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Reconstructing Russia: U.S. Policy in Revolutionary Russia, 1917-1922
 0873386353, 9780873386357

Table of contents :
Contents
Acknowledgments
Introduction
1. The Open Door; Wilsonianism, and the New Frontier in Siberia
2. A Minister Plenipotentiary for Russia’s Railroads: The Stevens Commission in Russia, June—December 1917
3. The Specter of a Divided World: The Sources and Conduct of American Economic Warfare Against Germany, January —August 1918
4. Between Germany and Japan: Wilson, the Czechoslovaks, and the Decision to Intervene, May—July 1918
5. The Genesis of the Russian Bureau: The Sources and Conduct of the American Economic Assistance Program, July—September 1918
6. A Stillborn Program: The Russian Bureauy October—December 1918
7. An Insoluble Dilemma: Economic Assistance and the Kolchak Government
8. A Critical Juncture: The Chinese Eastern Railway in Far Eastern Rivalries, 1920—1922
Conclusion
Notes
Bibliography
Index

Citation preview

R econstructing R ussia

RECONSTRUCTING U. S. Policy in Revolutionary Russia,

1917-1922

Leo J. Bacino

The Kent State University Press • Kent, Ohio, and London

© 1999 by the Kent State University Press, Kent, Ohio 44242 A ll rights reserved Library o f Congress Catalog Card Number 99-21764 ISBN 0-87338-635-3

Manufactured in the United States o f America 06 05 04 03 02 01 00 99

54321

Library o f Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Bacino, Leo J., 1959Reconstructing Russia: U .S. policy in revolutionary Russia, 1917-1922 / Leo J. Bacino. p.

cm.

Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0-87338-635-3 (cloth : alk. paper) «>

i. Economic assistance, American— Russia (Federation)— Russian Far East— History— 20th century. 2. Russian Far East (Russia)— Relations— United States— History— 20th century. 3. United States— Relations— Russia (Federation)— Russian Far East— History— 20th century. I. Title. HC340.12.Z7F2723

1999

338-9i 73° 47— dc21 British Library Cataloging-in-Publication data are available.

99-21764

fo r myfa th e r

« 'S *

Contents

M ap o f Post-R evolutionary Russia / viii Acknow ledgm ents / xi Introduction / i 1

T h e O pen D oor, W ilsonianism , and the N ew Frontier in Siberia / 12

2

A M in ister Plenipotentiary for Russia’s Railroads: T h e Stevens Com m ission in R ussia, Ju n e-D ecem ber 1917 / 25

3

T h e Specter o f a D ivided W orld: T h e Sources and Conduct o f A m erican Econom ic W arfare A gain st Germ any, Jan u ary-A u gu st 1918 / 41

4

Betw een G erm any and Japan : W ilson , the C zecho-Slovaks, and the D ecision to Intervene, M a y -Ju ly 1918 / 61

5

T h e G enesis o f the Russian Bureau: T h e Sources and Conduct o f the A m erican Econom ic Assistance Program , Ju ly-Sep tem b er 1918 / 85

6

A Stillborn Program : T h e Russian Bureau, O cto b erD ecem ber 1918 / 105

7

A n Insoluble D ilem m a: Econom ic Assistance and the K olchak Governm ent / 128

8

A C ritical Juncture: T h e C hinese Eastern R ailw ay in Far Eastern Rivalries, 1920-1922 / 163 Conclusion / 195 N otes / 203 Bibliography / 225 Index / 233

A

«'S*©

Acknowledgments

O ver the years I have benefited enormously from the faculty and students o f the D epartm ent o f H istory at N orthern Illinois University. I owe a tremen­ dous debt to the N IU history faculty for a rich and diversified intellectual training; they are a credit to public education. M ost im portantly, I w ant to thank m y director, C arl P. Parrini. H e em bodies the highest personal and intellectual qualities o f a teacher-scholar. I also w ant to acknowledge m y theoretical debt to M ary O . Furner and to thank her for her participation on m y dissertation com m ittee. From m y earliest undergraduate courses, teachers like W illiam B eik, C . H . and M argaret G eorge, and M arvin Rosen provided direction and inspiration. Since this study is a revised version o f m y P h .D . dissertation, I w ould also like to thank the other members o f m y com m ittee, W . Bruce Lincoln and A nthony Scaperlanda, for their careful reading o f m y dissertation and the help they provided in the final stages o f the dissertation process. I have been very fortunate to have been associated w ith an exceptional group o f students at N IU . I w ill always value the friendship and support I have received from this close-knit group. In particular, I want to acknowledge B ill Burr, Thom as Elkins, Brian Forberg, Lin n Freiwald (who very gener­ ously took the time to edit the manuscript), Keith H aynes, M ichael H ickey, Jean K adel, Jim Livingston, L arry Lynn, Sandy M azzola, Bruce N elson, Sonia N elson, D on R odrick, Richard Schneirov, Paul Street, and R obert Tyree.

I have benefited gready from my discussions w ith historians D avid Foglesong, Linda K illen, and Thom as Knock, whose research has enriched our understanding o f W ilsonian foreign policy. T h e editors and readers at T h e K ent State U niversity Press have been exceptionally helpful and gracious throughout the process. I especially w ant to thank director Jo h n H ubbell and m anaging editor Joanna H ildebrand C raig for their assistance and assistant editor E rin H olm an, who conscien­ tiously guided the m anuscript through the copyediting process at Kent State. Clarence W underlin and M ary A n n H eiss deserve special thanks for intro­ ducing me to this fine press. For technical assistance I would like to thank D ennis Butzow, Ilga Ja n ouskovec, and Jo e l Leer. M y research has been facilitated by the assistance o f m any generous archivists at the N ational Archives, the Library o f Congress, Yale University, the International H arvester Archives, the W isconsin State H istorical Society, the H oover Institute and Stanford U niversity Libraries, and the m anuscript department o f the Regenstein Library at the U niversity o f Chicago. T h e staff at the N orthern Illin ois U niversity library, particularly the interlibrary loan and governm ent publications departm ents, have facilitated m y research over m any years. Finally, I thank m y m other, Elizabeth Bacino; m y fam ily, D ennis and Elizabeth Butzow ; and D r. W illiam Cohen for all o f their support.

xii

Acknowledgm ents

Introduction

T h e A m erican intervention in Siberia during the Russian Revolution and civil w ar left no lasting effects on the region, other than a legacy o f bitter­ ness and m istrust for future Soviet-A m erican relations. B u t seventy years o f Soviet-A m erican rivalry has obscured the fact that, during the Russian Revolution and civil war, Siberia had been a focal point in the U nited States’s struggle against the rival powers to recast the international econom ic and political order. T h is forgotten dim ension o f the A m erican intervention in Russia represented a sophisticated foreign assistance program . It now de­ serves careful réévaluation in view o f the im portant lessons it can provide for contem porary Am erican policym akers who are struggling to devise effec­ tive policies for post-Soviet Russia. In 1918, the decisive year o f the calam itous w orld war, A m erican states­ men were deeply concerned that the Russian Em pire w ould be divided into G erm an and Japanese spheres o f influence. T h e origins o f W orld W ar I it­ se lf lay in the rivalry over spheres o f influence in sem idependent developing regions, such as C h in a, Eastern Europe, and the M id d le E ast. T h e collapse o f the Provisional G overnm ent in Russia at the end o f 1917 intensified this rivalry am ong the rem aining powers by transform ing the Russian Em pire itse lf into an arena in this global struggle between im perial system s. D urin g the extraordinary years 1918 and 1919, when a political vacuum existed in the em pire, Germ any, Japan , B ritain , and France all pursued policies in Russia

that were aimed at establishing spheres o f influence o f one form or another. I f these powers had been allowed to dism em ber the Russian Em pire, this would have given added im petus to their ongoing struggle to divide the re­ m aining developing regions. T h is possibility alone required the U nited States to becom e actively involved in Siberia as part o f its larger effort to prom ote the O pen Door. In contrast to this fram ew ork o f great-pow er rivalry, A m erican states­ men viewed bolshevism as epiphenom enal, a sym ptom o f the czarist re­ gim e’s pervasive social and econom ic m alaise that the w ar had unleashed. Indeed, during 1918 much o f the W ilson adm inistration’s antagonism to­ w ard the Bolsheviks arose from the practical consideration that this revolu­ tionary regim e served as a pawn in the larger system ic conflict am ong the G reat Powers. A t the threshold o f a new historical epoch, A m erican statesm en also perceived trem endous opportunities for R ussian-A m erican relations. T h e W ilson adm inistration had greeted the M arch Revolution o f 1917 in R ussia as an event that could have a great im pact on the postwar international order. W ith the establishm ent o f the Provisional G overnm ent, the adm in­ istration w as encouraged that Russia w ould now begin to evolve a constitu­ tional form o f governm ent. A s a corollary to this social and political process, m ajor A m erican corporate groups believed a post-czarist Russia w ould w el­ come A m erican investm ent as an alternative to the politically based pattern o f European investm ent during the czarist years. In this event, Russia w ould be disposed to participate in the international econom y on term s consistent w ith O pen D oor principles: a w orld system that operated under rules that guaranteed equality o f opportunity for trade and investm ent— in direct con­ trast to the existing system o f preferential spheres o f influence. A gainst this background, Am erican statesmen attached great significance to Siberia. T h ey believed that this vast developing region, w ith its relatively egalitarian social structure, w ould rapidly begin the transition toward a postczarist civil society. A s this social and econom ic transform ation gathered momentum in Siberia, it w ould, in turn, provide a tremendous oudet for A m erican investm ent and thereby help solidify an O pen D oor system . In order for the U nited States to unlock the frill potential this unique region offered for econom ic expansion, the W ilson adm inistration first had to over­ come the challenges posed by the com bined am bitions o f the rival powers, as w ell as the new phenom enon o f revolutionary socialism . Y et Siberia’s unparalleled significance as an econom ic frontier and the distinct interest the U nited States exhibited toward it only made the interpower struggle for hegem ony in the region more intense. In this crucible o f w ar and revolu­ tion, A m erican efforts to provide Siberia w ith econom ic assistance should

2

Reconstructing Russia

accordingly be view ed as a distinctly W ilsonian experim ent in foreign assis­ tance policy. U nlike post-W orld W ar II foreign assistance program s, A m er­ ican policy in Siberia not only had to contend w ith anticapitalist revolutionary movements but also w ith the ambitions o f form idable rival powers. T here­ fore, during the form ative stages o f Soviet-Am erican relations, the counter­ revolutionary tendencies inherent in W ilson’s approach to Siberia were still subordinated to the progressive historical role Am erican O pen D oor diplo­ m acy played in its struggle against the more exploitative form s o f im perialism practiced by the other powers. T h is study examines the U nited States’s effort to promote social and eco­ nom ic reconstruction in Siberia between 1917 and 1922. It w ill demonstrate that this endeavor constituted a m ajor policy initiative at a pivotal juncture in the nation’s evolution toward global preeminence in the twentieth century. T h is policy simultaneously represented the prim ary response o f Am erican statesmen to events in revolutionary Russia and an im portant new dimension in their larger struggle to achieve a structural transform ation o f the interna­ tional political economy. T h e term “reconstruction’’ is used here to define the nature o f Am erican policy because it was consistently used by Am erican states­ men themselves when expressing their purposes in Russia. M ore im portant, this term embodies the developmental impulses that motivated Am erican policy. It conveys the Am erican policym akers’ recognition that Siberia’s long­ term development would ultim ately hinge on fostering a stable civil society; efforts to gain im mediate economic advantages in Russia would only hinder this goal. T h ey clearly regarded their assistance policy in Siberia as a prelude to an ambitious developmental program that would reintegrate the form er czarist empire and border regions like M anchuria into a global economy man­ aged by the U nited States according to the rules o f the O pen Door. Since A m erican policym akers thought their initiatives in Siberia w ould have far-reaching im plications for A m erican prosperity and for the stability o f the em erging international system , the failure o f these efforts in no w ay dim inishes their significance. T h e inability o f the U nited States to incor­ porate the region on an O pen D oor basis and the eventual w ithdraw al o f the Soviet U nion from the w orld m arket undoubtedly contributed to the form ation o f closed econom ic blocs during the interw ar period. T h e devel­ opm ent o f regional econom ic blocs in turn disrupted international trade and investm ent, w hich contributed to the depression and to the tensions between the powers that resulted in W orld W ar I I .1 T h e W ilson adm inistration’s assistance policy focused on two com ple­ m entary initiatives: the restoration o f operations on the T rans-Siberian rail­ w ay and the provision o f com m ercial assistance to the Siberian population via the region’s prom inent peasant cooperative societies. T hese form s o f

Introduction

3

assistance were geared toward reestablishing predictable and stable m arket relations along the continent-sized area traversed by the Trans-Siberian rail­ w ay system . A m erican policym akers were m erely acting on the recognition that a more secure environm ent w ould provide an im petus for social and econom ic reconstruction in this region where czarist authority had been relatively w eak and could be replaced by institutions more representative o f the region’s society. In its initial stages, the Am erican assistance policy attempted to commence the reconstruction process in Siberia by nurturing the recovery o f Russian civil society, or by encouraging w hat W ilson called “self-governm ent.” W il­ son’s conception o f self-governm ent sheds valuable light on his approach to the w hole Russian question because it denotes a level o f socioeconom ic developm ent rather than a specific form o f governm ent. In W ilson’s view, self-governm ent existed where there were political, insti­ tutional, or legal structures founded on the consent o f the governed and that provided essential guarantees for personal and property rights. In other words, ^ ils o n used the term “self-governm ent” to characterize w hat amounted to a constitutional o rd er a civil society founded on voluntary assodational activi­ ties and mediated by an institutional structure and a rule o f law that accom­ modated individual liberty to public power. W ilson attributed great significance to these self-governing social and political capacities because they were essential building blocks o f the new international order he hoped to construct from the remains o f the shattered system o f European em pires. A s an alternative to the prewar system o f in­ ternational relations founded on a tenuous balance o f power am ong rival em pires, W ilson envisioned a rational system based on cooperation between powers, particularly w ith regard to their relations in developing regions. T h is type o f system , w hich N . G ordon L evin has appropriately defined as liberal-internationalist, would operate w ithin a fram ew ork o f international law guaranteed by A m erican economic and naval power. W h ile this study deliberately subordinates the anti-Bolshevik facets o f the U nited States’s Russian policy, it fu lly acknowledges that A m erican pol­ icym akers were staunchly anti-Bolshevik. Since A m erican policym akers considered bolshevism the product o f pervasive instability, they believed that econom ic assistance w ould constitute the only effective antidote to the problem . In other w ords, the reconstruction program em bodied the truly coherent, or class-conscious, response o f Am erican policym akers to revolu­ tionary events in Russia. Furtherm ore, a successful A m erican-sponsored assistance program in Siberia would also serve as the m ost effective means for influencing events in European Russia.

4

Reconstructing Russia

W h ile the Bolshevik regime survived, contrary to the expectations o f most A m erican policym akers, this in no w ay lessens the efficacy o f A m erican ex­ pectations or o f policies rooted in these assum ptions. A fte r all, the Bolshe­ viks them selves were doubtful o f their future when it becam e clear that revolutions would not erupt in the advanced W estern industrial countries. Because the A m erican policym aking establishm ent considered the B o l­ shevik Revolution a tem porary phase in the revolutionary cycle, more at­ tention must be paid to their concern that the Bolshevik regim e w ould becom e a pawn in the broader system ic conflict am ong the powers. Indeed, Germ any, Japan , and B ritain all attem pted to use revolutionary instability to further their designs in the Russian Em pire. T herefore, although A m er­ ican reconstruction efforts in Siberia were im plicitly aim ed at com bating bolshevism , a com prehensive assessm ent o f these initiatives must take into account their role in the intense interim perialist struggle for control o f the region. B y view ing the A m erican assistance policy as part o f this broader im perial rivalry, this study provides a w ider perspective on the debate over the A m erican response to revolutionary events in the Russian Em pire. In the critical years o f 1918 and 1919, the thorny issue o f m ilitary interven­ tion in Siberia lim ited W ilson’s ability to undertake any substantial program o f economic assistance in the region. Nevertheless, this study w ill demon­ strate that W ilson’s controversial decision to undertake a m ilitary interven­ tion on behalf o f the stranded C zecho-Slovak C orps in the summer o f 1918 was essentially an attem pt to reconcile A llied pressure for a m ilitary interven­ tion w ith his prim ary goal o f providing economic assistance to Siberia. D u rin g the trying m onths between Janu ary and Septem ber 1918, W ilson repeatedly rejected A llied appeals for an effort to restore the eastern front. W ilson only accepted the efficacy o f an intervention in Siberia when he learned that a consensus o f anti-Bolshevik political representatives, espe­ cially the representatives o f the peasant and w orker cooperatives, w ould welcom e an A m erican-led intervention to bolster popular resistance against Germ any. T hese sentim ents convinced W ilson that the politically conscious segments o f Russian society favored an A llied intervention in defense o f Rus­ sian national sovereignty, i f it did not threaten Russian territorial integrity. T h e attitude o f the cooperative societies particularly influenced W ilson’s de­ cision to intervene, because these organizations were truly organic regional institutions that represented the m aterial and social aspirations o f a consid­ erable segm ent o f the Siberian population. A fte r W ilson reached this deci­ sion, he steadfastly insisted that any A llied m ilitary operations in Siberia should be lim ited to providing logistical support for the C zecho-Slovaks, w ho, in turn, would provide security for the T rans-Siberian Railroad.

Introduction

*x« 5

B u t the rival aspirations o f B ritain , France, and Japan in Siberia under­ m ined A m erican efforts to assist the reconstruction o f civil society in the region during 1918 and 1919. B y the end o f 1919, Bolshevik forces trium phed over the conservative regim e o f A lexandr Kolchak. K olchak had acceded to pow er in N ovem ber 1918 w ith the support o f B ritish m ilitary officials. H is regim e was doom ed by its exclusive reliance on m ilitary m eans to defeat bolshevism and by its unw illingness to develop support am ong the popula­ tion. I f the K olchak regim e’s repressive practices were not sufficient hin­ drance to constructive p o licy in Sib eria, Jap an used its large m ilitary expedition to fnistrate the w ork o f the A m erican railroad advisers and to im pede the shipm ent o f A m erican goods w est along the railroad. T h is study w ill dem onstrate that the debate w ithin the W ilson adm inistration over recognition o f the K olchak regim e was prim arily m otivated by its broader desire to finance econom ic assistance for Siberia. T h e U nited States abandoned its assistance efforts in Siberia after the Bolshevik victory at the end o f 1919. Even then, the Republican H arding adm inistration persuaded the A m erican railroad advisers to rem ain on the Chinese Eastern Railw ay, the M anchurian section o f the Trans-Siberian system , for another three years until the end o f 1922. T h e continued pres­ ence o f A m erican railw ay advisers on the fringe o f the Trans-Siberian sys­ tem dem onstrates the im portance A m erican policym akers attributed to this transportation artery. W h ile enormous obstacles stood in the path o f these advisers’ w ork from the tim e o f their arrival on the Trans-Siberian railw ay in Jun e 1917 until they left in O ctober 1922, both the W ilson and H arding adm inistrations never wavered in their b elief that the stakes involved w ar­ ranted a continued A m erican presence on the system . T o fu lly appreciate the im plications o f the A m erican com m itm ent on the Trans-Siberian Railroad, it is necessary to view the venture in the broader context o f A m erican O pen D oor diplom acy in the Far E ast. Striking paral­ lels existed between the direction o f A m erican policy on the T rans-Siberian system from 1917 to 1922 and m ajor A m erican initiatives in M anchuria a decade earlier. From 1905 until his death in 1909, E . H . H arrim an, the A m erican railroad m agnate and financier, alternatively attem pted to pur­ chase partial control o f the South M anchurian R ailw ay from Japan or the Chinese Eastern Railw ay from Russia as part o f his ambition to own a w orld­ w ide railroad network. T o strengthen his bargaining position, H arrim an even undertook negotiations w ith C hinese officials to build a line parallel to the South M anchurian Railway. H arrim an’s proposals received strong diplom atic backing from the State D epartm ent during the T aft adm inistration. In 1909, Secretary o f State P h i­ lander Knox attem pted to revive H arrim an’s plans when he proposed his

6 »*»

Reconstructing Russia

“neutralization” schem e, whereby the powers would jo in tly finance China’s redem ption o f all the M anchurian railroads. A ll o f these initiatives failed because o f Japanese opposition and because Britain and France ultim ately refused to support these proposals over the objections o f their respective Far Eastern allies, Japan and Russia. T h e continuity between the H arrim an-Knox proposals and A m erican policy toward the T rans-Siberian system between 1917 and 1922 becam e apparent in 1920 when the U .S . governm ent officially supported inclusion o f the Chinese Eastern R ailw ay w ithin the jurisdiction o f the Second C h in a Consortium Banking G roup. A m erican assistance policy in Siberia also foreshadowed future foreign assistance program s. In early 1919, the W ilson adm inistration negotiated an agreem ent w ith B ritain , France, and Japan for supervision o f the T ransSiberian railw ay, this cooperative fram ew ork resem bled, in basic respects, contem porary m ultilateral developm ental agencies such as the Internation­ al M onetary Fund and the W orld Bank. Subsequently, W ilson wanted to obtain a large congressional appropriation, sim ilar to the M arshall Plan, for a large-scale program to assist Siberia’s reconstruction. T h is plan, w hich was shelved during the treaty fight, dem onstrates W ilson’s recognition that the U .S . government must assume a m ajor responsibility for prom oting global stabilization and long-term econom ic expansion. From one angle, the lim ited funding given the A m erican assistance efforts in Siberia m ay seem to call into question the degree o f com m itm ent to the reconstruction o f Siberia. B u t the A m erican political system ’s lack o f experience w ith large foreign assistance program s posed a form idable ob­ stacle fo r A m erican statesm en w ho recognized the potential significance o f Siberia. In view o f these political constraints, the W ilson adm inistration stood no chance o f ju stifyin g any large expenditures for the doubtful pros­ pect o f assisting a region suffering from w idespread turm oil. N evertheless, W ilson rem ained determ ined to obtain a large appropriation for Siberia from Congress in the sum m er o f 1919, ju st as his political fortunes were w aning. R ealist critics m ight respond that this study m erely dem onstrates the fu tility o f A m erican attem pts to escape from the balance o f power, w hich they view as the m ain source o f international stability. B u t these w riters overem phasize the causal role o f the balance o f power that has always served as a means o f furthering other ends. Prior to W orld W ar II, A m erican for­ eign policy challenged the balance o f power because it was a serious im ped­ im ent to tangible A m erican interests. T h e existence o f treaty arrangem ents, like the A nglo-Japanese alliance in the Far E ast, helped these powers pre­ serve their spheres o f influence from A m erican encroachm ent. It was only when W orld W ar I I brought about the com plete collapse o f the system

Introduction

7

based on spheres o f influence that the U nited States could establish m ulti­ lateral institutions to supervise international development. Therefore, in m any respects the W ilson adm inistration’s Siberian policy represented a “test run” for the accom plishm ents o f m idcentury. T h e first chapter in this volum e provides a b rie f assessm ent o f A m erican views on the political and econom ic future o f Russia and particularly o f Siberia. T h is chapter dem onstrates how Siberia’s unique position w ithin the Russian Em pire made it a particularly attractive area for the prospective extension o f A m erican influence. A m erican statesm en had a special affin ity for Siberia because o f its frontier characteristic, w hich lent itse lf to superfi­ cial analogies w ith the A m erican frontier o f the nineteenth century. T h e region’s rich natural resources, its relatively egalitarian social structure and the weakness o f czarist institutions appeared to m ake it fertile ground for rapid econom ic developm ent after the Revolution o f M arch 1917. T h e Am erican reconstruction program for Russia consisted o f three phases. Chapter 2 examines the first phase o f this process, which spanned the period o f A p ril through N ovem ber 1917, when the U nited States furnished the Provisional Governm ent w ith assistance to its railw ays. A m erica’s strategy to open the Russian “door” w as based on establishing A m erican m anagerial and technical influence on the Trans-Siberian and European Russian R ail­ roads during W orld W ar I. T h e U nited States offered the Russian Provi­ sional Governm ent a body o f prom inent railroad engineers, the A dvisory Com m ission o f R ailw ay Experts, in order to im prove operations on the Trans-Siberian Railroad after A p ril 1917. T h is commission was placed under the chairm anship o f John E Stevens, the most prestigious railroad engineer in the U nited States. Stevens w ould be the pivotal figure in the A m erican reconstruction program until the end o f 1922. In the year between the B olsh evik Revolution and the A rm istice in N ovem ber 1918, the threat o f G erm an econom ic dom ination o f R ussia preoccupied A m erican policym akers. Am erican statesmen believed the B o l­ sheviks’ seizure o f pow er w as m erely a tem porary phase in the revolution­ ary cycle; consequently, they feared this regim e w ould m erely pave the w ay for G erm any’s aim s in Russia as the population sought liberation from revolutionary extrem ism . C hapters 3 through 6 cover the year 1918, during w hich the W ilson adm inistration strove to defeat G erm any’s efforts to consolidate its econom ic position in the Russian Em pire follow ing the B rest-L ito vsk T reaty o f M arch 1918, w hich gave G erm any extensive eco­ nom ic privileges. In this context, A m erican econom ic assistance to Sib eria during 1918 served two purposes: it played an im m ediate strategic role in the w ar effort against G erm any and it attem pted to provide the com m er­ cial assistance necessary to begin the reconstruction process. T h e inter-A llied

8 «xe

Reconstructing R ussia

G ood s Exchange T rading Com pany (Tovaro-O bm ien), the Russian B u ­ reau o f the W ar Trade Board, and the plan for a tem porary ruble currency in Siberia were all conceived to further these dual objectives. T h e W ilson adm inistration even hoped the C zecho-Slovak C orps could play a role in this process as an A llied police force along the T rans-Siberian railw ay sys­ tem . T h is force, w hich w as originally slated for transportation to the w est­ ern front, consisted o f form er A ustro-H ungarian prisoners o f w ar w ho were reorganized in R ussia on b eh alf o f the A llied cause. Chapters 7 and 8 exam ine A m erican efforts to restore effective operations along the T rans-Siberian railw ay and to strengthen its links to the interna­ tional market. A n y chance for prom oting reconstruction in Siberia, and even­ tually in European R ussia, now rested squarely on the fate o f the Siberian railw ay system . Chapter 7 shows 1919 to be the critical year for W ilson’s reconstruction program . A fte r the conclusion o f an in ter-A llied railroad agreem ent in February 1919, the form ulation o f a com prehensive assistance program for Russia becam e a priority for the W ilson adm inistration. B y August, events in the Far E ast and political conditions at home underm ined this nascent program . T h e defeat o f anti-Bolshevik leader A dm iral Kolchak, Japan’s hostility to Stevens’s efforts to stabilize the railroads, and dom estic opposition to W ilson’s Russian policy blocked any hope o f im plem enting a governm ent-financed reconstruction program for the region. A fte r the A llies w ithdrew from Siberia, the U nited States retained Joh n Stevens in M anchuria to m anage the Chinese Eastern Railw ay, the last m ajor segm ent o f the Trans-Siberian railw ay system . C hapter 8 surveys the intersection o f the Siberian program w ith C hinese issues from 1920 through 1922. To prevent Japan from closing the eastern approach to Siberia, the U nited States sought inclusion o f the Russian-controlled C hinese Eastern R ailw ay w ithin the jurisdiction o f the new C h in a Consortium . T h is chap­ ter adds a new dim ension to our understanding o f A m erica’s Far Eastern policy by dem onstrating the integral role Siberia once played in A m erican calculations. N o existing study has recognized the scope or significance o f the W ilson adm inistration’s policy initiatives in Russia. For decades, the political and intellectual clim ate created by the A m erican-Soviet bipolar rivalry has led too m any scholars to view W ilson’s response to the Russian Revolution sim ply as a prelude to the C old W ar. In his tw o-volum e study S o v ietA m erican R elations, 191J-1Ç20, G eorge F. Kennan, statesm an, historian and a realist critic o f W ilsonian foreign policy, eschewed any efforts at a broad appraisal o f W ilson’s Russian policy in favor o f a narrative approach that em phasizes that the com plexity o f international relations m ilitated against the efficacy o f universalist w orldview s such as bolshevism or W ilsonianism .

