Rebuilding Afghanistan in times of crisis : a global response 9781138571587, 113857158X

Table of contents :
The Afghan Economy : An Historical Overview / Peter Marsden --
Locality and Power : A Methodological Approach to Afghan Rural Politics / Sayed Asef Hossaini --
Women and Economic Development in Post Conflict Afghanistan : Learning from other Muslim Nations / Nicole B. Dhanraj, Hilary Johnson-Lutz and Thomas Rzemyk --
International Development and Gender in Afghanistan : The Impact of the Women, Peace and Security Agenda from 2001-2015 / Kristen Cordell --
Women, Peace and Security : The Uphill Battle of Transforming Afghanistan through Women's Meaningful Participation in Peacebuilding and Security / Jorrit Kamminga --
Reconstruction and Gender : Why Women are Crucial to the Successful Reconstruction of Afghanistan / Shukria Dellawar and Christina Tsirkas --
Afghanistan and the Politics of Quagmire : A Retrospective Analysis of US Policy / David N. Gibbs --
China in Afghanistan : A New Force in the War in Afghanistan? / Niklas L.P. Swanström and Julian Tucker --
India's support for Afghanistan's reconstruction / Gareth Price --
Afghanistan Imbroglio : Reassessing External Powers' Role in Rebuilding the Country / K.N. Tennyson --
Evaluating World Bank Support to Building Capacity of the State and its Accountability to Citizens in Afghanistan / Clay G. Wescott --
Concluding Remarks : The Way Forward for Afghanistan / Adenrele Awotona.

Citation preview

Rebuilding Afghanistan in Times of Crisis

Rebuilding Afghanistan in Times of Crisis provides academics and researchers interested in planning, urbanism and conflict studies with a multidisciplinary, international assessment of the reconstruction and foreign aid efforts in Afghanistan. The book draws together expert contributions from countries across three continents – Asia, Europe and North America – which have provided external aid to Afghanistan. Using international, regional and local approaches, it highlights the importance of rebuilding sustainable communities in the midst of ongoing uncertainties. It explores the efficacy of external aid; challenges faced; the response of multilateral international agencies; the role of women in the reconstruction process; and community-­based natural disaster risk management strategies. Finally, it looks at the lessons learned in the conflict reconstruction process to better prepare the country for future potential human, economic, infrastructural and institutional vulnerabilities. Adenrele Awotona, Professor of Sustainable Urban Development in the School for the Environment, is the Founder and Director of the Center for Rebuilding Sustainable Communities after Disasters at the University of Massachusetts, Boston. He was previously a Director of Studies for the British Council International Seminars (“Reconstruction after disasters”) in the UK. He has also organized major international conferences (on Afghanistan, China, Iraq, Japan, etc.) and hosted a workshop for the U.S. Department of State (with participants from Brazil, Chile, Uruguay, Argentina and Paraguay). A stream of publications has emanated from both his research and his consultancy services.

Routledge Research in Planning and Urban Design

Routledge Research in Planning and Urban Design is a series of academic monographs for scholars working in these disciplines and the overlaps between them. Building on Routledge’s history of academic rigour and cutting-­ edge research, the series contributes to the rapidly expanding literature in all areas of planning and urban design. The Metaphysical City Six Ways of Understanding the Urban Milieu Rob Sullivan The City in Geography Renaturing the Built Environment Benedict Anderson Public Infrastructure, Private Finance Developer Obligations and Responsibilities Edited by Demetrio Muñoz Gielen and Erwin van der Krabben Planning Australia’s Healthy Built Environments Jennifer Kent, Susan Thompson By-­Right, By-­Design Housing Development versus Housing Design in Los Angeles Liz Falletta Rebuilding Afghanistan in Times of Crisis A Global Response Edited by Adenrele Awotona www.routledge.com/­Routledge-­Research-­in-­Planning-­and-­Urban-­Design/­ book-­series/­RRPUD

Rebuilding Afghanistan in Times of Crisis A Global Response Edited by Adenrele Awotona

First published 2019 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 52 Vanderbilt Avenue, New York, NY 10017 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2019 selection and editorial matter, Adenrele Awotona; individual chapters, the contributors The right of Adenrele Awotona to be identified as the author of the editorial material, and of the authors for their individual chapters, has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. The views and opinions expressed in this book are those of the editor and contributors and do not necessarily reflect the views and opinions of Routledge. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing-­in-­Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-­in-­Publication Data Names: Awotona, Adenrele A., editor. Title: Rebuilding Afghanistan in times of crisis : a global response / edited by Adenrele Awotona. Description: Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY : Routledge, 2019. | Series: Routledge research in planning and urban design | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: LCCN 2019005864 (print) | LCCN 2019022007 (ebook) | ISBN 9780203702659 (eBook) | ISBN 9781138571587 | ISBN 9781138571587 (hardback : alk. paper) Subjects: LCSH: Postwar reconstruction—Afghanistan. | Afghanistan—Economic policy. | Economic assistance—Afghanistan. | Women in development—Afghanistan. | Peace–building—Afghanistan. | Afghanistan—Foreign economic relations. Classification: LCC HC417 (ebook) | LCC HC417 .R425 2019 (print) | DDC 338.9581—dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2019005864 ISBN: 978-­1-­138-­57158-­7 (hbk) ISBN: 978-­0-­203-­70265-­9 (ebk) Typeset in Sabon by Apex CoVantage, LLC

Contents

List of figuresviii List of tablesix Contributor biographiesx Prefacexiii PART I

Background1

Introduction to Part I

3

ADENRELE AWOTONA

  1 Housing and disaster risk management in uncertain times: notes on Afghanistan

5

ADENRELE AWOTONA

  2 The Afghan economy: a historical overview

31

PETER MARSDEN

  3 Locality and power: a methodological approach to Afghan rural politics

49

SAYED ASEF HOSSAINI

PART II

The role of women in the reconstruction process69

Introduction to Part II ADENRELE AWOTONA

71

vi  Contents   4 Women and economic development in post-­conflict Afghanistan: learning from other Muslim nations

75

NICOLE DHANRAJ, HILARY JOHNSON-­L UTZ AND THOMAS J. RZEMYK

  5 International development and gender in Afghanistan: the impact of the women, peace and security agenda 2001–2015

90

KRISTEN A. CORDELL

  6 Women, peace and security: the uphill battle of transforming Afghanistan through women’s meaningful participation in peacebuilding and security

105

JORRIT KAMMINGA

  7 Reconstruction and gender: why women are crucial to the successful reconstruction of Afghanistan

123

SHUKRIA DELLAWAR AND CHRISTINA TSIRKAS

PART III

International donor community responses139

Introduction to Part III

141

ADENRELE AWOTONA

  8 Afghanistan and the politics of quagmire: a retrospective analysis of US policy

143

DAVID N. GIBBS

  9 China in Afghanistan – a new force in the war in Afghanistan?

156

NIKLAS SWANSTRÖM AND JULIAN TUCKER

10 India’s support for Afghanistan’s reconstruction

174

GARETH PRICE

11 Afghanistan imbroglio: reassessing external powers’ role in rebuilding the country K. N. TENNYSON

186

Contents vii 12 Evaluating World Bank support for building the capacity of the state and its accountability to citizens in Afghanistan

201

CLAY G. WESCOTT

13 Concluding remarks: the way forward for Afghanistan

215

ADENRELE AWOTONA

Index220

Figures

3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5

Kurtz’s power resources tree Two analytical instruments used for social space analysis A perspective of the valley from Nabi Bāy’s house The ceilings of a house in Akhshay village Akhshay farmland at the end of Sabzak Valley, in the north of Bamiyan Province

53 59 61 63 65

Tables

1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 6.1 6.2 1.1 1 11.2 11.3 11.4

Population of Afghanistan (2016 and earlier) Afghanistan Population Forecast Voluntary Repatriation 2002–2013 Total External Aid to Afghanistan (2002–2013) Structural challenges limiting women’s meaningful participation in peacebuilding Structural challenges limiting women’s meaningful participation in the security sector Exports and Imports General Government Revenue and Aid Flows 2002–2009 Cabinet-­Approved National Development Budget (US$ million) Donors Commitment and Disbursement (US$ million)

6 7 9 14 113 116 187 188 189 192

Contributor biographies

Adenrele Awotona, PhD (University of Cambridge, UK), is a professor of sustainable urban development in the School for the Environment and the founder and director of the Center for Rebuilding Sustainable Communities after Disasters at the University of Massachusetts, Boston. Kristen A. Cordell has worked as a development and conflict expert in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, Afghanistan and Lebanon. Working for the United Nations and the Organization for Security Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), she advised on issues related to stabilization, human security and empowerment strategies for vulnerable communities. Shukria Dellawar, senior fellow at the Center for International Policy, previously worked as director of advocacy and research at Women Thrive Worldwide. She has led several fact-­finding trips to Afghanistan, advocating for peace and human rights. She holds a bachelor of science and a master of science from George Mason’s School of Conflict Analysis and Resolution. Dellawar is fluent in Dari, Pashto, Urdu and English. Nicole Dhanraj began her career in the US Army, where she earned her degree in radiology technology in 2000. She earned her bachelor’s degree in psychology from St Martin’s University, master’s in international relations from Troy State University and a doctorate from Capella University with an emphasis in organizational management. David N. Gibbs a professor of history at University of Arizona has published works on the international relations of Eastern Europe, sub-­Saharan Africa and Afghanistan. The author of two books, Professor Gibbs is currently researching the rise of conservative politics in the United States during the 1970s. Sayed Asef Hossaini was born in 1980 in Balkh, Afghanistan. One year later, his family immigrated to Iran where he lived as a refugee for twenty-­ two years. He moved to Afghanistan in 2003 and studied sociology and philosophy at Kabul University. In 2016, he earned his PhD from Willy Brandt School of Public Policy in Germany.

Contributor biographies xi Hilary Johnson-­Lutz, associate faculty at the University of Phoenix School of Business and the Ashford University Forbes School of Business, has spent over twenty years in the U.S. Air Force and holds a bachelor of science in business management from National Louis University, a master of science in management from Troy University and a doctorate in organization and management from Capella University. Jorrit Kamminga is senior fellow at the Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael and policy advisor for Oxfam in Afghanistan. He holds a PhD in international relations from the University of Valencia, Spain. Dr. Kamminga has been working in Afghanistan since 2005, focusing especially on the nexus between security and development. Peter Marsden worked as a political analyst from 1989 to 2006 in support of the programs of British NGOs operating in Afghanistan. Since then, he has operated as a consultant specializing in refugee and livelihood-­related issues. He has written extensively on Afghanistan and on its economy. Gareth Price is a senior research fellow in the Asia Program at Chatham House, the Royal Institute of International Affairs, London. His research focuses on the economics, politics and international relations of the countries of South Asia. He previously worked for the Economist Intelligence Unit and the Control Risks Group. Thomas J. Rzemyk serves as a university professor at multiple institutions across the United States. He holds a doctor of education from Northcentral University, Prescott Valley, Arizona, and has two cyber security textbooks being released during 2019 and 2020. Niklas Swanström, PhD in peace and conflict studies from Uppsala University, Sweden, is the director at the Institute for Security and Development Policy, a Stockholm-­based non-­profit and non-­partisan research and policy organization. He is also a non-­resident professor at Sichuan and Leshan Universities in China. K. N. Tennyson, PhD, is an assistant professor at the Afghanistan Studies Programme, MMAJ Academy of International Studies, Jamia Millia Islamia, New Delhi. His areas of research interest include Afghanistan, India’s foreign policy, Northeast India politics and South Asian security issues. He is the author of the book Political Developments in Afghanistan: Implications for India. Christina Tsirkas is a licensed attorney who earned her juris doctorate in 2012 from Hofstra University School of Law, New York. In 2015, she traveled to Afghanistan as communications manager for Women for Afghan Women, a non-­profit organization dedicated to the advancement of Afghan women’s rights.

xii  Contributor biographies Julian Tucker is a research coordinator and junior research fellow at the Institute for Security and Development Policy’s China Center. He completed his studies in the master of arts program at the Humboldt University in Berlin, Germany. Clay G. Wescott is an evaluation and management consultant and is president of the International Public Management Network. Before his current work with the World Bank, he held senior positions with the Asian Development Bank, UNDP, Development Alternatives, Inc., Price Waterhouse and the Harvard Institute for International Development, and he taught at Princeton University. He has degrees in government from Harvard College (bachelor of arts, 1968) and Boston University (PhD, 1980). He has also edited two books.

Preface

Afghanistan, an extremely poor country, continues to be in the midst of a brutal and seemingly never-­ending war. Quoting the US forces in Afghanistan, Grobe (2016) notes that “today, one-­third of the country’s districts are either under insurgent control or influence or at risk of coming under it.” Indeed, in October 2016, Taliban battled their way into Kunduz, confirming retired Army Lt. Col. Jason Dempsey’s view that “the insurgency is stronger than ever” (Grobe 2016). Dempsey last served in 2015 as special assistant to the chairman of the US joint chiefs of staff. In its thirty-­third quarterly report on the status of the US reconstruction effort in Afghanistan, the congressional watchdog for the war, the special inspector general for Afghanistan reconstruction (SIGAR) also stated that “Afghanistan remains one of the worst places in the world to be a woman” (SIGAR 2016, 3). The report continues: The Washington Post recently quoted an unnamed senior U.S. administration official characterizing the security situation in Afghanistan as an “eroding stalemate.” The security section of this report discusses some worrisome facts that might support such a view: (1) Afghan army and police numbers remain below authorized-­strength goals, (2) the security forces suffer from high levels of attrition, (3) the United States lacks visibility into most Afghan units’ actual levels of training and effectiveness, (4) the security forces have questionable abilities to sustain and maintain units and materiel, and (5) the security forces continue to deploy commando and other highly skilled units on missions that should be undertaken by regular units. (SIGAR 2016, i) In March 1948, just after the end of World War II, the US Congress passed the Economic Cooperation Act and approved funding of over US$12 billion for the rebuilding of war-­ravaged Western Europe. That comprehensive European Recovery Program was nicknamed the Marshall Plan (U.S. Department of State Undated; Rostoum 2015).

xiv  Preface In 2014, after over a decade of war in Afghanistan, records show that more United States and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) money had been invested in the “reconstruction” of that country than was spent on the Marshall Plan (Engelhardt 2014; McCloskey et al. 2015; Sorel and Padoan 2008; Congressional Record 2003; Dobbins et al. 2008). Similarly, according to the World Bank, the international donor community has spent some US$30 billion in Afghanistan since the year 2000. Furthermore, from 2008 to 2016, the total value of the United Nations investments in Afghanistan (through its UN-­Habitat) was US$291,435,060 (UN-­Habitat 2016a). Moreover, since the first landmark ministerial-­level meeting on Afghanistan, which took place in Tokyo, Japan, in January 2002, attended by more than sixty countries and twenty international organizations and co-­chaired by Japan, the United States, Saudi Arabia and the European Union, billions of dollars have been spent on addressing Afghanistan’s reconstruction needs as assessed by the United Nations Development Program, the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank (Embassy of Afghanistan 2006; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2012): • The reintegration of former combatants as productive participants in the country’s economic recovery • The revival of economic activity • A fairer justice system, democratic institutions and mechanisms for the protection of human rights • Basic services, such as clean water, sanitation, schools, healthcare and roads • Gender equity and the protection of children and their rights • Security throughout the country. Similarly, at a conference in Brussels on October 5, 2016, co-­hosted by Afghanistan and the European Union, in which seventy-­five countries and twenty-­six international organizations and agencies participated, the donor nations stated their intent “to provide $US15.2 billion between 2017 and 2020 in support of Afghanistan’s development priorities” (SIGAR 2016, i). At the conference, the Afghan government presented its new Five-­Year Plan for attaining self-­reliance, the National Peace and Development Framework. These commitments made in Brussels are in addition to those made by donor countries in early 2016 at the NATO summit in Warsaw: “to maintain security assistance to Afghanistan at more than $[US]4 billion annually through 2020” (SIGAR 2016, i). Hence, the central objective of this edited volume is to evaluate the reconstruction activities and effectiveness of the massive investment in Afghanistan since 2000. It also tackles various vital concerns and challenges for rebuilding sustainable communities in Afghanistan amid current uncertainties. These include the examination of different aspects of the ongoing reconstruction of Afghanistan, such as poverty, gender-­focused training and capacity building,

Preface xv a strategic assessment of the intervention of the United States and other governments, physical and policy development, the political economy and the linkages among all these aspects, especially those between community-­ level actions and national public policy. The roles of a variety of sectors and actors – both state and non-­state from within Afghanistan, the region and the international community – are explored by academics and researchers, development and conflict experts, policy advisors, an evaluation consultant, and gender activists whose work has contributed to the strategic growth of Afghanistan; by a disaster studies specialist; and, by human rights advocates. The emphasis of their contributions includes the role of women in the recovery and development processes; mainstreaming gender; good governance and accountability practices; stabilization, monitoring and evaluation; and ­post-­conflict reconstruction. This unique book aims to contribute to the reader’s understanding of the following: • The historical roots of the present-­day US policy dilemma in Afghanistan • The national-­level approaches, the local interventions and the role of the formation of human capital in rebuilding Afghanistan (including how women’s knowledge, agency and collective action are absolutely necessary if Afghanistan is to achieve sustainable development) • The response of international multilateral agencies to the urgent need for urban and rural improvement, intentional planning and community-­ based disaster risk management (DRM) • The efficacy of external aid • The lessons learned in the in-­conflict reconstruction process to prepare the country better for any possible future human, economic, infrastructural and institutional vulnerabilities • Concrete, actionable recommendations to guide the roadmap going forward. Rebuilding Afghanistan in Times of Crisis aims to provide valuable discussion of the various dimensions of the reconstruction efforts that address the built environment and its infrastructure, the role of women in the reconstruction process and the role of the United States government for three primary audiences: 1) academics, including educators, scholars, researchers, graduate students and scientists interested in various aspects of the reconstruction process, such as housing, disaster management, development studies, environmental studies, the efficacy of external aid and humanitarianism; 2) practitioners in non-­governmental organizations (NGOs), civil society organizations (CSO) and community-­based organizations, as well as architects, engineers, landscape architects, crisis mappers, hydrogeologists, planners at all levels (regional, city, urban, community, neighborhood, economic, social, physical) and allied professionals; and 3) officials and policymakers, including leaders in the private sector and not-­for-­profit agencies,

xvi  Preface public policymakers and officials of government and multilateral organizations dealing with the rebuilding of Afghanistan. This volume has several distinctive features. First, it is much more than an assessment of the reconstruction activities and their effectiveness. It attempts to answer a question that arises from foreign assistance: “so what?” The contributing authors draw lessons from their assessment and make proposals for more effective intervention and aid to the country. Second, it is the only academic volume to focus on researched information regarding the interrelatedness of public policy and governance, poverty, natural disasters and DRM as well as the ongoing efforts by multilateral, public-­and private sector agencies to address them. Consequently, the book will be an immeasurably valuable resource and multidisciplinary reference point for all participants in the strategic and sustainable planning of Afghanistan’s future social, legal, physical, economic and political growth. Academics and the United States government have published journal articles, reports and books that deal mainly with war, anthropology, military history, politics, and the cultural and political history of Afghanistan. Some examples of these would suffice. Coburn (2011) conducted and published the first extended anthropological study of an Afghan community after the Taliban were removed from power by the United States. In it, he examines the apparently paradoxical situation in the small town of Istalif, exploring how the town’s local politics maintain peace despite a long, violent history in a country dealing with a growing insurgency. In the same year, Thomas Barfield, a Boston University anthropologist, published his history of Afghanistan (Barfield 2011). The book by the Kabul preservationist Rory Stewart and political economist Gerald Knaus, Can Intervention Work? is an account of their firsthand experiences of political and military-­ driven efforts in Iraq, Afghanistan and the Balkans, which examines what we can and cannot achieve in a new era of “nation-­building” (Stewart and Knaus 2011). In 2010, the U.S. Government Accountability Office published a volume, Securing, Stabilizing and Rebuilding Afghanistan and Iraq, which comprised two reports on the advancement in the global war on terror (U.S. Government Accountability Office 2010). The first report looks at where improvements can be made in such areas as emergency food assistance, drug control, security and the reconstitution of the local police in Afghanistan, and it examines the obstacles to continued development of the country. Mujtaba (2005) focuses on the realities of war, atrocities of certain behaviors during the Russian invasion, factional conflicts, human right violations and what the current (United States) administration is doing with the assistance of officials from the United Nations and other foreign countries such as France, Germany, Canada, the United States and Turkey (just to name a few) to bring about some relief to the “injured” and “maimed” people of Afghanistan. Iwasaki (2003) investigates Rebuilding Afghanistan’s Agriculture Sector, and the latest publication, by the warfare expert Major General Bob Scales

Preface xvii USA (Ret.), is a collection of “ideas, concepts, and observations about contemporary war taken from over thirty years of research, writing and personal experience.” However, there is no book (or non-­book sources) currently in the market which provides a robust, academically rigorous and in-­depth insight into all the aspects of the reconstruction of Afghanistan’s built environment, including the interrelated challenges of poor housing, urban poverty, environmental damage, climate change, a general lack of adequate government attention, unplanned urbanization and weak DRM. This edited volume addresses all of these dimensions of rebuilding Afghanistan.

The structure of the book The book consists of three parts (each with its own introduction) and a concluding chapter. Part I: Background Part II: The Role of Women in the Reconstruction Process Part III: International Donor Community Responses In Chapter 13, the concluding remarks, Adenrele Awotona outlines some future directions for the reconstruction of Afghanistan, as proposed by the contributing authors. Adenrele Awotona

References Barfield, Thomas. 2011. Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History, Illustrated. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Coburn, Noah. 2011. Bazaar Politics: Power and Pottery in an Afghan Market Town, Illustrated. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Paper. Congressional Record, Proceedings and Debates of U.S. Congress. 2003. Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense and for the Reconstruction of Iraq and Afghanistan, 2004 (House of Representatives – October 16, 2003), 108th Congress, 1st Session Issue. Vol. 149 (145), Daily Edition, October 16. www. congress.gov/­congressional-­record/­2003/­10/­16/­house-­section/­article/­h9583-­1. Retrieved February 24, 2016. Dobbins, James, Michele A. Poole, Austin Long, and Benjamin Runkle. 2008. After the War: Nation-­Building from FDR to George W. Bush. Prepared for the Carnegie Corporation of New York, National Security Research Division, RAND Corporation. www.rand.org/­content/­dam/­rand/­pubs/­monographs/­2008/­RAND_ MG716.pdf. Retrieved February 24, 2016. Embassy of Afghanistan. 2006. Press Release, President Karzai in Washington DC for Official Visit, September 25. www.afghanembassyjp.com/­generalPR.html. Retrieved February 24, 2016.

xviii  Preface Engelhardt, Tom. 2014. Build We Must – Abroad But Not at Home. Huffington Post Politics, September 8, Updated November 8. www.huffingtonpost.com/­tom-­ engelhardt/­military-­reconstruction-­infrastructure-­spending_b_5783318.html. Retrieved February 24, 2016. Grobe, Anna Mulrine. 2016. In Afghanistan, a Mounting Sense of Failure – and a Flash of Hope. Christian Science Monitor, November 29. www.yahoo.com/­ news/­afghanistan-­mounting-­sense-­failure-­flash-­hope-­232702473.html. Retrieved December 1, 2016. Iwasaki, Yoshihiro. 2003. Rebuilding Afghanistan’s Agriculture Sector, Published by PA, ASIN: B00BGLQ94I. McCloskey, Megan, Tobin Asher, Lena Groeger, Sisi Wei, ProPublica, and Christine Lee. 2015. We Blew $17 Billion in Afghanistan – How Would You Have Spent It? Special to ProPublica, December 17. https://­projects.propublica.org/­graphics/­ afghan#afg-­article. Retrieved February. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. 2012. Tokyo Conference on Afghanistan – The Tokyo Declaration: Partnership for Self-­Reliance in Afghanistan from Transition to Transformation, July 8. www.mofa.go.jp/­region/­middle_e/­afghanistan/­tokyo_ conference_2012/­tokyo_declaration_en1.html. Retrieved February 24, 2016. Mujtaba, Bahaudin. 2005. Afghanistan: Realities of War and Rebuilding. Aglob Publisher. ISBN 10: 1594270481. Rostoum, Elly. 2015. Rebuilding Afghanistan: The Way Forward. Foreign Policy Association, identified. August 6. http://­foreignpolicyblogs.com/­2015/­08/­06/­ rebuilding-­afghanistan-­the-­way-­forward/­. Retrieved February  24, 2016. Sorel, Eliot, and Pier Carlo Padoan. eds. 2008. The Marshall Plan – Lessons Learned for the 21st Century, Organization for Economic Co-­operation and Development (OECD). www.learneurope.eu/­files/­8113/­7509/­5720/­Plan_Marshall._Lecciones_ aprendidas_s_XXI.pdf. Retrieved February 2016. Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR). 2016. 33rd Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, October. www.sigar.mil/­pdf/­ quarterlyreports/­2016-­10-­30qr.pdf. Retrieved December 1, 2016. Stewart, Rory, and Gerald Knaus. 2011. Can Intervention Work? W. W. Norton & Company. ISBN 978-­0-­393-­34224-­6 UN-­Habitat. 2016a. Afghanistan, March. http://­unhabitat.org/­afghanistan/­. Retrieved March 9, 2016. U.S. Department of State Office of the Historian. undated. Milestones: 1945–1952; Marshall Plan, 1948. https://­history.state.gov/­milestones/­1945-­1952/­marshall-­ plan. Retrieved February 24, 2016. U. S. Government Accountability Office. 2010. Securing, Stabilizing and Rebuilding Afghanistan and Iraq, July 1.

Part I

Background

Introduction to Part I Adenrele Awotona

Part I, which consists of three chapters, provides a broad context to the contributions in this volume. Chapter 1, “Housing and disaster risk management in uncertain times: notes on Afghanistan” by Adenrele Awotona, reveals that Afghanistan’s woes go beyond the enduring destructive wars and long-­drawn-­out conflict. It is a country where “natural” and “human-­ made” disasters amalgamate, being persistently afflicted by extensive natural catastrophes such as floods, extreme winter and snow avalanches, earthquakes, landslides and drought. Although the interactions between these two sets of disasters are multifaceted and challenging to ascertain, together they have resulted in an enormous loss of lives, livelihoods and property, in addition to food insecurity, urban and rural poverty and mass migrations to neighboring countries. They have also caused a substantial upsurge in the population of slum dwellers, unsafe towns and cities, environmental destruction and heightened vulnerability to disaster risk due to continuing reduction in coping capacities. People in disaster-­prone areas, which additionally lack adequate infrastructure, are the most vulnerable because of extreme poverty, the scarcity of employment opportunities and poor health conditions. Hence, this chapter examines the extent to which the government of Afghanistan, with the support of massive external aid, has been able to effectively address the country’s continuing vulnerability, poor housing and dreadful environmental conditions, all of which have been aggravated by natural disasters. In Chapter 2, Peter Marsden provides a historical overview of the Afghan economy. The country has generally survived as a subsistence economy, with its largely desert terrain rendering it highly vulnerable to fluctuating harvests and natural catastrophes. Small-­scale informal trading and labor migration, primarily to Pakistan and Iran, have enabled families to increase the economic options available to them based on highly fluid responses to a constantly changing environment. External investment by the former Soviet Union, the United States, Europe, Iran, the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank has strengthened the infrastructure through a network of roads – albeit with security-­related and other setbacks to the maintenance of that network – together with the provision of electricity to the major

4  Background urban centers. Private sector investment beyond the informal sector has, however, been very limited, the major exceptions being the establishment of a nationwide mobile phone and Internet service and Chinese and Turkish investment to develop oil, gas and copper reserves. Chapter 3, “Locality and power: a methodological approach to Afghan rural politics” by Sayed Asef Hossaini, which is a study of Afghan rural politics, examines Afghanistan as a rural country where almost 75 percent of its population lives in rural areas (World Bank Group 2018). At least since the beginning of the twentieth century, Afghanistan has been struggling to establish a stable central state. The country’s contemporary history obviously indicates how the central state has failed to deal properly with rural areas during the process of expanding bureaucracy as a mechanism of authority across the territory. The central state, whether in the form of a monarchy, republic or communist state, has not been able to bring rural communities under its control. Rural communities are geographically far from the center and demographically too heterogeneous in language, ethnicity and religion. Despite an administrative categorization by the central state, there is not a clear-­cut boundary between different administrative units, particularly in rural Afghanistan. Sayed Asef Hossaini notes that the interconnectivity between the political power and the locality in Afghanistan could be argued at two levels of national and local politics. In terms of the national politics, the geographical characteristics of the settlements of each ethnic group have granted privileges to or brought about disadvantages for that group. At the local level, the concept of power has also been tightly connected to the notion of locality, while power is mainly interpreted as the accessibility to natural resources. In other words, the study of the power structure and the locality in a rural community is more about the relations between the “low-­dynamic parts of rural systems (e.g. nature, ecosystems) and the high dynamic parts including farming, housing, recreation and transport” (Bowler et al. 2002, 199) in the context of social relationships. The aim of this chapter, however, is not to argue for the significance of locality in the formation of the power structure. Rather, it concentrates on the methodological aspects of rural study by using various theoretical frameworks, including Herbert Gans’s use-­center theory and Pierre Bourdieu’s social space.

References Bowler, Ian R., Bryant, C. R. and Cocklin, Chris. 2002. The Sustainability of Rural Systems: Geographical Interpretations, Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands. World Bank Group. 2018. Rural population (% of total population). https://­data. worldbank.org/­indicator/­sp.rur.totl.zs. Retrieved April 3, 2019.

1 Housing and disaster risk management in uncertain times Notes on Afghanistan Adenrele Awotona

Introduction The three stated goals of the five-­year (2008–2013) Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS) were (Islamic Republic of Afghanistan 2008) as follows: •

Security: Achieve nationwide stabilization, strengthen law enforcement and improve personal security for every Afghan • Governance, rule of law and human rights: Strengthen democratic processes and institutions, human rights, the rule of law, the delivery of public services and government accountability • Economic and social development: Reduce poverty, ensure sustainable development through a private sector–led market economy, improve human development indicators and make significant progress toward the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). However, according to the British Government (2014), “over 30 years of conflict have left Afghanistan one of the poorest countries in the world.” Box 1 illustrates the country’s demographic profile. The effect of the extensive years of war and viciousness in the country has been colossal in terms of human loss and material destruction.1 For example, in Kabul alone, where nearly 70,000 houses were ruined (Chopra 2007), as much as 70 percent of its current population of over five million inhabitants lives in informal and squatter settlements (Gilsinan 2013) due to a severe deficiency of affordable housing for the low-­income and the poor. It has been estimated that over 500,000 homes were damaged throughout the country (UNCHR 2014a). Since 1980, disasters caused by natural hazards have also affected nine million people and caused over 20,000 fatalities in the country (Deltares website). Table 1.1 shows Afghanistan’s population growth from 1955 to 2016, and Table 1.2 illustrates the Afghanistan population forecast from 2020 to 2050. The population growth rate and rapid urbanization, which have been exacerbated by the return of 5.8 million refugees since 2002 (Sharifzai et al. 2015),

843,383 912,871 712,452 939,602 585,884 940,990 87,414 –316,183 125,692 292,371 237,148 188,113 144,954 103,581

–39,999 94,600 –135,500 160,800 –75,900 445,500 –296,800 –683,700 –223,500 –4,000 –4,000 –4,000 –4,000 –4,000

Migrants (net) 17.8 18 16 16 16 16 16 16 17 17 18 19 19 19

4.94 5.13 6.35 7.18 7.65 7.48 7.47 7.45 7.45 7.45 7.45 7.45 7.45 7.45

51 50 43 37 30 26 19 18 20 19 17 13 14 13

26.6% 26.3% 25.1% 23.3% 22.2% 20.7% 17.8% 16.8% 15.6% 13.5% 11.4% 5.6% 8% 6.7%

Median Fertility Density Urban Age Rate (P/­Km²) Pop%

Source: Worldometers (Reproduced with their permission) www.worldometers.info/­world-­population/­afghanistan-­population/­ Retrieved August 31, 2016

33,369,945 2.59% 32,526,562 3.07% 27,962,207 2.76% 24,399,948 4.37% 19,701,940 3.27% 16,772,522 6.81% 12,067,570 0.74% 11,630,498 –2.52% 13,211,412 0.98% 12,582,954 2.5% 11,121,097 2.28% 9,935,358 2.01% 8,994,793 1.69% 8,270,024 1.3%

2016 2015 2010 2005 2000 1995 1990 1985 1980 1975 1970 1965 1960 1955

Yearly% Yearly Change Change

Population

Year

Table 1.1  Population of Afghanistan (2016 and earlier)

8,880,234 8,546,635 7,011,272 5,691,905 4,383,053 3,474,413 2,148,654 1,955,053 2,066,880 1,704,871 1,269,972 553,706 721,379 553,706

7,432,663,275 7,349,472,099 6,929,725,043 6,519,635,850 6,126,622,121 5,735,123,084 5,309,667,699 4,852,540,569 4,439,632,465 4,061,399,228 3,682,487,691 3,322,495,121 3,018,343,828 2,758,314,525

Urban World Population Population

40 40 44 46 49 51 59 56 51 48 48 48 48 48

Afghanistan Global Rank

36,442,719 40,196,823 43,851,554 47,361,985 50,601,765 53,487,461 55,955,350

2.3% 1.98% 1.76% 1.55% 1.33% 1.12% 0.91%

783,231 750,821 730,946 702,086 647,956 577,139 493,578

–40,000 –54,200 –54,200 –54,200 –54,200 –54,200 –54,200

19 21 23 24 26 28 30

4.25 3.53 3.02 2.67 2.42 2.23 2.09

56 62 67 73 78 82 86

28.3% 30.9% 33.7% 36.7% 39.7% 42.7% 45.8%

10,320,963 12,418,550 14,788,124 17,374,813 20,093,889 22,863,478 25,642,244

0.5% 0.52% 0.54% 0.56% 0.57% 0.58% 0.59%

7,758,156,792 8,141,661,007 8,500,766,052 8,838,907,877 9,157,233,976 9,453,891,780 9,725,147,994

Migrants Median Fertility Density Urban Urban Country’s World (net) Age Rate (P/­Km²) Pop% Population Share of Population World Pop

Source: Worldomers (reproduced with their permission) www.worldometers.info/­world-­population/­afghanistan-­population/­ Retrieved August 31, 2016

2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050

Year Population Yearly Yearly Percentage Change Change

Table 1.2  Afghanistan Population Forecast

40 37 36 35 38 37 35

Afghanistan Global Rank

8  Adenrele Awotona have resulted in an acute housing need, among other major urban planning issues.2 Millions of Afghans have been forced to flee from their homes to Pakistan, Iran or other parts of Afghanistan by a combination of war and drought. Table 1.3 illustrates the number of Afghans who voluntarily returned between 2002 and 2013 to Afghanistan from their country of asylum. UNHCR’s shelter assistance program, which gives “priority to vulnerable returnee families that possess land or are allowed to use land, but lack the financial means to build a home, . . . aims to support vulnerable returnees as part of initial reintegration assistance,” built only 1,638 dwellings in 2013 and about 220,000 between 2002 and 2013 (UNCHR 2014a, 3–4).3 Studies indicate that Afghanistan is home to the largest refugee population in the world (Sharifzai et al. 2015) and that Kabul’s “biggest problem isn’t suicide bombers or militants . . . it’s the traffic” (Gilsinan 2013). Afghanistan, however, does not have a national housing policy (Sharifzai et al. 2015). Furthermore, the UN-­Habitat (2015) notes that although Afghan cities are a driving force of social and economic development, state building and peacebuilding, yet their full potential has been constrained by the absence of an effective urban policy and regulatory framework, insufficient and poorly coordinated investment and weak municipal governance and land management.4

Box 1  Demographic Profile of Afghanistan • The current population of Afghanistan is 33,498,383 as of August 30, 2016, based on the latest United Nations estimates. • Afghanistan population is equivalent to 0.44 percent of the total world population. • Afghanistan ranks number 40 on the list of countries by population. • The population density in Afghanistan is 51 per square kilometer (132 per square mile). • The total land area is 653,032 square kilometers (252,137 square miles). • 26.3 percent of the population is urban (8,880,234 people in 2016). • The median age in Afghanistan is 17.8 years. Source: Worldometers (Reproduced with their permission) www.worldometers.info/­world-­population/­afghanistan-­population/­ Retrieved August 31, 2016

Housing and disaster risk management 9 Table 1.3  Voluntary Repatriation 2002–2013 Year From Pakistan From Iran Other Countries Total

From Pakistan

From Iran

From other countries

Total

2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013

1,565,066 332,183 383,321 449,391 133,338 357,635 274,200 48,320 104,331 48,998 79,435 30,388

259,792 142,280 377,151 63,559 5,264 7,054 3,656 6,028 8,487 18,851 15,035 8,247

9,679 1,176 650 1,140 1,202 721 628 204 150 113 86 131

1,834,537 475,639 761,122 514,090 139,804 365,410 278,484 54,552 112,968 67,962 94,556 38,766

Total

3,806,606

915,404

15,880

4,737,890

Source: (UNCHR 2014b, reproduced with the permission of the author)

Some of the reasons for these deficiencies are rooted in the fact that “basic information for urban areas does not exist, is outdated, or not shared” according to Sadat Mansoor Naderi, Afghanistan’s minister for urban development affairs (UN-­Habitat 2015, iii). The other challenges for the country’s urban planning and housing include “insufficient capacity and resources, corruption, gender inequality and limited transparency and accountability” (UN-­Habitat 2015, iv), as well as the precariousness of governmental institutions, which are “unable to provide effective governance, efficiently deliver basic services to the population and guarantee human security in the country” (Raqeebi 2013, iii). Indeed, as noted by Calogero (2011, 223), “much of the planning of Kabul takes place as risk-­ management decisions, made in the United States and Europe.” However, Calogero (2011, 224) continues, Few of the Westerners working in Kabul have also worked professionally in urban planning in their “home” countries. Thus, what they were using as an implicit referent of “the normal” was actually an idealized image of professional practice “back home.” This seems natural in a discursive framing where aid workers and development specialists conceive of their work as entirely different from urban planning – a reproduction of difference that Robinson has eloquently refuted in her work. The absence of an “urban agenda” to guide urban development and weak municipal governance have resulted in Afghan cities growing “haphazardly, informally, with limited access to affordable and quality basic services, and

10  Adenrele Awotona with considerable socio-­economic divisions and exclusion” (UN-­Habitat 2015, vi). This section scrutinizes the extent to which the National Unity Government of Afghanistan has prioritized urban housing in the implementation of its Realizing Self-­Reliance framework, which was presented at the London Conference on Afghanistan on December 4, 2014.

The 2014 London Conference on Afghanistan At the conference, the Afghan government presented its reform program, Realizing Self-­Reliance: Commitments to Reforms and Renewed Partnership, which laid out a framework for improving security, political stability, economic and fiscal stabilization, advancing good governance, including electoral reform and strengthening democratic institutions, promoting the rule of law, and respect for human rights, particularly in relation to women and girls, fighting corruption and the illicit economy including narcotics, and paving the way for enhanced private sector investments and sustainable social, environmental and economic development. (The London Conference on Afghanistan 2014)5 The framework was a key component of the government’s Transformation Decade (2015 to 2024) Agenda. In order to assist the Afghan government in implementing this program of building “a more sustainable future for all Afghans, the International Community reaffirmed its Tokyo commitment of providing sixteen billion US dollars through 2015 and sustaining support through 2017, at or near the levels of the past decade.”6 Additionally, the international community pledged a sum of US$14 billion at the 2012 Chicago Summit, a meeting of the heads of state and heads of government of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which was held in Chicago, Illinois, on May 20 and 21, 2012, for the country’s “reconstruction, improvement of security, development and rehabilitation” (Raqeebi 2013, 2).7 All of these external assistance funds have, however, failed to achieve the expected results; the Afghan National Army (ANA) and the Afghan National Police (ANP) are still largely incapable of countering insurgency, ensuring internal stability and enforcing the government’s writ countrywide. . . . Much of the population continues to suffer from shortage of housing, clean water, electricity, medical care and jobs. Criminality, insecurity, weak governance, lack of infrastructure, and the Afghan government’s difficulty in extending rule of law to all parts of the country pose challenges to future economic growth in the country. (Raqeebi 2013, 3–4)

Housing and disaster risk management 11 Indeed, the US government’s watchdog for Afghanistan reconstruction efforts at the time, SIGAR John Sopko, identified seven “areas and elements” of US-­funded reconstruction “that are especially vulnerable to significant waste, fraud and abuse”: corruption (which retired NATO General John Allen described as “the existential threat to the long-­term viability of modern Afghanistan”) and rule of law, sustainability, Afghan National Security Forces capacity and capabilities, on-­budget support, counter narcotics, contract management and oversight access, and strategy and planning (Igoe 2014). Indeed, as early as 2004, it had been noted that widespread corruption is preventing some key ministries from achieving the minimal effectiveness required. Even within Kabul, the focus of the international community has been misplaced. In particular, the pressure of donors on the Ministry of the Interior has been nowhere near as strong as that exerted over the Ministry of Finance. The international community also failed to support adequately the attempts by “civil society” to change the corrupt practices of the state administration. (Giustozzi 2004) According to Integrity Watch Afghanistan, an Afghan civil society organization “committed to increase transparency, accountability and integrity in Afghanistan,” corruption is Afghanistan’s second biggest problem, after insecurity; bribery, the most common form of corruption, has doubled between 2011 and 2015, reaching close to US$2 billion. Although access to services has improved, citizens are forced to pay bribes in return. Integrity Watch Afghanistan found out in its 2012 survey that respondents thought the three biggest problems were insecurity (51 percent of respondents), unemployment (16 percent of respondents) and corruption (13 percent of respondents). In the 2014 survey, however, equal percentages of respondents (18 percent each) ranked corruption and unemployment as the biggest problem in the country after insecurity (45 percent).8 Similarly, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime reported that in 2012, half of Afghan citizens paid a bribe while requesting a public service and the total cost of bribes paid to public officials amounted to US$3.9 billion. This corresponds to an increase of 40 percent in real terms between 2009 and 2012, while the ratio of bribery cost to GDP remained relatively constant (23 percent in 2009; 20 percent in 2012). (UNODC 2012, 5) Indeed, all the donor countries “are worried about large sums of money being swallowed up by Afghanistan’s pervasive corruption” (Radio Free

12  Adenrele Awotona Europe 2008). By some accounts, “Afghanistan is in worse condition today than it was after the Soviet invasion ended in 1989” (Emanuele 2016). Terrorism and political corruption continue to be more widespread. And although the United States spent US$8.2 billion to eradicate the cultivation of opium between 2002 and June 30, 2015, “those billions have had little impact due in part to rampant corruption in domestic law enforcement” (Dent 2015). On September 14, 2016, SIGAR issued the first report from its Lessons Learned Program on the threat of corruption and the difficulties facing US efforts to combat it. The report, Corruption in Conflict, Examines U.S. government agencies’ understanding of the risks of corruption in Afghanistan, the slow recognition of the threat and evolution of U.S. responses, and their varying effectiveness. Systemic corruption, aggravated by floods of aid money, undermined the U.S. mission in Afghanistan from the outset and, unless effectively checked, will continue to undermine progress and could ultimately result in mission failure. (SIGAR 2016a) Corruption in Conflict makes eleven recommendations – three for executive and eight for legislative actions: “to avoid or mitigate corruption in Afghanistan and in other contingency operations, especially by making anticorruption a high priority in goals, plans, and operations.”9 In fact, in 2004, a total of some US$8.3 billion during the 2004/­ 2005–2007/­2008 fiscal years, including US$4.5 billion for the 2004/­2005 fiscal years were pledged in the 2004 Berlin Conference on Afghanistan for “Securing Afghanistan’s Future” (Government of Germany 2004). But to what extent have these billions of American dollars in international aid helped in the reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan and in alleviating poverty, which is worsened by natural disasters?

Efficacy of external aid In addition to the considerable external assistance, the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) has provided significant aid to Afghanistan for the development of an action plan to address the country’s massive environmental challenges from 2002 to 2010 (UNEP Afghanistan program UNEP Website). In response to the Afghanistan Post-­ Conflict Environmental Assessment Report (UNEP 2003), which found a degraded natural resources base and severely limited national capacity to address the problems, UNEP has built “the basic institutional, legal and human capacity for effective environmental management at the national level; provided assistance to the national environmental authorities to implement the environmental management framework across the country; and to manage the

Housing and disaster risk management 13 process of environmental restoration and community-­based management.” Specifically, UNEP has done the following: • •

• •

•

• •

Developed a National Environmental Strategy of Afghanistan and integrated environmental considerations into relevant ministry and sector strategies within the development process of ANDS Established the inter-­ministerial Committee for Environmental Coordination (CEC) and the National Environmental Advisory Council (NEAC), fora to ensure national participation and inter-­ ministerial coordination in the implementation of the National Environmental Protection Agency’s mandate and the effective integration of environmental considerations into government policies and public life10 Developed and institutionalized environmental laws and regulations through training and technical support in the development of an integrated environmental legal, regulatory and policy framework Provided extensive technical and drafting support regarding the development of the Environment Law of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, which was approved by the National Assembly and which came into force in January 2007 Contributed to the institutionalization of the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) and Pollution Control through training and technical support in the development and effective implementation of EIA policies, procedures and legislation Established community-­based natural resources management Provided support to the National Environmental Protection Agency and the Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock to establish a network of protected areas within Afghanistan.

The Australian Government (2012, 2) has noted that “Afghanistan is one of the largest recipients of official development assistance in the world.” Table 1.4 illustrates the various sources of external aid which was pledged, committed and disbursed to Afghanistan from 2002 to 2013. Studies show that even now, the country continues to rely heavily on external aid from the international community, “without which it would be unable to cover operational costs” (Raqeebi 2013, 19). According to SIGAR (2016b, 65), as of June 30, 2016, the United States had appropriated approximately US$114.93 billion for relief and reconstruction in Afghanistan since fiscal year 2002. Of that amount, US$96 billion has been appropriated for reconstruction funds managed by the Department of Defense, the state and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and US$17 billion distributed to several other US government entities for reconstruction projects. In its own assessment of the continuing lack of success of the United States’ efforts to build Afghanistan, SIGAR (2016b, iv) acknowledged a lack of accountability, failures in planning, deficiencies in internal controls and noncompliance issues as

14  Adenrele Awotona Table 1.4  Total External Aid to Afghanistan (2002–2013) Donors

Funds Pledged (2002–2013)

Funds Committed (2002–2011)

Funds Disbursed (2002–2010)

United States Japan Germany European Commission Asian Development Bank United Kingdom World Bank Canada India Norway Netherlands Italy Iran Denmark Sweden Australia Spain United Nations Saudi Arabia China Russian Federation Switzerland Aga Khan Development Network Finland Turkey France Others (28 donors)

56,100 7,200 5,029 3,068 2,200 2,897 2,800 1,769 1,200 938 864 753 673 533 515 369 308 305 268 252 239 197 190 152 143 134 886

44,356 3,152 2,130 2,883 2,269 2,222 2,137 1,256 1,516 775 1,015 645 399 438 635 744 220 446 140 139 151 118 140 160 213 323 630

37,118 3,152 762 2,594 1,005 2,222 1,700 1,256 759 636 1,015 540 377 438 635 656 194 182 103 58 147 102 140 160 180 174 500

TOTAL

89,982

69,252

56,805

*Figures are in $US millions Source: Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (2010), Development Cooperation Report, Ministry of Finance: 96 http://­mof.gov.af/­Content/­files/­Development%20Cooperation%20Report%202010.pdf Retrieved December 9, 2016

among the crucial difficulties encountered by the various executing agencies. Raqeebi (2013, 20) observes that although about 51 percent of the total external aid has been invested in the security sector, The money has, however, failed to achieve the desired results; the ANA and ANP are still largely incapable of countering insurgency, ensuring internal stability and enforcing the government’s writ. The ANA remains a fragmented force unable to effectively combat the insurgency, while the ANP is unable to tackle organized crime, enforce the law and

Housing and disaster risk management 15 protect citizens. Both institutions are underdeveloped, under-­trained and face crippling attrition rates. Although funding for police training has increased since 2007–2008, there have been few serious efforts to build a functioning justice system, which remains a major source of public grievance, easily exploited by the Taliban. The chart below shows that allocation of aid funds to different sectors in Afghanistan for 2011. A huge portion of the funds, around 68 percent were allocated to the security sector in 2011. Brinkley (2013) concurs with Raqeebi: After all the money spent, still today, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) says, Afghanistan has the world’s highest infant mortality rate; one hundred and twenty-­two of every thousand children die before they reach age one. UNICEF reports that fifty-­nine percent of the nation’s children grow up “stunted” for lack of nutrition during the early years of life. That’s the world’s second-­worst rate, behind Ethiopia. And even after more than a decade of intensive development aid from not only the United States but dozens of other nations, Afghanistan still ranks near the bottom on per capita income, literacy, life expectancy, electricity usage, Internet penetration, and on the World Bank’s broad Human Development Index. Afghanistan is now a major site for the concentration of international aid, totaling around US$286.4 billion, or US$9,426 per Afghan citizen, since 2001 (Poole 2011).11 It has, however, been suggested that international aid is most successful when reconstruction efforts are led by the community (Zia 2008).

Housing Afghans Afghanistan’s Minister of Urban Development has estimated that one million new housing units are needed in the country, mainly in urban areas (Bedford 2007). Also, nearly three million Afghan refugees who still remain in Pakistan and Iran are reluctant to return to Afghanistan because of “deteriorating security and lack of access to land, housing and livelihoods” (Macdonald 2010). According to the Afghanistan Housing Sector Assessment Workshop, which was held by the International Financial Corp (IFC) in March 2007, several obstacles render the housing finance industry in Afghanistan, which is still in its infancy, unable to actively participate in meeting the need (Bedford 2007): •

Lack of expertise: a severe lack of a trained professional class to conduct or execute a proper title search; a lack of transparency or enforcement

16  Adenrele Awotona

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

in the title system; a lack of capacity in appraisal, leaving banks unable to rely on the valuation of the property; a dearth of knowledgeable practitioners in mortgage or housing finance Land insecurity: lack of confidence in the title held by homeowners; a combination of several traditional means of property transfer, along with various official and conflicting registry schemes; various governments and officials have used land as a tool to prop up their regimes – for example, communists appropriated land, Mujaheddin appropriated the same land and distributed it to their supporters, and this was then taken by force by Taliban commanders and distributed once again. (Unfortunately, the occupation and illegal appropriation continues to this day. During each transfer, legal or not, a legal title was issued by a complicit land office and court system using forged title deeds. In addition, squatters who have moved onto land, either government or private, built a home while the owners were abroad during the conflicts. Even prior to the wars, land title has been complicated in Afghanistan due to several legal regimes that have been in place: customary law (rawaj), civil law (qanoon madani), religious law (shar’ia) and statutory or national state law.) Difficulty in registering liens: for example, it currently it takes several months and costs 6 percent of the property value to register a lien. These prohibitive costs and delays have kept a majority of people from properly registering a lien, generally preferring informal contracts Lack of legislative and legal environment: currently no mortgage, securitization or foreclosure law under which the banks would function, but currently several laws are under consideration to overcome these legal hurdles Lack of trained judiciary and enforcement: as with many areas of the Afghan legal system, the judiciary are poorly versed in the area of property law; most disputes continue to be settled usually through tribal or informal means Lack of cadaster: lack of clear boundaries has led to many, sometimes fatal, land disputes. The years of conflict have hampered the implementation of modern mapping techniques, which could have resolved these disputes. Although the Afghan Geodesy and Cartography Head Office (AGCHO) has begun digitizing existing cadastral maps, these are only a small portion of the estimated 800,000 properties in the country Difficulty in the transfer of title: due to the high cost, corruption and lengthy process, most property owners have not used the formal land titling process but have instead relied on traditional means of registering their ownership Lack of funding resources: Afghanistan, as in many developing countries, has an excess of liquidity in the banking system. These funds, though, are generally in the form of short-­term deposits, which do not match the longer-­term funding needs of housing finance. Afghanistan

Housing and disaster risk management 17 has a higher amount of inherent risk than most countries, which makes it even more unlikely that financial institutions will lend long term without some form of guarantee or risk sharing • Lack of insurance: in Afghanistan, it appears that insurers do not offer life and property insurance. Another concern for lenders is protection against fire and earthquake, which is of a particular importance for Kabul and the surrounding region • Absence of an enabling environment for financial institutions to enter the mortgage market: banks do not have public sector support in building their internal capacity. The financial institutions need funding or guarantee mechanism as an incentive to enter the market. Thus, housing provision on the scale needed to adequately meet the need is hampered by the weaknesses of Afghanistan’s legal systems (both formal and informal), lack of access to land because of the government’s defective land allocation scheme, land disputes in the absence of secure land tenure and the landless status of most of the poor and vulnerable.12 Afghanistan’s layers of incompatible laws, regulations and various presidential decrees have resulted in (Macdonald 2010): a morass of competing obligations and rights. In addition, land has been redistributed to political or military elites, or illegally seized without regard to prior title. The all-­too-­common result is the existence of multiple claims to land and property which can take years to resolve, especially for families returning from decades in exile whose homes have long been inhabited by others. (Macdonald 2010) Many urban and rural Afghans distrust the formal justice system, which lacks adequate structures and trained professionals. Instead, they turn to the traditional informal justice system (jirgas and shuras) even though it has “significant problems with quality, accountability, and discrimination against women” (Macdonald 2010). Indeed, about 80 percent of disagreements on land and property matters are determined through the informal system. The government of Afghanistan’s Land Allocation Scheme, an attempt to find a solution to the issue of landlessness among Afghan returnees from the neighboring countries to which they had fled, has failed largely because policy makers and returnees held different understandings and expectations of what type of land was needed, and what it meant for returnees to want to have land – rather than simply representing a physical possession, their desire for land ownership was a translation of their expectations and hopes for their future lives. (Majidi 2013)

18  Adenrele Awotona

Disaster risk management in Afghanistan Harris et al. (2013) have noted that “a combination of natural hazards, conflict and fragility provide a recipe for human suffering” and suggested that “conflicts exacerbate natural disaster impacts and natural disasters can trigger or aggravate conflict.” Afghanistan is a country where natural hazards and human-­made disasters collide, although it is immeasurably hard to determine the bearing of natural disasters on the unending conflict and the effect of the conflict on natural disasters. Natural and human-­made disasters in Afghanistan include earthquakes, floods, droughts, landslides, sandstorms, avalanches, locust attacks, suicide bombings, continuous conflicts and unexploded ordinance (Islamic Republic of Afghanistan 2009, 7). Between 1954 and 2006, Afghanistan suffered 112 large-­scale natural disasters (United Nations Development Program 2010, 5). The effects of these, coupled with years of sustained war, crushing poverty and unemployment, environmental degradation and poor infrastructure have amplified the vulnerability of the people and insecurity at all levels (United Nations Development Program 2010, 11). A report by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations ( FAO 2016) lists Afghanistan as one of the thirty-­nine countries that immediately need outside aid for food as civil conflict and weather-­ related catastrophes continue to severely undermine food security.13 In 2016, more than eight million people in Afghanistan were affected by desperate food insecurity.14 In an earlier study of the impacts of the 1999–2001 droughts on livelihood systems and personal security of the population at the household and village level, Qureshi and Akhtar (2004, 12) reported that Drought (and) war have taken a heavy toll on Afghanistan’s economy and increased vulnerability and hardship for many (predominantly rural) communities. There has been widespread damage to productive potential of land and extinction of livestock. . . . The impact of drought on women is worst due to their socio-­cultural and economic positioning in the family and community. Women and children . . . play a central role in home economics. Lack of food, poor nutrition and poor sanitation typically result in decreased resistance to diseases. Qureshi and Akhtar (2004, 15) continued their report: Nutritional levels of poor men, women and children are inadequate in normal times: drought reduces the availability of food and compromises its quality. Maternal and infant mortality and morbidity rates rise, as do stunting and wastage. The effects of diseases which are not otherwise life threatening are intensified by malnutrition.

Housing and disaster risk management 19 In order to cope with these difficulties, the Sale of safe assets such as jewelry, watches, domestic items and productive assets such as land, livestock, farm machinery and sewing machines, were seen frequently during the three years of severe drought; . . . more than 80% households survived on relief donations from NGOs (national and international): Danish Committee for Aid to Afghan Refugees (DACAAR), Islamic Relief, UN agencies, among others; . . . while women beg for money. (Qureshi and Akhtar 2004, 12, 15–16) Finally, Qureshi and Akhtar (2004, 16, 20) lamented that Despite heavy risks of droughts, no emergency plans are available for monitoring, regulation, management and mitigation of drought . . . (and) unfortunately, national institutions dealing with drought are not in place in the country at present. Village level institutions seem to have been deteriorating throughout the last decades and are very weak at present.15 Hence, in order to address this state of distress in Afghanistan and other countries in similar conditions, the United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction, in its first-­ever Global Assessment Report on Disaster Risk Reduction, recommends that the following actions, among others, be taken universally to ameliorate these circumstances (UNISDR 2009): • A radical shift in development practices • A new strong emphasis on resilience and disaster planning • Limiting the impact of disasters on populations by improving squatter settlements, providing land and infrastructure for the urban poor, strengthening rural livelihoods and protecting ecosystems. Similarly, The Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA) 2005–2015, endorsed by 168 UN member states (including Afghanistan) at the World Conference on Disaster Reduction in Kobe, Japan, in 2005, advised all countries to implement these recommendations to diminish their disaster risk by 2015. Furthermore, the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015– 2030 was adopted by UN member states on March 18, 2015, at the Third UN World Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction in Sendai City, Miyagi Prefecture, Japan. The first major agreement of the post-­2015 development agenda, it recommended the following four priorities for action (United Nations 2015, 14). 1 To appreciate the nature and complexities of disaster risk 2 To strengthen disaster risk governance to manage disaster risk

20  Adenrele Awotona 3 To invest in disaster risk reduction for resilience 4 To enhance “disaster preparedness for effective response and to ‘build back better’ in recovery, rehabilitation and reconstruction.” (United Nations 2015, 14) To implement HFA 2005–2015 in the country, the International Organization for Migration (IOM 2015) reported that the Afghanistan National Disaster Management Authority (ANDMA) and the government of Japan signed an agreement to implement a thirty-­six-­month, US$9.9 million project aimed at reducing risks in some selected disaster-­ prone communities (in Herat, Faryab, Balkh, Jawzjan, Sari Pul, Baghlan, Takhar, Bamyan, Helmand and Kabul provinces) and strengthening the capacity of ANDMA to respond when natural disasters strike.16 By developing community disaster management plans, mapping local hazards and establishing early-­warning systems, as well as equipping the communities with basic search and rescue equipment and training them in disaster risk management (DRM), their level of awareness would be increased and their capacity enhanced to respond to disasters and protect themselves. Additionally, the project would strengthen ANDMA’s information management capacities, which would enable the Afghan government to “gain a better understanding of needs and response capabilities when a natural disaster occurs” (IOM 2015). Also, since 2003, the government of Afghanistan, in partnership with the United Nations and other development organizations, have developed the following: •

Key policy documents, including the Disaster Management Framework, the National Strategy for Disaster Management and the National Disaster Management Plan (United Nations Development Program 2010a; UNJobs undated 1) • The Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS), where Disaster Management (DM) was targeted within the social protection sector with a promise that “by 2010 an effective system for disaster preparedness and response will be in place,” which was officially launched in 2008 (United Nations Development Program 2010b, 6) • A five-­year Comprehensive Disaster Risk Reduction Project (CDRRP) “to reduce the level of community vulnerability to natural and human induced hazards down to manageable and humanitarian levels.” (United Nations Development Program 2010b, 6) Moreover, the World Bank and the Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery (GFDRR) are supporting the development of a comprehensive multi-­peril hazard and risk assessment in Afghanistan. They are also conducting an extensive analysis of the costs and benefits of resilient

Housing and disaster risk management 21 reconstruction and risk-­reduction strategies. The overall objectives of the projects are as follows (Deltares website): • To develop new information on current and future risks from perils such as fluvial flood, flash flood, drought, landslide, snow avalanches and seismic hazards in the country • To propose resilient reconstruction and risk reduction options based on the outcomes of the risk analysis and subsequent costs and benefits of those alternatives • To draft a roadmap for strengthening weather, climate and hydrological (hydromet) services and a nationwide integrated multi-­hazard early-­ warning system (EWS) in Afghanistan • To mainstream data-­driven DRM considerations in the bank’s portfolio in Afghanistan. In fact, the five-­year (2008–2013) ANDS pledged to reduce poverty throughout the country and implement an “effective system for disaster preparedness and response” by 2010 (ReliefWeb 2010). It explicitly promised to implement various community-­based DRM projects, which would include building community resilience through disaster risk reduction; through the improvement of response and recovery at the national, provincial and community levels; through the identification and expansion of Indigenous coping capacities; through the strengthening of traditional warning systems; and through the solidification of the target marginalized groups’ confidence to access a range of support services, with a view to minimizing the personal negative impacts associated with disaster situations. This commitment was based on the realization that “an institutionalized disaster response capability serves as the primary form of protection for Afghans . . . [helping] them attain a basic level of physical security and enhances their capabilities to find sustainable livelihoods” ( UNJobs undated 1). However, Afghanistan, in spite of its commitment, did not implement the priorities as laid down by the HFA during its implementation phase (2007–2009) (United Nations Development Program 2010b, 11). Similarly, the execution of the laudable community-­based disaster risk management (DRM) projects has been feeble. This is because, although Afghanistan has a National Disaster Management Authority (ANDMA), a National Disaster Management Plan which was prepared in 2003 by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP 2010b, 8) and a National Emergency Operations Center (NEOC), the country lacks the institutional capacity to build multi-­ hazard disaster risk management information services (DRMIS), to produce multi-­hazard risk analysis and maps, to design and apply methodologies for disaster risk assessments and to conduct specific risk valuations for critical facilities and lifeline infrastructure to help provincial governments prepare their development plans and budgets by considering identified disaster risks

22  Adenrele Awotona and ways to reduce them ( UNJobs undated 2). Indeed, the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) has observed that the government of Afghanistan has not sufficiently addressed the need for a comprehensive and enduring capacity development for risk and vulnerability reduction (Ramsey 2010), and the NEOC has not been well equipped and has not been functioning (United Nations Development Program 2010, 8). Afghanistan’s approach to DRM lacks coherence in that there are about twenty government ministries responsible for different emergency response duties with little coordination among them. For example, the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock is in charge of pest attacks and cattle epidemics; the Ministry of Interior is in charge of fire, air and road accidents and incidents; the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development is responsible for drought, earthquakes and earthquake-­induced landslides at rural level; and the Ministry of Energy and Water is responsible for floods, dam failures and landslides (Islamic Republic of Afghanistan 2009, 7). Thus, the United Nations Development Program has called for the immediate reinforcing of the legal and policy frameworks and the developing capacity of ANDMA and key ministries for effective disaster risk reduction and response (United Nations Development Program 2010b, 6).

Notes 1 In Afghanistan, the average life expectancy is still just forty-­nine years; a third of the population lives below the poverty line, earning the equivalent of US$1.00 per day; only one in four Afghans can read and write; and one in ten children die before their fifth birthday (British Government 2014). Also, according to the United Nations, Afghanistan is the world’s sixth least-­developed country. Only 13 percent of Afghans have access to safe water, 12 percent to adequate sanitation, 6 percent to electricity and 18 percent to piped city water. 2 By 2007, although foreign firms had invested $4.5 billion into rebuilding Afghanistan, little of it had gone into housing construction, according to Omar Zakhilwal, the director of the Afghanistan Investment Support Agency (AISA) in Kabul (Chopra 2007). 3 In addition to providing beneficiary families with essential construction materials such as tools, roofing beams, doors and windows, UNHCR’s shelter package consists of the following (UNCHR 2014a, 4): • Guiding the families through the construction phase to achieve a minimum standard of quality • Supporting the construction of a two-­room shelter with a floor area of 32 square meters (a living room, bedroom and corridor) and the provision of building materials for one external latrine • Granting US$100 for each beneficiary family upon the completion of the shelter as a compensation “for lost wage opportunities during the construction period or to pay for additional materials and labor expenses. Up to 50% of the cash grant may be given in advance to allow particularly poor families to meet immediate material and labor costs incurred during construction.”

Housing and disaster risk management 23 The process of selecting the beneficiaries includes the following (UNCHR 2014a, 4): • A needs assessment which involves local authority, community representatives and partner agencies operating in the region • Aiming at areas that show a high population of returns of both former refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) and that have access to water, security and accessibility to land, among other factors • The establishment of a beneficiary selection committee in each location, consisting of representatives from provincial and district authorities, the shura (or council of village elders), UNHCR and its partner agencies • Prioritizing families headed by a female, elderly or disabled person and large families of more than eight members • The encouragement of women’s involvement in the selection and implementation process. 4 Indeed, as an initial step toward the development of a strategic planning and based decision-­ making process aimed at stimulating dynamic and evidenced-­ inclusive urban growth in Afghanistan, the country held an Inclusive Cities Week event to network communities from regional hub cities and Kabul in February 2016. More than 350 civil society representatives and community members from the five major Afghan cities – Kabul, Herat, Mazar-­e-­Sharif, Jalalabad and Kandahar – were in Kabul to “promote inclusive and gender-­sensitive urban development, with a particular focus on the role of urban Community Development Councils (CDCs) as key entities in the sub-­national governance structure” (UN-­Habitat 2016b). 5 According to Kamrany 2011, the following needs to be done to rebuild Afghanistan “through economic/­employment transformation”: 1 Transition from war to peace via employment and earnings 2 Transform the economy – massive public and private employment opportunities 3 Share responsibility of investment, cost and effort a The government of Afghanistan (central and provincial governments) b Afghanistan’s private sector participation c Donors’ assistance, provision of subsidy for new employment and participation d New entrepreneurial activities 4 Include participation from all groups regardless of party and group affiliations (i.e., the Taliban will be invited to participate) 5 Provide employment enhancement–focused training and vocational e­ ducation – a combination of training on the job (learning by doing), short-­term vocational education and concurrently holding jobs and acquiring training and education 6 Create jobs through Afghanistan resources – rebuilding the country through Afghanistan’s internal resources, including mineral exploitation, agricultural production, tourism, infrastructure and others, plus donors’ participation 7 Ensure that donors share responsibility – subsidy for new employment, donors’ provision of subsidy for the cost of new labor employment is estimated at US$1 billion, a fraction of what is being spent there now (US$2,666 direct cost including overhead/­worker/­year or donor’s subsidy of 75 ­percent – US$2,000/­worker/­year for 500,000 worker/­year = US$1 billion/­year or US$6.1 billion during the first five years, assuming an annual cost increase of 10 percent, but estimates of total project costs are not included)

24  Adenrele Awotona Total employment creation will be more than 500,000 jobs due to a multiplier effect, which is a fraction of what the donors are spending in Afghanistan now 8 Build up institutional foundations of employment and jobs at the university level, vocational training and on-­the-­job participation. 9 Establish socioeconomic and political indicators for assessing and evaluating progress. 6 For details of the commitments made at the Tokyo Conference on Afghanistan which took place on July 8, 2012, visit www.unodc.org/­afghanistan/­en/­Events/­ tokyo-­conference-­on-­afghanistan.html. 7 NATO’s Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen and the leaders of the following countries were in attendance at the summit: Albania, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States. Other non-­NATO states and organizations were also in attendance, such as Afghanistan, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bosnia and Herzegovina, El Salvador, the European Union, Finland, Georgia, Ireland, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, South Korea, Kyrgyzstan, Macedonia, Malaysia, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, New Zealand, Pakistan, Qatar, Singapore, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Tonga, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, the United Arab Emirates, the United Nations and Uzbekistan. Source: Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia, https://­en.wikipedia.org/­wiki/­2012_ Chicago_summit, retrieved August 28, 2016. 8 Indeed, the 2014 National Corruption Survey report by Integrity Watch Afghanistan’s revealed the following: • There is a strong link between corruption and insecurity; the judiciary and police are seen as two most corrupt institutions, while the Ministry of Education is third; the financial burden of corruption on households has increased; corruption, by and large, remains institutionalized; and there is a high reliance on bribes to get things done. Of respondents whose households had paid a bribe, 34 percent said that they were highly certain the bribe would help them obtain the service. Speaking at the event, Dr Yama Torabi, Executive Director of Integrity Watch said, “The high degree of certainty that corruption allows access to public services is a sign of institutionalization of corruption.” • Bribery, which is the most common form of corruption, has nearly doubled in last four years. A total of about US$194.2 million was paid in bribes in 2014, compared to US$125.4 million in 2012. The number of adults who paid a bribe has gone from US$1.6 million to nearly US$2 million, a 25 percent increase in participation in bribery in two years. While the average bribe rose from US$190 in 2012 to US$240 in 2014, the average number of bribes paid per year has remained unchanged. • The justice institutions and the police are viewed as the two most corrupt public institutions. In comparison to 2012, both the courts and the Ministry of Interior remain the top two most corrupt institutions. The Ministry of Interior showed slight improvement with a reduction of 3 percent. The Ministry of Education, however, showed a setback and increased perception of corruption since it became the third most corrupt institution in 2014, while it was the seventh in 2012.

