar, Niyazi Kızılyürek, and Umut Özkırıml (eds), Nationalism in the Troubled Triangle, Cyprus, Greece and Turkey (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 130–145.

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Although the Greek government confronted the US administration to secure its support, this had its limits and Karamanlis maintained ultimate control over its exercise. For instance, in early April the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs K. Stavropoulos visited Washington and attended events organised by the Greek American community and its lobby organisations. Coming a few days after announcement of the Turkish–US DCA the Greek government anticipated how Greek Americans would react against the US administration. Athens did not want to get involved in such a dispute. Stavropoulos was tasked with ensuring the speech made by the President of AHEPA was not inflammatory and avoided exaggerations in expressing regret regarding recent developments in Greek–US relations.104 If the matter was raised with AHEPA, then Stavropoulos would explain that the Greek government had already been in talks with the US administration on how to settle the matter. Although this was a reasonable explanation, Greek advice to avoid excessive criticism in public remained in line with Karamanlis’ broader view of how public confrontation should be used for Greek benefit. Confrontation with the United States over the DCAs and Turkish activities was more publicly pronounced than it had been during the arms embargo a year earlier. Athens interpreted the Greek reaction as being cautious when it came to public statements. Revealing Greek– US differences in public was a last resort that the Greek government threatened to take if its voice was not heard. When the focus on defusing the Aegean crisis moved to the United Nations, Bitsios explicitly told US Ambassador Kubisch that should the US administration prevent a resolution condemning Turkey, then he would denounce Washington in the press.105 During considerations of the Aegean crisis at the United Nations, Greek Ambassador Tzounis urged that US officials’ public statements be ‘very carefully drawn and take into account Greek

104 CGKF, CKP, Folder 24B, Bitsios, tel. ϒOI 306 Foreign Ministry to Permanent Representative in UN, New York, 3 April 1976. Although the announcement is described as ‘solemn’ in the English version, the emphasis remained on the need for a public declaration. GRFPL, Presidential ME & SA, Box 11, Greece, State Department Telegrams, from SECSTATE-NODIS (4), Kissinger, tel. 079684 State to American Embassy Athens, 2 April 1976. 105 Comment, Svolopoulos (ed.), Karamanlis, Vol. 9, 278.

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domestic realities and not give cause for unfavorable effects on US–Greek relations’.106 Behind closed doors the picture was different. After imposition of the Turkish arms embargo Kissinger and Ambassador Alexandrakis did little to hide their feelings towards each other. In their first meeting following announcement of the Turkish agreement Kissinger noted, ‘You have been a chief actor in using pressure to get us to do things’.107 Alexandrakis reported Kissinger’s reference to Alexandrakis’ ability to ‘control more votes in Congress than I do’ and to the Greek government opting to go the ‘Congress’ way’. The Greek Ambassador sensed a pre-emptive move. When Kissinger ‘expressed these complaints [about Greek–Congress cooperation] in a friendly way he must have had in mind not only the past but also our [Greek] future stance in Congressional hearings about the Turkish–US agreement’.108 Alexandrakis also reported that the State Department displayed little interest in or understanding of Greek domestic sensitivities. While discussing the impact of the Turkish DCA, Alexandrakis explained to Athens that he had forcefully emphasised the impact on the domestic political stage to Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Joseph J. Sisco.109 Alexandrakis clearly had a better time dealing with members of Congress—and Democrats, in general—than working with the Republican administration. Back in Athens the Greek government’s perception of Ford and Kissinger was more complex. Averoff and Bitsios appreciated the actions taken by the administration. Kissinger’s response to the Aegean crisis satisfied Averoff. In a personal letter to Karamanlis, Averoff wrote: The Sixth Fleet could direct its ships to inspect various Greek ports in both the Ionian Sea and the Greek mainland. The ships should request permission to visit and disembark personnel on Rhodes and Lesbos (i.e., the two islands the Turkish press has been claiming [as belonging to

106 GRFPL, NSA, WH Presidential Briefings, Box 16, PDB 8/14/76, The Situation Room, Memorandum for Scowcroft, 14 August 1976. 107 Memorandum of Conversations, The Secretary, Under Secretary Sisco, Ambassador Alexandrakis, Washington, 31 March 1976, FRUS, Vol. XXX, doc. 62. 108 CGKF, CKP, Folder 24B, Alexandrakis, tel. A..404/E.X. Washington to MFA, 1 April 1976. 109 CGKF, CKP, Folder 24B, Alexandrakis, tel. 392E.X. Washington to Athens, 29 March 1976.

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the Turkish maritime zone]). Such requests implicitly represented and practically confirmed Kissinger’s commitment to ‘rapid and effective’ US involvement in the event that Greek sovereign rights in the Aegean are threatened.110

During another meeting with US officials Bitsios underlined his government’s commitment to work with the Ford administration. Bitsios criticised the actions of the Greek Lobby during the Turkish arms embargo debate.111 Such a statement is best regarded as highlighting nothing short of Athens’ cynicism. The Minister of Foreign Affairs condemned the very people for the actions he and his government encouraged them to take. The same two examples can be interpreted as evidence of divisions among the Greek leadership. However, an overview of internal communications in Athens confirms that Greek decision-makers shared a common view of the Ford administration. Maintaining ambiguity on any preference between the Republican Ford seeking re-election and the widely perceived as pro-Greek Democratic candidate Jimmy Carter best served Greek objectives. As the date moved closer to the November election the Greek government showed little interest in concluding the DCA negotiations. The slow progress irritated Washington. This time, Ambassador Kubisch insisted on the need to finalise the agreement as soon as possible. The American side detected Greek expectations of a better deal after the election. However, Kubisch insisted he believed Ford was favourite to win and that—even if Ford was defeated—there would be no change in the US position regarding the negotiations. The Greek Ambassador politely denied any involvement in US domestic politics and reaffirmed his government’s commitment to negotiations.112 In the following days the Greek team made some progress in the negotiations. Even after it announced its intention to put the negotiations on hold pending the elections, Athens did not want to burn all its bridges with Ford. Based at least on what he said 110 CGKF, EAP, File 29, Dimitrakopoulos, Letter given to the Prime Minister and Minister of National Defence, ‘Arguments re Sixth Fleet Ships and US Bases’, 5 August 1976. 111 GRFPL, NSA, NSC Staff Files, Box 10, Country File, Greece, 1976 (4) WH, Memorandum of Conversation, Foreign Minister Bitsios, Secretary General Tzounis, The Secretary, Assistant Secretary Hartman et al., 20 May 1976. 112 CGKF, CKP, Folder 27B, Stavropoulos, tel. 3K2667 MFA to Permanent Representative New York (to UN), 30 September 1976.

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to the Greeks, Kubisch stressed that assurances for the delay given had convinced Washington that the reasons were not political.113 Even after the election Averoff rejected the suggestion that the Greeks had delayed signing the agreement for political reasons. Meeting in London after conclusion of the 20th ministerial meeting of NATO’s Nuclear Planning Group, Averoff stated to the US Secretary of Defence Donald H. Rumsfeld that in his view the negotiations had proceeded smoothly. Averoff attributed the delay to Greek wishes to see the Turkish agreement before any final commitment was made.114 This was largely a pretence. The Greek government had actually decided that it could secure a better deal by negotiating with a Democrat. Athens was therefore unwilling to support Ford’s re-election publicly. Karamanlis cancelled his official visit to Washington that had been planned for June 1976. His visit had been in the making since late 1975 when Athens had signalled Karamanlis’ personal interest in visiting Washington. The administration and Ford personally endorsed an official visit. Ford characterised it as ‘good politics here also. Maybe next summer’. Although developments surrounding the DCAs resulted in the visit being postponed, it remained a possibility well into April. The Greek government formally cancelled the visit on 17 May.115

113 CGKF, CKP, Folder 27B, Kalogeras, Note on Greek–US negotiations, Athens, 4 October 1976. 114 CGKF, CKP, Folder 27B, Kabiotis, Memorandum of Conversation, Averoff, Rumsfeld et al., 17 November 1976. 115 GRFPL, NSA, NSC Staff Files, Box 9, Country File, Greece, 1976 (1) WH, Clift, Memorandum for Brent Scowcroft, 29 January 1976, Note on message and comment from Ambassador Kubisch about his discussion with Ambassador Molyviatis, assistant to the prime minister, and Box 10, Country File, Greece, 1976 (7) WH, Memorandum of Conversation, President Ford, Secretary Kissinger, Ambassador Kubisch, 17 October 1975. For planning in the White House regarding the visit see GRFPL, NSA, NSC Staff Files, Box 10, Country File, Greece, 1976 (4) WH, G. Flynn, Memorandum for Nicholson, 21 April 1976; ‘Kρ´ιση στις σχšσεις Eλλαδoς-Aμερικ ´ ης´ Mαταιωνεται ´ τo ταξ´ιδι Kαραμανλη´ στις Hνωμ. oλιτε´ιες [Greek–US Relations in Crisis—Karamanlis’ Visit to US Postponed]’, To Vima, 31 March 1976, 1; CGKF, CKP, Folder 30B, Note on Karamanlis’ discussion with Ambassador Kubisch, 17 May 1976.

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The Greek government cited the public reaction in Greece as the reason for cancellation.116 The Greek government attributed Karamanlis’ decision to domestic criticism or to ‘a major assault’—as it called it—since the opposition planned condemning Ford and Karamanlis for ‘selling out Cyprus’. Athens also noted that the Greek Lobby in the United States was against an official visit at this stage.117 Karamanlis suggested that the President of the Republic Constantine Tsatsos should visit in his place. The Greek decision infuriated the White House. Kissinger told Bitsios that the Greeks should understand that they ‘were not the only ones to have political problems’.118 In an election year Ford faced significant domestic challenges. Karamanlis’ proposed visit fitted well within the Ford campaign’s desire to present its candidate as a successful statesman.119 The prospect of a visit from the Greek head of state did not satisfy the White House.120 Tsatsos occupied the largely ceremonial office of President of the Republic. Moreover, he lacked the international status of Karamanlis who was recognised as the restorer of Greek democracy. Karamanlis was the dominant figure in Greek politics in the public consciousness of Greece and internationally. His coming to Washington would be an indication to the American public and, perhaps more importantly, to Greek American voters that Greek–US tensions had been resolved. The political machinations of 1976 exemplified the Greek confrontational strategy as it played out against the balanced policy of the United States. Although the Greek government reaffirmed its strategy of confronting the Ford administration publicly, it did so carefully. Athens’ approach offers further proof that confronting Washington was a means to an end—not the end itself.

116 GRFPL, NSA, NSC Staff Files, Box 10, Country File, Greece, 1976 (4) WH, Clift, Briefing Item, Greece—United States, 11 June 1976. 117 GRFPL, NSA, NSC Staff Files, Box 10, Country File, Greece, 1976 (4) WH, Clift, Briefing Item, Greece—Karamanlis demurs, 18 May 1976. 118 Memorandum from the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs Scowcroft to President Ford, Washington, 20 May 1976, FRUS, Vol. XXX, doc. 65. 119 Yanek Mieczkowski, Gerald Ford and the Challenges of the 1970s (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 2005), 315. 120 Memorandum from the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs Scowcroft to President Ford, Washington, 20 May 1976, FRUS, Vol. XXX, doc. 65.

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The Ford administration meanwhile remained committed to its balanced policy in the Mediterranean. It maintained that the Turkish–US DCA and its careful positioning in the Aegean crisis did not constitute an anti-Greek stance. Greece already received proportionally more US military and economic support than Turkey. Similarly, public opinion and allied governments were perceived as favouring Athens during the Aegean dispute. Ford and Kissinger refused to isolate Turkey. Overall, they succeeded in maintaining a balance. The election of a Democrat to the Presidency with a new agenda for US foreign policy and Greek–US relations required both Greece and the United States to re-evaluate their strategic choices and expectations.

CHAPTER 5

Hope on the Horizon: Carter’s Election

In November 1976 James Earl ‘Jimmy’ Carter Jr. was elected as the 39th President of the United States. His message of change and hope resonated with the American public. American voters chose an ‘outsider’ to succeed President Gerald R. Ford.1 Greece welcomed his election. On the campaign trail Carter cultivated the image of a pro-Greek candidate. He attacked the record of President Ford and his Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger on foreign policy often using the Cyprus problem and Greek– Turkish disputes as examples of poor statesmanship. Carter’s arrival at the White House signalled a period in which Greek positions would be better understood and cooperation between the United States and Greece would be close. It justified the Greek government’s careful stance towards the Republican administration during the previous months. The perception of Carter as a pro-Greek candidate deeply concerned the Turkish government. Already strained relations risked further deterioration with the departure of Kissinger from centre stage and a Democrat becoming President. When he came to power President Carter looked at Kissinger’s dilemmas in dealing with Cyprus, Greece, and Turkey from a surprisingly different angle. Whereas the Ford administration expected to move closer to the Greek government, the Carter administration 1 Betty Glad, An Outsider in the White House: Jimmy Carter, His Advisors, and the Making of American Foreign Policy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009), 7.

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sought to strengthen Turkish–US relations. US national security dictated that the administration confirm its commitment to cooperation with the Turkish political and military leadership. The new President had to reinvent Kissinger’s policy of finding an equal balance between the two while delivering on his election promises. It was no coincidence that one of the new President’s first decisions concerned a policy review of relations with Cyprus, Greece, and Turkey. In the short term Carter’s arrival relaunched Greek–US relations in the mid-1970s. The negotiation teams from Greece and the United States agreed to the text of a new Greek–US DCA pending formal ratification. The negotiators also worked closely on securing some progress on Cyprus. Although the Greek government put confrontation on hold, it would return to it when the US appeasement of Turkey threatened what Athens had accomplished in recent years in containing its rival. Stalemate in the Eastern Mediterranean and a changing domestic environment in Greece had closed this initial period of better understanding and enhanced cooperation by autumn 1977.

Carter: The Greek Candidate? Greece welcomed the election of Carter to the Presidency. Reporting from Athens, US Ambassador Jack Kubisch described response to the news from Washington as enthusiastic. The Greek press with the expected exception of communist-supporting publications overwhelmingly lauded the election results. The Greek left-of-centre daily To Vima described the result as a source of satisfaction for Greece, celebration for Nicosia, and concern for Turkey. The Greek public similarly welcomed the election of Carter. Kubisch described the atmosphere in Athens as excited with the Greeks wanting ‘their pleasure known to Americans over Carter’s victory’.2 Such a positive Greek reaction had to do with the pro-Greek perception of Carter. The Democratic Party candidate had advocated policies close to Greek views. On the campaign trail Governor Carter called for a fundamental change in America’s role in the world. He promised to 2 National Archives [hereafter NARA], General Records of Department of State RG 59 [hereafter RG 59], Central Foreign Policy Files, 1973–1979, Electronic Telegrams [hereafter Electronic Telegrams] 1976, Kubisch, tel. 11807 Athens, US Embassy to State, 4 November 1976. See also To Vima, 4 November 1976, 1.

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pursue a foreign policy based on moral values and human rights considerations. Carter often used the Cyprus conflict and Greek–US relations in recent years as examples to help him explain his foreign policy vision and condemn the administration of Ford. The Democratic candidate criticised the previous Republican administration for an overreliance on realpolitik and disregard for any moral considerations. In doing so the Carter campaign echoed the main thrust of anti-American challenges against US policy. During the Vice Presidential debate in October 1976 Senator Walter Mondale (D-MN), Carter’s running mate, argued that Republicans ‘cozied up to the military dictatorship […] but […] turned their back on’ the Greek government after the restoration of democracy.3 The statement mirrored the reasons for Greek disappointment with Kissinger’s response in the summer of 1974. Carter’s own references to a lack of moral compass in dealing with the Cyprus question and the Aegean dispute enhanced the Democratic ticket’s pro-Greek credentials. The Greek public evidently appreciated his pro-Greek stance. It remains unclear whether the Greek government shared the public’s jubilation over the election of Carter. What is more, it is unclear whether the Karamanlis government expected a genuine change in US policy towards Greece. No explicit reference as to how the Greek government assessed Carter during the election campaign has yet been found in the records available. Common sense dictates that the conservative Constantine Karamanlis must have been closer politically to the conservative Gerald R. Ford. Greek reluctance to work with Ford in the leadup to the election and an overview of Greek records indicate that Carter’s election satisfied the Greek government as To Vima reported. In particular, there are factors that presuppose Greek contentment at the very least with the November election result. Such factors are Greek ties with the Carter campaign and with the Democratic Party and Karamanlis’ own emphasis on Cyprus as a moral question. The Greek Embassy in Washington kept the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Office of the Prime Minister apprised of all the statements

3 Courtesy of the Minnesota Historical Society, Digitised Archive, Walter F. Mondale Collection, Transcript of 1976 Vice Presidential Campaign Debate, 15 October 1976; see also Constantine G. Karamanlis Foundation [hereafter CGKF], Constantine Karamanlis Papers [hereafter CKP], Folder 23B, Alexandrakis, tel. A2153 Washington to Ministry of Foreign Affairs [hereafter MFA], 16 October 1976.

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Carter made on Greece, Cyprus, and Turkey. Ambassador Menelaos Alexandrakis emphasised Carter’s pro-Greek stance. Early indications of this stance came during the Democratic primaries. Carter challenged Kissinger over his ‘secret and personal’ deals with Turkey that did not secure ‘a clear commitment to an early statement giving Cyprus its independence’. Carter was referring to the then recently concluded Defence Cooperation Agreement (DCA) that triggered a severe Greek reaction. Carter lamented ‘Mr Kissinger’s […] agreement with the Turkish government’ as a missed opportunity to tie Ankara to specific steps towards a ‘just solution of the Cyprus tragedy’. Carter warned of ‘negligence of moral issues as well as courting long-range disaster if we [the US] fail to couple improvement in relations with Turkey with increased fair progress on Cyprus’.4 While he was the Democratic candidate for the Presidency Carter retained a pro-Greek line, particularly but not exclusively when speaking to Greek American voters. During the height of the Aegean crisis in 1976 Carter advocated the United States play an active role in efforts to defuse and settle the dispute. To that end Carter pledged unconditional support for a peaceful resolution.5 In September 1976 the campaign further substantiated the candidates’ views on Cyprus–Greece–Turkey issues. Following a meeting with Greek American community leaders the Carter campaign issued a policy paper that began by condemning the Ford administration for ‘tilting away from Greece and Cyprus’. The paper claimed that this decision of the Ford administration had proved to be disaster for NATO and US interests in the Eastern Mediterranean. The Carter campaign attributed eruption of the Cyprus 1974 crisis to the US administration. It blamed the US administration for its failure to prevent the Greek junta from carrying out activities to restrain and limit the Turkish invasion. In contrast, the policy paper advocated an end to the

4 CGKF, CKP, Folder 23B, Alexandrakis, tel. A1198 Washington to MFA, 21 June 1976. The telegram detailed a recent speech delivered by Carter on 21 May. 5 Chris Ioannides, Realpolitik in the Eastern Mediterranean: From Kissinger and the Cyprus Crisis to Carter and the Lifting of the Turkish Arms Embargo (New York: Pella, 2001), 149–151; see also CGKF, CKP, Folder 23B, Alexandrakis, tel. A1536 Washington to MFA, 20 August 1976.

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‘colonization of Cyprus by Turkish military and civilians’ and supported returning Greek-Cypriot refugees to their homes.6 The policy statement could easily have originated in Greece. Criticism of what Ford and Kissinger could have done—but never did—during the Cyprus crisis remained in line with how the Greek public and government assessed the situation. By condemning the Ford administration Carter indicated that he would take a different stance to Greek–Turkish disputes if elected. In an interview with a Greek newspaper Carter even made authorisation of further military aid to Turkey conditional on progress being made on Cyprus with prerequisites.7 Ever since the arms embargo came into force Turkish governments consistently objected to any linking of US economic and military provisions with a Cyprus breakthrough. At the Democratic National Convention (DNC) Carter unveiled his Vice Presidential pick Senator Mondale prompting more favourable commentary from Alexandrakis. The ambassador welcomed the nomination of Mondale reminding Athens that he had consistently voted ‘in our favour in the debate about the embargo or aid’ in Congress.8 The senator himself drew attention to his voting record in the US Senate. Speaking at the AHEPA convention Mondale underlined his commitment to finding a ‘lasting and just peace’ in Cyprus and unabashedly touted his voting record on Greek-related issues.9 Such statements were aimed primarily at rallying Greek American voters behind the Democratic ticket. They also appealed to Democratic Party voters who were interested in human

6 Carter Campaign Policy Statement, 17 September 1976. The English version can be

found in Ioannides, Realpolitik in Eastern Mediterranean, 150 and the Greek translation comes from a Greek government internal note, CGKF, CKP, Folder 23B, Prime Minister’s Office, Note on statements made by Carter on matters relevant to Greek–Turkish dispute and Cyprus, No creator’s name or date. 7 Carter interview with Leonardos for Eleftherotypia published on 14 October 1976. Details found in a Greek government internal note, CGKF, CKP, Folder 23B, Prime Minister’s Office, Note on statements made by Carter on matters relevant to Greek– Turkish dispute and Cyprus, No creator’s name or date. 8 CGKF, CKP, Folder 23B, Kountouriotis, tel. 1242 Washington to MFA, 15 July 1976. 9 CGKF, CKP, Folder 23B, Alexandrakis, tel. A308 Washington to MFA, 21 August

1976; Mondale address to AHEPA August 1976 conference, in Ioannides, Realpolitik in the Eastern Mediterranean, 152.

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rights considerations.10 Even as a political calculation the difference with the Republican administration was obvious. The Democrats endorsed the party election platform at the DNC. Regarding Greece the Democratic Party expressed support for the country’s democratisation process. The platform pledged the Democrats ‘must do all that it is possible’ to encourage a ‘fair settlement’ of the Cyprus question. This section of the platform implied interest in the United States continuing its role in the negotiations process. Alexandrakis felt the reference to Cyprus seemed vague since it was a compromise position between different factions and viewpoints within the Democratic Party. Nonetheless, the language the Democrats adopted in their convention contrasted strongly with what the Republicans advocated.11 The Republican election platform also referred to Cyprus and Greek– Turkish relations. The Republicans supported decreasing the US role in the region. Although the platform recognised the Cyprus problem as a complex issue ‘which separates our friends in Greece and Turkey’, the Republicans believed that Greece and Turkey were better suited to resolve their disputes alone. The platform merely called for restoring cooperation on NATO’s southern flank and hoping for a return to ‘friendly relations between the two countries’.12 This was not an isolated example. The party platform reflected broader thinking among leading Republican decisionmakers. In October US Secretary of Defense Donald Henry Rumsfeld echoed the Republican view for a decreased US role in the Greek–Turkish dispute. The prominent Greek American newspaper National Herald covered a campaign event in support of Ford held at the Pentagon. The event was designed to appeal to ethnic minorities by inviting many

10 Barbara Keys, ‘Congress, Kissinger and the Origins of Human Rights Diplomacy’, Diplomatic History, Vol. 34(4), 2010, 823–851; Umberto Tulli, ‘Whose Rights Are Human Rights? The Ambiguous Emergence of Human Rights and the Demise of Kissingerism’, Cold War History, Vol. 12(4), 2012, 577–585. 11 Democratic Party Platforms, ‘1976 Democratic Party Platform’, 12 July 1976, Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley (eds), The American Presidency Project, available at https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/1976-democratic-party-platform; CGKF, CKP, Folder 23B, M. Alexandrakis, tel. A1169 Washington to MFA, 16 June 1976. 12 Republican Party Platforms, ‘Republican Party Platform of 1976’, 18 August 1976, Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley (eds), The American Presidency Project, available at https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/republican-party-platform-1976.

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of their community and lobby organisations. During the event Secretary Rumsfeld described Greek–Turkish differences as not among the ‘big and priority problems’ the Pentagon faced. He claimed that Washington faced other significant challenges that dwarfed a regional dispute between two ‘distant’ allies.13 The Greek Embassy immediately reacted to the statement by raising it with the Department of State. The incident gave Alexandrakis an opportunity to stress that he believed the sentiment Rumsfeld expressed reflected ‘current thinking in the Pentagon and the current administration more broadly’.14 Whereas the Republicans minimised the importance of Greek–Turkish disputes, the Democratic candidate for the Presidency placed it at the forefront of his campaign. Moreover, his policy positions aligned with Greek expectations and requests to the United States during the past two years. In contrast, the Republican views were a response to Turkish calls to reduce international—including American—involvement in the Cyprus and Aegean disputes. Notwithstanding the statements and rhetoric of Carter on the campaign trail, the Greek Embassy established a direct channel of communication with top Carter advisors to further promote the Greek viewpoint. Two figures who Ambassador Alexandrakis met in the leadup to the November election stand out: George W. Ball and Cyrus R. Vance. Alexandrakis met Ambassador Ball in August 1976. Ball had served as Under Secretary of State during the Lyndon B. Johnson Presidency and had coordinated the US response to the Cyprus crises in the 1960s. In 1976 Ball was an advisor to Governor Carter who had limited foreign policy experience.15 Alexandrakis in his meeting with Ball expressed the Greek government’s resentment towards the ‘evenhandedness’ that had guided the State Department in dealing with Greece and Turkey. According to Alexandrakis this impartiality that the State Department pursued actually resulted in Washington’s ‘one-sided support of 13 ‘H Aμερικη ´ δεν εξαρταται ´ απ´o την Toυρκ´ια για την συγκšντρωσι [sic] πληρoϕoριων ´ απ´o τις βασεις ´ της σ’ αυτην ´ τη χωρα ´ [America Does Not Depend on Turkey for Intelligence Gathering from its Bases in that Country]’, The National Herald, 7 October 1976, 1. 14 CGKF, Evangelos Averoff Papers [hereafter EAP], File 29b, Apostolides copying Alexandrakis’ letter 2202/89/A2518 from MFA to Averoff, 18 October 1976, please note: the attached clippings of the article mentioned above and extensive commentary from the Greek Embassy. 15 Cyrus Vance, Hard Choices: Critical Years in America’s Foreign Policy (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1983), 31.

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Turkish illegalities [or unreasonable demands against Greece]’. Expressing broader sentiments of the Greek government Alexandrakis identified Ankara’s sense of support from the United States as the root cause of the Greek–Turkish dispute. As the meeting drew to a close Alexandrakis handed Ball a detailed memorandum in which he outlined his personal views about the ‘Cyprus dispute from the US perspective’.16 The Alexandrakis–Ball meeting took place amid the Aegean crisis of the summer of 1976. Although the Greek government appeared dissatisfied with the Ford/Kissinger response, Alexandrakis noted that a statement from the Democrats might prove useful. Based on a Greek report of the conversation Ball questioned what Carter could publicly do without getting entangled in the complex details of Greek–Turkish disputes. Subsequently, the Carter campaign released a statement to the AHEPA convention on 20 August and a policy statement a few weeks later on 17 September. Both statements referred to the Aegean dispute in ways that largely mirrored the Greek point of view. They underlined the need for a peaceful resolution potentially with the help of an international organisation. Reference to the International Court of Justice as a forum that ‘can clarify some of the legal issues involved in the oil rights dispute in the Aegean’ supported a key demand of the Greek government regarding the way forward.17 The Greek Ambassador also approached future Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance in the summer of 1976. Vance was another foreign policy advisor to the campaign credited by Carter for drawing his attention to the importance of Greek–Turkish tensions.18 In a policy paper to Presidential candidate Carter, Vance suggested the United States act as mediator in the Greek–Turkish dispute.19 The first Alexandrakis–Vance meeting took place on 14 July and focussed on general aspects of the Greek–US alliance. In the meeting Vance was somewhat general in advocating a peaceful solution of Greek–Turkish differences and underlined 16 CGKF, CKP, Folder 13B, Alexandrakis, Letter A.E..E.X. 645 from Washington to MFA, 18 August 1976. 17 CGKF, CKP, Folder 23B, Alexandrakis, tel. A1536 Washington to MFA, 20 August 1976. 18 Jimmy Carter, Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President (New York, NY: Bantam Books, 1982), 51. 19 Vance, Hard Choices, Appendix I: Overview of Foreign Policy and Positions, submitted to Carter on October 1976.

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the need to rebuild NATO’s southern flank. In response Alexandrakis stressed his conviction that the United States remained the only power able to promote both goals. Alexandrakis felt the arms embargo had the potential to force Turkish compromises. Compromise remained in Athens’ view necessary to securing progress in the Cyprus and Aegean disputes. The cutoff of arms sales had so far failed to produce results because the Ford administration undermined it.20 Having such an early meeting with a campaign advisor offered the Greek side the opportunity to present its thinking to Washington. The second Alexandrakis–Vance meeting took place immediately after Carter’s victory. In November the two discussed the US position in the UN General Assembly debate on Cyprus.21 The Greek side including the Cypriot government questioned among other things whether Carter would respect his campaign promises regarding the Eastern Mediterranean. Vance stressed that ‘Greece has a good friend’ in the new President. A few days later in a meeting with Cypriot representatives Tasos Papadopoulos and Spyros Kyprianou, Vance remarked that ‘it would be wrong to believe that Carter will not try, within the realm of possibility, to adhere to his promises’. Vance also indicated that the Carter administration had come up with a ‘new concept’ aimed at solving the Cyprus problem.22 On 3 December 1976, when President-elect Carter formally announced Vance as his nominee for Secretary of State, Alexandrakis reminded the Greek Foreign Minister of Vance’s views on Greek-related issues. He reported that Vance concurred with his outline of the Cyprus and the Aegean disputes. Alexandrakis stressed in particular that the two agreed on the need for separate solutions to the Aegean dispute and the Cyprus questions during their informal meeting. According to Ankara the two issues were linked. The recipient of Alexandrakis’ telegram—most

20 CGKF, CKP, Folder 73B, Alexandrakis, tel. A..3161.4B/1850 Washington to MFA, 14 July 1976. 21 See General Assembly Resolution 31/12, Question of Cyprus, A/RES/31/12, 12 November 1976, available at http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol= A/RES/31/12. 22 CGKF, CKP, Folder 27B, Papoulias, tel. A..2355 PermRep UN to MFA, 15 November 1976, quoting Alexandrakis and Dountas, Letter AP P: 2826 Nicosia to MFA, 17 November 1976.

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likely Karamanlis—underlined not only the relevant references to Greekrelated issues but also Vance’s statements that a ‘foreign policy based on “morality” was absolutely possible’.23 The Greek Ambassador reminded Athens that both Ball and Vance had appeared before the House Committee on International Relations (HIRC) during a major effort to repeal the embargo in June 1975. Both had been supportive in their testimonies of the arms embargo in principle considering it designed to uphold the letter of the law. Vance appeared supportive of a temporary repeal of the embargo in contradiction of Greek wishes. However, the Secretary-designate indicated that a temporary repeal ought to be explicitly linked to tangible progress in the Cyprus negotiations.24 This drastically differed from Kissinger’s way of working. Overall, the meetings of Ball and Vance with the Greek Ambassador increased the already close association between Athens and members of the Democratic Party. The efforts made to legislate for and uphold the arms embargo on Turkey had underscored the close links between the Greek government and Democrats in the US Congress since 1974. Supporters of the legislation overwhelmingly belonged to the Democratic Party. The leading figures of the Greek Lobby in Congress were all Democrats: Representative John Brademas (D-ID), Representative Benjamin Stanley Rosenthal (D-NY), Senator Paul Sarbanes (D-MD), Senator Thomas Eagleton (D-MO), and Senator Claiborne Pell (D-RI). Operating under explicit instructions of his government, Alexandrakis had in previous years actively and successfully established close ties with the group. His numerous reports on meetings with Brademas and others give the impression his relations with the group were of the greatest importance. Democrats indicated the Greek government had much to gain from there being a Democrat in the White House. As early as May 1976 messages from Washington advised the Greek government against having a close association with the Ford administration. Ambassador Alexandrakis informed Foreign Minister Bitsios and Prime Minister Karamanlis of a brief discussion he had had with Democrats regarding Karamanlis’ visit

23 CGKF, CKP, Folder 27B, Alexandrakis, tel. AP. P. A2514 Washington, 3 December 1976. 24 CGKF, CKP, Folder 25B, Alexandrakis, Letter 2223.31/A495 to the Greek Embassy in Washington, 22 December 1976.

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to Washington planned for mid-1976. At an embassy event, Alexandrakis spoke with Democrats and stressed that: Mr Macnamara [?sic] after praising the Prime Minister and [his] handling of economic issues added that he considered inadvisable a possible visit [to the United States] by the Prime Minister now. […] He thinks that President Ford has already lost the November election. Representative Brademas who was present during the discussion observed that the current administration could offer nothing to Greece and concurred with Mr Macnamara’s views.25

The Ambassador’s telegram was intended exclusively for Bitsios and Karamanlis. It bore the instruction that it was to be handed to Ambassador Petros Molyviatis who was Karamanlis’ closest advisor. It is unclear why the Greek diplomatic service attached such importance to this conversation at the Greek Embassy. It is difficult to identify who “Macnamara” was. The spelling of the name, which is in English in the Greek telegram, is not consistent with the spelling of Robert McNamara, the former US Secretary of Defense. Moreover, at the time of the conversation McNamara had already become President of the World Bank Group (WBG). Whether it was the former Defense Secretary or not, Alexandrakis considered this conversation noteworthy and reported it to Karamanlis. Coincidentally, two days later Karamanlis cancelled his forthcoming US visit. The Greek government officially notified the Ford administration on 17 May of the Premier’s decision.26 The conversation tallied with the advice the Democrats offered the Greek government in which they urged Athens to delay any binding decisions with Ford such as on the Defence Cooperation Agreement (DCA) until the new administration was formally installed.27 Karamanlis for his part appeared to have close relationships with leading Democrats since coming to power in 1974. Karamanlis met privately with Representative Rosenthal who was a key figure in the

25 CGKF, CKP, Folder 30B, Alexandrakis, tel. 527E.X. Washington to MFA, 15 May 1976. 26 CGKF, CKP, Folder 30B, Note on meeting between Karamanlis and the US Ambassador, 17 May 1976. 27 CGKF, CKP, Folder 25B, Alexandrakis, Letter 2223.31/A495 to the Greek Embassy in Washington, 22 December 1976.

