Recent Social Trends in France, 1960-1990 9780773563230

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Recent Social Trends in France, 1960-1990
 9780773563230

Table of contents :
Contents
Acknowledgements
Preface
Introduction
0. Context
0.1 Demographic Trends
0.2 Macro-economic Trends
0.3 Macro-technological Trends
1. Age Groups
1.1 Youth
1.2 Elders
2. Microsocial
2.1 Self-identification
2.2 Kinship Networks
2.3 Community and Neighbourhood Types
2.4 Local Autonomy
2.5 Voluntary Associations
2.6 Sociability Networks
3. Women
3.1 Female Roles
3.2 Childbearing
3.3 Matrimonial Models
3.4 Women's Employment
3.5 Reproductive Technologies and Biotechnologies
4. Labour Market
4.1 Unemployment
4.2 Skills and Occupational Levels
4.3 Types of Employment
4.4 Sectors of the Labour Force
4.5 Computerization of Work
5. Labour and Management
5.1 Work Organization
5.2 Personnel Administration
5.3 Sizes and Types of Enterprises
6. Social Stratification
6.1 Occupational Status
6.2 Social Mobility
6.3 Economic Inequality
6.4 Social Inequality
7. Social Relations
7.1 Conflict
7.2 Negotiation
7.3 Norms of Conduct
7.4 Authority
7.5 Public Opinion
8. State and Service Institutions
8.1 Educational System
8.2 Health System
8.3 Welfare System
8.4 The State
9. Mobilizing Institutions
9.1 Labour Unions
9.2 Religious Institutions
9.3 Military Forces
9.4 Political Parties
9.5 Mass Media
10. Institutionalization of Social Forces
10.1 Dispute Settlement
10.2 Institutionalization of Labour Unions
10.3 Social Movements
10.4 Interest Groups
11. Ideologies
11.1 Political Differentiation
11.2 Confidence in Institutions
11.3 Economic Orientations
11.4 Radicalism
11.5 Religious Beliefs
12. Household Resources
12.1 Personal and Family Income
12.2 Informal Economy
12.3 Personal and Family Wealth
13. Life style
13.1 Market Goods and Services
13.2 Mass Information
13.3 Personal Health and Beauty Practices
13.4 Time Use
13.5 Daily Mobility
13.6 Household Production
13.7 Forms of Erotic Expression
13.8 Mood-altering Substances
14. Leisure
14.1 Amount and Use of Free Time
14.2 Vacation Patterns
14.3 Athletics and Sports
14.4 Cultural Activities
15. Educational Attainment
15.1 General Education
15.2 Professional Education
15.3 Continuing Education
16. Integration and Marginalization
16.1 Immigrants and Ethnic Minorities
16.2 Crime and Punishment
16.3 Emotional Disorders and Self-Destructive Behaviour
16.4 Poverty
17. Attitudes and Values
17.1 Satisfaction
17.2 Perception of Social Problems
17.3 Orientations to the Future
17.4 Values
17.5 National Identity

Citation preview

Redent Social Trends in France 1960-1990

Series Comparative Charting of Social Change Series Editor: Simon Langlois

Michel Forse, Jean-Pierre Jaslin, Yannick Lemel, Henri Mendras, Denis Stoclet, Jean-Hugues Dechaux

Recent Social Trends in France 1960-1990 Translated by Liam Gavin

Campus Verlag • Frankfurt am Main McGill-Queen's University Press Montreal & Kingston • London • Buffalo

Canadian Cataloguing in Publication Data Main entry under title: Recent Social Trends in France: 1960-1990 (Comparative charting of social change, ISSN 1183-1952) Translation of La societe fran?aise en tendances, Presses Universitaires de France, 1990, ISBN 2-13-043026-0 Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0-7735-0887-2 1. France-Social conditions-1945.1. Forse, Michel. II. International Research Group on the Comparative Charting of Social Change in Advanced Industrial Societies. III. Series. HN425.5.56513 1993 944.083 C92-090349-5

Die Deutsche Bibliothek - CIP-Einheitsaufnahme Recent social trends in France : 1960 - 1990 / Michel Forse ... 119-20, 125-7; MLA *8> Montreal; Kingston ; London ; Buffalo : McGill-Queen's Univ. Press, 1993 (Comparative charting of social change) Einheitssacht.: La societe franfaise en tendances ISBN 3-593-34898-5 (Campus Verlag) ISBN 0-7735-0887-2 (McGill-Queen's Univ. Press) NE: Forse, Michel; Gavin, Liam [Ubers.]; EST All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Copyright ©1993 by Campus Verlag GmbH, Frankfurt/Main Published simultaneously in Canada and the United States by McGill-Queen's University Press Legal deposit 1993 Bibliotheque nationale du Quebec Printed in Germany

Contents Acknowledgements

ix

Preface

xi

Introduction

1

0. 0.1 0.2 0.3

Context Demographic Trends Macro-economic Trends Macro-technological Trends

11 11 17 26

1. 1.1 1.2

Age Groups Youth Elders

33 34 39

2. 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.6

Microsocial Self-identification Kinship Networks Community and Neighbourhood Types Local Autonomy Voluntary Associations Sociability Networks

43 44 48 52 56 60 66

3. 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5

Women Female Roles Childbearing Matrimonial Models Women's Employment Reproductive Technologies and Biotechnologies

70 71 76 81 87 92

4. 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5

Labour Market Unemployment Skills and Occupational Levels Types of Employment Sectors of the Labour Force Computerization of Work

97 98 104 108 113 116

5. 5.1 5.2 5.3

Labour and Management Work Organization Personnel Administration Sizes and Types of Enterprises

120 121 125 128

6. 6.1 6.2 6.3 6.4

Social Stratification Occupational Status Social Mobility Economic Inequality Social Inequality

131 132 137 141 146

v

7. 7.1 7.2 7.3 7.4 7.5

Social Relations Conflict Negotiation Norms of Conduct Authority Public Opinion

147 148 152 156 160 164

8. 8.1 8.2 8.3 8.4

State and Service Institutions Educational System Health System Welfare System The State

167 168 173 178 183

9. 9.1 9.2 9.3 9.4 9.5

Mobilizing Institutions Labour Unions Religious Institutions Military Forces Political Parties Mass Media

186 187 192 196 201 207

10. 10.1 10.2 10.3 10.4

Instkutionalization of Social Forces Dispute Settlement Institutionalization of Labour Unions Social Movements Interest Groups

213 214 217 222 226

11. 11.1 11.2 11.3 11.4 11.5

Ideologies Political Differentiation Confidence in Institutions Economic Orientations Radicalism Religious Beliefs

228 229 233 238 241 246

12. 12.1 12.2 12.3

Household Resources Personal and Family Income Informal Economy Personal and Family Wealth

250 251 256 260

13. 13.1 13.2 13.3 13.4 13.5 13.6 13.7 13.8

Life style Market Goods and Services Mass Information Personal Health and Beauty Practices Time Use Daily Mobility Household Production Forms of Erotic Expression Mood-altering Substances

264 265 270 274 279 282 286 290 294

VI

14. 14.1 14.2 14.3 14.4

Leisure Amount and Use of Free Time Vacation Patterns Athletics and Sports Cultural Activities

298 299 303 307 311

15. 15.1 15.2 15.3

Educational Attainment General Education Professional Education Continuing Education

315 316 321 325

16. 16.1 16.2 16.3 16.4

Integration and Marginalization Immigrants and Ethnic Minorities Crime and Punishment Emotional Disorders and Self-Destructive Behaviour Poverty

328 329 333 336 340

17. 17.1 17.2 17.3 17.4 17.5

Attitudes and Values Satisfaction Perception of Social Problems Orientations to the Future Values National Identity

344 345 350 352 355 362

VII

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Acknowledgments The French team presently includes Michel Forse", Jean-Pierre Jaslin, Henri Mendras, Denis Stoclet, and Jean-Hugues De"chaux, with close collaboration from Laurence Duboys Fresney. The team meets every Monday; its name, Louis Dim, is an anagram of the French "lundi soir." The group is very grateful to the Observatoire Frangais des Conjonctures Economiques, where it meets and works, and the very generous help it has given to this enterprise. Personal thanks are due to the Observatoire's successive presidents, Jean-Marcel Jeanneney and Jean-Paul Fitoussi. Special thanks are due to the Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique and the Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, which provided the grant that made possible the meetings in France and travel abroad. We owe a large debt to Laurence Duboys Fresney, who heroically managed and reviewed the copyediting and final preparation of the manuscript. The book is put forward as a collective work, but readers who want to communicate with the writers of particular trend reports, or who discover errors of fact or of judgment in the following pages are urged to contact to Louis Dirn (address below). Theodore Caplow Henri Mendras Paris, July 1991 (Louis Dim 69 quai d'Orsay - 75007 PARIS France - Ph. (1) 45 55 95 12)

IX

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Preface The Comparative Charting of Social Change Recent Social Trends in France, 1960-1990 is the third volume of a series. Similar volumes describing recent social trends in the United States, West Germany, and Quebec are being published this year, and other countries, beginning with Greece, will be covered in subsequent years. These national profiles of social change all have the same format. Each consists of 78 trend reports grouped under 17 main topics, and the sequence of reports—from 0.1, "Demographic Trends" to 17.5, "Trends in National Identity"—is identical for every profile. The object of this exercise is to provide appropriate data bases for the cross-national comparison of recent social trends. That work is well under way. A collection of papers comparing trends in the family, in the workplace, in social movements, in conflict resolution, and in value systems will be published in the series in 1992. The collective author of the series goes by the mellifluous name of the International Research Group on the Comparative Charting of Social Change in Advanced Industrial Societies, in short form the Comparative Charting Group. It is an entirely voluntary organization that evolved out of an informal collaborative relationship established in the 1970s between a group of investigators into social change in French communities called the Observation du changement social and a concurrent American effort known as the Middletown III project. A little later, Henri Mendras formed the working group on social trends that developed the original version of our present trend list and applied it to France. They published their results under the group pseudonym Louis Dirn.1 Theodore Caplow, the principal investigator of the Middletown III project, came to Paris to participate in the deliberations of the Louis Dirn group for several months in 1983. Soon after, the Louis Dirn group began to exchange visits and data with Wolfgang Glatzer and his colleagues at Frankfurt, who were analyzing social trends in the Federal Republic. In 1987, Mendras accepted a visiting appointment at the University of Virginia, during which time he established a close relationship with researchers who were studying social trends in Quebec under the leadership of Simon Langlois at Laval University. The first work session of the Comparative Charting Group convened in Paris in May, 1987. Subsequent work sessions were held at Bad Homburg in May of 1988, in Quebec City in December of 1988, in Charlottesville in May of 1989, in Nice in December of 1989, in Madrid in July of 1990, again in Bad Homburg in December of 1990, and in Syros in June of 1991. The scholarly yield of the project has increased with each session. The Comparative Charting Group is divided into national teams. It includes historians, political scientists, and economists, although the majority are sociologists. The team coordinators are Theodore Caplow for the United States, Henri Mendras for France, Wolfgang Glatzer and Karl-Otto Hondrich for West Germany, Simon Langlois for Quebec, Sebastiano Del Campo for Spain, and Constantin Tsoucalas for Greece. Applications from several other national teams are pending. For the purposes of this project, Quebec is treated as a national society. 1 . Louis Dirn, La societefranqaise en tendances (Paris: PUF 1990).

xi

The participation of individual scholars in the national teams, and of the national teams in the international group, is entirely voluntary. Simon Langlois and the Institut Que'be'cois de Recherche sur la Culture provide the project with a highly efficient secretariat, but there is no executive authority at all. Each national team is responsible for its own funding and internal operations. Work is assigned and deadlines are set by consensus at the semi-annual work sessions. This loose organization has worked so exceedingly well that we are tempted to propose it as a model for other international projects of social research. The general purposes of this collective effort are to prepare a comprehensive, numerically grounded description of recent social trends in advanced industrial societies; to identify similarities and differences among these national societies with respect to ongoing social trends; to subject these similarities and differences to comparative analysis; and to establish benchmarks for future tracking of social trends. The data module of this project is a trend report. It covers one of the 78 numbered topics in the List of Trends and Indicators developed by the Comparative Charting Group by revising the classification originally proposed by Louis Dim. The table of contents of this volume is an abbreviated version of that list. The numbered topics and subtopics provide a common outline for the national profiles. The general methodology of this work has been presented by Michel Forse".2 Most trend reports present and interpret multiple trends related to the respective topic. A trend report has four sections: an abstract of findings, an explanatory text, a collection of statistical tables or charts, and a bibliography of the sources drawn upon. The trends described in these reports are empirical and quantitative. They are based on time-series of good quality, quality being measured by explicit criteria. To be used in a trend report, a series must consist of empirical enumerations or measurements, must refer to an entire national society or to a representative sample of it, must cover a period of at least ten years and end no earlier than 1983, must include data for three or more points or intervals of time recorded contemporaneously, must be amenable to independent verification, and must be replicable in the respective national society and also in other national societies. The factual emphasis is fundamental. No trend is included that is not known with practical certainty, and no directionality is asserted without empirical data. Often, we have located studies of these tendencies by other scholars and used them to challenge or buttress our own interpretations. At all times, these empirical predilections keep alive the happy possibility that what we find may surprise us. And, indeed, it often has. Our preference for relatively hard data restricts most of the trend reports to recent decades, since many interesting statistical series do not go back very far or lose reliability as they recede to earlier years. There are some exceptions; in demography and macro-economics, for example, we have an abundance of good data from the last world war. But with the progress of work, it has become increasingly clear that a sharp focus on the period I960- 1990 is appropriate as well as expedient. For reasons that may vary somewhat from country to country, an astonishing number of social trends show a point of inflexion close to 1960, and the 30-year period following 1960 has seemed to exhibit exceptional coherence. It should be emphasized that the tendencies documented in these national profiles are not merely interpretations of the quantitative series or the ethnographic data. They reflect an underlying sense of social theory and of social reality that goes far beyond the raw data. The themes we have chosen, our methods of examining the available

2. Michel Fors6, Analyse structurelle du changement social. Le module de Louis Dim (Paris: PUF 1990).

xii

indicators, our decisions about selective emphasis among the evidence at hand, and our estimation of the significance or insignificance of observed trends constitute an intellectual structure derived from diverse national and disciplinary perspectives. This structure is described with exemplary clarity in the introduction by John Modell and Yannick Lemel, which follows. Our aim is to construct a better model of social change in the modern world than has heretofore been available. When we met in Paris in 1987 to establish permanent connections among ongoing investigations of social change that had occupied us in our respective countries during the previous decade, we were aware that although our separate studies had attracted a fair amount of scholarly and popular attention, they had not advanced our understanding of contemporary industrial societies as much as they should have, for want of a comparative perspective. Without systematic international comparisons, it is impossible to determine whether the trends we discover in a particular national society are local accidents or features of a larger system. We were specifically interested in the late twentieth century, the major industrial countries, and the social structure and institutional patterns that characterize the behaviour of large populations, especially those associated with the family, work, leisure, religion, education, government, politics, and voluntary associations. As we compared our separate bodies of work, we had the impression of being surrounded by the bits and pieces of a new theoretical model waiting to be assembled, a model that does not require social change to resemble scientific-technical progress, that proposes a the future that is open rather than ordained, and that acknowledges the mixture of objective and subjective elements in social reality. The construction of national profiles in comparable form was a preliminary task that had to be done in order to prepare for the construction of such a model. In preparing these trend reports, we learned a great deal we had not previously known about the French condition in the late twentieth century. We trust that our readers will find them equally instructive. Theodore Caplow University of Virginia August, 1992

xin

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Introduction What are the mainsprings of social change? This is the central question with regard to industrial society. But neither macrosociological theories nor the numerous fragmentary studies available have come up with either analysis or medium-range theory capable of reflecting nationwide transformations of the social system as a whole. Some of the systems of macro-historic analysis handed down by the pioneers in the field are still applicable today, while others have become visibly dated. References to the logic of the capitalist mode of production and to class struggle have become increasingly rare. Tocqueville explained the evolution of democratic societies, while Max Weber said that evolution was the result of disenchantment with the world and the progress of reason. Popular wisdom today recognizes technical innovation as the driving force behind economic growth and social change. Daniel Bell suggested a system of tensions between the economic, political, and cultural domains, each with its own temporality and logic. The list goes on but does not provide us with an operational system, since any attempt to find a general theory of social change leads only to a blind alley. Over the last fifteen years we have witnessed a remarkable methodological about-turn. Up to the 1970s it was agreed that social change was subject to unwieldy macroscopic trends which were largely determined by technical and economic developments. This left little or no choice to individuals and social groups except to adapt as best they could. Since then, we have seen the "return of the individual" (to use Alain Touraine's phrase) to the social sciences. Researchers in both economic and sociological disciplines are taking an increasing interest in individual and group strategies and in their cumulative effects, whether perverse or otherwise. In this vision of things, social change is seen as the cumulative effect of individual and collective wills. Between these two opposing conceptions stands a third which seeks to reconcile them by studying unwieldy and institutional driving forces on the one hand, and individual and collective strategies on the other. We locate our approach clearly in line with this third stance.

Precedents After the 1929 stock-market crash, President Hoover asked a group of sociologists to analyse the social changes which had taken place in the United States during the 1920s. The group, under the direction of William F. Ogburn, was later to publish the classic sociological document Recent Social Trends in the United States. Spurred on by the success of national economic accounting, a few pioneers set out to define the bases for social accounting which, using various statistical data, were to enable them to diagnose the social state of the nation. The ambition to construct a social chart of the nation, as a counterpart to Leontieff's table, was obviously premature. In retrospect, it seems somewhat naive to think that the data at hand could be used to establish accountable balances. A less ambitious project, the search for social indicators, retained attention and mobilized energy for quite a few years. With the abandonment of the idea of balance and therefore of flux, the establishment of a relationship between the development of one or several indicators and the development of a social phenomenon was sufficient to permit

1

Recent Social Trends in France 1960-1990

the formulation of a social indicator. Moreover, if the social phenomenon was the subject of a state policy, of state planning, or merely of administrative intervention, a wellconstructed indicator would mean that the effectiveness of state intervention could be evaluated. However, since indicators were built separately and sometimes for different reasons, they cannot form a coherent whole, nor that they can be used to gain an overall assessment of the state of the nation. They can supply us only with a quantitative estimation of developments. Even then, in order to succeed we would have to choose our statistics carefully, draw up a list of key domains, isolate a significant variable for each, and gather regular information on that variable. For heuristic reasons, indicators constructed in this way could not result in a system capable of explaining social change, as the variables are considered to be independent of one another. Of course, they could be used for sector-based comparisons between nations, if they are elaborated in the same manner, but this is rarely the case. In addition, "social forecasting," under different names, has been and continues to be enormously popular. In France the preparation of the fifth Plan (1964) brought together the most influential specialists of the time. Their Reflections on 1985 aroused some interest. The proximity of the year 2000 made Daniel Bell's co-authors more circumspect in The Report on the Year Two Thousand. This type of research, known as social reporting, continues to be popular in Germany, Great Britain, and the United States. It has become commonplace in ministries and large companies. However, the futures forum predicted by Bertrand de Jouvenel still does not exist. The 1970s saw spectacular progress in econometrics from the analysis of trends and their projected development to the construction of models enabling us to conduct mathematical simulations of various possible futures in function of expected changes in different exogenous trends. These developments could have led to a considerable increase in the reliability of economic predictions. Unfortunately, the changing nature of economic policies and of international monetary relations increased the complexity of the analysts' job and made their predictions more aleatory, in spite of their highly perfected instruments. Halfway between long-term future studies and present-day trend monitoring, sociologists have come together on several occasions to evaluate the state of France today. As early as 1965, two symposia were published with the contribution of the best French social scientists. More recently, one of us wrote an analysis called The Second French Revolution. In these and other books we took a certain distance in our research in order to contribute to a vision of the whole of French society. This same consideration, combined with the desire to be more systematic, prevailed in the present work. A Table of Trends In contrast with these precedents, the research presented here is intended to give a more overall and more systematic picture in which all the main trends in societal development will have their place. The idea of constructing a systemic model of French society may seem pretentious and without foundation. However, in recent decades sociology and the other social sciences have become specialized and fragmented into different domains and types of approach. This has resulted in greater knowledge of the different sectors of society and their institutions. Partial theories have been elaborated and perfected to the point of being operational and even being used in social intervention—for example, the

2

Introduction

theory of organizations. Today it is time to try to pool these different domains of knowledge into an overall sociological whole. Three axioms dictated our point of departure. First, it is possible to identify, isolate, and define trends of development in society. Second, some of these trends can be assessed using quantitative indices, while for others it is possible only to indicate the direction of development with a high degree of probability based on qualitative studies. Finally, these trends relate to each other in ways that it is possible to formulate in terms of causality: "Is there a causal link between trend X and trend Y which in turn is linked to trend Z?" If these three axioms are granted, then it is possible to build a matrix representing all the links between the trends, two by two, according to a frequently used procedure known as structural analysis. This matrix or table is arrived at by putting the trends in lines and columns and by marking each box in function of the presence or absence of a causal link between the line-trend and the column-trend. What Is a Trend? We formulate a trend only after sufficiently unequivocal, long (20 years), and massive changes have taken place. Given these criteria, it is only reasonable to suppose that such a trend stands little chance of being reversed in the foreseeable future. We formulate two types of proposition. For example, in the case of the Catholic religion, we distinguished two developments: a weakening of the ecclesial institution and of its magisterium and reduced religious observance. The first formulation is an example of a qualitative evaluation of an institutional structure. This evaluation can be backed up by an argument based on qualitative or quantitative indices from a variety of sources. Surveys of religious observance, studies of vocations to the priesthood, official announcements, and so on supply initial proof because these indices are consistent. They lead us to formulate a judgment and give the direction of the trend. The second formulation, reduced religious observance, lends itself more easily to the construction of quantitative indicators (rate of religious observance), which it is possible or foreseeable to measure at different dates in order to verify whether there is in fact a reduction. This is an example of an evaluation of a group of individual behaviours. Whether we are talking about the evaluation of a structure or of behaviour, a trend always indicates a general movement in the social group under study. As we have seen from the above example, indicators are used in the formulation of such an evaluation. An indicator corresponds to the most elementary level of apprehension of a change—that is, it corresponds to a statistical series or to the results of successive surveys. It must be formulated in such a way as to be immediately measurable. Sometimes, for reasons of contingency, it may be only partially available. Such is the case when surveys have not been sufficiently repeated over time or when the available statistics do not take the required form. Efforts to date indicate that it is not always easy to find answers to the questions we ask. Statisticians measure what is useful to administrators and, increasingly, seek to answer questions posed by economists while answering those of sociologists less and less often—for the very good reason that sociologists rarely try to formulate their questions in a statistically valid manner. This is only to be expected. It is, however, surprising to see how so little of sociological research can be used to back up our propositions. Sociologists formulate their research questions either in theoretical

3

Recent Social Trends in France 1960-1990

terms or in terms of everyday language in order to satisfy the needs of those commissioning the research, but rarely in terms of diagnosing the social reality. In order to find useful results, we had to conduct a long and thorough examination of the enormous mass of research accumulated over the last twenty years. The example of kinship networks is illustrative. We can say that relations of kinship are being strengthened, and that the network is becoming stronger. It is easy to build quantitative indicators to measure strengthening of kinship relations: number of visits, letters, phone calls, and so on. These relations can also be measured in terms of the importance of what takes place on the occasion of such contacts: transfer of money, gifts, loans, exchange of goods and services, child-minding, and so on. These indicators are partial but relatively congruent. However, the second formulation, relative to the strengthening of kinship as a network, is more difficult to prove. Indicators suggest that this proposition is more plausible than the opposite proposition—that is, that the kinship network is weakening. In this case we accepted as true a propostion whose opposite seemed scarcely plausible. This bias was based very largely on the opinions of experts on the subject Accepting, at least provisionally, to make up for the absence of data by the opinions of experts is the only solution that allows us to maintain our methodological coherence. There is no reason to feel uncomfortable about this. The important thing is to formulate for each indicator a proposition which enables us to detect an empirical change that is simple, unequivocal, and measurable. There is no a priori means of limiting a list of indicators for a given domain, but it is not necessary to be exhaustive in order to locate a trend. It can be identified as soon as we have found what is common to the partial developments measured by the indicators. Let us have another look at the example of religious practice. The number of church weddings, baptisms, and mass attendance at different dates are so many indicators which enable us to affirm that over twenty years there has been an overall decrease in religious practice. Other less numerous, qualitative sources (but thanks to which empirically measurable indicators could be built) show that religious practice has become more diverse. This is not in contradiction with our previous affirmation and enables us to formulate a more complete statement concerning religious behaviour—that is, there is both a reduction in and diversification of religious practice. This kind of procedure gets us around the problem of social indicators which exclude qualitative data. Besides, we are not trying to find immediate interpretations of the indicators. It is the relationships between trends that interest us. A trend is in fact the result of multiple choices: the choice of domain under study and thus of exogenous domains, a question we shall return to, the choice of indicators and their congruent parts, but also the choice of theories which served to delimit the phenomenon on which we seek to make a pronouncement. Having made these choices, it is then necessary, by a process of synthesis, to group together under one heading the various converging empirical developments we have retained. Hence the following definition: "A trend is a theoretical diagnosis through which meaning is given to a group of empirical developments described by indicators of one societal domain." It is a first step toward gaining knowledge of a phenomenon, but only a first step. So far we are still in the descriptive phase, hence the term "diagnosis," which, naturally, is not to be understood in its medical connotation. The second stage consists of entering the explanatory phase—that is, as we have already said, systematically questioning the relationships between trends.

4

Introduction

In spite of any imprecision in our definition, a trend is neither a general overall theory of change nor a law of history. Inferred from the convergence of certain changes over twenty years, it is more of a judgment based on a theoretical approach, of use in reaching the following stage of systematization, which would be impossible if we had remained at the level of indicators. The failures of past efforts have taught us that no progress can be made in putting indicators into perspective except by passing through this theoretical phase—if for no other reason than that it is impossible to close a list without going through such a phase. Thus a trend is not a pure description. By nature of the choices and synthesis involved in defining and delimiting a trend, we have already entered the theoretical domain. The expression "theoretical diagnosis" indicates the sort of tension between the analytical and the synthetic which we find here. Our procedure is incontestably analytical, but a trend is already a synthesis. Let us look at the youth trend in order to illustrate our definition. In short, chapter 1 affirms that, over the last twenty years, we have witnessed the emergence of an age group characterized by the instability of its life style, with this phase tending to become longer. The concept of age groups presupposes acceptance of the anthropological theories showing the value and scope of the concept and defining the conditions governing the applicability of a such a division. Explicit reference is not made to these theories, for this would place us well beyond the scope of this book, but it goes without saying that our use of the concept of the age group is based on anthropological discoveries. The list of indicators measuring youth change is practically endless but, among them, several indicate a certain instability: instability of employment (unemployment, length of schooling, precariousness of available jobs) and matrimonial instability (cohabitation). All of these indicate increasing and longer-lasting instability. We decided that this could best be synthesized by a medium-range theory focusing on these aspects. Some may say that by doing so we neglected other changes. This is possible, even probable, but we managed to bring out the idea that youth which, sociologically speaking though not physiologically speaking, had disappeared as an age group, is reappearing, since the great majority of young people share the experience of instability. The trend itself is not directly measurable, but the indicators on which it is based are, for example, a comparison of the rate of youth unemployment with that of the population as a whole. It is obvious from this example that theoretical considerations force a diagnosis upon us, the effect of which is to produce an "average" of the phenomenon. Some young people find a job and settle down at the same age as previously. Similarly, we have no "regional" trends which would enable us to relate developments to local particularities. The rounding off implicit in our choices and synthesis has the undeniable disadvantage of evoking a vision which takes insufficient account of gaps and diversity. Aware of this problem, the best we can do is to reintroduce these differences when interpreting the relationships between trends. Nonetheless, our method of proceeding forewarned us of the danger of formulating an "average" synthesis in a domain where situations are extremely diverse. Indeed, in such a case it would be difficult to find convergence of the different indicators. As ever, an average gives a faithful picture of reality only when the variance is not too great. We can only hope that where it is too great, our method and the precautions we took saved us from formulating a trend. Thus the average vision implicit in trend construction should not have any damaging effects. Some analytical precision is lost in the effort to organize a

5

Recent Social Trends in France 1960-1990

layout capable of resituating each empirically observed development at a societal level. That is the price we have to pay. We reject all charges of reductionism. The quality of a model is not judged by its degree of reduction but by its ability to describe and explain reality. With regard to the "aesthetic" criterion of simplicity, it need only be said that when two models have an identical general scope the simpler one is preferable to the more complicated. Others might reproach us with being insufficiently reductive and not proposing an a priori key for the interpretation of change, a key which would enable us to explain all partial changes. This is what we find with approaches which analyse in terms of modernization, seeking to sum up the maximum number of trends observed in terms of one single macro-development. In our case the situation is precisely the opposite, since our starting point is that no one trend is more important than another. We shall even show at a later time that change can not be reduced to the interplay between a few basic trends. Putting trends into perspective vis-a-vis one another should result from a positive study of the links between them. This is why we have built a matrix of their causal links. Macrotrends appear from mathematical and statistical operations which bring out the structures of this matrix. They are the product of analysis and not the fruit of an a priori vision of the meaning we think societal changes should have. While refusing to adopt any such visions—although they have the advantage of immediately producing all relevant observations—it is nonetheless imperative to delimit the historic and sociological scope of the trends. This delimitation is based only on the underlying methodological constraints. Exclusion Our list of trends includes institutions, ritualized situations, and behaviours and their models. In the French version of our study we deliberately excluded people's attitudes, feelings, opinions, values, and beliefs. Such exclusions have seemed excessive to our foreign colleagues, and some trends on values are presented here. In the last ten years, the development of tools for measuring public opinion and sensitivity has enabled us to measure changes. Analysis of each of our trends inevitably leads to questions concerning the attitudes of the principal agents. But, for each sector, we would need repeated surveys which would enable us to follow simultaneously the development of the trend (whether behaviour or institution) and the feelings of the persons concerned. We would then be in a position to study the relationship between the two. The weakening of the church probably contributes to reduced belief in God, as much as the reverse. The few studies available show that links exist between the two; however, they do not allow us to say whether changes in the institutions or the situation lead to changes in attitude, or whether the reverse is the case. Unable to decide between the two, we chose, at this stage in our analysis, to give precedence to practices over representations. "Heavy trends," which evolve slowly and seem to follow their own dynamics, are the only trends which could be taken into consideration here. We also excluded political decisions from our list, not because we were unaware of government decisions and rulings, or of the fact that parliament votes laws which influence behaviour and transform institutions, but because government and parliamentary decisions are influenced by the development of mores and sentiments as much as they contribute to shaping them and propagating them. Although on the one hand legislation relative to work has often been ahead of actual practices, as in the example of

6

Introduction

wage earners' right to self-expression, on the other hand reforms relative to marriage, divorce, and abortion have brought the law more into line with the development of mores. We cannot therefore presume that there is a simple link between any of our trends and a governmental or legislative decision. We can however, legitimately question the direct or indirect repercussions of a decision on each of our trends. Our model can be of assistance in envisaging the unexpected and sometimes perverse effects that each decision affecting a given trend can have on the others. Although we did not retain economic trends in the strict sense of the term, we have dealt with social phenomena which economists also take into consideration—for example, saving and personal wealth, purchasing power, and consumption. However, our point of view remains sociological. The interdependence of different countries has grown considerably in the last thirty years. The economic situation, unemployment, differing rates of tourism in different countries, all of these are interconnected. We do not deny that the rate of unemployment in Germany influences certain trends in French society, nor that the prospect of a single European market will accelerate the circulation of goods, capital, and perhaps of people. We have chosen to give pride of place to influences between trends within French society and not to international influences. If the international environment, political decisions, economic trends, and the evolution of ideas and values are outside our system of relationships, we are not unaware of these external constraints. We take account of them when interpreting our results. Since we did not include them, we are naturally bound to analyse them as constraints— that is, as heavy trends over which our own trends have little effect but which are affected by them. There remains the question of the time span under consideration. The history of recent change in French society is marked by a certain number of dates: 1958, 1965, 1968, 1973, 1981. We chose 1965 because it stands out as a turning point on numerous demographic and social charts and because a number of important events took place in that year. It was then that France got back on its feet after the disasters of the war. It was also the year when remarkable economic growth, accompanied by social development, took a new turn. Over this period, from 1965 to 1990, changes are great enough to warrant the formulation of unequivocal trends. Of course, this time span could be considered, not without reason, to be too short. Often we had to go back to the beginning of the century to place the trend in its proper perspective and to evaluate it in relation to a previous trend. Intermediary fluctuations of society as a whole have often marked the appearance of new trends but not turnabouts. Sometimes the formulation retained concerns only the last ten years, in the absence of data reaching back to 1965. The Matrix Mindful of the efforts of the prospectivists to produce "futures"—non-absurd pictures of different possible futures—and stimulated by the example of global econometric models, we questioned the links between our trends and constructed a square matrix. We restricted ourselves to the alternatives of influence or non-influence, but indicated the direction of the influence—that is, X either reinforces Y or acts against it Thus, into the 3 540 boxes in our matrix (excluding the diagonal) we put "0" (no link), "+" (reinforced trend), "-" (contrary trend). Each of the links we formulated implicitly supposes a theoretical argument to be developed. In this respect, the matrix has a heuristic value since

7

Recent Social Trends in France 1960-1990

it leads to the formulation of theoretical hypotheses which may lend themselves to both theoretical and empirical research. The procedure is systematic in that, as soon as the different trends have been formulated, we look for all possible links of interaction even if, a priori, it is difficult to imagine such a relationship. We need hardly say that if the formulation of trends demands verification, then all the more so that of links. The systematic character of our listing obliges us to consider many absurd or nonexistent links, but also to analyse some which would not have come spontaneously to mind in a more qualitative prospective study or one focusing on a particular social problem, however great. The matrix is a sort of check-list which forces us to consider all possibilities and which reveals unsuspected links, particularly secondary links which are sometimes surprising at first sight and which lead us to formulate problems which would not otherwise have been formulated. Some trends take on more depth and meaning if they are analysed in conjunction with certain other trends. For instance, the labour unions' loss of public esteem does not make much sense except in the context of a parallel analysis of the institutionalization of unions. Similarly, the development of the informal economy does not have much meaning except in relation to the growing monetarization of the domestic economy. These two apparently contradictory trends turn out to be complementary. Thus, perhaps the greatest merit of our method is, that it highlights relationships, and thus social mechanisms, which had hitherto gone unnoticed. Obviously, we do not intend to make this matrix into a model analogous to the econometric model for the simple reason that our relationships are not quantifiable and that it is impossible to evaluate their relative "strength." The matrix lends itself to the construction of graphs describing the relationship between trends and groups of trends. The trends with the greatest influence are, by definition, not the most stable, but we suppose that whether they continue or whether they change they will influence a large number of other trends. Our ability to assess their stability is variable and depends on their more or less caused nature. For example, the change in matrimonial models was caused by a group of factors (longer schooling, more wage-earning women, lower birth rate and incidence of marriage, transformation of sexbased role models, etc.) so that a reversal of the trend is unlikely. Consequently, we may consider that the numerous trends arising from this change have every chance of continuing if the relationship of cause and effect is established. Unlike those with a fondness for "heavy trends," posited a priori as preconceived future structures, our method is empirical and rules out all postulations concerning the sequence of causes: these are the product of our analyses. International Comparison It is often repeated that the means of promoting progress in the social sciences today is through international comparison. To date this method has met only with repeated failures or very modest half-successes. Our method offers new possibilities because it gives us an overall picture at the national level and allows for the use of both statistics and qualitative analysis which may sometimes be of an ethnological order. Confidence in the model led to the establishment in 1986 of the international "Comparative Charting of Social Change" group composed of American, French Canadian, Spanish, Greek, and German teams. Other nationalities are joining us. Heretofore there were three main ways of comparing several different countries. Statistical comparisons, though obviously useful, are usually purely descriptive and rarely lend themselves to analytical analysis. Moreover, statistics

8

Introduction

use concepts and thresholds which differ from one country to another and, more importantly, have different meanings depending on administrative and legal rulings and on social structures. The pioneering study of time budgets in Eastern and Western European countries and North America enabled us to compare the amount of time spent washing the dishes in Novosibirsk, Paris, and Chicago, but the indicator had no real meaning except in relation to different family structures which are still not well known. International studies of stratification and mobility in the 1950s led to debates of increasing subtlety and sometimes intensity concerning the indicators and forms of social differentiation, the scope of particular inequalities, and social mobility in the different countries, without leading to any real conclusion. The fact that social indicators, which were developed as a tool in numerous countries, did not lend themselves to systematic international comparison is a further convincing proof that purely statistical comparison is a poor method which does not in itself generate new sociological analyses. Culturalism had its heyday and continues to exercise a certain charm by virtue of its claim to identify within the individual the most intimate and fundamental mainsprings of society as a whole. Unfortunately, these qualitative analyses owe too much to the talent and intuition of the researcher to be repeatable and therefore are not really comparative. Pierre Bourdieu's problematic analysis in terms of habitus did not lead to any systematic comparative analysis. Nevertheless, the preoccupation with linking micro- to macrosociological analysis has proved fruitful and should not be forgotten. In the political sciences there is a long history of comparing individual elements. Whether we call it comparative politics, comparative constitutional law, comparative government, or some other name, the subject has led to repeated debates which have hardly led to an increase in our store of knowledge, since political institutions can be understood only in reference to the sum of the social structures and "culture" of a country. The growth of large multinational companies and the progress made in organizations theory led to promising comparative studies. It is fruitful to see how an organizational structure modifies itself in order to adapt to the "culture" of different countries insofar as the organizational structure is treated as an "invariable" which causes the different cultures to "react." Unfortunately, the cultures are too poorly defined to allow for systematic analysis. The arrival of computerization in large companies and administrations practically offered us a laboratory situation for comparative study, but again the concept of "culture" was too vague. Trends formulated for France cannot be transposed automatically to other countries. Some have no raison d'etre outside of France—for example, the fall of the Communist Party would have no meaning in a country like the United States, where it has never been important. Similarly, phenomena which we considered to be secondary for France were retained in other countries. The international list of trends is therefore longer than the initial French list—seventy-five international trends, compared with sixty French trends. Once the longer list was agreed to, each national group set about formulating each of the trends in accordance with the same principles. Seventy-five similar formulations for four countries obviously lend themselves to comparison: the drop in the birth rate is not the same in all four countries: female employment has increased everywhere but takes different forms; religious observance dropped in Europe and Quebec but is rising in the United States. More often than not, trends take the same direction but the mechanisms leading to this direction are very different. The fact that differing causes lead to similar results gives rise to interesting questions, which can then be studied by analyzing the matrices. Which trends influence a given other trend, and how? If the influencing trends

9

Recent Social Trends in France 1960-1990

are not the same, we may be able to infer a difference in societal structure, as well as a system effect. When the four matrices are built, a comparison of their structures will enable us to increase our understanding of the different mechanisms of social change in these countries. Will the same trends be considered to be the most influential in all four countries, or will very different endogenous mainsprings appear? Will the macro-trends for other countries resemble those identified for France? A whole series of questions of this order will be asked during the stage of comparative analysis. The formulation of new hypotheses will lead to a re-analysis of the trends and, we hope, to progress in theory. The grouping of trends under eighteen different headings is the result of initial analyses of the matrix. The aim of these analyses was to group together the trends which were "closest" to each other—that is, the trends which influence and are influenced by the same trends. Insofar as trends within the same group play the same role, each group can be treated as a single trend. This is why we have called these eighteen headings macrotrends. The introduction under each heading outlines the unity of each macro-trend. Louis Dirn

References Darras, 1966. Le portage des benefices. Ed. de Minuit. Ogburn, W. F. (dir.), 1933. Recent Social Trends in the United States. New York: President Research. Reynaud, J.-D (ed.), 1956. Tendances et volontes de la societtfrangaise. Futuribles SEDEIS (Preface by R. Aron). Reyanud, J.-D., and Y., Grafmeyer (eds), 1981. Frangais, qui Stes-vous? Paris: La Documentation Frangaise.

10

0 CONTEXT 0.1

Demographic Trends Abstract. Both the reduced number of births after 1964 and less migration after 1974 (compared to the period 1945 to 1965) caused the lower growth rate of the French population. Although life expectancy on the whole has increased considerably since 1945, the average difference between male and female life expectancy has increased. The higher mortality rate of men over the age of 60 is leading to increased feminization of the population. Life expectancy still varies greatly according to class.

Population Size Since World War II, the French population has gone through two major phases of development. There was a high growth rate between 1946 and 1964, due to natural increases and favourable migration conditions. Then the growth rate diminished, due to fewer births after 1964 and reduced migration after 1974. Although the natural growth rate has been low for the last 15 years, it is still higher than that in other European countries. In 1989, metropolitan France had a population of 56,3 million, compared to 50,5 million in 1970 and 41,5 million in 1950. Birth-Rate Fertility After unexpected large-scale demographic growth during the postwar years, the 1960s was a period of decline in fertility, and the 1970s brought major reductions in the number of births. In 1975, the birth rate was very close to the population-maintenance rate of 2,1 children per woman. Thereafter, the rate stabilized at 1,8 children per woman (see 3.2, "Childbearing"). Changes in conception patterns and, particularly, in family patterns are detrimental to fertility in the long term: the interval between marriage and the birth of the first child has increased, the average interval between births has increased, and the number of large families has decreased. At the same time, the number of prenuptial and extra-marital births has increased. Whatever form the couple takes, the model, confirmed by the facts, is that of a one- to two-child family. Even if this trend continues, given the demographic potential of the baby boom, the population should continue to grow, to reach 60 million in about the year 2000. Immigration Until 1974, the immigrant population was made up of workers who came to France with the intention of returning to live in their homeland. After 1974, workers' families joined them with the intention of settling definitively in France. According to National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE) estimates, the number of foreigners in France rose from 1,8 million in 1974 to 3,7 million in 1982. Initially, in a climate of great economic growth, both business and government favoured the use of foreign labour. The oil crisis in the 1970s and the application in 1974 of the policy of suspending immigration contributed to a noticeable reduction in the number of

11

0 Context

entries: since 1985, the figure has been close to zero. There are between 4 million and 4,5 million foreigners legally registered in France today, according to INSEE and Ministry of the Interior estimates. From 1965 onward, the structure of society was marked by a reduced proportion of foreigners from European countries and an increase in North Africans, who have greater difficulty integration into French society (see 16.1, "Immigrants and Ethnic Minorities"). In 1985, 50% of foreigners were European, as against 80% in 1945. Life Expectancy at Birth and Mortality After increasing considerably over the course of the twentieth century, particularly since 1945, life expectancy has more or less leveled out for the moment. One of the striking features in recent times is the widening gap between male and female life expectancy. In 1950 there was a difference of 5,5 years in favour of women; the difference was 8 years in 1970, and 8,3 years in 1990, when life expectancy at birth was 80,6 years for women and 72,3 years for men. Although there has been little enough change in overall mortality in the last 15 years (about 550 000 deaths per year), infant mortality decreased considerably in the last 50 years, and continues to do so. The current rate of 7,5% is one of the lowest in the world. The main causes of death in the adult population are malignant tumors and diseases of the circulatory system (25% and 20%, respectively). Of the two, only the second has lost ground since the end of the 1950s, along with two other disease groups formerly responsible for a large number of deaths: respiratory diseases and infectious diseases. In the last 20 years, the number of deaths due to road accidents has declined slightly, while the number of suicides has shown a slight increase. Life expectancy still varies greatly according social class. At the age of 35, there is a five-year difference between the life expectancy of a senior executive and that of a labourer, and nine years between that of a teacher and that of a labourer.

Sex Distribution Although the figures show that in 1985 the population of France comprised 28 million females and 27 million males, a study of sex distribution at different ages reveals that this numerical difference really applies only after the age of 40. The difference in life expectancy has been growing since 1945, and in France more than elsewhere it operates in favour of greater female representation in the older population. Higher mortality among men is accentuated beyond the age of 60. Tumors and cardiovascular diseases are the main causes, aggravated by alcohol and tobacco addictions which are more frequent among men. Age Distribution The last 20 years have seen a gradual change in age distribution. Since 1966, this has been characterized by a clear and constant decline in the proportion of people under the age of 20, and a no less clear increase in the adult population. The proportion of people aged 65 and over grew gradually but constantly until 1980, then decreased until 1985, due to the arrival at the age of 65 of the numerically smaller generations born in the 191418 period. Longer-term retrospective observation distinctly reveals the phenomenon of

12

0.1 Demographic Trends

the ageing population. The proportion of people aged 65 and over rose from 9,6% in 1931 to 13,8% in 1990. Rural and Urban Distribution The attraction of the cities, and particularly of the Paris region, was great in the 1960s, but over the last 15 years it seems to have waned somewhat. Since 1968, the essential characteristics of the evolution of population distribution have been a relative decentralization from the capital out to the nearby suburbs and, more recently, to more distant suburbs; a relative depopulation of city centres in favour of the suburbs, themselves growing at a slower rate; a relative repopulaton of rural communes in Industrial or Urban Population Zones (IUPZ, a general term used to cover urban units of more than 2 000 inhabitants and industrial or "bedroom" rural communes); a gradual slowing of the depopulation of rural zones other than lUPZs; and depopulation of the north and increased population density in the southern half of the country. Pierre Fattaccini

References Calot, G. 1985, May. "Les perspectives de'mographiques francaises." Futuribles 88: 24-31. Desplanques, G. 1986, March-April. "50 ans de fe'condite' en France: rangs et intervalles entre naissances." Population 2: 233-58. Dinh, Q.-C. 1987. "La population francaise de 1950 a 2010: 6volution r^cente et perspective a moyen terme." in INSEE, Donntes sociales 20-6. Lefebvre, M. 1985, January-February. "Repartition gdographique de la population." Cahiers Frangais 219: 6-13. Marc, G. 1987. "Les Strangers en France." in INSEE, Donntes sociales 27-31.

13

0 Context

Table 1 Population Size and Sources of Population Change, by Five-Year Periods (Annual averages) Rate per 1 000

Initial Population Years

(1000s)

Net Growth

Births

Deaths

1946-49 1950-54 1955-59 1960-64 1965-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-88

40125 41647 43227 45464 48561 50528 52600 53731 55062

9,5 7,6

21,4 19,7 18,7 18,6 17,4 16,8 14,1 14,6 14,0

13,4 12,9 12,0 11,5 11,2 10,9 10,4 10,2

10,4 14,0

8,2 8,2 4,3 4,9 4,3

Source: INSEE, Annucdre rttrospectif de la France, 1990: 26.

14

9,8

1st January Population

Natural Increase

8,0 6,8 6,7 7,0 6,2 6,0 3,7 4,3 4,3

Immigration

1,5 0,7 3,6 6,9 2,0 2,2 0,6 0,6 0,0

0.1 Demographic Trends

Table 2 Average Years of Life Remaining at Beginning of Age Interval, 1960-1988 Year

At birth:

At age 20:

At age 50:

At age 75:

Years of Life Remaining Females

Males

1960 1970 1981 1988

67,2 67,7 70,4 72,3

74,2 75,2 78,5 80,5

1960 1970 1981 1988

50,0 50,1 51,9 53,5

56,5 57,1 59,6 61,4

1960 1970 1981 1988

23,1 23,3 24,8 26,4

28,3 28,9 31,1 32,8

1960 1970 1981 1988

7,5 7,6 8,2 9,2

9,1 9,6 10,6 11,8

Source: 1NSEE, Annuaire statistique de la France, 1991.

15

0 Context

Table 3 Age Structure of the Population, 1946-1988 (%) Age

Year

Under 15

15-19

20-24

25-59

60-64

65+

75 +

1946 1950 1960 1970 1980 1988

21,4 22,5 26,2 24,9 22,5 20,5

8,1 7,6 6,0 8,2 8,1 7,7

8,2 7,7 6,4 8,0 7,8 7,7

46,3 45,9 44,6 40,8 44,6 45,4

5,0 4,9 5,1 5,2 3,0 5,2

11,1 11,4 11,6 12,8 14,0 13,6

3,4 3,8 4,3 4,7 5,7 6,6

Source: INSEE, Annuaire rttrospectif de la France, 1991.

Table 4 Probability of Dying Between Ages 35 and 60 According to Occupational Status, 1955-59—1975-80 (Males) Occupation

Labourer Farm labour Skilled labour Tradesman Wage-earner Owner-manager Middle management Farmer Technician Supervisor Teacher Senior management and professions

1955-1959 %0

1975-1980 %0

28 22

25

21

17,5

21,8

20,5

19 14

19,5 18,5

13,5

15,5 14,9

11,9

16

17 12

14

13 12 11 10

9

Source: INSEE, G. Desplanques, "La mortality des adultes." Coll. de 17NSEE, D102, Sept. 1984.

16

0.2

Macro-economic Trends Abstract. After a period of strong growth in the 30 postwar years, the period from 1975 to 1985 constituted a rupture in the development of the French economy, marked by stagflation, a decrease in overall investment, and a reduced savings rate for households, as well as increased expenditures and a growing public debt. Membership in the EEC led to a geographical reorientation of exchanges that is somewhat favourable to France, which has shown a constant deficit since 1974. From 1986 on, with a more favourable international climate, the economic situation showed relative improvement: growth and inflation rates were close to 3%, investment increased, unemployment leveled off, and the government ran a smaller deficit

Growth During the 30 postwar years, France went through an exceptionally constant period of economic growth. Between 1960 and 1974, the GDP increased by an average of 6% per year. The period of reduced growth (2,5% per year) which followed the first oil crisis was marked by two short periods of recession, in 1975 and 1980-81, and a slight improvement as of the spring of 1987. Gross disposable household income followed the same pattern, increasing by nearly 7% per year until 1974, and by less than 3% thereafter, with a noticeable period of stagnation in 1974, 1980, 1983, and 1984. In 1987 and 1988, the number of unemployed declined for the first time in 15 years. The unemployment rate remains high, at 10,2%, but close to the European average. Prices Inflation in France has gone through two stages over the last 20 years: after rising at an average rate of 6,2% between 1970 and 1973, inflation increased for the 1973-82 period, peaking at almost 14% at the beginning and end of the period. From 1981 on, inflation decelerated to its 1989 rate of around 3%. Over the long term, service costs increased more rapidly than the general index, while industrial and agricultural costs rose more slowly. Labour productivity increased, while capital productivity decreased. Savings and Investments The gross increase in fixed capital (investment by agents of all categories) mounted to almost one quarter of total added value over the 1960-73 period, but fell to only 18,5% by 1987. Overall investment has been in decline since 1974, but its principal elements have progressed at very different rates. The most striking feature is the considerable increase in investment by large national companies (LNCs) between the first and second oil crises, at the very moment when productive investment outside of LNCs was in regression and stagnating in other sectors, particularly in public administration and in households. On the other hand, LNC investment became negative after 1981, and investment by the productive sector other than LNCs became positive. The reestablishment of overall investment and of productive investment on a more solid basis

17

0 Context

began in 1985 in the context of re-establishing the profit and savings basis of companies. The process is continuing. Household-savings patterns have changed considerably over the last 20 years. Since 1975, the overall savings rate has been in regular decline, dropping from 20,2% in 1975 to 12% in 1990. Since the mid-1980s, an increasing tendency to invest in securities has been noted within the general framework of financial modernization: technical and institutional reforms to the financial market, diversification of products, and a lighter taxation of savings. This increased interest in the stock market, while tempered by the October 1987 crash, is accompanied by greater mobility in the forms of investment. Public Expenditure By "expenditures by public administration" is meant expenditures by the state and local collectivities, and social security. Overall public expenditures in relation to GDP have risen regularly since World War II, from 35% in 1960 to 43% in 1975, and to 52% in 1985. The steep increase since the 1970s is partly related to temporary reflating policies, particularly in 1975 and 1981-82, but it is essentially due to increased spending on social coverage and transfers and, since 1980, to the increased public debt. Overall, the increase in public expenditures seems to have stabilized since 1986. Public and Private Debt The 1970s were marked by a succession of situations showing either a slight surplus or a slight deficit in public and state administrations (with the exception of a large state budget deficit in 1975), while the 1980s were characterized by public-administration deficits and debts. We must, however, distinguish between different situations in this overall trend: between 1980 and 1985, the state debt rose went from 15% to 20% of the GDP, and exceeded 25% in 1988. Consequently, the share of budget resources used to repay the debt also increased, reaching almost 10% in 1988. Local public-administration debts remained relatively stable as a percentage of the GDP (at less than 10%). In recent years, social-security accounts have swung through periods of equilibrium, excess, and deficit in spite of regular and progressive increases in contributions. Finally, the debt rate for households has risen steeply in recent years, from 35% of gross disposable annual income in 1973 to 48% in 1990. Although more liberal banking policies have encouraged this trend, they will no doubt be braked because of the danger they poses for credit rating. Foreign Trade France's position with regard to world trade has improved considerably since 1970. Exports rose from 15% of GDP in that year to 25% in 1990. Membership in the EEC led to major modifications in the geographic distribution of France's foreign trade. Today, 60% of its exports are to other member countries, compared to 30% in 1950. This geographic redistribution is not always in France's favour; in recent years, France has shown regular deficits with its principal partners, Germany, Belgium, and Holland. An overall analysis of external trade over the last 20 years shows that French agri-nutritional industries are prospering, deficits for energy produced have been reduced, but deficits in manufacturing products are continuing. France has no expertise in this domain and has lost a considerable share of the market since 1979. Balance-of-trade figures for the 1970s

18

0.2 Macro-economic Trends

show large deficits. The first, a deficit of 19,7 billion francs in 1974, is related to the steep increase in energy costs. The second, a deficit of 21,2 billion francs in 1976, is due more to the effects of temporary reflation measures. Between 1980 and 1984, France showed a record foreign-trade deficit (of 93,2 billion francs in 1982). This was initially due to the second oil crisis, and was exacerbated by the strong reflation policies embarked upon at the end of 1981, within the context of tightening up world trade. The upswing of 1986 was short-lived: 1987 and 1988 again showed a deficit. Pierre Fattaccini

References Bonin, H. 1988. Histoire economique de la France depuis 1880. Paris: Masson. Carr6, J.-J., Dubois P., and E. Malinvaud, 1990. La croissancefrangaise. Paris: Le Seuil. Eck, J.-F. 1988. Histoire de I'iconomie frangaise depuis 1945. Paris: Armand Colin, coll. Cursus. Jeanneney, J.-M., ed., 1989. L'economie frangaise depuis 1967. Paris: Le Seuil.

19

0 Context

Table 1 Growth Rate for GDP (%)

1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989

5,5 6,7 5,3 6,5 4,8 5,2 4,7 4,3 7,0 5,7 5,4 5,9 5,4 3,2 0,2 5,2 3,1 3,4 3,2 1,6 1,2 2,5 0,7 1,3 1,9 2,5 2,2 3,8 3,8

Source: INSEE, Annuaire rttrospectif de la France, 1990.

20

0.2 Macro-economic Trends

Table 2 Increase of Monthly Consumer Price Index (Yearly average, base 100 in 1970)

35,1 65,0 95,1 100,0 105,5 112,0 120,2 136,7 152,8 167,5 183,2 199,8 221,3 251,3

1949 1959 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989

285,0

318,6

349,3 375,2

397,1

407,6 420,4

431,7

447,4

Source: INSEE, Annuaire rttrospectif de la France, 1990: 287.

Table 3 Value of Total French Investment

645 633 624 602 586 605 633 659 715 758

1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 Source: INSEE, Annuaire statistique de la France, 1990: 334.

21

0 Context

Table 4 French Foreign Trade Figures

Year

Imports (millions of francs)

1938 1948 1950 1952 1954 1956 1958 1960 1962 1964 1966 1968 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1987 1988

6726 10777 14161 15220 19780 23552 31016 37 133 49719 58496 69029 106190 135 741 254 651 308 012 368 401 570 778 757 595 905 421 887 502 945040 1 053 799

Exports (millions of francs)

305

460

4340 10777 14161 15095 16234 21531 33901 36356 44408 53782 62723 99641 131 497 220 213 266228 344 594 469 694 606094 813003 825 417 857 774 963 748

Source: INSEE, Annuaire retrospect}/ de la France, 1990: 600.

22

Rate of coverage (%)

66,3 64,53 100,43 89,00 99,18 82,07 91,42 109,30 97,91 89,32 91,94 90,86 93,83 96,87 86,48 86,43 93,54 82,29 80,00 89,79 93,00 90,77 91,45

0.2 Macro-economic Trends

Table 5 Total Public Debt (Government) Year

Billions of Francs

1998 1948 1950 1955 I960 1962 1964 1966 1968 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988

4 34 40 57 84 85 87 80 97 164 173 197 253 315 414 496 614 775 915

1067 1 194 1282 1475

Source: INSEE, Annuaire rttrospectif de la France, 1990:619.

23

0 Context

Table 6 Gross Savings of Households Year

Billions of Francs

1970 1975 1980 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989

105 217 351 458 459 447 464 450 401 470 510

Source: INSEE, Annuaire retrospectif de la France, 1990: 254.

Table 7 Business Failures, 1968-1988 Year

Number of firms

1968 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1987 1988

8865 10813 9786 11974 12395 15589 17375 20462 25018 27802 30766 35052

Source: INSEE, Annuaires statistiqws de la France, 1979,1984, and 1990.

24

0.2 Macro-economic Trends

Table 8 Per Capita Growth Rates of GDP, Income and Personal Consumption Expenditures (constant francs)

Year

1961 1965 1970 1975 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989

GDP

Income

5,34 4,62 5,48 -0,74 3,69 3,71 3,43 0,93 -0,14 0,71 1,77 2,06 1,46 — — — —

4,4 3,8 4,7 0,2 2,5 2,9 2,7 1,1 0,6 1,9 0,2 0,9 1,4 2,1 1,7 3,3 3,3

Source: INSEE, Annuaire statistique, 1990.

25

Consumption expenditures

4,8 3,0 3,4 2,9 2,6 3,7 3,0 0,9 1,7 2,9 0,7 0,6 1,9 2,9 2,3 2,6 2,3

0.3

Macro-technological

Trends

Abstract. The main indicators of technological progress have evolved in the following fashion: energy consumption was high in the 1960s and 1970s, but slowed up with the oil crisis, leading to a diversification of the sources and of the consumption structure. The number of patents granted decreased in the 1970s, due to a lower number of national applications, but increased again in the 1980s because of a greater number of applications from abroad. Publishing output increased continuously until 1975, but has been decreasing since then. After easing off in the 1970s, research and development registered a relative improvement in the 1980s, bringing the R&D GDP to more than 2%. Since 1970, labour productivity has increased constantly, but capital productivity has not.

Energy Consumption The oil crisis delivered a severe blow to energy consumption, which had risen considerably since the World War n (consumption tripled between 1950 and 1972). After a record consumption of 200 million tons oil-equivalent in 1979, the slower growth rate and the energy-saving policy led to a noticeable reduction in consumption. A slight increase has been recorded since 1985. In 1987, the Ministry for Industry forecast an average increase of 8% until the year 2000. Modifications in relative prices led to a serious reduction in coal consumption from 1950 on, and with the oil crisis the government's policy of diverisfying energy sources brought about changes in consumption structure. These were characterized by a large decrease in oil consumption after 1973 and a massive increase in nuclear power. Nuclear power now accounts for 34,3% of total consumption, and oil for 38,6%. Inventions The situation of technology in France is measured by the national number of patent applications. The total number (from France or abroad) of applications decreased in the 1970s, but increased considerably in the 1980s. Most of this increase is due for the main part to an increase in applications from abroad. Foreign penetration, as indicated by foreign patent applications, has risen from 70% in 1970 to 80% in 1990. Publishing Between 1945 and 1975, the output of the publishing industry showed a strong increase within the context of the general development of cultural consumption. Between 1960 and 1970, turnover in the industry doubled. With the end of the 1970s, however, the book market began to show difficulty: the number of readers leveled out and sales increased less rapidly. The recent trend has been to bring together production and distribution. Research and Development Domestic expenditure on R&D was estimated in 1987 at 120 billion francs, or 2,27% of GDP.