Housing and disaster risk management 25 • Ethnicity and personal and family relationships are slowly becoming more important. The rising importance of relationships and connections (ethnic and other relationships) for access to the state has resulted in the increased acceptance of respondents to use connections for securing jobs. • In general, citizens’ access to public services has improved. A clear majority of the respondents reported to have access to at least one public service. The most accessible public service was primary and secondary education (accessible to 92 percent), followed by access to security provided by police (with 88 percent accessibility rate). Nevertheless, respondents had to pay bribes for access to many public services, as a result of which the financial burden of corruption on households increased from 52 percent in 2012 to 57 percent in 2014. Source: Integrity Watch Afghanistan 2016, http://­integritywatch.co/­, retrieved May 18, 2016. 9 Legislative branch recommendations 1 Congress should consider enacting legislation that makes clear that anticorruption is a national security priority in a contingency operation and requires an interagency anticorruption strategy, benchmarks and annual reporting on implementation. 2 Congress should consider enacting legislation that authorizes sanctions against foreign government officials or their associates who engage in corruption. 3 Congress should consider requiring the United States Department of Defense (DOD), United States Department of State (State), USAID and other relevant executive agencies to establish a joint vendor vetting unit or other collaborative effort at the onset of any contingency operation to vet contractors and subcontractors better in the field. Executive branch recommendations 4 The United States National Security Council (NSC) should establish an interagency task force to formulate policy and lead strategy on anticorruption in contingency operations. The task force should encourage NSC principals to factor in the threat of corruption when deciding on and planning such missions. 5 At the onset of any contingency operation, the intelligence community should analyze links between host government officials, corruption, criminality, trafficking and terrorism. This baseline assessment should be updated regularly. 6 DOD, State, USAID and the intelligence community should each designate a senior anticorruption official to assist with strategic, operational and tactical planning at headquarters at the onset of and throughout a contingency operation. 7 DOD, State and USAID should each establish an office for anticorruption to provide support, including advice on anticorruption methods, programming and best practices for personnel in contingency operations. 8 The president should consider amending Executive Order 13581, which authorizes the listing of transnational criminal organizations on Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) Specially Designated Nationals list, to include individuals and entities that have engaged in corruption and transferred the proceeds abroad. 9 In international engagements related to contingency operations, the US government should bring high-­level political commitment to bear against corruption to ensure anticorruption is a priority from the outset for the host government and international and regional partners.

26  Adenrele Awotona 10 The State Department should place a high priority on reporting on corruption and how it threatens core US interests, consistent with new anticorruption initiatives by the department and recommendations in the 2015 Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR). 11 DOD, State, USAID, the Treasury Department, the Justice Department and the intelligence community should increase anticorruption expertise to enable more effective strategies, practices and programs in contingency operations. Source: SIGAR 2016c. 10 Article 15 of the Constitution of Afghanistan reads that “The state shall be obligated to adopt necessary measures to protect and improve forests as well as the living environment.” Accordingly, the National Environmental Protection Agency (NEPA) was established in 2005 as an independent national institution. NEPA serves as Afghanistan’s environmental policymaking and regulatory institution. Source: National Environmental Protection Agency Afghanistan NEPA – Islamic republic of Afghanistan, www.weadapt.org/­organisation/­nepa-­afghanistan, retrieved September 1, 2016. 11 For a detailed analysis of international investments in Afghanistan, see Lydia Poole, Afghanistan: Tracking Major Resource Flows 2002–2010, 2011, www. globalhumanitarianassistance.org/­wp-­content/­uploads/­2011/­02/­gha-­Afghanistan-­ 2011-­major-­resource-­flows.pdf, retrieved December 25, 2016. 12 Macdonald 2010 has noted that “through the Afghan government’s Land Allocation Scheme (LAS), a system was established where state-­owned land was supposed to be redistributed to landless returnees and internally displaced people. However, only 30,000 families (out of 300,000) have received temporary documents, of which only 4,000 have moved to settlements. The scheme has been hampered by the isolated location of most resettlement sites, corruption, lack of transparency in beneficiary selection and the absence of basic services, such as potable water, sanitation facilities, schools, mosques and clinics. Occupancy levels on the LAS at the end of 2008 averaged at 17 percent.” 13 The thirty-­ nine countries currently in need of external food assistance are Afghanistan, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Guinea, Haiti, Iraq, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Swaziland, Syria, Uganda, Yemen and Zimbabwe. Indeed, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations has noted that “the impact of long-­running conflicts in several Near Eastern countries continues to severely depress agricultural production despite generally beneficial weather conditions for staple grain crops” (FAO 2016). 14 The United States Agency for International Development has been assisting farmers in western Afghanistan in one targeted disaster risk reduction effort focusing on increasing their potato harvest. This consists of simply providing the farmers with reliable storage facilities that protect the potatoes, a major staple food, so that they can last through the cold and snowy winter months. This enables the farmers to cultivate more food and perhaps have a chance to sell surplus produce at advantageous prices to them, thereby ensuring a more resilient livelihood which is less susceptible to the vagaries of the weather (USAID 2012). 15 Indeed, the NEPA, the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) and the fifth assessment report of the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC5) have projected that in the near future in Afghanistan,

Housing and disaster risk management 27 the mean annual temperature will increase, and water availability will decrease, thereby aggravating incidences of extreme weather and natural hazards such as droughts and floods. These climatological changes may seriously “disrupt the foundation of the country’s economy, stability and food security” (United Nations Environment Program (UNEP 2015). 16 ANDMA is a government body which is mandated to coordinate all disaster-­ related activities within the country, along with key Ministries, civil society and the international community. It was established in 1971 with the help of the United Nations Disaster Response Office (UNDRO) and approval of the national commission for disaster management (Islamic Republic of Afghanistan 2009, 7).

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28  Adenrele Awotona Gilsinan, Kathy. 2013. Kabul’s Utterly Mundane Urban Planning Crisis. The Atlantic City Lab, August 21. The City’s Biggest Problem Isn’t Suicide Bombers or Militants . . . it’s the Traffic. www.citylab.com/­design/­2013/­08/­kabuls-­utterly-­ mundane-­urban-­planning-­crisis/­6447/­. Retrieved March  2, 2016. Giustozzi, Antonio. 2004. ‘Good’ State vs. ‘Bad’ Warlords? A Critique of State-­ Building Strategies in Afghanistan, Working Paper no. 51, Crisis States Research Centre, LSE, October. http://­eprints.lse.ac.uk/­13314/­1/­wp51.pdf. Retrieved May 5, 2016. Government of Germany. 2004. Afghanistan: 2004 Berlin Conference Declaration. ReliefWeb, April 1. http://­reliefweb.int/­report/­afghanistan/­afghanistan-­2004-­berlin-­ conference-­declaration. Retrieved December 8, 2016. Harris, Katie, David Keen, and Tom Mitchell. 2013. When Disasters and Conflicts Collide: Improving Links Between Disaster Resilience and Conflict Prevention. Overseas Development Institute, London, February. www.odi.org/­sites/­odi.org.uk/­ files/­odi-­assets/­publications-­opinion-­files/­8228.pdf. Retrieved December 8, 2016. Igoe, Michael. 2014. The 7 Biggest Threats to Afghan Reconstruction in 2015, December. www.devex.com/­news/­the-­7-­biggest-­threats-­to-­afghan-­reconstruction-­ in-­2015-­85043. Retrieved April 14, 2016. Integrity Watch Afghanistan. 2016. http://­integritywatch.co/­. Retrieved May 18, 2016. International Organization for Migration (IOM). 2015. Major New Disaster Risk Management Program for Afghanistan. www.iom.int/­news/­major-­new-­disaster-­ risk-­management-­program-­afghanistan. Retrieved August 31, 2016. Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. 2008. The Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS), 2008–2013. Ministry of Foreign Affairs. http://­mfa.gov.af/­en. Retrieved August 31, 2016. Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. 2009. Views from the Front-­Line: The Global Network of CSOs for Disaster Reduction – Country Report: Afghanistan, May 19. www.preventionweb.net/­f iles/­3 0440_afghanistanglobalnetworkcsodr.pdf. Retrieved December 8, 2016. Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. 2010. Development Cooperation Report. Ministry of Finance. http://­mof.gov.af/­Content/­files/­Development%20Cooperation%20 Report%202010.pdf. Retrieved December 9, 2016. Kamrany, Nake M. 2011. Reconstruction of Post-­War Afghanistan. The World Post. www.huffingtonpost.com/­nake-­m-­kamrany/­reconstruction-­of-­postwar_b_944 892.html. Retrieved May 5, 2016. The London Conference on Afghanistan. 2014. Communiqué. www.gov.uk/­govern ment/­uploads/­system/­uploads/­attachment_data/­file/­383205/­The-­London-­Confer ence-­on-­Afghanistan-­Communique.pdf. Retrieved April 14, 2016. Macdonald, Ingrid. 2010. Afghanistan’s Reintegration Challenges: Land and Housing. Norwegian Peace Building Center, Noref Article, May. www.peacebuilding. no/­var/­ezflow_site/­storage/­original/­application/­c6f855e87a56ceaf6fea78d86ff9 f0b8.pdf. Retrieved August 31, 2016. Majidi, Nassim. 2013. Home Sweet Home! Repatriation, Reintegration and Land Allocation in Afghanistan, June. https://­remmm.revues.org/­8098?lang=en. Retrieved May 5, 2016. Poole, Lydia. 2011. Afghanistan: Tracking Major Resource Flows 2002–2010. www. globalhumanitarianassistance.org/­wp-­content/­uploads/­2011/­02/­gha-­Afghanistan-­ 2011-­major-­resource-­flows.pdf. Retrieved December 25, 2016.

Housing and disaster risk management 29 Qureshi, Asad Sarwar, and Mujeeb Akhtar. 2004. A Survey of Drought Impacts and Coping Measures in Helmand and Kandahar Provinces of Afghanistan. International Waste Management Institute (IWMI), Internal Report, December. www.preventionweb.net/­files/­1853_VL102120.pdf. Retrieved December 25, 2016. Radio Free Europe. 2008. Afghanistan: Donors’ Conference Opens in Paris. www. rferl.org/­content/­article/­1144606.html. Retrieved August 31, 2016. Ramsey, Amber. 2010. Afghanistan: Disaster Management and Emergency Preparedness, Issue 02. Civil-­Military Fusion Center. http://­reliefweb.int/­sites/­reliefweb. int/­files/­resources/­11907948C47300428525777E00651593-­Full_Report.pdf. Retrieved August 31, 2016. Raqeebi, Muneeb Mohammad. 2013. External Aid and Its Effectiveness in the Reconstruction and Development of Afghanistan: An Analysis of the Years 2002– 2014. A Thesis Submitted to the graduate faculty of The University of Alabama at Birmingham in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Public Administration (MPA). ReliefWeb. 2010. Afghanistan: Disaster Management and Emergency Preparedness, Issue 2. http://­reliefweb.int/­report/­afghanistan/­afghanistan-­disaster-­management-­ and-­emergency-­preparedness-­issue-­0210. Retrieved August  31, 2016. Sharifzai, Mohammad Saraj, Keisuke Kitagawa, Mohammad Kamil Halimee, Javid Habib, and Daishi Sakaguchi. 2015. Principles of Sustainable and Affordable Housing Policy for Afghan Refugees Returning to Afghanistan. World Academy of Science, Engineering and Technology, International Journal of Civil, Environmental, Structural, Construction and Architectural Engineering 9 (12). www. waset.org/­publications/­10003275. Retrieved March 3, 2016. Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR). 2016a. Corruption in Conflict: Lessons from the U.S. Experience in Afghanistan, September. www.sigar.mil/­pdf/­lessonslearned/­SIGAR-­16-­58-­LL.pdf. Retrieved December 1, 2016. Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR). 2016b. 32nd Quarterly Report on the Status of the U.S. Reconstruction Effort in Afghanistan, July 30. www.sigar.mil/­pdf/­quarterlyreports/­2016-­07-­30qr.pdf. Retrieved August 29, 2016. UNCHR. 2014a. Shelter Assistance for Returnees in Afghanistan, Annual report for 2013. The Khaled Hosseini Foundation, Submitted in February. www.khaledhos seinifoundation.org/­pdf/­UNHCR_2013_Shelter_Program_Report.pdf. Retrieved March 10, 2016. UNCHR. 2014b. VOLREP and Border Monitoring Monthly Update, March. www. unhcr.org/­50ab463b6.html. Retrieved March 10, 2016. UNEP Afghanistan Program. UNEP Website. www.unep.org/­conflictsanddisasters/­ UNEPintheRegions/­CurrentActivities/­Afghanistan/­tabid/­287/­language/­en-­US/­ Default.aspx. Retrieved September 1, 2016. UN-­Habitat. 2015. State of Afghan Cities Report 2015, Volume 1. http://­unhabitat. org/­books/­soac2015/­. Retrieved March 9, 2016. UN-­Habitat. 2016a. Afghanistan, March. http://­unhabitat.org/­afghanistan/­. Retrieved March 9, 2016. UN-­Habitat. 2016b. Afghanistan Holds ‘Inclusive Cities Week’ to Network Communities from Regional Hub Cities and Kabul. http://­unhabitat.org/­afghanistan-­holds-­ inclusive-­cities-­week-­to-­network-­communities-­from-­regional-­hub-­cities-­and-­kabul/­. Retrieved March 9, 2016.

30  Adenrele Awotona United Nations Development Program. 2010a. National Disaster Management Plan, 2010–Afghanistan. https://­www.preventionweb.net/­files/­31182_afghanistan nationaldisastermanageme-­451.pdf. Retrieved April 2, 2019. United Nations Development Program. 2010b. Afghanistan National Disaster Management Project (NDMP), First Quarter Project Progress Report. www.preven tionweb.net/­files/­14480_NDMP.Q1.20101.pdf. Retrieved December 8, 2016. UNJobs. undated 1. Component Head (Community Base Disaster Risk Management), Kabul. http://­unjobs.org/­vacancies/­1251976710915. Retrieved August  31, 2016. UNJobs. undated 2. Disaster Risk Management Expert on Strengthening Institutional Mechanisms, Kabul. http://­unjobs.org/­vacancies/­1334814635241. Retrieved August 31, 2016. United Nations Environment Program (UNEP). 2003. Afghanistan Post-­Conflict Environmental Assessment Report, Nairobi, Kenya. http://­postconflict.unep.ch/­ publications/­afghanistanpcajanuary2003.pdf. Retrieved September 1, 2016. United Nations Environment Program (UNEP). 2015. Building Afghanistan’s Resilience: Natural Hazards, Climate Change, and Humanitarian Needs. A Paper for the 2016 Brussels Conference on Afghanistan by The Afghanistan Resilience Consortium (ARC) and Save the Children International (SCI) 2016. http://­postconflict. unep.ch/­publications/­Afghanistan/­UNEP_AFG_Brussels_conference_2016.pdf. Retrieved December 8, 2016. United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction Secretariat (UNISDR). 2009. Global Assessment Report on Disaster Risk Reduction. www.prevention web.net/­english/­hyogo/­gar/­report/­index.php?id=1130&pid:34&pif:3. Retrieved October 13, 2016. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). 2012. Corruption in Afghanistan: Recent Patterns and Trends: Summary of Findings. www.unodc.org/­documents/­ frontpage/­Corruption_in_Afghanistan_FINAL.pdf. Retrieved August 28, 2016. United Nations. 2015. The Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030. www.preventionweb.net/­files/­43291_sendaiframeworkfordrren.pdf. Retrieved October 13, 2016. United States Agency for International Development (USAID). 2012. Pounds of Prevention: A Disaster Risk Reduction Story. www.preventionweb.net/­files/­29442_ fullreport11091.pdf. Retrieved December 8, 2016. Worldomers. 2016. Afghanistan Population. www.worldometers.info/­world-­popula tion/­afghanistan-­population/­. Retrieved August 31, 2016. Zia, Mohammad Ehsan. 2008. Afghan Aid That Works. The Christian Science Monitor, May 16. www.questia.com/­read/­1P2-­32635586/­afghan-­aid-­that-­works. Retrieved December 25, 2016.

2 The Afghan economy A historical overview Peter Marsden

Introduction Afghanistan is essentially a mountainous desert, with river valleys of varying sizes drawing on snow melt from the Hindu Kush and feeding agriculture to the north, south and east. Subsistence agriculture largely sustains the Afghan economy, with fluctuating harvests rendering it more or less vulnerable in any given year. The agricultural economy is based primarily on wheat, with livestock rearing another important element. However, the income from farming is not sufficient, for much of the population, to ensure survival. Families seek to survive by diversifying their income sources, with young men, in particular, being sent to work as laborers in the urban areas or in the labor markets of Pakistan, Iran and the Arabian Peninsula. Some go further afield, with traffickers being engaged to smuggle them into Europe. Security-­related factors, including pressure to fight for the Taliban, also act as significant factors in migratory flows. Small-­scale informal trading within Afghanistan and with its neighbors adds further to household incomes. The barrier created by the Hindu Kush, which dissects the country from west to east, results in trading networks being closely linked to the nearest neighbor. This is particularly the case in western Afghanistan, where the city of Herat has become, in many respects, an economic colony of Iran. Ethnic affiliations are also an important factor so that the Pashtuns of southern Afghanistan relate closely to the equally large Pashtun population of Pakistan. The northern city of Mazar-­e-­Sharif, with its significant Uzbek and Tajik populations, has similarly benefited from its proximity to Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. Growing, and now widespread, access to mobile phone networks and the Internet has greatly facilitated the informal trading system over the past fifteen years or so. Informal trading has also benefited from increased access to electricity and from an improved road infrastructure. A consequence has been a pronounced urbanization process. The work of the aid community since 1989 has increased access to both healthcare and education services, and this may be a contributory factor

32  Peter Marsden in a significant growth in the population, notwithstanding the deaths brought about by the post 1978 conflict situation. However, the security environment remains highly precarious and external private sector investment has been limited. The departure of much of the international presence, both military and civilian, since 2014, has represented a serious shock to the economy, with the demand for goods and services very much reduced. Afghanistan is ranked 168 out of the 189 countries listed in UNDP’s Human Development Index in its Human Development Report 2018. It is therefore one of the poorest countries in the world. The World Bank published an economic report on Afghanistan in September 2004 in which it noted that 90 percent of the economy was based on the informal sector. One-­fifth of rural households were estimated to be extremely poor, facing food insecurity throughout the year. A further 50–60 percent of rural households were “doing a little better” but remained poor and were vulnerable to falling into deeper poverty. The urban population presented a similar pattern. The report noted particularly poor social indicators, including infant mortality of 115 per 1,000 live births, under-­five mortality of 172 per 1,000 live births and maternal mortality of 1,600 per 100,000 live births. These indicators have since improved so that, according to the UNDP Human Development Report for 2018, infant mortality in 2016 was 53.2 per 1,000 live births, under-­five mortality was 70.4 per 1,000 live births and maternal mortality, in 2015, was 396 per 100,000 live births. The opium economy was said, in the same World Bank report, to constitute one-­third of total, narcotics-­inclusive, GDP, with agriculture representing a further 32 percent. Manufacturing, mostly small scale, contributed only 9 percent. Illegal activities were said to be significant in scale and included smuggling, trade in illegally exploited natural resources, the appropriation of customs duties, illegal taxation, human trafficking, land seizures and real estate speculation based on armed force or corruptly obtained contracts. The Asian Development Bank’s Asian Development Outlook 2017 reported a growth in GDP of 2 percent in 2016. This followed a downturn over the 2013–2015 period from a growth rate of 11.4 percent in 2012. A lack of confidence among investors, the business community and the general public had inhibited growth. This reflected “an increasingly difficult security situation and protracted uncertainty in the political environment.” However, factors such as Afghanistan’s accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in July 2016 and the development of the port of Chabahar in Iran were assessed as likely to strengthen growth. The large-­scale return of Afghans from Pakistan, in the summer and autumn of 2016, was expected to compound persistent poverty, already aggravated by low labor demand and by the large number of people displaced by insurgent activity. The report also noted an increase in private capital outflows in 2015, which had accompanied a marked emigration process.

The Afghan economy 33

The agricultural economy The central spine of the Hindu Kush provides only limited opportunities for agriculture, through the narrow river valleys which dissect it. However, the melting snow which runs off the massif feeds much larger valleys, particularly to the south and west. Notable among these is that of the Helmand River, which crosses the vast desert of southwest Afghanistan; the Shomali Valley immediately to the north of Kabul; the Kabul River, which flows east from Kabul through Jalalabad to the Pakistan border; and the Hari Rud valley, which sustains Herat and the surrounding area in northwestern Afghanistan. To the north of the Hindu Kush, the Kunar delta provides particularly good growing conditions, and the grasslands to the west of it, centered on Mazar-­e-­Sharif, provide a relatively good environment for agriculture, primarily through the Balkh River and the Sari Pul River but also through rain-­fed agriculture. A useful source of information on the crops cultivated in Afghanistan is Anthony Fitzherbert’s An Introductory Guide to Sources of Traditional Fodder and Forage and Usage.1 This work shows that livestock represents an important part of the agricultural process, drawing on the unsuitability of much of the land for crop production but its suitability for grazing by sheep, goats and cattle. The guide notes that wheat, both irrigated and rain fed, is the major crop and that the bulk of the fodder fed to livestock takes the form of wheat straw. The stubble left after the harvest is also used by grazing animals. Small and broken grain is fed to poultry. Barley is also fed to livestock, but because of its relatively high cost, it is normally used only for vulnerable animals. Barley is also used for human consumption in remote high-­altitude areas. Maize is cultivated as a summer crop, after wheat, along with mung beans, rice (if sufficient water is available), cotton and summer vegetables, such as okra. These are used primarily for human consumption. Also grown for human consumption are Phaseolus beans, peas, lentils, chickpeas, mustard and rape seed, radishes, peanuts, sunflower seeds, broad beans and soya beans. Where conditions permit, fruit and vegetables are cultivated. Additional fodder crops include lucerne and Persian clover. According to figures published for 1960–2016 by Index Mundi under the heading “Afghanistan Wheat Production by Year,” wheat production over the 1960–1972 period hovered between 1.947 million metric tons in 1963 and 2.45 million metric tons in 1972. Production improved somewhat over the 1973–1986 period, with a low of 2.663 million metric tons in 1979 and a high of 2.940 million metric tons in 1986. This coincided with the Daoud Presidency of 1973–1979, the early years of the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) government and the Soviet military presence. Thereafter, there was a sharp fall to a low of 1.650 million metric tons in 1990, a figure repeated in 1992, before a steady rise to 2.834 million metric tons in 1998. The low point over the 1990–1992 period can be partly attributed to the armed engagement between the Mujahidin and the PDPA government,

34  Peter Marsden followed by the period of instability which characterized the Mujahidin government of 1992–1996. The emergence of the Taliban from the autumn of 1993 provided a high level of security in southern Afghanistan, which facilitated agriculture there, but resistance to their expansion in the north from 1996 onward took important areas of agricultural potential, such as the Shomali Valley, out of production. The insecurity of northern Afghanistan was a contributory factor, compounding adverse climatic conditions, to the near famine of the 2000–2001 years, when production fell to 1.469 million metric tons. Fortunately, the UN and the wider aid community were able to access the worst affected populations and avoid the mass starvation which had characterized a less serious famine in 1970. Between 2003 and 2012, wheat production oscillated wildly, falling to 2.1 million metric tons in 2008. From 2012 to 2017, it was at an all-­time high, at around a level of 5 million metric tons, before falling to 4 million metric tons in 2018. Agricultural production has therefore been highly sensitive to both the level and the nature of conflict. The Soviet military intervention of December 1979 took on a religious and a security significance. Afghanistan was deemed to have been invaded by a secular, non-­Islamic power, which required Muslims to undertake a migration to a country where Islam still prevailed as the state religion, namely Pakistan and Iran. Although some farmers moved back and forth into Afghanistan from the refugee camps in Pakistan to keep their land under cultivation, much of the land suffered from neglect due to the absence of its owners and sharecroppers. The increased intensity of the Soviet military offensives on rural communities from 1986 onward will have compounded the impact of this cumulative neglect in driving many of the remaining farmers to abandon their land. When the US government led a further military intervention in October 2001, both Pakistan and Iran strongly pressured refugees to return. However, the process of returning, claiming entitlement to land and getting the land working again was far from easy, and there was a continuing return flow into Pakistan and Iran in relatively large numbers. The subsequent Taliban-­led insurgency, from 2003 onward, has created areas which have been hotly contested, and these will have suffered from a decline in agricultural production. Notwithstanding the impact of conflict on agricultural production, Afghanistan has continued to experience fluctuations in levels of rainfall and also snowfall. Periods of particularly heavy snow have led to flooding and landslides, both of which have had the capacity to destroy stretches of cultivated land. Sudden warming, in combination with heavy snow, can cause devastating flash floods. The construction of flood defenses and drainage systems has therefore been an important part of the continuing work of farmers. NGOs and UN agencies have assisted this process by providing funding and other resources. Land ownership patterns are complex. Although some will own land that is sufficient for their survival, others will have to supplement their income from the land through labor migration, trading and other strategies. The

The Afghan economy 35 exodus of six million refugees to Pakistan and Iran in the 1980s, in combination with land grabs by successive power holders and the frequent absence of documentation has led to many disputes over entitlement to land. Difficulties in proving entitlement have been an added factor in the urbanization process. Sharecropping and other tenancy arrangements are an important feature of the agricultural economy. According to the 2011/­2012 National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment (NRVA),2 which was published in August 2012, an estimated 7.6 million people (30.1 percent of the population) were assessed to be very severely to moderately food insecure (consuming fewer than 2,100 calories per day). Of these, 2.2 million (8.5 percent) were very severely food insecure (consuming fewer than 1,500 calories per day) and another 2.4 million severely food insecure. The urban population were slightly more food insecure than the rural population but represented only 28 percent of the population. The areas with the highest levels of food insecurity were said to be in the northeast and in the central highlands, both mountainous regions with poor growing conditions. Also, 21 percent of households drew part of their income from wage labor. These tended to be families with poor asset holding.

Labor migration The ability of Afghans to move back and forth between Afghanistan and Pakistan and between Afghanistan and Iran in order to work has been fraught with difficulties. The actual border with Pakistan is relatively porous, with much of it being mountainous terrain. Under pressure from the US government, concerned to prevent arms and other support reaching the Afghan Taliban from Pakistan, the Pakistan government has increased border controls. The border with Iran is much more heavily policed, however. Notwithstanding the controls imposed, Afghans succeed in entering both Pakistan and Iran in large numbers to seek work. Once they are in either country, they are at constant risk of being picked up by the police and asked for their identification papers. Various forms of temporary permits have been issued by both Pakistan and Iran since 1979, and these are more likely to be held by those who have a long-­established presence. Those entering as new economic migrants risk being deported, particularly in Iran. As an added deterrent, Iran long ago established detention centers for illegal Afghan migrants, where conditions have been extremely severe. Once in Pakistan or Iran, Afghans tend to work in the most menial occupations. In the case of Iran, this was specifically designated when Afghans first arrived as refugees in the early 1980s in response to the PDPA coup and the Soviet military intervention. Afghans at that time were permitted to work only in limited sectors, including construction, agricultural laboring and waste disposal. Those working in the cities were also confined to certain poor neighborhoods. Few were provided for in refugee camps. In Pakistan, in contrast, refugee camps were set up to accommodate around

36  Peter Marsden three million Afghans. During the early years, food rations were provided, as were health, education and water supply services. Over time, the scale of these was progressively reduced. Afghans therefore found themselves having to seek work outside the camps to supplement food rations and also pay for healthcare and schooling. The situation for Afghans in Pakistan deteriorated dramatically in 2016, when the Pakistan government placed increased pressure on Afghans within its borders to return to Afghanistan. From July to December 2016, 370,102 registered refugees and 244,309 undocumented Afghan migrants crossed into Afghanistan.3 This push on Afghans to return followed the formal inauguration of the India-­funded Salma Dam in Herat Province. Pakistan interpreted this as indicative of a growing rapprochement between Afghanistan and India. Pakistan was also said to be concerned by the likely impact on its own economy of the development of the port of Chabahar, in Iran, as an alternative outlet to Karachi for the transportation of goods to and from Afghanistan. The extent to which Afghans have actively sought to overcome the difficulties inherent in seeking labor migration in Pakistan or Iran as an income source has been subject to the vagaries of the Afghan, Iranian and Pakistani economies as well as to the degree of policing in each of the neighboring countries. When the Afghan economy was benefiting from the international presence at its height, laboring rates within the urban areas of Afghanistan were competitive with those in Pakistan or Iran. The international sanctions imposed on Iran and the adverse security situation in Pakistan have also acted as constraints on labor migration. These may have contributed to the trend whereby Afghans have sought laboring opportunities in Europe, although the adverse security situation in Afghanistan is also likely to be an important factor in this particular migratory flow. Families have to be continuously responsive to a highly fluid situation to determine whether, at any one time, it is in their best interests to opt for labor migration in one of the neighboring countries or to look for opportunities within the urban sector within Afghanistan or as seasonal laborers within the opium economy. In giving careful consideration to the options available, families have benefited significantly from the increased access to mobile phones, which has been an important outcome of the post-­2001 period. They are thus able to phone relatives or other contacts to determine the ease or difficulty of securing work in one location or another and also to determine relative laboring rates. A family will often seek to diversify its income sources by having one or more sons working on the land, working as migrant laborers in one of the neighboring countries or as laborers within the urban economy of Afghanistan. From the perspective of the Pakistani and Iranian governments, there is an ambivalence toward the presence of Afghans. While their availability to work in the most menial occupations is, potentially, of benefit to the respective economies, there is significant prejudice against Afghans in both countries, and the daily humiliation involved can be a factor in whether

The Afghan economy 37 individuals choose to remain. Further, there has been, within Iran, opposition from the labor unions to the use of the cheap labor that Afghans provide and to the absence of health and safety measures that they have no choice but to accept. Pressure from the unions, along with general popular pressure, can be a trigger for the periodic sweeps of arrests and deportations of Afghans in which the Iranian government engages.

The opium economy The small-­scale production of opium goes back some way, to support a need for pain relief and relief from stress. However, there was also some recorded trade in opium as far back as 1932, when the Afghan government stated production to be 74.5 tons.4 The construction of a dam in the Helmand River by the US government in 1973 was followed by a marked increase in opium production in Helmand and Kandahar.5 The power vacuum in the rural areas during the armed conflict between the PDPA government of 1978–1992 and the Mujahidin created the opportunity for the latter actively to encourage farmers to move to opium production in order to help purchase weapons. According to Afghanistan’s Opium Drug Economy by Christopher Ward and William Byrd, published in 2004 through the World Bank, opium production had reached 1,570 tons by 1990, the year after the Soviet military withdrawal, and 2,330 tons by 1993, the year after the collapse of the PDPA government and its replacement by the Mujahidin government. According to this report and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Afghanistan Opium Survey 2013, the area cultivated with opium was below 100,000 hectares throughout the 1990 to 2003 period, whereas the area cultivated since has been consistently above this level. According to UNODC figures, this trend has tended to accelerate since 2013, reaching a high of 328,000 hectares in 2017. The Afghanistan Opium Survey 20186 noted that the net (after eradication) area cultivated with poppy in 2018 was 263,000 hectares and that the potential production of opium was 6,400 tons. This production level had been exceeded in two of the previous twelve years, with production of 9,000 tons in 2017 reaching the highest point. The report also estimated the total production of heroin, of export quality with 50–70 percent purity, to be 360–610 tons in 2018. The remaining opium was therefore trafficked and consumed within the region in its pure form. Helmand has long been the major producer, facilitated by conducive growing conditions in the Helmand Valley and by the significant involvement of a particular network of key traffickers in the production and trafficking businesses. In 2018, opium poppy was cultivated on 136,798 hectares within Helmand, representing 52 percent of the total area on which poppy was grown in Afghanistan. An interesting analysis of how the opium industry is structured in Afghanistan is provided by Mark Shaw in “Drug Trafficking and the Development of Organized Crime in Post-­Taliban Afghanistan.”7 The analysis indicated that

38  Peter Marsden a pyramid-­type structure then existed through which farmers, at the bottom of the pyramid, could freely choose to grow opium poppy, provided that they had access to land, seed and credit (with the latter two often provided by trafficking organizations). These were said to sell to small-­scale traders operating within their area, and they in turn sold to local traders at local market centers. Above this level were middle-­level traders who operated at the edge of the criminal underworld, with a significant level of secrecy. These sold to traffickers, who were responsible for the movement of opium across Afghanistan’s borders to Iran, Central Asia and Pakistan. Traffickers were said to have close links to chiefs of police, whom they would pay off to ensure freedom of operation. Overall control of the process was thought to be in the hands of a small number of individuals, with an estimated twenty-­ five to thirty traffickers responsible to each. These – at most fifteen – key traffickers, who were primarily based in the south of the country, regulated the market through the stock that they held and also oversaw the production and trafficking of heroin. They had close political connections, particularly with the Ministry of the Interior. While the opium farmers at the bottom of the pyramid have some freedom to choose whether or not to grow opium in any given year, the poorest farmers are often caught in a cycle of indebtedness through punitive credit arrangements which give them no option but to continue to produce opium.8 However, for those who are not trapped by debt, the decision to grow opium is influenced by a significant number of variables relating to potential rural livelihood strategies.9 These variables can include the relative price of wheat, the anticipated quality of the opium harvest and the ease of access to market. Adverse weather conditions can significantly affect yields, as can drought and crop disease. In 2010 the number of households involved in the cultivation of opium poppies was estimated at 248,700, representing about 6 percent of the total population.10 These figures may usefully be compared with the estimates in 2004, when around 356,000 families were involved directly in opium production, representing some 10 percent of the population. Furthermore, in that year at least 480,000 people were believed to have worked as itinerant workers in the opium harvest.11 This reflects the dependence of the annual opium harvest on the employment of seasonal laborers. Several hundred thousand12 tend to be involved, following the harvest from the warmer southern provinces to the cooler northern ones. An unfortunate consequence of the production of opium is growing usage of both opium and heroin within Afghanistan. A UNODC report published in April 2014 noted that it had been estimated, in 2009, that approximately 8 percent of Afghans between fifteen and sixty-­four were drug users. The total number of heroin users had been estimated at 120,000, an increase of 140 percent since 2005.13 A more recent picture is given in the 2015 Afghanistan National Drug Use Survey, published by SGI Global, LLC. This was referred to in the Afghan

The Afghan economy 39 government’s Drug Action Plan for 2015–2019.14 It reported on a national drug use rate of 11 percent and noted that rural drug use rates were nearly three times higher than in urban areas, with children as significant users. In stating the action that it would take to address drug usage in the rural areas, it cited, as a key assumption, that one of the root causes was insufficient access to licit analgesic medicines. The cross-­border trafficking of opium and heroin has also resulted in high levels of addiction in the neighboring countries. The UNODC report, The Opium Economy in Afghanistan: An International Problem, published in 2003, reported on an estimated 1.2 million chronic opiate users in Iran in 2000–2001. This represented 2.8 percent of the population aged fifteen and above. Estimates were also given of opiate abuse in other countries in the region, with the comparative percentages being 1.8 percent in the Russian Federation, 1 percent in Central Asia and 0.9 percent in Pakistan.

Industrial production Investment in the extraction industries Afghanistan has significant reserves of minerals, notably chromium, copper, gold, iron ore, lead, zinc, lithium, marble, precious and semi-­precious stones, sulfur and talc. It also contains reserves of petroleum and natural gas.15 However, the history of efforts to extract them has been one of setbacks arising from the adverse security environment since 1978. (a) oil and gas Natural gas was exported to the Soviet Union over the 1977–1988 period and provided the major element in the revenue of the then–Afghan government, peaking in 1982.16 However, the wells, which had been drilled by Russian exploration teams, were abandoned during the 1990s.17 Natural gas was nonetheless still produced at four fields, from thirty-­five wells around Shiberghan, as of May 2013, and was distributed to domestic consumers and to the fertilizer plant at Mazar-­e-­Sharif.18 The Afghan Ministry of Mines and Petroleum announced in the same month that, with funding from the Asian Development Bank allocated in 2009, it had invited tenders for the rehabilitation of the gas fields in Shiberghan and that, subsequently, it had awarded a contract to Turkish Petroleum Corporation.19 Work was scheduled for completion by October 2013. In October 2016, the Afghan government announced that it had signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the Bayat Power Company, which is registered in Afghanistan, for the establishment of a gas-­fueled power plant at Shiberghan.20 However, it is not clear what impact this will have on the distribution of gas to domestic consumers, particularly with regard to the price that will be charged. The Asian Development had indicated, in

40  Peter Marsden its Power Sector Master Plan of May 2013, that any construction of a gas-­ fueled power plant would require the extraction of an additional source of gas, simply to operate the plant, and that the cost of the gas produced would require significantly higher prices to be charged. The U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) reported in January 2012 that by using a geology-­based assessment methodology, it had produced an estimate of “undiscovered, technically recoverable, conventional petroleum resources” for the Amu Darya Basin (which extends across northwest Afghanistan, southeast Turkmenistan, southwest Uzbekistan and a small area of northeastern Iran) and the Afghan-­Tajik Basin (which is situated across north-­central and northeastern Afghanistan, together with southern Uzbekistan and Tajikistan). The USGS estimated that the Amu Darya Basin contained 962 million barrels of crude oil, 52 trillion cubic feet of natural gas and 582 million barrels of natural gas liquids and that the Afghan-­Tajik Basin contained 946 million barrels of crude oil, 7 trillion cubic feet of natural gas and 85 million barrels of natural gas liquids.21 This report followed an earlier report, in 2006, in which the initial findings were announced. The 2006 findings formed the basis for an invitation, issued by the Afghan government in March 2009, for bids to explore, develop and produce hydrocarbons in selected blocks in northern Afghanistan. These were named as the Jangalikalan, Juma-­Bashikurd and Kashkari blocks.22 All three are located to the west of Mazar-­e-­Sharif and are within the Amu Darya Basin. China National Petroleum Corporation was awarded a contract in December 2011 to develop specific blocks in the Amu Darya Basin, in conjunction with an Afghan partner, Watan Group.23 However, Reuters reported in August 2013 that the production process had halted because it had not been possible to negotiate a transit arrangement with Uzbekistan to take the crude oil to be refined. The report also noted that the project had faced security constraints.24 The indications are that production has not resumed.25 (b) The Trans-­Afghanistan pipeline An initiative, which has been taken forward by the Asian Development Bank (ADB), to transport gas from Turkmenistan’s Daulatabad gas fields by pipeline to Afghanistan, Pakistan and, potentially, India has been under varying degrees of discussion since 1996. In spite of many doubts as to the viability of a pipeline, an agreement was signed on December 11, 2010, between Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan and India to proceed with construction. The ADB announced in May 2012 that GAIL (India) Ltd and Pakistan’s Inter-­State Gas System (Private) Ltd had signed Gas Sales and Purchase Agreements with Turkmenistan and that Afghanistan had also signed a Memorandum of Understanding on long-­term gas cooperation with Turkmenistan. Afghanistan finally signed a Gas Sales and Purchase Agreement with Turkmenistan in July 2013. The

The Afghan economy 41 proposed route was to transit Herat and Kandahar within Afghanistan and Quetta and Multan within Pakistan. In March 2015, The Hindu reported on an announcement by the Indian petroleum minister that negotiations for the pipeline were at a final stage and that the pipeline might become a reality.26 It was announced in August 2015 that Turkmengaz has been named as consortium leader for the pipeline.27 However, the Oil and Gas Journal reported in February 2016 that, due to a number of variables, the pipeline project was looking less than certain.28 Yet the New York Times reported in February 2018 that a ceremony had taken place in Herat to mark the beginning of the construction process.29 (c) Copper and iron ore The copper deposit at Aynak, 35 kilometers to the south of Kabul, was investigated by Russian geologists during the late 1970s and 1980s, and their data was more recently scanned, digitized and reinterpreted by the British Geological Survey, in association with the Afghanistan Geological Survey. In British Geological Survey’s 2007 report, they estimated the total reserves at 4.7 million metric tons. Invitations to tender for the extraction of the Aynak copper reserves were issued in November 2007, and a contract was subsequently awarded to the China Metallurgical Group Corporation and the Jiangxi Copper Company Limited, which subsequently formed a consortium. This was based on a new mining law, which the British Geological Survey had assisted the Afghan Ministry of Mines and Industries in drawing up in 2005. However, in 2013, the China Metallurgical Group Corporation indicated that it wished to renegotiate the contract. As at January 2017, no statement had apparently been made to suggest an outcome, and work on the extraction had yet to commence. Among the factors cited for delay in the process was the need for archeological work to be carried out on a Buddhist city, dating back to the early centuries ce, on the same site. As at January 2017, the excavation had been going on for nine years. Security threats have also proved to be a challenge. However, technical considerations would appear to have influenced the interest, on the Chinese side, in renegotiating the contract.30 An estimated 1.8 billion tons of iron ore, located at Hajigak in the central Province of Bamyan, remains to be exploited.31 The Afghan government invited bids in 2010.32 The Afghan Ministry of Mines and Petroleum announced in November 2011 that a consortium comprising Steel Authority of India Limited (SAIL) and others had been awarded three blocks and that the remaining block had been awarded to a Canadian company, Kilo Goldmines Ltd.33 However, it was reported in 2015 that the SAIL-­led consortium had decided not to proceed with the project, citing security concerns.34 The Kilo Goldmines Ltd website states that it has “a non-­participatory interest (20 percent), subject to dilution” in the Hajigak Project.

42  Peter Marsden Contributions to the trading economy Reference has been made in the introduction to the importance of small-­ scale informal trading to the household economy. The street scene in the cities, towns and district centers of Afghanistan is dominated by stalls and workshops. The ability of these to function effectively has been greatly strengthened by the ease with which farmers can transport their agricultural goods in a reasonable condition to market, keep them fresh through refrigeration and take account of changing market prices through the use of mobile phones. The major achievements of the period since 2001 have been the construction of a major highway system (albeit damaged through poor construction techniques, insufficient maintenance and an adverse security environment), the establishment of twenty-­four-­hour electricity in some of the major cities and a level of access to electricity in many rural areas, together with the establishment of a nationwide and widely used mobile phone network. (a) Roads At a time when the Soviet Union and the United States were competing to exert influence in Afghanistan, in the 1960s, the two superpowers built separate sections of a national highway system which extended from the Iranian border through Herat and Kandahar and to Kabul and Mazar-­e-­ Sharif. This highway system was of a high quality but subsequently suffered from neglect and from damage from tanks and other military vehicles over the course of the 1978–1992 conflict between the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan government (aided by the Soviet Union) and the US-­and Saudi-­supported Mujahidin. With the rural areas largely under the control of the Mujahidin, the PDPA government was constrained in its ability to maintain the highways. By the time of the US-­led military intervention in October 2001, the highways had lost their tarmac surfaces and consisted of a series of concrete sections interspersed by expansion gaps. The US government gave high priority to reinstating the highway system, but due to security constraints, it was not always able to ensure sufficient oversight of contractors. The quality of the constructed roads has therefore been an issue of concern. The US government funded and oversaw the construction of most of the highway between Herat and Kabul, with Saudi Arabia also covering part of the Herat to Kandahar stretch. Iran constructed a new road linking Herat with the Iranian border and also rehabilitated the road system within Herat. India linked with the Herat to Kandahar highway to build a new road to the Iranian border at Milak in southwest Afghanistan, ultimately to link with the Iranian port of Chabahar. The European Commission funded an upgrading of the Kabul to Jalalabad road, and Pakistan took responsibility for the road between Jalalabad and the Pakistan border at Torkham. The upgrading of the road from Kabul to Mazar-­e-­Sharif fell to

The Afghan economy 43 the World Bank, which also built a spur into northeastern Afghanistan. The ADB took on the task of linking Mazar-­e-­Sharif with the provinces to the west of it, a task beset with security and other difficulties. Other challenges were faced when the ADB sought to improve road access into the central Hazarajat region. Beyond upgrading the national highway systems, there have been many projects carried out by NGOs and others to improve local roads between villages and district centers. Some of these have been carried out under the Afghan government’s rural development program, known as the National Solidarity Program. These local roads have enabled farmers to reduce the level of fruits and vegetables bruising when they transport those commodities to market. The heavily potholed dirt tracks which preceded these roads had been hugely damaging to produce. (b) Electricity Investment by the Soviet Union over the 1979–1991 period made it possible to develop hydroelectricity facilities, initially through a hydroelectric power station at Asadabad, in eastern Afghanistan. This began operating in 1983. A further major investment was in the Naghlu Hydroelectric Dam, on the Kabul River, which provided most of Kabul’s power until 2009. Residents of the capital otherwise relied on generators. The ADB played a major role in funding and facilitating the construction of a power transmission line from hydropower plants in Uzbekistan to Kabul. The completion of this, in May 2009, provided twenty-­four-­hour electricity to most of the city. A further transmission line, completed in October 2011, took electricity from Tajikistan to the northern city of Pul-­ e-­Khumri. The western city of Herat was, soon after the US-­led intervention in Afghanistan, connected to the Iranian grid. Iranian investment in the infrastructure of Herat was consistent with its goal of establishing the city as an economic colony. The northern city of Mazar-­e-­Sharif had already been connected to the Soviet grid during the period of the Soviet military presence and subsequently to that of Uzbekistan after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The supply was discontinued in 1998, because the Taliban failed to pay dues to the Uzbek government, but it was reconnected in 2002. However, the supply of electric power to the southern cities of Jalalabad and Kandahar has been a more complex process. The Afghan government announced in October 2016 that it had signed a contract with the American-­Turkish company 77 to increase the power production capacity of the Kajaki Dam in Helmand. Efforts by the US and UK coalition military, following the US-­led intervention in Afghanistan, to build the dam’s capacity have been beset with setbacks due to security and other factors.35 Access to electricity within the rural areas has been largely dependent on interventions by NGOs, through the National Solidarity Program and

44  Peter Marsden other mechanisms, to establish hydropower projects. Where electricity has been thus provided, it has enabled farmers and households to keep produce and food supplies refrigerated and has facilitated small-­scale home-­based manufacturing. (c) Telecommunications The development of a mobile telephone network since 2002 has been a major contributor to both the formal and the informal economies. The major actor in this development has been the company Roshan, which is majority owned by the Aga Khan Development Network. By 2005, it already had 450,000 subscribers, and by April 2017, it was reaching over 6.5 million.

The provision of aid Although there was some limited provision of aid, from Germany and others, between the two World Wars, aid on any scale was not provided until after the Second World War. The Soviet Union and the United States were initially in competition, with the two superpowers engaged in the construction of the super highway discussed earlier. The United States also took on a major project through the construction of a dam on the Helmand River in 1973. However, thereafter, the Soviet Union was much more involved, particularly in the supply of military hardware and in the field of education, with Afghans sent in large numbers for training within its borders. Following the PDPA coup of 1978 and its own subsequent military intervention, the Soviet Union focused its assistance again on military supplies but also gave considerable assistance to the establishment of an intelligence service, to help the new regime identify and take action against those who were actively opposed to it. This intelligence service has remained one of the more effective elements of the Afghan government bureaucracy. The United States returned to the scene in response to the Soviet military intervention by funding, initially covertly, the resistance operations of the Afghan Mujahidin, through the provision of arms, with Pakistan used as a conduit for such assistance. Saudi Arabia, at this stage, agreed to equally match US funding for the Mujahidin and also took the opportunity to promote the Wahabbi creed through the creation of a large network of madrasahs in the refugee camps in Pakistan. The graduates of these madrasahs went on to form the nucleus of the Taliban movement. The refugee camps served as a base of cross-­border resistance operations by the Mujahidin, but they also housed three million refugees who needed to be provided for in some way or another. With assistance from the wider international community, the UN system, with significant input from NGOs, provided a basic system of support. The World Food Programme thus distributed food while other UN agencies, together with NGOs, provided water supply, healthcare, education and skills training. At the same

The Afghan economy 45 time, there was limited aid taken across the border by NGOs to support families who were unable to escape to Pakistan. The departure of Soviet troops in February 1989 provided the opportunity for cross-­border operations to be scaled up. Initially, this took the form of the provision of improved wheat seed to farmers within the provinces close to the Pakistan border. The FAO played a key role in this process. NGOs also set up health and education programs, expanding gradually across the country. These benefited from negotiations with individual Mujahidin commanders. Such negotiations also made it possible to establish rural development programs in support of agriculture, through food for work and other models. These often took the form of technical support for the creation of flood protection walls, culverts and other drainage systems, as well as support to expand irrigation systems. UNOPS played an important role in taking forward a community development process in which farmers participated actively in the provision of labor and other resources. The much-­improved security provided by the Taliban in southern Afghanistan from 1994 onward made it possible to engage in much-­ longer-­ term planning for community development programs, a process greatly facilitated by the willingness of the European Commission to fund such an approach. However, the strong resistance to the Taliban advance in the north of Afghanistan, following the capture of Kabul in September 1996, created a difficult environment for the aid community, and aid programs were frequently disrupted. Throughout the 1992–2001 period, the UN and NGOs were working as effective substitutes for a government process in a situation in which neither the Mujahidin government of 1992–1996 nor the Taliban government of 1996–2001 had the capacity or the inclination to prioritize providing services to the population. Further, they were operating within a country in which the de facto governments were not accorded general recognition by the international community. The US-­led intervention of October 2001 was followed by a process through which an internationally recognized government was established. The major donor governments thus set out to help government ministries to build the capacity of those ministries. This was done, in part, through the secondment of international staff to work within individual ministries. It was also taken forward through the creation of the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund, which enabled ministries to receive donor funding under a process controlled by the World Bank. This provided oversight for donors over the disbursement of funds by ministries and was intended to limit the possibility of corruption. An important program, which took forward the community development approach initiated by NGOs and UNOPS in the 1990s, was the National Solidarity Program established by the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development. This set out to work with community structures to identify priorities relating to agriculture and local infrastructure and to provide

46  Peter Marsden grants to bring them to fruition. It quickly established itself as effective and has received significant donor support.

Security The Taliban-­led insurgency shows no signs of abating and has been compounded by the emergence of so-­called Islamic State as a further actor engaged in terrorist activity. The efforts of the Afghan government, with some support from the US military, to combat the two insurgencies, have had some success but not sufficient to change the underlying pattern of a weak state under threat from determined efforts to undermine it.

Security-­related asylum claims in Europe The loss of confidence in the future of the country is combining with precarious living conditions and fear, on the part of young men and their families, that they will come under pressure to join the Taliban. A consequence is a continuing flow of teenage and young adult males toward Europe. An estimated 182,985 Afghans sought asylum in Europe in 2016.36 Afghans were the second largest group of asylum seekers entering Europe in both 2015 and 2016, with a slight increase in 2016 over 2015. In 2016, they accounted for 15 percent of the total number of first-­time asylum applications in the 28 EU member states. Germany received 127,000 of the Afghan asylum seekers who entered Europe in 2016. Austria received a further 12,000, and 11,000 sought asylum in Hungary.37 According to the UNHCR Eligibility Guidelines for 30 August 2018, asylum seekers from Afghanistan were the largest group seeking asylum in twenty two countries between January and April 2018, with an estimated 30,000 claims. Globally, in the first half of 2017, Afghans lodged some 52,400 claims for asylum, a marked decrease from the same period in 2016 (124,000).

Conclusions The Afghan economy has experienced dramatic changes since the Second World War, with significant variations in its fortunes arising from the long period of conflict. Agricultural production is relatively high, but this remains subject to the vagaries of fluctuating harvests. The opium economy also continues to be strong. However, confidence in the future of the economy is low, manifested in the marked outflow of capital, the continuing movement of Afghans in large numbers to Europe and the stalling of major oil, gas and mineral extraction projects. The rapid urbanization process which has characterized the period since the US-­led intervention of October 2001, in combination with the provision of twenty-­four-­hour electricity to Kabul, Herat and Mazar-­e-­Sharif and the widespread access to mobile phones, will have strengthened the trading economy, but the population has not

The Afghan economy 47 ceased to suffer from serious levels of poverty and to face a highly precarious existence.

Notes 1 Anthony Fitzherbert, An Introductory Guide to Sources of Traditional Fodder and Forage and Usage: Environmental Resilience in Pastoral Systems in Afghanistan (Printed at Geneva: United Nations, 2016). 1610972 (E)-­June  2016–500-­UNEP/­PCDMB/­2016/­1. 2 Central Statistics Organisation of Afghanistan: Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment 2011–12. (The NRVA is carried out by the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development, the Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock, the Ministry of Public Health and the Ministry of Women’s Affairs, with support from the UN, the World Bank, the Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, DFID and the NGO partners of the National Surveillance System.) 3 Jelena Bjelica, Caught Up in Regional Tensions? The Mass Return of Afghan Refugees from Pakistan, Afghanistan Analysts Network, December 22, 2016. 4 Doris Buddenburg, On the Cultural History of Opium – And How Poppy Came to Afghanistan, Afghanistan Analysts’ Network, January 11, 2016. 5 Ibid. 6 Afghanistan Opium Survey 2018 (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime Narcotics, and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Ministry of Counter-­ 2018). 7 Mark Shaw, Drug Trafficking and the Development of Organized Crime in Post-­ Taliban Afghanistan, in Doris Buddenburg and William A. Byrd (eds) Afghanistan’s Drug Industry: Structure, Functioning, Dynamics, and Implications for Counter-­Narcotics Policy (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and The World Bank, November 2006). 8 Afghanistan: State Building, Sustaining Growth and Reducing Poverty: A Country Economic Report (World Bank, September 2004). 9 Afghanistan Opium Survey 2015: Socio-­Economic Analysis (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Ministry of Counter-­Narcotics, 2015). 10 Afghanistan Opium Survey 2010 (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and Government of Afghanistan Ministry of Counter-­Narcotics, 2010). 11 Afghanistan Opium Survey 2004 (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and Government of Afghanistan Counter-­Narcotics Directorate, 2004). 12 Doris Buddenburg, On the Cultural History of Opium – And How Poppy Came to Afghanistan, Afghanistan Analysts Network, January 11, 2016. 13 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Impact of Drug Use on Users and Their Families in Afghanistan, April 2014. 14 Islamic Republic of Afghanistan: Ministry of Counter-­ Narcotics, Afghan National Drug Action Plan 2015–19, October 14, 2105. 15 Chin S. Kuo, The Mineral Industry of Afghanistan (U.S. Department of the Interior, U.S. Geological Survey, August 2012). 16 Dr Anton Minkov and Dr Gregory Smolynec, Economic Development in Afghanistan During the Soviet Period, 1979–89: Lessons Learned from the Soviet Experience in Afghanistan (Canada: Defence R & D Canada, Centre for Operational Research and Development: National Defence, August 2007). 17 Asian Development Bank, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan: Power Sector Master Plan, May 2013. 18 Ibid.

48  Peter Marsden 19 Islamic Republic of Afghanistan: Ministry of Mines and Petroleum, Rehabilitation of Eight Shiberghan Gas Wells Underway: Production Capacity to Reach 1,000,000 m3/­Day, May 11, 2013. 20 1tvnews.af: Government Signs MOU for Jowzjan Gas-­Fuelled Power Plant, October 3, 2016. 21 US Geological Society, Assessment of Undiscovered Oil and Gas Resources of the Amu Darya Basin and Afghan-­Tajik Basin Provinces, Afghanistan, Iran, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, 2011. 22 Geoexpro. Oil and Gas Available in Afghanistan, Vol. 6, no. 3 (2009). 23 Reuters, Update 1-­Afghanistan Signs Major Oil Deal with China’s CNPC, December 28, 2011. 24 Reuters, Update 1-­Missing Refinery Deal Halts Landmark China-­Afghan Oil Project, August 18, 2013. 25 It is not always easy to establish the up-­to-­date position on the progress of contracts in Afghanistan. While the Afghan government will often announce that a new contract has been signed, it will not normally go public if there are difficulties in the implementation of the contract. Similarly, the websites of the contracting organization will tend to exclude information which is indicative of difficulties or which might preclude future action in a more positive climate. 26 www.thehindu.com, Trans-­Afghanistan Pipeline May Become a Reality: Pradhan, March 9, 2015. 27 Eurasianet, Consortium Leader Picked for Trans-­Afghan Pipeline, August 6, 2015. 28 www.ogj.com, TAPI Pipeline Progresses, But Future Uncertain, May 2, 2016. 29 The New York Times, Afghanistan Breaks Ground on 1,127-Mile ‘Peace ­Pipeline’, February 23, 2018. 30 The Diplomat, The Story Behind China’s Long-­Stalled Mine in Afghanistan, January 7, 2017. 31 Paul McDonnell and Anthony John Benham, Minerals in Afghanistan: The Hajigak Iron Deposit (Afghanistan Geological Survey, 2006). 32 Chin S. Kuo, The Mineral Industry of Afghanistan (U.S. Department of the Interior, U.S. Geological Survey, August 2012). 33 Islamic Republic of Afghanistan: Ministry of Mines and Petroleum, Afghanistan Ministry of Mines Announces the Winning Bidders for the Hajigak Iron Ore Project Tender, November 28, 2011: Publish Date: June 23, 2012. 34 www.miningweekly.com, India and Afghanistan Won’t Pursue Mining, Steel Project, November 27, 2015. 35 ltvnews.af, Contract Signed to Increase Kajaki Dam’s Capacity to 151MW, October 1, 2016. 36 http://­ec.europa.eu, Eurostat: Statistics Explained, Asylum Quarterly Report: File: First Time Asylum Applicants in the EU-­28 by Citizenship: Q4 2015 – Q4 2016.png, March 15, 2017. 37 http://­ec.europa.eu, Eurostat: “Statistics Explained: Asylum Statistics 13 March 2017.”

3 Locality and power A methodological approach to Afghan rural politics Sayed Asef Hossaini

Introduction: Afghanistan as a rural country Afghanistan can be considered a rural country, as almost 75 percent of its population lives in rural areas (World Bank 2014). At least since the beginning of the twentieth century, Afghanistan has been struggling to establish a stable central state. The country’s contemporary history obviously indicates how the central state has failed to deal properly with rural areas during the process of expanding bureaucracy as a mechanism of authority across the territory. The central state, whether in the form of a monarchy, republic or communist state, has not been able to bring rural communities under its control. Rural communities are geographically far from the center and demographically too heterogeneous in language, ethnicity and religion. Despite an administrative categorization by the central state, there is no clear-­cut boundary between different administrative units, particularly in rural Afghanistan. Mielke and Schetter1 (2007) in the article Where Is the Village? Local Perceptions and Development Approaches in Kunduz Province, detail how the locals use different terms to define their settlements in the northern province of Kunduz: Due to the lack of state penetration and territorialization of the local level, different terms and contested local concepts regarding the loci of rural community life exist in Afghanistan today: qarya, deh, qishlāq, manteqa and keley (kelay), just to mention the most commonly cited ones (Dupree 1973). Most of the time, all of these concepts have been indiscriminately translated into English as “village.” In fact, the notions commonly used to denominate rural settlements are not limited to the above labels. (Mielke and Schetter 2007, 74) However, such self-­interpretation of the locus and a variety of terms used to define the spatial dimensions of rural settlements lead to at least two assumptions: a) the locals probably use each term to name separate areas in their settlement, for instance, Manteqa refers to a specific area and Qishlāq

50  Sayed Asef Hossaini to another one; b) the terms could be overlapping definitions of single spatial units, for instance, they use Qarya and Aqhil synonymously. In some cases, villagers do not see a clear demarcation between their village and some nearby settlements or even the nearest urban settlement despite an administrative classification. However, “the term rural is not a uniformly defined term” (Bowler et al. 2002, 197) either in Afghanistan or in other countries. “Several definitions are used, but two are fairly common in land-­use planning: rural as ‘the open’ and rural as ‘non-­urban.’ Thus ‘rural’ describes areas composed of (open) fields, outside urban areas, with a low population density” (ibid.). Similar to the term rurality, the term locality is also ambiguous in social sciences. Simon Duncan believes that “the confusion and lack of clarity may be a consequence of the unexamined social assumptions within the term.” Nonetheless, the term refers to the correlation between the physical variable and social phenomena. Duncan notes that “locality means first of all to indicate that spatial variations make a difference to how social relations work although without saying how and why. But even more than this, the term seems to suggest that particular places somehow capture a degree of social autonomy” (Duncan 1989, 221). With respect to this conception, in this article, locality refers to spatial variations and their correlations with social features in rural settlements. Nigel Allan2 (2001) in his article Defining Place and People in Afghanistan illustrates the difficulty facing outsiders by the level of ethno-­cultural diversity of Afghanistan in connection with geographical characteristics. He describes how locality and physical places have played a crucial role in the contemporary history of Afghanistan, a country where, according to the Summer Institute of Linguistics, forty-­five languages (and dialects) are currently spoken by fifty-­five different ethnic groups (Orywal cited in Allan 2001, 545). The interconnectivity between the political power and the locality in Afghanistan could be identified at two levels of national and local politics. In terms of the national politics, the geographical characteristics of the settlements of each ethnic group have granted privileges to or brought about disadvantages for them. For instance, Allan notes that “major and minor ethnic groups have been shut out of representation in the government, largely because they lived in remote regions of Afghanistan, far from Kabul. This inequality enabled the Pashtun monarchy, backed by their kinfolk, to exert hegemonic control over the military, clergy, judiciary, commercial and civil authorities in Kabul throughout the 20th century” (Allan 2003, 195). At the local level, power has also been tightly connected to locality, but power is mainly interpreted as the accessibility to natural resources. In other words, the study of the power structure and the locality in a rural community is more about the relations between the “low-­dynamic parts of rural systems (e.g. nature, ecosystems) and the high dynamic parts including farming, housing, recreation and transport” (Bowler et al. 2002, 199) in the context of social relationships.

Locality and power 51 This chapter does not intend to argue for the significance of locality in the formation of a power structure but instead concentrates on methodological aspects of rural study. Using some relevant theories, the chapter aims to draw a methodological framework in a bid to reach a more comprehensive perception of local politics in rural Afghanistan. Accordingly, the article benefits from different theoretical frameworks, including Herbert Gans’ use-­centered theory and Pierre Bourdieu’s social space theory.

Rural power Power has been an especially challenging concept in the social sciences. The concept has been broadly discussed in the field of political science in the context of the sovereign state and its relations with subordinates. But it has also been central to a broad range of other disciplines, including political philosophy, political sociology and anthropology. Mainly formulated by Max Weber, power has been assumed to be zero-­ sum – that is, that a person can possess it only if someone else loses it. Michel Foucault eventually liberated the term from its positivist pattern and the bounds of the political science in which power had been largely discussed in the context of the modern state. Angela Cheater3 (2005) believes that “there seems to have been an unvoiced shift away from the Weberian distinction (Weber 1947) between power (as the ability to elicit compliance against resistance) and authority (as the right to expect compliance). This shift owes much to Michel Foucault and postmodernism and possibly reflects the ongoing loss of state authority to both sub-­national and global organisations” (Cheater 2005, 2). Foucault’s notable quote “power is everywhere, not because it embraces everything, but because it comes from everywhere” is the definitive turning point that sparked a change in power studies. Foucault’s idea relied on “people” as the main actors of power relationships in a community. Along this line, Foucault argues that Individuals . . . are always in the position of simultaneously undergoing and exercising this power. They are not only its inert consenting target; they are always also the elements of its articulation . . . the vehicle of power, not its points of application. (Foucault 1980, 98, cited in Cheater 2005, 3) From another perspective, Foucault’s post-­structuralist conception of power opened a window to an anthropological view of power. 2.1  The anthropological view of power Political anthropology and ethnographic disciplines set aside the abstract theories of power and instead concentrate on concrete indicators of power in everyday life. Therefore, in some cases, empowerment is used as a

52  Sayed Asef Hossaini substitute for power. This term is particularly associated with women, gender, health, education and development (Cheater 2005, 1) and illustrates how different variables in a community can affect the power structure in general. However, Donald Kurtz argues that political power is not an abstraction or an anthropomorphized force. It does not exist apart from those who use it (Kurtz 2001, 30). Citing Redcliffe-­Brown’s idea, he points out that “there is no such thing as the power of the state [an abstraction]. There are only, in reality, the power of individuals – kings, prime ministers, magistrates, policemen, party bosses and voters” (ibid.). Moreover, Ralph Nicholas argues that “power is control over resources, whether human or material. . . . Participants in political activity attempt to expand their control over resources; or, if they do not, they are not engaged in political action” (Nicholas 1966, 4 also 1968, cited in Kurtz, 31). This means that an anthropological understanding of power is based on the study of “resources” and the extent of their controllability. For instance, to study the power structure in rural communities in Bangladesh, natural resources, particularly land, were considered as key (BRAC 1986). From an ethnographic perspective, Kurtz argues that the identification of political power with the control of resources can be accommodated by five common resources: human, material, ideology, symbols and information (Kurtz 2001, 31) (see Figure 3.1). He also describes these categories of resources: The material domain includes human and what I think of as tangible resources. Human resources refer to the allies and supporters – people – that any political agent requires to be a leader. Tangible resources provide the culturally defined goods, such as money in the United States, pigs in highland New Guinea, cacao beans among the Aztecs and the like. Politics is obvious when agents compete for human and tangible resources and use them to attain their goals. The ideational domain of power includes ideology, symbols and information. The power they provide is more subtle. Ideational resources, especially symbols, are used largely to impose meaning on political actions. Ideologies and information are used to manipulate that meaning. In concert, ideational resources help leaders to convince others of the legitimacy of their authority and to enhance the leaders’ abilities to acquire additional material resources. (Kurtz 2001, 31) Kurtz believes that there is a tight linkage between human and tangible resources in the category of material, such that “without supporters a leader could not generate the tangible resources that are necessary to compete successfully in political arenas. . . . A serious lack of any material resource, tangible or human, is an indication of the bankruptcy of a leader politics”

Locality and power 53 (ibid., 32). In Kurtz’s categorization, human capital, which can be called supporters, would be divided into three different categories: followers, benefactors and loyalists. Kurtz argues that ideational resources, including ideology, symbols and information, are mostly used to legitimize the actions of actors, but they can also provoke and encourage supporters. For instance, citing Carlsnaes (1981) and Wolf (1999), Kurtz remarks that “the primary functional relevance of an ideology is that it enables leaders to mobilize people for action around a set of beliefs and ideas” (Kurtz 2001, 35). The ideological, symbolic and informational resources need to be exercised as power through a specific mechanism. This means that the style of information distribution or the illustration of symbols could also be considered in power studies. For instance, political actors use different types of tools to collect, form and release relevant information in certain areas and in specific periods of time to sustain or expand their domain of domination.

Followers Human

Benefactors Loyalists

Material Land

Power Resources

Ideational

Tangible

Money

Ideological

Weapons etc.

Symbolic Informational

Figure 3.1  Kurtz’s power resources tree

54  Sayed Asef Hossaini

Locality, social space and power Margaret Rodman (2003) believes that “place” is still “a problem in anthropological theory.” She argues that place as a crucial issue is neglected in contemporary anthropology and is reduced simply to the concept of a “location, where people do things” (Rodman 2003, 204). But in contrast, Abbott (1997) argues that “one cannot understand social life without understanding the arrangements of particular social actors, in particular, social times and places . . . [and where] social facts are located” (as cited in Logan 2011, 1). Rodman also notes that anthropologists’ perception of space might be borrowed from contemporary approaches in geography, categorized by geographer Dov Nir (1990). In Nir’s view, “there are two opposing views of ‘region’ in contemporary geography. For some, ‘region’ is just a concept, a mental construct or analytical tool. For others, regions are realities that exist in space.” Accordingly, in anthropology, place is addressed as “1) an anthropological construct for ‘setting’ or the localization of concepts and as 2) socially constructed, spatialized experience” (Rodman 2003, 206). However, from a geographical perspective, a “spatial analysis is primarily [the] analysis of form” (Goodchild 1996, 245). This implies that the initial step of studying the social actions in a community with regard to its physical locality could be the study of the physical form of a place. In everyday life, the actions of people take place in physical places: where they cultivate crops, study, sleep, gather for a traditional or religious ceremony and spend their time with friends, families and other members of the community. In other words, “everything happens somewhere, which means that all action is embedded in place and may be affected by its placement” (Logan 2011, 1). Logan (2011) distinguishes “place” from “space” so that in his argument “place” specifically refers to “location.” He recruits the term “spatial thinking” to address the sociological approaches to physical areas. Logan notes that “spatial thinking is about where things are or where they happen, and it is especially about where they are in relation to others” (ibid., 1). To describe spatial thinking, Logan forms some questions like “where is it (a district) in relation to other places? Is it near the center city or out in the suburbs? Is it close to a transit line? How long does it take to get to the daycare center etc.?” He eventually suggests distance, proximity, exposure and access as the critical features in spatial thinking (Logan 2011, 1–2). From a radical point of view, Herbert Gans (2002) argues that “natural space is a pre-­social notion, so that sociologically, at least, it is literally air over dirt,” but a natural space can be converted into a social space when it is used. Gans, in his use-­centered theory, clarifies that a “natural space becomes a social phenomenon, or social space[;] once people begin to use it, boundaries are put on it, and meanings (including ownership, price, etc.) are attached to it” (Gans 2002, 329).

