Readings in social theory: the classic tradition to post-modernism [2 ed.] 0070205744, 9780070205741

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DAHRENDORF'^C. WRIGHT MILLS PETER BLAU AL^ JAMES FARGANISOOROTMY smith michel F( >URKHEIM Filie£»Ri€H NIETZSCHE MAX WEBER kLCOTT PARSONS ROI^RT K. MERTON RALF £>AHREI^IiaRF\ ERBERTBLUMER ERVINhesive

CHAPTER

3

EMILE DURKHEIM: ANOMIE AND SOCIAL INTEGRATION

79

share in the collective energy and supports his

measure avoid the prospect of annihilation we cannot extirpate it; it is inevitable, whatever we do. We may push back the frontier for some generations, force our name to endure for some

own when

years or centuries longer than our body; a

each and each to all, something like a mutual moral support, which instead of throwing the

own

individual on his

him

resources, leads

to

exhausted.

But these reasons are purely secondary. Excessive individualism not only results in

moment, too soon

favoring the action of suicidogenic causes, but

in

such a cause. It not only frees man's inclination to do away with himself from a protective obstacle, but creates this inclination out of whole cloth and thus gives birth to a special suicide which bears its mark. This must be clearly understood for this is what constitutes

means

it is

itself

the special character of the type of suicide just

distinguished and justifies the

given

What

it.

name we have

there then in individualism

is

has been sometimes said that because of

man cannot live without attachment to some object which transcends and survives him, and that the reason his psychological constitution,

for this necessity

is

perish entirely. Life less

some reason

is

too

he

is

is

we must have

little.

is

life's trials.

involved,

we

He

is

not orUy

hemmed

we have no

Under

He

in spatially;

When,

other object than our-

cannot avoid the thought that our

end

in

nothingness, since

ourselves disappear. But annihilation

courage

some

The individual

also strictly limited temporally.

efforts will finally

us.

not to

said to be intolerable un-

not a sufficient end for his activity.

therefore,

selves

need

is

for existing

purpose justifying alone

a

we

terrifies

would lose act and struggle, our exertions. The

these conditions one

to live, that

is,

to

since nothing will remain of

words, is supposed to be contradictory to human nature and, consequently, too uncertain to have chances of permanence. In this absolute formulation the proposition is vulnerable. If the thought of the end of our state of egoism, in other

personality were really so hateful, we could consent to live only by blinding ourselves voluntarily as to

life's

will

it

order

to

for

most men, always comes

be nothing. For the groups we join prolong our existence by their

must them all our deposit of ourselves. Those are few whose memories are closely enough bound to the very history of humanity to be assured of living until its death. are themselves mortal; they too

dissolve, carrying with

So,

if

we

no such

really thus thirsted after immortality,

brief perspectives could ever

us. Besides,

what

of us

is it

that lives?

appease

A word,

an imperceptible trace, most often therefore nothing comparable to the violence of our efforts or able to justify them to us. In actuality, though a child is naturally an egoist who feels not the slightest craving to survive himself, and the old man is very a sound,

anonymous,

that explains this result? It

when

value. For

if

we may

in a

often

child

a

in

this

and so many other life as much we have seen

respects, neither ceases to cling to

or

more than the

that suicide

is

adult; indeed

very rare for the

first

fifteen

and tends to decrease at the other extreme of life. Such too is the case with animals, whose psychological constitution differs years

from that of men only in degree. It untrue that life is only possible by ing

its

rationale outside of

is

therefore

its

possess-

itself.

Indeed, a whole range of functions concern only the individual; these are the ones indispensable for physical life. Since they are made

purpose

for this

attainment.

In

man

only, they are perfected

everything concerning

by

its

them,

without These functions serve by merely serving him. In so far as he has no other needs, he is therefore self-sufficient and can live happily with no other objective than living. This is not the case, however, with the civilized adult. He has many therefore,

thought

ideas,

of

can

act

reasonably

transcendental

feelings

and

purposes.

practices

unrelated

to

80

THE CLASSIC TRADITION

PART1:

organic needs. The roles of

art,

morality,

reli-

gion, political faith, science itself are not to

bound by

Instinctively

repair organic exhaustion nor to provide

sound

society.

functioning

supra-

ascribe

physical

of

the

life is built

organs.

All

this

and expanded not because

demands of the cosmic environment but because of the demands of the social environof the

ment. The influence of society is what has aroused in us the sentiments of sympathy and solidarity drawing us toward others; it is society which, fashioning us in its image, fills us with religious, political and moral beliefs that control our actions. To play our social role we have striven to extend our intelligence and it is still society that has supplied us with tools for this development by transmitting to us its trust fund of knowledge. Through the very fact that these superior forms of human activity have a collective origin, they have a collective purpose. As they derive from society they have reference to it; rather they are society

itself

to

have

a raison d'etre in

our eyes, the purpose

all

ties

of domestic or political

and unreflectively they and do, the one to his God, the living symbol of the

that they are

Church or

his

Church, the other to his family, the third to his country or party. Even in their sufferings they see only a means of glorifying the group to which they belong and thus do homage to it.

and seeks more fully to his contempt for the flesh and more fully resemble his divine model. But the more the believer doubts, that So, the Christian ultimately desires

suffering to testify

is,

the less he feels himself a real participant in

which he belongs, and more the family and community become foreign to the individual, so much the more does he become a mystery to himself, unable to escape the exasperating and agonizing question: to what purthe religious faith to

from which he

is

freeing himself; the

pose?

incarnated and

individualized in each one of us. But for them

man

for the believer firm in his faith or the

strongly

If,

man

in other is

words, as has often been said, is because social man

double, that

superimposes

man

himself

upon

man.

physical

they envisage must be one not indifferent to us.

Social

We can cling to these forms of human activity only to the degree that we cling to society

which he expresses and serves. If this dissolves, if we no longer feel it in existence and action about and above us, whatever is social

itself.

we

same measure

Contrariwise, in the

as

detached from society we become detached from that life whose source and aim is society. For what purpose do these rules of morahty, these precepts of law binding us to all feel

sorts

of sacrifices,

exist, if there is

serve and in

these

restrictive

no being outside us

whom we

participate?

dogmas

whom What

they

is

the

necessarily presupposes a society

deprived of all objective foundation. is an artificial combination of illusory images, a phantasmagoria vanishing at the least reflection; that is, nothing which can be a goal for our action. Yet this social man is the essence of civilized man; he is the masterin us

is

All that remains

piece of existence.

Thus we are

bereft of rea-

purpose of science itself? If its only use is to increase our chances for survival, it does not

sons for existence; for the only life to which we could cling no longer corresponds to anything

deserve the trouble

actual; the only existence

it

entails. Instinct acquits

itself

better of this role; animals prove this.

Why

substitute

for

uncertain reflection? ing,

above

all? If

be estimated by

it

a

What

more is

hesitant

and

the end of suffer-

the value of things can onlv their relation to this positive

it is without reward and incomprehensible. This problem does not exist

evil for the individual,

still

based upon

reali-

no longer meets our needs. Because we have been initiated into a higher existence, the one which satisfies an animal or a child can satisfy us no more and the other itself fades and leaves us helpless. So there is nothing more for our efforts to lay hold of, and we feel them lose ty

themselves

in

emptiness. In this sense

it

is

true

CHAPTER

3:

to say that our activity needs an object transcending it. We do not need it to maintain ourselves in the illusion of an impossible immortality; it is implicit in our moral constitution and cannot be even partially lost without this

losing

proof

its is

same degree. No

raison d'etre in the

needed

such a state of confucause of discouragement may

sion the least

that in

easily give birth to desperate resolutions. is

If life

not worth the trouble of being lived, every-

thing becomes a pretext to rid ourselves of

But this

not

is

This detachment occurs

all.

not only in single individuals. stitutive

it.

One

of the con-

elements of every national tempera-

consists of a certain way of estimating the value of existence. There is a collective as well as an individual humor inclining peoples to sadness or cheerfulness, making them see

ment

things in bright or sombre lights. In

value of

human

life;

incompetent. The himself and his

experience

is

own

his

own

life to

is

horizon; thus his

He may

indeed consider

be aimless; he can say nothing

On the contrary, without may generalize its own feel-

applicable to others. sophistry, society

ings as to

itself,

its

state of health or lack of

health. For individuals share too life

of society for

it

suffering infection. sarily suffer.

deeply in the to be diseased without their

What

Because

communicated

it is

it

suffers they neces-

the whole,

to its parts.

Hence

it

its ills

are

cannot dis-

integrate without awareness that the regular

conditions of general existence are equally disturbed. Because society

is

the

end on which our

depend, it cannot feel us escaping without a simultaneous realization that our

better selves it

activity is purposeless. Since

we

ual sadness,

has purpose. Then new moralities originate which, by elevating facts to ethics, commend suicide or at least tend in that direction by suggesting a minimal existence.

On

their

appearance

they seem to have been created out of whole

by their makers who are sometimes blamed for the pessimism of their doctrines. In cloth

an effect rather than a cause; they merely symbolize in abstract language and sysreality they are

have, by virtue of their origin, an authority which they impose upon the individual and they drive him more vigorously on the way to which he is already inclined by the state of moral distress directly aroused in him by the disintegration of society. Thus, at the very

moment

that,

with excessive zeal, he frees himself from the social environment, he still submits to its

However

influence.

individualized a

man may

always something collective remaining the very depression and melancholy resulting from this same exaggerated individualism. He effects communion through sadness when he no longer has anything else with which be, there is

—

to achieve

Hence

it.

this

type of suicide well deserves the

name we have given

it.

contributing factor in cause. In this case the life

work, society cannot be conscious of its own decadence without the feeling that henceforth this work is of no value. Thence are formed currents of depression and disillusionment emanating from no particular individual but

ety

its

when chronic, in its way reflects the

poor organic state of the individual. Then metaphysical and religious systems spring up which, by reducing these obscure sentiments to formulae, attempt to prove to men the senselessness of life and that it is self-deception to believe that it

handi-

are

bonds, a sort of col-

lective asthenia, or social malaise, just as individ-

tematic form the physiological distress of the

too limited to serve as a basis for

a general appraisal.

reflect the relaxation of social

body social. As these currents are collective, they

knows nothing but

little

expressing society's state of disintegration. They

only

for this the individual

latter

81

on the

fact,

society can pass a collective opinion

EMILE DURKHEIM: ANOMIE AND SOCIAL INTEGRATION

Egoism it;

it

is

is

not merely a generating

its

bond attaching man to him to soci-

relaxes because that attaching

is itself slack. The incidents of private life which seem the direct inspiration of suicide and are considered its determining causes are in reality only incidental causes. The individual

yields to the slightest shock of circumstance

82

PARTI:

THE CLASSIC TRADITION

because the state of society has made him a ready prey to suicide. Several facts confirm this explanation. Suicide is known to be rare among children and to diminish among the aged at the last confines of life; physical man, in both, tends to become the

whole

man. Society is still lacking in the forhas not had the time to form him in its image; it begins to retreats from the latter or, what amounts to the same thing, he retreats from it. Thus both are more self-sufficient. Feeling a lesser need for self-completion through something not themselves, they are also less exposed to feel the lack of what is necessary for living. The immunity of an animal has the of

mer, for

same

it

causes.

We

and some animals

woman's

life is

to care for, the old

full.

If

unmarried

she remains faithfully

attached to religious traditions and thus finds

ready protection against suicide, it is because these very simple social forms satisfy all her needs. Man, on the contrary, is hard beset in this respect. As his thought and activity develop, they increasingly overflow these antiquated forms. But then he needs others. Because he is a more complex social being, he can maintain his equilibrium only by finding more points of support outside himself, and it is because his moral balance depends on a larger

number

of conditions that

is

it

more

easily disturbed.

shall likewise see in the next

chapter that, though lower societies practice a

form of suicide of discussed

just

is

Since their social

their

own, the one we have

almost life is

unknown

to

them.

very simple, the social

thus they need find

unless his needs are sufficiently proportioned

They readwhich they

means. In other words, if his needs more than can be granted, or even merely something of a different sort, they will be under continual friction and can onlv func-

for satisfaction.

little

external

objectives

to

become attached. If he can carry with him his gods and his family, primitive man, everywhere that he goes, has all that his social nature demands. This

is

isolation

also

more

why woman easily than

can endure

man.

When

a

life in

widow

seen to endure her condition much better than a widower and desires marriage less pasis

sionately,

one

is

led to consider this ease in dis-

pensing with the family a mark of superiority; it is said that woman's affective faculties, being very intense, are easily employed outside the domestic circle, while her devotion is indispensable to man to help him endure life. Actually, if this is her privilege it is because her sensibility is rudimentary rather than highly developed. As she lives outside of community existence more than man, she is less penetrated by it; society is less necessary to her because she is less impregnated with sociability. She has few needs in this direction and satisfies

them

easily.

be happy or even exist

and

inclinations of individuals are simple also

ily

ANOMIC SUICIDE No living being can

With a few devotional practices

to

his

require

tion painfully.

Movements incapable

of pro-

duction without pain tend not to be reproduced. Unsatisfied tendencies atrophy, and as the impulse to live rest,

it is

bound

to

is

merely the result of

weaken

all

the

as the others relax.

In the animal, at least in a nornial condition, this

equilibrium

is

established with automatic

spontaneity because the animal depends on

purely material conditions. All the organism

needs is that the supplies of substance and energy constantly employed in the vital process should be periodicallv renewed by equivalent quantities; that replacement be equivalent to use. When the void created by existence in

own

its

resources

is filled,

satisfied,

asks nothing further.

reflection

is

the animal,

Its

ine other ends than those implicit in cal

nature.

demanded

power

of

not sufflciently developed to imag-

On

its

the other hand, as the

of each organ itself

phvsi-

work

depends on the

CHAPTER

3:

general state of vital energy and the needs of

organic equilibrium, use

is

regulated in turn by

is automatic. The one are those of the other; both are fundamental to the constitution of the existence in question, which cannot exceed them. This is not the case with man, because most of his needs are not dependent on his body or

83

EMILE DURKHEIM: ANOMIE AND SOCIAL INTEGRATION

Unlimited

itself.

and

definition

desires

are

insatiability

insatiable

by

rightly consid-

is

replacement and the balance

ered a sign of morbidity. Being unlimited, they

limits of

constantly and infinitely surpass the

not to the

same degree.

may consider that

Strictly

speaking,

we

the quantity of material sup-

maintenance of a human life is subject to computation, though this be less exact than in the preceding case and a wider margin left for the free combinations of plies necessary to the physical

the will; for

beyond the indispensable mini-

mum

which satisfies nature when instinctive, a more awakened reflection suggests better condiseemingly desirable ends craving fulfillment. Such appetites, however, admittedly sooner or later reach a limit which they cannot pass. But how determine the quantity of wellbeing, comfort or luxury legitimately to be craved by a human being? Nothing appears in man's organic nor in his psychological constitution which sets a limit to such tendencies. The functioning of individual life does not require them to cease at one point rather than at another; the proof being that they have constantly increased since the beginnings of history, receiving more and more complete satisfaction, yet with no weakening of average health. Above all, how establish their proper variation with differtions,

ent

conditions

of

life,

importance of services,

occupations, etc.? In

relative

no society are

they equally satisfied in the different stages of the social hierarchy. Yet stantially the

human

same among

tial qualities. It is

not

all

human

nature

men,

is

sub-

in its essen-

nature which can

assign the variable limits necessary to our needs.

They are thus unlimited so far as they depend on the individual alone. Irrespective of any external regulatory force, our capacity for feeling

is

in

it-

and bottomless abyss. nothing external can restrain this capacity, it can only be a source of torment to self an insatiable

But

if

their

means at command; they cannot be quenched.

Inextinguishable thirst torture.

human

It

been

has

is

constantly renewed

claimed,

indeed,

activity naturally aspires

signable

and

limits

sets

itself

that

beyond

as-

unattainable

goals. But how can such an undetermined state be any more reconciled with the conditions of mental life than with the demands of physical life? All man's pleasure in acting, moving and

exerting

himself implies

sense that his

the

and that by walking he has advanced. However, one does not advance when one walks toward no goal, or which is the same thing when his goal is infinity. Since the distance between us and it is always the same, whatever road we take, we might as well have made the motions without progress from the spot. Even our glances behind and our feelefforts are not in vain

—

—

ing of pride at the distance covered can cause only deceptive satisfaction, since the remaining

distance

is

not proportionately reduced. To

pursue a goal which able

is to

condemn

Of

ual unhappiness.

contrary to sures even

all

is

by

course,

reason, and

when

definition unattain-

oneself to a state of perpet-

man may hope

hope has

unreasonable.

It

its

may

plea-

sustain

him for a time; but it cannot survive the repeated disappointments of experience indefinitely. What more can the future offer him than the past, since he can never reach a tenable condition nor even approach the glimpsed ideal? Thus, the more one has, the more one wants, since satisfactions received only stimulate instead of filling needs. Shall action as such be considered agreeable? First, only on condition of blindness to

its

uselessness. Secondly, for

and to temper and half accompanying painful unrest, such unending motion must at least always be easy and unhampered. If it is interfered with only restlessness is left, with the lack of ease which this pleasure to veil

the

be

felt

84

THE CLASSIC TRADITION

PARTI:

it, itself, entails. But it would be a miracle if no insurmountable obstacle were never encoun-

tered.

Our

thread of

life

pretty thin, breakable at

on these conditions any instant.

is

must play the same

according to

role for

wise the the

existence; only conscience, therefore, can

means to re-establish it. Phvsical would be ineffective; hearts cannot be

furnish the

touched by physio-chemical

forces.

So

far as

the appetites are not automatically restrained

by physiological mechanisms, they can be halted only by a Hmit that they recognize as just. Men would never consent to restrict their desires

if

assigned

they

limit.

justified

felt

in

passing the

But, for reasons gi\'en above,

they cannot assign themselves this law of jus-

So they must receive

it from an authority which they yield spontaneously. Either directly and as a whole, or through the agency of one of its organs, society alone can play this moderating role; for it is the only moral power superior to the individual, the authority of which he accepts. It alone has the power necessary to stipulate law and to set the point beyond which the passions must not go. Finally, it alone can estimate the reward to

tice.

which they

respect, to

be prospectively offered

human

mon

functionary, in the

to

every

name

class

of the

of

com-

a matter of fact, at every

tory there

is

a

dim

moment

of his-

perception, in the moral

consciousness of societies, of the respective value of different social services, the relative

reward due to each, and the consequent degree of comfort appropriate on the average to workers in each occupation.

The

to

each,

man

of wealth is reproved if he lives poor man, but also if he seeks the refinements of luxury overmuch. Economists may protest in vain; public feeling will always be scandalized if an individual spends too much wealth for wholly superfluous use, and it even seems that this se\'erity relaxes onlv in times of moral disturbance. A genuine regimen exists, therefore, although not always legally formulated, which fixes with relative precision the maximum degree of ease of living to which each social class may legitimatelv aspire. However, there is nothing immutable about such a scale. It changes with the increase or decrease of collective revenue and the changes occurring in the moral ideas of societ^^ Thus what appears luxury to one period no longer does so to another; and the well-being which for long periods was granted to a class only bv exception and supererogation, finallv appears strictly life

of a

necessary and equitable.

Under this pressure, each in his sphere vaguely realizes the extreme limit set to his ambitions and aspires to nothing beyond. At least if he respects regulations and is docile to collective authority, that

interest.

As

assigned

place in the hierarchy. Accord-

of living is considered the upper limit to which a workman may aspire in his efforts to improve his existence, and there is another limit below which he is not willinglv permitted to fall unless he has seriously demeaned himself. Both differ for city and countrv workers, for the domestic ser^'ant and the day-laborer, for the business clerk and the official, etc. Like-

the state of equilibrium of the animal's dor-

restraint

its

public opinion and a certain

well-being

way

moral needs which the organism plays for physical needs. This means that the force can only be moral. The awakening of conscience interrupted

mant

in

of

coefficient

ing to accepted ideas, for example, a certain

To achieve any other result, the passions first must be limited. Only then can they be harmonized with the faculties and satisfied. But since the individual has no way of limiting them, this must be done by some force exterior to him. A regulative force

are graded

different functions

is,

has a wholesome

moral constitution, he feels that it is not well to ask more. Thus, an end and goal are set to the passions. Trulv, there is nothing rigid nor absolute about such determination. The economic ideal assigned each class of citizens is itself confined to certain limits, within which the desires

have

free range.

But

it

is

not infinite. This

CHAPTER

limitation

relative

and

moderation

the

make men contented with

involves,

3:

it

their lot

while stimulating them moderately to improve

and

average contentment causes the feeling of calm, active happiness, the pleasure it;

this

and

existing

in

which characterizes

living

health for societies as well as for individuals.

Each person

is

then at

least,

generally speak-

harmony with his condition, and desires only what he may legitimately hope for as the ing, in

normal reward of not

his activity. Besides, this

condemn man

may

does

to a sort of immobility.

seek to give beauty to his

life;

He

but his without

attempts in this direction may fail causing him to despair. For, loving what he has

and not

fixing his desire solely

lacks, his

wishes and hopes

has happened to aspire

wholly

He

destitute.

may

to,

without his being

has the essentials. The

equilibrium of his happiness it is

defined,

and

a

on what he of what he

fail

is

secure because

few mishaps cannot discon-

cert him.

But

it

would be

of

little

use for everyone to

recognize the justice of the hierarchy of functions established

by public opinion,

if

he did

not also consider the distribution of these functions just.

The workman

is

not in

harmony

with his social position if he is not convinced that he has his deserts. If he feels justified in occupying another, what he has would not satisfy him. So it is not enough for the average level of needs for each social condition to be regulated by public opinion, but another,

more

must fix the way in which these conditions are open to individuals. There is no society in which such regulation does not exist. It varies with times and places. Once it regardprecise rule,

ed birth as the almost exclusive principle of social classification; today it recognizes no other inherent inequality than hereditary fortune and merit. But in all these various forms its object is unchanged. It is also only possible, everywhere, as a restriction upon individuals imposed by superior authority, that is, by collective authority. For it can be established only

85

EMILE DURKHEIM: ANOMIE AND SOCIAL INTEGRATION

by requiring of one or another group of men, usually of all, sacrifices and concessions in the

name of

the public interest.

Some, to be sure, have thought that this moral pressure would become unnecessary if men's economic circumstances were only no longer determined by heredity. If inheritance were abolished, the argument runs, if everyone began life with equal resources and if the competitive struggle were fought out on a basis of perfect equality, no one could think its results unjust. Each would instinctively feel that things are as they should be. Truly, the nearer this ideal equality

were

approached, the less social restraint will be necessary. But it is only a matter of degree. One sort of heredity will always exist, that of natural talent. Intelligence, taste, scientific, artistic,

lit-

courage and manual dexterity are gifts received by each of us at birth, as the heir to wealth receives his capital or as the nobleman formerly received his title and function. A moral discipline will therefore still be required to make those less favored by nature accept the lesser advantages which they owe to the chance of birth. Shall it be demanded that all have an ec]ual share and that no advantage be given those more useful and deserving? But then there would have to be a discierary or industrial

pline

far

ability,

stronger

make

to

these

accept

a

treatment merely equal to that of the mediocre

and incapable. But like the one

mentioned, this disciconsidered just by the peoples subject to it. When it is maintained only by custom and force, peace and harmony are ilfirst

pline can be useful only

if

lusory; the spirit of unrest

and discontent are

la-

ready and Greece

tent; appetites superficially restrained are

to revolt.

when

This happened in

Rome

the faiths underlying the old organization

of the patricians

and plebeians were shaken, and

our modern societies when aristocratic prejudices began to lose their old ascendancy. But this state of upheaval is exceptional; it occurs only when society is passing through some abnorin

86

THE CLASSIC TRADITION

PARTI:

mal

crisis.

normal conditions the

In

collective

regarded as just by the great majority of persons. Therefore, when we say that an authority is necessary to impose this order on order

is

we

do not mean that violence is the only means of establishing it. Since this regulation is meant to restrain individual passions, it must come from a power which dominates individuals; but this power must also be obeyed through respect, not individuals,

certainly

fear. It is

not true, then, that

released from

human activity can be Nothing

all restraint.

in the

world

can enjov such a privilege. All existence being a part of the universe its

is

relative to the remainder;

nature and method of manifestation accord-

depend not only on

itself but on other consequently restrain and regulate it. Here there are only differences of degree and form between the mineral realm and the think-

ingly

beings,

who

ing person. Man's characteristic privilege that the

bond he accepts

He

is

is

not physical but

governed not by a material environment brutally imposed on him, but by a conscience superior to his own, the superiority of which he feels. Because the moral; that

is,

social.

is

practice the increased self-repression to

they

unaccustomed.

are

So

they

which not

are

adjusted to the condition forced on them, and its

very prospect

is

intolerable;

hence the suffer-

ing which detaches them from a reduced existence even before they have It is

the

same

if

made

trial

of

it.

the source of the crisis

is

an

abrupt growth of power and wealth. Then, truly, as the conditions of life are changed, the standard according to which needs were regulated can no longer remain the same; for it varies with social resources, since it largely determines the share of each class of producers. The scale is upset; but a new scale cannot be immediately improvised. Time is required for the public conscience to reclassify men and things. So long as the social forces thus freed have not regained

equilibrium,

their

unknown and

so

all

values

respective

regulation

is

are

lacking for a

The limits are unknown between the posand the impossible, what is just and what is unjust, legitimate claims and hopes and those which are immoderate. Consequently, there is no restraint upon aspirations. If the disturbance is profound, it affects even the princitime.

sible

ples controlling the distribution of

men among

greater, better part of his existence transcends

various occupations. Since the relations between

the body, he escapes the body's yoke, but

various

is

when

is disturbed by some by beneficent but abrupt transitions, it is momentarily incapable of exercising this influence; thence come the sudden rises in the curve of suicides which we have

But

society

painful crisis or

pointed out above. In the case of economic disasters, indeed, something like a declassification occurs which suddenly casts certain individuals into a lower state than their previous t)nc. Then they must reduce their requirements, restrain their needs, learn greater self-control. All the advantages of social influence are k>st

si)

far as

they are con-

cerned; their moral education has to be recom-

mended. But

them instanand teach them to

societv cannot adjust

taneously to this

new

parts

of

society

are

necessarily

modified, the ideas expressing these relations

subject to that of society.

life

must change. Some particular class especially favored by the crisis is no longer resigned to its former lot, and, on the other hand, the example of its greater good fortune arouses all sorts of jealousy below and about it. Appetites, not being controlled by a public opinion become disoriented, no longer recognize the limits proper to them. Besides, they are at the same time seized by a sort of natural erethism simply by the greater intensity of public life. With increased prosperity desires increase. At the very

moment when

traditional rules ha\'e lost

their authority, the richer prize offered these

stimulates them and makes them more exigent and impatient of control. The state of de-regulation or anomie is thus further

appetites

CHAPTER

3

heightened by passions being less disciphned, precisely when they need more disciplining. But then their very demands

ment

impossible.

make

Overweening

fuU'ill-

ambition

always exceeds the results obtained, great as they may be, since there is no warning to pause here. Nothing gives satisfaction and all this agitation is uninterruptedly maintained without appeasement. Above all, since this race for an unattainable goal can give no other pleasure but that of the race itself, if it is one, once it is interrupted the participants are left emptyhanded. At the same time the struggle grows more violent and painful, both from being less controlled and because competition is greater. All classes contend among themselves because no established classification any longer exists. Effort grows, just when it becomes less productive. How could the desire to live not be weakened under such conditions? This explanation is confirmed by the remarkable immunity of poor countries. Poverty protects against suicide because it is a restraint in itself. No matter how one acts, desires have to

depend upon resources

to

some

extent; actual

EMILE DURKHEIM: ANOMIE AND SOCIAL INTEGRATION

87

the very source of immorality. This, of course,

is

no reason why humanity should not improve its material condition. But though the moral danger involved in every growth of prosperity is

not irremediable,

it

should not be forgotten.

anomy never appeared

If

except, as in the

above instances, in intermittent spurts and acute crisis, it might cause the social suiciderate to vary from time to time, but it would not be a regular, constant factor. In one sphere of the sphere of trade and social life, however industry

—

—

it is

actually in a chronic state.

For a whole century, economic progress has mainly consisted in freeing industrial relations from all regulation. Until very recently, it was the function of a whole system of moral forces to exert this discipline. First, the influence of

was

by workers and masters, It consoled the former and taught them contentment with their lot by informing them of the providential nature of religion

felt

alike

the poor and the rich.

the social order, that the share of each class

was assigned by God himself, and by holding out the hope for just compensation in a world to come in return for the inequalities of this governed the

recalling

that

possessions are partly the criterion of those

world.

So the less one has the less he is tempted to extend the range of his needs indefinitely. Lack of power, compelling moderation, accustoms men to it, while nothing excites envy if no one has superfluity. Wealth, on the other hand, by the power it bestows, deceives us into believing that we depend on ourselves only. Reducing the resistance we encounter from objects, it suggests the possibility

that worldly interests are not man's and higher they must be subordinate to other interests, and that they should therefore not be pursued without rule or measure. Temporal power, in turn, restrained the scope of economic functions by its supremacy over them and by the relatively subordinate role it assigned them. Finally, within the business world proper, the occupational groups by regulating salaries, the price of products and production itself, indirectly fixed the average level of income on which needs are partially based by the very force of circumstances. However, we do not mean to propose this organization as a model. Clearly it would be inadequate to existing societies without great changes. What

aspired

to.

The

of unlimited success against them.

limited one feels, the tation appears.

more

intolerable

Not without reason,

less

all limi-

therefore,

have so many religions dwelt on the advantages and moral value of poverty. It is actually the best school for teaching self-restraint. Forc-

ing us to constant self-discipline,

it

prepares us

It

latter,

entire

to accept collective discipline with equanimity,

we

while wealth, exalting the individual, may always arouse the spirit of rebellion which is

influence,

lot,

stress is its existence, the fact of its useful

take

its

and

place.

that nothing today has

come

to

88

THE CLASSIC TRADITION

PARTI:

Actually, religion has lost

And government,

most of

its

nomic life, has become its tool and servant. The most opposite schools, orthodox economists and extreme socialists, unite to reduce government to the role of a more or less passive intermediary among the various social functions. The former wish to make it simply the guardian of individual contracts; the latter leave it the task of doing the collective bookkeeping, that

of recording the

is,

demands

of

consumers, transmitting them to producers, inventorying the total revenue and distributing it according to a fixed formula. But both refuse it any power to subordinate other social organs to itself and to make them converge toward one dominant aim. On both sides nations are declared to have the single or chief purpose of achieving industrial prosperity; such is the

dogma

economic materialopposed sysas these theories merely express the

implication of the

of

ism, the basis of both apparently

tems.

And

being still regarded as a means to an end transcending itself, has become the supreme end of individustate of opinion, industry, instead of

als

and

Thereupon the appetites become freed of any limiting

societies alike.

thus excited have authority.