26

0.3 Macro-technological Trends

After a sustained increase in the 1960s, research efforts slowed in the 1970s. Private industry did not compensate for the withdrawal of state support, resulting in a downward trend in most indicators between 1970 and 1980: R&D expenditures as a percentage of GDP diminished; R&D expenditures in industry stagnated; and the number of researchers as a percentage of the active population ceased to increase. During the 1980s, the position of research improved in relative terms. As of 1982, R&D expenditures rose to more than 2% of GDP, and the annual growth rate expressed as a volume of DERD rose by an average of 4% per year. France's investment in R&D remains noticeably lower than of its principal competitors. Productivity Although overall productivity has shown a constant increase since 1970, capital productivity has shown the reverse tendency. The overall increase of 1,9% per year for the commercial sector after 1970 (against 4% in the 1960s) is entirely due to the increased productivity of labour. Capital productivity has declined constantly, though the decrease after the second oil crisis was less noticeable than that after the first Analysis of productivity in the industrial and service sectors shows significant contrasts. Increased overall productivity in the latter sector is less than that in the former. Productivity in the industrial sector increased by 3% per year between 1970 and 1979, and began to decline only after the second oil crisis, whereas in the service industries productivity was negative between 1974 and 1979 (-0,3%) and slightly positive thereafter (+0,8%). Pierre Fattaccini

References Busson, A. Y, Evrard 1987. "Portraits dconomiques de la culture." In Notes and ttudes docwnentaires. Paris: La Documentation Francaise. INSEE, 1990. Tableaux de l'6conomie francaise. INSEE, 1989, February. "La productivity en France de 1970 a 1987." Insee-Premiere 6. Ministere de 1'Industrie et de 1'Ame'nagement du Territoire. 1989. Les chiffres cits de I'industrie.

27

0 Context

Table 1 Primary Energy Consumption Year

Tons Oil Equivalent (millions)

1950 1960 1970 1973 1979 1980 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989

57,6 84,6 153,6 183,1 199,8 196,3 191,0 193,6 197,3 199,4 205,5 209,6

Source: INSEE, Annuaires statistiques de la France, 1984 and 1990.

28

0.3 Macro-technological Trends

Table 2 Registered Patents

Year

Number of Patents

1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989

14807 13458 12706 12110 11471 11811 11445 11303 11000 10945 10681 11 147 11333 12050 12155 12695 12437 12592

Source: INSEE, Annuaires statistiques de la France, 1984 and 1990.

29

Balance of Income/Expenditures on Foreign Patents (Millions of francs)

-1 145 -1 187 -1366 -1809 -1288 -1495 -1607 -2242 -2457 -3462 -2469 -3948 -4219 -3798 -4 184 -6484 -4842

0 Context

Table 3 Research and Development

Year

1963 1967 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988

Total Investment as % of GDP

State Investment (%)

Company Investment (%)

69 71 63 62 61 61 60 58 58 58 56 56 58 57 57 57 57 57 56 54

49 51 56 58 58 59 60 60 60 60 60 60 59 58 57 57 59 59 59 59

1,58 2,16 1,88 1,85 1,75 1,77 1,79 1,75 1,73 1,73 1,78 1,82 1,97 2,06 2,11 2,21 2,26 2,25 2,29 2,29

Source: INSEE, Annuaire statistique de la France, 1990: 316.

30

0.3 Macro-technological Trends

Table 4 Engineering Diplomas and State Doctorates in Science and Technology

Year

Engineers

1948 1953 1954 1958 1963 1968 1970 1975 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988

— 3693 4729 6658 8873 8775 9956 11548 11757 12156 12315 12685 13659 13722 14252 14739

Source: DSfSEE, Annuaire rttrospectif de la France, 1990: 230-231.

31

State Doctorates Science and Technology 109 177 — 322 342 774 978 1 144 1 111 1 169 1016 1089 1239 1457 937 1413 —

0 Context

Table 5 Scientific, Professional, and Technical Book Sales Year

Millions of francs

1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988

227,2 248,7 216,7 297,9 330,2 341,7 399,1 412,0 516,7 557,4 564,2 617,2 534,3 541,3

Source: INSEE, Annuaires statistiques de la France, 1984 and 1990.

32

1 AGE GROUPS Most peasant and lineal societies are structured according to age groups which articulate phases of the life cycle: childhood, youth, adulthood, and old age. Each phase has a corresponding principal function: socialization, fun time, work and war, power, and transmission of traditions. These phases are always less discrete for women than for men. Feudal and industrial society abolished these phases: at the end of childhood, the boy became an adult who was put to work and had to bear arms. In the nineteenth century, the bourgeoisie reinvented the concept of youth, though only within the social class itself. Age groups lost their importance in peasant society, and working-class children were put to work even before they reached adolescence. In the last 30 years, two categories have surfaced: old age, arising from the combined effect of increased life expectancy, the institutionalization of retirement, and the lowering of retirement age; and youth, arising from the institutionalization of a period of instability between school-leaving (at 16-18 years of age) and "settling" (marriage and stable employment at about 28 years of age). The appearance of these two age groups and their rapidly growing importance in society does not affect the living conditions of adult couples who provide for the education of children and work to earn a living. However, the heightened contrast between youth, adulthood, and old age has deprived adulthood of its hegemony: heretofore, adulthood was the norm. Now, on the contrary, adulthood has become a stage in the life cycle, situated between two structurally different stages. Since adulthood did not change structurally, it has not been retained as a trend. Similarly, childhood has not been modified structurally: it remains centred around life apprenticeship. Children have not acquired a major role in society; they are still the objects of family, school, and social-educational processes. However, adolescence, from puberty to school-leaving age, was examined. It did not appear to constitute an autonomous force, and has not been retained as a trend.

33

1.1 Youth Abstract. Twenty years ago, the majority of young people from all social categories had married and found stable employment by the age of 24. Today there is an unstable intermediary period of unemployment and/or cohabitation between the end of adolescence and the beginning of adult life. Those in different social categories experience this period in different ways.

During the 1960s, people from every level of the social pyramid had left home and "settled"—married and found stable employment—by the age of 24. From about 1970 on this pattern was totally shaken. Marital and occupational settling dates were postponed and separated from each other. This change dissociated the different settling ages, thereby creating an intermediary period in all social categories. This new period arises, first of all, from the raising of the school-leaving age (see 15.1, "General Education") and the extended professional settling phase. Those who become manual workers attend school until the age of 16, students achieve a "bac" (highschool diploma) at the age of 18 on average, and university students may continue their studies until they are 25, the upper age limit for military service. Since the economic crisis —with the exception of students at the "Grandes Ecoles," the French equivalent of American Ivy League universities, whose expectations have not changed—a large proportion of young people do not find stable employment either on leaving school or on completing military service. They spend a greater or lesser period of time either unemployed or living from short-term employment. Occupational settling, which used to punctuate the shift from adolescence to adulthood, has become a slower, more complex process. Marital settling has also been postponed. Between 1975 and 1985, the average age at the time of first marriage rose from 22,5 to 24,5 years for women, and from 24,5 to 26,5 years for men. With minor differences, cohabitation began to be practised throughout the social scale (see 3.3, "Matrimonial Models"). More young people are now leaving the parental home to live alone than did so 20 years ago. On the other hand, since the early 1980s, a lack of means has impelled young people pursuing their studies, and particularly the unemployed from lower social strata, to stay longer in the parental home. It is during this period of instability that personal ambitions are formed and adapted to the social environment. Youth was strongly affected by changes in the educational system. Social and professional ambitions increased with the rising demand for education. However, since the growing number of graduates led to a depreciation of the value of degrees, level of education is no longer a reliable indicator of social position. Thus, young adults undergo a process of adjustment between personal ambitions and social position; this often takes several years, with a large variety of jobs being held. Youth has become a period of social ambiguity during which the individual must find a job which is no longer automatically determined by schooling. Moreover, a profound change has taken place in the valorization of life stages. Adults today wish to look young, but are unwilling to forgo the advantages and responsibilities which age confers. This creates a negation of the differences between youth and adulthood and destabilizes the social identification of youth. The ambiguity of youth explains why young people play such a small role in institutionalized political (see 11.1, "Political Differentiation") and trade-union life (see 9.1, "Labour Unions"): in the 1986 legislative elections, the voting rate for the 20-30 age group was 10 points lower than for the electorate as whole. Although 80% are enrolled

34

1.1 Youth

on electoral lists, many abstain: between 30% and 35% of those under the age of 30, depending on the election. They do, however, play an active role in groups, associations (NGOs), and new forms of social interaction (see 2.5, "Voluntary Associations," and 2.6, "Sociability Networks"), and, above all, they are the largest "consumers" of art and culture (see 14.4, "Cultural Activities"). The intermediary period of setting into adulthood is experienced in very different ways by the 16-18 age group, depending on the social setting. Whereas young suburban workers continue to live with their parents, sometimes "letting rip" and living a semidelinquent life, middle-class young people have their own apartments, study, do odd jobs, cohabit, and travel. During this time they experience instability and are helped by social assistance and by support from parents (see 2.2, "Kinship Networks").

Jean-Hugues Dechaux

References Baudelot, C. 1988, January. "La jeunesse n'est plus ce qu'elle 6tait: les difficulty's d'une description.' Revue 6conomique 1. Dubet, F. 1987. La galere: jeunes en survie. Paris: Fayard. Galland, 0.1984. Les jeunes. Paris: La De'couverte. Galland, 0.1987, April. "Une nouvelle jeunesse"? Futuribles. Galland, 0.1991. Sociologie de la jeunesse. Paris: Armand Colin. Gokalp, C. 1981. "Quand vient I'Sge des choix." INED, Travaux et Documents: 95. Paris: PUF. INSEE 1988, December. "L'entre'e des jeunes dans la vie active." Economic et statistique: 216. Welcome, G., and C. Willerval. 1986. Juniorscopie. Paris: Larousse.

35

1 Age Groups

Table 1 Commencement of Working Life by Age (Boys) (%) 1954

Age

14 16

30,2

59,3 81,4 91,8

18 22

1962 27,3 50,6 72,3 90,9

1982

0 4 37 74

1987

0

1,13 27,2 67,1

Source: O. Galland, Sociologie de lajeunesse, 1991: 126.

Table 2 Average Age at First Marriage Year

Men

Women

1957 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989

26,2 26,1 25,1 24,4 24,6 25,2 25,3 25,5 25,8 26,0 26,4 26,6 27,0 27,2 27,5

23,6 23,5 22,6 22,4 22,5 23,0 23,2 23,4 23,6 23,9 24,3 24,6 24,9 25,2 25,5

Source: 1NSEE, Annuaire r&rospectif de la France, 1990: 38.

36

1.1 Youth

Table 3 Unmarried Couple Households (Persons under 35 years) Year

Number of Unmarried Couples

1968 1975 1982 1985

67000 165000 464000 589000

Source: Audirac, P.-A. 1986, February. Economic et Statistique: 185.

Table 4 Percentage of Young People Living with Parents

Age

1982

1987

1989

15-19 20-24 25-29

89,5 57,3 26,0

91,6 63,2 33,6

91,3 53,8 17,5

Source: INSEE, Enquetes emploi.

37

1 Age Groups

Table 5 Status of Youths Between 16 and 25 Years Status Students Trainees Employed

1983

1984

1985

1986

1987

1988

29,9

30,8

32,0

33,1

34,6

36,3

45,2

42,5

41,3

42,0

41,4

40,0

2,6

2,5

2,5

2,5

2,6

2,7

0,1

0,1

0,7

2,4

2,6

2,5

1,6

1,8

1,5

1,7

1,3

1,8

Youth employment incentive schemes: - apprentices - Community Employment - Occupational Training for Unemployed - Training Contracts

— 1

— 1

— 0,9

0,3 1,1

1,0 3,3

1,2 2,0

Non-assisted employment Army Unemployed Inactive Balance

41,5 2,9 9,8 6,8 3,8

38,9 2,7 11,9 6,7 3,6

37,2 2,9 12,4 6,6 3,3

35,7 2,9 11,5 5,9 2,9

31,9 2,7 11,3 5,7 3,0

31,6 2,9 9,9 5,4 3,7

Total Number in age group (in thousands)

100

100

100

100

100

100

8583

8584

8556

8531

8528

8537

Source: INSEE, Premiers rtsultats: 168, 1988.

38

1.2 Elders Abstract. Longer life expectancy, earlier retirement, and universal pensions give elders a greater role in all domains of society, particularly in relation to new lifestyles and leisure activities.

The average life expectancy for a French male increased from 55 years in 1940 to 72 years in 1987; for females, from 60 years to 80 years. There are still wide variations between different professions (teachers have the longest life expectancy, unskilled labourers the shortest). The increase at first led to a rise in the number of people over 60, but the structure of the age pyramid has now caused this proportion to stabilize. Short of an improbable increase in the birth rate between now and the year 2000, people over 60 will account for about 20% of the population at that time. The legal retirement age has been reduced from 65 to 60. French people today retire between 55 and 65, though self-employed persons continue to work until they are 70 or over. The French social-security system guarantees a retirement pension for all citizens. At the age of 78, health-related spending starts to increase: this is the beginning of the "fourth" age, which is not under consideration in this study. On average, senior citizens enjoy good health until they reach that age. They have no debts and possess a share of the national wealth which is more than proportionate to their number. As a result, their income is higher than the national average, and this gap has widened somewhat in recent years. Their income range is as broad as that of the population as a whole, with differences between retired people being as great as between the socio-professional categories. The saving rate for the over-65 age group is higher than the national average (12.3, "Personal and Family Health"). Their life styles, cultural and consumer patterns, and ways of socializing display great differences, depending on income, educational attainment (see 15.1, "General Education"), and family, neighbourhood, and friendship networks (see 2.2, "Kinship Networks"). Retired people tend to settle in the country or in small towns, or to "go south" in search of a milder climate; as a result, they have a revitalizing effect on the rural milieu (see 2.3, "Community and Neighbourhood Types"). With an abundance of time on their hands, they can devote themselves to different free-time activities; they participate informally in the economy in various ways, through housework, gardening, do it yourself, mutual assistance, and so on. They are good customers for certain sectors, such as travel, fine food, and furniture. This new "leisure class" will invent new life styles and play an important role in determining the future shape of France's society and economy. We cannot predict what the face of society will be, given that the "new" senior citizens will be radically different. The majority of present-day old people led their professional and private lives before, during, and after the war, in a period of extreme hardship and poverty; this generation is aware of new leisure activities, but they retain their old life style. Those reaching retirement age today were brought up in the same period of poverty, but their years of professional activity correspond to the "the high growth period between 1945 and 1975"; therefore, they have the same habits and life style as today's society. When the babyboom and 1968 generations reach retirement age, their leisure and cultural practices will have been acquired from childhood (see 1.1, "Youth").

39

1 Age Groups

These new senior citizens will take on functions and responsibilities in civil, religious, and cultural associations, particularly within municipalities (see 2.5, "Voluntary Associations"). They will be able to retain or resume their position in the commercial and social economy. They play an essential role in reinforcing kinship activities. By their very existence, they maintain links between extended kin. Because of their activity and resources, they maintain contact with their offspring through the exchange of gifts, favours and so on. Grandparents will be in a privileged position vis-a-vis their grandchildren; because both parents will be active, grandparents will play an essential role in the education and socialization of their grandchildren, and therefore in transmitting values (see 7.3, "Norms of Conduct," and 7.4, "Authority"). As the "leisure class" they will offer their grandchildren models and values which differ from those of their working parents. At present, the cultural consumption of retired people is below average, with the exception of newspapers and television (see 14.4, "Cultural Activities"). Given that the generations to come will have a much higher cultural level, we may assume that they will also be greater consumers of culture.

Henri Mendras

References Audirac, P.-A. 1985. "Les personnes ag6es, de la vie familiale & 1'isolement." tconomie et statistique: 175. Babeau, A. 1985. La fin des retraites. Paris: Hachette. Canceill, G. 1989, June. "Ressources et niveau de vie des personnes agees." tconomie et statistique: 222. Commissariat Ge'ne'ral du Plan, 1980. Vieillir demain. Paris: Documentation Frangaise. Dinh Quang Chi, and Labat, J.-C. 1986, July-August "Le vieillissement de la population francaise est ineluctable." ficonomie el statistique: 190. Guillemard, A.-M. 1986. Le declin du social Paris: PUF. Le vieillissement de la societe, 1985. special issue of Futuribles: 68. Mendras, H. 1984, July. "Le troisieme Sge animera la soci&6 frangaise." Revue de I'OFCE: 8. Paillat, P. 1982. Vieillissement et vieillesse. Paris: PUF, coll. Que sais-je?

40

1.2 Elders

Table 1 Life Expectancy at Selected Ages, by Sex 1946-48 to 1987 Age

1946-48

1949-51

1959-61

1965

1970

1975

1981

1987

16,2 7,8 4,2

16,5 7,8 4,2

17,3 8,2 4,4

18,4 9,0 4,8

20,8 9,8 5,0

21,3 10,0 5,1

22,3 10,6 5,3

23,7 11,7 5,9

Males

60 70 85

15,5 7,0 3,7

15,0 6,7 3,4

15,9 7,4 3,8

15,7 7,5 3,9

Females

60 70 85

18,3 8,4 4,5

18,0 8,1

4,2

19,7 9,0 4,6

20,1 9,3 4,7

Source: INSEE, Annuaire retrospectif de la France, 1990.

Table 2 Number of Older Persons Year

60-64 Years

65 Years +

Total Population

1946

1 998 090 2 036 667 2316151 2 636 052 1616609 2875609

4 440 003 4 727 108 5 287 916 6 473 612 7 541 038 7 564 528

40 125 230 41 647 258 45 464 797 50 528 219 53 731 387 55 750 317

1950 1960 1970 1980 1988

Source: INSEE, Annuaire retrospectif de la France, 1990: 27.

41

1 Age Groups

Table 3 Labour-Force Participation Rates for Older Persons (%)

55^64 Yrs

Year

77,9 78,1 72,4 67,9 62,7 49,3 48,0 47,0 47,1

1954 1962 1970 1975 1980 1985 1986 1987 1988

Males

65 Yrs+

35,7 26,8 14,3 10,0

5,8 4,8 4,4 3,8 3,4

Females 65 Yrs+ 55-64 Yrs

13,5 11,4

38,7 38,0 37,2 35,4 36,1 29,7 30,1 30,7 31,1

7,5 5,3 3,0 2,5 2,2 2,0 2,0

Source: INSEE, Annuaire rttrospectif de la France, 1990: 57.

Table 4 Annual Average Increase in Disposable Income (%) 1962-70

1970-75

1975-79

1979-84

Head of household active

+ 4,2

+ 2,8

+ 0,5

-1,0

Head of household retired

+ 6,2

+ 5,9

+ 2,9

+ 1,0

Source: CERC, Les revenus des manages 1960-1984, Documents du CERC: 80, 1986.

42

2 MICROSOCIAL

The massive traditional social structure, consisting of large companies and national institutions, leaves more and more scope for a structure based on the social networks that constitute local institutions. These networks merge and converge, connecting and disconnecting as they overlap with and duplicate each other. Local autonomy is increased by renewed sociability, the new-found importance of family networks, and affiliation with proximal groups. In the absence of integration into higher structures, these networks and microgroups focus on their own functioning and concentrate on satisfying their own internal needs. In order to be dynamic they need more outside stimuli, such as national questions and debates. Since the time of Tocqueville, Parisian centralization, unanimously recognized as a national illness, has been on the increase. First royal fiat, then government order, decreed that all data and decision-making should be centred in Paris. An inevitable result was the weakening of local power structures, particularly the communes. On the economic level, large-scale organization led to the merging of local companies into large firms and multinationals. In theory, large national institutions (church, army, school, unions) were one and the same throughout the country. Major ideological conflicts were shared by all French people, and all identified with the nation and with large social classes. Over the last 20 years, the secular tendency seems to be reversing. The crumbling of social classes has led to a dulling of class consciousness, patriotism is on the wane, whereas there is greater identification with locality and region. The failure of the communes to unite strengthened the legitimacy and increased the power of mayors and municipalities. Activists have become increasingly rare in national institutions, as they have preferred to be active at the level of local associations, which have increased dramatically in number. The rural fabric is being restructured around burg-centres, while urban life, having expanded, is now refocusing around city or surburban centres which have been reclaimed by the upper classes. The proximity factor is winning out over that of size. Local has supplanted national. Borders no longer compartmentalize social space, and the increasing number of networks is creating a social fabric which is both supple and fundamental. The resilience of society no longer depends on its rigidity but on its flexibility. For individuals, an increased number of contacts, even minor ones, may lead to even greater control than a loose link with powerful institutions would indicate. As against this, diversity of contacts increases freedom of choice.

43

2.1

Self-identification Abstract. People are tending to identify less with social class and the great national institutions. There is greater identification with family, locality, and occupational and micro-groups.

The awareness of belonging to a social class was analyzed in the 1950s and 1960s as being one of the essential characteristics of society. Alain Touraine, along with foreign sociologists, attempted to measure workers' class consciousness, which the Communist Party and trade unions were trying to increase. Bourgeois class consciousness was also taken for granted. Farmer class consciousness was, like class consciousness of the petite bourgeoisie, subject for debate. Sociologists today are agreed that class consciousness has blurred. In 1976, three-quarters of workers considered themselves to be members of a class, as opposed to only half in 1987. Surveys show that more and more French people consider themselves to be members of the middle class. This is obviously a negation of class consciousness, since there is no longer a class struggle. Class-based institutions, particularly trade unions, have lost influence (see 10.2, "Institutionalization of Labour Unions"). Similarly, the great national institutions (church, school, army) are no longer major identification points (see 11.2, "Confidence in Institutions"). The belief that ever more intense technological progress would sustain a growth economy has proved impractical. People are falling back on smaller groups, places, and organizations over which they have more control (see 2.3, "Community and Neighbourhood Types"). Society is becoming more varied as the need for autonomy, self-expression, and individuality increases, but it is also becoming more complex, since it is no longer possible to classify individuals purely on the basis of their belonging to a macrogroup. Several signs indicate that French people today valorize small-scale social universes. For example, there has been an unprecedented increase in the number of associations dedicated to sections of social life (see 2.5, "Voluntary Associations"). Similarly, the family is showing remarkable vitality: people both young and old continue to appreciate the family universe, since 64% of French people consider that the family is "the only place where they feel relaxed and comfortable." Moreover, decentralization (see 2.4, "Local Autonomy") seems to contribute to strengthening identification with a region or commune. Within companies, people identify with groups rather than with trades or professions. The consequences of this phenomenon are multiple. The development of associations in towns has created new 61ite networks, from which many deputies elected since 1981 have come, and on which they depend. The growth of the informal economy (see 12.2, "Informal Economy"), which indicates the existence of personal networks (see 2.6, "Sociability Networks") indispensable to its functioning, is also related to this falling back on the microsocial and to new needs for autonomy. Michel Forse

44

2.1 Self-identification

References Chancel, J., H. Dougier, and P.-E, Tixier. 1981. "Les Evolutions minuscules: qui s'engage aujourd'hui et pourquoi fake?" In Autrement. Paris: Seuil. Fors6, M. 1982, June. "Les Francais red&ouvrent les vertus du microsocial." Revue de I'OFCE 1, D'Iribame, P. 1983. "Crise de I'identite modeme." Futuribles: 62. Dubar, Cl. 1991. La socialisation. Construction des identitis sociales et professionnelles. Paris: Armand Colin. Jollivet, M. 1966, January. "L'utilisation de la notion de classe sociale en sociologie mrale." £pist£mologie sociologique: 3. Lautman, J. 1981. "Ou sont les classes d'antant." In Mendras, H. 1980. La sagesse et le desordre. Paris: Gallimard. Sainsaulieu, R. 1978. L'identite au travail. Paris: FNSP. Schumacher, E. 1978. Small is beautiful. Paris: Seuil. Touraine, A. 1966. La conscience ouvriere. Paris: Seuil. Touraine, A., M. Wieviorka, and F. Dubet. 1984. Le mouvement ouvrier. Paris: Fayard.

45

2 Microsocial

Table 1 Family Do you agree with the statement "The family is the only place where people feel relaxed and easy?" (%)

1978

1979

1980

1981

1982

1983

1984

1985

1986

Yes

69,7

68,7

66,6

63,7

60,8

63,0

62,9

62,8

63,7

No

30,3

31,3

33,4

36,0

39,1

36,9

37,0

37,1

36,2

Don't know







0,3

0,1

0,1

0,1





100

100

100

100

100

Total

100

100

100

100

Source: CREDOC, Futuribles, Sept. 1987: 36.

Table 2 Class Consciousness "Do you feel that you belong to a social class?'1 (%)

«Yes» Total

December 1966a 66

December 1976b 68

March 1983b

April 1987b

May 1988C

62

56

56

67 66 62 71

60 63 59 50

60 65 52 56

Profession of interviewee: Senior management Middle mamagement Wage earner Worker

61 65 56 60

68 57 64 74

Sources: a. Sample of 1 780 people, Michelat et Simon, Revue Frangaise de Sociologie, XII, 1971, 483-527. b. Sample of 2 000 people, Sondage SofKs-L'Expansion. c. Sample of 4 000 people, Sondage Sofres-Cevipof.

46

2.1 Self-identification

Table 3 "If yes, which class do you belong to?" (%)

Occupation : Farmers Artisans, shopkeepers Senior management, professionals, intellectuals Middle-management Wage-earners

Bourgeoisie

Poor

Management class

ing

class

Middle Worker class

Lower class

IntelIndelectuals pendent None

2,3

29,1

38,4

8,1

0

16,3

1,2

1,0

11,9

22,8

26,7

3,0

2,0

28,7

1,0

0

3,9

2,9

1,9

42,7

1,0

23,3

6,8

3,9

2,9 0,6

0,4 1,5

0,7 0

29,5

9,8

12,3

1,8 5,6

5,8 2,0

4,3 2,6

1,1 1,2

0,6

3,8

0,3

47,5

16,1 18,6

60,9 40,9 24,2

3,1

0

1,9

0

0

4,7

0

3,0

0

13,6

Workers

Work-

Source: SOFRES-CEVIPOF, 1988, May, survey, sample of 4 000 people having answered "Yes" to the previous question, either employed or unemployed having previously worked.

Table 4 Feeling of Belonging to a Locality "To which of the following places do you feel that you most belong?" (%

Town or commune Department Region France None Don't know Total

1985

1987

1989

33 5 11 45 5 1

36 6 13 39 4 2

41 7 11 38 2 1

100

100

100

Source: SOFRES-Observatoire Regional du Politique. 1990.

47

2.2 Kinship Networks Abstract. Kinship ties increase with greater life expectancy. The kinship network remains the principal substructure underlying sociability. Children often live near their parents and there are more numerous and more frequent exchanges of favours between children and parents.

Over the last 30 years, increased life expectancy has compensated for a reduced birth rate, enabling us to conclude that there are a relatively stable number of close kin. However, old people, because they live longer, are the trustees of family memory, maintain links in the extended family, and keep alive the image of "the family." Because of the extension of the schooling phase and the difficulties of professional settling, the tendency for young people to leave home early has reversed since the beginning of the 1980s (see 1.1, "Youth"). Once married, children leave the parental home, but 75% of them live within 20 km of at least one set of parents. Aged parents no longer live with their children, but live nearby, facilitating frequent visits and shared meals. Whereas meetings with parents are more frequent, contact with members of the extended family shows less resistance to geographical distancing. This structure constitutes "local kinship." Kinship is the principal framework of socialization for French people, particularly the working classes (see 2.6, "Sociability Networks"). Most ritualized festivities are the occasion for family gatherings: holidays such as Christmas and All Saints Day, but also the celebration of rites of passage: birthdays, communions, marriages, funerals, and so on. The exchange of gifts is principally a family rite. With the exception of delicate matters involving ideological stands (morality, education, religion, politics and so on), requests for advice are frequent and presuppose a relative cultural continuity. Beyond this socialization, numerous transfers of goods and services indicate attachment to the family. Young couples who reject excessive or regular support nonetheless benefit, particularly when they set up house, from substantial material and financial aid which comes indiscriminately from both families: gifts in kind or financial assistance amounting to several months' income, interest-free loans, and so on. Subsequently, parents may help with young grandchildren (day care and holiday care) or with the ups and downs of life (home management, job hunting, advice, and so on). Numerous unquantifiable daily favours (shopping, giving lifts, knitting, and so on) constitute exchanges between the generations which continue right through the life cycle. These exchanges, favours, and occasions for socializing are, above all, the domain of women and strengthen the predominance of the maternal line. Since increased life expectancy increases lineage, inheritance takes place only when the children are already well established in life (see 1.2, "Elders"). Consequently, inheritance-transmission patterns have changed: the inheritance skips a generation, and is transmitted to the grandchildren in the form of gifts. It establishes the grandchildren, rather than the direct heirs, as inheritors, thereby strengthening kinship in the immediate family. This solidarity between generations operates within the framework of a solidly based norm structure which lays down the idea of continual assistance. This is seen as an imperative duty by both parents and grandparents. However, the norm structure does not

48

2.2 Kinship Networks

exclude the ambivalence felt by young couples between their desire for autonomy and their need for assistance. Because assistance must not be imposed and must respect their independence, it is all the more solicited. It must therefore be discreet and disinterested. This interplay of need and duty is played out in a variety of widely diverse and subtle ways. Forms of family support vary in function of social class. In the upper and middle classes, it mainly takes the form of promotion, aimed at improving status, either by providing the footholds necessary to reach a better position, which the interested parties would otherwise take longer to reach, or by enabling them to achieve a better position than their parents. In the lower classes, assistance enables the couple to lead a normal life by supplying it with the means to overcome the trials and accidents of existence, particularly unemployment. Overall, although statistical data do not prove it, a strengthening of kinship networks seems plausible. There are a growing number of occasions for interchange: rising unemployment (see 4.1, "Unemployment"), the increasing uncertainty of youth, changing patterns of inheritance transmission (see 12.3, "Personal and Family Wealth"), and more jobs for women (see 3.4, "Women's Employment") should contribute to strengthening kinship exchanges. Moreover, the 50-60-year-old generation must take care both of their parents (one-third of 60-year-old women's mothers are still living) and of their own children. Jean-Hugues Dechaux

References D6chaux, J.-H. 1990. "Les ^changes 6conomiques au sein de la parentele." Sociologie du Travail: 1. Delbes, C. 1983. "Les families des salaries du secteur prive" a la veille de la retraite. II: Les relations familiales." Population: 6. Gokalp, C. 1978. "Le reseau familial." Population: 6. LaffSrere, A. 1984. "Des parents aux enfants: aides, donations, heritages." Donnees sociales. Le Bras, H. 1982. "Evolution des liens de famille au cours de 1'existence. Une comparaison entre la France actuelle et la France du XVIIIe siecle." In Les ages de la vie. INED, Cahier 96, Paris: PUF. Paillat, P. 1983. "Les families des salari6s du secteur priv6 a la veille de la retraire: I - Le reseau familial." Population: 3. Pitrou, A. 1977. "Le soutien familial dans la socie'te' urbaine." Revue Franqaise de Sociologie, 18: 1. Roussel, L. and O. Bourguignon, 1976. "La famille apres le manage des enfants." Travaux et Documents. Paris: INED: 78.

49

2 Microsocial

Table 1 Size of Household Average number of persons per household

Year

3,47 3,40 3,07 3,1 3,11 3,05 2,88 2,70 2,63 2,53

1901 1911 1946 1954 1962 1968 1975 1982 1985 1990

Source: INSEE, I. Copp6e, La taille des manages and Donntes sociales 1990.

Table 2 Type of Child Care Type* Paid help Member of family Daycare centre Other

1981a

46,5 27,0

8,6 3,5

* not including one parent. Source: a. INED 1981 survey. b. "Aspirations" CREDOC, 1987-88 survey.

50

1987-88b

45 26 16 7

2.2 Kinship Networks

Table 3 Proportion of Young Adults Living with Parents (%) Young adults

1982

1989

from 20 to 24 years: Males Females

52,6 37,9

61,5 46,4

from 25 to 29 years: Males Females

17,6 8,7

23,2 11,8

Source: ESTSEE, Enqufres Emploi 1982 and 1989.

Table 4 Proportion of Households Having Received Assistance from Parents Forms of assistance

%

Children minded by grandparents Financial assistance at start of marriage Lasting financial assistance Substantial loans A gift An inheritance Assistance in finding work Occasional assistance Substantial gift at time of marriage

27 10 16 18 18 24 25 38 40

Source: INSEE, Donntes societies, 1984.

51

2.3 Community and Neighbourhood Types Abstract. The revitalization of rural life around small and medium-sized towns makes localities more independent. Local areas and communes in urban agglomerations are becoming more independent. The greater role of municipalities in sports, culture, and socio-economic life has a reinvigorating effect on local companies.

The standardization policy of royal, Napoleonic, and republican governmental systems, backed up by the railroads, industrialization, and urbanization, led to the concentration and delocalization of French society. This movement has slowed, and even reversed, since the beginning of the 1970s, to make way for renewed localization. The 1982 census showed that between 1975 and 1982 the population of rural communes grew more quickly, at a rate of 7%, than did that of the cities, at a rate of 1%; the national average was 3% during this period. Urban centres are being depopulated, whereas suburban populations are increasing, though at a slower rate than in the previous intercensal period. From 1975 on, the population of rural communes began to grow, particularly those situated on the periphery of urban agglomerations. When cities overflow into the country, new links are forged between the two. The term "rurbanization" has been coined to describe this development. The reasons for this phenomenon are multiple: the attractions of a private house, prohibitive housing prices in some city centres, and so on. A motorized life style is certainly a precondition (in 1982,27% of homes in rural communes of partially urban cantons possessed at least two cars). Rurbanization seems to have slowed since 1982, although metropolitanization seems to be continuing. Some urban centres show an increasing concentration of skilled workers and subcontracting industries, while others show a reduction in these areas. Meanwhile, the population of truly rural communes (those beyond the influence of cities) continues to decline. These areas have a predominance of senior citizens and declining employment, particularly because of the concentration of farmers in the more fertile zones. Farmers no longer constitute the largest socio-professional category of the active population of rural communes; they have been outnumbered by workers. Wageearners and the middle classes are also making notable inroads. In spite of this situation, other signs—at least in certain cases—indicate a revitalization. Abandoned dwellings in isolated hamlets used to be the ultimate symbol of delocalization. Since 1975, the number of vacant dwellings in rural areas has decreased, as it has in urban peripheral areas. Refurbishment of old houses is coupled with the rapidly increasing number of new dwellings built as holiday homes, but also, more and more frequently, as homes for people working in cities. This new population is revitalizing areas, as well as changing their traditional uses. Rural areas are no longer as large, nor do they have the same social composition, but, far from dying, they seem to be thriving. Local associations are springing up rapidly, and local political life has lost none of its colour. France, with 36 000 communes, has the smallest local politico-administrative unit in Europe. All attempts to merge communes have failed, and municipalities have been granted greater power and financial means: the budget for municipalities has increased faster than has that of the state (see 2.4, "Local Autonomy").

52

2.3 Community and Neighbourhood Types

Increased property ownership (see 12.3, "Personal and Family Wealth") and rurbanization are closely linked: 60% of owners of dwellings built after 1980 live in an urban unit of fewer than 100 000 inhabitants and 90% of them have private houses. Housing developments are occupied by workers and wage-earners or by the middle classes, and sometimes by both (see 6.1, "Occupational Status"). Conflict between these strata and/or the original inhabitants is frequent; for instance, when there is a question of the use to which available land should be put, there is often disagreement between those who wish to see it developed for housing and those who wish it to remain agricultural (see 7.1, "Conflict"). Here we see, though in a totally new form, the traditional conflicts of village societies: municipal elections are often the time at which these conflicts appear. Is this not the best sign of the revitalization of local communities? In certain areas of large cities (particularly when they are being renovated or refurbished), alliances are made and broken between new arrivals and original inhabitants. Redevelopment of city centres is a striking example, all the more so since the type of dwellings and the commercial and socio-cultural activities available are essential to the definition of the image of social life in the area. We find the same phenomenon in suburbs where municipalities are looking for a way to create an original image through their choice of cultural, sports, or leisure activities, as well as through reconversion of areas and an enlightened social policy. The creation of large department stores outside towns led to delocalization in the 1960s; during the 1980s, medium-sized shops multiplied and local business reacquired a clientele. Many studies insist that behind the relative homogeneity of these transformations is a diversity of life styles and politico-administrative management (see 2.6, "Sociability Networks"). These studies demonstrate that the trend toward relocalization promotes such diversity. Michel Forse

References ATP, 1983. "Observation continue du changement social et culturel." Cahiers de ['observation du changement social. Paris: CNRS. Bontron, J.-C. 1985, June. "Population et espace rural vers une nouvelle dynamique." Pour. Boudoul, J.-C. and J.-P, Faur. 1982, November. "Renaissance des communes rurales ou nouvelle forme d'urbanisation." fcconomie et statistique: 149. Desplanques, G. 1979, January. "La ville ou la campagne." ficonomie et statistique: 107. Guy, C. 1989. "Villes et campagnes." fccoflash: 36. INSEE, 1988. "Villes et campagnes." Contours et caracteres. Kayser, B. 1990. La renaissance rurale. Paris: Armand Colin. Lautman, J. 1983. "Renouveau des socie'te's locales: volont£ ou r6sultat?" Sociologie du Travail, 25/2. Lefebvre, M. 1985. "R6partition g^ographique de la population." Les carders frangais: 219. L'esprit des lieux, 1987. Paris: CNRS. Taffin, C. 1975. "Accession a la propri6t6 et rurbanisation." tconome et statistique: 175.

53

2 Microsocial

Table 1 Growth of Town Population According to Size Size of town in thousands of inhabitants

Annual growth rate (%)

2 to 5 5 to 10 10 to 20 20 to 50 50 to 100 100 to 200 200 to 2 000 Paris and suburbs (9,1 million)

1975-1982

1982-1990

1,00 0,89 0,62 0,26 0,21 0,21 1,16 0,05

0,62 0,54 0,41 0,24 0,25 0,19 0,38 0,50

Source: DSTSEE, Census Figures.

Table 2 Population Distribution of Cities and their Suburbs Population in 1990 in millions

Annual Variation (%) 1975-1978

1982-1990

Urban population (fewer than 2 000 inhab.)

41,1

0,30

0,39

-in cities -in suburbs

23,5 17,6

-0,09 0,89

0,07 0,85

Metropolitan population

56,6

0,45

0,51

Source: INSEE, Census Figures.

54

2.3 Community and Neighbourhood Types

Table 3 Breakdown of Rural Occupations by Percentage Occupations

1962

1982

1987

1989

Farmers Labourers Senior and middle management Wage-earners Artisansshopkeepers

40,0 38,0

22,2 33,9

20,0 32,3

18,0 32,3

6,0 5,5

16,2 17,6

19,2 19,1

20,1 20,3

10,5

10,1

9,4

9,3

Total

100

100

Source: INSEE, Enquetes Emploi.

55

100

100

2.4 Local Autonomy Abstract. Greater power was accorded to "peripheral authorities" and local levels of the politico-administrative system by the 1982 decentralization act, which instituted direct election of regional councillors and transferred certain administrative powers to mayors and to presidents of regional and general councils.

Centralization of the politico-administrative system is obvious in France; it has been formal and total for a long time. New rules and orders are always formulated at and come down from the top of the hierarchical pyramid—in the final analysis, Paris. We must distinguish between deconcentration and decentralization. Although the French regime is centralized, it is also deconcentrated: there can be no local administrative act without a delegation of authority from the centre. However, this judicial problem does not enable us to state the exact degree to which the system is centrally organized. When Pierre Gremion examined the centralizing power of the administrative system, he placed local administration within the framework of the relationship between the centre and the periphery. He showed that the centre's capacity to integrate, through the administrative system, is variable; it depends both on the areas of state intervention and on the period, and the integration does not always operate through the same channels. The 1964 study of effects of the reform of the regionalization policy showed the traditional structure of the institutionalized network of communication between public administration and society. The network consists of a chain of important persons which runs through the bureaucracies and the representational institutions (see 2.6, "Sociability Networks"). This chain gives undeniable power to the periphery, since nothing can really be undertaken by the centre without the indispensable support of the lobbyist networks. Departmental civil servants will do nothing without the support of the local and professional representatives who constitute local legitimacy and who are intimately familiar with local interests (see 10.4, "Interest Groups"). Consequently, a functional alliance is formed between civil servants and important local people, who support each other and thus can get rid of their source of legitimacy—the state for civil servants and the electorate for the others—to ensure the adaptation of national regulations to local needs and traditions. This "peripheral power" explains why centralization has respected regional diversity. Everything within this framework indicates that the "department" is the priviliged intermediary level between municipalities and Paris, except in the case of large cities, where the mayor usually has direct contact with centralized power. Although the 1964 reforms in no way affected the decisive role of the department, the 1982 reform influenced it profoundly by creating a publicly elected assembly at the regional level. This brought into existence a new (younger and more professional) category of regionally elected representatives, and a new regional administration. Although it is true that this reform also reaffirmed certain traditional departmental responsibilities, we may ask whether, in the long term, considering present-day trends and the European dimension, regional power will not finally be reaffirmed to the detriment of the department. For the moment, three important changes are operational. The first is abolition of a priori municipal supervision and inspection, which are replaced by a posteriori verification for the financial domain (the creation of a regional accounts office). The legitimacy of local administrative bills is verified by administrative tribunals. The second

56

2.4 Local Autonomy

is transfer of the executive power: the president of the "general council," not the prefect, is the executive of the council. The same is true for the president of the "regional council." Last is extension of the powers of economic intervention of local collectivities, particularly the municipalities. The transfer of responsibilities leads to a transfer of financial means. Between 1974 and 1988, the total of local collectivity budgets multiplied by a factor of 5,4, and the state budget by a factor of 4,5. The number of employees in territorial collectivities rose, on average, by 4% per year from December of 1979 to December of 1983, although it has slowed since 1986. The increase was greatest in communes. Finally, the law provides for creation of a territorial public-servant legal statute on a par with that of state civil servants.

Michel Forse

References Dupuy, F., and J.-C., Thoenig, 1983. Sociologie de ('administration fransaise. Paris: Armand Colin. Frege, X. 1986. La decentralisation, Paris: La D6couverte. Gre'mion, P. 1976. Le pouvoir ptriphMque. Paris: Seuil. ENSEE, 1988. "Les effectifs des collectives locales." Premiers rtsultats: 135. "La decentralisation en marche." 1985, April-May. Cahiers Frangais: 220. Robert, J. 1987, April. "Paris et le de"sert francais." Chronique de la SEDEIS: 15. Thoenig, J.-C. 1986. "La decentralisation sur le terrain." Futuribles: 95.

57

2 Microsocial

Table 1 Tax Revenues of Collectivities (Millions of francs) Year

Communes

Departments

1975 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987

72103 134 598 157 370 186074 209021 232 783 252 767 270 505 299 708

35 151 71442 84018 99182 113393 114261 122 386 133 569 142 518

Regions 2384 5330 5973 7659 12163 15468 18 197 23359 29481

Source: INSEE, Annnuaire rtirospectifde la France, 1990: 622-623.

Table 2 Regional Expenditure (%)

Economic expenses Professional training Initial training Transport and communication Regional development Culture, social life, sports, health Debts and miscellaneous expenses

1974

1982

3,9

9,9

1,3

5,7

53,1

33,6 21,9

9,2 5,9

Regional administration and functioning

26,6

Source: D.G.L., IAURIF and Inter-r6gions.

58

9,3

19,6

1988

7,4

14,5

28,1 17,2

9,4 6,7

12,0

4,7

2.4 Local Autonomy

TableS Numbers Employed by Local Collectivities Year

1967 1969 1973 1976 1977 1979 1980 1983 1985 1987

Departmental and regional (thousands),

Communal and intercommunal (thousands)

58 85 96 119 128

112*

* This drop corresponds to a transfer of staff to state organizations in the region. Source: INSEE, Economic et Statistique: 222, June 1989: 42-43.

59

345 420 520 580 700 730 735

2.5

Voluntary Associations Abstract. There has been a sharp increase in the number of local sports, cultural, and social-action associations. Their leaders come from the middle classes and exercise social authority. This increases the number of locally important people.

It is extremely difficult to assess the extent of the association movement. Different estimates put the number of associations at between 300 000 and 500 000; the divergence is due to the fact that many associations, after an existence which is often ephemeral, become inactive and do not register disbandment. On a national level, all we are really aware of is the yearly flux in new associations. For legal reasons, all new associations must register with the prefecture; their existence is then published in the Official Register, which provides us with an exhaustive census. The number of new associations increased slowly until the 1960s; from the 1970s on, the number increased rapidly. More than 50 000 were founded in 1987, nearly twice as many as in 1976, four times as many as in the 1960s, and 10 times as many as at the beginning of the century. The number increased by 20% between 1977 and 1982, and by 22% between 1982 and 1987. The number and occupations of members are not well known. Membership itself is often no more than a token act with no real associational meaning (for example, of parentteacher associations). It is even more difficult to assess the number of active members and officials. An active person will often be a member of several associations, so that estimates based on simple addition are always excessive. According to surveys and a recent INSEE study, it is estimated that about 45% of the population are members of associations. The so-called militant associations (associations whose activity may be considered to influence the social and political life of the country) have never had the greatest number of members (see 10.3, "Social Movements"), and membership in them has been decreasing over the last 15 years. Consumer associations, although feared by some companies, account for only 2% of the population. Leisure activities continue to dominate the world of associations, due to the large number devoted to sports and culture. Sports associations are the only ones that draw an increasing number of members: 15% of people over the age of eighteen in 1979 and 19% in 1986 (see 14.3, "Athletics and Sports," and 14.4, "Cultural Activities"). However, an increasing number of associations are being formed to run local institutions or organize social activities (see 2.4, "Local Autonomy"). Many associations stress, in their declaration in the Official Register, their desire to revitalize society and to avoid activities related to traditional politics and politicians. Activists no longer consider that they can exert pressure on the national level. It is at the level of the block, the neighbourhood, and the commune that they wish to operate and effect change, because at these levels they are closer to everyday reality and decision making than they are in the municipalities. Most of the associations remain independent and do not affiliate with federations. Available local studies and surveys indicate that it is, above all, members of the middle classes who join associations (see 6.1, "Occupational Status"). By this means they hope to achieve a certain social standing locally and to take over from the traditional

60

2.5 Voluntary Associations

bourgeoisie. Officials and members of several associations come from the upper-middle classes (within the local social context); membership provides a way for them to play a social role, and to assert themselves as officials and later as important persons. Being active in an association is often an apprenticeship which leads to municipal politics.

Michel Forse"

References Agulhon, M., and M. Bodiguel. 1979. Les associations au village. Aries: Actes-Sud. Conseil National de la Vie Associative. 1985. Bilan de la vie associative. Paris: Documentation Francaise. CREDOC. 1988, December. "Evolution du monde associatif de 1978 a 1986." Consommation et modes de vie: 34. Deruelle, D. 1982, July-August. "Demographic des associations." Bloc-notes de I'Observatolre tconomque de Paris: 7-8. Forse", M. 1984, January. "Les creations d'associations, un indicateur de changement social." Revue de I'OFCE: 6. Heian, F. 1988, March. "Un monde selectif: les associations." ficonomie et statistique: 208: 17-32. Heron, F. 1988, March. "Au coeur du reseau associatif: les multi-adherents." Economic et statistique: 208: 32-44 Lemel, Y., and C., Paradeise. 1974, April. "Appartenance et participation a des associations." Economic et statistique: 55. Mehl, D. 1982. "Culture et actions associatives." Sociologie du travail: 1. Meister, A. 1974. La participation dans les associations. Paris: Editions ouvrieres.

61

2 Microsocial

Table 1 Number of Associations Founded per Year and Rate of Membership

Year

New Associations

1907 1917 1927 1937 1960 1967 1973 1975 1978 1980 1982 1986

5000 6000 8000 9000 13000 18000 20000 24000 35000 30000 40000 50000

a. INSEE survey b. Ministry of Culture survey c. INSEE survey Sources: OFCE and CREDOC calculations.

62

Membership (%)

—a 27 28b 34C 46 47 42 49

2.5 Voluntary Associations

Table 2 Association Membership Rates for 1978-80 and 1984-86 (%) Associations Sports Culture and Leisure Senior citizens P.T.A. Professional Trade union Charity and mutual assistance Local Religious Political party Youth Family Consumer Nature protection Students Women

1978-80 Average

1984-86 Average

15,3 12,2

18,9 11,6



10,0

6,8 9,7 5,6 5,3 5,1 2,5 5,8 3,1 2,6 3,4 1,9 1,8

8,5 8,2 7,1 6,8 6,6 6,0 4,7 3,1 2,8 2,6 2,4 2,0 1,7 1,1

Source: CREDOC, Consommation el mode de vie, December 1988.

Table 3 Membership in Associations by Senior and Middle Management in 1986 (%) Number of associations Zero One Two Three or four Five

Middle management 6 10 14 19 26

Source: CREDOC, Consommation et modes de vie, December 1988.

63

Senior management 2 4 7 10 13

Table 4 Membership According to Occupational Category in 1978-80 and 1984-86 Prof.

Trader Year

Fanner

and

Head of

Middle management

Wageearner

Worker

Service person-

Student

Homemaker

29,4 30,0

27,4 32,2

19,6 20,4

18,4 23,3

7,4 9,1

33,1 38,9

12,9

7,2

24,7 19,4

19,4 24,3

142 112

7,4 7,0

5,0 5,9

3,6

8,5 —

6,9 —

42 —

1,6 —

2,8 —

5,6 2,6

62 2,7

3,4 2,8

2,7 22

1,4 32

— 4,4 3,7

senior managment

19,5 25,4 18,7

Firms

8,4

_

and

Artisan

nel

Retired

9,4

5,2 7,2

22,9 14,4

10,9

7,8

12,5 11,2

2,5

7,8 —

5,5 —

3,6 2,5

1,5 2,3

32 1,6

1,7 1,0

4,4 3,5

2,0 6,5

2,7 3,5

6,0 5,4

5,5 7,1



— —

27,7 27,5

— —

— —

4,5 —

3,0 —

1,4 —

19,7



1,0 —



3,6 1,1

2,3 1,7

1,3 1,5

8,5 1,1

2,8 0,7

1,5 2,2

Sports

78-80 84-86

13,1

23,4

Culture and leisure

78-80 84-86

7,1 6,2

— 13,3

Religious

78-80 84-86

6,4 4,3

— 7,5

Family

78-80 84-86

3,4 2,8

— 2,6

— 1,8 4,3

Trade unions

78-80 84-86

23,1 22,2

8,2

10,6

9,1

26,51 14,0

21,8 14,3

10,4

13,5

7,7

9,1 1,9

Local

78-80 84-86

7,4 8,6

— 8,4

7,3 9,0

8,5 7,5

7,6 9,7

4,7 42

3,8 3,7

Students

78-80 84-86

— —



— —

2,2 —

22 —

2,9 —

Youth

78-80 84-86

2,0 —



1,1 —

1,0 —

4,5 —

Nature protection

78-80 84-86

4,0 3,0

— 4,6

3,4 0,8

8,3 5,6

82 3,7

7,7

Prof.

Year

Fanner

Trader

and

Artisan

Head of Firms

Middle and senior management management

Wageearner

Worker

Service person-

Student

Homemaker

Retired

nel

Consumers

78-80 84-86

0,7 0,5

9,1

1,2 3,7

5,2 4,8

6,1 4,9

3,0 2,6

2,4 1,9

1,4 1,6

2,6 1,9

2,6 1,9

1,8 1,9

P.T.A.

78-80 84-86

7,5 6,7

9,1

12,3 13,9

22,3 15,7

19,7 18,7

11,8

9,4

7,6 6,6

7,6 6,9

1,3 1,4

16,9

9,9

1,4 1,3

Charity and mutual assistance

78-80 84-86

5,0 9,7

— 8,7

5,4 8,0

10,2 11,7

7,5 8,7

3,0 3,4

1,8 3,2

3,9 4,3

2,4 3,5

6,5 6,5

8,9 9,3

Women

78-80 84-86

2,0 1,6

— —



3,3 0,3

2,2 0,9

2,5 1,1

0,3 0,7

1,3 1,9

2,4 0,6

4,0 1,9

1,1 1,0

Political party

78-80 84-86

0,9 3,9

— 6,3

1,9 8,3

6,5 8,4

5,9 4,8

2,5 3,9

3,2 2,9

0,9 2,0

3,2 3,0

1,1 1,3

1,7 3,1

Professional association

78-80 84-86

23,5 24,0

24,9



18,8 28,5

27,3 27,2

15,6 15,4

4,2 4,4

4,2 4,2

4,2 4,0

1,7 0,8

— —

2,0 2,3

Member of at least one association

78-80 84-86

49,3 49,3

44,8 57,5

49,3 57,5

72,2 67,8

63,6 65,8

45,8 43,7

43,2 41,4

27,2 28,8

67,0 65,1

39,2 33,1

32,2 32,5

Source: INSEE, Donntes sociales, 1990.

2.6

Sociability Networks Abstract. Neighbourhood and friendship networks are growing and intermingling. Following the breakdown of old peasant, working-class, and bourgeois forms of conviviality, new and more extensive forms of sociability are appearing.

Studies on sociability are very recent; data for earlier years are very scarce. The only area in which a distinct development for the population as a whole is noticeable is the frequency of receptions, which increased by about 25% between 1967 and 1987. The following interpretations are therefore necessarily hypothetical. Sociability within villages was very diverse, depending on the region, but it was structured by neighbourhood contact and mutual professional assistance. These two bases were always more or less in conflict. Kinship networks, however, were the basis for sociability outside the neighbourhood; they underlay marital and land strategies, and local power was transmitted through families. Urban working-class sociability was more restricted to the neighbourhood, kinship was less important, and conflicts and disputes were less serious. These two models, which Alain Degenne calls "unifying," are both based on a common background and culture whose rules are accepted by all, in which confrontation is direct and networks are undifferentiated. The "discreet traditional" model was practised by the urban middle classes, who shared a dignified and thrifty style of life but refused almost all neighbourhood sociability, and whose kinship networks were neither strong nor widespread. Families knew each other, observed and assessed each other, but were jealously aloof and not very ready to negotiate. The neighbourhood was an area of adaptation in which shopkeepers played an essential role. The discreet traditional model is still, no doubt, the most widespread form of sociability. However, it is experienced differently by different social categories, particularly as a function of elective relationships such as friendship and camaraderie, which are more frequent in the upper classes. The upper-middle classes also experience the model differently as a function of the sociability organized by associations (see 2.5, "Voluntary Associations"). The "classifying" model is that of the bourgeoisie and certain traditional worker milieux, in which roles and positions are strongly delineated. The neighbourhood is not important; it is recognition of others as belonging to the same class (sub-class, milieu) that is the basis for sociabili ty, degree of conviviality, and rules of avoidance. The "neo-convivial" model was recently developed by the new salary-earning middle classes (see 6.1, "Occupational Status"). It stresses the informality of social contact: the more, the merrier. This reconciles individual mobility and the importance of location: all share the same form of sociability, in which each is accepted without being known or recognized. Conversation is the basis of exchange. Social control is strong, but is compensated for by mobility and the valorization of novelty. Networks are multiple and dense, but without strong constraint. This consumer sociability has developed increased stability and become ritualized, but still allows for mobility: one pulls up roots and puts them down again easily. Although this sociability is very extensive compared to the more intensive unifying types, it does not affect valorization of and centring on the family. The multiplicity of contacts implied in this form of sociability would indicate mat the networks extend, multiply, intersect, and take on greater importance. Neo-convivial sociability is not incompatible with the ruling form of individualism and is practised by

66

2.6 Sociability Networks

growing numbers. It has become highly competitive with the intensive traditional models. It may well continue to expand and to reach other strata of the population.

Michel Forse"

References Bonneville, M. 1979. "Affectation de 1'espace et conflits sociaux a Croix-Luizet." Archives de I'O.C.S.: vol.2, Editions du CNRS. Chalvon, S., and E. Claverie. 1979. "Le triangle du 14e arrondissement." Archives de l'O.C.S:. vol. 2, Editions du CNRS. Degenne, A., 1987. "Un langage pour 1'dtude des r&eaux sociaux." In L'esprit des Lieux. Paris: CNRS. Degenne, A. and J. Duplex. 1982. "Les rfiseaux de cooperation et d'echange, une dimension de la Iocalit6." Cahiers de 1'O.C.S.: vol. 9-1, Editions du CNRS. Fors6, M. 1981, April. "La sociability." tconome et Statistique: 132. H6ran, F. 1988, December. "La sociability une pratique culturelle." ficonomie et Statistique: 216. Herin, R. and al., 1982. "Le Domfrontais." Cahier de l'O.C.S.: vol 4-2, Editions du CNRS. "La conviviality aujourd'hui." 1987, September, ^changes et Projets, numero special 50-51. Lamarche, H. 1982. "Changement social et locality rurale." Cahiers de 1'O.C.S.: vol. 7-1, Editions du CNRS. Meuret, B. 1982. "Sociographie des r6seaux sociaux & Croix-Luizet." Cahiers de 1'O.C.S.: vol. 16-2, Editions du CNRS. Pincon, M., and M. Pincon-Charlot. 1989. Dans les beaux quartiers. Paris: Seuil. Portet, F. 1979. "Le Creusot: "la ville technique. La soci6t6 machine." Archives de 1'O.C.S.: vol. 2, Editions du CNRS, vol. 2.

67

2 Microsocial

Table 1 Lunch or Dinner Receptions in the Home (%) For 100 persons in each group

for colleagues or work

for friends

for parents

1981

1988

1981

1988

1981

1988

Total Males Females

77,5 76,2 78,7

73 70 77

70,0 72,2 67,9

66 66 65

26,3 28,9 23,9

16 17 16

Couples Single Widowed or divorced

90,9 44,3

86 40

77,0 64,2

73 60

31,5 20,8

20 11

64,3

67

44,7

41

10,1

9

Fanners Artisans, traders Senior managment Middle managment Wage-earners Skilled labourers Unskilled labourers Students Housewives Retired Inactive others

87,2 82,4 88,1 79,3 84,9 80,9 77,4 47,7 82,4 74,8 57,7

86 81 74 72 78 76 71 37 84 80 61

73,3 79,3 93,5 85,3 84,1 80,7 70,1 72,3 73,6 45,9 51,2

68 67 88 82 72 72 67 61 63 46 54

45,2 29,7 56,4 47,7 34,6 28,5 22,1 18,1 26,7

25

Source: Ministere de la Culture, Pratiques culturelles des Frangais.

68

7,9

18,8

17 41 31 18 18 14 7 14

7 9

2.6 Sociability Networks

Table 2 Outings (%) Type of outing

1967

1987-88

An evening out at least once a month

30,2

47,6

A visit to a caf6 at least once a month

24,1

17,7

8,4

24,6

Visiting parents or friends at least once a month

36,5

60,2

Dancing at least 5 or 6 times a year

20,3

29,3

Playing cards or other parlour games about once a week

13,2

18,2

A visit to a restaurant at least once a month

Source: INSEE, Les pratiques de loisirs 20 ans aprts, 1989.