Introduction

9

In his A m erican-R ussian R elations, 1781—1947, W illiam A . W illiam s focused on the anti-Bolshevik m otives o f the W ilsonians. T h e single best source on the ideological basis o f W ilsonian foreign policy is the w ork o f N . G ordon Levin , w ho argued persuasively in his study Woodrow W ilson and W orld Politics: A m erica’s Response to War a n d R evolu tion that W ilson attem pted to foster an environm ent favorable to the developm ent o f liberal constitutional institutions in the Russian Em pire in opposition to both revolutionary so­ cialism and m ilitaristic im perialism . T h e best introduction to the question o f Am erican involvem ent in Sibe­ ria is Joh n A . W h ite’s study, T he Siberian Intervention. R elying alm ost exclu­ sively on published sources, this excellent study suggests several im portant points about the political econom y o f Am erican policy in Siberia. W hite ar­ gues that it was the pressure exerted on Russia by G erm any and Japan that gave purpose to the A llied and A m erican intervention in Russia. Betty M . Unterberger s A m erica’s Siberian Intervention, 1918-1920 provides a solid back­ ground on the subject o f Am erica’s intervention in Siberia. She emphasizes that the W ilson adm inistration undertook a lim ited intervention on behalf o f the C zecho-Slovak Corps to maintain Russian sovereignty and to preserve the O pen D oor in Siberia and northern M anchuria against Japanese aggres­ sion. H er essay “W oodrow W ilson and the Russian Revolution,” published in A rthur S. Lin k’s Woodrow Wilson and a Revolutionary World, 191J-1921, pro­ vides a fine overview o f W ilsonian policy. Lin da K illen’s path-breaking study The R ussian Bureau: A Case Study in W ilsonian D iplom acy is the first m onograph to address the issue o f A m eri­ can econom ic assistance to Siberia. T h is valuable study surveys Am erican com m ercial assistance efforts in 1918 and 1919 and questions the consistency between W ilson’s high-sounding rhetoric regarding his expectations for Rus­ sia’s liberal-dem ocratic potential and his reluctance to com m it funds for a program o f econom ic assistance. Recent historiography on the A m erican intervention in the Russian Revolution has polarized around exaggerated positions. D avid M cFadden’s A ltern a tiv e Paths: Soviets an d Am ericans, 1917-1920 overstates the potential for a Soviet-A m erican rapprochem ent and expanded trade w ith Sovietcontrolled regions during this period; and C hristine W h ite’s B ritish and A m erican Com m ercial R elations w ith S o v iet R ussia, 1918-1924 also overesti­ mates the significance o f A m erican trade expansion w ith the Soviet U nion in the 1920s.1 A lternately, D avid Foglesong’s A m erica’s Secret War A g a in st Bolshevism : U.S. Intervention in the R ussian C iv il War, 1917—1920 em phasizes w hat he considers to be the counterrevolutionary nature o f the W ilson ad­ m inistration’s policy toward Russia. B y ignoring the significance and com ­ plexity o f the interpower rivalry in Russia and the sophistication o f the

10

Reconstructing Russia

W ilson adm inistration’s assistance policy, Foglesong m istakes the distinctly progressive character o f W ilson’s policy fo r a series o f covert operations against the Bolsheviks. M y use o f prim ary sources dem onstrates that A m erican foreign policy is conceived and m anaged by a policym aking “establishm ent” com posed o f governm ent officials and strategic representatives o f the private sector. T h is “establishm ent” is fundam entally oriented toward prom oting the stable ex­ pansion o f the corporate political economy. T h is does not im ply that U .S . foreign policy is a servant o f specific interests, nor does it condem n foreign investm ent as necessarily harm ful to developing countries. It m erely recog­ nizes the predom inance o f corporate capitalism and the leadership o f both governm ent officials and private individuals w ho assumed this system was the prim e agent o f progress. T h e prim ary sources for this study are Record G roup (R G ) 59: T h e G en ­ eral Records o f the Departm ent o f State; the manuscripts o f the central figures in the W ilson administration; and R G 43: T h e Records o f the A dvisory C om ­ mission o f Railw ay Experts to Russia, the Russian Railw ay Service Corps, and the Inter-A llied Railw ay Com m ittee. R G 59 continues to be an indis­ pensable resource for exam ining Am erican foreign relations; this vast body o f m aterial can still yield new insights into the policym aking process. T h is study has also made extensive use o f the papers o f W oodrow W ilson, Robert L an ­ sing, Frank Polk, Breckinridge Lon g, Edw ard M . H ouse, Gordon A uchincloss, Roland S. M orris, Charles Evans H ughes, Vance M cC orm ick, and British representative Sir W illiam W isem an. T h e records o f the Am erican Railw ay Experts in Russia have proved extrem ely valuable in revealing the connections between the engineers’ technical and operational w ork on behalf o f the Trans-Siberian railway and Am erica’s broader economic and political goals in the region. Samuel H arper’s papers contain valuable correspondence w ith officials in the Russian division o f the State Departm ent. Finally, the papers o f Cyrus M cC orm ick Jr. have memoranda regarding Am erican eco­ nomic assistance efforts in 1918. Records o f Russian Bureau o f the W ar Trade Board, R G 182; the country files o f the Treasury D epartm ent, R G 39; the Bureau o f Foreign and D o ­ m estic Com m erce, R G 151; and the Com m erce D epartm ent, R G 40; were all used in order to exam ine the com plex range o f problem s A m erican pol­ icym akers confronted and the sophisticated m ethods W ilsonian policy de­ vised to solve those problem s.

Introduction

11

1 «'S.® The Open Door; Wilsonianism , äh

*/the N ew

Frontier in Siberia

T h e M arch Revolution o f 1917 abruptly transform ed the A m erican view o f the Russian Em pire. In less than a fortnight, centuries o f autocratic rule bolstered by a privileged bureaucracy collapsed and opened a space for pro­ gressive social forces to assert them selves. A m erican statesm en believed the liberal character o f this revolution w ould foster close political and econom ic ties between Russia and the U nited States in the future. T h e interest A m erican statesm en and businessm en took toward Russia after the outbreak o f W orld W ar I was rooted in the fundam ental secular trend in the developm ent o f A m erican capitalism . Since the depression o f the 1890s, A m erican statesm en and business leaders recognized that A m er­ ica’s industrial developm ent had reached a crossroad. Foreign investm ent outlets were needed to absorb profitably the capital surpluses generated by industrial capitalism since the 1870s. T h is overinvestm ent o f capital in the dom estic econom y caused the severe industrial cycles and the labor unrest that m arked this thirty-year period. T h is crisis underlay the U nited States’s staunch advocacy o f the “O pen D oor” policy as its prim ary foreign policy objective by the late 1890s. Equal opportunity for trade and investm ent in developing regions w ould facilitate stable expansion o f the capitalist system and reduce the sources o f tension between the rival industrial powers. Beginning in the 1890s, A m erican statesm en believed the C hinese E m ­ pire offered the best prospects for A m erican investm ent because o f its huge

population and rich natural resources. C h in a was the only m ajor developing region that had not yet been incorporated into the colonial em pire o f an­ other power. C onditions in C hina, however, were not conducive to foreign investm ent. C hina’s social and econom ic backwardness increased risk and discouraged investors. M uch o f the econom y was based on subsistence or com partm entalized into regions that inhibited the penetration o f m arket forces. T h e C hinese m onarchy’s rapid deterioration increasingly paralyzed its extensive governm ental apparatus at the end o f the nineteenth century, a process that encouraged the powers to erode C hina’s territorial sovereignty through the establishm ent o f spheres o f influence after 1895. B y the out­ break o f W orld W ar I, C h in a had still not becom e the viable investm ent oudet that A m erican capitalists had hoped for.1 Prior to the M arch Revolution in Russia, a syndicate o f investm ent banks led by the N ational C ity B an k had begun to exhibit confidence in Russia’s future when they floated a series o f loans to the czarist governm ent w orth $86 m illion. From Petrograd, Com m erce D epartm ent attaché H en ry D . Baker thought that these loans could becom e the opening wedge for the large-scale involvem ent o f A m erican capital in Russia’s postw ar develop­ ment. A t the tim e he reported that “it is anticipated that in connection w ith the great loan o f $260 ,0 00 ,00 0 to the Russian Governm ent now being ne­ gotiated by an A m erican syndicate, headed by the N ational C ity Bank o f N ew York, and also in connection w ith the G reat International C orpora­ tion lately projected by N ational C ity B an k interests, there w ill be a great im petus created fo r A m erican investm ent projects in R ussia.” T h e A m erican International C orporation was form ed in late 1915 by a group o f large A m erican corporations, led by the N ational C ity Bank, to take advantage o f the w ithdraw al o f European capital from developing re­ gions. Its purpose w as to obtain concessions for developm ental projects and to finance them in the U nited States. T h e em ergence o f A m erican financial preeminence was not overlooked in Russia where Baker noted: “There seems an unusual ten d en cy. . . to be favorable to the idea o f A m erican firm s par­ ticipating in the developm ent o f this country, as it is realized that ow ing to the great calls on other foreign countries engaged in the present w ar for capital and financing the war, that the only country now left in a position to give m aterial assistance to Russia w ith the developm ent o f its internal re­ sources is the U nited States.”2 B u t it was the M arch Revolution in Russia that breathed new life into Am erican conceptions o f the O pen D oor. Am erican businessmen and states­ men believed that Russia’s adoption o f liberal dem ocracy after M arch 19 ^ had set Russia on a path o f developm ent that was com plem entary to that o f the U nited States.

The N e w F ro n tier in Siberia

13

T h e A m erican-R ussian Cham ber o f Com m erce, w hich had been recog­ nized as an official organ by the czarist governm ent, expressed the high ex­ pectations A m erican capitalists attached to the developm ent o f oudets in postwar Russia. T h e cham ber’s vision o f how relations between A m erica and Russia would develop deserves close exam ination, since its m em bers included numerous representatives o f large corporations that hoped to par­ ticipate in the developm ent o f Russia. In Septem ber 1917 the cham ber’s president, C harles H . Boynton, com ­ pared Russia’s position to that o f the U nited States at the end o f the C iv il W ar. L ike A m erica during its era o f Reconstruction, Russia would need large amounts o f foreign capital to pay its foreign debt and to develop its m anu­ facturing potential. Initially, the expansion o f Russia’s dom estic m anufac­ turing industry, through the help o f protective tariffs and foreign capital, would stimulate exports and relieve the burden o f Russia’s large foreign debt.3 Boynton em phasized that the U nited States’s historical experience placed it in a better position than any other nation to assist Russia’s developm ent. A m erica had the necessary capital, the proper technology, and the organiz­ ing ability R ussia needed to develop its industries. Y et beyond these com ­ plem entary econom ic factors, B oyn ton stressed that m any prom inent Russians favored A m erican capital because they considered it "untainted by political designs” unlike the “G erm an exploitation o f their econom ic life prior to the w ar.” B efore the w ar European powers like France and G erm any had intensively exploited specific sectors o f the Russian econom y to advance their own political and econom ic objectives to the detrim ent o f R ussia’s national developm ent. In contrast Boynton believed the Russians w ould welcom e A m erican capital and expertise because “w hat she needs is the great extensive development such as we have had in this country because R ussia is a great huge nation w hich requires a sim ilar treatm ent to that o f our ow n.” Indeed, notw ithstanding the various differences in cultures and clim atic conditions between the tw o countries, Boynton did “not consider it too optim istic to assume that Russia’s developm ent during the next fifty years w ill be parallel to that o f the U nited States during the last fifty years .”4 Consistent w ith this assum ption that Russia’s developm ent w ould re­ sem ble that o f the U nited States, Boynton did not envision a neocolonial relationship between the two countries, even though Russia w ould furnish a large export m arket for A m erican goods in the short run. Rather, A m er­ ican exports w ould hasten the process o f reconstruction in Russia during the im m ediate postw ar period. Because Russia’s own m anufacturing w as in its infancy, Boynton suggested that A m erican firm s that were interested in that m arket should “have in m ind that for a short tim e after the W ar, say tw o or three years, there w ill be a splendid opportunity for the sale o f all

14

Reconstructing R ussia

kinds o f A m erican m erchandise.” H e qualified this observation w ith the rem inder that “the far-seeing business man w ill be laying his plans today fo r co-operating w ith Russian capital in the organization o f factories in R ussia fo r the production o f standard A m erican products w hich w ill meet the needs o f the Russian m arket.”s T h e recognition by the cham ber in 1917 that R ussia w ould require A m erican exports to help reestablish dom estic production helps explain w hy in the sum m er o f 1918 the W ilson adm inis­ tration adopted a com m ercial assistance program to begin the process o f reconstruction in R ussia. A t that tim e the cham ber w ould help the adm in­ istration to collect data from the private sector regarding the availability o f goods for Siberia. In the long run, A m erican business had a greater stake in helping R ussia develop its own m anufacturing potential. Beyond the export o f goods B oyn ­ ton thought that in m any cases, “it w ill be more advisable for A m erican firm s to interest them selves in the actual m anufacture o f their products in R ussia through cooperation w ith Russian capital, the sale o f their m anufac­ turing rights, or the establishm ent o f their own plants in the Russian field.” M oreover, Russia’s developm ent was also expected to play an im portant role in m aintaining A m erican prosperity since “both from the standpoint o f a m arket for A m erican m erchandise and for A m erican equipm ent m achin­ ery, and as a field for the investm ent o f A m erican capital in m anufacturing enterprises, Russia w ill undoubtedly present perhaps our m ost favorable foreign opportunity at the term ination o f the W ar.”6 T h is contention was supported by no less an authority on the A m erican econom y than H erbert H oover, who attached great im portance to the Russian m arket as an outlet for A m erican capital and as a guarantor o f continued A m erican prosperity. A s late as D ecem ber 1921 H oover still asserted to Secretary o f State Charles Evans H ughes that “the hope o f our commerce lies in the establishm ent o f A m erican firm s abroad, distributing A m erican goods under A m erican di­ rection and, above all, in the installation o f A m erican technology in R u s­ sian industries.”7 L ik e m ost A m erican observers in 1917, Boynton assum ed that radical­ ism in R ussia w as an inevitable but transitory phase o f the revolutionary process. It was im portant that A m erican businessm en not be discouraged by these revolutionary vicissitudes because “the pendulum o f political forces w ill continue to sw ing, som etim es violendy, but it is certain to com e to rest at a point o f equilibrium where all R ussia w ill jo in in a governm ent o f stability, o f integrity and provide individual opportunity and freedom for its citizens.”8 For this reason A m ericans m ust not becom e involved in the “tem porary political upheaval” because their attention should be fixed on the “ Russia o f the future.” T h u s, the public’s attitude toward Russia w ould

The N e w F ro n tier in Siberia

«x» 15

be best informed by Am erica’s diplomatic corps, consular service, and business representatives "w hose judgm ents are best adapted to a clear conception and proper deductions from its passing events.” T h is sound "Am erican opinion o f Russia” w ould always lead one to the overriding conclusion that even several years o f social and political instability w ould not dim inish Russia’s trem endous econom ic potential.9 W oodrow W ilson was also dedicated to the objective o f establishing the O pen D oor as a precondition for m aintaining A m erica’s econom ic prosper­ ity. Yet, in W ilson’s system o f values, an O pen D oor political econom y served a higher m oral purpose as w ell. W ilson believed capitalist social and econom ic relations and republican institutions were inseparably linked his­ torically, together constituting the basis for political democracy, individual liberty, and econom ic developm ent.10 For this reason, W ilson understood that economic policy w ould always play a critical role in shaping a nation’s civic qualities. T h is concern for a society’s m oral characteristics was the unifying theme in all o f W ilson’s political w ritings and speeches throughout his public career in academ ia and later in politics.11 W ilson’s com m itm ent to encourage liberalism and democratic institutions abroad not only reflected A m erican national interest, but also the m oral principles em bodied in his political economy. T hrough the instrum ents o f the O pen D oor and the League o f N ations he was endeavoring to construct a m odem international com m onwealth in w hich individual liberty, civic responsibility, and eco­ nom ic developm ent were harm onized by constitutional-dem ocratic insti­ tutions at both the national and international levels. T hese am bitions inspired W ilson’s enthusiasm for the M arch Revolu­ tion in Russia. W ilson regarded the M arch Revolution as an im portant step toward the construction o f a new international political order based on liberal-dem ocratic principles. In his request to Congress for a declaration o f w ar against G erm any on A p ril 2 ,19 17 , W ilson stressed that A m erica would be joined by the new Russia as “a fit partner for a League o f H onour,” that now consisted solely o f dem ocratic nations. W ilson’s optim ism about the prospects for the M arch Revolution was based on the b elief that the R us­ sian people had always been essentially dem ocratic in character. T h e popu­ lation’s dem ocratic im pulses had been shackled by the czarist autocracy, w hich W ilson thought had never truly been Russian “in origin, character or purpose.” H e asserted that “ Russia was known by those who knew it best to have been always in fact dem ocratic at heart, in all the vital habits o f her thought, in all the intim ate relationships o f her people that spoke their natural instincts, their habitual attitude towards life.”12 W ilson’s overestim ation o f Russia’s natural dem ocratic qualities should be traced to the intellectual influence o f his longtim e friend and intellectual

16 ***

Reconstructing Russia

confidant Frederick Jackson Turner. In his influential essay, “T h e Sign ifi­ cance o f the Frontier in A m erican H istory,” Turner argued that A m erican dem ocracy had been revitalized throughout the nineteenth century by the influence o f the western frontier. Frontier conditions fostered such liberal virtues as personal independence and industriousness am ong the setders as they struggled to subdue nature in an environm ent unfettered by any preex­ isting social divisions. T hese virtues, in turn, were im parted into the dem o­ cratic political institutions that em erged from this egalitarian social base. O nce liberal-dem ocratic political institutions were established, the liberal character o f the society w ould persist through subsequent stages o f eco­ nom ic developm ent. Turner concluded his essay by speculating that A m er­ ica’s inherent liberalism could serve as a guide for other peoples.13 W ilson’s enthusiasm for the M arch Revolution appears less naive w hen the Siberian frontier is taken into account. Contem porary observers pre­ dicted that Siberia w ould play a role in prom oting Russia’s cultural devel­ opm ent that was analogous to the A m erican frontier in the nineteenth century. T h is new frontier w ould foster liberal-dem ocratic qualities am ong the settlers and constitute the foundation for a long-term com m unity o f interests between R ussia and the U nited States. T h e pervasive influence o f T urner’s thesis on the A m erican policym aking establishm ent is exhibited by a confidential m em orandum produced for the mem bers o f the U nited States’s delegation to the W ashington N aval Conference in late 1921. In this review o f Siberia’s settlem ent, the anonymous author credited “the nat­ ural m ovem ent o f the Russian people eastward . . . led by the pioneer” as the m otive force behind Siberia’s integration w ith R ussia. T h e author then portrayed Russian colonization o f Siberia in term s that virtually restated Turner w hen he asserted: “A fter the explorer cam e the settler. C onsolida­ tion o f G overnm ent follow ed. A s a result the barren w ild country, unoccu­ pied save for a few scattered h a lf savage A siatic tribes, was transform ed into a vigorous Russian com m onwealth, adapted to the institutions and culture o f the w hite m an.” 14 T h e influence o f Joh n Locke’s N atural L aw is particularly apparent in the author’s com m ent: “T h e advance was a natural movem ent o f explora­ tion and colonization by the Russian people them selves and was not a pol­ icy o f annexation initiated or executed by the Governm ent.”15 Slavic peasants were legitim ately exercising their natural right to appropriate and exploit underdeveloped resources. Finally, the author presum ed an historical paral­ lel between A m erica and Russia in declaring: politically Russian, northern A sia must be considered as a country shar­ ing in the institutions and social organization o f Europe and A m erica.

The N e w F ro n tier in Siberia

»x» 17

N otw ithstanding the fact that, preceding the revolution, Russia was un­ der a form o f governm ent denom inated as autocratic, the genius o f the people revealed in its culture and exem plified in local life w as, like that o f other w estern peoples, essentially dem ocratic. In the case o f Siberia this was even more m arked by reason o f a population largely drawn from the m ore independent and enterprising elem ents o f the Russian people and further hardened in the struggle w ith prim itive nature and the trials o f frontier life. G enerally speaking the exploration and setdem ent o f Siberia bears a striking resem blance to the opening o f the A m erican W est and is in fact alm ost a duplicate o f this rom antic achievem ent. 16 T h is fundam entally Turnerian outlook, together w ith prospects for close econom ic ties between the two continental em pires in the postwar period, was the basis for W ilson’s confidence in the future o f liberal dem ocracy in Russia. In view o f the absence o f dem ocratic institutions in Russia’s history, W il­ son’s conception o f self-governm ent requires exam ination, lest his optim ism for Russia’s incipient dem ocracy be dism issed as com pletely im plausible. W ilson w as essentially concerned about encouraging civic liberty in Russian society, rather than w ith prom oting dem ocracy as a specific form o f govern­ m ent. A s he explained in his essay o f 1900, “D em ocracy and Efficiency,” Am ericans cherished dem ocracy “for the em phasis it puts on character; for its tendency to exalt the purposes o f the average man to some high level o f endeavor; for its ju st principle o f com m on assent in m atters in w hich all are concerned; for its ideals o f duty and its sense o f brotherhood.” In other words, W ilson favored the dem ocratic form o f governm ent because it was the m ost conducive environm ent for cultivating civic virtue in the whole population.17 But W ilson was quick to point out that “democracy is merely the most rad­ ical form o f ‘constitutional government,mwhat he also called “representative government” or “self-governm ent.” H e assumed that “constitutional govern­ ment” could actually exist in a variety o f forms. Constitutional government was distinguished by the existence o f a covenant or fundamental law between governm ent and the people, w hich was maintained by regular public con­ sent; the covenant itself must guarantee individual liberty and delim it the authority and functions o f government.18 These fundamental principles could be preserved in different forms o f constitutional government. In “Dem ocracy and Efficiency,” W ilson contended that it was an unfortunate irony that A m er­ ica’s vigorous democratic character and principles had actually hindered the development o f its governmental institutions. A t the threshold o f a new age,

18

Reconstructing Russia

W ilson regretted that A m erica lacked the adm inistrative ability necessary to assume the international responsibilities o f a great power. T h is evaluation o f the A m erican political culture suggests W ilson never supposed that A m erican institutions could serve as a m odel o f governm ent for an infant dem ocracy such as R u ssia.19 Rather, the enthusiasm W ilson expressed for Russian dem ocracy in his w ar address reflected his assum p­ tion that, w ith the collapse o f the absolutist government, Russia would finally be flee to evolve its own unique brand o f constitutional governm ent. In the context o f his worldview , W ilson’s assertion that Russia w as “dem ocratic at heart” should be interpreted to m ean that he believed Russian society was endowed w ith considerable, i f rudim entary, civic qualities. W ilson was con­ fident these attributes w ould constitute the basis for a genuinely representa­ tive governm ent w hose actual form w ould be suited to Russia’s specific historical and cultural conditions. T h is analysis also provides the key to understanding W ilson’s approach to the Russian question after the Bolshevik Revolution in N ovem ber 1917. Both W ilson’s policy o f nonintervention in Russia’s dom estic politics and the U nited States’s efforts to furnish com m ercial assistance to Siberia were consistent w ith his dictum from “D em ocracy and E fficiency” that w hat A m erica had to offer the w orld w as “the aid o f our character. . . and not the premature aid o f our institutions.”20 «'S*©

Recent developm ents in Russia lent credence to the historical com parisons A m erican statesm en drew between Russia and the U nited States. Indeed, D onald Treadgold has devoted a w hole study to the Siberian m igration in w hich he argues that before W orld W ar I, the society that was developing in Siberia exhibited greater sim ilarities w ith the nineteenth-century A m eri­ can frontier society than w ith its European Russian origins.21 B y 1913, over 5 m illion people had m igrated to Siberia from European R ussia— m ost o f these after 1890. Y et, between the em ancipation o f the serfs in 1861 and the early 1890s, the czarist regim e never form ulated an effective m igration pol­ icy to either forbid or to assist m igration. P rior to the 1840s, the governm ent tried to colonize Siberia w ith exiles and com pulsory colonists. Illegal volun­ tary m igration, however, outnum bered these officially sponsored initiatives as peasant colonists sought land and freedom from creditors, servitude, and governm ent regulations. D u rin g the 1820s, the governor-general o f Siberia reported that it was senseless to prevent free m igration to Siberia because it helped settle this

The N e w Fro n tier in Siberia

«x. 19

underpopulated region and because it alleviated overpopulation in European Russia. In 1843, the governm ent initiated a program w hereby state peasants could leave overpopulated villages and be settled in Siberia w ith financial assistance from the state. N evertheless, Treadgold em phasizes throughout his study that official sponsorship o f m igration failed to reduce the flow o f illegal m igration to Siberia, since peasants preferred to flee rather than sub­ je ct them selves to the paternalism o f the state. A fte r 1892, when the Trans-Siberian Railroad was begun, the govern­ m ent finally bowed to the inevitable and com m itted itse lf to a generously subsidized program o f regulated resetdem ent. A large percentage o f the m igrants continued to avoid this official program . Betw een 1909 and 1913, from 31 to 47 percent o f all m igrants were still irregular. W hen Petr Stolypin becam e prim e m inister in 1906, he advocated a liberal approach to the ques­ tion o f m igration. H e reasoned that instead o f attem pting to regulate the m igrants’ destination, the governm ent should let people choose their desti­ nation and then assist their endeavor. Stolypin regarded the question o f Siberian m igration as especially im ­ portant because he believed that the region’s settlem ent would play a central role in the regeneration o f the w hole em pire. T h e principal objective o f his governm ent was to dissolve the commune system and to replace it w ith individual peasant property. T h is process would stimulate Russia’s economic developm ent and enhance social stability, w hich was necessary i f the m on­ archy w as to survive in a constitutional form as Stolypin desired. To facilitate the individualization o f land tenure in European R ussia, the surplus population had to be resettled in Siberia. Siberia was particularly suited to individualized land tenure. V irtually all o f Siberia’s land was legally owned by the state, rather than the commune, a factor that w ould expedite its transference into private holdings. Yet, independent o f ju rid ical issues, the sparsely settled Siberian frontier naturally tended to develop private landholding. Because o f the region’s abundance o f land, the Siberian com ­ mune rarely evolved the authority to redistribute land. Instead, land tenure in Siberia was quickly evolving from some form o f squatters’ right at the consent o f the commune to hereditary-household tenure w ithout any redis­ tribution occurring.22 Treadgold cites a good deal o f evidence that shows that this natural m igration to Siberia was producing a prosperous peasant class in that re­ gion. A survey com m issioned by Stolypin and the M in ister o f A griculture A leksandr K rivoshein, published in 19 11, revealed that, on average, a Sibe­ rian settler had more land, cattle, grain, and m achinery than the average European Russian peasant. Furtherm ore, Stolypin also figured that yields

20 »X»

Reconstructing Russia

and productivity were significandy higher than in European R ussia and the incom e o f a typical Siberian fam ily was rising steadily .23 E ven the Soviet historian M . M . Stishov adm itted that it was not unusual to find house­ holds w ith ten to twelve horses or cows in Siberian villages. Interestingly enough, he did not categorize these peasants as “ K ulaks,” but as a type o f prosperous “m iddle peasant.”24 Russian observers were taking note o f Siberia’s prosperity and o f the unique social structure that was developing there. A s Treadgold explained, by the turn o f the century Russians frequendy referred to Siberia as being “dem ocratic” in character because o f its high degree o f social and econom ic equality, although political connotations were not im plied prior to the M arch Revolution. Stolypin, w ho was the strongest proponent o f individualized peasant proprietorship, was h im self am bivalent about the dem ocratic ten­ dencies that were taking root in Siberia. H e even confided to a fam iliar journalist a fear that “the D em ocracy o f Siberia w ill crush us .”25 Treadgold did not interpret this concern as an indication that Stolypin expected the peasantry to dem and universal suffrage in the near future, but rather, that Siberia’s dem ocratic culture w ould underm ine the value system o f Im perial Russia over tim e. Follow ing this them e, Treadgold dem onstrates that Russian w riters char­ acterized the Siberian population in term s that were strikingly rem iniscent o f Turner. For instance, Treadgold quotes a statem ent by governm ent de­ m ographer N . V. Turchaninov in w hich the latter described the Siberian m igrant as: Representing, in the person o f the setders, the daring escapees from Russia proper, having m oved here under harsh conditions som etim es even prior to the conquest o f the region, and in the person o f the recent setders, the m ost energetic and enterprising representatives o f their m ilieu— for only such m igrants becom e firm ly acclim atized and strike root in the new regions— the Siberian peasants indeed differ from the rem aining mass o f the Russian peasan try. . . in their greater steadfastness. . . in the struggle w ith [nature] . . . their greater m obility and readiness to accept every kind o f innovation .26 Treadgold cites substantial evidence that the Siberian frontier also stim u­ lated self-sufficiency and initiative am ong the setders, as w ell as a high de­ gree o f equality. A zia tska ia R ossiia , a two-volum e series o f books on Siberia, observed that the Siberian peasantry was receptive to the use o f m odem agricultural m achinery and to the technical advice o f agronom ists.