By

sanctifying them, so to speak, this

them seems like a sort of sacrilege. For this reason, even this purely utilitarian regulation of them exercised by the industrial world itself through the medium of occupational groups has been unable to apotheosis

above

all

of

well-being

human

has

placed

law. Their restraint

persist. Ultimately, this liberation of desires

has

been made worse by the very development of industry and the almost infinite extension of the market. So long as the producer could gain his profits only in his immediate neighborhood, the restricted amount of possible gain could not much overexcite ambition. Now that he may assume to have almost the entire wt)rld

how

could passions accept their former confinement in the face of such limitless prospects?

as his customer,

Such

power.

instead of regulating eco-

is

predomand which has

the source of the excitement

inating in this part of society,

thence extended to the other parts. There, the state of crisis

and anomy

is

From top

to

speak, normal.

constant and, so to

bottom of the

lad-

aroused without knowing where to find ultimate foothold. Nothing can calm it, since its goal is far beyond all it can attain. Reality seems valueless by comparison with der,

greed

the

dreams

is

of fevered imaginations; reality

therefore abandoned, but so too

abandoned when

in turn

it

thirst arises for novelties,

is

is

possibility

becomes

reality.

A

unfamiliar pleasures,

nameless sensations, all of which lose their savor once known. Henceforth one has no strength to endure the least reverse. The whole fever subsides and the sterility of all the tumult is

apparent, and

it

is

seen that

all

these

new

cannot form a solid foundation of happiness to support one during days of trial. The wise man, knowing how to enjoy achieved results without having constantly to replace them with others, finds in them an attachment to life in the hour of difficulty. But the man who has always pinned all his hopes on the future and lived with his eyes fixed upon it, has nothing in the past as a comfort against the present's afflictions, for the past was nothing to him but a series of hastily experienced stages. What blinded him to himself was his expectation always to find further on the happiness he had so far missed. Now he is stopped in his tracks; from now on nothing remains behind or ahead of him to fix his gaze upon. Weariness alone, moreover, is enough to bring disillusionment, for he cannot in the end escape the futility of an endless pursuit. We may even wonder if this moral state is sensations

in

their

not principally what

phes of our dav so eties

where

man

is

quantity

makes economic

catastro-

fertile in suicides. In soci-

subjected to a healthv dis-

he submits more readilv

to the blows of The neccssarv effort for sustaining a litmore discomfort costs him relati\el\' little,

cipline,

ciiance. tle

a

infinite

CHAPTER

since he

But

used

is

when every

to

3:

discomfort and constraint.

constraint

is

hateful in

itself,

how can closer constraint not seem intolerable? There is no tendency to resignation in the feverish impatience of men's lives. When there is no other aim but to outstrip constantly the point arrived at, how painful to be thrown back! Now this very lack of organization characterizing our economic condition throws the door wide to every sort of adventure. Since imagination is hungry for novelty, and ungoverned, it gropes at random. Setbacks necessarily increase with risks and thus crises multiply, just when they are becoming

more

destn.ictive.

Yet these dispositions are so inbred that soci-

ety has

grown to accept them and is accustomed them normal. It is everlastingly repeat-

to think

man's nature

be eternally dissatisfied, constantly to advance, without relief or rest, toward an indefinite goal. The longing

ed that

it

is

for infinity

to

daily represented as a

is

mark

of

moral distinction, whereas it can only appear within unregulated consciences which elevate to a rule the lack of rule from which they suffer. The doctrine of the most ruthless and swift progress has become an article of faith. But other theories appear parallel with those praising the advantages of instability, which, generalizing the situation that gives

claim that

evil,

sure and that

it is it

them

Industrial

it

men is

only by false

greatest in the eco-

has most victims there.

and

commercial

functions

are

among the occupations which furnish greatest number of suicides. Almost on a

89

were distinguished from workmen, for the former are probably most stricken by the state of anomy. The enormous rate of those with independent means sufficiently shows that the possessors of most comfort suffer most. Everything that enforces subordination attenuates the effects of this state. the lower classes

is

At

least the

limited

horizon of

by those above

them, and for this same reason their desires are more modest. Those who have only empty space above them are almost inevitably lost in it, if no force restrains them. Anomy, therefore, is a regular and specific factor in suicide in our modern societies; one of the springs from which the annual contingent

So

feeds.

we have

new

here a

type to distin-

from them in which individuals are attached to society, but on how it regulates them. Egoistic suicide results from man's no longer finding a basis for existence in life; altruistic suicide, because this basis for existence appears to man situated beyond life guish from the others. its

It

differs

dependence, not on the

way

in

The third sort of suicide, the existence of which has just been shown, results from man's activity's lacking regulation and his consequent sufferings. By virtue of its origin we itself.

name

of anomic

egoistic suicide

have kin-

shall assign this last variety the suicide.

richer in grief than in plea-

attracts

claims. Since this disorder

nomic world,

birth, declare life

EMILE DURKHEIM: ANOMIE AND SOCIAL INTEGRATION

Certainly, this

and

Both spring from society's insufficient presence in individuals. But the sphere of its absence is not the same in both cases. In dred

ties.

egoistic suicide

it is

deficient in truly collective

thus depriving the latter of object and

really

activity,

the

meaning. In anomic suicide, society's influence

with the liberal professions, they sometimes surpass them; they are especially more afflicted than agriculture, where the old regulative forces still make their appearance felt most and where the fever of business has least penetrated. Here is best recalled what was once the

is

general constitution of the economic order.

an anomic

And the divergence would be yet greater if, among the suicides of industry, employers

vice versa. These

level

lacking in the basically individual passions, thus leaving them without a check-rein. In spite of their relationship, therefore, the two

types are independent of each other. We may offer society everything social in us, and still be

unable

to control

state

do not draw

our desires; one may live in without being egoistic, and

two

sorts of suicide therefore

their chief recruits

from the same

90

PART1:

THE CLASSIC TRADITION

one has

social environments;

among

its

careers,

intellectual

principal field

the

world

of

—

thought the other, the industrial or commerworld.

cial

But it has been less frequently noticed that religion has not confined itself to enriching the

human certain

intellect,

number

forming the

formed beforehand, with a

of ideas;

has contributed to

it

Men owe

to it not only a good part of the substance of their knowledge, but also the form in which this

Emile Durkheim: The Elementary

Forms

of Religious Life

The study which we are undertaking fore a

way

conditions, the old

gion. To be sure,

up

is

there-

new problem of the origin of reliif by origin we are to under-

of taking

again, but under

intellect itself.

knowledge has been elaborated. At the roots of all our judgments there are a certain number of essential ideas which dominate all our intellectual life; they are what philosophers since Aristotle have called the categories of the understanding: ideas of time, space, class, number, cause, substance, person-

They correspond to the most univerThey are like the solid frame which encloses all thought; this does not seem to be able to liberate itself from them without destroying itself, for it seems that we cannot think of objects that are not in time and space, which have no number, etc. Other ideas are contingent and unsteady; we can conceive of their being unknown to a man, a societv or ality, etc.

stand the very

nothing

first

scientific

beginning, the question has

about

olutely discarded. There

it,

and should be

res-

was no given moment

when

religion began to exist, and there is consequently no need of finding a means of transporting ourselves thither in thought. Like everv human institution, religion did not com-

mence anywhere.

Therefore,

all

speculations of

this sort are justly discredited;

they can only

and arbitrary constructions which are subject to no sort of control. But the problem which we raise is quite another one. What we want to do is to find a consist in subjective

means of discerning the ever-present causes upon which the most essential forms of religious thought and practice depend. it has been known that the systems of representations with which men have pictured to themselves the world and themselves were of religious origin. There

For a long time

first

no religion that is not a cosmology at the same time that it is a speculation upon divine things. If philosophy and the sciences were born of religion, it is because religii>n began by taking the place of the sciences and philosophy. is

sal properties of things.

an epoch; but these others appear to be nearly inseparable from the normal working of the intellect.

They are

intelligence.

like the

Now when

framework

primitive

of the

religious

beliefs are systematically analysed, the princi-

pal categories are naturally found.

Thev are

born in religion and of religion; they are a product of religious thought. This is a statement that we are going to have occasion to make many times in the course of this work. This remark has some interest of itself already; but here is what gives it its real importance.

The general conclusion of the book which him is that religion is

the reader has before

something eminently

social.

Religious repre-

sentations are collective representations which

express collecti\e

realities; the rites are a

man-

ner of acting which take rise in the midst of the

Source

Reprinted frcim Fmilo Durkheim,

lan/ Fornii of Rt-ligioiis Life.

The Free

Press.

Tlic Elcincn-

assembled groups and which are destined to excite, maintain or recreate certain mental states in these groups. So if the categories are of

CHAPTER

religious origin, they this

nature

common

ought

3:

to participate in

to all religious facts; they

too should be social affairs and the product of

—

At least for in the actual condition of our knowledge of these matters, one should be careful to avoid all radical and collective thought.

exclusive statements

—

it

allowable to sup-

is

pose that they are rich in social elements. All

known

religious beliefs,

or complex, present one

all

the

and ideal, of which men think, into two classes or opposed groups, generally designated by two distinct terms which are translated well enough by the words profane and sathings, real

cred (profane, sacred. This division of the

into

two domains, the one containing

sacred, the other

all

that

is

profane,

all

is

sorts

of

things,

them

world that

is

the dis-

tinctive trait of religious thought; the beliefs,

myths, dogmas and legends are either representations or systems of representations

sion of the others. But

forms of the contrast is

which

fane things.

human thought

there

two categories

of

things so profoundly differentiated or so radically

opposed

to

one another. The

opposition of good and bad

is

traditional

nothing beside

good and the bad are only two opposed species of the same class, namely morals, just as sickness and health are two different aspects of the same order of facts, life, while the sacred and the profane have always and everywhere been conceived by the human mind as two distinct classes, as two worlds between which there is nothing in common. The forces which play in one are not simply those which are met with in the other, but a litthis; for

tle

the

stronger; they are of a different sort. In dif-

ferent religions, this opposition has

ceived in different ways.

have been

vary, the fact of the

universal.

of these two classes manioutwardly with a visible sign by which we can easily recognize this very special classification, wherever it exists. Since the idea of the sacred is always and everywhere separated from the idea of the profane in the thought of men, and since we picture a sort of logical chasm between the two, the mind irresistibly refuses to allow the two corresponding things to be confounded, or even to be merely put in contact with each other; for such a promiscuity, or even too ciirect a contiguity,

The opposition

fests

itself

would

contradict too violently the dissociation

The sacred thing is which the profane should not touch, and cannot touch with impunity. To be sure, this interdiction cannot go so far as to make all communication between the two worlds impossible; for if the profane could in no way enter into relations with the sacred, this latter could be good for nothing. But, in addi-

par excellence that

of

first

howsoever much the

may

and powers which are attributed to them, or their relations with each other and with pro-

no other example

seemed

put into an ideal and transcendental world, while the material world is left in full posses-

of these ideas in the mind.

In all the history of

has

in different parts of

the physical universe; there, the

express the nature of sacred things, the virtues

exists

it

91

if**************

characteris-

they presuppose a classification of

tic:

two

these

sufficient to localize

contrast

whether simple

common

EMILE DURKHEIM: ANOMIE AND SOCIAL INTEGRATION

been con-

Here, to separate

tion to the fact that this establishment of rela-

tions

is

always a delicate operation in itself, great precautions and a more or

demanding less

complicated initiation, it is quite impossiprofane is to lose its specific char-

ble, unless the

acteristics

and become sacred

after a fashion

degree itself. The two classes cannot even approach each other and keep their own nature at the same time.

and

to a certain

Thus we arrive at the first criterium of religious beliefs. Undoubtedly there are secondary species within these

two fundamental

classes

which, in their turn, are more or less incompatible with each other. But the real characteristic of religious phenomena is that they always

92

PARTV THE CLASSIC TRADITION

suppose

which embrace cally

whole unitwo classes but which radi-

a bipartite division of the

known and knowable,

verse,

all

into

that exists,

exclude each other. Sacred things are

those which the interdictions protect and isolate;

profane things, those to which these inter-

dictions are applied a distance

and which must remain

at

from the first. Religious beliefs are which express the nature of

the representations

sacred things and the relations which they sus-

with each other or with profane conduct which prescribe how a man should comport himself in the presence of these sacred objects.

group, the family or the corporation. Moreover,

even these particular religions are ordinarily only special forms of a more general religion which embraces all; these restricted Churches are in reality only chapels of a vaster

which, by reason of name still more.

Thus we religion

is

arrive at the following definition:

a unified system of beliefs

relative to sacred things, that

things. Finally, rites are the rules of

apart and forbidden

The

always comdetermined group, which makes profession of adhering to them and of practising the rites connected with them. They are not merely received individually by all the members of this group; they are something belong-

mon

really religious beliefs are

to a

and they make its unity. The individuals which compose it feel themselves united to each other by the simple fact that they have a common faith. A society whose members are united by the fact that thev think in the same way in regard to the sacred world and its relations with the profane world, and by the fact that they translate these common ideas into common practices, is what is called a Church. In all history, we do not find a sii\gle religion without a Church. Sometimes the Church is strictly national, sometimes it passes the frontiers; sometimes it embraces an entire people (Rome, Athens, the Hebrews), sometimes it embraces only a part of them (the ing to the group,

Christian societies since the advent of Protes-

sometimes it is directed by a corps of sometimes it is almost completely devoid of any official directing body. But wher-

this

***************

tain, either

***************

Church

very extent, merits

this

—

is

and

A

practices

to say, things set

and practices, which unite into one single moral community called a Church, all those who adhere to them. The second element which thus finds a place in our definition is no less essential than the first; for by beliefs

showing that the idea of religion is inseparable from that of the Church, it makes it clear that should

religion

be an eminently collective

thing.

*************** The proposition established

in the

preceding

chapter determines the terms in which the prob-

lem of the origins of totemism should be posed. is everywhere dominated bv the idea of a quasi-divine principle, imminent in certain categories of men and things and thought of under the form of an animal or vegSince totemism

etable, the explanation of this religion tiallv the this,

explanation of this

we must seek

to learn

led to construct this idea rials It

essen-

how men have been

and out of what mate-

they have constructed is

is

belief; to arrive at

it.

obviously not out of the sensations

which the things serving as totems are able to arouse in the mind; we have shown that these things are frequently insignificant. The lizard,

tantism);

the caterpillar, the rat, the ant, the frog, the

priests,

turkey, the bream-fish, the plum-tree, the cock-

ever it

we

observe the religious

has a definite group as

its

life,

we

find that

foundation. Even

the so-called private cults, such as the domestic cult or the cult of a corporation, satisfy this

condition; for they are always celebrated by a

atoo,

etc.,

appear

to

cite

frequentiv

only those names which in the lists of Australian

upon and strong impressions which in a wav resemble religious emotions and which impress a sacred character upon the totems, are not ot a nature to produce

men

these great

CHAPTER

objects they create.

It is

true that this

is

3:

not the

case with the stars and the great atmospheric

phenomena, which have, on the that

necessary to strike

is

the

contrary,

all

imagination

forcibly; but as a matter of fact, these serve only very exceptionally as totems. It is even probable that they were very slow in taking this office. So it is not the intrinsic nature of the

thing

whose name

the clan bears that

marked

it

out to become the object of a cult. Also, if the sentiments which it inspired were really the determining cause of the totemic rites and

would be

the pre-eminently sacred animals or plants employed as totems would play an eminent part in the religious life. But we know that the centre of the

beliefs,

cult

it

the

thing;

actually elsewhere.

is

It

is

the figurative

representations of this plant or animal and the

totemic emblems and symbols of every sort, which have the greatest sanctity; so it is in them that is found the source of that religious nature, of which the real objects represented by

emblems receive only a reflection. Thus the totem is before all a symbol,

these

a

material expression of something else. But of

what?

From the analysis to which we have been giving our attention,

it is

and symbolizes two the

first

place,

form of what

it

evident that

is

it

expresses

the outward and visible

we have called

ple or god. But

it

different sorts of things. In

is

the totemic princi-

also the

symbol

of the

determined society called the clan. It is its flag; it is the sign by which each clan distinguishes itself from the others, the visible mark of its personality, a mark borne by everything which is a part of the clan under any title whatsoever, men, beasts or things. So if it is at once the

god and of the society, is that not because the god and the society are only one? How could the emblem of the group have been able to become the figure of this quasi-divinity, if the group and the divinity were two distinct realities? The god of the clan, the totemic prinsymbol

ciple,

of the

can therefore be nothing else than the

EMILE DURKHEIM; ANOMIE AND SOCIAL INTEGRATION

93

itself, personified and represented to the imagination under the visible form of the ani-

clan

mal or vegetable which serves as totem. But how has this apotheosis been possible, and how did it happen to take place in this fashion? In a general way,

society has

all

that

it is

is

unquestionable that a

necessary to arouse the

sensation of the divine in minds, merely by the

power that it has over them; for to its members it is what a god is to his worshippers. In fact, a god is, first of all, a being whom men think of as superior to themselves, and upon whom they feel that they depend. Whether it be a conscious personality, such as Zeus or Jahveh, or

merely abstract forces such as those in play totemism, the worshipper, in the one case as

in in

manners of acting which are imposed upon him by the nature of the sacred principle with which he feels that he is in communion. Now society the other, believes himself held to certain

gives us the sensation of a perpetual dependence. Since it has a nature which is peculiar to itself and different from our individual nature, it pursues ends which are likewise special to it; but, as it cannot attain them except through our intermediacy, it imperiously demands our aid. It requires that, forgetful of our own interest, we make ourselves its servitors, and it submits us to every sort of inconvenience, privation and sacrifice, without which social life would be impossible. It is because of this that at every instant we are obliged to submit ourselves to rules of conduct and of thought which we have neither made nor desired, and which are sometimes even contrary to our most fundamental inclinations also

and instincts. Even if society were unable to obtain these concessions and sacrifices from us except by a material constraint, it might awaken in us only the idea of a physical force to which we must give

way

of necessity, instead of that of a moral

power such

as religions adore. But as a matter

of fact, the empire

which

it

holds over con-

94

THE CLASSIC TRADITION

PARTI:

the

due much less to the physical which it has the privilege than to moral authority with which it is invested. If

we

yield to

sciences

is

supremacy

is

of

its

orders,

it is

not merely because

it

strong enough to triumph over our resis-

tance;

it is

primarily because

it is

the object of a

venerable respect.

We

say that an object, whether individual or

collective, inspires respect

when

tation expressing

mind

in the

it

such a force that relative

to

gifted with

automatically causes or

it

inhibits actions, without iv^nrd for tion

the represenis

useful or

their

any considera-

injurious effects.

When we obey somebody because of the moral authority which we recognize in him, we follow out

seem

his opinions, not because they

wise, but because a certain sort of physical energy is imminent in the idea that we form of this person, which conquers our will and inclines it in the indicated direction. Respect is the emotion which we experience when we feel this interior and wholly spiritual pressure

upon us. Then we are not determined by the advantages or inconveniences of the attitude which is prescribed or recommended to us; it is by the way in which we represent to ourselves the person recommending

operating

or prescribing

it.

This

ally take a short,

place for hesitation; is

a

all

why commands

it is

command and

excludes

is

gener-

peremptory form leaving no because, in so far as

goes by

its

own

force,

it it

idea of deliberation or calculation;

efficacy from the intensity of the mental which it is placed. It is this intensity which creates what is called a moral ascendancy. it

gets

its

state in

*************** Since

it

is

in spiritual

sure exercises

men exist

the idea

itself,

that

it

ways

that social pres-

could not

fail

to

give

outside themselves there

one or several powers, both moral and,

at

same time, efficacious, upon which they depend. They must think of these powers, at the

least in part, as outside themselves, for these

address them

in a

tone of

command and some-

times even order them to do violence to their

most natural true that

influences ety,

inclinations.

It

is

undoubtedly

they were able to see that these

if

which they

feel

emanate from

soci-

then the mythological system of interpreta-

would never be born. But social action ways that are too circuitous and obscure, and employs physical mechanisms that are too complex to allow the ordinary observer to see when it comes. As long as scientific analysis does not come to teach it to them, men tions

follows

know

well that they are acted upon, but they

do not know by whom. So they must invent by themselves the idea of these powers with which they feel themselves in connection, and that, we are able to catch a glimpse of the way by which they were led to represent them

from

under forms that are really foreign to their nature and to transfigure them by thought. But a god is not merely an authoritv upon whom we depend; it is a force upon which our strength relies. The man who has obeyed his god and who for this reason, believes the god is with him, approaches the world with confidence and with the feeling of an increased energy. Likewise, social action does not confine itself to demanding sacrifices, privations and efforts from us. For the collective force is not entirely outside of us; it does not act upon us wholly from without; but rather, since society cannot exist except in and through indi\'idual consciousness, this force must also penetrate us and organize itself within us; it thus becomes an integral part of our being and by that very fact this is elevated and magnified. There are occasions when this strengthening and vivifying action of society is especially apparent. In the midst of an assembly animated by a common passion, we become susceptible of acts and sentiments of which we are incapable when reduced to our own forces; and when the assembly is dissoh'ed and when,

we fall back to we are then able to measure which we have been raised above

finding ourselves alone again,

our ordinary the height to

ourselves.

I

level,

listory

abounds

in

examples of

this

CHAPTER

sort.

is

It

enough

3:

to think of the night of the

Fourth of August, 1789, when an assembly was suddenly led to an act of sacrifice and abnegation which each of its members had refused the

day

and

before,

prised the day

at

which they were This

after.

is

why

all

all

sur-

parties

economic or confessional, are careful to have periodical reunions where their members may revivify their common faith by manifesting it in common. To strengthen those sentiments which, if left to themselves, would soon weaken, it is sufficient to bring those who hold them together and to put them into closer and more active relations with one another. This is political,

the explanation of the particular attitude of a

man speaking to a crowd, at least if he has succeeded in entering into communion with it. His language has a grandiloquence that would be ridiculous in ordinary circumstances; his gestures

show

thought

is

a

certain

impatient of

domination; his very all rules,

and

easily falls

because he feels within him an abnormal over-supply of force which overflows and tries to burst out from him; sometimes he even has the feeling that he is dominated by a moral force which is greater than he and of which he is only the interpreter. into all sorts of excesses.

It is

by this trait that we are able to recognize what has often been called the demon of oratorIt is

ical inspiration.

Now

this exceptional increase

EMILE DURKHEIM: ANOMIE AND SOCIAL INTEGRATION

of

some

great collective shock, social interac-

have become much more frequent and active. Men look for each other and assemble together more than ever. That general effervescence results which is characteristic of revolutions

tionary or creative epochs.

vidual forces.

now

Men

ferent.

states,

where makes

intermittent

are other more durable ones, strengthening influence of society

there this

itself felt

with greater consequences and

men become

dif-

are of such

*************** In addition to

men, society also consecrates

things, especially ideas.

If

a belief

is

unani-

mously shared by a people, then, for the reason which we pointed out above, it is forbidden to touch it, that is to say, to deny it or to contest it.

Now

the prohibition of criticism

is

an interdic-

and proves the presence of something sacred. Even today, howsoever great may be the liberty which we accord to others, a man who should totally deny progress or ridicule the human ideal to which modern societies are attached, would produce the effect of a sacrilege. There is at least one principle which those the most devoted to the tion like the others

examination of everything tend to place to regard as untouchable, that is to say, as sacred: this is the very principle of free examination. This aptitude of society for setting itself up free

purely

and

differently

an intensity that they cannot be satisfied except by violent and unrestrained actions, actions of superhuman heroism or of bloody barbarism.

incarnate and personified.

passing

more and

The passions moving them

as a

these

see

merely of shades and degrees;

degree they strengthen his own sentiment. The passionate energies he arouses re-echo within him and quicken his vital tone. It is no longer a simple individual who speaks; it is a group Besides

this greater

than in normal times. Changes are not

above discussion and

is

Now

activity results in a general stimulation of indi-

something very real; it comes to him from the very group which he addresses. The sentiments provoked by his words come back to him, but enlarged and amplified, and to this of force

95

god or for creating gods was never more apparent than during the first years of the French Revolution. At this time, in fact, under the influence of the general enthusiasm, things laical

by nature were transformed by

public opinion into sacred things: these were the Fatherland, Liberty, Reason.

*************** We

are

now

able to understand

how

the

frequently even with greater brilliancy. There

totemic principle, and in general, every

are periods in history when, under the influence

gious force, comes to be outside of the object in

reli-

96

PART

1

:

THE CLASSIC TRADITION

which it resides. It is because the idea of it is in no

wav made up

of the impressions directly pro-

Rehgious forces are therefore moral forces.

made

of the consciousnesses that experience them,

such as

To be objectified, they are fixed upon some object which thus becomes sacred; but anv object might fulfil this function. In principle, there are none whose nature predes-

the legal

objectified.

tines

them

to

it

to the exclusion of all others;

but also there are none that are necessarily impossible. Everything depends upon the circumstances which lead the sentiment creating religious ideas to establish itself here or there,

upon

this point or

upon that one. Therefore, assumed by an object is

the sacred character

not imphed in the intrinsic properties of this latter: it is added to them. The world of rehgious things nature;

is

not one particular aspect of empirical superimposed upon

*************** if is

In addition to

all

it.

the reasons ^vhich have been

gi\'en to justif}' this conception, a final one may be added here, which is the result of our whole work. As we ha\'e progressed, we have established the fact that the fundamental categories of thought, and consequently of science, are of rehgious origin. We have seen that the same is true for magic and consequently for the different processes which have issued from it. On the other hand, it has long been known that up until a relatively ad\anced moment of e\olution, moral and legal rules have been indistinguishable from ritual prescriptions. In summing up, then, it may be said that nearly all the great social institutions have been bom in religion. Now in

order that these principal aspects of the collective life may have commenced by being only

obviously be the eminent form and, as it were, the concentrated expression of the whole collective life. If religion had gi\en birth to all that is essential in society, it is because varied aspects of the religious

necessary that the religious

the idea of society

is

life, it is

life

the soul of religion.

forces,

***************

duced by this thing upon our senses or minds. Rehgious force is only the sentiment inspired by the group in its members, but projected outside

and

human

But,

it

is

what

said,

society

the basis of religion? it

is it

Is it

that has thus

the real society,

is and acts before our \'ery eyes, with and moral organization which it has

laboriouslv fashioned during the course of histor\'?

This

is full

and imperfections.

of defects

goes beside the good, injustice often reigns supreme, and the truth is often obscured by error. How could anything so crudely organized ir^pire the sentiments of love, the ardent enthusiasm and the spirit of abnegation which all religions claim of their followers? These perfect beings which are gods could not have taken their traits from so mediocre, and sometimes e\-en so base a reahty. But, on the other hand, does someone thiiJc In

it,

evil

of a perfect societs',

where

and

justice

\vould be so\ereign, and from which its

e\-il

forms would be baiushed for ever?

would

cienv that this

is

the religious sentiment;

No

in close relations for,

truth in all

one

with

they would say,

it

towards the realization of this that all reUgions strive. But that societv is not an empirical fact, definite and obser\-able; it is a fanc\', a dream with which men have Ughtened their sufferings, but in which thev have never really Uved. It is merely an idea which comes to express our more or less obscure aspirations towards the good, the beautiful and the ideal. Now these aspirations have their roots in us; they come from the very depths of our being; then there is nothing outside of us which can account for them. Moreover, they are already is

religious in themselves; thus that the ideal society

from being able But, in the

simplified

to explain

first

when

alistic side: in its

it

would seem

presupposes rehgion,

far

it.

place, things are arbitrarily

religion

way,

it

is

seen onlv on

is realistic.

its

There

ide-

is

no

physical or moral ugliness, there are no vices or e\'ils which do not ha\'e a special There are gods of theft and trickery, of

divinity. lust

and

CHAPTER

3:

war, of sickness and of death. Christianity itself, howsoever high the idea which it has made of the divinity

may be, has been obUged

to give the

mythology. Satan is an even if he is an impure being, he is not a profane one. The anti-god is a god, inferior and subordinated, is true, but nevertheless endowed with it extended powers; he is even the object of rites, at least of negative ones. Thus religion, far from ignoring the real society and making abstraction of it, is in its image; it reflects all its aspects, even the most vulgar and the most repulsive. All is to be found there, and if in the

EMILE DURKHEIM: ANOMIE AND SOCIAL INTEGRATION

they transport themselves by thought. But that is is

merely changing the terms of the problem; it not resolving it or even advancing it. This

spirit of evil a place in its

systematic idealization

essential piece of the Christian system;

teristic

we

majority of cases

see the

good victorious

over evil, life over death, the powers of light over the powers of darkness, it is because reality

97

innate

of religions.

is

an

essential charac-

Explaining them by an

power of idealization is simply replacword by another which is the equiva-

ing one

lent of the

first;

it

is

as

if

they said that

men

have made religions because they have a rehgious nature. Animals know only one world, the one which they perceive by experience, internal as well as external. Men alone have the faculty of conceiving the ideal, of adding something to the real. Now where does this singular privilege come from? Before making it an initial fact or a mysterious virtue which escapes science, we must be sure that it does not

between these were reversed, life would

depend upon empirically determinable condi-

be impossible; but, as a matter of fact, it maintains itself and even tends to develop. But if, in the midst of these mythologies and

The explanation of religion which we have proposed has precisely this advantage, that it gives an answer to this question. For our definition of the sacred is that it is something added to and above the real: now the ideal answers to this same definition; we cannot explain one without explaining the other. In fact, we have

is

not otherwise.

two contrary

theologies

we

the relation

If

forces

see reality clearly appearing,

it

is

none the less true that it is found there only in an enlarged, transformed and idealized form. In this respect, the most primitive religions do not differ from the niost recent and the most refined. For example, we have seen how the Arunta place at the beginning of time a mythical society

whose organization

exactly repro-

duces that which still exists today; it includes the same clans and phratries, it is under the same matrimonial rules and it practises the same rites. But the personages who compose it are icieal beings, gifted with powers and virtues to which common mortals cannot pretend. Their nature is not only higher, but it is different, since it is at once animal and human. The evil powers there undergo a similar metamorphosis: evil itself is, as it were, made subof

whence

Some

for idealizing, that

collective life

awakens

religious

activity.

Vital energies are over-excited, pas-

more active, sensations stronger; there are even some which are produced only at this moment. A man does not recognize himself; he feels himself transformed and consequently he transforms the environment which surrounds sions

him. In order to account for the very particular

impressions which he receives, he attributes to the things with which he is in most direct con-

which

sense, does not exist except in thought, but to

men have is

if

thought on reaching a certain degree of intensity, it is because it brings about a state of effervescence which changes the conditions of psychic

to say, of substituting for

this idealization

reply that

seen that

which they have not, exceptionpowers and virtues which the objects of everyday experience do not possess. In a word, above the real world where his profane life passes he has placed another which, in one

lime and idealized. The question itself

tions.

now

raises

comes.

a natural faculty

the real world another different one, to

tact properties al

98

THE CLASSIC TRADITION

PARTI:

which he

attributes a higher sort of digi^ity

than to the

first.