69

3 WOMEN Male-female role differentiation is one of the most fundamental distinctions in all societies. Since the 1960s, the role of women has undergone a major transformation, whereas that of men has hardly changed at all except as a consequence of role changes among women. The range of possibilities for women has increased considerably. The majority of male roles are now open to them, but the reverse is not true. Old distinctions, based on region for farmers and on social class for city-dwellers, are now tending to disappear. Women are noticeably more independent of men than they used to be. This is particularly evident in the realm of values and opinions, which have changed radically in the last 20 years. In practice, however, things have progressed far more slowly: in the vast majority of cases, housework is still the domain of the woman. A larger female work force has given women financial autonomy which, because of their domestic, maternal, and social responsibilities, is leading to monetarization of the domestic economy and, in the long term, an increase in the range of possibilities open to women. Birth control means that childbirth can now be planned so that it fits in with career demands: women have fewer children and at a later age, and no longer abandon their jobs at the time of childbirth. Diversification of matrimonial models is leading to new types of conjugal relationships. Cohabitation, in particular, presupposes undifferentiated roles and constitutes a model of autonomy and negotiation for many married couples. This leads to diversity in the types of sponsal relationships. Women's autonomy has increased in all of these domains, thereby broadening their scope for strategic action.

70

3.1

Female Roles Abstract. The weakening of male and female role models is obvious in representational and regulatory structures. The same is true in occupational and parental contexts, but there is stagnation in day-to-day life, particularly in the division of domestic labour.

In 1979, almost 40% of the French people felt that women with young children should never work; in 1982, only 29% of the population still held this opinion. People's opinions obviously depend largely on their age and sex, and women and young people are more inclined than men and older people to consider a career and parenthood compatible. The general acceptance of working women (see 3.4, "Women's Employment") is indicative of a broader movement in all areas of daily life: sex differentiation is less and less acceptable. This trend is clearly visible in people's ideas and their ways of thinking, but it is less obvious in practice. There is a shortage of data indicating the degree of sex differentiation in all areas of daily life; the picture we get from time-use surveys relates to people's actual practices. These surveys indicate that real progress is slow, particularly with regard to division of domestic chores. There is increased equality in conjugal roles (see 3.3, "Matrimonial Models"). Opinion polls conducted at 15-year intervals show a growing tendency for spouses to share decision making equally. According to the women questioned the major decisions relating to children's education, choice of dwelling place, friends, and so on are now shared. With regard to parenting, it is now indisputable that child care is less and less considered to be the responsibility of the mother only. Recent jurisprudence and legislation relative to child custody in cases of divorce have been influenced by this change in attitude. The last point relates to interaction between the sexes: socialization, dress codes, decency. It is now the rule for women to have both skirts and trousers in their wardrobe. Data relating to sociability indicate that practices in this domain are tending slowly toward equality: the predominance of women in organizing sociability is beginning to change. Data on job distribution (see 3.4, "Women's Employment") reveal that women are overrepresented in clerical categories and are generally less well qualified than men. On average, within each occupational group, women's salaries are lower and more restricted in range than men's: there is a difference of 20% for labourers. Women are also underrepresented in professional categories and positions of power: only 5,7% of representatives in the Assembled Nationale and 2,5% of those in the Senate are women. However, women made a spectacular entry into municipal councils. Women in Grandes Ecoles (major universities) constitute between 7% (Polytechnique) and 20% (National School for Administration [E.N.A.]) of students. Yannick Lemel

71

3 Women

References Claude, M., and F., DeSingly 1987. "Les jeux de rdles conjugaux." INSEE, Donntes societies. Gokalp, C., and H., Le"ridon. 1983, Winter. "Incidence de 1'activite' feminine sur la participation du pere a la vie familiale." Revue Tocqueville: vol 5-2. Maruani, M., and C. Nicole. 1990. Au labeur des dames. Paris: Syros. Roy, C. and G., Grimier. 1987, June. "Les emplois du temps en France en 1985-1986." INSEE, Premiers Rtsultats: 100.

72

3.1 Female Roles

Table 1 Attitudes toward Women Working (% Year

Unfavourable

Favourable

1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989

68 67 68 58 60 56 58 57 55 58 57 54

32 33 32 42 40 44 42 43 45 42 43 46

Source: CREDOC. 1991, April. Consommation et modes de vie: 58.

73

Table 2 Time Use of Adult City-dwellers in 1974-75 and 1985-86 (per day) 18-64 years Working men

Working women

1975

1985

1975

1985

Physiological time of which: - meals at home - professional work

Ilh40

Ilhl7

Ilh20

Ilhl5

Ih33 6h05

Ih23 5h36

Ih28 4h58

Ihl8 4h38

Domestic time of which: - Housework (cooking, washing, cleaning...)

2h20

2h41

4h42

4h38

Oh54

Ih05

3hl5

3h09

3hll

3h41

2h22

2h51

Ih20 Oh05 Oh08

Ih38 Ohll Oh09

Oh59 Oh02 Oh05

IhlO Oh05 Oh09

Free time of which: - television - sports - occasions, outings

Source: INSEE. 1987, June. Premiers resultats: 100.

Table 3 Task Sharing as Seen by Parents "Who performs the following tasks in your family?'' (%) The mother Mother

Father

Shared tasks - choice of apartment - choice of vacations - scolding children -choice of car

10 11 18 8

3 5 10 20

Father's tasks -odd jobs

10

Mother's tasks - cooking - housework, cleaning - shopping - meeting teachers

78 72 63 56

Mother or both: - budgeting - giving pocket money - consoling children - games, sports

44

37 50 12

The father Mother

Both

Father

Mother

Neither

Other

Father

Mother

Father

Mother

Father

6 29

5 6 11 28

81 77 69 56

76 72 61 55

1 2 3 1

1 2 3 1

1 — 1

— 1 — 1

5

58

59

19

17

4

3





66 58 48

45

2 1 3 8

2 2 5 8

16 19 30 29

16 21 31 29

— 1 — 2

— 1 — 2

— 4 — 1

27 34 29 7

12 7 2 23

14 8 6 24

43 38 46 36

43 37 47 33

2 5 2 18

2



2 16

— —

3

4

Source: Ministere des Affaires sociales, January 1988.

4

— 4 — 1 — — — —

3.2

Childbearing Abstract. French fertility rates declined rapidly in the 1960s and 1970s, but have leveled out in the last 10 years. Fewer no-children households and fewer and smaller large families have caused the mean number of children per family to settle at around two. First children are born later, and subsequent births are staggered over greater lengths of time.

There were 770 000 births registered in France in 1988. This corresponds to a fertility rate of 1,8 children per woman, which is lower than the population-replacement rate of 2,1 children per woman. In 1964, the fertility rate reached its highest peak since the end of World War II (2,9 children per woman). The downswing, initially slow until 1968, grew more rapidly from 1972 to 1976. In 1983, it reached its lowest peace-time rate of 1,79 children per woman. Although the reduced fertility rate is not the only cause, demographic growth in France has halved since 1975, from 1% a year between 1946 and 1975 to 0,4% a year. However, the potential of the baby-boom years will enable the population to continue to grow until the year 2000 at least, independently of immigration. In 1982, the largest families were those in which the husband was a blue-collar worker or a farmer; fathers of the smallest completed families were from the middle classes, self-employed, or belonged to one of the intermediary occupational groups; and completed families in which the father was an executive or a member of the professional classes showed a higher fertility rate. Relative differences have reduced slightly over 20 years (1970-1990) but the overall distribution remains the same: a U curve—or rather an upside-down J—with the fertility rate much higher in the lower levels of the social scale than in the upper. The curve is repeated for women: overall, the fertility rate decreases; as education increases, if we consider only women with families, the upside-down J curve is still valid. Compared with preceding generations, childless and large families have given way to two- and three-child families. If we study at time intervals the families of women born in the years between 1917 and 1946, we notice a reduction in the number of women without children and a scarcity of large families: the proportion of women with six children before the age of 35 went from 6% for women born around 1930 to 2% for women born 15 years later. This trend spread progressively to smaller families: the proportion of women born in 1945 and 1946 who have three children before the age of 35 years is smaller than the proportion of women with only two children. This trend is confirmed by prospective demographic analysis: by calculating the probable final number of children for present generations (born between 1962 and 1981), it is estimated that families of three or more children will become the least numerous, whereas there should be a slight upswing in the number of childless women and a distinct rise in the number of women with only one child. This is already noticeable in the number of children in the most recently observed generations. Coming after 30 years of steady decrease, the slight fertility-rate increase to three or four children, noticed after 1980, will not be enough to influence the overall decrease in family size. The phenomenon varies with different social classes: childless families are rare in farming areas, but more common to find childless families among workers who owe their high fertility rate to the great number of large families. The executive classes rarely remain childless, tending to produce families of average size. It is unusual for them to have only one child, and the

76

3.2 Chilbearing

number of children will reach or exceed three more often than it does in the middle classes. Several studies have shown that the majority of women and couples do not set out to have a particular number of children, but that families are constituted more on the basis of one child at a time. The lower birth rate, particularly the rareness of large families, nonetheless results both from a reduction in the number of children desired and, thanks to more efficient family planning (modern contraceptive methods), a smaller number of unwanted pregnancies. No doubt this second factor has now reached its peak, which would explain the present leveling out of the birth rate. While the size of the family has tended to concentrate around two children, timing has been subjected to considerable modifications. Whereas marriage and birth of the first child were closely linked in the past, today they tend to be dissociated. Over a 30-year period (1952-80), almost two out of three couples had at least one child in the two years following their marriage. Between 1975 and 1979, the proportion of couples following this model was only 54%. Between 1970 and 1981, the period between marriage and birth of the first child lengthened from 1,8 to 2,4 years. Similarly, the frequency of prenuptial conceptions, traditionally about 20-25%, dropped to 17% in 1980. Meanwhile, there was a strong upward movement in the number of extra-marital births: more than one out of four children is born out of wedlock today, against 6% in 1968. Although marriage and birth of the first child have become dissociated, a higher median age has been recorded over a 20-year period (1960-80) for women at time of birth of each successive child. Moreover, the mean interval between births has greatly increased: to 3,9 years in 1980 from 3,2 years in 1962. We are therefore witnessing both a postponement in age of mother at birth of first child and greater spacing between births. These modifications in the family calendar, along with the reduced birth rate and the diminishing size of families, were first observed among the most highly educated women and the most well-to-do social strata. Jean-Hugues Dechaux

References Borrel, C., and S., Thave. 1989, September. "Families nombreuses: 22 % des families, 40 % des enfants." Economic et statistique: 224. Calot, G. 1985, May. "Les perspectives d6mogaphiques frangaises." Futuribles 88: 24-31. Desplanques, G. 1985. "Fe'condite' et milieu social." Economic et Statistique 175: 21-38. Desplanques, G. 1986, March-April. "50 ans de f6condit6 en France: rangs et intervalles entre naissances." Population 2: 233-258. Desplanques, G., and N., DeSaboulin. 1986, April. "Mariage et premier enfant: un lien qui se d6fait." Economic et Statistique: 187. Leridon, H. 1985, May-June. "La baisse de la f6condit6 depuis 1965: moins d'enfants desire's et moins de grossesses non-desir6es." Population 3: 507-526.

77

3 Women

Table 1 Birth Rate Years

Live births per 1 000 inhabitants

20,9 18,9 18,2 17,9 16,9 16,0 14,1 14,2 14,1 14,9 14,9 14,6 13,7 13,8 13,9 14,0 13,8 13,8 13,6

1946-50 1951-55 1956-60 1961-65 1966-70 1971-75 1976-80 1981-85 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 Source: INSEE. 1990. Annuaire statistique de la France: 61.

78

3.2 Chilbearing

Table 2 Decline in Number of Large Families Distribution of legitimate births by family size

Yea-

1962 1965 1970 1975 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988

1

36,1 37,3 42,4 48,2 44,2 42,7 42,9 43,8 43,2 42,2 41,2 40,6 40,7

2

4+

3

26,0 26,7 27,7 31,0 34,6 34,1 34,6 35,3 35,1 34,9 34,9 34,9 34,3

22,2 20,7 15,6 9,5 6,6 7,5 7,8 7,7 7,8 8,0 8,3 8,3 8,7

15,7 15,3 14,3 11,3 14,6 15,7 14,7 13,2 13,9 14,9 15,6 16,2 16,3

Source: INSEE, TEF, 1990. Table3 Rates of Out-of-Wedlock Births (%) Year

Birth rates

1968 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988

6,3 8,5 8,5 8,8 9,4 10,3 11,4 12,7 14,2 15,9 17,8 19,6 21,9 24,1 26,3

Source: INSEE, TEF, 1990.

79

3 Women

Table 4 Decline in Number of Births per Woman (Synthetic fertility index)

1946 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987

2,98 2,93 2,67 2,72 2,83 2,47 1,92 1,94 1,94 1,91 1,78 1,80 1,82 1,84 1,81

Source: INSEE, Annuaire r€trospectif de la France, 1990.

80

3.3 Matrimonial Models Abstract. In the postwar years there was basically one matrimonial model: early marriage, children, and a stable couple. Since then the trend has been reversed and the family unit has become more fragile: celibacy, divorce, and separation are increasing and new models have appeared: cohabitation and single-parent families.

In 1968, there were 67 000 unmarried young couples (the man younger than 35) living together; this figure rose to 165 000 in 1975, to 464 000 in 1982, and to 589 000 in 1985. In 1990, one cohabiting couple out of five was not married. The slow but constant increase in divorce figures since 1885, when divorce was reintroduced, has steadily accelerated since the 1960s. About 33 000 divorces were recorded in 1962, about 37 000 in 1970, and 105 000 in 1987. Since 1981, divorce after a long married period (15 years or more) has increased, whereas the figure is constant for short married periods (less than four years). The procedure was changed in 1975 to facilitate divorce by mutual consent, which in 1984 constituted almost half of all cases. When the petition comes from only one partner, in 7 out of 10 cases that partner is the woman; four times as many working women as non-working women divorce. Single-parent families are a recent phenomenon; as of 1990, they numbered one million. Median age at marriage decreased until 1975, when it was 22,5 years for women, 24,5 years for men. Since then it has risen: to 25,2 years for women and 27,2 years for men in 1988. The percentage of single adults (aged 20-35 years) rose from 45,9% for men and 61,3% for women in 1982 to 52,7% and 67,3%, respectively, in 1985. The marriage rate declined steadily from 1972 to 1987. The number of extra-marital births rose steadily to 24,1% in 1987. In 1990, there are more than one million unmarried couples, 7,5% of the total number of couples. There is no shortage of quantitative indicators, and they all give the same picture. In the postwar years, the normal thing to do—the only imaginable thing to do—was to get married, have children, and spend one's life with the same marital partner. Exceptions were extremely rare, and no doubt were seen for what they were: exceptions. Today, these exceptions have multiplied to the point where we must ask whether the postwar matrimonial model is not being challenged, whether new life styles, such as celibacy, cohabitation, and single-parent families are not being institutionalized as models. It is difficult to answer these questions, considering the nature of the information available. At any given moment we can determine the number of people in this or that matrimonial or demographic situation, but it is far more difficult to know the different situations preceding it. Among the different possible behaviours practised by the younger generations, it is difficult to determine which are passing and which definitive, since we lack a precedent which would enable us to draw conclusions (see 1.1, "Youth"). For example, the cohabitation practised by young couples during the 1970s could have been interpreted at the time as the development of a sort of trial marriage. Ten years later, the proportion of these couples still not married but now with children was so high that the original explanation could no longer be retained. Having stated these reservations, one point is clear from the present state of information: cohabitation has developed well beyond its initial experimental stage; it has become quite common among divorced people who wish to live with another partner. However, different indices suggest that the trend has been reversed since 1985: cohabitation among the younger generations has ceased to increase.

81

3 Women

From numerous points of view, legal marriage and the de facto couple have become two possible models, each with its own legitimacy, its own rationale, its own advantages and disadvantages. They seem to have become two alternatives; they are no longer the official form and the debased form. If to this observation we add the fact that a not inconsiderable proportion of people will live as singles (with or without children), then these different developments taken together must be interpreted as a diversification of matrimonial models. There is no longer only one basic model and situations which deviate from it, but different situations, each constituting an alternative model for traditional conjugal life. Yannick Lemel

References Audirac, P.-A. 1986, February. "La cohabitation : un million de couples non mane's." Economic et Statistique 185.

Audirac, P.-A. 1987. "Le de"veloppement de 1'union libre chez les jeunes." INSEE, Dannies Sociales. DeSingly, F. 1987. Fortune et infortune de lafemme marine. Paris: PDF. Forse", M. 1986, July. "Le recul du manage." Observations et diagnostics, Revue de I'OFCE 16. INSEE, 1988, December. "Les mariages en 1987." Premiers Rtsultats 160. Lgridon, H. and C.,Villenneuve. 1988, March-April. "Les nouveaux couples: nombre, caract6ristiques et attitudes." Population 2. Munoz-Perez, B. 1987. "Le divorce." INSEE, Donnees Sociales.

82

3.3 Matrimonial Models

Table 1 Population 15 Years and Older by Sex and Marital Status

Males (1000s)

Year

Single

1936 1946 1954 1972 1981 1989

9 192 9050 9793 11977 6010 7 189

Married

Widowers

Divorced

867 803 722 663 670 647

129 167 263 409 563 938

Married

Widows

Divorced

9619 9210 10108 12047 12729 12550

2874 3004 2906 3061 3208 3254

199 248 373 567 796 1260

9608 9110 10001 12125 13023 12703

Females (1000s) Year

Single

1936 1946 1954 1972 1981 1989

8692 8556 8829 10632 4905 6138

Source: INSEE, Annuaire statistique.

83

3 Women

Table 2 Marriage and Divorce Rates Divorces

Marriages Year

(1000s)

1961 1965 1970 1975 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989

315 346 394 387 334 315 312 300 281 269 265 265 271 281

per 1 000 pop.

6,8 7,1 7,8 7,4 6,2 5,8 5,7 5,5 5,1 4,9 4,8 4,8 4,9 5,0

Source: INSEE, TEF, 1990.

84

per 10000 married couples

— 38,9 55,6 81,2 87,6 93,9 98,7 104,0 107,5 108,4 106,5 106,1



(1000s)

— 33 45 63 68 73 77 81 84 85 84 84 —

3.3 Matrimonial Models

Table 3 Number of Marriage by Previous Marital Status

Husbands

Wives

Year

Total

Single

Widower

Divorced

Single

Widow

Divorced

1953 1971 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989

308426 406416 334 377 315 117 312405 300513 281402 269419 265 678 265 177 271 124 279900

272 955 373 971 292 523 273 620 270331 258 558 239 989 227 133 222 912 219 797 225 243 232 302

14 178 9310 6354 6218 5605 5425 5214 5200 4911 4994 4786 4719

21293 23135 35500 35279 36469 36530 36199 37086 37855 40386 41095 42879

275 721 376 192 296 140 277 031 274 037 261 352 242841 229 787 225 362 222 705 228 137 235 082

13292 9063 5878 5653 5312 4986 4821 4655 4381 4567 4194 4287

19413 21 161 32359 32433 33056 34175 33740 34977 35935 37905 38793 40531

Sources: INSEE, 1991, March. Annuaires statistiques and INSEE Premiere 125.

85

3 Women

Table 4 Average Age of Newly-Weds by Sex and Previous Marital Status Husbands Year

1957 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988

Total

28,3 28,0 27,0 26,0 26,3 27,1 27,4 27,5 27,8 28,2 28,7 29,0 29,5 29,8

Single

26,2 26,1 25,1 24,4 24,6 25,2 25,3 25,5 25,8 26,0 26,4 26,6 27,0 27,2

Wives

Widower Divorced

52,7 53,7 55,1 54,4 55,0 54,9 54,9 55,1 54,9 55,2 54,8 55,6 55,2 56,3

Total

40,7 41,1 41,4 40,3 38,7 38,1 38,2 38,2 38,5 38,8 39,3 39,7 40,1 40,6

Source: INSEE, Annuaire rttrospectif de la France, 1990: 38.

86

25,4 25,2 24,2 23,8 23,9 24,6 24,9 25,0 25,4 25,7 26,2 26,5 27,0 27,3

Single

Widow

23,6 23,5 22,6 22,4 22,5 23,0 23,2 23,4 23,6 23,9 24,3 24,6 24,9 25,2

46,8 47,5 48,1 48,1 47,7 46,8 46,6 46,5 46,4 46,4 46,1 46,6 46,3 47,7

Divorced

37,9 38,2 38,4 37,8 36,3 35,2 35,3 35,3 35,5 35,7 36,0 36,4 36,8 37,2

3.4 Women's Employment Abstract. In spite of unemployment and the economic crisis, female employment has increased, particularly in the tertiary sector. Women no longer abandon their careers at time of childbirth, but their jobs are often precarious.

Working women are not a new phenomenon. The wives of farmers, shopkeepers, and tradesmen have always played a role in the family business and have always been seen as contributing to the work. Working women constituted 36% of the work force in 1975, as they did in 1906. This proportion slipped to 33% between 1962 and 1965, but has been rising steadily ever since. Today, more than two-thirds of women aged between 25 and 50 years are employed. In 1968,45% of women aged between 25 and 54 years had a job, 53% did in 1975, and 63% did in 1982. Over those 15 years, the total number of jobs in France rose by 630 000, but the number of working women rose by 1 400 000. Thus, in spite of the crisis and slower economic growth, the female working population has increased in recent years. For the first time, in the 1982 census, the number of couples with both partners working exceeded the number with only one partner working. In the past, women left their job when their children were born and looked for another when the children were reared (see 3.2, "Childbearing"). Now, on the contrary, women keep their jobs, even while raising their children. A career is progressively becoming as much an important part of a woman's identity as it is part of a man's. The model bourgeois woman was a housewife, and this model still reigned among the bourgeoisie only a generation ago (see 3.3, "Matrimonial Models"). The model for working-class women was also the housewife reigning as mistress of the house with the income brought home by her husband, but a high percentage of women were obliged to go out to work. Over the last 30 years, the model of the working woman has spread from the new middle classes up to the upper classes and down to the working classes, where it still meets with some resistance. Between 1975 and 1982, the proportion of women increased in all occupational categories with the exception of teaching (already 64% female) and factory work, where the proportion stagnated, except for unskilled labourers. Women have opted principally for the tertiary sector (where 52% of wage-earners are women), and particularly for the public sector and local collectivities. Administrative and tertiary-sector activities offer more flexible working conditions and correspond to the kind of qualifications that women are reputed to have. Part-time work has developed rapidly: one woman wage-earner out of four works part time; between 1975 and 1985, 70% of jobs created for women were part time. The phenomenon of working women occupies a central position in the development of French society. It blurs the social hierarchy (see 6.1, "Occupational Status") because, in spite of male dominance, the different occupational positions occupied by men and women make the social position of the family somewhat ambiguous, which is leading to a swelling of the middle classes: the spouse with the higher position tends to raise the level of the family in the hierarchy. The fact that more women work leads to increased monetarization of home economics (see 13.6, "Household Production"). This makes work management more complex within companies (see 5.2, "Personnel Administration") and raises particular problems for labour unions (see 9.1, "Labour Unions"). It leads to increased dependence on the extended family for education of the children (see 2.2, "Kinship Networks"), and promotes diversification of matrimonial

87

3 Women

models. Attitudinal and value differences between women and men within the home disappear when they are in the working world (see 3.1, "Female Roles"). Yannick Lemel

References DeSingly, F. 1987. Fortune et infortune de lafemme marine. Paris: PUF. Dim, L., and D., Stoclet 1985, January. "Travail des femmes et structures sociales." Observations et diagnostic, Revue de I'OFCE 10. Huet, M. 1982, June. "La progression de I'activite" feminine est-elle irreversible?" Economic et Statistique 145. Maruani, M. 1990. Au labeur des dames. Paris: Syros. Mossuz-Lavau, J., and M., Sineau. 1983. Enqu&e sur les femmes et la politique en France. Paris: PUF.

88

3.4 Women's Employment

Table 1 Employment Rate of Women by Age (%)

1954

1962

1968

1975

1982

1985

1989

Total

38,4

36,2

36,1

40,3

43,0

45,8

45,8

15-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 50-54 55-59 60-64 65-69 70-74 75 +

43,4 57,2 42,7 38,8 39,6 44,3 46,6 46,8 42,6 35,1 21,9 13,0 6,1

35,5 61,5 45,3 38,7 39,6 41,2 45,0 45,3 42,2 33,9 19,2 10,4 4,8

31,4 62,4 50,6 42,4 41,3 43,4 45,3 45,1 42,3 32,3 14,7 7,4 3,3

35,4 66,0 62,7 54,6 50,6 49,4 49,9 48,1 41,9 27,8 10,0 4,2 2,1

16,7 66,9 70,6 67,0 65,1 62,0 58,3 54,1 45,0 22,3 5,0 2,2 1,0

11,8 64,2 75,7 72,2 71,9 72,0 67,8 59,8 44,6 18,0 4,4 1,5 0,8

9,4 59,7 76,2 73,3 73,3 74,0 69,0 62,2 44,7 17,7 4,2 1,5 0,6

Source: INSEE, L'activitt feminine, INSEE-r6sultats 10.

89

3 Women

Table 2 Distribution of Working Women by Occupational Category (Old nomenclature)

1982

1962

Working Change population (%) 1962-1982

Total

Working population (%)

Overall

6664211

34,6

9 584 720

40,7

1,44

Farmers Agricultural employees Heads of industry and trade Professionals and senior management Middle management Wage earners Workers Service personnel Others Non-salaried Salaried Unemployed

1 192 217

39,2

543 120

37,5

0,46

95212

11,5

48020

15,8

0,49

749 942

36,7

601 160

34,6

0,80

121 676 594043 1410 117 1522606 846988 109108 2067046 4 510 434 86731

15,9 39,6 58,8 21,6 80,9 23,4

479 720 1 586 840 3063900 1 987 580 1 210 240 64 140 1 288 540 7 171 140 1 125 040

26,5 48,8 65,5 24,0 79,8 13,0

3,94 2,67 2,17 1,31 1,43 0,59

— — —

— — —

— — —

90

Total

3.4 Women's Employment

(New nomenclature)

1982

Fanners Artisans, traders, directors of companies Senior management and professionals Blue collars Wage earners Workers Unemployed never having worked

Working population (%)

Working population (%)

Total

9 790 401

41,8

10 520 614

43,7

594 156

38,4

468 622

36,9

639 426

35,2

604982

34,4

454 629 1 688 827 4 595 759 1 622 145

24,4 40,3 75,1 21,3

665410 1 959 706 5 153 912 1 503 254

28,7 42,7 76,1 21,1

195 459

66,6

164728

89,9

Total Overall

1989

Source: INSEE, L'activitf feminine, INSEE-r6sultats 10.

91

3.5

Reproductive Technologies and Biotechnologies Abstract. Industrial exploitation of biotechnologies which generate human, animal, or plant life is only beginning. Contraception is the application that has had the greatest influence on practice and opinions.

The stakes are enormous biotechnology. Its techniques increase the potential uses of micro-organisms, plant or animal cells, or biochemically active derivatives of these cells. Bio-industries are the industrial and commercial applications of these technologies. Contraception is no doubt the application that has had the greatest impact on the practices and opinions of the French people. In 1978, 29% of women aged between 15 and 49 years used either the birth-control pill or the IUD, 7% used a local contraceptive, and 24% used another method. In 1985, the first group had increased by 12 to 13 points. If the other methods are used at the same rate, the Pill and the IUD will be used a maximum of a little more than half the women aged between 15 and 49 years. In 1956, when questioned about the possible setting up of specialized dispensaries where women could be informed about all the different means of avoiding pregnancy, the French people were almost equally divided: 45% approved and 43% disapproved (ESIED, 1956); women aged between 20 and 49 years approved strongly (52% for, 38% against), whereas older people, and practising Catholics especially, were strongly opposed to the idea (26% for and 63% against). All of this reticence was to be swept aside in less than 10 years: in 1965, the majority in favour of the diffusion of information concerning contraceptive methods was overwhelming, even among the most conservative sections of the population, Catholics in particular (see 9.2, "Religious Institutions"). The situation was ratified in 1967 with the passing of the Neuwirth Law, which legalized the Pill. The contradiction between the official position of the church and the practice of the faithful was flagrant. In 1968, after the promulgation of the Papal encyclical De Hwnanae Vitae, 75% of the French people felt that "the majority of Catholics would not follow the Papal directive" (IFOP, 1968). Apart from contraception, other biotechnological applications are rapidly being developed. There are enormous differences in estimations of the size of the bio-industrial market, because the elements to be considered are not easily isolated. Forecasts for the year 2000 calculate that bio-industrial activities will have multiplied by a factor ranging from 2,5 to 5. The markets that promise the greatest expansion are those of monoclonal antibodies, as well as medicine generally (human insulin, growth hormones and so on). All sectors are implicated in this domain: antibiotics, vitamins, hormones (cortisone, for example), vaccines (for preventing tooth decay or malaria), diagnostic agents, and so on. At present, biological agents have only a modest role in agriculture, although research leads us to expect important developments in protective agents and seeds. We are witnessing in vitro development of plant-cell cultures which wiS lead to the production of pharmaceutical products, chemical products, perfumes, and aromatic products which are usually extracted from plants. Added to the traditional agricultural produce destined for human consumption will be various other products: proteins, additives, thickening and gelling agents, sugar, condiments, and so on. Applications in the domain of animal food are recent, but will also develop rapidly: proteins, amino acids, vitamins, and so on: an ox weighing one ton produces 1 kg of protein a day; a ton of yeast produces 100 tons of protein a day; a ton of bacteria produces 1 billion tons of protein a day.

92

3.5 Reproductive Technologies and Biotechnologies

In terms of the number of products, chemistry is perhaps the most promising domain of application in the long run because there are few chemical products that cannot theoretically be produced by biological means. The problem is to make these channels competitive: heavy chemistry (industrial alcohols, solvents, organic acids, glycerines), light chemistry (biopolymers, enzymes, and so on) and energy-yielding substances (alcohol, diester, and methane). The production of methane from fermentation and alcohol from biomass may provide energy sources which are not yet financially viable because of today's oil prices. Michel Forse

References Bye, P., and A., Mounier 1984. "Les Futurs alimentaires et 6nerg6tiques des biotechnologies." Economies et Societes, Cahiers de CISMEA 27. Darbon, P., and J. Robin. 1987. Les biotechnologies. Quelles realties? Quel avenir?, Paris: FayardDiderot Joassin, L. 1982. "Les perspectives de la biotechnologie dans ses diff&ents domaines d'application." Problemes economiques 1773. London, H. and al., 1987. "La seconde Revolution contraceptive." Paris: PUF. Cahiers de I'INED, 117. Plassard, F. 1986. Sept pistes de reflexion, pour mieux percevoir I'impact des nouvelles technologies du vivant sur {'agriculture et I'agro-alimentaire. Paris: Document de Travail. CESTA. Teso, B. 1982. "Biotechnologies: Promesses et Contraintes." Problemes Economiques 1798.

93

3 Women

Table 1 Proportion of Women Using the Pill (%)

1970

1971

1975

1978

1980

1981

1985

1988

1989

9

10

21

28

22

18,5

26

33,5

33

Source: CREDES, Lesfemmes sous contraception orale, 1991: 50.

Table 2 Comparison of Methods of Contraception Between 1978 and 1988 (%) Per 100 women of 20 to 44 years Using some method Principal method used: - The pill -IUD - Condom - Withdrawal - Periodic abstinence -Other

1978

Surveys of

1988

68,1

67,7

27,9

33,6 19,1

8,9 5,2

18,3

5,6 2,2

Source: INED, Population et socittts. October 1988.

94

4,2 6,3 2,4 2,1

3.5 Reproductive Technologies and Biotechnologies

Table 3 Characteristics of Users of Prescribed

Contraceptives

% of women using either pill or IUD 1978

1988

Overall

36

53

Marital status: - Married, living with husband - Cohabiting - Not cohabiting with partner -Without partner

36 61 61 15

54 64 65 26

Place of residence: - Rural commune - Town of fewer than 20 000 inhabitants - Town of 20 000 to 100 000 inhabitants - Town of more than 100 000 inhabitants -Paris

31 31 38 39 47

56 56 51 50 51

Level of education: - Primary, CEP - CAP (post-primary technical certificate) - BEPC (secondary intermediate certificate) - Baccalaui6at +

30 39 40 44

40 53 60 55

Nationality: - French - Other

37 34

54 34

Source: INED, Population et sorites, October 1988.

95

3 Women

Table 4 Breakdown of Bio-industry Markets in France in 1980 and 1990 (Billions of Francs) Sector and type of product Pharmaceutical industry: - Antibiotics - Interferon - Vaccines, blood, and diagnostic products - Hormones - Vitamins -Other Sub-total

1980

1990

1,5 0

2,2 0,3

0,3 3,6

5,8

1,16 0,48 0,15

Agro-nutritional industry: - Maize products - Amino acids - Organic acids - Enzymes Sub-total

1,53 0,17 0,13

0,1 1,9

2,22 0,61 0,19 0,33

1,89 0,28 0,17

0,1 2,4

Agriculture: -Seeds -Other

0,02

0,03

Chemical industry: - Ethanol

0

2

Total

9

15

3,5

Source: A. Sasson, Les biotechnologies, defis et promesses, Unesco, 1985.

96

5,2

4 LABOUR MARKET

The model of a "good" full-time job, guaranteed for life, is based on the notion of a skill. It requires all the energy of the worker and perhaps even of his or her family as well. This model is giving way to one which is less centred around a particular skill than around the ability to adapt to new roles and market developments. This kind of model generates its own inequalities. The economic recession, international trade, the increasing number of women in the paid work force, the higher level of education among youth, new technological developments, and the greater demand for services have all seriously upset the labour market, which is breaking down with increasing clarity into three divisions: jobs that are stable (a permanent contract), but whose stability is threatened by restructuring due to the economic crisis, and permanent civil servants; jobs that are "precarious" (temporary, fixed-term contract, and so on) of at least two types: those based on a relatively long-term contract and results of underemployment (part-time jobs, public-utility work, unemployment training programs, and so on); jobs for the "outcasts," the long-term unemployed who no longer find work, or can find work only intermittently, and who swell the ranks of the "new poor." The desire to increase the flexibility of the labour market has led to modifications in legislation regarding employment (an employer wishing to lay off staff no longer has to receive prior authorization to do so), and changes have been made with regard to labourmanagement agreements. Enterprises are trying to streamline their staff, but technical changes (computerization, robotization, and so on) and the need to involve staff more deeply require that there be stability of employment, which goes against the idea of high flexibility. Technological innovations and the notion of an adaptable work force presuppose more skilled training and lead to a higher level of education as well as changes in the hierarchical structure (greater staff participation, negotiation). It is difficult to reach these goals if there is no employment stability. New agents are appearing on the labour market. Locally elected representatives are interested in saving enterprises in difficulty or in the creation of new jobs. In many towns, the local municipality is the largest employer.

97

4.1 Unemployment Abstract. The number of unemployed increased slightly between 1965 and 1975, then rapidly until 1985, and has since leveled out. Mean periods spent unemployed have increased. Those most affected are the young, women, non-degree holders, and immigrants. People experience unemployment in very different ways depending on how much they value work and on their social position (age, sex, level of education, socio-professional category).

After a long period of full employment, unemployment was again on the rise in France in the mid-1960s. There was a slow increase until 1974, then the numbers increased rapidly, reaching one million in 1976 and two million in 1983. In 1990, numbers were in excess of 2,5 million, according to estimates of the International Labour Office, the Census Bureau and the National Agency for the Unemployed. According to the ILO definition, unemployment leveled out in 1988 at just under 11% of the active population. Unemployment figures are raised because of a permanent turnover. In 1984, more than 10 000 people registred at the ANPE (national agency for the unemployed) every day—3,7 million in the course of the year. Being unemployed has become a commonplace phenomenon at the start of working life—80% of first jobs are preceded by a period of unemployment—and during working life: in less than 10 years (from 1976 to 1984), loss of jobs through redundancy and contract termination (end of fixed-term contract or temporary employment) doubled and tripled, respectively. Time spent job-hunting is increasing. From 7.6 months in 1975, the average time spent unemployed exceeded 16 months in 1989; in 1988, the proportion of long-term unemployed (at least two years) had risen to 13,5% of all unemployed. These are mostly workers 50 years old and over who cannot adapt and who finally give up looking, and North African immigrants. Overall, 40% of all unemployed today have been jobless for one year or more, as opposed to 16% in the past. Depending on the person's position in the labour market, four types of unemployment can be distinguished. Starting-out unemployment affects young people looking for a first job and people wishing to re-enter the work force again after a long period of inactivity. This category comprises mainly young unskilled workers and women who gave up their jobs to raise a family. Instability unemployment is usually frequent but of short duration. This category comprises mainly young people (see 1.1, "Youth"), particularly young women. The category of youth is characterized by a high unemployment rate (25%); young people find work quickly, but also return quickly to the ranks of the unemployed: for want of better work they will accept part-time positions or general unskilled jobs, usually of very short duration. Unemployed again, with very little unemployment benefit, they have to accept any job of whatever tenure. Thus the growing number of jobs of precarious tenure (see 4.3, "Types of Employment") contributes to unemployment figures. Older unemployed workers (see 1.2, "Elders") are victims of rejection linked to restructuring of the production process. This places them in competition with younger, more mobile, better trained categories of workers on lower salaries. They spend a particularly long time unemployed: in 1987, three-quarters of those who lost their jobs after the age of 50 were still unemployed 15 months later. Many give up trying, and are thereby excluded from the labour market Lastly, occupational-mobility unemployment concerns people in mid-career, who are easily employable. They tend to be men aged between 30 and 40, with good qualifications, and they usually find stable employment easily.

98

4.1 Unemployment

In contrast to traditional "crisis-period unemployment," which is indiscriminate and economy-related, present-day unemployment is characterized by selectivity. In short, those who suffer from unemployment are women, youths, workers above 50 years of age and those with a low level of education. The economic situation alone does not explain this phenomenon. It also results from the actions and strategies of various social agents (the state, management, and labour unions) involved in an ongoing process of negotiation on the labour market, and thereby reflects a particular form of social regulation of unemployment. Being unemployed means having material problems: in March of 1985, the proportion of ANPE-registered unemployed receiving no benefits was estimated at 40%; in 1989 this figure had risen to 50% (including youths looking for a first job, unskilled women who decide to start working, and so on). According to a 1979 study (when unemployment benefits were more substantial than they were in 1990), a working-class family with either parent unemployed lost a quarter of its income but reduced its expenditures by only 15%, either as a result of inefficient domestic management, different forms of microsocial solidarity, or even undeclared work. It should be mentioned that there are very few families in which both husband and wife are unemployed. Unemployment leads people to fall back on the family; kinship networks (see 2.2, "Kinship Networks") lend a helping hand. In 1986, 30% of unemployed people lived with their parents, the youngest (particularly the boys) putting off the moment of "denesting." Living in a couple protects the man from unemployment, but at the expense of the woman, for whom the risk increases. Undeclared work (see 12.2, "Informal Economy") does not compensate for traditional inequalities in access to work since it is those most likely to find a job who do the most undeclared work. Undeclared work is in fact a form of artisanal activity which cannot survive legally and is subsidized by unemployment benefits. Unemployment is experienced differently as a function of the way work is experienced. People who are very attached to their work experience unemployment as a loss of status, even as a humiliation, accompanied by boredom, deserialization, and loss of time structure. This state of anomie is to be found in "total unemployment" as experienced by manual labourers. In "reverse unemployment," on the other hand, the fact of not working is not devalorized; it allows the "victim" to pursue another life style. It is the means of access to one's "true vocation." It is essentially youths and diploma holders who experience unemployment in this way. In the case of "deferred unemployment," the individual initially retains his or her life style, and job-hunting becomes a strategic exercise which demands both time and competence; the maintenance of norms of a working life constitutes a deliberate denial of the unemployed condition. This mental effort does not exclude a feeling of devalorization which, for the long-term unemployed, can evolve into a feeling of helplessness close to that experienced in total unemployment. This type of unemployment is experienced by the managerial class. Jean-Hugues Dechaux

99

4 Labour Market

References Barthe, M.A. 1981. "Chdmage, travail au noir et entraide familiale." Consommation 3. Benoit-Guilbot, 0.1985, January-February. "Acteurs sociaux, politiques de 1'emploi et structures du chdmage. Le jeu du Mistigri." Futuribles: 84-85. "Chomage et ch6meurs." 1987, November, December. Temps Modernes. "Emploi et chomage: l'6clatement." 1986, November-December, ficonomie et Statistique 193-194. "Emploi et chomage: court terme et long terme." 1987, December, tconorrde et Statistique 205. Freyssinet, J. 1988. Le Chomage. Paris: La Decouverte. Coll. "Reperes." LeMouel, J. 1981. "Le chomage des jeunes: des v&us tres difKrents." Sociologie du Travail 2. Schnapper, D. 1981. L'epreuve du chomage. Paris: Gallimard. Wuhl S., 1991. Du chdmage a {'exclusion? L'ltat des politiques? L'apport de I 'experience. Paris: Syros.

100

4.1 Unemployment

Table 1 Unemployment Rate by Sex and Age Males

Females

15_24 25^9 years years 49 +

Total

— 2,1 2,2 1,9 1,6 1,9 2,7 2,9 3,3 3,8 4,0 4,3 4,9 5,2 5,5 6,3 7,0 7,1 7,2 6,8 6,1

0,8 1,2 1,7 1,9 1,8 1,8 2,5 3,4 3,3 3,7 4,2 4,3 4,9 6,1 6,4 7,3 8,7 8,7 8,8 8,5 8,0 7,3

Overall

15-24 25^49 years years 49 +

Total

— 3,9 4,0 3,5 3,3 3,2 3,8 4,4 4,2 4,6 5,7 6,2 6,6 7,0 7,5 7,9 7,9 8,3 8,9 9,0 7,9

2,0 2,8 5,1 5,2 5,1 5,1 5,9 7,2 7,5 7,7 8,4 9,5 10,3 11,6 11,5 12,2 13,4 13,1 13,8 13,5 13,6 12,6

15-24 25-49 years years 49 +

1Q

1 054 JL 7 J •*

1961 1965 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989*

Total

— 3,1 3,7 3,8 3,9 6,0 7,4 7,5 7,9 9,1 9,6 11,1 14,0 14,8 17,3 21,1 19,4 18,2 17,5 16,6 16,9

— 1,0 1,2 1,1 1,1 1,6 2,3 2,1 2,5 2,9 2,9 3,3 4,2 4,4 5,0 6,0 6,4 6,8 6,6 6,5 6,1

— 9,2 8,9 9,7 10,6 11,9 14,6 15,2 15,8 18,2 21,3 23,1 25,8 25,6 28,1 30,5 27,3 27,7 26,6 26,1 24,2

— 3,4 3,7 3,4 3,2 4,2 5,1 5,3 5,6 5,7 6,3 7,0 8,0 8,0 8,4 9,4 10,1 11,1 11,2 11,7 11,6

* f7

— 5,7 6,0 6,4 6,8 8,5 10,6 10,9 11,4 13,2 14,8 16,5 19,3 19,6 22,2 25,3 22,9 22,5 21,6 20,9 20,5

March 1989 Source: INSEE, Annuaire rttrospectif de la France, 1990: 71 mAEnquete emploi 1989.

101

— 1,8 2,0 1,9 1,8 2,5 3,3 3,3 3,7 4,0 4,2 4,7 5,7 5,8 6,4 7,4 7,9 8,6 8,5 8,7 8,5

— 2,8 2,9 2,5 2,2 2,4 3,1 3,4 3,6 4,1 4,6 5,0 5,6 5,9 6,3 6,9 7,3 7,6 7,9 7,7 6,9

1,2 1,7 2,9 3,1 3,1 3,0 3,8 4,8 4,9 5,2 5,9 6,4 7,0 8,3 8,5 9,3 10,6 10,6 10,9 10,6 10,4 9,6

4 Labour Market

Table 2 Unemployment Rate by Socio-professional Category

Year

Farmers

Artisans, traders, company directors

1968 1970 1975 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989*

0,1 0,1 0,2 0,3 0,1 0,2 0,3 0,2 0,5 0,5 0,4 0,6 0,5

0,6 0,6 1,3 1,4 1,7 2,0 2,2 2,7 3,0 2,9 3,3 2,8 2,6

Senior management and professionals

Middle management

0,6 0,8 1,7 2,3 2,4 2,5 2,3 2,3 2,8 2,9 2,9 2,8 2,3

0,9 0,8 2,1 3,3 3,6 4,1 3,8 4,3 4,5 5,0 5,1 4,6 3,6

Wageearners

1,8 1,6 4,5 7,5 8,2 8,9 9,3

10,9 10,8 11,4 12,4 12,0 10,7

Workers

Overall

2,1 1,9 4,1 6,7 8,5 9,6

1,7 1,6 3,7 6,1 7,1 7,8 8,1 9,5

10,1 12,4 13,7 13,9 14,8 14,6 12,2

10,2 10,2 10,7 10,2

8,7

* March 1989 Source: INSEE, Annuaire r&rospectif de la France 1990: 76, and EnquSte Emploi 1989.

Table 3 Average Number of Months Unemployed Year

1968 1970 1975 1980 1985 1987 1989*

Males

Females

Overall

8,8 8,4 6,7 10,6 13,7 15,9 16,0

8,8 9,0 8,3 12,3 16,2 17,2 16,5

8,8 8,7 7,6 11,6 15,0 16,6 16,3

* March 1989 Source: INSEE, Collections de 1'INSEE D 123:103.

102

4.1 Unemployment

Table 4 Long-Term Unemployment Rates (More than 12 months)

Long-term unemployed as % of unemployed population Women Under 25 years 50 years + Skilled workers Unskilled workers Labourers and specialized workers Management

1974

1976

1978

1980

1982

1984

1986

1988

1990

12,1

15,6

18,8

22,7

25,6

27,4

30,2

30,2

30,8

52,5 55,4 11,0 21,3

57,5 19,4 41,7 13,1 25,2

60,2 21,6 37,4 14,2 27,7

59,2 25,0 40,9 15,7 28,6

55,0 26,9 37,0 18,2 26,4

52,7 28,4 32,4

53,9 23,1 24,9

56,6 16,7 25,3 18,8 31,5

57,9 13,5 23,9 16,5 34,1

41,7

36,4

34,4

31,3

31,9

— —

— —

26,7

24,8

9,3

6,7

6,1

5,2

4,7

Source: Probtemes tconomiques 2228, June 1991.

103

3,7

— —

— —

3,1

3,3

4.2 Skills and Occupational Levels Abstract. Transformation of tasks and trades has led to a modification of qualifications: an increase in nonmanual employment, information-processing points, and supervision of automated processes. These new trades require higher qualifications and the ability to co-operate.

The notion of manual labour is complex, and is not a statistical category. While the idea of corporal activity and physical effort goes hand in hand with the idea of task realization, the manual labourer may be a highly trained skilled operative or an unskilled worker. The drop in the number of manual jobs is therefore difficult to quantify. The concept of qualification is located at the intersection of three different types of analyses. First, the wage-earner's qualifications and competence are built up from job experience; analysis of this type of qualification focuses on occupational training and practical experience, with due consideration given to the context in which it took place, and the wage-earner's history of job achievement. Second are the qualifications required for the job—that is, the skills required in order to hold the specific position within the particular technological framework and given work structure, as well as an analysis of the consequences of possible errors. Here the analysis centres mainly on the job itself but takes account of the environment (work groups, departments, culture, and so on). Lastly, qualification is also the socially recognized qualification—that is, the classification that determines salary and location in the social hierarchy. The scope of analysis therefore covers the labour market, the strategies of the agents, alliances, and an appreciation of the balance of power between them in order to evaluate real competence. Centring on these three domains, different studies have tried to isolate the factors that determine the development of qualifications. There is a twofold movement: on the one hand, deskilling-overskilling ensures the domination of capital over work. On the other hand, some think that wage-earners are progressively gaining an active say in the complex tasks surrounding production. Therefore, growth depends on the degree of development, creativity, and adaptability of wage-earners, and is restricted by outdated social relationships. International comparisons have eliminated economic and technological determinism in favour of the societal dimension: training processes (see 15.2, "Professional Education"), types of labour division, and forms of collective action. In all cases, in order to improve its production or service it is in the enterprise's interest that the employees use their competence fully, but the enterprise tends not to recognize this fact officially, in order to avoid paying higher wages, whereas it is in the interest of employees and labour unions (see 10.2, "Institutionalization of Labour Unions"), in order to influence salaries and job organization (see 5.1, "Work Organization"), to have their training and competence recognized, including skills and competences which are little used in the job in question. The present trend is toward greater recognition of qualifications rather than job security, and toward low pay. The balance is always delicate, and is threatened by three types of development: job development, changes in work organization, and introduction of new technology. Overall, skilled labour has advanced in the last 30 years. Between 1954 and 1982, the proportion of middle executives, technicians, supervisors, and clerical staff in the population active on the job market grew from 15,3% to 31,7%. In the same period, managerial staff and professionals grew from 2,9% to 7,7% (see 4.4, "Sectors of the Labour Force"). The percentage of labourers continued to grow until 1975, but has receded and constituted only 30% of jobs in 1990, with the greatest reduction being in unskilled labour. The increase in numbers of executives, wage earners, and technicians

104

4.2 Skills and Occupational Levels

poses the problem of qualifications in a new way. Task analysis is less important, and new dimensions have to be taken into account such as the capacity to make decisions, to direct, to delegate, to communicate, to analyze, and the ability to co-operate and to achieve goals (see 5.2, "Personnel Administration," and 5.3, "Sizes and Types of Enterprises"). Changes in industry have been all the greater as unskilled jobs have been cut drastically as a result of technical developments. The need to reduce organizational rigidity and respond to new requirements for quality and adaptability of production has led enterprises to reorganize production lines around work groups with greater autonomy (see 5.1, "Work Organization"). Recognition of collective competence and the need for teamwork in achieving goals have assumed a new importance. A new element, which overshadows the traditional modes of regulation between management and labour unions, has come into play: the desire of a large number of workers (particularly the young) for greater autonomy in their work, and for participation in decisions influencing it. The higher level of education, changes in the exercise of authority and a smaller number of hierarchical levels all contribute to this development. Jean-Pierre Jaslin

References "Adaptation des structures de 1'emploi et modernisation des entreprises." 1988, September. Economic et Statistique 213. Carre", J.J., P. Dubois, and Malinvaud, E. 1972. La croissancefrangaise: un essai d'analyse causale de I'apres-guerre. Paris: Seuil. Dadoy, M. 1973, April-June "Le systeme devaluation de la qualification du travail: pratique et ideologic." Sociologie du travail. DeMontmollin, M. and O., Pastr6. 1984. Le taylorisme. Paris: La D6couverte. Desrosieres, A., and L. TheVenot 1988. Les categories socio-professionnelles. Paris: La D6couverte. Maurice, M., F. Sellier and J J., Sylvestre 1982. Politique d'iducation et organisation industrielle en France et en Allemagne. Paris: PUF. "Nouvelles technologies dans 1'industrie. L'enjeu des qualifications." 1984. Sociologie du travail, 4e trimestre. Salais, R., and L., Th6venot. 1986. Le travail-march^, regies, conventions. Paris: INSEE-Economica.

105

4 Labour Market

Table 1 Breakdown of Workforce by Category: Relative Shares and Feminization Socio-professional groups

Fanners Employer, artisans, traders Senior management and professional Middle management Wage-earners Workers Unemployed never having worked Total population

%o ef employed population

%o of women in the group

1962

1975

1987

1962

1975

1987

159 109

78 81

55 73

384 353

337 327

373 344

47 110 185 390 0

71 160 234 373 3

91 191 272 305 13

163 339 664 196 462

218 376 710 206 661

278 421 760 211 579

1000

1000

1000

344

374

430

Source: Desrosieres, TheVenot, Les categories socio-professionnelles.

106

4.2 Skills and Occupational Levels

Table 2 Development of Employment by Economic Sector, 1970-1990 Sector

Year

Agriculture

1970 1980 1990 1970 1980 1990 1970 1980 1990 1970 1980 1990 1970 1980 1990 1970 1980 1990 1970 1980 1990 1970 1980 1990

Industry (including energy) Manufacturing Construction and engineering Trade and commercial services Insurance and banking Non-commercial services Overall

Numbers (1000s) 2785 1881 1339 5860 5631 4718 4965 4777 3905 2057 1864 1600 5923 7 123 8300

381 557 601

3892 4788 5581 20900 21847 22140

Source: INSEE, "Rapport sur les comptes de la nation 1990" INSEE-rtsultats 36-37-38: 57.

107

4.3

Types of Employment Abstract. Between unemployment at one extreme and permanent full-time employment at the other, a whole range of intermediary work situations have come into being (part-time, fixed-term, temporary, training periods, and so on), along with increased mobility.

From 1975 to 1989, the population active on the job market, including the unemployed, increased from 22 million to 24 million; as a proportion of the total population, it remained constant at about 43%. This stability is due to different factors. Working life began later: in 1989, only 13,6% of men and 9,4% of women aged between 15 and 19 years were working; in 1975 the figures were 29% and 23,4%, respectively. The most striking factor is the increasing proportion of women active in the work force, which reached 45,8% in 1989. Lastly, the proportion of the population active in the work force engaged in salaried jobs rose from 72,5% to 84,6%; this movement affected all sectors except agriculture and construction and civil engineering. With the increased diversity of types of work, it is becoming difficult to draw a clear line between employment and unemployment. Workers will often go from periods of precarious employment to unemployment and then back to precarious employment. The same applies to those with job security and those without. Unlike the situation at the beginning of the 1970s, a wage-earner may frequently pass from a stable sector into a less stable one: this was the case with workers in the steel industries and shipyards. Although stable jobs in the public service and permanent contracts are by far the most numerous, it is essentially precarious and start-up jobs that have developed most. Of these positions, fixed-term contracts account for about 3% of wage-earners (478 000 in 1987). This type of work is a form of extended trial period: it accounts for 13,5% of the newly unemployed and 11% of the newly employed. This type of contract has now become an obligatory stage on the way to stable employment. This is particularly true for enterprises with fewer than 200 employees and for women, and remains true whatever the level of education. Temporary-employment agencies were employing nearly 150 000 temporary workers at the end of 1987. The number of these agencies grew considerably until 1980, and thereafter became highly concentrated, with 4% of them handling two-thirds of the work. Work contracts are shorter (by an average of 3,8 weeks in 1980, and 1,9 weeks in 1984) and the number of jobs has dwindled in similar proportions. Moreover, the qualification level of temporary workers has slipped a little. Most are still unskilled labourers, although the number of executives and technicians has doubled. The number of women and youths has also increased. Temporary male workers are more and more in demand in large enterprises (200 or more employees). Part-time contracts account for more than two million jobs. Some of these jobs have very short work periods, less than 20 hours a week. In general, such jobs are extremely precarious. Precariousness is even greater in temporary labour. From 1983 to 1987 these types of jobs increased by 14,5%. They now account for 1,2 million active workers or 5,4% of the working population. Most of them (67%) are women, and 40% of them are aged between 25 and 49 years. Training programs terminating in employment have developed rapidly since 1985. In 1986, 407 000 people took paid training courses. Public-utility jobs accounted for 234 000 people in March of 1987. Since then, other forms of employment schemes have

108

4.3 Types of Employment

appeared: in-company training programs, combined work and study programs, and so on. The diversity in types of work contract increases mobility, but new handicaps make access to the "protected market" more difficult, and jobs there are less and less permanent. Unskilled positions give women wishing to work again and youths access to the labour market The least qualified and the eldest are in difficulties, as job experience is little valued on the labour market. This is a major upheaval in a country in which on-thejob experience was always more valued than diplomas.

Jean-Pierre Jaslin

References Beret, P. 1986, June. "Les dvolutions des systemes de mobilit6 dans la crise et les strategies des offreurs de travail." Travail etEmploi 28. Elbaum, M. 1987, December. "Les petits boulots plus d'un million d'actifs en 1987." Economic et Statistique 205. Henry, R. 1986, February. "L'inte'rim en 1984." Dossiers Statistiques du travail et de I'emploi 19. Jaslin, J.-P., J. Loos and M. Forse". 1988, April. "Du dualisme & la flexibility du march6 du travail." Observatoire et diagnostics economiques. Revue de 1'O.F.C.E. 23. Schnapper, D. 1989. "Rapport £ I'emploi, protection sociale et statuts sociaux." Revue Frangaise de Sociologie 1.

109

4 Labour Market

Table 1 Precarious Employment as a Proportion of Total Employment (%)

Year

Overall

1986 1989 1990

4 6,5 5,8

Permanent contracts

Part-time

0,8 1,8 1,7

3 4 3,5

Employment training schemes

0,2 0,4 0,2

Source: INSEE.

Table 2 Temporary Work Contracts

Year

1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987

Number of contracts

2 295 639 2 356 189 2 355 306 2 904 498 437 180 4150513

Volume of work measured as equivalent permanent wage-earners Numbers

Rate trend

142 157 113425 101 998 123 585 142 905 183603

-20,2 -10,1 + 21,2 + 15,6 + 28,4

Source: Liaisons sociales, Tableaux sociaux, statistiques retrospectives.

110

Percentage of temps in the wage-earning population

0,86 0,79 0,96 1,11 1,43

4.3 Types of Employment

Table 3 Distribution and Development of Paid Trainees

Numbers (1 OOOs) Distribution Employed Unemployed Unemployed in training

1982

1983

1984

1985

1986

1987

1988

136

134

139

248

407

433

506

54 6

53 4

49 5

62 4

73 5

79 4

72 7

40

43

46

34

22

17

21

Source: Liaisons sociales, Tableaux sociaux, statistiques retrospectives.

Table 4 Development of Part-time Work (% of available work force) Year

Males

1971 1980 1988

1,7 2,4 3,4

Source: INSEE, Annuaire rltrospectif de la France, 1990.

Ill

Females

13,1 17,1 23,8

4 Labour Market

Tables Development of Precarious Employment in the Private Sector (%) March 1984 Apprentices Temporary employment In-company trainees Fixed-term contracts Part-time Permanent contracts

1,3 0,8 0,4 2,0 8,5 87,0

Source: CERC, Document du Cere 94.

112

March 1988 1,5 13 1,4 4,1 9,5 82,2

4.4

Sectors of the Labour Force Abstract. Jobs in the service sector catering to companies and households have increased. The same is true for tertiary-sector employment in industry, whereas bluecollar employment has decreased.