Locality and power 55 Similarly, Goodchild (1996) argues that “spatial analysis is primarily [the] analysis of form, whereas understanding requires analysis of process.” He says that “geographical information is primarily cross-­sectional – that is, it represents a ‘snapshot’ at a point in time. Mechanisms of cause and effect on the other hand, are strongly temporal and it is consequently difficult or impossible to deduce cause and effect from patterns observed in geographical data” (Goodchild 1996, 245). Hence, the initial phase of studying the concept of locality in a village could be focused on the physical dimensions of the setting, while the second phase focuses on the social features of places. In fact, understanding the location and geographical features of main places like roads, mosques, houses and farmlands provides an analytical tool to reach the perception of social aspects of the surrounding environment. Two different theories have been used to analyze the social characteristics of place. One is the use-­centered theory, suggested by Herbert Gans, in which the socialization of physical places is assessed through a benchmark that shows eight types of space consumption. The second theory is an anthropological categorization of spaces in human communities in which Low and Lawrence-­Zuniga suggest six different categories of social places, including embodied spaces, gendered spaces, inscribed spaces, contested spaces, transitional spaces and spatial tactics. 3.1  Use-­centered view Hilda Kuper (1972) defines social space experientially, whereby individuals attach values to space through social and personal experiences and culturally as a conceptual mode (as cited in Low and Lawrence-­Zuniga 2003, 19). Herbert Gans (2002) simplifies this conception and proposes the use-­centered view from a methodological perspective. The principal ideal behind Gans’s use-­centered view of space is simply the use of geographical places. Gans believes that natural places convert to social phenomena simply once they have been used. The use of places in the theory does not necessarily refer to physical consumption but rather to placing value and labels on specific locations. According to Gans, “use is defined broadly here, meaning not only how individuals and organizations live and work in space, but what else they do to and with it. Elaborating the traditional dichotomy of ‘use value’ and ‘exchange value’ ” (Logan and Molotch 1987). “ ‘use’ also covers production and reproduction, buying and selling, speculation, allocation, distribution, competition as well as control, exploitation, theft and destruction of space. Indeed, ‘use’ is about everything that emplaced humans do as space users” (Gans 2002, 330). Rodman also addresses the use of land from a more abstract perspective and notes that “places are not inert containers[, but instead] they are politicized, culturally relative, historically specific, local and multiple constructions” (Rodman 2003, 205).

56  Sayed Asef Hossaini Michel Foucault in his article Of Other Spaces: Utopias and Heterotopias also argues how people attach value to their surrounding places in a way that the functionality of each place differs with respect to the social codes: In the so-­called primitive societies, there is a certain form of heterotopias that I would call crisis heterotopias, i.e., there are privileged or sacred or forbidden places, reserved for individuals who are, in relation to society and to the human environment in which they live, in a state of crisis: adolescents, menstruating women, pregnant women, the elderly, etc. (Foucault 1967, 1977, 33) Gans speculates that physical characteristics of an area and its natural features can have social effects once these features are valued by and meaningful to the inhabitants. He explains that the “spatial determinists may believe that space always has social effects, but such effects are not automatic and are indirect. The presence of gold under natural space has considerable economic effects, but only in societies in which gold is valued” (Gans 2002, 330). He argues that the meaningfulness and valuation of places are tied to the forms in which the places are used by the actors. Gans eventually formulates his idea and concludes that the “casually flavored use-­and user-­centered way of looking at space and spatial sociology can be illustrated by applying it to several concepts and issues that are relevant to the field, including land use, location, density, propinquity, public space, neighborhood, community and political economy” (ibid., 330). There might be more indicative factors, such as architecture, to assess the sociability of places. At the same time, it might also be impossible or at least difficult to make some concepts applicable to certain locations, such as the political economy or density of a cemetery. 3.2  The anthropological categorization of space As mentioned above, space refers to socialized aspects of physical areas. Apart from the use-­centered theory, there exists another principal approach to social dimensions of geographical areas. This approach focuses on relationships between culture and geographical places. Low and Lawrence-­Zuniga, borrowing Edward Hall’s notion of proxemics, call such correlations locating culture and remark that culture has influences on spatial understanding and social behavior in a community. They state that “studies of tribal and village societies customarily included descriptions of the natural landscapes of these in support of other theoretical arguments. Increasingly, however, anthropologists have begun to shift perspective to foregrounding spatial dimensions of culture rather than treating them as background, so that the notion that all behavior is located and constructed of space has taken on new meaning” (Low and Lawrence-­Zuniga 2003, 1).

Locality and power 57 Hall’s theory is predominantly based on “distances” and the boundaries that people draw around themselves during everyday life to perform their actions. He categorizes the distances in four different forms: intimate distance, personal distance, social distance and public distance. In his study, Hall focuses on physical distances that could be part of social actions rather than conceptual or abstract forms of boundaries that people might use in their conversations, for example. He principally discusses how people regulate their distances in different situations. For example, when discussing intimate distance, he notes that “this is the distance of love-­making and wrestling, comforting and protecting” (Hall 1966, 117), or with respect to social distances (close phase), he measures the distance between people in American society to be between 4 and 7 feet (ibid., 121). Regarding the spaces distinguished by distances and actions, six thematic categories have been defined in cultural anthropology of spaces: 1 embodied space, which refers to “the location where human experience and consciousness take on material and spatial form,” or “the space occupied by the body, and the perception and experience of that space, contracts and expands in relationship to a person’s emotions and state of mind, sense of self, social relations and cultural predispositions” (Low and Lawrence-­Zuniga 2003, 2–3) 2 gendered space, which refers to the physical distance that separates two genders in a community, or “the anthropological study of gender focuses on how behavior patterns and symbolic representations distinguishes the sexes, and considers how differences in power, authority and value are attributed to these sexual asymmetries” (ibid., 7) 3 inscribed spaces, which describes “how people form meaningful relationships with the locales they occupy, how they attach meaning to space and transform from ‘space’ to ‘place’ ” (ibid., 13) 4 contested space addresses “social conflicts that are focused on particular sites” and is defined as geographic locations where conflicts in the form of opposition, confrontation, subversion and/­or resistance engage actors whose social positions are defined by differential control of resources and access to power” (ibid., 18) 5 transitional spaces refers to “global, transitional and translocal spatial transformations produced by the economy of late capitalism and focuses on people on the move” (ibid., 25) 6 spatial tactics considers the “use of space as a strategy and/­or technique of power and social control” (ibid., 30).

3.3  Rural places and social spaces Arnold Berleant (2003), from the perspective of a humanistic geography, states that “place is the location of experience” (Berleant 2003, 42).

58  Sayed Asef Hossaini According to his argument, place could be referred to as a certain locus where the actions of everyday life occur in rural communities and is thus gradually converted to a social space. Berleant further argues that place “is realized as a set of ‘environmental relations created in the process of human dwelling . . . internally connected with time and self. . . . Places thus provide an organizing principle for . . . a person’s engagement or immersion in the world around’ him or her” (ibid., 42–43). The “location of experiences” definitely provides an index of physical places that could be studied to reach an understanding of the sociality of a geographical locale. As mentioned before, these places are concrete and tangible, though they are accompanied by conceptual characteristics of sociality. Therefore, from a methodological perspective, these places could be frequently recognizable through their function and use. The diversity of social spaces in rural communities, particularly in less developed countries like Afghanistan, does not seem to be complex but rather limited to a number of houses, farmlands, mosques, the market and roads. However, there are profound and meaningful connections between inhabitants and locations in rural, rather than urban, areas. Rodman (2003), accordingly, notes that “the people . . . in non-­Western, less industrialized countries may have even more immediate and full relationships with place insofar as time-­space relations are less fragmented and they retain more local control over their physical and social landscapes” (Rodman 2003, 640). Nonetheless, at least six categories of places cover where Afghan villagers live their everyday lives and shape their individual and social actions: houses (living rooms and bedrooms, kitchens, restrooms, cattle farms, guest rooms), farmlands, roads, public areas (mosques, menbar or meeting halls, madrasa, schools, clinics and the market or bazaar), infrastructures (water springs, water tanks) and finally the cemetery. The combination of places and the extent of value attached to each of them may differ among rural communities. To provide better analytical tools to study the concept of space in rural areas, two approaches should be combined so that the study initially follows the use-­centered theory to define how spaces are used in Afghan villages and how rural inhabitants assign value and meaning to physical places and convert them into meaningful social spaces (phase I). Afterward, the outcomes of this use-­centered analysis should be classified and assessed based on the anthropological categorization of space (phase II). In this regard, six different categories of space will be employed: embodied spaces, gendered spaces, inscribed spaces, contested spaces, transitional spaces and spatial tactics (see Figure 3.2). Needless to say, there is overlap between parts of these two theories that are used as analytical tools to study the transformation of place to space. Although some scholars use the terms place and space differently, place in this research refers to the geographical features of areas, while space refers to the social aspects of physical spaces. Bourdieu, for example, does not

Phase I

Use–Centered View (Herbert Gans 2002) Land use, location, density, propinquity, public space, neighborhood, community and political economy -

Location Architecture Boundary Density Propinquity

-

Location Architecture Economy (use)

-

Location Materialization Economy (use)

Farmland

-

Location boundary Economy (use)

Infrastructu res -Water Pumps …

-

Location Materialization Economy (use)

Houses

Mosque Menbar

Public Spaces

School, Madrasa Bazaar

Roads

Phase II

Anthropological Categorization of Spaces -

Embodied Gendered Inscribed Contested Transitional Spatial Tactics

Figure 3.2  Two analytical instruments used for social space analysis

60  Sayed Asef Hossaini adopt different terms to define the sociality and physicality of an area in his work on the sociology but rather designates both as “social and physical spaces” (Bourdieu 1996, 11). 3.4  Power variables and rural resources As mentioned before, the term locality refers to spatial variations and their correlations with social features in rural settlements. In other words, locality can be defined as a joint concept of physical place and social space. Thus, this chapter questions how we can find out the correlations between physical places and social spaces (locality) in the context of accessibility and control over resources (power) in a village. With respect to this definition, the relationship between the locality and power can be methodologically studied through two approaches: (1) the first approach focuses on the locality of the resources and their own interconnections; (2) the second approach focuses on how these resources reflexively affect the locality of the rural settlement, particularly in the attitude of the power brokers. In other words, the first approach indicates the characteristics of the low-­dynamic parts of rural systems, such as farmland, roads, water streams and so on, and the second approach indicates the low-­ dynamic parts of rural systems, including the natural resources affect the high-­dynamic parts, such as farming, housing, architecture, public spaces, transport and so on. In practice, a researcher should initially recognize and categorize the resources based on Kurtz’s categorization and then study the locality (physical and social features) of each resource and its interconnection with other resources and with the inhabitants. Afterward, in terms of the locality, the researcher should study the physical dimensions and social features of rural places, including houses, farmland, roads, public places and so on. For such an investigation, the researcher can benefit from the analytical instruments suggested in Figure 3.2. However, with regard to the use-­centered theoretical framework, a researcher can, for instance, study the locality of housing in the context of power relations in a village. House Location In the use-­centered view, “location is a relational concept that refers to social spaces that make connections between users or uses” (Gans 2002, 331). Regarding this definition, houses are social spaces through which the villagers as the users have connections with each other. Simultaneously, villagers also have a meaningful relationship with the land used for their housing. For example, in Akhshay, an ordinary village in the Bamiyan Province, houses are mostly positioned on the eastern slope of the valley. Due to the

Locality and power 61 shortage of farmland, it seems that the villagers preferred to minimize the amount of land occupied by their shelters. Compared to Akhshay, in Petab-­e Zarin, a feudal village, houses are more scattered and strategically located across the village. It seems that the shortage of farmland has not been the key criterion in rural housing in this case, but instead, the accessibility to and control over local resources has been a more important consideration. In this village, which is located in a broad valley, Arbabo and Mirzayo, two Hazara landlord families, have constructed their houses predominantly in sun-­facing areas on the northern hillside (right side), where they have benefited from the ability to observe the farmlands and the main road of the valley. Gholam Nabi Bāy, a Hazara landlord, constructed his new house on the top of the hill, where he is empowered by being able to observe whole the valley (see Figure 3.3). In this respect, Michel Foucault considers the notion of surveillance and a situation which allows observation in the context of power and defines it as Panopticism. He notes that “the Panopticon is a privileged place for experiments on men” and that “the Panopticon functions as a kind of laboratory of power. Thanks to its mechanisms of observation, it gains in efficiency and in the ability to penetrate into men’s behaviour” (Foucault 1978, 204). Meanwhile, Aghaye Rayis, the Sadat landlord family, positioned their settlement in the flat areas between the main road and the river.

Figure 3.3  A perspective of the valley from Nabi Bāy’s house Source: Sayed Asef Hossaini

62  Sayed Asef Hossaini Architecture Max Robinson (2003) cites Christian Norberg-­Schulz’s conception of architecture and notes that “the comprehension of place is integral to an understanding of architecture. A building is more than a simple response to the requirement of the programme: it is also more than an artefact fashioned for a site like a jewel adorning the landscape” (Robinson 2003, 143). Gans, in his use-­centered view, did not consider architecture to be an indicator of the sociability of places, but it seems that the architecture of buildings, as Schulz suggests, could also be crucial for reaching a broader understanding of how users consume their lands. On this point, Michel Foucault believes that “in our era, space presents itself to us in the form of patterns of ordering” (Foucault 1997, 331). From such a fundamental perspective, houses could be seen as patterns of ordering of agents and things in our routine life. This implies that the architecture of houses sets up a pattern for placing our needs and interests in everyday life. Or in other words, as Winston Churchill stated “we shape our building and afterwards our buildings shape us” (as cited in Hall 1966, 106). In addition to the concept of the locality of houses, useful information about the spaces used for housing in a rural community can also be provided by the form of shelters, construction materials, spaciousness, boundaries and internal and external decoration. For example, in many ordinary Afghan villages, houses are commonly constructed from mud and wood. Mud is used to shape thick walls, and wood is frequently used for doors and windows. In general, the villagers use timber and twigs to make up the ceilings (see ­Figure 3.4). The walls and roofs are also thatched in order to reduce humidity during the rainy season. The mud used for the construction of walls is locally called pakhasa, or ripe mud prepared by foot. The villagers beat mud with their feet so that it reaches a certain state of adhesion. Then they make large blocks of mud to build walls. The mud walls are thick and function as insulation from the cold during tough winters in Afghanistan. In Afghan feudal settlements, landlords’ old houses are made from mud and wood, similar to the houses of ordinary villagers. But new establishments or renovated buildings demonstrate significant differences. Access to new economic resources has provided an opportunity for some local people to bring changes to the architecture of their houses. Cement, stone and bricks instead of pakhasa (mud), iron bars instead of timber and twigs and plaster chuck – all considered expensive materials in Afghanistan, particularly in rural areas – have recently been used in some houses. Metal doors and windows have also been preferred in feudal villages. Density Gans, discussing density explains that to understand “how much actual and potential social space is available per capita helps determine how much living space people can afford” (Gans 2002, 332). In this way, density could

Locality and power 63

Figure 3.4  The ceilings of a house in Akhshay village Source: Sayed Asef Hossaini

be calculated by those social spaces or socialized places occupied per person in rural houses. Considering the importance of density in rural communities, Gans notes that “in agricultural societies, areal density can become critical; land shortage can lead to starvation and emigration” (ibid., 332). Unfortunately, there exists little demographic or geographic information about Afghanistan’s rural settlements. However, direct observations indicate that in Afghan rural communities, the villagers maintain a fixed rate of density. The villagers simply move to other places before reaching a critical point of economic shortage in the region. Boundary Houses in rural Afghanistan frequently consist of a yard and numerous rooms. The yard, with its walls and a gate, functions as a bounding mechanism that determines the geographical territory of a house. Raimondo Strassoldo (1987) views boundary as a principal function of a system and remarks that “the basic function of systems, natural as well as social and

64  Sayed Asef Hossaini cultural, is to maintain, defend and maximize the difference between the inside and the outside, i.e., the boundary” (Strassoldo 1987, 21). The visible boundaries in rural houses are regularly formed by high walls or fences, with a gate. George Simmel considers the significance of gates in the territorial characterization of residential dwellings. He states that “the door (gate) is what connects the inside and the outside, home and world. It permits, filters and controls exchanges with the environment and is therefore vital to any organism. Moreover, it is one of the main elements of the ‘front,’ the public side of structures” (cited in Strassoldo 1987, 26). For example, in Akhshay (an ordinary village) and Petab-­e Zarin (a feudal village) in the Bamiyan province, houses are mostly divided by mud walls and gates from each other. In Akhshay, the shortage of land seems to be the main reason for drawing clear-­cut boundaries between the buildings. But in Petab-­e Zarin, where houses are not positioned in close proximity, the rationale for visible boundaries might relate more to social issues rather than economy of land. Considering the social stratification in the region, high walls and protected gates could not have been only a protective mechanism for landlords’ territories. Rather, they could be customized as sharp borders to separate semi-­feudal families from ordinary villages in the region. In other words, the physical borders were used to divide different social spaces. Pierre Bourdieu’s distinction theory may affirm such an assumption. Bourdieu notes that “one can observe almost everywhere a tendency toward spatial segregation, people who are close together in social space tending to find themselves, by choice or by necessity, close one to another in geographic space; nevertheless, people who are very distant from each other in social space can encounter one another and interact, if only briefly and intermittently, in physical space” (Bourdieu 1989, 16). Propinquity In its fundamental sense, propinquity theory refers to what Festinger et al. (1950) initially identified and described as the effect on social behavior from a psychological perspective of lack of space between dwelling units. Festinger et al. focused on the spatial ecology of group formation and studied how physical distance or nearness affects, for instance, the formation of friendship between neighboring families. Festinger et al. explain that “physical distance is measured distance and is one of the major determinants of whether or not passive contacts will occur. Obviously, there is a high negative relationship between the physical distance separating the homes of two people and the probability that these people will make passive contact. The smaller the physical distance the greater the number of required paths neighbors are likely to share and the greater probability of passive contacts” (Festinger et al. 1950, 35).

Locality and power 65

Figure 3.5 Akhshay farmland at the end of Sabzak Valley, in the north of Bamiyan Province Source: Sayed Asef Hossaini

According to residential propinquity theory, “the low amount of space between houses encourages friendly social contact or conflict, neighboring skills, as well as the demographic homogeneities in a population that spell compatibility” (Gans 2002, 333). At the same time, the “lack of physical space between neighbors can have negative effects on felt personal and familial privacy” (ibid., 333). However, it appears that natural characteristics, especially the physical broadness of villages, have remarkable effects on the formation of boundaries and the level of propinquity between houses. Land shortage and the level of propinquity have a positive relationship and clear-­cut borders; limited land creates more propinquity and more physical borders. This might be interpreted as an attempt by the inhabitants to reduce the potential conflicts between neighboring families by determining the housing territories.

Conclusion The theoretical and methodological frameworks considered in this chapter may provide the initial analytical tools for rural studies in Afghanistan. These frameworks can secure a range of theories from different disciplines

66  Sayed Asef Hossaini in the social sciences by which researchers can reach a better understanding of rural settlements and their social relations, particularly in terms of power and politics. Although this chapter focused on using the housing in a village as its example, researchers can apply such benchmarks and analytical frameworks to investigate other places, including public places, farmland, roads, natural resources etc. in rural settlements. However, a mutual relationship seemingly exists between the locality of main rural places and the power structure. The aspects of locality that can be simplified as the physical and social dimensions of places has a meaningful relationship with power resources in Afghan villages. For instance, particularly with respect to public places, including religious, educational and economic institutions, influential people desire control. In other words, more accessibility to public places creates more capacity to intervene in and manipulate public spaces.

Notes 1 Katja Mielke is a junior research fellow at the Bonn Internatioanl Center for Conversion (bicc). Conrad Schetter is currently the director of research at Bonn International Center for Conversion (bicc). 2 Nigel J. R. Allan is a geographer at the University of California, Davis. He specializes in society and habitat relations in the states and countries of the Hindukush-­ Himalaya region. 3 Angela Cheater is the author of Social Anthropology: An Alternative Introduction.

References Abbott, Andrew. 1997. Of Time and Space: The Contemporary Relevance of the Chicago School. Social Forces, 75, 1149–1182. Allan, Nigel J. R. 2001. Defining Place and People in Afghanistan. Post-­Soviet Geography and Economics, 545–560. Allan, Nigel J. R. 2003. Rethinking Governance in Afghanistan. Journal of International Affairs, 193–202. Berleant, Arnold. 2003. The Aesthetic in Place. Constructing Place; Mind and Matter, edited by Sarah Menin, 41–54. London and New York: Routledge. Bourdieu, Pierre. 1989. Social Space and Symbolic Power. Sociological Theory, 14–25. Bourdieu, Pierre. 1996. Physical Space, Social Space and Habitus. Oslo: Institutt for sosiologi og samfunnsgeografi, Universitetet i Oslo. Bowler, Ian R., C. R. Bryant, and Chris Cocklin. 2002. The Sustainability of Rural Systems: Geographical Interpretations. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands. BRAC. 1986. Power Structure in Ten Villages. Dhaka: Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC) Prokashana. Carlsnaes, Walter. 1981. The Concept of Ideology and Political Analysis: A Critical Examination of Its Usage by Marx, Lenin and Mannheim. Westport: Greenwood Press. Cheater, Angela. 2005. Power in the Postmodern Era; Empowerment and Dispowerment in Changing Structures. The Anthropology of Power, edited by Angela Cheater, 1–12. US and Canada: Routledge.

Locality and power 67 Duncan, Simon. 1989. What Is Locality? New Models in Geography: The Political Economy Perspective, edited by Richard Peet and Nigel Thrift, 221–254. London: Routledge. Dupree, Louis. 1973. Afghanistan. New York: Princeton University Press. Festinger, Leon, Stanley Schachter, and Kurt Back. 1950. Social Pressures in Informal Groups; A Study of Human Factors in Housing. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Foucault, Michael. 1980. Power/­Knowledge; Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972–1977, edited by Colin Gordon. US: Pantheon Books. Foucault, Michel. 1997. Of Other Spaces: Utopias and Heterotopias. Rethinking Architecture: A Reader in Cultural Theory, edited by Neil leach, 330–336. New York: Routledge. Foucault, Michel. 1967. Of Other Spaces: Utopias and Heterotopias. Paris: Journal Architecture. Foucault, Michel. 1978. Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison. New York: Vintage Books. Gans, Herbert J. 2002. The Sociology of Space: A Use-­Centered View. City and Community, 329–339. Goodchild, Michael F. 1996. Geographic Information Systems and Spatial Analysis in the Social Sciences. Anthropology, Space, and Geographic Information Systems, edited by Mark Aldenderfer and Herber D. G. Maschner, 241–250. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press. Hall, Edward T. 1966. The Hidden Dimension. US: Anchor Books. Kuper, Hilda. 1972. The Language of Sites in the Politics of Space. American Anthropologist, 411–425. US: University of California Press. Kurtz, Donald V. 2001. Political Anthropology; Paradigms and Power. New York: Westview Press. Logan, John. 2011. Making a Place for Space: Spatial Thinking in Social Science. Brown: Department of Sociology Brown University. Logan, John R., and Harvey Luskin Molotch. 1987. Urban Fortunes: The Political Economy of Place. California: University of California Press. Low, Setha M., and Denise Lawrence-­Zuniga. 2003. The Anthropology of Space and Place; Locating Culture. Australia: Blackwell Publishing. Mielke, Katja, and Conrad Schetter. 2007. ‘Where Is the Village?’ Local Perceptions and Development Approaches in Kunduz Province. ASIEN, 71–87. Nicholas, Ralph W. 1966. Segmentary Factional Political System, in Marc J. Swartz, Victor W. Turner, and Arthur Tuden (eds.) Political Anthropology, 49–60. Chicago: Aldine. Nicholas, Ralph W. 1968. Rules, Resources, and Political Activity, in Mark J. Swartz (ed.) Local Level Politics, 295–322. Chicago: Aldine. Nir, Dov. 1990. Region as a Socio-­environmental System: An Introduction to a Systemic Regional Geography. GeoJournal Library Series 16. Wolf Tietze, ed. Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers. Norberg-­Schulz, Christian. 1971. Existence, Space and Architecture. New York: Praeger Publishers. Robinson, Max. 2003. Place-­Making: The Notion of Centre. Constructing Place; Mind and Matter, edited by Sarah Menin, 143–153. London and New York: Routledge. Rodman, Margaret C. 2003. Empowering Place: Multilocality and Multivocality. American Anthropologist, 640–656. US, UK: Blackwell Publishing.

68  Sayed Asef Hossaini Strassoldo, Raimondo. 1987. The Sociology of Space: A Typological Approach. London: Department of Geography, Syracuse University. Weber, Max. 1947, The Theory of Social and Economic Organisation. New York, Free Press. Wolf, Eric R. 1999, Envisioning Power: Ideologies of Dominance an Crisis. US: University of California Press. World Bank. 2014. http://­data.worldbank.org/­indicator/­SP.RUR.TOTL.ZS?locations= AF. Retrieved June 29, 2016.

Part II

The role of women in the reconstruction process

Introduction to Part II Adenrele Awotona

In 2005, a World Bank report recommended five main areas of involvement in support of gender equity and gender mainstreaming in Afghanistan (The World Bank 2005, The Executive Summary): 1

Substantially strengthening women’s employment in the health and education sectors, which will have direct, positive effects on girls’ school enrollment, women’s access to health services, maternal mortality and general child and family health 2 Strengthening women’s involvement in agricultural and livestock production in the form of extension, training, credit facilities and expanding marketing opportunities 3 Developing socially acceptable skilled and unskilled employment opportunities for women in the urban sector in response to the high level of poor female-­headed households 4 Instituting legal reforms to remove gender inequities within family law, specifically in marriage, marriage age, divorce and inheritance 5 Collecting adequate sex-­disaggregated data across all sectors to document women’s and men’s involvement in support of gender equity and to enable the monitoring of future developments and effects of investments. The World Bank developed an approach to implement these suggestions (The World Bank 2005, Introduction): First, we will adopt measures to restore those rights to our women and girls that they were denied because of the segregationist policies of the Taliban and the threat to their personal security during periods of conflict. To support this, we will need to create women specific opportunities that will allow them to catch up with men and boys. Particular concerns are the re-­instatement of women in employment and income-­earning opportunities, up-­grading women’s professional knowledge which has fallen out of date because of their years of exclusion, and enhancing their management skills and familiarity with modern technologies in the

72  The role of women in reconstruction work place. These will call for specific programs directed to enhancing the capabilities of our girls and women. Today, nearly fifteen years later and in spite of the establishment of the Ministry of Women’s Affairs and the massive investment that international and national agencies have made in women’s programs, women in Afghanistan continue to face extraordinary inequalities. They also face social, economic and political challenges to achieving adequate progress in health, education, income generation, microfinance, small business development, farm-­based activities, the protection of women and girls at risk, power and political voice. These challenges, along with women’s participation in the development process both as beneficiaries and contributors, are examined in Chapters 4 to 7. Indeed, throughout their contributions, the authors emphasize how the role of women in the rebuilding process is intimately intertwined with the national purpose. They also propose a variety of approaches to boost growth, poverty reduction, the quality of health services, food production, urban labor market opportunities, women’s resources and capacities and the structural and situational factors that may enhance women’s contributions to the political, social and physical reconstruction processes and practices, peacebuilding and democratization. Chapter 4, by Nicole Dhanraj, Hilary Johnson-­Lutz and Thomas J. Rzemyk begins by noting that war has plagued Afghanistan over the last thirty years, and as a result, the nation has faced serious economic setbacks, especially in sustainability. Afghanistan has a long history of war over the past three decades and the country has struggled to rebuild its economic sustainability and safety. Since 2001 and the beginning of the troop withdrawal in 2015, the Afghan people have undergone substantial political and social transformation, yet Afghanistan remains one of the poorest and most dangerous countries in world. While some progress has been made, it remains small, especially in terms of including women as key contributors to the sustainability of the economy. This chapter analyzes previous efforts by neighboring Arab nations such as Yemen and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) to empower women and evaluates the tools, strategies and tactics used to help women prosper and move forward in Afghanistan as contributing members of society through educational and entrepreneurial opportunities in all regions and in Afghanistan’s provinces. This chapter also studies the current and future security challenges that must be addressed to sustain the future success of economic prosperity and to highlight them as a cautionary measure for international relief. The findings of this analysis show practical approaches that the Afghan government, the Ministry of Education and the United States can put into practice for long-­term economic sustainability in Afghanistan. The recommendations aim to improve social justice and cultural setback issues at the central government level; implement and expand on educational programs, such as the National Education Strategic Plan III (2014–2020); promote technical and vocational training among women,

The role of women in reconstruction 73 beginning in high school; and, finally, execute some of the approaches used in other Muslim nations to promote economic success. Kristen A. Cordell, in Chapter 5, suggests that by all accounts, donor governments have been largely “successful” in identifying significant resources for gender-­related programming in Afghanistan during 2001–2015. However, the strategic approach and prioritization of those resources vis-­à-­vis donor policies may have had an adverse effect on women’s empowerment locally. This chapter looks at the evolution of the international donor approach in Afghanistan, from Women in Development (WID) to Women, Peace and Security (WPS,) and how that approach has informed emerging national-­level norms. It concludes that the prioritization of specific gender-­ related principles above others (within women, peace and security policy in the United Nations Security Council Resolution, UNSCR, 1325 et al.), alongside a complex operational environment, has had a significant impact on national outcomes. In choosing to adopt and diffuse norms related to protection starting in 2010, this research finds that donors may have lost considerable opportunities to advance meaningful participation of women in Afghan society. Specifically, this includes a lack of attention to expanding once-­small-­scale participation projects into meaningful inclusion into formal and informal peacebuilding processes. In deciding to emphasize the women, peace and security agenda, the international donor community has diffused norms that reinforce the narrative of victimization, which has therein been internalized by local domestic institutions. The analysis here focuses on how the prioritization process has impacted not only meaningful gender integration into peace and security processes but also emerging overall state stability and development. Chapter 6, “Women, Peace and Security” by Jorrit Kamminga, first traces the confluence of the protection of women’s rights and progress in Afghanistan. This process was – and sometimes still is – fueled by the West’s simplistic representation of Afghan women, often portrayed as either passive victims of oppression and violence or as active role models or heroes. The decisive moment for linking women’s empowerment and progress in Afghanistan, however, seems to have been the rule of the Taliban (1996–2001). Their notorious oppression of women became part of the justification for the international intervention in Afghanistan in 2001 and a benchmark for results afterward. The improvement of women’s rights, especially in their access to basic social services such as education and healthcare, has become a standard part of the indicators of progress in Afghanistan. This progress – real and significant – has, however, also been partially exploited as a useful instrument to mask the complex nature of international missions or the lack of results in other areas. Second, the chapter shows that Western women’s rights agenda does not always set the same priorities as Afghan women do and sometimes offers a rather unnuanced view of Afghan reality. Nevertheless, the international attention to Afghan women’s rights and empowerment has been far more than only symbolic. In fact, as the subsequent

74  The role of women in reconstruction sections of the chapter make clear, the sustained international commitment to Afghan women has received an important boost with the WPS agenda, as first laid down in October 2000 by United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325. Third, the chapter examines why the implementation of this agenda in Afghanistan suffers from serious challenges. Since the adoption of Afghanistan’s National Action Plan in June 2015, little progress has been made. It provides insight into the current impasse by addressing the various challenges involved in the WPS agenda’s three key strategic components: inclusive security, inclusive peacebuilding and inclusive justice. The latter, inclusive justice, is often missing from the debate but cannot be ignored if the WPS agenda is to be effective and sustainable. In the conclusion, the chapter offers some recommendations on how more progress could be made in implementing the WPS agenda in Afghanistan. Part of these recommendations is an analysis of the usefulness of a complementary instrumental approach to women’s meaningful participation, as opposed to a women’s empowerment approach based on equal rights. In chapter 7, Shukria Dellawar and Christina Tsirkas note that the decades of violence and political turmoil in Afghanistan have set back social progress, increased the level of poverty within the country and created an environment rife with security threats. Currently, the country is heavily dependent on development aid and security assistance. As the amount of aid available continues to decrease and foreign security forces and NGOs continue to pull out of Afghanistan, the country must focus on its own reconstruction efforts, and the participation of Afghan women is central to successfully accomplishing this objective. Despite significant opposition to the advancement of women’s rights throughout history, including a ban on education and work under the Taliban regime, women have still managed to make invaluable contributions to every facet of Afghan society. And these continued contributions are needed going forward. Women’s knowledge, agency and collective action are absolutely necessary if Afghanistan is to achieve sustainable development. However, without a solution to the security crisis and without effective implementation and enforcement of the rule of law, Afghan women will continue to be sidelined, and Afghanistan’s reconstruction efforts will remain crippled.

Reference The World Bank. 2005. Afghanistan: National Reconstruction and Poverty ­Reduction – The Role of Women in Afghanistan’s Future, March, The Executive Summary. http://­siteresources.worldbank.org/­AFGHANISTANEXTN/­Resources/­ AfghanistanGenderReport.pdf. Retrieved February 21, 2018.

4 Women and economic development in post-­conflict Afghanistan Learning from other Muslim nations Nicole Dhanraj, Hilary Johnson-­Lutz and Thomas J. Rzemyk Background In the thirty-­year history of war in Afghanistan, women have suffered tremendously in areas of social and educational repression. They have sustained gender inequality and discrimination in all facets of life. Throughout history, women have lived lives treated as commodities rather than as valued members of society with opinions, ideas, a sense of empowerment and an identity of their own. Rural Afghanistan is deeply rooted in its patriarchal traditions. The traditional ideology is characterized by male dominance and power over women. There is a strict division between men and women, with men allowed out in public while women are restricted to private life. Girls marry young and are supported by their husbands, women’s main purpose being to produce children and to be subservient to men.

Geography, government and economy The Islamic Republic of Afghanistan is located in South Central Asia. It is landlocked with Iran, Pakistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan bordering to the west, east, south and north respectively. It has a population of roughly thirty million and is considered to be one of the least developed countries in the world (UNODC). There are various ethnicities, such as Pashtun (the largest), Tajik, Hazare, Uzbek and other smaller ethnic groups. While each group has its own language, the official language is Afghan Persian, followed by Pashtu. About 84 percent of Afghans are Sunni Muslim, while roughly 15 percent of them are Shi’a Muslim. The ethnic and religious groups within Afghanistan have been severely divided, which has led to a disjointed sense of nationalism (Ahmed-­Ghosh 2003). Afghanistan has survived mainly from subsistence crops, such as wheat, fruit and nuts. Its most important crop is opium. Afghanistan is the world’s largest producer of opium, which mainly facilitates the international drug trade. Agriculture serves as the main livelihood especially for poorer villages. However, only about 10 percent of the land viable for agriculture; the rest was damaged from wars in the 1980s and 1990s. The country has

76  Nicole Dhanraj et al. benefited little from exports, due to the last several years of war. War has also killed the trading industry once prominent in the city’s capital, Kabul. As a result, unemployment rates have soared. As the country recovers from years of war, dependence is still high on foreign aid.

The current Afghan government structure The Afghanistan government structure and overall functions have changed drastically since 2001. After September 11, 2001, the original government crashed, and a new government “had” to be put into place to restore and maintain order in the country. In 2001, the new Afghan Constitution established Afghanistan as an Islamic Republic, with Islam as the official religion of the state. It also restructured the government to be created as a democratic nation and allowed for a “separation of powers” under the direction of a newly appointed president. The new government structure consists of an executive branch, a two-­tier legislature and a judiciary. The president and the two-­tier legislature must approve the justices to a single term of ten years (Thier 2006). This established structure is known as the central government. One of the biggest challenges that the central government faces is its authority and power in other remote regions of the country due to the growing rise of militant forces.

Women and Afghanistan’s cultural context Afghanistan has been a harsh place for women. The literature suggests that several components affect women’s status. Women’s subordinated roles and repressed status have resulted from an intertwinement of social, cultural and historical events. Civil conflict, tribal codes and cultural customs have influenced women’s lack of involvement in society. They have been denied opportunities such as employment, education and economic decision-­ making, in essence denying women what the rest of the world would consider as basic rights. Women’s roles have been mainly cloaked by the veil of subordination, thought to be rooted in Islamic teachings. However, the Koran, in addition to having passages that bestow lower status on women, also speaks of women in the context of equality, economic opportunity and education. There has not been a uniform interpretation of the texts, and this has left women in an unfavorable situation. It is this doctrinal ambiguity that has allowed various interpretations of the religious text and different applications across Muslim nations (Guman 2003). As a result of tradition, culture and politics, it has been difficult for women to assimilate into active roles contributing to public life, since they were previously banned from participating in any economic or political activity. As more and more conflicts arose, women’s rights suffered. Recently, the Taliban has been severely criticized for its treatment of and attitude to women. However, according to Ahmed-­Ghosh (2003) and Gohar et al.

Women and economic development in Afghanistan 77 (2014), women’s status and place in society has not been solely the result of the Taliban’s regime and policies. According to these authors, the Mujahidin Era was considered to be one of the worst for abuses against women. Consequently, they advise taking a larger historical perspective on women rather than scrutinizing the nation under the Taliban’s rule. During Soviet occupation and the Taliban regime, women’s rights and their status suffered more in rural Afghanistan, where practices generally exclude women. Beath et al. (2014) argue that a transformation in women’s status will be successful only if rural Afghanistan is included in economic development plans. Otherwise, Islamic fundamentalism will continue to have a strong hold on women’s rights, barring them from participating in any activity other than domestic work.

Progress for Afghan women According to United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO n.d.), Afghanistan’s average literacy rate for females is 17 percent, but it varies depending on the geographical region. Women with the highest literacy are in the nation’s capital of Kabul. The country’s culture, security concerns and lack of schools in some regions are the main causes of their low literacy rate. However, the postwar era can serve as an opportunity for women to develop their voices and become involved as contributors to economic development instead of being bystanders. International political forces and activist groups have been working toward empowering and emancipating women from their traditional roles and status. Ahmed-­Ghosh (2003) argues that there is opportunity within the “deficiencies” of Afghanistan. He postulates that women can use Afghanistan’s economic and political situation and its social disorder to renegotiate their roles and status in society. Efforts to empower women have been ongoing throughout the last ten years, but those efforts have yet to filter through to all parts of the country. Such efforts include the creation of the Ministry of Women Affairs, increased educational opportunities for women and their inclusion in the workforce (Gohar et al. 2014). Many of these opportunities were destroyed or halted as a result of war and more recently because of Sharia law implemented under the Taliban regime. After the war under the Karzai government, women were able to express their voice, stand up for themselves and therefore advocate for opportunities for women in their country. Also, since the war has ended, the international community has taken it upon itself to improve women’s status in the country. Western society has provided aid and has expected improvements comparable with other countries to be implemented in Afghanistan. However, the internal dynamics of the country need to be understood before trying to impose Western or other non-­Muslim ideals on the country.

78  Nicole Dhanraj et al.

The need to educate women Research by Dollar and Gatti (1999) and Klassen (1999) have been pivotal in showcasing women as essential to promoting economic development. One way is through education. Education is considered an investment; however, as girls marry young, there are no investment returns to the family. Education is a vital part of building a dynamic economy (World Bank 2008). Educating women in particular not only builds a competitive economy but also comes with social advantages. These include reducing infant mortality and improving child health and welfare (UNESCO n.d.). Furthermore, educated women are able to make informed decisions, speak for themselves and challenge the status quo, thus hopefully leading to a new position of power for women. Despite tribal norms that subjugate women, rural Afghanistan has seen the benefits of educating women, such as in the support of a midwifery program once lost under Taliban rule. The Islamic Republic of Afghanistan’s Ministry of Education created the National Education Strategic Plan III (2014–2020). This educational plan establishes policies and objectives for five years and focuses on increasing equitable access to education and improving education quality through several program areas, such as general and Islamic education, curriculum development, teacher education, science and technology education, literacy and education management. It is critical that these areas be established, especially to provide opportunities and introduce recognized standards for teacher education.

Recommendations Recommendation #1: education for women The research indicates that it is imperative for Afghanistan to implement the proposed National Education Strategic Plan III (2014–2020) created by the Ministry of Education. This plan creates a clear and concise strategic framework, which can be adapted to all areas of education, specifically educating women. The Afghanistan Ministry of Education is committed to improving the management and accountability of the education system to ensure transparency and emphasize learning achievement for all Afghans. This is a critical investment for the country’s future generations. The central government structure also has a new focus on promoting higher education, addressing the high unemployment rate in major metropolitan cities, including Kabul, and encouraging small business owners to pursue new opportunities throughout the entire country. This is being done through a variety of programs sponsored by the central government. President Ghani is also the cofounder of the Institute for State Effectiveness, an organization set up in early 2005 to improve the ability of the states

Women and economic development in Afghanistan 79 to serve their citizens across all of the provinces of Afghanistan. The goals of the Institute for State Effectiveness in Afghanistan are to develop and refine the know-­how of skill sets in several areas: • Governments: realizing capacity, to build systems across the levels and functions of government • Markets: building markets, to promote growth and opportunity by fostering inclusive markets • People: fostering inclusion, to expand the space for civil society and to empower citizens (Institute of State Effectiveness 2015). Recommendation #2: continued support for established programs The Ministry of Education also needs continued support for programs, such as from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) Promote Initiative, which aims to provide education and leadership opportunities for women in the eighteen to thirty age group. This new generation of women would gain skills to facilitate participation in the economy. President Ghani strongly believes that through partnerships with neighboring nations, a strong government and cooperation with the United States, the Institute for State Effectiveness could help build governmental systems and improve the ability of states to serve their citizens in several capacities in other areas of Afghanistan, including the remote regions. Instituting the goals of the Institute for State Effectiveness could also help alleviate some of the primary security concerns across the country (Oxford Research Group 2015). Recommendation #3: promoting entrepreneurial activity throughout all regions of Afghanistan by examining the success of other Arab nations, such as the UAE Yusaf (2010) found that women in traditional Arab society could prosper as entrepreneurs if they were willing to take risks and if they had the support of their male counterparts. Many women pursued opportunities against the will of their partners and proved that they could be successful in certain business models and ventures. Also, the study concluded that the host nation must develop and properly implement entrepreneurship-­friendly laws for women. However, a change in laws is not enough. A shift in social justice and cultural norms is also needed to include a reaffirmation of the positive role of religion regarding women’s work. The central government structure of the UAE is gradually making these changes, but it is a slow process. The central government of Afghanistan can use the business models and recommendations of this study to promote entrepreneurial activity among women in Afghanistan. Lastly, the study concluded that entrepreneurship education should take place in high school and not only in higher education (Yusaf 2010).

80  Nicole Dhanraj et al. Recommendation #4: encouraging technical education and vocational training for women by examining the success of other Arab nations, such as Yemen A report released by the Republic of Yemen in 2004 examined the future challenges, from a historical perspective, that women in Yemen face when they want to enter the workplace. From 2004 to the present day, many of these challenges still exist (Technical Education and Vocational Training Strategic Development Plan 2004). Many female workers in Yemen work as teachers, nurses and secretaries and in customer service areas. Many would like to see a rise in female participation in the technical and vocational arena. The article summarizes seven main challenges facing young Arab women wanting to enter the technical and vocational fields: • • • •

Double discrimination facing women Lack of infrastructure Saturation of traditional fields with no potential for making an income Lack of initiatives that can further support women breaking into employment • Gaps in the search for employment • Limited capacity of the lead national institutions to support women in Technical Education & Vocational Training (TEVT) • Lack of research and reliable data informing policy planning This specific report takes the position that several improvements can be made to close the gaps in these challenges and to promote technical and vocational training among women. One recommendation is to launch a large-­ scale new media campaign featuring men and women working together and attending vocational training in areas of high unemployment. Another recommendation was to launch a large-­scale high school awareness campaign focusing on reaching out to young women and parents and revise the ministries’ and institutes’ promotional materials to represent both genders (Technical Education and Vocational Training Strategic Development Plan 2004). Overall, the Ministry of Education in Yemen can play a vital role in taking the lead in promoting women in education.

Female empowerment through entrepreneurship “Entrepreneurship plays a critical role in driving the structural transformation from a low income traditional economy to a modern economy” (Naudé 2010, 3). Micro, small and medium-­size enterprises and businesses are key to development and providing income to over 9 percent of households in Afghanistan (Naudé 2010; Dunne 2014). Academic research shows that there is a connection between entrepreneurship and the state of the economy process. Furthermore, entrepreneurship plays a major role in innovation and the distribution of new products and services (Holmen et al. 2011).

Women and economic development in Afghanistan 81 The empowerment of women has also become an important issue in recent years, particularly in Afghanistan, because empowering women signals overall progress for the nation (Rao 2013). Female entrepreneurship is an important aspect of that empowerment, and it is increasing globally (Davis 2012). Despite this increase, women lack the crucial skills needed for the success and development of their businesses (Davis 2012). Furthermore, one of the biggest social constraints facing female entrepreneurs, particularly in Muslim countries, is the attitude toward employed and self-­ employed women (Holmen et al. 2011). Zeidan and Bahrami (2011) assert that the role of women in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) region is dramatically changing from a traditional family support role to that of a contributor to the economy. While regional cooperation can produce good outcomes across the region, the authors propose that more actions are needed on a country specific basis. The reason for this is that women’s entrepreneurial interest and activities are not consistent across GCC nations. Women in Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Bahrain seem to be more active than women in other countries (Zeidan and Bahrami 2011). The question still remains: why are women from the Middle East not as active entrepreneurially as women from other countries with similar socioeconomic standing? The reports generated from these studies uncovered a number of challenges boiling down to regulatory and social constraints, access to capital in some countries, cumbersome startup processes and characteristics such as low self-­confidence and aversion to risks (Zeidan and Bahrami 2011). Despite the rise in the number of female entrepreneurs and the important role they play in reviving the economy, it is still difficult and even unsafe for women to participate in business. Holmen et al. pointed out that “As a developing country in conflict, Afghanistan is a very dangerous country” (Holmen et al. 2011, 308). Currently, the economy relies largely on external funding sources and the sale of opium. Also, “The business environment is harmed by the poor security situation consisting of conflicts among Afghans on the one hand and between Afghans and foreign troops on the other” (Holmen et al. 2011, 308). Another problem faced by female entrepreneurs is their lack of education and business-­related skills, such as finance, technology and management. Existing frameworks for promoting female entrepreneurship in the Middle East, including the GCC, focus mainly on changing gender differential regulations and societal norms under the law. While we acknowledge that such changes will be highly beneficial, we propose additional measures be taken to empower women and thus enable them to be more active participants in the economy. A study on young female entrepreneurs in the UAE found that women faced several barriers that obstructed the creation of their business ventures. These barriers dealt mostly with cultural concerns and lack of training (Itani et al. 2010). In Arab countries, women are bound to more traditional roles,

82  Nicole Dhanraj et al. which can have a negative effect on their entrepreneurial pursuits. Male family members tend to resist rather than support female relatives’ entrepreneurial pursuits (Itani et al. 2010).

Recommendations/­interventions for entrepreneurship The United States has policies in place to “promote women’s rights in Afghanistan rigorously” (Katzman 2015, 54). Among the various programs in place, the US ambassador awards small grants used as microloans to help finance businesses owned by women. This support has led to the creation of over 170,000 small businesses (Katzman 2015). These strategic pillars, and the specific programs funded by them, are discussed in annual State Department reports on US aid to women and girls (Katzman 2015). The USAID recently announced the award of the largest women’s empowerment program in the agency’s history, Promote, which is focused on creating and advancing opportunities for Afghan women in various capacities, including politics and business (USAID n.d.). This five-­year program educates and trains the new generation of Afghan women between the ages of eighteen and thirty. Project Artemis is a unique program hosted by the Arizona State University’s Thunderbird School of Global Management. The goal of the program is to equip promising female Afghan businesspeople with the skill set to grow their businesses. Mentors are assigned to each participant after the program to provide any assistance needed to create or expand their businesses after returning home (Hilburn 2013): “Project Artemis graduates have returned to Afghanistan to run successful businesses that have created over 3,000 jobs for their local communities and have trained and mentored well over 15,000 of their fellow Afghan citizens in business and leadership skills” (Project Artemus Afghanistan, n.d., para.1).

Challenges to implementation Security concerns in Afghanistan must be addressed in all regions. This is to ensure the safety and success of educational and entrepreneurial programs in the near and distant future. Research indicates that development assistance from the international community is a vital approach to promote stabilization and security strategies in insecure and deteriorating areas of Afghanistan (Saghafi-­Ameri 2011). Women in Afghanistan face many challenges. The current government structure is stable, but past and current research has indicated that the future is unpredictable, especially for security and sustained funding. In a study by Jejeebhoy and Sathar (2001), the authors suggest that tradition is more in rural areas and has a stronger influence on women’s empowerment than education, employment or other ways in which women try to establish autonomy. Their findings indicate that social institutions are beneficial in

Women and economic development in Afghanistan 83 shaping attitudes toward women’s roles. The authors suggest strategies, such as increasing gender consciousness and encouraging women to challenge the status quo in order to establish their rights and pave the way for equal access to public resources. The authors emphasize the focus should be on regions rooted in tradition and culture rather than on religion. These strategies that were emphasized by researchers shortly after September 11, 2001, are still true in 2015. The Afghan team for Women for Women International is a good example. This program has been successful in that 50 percent of their male participants changed their attitudes toward women and promoted the men’s participation in empowering women through education. Other social networks are needed so that women can share their rights, knowledge and strengthen their influence in the community with other women (Women for Women International 2015). Poverty, however, is a barrier to education. The costs associated with purchasing supplies are often too much of a burden for poor rural families. Another barrier is the loss of help for household chores when the child is sent to school. Many of these poor areas also depend on farming and need help on the land or at home while parents are tending to their farmland. This study also found that social justice and social policies are major issues for Afghan women. In our chapter, we define social justice as the view that everyone deserves equal economic, political and social rights and opportunities. The following are the top three security concerns in Afghanistan for promoting economic and entrepreneurship for women throughout the entire country: 1 The return of a Taliban regime 2 Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) getting sufficient funding for resources, intelligence gathering and troop competence 3 Violence among ethnic groups and tribes (Huntington 1993). During the withdrawal of Soviet Russian forces in 1989 and 1990, there was an uprising between many of the tribes and Mujahideen in Afghanistan. This infighting proved Dr Samuel Huntington’s theory that “conflicts can occur within civilizations.” Many fear that if the central government fails to meet the growing needs of the country, such as the needs of the remote regions, this theory could once again take effect if the government falls (Huntington 1993). Research indicates that encouraging the Afghan governments and international efforts to improve the country through a democratic approach could result in an uprising in certain regions of the country and also among certain ethnic groups. In addition, there are perspectives that promoting Muslim women to become more involved in education, in addition to entrepreneurship opportunities, could also result in negative outcomes (Huntington 1993).

84  Nicole Dhanraj et al.

Current security conditions in Korangal Valley in Kunar province The missions performed by US military and foreign forces from the mid 2000s have been to try to promote the new Afghan democratic government structure. In certain regions of Afghanistan, this approach is obtaining modest results. However, even in 2015, a democratic government structure has not been developed in the Korangal province. In April 2010, the American outpost was closed by the US government. Senior US military officials state that the closing of Korangal Outpost is part of an effort to consolidate and refocus American forces in Afghanistan (Roggio 2010). The security situation in the Korangal Valley is similar to that in Uruzgan, Daikundi and the western Ghanzi region. Each of these areas comprises a remote and mountainous region east of Sangin. These remote areas are inaccessible by modern vehicles, and traditional security forces harbor Taliban fighters and extremists (Roggio 2010). For a brief time from 2010 to 2012, security concerns declined with the expansion of a robust Village Stability Operations (VSO) effort and Afghan Local Police (ALP) in Uruzgan, Daikundi and the western Ghanzi region, which helped the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to “establish security in rural villages and promote local governance and development” from 2010 to 2012 (Saum-­Manning 2012, 6). However, by the end of 2012, there was a withdrawal of ISAF forces, leaving local police forces on their own to repel Taliban assaults (Chandrasekaran 2012). Overall, this is still considered to be one of the most dangerous areas in Afghanistan. It is going to take significant effort to continue to fight terrorism in this region along the Pakistan border, and until then, the instability will halt the future growth of economic and educational programs in the area.

Current and future: North Atlantic Treaty Organization legislation and United States–led forces’ efforts in Afghanistan The future mission by US military forces in Afghanistan is called Operation Freedom’s Sentinel. All branches of the US military, including its army, navy, marines and air force, will contribute to the efforts of rebuilding Afghanistan and promoting sustainability throughout all of Arghanistan’s regions. The name of the military engagement changed in the winter of 2014 after the formal end to the war in Afghanistan concluded. Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) ended on December 31, 2014, and transitioned to Operation Freedom’s Sentinel (OFS) on January 1, 2015. OFS is a contingency operation in accordance with Title 10 USC 101(a) (13) (Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy 2015). Navy Rear Admiral John Kirby stated that the new mission would focus on training, advising, assistance and counterterrorism throughout Afghanistan (Kirby 2015). Former secretary of state Chuck Hagel stated that “In

Women and economic development in Afghanistan 85 Operation Freedom’s Sentinel, the United States will pursue two missions with the support of the Afghan government and the Afghan people” (Hagel 2014). Operation Freedom’s Sentinel mission also integrates the Resolute Support Mission (RSM) of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) The RSM is a new NATO-­led mission to train, advise and assist the Afghan security forces and institutions. The mission was launched on January 1, 2015, immediately after the stand-­down of the ISAF, a NATO-­led security mission that was enacted shortly after the war began in 2001. Initially the security forces were instructed to secure the larger areas around Kabul and to train Afghan security forces. As time progressed, their overall mission carried them throughout the entire country of Afghanistan in four distinct stages, which was completed in 2006 (Hagel 2014). As outlined in the RSM, a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) provides the legal framework. A SOFA is an agreement between a host country and a foreign nation stationing and allowing military forces and operations to take place in that country. The SOFA agreement for NATO’s RSM was signed in Kabul, Afghanistan, on September 30, 2014, and sanctioned by the Afghanistan Legislature on November 27, 2014. Further, the mission was also supported by the United Nations Security Council Resolution 2189, which was adopted on December 12, 2014 (RSM: Key Facts and Figures 2015). The newly established RSM will provide training, advice and assistance in eight key areas (RSM: Key Facts and Figures 2015): • Multiyear budgeting • Transparency • Accountability and oversight • Civilian oversight of the Afghan security institutions • Force generation • Force sustainment • Strategy and policy planning • Resourcing and execution • Intelligence • Strategic communications. The effort made by both the United States and NATO allies are part of a broader effort and international focus to ensure that Afghanistan never again becomes a safe haven for terrorism and that the country is able to move forward with a democratic and stable government which promotes overall sustainability in the country.

Conclusion The postwar transition period in Afghanistan is filled with challenges. The current status of Afghan women makes them susceptible and vulnerable to

86  Nicole Dhanraj et al. having their voices subdued despite it having an integral part in the future development and economic sustainability of the country. For educational programs and entrepreneurship programs for women to take place, they must be supported by the central government of Afghanistan, and specific cultural changes need to take place to support women in these and emerging roles. The purpose of this literature review was to reiterate the need for employment, education and entrepreneurship opportunities for Afghan women as a means of progress. This review also served to highlight the lessons learned from other Muslim-­dominated nations to help women prosper and move forward in Afghanistan as economic stakeholders rather than bystanders and consumers. The important outcome is to refocus social traditionalism to embrace new attitudes toward and beliefs about women that promote education and entrepreneurship. Such opportunities for women can contribute to economic growth that consequently facilitate long-­term sustainability. As a means of economic development, Afghanistan needs to be able to promote self-­sustenance and women’s empowerment, and this is a smart and effective strategy. The Afghan government needs to look inward and develop policies that would promote its longevity as a prospering nation. As a main method to promote that, the international community has pushed women’s empowerment. Empowerment is not only as a means of establishing an identity and a voice for women but also as a means of becoming valued contributors to society and economic participants. The pathway to facilitate such economic contribution is through women’s education and entrepreneurial opportunities. Economic freedom and entrepreneurship among women in Afghanistan are possible, but they will be slow, because cultural norms must be changed. For women to prosper and for educational and entrepreneurial programs to be successful in all provinces of Afghanistan, it is imperative to understand the past and current security concerns throughout the provinces. The potential decision for a drawdown of US troops could prove to be a defining moment in the near and the distant future of success in Afghanistan. Since the beginning of 2015, there have been mixed reports about the pace of the troop drawdown. The evidence provided in this chapter has indicated that since the troop withdrawal has begun, there has been a significant rise in violence and Taliban activity in both remote and major metropolitan areas across Afghanistan, including Kabul (Campbell 2015). Commander of USFOR-­A and Resolute Support General John Campbell indicated in February 2015 that he favors more flexibility in determining the pace of the US withdrawal over the next year (Campbell 2015). Further, General Campbell’s comments have outlined that a slower pace of withdrawal would contribute to training, education, advising and assisting Afghan and NATO forces. Many NATO and Afghan government officials have stated that the United States must stay past 2016 in order for security concerns to stabilize. Ensuring such security stability increases economic and democratic governmental growth (Campbell 2015).

Women and economic development in Afghanistan 87

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5 International development and gender in Afghanistan The impact of the women, peace and security agenda 2001–2015 Kristen A. Cordell1 Introduction The improved protection and participation of women in post-­conflict contexts has been recognized as a precondition for evolving state stability and prosperity. Research has shown that declines in the security and equality of women at the community and national levels has county, regional and even global implications – in the form of perilous security situations and a lack of overall stability (Hudson et al. 2013). Conflicts recur, and with the consequent instability, a growing level of social inequality arises (Caprioli and Caldor 2003). This point was captured by the 2011 World Development report by the World Bank, which showed that 80 percent of countries which were then in conflict, had been in conflict during the previous thirty years (Anderlini 2011). Research on the ever-­clearer link between improved gender equality and stability has led to a number of international mandates on women, peace and security, including United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions 1325 and 1820, on which this research focuses. The past thirteen years have seen a total of seven UNSC resolutions focused on closing the gaps for women in conflict. UNSCR 1325, the first, mandated member states to promote women’s participation in all areas of conflict and post-­conflict peacebuilding, while UNSCR 1820 addressed the need to improve protecting women from sexual violence during conflict. Tasked with implementing the terms of these resolutions is an array of international actors with differing mandates and institutional cultures, including bilateral donors. Despite these policy developments and corresponding tools, women’s security and status have lagged far behind those of men at the national and international levels (Kuehnast and Shoemaker 2010). Ongoing conflict continues to exacerbate social and economic stratifications between women and men during peacetime (Caprioli and Caldor 2003). During and after conflict, women are often unable to meet the minimum living standards or counter the constant risk of violence, and women constitute a higher proportion of victims of brutal rape and crime (Goetz and Anderson 2008). They are more likely than men to be among those displaced by conflict or

Development and gender in Afghanistan 91 to cross borders as refugees (Handrahan 2004). Women may be recruited into fighting forces (as wives, sex slaves, cooks or fighters), are regularly trafficked across international borders and sold into prostitution (Aroussi 2011) and often lack legal redress for crimes (Ní Aoláin and Rooney 2007). Violence remains commonplace in the lives of women, and full equality does not (Marcus 2002). New policies and institutional tools have not resulted in the institutional normative shifts that are essential to bringing about changes in women’s equality and security after conflict – the overarching goals of the resolutions (Goetz and Jenkins 2016). One reason is that simply allowing women’s participation in peace processes does not “challenge the dominant rules and practices of international institutions, nor does it end wars” (Hudson 2013). Providing protection is also not a panacea. Even when communities stabilize, the needs of women remain overshadowed (Sjoberg 2013). The number of civilians killed in Afghanistan from 2011 to 2012 decreased for the first time in a twelve-­year period; in the same period, the number of Afghan women and girls killed or injured increased by 20 percent (Report of the Secretary-­General: Women and Peace and Security, 2013). Meaningful change instead depends on making norms around women, peace and security resonant beyond the principles encompassed in the policies. This requires a deeply strategic approach and a willingness of the donor community to implement the resolutions as a mutually reinforcing set of tools, not disparate actions. It is necessary to evaluate approaches and policy with respect to national-­ level norms and to look for how the goals of the women, peace and security resolutions could become more, not less mutually reinforcing. This research works toward that end by examining the role of the international donor community in the gender norm–shaping process during post-­conflict reconstruction in Afghanistan. I reflect on donors as norm shapers and on the outcomes of their policy preferences and ask, what decisions and actions in the international donor space have the greatest “impact” for influencing improvements in gender equality and security in Afghanistan?

Policy background In 2000, the United Nations Security Council passed United Nations Security Council resolution 1325 (UNSCR 1325), the first time that the UN Security Council officially recognized the violence that women face during conflict and the necessity of women’s full participation in peace efforts. UNSCR 1325 mandated widespread protection for women from wartime violence, secured their participation in post-­conflict peace processes, prevented more harm during war (including displacement) and provided post-­ conflict relief and recovery systems that meet their specific needs (Olsson and Gizelis 2015). UNSCR 1325 drew much of its importance from the fact that the resolution was drafted and advocated for within the advocacy

92  Kristen A. Cordell community, who represented the women that the resolution intended to assist (Cohn et al. 2004). The advocacy approach was based on the idea that the widespread participation and protection of women was a foundational precursor to peace rather than an afterthought (Anderlini 2007). Starting in 2008, it became clear that the operational changes taken on by the agencies post–UNSCR 1325 were not enough to address fully post-­ conflict needs, specifically protection (Sjoberg 2013). A range of new media attention and reports showed that women were still disproportionately victims of violence in their communities (Gettleman 2007). As a result, the UN passed United Nations Security Council resolution 1820, which reaffirmed the protection element of UNSCR 1325 and (for the first time) addressed rape and sexual abuse as a tool of war against a civilian population (Anderson 2010). It called on all parties involved in conflict to “take special measures to protect women and girls from gender-­based violence, particularly rape and other forms of sexual abuse and all other forms of violence in situations of armed conflict” (UN Security Council, Security Council Resolution 1820 2008). In a 2010 analysis following the release of UNSCR 1820, Anne Marie Goetz called resolutions 1325 and 1820 “mutually supportive” and encouraged the implementation of UNSCR 1325’s provision on participation as a fundamental first step toward implementing 1820 (Goetz and Jenkins 2016). She cited Pierre Score, former special representative of the secretary-­ general (SRSG) in Cote D’Ivoire, who stated that “there will be no sustainable implementation of 1820 unless you are also implementing 1325” (Goetz and Jenkins 2016). However, Goetz’s argument has been shown to be an oversimplification of the relationship between the two policies as it has played out in practice (Shepherd 2011). Today, UNSCR 1325 and UNSCR 1820 are not the comprehensive set that she envisioned (Barrow 2010). Instead, they are implemented unevenly and have created competition for women, peace and security-­related resources. Further, there are fundamental and overarching tensions in implementing UNSCR 1325 and UNSCR 1820: Can women be agents and victims at the same time? Do actors have the agency to make that distinction in complex foreign environments? How do outside actors, including bilateral donors, influence this process for better and for worse?

Afghanistan: the evolution of women, peace and security To answer these questions, this section will detail the gender norm–­setting policies and practices of several major development donor agencies in the case of Afghanistan, against the backdrop of women, peace and security principles – specifically participation and protection. By grouping the objectives of the Security Council with respect to WPS as “principles,” we can compare and contrast their diffusion in the light of the bigger picture: enhanced gender equality (Ellerby 2013). In other words, if the principles

Development and gender in Afghanistan 93 are implemented effectively, the overarching goals sought by the Security ­Council – for norms in support of gender equality and women’s s­ ecurity – would be realized. This is rarely the case. In this short case study on Afghanistan, which covers three specific periods of time, some principles have excelled, whereas others have failed. 2001–2007 Small, symbolic increases in the representation and participation of women in Afghanistan can be understood as the primary objectives of the international community from 2001 to 2005. Starting in 2001, an awareness of the plight of women in Afghanistan led to an influx of aid and focus on women’s issues post-­Taliban (Hudson and Leidl 2015). Many have actually critiqued the close alignment of Afghan women’s standing with support for the intervention by Western powers, but this is a much larger debate than this chapter will allow for. Following the Taliban era, international foreign assistance organizations (including international bilateral donors, the United Nations and the World Bank) and a proliferation of non-­governmental organizations (NGOs), such as the National Endowment for Democracy, focused efforts on establishing schools for girls, improving women’s healthcare and encouraging women’s participation in business and government.25 Bilateral donors took a basic women in development (WID) approach that was common in the development space at that time (World Bank 2005). Efforts to assist women were project-­based intervention funding as opposed to a strategic approach to increase women’s participation in structures and systems (Abirafeh 2009). In 2001, the bar for women’s participation was low, and the resources for doing good gender integration post-­conflict were limited. The Bonn Conference brought together a number of prominent Afghans under the auspices of the UN to discuss issues related to the future of the Afghanistan. Only one independent female delegate was present at the conference (Benard et al. 2008). The interim Afghan government (appointed at the Bonn Conference), included two women, out of thirty members. Nominal gains were obtained when, following the Bonn Conference, bilateral donors emphasized gender within the political process, to include the creation of a Loya Jirga (or “grand council”) – which included a quota of 25 percent of seats to be reserved for women. An Independent Human Rights Commission included a subcommittee established to monitor the situation of women. By 2005, women had won eighty-­nine seats in the upper house of Afghanistan’s parliament. With the support of the international community, Afghanistan’s emerging institutional bodies were performing a multifaceted role: they not only prevented the issue of women’s rights and empowerment from being subsumed within other discourses but were also providing a much needed institutional framework for addressing the challenges associated with the advancement of women in Afghanistan (World Bank 2013).