Thus, from a double point of

place for investigating

problem,

this

can touch; it is a natural product of social life. For a society to become conscious of itself and maintain at the necessary degree of intensity the sentiments which it thus attains, it must

power

assemble and concentrate itself. Now this concentration brings about an exaltation of the mental life which takes form in a group of ideal conceptions where is portrayed the new life thus awakened; they correspond to this new

of conceiving the ideal.

which we have

which

is

added

to those

our disposition for the daily tasks of existence. A society can neither create itself or recreate itself without at the same time at

creating an ideal. This creation

is

not a sort of

work of supererogation for it, by which would complete itself, being already formed; is

the act by

which

it is

periodically

it it

made and

remade. Therefore when some oppose the ideal society to the real society, like

two antagonists

which would lead us in opposite directions, they materialize and oppose abstractions. The ideal society is

a part of

is

it.

not outside of the real society; it Far from being divided between

between two poles which mutually repel each other, we cannot hold to one with-

them

as

out holding to the other. For a society is not made up merely of the mass of individuals who compose it, the ground which they occu-

which they use and the movements which they perform, but above all is the idea which it forms of itself. It is undoubtedly true that it hesitates over the manner in which it ought to conceive itself; it feels itself drawn py, the things

in

divergent

directions.

But

these

conflicts

which break forth are not between the ideal and reality, but between two different ideals, that of yesterday and that of today, that which has the authority of tradition and that which has the hope of the future. There is surely a

it

still

these ideals

may

remains that

view it is an ideal world. The formation of the ideal world is therefore not an irreducible fact which escapes science; it depends upon conditions which observation

set of psychical forces

whence

evolve; but whatever solution

be given to

all

passes in

the world of the ideal.

Thus the expresses

is

collective

far

of the individual, but

school of collective

learned to idealize.

life

It is

which religion vague innate

ideal

from being due

to a

it is

rather at the

that the individual has

in assimilating the ideals

elaborated by society that he has become capable It is

society which,

by

sphere of action, has made him acquire the need of raising himself above the world of experience and has at the same time furleading him within

its

him with

nished

the

means

conceiving

of

another. For society has constructed this

new

world which

indi-

in constructing itself, since this expresses.

it

is

society

Thus both with the

vidual and in the group, the faculty of idealizing has nothing mysterious about it. It is not a sort of

luxury which a man could get along without, but a condition of his very existence. He could not be a social being, that is to say, he could not be a

man,

if

he had not acquired

it.

It is

true that in

incarnating themselves in individuals, collective ideals tend to individualize themselves. Each

understands them after his own fashion and marks them with his own stamp; he suppresses certain elements and adds others. Thus the personal ideal disengages itself from the social ideal in proportion as the individual personality develops itself and becomes an autonomous source of action. But if we wish to understand this aptitude, so singular in appearance, of living outside of realitv, it is enough to connect it with the social conditions

upon which it depends.

Thus there is something eternal in religion which is destined to survive all the particular symbols in which religious thought has successively en\'eloped itself. There can be no society which does not feel the need of upholding and reaffirming at regular intervals the collective

sentiments and the collective ideas which its

unity and

its

personality.

Now

this

make moral

CHAPTER

3:

remaking cannot be achieved except by the means of reunions, assemblies and meetings where the individuals, being closely united to one another, reaffirm in common their common sentiments; hence come ceremonies which do not differ from regular religious ceremonies, either in their object, the results which they produce, or the processes employed to attain these results.

What

essential difference

is

there

between an assembly of Christians celebrating the principal dates of the

life

of Christ, or of

Jews remembering the exodus from Egypt or the promulgation of the decalogue, and a

EMILE DURKHEIM: ANOMIE AND SOCIAL INTEGRATION

will

come when our

societies will

new ideas arise and new formulae are found which serve for a while as a guide to humanity; and when these hours shall course of which

have been passed through once, men will spontaneously feel the need of reliving them from time to time in thought, that is to say, of keeping alive their memory by nieans of celebrations which regularly reproduce their fruits. We have already seen how the French Revolution established a whole cycle of holidays to keep the principles with which it was inspired in a state of

perpetual youth.

mulgation of a new moral or legal system or some great event in the national life? If we find a little difficulty today in imagining what these feasts and ceremonies of the future could consist in, it is because we are going through a stage of transition and moral

quickly

away,

The

great things of the past

which

our fathers with enthusiasm do not excite the same ardour in us, either because they have come into common usage to such an extent that we are unconscious of them, or else because they no longer answer to our actual aspirations; but as yet there is nothing to replace them. We can no longer impassionate ourselves filled

for the principles in the tianity

recommended

to

name

of

which Chris-

masters that they treat

humanely, and, on the other hand, it has formed of human equality and fraternity seems to us today to leave too their slaves

the idea

which

large a place for unjust inequalities.

Its

how

it

could be realized in

facts. In

a word,

the old gods are growing old or already dead,

and others are not yet born. This

is

fell

tionary faith lasted

If this

institution

was because the revolubut a moment, and decep-

it

and discouragements rapidly succeeded moments of enthusiasm. But though the work may have miscarried, it enables us to imagine what might have happened in other conditions; and everything leads us to believe that it will be taken up again sooner or later. There are no gospels which are immortal, but neither is there any reason for believing that humanity is incapable of inventing new ones. As to the question of what symbols this new faith will express itself with, whether they will resemble those of the past or not, and whether or not they will be more adecjuate for the reality which they seek to translate, that is something which surpasses the human faculty of foresight and which does not appertain to the principal tions

the

first

question.

pity for

the outcast seems to us too Platonic; we desire another which would be more practicable; but as yet we cannot clearly see what it should be

nor

again

those hours of creative effervescence, in the

reunion of citizens commemorating the pro-

mediocrity.

know

99

what

ren-

dered vain the attempt of Comte with the old historic souvenirs artificially revived: it is life itself, and not a dead past which can produce a living cult. But this state of incertitude and confused agitation cannot last for ever. A day

Thus sociology appears destined to open a to the science of man. Up to the present, thinkers were placed before this double alternative: either explain the superior and specific faculties of men by connecting them to

new way

the inferior forms of his being, the reason to the senses, or the lent to

mind

denying

to matter,

which

is

equiva-

their uniqueness; or else attach

them to some super-experimental reality which was postulated, but whose existence could be established by no observation. What put them

100

PART1:

THE CLASSIC TRADITION

in this difficulty

was

the fact that the individ-

ual passed as being the

finis

natunv

—the

ulti-

mate creation of nature; it seemed that there was nothing beyond him, or at least nothing that science could touch. But from the moment when it is recognized that above the individual there is society, and that this is not a nominal being created by reason, but a system of active forces, a new manner of explaining men becomes possible. To conserve his distinctive traits it is no longer necessary to put them outside experience. At least, before going to this last extremity, it

would be well

to see

individual, though

come from

if it

that is

which surpasses the

within him, does not

this super-individual reality

which

we experience in society. To be sure, it cannot be said at present to

what point these explanations

may be able to reach, and whether or not they are of a nature to resolve

all

the problems. But

mark

it is

advance a limit beyond which they cannot go. What must be done is to try the hypothesis and submit it as equally impossible to

in

methodically as possible to the control of This is what we have tried to do.

facts.

CHAPTER

4

Friedrich Nietzsche:

Reason and Power

INTRODUCTION

Among social theorists in recent years, Friedrich Nietzsche has become the focus of increasing scholarly attention. Earlier interest in Nietzsche

among

had

been confined to understanding the linkages between his ideas and those of Georg Simmel and Max Weber. Simmel had written a full study of Nietzsche and Schopenhauer, and Weber's views on methodology, bureaucratic rationality, and charisma had Nietzschean influences that were and continue to be the subject of scholarly interest.

sociologists

Indeed, Weber paid tribute to Nietzsche

when he said: One can measure ar,

and

how he

the integrity of a

modern

especially of a

sees his

own

modern

schol-

philosopher, by

relationship to Nietzsche

and Marx. Whoever does not admit

that he could

not accomplish very important aspects of his

work without

work

own

two have performed, deceives both himself and others. The world in u'hich we ourselves exist intellectually is largely a world stamped by Marx and Nietthe

that these

zsche.

However,

it

is

the growing recognition of

Nietzsche's thought as the center of post-mod-

ernism (Chapter 17) that has stimulated the more recent serious concern with the works of this brilliant

and

eccentric nineteenth-century

philosopher, and compel his inclusion

among

the seminal texts in social theory.

Nietzsche was born in 1844 in the town of in Saxony into a long line of Lutheran

Rocken

clergymen. His father and both his grandfathers had been ministers in the Lutheran

Church.

When

Nietzsche was five years old,

his father died suddenly, leaving the

young

Nietzsche to be raised by his mother, his sister, his grandmother, and two maiden aunts. He

was

sent off to boarding school at the age of

and he later attended the University Bonn, where he was drawn to the study of Greek and Roman literature. He finished his advanced degree in philology at Leipzig and took a professorial post at the age of twentyfour at Basel. Nietzsche taught at Basel for ten years, from 1869 to 1879, during which time he produced his first major work. The Birth of Tragedy. Thereafter, Nietzsche published a number of important works. Human, AU-tooHitman (1878), The Gay Science (1882), Beyond fourteen, in

101

.

102

PART1

Good and

THE CLASSIC TRADITION

Evil

(1886),

Toivnrd a

Genealogij of

reason to nature and society had the effect of

(1889),

extending the Apollonian stranglehold on the emotional life of humankind. Human progress could be assured if reason were enthroned and ercitic sensuality repressed. The vapid, narrow,

Morals (1887), The Twilight of the and Thus Spoke Zarathustra (1892).

Idols

Nietzsche had to resign his post at Basel in 1879 because of iUness, but in the creative

work out

struggle to

his

philosophy over the

next decade, Nietzsche recovered physically,

only to succumb to madness in his final years. life was an extraordinary testament

and

sterile life of

nineteenth-century bourgeois

which Nietzsche rebelled, was then the contemporary expression of centuries

society, against

repression.

Max

Weber's "iron cage" of

Nietzsche's

of

bouts with the psychosomatic illnesses that plagued him. Nor was Nietzsche the ordinary type of scholar that one might encounter in the university. His

bureaucratic rationality, which speaks to the par-

to the will to live despite serious

writing

was emotionally charged,

his visions

were graphically presented, his style was poetic and aphoristic, and he did not follow the

celling

out

of

He

ing

and to ignore its and sensual component. For Nietzsche, Christianity continued to emphasize the Apollonian mode as it held out rewards in heaven for nal expressions of the culture

those

who

Similarly,

repressed the erotic Dionysian the

Enlightenment's

spirit.

promise

himian betterment through the application

spirit,

parallels

treatment of the human sciences as disciplinary agents of social control (Chapter 1 7) Nietzsche saw in the transition from Greek aristocratic morality to Christianity a funda-

mental change

erotic

human

later

expected rules of scholarly discourse. In his private life as well Nietzsche seemed eccentric.

never married, he developed a deep-seated misogyny, established a long-standing agonistic relationship with Richard Wagner, fell in love with Wagner's wife Cosima, and depended on a wide array of drugs to help him cope with his various illnesses. He drove himself to work feverishly and spent the last decade of his life in madness, unable to care for himself. In his studies of ancient Greece, Nietzsche detected what he called the Apollonian and the Dionysian cultures, which together captured the reality of Greek life. The Dionysian cults, celebrated with orgiastically expressive dance and music, represented a deeply emotional and irrational human force that strained to achieve ecstasy. In sharp contrast, the rational, analytical, and coolly logical Apollonian culture was represented in geometrically precise temples and in timeless marble statues. Greece was reason and passion, and it is a mistake to focus on the ratio-

the

Nietzsche's thesis, as does Michel Foucault's

to a slave morality.

ian doctrine of altruism, humility,

was designed

willful

to

and sensual.

The and

Christsuffer-

humble and restrain the It was Nietzsche's intenlegitimating myths that

explode the support these repressive religious authorities that presume to shape human life according to their values. His early support of Wagner and tion

the

to

Wagner movement,

as well as his

own

doc-

trine calling for the trans\aluation of values

were expressions of Nietzsche's profound contempt for bourgeois civilization and for the distorted values by which it justified itself. Nietzsche wrote about the Ubennensch, the next and higher stage of human development, in which the sensuous and creative individual comes forth, embracing life rather than fearing it, and in which the creative powers are encouraged as the rightful expression of free individuals. Weber's writings on rationalization and charisma, as well as Foucault's later works dealing with the care of the self, seem to resonate with Nietzsche's views. More immediately selfevident are the affinities between Sigmund Freud's views on repression and sublimation and Nietzsche's attack on bourgeois morality. The excerpts below, from Nietzsche's W/// to

of

Power, illustrate the aphoristic style that he

o\

occasionally used; but

more importantly, they

CHAPTER

point in the direction of perspectivism, idea that

all

assertions about truth

i.e.,

the

and mean-

ing are but relative claims that reflect social or

personal perspectives. This doctrine permitted Nietzsche to challenge the claims to universal

and from philosophical writings. The proclamation truth emanating from Christian teachings

that

"God

is

Dead"

is

Nietzsche's

that Christian morality

is

way

of saying

no longer privileged,

now

understood as a human construction propagated by social institutions that benefit from the widespread belief in the divini-

and

ty

that

it is

and universal

truth of Christian doctrines.

4;

FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE: REASON AND

there

no

is

POWER

103

single, valid truth or interpretation.

All texts are subject to interpretation,

and what-

moment is a function of power and not of truth. The appropriation of Nietzsche by post-modern advocates of feminism and multicultural democracy appears ironic, since Nietzsche himself expressed misogynistic and anti-democratic ever interpretation prevails at any given

sentiments. as Allan

Is

the democratization of Nietzsche,

Bloom has argued

in Tlic Closing of the

Amcricn)! Mind, a fundamental misappropriation

and misreading

incoherent?

Can

of his

work

the strongly

that renders

elitist

it

character of

Similarly, Nietzsche's perspectivism allows for

the Uhcrmensch, calling for transcendence of the

the deconstruction of the claims to universal

slavish pursuit of comfort

by philosophy and other disciplines, based on the privileged position of reason.

reconciled with egalitarian democracy and the

truth

Weber (Chapter

5)

objectivity, rationality, far

addresses the issues of

and

scientific truth in a

more sustained and systematic fashion than

Nietzsche. But Nietzsche's influence

is

appar-

and happiness, be

worship of popular mass culture? More importantly, is the Nietzschean challenge capable of providing a new basis for social order? For example, while Marx is critical of the bourgeois

capitalist

order and predicts

its

revolutionary

contemporary debates surrounding post-modernism and in the claims that rational and objective truth are

transformation, he also provides an account of

but

transvaluation of values develops a powerfully

ent throughout as

it

is

in the

legitimations of Eurocentric, Western, white-male dominated forms of power parading as knowledge. Post-modern theories of deconstruction can be traced back to Nietzsche through the works of Jacques Derrida and Michel Foucault. Nietzschean skeptical and perspectival formulations lie at the very heart of the current epistemological controversy over the meaning of truth and vaUd knowledge. Proponents of feminism and multi-culturalism argue that the suppressed voices of the marginalized groups in society must be heard. Their suppression is now seen as a consequence of the power of those privileged and established groups whose

claims to represent excellence and meritorious

the principles

critical cultural

creative

is

to

be

potential

which

lib-

may

be recognized and released. But Nietzsche's

philosophy pays scant attention to the question of what makes social order possible. Postmodernist appropriators of Nietzsche's thought are dealing with profoundly important social issues that go to the heart of the question of cultural change and social order. Is the contemporary celebration of popular culture among post-modernists a form of deconstructive liberation from the elite culture of the past, or is it really an unwitting affirmation of the values of

consumer capitalism and a further descent into barbarism and social breakdown? As social theorists

seen as self-serving rationalizations. All social reality and its meaning structures are a conse-

problem of

quence of

best, or

social construction, and, as a result.

perspective, through

eration from the past

achievements have been scrutinized and deconstructed by post-modernists and are cultural

upon which new order

constructed. In contrast, Nietzsche's call for the

or as critics of society, Nietzsche's contem-

porary exponents are constrained to address the social order or accept the charge

that their theories are romantically irrelevant at

mindlessly

nihilistic at

worse.

— 104

confusion of contradictory valuations and consequently of contradictory drives. This is the

The

Power

expression of the diseased condition in man, in contrast to the animals in

My

attempt to understand moral judgments as symptoms and sign languages which betray the processes of physiological prosperity or failure, likewise the consciousness of the condi-

—

and growth a mode of interpretations of the same worth as astrology, prejudices prompted bv the instincts (of races, tions for preservation

communities, of the various stages of life, as youth or decay, etc.). Applied to the specific Christian-European morality: Our moral judgments are signs of decline, of disbelief in

life,

a preparation for

pessimism. no moral phe-

nomena, there is only a nioral interpretation of these phenomena. This interpretation itself is of extramoral origin.

What does

it

mean

has projected a contradiction into existence? Of decisive importance: behind all other evaluations these moral evaluations stand in

command. Supposing they were abolished, according to what would we measure then? And then of what value would be knowledge, ?

?

259 (1884) Insight: all evaluation

perspective:

that

individual, a

church, a

of

is

made from

for

even

community,

that valuation

is

a

a

race,

— Because

of the state,

we

a

forget

always from a perspective, a

single individual contains within

tions?

From

—a

rare accident

A sort of planetary motion

means

Is

"An end" Whence come evalua-

willing an end.

their basis a firm

norm, "pleasant"

and "painful"?

we first make a thing with an evaluation. The extent of moral evaluations: they play a part in almost every sense impression. Our world is colored by them. We have invested things with ends and values: therefore we have in us an enormous fund in countless cases

painful by investing

it

but by comparing values it appears that contradictory things have been accounted valuable, that many tables of value have existed (thus nothing is valuable "in of latent force:

him

Analysis

the conditions of a limited

Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will

that

fo

Power,

individual

—often —

group

Obser\'ation

a vast

by VV.ilter Kaufmann. Reprinted by permission of Random House, Inc.

of

revealed that their erection

now 14(i7

in us!

well as his great

harmony

includes an evaluation.

force Source

of grand

260 (1883-1888)

and

Copyright

men —as

types of

all

moments

itself").

a definite

the preservation

faith, a culture.

existing

all

—

But

that our interpretation

which

to quite definite tasks.

This contradictory creature has in his nature, however, a great method of acquiring knowledge: he feels many pros and cons, he raises himself to justice to comprehension beyond esteeming things good and evil. The wisest man would be the one richest in contradictions, who has, as it were, antennae

"Willing":

chief proposition: there are

etc., etc. ?

answer

instincts

258 (1885-1886)

My

—

THE CLASSIC TRADITION

PARTI:

Friedrich Nietzsche: to

—

we employ that

of

tables

was

of

value

the erection of

erroneous

—of existence

for its preservation.

contemporary

man

re\'eals

very diverse value judgments

they no longer have any creative

— the

basis, "the condition of existence," is missing from moral judgment. It is much

more superfluous, it is not nearlv so It becomes arbitrary. Chaos.

painful.

CHAPTER

Who

creates

the

goal

that

stands

above

mankind and above the individual? Formerly one employed morality for preservation: but nobody wants to preserve any longer, there is

4;

is

POWER

FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE; REASON AND

one has compel accept as a norm.

a kind of lust to rule; each

spective that

it

other drives to

would

like to

1

05

per-

its

all

the

nothing to preserve. Therefore an experimental

497 (1884)

morality: to give oneself a goal.

The most strongly believed

me

are for

462 (SPRING-FALL 1887)

law of

much

belief,

of morality.

that reason truths?

In place of "sociology," a theory of the forms

so

a part of us that not to believe

would destroy

it

the

causality, a very well acquired habit of

Fundamental innovations: In place of "moral values/' purely naturalistic values. Naturalization

in

a priori "truths"

provisional assumptions; e.g.,

preservation of

the race. But are they for

What

a conclusion!

As

if

the

man were a proof of truth!

of domination. In place of "society," the culture complex, as

498 (1884)

my chief interest (as a whole or in its parts). In place of "epistemology,"

a perspective

theory of affects (to which belongs a hierarchy of the affects; the affects transfigured; their

superior order, their "spirituality"). In place of "metaphysics"

theory of eternal recurrence

and

religion, the

(this as a

means

To what extent even our intellect is a consewe would quence of conditions of existence not have it if we did not need to have it, and we would not have it as it is if we did not need to have it as it is, if we could live otherwise.

—

:

of

breeding and selection).

499 (1885) "Thinking" in primitive conditions (pre-organ481 (1883-1888)

Against positivism, which halts at phenomena would say: No, are only facts" I facts is precisely what there is not, only interpretations. We cannot establish any fact "in itself": perhaps it is folly to want to do such a

— "There

—

of crystal. is fitting

—In our thought, the essential feature

new

crustes' bed),

material into old schemes (=Pro-

making equal what

is

new.

557 (1885-1886)

thing.

"Everything

the crystallization of forms, as in the case

ic) is

subjective,"

is

you

say;

but

even this is interpretation. The "subject" is not something given, it is something added and invented and projected behind what there is. Finally, is it necessary to posit an interpreter behind the interpretation? Even this is inven-

The properties of a thing are effects on other "things": if one removes other "things," then a thing has no properties, i.e., there is no thing without other things, i.e., there is no "tliing-initself."

tion, hypothesis.

In so far as the

word "knowledge" has any

meaning, the world

knowable; but it is iiiterpreiable otherwise, it has no meaning behind it, but countless meanings. "Perspectivism." It is our needs that interpret the world; our drives and their For and Against. Every drive is

—

558 (SPRING-FALL 1887)

The

"thing-in-itself" nonsensical.

the relationships,

all

If

I

remove

the "properties,"

all

all

the

"activities" of a thing, the thing does not remain over; because thingness has only been invented by us owing to the requirements of

— 106

THE CLASSIC TRADITION

PART1:

logic,

— —

thus with the aim of defining,

communi-

In motion,

cation (to bind together the multiplicity of rela-

tion.

tionships, properties, activities).

therefore

559 (NOV. "Things selves"

1887-MARCH

that

1888)

have a constitution

568 in

them-

—a dogmatic idea with which one must

break absolutely.

it is

is given to sensacannot contain motion:

content

is,

a form of being.

(MARCH-JUNE

1888)

Critique of the concept "true and apparent world."

Of

mere

these, the first is a

fiction,

—

constructed

of fictitious entities.

560 (SPRING-FALL 1887) That things possess a constitution in themselves quite apart from interpretation and subjectivity, is a quite ideal hypothesis; it presupposes that interpretation and subjectivity are not essential, that a thing freed from all relationships would still be a thing. Conversely, the apparent objective character of things: could it not be merely a difference of degree within the subjective? that perhaps that which changes slowly presents itself to us

—

as "objectively" enduring, being, "in-itself" that the objective

no new

That which

is

only a false concept of a

genus and an antithesis within the subjective?

562 (1883-1888)

"Appearance" itself belongs to reality: it is a form of its being; i.e., in a world where there is no being, a certain calculable world of identical cases must first be created through appearance: a tempo at which observation and comparison are possible, etc.

Appearance is an arranged and simplified world, at which our practical instincts have been its

work;

at

to say,

we

perfectly true for us: that

it is

live,

we are

able to Hve in

it:

is

proof of

truth for us

the world, apart from our condition of living in

it,

world

the

that

we have not reduced

to

our

being, our logic and psychological prejudices, exist as a world "in-itself"; it is essenworld of relationships; under certain conditions it has a different aspect from every point; its being is essentially different from

does not tially a

every point;

it

presses

upon every

—and

the

point, every

development of thought a point had to be reached at which one realized that what one called the properties of things were sensations

every case quite incongruent.

of the feeling subject: at this point the proper-

being possesses the other measure of power; in

"In the

ties

ceased to belong to the thing." The "thingremained. The distinction between

in-itself"

point resists

it

The measure what form,

of

sum

of these

is

in

power determines what

force, constraint

it

acts or resists.

the thing-in-itself and the thing-for-us

Our particular case is interesting enough: we have produced a conception in order to be

on the

able to live in a world, in order to perceive just

is based form of perception which granted energy to things; but analysis revealed that even force was only projected into them, and likewise substance. "The thing affects a subject"? Root of the idea of substance in lan-

older, naive

enough

to

endure

it

—

guage, not

in

beings outside us! The thing-in-

no problem at all! Beings will have to be thought of as sensations that are no longer based on something devoid of sensation. itself is

569 (SPRING-FALL 1887)

Our

psychological perspective

is

determined

by the following: 1.

that for

communication is necessary, and that communication something

there to be

CHAPTER

has to be firm, simplified, capable of preci-

a subject ject.

For

it

all

to

in

the [so-called]

identical

be communicable, however,

it

were, logicized;

lies in

the continual recurrence of identical, related

things

their

in

character, in the belief that here to 3.

4.

604 (1885-1886)

meaning most cases a new interpre-

"Interpretation," the introduction of

not "explanation"

over

tation

(in

an old interpretation that

we

605 (SPRING-FALL 1887)

phenomenal world

is

The ascertaining

and "untruth," the

of "truth"

different

"unknowable" for us; questions, what things "in-themselves" may be like, apart from our sense receptivity and the activity of our understanding, must be

how could we "Thingness" was The question is whether

rebutted with the question: that things exist?

created by us.

many

other

ing such an apparent world

ways

—and

not

short,

itself

—

of creat-

mold

pretation

facts

according to

it;

that

is,

active inter-

and not merely conceptual

transla-

tion.

the best-guaranteed reality; in

whether

that

which "posits things"

is

not the sole reality; and whether the "effect of the external world

upon us"

is

not also

only the result of such active subjects other "entities" act

parent world

is fundamentally from creative positing, from forming, shaping, overcoming, willing, such as is of the essence of philosophy. To introduce a meaning this task still remains to be done, assuming there is no meaning yet. Thus it is with sounds, but also with the fate of peoples: they are capable of the most different interpretations and direction toward different goals. On a yet higher level is to posit a goal and

whether

this creating, logicizing, adapting, falsifying is

has itself

are able

mulable world of the chaos of sensations another kind of phenomenal world, a kind

there could not be

that

now

—

ascertaining of facts in general,

first

is

only a sign). There are no facts, everything is in flux, incomprehensible, elusive; what is relaour opinions. tively most enduring is

not "the true world," but the formless unfor-

know

the sub-

logicized

reckon and calculate;

the antithesis of this

—a modus of

become incomprehensible,

the world of "phenomena" is the adapted world which we feel to be real. The "reality"

familiar,

a subject

it

must be experienced as adapted, as "recognizable." The material of the senses adapteci by the understanding, reduced to rough outlines, made similar, subsumed under related matters. Thus the fuzziness and chaos of sense impressions are, as

upon

107

POWER

FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE: REASON AND

sion (above case).

2.

4:

upon

us;

—The

our adapted ap-

an adaptation and overpowactions; a kind of defensive

is

ering of their

measure. The subject alone is demonstrable; hypothesis that only subjects exist that "object" is only a kind of effect produced by

—

606 (1885-1886) Ultimately,

man

finds in things nothing but

what he himself has imported finding

is

into them: the

called science, the importing

Even

—

art,

should be a piece of childishness, one should carry on with both and be well disposed toward both some should find; others zoe others! should religion, love, pride.

if

—

import!

this

—

CHAPTER

5

Max Weber: The

Cage

Iron

INTRODUCTION mid-1950s, Leo Strauss, a renowned political philosopher and severe critic of Max Weber wrote: "Whatever may have

Writing

in

Max Weber was born into a middle-class fam-

the

ily

on April

father

21, 1864, in Erfurt,

Germany. His

was an active politician serving at various

Weber's sociology is the idea of rationalization and its consequences for modern life. Unlike Marx and Durkheim, both of whom projected optimistic outcomes in the transition to modernity, Weber rejects the Enlightenment's view of evolutionary progress and happiness. Instead he projects a "polar night of icy darkness," a highly rational and bureaucratically organized social order, an "iron cage" in which people are trapped. Modernity also produces a new character type, a technical as opposed to a cultured

and national government, while mother was a devout Protestant who raised a family and tended to the household. The Webers moved to Berlin in 1869 and settled in a fashionable suburb favored by academics and politicians. The Weber household hosted many notables from Berlin society. Weber studied law at the universities in Berlin and Gottingen and went on to take a Ph.D. in economic and legal history in 1889. He married Marianne Schnitger in 1893, and her devotion to him is evidenced throughout her famous biography. Mux Weber: A Life. The death of Weber's father in 1897 and the circumstances surrounding it had a profound impact on Weber's life. Since he had had a fearsome quarrel with his father shortly before his death, Weber felt guilt and overwhelming remorse to the point of depression. His life fluctuated between manic periods of extraordinary producti\'ity and

coldly calculating,

severe, almost catatonic depression. After a brief

actor.

stay in a mental hospital

been his errors, he is the greatest social scientist of our century." Weber's contribution is truly immense in both breadth and complexity. His methodological work provides a framework for research

and

instruction,

and

his substantive

explorations in religion, economics, history, and politics give a

the

unique insight into the origins of

modern world and

individual, a

its

evolution. Central to

passionless,

and instrumentally rational

108

levels of local his

Weber resumed

his

CHAPTER

responsibilities

Heidelberg

at

in

Two

1902.

Webers came to visit the United States, a trip which aicied his recovery and left him with an enduring fascination with America. Upon his return to Heidelberg, Weber assumed a full schedule of writing and was active in the intellectual life of the community. Following a brief period of service during World War I as a years

the

later,

5:

writes, capitalism

desire to

gious inspiration

in

Vienna

Society.

During the

in

died in June 1920, leaving behind a tal

last

few

Weber began lecturing again, 1918, and in Munich in 1919. He

life,

monumen-

scholarly corpus. In Tlw Protestant Ethic atid the Spirit of Capi-

study of the relationship of religious Weber offers an insight into the process of transformation and rationalization. Weber argued that seventeenthtalism, a

ideas to economic activity,

century beliefs in predestination and asceticism flowing from Calvinism shaped the actions of the faithful

and contributed

to the rise of capi-

adopted attitudes towards work and money that revolutionized their daily lives. To ease the pain of living with

talism. Specifically, Calvinists

the uncer-

the doctrine of predestination,

i.e.,

tainty of one's eternal fate as a

member

of the

damned, true believers sought a sign that they were favored. Hard work and economic success were taken as signs of salvation. Asceticism led to a frugal way of life and the resulting accumulation of capital. The preconditions for capitalism, namely available capital for investment in nascent industries, were set into elect or the

motion by the belief in Calvinism. Good Calvinists who wished to save their souls inadvertently engaged in those actions of industriousness and frugality that contributed to capitalism's rise.

Weber concludes his essay with some reflecon the future course of capitalist development. The Protestant beliefs that initiated this tions

have long since ceased to function as a justification for economic action. As Weber activity

sake;

its reli-

modern

has become a rational

become money-making instruments who no longer believe passionately in salvation and damnation. Weber does not long romantically an earlier era of Protestant no turning back from modernity and the scientific and industrial revolutions that made it possible. However, Weber wants us to recognize what we have become and to for the return of

Economy and

own

gone. Like other

system, an "iron cage," in which people have

belief.

years of his

is

perpetuated by the

for its

institutions, capitalism

Weber returned to the University in 1916 and continued to work on his major pro-

ject.

now

is

make money

captain in charge of running several Heidelberg hospitals,

109

MAX WEBER THE IRON CAGE

There

is

up to the realities of a disenchanted world. Whereas Marx predicted a proletarian revolution that would shatter the capitalist order and usher in the new age of socialism, Weber saw no such progressive future. Were socialism to arise, Weber claimed, it would not escape face

the bureaucratic fate of mociern institutions but

would succumb

to the rationalization process.