The tertiary sector has developed considerably in the last 35 years. In 1954 it employed 38,5% of the active population; today it accounts for 66,5% of salaried positions. The development of the tertiary sector can be broken down into three phases: first, until 1964, the tertiary sector developed at the same rate as industry (+ 1,7% per year), but the tertiary commercial sector alone developed by more than 4% per year, from 1964 to 1968, when industrial employment was on a slight downswing, the tertiary sector, along with construction and civil engineering more than compensated for the loss of jobs. Then, from 1968 to 1974, the tertiary sector continued to grow more quickly than the secondary sector, which had re-established development (more than 3% per year, as opposed to an average of 2%); from 1974 to 1980, the tertiary sector forged ahead and compensated for losses in industry and in building and public works, which were backsliding. Finally, after 1981, with the increased loss of jobs in the primary and secondary sectors, the tertiary sector could no longer compensate. The growth of the tertiary commercial sector, which had been largely responsible for development, slowed up considerably. Only the non-commercial part continued to progress, due to the creation of new positions in civil service (1981-82) and of short-term contracts for young people jobs (1985). Services to enterprises grew by 5,2% per year until 1976, then by more than 6% per year until 1980. Thereafter, growth stopped: trades related to construction and public works stagnated and temporary work slumped (until 1985), but engineering, accountancy firms, advertising and various other services, as well as low-skill jobs such as caretaking and cleaning increased as a result of the contracting out of industrial jobs. Services to households (see 13.4, "Time Use") developed less rapidly than did services to enterprises, but the number of jobs doubled over 25 years. The growth rate of 3,8% continued until 1978, then slowed to 1,5% because of the oil crisis and the slow rise in the rate of household consumption. Even the health-and-social-protection sector, where expansion had been very great (7,3% per year) due to the social-security system, grew by only 2,5% per year in the 1980s (see 8.2, "Health Systeme"). Other services—leisure and various other services (cleaning, laundering, and so on)-—stagnated or grew very slightly, but the oil crisis did stop the slump in repair services. Tertiary employment increased in the industrial sector, to 18,7% of jobs in 1983 (against 15,4% in 1969). A slump in industrial labour is therefore no longer detrimental to technical employment. It is difficult to determine whether the growth in service employment heralds deindustrialization. In all industrialized countries, with the exception of Japan and, to a lesser degree, Italy, jobs are decreasing in the industrial sector and increasing in the tertiary sector. But the oil crisis affects the tertiary sector a little later, when productivity and increasing employment slow down. Although banking services can be diversified and their productivity increased, it will nonetheless always be difficult to reduce the time necessary to train a young person. Service productivity must be examined differently in different sectors. Although the statistics do not give a clear picture of changes in the mechanisms of production, it would be better to analyze these changes than to shy away from speaking of the industrialization of the tertiary sector or the tertiarization of the secondary sector.

113

4 Labour Market

The amount of tertiary activity in every sector of industrial production is increasing. This is corroborated by the relatively high rate of non-material investment. Research and development stagnated at 1,05% of the GDP until 1979; thereafter, it rose to reach 1,4% in 1985. Moreover, some services require industrial production, computer sciences for example.

Jean-Pierre Jaslin

References Braibant, M. 1982, June. "Le tertiaire insaisissable?" Economic et Statistique 146. Dablin , J.P. and C., Sauviat. 1985, July. "Tertiarisation et emplois tertiaires, le cas de la France et 49 autres pays industrialists." Notes de I'lRES 5. Faivret, J.P., J.L. Missika, and D. Wolton. 1980. Le tertiaire Mate: le travail sans modele, Paris: Seuil. Gandillot, T. 1985, January. "Les limites aux creations d'emploi dans le tertiaire." Le Nouvel 4conomiste 25. Sauviat, C. 1986, October. "Une premiere approche macro-economique des relations tertiaire-industrie." Notes de I'IRES 10. Trogan, P. 1984, November-December. "L'emploi dans les services: une croissance quelque peu ambigue." Economic et Statistique 171-172. Vernieres, M. 1985. L'emploi du tertiaire. Paris: Economica.

114

4.4 Sectors of the Labour Force

Table 1 Non-civil Servants in Service Industries Year

Numbers (1 OOOs)

7410

1960

1965

8422 9596 10646 11810 12637 13289

1970 1975 1980 1985

1988

Source: ESTSEE, Annuaire retrospectif de la France 1990.

Table 2 Development of Tertiary Employment by Sector and by Qualification Between 1984 and 1988

(%)

Engineers Trade of which: Wholesale food Wholesale non-food Retail food Retail non-food Transport Commercial services Car repairs Hotels, cafes, restaurants Services to companies Services to private individuals Rental, credit, leases Insurance Financial bodies

+ 19 +6 + 14

-2

+ 25 +9 + 40

+4 + 52

+ 26 + 51 +1 + 43 + 38

UnTechni- Skilled skilled cians worker worker

+1

-8

+2

-7 -6 -8

+7

-7 -3

+5

-10

+4 + 10

-3

-7 -11 _5

-3 -5 -3 -8 -7 -8 -35 +2

-26 +3

-15

-15 -9 -14 -18 -6 -31 -17 -23 -19 -56 -11 +2 +4

-32

Senior management

Middle UnmanSkilled skilled agewage- wageement earner earner

+2

-3 -12 -4

-2 -10 -10

-1 -3

-16

-1

+1 + 10 +1

-9

+9

+ 20

+ 18 +3

+ 17 + 16 +7 + 10 +1

+ 19 + 15 +5 + 17

-5 -6

-5

-14

Source: INSEE, "La France a 1'epreuve des turbulances mondiale." INSEE-Etudes.

115

+ 16

+9

-9 -17

+ 15 +3

+4 +1 -7 -7

-20

+6

+4 + 18

-10 -5

+2

-21

+5

-27 +7

-3

-13 -8

4.5 Computerization of Work Abstract. The use of personal computers (PCs) has come to affect whole areas of society. Technical innovations are accompanied by social innovations which are, for the moment, restricted to the work place.

We can distinguish five categories of new technologies using electronic components: media innovations—local radio and television stations using the FM band, citizens'-band radios, but also video cameras and recorders, cable TV, and so on; new services linked to the telephone network—answering machines, remote-control alarm systems, fax machines, video conference, and so on; all computer-science products, which can be broken down into three types—mainframe computers, work stations, and PCs; all services resulting from a combination of the previous three categories—teletext, data banks, electronic cards, electronic mail, and so on; and everything that incorporates electronic components in a less obvious way—toys, household appliances, cars, and so on. All of these items are circulating with greater or lesser frequency, depending on the category and the social level. The development of computer science has been particularly rapid: expenditures on computers rose from 2% of the GDP in 1975 to 2,7% in 1980, and to 3,5% in 1985. It is probable that this increase will continue, and even accelerate, in the years to come. Certain "technical" factors help it along: reduced costs, the rapid growth of information to store and transmit, the generalization of digitalized signals which permit link-ups between telematics and private terminals. Having said this, experiments with cable TV, Teletel networks, and so on have not occasioned any great changes in the lives of people using them. Even when innovations are more widespread, there is no sign of the social innovations predicted by some journalists. We know that PCs are used principally for playing games and that video-tape recorders are used to record TV movies more often than to create one's own programs. New technologies are creating new opportunities for communication without destroying old social practices (see 2.6, "Sociability Networks"). The introduction of the telephone did not mean that people stopped writing letters or stopped seeing each other, similarly, it is unlikely that relationships established through new telematic media will replace face-toface meetings. In day-to-day life there are certain constraints which, in the short term at least, prevent overwhelming changes from taking place. Localization and configuration of dwellings can only develop slowly. The increase in free time, however (see 14.1, "Amount and Use of Free Time"), which should continue, is an important factor of expansion. It seems that new modes of communication and computer technology in the home will not lead to a homogenization of lifestyles. All households do not acquire the same technologies at the same time to the same degree. Consumer patterns as a function of social category are reinforced. For one and the same product, such as the Minitel, there are numerous different uses, which vary according to social and cultural distinctions, and become one more way of marking these distinctions. In a period of industrial restructuring, firms must invest in new technology. Although it is indisputable that robotics and office automation enchance productivity, the capitalistic character of such investments is responsible for an increase in the unemployment crisis (see 4.1, "Unemployment" and 4.2, "Skills and Occupational Levels"). New technologies are doing away with more jobs than they are directly creating. Automation of the tertiary sector will further aggravate the problem. Working hours and/or the duration of working life are being redefined (see 5.1, "Work Organization").

116

4.5 Computerization of Work

The introduction of new technologies is causing the disappearance of certain trades associated principally with the direct transformation of matter and therefore with a specific personal knowledge—a flick of the wrist or know-how acquired through a long apprenticeship. The skilled worker is becoming a mere supervisor. Innovations necessitate new skills while at the same time doing away with a considerable number of unskilled jobs. In the past, computerization often reinforced existing organizational models and only minimally affected worker behaviour, if it wasn't quite simply rejected. In 1990, different scenarios were possible. Thanks to microcomputers, periphery-centre-type organization can be bypassed (see 5.2, "Personnel Administration"). Communications are thought of more and more in terms of complex networks in which "intelligent" terminals can be linked up to a central unit of superior capacity. The new technologies are more supple and flexible, and facilitate the development of work in autonomous or semi-autonomous groups. They promote and facilitate greater decentralization of work, including management. The role of the hierarchy is being transformed: certain intermediate tiers are becoming obsolete. It is becoming less and less necessary to supervise work and more and more necessary to manage human resources. In conclusion, whereas computerization initially led to centralization and hierarchical structure, it no longer gives any a priori indication for any particular type of change (see 5.3, "Sizes and Types of Enterprises"). Everything depends on the logic of the negotiation taking place. Michel Fors6

References Agence de I'informatique. 1986. L'etat d'informatisation de la France. Paris: Economica. Alter, N. 1983. L'effet organisational de {'innovation technologique. Paris: These 3e^cycle, I.E.P. Balle*, O., and J.L. Peaucelle. 1972. Lepouvoir informatique dans I'entreprise. Paris: Editions d'Organisation. C.F.T.C.. 1984. Les mutations technologiques. Paris: C.F.T.C. Conseil Economique et Social. 1984. Informatique et emploi. Paris: Journal Officiel 4023. Giraud, A. (dir.). 1978. Les reseaux pensants. Paris: Masson. Gollac, M. 1989, September. "L'ordinateur dans rentreprise reste un outil de luxe." Economic et statistique 224. Mercier, P.A. and Plassard F., Scardigli V., 1984. La societe digitale. Paris: Seuil. Nora, S. and Mine, A. 1978. L'informatisation de la societe. Paris: Documentation Frangaise. "Nouvelles technologies dans 1'industrie: 1'enjeu des qualifications." 1984, April. Sociologie du Travail, numdro sp6cial. Pave", F. 1989. L'illusion informaticienne. Paris: L'Harmattan. Shaiken, H. 1986. Le travail a I'envers: automation et main-d'oeuvre a I'&ge des ordinateurs. Paris: Flammarion.

117

4 Labour Market

Table 1 Development of Consumer Electronic Products (Base 100 in 1980)

Information technology Electrical and electronic technology

1970

1975

1985

1987

1988

1989

1990

23,7

48,2

874,1

725,2

641,0

612,9

590,6

30,3

50,5

165,3

175,7

181,6

190,4

205,3

Source: INSEE, La consummation des menages en 1990, INSEE-rtsultats 27-28.

Table 2 Rate of PC Penetration %

Year

1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991

38 53 61 67 71 76

Source: Centre d'information sur l'6pargne et le cr6dit, April 1991.

118

4.5 Computerization of Work

Table 3 Computers in France Year

Very small (less than 250 000

Small (250 000 to 1 600 000 FF)

114 763

1042 3960 5596 7280 21295 27914 35 139 41621 49386 60396

FF)

1966 1970 1973 1976 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986

2758 24929 63593 73299 86719 111 589 144024 211258

Source: Quid 1988 and International Data Corporation.

119

Average (1,6 to 7 million

FF)

981

1798 1848 1655 2386 2785 2989 3 179 3929 4573

Large and very large (7 million FF+)

60 220 546 717

1271 1346 1466 1609 1769 1983

5 LABOUR AND MANAGEMENT To adapt more quickly to market developments and optimize investments, while still responding to workers' new and varied expectations, enterprises and public services have tried to invent new forms of work management with the primary aim of mobilizing workers. This presupposes a system of work organization which gives workers more autonomy and promotes co-operation between workers and management. New technologies help to facilitate this process. Decentralization brings decision making closer to the operative. Firms no longer isolate themselves from their local environment; they seek to play an active role in it. There are now more ways to organize work schedules (flextime, part-time, and so on). The value of each individual and his or her contribution to the enterprise is recognized by individualized salaries. Executives who are used to applying rules must now learn to mobilize resources. New techniques make it more difficult to identify with a trade, and management is trying to develop a "company culture" to compensate for the change. But we may wonder whether the increasingly pronounced dissociation of financial policies from production will not make it more difficult to implement new types of work management.

120

5.1 Work Organization Abstract. Autonomous work groups are increasing and the classic hierarchical pyramid is weakening. Managers are increasingly insisting on involving the whole staff in attaining company objectives. This requires new kinds of organization: project groups, production teams, flexible work stations, and so on.

The principal discovery of the last 15 years was the complexity of the workplace. Taylorism has become outdated and has no role to play in restructuring organization and production. Its omnipresent hierarchical system, pernickety rules, rigid structures, and mechanistic approach hinder the changes that enterprises and public services are trying to develop. These stumbling blocks also exist with regard to the introduction of new technology, market-driven production, the creation of new departments or products, and restructuring of work and modes of payment. Economic and technical developments, as well as new kinds of worker motivation, have led companies to rethink their approach to work organization and to centre their thinking around the concept of human resources: motivation, participation, expertise, and qualifications. This new approach is applied to all categories of workers and gives them a greater margin of autonomy. Autonomy has increased in work organization. Between 1978 and 1984 (no earlier data exist), checks on the number of working hours were considerably reduced: in 1978, 45,3% of workers were not subject to time checks, compared to 51,6% in 1984. Almost all forms of control are being reduced, including clocking in and supervision. The sole form of control that is increasing slightly is the signing by workers of the daily attendance sheet, from 5,3% to 5,5%. Simultaneously, there has been a rapid development of "free" scheduling (hours decided by the worker) and flextime (a limited margin for starting and finishing work), although these systems are still practised only by a minority: 16% of workers in 1984, as against 11,3% in 1978. Supervisor control of task performance has been reduced by almost half. With less assembly-line work, workers can easily leave their work station; their movements are less dictated by machines. Generally, there has been an overall improvement in working conditions. Most employees, particularly technicians and junior executives, seek fulfillment outside their work. Therefore, in order to mobilize their energies it would be better if thenwork allowed them to become more involved and use all their skills. It would increase their sense of the importance and value of production, and give them a degree of autonomy allowing for improvement. What is at stake in this type of situation is economic effectiveness for the company and recognition of their skills for the workers. Development of more diversified markets and introduction of new technology often trigger a change in structures. Contractors and managers are discovering the importance of involving the whole work force in achieving the company's goals, and simultaneously recognizing each worker's ambitions and experience as a means of increasing worker involvement. Worker participation has become fashionable in many different forms: smaller production units, flexible workshops, quality groups, feedback sessions, progress and project groups, and so on. Usually their role is to solve quality problems, reorganize workspace and working methods, improve working conditions, and, if the need arises, give an opinion on choice of materials and technology. Worker participation has gone from being masked and informal to being formal, open, and official.

121

5 Labour and Management

All categories of workers are affected by these changes, which modify old loyalties and influence hierarchical structures and negotiations. Enterprises and public services seem to be becoming more democratic. The question is whether this is a stable and inevitable trend. Although our present state of knowledge does not allow us to say, it seems to be an indisputable reality for the core of permanent employees in large companies, particularly those in which technology or production systems have undergone great changes. Some saw this process as a new means of controlling work processes, cutting costs, and pre-empting worker resistance. However, the worker-participation trend does not really increase control. In companies practising these systems, studies revealed that new margins were created, new individual skills came to the fore, new roles were invented, new groups were formed, socialization and apprenticeship patterns evolved, exchange was strengthened, negotiation became the norm even outside of hierarchical situations, loyalties changed, and promotion lines were modified. But all of this requires that the workers be in a rich, humane, and relatively protected environment. Alongside this optimistic interpretation there have been developments which principally affect women workers and those in precarious employment, for whom repetitive work has not decreased. Their pay rates, usually decided by the company as a function of production rates, are dictated either by colleagues or by other work stations. Their strategic resources are too limited to enable them to negotiate openly. This situation may increase conflict in certain sectors and slow introduction of new materials and less hierarchical forms of work organization, thus hindering task restructuring. Jean-Pierre Jaslin

References Borzeix, A., and D. Linhart. 1988. "La participation: un clair-obscur." Sociologie du travail 1. Cristofari, M.F., and J. Hue. 1985, November. "Horaires et amne"nagement du temps de travail des salaries en 1984." DSTE 17. Gollac, M. 1989, September. "Les dimensions de 1'organisation du travail." Economic et statistique 224. Les conditions de travail en 1987.1988. Rapport du conseil superieur de la prevention et des risques professionnels. Paris: Documentation Frangaise. Levy-Leboyer, C. 1984. La crise des motivations. Paris. PUF. Reynaud, J.-D. 1988. "La regulation dans les organisations: regulations de controle et regulations autonomes." Revue Frangaise de Sociologie 29. Riboud, A. 1987. Modernisation mode d'emploi. Paris: Union Generate d'Edition. Sainsaulieu, R. 1988. La sociologie de 1'organisation et de I'entreprise. Paris: Presses de la FNSP. Stankiewicz, F. 1988. Les strategies d'entreprises face aux ressources hwnaines. L'apres taylorisme. Paris: Economica.

122

5.1 Work Organization

Table 1 Development of Accidents in the Work Place

Year

1955 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1988

Number of accidents causing work stoppage (1000s)

Number of serious accidents (1000s)

Number of fatal accidents

011,8 154,4 110,2 113,1 971,3 731,8 690,0

67,3 108,7 109,1 119,0 101,8 74,1 68,5

1795 2123 2268 2246 1423 1067 1 112

1 1 1 1

Source: Liaisons sociales, Tableaux sociaux, Statistiques retrospectives.

Table 2 Distribution of Workers and Wage-earners by Length of Working Week on Offer (% More than 39 hours and fewer than 40 hours

Year

Fewer than 39 hours

39 hours

Workers 1978 1980 1985 1988

— — 30,3 28,4

4,6 3,3 47,5 51,4

— — 3,1 1,9

42,6 51,3 8,0 —

— — 28,3 30,2

2,4 2,5 59,1 59,3

— — 2,7 1,8

65,7 72,0 4,3 —

Wageearners

1978

1980

1985 1988

40 hours

More than 40 hours and fewer than 42 hours

42 hours and more

Weekly average (hours)

14,4 5,9

12,2

41,5 31,0 5,2 6,1

41,5 41,1 39,0 39,1

11,1 11,4 3,1 6,8

20,8 14,1 2,5 1,9

40,7 40,5 38,9 38,9

11,3

Source: Liaisons sociales, Tableaux sociaux Statistiques retrospectives.

123

S Labour and Management

Table 3 Proportion of Workers in Industry Working in Groups

(%

1957 1959 1963 1970 1974 1977 1981 1982 1986

14,3 20,1 25,0 25,5 31,3 29,9 27,5 25,6 30,4

Source: D.S.T.E. 52-53, November 1989.

Table 4 Rate of Use of Production Capacity in Industry Base 1970 (%)

1952 1960 1970 1980 1988

82,0 83,4 86,2 84,8 85,4

Source: INSEE, Annuaire statistique 1989.

Tables Development of Labour-Management Agreements Concerning Flextime

(%)

1984 1985 1986 1987 1988

30,0 32,7 38,2 38,0 40,2

Source: Liaisons sociales, Tableaux statistiques.

124

5.2

Personnel Administration Abstract. Various different kinds of work scheduling are to be found in large companies with individualized pay and perk systems. More attention is being paid to career development.

During the 1970s, ideas on work management centred around the break-up of the labour market into one group which succeeded in negotiating and maintaining stability, and another group characterized by a high degree of precariousness and largely compulsory geographic or occupational mobility. Work management in companies was organized around these two poles: job tenure and protection on the one hand, and subcontracting, temporary work, and precariousness on the other. Workers in the same company may belong to either group. Today the need to adapt to market and technological developments is leading management to seek flexibility for all. Workers are claiming their status as active agents within their companies and demanding that their particular expectations be satisfied. These changes, and others linked to economic and technological developments, are transforming work-management techniques. Over 10 or 15 years, management has changed its point of view: whereas the labour force used to be considered an expense which had to be reduced to a minimum, it is now considered a resource which must be optimized. This new concept has not yet affected all enterprises, but the movement is gradually growing and has taken root in organizations such as the public services. It does not take the same form in all sectors (industry, commercial and non-commercial tertiary sector), but the goals are the same. For the moment, flexibility is essentially quantitative. It is marked by unemployment and the appearance of a pool of precarious jobs (about 6% of the active population), and the simultaneous burgeoning of new legal entities which modify the legal status of a company and the nature of work contracts: GIEs (economic interest groups), franchises, subsidiaries, subcontractors, and so on. Conversely, professional and geographic mobility are shrinking. Three kinds of developments have been noted in large companies: extension of irregular hours and different ways of scheduling, particularly for women; individualized pay rates and perks; and career development. Work time has been considerably reduced since 1968, but companies have also introduced schedule modifications to adjust timetables to orders and optimize use of their equipment. These irregular timetables meet with resistance on the part of wage-earners, but they are being accepted by new recruits. Individualized salaries concern mostly management and supervisors. Currently, the system of generalized salary increases is widespread (72% of companies). Agreements signed in recent years aim to establish "merit-related" salaries or profit-sharing. In some companies, the salary policy is complemented by various other perks ("13th month," endof-year bonus, regular attendance bonus, continued salary in case of illness, or other fringe benefits such as social benefits, transport, accommodation, reduced rates on company products, life insurance, contingency schemes, and so on). Although these salary complements are not new, they are becoming more widespread; according to the CERC (centre for the study of costs and incomes), they now amount to as much as 18% of gross salary. Career development has also been transformed by the reduced number of hierarchical levels. Although the increased number of diploma-holders slows down internal promotion (in the public service as well), the enterprise cannot offer other

125

5 Labour and Management

compensations, such as work autonomy. Negotiations over work organization are rarely conducted at the same time as salary and schedule negotiations. All of these changes receive a very mixed welcome from the workers, particularly when negotiation practices are weak or centralized; the lack of objective negotiated criteria makes them fear employer partiality. These changes can, however, respond to the specific problems of certain workers (women and youths, for example). In order to improve work organization, adapt to technological and economic changes, and satisfy salary demands, the policy has been to decentralize work management. Within the framework of collective and national agreements, companies now have greater margins of autonomy. Union-management agreements and even factory-specific agreements are increasing, making it easier to adapt to developments. Against this, worker status is becoming greatly diversified, sometimes to the point of disintegrating, and this does not always facilitate mobilization for a common goal. This is the serious contradictory situation that personnel managers, now called human-resources managers, must confront.

Jean-Pierre Jaslin

References "Adaptation des structures d'emploi et modernisation des entreprises." 1988, September. Dossier Economic et statistique 213. Bangoura, S. 1987. "Les augmentations individualise'es en 1985." D.S.T.E. 30. Beret, P. 1986, June. "Les Evolutions des systemes de mobility dans la crise et les strategies des offreurs de travail." Travail et emploi 28. Cezard, M. and D., Rault. 1986, January. "La crise a freine' la mobilite sectorielle." Economic et statistique 184. Crazier, M. 1988. Comment reformer I'Etat? Troispays. trois strategies, Suede, Japan, Etats-Unis. Rapport au ministre de la fonction publique et des r6formes administratives. Paris: Documentation Francaise. Grandjean, C. 1987, June. "L'individualisation des salaires: la strategic des entreprises." Travail et Emploi. Henry. 1986, February. "L'inte'rim en 1984." D.S.T.E. 19. Jaslin, J.-P., M., Forse", and J. Loos. 1988, April. "Du dualisme a la flexibility du travail." Revue de I'OFCE 23. "Les complements de salaires." 1986. Document du CERC 83.4e trimestre. Tahar, G. 1985. La reduction de la dwree du travail. Paris: La Decouverte.

126

5.2 Personnel Administration

Table 1 Breakdown of Companies by Type of Increase Granted

(%)

Proportion of companies granting an increase

1985

1986

1987

1988

1989

Overall increases only Individual increases only Overall and individual increases No increase

72 6 13 9

66 8 14 12

67 9 14 10

59 12 19 10

57 18 18 7

100

100

100

100

100

Total

Source: Ministere du Travail, Informations Premieres 182,1990. Table 2 Profit-sharing Schemes

Number of schemes in operation Number of wage-earners concerned

1985

1986

1988

1303 401000

2630 730000

4600 985000

Source: Ministere du Travail, Informations Premieres 182, 1990. Tables "In your opinion, should wages be...:" (%)

Negotiated and increased in the same way for all Increased in function of personal merit, as assessed by your superior

1985

1986

1987

1988

35,6

33,1

44,4

56,2

64,4

66,9

55,5

43,8

Source: COS, Notes d'observation sociale, survey "L'indicateur de management."

127

5.3 Sizes and Types of Enterprises Abstract. The number of small and medium-sized companies has increased. Management at large companies is acquiring increasing independence, while subcontracting is increasing.

The notion of an enterprise is hard to define. Legal status itself does not explain all types of relationships between subsidiaries and holdings, between headquarters and work places, between franchisees and franchisers, or between participants within a jointventure holding. The difficulty is increased by the fact that we are now witnessing the dissociation of three distinct units within companies: financial structure, place-ofproduction management, and management authority for a group of workers. Such an observation is surprising at a time when the term "enterprise" is fashionable. Nevertheless, in order to be able to use the existing statistics we shall retain the INSEE (National Institute for Statistics and Economic Studies) definition of an enterprise: "A physical or moral legal entity, which exercises a non-salaried activity on its own account in one or more distinct geographic locations (workplaces)." If we exclude farmers, storekeepers, and artisans, who numbered about 2 750 000 in 1985, there were about 4 461 000 enterprises in France in 1986 (SIRENE index). The vast majority, more than 85%, are very small, employing fewer than five workers. Employment rose until 1981, particularly in large firms. Since then the trend has reversed, with employment rising in small and medium-sized companies. Between 1977 and 1987, the number of large establishments dropped by 20%, and their wage-earning work force dropped by 28%. Statistics on enterprises also show an increase in the number of workplaces: 70% of wage-earners work in establishments employing fewer than 200 persons. There were two stages of development between 1968 and 1980: a rise in the number of establishments until 1973, then a significant drop (- 4,6%) until 1980. These small enterprises are structured into strong financial groups. In 1983, these groups federated 26 500 enterprises and employed 9 100 000 workers, or 65% to 70% of private-sector workers. Over the last eight or nine years, small and medium-sized companies have stood up to the crisis better than large companies, and have kept more of their employees. However, gains in production and modernization are slower. Newer small and medium-sized companies are, on the whole, slightly more innovative than are large companies. Over the last 10 or more years, depending on the sector, there has been a greater segmentation of production processes, in the form of subsidiaries, subcontractors, contracts for services rendered, or, more recently, joint-venture holdings and franchises. This development, which is difficult to pin down in a general way, seems to have two functions: greater specialization and greater flexibility. Moreover, it means that investments can be chosen and costs reduced, and for the employer it facilitates the selection and management of labour. After a recession between 1981 and 1983, production picked up rapidly. Between 1981 and 1986, 42% of enterprises were new, of which 1 400 000 were new creations (76%) and the rest take-overs (24%). One million of these enterprises still existed in 1987. They are located in the tertiary sector and have a small number of employees (18% of all employees in France). A desire for greater stability is asserting itself.

128

5.3 Sizes and Types of Enterprises

On the one hand, there are financial concentration and more centralized decisionmaking centres; on the other hand, there are smaller establishments which have greater autonomy in day-to-day management, but which depend on strategic decisions made at other levels.

Jean-Pierre Jaslin

References Callies, J.M.1988, January. "Quatre entreprises sur dix cr66es depuis 1981." Economic et Statistique 206. Magliulo, B.1984. Les petites et moyennes entreprises. Paris: Hatier. Segrestin, D. 1988, March. La rehabilitation de I'entreprise; un point de vue sociologique. CNAM, roneo. V6rin, H. 1982. Entrepreneurs, entreprises, histoire d'une idle. Paris: PUF.

129

5 Labour and Management

Table 1 Distribution of Wage-earners by Size of Enterprise

(%)

Size of enterprise 1 to 9 wageearners 10 to 49 50 to 199 200 to 499 500 +

1975

1981

1983

1985

1987

18,4 24,6 22,2 14,1 20,7

21,4 26,4 22,0 12,9 17,3

22,2 26,9 21,8 12,8 16,5

23,2 27,4 21,9 12,1 15,4

24,1 28,2 22,3 11,6 13,8

100

Total

100

100

100

100

Source: Liaisons sociales, Tableaux sociaux, Statistiques retrospectives.

Table 2 Company Fluctuations Between 1979 and 1988

(%)

(growth) 1979 to 1982 (slowdown) 1982 to 1985 (revival) 1985 to 1988 Sector

Net Creation Failure difference

9,7

9,1

Net Creation Failure difference

8,7 8,2

Industry Construction Trade Services

11,3 12,6 14,2

10,3 11,4 11,3

+ + + +

0,6 1,0 1,2 2,9

11,3 12,0

Overall

12,7

10,9

+ 1,8

10,8

8,9

10,0 11,4

10,2

8,6

-0,2 -1,8 -0,1 + 3,4

9,6

+ 1,2

Source: M. Callies, Economic et Statistique 215, Nov. 1988.

130

Net Creation Failure difference

14,0 13,2

10,8 10,8 15,1 10,8

-0,6 -0,9 - 1,1 + 2,4

12,6

12

+ 0,6

9,9

6 SOCIAL STRATIFICATION On the whole, there has been great structural mobility in French society: certain large social classes shrank and others swelled rapidly. The disappearance of the farming community and massive reductions in self-employed categories, as well as the multiplicity and differentiation of the wage-earning middle classes, require a new analytical framework for society. The classic frameworks of a struggle between two classes and an unequivocal hierarchical pyramid are no longer suitable. Important new rifts have appeared between stable and precarious employment, one-salary and two-salary households, and variations in eligibility for state welfare benefits. These rifts run right through the social hierarchy. Generalized employment of women tends to place heterogamous (each spouse coming from a different social background) households in the centre of the hierarchy. The middle-class wage-earning categories are expanding and can be seen as a central cluster of expanding or contracting social groups, with high social mobility between them, and a shared basic culture. Labourers and clerical workers form another cluster and retain their characteristic life style, in spite of the spread of the culture of the central cluster. Social mobility in this cluster is low, except for women, a minority of whom accede to the middle classes through marriage, and particularly though promotion.

131

6.1 Occupational Status Abstract. Intermediate categories are expanding, particularly middle management, as a demographic element. The range of incomes is narrowing. More and more French people consider themselves middle class, though political observers find different attitudes among them.

After the war, France was the most agricultural of the industrialized countries: 45% of the population lived in "rural" communes and a quarter of the labour force worked in agriculture. Forty years later, France had become urbanized, with agriculture employing only 5% of the working population and amounting to only 4% of national production. The France of 1990 will stand comparison with any other industrialized country. The working population as a whole has changed drastically. In 1962, more than one person in five was engaged in working on the land. Artisans, shopkeepers, and managers were as plentiful as technicians, supervisors, teachers, and other intermediary occupations. Executives, professional people, and top-level intellectual professions accounted for only 5% of the working population. In 1985, farmers and farm employees amounted to less than 5% of the active population. Members of the intermediary professions were twice as plentiful as artisans, shopkeepers, and managers. Executives, professionals, and intellectual professions had doubled. The number of unskilled labourers continued to increase slowly until about 1977, and then started to decline. As a proportion of a constantly growing working population, they have fallen from 39% in 1962 to 31% in 1985. These developments in the great mass of occupational groups are accompanied by transformations within the groups themselves. The widespread spectacular increase in the level of education in the intermediary occupations and the arrival of women on the labour market, particularly in administrative positions, teaching, health, and assistance, has considerably changed the face of the working world. Overall, there has been an increase in the proportion of salaried workers from 60% of the working population in 1949 to 84% in 1983. Within the wage-earning categories, clerical workers and executives have increased considerably. Between 1962 and 1982, this development was particularly strong among technicians, teachers, and engineers. It was less pronounced in top management, middle management, and clerical workers in general. These changes should be related to the almost total stagnation in numbers of skilled workers and the decline of unskilled manual labour. Data for 1989 indicate that these major trends are continuing, although some change is creeping in. The number of owners of small enterprises, artisans, and shopkeepers has leveled out or is in slight decline, whereas the number of owners of enterprises employing ten or more people is increasing by almost 2% per year. Although the growth rate for executives and intellectual professions was slow between 1962 and 1982, it accelerated faster than either of the other groups between 1982 and 1989. The growth rate for the intermediary occupations has slowed to 1,3% per year. The rapid growth of intermediary occupations in the health and social sectors between 1962 and 1982 has since slowed, although these sectors still remain among those with the strongest growth. There are fewer foremen and supervisors than in 1982. General office work shows a fairly slow growth rate, and all categories of unskilled labour are in decline. There are very few time-indexed comparative studies of occupational status. Apart from weekly magazine surveys, very little sociological work offers the data necessary to

132

6.1 Occupational Status

detect trends. A 1972 survey indicates that professional people enjoy slightly more prestige than do top and middle management General office workers were approximately on a par with manual labourers, whose prestige increased with their skills.

Marco Oberti

References Beneton, Ph. 1991. Les classes sociales. Paris: PUF, coll."Que sais-je?" Bidou, C. 1984. Les aventuriers du quotidien. Paris: PUF. DeSingly, F., and C. Th61ot. 1988. Gens du public, gens duprive. La grande difference. Paris: Dunod. Desrosieres, A., and L. TheVenot. 1988. Les categories socio-professionnelles. Paris: La D6couverte. coll. "Reperes." Lavau, G. and al. 1983. L'univers politique des classes moyennes. Paris: FNSP. Lemel, Y. 1991. Stratification et mobilite sociales. Paris: Armand Colin. Mendras, H. 1988. La Seconde Revolution franc, aise. Paris: Gallimard. Morrisson, C. 1988, Spring. "Une revolution tranquille. Legalisation des revenus en France depuis 20 ans." Commentaire, vol II, 41. Okba, M. 1985, June. "L'extension du salariat en France depuis la guerre." La note de I'IRES 4.

133

6 Social Stratification

Table 1 Working Population by Socio-professional Category and Sex (1000s) Socio-professional category

1982

1985

1988

Males Farmers Artisans, traders and company heads Senior management and professionals Blue-collars Wage-earners Workers

12851

12467

12417

1 154 1373 2417 1439 5515

1085 1445 2533 1382 5091

1 146 1637 2483 1434 4891

Females Fanners Artisans, traders and company heads Senior management and professionals Blue-collars Wage-earners Workers

8760

8852

9091

1607 4131 1366

1723 4164 1273

1844 4381 1 158

21611

21319

21508

953

592 624 440

Overall

931

584 613 495

Source: Liaisons sociales, Tableaux sociaux, 1988 based on INSEE, Enqu&te emploi.

134

826

485 593 630

6.1 Occupational Status

Table 2 Distribution of Working Population by % in Professional (both sexes)

Categories

Old nomenclature

1968

1975

1982

Farmers Agricultural employees Heads of industry and trade Professionals and senior management Middle management Wage-earners Waters Service personnel Others

12,1

7,6 1,7 7,9 6,7

6,2 1,3 7,4 7,7

2,9 9,6 4,9 9,8

14,7 37,7

12,7 17,6 37,7

13,8 19,9 35,1

100,0

100,0

100,0

5,7 2,6

Total

20398

Total number (1 OOOs) Source: Liaisons sociales, Tableaux sociaux 1988.

135

5,7 2,4

21775

6,5 2,1

23525

6 Social Stratification

Table3 Development of Socio-professional Categories According to Census

(%)

Annual rate of variation

Women's share

19541962

19621968

19681975

19751982

1954

1982

Fanners Agricultural employees Heads of industry and commerce Professionals and senior management Middle management Wage-earners Workers Service personnel Others3

-3,3 -4,2 -1,5 + 4,1 + 3,8 + 1,9 + 1,1 + 0,4 + 1,2

-3,5 -5,6 -0,7 + 4,5 + 4,9 + 3,8 + 1,5 + 1,8 -1,2

-5,6 -6,1 -1,9 + 5,6 + 4,7 + 3,6 + 0,9 + 0,9 -0,1

-1,9 -3,0 + 0,2 + 3,1 + 2,4 + 2,9 + 0,1 + 3,0 -0,7

41,5 15,0 37,2 13,8 36,7 52,8 22,7 80,7 26,1

37,5 15,8 34,6 26,5 48,8 65,5 24,0 79,0 13,0

Total

+ 1,2

-1,2

-0,1

-0,7

34,8

40,7

a. Artists, clergy, army, and police. Source: Liaisons sociales, Tableaux sociaux 1988.

136

6.2

Social Mobility Abstract. Overall social mobility increased greatly between 1950 and 1960, mainly as a result of changes in work organization. Since 1980 mobility has been declining, with greatest immobility at each end of the social ladder.

The socio-occupational structure of French society was considerably modified in the postwar period. The number of wage-earners increased, and that of the self-employed and farmers decreased proportionately. The percentage of upper and middle-category wage earners increased (see 6.1, "Occupational Status"). Alongside these developments there was high structural social mobility, since new generations had to divide up labour differently from the way their parents did. Overall, for reasons which could be called mechanical, social immobility, as measured by the proportion of individuals performing the same work at a given moment as their father did before them, has diminished over the years. Whereas in 1953 50% of adult men aged between 40 and 59 years had similar jobs to their fathers', in 1977 fewer than 40% of adults in their 50s were doing the same jobs as their fathers had done. All social classes were not affected in the same way, the most marked being the classes in relative decline: as the proportion of farmers and self-employed persons diminished, their sons' chances of having the same job also diminished and, accordingly, their mobility prospects improved, whereas the probability of a blue-collar worker's son doing the same kind of job improved, and paradoxically his mobility prospects decreased. The statistics nevertheless give a strong impression of social rigidity: sons often have the same jobs as their fathers, and when they move away the social distance is generally short. This tendency toward immobility is particularly strong at each end of the social hierarchy. In 1985, six out ten sons of executives were executives themselves, while almost one out of two sons of workers were workers themselves. The intermediate social categories seem to be more mobile (see 6.1, "Occupational Status"). At least half as many sons from the intermediary professions become executives (one out of three) as stay in the paternal profession. Sons of wage earners also have real possibilities of social mobility, though to a slightly lesser degree. The weight of family history on personal destiny does not operate solely through the father's social position. Mobility studies over three generations reveal a genealogical effect (see 2.2, "Kinship Networks"): though it is not systematically the case, the grandfather's position also influences individual development. The maternal heritage is also added to the paternal one: for a given paternal background, a university-graduate mother ensures greater success at school. Lastly, men "resemble" their fathers-in-law almost as much as they do their fathers. We find that 60% of sons-in-law of executives belong to the "dominant" categories, as against 64% of married sons of executives. We may ask to what degree increased social mobility in the postwar period exceeded what was necessary for individuals to adapt to the modified structure of jobs available. In order to assess this "net" mobility, which existed independently of all structural transformations and which indicates the "true" mobility of French society, we must start from a hypothesis concerning the manner in which the social category of the father could, all things being equal and regardless of general social and other developments, determine the social category of his son. We can envisage numerous hypotheses and cannot therefore reach any definitive conclusion. Having said this, specialists agree that structural upheavals explain the greater part of increased social mobility, but that reduction in immobility and the growth in mobility have gone beyond what the structural

137

6 Social Stratification

changes imposed. On the other hand, some indices suggest that social mobility may be decreasing, particularly at the two extremes of the social hierarchy.

Yannick Lemel

References DeSingly, F., and C. Th61ot. 1986, January. "Ratines et profils des ouvriers et des cadres supe'rieurs." Revue Frangaise de Sociologie. Gollac, M., and P. Laulh6. 1987, May-June. "J^a mobilite1 sociale." in Donnees sociales anAtconomie et statistique 199-200. Pinet, N. 1988, September. "Mobilitfi sociale: le poids de 1'ascendance." Ecoflash 31. PoM, R., and J. Soleilhavoup. 1982, May. "La mobility sociale." Economic et Statistique 144. Pohl, R. and al. 1983, June. "Formation, Mobilitd sociale, Salaires." DSfSEE, coll. D 93. The"lot,C. 1982. Telpere, telflls?" Paris: Dunod.

138

6.2 Social Mobility

Table 1 Mobility Between First and Present Job in 1989

(%)

Socio-professional Group in 1989* Socio-professional group of first job 2. Employer 3. Management 4. Intermediary profession 5. Wage-earner 6A. Skilled worker 6B. Other worker

2

3

4

5

6A

6B

Total

55 — 12 13 17 14

86 29 10 7 3

10 — 51 21 27 15

20 — — 44 15 21

13 — — 5 29 31

— — 7 5 16

100 100 100 100 100 100

* Excluding farmers. Source: INSEE-Premitre 99, August 1990.

139

6 Social Stratification

Table 2 Comparative Mobility in 1977 and 1985 (1st line: 1985, 2nd line: 1977)

(%)

Socio-professional group of son Socio-professional group of father

1

2

3

4

5

6

Total

1. Farmer

33,8 33,3

8,9 9,8

5,0 5,0

12,0 10,8

6,7 7,4

33,6 33,7

100 100

2. Artisan, trader, head of business

2,0 1,6

29,0 30,2

19,6 20,2

19,2 20,6

7,2 7,8

23,0 19,6

100 100

3. Management, intellectual profession

0,5 1,4

9,2 10,3

59,8 57,8

20,7 21,6

6,0 4,1

3,8 4,8

100 100

4. Intermediary profession

0,1 0,5

10,0 8,9

31,8 30,9

31,3 36,0

8,8 10,0

18,0 13,7

100 100

5. Wage-earner

0,3 0,8

9,7 8,6

22,9 21,6

31,7 31,0

13,9 15,0

21,5 23,0

100 100

6. Worker

1,4 1,3

9,8 9,0

7,7 7,4

22,0 21,0

10,2 9,6

48,9 51,7

100 100

Source: Economic el Statistiques 199-200, May-June 1987.

140

6.3

Economic Inequality Abstract. Although inequalities in revenue began to decline in the 1960s, they have remained approximately constant since 1980. Other forms of inequality have been added to economic inequality. One part of the population is becoming increasingly poor, and youths are experiencing hardship.

The average household income in current francs multiplied by 2,5 between 1960 and 1985. This income increase was very rapid until 1974, when it began to dwindle. In 1979,1983, and 1984, the average income declined. The elements of income have greatly changed. The relative importance of salaries and social welfare has increased, to the detriment of non-salaried incomes. Salary incomes went from 60% of total incomes in 1959 to 71% in 1985. The evolution of salaries is of fundamental importance in examining income inequalities. The process of reducing inequalities, which began in France in 1960, came to a halt in the early 1980s. Recent years show a stabilization of the salary range within the private sector: differences between highest and lowest salaries seem to have become stable. The minimum legal wage no longer truly revalorizes low salaries, while increases in management incomes are very high at the top of the scale. In 1985 and 1986, the mean management and executive salary was 2,6 times that of a skilled worker. Salary ranges have increased within management itself. Salary supplements (profit-sharing, shares, and bonuses) only increase inequalities. These are more frequent in sectors with the highest mean salaries: more for executives and technicians than for office staff and manual workers. The youngest wage-earners have been the most affected by the re-establishment of hierarchical pay scales. In general, young wage-earners have seen their salaries depreciate in relation to older workers, except in the case of young degree-holding executives, particularly those from Grandes Ecoles. Social disparities (access to certain consumer goods, accommodation, leisure, and health) seem to have become more firmly entrenched. As well, the difference between men's and women's salaries is no longer diminishing, although it did so for 30 years. On average, men today earn 30% more than women. Regional wage disparities were disappearing throughout the 1960s and 1970s, but since 1982 the difference between Paris and the provinces has been increasing. The higher cost of living in the Paris region tends to offset this inequality in terms of buying power. The oil crisis did not have the same effect on all self-employed people. Farmers and certain artisans were particularly affected. Within occupations, differences were accentuated between those in a precarious position and those who were able to take advantage of market conditions. Although the results of studies on the role of patrimonies remain uncertain, possession of an inheritance is a major cause of economic inequality in France (see 12.3, "Personal and Family Wealth"). Hence, 10% of the most well-to-do families hold 60% of the overall assets. Incomes from property, particularly securities, grew considerably during the 1980s. Ownership of securities spread spectacularly. Junior executives, under the age of 40, played a large role in this movement by acquiring shares in privatized companies, but the last few years have nonetheless shown a greater concentration of securities in the hands of a smaller fraction of the population.

141

6 Social Stratification

The wealthiest people in France have grown even wealthier in the last decade, because social contributions were relatively greater for incomes below the social-security ceiling. Overall, although contemporary French society seemed headed toward a reduction in economic inequalities, new rifts seem to have appeared, proving that the wealthiest and best endowed are getting more so. The affirmation and consolidation of a poor segment of French society in the 1980s confirms the increase in inequalties. The few indicators available show a clear increase in the numbers of the poor, as well as a worsening of their financial situation. Between 1979 and 1984, the poorest 10% of households lost 15% of their share of the total revenue. This entrenchment of such "visible" inequality is reflected in the increased number of charities, many of which have a high media profile. In modern French society poverty can result from a social or family rupture, or from difficulties in finding a job.

Marco Oberti

References CERC. 1989. Les Franqais et lews revenus. Paris: Documentation Fran^aise and La D6couverte. DSfSEE. 1990. "Donnees sociales".

142

6.3 Economic Inequality

Table 1 Ratio of Average Wages of Male Management to Average Wages of Skilled Workers

(%)

Heads of business Management Administrative and commercial workers Engineers and senior technicians

1984

1985

1986

1987

3,1 2,7 2,7 2,8

3,1 2,6 2,7 2,7

3,3 2,6 2,7 2,7

3,6 2,7 2,9 2,8

Source: CERC.

Table 2 Stability of Male-Female Salary Disparities

(%)

Average male salary Average female salary

1982

1984

1985

1986

1987

1988

1 ,3 —

1,3 1,3

1,3 1,3

1,3 1,3

1,3 1,3

1,3

Source: CERC.

143

6 Social Stratification

Table 3 Differentiated Increase in Rate of Stockholding Rate of stockholding

1976 (1) %

1986 (2) %

(2)-(l) in points

Socio-professional category Fanners Artisans, small traders Manufacturers and large traders Professionals Management Intermediary professions Wage-earners Skilled workers Unskilled workers

8 10 22 35 28 14 7 5 3

17 26 55 49 52 28 11 8 6

9 16 33 14 24

Income (francs 1986) Less than 30 000 F from 30 000 to 50 000 F from 50 000 to 75 000 F from 75 000 to 100 000 F from 100 000 to 130 000 F from 130 000 to 200 000 F from 200 000 to 300 000 F 300 000 F and more

6 6 6 8 6 11 22 36

5 7 11 13 19 30 49 68

-1 1 5 5 13 19 27 32

Overall

10

20

10

Sources: INSEE, survey Epargne, 1976. INSEE, survey sur les Actifs financiers, 1986.

144

14 4

3 3

6.3 Economic Inequality

Table 4 Concentration of Securities Held by the Wealthiest Section of the Population

% of securities declared in!984 and 1987 and held - by the 50% of households with the lowest overall net income - by the 40% of households whose overall net income lies between the median and the 9th decile - by the 10% of households whith the highest overall net income of which: - by the 1% of households with the highest overall net income Source: CERC 94.

145

1984

1987

19,1

18,4

36,6 44,3

35,5 46,1

23,8

25,5

6.4

Social Inequality Abstract. Using a "cosmographic" vision of society, it is possible to discern various "constellations." However, the largest constellations in terms of population remain subjugated to the small, powerful elite.

Managers, teachers, and engineers make up the "central constellation": they are more dispersed than the popular constellation, but close to each other in terms of educational level. Technicians make up an intermediary group, and the self-employed, tradespeople, and artisans comprise an autonomous group. These groups are close to the popular group in terms of educational level, but generally earn more. The ruling class is made up of people from different professions, with distinctions of income and prestige persisting in each category. This powerful elite is characterized by possession of a patrimony and very high levels of university education, particularly in Grandes Ecoles. This ruling class was open to the outside for a time, but seems to be closing in on itself again, doubtless because its membership has ceased to increase. The "central constellation," being the largest, seems to be the greatest social force in the 1980s. It is composed of two fairly homogeneous "galaxies." The first, made up of private-sector management, is at the centre of French society and serves as a reference point for many social groups. Its members have a good income and a high level of education, own a large car, often have a country house, and go on vacation several times a year. The second galaxy is composed of public-sector workers with a medium-level salary and leaning politically to the left. Their numbers have grown to 18% of the electorate. They are teachers, social and cultural workers, and medico-social personnel. They have become a moral force and social innovators at the local level, through their high institutional and associational profile. It is they who made it possible for a socialist to be elected president and who actively engage in making society more "humane" and more "social." P. Bourdieu does not attribute as many innovative powers to this medial layer. Unlike the above-mentioned authors, he considers that the petite bourgeoisie only "suffers" the domination of the ruling class, which, according to him, is die only class capable of producing the dominant principles of legitimacy. Does the simple fact that the wage-earning medial strata have expanded enable us to speak of the "embourgeoisement" of French society? Are they or will they become the innovators of tomorrow? Although the tertiarization of society may well mean an even larger middle class, it seems that the real power today is in the hands of the ruling class and that the struggle to wrest away some of that power only highlights the differences that exist between the wage-earning middle classes. Marco Oberti

References Bourdieu, P. 1979. La distinction. Paris: Minuit. Lemel, Y. 1991. Stratification et mobiliti sociales. Paris: Armand Colin. Mendras, H. 1989. Le Seconde Revolution frangaise. Paris: Gallimard.

146

7 SOCIAL RELATIONS

In France, "the land of authority," social relations used to be characterized by a high degree of ritual and by fear of face-to-face encounters, which had the effect of respecting the integrity of the other. In hierarchical situations, distances were as marked between superiors and subordinates as between father and son, master and student: at meal time, children did not have the right to speak in the presence of adults; at meetings, subordinates were silent before their superiors, who were the only ones to speak. Nonhierarchical situations were compartmentalized and ruled by the principle of noninterference in another's business. Authority was seen as something incomprehensible. One had to accept it, protect oneself from it, or revolt against it if it became unbearable. This model is gradually giving way to one based on conflict and negotiation, in which each party is aware of its dependence on the other and knows that a good bargain is one in which each side gains something. This is the situation in cases of labour conflict and negotiation. In large organizations, efficiency depends on information passing from the bottom up to the top and on bosses getting the consent of their subordinates if they want their orders to be carried out correctly. This supposes that each understands the position, the goals, and the means of the other. In society as a whole, the growing number of surveys and opportunities to cast a vote enables everyone to know, at any given moment, the diversity of opinions, positions, and intentions, and consequently to modify his or her position in relation to others. At all levels of society, those "governing" are aware of the opinions of the governed concerning them, and must take the desires of that population into account in their decision making. In certain cases, this situation can paralyze decision-makers at each level. Norms and codes of behaviour used to be rigid and common to all within the same milieu; consequently, they had to be respected by all under pain of deviance and marginalization. By becoming more diverse, codes of behaviour allow for a degree of individual choice, and demand tolerance, if not respect, for the codes of others. These new norms may not be as absolute as the old ones.

147

7.1 Conflict Abstract. The reduction in the number of generalized conflicts has led to smaller work conflicts (fewer people involved) and fewer days missed through strikes, but conflicts are often longer and tougher.

Since 1977, with the exception of 1982, the number of working days missed because of strikes has been diminishing. In 1986, it reached a low of 1 041 600 days, between onethird and one-quarter fewer days per year than in the 1970s. This downswing was accompanied by a reduction in the number of conflicts, the number of firms affected, and the number of days missed per striker. Generalized conflicts (organized by the national labour unions) have been in decline since 1976, whereas local union conflicts— spontaneous action by workers or local unions—have begun to increase again, after a period of decline. Moreover, they are often "tougher" and longer than generalized conflicts. Strike action concerns the industrial sector more than the tertiary sector, and large firms more than small ones. Conflicts occur at the level of negotiations; thus, there is some decentralized strike action, and more generalized strike action in sectors which have difficulty decentralizing their negotiations, such as the EDF (national electricity company), the RATP (the Paris subway) and the SNCF (the national railroad company). There has been a reduction in salary-related conflicts, employment-related conflicts have remained steady, and conflicts related to work conditions and workers' rights have increased (see 5.1, "Work Organization," and 5.2, "Personnel Administration"). Each union organization has a predilection for certain subjects; a thumbnail sketch would show that the CGT (France's largest labour union) prefers salary conflicts, the CFDT (France's second-largest union) likes legal conflicts, non-union organizations go for conflicts concerning rights and conditions, and joint union activities usually concern employment and salaries. With the decline in conflicts, the CGT seems to be still active on traditional issues. Moreover, union solidarity is breaking up. This weakening allows more scope for "spontaneous action," which, without leaving aside employment issues, is becoming involved in more qualitative and less traditional questions (see 9.1, "Labour Unions," and 10.2, "Intitutionalization of Labour Unions"). It is therefore difficult to judge whether there is really, as some say, a reduction in worker combativeness, or just a change to more limited, tougher forms of action. People today are seeking clearer communication between central and peripheral levels; moreover, the tertiary sector requires specifically adapted modes of action because users are more directly concerned. This consolidates the strength of the CGT and increases the number of spontaneous conflicts, and also the use of stoppages rather than continuous strikes. Today, one strike out of three lasts less than one day. At the same time, recourse to tribunals and arbitration is more frequent. Statistical data indicate a new relationship between unions and wage-earners. They are pushing for a united stand, co-ordination, worker consultation, and clear statements of claims. The development of spontaneous conflicts raises a new question for the unions. The union is becoming a tool in the service of the workers. It should therefore be a teacher and organizer in order to channel their energies and widely divergent interests into a new set of social relations and a new social cohesion (see 10.2, "Intitutionalization of Labour Unions"). From their wishes the union must be able to draft a negotiable joint project which would be the framework for new social relations and a new cohesion (see 7.2, "Negotiation," and 10.1, "Dispute Settlement").

148

7.1 Conflict

We find the same thing outside of the work situation: major conflicts arising from social movements are disappearing, and power struggles take place locally, close to the negotiating rooms (see 10.3, "Social Movements"). The only conflicts remaining at the central level are those related to highly centralized organizations. The debates concerning private schools, educational reforms, and the social-security system are indicative examples. Even corporatist movements are losing their edge: there are fewer demonstrations by wine growers, farmers, and professionals (see 10.4, "Interest Groups"). Problems are dealt with more quickly and in a more ritualized manner. On another level, large demonstrations continue to be more centred around values (see 11.2, "Confidence in Institutions"), such as racism, human rights, and Third World aid, and are often given media exposure.

Jean-Pierre Jaslin

References Adam, G., and J.D. Reynaud. 1978. Conflits du travail et changement social. Paris: PUF. Dim, L., and JJ*. Jaslin. 1986. "Crise ou renforcement du syndicalisme?" Observation et diagnostic tconomiques. Revue de 1'OFCE 12. Feuerbach, E., and D. Furjot. 1986. "Diminution des conflits collectifs du travail." Travail et Emploi 28. Furjot, D., and C. Noel. 1987, December. "La conflictualite' en 1986. Bilan statistique et quantitatif." Travail et Emploi 34. Javillier, J.C. 1981. Les conflits du travail. Paris: PUF. Reynaud, J.-D. La sociologie des conflits du travail. Paris: PUF. coll "Que sais-je."

149

7 Social Realtions

Table 1 Collective Work Conflicts: General Data (1000s)

Number of Number of conflicts individual days lost resolved

1954 1957 1960 1963 1967 1970 1973 1977 1981 1983 1985 1986 1987

Numbers having stopped work

1269 2160 838 1 147 2823 1079 2246 1919 329 453 273 261 223

1440 4121 1070 5991 4203 1742 3914 3665 1495 1483 884 1041 969

1479 2623 1494 2382 1675 2942 3731 3302 2504 2837 1901 1391 1391

Number of firms affected by strikes

Source: Liaisons sociales, November 1988. Table 2 Localized Conflicts (1000s) Year

Number of individual working days lost

1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987

2434 2081 3172 1511 1441 2250 1320 1316 726 567 511

Source: Ministere du Travail.

150

9904 23312 3395 9794 30088 5944 34995 20287 3875 2837 1901 1391 1391

7.1 Conflict

Table 3 Average Number of Working Days Lost per Dispute (1000s)

Work dispute Salary dispute Local dispute Work conditions dispute

1979

1982

1984

1986

1006 1227

841 808 300 454

858 423 226 188

419 391 133 171

325 555

Source: Travail et Emploi December 1987.

151

7.2

Negotiation Abstract. Negotiation and bargaining have increased as means of resolving social conflict in the work place but also in political life and questions of public interest.

Negotiation as a means of resolving conflict is rapidly becoming established throughout French society. It pervades whole areas of social intercourse, from the education of children to social relations in companies, from neighbourhood contacts to company management. Negotiation, formal or informal, has become one of the most frequent means of resolving conflicts and of participating in collective life. This movement is fed by several other developments and often serves to consolidate them, which gives negotiation a central role in the development of social relations. The conception of negotiation has gradually shifted from that of a win-or-lose situation to that of a game in which both sides can win. Compensation is now given openly in return for advantages gained. The reduction in the number of major labour conflicts and the increased number of less spectacular, more decentralized "mini-conflicts" focused on a precise problem has given negotiation a new dynamism. This allows a greater number of people to participate, each finding his or her own degree of involvement and control of the stakes. However, negotiations are not limited to conflict situations. The division of discussions into different levels creates new situations of increasing complexity. Social, technological, and economic changes are great, and situations change rapidly; nothing is ever resolved once and for all. Both parties are obliged to negotiate and constantly renegotiate. More often than not, negotiation takes place in a concrete company situation and must develop within that context. The Ministry of Labour's annual report shows that branch negotiation is losing ground and that company-wide agreements are gaining ground. The number of workers affected is increasing slightly but does not exceed two million. More than four-fifths of agreements concern small or medium-sized companies with fewer than 500 workers, but companies with more than 500 workers account for 68% of workers; negotiations are rare in companies with fewer than 100 workers, and concern little other than salary questions. Since 1968, the government has tried to foster a system of contractual relations in order to help the social partners acquire a degree of autonomy, and thus gradually reduce the incidence of appeals for state intervention, which are characteristic of French social relations. Large-scale national negotiations and management agreements concerning employment, social security, professional education and training, support for the unemployed, work sharing, early retirement, and reduced working hours have all consolidated the position of the large labour confederations and given them the status of national institutions (see 10.2, "Institutionalization of Labour Unions"). In contrast, management sees itself as an economic pressure group rather than a social agent. It is willing to negotiate, but on condition that social negotiations with unions are kept outside the work place. Negotiation remains the privilege of the industrial sector and large enterprises: a signed agreement is far from being applicable, or applied, in all enterprises. New subjects for negotiation were opened up by the economic crisis, restructuring, development of the tertiary sector (see 4.4, "Sectors of the Labour Force"), the introduction of new technology (see 4.5, "Computerization of Work"), changes in work organization (see 5.1, "Work Organization"), and increased unemployment (see 4.1, "Unemployment")—and new forms of negotiation are also required. Past agreements

152

7.2 Negotiation

have to be constantly renegotiated, and issues need to be clarified. The Auroux and Roudy Laws, and the public and nationalized sectors' call for democratization tend to set up a modern system of social relations. Negotiation also introduces new actors on the social stage. On the one hand, there are the wage-earners, the people directly affected by technological and labour innovation; on the other hand, there are the experts, the mediators, the "gurus" (see 10.1, "Dispute Settlement"). Important negotiations are ushered in by in-depth reports on situations. It is a considerable advantage to have an understanding of these reports and to be able to influence the proposals of the gurus. A growing number of people wish to participate in and influence negotiations which affect their future. All concerned are now potentially active agents. This does not mean that companies are becoming permanent negotiation rooms. It takes time to learn to negotiate, and each side must be aware of the stakes and decide how to play. The growing trend toward negotiation means that decisions without consultation, the authoritarian exercise of power, and marginalization have become increasingly intolerable at all company levels (see 7.4, "Authority"). What we have said about professional negotiation may apply to all of society, but this is difficult to verify. Decentralization (see 2.4, "Local Autonomy") was accompanied by the institution of contractual relations between the department, the region and the state. The growing number of management associations (see 2.5, "Voluntary Associations") has led to an increase in the number of contracts with the government. Jean-Pierre Jaslin

References CFDT. 1986, October. "Le droit d'expression des travailleurs, un point de vue syndical." Revue Frangaise des Affaires Sociales. Morel, C. 1981. La grevefroide. Paris: Organisation. Reynaud, J.-D. and G., Adam. 1978. Conflits du travail et changement social. Paris: PUF. Sellier, F. 1984. La confrontation sociale en France 1936—981. Paris: PUF. S.E.S. 1987. Bilan annuel de la negotiation collective en 1986,6tablie par la S.E.S. pour la Commission Nationale de la Negotiation Collective du 29-06.