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arms embargo legislation. He also maintained a personal friendship with Senator Edward ‘Ted’ Kennedy (D-MA). Kennedy visited Athens on numerous occasions between 1974 and 1976.28 As was the case with the Rosenthal visit the US Embassy was not able to access information about his meetings in the Greek capital. The difference between these visits and that of Representative Wayne Hays (D-OH) to Athens in early January 1975 is telling about the different approaches taken by the US Embassy. Hays visited all three countries involved in the Cyprus dispute and closely coordinated with the Ford administration. The US Ambassador in each country followed Hays’ contacts closely and gave details about them to the State Department.29 In contrast, when Kennedy, Sarbanes, and Brademas—all ardent supporters of the Turkish arms embargo—visited Athens on various occasions, the US Embassy hardly accessed any information about their meetings with Karamanlis and other officials. Instead, its reports to the State Department were mainly speculative.30 Senator Kennedy visited Athens as Karamanlis’ personal guest in November 1976.31 Concerned about the possible implications of his visit just before the US elections the Greek government coordinated with Kennedy so that he arrived just after. After the visit Ambassador Alexandrakis followed up with Kennedy who stated that his intention had been

28 Edward Kennedy privately visited Greece on 16 November 1974, 18 March 1975, and 8–11 November 1976. On each occasion Karamanlis met Kennedy to hold private discussions about which little is known and the US Embassy had little information. See Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library [hereafter GRFPL], Presidential Country Files for the Middle East and South Asia, Box 11, Greece—State Department, Telegrams to SecState-NODIS (1), Kubisch, tel. 8244 Athens to State, 16 November 1974; see also Constantine Svolopoulos (ed.), Kωνσ τ αντ ι´ν oς Kαραμανλης ´ : αρχ ε´ιo, γ εγ oν o´ τ α, και κε´ιμενα [Constantine Karamanlis: Archive, Events and Texts, Hereafter Karamanlis ] (Kathimerini: Athens, 2005), Vol. 8, 337 and Vol. 9, 320. 29 GRFPL, National Security Adviser [hereafter NSA], White House Situation Room, Presidential Daily Briefings, 1974–77 [hereafter WH Presidential Briefings], Box 4, Presidential Daily Briefings [hereafter PDB] 1/4/75, Kissinger, Memorandum for the President, 4 January 1975. 30 See for example, GRFPL, NSA, WH Presidential Briefings, Box 4, PDB 1/17/75, Kissinger, Memorandum for the President, 17 January 1975. 31 NARA, RG 59, Electronic Telegrams 1976, Kubisch, tel. 12099 Athens to State, 11 November 1976.

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to inform ‘his circle about our [Greek] views regarding the restoration of peace in the area’.32 What is more, Karamanlis and Carter shared much the same moral stance regarding Greek–Turkish disputes. Carter often used the Cyprus problem as an example of immorality and injustice that Nixon, Ford, and Kissinger willingly accepted to secure their interpretation of US interests. Carter not only condemned Republican foreign policy in the Eastern Mediterranean region at campaign events targetting the Greek American community, he also did so at other events such as the Israeli B’nai B’Brith Convention when he stated that: ‘in Cyprus we let expediency triumph over fairness, and lost both ways’.33 Similarly, Karamanlis often highlighted the immorality of Turkish actions in Cyprus. Karamanlis considered Ankara had committed a ‘premeditated crime’ in Cyprus and that Washington had acted as an accomplice.34 More importantly, Turkey’s abuse of power was morally profound. Karamanlis stated in the Greek parliament in 1975 that: All international organisations (principally the United Nations), all national governments, and the international press have condemned Turkey. They have pressured and keep pressuring it [Turkey] to restore justice. […] Nobody ignores that in this case Turkey is the wrongdoer and Cyprus is the victim. […] Therefore, there is not only sympathy for Greece [and its position] but there is also a sense of justice [when supporting this position].35

The Greek Premier often reiterated that Turkey had violated the ceasefire on 14 August 1974 and unlawfully resumed military operations in

32 CGKF, CKP, Folder 27B, Alexandrakis, Letter .2223.31/67/A467 from the Greek Embassy in Washington to MFA, 1 December 1976. 33 CGKF, CKP, Folder 23B, Kountouriotis, Letter .2221/57/A1678 from the Greek Embassy in Washington to MFA, 15 September 1976. 34 Telegram from the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State, Athens, 11 September 1974, ‘Cyprus: Second Karamanlis–Tyler Meeting’, in Laurie Van Hook and Edward C. Keefer (eds), Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976 [hereafter FRUS], Vol. XXX, Greece; Cyprus; Turkey, 1973–1976 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2007), doc. 149. 35 Karamanlis, Speech in the Greek Parliament, 16 October 1975, in Svolopoulos (ed.), Karamanlis, Vol. 9, 78–79.

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Cyprus south of the stabilisation zone. The Greek government maintained a similar approach regarding Turkish claims in the Aegean Sea. Karamanlis acknowledged that despite domestic pressure the Aegean was not ‘a Greek lake’ and Turkey had ‘some rights’. However, its detailed claims were ‘unjustified’.36 Although these were highly emotional and moral arguments, they hardly persuaded Kissinger. Carter’s statements and emphasis on morality as a factor in foreign policy decision-making painted him in a different light and signalled a significant change from the power politics that the Ford administration had pursued. Although the Greek government likely hoped for a Carter victory, there is no document explicitly proving it. The abovementioned factors indicate that the Greek government had at least some reasons to believe Carter would chart a new course in Greek–US relations. The Greek government did not underestimate that the primary target of the Carter campaign was Greek American voters. The Cyprus question also served as a useful talking point on the moral deficiencies of Republican administrations and as a way for the Democratic candidate to explain his new vision. Considering the news emanating from Washington it was little surprise that Athens kept its options open by avoiding any long-term commitments with Ford. Carter’s election represented a change in Washington’s role in the world and at the same time served Greek interests. The Greek government had struggled to persuade Ford and Kissinger of its point of view on Cyprus and the Aegean. Although he brought unknown skills to foreign policy, Carter also offered hope and a much-needed restart of Greek– US relations. There was a part of Greek bureaucracy that viewed the Ford administration as explicitly pro-Turkish. Even if Carter did not move Washington closer to Greek views, any adjustment would be welcome.37 Alexandrakis noted that the new administration would possibly treat ‘two allies [Greece and Turkey] truly equally’ moving away from Kissinger’s one-sided preference for Turkey.38 The following months witnessed the

36 Karamanlis, Speech in the Greek Parliament, 17 April 1976, in Svolopoulos (ed.), Karamanlis, Vol. 9, 203. 37 Dimitris Bitsios, Π šρα απ o´ τ α Σ  ´ ν oρα, 1974–1977 [Beyond the Borders, 1974– 1977] (Athens: Estia, 1983), 232. 38 CGKF, CKP, Folder 25B, Alexandrakis, Letter .222.31/69/A470, 30 November 1976.

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eagerness of the Greek government to engage and work with the new administration. President-elect Carter was fully aware of the impact that his election had made on Greece. Just hours after his election Carter spoke to Greek and Greek American journalists promising to uphold his commitments to Greek American voters.39 The President-elect was fully aware now that the campaign was over that his incoming administration had to extend a hand to Turkey. Carter could not assume power while the impression he favoured Greece over Turkey remained. Appearing before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations the new President directly addressed this public perception. Carter recognised that ‘there was a great deal of celebration in Greece when I was elected, and I think the celebration was perhaps unwarranted if it was an assumption that I would lack objectivity’.40 Carter was interested in securing military and political cooperation with both allies. His nominee for Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance voiced support for these sentiments. In his confirmation hearings before the Senate, Vance stressed that it was in the US interest to secure relations with both Greece and Turkey.41 Carter and Vance responded to questions raised by US Senators about the administration’s intentions regarding the Greek and Turkish DCAs and the Cyprus negotiations. It was not long before the administration was required to take action on all issues encompassing Greek, Turkish, and US relations.

Carter in the White House The new administration brought in a new cohort of officials, promoted some career diplomats, and tasked them with US policy-making relating to Greece. Naturally, the Greek Embassy tried to gain insight into the new

39 CGKF, CKP, Folder 23B, Alexandrakis, tel. A2286 Washington to MFA, 3 November 1976. 40 Meeting with President-elect Carter, Briefing before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate 94th Congress Transition Period on President-elect Carter’s Views on Foreign Policy, 23 November 1976 (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1976), 14. 41 CGKF, CKP, Folder 27B, Alexandrakis, tel. A63 Washington to MFA, 11 January 1976.

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President’s personality and that of his team.42 At first glance the Greeks seemed satisfied with the individuals selected for key posts. The principal advantage of the future Secretary of State from the Greek point of view was that he was not Kissinger. Alexandrakis thought it positive that Vance had very little in common with Kissinger.43 Vance also had first-hand experience of the Cyprus problem as President Johnson’s Special Envoy to the region.44 Internal Greek communications and reports often mentioned this prior involvement with Cyprus as an asset. Athens expected that Vance would understand the complexities of the dispute at the national and international level of all three parties involved. Secretary of State Vance appointed his law partner Matthew Nimetz as a Counsellor to the Department of State.45 Nimetz was to become the ‘Department’s point person on Cyprus […] involved in nearly every aspect of U.S. efforts to achieve a settlement between the ethnic Greek and ethnic Turkish communities of Cyprus, both as a direct mediator and as a partner to UN Secretary General Kurt Waldheim’.46 Although this is an accurate description, Nimetz soon assumed a broader role on issues affecting all three states. For example, he played a central role in the repeal of the Turkish arms embargo and the negotiations for Greece’s return to full NATO membership later on. Nimetz eventually established himself as a key figure in the Department of State on policy towards the Eastern Mediterranean. He became a key link in coordinating US policy in the region between the Department of State and the National Security Council (NSC). At the NSC Paul B. Henze was his unofficial counterpart. Henze worked directly under National Security Advisor (NSA) Zbigniew Brzezinski. The Carter administration reorganised the structure of the NSC. Henze headed the Intelligence Coordination section in the new NSC. 42 CGKF, CKP, Folder 27B, Alexandrakis, Letter .2221/4/55/A2554 from the Greek Embassy in Washington to the Prime Minister’s Office, 7 December 1976. 43 CGKF, CKP, Folder 27B, Alexandrakis, tel. AP.P.A2523 to MFA, 4 December 1976. 44 Nikos Christodoulidis, Tα σ χ šδια λ ´ σ ης τ oυ Kυπ ριακ o´ (1948–1978) [Plans for Solution of the Cyprus Problem (1948–1978)] (Athens: Kastaniotis, 2009), 183. 45 Vance, Hard Choices, 43. 46 ‘Sources’, David Zierler and Adam M. Howard (eds), Foreign Relations of the United

States, 1977 –1980 [hereafter FRUS], Vol. XXI, Greece; Cyprus; Turkey (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2014), XIV.

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His duties included matters relevant to Greece, Turkey, Cyprus, the Horn of Africa, and international broadcasting.47 Henze had served as CIA station chief in Turkey prior to his NSC appointment and was fluent in Turkish. His post in Ankara afforded him a deep understanding of and insight into regional politics and national sensitivities. Although now relatively forgotten, it was Henze who drew Ioannides’ attention to the role the NSC played in the repeal of the arms embargo. As far as Ioannides was concerned Henze was the main pro-Turkish figure in the Carter administration.48 An overview of his approach towards the Eastern Mediterranean reveals that it imitated many aspects of Kissinger’s notion of a balanced approach towards Greece and Turkey. Henze believed the overriding concern for US national interests in the Eastern Mediterranean was the need to repair relations with Ankara. Despite the problems in Greek–US relations, when the administration assumed power Athens remained much closer to Washington than Ankara. Henze should be seen as a pragmatic follower of Kissinger’s footsteps rather than someone advocating in favour of Turkey. As a result of his position Henze encouraged Brzezinski’s greater involvement in Eastern Mediterranean matters. However, Brzezinski displayed little interest in dealing with Greece and Turkey. Nevertheless, he did encourage Henze to work closely with Nimetz. Any differences between the Department of State and the White House on Greek matters or US policy towards Cyprus and Turkey remained indistinct. The positions created for Nimetz and Henze reflected a new collective approach introduced by the Carter administration to US policy towards Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus often termed the Eastern Mediterranean policy. Considering the problems that dominated bilateral US relations with two of its Mediterranean allies and interconnected and overlapping elements of Greek–Turkish disputes this approach was logical. Kissinger had followed a similar approach. Every year from 1974 to 1976 a new problem arose in Greek–Turkish relations that required the Secretary of State’s personal attention. Kissinger dealt with the Cyprus crisis and its aftermath, led the effort to prevent and then repeal the US arms embargo on Turkey, appeased the Greek government following announcement

47 Zbigniew Brzezinski, Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser, 1977 –1981 (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1983), Appendix 3. 48 Ioannides, Realpolitik in the Eastern Mediterranean, 162.

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of the new DCA, and was instrumental in defusing the 1976 Aegean crisis. Despite this collective approach at the top, the Department of State followed its ‘customary penchant for compartmentalizing Greek and Turkish affairs’ an example of which was the failure to inform the US delegation in Athens about the gist of negotiations between Washington and Ankara regarding the DCA.49 Stearns in his rather generous portrayal of unintentional omission to inform the Greek side about the Turkish– US negotiations beforehand overlooks Washington’s underlying goal of providing something better than what Greece was getting in terms of aid to balance the impact of the arms embargo on Turkey. What remains an undisputed fact during the Ford Presidency is that taking a collective approach in the Eastern Mediterranean was the result of the need for issues to be handled at the top level of the Department of State. In contrast, the Carter administration made a conscious choice to create low-level or lower level positions that oversaw the broader picture in dealing with challenges posed by Cyprus, Greece, and Turkey. Although Eastern Mediterranean developments inevitably disappeared from the top of the agenda, the positions created for individuals such as Nimetz and Henze ensured that the collective approach towards the region was maintained throughout Carter’s Presidency. The Clifford mission of February 1977 to Ankara, Athens, and Nicosia reflected this collective approach. Carter personally appointed distinguished Washington lawyer Clark Clifford as his special envoy to the three states.50 Clifford’s mission aimed to review and relaunch US policy in the region.

The Clifford Mission: Washington’s Intentions … Kissinger’s final act as Secretary of State was to accelerate the need for action on Eastern Mediterranean issues. On 18 January just two days before the inauguration of the new President the Ford administration resubmitted the 1976 Turkish DCA to Congress requesting its ratification. The decision surprised the incoming administration. Secretarydesignate Vance asserted that the Ford White House had acted without 49 Monteagle Stearns, Entangled Allies: U.S. Policy towards Greece, Turkey and Cyprus (New York, NY: Council of Foreign Relations Press, 1992), 41. 50 Clark Clifford, Counsel to the President: A Memoir by Clark Clifford and Richard Holbrook (New York: Random House, 1991), 625.

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prior consultation and had given assurances that it would not take such an action. Consequently, the Carter administration requested Congress to defer consideration of the DCA. In a comment to the press Vance explained that the request to Congress reflected the decision to carry out a full review of related foreign policy issues that was underway and would be completed once the new President was in the White House.51 Ankara was not impressed. The Carter administration’s request received widespread coverage in the Turkish press. Turkish Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel and his ˙ Foreign Minister Ihsan Sabrı Ça˘glayangil decided to downplay the impact of Carter’s decision in their press statements. The Turkish government did not view the decision as an indication of the new President’s stance towards Turkey. Nevertheless, Ça˘glayangil reminded interested parties that Ankara continued to link reactivation of US bases in Turkey with ratification of the DCA.52 At a meeting with the Turkish Ambassador in Washington Melih Esenbel, Vance was forced to defend and further explain the administration’s decision. He argued that the administration considered delay of the DCA as ‘the only means to stave off Congressional statements opposing the Turkish–US security relationship’. He further pointed out that the new administration ‘intended to complete its policy review of the Eastern Mediterranean in the near future and would then strive to rebuild Turkish–US friendship’.53 Despite cautious public statements, Ankara’s suspicion about Carter’s commitment to relations with Turkey remained. In line with the promise for a full review of US policy towards Cyprus, Greece, and Turkey the administration launched the Clifford mission in February 1977. The Clifford mission was Carter’s personal initiative to demonstrate his commitment to solving Eastern Mediterranean problems in line with his campaign promises. Clark M. Clifford was another veteran of the Johnson

51 NARA, RG 59, Electronic Telegrams 1977, Kissinger, tel. 013345 State to Ankara,

20 January 1977. 52 NARA, RG 59, Electronic Telegrams 1977, Macomber, tel. 0496 Ankara to State, 21 January 1977, and Macomber, tel. 00522 Ankara to State, 24 January 1977. 53 Memorandum of Conversation, ‘The Turkish–US Security Relationship and Cyprus’, US participants: The Secretary-designate, Mr. Christopher et al., Turkish Participants: Ambassador Esenbel, 21 January 1977, FRUS, Vol. XXI, doc. 84.

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administration who worked with Carter during his election campaign.54 Matthew Nimetz and Nelson C. Ledsky from the State Department assisted him in the preparation of his tour to Ankara, Athens, and Nicosia. Ledsky would remain another key figure on US policy in the region throughout Carter’s terms serving as Director of the Office of Southern European Affairs.55 The mission’s goal was described as discussing matters relevant to Greek–US and Turkish–US relations. Clifford aimed in Cyprus to determine prospects for an early settlement and explore how Washington could assist in the negotiations.56 In contrast with the general goals described in the press statement the mission aimed at making an early breakthrough in challenges facing the Eastern Mediterranean. At one of the earlier Policy Review Committees (PRCs) the incoming decision-makers freely discussed where things stood in US relations with the two allies and the implications of the Cyprus question.57 President Carter expressed US policy rather crudely by stressing that ‘we need the bases in Greece and Turkey’. As a general goal the administration aimed to restore and rebuild the southern flank of NATO. Ratification of the Turkish DCA would serve to consolidate Turkey’s relations with Washington and the western alliance. Similarly, close ties and long-term return to full NATO participation would ensure Greece’s place in the West. However, Congressional approval of the Turkish DCA depended on conclusion of the Greek agreement that offered US benefits in its own right. Clifford therefore hoped to persuade the Greek government to resume Greek–US DCA negotiations promptly.58 54 Scott Kaufman, Plans Unraveled: The Foreign Policy of the Carter Administration (DeKalb, IL: Northern Illinois University Press, 2008), 21. 55 CGKF, CKP, Folder 27B, Alexandrakis, Letter .2222/St.DEPT/4/A160 from the Greek Embassy in Washington to MFA, 26 January 1977. 56 Jimmy Carter, ‘President’s Personal Emissary to Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus: Designation of Clark M. Clifford’, 3 February 1977; Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley (eds), The American Presidency Project, available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid= 7466. 57 Minutes of a Policy Review Committee Meeting, Participants: Vance, Brown, Brzezinski et al., Washington, 10 February 1977, FRUS, Vol. XXI, doc. 5. 58 Memorandum of Conversation, Participants: The President, Clark Clifford, Zbignew Brzezinski, Matthew Nimetz, Washington, February 15, 1977, FRUS, Vol. XXI, doc. 7; Summary of Conclusion of a Policy Review Committee Meeting on ‘Cyprus and the Aegean’, Washington, 10 February 1977, FRUS, Vol. XXI, doc. 6.

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At the same time the administration needed to make some progress on Cyprus. Vance met with Senator-elect Sarbanes and Representative Brademas on 31 December. These two leading supporters of the Turkish arms embargo emphasised that conclusion of the Greek DCA was not enough to ratify the Turkish agreement. Progress on Cyprus was still necessary.59 The Greek Lobby in Congress intended to hold Carter to account for his election promises. The underlying policy goal remained close—if not identical—to what Kissinger had tried to accomplish. Walking the tightrope that Greece and Turkey represented Carter added the promise of making progress on Cyprus despite their disputes and expectations of US support. The Carter administration also brought something new in terms of strategy by putting more pressure on Turkey to compromise. Consensus during the PRC was that the Turkish position posed the main obstacle to progress. All Turkish governments had so far avoided taking responsibility for not allowing headway to be made on Cyprus. Clifford attributed Ankara’s stance to Ford and Kissinger’s intransigence and the impression they gave that Congress could be ignored. As Clifford pointed out to Ambassador Esenbel, times had changed and now ‘there is a Democratic President and a Democratic majority, and that the Congress and the Administration will move together’.60 The Greek Ambassador emphasised the need for Turkey to compromise during preparations for the tour meeting with Clifford. The Greek government expected the Turkish government to move closer to the Greek position and proposals. When Clifford asked the Ambassador what inducements could be offered to the Turks for them to make concessions, Alexandrakis replied that: Some inducements for the Turks to act reasonably and in accordance with their [Turks] real interest would be the presence of an administration for at least four years committed to peace and morality, the prospect of cooperation with Congress, and Turkish apprehension that there will be no economic or military assistance in respect of their needs without progress.61 59 Memorandum of Conversation, Participants: Vance, Sarbanes, Brademas et al., Washington, 31 December 1976, FRUS, Vol. XXI, doc. 3. 60 Minutes of a Policy Review Committee Meeting on ‘Cyprus’, Washington, 10 February 1977, FRUS, Vol. XXI, doc. 5. 61 CGKF, CKP, Folder 7B, Alexandrakis, tel. A.37E.X. Washington to MFA, 10

January 1977.

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In Ankara the Presidential Emissary did indeed underline that ‘discernible improvement in the Cyprus situation was necessary if the DCA was to be pushed to enactment by the Administration’.62 For all the tough talk the expectations from Ankara remained minimal. As Brzezinski wrote in his summary of conclusions, ‘the maximum objective [of the mission] would be to return with enough evidence of Turkish flexibility on Cyprus to induce Congress to move forward with the Turkish DCA’. In the meantime some ‘movement’ towards progress could be enough at this stage to persuade Congress to maintain the existing level of aid for Turkey.63 It is no surprise that Washington interpreted the Turkish Foreign Minister’s commitment to ensuring the Turkish-Cypriot negotiator submitted ‘concrete and reasonable proposals’ in the forthcoming new round of intercommunal negotiations as a success.64 In Athens and Nicosia Clifford secured commitments from negotiators to work constructively on Cyprus and the Greek–US DCA negotiations. Archbishop Makarios adopted a conciliatory position that impressed Clifford. The Greek government announced its readiness to immediately resume talks between technical groups with a view to completing the military cooperation agreement.65 Washington was satisfied. Clifford had accomplished his very restricted remit: reassurance about Washington’s commitment to the region, resuming indirect dialogue between the parties, and securing promises to compromise and make progress. When it came to Greek–US relations US Ambassador Kubisch emphasised the beneficial impact the mission had on public aspects of the bilateral relationship. He pointed out that Clifford made ‘a greater and more favourable impact on Greek officials and Greek public opinion than any other American in the two-and-a-half years that I have been Ambassador here’. Kubisch continued:

62 Report by the President’s Personal Emissary to Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus (Clifford) to President Carter, Washington, 1 March 1977, Attachment: Ankara Report, 24 February 1977, FRUS, Vol. XXI, doc. 8. 63 Summary of Conclusion of a Policy Review Committee Meeting on ‘Cyprus and the

Aegean’, Washington, 10 February 1977, FRUS, Vol. XXI, doc. 6. 64 Report by the President’s Personal Emissary to Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus (Clifford) to President Carter, Washington, 1 March 1977, FRUS, Vol. XXI, doc. 8. 65 Report by the President’s Personal Emissary to Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus (Clifford) to President Carter, Washington, 1 March 1977, Attachment: Nicosia Report, 26 February 1977, FRUS, Vol. XXI, doc. 8.

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After two and a half years of living in an environment characterized by hostility, resentment, and bitterness against Americans (although progressively less so during the period), it was a personal pleasure for me to see the friendly waves and spontaneous applause as I moved around the city [Athens] with Clifford to our various meetings and visits. The public, press, radio, and TV reaction was almost universally favorable and the personal warmth and empathy that marked Clifford’s meetings with Prime Minister Caramanlis [sic] and other top Greek officials will be an asset for a long time to come.66

Top-level governmental US officials had virtually been unable to visit Greece since the political changes that had taken place in the country. In preparation for a visit to the region Kissinger stated that he simply could not land in Athens without causing a riot. The Clifford mission put an end to such a perception. The Greek government was equally satisfied with the mission since Carter’s early initiative fitted well with the Karamanlis government’s objectives.

… Meet Athens’ Objectives The Greek government welcomed the Clifford mission as a manifestation of Washington’s commitment to playing a continuous role in Greek– Turkish disputes. The Greek government not only expressed its support for Washington’s initiative, it also undertook concrete steps to secure the mission’s success. While the mission was being planned, the Greek government appealed to the Cypriot President Archbishop Makarios to ensure that he too welcomed the Clifford mission.67 The visit and its success fitted well with Athens’ intention to accommodate when it came to Greek–US and Greek–Turkish issues. Following the election of Carter the Greek Ambassador warned his government of the view amongst certain unnamed circles in Washington that ‘now the Greeks would be unmanageable’.68 Senators with close links to the Greek Embassy such as Sarbanes and Kennedy emphasised the time was ripe

66 NARA, RG 59, Electronic Telegrams 1977, Kubisch, tel. 1656 Athens to State, 22 February 1977. 67 CGKF, CKP, Folder 7B, Bitsios, tel. YOI-25 MFA to Nicosia, 13 January 1977. 68 CGKF, CKP, Folder 25B, Alexandrakis, Letter A.E. 2223.31/A495 from the Greek

Embassy in Washington to MFA, 22 December 1976.

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for the Greek government to demonstrate its goodwill without delay and come to the negotiating table regarding the country’s position in NATO or on Cyprus with reasonable proposals.69 Senator Sarbanes in particular reminded Ambassador Alexandrakis of the group’s meeting with Vance and his assessment of the US administration’s intentions. Sarbanes presented himself as the originator of the idea of dispatching a special envoy to the region. The Senator urged the Greek and Greek-Cypriot governments to present detailed proposals about future negotiations and settlement of the Cyprus crisis.70 The Greek government seriously considered these suggestions. Against a background of expectations from their supporters on Capitol Hill, Athens and Nicosia projected a constructive stance.71 At the same time the Greek and Cypriot governments warned the new administration of the implications of an ill-timed repeal of the arms embargo or ratification of the Turkish–US DCA. Both remained the only tools available that could force Ankara to cooperate.72 In the meantime the Greek government pursued a broader agenda. Athens had been focussing increasingly on the Aegean dispute—especially since the 1976 crisis. In May 1977 Karamanlis met Carter for the first time at a bilateral meeting held during the NATO summit in London. In their talks Karamanlis argued that the Aegean dispute was of ‘direct interest of Greece and more dangerous’ than Cyprus.73 While he explained the Greek position as best he could, the meeting that was barely

69 CGKF, CKP, Folder 27B, Alexandrakis, Letter 2223.31/6/A467 from the Greek Embassy in Washington to MFA, 1 December 1976. 70 CGKF, CKP, Folder 7B, Bitsios, tel. YOI-25 MFA to Nicosia, 13 January 1977. Note

the telegram quotes Alexandrakis’ message about his meeting with Sarbanes, Rosenthal, and Brademas. 71 For the Cypriot perspective on the Clifford mission and developments up until Makarios’ death see Makarios Drousiotis, K´ π ρ oς 1974–1977: H Eισ β oλη´ και oι Mεγ αλες ´ Δυν αμεις-H ´ realpolitik τ ων HΠ A και τ o διπ λ´o π αιχ ν´ιδι τ ης EΣΣΔ [Cyprus 1974– 1977: The Invasion and the Great Powers—The Realpolitik of the USA and the Double Game of the USSR] (Nicosia: Alfadi, 2014), Chapter 8. 72 CGKF, CKP, Folder 7B, Bitsios, tel. YOI-104 MFA to Nicosia, 15 February 1977, No creator name [possible Greek MFA for internal use], Note on what Makarios intended to say to Clifford, 16 February 1977. 73 Memorandum of Conversation, ‘President’s meeting with Prime Minister Caramanlis [sic]’, London, 10 May 1977, FRUS, Vol. XXI, doc. 166.

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half an hour long did not provide adequate time for a detailed presentation of Greek considerations and concerns. However, Clifford’s visit to Athens did. Prime Minister Karamanlis insisted that the Greek state was under constant threat not only from the communist bloc but also from a fellow NATO ally. This was the reason Greece needed a new explicit commitment from the United States to intervene in the case of aggression. Such a commitment would reinforce Kissinger’s 1976 previous assurance against acts of aggression in the Aegean. This request originated from a suggestion made by Ambassador Alexandrakis a few months earlier. Immediately following Carter’s victory the Greek Ambassador in Washington commented on Kissinger’s letter of 15 April 1976 regarding US opposition to actions of violence in the Aegean. The Ambassador suggested that ‘an attempt to improve that text [Kissinger’s letter]’ should be made. A stronger US commitment to peace in the region was likely in light of ‘the new President’s focus on morality in dealing with international problems’.74 Karamanlis argued that the possibility of a Greek–Turkish war remained, even though any such confrontation would likely start by accident.75 His presentation made a strong impact on Clifford convincing him that the danger was real and Greek concerns were sincere. In a follow-up session with Vance back in Washington, Clifford noted that ‘this emotion [inspired by Turkish expansionist policy] coming from the impressive and moderate Caramanlis [sic] had been noteworthy’.76 Similarly, when discussing Greek–Turkish disputes with Prime Minister Demirel during his Ankara visit, Clifford emphasised Greece’s apprehension regarding Turkey’s position.77 Washington appreciated that Greek concern about Turkish expansionism was genuine.

74 CGKF, CKP, Folder 7B, Alexandrakis, Letter .222.31/69/A470 from the Greek Embassy in Washington to MFA, 30 November 1976. 75 Memorandum of Conversation, Karamanlis and Clifford, 18 February 1977, in Svolopoulos (ed.), Karamanlis, Vol. 9, 391. 76 Memorandum of Conversation, ‘Report by Clark Clifford on his mission to the Eastern Mediterranean’, Participants: The Secretary, Clifford et al., Washington, 2 March 1977, FRUS, Vol. XXI, doc. 9. 77 Report by the President’s Personal Emissary to Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus (Clifford) to President Carter, Washington, 1 March 1977, Attachment: Ankara Report, FRUS, Vol. XXI, doc. 8.

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Although Clifford’s assessment of the Greek position was positive, the mission was not the complete success the White House wanted. The Greek government concluded that the incoming administration better understood the intricacies of problems facing the region and US responsibilities.78 The mission also allowed the Greek side to better comprehend Carter’s objectives. The US Department of State formally informed each ambassador of the substance of Clifford’s talks in their respective capitals.79 Based on contacts in Washington and reports from Ankara and Nicosia, Clifford maintained a hard line with the Turkish government. Clifford had insisted in his meeting with Turkish officials that the embargo could not be lifted without progress being made on Cyprus. Moving closer to a solution in Cyprus depended on Turkish concessions.80 Moreover, Washington expected cooperation from Greece. However, the Greek ambassador in Nicosia concluded that the US commitment to the arms embargo was time limited and would not stay in place indefinitely.81 Despite performing what could be described as a listening exercise and uttering some comforting words, Clifford did not offer anything concrete overall. Foreign Minister Bitsios was the most vocal of the Greek decisionmakers and the most critical of the mission’s shortcomings and the new administration. Although he applauded the policy ‘lines’ of Carter as different from the previous administration and being complimentary to Greek interests, there was not much in terms of substance that the Presidential Emissary brought with him. For example, despite Bitsios raising a question about the capabilities of the Turkish Aegean Army with US officials, the US team simply repeated Turkey’s official statement that the new army had limited capabilities. Bitsios lambasted the answer since it was widely known that US intelligence agencies knew the exact strength of the military formation and whether it was capable of threatening the Greek Islands. Why did Washington take Ankara at its word? For Bitsios 78 CGKF, CKP, Folder 7B, Averoff, tel. A112 MFA to Washington, 25 February 1977. 79 CGKF, CKP, Folder 7B, Alexandrakis, tel. 71 Washington to MFA, 4 March 1977, and Alexandrakis, tel. 66E.X. Washington to MFA, 9 March 1977. 80 CGKF, CKP, Folder 7B, Averoff, tel. A112 MFA to Washington, 25 February 1977, and Alexandrakis, tel. A71 Washington to MFA, 3 March 1977. 81 CGKF, CKP, Folder 7B, Dountas, tel. A..429EX Nicosia to MFA, 25 February 1977.

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there remained a big question mark over US policies towards Greece and Turkey and over whether any change in rhetoric would materialise.82 The Clifford mission marked the start of a period of intensive Greek– US contact regarding the Greek DCA and Cyprus negotiations. In the following months Washington and Athens focussed on two issues: the sixth round of intercommunal negotiations regarding Cyprus in Vienna conducted under the auspices of the UN Secretary General Kurt Waldheim between 31 March and 7 April and the resumption of Greek–US negotiations on US bases.

