Reasons & Causes - Causalism & Anti-Causalism in Philosophy of Action 9780230554092, 9780230554108, 9780230580640

Table of contents :
From anti-causalism to causalism and back : a history of the reasons/causes debate / Giuseppina D'Oro and Constantine Sandis
Still a cause for concern : reasons, causes and explanations / Daniel D. Hutto
Mental causation according to Davidson / John Heil
Why rationalization is not a species of causal explanation / Brian P. McLaughlin
Prolegomena to a cartographical investigation of cause and reason / Julia Tanney
Explaining actions and explaining bodily movements / Maria Alvarez
Actions, explanations, and causes / Alfred R. Mele
The causal theory of action and the commitments of common sense psychology / Scott Sehon
Explaining human agency : reasons, causes, and the first person perspective / Karsten Stueber.

Citation preview

� HISTORY OF ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY

History of Analytic Philosophy Series Editor: Michael Seaney. University of York. UK

To mark the 50th anniversary of Donald Davidson's 'Actions, reasons and causes', eight philosophers with distinctive and contrasting vieYJS revisit and update the reasons/causes debate.Their essays are preceded by a historical introduction which traces current debates to their roots in the philosophy of hi.story and social science, linking the rise of causalism to a metaphysical backlash agai,nst the linguistic tum. Both historically grounded and topical, this volume will be of great interest to both students and scholars in the philosophy of action and related areas of study. Giuseppina D'Oro is Reader in Philosophy at Keele University, UK. She is the author of

Collingwood and the Metaphysics ofExperience (2002) and co-editor (with James Connelly) of Collingwood's An Essay on Philosophical Method {2005). She has written extensively on Collingwood's defence of the autonomy of the human sciences and its continuing philosophical relevance to the reasons/causes debate.

Constantine Sandis is Reader in Philosophy at Oxford Brookes University, Ult He is the author of The Things We Do anrnuc1u a,..c12ilill 2001, 2003) that the dependence of mental properties on properties (the latter suffice for the former) means that mental physical properties are not causal 'competitors'. The causal of the mental is consistent with the supervenience of the mental the physical. According to the Macdonalds, causal relevance only patterns of counterfactual dependence or principled rrnrnri ::i�tlii tion. By that measure there is no problem with the causal of mental properties. As 'folk psychology 1 makes clear, such nrcmer-:it� ties covary in principled ways with other mental properties and various physical properties. Gibbons is (as Malcolm is) less sanguine about mental-physical rr\lTinP�,'"' tition, arguing that, although mental and physical properties mental properties often 1 win 1 • Mental properties constitutive of are relevant to the mental properties of effects, where relevance 'nomological dependence' (see Fodor 1997) . We have, not (or 1 upward1 ) causation but intra-level causal relevance. The strategy is illustrated in Figure 3 . 1 (see also Thomasson 1998 for an pendent argument along these same lines). I mention these points by way of setting them aside. My rn,1 tP1n ai;ii, tion is that the problem of the causal relevance of the mental grew of a fundamental misreading of Davidson. Davidson's solution to problem of mental causation could well be off base. It is, after all, sophical solution. But it is not subject to the sorts of difficulty out by Stoutland, Kim, and countless others, difficulties that have philosophers to tinker with the concept of causation, to take Jcc, , v u,J1 r;01 the possibility of systematic mental-physical overdetermination, and some cases, to embrace epiphenomenalism. In sum, there is no physical barrier to the idea that reasons cause actions.

Davidson Redux 1 1 Wittgenstein is famous for arguing that philosophical problems largely self-inflicted. Whether this is so in general, it is most r0�+� i ·n 1 u'4F1 apt in the present case. We have been put off the scent by an initial misreading of Davidson. Whatever its faults, Davidson's account of mental causation is not susceptible to the kinds of i..11 u, cJ1ccu1y;; that occupy philosophers intent on defending one or another form non-reductive p hysicalism. The irony is that many non-reductive calists trace their inspiration to D avidson.