153

7 Social Relations

Table 1 Main Subject of Worker/Management Agreements (%) 1984

1985

1986

1987

1988

Salaries Flextime Shorter working hours Union laws Representative institutions Classifications Working conditions Professional training

57,0 30,0 11,0

55,7 32,7

58,3 38,0

55,5 40,2

3,5 4,3 4,0 4,3 0,9

6,9 3,9 4,8 3,4 2,5 1,4

57,0 38,2

Other subjects

26,8

29,8

1,6

1,2 1,2 5,3 3,9 3,9 3,9

19,6

15,4

4,0 1,6 6,0 3,0

5,2 2,4 5,3 3,3 2,7 1,2

2,2

23,7

Source: Liaisons societies, November 1988.

Table 2 Number of Endorsements of Branch Agreements

1984

1985

1986

1987

1988

1988/87

Total

936

880

695

788

885

+12%

Non-salary endorsements Salary endorsements

174 765

197 683

144 551

164 624

191 694

+16% +11%

Source: Note de conjoncture sociale, September 1989.

154

7.2 Negotiation

Tables Number of Wage earners Covered by Collective Agreements (%) % of wage-earners not covered

% of wage-earners covered by

by an agreement

a collective agreement

1981

1985

1981

1985

1981

1985

80,1

86,4

24,2

35,4

11

4,4

Source: Liaisons societies, November 1988.

155

7.3 Norms of Conduct Abstract. Thirty years ago, there was a strict set of codes governing interpersonal relations. The codes have become more diverse and elastic, leading to greater tolerance for variations in behaviour. But other, equally constraining codes are appearing.

Corresponding to the weakening of norms imposed by religion, law, and family in the name of eternal morality, there has been a burgeoning of "hidden" norms claiming to be based on the selfish or hedonistic logic of the individual. These new norms hide their moral origin and tend to disguise social pressure, which nonetheless remains real. Since 1968, it has been "forbidden to forbid" in France, but freedom and self-actualization are compulsory. The results of an international survey of norms and tolerance for deviant and criminal behaviour show that the French and the Dutch have the highest rate of permissiveness. But the French are not necessarily the most permissive merely because they claim to be. Present data do not permit us to verify this permissiveness. Honesty continues to rank first in French rules of conduct, but this honesty tolerates adultery, lying, tax evasion, social-security swindles, and theft. Shop-lifting is so common that courts no longer punish it as severely as they used to, claiming that no damage is caused to the plaintiffs since they include these losses in their profit margins. By this means, justice ratifies French public opinion. Changes in the institution of marriage (see 3.3, "Matrimonial Models") give a good example of increasing permissiveness in the French system of values. Tolerance for young people cohabiting (see 1.1, "Youth," and 3.3, "Matrimonial Models") has spread through all social classes, from the most underprivileged to the wealthiest. In some circles, marriage is considered to be a sign of narrow-minded conservatism. Similarly, divorce is no longer seen as a lack of respect for the civil and religious institution of marriage and is no longer the object of social sanctions, even by practising Catholics. Legislation and social practices have made divorce commonplace in recent years. If there is disapproval, it is only for those who "divorce badly," without being able to agree on the future of their children. "Amicable" divorce was legally instituted in 1975. Since then, the law no longer punishes adulterers. The French, after the Danes, are the most tolerant of divorce and the most permissive of adultery. Norms governing sexual behaviour show contrasting development. There is growing tolerance for extra-marital sex among the young, less disapproval of homosexuality (decriminalized in 1980), and the erstwhile sin of onanism has been forgotten. However, laws passed in 1980 increased sanctions against rape. Similarly, having recourse to prostitutes (though not prostitution) is frowned upon, as is sexual promiscuity in general. In France there is no law or code of conduct forbidding sexual harassment of women by men in the workplace. Standards of decency are in line with standards of sexual behaviour: there is tolerance of pornography (shops and films in the 1970s, shows and Minitel link-ups in the 1980s) and nudism on beaches. There is some contrast in norms governing social behaviour. Good manners are no longer in fashion; in this respect, France is different from other European countries. Tolerance and respect for others, however, are highly esteemed: what is important is not so much to respect a "social norm" as to respect a "moral law." Loyalty is among the most highly valued qualities, whereas obedience no longer figures (see 7.4, "Authority"). Racism, in spite of the radical rejection of immigrants by a small portion of the population (see 16.1, "Immigrants and Ethnic Minorities"), is less and less tolerated.

156

7.3 Norms of Conduct

In conclusion, it seems likely that rejection of traditional authority (see 7.4, "Authority") leads to a weakening of old norms. But each norm abolished is replaced by another at one remove. Complete sexual freedom is restricted by the valorization of sincerity and faithfulness, divorce by increased parental responsibility; the devalorization of work is compensated for by the obligation to find expression in leisure activities, obedience by respect for others, and the valorization of consumerism by the patient search for the right price. Norms governing one's relation to oneself (see 13.3, "Personal Health and Beauty Practices")—hygiene, physical presentation, one's figure, fitness through sports and gymnastics (see 14.3, "Athletics and Sports"), moderation in eating habits, and so on— seem to bear more weight than in the past. This is corroborated by reduced tolerance for smoking, alcoholism, and overeating. If the effectiveness of social norms is judged by the degree to which they are internalized by individuals, we must conclude that the new norms cannot be attacked as having been "imposed from outside," so much are they presented as being the selfish expression of everyone's interest Anomie is not a threat.

Denis Stoclet

References Reynaud, J.-D. 1989. Les regies dujeu: I'action collective et la regulation sociale. Paris: Armand Colin. Stoetzel, J. 1983. Les valeurs du temps present. Paris: PUF.

157

7 Social Relations

Table 1 Changing Image of Homosexuality If you learned that your son was homosexual how should you react? (%)

I wouldn't mind I would be distressed but I would not interfere If possible I would try to change him I should be deeply shocked and I would do all in my power to make him change

1973

1974

1987

3

9

8

16 34

33 26

33 25

38

27

28

Source: SOFRES, Nouvel Observateur October 1987.

Table 2 Changing Image of Cohabitation Imagine you know a boy and a girl who decide to live together without getting married. How would you react? (%)

Survey La Croix/Sofres September 1976 I would find it acceptable I would be a little shocked but I would consider their business You would condemn this behaviour outright No opinion

Survey Nouvel Observateur/ Sofres July 1980

Survey Presse de province Sofres July 1982

July 1986

37

41

56

58

45

50

35

33

17 1

7 2

7 2

7 2

Source: SOFRES.

158

7.3 Norms of Conduct

Table 3 Morality and Mores (%)

1978

1981

1982

1984

1986

1988

1989

29 17 54

30 17 53

34 15 51

30 16 54

32 16 52

25 17 58

— —

34 15 51

32 15 53

42 16 42

36 15 49

34 16 50

28 26 46

31 23 46

35 21 44

38 24 38

36 21 43

31 26 43

37 19 44

42 18 40

44 17 39

30 18 52

35 14 51

31 17 52

AVAILABILITY OF ABORTION: Easily available abortion is a good thing Disagree Indifferent Agree

28 20 52

REINTRODUCTION OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: Disagree Indifferent Agree

— —

PORNOGRAPHY: We should strenuously oppose pornography Disagree Indifferent Agree

28 21 51

HOMOSEXUALITY: Homosexuals are the same as everyone else Disagree Indifferent Agree

— — —

Source: Agoram&rie, 1989.

159

7.4

Authority Abstract. Social relations in ritualized situations are changing from being based on authoritarianism into negotiation with a view to reaching a consensus. This new type of contact is first learnt at school and in the home.

In the past, French society was characterized by the rigidity of its social relations, which Michel Crozier defined as a difficulty in communicating and a fear of encounter. Social situations were ritualized in such a way that a clear distance was established between individuals, who found themselves protected by this distance, in that they were not exposed to danger. Formerly, faced with a emotionally distant schoolmaster, pupils had only one choice: to be good or to create a rumpus. By creating a rumpus, they formed a "delinquent community" (Pitts, 1980), united against the master, the ultimate dishonour being to break rank, to betray the others, to "snitch." The rumpus was a time-honoured tradition, ruled by custom, with its own rites and principles. One did not create a rumpus with all teachers, nor in all circumstances. The rumpus had a paradoxical effect of consolidating the authority of the master. This teacher/pupil relationship was the crucible in which was formed the French person's attitude to politics and government: "us" against "them." We must protect ourselves and even hide from "them" because "they" are incomprehensible. If they interfere in our business, revolt is the only possible reaction, as we do not know any other way of dealing with them. The "us-them" opposition is no longer representative of society, nor a norm of behaviour toward authority. When there are asssociation presidents in a town of 1 000 inhabitants, the role of the mayor is no longer the same. When activists organize "alternative living" networks in a new suburb, local authorities must take this into account. The situation is similarly, when farmers' representatives with the minister to discuss agricultural problems. In these cases and others, authority is becoming less distant and less incomprehensible. Consequently, when citizens come face to face with authority they are no longer reduced to either hiding from it or revolting against it in an anarchical fashion. In the past, a subordinate owed obedience to his superior, though not necessarily admitting his superiority. The authority of the priest, the dignitary, or the gendarme was not accepted at face value: its claim to legitimacy was not taken seriously. The questioning of authority is therefore not new; what is new is the fact that it can be done without great risk. Brute authority has lost its edge today; it cannot be wielded without consent, and consent is negotiable. Power has spread to all spheres of society; it can be exercised by too many; it is what Jean-Daniel Reynaud calls the "pleistocracy." This gives all people the potential power to say no, either to the supervisor in a workshop or to management, or to the dignitary who is telling them how to vote, or to the priest who lays down what is true, good, and evil and threatens them with hellfire, or to the old man who invokes age and experience in order to be obeyed. In a traditional-type factory, "unanimity" characterized the behaviour of the unskilled workers, who could express themselves only through collective action in which each one felt that he was part of the mass. When faced with an unpredictable authority, a crowd with no strategy falls back on a charismatic leader. This type of social relationship has been modified by the changing forms of organizational structures in enterprises (see 5.2, "Personnel Administration," and 5.3, "Sizes and Types of Enterprises"). Little by little, in the world of executives and technicians, which is charactized by strategy, conflict and negotiation are spreading to all levels. The French have learned to co-operate and,

160

7.4 Authority

particularly, to negotiate and understand the position of the other, knowing that a good compromise can be profitable for both parties (see 7.1, "Conflict," and 7.2, "Negotiation"). The development of the kindergarten school, the most important and least remarkedupon innovation in the French educational system (see 8.1,"Educational System"), illustrates and no doubt explains this progress. Children start school younger and in greater numbers in France than elsewhere, and the educational methods used in kindergarten are based on the idea of "awakening"—that is, non-competitive and without sanctions—in contradiction to the methodology used in primary and secondary schools. Educational relations within the family were rapidly transformed; from being distant and authoritarian, French education became manipulative and affective. Finally, the new relations of negotiation between grandparents and grandchildren are modifying the traditional image of the father and of authority (see 1.2, "Elders"). This loosening up of social relations does not always lead to greater freedom for the individual. In the past, the relationship between subordinates and a distant authority guaranteed the freedom of the subordinates who, apart from obeying expressly given orders, were left with a margin of freedom in which to organize themselves as they saw fit. A more loose society, in which bargaining is a permanent feature, must necessarily be more transparent than a more hierarchical and ritualized society. Transparency means that individuals cannot hide; consequently, they are subject to pressure from colleagues, from both above and below. Henri Mendras

References Association Fran?aise de Sciences Politiques. 1984. L'autoritarisme aujourd'hui. Paris: A.F.S.P. Attuel, J. 1986. L'autorite: permanence et metamorphose. Paris: PDF. Chappuis, R. 1987. Les relations d'autorite. Paris: Editions d'Organisation. Crozier, M. 1963. Lephenomene bureaucratique. Paris: Le seuil. Pitts, J. "Les Fran?ais et I'autoriteV' In Mendras, H. 1980. La sagesse et le desordre. France 1980. Paris: Gallimard. Reynaud, J.-D. 1989. Les regies dujeu: I'action collective et la regulation sociale. Paris: Armand Colin. Sainsaulieu, R. 1977. L'identile au travail. Paris: Presses de la FNSP. Schonfeld, W.R. 1976. Obedience and Revolt, French Behavior toward Authority. Beverly Hills: Sage. Wylie, L. 1975 Village in the Vaucluse. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1979 Un village du Vaucluse. Paris: Gallimard. 1968. r&d.

161

7 Social Relations

Table 1 Role of Parents "In your opinion, what attitude should parents adopt toward their children?"

(%)

Discuss and Give as much freedom as let them possible decide

Directive

Discuss and advise

9

56

32

2

1

Sex: Male Female

10 8

57 55

28 36

3 1

2 —

Age: 18-24 years 24-34 35-49 50-64 65 +

6 6 7 9 18

57 52 57 59 56

31 40 33 30 20

4 2 2 1 2

2 — 1 1 4

9 3 12

62 50 53

27 47 34

2 —1

6

58

32

3

— — — 1

5 7 7 13

58 59 55 57

33 30 35 24

3 4 2 3

1 — 1 3

Total

Profession of head of household: Fanner Artisan, trader, director of business Senior management, professional Intermediary profession and wage-earner of which: Intermediary profession Wage-earner Worker Not working or retired

Source: SOFRES, L'ttat de I'opinion. CUspour 1988, Seuil, 1988.

162

No opinion

7.4 Authority

Table 2 Authority "When a child needs to be punished, how do you think it should be done?"

(%)

By spanking or slapping By depriving of television or an outing By withholding pocket money By reasoning No opinion

23 30 9 67 4

Source: L'ttat de I'opinion. Cits pour 1988, Seuil, 1988.

Table3 The Basis of Education "In your opinion, what are the most important things that children should be taught?'' (%) Total Respect for others Politeness The importance of making an effort Tolerance Self-confidence Cleanliness Justice Loyalty Generosity A sense of humour Thrift Oder Ambition Independence Modesty

18-24 years 25-34 years 35-49 years 50-64 years

65 years +

82 72

83 71

83 69

85 68

81 73

78 79

50 47 42 40 39 37 36 29 25 22 21 15 13

34 51 53 46 40 36 36 16 14 18 27 19 14

43 49 51 45 34 36 32 20 19 19 22 22 13

58 52 43 37 40 36 34 23 19 20 22 17 12

56 46 33 35 39 44 38 43 33 23 18 8 13

52 35 30 38 40 41 41 44 40 33 17 7 16

Source: SOFRES, L'tiat de I'opinion. Cits pour 1988, Seuil, 1988.

163

7.5

Public Opinion Abstract. Shifts in public opinion are measured more frequently by means of social and political elections and surveys. Thus the public and the government are better informed, which has an increasing influence on the ways in which society is organized.

The number of electoral consultations was increased in recent years by the creation of European elections in 1979 and regional elections in 1986. Added to these is the number of social elections (social security, prud'homme [industrial arbitrators], workers' councils) which have either become routine or been set up recently. Every year these social elections give an indication of the strength of the unions (see 10.2, "Institutionalization of Labour Unions"). Voter turnout is very high for political elections, often approaching the 1974 peak of 88%. However, the multiplicity of elections seems to have led recently to decreased interest. The turnout for European and social elections rarely exceeds 50%. Nationalization of the political debate is manifested in municipal and cantonal elections, where candidates are defined with increasing clarity in terms of the left-right opposition found general elections (see 11.2, "Confidence in Institutions"). Consequently, local elections may be considered a kind of national consultation and may serve as a measure of political forces in between general and presidential elections. By-elections, which take place almost every week at certain times, are carefully followed and provide information on the state of public opinion. Surveys of public opinion celebrated their fiftieth anniversary in France in 1988; the first was carried out by IFOP (French Institute of Public Opinion) in 1938 on the subject of Munich. Their frequency has increased to such a degree that a day does not pass without the opinion of the French people being "surveyed" on one subject or another. In 1987, the number of published surveys was 600: two per working day, many more than in neighbouring countries. In particular, the multiplication of political surveys was made possible by the "nationalization" of the debate: the results have meaning because everyone can be located on a left-right continuum. These political barometers measure the popularity of politicians month by month. Those in power today are aware of the latest change in opinion among the French people, and the people are held enthralled by television and newspaper commentaries on margins of 1% or 2%, as if they were major events in public life. The circulation of political information, on all subjects and through all categories of the population, has accelerated considerably (see 13.2, "Mass Information"). For their part, politicians and the government are kept up to date on public opinion concerning their performance. The French people are aware of this development, and they like surveys: 62% say they are interested in the results of surveys published in the press. They think that surveys influence the choice of the electorate on the one hand, and the decisions of the administration on the other—that they are, in a word, "useful in democratic debate." Henri Mendras

164

7.5 Public Opinion

References Brute, M. 1988. L'empire des sondages. Paris: R. Laffont. Lancelot, A. 1980, Summer. "Sondage d'opinion et suffrage universel." Commentaire 10. Meynaud, H. and Duclos, D. 1985. Les sondages d'opinion. Paris: La Decouverte. SOFRES. 1989. L'ttal de {'opinion. Paris: Seuil.

165

7 Social Relations

Table 1 Number of Polls Conducted per Year by CEVIPOF

45 120 279 454 542 518 630 732 819 702 917

1965 1970 1975 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 Source: CEVIPOF.

Table 2 Abstention Rates at Selected Elections (As a % of cast votes) Municipal 1977 Legislative 1978 Presidential 1981 Legislative 1981 Municipal 1983 Legislative 1986 Presidential 1988 Legislative 1988 Municipal 1989

27,6 18,8 20,4 32,3 28,3 24,6 20,6 37,2 35,9

Source: Figaro/Etudes politiques 1989.

166

8 STATE AND SERVICE INSTITUTIONS The institutions of the welfare state have developed considerably since the social-security system was instituted, in 1945. Increases in the social budgets of the the nation prove this, as do increases in local government budgets for cultural, sanitary, and social services. The educational and university system has grown rapidly as a result of the baby boom and especially because of extended schooling, with more children starting school earlier and finishing. After a period of stabilization, a new increase is expected. The health system has grown consistently over the last 30 years, and efforts to reduce the trend have not had any great effect. The number of new services has multiplied on all levels, from the commune to the state, particularly in the cultural domain. The financial burden of unemployment is weighing more heavily and has led to the creation of various different re-employment policies. The economic role of the state has also grown, particularly with nationalizations in 1982 and with the increasing intervention of local government in the economic domain. The privatizations in 1986-87 marked a pause in this development. Fundamental agreement on the extension of the welfare state was called into question by the slowing of economic growth, which caused a reduction in the financial resources of the state, and brought the ideology of individual responsibility and endeavour back into fashion.

167

8.1 Educational System Abstract. The baby boom increased the number of educational institutions. Longer schooling, due to earlier starting and later finishing, maintained the increase. Democratic considerations brought about standardization of the schooling system. This standardization had the ironic effect of increasing selectivity.

Between 1950 and 1985, the school-going population in France (third level excluded) increased from 6 million to 13 million. The number of primary- and secondary-level teachers almost doubled between 1960 and 1985, and growth in the educational system was considerable over those 25 years. This has been quite deliberate, since the government has announced that the number of high-school graduates will increase by 80% by the year 2000. This announcement increased the demand, and there is already a rising curve which will in all probability exceed the prediction. There can be no doubt that this unprecedented growth rate is the result of the desire of successive governments, whatever their political colour, to raise the level of education. Thus, the school-leaving age was raised from 12 to 13 in 1882, from 13 to 14 in 1936, and by a further two years in 1959. While the school-leaving age was rising, the schoolentry age was being progressively reduced to a more tender age: from six years in the past, it has dropped to three years today. One of the major innovations in recent years was the multiplying of kindergartens. This rapid expansion has, naturally, been accompanied by a considerable financial investment by postwar governments; between 1956 and 1965, the state budget for national education was doubled. Many village schools were closed, but educational establishments mushroomed all over the country, particularly in the suburbs: between 1966 and 1975, the Ministry of Education built one secondary-level educational establishment per working day! However, it should also be noted that the growth rate is a result of pressure from parents who wanted their children to benefit from an education which is considered, rightly or wrongly, essential for social success. From the few studies available on the subject, it seems that schooling had increased even before the institutions were there to receive the pupils. The growth was accompanied by an apparent unification of the different parts of the educational system. Until 1958, children leaving "primary" school at the age of 14 had a choice of three systems. They could finish school with one final year known as the "certificat d'6tudes" (certificate of studies); they could continue for three more years of "complementary courses," which would lead to another certificate known as a "brevet;" or they could enter the "secondary" system and finish school at the age of 17 with the exam known as the "baccalaure'at." These different streams received, respectively, 40%, 25%, and 35% of pupils. Each channel had a distinctly different syllabus, and once a pupil had entered a stream it was impossible to switch. Children entering the classic secondary system attended first-year classes in the Iyc6e and not the "6cole communale," and children preparing for the "brevet" could not use their studies to also sit for the "baccalaureat." The corresponding teachers were distinguished by the method of recruitment and their education. Successive changes over a period of 20 years, culminating in the Haby education reforms in 1975, abolished these three streams and created a system which was theoretically unified: the teaching staff was partially shared, students were recruited on a geographical basis, and children did not have to choose between specialization and the duration of their studies until much later.

168

8.1 Educational System

The unified system, which was particularly requested by teachers, was supposed to democratize education (see 6.2, "Social Mobility"). However, various indices suggest that the educational system has stayed as elitist as it ever was. The explanation must no doubt be sought in the nature of the unification. Since it is possible for large numbers of pupils to switch between the different streams, there is a common denominator for them all, and this fact invites comparison. Because it is the job of educational institutions to guide and direct pupils based on criteria that are essentially those of academic success, clearly recognized hierarchies begin to appear between the streams. Thus, the overall selectivity of the system has increased: the number of C series "bacheliers" is hardly any higher than the number of elementary math students 30 years ago. The academic classes attract the children of the bourgeoisie, and the technical classes attract the children of the working classes. The considerable growth in educational institutions has, whatever else may be said, led to a higher level of education (see 15.1, "General Education"). At university level, the growth rate has also been spectacular: between 1960 and 1988, the number of students rose from 270 000 to 1 200 000. Twenty new universities and university institutes of technology were added to the 20 traditional universities. The Grandes Ecoles have also grown steadily; business colleges, in particular, have multiplied in provincial towns. Yannick Lemel

References Chariot, B. 1987. L'tcole en mutation. Paris: Payot. Cherkaoui, M. 1982. Les changements des systemes educatifs en France. 1950-1980. Paris: PUF. Dubet, F. 1991. Les lyceens. Paris: Seuil. Hamon, H., and P. Rotman 1984. Tant qu'il y aura des profs. Paris: Seuil. Lesourne, J. 1988. Education et Societe. Paris: La D£couverte. Ministers de l'6ducation nationale. 1989. Reperes et references statistiques sur les enseignements et la formations. Paris: SPRESE. Mourral, I. 1985. Vocation: enseignant. Paris: Nouvelles Editions Latines. Prost, A. 1986. L'enseignement s'est-il democratism? Paris: PUF.

169

8 State and Services Institutions

Table 1 Education Accounts

1974

1980

81,7

180,8

316,5

355,4

1985

1988

Domestic education expenditure (billions of francs) % of gross domestic product (GDP) Average expenditure per inhabitant (francs)

6,27 1560

6,44 3360

6,73 5740

6,28 6360

Breakdown of education expenditure by source of finance (%) State Local administrations Business Household

70 14 5 11

69 15 5 11

68 15 6 10

66 18 6 10

26,4 30,7 11,0

26,2 32,3 10,5

24,1 33,1 10,4

24,1 33,5 10,3

10,1

10,0

Breakdown of education expenditure by recipient sector (%) Primary level Secondary level Tertiary level Other types of schooling Training Activities aiming at organizing the teaching system Activities aiming at increasing school attendance Expenses demanded by educational institutions

1,8 9,9

2,0 9,5

2,1

2,1

4,4

4,0

3,7

3,3

10,9

11,5

11,2

11,4

4,9

Source: INSEE, Annuaire rttrospectif de la France, 1990.

170

4,0

5,3

5,3

8.1 Educational System

Table 2 National Education Budget (millions of francs) 503

62a

70b

74b

76C

78C

National education budget

1,5

9,1

26,1 40,6

54,3

73,1 92,5 124,9 151,9

% of state budget

6,7

13,0

16,9

18,5

18,3

17,6

%ofGNP

1,5 2,5

3,2—







% of GDP



3,3



18,5

3,2

3,2

82C

80°

3,4

15,8 —

3,3

3,5

84C

16,2 — 3,5

86C

85C

158,3 162,0 16,0

15,7

— 3,5

3,3

a. Including universities and department for youth and sport, b. Including universities, excluding youth and sport, c. Including universities, physical and sports education, and excluding CNRS (National Scientific Research Centre). Range: Without credits opened for state pensions, within the jurisdiction of the Ministry for Education depending on year. Sources: Education nationale. Direction g6n6rale des Finances et du contr61e de gestion.

Table 3 Number of Public and Private Schools

Primary degree Secondary degree

1958-1959

1979-1980

1988-1989

89436

68176

64172

9285

10628

11268

Source: INSEE, Tableaux de l'£conomefrangaise, 1982 and 1990.

171

8 State and Services Institutions

Table 4 Teachers 1979-1980

% of Females

1988-1989

% of Females

Primary degree

292 454

74

308 972

74

Secondary degree

258509

359 679

55

Source: INSEE, Tableaux de I'Economiefrangaise, 1982 and 1990.

172

8.2 Health System Abstract. After massive growth during the 1960s and 1970s the medical system is still developing, though less rapidly. The technical complexity of treatments continues to increase.

Medical production and consumption have grown and continue to grow at a considerable rate. Since 1972, the increase in "health" spending per household has far outstripped all other sectors of household expenditure. But this rate is slowing with the general slowing of economic growth, and also because of various government measures to stem the social-protection deficit (see 8.3, "Welfare System"). The growth of the medical sector, generally understood to comprise both producers and consumers, appears in all available data. Between 1963 and 1973, health spending grew both in volume and per capita by 7,3% per year; from 1973 to 1979 it grew by 6,9%, and between 1979 and 1985 by 4,9%. In 1970, there were 65 000 doctors in France, 500 000 hospital beds (public and private), and 21 000 chiropractors. In 1980, the figures were, respectively, 104 000, 600 000, and 34 500. In 1970, 44% of the population had consulted a medical practitioner at least once; 59% had done so in 1980. In the latter year, 11,5% had medical tests done, as against 6% ten years earlier. Although there is a high growth rate for all kinds of medical care, both inpatient and outpatient, some consumption rates are rising faster than others. Between 1970 and 1980, consultation with a specialist, radiology, specific examinations, biological analyses, and para-medical treatment all increased by 5% to 10% per year. Pharmaceutical treatment and consultation with a general practitioner, measured in number of medicines or visits, increased less rapidly, between 3% and 4% per year. Hospitalization also increased at the rate of 3% to 4%. In other words, the trend is toward an increasing number of specialized consultations and prescriptions. The growing number of people having recourse to consultation with a specialist, specific examinations, and dentists come from the most well-to-do social categories. These categories also show the greatest enthusiasm for preventive measures, monitoring techniques, and reduction of alcohol and tobacco consumption. This behaviour tends to spread progressively, so that the structure of treatment is changed by the growth in the number of extremely expensive technical consultations (ultrasound, scanner, nuclear processes). Hospital practice obviously plays a decisive role in this development. Yannick Lemel

References Charraud, A., and P. Mormiche. 1986. "Disparites de consommation m6dicale." coll. INSEE, M 118. CREDES. 1987. Socio-economic de la sante 1. INSEE. 1988, April. "Les depenses de sante?' Ecoflash 28. Ministere de la Sant6.1987. Annuaire des statistiques sanitaires et societies. Mizrahi, A., A. Mizrahi, and S. Sandier. 1991. Le systeme de sante en France de 1950 a 1989. Paris: CREDES.

173

8 State and Service Institutions

Table 1 Health Professions (1000s) Medical professions

1948

1955

1960

1970

1980

1985

Registered physicians3

31,4

41,0

46,7

67,9

124,4

159,2

Practising physicians b







65,2

108,1

13,7

15,3

22,4

Registered dental surgeons c

9,9

1986

1987

1988

165,8

171,4



128,0

132,1

138,8

143,4

32,4

38,0

39,0

39,7

40,4

Practising dental surgeons







20,6

31,0

34,9



36,1

36,7

Registered dispensing pharmacistse

13,5

14,2

14,9

17,2

20,9

23,1

23,6

24,0

24,5

Total number of pharmacists de





23,2

37,8

45,5

47,5

49,1

50,7



a. Number for metropolitan France, practising or retired, b. Metropolitan France. Practising physicians, whether registered or not. c. Including overseas departments and territories, d. Registered dispensing pharmacists, manufactures, wholesalers, assistant pharmacists, hospital pharmacists, mutualists and biologists; without double counting, e. Metropolitan France. Source: INSEE, Annuaire rttrospectif de la France, 1990.

174

8.2 Health System

Table 2 Average Annual Growth Rate of Controlled Health Professions Professions

1976-1971

1981-1976

1984-1981

Medical professions

4,1

4,9

4,2

Physicians private practitioners Pharmacists dispensing pharmacists Dental surgeons Midwives a

4,4 3,7 3,8 2,0 4,9

6,0 5,2 4,3 1,9 3,5 —

4,0 3,7 5,9 1,7 3,2 1,9

6,4

4,0

6,7 7,2 5,2 4,4 5,6 7,0 0,9

4,0 4,6 2,1 3,1 4,9 5,2 1,7 6,5

Paramedical professions Nurses State and psychiatric nurses Masseurs and physiotherapists Speech therapists Chiropodists Audioprosthetists Orthoptists

— 5,4 4,8 4,4 5,9 7,1

21,9 13,7

2,4

14,9

a. Densities are calculated for 100 000 aged between 15 and 44 years. Source: INSEE, Dannies sociales. 1987.

175

10,7

8 State and Service Institutions

Table 3 Number of Beds Installed per Year in Public Hospitals (a) (1000s beds)

1961

1970

1980

1987

Hopital Section - Total Short stay Medical Surgical Obstetrical Medium stay a Long stay b Mental illness

210,2 185,7 109,9 59,0 16,8 14,4

240,7 206,9 124,9 63,8 18,2 23,0

10,1

10,8

304,9 214,1 124,6 71,1 18,4 34,8 38,6 17,4

308,6 194,5 112,2 64,6 17,7 42,4 55,7 16,0

Hospice Section - Retirement Homes

126,2

158,9

125,1

113,5

10,8

13,0

8,2

4,5

347,2

412,5

438,2

426,6





Appended Sections Overall total

a. Not including hospital centres specializing in psychiatry. b. Long stays equated with medium stays until 1979. Source: INSEE, Annuaire rttrospectif de la France, 1990.

Table 4 Generalized Social Welfare For 100 persons

1960

1970

1980

Protected by social security (with free medical care) without mutuel

45,1

46,5

29,9

Protected by social security (possibly with free medical care) with mutuel

30,8

49,0

69,3

Total

75,9

95,6

99,2

Source: INSEE, Economic et statistiques, February 1984.

176

8.2 Health System

Tables Medical Equipment Number and distribution of authorized equipment

Type of heavy equipment

1976

1980

1985

Scanners

34

59

205

Nuclear medicine: scintillation cameras

65

124

175

X-Ray Equipment — less than 10 MeV — more than 10 MeV

246 44

250 53

279 63

1620

2224

2395

Hemodialysis machines in hospitals Source: SESI.

Table 6 Current Health Expenditure (millions of francs)

1980

1986

1987

1988

1989

212 532

428420

448378

485 378

526244

Expenditure on prevention

6660

11394

12020

12506

13507

Expenditure on the treatment system

4891

10046

11 173

11838

13242

General administration

2872

6262

6782

7343

7850

226 955

456 122

478 808

517065

560843

Expenditure on patients

Total Source: DSTSEE, TEF, 1990.

177

8.3 Welfare System Abstract. In the past, the range of state intervention increased. With the welfare state undergoing a financial crisis, the institution has become the subject of an ideological debate which illustrates present uncertainties as to the role of the state.

The concept of a welfare state is an ambiguous one. In its strict sense, it denotes all socially oriented public intervention. Speaking more broadly, it becomes synonomous with state intervention of a Keynesian type, the social arena being only one of many. For more than 30 years, state intervention developed in an effort to right wrongs, to remedy social and economic imbalances, and to fulfill the growing aspirations of the individual to greater social protection and a better life. The introduction to the 1946 constitution states, "The nation promises to provide the conditions necessary for the development of the individual and the family. It guarantees to protect the health, material security, rest and leisure of all—particularly women, children, and senior citizens." As the basic state-supervised social-coverage organization, the social-security system was generalized after World War II and progressively extended to the entire population. Social protection weighs heavily on the economic life of the country, amounting to 28% of the GDP. It continued to grow until 1985, but has since leveled out. The continued growth of public services governing protection and social regulations is reflected by the fact that public spending, and social spending in particular, increased far more quickly than did the GDP. The extension meant a greater degree of protection and a greater number of people protected: the ageing of the population (see 1.2, "Elders") had a direct influence on the sum of retirement pensions and health payments; there was a rapid increase in the demand for and cost of medication (see 8.2, Health System," and 13.3, "Personal Health and Beauty Practices"); schooling, almost entirely paid for by the state, was extended (see 8.1, "Educational System," and 15.1, "General Education"); cultural life and the mass media (see 9.5, "Mass Media"), largely subsidized by the state and public authorities, went through a major, expensive expansion (see 14.4, "Cultural Activities"); economic difficulties and unemployment brought new responsibilities and costs such as unemployment benefits (see 4.2, "Skills and Occupational Levels"), early retirement, and vocational training (see 15.2, "Professional Education"). Between 1978 and 1988, state expenditures in the social sector, health and employment, and housing and town planning increased almost threefold. Social contributions supplied 76,4% of the social-coverage revenue, with the rest coming from taxes. Old-age insurance is the most costly, counting for 44% of all payments; in 1970 the proportion was 41%. It consists mainly of retirement pensions. The French system is based on distribution of contributions payed by wage-earners, non-salaried workers, and companies. Added to these insurance payments are solidarity payments, whose function is to bring the income of those aged 65 and over up to the minimum old-age income. The increasing retirement expenditures reflect recent changes in the wage-earning population, particularly the arrival of women on the labour market. Health is the second most expensive service. Illness, disability, and accidents in the workplace account for 33% of social-protection services; in 1970, the figure was 36,8%. Payments related to illness make up three-quarters of the total (most of these payments cover hospital treatment, house calls, and medication). Health insurance is guaranteed to practically the whole population. Family allowances, which accounted for 18,7% of payments in 1970, today amount to 16%. The purpose of family allowances is to compensate in part for the cost of child

178

8.3 Welfare System

maintenance and to contribute to the housing expenses of low-income families. These payments are largely financed by company contributions, even if the companies are part of the government. Well-to-do families benefit from these payments just as much as do less well-off families. The last major service is unemployment coverage, which accounts for 7% of payments, as opposed to 2% in 1970. This consists essentially of unemployment benefits (84%). These payments are increasing faster than are payments on the whole, but no longer at the same explosive rate as between 1974 and 1981. Close examination of the social-coverage system reveals its extreme complexity and the respective importance of the different agents. Although the state plays a fundamental role, some of the agents are largely independent. In studying the development of social coverage, it is difficult to distinguish between what comes from state initiative and what comes from the interaction of the other social agents. "Social insurance" includes all social-security systems, but a sizeable share of payments comes from supplementary collective and public medical insurance, the government social-intervention schemes. There are numerous social-insurance systems, but it is the general social-security system that, by providing a little less than 45% of all payments, constitutes the symbol of social protection. These services are legally independent from the state, and their development remains an important element in government social policy. The state and the general system contribute to the equilibrium of most of the other systems. Social benefits paid to families made up 29,9% of their disposable income in 1981, and 34,2% in 1988. Interpretation of this figure is contentious. Salary deductions are approximately equal to these payments, so that, depending on one's ideological standpoint, social coverage can be seen as a redistribution of wealth to families or as tapping the nation's wealth. The redistributive effect of the social coverage system is limited: in 1980 the income ratio between senior executives and workers went from 2,7:1 before to 2:1 after redistribution. The ratio between retirement pensions and old-age contributions is much less favourable for skilled workers than for management, because the former have a shorter life expectancy. Certain public services can lead to greater inequalities: upper-class children benefit more from free schooling than do working-class children, who leave school earlier. In recent years, the idea of a crisis in the welfare state has developed because public expenditures were increasing too quickly in relation to the national economy (see 8.4, "The State"). Doubt began to spread about the effectiveness of public policies. This led to a lack of confidence in the administrative abilities of the welfare state. The crisis in the welfare state also gives rise to doubts concerning the bureaucracy and the legitimacy of the system. So great is the social consensus concerning the essential outline of the French welfare system that any innovations in the financing or status of its administrative organizations will probably remain peripheral. The development of alternative systems (mutual insurance, retirement schemes, and so on) seems to be one reaction to what is seen as a crisis in the administration of social protection. Marco Oberti

179

8 State and Service Institutions

References Ewald, F. 1986. L'£tat-providence. Paris: Grasset. Lenoir, R. 1988, June. "Le systeme de protection sociale: un risque et une chance." Futuribles.

"Prospective de la prise en charge des besoins sociaux: 1'avenir des systemes de protection sociale." 1981. Futuribles. Special.

Rosanvallon, P. 1981. La crise de l'£tat-previdence. Paris: Seuil. Saint-Occurs, J. 1985, October-November. "Le systeme frangais de protection sociale." Futuribles.

180

8.3 Welfare System

Table 1 Family Allowance (millions of francs)

Total

1973

1975

1980

1985

1988

28 345

35 168

68 957

121 742

138 282

Source: INSEE, Annuaire retrospectif de la France, 1990.

Table 2 Number Benefiting from Social Welfare (1000s)

1956

1960

1965

1970

1980

1985

1986

1987

118,9

137,5

191,4

225,8

155,4

121,5

115,3

114,4

1 278,6

1 215,0

1049,9

1095,9

942,1

301,0

296,2

290,8

Old-age allowances

135,0

153,6

168,3

205,7

276,5

285,6

273,3

258,5

Disability pensions

303,2

333,5

331,2

322,3

99,1

290,5

297,7

305,9

12,0

15,8

21,5

100,6





125,4

Children's allowance General medical allowance

Hostels and rehabilitation centres

3,0

Source: INSEE, Annuaire retrospectif de la France, 1990.

181

8 State and Service Institutions

Table 3 Family Allowances

Number of families benefiting from the general system (1000s) Amounts paid out by all systems (millions of francs)

1948

1956

1960

1965

1970

1975

1980

1985

2171

2644

2368

3661

3661

4086

4608

4925

2506

6955 10216 16 009 21 280 35 168 68 957 121 742 138 282

1988

4928

Source: INSEE, Annuaire rttrospectif de la France, 1990.

Table 4 Financing Social Welfare (billions of francs)

1981

Rate of annual development (%)

1988

Direct contributions

577,5

1 123,1

Employers' contributions Wage-earners' contributions Non-wage-eamers' contributions Service contributions Other contributions

376,7 156,1 39,4

683,7 345,7 80,4 10,6

10,0

8,9

2,6

12,0 10,7 14,1 13,1

91,8

157,7

8,0

Taxes Public contributions Tax deductions Recourse against a third party Revenue from capital Other revenues

19,8 133,5 21,2

51,4 240,5 52,2

14,6

16,0

8,4

20,2 18,3

Total revenues

870,3

1668,5

Indirect contributions

4,2 1,1

2,1

Source : INSEE, Donntes societies, 1990.

182

5,3

8,8

18,7 14,1

3,4

11,8

9,7

8.4 The State Abstract. The state is present in broad sectors of society. It has become an economic agent of the first order and intervenes in the social sphere. A debate has arisen concerning the limits to state expansion and the need to protect "private" spheres of society. The educational and paternalistic role of the state is being questioned more and more.

It is not easy to discern the place and role of the state in society. It cannot be defined by the number of civil servants, the development of ministries, or any other indicator. The nature of the relationship between the state and society is fundamental, and it is here that historical developments take on their full meaning. P. Rosanvallon defined three basic types of state in France: the state as "democratic leviathan," structured around the separation and autonomy of the political sphere; the "providential" state, defined as "eliminating uncertainty," which comes into being with the development of social rights; the state as "regulator of the economy"—the Keynesian revolution, through regulation, brought the economic sphere into the realm of state action and the state as a social agent. The state becomes a social force, producing cohesion by playing a role that was formerly played by intermediary bodies. It "produced" the French nation. Education and culture in France are much more than spheres of state activity— like diplomacy and finance, they are the raisons d'etre of the state. In France, state and other public-administration bodies continued to increase until the mid-1980s. Growth was particularly pronounced just after periods of great economic or political crisis. Today, the increase in expenses and deductions remains high for the social-protection system (see 8.3, "Welfare System"), but different kinds of social policy affect expenditures in other areas, as well as allocation of benefits from the central government and local authorities. Some domains—education, health, research, culture, social action, and so on—are traditionally the responsibility of the state; other state responsibilities are more formalized: defence, police, justice, general administrative services, and infrastructure. State expenditures for 1984 comprised 23% for education and culture, 26% for health and social welfare, 18% for defence, 12% for the economy, and 21% for administration. The considerable growth in the number of civil servants is indicative of the increasing state presence: the number of people on state and local-authority salaries has doubled over 20 years. Today, they account for 20% of the working population. As well as its traditional responsibilities, since World War II the state has played an increasing role in economic life. A whole area of industry can now be considered, with the beginning of planned development, the infrastructure of economic development. The revolutionary vision of economics arising from Keynesian theories, and the arrival in power of a new generation of high-ranking civil servants with an economic background, highlights the two types of state intervention: Keynesian and modernizing. This central elite helped to legitimize a state which was often called into question between the two wars. Since the war, both left-wing and right-wing governments have always considered it the state's duty to intervene to correct market fluctuations. This has led to the creation of important branches of the economy (nuclear industry, aerospace, and so on). The railways were nationalized in 1936; in 1945, the gas and electricity boards, the four major banks, and Renault became state companies. The 1981 nationalizations—although some were privatized in 1986—increased the national sector to such a degree that about half of economic activity is now under direct state control. Because of their volume (25% of

183

8 State and Service Institutions

GDP) and stability, state expenditures act as a counterweight, compensating for fluctuations in the private sector. Because of its selective policies (subsidizing certain credits, certain activities, and certain regions), the state modifies the results which would have issued from a more laissez-faire market. Since 1983, however, privatization and deregulation of certain sectors have caused a decline in state intervention. The debate concerning the role of the state in France gave birth to a theory of debureaucratization and rationalization of the state. The idea is to leave more room for public intervention by transferring public-service responsibilities to public organizations such as associations, foundations, and other groups. Sociologists have proven the vitality of the association network in France. The latest surveys show that the French are still very attached to the social-security system, and rely on the state to intervene in both the economic and social spheres. They nevertheless demand a more decentralized state and less intervention in "private life" (medicine, information, and leisure). There is a delicate balance struck between a growing demand for aid and the pursuit of greater freedom. The paternalistic and educational role of the state vis-a-vis society no longer has a raison d'etre. Deterritorialization of the state, linked with decentralization on the one hand and the building of Europe on the other, are likely to modify the relationship between state and society. The new Europe will certainly reduce the role of the state. Marco Oberti

References Ewald, F. 1986. L'fitat-providence. Paris: Grasset Meyer, J. 1983. Lepoids de I'ttat. Paris: PUR Rosanvallon, P. 1981. La crise de I'ttat-providence. Paris: Seuil. Rosanvallon, P. 1990. L'ttat en France. Paris: Seuil.

184

8.4 The State

Table 1 Numbers of Public Servants (Unit: Public servant) Men

1976

Women

Total

1986

1976

1986

1976

Permanent employees 904 798

962 181

694 164

992935

1598962

1955116

Other personnel

117385

142098

137 717

408 515

255 102

366 4 17

1986

Source: INSEE, Annuaire ritrospectif de la France, 1990.

Table 2 Expenditure per Ministry (billions of francs)

Civil expenditures Finance Education Agriculture Social welfare, health, employment, population Industry, research, commerce and trades Transport and public works Interior, justice, prime minister Housing, environment, town planning National and regional development War veterans Other ministries

1948

1960

1970

1980

2075 1053 165 397 448 973 243 111

19795 6857 1634 2086 328 4375 6092 212

46680 28942 8977 8200 7381 7951 6748 6306

222 655 99356 27833 47725 18787 31037 26042 16550

493090 166361 35723 111990 50496 53146 63256 40752

323 302

583 1352

6719 5643

17488 24960

26227 36163 1 077 177

1987

Total

7090

43314 133 567 532 433

Military expenditures

2831

16720

92054

165 176

Overall total

9921

60034 162 233 624487

1 242 353

Source: INSEE, Annuaire rttrospectif de la France, 1990.

185

28666

9 MOBILIZING INSTITUTIONS The four major French institutions of church, army, school, and the republic have lost their symbolic roles and their majesty. Antimilitarism, anticlericalism, defence of the republic, and secularism used to mobilize the French and involve them in political and ideological debates which contributed to national unity, but these issues no longer generate violent conflicts. Today, no one, on either the left or the right, contests the legitimacy of the republic. The army has lost its role as the educator of the people and the incarnation of patriotism. Catholic schools are no longer a cause of conflict between laypeople and the religious. The church has relinquished its claim to pronounce for all. Working-class institutions, created more recently, have also lost much of their symbolic meaning and power to mobilize. The Communist Party had its greatest electoral successes in the 1940s; since then, its popularity has declined. Its share in local political life is also on the wane. The history of the unions is punctuated with strikes and scissions which are indicative of their revolutionary ambitions and the political contradictions that fired them. By renouncing their revolutionary ambitions, they have acquired a legitimacy, which has changed them into administrative institutions of social democracy. They have simultaneously seen a portion of their militant bases erode and have lost a degree of public confidence.

186

9.1 Labour Unions Abstract. Membership in the large unions has dropped considerably. Union legitimacy is based more on the election of delegates and representatives than on membership numbers. However, there are more independent candidates in occupational elections, and abstention levels in industrial-tribunal elections have increased-

Unions have been reporting a drop in membership for several years. After a period of slow but regular growth between 1958 and 1968, membership in the large unions began to stagnate between 1968 and 1974, with the exception of the CFDT, which continued to grow. Since then, there has been a clear decline. In 1980, there were an estimated 4,7 million union members, 3,8 million of whom paid then* dues regularly, for a membership rate of 22%. Membership was estimated at 25% of all workers in 1972, and is considered to be about 15% today. This average conceals great diversity: workers in half of the country's firms are practically not unionized at all, and in the other half the rate varies between 30% and 50%. This dwindling in numbers affects the public sector a few years after the private sector. By primarily hitting traditional industry sectors (iron and steel, textiles, glass, construction and public works, and so on. After 1975 the recession hit the unions' strong points. In other sectors, the gloomy outlook encouraged neither union action nor membership; people preferred to hope for change rather than to undertake to bring it about. As well, the social environment is evolving: the world of labour is changing, labour awareness is weakening (see 2.1, "Self-identification"), and the new middle classes are becoming the central group in society. The three main confederations of labour unions are: Confederation Ge*n6rale du Travail (CGT), linked with the Communist Party; Confederation frangaise de"mocratique du travail (CFTC), influenced by the Catholic tradition; and Force Ouvriere (FO), which is strong among civil servants. New aspirations are appearing, evidenced in the renewed success of the association movement (see 2.5, "Local Autonomy") and focus on the microsocial and new forms of action: commitment is now more specific and of limited duration. Conflicts are being localized (see 7.1, "Conflict"), and negotiation (see 7.2, "Negotiation") is becoming widespread throughout society. All of these phenomena generate new and complex situations, which the social agents find disconcerting. The opinions of non-members are beginning to hold more and more weight in the making of union decisions, and, with negotiations revealing the importance of experts as opposed to union activists, it is becoming less necessary to be a member of a union in order to participate in union democracy (see 10.2, "Institutionalization of Labour Unions"). Up to now, membership could be replaced by exercising one's franchise, insofar as election results legitimized the unions. But this situation is changing, as union influence on elections begins to decline. The results of prud'homme (industrial tribunal arbitrators) elections are the best indication of support for unions. Although the five main unions always net 95% of the votes, independent unions getting the smaller share, the abstention rate, already high in 1979 (37%) and 1982 (41%), rose dramatically in 1987, to 54%. This rate constitutes a serious setback for trade unionism and makes the legitimacy of union organizations more tenuous. The results of workers'-council elections—which concern only private firms— illustrate the development of union support over 20 years. Apart from a reshuffling of the

187

9 Mobilizing Institutions

main unions (setbacks for the CGT, progress for CFDT and FO) and irregular scores for independent unions, the progress of non-union lists is great in the long term, in spite of the rule which forbids them presentation in the first round of elections. This progress of the non-unionized, who are very strong in firms of fewer than 200 employees, is due to the increase in relative importance of these firms in workers' councils as a whole. Nonunionized representatives do not exist in the public sector because of laws governing balloting in joint management-worker commission elections, but differential or autonomous unions carry a good deal of weight. In firms of fewer than 50 employees, elections of personnel delegates reveal that more than two-thirds come from non-union lists. In 8 out of 10 cases in which non-union delegates are elected, there is no union competition. Overall, the great increase in abstentionism in prud'homme elections combines with the increased importance of non-union candidates in workers'-council elections to have a cumulative effect. It is difficult to interpret the upsurge of non-union representatives, but it is closely related to the disappearance of firms with a strong union presence, and to the creation of others in which the unions cannot get a foothold. The unions no longer seem to be in step with society: they are rejected by youth (see 1.1, "Youth") and workers' confidence in them has eroded. In 1979, the percentage of workers who trusted the unions to defend their rights was far superior to the percentage of those who didn't trust them: 57% against 36%. Since then, the situation has been reversed; the proportion of those who do not trust the unions is, depending on the year, equal to or greater than the proportion of those who do. The reduction in membership and combativeness has put the unions on their guard. The number of working days lost through strikes has been falling constantly since 1976 (see 7.1, "Conflict"). With dwindling revenue from dues, the financial situation of unions is becoming serious, and the confederations are wondering whether this may be the time to develop paid services. Jean-Hugues Dechaux

References Adam, G. 1983. Le pouvoir syndical. Paris: Dunod. Aujard, J.-P., and S. Volkoff. 1986, December. "Une analyse chiffr6e des audiences syndicates." Travail et Emploi 30. Bouzonnie, H. 1987. "Involution des effectifs syndicaux depuis 1922: essai d'interpre'tation." Revue Franqaise des Affaires Sociales 4. Dim, L., and J.-P. Jaslin. 1985, July."Crise ou renforcement du syndicalisme?" Revue de I'OFCE 12. Landier, H. 1981. Demain quels syndicats? Paris: Hachette. Reynaud, J.-D. 1975. Les syndicats en France. Paris: Seuil. Rosanvallon, P. 1988. La question syndicale. Paris: Calmann-Levy. Touraine, A., Wieviorka M., and F., Dubet. 1984. Le mouvement ouvrier. Paris: Fayard.

188

9.1 Labour Unions

Table 1 Structure of Unionized Population in 1981 and 1989 (%)

Sex:

Age:

1981

1989

Male Female

70 30

68 32

18 to 24 years 25 to 34 35 to 49 50 to 64 65 +

7 25 32 29 7

2 23 44 23 8

12 6 12 32

16 7 15 33

Professions of those interviewed: Farmers Shopkeepers, artisans, industrial Intellectual professions and managers Intermediate professions and employees Intermediate professions Employees Workers Inactive, retired

(18) (14)

25 13

Source: La crise des syndicats, ProbUmes politiques et sociaux 632, May 1990.

189

(23) (10)

14 15

9 Mobilizing Institutions

Table 2

Rate of Development of Trade Unionism since 1981 by Sociopolitical Category (%) 1981

1989

Rate of stability

20

11

55

Male Female

29 11

15 7

52 64

18 to 24 years 25 to 34 35 to 49 50 to 64 65 +

9 21 27 26 8

1 11 19 12 5

11 52 70 46 63

Professions of those interviewed: Farmers Shopkeepers, artisans, industrials Intellectual professions, managers Intermediate professions and employees Workers Inactive, retired

48 30 38 28 25 6

40 16 31 13 12 4

83 53 82 46 48 67

Professional status of those interviewed: Self-employed Wage-earner

39 28

28 14

72 50

Interest in politics: Very A little Very little Not at all

31 20 17 8

23 12 7 5

74 60 41 63

Political classification: Extreme left Left Centre Right Extreme right

38 21 17 14 9

24 10 8 9 10

63 48 47 64 111

Total Sex:

Age:

Source: La crise des syndicats, Probltmes politiques et sociaux 632, May 1990.

190

9.1 Labour Unions

Table3 Development of Non-union Candidacies in Workers'-Council Elections (%) Unions

1966

1970

1974

1978

1982

1986

1987

1988

CGT

50,8 19,1

46,0 19,6

42,7 18,6

38,5 20,4

32,3 22,8

27,1 21,2

26,8 21,3

26,7 20,7

10,0

11,7

14,4

11,3

13,7

16,3

18,4

21,1

23,9

23,5

CFDT CFTC CGT-FO CFE-CGC Other unions Non-union

2,4 8,0 4,2 3,5

12,0

2,7 7,3 5,5 7,0

11,9

2,7

2,6 8,3 5,3 6,2

6,6 5,2

15,7

2,9

7,0 4,4

3,8

7,5 5,0

4,8 5,9 6,0

3,7

6,8 4,8

Source: Ministere des Affaires Sociales.

Table 4 "Unions Are Indispensable" (%)

Opposed Indifferent In favour

1981

1982

1984

1985

1986

1987

1988

1989

22 18

23 22

29 26

28 25

22 24

27 22

29 21

28 24

60

55

47

45

Source: Agorame'trie, 1989.

191

54

51

50

48

9.2

Religious Institutions Abstract. The shortage of vocations to the priesthood is indicative of the Catholic church's loss of power. By concentrating on the individual, the church has lost its mass appeal.

Until the end of the 1960s, the Catholic church claimed charge of all the people of France, except for about a million Protestants, a few hundred thousand Jews, and non-believers. In his own diocese, the bishop was the spiritual leader of practically the entire population, and felt that he had non-believers and the non-baptized in hand. In spite of the separation of church and state, he was an authority on a level with a general.or a prefect. Ninety-five per cent of the French population were baptized; if they did&t practise their religion regularly they were in the wrong, and it was the role of the clergy to bring them back to strict observance of church discipline. Grouped around the church was a set of institutions which furthered its action: Catholic schools, large and small seminaries, youth organizations, sports associations, and devout associations (the Children of Mary and so on). Catholic youth movements were founded between the two^wars for young fanners, students, and workers: Jeunesse Agricole Chre'tienne, Jeunesse Etudiante Chre'tienne, Jeunesse Ouvriere Chre'tienne (JAC, JEC, JOC). The Catholic press had a great deal of influence: the departmental La Croix, the national La Croix, and other weeklies and monthlies. Religion was essentially a means of knowing the world. Time and space were staked out with crosses and ceremonies. All empirical knowledge was evaluated by its relation to religious cosmology and revealed truth. The explicit goal of the majority of rites was to obtain material favours from God, the Virgin, and the saints, or to ward off misfortune. This Catholic "counter-culture" collapsed as a result of the rural exodus, the mass media, and, most of all, the weakening of the church itself. Church doctrine changed rapidly with Vatican II, in 1965. God became Love. Sin became an obstacle to happiness; as it was no longer punished, it did not incur feelings of guilt, and the confessionals were deserted. Instead of being reserved for the afterlife, happiness was allowed in the here and now. It was a completely new vision of the world. By modifying rites and disciplines, Vatican U awoke uncertainty in the masses of the faithful, while responding to the wishes of reformers and giving them a new lease on life. Today, scientific rationalism has prevailed; religion is no longer an instrument of material success, since wealth comes not from God but from economic achievement. The direct link between morality and religion, between actions in this world and payment in the next, was broken, and religious practice is no longer directly linked to it Only the cult of the dead has remained constant, and has even been renewed and enriched by new rites. The CFDT no longer claims to be Christian, although its activists, who came from JOC, and its ideologies remain faithful to the original beliefs. The JAC victory was without consequence for the church, because by affirming their power over agriculture the militants abandoned their missionary ambitions. The Catholic press and publishing houses are still important: 827, titles were published in 1964, and 1 031 in 1984. The daily La Croix has a circulation of 110 000, Notre temps has a circulation of 858 000, and Le Pelerin-Magazine has a circulation of 427 000 (see 13.2, "Mass Information"). Church institutions were already showing signs of weakness in 1950. Vocations to the priesthood began to fall at the beginning of the century, going from 1 500 per year (not counting Alsace-Lorraine) to about 1 000 per year (counting Alsace-Lorraine) in 1950, 500 per year in 1960, 200 per year in the 1970s, and about 100 per year in recent years.

192

9.2 Religious Institutions

Numerous books have expressed priests' anxiety about their role. Fired by this, the worker-priest movement and the Mission de France attempted to renew the priesthood. Nonetheless, many priests left the church, causing a disastrous drop in the proportion of priests to faithful and increasing the proportion of ageing priests. There were 41 000 secular priests in 1965, 36 000 in 1975, about 30 000 in 1984; the number will be down to 20 000 by 1995, unless married men and women are given access to the priesthood. Because the church claimed to govern the people of France, there was virulent anticlericalism in certain regions and in certain social categories. When this claim was abandoned, the anti-clericalism disappeared. Half of the Catholic population rejects the moral authority of the church, particularly in sexual matters. The Catholic church has become an institution like any other. It stands alongside other institutions (unions, political parties) and other faiths: Islam, Protestantism, Judaism. It retains between 10% and 20% of the population. Even within the church, major differences exist between communities. Militancy is gaining ground. The charismatic revival movement has quickly permeated the Catholic church; today it is estimated to have about 250 000 members. It recruits mostly from upper social levels. Religious allegiance nevertheless remains a criterion of ideological and moral distinction for French people: those who consider themselves close to the church usually have more family wealth (see 12.3, "Personal and Family Wealth") and religion remains an essential factor for explaining and justifying the political, ideological, and moral standpoints of the French people (see 11.1, "Political Differentiation"), whether they practise a religion or not. Henri Mendras

References Bauberot, J. 1988. Le protestantisme doit-il mourir? Paris: Seuil. Clevenot, M. (dir). 1987. L'etat des religions. Paris: La D6couverte. Crootaers, J. 1981. De Vatican II a Jean-Paul II: le grand tournant de I'eglise catnolique. Paris: Centurion. Donegani, J.-M., and G. Lescanne. 1986. Catholicismes de France. Paris: Desclde-Bayard-Presse. Gr6mion, C., and P. Levillain. 1986. Les lieutenants de Dieu. Paris: Fayard. Hervieu-L6ger, D. 1986. Vers un nouveau christianisme? Paris: Cerf. Isambert, F.A. 1980. "Le sociologue, le pr&tre et le fidele." In Mendras H., La sagesse et le dtsordre, Paris: Gallimard. Lambert, Y. 1985. Dieu change en Bretagne: la region de Limerzel de 1900 a nos jours. Paris: Cerf.