Another Failed Cyprus Negotiation Negotiations between Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot representatives continued. The sixth round of negotiations has a special significance considering Carter’s initiatives and the re-evaluation of US policy towards Cyprus, Greece, and Turkey. The outcome of the talks could determine the fate of the arms embargo and/or the Turkish–US DCA. Consequently, the Greek government was not interested in limited or unsubstantial progress. Nor was it—or the Greek side more generally— willing to appear as the reason for a potential breakdown of the talks. For the same reasons the United States paid the closest attention to this round of talks ever since Kissinger’s efforts to reconcile the two sides’ positions in 1975. In early 1977 Athens and Nicosia coordinated their positions in readiness for the forthcoming Vienna negotiations. The Greek Ambassador in Nicosia reported that Makarios was prepared to adopt a conciliatory stance with Clifford. Makarios had begun to shift his hardcore approach to the Turkish-Cypriot leader in their bilateral meetings. He confirmed to the Greek Ambassador that he aimed to alter and dispel perceptions of himself as a hardcore negotiator and the main obstacle to progress.83 In any future Cyprus settlement Makarios intended to accept a bizonal or bicommunal federation. This moved away from his earlier insistence on a multi-regional federation. He now advocated the return of a limited number of refugees to a Turkish-controlled area that had to cover no

82 CGKF, CKP, Folder 7B, Bitsios, tel. YOI-140 MFA to Washington, 10 March 1977. 83 CGKF, CKP, Folder 7B, Dountas, tel. A..356 Nicosia to MFA, 14 February 1977.

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more than 25% of the island’s territory.84 It was a promise that Makarios kept in his meeting with Clifford.85 Clifford was very appreciative of the Greek-Cypriot leader’s stance.86 The Greek-Cypriot proposals at the Vienna talks reflected Makarios’ position.87 It was a significant sacrifice that was not reciprocated by the Turkish-Cypriot side. The Turkish-Cypriot proposals disappointed the Greek and Cypriot governments.88 In Vienna the Turkish side demanded new territorial arrangements and envisaged a loose confederation between the two communities. The proposals ran contrary to earlier agreements between Makarios and Denktash.89 Although their rejection was inevitable, it was in Athens’ interest to dispel any doubt within the White House and on Capitol Hill that the Turkish side was to blame for the breakdown in talks in Vienna, particularly in light of the forthcoming White House proposals for military aid to Turkey. The US administration intended to request additional aid for Turkey in the 1978 fiscal year of $50 million. This compared with the provisions of the previous administration that had offered a total of $170 million in credit sales. Through Ambassador Alexandrakis the Greek government questioned the motives of the administration in offering economic assistance to Turkey given the lack of progress in efforts to defuse Greek– Turkish disputes or the Cyprus problem. Clifford defended his own proposal by responding that the additional aid for Turkey represented middle ground between what Ankara was asking and what Washington was prepared to give, as well as a means of encouraging the Turkish government to do more to secure a successful outcome on the open 84 CGKF, CKP, Folder 7B, Dountas, tel. A..356EX Nicosia to MFA, 14 February 1977, and Summary of the key points of Makarios’ presentation to Clifford, 16 February 1977. 85 Memorandum of Conversation, Makarios with Clifford, 24 February 1977, FRUS, Vol. XXI, doc. 32. 86 CGKF, CKP, Folder 7B, Dountas, tel. A..A429EX Nicosia to MFA, 25 February 1977. 87 See CGKF, CKP, Folder 7B, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Cyprus [problem], 6 May

1977, and a longer paper dated 15 June 1977. The two papers provide an overall account of the talks that took place in Vienna between 31 March and 7 April 1977. 88 CGKF, CKP, Folder 7B, Papadopoulos, tel. 120/41/284 Vienna to MFA, 31 March 1977. 89 CGKF, CKP, Folder 7B, Papadopoulos, tel. 120/43/287 Vienna to MFA, 1 April 1977.

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issues between Greece and Turkey. Clifford added that regarding the key Turkish demand for the DCA to be ratified, ‘we [the US] should reserve our decision on the DCA. Future developments will determine our decisions’.90 A day earlier US Ambassador to Athens Jack Kubisch had expressed a similar line in which the White House chose not to support ratification of the Turkish DCA despite conflicting views within the administration.91 The implications here were by adopting this stance Washington remained committed to seeing Turkey do more toward making progress in Cyprus. Despite these assurances the Greek Embassy in Washington warned Athens that the US administration intended to use anything that could be seen as positive in the Turkish responses in Vienna to pressure Congress to support the amount sought.92 Foreign Minister Bitsios instructed the Greek diplomatic services to ensure that the White House understood the substantive reasons behind Greek objections to Turkish proposals.93 The Greek government felt there was a danger Washington would try to put the blame for the breakdown of negotiations on the Greek and Turkish-Cypriot representatives.94 The Vienna talks provided a rare opportunity to work out exactly who were the US individuals responsible for Greek-related issues. Instead of expressing its concerns to special observer for the United States Nelson Ledsky who participated in the proceedings in Vienna, the Greek government chose to maintain a direct channel with the administration through the US Embassy in Athens and the Greek Embassy in Washington. Ledsky was not trusted since he had served under Kissinger. In discussions with the Greek Ambassador in Vienna, Ledsky advocated the possibility of Greek–Turkish co-exploitation of the Aegean’s resources. This was an unacceptable proposal for the Greek government despite being made unofficially. Bitsios commented that such ideas could only advance Turkish intransigence in the Aegean dispute. Moreover, Ledsky’s 90 CGKF, CKP, Folder 7B, Alexandrakis, tel. 76E.X. Washington to MFA, 17 March 1977. 91 CGKF, CKP, Folder 7B, Alexandrakis, tel. 75E.X. Washington to MFA, 17 March 1977. 92 CGKF, CKP, Folder 7B, Alexandrakis, tel. 76E.X. Washington to MFA, 17 March 1977. 93 CGKF, CKP, Folder 7B, Bitsios, tel. YOI-188 MFA to Vienna, 1 April 1977. 94 CGKF, CKP, Folder 7B, Bitsios, tel. 191 MFA to Washington, 4 April 1977.

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views proved the need to have close contacts with new members of the Carter administration such as Nimetz to ensure that ‘former aides to Kissinger don’t make decisions’, as Bitsios noted.95 This was further testament of the Greeks’ long-held mistrust of the former Secretary of State. Greek emphasis on all aspects of the negotiations centred on Clifford who seemed closer to Greek views.96 However, it would be a mistake to assume that Clifford unconditionally supported Greece. For example, overviewing the Vienna negotiations with the Greek Ambassador, Clifford appeared disappointed by both sides’ proposals.97 Nevertheless, Athens considered him more trustworthy and unbiased; it was through him therefore that the Greeks wanted Carter to receive their views. So, another round of Cyprus negotiations had achieved very little. The impact of the failure in Vienna was immediate. Although the administration remained committed to the need for increased aid to be made available for Turkey along the lines that Clifford had indicated, the aid package remained below the annual $250 million budget provided for the Turkish DCA.98 Congress rejected the administration’s suggestions and reduced the provisions for Turkey further. Turkey had not done enough. The administration’s effort to reassure Turkey failed and the Turks remained sceptical of Carter. The breakdown of talks called for reconsideration of the administration’s approach towards Turkey and by definition towards the Eastern Mediterranean. From his position at the NSC, Henze concluded that: … rather than simply keep listening to the pleadings of those who are lobbying their own special cause, the Administration should generate support for its own position on Greek–Turkish aid and its Eastern Mediterranean strategy. It can put itself in a much stronger position than the

95 CGKF, CKP, Folder 7B, Bitsios, tel. 191 MFA to Washington, 4 April 1977, and Bitsios, tel. 192 MFA to Washington, 4 April 1977. 96 CGKF, CKP, Folder 7B, Bitsios, tel. YOI-190 MFA to Vienna, 4 April 1977. 97 CGKF, CKP, Folder 7B, Alexandrakis, tel. 115E.X. Washington to MFA, 7 April

1977. 98 Memorandum from the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter, ‘Security Assistance for Turkey and Greece’, Washington, 18 April 1977, FRUS, Vol. XXI, doc. 12.

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previous Administration was. The Administration needs to take the initiative into its own hands instead of continually finding itself responding to Greek Lobby demarches.99

The administration decided not to alter its approach at this stage. The focus remained on the second element of the US strategy designed to secure ratification of the Turkish DCA at any stage. This meant making progress towards concluding the Greek–US DCA with the Greek government by doing whatever was necessary.

Greek--US DCA Negotiations In the meantime the Greek–US DCA gained momentum. At their final meeting in Athens, Bitsios cited the Greek government’s readiness to resume negotiations in late March. Present at the meeting between Bitsios and Clifford were the principal members of the Greek negotiating team: Macheritsas who supported the new head of the Greek delegation and another high-ranking official in the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs Spyros Chrisospathis. The two detailed the main points of contention regarding any future agreement. Their choice to raise contentious issues with Clifford benefitted the talks. The top level of the US administration then became aware of the significance the Greek government attached to seemingly insignificant requests. Moreover, Bitsios emphasised that the ‘take it or leave it’ approach of the US negotiators had so far been an obstacle to making progress in the talks.100 It was a crucial element that the US administration from then on strove to avoid. The Greek government’s decision to delay ratification until after the elections appeared to be fully justified. The Greek team noted that the US delegation in the first round of talks that finished on 22 April 1977 was ready to accept central Greek requests such as those relating purely to technical details and to matters of practical Greek control over the bases.

99 Jimmy Carter Presidential Library [hereafter JCPL], National Security Affairs, Collection 27, Staff Material [hereafter NSA Staff], Horn/Special, Box 1, Henze, Action Memorandum, 25 April 1977. 100 CGKF, CKP, Folder 7B, Memorandum of Conversation, Bitsios, Clifford et al., 18 February 1977.

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Athens viewed the latter as an essential issue.101 In his report to Bitsios particular emphasis was put by Chrisospathis on the need for: … the Americans to demonstrate goodwill in reaching an agreement that will be satisfactory to both sides. While initially insisting on [us] answering basic questions, […] they eventually agreed with our approach. This approach was that the Greek side would not provide explicit answers until the two sides discussed the broader aspects of all issues under negotiation.102

The first phase of negotiations was completed on 19 May 1977 to Greek satisfaction with five of the eight issues obstructing progress resolved. Once again the Greek government was impressed by the ‘great deal of flexibility’ that the US side demonstrated, particularly when contrasted with the previous administration.103 The two sides entered into the final phase of negotiations in June 1977. Considering the US administration’s strategy its delegation’s stance is not surprising. Securing an agreement was necessary to secure broader challenges involving the Southern Flank of NATO. While agreement at all costs does not appear to have been the US administration’s policy, Greece’s insistence on what the United States considered minor issues endangered such broader aims. For example, when the two sides argued over a few million dollars of additional aid the Greeks had requested, Henze stressed that the administration should focus on its long-term interests. Contrary to Office of Management and Budget (OMB) objections about this request Henze strongly advised Brzezinski of the need to accept Greek demands. He added that: … if we go on hassling with the Greeks for months about this $20 million FMS [Foreign Military Sales] credit […] we may never bring the DCA negotiations to an end, thus complicating the whole process of getting Greek–Turkish–Cyprus issues behind us.104 101 CGKF, CKP, Folder 27B, Chrisospathis, Note for the Minister ‘Negotiations for the Conclusion of a New Greek–US Defence Agreement’, 23 April 1977. 102 CGKF, CKP, Folder 27B, Chrisospathis, Note for the Minister ‘Negotiations for the Conclusion of a New Greek–US Defence Agreement’, 20 April 1976. 103 CGKF, CKP, Folder 27B, Chrisospathis, Letter 2203.253/1/AS1262 ‘Greek–US Defence Cooperation Agreement’, 21 May 1977. 104 JCPL, NSA Staff, Horn/Special Box 1, Henze, Action Memorandum for Z. Brzezinski: Additional Military Assistance to Further Greek–US DCA negotiations, 31 May 1977.

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Carter was closer to the OMB view but he only accepted it on the condition that acquiescing would help to conclude the negotiations.105 The climate in which the talks took place was such that progress was rapid. The two teams agreed on any open issues that remained on 11 July 1977. The Greeks were pleased that the agreement appeared to be superior to the Turkish one on some issues even though they were minor. The Greek government would be able to request that some of the $700 million that it would receive as part of the agreement be used for existing purchases—a capability that Ankara lacked.106 On 18 July 1977 the two chief negotiators concluded the texts of the final agreements in Athens.

Stalemate Again Conclusion of the Greek DCA proved to be the last positive development of 1977. The Greek government had yet to bring the agreement to parliament for a vote. Karamanlis did not give any indication of when he planned to do this until early autumn. However, it was not only Greece’s protracted stance on the DCA that stood in the way of progress—as the Carter administration anticipated would be made—in the Eastern Mediterranean. Turkey had entered another period of domestic instability. Put more accurately its general election in June failed to return a stable government. Neither of Turkey’s main parties—Demirel’s Justice Party (JP) and Ecevit’s Republican People’s Party (RPP)—secured an outright majority in the Turkish parliament. The RPP came first in the popular vote and won 213 seats, just short of a majority. Polling before the election raised hope that Ecevit could return to power. Washington and Athens perceived Ecevit as the Turkish leader able to agree to a Cyprus settlement primarily because he had been the leader who ordered the 1974 invasion. After the election and without support from minor parties it became clear that he could not form a government. Demirel led Turkey’s second national front coalition government with the help of smaller right-wing and nationalist

105 Memorandum from the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (Lance) and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter, Washington, 26 May 1977, FRUS, Vol. XXI, doc. 167. 106 CGKF, CKP, Folder 27B, Chrisospathis, Note on ‘Negotiations for the New Greek– US Defence Agreement’, 11 July 1977.

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parties.107 After the election Demirel projected a non-compromising attitude on Cyprus. His government stressed its rejection of any intent to bow to US and Greek pressures to compromise on reaching a settlement. The US State Department recognised the political game Demirel was playing in making such statements. Demirel could use such rhetoric to set the stage for concessions at a later point. The staunch uncompromising rhetoric he used also reflected the delicate balance of power within the Turkish coalition. The support and participation of nationalist parties in government limited its room for manoeuvre in Cyprus.108 Internal compromises and the inherent weakness of the new government meant it remained unable to deal with major domestic political and economic pressures—let alone foreign policy issues. Henze predicted in April 1977 that no progress would be made if the forthcoming elections returned an unstable government. Similarly, he warned that the deadlock on Cyprus would continue since the Greek government was also headed to the polls. When he wrote his memorandum for Brzezinski, Henze anticipated the Greek elections would be scheduled for late 1978.109 In early September 1977 Karamanlis decided on an early general election at the end of the year. The prospect of decisive progress on any aspects of Greek–Turkish–US relations became more distant. The unexpected death of Archbishop Makarios further challenged Washington’s planning. Makarios died of a heart attack on 3 August 1977 in Nicosia.110 He was considered the only Cypriot leader capable of progressing intercommunal negotiations. Securing his support for compromise remained instrumental to Carter’s effort to break the deadlock on Cyprus. It was widely believed that only he could guide the

107 C. H. Dodd, The Crisis of Turkish Democracy, 2nd enlarged ed. (Huntingdon: Eothen Press, 1990), 19–20. 108 JCPL, NSA, Brzezinski Material, President’s Daily Report File [hereafter PDRF],

Box 3, The Situation Room, Memorandum for Brzezinski, 29 July 1977 and 24 August 1977. 109 JCPL, NSA Staff, Horn/Special Box 1, Henze, Action Memorandum: Turkish Aid and Greek Lobby Objections, 23 April 1977. 110 Announcement of Makarios’ death and Karamanlis’ statement, 3 August 1977, in Svolopoulos (ed.), Karamanlis, Vol. 9, 491.

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Greek-Cypriot community to accept otherwise unacceptable compromises and concessions.111 His death raised a question over the legal status of his successor. Makarios had served as the last elected Cypriot President of the Republic before the 1974 invasion. He remained the internationally recognised President of Cyprus. The succession process offered Turkey the opportunity to challenge this. Turkish-Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash argued that Makarios’ successor could only represent the Greek-Cypriot community. Denktash sought to capitalise on the development in an effort to strengthen his standing. He wanted parity between his proclaimed ‘Turkish Federal State of Cyprus’ and the Cypriot Republic. He underlined his opposition to negotiations should the international community recognise Makarios’ successor as President of the Republic. The Turkish government supported Denktash’s hard-line stance. Foreign Minister Ça˘glayangil reiterated that the new Cypriot President would merely represent the Greek-Cypriot community. Nothing in the Turkish rhetoric marked any departure from its previous attitude. Makarios’ death complicated the intercommunal process. The status of the two communities in a revised constitution had been a thorny issue in the negotiations. Turkey once again sought to solve it unilaterally by insisting against a new round of intercommunal talks no earlier than the scheduled 1978 Presidential election on the island thus complicating Washington’s planning.112 The final straw as far as Washington’s expectations were concerned was Karamanlis’ decision to call a general election a year earlier than constitutionally mandated. Karamanlis justified his decision by saying there was an urgent need for renewal of the popular mandate for the government. He claimed that the Greek government in the following year (1978) was required to make decisions on national issues such as the Greek– Turkish dispute over the Aegean, the Cyprus negotiations, the Greek–US DCA, and Greece’s application for EEC membership.113 The government

111 Karamanlis’ meeting with Clifford, 18 February 1977, in Svolopoulos (ed.), Karamanlis, Vol. 9, 390. 112 JCPL, NSA, Brzezinski Material, PDRF, Box 3, The Situation Room, Memorandum for Bill Hyland, 9 August 1977, and The Situation Room, Memorandum for Brzezinski, 25 August 1977, and The Situation Room, Memorandum for Brzezinski, 24 August 1977. 113 G. N. Drosos, ‘ιατ´ι γ´ινoνται oι εκλoγšς; Tι Kρβεται ´ π´ισω απ´o την επ´ισπευση´ τoυς κατα´ δωδεκα ´ oλ´oκληρoυς μηνες ´ [Why Elections? What Is Hidden behind the

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scheduled the elections for the coming November. A few weeks later the election campaign started in Greece. This meant no progress could be made on issues related to US policy towards Greece and Turkey in the first nine months of the Carter administration. Any progress would have to wait until after the Greek election.

New President, Old Dilemmas The first period of the Carter Presidency brought Greece and the United States closer. Carter was deemed pro-Greek by the Greek public. His election spelled the end of Kissinger’s grip on foreign policy. The Greek press kept a close eye on whether the new administration held meetings with the former Secretary of State. The easing of anti-Americanism might enable the Greek government to move closer to the United States—something that concluding the DCA would signal. Alternatively, it might be that the Greek government simply did not have any reason to anticipate better treatment from the US negotiators. The latter meant it had little choice but to work with the new administration rather than further delay decisions such as the Greek DCA. It was also true that the election of Carter on its own did not persuade Karamanlis to move decisively closer to the United States. Although Greek and US negotiators concluded a new DCA, the Greek government viewed it as unable to be ratified before it secured another term in power. Relations with the United States remained a politically sensitive question in Greece. In terms of US policy towards Greece and Turkey Carter’s election did not bring the significant change that Athens had hoped for or that Ankara had feared. Carter followed the US Eastern Mediterranean policy largely defined by Kissinger’s balanced approach towards Greece and Turkey. The new administration opted to allay Turkish fears of an alleged US proGreece stance. Nonetheless, the Carter administration’s attitude toward the Greek–US DCA negotiations and the Cyprus problem satisfied the Greek government. Washington proved more receptive to Greek requests regarding the US bases. The Greek government was satisfied with Washington emphasising the need for Turkey to come up with initiatives on Cyprus much more so than had happened with the previous Republican Decision to Call Elections 12 Months Early]’, Kathimerini, 25 September 1977, 5; Karamanlis’ statement to Cabinet and Karamanlis’ letter to the President of the Republic, 20 September 1977, in Svolopoulos (ed.), Karamanlis, Vol. 9, 506.

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administration. The first six months of the new administration showed that Athens’ bet on Carter appeared to be justified. However, broader US goals in the Eastern Mediterranean suffered, while Turkish suspicions about Carter remained. Similarly, progress on Cyprus, which constituted a prerequisite for Congressional action on the DCA, was lacking. The US administration envisaged greater progress on these issues after the Greek elections. Unfortunately for Washington internal developments in both Greece and Turkey proved that such expectations were unfounded.

CHAPTER 6

Changing Course: Repealing the Turkish Arms Embargo

President Carter’s request for Congress to repeal the Turkish arms embargo dominated Greek–US relations throughout 1978. The request contradicted Carter’s campaign promises. There had not been any visible progress towards a settlement on Cyprus or a clear path towards one. Thus, the decision is justifiably seen as Carter’s conversion to Kissinger’s realpolitik and power politics.1 However, this decision reflected the challenges and changes that US policy faced. Repeal of the arms embargo was necessary for broader and regional contexts. It coincided with a shift in Carter’s foreign policy in which geopolitics played a greater role.2 In terms of US Eastern Mediterranean policy the decision represented another reiteration of Washington’s efforts to secure relations with both Greece and Turkey. From late 1977 on the governments of Greece and Turkey prioritised domestic considerations that were incompatible with any significant progress on Cyprus or the DCAs. The previous route mapped out to improve Greek–US and Turkish–US relations was no longer viable. The Carter administration

1 Chris Ioannides, Realpolitik in the Eastern Mediterranean: From Kissinger and the Cyprus Crisis to Carter and the Lifting of the Turkish Arms Embargo (New York: Pella, 2001), 305. 2 Barbara Zanchetta, The Transformation of American International Power in the 1970s (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 220.

© The Author(s) 2020 A. Antonopoulos, Redefining Greek–US Relations, 1974–1980, Security, Conflict and Cooperation in the Contemporary World, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-47656-4_6

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concluded that repealing the Turkish arms embargo was the only option available. In terms of Greek–US relations the decision marked a return to confrontation. The Greek government resorted to its confrontational strategy partly to prevent the repeal but mainly to retain some of the benefits. Athens was under no illusion that the legislation had reached its time limit. Therefore, in contrast with the strategy of confrontation used in the years of Ford and Kissinger, during the Carter administration Greece aimed to retain what Athens had achieved previously. It was a defensive and challenging strategy. A Democrat-controlled US Congress was less interested in confronting a Democratic administration. This reality meant that Athens had to re-evaluate its approach and its expectations. Although 1978 marked a return to confrontation, the Greek government and the US administration displayed a much more flexible approach and willingness to compromise than they had during Kissinger’s time at the helm of US foreign policy. Athens and Washington recognised their differences but decided to work closely despite them. Neither side aimed at achieving total prevalence over the other. Such a shared attitude ensured Greek–US relations remained close on other matters of mutual interest once the arms embargo had been repealed.

Progress at Last? In autumn 1977 Washington felt there was a good chance of breaking the stalemate that had dominated the Cyprus–Greece–Turkey triangle since the previous summer. In Nicosia Spiros Kyprianou succeeded Archbishop Makarios on 3 September 1977 as President of the Republic. The new Cypriot leadership met the Carter administration in New York during the annual opening of the UN General Assembly (UNGA). It was here that Kyprianou reported the Cypriot government’s preparedness to resume intercommunal talks with the Turkish-Cypriot side. However, he emphasised the need to avoid another futile round of talks. As far as Nicosia was concerned substantive progress in any intercommunal talks depended on Ankara’s stance.3

3 Memorandum of Conversation, ‘The Secretary’s Meeting with the Cypriot President Kyprianou’, New York, 1 October 1977, in David Zierler and Adam M. Howard (eds), Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977 –1980 [hereafter FRUS], Vol. XXI, Greece; Cyprus; Turkey (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2014), doc. 43.

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Around the same time the Turkish government signalled its willingness to take the steps necessary for progress to be made on Cyprus and move closer to a settlement. This willingness was reported by National Security Advisor (NSA) Zbigniew Brzezinski to Carter. The change reflected renewed Turkish interest in pushing for speedy approval of the Turkish–US Defence Cooperation Agreement (DCA). The DCA could be a solution to the myriad political and economic challenges that the Süleyman Demirel government faced. For example, the Turkish military pressed the government to secure the agreement with the United States as soon as possible. The new DCA offered vital resources at a time ˙ of economic weakness. Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Ihsan Sabri Ça˘glayangil signalled Ankara’s intention to undertake goodwill gestures on Cyprus that could persuade the US Congress to ratify the agreement. Such gestures could have included reducing the size of the Turkish air force on Cyprus and civilianisation of the main airport in the Turkishcontrolled zone.4 Turkey anticipated a positive response from Greece that it viewed as another actor in the Cyprus negotiations. The Greek position was more complex with Athens unable and unwilling to influence the stance of the legitimate Cypriot administration. In autumn 1977 Greece was preparing for a general election. Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs Dimitrios Bitsios, who met US Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance and Presidential Emissary Clark Clifford at the UNGA, claimed that the Greek government remained interested in advancing a Cyprus solution and easing Greek–Turkish tensions. Although the Greek government did not intend to play a direct role in the Cyprus negotiations as Turkey wanted, Bitsios implied Athens would react positively and potentially support ‘serious’ Turkish proposals. The Greek government deferred any decision or action on foreign policy matters such as ratification of the Greek–US DCA until after the November election. Prime Minister Constantine Karamanlis justified the request for an early election on the grounds of pending decisions on foreign policy issues. Bitsios underlined further the expectation that the new Karamanlis’

4 Jimmy Carter Presidential Library [hereafter JCPL], National Security Affairs [hereafter

NSA], Brzezinski Material, President’s Daily Report File [hereafter PDRF], Box 3, The Situation Room, Memorandum for Brzezinski, Evening Notes, 2 September 1977, and Box 4, Brzezinski for the President, 27 October 1977, and Brzezinski for the President, 11 November 1977; JCPL, Plains File, Subject File, State Department Evening Reports [hereafter SDER], Box 38, Vance, Memorandum for the President, 19 September 1977.

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government would be in a stronger position to take action on and play a role in the DCA, Cyprus, and the Aegean dispute after the election.5 Such developments convinced Vance and Clifford that progress in the Eastern Mediterranean remained a possibility before the end of 1977. Washington just had to build on the momentum and push all the parties to cooperate. All sides recognised that any initiative had to wait for the outcome of the Greek election.6 Therefore, all eyes were on Athens as the Greeks went to the polls on 20 November 1977. The Carter administration worked under the assumption of a Karamanlis victory. What is more, chargé d’affaires ad interim Hawthorne Q. Mills at the US Embassy in Athens expected another strong majority for the New Democracy (ND) conservative party. Based on this analysis Washington expected the returning Greek government to feel empowered to take perhaps unpopular decisions on policy matters relevant to the Greece–Turkey–Cyprus triangle. Most importantly, the Greek government would be in a position to respond positively to any Turkish gestures of goodwill in Cyprus or relating to the Aegean dispute. At the very least, as Zbigniew Brzezinski put it to the President, with Karamanlis returning to power he would likely sign the Greek–US DCA and might even move Greece back to full NATO participation. Brzezinski expected Karamanlis’ share of the popular vote to remain much the same as the result he secured back in 1974, which was more than half of all votes cast.7 The results of the election proved Brzezinski and the US diplomatic service had been overoptimistic.

5 Memorandum of Conversation, ‘The Secretary’s Meeting with Greek Foreign Minister Bitsios’, Greek Participants: Foreign Minister Bitsios and Ambassador Alexandrakis, US Participants: Secretary Vance, Undersecretary Habib, Matthew Nimetz et al., New York, 29 September 1977, FRUS, Vol. XXI, doc. 169; Memorandum of Conversation, Secretary’s Clifford’s Meeting with Greek Foreign Minister Bitsios’, New York, 3 October 1977, FRUS, Vol. XXI, doc. 170. 6 Memorandum from Henze to Brzezinski, 15 October 1977; Memorandum of Conversation, ‘Summary of the President’s Meeting with Clifford on Greece–Turkey–Cyprus’, 4 November 1977, FRUS, Vol. XXI, docs 15 and 16; JCPL, PDRF, Box 4, Brzezinski for the President, 3 November 1977. 7 JCPL, NSA, PDRF, Box 4, Brzezinski for the President, Information Items, 19 November 1977.

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A Changing Political Landscape Karamanlis won the 20 November 1977 general election. ND remained the largest party in the Greek parliament commanding a comfortable majority of 171 seats out of 300. However, Karamanlis’ party lost approximately 12% of the popular vote compared with the 1974 election. The 54% of the vote in 1974, though, was an unrealistically high result reflecting the public’s overwhelming support for Karamanlis as the restorer of democracy after the end of the dictatorship. It did not accurately reflect the strength of the conservative party in Greek society. Thus, a reduction in ND’s share of the vote was to be expected. However, the reduction in Karamanlis’ share of the vote was part of a broader picture of change in Greek party politics. The 1977 result delivered a blow to Greek moderates and pro-Western parties generally. The main opposition party, now called the Union of the Democratic Centre (EDIK), attracted only 12% of the popular vote. The party won only 16 seats in parliament—significantly fewer than the 60 seats it had before the election. In the past three years the party’s leading figure Georgios Mavros had maintained an overall pro-Western outlook. However, he strongly resisted Greece’s return to full NATO membership and condemned US policy. Mavros supported Greece’s accession to the EEC.8 When it came to relations with Turkey he adopted a moderate attitude. He condemned Turkey’s expansionism and activities in the Aegean but avoided inflammatory rhetoric during the 1976 Aegean crisis.9 The real winners of the 1977 election were parties that adopted a hard nationalistic line on foreign policy. The socialist party PASOK represented the most profound example in that it placed much emphasis on protecting Greek sovereignty as part of its campaign. PASOK saw an increase in its vote share finishing with 25% of the popular vote. The party elected 93 members to parliament thereby becoming the official opposition and government in waiting. PASOK complemented its socialist programme for the economy with strong nationalistic rhetoric on foreign policy.10

8 Richard Clogg, Parties and Elections in Greece: The Search for Legitimacy (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1987), 74. 9 Sotiris Rizas, Oι Eλλην oτ oυρκικ šς σ χ šσ εις και τ o Aιγ α´ιo, 1973–1976 [Greek– Turkish Relations and the Aegean, 1973–1976] (Athens: Sideris, 2006), 148. 10 Angelos Elephantis, ‘PASOK and the Elections of 1977: The Rise of the Populist Movement’, in Howard R. Penniman (ed.), Greece at the Polls: The National Elections of

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The leader of PASOK Andreas Papandreou had spent previous years challenging and criticising Karamanlis’ foreign policy from relations with the West to efforts for peaceful resolution to the Aegean dispute. Papandreou explicitly opposed the Greek–US DCA. Instead, he advocated the closure and removal of all US bases and military facilities in Greece. He campaigned in favour of leaving NATO entirely rather than securing a special relationship. Similarly, PASOK saw little benefit in EEC participation. Papandreou claimed that both NATO and the EEC threatened Greek independence.11 Finally, he opposed any compromise on Cyprus and the Aegean dispute. During a parliamentary debate in 1976 he condemned Karamanlis’ invitation to Ankara to submit the dispute to the International Court of Justice (ICJ). By proposing to take the dispute to the ICJ the government in his view acknowledged Ankara’s demands and relinquished Greek sovereign rights.12 During the 1976 Aegean crisis Papandreou uttered the infamous ‘sink the Hora’ slogan calling on the government to respond in a dynamic manner to Turkish violations.13 Apparently, the voting public approved of the positions he took. Another winner in the election was the small extreme-right-wing party the National Front (Ethike Parataxis or EP) that entered parliament for the first time. EP received approximately 7% of the popular vote and 5 seats. The foreign policy of EP appeared very complex partly because it was not well defined. Those who voted for EP consisted largely—if not exclusively—of supporters of the former dictatorship and the monarchy. Its support came mainly from ultra-right-wing voters such as army officers who opposed Karamanlis and the democratisation process.14 These army officers supported close Greek–US relations, full NATO participation, and even entry to the EEC. However, EP also promoted a strong line on 1974 and 1977 (Washington and London: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1981), 115. 11 Clogg, Parties and Elections, 138. 12 Debate on 17 April 1976, Eπ ι´σ ημα π ρακτ ικ α ´ τ ων σ υνεδριασ ´ εων τ ης Boυλης ´

[Official Record of the Greek Parliament] (Athens: Vouli ton Ellinon, 1976), Vol. 4, period from 18 March to 3 May 1976, 4502. 13 Modiano, ‘Turks Keep Oil Ship in Disputed Waters’, The Times, 9 August 1976, 4; Modiano, ‘Greece Seeks UN Aid over Aegean’, The Times, 10 August 1976, 1. 14 Yiannis Voulgaris, H Eλλαδα ´ τ ης μετ απ oλ´ιτ ευσ ης 1974–1990: Στ αθ ερ η´ Δημoκρατ ι´α, Σημαδεμšνη απ o´ τ η μετ απ oλεμικ η´ ισ τ oρ´ια [Greece of the Metapolifsi, 1974–1990: Stable Democracy Marked by Post-War History], 4th ed. (Athens: Themelio, 2008), 63.