He

regarded the creation of a centralized state administration to oversee the economy unc^er socialism as an even greater threat to individual freedom than the separate and oppositional spheres of state and economy under capitalism.

What was

this rationalization process

and

why was it significant for Weber's social theory? Weber's reflections on bureaucracy, excerpted below, provide us with an important point of departure. Weber argued that the characteristic form of modern institutional organizations, including the state, the corporation, the military,

the university, the church,

is

bureaucratic.

Highly specialized tasks are coordinated in a hierarchical order, with each level of organization reporting to the one above in a pyramidal fashion until one reaches the head of the organization. Depersonalization, routinization, and mechanical predictability are the characteristics of bureaucracies, and they survive and expand because they are the most efficient method for coordinating a large

number

of different tasks.

Decision making within bureaucracies

on a particular mode

is

based

of thinking, instrumental

110

THE CLASSIC TRADITION

PARTI:

reasoning, or Zweckrational, as

Weber

called

it.

This form of reasoning breaks down all problems into a means-ends chain and entails rational calculation of costs incurred

be secured

if

and

benefits to

a particular line of action

is

pur-

to study is a consequence of the values one holds and the relevance of particular events or phenomena to

those value assumptions.

Sociology

falls

methodology

sued.

Apart from his careful depiction of the role

and function

of the official,

Weber

characterizes

bureaucratic organizaticins as operating with "calculable rules"

and "without regard

What does he mean by

sons."

for per-

these terms?

Does "dehumanization," as Weber describes it, have any positive consequences? Bureaucracy and democracy exist in an uneasy relationship. Is the expertise that is fostered by bureaucratic organization compatible democratic

with

What problem one chooses

processes?

What

are

the

somewhere between

of the natural sciences

erary interpretation.

although

it

It

is

and

the

of

lit-

not a hard science,

respects the need for systematic

study and empirical analysis in order to arrive at generalizations. On the other hand, because sociology deals with

human

behavior,

it

is

obliged to inquire into the subjective meaning verstehende sociology meets need by supplementing the more objective methodologies with an interpretive one in which the sociologist attempts a deeper understanding by probing subjective meaning stn.icof action. Weber's this

potential sources of abuse

by experts and how can these be overcome? What does Weber have

tures.

say about the possibility of revolution in the age of bureaucracy? Finally, how does bureau-

Michel Foucault's "carceral society" (Chapter 17) and his

son and reality. The Hegelian-Marxist claim to grasp the totality of history was rejected by Weber, who saw the mind as a limited instrument capable of dealing empirically with a particular slice of reality. Weber suspected totalistic views leading to prophecies because they misconstrued the relation between the reasonine mind and social reality. Social theorists con-

description of instrumental rationality, as the

struct

to

cracy impact on the educational system and

with what kinds of results? The reader should keep in mind that the rationalization process in

Weber describes

mode

it

modern

society as

anticipates

Weber warned against the

models or

conflation of rea-

ideal types that explain the

society,

interrelationships of relevant key elements of

gives concrete empirical expression to Niet-

the social world. Weber's essay on bureaucracy, presented below, provides an example of a rational model or ideal type. The ideal type is a

prevalent

of thought in

modern

zsche's Apollonian type (Chapter

Max

4).

Weber's essays on the methodology of

the social sciences likewise demonstrate a Niet-

rational construct that helps to orient us to the

zschean influence and anticipate the postmodernist critique of truth and objecti\'ity (Chapter 17). Reprinted below are excerpts from one of those essays, in which Weber probes deeply into the question of the relation-

confusing infinity of social

ship of values to science and the possibility of

social realit\'

objective research in sociology. Weber's position

is

complex and not

easily

summarized. He which we

characterizes the social reality in

move

as infinite; yet out of this infinity of facts

a particular focus

even begin

is

to think

necessary before one can

about a social question.

not the reality;

which

to

it

The model is framework with

facts.

pro\'ides a

obser\e and determine

processes deviate from the

ways

how

in

social

which the

model organizes them. In other words, is more complex, more contingent, and more subject to unanticipated consequences than our rational models are able to predict. If we mistake reason, i.e., the models or ideal types, for the reality, we do \iolence to the complexities of exervdav life, and rather rational

than respect the integrity of our subject,

we

CHAPTER

may compel

it

to

fit

the rational

demands

If

For Weber,

of

our model.

5:

MAX WEBER: THE IRON CAGE

this is

111

an oversimplification.

He

power in modern society; class, status, and party. Weber and Marx share similar views on the meaning and significance of economic class. Ownership of property and its disposition on the open market are signs of considerable power. However, the political significance of economic power is more problematic for Weber, as he questions distinguishes three avenues to

models emanate from academic

these

establishments, think tanks, or governmental

agencies and they are implemented, they

may

become blueprints for social engineering, thus empowering a technocratic elite to shape the future, a development decried by Habermas (Chapter 16) and Foucault (Chapter 17). For Weber, scientific analysis was a tool for understanding social reality and not an appropriate instrument for social change. Directed social change presupposes the achievement of a valued objective; it deals with moral conceptions of justice and right. Science is an enter-

and interpretaand therefore it cannot make valid judgments about moral claims. Weber argued

whether economic itself?

class identity is the basis for

When

collective action.

Weber makes

does a class act for

collective class action

more

problematic than does Marx. Social status may be yet another dimension of power. Those with high status in society may

prise limited to factual analysis

also be wealthy; but they need not be.

tion,

over, those

that the appropriate arena for the struggle over

enjoy high status. For example, wealthy criminals do not have social status, and the nouveaux

and the moral claims that and not the one. In so doing, Weber placed sci-

who

are rich

not admitted to high society. But sta-

different policies

riches are

they support

tus groups are also ethnic

scientific

is

the political arena

ence and politics into different spheres, each with very different functions to perform. Analysis of society was not the equivalent of changing it, and the obligation of the sociologist

was

to

transform

understand social reality and not to If social change was needed, then

it.

pohtical parties

and

effective vehicle to

their

leaders were

the

The essay

"Class, Status, Party," reprinted

Weber deals with the question of the of political power to economic

relationship class class.

and

offers

an alternative

Marx claims

to

Marx's ruling

that the ruling class controls

economic and political power in capitalist society. The owners of the means of production are the dominant class because they control the wealth of society and therefore also political power. While they may not run for office, they either directly or indirectly control those

do.

The dominant ideas

who

—the ruling ideas—are

the ideas of the ruling class.

for

the objective categories of class.

Contemporary

events in the former Soviet Union seem to bear out these Weberian observations, as witness the

re-emergence of powerful religious and nationemotions despite a seventy-year regime

alistic

of proletarian class consciousness.

Weber turns

to the third

contemporary

dimension of power

namely, the political party. The fact that people are rich or that they enjoy high social status does not guarantee in

below, reveals yet another aspect of Weber's sociology.

and religious groups, Weber, these emerge as more significant in shaping values and behavior than

and

accomplish these ends in a

representative system.

Moredo not necessarily

society,

their success in politics. Politicians

win

elections

tions.

The

and gain support

abilities

in order to rise to

must

also

for their posi-

required of a political leader

prominence within a

political

party and to win elections reside in his persuasive personal characteristics and social skills.

Those

talents constitute yet another

power beyond

class

and

status.

avenue

to

Despite the

powerful linkages that connect class, status, party, Weber's analytic distinctions recognize ethnic, racial, and charismatic claims to

and

political leadership.

112

PARTI:

When

THE CLASSIC TRADITION

to poHtics,

Weber saw the

value preferences, but since as teachers they

possibility that "the iron cage"

might be shat-

enjoyed their legitimacy through the special

he turned

tered. PoUtical leaders

with a

new

vision of the

might project a moral vision of the just society and gather the support needed to bring about social change. future, a charismatic leadership,

But politics also entailed rational calculation. that the "ethic of ultimate ends,"

claims of science,

Weber saw

their politiciza-

tion of the classroom as dishonest.

At the end of The Protestant Ethic ami the Weber allows us to glimpse what modernity has in store when he writes: Spirit of Capitalism,

Weber wrote

the moral vision,

had

to

be accompanied by the

"ethic of responsibilitv," the cool calculation as to

how

to

overcome obstacles and

achie\'e the

desired goals. In any event, academics trained in social analysis were neither intellectually equipped nor temperamentally suited to engage in the politics of social change. Weber urged their participation as citizens, of course, and as

writers, their

work

\vas

bound

to express their

one knows who will live in this cage in the whether at the end of this tremendous development entirely new prophets will arise, or, if neither, mechanized petrification, embellished with a sort of convulsi\e self-importance. For of the last stage of this cultural development, it might well be trulv said: "Specialists without sensualists without heart; this nullit\' spirit, imagines that it has attained a level of civilization

No

future, or

never before achieved."

Max Weber: Bureaucracy

BUREAUCRACY officialdom functions in the following

manner: I. There tional

tions. (1)

is

the principle of official jurisdic-

which are generally ordered by is, by laws or administrative regula-

The regular of

the

bureaucratically

The authority

tributed in a stable

principles of

clearly established

governed

offers

to

give the

commands

way and

is strictly

is

dis-

delimited

rules concerning the coercive

cal,

The

II.

channels of appeal

lower

required for the discharge of these duties

by

and

of

many

not precisely delimited and are temporarily

for the

activities required

structure are assigned as official duties. (2)

these cases, the ruler exe-

all

means, physisacerdotal, or otherwise, which may be

placed at the disposal of

officials.

and of

hierarchy

office

(Iiistanzenziig)

stipulate a

system of super- and subor-

dination in which there

This means:

purposes

of conquest,

feudal states. In

called into being for each case.

areas,

rules, that

Mongolian empires

cutes the most important measures through personal trustees, table-companions, or courtservants. Their commissions and powers are

CHARACTERISTICS OF MODERN Modern

113

MAX WEBER: THE IRON CAGE

CHAPTERS:

is

a supervision of the

by the higher ones. Such a system the governed the possibility of appeal-

offices

ing, in a precisely regulated manner, the decision of a lower office to the corresponding

superior authority. With the

full

development

of the bureaucratic type, the office hierarchy monocratically organized. archical office authority cratic

structures:

in

The is

is

principle of hier-

found and

state

in all

bureau-

ecclesiastical

(3) Methodical provision is made for the regular and continuous fulfillment of these duties and for the exercise of the correspond-

structures as well as in large party organiza-

ing rights; only persons who qualify under general rules are employed.

authority

In the sphere of the state these three ele-

ments constitute

a bureaucratic agency, in the

sphere of the private economy they constitute a bureaucratic enterprise. Bureaucracy, thus understood, astical

fully developed in political and ecclesicommunities only in the modern state,

is

and in the private economy only in the most advanced institutions of capitalism. Permanent agencies, with fixed jurisdiction, are not the historical rule but rather the exception. This is

even true of large

political structures such as those of the ancient Orient, the Germanic and

tions

and private

It does not matter bureaucracy whether its called "private" or "pubHc."

enterprises.

for the character of

When tency"

is

the principle of jurisdictional "compe-

is

not

mean

carried

fully

subordination

—

through, hierarchical

at least in public office

that the "higher" authority

—does

is

autho-

rized simply to take over the business of the

"lower." Indeed, the opposite is the rule; once an office has been set up, a new incumbent will always be appointed if a vacancy occurs. III.

The management

of the

modern

office is

based upon written documents (the "files"), which are preserved in their original or draft form, and

upon

a staff of subaltern officials

scribes of all sorts.

The body

and

of officials work-

ing in an agency along with the respective apparatus of material implements and the files

makes up "Bureaucracy," From Max Weber, Economy and 2, pp. 956-963, 973-975, 983-985, 987-989, 998-1003, edited by Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich. Copyright 1978 by the Regents of the University of California, University of California Press. Reprinted by permisSource

Society,

Vol.

a bureau (in private enterprises often

called the "counting house," Kontor). In principle, the

modern organization

of the

civil service

separates the bureau from the private domicile of the official and, in general,

segregates official activity from the sphere of

114

THE CLASSIC TRADITION

PARTI:

Public monies and equipment are from the private property of the official. This condition is everywhere the product of a long development. Nowadays, it is found in public as well as in private enterprises; in the latter, the principle extends even to the private

life.

divorced

more or learned.

less

exhaustive, and which can be

Knowledge

of these rules represents a

special technical expertise

possess.

It

which the

officials

involves jurisprudence, admirustra-

management. The reduction of modern office management

tive or business

deeply embedded in

very nature.

entrepreneur at the top. In principle, the Koiitor (office) is separated from the household, busi-

The theory

ness from private correspondence, and busi-

for

The more ness assets from modern of business manconsistently the type agement has been carried through, the more are these separations the case. The beginnings

order certain matters by decree

been legally granted to an entitle the agency to regulate the matter by individual commands given for each case, but

of this process are to he found as early as the

only to regulate the matter abstractly. This

Middle Ages.

stands in extreme contrast to the regulation of

private wealth.

the peculiarity of the

It is

modern

entrepre-

neur that he conducts himself as the "first official" of his enterprise, in the

in

which the

bureaucratic

very same

ruler of a specifically state

[Frederick

of

II

way

are

intrinsically

different

from the management of

in

contrast,

is

management,

Office

IV.

ment

is

way

of

American way.

its

public administration, that

the

relationships through individual privileges

such relationships are not

bv sacred tradition.

THE POSITION OF THE OFFICIAL WITHIN AND OUTSIDE OF BUREAUCRACY All this results in the following for the internal

and external position of the

official:

at least all special-

— —

I.

Office Holding as a Vocation

thorough training in a field of specialization. This, too, holds increasingly for the modern

That the office

executive and employee of a private enterprise,

scribed course of training, which

es

just as V.

it

does for the state

When

activity

the office

demands

the

is

officials.

fully

developed,

official

of the

the fact that the length

working hours in the bureau may be limited. In the normal case, this too is only the product of a long development, in the public as well as in the private office. Formerly the normal state of affairs was the reverse:

of his obhgatory

Official

business

was discharged

expression,

first,

is

a

"vocation" (Benif) finds

in the

requirement of a pre-

demands

the

working capacity for a long period of time, and in generally prescribed special examinations as prerequisites of employment. Fur-

entire

full zoorkiii^'^ capaciti/

official, irrespective of

authority to

—which has agency —does not

and bestowals of favor, which, as we shall see, is absolutely dominant in patrimonialism, at

Prussia]

management and such manageusually presupposdistinctly modern

ized office

assumes

instance,

fixed

pri\'ate offices is a

totally foreign to the

modern

least in so far as

character

continental European notion and, by

all

of

modern

spoke of himself as "the first servant" of the state. The idea that the bureau activities of the state

to rules is

as

a

sec-

ondary activity. VI. The management of the office follows general ri//t's, which are more or less stable.

thermore,

it

finds expression in that the posi-

tion of the official (Pfliclit).

is

in the nature of a

"duty"

This determines the character of his

manner; Legally and holding is not considered ownership of a source of income, to be exploited for relations in the following actually, office

rents or

emoluments

in

exchange

for the ren-

dering of certain services, as was normally the case during the Middle Ages and frequently up to the threshold of recent times, nor is office

CHAPTERS:

holding considered a

common exchange

vices, as in the case of free tracts. Rather,

one

entrance into an

office,

including

economy, is considered an specific duty of fealty to the

in the private

acceptance of a

purpose of the

office (Aiiitftreiw) in return for

the grant of a secure existence. the

of ser-

employment con-

modern

type,

it

It is

decisive for

loyalty to an office that, in the pure

does not establish a relationship to a

person, like the vassal's or disciple's faith

under

feudal or patrimonial authority, but rather

is

devoted to impersonal and fnnctiotial purposes. These purposes, of course, frequently gain an ideological halo from cultural values, such as state, church, community, party or enterprise, which appear as surrogates for a this-worldly or other-worldly personal master and which are embodied by a given group.

The

political official

— —

at least in the fully de-

veloped modern state personal servant of a op, the priest

is

ruler.

not considered the Likewise, the bish-

and the preacher are

in fact

no

longer, as in early Christian times, carriers of a

purely personal charisma, which offers otherworldly sacred values under the personal mandate of a master, and in principle responsible only to him, to everybody who appears worthy of

them and asks

tial

sur\'ival

become

of

for them. In spite of the par-

the

old

theorv,

they

have

officials in the service of a functional

115

MAX WEBER: THE IRON CAGE

"insults to the office" and "contempt" of state and church authorities. The social position of the official is normally

highest where, as in old civilized countries, the

following conditions prevail: a strong demand for administration by trained experts; a strong

and

stable

social

where the

differentiation,

predominantly comes from socially and economically privileged strata because of the official

social distribution of

power or

the costliness of

the required training and of status conventions.

The possession patents

of educational certificates or

—discussed below

(sec.

13 A)

—

is

usually

linked with qualification for office; naturally, this

enhances the "status element"

position of the factor

is

explicitly

in the prescription that the

aspirant to an office career

body. This

is

acceptance of an

depends upon the

consent ("election") by the official

in the social

Sometimes the status acknowledged; for example,

official.

members

of the

the case in the officer corps

the German army. Sinular phenomena, which promote a guild-like closure of officialdom, are typically found in the patrimonial of

and, particularly, in prebendal officialdom of the past. The desire to resurrect such policies in changed forms is by no means infrequent

among modern

bureaucrats;

for instance, in the

letarianized

demands

[zt'fnsfi'o-]

played a

it

role,

of the largely pro-

officials

(the

tretii

ele-

purpose, a purpose which in the present-day "church" appears at once impersonalized and

ment) during the Russian revolution [of 1905].

ideologically sanctified.

low where the demand for expert administration and the hold of status conventions are weak. This is often the case in new settlements by virtue of the great economic opportunities and the great instability of their

II.

The Social Position

Usually the social esteem of the

of the Official

Social Esteem and Status Convention. Whether he is in a private office or a public bureau, the modern official, too, always strives for and usually attains a distinctly elevated

social stratification: witness the

governed. His social position is protected by prescription about rank order and, for the political official, by spe-

official as a rule receives a

social esteem vis-a-vis the

cial

officials is

especially

prohibitions of the criminal code against

Rank

United

States.

The

as the Basis of Regular Salary.

tion in the

form of a

salary,

monetary compensa-

normally

fixed,

and

the old age security provided by a pension.

The salary

is

not measured like a

wage

in

terms

116

of

THE CLASSIC TRADITION

PARTI:

work done, but according

to "status," that

is,

according to the kind of function (the "rank") and, possibly, according to the length of ser-

The

vice.

security

great

relatively

of

the

official's income, as well as the rewards of so-

cial

esteem,

make

the office a sought-after posi-

tion, especially in countries which no longer provide opportunities for colonial profits. In

such countries,

low

this situation

permits relatively

salaries for officials.

The

Fixed Career Lines and Status Rigidity. official is set for a "career" within the hierarchi-

apparatus compares with other organizations exactlv as does the machine with the nonmechanical modes of production. Precision, speed, unambiguity, knowledge of the files, continuity, discretion, unity, strict subordination,

reduction of friction and of material and

personal costs

—these

are raised to the opti-

mum point in the strictly bureaucratic adminisand especially in its monocratic form. compared with all collegiate, honorific, and As tration,

avocational forms of administration, trained bureaucracy is superior on all these points.

And

as far as complicated tasks are concerned,

order of the public service. He expects to move from the lower, less important and less well paid, to the higher positions. The average

paid bureaucratic work

mechanical fixing of the conditions of promotion: if not of the

service.

cal

official naturally desires a

offices, at least of the salary levels.

He wants

is

not only more preit is often cheaper

cise but, in the last analysis,

than even formally unremunerated honorific

Today,

it

is

primarily the capitalist market

these conditions fixed in terms of "seniority,"

economy which demands

or possibly according to grades achieved in a

ness of public administration be discharged precisely, unambiguously, continuously, and

system of examinations. Here and there, such grades actually form a character indclcbilis of the official and have lifelong effects on his career To this is joined the desire to reinforce the right to office and to increase status group closure and economic security. All of this makes for a tendency to consider the offices as "prebends" of those qualified by educational certificates.

The necessity of weighing general personal and intellectual qualifications without concern

that the official busi-

with as much speed as possible. Normally, the very large modern capitalist enterprises are themselves unequaled models of strict bureauBusiness management organization. cratic

on increasing precision, above all, speed of operations. steadiness, and, determined by the peculiar naThis, in turn, is communication, means of ture of the modern throughout

including,

rests

among

other things, the

news

ser-

the often subaltern character of such patents of specialized education, has brought it

vice of the press. The extraordinary increase in the speed by which public announcements, as

about that the highest

well as economic and political facts, are transmitted exerts a steadv and sharp pressure in

for

ly

the "ministerial"

filled

political offices, especial-

positions,

without reference to such

are as a rule certificates.

THE TECHNICAL SUPERIORITY OF BUREAUCRATIC ORGANIZATION OVER ADMINISTRATION BY NOTABLES The decisive reason

for the

advance of bureau-

the direction of speeding

up

the

tempo

of

administrative reaction towards various situations. The optimum of such reaction time is normally attained only by a strictly bureaucratic organizatit)n.

(The

fact

that the bureaucratic

apparatus also can, and indeed does, create certain definite impediments for the discharge

manner

best adapted to the in-

cratic organization

of business in a

tccliiiical

dividualitv of each case does noi belong into

has always been its purely superioritv over any other form of

organization.

The

fully

developed bureaucratic

the present ct>ntext.)

CHAPTERS:

Bureaucratization offers above

mum

possibility for carrying

the opti-

all

through the prin-

MAX WEBER: THE IRON CAGE

117

demanded by the external apparatus modern culture in the most favorable combi-

attitudes of

only

bureaucracy has

ciple of specializing administrative functions

nation.

according to purely objective considerations.

established the foundation for the administra-

Individual performances are allocated to func-

who have

tionaries

who by tise.

ly

specialized training and

constant practice increase their exper-

"Objective" discharge of business primari-

means

a discharge of business according to

calculable rules

and "without regard

for per-

In

particular,

rational law conceptually systemon the basis of "statutes," such as the later Roman Empire first created with a high degree of technical perfection. During the Middle Ages, the reception of this [Roman] law

of a

tion

atized

coincided with the bureaucratization of legal

The advance

sons."

administration:

"Without regard for persons/' however, is also the watchword of the market and, in general, of all pursuits of naked economic interests. Consistent bureaucratic domination means the leveling of "status honor." Hence, if the principle of the free market is not at the same time restricted, it means the universal domination of the "class situation." That this consequence of bureaucratic domination has not set in every-

trained expert displaced the old

where proportional to the extent of bureaucrais due to the differences between possible principles by which polities may supply their requirements. However, the second element mentioned, calculable rules, is the most important one for modern bureaucracy. The peculiarity of modern culture, and specifically of its technical and economic basis, demands tization

this

very "calculability" of results. When fully bureaucracy also stands, in a

developed,

specific sense,

under the principle of

sijw ira ac

Bureaucracy develops the more perfectly, the more it is "dehumanized," the more completely it succeeds in eliminating from official business love, hatred, and all purely personal, irrational, and emotional elements which escape calculation. This is appraised as its spestudio.

by capitalism. The more complicated and specialized mod-

cial

virtue

more porting apparatus demands

ern culture becomes, the

detached and

its

trial

procedure

to tradition or to irrational

presuppositions.

THE LEVELING OF SOCIAL DIFFERENCES In spite of

its

indubitable technical superiority,

bureaucracy has everywhere been a relatively late development. A number of obstacles have contributed to this, and only under certain social and political conditions have they definitely receded into the background. A. Administrative Democratization cratic

organization

power on and social

has

usually

Bureau-

come

into

economic differences. This leveling has been at least relative, and has concerned the significance of social and economic differences for the assumption of administrative functions. Bureaucracy inevitably accompanies modern the basis of a leveling of

mass democracy, in contrast to the democratic

self-government of small homogeneous units. This results from its characteristic principle: the abstract regularity of the exercise of authority,

which

is

a result of the

demand

for "equality

before the law" in the personal and functional

—hence, of the horror of "privilege," and

sense

external sup-

the principled rejection of doing business "from

personally

case to case." Such regularity also follows from

the

strictly objective expert, in lieu of

the lord of older social structures

moved by

which was bound

of the rationally

who was

personal sympathy and favor, by

grace and gratitude. Bureaucracy offers the

the social preconditions of

its

origin.

Any non-

bureaucratic administration of a large social structure rests in

some wav upon

the fact that

existing social, material, or honorific prefer-

— 118

PART1:

THE CLASSIC TRADITION

ences and ranks are connected with administrative functions and duties. This usually means

bureaucratically. In France, however, attempts

that an economic or a social exploitation of position, which every sort of administrative activity provides to its hearers, is the compensation for the assumption of administrative functions. democratization Bureaucratization and

basis of an election svstem that

within the administration of the state therefore

the entire country and break their influence,

an increase of the cash expenditures of

could not be overcome. Every advance of sim-

signify

the public treasury, in spite of the fact that

bureaucratic administration

is

usually

more

"economical" in character than other forms. Until recent times at least from the point of view of the treasury the cheapest way of satisfying the need for administration was to leave almost the entire local administration and lower judicature to the landlords of Eastern Prussia. The same is true of the administration by justices of the peace in England. Mass

— —

democracy which makes a clean sweep feudal, patrimonial, and at least in intent

of the

—

the

plutocratic

privileges

in

administration

unavoidably has to put paid professional labor in place of the historically inherited

tional" administration

B.

Mass

Parties

"avoca-

by notables.

and the Bureaucratic Conse-

quences of Democratization This applies not state. For it is no accident that in their own organizations the democratic mass parties have completely broken with traditional rule by notables based upon personal relationships and personal esteem. Such personal onlv to the

structures

still

persist

among many

old conser-

vative as well as old liberal parties, but cratic

mass

demo-

parties are bureaucratically orga-

nized under the leadership of party

officials,

professional party and trade union secretaries, etc.

In

Germany,

for instance,

this

has hap-

Democratic party and in mass-movement; in England earliest in the caucus democracy of Gladstone and Chamberlain which spread from Birmingham

pened

in the Social

the agrarian

United States, both parties since Jackson's administration have developed in the 1870's. In the

to organize disciplined political parties

bureaucratic

The

failed.

have

organization

on the

would compel repeatedly

resistance of local circles of notables

against the otherwise unavoidable bureaucrati-

zation of the parties, which

election

ple

alone al

techniques

as, for instance, the

representation,

means

would encompass

based on numbers system of proportiona strict

and

inter-local

bureaucratic organization of the parties and

therewith an increasing domination of party

bureaucracy and discipline, as well as the elimination of the local circles of notables this

holds for large

The progress

at least

of bureaucratization within the

administration

state

—

states.

itself

is

a

phenomenon

parallehng the development of democracy, as is quite obvious in France, North America, and

now

England. Of course, one must always that the term "democratization" can misleading. The demos itself, in the sense of be shapeless mass, never "governs" larger assoa rather is governed. What changes ciations, but in

remember

wav

which the executive leaders are selected and the measure of influence which the dciiwf. or better, which social circles from its midst are able to exert upon the content and the direction of administrative activities bv means of "public opinion." "Democratiis

only the

in

zation," in the sense here intended, does not

necessarily

mean an

increasingly active share

of the subjects in government. This result of democratization, but ily

it is

may

be a

not necessar-

the case.

We must expresslv recall at this point that the concept of democracy, cieduced from the "equal rights" of the governed, includes these further postulates: (1) pre\ention of the political

development of a closed status group of officials in the interest of a universal accessibility office,

and

(2)

of

minimi/ation of the authority of

officialdom in the interest of expanding the

CHAPTER

sphere of influence of "public opinion" as far as practicable. Hence, wherever possible, political democracy strives to shorten the term of

through election and

office

and

recall,

to

be

relieved from a limitation to candidates with special expert qualifications.

Thereby democra-

cy inevitably comes into conflict with the bureaucratic tendencies which have been pro-

duced by its very fight against the notables. The loose term "democratization" cannot be used here, in so far as it is understood to mean

power

the minimization of the civil servants'

in

favor of the greatest possible "direct" rule of

means the respecdemos. The decisive

the demos, which in practice tive party leaders of the

—indeed

aspect here

—

rather exclusively

is

it

the leveling of the governed in face of the governing and bureaucratically articulated

so

is

group, which in

may occupy

turn

its

autocratic position, both in fact

and

a quite

in form.

THE OBJECTIVE AND SUBJECTIVE BASES OF BUREAUCRATIC PERPETUITY Once

bureaucracy

fully established,

is

among

those social structures which are the hardest to destroy. Bureaucracy

is

the

means

of transform-

organized an instrument of rationally organizing authority relations, bureaucracy was and is a power instrument of the first order for one who controls the bureaucratic ing

social

action

into

rationally

action. Therefore, as

apparatus.

Under otherwise equal

rationally

organized

(Gesellschnftslumdeln)

is

and

conditions,

directed

action

superior to every kind

and also action (Gemeinschaftshandeln) opposing it.

of collective behavior (Massenlwndehi) social

5:

119

MAX WEBER: THE IRON CAGE

the professional bureaucrat

is

chained to his

economic and ideological existence. In the great majority of cases he is only a small cog in a ceaselessly moving mechanism which prescribes to him an essentially activity in his entire

fixed route of march. The official is entrusted with speciaUzed tasks, and normally the mechanism cannot be put into motion or arrested by him, but only from the very top. The individual bureaucrat is, above all, forged to the com-

mon

interest of all the functionaries in the per-

petuation of the apparatus and the persistence of

its

rationally organized domination.

The

ruled, for their part, cannot clispense with or replace the bureaucratic apparatus once it exists, for it rests upon expert training, a functional specialization of work, and an attitude set on habitual virtuosity in the mastery of single yet methodically integrated functions. If the apparatus stops working, or if its work is interrupted by force, chaos results, which it is difficult to master by improvised replacements from among the governed. This holds for public

administration as well as for private eco-

nomic management. Increasingly the material fate of the masses depends upon the continuous and correct functioning of the ever more bureaucratic organizations of private capital-

and the idea of eliminating them becomes more and more Utopian. Increasingly, all order in public and private ism,

organizations is dependent on the system of files and the discipline of officialdom, that means, its habit of painstaking obedience within

ed sphere of action. The

latter is the

its

wont-

more

deci-

however important in practice the files are. The naive idea of Bakuninism of de-

sive element,

Where administration has been completely

stroying the basis of "acquired rights" together

bureaucratized, the resulting system of domi-

with "domination" by destroying the public documents overlooks that the settled orientation of man for observing the accustomed rules and

nation

is

practically indestructible.

The individual bureaucrat cannot squirm out of the apparatus into which he has been harnessed. In contrast to the "notable" performing administrative tasks as a honorific duty or as a subsidiary occupation (avocation).

regulations will survive independently of the

documents. Every reorganization of defeated or scattered army units, as well as every restoration of an administrative order destroyed by revolts.

120

THE CLASSIC TRADITION

PARTI:

panics, or other catastrophes,

by an

effected

is

appeal to this conditioned orientation, bred both in the officials and in the subjects, of obe-

and

dient adjustment to such [social orders.