193

9 Mobilizing Institutions

Table 1 Priests 45507 41461 40300 39928 38876 38449 38362 37550 36781 36017 27000

1969 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1990

Source: Secretariat G6n6ral de ITipiscopat.

Table 2 Ordination of Priests

1830 1900 1918 1951 1965 1978 1982 1983 1985 1987

2300 1679 152 1028 646 118 106 95 116 106

Source: Episcopal.

194

9.2 Religious Institutions

Table 3 Seminarians 8480 7175 8490 1 172 1 198 1 196 1287

1861 1929 1949 1984 1985 1986 1987 Source: Episcopat.

Table 4 The Catholic Press (Circulation)

La Croix Le Pelerin Notre Temps

1975

1977

1982

1987

124 578 510 103 462 863

120 256 501 170 587 739

114980 471665 623 377

95375 378 807 817 989

Source: O.J.D.

195

9.3

Military Forces Abstract. By becoming professional, the army becomes commonplace and loses its symbolic role. At the same time, the French are agreed on the need for defence, including nuclear weapons.

Up to World War n, the army was a major institution in French society: officers enjoyed great prestige. Youths performed their military service, which was a rite of passage on the way to adulthood, when all men became citizens. Armed defence of the homeland by the people was the supreme duty of the nation and of each citizen. Curiously, the French army was contested on the left by a sizeable fraction of the population, in which insubordination and antimilitarism were widespread. The army was also linked to the colonial empire. . Over the last 20 years, the army lost its central role in public life and its symbolic importance for the population. Officers have become, sort of civil servants; youths do their military service without complaining too much. Defence is a state function, a sort of insurance upon which the French people are agreed, including a deterrent nuclear arsenal. There is no peace movement and pacifism is nonexistent, but the French do not really believe that they could be called to arms to defend their frontiers. Combat has become the business of the military, but military service has not been called into question. The colonies have disappeared, but the French army continues to play a role overseas, particularly in Africa. A professional army, without conscripts, would perform the same functions just as well, and the military would accept it willingly. The "service" remains a rite of passage, a symbolic institution, no doubt of more symbolic importance than the army itself (see 1.1, "Youth"). Before World War II, the traditional military values of honour, authority, hierarchy, and total availability were supreme values for the nation as a whole. They have lost this role, though they continue to be cultivated for themselves in more restricted social milieux, which are for the most part related to the army. Hierarchy and military authority (see 7.4, "Authority") were models for the organization of society and industry. The boss saw himself as the colonel of a regiment. Today, this model is becoming increasingly marginalized. Being killed and, in particular, killing are singularly exceptional functions in a society which condemns violence and denies death. The great majority of officers today, and almost all NCOs, have never seen combat. Today's soldier lives a double contradiction between his position as civil servant and his vocation as a fighting man, between the goal of combat and the absence of combat. The constraints of military life remain hard. Garrison changes demand frequent moving, which makes it difficult to buy a home and prevent sponses from having stable employment and their own career. In theory, service is not limited to fixed terms: officers and NCOs should always be available for exercises, duty, and manoeuvres. These constraints lead many military personnel to live in residences built for them near barracks and bases, thus isolating them from civilians. The army is still a means of social promotion, but recruits tend more than ever to come from military families. The army creates institutions and associations (see 2.5, "Voluntary Associations") around it which bring together those who are close to it: ex-military personnel, reserve officers, war veterans, people the army has honoured with medals. To ensure recruitment, it creates preparatory military centres. Technicians escape these contradictions by perfecting a skill which gives them the possibility of leaving the army, escaping the constraints of military life, and finding better remuneration in the private

196

9.3 Military Forces

sector. Rather than warlords, commanding officers are becoming managers, confronted more and more often with the types of problems associated with private enterprises. By becoming professional, the army becomes commonplace, the trades are the same as in civilian life, and arms become a specialty among others and not the daily exercise of every soldier. Women are beginning to occupy a modest position in certain corps. Training and teaching are gaining importance in the functioning of the military system as a whole.

Henri Mendras

References Girardet, R. 1953. La societe militaire dans la France contemporaine 1815-1939. Paris: Plon. Reynaud, E. 1988. Lesfemmes, la violence et I'armee: essai sur lafeminisation des armies. Paris: Fondation pour les Etudes de defense rationale. Saint-Macary, P. 1980. "Vivre Tame au pied." In Mendras H., La sagesse et le desordre. France 1980. Paris: Gallimard.

197

9 Mobilizing Institutions

Table 1 Military Expenditure

Year

Overall military expenditure (millions of francs)

1948 1960 1970 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989

2831 16720 28666 135009 136 998 145606 154909 165 176 174 276 182360

Operational Expenditure

Equipping Expenditure

— —

— —

— —

— 3,9 3,8 3,7 3,8 3,7 3,6

54,3 53,1 52,3 52,2 50,7 47,9 46,3

45,7 46,9 47,7 47,8 49,3 47,9 46,3

GDP (%)

(%)

(%)

Source: SIRPA, La defense en chiffres, 1989.

Table 2 Numbers in the Armed Forces Year

Infantry

Air Force

Navy

Gendarmerie

Overall

Civilians

1962 1970 1975 1980 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989

197402 116841 115525 115385 114 181 113 858 112224 110717 109504

67759 67504 63296 62170 60089 59524 58566 58494 58105

47964 52820 51842 49928 49070 47776 47002 46580 46293

67049 62674 69622 73296 76961 76961 76967 77 170 77170

388 216 308 163 310684 311 858 311 386 309571 306193 304405 302 380

163 239 137994 130284 135 265 141 675 141 853 140 276 136 155 132 095

Source: INSEE, Annuaire r&trospectif de la France, 1990.

198

9.3 Military Forces

Table 3 National Service Year

Number of conscripts

1938 1950 1960 1970 1980 1989

221 415 365 348 274 159 454 853 443319 438 585

Source: INSEE, Annuaire rttrospectif de la France 1990.

199

9 Mobilizing Institutions

Table 4 "You should be willing to sacrifice yourself for your homeland" (%) Year

Against

Indifferent

In favour

1977 1978 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989

45 52 48 55 51 58 56 59 54 53 54

25 22 20 18 24 19 19 21 22 25 23

30 26 32 27 25 23 25 20 24 22 23

Source: Agoramfitrie, 1989.

Table 5 'Military expenditure should be reduced'1 (%) Year

Against

Indifferent

In favour

1977 1978 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989

23 19 28 26 26 24 24 23 20 20 17

28 26 26 26 25 24 27 24 22 26 23

49 55 46 48 49 52 49 53 57 54 60

Source: Agoram6trie, 1989.

200

9.4 Political Parties Abstract. Polarization of the political system around the president has stabilized and modernized the parties. Their political role has become greater, although their anchoring in society remains quite weak. It is paradoxical that the fifth French republic, which was created to counteract the "party system," should have aided in the modernization and stabilization of the French party system. Government instability under the fourth republic brought discredit on the parties. According to a 1958 IFOP survey, 95% of those questioned blamed the problems of the regime on too-frequent changes of government; 80% felt that this instability was caused by too many parties. De Gaulle wished to restore the power of the state, at the expense of partisan interests. Although the 1958 Constitution recognized the role of the parties (Article 4) for the first time in French history, direct election of the President was the cornerstone of the new political regime. In the 1956 National Assembly, there were fourteen different parties, six of them playing an important role. After 1958, this system of many independent and badly organized parties gave way to a system of four well-organized parties. With growing polarization, some parties disappeared and others were integrated, to a greater or lesser extent, into the new coalitions. Conversely, new parties were founded: the Socialist Party in 1971, a fusion of the traditional socialists (Section Fran9aise de 1'Internationale Ouvriere: SFIO) and other groups; the Union des Forces Democratiques (UDF) in 1978, drawing together the centre-right parties. Until 1981, the French party system was characterized by two diametrically opposed coalitions: the RPR (Rassemblement pour la R6publique) and the UDF, on one side, and the SP and the CP, on the other. Later, the dominance of the "gang of four" was shaken by the appearance of the National Front on the extreme right and the rise of the ecologists. The polarization of the political system around the president also affected the functioning of the parties: they became presidency-oriented. Power became centralized around party leaders, entourages and groups of experts began to develop around possible presidential candidates, and the candidates placed a certain distance between themselves and their party as the election approached. These changes led to greater political stability, as governments changed every three years, on average, after 1958, as opposed to every six months under the fourth republic. However, the fact that the parties grew stronger did not call the presidency into question. The president is leader of the country by virtue of his election and by virtue of his party's parliamentary majority. The period of "cohabitation" has shown that the president has sufficient state power to maintain his position even when his party does not have a parliamentary majority. Modernization of the party system and, since 1981, alternating policies have further legitimized the parties. Although party politics is traditionally weak in France, it has become more ingrained: in 1958 only 50% identified with a political party, while 85% did so in 1978. In 1983, a SOFRES survey revealed that only one person out of three was willing to attend a political meeting or to talk politics. And although 16% (i.e., a potential six million people) declared themselves willing to consider joining a party, there are fewer than one million party members. In spite of a wave of new members in the 1970s, French political parties are badly organized and have few active members. The CP, the SP, and the RPR number between 200 000 and 250 000 members each. The socially dominated

201

9 Mobilizing Institutions

—women, senior citizens, youths, and the unemployed—are least likely to participate in political life. The socialist party has a trans-class electorate, but the educated middle classes and, increasingly, the upper classes constitute the active members, the parliamentary group, and the party organizers. Under the fourth republic, SFIO support moved from among the working class to the middle classes. Similarly, the Gaullist party defines itself as a trans-class party. It has moved progressively to the right, particularly since the founding of the RPR. Its active members are senior executives, business persons, and professionals. In both cases, the upper classes are overrepresented, although the RPR tends to attract the economic elite and the SP the intellectual elite. Although they have grown in strength and been modernized and legitimized by the political regime in operation since 1958, the parties are facing a traditional challenge and are confronted with their own bad organization. The crisis of representation within the parties indicates a need for further change in the present system, and perhaps a redefinition of the role of the party. Patrick Le Gales

References Brechon, P and al., 1987. Le RPR: cadres et militant. Paris: Economica. Chariot, J. 1986. Les partis politiques en France. Paris: ron6o. Chariot, J. 1986, February. "La transformation de 1'image des partis." Revue Franqaise de Sciences Politiques: 5-13. Gaxie, D. 1980, February. "Les logiques du recrutement politique." Revue Frangaise de Sciences Politiques: 5: 45. Offerle", M. 1987. Les partis politiques. Paris: PUF. Quermone, J.-L. 1987. "Lapr6sidence de la r6publique et le systeme des partis." Pouvoirs4\, 93-113. Key, H., and F. Subileau. 1986, March-April. "Les militants socialistes en 1985." Projet 198 19-34. Schonfeld, W. 1985. Ethnographic du PS et du RPR. Paris: Economica. Wilson, F. 1982. Political Parties under the Vth Republic. New-York: Praeger Publishers.

202

9.4 Political Parties

Table 1 Breakdown of Delegates at Socialist Party Congresses Since 1973 (%)

1973 Sex: Male 88 12 Female Age: 31 Under 30 years 27 30-39 years 40-49 years 23 12 50-59 years 7 60 years and over Socio-occupational category: Upper class 50 34 Middle class Working class 3 1 Other 12 Inactive Teaching professions : Primary school 6 Secondary and third level 19 Religion: Practising Catholic 12 Non-practising catholic Other religions No religion Unspecified Unionization: Non-members

CGT

CFDT

FO

FEN Other Unspecified Political history: None

PC PSU

Extreme left SFIO, New PS

CIR

Other

1977

1979

1981

1985

1990

85 15

84 16

80 20

86 14

81 19

16 40 26 12 6

16 42 24

13 5

8 45 29 11 7

9 31 35 17 8

10 23 42 18 7

49 37 5 3 6

36 43 5 12 4

48 37 5 3 7

44 40 2 5 8

53 30 1 5 11

12 24

11 19

5 25

— —

5 16

)

10

7

12

25 3 60 0

28 4 53 3

) 4 55 2

25 4 59 2

— — — — —

32 7 18 10 24 9 0

16 10 28 11 28 7 0

15 10 28 8 24 8 7

15 10 28 6 26 10 5

— — — — — — —

30 2 8 1 37 18 5

67 4 14 1 4 11 4

63 2 14 2 19 10 4

62 2 11 1 14 9 1

— — — — — — —

) 39

Source: SOFRES, L'frat de I'opinion, 1991.

203

35 6 50 2 40 — — — — — — 60 4 12 3 17 4 4

9 Mobilizing Institutions

Table 2 Socio-demographic Characteristics of RPR Executives Since 1978 (%) RPR Executives CERAT survey 1984

RPR Executives SOFRES survey 1990

89 11 0

80 20 0

76 23 1

11 25 22 32 8 2

11 28 26 20 13 2

15 20 33 19 12 1

3 12 49 17 3 2 14 0

3 11 36 17 8 2 23 0

2 8 34 22 8 2 20 4

— — —

34 66 0

27 70 3

— — — — —

6 37 18 39 0

3 23 24 42 8

42 47 3 7 1

33 57 3 7 0

42 47 4 5 2

40 60

41 59

24 76

RPR Executives CEVEPOF Survey 1978

Sex: Male Female Unspecified Age: Under 30 years 30-39 years 40-49 years 50-59 years 60 years and over Unspecified Occupations of those interviewed: Farmer Shopkeeper, artisan, head of firm Higher intellectual professions and management Intermediate professions Employee Worker Inactive, retired Other, unspecified Employment categories of those interviewed: Self-employed Wage-earner Unspecified Level of education: No recognized level Lower than "bac" Baccalauitat Certificate of higher education Other, unspecified Religion: Practising Catholic Non-practising Catholic Other religion No religion Unspecified Unionization: Member Non-member Source: SOFRES. L'4tat de I'opinion, 1991.

204

9.4 Political Parties

Table 3 Breakdown of Delegates to National Front Congresses (%) National Front executives National Front executives CEVIPOF survey CEVIPOF survey 1990 1978

Sex: Male Female Unspecified Age: 18-24 years 25-34 years 35-49 years 50-64 years 65 years and over Unspecified Occupations of those interviewed: Farmer Shopkeeper, artisan, head of firm Higher intellectual professions and management Intermediate professions Employee Worker Inactive, retired Unspecified Level of education: Primary Secondary Technical or commercial Third level Unspecified Monthly income per household Less than 10 000 F 10 to 15 000 F 15 to 20 000 F More than 20 000 F Unspecified Religion Practising Catholic Non-practising Catholic Other religion No religion Unspecified Source: L'ttat de {'opinion, 1991.

205

86 14 0

81 18 1

17 35 23 20 3 2

6 10 31 35 15 3

0 11 34 19 11 7 17 1

2 10 27 15 7 2 33 4

11 17 14 56 2

7 27 18 33 15

— — — — —

26 19 22 29 4

24 47 2 26 1

41 44 6 8 1

9 Mobilizing Institutions

Table 4 Socio-political Characteristics of Ecology Party (%)

Executives

Participants at Ecologist General Assembly November 1989 Sex: Male Female Unspecified

70 27 3

Age: 18-25 years 25-34 years 35-49 years 50-64 years 65 years and more Unspecified

10 34 38 13 3 2

Occupations of those interviewed: Farmer Shopkeeper, artisan, head of firms 5 Higher intellectual professions and management Intermediate professions Employee Worker Inactive, retired Other Unspecified

35 22 9 4 13 3 7

Employment categories of those interviewed: Self-employed Public sector wage-earner Private sector wage-earner Inactive Unspecified

15 34 23 22 6

Level of education Primary Secondary Technical or commercial Third level Unspecified

3 19 12 60 6

2 5

Source: SOFRES, L'ttat de ['opinion, 1991.

206

9.5 Mass Media Abstract. The rapid development of communications technology over the last decade was simultaneous with deregulation of the audiovisual public sector, the separation of postal and telecommunications services, and broader scope being given to private initiative.

Communications, in the broad sense of the term (media, books, teletexts, and so on), employs 1 067 000 people, 550 000 of them in the media. A 1982 law grants audiovisual journalists the same status as print journalists. The number of card-holding journalists has more than doubled over 20 years (6 697 in 1965, 14 924 in 1987). The information market is less developed in France than in other comparable countries, particularly in terms of the use of written or audiovisual materials in schools and universities. Televisions, telephones, VCRs, and other equipment became household fixtures more slowly in France than in other countries. At the end of 1987, only 31% of households (6,6 million) had a VCR, as against 60% in Great Britain, 44% in West Germany, and 51% in the United States. The 1982 and 1986 laws marked the end of the public monopoly on broadcasting. In placing audiovisual media under the aegis of an independent authority, the CSA, France is trying out a method of regulation that is somewhere between state control and market control. Program conditions are more numerous and more restrictive than in other countries: at least 50% of television programs and movies shown in theatres must have been made in the French language, and at least 60% of them must come from the EC. Many questions remain concerning the future production of audiovisual programs, particularly national productions. Although 86% of the population had a television in 1973, only 9% had a colour set. Most households received only two channels. FR3, which started in 1972, could be received only in Paris, the north, and the east of the country, and the annual number of broadcast hours was only one-fifth of what it is today. Only 5% of the population today does not have a television (against 14% in 1973), 24% have several sets, and 89% are colour ones. Almost three-quarters of the population watch TV every day, and for longer and longer periods. Although viewing time stayed relatively stable between 1973 and 1981, at a little less than 16 hours per week, it has now risen to more than 20 hours per week. The percentage of people watching TV every day, and for more than 20 hours per week, rose from 20% in 1973 to 26% in 1981, and to 36% in 1988, a rise of 80% in over 15 years. The goal of the "cable plan," launched in 1982—to have cable TV in half the households in the country by 1990—is far from being achieved. At the end of 1989 there were about 90 cable networks and only 250 000 households subscribing, out of more than two million possible link-ups. The majority of programs broadcast are not national productions. The anticipated interaction between "friendly" modes of communication has so far not taken place, although the number of "theme" channels has increased. Radio is an old medium which has been present in practically every household (96%) in the country since 1973. Until 1981, the French were remarkably stable in their listening patterns. Since then, there has been a drop in overall listening (4%) and in the proportion of daily listeners. Those who watch the most TV (more than 30 hours per week) are also the ones who listen most to radio. More than 12% of the population, the majority (63%) of them women, spend more than 20 hours a week watching TV and more than 20 hours a week listening to radio. Local radio stations, which have been legal only since 1983 and financed by advertising since 1984, have gained a considerable

207

9 Mobilizing Institutions

share of the radio market (17% in January of 1985, 36% in June of 1988). There were about 1 000 stations in 1984, and about 16 000 in 1988. The early, theme-based stations, run by small associations, have almost all given way to commercial stations. In 1985, half of the local radio stations were commercial and purely musical. Competition between these stations and national and peripheral stations radio is fierce. Among the 15-34 age group in the Paris region, 62,5% listen to private stations, 12,5% to Radio France publicsector stations, and 25% to peripheral stations—stations broadcasting from outside French borders for a French audience (RTL, FMC). Since 1973, 18% of the population has stopped reading a daily newspaper (from 72% in 1973 to 54% in 1988). Frequent or occasional reading has increased. Newspaper reading increases with age, with non-degree holders reading as much as degree holders, though not the same papers. Degree holders tend to read the national press; non-degree holders, the regional press. More magazines than daily papers are read, with 84% of the population reading magazines, against 79% reading newspapers. Press companies are more numerous in France than in other countries, but are less powerful and less involved in audiovisual media. General newspapers have been losing ground since the 1950s, although Paris is the European capital with the greatest choice of dailies. France abounds with specialized periodicals for women, youth, the old, leisure, and economics. After almost disappearing in the early 1970s, the popular press (France-Soir, Le Parisien) is making no progress, and the political press (La Croix, l'Humanit&) is in serious difficulty. A new generation of national dailies appeared at about the same time (Le Matin, Liberation, Le Quotidien de Paris). Regional papers have declined drastically: from 175 in 1939 to 67 in 1989. Although they have been losing readers since 1968, regional dailies have grown at the expense of national dailies, and have more than 20 million readers. This places them, with TV, in the first rank of national media. The dailies have started producing supplements (for TV, youth, and so on), have diversified into radio, teletext, and other media, and are trying to become involved with TV companies. Direct and indirect state aid to the press, intended to soften competition, is very high: but it tends to favour the most powerful. The 1986 law limits the extent of press monopolies, but there is no official authority whose job it is to see that the law is respected. Some new media have made considerable progress: teletext (Minitel), which was launched on the public market in 1984, met with immediate success. The demand for practical services seems to have won out over games and dating services, which were most in demand at the beginning. More than half of the users are management or professional people, and two-thirds are under the age of 40. There were 9 000 services in 1988, with 13% of households spending five million hours on line, 53% of them using the electronic phonebook.

Joelle Basso

208

9.5 Mass Media

References Aurelle, B. 1986. Les telecommunications. Paris: La D6couverte. Balle, F. 1990. Mfdias et societe. Paris: Montchrestien. Busson, A., and Y. Evrard Y. 1987. "Portraits 6conomiques de la culture." Notes et ttudes documentaires: 4846. Cayrol, R. 1991. Les madias. Paris: PUF. Cluzel, J. 1988. La television apres six reformes. Paris: Lattes et Licet. Guillauma, Y. 1988. Lapresse en France. Paris: La D6couverte. Le Diberder, A., and N. Coste-Cerdan. 1986. La television. Paris: La D6couverte. Mattelart, A. and M. Mattelart. 1986. Penser les mtdias. Paris: La D6couverte. Ministere de la Culture. 1990. Les pratiques culturelles des Francois. Paris: Documentation Frangaise.

209

9 Mobilizing Institutions

Table 1 National and Regional Daily Newspapers

National

Year

1914

1945

1965 1975 1985

1987 1988

Regional

Number

Circulation

Number

Circulation

titles

millions)

titles

millions)

80 26 13 12 12 12 11

5,5 4,6 4,2 3,2 2,7 2,7 2,9

242 153 92 71 70 67 65

4,0 7,5 7,7 7,4 7,1 7,0 7,1

of

(in

of

(in

%of Total circulation regionals

Nat. + Reg. (in millions)

9,5

12,1 11,9 10,5

9,8 9,7

10,0

100 =

Number Popucirculated lation (in national+ (per 1000 regional inhabs.) millions)

44,3 62,0 65,2 70,4 72,4 72,1 71,0

244,0 303,0 239,0 204,0



175,5 181,0

Source: Institut Frangais de Presse.

Table 2 Growth in the Use of Minitels in France Year

1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988

Hours (in 1 OOOs)

120 531

1 887,4 4312 5680 6762

Source: F. Balle, and G. Eymery. Les nouveaux mtdias 1990.

210

Terminals (1 OOOs)

413

1305 2237 3373 4045

40,0 50,0 52,0 55,0 55,5



9.5 Mass Media

Table 3 Development of French Advertising Expenditure, 1957-1988 (current francs, in millions)

1375

1957 1960 1967 1970 1977 1980 1987 1988

2055

4120

5700 13700 20300 52000 58300

Source: Cayrol, Les madias.

Table 4 Growth in Number of Television Sets Year

1950 1955 1960 1975 1980 1985 1988

Number of sets

3794 260508 1 901 946 14 162 000 15 978 000 17 063 800 18 807 000

Source: Cayrol, Les medias 1991: 268-69.

211

Households

(%)

80,0 90,0 91,6 94,3

9 Mobilizing Institutions

Tables Development of Radio Listening (%) Proportion of French population aged 15 years and more who listen to radio

1973

1981

1988

Every day or almost About three or four days a week About one or two days a week Less frequently Never or almost never

72 5 8 4 12

72 7 6 4 11

66 7 6 6 15

Average listening time (hours per week)

17

16

18

Source: Ministere de la Culture, Pratiques culturelles des Francois 1990.

Table 6 Development of Television Viewing (%) Proportion of French population aged 15 years and over who watch television

1973

1981

1988

Every day or almost About three or four days a week About one or two days a week Less frequently Never or almost never

65 9 13 6 6

69 13 8 5 4

73 11 6 5 5

Average viewing time (hours per week)

16

16

20

Source: Ministere de la Culture, Pratiques culturelles des Frangais 1990.

212

10 INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF SOCIAL FORCES

Although the great institutions of the nineteenth century have lost their symbolically unifying and conflictual role, other institutions are well on the way to becoming the major regulatory structures of French society. The most obvious example is the unions, which are losing their traditional anti-establishment role as labour organizers and becoming more and more accepted as a legitimate force with numerous functions in the governing bodies of professional, social, medical, municipal, cultural, and other kinds of institution. Similarly, social movements—such as feminism and consumerism, as well as ecological, regional, and cultural movements which agitated virulently against the different powers that be—have lost their anti-establishment aggressiveness and have joined the institutions and social structures to change them from the inside. Their leaders have joined the institutions that they formerly fought against. Simultaneous with the decline of these movements, whose anti-establishmentarianism was based on very general value systems, is the development of corporate movements for the defence of acquired professional or social rights. These movements are increasing in number and are learning to bring their influence to bear on decision-making institutions and mechanisms. The appearance and growth of these movements is at least an indication of the growing structuring of social questions. This multiplicity of organized social and cultural groups has led to more conflicts, and consequently to more frequent appeals to para-judicial arbitration authorities —which in turn are increasing in number, becoming institutionalized, and being called upon more and more often (joint commissions, industrial tribunals, and so on). The role of the courts is changing, and all segments of society are resorting to legal rulings.

213

10.1

Dispute Settlement Abstract. There has been a massive increase in the number of judicial and parajudicial arbitration and conciliation authorities. Civil and criminal courts are increasingly active. There are more and more legal specialists. The law as a conceptual system is being riddled with increasing specialization of rulings and jurisprudence.

Over the last 20 years, the incidence of recourse to industrial arbitration, pre-litigation authorities, and commercial, civil, and administrative tribunals has increased considerably. The number of paralegal authorities has multiplied, and the number of cases dealt with has doubled. This development had two consequences, which strengthened it by feedback effect: the law has become more diverse and specialized, resulting in the creation of pre-litigation commissions and the specialization of courts and legal professions; and recourse to arbitration has spread throughout society and its institutions—social law, appointed mediators, and so on. These specialized authorities have replaced justices of the peace, whose job it was to arbitrate in equity on conflicts of minor interest. The position was abolished in 1950. The number of persons employed in the legal system has increased considerably: the number of magistrates rose from 5 029 in 1975 to 5 840 in 1985, and lawyers from 10 400 in 1974 to 16 484 in 1986. The number of clerks and other court officers rose from 10 600 in 1975 to 16 800 in 1985. The number of lawyers increased more slowly than did the number of cases. This jurisdictional inflation calls into question the principle of French law whereby the function of the court is to apply the letter of the law. The multiplicity of specialized jurisdictional and arbitration authorities, some of which, such as commercial and industrial tribunals, are presided over by non-specialists, leads to variations in jurisprudence. Non-magistrate judges tend to judge in matters of equity as "amicable arbitrators" rather than in conformity with the law or jurisprudence. Urbanism and social law are good examples of this development. The increasing number of statutory decisions handed down by public powers, and their increasing complexity, leads to legal imperfections in these texts, and to further diversification and specialization of the different special laws. This in turn leads to specialized magistrates and legal professionals in increasingly restricted sectors. Finally, and for all these reasons, the effort to clear the law courts and to bring justice closer to the people being judged is having the effect of weakening the legal system based on Roman law. Moreover, technological innovations, and biological innovations in particular, pose radically new legal problems. The problem is compounded by the development of European law, which is a new threat for a system founded on legal codes. The adaptable nature of common law is more suited to plurinational jurisprudence. It is becoming difficult to elaborate a coherent legal doctrine. Henri Mendras

214

10.1 Dispute Settlement

References Carbonnier, J. 1979. Flexible droit. Textespour une sociologie du droit. Paris: L.G.DJ., 4e ed. Commaille, J. 1982. Families sans justice ? Le droit et la justice face aux transformations de la societe. Paris: Centurion. Direction generate de la police nationale. 1989. Aspects de la criminalite et de la delinquance constatees en France en 1988. Paris: Documentation Francaise. "Les professions Iib6rales juridiques et judiciaires: revenus et conditions d'exercice." 1988 Document du CERC. 90, 3e trimestre.

215

10 Institutionalization of Social Forces

Table 1 Growth in the Number of Liberal and Legal Professionals

Public and ministerial officers: Notaries Bailiffs Appeal court solicitors Clerks of commercial tribunals Lawyers at the Council of State and Court Cass. Lawyers Legal or tax consultants

1970

1986

Average annual growth rate

6327 2376 225 224 60 10365 3324

7316 2872 330 251 83 16484 3712

+ 0,9 + U + 2,4 + 0,7 + 2,0 + 3,9 + 1,8

Source: Document du CERC 90.

Table 2 Activities of the Civil Courts

Appeal court (judgments) High court Magistrates' court Arbitration courts for farm leases Commercial courts Social security commissions Industrial tribunals

1965

1975

1985

1987

45523 115525 180690 15718 74351

48382 171 913 199842 12073 135 410 77912 35812

99237 281 281 298 969 4852 214416 90390 82548

107 589 287 870 374 416 4529 — 103 855 83653

— 25405

Source: INSEE, Annuaire rttrospectif de la France, 1990: 641.

216

10.2

Institutionalization of Labour Unions Abstract. Union representation in different public and private institutions has multiplied over the last 20 years. Union representatives are thus becoming more professional, to the detriment of their activist role.

In both companies and government, the realms of union intervention have increased and developed rapidly since 1980. In spite of the extent of this phenomenon, there are no precise data on the number of bodies in which active union members have a role. Union influence within companies and public administration takes six principal forms: socio-cultural, vacation activities, sports clubs, leisure, shows, holidays, libraries, nursery schools, and retirement clubs (see 14.1, "Amount and Use of Free Time," 14.2, "Vacation Patterns," and 14.3, "Athletics and Sports"); work economics, which involves company training schemes, the future of the company, its management, and market development; working conditions and new technology, industrial medicine, hygiene and safety; salary classifications, work organization, scheduling, profit sharing; social coverage and welfare, supplementary pensions, life and accident insurance, housing assistance; and canteen management. Outside the company, unions are represented in a great variety of institutions relating to living standards, energy, the environment, tourism, and housing; consumerism; social issues, including youth and the army, delinquency, justice, and youth organizations, women and work, occupational equality, research, immigration, and information; professional, inter-professional and international organizations; social coverage and the social-security system (more than 3 000 administrators), contingency funds, and medical institutions (see 8.2, "Health System"); public, labour, economic, and training organizations; and institutions for legal redress including industrial tribunals, judicial boards, joint administrative and conciliation commissions, and welfare organizations (see 16.1, "Immigrants and Ethnic Minorities"). Unions exercise three different roles in such bodies. They are active in the management of certain joint organizations (mutual-benefit insurance associations, retirement boards, the national union for employment in industry and commerce) and socio-cultural commissions. Union delegates have a legal role on joint administrative commissions and as advisors to industrial tribunals, and are active in free legal-aid commissions within the social-security system (see 8.3, "Welfare System"). Lastly, they have an advisory role in deciding economic policies for workers' councils, and in regional social and economic boards (see 2.4, "Local Autonomy"), as well as in the majority of institutions with a say in the domains of economics and labour. The number of elected representatives on the different bodies gives an indication of the extent to which social relations are institutionalized. There are about 200 000 deputy or permanent delegates to workers' councils, 120 000 work-safety and hygiene delegates, 310 000 temporary or permanent shop stewards, 60 000 to 80 000 union delegates and representatives, and 2 100 administrators of nationalized firms (before privatizations). These 700 000 positions are not necessarily held by different individuals; about 450 000 workers from the private sector have a role in one or another of these bodies. It must be remembered that such representative bodies are absent from a large number of firms. Thresholds set by law and the absence of candidates mean that 50% of workers are not represented. Most institutions in the public and para-public sector are centralized, but the trend is toward decentralization and the inclusion of new domains, such as working conditions,

217

10 Institutionalization of Social Forces

safety and hygiene, and new technology. Institutional action in this sector is maintained by 65 000 to 70 000 representatives. The network effect, the growing number of responsibilities, and the reliability of the representatives are all advantages in acquiring competence and having it recognized. Consequently, if a representative is a member of one institution, he or she will be asked to sit on others in which the same competence is required. This creates a considerable work load for the unions and difficult organizational problems. These different roles have the effect of shaping the image both of trade unionism and of each union. Thus, paradoxically, the more the unions increase their realms of influence through institutional activity, the fewer people join the unions (see 9.1, "Labour Unions"). This shortage of members affects the unions' capacity to fully enjoy their new legitimate status. Jean-Pierre Jaslin

References Dim, L., and J.P. Jaslin. 1985, July. "Crise ou renforcement du syndicalisme?" Observations et diagnostics, Revue de I'OFCE 12. Ministere des Affaires Sociales. 1986, April. Dossiers Statistiques du Travail etde l'Emploi20. Ministere des Affaires Sociales. 1986, December. Dossiers Statistiques du Travail et de I'Emploi 2728. Mouriaux, R. 1986. Le syndicalisme face d la crise. Paris: La D6couverte. coll. "Reperes." Premier Ministre, Ministere chargg de la Fonction Publique. 1988. Lafonction publique de I'Etat en 1987. Paris: Documentation Franchise.

218

10.2 Institutionalization of Labour Unions

Table 1 Number of Union Delegates per Size of Establishment

Size of Establishment

Total

%

6947 5733 4267 1 167 524

39,6 61,4 82,7 93,2 95,4

6572 5468 3992 1 117 482

35,9 57,1 77,7 89,4 92,3

18638

55,1

17631

50,7

%

7393 6049 4436 1235 569

41,7 63,4 83,6 93,6 96,6

19682

57,1

Hp1#*ofttpc UClCgolCa

Workers: 50 to 99 100 to 199 200 to 499 500 to 999 1 000 or more

%

Number of establishments with union delegates

Number of establishments with union delegates

Number of establishments with union

1989

1987

1985

Source: Dossier statistiques du travail et de I'emploi, 68, April 1991.

219

10 Institutionalization of Social Forces

Table 2 Abstentions and Union Representation in Workers'-Council Elections (%) Abst. and CGT spoiled votes

CFDT

FO

CFTC

CGC

Other unions

nonunion

Industrial tribunals

1979 1982 1987

39,1 43,6 55,8

42,1 36,8 36,4

23,3 23,5 23,1

17,4 17,8 20,5

7,2 8,5 8,3

5,2 9,6 7,4

4,8 3,7 4,3



31,2 50,2

44,3 28,1

18,4

14,7 25,3

21,0 12,2

4,7 16,5





28,2 27,8 33,2 34,5

50,8 45,0 26,7 25,1

19,1 17,7 20,7 21,0

8,0 7,6 13,7 11,2

2,4 2,1 3,7 4,6

4,2 3,9 6,8 5,5

3,5 3,9 4,8 6,2

12,0 19,9 23,5 26,4

Social security

1962 1983 Workers' committees

1966 1967 1988 1989

Source: Syndicalisme et elections professionnelles, Regards sur I'actualM March 1991.

220

10.2 Institutionalization of Labour Unions

Table 3 Development of Union Branches in Companies

1970

1975

1978

1981

1989

Number of companies % of companies having one or more branches

29546

37348

36516

36548

25633

27,5

46,3

58,4

60,4

48,4

Number of union branches

11 175

26764

35216

39019



CGT (% of number of branches) CFDT

44,5 25,4 10,2 10,0

41,6 24,6 11,7 11,1

4,9 1,5 0,7 —

39,9 24,1 12,9 12,1

6,3 1,1 — 0,1

37,6 24,2 14,4 12,3

28,9 25,5 18,8 13,5

2,9

3,5

3,8

FO CGC

CFTC

CSL

CGSI

UTC

Other unions (including UTC until 1974)

4,2 1,6 1,0 —

Source: Liaisons societies April 1984.

221

5,6 0,7 — — 5,0

7,9 — — — 7,2

10.3

Social Movements Abstract. The social movements—such as feminism, consumerism, and regionalism—that came into existence 20 years ago and multiplied toward the end of the 1970s have become institutionalized and have lost their vitality.

The 1960s were marked by the emergence of social movements with new social preoccupations: protection of nature and criticism of productivism, consumer protection, respect for women and demands for sexual equality, and protection of regional diversity. These movements took up causes which had hitherto been outside the public domain, and aimed at protecting the rights of the individual, of interpersonal relations, and of minorities with regard to the state and all forms of centralized power. The first nationwide demonstrations date from the end of the 1960s. The first large ecology demonstration was in 1969: it was part of a national campaign, led by the federation of French nature-protection societies, to save the Vanoise national park, which was under threat from property developers. These movements had increased influence in the 1970s, and gave rise to struggles and conflicts. The ecology movement took shape when the government announced its nuclear program in 1974. The leaders of the movements tried to limit them, demonstrations increased, and ecology made its first appearance on the political scene. R. Dumond ran in the presidential elections of 1974, and the ballots had to make room for ecology candidates. At the same time, consumer organizations were becoming more active: there were seven boycotts between 1976 and 1980. Feminists were also becoming more active. The women's-liberation movement, founded in 1970, brought pressure to bear on the political parties and unions in order to have women's demands taken into account and defended. Its principal objective at the time was to launch a mass movement to legalize abortion. Regional independence movements became more organized in an effort to rally public support for their demands: they tried by various means, including assassination (unsuccessful attempts), to weaken centralized power. Pacifism has never been very popular in France, doubtless because of the fact that the country was monopolized by the Communist Party during the 1950s and 1960s. The French people are agreed on the necessity for national defence, including nuclear weapons (see 9.3, "Military Forces"). These movements are essentially "social" agents which, in their role as ethical critics, value moral conviction more than tactical effectiveness. Thus, they have a certain organizational fragility which is manifested in a great propensity for division, even schism, making lasting political alliances very difficult. This broadly explains the poor election results for the ecologists, in spite of the considerable public sympathy they enjoy. The 1980s were characterized by a lesser degree of conflict. This corresponds to the institutionalization phase of the social movements. Paradoxically, their weakening is the sign that they succeeded in making their ideologies known to the public and in having their demands taken into account by the authorities. The first Ministry for the Environment dates from 1971. Ecology associations and representative groups now have a say in defining public policy in some municipalities and departments, as well as on the national level. In 1976, a secretary of state for consumption was instituted; five years later, a ministry was created. Bodies have been set up to improve co-ordination between public authorities and consumer organizations. The National Consumer Institute produces a magazine and TV programs to inform consumers of their rights. Since 1973, consumer associations have been able to legally defend the interests they represent. Over 10 years (1970-1980), state financial assistance, in

222

10.3 Social Movements

constant francs, to consumer organizations increased fivefold. Specific institutional processes were created starting in the late 1960s, to deal with issues relative to women. In 1974, the secretary of state for women was created; in 1981, it became the Ministry for the Rights of Women. In 1975, the "veil law" legalized abortion, and five years later rape was recognized as a criminal offence. The disappearance of social feminism corresponds to the emergence of "state feminism." When decentralization was instituted, in 1983, the situation improved for regional groups: the means now exist to influence the course of local affairs. Autonomy for Corsica (1983) was another step in this direction. This institutionalization of social movements led to a diminution in the number of militant activists, many of whom became figures of local importance. The political expression of these movements has weakened. During the 1970s they practised a revolutionary rhetoric, which they have now abandoned without replacing it with any other highly assertive form of expression. Jean-Hugues Dechaux

References L6ger, D. 1982. Lefeminisme en France. Paris: Le Sycomore. Levy, M. 1988. Lefeminisme d'Etat en France, 1965-1985 :20 ans de prise en charge institutionnelle de Vegalite professionnelle entre honvnes etfemmes. these de 1'IEP de Paris. Simonet, J. 1991, April. "Les ideologies pacifistes en France au XXe siecle." Regard sur I'actualite. Documentation Francaise: 171. Simonnet, D. 1982. L'tcologisme. Paris: PUF. Touraine, A. 1984. "Le reflux de mouvements sociaux." in Le retour de I'acteur. Paris: Fayard. Touraine, A., F. Dubet, Z. Hegedus, and M. Wieviorka. 1981. Le pays contre I'Etat. Paris: Seuil. Touraine, A., Z. Hegedus, and F. Dubet. 1980. Laprophdtie antinucleaire. Paris: Seuil. Weiss, D., and Y. Chirouze. 1984. Le consume'risme. Paris: Sirey.

223

10 Institutionalization of Social Forces

Table 1 Successes of the Feminist Movement 1945 1965 1967 1970 1975 1983 1985

Suffrage Abolition of husbands' guardianship Legalization of contraception Shared parental responsibili ty Legalization of abortion Abortion refunded by social security Mutual administration of family possessions

Source: Francoscopie 1987.

Table 2 National Boycotts Before 1980 1976 1976 1977 1979 1980 1980

Boycott of asbestos-filtered wines Boycott of colouring agents Boycott of aerosols Boycott of over-priced vegetables Rent boycott Boycott of veal

Source: Weiss, Chirouze, 1984.

224

10.3 Social Movements

Table 3 Subsidies to the Consumer Movement Year

Francs

1970 1977 1980 1982 1984

1387000 5180000 15 182 900 29 383 000 35 257 700

Source: Weiss, Chirouze, 1984.

Table 4 Result of the Green Vote in European Elections (in French votes) (%)

1979

1984

1989

4,4

3,4

10,6

Source: Parlement europe'en.

225

10.4

Interest Groups Abstract. Traditional groups, such as farmer, and doctors, still exist. Other occupational groups are becoming organized in a "neo-corporatist" fashion in order to defend their respective interests.

All authors on the subject distinguish between "liberal" corporatism and the "authoritarian" corporatism that exists under fascist regimes. To reinforce the distinction, some prefer the term "neo-corporatism," which they use to indicate that organizations (labour unions or employers) which engage in relations of a corporatist nature with the state do so of their own free will. This is the kind of professional-interest representation we wish to deal with in this section. Apart from its particularity as a means of interest representation, it designates a type of negotiation in which the state is a privileged party. In most Western countries (Germany, the United States, Great Britain, the Scandinavian countries), the concept of corporatism covers a greater domain and does not have the same negative connotations as in France. According to P. Schmitter, corporatism can be distinguished from pluralism and from trade unionism and can be defined as "a system of interest representation by a limited number of compulsory, hierarchically structured agents. Accepted and recognized by the state, corporations enjoy a monopoly of representation if, in return, they can guarantee relative control of the choice of their leaders, the type of demands made from the base, and the support they receive." In this form, corporatism aims to regulate conflicts between divergent social interests by integrating the organizations representing these interests into the formal state-controlled or semi-state-controlled decision-making body. In France, the idea of corporatism is particularly related to the corporations of the Ancien Re'gime. In a broader sense, the term "neo-corporatist" is used to describe the tendency of every professional group to want to control its accessibility and to organize itself to defend its interests through bringing pressure to bear on public authorities, influencing public opinion, and possibly violent demonstrations. The rules governing access to a trade and circulation within it—that is, experience— constitute the basic structuring principle. The system is designed to facilitate as much as possible the social integration of its members within the body and, at the same time, to make that body into a social unit endowed with relative autonomy arising from the totally committed accompanying infrastructure (hence strong tendencies toward self-recruiting). In large companies, job ideology and occupational status are all the more important, since they are in contradiction to company ideology and hierarchical work organization (see 5.1, "Work Organization"). According to D. Segrestin, "the history of die closed professions (railroad workers, sailors, miners, publishing) shows that the tradesmen never really controlled either technical development or the work market." They have, however, always defended their occupational identity. Corporatist regulation tends to decline in time of crisis. It has been noticed that certain occupational groups tend to fall back on differential advantages and to defend their acquired rights. Since the beginning of the 1970s, this phenomenon has become generalized. All groups are trying to make claims for themselves and to develop corporatism. Outside of companies, neo-corporatism had its greatest development among small business persons—farmers, storekeepers, truck drivers, and so on. Farmers are a good example, since they organize periodic demonstrations to defend the rights of one type of farmer or another, and, overall, their occupational organizations run semi-state-controlled

226

10.4 Interest Groups

activities (teaching, popularization programs) and effectively exert a guiding influence on agricultural policy. On two occasions, the president of FNSEA, the major farmers' union, has become agriculture minister. In the public service, certain categories of civil servants defend their differential interests while still seeking to represent the public interest. National education illustrates this situation: the teachers "defend the school" and through it their discipline, and each category of teacher defends its other acquired position each time the schooling system is reformed (see 8.1, "Educational System"). Michel Forse

References Cotta, A. 1983. Le triomphe des corporations. Paris: Grasset. Cotta, A. 1984. Le corporatisme. Paris: PUF. coll."Que sais-je?" DeSingly, F., and C. Thelot. 1989, Gens du prive, gens du public. La grande difference. Paris: Dunod. Lehmbruch (ed.). Trends toward Corporatist Intermediation 119-147. London: Sage.

Panitch, L. 1979. "The development of Corporatism in Liberal Democraties." In Schmiuer and Lehmbruch. Paradeise, C. 1988, October. "Les professions comme marches du travail forme's." Sociologie et Societes, Vol .XX. Schmitter, P. 1979. "Still the century of corporatism?" In Schmitter and Lehmbruch (eds.), Trends toward Corporatist Intermediation. London: Sage. Segrestin, D. 1985. LepMnomene corporatiste. Paris: Fayard. Winkler, J. 1976. "Corporatisme." Archives Europeennes de Sociologie 17.

227

11 IDEOLOGIES The ideological explosion of 1968, which quickly refuted all scholarly pronouncements about the end of ideologies, leads us to be prudent in this domain. It is, however, true that we are witnessing the decline of Marxism as an eschatological doctrine, and that the rebirth of extreme right-wing traditional ideologies is confined to restricted social milieux. As well, religious observance, although its value as an index of faith is debatable, has decreased by half in the last decade. The electoral system maintains the left-right polarity as a system of national and local rivalries, but the ideological differences within either camp are greater than those between them. Of course, the right prefers liberty and the left prefers equality, but this is a question of nuances, while youth dreams of fraternity. Each one of the great symbolic institutions—church, army, school, and republic—used to arouse fundamental conflicts for large sections of society: anti-militarism, anti-clericalism, secularism, and so on. Today nobody even considers getting involved in such debates. The fact that these institutions are no longer issues of dispute is evidence of their disappearance as symbolically important references. Similarly, there is no longer any violent disagreement about the political system. Moreover, an economic vision of society is progressively taking over from a legal and moral vision. Economic effectiveness is an imperative that is accepted by all, and the nation is seen as a great enterprise. The rationale of accounting and economics being applied to the nation thwarts all ideological visions founded on moral values or ambitions for international power. All of these developments seem to indicate an increased consensus among the French people. But it is, rather, the fruit of increasing indifference, one of the indices being the higher abstention rate in recent elections.

228

11.1

Political Differentiation Abstract. The political system imposes polarity, but the differences between the two political poles are disappearing. This is accompanied by the appearance of a new, mobile, and strategic electorate motivated by personal interest, and of an extreme-right-wing electorate.

Since the beginning of the Fifth Republic, in 1958, polarity has become a structural feature of French political life. This can be broadly explained by reference to the voting system. The two-round majority-based presidential-election system has progressively imposed polarization and led to the disappearance of the centre. Centrists, credited with 31% of the votes in 1958, netted only 18% in 1967 and 1973, before moving toward the right in 1974. Greater electoral mobility has been recorded over the last 10 to 15 years, with an increasing number of voters unable to stick with either of the two poles for any length of time. Voter behaviour was highly stable between 1958 and 1973. The balance of power behind left and right was broken in 1958, in favour of the right. For the first time since 1945, the left had only a small minority and was excluded from government responsibilities for nearly a quarter of a century. This political redistribution (right 55%, left 45%) continued until 1973. The left-right balance was re-established in the 1973 legislative elections and in the 1974 presidential election. This gave new vitality to the non-communist left and led to the victory of Frangois Mitterand in 1981. After it won the legislative elections of 1981, the left began to lose ground, and the right won the legislative elections in 1986. Two years later, the left was back in the majority: Fra^ois Mitterand was re-elected president and the left acquired a slight majority in the Assemble'e Nationale. This alternation between left and right is partly due to the increasingly unstable behaviour of a growing number of voters. Between the first round of the legislative elections, in March of 1986, and that in June of 1988, more than 4 electors out of 10 changed political allegiances; in these two years, 10% went from left to right or the opposite. Election results depend, increasingly, on these "swing" voters. At the same time, there has been a realignment of the radical electorate since the beginning of the 1980s. The communist electorate has collapsed; it now accounts for about 10% of votes, its lowest since the Liberation. An extreme-right electorate has appeared since 1983. The extreme right received 0,7% of votes in the 1974 presidential elections, did not present a candidate in 1981, and got 14% of the votes in the 1988 presidential elections. Not since 1945 has it had such a high percentage. When it began, in 1983-84, the extreme-right vote was an expression of the radicalization of the right. The vote is now more young, male, active, and working class than the traditional rightwing electorate. Election results show a weakening of previously strong regional contrasts. Of course, the local anchoring of the left is still strong and that of the right even more so, but there are now fewer regions which are staunchly right or left. The political debate has become nationalized. Such changes in the electorate over a short period (10 to 15 years) do not arise solely from developments in the social structure. The electorate has undoubtedly been renewed during this period: it has become younger and less devout. With the expansion of the salaried class and urban development, the wage-earning middle classes have become more numerous (see 6.1, "Occupational Status"). These are favourable factors for the left, but they do not explain the high instability of electoral behaviour, nor the emergence of the extreme right.

229

11 Ideologies

The inability of socio-economic factors to explain electoral instability has led specialists to regard voting as increasingly an expression of strategic behaviour and to note the emergence of electors motivated by a personal vision of the common good rather than by unconditional adherence to a political family. Socio-economic factors condition and direct behaviour, but they cannot explain everything. The voters' choice is also a function of the political climate—that is, of politicians' ability to answer the great questions of the day and to satisfy the personal requirements of the voter. The alternation was made possible by the change in the balance of power within the left (the decline of the communist party and the rise of the socialist party) and by the ideological evolution of the socialist party, which moved back toward the centre (see 9.4, "Political Parties"). This reduction in the left-right cleavage facilitated greater electoral mobility. These "mobile" voters are different from the traditional floating electorate, which is characterized by low social and political integration and the incoherence of its ideological universe. Mobile voters are young, middle class, well educated, and somewhat unprincipled. They are characterized by their political and ideological centrism and their new attitude toward politics: they are more independent of parties and expect less from political action. This leads to a growing autonomy in electoral decision making, with voters modulating their choices in accordance with a strategic adaptation to the variations in the electoral ticket and with a view to the electoral stakes (see 7.5, "Authority"). The "practical vote," which consists of voting in the first round for the candidate who stands the best chance of making it to the second round, indicates that the vote cast is not always an expression of a profound conviction. In another example of the "practical vote," voters vote for candidates who are strongly opposed to their political choice, in order to eliminate even more dangerous adversaries. Thus, in the 1981 legislative elections, faced with the ineluctable victory of the left, some right-wing electors voted for socialist candidates in order to eliminate any risk of a communist success. The extreme-right vote is the radical vote of a part of the working-class electorate that is disoriented by the powerlessness of politics, left or right, to solve their problems. Jean-Hugues Dechaux

References Bon, F., and J.P. Cheylan. 1988. La France qui vote. Paris: Hachette. Capdevielle, J., Dupoirier, E., Grunberg, G. Sschweisguth D., and Ysmal C. 1981. France de droite vote a gauche. Paris: Presses de la FNSP. Dupoirier, E., and G. Grunberg. 1986. Mars 1986: la drole de dejaite de la gauche. Paris: PUF. Gaxie, D. (dir). 1985. Explication du vote: un bilan des etudes ilectorales en France. Paris: PFNSP. Habert, P., and A. Lancelot. 1988. "L'e"mergence d'un nouvel 61ecteur?" Le Figaro-etudes Politiques, Elections legislatives. Lancelot, A. 1983. Les flections sous la Ve republique. Paris: PUF. Mayer, N., and P. Perrineau. (dir.). 1989. Le Front National a decouvert. Paris: PFNSP. Ysmal, C. 1986. Le comportement Electoral des Francois. Paris: La D6couverte.

230

11.1 Political Differentiation

Table 1 Development of the Left/Right Balance Since 1974

(%)

Presidential election of 1974 (2nd round) Cantonal elections of 1978 (1st round) Municipal elections of 1977 (1st round) Legislative elections of 1978 (1st round) European elections of 1979 Presidential election of 1981 (1st round) 2nd round Legislative elections of 1981 (1st round) Cantonal elections of 1982 (1st round) Municipal elections of 1983 (1st round) Legislative elections of 1986 Presidential election of 1988 (1st round) 2nd round Legislative elections of 1988 (1st round) Municipal elections of 1989 European election of 1989

Left

Ecologists and others

Right

49,4 52,5 50,8 49,4 47,4 47,3 52,2 55,8 48,1 44,2 42,5 44,9 54,0 49,3 39,5 33,8

— 2,9 2,7 4,5 3,9 — 1,1 2,0 2,2 3,0 4,2 — 0,4 0,4 15,9

50,6 47,5 46,3 47,9 48,1 48,8 47,8 43,1 49,9 53,6 54,5 50,9 46,0 50,3 60,1 50,3

Source: Franco scopie 1991.

231

11 Ideologies

Table 2 Voter Allegiances between 1986 and 1988

(%)

Overall

Stable left

Stable right

Floating

Sex: Males Females

48 52

49 51

49 51

51 49

Age: 18-24 years 25-34 years 35-49 years 50-64 years 65 years and over

15 20 25 22 18

8 20 28 24 21

9 12 28 30 21

20 23 24 21 13

Occupation: 4 Farmers (owners and tenants) Shopkeepers, artisans, heads of firms 6 5 Liberal professions and management 8 Employees 11 Workers 16 Inactives, retired retired only 51

2 3 6 7 11 20 53

10 9 4 7 9 12 50

2 8 5 12 11 18 44

Sector of activity: Self-employed Employer Public sector wage-earner Private sector wage-earner Other

10 6 23 39 23

7 3 28 40 23

15 15 14 33 23

10 6 22 46 17

Religion: Catholic (practising regularly) Catholic (practising occasionally) Catholic (non-practising) Other

17 30 34 19

9 28 42 21

32 32 27 9

12 45 24 19

Level of education: None Primary + CAP BEPC and equivalent Bac and higher No answer

12 49 11 24 4

15 51 10 19 5

5 49 15 28 3

11 44 13 30 3

Source: Le Figaro/Etudes politiques, 1988.

232

11.2

Confidence in Institutions Abstract. Traditional French conflicts concerning great institutions (the republican system, the army, the church, schools, unions) are subsiding, and a basic consensus is being reached on certain fundamental values and institutions.

The great national institutions are no longer the cause of major ideological cleavages among the French people. The republic, the army (see 11.4, "Radicalism"), the church (see 9.2, "Religious Institutions"), and schools (see 8.1, "Educational System") have lost their fundamental symbolic value. Now that they have been devalorized, their legitimacy is no longer contested and they no longer give rise to the major conflicts which previously constituted the fabric of French society. Moreover, over the last 10 years the great ideological debates have fizzled out, Marxism has been removed from its pedestal, and the rebirth of right-wing ideologies is balancing out the perspective without shattering it. Only racism and the National Front arouse any passion in the new ideological lassitude that reigns in France. Let us define the consensus as a minimum agreement concerning the basic institutions, the rules of the game, the means of settling differences, and subjacent values, and let us then stress the fact that the consensus, which is never explicitly formulated, is not synonomous with unanimity. The mass media (see 13.2, "Mass Information"), in order to be heard and understood by all, use a common basic language, an elementary "consensus" on the way we see society, on values, and on the institutions that embody them. The multiplication of public-opinion polls (see 7.5, "Public Authority") reinforces this web of information. Of all institutions, the French are particularly attached to the municipality: the mayor is an esteemed and respected personage, although the majority of French people are agreed that politicians and parties are not to be trusted. Ninety-two per cent of the population consider the family to be an institution of primordial importance, ranking it just above work (84%). Nobody questions the right to private property or inheritance, which links family and property. Nature is also a precious commodity which all wish to protect against the dangers of technological development. Security has always been the major anxiety for the French. Now that disease and accidents are the only mortal dangers, the need for security and the desire for equality unite to make the social-security system the most highly valued institution of all: 97% of the population feel that to abolish it would be a disaster (see 8.3, "Welfare System"). Living well has become a common ideal, and models of the good life are numerous but not contradictory. The recent growth in the leisure press and good-living guides is an indication of this new consideration. Everyone has the right to live well—to benefit from goods, services, and security without which he or she would not be a full member of the national community. It is with this in mind that the "poor" are described as "outcasts" (see 16.4, "Poverty"). Economic prosperity is obviously the necessary condition for realization of this common goal, and economic growth is recognized by all as a measure of success. Profitability has taken on a moral value (see 11.3, "Economic Orientations"). All of this reveals the strong will of the French people to live together as a people because they feel French and consider themselves to be privileged compared with the rest of the world. The most violent ideological conflicts cannot be imagined without agreement as to the rules and the stakes, and therefore the fundamental values. In politics as elsewhere, the

233

11 Ideologies

minimum consensus is not expressed—it goes without saying—whereas dissension must be formulated: unformulated, it would not be dissension. The left places equality before liberty and the right places liberty before equality, but the two values are common to each. Fraternity has become an aspiration which is not, it is said, unattainable. Young people express it in their way of being and in their mass gatherings. That racism is the only object of violent emotional rejection is proved by this ideal of fraternity. Liberty, equality, and fraternity presuppose that individualism will continue as a life style and an ideology. After the ideological effervescence of the 1960s, the present period is characterized by an ideological lassitude and fragmented dissension, which do not rule out the possibility of further conflict.

Henri Mendras

References Duhamel, O. 1978. "Le consensus francais." L'opinion frangaise en 1977. SOFRES. Paris: FNSP. Duhamel, O.1984. "Involution des dissensus francais." Opinion publique. SOFRES. Paris: Gallimard. Duhamel, O., and J.L. Parodi. 1983. "Images syndicates." Pouvoirs 26. "Le consensus." Pouvoirs: 6. PUF: 1978.

234

11.2 Confidence in Institutions

Table 1 The Unions

"With regard to the protection of your interests, do you have a lot of confidence, some confidence, or no confidence at all in the action of the unions?"

(%)

Confidence

No confidence

49 40 39 31 45 45 38

37 45 47 59 42 43 49

October 1979 December 1982 October 1983 September 1985 December 1986 October 1987 October 1988

Gap + 12

-5 -8 -28

+3 +2

-11

Source: Liaisons sociales, 8-21 October 1988.

Table 2 Confidence in Democracy

"Do you consider that the present democratic system in France works very well, rather well, not very well, or not at all well?" (%)

SOFRES -Express survey March 1985

French people on the whole

Development of the positive evaluation

May 1989

Very or rather well

Not very or not at all well

No opinion

Very or rather well

Not very or not at all well

No opinion

53

42

5

60

36

4

+7

Source: EnquSte SOFRES du 20 au 23 mai 1989 sur "les Frangais, la politique et la representation."

235

11 Ideologies

TableS Gaps Between Incomes (%)

1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989

58 57 50 58 58 63 62 64

Source: Agorame"trie.

Table 4 Inheritances (%) 17 21 16 15 13 11 12 12

1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989

Source: Agorame'trie.