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protecting national rights and interest against Turkish aggression both in Cyprus and the Aegean. What complicated the picture even more was that anti-American sentiments were not confined to left and extreme-left groups. Similar slogans and conspiracy theories about the United States also thrived within extreme-right circles and demonstrations.15 Washington thought the election result dealt a blow to Karamanlis. Although the early election was meant to strengthen his hand in the face of tough and perhaps unpopular decisions, Karamanlis emerged weaker. This meant greater risk-taking would be required to break the deadlock in Greek–Turkish relations.16 The US Embassy doubted the result would enable Karamanlis to pursue an ambitious new course on foreign policy. Rather than Karamanlis being able to take more risks the US Embassy anticipated he would continue with his customary cautious approach on controversial issues. The United States remained unpopular in Greece despite the beneficial impact the election of Carter had. Relations with the United States remained a sensitive issue even for the pro-Western Karamanlis. A few months before the election the Schaufele incident highlighted how precarious relations were and how sensitive the Greeks remained to any US missteps such as Carter’s appointment to the US Embassy in Greece of William E. Schaufele who made an unfortunate remark on the Aegean dispute. He claimed during his Senate hearing that it was the ‘unusual arrangements’ of the past between Greece and Turkey that caused the Aegean dispute. The Greek government considered his views contentious and too close to Turkish positions. Hence Athens objected to his accreditation. The Carter administration viewed the Greek reaction as over the top. Nevertheless, the US administration delayed and subsequently withdrew his appointment. Mills became the acting head of the embassy until the arrival of Ambassador Robert J. McCloskey in March 1978.17

15 Konstantina E. Botsiou, ‘Anti-Americanism in Greece’, in Brandon O’Connor (ed.), Anti-Americanism: History, Causes, and Themes, Vol. 3: Comparative Perspectives (Oxford: Greenwood World Publishing, 2007), 232. 16 JCPL, NSA, Collection 27, Staff Material [hereafter NSA Staff], Horn/Special, Box 1, Henze, Memorandum for Brzezinski, 21 November 1977; JCPL, PDRF, Box 4, Brzezinski for the President, 22 November 1977. 17 See details in Constantine Svolopoulos (ed.), Kωνσ τ αντ ι´ν oς Kαραμανλης ´ : αρχ ε´ιo, γ εγ oν o´ τ α, και κε´ιμενα [Constantine Karamanlis: archive, events and texts] [hereafter Karamanlis ] (Kathimerini: Athens, 2005), Vol. 9, 484.

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More telling of Athens’ continued reluctance to embrace Washington in public was Karamanlis’ stance on the campaign trail. He mainly avoided talking about Greek–US relations. When he did refer to the bilateral relationship, Karamanlis ‘resorted to the conservatives’ argument that Greece had no choice but to continue its ties to the West and the United States’.18 No political party advocated returning to full NATO membership immediately except perhaps the extreme right. It was against this background that US reports from Athens concluded that Karamanlis more likely than not would avoid any abrupt changes in his foreign policy and would continue with his past cautious policies. Fully cognisant of this background the US Embassy in Athens also argued that the Greek government read too much into the impact that foreign policy issues had on the election results. This was also true of PASOK’s success. Mills noted that foreign policy played a marginal role in the campaign and he believed that it was the economic message of PASOK that resonated with the Greek voters. PASOK advocated a generous social welfare economic programme that challenged the policies of the ND. Indeed, there were complex reasons for the success of PASOK including the problems the Greek economy faced.19 Even if the US Embassy was correct and domestic policies weighed more in Greek voters’ decisions to support PASOK, it did not lessen the impact the result had on Karamanlis and his leading circle. The ND party faced tough questions regarding its politico-economic orientation in the late 1970s. Since the Greek political landscape was changing the ND conservative party had to choose between transforming into a modern centre-right party or remaining as the only party expressing the traditional right. Karamanlis pushed the party firmly to the political centre. His choices were not without internal opposition or political risk. The internal conflict over progressive social welfare policies that ran the risk of alienating some of its traditional votes reflected this dilemma best. Taken together its foreign and domestic policies since 18 National Archives [hereafter NARA], General Records of Department of State, RG 59 [hereafter RG 59], Central Foreign Policy Files, 1973–1979, Electronic Telegrams [hereafter Electronic Telegrams] 1977, Mills, tel. 10811 Athens to State, 19 November 1977. 19 Voulgaris, Greece of the Metapolifsi, 92–93; Panos Kazakos, Aν αμεσ ´ α σ ε Kρ ατ ´ oς και Aγ oρ α: ´ Oικ oν oμ´ια και Oικ oν oμικ η´ π oλιτ ικ η´ σ τ ην Mετ απ oλεμικ η´ Eλλαδα, ´ 1944–2000 [Between State and Market: Economy and Fiscal Policy in Post-WAR Greece, 1944– 2000], 9th ed. (Athens: Patakis, 2010), 294–334.

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1974 had not only alienated some traditional voters it had also failed to win new ones. The election result disappointed Karamanlis and his closest aides.20 As a result the Greek government pursued more restrictive goals than it had in the three years between 1977 and 1981, perhaps unintentionally and unconsciously. The government’s priority became to consolidate progress achieved rather than pursuing a radical agenda in either domestic or foreign policy. Inevitably, such a reactive approach undermined Washington’s policy planning and expectations. While noting the disappointing result for Karamanlis, the US embassy took solace in the overall result. Mills identified a solid pro-Western core in Greek society. He noted that half the votes had gone to pro-Western, pro-NATO, and pro-US parties.21 This assessment included the ND party, the UDC party, and the New Liberals party of Constantine Mitsotakis that only stood in Crete. Although Mitsotakis’ party secured only 1% of the vote nationwide, it elected two members of parliament. Soon afterwards the party merged with ND and Mitsotakis became Minister of Coordination. The new Karamanlis government featured a mix of new and returning ministers with strong commitments to close relations with the United States and the West more generally. The important Ministry of National Defence remained in the hands of Evangelos Averoff-Tossitsa who was well respected in Washington. The Carter administration—much as its predecessors had done—continued to view Averoff as a staunchly proWestern and pro-US political figure and an important advocate of Greece’s return to full NATO participation. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs changed hands when career diplomat Dimitris Bitsios retired from active service after the election. The new minister Panayiotis Papaligouras had previously served as Minister of Coordination and was involved in EEC negotiations. Mills reported his appointment as representing Karamanlis’ greater emphasis on early conclusion of Greek negotiations for EEC membership. Mills also reported as positive the addition of two deputy ministers in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Andreas Zaimis 20 Evanthis Hatzivassiliou, Eλληνικ o´ ς Φιλελευθ ερισ μ´o: To ριζ oσ π ασ τ ικ o´ ρε  ´ μα, 1932–1979 [Greek Liberalism: The Radical Wave, 1932–1979] (Athens: Patakis, 2010), 484, 539. See also Takis Papas, Making Party Democracy in Greece (Basingstoke; New York, NY: MacMillan, 1999), esp. Chapter 6. 21 NARA, RG 59, Electronic Telegrams 1977, Mills, tel. 10584 Athens to State, 21 November 1977.

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and Andreas Andrianopoulos, who had strong pro-Western and pro-US credentials. Mills’ reports to the Department of State overall highlighted a sense of continuity between previous and current Karamanlis governments based on the undeniable fact that Karamanlis himself retained ultimate control over foreign policy decision-making, particularly on issues of interest to Washington.22 Whether this continuity served or challenged US interests remained to be seen. The election result in Greece did much to strengthen the need for Washington to play a direct role in the Eastern Mediterranean. However, questions remained about whether Karamanlis remained committed to previous plans or whether he was willing to take more initiatives on foreign policy issues. The US administration noted that the hard line on foreign policy issues probably fuelled Papandreou’s performance in the election and showed that Karamanlis intended to limit possible public criticism of his actions. Washington had to push hard if its hopes for progress were to succeed.

Hopes Dispelled The first post-election Greek–US meetings and contacts pointed to a changed attitude in Athens on shared matters of interest. In early December Vance reported to Carter an incident reflecting what he called a ‘striking’ change in the Greek position. State Department Counsellor Matthew Nimetz had had two meetings with Ambassador Menelaos Alexandrakis within days of each other. The first meeting just after the election represented continuity of the pre-election Greek stance. In that discussion Alexandrakis agreed with Nimetz that Ankara was showing it was willing to compromise on Cyprus, which could help the Greek side to respond positively. On other issues such as NATO Alexandrakis went as far as to suggest that Greece was ready to ‘sneak back into the NATO military structure’. However, in the second meeting shortly afterwards Alexandrakis condemned the Turkish proposals on Cyprus,

22 For the administration’s view of Averoff see JCPL, NSA, NSA Staff, Horn/Special,

Box 1, Christine Dodson, Memorandum for Denis Clift, 1 March 1978, attached to a memorandum from Peter Tarnoff, Department of State, to D. Clift, 28 February 1978, calling Averoff a ‘good friend of the United States’ and recommending meeting with the Vice President; NARA, RG 59, Electronic Telegrams 1977, Mills, tel. 10812 Athens to State, 29 November 1977, and Mills, tel. 10901 Athens to State, 2 December 1977.

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particularly regarding the possibility of four-party talks (i.e., between Greece, Turkey, and the two Cypriot communities). Talking about the prospect of ratifying the Greek–US DCA Alexandrakis indicated a further delay citing domestic political pressure following the election results. Vance commented that the contradictions in what Alexandrakis said in the two meetings were down to new instructions from Athens.23 The Greek government on reviewing the election results had apparently decided to harden its stance towards Washington. This new Greek position was not a good omen for Vance’s bilateral meeting at the upcoming NATO ministerial summit. Indeed, at the NATO summit that took place a few weeks later in Brussels Vance held his first bilateral meeting with Papaligouras whose statements did little to reduce the sense that the Greek government had adopted a reactionary stance. Instead of expediting the process Papaligouras proposed that any talks on Eastern Mediterranean issues be put on hold until after the parliamentary Christmas recess. What was worse Papaligouras responded in an evasive if not negative manner to Vance’s questions. Papaligouras concurred with the Turkish view regarding the need for Greek and Turkish support to secure a solution on Cyprus. However, he objected to suggestions that there should be any direct Greek involvement. On the one hand, Athens recognised the Cypriot government as sovereign and hence could only offer support and advice. On the other hand, the four-party meeting suggested by Ankara risked linking the Cyprus problem with the Aegean dispute. The Greeks regarded the two issues as entirely separate and the processes of their solution in like manner. Although neither point constituted anything particularly new, the Greek government placed stronger emphasis on it playing a limited role. What is more, its statements contradicted Washington’s earlier hopes for Greek–Turkish cooperation in securing progress on Cyprus. Papaligouras introduced a new precondition to bringing the Greek–US DCA to parliament for ratification. Following persistent and direct questions from Vance the Greek minister refused to clarify his government’s intentions. He eventually claimed that Athens considered there should be a link between the Greek–US DCA and Greece’s NATO relationship. Although the Greece–NATO talks had yet to materialise into anything 23 JCPL, Plains File, SDER, Box 38, Vance, Memorandum for the President, 6 December 1977.

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concrete, the Greek delegation argued that an agreement with NATO had to be made before the DCA could be ratified.24 Vance’s disappointing meeting with Papaligouras was not the only setback to the administration’s Eastern Mediterranean policy. The US Secretary also met with Ça˘glayangil who pressured him for action on Turkey–US issues. The Turkish minister highlighted the compromises they had made and the steps they had taken to facilitate progress on Cyprus. Ça˘glayangil made it clear that Ankara had done its part and it was time for Washington to reciprocate. He insisted on knowing when the US administration intended to start the Turkish–US DCA ratification process.25 The Carter administration faced the dilemma of how to respond to Turkey, particularly since the Demirel government was taking risks on Cyprus to conform with US—especially Congressional—expectations. This was the reason Carter suggested there should be ‘public acknowledgement of Turkish moves – when they are significant’.26 The meeting with Ça˘glayangil raised questions in the administration on how to proceed with Eastern Mediterranean policy, in general, and the DCAs, more specifically, considering the great importance that Ankara attached to its agreement.27 Vance decided to visit Athens and Ankara in early January 1978 to assess the prospects of the progress Washington expected being made. It is unclear why this was a Vance rather than a Clifford mission. In recent months Washington had operated under the assumption that Clifford would return to the area. This sudden and unexplained change perhaps reflected the changing realities that US policy in the Eastern Mediterranean faced.

24 Memorandum of Conversation, ‘The Secretary’s Meeting with Greek Foreign Minister Papaligouras’ Brussels, 8 December 1977, FRUS, Vol. XXI, doc. 172. 25 Memorandum of Conversation, ‘Secretary’s Meeting with Ça˘ glayangil’ Brussels, 8

December 1977, FRUS, Vol. XXI, doc. 104. 26 JCPL, Plains File, SDER, Box 38, Christopher, Memorandum for the President, with Carter’s handwritten comments, 9 December 1977. 27 Memorandum from the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter, ‘Turkish and Greek DCAs’, 8 December 1977, FRUS, Vol. XXI, doc. 18.

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Vance in the Region In January 1978 Vance extended his Middle East tour to include stops in Ankara and Athens. The Ankara visit took place over 20 and 21 January and the Athens visit followed immediately after. Vance planned to meet a newly confirmed prime minister in Ankara since the Demirel coalition government had collapsed in late December 1977. Bülent Ecevit subsequently had the opportunity to try and form a government. Ecevit secured the support of smaller leftist parties and defectors from Demirel’s Justice Party (JP). In January Ecevit won a vote of confidence. In Ankara Vance aimed to convince the Turkish government that the US administration remained committed to putting the Turkish–US DCA before Congress for ratification soon. He also planned to emphasise the importance of more Turkish positive actions in Cyprus to facilitate early ratification. This was a tricky point to make since Turkish governments consistently resented any link being made between the Turkish–US DCA and the arms embargo with progress on Cyprus. They believed the Turkish–US relationship should be viewed on its own merits. However, Ankara was not oblivious of the reality that Congress had established a link between the two as pointed out by both the Ford and Carter administrations. Vance wanted to treat Ecevit above all as a ‘trusted ally’ by valuing the role of Turkey within the western alliance in broader regional and global contexts.28 During their meeting Ecevit stressed his commitment to improving relations with the United States. However, he remained convinced that a ‘strong Greek bias’ lingered in US policies towards Turkey. Ecevit introduced new demands on specific issues relevant to the Turkish–US relationship. For example, he raised two issues regarding bilateral Turkish–US cooperation. First, Ankara wanted to see the existing Turkish–US DCA renegotiated and updated since the 1976 agreement no longer met Turkey’s current military and economic needs. He felt the level of aid did not match with Washington’s expectations of Turkey. In addition, a new agreement would better reflect the economic pressures that Turkey faced. Thus, the agreement had to be ‘supplemented by economic assistance’. However, Ecevit stressed that the arms embargo also had to be

28 NARA, RG 59, Electronic Telegrams 1978, Christopher, tel. 014709 State to USDEL Secretary, 19 January 1978.

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lifted. In fact, this ought to be the first order of business—not ratification of the DCA. He clearly separated the two issues.29 Although Vance carefully listened to Ecevit’s presentation, on the question of renegotiation of the DCA Vance explained that opening up the agreement in an attempt to make it more favourable to Ankara entailed two dangers. It would lead to further delays in the ratification process and could allow Congress to impose changes that were less favourable to Ankara.30 As an example of this Vance described Congress’ discomfort with long-term agreements such as the four-year duration of the 1976 Turkish DCA. Vance did not respond to the request for imminent repeal of the Turkish arms embargo. In preparation for the Ankara visit the Department of State anticipated Ecevit would raise the issue, but did not include a suggested response in Vance’s briefing material.31 Although the administration emphasised its commitment to ratifying the Turkish– US DCA, this perhaps indicated its unwillingness to consider the arms embargo at this stage. In Athens Vance pushed the Greeks to clarify when the Greek–US DCA would be ratified. He also raised the possibility of a direct Greek role in the Cyprus talks. Vance’s meeting with Karamanlis confirmed the Greek conclusion that the DCA was linked with the Greek–NATO talks. Karamanlis argued that since a link between NATO membership and ratification of the agreement existed the first thing to be decided needed to be a new Greece and NATO relationship. He reasoned this was ‘because the existence of military facilities is only conceivable within a NATO framework’. Karamanlis added this was the reason Greece was asking for US assistance in its negotiations with NATO. He concluded that ‘if we were to withdraw [entirely] from NATO, there would be no framework covering the DCA. Therefore, this [the relationship with NATO] is the

29 NARA, RG 59, Electronic Telegrams 1978, Christopher quoting Vance, tel. 017298 State to President and Brzezinski, 22 January 1978. 30 Telegram from the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State, Ankara, 23 January 1978, 0800Z, FRUS, Vol. XXI, doc. 107. 31 NARA, RG 59, Electronic Telegrams 1978, Christopher, tel. 014709 State to USDEL Secretary, 19 January 1978.

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reason for the delay in ratification and not the government’s unwillingness [to ratify it]’.32 The Department of State knew this was not the full reason for the Greek delay. Washington recognised that Athens considered the prospect of ratifying the DCAs as something that could persuade Turkey to ease its objections to new Greek arrangements with NATO.33 Although Athens wanted to get Washington behind its position, Karamanlis was not prepared to state openly that his target was Ankara at this stage. The Greek government maintained that Greek–NATO negotiations concerned the western alliance as a whole and had nothing to do with Greek–Turkish disputes. Vance’s response to Karamanlis was to bring the NATO negotiations forward and ratify the Greek–US DCA at the same time. Karamanlis rejected this suggestion because he felt that it was NATO membership that established the legitimacy of the agreement. This meant that formal clarification of the status of Greece’s armed forces in the western alliance needed to precede any agreement about US bases in Greek territory.34 In addition to the argument about the delay of the Greek DCA Karamanlis suggested that the Greek government had had second thoughts about the contents of both DCAs. The Greek version of the Karamanlis– Vance meeting included a specific objection to the economic provisions of the agreements for both Greece and Turkey. During the discussion Karamanlis stated that ‘the ratification of the Greek DCA will bring closer the ratification of the Turkish DCA. This will take place at a time when we believe that the economic provisions of both DCAs should be dropped’.35 Karamanlis had previously mentioned Greek opposition to financial provisions being given in the form of military aid for both countries hosting US facilities. In the parliamentary debate after conclusion of the principles agreement between Bitsios and Kissinger in April 1976

32 Summary of Conversation between Prime Minister Karamanlis and Secretary of State Vance, 21 January 1978, in Svolopoulos (ed.), Karamanlis, Vol. 10, 92–99. The change between the first person plural and third person singular is in the original. 33 NARA, RG 59, Electronic Telegrams 1978, Christopher, tel. 014708 State to

USDEL Secretary, 19 January 1978. 34 Ibid.; Vance’s account of the discussion in English without significant difference but with less detail can be found in NARA, RG 59, Electronic Telegrams 1978, Vance, tel. 017349 State to White House, 23 January 1978. 35 Summary of Conversation between Prime Minister Karamanlis and Secretary of State Vance, 21 January 1978, in Svolopoulos (ed.), Karamanlis, Vol. 10, 92–99.

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Karamanlis noted that the Greek government did not ask for financial support in exchange for agreeing to US bases being sited in Greece. Karamanlis argued that his government agreed to the US bases because they served Greek national interests—not because it depended on receiving US economic support. However, if Turkey were to receive such support, then Greece had to as well. This time Karamanlis confirmed Athens’ willingness to drop linking aid provisions to both DCAs. Vance responded by stating that the economic provisions for Greece, Turkey, and the Philippines, with which the United States was also negotiating a similar agreement about bases sited there, constituted an integral part of these agreements. This meant economic provisions could not be dropped. This discussion did not proceed further. Karamanlis adopted a moderate stance on relations with Turkey. He expressed interest in working with Ecevit on all aspects of Greek–Turkish differences. Nevertheless, Karamanlis remained suspicious about his counterpart’s real intentions. Vance sought to dispel Karamanlis’ reservations by underlining his impression of Ecevit as committed to settling the Cyprus crisis and ready to make serious proposals on territorial and constructional aspects of the crisis. Vance concluded that Karamanlis ‘is clearly dedicated to a United Europe in close association with the U.S. I think he is a true friend whom we should support in his efforts to find peaceful solutions to his country’s differences with Turkey and in his determination to help rebuild a solid and stable democratic regime in Greece’.36 For his part Karamanlis appreciated Vance’s approach during their talks and noted his satisfaction with the Secretary’s visit.37 The meetings in Athens were undoubtedly positive for bilateral Greek– US relations. However, in terms of the US administration’s Eastern Mediterranean policy Vance’s tour in Ankara and Athens rang an alarm bell. The administration took stock of what the comments made by Ecevit and Karamanlis meant for US policy goals. In Washington there was broad agreement between Brzezinski, Vance, and US Secretary of Defense Harold Brown that the United States should discourage Ecevit from insisting on renegotiating the Turkish–US DCA. The way to oppose this would be to take early action on the agreement.

36 NARA, RG 59, Electronic Telegrams 1978, Vance, tel. 17349 State to White House, 23 January 1978. 37 JCPL, NSA, PDRF, Box 5, Brzezinski for the President, 26 January 1978.

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The administration contemplated whether to bring forward the request to ratify the Turkish–US DCA on its own without its Greek counterpart.38 Although such a consideration ran contrary to Congressional expectations for simultaneous submission of both DCAs, it reflected a crucial factor in the administration’s planning since it was felt that time was running out. This approach directly contrasted with Karamanlis’ caution. Karamanlis had not altered his attitude towards Greek–US or Greek–Turkish relations. Although he favoured gradual developments, this required time that the administration did not have or considered it did not have. Following Vance’s visit the US administration remained in close contact with Ankara. Matthew Nimetz paid another visit to Turkey to follow up on issues that Vance and Ecevit had discussed. Nimetz argued there was a need for rapid progress to be made in relations with Turkey. Henze in a briefing with Brzezinski quoted Nimetz as saying in a biweekly interagency Greece–Turkey–Cyprus meeting in the State Department that: ‘time is short and there is a very good chance that Ecevit will take decisive anti-U.S. steps if the Administration does not move on the DCA soon’.39 Nimetz expressed a similar position on the issue at his meeting with the leadership of the Congressional Greek Lobby two days earlier. Considering the administration should have dissuaded the Democrats from opposing ratification of the Turkish–US DCA, his stance in the discussion with them should not be taken at face value.40 The Turkish government was pushing the administration to bring forward the DCA for Congressional ratification on its own as it was believed no progress was being made on the Greek equivalent. Ecevit appeared to tone down his request for renegotiation. The problem remained that the existing Turkish–US DCA did not satisfy Turkish needs in light of an economic crisis occurring that would lead sooner or later to more provisions needing to be added.41

38 JCPL, NSA, NSA Staff, Horn/Special, Box 6, Henze, Evening Report for Brzezinski, 3 February 1978, and Henze, Evening Report for Brzezinski, 24 February 1978. 39 JCPL, NSA, NSA Staff, Horn/Special, Box 6, Henze, Evening Report for Brzezinski, 7 March 1978. 40 Memorandum from Counsellor of the Department of State (Nimetz) to Secretary Vance, 1 March 1978, FRUS, Vol. XXI, doc. 110. 41 JCPL, NSA, PDRF, Box 5, Info Items, 3 February 1978, and Info Items, Christopher–Ecevit Meeting, 30 March 1978.

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Cold War considerations intensified the sense of urgency and the belief within the administration that time was limited. Concern was growing in the White House and the Departments of State and Defense about Ecevit’s commitment to the western alliance. Since assuming power in January Ecevit had frequently complained about NATO’s treatment of Turkey. He even hinted that Turkey might drop out of NATO if the embargo remained in place.42 In a letter dated 18 January 1978 Brown cautioned Carter that: ‘we are running a substantial risk that the longer the DCA is delayed the more likely become Turkish actions which as a practical matter will nullify their participation in the Alliance’.43 Reports from Ankara persuaded the NSC that Turkey would begin to move away from the Western bloc in the absence of any basic initiative on the DCA.44 Ambassador Spires in Ankara gave Vance his ‘strong recommendation that you and the President decide to move firmly in support of early Congressional endorsement of the Turkish DCA in the hearings during the next month’. His comments were based on various meetings he had had with Turkish officials. He continued: I believe that our relations with Turkey will be irreversibly damaged if we do not make this move. This country is more important to us than either Greece or Cyprus, although I do not think that we should let it become an either/or choice. […] Ecevit has given us a time limit. [...] If we don’t move on the DCA by the time of the NATO summit, Turkey will make a major assessment of its interests and alignments in this world.45

The forthcoming NATO Heads of State summit in Washington marked a crucial point in Turkish–US relations. The Carter administration feared that Ecevit, who held the rotating presidency of NATO for that year,

42 William Halle, Turkish Foreign Policy, 1974–2000 (London: Frank Cass, 2002), 161. 43 Memorandum from Secretary of Defense Brown to President Carter, 18 January

1978, FRUS, Vol. XXI, doc. 106. 44 JCPL, NSA, NSA Staff, Horn/Special, Box 6, Henze, Evening Report for Brzezinski, 24 February 1978. 45 JCPL, NSA, NSA Staff, Horn/Special, Box 6, Spiers, tel. 1443 Ankara to State, 24 February 1978.

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would not participate.46 Such a development would have both publicly and internally questioned the alliance’s cohesion. Washington was also becoming increasingly concerned about the state of relations between the Soviet Union and Turkey. Turkey’s relations with the West started to show signs of being strained. Moreover, Ankara seemed eager to develop links—mainly economic—with Moscow. In an effort to secure relations with the Soviet Union Ecevit stressed that Turkey should not during the period of détente ‘be provocative to the Soviet Union’.47 He elaborated on this argument by explicitly recommending that US and NATO observation installations should be included in a new Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) Treaty. He did so to address what he said Soviet leaders told him were provocations. Carter prioritised the conclusion of another SALT Treaty with Moscow before the initial SALT I expired in October 1977.48 The administration’s initiative raised concerns among Western European allies.49 The Greek government meanwhile appeared seriously apprehensive about the proposed reductions.50 Although the Turkish attitude toward SALT might have pleased the US administration, Ecevit’s stance caused anxiety in Washington. The administration considered Ecevit’s statements carefully. The White House interpreted Moscow’s actions as ‘a clever foot in the door’ in Turkey.51 Henze also noted that in ‘the short-term we can probably rely on basic Turkish suspiciousness to ensure that they do not jeopardize themselves, but in the longer term these relationships bear watching’.52

46 JCPL, NSA, NSA Staff, Horn/Special, Box 6, Henze, Evening Report for Brzezinski, 24 February 1978. 47 NARA, RG 59, Electronic Telegrams 1978, Christopher quoting Vance, tel. 017298 State to White House, 22 January 1978. 48 Gaddis Smith, Morality, Reason and Power: American Diplomacy in the Carter Years (Toronto: Collins Publishers, 1986), 77. 49 Brian J. Auten, Carter’s Conversion: The Hardening of American Defense Policy (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2008), 252. 50 JCPL, NSA, PDRF, Box 4, The Situation Room, Memorandum for Brzezinski, 6 December 1977. 51 JCPL, NSA, NSA Staff, Horn/Special, Box 6, Henze, Evening Report for Brzezinski, 7 March 1978. 52 JCPL, NSA, NSA Staff, Horn/Special, Box 6, Henze, Evening Report for Brzezinski, 18 April 1978.

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Although Turkish–Soviet links played a role in the decision to repeal the embargo, it is not clear that the administration was especially concerned about specific Soviet–Turkish links before announcement of the repeal. In accordance with Carter’s policy US relations with Greece and Turkey remained significantly unbalanced. The administration was running out of time to bring Ankara closer to Washington. It needed to do something that would make this happen. Repeal of the US arms embargo appeared to be the most suitable option.

Decision to Repeal the Arms Embargo On 21 March 1978 Vance presented Carter with his, Brown’s, and National Security Advisor Brzezinski’s recommendations on how to deal with the Turkish issue. Vance presented two extremes in this policy paper that he referred to as a ‘full DCA package’ and a ‘no movement on a Turkish program’. There was also a middle-ground third option that he referred to as a ‘modified package for Turkey’, which advisors termed as a position that could be ‘defended as balanced, fair and responsive to the current situation’.53 The policy proposal officially moved the discussion from making efforts to ratify the Greek and Turkish DCAs to driving repeal of the Turkish arms embargo. The proposals forwarded to Carter required amendment of remaining provisions in the Foreign Assistance Act that continued to limit Turkey’s full access to US military aid. This was another victory for Ecevit since the document’s authors suggested that the Turkish DCA ‘will be promptly renegotiated’. Amendments to the Foreign Assistance Act were aimed at removing the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) cash purchases ceiling allowing thirdcountry transfers and enabling military planning with Turkish officials. The proposal suggested maintaining the Turkish military assistance level for the 1979 fiscal year at $175 million in FMS without granting military aid and amended the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) of the same year to include an additional $50 million security-supporting loan provided Turkey concluded a stabilisation agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The administration also suggested an increase over what it had already projected in Greek military assistance to $140 million in FMS credits. Finally, should Congress require it, Vance conceded 53 Memorandum from Secretary of State Vance to President Carter, ‘Greek–Turkish Military Assistance’ Washington, 21 March 1978, FRUS, Vol. XXI, doc. 20.

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the idea of allowing the President to determine whether Turkish credit purchases were NATO related and to continue submitting Presidential reports regarding progress made towards a Cyprus settlement. The pros and cons of such a policy were presented in a well-balanced way. The benefits emphasised satisfying the Turkish government and Ecevit personally. Ecevit could present Washington’s decision to renegotiate and improve the DCA the Demirel government had concluded as a foreign policy victory. Athens mirrored Washington in its preoccupation with Ecevit’s domestic standing. The Greek government appreciated Ecevit’s return to power. Karamanlis—as he confided to Vance—remained sceptical of Ecevit’s intentions. However, the Greek premier found that Demirel too was not interested in seriously negotiating bilateral Greek–Turkish problems.54 The Turkish–US DCA remained the preferred option to secure Turkish–US relations. The administration were convinced that repealing the arms embargo, a constant and persistent irritant in relations with Turkey, represented the best way forward. However, the White House anticipated opposition to proposed lifting of the embargo would be fierce not only from Greece’s supporters in Congress but also from Greece and Cyprus. Its best argument for Congress would be to emphasise the benefits that would come from a Democratic administration renegotiating a long-term and expensive military commitment to an ally. The US administration did not decide on the repeal in a light-hearted way. Significantly, as late as February 1978 Secretaries Vance and Brown were still committed to ratification of the Turkish–US DCA and did not mention repeal of the embargo as an alternative.55 Similarly, in early March 1978 internal communication within the NSC emphasised that the best strategy would be to secure Congressional ratification of the Turkish DCA separately from the Greek DCA.56

54 Telegram from the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State, Athens, 23 January 1978, FRUS, Vol. XXI, doc. 173; for Karamanlis’ comments on Demirel see Telegram from the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State, Athens, 11 February 1977, FRUS, Vol. XXI, doc. 164. 55 Memorandum from Secretary of Defense Brown to President Carter, 18 January 1978, FRUS, Vol. XXI, doc. 106; P. B. Henze, Memorandum for Brzezinski, 2 February 1978, Box 2. 56 JCPL, NSA, NSA Staff, Horn/Special, Box 2, Frank Moore, Memorandum for the President, ‘Turkish DCA—Legislative Strategy’, 4 March 1978.

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Vance recognised the impact announcement of the repeal would have on Athens and Ankara. He hoped to prevent a negative impact on Greek–Turkish rapprochement. Karamanlis and Ecevit scheduled their first bilateral meeting to review and openly discuss all aspects of Greek– Turkish disputes including the Aegean Sea and Cyprus for March 1978. The Montreux Summit, named after the Swiss town hosting the two leaders, took place between 10 and 11 March. Vance personally encouraged Karamanlis to respond positively to the anticipated invitation for talks from Ecevit. Fearing cancellation of the summit Vance remained adamant on the need to delay any binding decisions until its completion.57 Equally, he might have hoped for significant progress that could ease potential Congressional opposition to the administration’s proposals during the two leaders’ talks. Although the Montreux Summit represented a significant symbolic gesture, in practice it produced few if any concrete results. Greece and Turkey retained their positions. Although the press statement released after conclusion of the talks indicated limited progress, it did report that bilateral dialogue had started at a top level.58 Despite this limited progress, the US administration proceeded with the public announcement of its decision to request Congress to repeal the Turkish arms embargo. For many this meant Carter had betrayed his campaign promises of two years earlier.

Reacting to the News from Washington Since at least February 1978 the Greek government had anticipated US action against the arms embargo. Averoff had paid a private visit to the United States since that date and being a minister of an allied country had access to high-ranking officials in the Carter administration as well as to members of Congress interested in the Eastern Mediterranean. Despite this not being an official visit, Averoff still had opportunities to meet Vance, Nimetz, and leading figures of the Greek Lobby in

57 JCPL, NSA, NSA Staff, Horn/Special, Box 2, Henze, Memorandum for Brzezinski, 8 March 1978. 58 Press Statement on Montreux Summit, 12 March 1978, in Svolopoulos (ed.), Karamanlis, Vol. 10, 143.

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Congress including Senator Paul Sarbanes (D-MD) and Representative John Brademas (D-NY).59 On his return from the United States Averoff compiled a detailed account of his meetings and impressions for Karamanlis. His core observation was that Washington and Ankara were working together. He was particularly concerned that ‘elements in the Department of State and the Pentagon supported lifting the embargo and ratifying the two DCAs simultaneously’.60 Averoff speculated that the administration would take action on the DCAs and the arms embargo, in particular, between March and April 1978. Similar reports supporting Averoff’s speculations reached Athens from the Greek Embassy in Washington shortly after. In early March the Greek Ambassador in Washington Ambassador Alexandrakis relayed to the MFA a conversation between a member of the Embassy staff Loucas Tsilas and an unidentified member of the American Hellenic Institute regarding Greek–Turkish–US relations.61 The Embassy’s source stated that proTurkish elements in Washington were extending their influence in the Carter administration. Simultaneously, the pressure growing to improve Turkish–US relations came from the Pentagon, the CIA, and the NSC— not from the State Department. The same source recalled a story shared by one of his friends about CIA Director Admiral Stansfield M. Turner who returned a report regarding reasons for fortifying the Greek islands to its author noting that ‘this could have been written in the Parthenon’. Alexandrakis felt this anecdotal story reflected pro-Turkish feelings at various top levels such as the CIA and the NSC. The story identified Henze and Brzezinski by name. A day after the United States announced the repeal a telegram from the Greek Embassy in Bonn reached Averoff’s desk. It was a follow-up message to internal diplomatic communications—that are not available— regarding a recent visit of Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher

59 Constantine G. Karamanlis Foundation [hereafter CGKF], Evangelos Averoff Papers [hereafter EAP], File 31, Minister of National Defence, Main Schedule of Minister’s Visit to United States, No date. 60 CGKF, EAP, File 32, Averoff, Note for the Prime Minister, 3 March 1978. 61 CGKF, EAP, File 32, Alexandrakis, Letter .2223.1/13.A120 from Washington to

MFA, 8 March 1978, attached to a Memorandum of Conversation between Loucas Tsilas and a member of the American Hellenic institute. Tsilas would rise to become a major figure in Greek diplomacy including as Ambassador to the United States.