If

the appeal

is

successful

it

political]

brings, as

it

BUREAUCRACY AND EDUCATION A. Educational Specialization,

Degree

Hunting and Status Seeking

We

cannot here analyze the far-reaching and

were, the disturbed mechanism to "snap into

general cultural effects that the advance of the

gear" again.

rational bureaucratic structure of

The

to gain

domination develops quite independently of the areas in which it takes hold. Naturally, bureaucracy promotes a "rationalist" way of life, but the concept of rationalism allows for widely differing contents. Quite generally, one can only say that the bureaucratization of all domination very

A rationally ordered officialdom

strongly furthers the development of "rational

objective indispensability of the once-

existing apparatus, in connection with

its pecu"impersonal" character, means that the mechanism in contrast to the feudal order

liarly

—

based upon personal loyalty

work

for

—

is

easily

anybody who knows how

control over

it.

made

continues to function smoothly after the

to

enemy

matter-of-factness"

and the personality type

of

has occupied the territory; he merely needs to change the top officials. It continues to operate

the professional expert. This has far-reaching

because it is to the vital interest of everyone concerned, including above all the enemy. After Bismarck had, during the long course of his years in power, brought his ministerial colleagues into unconditional bureaucratic dependence by eliminating all independent

of the process can be briefly indicated here:

statesmen, he

saw

to his surprise that

upon

his

ramifications, but only

effect al

upon

one important element

the nature of education

its

and person-

culture (Erzieliu)ig iimi Bihiuug).

Educational institutions on the European continent, especially the institutions of higher

learning

— the

uni\'ersities, as well as technical

academies, business colleges, gymnasia, and

—

are dominated

and

resignation they continued to administer their

other secondary schools

unconcernedly and undismayedly, as if it had not been the ingenious lord and very creator of these tools who had left, but merely

influenced bv the need for the kind of "educa-

offices

some

individual figure in the bureaucratic ma-

chine which had been exchanged for other figure. In spite of

all

the changes of

some mas-

France since the time of the First Empire, the power apparatus remained essentially ters in

Such an apparatus makes "revolution,"

in

the sense of the forceful creation of entirely

formations of authority, more and more technically, because of its control

—

impossible

over the modern means of communication (telegraph etc.), and also because of its increasingly rationalized inner structure.

"revolutions"

coups

which

is

bred by the system of special-

ized examinations or tests of expertise (FachpriifuiigfU'cscn)

increasingly indispensable for

modern bureaucracies. The "examination for expertise" in the modern sense was and is found also outside the strictly bureaucratic structures: today, for instance, in the so-called "free" professions of

the same.

new

tion"

,

d'etat,

the classical

is

under

The place

this process

of

taken by

as again France demonstrates in

manner

since

all

successful trans-

formations there have been of this nature.

medicine and law, and in the guild-organized trades. Nor is it an indispensable accompani-

ment of bureaucratization: the French, English and American bureaucracies ha\e for a long time done without such examinations either entirely or to a large extent, using in-service

training

and performance

in the party organi-

zations as a substitute.

"Democracy" takes an ambivalent attitude also towards the system of examinations for expertise, as

it

does towards

all

the

phenomena

CHAPTER

of the bureaucratization which, nevertheless,

On

promotes.

it

the one hand, the system of

examinations means, or

appears to

least

at

mean, selection of the qualified from all social strata in place of the rule by notables. But on the other, democracy fears that examinations and patents of education will create a privileged "caste," and for that reason opposes such a system. the

Finally,

found already

examination

expertise

for

in prebureaucratic or

is

semibu-

its

earliest regular

historical locus is in prebeyidally

organized struc-

reaucratic epochs. Indeed,

domination.

of

tures

prebencis,

first

The

expectation

of church prebends

—as

of

in the Is-

lamic Orient and in the Occidental Middle

Ages

—and

then, as

was

especially the case in

China, also of secular prebends,

is

the typical

which people study and are examined. These examinations, however, have only in part prize for

5:

121

MAX WEBER: THE IRON CAGE

can again be turned to economic advantage. role played in former days by the "proof of

The

ancestry," as prerequisite for equality of birth,

access

and,

to noble prebends and endowments wherever the nobility retained social

power, for the c^ualification to state offices, is nowadays taken by the patent of education. The elaboration of the diplomas from universities, business and engineering colleges, and the universal clamor for the creation of further educational certificates in

all

fields serve the

formation of a privileged stratum in bureaus and in offices. Such certificates support their holders' claims for

connubium with

the nota-

bles (in business offices, too, they raise

hope

for

preferment with the boss's daughter), claims to be admitted into the circles that adhere to "codes of honor,"

claims for a "status-appropriate"

salary instead of a

wage according

to perfor-

bureaucratization brings the system of rational

advancement and old-age insurance, and, above all, claims to the monopolization of socially and economically advantageous positions. If we hear from all

examinations for expertise

sides

the character of tests for specialized "expertise."

Only

modern

the

development

of

irresistibly

full

to the

The American Civil-Service Reform movement gradually imports expert training and fore.

specialized examinations into the United States;

the examination system also advances into

all

main (European) breeding ground, Germany. The increasing bureau-

other countries from

its

mance, claims

demands

for assured

for the introduction of regulated

curricula culminating in specialized examina-

reason behind this is, of course, not a suddenly awakened "thirst for education," but rather the desire to limit the supply of candidates for these positions and to monopolize tions, the

them

for the holders of educational patents.

enhances the importance of the specialized examination in England. In China, the attempt to replace the old semipatrimonial bureaucracy by a modern bureaucracy brought the expert examination; it took the place of the former and quite differently structured system of examinations. The bureaucratization of capitalism, with its

For such monopolization, the "examination" is today the universal instrument hence its irresistible advance. As the curriculum required

demand

cational patent are always

cratization

etc.,

of

administration

for expertly trained technicians, clerks,

carries

such examinations

all

over the

for the acquisition of the patent of education

requires

considerable

is,

above

all,

greatly fur-

expenses and

a

long

period of gestation, this striving implies a repression of talent (of the "charisma") in favor of property, for the intellectual costs of the edu-

low and decrease,

rather than increase, with increasing volume.

The old requirement

world. This development

—

of a knightly style of

the prerequisite for capacity to hold a

life,

fief,

is

thered by the social prestige of the "patent of

nowadays in Germany replaced by the necessity

education" acquired through such specialized examinations, the more so since this prestige

of participating in

its

surviving remnants, the

duelling fraternities of the universities which

122

PARTI:

THE CLASSIC TRADITION

grant the patents of education; in the Anglo-

Saxon countries, the fulfill

the

same

athletic

and

social clubs

function.

On the other hand, bureaucracy strives everywhere for the creation of a

"right to the office"

by

the establishment of regular disciplinary proce-

dures and by the elimination of the completely arbitrary disposition of the superior over the

subordinate secure

the

official.

The bureaucracy seeks position,

official's

to

orderly

his

advancement, and his provision for old age. In this, it is supported by the "democratic" sentiment of the governed which demands that domination be minimized; those who hold this attitude believe themselves able to discern a weakening of authority itself in every weakening of the lord's arbitrary disposition over the officials. To this extent bureaucracy, both in business offices and in public service, promotes the rise of a specific status

group, just as did the quite

different officeholders of the past.

We

have

al-

ready pointed out that these status characteristics

are usually also exploited

nature contribute

to,

for,

and by

their

the technical usefulness of

man," rather than end sought bv education and the basis of social esteem in the feudal, theocratic, and patrimonial structures of domination, in the English administration bv notables, in the old Chinese patrimonial bureaucracy, as well as under the rule of demagogues in the Greek states during the so-called Democracy. The term "cultivated man" is used in slogans, the "cultivated

the "specialist,"

was

the

here in a completely value-neutral sense;

it

is

understood to mean solely that a quality of life conduct which zms held to be "cultivated" was the goal of education, rather than a specialized training in some expertise. Such education may have been aimed at a knightly or at an ascetic type, at a literary type (as in China) or at a gymnastic-humanist type (as in Hellas), or at a conventional "gentleman" type of the AngloSaxon variety. A personality "cultivated" in this sense formed the educational ideal stamped by the structure of domination and the conditions of

membership

stratum

societv

of

the

in

in

the ruling

questic>n.

qualification of this ruling stratum rested

The upon

bureaucracy in fulfilling its specific tasks. It is precisely against this unavoidable status character of bureaucracy that "democracy" reacts in its striving to put the election of officials for short terms in place of the appoint-

the possession of a "plus" of such cultural quality

ment

recall of

cultivated at the

discipli-

gravity in the Hellenic, in the medieval, as well

and to substitute the by referendum for a regulated

of officials

officials

nary procedure, thus seeking to replace the arbitrary

disposition

of

the

hierarchically

superordinate "master" by the equally arbitrary disposition of the

governed or

rather, of

the party bosses dominating them.

(in the quite variable

and value-neutral sense

of the term as used here), rather than

upon

a

"plus" of expert knowledge. Military, theological

and

legal expertise was, of course, intensely

same

time. But the point of

as in the Chinese educational curriculum

was

formed by elements entirely different from those which were "useful" in a technical sense. Behind all the present discussions about the basic questions of the educational system there lurks decisively the struggle of the "specialist"

Excursus on the "Cultivated Man" Social prestige based upon the advantage of schooling and education as such is by no means specific to bureaucracy. On the contrary. But

type of man against the (.>lder type of the "cultivated man," a struggle conditioned by the irresistibly expanding bureaucratization of all pub-

educational

ever-increasing importance of experts and spe-

B.

domination

prestige rests

in

upon

other

structures

of

substantially different

foundations with respect to content. Expressed

lic

and private

relations of authority

and bv the

knowledge. This struggle affects the most intimate aspects of personal culture.

cialised

CHAPTER

CONCLUSION

5:

123

MAX WEBER; THE IRON CAGE

not rational in this sense of the term. Hence

may

ask:

What were

we

these structures?

During its advance, bureaucratic organization has had to overcome not only those essentially negative obstacles, several

times previously

mentioned,

the

stood

that

in

way

of

the

required leveling process. In addition, adminis-

based on different principles did and still do cross paths with bureaucratic organization. Some of these have already been mentioned in passing. Not all of the types existing in the real world can be discussed here this would lead us much too far afield; we can analyze only some of the most importrative structures

—

tant

structural

principles

schematic exposition.

We

in

much

shall

simplified

proceed

in the

main, although not exclusively, by asking the following questions:

Max Weber:

"Objectivity" in Social

Science and Social Policy*

We

all

know

that

our science, as

is

the case

with every science treating the institutions and

human

events of

culture, (with the possible

exception of political history)

first

arose in con-

Its most immediate and often sole purpose was the

nection with practical considerations.

of value-judgments concerning measures of State economic policy. It was a

attainment

administrative struc-

"technique" in the same sense as, for instance,

tures in their developmental chances subject to economic, political or any other external determinants, or to an "autonomous" logic inherent

the clinical disciplines in the medical sciences

1.

How

far are these

tion

has now become known how this situawas gradually modified. This modification

any, are

was

not,

which these administrative structures exert? In doing this, one must keep one's eye on the fluidity and the overlap-

tion

of

in their technical strticture?

What,

2.

if

the economic effects

ping of

all

these

organizational

Their "pure" types, after

all,

principles.

are to be consid-

ered merely border cases which are of special

and indispensable analytical value, and bracket historical reality which almost always appears in mixed forms. The bureaucratic structure is everywhere a late product of historical development. The further back we trace our steps, the more typical is the absence of bureaucracy and of officialdom in general. Since bureaucracy has a "rational"

means-ends calculus, and matter-of-factness predominating, its rise and expansion has everywhere had "revolutionary" character, with rules,

results, in a special sense

still

to

be discussed,

as had the advance of rationaiism in general.

The march

of

bureaucracy accordingly de-

stroyed structures of domination which were

are.

It

however, accompanied by a formulathe

logical

(priiizipicllc)

distinction

between "existential knowledge," i.e., knowledge of what "is," and "normative knowledge," i.e., knowledge of what "should be." The formulation of this distinction was hampered, first, by the view that immutably invariant natural laws, later, by the view that an unambiguous evolutionary principle gov-

—

—

Smirce

Reprinted with the permission of The Free from Max Weber, The

Press, a Division of Macmillan, Inc.,

Methmtolog}/ cf the SoeinI Scieucea, translated and edited Edward A. Shils and Henry A. Finch. Copyright 1949

©

The Free

Press; copyright

by by

renewed 1977 by Edward A.

Shils. * This essay was published when the etiitorship of the Archh' fur Sozialwisfeui^chaft unci Sociatfolitik was transferred to Edgar Jaffe, Werner Sombart and Max Weber. Its form was influenced by the occasion for which it was written and the content should be considered in this light. (Marianne Weber.)

124

THE CLASSIC TRADITION

PART1;

and value-judgsomewhat more

erned economic life and that accordingly, xohat was normativehi right was identical in the former case with the immutably cxiftent and with the inevitably emergent. in the latter

scientific

With the awakening of the

ments of meaningful human conduct

—

—

—

—

historical sense, a

combination of ethical evolutionism and histor-

became

relativism

ical

the

predominant

atti-

tude in our science. This attitude sought to deprive ethical norms of their formal character and through the incorporation of the totality of cultural values into the "ethical" (Sittlichen) sphere tried to give a substantive content to ethical norms. It was hoped thereby to raise economics to the status of an "ethical science" with empirical foundations. To the extent that

an "ethical" label was given tural ideals, the particular

to all possible cul-

autonomy

of the eth-

ical imperative was obliterated, without however increasing the "objective" validity of those ideals. Nonetheless we can and must forego a

discussion of the principles at issue.

We

merely

ments?

criticism

This

All serious reflection about the ultimate ele-

are appropriate or inappropriate,

way

of

an

empirical specialized discipline must, as

we

wish ple.

journal

the

as

representative

show shortly, reject this view in princimust do so because, in our opinion, it

to It

can never be the task of an empirical science to

provide binding norms and ideals from which immediate practical activity can

directives for

be derived.

What It is

is

the implication of this proposition?

certainly not that value-judgments are to

be withdrawn from scientific discussion in general simply because in the last analysis they rest

on

certain ideals

and

are therefore "subjec-

tive" in origin. Practical action

our journal would always

and the aims

reject

of

such a propo-

not to be suspended in the presence of value-judgments. The problem is

sition. Criticism is

rather:

what

is

can in

this

end by

certain available means. In this

can indirectly itself

way we

criticize the setting of the

end

as practically meaningful (on the basis of

the existing historical situation) or as meaning-

with reference to existing conditions. Fur-

when

the possibility of attaining a

proposed end appears

mine

to exist,

we

can deter-

(naturally within the limits of our exist-

ing knowledge) the consequences which the

means to be used will produce in addition to the eventual attainment of the proposed end, as a result of the interdependence of all events. We can then pro\'ide the acting person with the ability to weigh and compare the undesirable as over against the desirable consequences of his action. Thus, we can answer the question: what will the attainment of a desired end "cost" in terms of the application of the

practical affairs.

Our

we

estimate the chances of attaining a certain

thermore,

of

orient-

undoubtedly accessible to scientific analysis. Inasmuch as we are able to determine (within the present limits of our knowledge) which means for the achievement of a proposed end

less

among men

is

ed primarily in terms of the categories "end" and "means." We desire something concretely either "for its own sake" or as a means of achieving something else which is more highly desired. The question of the appropriateness of the means for achieving a given end is

economics does and should derive valuejudgments from a specifically "economic point of view" has not disappeared but is especially current, quite understandably,

a

detailed analysis.

point out that even today the confused opinion that

of ideals

requires

the

meaning and purpose of the

predictable loss of other values? Since, in the vast majority of cases, every goal that

is

striven

does "cost" or can "cost" something in this sense, the weighing of the goal in terms ot the incidental consequences of the action which realizes it cannot be omitted from the deliberation of persons who act with a sense of responsibility. One of the most important functions of the tcchniciil criticism which we ha\'e been disfor

cussing thus far

is to

make

this sort of analysis

CHAPTER

To apply the

possible.

results of this analysis in

making of a decision, however, is not a task which science can undertake; it is rather the the

task of the acting, willing person: he weighs and chooses from among the values involved according to his own conscience and his personal view of the world. Science can make him realize that all action and naturallv, according to the circumstances, inaction imply in their

consequences the espousal of certain values and herewith what is today so willingly overlooked the rejection of certain others. The act

—

—

of choice itself

We

is

his

own responsibility. who makes

can also offer the person, the

into

insight

choice,

We

significance

a

the

of

them

also "judge"

critically.

have only

of course

125

MAX WEBER: THE IRON CAGE

5:

This criticism can

a dialetical character,

i.e., it

can be no more than a formal logical judgment of historically given value-judgments and ideas, a testing of the ideals according to the postulate of

the

desired end.

It

consistency

internal

can, insofar as

it

the

of

sets itself this

goal, aid the acting willing person in attaining final axioms ends are derived. It can assist him in becoming aware of the ultimate standards of value which he does not make explicit to himself or, which he must presuppose in order to be logical. The elevation of these ultimate standards, which are manifested

concerning the

self-clarification

from which

his desired

can teach him to think in

in concrete

value-judgments, to the level of

terms of the context and the meaning of the ends he desires, and among which he chooses.

explicitness

is

We do

this

entering into the realm of speculation.

oping

in

desired object.

through making

do or which can underself-evident that one

"ideas" which actually lie

the concrete end.

of the

and develmanner the

explicit

consistent

logically

a

It is

most important tasks of every science of

cultural

life

is

under-

to arrive at a rational

standing of these "ideas" for which really or allegedly struggle. This

step the boundaries of a science

men

either

does not over-

which

strives

for an "analytical ordering of empirical reality," although the methods which are used in this interpretation of cultural (geistiger) values are not "inductions" in the usual sense. At any rate, this task falls at least partly

limits of

to the

that

the scientific

As

to

whether the person expressing these valuejudgments sliould adhere to these ultimate standards is his personal affair; it involves will and conscience, not empirical knowledge. An empirical science cannot tell anyone what he should do but rather what he can do and under certain circumstances what he wishes to do. It is true that in our sciences, personal value-judgments have tended to influence scientific arguments without being explicitly admitted. They have brought about continual confusion and have caused various interpretations to be placed on scientific arguments even in the sphere of the determination

—

—

—

among

belongs

of simple casual interconnections

Howev-

according to whether the results increased or

the historical influence of ideas in the devel-

decreased the chances of realizing one's per-

conventional

among er,

beyond the

economics as defined according

the utmost

treatment of value-judgments can do without

opment

division

of

labor.

It

the tasks of social philosophy.

has been and

facts

the possibility of desiring a

so

sonal ideals,

i.e.,

great that our journal cannot renounce this

certain thing.

Even the editors and the collabo-

task. this

It

of social

life

still

is

shall rather regard the investigation of

phenomenon

as one of

its

most important

obligations.

But

the

judgments

of

human

as alien" to

is

scientific

may

not

treatment

only

of

value-

and

understand

our journal will regard

rators

a long

human

them

way from

this

it

frailty to the belief in

an "ethical"

sci-

ence of economics, which would derive ideals

and produce concrete

from

ends and the ideals which underlie them;

norms by applying general

can

But

acknowledgment of

empathically analyze (uncherlcboi) the desired it

"nothing

in this respect.

its

subject matter

ethical imperatives.

— 126

PARTI;

It is

true that

THE CLASSIC TRADITION

we

regard as objectively valuable

labor

protective

of

sections

legislation

—

in

those innermost elements of the "personality,"

short,

those highest and most ultimate value-judgments which determine our conduct and give meaning and significance to our life. We can indeed espouse these values only when they appear to us as valid, as derived from our highest values and when they are developed in the struggle against the difficulties which life pre-

appearance, only the means for the attainment

sents. Certainly, the dignity of the "personali-

expediency which would very often be incorrect even in this case we would have to recog-

ty" lies in the fact that for

about which

organizes

it

there exist values

—even

all

those issues in which, at least in

of the goal are at issue. But even

if

we were

to

mistake the illusion of self-evidence for truth which science can never do without damaging itself

—and wished to view the confUcts imme-

diately

from

arising

realization

attempts

practical

at

purely technical questions of

as

—

—

these

nize that this illusion of the self-evidence of

values are in certain cases concentrated exclu-

normative standards of value is dissipated as soon as we pass from the concrete problems of

it

its life;

if

sively within the sphere of the person's "individuality," then "self-realization" in tlwse interests for

which

it

claims validity as values,

idea with respect to which is

is

the

whole existence oriented. Only on the assumption of belief in

the validity of values

value-judgments jiiii^c

is

the attempt to espouse

However,

meaningful.

the validity of such values

faith. It

may

perhaps be a task

tive interpretation of life

is

it

to

a matter of

for the specula-

and the universe

quest of their meaning. But fall

its

in

certainly does not

within the province of an empirical science

which

be practised here. The empirically demonstrable fact that these ultimate ends undergo historical changes and are debatable does not affect this distinction between empirical science and value-judgments, contrary to what is often thought. For even the in the sense in

knowledge

of the

it is

most

to

certain proposition of

—

our theoretical sciences e.g., the exact natural sciences or mathematics, is, like the cultivation and refinement of the conscience, a product of culture. However, when we call to mind the practical problems of economic and social policy

(in the

usual sense),

we

see that there are

many, indeed countless, practical questions in the discussion of which there seems to be general agreement about the self-evident character of certain goals. Among these we may mention emergency credit, the concrete problems of social hygiene, poor relief, factory inspection, industrial courts,

employment exchanges,

large

philanthropic and protective social and eco-

nomic

economic and

services to problems of

The

social policy.

distinctive characteristic of a

problem of social polici/ is indeed the fact that it cannot be resolved merely on the basis of purely

which

considerations

technical

assume

already settled ends. Normative standards of

value can and must be the objects of dispute in a

problem of

discussion of a

because the problem

And

eral cultural values.

merely, as

we

the

social

policy

domain

of gen-

the conflict occurs not

are too easily inclined to believe

between

today,

lies in

"class interests" but

general views on

and the

life

between

uni\'erse as well.

This latter point, however, does not lessen the truth

the

that

decided quite

among

between

accepting

the

by

degree it

the

for

value-

individual espouses

is

other factors and certainly to a

significant

affinity

ultimate

particular

judgment which

and

the

degree

of

his class interests

time

being

this

only

unambiguous term. One thing is under all circumstances, namely, the

superficially

certain

more "general" this case, the

the problem in\olved, i.e., in broader its cultural significance,

the less subject it is to a single unambiguous answer on the basis of the data of empirical sciences and the greater the nile played by \alueideas (Werfideen) and the ultimate and highest personal axioms o( belief. It is simply naive to believe, although

there are

many

specialists

CHAPTER

who

even

now

occasionally do, that

and

ble to establish fically valid

to

it is

demonstrate as

"a principle" for practical social

norms

for the solution

of practical problems can be

unambiguously

science from which the

However much

Only an optimistic syncretism, such as

possi-

scienti-

127

MAX WEBER: THE IRON CAGE

5:

the product

times,

is,

at

of evolutionary-historical

delude

relativism, can theoretically

about

itself

the profound seriousness of this situation or practically shirk

its

consequences.

It

can, to be

the social sciences

sure, be just as obligatory subjectively for the

need the discussion of practical problems in terms of fundamental principles, i.e., the reduction of unreflective value-judgments to the premises from which they are logically derived and however much our journal intends to devote itself specially to them certainly the creation of a lowest common denominator for our problems in the form of generally valid ultimate value-judgments cannot be its task or

practical politician, in the individual case, to

derived.

—

mediate between antagonistic points of view as to take sides with one of them. But this has nothing whatsoever to do with scientific "objectivity." Scientifically the "middle course"

not truer even

extreme

in/

party

Nowhere

are

a hair's breadth,

ideals

the

the

of

interests

of

is

than the most or

right

left.

more

science

poorly served in the long run than in those

sit-

science.

uations where one refuses to see uncomfortable

Such a thing would not only be impracticable; it would be entirely meaningless as well. Whatever the interpretation of the basis and the

and the realities of life in all their starkThe Archiv will struggle relentlessly against the severe self-deception which asserts

nature of the validity of the ethical imperatives,

that

from them, as from the norms for the concretely conditioned conduct of the individual, cultural values cannot be unambigu-

points of view, or by following a line between

arrived

ously derived as being normatively desirable;

since this piece of self-deception tries to

can do so the less, the more inclusive are the values concerned. Only positive religions or

its

more

bound

than the former naive faith of parties in the

of cul-

entific

in general the task of

it is

any empirical

certain that

it

—

sects

precisely expressed: dogmatically

—are able

to confer

tural values the status of ethical

on the content

unconditionally valid

imperatives. Outside these sects, cultural

which the individual wishes to realize and ethical obligations which he should fulfill do not, in principle, share the same status. The fate of an epoch which has eaten of the tree of knowledge is that it must know that we cannot learn the meaning of the world from the results of its analysis, be it ever so perfect; it must rather be in a position to create this meaning itself. It must recognize that general views of life and the universe can never be the products of increasing empirical knowledge, and that the highest ideals, which move us most forcefully, are always formed only in the struggle with other ideals which are just as sacred to ideals

others as ours are to us.

facts

ness.

through the synthesis of several party

them, practical norms of at.

own

it is

is

It

scientific validity

standards of value in

more dangerous

to the

distinguish

to

knowledge

and

freedom of research

between duty

and

own ideals constitute which we wish to adhere with our

the

to see the fac-

tual truth as well as the practical

to

sci-

empirical

value-judgments,

fulfillment of the scientific

for

mask

relativistic terms,

"demonstrability" of their dogmas. The

capacity

up

can be

necessary to do this because,

duty the

to

stand

program

ever increas-

ing firmness.

There

is

and always

reason that

it

will

concerns us

be—and the —an unbridgeable this is

among (1) those arguments which appeal to our capacity to become enthusiastic about and our feeling for concrete practical distinction

aims or cultural forms and values, (2) those arguments in which, once it is a question of the validity of ethical norms, the appeal is directed to our conscience, and finally (3) those arguments which appeal to our capacity and need

128

THE CLASSIC TRADITION

PARTI:

for analytically ordering empirical reality in a

manner which

lavs claim to validity as empiri-

This proposition remains correct, desee, the fact that those highest

cal truth.

we shall

spite, as

this point. There is one tenet to which we adhere most firmly in our work, namely, that a social science journal, in our sense, to the extent that it is scientific should be a place

"values" underlving the practical interest are

where those

and alwavs

remain with our

will

be decisively significant in

truths

which — —can claim, even

sought,

are

illustration

to

determining the focus of attention of analytical

for a Chinese, the \'aliditv appropriate to

activitv (ordnende Tdtigkeit des Denkens) in the

analvsis of empirical reaUty.

sphere of the cultural sciences.

It

has been and

remains true that a systematically correct scientific proof in the social sciences, if it is to achieve its purpose, must be acknowledged as or more precisely correct even by a Chinese

—

— —

must constantly strive to attain this goal, which perhaps may not be completely attainable due to faulty data. Furthermore, the stated

it

successful logical analysis of the content of an

and

ideal

its

ultimate axioms and the discovery

of the consequences it,

which

arise

from pursuing

must also be valid the Chinese. At the same time, our Chinese

logically

for

and

practically,

can lack a "sense" for our ethical imperative and he can and certainly often will deny the ideal itself and the concrete value-judgments derived from

it.

Neither of these two

latter atti-

tudes can affect the scientific value of the analysis in any way. Quite certainlv our journal

and inevitably recurunambiguous interpre-

will not ignore the ever

rent attempts to give an tation

On

culture.

to

the

contrary,

these

attempts themselves rank with the most impor-

an

Of course, the editors cannot once and for all deny to themselves or their contributors the possibility of expressing

the ideals

in

value-judgments

which motivate them. However two

important duties arise in connection with this. First, to keep the readers and themseh'es sharplv aware at every

moment

of the stan-

dards by which they judge reality and from which the value-judgment is derived, instead of, as happens too often, deceiving themselves in the conflict of ideals by a value melange of values of the most different orders and types,

and seeking

something

to ever^'body If heeded, the practical evaluative attitude can be not only harmless to scientific interests but even directly useto offer

this obligation is rigorously

and indeed mandator)'. In the scientific and other practical recommendations, the motives of the legislator and the ideals of the critic in all their scope often can not be clarified and analyzed in a tangible and intelligible form in any other way ful,

criticism of legislative

follow with care the course of these discussions

than through the confrontation of the standards of value underlving the ideas criticized with others, preferably the critic's own. Every meaningful valuc-judg)ncnt about someone else's aspirations must be a criticism from the

of "social philosophy" (as here understood).

standpoint of one's

We

must be

under dvnamic

tant products of this cultural life and,

circumstances,

certain forces.

We

among

its

will therefore constantlv strive to

are furthermore completely free of the prej-

own

Wclta)isclianung:

a struggle against another's ideals

it

from

udice which asserts that reflections on culture which go bevond the analvsis of empirical data

the standpoint of one's own. If in a particular concrete case, the ultimate value-axioms which

order to interpret the world metaphysically

underlie practical acti\'itv are not only to be designated and scientificallv analyzed but are

in

can, because of their metaphysical character fulfill

no useful cognitive

cognitive tasks are ical

is

tasks. Just

what these

primarily an epistemolog-

question, the answer to which

and can,

in \-iew of

we must

our purpose, disregard

at

also to be

shown

in their relationship to other

value-axioms, "positive" criticism by means of a systematic exposition of the latter able.

is

unavoid-

CHAPTER

In the pages of this journal, especially in the

discussion of legislation, there will inevitably

be found social ideals,

policy,

in addition

analysis of facts. But

i.e.,

the statement of

social science,

to

we do

i.e.,

not by any

the

means

intend to present such discussions as "science"

and we

guard as best we can against allowing these two to be confused with each other. In such discussions, science no longer has the floor. For that reason, the second fundamental imperative of scientific freedom is that in such cases it should be constantly made will

clear to the readers (and

above

—again

we

say

one's

self!)

exactly at

MAX WEBER: THE IRON CAGE

"objections," replies

and

129

rebuttals, but in

its

pages no one will be protected, neither its contributors nor its editors, from being subjected sharpest

the

to

factual,

Whoever cannot bear

scientific

criticism.

who

takes the

this or

viewpoint that he does not wish to work, in the service of scientific knowledge, with persons whose other ideals are different from his own, is

free not to participate.

However, we should not deceive ourselves about

it

—

this last

in practice

the

it

which point the scientific investigator becomes silent and the evaluating and acting person begins to speak. In other words, it shouki be made explicit just where the arguments are addressed to the analytical understanding and where to the sentiments. The constant confusion of the scientific discussion of facts and their evaluation is still one of the most widespread and also one of the most damaging traits of work in our field. The foregoing arguments are directed against this confusion, and all to

5;

first

than

it

sentence means

seems

to

do

much more

at first glance. In

place, there are psychological limits

everywhere and especially in Germany to the possibility of coming together freely with one's political opponents in a neutral forum, be it social or intellectual. This obstacle which should be relentlessly combatted as a sign of narrow-minded party fanaticism and back-

ward

political culture, is reinforced for a jour-

nal like ours through the fact that in social sci-

ences the stimulus to the posing of scientific problems is in actuality always given by practical "questions."

Hence

the very recognition of

the existence of a scientific

problem coincides,

not against the clear-cut introduction of one's

personally, with the possession of specifically

own

oriented motives and values.

ideals into the discussion.

An

attitude of

moral indifference has no connection with scientific

"objectivity."