236

11.2 Confidence in Institutions

Table 5 Confidence in Doctors

(%)

Against Indifferent In favour of

1977

1986

1987

1989

12 15

18 19

15 17

16 20

68

63

73

64

Source: Agoram6trie

Table 6 Confidence in Justice (%)

Against Indifferent In favour of

1977

1981

1982

1984

1986

1987

1989

52 24 24

59 24 17

52 26 22

55 24 21

49 29 22

44 29 27

46 29 25

Source: Agoram6trie, 1989.

237

11.3

Economic Orientations Abstract. General knowledge of economic matters has improved. An economic vision of society is taking over from a legal or moral vision, and is having an increasing influence in political and ideological debates.

The 1971 CERC study on French familiarity with economic vocabulary stressed the low level of economic knowledge. "Savings," an everyday word, was relatively well known by all: 83% of those interviewed were able to give a correct definition. But the term "selffinancing," which may be classed as "educated" vocabulary, was appropriately defined by just 38% of those questioned. Only 35% of working-class persons knew what a mobile salary scale is, and 28% had a correct notion of what inflation is. More recent studies show that the French are no longer economically illiterate. The factor that best determines correct usage of concepts is not level of education, but how much the subjects use economic terminology and their ability to weigh economic decisions. A production engineer may explain inflation far less occurately than a farmer. Experience acquired during working life and from historic events, but also the division of labour within a household (housewives have a particularly good understanding of the word "savings") are discriminating factors (see 13.4, "Time Use"). Based on experience, each of us constructs a grid for analyzing the reality in which we live, a kind of practical ideology which is more or less removed from economic analysis. Common sense does not divide up reality according to the same cleavages as the different fields of study observed by scientific disciplines; it has a more global approach. Moreover, a balance sheet is not the reality of a company but a representation to help assess its profitability. The National Accounts are not the reality of the national economy but a representation of what the Ministry for Economics and Finance or the Commissariat for Economic Development wishes to know. Certain elements from these scientific approaches have been popularized in the media by journalists and politicians (see 13.2, "Mass Information"). This popularization bore fruit by 1975, when the French people acquired a clear enough concept of inflation and unemployment to be able to evaluate their development in their own daily lives: the opinions voiced in surveys coincide with the statistical indicators. For a long time, the state was considered to be the centre of the economy, but more and more French people are beginning to see the nation as an enterprise which must make a profit by selling more than it buys. The year 1983 was decisive in this development. When the Socialist government abandoned its policy of boosting the economy and returned to a policy of restraint, similar to that of the previous right-wing government, the French people, including those who refused to allow economics to dominate politics, realized that the laws of economics were unavoidable. Surveys show that confidence in companies and in company heads has grown remarkably since then: between 1981 and 1988, the proportion of French people claiming to "more or less trust" them rose from 44% to 57%. Profit is no longer considered to be morally reprehensible. The 1986 privatization of nationalized enterprises met with astounding approval among small investors. The economic press became popularized, particularly through economic supplements in the dailies. This movement does not keep the French from feeling worried by economic changes worry which, in some cases, leads to a "social reflection of the economy" which is quite different from the picture given by economists. When asked, "If the industry of a country is modern and well equipped, does it tend to increase or reduce unemployment?" 51%

238

11.3 Economic Orientations

answered. "It increases unemployment," 28% answered "It reduces unemployment," and 21% did not know. Michel Forse

References Albertini, J.M., (dir), 1985. Lesjeunes, {'Economic et la consommation. Bruxelles: Labour. C.E.R.C. 1971. "Les Frangais et le vocabulaire 6conomique." Documents du C.E.R.C.: 9. C.E.R.C. 1978. "Connaissances et opinions des Frangais sur les prix: ce qu'ils precoivent de revolution des prix." Documents du C.E.R.C. 43/44. C.R.E.D.O.C. 1981. "Conditions de vie et aspirations des Franc.ais 1978-1981." Consommation, Revue de Socio-economie 2. Fontaine, C. 1971, April. "L'attitude des Franc.ais devant leurs revenus, les prix, 1'epargne." Economic et Statistique: 22. Landier, H. 1975. L'initiation Economique des adultes. Paris: Tema-Formation. Lenoir, R. and B..Prot. 1979. L'information economique et sociale. 2 annexes. Paris: Documentation Francaise. "Les formations £ 1'economie des adultes et des adolescents." 1977, January-February Cahiers Frangais: 179. LTIardy, P. 1976, January. "Les attitudes des mdnages: leur signification." Economic et Statistique 74. Verges, P., and A. Lacout. 1973, November, December. "La place des representations dans la formation dconomique." Economic et Humanisme: 214. Verges, P., and A. Lacout. 1973, November, December. "Les cadres et 1'inflation." Economic et humanisme 214.

239

11 Ideologies

Table 1 Development of Economic-Sciences

(final year of secondary school) (%)

Students

Year

% of students

1968 1973 1978 1983 1988 1990

2,8 8,2

11,7 14,3 17,0 16,7

Source: B. Magliulo, ron&>, 1990.

Table 2 Development of Readership of General and Economic Press

(1000s)

Magazines L'Expansion L'Express Le Nouvel Economiste Le Nouvel Observatew Le Point La Vie Science et Vie economique

1985

1989

1200 2369

1088 2674

1951 2119 1701 1300

2327 1882 1309 1416

625

Source: Francoscopie 1991.

240

502

11.4

Radicalism Abstract. Before the last war, the legitimacy of republican institutions was questioned by both the extreme left and the extreme right. Nowadays nobody questions the legitimacy of political institutions, but there is still, on the left and the right, a hard core of voters who support either the Communist Party or the National Front.

Before the last war, the legitimacy of republican institutions was questioned by both the extreme left and extreme right. The disciples of Maurras challenged the principles of democracy, particularly the citizen's right to vote, and advocated a return to the monarchical principles of the Ancien Regime. The Marxists, including the Socialists, saw the system of parliamentary government as a bourgeois ploy to consolidate their power over society; a general strike and a revolution would bring about the dictatorship of the proletariat. Nowadays nobody questions the legitimacy of political institutions but there is still, on the left and the right, a hard core of voters who support either the Communist Party or the National Front. The Communist Party appeared and grew with the industrial working class between the wars, and took root in traditional leftist rural areas. Its role in wartime resistance and the prestige of the Soviet Union carried it on a wave of popularity between 1946 and 1950, when it reached its greatest electoral support with more than one-third of the popular vote. It suffered its first major setback with the advent of General de Gaulle in 1958, and went into a slow decline until 1979, when it had 20% of votes. Since then the decline has been rapid, and its share of the vote has been only about 10%, depending on the election. Opinion polls, though more recent, are another indicator. In 1974, 40% of respondents were in favour of the Communist Party and 40% were against it; in 1985, 70% were against and 20% for. This decline is related to the changed image of the USSR and of Marxism. It is very difficult to count party members and activists. The number rose after 1968, reaching a maximum of almost 450 000 in 1978; since then, it seems to have fallen to about 250 000. There has always been a high turn over of members. The social basis of the party has changed greatly. The rural exodus weakened it in the rural regions, particularly in the northwest Massif Central. Skilled workers in heavy industry have diminished in the population as a whole, going from 24% to 19%, whereas unskilled workers increased from 17% to 30%, and the unemployed and the retired have risen from 14% to 21% (see 4.2, "Skills and Occupational Levels"). Formerly, the party recruited from among the young and had relatively few old members; nowadays, recruiting efforts are drying up and the average age of members is rising. True to its conception of the working class, the party refuses to recruit from the new expanding social strata which are not considered to be working class. These new wageearning middle classes comprised 24% of party members in 1968, and only 6% in 1979 (see 4.4, "Sectors of the Labour Force," and 6.1, "Occupational Status"). The party nevertheless remains a highly institutionalized structure, which injects life into numerous organizations. For party activists it sets out to be a complete society, taking into account all areas of life. Activists occupy positions of responsibility in organizations which are more or less dependent on the party, particularly the CGT union (see 16.2, "Crime and Punishment"), which, like the other unions, is losing popularity while its management remains staunchly communist. Communist municipalities (see 2.3,

241

11 Ideologies

"Community and Neighbourhood Types") prefer to recruit their staff from among party members, and activists are thus transformed into permanent members. These municipalities are an essential source of finances. The party has barely more than 1 000 wage-earning employees; but there are probably about 15 000 wage-earners depending indirectly on the party for their salary. Circulation of the communist press (L'Humanite and La Terre) has dropped considerably (see 13.2, "Mass Information"). The appearance and rapid growth of the National Front surprised most observers. Proportional representation, introduced by Mitterand in 1988 to replace the majority-vote system, allowed the National Front to accumulate low percentages and yet send 20 deputies to the Assembled Nationale. The National Front electorate comes from three different sources: ex-communists, disillusioned with what they consider to be the loss of radicalism in the Communist Party, traditional right-wing voters; nationalist patriots, many of them fundamentalist Catholics; and voters living in areas with a high immigrant Maghrebi population. The charismatic leader of the party, Jean Marie Le Pen, who was a paratrooper during the Algerian war, reworks traditional right-wing ideologies and exploits latent racist feelings in a part of the French population by talking about the dangers of Maghrebis to the national identity. In the country as a whole, the National Front gets between 8% and 15% of the votes, depending on the election. In some areas and cities, the figure can rise to 40%. Henri Mendras

References Baudouin, J. 1991, April. "Le ddclin du PCF." Regards sur I'actualite. Documentation Frangaise: 170. Chariot, M. 1986, February. "L'Smergence du Front national." Revue Franqaise de Sciences Politiques. Duhamel, O., and J.L. Parodi. "Le parti communiste frangais a I'Spreuve du pouvoir." Pouvoirs: 32. Kriegel, A. 1985. Les communistes frangais. Paris: Le Seuil. Lavau, G. 1981. A quoi sen le P.C.F. ?, Paris: Fayard. Mayer, N., and P. Perrineau. 1989 Le Front national a decouvert. Paris: PFNSP. Ranger, J. 1986, February. "Le declin du Parti Communiste." Revue Franqaise de Sciences Politiques: 1. Robrieux, P. 1980-1984. Histoire interieure du P.C.F.. Paris: Fayard, 4 vol.

242

11.4 Radicalism

Table 1 Development of the Communist Vote in National Elections (%) 25,0 19,0 20,6 15,5 11,2

1968 1958 (presidential) 1978 (legislative) 1981 (presidential) 1984 (European) 1986 (legislative) 1988 (presidential) 1988 (legislative) 1990 (surveys)

9,7 6,8

11,3 < 10,0

Source: Le Figaro/Etudes politiques.

Table 2 The Communist (CGT) Vote in Labour Elections (As a % of cast votes) Industrial tribunals 1979 1982 1987 Social security 1962 1983 Workers' committees 1966 1967 1988 1989

42,1 36,8 23,1 44,3 28,1 50,8 45,0 26,7 25,1

Source: Regards sur I'actualiti 169, March 1991.

243

11 Ideologies

Table 3 Extreme-Right Voting under the Fifth Republic (All of France)

Year

Elections

1958 1962 1965 1967 1968 1973 1974 1978 1979 1981 1984 1986 1988 1988

Legislative Referendum Presidential Legislative Legislative Legislative Presidential Legislative

Extremeright votes

526644 1 809 074 1 260 208 124862 18933 122 498 190 921 210 761 265911 90422 2 210 334 2 760 880 4 375 894 2 391 973

European Legislative European Legislative Presidential Legislative

Source: Mayer, Perrineau, Le front national a dtcouvert, 1989.

244

% registered voters

1,9 6,6 4,4 0,4 0,1 0,4 0,6 0,6 0,8 0,2 6,0 7,4

11,5

6,3

%

cast votes

2,6 9,2 5,2 0,6 0,1 0,5 0,8 0,8 1,3 0,4

11,2

9,9

14,4

9,8

11.4 Radicalism

Table 4 Development of the Extreme-Right Vote by Social Category

(%)

Sex: Males Females

Age

18-24 years 25-34 years 35-49 years 50-64 years 65 years and over Voters' occupation: Farmers Shopkeepers and heads of firms Liberal professions and management Intermediate professions Employees Workers Inactive

1984

1986

1988

13 9

12 7

19 11

12 11 12 11 9

9 8 9 12 9

17 15 18 14 11

13 21 12 13 12 9 14

11 14 9 10 7 11 9

20 27 11 15 14 20 15

Source: Mayer, Perrineau, Le front national a dteouvert, 1989.

245

11.5

Religious Beliefs Abstract. Catholic religious observance is declining, most notably in formerly practising areas. New types of religious observance are appearing, giving expression to a variety of visions of Catholicism.

Since the 1960s, a decline has been observed in the rate of weekly attendance at mass attendance. In 1983, 14% of the population was going to mass weekly or once or more times a month; in 1988, this rate was down to between 10% and 12%. Of course, attendance at Sunday mass never involved more than a minority of the French people. Surveys in the 1950s showed that less than a quarter of respondents went to mass every Sunday, and that for a large majority religion came down to a "seasonal conformity" for the four seasons of life: baptism, first communion, marriage, and funerals; even for these occasions, however, the rate has dropped. All forms of religious observance are distinctly decreasing, and the alienation of youth is even more pronounced. Until about 1975, this decline could be explained by the disorganization of the church (shortage of vocations and, consequently, of priests) and by changed rules (revised doctrines and pastoral hesitation in the wake of Vatican n) (see 9.2, "Religious Institutions"). By returning to a more individualistic and demanding kind of spirituality, the clergy left behind the forms of popular religion (processions and celebrations of rites of passage) to which the church had adapted so long ago and which had enabled French society to recognize itself as Catholic. This distanced some of the faithful. The decline in observance continued, and is now an indication of real detachment on the part of the French people. Religious observance has always varied in the different regions. Until the 1960s, the proportion of practising Catholics was lower than 5% in some regions (Creuse, Yonne, Beam, and so on) and towns, whereas other regions (Brittany, Vendee, the east of France, and so on) were practically uniform in their observance. The decline in observance came later, but was stronger in areas with high observance. Thus, regional contrasts began to blur. The same applies to contrasts between social categories. Religious non-observance is becoming relatively standard in France. Although religious observance has declined distinctly, the proportion of people calling themselves Catholic has remained relatively constant: in 1983, they accounted for 83% of the population, against 89% in 1981. Agnostics comprised between 10% and 15%. A majority (53%) of French people today feel that attendance at religious services is not required in order to be a "practising" Catholic. Faith has become dissociated from traditional practices. Visiting cemeteries on All Saints' Day is the only religious observance which is practised almost unanimously. New practices are emerging and brightening up the religious landscape. Exotic religions and sects seem to be exerting a growing attraction, but it is difficult to predict their future development. The rapid expansion of "emotional communities" has been remarked within Christianity itself. One enters these communities by making an explicit choice in one's personal development. The emphasis is on active fervor and direct personal experience, with the group providing support for the spiritual development of each of its members. In this charismatic movement, personal testimony replaces the rites and intellectual formulations of the faith. Monasteries are also beginning to draw people again, as can be seen from the number of retreats. Types and forms of affiliation to Catholicism have diversified and there are various approaches and representations, organized into numerous subcultures. The

246

11.5 Religious Beliefs

fundamentalist schism in June of 1988 and the size of the congregations of different charismatic movements show the diversity and vitality of these "marginal" movements, whether they stay within the church or leave it. The relationship to Catholicism is no longer defined in terms of the old believer/non-believer opposition but through the development of zones of free thought within the doctrine itself; by means of exchange and transaction, a plurality of ways of relating to Catholicism come into being. Finally, religious adherence is less and less considered to be based on obligation and coercion: many people who consider themselves to be good Catholics no longer feel bound to the strict observance of religious practices. Some specialists see in this phenomenon of religious effervescence an indication of a "return to religion," characteristic of a postmodern society in which modernity has begun to come into doubt. In any case, religion seems to have become a personal matter, removed from any idea of obligation and based purely on private choice. It is thus surprising to find that of all the traditional practices, prayer alone has remained. Observance in the Protestant and Jewish religions is also in decline, but to make up for it there is a rebirth of certain forms of militancy and fundamentalism. As for Islam, now the second largest institutional religion in France, the number of mosques has multiplied, which is an indication of the religious fervour of Muslim immigrants.

Jean-Hugues Dechaux

References Donegani, M., and G. Lescanne. 1986. Catholicismes de France. Paris: Descl6e-Bayard-Presse. Hervieu-Leger, D. 1986. Vers un nouveau christianisme? Paris: Cerf. Isambert, F-A. 1980 "Le sociologue, le prStre et le fidele." In H. Mendras, La sagesse et le desorde. France 1980. Paris: Gallimard. Isambert, F.-A., and J.P. Terrenoire. 1980. Atlas de la pratique religieuse des catholiques en France. FNSP-CNRS. Kepel, G. 1987. Les banlieues de I'lslam. Paris: Seuil. "Les pratiques de la religion catholique: permanences et d6tachement." 1984 Opinion Publique: 1, 186-197. Mayer, J.F. 1985. Sectes nouvelles. Paris: Cerf.

247

11 Ideologies

Table 1 "God exists" (%)

Against Indifferent In favour

1977

1978

1981

1982

1983

1984

1985

1986

1987

1988

1989

27 27

27 30

25 28

27 32

30 28

26 28

31 28

24 30

26 27

22 33

26 34

46

43

47

41

42

46

41

44

47

40

45

Source: Agorame"trie, 1989.

Table 2 Catholics (%)

1970 Proportion of Catholics Proportion of baptisms in comparison with births Proportion of religious marriages Number of priests Number of ordinations Source: Mermet G., Francoscopie 1991, Episcopal.

248

90 84 95

45259

264

1987

80 64 55

34522

106

11.5 Religious Beliefs

Table3 Religious Observance (%)

Catholics Non-practising Practising occasionally Practising regularly

1974

1977

1983

1989

86,5 47,5

81 50

83 52

80 51

18

14

17

15

21

17

14

14

Source: Ptlerin Magazine/Sofies

1989.

Table 4 Religious Education of Children

Live births Baptisms of which: performed between 0 and 7 years performed after 7 years

1977

1980

1985

1987

744744 529 827 525 797 4030

800376 531 501 506877 6624

768 431 481 965 472 945 9720

767 828 488 656 477 654 11 134

Source: Donntes sociales 1990: 378.

Table 5 Do you believe in life after death? (%)

58 35 37 50 46

1948 1969 1970 1971 1980 Source: Dupin, Oui, non, sans opinion.

249

12 HOUSEHOLD RESOURCES Household purchasing power increased constantly until 1983, when it leveled out for two years before starting to increase again, more slowly this time. This average increase conceals new differences: among wage-earners, civil servants' purchasing power diminished slightly in the course of the 1980s, while that of the unemployed dropped considerably, particularly the long-term unemployed. The self-employed, with the exception of farmers, saw their purchasing power increase noticeably. This general increase in resources, from which almost everyone benefited, was accompanied by diversification in sources of income, which generated new forms of inequality. Consequently, the growing informal economy—particularly undeclared work, barter, and domestic production—increases the differences between those who can have recourse to these systems and those who can not. Senior citizens are in no danger of unemployment, are assured of their retirement pension, and possess the lion's share of the family wealth. Their incomes are above average. Young people, on the other hand, have insufficient incomes to maintain a standard of living commensurate with their social position (particularly young couples with children) and often have to resort to asking their parents for financial and other forms of aid. Property has always been more unevenly distributed than have incomes. Although the number of property-owning households has increased, since 56% of today's households own their homes, 50% of the property is owned by 10% of the households. All of these developments have led to new inequalities. Transferred incomes and additional resources available to wage-earners in large companies create further disparities.

250

12.1

Personal and Family Income Abstract. Average purchasing power increased until 1982 and has remained stable since. There is a greater diversity in sources of income. Inequalities diminished until the beginning of the 1980s.

Available studies on this topic are numerous and increasingly specialized. We shall limit ourselves to giving the general outlines of the trend over a long period. Gross income per person per year rose from 26 700 francs in 1960 to 59 770 francs in 1984. The increase in gross income in constant francs was very high from 1960 to 1973 (4,7% p.a.), slower between 1973 and 1984 (1,9% p.a.), and then up again (2,1% p.a.) between 1985 and 1988. Disposable income, after social deductions and taxes and repayment of transferred incomes (contributions for retirement schemes, family allowance, social security, unemployment), follows the same proportions, but structure and distribution are different depending on the social category. To sum it up, in 1988 workers enjoyed the income that management people received in 1955. The proportion of transfers in disposable income has risen from 20% in 1960 to 36% in 1984, because of increased retirement and health-related payments, and also because of unemployment benefits. At the same time, direct taxes increased from 4,8% of the pre-tax income to 9,3%. Changes in primary incomes, taxes, and transfers brought about a marked reduction in inequality. This reduction was greater for primary than for disposable incomes. The essential change in income distribution is no doubt the increased disposable income of non-workers (see 1.2, "Elders"), which has outstripped that of workers, office staff, and executives, and ranks behind only senior staff. Disposable Income per Person

1962

1984

Variation

Unemployed

Employed

105 79

189 233

2,7 5,0

Average

100

199

3,2

Source: OFCE based on Comptes de la Nation.

Purchasing power follows the income trend: when measured by the yardstick of the hourly rate for manual labour, the vast majority of food items were two to three times more affordable in 1980 than in 1960. Transportation by train is twice as affordable as it was; in 1984, a car cost 1 284 working hours, as opposed to 2 148 in 1960. Newspapers, films, and books are exceptions, as they are less affordable today than 20 years ago. Denis Stoclet

251

12 Household Resources

References Canceill, G., A. Laferrere and P. Mercier. 1989. "Les revenus fiscaux des manages en 1984." Coll. de I'INSEE, serie M: 139. CERC, 1984. "Les revenus des menages 1960-1984." Document du CERC: 80. num6ro special. Gombert, M. 1985, December. "Les ressources des manages par categoric socio-professionnelle en 1979. Coll. de I'INSEE, se"rie M: 116. Lattes, G. 1987, June. "Transferts de ressources et types de families, Evolution 1970-1982." Coll. de I'INSEE: 124. "Les ressources des manages." 1984. In Donnees Sociales. Paris: INSEE.

252

12.1 Personal and Family Income

Table 1 Development of Primary Income per Person (In 1989 constant francs)

1970

1989

1970/1989 Development

Overall wage-earners' pay per wage-earner

109200

169800

+ 55,5%

Income of individual firms per non-wage-earner worker

124400

182000

+ 46,2%

65800

94500

+ 43,6%

National income per inhabitant Source: CERC-INSEE.

Table 2 Development of Annual Net Average Salaries and Purchasing Power, 1950-1980 (in francs)

Senior managers Intermediate Employees Workers Source: Estimations based on DSfSEE data.

253

1950

1980

7900 4000 2400

136600 70500 41900

Development

+ 203% + 209% + 206%

12 Household Resources

Table 3 Development of Purchasing Power of Net Salaries per Category (%)

Managers Technicians Other intermediate professions Employees Skilled workers Unskilled workers

1987

1988

1989

-0,7 -0,8 -0,8 -0,5 -0,6 -0,2

+ 0,1 -0,3 -0,3 + 0,2 + 0,2 + 0,1

-0,5 -0,3 -0,2 -0,5 -0,6 -0,4

0,0

+ 0,7

-0,1

Overall Source: INSEE.

Table 4 Contributions to the Growth of Buying Power of Household Incomes (% per year) Between 1977 and 1982 Net salaries Income from non-wage-eamers' activities Income from property Social security benefits Current income and wealth taxes inheritance Total: income after taxes

0,7

Between 1982 and 1985

Between 1985 and 1988

-0,2

-0,5 -0,3

1,2 0,9

0,3 0,4 1,1 1,1

-0,3

1,0

2,8

2,1

1,0

2,8

0,3 1,6

Source: INSEE. Comptes de la Nation, CERC estimates.

254

12.1 Personal and Family Income

Table 5 Development of the Buying Power of Labourers' Hourly Earnings,* Estimated in Equivalent Working Time (in hours and minutes)

Bread (baguette) Steak (1kg) Pasteurized milk (1 litre) Butter (1kg) Red table wine (1 litre) Daily newspaper Telephone call Train journey of 200 km, 2nd class Cinema seat Cigarettes (one pack) Car (4 horsepower and Renault 4) 1 hectare of ploughable land

1960

1984

Buying power multiplied by

lOhOO 5hl8 18hOO 4 h 12 41hOO 7hOO 7hOO 7h40 53hOO 36hOO 2 148 h 00 1 344 h 52

6hOO 3h05 lOhOO Ih07 14hOO 9hOO 2hOO 3hOO IhOO lOhOO 1 286 h 45 889 h 36

1,6 1,7 1,8 3,7 2,9 0,7 3,5 2,5 0,8 3,6 1,6 1,5

* 1960: 2,082 F/hour, 1984: 21,18 F/hour. Source: Document du CERC: 80.

255

12.2 Informal Economy Abstract. It seems that there is an increase in unaccounted economic activities— exchange of goods and services, undeclared work and so on.

The refinement of economic statistics led people to believe that all economic activities could be fully rendered in statistical terms and that anything which could not was not in the domain of economics. Domestic chores, non-monetary exchanges, and do-it-yourself activities are still important: very rough calculations estimate them totalling as much as the GDP. Moreover, the increased number of public deductions (tax and social transfers) has led the public to try to avoid them. Finally, the rising cost of labour induced producers and retailers to transfer a part of the "work" to the customer, in the form of do-it-yourself kits and department-store goods which the customer and unpacks and assembles. These two trends have no doubt led to an overall increase in unaccounted activities. There are no reliable figures for this, since by definition, it is not recorded. Grouped together under the term informal or unaccounted economy are various activities, which do not develop in the same way. Undeclared work in enterprises, in which full-time wage-earners are not declared to the internal revenue department of the social-security system, is rare in France (compared to Italy), and is limited to marginal sectors such as ready-made clothes and to foreigners such as Turks or Pakistanis. Unbilled work is paid at the normal market rate for an artisan or handyman to someone who has another trade (a policeman who does housepainting, for example). This type of work is widespread and is no doubt increasing slightly, but it is only back-up income for those concerned. Barter, or exchange of unpaid services, is no doubt growing, including a helping hand to neighbours, friends, or relatives doing odd jobs and especially maintenance work in the home. Help and exchange of favours is difficult to quantify, but it is important within the kinship network (see 2.2, "Kinship Networks"). Home food production has dropped and do-it-yourself has increased (see 13.5, "Daily Mobility"). Overall, non-commercial activities save money for households (see 13.5, "Daily Mobility"), but this is partly compensated for by the purchase of raw materials, tools, and equipment, which, in order to simplify the task, are becoming more elaborate, more numerous, and more specialized (e.g., pre-glued wallpaper), and therefore more expensive. There have been two opposing schools of thought: those who saw the informal economy as a household reaction to the crisis that was causing their standard of living to stagnate, and those who wanted to make money from it. Throughout the period when standards of living were rising, unaccounted activities continued to develop, indicating that they are indeed an effect of economic growth and an important addition to household incomes. Available studies indicate that such activities are directly linked to social networks (see 2.6, "Sociability Networks") to the degree that they presuppose an exchange of goods and services. Because they lose their sociability networks centred around the enterprise, the unemployed (see 4.1, "Unemployment") in large cities have fewer occasions to perform these activities, whereas rural and small-town unemployed maintain their sociability networks and can thus continue to offer their services. Kinship (see 2.2, "Kinship Networks") is also a fundamental network: the grandmother who looks after children, the grandfather who works in the garden and produces vegetables, the father or brother who helps with home decoration, and so on.

256

12.2 Informal Economy

All of these activities presuppose one-half of an exchange, the other half of which is not an immediate money payment. The compensation may come after a length of time, which can be all the longer if social relations are strong and stable (hence the importance of kinship). Moreover, the compensation may be of the same order (two brothers who help each other paint their houses) or it may be very different (the grandmother who looks after her grandchildren in order to keep the affection of her own children). These activities reciprocally reinforce neighbourhood, companionship, friendship, and kinship ties.

Henri Mendras

References Barthe, M.-A. 1988. L'tconomie cachte. Paris: Syros. Gershuny, J. 1979, June. "L'6conomie informelle." Futuribles: 24. Greffe, X. 1981. "L'&onomie non officielle." Revue de socio-economic. CREDOC: 3. Mendras, H. and M. Fors6.1982, October. "Vers un renouveau du troc et de l'6conomie domestique." Revue de VO.F.CE.: 2. Sauvy, A. 1984. Le travail noir et I'tconome de demain. Paris: Calmann-Levy. 'Travail au noir et economic souterraine: un 6tat de la recherche." 1982. Travail et emploi: 12. Willard, J.-Ch. 1989, November. L'dconomie souterraine dans les comptes nationaux, Economic et Statistique: 226.

257

12 Household Resources

Table 1 Market Development for Floor Coverings, Gardening, and Do-it-yourself

(francs)

Expenditure per household

1968 1972 1976 1979 1980

198 350 696 1 114 1292

Source: LSA: 781.

Table 2 Development of Activity and Skill of Handymen in France (millions of households)

Total population (number of households) Number of handymen Occasional handymen Regular handymen Very competent handymen

1968

1972

1975

1980

16,0

17,2

18,2

19,5 11,7

4,0 2,5 1,5 —

Source: LSA: 781.

258

5,8 2,7 2,8 0,3

9,1 2,8 5,8 0,5

3,0 7,7 1,0

12.2 Informal Economy

Table 3 The Informal Economy: Income Estimated at More than 4% of the GDP Base year 1981

Informal economy work Commercial activities Domestic services Accounting adjustments Undeclared tips Undeclared benefits in kind 2. Absent firms

Update 1988

% GDP

% GDP

Millions of francs

% GDP

99600

3,1

141 450

3,0

170500

3,0

83600 16000

2,6 0,5

110100 31350

2,3 0,7

135000 35500

2,4 0,6

37500

1,2

47300

1,0

63000

1,1

28950 8400

0,9 0,3

35800 11500

0,8 0,2

50000 13000

0,9 0,2

6400

0,2

10550

0,2

13000

0,2

2150

0,1

1200



1500



88000

2,8

123900

2,6

150000

2,7

Reasons for adjusting Millions of francs added value 1. Informal economy Fraud and tax evasion Falsification of receipts Unpaid TVA

Final account 1985

Millions of francs

Field: non-agricultural and non-financial companies and individual firms (excluding large national firms). Source: INSEE, tconortue et statistique: 226, November 1989.

259

12.3 Personal and Family Wealth Abstract. Personal and family wealth, particularly ownership of the dwelling, has spread throughout the population as a whole, but remains unevenly distributed within different social categories. Elders possess a large share of the wealth.

The gross value of family wealth in 1984 was estimated at 13 300 billion francs, roughly the equivalent of four years of disposable income of the French population. Since 1950, the gross value of household property has increased at the rate of 12% per year in constant francs. When inflation is deducted there is a considerable volume increase of 3,7%. However, since incomes rose faster, the property-income ratio has dropped from 4,15 to 3,71. From 1980 on, there was a slowing of real accumulation, due to the reduced savings rate (18% of disposable income in 1975,12% in 1987). The percentage of French people stating their desire to save has grown in the last five years, although their debts have distinctly increased in the last two years. Meanwhile, the make-up of household property changed. Until the middle of the 1970s, real assets constituted more than 70% of family wealth. Real estate other than housing (buildings and land) has yielded top rank to financial assets, and particularly to insurance investment and stocks and shares. Nevertheless, 12% of households have no financial assets. Between 1976 and 1986, the proportion of households owning property increased: from 48% to 52%. Financial assets increased considerably: households with stocks or shares (the very rich) rose from 13% to 20%. Saving schemes for would-be homeowners have increased from 11% to 29% and savings accounts from 71% to 82%; these concern the most modest households. New types of saving and investment schemes have appeared in order to cater to this new demand. Overall, savers have a clear vision of the profitability, security, and manageability of these financial services. Executives have the most diversified assets. For the great majority of French people, the "patrimony" of the family is intangible. About half of all households have received a legacy, the number having increased in recent years. This has not reduced inequalities. Donations between relatives have increased in number and in proportion of properties, up to 22% in 1987. The wealthiest 10% of households possess more than 50% of the total assets, which is a higher concentration than that of incomes, but is comparable to foreign countries. The estimated greatest factor of disparity, other things being equal, is annual household income, followed by social category, age, and degree of urbanization. Available data do not enable us to say how this concentration of assets has changed over time. Assets vary according to social category. Lower down the scale, assets consist mainly of cash and home-ownership: one out of two households owns its home. Savings schemes and securities are much less evenly distributed, found, respectively, in 29% and 20% of households. In general, "saving against a rainy day" is distinctive of the more modest social categories; property-buyers' saving schemes and securities are more luxury forms of saving. Incomes from assets are more unevenly distributed than assets themselves: 18% of households declare 90% of asset income, which constitutes a relatively minor source of income since it accounts for only 4% of all fiscal income. Opinion polls and electoral studies show that attitudes toward owning property are strongly linked to political and religious attitudes (see 11.4, "Economic Orientations") and

260

12.3 Personal and Family Wealth

intersect with social categories. Property owners are very largely Catholic and tend to vote on the right, whatever their position on the social scale. Jean-Hugues Dechaux

References Babeau, A. 1988. Lepatrimoine aujowd'hui. Paris: Nathan. Babeau, A., and D. Strauss-Kahn. 1977. La richesse des Frangais. Paris: PUF. CERC. 1979. "Le patrimoine des Franc,ais." Document du CERC: 49. INSEE. 1988, November. "L'6pargne des manages." Ecoflash: 33. INSEE. 1989, May. "Le patrimoine: qui possede quoi ?" Ecoflash: 39. Laferrere, A. 1988, October. "Qui herite de qui?" Economic et Statistique 214. Levy, B., Lollivier, S. and JP, Milot. 1987. "Le patrimoine et ses revenus." Donnees Sociales 242248. Lollivier, S. 1985. "Les revenus du patrimoine sont tres indgalement rdpartis." Economic et Statistique: 180. Lollivier, S., and D. Verger. 1987, September. "Les diff6rents actifs patrimoniaux: qui possede quoi?" Economic et Statistique 202. Lollivier, S. and D. Verger. 1987, September. "Les comportements en matiere d'e'pargne et de patrimoine." Economic et Statistique 202.

261

12 Household Resources

Table 1 Development of Average Personal Wealth per Household as an Index (Excluding Inflation) and in Current Francs Year

Index

Current francs

1949 1959 1969 1979 1983 1989

100 155 274 345 347 364

18400 52700 136200 397900 597800 800000

Source: Francoscopie, 1991.

Table 2 Breakdown of Wealth (%) Structure

1970

1977

1982

1989

Property Securities Other (savings)

52 24 24

47 18 35

44 19 37

30 46 24

100

100

100

100

Total Source: Francoscopie, 1991.

262

12.3 Personal and Family Wealth

Table 3 Gross Wealth of Fiscal Households by Occupational Category (francs 1 OOOs)

1980

1990 5000 4100 2100 2050 1800

2350 2234 1067

Liberal professions Industrialists and wholesalers Farmers Artisans and shopkeepers Senior management Middle management Non-employed Employees Workers

882 848 357 345 181 148

750 750 400 270

Source: Francoscopie 1991 and CERC.

Table 4 Ownership of Residence

Year

Rate of ownershof principal residence

Share of new owners

1963 1970 1984 1988

39,0 44,8 51,2 54,3

9,3 14,2 24,4 26,5

Source: Insee-Premitre: 74, June 1990.

263

13 LIFE STYLE A higher standard of living, along with the weakening of social classes and the life styles related to them, has led to increased possibilities and models, corresponding to the diversity of value systems and life strategies. Each household can build its own life style based on its resources and capacities, and on the targets it sets itself. The range of consumer and capital goods available has increased in response to diversification of demand, and vice versa. Increased monetary revenue contributed to the growing market sector, which, in turn, transferred more of its production and maintenance costs to domestic work (kits, do-it-yourself, and so on). This development is equally clear in the area of food consumption, in which meals outside the home have become commonplace. At the same time, the cooking of complex and carefully prepared weekend meals has reacquired its former importance. The same trend is to be found in greatly changed attitudes toward food and the body. The attitude toward health has changed from the instrumental "as long as you're in good health" to a more aesthetic concept of physical well-being and appearance and psychological equilibrium. This changed concept of health has affected eating patterns. The explosion of media and advertising offers an infinite variety of models and appeals to diversifying systems of values and motivation. The variety and specialization of magazines is both the sign and the instrument of this diversification. There are numerous publications to satisfy everyone's taste, and the most peculiar fads have magazines devoted to them.

264

13.1

Market Goods and Services Abstract. The average increase in standard of living was accompanied by standardization of those consumer items in decline and a diversification of those in expansion.

The great increase in household consumption has led to a new distribution of expenditures. Over 25 years, household expenditures on food dropped from 30% of the budget to 19%, and clothing from 9,5% to 6,5%. In 1985, expenditures on housing outstripped those on food, with those on health and leisure advancing greatly. For certain "necessity" consumer items such as food, heating, health, and certain types of clothing, absolute value consumption per social class and income group is very close. For other items, the differences are maintained or increased. Including leisure, loan repayment, telephone bills, vacation, and so on, the improved standard of living over 20 years is revealed in larger homes, greater home ownership (see 12.3, "Personal and Family Wealth") and the generalization of home comforts. Cars, long a luxury item, are now owned by 75% of households, with 25% of them two-car households. Ownership of two cars is as common in two-income worker households as in senior-executive single-income households. Senior citizens and city dwellers (only 50% of Parisians own a car) do not feel the need for and do not own cars. The telephone was a rare item in 1960 (9,3% of households); to 28% of households in 1975, and to 90% by 1990. Almost all households now have a television set (92,4%, 72% of them colour, compared to 12% in 1975). Refrigerators and washing machines have almost reached the saturation point. All of these items are homogeneously distributed throughout the population. Differences between age and social class are slight, as they are between town and country. Only the very young, the very old, and very low-income households are less well equipped than average. The term mass consumption applies to the major items. However, differences related to social class, level of education, and income are maintained or increased (cultural expenditure, for example). New cleavages are appearing between youths and adults and the old, between singles and couples, and between those with and without children (see 1.1, "Youth," and 1.2, "Elders"). Age tends to replace social class in determining life style and consumption; this is particularly true for clothing. Classic hierarchical distribution seems to hold less and less for certain new items: dishwashers are bought by large families, freezers by rural dwellers, stereo systems by the young. Diversification of available items leads consumers to differ in their choice between brands or flavour in food, and style in furniture and clothing. Eating patterns are less and less codified, dress is no longer directly related to social class or age. Massive dress fashions have given way to brief, fragmented trends, and car manufacturers are increasing the number of special series produced. It was to explain this diversification of consumer styles that the socio-cultural and life-style typologies used by professional communications people came into being. Denis Stoclet

265

13 LifeStyle

References CERC. 1986. "Les revenus des m6nages 1960-1984." Document du CERC: 80. Choquet, 0.1984. "L'equipement du logement." Dannies Sociales. INSEE. Eenschooten, M. 1984. "Le logement." Dannies Sociales. INSEE. Herpin N., Choquet O., Kasparian, and Verger D. 1987 "Les conditions de vie des ouvriers." serie M; 126, INSEE. Herpin, N., and D. Verger. 1988. La consommation des Frangais. Paris: La Decouverte. Coll. "Reperes.

266

13.1 Market Goods and Services

Table 1 Development of the Structure of Household Consumption

(%)

- Food, drink and tobacco - Clothing (including shoes) - Residence, heating, lighting - Furniture, household furnishings, and equipment - Medical and health services - Transport and communication - Leisure, entertainment, education and culture - Other goods and services Total consumption (including non-commercial)

1959

1970

1980

1988

2000*

36,0

26,0

21,4

19,8

16,5

15,3

17,5

18,9

19,0

10,2

9,5

8,2 9,3

9,6

9,3 9,3

11,2

6,6 9,3

7,1

13,4

5,4

6,9

7,3

7,7 16,6

7,3

6,8

16,9

7,5

5,1

8,7

16,4 15,7

8,6

12,7

11,5

12,7

12,6

10,0

100,0

100,0

100,0

100,0

100,0

* INSEE estimates. Source: Francoscopie, 1991.

Table 2 Expenditure by Unit of Consumption per Senior Management Household Compared to Worker Household Expenditure (base 100 for each period)

Food Health Residence Transport and telecommunications Household equipment Clothing Culture, leisure

1966

1971

1979

1985

131 178 194 314 226 231 365

131 147 195 272 226 229 330

129 143 175 194 186 207 269

140 149 165 187 204 213 298

Source: Francoscopie, 1991.

267

13 LifeStyle

Table 3 Development and Breakdown of Household Expenditure per Category (%)

1970 Durable goods (car, TV, household appliances, etc.) Semi-durable goods Non-durable goods (food, etc.) Services Household and maintenance Health Transport and telecommunications Source: Francoscopie, 1991.

268

7,3

1980

8,9

1988

8,6

15,3 42,1

16,7 37,7

14,9 35,0

9,5 6,9 2,7

11,1

13,7

5,0 4,1

6,1 —

13.1 Market Goods and Services

Table 4 Development or Breakdown of Goods (%)

1962

1969

1979

1988

— 40,3 — — — — 30,1 — — — — 13,6 — 86,1 — — — 23,6

— 73,0 — — — 2,0 43,1 — — 7,5 48,6 36,7 — 88,4 — — — 48,8

13,1 94,0 17,2 13,1 48,8 23,0 72,0 8,6 19,5 34,0 71,0 62,6 11,2 93,8 15,2 35,6 9,1 72,1

38,3 98,0 35,2 27,6 69,5 39,3 83,6 15,4 31,7 48,6 81,5 74,9 18,0 96,3 23,0 47,6 13,8 80,3

Electric sewing machines Motorized cultivators Electric yogurt makers

37,9 14,5 — —

52,5 21,2 — —

66,7 31,9 8,6 14,6

75,5 38,4 10,3 16,8

Stable Knitting machines Electric can-openers Electric knives Ice cream makers

— — —• —

3,3 — 6,6 —

3,8 24,4 45,5 12,3

4,2 26,0 46,9 12,2

Minor decrease Curling irons Floor polishers

— —

— —

17,3 8,3

15,6 6,9

Major decrease Mechanical sewing machines Electric rotisseries Electric coffee grinders

35,6 — 67,5

27,2 — 80,9

16,6 17,7 80,0

12,3 12,2 62,4

Major increase Refrigerator-freezers Refrigerators Extractor hoods Dishwashers Electric coffee makers Freezers Non-portable washing machines Chain saws Power-driven lawnmowers Electric toasters Vacuum cleaners Hairdryers Barbecues Irons Electric fryers Engine block drills Electric juicers Food processors Minor increase Automobiles

Source: INSEE, Consommation des manages.

269

13.2

Mass Information Abstract. As they assume increasing importance in daily life, the media are becoming more diverse. There is a greater and more specialized flow of information destined for the general public. The public is becoming increasingly selective in its behaviour.

The media are of primary importance in the daily life of the French people. The vast majority of households are equipped to receive the traditional mass media: 95% have radio, 95% have television, and the weekly consumption rate per person is 15 hours for radio and 17 hours for television. Just over one-quarter of households have more than one television set. Television is now the most popular medium, since 70% of the population watch it every day—an increase of 22% over the viewing rate in 1967. Both of these media are subject to cumulative consumption but do not impinge on each other; however, listening to the radio is more and more a back-up activity, for atmosphere or background music, and not a principal activity. Because of audiovisual competition, the printed media are losing ground. The proportion of people who read a daily newspaper has decreased constantly, from 60% of the population in 1967 to 45% in 1983. This particularly affects national dailies; readers of regional dailies are more faithful to their newspapers. Even in the opinion of survey subjects, regional daily newspapers in the provinces remain the primary source of local information, well ahead of radio stations, which are valued by the young for their relaxed tone rather than their local relevance. The principal development in the written press is the appearance of specialized magazines. The "individualization" of reader interests is manifested in the press by multiplication and specialization: hobby magazines, do-it-yourself magazines, and so on are not replacing comics or romance magazines. Among the new media (see 4.5, "Computerization of Work"), the launching of the general public videotex service (Minitel) is considered a success and is spreading rapidly: at the end of 1986 more than 3 million homes had a set. The number of link-ups per month per set has leveled out at the relatively high level of 22, and concerns a growing variety of services (7 000 services available in late 1987, nearly 10 000 in late 1988). Originally designed to facilitate access to information, the Minitel owes a large share of its success to letter-box services, which have transformed it into a real instrument of communication. Its use has become commonplace in French society: 16% of telephone subscribers were equipped with a set at the end of 1988 and used it 80 minutes a month on average, whereas between 10% and 30%—depending on the source—of subscribers do not use it. Although those in charge of the mass media (radio, television, press) were initially worried by possible Minitel competition, they are using it more and more as a back-up for their traditional role, including classified ads and audience consultation during programs. Just as local radio stations have not become established as local information media, the Minitel is not yet perceived and used as a medium of domestic communication. On a broader scale, the arrival of new communication technology brings with it a diversification of complementary audiovisual equipment: direct-broadcast satellites, VCRs, cable television, and fibre optics are further increasing the capacity for image and information flow. Multi-service networks should develop along the lines of videotex. The increasing number of television channels (since 1986 there have been six national channels in France, one of them by subscription) and programs is opening the way to

270

13.2 Mass Information

more diversified and more specialized television in the years to come. Specialized channels devoted solely, for instance, to sport already exist in the United States. In time, the television screen will become multifunctional, both a receiver for television programs and a computer terminal. This diversification of the media allows for more selective reception. VCRs (in 3% of households in 1983 and 18% in 1987) give greater individual freedom; people can plan their own viewing schedule. More frequent program consultation and channel switching on television and station switching on radio indicate more mobile behaviour. By choosing its own viewing schedule the public is consuming information more in accordance with its own desires. This more diversified use of the media comes from an innovative subpopulation, consisting mainly of young urban dwellers.

Jean-Hugues Dechaux

References Ancelin, C. 1986. "Le videotex grand public en France." Futuribles 103: 26-34. Aurelle, B. 1986. Les telecommunications. Paris: La D6couverte. Coll. "Reperes." Balle, F. 1984. Media et societe. Paris: Mont chrestien. Busson, A. and Y., Evrard. 1987. "Portraits e"conomiques de la culture." Notes et Etudes documentaires, 4846. Cayrol, R. 1991. Les medias: presse ecrite, radio, television. Paris: PUF. Charpin, F., M., Fors6 and P. P6rin. 1989, April. "Temps et budget de la communication a domicile." Revue de I'OFCE 27. Jouet, J. and N. Celle. (coll.), 1985. La communication au quotidien. Paris: La Documentation Francaise. Missika, J.L., and D. Wolton. 1983 Lafolle du logis. La television dans les sociitis democraliques. Paris: Gallimard.

271

13 Life Style

Table 1 Development of Television Viewing (%) Proportion of French people aged 15 years and over who watch television...

1973

1981

1988

Every day or almost every day About 3 or 4 days a week About 1 or 2 days a week Less frequently Never or practically never

65 9 13 6 6

69 13 8 5 4

73 11 6 5 5

Average viewing time (hours per week)

16

16

20

Source: Ministere de la Culture.

Table 2 Reading of Newspapers asn'en, ACL Editions.

312

14.4 Cultural Activities

Table 1 Books

1973

1981

1988

73 70 51 13

80 74 56 14

87 75 62 16

1973

1981

1988

8 53 62 —

29 53 69 54

56 31 74 69

Listen to the radio principally For songs For classic music

12

2

20 2

22 3

Have listened to records or cassettes At least once a week over the last 12 months

66

75

73

Have been to a concert or a musical show at least once aver the last 12 months Music-hall Classical music Rock or jazz Operetta Opera

11 7 7 4 3

10 7 10 3 2

10 9 13 3 3

Percentage of French people of years and over who ... - have books in the home - have read at least 1 book in the last 12 months - have bought at least 12 books in the last 12 books - are members of a library Source: Ministere de la Culture.

Table 2 Music Percentage of French people 15 years and over who... Own musical equipment Hi-fi sets Record players other than a hi-fi set Records Cassettes

Source: Ministere de la Culture.

313

14 Leisure

Table 3 Cultural Practices out of the Home Percentage of French people 15 years and over who in the last 12 months have been to ... Cinema Funfair Museum Historic monument Dance Pay-to-enter sporting event Exhibition of painting or sculpture Zoo Show put on by amateurs Play performed by professionals Rock or jazz concert Folk dance show Music-hall or variety show Circus Concert of classical music Professional ballet group Operetta Opera

1973

1981

1988

52 47 27 32 25 24 19 30 10 12 6 12 11 11 7

50 43 30 32 28 20 21 23 12 10 10 11 10 10 7 5 2 2

49 45 30 28 28 25 23 22 14 14 13 12 10 9 9 6 3 3

6 4 3

Source: Ministere de la Culture.

Table 4 Development of the Number of Executives, Technicians and Casual Workers in the Audio-visual and Entertainment Industry

Workers Executive technicians Non-executive technicians Technicians total

1975

1979

1983

1985

588 — — 3 208

668 3574 3590 7 164

800 5288 4918 10206

1 139 5737 6787 12254

Source: Caisse des cong6s spectacles.

314

1986 1206 5893 7831 13724

15 EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT The higher schooHeaving age resulted in a higher level of general education. Almost all French people know how to read and write, and their level is improving. This is corroborated by the results of the military-service entry test. This higher level of general culture and education has led to the devaluation of diplomas, since both companies and the public sector can now demand even higher diplomas from prospective employees. Another consequence is the remarkable broadening of the demand for cultural leisure. However, the educational system is also becoming more selective in its choice of candidates for higher education. This maintains strong inequalities between those who succeed and those who fail at each stage. Educational differentiation remains high. Continuing education takes up where basic education leaves off, and often leads to a change in career choice for upper-level students. At lower levels, it helps to adjust qualifications to job requirements.

315

15.1

General Education Abstract. Longer schooling over the last 30 years has raised the general level of education. Selectivity has increased and reproduced the social hierarchy. It is increasingly difficult for those leaving school to find a job, particularly if they have not got a diploma.

Over 30 years, with the combined effect of the baby boom and the higher school-leaving age, the number of formally educated children more than doubled (from 6 million in 1950 to 13 million in 1980). In 1958, children began school at six years of age and most of them (70%) continued until age 14. Children today begin school earlier (at two years of age for one-third of children) and must continue until age 16. At 18 years, more than half of them are still in educational establishments (see 8.1, "Educational System"). The first consequence of extended schooling was a higher level of education: 30% of today's population pass their baccalaur6at, as opposed to 10% in 1959. Recently, the government announced that in the year 2000, 80% of that generation will have their baccalaure'at. There is a constant decline in school drop-outs. Between 1962 and 1987, the proportion of the over-25 working population with few or no diplomas diminished from 80% to 40%. The numbers in higher education tripled during the 1960s and continue to rise in the universities more than in the Grandes Ecoles. This leads to an increasing number of degree holders. Extended schooling also meant a higher level of general literacy: almost all French people can read and write. This is corroborated by the results of the military-service entry test Because general-knowledge and intellectual-aptitude tests administered to conscripts have not changed since 1967, they give a continuous record over 20 years. The median level was 10 in 1967, and reached 13,5 in 1982. Progress is so constant that correction has had to be made more severe. However, exam performance of intermediary-level (basic certificate and professional aptitude) youth is less homogeneous: there are more good results and more bad. These results are confirmed by mathematical-aptitude surveys: over 20 years, secondary-level students have made unquestionable progress. Spelling tests show stability. As the school-leaving age increased, selectivity did as well. The proportion of students repeating a grade increased at all levels of the secondary system. This phenomenon was greatest among boys and in lower levels of the social scale. Another indicator of greater selectivity is the younger age of pupils: all pupils in the same grade are the same age, within a two-year range; previously, the age difference was much greater. This apparently neutral criterion puts children from lower social categories at a disadvantage, because in order to succeed they need to be more mature. This selectivity thus recreates an educational hierarchy which is a faithful reflection of the social hierarchy. In spite of the higher level of education, it has become more difficult to find a job, particularly for those with few or no diplomas. Since 1973, there has been an increase in unemployment nine months after the end of schooling. This applies for all levels of education except the post-baccalaur6at level, where the proportion of unemployed is increasing very slowly (see 4.1, "Unemployment"). Thus, gaps are established between levels of education. The range is greater among women. When a man and a woman have the same diploma, the woman is at a disadvantage and the man is favoured. Overall, for all students at all levels of education, the unemployment rate in 1973 was 10%. In 1985, it oscillated around 20% for baccalaur6at and upper-level diploma holders, reached 40% to 50% for CAP and BEP holders, and as high as 55% to 60% for those without diplomas.

316

15.1 General Education

The proportion of youths who enter a job on leaving school is in decline: in a 10-year period, (1973-1983), net job recruiting dropped by 35%. This means that fewer young people arriving on the labour market are recruited for stable jobs, and an increasing number are recruited from among the unemployed. New job seekers tend to find jobs in the public sector (women particularly) or in small private-sector enterprises. Not only do those with a low level of education (CAP, BEP, or lower) find it more difficult to get a first job, but they also return more often to the ranks of the unemployed, having had one or several jobs (recurrent unemployment). The likelihood of downgrading has risen. Level for level, women find less highly qualified jobs than men. A leveling trend has also been noticed among job-seeking youth without a baccalaure'at: openings for those with a CAP or a BEP have drawn closer in type of job to openings for those with no diplomas. Since the end of the 1960s, baccalaure*ats and university degrees have been less valued, unlike degrees from Grandes Ecoles, which have not lost any of their value. As a general rule, the higher the level of education the more highly skilled the job will be. Jean-Hugues Dechaux

References Affichard, J. 1981, June. "Quels emplois apres I'^cole: la valeur des litres scolaires depuis 1973." tconomie et Statistique:134.

Baudelot, C., and R. Establet. 1989. Le niveau monte. Paris: Seuil. Baudelot, C., and M. Glaude. 1989, October. "Les dipldmes se ddvaluent-ils en se multipliant?" fcconomie et statistique 225

Boudon, R. 1985. L'inegalite des chances. Paris: Hachette. Coeffic, N. 1986, November-December. "Les jeunes a la sortie de l'6cole: poids du ch6mage et risques de d&lassement" tconomie et Statistique 193-194. DeSingly. 1989. Lire a 12 ans. Paris: Nathan. Jarousse, J.-P. 1985-86. "Une mesure de la rentabilite' des diplomes entre 1969 et 1976." Consommation,

2, 1985-1986. Ministere de I'Education Nationale. 1986. Reperes et references statistiques sur les enseignants et formation. Paris: SPRESE. Passeron, L. 1982. "L'inflation des diplSmes." Revue Frangaise de Sociologie n° XXIII. Prost, A. 1986. L'enseignement s'est-il democratism? Paris: PUF.

317

15 Educational Attainment

Table 1 Development of Schooling to the Age of 18 Years Over the Last 25 Years (%) Year

Males

Females

1962 1968 1972 1976 1980 1984 1987

31 40 48 53 53 64 69

36 46 55 59 69 80 80

Source: Baudelot, Establet.

Table 2 Development of School and University Population

% of population aged 2-22 years attending school or university

19601961

19701971

19751976

19801981

19851986

19861987

19871988

66,2

70,1

74,1

76,1

78,6

79,0

79,8

Source: Ministere Education Nationale.

318

15.1 General Education

Table 3 Results of the General Baccalaurlat from 1948 to 1989 (%)

Successful candidates

1948

1963

1968

1975

1980

1985

1989

67,9

61,9

81,3

67,2

66,1

67,9

75,4

Source: ENSEE, Annuaire rttrospectif de la France, 1990.

Table 4 Development of the Structure of Diplomas (Active Males and Females More than 25 Years) (%) 1962

1982

1975

1968

1987

M

F

M

F

M

F

M

F

M

F

None or CEP

80

78

68

67

58

60

50

50

40

42

CAP - BEPC

10

10

18

18

28

22

28

25

32

29

Bac and more

9

8

13

15

20

22

24

22

29

29

Source: Baudelot, Establet, op. cit.

319

15 Educational Attainment

Table 5 Unemployment 1972-1977 and 1980-1985 1980-1985

1972-1977 Most obtained diplomas

Males

Third-level diploma General baccalaur6at Technical bac +BET CAP, BEP BEPC CEP No diplomas

3 — — 7 10 9 12

Overall

Females

7,9

Females

6 15 — 8 9 21 28

8 13 10 20 19 19 31

8 19 14 31 22 41 42

14,0

19,8

24,9

Source: INSEE, ficonomie et Statistiques 216, December 1988.

320

Males

15.2

Professional Education Abstract. The numbers of students in second- and third-level education increased steeply between 1950 and 1970, then more slowly. The increase in secondary education was accompanied by a relative decline in literary subjects in favour of technology and economics courses. In the third level, the increase in attendance was accompanied by diversification and professionalization of curricula.

The evolution in tasks in companies led to a need for higher qualifications (see 4.2, "Skills and Occupational Levels"), and the development of continuing education brought about a greater adjustment to job requirements, particularly at lower levels (see 15.3, "Continuing Education"). The numbers of students in university and secondary school increased dramatically, and levels of education and classical culture rose as selectivity increased. At the secondary level, the trend is toward development of technical and professional training; the recent creation of a professional baccalaur6at is evidence of this. Greater numbers of students in third-level education is partly due to increases in the secondary level, which saw dramatic growth in numbers between 1950 and 1970, and less spectacular growth since. The total number of students for 1987-88 was 1 246 176, compared to 754 193 in 1970-71. This number comprises 45% students of arts, law, and economics; 17% in senior-technician sections and university institutes of technology; 13,5% in sciences; 12,5% in medicine; 6% in engineering and commerce. Over the last 20 years the first two sections (arts, law, economics) have expanded moderately, and the technological and technical sections have expanded dramatically. The number enrolled in science studies has increased less rapidly, and the number in medical studies has decreased since the introduction of a numerus classus in 1971. The selectivity of staterecognized engineering and commerce colleges also explains the small increase in attendance at these establishments over the period considered. In terms of level and of subject, the main characteristics of professional and general vocational diplomas as follows. There has been a very irregular increase in BAC+2 (baccalaure'at plus two further years) training: the number of DEUGs (diploma awarded upon successful completion of two years of university studies) awarded in legal, economic, literary, and scientific subjects was stable during the 1970s and increased slightly during the 1980s. On the other hand, there was a constant and noticeable increase in the number of DUTs (university diplomas in technology) and BTSs (senior technician certificates) during the 1970s; there were fewer DUTs and a dramatic increase in BTSs awarded during the 1980s. The numbers of DUTs and BTSs awarded in 1987 were 24 690 and 36 275, respectively, as opposed to 11 191 and 10 076, respectively, 15 years earlier. There was overall stability in the number of degrees awarded during die 1970s; the number rose in the 1980s with the appearance and development of the more professionally adapted master's diploma (master in technical sciences). Over and above the increase in the number of degrees awarded, whatever the level or subject, the trend in university-level education is toward greater diversification and professionalization of courses. On the labour market, however, employers prefer the selective training of engineering and business colleges. The number of students in these subjects has increased considerably in recent years, apparently in proportion to the number of new private business colleges of varying standards. Pierre Fattaccini

321

IS Educational Attainment

References INSEE. 1972 to 1989. Annuaires statistiques. Ministere de lEducation Nationale. 1989. Reperes et references statistiques 1989. Paris: SIGES. Secretariat dTEtat au Plan. 1989. Une formation pour tous Rapport de la Commission Formation, Recherche, Xe Plan 1989-1992, Paris, Commissariat General du Plan.