Mental Causation According to Davidson 87

Davidson thinks that the problem of mental causation - how mental events could causally interact with physical events - arises because we embrace three principles (Davidson 1 9 70: 208) . (1) The Principle of Causal Interaction: 'some mental events interact causally with physical events' . (2) The Principle o f t h e Nomological Character o f Causality: 'events related as cause and effect fall under strict deterministic laws'. (3) Anomalism of the Mental: 'there are no strict deterministic laws on the basis of which m ental events can be predicted and explained' . The principles are, on the face of it, inconsistent. If a mental event inter­ acts causally with a physical event, the events must fall under a strict law. But there are no strict laws relating mental and physical events. Suppose we add a supervenience principle: (4) The mental supervenes on the physical. Might this help? Consider a case in which a mental event, M1 super­ venes on a physical event, P i , and P1 causes P2, another physical event. Might this be an instance of what Kim once called 'supervenient causa­ tion' (Kim 1984; see also Sosa 1 984)? Might we say that Mi caused P2 ? For reasons discussed earlier, that appears unlikely. When Pi causes P2 , it does so in virtue of being P 1 , not in virtue of being Mi . M1 accompanies P i , but appears causally irrelevant to the occurrence of P2 • This is the situation depicted in Figure 3.3. We can make the difficulty salient if we assume that Mi, Pv and P2 are not events themselves but properties constitutive of events. A mental event includes a mental property. Given supervenience, the mental prop­ erty supervenes on a physical property. The result is a kind of complex event: a's being P 1 at t, and, in virtue of being Pi , a's being Mi at t. Given the Principle of the Nomological Character of Causality, it is in virtue of being Pi that the event in which P1 figures has the effects it has. True, a is M1 as well as (indeed, in virtue of being) P1 , but M1 is apparently out of the causal loop. This is not at all how Davidson is thinking of it, however. First, Davidson never took himself to be advancing claims about mental and physical properties, at least not when 'property' is given a robust, ontologically serious reading. Davidson speaks of mental and physical 'predicates' and 'descriptions'. By my count, 'property' occurs only five times (in

88 John Heil

the span of two pages) in 'Mental Events' . When Davidson does use ' word 'property' in characterizing his own view (as in Davidson 1 993, instance), he does so in a context in which it is clear that he is using· term in an ontologically deflationary, relaxed way, as when the Bo _ . Common Prayer speaks of God, 'whose property is always to have mer -­ This, I suggest, is merely a mildly pretentious way of saying that Go always merciful. Relaxed uses of 'property' are perfectly unob j ection until they are interpreted with full ontological seriousness. When happens, a linguistic point is given unearned ontological import. The key to understanding Davidson is the recognition that, Davidson, as for Spinoza, the mental-physical distinction is not ori logically deep. The distinction is one of conception, not of be Davidson is clear about this. An event, he says, is mental or phys 'only as described' (Davidson 1 9 70: 210, 2 1 5) , Supetvenience, the not a relation among mental and physical properties but a constr on the application of mental predicates. To say that the mental su venes on the physical is merely to say that (1) every event that be given a mental description can be given a physical descripti and (2) events differing in their mental descriptions must diffe some physically describable way, some way describable in the vo _ ulary of physics. Anomalism, the irreducibility of the mental to physical, is simply a reflection of the fact that application co tions for mental predicates are orthogonal to application conditi for predicates lifted from physics. There is no reasonable prosp of expressing application conditions for mental predicates in pu _ physical terms. 1 3 What of causation? What of Davidson's claim that causal relati must be backed by strict laws? A law, for Davidson, is a statemen a particular kind. The causal principle amounts to nothing more t the thesis that, whenever one event causes another, the events c be given a description in the vocabulary of fundamental physics s to make explicit the fact that events satisfying the one description invariably succeeded by or perhaps necessitate events satisfying second. Now, couple this idea with supervenience properly understo Every mental event - every event answering to a mental description a physical event, an evertt describable in physical terms. So, when it is true that a mental evertt causes some physical event, there is so description of these events in a physical vocabulary that makes evid that an event of the first type would be invariably accompanied b necessitate art event of the second type. As Davidson insists, it make · -