The Archiv, at least in its been and should never be

intentions, has never

a place

where polemics against

certain currents

in politics or social policy are carried on,

should

it

be a place where struggles are

nor

waged

has

come

into existence

A journal which under the influence of

a general interest in a concrete problem, will

always include among

who

its

contributors persons

are personally interested in these prob-

lems because certain concrete situations seem to be incompatible with, or seem to threaten,

for or against ideals in politics or social-policy.

the realization of certain ideal values in

There are other journals for these purposes. The peculiar characteristic of the journal has rather been from the very beginning and, inso-

they believe.

far as

it is

in the

power

of the editors, shall con-

tinue to be that political antagonists can meet in

it

to carry

on

scientific

work.

a "socialist" organ hitherto shall not

from

be "bourgeois."

its circle

It

of contributors

place himself within the tific

and

discussion.

It

It

has not been

in the future

it

excludes no one

who

is

willing to

framework of

scien-

cannot be an arena

for

A bond

which

of similar ideals will hold

this circle of contributors together

and

it

will be

the basis of a further recruitment. This in turn will tend to give the journal, at least in

ment

its treat-

of questions of practical social policy, a

which of course inevitably accompanies every collaboration of vigorously certain "character"

whose evaluative standpoint regarding the problems cannot be entirely expressed even in purely theoretical analysis; sensitive persons

in the criticism of practical

recommendations

130

PARTI:

THE CLASSIC TRADITION

and measures it quite legitimately finds expression under the particular conditions above discussed. The Archiv first appeared at a time in which certain practical aspects of the "labor problem" (as traditionally understood) stood

—

constituted a source of strength for the journal;

under the given circumstances it was perhaps even one of its claims to the justification for its existence.

There can be no doubt that the development

in the forefront of social science discussions.

of a "character," in this sense, in a scientific

Those persons for whom the problems which the Archil' wished to treat were bound up with ultimate and decisive value-judgments and who on that account became its most regular contributors also espoused at the same time the view of culture which was strongly influenced by these value-judgments. We all know that though this journal, through its explicit selfrestriction "scientific" discussions and to through the express invitation to the "adher-

journal can constitute a threat to the freedom of

ents of

all political

would pursue less

standpoints," denied that

a certain "tendency,"

it

it

nonethe-

possessed a "character" in the above sense.

This "character" was created by the group of its

regular contributors. In general they were

men who, whatever may have been

other

divergences in their points of view, set as their goal the protection of the physical well-being of the laboring masses and the increase of the latters'

share of the material and intellectual

values

of

our

culture.

employed the combination

As

a

means,

they

of state intervention

into the arena of material interests with the

shaping of the existing political and legal Whatever may have been their opinion as to the form of the social order in the more remote future for the present, they accepted the emergent trends of the capitalist system, not because they seemed better than the older forms of social organization but because they seemed to be practically inevitable and because the attempt to wage a fundamental struggle against it appeared to hinder and not aid the freer

order.

—

working class. In the situawhich exists in Germany today we need not be more specific at this point this was not and is not to be avoided. Indeed, it bore direct fruit in the successful many-sidedness of the participation in the scientific discussion and it cultural rise of the tion

—

—

scientific analysis;

when

it

really

does amount to that is purposely

the selection of contributors

one-sided.

In

this

case the cultivation of a

"character" in a journal

is

practically equiva-

The ediaware of the responsibility which this situation imposes upon them. They propose lent to the existence of a "tendency."

tors are

neither the deliberate transformation of the

character of the Archiv nor

vation by

means

contributors

to

its artificial

scholars

of

party loyalties. They accept

await

which

further

its it

fications

takes in

which

preser-

of a careful restriction of the

it

certain it

definite

as given

and

"development." The form the future and the modi-

may undergo

the inevitable broadening of

as a result of

its circle

of con-

depend primarily on the characpersons who, seeking to serve the ter of those cause of science, enter the circle and become or tributors will

remain frequent contributors. It will be further affected by the broadening of the problems, the advancement of which is a goal of the journal. With these remarks we come to the question on which we have not yet touched, namely, the factvial delimitation of our field of operations. No answer can, however, be given without raising the question as to the goal of social science

knowledge

in general.

When we

distinguished

between "value-judgments" and "empirical knowledge," we presupposed the existence of an unconditionally valid type of knowledge in the social sciences, i.e., the anain

principle

lytical

ordering of empirical social reality This

now becomes our problem we must discuss the meaning

presupposition

in

the sense that

of

objectively "valid" truth in the social sciences.

The genuineness of the problem is apparent to anyone who is aware of the conflict about

CHAPTER

5:

methods, "fundamental concepts" and presup-

description of

positions, the incessant shift of "viewpoints,"

of this "individual

and the continuous redefinition of "concepts" and who sees that the theoretical and historical modes of analysis are still separated by an

of explaining

apparently unbridgeable gap. It constitutes, as a despairing Viennese examinee once sorrow-

only a

fully complained,

only

What

"tzoo sciences of

economics."

meaning of "objectivity" in this The following discussion will be

the

is

context?

devoted

***************

There

to this question.

is

no absolutely "objective"

scientific

— —

or put perhaps more narrowly but certainly not essentially differently of "social phenomena" for our purposes independent of special and "one-sided" viewpoints according to which expressly or tacitly, consciously or unconsciously they are selected, analyzed and organized for expository pur-

analysis of culture

—

poses.

The reasons

of the cognitive goal of

all

research in social

sci-

all

it

the individual

phenomena,"

components

to say

nothing

causally. All the analysis of

which the finite human mind can conduct rests on the tacit assumption that infinite reality

portion of this reality constitutes

finite

the object of scientific investigation, is

it

and

that

"important" in the sense of being

"worthy of being known." But what are the criby which this segment is selected? It has often been thought that the decisive criterion in teria

the cultural sciences, too,

was

in the last analy-

the "regular" recurrence of certain causal

sis,

relationships.

The "laws" which we are able

to

perceive in the infinitely manifold stream of

events must

—according

to this

conception

contain the scientifically "essential" aspect of reality.

—

for this lie in the character

131

MAX WEBER: THE IRON CAGE

.

.

.

.

.

.

We seek knowledge of an historical phe-

nomenon, meaning by

historical: significant in

individuality (Eigenart).

its

element in

this is that

And

the decisive

only through the presuppart alone of the infinite

ence which seeks to transcend the purely formal treatment of the legal or conventional norms

position that a finite

regulating social

knowledge of an individual phenomenon become logically meaningful. Even with the widest imaginable knowledge of "laws," we

The type interested ity

is

life.

of social science in

an empirical

which we are

science of concrete real-

(Wirklichkeitswissenschaft).

Our aim

is

the

understanding of the characteristic uniqueness of the reality in which we move. We wish to understand on the one hand the relationships

variety of

phenomena

is

significant,

does the

are helpless in the face of the question:

how

is

the causal explanation of an individual fact possi-

—since

ble

a description

of

even the smallest

and on the other the causes of their being historically so and not otherzvise. Now, as soon as we attempt to reflect about the way in which life confronts us in immediate concrete situa-

can never be exhaustive? The number and type of causes which have influenced any given event are always infinite and there is nothing in the things themselves to set some of them apart as alone meriting attention. A chaos of "existential judgments" about countless individual events would be the only

presents an infinite multiplicity of suc-

result of a serious attempt to analyze reality

and the

cultural

significance

of

individual

events in their contemporary manifestations

tions,

it

and coexistently emerging and disappearing events, both "within" and "outside" ourselves. The absolute infinitude of this multiplicity is seen to remain undiminished even when our attention is focused on a single

cessively

"object," for instance, a concrete act of exchange,

as soon as

we

seriously attempt an exhaustive

slice of reality

presuppositions." And even this only seemingly possible, since every single perception discloses on closer examination an infinite number of constituent percep-

"without

result

is

which

can never be exhaustively judgment. Order is brought into chaos only on the condition that in every

tions

expressed this

in a

132

THE CLASSIC TRADITION

PARTI:

case only a pmrt of concrete reality

and

is

interesting

because only it is related to the cultural values with which we approach significant to us,

reality.

Only

which we

attribute

—are

They alone

And even

a

therefore

ficance

same

comphenomenon, namely those to

certain sides of the infinitely

plex concrete

general cultural signi-

worthwhile

knowing.

are objects of causal explanation.

this causal

explanation evinces the

an exhaustive causal investigaany concrete phenomena in its full

character;

tion of

—

only practically impossible it is simply nonsense. We select only those causes to which are to be imputed in the individual reality is not

an event. Where

case, the "essential" feature of

the

indii'iciualiti/

phenomenon

of a

the question of causality lazvs

concerned,

not a question of

is

but of concrete causal

a question of the

is

relationships;

it

is

not

subsumption of the event

under some general rubric as a representative its imputation as a consequence of

case but of

some

constellation.

It

is

in brief a question of

—

phenomenon an "historical indiunder consideration, the knowledge

a "cultural

vidual"

is

Wherever the causal explanation of

imputation.

is not the end of the investigation but only a means. It facilitates and renders possible the causal imputation to their concrete

of causal laws

causes of those components of a

phenomenon

which is culturally signiand only so far as it achieves this, is it valuable for our knowledge of concrete relationships. And the more "general," i.e., the the individuality of ficant.

more

So

far

abstract the laws, the less they can con-

are "objectively" less governed

on a basis of the

in zuhich situations this is the case is not

empirical reality of "laws,"

not

meaningless,

as

is

is

the reduction of

meaningless.

often

because cultural or psychic events

It is

maintained, for instance

it is

decided accord-

ing to the value-ideas in the light of which

view "culture" ture"

a finite

is

we

each individual case. "Culsegment of the meaningless

in

world process, a segment on beings confer meaning and significance. This is true even for the human being who views a particular culture as a mortal enemy and who seeks to "return to nature." He can attain this point of view only after viewing the culture in which he lives from the standpoint of his values, and finding it "too infinity of the

human

which

soft."

This

which

is

is

the purely logical-formal

when we speak

involved

fact

of the logi-

cally necessary rootedness of all historical enti-

"evaluative ideas."

ties (historische Individuen) in

of every our finding a certain culture or any "culture" in general to be valu-

The transcendental presupposition cultural science lies not in

able

but rather in the fact that we are cultural beendowed with the capacity and the will to

ings,

take a deliberate attitude towards the world

and

to

lend

and

is

which the concrete have for us in certain

revealed to us by any law;

phenomena and, more intlirectly, to the understanding of the significance of cultural events.

that the ideal of science

is

individual concrete situations. In which sense

and

significance

The conclusion which follows from the above is that an "objective" analysis of cultural events, which proceeds according to the thesis

It

significance

constellations of reality

tribute to the causal imputation of individual

***************

by laws.

meaningless for a number of other reasons. Firstly, because the knowledge of social laws is not knowledge of social reality but is rather one of the various aids used by our minds for attaining this end; secondly, because knowledge of cidtural events is inconceivable except

tain

significance.

it

may

phenomena

be,

of

it

will lead

human

Whatever

this

us to judge cer-

existence in

its

light

respond to them as being (positively or negatively) meaningful. Whatever may be the to

content

of

this

attitude

— these

have cultural significance significance alone rests

for

its

phenomena

us and on this

scientific

interest.

Thus when we speak here of the conditioning of cultural knowledge through ezuduative ideas (Wertideen) (following the terminology of modern logic), it is done in the hope that we will

CHAPTER

to crude misunderstandings such as the opinion that cultural significance should be attributed only to valuable phenome-

not be subject

na. Prostitution

as

much

a cultural

is

phenomenon

just

as religion or money- All three are cul-

phenomena

because and only insofar as their existence and the form which they historically assume touch directly or indirectly on our cultural interests and arouse our striving for knowledge concerning problems brought tural

onli/

by the

into focus

ev^aluative ideas

which give

fragment of reahty analyzed

significance to the

by those concepts. All knowledge of cultural reality, as may be seen, is always knowledge from pmrticular points of view. When we require from the historian and social research worker as an elementary presupposition that they distinguish the important

from the

trivial

and

that they should

have the

must understand how to relate the events of the real world consciously or that they

MAX WEBER: THE IRON CAGE

133

out the investigator's conviction regarding the significance of particular cultural facts, every attempt to analyze concrete reahty is absolutely meaningless, so the direction of his personal values in the prism of his mind, gives direction to his work. And the values to which the scientific genius relates the obbelief, the refraction of

ject

of his inquiry

may

determine,

i.e.,

decide

whole epoch, not only

the "conception" of a

concerning what is regarded as "valuable" but also concerning what is significant or insignificant, "important" or "unimportant" in the

phenomena. Accordingly, cultural science in our sense involves "subjective" presuppositions insofar it concerns itself only with those components of reality which have some relationship,

as

however

indirect, to events to

cultural significance.

necessary "point of view" for this distinction,

we mean

5:

.

.

used

Accordingly

.

by

historians

.

.

which we attach

.

the are

synthetic either

concepts

imperfectly

the notion that those stand-

as soon as the ehmination of ambisought for, the concept becomes an abstract ideal type and reveals itself therewith as a theoretical and hence "one-sided" view-

points can be derived from the "facts them-

point which illuminates the aspect of reality

unconsciously to universal "cultural values" and to select out those relationships which are significant for us.

If

selves" continually recurs,

it is

it

is

due

to the

who

to the naive

unaware evaluative ideas with which

self-deception of the specialist that

due

is

defined

guity

or,

is

with which are

it

shown

schema

can be related. But these concepts be obviously inappropriate as

to

which reality could be completely For none of those systems of ideas, which are absolutely indispensable in the understanding of those segments of reality into

he unconsciously approaches his subject matter, that he has selected from an absolute infinity a tiny portion with the study of which he concerns

integrated.

himself. In connection with this selection of

which are meaningful at a particular moment, can exhaust its infinite richness. They are aU

individual special "aspects" of the event which

always and every^vhere occurs, consciously or unconsciously, there also occurs that element of cultural-scientific work which is referred to by

attempts, on the basis of the present state of

work if its existence is to be To be sure, without the investigator's evaluative ideas, there would be no principle of selection of subject-matter and no meaningful

our knowledge and the available conceptual patterns, to bring order into the chaos of those facts which we have drawn into the field circumscribed by our interest. The intellectual apparatus which the past has developed through the analysis, or more truthfully, the analytical rearrangement of the immediately given reahty, and through the latter's integration by concepts which correspond to the state

knowledge of the concrete

of

the often-heard assertion that the "personal"

element of a

scientific

valuable in

and

it,

work

is

what is really must be ex-

that personality

pressed in every justified.

reality. Just as

with-

its

knowledge and the focus of

its interest, is

1

34

PART

THE CLASSIC TRADITION

1

in constant tension with the new knowledge which we can and desire to wrest from reaUty. The progress of cultural science occurs through this conflict. Its result is the

perpetual recon-

which we

struction of those concepts through

order

its

data into a system of concepts, the is to be acquired and slowly

content of which

perfected through the obser\'ation of empirical the

regularities,

and

construction of hypotheses,

their verification, until finally a "complet-

seek to comprehend

ed" and hence deductive science emerges. For

cial sciences is

this goal, the historical-inductive

reality. The history of the soand remains a continuous process

passing from the attempt to order reality analytithe cally through the construction of concepts

—

dissolution of the analytical constructs so constructed through the expansion scientific

horizon

of concepts

and

shift of the

—and the reformulation anew

on the foundations thus

trans-

formed. It is not the error of the attempt to construct conceptual systems in general which is shown by this process every science, even simple descriptive history, operates with the

—

conceptual stock-in-trade of this

its

time. Rather,

process shows that in the cultural sciences

concept-construction depends on the setting of the problem,

and the

tent of culture

itself.

latter \'aries

The

with the con-

relationship

between

present-dav

is

work

of the

a preliminary' task necessitated

by the imperfections of our discipline. Nothing can be more suspect, from this point of view, than the construction and application of clearcut concepts since this seems to be an overhasty anticipation of the remote future.

This conception was, in principle, impregnable within the framework of the classicalscholastic epistemology which was still funda-

mentally assumed by the majority of the research-workers identified with the Historical School. The function of concepts was assumed to

be the reproduction of "objective" reality in

the analyst's imagination.

Hence

references to the unreality of

all

the recurrent clear-cut con-

at theor\'-construction

If one perceives the implications of the fundamental ideas of modern epistemology which ultimately derives from Kant; namely,

our science were always useful for revealing

that concepts are primarily analytical instru-

the limits of the significance of those points of

ments for the intellectual mastery of empirical data and can be only that, the fact that precise

concept and reality in the cultural sciences involves the transitoriness of all such syntheses.

in

The great attempts

view which provided their foundations. The greatest advances in the sphere of the social sciences are substantively tied in

practical

guise of a

Adherence

up with

the shift

cultural

problems and take the

critique

of

to the

concept-construction.

purpose of

this critique

and

conclusions which are to be

not cause

him

desist

to

from constructing

them. The relationship between concept and historical research is reversed for those who appreciate

this;

the

goal

of

the

Historical

among drawn

end of understanding phenomena \vhich are significant from concrete indi\idual \iew-

of

the primary tasks of our journal. In the

genetic concepts are necessarily ideal types will

School then appears as logically impossible, the concepts are not ends but are means to the

therewith the in\estigation of the principles syntheses in the social sciences shall be

cepts.

from what has been said, we come to a point where perhaps our views diverge here and there from those of many, and even the most

points.

outstanding, representatives of the Historical too are to

only purpose of which was to trace the course of the hair-line which separates science from

be numbered. The latter still hold in many ways, expressly or tacitly, to the opinion that it is the end and the goal of everv science to

quest for social and economic knowledge. The ohjectiiv validity of all empirical knowledge

School,

among whose

offspring

we

*************** We are now at

faith

and

to

the

make

end of

this discussion, the

explicit the nieani)ig of the

CHAPTER

upon

5:

135

MAX WEBER; THE IRON CAGE

ordering of the

discontinue assessing the value of the individ-

given reality according to categories which are subjective in a specific sense, namely, in that

ual facts in terms of their relationships to ulti-

they present the presuppositions of our knowledge and are based on the presupposition of

ness

exclusively

rests

the

of

value

those

knowledge alone

is

the

which empirical The means

truths

able to give us.

available to our science offer nothing to those

persons to whom this truth is of no value. It should be remembered that the belief in the value of scientific truth is the product of certain cultures and is not a product of man's original nature.

Those

for

whom scientific truth is

of

no

value will seek in vain for some other truth to take the place of science in just those respects in

which

it is

of concepts

unique, namely, in the provision

and judgments which are neither

empirical reality nor reproductions of

which

facilitate

its

analytical

but

it

ordering in a

mate value-ideas. Indeed,

we have

knowledge

its

ultimate

value-ideas in general.

it

will lose

And

it

aware-

its

rootedness

the

in

well that

is

should be so. But there comes a moment when the atmosphere changes. The significance of the unreflectively utilized viewpoints becomes uncertain and the road

is lost

in the twilight.

problems moves on. Then science too prepares to change its

The

light of the great cultural

standpoint and its analytical apparatus and to view the streams of events from the heights of thought. It follows those stars which alone are able to give meaning and direction to its labors: ". der neue Trieb erwacht, .

.

Ich eile fort, ihr ewiges Licht zu trinken,

Vor mir den Tag und unter mir die Nacht, Den Himmel ;auuber mir und unter mir die

valid manner. In the empirical social sciences, as

of

Wellen."-

seen, the possibility of meaningful of

what

infinite richness of

is

essential for us in the

events

bound up with

is

the

viewpoints of a specifically particularized character, which, in unremitting application

of

the last analysis, are oriented

on the

able as elements of meaningful

and analyz-

human

con-

deduced

duct, but their validity can not be

from empirical data as such. The "objectivity" of the social sciences depends rather on the fact that the empirical data are always related to those evaluative ideas which alone make them worth knowing and the significance of the empirical data is derived from these evaluative ideas. But these data can never become the foundation for the empirically impossible proof of the validity of the evaluative ideas.

.

Class, Status, Party

basis of

evaluative ideas. These evaluative ideas are for their part empirically discoverable

Max Weber:

.

A. Economically Determined

Power and the

The structure

of every legal

Status Order.

order directly influences the distribution of

power,

economic

or

otherwise,

respective community. This

is

orders and not only that of the

within

true of

all

its

legal

state. In general,

we understand by "power" the chance of a man or a number of men to realize their own will in a social action

even against the resistance of oth-

who are participating in the action.

ers

"Economically conditioned" power

is

course, identical with "power" as such.

not, of

On

the

.

All research in the cultural sciences in an age of specialization, once

it is

oriented towards a

given subject matter through particular tings

of

problems and has established

setits

methodological principles, will consider the analysis of the data as an end in

itself. It

will

Act I, Scene II. (Translated by Bayard-Taylor) "The newborn impulse fires my mind,

'Fauil:

hasten on, his beams eternal drinking, The Dav before me and the Night behind. Above me Heaven unfurled, the floor of waves beneath I

me."

136

THE CLASSIC TRADITION

PARTI:

emergence of economic power be the consequence of power existing on other grounds. Man does not strive for power only in order to enrich himself economically. Power, including economic po^ver, mav be \'alued for its own sake. Very frequently the stri\'ing for power is also conditioned by the social honor it entails. Not all power, however, entails contrary, the

are not communities; they merely represent

may

possible,

The

social honor:

typical

American Boss,

as well

as the typical big speculator, deliberately relin-

social honor.

Nor

is

power

the only basis of

component of their life chances, insofar as (2) this component is represented exclusively by economic interests in the possession of goods and opportunities for income, and (3) is represented under the conditions of the commodity or labor markets. This is

It

way

the

in

property

distributed

purpose of exchange,

specific life chances.

honor,

may

be guaranteed by the legal order,

but, at least normally,

The

it

is

not their primary

an additional enhances the chance to hold power or honor; but it can not always secure them. The way in which social honor is distributed in a community between typical groups particsource.

legal order is rather

factor that

ipating in this distribution order."

The

social

we

order and

call

the "status

the economic

order are related in a similar manner to the order. However, the economic order merely defines the way in which economic goods and services are distributed and used. Of course, the status order is strongly influenced by it, and in turn reacts upon it. legal

Now:

"classes," "status groups,"

ties" are phenomena of the power within a community.

and "par-

distribution

of

a plurality of

in

in itself creates

The mode of distribution, accord with the law of marginal utility,

excludes the non-wealthy from competing for highly valued goods; it favors the owners and, in fact, gives to

them

a

monopoly

to acquire

such goods. Other things being equal, the mode of distribution monopolizes the opportunities for profitable deals for all

those who,

provided with goods, do not necessarily have to exchange them. It increases, at least generally, their power in the price struggle with those who, being propertyless, have nothing to offer but their labor or the resulting products, and who are compelled to get rid of these products in order to subsist at tioiT

all.

The mode

of distribu-

gi\es to the propertied a moiiopoly on the

from the sphere of use as "wealth" to the sphere of "cap-

possibility of transferring property

ital,"

that

is, it

function and indirectly in

Determination of Class Situation by Market Situation. In our terminology, "classes" B.

among

people, meeting competitively in the market for the

very frequently has been. Power, as well as

"class situation."

which the disposition over material

is

may even be

and

is

the most elemental economic fact that

social honor. Indeed, social honor, or prestige,

the basis of economic power,

for social action.

speak of a "class" when (1) a number of people have in common a specific causal

quishes social honor. Quite generally, "mere eco-

nomic" power, and especially "naked" money power, is by no means a recognized basis of

and frequent, bases

We may

gives

them the entrepreneurial

chances to share directly or returns on capital. All this holds all

true within the area in

which pure market conand "lack of proper-

ditions prevail. "Property"

ty" are, therefore, the basic categories of all

and

from M.ix Weber; Eamomy and Socicli/, Vol. 2, pp. 926-939, edited bv Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich. Copyright 1U78 by The ReSource

"Class, Status

Party,"

gents of the Uni\ersitv of California, University of California Press Reprinted bv permission.

does not matter whether

class

situations.

these

two categories become

It

competiti\'e struggles of the

the

effecti\'e in

consumers or

of

the producers.

Within these categories, however, class

situ-

ations are further differentia ted: on the one

CHAPTER

137

MAX WEBER; THE IRON CAGE

5:

hand, according to the kind of property that is usable for returns; and, on the other hand, according to the kind of services that can be offered in the market. Ownership of dwelUngs; workshops; warehouses; stores; agriculturally usable land in large or small holdings a quantitative difference with possibly qualitative consequences; ownership of mines; cattle; men (slaves); disposition over mobile instruments of

ever primitive, with rates of interest increasing

production, or capital goods of

They

—

cially

money

exchanged

or objects

for

all sorts,

espe-

could

plutocracy

develop.

Therewith "class

struggles" begin.

Those men whose fate is not determined by goods or services for themselves on the market, e.g., slaves, are not, howthe chance of using

ever, a class in the technical sense of the term. are, rather, a status

group.

can easily be

that

money; disposition over prod-

own

according to the extent of dearth and factual monopolization of lending in the hands of a

C. Social Action

According

Flowing from Class

Interest.

ing to their kinds of services as according to the

our terminology, the factor that creates "class" is unambiguously economic interest, and indeed, only those interests involved in the existence of the market. Nevertheless, the concept of class-interest is an ambiguous one: even as an empirical concept it is ambiguous as soon as one understands by it something other than the factual direction of interests following with a certain probability from the class situation for a certain average of those people subjected to the class situation. The class situation and other circumstances remaining the same, the direction in which the

way

in which they make use of these services, continuous or discontinuous relation to a recipient. But always this is the generic connotation of the concept of class: that the kind of chance in the market is the decisive moment

individual worker, for instance,

in a

sue his interests

which presents a common condition

for the

interests

in

social action of a larger or smaller portion of

ucts of one's

labor or of others' labor dif-

fering according to their various distances

consumability;

disposition

monopolies of any kind

—

all

over

from

transferable

these distinctions

differentiate the class situations of the propertied just as

does the "meaning" which they can

give to the use of property, especially to property

which has money equivalence. Accordingly,

the propertied, for instance,

may

belong to the

class of rentiers or to the class of entrepreneurs.

Those

who have no

individual's

fate.

who offer much accord-

property but

services are differentiated just as

Class situation

is,

this

The effect of naked possession per se, which among cattle breeders gives the non-owning slave or serf sense, ultimately market situation.

into the

power

of the cattle owner,

is

only a

fore-runner of real "class" formation. However, in the cattle loan

and

in the

naked severity of

the law of debts in such communities for the first

time mere "possession" as such emerges

as decisive for the fate of the individual; this

much

in contrast to crop-raising

is

communities,

which are based on labor. The creditor-debtor relation becomes the basis of "class situations" first in the cities, where a "credit market," how-

to

whether he task at

those

is

likely to pur-

vary widely, according to

constitutionally qualified for the

is

hand

low degree.

may

to a high, to In the

may

an average, or

same way,

to a

the direction of

vary according to whether or not

commonly

affected

or even an association

trade union, has

by the

class situation,

among them,

grown out

e.g.,

a

of the class situa-

tion, from which the individual may expect promising results for himself. The emergence of an association or even of mere social action from a common class situation is by no means

a universal

The

phenomenon.

class situation

may

be restricted in

its

efforts to the generation of essentially similar is to say, within our terminology, "mass behavior." However, it may not even of have this result. Furthermore, often merely

reactions, that

138

THE CLASSIC TRADITION

PART1;

amorphous

the latest industrial development, namely, the

D. Types of Class Struggle. Thus every class may be the carrier of any one of the innumerable possible forms of class action, but this is not necessarily so. In any case, a class does not in itself constitute a group (Gemeinschaft). To treat "class" conceptually as being equivalent to "group" leads to distortion. That men in the

slowdown

same

social action emerges. For

known

the "grumbling" of workers

example,

in ancient

The moral disapproval of the work-master's conduct, which in its practical significance was probably equivalent to an Oriental ethics:

phenomenon

increasingly typical

of precisely

by virtue of tacit agreewhich "social action" and possibly associations emerge from the mass of laborers

ment. The degree

in

behavior of the members of a class is linked to general cultural conditions, especially to those of an intellectual sort.

extent

of

the

evolved, and

It

contrasts

is

is

also linked to the

that

have

already

especially linked to the trans-

parency of the connections between the causes and the consequences of the class situation. For however different life chances may be, this fact in itself, according to all experience, by no

means gives

birth

to

"class

action"

(social

by the members of a class). For that, the real conditions and the results of the class situation must be distinctly recognizable. For only action

class situation regularly react

in

mass

actions to such tangible situations as economic

ones in the direction of those interests that are most adequate to their average number is an important and after all simple fact for the understanding of historical events. However, this fact must not lead to that kind of pseudo-scientific operation with the concepts of class and class interests which is so frequent these days and which has found its most classic expression in the statement of a talented author, that the individual may be in error concerning his interests but that the class is infallible about its interests. If classes as such are not groups, nevertheless class situations emerge only on the basis of social action.

However,

social action that brings

chances can be felt not as an absolutely given fact to be accepted, but as a resultant from either (1) the given distribu-

forth class situations

tion of property, or (2) the structure of the con-

Social actions that directly determine the class

then the contrast of

life

crete

economic

may

react against the class structure not only

through

acts

order.

of

protest, but in the

It is

only then that people

and irrational form of rational association. intermittent

There have been "class situations" of the category

(1),

of a specifically

naked and

first

trans-

parent sort, in the urban centers of Antiquity

and during the Middle Ages: especially then when great fortunes were accumulated by factually monopolized trading in local industrial products or in foodstuffs; furthermore, under certain conditions, in the rural

economy

of the

is

not basically action

among members of the identical class; action among members of different situation of the are: the labor

and the

it is

an

classes.

worker and the entrepreneur

market, the commodities market,

capitalistic enterprise. But, in its turn,

the existence of a capitalistic enterprise presup-

poses that a very specific kind of social action

goods per se, and especially the power of individuals to dispose, in principle freely, o\'er the means of production: a certain kind of legal order. Each kind of class situation, and above all when it rests upon the power of property per :?c, will become most clearly efficacious when all other determiexists to protect the possession of

most diverse periods, when agriculture was increasingly exploited in a profit-making manner. The most important historical example of

nants of reciprocal relations are, as far as possible, eliminated in their significance. It is in this

the second category

the market obtains

the

modern

(2) is

proletariat.

the class situation of

way

power of property in most sovereign impor-

that the use of the

tance.

its

CHAPTER

Now

status groups hinder the strict carry-

ing through of the sheer market principle. In the present context they are of interest only

from

one point of view. Before we

this

consider them, note that not al

much

briefly

of a gener-

nature can be said about the more specific

kinds of antagonism between classes

meaning

of the term).

The

our

(in

which

great shift,

has been going on continuously in the past, and up to our times, may be summarized,

although

a

at

cost

of

some

the

precision:

struggle in which class situations are effective

MAX WEBER: THE IRON CAGE

5:

were completely secondary as well as to conflicts in the

139

to slave rebellions

commodity market.