322

15.2 Professional Education

Table 1 Development of the Total Number of Students Passing the General and Technical Baccalaureat

Total

1950

1960

30 000

60 000

1980

1988

170 000

220000

320000

25000

60000

110000

1970

Technical and professional Source: INSEE, Annuaire statistique de la France, 1990.

Table 2 Number of Third-Level Graduate Students

Total

1958-1959

1963-1964

1973-1974

1981-1982

1988-1989

330 059

483 451

694 081

790 357

711 107

Source: INSEE, Annuaire rttrospectif de la France, 1990.

Tables Number of Students 1948-1949 Senior technicians Engineering schools

12276

1963-1964

1970-1971

1979-1980

11543

26840

61421

74387

162 057

24015

26386

34117

37162

42782

Source: INSEE, Annuaire retrospect^ 'de la France, 1990.

323

1981-1982 1988-1989

15 Educational Attainment

Table 4 Post-graduate University Diplomas (number of conferrals)

Sciences - Ph.D.s

1948

1969

1975

1984

1987

109

1040

1 144

1 239

1 413

Source: INSEE, Annuaire re'trospectifde la France, 1990.

Table 5 Results of University Degree Examinations (Number of graduates)

1948

1969

1975

1984

1987

1978

2398

7499

8577

7313

Dental surgery

900

974

1773

1883

1507

Pharmacology

1070

1549

2629

3690

3064

National degrees of doctor of medecine

Source: INSEE, Annuaire retrospectif de la France, 1990.

324

15.3

Continuing Education Abstract. Continuing education affects a growing number of wage earners at all levels, and plays an important role in adapting qualifications to job requirements. For the last 15 years, continuing education has helped the young and the unemployed to find jobs.

For several years, the government has been giving reasons for its continuing-education policy: to help young people achieve social and job integration, and to help other unemployed persons, particularly the long-term unemployed, to find jobs. The policy is intended to help reduce inequalities, and to speed up and amplify wage earners' efforts to adapt to new technology and modernization (see 4.2, "Skills and Occupational Levels," and 4.5, "Computerization of Work"). The budget for continuous job training has increased constantly since it came into being with the passing of a law in 1971 following an agreement between management and labour in 1970. In 1986, the training budget was the equivalent of 2,33% of the pay package, compared to 1,9% in 1981. The budget has increased more in large companies, whereas it has tended to stagnate in small companies. The total 1986 budget reached 40,6 billion francs, 40% of which was used to pay trainees: the regions contributed 2,9 billion francs and trained 364 000; the state contributed 13,5 billion francs for 881 000 trainees, and companies contributed 24,2 billion francs for 2 628 000 trainees. Added to this was the cost of training civil servants, public-utility work, job-finding courses, and apprenticeships, all amounting to another 19 billion francs for 1 800 000 trainees. In 1986, 30% of the working population under the age of 25 took a training course, compared to 16% of the over-25 population. Today, 34% of the trainee population are women, 52% are wage-earning workers, 27% are technicians, and 15% are engineers and managers. The trend is toward increased training for women and wage-earning workers, at the expense of technicians and skilled workers. Training in large companies is organized by management. In small and medium-sized companies, the demand for training usually comes from the employees rather than from the employers, and it is the best qualified who are given training (25% of those receiving training were above bacclaure'at level, although they constituted only 11% of the working population in 1982). The average length of a training course depends on who is paying for it. If the company is paying, the average length is 71,5 hours. It is considerably longer if the state (257 hours) or the region (217 hours) is paying. Continuous training is provided by 42 700 instructors, 7 700 working in companies and 35 000 in training centres. The labour market for instructors increased greatly between 1971 and 1975, but subsequently subsided. The instructors work in 10 681 different centres, 93% of which are private and 7% public (GRETA, universities, parapublic and agricultural-ministry centres, consular organizations, AFP A, and so on). But this web of organizations is very fragmented: only 1 091 of them have a turnover of more than 1 million francs and 202 (2%) exceed 5 million francs in business volume. Continuing education is seen as a means of increasing adaptability within an enterprise, achieving greater mobilization of workers, and improving production and adaptibility to new markets and new technology (see 5.2, "Personnel Administration"). From the data available, it is difficult to say to what degree these goals are being achieved. However, it seems that state and regional aid is essentially destined to helping youths and others find jobs (of the 13,5 billion francs of state aid, 12 billion francs are used to this end). Other financing is used to provide work-related training for wageearners: 95% of civil servants, 93% of private-sector wage-earners,

325

15 Educationnal Attainment

and 34% on training breaks. Training periods to promote or further qualify workers make up only a very small proportion, although they help anticipate future needs and improve workers' skills and transferability. At best they account for 6% to 10% of training hours, and at least half of them result from worker demand. We can thus conclude that the essential function of continuous training is work adjustment, particularly at lower levels. Technological developments, which have advanced greatly in recent years, are presenting new problems. It is no longer just a question of transmitting new knowledge or techniques, but also organizational skills, because new jobs demand that both individual workers and groups of workers be able to get the best out of equipment which is increasingly integrated. In practical terms, it is impossible to establish a link between continuous training and employment. The difficulty of being able to foresee job types for the year 2000 and the scale of adjustments to be made speedily means that it is difficult to optimize investment in initial and continuous education, as it is to anticipate or direct changes.

Jean-Pierre Jaslin

References Caspar, P. 1986, June. Essai sur I'investissement intellectuel Ministere de la Recherche et de lEnseignement supe"rieur, ministere de I'lndustrie, des PTT et du Tourisme, 6tude n°71. "La formation permanente: id6e neuve, idee fausse." 1974, October. Revue Esprit 10. "Projet de loi de finance pour 1988." 1987 document annexe sur la formation continue, Paris, Journal Offlciel. Tanguy, L (dir.). 1986. "L'introuvable relation formation-emploi", Esprit.

326

15.3 Continuing Education

Table 1 Budget for Continuous Job Training (1988 francs in billions)

Year

State

Enterprises

Regions

Total expenditure

1974 1978 1982 1984 1986 1988

14,7 15,2 12,7 14,9 17,3

7,2

15,7 18,8 21,3 21,9 26,4 30,7

— — 2,9 3,2 3,4

22,9 33,4 36,5 37,5 44,4 51,3

% paid by enterprises

68,5 56,3 58,4 58,4 59,5 59,8

Total expenditure as a%of

GDP

0,5 0,7 0,7 0,7 0,8 0,9

Source: CEREQ, Formation Emploi 34, 1991.

Table 2 Development of the Rate of Financial Investment by Size of Enterprise (1978-1982 and 1984-1988)

Year 1982/1978 1988/1984

10-19 wageearners

16% 18%

20-49 wage50-499 500-1 999 earners wage-earners wage-earners

7% 18%

4% 29%

Source: CEREQ, Formation Emploi 34: 20, 1991.

327

9% 34%

2000 wage-earners and over 8% 27%

Total 8% 26%

16 INTEGRATION AND MARGINALIZATION Overall improved wealth and standard of living do not necessarily reduce extreme inequalities and can contribute to creating new cleavages, including marginalization of those who are not able to follow the general direction society takes. Poverty is no longer a common and stable state of a part of the population, but the result of "accidents" of life such as disease, divorce, and unemployment. Moreover, the signs of social pathology are increasing: there is greater use of drugs and tranquillizers, and more suicides and attempted suicides. This new poverty and marginalization leads to the development of social and medical services and charitable institutions which institutionalize these situations. As well, some members of the large immigrant population experience marginalization, which is passed on to the second generation if the children do not succeed at school and end up unemployed because of their lack of skills.

328

16.1

Immigrants and Ethnic Minorities Abstract. France has always been a land of immigration and swift integration, but immigrants from North Africa are finding it particularly difficult to integrate because of their Muslim culture and racist reactions to it. Loss of roots and downgrading make it difficult for the children of these immigrants to succeed in school or at work.

France has long been a land of immigration, and migrating populations have contributed to the demography of the country. Today, France has nearly 4 million immigrants, comprising 7% of die total population. Before the war, immigrants came for the most part from Italy, Spain, or Poland, Catholic countries. Since 1945, Portuguese and, especially, blacks from French-speaking Africa have been immigrating. Very recently, there have been some arrivals from Southeast Asia. Throughout this period, immigrants from North Africa continued to arrive regularly. It is these latter (numbering 1 million in 1988) who find it difficult to gain acceptance and to integrate into French society. Their difficulties are, first, economic. Although immigrants usually do unskilled work, this is particularly true of Maghrebi workers, almost 50% of whom are unskilled (versus unskilled French workers, at 13%, and other unskilled foreigners, at 38%). In 1982, the unemployment rate among Maghrebis was 20%, as opposed to the rate among French people of 8% and the rate among all foreigners of 14%. Their standard of living is obviously affected by this: the annual expenditure of a Maghrebi family is one-quarter less than that of a French family of the same size. Moreover, many workers have left their families in the homeland and save in order to send them a large part of their incomes. These economic difficulties are compounded by specific cultural difficulties: coming from an Islamic culture, Maghrebis are particularly alienated by a society which is based on the separation of church and state. The usual forms of community organization throughout North Africa, particularly with regard to child-rearing and education, have no equivalent in France. Modes of family organization are very different. Although a decline has recently been observed in the fertility rate of Maghrebi women in France, differences in this domain remain large, at least for the first generation. Coming from a rural background, Maghrebi immigrants find themselves in urban and industrial zones where the life style and general organization is particularly alien to them, and most of all, where they completely lose their former social standing. They are not only uprooted but also de'classe', proletarianized. Finally, Maghrebis suffer from a very poor public image, which is no doubt linked to the aftermath of decolonization. In opinion polls concerning the image of different ethnic populations and immigrant nationalities, Maghrebis, and particularly Algerians, arouse the most critical response. As Maghrebis come from a particularly underprivileged background, their children encounter problems of integration. Although some Maghrebi children succeed very well at school, the Maghrebi failure rate is above average; girls have less pronounced schooling problems than boys (see 15.1, "General Education"). Then there is the problem of work integration: the unemployment rate (see 4.1, "Unemployment") of young Maghrebis is higher than average (31,4% against 21,4%), whereas that of the children of Portuguese immigrants is lower on average than the unemployment rate of young male foreigners (15% as opposed to 24%). Lastly, important identity problems (see 5.2, "Personnel Administration") arise from the lack of correspondence between the original culture and the host culture in which the children are schooled and grow up.

329

16 Integration and Marginalization

Overall, integration of Maghrebi immigrants is one of the most delicate problems confronting French society at the moment, highlighting social dysfunctions: unemployment (see 4.1, "Unemployment"), school failure (see 15.1, "General Education"), poverty (see 16.4, "Poverty"), and the anxiety of sensitive groups that are prone to racism. Formerly, immigrants were integrated rapidly and ethnic reference became secondary in less than two generations. The great institutions—army, church, political parties (particularly the Communist Party) and especially school—played an essential role in this process. We may wonder whether the decline of these institutions, and especially the increased selectivity of the educational system, is not disrupting the integration of process. Moreover, social integration and assimilation was related to job integration, which may be less easy in the future. Many immigrants live in poverty conditions: 43% live in overpopulated dwellings, compared to 14% of French people. Finally, recent measures to limit arrivals of new immigrants have the paradoxical effect of leading the immigrants already present to consider themselves permanently settled in France. On the question of religion, the reactions of second-generation Muslims are still difficult to predict, even if observers are struck by then* ignorance of Islam. Yannick Lemel

References Chapoulie, S. 1986, September. "Qui sont les Grangers?" Eco-Flash, INSEE. Desplanques, G. 1985, July-August. "Nuptialite' et f6condit6 des 6trangeres." fcconomie et Statistique: 179. Etienne, B. 1987. L'islamisme radical. Paris: Hachette. Kepel, G. 1987. Les banlieues de I'Islam. Paris: Seuil. Minces, J. 1986. La generation suivante. Paris: Hammarion. Noiriel, G. 1988. Le Creusetfrangais: Histoire de {'immigration XlXe-XXe. Paris: Seuil. Schnapper, D. 1986. "Modernit6 et acculturation." Communication: 43.

330

16.1 Immigrants and Ethnic Minorities

Table 1 Development of the Foreign Population in France (1851-1990) (1000s)

1851 1861 1866 1872 1876 1881 1886 1891 1896 1901 1906 1911 1921 1926 1931 1936 1946 1954 1962 1968 1975 1982 1990

381 506 655 676 802

1001 1 127 1 130 1052 1034 1047 1 160 1532

2409

2715 2198 1744 1765 2170 2621

3442 3680 3580

Source: INSEE, Recensements.

331

16 Integration and Marginalization

Table 2 Family Immigration Since 1973 (1000s)

1973 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989

72647 52318 40123 39300 42020 41589 47396 45767 39621 32545 27140 26769 29345 34594

Source: Office des migrations Internationales.

Table 3 Unemployed Foreigners as a % of Total Unemployed Since 1973

8,5 10,0 10,0 9,2 10,0 11,0 11,9 12,4 11,9 11,9 11,5 11,4 11,7 12,5 12,8

1973 1977

1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990

Source: Ministere des Affaires Sociales et de 1'Emploi. ANPE.

332

16.2 Crime and Punishment Abstract. Petty delinquency, fraud, and damage to property have increased. Personal assault has leveled out. There is a growing feeling of insecurity.

Information available on the scale of delinquency, whatever its nature or gravity, comes from police and legal records. Numerous successive filters come into play between the delinquent activity of individuals or enterprises and available statistics on the subject. It is therefore very difficult to evaluate the phenomenon precisely, because an apparent increase in criminality may be due to a real increase in delinquent acts, but it may also be due to an increased number of declarations of delinquency or to improved police efficiency in finding criminals. Once a special anti-theft brigade is set up, statistics on police anti-theft action will rise, as will the number of reported crimes if the public believes that police efficiency has improved. Changes in legislation, jurisprudence, or penitentiary administration will also modify the statistics. In addition to these difficulties, it must be said that a feeling of insecurity must not be confused with real acts of aggression. In recent years, the feeling of insecurity has increased considerably more than the acts, and now it seems to have leveled out The overall volume of criminality is increasing over the long term. Although legal criminality (on which judgment is pronounced) remains, per person, roughly constant, apparent criminal!ty (known to the police) is growing. It seems doubtful that the trend is a simple consequence of changes in police organization or of citizens' confidence in the police. Offences against property have doubled over 10 years, from 1 570 000 in 1975 to 3 108 000 in 1985. Over the same period, crimes increased from 35 000 to 40 000, offences against public morals from 14 500 to 18 000, and economic and financial offences from 54 000 to 79 000. Offences against the state and against property exceeded the overall average. However, crimes against persons increased at a slower rate than crimes against property. This development, and the fact that crimes against property increased considerably, explains why public sensitivity to delinquency increased, then leveled out. Yannick Lemel

References Cadiet, L. 1986. Regards sw lafraudefiscale. Paris: Economica. Cusson, M. 1990. Croissance et decroissance du crime. Paris: PUF. Direction Ge'ne'rale de la Police Nationale. 1989. Aspects de la criminality et de la delinquance constatees en France en 1988. Paris: Documentation Francaise. Margairaz, A., and R. Merkli. 1985. Lafuite devant I'impdt et les controles duflsc. Lausanne: Imprimerie Vaudoise. Martinez, J.C. 1984. Lafraudefiscale. Paris: PUF. Ministere de la Justice 1987. Annuaire statistique de la justice 1985. Paris: Documentation Fran9aise.

333

16 Integration and Marginalization

Table 1 Development of Criminality in France

Year

Number of reported criminal offences

Trend percentage

Population in thousands

Rate per 1 000 inhabitants

1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988

2 147 832 2 330 566 2 627 508 2 890 020 3 413 682 3 563 975 3 681 453 3 579 194 3 292 189 3 170 970 3 132 694

2,3 8,5

53272 53481 53731 54029 54335 54626 54831 55062 55278 55506 55750

40 44 49 53 63 65 67 65 60 57 56

12,7

9,9

18,1

4,4 3,3

-2,7 -8,0 -3,6 -1,2

Source: Direction ge'ne'rale de la Police Nationale.

Table 2 Types of Offences

1975

1980

- Theft (including receiving 1 233 186 1 624 547 stolen goods) - Fraud, financial and economic 315 278 531 588 embezzlement 87 161 102 195 - Offences against the person - Narcotics, breaches of the peace, 233 386 and offences against low and order 132665 - Miscellaneous other 135 792 144037 Total

1 912 327

2 627 508

Source: INSEE, Tableaux de I'tconomie frangaise.

334

1985

2 301 934

1988

1989

2016781 2 126 973

681 699 117948

568 638 122646

548 354 132 321

348592 129 021

369 727 54902

403 743 55051

3 579 194

3 132 694 3266442

16.2 Crime and Punishment

Table 3 "Do you ever feel seriously worried about your personal safety?" November 1984 Often From time to time Rarely Never No opinion

December 1987

14 ) ) 31 )

45

16 ) ) 26 )

42

21 ) ) 33 )

54

20 ) ) 38 )

58

1

Source: SOFRES, L'ttat de {'opinion.

335



16.3

Emotional Disorders and Self-destructive Behaviour Abstract. There are a growing number of signs of anomie: consumption of alcohol, use of legal and illegal drugs, suicide, and mental illness.

Durkheim observes that phenomena of anomie characterize periods of economic development (or crisis), rapid changes in social or political organization which are brought about by the loss of norms for the individual. All ruptures, changes, and rapid developments seem to make it difficult for individuals to respond appropriately to new situations, because landmarks disappear and old guidelines for behaviour are no longer applicable. Given the considerable changes in French society over the last 20 years, we may suppose a priori that anomie has developed. Having said this, anomie is not easy to measure, since it is not really a "thing" but, rather, a theory on the way societies function. Therefore, rather than speak about the recent development of anomie, it seems preferable to examine some indicators and analyze their development, without seeking to form any conclusions about anomie itself. We propose to examine four indicators: alcoholism, drug consumption, suicide, and mental illness. Overall, alcohol consumption is in decline, although consumption of some alcoholic drinks—spirits, beer—is tending to rise (see 13.8, "Mood-altering Substances"). Consequently, the mortality rate from alcoholism is in decline, though not the mortality rate from cirrhosis of the liver, which, though rarer in the social categories that had been prone to it, has increased in others. Overall, alcohol-related deaths remain constant. In 1970, heroin use was considered to be nonexistent in France. In 1980, the number of "consumers" was in excess of 5 000. Over the same period, the number of people— whether users or sellers—questioned by the police about drugs of any kind rose from 1 300 in 1970 to 3 000 in 1975, and to more than 20 000 in the 1980s. Thus, drug consumption increased in the 1970s and has continued to do so. It is, however, changing in nature: from being closely linked to student milieux in the 1970s, it has now spread to young, poorly educated groups. An INSERM (National Institute for Statistical Studies and Medical Research) study indicates that adolescents living with alcoholic parents are particularly affected. The overall suicide rate has risen since the 1960s, and accelerated particularly about 1975. It has gone from fewer than 30 per 100 000 to more than 40 per 100 000 for men aged between 35 and 44 years, and from 10 per 100 000 in 1960 to nearly 15 per 100 000 for women in the same age bracket by in 1980. Generally, the suicide rate increases with age, whatever the sex; but differences between young and old people seem to tend to widen for women and to narrow for men. The increased suicide rate is most marked for younger men, particularly since 1965, with the reverse being true for older men, at least until recent years. Young women have not been affected by this trend. The recent increase in suicide among young men is undoubtedly related to increased unemployment (see 4.1, "Unemployment") and to the consequences of the economic crisis. On January 1, 1965, there were 120 000 patients receiving treatment in all of the various psychiatric institutions in France. In 1975, the figure was 115 000, and in 1984 it was 85 000. Although there is a clear decline in the number of patients in treatment, we should not conclude that the total number of persons presenting psychiatric disorders has diminished, as reduced hospitalization corresponds to a change in treatment methods. Consumption of sleeping pills and psychotropics has increased throughout the population. Outside of hospital consumption, "sleeping pills and psychotropics"

336

16.3 Emotional Disorders and Self-destructive Behaviour

accounted for 5% of medication in 1970, 5,5% in 1980, and 7% in 1986. France has the highest use of these drugs in psychiatric hospitals. The number of psychoanalysts, psychiatrists, and psychotherapists has increased: between 1985 and 1988 this type of medical personnel in psychiatric hospitals increased by 5,7% and psychologists by 10%. Yannick Lemel

References Baudelot, C., and R. Establet. 1984, August. "Suicide: Involution se"culaire d'un fait social." Economic et Statistique: 168. Belliard, E. 1987. "Vingt ans de psychiatric hospitalise publique." Solidarite-sante, Etudes statistiques: 3. Boudon, R. 1987. "Anomie." Encyclopaedia Universalis. Damiani, P., and H. Masse". 1986, June. "Etude sur 1'alcoolisme." INSEE, coll."Archives et documents: 169. "Le boom de la d6prime." 1983 Le Nouvel Economste 402,29/8. "Les Franjais "Game's" aux benzodiazepines." 1989, January. Science et vie. Ministere de la Sant6 et de la Securite" sociale. 1985. Annuaire des statistiques sanitaires et sociales.

337

16 Integration and Marginalization

Table 1 Development of the Number of Drug Users

Cannabis Heroin Cocaine

1984

1978

1980

1982

1983

4500 1500 100

5000 3500 200

12500 7000 300

15000 7500 250

1985

1986

14500 14000 16000 16500 9500 10500 9000 10500 600 1000 400 500

Source: Direction de la Police Nationale, Aspects de la criminality en France.

Table 2 Number of Suicides per Annum in France Year

Males

Females

Overall

1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1986

3333 4826 5151 5302 5487 5653 5915 7362 8898 8850

1272 1576 1752 1921 1865 2181 2408 3044 3603 3750

4605 6402 6903 7223 7352 7834 8323 10406 12501 12600

Source: INSERM.

338

1988

16.3 Emotional Disorders and Self-destructive Behaviour

Table 3 Number of Psychiatric Patients Admitted to Public and Private Hospitals (1000s)

147,2 157,2 165,7 178,8 192,0 195,7 200,5 209,5 215,7 223,4 221,8 237,7

1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987

Source: INSEE. Annuaire rttrospectif de la France, 1990.

339

16.4

Poverty Abstract. Old forms of poverty are dying out, but economic problems have increased the risk of poverty for categories which were previously secure.

It is particularly difficult to chart changes in a domain such as poverty, since there is no agreement on what approach to take; it is thus difficult to define the phenomenon we are trying to measure. The very terminology indicates the problem. At different times and in different places the terms "poor," "socially handicapped," "sub-proletariat" and others have been used. Many studies use a threshold of "relative poverty"—a percentage of the average income. If a society becomes more wealthy and income distribution remains the same, this means that, paradoxically, there is no reduction in poverty. Attempts to measure poverty come up against the same kind of problem as do attempts to measure delinquency. In both cases, it is difficult to determine whether an observed change indicates a modification in the behaviour of social authorities in charge of the problem, or whether it comes from an objective change in the situation. Thus an increase in the number of people receiving a certain kind of benefit may be the consequence of increased prospecting on the part of those in charge of the corresponding funds; an improved level of general information and knowledge; or an effective increase in the number of persons elegible for such benefit. A simple method is to fix a priori a "threshold" of income below which people are said to be poor. The first attempts at measurement date from the 1970s and give very approximate classifications of very ill-defined populations. In 1974, R. Lenoir estimated the poor at between 5 and 15 million; in the same year, L. Stole"ru arrived at the figure of 10 million. Studies based on poverty thresholds show that, after declining from 1975 to 1979, poverty has again been increasing since 1979. After dropping by 16% between 1975 and 1979, the number of poor households—defined as consumption units whose disposable income, after deductions, was less than 40% of the average disposable income— increased by 15% between 1979 and 1984. In the latter year, there were 1,4 million poor households, compared to 1,2 million in 1979. The overall proportion of poor households rose from 6,3% to 6,8%. Thus, the number of "poor" people, in our objective a priori definition, has fluctuated over the last 15 years. In addition, the "crisis" has certainly generated new difficulties. According to the charity institutions most concerned with extreme indigence, the numbers of the poor have increased greatly in recent years. For example, the Salvation Army recently reopened a soup kitchen which had been closed for a long time because of lack of demand. At the same time, the media and social debates have introduced the term "the new poor." This term has no precise definition, but in the minds of local administrators of social aid and social action it is used to designate a fairly recognizable population: families or persons who, if there had not been a great increase in unemployment, would not be in difficulty. The problem facing families in this situation is that, having made financial commitments in order to purchase their dwellings, and now being unemployed, they will not be able to meet their payments and will find themselves, as a result of a cumulative process, being reduced to poverty. These "new poor" are seen as having quite different attitudes from the "standard poor." They have not "settled" into the situation of depending on assistance, and they have only a skimpy knowledge of assistance networks. They are loath to seek aid from these networks; they first try to overcome their difficulties alone, and seek institutionalized help only when it is too late. The number of long-term unemployed has unquestionably increased in recent years, particularly those who no

340

16.4 Poverty

longer receive any unemployment assistance. Fifteen years ago, the population of unemployed, single, young men without any family backing who are currently found in social assistance offices did not exist. Overall, it seems that we have witnessed a decline in traditional poverty, the poverty of hovels and slums containing a population which was stable from generation to generation. In contrast, today's poor are people who have become poor through some "accident" of family, social category, or health. Unemployment, disease, divorce, or pregnancy without a partner can lead to poverty. It is no doubt possible to recover from this kind of poverty, since family backing and social assistance can be extremely effective in these types of situation. Yannick Lemel

References CERC. 1989, 3rd trimester. "Les Fran?ais et leurs revenus: le tournant des annees 80." Document du CERC: 94. D6chaux, J.-H. 1990, January. "Pauvret6s ancienne et nouvelle en France." Revue de I'OFCE. Fracassi A., M.F. Marques, and J. Walter, \9%5Lapauvrete, une approche plurielle. Paris: ESF. Bouillon, M. 1987, July. "Le retour des mis6rables." Futuribles. Lion, A., and P. Maclouf. (ed), 1982. L'insecurite sociale. Pauperisation et solidarity. Paris: Editions ouvrieres. Milano, S. 1988. Lapawvreie en France. Paris: Hachette. Wresinski, J. 1987, February. "Grande pauvret6 et pr6carit6 6conomique et sociale." Journal Officiel, Avis et rapport du CES (6).

341

16 Integration and Marginalization

Table 1 Percentage of Poor Households in Function of Three-Income Thresholds (available means per unit of consumption)

1975 1979

40%

50%

60%

7,7 6,5

16,3 12,3

26,4 22,3

Source: Info-DAS 5.

Table 2 INSEE Estimates of Number and Proportion of Poor Households

1979 1984

1213000 1392000

i.e. 6,3% of households i.e. 6,8% of households

Source: CERC, 1989.

342

16.4 Poverty

TableS The Poorest Households (Breakdown of households by %) The poorest households, whose available income per unit of consumption is less than

Socio-occupational category of the reference member of the household

of all households

3,7 7,7 6,9

Fanners Self-employed non-farmers Management and heads of firms Intermediate professions Employees Workers Former non-wage-eamers Former wage-earners Inactive others

12,8 10,7 23,4

6,1

21,7

7,0

40% of the average the 2nd decile the 1st decile income (31600F/yr) (25 000 F/yr)(21 100 F/yr)

15,4 11,1

17,4 11,8

32,5

27,8

20,9

12,4 15,4

22,1

27,7

10,8

8,9 1,1 3,7 7,1

1,5 3,1 6,7

4,3 8,1

8,1

1,8 3,0 6,4

4,2 6,9

Source: INSEE, Enquete Revenus fiscaux, 1984.

Table 4 Rate of the Poorest Households

Number of households whose available income per unit of consumption is less than 40% of the average income* Total number of households

1979

1984

1 213 000

1 392 000

14,8

19 071 500

20 347 300

6,7

* i.e. 12 000 F per year, in 1979 and 21 000 F per year in 1984. Source: INSEE, Enqulte Revenus fiscaux.

343

Growth %

17 ATTITUDES AND VALUES The preceding chapters were devoted to the study of trends in institutions and behaviour. In this chapter we enter a new domain, and by using opinion polls we study changing value patterns. Depending on the course of events, opinions vary more quickly than behaviour, and in France the means of measuring these swings do not always have the same enduring qualities as those used to measure changes in behaviour. The questions asked in a given survey may be formulated differently in accordance with the wishes of those ordering the survey and formulations may change considerably, even for the same survey. As well, as surveys were much less well developed in the 1960s than they are today, thus making systematic comparison impossible over such a time span. For this reason, and for the sake of methodoligical coherence, this chapter was not included in the French version of this book. But now, in order to maintain cohesion with the other national volumes in this collection and to better inform foreign readers, we hereby present this chapter since it is nonethless desirable to distinguish certain strong trends in opinion changes over the last fifteen years. The first thing we notice in the following pages is the increase in a certain pessimism. Although they see unemployment as the principal social problem, the French are less satisfied with their standard of living and do not expect things to improve noticeably in the future. Thus the problem of unemployment, which began with the first oil crisis and has continued to increase ever since, seems to have strongly and permanently affected their confidence. Faced with the high state presence in production and the failure of successive governments to put the country back on the road to lasting economic growth, the French, traditionally a rather interventionist people, have turned to values closer to economic liberalism, while nonetheless remaining strongly attached to maintaining the welfare state. Liberalism has also gained ground in the cultural domain. Overall the French have adopted more permissive and tolerant attitudes with regard to behaviour and opinions. These new standards took root first of all in the wage-earning middle classes, particularly in the public sector, and have since spread to other categories of the population. It does not follow from this that the French are more liberal in all matters. With regard to crime they are in favour of more stringent repressive measures: there is now a majority calling for the reintroduction of capital punishment and more people today condemn drug abuse than in the past. In short, though for different reasons than those in the economic domain, we can again speak of a temperate or limited liberalism. Finally, it should be noted that over the last fifteen years the degree of identification with the French nation has decreased, giving way first to the idea and then to the reality of Europe. More French people now consider themselves as Europeans but at the same time, perhaps because the idea of Europe is more abstract or removed than that of France, there is now a majority who identify first of all with their town or village.

344

17.1

Satisfaction Abstract. From 1975 to 1984, dissatisfaction with the standard of living increased constantly. Since then, there has been a marked decline in this feeling, a relative loss of family feeling, stabilization of a positive view of democracy, along with a loss of respect for politicians, a changing general view of work, and stabilization of religious beliefs in spite of dwindling religious observance.

Standard of Living After the mid-1970s, there was a growing feeling of dissatisfaction with both personal and national standards of living in France. Dissatisfaction with personal standards of living was, however, considered to be less strong. In both cases, the percentage of dissatisfaction reached its highest level in 1984 (48% and 75%, respectively). Since then, it has decreased considerably. Expressed in terms of positive or negative evaluation of changes in the economic situation of the country over the last year, the decreasing trend in negative evaluations is also confirmed from 1984 onward. Just over one-quarter of those questioned in 1988 considered that the situation had deteriorated, compared to 62% four years earlier.

Family The decade 1975-1985 was marked by a relative loss of esteem for marriage and the family. Between 1978 and 1982, the percentage of people stating that "the family is the only place where we feel good" dropped from 70% to 60%. Since 1983, the percentage of positive answers has remained stable at about 63%. The importance of marriage, in terms of it's being considered an indissoluble union, is decreasing, while the idea mat "marriage is a union which can be dissolved by a simple agreement of both parties" is being seen in an increasingly favourable light (33% in 1978 and 38,5% in 1985). However, when presented as values, both marriage and family were given a high percentage of positive responses (91% for the family and 73% for marriage in 1988).

Politics Since 1973, the percentage of positive feeling about the functioning of democracy has ranged between 40% and 50%, except in exceptionally negative periods (1980 and 1983). Although politics is still considered to be an honourable activity by 61% of the people, the image of politicians suffered during the 1970s and up to 1985. Since then it has improved considerably. In 1989, 51% of those questioned considered that politicians cared very little or not at all what the electorate thinks, compared to 58% in 1985. Abstentionism is increasing, and the act of voting is losing its importance. The idea that a good citizen is someone who votes regularly was held by only 38% of those questioned in 1989, compared to 43% in 1983 and 51% in 1976. Work In 1989,66% of those interviewed felt that "we should work as little as possible," against 75% in 1977. These figures indicate the two extremes over the period in question, which was marked by relative instability of ideas about work. In 1988 and 1981, the reverse figures of 74% and 66% respectively, were obtained. Similar reactions were

345

17 Attitudes and Values

recorded for the proposition that "we should adopt the 35 hour week": 55% in favour in 1981,44% in 1983, 50% in 1986, and 43% today. However, the idea that the retirement age should be lowered has received fewer and fewer favourable responses over the last 10 years (75% in 1981 and 48% today). From these figures it is difficult to characterize the evolution of ideas about and attitudes toward work and satisfaction. The evolution of satisfaction in relation to non-working time seems to be more marked. Today, a relatively high proportion of people (about 60%) feel that work leaves enough time for outsidework activities (the family, personal activities, rest). This figure is clearly higher than the 1979 figure of about 40%. Over the shorter, more recent period between 1986 and 1989, there was a considerable increase in the number or people declaring themselves "ready to make sacrifices in order to succeed professionally": 50% in 1986 and 60% in 1989. Religion Although the proportion of people (about 60%) giving affirmative answers to the question "Do you believe in God?" has not varied much in 20 years, religious observance has suffered a distinct decline since the 1960s. In 1968, 25% of those interviewed said they went to mass every Sunday, versus only 6% in 1987. Even though 56% of French people considered a religious education to be useful in 1983, this figure is well below that of preceding years (63% in 1975). The majority of French people today are hostile to church intervention in sexual and moral matters. Overall satisfaction For the last 15 years, there has been a stable global feeling of satisfaction with life. The distribution of answers in early 1988 (14% very satisfied, 63% quite satisfied, 16% quite dissatisfied) is the same as it was in 1973. Thus the context of slow growth which characterizes the period did not affect the distribution of overall satisfaction with life. Pierre Fattaccini

References AESOP-Agorametrie. 1989. Les structures de I'opinion en 1989 Paris: AESOP. Bertier, E. 1985, March. "Les Franc.ais jugent leur niveau de vie." Futuribles. CREDOC. 1985-86. "Opinions et niveau de vie." Consommation: 4. Dupin, E. 1990. Oui, non, sans opinion: 50 ans de sondages IFOP. Paris: Inter&liu'on. "L'opinion publique dans la communaute' europ6enne." 1988, December. Eurobarometre: 30. SOFRES. 1990. L'etat de I'opinion. Paris: Seuil.

346

17.1 Satisfaction

Table 1 Overall Feelings of Satisfaction

(%)

Very satisfied Fairly satisfied Not very satisfied Not at all satisfied No reply

1973

1980

1985

1988

15 62 17 5 1

10 60 22 8 —

13 63 18 5 1

14 43 35 8 —

Source: Eurobarometre.

Table 2 Evaluation of the Economic Situation over the Last 15 Months (%)

A lot better A little better Same A little worse A lot worse Index

1982

1983

1984

1985

1986

1987

1988

1 13 29 35 20

1 16 26 33 21

1 11 24 36 26

1 19 33 31 14

1 19 45 23 8

1 15 34 35 12

1 31 39 21 6

1,92

1,68

Source: Eurobarometre.

347

1,79

2,12

2,25

2,07

2,47

17 Attitudes and Values

Tables Evaluation of Democracy

(%)

Very satisfied Fairly satisfied Not very satisfied Not at all satisfied No reply

1973

1980

1985

1988

4 37 30 16 13

3 33 32 18 12

5 39 35 13 8

8 34 43 10 5

Table 4 Evaluation of Politicians

"Overall, would you say that politicians have a lot, a little, very little or hardly any interest in what people like you think?" (%)

A lot or a little Very little or hardly any

1977

1979

1983

1985

1989

53 42

47 48

45 51

38 58

47 51

Source: Sofres/Le figaro-Magazine, May 23, 1989.

348

17.1 Satisfaction

Table 5 The Usefulness of a Religious Education "Would you say that giving a religious education to a young child is indispensable, useful, pointless, useless, or harmful?" (%) Enquete Le Pelerin/Sofres 1975 Indispensable

19)

Useful

63) 9 3 6

Pointless Useless or harmful No opinion Source: Sofres, L'fctat de I'opinion, 1984.

349

82

July 1983

15) 56) 14 7 8

71

17.2

Perception of Social Problems Abstract. Unemployment and the standard of living have been the principal subjects of national preoccupation over the last 20 years. International tensions and insecurity are sources of growing anxiety, and today they figure in the front line of personal concerns.

The principal subjects preoccupying the French people are apprehended from two points of view: national (in response to the question "In your opinion, what is the most important problem facing the country today?") and personal (in response to the question "Which of the following problems preoccupies you the most?"). As our data are incomplete, our view of the perceptions is very imperfect. The first aspect covers the period 1964-84 and the second period 1968-88. According to the survey, the most preoccupying problems in France are those related to standard of living and employment, except in years of social or political crisis such as the 1965-68 period. Employment has been mentioned more and more frequently, since the beginning of the 1970s. In 1984, 69% of those interviewed considered unemployment to be the most preoccupying problem for France. Cost of living, economic crisis, and danger of war were also mentioned, in that order of importance, with distinctly lower percentages (23%, 28%, and 12%, respectively). Financial problems, which almost one-third of the population considered to be most important at the end of the 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s, moved progressively into second position over the course of the decade. In 1978, 39% of French people said that their first personal preoccupation was unemployment, 35% said rising prices, and 13% personal security. At the beginning of the 1980s international tensions and the rise of insecurity became the principal causes of worry, whereas those related to employment and income shifted to second position. This order stands almost unchanged today. Preoccupations concerning security declined noticeably: mentioned by 72% of respondents in 1986, security is now mentioned by 56% and occupies the front rank of preoccupations, on a par with international tension. Preoccupations of an economic nature—employment, income, and prices—are also all on a par, with second rank at about 46% of respondents. Pierre Fattaccini

References Dupin, E. 1990. Oui, non, sans opinion: 50 ans de sondages IFOP Paris: Interedition. INSEE. "Enquete de conjoncture aupres des menages." Informations rapides, serie A.

350

17.2 Perception of Social Problems

Table 1 Evaluation of Living Conditions "Do you think that your living conditions will improve or deteriorate over the next five years?" (%)

1980

1982

1983

1985

1986

1987

1988

1989

Improve

21

23

23

29

26

25

34

39

Remain the same

31

31

27

35

33

33

35

36

Deteriorate

37

37

40

27

30

31

25

21

Source: Cr6doc, Consommation et modes de vie, 48 , April 1990.

Table 2 "Which of the following problems do you personally find most worrying?" (%)

Violence and insecurity Prices and the international situation Price increases Income Job tenure Taxes The social climate

1983

1984

1985

1986

1987

59 59 63 38 32 30 8

57 50

63 54 53 40 35 26 8

72 57 38 47 42 21 7

54 56

64 43 37 30 8

Source: IFOP.

351

48 45 45 24 10

17.3 Orientations to the Future Abstract. Whether respondents are assessing personal situation in the next year or living conditions in five years, pessimistic responses were on the rise until the mid1980s. The trend has since reversed. Fear of a world conflict in the short or the long term grew during the 1970s and diminished in the 1980s.

Evaluation of personal situation over the next year is an indicator of optimism or pessimism. Between 1980 and 1988, the proportion of positive evaluations doubled, from 15% and to 30%. Closer examination of responses over this period shows an irregular progression in positive evaluations. In fact, the number of persons who considered that the next year would be the same has continued to grow, reaching nearly 50% in 1988. The same question concerning living conditions in five years, time gives somewhat comparable results. The 1975-85 decade is marked by an increase in pessimistic evaluations. The proportion of people who felt that living conditions would get worse rose from 30% in 1978 to 38% in 1980, and peaked at 45% in 1984. Since then, the trend reversed and the number of people considering that living conditions will be better has increased constantly. In 1984, 19% gave a positive evaluation; two years later, 28% did so. However, this improvement was accompanied by an increase in the number of persons considering that living conditions will be similar (34,5% in 1986 compared to 28% in 1983). Questioned about foreseeable short-term international developments (within one year), the French seem to be less and less pessimistic. In 1980, 47% felt that the international situation would be worse, compared to 28% in 1988. Similarly, the proportion considering that the situation would not change rose from 37% in 1980 to 55% in 1988. Evaluations progressed in a relatively irregular fashion over the period considered. Long-term evaluation (over 10 years) of the dangers of another world war developed differently in the 1970s and the 1980s. Between 1971 and 1980, the proportion of people fearing world conflict ranged between 2,5% and 5%. Since then the score has been coming down regularly, and was close to 2% in 1988. Pierre Fattaccini

References CREDOC. Enquetes pluri-annuelles sur les conditions de vie et aspiration des Francais. "L'opinion publique dans la communautfi europeenne." 1988, December. Eurobarom&tre 30.

352

17.3 Orientations to the Future

Table 1 The next year: better or worse "So far as you are concerned, do you think that the next year (...) will be better or worse than the year which is ending?" (%)

1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 Better Worse Same No reply

15 39 35 11

32 32 28 8

18 42 36 4

17 46 31 6

15 41 36 8

26 21 45 8

26 19 47 8

24 30 25 17 43 48 8 5

Source: Eurobarometre.

Table 2 Public Perceptions of Standards of Living over the Next Five Years "Do you think that your living conditions will improve or deteriorate over the next five years?" (% of 2 000 respondents)

Will improve Will remain the same Will deteriorate Don't know

1978

1980

1982

1983

1984

1986

1989

25,9 32,1 29,9 12,1

21,1 31,0 38,2

23,8 31,0 37,8

24,0 28,0 40,1

19,7 28,3 45,2

28,0 34,5 28,3

39,0 37,0 21,0 13,0

7,4

9,7

Source: CREDOC.

353

7,9

6,8

9,2

17 Attitudes and Values

TableS Risk of a world war in the next ten years "Would you, with the help of this card, tell me how you assess the chance of a world war breaking out in the next 10 years?" (%)

World war within the next ten years

100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10

1971

1980

1981

1983

1984

1985

1987

2,0 1,0 3,0 2,0 2,0

3,0 3,4

2,8 2,7 4,6 6,3 7,2

4,4 2,6 5,0 5,5 5,4

2,4 0,8 2,7 3,8 2,7

1,4 0,6 2,1 2,7 4,0

1,5 1,2 2,5 3,6 3,9

13,0

19,5

8,5 7,8

16,2

18,6

19,1

15,4

13,5

10,1

11,8 10,4

10,9 11,1 13,7

10,4 12,6 14,7

11,5 12,4 15,7

18,8

6,4

4,9

10,0

8,4 9,0 7,7 6,3

No danger of war

32,0

10,4

14,8

17,6

24,7

30,7

27,2

No reply

15,0

0,0

6,6

2,8

1,7

0,5

1,2

4,85

3,84

3,71

2,91

2,49

2,63

Mean score

4,0 8,0 8,0

2,47

8,8 9,6 7,8

Source: Eurobarometre.

354

7,1 8,7

5,9

17.4

Values Abstract. The 1970s saw a decline in positive evaluations of the family; in the 1980s there was a slight upswing. The French show a limited attraction to economic liberalism and a strong attachment to social rights and institutions. There is instability in appreciation of work and a loss of confidence in trade unions. The decline in religious faith is surpassed by that in religious observance.

Values are exogenous to the Louis Dim model and are retained here only to facilitate international comparison. The term is used in the limited sense of the opinions and attitudes of those interviewed on four principal themes: the family, politics, work, and religion, and morality. These four domains are also studied in terms of satisfaction in section 17.1, "Satisfaction." Family Study of the evolution of ideas concerning the family reveals a contrast between the 1970s and the 1980s. The vast majority still appreciate the family as a living environment. A decline was recorded in the 1970s, and there has been a slight upswing since 1982. Similarly, the idea that "the family should remain the basic element of society" was in decline until the mid-1980s: 86% agreed with this statement in 1977, and 75% did so in 1983. Developments since then indicate a slight upward tendency, from 78% in 1984 to 84% in 1988. Compared to other social values, the family receives the greatest percentage of positive evaluations (91%), and this percentage rose slightly between 1981 and 1988. Hostility to marriage, although quantitatively very low, rose steadily until the mid-1980s. The statement that "people should not get married" received 18% agreement in 1985, up from 13% in 1978, then declined to 11% in 1989. The idea of women having an active role in social and political life has become more and more acceptable. The statement that "women should never work when they have young children" received fewer and fewer favourable responses: 28% in 1986 compared to 40% in 1978. In the political domain, 40 years ago, there was strong disagreement (75%) with the idea that a woman might hold the position of president. In 1988, only 7% of those interviewed were against this notion, and 91% were for it.

Politics The idea that the organization of society should be changed radically through revolutionary action is in decline. On average, this option was held by fewer than 6% of those interviewed in the 1980s, compared to 10% in the 1970s. The percentage of people who think that society should be improved through reforms (about 65%) has remained stable and very much in the majority over the period under study. The results of the principal surveys on economic liberalism seem contradictory. Opinions obviously depend very largely on the political situation and on the polysemantic character of the terms used: liberalism, capitalism, socialism, state control, and so on. When asked to rank a list of words in order of preference, French people chose liberalism, thrift, competition, and socialism, in that order, in every survey between 1982 and 1988. Although they were largely in favour of "reducing as much as possible the differences between incomes" (the percentage dropped at the end of the 1970s and rose again at the end of the 1980s to 64% in 1989), they were also voted massively against

355

17 Attitudes and Values

inheritance restrictions (52% in 1977 and 69% in 1989). The mid-1980s passion for "less state intervention" and privatization is clearly in decline, as is the idea that companies pay too many social-coverage expenses (from 74% in 1984 to 60% in 1988). We conclude that the French were only partly and temporarily won over by the liberal wave of the 1980s; they remain strongly attached to their social rights and to the institutions that guarantee them. They are more and more in favour of total maintenance of the unemployed (from 57% in 1981 to 67% in 1989); in correlation with this, they are more and more hostile to reductions in unemployment benefits (from 48% in 1983 to 67% in 1989). The importance of the homeland varies with the degree of personal implication inherent in the way the questions are asked. When the idea of personal sacrifice is involved, attitudes toward the homeland have declined somewhat, although not constantly, over the last 15 years. On the other hand, when the homeland is presented as a value, it receives a stable percentage of favourable responses at about 70%. Work The great majority of people responded negatively to the statement that "people should work as little as possible" at the end of the 1970s and right through the 1980s. In the absence of a developing trend in answers to this statement (see 17.1, "Satisaction"), there is relative stability of answers clearly in favour (15% to 20%) or quite in favour (10% to 15%), whereas the deviation from average of clearly hostile responses is greater (65% to 75% in 1989). When presented as a value, work received a relatively high percentage of responses in favour (75%) and showed a decline only in 1981 and 1988 (-3%). There is greater constancy in appreciation of trade unions: when asked whether trade unions were indispensable, fewer than 50% answered affirmatively in 1989, compared to 60% in 1981. A survey carried out at 10-year intervals asking workers what would be the best way to improve their company's role in their lives showed a strong desire to see increased profit-sharing (32% in 1989, compared to 18% in 1978). Over the same period, information campaigns on decisions concerning the company and professional training showed a decline in popularity (-5% and -7%, respectively), and there was a slight increase in demand for worker participation in work organization and conditions (+3%). Religion and Morality The constancy of religious faith, as expressed in the unchanging proportion of people over the last 20 years claiming to believe in God, contrasts with the decline in religious observance recorded over the same period (see 17.1, "Satisfaction"). In the mid-1980s, 15% considered that a religious education was "indispensable" for a young child, and 56% felt that it was "useful." These percentages were considerably higher 10 years earlier (19% and 63%, respectively). When presented as a value, religion received the approval of 50% of respondents. This index has dropped by only -3% over the 1980s. Hostility to church intervention in political matters rose from 50% in 1982 to 67% in 1987. The percentage in favour of liberalization of abortion has grown slowly and irregularly over 15 years, whereas the number against it has remained relatively constant at 30%. Capital

356

17.4 Values

punishment had the support of 60% of the country until it was abolished in 1981. Today, 50% of those interviewed are in favour of reintroducing it. Pierre Fattaccini

References AESOP-Agorametrie. 1989. Les structures de I'opinion en 1989. Paris: AESOP. CREDOC. Enquetes pluri-annuelles sur les conditions de vie et aspiration des Francais. Dupin, E. 1990. Out, non, sans opinion: 50 ans de sondages IF OP Paris: Intere"dition. SOFRES. depuis 1977 L'6tat de 1'opinion. Paris: Seuil.

357

17 Attitudes and Values

Table 1 The Family (%) Points of conflict

1977

1978

1981

1982

1984

8 11 81

10 12 78

9 13 78

64 20 16

63 20 17

66 20 14

1986

1988

1989

11 14 75

6 10 84

6 12 82

65 20 15

73 16 11

73 16 11

In favour of the family "The family should remain the basic unit in society"

Against Indifferent In favour

6 8 86

8 9 83

Against marriage

"People should not get married any more"

Against Indifferent In favour

75 15 10

72 15 13

Source: Agoramgtrie, 1989.

Table 2 Public Perception of Working Women (%)

1978

1979

1981

1982

1984

1986

1988

1989

Against

68

67

58

60

58

54

57

54

In favour

32

33

42

40

42

45

43

46

Source: CREDOC, Consommation et modes de vie, 58, April 1991.

358

17.4 Values

Table 3 Politics (%)

Points of conflict

1978

1981

1982

1984

1986

1988

1989

Equality of income: Differences between income should be reduced as much as possible Against Indifferent In favour

11 14 76

14 16 70

20 22 58

29 21 50

23 19 58

19 19 62

18 18 64

54 29 17

57 26 17

62 22 16

70 17 13

69 19 12

69 19 12

— — —

27 32 41

39 35 26

32 38 30

43 48 19

58 19 23

59 21 20

53 25 22

54 23 23

24 24 52

23 24 53

20 26 54

17 23 60

Inheritances: Inheritances must be limited Against Indifferent In favour

51 27 22

State presence: The role of the state must be reduced Against Indifferent In favour

— — —

— — —

Patriotism: We should be ready to sacrifice ourselves for our country Against Indifferent In favour

52 22 26

53 21 26

55 18 27

Military spending: It is essential to reduce military spending Against Indifferent In favour

19 26 55

24 26 50

26 26 48

Assistance to underdeveloped countries: We should greatly increase our aid to underdeveloped countries Against Indifferent In favour

33 23 44

28 24 48

29 27 44

36 24 40

27 24 49

29 27 44

31 24 45

— — —

22 31 47

20 25 55

20 28 52

11 26 63

Ecology: We should support ecology movements Against Indifferent In favour

12 24 64

— — —

359

17 Attitudes and Values

Table 4 Work (%)

1978

1981

1982

1984

1986

1988

1989

66 14

72 13

67 15

74 12

66 16

48

36 19

45

28 22

50

35 22

43

30 27

23 22

29 26

22 24

29 21

28 24

Against work: We should work as little as possible Against Indifferent In favour

69 14

17

65 13

22

20

15

18

14

18

The 35-hour week: We should adopt the 35 -hour week Against Indifferent In favour

— —

34 16

35 17

50

43

The necessity of unions: Unions are indispensable Against Indifferent In favour

— —

19 17

64

55

Source: Agorame'trie, 1989.

360

45

54

50

48

17.4 Values

Table 5 Morality , Mores (°>&) 1984

1986

1988

1989

54

30 17

53

34 15

51

30 16

54

32 16

52

25 17

57 14











29



















34 15

32 15

42 16

42

36 15

49

34 16

35 21

38 24

38

36 21

43

31 26

43

44 17

30 18

35 14

31 17

83 8

78 10

84 7

82 8

1978

1981

1982

Abortion on demand: Freely available abortion is a good thing Against Indifferent In favour

28 20

52

29 17

58

Abolition of the death penalty Against Indifferent In favour

61 12

27

Restoration of the death penalty Against Indifferent In favour

51

53

50

Pornography: We should actively combat pornography Against Indifferent In favour

28 21

51

28 26

31 23

46

46

44

Homosexuals : Homosexuals are the same as everyone else Against Indifferent In favour

— —

37 19

42 18

44

40

39

52

51

52

Legalization of hashish: Hashish should be freely available Against Indifferent In favour









80 10

10

Source: Agoram6trie, 1989.

361

9

12

9

10

17.5 National Identity Abstract. The majority of French people are proud of their nationality, and a minority are ready to sacrifice themselves for the homeland. They are in favour of increasing regional power, but their sense of belonging to a region is low. There is a growing majority of positive attitudes toward Europe, although the abstention rate in European elections is high.

The great majority of French people are proud of being French: between 75% and over the last 15 years. A 1977 survey showed that 86% of people, when asked which nationality they would choose to be born into if they had the choice, chose to be born in France. Only 4% did not have an opinion. A slight increase in this trend was noted during the 1980s. When asked, "Would you say that you are proud to be French?," 76% responded "very proud" or "fairly proud" in 1981, and 82% did so in 1985; in 1987 the figure was 78%, of whom 51% were "very proud." Positive attitudes toward the homeland are far from being in the majority and have shown a decline in the last 15 years. The idea that "you should sacrifice yourself for your homeland" is viewed with less and less favour: 30% in 1977, 25% in 1983, and 23% in 1989. Nevertheless, in the course of the 1980s, confidence in the homeland as a value remained stable. The proportion of people feeling "rather confident" remained close to 70% between 1981 and 1988. In an ad hoc 1987 survey, 49% of French people said that they were ready to die for France, and 35% did not envisage such a possibility. Over the 20 years in question, those interviewed were in favour of a transfer of power of decision to the regions. In a 1970 survey, 59% of those interviewed recognized the "necessity of decentralizing state power" and 64% were in favour of "regional reforms aiming at increasing the power of the regions." The same trend can be seen in surveys carried out throughout the 1970s and 1980s. By giving more power of decision to local bodies, the 1982 institutional reforms responded in part to the expressed wish of the majority, although they did not satisfy the greater economic, ethnic, and cultural demands of the Basque, Breton, and particularly Corsican militants who have been active since the 1970s. The Observatoire Interregional du Politique surveys carried out after 1985 show that those interviewed identified first of all with France (between 40% and 45%), and secondarily with their town or commune (between 35% and 40%); the region takes in third position with the relatively low proportion of between 10% and 15%. No great regional differences were found. Over the last 20 years, there has been a large and growing majority of positive attitudes toward European unification. On average, the proportion of people "very much" or "quite" in favour was slightly below 75% during the 1970s and over 80% in the 1980s. The number of those with no opinion declined constantly during the period, from 22% in 1970 to 6% in 1988. Abstention rates in European elections nevertheless remain high. In a more recent survey on a variety of subjects related to supranationality, French people appeared to be less hostile to possible changes of power in economic and legislative matters. In May of 1989,60% were moderately in favour of replacing French currency with a European currency, against only 49% five years earlier, and 46% were in favour of replacing French laws with European laws, against 41% in 1984. But people

362

17.5 National Identity

are more reserved on matters of defence: 44% remained against and 39% were moderately in favour of replacing the French army with a European army. The proportion of those against has dropped from 51% in 1984. Today, 79% are against the idea of replacing the French flag with a European one.

Pierre Fattaccini

References AESOP-Agorametrie. 1989. Les structures de I'opinion en 1989 Paris: AESOP. "La region." 1973, January-April. Les cahiersFrangais, 158-159. "L'opinion publique dans la communautS europ£enne." 1988, December. Eurobarometre 30. Observatoire Inter-re'gional du Politique, Enquete 1989. SOFRES, depuis 1977 L'6tat de I'opinion Paris: Seuil. Touraine, A. and F., Dubet. 1981. "Les pays centre lEtat." in Reynaud J.-D., Grafmeyer Y., Frangais, qui e*tes-vous ? Paris: Documentation Frangaise.

363

17 Attitudes and Values

Table 1 Development of the Role of France in World Affairs under the Four Presidents of the Fifth Republic (%) Under General de Gaulle 04/1968

Under G. Pompidou 01/1970

Under V. Giscard dEstaing 04/1979

Under F. Mitterand 08/1985

Perception of the next 15 years 08/1985 a

Very great Great

18 57

5 54

8 51

3 50

3 42

Rather small Very small

10 1

30 4

28 3

36 3

34 3

No opinion

14

7

10

8

18

a. The exact words of the question were: "In the 15 years between now and the year 2000 do you think that the influence of France on world affairs will be very great, great, rather small or very small?" Source: UEXPANSION Survey of 22 to 28 August 1985.

364

17.5 National Identity

Table 2 Pride in Being French (%) Are you personally proud of being French? French people 18-24 years 25-34 years 35-49 years 50-64 years Overall

51 27 19 2 1

Very proud Rather proud Not particularly proud Not at all proud No opinion

35 30 30 2 3

39 28 29 2 2

49 28 20 2 1

61 26 10 2 1

65 years and over

73 21 6 — —

Source: SOFRES Survey of 19 to 23 June 'The French and the idea of the homeland today," conducted for LE FIGARO-MAGAZINE.

Table 3 Attitudes toward Unification of Western Europe (%)

Very much for Rather for Rather against Very much against No reply

1965

1980

1985

1988

74 — 5 21

19 56 9 2 14

28 55 7 1 9

34 52 6 2 6

Source: Eurobarometre.

365

17 Attitudes and Values

Table 4 Supranationality Would you be rather in favour of or rather against: May 1989

Figaro/SOFRES survey April 1984 Rather in favour

Rather against

No Rather opinion favourable

The replacement of French currency by a European currency

49

40

11

French legislation (e.g. the length of the working week, vacation) being replaced by European legislation

41

43

The French army being replaced a European army

31

The French team in sporting events being replaced by a European team The French flag being replaced by a European flag

Rather against

No opinion

60

33

7

16

46

40

14

51

18

39

44

17

19

59

22

23

57

20

16

76

8

17

79

4

Source: SOFRES survey of 25 to 27 May 1989 on "The French and the European elections," conducted for LA TRIBUNE DE LEXPANSION.

366

17.5 National Identity

Table 5 The Homeland "We should be ready to sacrifice" (%)

1977 Against Only a little or indifferent In favour

45 25 30

1981 1982 1983

53 21 26

55 18 27

Source: AESOP, 1989.

367

51 24 25

1984 1985

58 19 23

56 19 25

1986

59 21 20

1987 1988 1989

54 22 24

53 25 22

54 23 23

17 Attitudes and Values

Table 6 Regions "With which of the following areas do you identify primarily: the town or commune where you live, the department, the region, France?" (%)

Results 1987 The town, commune... The department The region France None of the above Don't know Results 1985 The town, commune... The department The region France None of the above Don't know 1989 The town, commune... The department The region France None of the above Don't know

36 6 13 39 4 2 33 5 11 45 5 1 41 7 11 38 2 1

Source: Survey 1989, Le fait regional, comparative results, OIP, FNSPCNRS.

368

Comparative Charting of Social Change Editor: Simon Langlois Laval University and IQRC, Canada

Recent Social Trends in the United States 1960-1990 Theodore Caplow, Howard M. Bahr, John Modell, Bruce A. Chadwick Recent Social Trends in Quebec 1960-1990 Simon Langlois, Jean-Paul Baillargeon, Gary Caldwell, Guy Fr6chet, Madeleine Gauthier, Jean-Pierre Simard Recent Social Trends in the Federal Republic of Germany 1960-1990 Wolfang Glatzer, Karl-Otto Hondrich, Heinz Herbert Noll, Karin Stiehr, Barbara Worndl Recent Social Trends in France 1960-1990 Michel Forse, Jean-Pierre Jaslin, Yannick Lemel, Henri Mendras, Denis Stoclet, Jean-Hugues De"chaux

In preparation: Recent Social Trends in Spain 1960-1990 Salustiano Del Campo et al.