94  Kristen A. Cordell During this period, bilateral donor strategies began to focus on achievements in the health and education status of women. This was considered low-­hanging fruit, in which small amounts of money could lead to improvements in quality of life for all Afghans. In a 2005 report, the World Bank described their gender programming as participation in health, education, agriculture, economic growth and legal rights. The report concluded that donors should preference improved participation or agency for women in these sectors through a “complementary” approach which closely engaged the community. It also closely linked these efforts to broad reform of “existing institutions and processes . . . as the basis for implementation,” of women’s participation, broadly defined (World Bank 2011). With a focus on small-­scale development gains in health and education, the international community had for the most part equated gender mainstreaming (as mandated by Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, or CEDAW) with women’s rights in Afghanistan. One practical example of this is the effort to mainstream the Community Development Councils (CDCs) established as part of the Afghan National Solidarity Program (NSP). Carried out by USAID and the World Bank, this project focused on a quota of 30 percent for all women within all CDCs, which would then serve as the central decision-­making body responsible for the selection and implementation of development programs (Beath et al. 2015). The CDCs ensured women’s participation in Shuras at the local level. The program, funded by bilateral donors and lead by World Bank experts, surprised many when women actually took up positions of power within their communities. In 2005 and 2010, the Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU) found that women’s participation in the CDCs included an increase in their decision-­making power, access to and control over resources, respect within the family structure and overall confidence and physical and social mobility (Wakefield 2005). However, reviews of this impact are mixed. A 2013 similar study found that while including women in the Councils was found to increase actual local agency and participation of women it had no measurable impact on long-­standing familial and community understanding of broader equity and normative support for increased participation (Hogg et al. 2013). With support from the international community, local women-­focused NGOs were reconstituted during this period. The Afghan Women’s Network, originally established in 1995 to assist female Afghan refugees who had fled to nearby Peshawar in south Pakistan, moved back to Afghanistan and registered as one of the networks within civil society (Benard 2002). In addition to Afghan Women’s Network (AWN), several other groups scaled up, including PARSA (1996), Afghan Women Skill Development Center (1999), Education Training Center for Poor Women and Girls in Afghanistan (1997) and the Noor Educational and Capacity Development Organization (2000). These organizations were assisted by open grant calls such

Development and gender in Afghanistan 95 as the US ambassador’s Small Grants Fund, which, starting in 2009, issued some 1,000 grants totaling US$17.2 million to support women-­focused civil society groups in thirty-­four provinces during a five-­year period (DevEx 2016). The grants were aimed at organizational capacity, improved participation and some general empowerment activities; they did not include funding for activities around women, peace and security. A 2005 OECD report on donors’ activities from 2000 to 2005 found that the priorities of the community on gender was closely related to the education and health programming; however, women (and women’s groups) also identified security and legal assistance as equally critical issues during this time – two issues that did not show up in donor programming portfolios during that period (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 2010). Programs were modest and centralized. Women, peace and security themes were not integrated. Both goals and objectives remained narrowly focused and conservative in approach (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 2005). In 2015, retrospective project analysis by Canada’s Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development agency found that for projects in 2005 “gender equality results are mainly concentrated in the social sectors through improved access to services. Limited improvements for women related to human rights and their role in decision-­making were observed” (DFATD 2015). The report goes on to state that such changes are the result of much-­longer-­term efforts that would continue across the next decade. 2007–2010 In many ways, 2007–2010 can be considered the pivotal point toward full implementation of the women, peace and security agenda in Afghanistan. The expansion of bilateral donor development assistance moved from small, participation-­focused engagement to larger inclusivity approaches. At this point, UNSCR 1325 was well established among donor agencies; governments of the UK, Sweden, Denmark and Norway developed their domestic national action plans (NAPs) during 2006 and 2007 (Swaine 2009) Strategic UNSCR 1325–related programming closely mirrored new commitments at headquarters, including pressure to deliver in the light of the ten-­year anniversary of UNSCR 1325 in 2010. Despite being domestic policy, most of the NAPs focused exclusively on mainstreaming overseas development efforts, including the highly symbolic and resource-­rich Afghanistan. The United States, the largest donor to reconstruction in Afghanistan, is one example of this evolution. The women, peace and security program gained momentum when, in 2009, President Obama established the Department of State, Office of Global Women’s Issues (S/­GWI), under the direction of an Ambassador Melanne Verveer. Ambassador Verveer, an advocate of the women, peace and security agenda, saw the US commitment in Afghanistan as a critical component to operationalize the resolution. This included a

96  Kristen A. Cordell robust development approach to ensuring women’s human security. Hillary Clinton, in her role as secretary of state, put a spotlight on the issue of women, peace and security by tasking the department to create a US NAP. In 2010, Clinton referenced the needs of Afghan women during her remarks during the UN Security Council Open Debate on UNSCR 1325. The US NAP which was finalized in January of 2011, outlined the implementation of the commitment of the United States Government (USG) to ensuring women’s security in line with UNSCR 1325. Afghanistan was a focus country from the start. In 2009, the Nordic donors in Kabul, led by the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD) and Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA) began developing a joint initiative for promoting women, peace and security in Afghanistan (Bauck 2009). Their framework – the Joint Nordic Gender Action Initiative – carved out pieces of the UNSCR 1325 agenda for distribution. The document recognized that previous gender programming – specifically focused on the National Solidarity Program and education projects had lacked a strategic gender perspective. The Nordic plan specifically emphasized interventions to address gender-­based violence (Afghan Women’s Network 2012) and established a partnership with UN Women to increase the capacity of Afghanistan’s leadership to address WPS (European Commission 2015). Assisted by the Nordic donors and others, the government of Afghanistan began outlining its frameworks on WPS. In 2011, the Afghan Ministry of Women’s Affairs introduced the formation of the National Action Plan for Women of Afghanistan (NAPWA) and the Elimination of Violence Against Women Law (EVAW). The NAPWA had a number of critical areas of women, peace and security relating to key limitations to women’s full participation. It also raised the issue of security sector partners responsible for addressing Violence Against Women. Similarly, the EVAW law established community-­based violence against women centers that could provide assistance for survivors of violence. Together, these documents moved beyond the quotas established by the Afghan constitution and suggested meaningful accountability systems for addressing women’s security in Afghanistan. New civil society organizations (CSOs) were created during the same period, to advocate for a broad agenda on women, peace and security. For example, the Research Institute for Women, Peace and Security (RIWPS) was established following the Peace Jirga in 2010. The organization was set up to work alongside the High Peace Council to ensure women’s integration into the formal peace process and to consolidate agendas for women’s inclusion. This time period also saw the establishment of the Afghan Women’s Coalition and the Shelter Network. Existing CSOs began to expand their mandate to include the implementation of the EVAW law and to ensure women’s access to justice through legal reform efforts. For example, starting in 2010, the Afghan Women’s Network began an annual monitoring report on UNSCR 1325 implementation and on lobbying efforts

Development and gender in Afghanistan 97 for women’s inclusion in peace councils and a peace and conflict working group (Kirby 2015). The first Afghan civil society report on UNSCR 1325, coordinated in 2010, describes the major challenges for Afghan women in a manner reflective of international donor priorities during this time. It characterizes sexual and gender-­based violence (SGBV) as a secondary concern which has not been as problematic as “in conflicts such as in Bosnia or in the Democratic Republic of Congo” (Copenhagen Development Consulting and German Association of Development Consultants 2005). The report focuses significant attention on the need to increase women’s participation in peace councils, the national government and local governance structures, calling for representation within “decision and policy making, approaches to peace and governance, and legislation” (Kirby and Shepherd 2016). During this period, the international community focused on participation through strategic institutionalization. Specifically, donors supported the government’s policies and capacities, which they hoped would yield dividends in the long run. 2011–2015 In 2011, bilateral donors’ priorities began to shift as they double down on their women, peace and security programming in Afghanistan and began to integrate a thematic focus on protection, the primary goal of recently passed UNSCR 1820 on ending SGBV during conflict. Like other development programming in the country, the donors felt that the support for the government capacity and ownership was sufficiently addressed. During this time, donor reports from DANIDA, the EU, Norway and Sweden began to reflect protection-­focused language (including nuances around victimization) (European Commission 2015). At the headquarters level, the United States and others created policies on the strategic implementation of measures to address GBV for all international development efforts. For example, prompted by the advocacy around the new resolution, the UK created the high-­level Preventing Sexual Violence Initiative (PSVI). Because addressing protection and SGBV were more aligned with their own national interest at the time, they became the priority at the national level as well. The shift in priorities could be seen clearly at the country level. While Denmark’s development portfolio in Afghanistan was described as “fighting poverty, promoting social and economic development, increasing employment opportunities for both men and women,” during 2011–2015, the reported gender activities were centered on assistance for victims of violence.43 As another example, the Netherlands reported working on a variety of initiatives, including support for the UN trust fund, to end violence against women, led by UN Women and the Afghan NGO Equality for Peace and Democracy (EPD) for the Gender Equality Platform. But the activities within these efforts focused on protection-­related themes. SIDA began to work closely with UN Women, specifically to establish “protection

98  Kristen A. Cordell mechanisms through women’s shelters set up in some 20 provinces, where women receive legal assistance and support for rehabilitation” (Copenhagen Development Consulting and German Association of Development Consultants 2005). SIDA also focused considerable efforts during 2011 on driving the implementation of the EVAW law. Not only were the types of gender programming funded by donors changing, but their language was as well. Mainstreaming conversations became second to protection-­related dialogue (Kirby and Shepherd 2016). Reporting included counting the number of women raped or killed, not those who were elected. The UK 2011–2015 Operational Plan in Afghanistan noted the immense need for women to increase their participation in the economic and judicial sector. Yet in listing their priorities, they write: “tackling violence against women and girls will be a strategic priority in the UK aid programme in the years ahead” (DFID 2012). Of course, this trend was not limited to Afghanistan development projects: in 2011, the Norwegian Peace Institute were told during a meeting with the Gender and Development and the Ministry of Health in Liberia that “there is nothing more sexy than to fund GBV [gender-­based violence] projects” (de Carvalho and Schia 2011). This shift in focus occurred when the gains for women’s participation in Afghanistan had not been solidified (through policy or capacity-­building activities). Small-­scale projects from 2001 to 2005 and the capacity projects which followed lost momentum quickly (OXFAM 2014). In 2013, the Wolesi Jirga removed the previous substantial 25 percent quota for women’s participation in provincial councils. After significant pressure from women’s rights advocates in country, the Meshrano Jirga was able to reintroduce the quota, but only at a watered-­down 20 percent. Few women were able to keep their roles on High Peace Council and fewer still at the provincial level, where they have been systematically excluded and/­or “made to carry out their activities without access to the resources that have been set aside to fund the reintegration program” (Barsa 2015). According to women’s rights activists and female parliamentarians in the country, the revision was a symbolic shift which resulted from “a push by conservative forces that do not approve of women’s empowerment” (Heinrich Boell 2011). The irony is, while the country began to stabilize, women began to experience the erosion of their personal security. The shift away from institution building and toward protection had an inverse impact on participation – a fundamental component of widening women’s security and equality.

Shaping gender norms: missed opportunities and recommendations for future action In 2015, the Canadian Aid Agency CORDAID reflected on the challenges of addressing women’s participation through a “bean-­counting” approach. Their report found that placing women in formal positions of power in

Development and gender in Afghanistan 99 Afghanistan occurred “without much thought given to the conditions in which these women must function” (CORDAID 2014). Herein lies the challenge of addressing gender within reconstruction activities in Afghanistan: attention to the “conditions” around women, peace and security would include a need for a much broader understanding of underlying power dynamics in Afghan society and a more nuanced understanding of the role of community leaders and men. Donors simply did not have this capacity in Afghanistan (for a wide range of reasons) and therefore fell back on their institutional preferences for principles regarding women, peace and ­security – cherry-­picking priorities at the expense of the overall platform. Gender Security Council resolutions are particularly complex in a norm-­ setting agenda, because they are thematic in nature. Thematic resolutions must be continually adapted to the local context be useful and address the “needs and rights of individuals, instead of being state-­centred” (True-­Frost 2007a). Reconstruction in Afghanistan was hyper-­ centralized. Although donors had a range of local-­level implementation responsibilities, the central state ruled. Further complicating progress is the fact that UNSCR 1325 and UNSCR 1820 are non-­coercive, global and thematic, which increases the importance of international institutions above even national entities in transferring overarching principles as norms (True-­Frost 2007a). During and after conflict, bilateral donors can be understood to be norm-­ shaping institutions – including gender norms. However, the process of creating and socializing norms is complex and varied. Norms spread in a vague manner that allows spoilers (like the Taliban) to co-­opt their meaning for a range of purposes. Donors may also select “[policies] that fit with institutional norms” (Krook and True-­Frost 2012). Motivated by time and resource constraints, it is not uncommon for donors to “choose” between principles. Because the themes of the UN Security Council resolutions on women, peace and security fit into a diverse set of institutional priorities (such as keeping the peace), donors are likely to select the principles most fitting to their current objectives (which of course also change over time). In Afghanistan, this meant picking the most politically salient resolution which fit the overall development approach to Afghanistan (including the Transformation Decade, which began in 2014) as opposed to the one most appropriate for addressing the underlying needs of women in the community. Put simply, the principles of protection and participation encapsulated in the resolutions are highly malleable to international institutional preferences. Their meaning in local and national contexts is constantly changing in a manner far too complex for an unstable operating environment (Von Billerbeck 2015). The result is gender programming that focused only on the symptoms of women’s insecurity instead of “the social norms that drive the problems” (Otto 2012). The donor community was committed to (small-­ scale) women’s participation during the early years of conflict in Afghanistan, but at the critical point where participation should have been ramped up to support inclusive peacebuilding norms (in support of the broader

100  Kristen A. Cordell women, peace and security agenda), it was instead replaced by a focus on protection. As this research shows, the introduction of the women, peace and security platform in 2009 brought forward a number of new priorities for increased meaningful participation and improved protection, so the donor community focused on protection. Further, this approach trickled down to the NGOs, reliant on the international partners for funding. The focus has remained on “appeasing bilateral donors at the expense of laying a foundation for genuine participation” (Hudson 2012). One NGO leader writes that the hundreds of NGOs created in response to donor funding in Afghanistan closely follow the “wishes of the donor community” even at the expense of the actual need of their existing platforms. This resulted, according to the author, in substantial “duplication or ineffectiveness” (Ghani 2007). Given the complexity of the UNSCR 1325 and UNSCR 1820 agenda, bilateral donors and their partners simplified their task by focusing on activities and quotas instead of the long-­ term attitudinal changes necessary to address longer-­term gender equality (Sjoberg and Peet 2011). Additional research is needed to evaluate if the findings of this analysis and to apply it to other nation-­building cases, particularly those that have spanned the Security Council resolutions. Additional research should respond to the following questions: Are the various principles actually divergent or antithetical, or is Afghanistan a one-­off? What does this relationship tell us about donor government preferences at the global level?

Conclusion Over the last fifteen years, the international donor community has spent some $US30 billion in Afghanistan. This has yielded some successes. Maternal mortality has declined rapidly, and life expectancy has increased by twenty years. Girls now account for more than a third of all school children in Afghanistan, with some three million girls in school. However, the implementation of the women, peace and security agenda (UNSCR 1325 and UNSCR 1820) has caused confusion and in some cases led to missed opportunities for addressing large-­scale and impactful participation in the form of integrated peacebuilding. During the last five years, one unintended consequence of this confusion has been a shift in how the donor community has prioritized competing needs within the portfolio, which has resulted in priority being placed on protection. The brief examination of specific donor platforms here suggests that there was a pivotal opportunity in 2010 for more broad-­based support for women, peace and security programming and policy toward more protection-­ related programming, which has greatly influenced national frameworks and systems in Afghanistan. Small-­scale empowerment programming, focused on participation across sectors, has given way to a rush to focus on Violence against Women (VAW) and SGBV without a resulting

Development and gender in Afghanistan 101 investment in meaningful, integrated participation efforts (specifically integration of women in formal and informal peace processes, security sector reform or lasting structural integration). Therefore, what may be seen as a “success” in advancing the advocacy platform of protection has potentially drawn resources away from advancing agency in a substantial way. As the introduction of this short chapter shows, bilateral donors’ priority areas in women, peace and security matter to the norms that are illustrated at the national level and their resulting impact. In revisiting the discussion about shaping international norms, this short case study shows a complex process of shaping and diffusing information, which results in the prioritization of a specific principle above others, often because of the complexity of the operational environment, changes in the national political structure or international policy. Of course, these questions are complex and deserve more attention. Yet in the interim, this chapter asserts that the concerns of the advocacy community for women’s abandonment or peril had little to do with donor complacency or a lack of resources; instead, it arose from institutional normative preferences for protection-­related principles. This has weakened previous investments in participation or at least has not allowed a significant impact on deep, structural challenges. By all accounts, donor governments were “successful” in identifying significant resources to address women’s needs in Afghanistan. However, the priorities that they chose may have negatively affected structural changes. If fact, in “sounding the alarm” of the desperation of Afghan women, the advocacy community may have unintentionally reinforced a women-­as-­victims narrative that the international donor community had set forth in its prioritization of protection.

Note 1 This submission is based on the author’s independent research and is not representative of the views of the US government.

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6 Women, peace and security The uphill battle of transforming Afghanistan through women’s meaningful participation in peacebuilding and security Jorrit Kamminga Introduction This chapter first traces the confluence of the protection of women’s rights and progress in Afghanistan. This process was – and sometimes still is – fueled by the simplistic representation of Afghan women in the West, often portrayed as either passive victims of oppression and violence or as active role models or heroes. The decisive moment for linking women’s empowerment and progress in Afghanistan, however, seems to have been the rule of the Taliban (1996–2001). Their notorious oppression of women became part of the justification of the international intervention in Afghanistan in 2001 and a benchmark for results afterward. The improvement of women’s rights, especially in terms of their access to basic social services, such as education and healthcare, have become a standard part of the indicators of progress in Afghanistan. This progress – real and significant – has, however, also been exploited as a useful instrument to mask the complex nature of international missions or the lack of results in other areas. Despite the progress made, the second section of this chapter shows that the Western women’s rights agenda does not always set the same priorities as Afghan women and sometimes offers a rather unnuanced view of reality in Afghanistan. Nevertheless, international attention on Afghan women’s rights and empowerment has been far from only symbolic. In fact, as the subsequent sections make clear, the sustained international commitment to Afghan women has received an important boost with the normative women, peace and security agenda (conventionally abbreviated to WPS) as first laid down in October 2000 by United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325. The remainder of the chapter shows that the implementation of this agenda in Afghanistan suffers from serious challenges. Since the adoption of Afghanistan’s National Action Plan in June 2015, little progress has been made. The chapter provides insight into the current impasse by addressing two key strategic components of the WPS agenda: inclusive security and inclusive peacebuilding.

106  Jorrit Kamminga Finally, the chapter offers some recommendations on how more progress could be made when it comes to the implementation of the WPS agenda in Afghanistan. To break the current deadlock, an operational approach to women’s meaningful participation is put forward to complement the traditional women’s empowerment agenda, which is based on equal rights.

The confluence of women’s rights and progress in Afghanistan In November 2016 Sharbat Gula returned to Afghanistan. The Afghan woman had been detained in Pakistan for nearly two weeks on the charge of using a false identity card. Few people know her name, but everybody knows her face and her haunting green eyes. The American photographer Steve McCurry immortalized the Afghan woman, at the time living in a refugee camp in Pakistan in December 1984, in a portrait for the cover of the June 1985 issue of National Geographic. Eighteen years later, in January 2002, a team of journalists of the magazine found her again (Newman 2002). The subsequent reunion of McCurry and Gula also made headlines around the world. The first portrait of Sharbat Gula became a symbol for the tragedy of Afghan civilians’ fleeing the violence of war at the time that the Soviet Union was politically and militarily controlling Kabul and large portions of the country. After the attacks of September 11, 2001, attention increased again for the iconic photo, because the Bush administration partially justified the war in Afghanistan with the need to protect Afghan women’s rights (Hesford and Kozol 2005, 3). Media and communication scholars have used this and similar images as an entry point to assess the broader relationship between American representations of Afghan women and the foreign policy of the United States (Schwartz-­DuPre 2010, 336). As Dana Cloud writes, “Although the oppression of women under Taliban rule is well documented, these images do more than represent that reality. They operate within a rhetorical discourse that becomes more forceful when images of oppression are contrasted with images of women granted entry – by the arrival of U.S. forces – into modern, Western-­style, market-­driven ‘civilization’ ” (Cloud 2004, 294). Since Sharbat Gula, the symbolism of Afghan women in international media has generally taken two forms. On the one hand, some women have been portrayed as active role models or heroes, such as Niloofar Rahmani, the first female pilot of the Afghan Air Force (Stancati and Amiri 2016), and Malalai Joya, the member of parliament who dared to stand up for women’s rights in the face of strong opposition from former warlords (Joya and O’Keefe 2009). On the other hand, Afghan women have often been depicted as passive victims, such as twenty-­seven-­year-­old Farkhunda Malikzada, who was lynched by a mob in Kabul in March 2015 (Kargar 2015), or Aisha Mohammadzai, whose face was mutilated by the Taliban and who

Women, peace and security 107 appeared on the cover of Time magazine in the summer of 2010 (Baker 2010). This internationally imposed dichotomy offers a simplistic picture of Afghanistan’s reality, in which women in blue burqas symbolize repression and lack of progress, while “strong” Afghan women radiate change and hope for a better future. Within this simplified reality, it seems a logical reflex for Western politicians to highlight the progress of young girls and women because of international reconstruction efforts since 2001. However, it opens the door to the extreme position of justifying entire political or military actions in the name of women’s rights and women’s empowerment. According to the Iranian researcher Rostami-­Povey, “US policy-­makers characterized gender relations in Afghanistan in ways that legitimated their action. They made an analogy between the defeat of the Taliban and Al-­Qaida and women’s liberation” (Rostami-­Povey 2007, 1). The former first lady Laura Bush expressed this analogy in her radio address to the American people on November 17, 2001: “The fight against terrorism is also a fight for the rights and dignity of women. . . . Only the terrorists and the Taliban forbid education to women. Only the terrorists and the Taliban threaten to pull out women’s fingernails for wearing nail polish.” One month later, on December 12, 2001, former president George Bush enunciated the link between terrorism and women’s rights in even clearer terms in his remarks during the signing ceremony of the Afghan Women and Children Relief Act: “The central goal of the terrorists is the brutal oppression of women – and not only the women of Afghanistan.” In Western eyes, the Taliban regime (1996–2001) had become the personification of women’s subjugation. With some exceptions (Ansary 2012, 281), women were not allowed to study, could not work outside the house and were allowed to leave their homes only if in a burqa and accompanied by male relatives. They were not allowed to laugh out loud or speak loudly, use cosmetics or show bare arms or ankles (Lamb 2002, 16–17; Cooley 2000, 145). It is a rather poor response of foreign policymakers, however, to highlight this “barbarian behavior” especially ex post facto. During the years under the Taliban regime, the international community did not go much beyond condemning the Taliban policy and applying limited sanctions to put pressure on the Taliban government, with few concerns about the humanitarian consequences of such sanctions (United Nations Security Council 1999). The UNSCRs 1267 and 1333 on the situation in Afghanistan, adopted in October 1999 and December 2000 respectively, merely express the concern about the regime’s human rights violations and “particularly discrimination against women and girls.” Beyond international sanctions, little was done to put pressure on the Taliban, and the sanctions themselves proved to have no effect (Ansary 2012, 255–256). While the Taliban regime warranted a strong condemnation by the international community because of its dismal women’s rights record, such an argument ignored the broader picture of a centuries-­old patriarchal society

108  Jorrit Kamminga that has structurally oppressed women, regardless of brief flirtations with modernization in the 1920s under King Amanullah Khan (1919–1929) and in the 1950s and 1960s under King Zahir Shah (1933–1973) (Ahmed-­Ghosh 2003). The brutality of the Taliban regime was only one chapter in a long history of violence and conflict. Even with the best intentions, Western policymakers singled out one element of a hugely complex society in one short time span of Afghanistan’s history. As Malou Innocent writes, “Those in the West who advocate policy efforts directed at redressing gender inequality in Afghanistan are focusing too narrowly on changing a single variable of social life. In the process, they are overlooking the interplay of broader societal forces that keep Afghan women subjugated” (Innocent 2011, 33). Feminist perspectives on the so-­called War on Terror have especially criticized the “sudden interest” in women’s rights, claiming that “the co-­optation of women’s rights discourse and the indignation expressed about the treatment of women by the Taliban serve[d] to justify a US response to the ‘war on terrorism’ and moralize[d] the plan to force the Taliban from power” (Hunt 2002, 117). In that view, Afghan women’s rights were exploited to justify military aid to Afghanistan in the 1980s and, two decades later, a military intervention in a state harboring terrorists. From 2001 onward, it was never clear whether the international community would do more than bring security and stability to Afghanistan. There was never a clear political strategy for the long term, focused, for example, on regional reconciliation, state building or – even more ambitious – nation building (Cowper-­Coles 2012, 299–300). This gap was also reflected in the uncertainty about the nature of the international military missions in Afghanistan. For example, in Canada the parliamentary debates revolved around the question of whether a Canadian mission in Afghanistan could be considered a peacekeeping force or not (Struck 2006). In the Netherlands, the debate repeatedly returned to the question whether the Dutch mission was a reconstruction or a combat mission (Dimitriu and de Graaf 2016). In such complex debates, the political rhetoric of women’s rights helped to steer attention away from unclear mandates of foreign missions.

Viewing Afghan women’s rights through a Western lens Using women’s rights either as justification for military action ex ante or to account for progress afterward creates the problem that these rights of Afghan women are constantly approached in a Western way and often without a nuanced view of Afghan reality. As a woman in Rostami-­Povey’s book Afghan Women complains, “All I hear since the fall of the Taliban is chadarri, chadarri, chadarri [burqa]. My problem is not chadarri; my problem is that I don’t have any food to feed myself and my children” (Rostami-­ Povey 2007, 37). While the Western priorities may have been at odds with the actual needs of Afghan women, this does not mean that the international assistance

Women, peace and security 109 programs have been merely symbolic. Since 2001, women’s rights programs of Western donor organizations and international non-­governmental organizations (INGOs) have been much more than simply a means to an end. In fact, the superficial political dividing line of 2001 is misleading, because organizations such as the Swedish Committee for Afghanistan (SCA) and Oxfam have been working for Afghan women’s rights for many decades. It is true, however, that this work received an important boost after 2001 with unprecedented levels of funding and an extraordinary number of projects and programs. The result is impressive. Using the Taliban regime as a benchmark, Peter Bergen writes [The Taliban] imprisoned half the population inside their homes, preventing women from having jobs and girls from attending school. Although Afghanistan today remains a deeply conservative Muslim society, proportionately more women are now serving in the Afghan parliament than in the U.S. Congress. And while only fewer than 1 million children, almost entirely boys, were in school under the Taliban, now more than 8 million children are in school, more than a third of whom are girls. (Bergen 2013) There are now hundreds of Afghan women’s organizations. The Afghan Women’ Network (AWN) alone represents 125 women’s organizations. In September and October 2015, the author coordinated a series of visits of Afghan civil society representatives to Brussels and The Hague, which provided further insights into the current state of women’s empowerment in Afghanistan. Wazhma Frogh, founding director of the Women and Peace Studies Organization (WPSO) said that “There are now enough women’s rights activists in Afghanistan. What we need now are women leaders” (personal comment, September 29, 2015). Nargis Nehan, founder of Equality for Peace and Democracy (EPD) confirmed the often-­one-­sided interpretation of Afghan women’s rights by the West: “We are only invited to international conferences to talk about gender equality and women’s participation, while we also want to be involved in discussions on other issues such as security and development” (personal comment, September 29, 2015). There seems to be a tragic paradox at play: Afghan women are provided with a platform by the international community, but in their own eyes this is often not the right platform.

Women, peace and security in Afghanistan In 2000, the international community provided an additional platform for women in Afghanistan. With UNSCR 1325 on women, peace and security, it established a new legal framework for its work on women’s empowerment

110  Jorrit Kamminga and participation in fragile and conflict-­affected countries. While this resolution addresses the huge impact of conflicts on women and children as passive victims of violence, it also specifically encourages the active participation of women in decision-­making processes related to conflict resolution and peacebuilding. Since the 2000 resolution, the WPS policy framework was further clarified and strengthened in seven subsequent resolutions (Kirby and Shepherd 2016, 251). To implement this framework, countries have adopted national action plans (NAPs). By December 2018, seventy-­nine countries had adopted a NAP. While the NAPs of (post-­)conflict countries are naturally targeted more toward domestic implementation, those of donor countries use the action plans to guide their external support for fragile and conflict-­affected countries elsewhere (Basu 2016, 266). How such “donor NAPs” relate to Afghanistan’s NAP has been critically assessed by the Afghanistan Public Policy Research Organization (APPRO 2017). While the coordination and funding of the global WPS agenda depends on donor countries, the implementation in countries such as Afghanistan is contingent on what is possible in the Afghan context. The Afghan government adopted its NAP on June 30, 2015 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2015). Divided into four strategic pillars, it aimed to (1) increase women’s participation in peace processes and the security sector (participation); (2) ensure the protection of women from violence and discrimination (protection); (3) prevent (sexual) violence against women (prevention); and (4) provide relief and recovery services to women from and within conflict-­affected communities, internally displaced people (IDPs) and survivors of violence (relief and recovery). However, in the years that have passed since the adoption of Afghanistan’s NAP, little progress has been made in its implementation. The consultations between the Afghan government and the international community to finalize the costing of the implementation of the NAP 1325 was only finalized in April 2018. One of the key challenges has been reaching an agreement between donors and the Afghan government on how funds get allocated and linked to concrete activities within the relevant line ministries. Although the main financial mechanisms to support implementation are now in place, it remains unclear how progress will be measured against NAP 1325 objectives and to what extent the WPS framework can effectively be a catalyst for inclusive peace and security.

Sustained international commitment to women, peace and security International attention on Afghan women’s rights has not subsided in recent years. For example, the sustained international commitment to women’s empowerment was clearly expressed at two important international events: the NATO Summit in Warsaw in July 2016 and the Brussels

Women, peace and security 111 Conference on Afghanistan in October 2016. The final declaration of the Warsaw Summit stressed the need to “build on recent achievements in empowering women to participate fully in all aspects of Afghan society, including service in the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces; and political processes; and fully implement Afghanistan’s National Action Plan on UNSCR 1325” (NATO 2016). It reconfirms the commitment of NATO to the implementation of the WPS agenda, whether through the gender advisors (GENADs) to the Resolute Support Mission in Kabul or through the special representative for WPS in Brussels. At the Brussels Conference, half of the Afghan civil society delegates participating in the event were women. A side event, titled Empowered Women, Prosperous Afghanistan, was given more weight through the participation of Rula Ghani, Afghanistan’s first lady. The dependence on foreign funding and assistance has fueled the debate on whether this Western-­driven agenda is compatible with the Afghan reality of a predominantly conservative society, in which many men still struggle with a bigger role for women. This concern has also been articulated as a “clash between Western ideals and Afghan realities” (Rubin 2015). Palwasha Hassan, director of the Afghan Women’s Educational Center (AWEC), one of the ten Afghan civil society delegates during the Brussels Conference on Afghanistan, is frank about the challenges and admits that traditional values still play an important role in the country (personal comment, July 25, 2016). However, she also sees Afghanistan as part of an international community, within which the country can learn from others who are more advanced when it comes to women’s emancipation. Viewed in this light, the sustained international support for the WPS agenda is crucial, especially because the Afghan government still has limited capacity and resources for its implementation. What is more important, however, is the urgent need to explore what works on the ground. In the Afghan context where, at the time of finalizing this chapter (March 2019), conflict and insecurity were increasing and there was still no official peace process despite parallel U.S.-­led talks in Doha and Russia-­led talks in Moscow in February 2019, there is especially a need for two key strategic components of WPS: inclusive peacebuilding and inclusive security. However, in various conversations that the author had with Afghan men since 2014, the opinion is expressed that Afghanistan is not ready for the WPS agenda. The argument goes that the country is too insecure and that forcing societal changes could backfire if they are brought about too quickly in such a volatile environment. The security situation is indeed highly problematic. At the local level, the Taliban insurgent groups have shown that they can control various districts around the country, can seriously threaten towns and districts and can strike in the heart of Kabul with coordinated attacks, such as on the Intercontinental Hotel in January 2018. At the end of September 2015, the Taliban could control the city of Kunduz for three days. In September 2016, they were on

112  Jorrit Kamminga the verge of capturing Tarin Kowt, the provincial capital of Uruzgan province. By September 2017, the Taliban groups were reported to control as much as 47 percent of Afghanistan’s territory (Roggio and Gutowski 2017). The presence of the Islamic State, especially in eastern Afghanistan but more recently also in northern provinces, has produced yet another worrying element in Afghanistan’s insecurity at the local level. The devastating attack on Hazara demonstrations in July 2016 and on several Afghan Shiite targets since then shows the Islamic State is now also able to strike in urban centers. In such an unstable and unpredictable situation, it is logical that the priority for Afghan women and men is security and protection, but this does not mean that the WPS agenda should somehow be put on hold. Such an argument is, in fact, highly paradoxical as it is precisely the objective of the WPS agenda to foster the role of women in processes and structures that can help solve conflict and bring about peace.

Inclusive peacebuilding Inclusive peacebuilding can be broadly defined as the active and meaningful participation and structural inclusion of citizens, vulnerable groups, women and civil society organizations (CSOs) in formal and informal peace processes at the local, national or international levels (Kamminga and Zaki 2016, 4). When it comes to the meaningful participation of women, there has hardly been any involvement in previous formal or informal peace negotiations (Cameron and Kamminga 2014). Table 6.1 provides an overview of some of the structural challenges involved. The peace negotiations in 2016 with the jihadist group Hezb-­e Islami Gulbuddin could be considered an exception. Habiba Sarabi, deputy head of the High Peace Council and the first woman with a senior position in this body, was present at the preparatory talks. She says that her participation allowed for the effective representation of the interests of women in the peace talks (personal comment, December 21, 2016). Previously, Sarabi was the minister of women’s affairs and governor in the province of Bamyan. Meeting her in Kabul in December 2016 in her new role can already be considered progress. Three years earlier, when the author was involved in research on inclusive peacebuilding for an Oxfam report, the meeting with the High Peace Council in the capital was with three male representatives and not a single woman. The participation of Sarabi in these negotiations perhaps offers some hope for future peace negotiations with the Taliban. But it all depends on whether the High Peace Council will play a leading role in such peace negotiations and whether women such as Sarabi can help change government institutions which have so far generally sidelined women in peace and reconciliation efforts (Arghandiwal 2012). Wazhma Frogh is highly skeptical about the prospect of more meaningful participation: “The Afghan government thinks that we, Afghan women, cannot keep secrets. That is why there are

Women, peace and security 113 Table 6.1  Structural challenges limiting women’s meaningful participation in peacebuilding • Lack of a formal peace process between the Afghan government and Taliban insurgent groups • Structural lack of women’s participation in formal and informal peace processes since 2001, which means little precedent has been created for women’s meaningful participation and there are few role models • Predominant focus on national peace processes, while most of the conflict in Afghanistan takes place at the local level, where women are already contributing to peacebuilding, to conflict mediation and resolution and to reconciliation efforts • Simplistic equation of inclusive peacebuilding with “a woman at the table” • Lack of clear preconditions or red lines of the Afghan government in the February 2018 peace offer of president Ghani when it comes to upholding the Afghan Constitution, particularly the promotion of women’s rights enshrined in it, in future peace processes • Sidelining women in peacebuilding bodies, such as the High Peace Council and the Provincial Peace Councils • Cultural barriers preventing women from playing a bigger role in peacebuilding efforts • Lack of awareness among women about peace, reconciliation or reintegration initiatives, such as Afghanistan’s Peace and Reintegration Program (APRP) and more recent projects • Lack of trust by women in male-­dominated mediation and peacebuilding bodies • Predominant use of informal dispute settlement mechanisms for public and social disputes, mechanisms that women generally do not participate in and have little access to

so few women in the High Peace Council” (personal comment). According to Farhadullah Farhad, its deputy chief executive, currently twelve out of fifty members of the High Peace Council are women (personal comment, October 22, 2017). In a future peace process with the Taliban, the stakes will also be much higher than with Hezb-­e Islami Gulbuddin, as the latter was severely weakened and had a more fragile starting position in the negotiations. Negotiations with the Taliban will provide a true test case of whether the Afghan government is serious about inclusive peacebuilding and whether they are willing to “condition” such peace talks from the start by including female representatives. According to Frogh, a woman at the negotiation table can still be considered too strong a signal according to the Taliban (personal comment). In the absence of a formal peace process with the Taliban at the national level, there is an opportunity to focus much more on the role of women in local processes of peace and reconciliation. The conflict in Afghanistan that is discussed at international conferences is often limited to coordinated attacks on high-­profile targets, tensions with neighboring countries and

114  Jorrit Kamminga clashes between the Taliban and Afghan forces. This, however, is only a fraction of the conflict that Afghans face in their daily lives. Most conflict takes place at the local level and revolves around disputes inter alia related to land or water allocation, legal affairs, poverty, unemployment, religious affairs or the rights and obligations of customs. The link between inclusive peacebuilding and local communities has not been completely missing. Initiatives such as the APRP, Oxfam’s Building Afghan Peace Locally (BAPL) program and the Monitoring Women’s Security in Transition project of APPRO, AWN and Cordaid provide important lessons learned. There is, however, much more that can be done at the district and provincial level, where the implementation of the Afghan NAP is crucial for the overall success of the WPS agenda. Because of the weak linkages between different levels of conflict resolution, the work on local peacebuilding initiatives has not yet been successful in opening a national debate and still has a limited capacity to affect national-­level policy and dialogue on issues regarding peace, reconciliation, dispute resolution and social inclusivity.

Inclusive security Inclusive security, the second strategic component of WPS highlighted in this chapter, can be broadly defined as the active and meaningful participation and structural inclusion of citizens, vulnerable groups, women and CSOs in policies, structures and mechanisms for addressing basic security and protection (Kamminga and Zaki 2016, 3). One important aspect is the inclusion of women in the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces. Hassan’s argument that Afghanistan can learn a lot from other countries seems to be important here. For example, for the Netherlands, Germany and Sweden were much more advanced in the beginning of the twentieth century when it came to the incorporation of women in the police force. This seems to prove the point that an international agenda promoting gender equality and women’s emancipation can be important, regardless of traditional norms and values. While supported by the international community, Wazhma Frogh is adamant about her view that this is not a Western donor agenda: “The financing is indeed often external, but the Afghan women themselves want to play a bigger role in society” (personal comment, September 29, 2015). She illustrates this by pointing to the Afghan women that are currently working with the Afghan police force: “The West did not invent the Afghan policewoman. The first woman started working with the police in 1967. Moreover, Malalai Kakar, Afghanistan’s most important female police officer until her death in 2008 in an attack by the Taliban, already joined the force in 1982. Donor countries can set priorities, but if these do not match with what Afghan women want, programs will quickly collapse.”

Women, peace and security 115 This suggests that the problem does not lie in the internationally driven agenda itself but rather much more in its implementation. In Afghanistan, the participation of women in the security sector is still modest. Women’s participation in the security forces has gradually increased over recent years but currently seems to be stalled at numbers far below the targets of the Afghan government (WPSO 2015b). At the time of finalizing this chapter, around 3,229 police officers were female out of a total of 129,000 police officers (2.5 percent). In the Afghan army, around 1,700 were women out of a total of 195,000 (around 0.9 percent) soldiers. For 2017, the tashkeel (staffing plan) for the Ministry of Interior contained at least 2,000 more female positions which would replace the same amount of men (Shahi Rasooli, personal comment, November 20, 2016). That could potentially bring the number of women working for that ministry to 5,969, but there is no deadline for this increase. The approved total female positions in the tashkeel of the Ministry of Defense is 5,005, but it is not clear whether this is a realistic target given the lack of progress in recent years. For example, past experience shows that it is not easy to find female recruits, let alone educated women for the higher positions (APPRO 2015, 10–11). There are now many more educated women in Afghanistan, but that does not mean that they are willing or even allowed to work in the security sector. Various research reports have documented the structural challenges that explain the low number of women in the security sector (WPSO 2015a, 2015b; APPRO 2015; Hancock 2013; APPRO 2010). Table 6.2 summarizes some of these challenges. A structural problem is that the security institutions currently do not provide an enabling environment for the meaningful inclusion and participation of women. Their role is often still considered merely symbolic or worse: degrading them to servant positions in which they clean, cook or serve tea for their male colleagues (APPRO 2015, 15). Frogh says that “Changing rooms that are intended for women are converted into kitchens where female police officers are later preparing the food for their male colleagues” (personal comment). There is a general lack of facilities where women can eat, shower or change separately from men (APPRO 2015, 14–15). Moreover, women are often not fully respected by male colleagues because they, for example, do not work at night or have to leave early because of family duties. Women in the security forces face stigmatization and even (sexual) violence and intimidation, whether within the security institutions or outside in the communities (APPRO 2015, 10). Because of the discrimination in society, some women are scared to wear their uniforms outside of the office. Faced with discrimination or intimidation within the security forces, women hardly have access to female superiors or effective complaint mechanisms to address abuse or harassment. The newly established internal complaint mechanism in the police and the eighty-­six Police Women Councils, which provide a practical

116  Jorrit Kamminga Table 6.2 Structural challenges limiting women’s meaningful participation in the security sector • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

Discrimination and stigmatization in both the security sector and society Sexual abuse and harassment by male colleagues Lack of respect from colleagues or superiors in the security forces Limited availability and access to complaint mechanisms or female superiors to report discrimination or harassment to Restriction of tasks – for example, by having most women involved in body searches and not involved in patrolling in the streets or other operational duties Denial of responsibilities and authority of senior female staff Lack of career opportunities, including training and promotion for female staff Masculine culture of security institutions, sometimes reinforced by the predominant focus on counter-­insurgency and military operations Conservative and patriarchal nature of Afghan society that preserves cultural norms, traditional taboos and stigmas related to women’s roles in the security sector Limited number of senior female role models and lack of a critical mass of women in the security forces and the line ministries Lack of awareness in society about the roles and added value of women in the police and the army Lack of support from families to allow their wives and daughters to join the security forces Limited availability of (literacy) training and schools for female recruits Illiteracy and lack of capacity among female police officers and soldiers that prevents them from performing well, taking on more responsibilities or reaching higher positions Lack of tailored facilities such as women-­only changing rooms and washrooms Unequal family responsibilities of women and a lack of childcare centers for women to leave their children during work Lack of or limited transportation possibilities for women to and from work General lack of interest among women to join the security forces, even apart from the societal pressure and institutional challenges, which do not make this an easy career choice

forum to support police women and advance their participation, protection and professionalization at provincial level, are steps in the right direction, but they need to be properly monitored to assess their effectiveness. The Afghan NAP calls for “women’s active and effective participation in leadership positions of security agencies” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2015, 6). However, with few exceptions, such as Brigadier General Hekmat Shahi Rasooli, director of the Human Rights, Women Affairs and Children Department of the Ministry of Interior, women do not reach senior or decision-­making positions. This is partially related to societal norms and traditional attitudes, but illiteracy, low levels of education and lack of capacity of women also explain the difficulty in appointing women to higher

Women, peace and security 117 levels. In general, there is still no critical mass of women and women’s rights champions in the security forces and line ministries that would help normalize their meaningful presence and attract more women. According to Shahi Rasooli, the challenge lies especially in simultaneously increasing both the capacity of women and the understanding of men (Shahi Rasooli, personal comment). She admits that the obstacles are hard to overcome, but she remains positive about the prospects of inclusive security. Solving these challenges not only requires a change in the attitudes of Afghan men and women, local communities and the public institutions involved but also demands practical improvements, such as a safer working place, opportunities for career progression and increasing public awareness regarding the role and added value of having female police officers and soldiers in society. While changing attitudes and societal norms will take time, there is an important (shorter-­term) opportunity to focus on a more operational approach which highlights the added value of female police officers and soldiers, such as in their access to intelligence or their roles in searching or interrogating women. However, as the next section will show, these tactics are no substitute for the longer-­term objectives of changing societal norms and promoting gender equality.

The operational approach of inclusive security to complement the women’s equality agenda In the face of all the cultural and institutional barriers to inclusive security, it seems fair to question why the international community continues to support this agenda in Afghanistan. Joke Florax, gender project manager with the National Police in the Netherlands is, however, convinced that the international community should continue this type of assistance. In 2011 and 2012, she worked as gender advisor with the European Union Police Mission (EUPOL 2015) in Afghanistan. She is a strong champion of women’s inclusion in the police force. One of the key arguments that she uses is that women’s participation in the security forces counters the negative image of Afghan women as victims: “If you can replace that image by strong police women as role models, you can work toward changes in conservative societies” (personal comment, July 11, 2016). With this argument, she also provides an answer to the question whether the agenda of inclusive security is compatible with the reality of a still very conservative society. She answers affirmatively because, in her view, the WPS agenda is an inherent part of a social and cultural process that intends to bring positive change to Afghanistan’s society, one step at a time. However, Florax stresses that this change should not always be brought about from the perspective of the women’s rights agenda. She prefers to speak of a “business case,” in which “good policing should be the guiding principle” (personal comment). Only in that way can the added value of women in the security sector effectively be made clear to a conservative

118  Jorrit Kamminga society. This operational approach is, however, not a stand-­alone strategy. Florax explains, “Of course this also means that you have to invest in the acceptance of female police officers by colleagues and citizens. You have to make sure that husbands, fathers and other family members agree with the police training of women.” However, most important, in her view, is the assessment of the tasks and results of the work that female police officers and soldiers do as part of a properly functioning police force – for example, in increasing women’s access to the police, increasing the number of cases reported by women and increasing the intelligence that can be gathered by women because of their access to other women in local communities. To establish the “business case” as a reality in Afghanistan, Florax says that it is crucial that police commanders be increasingly convinced of the added value of deploying female police officers (personal comment). Of course, such a change will not happen overnight in a country where commanders are often still accustomed to speaking only to male village elders or other senior men. Often, the outcome of the change process will depend on whether the superiors will increasingly perceive the incorporation of women as part of their own prestige. Enhancing their prestige, however, is not exactly a priority of the women’s rights agenda – and even that still requires a cultural change in the security sector since male commanders are currently unable to boast about female empowerment beyond an audience of donors and international organizations. There are simply not enough male champions of women’s rights and empowerment within the line ministries. At the Dutch Ministry of Defense, Björn de Heer agrees with Florax. Until March 2016, he was responsible for civil-­military cooperation and at the same time was the gender advisor for military missions. De Heer talks about “operational effectiveness” instead of a “business case,” but this should be understood as “good soldiering,” similar to Florax’s concept of “good policing” (De Heer, personal comment, August 10, 2016). Interestingly, De Heer identifies roughly the same challenges in the security sectors of Afghanistan and the Netherlands: “There are not enough women to produce a critical mass, and there is an organizational architecture that hinders change processes” (personal comment). This similarity raises questions about how effective donor countries can be in supporting inclusive security abroad (through a NAP) if they do not seem able to boost women’s participation in the security sector at home. According to De Heer, only an operational approach that looks at the effectiveness of military operations can overcome these challenges. Like Florax’s argument about the police, this requires leadership. Superiors who are convinced of the added value of women in the army can make the change. Their narrative should address the relevance of women. De Heer thinks that, even in the Netherlands, this change process will take a long time, especially because it partly depends on a cultural change within the security sector: “Within the line ministries a change is needed in the attitude of the

Women, peace and security 119 ‘old boy network’ that is currently standing in the way of more acceptance and inclusion of women” (personal comment). In Kabul, Palwasha Hassan agrees with the operational approach put forward by Florax and De Heer (personal comment, July 25, 2016). In addition, she thinks that women have a lot to bring to the security sector. Out of necessity, Afghan women have gained a lot of experience in four decades of conflict with building resilience and mediating disputes in a context where a formal security apparatus was often absent (Hassan, personal comment). Nevertheless, the operational approach seems to be at odds with the women’s rights agenda. It seems to pit the pragmatism of women’s employability against the ideology of women’s equality. However, that friction or incompatibility seems to be artificial. The pragmatic approach is useful in Afghanistan in that it can help to circumvent, in the short term, some of the traditional barriers that prevent women from playing a bigger role in society. The operational approach also works toward normalizing women’s presence in the security sector, which can have spillover effects into their roles in other sectors. Role models are by definition symbols, but they can shatter cultural taboos and bring about structural changes. Jamila Bayaz, the first female district police chief, is an example. Another interesting role model is Saba Sahar, a police officer and a popular actress. She is a producer and was a few years ago one of the main characters of a popular police drama series on television titled Inspector Amanullah, which aimed to increase awareness but also to promote interest among women in joining the police force. The operational approach does not replace the women’s rights agenda. It is rather a question of setting priorities in the complex reality of Afghan society. Women, as well as other groups, are needed in the police force and the army simply because it is the only way that these institutions will be able to function properly. That argument does not discard the ideological objective of women’s rights. It continues to be important to work toward w ­ omen’s equality, but doing so by waving the flag of women’s rights can often be counterproductive – for example, because it can be interpreted (or framed) as a Western attempt to undermine the Islamic faith or because it can close the door to constructive engagement with more conservative segments of Afghan society. A more incremental approach focusing on women’s added value and the normalization of their (new) roles in Afghan society could be more effective.

Conclusion Despite generous international investment and sustained support for and attention to the women, peace and security agenda in Afghanistan, its implementation remains slow. Since the adoption of the Afghan National Action Plan in 2015, there has only been limited progress. It subsequently took three years to produce an agreement that the donor community could

120  Jorrit Kamminga accept on a concrete, activity-­based budget for all the ministries involved. Thematic and operational knowledge about the WPS agenda is still limited among the civil servants who have to implement it. In addition, coordination has also proven to be a challenge, both among the donor agencies involved and among the Afghan line ministries. The societal and sectoral barriers are huge. As long as traditional norms and cultural values hamper women’s empowerment, a more operational approach to inclusive security and inclusive peacebuilding could be more effective. That approach, however, is also no silver bullet solution. Structural progress will often be achievable only if the longer-­term changes of cultural norms and societal consciousness have caught up with the faster tempo of the internationally driven agenda of WPS. That means the international community and its Afghan counterparts need to have realistic expectations about what can be achieved in Afghanistan, especially in light of the fact that the number of women working in the security sectors in Western countries is often also still limited. Despite the urgent need for WPS, some elements of this internationally driven agenda may still be difficult to implement in Afghanistan’s conservative society. That makes it even more important sometimes to divert attention, ­temporarily, from the women’s equality agenda in favor of a more operational approach that focuses on “what works” by highlighting the work of female civil servants, police officers, soldiers, lawyers and judges as necessary for the proper functioning of the security and justice sectors. The sustained support of the international community for the implementation of the WPS agenda is commendable. Financial support and capacity building are necessary for the protection and training of women but especially for raising awareness of women’s rights among men. In that sense, a purely operational approach will not be enough. To promote women’s equality effectively in Afghanistan, the awareness of men should eventually go beyond their increased understanding and acceptance of the meaningful roles that women can play to foster peace and security. Afghan women play an important part in increasing that awareness, but the men themselves even more. The success of this women’s empowerment agenda will often depend first and foremost on men, peace and security.

Bibliography Ahmed-­Ghosh, Huma. 2003. A History of Women in Afghanistan: Lessons Learnt for the Future or Yesterdays and Tomorrow: Women in Afghanistan. Journal of International Women’s Studies 4 (3): 1–14. Ansary, Tamim. 2012. Games Without Rules: The Often-­Interrupted History of Afghanistan. New York: Public Affairs. APPRO. 2010. Growing Pains: Women in the Afghan National Police. Unpublished Report. Kabul: APPRO. APPRO. 2014. Implementation of the National Action Plan for Women in Afghanistan: An Assessment. Project Report. Kabul: APPRO.

Women, peace and security 121 APPRO. 2015. Women in Afghan National Police: What Now? Project Report. Kabul: APPRO. APPRO. 2016. Renew Approach to Gender Programming. Policy Brief. Kabul: APPRO. APPRO. 2017. Gender Programming in Afghanistan: Critical Analysis of National Actiona Plans on Women, Peace and Security. Critical Review Report. Kabul: APPRO. Arghandiwal, Miriam. 2012. Women on Afghan Peace Council Say They Are Sidelined. Reuters, March 22. Baker, Aryn. 2010. Afghan Women and the Return of the Taliban. Time 176 (6). Basu, Soumita. 2016. Gender as National Interest at the UN Security Council. International Affairs 92 (2): 255–273. BCA. 2016. Communiqué. Declaration of the Brussels Conference on Afghanistan: Partnership for Prosperity and Peace. Brussels, October 4–5. Bergen, Peter. 2013. What Went Right? Critics of the War Are Missing the Big Picture: Afghanistan Is Much Better off Today, Argument. Foreign Policy, March. http://­foreignpolicy.com/­2013/­03/­04/­what-­went-­right/­. Cameron, Elizabeth, and Jorrit Kamminga. 2014. Behind Closed Doors: The Risk of Denying Women a Voice in Determining Afghanistan’s Future, 200. Oxfam Briefing Paper. Oxford. Cloud, Dana L. 2004. ‘To Veil the Threat of Terror’: Afghan Women and the (Clash of Civilizations) in the Imagery of the U.S. War on Terrorism. Quarterly Journal of Speech 90 (3): 285–306. Cooley, John K. 2000. Unholy Wars: Afghanistan, America and International Terrorism. London: Pluto Press. Cowper-­Coles, Sherard. 2012. Cables from Kabul: The Inside Story of the West’s Afghanistan Campaign. London: Harper Press. Dimitriu, George, and Beatrice de Graaf. 2016. Fighting the War at Home: Strategic Narratives, Elite Responsiveness, and the Dutch Mission in Afghanistan. Foreign Policy Analysis 12: 2–23. Dutch NAP Partnership. 2016. The Netherlands National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security, 2016–2019: A Partnership to Contribute to the Implementation of the Women, Peace and Security Agenda. The Hague: Dutch NAP Partnership. EUPOL. 2015. The Presence of Women in the ANP Is Not a Luxury, It Is a Necessity. EUPOL Account of a Seminar about the Ministry of Interior’s Strategic Implementation Plan for Integrity of Female Police, EUPOL Headquarters. Kabul, October 4. Hancock, Louise. 2013. Women and the Afghan Police: Why a Law Enforcement Agency That Respects and Protects Females Is Crucial for Progress, 173. Oxfam Briefing Paper. Oxford. Hesford, Wendy S., and Wendy Kozol. 2005. Just Advocacy? Women’s Human Rights, Transnational Feminisms, and the Politics of Representation. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press. Huber, Marie S. 2015. Afghanistan Gender Equality Report Card 2014: Evaluating the Government of Afghanistan’s Commitments to Women and Gender Equality. EPD Report. Kabul, February. Hunt, Krista. 2002. The Strategic Co-­Optation of Women’s Rights. International Feminist Journal of Politics 4 (1): 116–121.

122  Jorrit Kamminga IDLO. 2014. Women’s Professional Participation in Afghanistan’s Justice Sector: Challenges and Opportunities. Rome: IDLO, June. Innocent, Malou. 2011. Should America Liberate Afghanistan’s Women? Survival 53 (5): 31–52. Joya, Malalai, and Derrick O’Keefe. 2009. A Woman Among Warlords: The Extraordinary Story of an Afghan Who Dared to Raise Her Voice. New York: Scribner. Kamminga, Jorrit, and Akram Zaki. 2016. Women, Peace, Security and Justice in Afghanistan after Brussels and Warsaw: Setting the Scene for a Technical Research Agenda. Bayan II Discussion Paper. Kabul. Kargar, Zarghuna. 2015. Farkhunda: The Making of a Martyr. BBC World News Magazine, August 11. Kirby, Paul, and Laura J. Shepherd. 2016. Reintroducing Women, Peace and Security. International Affairs 92 (2): 249–254. Lamb, Christina. 2002. The Sewing Circles of Herat: A Personal Voyage Through Afghanistan. New York: Harper Collins Publishers. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. 2015. Afghanistan’s National Action Plan on UNSCR 1325 Women, Peace and Security. Kabul. http://­ peacewomen.org/­sites/­default/­files/­NAP Afghanistan.pdf. NATO. 2016. Warsaw Summit Declaration on Afghanistan. Declaration of the NATO Summit Warsaw 2016. Warsaw, July 8–9. Newman, Cathy. 2002. A Life Revealed. National Geographic 201 (4). Roggio, Bill, and Alexandra Gutowski. 2017. LWJ Map Assessment: Taliban Controls or Contests 45% of Afghan Districts. The Long War Journal, September 26. Rostami-­Povey, Elaheh. 2007. Afghan Women: Identity and Invasion. London: Zed Books. Rubin, Alissa J. 2015. Afghan Policewomen Struggle Against Culture. The New York Times, March 1. Schwartz-­DuPre, Rae Lynn. 2010. Portraying the Political: National Geographic’s 1985 Afghan Girl and a US Alibi for Aid. Critical Studies in Media Communication 27 (4): 336–356. Sinha, Sylvana Q. 2011. Traditional Dispute Resolution and Afghanistan’s Women, 117. Peacebrief. Washington. Stancati, Margherita, and Ehsanullah Amiri. 2016. Female Pilot’s Asylum Request Riles Afghan Military Leadership. The Wall Street Journal, December 26. Struck, Doug. 2006. In Canada, a Cautious Debate on Afghan Role. Washington Post, April 11. TOLOnews. 2017. Remarkable Increase in Afghan Female Judge Numbers: AWJA. TOLOnews, March 29. United Nations Security Council. 1999. Report on the 4051st Meeting of the Security Council on 15 October 1999. New York: United Nations Security Council. Wardak, Ali. 2016. A Decade and Half of Rebuilding Afghanistan’s Justice System: An Overview. Part of the Project Supporting Primary Justice in Insecure Contexts: Afghanistan and South Sudan, Supported by NWO-­WOTRO. Leiden: Van Vollenhoven Institute. WPS Working Group Meeting. 2017. Minutes of the Thirteenth Women, Peace and Security Working Group Meeting. Kabul, March 26. WPSO. 2015a. Enhancing the Roles and Perceptions of the Female Police in Afghanistan. Project Report. Kabul. WPSO. 2015b. The Stalled Agenda of Inclusive Security and Inclusive Peace Building in Afghanistan. Briefing Paper. Kabul.

7 Reconstruction and gender Why women are crucial to the successful reconstruction of Afghanistan Shukria Dellawar and Christina Tsirkas

Afghanistan has been in a state of ongoing conflict for four decades now. A review of contemporary Afghan history shows a gradual decline of human rights beginning with the revolution of Afghan Marxist/­Leninist PDPA (People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan) in 1978, followed by the decade-­ long Soviet occupation, leading to the Afghan civil war and Taliban rule and ending with the US-­Coalition military intervention in 2001. All of these phases have adversely impacted human rights. These decades of violence and political turmoil have greatly set back social progress. Although the warring parties and the nature of the threats varied throughout the different phases of the conflict, women in specific became the target of war time atrocities – gradually losing their freedom of movement, access to education, participation in the labor force and contribution to civil society at large. Afghan women have made notable progress after 2001 by re-­entering schools and joining the workforce. They have served their country in many roles, including as members of parliament, presidential candidates, journalists, teachers, doctors, nurses and entrepreneurs, among others. Their contributions to society demonstrate a sign of progress over the last seventeen years. However, with deteriorating security and dwindling foreign aid, women’s progress hangs in the balance. The aim of post-­conflict reconstruction is the consolidation of both peace and security and the realization of sustainable economic and social development. Sustainable development in these areas will not be feasible without the active participation of an entire gender. Efforts to achieve a just and sustainable future cannot ignore the rights, dignity and capabilities of half the country’s population.1 To be successful, reconstruction policies must not only redress the disproportionate impact that economic, social and environmental factors have had on women in the past few decades, but Afghan leaders must also recognize that women should be directly involved in reconstruction efforts. Women’s knowledge, agency and collective action will greatly enhance the country’s productivity and help ensure its progress toward sustainable development.2 Afghan women must play an integral part in all aspects of the country’s reconstruction. This chapter will examine how decades of opposition to the

124  Shukria Dellawar and Christina Tsirkas advancement of women’s rights, coupled with rampant female suppression throughout extremist regimes, has drastically limited Afghanistan’s development. It will also focus on how, when afforded the opportunity to access and participate in many facets of Afghan life, women have positively impacted Afghanistan’s social and economic progress.

Despite opposition, Afghan leaders have consistently recognized the advancement of women’s rights as an important factor in the country’s development The majority of media coverage about Afghanistan in recent history paints a picture of a country that has always been “backward” and oppressive to the female gender, but that is not the case. Numerous Afghan leaders throughout history recognized that women’s rights were directly linked to the country’s development and attempted to pave the way for their advancement. King Amanullah recognized women’s rights as an integral part of modernization and enacted measures to advance them between 1919 and 1929. He was the first king to introduce “co-­education and the attempt to remove the veil from women and to ask all the Afghans in Kabul to wear Western clothes.”3 King Amanullah also introduced the first Constitution to Afghanistan and minimized the power of religious clerics. Education was made compulsory for all Afghans. Freedom of the press was established, along with a Family Law Code that abolished child marriages, enforced judicial permission for individuals involved in polygamy, freed widows from the domination of their husbands’ families and removed some family law questions from the jurisdiction of mullahs.4 King Amanullah Khan’s wife, Queen Soraya, who was also a strong believer in women’s rights, used her power and influence to educate girls, open a women’s hospital and establish a women’s magazine. By the late 1920s, Afghanistan had “one of the most progressive legislations in the Muslim World.”5 The fast pace of change in the cities did not match the development and education of Afghans in rural areas and the king was forced into exile as angered conservative tribes rose in defiance of his speedy modernization.6 King Amanullah wanted Afghanistan to catch up with the “technological progress of the West but did not appreciate that this advancement was based on long-­term economic and social developments, while his reforms of a social and cultural nature needed time, a sound economic and educative basis and the support of the populace if they were to be realized.”7 The overthrow of King Amanullah led to many social, political and educational setbacks, including the complete repeal of progressive legislation and advancements for women.8 To appease the religious hierarchy, Nadir Shah (Amanullah’s cousin) guaranteed the autonomy of Sharia courts and omitted any mention of women or their rights from the 1931 constitution, which was in force until 1964.9

Reconstruction and gender 125 In 1929, King Zahir Shah also prioritized women’s rights, but having learned from his predecessors about the peril of instituting vast changes too quickly, he expanded women’s rights at a more gradual pace. During his forty-­year reign, women were granted the right to vote, to work and to receive an education. They also earned higher-­education degrees, were free to marry by choice and did not have to wear a burqa.10 This period of significant advancements in women’s rights led to substantial development for the country itself, so much so that the final decade of King Zahir Shah’s reign (1963–1973) was considered the Golden Age of Afghanistan. King Zahir Shah worked with many Afghan intellectuals and technocrats to present a more progressive constitution to the nation. This document was approved by a national assembly and began the process of “transforming Afghanistan’s government to a democratic, constitutional, parliamentary monarchy.”11 The new constitution also included principles of free speech, civil rights and suffrage.12 Afghans embraced these gradual changes, and the country’s political development surpassed that of its neighbors, such as Pakistan, Iran, China and the Soviet Union, who were experiencing military rule, an oppressive police state and totalitarian regimes at the time.13 Afghans also made considerable social and security progress during the Golden Age. Afghan nationals and foreigners were able to travel freely throughout the country without restriction. The number of female students in secondary schools was increasing, and at Kabul University, female students outnumbered male ones in the colleges of education and the humanities. Educated women represented more than 50 percent of teachers and government employees in Kabul. Women in the city were also able to move about freely without a male escort.14 Women greatly contributed to healthcare, business, education and politics and helped to propel the country forward. In 1977 alone, women comprised 15 percent of the country’s highest legislative body.15 Although the more rural areas did not advance as quickly as the cities, the government still had offices and staff “to provide security, public works and social and judicial services, as well as education for young girls and boys.” The monarchy ended 1973, with President Daud Khan taking over power through a bloodless coup. President Daud Khan did not impose the burqa on women and banned forced marriages. President Daud also made sixteen the legal age for marriage and banned child marriages. Women enjoyed relatively greater freedom and more rights in the cities, but the advancement did not spread to rural areas. The communist People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) assassinated President Daud Khan in 1978.16 After some infighting within PDPA during the Saur Revolution, Noor Mohammad Taraki took over in 1978. Taraki continued expanding women’s rights. He opened six hundred schools for boys and girls. He banned dowry and gave women the right to choose their husbands. Women were also encouraged to be involved in legislative and policy issues. Taraki changed the curriculum in schools and universities, revising it to incorporate

126  Shukria Dellawar and Christina Tsirkas Marxist ideology. However, these drastic changes were not popular across Afghanistan, particularly in tribal and rural areas. The tribes and conservatives revolted against these and other social changes as foreign elements of Marxism and communism grew more prominent.17 Taraki’s rule was also marred by assassinations, disappearances and rapes of thousands of Afghans who did not agree with his Marxist ideology. Taraki was assassinated by Hafizullah Amin. The PDPA leadership era was marred by violent attacks against those who posed the slightest dissent against their rule, and countless innocent civilians were killed.18 The Soviets invaded Afghanistan in 1979 and placed Babrak Karmal, another communist leader of the PDPA, in power. The Soviet occupation lasted until 1989, and women had some basic freedoms only in Kabul and other cities where the Soviets had control. However, nearly two million Afghans were killed and another five million displaced during the ten-­year occupation. Soviets adopted a “deliberate policy of bombing villages, massacring civilians and executing captured guerrillas,” while thousands of Afghan political prisoners could not be traced.19 Women who worked with the communist regime enjoyed freedoms, but most women across the country witnessed their rights become a casualty of war. This era left countless numbers of Afghans imprisoned, killed, tortured and displaced. The Russians withdrew in defeat in 1989 leaving behind the Najibullah regime. The Najibullah regime encouraged women to work and receive an education. However, due to other internal political strife, the Najibullah regime lasted only three years, until Najibullah was killed. A power vacuum led to a bloody civil war among the anti-­communist Mujahideen as they turned on each other, killing over 50,000 people and destroying the Kabul’s infrastructure. From 1992 to 1996, women’s rights were curtailed. TV broadcasting was censored, and female anchors were banned. Women were required to wear a headscarf in public. Massive violence unfolded as Mujahideen groups turned on each other with indiscriminate shelling and bombing of the capital. This security crisis paved the way for the rise of Taliban.20

The extremist oppression of Afghan women during the Taliban regime caused lasting setbacks to the country’s sustainable development Despite political turmoil, the Soviet invasion and civil war, it is still estimated that by the early 1990s, 70 percent of schoolteachers, 50 percent of government employees and university students and 40 percent of doctors in Kabul were women.21 Unfortunately, the Taliban undid all this progress by completely marginalizing women from society. Women became almost entirely dependent on men socially and economically. The Taliban banned women from employment, including trade, eliminating a viable source of talent and expertise from the country’s

Reconstruction and gender 127 workforce.22 This caused a brain drain as many educated professionals left the country. The Taliban also made it illegal for women to attend school or receive a public education. Determined to provide their daughters with some sort of education, Afghan women set up hundreds of schools in private homes.23 During its five-­year reign, the Taliban dismantled Afghanistan’s education system, converting many of its co-­ed educational facilities to all-­boys schools. As a result of the girls’ educational ban, Afghan women’s literacy rates dropped to 13 percent in urban areas and to only 3 percent in rural areas. This constituted some of the lowest literacy rates in the world.24 Afghanistan’s health system was crushed since female nurses and doctors were no longer allowed to work. Women were prohibited from receiving healthcare services from male doctors, and with women banned from the workforce, access to health services was made virtually impossible for women. A small number of women were allowed to continue working as doctors and nurses, resulting in a low doctor-­patient ratio: one physician for every 50,000 Afghans.25 These policies also drastically lowered the percentage of women with access to healthcare, devastating the country’s medical infrastructure and disproportionately affecting women and children. In 2000, surveys conducted by UNICEF and the US Centers for Disease Control found an average of 1,600 maternal deaths for every 100,000 live births, indicating that Afghanistan was one of the worst places in the world for a woman to become pregnant.26 At the time, Afghanistan also had the fourth highest child mortality rate in the world. The lack of basic healthcare available also caused high numbers of deaths by easily treatable illnesses. Diarrhea was estimated to kill about 85,000 children per year, and tuberculosis rates were among the highest in the world by 2001.27 The Taliban also banned women from being outside of their home without a male family member and made the wearing of the burqa mandatory. This mandate immobilized women while making them entirely dependent on men. Furthermore, these policies helped ingrain in Afghan men the idea that women were subservient to men, causing significant setbacks in social progress. Women’s roles were reduced to childbirth and domestic chores only. In addition to creating a generation in which half of the population was forced into helplessness, “the low social status of women and the consequent power imbalances between women and men” also became underlying reasons for “harmful and discriminatory practices and physical and sexual violence against girls and women in Afghanistan.”28 The Taliban’s severe human rights abuses from 1996 to 2001 were denounced worldwide and used as part of the moral justification for the US-­ led invasion in 2001. Taliban’s marginalization of women from all aspects of society caused major setbacks to the country’s development. In addition to forced social and economic dependency and the elimination of an entire gender from the workforce, the Taliban had also destroyed the social status of women.