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to Bonn. Ambassador Aristotelis Frydas reported that the West Germans had not expected Christopher’s visit. During his time there the US official had been preoccupied with matters related only to Turkey. Based on what his sources told him Frydas noted there was no reference to Greek– Turkish relations or the Cyprus issue. He felt this constituted a warning sign.62 Greece’s expectation that efforts would be made to repeal the arms embargo perhaps explains why the Greek reaction was gradual. The Greek government initially appeared calm about the news from Washington. Following a meeting on 31 March 1978 with Averoff, US Ambassador McCloskey commented that Averoff’s ‘reaction was not as strong as it could have been’. McCloskey warned though that the United States should remain alert ‘until we hear from Caramanlis and until the implications of what we said sink in’.63 The meeting to announce the US decision to repeal the arms embargo coincided with Karamanlis’ latest European tour that dealt with Greece’s EEC negotiations. Despite McCloskey’s cautious tone, the White House internally concluded that the Greeks were taking the decision to lift the embargo quite well.64 The initial reaction of the Greek government relayed by Averoff should be attributed to a lack of surprise. The Greek government and Averoff himself were well aware that the mood in Washington was changing regarding the arms embargo and its impact on relations with Ankara. The response of the Greek press and opposition parties to Carter’s announcement was hostile. The press accused Carter of hypocrisy by contrasting the decision with his election promises.65 The opposition lashed out against US and Greek government policies.66 Leader of 62 CGKF, EAP, File 32, Evangelidis, tel. .120.3/2210 from Bonn to MFA, 1 April 1978. 63 NARA, RG 59, Electronic Telegrams 1978, Cooper, tel. 083585 State (quoting message from US to Athens) to USDEL Secretary, 31 March 1978. 64 JCPL, NSA, NSA Staff, Horn/Special, Box 6, Henze, Evening Report for Brzezinski, 5 April 1978. 65 K. Tsaloglou, ‘To «εμπαργκo» ´ απoκαλπτει ´ τo θλιβερ´o χασμα ´ μεταξ´ διακηρξεων ´ και πραξεων: ´ καθαρη´ εμπoρικη´ επιχε´ιρηση η μ´oνη λoγικη´ σκoπιμ´oτητα για την αρση ´ τoυ [The “Embargo” Reveals the Sad Gap between Rhetoric and Deeds: Its Repeal Is Based on Corporate Interests]’, Kathimerini, 9–10 April 1978, 5. 66 NARA, RG 59, Electronic Telegrams 1978, McCloskey, tel. 3959 Athens to State, 3 April 1978.

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PASOK Andreas Papandreou argued that the drive to repeal the embargo represented an ‘ominous development’ for Greek national interests. He repeated his almost conspiratorial allegations against both the US administration and the Karamanlis government.67 Papandreou linked the Montreux Summit to repeal of the embargo. He implied that Ankara was only interested in the bilateral meeting so as to use it as testament of its goodwill in negotiating the Greek–Turkish dispute. Papandreou also felt that Carter had used the Greek–Turkish talks in Montreux to justify his administration seeking repeal of the embargo.68 Papandreou implied naivety on the part of the Greek government and was suspicious of its silence on the issue.69 He used the announcement to launch an attack against Greek–US relations and the Greek government. In Papandreou’s view the decision dispelled any doubts about Washington’s preference for Ankara and its accommodating policy towards Turkish aggression.70 Karamanlis responded by declaring his government’s intention to safeguard vital Greek interests.71 In subsequent meetings with the US ambassador, Karamanlis did not hide his resentment of the US administration. At the first meeting with McCloskey after his arrival in Athens on 11 April 1978 Karamanlis termed the Turkish stance on the Cyprus issue as blackmail and, accordingly, Washington’s decision to repeal the embargo as succumbing to such coercion.72 According to McCloskey’s summary of a meeting on 19 April 1978 (not a direct quotation) Karamanlis angrily

67 ‘ιαβημα ´ απανδρšoυ [Papandreou’s Appeal]’, Kathimerini, 8 April 1978, 1. 68 Papandreou’s letter to the President of the Republic, 7 April 1978, in Svolopoulos

(ed.), Karamanlis, Vol. 10, 177. 69 ‘ϕoδρη ´ επ´ιθεση απανδρšoυ κατα´ Kαραμανλη´ δημιoυργε´ι «νšo κλ´ιμα» [Papandreou’s vehement attack against Karamanlis creates a “new climate”]’, Kathimerini, 9 April 1978, 1. 70 ‘ιαβημα ´ απανδρšoυ [Papandreou’s appeal]’, Kathimerini, 8 April 1978, 1; ‘ϕoδρη´ επ´ιθεση απανδρšoυ κατα´ Kαραμανλη´ δημιoυργε´ι «νšo κλ´ιμα» [Papandreou’s Vehement Attack against Karamanlis Creates a “New Climate”]’, Kathimerini, 9 April 1978, 1. 71 ‘H Eλλας ´ ε´ιναι απoϕασισμšνη και ικανη´ να πρoστατεσει ´ τα εθνικα´ της συμϕšρoντα: Bαρυσημαντη ´ δηλωση ´ τoυ πρωθυπoυργo´ κ. Kαραμανλη´ για την αμερικανικη´ πoλιτικη´ [Greece Is Determined and Able to Protect Its National Interest: Karamanlis’ Statement Regarding the American Policy]’, Kathimerini, 8 April 1978, 1. 72 CGKF, Constantine Karamanlis Papers [hereafter CKP], Folder 29B, MFA, Note on Karamanlis’ meeting with McCloskey, 11 April 1978; NARA, RG 59, Electronic Telegrams 1978, McCloskey, tel. 3008 Athens to State, 11 April 1978.

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appeared to argue that: ‘we had been misled by their [the Turks’] deceit and cunning. […] Any notion, therefore, that Ankara has any incentive to settle for what is equitable – even though it would be more than the status quo ante – was naive of us and an insult to our intentions’.73 More importantly, the US administration did not disagree that the Turkish proposals were inadequate and felt more pressure on the Turks was needed to ‘improve their proposals’.74 Carter adopted a similar line when Karamanlis raised the issue in their bilateral meeting at the Washington NATO summit in May.75 The Greek government found little solace in US comments about Ecevit’s future stance in the Greek–NATO negotiations. Political Counsellor of the US Embassy George M. Barbis in a meeting with Director General of the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs Ioannis Tzounis referred to Deputy Secretary Warren Christopher’s meeting with Ecevit. Barbis stated that Christopher and Ecevit did not discuss NATO-related issues except as broader and general issues at a low diplomatic level. Barbis added that the United States in ‘recent talks’ indicated that ‘the Turks should demonstrate a positive stance in the Greek–NATO negotiations’.76 Such a vague reference could not possibly persuade Athens that Washington had secured any reciprocal cooperation from Ankara in exchange for repeal of the embargo. Karamanlis’ reaction followed another unsuccessful round of negotiations between the two Cypriot communities. The Greek government hoped that Washington had secured Ankara’s commitment to finding a context in which there would be ‘reasonable proposals for a Cyprus solution’.77 McCloskey’s reply that Ankara had made no specific commitments did nothing to lessen Greek concerns. When the Turkish side submitted its proposals to UN Secretary General Waldheim, the Greek 73 NARA, RG 59, Electronic Telegrams 1978, McCloskey, tel. 3309 Athens to State, 19 April 1978; unfortunately, there is no Greek record of this meeting. 74 JCPL, NSA, NSA Staff, Horn/Special, Box 6, Henze, Evening Report for Brzezinski, 21 April 1978. 75 Memorandum of Conversation between Karamanlis and Carter, 31 May 1978, in Svolopoulos (ed.), Karamanlis, Vol. 10, 242. 76 CGKF, EAP, File 32, MFA, Note on meeting between Tzounis and Barbis, 6 April 1978. 77 CGKF, CKP, Folder 29B, Averoff, Memorandum of Conversation with McCloskey, 3 April 1978.

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government’s critique and fears seemed justified. On 13 April 1978 the Turkish-Cypriot community submitted its proposals to Waldheim. The strong influence Ankara exerted on the Turkish-Cypriot community accounts for identifying these proposals as Turkish proposals. Karamanlis told McCloskey that although Athens did not know the exact details of the proposals, he ‘drew his conclusions from the explanatory note issued publicly by Turkey’ according to which it was clear to him that Ankara displayed ‘neither seriousness of intention nor interest in fair negotiation’.78 It soon became known that the Turkish-Cypriot side ‘opposed accepting full restoration of Greek-Cypriots’ human rights, opposed allowing freedom of communication, movement, resettlement and employment, opposed submitting a specific proposal [on the future status of the] Famagusta [area] and opposed submitting proposals regarding the territorial issues [of the two communities]’.79 Immediately following the news the Greek government extensively studied the provisions the proposed steps would entail in Congress. The decision upset Greek planning that had thus far managed to steer the US stance to Athens’ favour. The Greek government returned to a strategy of confrontation to secure significant concessions from the US administration much as it had done in the past. However, in 1978 it displayed more pragmatism. Athens worked closely with both the US administration and Congress to make the most of its expectations.

Working with the White House Concessions were sought from the US administration during the first meeting between Ambassador McCloskey and Averoff on 31 March 1978. Averoff requested that the United States renew its commitment to Greek territorial integrity. He stated that ‘although I don’t believe in the practical value of guarantees I think it is particularly useful that simultaneously with the announcement [implied announcement of the decision to seek repeal of the arms embargo] the substance of Kissinger’s

78 NARA, RG 59, Electronic Telegrams 1978, McCloskey, tel. 3309 Athens to State, 19 April 1978. 79 Karamanlis’ public statement on 18 April 1978 and editor’s analysis and presentation of Turkish-Cypriot proposals, in Svolopoulos (ed.), Karamanlis, Vol. 10, 193.

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letter to Bitsios should be repeated or at least mentioned’.80 The 1976 exchange of letters between Kissinger and Bitsios stated that US policy in the Eastern Mediterranean was opposed to any act of aggression implicitly guaranteeing Greece’s sovereignty from Turkish military actions.81 The Greek government felt such a request could alleviate the domestic pressures the repeal created. In a subsequent meeting with McCloskey, Averoff elaborated on this further by pointing out that some public US actions in favour of Greece were needed to tone down critical voices about relations with Washington. Averoff noted that ‘those preaching “antiAmericanism” appear vindicated and their position is strengthened’ while the position of pro-Western advocates is weakened. Averoff stressed the difficulty that pro-Western politicians in Greece faced when presenting arguments to the public in favour of close cooperation with the United States. Anti-American pressure created an unsustainable situation that could lead Greece away from the West and the United States. Averoff claimed such a development would be detrimental to both US and Greek interests. Washington had to find a way of supporting pro-Western promoters in Greece.82 McCloskey recognised such support as crucial for the Greeks and consequently urged the Department of State to ‘carefully consider including some kind of statement in the announcement about the President’s decisions that will alleviate Greek concerns about their security, keeping in mind that it remains in our interest to do what we can to avoid undermining Caramanlis’ [sic] position’.83 In Washington the administration recognised that foreign policy issues such as relations with the United States remained problematic for the long-term prospects of the Karamanlis government.84 Secretary of State Vance in his testimony to the House Committee on International Relations (HIRC) reiterated the US position regarding the disputes in the Eastern Mediterranean by insisting that they ought to be settled through peaceful means and that neither 80 CGKF, CKP, Folder 29B, Averoff, tel. YIO-66 Athens to Embassy Copenhagen, Note for the Prime Minister and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, 31 March 1977. 81 See Chapter 4. 82 CGKF, EAP, File 32, Averoff, Memorandum of Conversation with US Ambassador,

2 April 1978. 83 NARA, RG 59, Electronic Telegrams 1978, Cooper quoting McCloskey, tel. 083585 State to USDEL Secretary, 31 March 1978. 84 JCPL, NSA, PDRF, Box 5, Brzezinski for the President, 3 April 1978.

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side should resort to provocative actions or seek a military solution. He went on to add that the United States ‘would actively and unequivocally’ oppose them.85 The statement was in line with what the Greek government had requested. Alexandrakis commented the verbatim repetition of this in Congress, presumably because Vance testified under oath, strengthened the previous US commitment to opposing acts of aggression made by Kissinger.86 Listening closely to Greek requests was part of the White House’s effort to avoid alienating the Greek government. Repeal of the arms embargo was decided on the basis that it would ensure close Turkish–US cooperation. Nonetheless, the US administration wanted to avoid tension with Greece. The NSC saw the ongoing Greek–EEC negotiations as an opportunity to aid such a goal by demonstrating Washington’s support for the Greek government. In late June 1978 Henze argued that ‘in the wake of the lifting of the embargo and of the steps towards normalization of Greek–Turkish relations, Greek movement toward the EEC should proceed smoothly and we should quietly do what we can behind the scenes to encourage this development’.87 US diplomats supported the Greek application in their bilateral meeting with European counterparts.88 It is unclear how this backroom US support for Greek entry to the EEC benefitted Greek–US relations, but Henze had raised a critical issue. In a lengthy letter to Foreign Minister Papaligouras in April 1978 the Greek Permanent Representative to the EEC attempted to assess the US attitude toward Greek efforts to gain entry to the Community. Ambassador Stefanos Stathatos reluctantly admitted that the United States most

85 CGKF, EAP, File 32, MFA, Note on clarification briefing by McCloskey, attached to McCloskey’s submitted copy of Vance’s statement to be made later that day; CGKF, CKP, Folder 29B, Chrysospathis, Note on lifting the Turkish embargo, 10 April 1978, confirming the statement was made. 86 CGKF, CKP, Folder 29B, Alexandrakis, tel. AP P A198 Washington to MFA, 6 April 1978. 87 JCPL, NSA, NSA Staff, Horn/Special, Box 2, Henze, Memorandum for Brzezinski, 20 July 1978. 88 Eirini Karamouzi, Greece, the EEC and the Cold War, 1974–1979: The Second Enlargement (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 137.

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likely did not support Greek efforts.89 Until that point the US administration had appeared unable to communicate its support for the Greek application effectively. Despite Henze’s suggestion for smooth movement to entry it was a difficult task. The Nine had agreed to Greece’s admission to the EEC at the political level. However, Karamouzi (2014) argued that political agreement could not—as the Greek government discovered— replace the need for progress at the technical level. For example, there were a number of technical issues that delayed progress that the Greek government needed to address in 1977. The extent to which Washington could assist Athens with its ‘good services’ in this matter remains unclear if that was what the NSC had indeed implied. Overall the US administration and the Greek government appeared to be interested in securing good relations. In another contrast with the Kissinger era the Greek government pursued its strategy of confrontation carefully. The Greek government hoped to use the US administration to encourage legal provisions regarding repeal of the embargo that would serve Greek interests. It enjoyed a close and trusting relationship with Vance that it had not had with Kissinger. Evidence for this comes from the fact that Athens’ initial aim included approaching Vance to include some terms in the bill to repeal the embargo. Ambassador Alexandrakis believed the US administration intended repeal of the embargo to improve relations with Ankara. Therefore, it should have been opposed to attaching any terms to it.90 This gave Athens a way to work with supporters of the embargo in Congress. The approach taken by Athens towards the Carter administration became clear in late May. Although the Greek government remained wary, it participated in the North Atlantic Summit of 1978 in Washington. Greek references to the DCA as part of the Greek–NATO relationship were not merely an effort to delay signing the agreement, they recognised the need for a relatively early agreement with NATO and were an 89 Permanent Representative in EEC Stathatos, Brussels, 17 April 1978, in Fotini Tomai (ed.), H Συμμετ oχ η´ τ ης Eλλαδας ´ σ τ ην π oρε´ια π ρ oς τ ην ευρωπ α¨ικ η´ oλoκληρωσ ´ η [Greece’s Participation in the European Integration Process], Vol. 2: Aπ o´ τ o π αγ ´ ωμα τ ης σ υμϕων´ιας σ ´ νδεσ ης σ τ ην šντ αξ η σ τ ις ευρωπ α¨ικ šς κ oιν o´ τ ητ ες (1968–1981) [From the ‘Freezing’ of the Association Agreement to Accession to the European Communities] [Hereafter Greece and European Integration] (Athens: Foreign Ministry and Papazisis, 2006), doc. 56. 90 CGKF, CKP, Folder 32B, Alexandrakis, tel. AP P A 147 E.X. Washington to MFA, 29 July 1978.

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attempt to enlist US support. Such an effort became dominant in the aftermath of the repeal (as argued in the next chapter). While he was in Washington Karamanlis accepted an invitation from the Chairman of the HIRC to meet with some of its members and Congressional leaders at an informal event. The meeting offered him an opportunity to express the Greek position regarding the Turkish arms embargo. Karamanlis stressed that repealing the embargo ‘would increase bitterness [felt by the Greek people due to recent US administrations’ support of the junta and inaction in the Cyprus crisis], would encourage leftist movements in Greece, and would clearly weaken the present government of Greece’.91 The following day Karamanlis met with Secretary Vance whose schedule had prevented him from attending the Karamanlis–Carter talks at the White House. Karamanlis gave Vance the reasons he had decided to meet with the members of Congress. He stressed that although he would prefer not to appear before the HIRC, he could not ignore the public invitation Chairman Zablocki had extended to him.92 The contradiction with Karamanlis’ defiant stance toward Ford three years earlier was stark.

Working on Capitol Hill In parallel with requests it made to the White House, Athens also maintained a direct channel of communication with Congress. As it had done in the past the Greek Embassy played a pivotal role in circulating Greek expectations on Capitol Hill. It is significant that there were elements within the Carter administration vehemently opposed to the arms embargo and this caused Athens to adjust its approach. The Greek government hoped that the arms embargo would remain in place. However, it also concluded that the best way forward was to have an alternative plan in the event its efforts against repeal of the arms embargo failed. The Greek government emphasised the need for arrangements that would provide Athens and Ankara with similar access to US military aid should the legislation indeed be repealed. This would also ensure 91 CGKF, CKP, Folder 31B, Notes on meeting of Prime Minister of Greece and the House International Relations Committee, 2 June 1978. 92 Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Greece, 7 June 1978, FRUS, Vol. XXI, doc. 177.

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Congress puts pressure on Ankara to deliver concessions on Cyprus and avoid aggression in the Aegean. In a telegram to Ambassador Alexandrakis, Foreign Minister Rallis restated the Greek strategy that they had clearly discussed previously.93 The key points emphasised the importance of the US legislation reflecting that Congress would still remain interested and involved in discussions about Cyprus and Greek–Turkish disputes if the embargo was lifted. Rallis felt this would be possible if the law provided for Congress to evaluate progress made towards a Cyprus solution before each annual appropriation of aid. Athens wanted to ensure that US aid to both Greece and Turkey would be allocated in accordance with the balance of power between them. Finally, the Greek government desired an explicit commitment from the United States that it would actively and effectively oppose any use of force or any provocation that could lead to the use of force in the Aegean and at the same time that it would continue to encourage progress in the Greek–Turkish dispute through peaceful and internationally accepted means. Athens soon discovered that its plan lacked the support of those US Representatives and Senators who opposed repeal of the arms embargo. In late July Alexandrakis stated that: … our goals are not identical but overlapping. Our friends’ goal is narrower. It aims at a political victory by maintaining the embargo. Our goal too is maintaining the embargo, but also securing our position in the event of it being repealed.94

The Greeks attempted to alter the approach taken by the embargo supporters by appealing directly to Representative Brademas. They argued for the need to secure broader goals for Greece and pointed to the benefits of avoiding a split within the Democratic Party.95 However, the Greek rhetoric failed. Athens relied extensively on Republicans and those in favour of repealing the arms embargo to gather support to get its proposals and requests included in the proposed legislation during the 93 CGKF, CKP, Folder 29B, Rallis, tel. YOI-131 MFA to Washington, personal for the Ambassador, 28 July 1978. 94 CGKF, CKP, Folder 32B, Alexandrakis, tel. A147E.X. Washington to MFA, 29 July 1978. 95 CGKF, CKP, Folder 32B, Alexandrakis, tel. A153E.X. Washington to MFA, 1 August 1978, and Rallis, tel. YOI-133 MFA to Washington, 2 August 1978.

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debate about the legislation in Congress. Although the Greek requests were seen as ‘realistic’, they were the bare minimum Greece could ask for.96 In late July 1978 the focus turned to provisions that would accompany repeal of the legislation. On 25 July Senate Majority Leader Robert C. Byrd introduced an amendment to Bill S 3075 regarding specific provisions accompanying repeal of the arms embargo. These stated that the President must submit a report to Congress every 60 days. One of the aims of the report was to ensure that any military aid to Turkey remained in line with the US approach in the Eastern Mediterranean and that the amount of aid given to Greece was raised to $175 million for the 1978 fiscal year. Another aim of the report was to condemn the presence of a strong military force in Cyprus as incompatible to respecting the sovereignty of the Republic of Cyprus.97 The amendment was the product of cooperation between the Greek embassy and staff working for representatives sitting on the relevant House and Senate committees.98 Although the Greek government appeared satisfied with this first step, further changes were necessary.99 On 1 August 1978 the House approved a similar amendment called the Seiberling amendment that was largely identical to the Byrd amendment. All parties involved accepted the House vote as meaning the arms embargo would be repealed. The Turkish government welcomed it as a step towards restoring ‘friendly relations with the United States’. The Cypriot government praised the United States for taking on ‘tremendous responsibilities and obligations to find a just solution to the Cyprus problem based on the UN resolution’. The Greek government expressed its regret at the development because it felt it might ‘encourage

96 CGKF, CKP, Folder 32B, Alexandrakis, tel. A160E.X. Washington to MFA, 3 August 1978, and Alexandrakis, tel. A162E.X. Washington to MFA, 4 August 1978. 97 Panagiotis Theodorakopoulos, To Koγ κρ šσ o σ τ ην διαμ´oρϕωσ η τ ης Aμερικανικ ης ´ Eξ ωτ ερικ ης ´ Π oλιτ ικ ης ´ : O ρ o´ λoς τ oυ σ τ ην π ερ´ιπ τ ωσ η τ ης Eλλαδας ´ [Congress and the Shaping the American Foreign Policy: Its Role in the Case of Greece] (Athens: Sideris, 1996), 151. 98 CGKF, CKP, Folder 32B, Alexandrakis, tel. A159E.X. Washington to MFA, 3 August 1978. 99 CGKF, CKP, Folder 32B, Rallis, tel. 188 MFA to Washington, 21 July 1978, and Alexandrakis, tel. A142E.X. Washington to MFA, 25 July 1978.

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Turkish intransigence’.100 Although the Greek government had reservations about the Congressional vote, a few days later the Department of State informed Carter of a ‘cordial’ meeting between Karamanlis and McCloskey. Karamanlis emphasised the importance his government attached to references in the final bill to ‘preservation of the military balance in the region’.101 Karamanlis’ accommodating position was aimed at helping the Greek Embassy foster cooperation with members of Congress. The Senate and House bills differed on some aspects and required a conference committee stage before the final bill could be approached. The conference stage prompted the Greek government to intensify last gasp efforts to alter the Greek Lobby’s uncompromising position. Foreign Minister Rallis instructed Alexandrakis as a matter of urgency to approach Brademas personally as well as other ‘friends of ours’ on the Hill. He stressed that neither Brademas’ group nor the Greek government had achieved their goals: the amendment was not defeated and additional pressure on Turkey was not secured.102 The Greek Lobby now appeared more willing to negotiate with the administration since its main goal had failed. The Greek government had to broaden its cooperation with the US Congress and rethink its goals. Its main goals became the inclusion of clear references to the preservation of peace in the Aegean and maintaining the balance of military power between Greece and Turkey in the final text of the bill. Rallis concluded that approaching both supporters and opponents of the arms embargo involved in the House–Senate conference would be necessary to achieve these goals. Karamanlis himself was placed at the forefront of diplomats contacting representatives personally and tasked with stressing Greek expectations.103 The Greek Embassy became deeply involved in preparing, with the assistance of its own legal advisors, versions of the text whose wording satisfied Greek interests. Although representatives 100 JCPL, Plains File, SDER, Box 390, Vance, Memorandum for the President, 2 August 1978; JCPL, NSA, PDRF, Box 7, The Situation Room, Memorandum for Brzezinski, 2 August 1978. 101 JCPL, Plains File, SDER, Box 39, Christopher, Memorandum for the President, 7 August 1978. 102 CGKF, CKP, Folder 32B, Rallis, tel. YOI-133 MFA to Washington, 2 August 1978. 103 CGKF, CKP, Folder 32B, Rallis, tel. 195 MFA to Washington, 8 August 1978, and

Alexandrakis, tel. A422 Washington to MFA, 5 August 1978.

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Clement Zablocki and Lee H. Hamilton were supporters of the repeal, they praised the Greek requests as ‘realistic’ and stated their willingness to support them.104 While the Greek government was trying to secure the support of the Greek Lobby, rumours questioning Athens’ position on the issue circulated on Capitol Hill. Karamanlis addressed these rumours during his visit to Washington. One version reported that Karamanlis would not make a political issue of the repeal in Greece. In his early June meeting with members of the HIRC Karamanlis made it clear that the Greek public did not support the repeal. He claimed potential reactions to the repeal ‘could even topple his government and cause him to resign’.105 Throughout the Congressional battle the Greek government tried to capitalise on Karamanlis’ perceived personal importance to Greek–US relations to persuade representatives and senators to support Greek views.106 Carter signed the repeal of the arms embargo into law on 26 September 1978. The Greek government managed to include the references it sought and was offered $35 million in additional aid. The legislation tasked the president with submitting a report every 60 days testifying to progress made towards a Cyprus solution. Although Carter and the presidents who followed him did so, the practice became more titular than an action of any substance. The effectiveness of the final version of the law repealing the arms embargo is disputed. Ioannides (2001) stressed it had failed since meaningful progress on Cyprus was not secured.107 However, Theodorakopoulos (1996) focussed on the positive impact the balance of power had on the future of US military aid provisions to Greece and Turkey.108 Greek records do not provide the Greek government’s view. Despite the limitations prime among which was the uncompromising position that supporters of the arms embargo adopted, the Greek government did

104 CGKF, CKP, Folder 32B, Alexandrakis, tel. A162E.X. Washington to MFA, 4 August 1978, and Alexandrakis, tel. 172E.X. Washington to MFA, 8 August 1978. 105 CGKF, CKP, Folder 31B, Note on the meeting between the Prime Minister and the House International Relations Committee, 2 June 1978. 106 CGKF, CKP, Folder 32B, Rallis, AE.195, 8 August 1978. 107 Ioannides, Realpolitik, 398. 108 Theodorakopoulos, Congress, 154.

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succeed in securing benefits for the country in return for repeal of the arms embargo.

End of the Collective Approach Repeal of the Turkish arms embargo did not end the US effort to bring about negotiations on Cyprus. Provisions in the new law tasked the US President with demonstrating that progress was being made toward a Cyprus solution. In the following months the US administration pursued initiatives that focussed on breaking the deadlock. After the votes in Congress secured the repeal of the legislation the US administration worked closely with the governments of Britain, France, and West Germany, as members of the UN Security Council, to create a ‘Framework for a Cyprus Settlement’.109 The Cypriot communities, Greece, and Turkey were once again unwilling to compromise.110 The Greek-Cypriot side formally rejected the ‘Framework’ on 14 December 1978. Rejection of the US-led effort to put in place a formal process that would lead to a settlement in Cyprus represented the end of the US administration’s holistic approach towards the Eastern Mediterranean. The Cyprus dispute itself was never at the centre of US policy. The President’s Emissary to Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus described the US approach toward Cyprus best in his 4 November 1977 meeting with Carter. Clifford argued that: ‘We still have an interest in Cyprus—but as a matter of fact, Cyprus is just one smaller piece on the chessboard—it is Turkey and Greece and our efforts to prevent trouble between them that matter’.111 Until early 1978 the US administration remained committed to reducing tensions between Greece and Turkey, particularly in relation to Cyprus, while strengthening bilateral relations with both. The DCAs, particularly the Turkish one, were the bargaining chip. The administration was fully aware that Congress would only ratify the Turkish–US DCA if

109 Nikos Christodoulidis, Tα σ χ šδια λ ´ σ ης τ oυ Kυπ ριακ o´ (1948–1978) [Plans for Solution of the Cyprus Problem (1948–1978)] (Athens: Kastaniotis, 2009), 213. 110 Intelligence Information Cable Prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency, Washington, 21 November 1978, FRUS, Vol. XXI, doc. 62. 111 Memorandum of Conversation, ‘Summary of the President’s Meeting with Clark Clifford on Greece–Turkey–Cyprus Problem’, Participants: President Jimmy Carter, Clark Clifford, Secretary Cyrus Vance, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Matthew Nimetz, Paul B. Henze, Washington, 4 November 1977, FRUS, Vol. XXI, doc. 16.

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adequate progress toward a Cyprus solution was made. Prime Minister Demirel and the Turkish military establishment appeared eager to secure the Turkish–US DCA and willing to move closer to the Greek position. However, following the Greek elections and Ecevit’s return to power the value of the DCAs as a US tool to promote concessions was reduced. During the 1976 and 1977 DCA negotiations the Greek government sought to secure the same legal framework and a comparable level of military and economic aid as those provided by the United States to Turkey. The Greek effort was successful. In addition, the US Congress emphasised its intention to simultaneously approve both DCAs. The last remaining piece in the process jigsaw was parliamentary ratification of the Greek–US DCA, which was expected to take place strictly along party lines. After the 1977 elections the Greek government was not prepared to take another unpopular step. Hence US ratification of the agreement with Turkey faced its first setback. The US administration was not in a position to guarantee the Turkish–US DCA would bring about progress in resolving the Cyprus crisis. Ecevit meanwhile demonstrated little interest in accepting the Turkish– US DCA his predecessor had concluded. With Turkish economic problems mounting Ecevit sought to exploit relations with the United States to secure much-needed economic assistance. Threatening to move away from NATO was his way of putting pressure on Washington. As relations with Ankara deteriorated the US administration reversed its approach. Although repeal of the US arms embargo represented a short-term solution to moving toward closer Turkish–US relations, a new or updated Turkish–US defence agreement would require lengthy negotiations and a long ratification process. Karamanlis told Vance that a solution to the Cyprus crisis would likely remove all the complications affecting Turkish–US, Greek–US, and Greek–Turkish relations. However, despite US expectations, neither the Greek nor the Turkish government were willing to ask their respective ethnic communities in Cyprus to make concessions as they both feared a backlash at home. Any Greek role played to find a solution to the Cyprus crisis was always going to be inferior to that played by the Turks. The Greek government could only at best advise and counsel the sovereign government of Cyprus. By contrast, Ankara could influence if not control the leadership of the Turkish-Cypriot community thanks not least to Turkey’s military presence in the northern zone.

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The Greek government steadily abandoned many of its long-term goals such as settling the Greek–Turkish dispute. Securing Greece’s role in the West by concluding EEC negotiations and securing a formal agreement with NATO emerged as the government’s main short-term goals. Rather than making a politically controversial return to the western alliance the Greek government underlined that its declared intention since 1975 had been for a ‘special relationship’ that had yet to materialise. Such a goal was consistent with Karamanlis’ rhetoric thus far and could shield his government from criticism. The Greek strategy of confrontation aimed at ensuring maximum US support for these goals. This approach became apparent in the aftermath of repealing the Turkish arms embargo when the Greek government focussed exclusively on settling the terms of Greece’s participation in the western alliance. Washington’s assistance remained crucial to securing this goal.

CHAPTER 7

The Final Act: Reintegrating Greece into NATO

Between 1978 and 1980 the Greek government increased its efforts to formalise Greece’s relationship with NATO that had been in limbo since its 1974 withdrawal from integrated command. Talks between Athens and Brussels aimed at forging a special relationship. Eventually, Greece pursued full reintegration into the military structure of NATO. The process concerned NATO as a whole and remained distinct from bilateral Greek–US relations. This was the case between 1975 and 1978 when Greek and NATO representatives worked towards finalising a new framework for Greek forces to participate in NATO defence structures. In late 1978 the situation changed when Turkey objected to the arrangements the two sides concluded. Ankara’s effective veto of Greece’s reintegration put the issue at the forefront of bilateral relations between Greece and the United States—or at least that was Athens’ intention. The Greek government followed a template that it had put together almost a year earlier. This insisted that no progress on Greek–US defence cooperation could take place without concluding the Greek–NATO agreement that was pending. Ankara’s reaction galvanised even stronger efforts to persuade the US administration to play a direct role in the Greek–NATO process and secure a compromise with Ankara. The United States continued to urge both sides to find acceptable solutions. Washington worked behind the scenes in Brussels in concert with other

© The Author(s) 2020 A. Antonopoulos, Redefining Greek–US Relations, 1974–1980, Security, Conflict and Cooperation in the Contemporary World, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-47656-4_7

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NATO members in efforts to break the deadlock. Athens could do little to change Washington’s stance. Regional developments influenced the bilateral relationship. Despite the impact of its 1977 election (or perhaps because of it) Greece proved to be a stable multiparty democracy with a growing economy. Signing the accession treaty to the European Economic Community in 1979 reinforced Greece’s place within the western alliance. Its twin—as the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) referred to Turkey—followed an entirely different course. Years of political and economic instability transformed into a socioeconomic crisis that challenged democratic institutions. The Iranian Revolution and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan reaffirmed Ankara’s importance for western security. Dramatic support was required to ensure Ankara’s place in the West. The divergent paths taken by Greece and Turkey meant the balanced approach that past US administrations had followed no longer served US interests. Although Greece officially returned to NATO in October 1980, key decisions about Greek–NATO cooperation and the Greek–US defence relationship remained unresolved. Ratification of the Defence and Economic Cooperation Agreement (DECA), which was the updated version of the Defence Cooperation Agreement (DCA), would only be completed three years later. By then a new president would occupy the White House and a new party would govern Greece. Policy priorities and strategies Karamanlis, Ford, and Carter previously pursued in relation to the Greek–US alliance had to face up to a new reality.