The N e w Fro n tier in Siberia

21

In A siatskaia R ossiia the settlers’ innovativeness was attributed to the network o f cooperative societies that were developing rapidly in Siberia. T h is study em phasized that the Siberian setders exhibited uan exceptional capacity for self-help by means o f cooperatives, credit unions, and other types o f unions and societies.”27 A m erican policym akers view ed the rapid expansion o f the cooperative movem ent in Siberia after 1914 as a phenom e­ non o f great im port, a developm ent that w ould foster dem ocratic civic val­ ues in Russian society and econom ic ties w ith the U nited States. T h e cooperative m ovem ent in Russia received its original im petus from the penetration o f m arket forces in the 1890s as peasant producers began to suffer horn sharp increases in the cost o f rye bread and m eat. Cooperation made sw ift progress after a lim ited constitutional governm ent was inaugu­ rated in 1905, even though the cooperative m ovem ent did not enjoy the status o f a legal personality under the czarist governm ent. T h e severe disruptions caused by w ar stim ulated an unprecedented ex­ pansion o f cooperative societies o f all varieties, as they were the only insti­ tutions capable o f organizing supply and distribution in this poorly integrated em pire o f sm all producers. T h e m em bership o f all consumers’ societies in­ creased from less than 2 m illion in 1915 to 17 m illion in 1919. In Siberia alone the num ber o f consum er societies grew from 519 in 1914 to 8,140 in 1918. B y 1918 between one-fourth and one-third o f the aggregate value o f Siberia’s entire retail trade was sold by local consum ers’ cooperatives.28 Russian cooperatives can be grouped into three general categories: con­ sumer, credit, and agricultural, although functions increasingly overlapped as the societies m ultiplied rapidly during the war. T h e prim ary units o f cooperation were the local societies that were form ed voluntarily by their mem bers. T hese local societies were com bined into unions o f cooperative societies at the district, provincial, and national levels to accumulate the financial resources and to derive the bargaining power to engage in efficient buying and selling. A few large cooperative unions, such as the U nion o f Siberian C ream ery A ssociations, represented w hole regions. Cooperative organizations were also established by labor organizations such as the prom ­ inent A ll Russian R ailw ay Supply U nion. D istrict and provincial cooperatives were centralized in two national or­ ganizations, the A ll-R u ssian U nion o f Consum ers’ Societies, and the N arodny (Peoples) Bank. T h e C entral U nion o f Consum ers’ Societies was the leading organization o f Russian cooperation after its reorganization from the M oscow U nion o f Consum ers’ Societies in 1917. T h is central union linked the network o f consum ers’ societies into a national federation by coordinat­ ing w holesale supply and m arketing activities. M ore than three thousand individual societies owned shares in the C entral U nion by 1917. A fte r 1917,

22

Reconstructing Russia

the C entral U nion evolved beyond its original cooperative trading endeav­ ors into “a national institution w ith far flung interests, a state w ithin a state.”29 A s private trade collapsed during the war, the m ajor cooperative organi­ zations, particularly the C entral U nion and the U nion o f Siberian C ream ­ ery A ssociations, increasingly assum ed the status o f quasi-state institutions because the governm ent had becom e dependent on them for supplying the arm y and cities w ith provisions. T h e C entral U nions prom inence in the nation’s econom y was reflected in the numerous com m odity departm ents or divisions that were established to m anage day-to-day com m ercial activities. Separate departm ents existed for grains, fats and oils, fish and groceries, dairy, ironware, textiles, haberdashery, footwear, raw m aterials, finances, le­ gal affairs, and transportation. A n Econom ic and O rganization D epartm ent handled supervision, policy form ulation, and planned m ethods o f organiza­ tion. Finally, the C entral U nion’s m anufacturing operations were expanded to m eet the severe shortages o f m any basic consum er goods.30 T h e N arodny (Peoples) Bank was founded in 1912 for the purpose o f supplying funds to credit institutions and cooperative enterprises. A ffiliated credit cooperatives, including the C entral U nion o f Consum ers’ Societies, owned the bank’s stock. T h e N arodny B an k m aintained a paid up capital o f 10 m illion rubles by 1918. D u rin g 1917 the bank had a turnover o f 3 billion rubles. L ik e the Consum ers’ Societies, the N arodny B an k achieved the sta­ tus o f a quasi-governm ental institution when the Provisional G overnm ent made the State Bank’s credit available to it. A m erican observers believed cooperative institutions played an equally im portant cultural role in nurturing dem ocracy and self-im provem ent am ong the rural population.31 A w ide range o f educational activities were sponsored by cooperative institutions including schools, newspapers, lec­ tures, conferences, children’s playgrounds, social entertainm ents, am ateur theatricals, concerts, choruses, and reading room s. T hese nontrading activ­ ities were designed to encourage new social values such as self-reliance, th rift, cooperation, and the technical skills indispensable for econom ic progress. In fact, A m erican observers view ed Russian cooperatives so fa­ vorably because their voluntary associational principles were seen as a nec­ essary appendage to private enterprise at this stage o f national developm ent. Eugene Kayden, a W ar Trade Board specialist, em phasized that individu­ als joined cooperatives for their “m aterial benefit” and “social w elfare” and “to participate directly in an order o f econom ic exchange w hich has been described as irredeem ably private and capitalistic. Cooperation was there­ fore a socializing force w ithin the fram ew ork o f the present society, taking fo r its function the training and directing o f the creative econom ic instincts toward a m ore harm onious and rational order.”32 W illiam C . H untington,

The N e w F ro n tier in Siberia

23

an experienced Com m erce D epartm ent attaché, recom m ended Russian cooperatives as w orthy partners in A m erica’s effort to reconstruct R ussia in a statem ent to a N ational C ity B an k official: Personally I look upon the cooperative m ovem ent w ith favor, and, w hile fu lly aware that it does not operate w ith the efficiency and initiative o f a private business concern, believe it has accom plished m uch for the R us­ sian people, and that it is a pretty good training school in constructive dem ocracy. L ast sum m er [1918] I sat in a directors’ m eeting o f the M o s­ cow N arodny B an k in M oscow , and, gazing at the men there, I got the im pression that they were the nucleus o f the future m iddle class o f R ussia.33 Both H untington and Kayden were recognizing that the cooperatives represented organic social institutions that would play a critical role in fos­ tering better integration between civil society and the state. W ar had given im petus to this process as cooperative officials were incorporated into the central state bureaucracy and w ar com m ittees because o f their ability to organize the supply o f necessities for the arm y and urban areas.34

A m erican statesm en were confident that a progressive dem ocratic govern­ m ent in Russia w ould naturally seek A m erican technical expertise and cap­ ital resources after the w ar because they assum ed an historical com m unity o f interests between the two continental em pires. T hese historical im pres­ sions shaped the A m erican response to Russian events between 1917 and 1922. A m erican assistance to Russia after 1917 through agents such as the Stevens R ailw ay Com m ission and the Russian Bureau o f the W ar Trade Board represented the enlightened self-interest o f the U nited States. W il­ sonian im pulses were intertw ined w ith long-term A m erican investm ent interests and the need to com bat G erm an econom ic dom ination o f the Russian Em pire. T h u s, it would underestim ate A m erican policy to over­ look the organic relationship between these constituent m otives. Because A m erican statesm en believed the U nited States and R ussia shared com ple­ m entary interests, they could sincerely disclaim selfish m otives w hile fully expecting to derive the benefits from close econom ic ties w ith a kindred liberal em pire.

24

Reconstructing Russia

2 «'S * »

A M inister Plenipotentiary fo r Russia’s Railroads: The Stevens Commission in Russia , Ju n e—December 19 17

A m erican efforts to reconstruct Russia’s political econom y began in June 1917 where they w ould end in O ctober 1922, on the Trans-Siberian railw ay system . Shortly after Russia’s M arch Revolution, w hich brought to pow er a fragile coalition o f m oderate socialists and liberals, the W ilson adm inistra­ tion offered m ilitary assistance to the Provisional G overnm ent in the shape o f railroad experts to im prove operations on the strategic Trans-Siberian Railroad. In early M ay 1917, the adm inistration announced that renowned railroad expert Jo h n F. Stevens w ould head an advisory com m ission o f rail­ road experts to Russia for the disinterested purpose o f assisting its m ilitary effort against Im perial Germ any. Y et for A m erican policym akers, and espe­ cially Stevens him self, the defeat o f G erm an w ar aims in Russia had im por­ tant im plications for A m erican postw ar objectives. Indeed, Stevens’s purely advisory role m anifested the liberal principles W ilson hoped to infuse into postw ar international relations generally. T h e U nited States hoped to open the Russian “door” by establishing the m anagerial and technical practices o f the A m erican corporate political econom y on Russia’s developing transpor­ tation infrastructure. A n international O pen D oor environm ent w ould pro­ vide the w idest vent for A m erica’s great financial resources and technical expertise. Russia’s liberal M arch Revolution was a key determ inant in W ilson’s de­ cision to seek a declaration o f w ar against Im perial G erm any on A p ril 2,1917.

In his confidential letter to W ilson on M arch 19, the first justification Secre­ tary o f State Robert Lansing gave the president for declaring w ar against G erm any at that tim e was that such a step would “encourage and strengthen” the new liberal-dem ocratic governm ent in R ussia.1 For this reason, after A m erica’s entry into the war, W ilson dispatched a special diplom atic m is­ sion headed by E lihu R oot to Russia; the m ission arrived in early Jun e. W il­ son hoped the Root m ission would demonstrate A m erica’s goodw ill toward the Russian Revolution and help W ashington determine the most effective means by w hich the U nited States m ight assist Russia’s w ar effort. M eanw hile, the U nited States moved quickly to provide tangible assis­ tance to the Provisional Governm ent. O n M arch 31,19 17 , at a m eeting o f the Council o f N ational D efense, Stanley W ashburn, who had traveled exten­ sively on the eastern front as a w ar correspondent, recommended that the U nited States send the fledgling government railroad experts to help improve the efficiency o f the Trans-Siberian Railroad. A n y improvement in Russia’s w ar effort, and, ultimately, the very survival o f the Provisional Governm ent, depended on a m ajor overhaul o f the disorganized system o f state-run rail­ roads. Since early 1915, Russian industrialists had been criticizing government mismanagement o f the railroads for the empire’s constant fuel and transpor­ tation shortages. B u t the industrialists lacked the unity and political w ill nec­ essary to pressure the czarist government into enacting fundamental changes in the management o f the state railroad system.2 Recognizing that tim ely Am erican assistance m ight break this im passe, D aniel W illard, the chairman o f the Railw ay A dvisory Com m ittee o f the Council o f N ational Defense (C N D ), im m ediately offered to organize a com m ission o f railroad experts for Russia. Dem onstrating both its rationalizing impulses and its global perspec­ tive on the war, the C N D believed that “competent railroad men” could also extend the benefits o f Am erican expertise to the Russian railway system. In ititially, the Am erican experts would be expected to spend considerable time gathering data on the material and manpower needs o f the chaotic Russian railway system.3 O n A p ril 2 ,19 17 , the day W ilson requested a declaration o f w ar against Im perial Germ any, the State D epartm ent inquired o f the Provisional G o v­ ernment whether it would welcom e an inspection by six Am erican railway experts.4 A w eek later the Provisional G overnm ent’s m inister for Foreign A ffairs, Pavel M iliukov, told Am bassador D avid R . Francis that he was au­ thorized to accept the Am erican offer. B u t shortly after this, Francis cabled W ashington that he had not received form al consent. H e had learned con­ fidentially that the Russians had only reluctantly consented to the proposal, and he explained to the State Departm ent that this hesitancy existed because the “Russian nature resents outside advice.” M oreover, the Russians claim ed

26

Reconstructing Russia

it w ould take two months before the com m ission could com plete a report, and by that tim e it w ould be late in the summer. Francis did not question the m otives o f the Russian railw ay officials whom he believed to be com petent, he m erely passed on the request o f the governm ent that the U nited States expedite com pletion o f an existing order for 375 locom otives from A m erican m anufacturers. T h e State D epartm ent quickly obtained a pledge from the Am erican m anufacturers to give priority to Russia’s orders.s W ashington anticipated that Russia w ould need extensive governm ental credit to finance the purchase o f locom otives and freight cars. Follow ing a Russian request for an additional five hundred locom otives and ten thou­ sand freight cars at the end o f A p ril, Treasury Secretary W illiam G ibbs M cA ddo explained to Francis the term s under w hich the U .S . governm ent could extend Russia credits under the congressional authorization that al­ lowed the Treasury to finance cobelligerents. T h e Provisional G overnm ent was anxious to obtain loans directly from the U nited States and not through B ritish interm ediation, as in the case o f previous private loans from A m er­ ican banks. W h en A m erican loans were made through B ritain the cost o f credit was increased, and B ritain m aintained some control over the pur­ chases made by Russia. U nder the terms o f this loan, all Russian purchases had to be approved by a U .S . Treasury D epartm ent representative. T h is stipulation w ould help guarantee that A m erica’s credit would be used for w hat the U .S . governm ent believed to be the best purposes at a tim e when even its own financial resources were stretched. In other w ords, the U nited States w ould attach conditions to the loans it m ade to Kerensky’s govern­ m ent in order to closely supervise the supplies R ussia w ould purchase.6 O n M ay 17 the U nited States announced its decision to establish a credit o f $10 0 m illion for the Provisional G overnm ent o f R ussia. T h is credit bore an interest rate o f 3 percent per year, the same term s upon w hich the U nited States furnished credit to the W estern allies. R o o t’s m ission planned to dis­ cuss more fu lly w ith the Provisional G overnm ent Russia’s financial needs for its w ar effort. A dditional credits could be provided by the U nited States w ithin the lim its set by Congress as the situation m ight dem and.7 P rior to this, on M ay 3, the State D epartm ent announced that Jo h n F. Stevens w ould head the railroad m ission to R ussia, w hich w ould leave for V ladivostok in one w eek.8 A natural outdoorsm an, Stevens b uilt his repu­ tation as a construction engineer in the A m erican N orthw est during his em ploym ent w ith Jam es J . H ill’s G reat N orthern Railw ay, from 1889 to 1903. In 1905 Secretary o f W ar W illiam H .T a ft m ade him ch ie f engineer o f the Isthm ian C anal Com m ission. D u rin g 1906 Stevens planned m ost o f the construction w ork for the Panam a C anal— m any o f his contem porar­ ies believed he was largely responsible for the project’s ultim ate success.9

Ju n e -D ecem ber ig iy

27

Tem peram ental and physically rugged, Stevens was a com m anding figure w ho exuded confidence and authority. H e w ould have little tolerance for the deceitful and pretentious qualities o f the Russian officials w ith whom he was to w ork. In turn, Stevens’s assertive m anagem ent style w ould evoke resentm ent and m uch passive resistance from czarist officialdom . N ever­ theless, his determ ination and his reputation as the leading civil railw ay engineer w ould help him to persevere during his trying service in Russia. A controversy im m ediately developed between R oot and Stevens over the com m ission’s ranking. Since the railroad question was the m ost im por­ tant issue confronting R ussia, R oot believed that his special diplom atic m is­ sion should be authorized to discuss the issue w ith the Russian governm ent. H e feared the credibility o f his m ission m ight be underm ined i f the R ail­ road Com m ission were not accountable to it. R oot wanted the railroad ex­ perts to m ake prelim inary reports to the diplom atic m ission and for all o f the experts’ com m unications w ith the Russian governm ent to pass through his hands.10 T o head o ff a potential conflict over this issue Lan sin g drafted alterna­ tive instructions that defined the relationship between R oot’s m ission and the Railroad Com m ission. U nder the first scenario, Stevens’s Com m ission would be direcdy subordinated to R o o t’s m ission. Stevens would be obli­ gated to report to R oot’s m ission and the railroad experts w ould function under R oot’s direction. A lternatively, Stevens w ould be instructed to re­ strict the activities o f his com m ission to transportation questions. B u t, since R oot w ould carry am bassadorial rank, Stevens w ould be instructed to con­ fer w ith him and to negotiate transportation questions w ith the Russian governm ent in accordance w ith R o o t’s general recom m endations.11 W ilson flady rejected both o f Lansing’s definitions o f the Railroad C om ­ m ission’s status on M ay 7 ,19 17 ; the president left no room for m isunder­ stan d in g. W ilso n in ten ded the R ailro ad C o m m issio n to be en tirely independent o f R oot’s m ission. Stevens and his experts were to be placed stricdy at the service o f the Russian government and were not to act as agents o f the U .S . governm ent. T h e com m ission would not report back to W ash­ ington, because it was accountable only to the Russians— to the extent the Russians desired its services. Perhaps because o f his confidence in the tech­ nical ability o f the A m erican railroad engineers, W ilson believed the com ­ m ission’s recom mendations would be favorably received by the Russians.12 W ilson’s keen interest in this issue reflected the enlightened self-interest that characterized his Russian policy: he had a genuine desire to assist Russia’s liberal Revolution and a m istrust o f the A llies’ traditional diplo­ macy. W ilson understood that A m erican assistance to Russia must not only prom ote A m erican interests; rather, an enduring and m utually beneficial

28 «k-

Reconstructing Russia

relationship could only be developed i f Russian national sovereignty was preserved. W ilson’s policy dem onstrated a recognition that it would be coun­ terproductive for the U nited States to im pose its agenda on the Provisional G overnm ent; not only w ould heavy-handed A m erican intervention violate his pledge to support liberalism in R ussia, it w ould further erode the legit­ im acy o f this fragile liberal governm ent. Indeed, follow ing Lan sin g’s offer to send the diplom atic m ission to R ussia in m id -A p ril, Francis cautioned that the U nited States should w ork discreetly for the sole purpose o f help­ in g R ussia to prosecute the w ar successfully. Francis counseled the State D epartm ent that great care should be exercised “in giving expression to view s concerning internal affairs.” H e em phasized that A m erica’s prom pt recognition o f the Provisional G overnm ent, and President W ilson’s enthu­ siasm for the Russian Revolution, had m ade a "deep im pression and have greatly augm ented republican sentim ent.” Francis consequently advised the State D epartm ent that the U nited States should “be careful to avoid any­ thing likely to detract from a good record.” 13 «***© W ilson’s desire to place the Stevens Com m ission at the service o f the Provi­ sional Governm ent must also be view ed w ithin the context o f the rivalry that existed between the U nited States and the W estern allies over Russia. Francis had inform ed the State D epartm ent that Russian officials had only consented grudgingly to allow the visit by the A m erican railroad experts.14 In view o f this lukewarm reception, W ilson had all the more reason to dem ­ onstrate A m erica’s respect for Russian sovereignty when Britain im m edi­ ately attem pted to divert A m erican policy for its own purposes. O n A p ril 21, Britain’s ambassador, G eorge Buchanan, told Francis that he was recom ­ m ending to the Provisional Governm ent that A m erica be given control over Vladivostok and the w hole Trans-Siberian railw ay system . A s a quid pro quo, Britain had taken “control at A rchangel.”15 T h is proposal was designed to erode Russia’s sovereignty by drawing the U nited States into a system o f spheres o f influence in Russia. T h is plan w ould also enhance Britain’s free­ dom o f action by em broiling A m erica w ith Japan in the Russian Far East. Francis reported that Britain’s proposal had aroused resentm ent am ong the Russian officials w ho told him , “Russia does not need nurses.”16T h is context o f interpower rivalry explains w hy W ilson took a personal interest in the status o f Stevens’s Com m ission. W ilson’s intervention in this obscure con­ troversy would give the U nited States an im portant diplom atic advantage in the com ing years. M in dfu l o f the Provisional G overnm ent’s tenuous posi­ tion, W ilson shrew dly perceived the political advantage in having Stevens’s

Ju n e-D ecem ber 19 17 c* 51

m achinery, railroad equipm ent and supplies, and electrical equipm ent and appliances. T h e program was designed to supply badly needed m anufac­ tured products to the extent that transportation conditions perm itted. It w ould also facilitate the exportation o f Russian products, i f possible, to accumulate credits in favor o f Russian exporters. M iles contended that a program o f this scope could not be financed by the private sector but could succeed only w ith “the liberal support o f our governm ent.” T h e results o f a successfully executed program “should not only set up strong com petition to G erm any in Southern R ussia, but should build a relation w ith E ntire R ussia w hich w ould not only free her from G erm an com m ercial dom ination but also m aintain a field for future rela­ tions as w ell.” In conclusion, he w arned that, although A m erica could do the most to assist R ussia, i f it failed to do so, “ Russia w ill turn to G erm any for w hat she can get parceled [rtr] out to her.”29 M iles’s plan was ultim ately designed to prevent G erm any from gaining control o f Russia’s economy, and he hoped to achieve this goal indirecdy by enhancing A m erican credi­ bility w ith the Russian population through the provision o f com m ercial as­ sistance, thereby contrasting A m erican m otives w ith G erm any’s exploitative practices. H is plan for coordinating com m ercial assistance through the R us­ sian cooperative societies clearly foreshadowed the W ar Trade Board’s R u s­ sian Bureau o f the fall o f 1918. A t a m eeting in E lih u R oot’s apartm ent in N ew Y ork C ity on M arch 9, B asil M iles briefed the members o f the R oot m ission to Russia on the status o f A m erica’s policy toward Russia. C yrus M cC orm ick’s rough notes indi­ cate that M iles’s proposal had been adopted as the basis for policy discus­ sions in W ashington. R oot’s visitors were also told that A lonzo E . Taylor had begun to w ork on the Russian situation. T aylor had assisted H erbert H oover on the Belgium R e lie f Com m ission and was now called on by the W ar Trade Board to devise a plan for undertaking econom ic w arfare against G erm any in Russia. However, the danger o f Japanese m ilitary aggression in Siberia stood in the w ay o f any relief initiatives. M cC orm ick recorded that, “Jap[anese] situ ation ] has tem p[orarily] upset this. O ur G o v’t sitting still. Jap[an] going in and w ill lead to com plications.”30Therefore, until the perils associated with Japanese intervention were m itigated, A m erican assistance w ould be re­ stricted to supporting purchasing operations by the cooperative societies within Russia that the Tovaro-O bm ien had been organized to conduct. T hus, when M cC orm ick noted a comment by Frank Polk that the “State D ep’t wants to sit quiet tem porarily feeling that G[erm any] m ay begin ruthless actions,” it was perhaps trying to make a virtue o f a necessity.31 Polk’s comment also

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im plies the State D epartm ent may have been biding its tim e, anticipating heightened social discontent against G erm an requisitioning practices in the U kraine. T h e critical shortage o f m anufactured goods in the U kraine, now exacerbated by G erm an exploitation, w ould tend to prepare an even more favorable reception for A m erican com m ercial influence in the region. D espite the restraints placed on A m erican policy because o f the om i­ nous presence o f Japan , in late M arch the first steps were taken for w aging econom ic w arfare against G erm any in Russia. A t this tim e, a State D epart­ m ent group— w hich included M iles, the trade adviser Ju liu s Lay, A ssistant Secretary E . T . W illiam s, and Consular Service C h ie f W ilb u r J . C arr— was evaluating a report b y D r. A lonzo E . T aylor o f the W ar Trade Board.32T ay­ lor suggested two different strategies for obstructing G erm an purchases in R ussia. F irst, the U nited States could alter its trade agreem ents w ith the neutral countries o f northern Europe and encourage them to sh ift their food purchases from A m erica to Russia. In exchange for food, these neutral countries w ould supply Russia w ith badly needed m anufactured goods and give added com petition to G erm an producers in the Russian m arket. Sec­ ond, A m erica could also endeavor to trade m anufactured goods for Russian supplies from the east through Siberia in cooperation w ith the A llies. In either case, the objective was to com pete w ith G erm any over the exchange o f m anufactured goods for Russian food and prim ary products in order “to force the m ark upon the open exchange m art o f the w orld, w hich cannot have any other effect than to lower its value.” M iles also em phasized that it w ould be im portant to “bring the m ark into foreign exchange especially in R ussia.”33 B y forcing G erm any to spend m arks for its purchases in Russia, the rate o f exchange w ould worsen for G erm any and thus reduce its ability to obtain precious com m odities. In com m enting on this plan, M iles particularly recom mended that cer­ tain com m odities essential to G erm any’s w ar effort be engrossed, such as w estern Siberia’s surplus grain and dairy products, together w ith free sup­ plies o f copper, platinum , and manganese. H e also suggested that these goods could sim ply be stored or moved to safe places i f their exportation was im ­ possible. M iles also devoted much attention to the necessity o f establishing an infrastructure for rendering assistance to Siberia at a later period. F irst, the U nited States w ould endeavor to restore norm al transportation along the Trans-Siberian Railroad by increasing Joh n Stevens’s m anagerial authority and by distributing the recendy arrived Russian Railw ay Service C orps across the line’s vast distances to the borders o f European Russia. Second, more consular representatives would be required to assist the am bassador’s staff

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“in political, econom ic, industrial, and financial m atters” associated w ith the em erging A m erican program .34 From the end o f January, M iles had been discussing the need for expanding A m erica’s consular network w ith Consular C h ie f W ilb u r C arr.3S B y late M arch, vice consuls were established at C h ita, Krasnoyarsk, Tom sk, N ovonikolaevsk, O m sk, Ekaterinburg, and Sam ara, and there was another consul general at Irkutsk.36 C onsul G eneral Sum m ers was also authorized to em ploy six more N ational C ity B an k em ­ ployees and as m any International H arvester em ployees as possible. T hese representatives were instructed to contact leaders from the various political factions such as the form er Provisional G overnm ent, the C onstitu­ ent Assem bly, and the Siberian Conference, together w ith the cooperative societies, railw ay unions, zem stvos, and m unicipalities.37 T h e A m erican m ilitary m ission was responsible for establishing liaisons w ith the different m ilitary contingents— particularly the Czech A rm y C orps, but also Generals A lexiev, Kornilov, and even the C ossack leader G . M . Semenov. T h e State D epartm ent did not intend to com prom ise A m erican neutrality toward the rival political factions but to “provide the skeleton o f an organization which could be rapidly expanded and which would be o f definite value in the mean­ w hile.”38 Im plicit in this comment is the Am erican assumption that Bolshevik fortunes would eventually wane. Im plicit also is a desire to strategically posi­ tion the U nited States to assist the reconstruction phase. A t that time, A m er­ ica’s presence in Siberia could also play a role in nurturing a constitutional political order by encouraging cooperation between anti-Bolshevik forces. In late M arch M iles anticipated that it w ould take some tim e for the U nited States to furnish Russia w ith com m ercial assistance. D u rin g this period the State D epartm ent could devote its attention to building an in­ frastructure for supplying com m ercial assistance in the fixture when recon­ struction measures could proceed. M eanw hile, as the supplem entary consular officers gradually took up their positions at com m ercial centers along the Trans-Siberian Railroad, the Tovaro-O bm ien purchasing organization w as prepared to begin operations in European Russia. M iles’s deliberations also shed light on the delay involved in com m enc­ ing com m ercial assistance as w ell as the apparent paralysis that afflicted the W ilson adm inistration’s Russian policy throughout the summer o f 1918. H e assum ed little or no shipping would be available until the fall because o f A m erica’s com m itm ent to the critical m ilitary effort on the western front. Furtherm ore, none o f the initiatives proposed in T aylor’s report or in the State D epartm ent’s discussions w ould be threatened by a unilateral Jap a­ nese intervention.39 A nother factor prevented Am erica from providing com m ercial assistance in the spring o f 1918. W h ile the State D epartm ent was discussing T aylor’s