Mental Causation According to Davidson

89

sense to ask whether one event caused another in virtue of being mental or in virtue of being physical. Causality and identity are relations between individual events no matter how described. But laws are linguistic; so events can instan­ tiate laws and hence be explained or predicted in light of laws only as those events are described in one or another way. The principle of causal interaction deals with events in extension and is therefore blind to the mental-physical dichotomy. The principle of the anoma­ lism of the mental concerns events described as mental, for events are mental only as described. The principle of the nomological char­ acter of causality must be read carefully: it says that when events are related as cause and effect, they have descriptions that instantiate a law. It does not say that every true singular statement of causality instantiates a law. (Davidson 1 9 70: 2 1 5) Some philosophers have thought that Davidson is simply missing the point. This, they speculate, might be due to differences in Davidson's and Kim's conceptions of events. Davidsonian events are said to be 'coarse-grained', while Kim's are 'fine-grained'. The thought is that Davidson takes complex events as fuzzy wholes, thereby obscuring the fact that not every property included in a complex event is relevant to p roperties included in its effects. Think here of Dretske's soprano, who sings a phrase with a certain meaning that shatters a delicate glass (Dretske 1 988: 79). The phrase has a meaning, but its meaning what it does has. nothing to do with the glass's shattering. Events can be as fine-grained as you please, however, without affecting Davidson's argument. An event is not mental in virtue of incorpo­ rating a mental property, physical because it includes a physical prop­ erty. 'Mental' and 'physical' do not designate families of properties but families of predicates. A mental event is an event that satisfies a mental predicate. This event could be a fine-grained Kim-style event. Given supervenience, that very event satisfies a physical predicate that could figure in the formulation of a strict law. In fact, if Davidson and Malcolm are right, a particular event might satisfy a mental predicate only if that very event has the right kind of effect, an effect that satisfies the right sort of description. When this is so, both the cause and effect must have a precise physical description that serves as an instance of a strict law. The upshot is a modified version of Kim's diagram (Figure 3 .4).

90

Jo/111

Heil

'Pi'

C

E

Figure 3.4 Mental causation for Davidson

Here, 'Mi ', 'P1 ', 'M2', and 'P2' are taken, not to be properties but to predicates or descriptions that pick out C and E. C and E are particul events. Include in C and E whatever you think is required for C's causin E; omit whatever you think is not required. As Davidson notes, there · no question of whether C causes E in virtue of answering to 'M1 ' or i virtue of answering to 'P1 ' . C causes E in virtue of C's actual make-u whatever it might be. In virtue of that make-up (and perhaps much el besides), C satisfies 'Mi 'and 'P1 ' as well. I have suggested that it is a mistake to imagine that Davidson's accou of mental causation rests on a proprietary conception of events. I believ that the same holds for the conception of causation favoured by Davidso The really crucial feature of Davidson's view is the idea that the worl whatever its ultimate ontology, can be described using a fine-grain physical vocabulary and described in many other ways as well. All the ways of describing the world - one and the same world - can be tr although there is no reason to think that we could provide analyses terms belonging to one mode of description using terms belonging another mode of description. We regard physics as privileged not becau it gives us the only true description of reality or a description of reali into which all other descriptions are translatable but because it provides self-contained 'closed' account, one that makes salient the world's caus structure. Physics gives us what passes for a basic description of the worl a description that encompasses truth makers for every other descriptio11 When we move on from electrons and quarks to talk of tables, trees, an· intentions, our thoughts and utterances are often true, but this is nq, because, in addition to arrangements of quarks and electrons, there ar' tables, trees, and intentions. Once God has created the quarks and ele trons and distributed them in space and time, God has thereby create truthmakers for our talk of tables, trees, and intentions. As Davidso · says, we have ontological but not conceptual reduction (1993, 3).