A New Special Relationship? In 1975 one of the first decisions of the first Nea Dimocratia (ND) government concerned the place of Greece in NATO after its withdrawal from the military structure. In August 1974 Athens announced it had left the military side of the alliance and had opted to stay in its political structures only. After the general election the Greek government had to explain what this decision meant in practice. Although the statement was necessary from a domestic point of view, it was in itself a symbolic and meaningless gesture as Minister of National Defence Evangelos AveroffTossitsa admitted. In a detailed memorandum in early 1975 to Prime Minister Constantine Karamanlis and the Greek cabinet Averoff made it

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clear what the announcement meant and came up with options that were the most compatible with Greece’s national security objectives.1 After the announcement the expectation of automatic participation of Greek forces in an East–West conflict no longer applied. The same was true of any collective retaliation against an act of aggression or attack by a Warsaw Pact member on Greece, an obligation that applied to all members under Article 5 of NATO. Averoff was an ardent supporter of Western cooperation and viewed the development as negative. Greece continued to face threats from its communist northern neighbours. Such concern became abundantly clear when the Greek political and military leadership in addition to planning how to counter a potential clash with Turkey in the summer of 1974 they also underlined the need to reinforce the border between Greece and Bulgaria.2 Consequently, the French model the Greek decision imitated did not serve national objectives. France had concluded a series of bilateral agreements that governed its defence relationship with NATO. Although the French military remained independent of allied structures, the two sides would cooperate fully in the event of an East–West confrontation. Even if the western alliance agreed to a similar request from Greece, it would still not fulfil Greek aims. Greek national security depended on a closer relationship with NATO. Greece lacked its own nuclear force, did not have a strong defence industry, and unlike France shared a common border with a communist state (considerations that Averoff often pointed out). More importantly, Athens faced ‘the negative stance’ of another member of the alliance. The Greek defence minister referred to the possibility of Turkey taking advantage of the unanimity clause in NATO decisions to the detriment of Greece. Averoff recommended specific arrangements between Greece and NATO that reflected the close yet distinct membership of the alliance the Greek government advocated. However, Averoff also urged the cabinet to consider national security as the principle guide in efforts to establish a new Greek–NATO relationship. The Greek government would accept 1 Constantine G. Karamanlis Foundation [hereafter CGKF], Constantine Karamanlis Papers [hereafter CKP], Folder 67B, Averoff, Brief Memorandum, No. 40013, Minister of National Defence for the Prime Minister: The Greek Withdrawal from NATO, 6 January 1975. 2 CGKF, CKP, Folder 2B, Averoff, Brief Memorandum of Meeting between political and military leadership, 25 August 1974.

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compromise if it served long-term security objectives. Internal political consultations eventually resulted in what the government called a new special relationship between Greece and NATO. In a statement to the Greek Parliament Prime Minister Karamanlis described the main elements of the new relationship his government hoped to conclude with NATO in October 1975. The Greek government called for national control over all military forces during peacetime. In the event of an East–West conflict Greek forces would resume full participation in allied commands. Greece and NATO were to negotiate detailed arrangements to that end. Finally, Karamanlis emphasised that the new relationship would require NATO to secure the explicit permission of the Greek government for any action within Greek territory.3 Technical groups from the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs, national defence, and military commands were expected to translate the political guidelines into workable proposals. At the NATO level the Defence Planning Committee (DPC) established an Open-Ended Group (OEG) to accommodate negotiations between Greek and NATO representatives. In due course the two sides expected to present their conclusions and proposals for a new Greek–NATO military relationship to the Military Committee (MC) for consideration and endorsement. The ultimate decision on the future Greece–NATO relationship remained with the DPC in which allies were required to reach a unanimous agreement. Slow progress marked the negotiations between 1975 and 1978 for a number of reasons but mainly because of the complexity of the task. Turkey often raised objections in terms of procedure that aimed to delay rather than derail negotiations.4 Meanwhile, Greece continued to participate in NATO on an informal basis. Since the announcement of Greece’s withdrawal from integrated command in the summer of 1974 no attempt was made to formalise 3 Karamanlis speech in Greek parliament, 16 October 1975, in Constantine Svolopoulos (ed.), Κωνσταντίνος Καραμανλής: αρχείο, γεγονότα, και κείμενα [Constantine Karamanlis: Archive, Events and Texts, Hereafter Karamanlis] (Athens: Kathimerini, 2005), Vol. 9, 77. 4 See Constantine Svolopoulos, Η Ελληνική Εξωτερική Πολιτική, 1945–1981 [Greek Foreign Policy, 1945–1981], 8th ed. (Athens: Estia, 2008), Vol. 2, 207–217; Monteagle Stearns, Entangled Allies: U.S. Policy toward Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus (New York, NY: Council of Foreign Relations Press, 1992), Chapters 5 and 9; Tozun Bahcheli, Greek–Turkish Relations since 1955 (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990), 149–159.

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Greek participation or non-participation on the various NATO committees based on strict and rigid guidelines. Greece’s NATO allies accepted the dominant view within the US Department of State not to force the Greek government to take hasty actions on where it stood in the western alliance. Such a flexible approach remained true in the following years. No member not even Turkey insisted on establishing strict guidelines as to which committees Greek representatives should continue to sit on. The Greek government decided to continue or cease participation on NATO committees on a vague and arbitrary interpretation of which committees were political and which were military.5 The FCO started discussing the status of Greek involvement in NATO around the time the Greek–NATO talks for a new special relationship intensified in mid-1978. The Greek government deciding its representatives would continue to sit on most committees perhaps reflected Greece’s interest in maintaining as many links with the western alliance as possible. Greece naturally ceased to attend the DPC and the Defence Review Committee. However, it sat on all other major committees including the MC when discussions included issues outside integrated command or issues concerning the Greek–NATO relationship. Therefore, the Greek announcement did not mark an abrupt severance of the Greek–NATO relationship. It created a complex and intertwined unofficial one. In 1977 Ambassador Menelaos Alexandrakis signalled his government’s desire to expedite Greek–NATO negotiations in one of his earliest meetings with the incoming Carter administration. According to what Alexandrakis said to Secretary-designate Vance the Greek government intended to submit ‘concrete proposals to the alliance in mid-January that are designed to meet both Greek and Allied defense needs’.6 The talks between Athens and Brussels accelerated in the following months. Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) General Alexander Haig agreed with Chief of the Greek General Staff General Ioannis Davos on key aspects regarding Greece’s role within the integrated structure of

5 The National Archives [hereafter TNA], Foreign and Commonwealth Office [hereafter FCO], 46/1726, Gragg, UKDEL NATO, Letter 021/358/1 to Figgis, FCO, 25 May 1978. 6 Tarnoff, Memorandum of Conversation, 6 January 1977, in David Ziegler and Adam M. Howard (eds), Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980 [hereafter FRUS], Vol. XXI, Greece; Cyprus; Turkey (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2014), doc. 162.

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NATO including how Greek forces would be accommodated. The Greek return required reorganisation of Eastern Mediterranean air, land, and naval commands. Such reorganisation was a necessary step considering the enmity that had existed between Athens and Ankara since 1974. Greek and Turkish forces had cooperated closely within the relevant Eastern Mediterranean commands before the Cyprus crisis and the Greek withdrawal from NATO. Land Forces South-East Europe (LANDSOUTHEAST) command was based near Izmir on the western coast of Turkey as was the Sixth Allied Tactical Air Force (SIXATAF/6ATAF). A US general headed each command and had Greek and Turkish deputies serving under him. Following Greece’s withdrawal the US general only supervised Turkish deputies. The SACEUR eventually assigned commands to Turkish generals as well. NATO had to establish separate commands to accommodate Greek forces. General Haig proposed the creation of two new commands in the Eastern Mediterranean: Land Forces South-Central (LANDSOUTHCENT) and the Seventh Allied Tactical Air Force (SEVENTAF/7ATAF) both based near Larissa in Greece.7 But what would be the area of responsibility of these new commands? Greek and Turkish forces were responsible for different geographical areas that, with the exception of land command, did not necessarily correspond to national boundaries. For instance, the area of command and control assigned to the Greek navy included both Greek and international territorial waters in the Aegean Sea. The narrow strip of Turkish territorial waters along the Turkish coast remained the responsibility of the Turkish navy. The areas of air command reflected a similar situation in which Greeks and Turks controlled the flight information areas (FIRs) of Athens and Istanbul, respectively—zones beyond national airspace boundaries. The Aegean dispute complicated such arrangements. Turkey was opposed to assigning new commands to the same geographical areas of responsibility that Greek forces had up until 1974. The Greek view was that these zones would only be finalised after the return to NATO. This difference, at

7 See Victor Papacosma, ‘Greece and NATO’, in Lawrence S. Kaplan, Robert W. Clawson, and Raimondo Luraghi (eds), NATO and the Mediterranean (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources Inc., 1985), 203–205, which offers a detailed account of the development and arrangement of NATO commands in the Mediterranean.

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least when put in this simple form, dominated efforts at securing unanimous agreement amongst NATO members on Greek participation in the alliance until 1980.8 The western alliance anticipated progress would be made towards Greek reintegration in 1978. Meetings between Haig and Davos became more frequent. The two generals put together a document listing 12 factors concerning and governing the military relationship between Greece and NATO after Greece’s return. The Greek government and press called it the ‘Haig–Davos agreement for Greek reintegration’. Although Athens felt the ‘agreement’ established a special relationship in line with proclamations made by the Greek government,9 the Haig–Davos document did not constitute a final agreement or a special relationship with Greece. Ambassador William Tapley Bennett Jr. offered a sober assessment of the conclusions the two representatives reached. Bennett was the US Permanent Representative to NATO and noted in a telegram to the Department of State that the Haig proposals described the relationship between Greece and NATO as standard apart from the addition of new command arrangements. The phraseology the Greek government chose for the document (i.e., an agreement establishing a new special relationship with NATO) reflected the country’s domestic needs rather than being an objective assessment of the contents of the talks.10 The Haig–Davos conclusions were proposals the SACEUR submitted in June 1978 to the MC for consideration. This was not the end of the road since the MC expected to review the proposed provisions for Greek reintegration into NATO from military and defence points of view. It was then to submit its assessment to the DPC who would make the final 8 Ioannis Valinakis, Εισαγωγή στην Ελληνική Εξωτερική Πολιτική [Introduction to Greek Foreign Policy 1949–1988], 4th ed. (Thessaloniki: Paratiritis, 2003), 224–228. 9 CGKF, CKP, Folder 34B, National Defence Command, Information Note for the Chief of Staff, 14 October 1980 (the records in this folder give a detailed account of successive plans and negotiations that is more complete than anything currently available); Nikos Simos, ‘Σε αποφασιστικό σημείο το θέμα της «ειδικής σχέσεως» με το ΝΑΤΟ [At a Crucial Point in the Question of the ‘Special Relationship’ with NATO]’, Kathimerini, 21 September 1978, 1. 10 National Archives [hereafter NARA], General Records of Department of State, RG 59 [hereafter RG 59], Central Foreign Policy Files, 1973–1979 Electronic Telegrams [hereafter Electronic Telegrams] 1978, Bennett, tel. 09107 NATO to State, 5 October 1978.

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decision. The DPC was tasked with evaluating the proposals from military and political points of view. The Haig–Davos conclusions opened up a period of intense discussions behind the scenes in Brussels as the MC did its utmost to allay opposition from Ankara.

How to Deal with Turkey Turkish objections to the Haig–Davos conclusions were of little surprise to other NATO members or the Greek government. Ambassador Stavros G. Roussos from London reported an assessment made by Deputy UnderSecretary of State at the FCO Reginald Hibbert. Hibbert stressed that it was widely expected that Turkey would take advantage of Greek efforts to reintegrate into NATO to enhance its long-held objectives regarding Greek–Turkish differences. The FCO came to view the Greek reintegration process as Turkey’s strongest card in its dispute with Greece. It was a card no Turkish government would play without significant gains being made.11 Following the Haig submission to the MC the Turkish government formally listed its objections to the proposed arrangements in summer 1978. Ankara underscored its support and continued to do so for the following two years of Greece’s return to the alliance in principle. The Turkish government insisted that its objections were to the proposed specific arrangements that compromised NATO and Turkish security. Such arrangements included NATO air and naval command and control arrangements on NATO’s southern flank. Ankara insisted on the need to resolve the controversial provisions before Greece’s return, arguing that the arrangements as they had existed prior to 1974 were void since the Greek withdrawal.12 NATO members recognised Turkish objections had a solid base militarily. Although they felt it was high time for the western alliance to adopt the task force concept when assigning command and control areas rather than the outdated practice of national forces being responsible for given areas, Greece had consistently objected to task force proposals in the Aegean prior to 1974. However, NATO members also recognised 11 CGKF, Evangelos Averoff-Tossitsa Papers [hereafter EAP], File 32, Roussos, tel. 3100.1/AΣ.375 London to MFA, 11 October 1978. 12 TNA, FCO 46/1727, Cragg, Letter 021/358/1 to MOD, ‘Greece and NATO’, 30 August 1978, attached to Turkish Delegation–NATO doc 2821.

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the Greek government could not accept reintegration into NATO under worse terms than those it enjoyed before partial withdrawal. More importantly, the Greek government made it clear that it could not accept any part of Greek territory being subject to foreign control—let alone potentially Turkish control. Turkish objections to Greek reintegration posed a significant challenge to key NATO members and the closest allies of Greece and Turkey: the United States, the Federal Republic of Germany, and the United Kingdom.13 Turkish objections dismayed the allies since they were seen as an attempt by Ankara to weaponise the western alliance to solve a bilateral dispute. However, no NATO partner stepped up to the plate to play a direct role in finding a compromise between the Greek and Turkish governments. Efforts were instead concentrated in Brussels where priority was given to talks between military and permanent representatives including the Turkish and Greek ambassadors. Such an approach was particularly true of the United States. As leader of the western alliance it was expected to take the lead. Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher explained to Carter that the United States needed to work with General Haig and others to ‘remove this impediment to Greek reentry’.14 However, Washington did not plan to work alone in its push for a solution. Efforts to reintegrate Greece into NATO coincided with the last few steps taken towards repeal of the Turkish arms embargo. Initially, although it remained unclear whether White House efforts to repeal would succeed, when the arms embargo was repealed it removed a constant irritant in Turkish–US relations. However, it was not enough on its own to repair relations. The two sides remained locked over the reopening of US bases in Turkey and over negotiations for a new Turkish– US DCA. The precarious state of Turkish–US bilateral relations offered little incentive for the Carter administration to agree to play a direct role in Greek–Turkish differences over NATO arrangements. US officials naturally raised the question of Greek reintegration during meetings with their 13 TNA, FCO 46/1729, Ministry of Defence to UKMILREP, Letter DPS/B/5I/8, 6 October 1978, and Killick to Defence Department (FCO), Letter, 5 October 1978, and UKMILREP, tel. 3644 to RBDWC, 20 [unclear in the original] September 1978. 14 Jimmy Carter Presidential Library [hereafter JCPL], Plains File, Subject File, State Department Evening Reports [hereafter SDER], Box 39, Christopher, Memorandum for the President, 23 October 1978.

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Turkish counterparts throughout the following two years. The US administration did encourage compromise and was prepared to accept specific solutions. Washington consciously refrained from making Turkish–US or for that matter Greek–US bilateral cooperation conditional on Greek reintegration into NATO. The US Permanent Representative to NATO coordinated his actions with an inner circle of NATO members made up of Germany, Norway, the United Kingdom, and Italy in an attempt to break the deadlock.15 In any event Greek reintegration promised to be a lengthy process. The Haig–Davos conclusions called for the MC to report to the DPC. Member-states-other than Greece and France-worked towards reaching a common decision on their assessment of the Haig proposals. Between June and November military representatives struggled to find a formula that would get Greece back into the military structure of NATO as soon as possible and at the same time accommodate Turkish concerns. How to strike a compromise that would satisfy both states was the same riddle the western alliance only too often faced in dealing with Greece and Turkey. The western alliance recognised the validity of Turkish arguments regarding command and control areas that Ankara backed up by referring to specific earlier NATO agreements. Nevertheless, NATO also recognised the Greek government could not accept preconditions to its return. Similarly, the western alliance recognised that domestic opposition to an agreement involving control or potential control of a portion of Greek territory could not be overcome even though such control had been exaggerated.16 The solution involved the addition of a disclaimer and remained unchanged in all future reiterations of the Haig–Davos conclusions. According to the US Permanent Representative both Athens and Ankara had to accept that NATO arrangements did not provide any legal precedent regarding boundary questions in the Aegean.17 The proposal

15 JCPL, Plains File, SDER, Box 39, Vance, Memorandum for the President, 31 October 1978, and Vance, Memorandum for the President, 6 November 1978; see various reports on meetings between the representatives in Brussels such as TNA, FCO 46/1729, UKMILREP to MODUK, tel. 071640z, September 1978 (registry date 5 October 1978). 16 TNA, FCO 46/1730, Sutherland, tel. 473 to FCO, 4 November 1978; TNA, FCO 46/1729, telegram, MoD to UKMILREP Brussels, 2 October 1978, on efforts to break the deadlock among others. 17 NARA, RG 59, Electronic Telegrams 1978, Bennett, tel. 9107 USNATO to State, 5 October 1978.

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was not enough to quell Turkish opposition. By late October 1978 only one avenue remained for the MC: a report reflecting the supporting views of the majority of member-states while citing Turkey’s dissenting opinion. The MC report satisfied Athens to some extent. The Greek government could present it as evidence that all NATO members except Turkey supported its desire for establishing a special relationship with the alliance. The Greek government could then continue its effort to formalise the Greek-NATO relationship fending off any domestic criticism. It was Turkey that shut the door on Greek reintegration at this stage—not NATO. Moreover, Ambassador McCloskey reported the interpretation given in Athens claimed that the alliance had ‘rejected’ Turkish views.18 It satisfied what Karamanlis emphasised in his meeting with Christopher: Athens could not afford to appear to be begging the western alliance to allow it to return.19 The MC report on Greek reintegration proposals did not result in a meaningful discussion at the DPC. Matters took a turn for the worse when it became apparent that the Turkish government intended to veto the Haig–Davos proposals. Turkey’s formal objections transformed Greek–NATO negotiations into another Greek–Turkish dispute. The Greek government remained unmoved in its opposition to holding bilateral talks with Ankara. Athens intensified its efforts to get Washington to resume playing a central role and to try and persuade the Ecevit government to compromise. The Greek government reverted to its strategy of confrontation to force Washington to intervene in the Greek reintegration process and secure an agreement in a timely fashion.

Limits of Confrontation The Greek government considered it imperative to get the United States to play a central role in lifting Ankara’s objections to the Greek reintegration process. From late 1978 until the autumn of 1980 Athens increased pressure on the Carter administration to force a Turkish compromise. The Greek government insisted against prolonging the negotiations and 18 NARA, RG 59, Electronic Telegrams 1978, McCloskey, tel. 09472 Athens to State, 30 October 1978; ‘Αντιδρά φανερά πια η Τουρκία στις σχέσεις Ελλάδος–ΝΑΤΟ [Turkey Now Clearly Objects to Greek–NATO Relations]’, Kathimerini, 19 October 1978, 1. 19 CGKF, CKP, Folder 51B, Note on meeting between Karamanlis and Christopher in Athens, 19 October 1978.

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significantly altering the Haig–Davos conclusions. This raises the question of why the Greek government insisted on Greek reintegration at this stage and under the specific provisions of the Haig–Davos conclusions. There are a number of factors that explain Greece’s wish to return to the alliance in 1978. The Greek government had recognised that the 1974 decision to leave NATO no longer benefitted Greece. The pressure Athens put on its allies had not prevented repeal of the Turkish arms embargo.20 The longer Greece remained outside the integrated structure of NATO the more benefits Turkey secured.21 It was widely felt that the decision of August 1974 now worked against the interests of Greece. Accurate interpretations of the situation made by Chourchoulis, Kourkouvelas, and Rizas (see footnotes 20 and 21) amongst others summed up the complex factors that prevailed in Greek government thinking. Domestic imperatives and national security considerations once again guided Athens’ stance towards the alliance. Although the Greek government aimed to limit the political cost of the decision to return to NATO, Averoff claimed that many supporters of ND, PASOK, and the left more broadly were also opposed to full participation in NATO as of January 1978. This is the reason the Greek government pursued the idea of a special relationship with the alliance at this stage.22 During Christopher’s visit to Athens in October 1978 the Greek government let him know that the domestic environment called for agreement at an early stage. Minister for Foreign Affairs George Rallis claimed that there … are no anti-American demonstrations and we are ready to discuss a special relationship with NATO. Moreover, many supporters of the opposition parties accept this development. […] I am afraid though that pressures applied to us during the negotiations with NATO, in particular within the

20 Dionysios Chourchoulis and Lykourgos Kourkouvelas, ‘Greek Perceptions of NATO

during the Cold War’, Southeast and Black Sea Studies, Vol. 12(4), 2012, 507. 21 Sotiris Rizas, Από την Κρίση στην ύφεση: Ο Κωνσταντίνος Μητσοτάκης και η πολιτική της προσέγγισης Ελλάδας-Τουρκίας [From Crisis to Détente: Konstantinos Mitsotakis and the Policy of Rapprochement between Greece and Turkey] (Athens: Papazisis, 2003), 60. 22 TNA, FCO 46/1725, Note on meeting between the Defence Secretary and the Greek Minister of Defence, 9 January 1978.

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Military Committee, endanger such an ideal situation. […] We insist the suggestions General Haig submitted three months ago be adhered to.23

Such statements were intended to put pressure on Greece’s allies to ensure agreement on the basis of the Haig conclusions. Moreover, the references to public opinion reflect the domestic pressures the Greek government faced. Despite potential opposition at home the Greek government made significant concessions to secure the Haig–Davos agreement and appeared ready to take further steps to bring the talks to a successful conclusion. In November 1978 as efforts intensified to make the MC report unanimous Athens signalled its readiness to make one more concession. It was willing to accept that the command and control boundaries that existed prior to the 1974 agreement on the special relationship no longer needed to be reconfirmed.24 Prolonging the talks could result in further concessions being requested that the Greek government could not shoulder politically. It was clearly not enough. The Greek government risked a domestic backlash. It had already reneged on Karamanlis’ insistence that Greece would return to NATO only after the Cyprus crisis was resolved. Regardless of how the Greek government presented the agreement—as a special relationship or as reintegration—it remained a significant departure from publicly stated policy. From an election campaign strategy standpoint the ND party would be better placed to deal with an unpopular issue at this stage rather than closer to the next general election scheduled for the autumn of 1981. From the national security perspective Greek reintegration remained directly linked to the relationship between Turkey and Greece as well as the role Greece played within the Western defence system in an unstable regional environment. In later interviews Karamanlis and his successor Rallis, who guided Greece’s return to the western alliance in October 1980, emphasised the threat to Greek interests as pivotal to

23 CGKF, CKP, Folder 51B, MFA, Memorandum of Conversation between the US Undersecretary of State Christopher and the Minister of Defense Averoff-Tositsa and Minister of Foreign Affairs Rallis, 20 October 1978; CGKF, EAP, File 32, PM Office, Instructions to Ministers Rallis and Averoff for meeting with Christopher, 10 October 1978. Note on additional info on the original Greek Memorandum of Conversation. 24 TNA, FCO 46/1930, Owen, tel. 199 to UKDEL NATO, 4 November 1978.

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reintegration.25 Karamanlis later argued that the Greek government faced challenges caused by Turkish government’s efforts ‘to exploit to its benefit our [Greek] status in the alliance’.26 The longer the Greek government remained outside NATO, the more Turkey would be able to undermine Athens’ links with the western alliance.27 The fear of Turkey taking advantage of Greece’s position in NATO was not just an abstract perception. A practical implication emerged during discussions about NATO’s future defence planning. The question about the role Greece would play in the Long-Term Defence Programme (LTDP) launched by the western alliance during the NATO Heads of State Summit in London in May 1977 best demonstrated Greece’s concern about its links with the western alliance being undermined. The LTDP was the West’s response to the Soviet build-up in Eastern Europe amid negotiations for further arms reductions.28 It clarified the implications of such a build-up the Greek government would have to face within the western alliance at a time when NATO was changing. The Greek government viewed securing a role in the LTDP as vital to its defence capabilities. Considering Averoff’s earlier arguments about the importance of Western support for Greece it is little wonder the Greek government was interested in the project. Indeed, the western alliance accepted that Greece would participate in the process and be allowed to express its views on matters relevant to Greece. The Greek government recognised that the alliance would not be bound to act on its views.29 A real test about Greece’s future role in the LTDP, and NATO more generally, were the preliminary preparations for the upcoming NATO summit. The agenda of the NATO Heads of State Summit in Washington in May 1978 included a discussion of the LTDP. Despite Greece’s withdrawal from the DPC, Karamanlis instructed the Greek permanent representative to request participation in the discussion. The Greek

25 Quoted in Valinakis, Introduction, 231. 26 Svolopoulos, Foreign Policy, 207. 27 Rizas, From Crisis to Détente, 60. 28 Kristina Spohr, ‘Western Europe, the United States and the Genesis of NATO’s

Dual-Track Decision 1977–1979’, Journal of Cold War Studies, Vol. 13(2), 2011, 39–89. 29 CGKF, CKP, Folder 31B, MFA/NATO Desk, ‘Long-Term Defence Programme’, 9 May 1978.

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request had the backing of the alliance. After all, it merely reflected how flexible the Greek withdrawal had been. However, Turkey objected to Karamanlis’ request.30 The Turkish government made it clear there was no way Karamanlis could take part in the meeting since Greece no longer sat on the DPC. Eventually, a compromise was reached in which Karamanlis would be welcome to attend the discussion on the LTDP but would not have voting rights. The Greek government viewed the compromise as unacceptable and Karamanlis instructed the Greek delegation to NATO to withdraw the request.31 The incident gave Secretary Vance an opportunity to air his views once more about Greece and Turkey’s position in the alliance. He lamented that Ankara and Athens attached ‘lower priority to NATO issues than to their narrower national objectives in their disputes with each other and their bilateral problems with the US’. On the specific case of the LTDP the US administration regretted the Turkish stance and opposed Ankara’s intention to impose ‘severe Turkish limitations on Greek involvement in the LTDP’. Vance continued by speculating that Turkish attempts to hold virtually all questions of Greece’s participation in NATO hostage to passage of the US–Turkish DCA, if this is indeed Ankara’s objective, could in the end prove more embarrassing to Ankara than to us. Would also [sic] distinguish between Greek involvement in the LTDP and full Greek return to NATO’s integrated military structure […] we can afford delay on the latter, but want to move ahead rapidly with the former.32

Rather than isolating petty instances or getting bogged down on minor matters of compliance with NATO rules, Vance’s telegram made clear that these represented the kind of pressure Ankara, as a full NATO member, would be able to exercise against Greece. The Greek government were determined not to succumb to that. 30 TNA, FCO 46/1726, Figgis, Letter to Vereker, 16 May 1978, and Figgis, Letter to

Sutherland, FCO, ‘Greece and NATO’, 8 June 1978, particularly the attachments such as the Turkish delegation’s letter setting the terms of Greek participation to the discussion. 31 CGKF, CKP, Folder 31B, Rallis, tel. NATO5517/70/789 Athens to Permanent Representative NATO, 13 May 1978. 32 NARA, RG 59, Electronic Telegrams 1977, Vance, tel. 284082 State to US Mission in NATO, 29 November 1977.

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When Turkey formally objected to the Haig–Davos arrangements the Greek government returned to its strategy of US confrontation. Athens opposed any changes to the Haig–Davos conclusions and insisted on the need for rapid ratification of proposals formalising the Greek–NATO relationship. In an effort to put pressure on the United States and force Washington’s hand to push for a compromise with Turkey, Athens set various deadlines for progress such as the maximum time the Greek government was prepared to wait before it withdrew its request to return to the alliance. This was the message that Karamanlis conveyed to Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher during his October 1978 visit to Athens. Karamanlis argued that should the Turkish objections remain in place he would be forced to revoke the Greek intention to return to the western alliance in the near future.33 A few months later in the summer of 1979 the Greek government sent the same message, warned that time was running out, and threatened freezing the process used to reach an agreement with NATO.34 One of the last times Karamanlis used this strategy of confrontation to pressure Washington came in spring 1980. Karamanlis had decided to seek the office of President of the Republic. The five-year term of President of the Greek Republic Constantine Tsatsos had come to its end and it was widely speculated that Karamanlis intended to seek the office that was not party political. Before announcing his decision Karamanlis informed the US administration of his intention in an effort to expedite progress in the negotiations. The Greek Ambassador conveyed a strictly personal verbal message to Secretary Vance revealing Karamanlis’ intention to seek election for the Presidency in mid-1980. In his message Karamanlis underlined the possibility of early elections as a result of the constitutional requirement the successful candidate would have to achieve of a two-thirds majority vote in the Greek Parliament. He intended to withdraw from the government either by being elected President or failing that departing entirely from politics. Considering the possibility of instability he insisted that a Greek–NATO agreement might 33 CGKF, CKP, Folder 51B, Note, Memorandum of Conversation between Karamanlis and Christopher, 19 October 1978. 34 NARA, RG 59, Electronic Telegrams 1979, McCloskey, tel. 04001 Athens to State, 8 May 1979; Telegram from Secretary of State Vance to the Department of State, 1 June 1979, FRUS, Vol. XXI, doc. 189; Telegram from the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State, 8 June 1979, FRUS, Vol. XXI, doc. 190.

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no longer be viable in the future.35 Vance immediately informed Carter of this development and reaffirmed the US commitment to Greece’s return to NATO.36 Although this did not fundamentally alter the US approach, the White House seriously considered the Greek views and the informal deadline of March 1980 that Athens had set for conclusion of the reintegration process.37 Although Vance made Carter aware of the statement, he was unable to persuade the Carter administration to change its stance against getting involved in the Greek–NATO–Turkey effort that General Haig’s successor Bernard W. ‘Ben’ Rogers pursued. To increase pressure on Washington the Greek government put a freeze on bilateral cooperation during the first six months of 1979— something so far overlooked in the literature. Christopher’s October 1978 visit focussed strongly on bilateral cooperation, particularly on soft-policy aspects and public policy. The Carter administration aimed to build on broader Greek–US cooperation and reduce its emphasis on defence/military cooperation. Nevertheless, renewal of the Voice of America agreement, along with a solar observatory agreement, and the new bilateral coordination agreement were all paused.38 Although the US administration insisted on the need to conclude these agreements, Athens disagreed. The Greek government argued for the need to conclude only the NATO agreement and showed no interest in the other agreements. The US Embassy attributed the unwillingness of the Greek government to approve these trivial agreements as politically motivated and that direct orders from the top of the Greek government were being followed to demonstrate that Greece ‘cannot be taken for granted as an ally’.39 The Greek government maintained this position leading to what the US administration described as a freeze in bilateral relations. Nevertheless, 35 Karamanlis message to Vance, 25 January 1980, in Svolopoulos (ed.), Karamanlis, Vol. 11, 383. 36 Tzounis message to Molyviatis following his talk with Vance, in Svolopoulos (ed.), Karamanlis, Vol. 11, 384. 37 JCPL, Z. Brzezinski Donated Historical Material Collection, Subject File, Box 34, Meeting—Vance/Brown/Brzezinski: 1/80–2/80, Brzezinski, Memorandum for the President, 29 January 1980. 38 NARA, RG 59, Electronic Telegrams 1979, McCloskey, tel. 00408 Athens to State, 15 January 1979, and McCloskey, tel. 04835 Athens to State, 4 June 1979, and McCloskey, tel. 05430 Athens to State, 20 June 1979. 39 NARA, RG 59, Electronic Telegrams 1979, McCloskey, tel. 02357 Athens to State, 16 March 1979.

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the Greek stance failed to move the US administration. Carter instructed Vance in no uncertain terms to ‘let the SACEUR handle’ the Greek reintegration process and ‘keep the US government out of it’.40 In October 1979 the Carter administration stated ‘about six months ago, Karamanlis froze relations with the U.S. with the objective of putting pressure on us to be more responsive to the Greek position’.41 The implications the Greek stance had on Greek–US cooperation were significant. Washington’s displeasure with Athens became evident in a stormy meeting between the US Ambassador in Athens and Director of the Prime Minister’s Political Office Ambassador Petros Molyviatis. During the meeting Ambassador McCloskey criticised the Greek government for its approach towards Washington saying that ‘we could not accept being appealed to privately to help with Greece’s regional problems while we were being bullied to such an extent publicly’.42 It was not only the Greek position on these agreements that undermined the Greek strategy. Greek efforts to embroil the US administration in the NATO dispute faced another severe obstacle. The US administration was unwilling to get involved because it believed the Greek threat to abandon negotiations was simply not credible whether in 1978 or afterwards. During Christopher’s October 1978 visit the Greeks outlined their intention to abort the negotiations if the MC were to alter the Haig–Davos conclusions radically. These statements had a lukewarm reception. Although the US Ambassador did not dismiss them light-heartedly, he noted that, ‘We continue to believe that there is some bluster and bluff in their words—the Greeks know as well as we the costs to themselves if they ever had to follow through on these words’.43 An overview of the Greek strategy during EEC negotiations further supported this view. The Department of State returned to the theme of ‘bluff and bluster’ in the Greek strategy when Ambassador McCloskey

40 JCPL, Plains File, SDER, Box 40, Vance, Memorandum for the President, 11 October 1979. 41 Memorandum from Robert D. Blackwill of the National Security Council Staff to

the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Aaron), 1 October 1979, FRUS, Vol. XXI, doc. 194. 42 Telegram from the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State, Athens, 8 June 1979, FRUS, Vol. XXI, doc. 190. 43 NARA, RG 59, Electronic Telegrams 1978, McCloskey, tel. 09329 Athens to State, 25 October 1978.