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recom m endations, it w as becom ing clear that the Russian cooperative soci­ eties w ould be unable to guarantee against A m erican shipm ents falling into Germ an hands. A s early as February 25, Lansing had indicated the State Departm ent wanted to continue shipping “non-warlike stores including rail­ w ay m aterial, agricultural machinery, binder twine, arm y and civilian shoes, and leather, together w ith Red Cross supplies” to dispel the Russian people’s "im pression that they are being abandoned by the A llies or by the U nited States.”40Nevertheless, Lansing cautioned that G erm any must not be allowed to acquire the goods. A month later when the M oscow Supply Com m ittee was trying to buy a m illion pairs o f shoes, Lansing directed Consul G eneral Sum m ers to cooperate w ith the com m ittee to ensure the distribution o f Am erican goods to the cooperative societies’ members in exchange for grain deliveries to the cities.41 Sum m ers, however, was very uncertain the M oscow Com m ittee could safely distribute their large order for shoes and consequently recom mended that any goods shipped to Russian ports be held indefinitely upon their arrival pending “future developm ents.” H e also requested to be consulted before any goods were transported inland.42 Sum m ers’s reservations were heeded at the State D epartm ent, w hich notified Francis on A p ril 22 that none o f the five hundred locom otives or ten thousand cars ordered before the collapse o f the Provisional Governm ent w ould be shipped until the departm ent was sure they w ould not benefit Germ any.43 Four days later, on A p ril 26, Sum m ers was inform ed that, until he advised the State D epart­ ment on a procedure for safeguarding the shipm ent o f shoes and other goods to R ussia, all export licenses were being suspended.44 T w o hours after Sum m ers was notified that export licenses to R ussia were being halted, Lan sin g issued another instruction to A m bassador Francis. T h e State D epartm ent now w anted a com plete report regarding supplies “especially desired” by Germ any, including their quantity, price, location, and the am ount that could be exported or relocated beyond G erm an reach.45 O n M ay 11, Francis reported that available Russian sup­ plies useful to G erm any consisted o f fats, copper, tin, lead, ferro-alloys, textiles, and rubber. Sunflow er seed oil w as the m ost prevalent com m odity and w as available throughout European R ussia. Petrograd and M oscow held large quantities o f copper, tin, and raw rubber, together w ith cotton and w ool cloth. G erm any w anted a large am ount o f ferro-alloys, but little w as available. Finally, raw cotton could be purchased in Turkestan. Francis did not know which supplies could be moved to ports or relocated w ithin the country due to the extent o f com m ercial dislocation. Y et, i f A m erican goods were bartered for these supplies, he suggested that it would be necessary to guarantee that the im ports w ould not come under G erm an

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control i f they were shipped to Vladivostok or A rchangel. M urm ansk was not secure, given the possibility o f a Finnish attack. A s an alternative, the A llies could purchase goods to be resold in Russia.46 M iles, in a sum m ary o f this report by Francis, suggested the specific form o f economic warfare toward which the State D epartm ent was leaning. H e acknowledged the desirability o f bartering Am erican goods for Russian sup­ plies that could not be purchased w ith cash and the distribution o f Am erican im ports through the cooperatives to the Russian population. Tw o Am erican exporters, the R . M artens Com pany and G eorge C . Sherm an, had applied to the State D epartm ent for export licenses to barter shoes and clothing to the railway unions in return for c alf skins, hides, copper, and platinum , which were comm odities sought by the W ar Industries Board. However, after the suspension o f export licenses to Russia in the previous m onth, these con­ tracts were not going to be consummated in the foreseeable future. N evertheless, M iles expressed interest in the ambassador’s suggestion that the A llies could purchase Russian supplies and distribute them in areas beyond G erm an influence w hich “w ould do much to revive trade in R us­ sia.”47 Consequendy, although A m erica w ould be unable to supply needed manufactured goods in the short term , it could assist the cooperatives’ efforts to hasten reconstruction from w ithin Russia and thus strengthen the resis­ tance o f the population to G erm an enticem ents. T h is conclusion was sub­ stantiated by M iles’s assertion that “at the beginning no additional tonnage w ill be essential.” T h e necessary tonnage would be made available by the U .S . Shipping Board “ i f the plan develops and it is desirable to ship goods to or from R ussia.”48 D uring m id-M ay, the A llied M ilitary M issions began to evacuate m ili­ tary supplies from Petrograd under the auspices o f the Tovaro-O bm ien. Around M ay 15, the Am erican m ilitary attaché N aval L t. Peter I. Bukowski joined B ritish and French officers at Petrograd to assist the Bolsheviks’ evacuation o f the vast stores o f m ilitary supplies concentrated there. Bukowski reported that the Bolsheviks now considered G erm any a much greater threat to their existence than the A llies because o f B rest-L ito vsk’s harsh terms and because o f the initial successes o f G erm any’s long-aw aited spring offensive on the western front. H e believed the “ interests o f the Bolsheviks and the A llies coincided at the tim e” since the m ilitary stores at Petrograd had now becom e particularly valuable booty.49 Indeed, G erm an designs on Petrograd’s supplies becam e evident im m ediately after the B rest-L ito vsk T reaty was ratified in m id-M arch, as “enem y com m ercial and financial representatives com m enced arriving in large num bers. T h e y began at once their intensive activities by purchasing m aterials and endeavoring to ship them to Germ any. ”so

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C o l. Jam es A . R uggles, ch ief o f the A m erican m ilitary m ission, thought A llied assistance w ith the evacuation was necessary i f only to encourage Bolshevik resistance to G erm an pressure. T h is m otive explains Raym ond Robins’s assignm ent as liaison w ith the Bolsheviks during the spring and early summer. R obins’s personal rapport w ith the Bolsheviks notwithstand­ ing, the W ilson adm inistration had no intention o f extending any form o f recognition to the Soviet governm ent. Rather, W ashington purposely used Robins to dangle faint prospects o f assistance before the Bolsheviks to avert a possible Soviet capitulation to G erm an dem ands. Accordingly, Bukow ski expressed the purely m ercenary nature o f his relationship w ith the Bolshe­ viks when he revealed that the A llied m ilitary m issions were only “w orking w ith the Soviets where [their] aim s were coincident w ith ours, and w orking against them when our aim s differed.”51 B y the end o f M ay, Francis reported from Vologda that good progress had been made in evacuating supplies from Petrograd.” W hen the operation was abandoned in August because o f the deterioration in relations between the A llies and Bolsheviks, 170,000 tons o f supplies had been evacuated, which represented from 85 to 90 percent o f the valuable supplies in Petrograd and neighboring industrial centers. T h e evacuated m aterial consisted o f the fol­ lowing: copper, lead, nickel, and alloys, high-speed instrument steel, ferro­ alloys, m achinery such as telephones and lathes, rubber products, and war matériels including cartridges, naval guns, field guns, and shells. T h e shipments evacuated by water arrived at cities along the Volga. M ost o f the im portant shipments arrived at their destinations before the Czech A rm y C orps’ uprising o f late M ay, and consequently fell into their hands. T h e rail shipm ents, which constituted two-thirds o f the tonnage transported, were w idely dispersed throughout the eastern part o f European Russia, which prohibited G erm any from re-collecting them. Bukowski spent ju st over thirty thousand dollars o f the m illion-dollar appropriation to theTovaro-O bm ien. N evertheless, the successful evacuation o f Petrograds m ilitary supplies spurred the Tovaro-O bm ien on to further efforts.53 B y late M ay, the Tovaro-O bm ien was sufficiently organized to begin work, and Francis accordingly requested additional funds for its operations. O n Ju n e 13, Lan sin g authorized Francis to draw an additional $5 m illion to purchase Russian supplies w hile stipulating that the organization should cooperate w ith the consular service and the A llies to prevent these supplies from com ing under G erm an or Bolshevik control.54 From the end o f June until A ugust, the Tovaro-O bm ien was principally engaged in the purchase o f the follow ing com m odities: the sunflower seed oil supplies in the north­ ern Caucasus, the large stock o f textiles around M oscow , and flax near the G erm an lines in the South.

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C onsul G eneral D ew itt C . Poole disclosed the organization’s strategy for disposing o f supplies on Ju ly 16. A t that tim e the transportation o f goods to A rchangel for export w as im possible. H e inform ed the State D e­ partm ent that "our plan was rather to break up concentrated stocks and distribute them beyond the pow er o f the G erm ans to recollect.”55 T h e Tovaro-O bm ien used the prom inent C en tral U nion o f Consum ers’ Soci­ eties as the purchasing agent since it was "the only elem ent in Russian com m ercial and credit apparatus w hich has survived com plete destruction.” T h e A llied com pany extended credit to the financially strapped C entral U nion w hich, in turn, undertook the purchase o f textiles and sunflower seed o il and supervised their distribution am ong the population. Poole revealed the m otivation behind this strategy w hen he com m ented that "such econom ic w arfare is effective, hum anitarian and associates us w ith a pow erful perm anent dem ocratic force in R u ssia.” H ence, this program contributed to a num ber o f A m erican objectives in R u ssia, especially to the developm ent o f ties w ith progressive social and econom ic forces such as the C en tral U n ion .56 Between June 29 and August 5, disbursements totaling ju st over $1,775,000 were made from A m erican funds to the C entral U nion for purchases o f sunflower seed oil in the Kuban. Sunflow er seed oil w as an im portant com ­ m odity, since it was a prim e ingredient in the production o f soap for the population. T h e C entral U nion organized and financed the transportation o f the oil to factories in the interior where it was converted into soap for distribution. Darcy, the French representative on the Tovaro-O bm ien, re­ ported on Ju n e 27 that “the buying o f oil is now progressing. T h e C en trosoyouz appears to be rem arkably active.”57 A t that tim e, one contract had already been negotiated to supply the C entral U nion w ith 24 m illion rubles (over $2 m illion). N ow, in view o f the apparent success o f the program , D arcy recom m ended that a total o f 100 m illion rubles should be furnished to the C entral U nion. T h is request resulted in the conclusion o f a second contract for 24 m illion rubles, w hich reflected the lim its placed on B ritish and A m erican credit. T h e Tovaro-O bm ien was unable to fulfill this second contract because o f the difficulty it encountered in obtaining rubles. Repeated setbacks plagued efforts by the Tovaro-O bm ien to finance the C entral U nion’s textile purchases. D espite the nationalization o f commerce inaugurated under Soviet rule, the C entral U nion received a m onopoly for distributing textile stocks am ong the peasantry; the state m onopoly could not adm inister the task. In July, the Tovaro-O bm ien was negotiating w ith the C entral U nion to help it finance a sale o f textiles w orth approxim ately one billion rubles. T h e plan called for France, B ritain , and the U nited States each to advance 10 0 m illion rubles. H owever, because rubles were difficult

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to procure, A m erica’s share was to be deposited as Sio m illion in the U nited States and used as credit for purchasing rice and tea in C hina, together w ith A m erican goods. T h is credit w ould be repaid in installm ents o f rubles at the rate o f ten per one dollar as the C entral U nion sold its stocks o f tex­ tiles.58 In any event, a single credit o f $10 m illion was w ell in excess o f the $6 m illion appropriation the W ilson adm inistration was able to provide the Tovaro-O bm ien. O n Ju ly 31, the Tovaro-O bm ien agreed to open credit to the Central Union for 50 m illion rubles. O nce again, due to the scarcity o f rubles, on A ugust 14 the Central U nion agreed to accept the equivalent o f two 25-m illion-ruble advances in the form o f deposits at N ew York C ity and London totaling $2.5 m illion and 600,000 pounds respectively.59 A confused situation arose after Poole drew the $2.5 m illion draft payable at the N ational C ity B an k o f N ew York, because the draft was lost in transit to the U nited States. It was not until Jun e 1919, w hen the various legal technicalities involved in duplicating the original draft were resolved, that the credit was finally placed in the account o f the C entral U nion at the N ational C ity Bank o f N ew York.60 French and A m erican m erchants handled flax purchases as agents o f the Tovaro-O bm ien ow ing to their experience in the trade. T hese firm s were financed by the Tovaro-O bm ien to buy w hat flax they could w ith the op­ tion o f repurchasing any stocks that were exported. French m erchants were advanced $106,704, and the Am erican firm o f Slav and Jo ffe received $43,866 for flax purchases.61 D rafts for a total o f $4,797,500 were drawn by the Tovaro-O bm ien against the $6 m illion appropriation w hen its operations were discontinued after m id-A ugust. A lthough this represented a m odest sum, all credits that were actually advanced were apparently spent successfully— in spite o f the difficult conditions under which the organization worked. M oreover, Consul Frank C . L ee suggested that any assessment o f the program had to take into ac­ count its psychological effect on Germ an purchasing activities. T h e organiza­ tion’s purchases were concentrated in areas adjacent to the Germ an-occupied U kraine, which were being infiltrated by Germ an purchasing commissions. T hus, as Lee pointed out, “T h e m oral effect on Germ an purchasers was also im portant. T h e fact that the A llied Governm ents were back o f the TovaroO bm ien could not long be concealed and finally the business was openly advertised. T h e Germ ans, knowing the form er strength o f the cooperatives, believed that they, backed by enormous A llied loans, were purchasing all avail­ able stocks o f m aterials, and consequently their activities were lessened.”62 A t the very least then, the Tovaro-O bm ien attem pted to discourage G erm an purchasing agents, and it m ay have bid up prices o f com m odities that G e r­ m any was anxious to obtain.

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W hile the scope o f Am erican economic warfare against G erm any in Rus­ sia was restricted to the Tovaro-O bm ien during the spring and summer o f 1918, the stakes were considered very high. State D epartm ent experts viewed Germ any’s purchasing activities as m erely the cutting edge o f a concerted effort to gain a preeminent position in Russia’s economy. T h e W ilson admin­ istration’s lim ited response to the Germ an threat was a consequence o f cir­ cumstances that were beyond its control, such as the dangers associated w ith an intervention by Japan, the lack o f available shipping, and the risk that Am erican goods m ight fall into Germ an or Bolshevik hands. Nevertheless, the State Departm ent had already begun to conceive a program for rendering commercial assistance to Russia, and it had already begun to station the nec­ essary consular personnel in Siberia as part o f the infrastructure that would be required to undertake the task. T h e W ilson administration’s effort to cultivate ties w ith the prom inent cooperative societies was a crucial facet o f this pro­ cess. It represented a calculated m oral investment in the future o f RussoAm erican relations in that it attempted to develop Am erican prestige among the progressive sectors o f Russian society.

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4 Between Germany and Japan : Wilson, the Czechoslovaks , and the Decision to Intervene, M a y— Ju ly 19 18

Betw een the spring and m id-sum m er o f 1918, the W ilson adm inistration struggled to devise a policy toward Siberia that would reconcile a m ilitary intervention w ith the prim ary goal o f furnishing econom ic assistance to the region. It was the threat o f an expanded G erm an influence in the Russian Em pire that ultim ately forced W ilson to undertake a lim ited intervention in support o f the C zecho-Slovak legion and to tem porarily postpone eco­ nom ic assistance. T h is interpretation does not discount the genuine hu­ m anitarian concern W ilson felt for the welfare o f the C zecho-Slovak Corps. M ore im portant, this view is entirely consistent w ith the argum ents that have em phasized W ilson’s desire to preem pt A llied pressure for a largescale Japanese intervention. H owever, this analysis goes further to present a com prehensive picture o f the dangers that preoccupied the W ilson adm in­ istration in the sum mer o f 1918. A t this critical phase o f the w ar on the w estern front, W ilson opposed a Japanese intervention precisely because this step m ight force crucial seg­ m ents o f the Russian population to accept even closer ties w ith G erm any out o f their legitim ate concern over Jap an s am bitions in the Russian Far E ast. In other w ords, the W ilson adm inistration’s Siberian policy was es­ sentially m otivated by the underlying clash o f com peting G erm an and A m erican w orld system s, w hich had been the catalyst for A m erica’s entry

into the war. In supporting an intervention on b eh alf o f the C zech o­ slovaks, W ilson believed he had found a strategy that w ould facilitate the process o f reconstruction in Siberia am id the com plex challenges A m erica faced in the region: the instability resulting from w ar and revolution, the m enace o f bolshevism , the urgent threat posed by G erm an econom ic in ­ fluence, and the rival aspirations o f Japan , B ritain , and France. A m erican assum ptions concerning Siberia’s unique social structure hold the key to understanding W ilsonian policy toward Siberia after the Bolshe­ vik Revolution. D u rin g this period the view s o f Paul Reinsch, the A m eri­ can m inister to C h in a, were a particularly im portant influence on the adm inistration’s policy, since, as a progressive internationalist and student o f Frederick Jackson Turner, his recom m endations received special atten­ tion at the W h ite H ouse. In a cable dated M ay io , Reinsch proposed the form ation o f an A m eri­ can-led A llied com m ission to furnish Siberia w ith com m ercial assistance. In his view, A m erican aid w ould be particularly beneficial since "conditions in Siberia [are] not unlike A m erica therefore we can be m ost helpful.”1 H ow ­ ever, Reinsch em phasized that A llied support should come in the form o f econom ic assistance rather than through a m ilitary intervention, and that, “should intervention come first there is danger that it w ill be understood to be in favor o f reaction and capitalism and w ill alienate the people perm a­ nently.”2 B y M ay, W ilson had decided the only practical means for providing eco­ nom ic assistance to Russia was through a program o f barter trade, featuring the exchange o f A m erican m anufactured goods for Russian raw m aterials. T h e consensus o f opinion W ilson received advocated some form o f barter trade because o f the dislocation o f normal commercial activity and the con­ sequent collapse o f the ruble. D uring a conversation about the Russian situ­ ation at the W hite H ouse on M ay 13, W ilson agreed w ith Cyrus M cC orm ick’s view that barter was the only means through w hich Am erica could “negotiate w ith the Russian people.” W ilson suggested that he would request Secretary o f Com m erce W illiam C . Redfield to convene a conference o f businessmen w ith experience in Russian affairs to solicit “practical suggestions as to w hat b arte r. . . could be undertaken.”3 W h ile R ussia’s social and econom ic instability necessitated an elem en­ tary program o f barter w ith Siberia, this context only reinforced W ilson ’s b e lie f that com m erce w as an im portant agent for prom oting international harm ony. O nce, in a speech before the C hicago Com m ercial C lu b in 1902 W ilson declared that com m erce was the “m ost statesm anlike occupation” since the trader had to have even a better grasp o f social and political

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conditions on the international level than the statesman. W ilson continued: “Tradesm en have been inside the life o f nations the outside o f whose policy statesm en have observed, and traders have been able to tell statesmen the things necessary to control a policy, and to dictate it, make it intelligent. It is the trader’s business, in short, to know the w orld. Instinctively, therefore, men who are engaged in commerce feel the pulse o f affairs.”4 H ence, the m erchant fostered mutual understanding am ong societies through intim ate contact w ith, and sym pathy for, foreign cultures. T h is faith in the virtue o f com m erce explains W ilson’s resolve to “negotiate” w ith the Russian people through the instrum entality o f barter. Am erican traders could be counted on to reliably assess the prevailing m ood and aspirations o f the enigm atic Russian population, as w ell as their m aterial requirem ents. A system o f barter between the U nited States and Russia was therefore uniquely suited to advance W ilson’s vigorously liberal m oral objectives. First, barter served profoundly humanitarian ends by providing basic manufactured goods to a desperate population. Concurrendy, the resumption o f simple com­ mercial transactions would begin the process o f reconstruction by encourag­ ing self-help initiatives among the population at the local level. Finally, a barter program would dem onstrate A m erica’s friendly intentions toward Russia and distinguish its motives from the other powers’ ambitious financial schemes— difficult to im plem ent under highly unstable conditions, but likely to further erode Russian sovereignty. Barter thus appealed to W ilson as an expedient application o f economic policy to the higher purpose o f moral statesmanship. B y the end o f Ju n e 1918, after soliciting advice from organized business groups such as the A m erican-R ussian Cham ber o f Com m erce, W ilson de­ cided that com m ercial assistance would have to be undertaken by the pri­ vate sector, w ithout governm ent financing. T h e president evidently rejected a recom m endation by Com m erce Secretary Redfield for a $10 0 m illion gov­ ernm ent-financed program o f com m ercial assistance for Siberia, because he did not think Congress would appropriate the funds. W h ile he believed that com m ercial operations could be effectively handled by private interests, he nevertheless thought their activities would have to be supervised by a coor­ dinating com m ission to prevent exploitation o f the Siberian population.5 N ear the end o f M ay 1918, Reinsch stressed a dim ension o f the Siberian question that was rapidly becom ing a critical factor in A m erican calcula­ tions about com m ercial assistance to the region. H e argued that the A llies m ust take im m ediate action in Siberia to deny G erm any the rich resources o f western Siberia. O n M ay 30, he w arned that “all sources indicate ex­ trem e need fo r A llied action [in ] Siberia. G erm an influence extending

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eastward w hile arm ed prisoners, though strategically unim portant, fa cili­ tate pro-G erm an organization. W est Siberia[n] source o f supplies, is at stake. Positive action is required also in order to prevent Russian m oderate elem ents in despair accepting G erm an influence.”6T h is cable stressed tw o im portant points that w ould soon influence W ilson’s decision to support a lim ited intervention. F irst, Reinsch em phasized that the G erm an prisoners posed a potential danger because they could m ediate the extension o f G e r­ man purchasing activities in Siberia. Second, as G erm any expanded its econom ic links w ith European Russia and Siberia, the propertied classes and m oderate political elem ents w ould accept G erm an help in their des­ perate search for an alternative to Bolshevik rule. Eventually, a G erm ansponsored “T herm idor” w ould inevitably draw these groups into a close association w ith the G erm an continental system . W ilson’s views toward the questions o f intervention and economic assis­ tance were being shaped by these considerations. O n M ay 16, Reinsch con­ cluded a cable on the Siberian situation w ith the recom m endation that the “situation in Siberia seems more favorable than ever for effective jo in t ac­ tion o f A llies and A m erican initiative. A com m ission authorized to com ­ mand moderate financial support would be able to reconstruct at least Siberia as an A llied factor. Should A m erica rem ain inactive longer friendly feeling is likely to fail.”7 W ilson thought this suggestion im portant enough to re­ quest Lansing’s “com m ents and judgm ent” on the matter. Later, on M ay 30, in a conversation w ith the B ritish agent W illiam W ise­ man over the question o f intervention, W ilson vigorously expressed his ob­ jections to Britain’s proposals for a Japanese intervention on the grounds that it would push Russia into G erm any’s hands. W ilson told W isem an that he thought an advance along the Trans-Siberian Railroad by “a large British-A m erican force” m ight “have rallied the Russian people to assist in defense o f their country.” B u t i f the W estern allies relied m ainly on Japanese m ilitary assistance, he believed “we should rally the Russians against us,” w ith the exception o f a “sm all reactionary body w ho would join anybody to destroy the Bolsheviki.” W isem an off-handedly remarked that in any case the situation could not possibly get worse than it was already. B u t W ilson “entirely disagreed” w ith this attitude. O n the contrary, he was convinced “W e would make it much worse by putting the G erm ans in a position where they could organize Russia in a national movem ent against Japan. I f that was done he w ould not be surprised to see Russian soldiers fighting w ith the Germ ans on the W estern Front.” W hen W isem an retorted in frustra­ tion w ith the query w hether the A llies should sim ply do nothing, W ilson responded firmly, “N o, we must watch the situation carefully and sym pa­ thetically, and be ready to move w henever the right tim e arrived.”