The propertyless of Antiquity and of the Middle Ages protested against monopolies, pre-emption, forestalling, and the withholding of goods from the market in order to raise prices. Today the central issue is the determination of the price of labor. The transition is represented by the fight for access to the market and for the determination of the price of products. Such fights went on between merchants and workers in the putting-out system of

has progressively shifted from consumption credit toward, first, competitive struggles in the commodity market and then toward wage

domestic handicraft during the transition to modern times. Since it is quite a general phe-

disputes on the labor market. The class strug-

antagonisms that are conditioned through the market situations are usually most bitter between those who actually and directly participate as opponents in price wars. It is not the rentier, the share-holder, and the banker who suffer the ill will of the worker, but almost exclusively the manufacturer and the business executives who are the direct opponents of workers in wage conflicts. This is so in spite of the fact that it is precisely the cash boxes of the rentier, the shareholder, and the banker into which the more or less unearned gains flow, rather than into the pockets of the manufacturers or of the business executives. This simple state of affairs has very frequently been decisive for the role the class situation has played in the formation of political parties. For exam-

Antiquity

of

gles

—to

the

extent

they

that

were genuine class struggles and not strugwere initially gles between status groups carried on by peasants and perhaps also artisans threatened by debt bondage and struggling against urban creditors. For debt bondage is the normal result of the differenti-

—

ation

wealth

of

commercial

in

especially in seaport cities.

has existed

among

A

cities,

similar situation

cattle breeders.

Debt

tionships as such produced class action

rela-

up

to

days of Catilina. Along with this, and with an increase in provision of grain for the city by transporting it from the outside, the struggle over the means of sustenance emerged. It centered in the first place around the provision of bread and determination of the price of bread. It lasted throughout Antiquity and the entire Middle Ages. The propthe

together against those

who

ertyless

flocked

actually

and supposedly were interested

the dearth of bread. This fight spread until

involved the

way

all

of

in

and

to handicraft production.

There were only incipient discussions of wage disputes in Antiquity and in the Middle Ages. But they have been slowly increasing up into

modern

times.

In

the

earlier

periods

ple,

it

has

made

archal socialism formerly, at least to

here that the class

possible the varieties of patri-

and the frequent attempts

—of threatened status groups

form alliances with the proletariat against

the bourgeoisie.

it

those commodities essential to

life

nomenon we must mention

they

E.

Status Honor.

In contrast to classes, Stande

normally groups. They are, however, often of an amorphous kind. In contrast to the purely economically determined "class situation," we wish to designate as status situation every typical component of the life of (status group's) are

140

men

THE CLASSIC TRADITION

PARTI:

that

is

determined by a

specific, positi\'e

or negative, social estimation of honor. This

honor

may

shared bv a

be connected with any quahty plurality, and, of course, it can be

knit to a class situation: class distinctions are

linked in the most varied u'ays with status distinctions. Property as such is not always recog-

nized as a status qualification, but in the long run it is, and with extraordinary regularity. In the

subsistence

associations,

it is

economy

of

neighborhood

often simply the richest

who

belong to the

circle.

tion are restrictions

intercourse

is,

all those who wish to Linked with this expectaon social intercourse (that

expected from

is

life

which

not subservient to eco-

is

nomic or any other purposes). These restrictions may confine normal marriages to within

and may lead to complete endogamous closure. Whenever this is not a mere indi\-idual and socially irrelevant imitathe status circle

tion of another style of

of

action

closing

this

but consensual

life,

character,

status

the

under way.

is the "chieftain." However, this often is only an honorific preference. For example, in the socalled pure modern democracy, that is, one devoid of any expressly ordered status privileges for individuals, it may be that only the families coming under approximately the same tax class dance with one another. This example is reported of certain smaller Swiss cities. But status honor need not necessarily be linked

de\'elopment

with a class situation. On the contrary, it normally stands in sharp opposition to the preten-

ferentiation evolves in such a

sions of sheer property.

inant at a given time in society. This submis-

Both propertied and propertyless people can belong to the same status group, and frequently thev do with very tangible consequences. This equahty of social esteem may, however, in the

sion to fashion also exists

long run become quite precarious. The equality of status among American gentlemen, for instance,

is

expressed by the

fact that

outside

by the different functions of business, it would be considered wherever the old tradition strictly repugnant the subordination determined

still

prevails

—

—

if

even the richest boss, while

playing billiards or cards in his club would not treat his clerk as in every sense fully his equal

but would bestow upon him the condescending status-conscious "benevolence" in birthright,

which the German boss can never dissever from his attitude. This is one of the most important reasons why in America the German clubs have never been able to attain the attraction that the American clubs have. In content, status honor is normally expressed by the fact that above all else a specific style of

In

status

is

characteristic form, stratification

its

groups on

the basis

by

of conventional

styles of life evolves at the present time in the

United States out of the traditional democracy. For example, only the resident of a certain street ("the Street") is considered as belonging to "society," is qualified for social intercourse,

and

is

visited

for strict

ica

to

and

invited.

Above

way

all,

make is dom-

as to

submission to the fashion that

a

this dif-

among men in Amerdegree unknown in Germany; it

appears as an indication of the fact that a given man puts forward a claim to qualify as a gentleman. This submission decides, at least prima facie, that he will be treated as such. And this recognition becomes just as important for his

employment chances and abo\'e all, for

in

swank

social

establishments,

intercourse

and

"esteemed" families, as the qualification for dueling among Germans. As for the rest, status honor is usurped by certain marriage with

families resident for a long time, and, of course, correspondingly wealthy (e.g. F.F.V., the First

Families of Virginia), or by the actual or alleged

descendants of the "Indian Princess" Pocahontas,

of the Pilgrim fathers, or of the Knicker-

bockers, the

members

of almost inaccessible

and all sorts of circles setting themselves apart by means of any other characteristics and sects

badges. In this case stratification is purely con\entionaI and rests largely on usurpation (as

CHAPTER

does almost But the road

all

status

honor

in its beginning).

to legal privilege, positive or

ative, is easily traveled as

neg-

soon as a certain

tal

and unconnected coexistences

of ethnically

segregated groups into a vertical social system of super- and subordination. Correctly formu-

order has in fact been "lived in" and has achieved stability by virtue

lated: a

of a stable distribution of economic power.

political unit.

stratification of the social

141

MAX WEBER; THE IRON CAGE

5:

comprehensive association integrates

the ethnically divided communities into one

They

way:

differ precisely in this

ethnic coexistence, based on mutual repulsion F. Ethnic Segregation and Caste. Where the consequences have been realized to their full extent, the status group evolves into a closed caste. Status distinctions are then guaranteed not merely by conventions and laws, but also by religious sanctions. This occurs in such a way that every physical contact with a member of any caste that is considered to be lower by the members of a higher caste is considered as making for a ritualistic impurity and a stigma which must be expiated by a religious act. In addition, individual castes develop quite dis-

tinct cults

and gods.

caste structure brings about a social subordination in

and an acknowledgment

of

"more honor"

favor of the privileged caste and status

groups. This

become

is

due

ethnic

structure

to the fact that in the caste

distinctions

"functional"

such have within the

as

distinctions

political association (warriors, priests, artisans

war and for and so on). But even pariah peoples who are most despised (for example, the Jews) that are politically important for

building,

are usually apt to continue cultivating the be-

however, the status structure reaches such extreme consequences only where there are underlying differences which are held to be "ethnic." The caste is, indeed, the normal form in which ethnic communities that believe in blood relationship and exclude exogamous marriage and social intercourse usually associate with one another. As mentioned before, such a caste sitviation is part of the phenomeIn

and disdain, allows each ethnic community to its own honor as the highest one; the

consider

general,

non

lief in is

their

own

specific "honor," a belief that

equally peculiar to ethnic and

status

to

groups.

However, with the negatively privileged

sta-

tus groups the sense of dignity takes a specific

deviation.

A

sense of dignity

tion in individuals of social

ventional

demands which

is

the precipita-

honor and of cona positively privi-

leged status group raises for the deportment of

of pariah peoples and is found all over the world. These people form communities, ac-

its

quire specific occupational traditions of handi-

naturally related to their "being" which does

crafts or of other arts,

and cultivate a belief in community. They live in a diaspora strictly segregated from all personal intercourse, except that of an unavoidable sort, and their situation is legally precarious. Yet, by virtue of their economic indispensability, they are tolerated, indeed frequently privileged, and

not transcend

their ethnic

"beauty and excellence" (Ka/\.oK(XYa6{a). Their kingdom is "of this world." They live for the

they live interspersed in the political

A

status segregation

that

is, it is

is

related to their

present and by exploiting their great past. The

sense of dignity of the negatively privileged strata naturally refers to a future lying

the present, whether

is

it

of this

beyond

life

or of

transforms the horizon-

first,"

histori-

from

tion: the caste structure

itself,

groups

grown into a caste difa mere ethnic segrega-

The Jews are the most impressive example.

fers in its structure

of dignity that charac-

must be nurtured by the belief in a providential mission and by a belief in a specific honor before God. The chosen people's dignity is nurtured by a belief either that in the beyond "the last will be the

ties.

cal

communi-

members. The sense

terizes positively privileged status

another. In other words,

or that in this

life

it

a

Messiah

will

appear

142

THE CLASSIC TRADITION

PART1:

world which has cast them out the hidden honor of the pariah people. This simple state of affairs, and not the resentment which is so strongly emphasized in Nietzsche's much-admired conto bring forth into the light of the

struction

Genealogy of Morals,

the

in

the

is

of carrying

arms

—

—which

most obvious in its to be a dilettante, for

is

the right consequences example, to play certain musical instruments. However, material monopolies provide the most effective motives for the exclusiveness of ,

a status group; although, in themselves, they

source of the religiosity cultivated by pariah status groups moreover, resentment applies only to a limited extent; for one of Nietzsche's

are rarely sufficient, almost always they

main examples, Buddhism,

est of the families in the

it

is

not at

ap-

all

development of status groups from etlinic segregations is by no means the normal phenomenon. On the contrary. Since objective "racial differences" are by no means behind every subjective sentiment of an ethnic community, the question of an ultithe

mately

there

the

rest,

racial

monopolization of at least of equal

bridegrooms is importance and is parallel to the interest in the monopolization of daughters. The daughters of the members must be provided for. With an increased closure of the status group, the con-

foundation of status structure

is

ventional preferential opportunities for special

employment grow

Very frequently a status group is instrumental in the production of a thoroughbred anthropological type. Certainly status groups are to a high degree effective in producing

groups,

case.

they

for

types,

individuals

who

selects those

are

fit

(e.g.

select

the

personally

knighthood

for warfare, physically

and psychically). But individual selection is far from being the only, or the predominant, way in which status groups are formed: political membership or class situation has at all times been at least as frequently decisive. And today the class situation is by far the predominant factor After

all,

the possibility of a style of

expected for members of a status group ally conditioned economically.

is

life

usu-

into a legal

monopoly

of

members. Certain goods by status entailed estates, and fre-

special offices for the

become

qualified

extent. Within a status circle

the question of intermarriage; the inter-

is

rightly a question of the concrete individual

extreme

some

potential

plicable.

For

into play to

come

objects for monopolization typically,

quently also the possession of serfs or bondsmen and, finally, special trades. This monopooccurs

lization

group

is

manage them; and maintain

when

positively

exclusively entitled to

its

group must

status

the

own and

to

negatively when, in order to

way of life, the status own and manage them. For the

specific

)!ot

life in status honor groups are the specific bearconventions. In whatever way it may

decisive role of a style of

means

that status

ers of all

be manifest,

all

stylization of

nates in status groups or

by them. Even

if

is

life

either origi-

at least

conserved

the principles of status con-

ventions differ greatly, they reveal certain typical traits, especially

among

the most privileged

Quite generally, among privileged status groups there is a status disqualification that operates against the performance of common strata.

G. Status privileges. For all practical purposes, stratification by status goes hand in hand with a monopolization of ideal and material goods or opportunities, in a manner we have

come

to

know

status honor,

as typical. Besides the specific

which always

rests

upon distance

physical

labor

"setting in" in

This disqualification

is

America against the old

now tradi-

Very frequently every economic pursuit, and especially en-

tion of esteeni for labor

rational

looked upon as a dis-

and exclusiveness, honorific preferences may

trepreneurial activity,

consist of the privilege of wearing special cos-

qualification of status. Artistic

tumes, of eating special dishes taboo to others.

tivity

is

is

and

literary ac-

also considered degrading

work

as

CHAPTER

soon as

it

when

is

it

exploited for income, or at least connected with hard physical exeris

An example

tion.

mason

is

the sculptor

working

like a

dusty smock as over against the painter in his salon-like studio and those forms of musical practice that are acceptable to the status group. in his

5:

that recurs everywhere. Precisely

Stratification.

of the gainfully

The frec^uent disqualification employed as such is a direct

result of the principle of status stratification,

and a

of course, of this principle's opposition to

distribution

power which

of

is

regulated

exclusively through the market. These

two

fac-

with various individual ones, which will be touched upon below. operate along

tors

We

have seen above that the market and its knows no personal distinctions: "functional" interests dominate it. It knows

processes

nothing of honor. The status order means precisely

the reverse:

stratification

in

terms of

honor and styles of life peculiar to status groups as such. The status order would be threatened at its very root if mere economic acquisition and naked economic power still bearing the stigma of its extra-status origin could bestow upon anyone who has won them the

same or even

greater honor as the vested

interests claim for themselves. After

all,

given

equality of status honor, property per se repre-

an addition even if it is not overtlv to be such. Therefore all groups having interest in the status order react with special sharpness precisely against the pretensions of purely economic acquisition. In most cases they react the more vigorously the more they feel themselves threatened. Calderon's sents

acknowledged

respectful

treatment

of

the

peasant,

for

opposed to Shakespeare's simultaneous ostensible disdain of the canaille illustrates the different way in which a firmly structured status order reacts as compared with a instance, as

status order that has carious. This

is

become economically

an example of

pre-

a state of affairs

143

because of

the rigorous reactions against the claims of the "parvenu" is never acceptand without reservation, by the privileged status groups, no matter how completely his style of life has been adjusted to

property per

fe,

ed, personally

theirs.

They

will only accept his descendants

who have been H. Economic Conditions and Effects of Status

MAX WEBER: THE IRON CAGE

educated in the conventions of

group and who have never besmirched its honor by their own economic their

status

labor

As to the general effect of the status orcier, only one consequence can be stated, but it is a very important one: the hindrance of the free development of the market. This occurs first for those goods that status groups directly withhold from free exchange by monopolization, which may be effected either legally or conventionally. For example, in

many

Hellenic

cities

during the "status era" and also original-

ly in

Rome, the inherited

estate (as

shown by

the old formula for placing spendthrifts a

under

guardian) was monopolized, as were the

and espeand merchant guilds. The market is restricted, and the power of naked property per sf, which gives its stamp to class formation, is pushed into the background. The results of this process can be most varied. Of course, they do not necessarily weaken the contrasts in the economic situation. Frequently they strengthen these contrasts, and in any case, where stratification by status permeates a community as strongly as was the case in all political communities of Antiquity and of the Midcile Ages, one can never speak of a genuinely free market competition as we unestates of knights, peasants, priests, cially the clientele of the craft

today. There are

wider effects than goods from the market. From the conflict between the status order and the purely economic order mentioned above, it follows that in most instances the notion of honor peculiar to status absolutely abhors that which is essential to the market: hard bargaining. Honor abhors hard bargainderstand

it

this direct exclusion of special

144

THE CLASSIC TRADITION

PART1:

among peers and the members of a

ing for

occasionally

it

status group

Therefore, everywhere

some

taboos

it

in general.

status groups,

and

usually the most influential, consider almost

any kind of overt participation

in

economic

acquisition as absolutely stigmatizing.

With some over-simplification, one might thus say that classes are stratified according to their relations to the production and acquisi-

goods;

of

tion

whereas status

groups

are

according to the principles of their consumption of goods as represented by special stratified

styles of

An

"occupational status group," too,

is

a sta-

group proper. For normally, it successfully claims social honor only by virtue of the special style of life which may be determined by it. The differences between classes and status groups frequently overlap. It is precisely those status communities most strictly segregated in terms of honor (viz. the Indian castes) who today show, although within very rigid limits, tus

a relatively high degree of indifference to pecu-

niary income.

As

in

However, the Brahmins seek

many

status,

only the following can be said.

the bases of the acquisition

goods are tus

is

relatively stable,

When

and distribution of stratification by sta-

favored. Every technological repercus-

and economic transformation threatens by status and pushes the class situation into the foreground. Epochs and countries in which the naked class situation is of predominant significance are regularly the periods of technical and economic transformations. And every slowing down of the change in economic stratification leads, in due course, to the growth of status structures and makes

sion

stratification

for

a

toward the acquisition of social power, that is to say, toward influencing social action no matter what its content may be. In oriented

principle, parties

may

well

As over

as in a state.

classes

resuscitation of the important

role

of

and status groups, the

against the actions of for

which

this is not

party-oriented

case,

may aim

cause (the party

gram

social

at realizing a pro-

for ideal or material purposes), or the

goal

may

from

these,

be personal (sinecures, power, and

honor

ers of the party).

and the followUsually the party aims at all for the leader

these simultaneously. Parties are, therefore, only possible within groups that have an associational character, that is, some rational order

to

a staff of persons available

enforce

it.

For

parties

who

are ready

aim precisely

at

and if possible, to recruit from it party members. In any individual case, parties may represent interests determined through class situation or status situation, and they may recruit their following respectively from one or the other But they need be neither purely class nor purely status parties; in fact, they are more likely to be mixed types, and sometimes they are neither. They may represent ephemeral or enduring

influencing this

staff,

structures. Their

means

of attaining

power may

be quite varied, ranging from naked violence of any sort to can\assing for \otes with coarse or subtle means: money, social influence, the force of speech, suggestion, to the rt>ugher or

social honor.

exist in a social club as

action always involves association. For it is always directed toward a goal which is striven for in a planned manner. This goal may be a

and

different ways.

economic conditions makthe predominance of stratification by

to the general

ing for

order and are in turn influenced by it. "Parties" reside in the sphere of power. Their action is

necessarily

life.

such income

is within the social order, that is, within the sphere of the distribution of honor. From within these spheres, classes and status groups influence one another and the legal

status groups

more

cknnsv hoax, and so on artful tactics of obstruc-

tion in parliamentary bodies. I.

es

Parties. is

Whereas

the genuine place of class-

within the economic order, the place of

The

sociological structure of parties differs

in a basic

way

according to the kind of social

CHAPTERS:

action

which they struggle

to influence; that

nreans, thev differ according to whether or not

the

community is stratified by status or by Above all else, they vary according to

classes.

the structure of domination. For their leaders

normally deal with

its

conquest. In our general

terminology, parties are not only products of

modern forms

of domination.

We

shall also

MAX WEBER: THE IRON CAGE

groups and parties: The fact that they presuppose a larger association, especially the framework of a polity, does not mean that they are it. On the contrary, at all times it has been the order of the day that such association (even when it aims at the use of military

confined to

force in

common)

reaches beyond the state

boundaries. This can be seen in the [interlocal]

designate as parties the ancient and medieval

solidarity of interests of oligarchs

ones, despite the fact that they differ basically

crats in Hellas, of

from modern

parties.

Since a party always

struggles for political control (Herrscliaft),

organization

too

is

frequently

strict

its

and

Because of these variations between the forms of domination, it is impossible to say anything about the structure of parties without discussing them first. Therefore, "authoritarian."

we of

shall

all

now

turn to this central

phenomenon

social organization.

Before

general

we do

this,

observation

we

should add one more about classes, status

145

and demoGuelphs and Ghibellines in the Middle Ages, and within the Calvinist party during the age of religious struggles; and all

the

way up

to the solidarity of landlords

Congresses of Agriculture), princes (Holy Alliance, Karlsbad Decrees [of 1819]), socialist workers, conservatives (the longing of Prussian conservatives for Russian intervention in 1850). But their aim is not nec(International

essarily the establishment of a

new

territorial

dominion. In the main they aim to influence the existing polity.

CHAPTER

6

Georg Simmel: Dialectic of Individual

and Society

INTRODUCTION

the notion that one can study society as a

typology of the stranger not only addresses the marginality of the person who exists on the fringes of a group, but also describes how

whole and attempt to discover its laws of evolution and development. Society is a moral and

of the

Simmel' s approach to sociology those of

Comte and Durkheim

differs

in that

he

from

rejects

becomes an element of the life group when its members seek to confide the stranger. The marginality of the stranger

the stranger

cultural enterprise involving the association of

in

and therefore it must be approached differently from the way in which we study nature and nature's laws in the physical sciences. For Simmel, society is made up of the interactions between and among individuals, and the sociologist should study the patterns and forms of these associations, rather

connotes a role that is in but not of the group. Thus the stranger can have detachment and objectivity and be sought after by group members as an intermediary or as someone who can

than quest after social laws.

his writings.

free

individuals,

Simmel attempts to capture the complexity and the ambiguity of social life by viewing it dialectically. Although individuals are free and creative spirits and not the mere objects of social determination, they are nevertheless part

and play a role in dynamic tension that

of the st)cinlization process its

continuation.

Simmel wishes

It

is this

to capture in his social theory.

Simmel's explorations of

social

forms and

keep secrets. It is this interactive relationship, from the perspective of the indi\idual and the group, that Simmel so effectively captures in

Simmel began

his inquiries

from the bottom

up, observing the smallest of social interactions

and attempting to see how larger-scale institutions emerged from them. In doing so he often

phenomena that other theorists missed. For example, Simmel obser\'od that the number of parties to an interaction can effect its nature. The interaction between two people, a noticed

di/mi, will

be verv different from that which

social types place the reader in a

vortex of

possible in a three-parly relationship, or

example,

Simmel's

Within a

interactions.

146

Thus,

for

d\/adic

is

trimi.

relationship, each indi\idual

CHAPTERS:

can maintain his or her party to the interaction

is

GEORG

identity. When one no longer interested

maintaining it, the relationship is over. As soon as another person is added, however, the situation and its possibilities change markedly, and group structures which are separate from and influence the indi\'iduals involved begin to emerge. Two of the people can form a group against the third; one person can become the mediator or the object of competition between the remaining two; etc. Simmel saw the forms of in

these interactions as entailing similar options

and strategies whether one was dealing with roommates, nation-states, or corporate groups. Simmel was very interested in and troubled by this relation between the individual and society, and he was particularly acute at relating the most intimate details of individual psychology to larger social structures. Modern civilization in his view was both an aid and a hindrance to the free development of the individual.

Simmel's reflections on culture and alienon the philosophy

ation as well as his writings

money

SIMMEL: DIALECTIC OF INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIETY

147

dented degree from the narrow constraints of small town life, a promising development; on the other, the impersonal nature of city life, especially its tendency to cause people to treat others merely as means towards ends, and in purely monetary terms, threatens to become an alienating structure that would dominate and

new-found individualism. The good example of Simmel's eclecticism: he borrows heavily from Durkheim in his analysis of the relation between personality type and the division of labor, and from Marx in his discussion of alienation and objectification. In the end, however, he comes closest in his overall vision to Weber's pessimistic view distort

essay

this

is

a

of the "iron cage," seeing the

way

of

life

new

metropolitan

as threatening to personal freedom

and the quality of mental life. Georg Simmel was born in 1858

in Berlin,

the youngest of the seven children of his pros-

perous and cultured Jewish parents. After graduating from the German equivalent of high school, the Gymnasium, he studied at the University of Berlin, then a locus of intellectual

about weighty themes that have moral implications. But Simmel does not moralize: he approaches his subject dialectically and ana-

Though he was offiphilosophy student, Simmel quickly acquired what was to be a lifelong taste for intellectual eclecticism, studying a broad array of

modern expe-

disciplines including history, social psychology,

of

point to his willingness to write

lyzes the tensions that define the rience.

Modern

activity in central Europe. cially

art,

society has

moved

a

anthropology, and sociology, and cultivat-

to liberate indi-

ing a mild contempt for academic procedures

viduals from the stifling constraints of earlier

such as extensive footnoting and the establish-

forms of association. Urban

ment

life

today allows

individuals to play a variety of roles in different social spaces thereby enhancing freedom

from the constraints of a fixed, static, and communal life of an earlier era. Yet the price of this freedom is to be found in the increasing sense of alienation that people experience in respect to the culture of urban life. This latter theme forms the focus of the essay below, "The Metropolis and Mental Life." On the one hand, Simmel sees the modem emergence of cities and cosmopolitan living as having freed individuals to an unprece-

of strict disciplinary boundaries. This rebelliousness and the refusal to limit himself to a single academic subject, combined

with the considerable anti-Semitism of university administrations, caused

German

Simmel

sig-

academic career. After receiving his doctorate he became a Privatdozent at the University of Berlin in 1885, and despite the many books and articles he was to write, the international fame he was to acquire during his years there, and the efforts of many of his fellow nificant setbacks in his

Max Weber, to obtain him he was repeatedly to be denied

professors, including a professorship,

148

a

THE CLASSIC TRADITION

PART1:

regular academic appointment.

It

was not

until 1914, four years after his death, that

Sim-

normal professorship, at the and even this achievement was marred by the fact that the university shut down almost immediately with the outbreak of World War I. Despite his ostracism from mainstream academic life, Simmel became a noted figure in the intellectual circles of Berlin and even worldwide. Because he was one of the most brilliant lecturers of his day, his classes were not only favored by students but became intelmel received University

a

of

Strasbourg,

lectual events, with

many of the cultural He was friends

of the city in attendance.

elite

with

many

of the leading intellectual figures of the

day,

including

Max Weber and Edmund

Husserl, and a he

was

a frequent guest at din-

ner parties and social events.

Many

of his six

books and over seventy articles were translated into English, French, Italian, Polish, and Russian.

Simmel has had an enormous effect on sociology and is considered perhaps the major founding figure of microsociology. His influence has been particularly strong in America. Albion Small, a translator of several Simmel articles, Robert Park, who studied with Simmel in Berlin in 1899 and 1900, and George Herbert Mead (Chapter 7), who reviewed Simmel's Philosopliy of Monty, all played a major role in the founding of the Chicago school of sociology and

its

main

theoretical bent, symbolic interac-

tionism (Chapter

14).

CHAPTER

6:

GEORG

inquiry must answer the question of

Georg Simmel: The Metropolis and Mental

SIMMEL: DIALECTIC OF INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIETY

personality

Life

ments

accommodates

how

49

the

the adjust-

itself in

to external forces. This will

1

be

my

task

today.

The deepest problems

of

modern

from the claim of the individual

to

life

derive

preserve the

autonomy and individuality of his existence in the face of overwhelming social forces, of historical heritage, of external culture,

technique of

man

primitive

The

life.

has to

tence attains in this

transformation.

upon man

fight

and

of the

with nature which

wage for his bodily exismodern form its latest

The eighteenth century

called

to free himself of all the historical

bonds in the state and in religion, in morals and in economics. Man's nature, originally good and common to all, should develop unhampered. In addition to more liberty, the nineteenth century

demanded

The psychological

basis of the metropolitan

type of individuality consists in the

intensifica-

which results from the swift and uninterrupted change of outer and inner stimuli. Man is a differentiating creature. His mind is stimulated by the difference between a momentary impression and the one which preceded it. Lasting impressions, impressions which differ only slightly from one another, impressions which take a regular and habitual course and show regular and tion of nervous stimulation

habitual

contrasts

—

all

these

use up,

so

to

speak, less consciousness than does the rapid

crowding

of

changing images, the sharp

dis-

the functional

continuity in the grasp of a single glance, and

man and his work; this spemakes one individual incomparable to another, and each of them indispensable to the highest possible extent. However, this specialization makes each man the more directly dependent upon the supplementary activities

the unexpectedness of onrushing impressions. These are the psychological conditions which the metropolis creates. With each crossing of the street, with the tempo and multiplicity' of economic, occupational and social life, the city sets up a deep contrast with small town and rural life with reference to the sensorv founda-

specialization of cialization

of

all

ment

others. Nietzsche sees the full cievelop-

by the most

tions

ruthless struggle of individuals; socialism be-

from

lieves in the suppression of all competition for

ent

of the individual conditioned

same

reason. Be that as

of psychic

man

life.

The metropolis exacts

as a discriminating creature a differ-

amoimt

of consciousness than does rural

may, in all these positions the same basic motive is at work: the person resists to being leveled down and worn out by a social-technological mechanism. An

Here the rhythm of life and sensory mental imagery flows more slowly, more habitually, and more evenly. Precisely in this connection

inquiry into the inner meaning of specifically

becomes understandable as over against small town life which rests more upon deeply felt and emotional relationships. These latter are rooted in the more unconscious layers of the psyche and grow most readilv in the steady rhythm of uninterrupted habituations. The intellect, however, has its locus in the

the

modern

life

and

its

it

products, into the soul of

the cultural body, so to speak,

must seek

to

solve the equation which structures like the

metropoUs

set

up between

and Such an

the individual

the super-individual contents of

life.

Reprinted with permission of The Free Press, a Inc., from The Scciolo^y of Georg Simmel, translated and edited bv Kurt H. Wolff. Copyright 1 950, 1 978 by The Free Press. Source

division of Macmillan,

life.

the

sophisticated

psychic

character

of

metropolitan

—

life

higher layers of the

transparent,

conscious,

psyche;

the most adaptable of our inner

it

forces. In

is

order to accommodate to change and

to the contrast of

phenomena, the

intellect

does

'

not require any shocks and inner upheavals;

it

150

is

THE CLASSIC TRADITION

PARTI:

only through such upheavals that the more

mind could accommodate to the metropolitan rhythm of events. Thus the metconservative

—

man which, of course, exists thousand individual variants develops an organ protecting him against the threatenropolitan type of

—

in a

ing currents and discrepancies of his external

environment which would uproot him. He reacts with his head instead of his heart. In this an increased awareness assumes the psychic prerogative. Metropolitan

life,

thus, underlies a

heightened awareness and a predominance of intelligence in metropolitan man. The reaction to metropolitan phenomena is shifted to that organ which is least sensitive and quite remote

from the depth of the personality. ty

is

thus

seen

preserve

to

Intellectuali-

subjective

life

overwhelming power of metropolitan life, and intellectuality branches out in many directions and is integrated with numerous discrete phenomena. The metropolis has always been the seat of the money economy. Here the multiplicity and concentration of economic exchange gives an importance to the means of exchange which the scantiness of rural commerce would not have allowed. Money economy and the domiagainst the

nance of the ed.

intellect are intrinsically

They share

a

matter-of-fact

connect-

attitude

in

men and

dealing with

with things; and, in this attitude, a formal justice is often coupled with

an inconsiderate hardness. The intellectually sophisticated person is indifferent to all genuine individuaHty, because relationships and reactions result from it which cannot be exhausted with logical operations. In the same manner, the individuality of phenomena is not commensurate with the pecuniary principle.

Money

mon

concerned only with what is comall: it asks for the exchange value, it

is

to

reduces

all

question:

quality

individuality, is

to

the

All intimate emotional

between persons are founded in their whereas in rational relations reckoned with like a number, like an

relations

man

and individuality

How much?

element which is in itself iridifferent. Only the objective measurable achievement is of interest. Thus metropolitan man reckons with his merchants and customers, his domestic servants and often even with persons with whom he is obliged to have social intercourse. These features of intellectuality contrast with the na-

which the inevitable knowledge of individuality as inevitably proture of the small circle in

duces a warmer tone of behavior, a behavior which is beyond a mere objective balancing of service and return. In the sphere of the economic psychology of the small group it is of importance that under primitive conditions procluction serves the customer who orders the good, so that the producer and the con-

sumer

are acquainted.