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and Ambassador Bennett from NATO assessed the Greek strategy towards its partners in the EEC negotiations. The US Embassy described the Greek approach: … it is worthwhile to review the way the Prime Minister mobilized a relatively weak nation for what he hoped would be maximum advantage in negotiating with partners who held most of the cards. In order to bring the Europeans to something close to the Greek position, Karamanlis acted as if he were prepared to smash a centerpiece of his policy, Greek membership in the EC. He blustered, wheedled, and postured. And he and his government did so openly so that the Greek public was engaged in a drama which pitted Greece against the Community on issues where success or failure could easily be measured. […] on the whole it was a strange performance by the Prime Minister and his advisers as they threatened their negotiating partners, fueled the opposition, and begged to be saved from that opposition all at the same time. In the end, Karamanlis did not achieve all his goals and wound up accepting the ‘unacceptable’. In fact, it is not clear to us that the Greeks achieved much more than they might have attained if they had negotiated in a less hyper fashion. However, Greeks seem to be drawing the opposite conclusion: that these tactics, traditional ones in the Greek diplomatic armory, were the key to Greek ‘success’.44

Although such an approach clearly mirrored that of Greece towards the United States regarding NATO, the US administration was not prepared to yield to Greek pressure tactics. The NSC, specifically Henze, noted and fully endorsed the Ambassadors’ analysis of Karamanlis’ tactics in getting Greece into the EEC. Henze also added that It was a splendid performance worthy of any politician at his best. The concluding points are important for the United States to remember in future dealings with Greece – and they too often tend to get forgotten as people susceptible to Greek Lobby influences get all worked up about Karamanlis’s tactics.45

Such considerations undermined Greek efforts to get the United States to play an active part in getting Turkey to limit its objections. What is 44 NARA, RG 59, Electronic Telegrams 1978, McCloskey, tel. 11235 Athens to State, 27 December 1978. 45 JCPL, NSA, Collection 27, Staff Material [hereafter NSA Staff], Horn/Special, Box 3, Henze, Memorandum for Brzezinski, 29 December 1978.

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more, Athens faced the wrath of its allies for allowing repairs to a ship of the Soviet navy to be undertaken in a shipyard in Syros. If such an action was indeed intended to increase pressure on the western alliance, it did not and had the reverse effect. The Greek government decided to abandon confrontation and seek rapprochement. The arrival of a new Greek Ambassador in Washington offered such an opportunity. In spring 1979 the Greek government announced that Ambassador Alexandrakis would return to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and would be replaced by Ambassador Ioannis Tzounis, the Director General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He would arrive in Washington in August 1979. Soon after his arrival the CIA reported that the new Ambassador appeared to regret the Embassy’s choice to develop close links with the Greek Lobby while overlooking the White House. The report stated that: Tzounis is convinced that the Greek Government has placed too much faith in good relations with the American Congress while allowing relations to deteriorate with the Executive Branch, and particularly the State Department and the White House. […] In outlining his thoughts for a new foreign policy approach to the American Government, Tzounis strongly criticized the Greek Government for seeking “confrontation” with consecutive American administrations. He felt that Greek policy in the future should be one of verbal cooperation with the American administration.46

Tzounis appeared to want to build bridges with the administration. The level of confrontation Alexandrakis had with the Carter administration never reached that of his confrontation with Kissinger. However, it is clear that the former Greek Ambassador had closer ties with Greek supporters in Congress. Ambassador Alexandrakis enjoyed close links with Senator Edward M. Kennedy, for example, as did Karamanlis. In November 1979 Kennedy formally announced his intention to challenge Carter for the Democratic Party’s Presidential nomination of 1980. Perhaps Alexandrakis’ ties with Kennedy—and the Greek Lobby in Congress more broadly—convinced the Greek government to replace its Ambassador to the United States in an effort to relaunch cooperation with the White House. However, any assumptions about what motivated Greece

46 Turner, Memorandum from Director of Central Intelligence Turner to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs Brzezinski, 6 November 1979, attached to a report prepared by the CIA, FRUS, Vol. XXI, doc. 195.

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to dispatch Tzounis can only be speculative since there is no relevant documentation in Karamanlis’ archive. Since Tzounis had served as Director General of the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs between 1974 and 1979, he clearly actively participated in foreign policy decision-making affecting the United States. The relevant part of Tzounis’ statement indicated criticism was directed at Ambassador Alexandrakis who had cultivated close relations with the Greek Lobby and had actively engaged in the Congressional effort against repeal of the arms embargo. However, Alexandrakis operated under Karamanlis’ instructions and reported back to the Foreign Ministry and the Prime Minister’s Office. Incidentally, McCloskey made a comment a few months earlier on the structure of the Greek decision-making process in which he emphasised Karamanlis’ control over foreign policy bureaucrats.47 As mentioned above, replacing Alexandrakis could reflect Athens’ aim to reformulate its previous close association with Congress while opting for closer links with the White House. Tzounis’ statements probably served such a goal and were carefully calculated to appeal to the administration rather than representing any genuine criticism of his predecessor. The Greek strategy of US confrontation faced an additional obstacle when the US administration reevaluated its broader Middle Eastern policy in the immediate aftermath of the Iranian Revolution.

Regional Instability The deteriorating domestic situation in Iran forced the US administration to reconsider its broader foreign policy. President Carter generally sought to strengthen Washington’s ties with its allies.48 In the case of Greece and Turkey the US focus had already been on ensuring bilateral relations remained close with both. The Iranian Revolution had a profound impact on the US administration’s thinking regarding Turkey and by extension on Greece’s requests regarding NATO negotiations. After all, Turkey and Iran shared much more than a common border. Bulent Ecevit’s return to power did little to stabilise Turkey’s political, economic, and social crisis. The Turkish government eventually concluded 47 NARA, RG 59, Electronic Telegrams 1979, McCloskey, tel. 02049 Athens to State, 7 March 1979. 48 Scott Kaufman, Plans Unraveled: The Foreign Policy of the Carter Administration (DeKalb, IL: Northern Illinois University Press, 2008), 194.

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that declaring martial law was the only remedy to civil disturbances. This was insufficient to address the political terrorism that had got out of hand with attacks against journalists, political figures, and even US military officers.49 The similarities with pre-revolutionary Iran were obvious. As The Economist noted: ‘there are fears that Turkey could be enveloped in the sort of chaos that overtook Iran’. The Economist also raised questions about the implications of the Iran situation for other US and NATO allies in the area.50 The US administration shared similar concerns regarding Turkey. In the White House NSC staffer Henze gave NSA Brzezinski a detailed analysis of links between events in Tehran and potential contamination of the Turkish domestic situation in December 1978. Henze was a specialist on Turkey internal situations and had previously served in the CIA station in Ankara. He understood the fundamental differences between Tehran and Ankara in terms of religion with Iran following Shia Islam and Turkey following Sunni Islam. He also understood the institutional structures that gave Ankara a strong secular orientation as a result of Atatürk’s reforms and dogma. However, Henze argued in his reports to Brzezinski that the overriding danger of losing Turkey as an ally remained. The Turks were growing frustrated with the West and their NATO allies. The Turkish political leadership believed the only way to deal with the country’s social and political crisis was through delivering strong economic performances. However … weak governments, preoccupied since 1974 with Cyprus, Greece and the U.S. arms embargo, have compounded their economic difficulties by delaying hard decisions and avoiding belt-tightening. The fear that a slowdown in economic growth will cause underlying strains and tensions to reach a breaking point has become a nightmare haunting political leadership. […] But the improvising and the muddling through has almost reached an end. Turkey’s leaders abhor accepting a slowdown in economic

49 JCPL, NSA, NSA Staff, Horn/Special, Box 3, Henze, Memorandum for Brzezinski, 26 December 1978, and Henze, Memorandum for Brzezinski, 2 February 1979, regarding the assassination of a prominent Turkish journalist; ‘Turkey: No End to Violence’, The Economist, 14 July 1979, 42. 50 ‘A Case for First Aid: Putting Money into Mr. Evecit’s Turkey Will Not Solve Its Problems But It Could Prevent Them Getting Even Worse’, The Economist, 13 January 1979, 22; ‘The Crumbling Triangle’, The Economist, 9 December 1978; ‘Sick Man of Europe Again’, The Economist, 17 March 1979, 13.

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growth because they fear the social and political consequences; leadership itself is weak because the political process is stalemated. It is in this respect that Turkey comes to resemble Iran. The resemblance may be superficial because the details are different and the whole crisis is not systemic – but the dangers may be almost as great.51

In response to Turkish instability and its concomitant dangers Henze suggested additional economic support for Turkey and an increase in cooperation between the US military and the Turkish military.52 Henze also advocated progress be made towards a settlement in Cyprus as a means of easing tension in the region. Although he accompanied his suggestion in December 1978 with the need for ‘sustained pressure on Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus to achieve settlement’, a month later his position had changed. Henze then argued that ‘we should not attempt to mediate between the two leaders [Ecevit and Karamanlis] but simply to get a discrete dialogue under way between them’.53 Henze had little to say about the NATO negotiations and Greek attempts to involve Washington. However, the similarities with the US position on Cyprus provide an indication of the US administration’s thinking. Ambassador Spiers warned about the danger of the United States putting pressure on Ankara to relinquish its opposition to the Greek– NATO agreement. Reporting from Ankara regarding domestic political instability the US Ambassador warned about the presence of ‘groups’ in Turkey ‘who feel Turkey’s best interests would be served if the country opted out of NATO […]. Many view the acceptance of the U.S. military and economic aid as giving us license to push them in directions contrary to their national interests on Cyprus, Greek reintegration, etc.’54 The US Ambassador proffered such views at a critical point when US intelligence services remained concerned about the prospects of an Ecevit

51 JCPL, NSA, NSA Staff, Horn/Special, Box 3, Henze, Memorandum for Brzezinski, 15 December 1978, underlined in the original. 52 JCPL, NSA, NSA Staff, Horn/Special, Box 3, Henze, Memorandum for Brzezinski, 24 January 1979, and Henze, Memorandum for Brzezinski, 22 February 1979. 53 JCPL, NSA, NSA Staff, Horn/Special, Box 3, Henze, Memorandum for Brzezinski, 15 December 1978, and Henze, Memorandum for Brzezinski, 15 January 1979. 54 Telegram from the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State, 13 April 1979, FRUS, Vol. XXI, doc. 133.

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government that despite earlier statements was considered primarily proWestern.55 When Assistant Secretary of State Warren Christopher visited Ankara in May 1979, it came as no surprise that meetings focussed purely on bilateral Turkish–US issues.56 In parallel with Greek appeals to Washington to intervene and US thinking regarding its role in the Greek–NATO negotiations the SACEUR continued his efforts to break the impasse between Athens and Ankara. During the first half of 1979 the SACEUR submitted three sets of proposals. The first was rejected by Ankara while Athens rejected the other two. Amid the international climate that the Iranian Revolution created and the possible implications for Pakistan and the Arab world, in general, successfully concluding the southern flank question was appealing.57 As the stalemate between Greece and Turkey persisted the US administration considered the prospects of a direct US initiative. In line with concerns raised individually within the Department of State the Policy Review Committee (PRC) on Greek reintegration argued that a direct US initiative whether successful or not would endanger relations with both the Greek and the Turkish governments.58 Washington therefore did not shift its position. Athens had to wait until the September 1980 military coup in Turkey before Turkish objections were lifted. In February 1980 General Rogers presented his final plan for Greek reintegration to which the Greek government agreed. Although Demirel’s government had declined to do so, the military government appeared more forthcoming and did not veto the plan. The Turkish military’s stance towards Greek reintegration into NATO played an important role in Washington’s thinking about the 55 JCPL, NSA, NSA Staff, Horn/Special, Box 3, Henze, Memorandum for Brzezinski, 16 February 1979; Intelligence assessment prepared by the CIA, Washington, 24 May 1979, FRUS, Vol. XXI, doc. 140. 56 Telegram from the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State, Ankara, 8 May 1978, FRUS, Vol. XXI, doc. 138. 57 JCPL, NSA, NSA Staff, Horn/Special, Box 4, Henze, Memorandum for Brzezinski, 19 February 1980 (note that Brzezinski approved the working group meeting). 58 JCPL, NSA, NSA Staff, Horn/Special, Box 5, Henze, Memorandum for Christine Dodson, 9 May 1980, attached to a memorandum from Peter Tarnoff to Brzezinski, 1 May 1980 and to the Summary of Conclusions of the PRC; NARA, RG 59, Electronic Telegrams 1978, Vance quoting Spiers’ message, tel. 256983 State to Athens, 11 October 1978.

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military takeover in Ankara. Considering the commitment the Turkish military establishment had made to the West and NATO the coup d’état was assessed as a positive development.59 Any administration coming to power criticising Kissinger’s blunt realpolitik could not have echoed his foreign policy approach more. Greek reintegration into NATO was officially approved in October 1980.

End of the Balanced Approach The Iranian Revolution and the resulting loss of Iran as a valuable regional US ally shaped Washington’s view and expectations of Athens and Ankara. Since the end of the Second World War up to the late 1970s Greece and Turkey led parallel lives in terms of political, economic, and social developments and structures. Greece’s accession to the EEC and Turkey’s crumbling democratic institutions meant this situation no longer applied. Karamanlis’ proclamation that Greece belonged to the West was an ideological statement that according to some scholars undermined any attempt to move away from the western alliance and the United States.60 From the US perspective in the late 1970s the statement reflected reality. The Greek state and people had many close historical, cultural, economic, and security ties with Western Europe that prevented Athens from moving away from the West. The Greek economy was successful and the country enjoyed an excellent international credit rating. The idea of the Karamanlis government moving away from its only ‘viable option’ was unthinkable.61 The picture of an integrated Greece in Western political, economic, and military structures regardless of its status in NATO contrasted with Turkey’s uncertain and uneasy relationship with its Western partners. The western alliance was willing to support Turkey financially through Western institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). 59 JCPL, NSA, NSA Staff, Horn/Special, Box 5, Henze, Memorandum for Brzezinski,

12 September 1980; JCPL, Plains File, SDER, Box 40, Christopher, Memorandum for the President, 26 September 1980. 60 Jon Kofas, Under the Eagle’s Claw: Exceptionalism in Postwar U.S.–Greek Relations (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2003), 243–250. 61 Intelligence memorandum prepared by the CIA, Washington, 30 August 1978, FRUS, Vol. XXI, doc. 24.

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However, despite such support the Turkish government considered it necessary to side with the strong anti-American and anti-Western movement that existed in the country. Although Ecevit also made overtures to the Soviet Union, he did so for domestic purposes. Even though the possibility of Turkey leaving the western alliance remained low, Turkey’s ability to fulfil its role on behalf of NATO was seriously in doubt. Against this background the US administration concluded that the ‘balanced approach’, the dominant doctrine during the Ford and Carter administrations regarding relations with Greece and Turkey, had to be abandoned. December 1978 marked the first time Henze castigated ‘the notion, born of the fight to lift the arms embargo and the need to assure the Greek Lobby, that Turkey and Greece must be treated as equals in military aid and in other related ways’. He claimed that ‘equal’ military aid for Turkey and Greece was unequal because Greece with 10 million people could never have the strategic weight that Turkey with 42 million has. He went on ‘… without demeaning the Greeks we should make our understanding of these facts quietly clear to the Turks’.62 Henze was not alone in this assessment. As events in Iran unravelled the US administration strongly emphasised the need for US support, primarily economic, for Turkey to stabilise its internal conditions.63 The Carter administration planned to raise the issue of Turkey during the Guadeloupe Conference in the hope of securing European support for Ankara’s outstanding challenges.64 The Guadeloupe Conference was intended as an informal top-level exchange of views between the United States and the main European powers, the United Kingdom, France, and West Germany.65 Since Washington had its own economic challenges,

62 JCPL, NSA, NSA Staff, Horn/Special, Box 3, Henze, Memorandum for Brzezinski, 15 December 1978. 63 Summary of Conclusions of a Policy Review Committee Meeting, Washington, 28

December 1978, FRUS, Vol. XXI, doc. 127. 64 Summary of Conclusions of a Policy Review Committee Meeting, Washington, 7 March 1979, FRUS, Vol. XXI, doc. 131. 65 Kristina Spohr, ‘Helmut Schmidt and the Shaping of Western Security in the Late 1970s: The Guadeloupe Summit of 1979’, International History Review, Vol. 37(1), 2015, 167–192.

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managing the US deficit had been a dominant factor in US foreign assistance policy.66 The Europeans, particularly West Germany, and the IMF were expected to shoulder the efforts to solve Turkish economic and political deadlocks.67 The Iranian crisis intensified such economic considerations. However, in terms of the broader US strategy in the region Turkey had following the fall of Iran in the words of Henze ‘become a test of Soviet behavior in the framework of détente’.68 After the loss of US military installations in Iran, Turkey emerged as the most suitable alternative to host intelligence installations given its proximity to the Soviet Union. However, Ecevit was reluctant to grant consent for any such relocation.69 Henze believed the reason behind Ecevit’s position was a fear of continued and further Soviet destabilisation efforts aimed at distancing Turkey from its allies. Henze emphasised the need to consolidate Turkish–US relations to remedy this. He felt a prerequisite to achieving this entailed the administration paying less attention to the Greek Lobby and recognising that the ‘Greek government had played games with us on the DCA while we negotiated with them’. A new security agreement with Congressional approval for Turkish aid would be central to securing relations with Ankara, despite possible objections from the Greek Lobby and ‘the petty preoccupations the Greek Lobby has forced upon us’.70 The US administration did indeed accelerate the process to conclude the new Turkish–US Defence and Economic Cooperation Agreement (DECA). This substantially differed from the objectives of past US administrations. When the White House decided to shelve the 1976 DCA, the administration stressed the possibility of limiting the duration of the agreement to two years. This would have reduced opposition from a Congress that hated lengthy agreements.

66 Daniel J. Sargent, A Superpower Transformed: The Remaking of American Foreign Relations in the 1970s (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2015), 273–285. 67 Summary of Conclusions of a Policy Review Committee Meeting, 28 December 1978, FRUS, Vol. XXI, doc. 127; a similar approach was agreed in a Summary of Conclusions of a Policy Review Committee Meeting, 7 March 1979, FRUS, Vol. XXI, doc. 131. 68 JCPL, NSA, NSA Staff, Horn/Special, Box 3, Henze, Memorandum for Brzezinski, 10 May 1979. 69 William Hale, Turkish Foreign Policy, 1974–2000 (London: Frank Cass, 2002), 163. 70 JCPL, NSA, NSA Staff, Horn/Special, Box 3, Henze, Memorandum for Brzezinski,

10 May 1979.

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However, in 1980 the Carter administration concluded an agreement for a duration of five years that was to be renewed annually thereafter.71 Although the new agreement did not provide a specific amount of guaranteed aid as it had in 1976, the Carter administration promised a significant increase in military aid to Ankara. In the following years Turkey emerged as the third largest recipient of US aid just behind Israel and Egypt.72 US military aid was additional to the international package of assistance that had been determined at Guadeloupe in 1979.73 The Turkish–US DECA of January 1980 renewed Greek interest in negotiating a similar agreement.74 The US administration was willing to agree to this. Greek–US negotiations proceeded and reached an advanced stage as a result of agreement being reached about Greece’s reintegration into NATO. However, in July 1981 the Greek government announced its rejection of a new Greek–US DECA that was similar to the Turkish–US one. In his account of this development Prime Minister Rallis stressed the unwillingness of the United States to accept the Greek terms.75 However, political calculations regarding the impact that ratification of an unpopular agreement such as the Greek–US DECA would have just a few months before the election appear to have been the underlying reason for Rallis’ reluctance to proceed with its ratification.76 Finally, when Greek and US representatives met in June 1980 the US delegation dropped its balanced approach it normally adopted in direct talks for the first time. Nimetz had by then been appointed Under Secretary of State for International Security Affairs. During his visit to Athens to promote conclusion of the Greek–US DECA Nimetz argued that given the turbulence that had broken out on Turkey’s eastern borders the ‘balance’ had shifted. He added that: ‘if my friends in Congress pressure me 71 Richard C. Campany Jr., Turkey and the United States: The Arms Embargo Period (New York, NY: Praeger Publishers, 1986), 64. 72 Hale, Turkish Foreign Policy, 165. 73 JCPL, NSA, NSA Staff, Horn/Special, Box 3, Henze, Memorandum for Brzezinski,

30 January 1980 (detailing levels of economic aid to Turkey for 1979 and 1980). 74 Svolopoulos, Foreign Policy, 216. 75 Rallis, Georgios, Ώρες Ευθύνης [Times of Duty] (Athens: Euroekdotiki, 1983), 225. 76 Evanthis Hatzivassiliou, Ευάγγελος Αβέρωφ Τοσίτσας 1908–1990, Πολιτική Βιογραφία

[Evangelos Averoff-Tossitsas 1908–1990: Political Biography] (Athens: Sideris, 2004), 166.

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on the issue of balance, I would suggest reducing aid to Greece. The Greek position is very strong, while, on the contrary, the Turkish position is very precarious’.77 Nimetz explained that US legislation called for a ‘balance in the region’ when allocating military aid. Considering regional events it was Turkey that was in need of additional aid—not Greece.

Carter and Greek Reintegration into NATO Considering the precarious state of Turkey-US and Turkey-West ties, the US administration remained steadfast in refusing to pressurise Ankara to accelerate Greece’s return to NATO. The Greek government had reportedly resented the US stance throughout the process. Although Greek conservatives close to Karamanlis were traditionally pro-American, they were disenchanted with the Carter administration. US intelligence sources reported that Karamanlis had told his inner circle that the lack of progress in Greek reintegration into the western alliance was attributable to a lack of leadership in Washington.78 Karamanlis seemed equally critical of the US administration during his visit to Saudi Arabia telling Crown Prince Fahd that ‘the US commits mistakes and creates problems for us [Greeks, Saudis] because the Americans lack any kind of global policy’.79 The Greek government insisted on returning to NATO along the lines of the February 1980 plan presented by General Rogers. The Turkish government continued to oppose a succession of similar proposals until autumn 1980. The 12 September 1980 military coup in Turkey offered hopes that the new Turkish leadership would facilitate Athens’ return to the western alliance considering the importance the Army attached to NATO.80 As a consequence—as noted by NSC staff—the Greek 77 CGKF, CKP, Folder 14B, Memorandum of Conversation held at the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 23 June 1980 with the US delegation headed by Under Secretary Nimetz, 23 June 1980. 78 Intelligence information cable prepared by the CIA, 10 May 1979, FRUS, Vol. XXI, doc. 188. 79 Karamanlis, Discussion with Prince Fahd, February 1979, in Svolopoulos (ed.), Karamanlis, Vol. 11, 48. 80 Bruce R. Kuniholm, ‘Turkey and NATO’, in Lawrence S. Kaplan, Robert W. Clawson, and Raimondo Luraghi (eds), NATO and the Mediterranean (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources Inc., 1985), 223; for the 12 September 1980 coup in Turkey see Mehmet Ali Birand, The Generals’ Coup in Turkey: An Inside Story of 12 September 1980 [translated by M. A. Dikerdem] (London: Brassey’s Defence Publishers, 1987).

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government ‘launched an all out offensive designed to force us to put overwhelming pressure on the Turks’ to secure Ankara’s agreement to the final General Rogers’ plan at an early date.81 In his communications with the Greek Defence Minister the US Secretary of Defense Harold Brown emphasised the United States had made clear to the new government in Turkey the importance Washington attached to settling the issue promptly.82 Within a week the new Greek Foreign Minister Constantine Mitsotakis had informed the US Embassy in Greece that the Turkish government had agreed to a plan to bring Greece back into the western alliance’s integrated military command. The Greek parliament subsequently approved the country’s return to NATO on 24 October 1980.83 Even at such a late stage in the 1980 US Presidential election campaign, the White House sought to receive credit for the development.84 Supporters of the Carter campaign announced the Greek return to NATO to prominent Americans of Greek descent and to organisations they belonged to. A few weeks later Carter failed to get elected for a second term. The last bilateral meeting between the Greek government and the Carter administration took place at the margins of the December 1980 NATO ministerial summit. It was here that Mitsotakis thanked the outgoing administration and the new Secretary of State Edmund S. Muskie personally for the support and understanding the United States demonstrated during the process of bringing Greece back to NATO.85 The Carter administration actually succeeded in achieving its goals. The White House and the Department of State had made maintaining 81 Memorandum from Robert Blackwill of the National Security Council Staff to President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski), 25 September 1980, FRUS, Vol. XXI, doc. 205. 82 Letter from Secretary of Defense Brown to the Greek Minister of National Defence (Averoff), 10 October 1980, FRUS, Vol. XXI, doc. 208. 83 Rallis, Times of Duty, 101. 84 See various examples such as JCPL, White House Central File, Subject File, Coun-

tries, Box 28, Chief of Staff Jack Watson to various recipients, 21 October 1980, regarding the US role in Greece’s reintegration into NATO; Anne Wexler and Stephen Aiello, 25 October 1980, about invitations issued to a briefing in the East Room at the White House regarding the Eastern Mediterranean and Greek reintegration into NATO. 85 Telegram from the Department of State to the US National Military Representative, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, 14 December 1980, FRUS, Vol. XXI, doc. 211.

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relations with Greece and Turkey and securing NATO’s southern flank as their Eastern Mediterranean objectives when Carter came to power in early 1977.86 Relations between Washington and Ankara seemed strengthened following repeal of the Turkish arms embargo. The US and Turkish governments had also concluded a defence agreement that secured the operation of US bases and military facilities in Turkey. US rapprochement with Turkey did not seem to have had an adverse effect on US relations with Greece. The Greek government eventually accepted lifting of the arms embargo and Washington considered the Greek reaction as moderate given the tensions between Athens and Ankara.87 Moreover, despite the differences with Turkey, Greece returned to NATO and the southern flank was rebuilt. Although the Cyprus problem remained unsettled, the US administration could point to the December 1978 initiative it made along with Canada and the United Kingdom for a solution within a UN framework. However, that initiative failed because of resistance from both communities on Cyprus.88 In contrast with other areas of foreign policy every member of the US administration saw eye to eye regarding Washington’s policy toward the Eastern Mediterranean triangle. Previous chapters of the book have confirmed the general observation that Carter, Vance, and Brzezinski agreed on how to deal with Greece and Turkey despite minor points of difference. Moreover, the Carter administration achieved US goals ensuring cohesion of the alliance for the region that had first been stated back in 1974. Despite relations with Greece and Turkey being an example that justifies Nancy Mitchell’s view that Carter’s foreign policy was successful, the President did not get the credit he deserved.89

86 Report by the President’s Personal Emissary to Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus (Clifford) to President Carter, 1 March 1977, FRUS, Vol. XXI, doc. 8. 87 Memorandum from the Counsellor of the Department of State (Nimetz) to Secretary of State (Vance) and the Deputy Secretary of State (Christopher), 31 July 1978, FRUS, Vol. XXI, doc. 22. 88 Nikos Christodoulidis, Τα σχέδια λύσης του Κυπριακού (1948–1978) [Plans for Solution of the Cyprus Problem (1948–1978)] (Athens: Kastaniotis, 2009), 234. 89 Nancy Mitchell, ‘The Cold War and Jimmy Carter’, in Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad (eds), The Cambridge History of the Cold War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), Vol. 3: Endings, 66–88.

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Greece’s return to NATO satisfied what had been a central US policy goal since 1974. It can be argued that international developments forced the Greek government to seek a return to NATO’s integrated military command. Nonetheless, Washington’s stance prevented the Greek–Turkish dispute over NATO from directly impacting US bilateral relations with either party. Finally, the administration took steps to stabilise Turkey’s commitment to the West at a crucial time for the Middle East. Carter had a lot to feel pleased about regarding his accomplishments in the Eastern Mediterranean.

CHAPTER 8

Conclusions

Continuity and change characterised the relationship between Greece and the United States from 1974 to 1980. The United States remained a central pillar to Greek national security and Greece remained a key component of US security policy in the Eastern Mediterranean. At the same time, anti-Americanism in Greece, the Congressional influence in US foreign policy and the escalation of Greek-Turkish tensions posed new challenges to the bilateral relationship. The book argues that the intersection of national security considerations and domestic political developments informed and shaped both sides’ perception of, approaches to, and objectives for their complex Cold War alliance in the 1970s. The book deals with how Greece’s influence affected US policy towards the Cyprus-Greece-Turkey triangle. Cold War considerations did not hinder Athens’ preparedness to defy the United States. The severity of Greek–Turkish tensions represented a challenge that only ambitious and inventive Greek foreign policies and strategies could overcome. The book also describes the limitations US administrations accepted in pursuing their policies towards Greece. Republican and Democrat administrations of the period recognised Greece’s legitimate interest in playing a part in the decision-making process as a result of domestic political calculations or national interest imperatives (as detailed in relevant chapters). Consequently, the book belongs to the emerging new

© The Author(s) 2020 A. Antonopoulos, Redefining Greek–US Relations, 1974–1980, Security, Conflict and Cooperation in the Contemporary World, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-47656-4_8

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Cold War historiography that highlights a more complex international cooperation than existing Cold War scholarship has suggested.1 The year 1974 marked the time Greek–US relations entered a new period. Chapter 2 details how Greek decision-makers sought US assistance and support during the crucial hours of political transition and during efforts to prevent escalation of the Cyprus conflict into a Greek– Turkish war. The second Turkish invasion of Cyprus on 14 August 1974 became another turning point Athens’ relationship with its western allies. The western alliance failed to side with Greece publicly and behind the scenes NATO leaders failed to respond positively to requests from their Greek colleagues. The Greek government perceived withdrawal from the integrated military command of NATO as its only option. In the aftermath of the crisis Athens took stock of the new environment the Greek–Turkish conflict created. Although Greece’s European allies offered economic assistance, they avoided getting involved in any political process to settle the various disputes between Greece and Turkey. A short-lived attempt to lure the Soviets into getting involved failed as a pressure tactic. There were indications within the western alliance of a superpower agreement on handling the Cyprus crisis. The United States remained the only available option, particularly Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger and his shuttle diplomacy between Ankara, Athens, and Nicosia. Those closest to Prime Minister Constantine Karamanlis considered Greece faced a double threat: communism from the north and Turkish expansionism from the east. Although East–West détente subdued the first threat, the ongoing Cyprus crisis and the Aegean dispute accentuated the second. Chapters 3 and 7 demonstrate beyond doubt that the Greek conservative leadership actively pursued policies designed to tackle both perceptions of threat simultaneously. Greek governments valued the benefits the western alliance offered to a Cold War frontline state in dealing with both perceptions of theat. It is also an undeniable fact that the perceived Turkish expansionism dominated the Greek decision-making process. At the height of Greek–Turkish tensions in the summer of 1974 Greek decision-makers reassessed their

1 Laurine Crump and Susanna Erlandsson, ‘Shedding New Light on Cold War Europe’, in Laurine Crump and Susanna Erlandsson (eds), Margins for Manoeuvre in Cold War Europe: The Influence of Smaller Powers (London: Routledge, 2019), 173–174.

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national security doctrine and strategy to fit new geostrategic considerations. A war with Turkey became a prospect that was more openly discussed than ever before and Ankara emerged as an unpredictable opponent. The Greek governments of the period were determined to avoid a humiliating fait accompli, especially in the Aegean Sea, because of perceived military inferiority. There was an increase in the national defence budget to facilitate a military build-up. Increasing the strength and capabilities of the Greek armed forces could deter Turkish expansionism and prevent a military confrontation with devastating consequences. Diplomacy, however, had a central role to play in containing an aggressive and impulsive adversary like Turkey and promoting a peaceful resolution of the bilateral disputes. The Greek diplomacy of the 1970s was characterised by multilateralism: the Karamanlis governments aimed at Greece joining the European Economic Community (EEC), developing relations with neighbouring Balkan states, and opening up economic cooperation with the Soviet Union. Multilateralism—as a new generation of historians have demonstrated—included relations with the United States. Thanks to detailed research in the Prime Minister’s archive the book underscores that relations with the United States remained at the heart of Greek national security policy, were handled by top Greek decision-makers, and were a response to security considerations due to the likelihood of war with Turkey. Paving the way for a peaceful resolution or at least easing tensions between Ankara and Athens could also allay the shared fear amongst EEC member-states that potential Greek membership would bring the complex Greek–Turkish disputes into the Community. It was with this in mind that Greek–US relations also supported the Greek effort for accession to the EEC. Ideologically, the Greek conservatives linked close ties with the United States to national interest.2 The leader of the western alliance remained the strongest ally Greece could hope for offering unparalleled political, military, and economic support. Nonetheless, the New Democracy governments utilised every opportunity available to promote national

2 For a discussion on ideology and foreign policy see Constantine Tsoukalas, ‘Iδεoλoγικα ´ Pεματα ´ και Eξωτερικη´ oλιτικη´ [Ideological Stances and Foreign Policy]’, in Constantine Arvanitopoulos and Marilena Koppa (eds), 30 Xρ o´ νια Eλληνικ ης ´ Eξ ωτ ερικ ης ´ Π oλιτ ικ ης ´ , 1974–2004 [30 Years of Greek Foreign Policy, 1974–2004] (Athens: Livani, 2005), 377–402.