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W ilson proceeded to explain that he was inclined to send to Siberia and M urm ansk a “C iv il Com m ission” consisting o f B ritish , French, and A m er­ ican personnel, w hich would help organize the railroads, food supplies, and a system o f barter. W h ile he was aware “it w ould take a long tim e before any results could be expected from such a m ovem ent,” W ilson did leave open the possibility that “i f in the m eantim e we were invited to intervene by any responsible and representative body, w e ought to do so.”8 W ilson’s desire to pursue a constructive policy o f econom ic assistance w ould be hindered throughout the sum m er by the A llies’ persistent efforts to draw him into a large-scale intervention through Siberia. B u t when the C zecho-Slovak C orps becam e em broiled in the Russian civil war, W ilson perceived an opportunity to solve his dilem m as in Siberia. W ilson gam bled that the popular C zecho-Slovak C orps could at once be used to diffuse A llied pressure for a large-scale intervention, to neutralize G erm an in fl­ uence in Siberia, and to provide the security for an A m erican-led recon­ struction program . Evidence o f G erm an attem pts to infiltrate the Siberian econom y were filtering through to the State D epartm ent by the spring and early sum mer o f 1918. M enacing reports from A m erican foreign service personnel con­ firm ed the presence o f G erm an purchasing agents in western Siberia dur­ in g the spring o f 1918. U pon his arrival at the International H arvester C om pany offices in O m sk on M arch 9, Com m ercial A ttaché W illiam C . H untington w as alarm ed to learn that G erm an influence had penetrated deep into Siberia’s interior when he recorded that the “International H ar­ vester officials gave us authentic reports o f G erm an agents actively at w ork taking orders for m owers and insisting not on cash but raw m aterials in paym ent!” 9 H untington was also inform ed that there were large quantities o f grain and dairy products in the area. In early A p ril, J . Butler W right, w ho had been serving as counselor to the A m erican em bassy in Petrograd, substantiated the existence o f large stores o f w heat in western Siberia’s A ltai district, as he traveled across the T rans-Siberian Railroad during his return to W ashington. W h ile noting that the peasants were only w illin g to barter their w heat for needed supplies he added, “G erm an com m ercial agents are covem ing [ric] the country prom ­ ising early delivery o f such supplies. T h is region is perilously near the U rals.” Finally, W right w arned that “every effort is being made by G erm an agents to secure m etals o f the U rals principally gold, platinum , regarding the latter o f w hich m ine is owned” (presum ably by G erm an interests).10 N ear the end o f A p ril the A m erican consul in O m sk reported that a G erm an purchasing com m ission was in the city and buying w heat, potatoes, cotton, w ool, flax, and sm oked meat for delivery to Germ any.11

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M any Am erican and A llied statesmen believed western Siberia’s grain sur­ plus m ight decide the outcome o f the economic warfare against G erm any in Russia. In Ju ly C onsul G eneral Poole explained the potentially decisive role western Siberia’s grain could play in guaranteeing G erm any’s continental conquest. Favorable w eather conditions were offsetting reduced sowings in European R ussia, presenting the possibility that European Russia would be self-supporting after the 1918 harvest. H owever, large amounts o f European Russian grain were required to feed G erm any’s population, m aking this crop insufficient to the com bined need o f both G erm any and Russia. T herefore, the “key to the situation which is in turn the key to Germ an success or failure in R ussia, is the stored grain o f [the] western section [o f] Siberia.”12 W ith ­ out western Siberia’s grain, G erm an requisitioning policies w ould create food shortages in European Russia and threaten to ignite social unrest against Germ any. C ivil disorder would then disrupt production needed by G erm any to sustain its w ar effort. Poole urged an im m ediate intervention in support o f the C zech A rm y Corps (which had by this tim e taken control over most o f the Trans-Siberian Railroad since their uprising against Bolshevik forces in late M ay) to rees­ tablish a front running from the M urm ansk peninsula south along the Kam a and Volga Rivers to the Kuban.13 Therefore, although the W ilson adm inis­ tration would remain adam ant in its rejection o f A nglo-French appeals for a Japanese m ilitary expedition to interdict supplies around the U rals, W ash­ ington was aware o f Germ an designs on the region. B u t G erm any’s efforts to extend its influence in the Russian econom y were only the first stages o f a process through w hich it hoped to attract the Russian Em pire into its continental system . In building its influence in the Russian economy, G erm any hoped to attract support from the Russian bour­ geoisie, who sought an end to Bolshevik rule. A s resentm ent toward bol­ shevism intensified, G erm any awaited the mom ent when nationalist and bourgeois elem ents w ould favor a G erm an intervention against Lenin’s re­ gim e. Subsequently, in its role as ultim ate guarantor o f social stability and o f bourgeois rule in Russia, G erm any would assume a position o f great influ­ ence w ithin the em pire. Indeed, by late Jun e 1918, the G erm an m inister plenipotentiary W ilhelm Von M irbach discussed this scenario in a report to G erm an State Secretary Richard von Kuhlm ann. M irbach was confident the Bolsheviks would soon fall and that “we should seek to ensure that w e are in a position to fill the vacuum w hich w ill result from its disappearance w ith a regim e w hich w ould be favorable to our designs and interests.” B u t M irbach did not recommend that G erm any support purely m onarchist elem ents, who he considered “too

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confused and lazy,” and w ho were "fundam entally only interested in w in­ ning back their form er secure and com fortable living conditions w ith our help.” Instead, in a statem ent that revealed the sophistication and breadth o f G erm any’s continental am bitions, M irbach explained that T h e nucleus o f w hich w e are thinking should be com posed o f m oderates from the right w ing, O ctobrists and Kadets (these reaching as far to the left as possible), especially as such a com bination would ensure that we had a large percentage o f the influential men o f the industrial and bank­ ing w orlds serving our essential econom ic interests. T h is bloc, w hich is already quite pow erful as it stands, could be fur­ ther strengthened and hardened i f w e could draw the Siberians into it— though this w ould indeed be our hardest problem . T h en , even further vistas, based on the m ineral resources o f Siberia, w ould appear, and, in this connexion, I w ill ju st touch on a few wider, alm ost unlim ited possi­ bilities o f developm ent w hich point us to the far and farthest E ast.14 T h e W ilson adm inistration was closely m onitoring M irbach’s activities in Russia. In early Ju n e, W illiam B u llitt passed on to W ilson a m em oran­ dum from the French Em bassy that exhibited the approach M irbach was taking w ith certain conservative bourgeois groups in M oscow. T h e French consul general at M oscow reported, from a source he considered to be reli­ able, that M irbach had been attem pting to cultivate support from conserva­ tive K adet party elem ents by asserting that “although G erm any had made it a principle not to m eddle w ith Russian dom estic affairs, all her sym pathies w ent to the parties o f order and industry. I f those parties should succeed in setting up a governm ent, he was authorized by Em peror W illiam to an­ nounce that i f appealed to he could have G erm an troops at M oscow in forty-eigh t hours.ls M irbach also endeavored to appease the nationalist sentim ents o f these conservative bourgeois groups by alleging that “G erm any w ould be disposed to revise the Brest Litovsk treaty as she never intended to make that instru­ m ent the true foundation o f her future economic relations w ith Russia w hich she desires, in accordance w ith her interests and sym pathies, to see restored to a norm al and prosperous life .” 16 Sim ilar reports reached the State D epartm ent from Am erican m ilitary intelligence officers stationed in Scandinavia. A t Christiania, N orway, U .S. m ilitary intelligence learned from a K adet source that in early M ay M irbach had proposed to the Kadet C entral Com m ittee in M oscow that G erm any w ould finance its efforts to overthrow the Bolsheviks. O n this occasion he

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even prom ised that G erm any w ould assist the reunification o f the U kraine w ith Russia and that it would effect a fair setdem ent o f the disputes between Finland and Russia. T h e K adet Central Com m ittee rejected these G erm an offers to reconcile relations between their nations.17 Throughout the critical period between M ay and A ugust 1918, the Kadet party C entral Com m ittee staunchly resisted G erm an overtures as it contin­ ued to declare its allegiance to the A llie d cause. H ow ever, som e prom i­ nent K adets did w aver in th eir lo yalty to the A llie s. N one other than P avel M iliu kov, perhaps the m ost prom inent K adet leader, seriou sly ex­ plored the possibility o f accepting G erm an help to overthrow the Bolshe­ viks. M iliukov suddenly shifted his position w ith regard to G erm any after he witnessed the occupation o f R ostov by G erm an troops in m id-M ay 1918. H e had remained in the city when the W hite forces o f Kaledin and Kornilov were driven south by B olshevik forces in M arch. M iliukov was so im pressed w ith the G erm ans’ ability to m aintain order in the areas under their control that he actually entered into negotiations at K iev between early Ju n e and m id-July w ith G erm an ambassador Baron P hilip M um m and w ith officers from the general staff, over the possibility that G erm any could assist Kadet efforts to overthrow the Bolshevik regim e in Russia proper. T hese negotia­ tions were cut short by the assassination o f M irbach in early Ju ly and b y the A llies’ decision to support the C zecho-Slovak C orps, events that reinforced G erm an resolve to hold the U kraine and to continue its relationship w ith the Bolsheviks, who constituted a buffer against the A llied-backed C zecho­ slovaks.18 B y the beginning o f the summer o f 1918, the threat o f G erm an economic penetration in Siberia gave urgency to the adm inistration’s debates over A m erican policy in the region. In particular, m emoranda by J . B u der W right and the W ar Trade Board dem onstrate that the im m ediate objective o f any assistance program w ould be to counter G erm an efforts to draw Siberia into its econom ic orbit. W right’s memo carefully outlined the situation and rec­ omm ended a detailed program for assisting Siberia and Russia that was very sim ilar to w hat W ilson was contem plating. T h e views o f the highly respected W right, who now joined B asil M iles in the State D epartm ent’s Russian section, undoubtedly received careful atten­ tion w ithin the adm inistration in light o f his firsthand knowledge o f the cur­ rent conditions in Siberia. From his personal observation o f conditions along the Trans-Siberian Railroad during M arch and A p ril and his extensive con­ tact w ith reliable official and private sources, W right believed Siberia was not as “saturated” w ith Germ an m ilitary and economic influence as European Russia. H e believed Bolshevik authority was “w aning” and the “ Red G uards”

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were “feared and detested throughout the country.” N evertheless, a predom­ inantly m ilitary intervention, especially one w ith “preponderant Japanese participation,” w ould arouse resentm ent and opposition am ong the Siberian population and lend credibility to G erm an propaganda. Conversely, a pro­ gram principally designed to rehabilitate the Trans-Siberian Railroad and to furnish agricultural and economic assistance w ould be welcom ed by the “bet­ ter peasant classes,” the railw ay w orkers, the “great Russian Co-operative Societies,” and the “better elem ents.”19 W right also pointed out w hy some form o f intervention w ould necessar­ ily have to accom pany a program o f econom ic assistance. H e em phasized “that the m aintenance, operation and control o f the T rans-Siberian R ail­ road be made the initial and preem inendy im portant step in a program o f im m ediate assistance to Siberia and neutralization o f G erm an econom ic and political endeavor in that region.” T h e Russian R ailw ay Service C orps, w hich was still aw aiting duty at H arbin, should now be utilized to reorga­ nize the w hole railroad system and to prepare the w ay for com m ercial and humanitarian assistance.20 However, during their m eeting at H arbin in A pril, Joh n Stevens had insisted to W right that he “absolutely refused to allow his men to extend their w ork along the T rans-Siberian w ithout adequate pro­ tection.”21 Therefore, W right estim ated that an “A llied M ilitary Police Force” o f tw enty-five thousand men divided equally into five-thousand-m an con­ tingents from the U nited States, B ritain , Japan , France, and C h in a should be organized for the sole purpose o f protecting the R ailw ay Service C orps and its auxiliary units.22 In W righ t’s view educational w ork and reconstructive assistance should follow the extension o f the R ailw ay Service C orps’ activities. Experts from the D epartm ent o f A griculture w ould dissem inate technical knowledge adapted to Siberia’s particular conditions. Furtherm ore, “inform ation and ad­ vice regarding our solution o f the problem o f the disposition o f the N ational D om ain— w hich is the basic consideration in the all im portant A grarian Q uestion should also be provided.” A s in the case o f Reinsch, the pervasive frontier “m entalité” figured prom inently in W righ t’s recom m endations for Siberia. Educational w ork and hum anitarian efforts by the Y M C A and Red C ross would undertake the form idable task o f rebuilding Siberia’s social infrastructure, including its inadequate educational system , m edical, and sanitary facilities. W right believed the U nited States and Russia should develop m utually profitable trade relations either through an A m erican purchase o f Russian supplies or through barter. In particular he noted that com m ercial opera­ tions should further the “distribution o f agricultural im plem ents, w hich are

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sorely needed throughout Russia and small quantities o f w hich the Germ ans already are endeavoring to tem pt the peasants to relinquish their stores o f grain.” A n “A llied Com m ission or Council” composed o f representatives from the five A llied powers would adm inister these activities, supplemented by a m ilitary staff from the A llied Police Force. T h is commission would operate either by m ajority vote or delegate its authority to a “C om m issioner-inC h ief.” W right thought the C zecho-Slovak troops spread across Siberia could play an integral role in the A llied policing operations.23 A t the end o f M ay, W ar Trade Board chairm an Vance C . M cC orm ick established a com m ittee w ithin the agency to exam ine m ethods for encour­ aging the exchange o f goods between Russia and A m erica and for m ain­ taining the economic blockade against G erm any in Russia.24T h e com m ittee, composed o f Thom as L . Chadboum e, Clarence M . W oolley, and Joh n Foster D u lles, based their report o f Ju n e 5 on discussions w ith individuals w ho had recently returned from R ussia, including J . Butler W right. T hese sources all agreed certain general conditions had to be taken into account in planning a program o f econom ic assistance. F irst, the com plete breakdown o f transportation had made it im possible to distribute food and m aterials in m any areas. Second, the collapse o f the ruble m eant the popu­ lation, and particularly the peasantry, w as no longer w illing to exchange com m odities for currency. Therefore, since the population lacked basic m an­ ufactured goods such as boots, shoes, socks, cotton goods, nails, corrugated iron, railw ay m aterials, agricultural m achinery, and seed grain, these types o f products could be offered to the Russians in exchange for their prim ary com m odities. Yet, in contrast w ith the State D epartm ent’s recom m enda­ tions, this com m ittee urged that A m erica should only exchange goods on a nonrem unerative basis to gain the Russian peoples’ trust and to disassociate its m otives from B ritain , France, and Japan . Since President W ilson had always expressed A m erica’s goodw ill toward R ussia, the com m ittee believed any offer o f econom ic assistance would be received w ith favor by the Soviet governm ent. A lthough the W ilson adm inistration clearly was not inclined to render assistance to the em battled Soviet regim e, the com m ittee’s essen­ tial point concerning the Russians’ m istrust o f A llied m otives would not be lost on the adm inistration. Prom pt steps were also necessary to counter G erm any’s strategy o f sup­ porting conservative client governm ents, such as the U kraine and Finland, as alternatives to Bolshevik rule. G erm any was presently courting the con­ servative bourgeois elem ents in Soviet-controlled G reat Russia w ith the hope these groups w ould eventually prefer G erm an hegem ony to Bolshevik rule. T herefore, w hile the W ar Trade Board was im m ediately concerned

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w ith the hum anitarian and strategic angles o f the Russian question, it was because these factors were at the forefront in the struggle “to prevent the enem y from securing perm anent hold upon Russian econom ic resources and com m ercial opportunities,” and “to prevent Russian acceptance o f G e r­ m an political leadership.”25 T o accom plish these objectives the W ar Trade Board com m ittee recom ­ m ended sending an industrial m ission to Russia under the direction o f a Russian com m issioner w ho would be responsible for coordinating its activ­ ities from W ashington. T h e m ission’s w ork was to be perform ed by special­ ized departm ents dealing w ith com m ercial transactions, financial m atters, and transportation. A fte r arriving at V ladivostok, the m ission w ould begin to advance westward w ith a local chairm an selected from am ong the body o f experts. A s the m ission advanced along the T rans-Siberian Railroad it w ould establish contact w ith the cooperative societies and thereby help fa­ cilitate the exchange o f necessities in Siberia. O n Jun e 14, in a note to Sec­ ond A ssistant Secretary W illiam P hillips, M iles indicated he essentially concurred w ith this plan when he com m ented, “T h e plan outlined is to m y m ind a good one and could be adopted to anything now under consider­ ation.”26 W h ile the W ar Trade Board’s proposal bore a strong resemblance to W righ t’s recom m endation o f Jun e 3, it was distinguished m arkedly by its provision that A m erica act independently o f the A llies in Siberia. T h e ad­ m inistration’s m istrust o f the A llies and its subsequent decision to pursue an independent program o f com m ercial assistance w ould encounter the obstructions posed by the A llies’ unilateral initiatives. Throughout this period when A m erican policy toward intervention and econom ic assistance was being debated, B asil M iles, head o f the State D e­ partm ent’s Russian section, advocated an even more am bitious range o f eco­ nom ic measures and a substantial amount o f governm ental support in order to block G erm an influence in Russia. H e w ent so far as to suggest that the governm ent should support efforts to purchase the stocks o f Russian com ­ panies in order to forestall G erm any’s attem pts to m onopolize these assets. M oreover, the adm inistration should finance barter exchanges w ith Russia, w hile endeavors to safeguard Russian supplies from G erm an control “should be supported as far as called for.”27 W h ile M iles, W right, and the W ar Trade Board experts m ay have over­ estim ated the threat o f G erm an activity in Siberia, their concern, and the breadth o f their recom m endations, was necessarily influenced by the m ili­ tary crisis that had arisen on the western front from the early successes o f G erm any’s massive spring offensive, w hich made even the potential access to Russian raw m aterials vital strategically. T aking this analysis o f the State

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D epartm ent s political econom y a step further, they correctly perceived that G erm an com m ercial policy w as not m erely a w artim e exigency, but part o f a persistent effort to acquire financial dom inion over Russian resources. B y early Ju n e, the State D epartm ent w as exploring the possibility o f en­ couraging the Russian population to resist G erm an influence. O n Ju n e 5, at Lan sin g’s request, C onsul G eneral Poole was instructed to determ ine the view s o f the U nion o f Siberian Cooperative U nions and the C entral U nion in regard to the organization o f resistance against G erm any in R ussia.28 O ne w eek later Poole cabled a lengthy statem ent from A lexander Berkenheim o f the board o f the A ll-R u ssian U nion o f C ooperative Societies, w hich in ­ cluded the U nion o f Siberian C ooperative U nions and had relations w ith the prom inent Siberian C ream ery A ssociations. A m erican sources regarded Berkenheim as a thoroughly reliable repre­ sentative o f the Siberian cooperative associations because he had proven h im self as an able m anager o f their purely business activities. In his state­ m ent Berkenheim asserted that the cooperative societies were prepared to help save the people o f European R ussia from starvation during this period o f econom ic crisis, but foreign assistance w ould nevertheless be needed. W h ile the European Russian population generally opposed Germ any, they were now w illin g to accept m ilitary intervention by “either the A llies or even the C en tral Powers” out o f their desire for an end to B olsh evik rule and the restoration o f stability. Berkenheim stressed that the cooperatives’ political sym pathies were w ith the A llie s, and “ in Siberia where the C o o p ­ erative Societies represent the people here in the fullest m easure there is a special feeling o f friendliness fixed and unshaken toward A m erica.” A m il­ itary intervention by the A llies w as the only m eans o f resisting G erm any, but the W estern allies had to participate in any expedition because Jap an w as not trusted am ong the Siberian population. Consequendy, i f A m erica guaranteed R ussia’s sovereignty, the Siberian population and the coopera­ tive societies w ould welcom e an A llied intervention.29 P rior to this, during a secret conference in A p ril the Siberian C ream ery A ssociations had al­ ready decided to call for an intervention by the W estern allies.30 Lan sin g brought Berkenheim ’s statem ent to W ilson’s attention on Ju n e 19. W ith out delay W ilson enthusiastically replied, “this dispatch has inter­ ested me very m uch. T h ese associations m ay be o f very great service as instrum ents fo r w hat w e are now planning to do in Siberia.” W ilson added that T hom as M asaryk, president o f the C zech N ational C oun cil, also ap­ proved o f the plan.31 T h is com m unication held particular im portance for A m erican policy as the odyssey o f the C zecho-Slovak C orps rapidly unfolded. Events in Siberia would now revolve around the C zecho-Slovaks’ effective occupation o f the

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T rans-Siberian R ailroad, w hich offered W ilson an opportunity to solve his dilem m a over the issue o f m ilitary intervention. D u rin g M arch 1918 approx­ im ately forty thousand C zecho-Slovak troops, form erly A ustrian prisoners o f war, began a jou rney to V ladivostok for trans-shipm ent to the western front. T h e W ilson adm inistration held these troops and their political lead­ ership in the highest regard, believing they represented the dem ocratic aspi­ rations o f the eastern European peoples, were loyal to the A llied cause, and enjoyed friendly relations w ith the Russian population. T h e determ ination o f the C zechs’ political leadership to contribute their troops to the western front was part o f their cam paign to further ju stify Czechoslovakia’s claim to national independence. T hese factors made the C zechs a particularly attrac­ tive agent fo r prom oting W ilsonian objectives in central Europe. T h e B olsh evik authorities and the C zechs had signed an agreem ent on M arch 26 that allowed the C zechs passage on the T rans-Siberian Railroad to Vladivostok. T h is agreem ent required the C zechs to surrender their arms at Penza and travel as civilians, not m ilitary detachm ents. M utual distrust betw een the Bolsheviks and C zechs w as evident from the beginning and resulted in num erous delays. A t the end o f M ay, w hile the first contingent o f fifteen thousand C zechs had already arrived at Vladivostok, fighting broke out between Bolshevik forces and the rem aining C zechs in central and w est­ ern Siberia. In late Ju n e the C zechs at V ladivostok took control o f the city and appealed to the A llies fo r a m ilitary force to assist the rescue o f their com rades stranded deep in the Siberian interior.32 T h e C zech uprising fin ally gave W ilson the m oral grounds upon w hich he could agree to U .S . participation in a m ilitary expedition w ith the A llies w hile strictly lim itin g its objectives to a supporting role. M ore im portantly from the A m erican standpoint, however, w as the C zechs’ occupation o f the T ran s-Sib erian R ailroad itself. W ith the support o f the C zech forces the U nited States could begin to restore railroad operations across Siberia and fin ally com m ence a program o f com m ercial assistance. T h is fortuitous de­ velopm ent gave the W ilson adm inistration hope that it w as now in a posi­ tion to reconcile the problem atic relationship between m ilitary intervention and econom ic assistance. D ifferences o f opinion had existed between the A llies from the begin­ ning over the disposition o f the C zech troops. A s early as A p ril 1, the B ritish W ar O ffice suggested m aintaining the Czechs in Siberia as a nucleus around w hich the eastern front could be reopened. B oth the French and C zechs strongly opposed this idea at the tim e, insisting these forces m ust be trans­ ported to the w estern front. A t the Suprem e A llied W ar C oun cil m eeting in early Jun e, Britain only reluctantly agreed to the transportation o f the Czechs to w estern Europe and to request Japan to supply the tonnage. B ritain was

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particularly dissatisfied w ith the diversion o f Japanese shipping fo r this task, since it w ould prevent Japan from m ounting an expedition into Siberia. In fact, m uch evidence indicates A llied officials encouraged the C zech revolt in the Bolsheviks’ rear to threaten G erm any w ith the possibility o f restoring the eastern front.33 Since M ay, m any State D epartm ent officials such as W illiam Phillips, B asil M iles, and Joseph E . G rew , acting ch ie f o f the w est European division, also believed the C zechs should be kept in Siberia.34 T herefore, a good deal o f sentim ent already existed w ithin the State D epartm ent that view ed the C zechs as essential to a reconstruction pro­ gram , w hen a telegram from M in ister Reinsch in Peking arrived at W ash­ ington on Ju n e 13. Reinsch stressed the opinion o f the A llied representatives in Peking, w ith w hich he fu lly concurred “that it w ould be a serious m istake to rem ove the C zech o-Slovak troops from Sib eria.” T h e C zechs needed only a sm all am ount o f assistance from the A llies in order to “control all o f Siberia against the G erm an s,” since “they are sym pathetic to the Russian population, eager to be accessories to the A llie d cause, the m ost serious m enace to [the] extension o f G erm an influence in Russia. T h e ir rem oval w ould greatly benefit G erm any and further discourage R ussia. I f they w ere not in Siberia it w ould be w orthw hile to bring them there from a distance.”35 W ilson reacted favorably to this recom m endation on Ju n e 17 w hen he com m ented to Lansing, “T h ere seems to me to em erge from this suggêstion the shadow o f a plan that m ight be w orked, w ith Japanese and other assis­ tance. T h ese people are the cousins o f the R ussians.”36 Since Reinsch had specifically been em phasizing the danger o f G erm an econom ic penetration in Siberia, W ilson’s response suggests he eagerly endorsed the view that the C zecho-Slovaks’ presence there w ould assuage Russian sensibilities over an unavoidable Japanese presence in Siberia. In other w ords, W ilson appears to have been deeply im pressed w ith the prospect that a C zecho-Slovak occu­ pation o f the T rans-Siberian R ailroad w ould dem onstrate to the Siberian population the A llie s’ com m itm ent to restore regional stability under the auspices o f a m ilitary force sym pathetic to the Russian population. T h e State D epartm ent was also elated w ith inform ation from A d m . A ustin M . K night o f the flagship Brooklyn that the C zechs at V ladivostok had “com pletely m odified” their attitude about retiring from Siberia. O n Ju n e 21, K n igh t reported that the C zechs were now w illin g to cooperate w ith the A llies against G erm an activity in Siberia and to participate in the reestablishm ent o f the eastern front. T h e C zech presence w ould also allay the Siberian population’s m isgivings o f an A llie d m ilitary intervention b y subordinating Japan ’s role.37 J . B u tler W right seized on this news w ith alac­ rity, urging M iles that “T h is is a ‘G odsend’. I t ’s ju st the news w e w ant. M asaryk is in town! L e t’s concentrate on this w ith all our pow er at once!”38

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F o r the Russian division the C zech uprising w as the catalyst they had been looking for to hasten the organization o f an econom ic program fo r Siberia. In a letter to W ilson on Ju n e 23, L an sin g revealed the true thrust behind A m erica’s sudden interest in m aintaining the C zechs in Siberia w hen he suggested, “Is it not possible that in this body o f capable and loyal troops m ay be found a nucleus for m ilitary occupation o f the Siberian R ailw ay?”39 A t the beginning o f Ju ly 1918, the W ilso n adm inistration w as prepared to undertake a lim ited m ilitary intervention in Siberia to support a pro­ gram o f com m ercial assistance, but events rapidly overtook W ilson ’s delib­ erate approach to the problem . O n Ju ly 2, the Suprem e W ar C ou n cil forced W ilson ’s hand w ith an urgent appeal fo r his im m ediate consent to a m ili­ tary intervention in Siberia. W h ile W ilso n w ould not accept the A llie s’ recom m endations, their m essage raised dangers that w ere consistent w ith the w arnings he had been receiving from R einsch and from the A m erican am bassadors in Europe. In this m essage the AUies presented the issue o f intervention in term s that placed W ilson ’s m oral leadership on the spot. F irst, the A llies argued it w as a m oral obligation to assist the large C zech forces w ho were in danger o f being cut o ff in central and w estern Siberia. A n expedition in support o f the C zechs w ould also enable the A llies to establish stability in Siberia. Second, A llie d intervention w as necessary to prevent G erm any from gaining control over w estern Siberia’s resources. Fin ally, the reestablishm ent o f an eastern front w as crucial fo r the w hole w ar effort since G erm an y w ould then be prevented from transferring d ivi­ sions to the w estern front. T o further assuage W ilson ’s reservations, Jap an w as w illin g to guarantee R ussian sovereignty and prom ised not to interfere in R ussia’s dom estic politics.40 T h e State D epartm ent used the A llie d m essage as a m eans o f prodding W ilso n to take the initiative on the question o f intervention in Siberia. O n Ju ly 4, Lan sin g initialed a m em orandum to the president that stressed that the rem arkable success o f the C zech o-Slovak forces across Siberia had in ­ troduced “a sentim ental elem ent” into A m erican calculations. H e asserted that A m erica had a responsibility for protecting the C zecho-Slovaks be­ cause they were supposedly in danger from G erm an and A ustrian prisoners w ho the Bolsheviks were arm ing to attack them . Lan sin g suggested that the fifteen thousand C zech troops at V ladivostok be furnished w ith enough arm s to relieve the tw enty-five thousand w est o f Irkutsk. Som e A llied troops should be sent to help police the railroad and provide logistical support for the C zechs. Lan sin g em phasized that this expedition w ould not attem pt to restore order or in terfere in the c iv il w ar. N everth eless, he b elieved the Jap an ese w ould have to provide m ost o f the troops alth ou gh he thou gh t it “w ise” and “prob ably necessary” th at A m erican and A llie d troops also

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participate. H e also believed the policy should be publicly announced im ­ m ediately and it should include a declaration prom ising noninterference in Russia’s internal affairs and the w ithdraw al o f all m ilitary forces once the danger o f G erm an and A ustrian aggression w as over. Finally, he recom m ended that a peaceful com m ission headed by a polit­ ical high com m issioner should im m ediately proceed to V ladivostok. Its m em bers should include representatives from industry, com m erce, finance, and agriculture together w ith spokesm en on m oral issues. T h e ir purpose w ould be to assist the “ Russian people by restoring norm al conditions o f trade, industry and social order.” T h is com m ission w ould closely follow the C zechs w estw ard “w ith due regard to safety,” and “the final destination [o f the C om m ission] should depend in large m easure upon their reception by the Russians and the resistance m ade to the m ilitary forces.”41 T w o days later on Ju ly 6, W ilson decided to em bark upon a policy o f intervention in Siberia during a conference at the W h ite H ouse that w as attended by Lan sin g, Secretary o f W ar N ew ton D . Baker, Secretary o f the N avy Josephus D aniels, G en . Peyton C . M arch, and A dm . W illiam Benson. W ilson remained adam ant that the U nited States should reject the A llied ap­ peals to reestablish an eastern front, because the task was “physically im possi­ ble.” U nder the present circumstances W ilson insisted that no advance beyond Irkutsk should be considered. Am erica’s consent to m ilitary action would be based strictly on its obligation to help the Vladivostok Czechs reestablish con­ tact w ith their com patriots in western Siberia. A lthough the U nited States could not furnish any considerable forces on short notice to assist the C zechs, W ilson decided that a jo in t m ilitary force o f seven thousand Am erican and seven thousand Japanese troops should be used to guard the C zech commu­ nication lines. Japan should supply the Vladivostok Czechs w ith the necessary arms and the U .S . governm ent w ould share the expense. W ilson stated that further steps should aw ait developm ents. Lan sin g inform ed Japan ’s am bas­ sador, Viscount Kikujirö Ishii, o f A m erica’s proposal on Ju ly 8, yet W ilson did not w ish to consult Britain and France until after Japan had agreed to a jo in t and equal m ilitary expedition.42 W h ile W ilson had decided to proceed first w ith an intervention on b eh alf o f the C zech o-Slovaks, he w as essentially struggling to reconcile the necessity o f som e form o f intervention w ith a program o f econom ic assistance fo r Siberia. H e revealed to H ouse on Ju ly 8 that he w as preoccu­ pied w ith this dilem m a w hen he confided: “I have not w ritten recently because I have been sw eating blood over the question w hat is righ t and feasible (possible) to do in R ussia. It goes to pieces like quicksilver under m y touch, but I hope I see and can report som e progress presently, along the double line o f econom ic assistance and aid to the C zech o -Slo vak s.”43