128  Shukria Dellawar and Christina Tsirkas

When afforded the opportunity, women have made significant contributions to society that have aided in Afghanistan’s development Women across Afghanistan have consistently proven that given the opportunity, they are as capable as their male counterparts in making positive contributions to society. This pattern extends throughout history. Women’s political, social and economic contributions In the 1960s, during the Golden Age, when women’s rights had been expanded and Kabul was considered “the Paris of Central Asia,” Afghanistan saw the rise of a young Afghan fashion designer, Safia Tarzi. Vogue selected Afghanistan as the location for a high-­fashion photo shoot and decided to write an editorial on Safia. Kabul hosted fashion shows, which were attended by Queen Humaira, wife of King Zahir Shah. Afghan women’s interest and work in the fashion industry added money to the Afghan economy through tourism and clothing exports, and it enhanced the country’s reputation in a lucrative industry, making it a popular stop along the Silk Road.29 The Golden Age also saw an increase in women’s political involvement. In the closing years of King Zahir Shah’s reign, female activists formed the Democratic Organization of Afghan Women (DOAW). Despite cultural objection, the DOAW were visible in protests and demanded social guarantees, including the right to work, paid sick days, paid maternity leave and equality for women. In 1968, hundreds of girls took to the streets to protest proposed legislation by conservative members of parliament that would prevent them from studying abroad. In 1970 five thousand girls in Kabul protested the behavior of two conservative Mullahs, who disapproved of women’s presence in public and had been shooting women in the legs and splashing them with acid for wearing Western-­style clothing.30 Women seized the opportunity to stand up for their freedoms and took an active role in politics. Even during the Taliban regime, women continued to make positive contributions. After the ban on girls’ education, women risked their lives by conducting secret classes to provide education to their daughters. A UN report estimated that by 2001, underground schools in private homes were as high as 300,000 Afghan students.31 Women’s Association of Afghanistan, an NGO, funded and held sewing, knitting and handicraft courses in private residences, which enabled women to “make clothes and other necessities for themselves and their families and sometimes they sold or exchanged their products with other women.”32 The female doctors at Rabia Balkhi Women’s Hospital remained in the country, working with bare minimum facilities and without payment in order to ensure that at least some women had access to healthcare.33

Reconstruction and gender 129 After 2001, women regained a number of rights and freedoms with the help of the international community. Foreign intervention and an influx of international aid created many opportunities for women to educate and seek employment. At the first Bonn conference (an Afghan peace conference sponsored by the United Nations), in which women played a part, delegates agreed on provisional arrangements that paved the way for the establishment of a democratic government in Afghanistan.34 In 2004, a new Afghan Constitution which endorsed gender equality was adopted. This Constitution gave women the same equal status that men enjoyed (Article 22), the right to an education (Articles 43 and 44), access to employment (Article 48) and the right to hold political office (Article 84).35 Afghanistan also became a signatory to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), which made the Afghan government responsible for the safety of women entering public office.36 The Constitution reserved a 25 percent quota of seats in the Lower House of Parliament and a 17 percent quota of seats in the Upper House of Parliament for women. Women were also granted the right to vote in the electoral process.37 With constitutional guarantees, women re-­entered the political, educational and economic arenas. Voter turnout by the female population in the parliamentary elections showcased women’s significant interest in the country’s political future.38 Women – including Massouda Jalal, a female physician who ran for the presidency – ran for positions in Parliament.39 Afghan women participated in both the first and second Bonn Conferences. They participated in the Loya Jirgas, a traditional grand assembly of Afghan elders, which convenes on occasion to discuss and resolve matters of national urgency. Nine women served on the High Peace Counsel, a body of the Afghan Peace and Reintegration Program, which was set up to initiate dialogue with members of Taliban in an effort to end the hostilities. By early March 2002, “1.5 million children who had been barred from education returned to school.”40 By December of the same year, that number surpassed five million, of whom two million were girls. Women went back to teaching and also attended university. Women re-­entered the workforce in many different sectors, including business, healthcare, teaching, agriculture and politics. In 2001, the World Food Program conducted a survey on food needs in Kabul, employing 2,400 women as surveyors.41 In 2005 the Grameed Foundation US estimated that 11 percent of entrepreneurs in Afghanistan were women, only four years after a time when women had been completely barred from the workforce.42 Women’s positive contribution in politics and peacebuilding Afghan women have served in many capacities that contribute to peace. Women in the cities have reached out to women in rural areas to register

130  Shukria Dellawar and Christina Tsirkas female voters. They have defended women’s rights in Parliament, become active civil society leaders and have joined the national police and army. The Bonn I agreement in 2001 called for the establishment of the Ministry of Women’s Affairs. This ministry was instrumental in promoting women’s rights at several junctures, including Article 22 of the national Constitution, which gave women “equality in rights and duties.” Afghan women also mobilized to get the CEDAW ratified43 and as a result Afghanistan signed CEDAW in 2003. During the constitutional process in Afghanistan, women across the country networked and promoted gender equality. This also cultivated ethnic unity as majority ethnic groups of Pashtun and Tajik women worked closely with minority Uzbeks so that their spoken language would be considered an official language in regions where it is spoken. This served to bridge the gap in ethnic discrimination, as women worked together in resolving issues that affected them. Afghan women have served “as valuable allies in efforts to recognize and manage the country’s ethnic conflicts.”44 Women have spoken out against extremists and have denounced warlords and the culture of impunity. They have advocated for equality, freedom of expression, justice and democracy.45 As a result of women’s active role in Parliament and the workforce, female voters have increased, and presidential candidates seek endorsement by women’s groups.46 Additionally, women have been leading advocates of education, healthcare and development.47 Women have been recruited to serve in the police force and army units and as security search officers for women. Female search officers have also been employed at airports to perform security searches on female travelers. Even the US marines have recruited and deployed Afghan women to assist with the US marines, “in order to reach local women when units are out on patrol.”48 Many women contribute in traditional roles as peacemakers, including “caring for the sick and the elderly, sustaining and ensuring the survival of their families. Even in refugee camps, women shoulder the responsibilities of others.”49 Despite women being targets of sexual assault and domestic abuse, they still continue to give voice to civilians silenced by atrocities. . . . [W]omen are often left to handle the trauma and violence that come home with men whose lives have been devastated by war. . . .  [W]omen provide the continuity that enables families and communities to heal and move forward. . . . [T]hey are claiming their place as major stakeholders and active agents in resisting war, building peace and defining security on their terms.”50 An October 2013 assessment by the International Crisis Group on Afghan women and conflict reported that “women are more than 27 percent of parliament. They are in the bureaucracy, the judiciary and the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) and are lawyers, entrepreneurs, journalists and civil society activists.”51 The report also highlighted that women’s legal status had improved as gender equality was now ensured by the Constitution. The

Reconstruction and gender 131 adoption of Elimination of Violence against Women (EVAW) law, the establishment of the Ministry of Women’s Affairs and the National Action Plan for Women (NAPWA) are all major accomplishments. In the last two elections, women have also voted in greater numbers. This is a significant contribution, because it gives young women and girls across the country hope for their future. Obstacles faced by Afghan women Afghan women are impacted by one of the lowest literacy rates and one of the lowest poverty rates in the world. In Afghanistan, a person is considered educated if they can read and write. The country’s overall literacy rate is 28 percent. Only 12 percent of women are considered literate, compared to 43 percent of men. The literacy rate is also dire in rural areas, where 75 percent of the population lives. Only 7 percent of women and 35 percent of men have basic reading and writing skills.52 Additionally, the Afghan government estimates that nearly 42 percent of all Afghans live below the poverty line. Another 20 percent who are slightly above the poverty line are considered at risk of potentially falling below the poverty line.53 A study conducted by the Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit points out economic challenges. Many women across Afghanistan do not have access to job opportunities: they lack professional experience, are often paid lower wages compared to men and are less educated than men. Furthermore, even when women are qualified for jobs, they are often not supported by their families, who often discourage them from working.54 These challenges are further exacerbated by security threats. Many empowered women are in greater danger for their personal safety because they get threats of rape and murder by criminals who demand money or warlords and insurgents who aim to minimize their influence. Empowered women who speak out against miscreants become bigger targets and often have to travel with security.55 Female human rights activists are also targeted due to their association with foreign NGOs promoting ideas that “betray” Afghan social norms. A research study conducted by the Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies cautions that increased insecurity, widespread dissatisfaction with the Afghan government and the foreign military presence have created a “strong backlash against the women’s rights discourse. Viewed as a countercultural, Western intrusion by many Afghans – both men and women – the gendered strategies of the U.S. led intervention have created challenges for many women, who have been the targets of threats and attack because of their perceived association with Western interests.”56 Violence against women and negative cultural practices such as child or forced marriages continue. Additionally, many Afghan women face challenges in the workforce, competing for jobs that prioritize applicants based on kinship or ethnic group preferences.

132  Shukria Dellawar and Christina Tsirkas

Women’s active participation in the political process is needed to ensure that women’s rights are not reversed It has already been established that the advancement of women’s rights and their participation in all areas of development are essential for Afghanistan’s successful reconstruction. However, history has demonstrated that when women are not involved in the political process, many times their rights are overlooked, compromised or even sacrificed for other “gains.” For this reason, women must be involved in politics. The disproportionate number of women in policy circles means issues affecting women often do not get weighty consideration. Issues such as rape, domestic abuse, mass displacements and women-­headed households deserve greater consideration. According to a statistical survey published in 2012 by the Afghanistan Statistical Organization, women make up 45 percent of the Afghan population.57 It is imperative, for the nation’s progress, to have almost half of its population involved in nation building. Risking women’s progress will seriously jeopardize Afghanistan’s ability to use its full workforce capacity in building a stable and prosperous Afghanistan. In active conflict zones, men often dominate peace negotiations. Afghanistan is no exception to this tendency. Carrying a gun should not be a prerequisite for having a seat at the negotiating table. Perhaps it’s equally or more important to place people at the table of delegates who seek to build peace, including women.58 Since Afghan women were severely affected by Taliban rule of the past, they need to be included in negotiations in order to properly counteract the policies that oppressed them. Both the government and society at large need to understand what women can bring to the table and how they can benefit the peace process. The status quo that has left women out of politics will not change unless men also support women in the process and break away from discriminatory practices. A national reconciliation is necessary to end the ongoing violence and to stabilize the country. The only way to win women’s support for peace is to have prominent female activists experienced in peace and security issues present and engaged in talks with the Taliban.

Women’s involvement in reconstruction will change the pervasive negative stereotype that Afghanistan is brutal, inhumane and barbaric to its women Since the rise of the Taliban regime, Afghanistan has consistently been named one of the worst and most dangerous places in the world to be a woman.59 Unrelenting media coverage since the US-­led invasion in 2001 has helped to further promote this reputation and has cast all Afghan men as violent misogynists. The images and stories that the media have ingrained in people’s minds since the US-­led invasion have consistently portrayed a country that regards women as subhuman.

Reconstruction and gender 133 The most famous women in Afghanistan during the past decade have arguably been the survivors of particularly gruesome trauma. Among them are Bibi Aisha, Gul Meena, Sahar Gul and, more recently, Farkhunda, who all received large-­scale coverage in major news outlets throughout the world. Bibi Aisha had her nose and ears cut off by her own husband after she ran away from their marital home after suffering years of abuse. Her nose-­less face was featured on the cover of Time magazine back in 2010 and became an iconic image of the plight of Afghan women.60 Gul Meena was the victim of an attempted honor killing. Her brother attacked her with an ax after she ran away with the man she loved.61 Sahar Gul was a child bride whose in-­laws kept her in a basement and subjected her to years of torture.62 Farkhunda, an Afghan woman falsely accused of burning the Koran, was unjustly beaten and burned to death in Kabul by a mob of Afghan men. This tragedy received worldwide coverage and sent a message to the global community that Afghanistan’s social progress was still stunted, that years of foreign intervention and billions of dollars in aid had not improved women’s conditions in the country.63 In response to Farkhunda’s plight, Afghan women came together in unprecedented protests, denounced the barbaric attack and even broke with tradition, carrying Farkhunda’s coffin in a show of defiance.64 All of these women’s stories were featured in prominent publications all over the world, ensuring that readers were flooded with gruesome images of Afghanistan’s treatment of its women. The majority of the world’s population is probably unaware that the country ever experienced a Golden Age because it occurred years prior to the Soviet invasion, before the country became a place of interest for the United States during the Cold War (and a focal point of the media’s attention during Taliban reign and after September 1, 2001). The media does not take into account cultural complexities and the devastating consequences of war. Living in extreme poverty and violence, some men are forced to make difficult decisions. In one case, a man sold his daughter to prevent the rest of his family (his wife and three younger children) from dying of starvation.65 This man was illiterate, had tried unsuccessfully to find paid work for months and had been searching through the garbage at night to feed his family. While his actions may be morally questionable, they cannot blatantly be characterized as misogynistic. This man was put in a desperate situation based on economic circumstances outside of his own control, in a culture where women have been treated as commodities. By his own words, had his options not been the sale of his daughter or the starvation of his entire family, he would have made a different choice. He would never have chosen to sell his daughter and still considers himself “a cruel and merciless father” for doing so.66 There are men who have gone to great lengths to advance women’s rights. For example, in 2015, a group of men marched through the streets of Kabul clad in burqas to show their solidarity with Afghan women ahead of

134  Shukria Dellawar and Christina Tsirkas International Women’s Day.67 In another incident, a group of eighteen male activists in Herat province launched a campaign known as Men Supporting Women, which calls for a bid to stop violence against the female population.68 On a more familial level, men who allow the female members of their households to receive an education and join the workforce also champion women’s progress. Two million of the five million children who went back to school after the fall of the Taliban were girls. These girls would not have been allowed to attend school without permission from their immediate male relatives. It is these men who silently support women’s advancement in society yet continue to be stigmatized by the negative stereotypes placed on all Afghan men. Since the US-­led invasion, the global community has allocated billions of dollars in aid. Women’s rights are of great importance to donor countries,69 and women’s active participation in reconstruction would help demonstrate to donor countries that their funds are indeed contributing to sustainable development.

Conclusion As has been indicated in this chapter, Afghan women’s progress and contribution to reconstruction efforts has been blocked by many factors, including consequences of war and violence, unsupportive policies, negative cultural norms and the poor enforcement of rule of law. One of the most harmful acts against women came from the Taliban, when they removed women and girls from school and the workforce. The lack of education and workforce skills greatly inhibited women’s development, making them a financial liability. Thus far, women continue disproportionately to lack the skills necessary to participate fully in the country’s reconstruction. Irrespective of these challenges, over the last seventeen years, women have still greatly contributed to the education sector, healthcare system, governance and civil society, all of which directly impact reconstruction efforts. Although women’s rights are guaranteed by the Afghan Constitution, their rights still fail to translate into the daily lives of women. International donors need to make funding conditional on certain benchmarks: improving the judicial system, more education and employment opportunities for women across Afghanistan and vocational training and greater engagement of women in policymaking. Although efforts along these lines continue, the Afghan government is still not held accountable when it fails to meet these benchmarks. Donors should consider tying aid to specific targets that impact women’s inclusion in all aspects of reconstruction. More holistic approaches to women’s empowerment that take into consideration complex cultural and political barriers should be pursued to ensure sustainability. As for the Afghan government, at this critical juncture when foreign aid is diminishing and a minimal number of foreign troops remain in the country,

Reconstruction and gender 135 it should invest in its own citizens to further progress in reconstruction. Negative stereotypes of Afghan women as victims and of Afghan men as misogynists will not go away without genuine efforts to do away with discriminatory practices toward women that serve only to harm the country as a whole. Women’s continued progress and contribution to society is crucial to Afghanistan’s success as a nation. Imagine how a corporation would be debilitated by the complete lack of productivity of half of its workforce; similarly, a country would remain at a significant disadvantage without the active participation of half of its population.

Notes  1 World Survey on the Role of Women in Development 2014: Gender Equality and Sustainable Development (The United Nations, 2014), www.unwomen. org/­~ /­m edia/­h eadquarters/­a ttachments/­s ections/­l ibrary/­p ublications/­2 014/­ unwomen_surveyreport_advance_16oct.pdf.  2 Ibid.  3 Nabi Misdaq, Political Frailty and External Interference (New York: Routledge, 2006), 98–99. E-­book.  4 Deniz Kandiyoti, The Politics of Gender and Reconstruction in Afghanistan (The United States Research Institute for Social Development, February 2005), 5, www.unrisd.org/­80256B3C005BCCF9/­(httpAuxPages)/­3050BE40DA5B871 CC125704400534A7A/­$file/­OPGP4.pdf.  5 Ibid.  6 Sayid Sattar Langary, Women from Afghanistan in Diaspora, Their Stories of Adversary, Freedom, and Success (AuthorHouse, 2010).  7 Ibid.  8 Deniz Kandiyoti, The Politics of Gender and Reconstruction in Afghanistan (The United States Research Institute for Social Development, February 2005), 5, www.unrisd.org/­80256B3C005BCCF9/­(httpAuxPages)/­3050BE40DA5B871 CC125704400534A7A/­$file/­OPGP4.pdf.  9 Ibid. 10 Sayid Sattar Langary, Women from Afghanistan in Diaspora, Their Stories of Adversary, Freedom, and Success (AuthorHouse, 2010). 11 Thomas E. Gouttierre, What History Can Teach Us About Contemporary Afghanistan. Education About Asia, Vol. 17 (2012), www.unomaha.edu/­ international-­studies-­and-­programs/­center-­for-­afghanistan-­studies/­_files/­docs/­ gouttierre-­eaa-­fall2012.pdf. 12 Deniz Kandiyoti, The Politics of Gender and Reconstruction in Afghanistan, 5. The United States Research Institute for Social Development, February 2005, www.unrisd.org/­80256B3C005BCCF9/­(httpAuxPages)/­3050BE40DA5B871CC 125704400534A7A/­$file/­OPGP4.pdf. 13 Thomas E. Gouttierre, What History Can Teach Us About Contemporary Afghanistan, Education About Asia, Vol. 17 (2012), www.unomaha.edu/­ international-­studies-­and-­programs/­center-­for-­afghanistan-­studies/­_files/­docs/­ gouttierre-­eaa-­fall2012.pdf. 14 Ibid. 15 Report on the Taliban’s War Against Women (U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, 2001), www.state.gov/­j/­drl/­rls/­6185. htm. 16 Sayid Sattar Langary, Women From Afghanistan in Diaspora, Their Stories of Adversary, Freedom, and Success (AuthorHouse, 2010).

136  Shukria Dellawar and Christina Tsirkas 17 Ibid. 18 Kate Clark, Death List Published. Families of Disappeared End a 30 Year Wait for News, Afghanistan Analysts Network, September 26, 2013, www. afghanistan-­analysts.org/­death-­list-­published-­families-­of-­disappeared-­end-­a-­ 30-­year-­wait-­for-­news/­. 19 Martin Ewans, Afghanistan – A Short History of Its People and Politics (New York: Harper Collins, 2002). 20 Jonathan Steele, 10 Myths About Afghanistan, The Guardian, September 27, 2001, online. 21 Report on the Taliban’s War Against Women (U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, 2001), www.state.gov/­j/­drl/­rls/­6185. htm. 22 Deniz Kandiyoti, The Politics of Gender and Reconstruction in Afghanistan (The United States Research Institute for Social Development, February 2005), 5, www.unrisd.org/­80256B3C005BCCF9/­(httpAuxPages)/­3050BE40DA5B871 CC125704400534A7A/­$file/­OPGP4.pdf. 23 A Woman Among Warlords: Women’s Rights in the Taliban and Post Taliban Era, PBS.org, September 11, 2007, www.pbs.org/­ wnet/­ wideangle/­ episodes/­ a-­w oman-­a mong-­w arlords/­w omens-­r ights-­i n-­t he-­t aliban-­a nd-­p ost-­t aliban-­ eras/­?p=66. 24 Ibid. 25 Ibid. 26 Afghanistan Is Among Worst Places on Globe for Women’s Health, say UNICEF and CDC, UNICEF and the CDC (New York and Kabul, November 6, 2002), www.unicef.org/­newsline/­02pr59afghanmm.htm. 27 A Woman Among Warlords: Women’s Rights in the Taliban and Post Taliban Era. PBS.org, September  11, 2007, www.pbs.org/­wnet/­wideangle/­episodes/­a-­woman-­ among-­warlords/­womens-­rights-­in-­the-­taliban-­and-­post-­taliban-­eras/­?p=66. 28 Elaheh Rostami Povey Women in Afghanistan, Passive Victims of the Borga, or Active Social Participants? Development in Practice, Vol. 13, no. 2–3 (2003). 29 MessyNessy, A Groovy Fashion Show in 1960s Afghanistan, MessyNessy Chic, December  23, 2015, www.messynessychic.com/­2015/­12/­23/­a-­groovy-­fashion-­ show-­in-­1960s-­afghanistan/­. 30 Deniz Kandiyoti, The Politics of Gender and Reconstruction in Afghanistan (The United States Research Institute for Social Development, February 2005), 5, www.unrisd.org/­80256B3C005BCCF9/­(httpAuxPages)/­3050BE40DA5B871 CC125704400534A7A/­$file/­OPGP4.pdf. 31 A Woman Among Warlords: Women’s Rights in the Taliban and Post Taliban Era. PBS.org, September 11, 2007, www.pbs.org/­ wnet/­ wideangle/­ episodes/­ a-­w oman-­a mong-­w arlords/­w omens-­r ights-­i n-­t he-­t aliban-­a nd-­p ost-­t aliban-­ eras/­?p=66. 32 Elaheh Rostami Povey, Women in Afghanistan, Passive Victims of the Borga, or Active Social Participants? Development in Practice, Vol. 13, no. 2–3 (2003). 33 Ibid. 34 Tom A. Peter, Afghanistan’s Bonn Conferences. 4 Things You Need to Know, Christian Science Monitor, November 29, 2011, www.csmonitor.com/­World/­ Global-­Issues/­2011/­1129/­Afghanistan-­s-­Bonn-­Conference-­4-­things-­you-­need-­ to-­know/­What-­was-­the-­first-­Bonn-­Conference. 35 The Constitution of the Islamic State of Afghanistan, The Embassy of Afghanistan (Washington, DC, n.d.), www.embassyofafghanistan.org/­page/­constitution. 36 David Cortright and Kristen Wall, Afghan Women Speak. Enhancing Security and Human Rights in Afghanistan (University of Notre Dame, 2012). 37 Ibid.

Reconstruction and gender 137 38 A Woman Among Warlords: Women’s Rights in the Taliban and Post Taliban wnet/­ wideangle/­ episodes/­ Era, PBS.org, September 11, 2007, www.pbs.org/­ a-­w oman-­a mong-­w arlords/­w omens-­r ights-­i n-­t he-­t aliban-­a nd-­p ost-­t aliban-­ eras/­?p=66. 39 Ibid. 40 Ibid. 41 Ibid. 42 Ibid. 43 National Action Plan for the Women of Afghanistan NAPWA 2008–2018, 5. 44 S. N. Anderlini, Women Building Peace, What They Do, Why It Matters (Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2007), 137. 45 Ibid. 46 Natan Hodge, Afghan Candidate Seeks Backing of Women, Young, The Wall Street Journal, November 13, 2013. 47 Ibid, 128, 141. 48 Kuehnest et al., Women & War, Power and Protection (United States Institute of Peace Press, 2001), 9. 49 S. N. Anderlini, Women Building Peace, What They Do, Why It Matters (Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2007), 8. 50 Ibid. 51 International Crisis Group, Women and Conflict in Afghanistan, October 14, 2013, www.crisisgroup.org/­en/­regions/­asia/­south-­asia/­afghanistan/­252-­women-­ and-­conflict-­in-­afghanistan.aspx. 52 N. Colt, Afghanistan’s Journey to Literacy, The Huffington Post, November  20, 2012, www.huffingtonpost.com/­ned-­colt/­afghanistans-­journey-­to-­ literacy_b_2164918.html. 53 Rural Poverty Portal Rural Poverty in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, April  22, 2014, www.ruralpovertyportal.org/­country/­home/­tags/­afghanistan. 54 Ganesh et al. Synthesis Paper, Women’s Economic Empowerment in Afghanistan 2002–2012, Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, Published November 2013. 55 Jessica Donati and Mostafa Andalib, High Profile Attacks on Women in Afghanistan Undermine Right’s Campaign, Reuters, August 13, 2013. 56 D. Cortright and S. Persinger, Afghan Women Speak. Enhancing Security and Human Rights in Afghanistan (Kroc Institute for International Peace University of Notre Dame, 2010). 57 The Central Statistics Organization of Afghanistan, Women and Men in Afghanistan 2011, 2012. 58 K. Kuehnast, Gender and Peacebuilding: Why Women’s Involvement in Peacebuilding Matters (US Institute of Peace, Global Peacebuilding Center Date?) www.buildingpeace.org/­think-­global-­conflict/­issues/­gender-­and-­peacebuilding. 59 Emma Graham-­Harrison, Afghanistan Still One of the Worst Places to Be a Woman, says EU Ambassador, The Guardian March 7, 2014, www.theguard ian.com/­world/­2014/­mar/­07/­hamid-­karzai-­afghanistan-­women-­eu-­mellbin. 60 Aryn Baker, Afghan Women and the Return of the Taliban, Time Magazine August 9, 2010, http://­content.time.com/­time/­magazine/­article/­0,9171,2007407,00.html. 61 Anna Coren, Exclusive: How My Brother Tried to Kill Me in “honor” Attack, CNN April  4, 2013, www.cnn.com/­2013/­04/­04/­world/­asia/­afghanistan-­honor-­ killing-­survivor/­. 62 Sahar Gul, The Fears of a Tortured Afghan Child Bride, BBC News, July 15, 2013, www.bbc.com/­news/­world-­asia-­23311414. 63 Zarghuna Kargar, Farkhunda: The Making of a Martyr, BBC World News, August  11, 2015, www.bbc.com/­news/­magazine-­33810338.

138  Shukria Dellawar and Christina Tsirkas 64 Farkhunda Burial “a first for Afghan women”, BBC World News, August 10, 2015, www.bbc.com/­news/­magazine-­33809144. 65 Afghanistan: I Sold My Daughter to Feed the Rest of My Family, IRIN News, May  18, 2008, www.irinnews.org/­report/­78276/­afghanistan-­i-­sold-­my-­daughter-­ to-­feed-­the-­rest-­of-­my-­family. 66 Ibid. 67 Radhika Sanghani, Afghan Men Wear Burqas to Campaign for Women’s Rights, The Telegraph, March 6, 2015, www.telegraph.co.uk/­ women/­ womens-­ life/­ 11453879/­Afghan-­men-­wear-­burqas-­to-­campaign-­for-­womens-­rights.html. 68 Jawed Zeyartjahi, Heart Men Launch Movement in Support of Women, Tolo News, November  29, 2015, www.tolonews.com/­en/­afghanistan/­22583-­herat-­ men-­launch-­movement-­in-­support-­of-­women. 69 Amie Ferris-­Rotman and Jodie Evans, After Over a Decade of Occupation and $1.5 Billion in US Aid, the Reality Facing Women in Afghanistan Has Barely Changed, AlterNet, October 5, 2015, www.alternet.org/­ activism/­ after-­ over-­ decade-­occupation-­and-­15-­billion-­us-­aid-­reality-­facing-­women-­afghanistan-­ has.

Part III

International donor community responses

Introduction to Part III Adenrele Awotona

Part III has five chapters. Chapter 8, by David N. Gibbs, begins from the presumption that current US policy in Afghanistan faces a major dilemma with no obvious resolution. The intervention in that country, which began in 2001 is now in its second decade. US officials feel they cannot leave and “abandon” Afghanistan, since this would damage the superpower’s credibility, but at the same time there is no prospect that further intervention will produce a stable government in the foreseeable future. This chapter assesses the historical roots of the present-­day US dilemma. The late political scientist Chalmers Johnson famously argued that most major threats to US security result from past policy failures. It is the theme of this chapter that the US dilemma in Afghanistan constitutes a case of policy blowback, the result of past US failures, dating back to the 1970s. The chapter reviews new evidence that the US actually helped to destabilize Afghanistan during the 1970s and contributed to the conditions that led to the 1979 Soviet invasion of that country, which in turn produced the chronic instability that still plagues the country. During the 1980s, US officials privately viewed the Soviet invasion as a strategic “asset” and therefore sought to lengthen the occupation and thereby weaken the Soviet adversary. US officials therefore sought to undermine United Nations (UN) proposed peace agreements, which might have led to an early end to the Soviet occupation. When the Soviets finally did withdraw in 1989, US officials refused to work with the post-­communist Afghan government that remained, which helped destabilize that regime. The large-­scale social disintegration that attended the lengthy war against the Soviets and the post-­Soviet Afghan government helped create the intractable social and political problems that now prevail in the country and which complicate the US effort at nation building. Chapter 9, co-­authored by Niklas Swanström and Julian Tucker, looks at the People of the Republic of China’s Afghanistan policy, examining how Beijing has crafted its approach to its fractious neighbor, embedding Sino-­ Afghan relations in the context of the Afghanistan conflict. It attempts to identify the forces that have informed the relationship and theorizes about

142  International donor community responses future developments and challenges. The ongoing war in Afghanistan has gone through many phases and developments, with the centripetal forces of the conflict drawing in many external actors. The fluid situation makes it difficult for policymakers to chart a course which could stabilize the turbulent politics of Afghanistan. In addition, contact with the conflict in Afghanistan can weaken neighboring states, Pakistan being the prime example. For Beijing, conflict in Afghanistan is tangential to several areas shaping China’s domestic politics and foreign ambitions. Chapter 10, by Gareth Price, studies how India’s policy toward Afghanistan since the ousting of the Taliban after September 11, 2001, has been driven by a number of broadly complementary ambitions. First, it hopes for Afghanistan to develop into an independent and stable country, something which would enhance India’s domestic security. Second, India sees a number of prospective economic benefits that would stem from a stable Afghanistan. A number of major infrastructure projects have been mooted (some for two decades) that could benefit India and Afghanistan. These include the Turkmenistan–Afghanistan–Pakistan–India gas pipeline and CASA 1000 (Central Asia South Asia). Both could serve to ameliorate energy shortages in South Asia by taking advantage of energy surpluses in Central Asia. While politics explains the primary motivation for Indian engagement with and support for the Afghan government, this engagement has often been driven by India’s private sector or, in some cases, by state-­owned companies and private sector partners. While the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) provided security guarantees, this approach made perfect sense, but following the announcement of the NATO drawdown, many Indian investors in Afghanistan are likely to feel vulnerable, none more so than those which invested in India’s largest iron ore mine at Hajigak. Chapter 11, by K. N. Tennyson, reassesses external powers’ role in rebuilding Afghanistan. He notes that while Afghanistan, a multiethnic and multicultural society is economically weak and geographically landlocked and therefore has little economic value to the outside world, it has played an important role in the politics of the world for many centuries because of its geostrategic location. Hence, since external powers often intervene in the politics of Afghanistan to take control of the country’s strategic location, their intrusive policy has formed part of the political problem in the country. In Chapter 12, Clay G. Wescott looks at the results of World Bank assistance in Afghanistan from 2002 to 2011. The World Bank sought to achieve results in three main areas: building the capacity of the state and its accountability to citizens, promoting growth of the rural economy and improving rural livelihoods and supporting the growth of the formal private sector. This chapter focuses on the first main area of support and draws on a few subsequent assessments of more recent World Bank support to get a sense of the progress and sustainability of these reforms since 2012.

8 Afghanistan and the politics of quagmire A retrospective analysis of US policy David N. Gibbs

Introduction When viewed from a US standpoint, Afghanistan has been a major source of instability and security threats. Since the late 1990s, Afghanistan’s Taliban government allied itself with the Al-­Qaeda terrorist network, which generated several spectacular terrorist attacks, most notably the September 11, 2001 attacks against the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. In response to these disasters, the United States and its allies sponsored the overthrow of the Taliban regime in late 2001 and the installation of a new Afghan government, under the tutelage of military forces from the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The Afghan war that resulted from these events has evolved into a quagmire for the United States, one that is now well into its second decade. It constitutes one of the longest single wars in the history of the US military. While the combat role was supposed to have officially ceased in 2014, thousands of US forces remain in the country.1 The United States Air Force has continued strikes against insurgent targets, while there are frequent calls for US ground forces to resume combat operations. The combined long-­term cost of the Afghan and Iraq wars has been estimated at US$4–$7 trillion.2 These efforts have achieved little success: The Taliban, Al-­Qaeda, Islamic State and a variety of other anti-­government and anti-­Western militias continue to operate in the country. Despite the interminable nature of the war and the lack of any clear objective, US officials believe that they cannot “abandon” Afghanistan, since this would damage the United States’ credibility as a superpower; but at the same time, there is no prospect that further intervention will produce a stable government in the foreseeable future. It is the theme of this chapter that the present-­day US quagmire in Afghanistan is the culmination of several decades of policy failures, which have substantially weakened international security and augmented terrorist threats. In what follows, I will present the historical background to the present-­ day quagmire, beginning with US interventions in the 1970s. Though many countries surely contributed to the chaotic situation in Afghanistan, this chapter will focus on US policy as a generator of chaos.

144  David N. Gibbs

Origins of destabilization Up until the late 1970s, Afghanistan played a marginal role in international relations. The country was widely viewed as remote and inaccessible, quite distant from the oilfields of the Persian Gulf or other genuinely strategic areas of the Middle East or South Asia, points that were underscored in declassified documents from the period.3 The country did, however, have one significant strategic feature: it had a long border with the Soviet Union (USSR), and several of the principal ethnic groups of northern ­Afghanistan – notably the Uzbeks and the Tajiks – also lived in large numbers on the Soviet side of the border. Given these facts, the Soviet government sought influence in the country, for defensive purposes, to establish it as a security zone on its southern frontier. From 1954 to 1956, the USSR established a sizable aid program in Afghanistan. Officers in the Afghan army were often trained in Soviet academies, while considerable economic assistance was also provided. This aid program was viewed with indifference by most US officials, who made no effort to interfere with or to outbid the Soviets. Afghanistan was implicitly recognized as a Soviet sphere of influence. Official documents from this period emphasized that although Afghanistan remained somewhat dependent on Soviet aid, the USSR showed little interest in occupying the country or turning it communist.4 In 1967, a US academic wrote that “Soviet aid to Afghanistan has been immensely successful. . . . Even US officials are hard pressed to find major flaws.”5 With respect to the country’s overall significance, a 1973 article in the Wall Street Journal stated that Afghanistan seemed a “vast expanse of desert waste,” of little strategic value. The Wall Street Journal journalist wondered why “the Russians, or anyone else for that matter, would particularly want Afghanistan.”6 With regard to its stance in the Cold War, Afghanistan remained officially neutral, but with a pro-­Soviet tilt. With regard to internal politics, however, communism held limited appeal. From 1965, there was a small communist party, the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), but it had few members and was riven by factional disputes. It seemed that the communists had no realistic prospect of gaining support among the conservative Afghan peasantry, who constituted the large majority of the population. A Soviet official, cited by anthropologist Louis Dupree in 1979 stated that “If there is one country in the developing world where we would like not to try scientific socialism at this point in time, it is Afghanistan.”7 Overall, Afghanistan was far from a utopia. It was one of the most isolated and underdeveloped countries in the world, with low life expectancy, high illiteracy, appalling treatment of women and girls, and periodic famines.8 And yet the period of Afghan history before 1978 did have one strongly positive feature: the country was not at war, and this circumstance of political stability might well have endured – except that the United States and its allies intervened in the country and upset the political balance.

Afghanistan and the politics of quagmire 145 During 1973–1974, US, Iranian, and Pakistani intelligence agents all began covert operations in Afghanistan, which supported Islamist groups seeking to overthrow the Afghan president, Mohammad Daoud. This little-­ known operation has been documented by Cordovez and Harrison in their authoritative study.9 The attempted overthrow failed but served as a warning to the Daoud government. From the US standpoint, the covert action marked a fundamental shift in policy toward Afghanistan, which up to this point had refrained from any destabilizing activity. The most likely motive for the 1973–1974 intervention was the need to showcase US power, to make up for perceived weakness resulting from a lackluster war effort in Vietnam.10 The Western interventions continued over an extended period and assumed both carrot and stick roles. The “stick” had already been used in 1973, with the attempted overthrow of President Daoud. But this was followed up with a carrot: in 1974, the Shah of Iran, Mohammad Pahlavi, offered Daoud a substantial foreign aid package which would exceed what the Soviets were providing. This aid offer sought to move Afghanistan away from the Soviets and into a more pro-­Western orientation. The Iranian aid program was strongly encouraged by US officials. Daoud accepted the offer, and a US$2 billion package was to be dispersed over the following years. In exchange, Daoud indeed began moving Afghanistan into a more pro-­ Western direction, and his military officers were trained at academies in Egypt and India.11 One of the key effects of the aid program was to encourage a gradual crackdown against the communist PDPA,12 which occurred in phases. On this issue, once again, Daoud acceded to Western pressure. In early 1978, top communist leaders were imprisoned by Daoud, possibly as a prelude to their execution. The arrests fully destabilized the country: pro-­communist officers in the Afghan Air Force led a military uprising against Daoud, which aimed at freeing the PDPA leadership. Several days of disorder ended with the overthrow of the Daoud regime, the release of the communists from prison, and their installation as the new government of the country. Contrary to widespread belief at the time, there is no evidence that the Soviets (who never really trusted the local communists) supported the coup.13 The new PDPA regime immediately declared that their takeover constituted the “Saur Revolution,” which would transform Afghan society. The communist takeover would in turn produce a disastrous civil war. The United States and its allies played no direct role in this coup, but their policies certainly helped to make it possible. When US officials authorized covert interventions aimed at moving Afghanistan out of the Soviet orbit, they risked upsetting the delicate political balance that had kept Afghanistan a peaceful country; they set in motion a series of events that ultimately ended with the 1978 communist takeover. This takeover in turn generated decades of civil war and external intervention, a state of affairs that continues to the present day. US policies played a decisive role in destabilizing

146  David N. Gibbs Afghanistan and, when viewed over the long term, in laying the groundwork for the later rise of Al-­Qaeda.

Popular resistance and Soviet invasion After their takeover, the newly installed communists inaugurated a major reform program, and their reforms included a redistribution of arable land to the peasantry and a series of measures aimed at achieving equality of the sexes. The communists also began a mass literacy campaign, which was aimed especially at women and girls, who had previously been neglected by the educational system. Although the reform program may have been laudable in principle, it was carried out in an arrogant and heavy-­handed manner. Any resistance to the reforms was met with violence and repression. These factors all helped to trigger widespread opposition, especially in the rural areas, where the communist party had always lacked support. The anti-­communist opposition was composed of several separate organizations which never achieved any centralized command structure and functioned in loose coalitions, based on a common agenda of anti-­communism and Islamic fervor. There is no doubt that the Mujahidin guerrillas, as they were collectively known, achieved widespread popular support, at least initially.14 The resultant 1978–1979 civil war in Afghanistan presented Soviet officials with a dilemma. On the one hand, the USSR publicly embraced their Afghan comrades as legitimate communists and ideological allies. The Soviet military sent aid and several hundred advisors and trainers to Afghanistan, who supported the government’s counter-­ insurgency efforts against the Mujahidin. On the other hand, Soviet officials privately realized that the Afghan communist party was poorly led and that their rashly implemented reform programs helped to trigger the popular uprising. The Soviets sought to moderate the communists and to reduce the influence of some of the more impetuous figures in the party, notably the foreign minister, Hafizullah Amin, who was considered particularly hard-­line. But contrary to popular belief, the Soviets had no interest in invading the country during this period. Previously secret documents have now become available, and they show repeated statements by Soviet officials that they could not send regular combat forces into Afghanistan, because this would entail becoming engaged in civil war, fighting on behalf of an unpopular government against a mass insurgency.15 The new documents leave no doubt that at least initially, the USSR accepted the possibility that their Afghan comrades might fall from power, but the Soviets would not send their troops to save them. What seems to have changed Soviet attitudes was a covert intervention by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), which was approved by President Jimmy Carter on July 3, 1979. President Carter’s national security directive on that date authorized the delivery of “cash or non-­military supplies” to the Mujahidin.16 This covert aid program began before the Soviets invaded the country, not afterward. It seems highly likely that President Carter

Afghanistan and the politics of quagmire 147 undertook this action with full knowledge that the Soviets would discover it and that such aid would exacerbate the long-­standing Soviet fears that the United States was seeking influence in Afghanistan as a means of threatening the USSR itself.17 One of the strongest advocates of this covert operation was the president’s influential national security advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski, who would later present the action as a deliberate provocation of the Soviets, taken with the knowledge that it was likely to trigger an invasion. Brzezinski’s revelation would come during a 1998 interview with the French magazine Le Nouvel Observateur,18 which I present in translation (my emphasis added throughout): The former director of the CIA, Robert Gates, stated in his memoirs19 that the American intelligence services began to aid the Mujahidin in Afghanistan six months before the Soviet intervention. In this period, you were the national security advisor to President Carter. You therefore played a key role in this affair. Is this correct? Brzezinski: Yes. According to the official version of history, CIA aid to the Mujahidin began during 1980 – that is to say, after the Soviet army invaded Afghanistan on December 24, 1979. But the reality, closely guarded until now, is completely otherwise: indeed, it was July 3, 1979 that President Carter signed the first directive for secret aid to the opponents of the pro-­Soviet regime in Kabul. And that very day, I wrote a note to the president, in which I explained to him that in my opinion this aid was going to induce a Soviet military intervention. Q: Despite this risk, you were an advocate of this covert action. But perhaps you yourself desired this Soviet entry into the war and looked for a way to provoke it? B: It wasn’t quite like that. We didn’t push the Russians to intervene, but we knowingly increased the probability that they would. Question:

Using surprisingly blunt language, Brzezinski stated that the covert operation was undertaken with the knowledge that it “increased the probability” of a Soviet invasion and that the president was informed of this danger. To be sure, Brzezinski qualifies these statements by claiming that “we didn’t push the Russians to intervene” when he was pressed on the issue by the French journalist; but this denial appears pro forma and is contradicted by other statements, made elsewhere in the interview (“We knowingly increased the probability that they would” invade). When viewed in full, the interview strongly implies that Brzezinski wished to provoke the invasion – with full support from the president. Brzezinski’s wish was realized on December 24, 1979, when Soviet commandos helped spearhead a large-­scale Soviet invasion and occupation of

148  David N. Gibbs Afghanistan,20 which lasted almost a decade. The US decision to support the Mujahidin likely influenced the Soviet decision to invade, which was a reversal of the long-­standing Soviet policy not to send combat troops into Afghanistan. Shortly after the invasion, the Soviet press justified the action as a response to “unwarranted interference by imperialist forces in the internal affairs of Afghanistan,” which presented the danger that the country would be “transformed into a staging ground for the preparation of imperialist aggression against the Soviet Union.”21 In this case, the Soviet fears of “imperialist aggression” were exaggerated, but they also contained an element of truth, as the Brzezinski interview suggests. The occupation of Afghanistan which resulted from the invasion invigorated and intensified the Mujahidin insurgency, which was no longer against merely local Afghan communists but now also an invading foreign power. The extended jihad that resulted from this situation shredded the social fabric of the country, but it also helped to lay the groundwork for making Afghanistan a regional and global generator of instability, an unfortunate status that the country still holds today.

America and the Afghan war during the Reagan presidency President Ronald Reagan continued the US aid to the Mujahidin guerrillas that had begun during the Carter administration. The aid program gradually evolved from a relatively small-­scale project into one of the largest covert operations in the history of the Cold War. Afghanistan became the main proving ground for the Reagan Doctrine, which sought to roll back perceived gains by Soviet allies across the globe, through covert and paramilitary means.22 At the time, public debate surrounding the Reagan Doctrine focused primarily on its application to civil wars in Central America; but these were merely sideshows in comparison with the Afghanistan operation, which became the central arena of armed conflict during this final, decisive phase of the Cold War. Military intervention in Afghanistan was spearheaded by the CIA, which funneled large quantities of light weapons and other supplies to Mujahidin guerrillas, who operated from bases along border areas in Pakistan, with headquarters located in the northwest Pakistani city of Peshawar.23 The military support was undertaken in close cooperation with the Inter-­Services Intelligence (ISI) directorate, Pakistan’s own intelligence agency, and with the intelligence agencies of China and Saudi Arabia. Though the arms supplies were distributed to several Mujahidin groups, some of the largest quantities went to the Hisbi Islami group led by Gulbadin Hekmatyar, generally regarded as the most violent and religiously extreme of all the guerrilla leaders. According to a friendly account of the Afghan resistance, “The methods of [Hekmatyar’s party] are severe indeed; torture and execution are commonly used to deal with those who oppose the party line.”24 Hekatmyar’s group became deeply involved in international narcotics trafficking.25

Afghanistan and the politics of quagmire 149 None of these details were allowed to interfere with the US arms supplies. Indeed, there was also an extended propaganda effort supported by the US government which sought to glorify the anti-­Soviet jihad.26 President Reagan declared March 21, 1983, as “Afghanistan Day,” which celebrated the “valiant and courageous Afghan freedom fighters.”27 In the United States, the Afghan operation was exceptionally popular and received strong support from both Democrats and Republicans in Congress, who often vied for the image of being the more supportive of the Mujahidin, giving the overall program considerable clout and exceptionally high levels of funding.28 The weapons supply program during the 1980s constituted yet another illustration of policy blowback, and it directly contributed to the later problem of Islamic extremism, associated with Al-­Qaeda and other terrorist groups. US policy in Afghanistan contributed to the rise of terrorism in three ways. First, the United States actively recruited idealistic Muslims throughout the world to join the jihad in Afghanistan to augment the manpower of the Mujahidin. The recruitment was undertaken directly by US government agencies or by allied states working in collaboration with the United States.29 The possibility that these Muslim expatriates would turn against the United States was simply disregarded. Osama Bin Laden himself was “recruited by the CIA” in 1979 to support the Afghan War according to Le Monde.30 An analysis in Jane’s Intelligence Review noted that Bin Laden “worked in close association with US agents” during the 1980s.31 US officials have strenuously denied any past cooperation with Bin Laden, but there is considerable evidence against this view, from a range of respected sources.32 Many of the Mujahidin guerrillas who were supported by the CIA would later evolve into the Taliban and Al-­Qaeda.33, John Cooley notes in his classic study of terrorism that Al-­Qaeda terrorism was “planned, engineered and in some cases carried out by CIA-­trained veterans of the 1979–89 Afghanistan War, or those schooled or influenced by them.”34 Second, the United States openly encouraged the radical ideas of the Mujahidin, which helped lay the ideological basis for later anti-­US terrorism. Beginning in 1986, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) funded the writing of textbooks for Afghan refugee children living in Pakistan. These textbooks glorified violence, which was presented as integral to Islamic theology. One of these USAID-­funded textbooks taught Afghan children the letters of the Persian alphabet: “Alif is for Allah . . . Ti is for rifle . . . Jim is for Jihad.” The schoolbooks also contained such illustrative phrases as “The Mujahidin missiles rain down like dew on the Russians,” “Shakir conducts jihad with the sword,” and “God becomes happy with the defeat of the Russians.”35 After the 2001 terrorist attacks, Western politicians would routinely condemn the indoctrination of Muslim youth in Madrassas in Afghanistan and Pakistan, which are widely viewed as propaganda centers and generators of terrorism. During the 1980s, however, US officials encouraged such indoctrination and indeed financed the publication of extremist materials.

150  David N. Gibbs Third, the United States and allied states encouraged Mujahidin fighters to use terrorist methods against their enemies – which would later be directed against Western targets. Specifically, the Pakistani ISI trained the Mujahidin to use car bombing as a technique of war, and they did so with full knowledge and approval of CIA personnel who worked closely with the ISI. In principle, the car bombing campaign targeted Soviet soldiers and officials in Afghanistan, but the bombings also killed large numbers of Afghan civilians as well.36 Car bombing is of course a classic terrorist practice. Many of the weapons delivered to the Mujahidin – such as the shoulder-­launched Stinger antiaircraft missile – had considerable potential as instruments of terrorism. Reagan administration personnel recognized that their support for the Mujahidin risked future terrorism, but they readily accepted this risk;37 in doing so, they contributed to post–Cold War turmoil. Steve Coll commented that the infrastructure of Al-­Qaeda terrorism, including “the specialized camps, the sabotage training manuals, the electronic bomb detonators” had been built with US and Pakistani support.38

Continued blowback after the Soviet withdrawal During the course of the occupation, the Soviets became increasingly sophisticated in their methods. They realized that their local Afghan client, President Babrak Karmal, appeared to be an unpopular puppet with limited support. In 1986, Soviet officials orchestrated a policy shift that entailed the removal of Karmal and his replacement by the former security chief, Mohammad Najibullah, who was first installed as head of the communist party and then, a year later, as president. Initially, it was widely believed that Najibullah was another feckless Soviet client, but over time, he proved to be surprisingly effective and even popular. He cast himself as a religious Muslim and an Afghan nationalist. Many Afghans who had no sympathy for communism gradually came to respect Najibullah, as someone who was more reasonable than the fanatical Mujahidin and who was doing a reasonably good job governing the areas that were under government control.39 Urban women appreciated the communists’ traditional support for gender equality, and they became a special source of political support. Najibullah’s increasing success reassured the Soviets that his government might be able to survive without foreign troops. In 1988, the major parties to the war, including the United States and the Soviet Union, signed the Geneva Accords, which laid the basis for the full Soviet military withdrawal from Afghanistan.40 The USSR would continue to provide supplies to the communist government but would no longer use its own troops. The troop withdrawal was completed in early 1989, and President Najibullah used the occasion to bolster his nationalist credentials. At his insistence, the PDPA largely abandoned communism, renaming itself the Homeland (Watan) Party. At the same time, the various Mujahidin groups continued to lose popularity, due to their reputation for sectarian

Afghanistan and the politics of quagmire 151 infighting, violence and corruption. Najibullah inaugurated a process of national conciliation, which sought to bring in more moderate elements of the opposition into his government, to broaden its political base while isolating the more intransigent guerrilla groups. The president called for elections to be supervised by the United Nations.41 In short, there was a brief period when a political compromise might have been achieved, under the direction of President Najibullah, which would have involved the former communists, combined with some of the more moderate (or at least more opportunistic) elements among the opposition. In 1990, the New York Times reported that Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev had proposed a general settlement of the Afghan War, which would have entailed a symmetrical cutoff of all Soviet aid to Najibullah and US aid to the Mujahidin. However, the newly inaugurated Bush administration declined to accept the proposal or to deal with Najibullah.42 It seems likely that US officials were influenced by the overall atmosphere of ebullience and triumphalism that attended their victory in the Cold War, symbolized by the opening of the Berlin Wall in 1989. This attitude of triumph appears to have influenced policy in Afghanistan, where the United States sought an outright military victory by the Mujahidin forces, which the CIA continued to support. Given the prospect of continuing US funds, the Mujahidin saw little incentive to work with Najibullah, which impeded efforts to form a broad-­based government and wind down the war. Throughout his remaining time in power, Najibullah sought American cooperation in achieving a political settlement. He repeatedly warned that a Mujahidin victory could generate instability throughout the region. In an interview with Jane’s Defence Weekly, Najibullah “raised the specter of Islamic fundamentalism,” which would generate disorder.43 While meeting with a visiting US academic, he stated that “Afghanistan in extremist hands would be a center of instability.”44 In the International Herald-­Tribune, Najibullah declared that “If fundamentalism comes to Afghanistan, war will continue for many years. . . . Afghanistan will be turned into a center of terrorism.”45 The concerns about Islamic extremism would prove to be well-­founded. Soviet aid to the Najibullah government finally ceased in 1991, just before the collapse of the Soviet state itself, which occurred at the end of the year.46 The cutoff of the Soviet aid led to the collapse of the Najibullah government in 1992. The Mujahidin guerrillas finally stormed into Kabul in triumph. For ordinary Afghans, however, this overthrow brought the chaos that many had long feared. The Afghan war now entered a new and more deadly phase as the various Mujahidin factions fought with each other, turning Kabul for the first time into a major battleground. The new level of chaos might have been avoided if the United States had been willing to support elections and the formation of a coalition government, as proposed by Najibullah, but this route was blocked by the Bush administration, which was bent on total victory.

152  David N. Gibbs Amid the disorder that attended Najibullah’s overthrow, a new Islamist organization was gradually cobbled together in the early 1990s from the membership of the various guerrilla groups: the Taliban. With support from Pakistan’s ISI, the Taliban was able to capture Kabul by 1996 and gradually consolidated its hold over most of the country. During this phase of the war, the United States had largely disengaged, although Pakistan remained a key player.47 The horrific character of the Taliban’s rule has been widely discussed (though in many respects, they were not that much different from some of the Mujahidin groups that the United States had previously supported). They then became a base of operations for international terrorism, directed by Al-­Qaeda. But the Taliban extremists did have one positive feature: their rule inaugurated an era of relative stability for Afghanistan in between periods of intense warfare. The Taliban established effective rule over almost 90 percent of the country by 1999;48 only the remote northeastern region remained outside central control. The country appeared to be moving toward a more stable political equilibrium (albeit a highly repressive one). In late 2001, however, the United States and allied countries orchestrated the overthrow of the Taliban and shattered the incipient stability. A new Afghan government was then installed by the victorious Americans, led by Hamid Karzai; meanwhile, the Taliban and associated militias retreated to the rural areas of Afghanistan, where they resumed guerrilla warfare, a state of affairs that continues today. Al-­Qaeda and later the Islamic State were able to operate in remote areas of the countryside. The terrorist presence emanating from Afghanistan – the original reason for the US intervention in the first place – was never subdued. The overthrow of the Taliban had the effect of further destabilizing the country and intensifying the violence, with little prospect of resolution.

Conclusion The nearly four decades of war in Afghanistan has been a tragic event, most notably for the people of that country. But it has also been a tragedy for the interventionist powers, who sought unsuccessfully to exert control and have paid a heavy price for doing so, both in lost lives and in wasted resources. In this chapter, we have focused on the role of the United States, which helped to create the military quagmire so evident today. US officials may complain about the corruption of the Afghan government, the ineffectiveness of its army, and the interminable nature of the resulting war.49 In the end, however, the United States bears much of the blame for having taken so many interventionist actions, over a long period of time, to destabilize that country. If Afghanistan is now in a state of chronic disorder, this is a state of affairs that the United States helped to create. The Afghan experience of the past forty years might be taken as a cautionary tale by US officials, regarding the extreme risks posed by foreign intervention, covert operations, and regime change.

Afghanistan and the politics of quagmire 153

Notes 1 For a recent overview of the war, see Sarah Almukhtar and Karen Yourish, More than Fourteen Years after US Invasion, the Taliban Control Large Parts of Afghanistan, New York Times, April 19, 2016. 2 Nobel Laureate Joseph Stiglitz, “Rewriting the Rules of the American Economy,” Part 2, Democracy Now, October 27, 2015, www.democracynow.org/­2015/­10/­ 27/­nobel_laureate_joseph_stiglitz_on_rewriting_the. 3 US National Security Council, Memorandum of Discussion at the 228th Meeting of the National Security Council on December 9, 1954, in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954 (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1983), Africa and South Asia, vol. XI, Part 2; and US Joint Chiefs of Staff, Program Assistance for the General Area of China, January 16, 1950, 335, Declassified Documents microfiche series (1979, 33A). 4 U.S. Department of State, Intelligence Report: The Future of Soviet-­Afghan Relations, May 29, 1956, Declassified Documents Microfiche Series (1983, 351B). 5 Marshall I. Goldman, Soviet Foreign Aid (New York: Praeger, 1967), 122–123. 6 Peter Kann, Do the Russians Covet Afghanistan? If so, It Is Hard to Figure Why, Wall Street Journal, December 27, 1973. 7 Louis Dupree, Afghanistan Under the Khalq, Problems of Communism, Vol. 28, no. 4 (1979), 50. 8 For useful background, see Fred Halliday, Revolution in Afghanistan, New Left Review, no. I/­112 (1978). 9 Diego Cordovez and Selig S. Harrison, Out of Afghanistan: The Inside Story of the Soviet Withdrawal (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 14–16. 10 Regarding perceived US weakness as a motive for intervention during the mid-­ 1970s, see John Stockwell, In Search of Enemies: A CIA Story (New York: Norton, 1978), 43. 11 The covert operations and the Iranian aid program are discussed at length in Diego Cordovez and Selig S. Harrison, Out of Afghanistan: The Inside Story of the Soviet Withdrawal (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 14–21. 12 Selig S. Harrison, The Shah not Kremlin Touched off Afghan Coup, Washington Post, May 13, 1979. 13 Odd Arne Westad, Prelude to Invasion: The Soviet Union and the Afghan Communists, 1978–1979, International History Review, Vol. 16, no. 1 (1994), 51; and Diego Cordovez and Selig S. Harrison, Out of Afghanistan: The Inside Story of the Soviet Withdrawal (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 27–28. 14 Fred Halliday, War and Revolution in Afghanistan, New Left Review, no. I/­119 (1980). 15 I discuss these Soviet documents in detail in David N. Gibbs, Reassessing Soviet Motives for Invading Afghanistan: A Declassified History, Critical Asian Studies, Vol. 38, no. 2 (2006). 16 US White House, Finding Pursuant to Section 662 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as Amended, Concerning Operations in Foreign Countries Other than those Intended Solely for the Purpose of Intelligence Collection, July 3, 1979, from Counsel Cutler Papers, Box 60, Folder Central Intelligence Agency Charter, 2/­9–29/­80, Carter Presidential Library. 17 Such fears were expressed for example in the memoirs of Nikita Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971), 507–508. Regarding the larger context of Soviet decision-­making regarding the 1979 invasion, see Artemy Kalinovsky, Decision-­Making and the Soviet War in Afghanistan: From Intervention to Withdrawal, Journal of Cold War Studies, Vol. 11, no. 4 (2009).

154  David N. Gibbs 18 From Les Révélations d’un Ancien Conseiller de Carter: “Oui la CIA est Entrée en Afghanistan avant les Russes . . .” Le Nouvel Observateur, January 15–21, 1998. Translated by William Blum and David Gibbs. Emphasis added. 19 See Robert Michael Gates, From the Shadows: The Ultimate Insider’s Story of Five Presidents and How They Won the Cold War (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996), 146–147. 20 For a detailed history of the Soviet invasion and occupation, see Rodric Braithwaite, Afghansty: The Russians in Afghanistan, 1979–89 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). 21 A. Petrov, Limited Soviet Military Contingent, Pravda, December 31, 1979, translated in Current Digest of the Soviet Press, January 1980. Another reason for the invasion was the consolidation of power by Hafizullah Amin, who was long distrusted by the Soviets. See David N. Gibbs, Reassessing Soviet Motives for Invading Afghanistan: A Declassified History, Critical Asian Studies, Vol. 38, no. 2 (2006), 255–257. 22 James M. Scott, Deciding to Intervene: The Reagan Doctrine and American Foreign Policy (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1996), chap. 3. 23 The most detailed study of this operation is in Steve Coll, Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001 (New York: Penguin Press, 2004). 24 Gérard Chaliand, Report from Afghanistan (New York: Penguin Press, 1982), 56. 25 Described in Alfred W. McCoy, Jr., The Politics of Heroin: CIA Complicity in the Global Drug Trade (Chicago: Chicago Review Press, 2003), chap. 9. 26 Richard Bernstein, For Journalism Dean, Questions about Objectivity, New York Times, November 3, 1987; and US Media Accuracy “Relaxed” on Afghanistan, MERIP Reports, no. 89 (1980), 6. 27 President Ronald Reagan, Proclamation 5033: Afghanistan Day, March 21, 1983, American Presidency Project, University of California, Santa Barbara, www.presidency.ucsb.edu. 28 For a generally positive account of the Congressional support for war, see George Crile, Charlie Wilson’s War (New York: Grove Press, 2007). 29 John Cooley, Unholy Wars: Afghanistan, America, and International Terrorism (London: Pluto Press, 2002). 30 Veronique Maurus and Marc Roche, L’Homme le Plus Redouté des Etats-­Unis, Longtemps Entrâiné par la CIA, Le Monde, September 15, 2001. Quote translated from the French. 31 Al Venter, America’s Nemesis: Usama Bin Laden, Jane’s Intelligence Review (October 1, 1998). 32 Regarding Bin Laden’s close US connections during the 1980s, see Luke Harding, Chasing Monsters: The Americans Helped Create the Terrorist Bin Laden, Now They Try to Destroy Him, Guardian, November 24, 2000, 2001; and Andrew Marshall, Terror “Blowback” Burns CIA, Independent, November 1, 1998. 33 Some of the closest US allies, including Hekmatyar, would later work directly with Al Qaeda. See US Designates Hekmatyar as Terrorist, Dawn (Karachi), February 20, 2003, www.dawn.com/­news/­83014. 34 John Cooley, Unholy Wars: Afghanistan, America, and International Terrorism (London: Pluto Press, 2002), 193. 35 See Craig Davis, “A” is for Allah, “J” is for Jihad, World Policy Journal, 90, 93 (Spring 2002). 36 Mike Davis, Buda’s Wagon: A Brief History of the Car Bomb (London: Verso, 2008), chap. 13.

Afghanistan and the politics of quagmire 155 37 That US officials were aware of a terrorist threat is repeatedly noted in Alan J. Kuperman, The Stinger Missile and US Intervention in Afghanistan, Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 114, no. 2 (1999), 223, 232, 235. 38 Steve Coll, Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001 (New York: Penguin, 2004), 145. 39 John F. Burns, Afghans: Now They Blame America, New York Times Magazine, February 4, 1990. See also Shane A. Smith, Afghanistan after the Occupation: Examining the Post-­Soviet Withdrawal and the Najibullah Regime It Left Behind, 1989–1992, The Historian, Vol. 76, no. 2 (2014). 40 Regarding the 1988 Geneva Accords, see Diego Cordovez and Selig S. Harrison, Out of Afghanistan: The Inside Story of the Soviet Withdrawal (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995). 41 Steve Coll, Afghan Leader Urges UN-­Monitored Elections: Najibullah Says His Soviet-­Backed Government Will Step Down if Defeated, Washington Post, January 25, 1990; and As Cold War Melts in Afghanistan, Old Rivalries Bring New Troubles, Washington Post, October 20, 1991. 42 John F. Burns, Afghans: Now They Blame America, New York Times Magazine, February 4, 1990. 43 T. A. Davis, Afghan President Dr. Muhammad Najibullah Is Seeking a Formula to End the Civil War and Prevent the Fragmentation of His Country, Jane’s Defence Weekly, March 7, 1992. 44 Ludwig W. Adamec, Report on Afghanistan, unpublished notes, February 3, 1992. I thank Professor Adamec of the University of Arizona for providing me this report, which paraphrases Najibullah’s statements. 45 As quoted in Michael Griffin, Reaping the Whirlwind: The Taliban Movement in Afghanistan (London: Pluto Press, 2001), 5. 46 Steve Coll, Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001 (New York: Penguin, 2004), 232–233. The United States also discontinued its military aid to the Mujahidin at the end of 1991, although aid from Pakistan and other sources continued. 47 Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil, and Fundamentalism in Central Asia (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010). 48 Jason Burke, Afghans Do Deal to End Civil War, Independent, March 15, 1999. 49 See Dexter Filkins, Leader of Afghanistan Finds Himself Hero No More, New York Times, February 7, 2009.

9 China in Afghanistan – a new force in the war in Afghanistan? Niklas Swanström and Julian Tucker1

Introduction After decades of nearly continuous warfare, Afghanistan has become archetypical as a country ruled by instability, insurgency and intractable conflict. Throughout the course of its history, the heterogeneous mountain country has experienced outside interventions. The British Empire, the USSR and the United States have all in their turn experienced military reversals after becoming involved in Afghan domestic politics.2 This recurring history has earned Afghanistan a reputation as the Graveyard of Empires. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) is now beginning to flex its muscles on the world stage, taking its first tentative steps as an emerging global power. Despite sharing a short border of only about 76 kilometers, Beijing and Kabul are tied to one another, not least because of the web of relations in their common neighborhood and China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). This chapter looks at the PRC’s Afghanistan policy, examining how Beijing has crafted its approach to its fractious neighbor, embedding Sino-­Afghan relations in the context of the Afghanistan conflict. It attempts to identify the forces that have informed the relationship and theorizes about future developments and challenges. The ongoing war in Afghanistan has gone through many phases and developments, with the centripetal forces of the conflict drawing in many external actors. The fluid situation makes it difficult for policymakers to chart a course which could stabilize the turbulent politics of Afghanistan. In addition, contact with the conflict in Afghanistan can weaken neighboring states, Pakistan being the prime example. For Beijing, conflict in Afghanistan is tangential to several areas that shape China’s domestic politics and foreign ambitions.

The building blocks of Beijing’s Afghanistan policy The PRC’s approach to Afghanistan revolves around several distinct yet interrelated policy objectives. Although the way in which these goals fit into the mosaic of international relations has changed over time, the main features have stayed the same, evolving with the political context. First,

China in Afghanistan 157 Beijing seeks to stabilize its restive western province of Xinjiang. Home to significant numbers of Uyghurs, a majority of whom are Sunni Muslims and have an ethno-­linguistic affinity with the population of Central Asia, parts of the Muslim population of Xinjiang have long harbored hostility to Chinese rule.3 Rising tensions between ethnic Uyghurs and Han Chinese in the recent past has led to violence spilling over into the Chinese heartland, such as lethal attacks in Beijing in 2013 and Kunming in 2014, as well as potential future attacks threatened by the Islamic State.4,5 Uyghur separatists and radicals opposing Beijing have traveled abroad, exporting anti-­PRC sentiments. Chinese security policy is most concerned with Uyghur organizations, which Beijing views as espousing violent extremism. While this may be true of some, such as the East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM), considered a terrorist movement by the United States and the United Kingdom, this is by no means true of others, such as the World Uyghur Congress, which is not considered a terrorist group by any state other than China.6 Ties to sympathetic communities in greater Central Asia has led Uyghurs to establish émigré communities in countries like Afghanistan, and Beijing fears that ungovernable space could allow militants to establish safe havens from which to plot attacks against Chinese citizens and interests. Fears of Uyghur agitation drove the PRC’s opposition to the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and later brought about the development of ties between Beijing and the Taliban, as well as Chinese involvement in anti-­terrorism training in central Asia. Second, there is also a geopolitical dimension to Sino-­Afghan relations. For decades, the PRC has attempted to forge closer ties with Pakistan and Iran, both of which have interests in the conflict in Afghanistan.7 Tehran and Islamabad are close trading partners of Beijing’s, and a peaceful Afghanistan would allow for more integrated trade. At the same time, the militancy and violence radiating from war-­torn Afghanistan could spill over into neighboring states, stoking fears that Pakistan and Iran’s governments might be destabilized to the point of no return. Should this happen, Beijing stands to be dragged into a wider conflict or lose the support of two key partners, not to mention large investments.89 Iran and Pakistan have become two of the largest import markets for Chinese arms,10 probably a reflection of Beijing’s desire to shore up its investments and key allies.11 The PRC has also become the most important financial power in post-­ Soviet Central Asia, a region which is vulnerable to militancy from Afghanistan. All of these areas, as well as Pakistan and Afghanistan, are included in China’s BRI,12 which seeks to expand the PRC’s role in world affairs through economic means. The staggering sums that have been invested in the project constitute a major influx of wealth in an impoverished area, but they bring with them the potential for conflict by aggravating existing tensions, by widening the gulf between kleptocratic elites and marginalized populations. Militants based in a lawless Afghanistan could either derail the project by targeting elements of the BRI’s supply chain or work to extort protection

158  Niklas Swanström and Julian Tucker money. This gives Beijing a strong interest in a stable Afghanistan, which could become part of a southern route connecting South Asia with the BRI. China perceives itself as being blocked by the United States to the east and southeast, but Greater Central Asia to the west with Afghanistan as a focal point has emerged in Chinese geopolitical thought as a region in which to break out of US encirclement.13 Beijing is aware that continued instability and anti-­Chinese developments could potentially mean losing the exit that its western borders offer, enveloping what to China appear to be non-­threatening and relatively friendly states. There are other drivers in the relationship between the PRC and Afghanistan. The presence of a large number of foreign troops in the immediate neighborhood makes Chinese military planners nervous, but neither does Beijing wish for a quick US exodus, as it would force China to act unilaterally. While US and Chinese aims have converged in Afghanistan, this is not necessarily the case in the rest of the world. Another important issue is the international drug trade. The center of heroin production has shifted away from Southeast Asia to Afghanistan, and opioids flow into both Central Asia and Pakistan,14 some of which travels on into China, where a major narcotics problem demands government attention.15,16 Afghanistan itself is also rich in mineral and energy reserves, which a resource-­hungry China could one day develop and consume.17 Chinese investors have proven themselves remarkably willing to sink long-­term financial stakes into projects in conflict-­ridden areas, with major projects in Afghanistan, Iraq and Sudan. All of these issues have directed the course of Sino-­ Afghan relations over the past decades, defining the playing field on which the relationship between Beijing and Kabul is built. This has not happened in a vacuum, and events in rural Afghanistan or industrial centers in China have often had reverberations throughout the world. Sometimes the connections between different events are obvious, but more often than not, they are opaque and can only be guessed at. Any discussion of the history of Sino-­Afghan relations must include Beijing’s Afghanistan policy, which is in reality a multistate approach rather than just a bilateral relationship.