Conclusion Many readers will remain dissatisfied. Even if something like Davidson. account works for beliefs, desires, and intentions, it does not touch th

Mental Causation According to Davidson 91

qualitative dimension of conscious experience, the qualia. Conscious qualities would count as mental for Davidson, not because they have a distinctive intrinsic character but because they can be picked out with mental predicates. But, as Davidson himself acknowledges (Davidson 1970: 21 1-12), anything at all could be picked out by means of a mental predicate, so anything at all could count as mental! Davidson ignores the really stunning problem of finding a place for qualities of conscious experience alongside the primary qualities beloved by physicists. You might be willing to accept that 'intends to flip the switch1 and 'is in brain state B/ could pick out one and the same state without seeing how this could work for 'is in pain' and 'is in brain state Bz '. Let me close with three comments on this worry. First, you might regard Davidson's neglect of qualia as undermining his whole approach to minds and mental causation. What we need is an overall conception of the mind that illuminates its place in nature. A solution that applies only in one, narrowly circumscribed mental domain cannot be taken seriously in the absence of a broader, all-encompassing account. Second, you could eschew the need for an all-encompassing theory, accept Davidson's account of mental causation as it pertains to action, and simply leave open the question of qualia. Third, you could accept Davidson 1s account as providing an overall ontological picture of the world and our place in it, then try to work out how the thesis might be extended to the qualia. You could accept the idea that the mental-physical distinction is a distinction of conception, not of being, and look more closely at qualities picked out in ordinary talk of conscious experiences. Davidson is silent on the ontology, what the world must be like if it is true that you flipped the switch because you wanted to turn on the light or that you reached for an aspirin bottle because your head hurt. If Davidson has the right picture, truthmakers for such claims could be picked out in the vocabulary of physics. This third approach strikes me as promising if only because its compet­ itors have failed so miserably. Ironically, the chief competitor nowadays, non-reductive physicalism, owes its inspiration largely to Davidson. If my account here is right, however, non-reductive physicalism is not at all what Davidson had in mind. Suppose we return to the source Davidson 1s Spinozistic ontological monism paired with conceptual dualism - and see where it takes us. 14 What have we got to lose?

Appendix: more on reasons as causes I have argued that there is no reason to think that mental states or events could fail to play causal roles in the production of actions. If

92 John Heil

you accept this conclusion and couple it with the idea that reasons ar mental states - beliefs and desires, for instance - it follows that reaso can be causes. This is the line taken by Davidson. Some philosophers who would accept the causal efficacy of belie and desires, however, contend that reasons are not causes. Reasons they hold, are not to be identified with beliefs and desires or indee with any mental states. Reasons are what we believe or desire: belief o desire contents. Reasons fail to be causes not because they are mental bti because reasons belong to the wrong ontological category. Your belie desires, and various other states of mind are efficacious in producin bodily motions, but these beliefs and desires are not reasons. There 1 something right about this. Suppose you desire a second helping of pie and believe that you ca obtain a second helping by slicing the pie on the table in front of you These beliefs and desires lead you to form an intention to slice the p· and ultimately issue in your slicing the pie. Your reasons for slicing t pie are not your beliefs and desires, however, but what you believe an desire. What of a case in which you have many reasons to perform som action, and you act on some of those reasons and not on others? Recal the case considered earlier in which you rise when the Queen enters th room for one reason rather than another. Cases of these kinds featu importantly in Davidson's argument to the conclusion that reaso are causes: you act on a reason, R, when R is part of the cause of yo action. Here, it would be useful to distinguish (i) (ii) (iii) (iv)

there being a reason, R, to A; there being a reason, R, for you to A; your having a reason, R, to A; and R 1s being your reason for A-ing.

It looks as though, if a reason, R, is to motivate an action at all, for an ai;