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Indeed, W ilson’s thought on this question had evolved rapidly in early Ju ly, as his conversations w ith B ritish am bassador the M arquis o f R eading clearly dem onstrate. O n Ju ly 3, W ilson told R eading that he w as still pri­ m arily interested in sending an econom ic com m ission to Siberia. R eading reported to the foreign office W ilson’s b e lie f that: although we could not consider an Eastern Front at the mom ent w e should consider interm ediate courses and he inform ed me that he [W ilson ] had been still considering and exam ining the plans fo r an Econom ic C o m ­ m ission on a great scale and that he recognized that it w ould be necessary to protect this Com m ission. H is idea was that the Com m ission should be o f first im portance, that the policy o f econom ic assistance to R ussia should be kept to the front and that the m ilitary force should play a sec­ ondary part.44 In his sum m ary o f this interview w ith W ilson, R eading em phasized “that it shows that the President’s m ind is crystallizing ( if he has not already decided) in the direction o f the Econom ic C om m ission and the arm ed pro­ tective force.” W ilson particularly recognized “the necessity fo r arm ed pro­ tection o f the C om m ission so that as it advances it m ay be protected from attack in the rear or from being cut o ff, and that it is incum bent upon U .S . and A llies to assist and protect the C zecho-Slovaks and that im m ediate action m ust be taken.”4S T hree days after this interview , W ilson shifted his stance w hen he gave priority to support for the C zecho-Slovaks. O n Ju ly 9, Lan sin g explained to the A llied am bassadors that because o f the urgent need to assist the C zechs the U nited States w ould “not w ait for the form ation o f the Econom ic C om ­ m ission but w ill in the first instance send troops and w ill send the C om m is­ sion later thus reversing the order o f the original proposal.”46 H ow ever, W ilson had not altered his view s on the question o f intervention or in the im portance he attributed to an econom ic assistance program . Rather, he had com e to the conclusion that he m ust im m ediately extend support to the C zecho-Slovaks, because they must necessarily initiate any A llied-sponsored reconstruction efforts. T h e sequence o f events that took place betw een m id-June and early Ju ly 1918 indicate that W ilson ’s decision to support an intervention on b eh a lf o f the C zech o -Slo vak forces w as part o f an astute m aneuver on his part that aim ed to achieve a num ber o f related A m erican objectives in Siberia. F irst, this course o f action w as certainly an attem pt to forestall A llie d appeals fo r a large-scale m ilitary intervention. M ore im portant, since the cable from A m bassador R einsch on Ju n e 13, W ilson had been

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considering the possibility o f retaining the C zech o-Slovaks on the T ran sSiberian R ailroad, both as an an ti-G erm an force and as a vanguard fo r the distribution o f econom ic assistance through the cooperative societies. In the w eeks prior to his Ju ly 6 decision, the consensus o f opinion W ilso n received from A llie d and A m erican diplom atic sources indicated the B o l­ sheviks w ere on the verge o f collapse.47 B y Ju ly, the accum ulated w eigh t o f these reports m ust have presented a com pelling case to W ilso n that speedy A llie d m ilitary action m ight be required to prevent G erm any from fillin g the political vacuum in European R ussia, and possibly w estern Sib eria, that w ould result from a B olsh evik collapse. A t this point, the Suprem e W ar C o u n cil’s urgent appeal o f Ju ly 2 fin ally forced W ilso n s hand on the question o f intervention b y im pressing him w ith the desirability o f helping the C zech o-Slovaks to consolidate their forces, an operation that w ould necessarily so lid ify A llied control over the T ran s-Sib erian R ailroad. Y et, the decision to intervene created a new dilem m a, because the sudden in ­ troduction o f Japanese forces w ould have been the w rong signal to send to liberal segm ents o f the R ussian population, fo r it w ould have increased the risk o f legitim izin g a G erm an protectorate as a curb against Japanese in ­ cursions. T h is danger m ay explain w h y L an sin g’s Ju ly 4 m em o advised that an A llie d intervention be represented strictly as a hum anitarian m ission on b eh alf o f the C zech o-Slovaks. A s W illiam B u llitt had w arned in early M arch , i f the A llies intervened in R u ssia for the explicit purpose o f restor­ in g order, w hat could m orally prevent G erm any or Jap an from doing like­ w ise? B u t i f the W estern powers intervened for the purpose o f saving the stranded C zech o -Slo vak forces, this w ould deter G erm any or Jap an from launching a large-scale intervention under the pretext o f a “police action.” L an sin g hinted at this political m otive w hen he suggested that “furnishing protection and assistance to the C zech o-Slovaks, w ho are so loyal to our cause, is a very different thin g from sending an arm y into Sib eria to restore order or to save the Russians from them selves. T h ere is a m oral obligation to save these m en from our com m on enem ies, i f w e are able to do so.”48 W ilson ’s decision to undertake a lim ited intervention also dem onstrates that he w as able to discrim inate between the A llie s’ alarm ist appeals regard­ in g the necessity for a large-scale intervention to restore a second front and the longer-term threat o f G erm an econom ic hegem ony in R ussia. N or did W ilson overestim ate the extent o f G erm any’s current hold over R ussia, fo r he recognized that it w ould take G erm any a year and a h a lf to tap sign ifi­ cant quantities o f Russian resources.49 In favoring a westw ard advance by the C zecho-Slovaks, W ilson believed he w ould be furnishing support to a force that enjoyed particularly frien d ly relations w ith the Russian population. From his standpoint, their presence

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in Siberia appeared to offer a particularly favorable opportunity for an A llied effort to reestablish a degree o f social stability along the Trans-Siberian rail­ way, an initiative that would undercut G erm an com m ercial influence or the potential appeal o f G erm any as a bulw ark against bolshevism or Japan. T o illustrate this point, an im m ediate task o f an A llied force w ould be to ensure control over the G erm an and A ustro-H ungarian prisoners w ho were concentrated at different locations in Siberia, such as O m sk. In early 1920, shortly after the Bolshevik defeat o f A dm iral Kolchak, the A m erican Red C ross com m issioner to Siberia, Robert B . Teusler, thought the presence o f these prisoners in Siberia was a “serious menace” because “so m any o f them are officers w ith university training and highly qualified professional m en.” Besides these actual m ilitary prisoners, Teusler had discovered from his expe­ riences that “there are also a large num ber o f so-called civilian G erm an pris­ oners in Siberia w ho are not im prisoned. T hese men have lived in Siberia for m any years, were interned at the beginning o f the war, and now rem ain to form very definite contacts w ith the Russian people them selves.”so For these reasons it is conceivable that these G erm an prisoners in Siberia, both m ilitary and civilian, could have helped facilitate the extension o f G erm an econom ic influence in Siberia after Brest-Litovsk, had there been no A llied counter­ measures. In their role as an A llied gendarm erie for Siberia, the Czecho-Slovaks w ould help establish the preconditions for any assistance program that was subsequently undertaken. Initially, they w ould provide security for the R ail­ w ay Service C orps along the w hole o f the Trans-Siberian railw ay system , a guarantee that Joh n Stevens had insisted upon in his conversation w ith J . B . W right. T h is protection w ould be essential for the reconstruction o f Siberia, since com m ercial assistance could only be effectively furnished to the region after the A m erican engineers restored operations across this transportation artery. T h e C zecho-Slovak forces w ould also directly assist the w ork o f the A m erican railroad engineers because they had several locom otive shop w ork battalions in their contingent. T hese units were assigned to w ork in various shops and roundhouses on the Trans-Siberian Railroad.sl W ilson understood that his consent to a m ilitary expedition w as a cal­ culated gam ble. H e adm itted as m uch to G en eral M arch at the Ju ly 6 con­ ference w hen M arch dissented from the policy on grounds that Japan could not be trusted to com ply w ith the term s o f the U nited States.52 B y m idJu ly Jap an had still not replied to the proposal o f the U nited States fo r a lim ited m ilitary intervention on b eh alf o f the C zech o-Slovaks, w hile B rit­ ain had unilaterally begun to prepare its own expeditionary force. B u t Ja ­ pan w ould not cooperate w ith W ilson ’s proposal because it was fu lly aware o f A m erica’s strategy. D u rin g a m eeting o f Jap an ’s A d visory C ou n cil on

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Foreign R elations, Foreign M in ister Shim pei G o to bluntly asserted that “A m erica looks on the C zech forces as its own arm y.”53 W ilson accordingly resorted to m oral suasion w ith the A llies w hen he delineated A m erica’s purposes in Siberia through an aide-m ém oire that w as given to the G reat Powers on Ju ly 17. In this statem ent W ilson categorically refused to participate in any m ilitary intervention through Siberia that had as its aim the restoration o f an eastern front, because it w ould only w orsen “the present sad confusion in R ussia rather than cure it, injure her rather than help her.” H e declared that m ilitary intervention w ould “be m erely a m ethod o f m aking use o f R ussia, not a m ethod o f serving her” and the Russian population w ould “be used to m aintain foreign arm ies, not to re­ constitute their ow n.” T h e U nited States w ould consent only to a m ilitary action “to help the C zecho-Slovaks consolidate their forces and get into successful cooperation w ith their Slavic kinsm en and steady any efforts at self-governm ent or self-defense in w hich the Russians them selves m ay be w illin g to accept assistance.” W ilson called on the A llies to publicly assure the Russian people they w ould not interfere w ith Russia’s political sover­ eignty or infringe on Russia’s territorial integrity at the present tim e or in the future. In conclusion, W ilson indicated that the U nited States intended to provide econom ic assistance for the Siberian population. H e m odesdy explained that the U .S . governm ent w ould: take advantage o f the earliest opportunity to send to Siberia a com m is­ sion o f m erchants, agricultural experts, labor advisers, R ed C ross repre­ sen tatives, and agents o f the Y ou n g M e n ’s C h ristia n A sso cia tio n accustom ed to organizing the best m ethods o f spreading useful inform a­ tion and rendering educational help o f a m odest sort, in order in som e system atic m anner to relieve the im m ediate econom ic necessities o f the people there in every w ay for w hich opportunity m ay open. T h e execu­ tion o f this plan w ill follow and w ill not be perm itted to em barrass the m ilitary assistance rendered in the rear o f the w estw ard-m oving forces o f the C zecho-Slovaks.54 W ilson’s m em orandum w as consistent w ith the strategy he had been considering since m id-June o f using the C zecho-Slovaks to block the spread o f G erm an econom ic influence in Siberia. M oreover, W ilson’s view that the C zechs could encourage efforts at “self-governm ent or self-defense” am ong their “ Slavic kinsm en” is crucial to understanding his conception o f the re­ construction process. T h e reinvigoration o f these basic civic capacities in the Siberian population w ould engender the confidence necessary to revive

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norm al com m ercial activity and to reestablish governm ental functions. In other w ords, im plicit in W ilson ’s em phasis on “self-governm ent or selfdefense” w as the fundam ental liberal precept that security fo r person and property w as an essential basis fo r econom ic developm ent. A m erican enthusiasm fo r the C zecho- Slovak C orps stood in sharp con­ trast to die reserved attitude the W ilson adm inistration took toward the rival anticom m unist political factions w ho were vying for A llied support in the late summer 1918. Instead o f supporting any o f die fragile Siberian governments— a move that w ould only em broil the U nited States in the Russian civil w ar— W ilson placed A m erican support behind the C zecho-Slovaks’ occupation o f the Trans-Siberian railw ay in an effort to help restore civil order. W ilson ju st­ ified this lim ited intervention on the recognition that none o f the Siberian governm ents were viable or su ffid en d y representative o f the popular w ill. N ear the end o f Ju ly, R oland M o rris, the A m erican A m bassador to Japan and a longtim e progressive D em ocrat, conveyed this position to representa­ tives o f the various anti-Bolshevik political movements w ho were attem pting to form a unified governm ent. For instance, M orris told R V. Vologodskii o f the provisional Siberian governm ent that w hile the U nited States would not recognize his governm ent, this did not mean that A m erica “w ould treat such governm ents in an unfriendly w ay or w ithhold its sym pathy and assistance.” In other words, the U nited States m ight be w illing to enter into practical relationships w ith existing governm ents under certain circumstances. T h is statem ent foreshadowed the pragm atic approach W ilson w ould subsequendy take toward the K olchak governm ent in 1919. M orris then made W ilson’s essential conditions for recognition more explicit in a m eeting w ith represen­ tatives o f D m itri K horvat’s ultraconservative Far Eastern Com m ittee for the D efense o f the H om eland. In a pointed com m ent that expressed W ilson’s disapproval o f any reactionary political setdem ent, M orris told them that the U nited States would delay recognition o f any governm ent because “the con­ victions o f the Am erican people inclined them toward Governm ent that arose from the bottom up, rather than in favor o f the authority im posed from above.”ss Events w ould soon ju stify A m erican caution. T h e disparate Sib e­ rian political groups were com pletely out o f touch w ith the region’s popula­ tion and incapable o f transcending their factional rivalries— even for the purpose o f form ing a united front against the Bolsheviks. U nity would only be achieved by force in N ovem ber t9i8, at the hand o f A dm . A leksandr K olchak’s m ilitary dictatorship— a regim e that rapidly im ploded because o f its callous disregard for the public’s w elfare.

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Perhaps further light can be shed on W ilson’s intervention policy by exam ­ ining the m em oranda o f Ju liu s Lay, the State D epartm ent’s trade adviser. Follow ing W ilson’s aide-m ém oire o f Ju ly 17, L ay produced m emoranda that were consistent w ith the policy enunciated in the president’s declaration and that were apparendy drafted to offer recom m endations on how the pol­ icy should be carried out. In the three memos that spanned the period from Ju ly 19 to 23, L a y advanced his view s on how the specific m ilitary and eco­ nom ic aspects o f the intervention should be im plem ented to achieve A m er­ ican objectives. O n Ju ly 22, L ay argued that the principal objective behind an interven­ tion in Siberia w as to defeat Germ any. T o achieve this goal, not only would it be necessary to divert G erm an troops from the western front for strategic ends in the present war, but it would also be necessary to prevent G erm any from dom inating Russia after the war. O therw ise, regardless o f the out­ come o f the w ar in the W est, G erm any would be left in control o f enormous resources, w hich w ould radically alter the global relations o f power. In accordance w ith the president’s basic position, L ay did not advocate a large m ilitary intervention that would attem pt to reopen an eastern front. L ike W ilson, L a y believed hostilities against G erm any could only be re­ sumed in the east i f the expeditionary forces boosted the population’s morale and became a nucleus around w hich Russian forces could rally and begin to organize an efficient army. A lso consistent w ith the president’s decision to undertake a lim ited intervention, L a y recommended that a m oderate-sized expedition should be sent to Siberia, in w hich A m erican troops played a prom inent role. T hese expeditionary forces should be composed largely o f logistical troops who w ould support the C zecho-Slovaks, w ho, o f course, would constitute the predom inant m ilitary force.S6 L a y ’s m em oranda are particularly interesting for the em phasis he placed on using a lim ited m ilitary intervention by A llied forces as a means to counteract G erm an econom ic influence in Siberia. Indeed, he was certain this step should actually precede econom ic m easures. L a y shared the pre­ vailing State D epartm ent view that the im m ediate objective o f A m erica’s Siberian policy should be to deny G erm any the use o f Russian resources for its w ar effort. H e hoped the intervention w ould deprive G erm any o f the resources o f western Siberia and o f Russia east o f the Volga, w hich w ould largely reestablish an effective blockade against Germ any. H owever, w hile acknowledging the essentially econom ic nature o f the G erm an threat in Siberia, he nevertheless em phasized that it w ould be a m istake for the U nited States to in itially undertake a strictly econom ic program to counter G erm an influence, because “all classes and all parties have im plored our aid

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Reconstructing Russia

against the G erm ans and interpret our prom ise to stand by them as a prom ise o f m ilitary assistance.”57 H e w arned that ever since the B rest-Litovsk Treaty the “gravest danger that had threatened the A llies in R ussia” w as the possi­ b ility that the bourgeois elem ents, “despairing o f A llie d aid ,” w ould accept G erm an intervention against bolshevism . N eith er w as L a y given to exag­ gerate the extent o f G erm an influence over R ussian liberals and conserva­ tives for, w ith the exception o f a few m onarchists, he believed they w ere “consistently p ro -A lly.” N evertheless, he had to take into account that “it is reliably reported that they have already through their leaders entertained G erm an proposals.” O n the basis o f these assessm ents, L a y concluded his Ju ly 19 m em orandum w ith a scenario that echoed the sentim ents W ilson had ju st expressed in his aide-m ém oire, w hen he stated that “ Should a sm all A llied arm y entering Siberia m eet w ith a sym pathetic reception and Russian soldiers jo in the colors under their leadership to fight Germ any, the p ro -A lly elem ents in R ussia m ight be encouraged to hold out against G e r­ m an overtures.”58 In a m em orandum from Ju ly 23, L a y also provides a possible explanation w hy W ilson , in his aide-m ém oire, had subtly shifted his ground from advo­ cating an econom ic com m ission that w ould operate on a “great scale” to a m odest endeavor that w ould assist the people’s efforts to help them selves. L a y cautioned that there is danger lest a purely econom ic m ission should be regarded sim ply as a schem e by A m erica to achieve econom ic penetration and com m er­ cial advantages. Such a view w ill be industriously circulated by G erm an agents and m uch w ill be made o f the popular idea that A m erica thinks only o f financial gain. It m ay be added that num erous articles are ap­ pearing in the Japanese press setting forth the same point o f view .59 Paul Reinsch related that this issue had been a very im portant consideration fo r W ilson throughout the sum m er o f 1918 w hen m any in the adm inistra­ tion recom m ended that a prom inent businessm an, such as H erbert H oover, head an econom ic com m ission for R ussia. In discussing possible candidates fo r this position, W ilson told Reinsch that “he feared to place a representa­ tive o f ‘b ig business’ in such a position; men w ould suspect selfish national m otives. I felt he [W ilson ] w ished A m erica to lead in giving the Russian people such aid in reorganizing their econom ic life as w ould perm anently benefit them and preserve them fo r our com m on cause.”60 If, then, L a y ’s m em oranda constitute a record o f discussions from w ithin the policym aking apparatus over how to proceed w ith the policy W ilson

M a y -Ju ly 19 18

83

laid out in his Ju ly 17 aide-m ém oire, then it also indicated the extent to w hich the president’s intervention policy w as influenced by the potential threat o f expanded G erm an influence over the Russian political economy. In retrospect, it m ay seem im plausible that the threat o f expanded G e r­ m an econom ic penetration in Siberia played such a prom inent role in in ­ fluencing the policym aking decisions o f the W ilson adm inistration from the spring to the end o f the sum m er o f 1918. N evertheless, it cannot be disputed that the specter o f G erm an econom ic penetration into Siberia, w hether actual, prospective, or m erely hypothetical, attracted a great deal o f attention at the State D epartm ent and the W h ite H ouse. A m erican officials m ay then seem vulnerable to the charge that they were fighting a phantom in believing G erm any could derive any significant m a­ terial benefits from R ussia proper, or Siberia, at this stage o f the war. Y et, in view o f the h ighly unstable and rapidly changing conditions that existed throughout the vast Russian Em pire, and considering the ongoing d ifficul­ ties the adm inistration encountered in obtaining accurate inform ation, A m erican policym akers had to take this danger seriously. A t that tim e, w ith the outcom e o f the w ar on the w estern front still hanging in the balance and w ith A llied policy toward R ussia paralyzed by deep divisions am ong the coalition pow ers, it w ould not be hard to envision a scenario in w hich im ­ portant segm ents o f the Russian population could reconcile them selves to a strong G erm an political and econom ic position in the em pire; this as an acceptable alternative to continued B olsh evik rule, or to Japanese encroach­ m ents upon the Russian Far E ast. T h e case o f Pavel M iliu kov dem onstrated how even a staunch Russian nationalist could entertain the possibility o f a G erm an protectorate. In this context, the decision to support the C zecho-Slovaks constituted a tim ely strategic initiative that dem onstrated A llied resolve to counter G erm an in fl­ uence. Indeed, the C zecho-Slovaks quickly fulfilled this purpose, as a party o f A m erican officials reported upon their arrival at H arbin, M anchuria, in early Septem ber 1918 (they had been traveling w ith G eorge Em erson o f the A m erican R ailw ay Service C orps from locations in w estern and central S i­ beria). A t that tim e C onsu l D ouglas Jen kin s learned from one o f his col­ leagues that during Ju n e the C zech o-Slovaks’ occupation o f the T obolsk grain-producing area w est o f O m sk had blocked the activity o f G erm an purchasing agents.61 A lthough subsequent events underm ined W ilson’s strat­ egy, in m id-sum m er 1918 the C zecho-Slovaks’ hold over the T ran s-Siberian railw ay system appeared to offer the U nited States the best possible circum ­ stances for undertaking a program o f econom ic assistance in this hotly con­ tested region.

84

Reconstructing R ussia

5 «"K®

The Genesis o f the Russian Bureau: The Sources and Conduct o f the Am erican Economic Assistance Program , Ju ly —September i ç

i

8

W ilson decided to support a lim ited m ilitary intervention on b eh alf o f the C zecho-Slovaks because he hoped their presence in Siberia w ould block G erm an influence, strengthen Russian efforts at “self-governm ent,” and con­ stitute an advance force for the econom ic com m ission he was then contem ­ plating. B u t, W ilson’s strategy w as quickly subverted by the W estern allies and Jap an , w ho im m ediately seized the opportunity to launch a large-scale m ilitary intervention that w ould further their own interests in the Russian E m pire. W ilson’s problem s were com pounded at hom e by a bureaucratic rivalry that stem m ed from the Com m erce D epartm ent’s efforts to organize its ow n com m ercial contacts w ith the Siberian cooperative societies. In its attem pt to circum vent the State D epartm ent’s coordination o f A m erican assistance efforts, the Com m erce D epartm ent created further com plications fo r the adm inistration during the difficult period w hen it w as endeavoring to craft the various facets o f W ilson’s Siberian policy into an effective pro­ gram that w ould foster reconstruction. T h e adm inistration’s plans for the econom ic m ission w ere put on hold pending Japan ’s response to the A m erican proposal for sending A m erican and Japanese contingents o f seven thousand troops.1 T h is question is cru­ cial to understanding the troubled course A m erican assistance policy w ould follow in A u gu st and Septem ber 1918. T h e A llies w ould not accept the

lim its W ilson wanted to place on the intervention, nor would they cooperate on questions o f econom ic assistance. Japan never agreed to lim it its expe­ ditionary force to the seven thousand m en the U nited States believed w as sufficient for the lim ited task o f supporting the C zechs. Japan ’s interven­ tion w ould take on particularly m enacing im plications near the end o f Ju ly w hen it announced it w ould be sending divisions to patrol both the A m u r section o f the T ran s-Sib erian R ailroad and the C hinese Eastern R ailw ay in northern M anchuria. B y the beginning o f Septem ber, Japan took steps that w ould directly threaten Joh n Stevens’s authority w hen it placed all Siberian railroads under m ilitary control. A t the end o f O ctober, it w ould have approxim ately twelve thousand troops stationed on the m ainline itself, w ith another tw enty thou­ sand preparing to w inter at C h ita, the juncture o f the m ainline and the A m ur line. T hese forces w ould obstruct the w estw ard m ovem ent o f all freight traffic in order to discrim inate in favor o f Japanese com m erce. W ilson’s policy had in fact becom e distorted; the presence o f the C zecho-Slovaks in Siberia gave Japan a rationale to m aintain its troops in the Russian Far E ast and in northern M anchuria. B ritain encouraged Japan to disregard A m erica’s resolve to lim it the num­ ber o f troops that w ere introduced into Siberia. O n Ju ly 20, B ritish foreign secretary A rth u r B alfou r instructed his am bassador in T okyo to inform the Japanese that B ritain believed the A m erican proposal was inadequate. O n A ugust 12 the B ritish Em bassy in W ashington urged the State D epartm ent to request Japan to send as m any troops as it thought necessary, w hile in private discussions a w eek later Foreign Secretary B alfou r im pressed upon Japan ’s am bassador that “the am ount o f forces required to achieve our ob­ jects in Siberia was entirely a m ilitary question and H is M ajesty’s G overn ­ m ent w ould approve anything w hich the H igh Com m and in Tokyo thought necessary.”2 B ritish collusion w ith Japan explains w hy W ilson did not w ant to inform the W estern allies o f A m erica’s consultations w ith Japan over a lim ited m ilitary expedition until after Japan had agreed to his term s. W h ile W ilson has been faulted for his attem pt to exclude B ritain and France from these discussions, his desire to avoid their participation in the intervention was w ell-founded. B ritain and France w ould have considered an A m erican requ est fo r th eir p articip atio n in the m ilitary expedition as an open in g w edge for the eventual restoration o f an eastern front.3 Indeed, the unw ill­ ingness o f B ritain and Japan to cooperate in a lim ited m ilitary intervention doom ed W ilson’s hopes o f utilizing the C zechs as a stabilizing force along the T rans-Siberian railway. A t the tim e o f the A rm istice on N ovem ber 11, Japan had sent nearly seventy thousand troops to Siberia.