The origins of the PRC’s Afghanistan policy The Chinese and the Mujahideen Many of Afghanistan’s modern international relations have their origins in the period following the Saur Revolution in 1978 and the subsequent military intervention by the Soviet Union. At the time, Sino-­Soviet relations were strained, and for Beijing, the appearance of the Red Army in neighboring Afghanistan was disconcerting. For many in the PRC’s politburo, the memory of the short-­lived Second East Turkestan Republic (1945–1949), which had enjoyed Soviet support, was close at hand.18 The prospect of a Kremlin satellite state on a sensitive border region played into the PRC’s

China in Afghanistan 159 fears of encirclement, and there was certainly a history of Russian involvement in China’s volatile border regions.19,20 Another geostrategic consideration was the balance of power in South Asia. A shared antipathy toward India, as well as other economic and military considerations, had fostered a close relationship between China and Pakistan.21 The contentious question of sovereignty over the Pashtun tribal belt, sometimes referred to as the Pashtunistan Issue,22 had driven hostility between Islamabad and Kabul for decades.23 Incorporating Afghanistan into the Soviet sphere of influence, coupled with increasingly close ties between Moscow and New Delhi, opened up the possibility for joint Russian-­Indian action that could significantly undermine the PRC’s only all-­weather ally, Pakistan. In response to the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, the PRC commenced a program of silent support for the growing Mujahedeen opposition movement.24 This maneuver brought China into line with the United States, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Iran, each of which supported different factions opposed to the Afghan Democratic Republic, each for their own reasons. Beijing became entangled with the internal affairs of a sovereign state – along with a group of “allies” that is hard to imagine today. Perhaps unsurprisingly, this policy is not highlighted in Chinese historiography. Funding and arms made in China began to trickle into Afghanistan.25 Despite abutting northern Afghanistan’s Wakhan Corridor, the PRC funneled most of the resources it provided to anti-­PDPA rebels through Pakistan. China was not alone in this; the United States and Saudi Arabia also heavily depended on the Pakistani authorities to manage their support for the Mujahedeen.26 According to some sources, by March 1985, the PRC had supplied Afghan opposition with as much as US$400 million.27 However, it was not long before geopolitical shifts occasioned a rethinking of Beijing’s position. By the early 1980s, tensions between the United States and the PRC were on the rise, and at the same time, Beijing’s relations with the USSR improved. Soviet efforts to support the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan’s (PDPA) regime were not as successful as had at first been feared. By now it appeared unlikely that Moscow would try to insert itself into the Pashtunistan issue, and the popularity of the anti-­Soviet jihad made further adventurism in the Islamic world unlikely. The worst-­case scenario of a pro-­Soviet rebellion in Xinjiang receded into the realm of Cold War alarmism, and Beijing turned away from its old Afghanistan policy. Only a few years after the beginning of the war in Afghanistan, Chinese financial and material support for the Mujahedeen had evaporated, and China had become one of the first states to disengage from Afghanistan. Setting the stage – north vs. south in a civil war Following the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan in 1989, the world’s attention turned away from Afghanistan. Policymakers in the United States and the European Union were far more interested in the new

160  Niklas Swanström and Julian Tucker trajectories of the states of Eastern Europe and post-­communist Russia than in the fate of war-­torn Afghanistan. The early 1990s were characterized by little interest in Afghanistan. After sinking millions into the war, sponsoring states were unable or unwilling to continue financial support. Both the PDPA government and its Mujahedeen opponents were left to fend for themselves, with Washington and Moscow joining Beijing in disengaging from Afghanistan. Even as the global powers had disengaged from Afghanistan, the Cold War frontlines persisted, and the fighting continued, as it does in some form in the present day. Even without the sponsorship of the great powers, the war in Afghanistan dragged on, and regional powers wielded more influence. Pakistan, still a close ally of both the United States and the PRC – and to a lesser extent the Islamic Republic of Iran, only recently emerging from the massively destructive Iran-­Iraq War – and some of the newly independent states of former Soviet Central Asia, would attempt to direct the course of the war. Despite the end of the USSR’s backing, and defying expectations, the PDPA government of Najibullah Ahmadzai persisted until early 1992.28 By adroitly playing various factions off against one another, the PDPA managed to exploit the disunity of the confederation arrayed against it. Najibullah’s communist government controlled only a small portion of Afghanistan: the government’s control during this period barely extended beyond Kabul, a few urban centers and the roads linking them. As the regime began to unfold and the opposition took hold over greater and greater parts of the country, rifts began to emerge within the Mujahideen. As the question of who would rule Afghanistan after the collapse of the PDPA began to loom ever larger, the alliance of Islamic resistance fighters began to develop two distinctive poles: one in the north and one in the south. Ethnic minority groups in the more sparsely populated north and east of the country generally did better under the PDPA’s government29. Minority groups like the Tajiks, Hazara, Uzbeks and Turks, marginalized by previous Pashtun-­dominated governments, became more prominent.30 Nevertheless, there were successful anti-­communist forces in the north, notably the successful Ahmad Shah Massoud of the Jamiat-­e Islami, who built an extensive power base in the Panjshir Valley of the northeastern Afghanistan. Northern Mujahideen were much further removed from sources of funding provided by the international community and were therefore less dependent on and more hostile toward Pakistan. This also made them more willing to explore new sources of funding, leading to increasing involvement in the nascent northern narcotics trafficking route.31 Cultural and linguistic affinity with the peoples of Central Asia helped form smuggling routes and facilitated contact between pro-­and anti-­communist forces. A more flexible and conciliatory approach meant that members of the crumbling communist state were more likely to surrender to and merge with groups based in the north. In southern Afghanistan, the Mujahideen fronts were dominated by Ghilzai and Durrani Pashtuns, historically the dominant groups in

China in Afghanistan 161 Afghanistan.32 The entrenched tribal structure of the Pashtun south differed greatly from the social norms of northern Afghanistan and clashed with the communist government and its Soviet sponsors. Unlike their northern counterparts, these resistance groups benefited from international funding and could operate from safe havens outside Afghan territory. Southern Mujahideen could make use of the porous border with Pakistan for tactical reasons33 and relied on international support funneled through the Inter-­ Service Intelligence (ISI) of Pakistan. Since much of the Jihad’s operations were being bankrolled form overseas, there was less pressure to find new sources of income within the country. However, dependence on the ISI made the southern fighters more reliant on Pakistan and in some cases alienated them from the local population. The presence of Mujahideen outside of Afghan territory also allowed for more access to international journalists, as well as non-­Afghan volunteers eager to participate in the struggle against the Soviet Union. The result was that the Southern Mujahideen increasingly began to incorporate an internationalist-­jihadist narrative that would form the basis of much of Afghanistan’s later history. Ultimately, the inability of the southern Mujahideen to gain political or military success led to the rise of a new force in the south: the Taliban. Fed up with their long-­time clients, the ISI shifted support to this new movement, hoping it could form a pliant government for Afghanistan which could be steered from Islamabad. With Pakistani support, the Taliban grew rapidly, attracting former Mujahedeen fighters from southern Afghanistan and young religious students, many of whom hailed from Pakistan. By 1996 the movement had become the premiere force in southern Afghanistan, easily incorporating or sweeping away opposition and ultimately taking Kabul. The meteoric rise to prominence made the Taliban the main force in the southern axis. Like their predecessors, they retained certain hallmarks of power vital for ruling in southern Afghanistan: the Pashtun tribal organization, the backing of Pakistan and support from Islamist and increasingly Jihadist organizations from abroad. This brought them into contact with the northern axis, which almost immediately came to oppose the Taliban. For Beijing, the question of who ruled in Afghanistan was of secondary importance. China had been largely content to ignore the war, giving Islamabad a tacit green light to try and promote stability, or at least pursue its own interests. However, inaction should not be mistaken for apathy: the PRC realized it had little to gain through direct intervention. Despite technically abutting Afghanistan, the remoteness of the narrow strip of shared border in the Wakhan corridor effectively separated the two countries from one another. States which took an interventionist line had little to show for their efforts: the USSR had been severely bloodied despite investing enormous resources and labor. Iran and Pakistan were both major backers of parties in the Afghan civil war, yet with little or no benefit to Tehran or Islamabad. coordinated Gradually, however, this calculation began to shift. Well-­ and devastating terror attacks in Xinjiang, first in 1992 and again 1997,

162  Niklas Swanström and Julian Tucker presumably orchestrated by Uyghur radicals, highlighted the dangers of Islamist terrorism.34 The attacks on American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998 demonstrated the reach and scope of movements like Al-­ Qaeda35, ushering in an era of internationalist violent extremism.36 Beijing was aware that Uyghur activists had made their way to Afghanistan and Pakistan, probably establishing contact with Afghan Arabs and other jihadist organizations. With no rule of law, rampant violence and widespread access to weapons, Afghanistan could potentially be used to establish supply bases and training camps for China’s enemies. Beijing was aware that Taliban support for Uyghur Islamists stemmed from two needs: the drive to establish military control over the whole of Afghanistan meant that the Taliban were willing to welcome “foreign fighters.” First, the battlefield roles played by the remaining Afghan Arabs and later the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) were a testament to the Taliban’s willingness to host non-­Afghan jihadists so long as they remained loyal to the Emir.37 Second, the isolation of the Taliban meant that the leadership was willing to embrace whatever sources of income they could find. This was evinced by the continued presence of the wealthy yet difficult-­to-­ control Osama Bin Laden, who was able to pay for much of the development in the Taliban’s core areas.38,39 Beijing began to cautiously establish contact with the Taliban, facilitated by Islamabad.40 These contacts go back to at least 1999, though it is likely that they extend further back to when Taliban pre-­eminence became apparent. The most immediate purpose of China’s Afghanistan policy was to secure a guarantee from the leadership that the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan would not provide Uyghur militants with a safe haven from which to attack China. At the same time, the rapid growth in Chinese investments in both Pakistan and the former Soviet States of Central Asia meant that the PRC stood to lose more to destabilization radiating from Afghanistan than ever before. Other secondary issues, like China’s anti-­narcotics platform41 and a growing HIV epidemic42 demanded some kind of response from Beijing. The anti-­Taliban coalition in the north – that is, the aforementioned northern axis – meanwhile had little to offer the PRC, dependent as these fighters were on drug smuggling and evidently not in a position to control the country as a whole. All things being equal, most seasoned gamblers would have bet on the Taliban and not the crumbling Northern Alliance in the pre-­2001 period. The diplomatic exchange between China and the Taliban culminated in December 2000, when the PRC’s ambassador to Pakistan, Lu Shulin, met with the paramount leader of the Taliban Mullah Mohammad Omar in Kandahar.43 The reclusive Mullah Omar, who rarely met with foreigners and was notoriously hesitant to appear in public (so much so that only two photographs of him are believed to exist), personally assured Lu that the Taliban would not permit militants seeking to harm China to operate on their territory. In exchange, Beijing was asked to provide two things that the

China in Afghanistan 163 Taliban desperately needed to consolidate their status as the de facto government of Afghanistan: diplomatic recognition and protection from UN sanctions. At this point, only Pakistan, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia had recognized the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan as a sovereign state, so Chinese support would go a long way toward cementing the Taliban’s ambition to become a fully fledged government. But while both sides had to gain from this cooperation, neither was willing to go the full distance. Both parties may have been waiting for the other to make the first move, and any agreement is likely to have stalled because of a lack of trust. The Taliban and the Chinese knew little of one another and depended on Islamabad to broker any kind of agreement.44 It is not inconceivable that Pakistan wished to drag out negotiations for its own purposes. It appears that the Taliban did curb overt action by Uyghur Islamist groups, but Uyghur fighters were allowed to join other groups, most notably the IMU, which at this point largely consisted of Turkic militants who had both a linguistic and a cultural affinity with the populations of Xinjiang.45 At the same time, while the PRC did abstain from sanctions targeting the Taliban, Beijing was not yet ready to make use of its coveted veto power in the UN Security Council to block such sanctions. However, the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks and the subsequent US-­led invasion would ultimately derail the relationship, though some contact lingered. A new balance From China’s perspective, the presence of the US military in Afghanistan was not greeted with enthusiasm. Beijing, ever skeptical of interventionist adventures, especially in its greater neighborhood, advocated an approach that would see the fate of Afghanistan in Afghan hands. As the Taliban became an insurgent movement and the conflict in Afghanistan became increasingly drawn out and deadly, the interests of the United States and the PRC converged. Both countries hoped that some kind of accord could be reached and a stable future guaranteed. In the United States, a war weary population and overstretched budget made the continued presence of American troops a dubious prospect. A collapse of the internationally backed government and the return of a pro-­Jihadist, virulently anti-­American Taliban government or an unending spiral of lawlessness and civil war would be inimical to the United States and most regional states. Beijing was also gravely concerned about the threat of instability, fearing the spread radicalization and the spillover of violence into Chinese territory. The large investments by Chinese stakeholders in and around Afghanistan have also made Beijing more vulnerable to conflict in the areas surrounding Afghanistan.46 Afghan security forces have in recent years attempted to take on a more active role in providing security in the country. But the bloody realities of the ongoing war have made clear that without external backing, Kabul will not be able to contain the Taliban-­led insurgency. While the bulk of foreign

164  Niklas Swanström and Julian Tucker combat troops left Afghanistan by the end of 2014, a smaller contingent has remained behind. Criticism by the United States of the PRC’s unwillingness to contribute to guaranteeing security while benefiting from investments has cast Beijing as a free-­rider in Afghanistan and Iraq. While it is true that Beijing is not averse to allowing the United States to bear the brunt of operations against extremists, it does not advocate a permanent US military presence in an area, which it views as becoming part of its sphere of influence. Efforts by China to facilitate peace by economic and political means have recently begun to become more visible.47 While Beijing is careful not to draw too much attention to its security strategies in Afghanistan and Pakistan, Chinese security forces are believed to be involved in helping the Afghan army and national police raise their levels of professionalism.48 Even if it appears unlikely that the People’s Liberation Army will be deployed to Afghanistan any time soon, Chinese security policy could be based on mutual training exercises, arms supplies and logistical assistance.49 Such military-­to-­military contacts have already taken place in the immediate neighborhood, with PLA advisors supporting security forces in Pakistan and in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), which was established to promote security cooperation and combat terrorism in Central Asia and which includes both the PRC and Russia, has been key to Beijing’s security policies abroad. Pakistan, Afghanistan and India all hold observer status in the organization, with Islamabad and New Delhi slated to become full members by 2017.50 The inclusion of both Central and South Asian states in the SCO speaks to the desire to fuse the two regions. Beijing is seeking to stabilize its neighboring region in this way by creating effective and manageable institutions which can be used to create a favorable security paradigm. While the major focus rests on trade relations and economics, there is a large military component to this, as assets and investments need to be safeguarded from potential disruptions. The growing export of military equipment from China to both Pakistan and Uzbekistan speaks to Beijing’s desire to shore up its regional allies in an effort to promote their internal stability and ability to react to domestic threats but also to crack down on anti-­Chinese forces.51 This “securitization” of investment policy has been a driving force behind the BRI strategy of the PRC. This enormous undertaking would see Chinese capital and resource markets being employed as an engine to solidify infrastructure and investment schemes abroad. The states of post-­Soviet Central Asia are solidly entrenched in the Northern Sphere, the so-­called New Silk Road, while Pakistan is key to China’s access to the Persian Gulf through the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). Afghanistan straddles both these branches of the Silk Road, and in terms of security, it is the pivot on which Beijing’s ambitions hinge. The old dream of having Afghanistan as the connecting element between the markets of Central Asia and South Asia has persisted but has also been flipped. A fundamental weakness of the BRI is that a huge amount of trade can be disrupted with relatively minor effort. If any single link in the supply chain is destroyed, the entire undertaking is jeopardized.

China in Afghanistan 165 Two important, related developments in Afghanistan have recently come to shake at Beijing’s calculation on Afghanistan. The first is the shift of the locus of the war toward Afghanistan’s northern frontiers. Where previously the insurgency was largely confined to the southern part of country, with Pashtun fighters making up the bulk of the anti-­Kabul elements, it has now expanded northward into new areas, coming much closer to China’s New Silk Road. However, in recent years, the Taliban have been able to make gains with ethnic minorities and tap into the power structures of the north, including along the border with Afghanistan. Although the appalling levels of violence against civilians means that it will be almost impossible for the Taliban to conquer the hearts and minds of all Afghans,52 the movement has still been able to take advantage of disaffection outside of its historical power base. Beyond Afghanistan’s border to the north, this development has caused panic as the governments of Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan fear the potential of a spillover of violence that could ignite challenges to their own authority. The intensification of fighting north of the Hindukush has also alarmed Chinese stakeholders in Central Asia. It has become increasingly clear to Beijing that its stake in Central Asia is no longer as secure as it once was. Another important development that has changed the character of the insurgency is the entrance into the conflict of a new force: the Afghan franchise of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria group (usually referred as ISIS­K).53 Allied with the Pakistani Taliban movement, the group is hostile to both Kabul and Islamabad. Critically, it is also at odds with the Afghan Taliban, having emerged form splinter groups that broke away from the Quetta Shura after the revelation in 2015 that the paramount Taliban leader Mullah Omar had died sometime in 2013 and the ensuing power struggle. Although this split the insurgency, and there are some indications that the Taliban has engaged ISIS-­K fighters and groups, there has been some debate about how irreconcilable the two groups’ positions are. Whatever the case, ISIS-­K has established a foothold in Nangarhar Province, near the border with Pakistan and the Khyber Pass, which has long linked neighboring regions.54 This split has further complicated an already extremely complex situation and serves to highlight the question of what degree of authority any single leadership entity has within the Taliban movement.

A way forward between Kabul and Kandahar The historical development of Sino-­Afghan relations shows that Beijing has been willing to cultivate contacts with both the internationally recognized Islamic Republic of Afghanistan in Kabul and with the Quetta Shura’s Taliban insurgency. Key to understanding the Chinese approach to conflict in Afghanistan is the recognition that it is pragmatic rather than idealistic. This has allowed Beijing to develop ties with several sides in the Afghanistan conflict and at least in theory makes it potentially influential with both sides in the ongoing fighting. The US Afghanistan policy, by contrast, has not been

166  Niklas Swanström and Julian Tucker as free to put realpolitik before domestic politics, one prominent example being the impossibility of recognizing the early Taliban government of the mid 1990s. Steve Coll vividly describes how a push by the influential oil and gas firm Unocal to improve relations with the Taliban to facilitate the construction of a pipeline linking the energy reserves of the newly independent Turkmenistan with the ports of Pakistan through Herat was derailed.55 One prominent factor hindering the deepening of contact with the Taliban leadership was the Islamic Emirate’s treatment of women, which prompted lobby groups in Washington, notably the Feminist Majority Foundation, to oppose any kind of interactions.56 Given the current structure of China’s political system, it seems highly unlikely that such domestic policy concerns would trump economic or security interests. Whether the PRC can leverage its influence in Afghanistan and neighboring countries to foster peace remains to be seen. There are some signs that the Taliban themselves are trying to become more palatable as a governing body. It appears that the Taliban and Moscow have taken the unprecedented step of establishing contact, something that even a few years ago would have seemed highly unlikely.57 This probably has to do with Russia’s security assets in Central Asia, especially in Tajikistan, where Moscow’s security forces continue to play a major role. As the insurgency takes hold in the northern part of the country the Taliban have increasingly come into contact with Russian interests but also with Chinese interests.58 At the same time, Russia and China, as well as the United States, Iran and Pakistan, are extremely hostile to the globalist ambitions of ISIS. All of these states, despite various degrees of hostility to one another, have engaged the jihadist group in some form or another in order to contain it. This has allowed the Taliban to draw a contrast between themselves and the more extreme vision of ISIS, essentially looking good by contrast. By publicly denouncing and combatting the supporters of the Baghdadi ­Caliphate – many of whom were renegades from the movement – the Taliban can align themselves with Moscow and Beijing and quite possibly become eligible for support.59 At the same time, the presence of ISIS as an alternate Islamist force in Afghanistan allows the Taliban to present themselves as moderates also within the country. There have been at least some indications that the Taliban has adopted a more conciliatory approach toward the country’s minority groups.60 By gaining support among disaffected minorities, the movement broadens its support base beyond the traditional southern axis on which it has based itself.61 The Quetta Shura also seems to have significantly softened its stance on the country’s Shiite population, which both makes it more acceptable to Iran and helps contrast it to the virulently anti-­Shiite ISIS-­K. In one recent episode, a number of Shiite Hazara hostages who were being held by ISIS-­K-­aligned forces were liberated and protected by Taliban fighters.62 Such moves can be interpreted as part of a wider approach to winning public opinion and propaganda by the Quetta Shura.

China in Afghanistan 167 Beijing could probably live with – and even support – a Taliban government in Afghanistan, provided that the leadership guaranteed the PRC’s core demands: curbing Uyghur violent extremism, promoting regional stability and safeguarding Chinese investment. An Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan led by the Quetta Shura, whether based in Kabul or in Kandahar, would probably be all too happy to accept these conditions in exchange for diplomatic recognition and financial support. However, despite attempts to change and increase military capacity to challenge the Afghan government in Kabul, the Taliban do not enjoy widespread popular support. Neither the Kabul government nor the various non-­state opponents of the Islamic Emirate (ISIS-­K being only one of many) are likely to accept the hegemony of the Taliban without a struggle, and popular opinion is not with the movement.63 At the same time, it is questionable how disciplined the Taliban’s leadership actually is and how much control the movement wields over its many members.64 The PRC may be well positioned politically and economically to influence both sides, but at this point, neither the Taliban nor the Ghani administration are in a position to control the entire country. Although the trend of the conflict seems to favor the Taliban at the moment, total victory is all but impossible. Should Beijing elect to throw its weight behind either side, the precarious situation of Chinese investments and development policy would incentivize the opposition to attempt to strike against its interests in both Central Asia and South Asia. Policymakers in Beijing are acutely aware of these issues and will continue to inject their Afghanistan policy with ample caution. As the PRC’s role as an agent promoting security and development policy grows in the near future, its engagement with Afghanistan will no doubt increase. All things remaining equal, the potential risks to Chinese investment and current foreign policy doctrine mean that Beijing’s involvement will probably take on the characteristics of a tide, with a series of gradual advances and retreats leading inexorably forward, rather than a crashing tidal wave. However, events in the rest of the world will continue to develop at a rapid pace, and this may force the hand of various actors. The onset of environmental instability stemming from climate change, upsets caused by technological revolutions or sudden changes in trade or foreign policy brought on by electoral upheavals in a globalized world all add to a general climate of uncertainty. In this period of rapid transformation, policymakers in both the PRC and Afghanistan may well be confronted by an unexpected and radical turn of events.

Notes 1 The authors are grateful for research and formatting assistance provided by Carine Monteiro Da Silva and Sharanya Thakur. 2 Dalrymple, William, Return of a King: The Battle for Afghanistan. London: Bloomsbury, 2013. 3 Frederick Starr, Xinjiang China’s Muslim Borderland (M. E. Sharpe, 2004).

168  Niklas Swanström and Julian Tucker 4 Carrie Gracie, The Knife Attack That Changed Kunming, BBC News, July 16, 2014, www.bbc.com/­news/­world-­asia-­28305109. 5 Robbie Gramer, The Islamic State Pledged to Attack China Next. Here’s Why. Foreign Policy, March 1, 2017, http://­foreignpolicy.com/­2017/­03/­01/­ the-­islamic-­state-­pledged-­to-­attack-­china-­next-­heres-­why/­. 6 Sui-­ Lee Wee, Chinese Police Blame Separatist Group for Urumqi Bombing: Xinhua, Reuters, May 18, 2014, www.reuters.com/­article/­us-­china-­xinjiang-­ idUSBREA4H01O20140518. 7 Ehsan, Mohammad Mansoor, Afghanistan-­ China Relations: 1955–2012, Himalayan and Central Asian Studies, Vol. 17 no. 3–4 (July-­December 2013): 230–250. 8 China Looks Towards Iran, The Huffington Post, May 6, 2016, www.huff and ingtonpost.com/­china-­hands/­china-­looks-­towards-­iran_b_9856930.html Sajjad Hussain, China’s CPEC Investment in Pakistan Reaches $62 Billion, Livemint, April 12, 2017, www.livemint.com/­Politics/­dB5tQKISoKNrvl7EwDPFbP/­ Chinas-­CPEC-­investment-­in-­Pakistan-­reaches-­62-­billion.html. 9 Daniel, Frank Jack and Mirwais Harooni, Chinese Demands, Rebels and Buddhist Ruins Stall Afghan Copper Dream. Reuters, April 12, 2015, www.reuters. com/­article/­us-­afghanistan-­china-­copper/­chinese-­demands-­rebels-­and-­buddhist-­ ruins-­stall-­afghan-­copper-­dream-­idUSKBN0N304320150412. 10 Armin Rosen, This Map Shows Which Countries Export Weapons to India and Pakistan, Business Insider, March 19, 2015, www.businessinsider.com/­ this-­map-­shows-­which-­countries-­export-­weapons-­to-­india-­and-­pakistan-­2015-­ 3?r=US&IR=T&IR=T. 11 Huffington Post, China Looks Towards Iran. May 7, 2017, www.huffington post.com/­china-­hands/­china-­looks-­towards-­iran_b_9856930.html. 12 President Xi Jinping Delivers Important Speech and Proposes to Build a Silk Road Economic Belt with Central Asian Countries, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, September 7, 2013, www.fmprc.gov.cn/­mfa_ eng/­topics_665678/­xjpfwzysiesgjtfhshzzfh_665686/­t1076334.shtml. 13 Niklas Swanström, Congressional Hearing, March 18, 2015, www.uscc.gov/­ sites/­default/­files/­Swanstrom%20Testimony_3.18.15.pdf. 14 Aikins, Matthieu, Afghanistan: The Making of a Narco State. Rolling Stone, December 4, 2014, www.rollingstone.com/­politics/­news/­afghanistan-­the-­making-­ of-­a-­narco-­state-­20141204. 15 Niklas Swanström and Yin He, China’s War on Narcotics: Two Perspectives, Silk Road Paper, December 2006, https://­books.google.se/­books/­about/­China_s_war_ on_narcotics.html?id=hATDAAAAIAAJ&redir_esc=y. 16 Swanström, Niklas and Yin He, China’s War on Narcotics: Two Perspectives. Central Asia-­Caucasus Institute and Silk Road Studies Program, December 2006, http://­isdp.eu/­content/­uploads/­publications/­2006_swanstrom-­he_chinas-­war-­ on-­narcotics.pdf. 17 James Risen, U.S. Identifies Vast Mineral Riches in Afghanistan, New York Times, June13, 2010, www.nytimes.com/­2010/­06/­14/­world/­asia/­14minerals.html. 18 James A. Millward and Nabijan Tursun, Political History and Strategies of Control, 1884–1978, in Fred Starr (ed) Xinjiang: China’s Muslim Borderland (M. E. Sharpe, 2004), 63–100. 19 “Soviet-­based Muslim guerrillas were reportedly encouraged to raid Chinese border posts in Xinjiang. The Russians hoped to take advantage of the internal ferment caused by the Cultural Revolution and strengthen forces in the leadership that were opposed to Mao.,” Jonathan Steele, Soviet Power (Simon and Schuster, 1984). 20 “Moscow was quick to exploit the deteriorating situation in the region. Doubled since January 1967, Uyghur broadcasts from Radio Tashkent not only

China in Afghanistan 169 condemned Chinese persecution of Xinjiang’s Muslim nationalities but also encouraged the Uyghurs to revolt against Chinese rule, offering them refuge. Moreover, Moscow encouraged and probably organized Kazakhstan-­based ethnic guerrillas to raid Xinjiang’s frontier posts. According to a Xinjiang refugee leader, 5,000 such raids took place in 1966 alone. Sino-­Soviet tension along the border continued, leading to several incidents in 1967.” Starr, S. Frederick, Xinjiang: China’s Muslim Borderland (M. E. Sharpe, 2004). 21 Rosen, Armin, This Map Shows Which Countries Export Weapons to India and Pakistan. Business Insider, March 19, 2015, https://­businessinsider.com/­ this-­map-­shows-­which-­countries-­export-­weapons-­to-­india-­and-­pakistan-­2015– 3?r=US&IR=T&IR=T. 22 “After the 1947 Partition of India, the government of Afghanistan found an opportunity to reclaim the lands lost to British India as a result of the Durand Line Agreement in 1893. These lands, known as Pashtunistan, were annexed to Pakistan. The issue of Pashtunistan’s fate became the backbone of Afghanistan’s foreign and domestic policies.” Faridullah Bezhan, The Pashtunistan Issue and Politics in Afghanistan, 1947–1952. The Middle East Journal, Vol. 68, no. 2 (Spring 2014): 197–209(13). 23 Bezhan, Faridullah, The Pashtunistan Issue and Politics in Afghanistan, 1947– 1952. Middle East Journal, Vol. 68, no 2 (Spring 2014): 197–209. 24 Frederick Starr, Xinjiang China’s Muslim Borderland (M. E. Sharpe, 2004). 25 “Thus, the Chinese provided a sizeable number of Soviet-­ designed arms to the Afghan mujahideen groups to contain Soviet expansionism. They used the Wakhan corridor (Chitral) route and the bulk of them were routed through Peshawar. Soviet-­style light weapons and stores came to the insurgents in the northeast from China, despite severe logistical problems. . . . China supplied Sam-­7s, RPG-­7 anti-­tank rockets, sophisticated land mines and heavy antiaircraft machine guns to the resistant groups.,” A.Z Hilali, China’s Response to the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan, Central Asian Survey Journal, Vol. 20 (2001). 26 Steve Coll, Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001 (Penguin Books, 2004). 27 Ahmad Bilal Khalil, The Rise of China-­Afghanistan Security Relations, The Diplomat, June 23, 2016, http://­thediplomat.com/­2016/­06/­the-­rise-­of-­china-­ afghanistan-­security-­relations/­. 28 William Maley, The Afghanistan Wars (Palgrave Macmillan, 2009). 29 Newell, Richard S, Post-­Soviet Afghanistan: The Position of the Minorities. Asian Survey, Vol. 29, no. 11 (November 1989): 1090–1108. 30 Richard S. Newell, Post-­Soviet Afghanistan: The Position of the Minorities, Asian Survey, Vol. 29, no. 11 (1989). 31 Matthieu Aikins, Afghanistan: The Making of a Narco State, RollingStone, December 4, 2014, www.rollingstone.com/­politics/­news/­afghanistan-­the-­making-­of-­a-­ narco-­state-­20141204. 32 Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia (New Haven: Yale University Press, Second Edition, 2010). 33 Ali Ahmad Jalali, Afghan Guerrilla War: In the Words of the Mujahideen Fighters (Zenith Press, 2002). 34 Teresa Poole Peking, China Blames ’criminals‘ for Bus Bomb, The Independent, March 10, 1997, www.independent.co.uk/­news/­world/­china-­blames-­criminals-­ for-­bus-­bomb-­1272112.html. 35 CNN, 1998 US Embassies in Africa Bombings Fast Facts. August 9, 2017, https://­edition.cnn.com/­2013/­10/­06/­world/­africa/­africa-­embassy-­bombings-­fast-­ facts/­index.html. 36 1998 U.S. Embassies in Africa Bombings Fast Facts, CNN, August 3, 2016, http://­ edition.cnn.com/­2013/­10/­06/­world/­africa/­africa-­embassy-­bombings-­fast-­facts/­.

170  Niklas Swanström and Julian Tucker 37 Alex Strick van Linschoten and Felix Kuehn, An Enemy We Created: The Myth of the Taliban-­al Qaeda Merger in Afghanistan (Oxford University Press, 2012). 38 Steve Coll, Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001 (Penguin Books, 2004). 39 Coll, Steve, Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001. London: Penguin Books, 2004. 40 Small, Andrew, Why Is China Talking to the Taliban? Foreign Policy June 21, 2013, http://­foreignpolicy.com/­2013/­06/­21/­why-­is-­china-­talking-­to-­the-­taliban/­. 41 Niklas Swanström and Yin He, China’s War on Narcotics: Two Perspectives, Silk Road Paper, December 2006, https://­books.google.se/­books/­about/­China_s_ war_on_narcotics.html?id=hATDAAAAIAAJ&redir_esc=y. 42 Hyde, Sandra Teresa, Eating Spring Rice: The Cultural Politics of AIDS in Southwest China. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007. 43 Andrew Small, Why Is China Talking to the Taliban? Foreign Policy, June 21, 2013, http://­foreignpolicy.com/­2013/­06/­21/­why-­is-­china-­talking-­to-­the-­taliban/­. 44 Small, Andrew, The Sino-­Pakistani Axis: Asia’s “Little Understood” Relationship. DW, January 15, 2015, www.dw.com/­en/­the-­sino-­pakistani-­axis-­asias-­ little-­understood-­relationship/­a-­18194448. 45 Mansoor Ehsan, Mohammad, Afghanistan-­China Relations, 1955–2012. Himalayan and Central Asian Studies, Vol. 17, no. 3–4, July–December 2013. 46 Swanström, Niklas, The Security Dimension of the China-­Central Asia Relationship: China’s Military Engagement with Central Asian Countries. Congressional Testimony, March 18, 2015, www.uscc.gov/­sites/­default/­files/­Swanstrom. 47 Frank Jack Daniel and Mirwais Harooni, Chinese Demands, Rebels and Buddhist Ruins Stall Afghan Copper Dream, Reuters, April 11, 2015, www.reuters. com/­article/­us-­afghanistan-­china-­copper-­idUSKBN0N304320150412. 48 Charles Cover, Mystery Deepens Over Chinese Forces in Afghanistan, Financial Times, February 26, 2017, www.ft.com/­content/­0c8a5a2a-­f9b7-­11e6-­9516-­ 2d969e0d3b65. 49 Cover, Charles, Mystery deepens over Chinese forces in Afghanistan. Financial Times, February 26, 2017, www.ft.com/­content/­0c8a5a2a-­f9b7-­11e6-­9516-­2d 969e0d3b65. 50 Elena Kosolapova, India, Pakistan to Become SCO Full Members in June, Trend News Agency, April 21, 2017, http://­en.trend.az/­casia/­kazakhstan/­2745024. html. 51 Charles Cover, Mystery Deepens Over Chinese Forces in Afghanistan, Financial Times, February 26, 2017, www.ft.com/­content/­0c8a5a2a-­f9b7-­11e6-­9516-­ 2d969e0d3b65. 52 Ghulam Farooq Mujaddidi, Why the Taliban Cannot Win the Afghan War, The Diplomat, April 1, 2017, http://­thediplomat.com/­2017/­04/­why-­the-­taliban-­can not-­win-­the-­afghan-­war/­. 53 Johnson, Casey Garret, Special Report 395: The Rise and Stall of the Islamic State in Afghanistan. United States Institute of Peace, November 2016. www. usip.org/­sites/­default/­files/­SR395-­The-­Rise-­and-­Stall-­of-­the-­Islamic-­State-­in-­ Afghanistan.pdf. 54 Special Report 395, The Rise and Stall of the Islamic State in Afghanistan, United States Institute of Peace, November 2016, www.usip.org/­sites/­default/­ files/­SR395-­The-­Rise-­and-­Stall-­of-­the-­Islamic-­State-­in-­Afghanistan.pdf. 55 Steve Coll, Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001 (Penguin Books, 2004). 56 Campaign for Afghan Women & Girls, Feminist Majority Foundation, 2014, retrieved May 4, 2017.

China in Afghanistan 171 57 Maija Liuhto and Shashank Bengali, Why Russia Might Be Working with Its Cold War Enemy, the Taliban, Los Angeles Times, April 10, 2017, www.latimes. com/­world/­la-­fg-­afghanistan-­russia-­taliban-­2017-­story.html. 58 BBC News, Russia Denies It Is Supplying the Taliban After Nato General Claim. March 24, 2017, www.bbc.com/­news/­world-­asia-­39383726. 59 Russia Denies It Is Supplying the Taliban After Nato General Claim, BBC News, March 24, 2017, www.bbc.com/­news/­world-­asia-­39383726. 60 Bezhan, Frud, Ethnic Minorities Are Fueling the Taliban’s Expansion in Afghanistan. Foreign Policy, June 15, 2016, http://­foreignpolicy.com/­2016/­06/­15/­ethnic-­ minorities-­are-­fueling-­the-­talibans-­expansion-­in-­afghanistan/­. 61 Frud Bezhan, Ethnic Minorities Are Fueling the Taliban’s Expansion in Afghanistan, Foreign Policy (June 15, 2016), http://­foreignpolicy.com/­2016/­06/­15/­ ethnic-­minorities-­are-­fueling-­the-­talibans-­expansion-­in-­afghanistan/­. 62 Ismael Shahamat, Kidnapped by IS, Saved by the Taliban, BBC News, December 26, 2015, www.bbc.com/­news/­world-­asia-­35041759. 63 Ghulam Farooq Mujaddidi, Why the Taliban Cannot Win the Afghan War, The Diplomat, April 1, 2017, http://­thediplomat.com/­2017/­04/­why-­the-­taliban-­can not-­win-­the-­afghan-­war/­. 64 Andrew Small, The Sino-­Pakistani Axis: Asia‘ s ‘little understood’ Relationship, Deutsche Welle, January 15, 2015, www.dw.com/­en/­the-­sino-­pakistani-­axis-­ asias-­little-­understood-­relationship/­a-­18194448.

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172  Niklas Swanström and Julian Tucker Feminist Majority Foundation. 2014. Campaign for Afghan Women and Girls. Retrieved May 4, 2017. Gracie, Carrie. 2014. The Knife Attack That Changed Kunming. BBC News, July 16. www.bbc.com/­news/­world-­asia-­28305109. Gramer, Robbie. 2017. The Islamic State Pledged to Attack China Next. Here’s Why. Foreign Policy, March 1. http://­foreignpolicy.com/­2017/­03/­01/­the-­islamic-­ state-­pledged-­to-­attack-­china-­next-­heres-­why/­. Hilali, A. Z. 2001. China’s Response to the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan. Central Asian Survey 20 (3): 323–351. Huffington Post. 2017. China Looks Towards Iran, May 7. www.huffingtonpost. com/­china-­hands/­china-­looks-­towards-­iran_b_9856930.html. Hussain, Sajjad. 2017. China’s CPEC Investment in Pakistan Reaches $62 Billion. Livemint, April 12. www.livemint.com/­Politics/­dB5tQKISoKNrvl7EwDPFbP/­ Chinas-­CPEC-­investment-­in-­Pakistan-­reaches-­62-­billion.html. Hyde, Sandra Teresa. 2007. Eating Spring Rice: The Cultural Politics of AIDS in Southwest China. Berkeley: University of California Press. Jalali, Ali Ahmad, and Lester W. Grau. 2002. Afghan Guerrilla Warfare: In the Words of the Mujahideen Fighters. Minneapolis: Zenith Press. Johnson, Casey Garret. 2016. Special Report 395: The Rise and Stall of the Islamic State in Afghanistan. United States Institute of Peace, November. www.usip.org/­ sites/­default/­files/­SR395-­The-­Rise-­and-­Stall-­of-­the-­Islamic-­State-­in-­Afghanistan. pdf. Khalil, Ahmad Bilal. 2016. The Rise of China-­Afghanistan Security Relations. The Diplomat, June 23. https://­thediplomat.com/­2016/­06/­the-­rise-­of-­china-­afghanistan-­ security-­relations/­. Kosolapova, Elena. 2017. India, Pakistan to Become SCO Full Members in June. Trend News Agency, April 21. https://­en.trend.az/­casia/­kazakhstan/­2745024. html. Maley, William. 2009. The Afghanistan Wars. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Millward, James, and Nabijan Tursun. 2003. Political History and Strategies of Control, 1884–1978. Xinjiang: China’s Muslim Frontier, edited by Frederick Starr, 63–100. New York: M.E. Sharpe. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China. 2013. President Xi Jinping Delivers Important Speech and Proposes to Build a Silk Road Economic Belt with Central Asian Countries, September 7. www.fmprc.gov.cn/­mfa_eng/­ topics_665678/­xjpfwzysiesgjtfhshzzfh_665686/­t1076334.shtml. Mujaddidi, Ghulam Farooq. 2017. Why the Taliban Cannot Win the Afghan War. The Diplomat, April 1. https://­thediplomat.com/­2017/­04/­why-­the-­taliban-­ cannot-­win-­the-­afghan-­war/­. Newell, Richard S. 1989. Post-­Soviet Afghanistan: The Position of the Minorities. Asian Survey 29 (11) November: 1090–1108. Peking, Teresa Poole. 1997. China Blames ‘criminals’ for Bus Bomb. The Independent, March 10. Rashid, Ahmed. 2010. Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil, and Fundamentalism in Central Asia, 2nd ed. New Haven: Yale University Press. Rosen, Armin. 2015. This Map Shows Which Countries Export Weapons to India and Pakistan. Business Insider, March 19. https://­businessinsider.com/­ this-­map-­shows-­which-­countries-­export-­weapons-­to-­india-­and-­pakistan-­2015– 3?r=US&IR=T&IR=T.

China in Afghanistan 173 Shahamat, Ismael. 2015. Kidnapped by IS, Saved by the Taliban. BBC News, December 26. www.bbc.com/­news/­world-­asia-­35041759. Small, Andrew. 2013. Why Is China Talking to the Taliban? Foreign Policy, June 21. http://­foreignpolicy.com/­2013/­06/­21/­why-­is-­china-­talking-­to-­the-­taliban/­. Small, Andrew. 2015. The Sino-­ Pakistani Axis: Asia’s ‘little understood’ Relationship. DW, January 15. www.dw.com/­en/­the-­sino-­pakistani-­axis-­asias-­little-­ understood-­relationship/­a-­18194448. Starr, S. Frederick. 2004. Xinjiang: China’s Muslim Borderland. New York: M.E. Sharpe. Swanström, Niklas. 2015. The Security Dimension of the China-­ Central Asia Relationship: China’s Military Engagement with Central Asian Countries. Congressional Testimony, March 18. www.uscc.gov/­sites/­default/­files/­ SwanstromTestimony_3.18.15.pdf. Swanström, Niklas, and Yin He. 2006. China’s War on Narcotics: Two Perspectives. Central Asia-­Caucasus Institute and Silk Road Studies Program, December. http://­isdp.eu/­content/­uploads/­publications/­2006_swanstrom-­he_chinas-­war-­on-­ narcotics.pdf. Van Linschoten, Alex Strick, and Felix Kuehn. 2012. An Enemy We Created: The Myth of the Taliban-­Al-­Qaeda Merger in Afghanistan. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Wee, Sui-­Lee. 2004. Chinese Police Blame Separatist Group for Urumqi Bombing: Xinhua. Reuters, May 18. www.reuters.com/­article/­us-­china-­xinjiang/­chinese-­police-­ blame-­separatist-­group-­for-­urumqi-­bombing-­xinhua-­idUSBREA4H01O20140518.

10 India’s support for Afghanistan’s reconstruction1 Gareth Price

India’s policy toward Afghanistan since the ousting of the Taliban after September 11, 2001, has been driven by a number of broadly complementary ambitions. First, it hopes for Afghanistan to develop into an independent and stable country, something which would enhance India’s domestic security. India’s enmity toward the Taliban dated long before September 11, 2001. The alternative – an unstable Afghanistan that would provide a safe haven for Islamist militants and “strategic depth” for Pakistan – is seen as being a direct threat to India’s security. The hijacking of Indian Airlines flight 814 in 1999 is well remembered in India. The plane was hijacked and diverted to Kandahar, and it is widely believed that the Taliban guarded the plane to prevent any rescue attempt. India eventually released three Islamist militants in exchange for the hostages. These included Masood Azhar, founder of Jaish-­e-­Mohammed, and Ahmed Omar Saeed Sheikh, later convicted of the kidnapping and murder of US journalist Daniel Pearl.2 India has also claimed links between the Taliban and Pakistan’s military and Inter-­Services Intelligence (ISI) long before such claims were widespread in the West. Thus, politically, India has invested heavily both in the Afghan government and in various development projects intended to stabilise the country. Second, India sees a number of prospective economic benefits that would stem from a stable Afghanistan. A number of major infrastructure projects have been mooted (some for two decades) that could benefit India and Afghanistan. These include the Turkmenistan–Afghanistan–Pakistan–India gas pipeline and CASA 1000 (Central Asia South Asia 1000). Both could serve to ameliorate energy shortages in South Asia by taking advantage of energy surpluses in Central Asia. Furthermore, Afghanistan provides economic opportunities, most notably in mining. Indian firms have been keen to exploit Afghanistan’s geological potential. The United States has estimated that Afghanistan’s mining potential is worth US$1 trillion3, and a subsequent survey by Afghanistan’s mining ministry suggested that it may be three times greater.4 It is also clear that Afghanistan could have played a role in boosting confidence between India and Pakistan. Were Pakistan to allow Indian goods to transit its

India’s support for reconstruction 175 territory, all three countries would benefit. However, this has not happened, and India has developed alternative access through Iran and by air. India does allow Afghan trucks carrying goods for India to transit Pakistan up until the checkpoint at Wagah, 1 kilometre from the Indian border. The Afghan trucks then return, empty, to India. In a similar vein, the acceptance of Afghanistan as a member of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) in 2007 could have provided a multilateral rather than bilateral mechanism for developmental cooperation, but since the 2008 Mumbai attacks, SAARC’s progress has been moribund, leaving India to work with Afghanistan bilaterally. India has provided development assistance in its neighbourhood for decades, constructing roads in Nepal, for instance, not long after it had gained independence. However, it has not necessarily seen itself as a provider of development assistance – rather as a larger neighbour benefiting from its neighbours’ development. This in part explains why the projects it has undertaken in Afghanistan appear somewhat eclectic. However, this also reflects on its position vis-­à-­vis the West. India was largely sidelined by Western countries – and even occasionally excluded from multilateral meetings at Pakistan’s behest – after the defeat of the Taliban. This left India to forge a bilateral relationship with Afghanistan, filling in gaps left by Western donors. At the same time, many in India were sceptical that the West would remain committed to Afghanistan in the longer term, but India would remain affected by any instability in that country. However, although the announcement of the Western drawdown may not have taken India by surprise, it has left vulnerable many Indian projects that had depended on the Western security umbrella. Although politics explains the primary motivation for Indian engagement with and support for the Afghan government, this engagement has often been driven by India’s private sector or, in some cases, by state-­owned companies and their private sector partners. While the US and NATO provided security guarantees, this approach made perfect sense, but following the announcement of the NATO drawdown, many Indian investors in Afghanistan are likely to feel vulnerable, none more so than those which invested in India’s largest iron ore mine at Hajigak. India has played a significant role in Afghanistan’s development since the overthrow of the Taliban. India’s ties with Afghanistan are frequently referred to in cultural terms as well as by historical coexistence. Opinion polls in Afghanistan frequently confirm that India is held in high esteem by the majority of Afghans. Development assistance is just one part of a broader projection of India’s soft power in Afghanistan. Bollywood films dubbed into local languages are highly popular, as, increasingly, is cricket. Many Afghans seek medical treatment or education in India, and many of Afghanistan’s political leaders live or have lived in India. The former president, Hamid Karzai, spent part of his education in India. And several Indian cities (and one Indian state) have formed a twinning

176  Gareth Price relationship with Afghan cities and between one Indian state and a province of Afghanistan.5 Since the Taliban were ousted, India has provided assistance in the region of US$2 billion to the reconstruction of Afghanistan, pledging a further US$1 billion in 2016. This makes India the fifth or sixth largest donor to Afghanistan (depending on how assistance is measured). Because of lower costs – particularly in salaries – Indian assistance is likely to have a greater impact, pound for pound, than that of Western donors. Furthermore, many of the specific projects which India has carried out have a history of Indian involvement. Indian firms were involved in the initial construction of the Salma Dam in the 1970s, and the Indira Gandhi Institute of Child Health was called such because of Indian assistance in the 1960s. In September 2016, India promised a further US$1 billion to support Afghanistan’s development, and India also proposed to provide Afghanistan with medicines and to cooperate in solar power. In addition, India could argue that rather than carrying out projects to meet needs identified by India, its assistance is both undertaken in partnership with the Afghan government and is intended to fills gaps identified by the Afghan rather than the Indian government. This is assisted by the Afghanistan National Development Strategy, which provides eight pillars for development, namely security; governance; infrastructure and natural resources; education and culture; health and nutrition; agriculture and rural development; social protection; economic governance; and private sector development. Indian assistance can easily fit into these categories. Indian activities are spread across Afghanistan in diverse economic and social developmental activities, though many of the smaller projects have been concentrated in the south and east of the country. Most of India’s aid programs fit into one of four categories: large-­scale infrastructure projects, capacity building, humanitarian assistance and smaller development projects. India has also undertaken a small number of other one-­off projects which do not easily fit within these categories. For instance, India provided financial support for the renovation of the nineteenth-­century Stor Palace, which was restored by the Aga Khan Trust for Culture in association with the Afghan and Indian governments. The project employed more than three hundred Afghan artisans and workers. India also upgraded the telephone exchanges in eleven Afghan provinces and enabled the expansion of the TV network to all provincial capitals.

Large-­scale infrastructure projects India has undertaken four large-­scale infrastructure projects in Afghanistan, most of which were initiated in the optimistic early years of Hamid Karzai’s government and which subsequently faced a particular set of challenges resulting from a deteriorating security situation. This is particularly true for the Salma Dam (subsequently renamed the Afghan-­India Friendship

India’s support for reconstruction 177 Dam) and the Afghan parliament building. India also constructed part of the transmission line connecting Kabul with Uzbekistan and road and rail links between the Iranian port of Chabahar and Delaram (on the main highway which connects Afghanistan’s largest cities). The Salma Dam is located in the Chishti Sharif district on the Hari River in Herat Province around 150 kilometres from Herat in a largely unoccupied area, although the road to Herat was renowned for kidnapping. India has substantial expertise in hydropower, and by Indian standards, the dam was relatively small, albeit remotely located. The first feasibility reports for the Salma Dam were produced in 1957. An Indian public sector company – Water and Power Consultancy Services (WAPCOS) – began working on the project in 1976, but work was halted as a result of the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. WAPCOS resumed work in 1988, but again work was halted because of conflict. In 2006 India committed to complete the dam project at an estimated cost of US$275 million. The project was beset with difficulties. WAPCOS had returned to the dam location in 2002. At that stage, the Taliban had been defeated and the region seemed peaceful. Many Afghans thought that Iranian politicians were attempting to interfere with the project because it would reduce the flow of water into Iran. Some Afghans believed that Iran was funding the Taliban to prevent dam construction, a belief reinforced after the murder of the governor of the district, who had been a strong proponent of the dam. In 2013, Afghan intelligence claimed to have thwarted a Taliban plan to blow up the dam, and security concerns around local non-­Taliban strongmen – the area was contested by two rival militia leaders – were ever present. Other problems were technical. Once the project started it became evident that the feasibility report was needed updating. The riverbed yielded insufficient material for construction materials, and although the mountains could be mined for rock, India struggled to obtain passage for dynamite for some time. Despite a host of problems, the dam was finally completed. The reservoir behind the dam started to form in July 2015, and the dam was inaugurated in June 2016, four years behind schedule. The dam produces 42 megawatts of electricity, provides irrigation for 40,000 hectares of land and produces stabilising irrigation for an additional 35,000 hectares. In addition, India rehabilitated the Amir Ghazi and Quaragha reservoirs. Perhaps the most visible symbol of India’s support for the Afghan government and Afghan democracy was through its construction of the Afghan Parliament. The foundation stone was laid in August 2005 in a ceremony attended by Hamid Karzai and the then–Indian prime minister, Manmohan Singh. Construction work began at the start of 2009 at the 84-­acre plot on the southern outskirts of Kabul. The parliament was intended to be opened three years later, but the project was plagued by delays stemming from several factors: a shortage of local skilled labour; the need to import materials from India or Iran (and the need to then transport materials through Iran rather than through Pakistan)

178  Gareth Price as well as the deteriorating security situation within Afghanistan. Together, this meant that the parliament building was only finally opened in December 2015, during a visit by the Indian prime minister, Narendra Modi. Costing around US$100 million and paid for in full by India, the complex comprises a three-­storey bronze-­domed main building containing a Wolesi Jirga (lower house) and a Meshrano Jirga (upper house), along with conference rooms, dining rooms and a library. Construction was carried out by two Indian firms – BSCPL Infrastructure Ltd, Hyderabad, and C&C Constructions Ltd, Gurgaon – which were contracted by India’s Central Public Works Department. The two firms had prior experience in Afghanistan, constructing the road between Gardez and Khost for USAID. In March 2016, shortly after the parliament building was opened, the Taliban fired explosives at the complex, though they missed the main building. In addition, as part of its training assistance, officials in the National Assembly secretariat receive training in India’s Bureau of Parliamentary Study and Training. India also organises regular exchanges and study visits for Afghanistan’s Independent Election Commission members and officials. Given Pakistan’s refusal to allow Indian products to cross its territory, India was forced to move goods through Iran. Initially, this involved the Iranian port of Bandar Abbas, though India subsequently agreed to develop the Iranian port of Chabahar, closer to Iran’s border with Pakistan. India plans to build a railway connecting Chabahar with Afghanistan. However, the Afghan border with Iran is relatively remote and unconnected with the main highway that connects Afghanistan’s major towns. Consequently, India’s Border Roads Organisation took responsibility for the construction of a 218-­kilometre road between Zaranj, on the border with Iran, and Delaram, situated on the main, circular highway that connects Afghanistan’s main cities. Construction work started in 2005, and the highway was opened in January 2009. Around three hundred employees of the Border Roads Organisation worked on the project, guarded by around seventy members of the Indo-­Tibetan Border Police. The project was delayed because of frequent attacks, which led to the deaths of 129 Afghan workers and six Indians. In addition, a further 58 kilometres of inner-­city roads were constructed with Indian assistance. The construction of the Zaranj–Delaram road meant that the journey time was cut from twelve to fourteen hours to just over two hours, and the number of trucks making the journey has increased tenfold, increasing customs revenue collection at the Zaranj border. In the early 2000s, Kabul faced long power outages. At times, citizens received just three hours of electricity on alternate days, and the situation was worse in winter. The city was powered by one gas turbine and twenty-­ five diesel generators. Hamid Karzai negotiated a power purchase agreement with Uzbekistan and after this sought Indian assistance to help build an electricity transmission line between the two countries. India funded the construction of the 150-­megawatt Pul-­i-­Khumri Transmission Line, which connects Pul-­i-­Khumri, in northern Afghanistan with

India’s support for reconstruction 179 Kabul along with a number of electricity sub-­stations. The line stretches 202 kilometres and was constructed by the Power Grid Corporation of India (Power Grid), a state-­owned utility company. The project had a range of benefits: it would bridge the power deficit in Kabul, with substantial economic benefits; showcase Indian expertise; and enable power to be shifted across the regions of Afghanistan. The project faced several challenges: many areas were affected by land mines as the line had to pass through high-­altitude areas such as the Salang Pass, at 4,000 meters above sea level. There, work could be undertaken for only four months a year, owing to the inclement conditions. Furthermore, Pakistan refused to allow construction material to pass through its territory, meaning that 15,000 tonnes of material had to be shipped via the Iranian port of Bandar Abbas and on war-­torn Afghan roads. The contract was agreed as a forty-­two-­month project in August 2005. Despite the challenges, the power line started working one month ahead of schedule, in January 2009. But the deputy general manager of Power Grid in Afghanistan was killed in 2010 during a Taliban suicide attack on two hotels in Kabul.

Capacity building Much of India’s assistance to Afghanistan has focused on capacity building, including both academic education and vocational training. India has supported education courses for thousands of Afghans since 2001. The Indian Council for Cultural Relations (ICCR) has provided scholarships for more than 10,000 Afghans to study undergraduate and postgraduate degrees in India under its Special Scholarship Scheme, providing more than fifteen hundred scholarships each year. Under the programme, selections are made based on a nationwide competition with six seats reserved for each of Afghanistan’s thirty-­four provinces. Meanwhile, the Indian Council of Agricultural Research (ICAR) also funds hundreds of scholarships for Afghans to study agriculture-­related degrees. In addition, around eight thousand Afghans finance themselves to undertake degrees in India. The Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation program (ITEC) also runs shorter, technical programs for mid-­level civil servants with around five hundred allocated each year. These last three to six months and take place at any professional institute in India. Popular subjects include urban development, auditing, legislative drafting and public administration. Many of the ITEC scholarships have focused on the justice sector. India has set up training programmes for Afghan students at law schools in India. India has also sent twenty civil servants to work as mentors to Afghanistan under the UNDP and Afghan government-­run Capacity for Afghan Public Service project. The civil servants worked in Afghan ministries not as advisors but as mentors and to develop training modules for Afghan officials.

180  Gareth Price It has also conducted technical police training, strengthening links between the police and prosecutors. India also selected an Indian NGO – SEWA (the Self-­Employed Women’s Association) – to work in Afghanistan, training Afghan women to set up businesses. SEWA helped the Afghan Ministry of Women’s Affairs to develop a vocational training centre at Bagh-­e-­Zanana (a garden set aside for women in Kabul). A delegation of Afghan officials was taken on a tour of SEWA’s facilities in India to understand how this could be replicated in Afghanistan; SEWA provides training in fields such as embroidery, agriculture, packaging and marketing for a thousand women, more than half of whom are war widows. The Confederation of Indian Industries also conducted a pilot project training a thousand young Afghans in skills such as carpentry, masonry and plumbing. The project was carried out in cooperation with the Afghan Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs. In addition, India constructed numerous schools under its Small Development Project scheme (discussed later in the chapter) and offered specific assistance to several educational institutions: it provided assistance in rebuilding Hamid Karzai’s alma mater in Kabul and supported the Afghan Red Crescent Society’s program to treat child congenital heart disease. India also established the National Agricultural University at Kandahar.

Humanitarian assistance In 2002 the Afghan government launched a Back to School initiative, aimed at encouraging school attendance. In 2003 India, in association with the World Food Programme (WFP), launched the School Feeding Programme, a scheme to provide high-­energy biscuits to Afghan school children. The project was intended to boost child nutrition but also to encourage school attendance. India’s contribution was part of a wider offer to provide Afghanistan with 1 million tonnes of wheat. After India made the offer, Pakistan refused to let the wheat travel over its territory to Afghanistan. India and the WFP decided instead to convert the wheat into biscuits with added vitamins and then ship them through Iran. As with much Indian assistance, the biscuits were then shipped from India to Bandar Abbas in Iran and from there by rail and road to the Afghan cities of Herat, Kabul, Kandahar and Jalalabad. Under the School Feeding Programme, India supplies 100-­gram high-­protein biscuits to around 2 million school children in all every Afghan province (excluding Kabul). In addition to this, the government of India has also provided the WFP with 15,000 tonnes of rice. India has provided a range of medical assistance to Afghanistan, sending a team of doctors to Kabul at the end of 2001. It also set up camps to fit artificial limbs (given the preponderance of land mines in Afghanistan). Subsequently, it established numerous clinics under its Small Development

India’s support for reconstruction 181 Project scheme and five Indian Medical Missions in the five major cities of Afghanistan. These provide free consultations and supply medicine to more than 30,000 people each month. India has also given ten ambulances – two for each of Afghanistan’s five major cities – to the Afghan Ministry of Public Health. In addition, thousands of Afghans have travelled to Indian hospitals for medical treatment. This has been facilitated by growing connectivity between India and Afghanistan: at present, four or five flights daily between Kabul and Delhi. India also agreed to rehabilitate the Indira Gandhi Institute of Child Health in Kabul, Afghanistan’s largest paediatric hospital. Its surgical block was completed in 2005 and the polyclinic block in 2007. In addition, many Afghan doctors working at the hospital have received training at the All India Institute of Medical Sciences in New Delhi.

Small development projects In May 2005, during Manmohan Singh’s visit to Afghanistan, India signed a US$20 million scheme to institutionalise a Small Development Project scheme. It included a series of memoranda of understanding (MoUs) to undertake various projects, constructing thirty-­eight schools and a bridge and providing seventy-­ one water access points. The scheme had been launched the previous month, when sixteen MoUs were signed setting up four demonstration nurseries, seven health and 219 water points or bore wells. The projects were generally located in southern and south-­eastern Afghanistan – areas which had traditionally had a low Indian presence but which were vulnerable to instability. While larger, more-­visible projects were constructed in more secure areas, these smaller, lower-­profile projects were concentrated in less secure regions. The intention was to demonstrate the possibility of development contributing to security. The schemes were aligned to the Afghan National Development Strategy and were intended to be quick-­impact projects of six to nine months, costing less than US$1 million, determined through discussions with local government and implemented by local contractors. As the scheme developed, India additionally constructed veterinary clinics, canals, hospitals, public toilets, an orphanage and vocational training centres. Most of the projects are specifically requested by the provinces. In addition, India has supported two NGOs working in Afghanistan: a Turquoise Mountain Foundation project to restore properties in Murad Khane, the oldest part of the historic city of Kabul, and a project focused on Balkh, to form common interest groups to promote savings and entrepreneurship, modelled on self-­ help groups in Tamil Nadu and Madhya Pradesh, India. Prior to this, India had provided several gifts to Afghanistan in the early years after the ousting of the Taliban. In late 2001 India gave four hundred buses to Afghanistan, of which 205 were used in Kabul and the rest across the rest of Afghanistan. These were supplemented by two hundred

182  Gareth Price minibuses, intended for use in hilly regions, and 105 utility vehicles, to be used by municipalities. As well as this, India provided three planes to enable the national carrier, Ariana Afghan Airlines, to become operational. It also provided training for airline staff.

Social exchange While not necessarily developmental, the various cultural exchanges between India and Afghanistan play a vital role in normalising Afghanistan, given that the country has been ravaged by conflict for decades. It has also played a role in India’s soft power projection and helps to explain why India is generally viewed positively by Afghans. India established the Indian Cultural Centre in Kabul in 2007, which screens films and arranges concerts of Afghan and Indian musicians. India has also enabled Afghan musicians to perform at Indian festivals and Indian musicians to perform at Afghan festivals. The ICCR has also hosted an exhibition by forty female artists in Delhi. In 2008 the India-­Afghanistan Foundation was established with the intention of fostering educational, cultural and scientific cooperation. The foundation has held seminars in both Delhi and Kabul. India has also provided support for Afghan TV and radio stations.

Trade and investment India’s development assistance to Afghanistan is seen as being mutually beneficial rather than purely altruistic. As well as being good for India’s security, a stable Afghanistan could provide a market for Indian products and a source of raw materials – notably minerals. Thus, in parallel to providing assistance, India has attempted to bolster economic ties with Afghanistan, and around a hundred Indian companies have invested in operations in Afghanistan. To support this, the Indian Embassy in Afghanistan has signed a series of MoUs linking both chambers of commerce and hospitals in India and Afghanistan. As with Indian assistance, Indian products and services are generally cheaper than those from the West. They are also, frequently, more suitable than Western equivalent and easier to maintain. India has also contributed to Afghanistan’s economic initiatives. For instance, after the Afghan government decided to restore an industrial park in eastern Kabul, India set up a common facility and tool room to support the initiative. In 2003 Afghanistan and India signed a Preferential Trade Agreement aimed at increasing trade through the reduction of tariffs and trade barriers. These offered substantial duty concessions to Afghanistan. By 2010, India had become Afghanistan’s fifth largest source of imports, accounting for just over 5 percent of Afghanistan’s imports (worth US$414 million). Afghanistan’s exports to India the same year were worth US$125 million,

India’s support for reconstruction 183 but this accounted for around 25 percent of all of Afghanistan’s exports. In 2011 India removed customs duties from all Afghan exports (apart from alcohol and tobacco), giving Afghanistan duty-­free access to the Indian market. During 2014–2015, India’s exports had risen slightly (to US$423 million), while Afghanistan’s exports to India had increased significantly (to US$262 million). India has also taken significant steps to bolster Afghanistan’s economy. The Heart of Asia process – a regional forum in which most of Afghanistan’s neighbours are represented – involves a range of confidence-­building measures, and India has taken the lead in commercial aspects, hosting numerous meetings. At the same time, India’s main business groupings have held numerous conferences attempting to increase bilateral economic ties. For instance, Afghanistan’s minister of energy and water and minister of rural rehabilitation and development took part in the recent Afghanistan-­India Renewable Energy Summit, hosted by the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI). The largest single Indian investment in Afghanistan has been in the Hajigak mining block in the province of Bamyan. In 2011 a seven-­strong Indian consortium, led by the state-­owned mining company Steel Authority of India Limited, won four out of five blocks in a deposit estimated to contain 1.8 billion tonnes of iron ore. Although development has been slow, the construction of various infrastructures from Chabahar in Iran to the Afghan border and then to Delaram is intended to help facilitate the mine’s development. A railway connecting Chabahar to Zaranj, Delaram and Hajigak has been mooted to enable the project – which will involve the construction of a power plant, steel mill and the associated communications infrastructure at an estimated cost of around US$11 billion.

The strategic partnership and the future Since 2011, the relationship between India and Afghanistan has been guided by a Strategic Partnership agreement which includes a framework for cooperation both in politics and security and in economic and developmental affairs. The agreement demonstrates India’s multifaceted and long-­ term commitment to Afghanistan. The agreement commits both sides to an annual summit, regular bilateral consultations, cooperation in international groupings and enhanced security cooperation, including training for Afghan security forces. The partnership was also established by the Strategic Partnership Council – a meeting of officials led by the foreign ministers of Afghanistan and India, which is likely to drive the relationship in the future. The agreement pledges to further strengthen economic ties by improving protection for investments, simplifying customs procedures and removing non-­tariff barriers. The agreement calls for the creation of air cargo facilities to promote trade, along with greater connectivity. In 2017 – as Pakistan continued to block overland trade from India to Afghanistan – India

184  Gareth Price opened an air corridor to Afghanistan with two freight planes travelling weekly from Delhi to Kabul. The planes carry mostly high-­value items such as medicines. The agreement also sets out India’s longer-­term assistance strategy for Afghanistan. Under the agreement, India pledges to continue its support, cooperating in Afghanistan’s priority areas: agriculture, mining and health. India also committed to expanding its Small Development Projects (SDP) scheme in remote and rural areas of Afghanistan. In terms of capacity building, the two countries also agreed to strengthen institutional ties by encouraging cooperation between similar ministries and government agencies. India agreed to continue its various scholarship schemes under the ICCR and the ITEC and to extend further scholarships in medicine, engineering and management. India’s support for Afghanistan has had a number of drivers. On the one hand, it has been intended to help stabilise Afghanistan and provide economic, social and political development. On the other, it has been intended to assist Indian companies and to provide India with influence in Afghanistan. This dual approach has led to a debate over the modalities of future engagement with Afghanistan – whether India should focus on the smaller projects or continue with high-­visibility large projects. While the large-­scale projects have provided India with prestige, the deteriorating security situation has meant that they are now harder to carry out. Whether smaller projects or larger projects provide India with greater influence is a matter of debate, and the answer depends largely on who India wishes to influence. Smaller projects are welcomed in the districts where they are based, and they provide India with a presence in higher-­risk security areas. There is also a significant need for SDPs that provide added value in the agriculture sector in particular.6 The larger projects, in contrast, garner support from the urban elite but equally act as manifestations of the state, something that Afghanistan surely needs.

Notes 1 Most of the information regarding Indian assistance to Afghanistan comes from the Ministry of External Affairs, which through various websites provides a description of the various projects that India has undertaken in Afghanistan. For instance, www.mea.gov.in/­Portal/­ForeignRelation/­Afghanistan_Dec_2016.pdf http://­eoi.gov.in/­kabul/­?0707?000 www.chathamhouse.org/­sites/­files/­chathamhouse/­ public/­ Research/­ Asia/­ 0813pp_indiaafghanistan.pdf In addition, a number of other studies have further sought to detail India’s development assistance. For instance, http://­cprindia.org/­sites/­default/­files/­policy-­briefs/­Indian%20Development %20Cooperation%20with%20Afghanistan%20and%20the%20%E2%80% 98Afghan-­India%20Friendship%20Dam%E2%80%99_0.pdf 2 See, for instance, https://­cpj.org/­data/­people/­daniel-­pearl/­ 3 http://­www.mining.com/­1-­trillion-­motherlode-­of-­lithium-­and-­gold-­discovered-­in-­ afghanistan/­

India’s support for reconstruction 185 4 https://­www.cnbc.com/­2017/­08/­18/­trumps-­afghanistan-­strategy-­may-­unlock-­3-­ trillion-­in-­natural-­resources.html 5 The sister city project links Delhi and Kabul; Mumbai and Kandahar; Ajmer Sharif in Rajasthan and Herat; Hyderabad and Jalalabad; Ahmedabad in Gujrat and Asadabad as well as connecting the Indian state of Assam with Afghanistan’s Helmand province. 6 Mariet D’Souza, Shanthie, India’s role in the economic stabilisation of Afghanistan. http://­library.fes.de/­pdf-­files/­bueros/­kabul/­12959.pdf.

11 Afghanistan imbroglio Reassessing external powers’ role in rebuilding the country K. N. Tennyson

Introduction Afghanistan, a multiethnic and multicultural society is economically weak and geographically landlocked; therefore, the country has little economic value to the outside world. Yet, it has played an important role in the politics of the world for many centuries because of its strategic location. The external powers often intervene in the politics of Afghanistan to take control of the country’s strategic location because “anyone who controls Afghanistan controls the land routes between the Indian subcontinent, Iran and resource-­rich Central Asia,” therefore “every major [external] power, wanted a slice of the pie.”1 The intrusive policy of the external powers in Afghanistan thus formed part of the political problem in the country.