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interest. The Greek conservatives recognised the Cold War realities that placed a democratic Greece in the West. However, internal debates about the level of engagement with NATO post 1974 or the US bases reflected an objective assessment of the benefits the United States, and the western alliance more broadely, offered to Greece which were less ideologically driven.3 Put simply, the looser the Greek–US or Greek–NATO relationship, the more indispensable Turkey became for the alliance. Greece had to ensure its relevance to western security to count on US support against Turkish expansionism. Consequently, the Greek conservatives did not hesitate to confront Washington in their attempt to influence US policy to their benefit. Confrontation as a strategy was much more nuanced that earlier scholarship suggested. The book not only explains the multifaceted strategy of confrontation, but also how confrontation served to strengthen Greek–US cooperation—but on Athens’ terms. US involvement in Greek–Turkish disputes was not on its own enough to ensure Greece’s national security objectives. Athens had to devise a strategy that would ensure Washington’s support. The Greek general election of November 1974 returned a stable government capable of implementing a coherent policy and strategy. The change of government coincided with the battle on Capitol Hill regarding an arms embargo on Turkey intensifying. The conflict between the two branches of US government motivated the Greek government to maximise whatever political advantage it had. This is the first time a book has looked at the contacts the Greek Embassy headed by Ambassador Menelaos Alexandrakis in Washington had with leading figures of the Greek Lobby in Congress. Throughout the arms embargo period, especially during crucial votes on whether it should remain or be repealed, Alexandrakis and his Embassy staff reiterated just how important the legislation was for the Greek government and sought provisions that would benefit Greece either in the form of imposing requirements on Turkey or through increases in aid from the United States. Although the arms embargo did not become a reality because of the actions of the Greek government, the Greek stance towards Congress shows that Athens not only applied pressure tactics but also followed a cohesive strategy. The Greek conservative leadership perceived debates about imposing an arms embargo on Turkey as a chance to move views in Washington 3 Fotios Moustakis, The Greek–Turkish Relationship and NATO (London: Frank Cass, 2003), 33.

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closer to those in Athens. The Greek Lobby consisted predominantly of Democrats eager to vote against a Republican administration and in favour of an arms embargo. At the same time the Greek government did not question the benefits that working with the US administration offered. When it became known that Greece and members of Congress were contacting each other, Athens pointed out its interest in the arms embargo was legitimate. The Greek government objected to accusations from the White House that it was meddling in US party politics. Similarly, Karamanlis used the arms embargo as manifesting the United States had taken some sort of action in condemning the Turkish invasion of Cyprus. Karamanlis made it clear to his domestic audience that Greece still had friends in Washington who valued the bilateral relationship and that his pro-Western policy was working. However, he did not seek domestic political benefits for his government’s contacts and influence within Congress. When the actions of the Greek Embassy were made public long-term cooperation with the Republican administration was threatened. The Greek reaction to conclusion of the Turkish–US 1976 Defence Cooperation Agreement underscored this approach further (as explained in Chapter 4). The Greek government confronted the United States publicly. The reaction of the Greek people was one of disbelief and the government’s response had to be robust. When the two sides approved the principles agreement for the future Greek–US DCA, emphasis turned to reconciling the two sides in the eyes of the public. A thin line separated the two types of confrontation with one aiming to push Washington firmly to Athens’ side and the other aiming to please the Greek public. Although political instinct is not a clearly defined approach, it guided the actions of Greek decision-makers. Chapter 5 highlights the advantages and disadvantages of the election of Jimmy Carter for the Greek strategy towards the United States. Carter made it clear during his election campaign that he supported the Greek position and expected the Turks to make concessions in Cyprus. The Greek people welcomed his election, which eased anti-American pressure on the bilateral relationship to a certain extent. However, President Carter was not prepared to support Greece at the expense of Turkey. Carter made no effort to radically change US policy towards Greece and Turkey. Washington remained committed to close relations with both. The book highlights such a continuity in terms of policy between two Presidencies that had promised to be diametrically different. Despite his

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critique of Kissinger, Carter continued Kissinger’s policy towards Greece and Turkey. Although the options facing Kissinger in the summer of 1974 left much to be desired, there are arguments that the predicament in which he found himself in the Eastern Mediterranean was of his own making.4 Although there is evidence to the contrary (as shown in Chapter 2), a definitive answer requires further research that falls outside the scope of the book. Kissinger’s red line remained avoiding direct involvement that President Lyndon B. Johnson implemented in 1964. This is the reason Kissinger and the US policy of the 1970s have been described as ultimately pro-Turkish.5 Kissinger recognised the limited prospects for success of his intervention or that of the United States more broadly in the disputes between two Western allies that dated back decades. He promoted a balanced approach because he believed that US national interest dictated finding a way to secure US relations with both Greece and Turkey despite their disputes. However, such plans were challenged by Congress. Turkey interpreted the arms embargo as Washington’s support for Greece (as often mentioned in the book). The provisions of the 1976 Turkish–US DCA aimed to restore Turkish trust in the United States in response to the arms embargo. Although designed to improve Turkish– US relations, the decisions of the Ford administration in 1976 inextricably linked relations between Greece, Turkey, and the United States and invited greater Congressional involvement in US policy in the Eastern Mediterranean. Analysts have underscored the implications a n assertive US Congress had on US foreign policy in the 1970s. However, the clash between the two branches of US government also had a beneficial impact on US relations with Greece, which has been severely overlooked. When Congress moved towards legislating the arms embargo, it challenged the growing public assumption that Washington had little value as an ally of Greece. The Greek public and many political figures viewed Kissinger, 4 William Mallinson and Vassilis Fouskas, ‘Kissinger and the Business of Government: The Invasion of Cyprus, 15 July–20 August 1974’, Cyprus Review, Vol. 29, 2017, 111– 115. 5 Kostas

Yfantis, ‘Tšλoς Eπoχης… ´ Oι ελληνoαμερικανικšς σχšσεις και o Kωνσταντ´ινoς Kαραμανλης, ´ 1974–1980 [End of an era… Greek American Relations and Constantine Karamanlis, 1974–1980]’, in Constantine Svolopoulos, Konstantina Botsiou, and Evanthis Hatzivassiliou (eds), O Kωνσ τ αντ ι´ν oς Kαραμανλης ´ σ τ oν εικ oσ τ o´ αιωνα ´ [Constantine Karamanlis in the 20th Century] (Athens: Idruma K. Karamanlis, 2008), 535.

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the personification of US power at the time, as a duplicitous pro-Turkey figure. The arms embargo on Turkey convinced pro-Western Greeks that the US policy was more nuanced than the simplistic arguments of the antiAmerican movement imply. Congress and the White House engaged in an informal and largely unintentional division of labour: Congress championed Greek causes, while the Republican White House underscored the US commitment to Turkey. As far as public perception in Greece was concerned the election of President Carter signalled a change from a pro-Turkish to a balanced approach. In practice, Carter’s administration accepted Kissinger’s interpretation of the balanced approach. Kissinger experienced first-hand how his rhetoric alienated the Turkish government. He sought to counterbalance the Turkish perception of him as pro-Greek. Although he continued with Kissinger’s balanced approach, Carter came up with a new strategy to settle the Greek–Turkish dispute that involved placing greater focus on Turkish concessions, a strategy largely forced on him out of necessity rather than choice. The election of a Democrat to the White House neutralised making use of Congress as a means of confrontation for the Greek decisionmakers. After 1977 there were fewer Democrats willing to vote against the administration. The Greek government watered down its expectations during the final stages of repeal of the Turkish arms embargo (as shown in Chapter 6). Greek decision-makers adopted a defensive stance that aimed to safeguard the concessions of the Ford administration. The Democratic Executive could not overlook or reject the wishes of a Democratic Congress. The two branches of government had to work together. The new strategy President Carter promoted required the cooperation of the political class in Ankara and Athens. Throughout the 1970s Turkey experienced an unstable political system marked by weak, short-lived coalition governments. Political personnel simply lacked the authority to take bold and unpopular decisions on sensitive issues such as Cyprus and the Aegean dispute. Consequently, the US administration adjusted its strategy towards Greece and Turkey. Such an adjustment does not equate to inconsistency, as Chapter 6 highlights. It underscores the unstable environment US policy faced in the Eastern Mediterranean, southern Europe, and the Near East in the 1970s.

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The collapse of the Greek dictatorship and the Cyprus crisis of 1974 were part of a series of changes that swept southern Europe in the mid1970s. The emergence of Eurocommunism as a legitimate political force in Italy and France challenged transatlantic cooperation and Western cohesion.6 The Carnation Revolution in Portugal in 1974 and the collapse of the Francoist dictatorship in Spain in the following year further challenged European stability. Political transitions in Iberia questioned the emerging regimes’ ties with the West.7 Leftist and communist-leaning forces in Lisbon played central roles in subsequent developments. Portugal’s commitment to NATO was queried. Similarly, analysts had long speculated that Spain’s relations with the United States and NATO would diminish in the event of General Franco’s death. Although these predictions proved eventually to be exaggerated, such expectations influenced contemporary interpretations of events in Greece. Greece’s withdrawal from NATO and the widespread anti-American movement strengthened the belief that radical change in Greek–US relations had occurred, a belief that lingered into the following decades. The situation in Southern Europe and the Eastern Mediterranean changed towards the end of the decade. Although Southern Europe was no longer a source of concern, the Middle and Near East were. The era of détente had officially ended. The Soviet Union increased pressures on the peripheries of the region and the emergence of Islamic fundamentalism threatened US interests in the region. Turkey emerged as the only US ally capable of assuming the stabilising role that Iran had played in the past. However, Turkey faced its own political crisis that stemmed from years of economic stagnation. In efforts to promote stability inside Turkey the United States committed generous amounts of economic and military aid, as Chapter 7 explains. Washington interpreted Turkey’s political and military strength as a new pillar in US national security in the Middle East. For the first time since the end of the Second World War this new 6 John Young, Cold War Europe, 1945–1991: A Political History, 2nd ed. (London: Arnold, 1991), 183–191. 7 Paul Heywood, ‘The Emergence of New Party Systems and Transitions to Democracy: Spain in Comparative Perspective’, in Geoffrey Pridham and Paul G. Lewis (eds), Stabilising Fragile Democracies: Comparing Systems in Southern and Eastern Europe (London: Routledge, 1996), 145–166; Angel Vinas, ‘Spain and NATO: Internal Debate and External Challenges’, in John Chipman (ed.), NATO’s Southern Allies: Internal and External Challenges (London: Routledge, 1988), 141; Thomas A. Schwartz, ‘Legacies of Détente: A Three-Way Discussion’, Cold War History, Vol. 8(4), 2008, 522.

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approach meant that Greece and Turkey were expected to play different roles in the region. Although Greece remained an ally with widespread influence in the Balkans, Turkey’s role expanded. While Athens and Ankara had played complementary roles in the Eastern Mediterranean, from 1980 onwards they followed different destinies. This led to Turkey becoming a regional power and to Greece and the United States having to determine their relationship on a new basis. In addition to the book describing the power structures between states it emphasises the role played by individuals. Greek diplomats enjoyed multi-level direct access to US decision-makers. Experienced and well versed in the intricacies of the US political system diplomats played a crucial role in promoting Greek interests in the United States. Developments at the time were outside the control of the Greek leadership. For instance, the arms embargo was primarily the result of the power struggle between Congress and the White House. Greek diplomats conveyed Greek views through appropriate channels thereby maximising Athens’ voice and offered advice that ensured better goals (as shown in the case of the DCAs). Similarly, US personnel offered indispensable insights into the domestic challenges that Athens faced, highlighting the limitations of Greek governments and avoiding unattainable demands or unnecessary concessions. All in all, Greek national security doctrine throughout the 1970s called for close relations with the United States to confront the communist threat and Turkish expansionism—a threat coming from within the western alliance. Greek conservative leaders recognised the pressing need to convince Washington to offer its support on a bipartisan basis and regardless of who occupied the White House. With that end in mind Athens developed a new strategy of confrontation aiming to persuade, if not force, the United States to support Greek objectives. Publicly confronting the United States could also appease the public’s antiAmerican sentiments and offer electoral gains to the Greek conservative party. However, these gains were not the principal objective of the Greek conservatives, who subverted domestic politics to national security imperatives. Thus, public confrontation with Washington remained as Athens’ last resort during this period. For its part the United States during both the Ford and Carter Presidencies promoted a balanced approach towards Greece and Turkey aimed at safeguarding relations with both. As Greece integrated firmly into Western structures through its return to full NATO

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membership and accession to the EEC, Turkey lagged behind. Washington’s greater focus on Turkey was the result of regional changes and new emerging challenges. In 1981 PASOK came to power in Greece and Andreas Papandreou became the Prime Minister. His government implemented a new interpretation of Greek national interests challenging the central role played by the United States in Greek national security. Future research will hopefully determine how this interpretation challenged and counteracted the national security doctrine that the Greek conservatives pursued in the 1970s. Despite the changes that occurred after the end of the 1970s and the Cold War, the Greek national security policy today presents visible similarities to the objectives Greek governments pursued between 1974 and 1980.

Bibliography

Primary Sources Unpublished Greek (translated by the author) Constantine G. Karamanlis Foundation, Athens, Greece Evangelos Averoff-Tossitsa Papers, 1974–1980 Constantine Karamanlis Papers, Records related to foreign policy, 1974–1981 US Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library, Ann Arbour, MI, USA National Security Adviser Collection Kissinger-Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, 1969–1977, General Subject File NSC Europe, Canada, and Ocean Affairs Staff: Files, 1974–1977, Country File White House Situation Room Files Presidential Country Files for the Middle East and South Asia, Country File Files on Cyprus, Greece, Turkey Digitised Collection, Memoranda of Conversations Digitised Collection, White House Press Releases, 1974–1977 Digitised Collection, NSA, Kissinger Reports on USSR, China and Middle East Discussions, 1974–76 Jimmy Carter Presidential Library, Atlanta, GA, USA National Security Affairs Collection Brzezinski Material & NSC, Staff Material © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 A. Antonopoulos, Redefining Greek–US Relations, 1974–1980, Security, Conflict and Cooperation in the Contemporary World, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-47656-4

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Index

A Afghanistan, 210 Agnew, Spiro, 35 AHEPA. See American Hellenic Educational Progressive Association (AHEPA) Alexandrakis, Menelaos, 39, 59, 76, 82, 85–87, 92, 101, 102, 105, 106, 108, 110–114, 122, 127, 135–148, 152, 153, 156–158, 160–162, 174, 180, 193, 199, 200, 202–205, 213, 228, 229, 244 American Hellenic Educational Progressive Association (AHEPA), 77, 84, 126, 137, 140 Andrianopoulos, Andreas, 180 Androutsopoulos, Adamantios, 19 Averoff-Tossitsa, Evangelos, 11, 23, 24, 29, 38, 58, 59, 63, 64, 67, 68, 71, 73–75, 80, 99, 100, 120, 127, 129, 158, 179, 180,

192–194, 196–198, 210, 211, 220–222, 236, 238

B Ball, George W., 76, 139, 140, 142 Bennett, William Tapley, Jr., 33, 34, 123, 215, 218, 227 Bitsios, Dimitrios, 13, 43, 52, 57–59, 65, 69, 70, 72, 85, 87, 89–91, 100, 101, 104, 110–112, 114, 119–122, 124, 126–128, 130, 142, 143, 146, 155, 156, 158, 159, 161–164, 173, 174, 179, 185, 198 Brademas, John, 77, 79, 84, 142–144, 153, 156, 193, 202, 204 Britain, 12, 20, 24, 25, 47, 206 Brown, Harold, 152, 186, 188, 190, 191, 225, 238 Brzezinski, Zbigniew, 12, 14, 148, 149, 152, 154, 162, 164–167, 173, 174, 182, 186, 187, 190,

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 A. Antonopoulos, Redefining Greek–US Relations, 1974–1980, Security, Conflict and Cooperation in the Contemporary World, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-47656-4

265

266

INDEX

193, 206, 225, 230, 232–235, 238, 239 Buffum, William B., 26, 28, 51 Burckold (US Official), 73 Byrd, Robert C., 203 C ˙ Ça˘glayangil, Ihsan Sabrı, 101–103, 109, 151, 167, 173, 182 Callaghan, James, 25, 26, 33, 34 Carter, James Earl, ‘Jimmy’, 4, 8–10, 12, 14, 15, 38, 128, 133–137, 139–141, 145–159, 162, 163, 165, 166, 168, 169, 171–174, 177, 179, 180, 182, 183, 188– 196, 200, 201, 204–206, 210, 213, 217, 219, 225, 226, 228, 229, 234, 236–240, 245–247, 249 Christopher, Warren, 19, 24, 151, 182–185, 189, 193, 194, 196, 204, 217, 219–221, 224–226, 232, 233, 239 Chrysospathis, Spyros, 163, 164, 199 Clifford, Clark, 150–163, 167, 173, 174, 182, 206, 239 Cold War, 2–7, 15, 17, 50, 63, 67, 68, 72, 188, 241, 242, 244, 250 Conference of Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), 68, 86 CSCE. See Conference of Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) Cyprus, 4, 5, 10–12, 14, 15, 18–23, 26, 28–32, 34–38, 40, 44, 45, 47, 49, 51, 52, 55–57, 59, 60, 62–65, 67–69, 73, 76–78, 80–83, 85, 88–90, 93, 96, 103, 108, 110, 113, 118, 133–141, 144– 146, 148–154, 156, 158–161, 164–169, 171–174, 176, 177, 180–184, 187, 188, 191, 192,

194–196, 202, 203, 205–207, 231, 239, 242, 245, 247 Cyprus crisis, 3, 4, 6, 9, 11, 12, 14, 15, 17–19, 22, 23, 25, 33–35, 37–40, 44, 46–48, 55, 60, 63, 65–67, 70, 75, 80, 116, 137, 149, 156, 186, 201, 207, 214, 221, 242, 248 negotiations, 36, 43, 56, 64, 65, 70, 75, 82, 87, 88, 142, 147, 159, 162, 167, 173, 206 Treaty of Guarantee of 1960, 20 Turkish invasion, 1, 18, 22, 26, 49, 60, 62, 71, 76, 79, 242, 245 Western Sovereign Base Area (WSBA), 44 Zurich and London treaties, 20

D Davis, Roger P., 38 Davos, Ioannis, 213, 215, 216, 218–221, 224, 226 Debré, Michel Jean-Pierre, 45 Demirel, Süleyman, 101, 116, 120, 151, 157, 165, 166, 173, 182, 183, 191, 207, 232 Denktash, Rauf, 160, 167 Deshors (French Official), 108 Détente, 6–8, 13, 15, 18, 50, 51, 67, 68, 189, 235, 242, 248 DPC. See North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, Defence Planning Committee (DPC)

E Eagleton, Thomas, 77, 109, 142 Eastern Mediterranean, 2, 4, 14, 15, 22, 39, 88, 112, 113, 134, 136, 141, 145, 148–152, 157, 162, 165, 168, 169, 171, 174,

INDEX

180–182, 186, 192, 198, 203, 206, 214, 238–241, 246–249 Ecevit, Bülent, 29–31, 34, 79, 101, 124, 165, 183, 184, 186–192, 196, 207, 219, 229, 231, 234, 235 EDA. See Eniaia Dimokratiki Aristera (EDA) EDIK. See Enosis Dimokratikou Kentrou (EDIK) EEC. See European Economic Community (EEC) EK/ND. See Enosis Kentrou (EK) Eniaia Dimokratiki Aristera (EDA), 58 Enosis Dimokratikou Kentrou (EDIK), 175 Enosis Kentrou (EK), 57 EP. See Ethike Parataxis (EP) ERE. See Ethiki Rizospastiki Enosis (ERE) Esenbel, Melih, 151, 153 Ethike Parataxis (EP), 176 Ethiki Rizospastiki Enosis (ERE), 57 European Commission, 104 European Economic Community (EEC), 7, 8, 13, 43–45, 48, 51, 61, 64, 104, 110, 118, 167, 175, 176, 179, 194, 199, 200, 208, 210, 226, 227, 233, 243, 250 1961 Association Agreement, 43, 45

F Federal Republic of Germany, 24, 47, 206, 217, 234, 235 Ford, Gerald R., 4, 8, 9, 11, 12, 14, 15, 18, 22, 30, 35, 36, 39–41, 43, 47, 48, 55, 56, 63, 75, 81, 83–88, 90, 91, 93, 101, 108–111, 117, 120, 121, 125, 127–131, 133, 135–138,

267

140–146, 150, 153, 172, 183, 201, 210, 234, 246, 247, 249 France, 24, 47, 70, 124, 206, 211, 218, 234, 248 Frydas, Aristotelis, 194

G Genscher, Hans-Dietrich, 46–48 Giscard d’Estaing, Valéry, 45, 110 Gizikis, Phaedon, 19, 23, 24 Greece, 1–8, 10–15, 17–22, 24–26, 29, 30, 32–41, 43–50, 52, 55–57, 61–67, 69–78, 80, 83, 84, 87, 88, 91–97, 99, 100, 103–107, 109–125, 130, 131, 133–139, 141, 143, 145–153, 155–159, 161, 162, 164, 165, 167–169, 171–181, 184–188, 190–192, 194, 198–206, 208–218, 220–223, 225–234, 236–250 Aegean crisis/dispute, 65–67, 69, 75, 88, 89, 93, 96, 114, 116, 118, 124–127, 131, 135, 139–141, 150, 156, 161, 174–177, 181, 214, 242, 247 anti-Americanism, 1, 3, 8, 14, 17, 37, 41, 46, 47, 55, 57, 60–63, 71, 74, 76, 103, 109, 135, 168, 177, 198, 220, 234, 245, 247–249 Civil War, 2, 55 Greek dictatorship, 8, 35, 80, 248 metapolitefsi, 17, 60 national security, 3, 6, 8, 55, 60, 61, 68, 211, 221, 241, 243, 244, 249, 250 Polytechnic Uprising, 19 Greek–Turkish relations, 11, 29, 67, 83, 90, 118, 138, 149, 177, 187, 194, 199, 207

268

INDEX

Greek–US Defence and Economic Cooperation Agreement (DECA), 210 Greek–US Defence Cooperation Agreement (DCA), 95, 143, 210 Greek–US relations, 1, 3, 4, 6, 9–11, 14, 15, 43, 56, 59, 62, 80, 93, 95, 96, 125, 126, 131, 134, 135, 146, 149, 154, 171, 172, 176, 178, 186, 195, 199, 205, 209, 242, 243, 248 Güne¸s, Turan, 26, 27

H Haig, Alexander, 213–221, 224–226 Hamilton, Lee H., 113, 205 Hartman, Arthur A., 23, 26–28, 33, 34, 39, 42, 89, 92, 109–111, 113 Hays, Wayne, 144 Henze, Paul B., 148–150, 162–164, 166, 174, 187–189, 191–194, 196, 199, 200, 206, 227, 230–236 Hibbert, Reginald, 216

I Iakovos, Archbishop, 41 ICJ. See International Court of Justice (ICJ) IMF. See International Monetary Fund (IMF) Ingersoll, Robert S., 23, 69, 102 ˙ ˙ Inönü, Mustafa Ismet, 21 International Court of Justice (ICJ), 89, 120, 123–125, 140, 176 International Monetary Fund (IMF), 91, 190, 233 Ioannides, Dimitrios, 19 Iran, 229–231, 233–235, 248

Iranian Revolution, 210, 229, 232, 233 Italy, 123, 124, 218, 248

J Johnson, Lyndon B., 21, 32, 139, 148, 151, 246 JP. See Justice Party (JP) Justice Party (JP), 165, 183

K Kalogeras, Petros, 97–100, 108, 109, 114, 129 Karamanlis, Constantine, 7, 11, 13, 24, 25, 27, 29, 32, 33, 35–38, 40–43, 45, 46, 49, 50, 52, 55, 57–63, 67, 69–71, 73, 74, 76, 80, 82, 83, 86–88, 90, 91, 93, 95, 97, 99, 100, 103, 104, 107–111, 113, 115, 117–120, 126, 127, 129, 130, 135, 142–146, 155–157, 165–168, 173–180, 184–187, 191–198, 201, 204, 205, 207, 208, 210, 212, 219, 221–224, 226–229, 231, 233, 237, 242, 243, 245 Kavalieratos, Pheadon, 45 Kennedy, Edward M. ‘Ted’, 82, 144, 228 Kissinger, Henry A., 9, 11, 12, 14, 17, 18, 21, 22, 24–28, 30–43, 46, 47, 50–52, 56, 57, 61, 65, 68, 76–78, 80, 83, 84, 88–93, 96, 101–103, 109, 111–113, 115, 118–124, 127, 128, 130, 131, 133–137, 140, 142, 145, 146, 148–150, 153, 155, 157, 159, 161, 162, 168, 171, 172, 185, 197–200, 228, 233, 242, 246, 247

INDEX

Kommunistiko Komma Elladas/esoterikou (KKE), 58, 103 Kosciusko-Morizet, Jacques, 48 Kosmadopoulos, Dimitiros, 29 Kubisch, Jack, 62, 63, 82, 83, 91, 93, 99, 100, 109, 124, 126, 128, 129, 134, 144, 154, 155, 161 Kyprianou, Spyros, 141, 172 L Lambrias, Panayiotis, 37 Ledsky, Nelson, 152, 161 LTDP. See North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, Long-Term Defence Program (LTDP) M Macheritsas (Greek official), 163 Macomber, William B, Jr., 30, 31, 34, 151 Makarios III, Archbishop, 19, 21, 52, 88, 154, 155, 159, 160, 166, 167, 172 Mansfield, Mike, 78 Mavros, George, 24–28, 41, 42, 45, 46, 50, 56–58, 61, 103, 175 MBFR. See Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) MC. See North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, Military Committee (MC) McCloskey, Robert J., 26, 35, 177, 194–199, 204, 219, 224–227, 229 Mills, Hawthorne Q., 174, 177–180 Mitsotakis, Constantine, 179, 238 Molyviatis, Petros, 59, 65, 90, 129, 143, 225, 226 Mondale, Walter, 135, 137 Muskie, Edmund S., 238

269

Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR), 68

N ND. See Nea Dimokratia (ND) Nea Dimokratia (ND), 57, 59, 103, 174, 175, 178, 179, 210, 220, 221 Nimetz, Matthew, 14, 148–150, 152, 162, 174, 180, 187, 192, 206, 236, 237, 239 Nixon, Richard M., 18, 22, 30, 35, 36, 60, 145 North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), 3, 4, 7, 8, 11–15, 17, 18, 20, 29, 36–40, 42–45, 47, 58, 60–66, 68–75, 79, 84, 88, 90, 91, 99, 100, 103, 104, 117, 120, 123, 129, 136, 138, 141, 148, 152, 156, 157, 164, 174–176, 178–182, 184, 185, 188, 189, 191, 196, 200, 207–227, 229–234, 236–240, 242, 244, 248, 249 Defence Planning Committee (DPC), 70, 212, 213 Defence Review Committee, 213 Long-Term Defence Program (LTDP), 222, 223 Military Committee (MC), 70, 212, 213, 215, 221 Open-Ended Group (OEG), 212 Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), 213–215, 226, 232 Norway, 218

O Office of Management and Budget (OMB), 164

270

INDEX

OMB. See Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), 233

P Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK), 14, 57, 58, 60, 103, 175, 176, 178, 195, 220, 250 Papadopoulos, George, 19 Papadopoulos, Tasos, 141 Papaligouras, Panayiotis, 179, 181, 182, 199 Papandreou, Andreas, 42, 57, 61, 103, 176, 180, 195, 250 Pell, Claiborne, 77, 142

R Rallis, George, 13, 29, 202–204, 220, 221, 223, 236, 238 Ramsbotham, Peter, 26 Republican People’s Party (RPP), 79, 165 Rockefeller, Nelson A., 83, 110 Rogers, Bernard W., ‘Ben’, 225, 232, 237, 238 Rosenthal, Benjamin Stanley, 77, 80, 82, 85, 142–144 Roussos, Stavros G., 216 RPP. See Republican People’s Party (RPP) Rumsfeld, Donald H., 129, 138, 139

S SALT. See Strategic Arms Limitation Talks/Treaty (SALT) Sarbanes, Paul, 77, 84, 142, 144, 153, 155, 156, 193 Sauvagnargues, Jean, 45, 47, 48

Schaufele, William E., 177 Schmidt, Helmut, 46, 110, 234 Sisco, Joseph J., 23, 26, 35, 42, 92, 109, 113, 121, 127 Sismik (Turkish ship), 119 Soviet Union, 7, 8, 43, 48–51, 189, 234, 235, 243, 248 Stathatos, Stefanos, 45, 199, 200 Stavropoulos, K., 126, 128 Stearns, Monteagle, 21, 97, 99–101, 112, 150, 212 Strategic Arms Limitation Talks/Treaty (SALT), 68, 189 T Tasca, Henry J., 24, 25, 29, 32, 33, 50, 80 The Hague. See International Court of Justice (ICJ) Theodoropoulos, Vyron, 13, 59, 68, 75 Truman, Harry S., 2 Tsatsos, Constantine, 130, 224 Tsilas, Loucas, 193 Turkey, 2–8, 10–12, 18, 20–23, 25, 30–34, 36, 38–40, 44–49, 52, 55–57, 62–71, 73, 75–88, 90, 92–96, 99, 101, 102, 104–107, 109–114, 116–124, 126, 131, 133, 134, 136–139, 142, 145–147, 149–154, 157–162, 165, 167–169, 171–175, 177, 181–183, 185–192, 194, 197, 202–207, 209–214, 216–225, 227, 229–240, 242–250 Turkish–US Defence and Economic Cooperation Agreement, 235, 236 Turkish–US Defence Cooperation Agreement, 86, 94–97, 101–110, 113, 114, 126, 131, 150, 156,

INDEX

159, 182–184, 186, 187, 191, 206, 207, 217, 223, 245, 246 Turkish–US relations, 4, 6, 21, 30, 81, 84, 90, 93, 101, 102, 134, 147, 152, 166, 171, 183, 188, 191, 193, 207, 217, 235, 246 Tyler, William R., 42 Tzounis, Ioannis, 59, 65, 90, 108, 126, 196, 225, 228, 229 U UN. See United Nations (UN) United Nations (UN), 20, 29, 30, 33, 39, 47, 48, 51, 89, 123–126, 145, 203, 239 United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), 28, 31 United Nations Security Council (UNSC), 49 United States (US), 1–8, 11, 12, 14, 15, 17, 18, 20–22, 25, 26, 29, 31–36, 38, 39, 41, 43, 44, 46– 48, 50, 52, 53, 55, 56, 59–64, 68, 69, 72, 74, 75, 77, 82, 84, 90, 92, 93, 95, 96, 100, 103, 107–115, 117–119, 121–123, 125, 126, 130, 131, 133, 134, 136, 138–141, 157, 159, 161, 164, 168, 173, 177–179, 183, 186, 192–194, 196–199, 202, 203, 207, 209, 217, 219, 224, 227–229, 231, 233, 234, 236, 238, 241–246, 248–250 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 35, 37, 58, 149, 193, 228, 230 Democratic Party, 8, 83, 134, 135, 137, 138, 142, 202, 228, 241 Foreign Assistance Act (FAA), 81, 101, 190 Greek–Americans, 77, 83 Greek Lobby, 76, 77, 83, 84, 90, 93, 128, 130, 142, 153, 163,

271

187, 192, 204, 205, 227–229, 234, 235, 244, 245 National Security Council (NSC), 11, 12, 100, 110, 117, 148, 149, 162, 188, 191, 193, 199, 200, 227, 230, 237 Republican Party, 4, 8, 83, 127, 133, 135, 138, 139, 145, 146, 169, 241, 245, 247 Turkish arms embargo, 4, 10, 39, 52, 56, 75–88, 90, 92, 93, 96, 101, 102, 105–107, 109, 113, 118, 126–128, 137, 141, 142, 144, 148–150, 153, 156, 158, 159, 171, 172, 183, 184, 188, 190–197, 199–208, 217, 220, 229, 230, 234, 239, 244–247, 249 US bases, 12, 15, 64, 71–75, 84, 86, 91, 95, 97, 98, 101, 103, 105, 107, 108, 151, 159, 168, 176, 185, 186, 217, 239, 244 US Congress, 2, 4, 39, 40, 52, 53, 56, 75–78, 80, 82–84, 87, 88, 90–93, 106, 111, 113, 114, 127, 137, 142, 150, 153, 154, 161, 162, 171–173, 183, 184, 192, 193, 197, 199–204, 206, 207, 228, 229, 235, 236, 244–247, 249 Vietnam War, 56, 77, 79 USSR. See Soviet Union

V Vance, Cyrus R., 12, 14, 139–142, 147, 148, 150, 151, 153, 156, 157, 173, 174, 180–188, 190–192, 198–201, 207, 213, 223–226, 239 Vlachos, Angelos, 13, 27, 33, 37 Vladivostok Summit, 51

272

INDEX

W Waldheim, Kurt, 30, 148, 159, 196, 197 Warsaw Pact, 55, 64, 70, 119, 211 western alliance, 2–7, 18, 20, 30, 40, 48, 64, 104, 117, 152, 183, 185, 188, 208, 210, 213, 215–219, 221, 222, 224, 228, 233, 234, 237, 238, 242, 243, 249 Wilson, Harold, 44, 110

Y Yugoslavia, 5

Z Zablocki, Clement, 201, 205 Zaimis, Andreas, 179 Zhivkov, Todor Hristov, 119