86 «h* Reconstructing R ussia

B ritain also com plicated the efforts o f the U nited States to form ulate a com m ercial assistance program . O n Ju ly 25 B ritain m oved to preem pt A m er­ ican plans w hen it inform ed the U nited States it w as taking steps to begin its own program o f com m ercial assistance for Siberia. A lthough it w as inev­ itable that A m erica and Japan w ould provide m ost o f the supplies needed by Siberia, B ritain nevertheless m aintained it w as desirable to give assis­ tance efforts as m uch o f an in ter-A llied character as possible. Consequendy, B ritain planned to supply goods from B ritish stocks at V ladivostok and Khabarovsk. A n interdepartm ental com m ittee had already been established in London to coordinate B ritish efforts and a high com m issioner w as being appointed at V ladivostok to supervise all local arrangem ents and to serve as the British representative on a proposed inter-A llied com m ission. T h e British governm ent intended to enlist private B ritish trading firm s in the F ar E ast both to serve as its agents and to operate for a fixed com m ission— not for profit. G oods were to be sold at cost to avoid profit-m aking and to allay the population’s suspicions o f A llie d m otives. Private firm s could nevertheless lend their know ledge o f local conditions to prom ote a m ore efficient reha­ bilitation. H ie H on g K ong and Shanghai B an kin g C orporation w as also consider­ in g the possibility o f opening a branch bank at V ladivostok to im prove m onetary conditions, w hich the B ritish governm ent encouraged. T o avoid controversy between the governm ents over the term s by w hich goods were supplied to the population, B ritain believed the A llied governm ents should agree to pursue the sam e policy. B ritain suggested these questions be re­ ferred to the proposed in ter-A llied com m ission, w hich w ould determ ine the A llie s’ com m ercial policy on the basis o f local conditions.4 Britain’s economic and political objectives in Siberia during the summer o f 1918 were designed to further its overall spheres o f influence policy toward the Russian E m pire.5 Its nonprofit com m ercial program sought to place B ritish commerce in good standing w ith the large Siberian cooperative soci­ eties and thus establish an advantageous position for British commerce in Siberia’s postwar trade. B asil M iles called Vance M cC orm ick’s attention to the likelihood that the N arodny B an k would become an agent for prom oting postw ar trade between Russia and Britain through its contact w ith British cooperative societies.6 B ritain also took steps to enhance its political influence in Siberia. In Ju ly it named S ir C harles E lio t as its high com m issioner to supervise the govern­ m ent-run Siberian Supply Com pany, and G en . A lfred W . F. Knox was made head o f Britain’s m ilitary m ission in Siberia to counsel p ro -A lly Russians. A fter the Czech’s rapid m ilitary successes o f m id-Septem ber, Britain was

Ju ly -S ep tem b er 19 18

*** 87

even m ore encouraged by the prospects that the lim ited intervention could be transform ed into a full-fledged effort to restore the eastern front. B ritish m ilitary and diplom atic officials concluded that the various political factions in Siberia had to be united under a provisional m ilitary governm ent. A candidate had already been groom ed by the B ritish to assum e absolute political control in Siberia, the conservative R ussian adm iral A leksan dr K olchak. B o th E lio t and K nox enjoyed frien d ly personal relations w ith K olchak, and B ritish officials had been in close contact w ith him for w ell over a year. K nox had strong ties w ith czarist elem ents and by the fall o f 1918 he had begun to rebuild the Russian A rm y in Siberia from rem nants o f the reactionary officer corps. Strong circum stantial evidence suggests K nox and his staff were instrum ental in organizing the coup o f N ovem ber 1918, w hich overthrew the C oalition D irectorate governm ent and installed K olchak as “ Suprem e Lead er” o f the O m sk Siberian governm ent.7 K olchak’s reactionary governm ent w as a vehicle through w hich B ritain could advance its spheres o f influence policy in Eurasia. For instance, B rit­ ain never recognized K olchak’s O m sk governm ent as anything but a “ Sib e­ rian governm ent,” not an “A ll-R u ssian governm ent.” Likew ise, in their efforts to build lasting econom ic ties w ith Siberia, B ritish businessm en preferred to w ork through the C ou n cil o f M in isters, w ho favored a constitutional Siberian Federation.8 For these reasons and cognizant o f Britain’s desire to feel out A m erica’s intentions, the W ilson adm inistration responded to Britain’s com m ercial proposal w ith reserve. O n Ju ly 25 State D epartm ent counselor Frank Polk spoke w ith B ritish chargé Barclay concerning the U nited States’s position on econom ic assistance. Polk endeavored to em phasize that com m ercial ac­ tivity played a subordinate role in A m erica’s prospective plan, an assertion that was quite m isleading. A fte r expressing the U nited States’s appreciation o f B ritain ’s desire to cooperate in a program o f assistance, he stated: “It is apparent, however, that the B ritish G overnm ent has in m ind a purely eco­ nom ic m ission rather than a m ission w hich w ould have fo r its m ain object the study o f the situation and w ould endeavor to ascertain in w hat w ay the Russian could be assisted to help him self. In other w ords, the R ed C ross and educational side o f the m ission w ould be very m uch m ore to the fore than the econom ic side.” 9 Polk then evaded the question o f w hat A m erica did intend to do w hen he claim ed no definite policy w ould be pursued until the exploratory m is­ sion had reported on conditions in Siberia. T herefore, the U .S . governm ent w as not in a position to discuss questions that involved “the class o f goods w hich ought to be sent, the advisability o f establishing branch banks, or the term s on w hich goods are to be sold to the Russian G overnm ent.”10 Polk

88 81; U .S . opinion of, 4 -5 ,

1 7 2 ,1 7 4 -7 8 ,1 8 3 -8 4 ,1 8 6 ,1 8 9 -9 1 ;

3 8 -3 9 ,4 1 , 2 0 9 0 .1 5 ,219m 96; victory of, 6,

communist victory in, 201; economy of,

196; vs. bolshevism, 162; W ilson’s

1 2 -1 3 ,1 1 8 -1 9 ,1 6 4 ; and funding for In ter-

handling of, 5 7 ,13 5 -3 6 Bolshevism, 2, 20511.34; vs. Bolsheviks, 162; W ilso n s plan to undermine, 134 -35 Bond issue, on Chinese Eastern Railway,

176-78

Allied Railway Com m ittee, 14 3 ,14 7 , and Japan, 17 8 ,18 1; resistance to Technical Board’s power, 17 3 ,18 0 ,18 2 ,18 4 -8 6 . See also M anchuria C h in a Banking Consortium , 163; and

Boynton, Charles H ., 14 -15

Chinese Eastern Railway, 7 ,1 6 6 -7 1 ,

Brest-Litovsk Treaty (1918), 4 3,5 6 , 6 7 ,10 7

178 -8 0

234 «'x*

In dex

Chinese Eastern Railway, 6 - 7 ,1 3 0 ,1 6 3 -9 4 ; in agreements at Far Elast conference, 181-82;

Cooperative societies, 5 4 ,7 1 - 7 2 ,8 7 , assistance for, 7 7 ^ -7 8 ,137 ,15 2 -5 4 ,16 0 -6 1;

barter agreements between rail lines,

Com m erce Departm ent’s negotiations

19 0 -9 1; currencies used by, 155,22on. 6;

with, 8 5 ,9 2 - 9 4 ,1 0 0 ,1 0 2 - 3 ; credit for,

finances of, 17 8 -8 0 ,18 6 -8 9 ; improvements

12 4 -2 5 ,14 3 ; and Germany, 5 5 -5 6 ,7 2 ; in

to, 120 ,151; under Inter-Allied Railway

reconstruction strategy, 10 3 -4 . See also

Committee, 132-33; Japan’s struggle for control of, 8 6 ,10 0 ,12 1,12 9 ,13 4 ,14 6 ;

Peasant cooperative societies Corruption, 151; on Chinese Eastern

profitability of, 17 4 ,17 6 ,18 6 ; Russian rights

Railway, 132; in Khorvat government, 186;

over, 189 -9 0 ; struggle for control of,

in Kolchak government, 154,157, patron­

181-86; and U .S ., 12 0 ,134 ,16 2

age workers on Chinese Eastern Railway,

Chinese Em pire. See C h in a C ivil liberties, 18 ,14 8 C ivil society, 3 - 4 ; relation to state, 24, 205m 34; W ilson’s concept of, 4 ,1 6 . See also Self-governm ent Civilians, Russian, 9 0 ,9 5 ,14 8 ; acceptance o f alternative currencies, 12 3-2 4 ;

175,18 6 Cossacks, 150; Japanese support for, 120, 12 9 ,13 0 ; U .S . defending railroads against, 1 3 6 , 147 Council o f National Defense ( C N D ), 26 ,32 Cravath, Paul D ., 117 Credit: for cooperative societies, 137 ,152 -53;

distribution o f supplies to, 9 7 -9 9 ,

given to Russia, 4 9 - 5 0 ,5 8 -5 9 ,1 1 8 -1 9 ;

1 0 1 - 2 , 115

gold, 152; need to stabilize currency for,

C o al, 3 3 -3 4 ,16 5

151,154 ; supervising use of, 27,158; vs.

Coalition Directorate government,

alternative currencies, 124-25

overthrow of,

88

Credit societies, 5 1,12 6

Coalition revolutionary government, 19 0 -9 1

Crosby, Arthur, 114

Colby, Secretary o f State, 173

Currencies, 7 0 ,154 ; accepted by Chinese

C o ld W ar, 2 0 0 -2 0 1

Eastern Railway, 1 6 4 - 6 5 ,1 7 6 ,1 8 6 ,22on. 6;

Com m erce Department, U .S ., 8 5 ,9 1-9 4 ,

convertibility of, 19 7 -9 9 ,2 2 3 0 .4 ; Germ an

10 0 -10 4 Com m ercial assistance, 7 3 ,1 3 7 ,1 5 8 ,2i8n. 66;

speculation in rubles, 4 3 -4 4 ; hoarding, 119 ,12 2 ; and Kolchak government, 151,

and barter, 6 2-6 3; ^ d Britain, 87-88;

156; monetary plan o f Inter-Allied

control of, 9 3-9 5 ,15 2 ; interference with

R ailw ay Com m ittee, 151-55; plans for

U .S . plans, 8 7 ,8 9 ,12 0 -2 1; motives for,

alternative, 123-25; rate o f exchange, 53,

6 9 -70 ; obstacles to, 5 4 -5 5 ,10 4 -19 ; to

12 2-23; rivalry over, 10 4 -1 8 ,1 2 1 -2 2 ;

Siberia, 15,19 ; through cooperative

stabilizing, 10 3 ,151; vs. barter, 6 2 -6 3

societies, 3 - 4 ,1 5 2 -5 4 . See also Econom ic

Curzon, Earl, 16 9 ,17 1

assistance

Cutler, Stanley, 10 0 -10 2

Com m odities, 4 8 ,7 0 ,1 0 9 ,1 1 8 ; and Germ an purchasing agents, 6 5-6 6 ; keeping away from Germ ans, 5 3 ,5 5 -5 7 Com m onwealth o f Independent Republics, payments union for, 19 7-9 8

Czarist government, 2 6 ,2 8 ; and Siberian migration, 19 -2 0 ; and U .S ., 1 3 -14 C ze ch A r m y Corps. See C zech o -Slo vak Corps C zech National Council, 72

Congress, U .S .: and appropriations for

Czech o -Slo vak Corps, 9 9 ,10 5 ,14 8 ; Allied

Russia, 7 ,1 3 3 - 3 4 ,1 4 3 -4 4 ,1 5 8 - 5 9 ; and

uses of, 7 0 ,1 5 8 - 5 9 ,2i2n.33; funding for,

W ilson’s declining popularity, 128-29 ;

117 ,16 9 ; priority o f support for, 9 5-9 6 ,

and W ilson’s Russian policies, 13 5 -3 6 ,14 7

10 0 -10 1; in Russian civil war, 6 5 ,119 -2 0 ;

Constituent Assembly, 54

uprising against Bolsheviks by, 57 ,6 6 ,

Consular network, U .S . in Russia, 4 8 ,5 3 -5 4

7 2-84 ; and U .S . military intervention, 5,

Cooperative movement, in Russia, 2 2 -2 4

6 1-6 2 ; U .S . relations with, 5 4 ,8 9 -9 0 ,14 5 ;

In dex

235

Czech o -Slo vak Corps (cont.) used as reason for military intervention, 7 2 -8 4 ,8 6 ,1 1 9 ; withdrawal of, 158 -59 ,16 5

W ilson’s goals for, 85. See also InterAllied economic commission Econom ic reforms, 199; demanded o f Kolchak government, 156-58

Daniels, Josephus, 76

Econom y: in Chinese Em pire, 13; reforms

Darcy, Piere, 48,58

demanded o f Kolchak government, 156;

Darien, preferential rail rates to, 188

Russia’s exploited by G erm any and

Darling, W illiam C ., 3 0 ,3 5 -3 6 Davis, Joh n W ., 16 9 ,17 2 Davis, Norm an H ., 173 Dem ocracy: encouraged b y cooperatives, 2 3-24 ; proposal for recognition o f Kolchak government, 144; W ilso n s hope for Russia, 18 -19 “Democracy and Effiden c/* (W ilson), 18 -19

France, 14 Education: combined in economic mission, 6 9 ,8 0 ,8 8 ; through cooperatives, 2 3 -2 4 Eliot, Sir Charles, 8 7 -8 9 ,13 1 ,15 9 ,1 6 9 Em erson, George, 8 4 ,14 9 -5 0 ,15 9 ; training Russian railroad workers, 3 6 ,3 8 -4 0 Entente powers, and military intervention in Siberia, 4 5-4 7

Depression, causes of, 3, 200

European Payments, Union of, 197

Developmental agendes, multilateral, 7

European Russia, 121; food for, 37—3 8 ,6 6 ,7 2 ;

Diplomatic mission, R oot’s, 26, 28 Disarm ament agreements, at Far East conference, 181 Distribution system, in Russia, 9 6 -9 7 ,115 ,119

land tenure in, 20; new rubles in, 10 7 -8 ; transportation in, 3 5 -3 6 ,5 3 Exports, 118 ,17 6 ; currendes for, 10 9 ,12 4 -2 5 ; regulation of, 5 5 - 5 6 ,9 8 -9 9 ,1 0 1,1 5 3 ; from

Dollar Diplomacy, 196

Russia, 52; to Russia, 2030. 2. See also

Dulles, Joh n Foster, 7 0 ,1 1 7 -1 8 ,1 2 4

Trade

Eastern front, reopening, 3 8 ,4 4 ,8 2 ; Allies pressing for, 86,88; threatening Germ any with, 74-75;

Fabian, Constantine, 4 9 -50 Far Eastern republic, 18 9 -9 1; railroads in, 1 9 2 - 9 3 ,1 9 6 - 9 7

W ilso n s opposition to, 5 ,7 6 - 7 7 , 80

Finland, 6 8 ,7 0

Econom ic assistance, 51-54 ; alternatives to

Foglesong, David, i o - n

International M onetary Fund’s plans, 19 7 -9 9 ; British vs. U .S . in, 8 8 ,159 -6 0 ;

Food, 37—38; and Germ ans, 53, 65; Russian supply of, 4 9 ,9 0 ; shortages of, 4 9 ,118 ,13 5 ;

cost of, 9 5 -9 6 ,9 8 -9 9 ; Czech o -Slo vak

Siberia’s supplies of, 5 3 ,6 5 -6 6 ,1 1 8 - 1 9 ; to

Corps as opening for, 7 4 -7 8 ,12 0 ; failure

undermine bolshevism, 135

o f relief efforts, 125-27, for Kolchak

Food Bill for Europe, 133 -3 4

government, 14 5 ,15 6 -5 8 ,16 0 ; mechanics

Foreign assistance programs, U .S ., 2 ,6 ;

of, 4 9 - 5 1 ,5 8 - 5 9 ,7 0 ,9 7 - 9 8 ,1 0 0 - 1 0 2 ; and

Congress’s discomfort with, 136; funding

military intervention, 6 1 -6 5 ,7 3 -7 6 ,8 2 - 8 3 ;

for, 7 ,12 8 -2 9 ; justification f ° r>3“”4>

motives for, 2, 6 3 ,6 8 - 6 9 ,147*» objectives

19 9 -2 0 0

of, 5 2 ,8 2 -8 3 ,9 6 -9 7 , obstacles to, 120; in

Foreign debt, Russia’s, 14 ,156

Poole’s proposal, 161-6 2; for Siberia, 53-54,

Foreign policy, U .S . See under U .S .

71; to undermine bolshevism, 4 -5 ,1 3 4 -3 5 ;

Four-Power Treaty, 181

U .S . polides for, 6 5 ,8 0 ,8 9 -9 2 . See also

France, 3 5 ,8 9 ,14 4 ; and Chinese Eastern

Com m ercial assistance Econom ic Com m ission: troops to protect, 77, U .S . plans for, 88-89 Econom ic commission: Com m erce vs.

Railway, 16 5 ,16 8 -7 0 ; and C zech o -Slo vak Corps, 7 3,8 6 ; economic activities of, 1 - 2 , 1 4 ,5 9 ,1 1 3 - 1 4 ,1 1 7 - 1 8 ; in Four-Power Treaty, 181; and military intervention in

State Department on, 9 1 -9 5 ,1 0 0 -10 4 ;

Siberia, 4 4 -4 6 ,6 6 ; objectives in Siberia,

mistrust o f motives of, 8 3 ,115 -16 ;

195 Frands, D avid R ., 2 6 -2 7 ,2 9 ,3 7 ,5 7 , on

236

In dex

economic plans, 4 2 - 4 3 ,4 8 ,1 1 3 ; on Russia’s

H siao-lien, Sung, 178

railroads, 3 0 ,3 2 ,3 5 - 3 6 ,4 0

Hughes, Charles Evans, 15 ,17 4 ,18 1,18 5

Freight cars, 2 7 ,3 1 - 3 2 ,3 5 ,1 4 9 ,1 9 1

Hughes, Evan, 18 0 -8 1,18 4 -8 5 Huntington, W illiam C ., 2 3-24 , 6 5 ,10 7

Geddes, Sir Auchland, 16 9 ,17 3

Hurley, 9 0 -9 1

Germany, 7 1 -7 2 ,8 3 ; ambitions in Russia, 4 1 - 4 5 ,6 6 -6 8 ,8 4 ; and Bolsheviks, 4 1,5 6 ,

Imperialists/Great Powers, 7; Japan as

7 0 ,7 2 ; buying rubles, 4 3 ,10 5 -8 , n o , 123; in

autocratic, 46; rivalry among, 12 ,15 9 -6 0 ,

currency issues, 124-25; domination o f

164 ,174 , 203n. 1; rivalry over Russia, 1 - 3 ,5 ,

Ukraine, 5 1,53; economic influence in

2 9 ,10 4 -18 ; and W ilson’s vision, 4 ,2 0 0 .

Russia, 1 4 ,4 4 ,4 9 - 5 0 ,6 1 - 6 2 ,6 5 - 6 6 ,7 8 - 7 9 ;

See also Allies; specific countries

economic warfare against, 4 8 ,5 2 -5 3,

Industrial mission, to Russia, 71

55“ 56> 5 9 -6 0 ,6 6 ,6 8 ; M itteleuropa

Industry, developing Russia’s, 14 -15

economic system of, 38; purchasing

Inter-Allied banking organization, 115,152

agents of, 4 3 ,5 1 ,5 6 ,5 9 ,6 5 - 6 6 ,8 4 ; spring

Inter-Allied board, to oversee economic

offensive of, 5 6 ,7 1 -7 2 ; U .S . declaration o f w ar against, 16, 25-26 ; U .S . fear o f influence of, 1 - 2 ,4 1 - 4 2 , 5 1 - 5 2 , 6 3 - 6 4 , 7 1 ,

intervention, 87,8 9 Inter-Allied Council on W ar Purchases and Finance, 114

82-83; and U .S . fears o f Japanese

Inter-Allied currency plans, 1 1 4 -17 ,12 5

intervention, 4 5-4 7, 6 1 -6 2 ,6 4 ,6 9 . See also

Inter-Allied economic commission, 10 9 ,14 6

Imperialists/Great Powers G ibbs, George, 3 0 ,3 4 ,3 5 Global economy: Russia’s importance to, 16 1,17 6 ; U .S . in, 3, 2 0 0 ,203m i G o o d, Jam es W ., 133 G o to , Foreign Minister, 8 0 ,10 3 ,1 2 1 Governm ent. See State; specific countries Grain, 3 7 ^ 3 8 ,6 5 -6 6 ,118

Inter-Allied Purchasing Com m ittee, 191 Inter-Allied purchasing company, 48. See also Tovaro-O bm ien (purchasing company) Inter-Allied Railway Agreem ent, 1 5 9 ,2o6n. 17, end of, 16 4 ,189 Inter-Allied Railway Com m ittee, 128-29 , x3I - 33> l 84 » l 89 i and Chinese Eastern

Gram sci, Antonio, 205m 34

Railway, 16 6 -6 8 ,18 5; and currencies in

Graves, G en. W illiam S., 12 0 -2 1

Chinese Eastern Railway zone, 16 5,17 6 ;

Greene, Sir W illiam C ., 130 -3 1

funding for, 13 7 - 3 8 ,1 4 1 - 4 * , 146-47» x58*»

Greiner, John G ., 3 0 ,3 5

monetary plan of, 151-55. See also

Grew, Joseph E ., 74

Technical Board Inter-Allied trading company, for

Hanson, G . C ., 19 2-9 3 H arding administration, 6 ,1 8 0 -8 1 Harrim an, E . H ., 6 - 7 Harris, Ernest, 14 1,15 4 H eid, August, 9 3 ,10 1; on economic

distribution o f supplies, 115 International Banking Corporation ( IB C ),

hi

International conservancy, for Chinese Eastern Railway, 183-84

conditions, 11 8 -1 9 ,1 2 2 -2 3 , x53—54; in

International economy. See Global economy

Russian Bureau o f W ar Trade Board,

International Harvester, 4 9 - 5 1 ,5 4 ,6 5 ,12 6 ,

9 8 ,10 0

196, 21m . 9

H ogan, M ichael, 223m 4

International law, W ilson’s vision for, 4

H o n g K ong and Shanghai Banking

International M onetary Fund ( IM F ), 7,

Corporation, T h e, 8 7 ,12 2 ,17 9

alternative to plans of, 19 7 -9 9

Hoover, Herbert, 15 ,8 3 ,14 6

International relations, W ilson’s vision for, 4

H orn, Henry, 37

International trusteeship, proposed for

House, Edw ard, 4 5 -4 6 ,9 4

Chinese Eastern Railway, 16 6 -6 8 ,17 3

In dex

237

Interstate Commerce Commission (IC C ), 189

Kennan, G eorge F., 9

Investments: funding for Chinese Eastern

Kerensky, Aleksandr, 3 4 ,1 4 4 -4 5

Railway from, 17 9 -8 0 ; need for foreign oudets, 12 -13; in Russia, 2 ,3 2 ; third* world limitations on, 2 0 0 -2 0 1

Kerensky government. See Provisional Governm ent Khorvat, G en . D m itri, 8 1 ,1 3 0 ,16 6 ,1 7 4

Ishii, Viscount Kikujir, 7 6 ,1 0 3 ,1 1 5 - 1 6

Khorvat government, corruption in, 186

Italy, 4 4 -4 5

Killen, Linda, 10 Knight, A d m . Austin M ., 7 4 ,9 3 ,10 5 , n o - n

Jack, C o l Archibald, 131

Knox, G en . Alfred W . E , 8 7 -8 8 ,131

Jam eson, J. Paul, 179

Knox, Philander, 6^-7

Japan, 3 9 ,8 9 ,1 1 8 - 19 , x59i hi agreements at

Knox Neutralization Plan o f 1 9 0 9 ,6 - 7 ,1 2 1

Far E a st conference, 181-82; ambitions in

Koenig, G eorge W ., 50

Siberia, 4 5 -4 7 ,5 2 - 5 3 ,1 0 3 ,1 3 7 ,1 9 5 ; and

Kolchak, Aleksandr, 6 ,8 8 ,1 3 0

Britain, 1 7 0 - 7 1 ,1 7 4 ,1 8 0 -8 1 ; causing

Kolchak government, 8 1 ,1 2 2 ,1 2 9 -3 1 ,1 6 6 ,

Siberia’s worsening economic conditions,

2i7n. 50; British support for, 159 -6 0 ;

119 -2 0 ,15 4 ; and Chinese Eastern

defeated by Bolsheviks, 155; evaluation by

Railway, 16 3 -6 9 ,1 7 6 -7 8 ,1 8 3 -8 4 ,1 8 8 ,

M orris, 147-48; and monetary plan o f

19 0 -9 1; influence on Ch ina, 13 2 ,17 0 -7 1,

Inter-Allied Railway Com m ittee, 151-55;

17 8 ,18 3-8 4 ; and Inter-Allied Railway

Technical Board demanding reforms of,

Com m ittee, 1 3 2 -3 3 ,1 5 0 -5 1 ,1 7 3 ; and

x55—56; and U .S ., 1 4 0 -4 2 ,1 4 4 - 4 6 ,1 6 0 -6 1 ;

Kolchak government, 13 0 -3 1 ,1 6 0 - 6 1 ;

weaknesses of, 12 0 ,1 5 1 ,15 4 ,1 5 7 -6 0

manipulating trade, 188-89; and military

Koo, V. K . W ellington, 171

intervention in Siberia, 4 4 -4 6 ,5 4 ,6 1 -6 2 ,

Kornilov, G en . L . G ., 3 5 ,5 4 , 207m 40

7 5 -7 6 ,7 8 -8 0 ,8 5 -8 6 ,18 5 -8 6 , 2i5n. 31;

Krivoshein, Aleksandr, 20

military intervention in Siberia by, 45-4 6, 6 1 ,6 4 ,6 6 ,6 9 ,7 8 ,1 8 9 ; plans for Far East,

Lake Baikal region, 130 -3 1

130 -3 1; relations with Russians, 7 4 ,116 ; in

Lam ont, Thom as, 16 3 ,1 6 6 ,16 8 -7 1

rivalry over currencies, 112 ,1 1 8 ,1 2 1 -2 2 ;

Lan d tenure, in Siberia vs. European

role with C zech o -Slo vak Corps, 74-75; support for Cossacks, 12 9 -3 0 ,15 0 ; and Trans-Siberian Railroad, 12 0 - 2 1 ,1 2 9 ,1 3 4 ,

Russia, 20 Lansing, Robert, 2 6 ,2 8 ,8 9 ,1 1 5 - 1 6 ,1 3 3 ; on commercial assistance, 4 8 ,9 4 ; and

1 3 6 ,1 4 0 -4 1 ; and U .S ., 6, 83; U .S . fear o f

C zech o-Slovak Corps, 7 4 -7 5 ,119 -2 0 ; and

influence of, 1 - 2 , 4 2 , 4 4 , 7 2 ; vs. U .S . on

economic warfare against Germany,

railroads, 12 1,14 7. See also Imperialists/

55-57; on Germany, 4 2 ,7 2 ; on military

G reat Powers

intervention in Siberia, 4 4 -4 5 ,4 7 ,7 5 - 7 6 ;

Jenkins, Douglas, 84 Johnson, Benjamin O ., 15 0 ,17 5 -7 6 ; and C h ita railroad, 1 9 1 -9 2 ,19 6 -9 7 ; and

on recognition o f Kolchak government, 14 5,16 0 ; on Siberian policies, 6 4 ,9 0 - 9 2 Lansing-Ishii Agreem ent, 171

coalition revolutionary government,

Lay, Julius, 5 3 ,8 2 -8 3

19 0 -9 1

League o f Nations, W ilson’s belief in, 16

Johnson, H iram , 136

Lee, Franck C ., 59

Judson, G en . W illiam V., 48

Leffingwell, Russell C ., 108

Kadet party (Constitutional Democrats),

Liberal capitalism, 135

Levin, N . Gordon, 4 ,1 0 ,1 3 5 30, 67^68

Liberal democracy: after M arch

Kautsky, Karl, 203m 1

Revolution, 1 3 ,1 6 -18 ; as reason to keep

Kayden, Eugene, 2 3 -2 4 ,9 7 -9 8

Japan out o f Siberia, 4 6 -4 7 ; W ilso n ’s

Kazakevitch, D . R , 151,175

protectiveness of, 29

238

In dex

Liberal worldview, influence of, 9 6 -9 7

Mikhailov, I. A ., 154,156

Liberal-internationalist system, 4 ,1 2 1

M iles, Basil, 7 4 ,16 0 ; and cooperative

Lindley, Francis O ., 113

societies, 4 8 -4 9 ,5 1 - 5 4 ,7 1 ,8 7 , on

Lin k , A rth ur S., 10

Germany, 4 2 ,5 6 ,7 1 ; on Japan, 4 7 ,12 0 ; on

Liu , C . S., 178 Liverovskii, A . V., 3 5 - 3 6 , 207m 40 Locke, John, Natural L a w of, 17 Locom otives, 55; poor condition o f Far

Siberian policies, 7 1 ,8 9 - 9 0 ,1 4 0 - 4 1 M ilitary: demanding priority use o f railroads, 14 9 -5 1,15 6 ; Russian, 3 4 ,3 7 -3 8 M ilitary assistance, 48; to anti-Com m unist

Eastern republic’s, 19 1,19 3 ; replacement

governments, 201; for Kolchak

o f Russian with Am erican, 33-35;

government, 158; offered to Provisional

Russian need for, 2 7 ,3 1 -3 2

Governm ent, 2 5 -2 7 ,14 5

Lomonosov, George, 3 2 ,4 9 -5 0 Lo n g , Breckinridge, 44; on military

M ilitary interference, on railroads, 14 0 -4 1, 17 1-7 2

intervention in Siberia, 4 5,4 7 , on

M ilitary mission, U .S ., 54

monetary crisis, 10 5 ,10 7 -8 ; in Siberian

M ilitary supplies, 48,158; evacuated from

policy debate, 8 9 -9 1

Petrograd, 56-57, shipping, 9 9 ,13 1 M ilitary Transportation Board, 131-32 ,

M cA d d o , W illiam G ibbs, 27

14 9 -51

M cC o rm ick , Cyrus, 5 0 ,5 2 -5 3 , 62

Miliukov, Pavel, 2 6 ,6 8 ,8 4

M cC o rm ick , Vance C ., 87,125; on

Miller, Henry, 3 0 ,3 5 -3 6

commercial assistance, 7 0 ,9 0 - 9 1 ,9 5 ,1 0 1 , 1 1 5 ,12 0 -2 1 ,15 8 -5 9 ; on recognition o f Kolchak government, 145-46 ; and Russian Bureau, 13 3 ,13 7 ,14 4 M acD erm id, Reuben R ., 10 2 -3

M inistry o f Comm unication. See M inistry o f W ays o f Com m unication M inistry o f W ays o f Comm unication, Russian, 3 0 ,3 2 - 3 4 ,3 6 - 3 7 ,1 5 0 - 5 1 M irbach, Baron W ilh elm von, 4 2 ,6 6 -6 8

M cFadden, David, 10

M itteleuropa economic system, 3 8 ,4 2

M a cG o w an , D avid B ., 189

Monarchists, Russian, 6 6 -6 7

M cK instry, A . E ., 50

M orality: o f military intervention in

M acM urray, Joh n V. A ., 173

Siberia, 4 6 -4 7 ,7 2 -7 3 ,7 5 ; and W ilso n -

Maier, Charles, 199, 223m 4

ianism, 16 ,18 ; o f Wilsonianism , 201

M anchuria, 6 ,16 4 ; British vs. Japanese interests in, 17 0 -7 1,17 4 ; Japanese control of, 1 4 6 ,1 6 8 ,17 7 ,18 9