Post-­Taliban Afghanistan Following the overthrow of the Taliban regime and the subsequent establishment of a democratically elected government in Afghanistan, various regional and external powers and numerous multilateral lending institutions invested billions of dollars into reconstruction and rehabilitation projects for the war-­ravaged country. The reconstruction programs include restoring power transmission lines, communication network, transport infrastructures, educational institutions, healthcare, strengthening the Afghan National Security Forces and so on. The enormous foreign aid poured into Afghanistan had indeed transformed the lives of many Afghans. For example, the Afghan children (under five) mortality rate has been drastically reduced, from 257 per thousand in 2000 to 97.3 in 2013.2 Another significant development that took place in Afghanistan after the overthrow of the Taliban regime was the huge increase in school enrollment, especially among girls. In 2001 only about a million children were recorded to have gone to school in Afghanistan, none of them girls. However, by 2013, the number has increased to 8.7 million, with 36 percent of the student population being girls.3 But the challenges remain. Despite the country’s social

Afghanistan imbroglio 187 indicators showing some positive results, Afghanistan’s basic infrastructure, such as communication, transportation, healthcare and education, is one of the lowest in the world. The ranking of Afghanistan at 171 out of 188 countries in the 2015 United Nations Development Program’s Human Development Report is a manifestation of it.4 The reason why Afghanistan continues to remain poor and undeveloped despite the huge foreign aid flowing into the country is not difficult to identify. Afghanistan imports almost everything, from food to medicines and from agricultural products to heavy machinery. On the other hand, it exports only agricultural and forest products like fruits (fresh and dried), carpets, seeds and medical plants.5 Since Afghanistan’s main source of income and employment is based on agriculture6 and not on industry, it creates employment problems and a huge negative balance of trade. Table 11.1 shows that Afghanistan exports remain extremely low most of the time, but its imports constantly increase. Because Afghanistan is economically poor and militarily weak, it relies heavily on foreign aid for its socioeconomic development and the security of the country. Stefanie Nijssen of the Transparency International’s Defence and Security Program (TI-­DSP) stated in her report, The Afghan Economy: A Brief History, that Afghanistan “received 50% of its foreign aid from the Soviet Union between 1950 and 1970 and 30% from the United States.”7Nipa Banerjee, a fellow at the School of International Development and Global Studies (University of Ottawa) and former head of the Canadian government’s aid program in Afghanistan (2003–2006) wrote of the post-­ Taliban period that “Ninety-­five percent of the development budget and 60 to 70 percent of the operational budget of Afghanistan are externally financed,”8as Table 11.2 indicates. However, the flow of foreign aid into Afghanistan is not a new development. Historical records show that successive Afghan rulers relied on foreign aid for their country’s socioeconomic

Table 11.1  Exports and Imports US$ million Trade

1999– 2000

2001– 2002

2004– 2005

2006– 2007

2010– 2011

2013– 2014

2015– 2016

Exports (FOB)* Imports (CIF)* Trade Balance

166 1,012 –846

68 1,696 –1,628

144 2,101 –1,957

416 2,744 –2,328

388 5,154 –4,766

515 8,724 –8,209

571 7,723 –7,152

* FOB: Free on board * CIF: Cost Insurance Freight Source: Compiled from various issues of the Central Statistics Organization, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Afghanistan Statistical Yearbook, accessed February 1, 2017, http://­cso.gov. af/­en.

188  K. N. Tennyson Table 11.2  General Government Revenue and Aid Flows 2002–2009 US$ Billion Year

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

Aid General Government Revenue

1.4 0.1

1.8 0.2

2.4 0.3

3.0 0.4

3.1 0.6

4.0 0.7

5.0 0.8

6.1 1.3

Source: Lydia Poole, Afghanistan: Tracking Major Resource Flows 2002–2010, Briefing Paper, Conflict & the Military, January 2011, Version 1, 18, accessed March 22, 2017, www. globalhumanitarianassistance.org/­wp-­content/­uploads/­2011/­02/­gha-­Afghanistan-­2011-­major-­ resource-­flows.pdf.

development and a “slowdown” in foreign aid often created serious socioeconomic and political problems in the country. Afghanistan government’s failure to generate domestic revenue and its excessive dependency on external aid became the greatest stumbling block for the country’s socioeconomic growth. It was for this very reason that Afghanistan President Mohammad Ashraf Ghani, in his remarks at the 6th Ministerial Conference of the Heart of Asia-­Istanbul Process held at Amritsar, India, on December 4, 2016, stressed the need for Afghanistan to generate domestic revenue and stop depending on foreign “aid.”9 There are enormous and complex tasks for the Afghan government; however, the government faces a daunting task because the resources of the country are severely strained and limited. Like other countries of the world, the government of Afghanistan lays out a financial plan (budget) for each department and program, but the government is finding it difficult to secure enough resources because of the poor financial condition of the country. For example, in 2010–2011, the required budget for the country’s Livelihood and Social Protection was US$644.30 million, but it could distribute only US$239.00 million. Similarly, in 2014, the government of Afghanistan’s estimated budget for Livelihood and Social Protection was US$777.94 million, but the government was able to provide only US$520.37 million. The same is true for other departments, including the national police and law enforcement and the Afghan national army. The reality about the state of affairs in Afghanistan is that since the Taliban regime in Afghanistan was overthrown, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) took over security-­related matters of the country. As a result, the Afghan government has spent only a minimum amount on its security forces (see Table 11.3), yet even so, the Afghan government was not able to generate enough resources. The lack of financial resources is one of the reasons for the failure of the Afghan government to achieve its National Development Strategy Goals.

237.10 150.90 644.30 515.60 365.90 41.40 1.30

123.33 103.67 371.65 318.12 173.27 17.11 1.01

101.44 90.48 239.00 257.09 122.85 14.42 1.01

353.80 201.20 631.50 492.00 346.70 164.60 327.20

Req.

Disb*

Req.*

Com.*

2013

2010–2011

165.93 128.63 472.99 271.19 238.61 10.04 65.81

Com. 123.78 105.40 412.52 222.51 124.42 7.76 52.45

Disb.

372.49 283.32 777.94 502.77 468.93 50.09 55.50

Req.

2014

207.90 187.26 585.01 286.13 287.58 14.86 48.95

Com.

153.62 166.60 520.37 205.98 177.32 11.76 48.95

Disb.

Source: Compiled from various issues of the Central Statistics Organization, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Afghanistan Statistical Yearbook, accessed February 1, 2017, http://­cso.gov.af/­en.

* Req.: Requirement * Com.: Committed * Disb.: Disbursement

Education & Vocational training Health & Nutrition Livelihood & Social Protection Transport Energy, Mine & Telecommunication National Police & Law Enforcement National Army

Indicator

Table 11.3  Cabinet-­Approved National Development Budget (US$ million)

190  K. N. Tennyson

The politics of aid and development in Afghanistan Since the December 2001 Bonn Conference, various other summits and conferences on Afghanistan have been held in different parts of the world, and in every such meeting, the International Community pledged billions of US dollars for the reconstruction and development of the war-­torn country. The large amount of developmental aid promised to Afghanistan brought a ray of hope to the impoverish people of the country. But all is not well with foreign aid in Afghanistan. In Afghanistan, most of the aid money was reported to have been used by the donors and little is channeled through the Afghan government. The Afghanistan government has little or no knowledge of how the donors use the financial aid. Expressing disappointment in the way foreign aid had been used in Afghanistan, Anwar-­ul-­Haq Ahady, the then– finance minister of Afghanistan said in April 2007, “We are accountable for only US$3.7 billion of the US$12.8 billion of aid money that has been spent in the country in the last five years: the rest has been spent by donors themselves.”10 Anwar-­ul-­Haq Ahady’s declaration was not surprising, because “a whopping 40 percent of the [development] aid that flowed into Afghanistan” is reported to have been returned to the “donor countries in the form of corporate profits and consultant salaries.”11 The Afghanistan government receives only a small proportion of developmental aid, which creates serious policy problems. It is in this context that the former president of Afghanistan, Hamid Karzai, in his address at the General Debate of the 67th Session of the United Nations General Assembly expressed his country’s appreciation to the international community for their willingness “to align aid with [Afghanistan’s] national priorities and channel assistance through the Afghan budget.” He also “reiterated” his government’s “determination to improve governance and to collaborate with [Afghanistan’s] international partners to wipe out the cancer of corruption whether it is in the Afghan government or in the international aid system.”12 One often hears of the displeasure expressed by the Afghan leaders toward the international community (donors) for not giving Afghanis a free hand to run the developmental aid. However, some economists and political analysts have pointed out that the donor countries and agencies have not been willing to hand over the foreign aid directly to the Afghanistan government, because of the huge corruption in the country and lack of trust in the Afghan government. Expressing one such view, Dr D Suba Chandran, professor at the International Strategic and Security Studies at the National Institute of Advanced Studies (NIAS), Bangalore, India, and former director of the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies (IPCS), a New Delhi–based think-­tank wrote, “[T]he donor agencies prefer distributing aid directly” and not through the government because of the high “level of corruption” in Afghanistan and “the ineffectiveness of local administration.”13 The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and the Islamic Republic

Afghanistan imbroglio 191 of Afghanistan High Office of Oversight and Anti-­Corruption 2012 report Corruption in Afghanistan: Recent Patterns and Trends stated that life without the involvement of bribery is unimaginable in Afghanistan. The report says corruption has reached such an alarming level that 50 percent of the people of the country have to pay bribes to get their work done.14 Haroun Mir and Habib Wardak, two prominent Afghan analysts based in Kabul opined that in Afghanistan “corruption is no longer considered taboo”;15 it has become a way of life. Even the incumbent Afghan president, Mohammad Ashraf Ghani, acknowledged the problem of corruption in his country and promised to wipe out the social evil (corruption) from Afghanistan. He categorically stated at the European Union Conference The Way Ahead for Anti-­Corruption in Afghanistan that he was “elected” by Afghans “because [he] promised them that [he will] tackle corruption seriously.”16 Nonetheless, in spite of the deep distrust the external powers had of the Afghan government, the former “pledged to align its support behind [the Afghanistan National Priority] Programs and to work to deliver 50% of its aid through the Afghan government” at the first-­ever International Conference on Afghanistan held at Kabul in July 2010.17 There is no denying the fact that the Afghan government is corrupt, inefficient and weak, but it not the only one to blame. The external powers are equally responsible for the spread of the corruption in the country. The United States and other Western countries accused Hamid Karzai, the former president of Afghanistan, of being corrupt, but it came to light that “For more than a decade, wads of American dollars packed into suitcases, backpacks and, on occasion, plastic shopping bags have been [clandestinely] dropped off every month or so at the offices of Afghanistan’s president.” Mathew Rosenberg of The New York Times wrote that the so-­called ghost money is believed to have been given to the Afghan leaders “to maintain access to [President] Karzai and his inner circle and to guarantee the agency’s influence at the presidential palace, which wields tremendous power in Afghanistan’s highly centralized government.”18 A similar covert operation was also reported to have been carried out by Iran in Afghanistan “to buy the loyalty of Mr. Daudzai [President Karzai’s Chief of Staff] and promote Iran’s interests in the presidential palace.”19 The irony with the external powers’ policy in Afghanistan is that millions of US dollars were reported to have been clandestinely given to the Afghan leaders to win them over, but most of the countries, including the United States, failed to deliver the promised developmental aid to Afghanistan. For example, in 2011–2012, the United States had committed US$4,670 million but only US$3,190 million was disbursed. Similarly, in 2014, out of the US$1,653.96 million in aid committed, only US$1,264.63 million was disbursed. It is not only the United States; many other countries and multilateral donors also did not live up to the expectations of the Afghans. Table 11.4 shows the gap between the aid committed and the amount disbursed by donors (bilateral and multilateral). This called for the international

192  K. N. Tennyson Table 11.4  Donors Commitment and Disbursement (US$ million) Donors

2011–2012

2014

Total Committed

Total Disbursed

Total Committed

Total Disbursed

United States of America United Kingdom Japan Australia Canada Norway India Italy

4,670

3,190

1,653.96

1264.63

542 934 77 144 127 500 149

367 934 62 118 127 72 50

457.59 422.21 176.79 142.27 127.70 20.06 37.19

253.87 570.16 163.10 92.84 109.13 –­ 37.14

Multilaterals

Total Committed

Asian Development Bank World Bank EU

Total Disbursed

Total Committed

Total Disbursed

200

123

132.10

114.26

421 194

152 221

– 191.95

205.03 260.64

Source: Compiled from various issues of the Central Statistics Organization, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Afghanistan Statistical Yearbook, accessed February 1, 2017, http://­cso.gov. af/­en.

community to play more pro-­active role in the development of the war-­ ravaged country.

Reassessing the international community’s role in rebuilding Afghanistan Afghanistan has been devastated by the protracted war and therefore it needs a complete social, economic and political transformation. Adam Pain and Jonathan Goodhand, analyzing the prevailing political scenario of the country, commented that Afghanistan faces three major challenges, which they describe as “triple transitions”: security, political and socioeconomic transitions. They are of the opinion that there is a “need for an overall peace building framework in which these triple transitions should be linked to one another and occur simultaneously.”20 This brings us to the conclusion that to bring about lasting peace in a war-­ravaged country like Afghanistan, the international community should not only focus on exterminating the militant groups but also take care of the socioeconomic and security problems of Afghans. Major General Y. K. Gera (Ret’d), an Indian senior military officer pointed out that “It would be prudent to realize that whether Mullah Omar and Osama bin Laden live or perish, their legacy will live on until

Afghanistan imbroglio 193 sustained international efforts are made to address the problems faced by Afghanistan which continues to bear the brunt of the last great battle of the Cold War era.”21 Interestingly, this fact has been recognized and acknowledged by the international community. But unfortunately, the international community, especially those countries neighboring Afghanistan, try to downplay each other’s relation with Afghanistan. The reason for it is not difficult to find: most of the countries are not committed to the welfare and security of Afghans. For example, Pakistan, Afghanistan’s “twin brother,” though officially aligned with the United States in the war against terrorism in Afghanistan, continues to carry out a clandestine policy of assisting the Taliban. Besides, Pakistan considered Afghanistan as within its legitimate sphere of influence and has always tried to hinder India’s involvement in Afghanistan. Iran is another country which endorsed the US-­led War on Terror in Afghanistan, but of late various reports have suggested that Iran, in its bid to counter the United States’ influence in Afghanistan, had covertly assisted the Taliban. Further, sending a strong signal to the Afghan government to distance itself from the United States, in late 2010 and early 2011, Iran had blockaded the supply of fuels (humanitarian aid) to Afghanistan, alleging “that fuel transited through Iran (was) handed over to NATO forces” and not to Afghan citizens.22 The United States, on the other hand, instead of taking Iran with it in the War on Terror in Afghanistan, referred to Iran as being within the so-­called Axis of Evil and had tried to thwart Iran’s influence in Afghanistan. A similar political game was played by the two superpowers, the Soviet Union and the United States, in Afghanistan in the 1970s and 1980s. In December 1979, the Soviet Union militarily invaded Afghanistan to take control of its “client state.” As a reaction to the Soviet action, the United States devoted its resources to Afghanistan to contain the Soviet influence. China also got entangled in Afghanistan’s politics for fear of the Soviet expansion in the region. But with the withdrawal of the Soviet Union from Afghanistan, the United States’ interest in Afghanistan began to wane, and the Soviet Union completely relinquished its control over the affairs of Afghanistan and left it in the hands of the feeble communist Najibullah government. The ultimate result of the Cold War politics in the region was the emergence of various warring groups in Afghanistan. Amin Saikal, a renowned scholar on Afghanistan, having observed the impact of the Cold War politics on the Afghans, wrote that “The tragedy of Afghanistan has outlasted the country’s Soviet invaders. The Cold War Afghan crisis has been transformed into a post–Cold War ethno-­nationalist struggle.” He adds that although the internal political conflict in Afghanistan “derives in part from Afghanistan’s own ethnic fractures, it [was] aggravated by the fact that outside actors have found it increasingly convenient to focus their national and strategic interests on Afghanistan’s disturbed politics.”23 The policy of destructive connivance carried out by the external powers in Afghanistan is also demonstrated by their dealing with the Taliban. On

194  K. N. Tennyson September 20, 2001, US President George W. Bush in his address to a Joint Session of Congress warned that America’s War on Terror will not “end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated.” He further stated that the United States would eliminate global terror networks by using “every means of diplomacy, every tool of intelligence, every instrument of law enforcement, every financial influence and every necessary weapon of war.”24 Subsequently, the United States, in pursuit of its objectives to destroy and eliminate global terror networks (Taliban and Al-­Qaeda), deployed massive air and ground forces in Afghanistan. After more than a decade of war with the Taliban, the international community, including the United States, began to realize the futility of demonizing or isolating the Taliban from Afghan politics and began to engage with them. The Taliban cannot be ignored, because they are part of Afghan society. But the problem with the external powers’ politics is that every country, be it the United States, Pakistan or Iran, wants to deal with the Taliban in their own way for their own political interests. This is why the US-­led War on Terror in Afghanistan failed to achieve its objective (to wipe out terrorist activities in Afghanistan) despite using the state-­of-­the-­art military technology. The Taliban not only survived but have regrouped, re-­equipped and re-­emerged as a strong fighting force challenging the very existence of the established Afghan government. Stanley McChrystal, the then–Commander of the US Forces in Afghanistan (USFOR­A) and ISAF made no secret of the short-­sighted policy of the United States in Afghanistan. McChrystal in his confidential briefing paper written to then– President of the United States Barack Obama stated that “The weakness of state institutions, malignant actions of power-­brokers, widespread corruption and abuse of power by various officials, and ISAF’s own errors, have given Afghans little reason to support their government.”25 Decades of political crisis in the country had divided the multiethnic and multilinguistic Afghan society into different political platforms. Today, the distrust between different ethnic groups in the country is so strong that there is hardly any meeting point between them. Therefore, there is an urgent need on the part of the Afghan government to focus on the complex ethnic issue if the government really wants to bring peace to and develop the country. Nevertheless, it will be a daunting task for the Afghan government to consolidate the different ethnic groups into a common political platform, as the resources of the government are severely strained and limited. Given the weakness of the Afghan government, the international community, especially the regional powers like India, Pakistan, Iran and Central Asian Republic, should work together earnestly to bring long-­term peace and stability to Afghanistan, because there can never be peace and stability in the region without peace, prosperity and stability in Afghanistan. No matter how powerful and peaceful a country might be, any political problem or crisis that occurs in Afghanistan will directly or indirectly spill over into the region and affect regional peace and security. While the external powers formulate their plans and policies for Afghanistan, they need to adopt a more inclusive policy which incorporates all

Afghanistan imbroglio 195 sections of the Afghan society, because the uneven distribution of developmental work and foreign aid in the country creates discontent and forms a rift between different sections of Afghan society. The huge protest demonstration in Kabul in May and July 2016, organized by Afghanistan’s Hazara community, who were protesting against the government’s decision to reroute “a power transmission line” – the Turkmenistan–Uzbekistan–Tajikistan–Afghanistan–Pakistan (TUTAP) power project – linking Turkmenistan with the Afghan capital, is one such classic example. The Hazara community, most of whom are Shia Muslims, protested against the government’s decision to change the TUTAP power project route from Bamyan to Salang, as the minority community in the country felt discriminated against and wanted their region to be integrated with the developmental plans and programs of the country.26 The minority communities in the country are displeased with the central (Kabul) government’s plans and policies because most of the NGOs and foreign aid are benefited by Kabul, while other parts of the country are ignored. Until and unless every section of Afghan society is included and every region of the country is incorporated in the development plans and policies, the country will remain fragile. Today, what the Afghans need is not bullets but bread, butter and security. Afghanistan’s policymakers have repeatedly assured the international community that they will eliminate the militant groups from the country and bring about peace and development in Afghanistan. But the level of violence in the country has not diminished significantly, because the Afghan government has failed to win the hearts and minds of the Afghan people. As a consequence of the failure of the Afghan leaders to win over the various different ethnic groups in the country, many Afghans do not have the feeling of belonging to a larger community: Afghanistan. The external powers therefore need to realize that the way to peace and stability in Afghanistan does not lie in the central (Kabul’s) authority alone. It would be suicidal on the part of the external powers to depend solely on the leadership in Kabul to bring about peace and stability in Afghanistan. The same applies to the production and distribution of opium. Today, Afghanistan (located in the Golden Crescent region, which includes Iran and Pakistan) has overtaken Myanmar (located in the Golden Triangle region in Southeast Asia) as the world’s largest producer of opium in the world. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan’s Ministry of Counter Narcotics report, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2016: Cultivation and Production, stated that in 2016 “The total area under opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan was estimated to be 201,000 hectares (182,000–221,000), which represents a 10% increase from 2015.”27 Most of the opium cultivation is reported from provinces like Badakhshan (northeastern region), Badghis (western region), Baghlan (northern region), Balkh (northern region), Sari Pul (northern region), Farah (western region), Faryab (northern region), Hilmand (southern region), Uruzgan (southern region) and Zabul (southern region). What is more worrying is the report that opium production in Afghanistan had

196  K. N. Tennyson increased in “provinces where the security situation has deteriorated” and where the government in Kabul has little control.28 The proliferation of drug production in Afghanistan has far-­reaching consequences not only on Afghans but the people of the region as a whole. It spreads across international borders and creates serious policy problems for the policymakers. Therefore, there is an urgent need for the Afghan government and the international community, especially countries neighboring Afghanistan, to work together toward the complete eradication of narcotic drug production in Afghanistan. The eradication of drugs from Afghanistan can solve many of Afghanistan’s domestic problems and cross-­border political problems and issues.

The road ahead Afghanistan is in a state of flux. It is not that there is political crisis in the country, but the country’s economy is still fragile and its security at stake. Therefore, there is an urgent need on the part of the Afghan government to regenerate the country’s feeble economy and strengthen the security forces of the country to safeguard the country from further deterioration. But it will not be an easy task for the Afghan government to restore the country’s socioeconomic problems and strengthen the security of the country. Since Afghanistan is economically poor and militarily weak and as the country is socially divided between various ethnic, religious and political interest groups, urgent action will need to come from external powers, especially Afghanistan’s neighbors, like India, Iran, Pakistan and Central Asian Republics, to take more responsibility, adopt more pragmatic policies and start looking at Afghanistan as an integral part of the neighborhood. Afghanistan’s neighboring countries need to place the regional interests above individual national interests and work for the promotion of peace, prosperity and security of all the countries of the region in general and Afghanistan in particular. Unless and until Afghanistan is stabilized and the Afghans are secured socially, economically and politically, the region as a whole will be affected. The external powers cannot afford to let Afghanistan descend into chaos again.

Notes 1 Ramananda Sengupta, Why Afghanistan Is Important to India, August 30, 2005, www.rediff.com/­news/­2005/­aug/­30spec4.htm, retrieved May  3, 2010. 2 UNDP, Human Development Report 2002: Deepening Democracy in a Fragmented World (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press 2002), 251, UNDP, Human Development Report 2015: Work for Human Development (New York: UNDP, 2015), 240. 3 Afghanistan: Before and After the Taliban, 2 April 2014, www.bbc.com/­ news/­world-­asia-­26747712 and Jessica Donati, After 10 Year of Western Aid, Afghanistan Is a Dependent Mess,December 24, 2014, www.businessinsider.

Afghanistan imbroglio 197 com/­r-­a-­decade-­of-­western-­aid-­in-­afghanistan-­-­-­mission-­unsustainable-­2014-­ 12?IR=T, retrieved August 4, 2016. 4 UNDP, Human Development Report 2015: Work for Human Development (New York: UNDP, 2015), 210. 5 For detail report on Imports and Exports of Afghanistan see Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Central Statistics Organization, 2015–2016, Exports-­ Free on Board (FOB), http://­cso.gov.af/­en/­page/­1500/­4722/­2015-­2016, retrieved April 19, 2017. 6 The Afghan Business Council, Dubai-­ United Arab Emirates statistics shows that 80% of the Afghan labour force are engaged in agriculture and only about 20% are in industry and service sectors, see Afghan Business Council, Dubai-­ United Arab Emirates, Recent Updates: Economy, www.abcdxb.com/­Economy. aspx#,retrieved March 15, 2017. 7 Stefanie Nijssen, The Afghan Economy: A Brief History, Civil-­Military Fusion Centre, Special Report on Economic Development in Afghanistan, 14 October 2010, 2, http://­reliefweb.int/­sites/­reliefweb.int/­files/­resources/­AB458EBF37B 01017852577BC006B45C4-­Full_Report.pdf, retrieved January 19, 2017. 8 Nipa Banerjee, Afghanistan Is Among Today’s Greatest Development Challenges, Policy Option, July 6, 2016, http://­policyoptions.irpp.org/­2016/­07/­06/­ afghanistan-­is-­among-­todays-­greatest-­development-­challenges/­, retrieved December 12, 2017. 9 Administrative Office of the President, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, H.E. President Mohammad Ashraf Ghani’s Remarks at 6th Ministerial Conference of the Heart of Asia-­IstanbulProcess, Amritsar, India, December 4, 2016, http://­aop. gov.af/­english/­3618/­H.E+President+Mohammad+Ashraf+Ghani%27s+Remar ks+at+6th+Ministerial+Conference+of+the+Heart+of+Asia-­Istanbul+Process, retrieved February 1, 2017. 10 Gov’t Questions Effectiveness of Foreign Aid Billions, IRIN News, Kabul, May 7, 2007, www.irinnews.org/­report/­72002/­afghanistan-­govt-­questions-­effec tiveness-­foreign-­aid-­billions, retrieved August 12, 2016. 11 Sonali Huria, Failed States and Foreign Military Intervention: The Afghanistan Imbroglio, IPCS Special Report, 67, February 2009, 3. 12 Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Permanent Mission of Afghanistan to the United Nations in New York, President Hamid Karzai Speaks at the United Nations General Assembly, http://­afghanistan-­un.org/­2012/­09/­president-­hamid-­ karzai-­speaks-­at-­the-­united-­nations-­general-­assembly/­, retrieved April  29, 2017. 13 D. Suba Chandran, Af-­Pak Diary: Kabul Conference and the Countdown to Another Disaster, July 21, 2010, www.ipcs.org/­article/­terrorism/­af-­pak-­diary-­ kabul-­conference-­and-­the-­countdown-­to-­another-­3197.html, retrieved August 12, 2016. 14 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and Islamic Republic of Afghanistan High Office of Oversight and Anti-­Corruption, Corruption in Afghanistan: Recent Patterns and Trends, 2012,www.unodc.org/­documents/­frontpage/­Corruption_ in_Afghanistan_FINAL.pdf, retrieved May 13, 2015. 15 Haroun Mir and Habib Wardak, The Perils of Corruption in Afghanistan, June 24, 2015, www.aljazeera.com/­indepth/­opinion/­2015/­06/­perils-­corruption-­ afghanistan-­150623074926689.html, retrieved May 13, 2015. 16 Administrative Office of the President, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Transcript of President Mohammad Ashraf Ghani’s Remarks at European Union Conference, The Way Ahead for Anti-­Corruption in Afghanistan, Presidential Palace, Kabul, May 5, 2016, http://­aop.gov.af/­english/­2237/­%E2%80%9CThe+Way+Ahead+ for+Anti-­Corruption+in+Afghanistan%E2%80%9D, retrieved April 30, 2017. 17 Announcement, Kabul International Conference Outcomes, 20 July 2010, www. gov.uk/­government/­news/­kabul-­international-­conference-­outcomes; also see Karzai

198  K. N. Tennyson reaffirms 2014 goal for Afghan-­led security,The Denver Post, July 20, 2010, www. denverpost.com/­2010/­07/­20/­karzai-­reaffirms-­2014-­goal-­for-­afghan-­led-­security/­, retrieved July 1, 2016. 18 Mathew Rosenberg, With Bags of Cash, C.I.A. Seeks Influence in Afghanistan, The New York Times, April 28, 2013, www.nytimes.com/­2013/­04/­29/­world/­ asia/­cia-­delivers-­cash-­to-­afghan-­leaders-­office.html?_r=0, retrieved May  1, 2017 and Karzai Confirms Receiving Cash from the US April 29, 2013, www.tolo news.com/­afghanistan/­karzai-­confirms-­receiving-­cash-­us. 19 Dexter Filkins, Iran Is Said to Give Top Karzai Aide Cash by the Bagful, The New York Times, October 23, 2010, www.nytimes.com/­2010/­10/­24/­world/­asia/­ 24afghan.html, retrieved April 4, 2017. 20 Adam Pain and Jonathan Goodhand, Afghanistan Current Employment and Socio-­Economic Situation and Prospects, InFocus Programme on Crisis Response and Reconstruction, Working Paper 8, Recovery and Reconstruction Department, Geneva, March 2002, 43, www.ilo.org/­wcmsp5/­groups/­public/­-­-­ ed_emp/­-­-­-­e mp_ent/­-­-­-­ifp_crisis/­Documents/­publication/­wcms_116403.pdf, retrieved May 29, 2007. 21 Major General Y. K. Gera (Retd), The Situation in Afghanistan and the Way Ahead, U.S.I., Journal, Vol. 138, no. 574 (October–December 2008), 540. 22 Quoted in Pamela Constable, Iran’s Fuel Blockade Strains Relations with Afghanistan, Prompts Protests, Washington Post, January 17, 2011, www.wash ingtonpost.com/­wp-­dyn/­content/­article/­2011/­01/­16/­ AR2011 011604 262.html, retrieved June 3, 2014. 23 Amin Saikal, Afghanistan’s Ethnic Conflict, Survival, Vol. 40, no. 2 (Summer 1998), 114. 24 George W. Bush, Address to the Joint Session of the 107th Congress, United States Capitol, Washington, DC, September 20, 2001, Selected Speeches of President George W. Bush: 2001–2008, https://­georgewbush-­whitehouse.archives. gov/­infocus/­bushrecord/­documents/­Selected_Speeches_George_W_Bush.pdf, retrieved April 2, 2017. 25 Quoted in Peter Beaumont, Same Old Mistake in New Afghan War, The Guardian, October 18, 2009, www.theguardian.com/­world/­2009/­oct/­18/­afghan-­war-­ soviet-­invasion-­mistakes, retrieved July 13, 2010. 26 Shereena Qazi, Afghan Power Project Prompts Hazara Protest in Kabul, Al Jazeera, May 17, 2016, www.aljazeera.com/­news/­2016/­05/­power-­line-­ protests-­afghan-­capital-­kabul-­paralysed-­160516060446393.html, retrieved April 2, 2017. and Afghan Hazara Minority Protest in Kabul Over Power Line, Al Jazeera, July 23, 2016,www.aljazeera.com/­news/­2016/­07/­afghan-­hazara-­ minority-­protest-­kabul-­power-­line-­60723064233800.html, retrieved June  3, 2017. 27 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Ministry of Counter Narcotics report, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2016: Cultivation and Production, December 2016, 6 and 14, http://­mcn. gov.af/­Content/­files/­Survey%20-­%202016.pdf http://­mcn.gov.af/­Content/­files/­ Survey%20-­%202016.pdf, retrieved February 15, 2017. 28 For a detailed report of the key finding of the opium cultivation in Afghanistan, see ibid., 6–7 and 14–15.

Bibliography Administrative Office of the President, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. 2016a. [Transcript] President Mohammad Ashraf Ghani’s remarks at European Union Conference, the Way Ahead for Anti-­Corruption in Afghanistan, May 5. http://­aop.

Afghanistan imbroglio 199 gov.af/­english/­2237/­%E2%80%9CThe+Way+Ahead+for+Anti-­Corruption+in+ Afghanistan%E2%80%9D. Administrative Office of the President, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. 2016b. H.E President Mohammad Ashraf Ghani’s Remarks at 6th Ministerial Conference of the Heart of Asia-­IstanbulProcess, Amritsar, India, December 4. http://­aop.gov. af/­english/­36 18/­H.E+President +Mohammad +Ashraf +Ghani%27s+Remarks+at +6th+Ministerial+Conference+of+the+Heart+of+Asia-­Istanbul+Process. Afghan Business Council, Dubai-­United Arab Emirates. Recent Updates: Economy. www.abcdxb.com/­Economy.aspx#. Afghan Hazara Minority Protest in Kabul Over Power Line. 2016. Al Jazeera, July 23. http://­www.aljazeera.com/­news/­2016/­07/­afghan-­hazara-­minority-­protest-­kabul-­ power-­line-­160723064233800.html. Afghanistan: Before and After the Taliban. 2014. British Broadcasting Corporation, April 2. www.bbc.com/­news/­world-­asia-­26747712. Banerjee, Nipa. 2016. Afghanistan Is Among Today’s Greatest Development Challenges. Policy Option, July 6. http://­policyoptions.irpp. org/­2016/­07/­06/­ afghanistan-­is-­among-­todays-­greatest-­development-­challenges/­. Beaumont, Peter. 2009. Same Old Mistakes in New Afghan War. The Guardian, October 18. www.theguardian.com/­world/­2009/­oct/­18/­afghan-­war-­soviet-­invasion-­mistakes. Bush, George W. 2001. Address to the Joint Session of the 107th Congress. United States Capitol, Washington, DC. Selected Speeches of President George W. Bush: 2001–2008, September 20. https://­georgewbush-­whitehouse. archives.gov/­focus/­ bushrecord/­documents/­Selected_Speeches_George_W_Bush.pdf. Chandran, D. Suba. 2010. Af-­Pak Diary: Kabul Conference and the Countdown to Another Disaster. Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies (IPCS), July 21. www. ipcs.org/­article/­terrorism/­af-­pak-­diary-­kabul-­conference-­and-­the-­countdown-­to-­ another-­3197.html. Constable, Pamela. 2011. Iran’s Fuel Blockade Strains Relations with Afghanistan, Prompts Protests. Washington Post, January 17. www.washingtonpost.com/­wp-­ dyn/­content/­article/­2011/­01/­16/­AR2011011604 262.html. Donati, Jessica. 2014. After 10 Year of Western Aid, Afghanistan Is a Dependent Mess. Business Insider, December 24. www.businessinsider.com/­r-­a-­decade-­of-­ western-­aid-­in-­Afghanistan  – mission-­ unsustainable-­2014–12?IR=T. Filkins, Dexter. 2010. Iran Is Said to Give Top Karzai Aide Cash by the Bagful. The New York Times, October 23. www.nytimes.com/­2010/­10/­24/­world/­asia/­ 24afghan.html. Gera, Major General Y. K. (Retd). 2008. The Situation in Afghanistan and the Way Ahead. U.S.I. Journal 138 (574) October–December: 540. Gov’t Questions Effectiveness of Foreign Aid Billions. IRIN News, May 7, 2007. www.irinnews.org/­report/­72002/­afghanistan-­govt-­questions-­effectiveness-­foreign-­ aid-­billions. Huria, Sonali. 2009. Failed States and Foreign Military Intervention: The Afghanistan Imbroglio. IPCS Special Report, 67, 3, February. Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Central Statistics Organization. 2015–2016. Exports-­Free on Board (FOB). http://­cso.gov.af/­en/­page/­1500/­4722/­2015-­2016. Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Permanent Mission of Afghanistan to the United Nations in New York. President Hamid Karzai Speaks at the United Nations General Assembly. http://­afghanistan-­un.org/­2012/­09/­president-­hamid-­karzai-­speaks-­at-­ the-­united-­nations-­general-­assembly/­.

200  K. N. Tennyson Kabul International Conference outcomes. 2010, 20 July. www.gov.uk/­government/­ news/­kabul-­international-­conference-­outcomes. Karzai Confirms Receiving Cash from the US. 2013. TOLOnews, April 29.www. tolonews.com/­afghanistan/­karzai-­confirms-­receiving-­cash-­us. Karzai Reaffirms 2014 Goal for Afghan-­Led Security. 2010. The Denver Post, July 20. www.denverpost.com/­2010/­07/­20/­karzai-­reaffirms-­2014-­goal-­for-­afghan-­led-­ security/­. Mir, Haroun, and Habib Wardak. 2015. The Perils of Corruption in Afghanistan. Al Jazeera, June 24. www.aljazeera.com/­indepth/­opinion/­2015/­06/­perils-­corruption-­ afghanistan-­150623074926689.html. Nijssen, Stefanie. 2010. The Afghan Economy: A Brief History. Civil-­Military Fusion Centre, October 14. http://­reliefweb.int/­sites/­reliefweb.int/­files/­resources/­AB458E BF37B01017852577BC006B45C4-­Full_Report.pdf. Pain, Adam, and Jonathan Goodhand. 2002. Afghanistan: Current Employment Economic Situation and Prospects. InFocus Programme on Crisis and Socio-­ Response and Reconstruction. Working Paper 8. Recovery and Reconstruction Department, Geneva, March.www.ilo.org/­wcmsp5/­groups/­public/­-­ed_emp/­-­emp_ ent/­-­ifp_crisis/­Documents/­publication /­wcms_116403.pdf. Quiz, Shereena. 2016. Afghan Power Project Prompts Hazara Protest in Kabul. Al Jazeera, May 17. www.aljazeera.com/­news/­2016/­05/­power-­line-­protests-­afghan-­ capital-­kabul-­paralysed-­1605160 60446393.html. Rosenberg, Mathew. 2013. With Bags of Cash, C.I.A. Seeks Influence in Afghanistan. The New York Times, April 28. www.nytimes.com/­2013/­04/­29/­ world/­asia/­ cia-­delivers-­cash-­to-­afghan-­leaders-­office.html?_r=0. Saikal, Amin. 1998. Afghanistan’s Ethnic Conflict. Survival 40 (2): 114. Sengupta, Ramananda. 2005. Why Afghanistan Is Important to India, August 30. www.rediff.com/­news/­2005/­aug/­30spec4.htm. UNDP. 2002. Human Development Report 2002: Deepening Democracy in a Fragmented World. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press. UNDP. 2015. Human Development Report 2015: Work for Human Development. New York: UNDP. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime & Islamic Republic of Afghanistan High Office of Oversight and Anti-­Corruption. 2012. Corruption in Afghanistan: Recent Patterns and Trends, December. www.unodc.org/­documents/­frontpage/­ Corruption_in_Afghanistan_FINAL.pdf.

12 Evaluating World Bank support for building the capacity of the state and its accountability to citizens in Afghanistan1 Clay G. Wescott Introduction An evaluation (World Bank 2012a) looked at the results of World Bank assistance in Afghanistan from 2002 to 2011. The World Bank sought to achieve positive results in three main areas: building the capacity of the state and its accountability to citizens; promoting growth of the rural economy and improving rural livelihoods; and supporting the growth of the formal private sector. Overall, the evaluation found that the country used the assistance well to make major progress toward most of the major objectives, although the risks to development outcomes remain high. There are important achievements in public financial management, public health, telecommunications, community development, primary education, rural roads, irrigation, mining and microfinance. There has been less progress in civil service reform, agriculture, urban and private sector development. This chapter focuses on the first main area of support: building the capacity of the state and its accountability to citizens. There were two main dimensions to this assistance. First, the World Bank supported core financial systems to heighten fiscal sustainability and improve transparency and accountability. The results include a relatively strong framework of public financial management, such as improvements in budgeting and spending efficiency at line ministries. However, challenges remain, including a weak capacity for processing procurement and implementation delays due to security-­related issues. Second, the World Bank helped build and improve core administrative and judicial institutions at the national and subnational levels. Results include the adoption of new laws and regulations, more transparent recruitment and pay and grading reforms. However, corruption is rampant, and there is little evidence of improved administrative performance, except by a “second civil service” of contracted specialists paid with unsustainable donor funds. For full details on these and other results of World Bank support in Afghanistan, see World Bank 2012a. The chapter draws on a few subsequent assessments of more recent World Bank support to get a sense of the progress and sustainability of these reforms since 2012. However, a much more intensive study would be

202  Clay G. Wescott needed to get a full update on the present situation and the emerging risks in these areas. Afghanistan is in the crosshairs of competing geopolitical interests and factional turmoil. The withdrawal of most Western troops by 2014 and the internal divisions within the Taliban has stoked up the country’s many other internal rivalries. The 2014 election of Ashraf Ghani was challenged by his rival, Abdullah Abdullah. The Pashtun Islamist insurgent leader Gulbuddin Hekmatyar has come back into the fray. The Tajik Islamist party Jamiat-­i-­Islami, Hekmatyar’s historical rivals, has strongly reacted to this. There is no national, political settlement holding these and other factions together. With a full US military withdrawal, the regime could collapse and Russia, Iran, Pakistan and other regional powers would ramp up efforts to secure their interests in the conflict (Bokhari 2017). On the other hand, the Afghanistan-­Pakistan Action Plan for Peace and Solidarity, starting in October 2017, comprises Pakistan’s support for an Afghan-­led peace process. The seven components include action against fugitives, denying territory to anti-­state actors, establishing a liaison office, avoiding territorial violations, avoiding public blame games and establishing related working groups. Pakistan may be motivated in part by the China– Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) proposal that would cross Afghanistan to reach the Indian Ocean at a new port being constructed north of Karachi (Geopolitical Futures 2018). India is seeking access to Central Asia by using a proposed link from a new Iranian port of Chabahar, linked by a road and rail network through Afghanistan that would be jointly developed by India and China. These massive infrastructure projects can succeed only if there is stability in Afghanistan, so there is reason to believe that these key regional powers will take steps to try to ensure a more stable future. In July 2018, heads of intelligence from China, Iran, Pakistan and Russia held consultations in Islamabad on taking coordinated steps to restrain the Islamic State in Afghanistan. Any transition to a peaceful settlement would also require support from the United Nations (UN) and regional organizations such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), along with a clear indication that the United States does not intend to maintain permanent bases in Afghanistan. The Taliban and other fighting forces would need to be integrated into the administration and the Afghan military (Rubin 2018). These issues are not analyzed in this chapter, but there is reason for hope that the results achieved so far in state capacity and accountability could be sustained in the medium term.

Context The Afghan Interim Administration took power in 2001 in a setting where ministries lacked materials and equipment. Skills were lacking in procurement, expenditure programming, budget preparation, accounting, financial control and audit, along with human resources and program management. Most women, who constituted 43 percent of government employees before

Evaluating World Bank support for Afghanistan 203 the period of Taliban rule, had been dismissed. While the civil service, divided into Tashkeels (staff allotments) for each ministry, had common pay scales, terms and conditions that signaled unity and fairness, public services such as education and healthcare were limited. The World Bank supported the country’s efforts to rebuild public services in four areas: putting in place the basics of public financial management and procurement system; building capacity to recruit and retain essential skilled personnel; building effective systems for health and social protection; and improving the quality and accessibility of public education. The chapter now analyzes these first two areas.

Public financial management and procurement The country’s objective was to strengthen core systems, heighten fiscal sustainability, improve transparency and use the budget process to make expenditures at the subnational level more effective and equitable. The result was a relatively strong public financial management (PFM) framework, impressive revenue through 2012, growth and greater assurance that funds provided through the budget (including most Bank-­administered resources) would be used effectively. Afghanistan’s PFM framework in 2012 was better than would be expected for a country of this per capita income, which had started virtually from scratch ten years earlier. It achieved impressive revenue performance in this period (up from 3 percent of GDP in 2002–2003 to 10.1 percent in 2012) and greater assurance that funds provided through the budget would be used effectively. Accounting and financial management reporting have become more accurate and timelier. The use of the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF) to pay salaries ensured timely and reliable payment to staff while facilitating quick disbursement of donor funds to scale up the implementation of national programs. The World Bank administers the ARTF, which is the largest source of on-­budget financing for the government. Pooling resources increases leverage and accountability, and the ARTF has been successful in mobilizing and using resources effectively. It also allows the scaling up of programs piloted with World Bank resources through support for on-­budget programs increasing national ownership. But it comes with the demand for better documentation and supervision to justify financing decisions and rising expectations of a greater voice from the government and financing partners. About half of ARTF funds have been used effectively to scale up programs initially piloted with World Bank financing, thereby reducing the risk to contributing development partners. More recently, the incentives program supported by the ARTF has provided further impetus to PFM reforms. Conditionality associated with the incentives program within the recurrent cost window creates an incentive for the government to address difficult reforms while enabling development partners to sustain a more coherent and influential dialogue with the

204  Clay G. Wescott government on vital reform areas. Despite the progress, significant challenges remain. Budget formulation and execution is hampered by weak project planning by line ministries and the unpredictability of donor financing. Off-­budget expenditures remain significant, even though all World Bank– managed operations are on budget. However, the decisions by bilateral partners to keep funds off budget is not necessarily due to the status of PFM, because political or other considerations also affect them. There have been some improvements in fiscal management and spending efficiency at line ministries. Ministries help formulate the budget through their inputs to the Ministry of Finance (MOF), and all processes in budget execution depend on their contracting services, requesting payments directly into the Afghanistan Financial Management Information System and reconciling expenditures with commitments. But substantial capacity weaknesses in project preparation and implementation remain to be addressed. Subnational units of the MOF – Moutoufiats – have online, real-­time use of the information system; however, the capacity of most other subnational units for PFM is weak. Parliament approved a National Audit Law in 2013 (ECOSAI undated). It clarifies the role of the Central Audit Organization as having an independent review function with no oversight or responsibility for internal audits, and this opens the way for the application of Article 61 of the Public Finance and Expenditure Management Law. The law also provides for independence both in the mandate and reporting for the Central Audit Organization. An updated Public Procurement Law and Public Procurement Rules were issued in 2015 (World Bank 2017a). However, capacity in most line ministries for processing procurement is weak, and there are interruptions and delays in contract implementation in part due to security issues. The strategic relevance and technical quality of the World Bank’s PFM operations are commendable, especially considering the difficult national context. In the early years, the emphasis was appropriately on expenditure control and the establishment of basic mechanisms for cash protection and management, including a single treasury account, payroll and simple accounting. These PFM achievements will need to be consolidated over the next few years to strengthen budget planning and execution capability. World Bank support came from PFM components totaling about US$239 million in four development policy and seven investment operations funded from the World Bank’s International Development Association and the ARTF and $1.1 million in analytical work. The package of parallel investment operations and analysis provided the government with essential content and operational support to use the development policy resources productively. This support from the World Bank, along with parallel efforts from the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development (DFID), the United Nations’ Development Program (UNDP), the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the government of Japan and the Asian Development Bank, among others, sought to

Evaluating World Bank support for Afghanistan 205 help establish a functioning PFM and procurement system led by the MOF in areas where there was sufficient political willingness to move forward. The political willingness to move forward had to be demonstrated by the existence of a legal framework, including Public Finance and Expenditure Management Law; Public Procurement Law; Pension Law; and key amendments. It also required procedures for a basic budget; treasury and revenue mechanisms, including increased budget allocation for health and education; improved access to key financial information; a basic computerized treasury system for processing payments and producing reports; a Verified Payments System for payroll; a basic institutional structure (such as a reorganized Budget Department, Fiscal Policy Unit, Cash Management Unit, unified chart of accounts, Central Bank payment system, Control and Audit Office, Central Procurement Facility); and a cadre of staff, led by a second civil service of contracted, technical and professional staff to operate this structure in the MOF, line ministries and the subnational administration. Twenty-­nine percent of World Bank support (and 52 percent of concessional funding from the International Development Association) provided the means for achieving these results, which came from four development policy operations (Programmatic Support for Institution Building I, II and III and Strengthening Institutions). The remainder came from a combination of investment operations (Emergency Public Administration Project, Strengthening Financial Capacity and Public Financial Management Reform), technical assistance and analytical work on public expenditure management, procurement and fiduciary safeguards that provided the government with essential content and operational support to use the development policy resources productively. A 2005 flagship report (World Bank 2005) set the baseline and provided analysis of major PFM issues that informed World Bank support, Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability Assessments (World Bank 2005, Vol. 2, 2008a), which provide a measure of progress against international benchmarks. Some reports were less useful, such as the gap analysis work (World Bank 2007) which provided twenty-­three pages of recommendations covering almost the entire accounting, financial reporting and auditing spectrum, without any guidance on prioritization and without regard for capacity realities. While some of the recommendations have since been implemented (e.g. the adoption of international cash accounting and audit standards and improvements in internal audits), the report would have been more helpful if it had identified which key gaps were likely to be especially important, taking into account the Afghan context, including issues of weak educational institutions to support an accounting profession and security issues and including how these gaps could be filled in a realistic and cost-­ effective fashion and within an appropriate time frame. The ARTF supported improved PFM by upholding fiduciary standards, adjusting them to the realities of the country and offering incentives for the government to address difficult reforms. The transformation of the recurrent

206  Clay G. Wescott cost window into an Incentives Program growing in 2012 in proportion to unconditional annual budget support is an innovation worthy of note. The approach to skills development was multifaceted, including the injection of highly skilled Afghan consultants from around the world, on-­the-­job mentoring of local staff and training courses through the Afghanistan Civil Service Institute, as well as other sources. However, the World Bank and its development partners have not been able to address the weak project planning of government-­funded investments; the extensive off-­budget expenditures; the capacity constraints in line ministries and subnational authorities; and the lack of prosecutorial support from the attorney general. These deficiencies have led to serious remaining weaknesses in the accountability framework, which has worsened corruption. The World Bank has worked with the Afghan government to take some initial steps to address potential mining revenues. The cabinet endorsed a 2010 commitment to make Afghanistan a candidate country for the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative. Afghanistan became a member in 2013 and is committed to publishing all payments of taxes, royalties and fees from its extractive sector and to ensuring that extractive companies operating in Afghanistan publish what they have paid to the government (see reports at AEITI 2017). However, many steps still need to be taken in the PFM roadmap to further reduce the fiduciary risk on these and other government revenues to acceptable levels, as pointed out in the previous section. Other post-­conflict countries have returned to conflict because of disputes over natural resources (Collier 2009). To address this risk, the World Bank should advise the government to consider models from other countries for providing special protection to natural resources revenues in order to set up mechanisms before significant increases in revenue occur and rent-­seeking practices have been established. The government also needs to more clearly and compellingly communicate its natural resources policies to the Afghan population. Heightened policy dialogue on providing additional protection to mining revenues is needed before these revenues start to expand and become targets for rent-­seeking practices. A policy operation following the 2012 evaluation supported tenders for large-­scale mines, but only one was launched and completed, due to lack of adequate security of tenure for potential investors (World Bank 2017b). Another objective of the policy operation was to increase government revenue. The result was an increase in customs revenue and improved detection of customs noncompliance. However, total domestic revenues fell from 10.1 percent of GDP in 2012 to 8.5 percent in 2014, due to insecurity and economic slowdown. An assessment concluded that the operation tried to address too many issues and didn’t consider the possible impact of elections and lack of continuity (ibid.). Since then, domestic revenue has increased to 12.2 percent of GDP in 2017 as a result of improved revenue administration, compliance and new tax measures.

Evaluating World Bank support for Afghanistan 207 The Kabul Bank crisis has been a serious setback. The biggest private sector bank, Kabul Bank, which is used to pay salaries to civil servants, had a run on its deposits on September 2010 and lost all its liquidity in a week. The reason emerged as fraud and embezzlement involving the political elite. The Kabul Bank crisis put on hold a decision on the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) new Extended Credit-­relief Facility and showed the limited capacity of the Central Bank to ensure regulatory oversight. The government moved rapidly to reassure depositors. Kabul Bank, along with four other state-­owned banks, is still being used for salary payments to civil servants. The authorities are continuing the efforts to advance the Kabul Bank liquidation and recover the remaining assets. However, asset recoveries and settlements have become more difficult over time because outstanding claims involve more complicated ownership structures that require lengthy legal procedures (IMF 2017). Powerful people are refusing to make repayments despite criminal court procedures (which were done hastily to create the appearance of action rather than in a thorough way that might get other countries to respond with legal assistance). The losses were initially covered by the Afghan government through a US$825 million lender at a last resort facility. Since then, an estimated US$437 million been repaid, including US$205 from cash recoveries and the rest from the government budget. And US$388 million is outstanding (McLeod 2016). This incident raises the question of the overall approach to public finance improvement, which is putting in place modern systems of reporting and control on revenue and public expenditures. Though these systems may have reduced unauthorized spending and reassured donors enough to put more aid in the budget, the losses from the Kabul Bank are far greater than the estimated benefit of, for example, US$151 million from the Second PFM Reform Project supported by the World Bank in terms of efficiency savings achieved, less the cost of the operation (World Bank 2018). The fact that top officials of the previous government and their close relatives are implicated in the scandal raises questions about government commitment to maintaining high fiduciary standards across the public sector. Better systems of risk management are needed for large banks, including closely monitoring contingent liabilities and accounting for these liabilities under different stress scenarios. Without these measures, fiscal sustainability will remain jeopardized.

Public administration The country’s objective was to build a reformed and sustainable civil service accountable to its citizens to provide services that are affordable, accessible and adequate. The result is that World Bank support – along with parallel efforts from the IMF, UNDP, USAID and DFID, among others – has led to the adoption of new laws and regulations, more transparent recruitment, a

208  Clay G. Wescott reduction in the number of ministries and pay and grading reforms. A basic size and structure for the civil service has been set, defining the numbers of staff needed across ministries and agencies, setting an affordable pay scale for civil servants, including pensions, and beginning the process of basing the civil service on rules. Nevertheless, high-­level, off-­budget corruption is perceived to be getting worse despite PFM reforms intended to reduce the degree of leakage from the core budget. There is little evidence that the new laws, procedures and regulations are translating into improved civil service performance. The World Bank supported the sector with US$214 million from a mix of development policy and investment operations and US$3 million in analytical work. The objectives and technical quality of the World Bank ’s support were relevant to the government, and World Bank strategies and were aligned with the World Bank analytical work and with work supported by other development partners. World Bank support was aimed at the development of a regulatory framework for the civil service (including new policies, laws and regulations); new structures (Independent Administration Reform and Civil Service Commission) to manage human resources and civil service reforms; and pay and grading reforms, with new average pay scales that were two to three times the previous ones in return for merit-­and results-­ based human resources management. The World Bank also supported short-­term incentive programs to attract a second civil service of skilled Afghans and compensate them for the cost of leaving jobs overseas. This scheme also aimed to compete with pay levels offered in Afghanistan by international agencies and NGOs for staff with similar skills. These staff members are employed both by government ministries (using donor funding to meet the remaining amount of normal salaries) and by partner organizations. Most capacity has been built among the contracted staff of donor-­funded projects rather than in the core civil service. Relying on the second civil service for gains in public administration and governance leads to multiple challenges. Training and institutional development often take a backseat to doing the tasks themselves. There is salary competition for individuals who move out of the civil service and then from project to project, resulting in difficulty in filling key civil service positions. There is a risk to sustainability if security deteriorates or donor funding decreases, as well as the risk that the extreme pay differentials will become politically and socially untenable (see Islamic Republic of Afghanistan 2010 and Appendix I). There is the added risk that as foreign forces leave, fiscal and politico-­economic constraints may make it impossible for the regime to sustain the administrative improvements that have been achieved. The dominance of security forces on the public payroll and operational budget poses the additional risk of a power imbalance between military and civilian sectors. The World Bank’s analytical work gave a useful picture of the legacy of basically sound administrative practices which were reasonably well

Evaluating World Bank support for Afghanistan 209 understood if not always adhered to and the need to build on this legacy rather than try to replace it with something different (World Bank 2004, Vol. 2). The World Bank has provided good high-­level analysis of civil service challenges (e.g. World Bank 2008b, 2009, 2012b), which contributed to establishing the Presidential Commission on National Technical Assistance. However, more attention should have been paid to the development of a more granular human resources strategy that covers the following: • How to build on the legacy commitment of Afghan civil servants to public service • How and when Afghanistan will transfer civilian responsibilities from foreign to Afghan contract staff and civil servants • The appropriate proportion of Afghan contract staff to civil servants moving forward and how large a civil service is required • What all this will cost and how it will be paid for • How to ensure the production of adequate levels of graduates with essential skills by local and foreign universities. The World Bank also undertook some early analytical work on subnational governance that suggested a two-­pronged approach: the state should deliver some basic support to deconcentrated units, and there should be some cautious increases in delegation, including incentives triggered by simple measures of administrative effort and fewer delays in staff appointments and payroll and in the physical reconstruction of provincial and district facilities (World Bank 2004, Vol. 1). This approach was correctly premised on the fact that according to its constitution and history, Afghanistan is a unitary state, with appointed governors, and a limited subnational presence of line ministries. However, the results have been uneven. The Constitution provides for elected provincial, district and village councils. Provincial councils were elected in 2005 and 2009 but with limited, unclear functions (Lister and Nixon 2006), and they are still seeking effective roles in securing provincial development, while district and village councils have not yet been established. World Bank support instead focused on subnational public administration. Payroll systems have improved, as discussed in the previous section, but other PFM standards for deconcentrated units at the subnational level remain weak. Some bilateral donors are assisting the provinces where they are working to strengthen local government facilities, but these efforts are not consistent and cover only a handful of provinces. In many areas, programs supported by project funding or provincial reconstruction teams have more resources, and some even have a more established presence at the local level than formal units of local government. Some World Bank projects expected too much in too short a time. For example, the Civil Service Reform Project had to be restructured to align better with the implementation capacity of the Independent Administrative Reform and Civil Service Commission, which had a change of leadership

210  Clay G. Wescott in the early days of the project. The challenges of that project were probably heightened on the World Bank’s side by the high turnover of task team leaders (four over a four-­year period). Another type of challenge is seen in the World Bank’s Judicial Reform Project, which focused on the centralized state justice system. The project supported improvements in areas that had client ownership, such as design standards for and the construction of courthouses, law libraries, legal aid offices and pay and grading reforms for prosecutors, but judicial reforms were held back by a lack of support from the Attorney General’s Office. The World Bank tried to address some of these challenges in an ARTF-­funded operation approved in December 2011: Capacity Building for Results (CBR). This operation has several design features intended to address the shortcomings of past support, including joint management by the MOF and the Civil Service Commission; high-­level controls to prevent rent seeking through recruitment practices; a results-­based approach to access funding and assess ministry performance; and predictable levels of funding over a five-­year period. By 2016, the project had supported the recruitment of high-­capacity staff into critical posts at salaries closer to the market rates than in the past. Of these positions, 1,127 have now been selected, with 680 so far contracted and fifteen hundred expected to be contracted by end-­December 2017. There has also been extensive training carried out through the Afghanistan Civil Service Institute, including a mid-­level management development program that is facilitating the promotion of mid-­level managers across the civil service (World Bank 2017c). Other World Bank support to improve public administration since the 2012 evaluation continues to face challenges. For example, an effort to improve the country’s statistical capacity completed in 2016 was unable to achieve much of what was hoped for. An assessment derived some lessons from this engagement. First, building capacity in Afghanistan is facilitated by a prioritized, simple and properly sequenced design alongside high-­level consultation with stakeholders to ensure that they are on board. In this case, the Afghanistan Central Statistical Organization was unable to benefit from an international twinning arrangement built into the World Bank’s support. The implementing agency’s challenges increased from a change in leadership during the project, and it was unable to cope with the ambitious number of planned activities. Second, organizational capacity development in Afghanistan involves doing things that the World Bank and the Afghan government do not fully understand, with many contextual unknowns, different interests and multiple transactions that increase risk. Facing these challenges requires addressing a range of motivational problems, allowing solutions to emerge from trial and error and seeking authorization for teamwork with highly varied functional roles and skill sets. It takes complex learning adaptation, keeping options open and mash-­ups. In this case, the project design was not flexible enough, because all components and fund allocations were predetermined. A more flexible design would have allowed

Evaluating World Bank support for Afghanistan 211 more timely adjustments as unexpected problems emerged and would have enhanced the chances of achieving the intended results (World Bank 2016). An overall assessment of the World Bank’s support for public administration and governance needs to consider the difficult security environment and the challenge from the fact that the World Bank’s resources are dwarfed by those of much larger players. Given these challenges, the World Bank has helped to put in place some elements of a functioning civil service, which has had some success in providing citizens with essential services. However, there are significant shortcomings. World Bank operations have not been able to deliver all that was promised, and the quality of the enacted reforms is uneven. Although formal laws, regulations and processes for the functioning of the civil service have been put in place, actual changes in behavior have been slow to take hold. Most of the results have depended on consultants and Afghan civil servants who are on enhanced pay arrangements financed by donors, which is not sustainable.

Summary and risk management In conclusion, Afghanistan now has a relatively strong public financial management framework and greater assurance that funds provided through the budget will be used effectively. Accounting and financial management reporting have become more accurate and timelier with the adoption of the Afghanistan Financial Management Information System. The use of the ARTF to pay salaries has ensured timely and reliable payments to staff while facilitating the quick disbursement of donor funds and accountability in their use. The ARTF also supported an incentives program for the government to undertake difficult reforms. Nonetheless, the process of reaching the objectives of building capacity for budget formulation and execution, including improvements in fiscal management and spending efficiency at many line ministries and subnational entities, has been slow. Although a Public Procurement Law and amendments have been adopted with World Bank support, capacity building for effective implementation is still needed, creating substantial procurement bottlenecks. In public administration, World Bank support has led to the adoption of a civil service law and regulations for overseeing administrative reform; more transparent recruitment; a reduction in the number of ministries from thirty-­four to twenty-­six; and pay and grading reforms. Nevertheless, public administration remains vulnerable because there is little evidence that the new laws, procedures and regulations are translating into improved civil service performance. Despite the inroads made with the support of the World Bank to reduce leakage and increase donor trust, the government’s ability to control corruption and enforce anti-­corruption measures remains weak. The achievements have relied mainly on a second civil service of contracted staff who are paid relatively high salaries, some of whom are working for other development partners, although there has been recent progress with a

212  Clay G. Wescott plan to hand over tasks to civil servants on pay scales that the government can afford. These improvements in core public administrative and financial administration have enabled progress in improving public service delivery. Basic health services have been extended to cover all thirty-­four provinces. From 2002 to 2009, the infant mortality rate fell by 22 percent and the under-­five mortality rate fell by 26 percent. The number of functioning health establishments and trained midwives (from accredited schools) increased fourfold from 2002 to 2010, and the proportion of facilities with skilled female health worker(s) has increased from 25 to 72 percent. Despite data constraints, there is evidence of reductions in maternal mortality rates and fertility rates and of increased contraceptive prevalence. Primary school enrollment increased from one million students in 2001 to 7.2 million in 2011. The enrollment of girls has grown from a negligible number to almost three million. World Bank assistance included projects for primary and secondary education, higher education and vocational skills training, but higher education and skills training have had more modest outcomes. Early investments focused more on access than quality. World Bank assistance provided grants for the purchase of school supplies and equipment in almost 10,000 schools and construction of over five thousand classrooms. For more information on the progress in health and education services and the World Bank’s role in supporting this progress, see World Bank 2012a. The ambitious results achieved by the country are subject to serious risks. In PFM, the slow progress on upstream budget preparation and procurement by line ministries and subnational entities risks undermining the progress made on accounting, financial control and reporting, and this hampers improvements in service delivery. This risk is heightened by the faster increases in core expenditures (particularly those related to security) relative to domestic revenues and the threat to fiscal and macroeconomic stability. In public administration, the reliance on the second civil service for gains in public administration and governance led to multiple risks: the risk to sustainability if security deteriorates or donor funding decreases and the risk that the extreme pay differentials will become politically and socially untenable. There is also the risk that as foreign forces leave, the regime may find it necessary to roll back the administrative improvements that have been achieved, to make greater use of public resources to make nontransparent transfers to elite supporters needed to sustain a ruling coalition. The dominance of security forces in the public payroll and operational budget poses the additional risk of a power imbalance between military and civilian sectors. Overall, the evaluation found that the country used the assistance well to make major progress toward building the capacity of the state and its accountability to citizens, although the risks to these outcomes remain high.

Evaluating World Bank support for Afghanistan 213

Note 1 The findings, interpretations and conclusions expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/­the World Bank and its affiliated organizations or those of the executive directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent. The World Bank does not guarantee the accuracy of the data included in this work. This chapter draws mainly from World Bank, 2012a.

References Afghanistan Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (AEITI). 2017. Reports and Publications. www.aeiti.af/­en. Bokhari, K. 2017. Delaying the Inevitable in Afghanistan. Geopolitical Futures. https://­geopoliticalfutures.com/­delaying-­inevitable-­afghanistan/­. Collier, Paul. 2009. War, Guns and Votes. New York: Harper Collins. Economic Co-­ operation Organization Supreme Audit Institutions (ECOSAI). undated. The Control and Audit Office of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. www. ecosai.org.pk/­afghanistan-­info.php. Geopolitical Futures. 2018. Watch List Findings, April 14. https://­us11.campaign-­ archive.com/­?e=b84174b617&u=781d962e0d3dfabcf455f7eff&id=1db60e01b8. International Monetary Fund (IMF). 2017. Afghanistan Article IV Consultation Reports. International Monetary Fund. Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. 2010. Report on Analysis of Donor-­funded Remuneration for Individuals Working in the Government. Kabul: Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. Lister, S., and H. Nixon. 2006. Provincial Governance Structures in Afghanistan: From Confusion to Vision? AREU Briefing Paper. Kabul: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit. McLeod, Grant. 2016. Responding to Corruption and the Kabul Bank Collapse. Washington: US Institute of Peace. www.usip.org/­sites/­default/­files/­SR398-­ Responding-­to-­Corruption-­and-­the-­Kabul-­Bank-­Collapse.pdf Rubin, Barnett R. 2018. Is Afghanistan Ready for Peace? How Great Powers Can End the War. Foreign Affairs. www.foreignaffairs.com/­articles/­afghanistan/­2018-­ 07-­30/­afghanistan-­ready-­peace. World Bank. 2004. Subnational Administration in Afghanistan. Washington, DC: World Bank. World Bank. 2005. Afghanistan Managing Public Finances for Development. Washington, DC: World Bank. World Bank. 2007. Afghanistan: Public Sector Accounting and Auditing a Comparison to International Standards. Financial Management Unit South Asia Region. Washington, DC: World Bank. World Bank. 2008a. Afghanistan Public Financial Management Performance Assessment. Washington, DC: World Bank. World Bank. 2008b. Afghanistan Building an Effective State Priorities for Public Administration Reform. Washington, DC: World Bank. World Bank. 2009. Scaling up Technical Assistance and Capacity Development in Afghanistan. Washington, DC: World Bank. World Bank. 2012a. Afghanistan: Country Program Evaluation, 2002–2011. Independent Evaluation Group. Washington, DC: World Bank.

214  Clay G. Wescott World Bank. 2012b. World Development Report 2012: Gender Equality and Development. Washington, DC: World Bank. World Bank. 2016. Afghanistan – AFGHANSTAT: Strengthening the National Statistical System. Implementation, Completion and Results Review, ICRR0020434. Independent Evaluation Group. Washington, DC: World Bank. World Bank. 2017a. Benchmarking PPP Procurement 2017 in Afghanistan. http://­ bpp.worldbank.org/­d ata/­e xploreindicators/­~ /­m edia/­W BG/­B PP/­D ocuments/­ PPP2017-­CountryFiles/­Afghanistan.pdf. World Bank. 2017b. AF: Development Policy Programmatic Series (P118027). Implementation, Completion and Results Review, ICRR0020413. Independent Evaluation Group. Washington, DC: World Bank. World Bank. 2017c. Afghanistan Capacity Building for Results Facility (P123845). Implementation Status & Results Report, Sequence 14. Washington, DC: World Bank. World Bank. 2018. Implementation Completion and Results Report on a Grant in the Amount of $114.12 Million to the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan for a Public Financial Management Reform II. Washington, DC: World Bank.

13 Concluding remarks The way forward for Afghanistan Adenrele Awotona

The role of the international community, working with the Afghan government International backing for the country will continue to be needed immediately in the following main areas: 1 2 3 4

Strengthening disaster risk reduction and response Poverty alleviation and the reinforcement of the well-­being of citizens The promotion of female empowerment Capacity building.

I shall now briefly review each of these needs. Strengthening disaster risk reduction and response The World Bank has noted, on its website, that since 1980, “disasters caused by natural hazards have affected 9 million people and caused over 20,000 fatalities” in Afghanistan (The World Bank’s Website). Low human development, exacerbated by natural hazards such as flooding, earthquakes, snow avalanches, landslides and droughts, as well as other climate change effects, continue to be intense and rampant, resulting in massive and frequent loss of lives, livelihoods and public and private property. However, Afghanistan’s approach to disaster risk management (DRM) lacks coherence. There are about twenty government ministries responsible for different emergency response duties and little coordination among them. There is, therefore, an urgent need to integrate development planning, strategic disaster risk– reduction preparation, public policy, international investments and the legal and policy frameworks for effective disaster and climate risk management. There is also a pressing need to develop and implement original mitigation strategies to minimize some urban and rural communities’ vulnerability to natural hazards. Furthermore, land-­ use decisions should provide affordable disaster-­ resistant housing and disaster-­ resistant energy technologies; poor and

216  Adenrele Awotona low-­income urban and rural dwellers should be provided with the necessary assistance to retrofit their dwellings to comply with new, appropriate and enforceable building codes; wide-­ranging and tangible DRM education programs and employable skills should be provided for young persons in particular; and investments in social capital should be made to equip a population in such a way that it can meaningfully contribute to pre-­and post-­disaster sustainable planning processes. It is equally essential to provide disaster preparedness and recovery resources for kindergarten through twelfth-­ grade schools, in collaboration with the United States’ Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), which has a wealth of experience in this area. Afghanistan’s top-­down approach to DRM is fundamentally flawed. Instead, a whole community approach should be adopted and integrated into the people’s daily practices. According to FEMA (2011), a whole community approach to emergency management “presents a foundation for increasing individual preparedness and engaging with members of the community as collaborative resources to enhance the resiliency and security” of a nation. Poverty alleviation and the reinforcement of the well-­being of the citizens The long period of conflict has resulted in a fragile Afghan economy and confidence in its future is low, as demonstrated by the marked outflow of capital, the continuing movement of Afghans in large numbers to Europe and the stalling of major oil, gas and mineral extraction projects. Indeed, when poverty is pervasive, as it is in Afghanistan, terrorism and instability take hold. According to the editorial in the Daily Outlook Afghanistan newspaper on March 11, 2018, The large numbers of people who join militancy are from poor families. They fight not for an ideological reason but to alleviate their hunger. In the same way, scores of Afghan youth and manpower take refuge in foreign countries to survive poverty and hunger. Poverty is also one of the main reasons behind the crime, which has increased in Kabul city in recent months and those who live in the slums are involved in pickpocketing, burglary, kidnapping, killing etc. In short, poverty engenders great challenges across the country. To stop the brain drain, prevent citizens from taking refuge into other countries, reduce crime and mitigate insurgency, the government will have to create jobs rather than exerting pressure on them. Even death punishment will not reduce the level of crime and insurgency, unless jobs are created and people are lifted out of poverty. The second issue which is encouraging harmony between religious believers will widen the room for peace and brotherhood and it is a

Concluding remarks 217 necessary step to be taken in all countries, mainly in Afghanistan. Both Afghan government and religious scholars need to promote tolerance and harmony across the country to free it from violence and conflicts. In short, to form a violence-­free and prosperous society, Afghan government should take China as a role model in social and economic spheres and work for the progress of society with strong determination and commitment. Therefore, there is an urgent need for the Afghan government to revive the country’s economy and strengthen its security forces to safeguard the country from further deterioration. Afghanistan is a poor and militarily weak country, socially divided among ethnic, religious and political interest groups. Hence, Afghanistan’s neighboring countries (India, Iran, Pakistan and Central Asian Republics) also must take more responsibility, adopt more pragmatic policies and start looking at Afghanistan as an integral part of the neighborhood. They should prioritize regional interests above respective national ones and work towards promoting peace, prosperity and security throughout the region in general and in Afghanistan in particular. Peace and prosperity will continue to elude the region as a whole unless and until Afghanistan is politically stabilized and the Afghans are secure socially, economically and politically. Promotion of female empowerment In 2005, a World Bank report recommended that under the prevailing social, economic and political conditions in Afghanistan, the following should be the main areas of intervention in support of gender equity and gender mainstreaming (World Bank 2005, xvi): • Substantial strengthening of women’s employment in the health and education sectors, which will have direct positive effects on girls’ school enrollment, women’s access to health services, maternal mortality and general child and family health • Strengthening women’s involvement in agricultural and livestock production in the form of extension and training, credit facilities and expanding marketing opportunities • Developing socially acceptable skilled and unskilled employment opportunities for women in the urban sector in response to the high level of poor female-­headed households • Instituting legal reforms to remove gender inequities in family law, in terms of marriage, marriage age, divorce and inheritance • Collecting adequate sex-­disaggregated data across all sectors to document women’s and men’s involvement and to enable future developments and the effects of investments to be monitored.