M organ, J. R , 17 9 -8 0 M orris, Roland, 8 1 ,1 0 0 ,1 0 1 ,1 2 1 - 2 2 ; and Inter-Allied Railw ay Com m ittee, 131-33,

M arch , G en. Peyton C ., 76

2o6n. 17, on Japan and Trans-Siberian

M arch Revolution, 149; U .S . response to,

Railroad, 1 2 0 ,1 2 9 - 3 0 ,1 4 0 -4 1 ; and

1 3 - 17 ,2 5 - 2 6 , 204m 9 M arket: C h in a as, 12 -13 ; Russia as, 14 -15, 16 1,16 3 -6 4 , 203m 2 M arket economy, helping to develop, 197-98

Kolchak government, 1 3 0 -3 1 ,1 4 4 -4 5 , 14 7 -4 8 ,15 5 -5 9 , 2i7n. 50 M o sco w Com m ittee, 55 M o sco w District Supply Com m ittee, 4 9 -50

Marshall, Arth ur G ., 48

M oscow—Donets Basin lines, 33

Marshall, Th om as R ., 136

M o sco w -O m sk line, 37 -38

M arshall Plan, 7 ,1 5 2 ,1 9 9 ,2 2 3 1 1.3 ; successes

M o sco w -Petrograd line, 33

of, 19 7 ,19 9 M asaryk, Thom as, 72

Multinational corporations, and sovereignty, 198

M atsuda Bank, 112

M u m m , Baron Philip, 68

M ayer, C arl, r89

Municipalities, 5 4 ,12 4 -2 5 ,15 7

Metals/ores: G erm any’s desire for, 5 5 ,57 ,6 5;

M urm ansk, 113

in trade, 4 8 ,53

In dex

239

Narodny (Peoples) Bank, 2 2 -2 3 ,5 0 -5 1 ; and

Siberia, 2 2 -2 4 ; U .S . support for, 3 - 4 ,4 8 ,

cooperative societies, 8 7 ,126 ; and new

51. See also Cooperative societies

rubles, 10 7 -8 ; and sale o f furs, 9 3 ,10 2

Peasants, 17; bartering by, 6 5 -6 6 ,7 0 ;

National C ity Bank, 5 4 ,9 2 ; debt o f Russian Em bassy to, 13 9 -4 1,14 3 ; loans to Russia, 13,59 ; Russian branch of, 105, m - 1 2 ,

hoarding by, 122; in Siberia, 19 -2 2 Petrograd, evacuating military supplies from, 56 -57 Phillips, W illiam , 7 1 ,7 4 ,8 9

12 2-23 National liberation movements, 2 0 0 -2 0 1 National Security and Defense, 133 Nationalism: Chinese, 1 6 4 -6 6 ,17 9 ,18 2 ; Russian,

66 . See also Sovereignty

Policing operations: by Allied M ilitary Police Force, 69; by Allied troops, 75; by C zech o -Slo vak Corps, 7 0 ,7 9 Politics: among rival Russian factions, 81,

Nation-building, 2 0 1 ,205m 33

135; British influence in Siberia, 87-88;

Natural L a w (John Locke), 17

over foreign assistance programs,

Natural resources, 1 7 ,7 1 - 7 2 ; barter of, 6 2 -6 3;

19 9 -2 0 0 ; over U .S . policies on Russia,

in Chinese Em pire, 12 -13 ; G erm any’s access to Russia’s, 4 1 - 4 3 ,6 3 - 6 4 ,7 8 ,8 2 Noninterventionism, o f Railroad Com m ission, 34 -3 5 N orth Korea, 201 N orth Russia: British in, 114 ,118 ; U .S . troops in, 136 Novitskii, Vladimir, 10 8 ,118 ,15 6

1 3 5 - 3 6 ,1 4 3 - 4 4 ,15 8 -5 9 ,162 Polk, Frank, 3 1-3 2 ,8 8 -8 9 , !34, * 3 ^ on G erm any’s economic ambitions, 4 2 -4 3 , 52-53; and Inter-Allied Railway Com m ittee, 14 3 -4 4 Poole, D ew itt C ., 7 2 ,19 1, 2i9n. 96; on Tovaro-O bm ien, 58-59; on U .S . economic policies, 6 6 ,16 1 Preston, Charles L ., 9 2 -9 3 ,1 0 2

October Revolution. See Bolshevik Revolution Oils, 4 8,55 O m sk, line to M oscow, 37 O m sk government. See Kolchak government O pen D oor policies, 2 ,4 2 - 4 4 ,4 7 , 200; in

Prinltipo Conference, 135 Prisoners, 119; Czecho-Slovaks as, 73; Germ an, 6 4 ,7 9 Profiteering, 119 ,12 6 ; U .S . commitment to avoid, 9 9 , 10 1-2 Provisional Governm ent o f Russia, 2 3,38 , 45; after M arch Revolution, 25; o f

C hina, 174; Knox Neutralization Plan o f

Chaikovskii, 136; collapse of, 1,12 5;

1909 in, 121; railroads in, 6 ,1 6 3 ,18 0 ;

currencies for, 10 7 ,113 ,15 1; Kolchak

reasons for U .S . support of, 12 ,2 5; U .S .

government as, 158-59; and railroads,

commitment to, 1 6 ,13 4 ,16 2 O ’Reilly, W ., 159 -6 0 Ostroumov, Boris, 17 4 -7 5 ,18 6 -8 9 ,19 2

2 9 -3 0 ,3 6 -3 8 ; U .S . relations with, 2 ,54 ; U .S . support for, 2 5 -2 7 ,2 9 ; weakness of,

34,35

O w en, W illiam H ., 10 7 ,12 3 ,12 5 , 215m 24

Purchasing agents. See under Germ any

Paris Peace Conference. See Am erican

Railroad Com m ission, 2 6 -2 8 ,3 6 ; recom­

Com m ission in Paris Parker, M aj. F. B ., 149 Payments union, for Com m onwealth o f Independent Republics, 19 7-9 8 Peace Conference, after Arm istice, 125 Peace treaty, 7 ,12 8 ,15 8 ,16 1. See also BrestLitovsk Treaty Peasant cooperative societies, 5 ,51; agricultural machinery for, 4 8-50 ; in

240

In dex

mendations from, 3 1 ,3 2 - 3 4 ; role of, 2 8 -3 0 ,3 4 -3 5 Railroads, Russian, 136 ,155; Allied troops protecting, 75; condition of, 2 6 ,3 2 ,15 4 ; financing for, 138 -4 0 ; and Japanese, 86, 10 0 ,1 2 0 -2 1 ; military vs. commercial uses of, 156,174; U .S . aid to, 1 0 0 - 1 0 1 ,149 -50 . See also Chinese Eastern Railway; TransSiberian Railroad; Workers, railroad

Railw ay Advisory Com m ittee, o f Council o f National Defense, 26

with, 7 3 - 7 4 ,7 8 -7 9 ,9 9 ; and Railroad Com m ission, 2 6 -3 1 ,3 4 ,15 9 , 2o6n. 17,

Railw ay Service Corps, Russian, 3 9 -4 0 ,5 3 , 6 9 ,1 2 0 ,1 3 2 - 3 3 ,1 4 9

rivalry over currencies in, 10 5-18; studies o f U .S . policies toward, 9 -10 ; U .S . aid to,

Railw ay unions, 5 1-5 2 ,5 4

6 2 - 6 3 ,133“ 34> H7> U .S . motives in, 3, 25,

Railway Workers Union, link to credit

8 2 ,14 7 . See also Reconstruction, o f

societies, 51-52

Russia; Siberia

Ranney, G . A ., 50

Russian Arm y, 3 4 ,38 , 88, 205m 33

Reading, M arquis of, 77

Russian Bureau: A Case Study in Wilsonian

Reconstruction, o f Russia, 151; in current

Diplomacy, The (Killen), 10

times, 197^-98; methods of, 54 ,6 3,154 ; need for, 6 9 ,76 ; need for railroads in, 119 ,120 ,

Russian Bureau, o f W ar Trade Board, 52; funding for, 13 3 -3 4 ,1 4 3 -4 4 ; obstacles to,

140 ,142; obstacles to, 10 4 ,128 -2 9 , 161, I95>

10 4 ,1 18 -2 0 ,1 2 5 -2 7 , role of, 10 4 ,152 -54 ,

role o f Czechs in, 7 4 ,7 7 ,8 0 -8 1; role o f

161; W a r Trade Board's relationship with,

multinational corporations in, 198; U .S .

98,137

commitment to, 16 1,19 2; U .S . goals for,

Russian civil war, 6 8 ,136 ; Allies avoiding

4 -5 ,14 6 ; U .S . motives for, 3 , 4 8 ,9 6 - 9 7 ,147» W ilsons plan for, 8 0 -8 1,10 3 -4 ,13 5

involvement in, 75,81; C zech o-Slovak Corps in, 6 5 ,1 1 9 -2 0

Red Cross, 6 9 ,8 8 ,112

Russian Embassy, bankruptcy of, 13 9 -4 3 ,14 5

Redfield, W illiam C ., 6 2 ,9 1 - 9 2 ,9 4

Russian government, future: currency

Reforms: o f Chinese Eastern Railway,

decisions of, 1 0 7 ,114 -15 ,15 4 ; need to

Ï75—76; economic, 156 -58 ,19 9

resolve monetary problems, 10 9 -10 ,12 3 , 151; repaying railroad costs, 133 ,19 1

Reinsch, Paul, 6 2 - 6 4 ,74» 7 7 ~7^y 83 Repression, 162; by Kolchak government, 6,

Russian M aritim e Provinces, 18 1,18 5 -8 5 ,19 0 Russian Revolution, 12 ,15, 29. See also

154,157

Bolshevik Revolution; M arch Revolution

Robins, Raymond, 57

Russo-Am erican Com m ittee o f the Far

Root, Elihu, 2 6 -2 8 ,4 5 -4 6 ,5 1 -5 2 ,1 8 4 ,1 8 5 ;

East, 93

and Stevens, 28,186 Root mission, 32

Russo-Asiatic Bank, 111-12 ,118 ; and Chinese

Rosenberg, W illiam C ., 30

Eastern Railway, 16 6 -6 7 ,17 2 ,17 4 ,17 6

Rubles, 5 8 - 5 9 ,1 2 1 - 2 2 ,1 2 3 ,222n. 78; on Chinese Eastern Railway, 16 4 -6 5 ,17 6 ,

Sands, W illiam F., 42

22on. 6; collapse of, 4 9 - 5 0 ,6 2 ,7 0 , n o n .

Schurman, Jacob G ., 183-86

6; getting more into circulation, 151,154;

Second C h ina Consortium Banking Group, 7

and rival currencies, 1 0 5 - 1 8 ,1 0 9 - 1 1 ,1 7 6 Ruddock, A . B ., 178 -79

Self-government, 96, 2ion. 37, W ilson

Ruggles, Jam es A ., 57

trying to foster, 18 -19 , 8 0 -8 1,10 4 ,19 6 . See

Russia, 3 9 ,1 3 5 ,13 9 ,1 6 1 ,16 6 ; belief in

also C ivil society

democratic nature of, 17, 204m 9; and Chinese Eastern Railway, 1 6 6 - 6 7 ,1 74“

Semenov, G . M ., 54; Japanese support for,

75»

19 0 -9 1; current need for reconstruction

12 0 ,130 ; and railroads, 150 ,165 Sherman, Isaac J., 9 3 -9 4

of, 197^98; Em pire, 1 - 2 ,1 2 , 2 0 ,6 1 -6 2 ,12 5 ;

Shoes, 50 ,55, 9 0 ,9 7

Germ any's designs on, 3 8 ,4 1 -4 4 , 6 6 -6 8 ,

Siberia, 1,6 4 . See also Russia; in agreements

72; imperialists' rivalry over, 1 - 3 ,5 , 29,

at Far East conference, 181-82; Allies'

10 4 -18 ,15 9 -6 0 ; as market, 14 -15 ,16 1,

policies in, 6 4 -6 5 ,7 0 -7 1 , 87-88; as

1 6 3 - 6 4 ,203m 2; mistrust o f Allies’

democratic, 21; economic and social

motives, 7 0 ,8 7 ,115 ; parallels seen to U .S .

conditions in, 9 7 - 9 8 ,1 1 8 - 2 0 ,1 2 5 - 3 0 ,1 3 7 ,

history, 1 3 - 1 4 ,1 7 -1 8 ; popularity o f Czechs

154; economic assistance for, 53 -5 4 ,9 5 ,

In dex

241

Siberia (cont.)

I33“ 34» x39> 1 6 6 ,2o6n. 17, and recognition

1 0 1 -2 ,1 2 5 -2 7 ; economics of, 2 2 - 2 3 ,6 6 ,1 1 7 ,

o f Kolchak government, 14 1 - 4 2 ,16 0 ; and

and Germany, 5 3 ,6 3 -6 4 ; governments of,

Trans-Siberian Railroad, 14 0 -4 1; vs.

8 1,12 2 ; importance of, 2 -3 , 2 0 - 2 1 ,4 4 , 164; influence on Russia, 17, 2 0 -2 1; and Japanese, 52 -53, 6 9 ,1 2 0 - 2 1 ,1 2 1 ,1 8 5 ;

Com m erce, 9 1 -9 4 ,10 0 -1 0 4 Stevens, Joh n F., 3 1 - 3 2 , 6 9 , 9 5 , 2o8n. 48; background of, 27-28; and Chinese

m ilitary intervention in, 5 ,4 4 - 4 7 , 6 9 ,7 2 ,

Eastern Railway, 1 6 3 ,1 6 6 ,1 7 1 - 7 4 ,1 7 7 7 8 ,

16 2 ,18 5 -8 6 ; motives for U .S . policies, 5 2 -

18 0 ,18 2 ,18 5 -8 7 , and C h ita railroad, 192,

5 3 ,6 8 ,7 0 - 7 1 ; Open D oor policies in, 44,

296—97; funding for, 137 ,14 3; and Inter-

134; and railroads, 12 9 -3 0 ,13 6 ; settlement

Allied Railway Com m ittee, 13 8 ,18 9 -9 0 ;

of, 18 -2 2 ; struggle over U .S . policies on,

and Japanese, 8 6 ,1 2 0 ,1 2 1 ,16 4 ,1 8 2 ;

6 1 ,8 9 -9 2 ; vs. European Russia, 2 0 ,1 0 7 -8

priority o f work, 3 7 ,10 0 ; Railroad

Siberian Conference, 54

Commission, 2 5 ,2 8 ,3 0 ,3 4 -3 6 ; reconciling

Siberian Cream ery Association, 72 ,153

military vs. commercial transportation,

Siberian Intervention (W h ite), 10

149 -50 ; role of, 3 5 -3 7 ,5 3 ,12 8 -2 9 ,13 1-^ 2 ;

Sm ith, Charles H ., 1 3 9 ,1 4 6 -4 7 ,1 5 1 ,1 5 4 ,1 6 6 Social welfare, encouraged by cooperatives,

and Russian politics, 155,159 ,18 9 Stevens, R . R ., 48 Stolypin, Petr, 2 0 -2 1

2 3-2 4 Socioeconomics, in W ilso n s concept o f self-government, 4 South M anchurian Railway, 6 - 7 ,1 2 1 ,1 7 7 ,

Sukin, John, 4 5 ,12 2 ,14 8 ,1 5 4 ,1 5 6 ,1 5 9 Summers, M addin, 4 3 -4 4 ,5 4 -5 5 Supreme Allied W ar Council, 7 3 -7 5 ,7 8

185,188 Sovereignty: Ch ina’s, 13 ,17 2 ,18 4 ; and cur­ rency plans, 10 8 ,113 ; and financing o f

Taft, W illiam H , 27 T a ft administration, 6 - 7 ,1 9 6

Trans-Siberian Railroad, 139 ,14 2 ; and

Taylor, A lonzo E ., 52 ,5 4 -5 5

multinational corporations, 198; Russia’s,

Technical Board, o f Inter-Allied Railw ay

2 9 ,4 0 ,7 2 ,7 5 ,8 0 ,1 3 5 ,1 6 5 ,1 7 2 Soviet-Am erican Relations (Kennan), 9 Soviets, 3 ,19 3 ; building fear of, 19 9 -2 0 0 ; and Chinese Eastern Railway, 16 6 ,18 6 ; U .S . cooperation with, 197, 2ion. 51

Com m ittee, 1 3 1 -3 2 ,13 8 -3 9 ,15 5 ,17 2 ; and Chinese Eastern Railway, 16 7 -6 8 ,17 2 -7 5 , 18 0 ,18 2 ,18 4 -8 9 ; and Russian government,

155-56,159 Technical Com m ittee: Britain’s

Speculation, 4 2 - 4 4 ,1 0 3 ,1 1 9 ,1 2 6 ,1 5 1

dissatisfaction with, 146; reconciling

Spheres o f influence, 1; in China, 13,16 4 ,

military vs. commercial transportation,

174; collapse o f system, 7 -8 ; and currencies in Russia, 10 8 ,112 -15 ; in

14 9 -50 ; Ustrugov interfering with, 150 -51 Tenney, Charles, 167

M anchuria, 120; O pen D o o r vs., 2 -3 ; in

Tereschenko, M ikhail, 35-36 , 2o8n. 48

Russia, 2 9 ,4 2 ,4 4 ,1 9 5

T h ird world, and U .S . foreign strategy,

Stanert, W illiam R ., 137 State: relation to civil society, 24, 205m 34; role in economic assistance, 6 3 ,12 3 ,19 6 State Department, U .S ., 4 0 ,4 5 ,6 7 -6 8 ,7 4 ,

2 0 0 -2 0 1 T h o m e , L t. Landon K ., 123-25 T itus, F. M ., 3 9 -4 0 Tools, as economic assistance, 97^98

118 ,19 2 ; and Chinese Eastern Railway,

Tovaro-O bm ien (purchasing company), 48,

1 6 7 -6 9 ,1 7 2 -7 4 ,1 7 9 -8 0 ; countering

52, 54, 5r 58 Trade, 3 ,5 2 -5 3 ; among gold-standard

Germany, 5 2 -5 3 ,5 5 -5 6 ,6 5 -6 6 ,7 1 - 7 2 ; and currency issues, 1 0 9 ,1 1 4 - 1 5 ,11 7 , and

countries, 115; controlling through

economic assistance, 9 0 ,5 4 ,15 3 ,15 8 -5 9 ,

railroads, 12 1,16 3 ; currencies for, 58-59,

196; and Far East policies, 1 8 1-8 3 ,19 0 -9 1;

124-25; need to stabilize currency for, 151;

and Inter-Allied Railway Com m ittee,

interrepublic, 19 7-9 8 ; o f manufactured

242 »x«

In dex

goods for raw materials, 6 2 -6 3 ,6 9 - 7 0 ; in

Unterberger, Betty M ., 1 0 , 215m 31

monetary plan o f Inter-Allied Railway

Ural Mountains, metal deposits in, 65

Com m ittee, 152-55; O pen D o o r vs.

U .S ., 39 ,17 4 ; and Chinese Eastern Railway,

spheres o f influence, 2 -3 ; U .S . with Russia, 3 9 ,7 0 - 7 1 ,1 3 7 Trans-Baikal Railroad, 19 0 -9 1

16 3 -6 6 ,18 6 ; com munity o f interests with Russia, 3 2 ,4 0 ; cooperation with Soviets, 197, 2ion. 51; distancing itself from Allies,

Trans-Baikal region, 120

7 0 -7 1,1 1 5 ; economic assistance by, 2 2-2 4 ,

Transportation issues, 3 2 ,5 6 ; effects o f

5 9 ,6 2 -6 3 ,1 2 2 - 2 5 ; economic warfare

breakdown, 7 0 ,119 ; military vs.

against Germany, 5 2 -5 3 ,5 9 -6 0 ; Far East

commercial traffic on, 5 4 ,14 8 -5 1; rate

policies of, 14 6 ,17 4 ,18 0 -8 2 ; foreign policy

reductions, 186—87; f r ° m U .S . to Russia,

of, 7 ,9 - 1 2 ,1 9 6 , 204m 1; historical parallels

56; for war effort, 2 6 ,38

with Russia, 1 4 ,1 7 -1 9 ; international

Trans-Siberian Railroad, 7 1 ,10 0 ,1 0 4 ,

commitments of, 7, 200, 2 0 3 0 .1, 20 50 .19 ;

128-29 , H9» barter agreements between

and Japan, 10 0 ,12 1; and Kolchak

rail lines, 18 9 -9 1; and Britain’s interest in,

government, 14 0 -4 2 ,15 7 -6 0 ; and military

130 -3 1; C zech o -Slo vak Corps on, 5 ,6 6 ,

intervention in Siberia, 4 4 -4 5 ,7 6 ,1 6 2 ;

7 2-84 ; financing, 1 3 8 -4 4 ,14 6 ,19 1;

Russian policies of, 6 1 -6 2 ,8 1-8 3 , US- 34»

importance of, 2 0 ,1 1 9 ,12 7 ,1 3 4 ;

16 3,19 8 ; and Trans-Siberian Railroad,

improvements in, 3 5 ,1 5 0 - 5 1 ,2o8n. 48;

1 4 0 -4 2 ,14 6 ; trying to demonstrate

inefficiency of, 3 0 -3 1 ,3 3 ,14 9 -5 0 ; and

goodwill, 2 6 ,3 9 ,7 0 ,1 9 0 - 9 2

Japanese, 8 6 ,12 0 —2 1 ,1 3 4 ,1 4 0 -4 1 ; motives

Ussuri Railway, 165,185

for assistance to, 2 5 -2 7 ,5 3 ,6 9 ; in Russian

Ustrugov, L . A ., 13 1,13 9 ,15 0 ,15 6

reconstruction, 119 ,16 1; U .S . commitment to, 3 - 4 , 6 ,3 9 ,1 2 0 - 2 1 ,1 3 4 ,

Van Sinderen, H en ry B ., 9 5 -9 7 ,12 4

146; U .S . troops on, 136 ,16 2

Vladivostok, 2 9 ,11 2 ,1 2 2 ; assembly shops at,

Treadgold, Donald, 19 -2 1

3 2 , 35» 39» C ze ch take-over of, 7 3 -7 4 ,7 6 ;

Treasury Department, U .S ., 27, on currency

Japanese troops in, 185-85; National C ity

issues, 1 0 8 - 9 ,124i aHd debt o f Russian

Bank branch at, i n -1 2 ; shipping business

Embassy, 1 4 0 ,14 3 ,14 5

ruined, 188

Tretiakov, S. N ., 36

Vologodskii, R V , 81

Trum an administration, 1 9 9 -2 0 0 ,2 0 1

Vtorov, Leonidas, 4 9 -50

Trusteeship, suggestion that U .S . take over Russia as, 40

Walker, M artin, 19 7 -9 9

Turchaninov, N . V., 21

W ang, 186

Turner, Frederick Jackson, 17

W ang, C . C ., 176 W a r Department, U .S ., 2i7n. 50; selling

Uchida, Viscount Yasuya, 12 9 -3 0 ,16 9

army surplus, 13 7 -3 8 ,14 3 ,15 3

Ughet, Serge, 9 6 -9 7 ,10 8

W a r Industry Board, 56

Ukraine, 59 ,7 0 ; G erm an domination of, 49,

W a r Trade Board, 5 3 ,9 0 -9 1 ,1 3 9 ,1 9 6 ;

51,53, 68 Union o f Cooperative Unions (Zakupsbyt), 9 2 - 9 4 , 10 1-2 Union o f Siberian Cooperative Associations, 153 Union o f Siberian Cooperative Unions, 72 Union o f Siberian Cream ery Associations, 205n. 33 Union o f Siberian Cream ery Unions, 153

control o f commercial assistance by, 9 4 - 9 6 ,9 9 -1 0 1 ; distribution system for supplies, 9 7,115; export regulations of, 9 8 -9 9 ,15 3 -5 4 ; and Germ an economic influence in Siberia, 6 8 ,7 1; on rival currency plans, 1 0 9 ,1 1 7 -1 8 ,1 2 3 ,1 2 5 ; and Russian bureau, 5 2 ,9 8 ,13 7 , and U .S . trade with Russia, 7 0 - 7 1 ,9 3 ,1 0 1 - 2 ,1 4 3 . See also Russian Bureau

In dex

243

Washburn, Stanley, 26 W ashington Conference: effects of, 188-89; on Far East policies, 18 0 -8 6 ; U .S . trying to demonstrate goodwill at, 19 0 ,19 1

governments, 2 ,1 6 - 1 7 ,8 1 ; Russian policies of, 4 9 ,5 4 ; and Russian reconstruction, 7 ,1 6 1 -6 2 ; and status o f Railroad Com m ission, 28 -30

W ashington Naval Conference, 17 ,18 1

Wilsonianism: ethics of, 201; studies of, 9 -1 0

Western front, 5 4 ,5 6 ,6 4 ; C zech o-Slovak

W isem an, W illiam , 64

Corps going to, 73, 21211.3 3 W h ite, Christine, 1 0 , 203m 2 W h ite , Joh n A ., 10 W illard, Daniel, 2 6 ,3 1 ,3 5 - 3 6 ,4 0 ; and Stevens, 37 -39 W illiam s, E . T . , 53

Woodrow Wilson and a Revolutionary W orld (Link), 10 Woodrow Wilson and World Politics (Levin), 10 Woolley, Clarence M ., 7 0 ,1 4 4 W orkers, railroad: difficulty o f paying, 133,

W illiam s, W illiam A ., 10

155; lack o f middle management, 3 0 -3 1;

W ilson, W oodrow, 5 , 1 2 5 , 1 6 0 , 205m 19,

patronage, 175,18 6 ; urged to increase

223m 2; and Bolsheviks, 4 1,4 9 ,5 7 , and

productivity, 3; U .S . in Russia, 5 4 ,6 9 ;

British commercial proposals, 88-89; and

U .S . training Russian, 3 1 ,3 5 -3 6 ,3 8 -4 0

Com m erce Department, 9 3-9 4 ; and

W orld Bank, 7

commercial assistance, 1 5 ,1 9 ,6 2 -6 3 ,

W o rld W ar 1 , 1 ,1 3 ,2 9 ,3 3 ; Russian

9 0 -9 2 ,10 0 -1 0 4 ; concept o f self-

withdrawal from, 3 4 ,4 1 - 4 2

government, 4 ,1 8 - 1 9 ; on C zech o ­

W orld W ar II, 3 ,7 - 8 . See also M arshall Plan

slovaks, 73—7 5 ,1 19 -2 0 ; and debt o f

W righ t, J. Butler, 6 5 ,6 8 -7 1 ,7 4

Russian Embassy, 14 0 ,14 2 ; declining political fortunes, 1 2 8 -2 9 ;on economic

Yen, 164

assistance, 10 3 ,10 9 ,12 5 ; economic

Yen, W . W ., 17 8 -7 9 ,18 3 -8 5

assistance plan of, 199; formation o f

Y M C A , 69; efforts combined with

Russian policies of, 7 6 -7 8 ,8 0 ; and

economic mission, 112

Kolchak government, 6 ,1 4 1 ,1 4 4 - 4 6 ,1 6 0 ;

Y u n -p eng, G en . C h in , 178

and military assistance, 25-27; and

Yurenev, Kadet P. R , 34

military intervention in Siberia, 4 4 -4 7 , 6 1-6 2 , 6 4 -6 6 ,7 2 ,7 6 , 89; objectives o f Russian policies of, 2 5 -2 7 ,8 3 -8 4 ; paralysis

Zakupsbyt. See Union o f Cooperative Unions

of, 61; politics around Russian policies of,

Zeiler, Thom as, 203m 2

Ï33—3 6 ,14 7 ,15 8 -5 9 ,19 5 —96; and Russian

Zem stvos, 5 4 ,15 7 ,1 6 0 -6 1 , 2ion. 37

244 *x.

In dex