218  Adenrele Awotona To carry out these interventions, a number of policy actions have been undertaken over the years by the government of Afghanistan with the support of international aid agencies. However, the current status of Afghan women still makes them susceptible and vulnerable to having their voice subdued despite it having an integral part in the future development and economic sustainability of the country. Hence, for educational and entrepreneurship programs for women to work effectively, women must be empowered and supported by the central government of Afghanistan. Specific cultural changes should take place, their need for employment and security concerns should be addressed and lessons should be learned from other Muslim nations which have helped women to prosper and move forward as economic stakeholders rather than as bystanders and consumers. Such measures would enable Afghan women to contribute significantly to the economic growth of the country. Despite generous international investment and sustained support and attention for the women, peace and security (WPS) agenda in Afghanistan, its implementation remains at an impasse. Since the adoption of the Afghan National Action Plan in 2015, there has only been limited progress. The three years that have passed since did not produce an agreement on a concrete activity-­based budget for all the ministries involved that the donor community could accept. Knowledge about the WPS agenda is still limited among the civil servants who have to implement it. In addition, coordination has also proven to be a challenge, both between the donor agencies involved and between the Afghan line ministries. Indeed, despite the urgent need for WPS, some elements of this internationally driven agenda may still be difficult to implement in Afghanistan’s conservative society. That makes it even more important sometimes, temporarily, to divert attention from the women’s equality agenda in favor of a more instrumental approach that focuses on “what works” by highlighting the added value of the work of female civil servants, police officers, soldiers, lawyers and judges. But a purely instrumental approach will not be enough. To effectively promote women’s equality in Afghanistan, the awareness of men should eventually go much beyond their increased understanding and acceptance of the meaningful roles that women can play to foster peace and security. Afghan women play an important part in increasing that awareness, but the men play an even more important one. The success of this women’s empowerment agenda will often depend first and foremost on men, peace and security. But despite the inherent benefits of women’s active participation in the reconstruction process, there are still many obstacles for the country as a whole to overcome before women will be able to make genuine, lasting contributions to society. The main impediments in this case are instability and lack of security. There are laws in effect to protect women and their rights, but the laws are of little use because there are no proper authorities to enforce them.

Concluding remarks 219 There is a lack of transparency within the legal system, and the justice system is broken and incapable of protecting Afghan women. Indeed, what is needed for the future of women in Afghanistan is also what is needed for the future of all Afghans. As important as women’s contributions are and will continue to be to the reconstruction of the country, without a solution to the security crisis and without a robust effort toward the effective implementation and enforcement of the rule of law, women will be unable to make lasting contributions to the sustainable development of Afghanistan. Capacity building The process of reaching the objectives of building capacity for budget formulation and execution, including improvements in fiscal management and spending efficiency at many line ministries and subnational entities, has been slow. Although a Public Procurement Law and amendments have been adopted with World Bank support, capacity building to ensure effective implementation is still needed in Afghanistan. In public administration, World Bank support has led to the adoption of a civil service law and regulations for overseeing administrative reform. Nevertheless, public administration remains vulnerable because there is little evidence that the new laws, procedures and regulations are translating into improved civil service performance. Also, the government’s ability to control corruption and enforce anti-­corruption measures remains weak. Overall, however, the evaluation reported in Chapter 12 found that Afghanistan used World Bank assistance well to make major progress toward building capacity of the state and its accountability to citizens, although the risks to these outcomes remain high. So, international attention to the sustainable development of the country must not be allowed to lag.

References Daily Outlook Afghanistan. 2018. China – A Poverty Alleviation Role Model for Afghanistan, March 11. http://­outlookafghanistan.net/­editorialdetail.php?post_ id=20381. Retrieved October 10, 2018. Federal Emergency Management Agency. 2011. A Whole Community Approach to Emergency Management: Principles, Themes, and Pathways for Action. www. fema.gov/­media-­library-­data/­20130726-­1813-­25045-­3330/­whole_community_ dec2011__2_.pdf. Retrieved October 3, 2018. The World Bank. 2005. Afghanistan National Reconstruction and Poverty ­Reduction – The Role of Women in Afghanistan’s Future. The World Bank, March. http://­siteresources.worldbank.org/­AFGHANISTANEXTN/­Resources/­Afghani stanGenderReport.pdf. Retrieved October 10, 2018. The World Bank’s Website. Afghanistan: Disaster Risk Management & Resilience Program. www.worldbank.org/­en/­programs/­afghanistan-­disaster-­risk-­management-­and-­ resilience-­program. Retrieved September 27, 2018.

Index

Note: Figures, tables, and boxes are denoted with italicized, bold, and underlined page numbers, respectively; end note information is denoted with an n and note number following the page number. Abdullah, Abdullah 202 ADB see Asian Development Bank Afghan Geodesy and Cartography Head Office (AGCHO) 16 Afghanistan: civil war in 123, 126, 145, 146, 159 – 163, 164; disaster risk management in (see disaster risk management); economy of (see economy); geography of (see geography); housing in (see housing); international participation in (see external aid and investment; international development; international donor community responses); origins of destabilization in 144 – 146; peacebuilding and security in (see peacebuilding and security); population and demographics of 4, 5 – 8, 6 – 7, 8, 22n1, 32, 49, 75, 132; reconstruction process in (see reconstruction process); rural areas in (see rural areas); urban areas in (see urban areas); women in (see women) Afghanistan Central Statistical Organization 132, 210 Afghanistan Civil Service Institute 206, 210 Afghanistan Financial Management Information System 204, 211 Afghanistan Housing Sector Assessment Workshop 15 Afghanistan-India Renewable Energy Summit 183

Afghanistan Investment Support Agency (AISA) 22n2 Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS) 5, 20, 21, 176, 181 Afghanistan National Disaster Management Authority (ANDMA) 20, 21, 22, 27n16 Afghanistan National Drug Use Survey 38 – 39 Afghanistan Opium Surveys 37 Afghanistan-Pakistan Action Plan for Peace and Solidarity 202 Afghanistan Public Policy Research Organization (APPRO) 110 Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF) 45, 203, 204, 205 – 206, 210, 211 Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU) 94, 131 Afghanistan’s Peace and Reintegration Program (APRP) 113, 114, 129 Afghan Local Police (ALP) 84 Afghan National Army (ANA) 10, 14 – 15, 188, 189 Afghan National Defense and Security Forces 111, 114 Afghan National Police (ANP) 10, 14 – 15 Afghan National Security Force (ANSF) 83, 130 Afghan Parliament 177 – 178 Afghan Women and Children Relief Act (2001) 107 Afghan Women’s Coalition 96

Index  221 Afghan Women’s Educational Center (AWEC) 111 Afghan Women Skill Development Center 94 Afghan Women’s Network (AWN) 94, 96 – 97, 109, 114 Aga Khan Development Network 14, 44 Aga Khan Trust for Culture 176 AGCHO (Afghan Geodesy and Cartography Head Office) 16 agriculture see farming and agriculture Ahady, Anwar-ul-Haq 190 aid see external aid and investment airlines: external aid and investment in 182, 183 – 184 AISA (Afghanistan Investment Support Agency) 22n2 Aisha, Bibi 133 Allan, Nigel 50, 66n2 Allen, John 11 All India Institute of Medical Sciences 181 ALP (Afghan Local Police) 84 Al-Qaeda/Al-Qaida 107, 143, 146, 149, 150, 152, 162, 194 Amin, Hafizullah 126, 146 ANA (Afghan National Army) 10, 14 – 15, 188, 189 ANDMA (Afghanistan National Disaster Management Authority) 20, 21, 22, 27n16 ANDS (Afghanistan National Development Strategy) 5, 20, 21, 176, 181 ANP (Afghan National Police) 10, 14 – 15 ANSF (Afghan National Security Force) 83, 130 APPRO (Afghanistan Public Policy Research Organization) 110 APRP (Afghanistan’s Peace and Reintegration Program) 113, 114, 129 architecture 62, 63 AREU (Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit) 94, 131 Ariana Afghan Airlines 182 ARTF (Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund) 45, 203, 204, 205 – 206, 210, 211 Asian Development Bank (ADB): Asian Development Outlook (2017) 32; economic analysis of Afghanistan 32;

external aid and investment by 3, 14, 39 – 40, 43, 192, 204 Australia: external aid and investment by 14, 192 avalanches 3, 18, 21, 215 AWEC (Afghan Women’s Educational Center) 111 AWN (Afghan Women’s Network) 94, 96 – 97, 109, 114 Awotona, Adenrele 3, 5, 71, 141, 215 Azhar, Masood 174 background for reconstruction process see context for reconstruction process Back to School initiative 180 Bahrain: women’s status in 81 Banerjee, Nipa 187 BAPL (Building Afghan Peace Locally) program 114 Bayat Power Company 39 Bayaz, Jamila 119 Belgium: Brussels Conference on Afghanistan (2016) in 110 – 111 Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) 156, 157 – 158, 164 Bergen, Peter 109 Berleant, Arnold 57 – 58 Berlin Conference on Afghanistan (2004) 12 Bin Laden, Osama 149, 162, 192 Bollywood 175 Bonn Conference on Afghanistan 93, 129, 190 boundaries: of administrative categories in rural areas 4, 49 – 50; of housing 63 – 64; of land, mapping 16 Bourdieu, Pierre 4, 51, 58, 60, 64 BRI (Belt and Road Initiative) 156, 157 – 158, 164 bribery 11, 24 – 25n8, 191; see also corruption Brussels Conference on Afghanistan (2016) 110 – 111 Brzezinski, Zbigniew 147 – 148 BSCPL Infrastructure Ltd. 178 Building Afghan Peace Locally (BAPL) program 114 burqas and veils 107, 108, 124, 125, 126, 127, 133 Bush, George H. W. 151 Bush, George W. 106, 107, 194 Bush, Laura 107 Byrd, William 37

222 Index Campbell, John 86 Canada: Canadian Aid Agency (CORDAID) 98 – 99, 114, 187; external aid and investment by 14, 98 – 99, 114, 187, 192; Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development agency 95; military intervention by 108 capacity and accountability building: context for 202 – 203; corruption undermining 201, 206, 207, 208, 211; in education 212; in healthcare 212; Indian investment in 179 – 180, 184; overview of 142, 201 – 202, 211 – 212, 219; peacebuilding and security importance to 202, 211, 212; in public administration 207 – 212, 219; In public financial management and procurement 203 – 207, 209, 211 – 212, 219; World Bank support for 142, 201 – 213, 219 Capacity Building for Results (CBR) 210 Capacity for Afghan Public Service project 179 Carter, Jimmy 146 – 147 CASA 1000 (Central Asia South Asia 1000) 174 CBR (Capacity Building for Results) 210 C&C Constructions, Ltd, Gurgaon 178 CDCs (Community Development Councils) 23n4, 94 CDRRP (Comprehensive Disaster Risk Reduction Project) 20 CEC (Committee for Environmental Coordination) 13 CEDAW (Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women) 94, 129, 130 cemeteries, as social spaces 58 Central Asian Republics 194, 196, 217; see also specific countries Central Asia South Asia 1000 (CASA 1000) 174 Central Audit Organization 204 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 15, 146 – 150, 151 central state government: capacity and accountability of 142, 201 – 213, 219; ministries of (see Ministry entries); Mujaheddin (see Mujaheddin/ Mujahidin/Mujahideen); National Unity Government as 10; PDPA

(see People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan); rural politics and 4, 49; structure of 76, 84; Taliban (see Taliban); urban housing prioritization by 10 Chandran, D. Suba 190 Cheater, Angela 51, 66n2 children: disaster risk management for 18; drug use by 39; education for (see education); health conditions for 78, 127, 180, 181; infant and child mortality rates 15, 22n1, 32, 78, 127, 186, 212; marriage of 124, 125, 131, 133; violence against 110; women’s responsibility for 115, 116 China: Afghanistan civil war influencing policy of 159 – 163; Afghanistan policy analysis 141 – 142, 156 – 171; Belt and Road Initiative 156, 157 – 158, 164; China National Petroleum Corporation 40; external aid and investment by 4, 14, 41, 148, 158, 159, 162, 163 – 164, 167; Mujahideen relations with 158 – 159, 160, 169n25; origins of Afghanistan policy of 158 – 165; Pakistan and Iran relations with 157, 159, 162, 164, 202; peacebuilding and security efforts of 164, 167, 202; People’s Liberation Army 164; Shanghai Cooperation Organization involvement of 164, 202; Soviet relations with 158 – 159, 168 – 169nn19 – 20; Taliban relations with 157, 162 – 163, 165 – 167; US relations with 158, 159, 163 – 164; Xinjiang stabilization goals of 157, 161 – 163, 167, 168 – 169nn19 – 20 China Metallurgical Group Corporation 41 China National Petroleum Corporation 40 China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) 164, 202 Churchill, Winston 62 CIA (Central Intelligence Agency) 15, 146 – 150, 151 cities see urban areas Civil Service Commission 208, 209, 210 Civil Service Reform Project 209 – 210 civil war 123, 126, 145, 146, 159 – 163, 164 Clinton, Hillary 96

Index  223 Cloud, Dana 106 Coll, Steve 150, 166 Committee for Environmental Coordination (CEC) 13 Community Development Councils (CDCs) 23n4, 94 Comprehensive Disaster Risk Reduction Project (CDRRP) 20 Confederation of Indian Industries 180 Constitution, Afghan 76, 124, 125, 129, 130, 134, 209 contested spaces 57 context for reconstruction process: capacity and accountability building in 202 – 203; cultural (see culture); economic history in 3 – 4, 31 – 48; housing and disaster risk management in 3, 5 – 27; overview of 3 – 4; rural politics in 4, 49 – 66 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) 94, 129, 130 Cooley, John 149 coping capacity 3, 21 copper mining 4, 41 CORDAID (Canadian Aid Agency) 98 – 99, 114, 187 Cordell, Kristen A. 73, 90 corruption: anticorruption laws 25 – 26n9; capacity and accountability building hampered by 201, 206, 207, 208, 211; Corruption in Conflict report on 12; drug trafficking and 38; economic effects of 32; external aid and investment concerns about 11 – 12, 190 – 191; National Corruption Survey report on 24 – 25n8; pervasiveness of 11 – 12, 24 – 25n8; reconstruction process hampered by 11 – 12, 24 – 25n8, 190 – 191 CPEC (China-Pakistan Economic Corridor) 164, 202 culture: ethnicity and (see ethnicity); Indian-Afghan ties of 175 – 176, 182; language and 49, 50, 75; religious (see religion); rural politics and 4, 49, 50, 56 – 57; women in context of 76 – 77, 79, 81 – 82, 83, 86, 98 – 100, 111, 113, 116, 117 – 120, 130, 131, 133, 218 DACAAR (Danish Committee for Aid to Afghan Refugees) 19

DANIDA 97 Danish Committee for Aid to Afghan Refugees (DACAAR) 19 Daoud, Mohammad 33, 145 death: disasters leading to 3, 5, 215; infant and child mortality rates 15, 22n1, 32, 78, 127, 186, 212; life expectancy 22n1, 100; maternal mortality rates 32, 100, 127, 212; post 1978 conflicts 32, 126; of women/girls 32, 91, 100, 127, 133, 212 de Heer, Björn 118 – 119 Dellawar, Shukria 74, 123 Democratic Organization of Afghan Women (DOAW) 128 Denmark: external aid and investment by 14, 19, 97 Dhanraj, Nicole 72, 75 Disaster Management Framework 20 disaster risk management: for agriculture 18, 19, 26nn13 – 14, 34, 45; context for 5 – 10, 6 – 7, 8, 9; corruption concerns for 11 – 12, 24 – 26nn8 – 9; economic and employment strengthening in 19, 23 – 24n5; environmental destruction addressed in 3, 12 – 13, 18, 26n10, 26 – 27n15; external aid and investment for 3, 10 – 15, 14, 18 – 19, 22n2, 23 – 24n5, 45, 215 – 216; food insecurity concerns in 3, 15, 18, 26nn13 – 14, 27n15; Global Assessment Report on 19; goals and priorities for 19 – 21; housing-related 3, 5, 8 – 11, 15 – 17, 22 – 23nn2 – 3, 26n12, 215 – 216; lack of capacity for 21 – 22; overview of 3, 18 – 22; population and demographics for 5 – 8, 6 – 7, 8, 22n1; resilience in 19 – 21; urban planning and development considerations in 8 – 10, 23n4, 215 – 216; see also natural disasters distinction theory 64 divorce. gender equity in 71, 217 DOAW (Democratic Organization of Afghan Women) 128 droughts 3, 9, 18 – 19, 21, 22, 27n15, 215 Drug Action Plan 39 drugs: anti-government insurgents trafficking 148, 160; Chinese

224 Index concerns about 158, 162; demographics of users 38 – 39; economic effects of 32, 37 – 39, 75, 195 – 196; external aid to eradicate 12; peacebuilding and security threatened by 195 – 196 Duncan, Simon 50 Dupree, Louis 144 Durand Line Agreement (1893) 169n22 earthquakes 3, 17, 18, 21, 22, 215 East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM) 157 economy: ANDS goals for 5; capacity building strengthening 201; disaster risk management on strengthening 23 – 24n5; drug-/opium-based 32, 37 – 39, 75, 195 – 196; educational ties to 31 – 32, 44 – 45, 72 – 73, 77, 78 – 80, 81, 83, 86; employment in (see employment); entrepreneurship in 79, 80 – 82, 86, 129, 181, 218; ethnicity and 31; external aid and investment in 3 – 4, 39 – 43, 44 – 46, 76, 82, 144, 181, 182 – 184, 187 – 188, 187 – 188, 196, 217; farming and agriculture in 31, 32, 33 – 35, 75, 187, 197n6; food insecurity and 32, 34, 35 – 36; GDP in 32; geographic influences on 31, 33, 75; government structure and 76; historical overview of 3 – 4, 31 – 48; illegal activities in 32 (see also drugs); Indian policy to boost 174 – 175, 181, 182 – 184; industry and manufacturing in 32, 39 – 44, 174, 182 – 183, 197n6, 206; informal trading/sector in 3, 31, 32, 42 – 44, 75 – 76 (see also trade); infrastructure effects on 31, 42 – 44; migratory flows and 3, 31, 32, 34 – 37, 46; mobile phones and Internet service affecting 31, 36, 44; post-conflict economic development 72 – 73, 75 – 86, 123; poverty and 3, 5, 32, 72, 83, 217; rural 31, 32, 33 – 35, 39, 42 – 46, 75, 77, 201; security effects on 32, 34, 46, 72, 81, 83 – 86; subsistence 3; sustainable development of 123; women’s contributions to 72 – 73, 75 – 86, 123, 125, 128 – 129, 131, 217 – 218 education: Back to School initiative 180; budget for 189; capacity and

accountability building in 212; compulsory 124; corruption in 24n8; disaster risk management programs in 216; economic ties to 31 – 32, 44 – 45, 72 – 73, 77, 78 – 80, 81, 83, 86; external aid and investment in 31 – 32, 44 – 45, 93, 94 – 95, 175, 179 – 180, 181, 184, 186, 212; girls’/women’s 71 – 74, 76 – 81, 83, 86, 93 – 95, 100, 109, 116, 123 – 129, 131, 134, 146, 186, 212, 217 – 218; Indian provision of 175, 179 – 180, 181, 184; Islamic radicalism in 149; literacy and 22n1, 77, 116, 127, 131, 146; poverty as barrier to 83; public areas for, as social spaces 58, 59, 66; refugees’ 36; vocational 23n5, 72, 80, 81, 134, 179 – 180, 212 Education Training Center for Poor Women and Girls in Afghanistan 94 EIAs (Environmental Impact Assessments) 13 electricity: demographics of access to 22n1; economic impacts of 31, 43 – 44; external aid and investment in 3 – 4, 43 – 44, 177, 178 – 179; protests again transmission line projects for 195 Elimination of Violence Against Women Law (EVAW) 96, 97, 131 embodied spaces 57 employment: corruption and access to 25n8; disaster risk management on strengthening 19, 23 – 24n5; disasters and scarcity of 3, 18; entrepreneurial 79, 80 – 82, 86, 129, 181, 218; external aid and investment to subsidize 23 – 24n5, 76, 82, 93, 181; labor unions and 37; migration for improved 3, 31, 35 – 37; permits for 35; vocational and technical education for 23n5, 72, 80, 81, 134, 179 – 180, 212; women and gender equity/inequity in 71 – 72, 74, 76, 77, 79 – 82, 86, 93, 111, 114 – 120, 116, 123, 125 – 131, 134, 217 – 218 entrepreneurship: external aid and investment to promote 181; women’s 79, 80 – 82, 86, 129, 218 environmental destruction: climate change and 26 – 27n15, 215; disaster risk management for 3, 12 – 13, 18,

Index  225 26n10, 26 – 27n15; external aid and investment to address 12 – 13 Environmental Impact Assessments (EIAs) 13 EPD (Equality for Peace and Democracy) 97, 109 Equality for Peace and Democracy (EPD) 97, 109 ethnicity: Chinese heterogeneous 157; corruption and 25n8; demographics of 75; economic impacts of 31; governance and divisiveness by 194 – 195; rural politics and 4, 49, 50, 56 – 57; Taliban’s approach to 165, 166; violence based on 83, 160 – 161; women cultivating unity of 130 ETIM (East Turkistan Islamic Movement) 157 Europe/European Union: employment in 31, 36; European Union Police Mission (EUPOL) 117; external aid and investment by 3, 14, 42, 97, 192; migration to 31, 36, 46; see also specific countries EVAW (Elimination of Violence Against Women Law) 96, 97, 131 external aid and investment: in ­ anti-government insurgency 44 – 45, 146 – 152, 159, 160 – 161; in antiSoviet doctrine 146 – 150, 193; in capacity and accountability building 142, 179 – 180, 184, 201 – 213, 219; Chinese 4, 14, 41, 148, 158, 159, 162, 163 – 164, 167; committed vs. disbursed amounts of 14, 191 – 192, 192; corruption concerns with 11 – 12, 190 – 191; decrease of, and importance of women in reconstruction process 74; in disaster risk management 3, 10 – 15, 14, 18 – 19, 22n2, 23 – 24n5, 45, 215 – 216; economic effects of 3 – 4, 39 – 43, 44 – 46, 76, 82, 144, 181, 182 – 184, 187 – 188, 187 – 188, 196, 217; in education 31 – 32, 44 – 45, 93, 94 – 95, 175, 179 – 180, 181, 184, 186, 212; efficacy of 12 – 15, 14; in employment assistance 23 – 24n5, 76, 82, 93, 181; in environmental restoration and management 12 – 13; in food security 15, 26n14, 34, 44, 180; future needs and role of 196, 215 – 219; government reliance

on 187 – 188, 188; in healthcare 31 – 32, 44 – 45, 93, 94 – 95, 175, 176, 180 – 181, 184, 186, 212; in housing 3, 10 – 11, 22n2; Indian policy on 14, 36, 42, 175, 176 – 184, 192, 196, 202, 217; in infrastructure 3 – 4, 22n2, 36, 42 – 44, 176 – 179, 181, 202; in military training and assistance 44, 144, 145, 148, 164; in mining 4, 39 – 41, 183, 206; in peacebuilding and security 14 – 15, 73, 82, 84 – 85, 90 – 101, 108 – 112, 119 – 120, 164, 187, 192 – 196, 217; politics of 190 – 192, 192; postTaliban situation with 186 – 188, 187 – 189; in poverty alleviation 12, 216 – 217; in public administration 207 – 212, 219; in public financial management and procurement 203 – 207, 209, 211 – 212, 219; reassessment of role of 142, 186 – 198; in women- and genderprogramming efforts 72, 73, 77, 82, 90 – 101, 108 – 112, 119 – 120, 129, 134, 180, 186, 217 – 219; see also international development external powers’ role reassessment: future needs 196; overview of 142, 186, 192 – 196; politics of aid and development 190 – 192, 192; postTaliban Afghanistan 186 – 188, 187 – 189 Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative 206 extreme winter and snow avalanches 3, 18, 21, 215 Family Law Code 124 farming and agriculture: disaster risk management and 18, 19, 26nn13 – 14, 34, 45; economic role of 31, 32, 33 – 35, 75, 187, 197n6; education in 179, 180; external aid and investment in 45, 179, 180; land for 34 – 35, 60 – 61, 65, 75; livestock importance to 33; opium production in 37 – 39, 75, 195 – 196; road conditions affecting 43; rural politics and 4, 58, 59, 60 – 61, 65; sharecropping 35; social spaces in 58, 59; subsistence 31, 75; wheat and grain cultivation in 33 – 34, 45, 75; women’s role in 71, 217

226 Index Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI) 183 Feminist Majority Foundation 166 FICCI (Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry) 183 financial issues: capacity and accountability building for 201, 203 – 207, 209, 211 – 212, 219; housing finance industry obstacles 15 – 17; microfinance 82; public financial management and procurement 188, 189, 203 – 207, 209, 211 – 212, 219; see also economy; poverty Finland: external aid and investment by 14 fire 17, 22 Fitzherbert, Anthony 33 floods 3, 18, 21, 22, 27n15, 34, 45, 215 Florax, Joke 117 – 118, 119 food insecurity: complexity of issues with 133; countries facing 26n13; disasters leading to 3, 18, 27n15; economic status and 32, 34, 35 – 36; external aid and investment addressing 15, 26n14, 34, 44, 180; refugees’ 36 foreign participation see external aid and investment; international development; international donor community responses Foucault, Michel 51, 56, 61, 62 France: external aid and investment by 14 Frogh, Wazhma 109, 112 – 113, 114, 115 future of reconstruction process 215 – 219 GAIL (India) Ltd. 40 Gans, Herbert 4, 51, 54 – 56, 59, 62 – 63 Gates, Robert 147 GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council) region 81 gender: challenges and inequalities based on 72, 82 – 83, 85 – 86, 90 – 91, 113, 115 – 117, 116, 131; cultural context for 76 – 77, 79, 81 – 82, 83, 86, 98 – 100, 111, 113, 116, 117 – 120, 130, 131, 133, 218; educational opportunities based on 71 – 74, 76 – 81, 83, 86, 93 – 95, 100, 109, 116, 123 – 129, 131, 134, 146,

186, 212, 217 – 218; employment in relation to 71 – 72, 74, 76, 77, 79 – 82, 86, 93, 111, 114 – 120, 116, 123, 125 – 131, 134, 217 – 218; equity and mainstreaming goals 71 – 72, 217; evolution of gender norm-setting practices 92 – 98; external aid and investment in issues of 72, 73, 77, 82, 90 – 101, 108 – 112, 119 – 120, 129, 134, 180, 186, 217 – 219; gendered spaces 57; health conditions/healthcare based on 71, 73, 93, 94 – 95, 127, 128; inclusive programs regardless of 23n4, 74, 105, 111, 112 – 119, 113, 116, 120; international development programming related to 73, 77, 90 – 101, 108 – 112, 119 – 120; laws and legal system on 71, 96, 97, 109 – 110, 124, 130 – 131, 217, 218 – 219; peacebuilding and security in relation to 72, 73 – 74, 83 – 84, 90 – 101, 105 – 120, 129 – 131, 132 – 134, 218; power in relation to 52, 72, 73 – 74, 77, 78, 80 – 82, 86, 93 – 95, 98 – 99, 105, 109 – 112, 120, 131, 217 – 219; representations of 105, 106 – 107, 117, 132 – 134, 135; rural views of 75, 77, 82, 124, 125; shaping of gender norms 98 – 100; violence based on 90 – 92, 96 – 98, 100 – 101, 105, 110, 115, 127, 130 – 134; Western views of 108 – 109; see also women Geneva Accords 150 geography: economic influences of 31, 33, 75; rural politics and 4, 49, 54, 55 – 56, 58 Gera, Y. K. 192 – 193 Germany: Berlin Conference on Afghanistan in 12; Bonn Conference on Afghanistan in 93, 129, 190; external aid and investment by 14, 44; migration to 46; women- and gender-programming efforts of 114 GFDRR (Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery) 20 – 21 Ghani, Mohammad Ashraf 78 – 79, 167, 188, 191, 202 Ghani, Rula 111 Gibbs, David N. 141, 143 Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery (GFDRR) 20 – 21

Index  227 Goetz, Anne Marie 92 Golden Age of Afghanistan 125, 128, 133 Goodhand, Jonathan 192 Gorbachev, Mikhail 151 governance: ANDS goals for 5; capacity and accountability building for 142, 201 – 213, 219; central state (see central state government); ethnic divisiveness affecting 194 – 195; public administration under 207 – 212, 219; public financial management and procurement under 188, 189, 203 – 207, 209, 211 – 212, 219; structure for 76, 209; Taliban integration into 202; weak municipal 8 – 9; women’s role in 93 – 94, 97, 98, 109, 111 – 112, 115 – 117, 123, 125, 128 – 131, 132 Grameed Foundation 129 Gul, Sahar 133 Gula, Sharbat 106 Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) region 81 Hagel, Chuck 84 – 85 Hall, Edward 56 – 57 Hassan, Palwasha 111, 114, 119 health conditions: budget for 189; capacity and accountability building in healthcare services 212; children’s 78, 127, 180, 181; disasters deteriorating 3; external aid and investment improving 31 – 32, 44 – 45, 93, 94 – 95, 175, 176, 180 – 181, 184, 186, 212; Indian healthcare provision 175, 176, 180 – 181, 184; refugees’ 36; women’s 71, 73, 93, 94 – 95, 127, 128; see also death Heart of Asia process 183, 188 Hekmatyar, Gulbadin/Gulbuddin 148, 202 Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin 112, 113 HFA (Hyogo Framework for Action) 19, 20, 21 High Office of Oversight and AntiCorruption 191 High Peace Council 96, 98, 112 – 113, 113, 129 Hindu Kush 31, 33 Hisbi Islami group 148 Homeland (Watan) Party 150 Hossaini, Sayed Asef 4, 49

housing: architecture of 62, 63; boundaries of 63 – 64; density of 62 – 63; disaster effects on 3, 5, 8 – 9; external aid and investment in 3, 10 – 11, 22n2; funding for 3, 10 – 11, 16 – 17, 22n2; housing finance industry for 15 – 17; insurance for 17; land ownership and access for 8, 15, 16 – 17, 26n12, 60 – 61; legal obstacles for 16, 17; location of 60 – 61, 61; obstacles to meeting need for 15 – 17; overview of 3; power relations and 60 – 65, 61; propinquity theory on 64 – 65; refugee return and need for 5, 8, 15, 17, 22 – 23n3; in slums and squatter settlements 3, 5, 19; as social spaces 58, 59, 60 – 65; title concerns for 15 – 16; UNHCR shelter assistance program for 8, 22 – 23n3; unsafe 3; urban planning and development considerations for 8 – 10, 215 – 216 Humaira, Queen 128 human development indicators: Afghanistan’s ranking in 15, 32, 187; ANDS goals to improve 5 human rights 5, 123 human trafficking 31, 32, 91, 133 Hungary: migration to 46 Huntington, Samuel 83 Hyderabad 178 Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA) 19, 20, 21 ideology: of gender roles 75; in rural politics 52 – 53, 53 IFC (International Financial Corporation) 15 IMU (Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan) 162, 163 Inclusive Cities Week 23n4 inclusive justice 74 inclusive peacebuilding 105, 111, 112 – 114, 113, 120 inclusive security 105, 111, 114 – 119, 116, 120 Independent Administration Reform 208, 209 Independent Election Commission 178 Independent Human Rights Commission 93 India: Afghanistan reconstruction support 142, 174 – 185; Border Roads Organisation 178; Bureau

228 Index of Parliamentary Study and Training 178; capacity building by 179 – 180, 184; Central Public Works Department 178; Chinese relations with 159; cultural and social ties with Afghanistan 175 – 176, 182; economic goals of 174 – 175, 181, 182 – 184; external aid and investment by 14, 36, 42, 175, 176 – 184, 192, 196, 202, 217; humanitarian assistance by 180 – 181; Indian Council for Cultural Relations 179, 182, 184; Indian Council of Agricultural Research 179; infrastructure projects by 36, 42, 176 – 179, 181, 202; oil and gas for 40 – 41, 142, 174; Pakistani relations with 174 – 175, 180, 183, 193; partition of, reclamation of lands in 169n22; peacebuilding and security goals of 174, 194, 217; Power Grid Corporation of India 179; Shanghai Cooperation Organization involvement of 164; Small Development Project scheme 180 – 182, 184; Soviet relations with 159; Strategic Partnership agreement with 183 – 184; Taliban relations with 174, 175 – 179; trade and investment policies of 174 – 175, 182 – 184; women- and gender-programming efforts of 180 India-Afghanistan Foundation 182 Indian Airlines hijacking 174 Indian Cultural Centre 182 Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation (ITEC) program 179, 184 Indira Gandhi Institute of Child Health 176, 181 industry and manufacturing: economic role of 32, 39 – 44, 174, 182 – 183, 197n6, 206; external aid and investment in 4, 39 – 41, 182 – 183; mining industry 4, 39 – 41, 142, 166, 174, 175, 183, 189, 206; trading economy and 42 – 44 infrastructure: budget for 189; demographics of access to safe 22n1; economic impacts of 31, 42 – 44; electricity as 3 – 4, 22n1, 31, 43 – 44, 177, 178 – 179, 195; external aid and investment in 3 – 4, 22n2, 36, 42 – 44,

176 – 179, 181, 202; improving, for disaster risk management 19; lack of adequate, in disaster-prone areas 3, 10, 18; peacebuilding and security importance to 202; roads as 3, 31, 42 – 43, 58, 59, 175, 177, 178, 202; as social spaces 58, 59; telecommunications 4, 31, 36, 44, 176, 189 inheritance, gender equity in 71, 217 Innocent, Malou 108 inscribed spaces 57 Institute for State Effectiveness 78 – 79 Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies (IPCS) 190 insurance, housing or property 17 Integrity Watch Afghanistan 11, 24 – 25n8 international aid see external aid and investment; international development International Conference on Afghanistan 191 International Crisis Group 130 international development: 2001 – 2007 era of 93 – 95; 2007 – 2010 era of 95 – 97; 2011 – 2015 era of 97 – 98; evolution of practices 92 – 98; genderbased violence addressed with 90 – 92, 96 – 98, 100 – 101, 110; gender norms shaped by 92 – 100; overview of 100 – 101; peacebuilding and security efforts of 73, 90 – 101, 108 – 112, 119 – 120; policy background for 91 – 92, 108; UNSCR 1325 guidance for 73, 74, 90, 91 – 92, 95 – 97, 99 – 100, 109 – 111; UNSCR 1820 guidance for 90, 92, 97, 99 – 100; women- and gender-programming efforts with 73, 77, 90 – 101, 108 – 112, 119 – 120; see also external aid and investment international donor community responses: Chinese policy analysis 141 – 142, 156 – 171; Indian reconstruction support 142, 174 – 185; overview of 141 – 142; reassessment of 142, 186 – 198; US policy analysis 141, 143 – 155; World Bank capacity building 142, 201 – 213, 219; see also external aid and investment; international development

Index  229 International Financial Corporation (IFC) 15 international investments see external aid and investment International Monetary Fund’s Extended Credit-relief Facility 207 International Organization for Migration (IOM) 20 International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) 84, 85, 188 International Women’s Day 134 Internet service see mobile phones and Internet service IOM (International Organization for Migration) 20 IPCS (Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies) 190 Iran: Chinese relations with 157; corruption and bribery from 191; covert Afghan operations by 145; drug use in 39; employment and economic ties to 3, 31, 35 – 37; external aid and investment by 3, 14, 42, 43, 145, 159, 191, 196, 217; geography respective to 75; Indian relations with 177, 178, 180; migration to 3, 8, 31, 34 – 37; oil and gas in 40; peacebuilding and security goals of 194, 202, 217; refugee return from 8, 9; Taliban relations with 193 Iraq: Chinese investment in 158 iron ore mining 41, 175 irrigation systems 45 ISAF (International Security Assistance Force) 84, 85, 188 Islam: Chinese policy in relation to 157, 161 – 162; demographics of followers of 75; migration related to 34; official state religion 76; US policy contributing to rise of radical 149, 151 – 152; women’s status in 76, 77, 83 Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) 162, 163 Islamic Relief 19 Islamic Republic of Afghanistan see Afghanistan Islamic State 46, 112, 143, 152, 157, 165, 166 – 167, 202 Italy: external aid and investment by 14, 192

ITEC (Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation) program 179, 184 Jaish-e Mohammed 174 Jalal, Massouda 129 Jamiat-e Islami/Jamiat-i-Islami 160, 202 Japan: disaster risk management joint efforts with 19, 20; external aid and investment by 14, 192, 204; Tokyo Conference on Afghanistan in 24n6; World Conference on Disaster Reduction in 19 Jiangxi Copper Company Limited 41 Johnson, Chalmers 141 Johnson-Lutz, Hilary 72, 75 Joint Nordic Gender Action Initiative 96 Joya, Malalai 106 judiciary/judicial system: capacity and accountability building in 201, 210; corruption in 24n8; education for 179; housing and property law decisions by 16, 17; Judicial Reform Project 210; women in 98, 113, 120, 130, 219 Kabul Bank crisis 207 Kajaki Dam 43 Kakar, Malalai 114 Kamminga, Jorrit 73, 105 Karmal, Babrak 126, 150 Karzai, Hamid 152, 175, 176, 177, 178, 180, 190, 191 Khan, Amanullah 108, 124 Khan, Daud 125 Kilo Goldmines Ltd. 41 Kirby, John 84 Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies 131 Kuper, Hilda 55 Kurtz, Donald 52 – 53, 53, 60 labor see employment land: agricultural 34 – 35, 60 – 61, 65, 75; communist redistribution of 146; demographics of 8; disaster risk management on provision of 19; housing and 8, 15, 16 – 17, 26n12, 60 – 61; Land Allocation Scheme 17, 26n12; land insecurity 16, 17; mapping and boundaries of 16; refugee access to 8, 15, 17, 26n12,

230 Index 34 – 35; rural politics and power/ control of 52, 60 – 61 landslides 3, 18, 21, 22, 34, 215 language 49, 50, 75 law/laws: ANDS goals for rule of 5; anticorruption 25 – 26n9; capacity and accountability building with 201, 204, 205, 207 – 208, 211, 219; education in 179; environmental 13; gender equity in 71, 96, 97, 109 – 110, 124, 130 – 131, 217, 218 – 219; housing obstacles due to 16, 17; land ownership under 16 Lawrence-Zuniga, Denise 55, 56 – 57 liens 16 life expectancy 22n1, 100 literacy: demographics of 22n1; women’s 77, 116, 127, 131, 146 locality: definition of 60; of rural politics 4, 50 – 51, 54 – 65, 66; see also places; spaces London Conference on Afghanistan (2014) 10 – 12 Low, Setha M. 55, 56 – 57 Loya Jirgas 129 Lu Shulin 162 Malikzada, Farkhunda 106, 133 manufacturing see industry and manufacturing marriage, gender equity/inequity in 71, 75, 124, 125, 131, 133, 217 Marsden, Peter 3, 31 maternal mortality rates 32, 100, 127, 212 McChrystal, Stanley 194 McCurry, Steve 106 MDGs (Millennium Development Goals) 5 Meena, Gul 133 Men Supporting Women campaign 134 microfinance 82 Mielke, Katja 66n1 migrations: agricultural effects of 34 – 35; disasters leading to 3, 8; employment and economic incentives for 3, 31, 35 – 37; refugee return 5, 8, 9, 15, 17, 22 – 23n3, 26n12, 32, 34 – 35, 94; religious-based 34; security-related 31, 46, 106; urban 5, 31, 35 military: budgets for 188, 189; external aid and investment in 44, 144, 145,

148, 164; peacebuilding and security efforts of (see peacebuilding and security); political coup role of 145; Soviet-Afghanistan intervention by 33, 34, 35, 44, 77, 83, 106, 123, 126, 141, 146 – 152, 158 – 159, 193; Soviet-Afghanistan withdrawal of 37, 83, 141, 150 – 152, 159; Taliban integration into 202; US-Afghanistan intervention by 34, 42, 43, 45, 84 – 85, 106 – 108, 123, 132, 141, 143, 163 – 164, 194; US-Afghanistan withdrawal/drawdown of 72, 86, 175, 202; women in 111, 114 – 115, 116, 118 – 119, 120, 130; see also Afghan National Army; Afghan National Defense and Security Forces Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) 5 mining industry: budget for 189; capacity and accountability building in 206; copper 4, 41; economic role of 39 – 41, 174, 183, 206; external aid and investment in 4, 39 – 41, 183, 206; Indian interests in 174, 175, 183; iron ore 41, 175; oil and gas 4, 39 – 41, 142, 166, 174 Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock 13, 22 Ministry of Counter Narcotics 195 Ministry of Defense 115 Ministry of Education 24n8, 78 – 79 Ministry of Energy and Water 22 Ministry of Finance 204 – 205, 210 Ministry of Interior 22, 24n8, 115, 116 Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs 180 Ministry of Mines and Industries 41 Ministry of Mines and Petroleum 39, 41 Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development 22, 45 – 46 Ministry of Women’s Affairs 72, 77, 96, 130, 131, 180 Mir, Haroun 191 mobile phones and Internet service: budget for 189; economic effects of 31, 36, 44; external aid and investment in 4, 44, 176 Modi, Narendra 178 Mohammadzai, Aisha 106 – 107 Monitoring Women’s Security in Transition project 114 mortality see death

Index  231 Mujaheddin/Mujahidin/Mujahideen: Chinese relations with 158 – 159, 160, 169n25; civil war among 126, 160 – 163; economic and agricultural impacts of 33 – 34, 37, 42; external aid and funding of 44 – 45, 146 – 152, 159, 160; land appropriation by 16; women and gender inequity under 77, 83, 126 Naderi, Sadat Mansoor 9 Naghlu Hydroelectric Dam 43 Najibullah, Mohammad 126, 150 – 152, 160, 193 NAPWA (National Action Plan for Women of Afghanistan) 96, 131, 218 National Action Plan for Women of Afghanistan (NAPWA) 96, 131, 218 National Action Plans 74, 95 – 96, 105, 110 – 111, 114, 116, 119, 131, 218 National Agricultural University 180 National Audit Law 204 National Corruption Survey report 24 – 25n8 National Disaster Management Plan 20, 21 National Education Strategic Plans 72, 78 National Emergency Operations Center (NEOC) 21, 22 National Endowment for Democracy 93 National Environmental Advisory Council (NEAC) 13 National Environmental Protection Agency (NEPA) 13, 26n10, 26 – 27n15 National Environmental Strategy of Afghanistan 13 National Institute of Advanced Studies (NIAS) 190 nationalism 75, 150 National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment (NRVA) 35 National Solidarity Program 43, 45 – 46, 94 National Strategy for Disaster Management 20 NATO see North Atlantic Treaty Organization natural disasters: disaster risk management for 3, 5 – 27, 34, 45, 215 – 216; droughts as 3, 9, 18 – 19, 21, 22, 27n15, 215; earthquakes

as 3, 17, 18, 21, 22, 215; economic effects of 3; extreme winter and snow avalanches as 3, 18, 21, 215; floods as 3, 18, 21, 22, 27n15, 34, 45, 215; landslides as 3, 18, 21, 22, 34, 215; pest/locust attacks as 18, 22; sandstorms as 18 natural resources: Chinese interest in Afghan 158; illegal exploitation of 32; land as (see land); mining (see mining industry); rural politics and power/ control of 4, 50, 52 – 53, 53, 60 – 61 NEAC (National Environmental Advisory Council) 13 Nehan, Nargis 109 NEOC (National Emergency Operations Center) 21, 22 NEPA (National Environmental Protection Agency) 13, 26n10, 26 – 27n15 Nepal: Indian aid to 175 Netherlands: external aid and investment by 14, 97; military intervention by 108; women- and gender-programming efforts of 97, 114, 117 – 119 New Silk Road 164 – 165 NIAS (National Institute of Advanced Studies) 190 Nicholas, Ralph 52 Nijssen, Stefanie 187 Nir, Dov 54 Noor Educational and Capacity Development Organization 94 Norberg-Schulz, Christian 62 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO): Chicago Summit external aid commitments by 10; peacebuilding and security efforts of 85, 110 – 111, 143, 175; Resolute Support Mission of 85, 111; Warsaw Summit 110 – 111 Norway: external aid and investment by 14, 96, 97, 192; Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD) 96 Norwegian Peace Institute 98 NRVA (National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment) 35 Obama, Barack 95, 194 oil and gas industry: economic role of 39 – 41; external aid and investment

232 Index in 4, 39 – 40; Trans-Afghan pipeline for 40 – 41, 142, 166, 174 Omar, Mohammad 162, 165, 192 Omar Saeed Sheikh, Ahmed 174 Operation Enduring Freedom 84 Operation Freedom’s Sentinel 84 – 85 opium see drugs Oxfam 109, 112, 114 Pahlavi, Mohammad 145 Pain, Adam 192 Pakistan: Chinese relations with 157, 159, 162, 164, 202; covert Afghan operations by/with 145, 148, 150, 152, 159, 193; drug use in 39; electricity in 195; employment and economic ties to 3, 31, 35 – 37; external aid and investment by 42, 159, 161, 196, 217; geography respective to 75; Indian relations with 174 – 175, 178, 180, 183, 193; InterServices Intelligence directorate 148, 150, 152, 161, 174; Inter-State Gas System (Private) Ltd. 40; migration to 3, 8, 31, 34 – 37, 44 – 45, 106; oil and gas for 40 – 41, 142, 166, 174; peacebuilding and security goals of 194, 202, 217; refugee return from 8, 9, 94; Shanghai Cooperation Organization involvement of 164; Taliban relations with 161, 163, 193 Panopticism 61 PARSA 94 PDPA see People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan peacebuilding and security: 2001 – 2007 era of 93 – 95; 2007 – 2010 era of 95 – 97; 2011 – 2015 era of 97 – 98; ANDS goals for 5; capacity and accountability building contingent upon 202, 211, 212; Chinese role in 164, 167, 202; cultural context and 98 – 100, 111, 113, 116, 117 – 120; drugs as threat to 195 – 196; economic ties to 32, 34, 46, 72, 81, 83 – 86; evolution of practices for 92 – 98; external aid and investment in 14 – 15, 73, 82, 84 – 85, 90 – 101, 108 – 112, 119 – 120, 164, 187, 192 – 196, 217; failure to achieve 10, 14 – 15; gender-based violence vs. 90 – 92, 96 – 98, 100 – 101, 105, 110, 115, 127, 130 – 134; gender

norms and 92 – 100; inclusive 105, 111, 112 – 119, 113, 116, 120; Indian goals for 174, 194, 217; international development and 73, 90 – 101, 108 – 112, 119 – 120; local level 114; migration related to 31, 46, 106; policy background for 91 – 92, 108; poverty as detriment to 216 – 217; protection vs. participation in 99 – 101, 110; representations of Afghan women and 105, 106 – 107, 117, 132 – 134; Taliban challenges to 84, 86, 105, 106 – 109, 111 – 114, 113, 193; terrorism threatening 106, 107 – 108, 111 – 112, 193; UNSCR 1325 on 73, 74, 90, 91 – 92, 95 – 97, 99 – 100, 105, 109 – 111; UNSCR 1820 on 90, 92, 97, 99 – 100; women’s role in 72, 73 – 74, 83 – 84, 90 – 101, 105 – 120, 129 – 131, 132 – 134, 218; see also military; police Pearl, Daniel 174 People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA): communist tenets of 125 – 126, 144, 145 – 146, 150, 160; Daud Khan assassination by 125; economic impacts of 33, 35, 37, 42; human rights decline under 123; political coup by 145; renaming of 150; women’s status under 125 – 126, 146 People’s Republic of China see China pest/locust attacks 18, 22 places: geography of (see geography); in rural politics 54, 57 – 58, 60 police: budgets for 188, 189; corruption among 24n8, 38; identification papers required by 35; peacebuilding and security role of 84, 111, 114 – 119, 116, 120, 130; training and education for 180; women in 111, 114 – 119, 116, 120, 130; see also Afghan Local Police; Afghan National Defense and Security Forces; Afghan National Police Police Women Councils 115 – 116 population and demographics 4, 5 – 8, 6 – 7, 8, 22n1, 32, 49, 75, 132 poverty: ANDS goals to reduce 5, 21; complexity of issues with 133; demographics of 22n1; disasters worsening 3, 5, 12, 18; economic

Index  233 status and 3, 5, 32, 72, 83, 217; as educational barrier 83; external aid and investment to alleviate 12, 216 – 217; housing and 3, 5, 17; landlessness and 17; terrorism ties to 216 – 217; women in 71, 83, 131 power: anthropological view of 51 – 53, 53; empowerment and 52, 72, 73 – 74, 77, 78, 80 – 82, 86, 93 – 95, 98, 105, 109 – 112, 120, 131, 217 – 219; housing locality in context of 60 – 65, 61; natural resources control as 4, 50, 52 – 53, 53, 60 – 61; in rural politics 4, 50 – 53, 53, 60 – 61, 66; women’s access to 52, 72, 73 – 74, 77, 78, 80 – 82, 86, 93 – 95, 98 – 99, 105, 109 – 112, 120, 131, 217 – 219 Power Grid Corporation of India 179 Presidential Commission on National Technical Assistance 209 Price, Gareth 142, 174 Project Artemis 82 Promote Initiative 79, 82 propinquity theory 64 – 65 proxemics 56 – 57 public administration 207 – 212, 219 public areas, as social spaces 58, 59, 66 public financial management and procurement 188, 189, 203 – 207, 209, 211 – 212, 219 Quetta Shura 165, 166 – 167 Rabia Balkhi Women’s Hospital 128 Rahmani, Niloofar 106 railroad, external aid and investment in 177, 178, 183, 202 Rasmussen, Anders Fogh 24n7 Reagan, Ronald/Reagan Doctrine 148 – 150 Realizing Self-Reliance: Commitments to Reforms and Renewed Partnership framework 10 reconstruction process: context for (see context for reconstruction process); economic development in (see economy); future of 215 – 219; international participation in (see external aid and investment; international development; international donor community responses); peacebuilding and security in (see peacebuilding and

security); reassessment of external powers’ role in 186 – 198; women’s role in (see women) Red Crescent Society 180 refugees: asylum applications by 46; economic impacts of returning 32, 34; employment for 35 – 37; external aid and investment in 44 – 45; housing and land for returning 5, 8, 15, 17, 22 – 23n3, 26n12, 34 – 35; women as 90 – 91, 94, 106, 130 religion: demographics of 75; migration related to 34; official state 76; public areas for, as social spaces 58, 59, 66; rural politics and 49; women’s status in 76, 77, 79, 83, 124; see also Islam representations of Afghan women 105, 106 – 107, 117, 132 – 134, 135 Research Institute for Women, Peace and Security (RIWPS) 96 resilience 19 – 21 Resolute Support Mission (RSM) 85, 111 RIWPS (Research Institute for Women, Peace and Security) 96 roads: economic impacts of 31, 42 – 43; external aid and investment in 3, 42 – 43, 175, 177, 178, 202; as social spaces 58, 59 Robinson, Max 62 Rodman, Margaret 54 Rosenberg, Matthew 191 Roshan 44 RSM (Resolute Support Mission) 85, 111 rural areas: capacity building in 201; definition of rural 50; disaster risk management in 18, 19, 22; drug use in 39; economy in 31, 32, 33 – 35, 39, 42 – 46, 75, 77, 201; external aid and investment in 45 – 46; farming and agriculture in (see farming and agriculture); food insecurity in 35; infrastructure and electricity in 42 – 44; National Solidarity Program for 43, 45 – 46, 94; politics in 4, 49 – 66; population in 4, 32, 49; poverty in 3; women’s status in 75, 77, 82, 124, 125 rural politics: administrative categorization and boundaries in 4, 49 – 50; anthropological categorization of space in 55, 56 – 57,

234 Index 58, 59; central state government challenges and 4, 49; definition of rural 50; ethno-cultural heterogeneity affecting 4, 49, 50, 56 – 57; geography and 4, 49, 54, 55 – 56, 58; housing and 58, 59, 60 – 65, 61; human resources and capital in 52 – 53, 53; ideology, symbols, and information in 52 – 53, 53; locality of 4, 50 – 51, 54 – 65, 66; local politics and 4, 50; national politics and 4, 50; natural resources control in 4, 50, 52 – 53, 53, 60 – 61; overview of 4, 49 – 51, 65 – 66; place importance to 54, 57 – 58, 60; power in 4, 50 – 53, 53, 60 – 61, 66; social spaces and 4, 51, 55, 57 – 66; use-center theory on 4, 51, 54 – 56, 58, 59, 62 Russian Federation: drug use in 39; external aid and investment by 14; peacebuilding and security goals of 202; Shanghai Cooperation Organization involvement of 164; Taliban relations with 166; see also Soviet Union (former) Rzemyk, Thomas J. 72, 75 SAARC (South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation) 175 Sahar, Saba 119 Saikal, Amin 193 SAIL (Steel Authority India) 41, 183 Salma Dam (Afghan-India Friendship Dam) 36, 176 – 177 sandstorms 18 sanitation 22n1 Sarabi, Habiba 112 Saudi Arabia: external aid and investment by 14, 42, 44, 148, 159; Taliban government recognition by 163; women’s status in 81 Schetter, Conrad 66n1 School Feeding Programme 180 SCO (Shanghai Cooperation Organization) 164, 202 Score, Pierre 92 Second East Turkestan Republic 158 security see peacebuilding and security Self-Employed Women’s Association (SEWA) 180 Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 19 – 20

SEWA (Self-Employed Women’s Association) 180 sexual violence against women 90, 92, 97 – 98, 110, 115, 127, 131 SGI Global, LLC 38 Shah, Nadir 124 Shah, Zahir 108, 125, 128 Shahi Rasooli, Hekmat 116, 117 Shah Massoud, Ahmad 160 Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) 164, 202 Shaw, Mark 37 Shelter Network 96 Simmel, George 64 Singh, Manmohan 177, 181 slums and squatter settlements 3, 5, 19 Small Development Project scheme 180 – 182, 184 snow-related disasters 3, 18, 21, 215 social development: ANDS goals to improve 5; budget for 188, 189; economic indicators and 32; Indian-Afghan 182; rural politics and 50, 54; sustainable 123; women’s opportunities for 75, 82 – 83, 86, 123, 127 social spaces 4, 51, 55, 57 – 66 SOFAs (Status of Forces Agreements) 85 Sopko, John 11 Soraya, Queen 124 South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) 175 Soviet Union (former): Chinese relations with 158 – 159, 168 – 169nn19 – 20; collapse of 151; external aid and investment by 3, 42, 43, 44, 144, 146, 151, 187; Indian relations with 159; military intervention by 33, 34, 35, 44, 77, 83, 106, 123, 126, 141, 146 – 152, 158 – 159, 193; military withdrawal by 37, 83, 141, 150 – 152, 159; oil and gas for 39; origins of Afghan destabilization with 144; US policy to undermine 146 – 150, 193 spaces: anthropological categorization of 55, 56 – 57, 58, 59; contested 57; embodied 57; gendered 57; inscribed 57; social 4, 51, 55, 57 – 66; spatial tactics 57; spatial thinking 54; transitional 57; use-center theory on 4, 51, 54 – 56, 58, 59, 62 Spain: external aid and investment by 14

Index  235 Status of Forces Agreements (SOFAs) 85 Steel Authority India (SAIL) 41, 183 Stor Palace 176 Strassoldo, Raimondo 63 – 64 Strategic Partnership Council 183 Sudan: Chinese investment in 158 Swanström, Niklas 141, 156 Sweden: external aid and investment by 14, 96, 97 – 98; Swedish Committee for Afghanistan (SCA) 109; Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA) 96, 97 – 98; women- and genderprogramming efforts of 96, 97 – 98, 109, 114 Switzerland: external aid and investment by 14 symbolism: of Afghan women 106 – 107, 115, 119 (see also representations of Afghan women); in rural politics 52 – 53, 53 Tajikistan: Afghan civil war concerns of 165; economic ties to 31; electricity in 195; geography respective to 75; oil and gas in 40 Taliban: Al-Qaeda alliance with 143, 152; Chinese policy in relation to 157, 162 – 163, 165 – 167; electricity infrastructure under 43; external aid and 44 – 45, 149; farming and agriculture under 34; government and military integration of 202; human rights decline under 123; Indian relations with 174, 175 – 179; insurgency by 46, 152, 163, 165 – 166, 177, 178, 179, 194; land appropriation by 16; migration for safety from 31; Pakistani support for 161, 163, 193; peacebuilding and security challenges by 84, 86, 105, 106 – 109, 111 – 114, 113, 193; post-Taliban Afghanistan 186 – 188, 187 – 189; Russian relations with 166; US policy contributing to rise of 149, 152, 166, 193 – 194; women and gender inequity under 71, 73, 74, 76 – 77, 83, 105, 106 – 109, 126 – 127, 128, 132, 134, 166 Taraki, Noor Mohammad 125 – 126 Tarzi, Safia 128

taxation 32, 206 telecommunications see mobile phones and Internet service Tennyson, K. N. 142, 186 terrorism: Chinese response to 161 – 162; disaster risk management for 12, 18; India’s policy in relation to 174; peacebuilding and security threatened by 106, 107 – 108, 111 – 112, 193; poverty ties to 216 – 217; suicide bombings as 18, 179; US military intervention in response to 106, 107, 143, 194; US policy contributing to rise of 149 – 150, 152; women’s oppression linked with 107 – 108 TI-DSP (Transparency International’s Defence and Security Program) 187 Tokyo Conference on Afghanistan (2012) 24n6 Torabi, Yama 24n8 trade: Chinese policy on 157, 164 – 165; illegal 32 (see also drugs); Indian policy on 174 – 175, 182 – 184; infrastructure improvements benefitting 31, 42 – 44; negative balance of 187, 187; small-scale, informal 3, 31, 42 – 44, 75 – 76 Transformation Decade Agenda 10, 99 transitional spaces 57 Transparency International’s Defence and Security Program (TI-DSP) 187 transportation: budget for 189; external aid and investment in 177, 178, 181 – 182, 183 – 184; see also roads Tsirkas, Christina 74, 123 Tucker, Julian 141, 156 Turkey: external aid and investment by 4, 14 Turkish Petroleum Corporation 39 Turkmengaz 40 Turkmenistan: Afghan civil war concerns of 165; electricity in 195; geography respective to 75; oil and gas in 40 – 41, 142, 166, 174 Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-PakistanIndia pipeline 40 – 41, 142, 166, 174 Turkmenistan-Uzbekistan-TajikistanAfghanistan-Pakistan (TUTAP) power project 195 Turquoise Mountain Foundation 181

236 Index UNICEF 15, 127 United Arab Emirates (UAE): Taliban government recognition by 163; women’s empowerment efforts by 72, 79, 81 United Kingdom: British Geological Survey 41; Department for International Development 204, 207; external aid and investment by 12 – 13, 14, 43, 97, 98, 192, 204, 207; London Conference on Afghanistan in 10 – 12; Operational Plan in Afghanistan 98; Preventing Sexual Violence Initiative 97 United Nations: Chinese stance in 163; Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) 94, 129, 130; Development Program (UNDP) 21, 22, 32, 179, 187, 204, 207; Disaster Response Office (UNDRO) 27n16; disaster risk management goals 19 – 20, 21 – 22, 27n16, 34; Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) 77; Environment Program (UNEP) 12 – 13, 26 – 27n15; external aid and investment by 14, 19, 34, 44 – 45, 93, 204; Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) 18, 26n13, 45; High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 8, 22 – 23n3, 46; housing assistance 8, 22 – 23n3; Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 26 – 27n15; International Strategy for Disaster Reduction 19; Millennium Development Goals 5; Office for Project Services (UNOPS) 22, 45; Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) 11, 37, 39, 190 – 191, 195; peacebuilding and security coordination with 202; Security Council Resolution 1267 107; Security Council Resolution 1325 73, 74, 90, 91 – 92, 95 – 97, 99 – 100, 105, 109 – 111; Security Council Resolution 1333 107; Security Council Resolution 1820 90, 92, 97, 99 – 100; Security Council Resolution 2189 85; Women 96, 97; womenand gender-equity efforts of 73, 74, 90 – 98, 105, 107, 109 – 111, 129, 130

United States: Agency for International Development (USAID) 13, 25 – 26n9, 26n14, 79, 82, 94, 149, 204, 207; anticorruption efforts in 25 – 26n9; anti-Soviet position of 146 – 150, 193; Centers for Disease Control 127; Chinese relations with 158, 159, 163 – 164; corruption and bribery from 191; cost of military intervention by 143; covert Afghan operations by 145, 146 – 152; Department of Defense 13, 25 – 26n9; Department of Justice 26n9; Department of State 25 – 26n9, 82, 95 – 96; Department of Treasury 25 – 26n9; external aid and investment by 3, 11 – 15, 14, 42, 43, 44, 82, 94 – 96, 97, 146 – 152, 159, 187, 191, 192, 193, 204, 207; Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) 216; Geological Survey (USGS) 40; Marines, Afghan women working with 130; military intervention by 34, 42, 43, 45, 84 – 85, 106 – 108, 123, 132, 141, 143, 163 – 164, 194; military withdrawal/drawdown by 72, 86, 175, 202; National Security Council 25n9; Office of Global Women’s Issues 95 – 96; origins of Afghan destabilization with 144 – 146; peacebuilding and security efforts of 84 – 85, 95 – 96, 175; popular Afghan resistance supported by 146 – 148; retrospective Afghanistan policy analysis 141, 143 – 155, 165 – 166, 193 – 194; Taliban relations with 149, 152, 166, 193 – 194; terrorism and radical Islam rise with policy of 149 – 150, 151 – 152; women- and gender-programming efforts of 79, 82, 94 – 96, 97, 106 – 108, 130, 131, 166 Unocal 166 urban areas: disaster risk management in 3, 5, 8 – 12, 18 – 22, 23n4, 215 – 216; drug use in 39; food insecurity in 35; infrastructure and electricity in 3 – 4, 43; migration to 5, 31, 35; population of 5, 6 – 7, 8; poverty in 3, 32; urban planning and development for 8 – 10,

Index  237 23n4, 215 – 216; weak municipal governance in 8 – 9; women’s employment opportunities in 71, 217 USAID (US Agency for International Development) 13, 25 – 26n9, 26n14, 79, 82, 94, 149, 204, 207 use-center theory 4, 51, 54 – 56, 58, 59, 62 Uzbekistan: Afghan civil war concerns of 165; Chinese relations with 164; economic ties to 31; electricity in/ from 43, 178, 195; geography respective to 75; Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan 162, 163; oil and gas in 40 Verveer, Melanne 95 Village Stability Operations (VSO) 84 voting rights 125, 129 – 130, 131 vulnerability: disasters increasing 3, 18; landlessness and 17; women’s 85 – 86, 218 WAPCOS (Water and Power Consultancy Services) 177 Ward, Christopher 37 Wardak, Habib 191 Watan Group 40 water: demographics of access to safe 22n1; external aid and investment in 44, 177, 181; hydroelectricity with 43, 177; irrigation systems 45; refugees’ access to 36; see also droughts; floods Water and Power Consultancy Services (WAPCOS) 177 Weber, Max 51 Wescott, Clay G. 142, 201 WID (Women in Development) 73 winter disasters 3, 18, 21, 215 women: burqas and veils for 107, 108, 124, 125, 126, 127, 133; challenges and obstacles for 72, 82 – 83, 85 – 86, 90 – 91, 113, 115 – 117, 116, 131; crucial importance of 74, 123 – 138; cultural context for 76 – 77, 79, 81 – 82, 83, 86, 98 – 100, 111, 113, 116, 117 – 120, 130, 131, 133, 218; death/mortality rates for 32, 91, 100, 127, 133, 212; disaster risk management for 18 – 19; economic development and 72 – 73, 75 – 86,

123, 125, 128 – 129, 131, 217 – 218; education of 71 – 74, 76 – 81, 83, 86, 93 – 95, 100, 109, 116, 123 – 129, 131, 134, 146, 186, 212, 217 – 218; employment of 71 – 72, 74, 76, 77, 79 – 82, 86, 93, 111, 114 – 120, 116, 123, 125 – 131, 134, 217 – 218; entrepreneurship of 79, 80 – 82, 86, 129, 218; external aid and investment in issues for 72, 73, 77, 82, 90 – 101, 108 – 112, 119 – 120, 129, 134, 180, 186, 217 – 219; governance and political activism of 93 – 94, 97, 98, 109, 111 – 112, 115 – 117, 123, 125, 128 – 131, 132; health conditions/ healthcare of 71, 73, 93, 94 – 95, 127, 128; human rights of 123; international development and 73, 77, 90 – 101, 108 – 112, 119 – 120; laws and legal system affecting 71, 96, 97, 109 – 110, 124, 130 – 131, 217, 218 – 219; men supporting rights of 133 – 134, 218; overview of 71 – 74; peacebuilding and security role of 72, 73 – 74, 83 – 84, 90 – 101, 105 – 120, 129 – 131, 132 – 134, 218; power of 52, 72, 73 – 74, 77, 78, 80 – 82, 86, 93 – 95, 98 – 99, 105, 109 – 112, 120, 131, 217 – 219; progress and development conflated with rights of 73 – 74, 77, 81, 86, 105 – 108, 124 – 126, 134 – 135; representations of 105, 106 – 107, 117, 132 – 134, 135; rural views of 75, 77, 82, 124, 125; social development for 75, 82 – 83, 86, 123, 127; Taliban’s treatment of 71, 73, 74, 76 – 77, 83, 105, 106 – 109, 126 – 127, 128, 132, 134, 166; violence faced by 90 – 92, 96 – 98, 100 – 101, 105, 110, 115, 127, 130 – 134; voting rights of 125, 129 – 130, 131; Western views of 108 – 109; see also gender Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda 73, 74, 92, 96, 105 – 106, 109 – 111, 114, 117, 120, 218 Women and Peace Studies Organization (WPSO) 109 Women for Women International 83 Women in Development (WID) 73 Women’s Association of Afghanistan 128

238 Index World Bank: capacity and accountability building by 142, 201 – 213, 219; disaster risk management efforts of 20 – 21, 215; economic analysis of Afghanistan by 32, 37; external aid and investment by 3, 14, 43, 142, 192, 201 – 213; external aid oversight and disbursement by 45, 203 – 204; Human Development Index 15; International Development Association 204, 205; private sector development by 201; public administration improvements by 207 – 212, 219; public financial management and procurement improvements by 203 – 207, 209, 211 – 212; rural economy development by 201; women- and

gender-equity efforts of 71 – 72, 93, 94, 217; World Development report (2011) 90 World Conference on Disaster Reduction 19 World Food Programme 44, 129, 180 World Trade Organization (WTO) 32 World Uyghur Congress 157 WPS (Women, Peace and Security) agenda 73, 74, 92, 96, 105 – 106, 109 – 111, 114, 117, 120, 218 WPSO (Women and Peace Studies Organization) 109 WTO (World Trade Organization) 32 Yemen: women’s empowerment efforts by 72, 80 Zakhilwal, Omar 22n2