The modern metropolis,

however, is supplied almost entirely by production for the market, that is, for entirely unknown purchasers who never personally enter the producer's actual field of vision. Through this anonymity the interests of each party acquire an unmerciful matter-of-factness; and the intellectually calculating economic egoisms of both parties need not fear any deflection because of the imponderables of personal relationships. The money economy dominates the metropolis; it has displaced the last survivals of domestic production and the direct barter of goods; it minimizes, from day to day, the amount of work ordered by customers. The matter-of-fact

attitude

is

ob\-iouslv

so

inti-

mately interrelated with the money economy,

which is dominant in the metropolis, that nobody can sav whether the intellectualistic mentality first promoted the money economy or whether the latter determined the former.

The metropolitan way of life is certainly the most fertile soil for this reciprocity, a point which 1 shall document merely by citing the dictum of the most eminent English constitutional historian: throughout the whole course of English history, London has never acted as England's heart but often as England's and always as her moneybag!

lect

intel-

CHAPTERS:

certain

In

seemingly

insignificant

GEORG

traits,

the surface of Hfe, the

same

psychic currents characteristically unite.

Mod-

which ern

lie

upon

mind has become more and more

calculat-

SIMMEL: DIALECTIC OF INDIVIDUAL

AND SOCIETY

151

from each point on the surface of existence

however closely attached to the surface alone one may drop a sounding into the depth of the psyche so that all the most banal

—

ing.

The calculative exactness of practical life which the money economy has brought about

externalities of life finally are connected with

corresponds to the ideal of natural science: to transform the world into an arithmetic problem, to fix every part of the world by mathematical formulas. Only money economy has filled the days of so many people with weighing, calculating, with numerical determinations, with a reduction of qualitative values to

and

Through the

quantitative ones. ture of

money

new

a

calculative na-

precision, a certainty in

the definition of identities and differences, an

imambiguousness in agreements and arrangements has been brought about in the relations of life-elements

—

just as externally this preci-

by the universal

sion has been effected

diffu-

sion of pocket watches. However, the conditions of metropolitan effect of this trait.

life

The

are at once cause

relationships

and

and

affairs

of the typical metropolitan usually are so varied

and complex

that

without the

strictest

the ultimate decisions concerning the style

of

life.

Punctuality,

meaning

calculability,

upon life by the complexiand extension of metropolitan existence and are not only most intimately connected with its money economy and intellectualistic character. These traits must also color the contents of life and favor the exclusion of those irrational, instinctive, sovereign traits and impulses which aim at determining the niode of life from within, instead of receiving the general and precisely schematized form of life from without. Even though sovereign types of personality, characterized by irrational impulses, are by no means impossible in the city, they are, nevertheless, opposed to typical city life. The passionate hatred of men like Ruskin and exactness are forced ty

Nietzsche for the metropolis

is

understandable

these terms. Their natures discovered the

in

value of

alone in the unschematized exis-

life

punctuality in promises and services the whole

tence which cannot be defined with precision

would break down into an inextricable chaos. Above all, this necessity is brought about by the aggregation of so many people with such differentiated interests, who must integrate their relations and activities into a highly complex organism. If all clocks and watches in Berlin would suddenly go wrong in different ways, even if only by one hour, all economic life and communication of the city would be disrupted for a long time. In addition an apparently mere external factor: long distances, would make all waiting and broken

for

appointments result in an ill-afforded waste of time. Thus, the technique of metropolitan life is unimaginable without the most punctual integration of all activities and mutual relations into a stable and impersonal time schedule. Here again the general conclusions of this entire

from the rapidly changing and closely compressed con-

structure

task of reflection

become obvious, namely,

that

all

alike.

From

the

same source

of this

hatred of the metropolis surged their hatred of

money economy and modern existence. The same

which have thus coalesced and minute precision of the

factors

into the exactness

form of

of the intellectualism of

have coalesced into a structure of on the other hand, they have promoted a highly personal subjectivity. There is perhaps no psychic phenomenon which has been so unconditionally life

the highest impersonality;

reserved to the metropolis as has the blase tude.

The blase

attitude results

atti-

first

trasting stimulations of the nerves.

From

this,

enhancement of metropolitan intellectuality, also, seems originally to stem. Therefore, stuthe

pid people the

first

who

are not intellectually alive in

place usually are not exactly blase.

A

152

PARTI:

THE CLASSIC TRADITION

boundless pursuit of pleasure makes one it agitates the nerves to their strongest reactivity for such a long time that in

life

blase because

they finally cease to react at all. In the same way, through the rapidity and contradictoriness of their changes, more harmless impressions force such violent responses, tearing the nerves so brutally hither and thither that their last

in the

gather

to

and if one same milieu they have no time

reserves of strength are spent;

remains

emerges

new

strength.

to react to

new

An

incapacity thus

sensations with the

appropriate energy. This constitutes that blase attitude child

which,

in

fact,

every

metropolitan

shows when compared with children and less changeable milieus.

of

quieter

This physiological source of the metropoli-

may be unnoticeably minute. However, through the relations of the rich to the objects to be had for money, perhaps even through the total character which the mentality of the contemporary public everywhere

equivalence

imparts to these objects, the exclusively pecuniary evaluation of objects has considerable. the

The

large cities, the

money exchange,

of things to the fore

than do smaller

bring the purchasability

much more

localities.

That

is

the blase attitude the concentration of

individual to attains

its

its

highest achievement so that

achievement

is

and appears

in the peculiar

essence of the blase attitude consists in the

the blase attitude.

transformed into its oppoadjustment of In

this

phenomenon

accommodating and forms of metropolitan life.

ulation the last possibility of

with the half-wit, but rather that the meaning and differing values of things, and thereby the

to the contents

The

things themselves, are experienced as insub-

brought

They appear to the blase person in an and gray tone; no one object deserves preference over any other. This mooci is the faithful subjective reflection of the completely internalized money economy. By being the equivalent to all the manifold things in one and the same way, money becomes the most

objective world, a devaluation

evenly

flat

frightful leveler. For

money

expresses

tative differences of things in

much?" Money, with indifference, becomes

all its

the

all

quali-

terms of "how

colorlessness

and

common denomina-

tor of all values; irreparably

it

hollows out the

core oi things, their individuality, their specific value,

and

their

incomparability.

All

things

Hoat with equal specific gravity in the constant-

moving stream of money All things lie on same level and differ from one another only in the size of the area which they cover. In ly

the

the individual case this coloration, or rather discoloration, oi things through their

money

the

nerves find in the refusal to react to their stim-

that the objects are not perceived, as is the case

stantial.

it

intensification of the saine conditioning factors this

mean

men and

peak. Through the mere cjuantitative

site

blunting of discrimination. This does not

cities are

things stimulate the nervous system of the

which flows from the money economy. The

is

impressively

why

also the genuine locale of the blase attitude. In

joined by another source

tan blase attitude

become quite main seats of

self-preservation of certain personalities at the price of

is

devaluating the whole

which in the end unavoidablv drags one's own personality ciown into a feeling of the same worthlessness. Whereas the subject of this form of existence has to come to terms with it entirely for himself,

city

his self-preservation in the face of the large

demands from him

a

no

less

negative

behavior of a social nature. This mental attitude of metropolitans toward one another we may designate, from a formal point of view, as reserve. If so many inner reactions were responses to the continuous external contacts

with innumerable people as are those in the small town, u'here one knows almost everybody one meets and where one has a positive relation to almost e\ervone, one would be completely atomized internally and come to an unimaginable psychic state. Partly this psychological fact, partlv the right to distrust

men have

in the face of the

which

touch-and-go

ele-

CHAPTER

merits of metropolitan reserve. ly

necessitates

our

we frequenteven know by sight those who have neighbors for years. And it is this

As

do not

life,

GEORG

6:

a result of this reserve

been our reserve which in the eyes of the small-town people makes us appear to be cold and heartless.

Indeed,

if

1

do not deceive myself, the

inner aspect of this outer reserve indifference but,

more

is

we

often than

not only

are aware,

mutual strangeness and repulsion, which will break into hatred and fight at the moment of a closer contact, however caused. The whole inner organization of such an extensive communicative life rests upon an extremely varied hierarchy of sympathies, indifferences, and aversions of the briefest as well as of the most permanent nature. The sphere of indifference in this hierarchy is not as large as might appear on the surface. Our psychic activity still responds to it

is

a slight aversion, a

almost every impression of somebody else with a somewhat distinct feeling. The unconscious,

and changing character of

fluid

this

impression seems to result in a state of indifference. Actually this indifference would be just as unnatural as the diffusion of indiscriminate

mutual suggestion would be unbearable. From both these typical dangers of the metropolis, indifference and indiscriminate suggestibility, antipathy protects us. A latent antipathy and the preparatory stage of practical antagonism effect the distances and aversions without which this mode of life could not at all be led. The extent and the mixture of this style of life, the rhythm of its emergence and disappearance, the forms in which it is satisfied all these, with the unifying motives in the narrower sense, form the inseparable whole of the metropolitan

—

style of

life.

What appears

in the

metropolitan

style of life directly as dissociation is in reality

only one of

its

elemental forms of socialization.

This reserve with

its

overtone of hidden

aversion appears in turn as the form or the cloak of a

more general mental phenomenon

the metropolis:

it

of

grants to the individual a

SIMMEL: DIALECTIC OF INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIETY

153

and an amount of personal freedom which has no analogy whatsoever under other conditions. The metropolis goes back to one of the large developmental tendencies of social life as such, to one of the few tendencies for which an approximately universal formula can be discovered. The earliest phase of social formations found in historical as well as in contemporary social structures is this: a relatively kind

small circle firmly closed against neighboring,

some way

strange, or in

However,

this

allows

individual

its

circle

is

antagonistic circles.

and narrow

closely coherent

members only

a

development of unique qualities free, self-responsible movements. Political and kinship groups, parties and religious assoand ciations begin in this way. The self-preservation field for the

young

of very

associations requires the estab-

boundaries and a centripetal cannot allow the individual freedom and unique inner and outer development. From this stage social development proceeds at once in two different, yet corresponding, directions. To the extent to which the lishment of

strict

unity. Therefore they

—

group grows numerically, cance and in content of degree the group's

and the

—

life

is

to

the

same

direct, inner unity loosens,

rigidity of the original

against others tions

spatially, in signifi-

demarcation

softened through mutual rela-

and connections. At the same

time, the

individual gains freedom of movement, far

beyond the

first

jealous delimitation.

The

indi-

vidual also gains a specific individuality to

which the division of labor in the enlarged group gives both occasion and necessity. The state and Christianity, guilds and political parties, and innumerable other groups have developed according to this formula, however much, of course, the special conditions and forces of the respective groups have modified the general scheme. This scheme seems to me distinctly recognizable also in the evolution of

individuality within urban life

in

life.

The small-town

Antiquity and in the Middle Ages set

barriers against

movement and

relations of the

154

PART1:

THE CLASSIC TRADITION

individual toward the outside, and

it

set

up

independence and differentiation within the individual self. These barriers were such that under them modern man could not have breathed. Even today a barriers against individual

metropolitan

man who

is

placed in a small

town feels a restriction similar, at least, in kind. The smaller the circle which forms our milieu is, and the more restricted those relations to others are which dissolve the boundaries of the individual, the more anxiously the circle guards the achievements, the conduct of life, and the outlook of the individual, and the

more

and qualitative spewould break up the framework of

readily a quantitative

cialization

whole little circle. The ancient polis in this respect seems to have had the very character of a small town. The constant threat to its existence at the hands of enemies from near and afar effected strict coherence in political and military respects, a supervision of the citizen by the citizen, a jealousy of the whole against the individual whose particular life was suppressed to such a degree that he could compensate only by acting as a despot in his own household. The tremendous agitation and excitement, the unique colorthe

fulness of Athenian

life, can perhaps be understood in terms of the fact that a people of incomparably individualized personalities

struggled against the constant inner and outer

pressure of a de-individualizing small town. This produced a tense atmosphere in which the

weaker individuals were suppressed and those were incited to prove themselves in the most passionate manner This is precisely why it was that there blossomed in Athens what must be called, without defining of stronger natures

it

exactly, "the general

intellectual

human

development

character" in the

of our species. For

we

stage in

common,

that

is,

they find their

enemy

narrow formations and groupings the maintenance of which places both of them into a state of defense against expanse and generality lying without and the freely moving individuin

ahty within. Just as in the feudal age, the "free" man was the one who stood under the law of is, under the law of the largest and the unfree man was the one who derived his right merely from the narrow circle of a feudal association and was excluded from the larger social orbit so today metropolitan man is "free" in a spiritualized and refined sense, in contrast to the pettiness and prejudices which hem in the small-town man. For the reciprocal reserve and indifference and

the land, that

social orbit,

—

the intellectual

in their

the

life

conditions of large circles

more strongly by the individual impact upon his independence than in

are never

felt

thickest

crowci of the big

citv.

This

is

because the bodily proximity and narrowness of space makes the mental distance only the more visible. It is obviouslv only the ob\-erse of this

freedom

one nowhere

if,

under certain circumstances, and lost as in the

feels as lonely

metropolitan crowd. For here as elsewhere

by no means necessary

man

be reflected in his

it is

freedom of emotional life as comthat the

fort. It is not only the immediate size of the area and the number of persons which, because of the uni\'ersal historical correlation between the enlargement of the circle and the personal inner and outer freedom, has made the metrop-

olis the locale of

freedom.

It

is

rather in tran-

expanse that any given city becomes the seat of cosmopolitanism. The horizon of the city expands in a manner comparable to the way in which wealth de\'elops; a scending

certain

this visible

amount

of

property

way

increases

in

a

ever more rapid pro-

maintain factual as well as historical validity for the following connection: the most exten-

quasi-automatical

and the most general contents and forms of life are most intimately connected with the most individual ones. They have a preparatory

passed, the economic, personal, and intellectu-

sive

gression.

As soon

al relations

lectual

in

as a certain limit has been

of the citizenry, the sphere of intel-

predominance of the

city o\'er its hinter-

CHAPTER

grow

land,

as

in

geometrical

6:

GEORG

progression.

dynamic extension becomes a step, not for an equal, but for a new and larger extension. From every thread spinning out of the city, ever new threads grow as if by themEvery gain

in

selves, just as within

the city the unearned

increment of ground rent, through the mere increase in communication, brings the owner

SIMMEL; DIALECTIC OF INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIETY

expressed in the working-out of a way of life. That we follow the laws of our own nature

—

and this after all is freedom becomes obvious and convincing to ourselves and to others only if

life

transformed

is

The

directly into qualitative traits of character

sphere of

of the small

life

self-contained

and

town

is,

autarchic. For

in the

it is

sive nature of the metropolis that

main,

the deci-

inner

its

life

overflows by waves into a far-flung national or international area. Weimar is not an example to the contrary, since its significance was hinged

upon individual

personalities

them; whereas the metropolis

is

and died with indeed charac-

by its essential independence even from the most eminent individual personalities. This is the counterpart to the independence, and it terized

the expressions of this nature differ from the

expressions of others. Only our unmistakability

proves that our

imposed by

automatically increasing profits. At this point, the quantitative aspect of

155

way

of

life

has not been super-

others.

Cities are, first of

all,

seats of the highest eco-

They produce thereby such extreme phenomena as in Paris the renumerative occupation of the quntorzieme. They are persons who identify themselves by signs on their residences and who are ready at the dinner hour in correct attire, so that they can be quickly called upon if a dinner party should nomic division of

labor.

consist of thirteen persons. In the its

measure of

expansion, the city offers more and more the

decisive conditions of the division of labor. offers a circle

which through

its

It

size can absorb

a highly diverse variety of services. At the

the price the individual pays for the inde-

same tinie, the concentration of individuals and their struggle for customers compel the

pendence, which he enjoys in the metropolis.

individual to specialize in a function from which

is

The

most

metropolis

significant

this functional extension

is

physical boundaries.

its

in

turn

characteristic

And

of

the

beyond

this efficacy reacts

and gives weight, importance, and

responsibility to metropolitan

life.

Man

does

not end with the limits of his body or the area

comprising his immediate activity. Rather is the range of the person constituted by the sum of effects emanating from him temporally and spatially. In the same way, a city consists of its total effects which extend beyond its immediate confines. Only this range is the city's actual

which its existence is expressed. This makes it obvious that individual freedom, logical and historical complement of such

extent in fact

the

extension,

is

not to be understood only in the

negative sense of mere freedom of mobility

and elimination of prejudices and petty philistinism. The essential point is that the particularly and incomparability, which ultimately every

human

being possesses, be

somehow

he cannot be readily displaced by another. It is that city life has transformed the struggle with nature for livelihood into an inter-human struggle for gain, which here is not granted by nature but by other men. For specialization does not flow only from the competition for gain but also from the underlying fact that the seller must always seek to call forth new and differentiated needs of the lured customer. In order to find a source of income which is not yet exhausted, and to find a function which cannot readily be displaced, it is necessary to specialize in one's services. This process promotes differentiation, refinement, and the enrichment of the public's needs, which obviously must lead to growing personal differences within this public. All this forms the transition to the individualization of mental and psychic traits which the city occasions in proportion to its size. There is a whole series of obvious causes underlying decisive

a

156

PARTI:

THE CLASSIC TRADITION

process. First,

this

one must meet the

culty of asserting his

own

dimensions of metropohtan

the

diffi-

personahty within hfe.

Where

and the expense of energy reach their Hmits, one seizes upon quahtative differentiation in order somethe quantitative increase in importance

how

to attract the attention of the social circle

by playing upon its sensitivity for differences. Finally, man is tempted to adopt the most tendentious peculiarities, that is, the specifically metropolitan extravagances of mannerism, caprice,

and preciousness. Now, the meaning

of these extravagances does not at

all lie in

contents of such behavior, but rather in

its

the

form

of "being different," of standing out in a strik-

ing

manner and thereby

For

many

means

attracting attention.

character types, ultimately the only

of saving for themselves

of self-esteem

and the sense

some modicum

of filling a position

through the awareness of others. In the same sense a seemingly insignificant factor is operating, the cumulative effects of which are, however, still noticeable. 1 refer to the brevity and scarcity of the inter-human contacts granted to the metropolitan man, as compared with social intercourse in the small town. The temptation to appear "to the point," to appear concentrated and strikingly characterisis

indirect,

tic,

lies

much

closer to the individual in brief

metropolitan contacts than in an atmosphere in which frequent and prolonged association assures the personality of an unambiguous

image of himself in the eyes of the other. The most profound reason, however, why the metropolis conduces to the urge for the most individual personal existence no matter whether justified and successful appears to me to be the following: the development of modern culture is characterized by the preponderance of what one may call the "objective

— —

individual in his intellectual development

—

two becomes

we

—

evident. Indeed, at

some

points

notice a retrogression in the culture of the

individual with reference to spirituality, delicacy,

and

discrepancy

This

idealism.

results

from the growing division of labor. For the division of labor demands from the individual an ever more one-sided accomplishment, and the greatest advance in a one-sided essentially

pursuit only too frequently

means dearth

and

with the overgrowth of is reduced to a negligible quantity, perhaps less in his consciousness than in his practice and in the totali-

can cope

less

less

The individual

objective culture.

of his obscure emotional states that are derived from this practice. The individual has ty

become

mere cog in an enormous organizaand powers which tear from his hands all progress, spirituality, and \'alue in order to transform them from their subjective form into the form of a purely objective life. It a

tion of things

needs

merely

metropolis

is

to

be

pointed

out

that

which outgrows all personal life. Here in buildings and educational institutions, in the wonders and comforts of space-conquering technology, in the formations of

and

community

offered such an o\'erwhelming fullness of crystallized

and impersonalized

spirit that the per-

under

impact.

as well as in the objects of the domestic envi-

lations, interests, uses of

embodied

a

sum

oi spirit.

The

life,

in the visible institutions of the state, is

so to speak, cannot maintain

is

the

the genuine arena of this culture

sonality,

ronment, there

to the

personality of the individual. In any case, he

over the "subjective spirit." This is to say, in language as well as in law, in the technique of production as well as in art, in science spirit"

fol-

lows the growth of this spirit very imperfectly and at an ever increasing distance. If, for instance, we view the immense culture which for the last hundred years has been embodied in things and in knowledge, in institutions and in comforts, and if we compare all this with the cultural progress of the individual during the same period at least in high status groups frightful disproportion in growth between the

its

infinitely

On

the

one hand,

easy for the personality

ness are offered to

it

from

life is

in that

itself

made

stimu-

time and consciousall sides.

They carry

CHAPTER

the person as

swim

however,

life is

for oneself.

GEORG

and one needs

in a stream,

if

hardly to

6:

On

the other hand,

composed more and more

of

these impersonal contents and offerings which

tend

to

orations

displace

the

genuine personal

and incomparabilities. This

col-

results in

the individual's summoning the utmost in uniqueness and particularization, in order to preserve his most personal core. He has to exaggerate this personal element in order to remain audible even to himself. The atrophy of individual culture through the hypertrophy of objective culture is one reason for the bitter

hatred

which

the

preachers

of

most

the

extreme individualism, above all Nietzsche, harbor against the metropolis. But it is, indeed,

why

also a reason

these preachers are so pas-

157

AND SOCIETY

SIMMEL: DIALECTIC OF INDIVIDUAL

Goethe and Romanticism, on and thrtiugh the economic division of labor, on the other hand, another ideal arose: individuals liberated from historical bones now wished to distinguish themselves from one another. The carrier of man's values is no longer the "general human being" in every individual, but rather man's qualitative uniqueness and irreplaceability. The external and internal history of our time takes its course within the struggle and in the changing entanglements of these two ways of defining the individual's role in the whole of society. It is century, through

the one hand,

the function of the metropolis to provide the

arena for this struggle and

its

reconciliation.

For the metropolis presents the peculiar conditions which are revealed to us as the opportu-

sionately loved in the metropolis

and why they

nities

appear

man

both these ways of allocating roles to men. Therewith these conditions gain a unique place, pregnant with inestimable meanings for the development of psychic existence. The metropolis reveals itself as one of those great historical formations in which opposing streams which enclose life unfold, as well as join one another with equal right. However, in

to

the

metropolitan

as

the

prophets and saviors of his most unsatisfied yearnings. If one asks for the historical position of these two forms of individualism which are nour-

ished

by

the

quantitative

relation

of

the

metropolis, namely, individual independence

and the elaboration of individuality itself, then the metropolis assumes an entirely new rank order in the world history of the spirit. The eighteenth century found the individual in oppressive bonds which had become meaningless bonds of a political, agrarian, guild, and religious character. They were restraints which, so to speak, forced upon man an unnatural form and outmoded, unjust inequalities. In this situation the cry for liberty and equality arose, the belief in the individual's full freedom of movement in all social and intellectual relationships. Freedom would at once permit the

—

noble substance

common

to all to

come

this

and the

stimuli for the

process the currents of

individual

development of

life,

whether

their

phenomena touch us sympathet-

ically or antipathetically, entirely

transcend the

sphere for which the judge's attitude

is

appro-

have grown into the roots and into the crown of the whole of the historical life in which we, in our fleeting existence, as a cell, belong only as a part, it is not our task either to accuse or to pardon, but only priate. Since

to

such forces of

life

understand.'

to the

substance which nature had deposited in every man and which society and history fore, a

had only deformed. Besides this eighteenthcentury ideal of liberalism, in the nineteenth

'The content of this lecture by its very nature does not derive from a citable literature. Argument and elaboration of its major cultural-historical ideas are contained in my Philosofihie des Geldes

imd

Leipzig:

[The Philosophy of Money; Miinchen

Duncker und Humblot,

1900].

,

CHAPTER

7

George Herbert Mead: The Emergent Self

INTRODUCTION George Herbert Mead was born on February 17 1863, in South Hadley, Massachusetts. His father a clergyman, and his mother well educated. Mead's family encouraged his intellectual development. He spent most of his childhood at Oberlin College in Ohio, where his father held an appointment at the theological seminary, and benefited from the progressive education for which Oberlin is known. He later went to Harvard for his post-graduate degree and studied under William James. After a year, he went to Germanv to study philosophy and met Stanley Hall, the psychologist who sparked Mead's interest in that discipline. His work in social psychology, much of which was done at the University of Chicago, is what most consider to be his greatest contribution to sociology.

Mead

is

considered to be a leader of

the so-called Chicago School, a group of intel-

which includes John Dewey, W. I. Thomas and Robert Park. Generally, this group was marked by its pragmatic philosophy, its commitment to social reform, and its democratic ideas. The city of Chicago became a practical laboratory for sociology. Mead and his ct)nlectuals

158

temporaries were committed to the idea that sociology can be used to help others; thev had

an optimistic view of the society and its future and believed that knowledge should guide social action.

Mead's work can best be assessed

in

compar-

ison to the prevailing behavioristic psychology

view humans respond to stimuli. Watson, behaviorists

of his time. Behaviorism tends to

as reactive creatures

Under

the aegis of

J.

who B.

adopted a scrupulously scientific methodology anci claimed that only observable behavior could be the subject of scientific study. The mental life of an individual was relegated to a "black box" beyond our perceptual grasp, and as a result, behaviorists declared that explanations

that

relied

on the unobservable were

unscientific.

Mead's contribution to our understanding and how it is constituted emphasizes the idea that we are thoughtful and reflective creatures whose identities and actions arise as a result of our interaction with others. We are not simply vessels of behaviors waiting to be released by the appropriate stimuli in our enviof the self

CHAPTER

ronment. That explanation might suffice for pigeons, but Mead was convinced that human behavior was more complex. His most significant insight was his view of human behavior as reflexive, by vvhich he meant that vou and I think before we act in many of our important activities. Although it is true that people do en-

gage

behaviors that are not reflexive,

in

thoughtful behavior and

how

it

was

emerges that

it

Reflexivity entails the capacity to use

respond

to

and

language, symbols, and thoughts, called

the significant gestures.

seen as reflexive because we are able to understand and react to what others think and say about our behavior. Our actions

Our behavior

is

engaged with the actions of others, whose responses tti what we do send us signals

are always

as to their approval or disapproval.

We

are able to step out of ourselves and actions objects to ourselves so that

lyze

and assess the

we

in turn

make our

we

can ana-

reactions of others.

basis of this assessment

On

the

are able to trans-

form our actions and behavior

differently in

159

interactionism, the school of thought to

which

Mead's ideas gave tive process

rise,

claims that the interac-

among humans

was Mead's contention

that this internal

mental dialogue, the dialogue between the "I" and the "me," is what caused the social self to emerge. Mind, Self and Society, published after his death on April 26, 1931, best explicates Mead's perspective. What is interesting about this formulation is Mead's insistence that the "self," as it is commonly understood, cannot exist outside of its social context.

Mead

traces the

He

Even con-

is a social phenomenon, according Mead. Conversely, the structure of society can be understood as the produce of the communication of social acts between individual subjects. The vehicle of this communication is the gesture, which Mead defines as either conscious or unconscious. The unconscious ges-

in

on different roles and proceed to more complex which the child must conceptualize

their play

games

in

many players in order to particiLearning the game, whether it is baseball or soccer, is learning to be a member of the the roles of pate.

team.

It

means learning

teammates and the plays

may bring The game is and Mead is erly,

the positions of one's that, if

a

metaphor

very

example. No intentionality is involved. The conscious gestures define human communication. Symbolic

scream of fear or pain,

for

for

much

democratic

life,

the sociologist of

democracy. Just as children must learn to cooperate, to restrain their impulsive need to score (the "I") in preference for team play (the "me") so also do individuals reflect on their impul-

and engage

Mead

correction.

in self-analysis

and

humans

the

attributes

to

capacity to reshape their behavior in order to

gain approval and acceptance from others. In this way our actions are adjusted to those with

whom we ment, the

interact. fitting

those of others, that life,

is

It

this constant adjust-

together of our actions with is

the substance of social

and particularly of democratic

This process of

fitting

social

life.

together entails a respect

and the "generalized

for the particular other

basically a stimulus-response relation-

executed prop-

victory.

other" or the moral rules.

ship: a

notes that babies

begin to interact on the stimulus-response level and then slowly begin to evolve the skill of

to

is

generally con-

development of these men-

the child.

tal abilities in

sciousness

ture

is

ducted through the use of conscious gestures, or symbols.

sive behavior

future situations. It

GEORGE HERBERT MEAD: THE EMERGENT SELF

"play-acting." Children take

most concerned Mead.

which Mead

7:

It

requires a degree

of self-control and adjustment of one's behav-

reduces the need for external authority compel or coerce behavior. In so far as the self is an emergent property, the result of an ior that to

internal dialogue, the cooperative

dimensions

and the tempered by the generalized

of social interaction are underscored willful other.

ego

is

160

THE CLASSIC TRADITION

PART1:

George Herbert Mead: Mind, and Society

says something, and that calls out a certain

Self

he was going thing,

The is

self,

as that

which can be an

essentially a social structure,

object to

and

it

ences,

and so we can conceive

solitary self. a

arising

self

When

But

it is

its

itself,

arises in

social experience. After a self has arisen,

certain sense provides for itself

it

in a

social experi-

of an absolutely

impossible to conceive of

outside

of

experience.

social

we

can think of a person in solitary confinement for the rest of his life, but who still has himself as a companion, and is able to think and to converse with himself as he it

has arisen

had communicated with others. That process which I have just referred, of responding one's self as another responds to in one's

own

it,

to to

taking part

conversation with others, being

aware of what one is saying and using that awareness of what one is saying to determine what one is going to say thereafter that is a process with which we are all familiar. We are

—

continually following

up our own address to what we

other persons by an understanding of are saying,

and using

that

understanding

direction of our continued speech.

We

in the

are find-

what we are going to say, what we are going to do, by saying and doing, and in the

ing out

process

process

we

are

itself.

continually

controlling

what we say another and

that

action, so that

we shift from what we

do because of

the

In the conversation of gestures calls

out a certain response in in

turn changes our

is

own

started to

the reply the other makes.

conversation of gestures

makes him change what

reply in himself which

The

the beginning of

communication. The individual comes to carry on a conversation of gestures with himself. He

we

thing, but is cruel.

will

when he

The

One

starts to say somepresume an unpleasant some-

to say.

effect

starts to

say

on himself

ing checks him; there

is

of

it

he realizes

what he

is

it

say-

here a conversation of

gestures between the individual and himself.

We mean by is

one that

significant speech that the action

affects the individual himself,

that the effect

upon

and

the individual himself

is

part of the intelligent carrying-out of the con-

Now we, so to speak, phase and dispense with it for the time being, so that one is talking to one's self as one would talk to another person. This process of abstraction cannot be carried on indefinitely. One inevitably seeks an audience, has to pour himself out to somebody. In reflective intelligence one thinks to act, and to act solely so that this action remains a part of a social process. Thinking becomes preparatory to social action. The very process of thinking is, of course, simply an inner conversation that goes on, but it is a conversation of gestures which in its completion implies the expression of that which one thinks to an audience. One separates the significance of what he is saying to others from the actual speech and gets it ready before saying it. He thinks it out, and perhaps writes it in the form of a book; but it is still a part of social intercourse in which one is addressing other persons and at the same time addressing one's self, and in which one controls the address to other persons by the response made to one's own gesture. That the person should be responding to himself is necessary to the self, and it is this sort of social conduct which provides behavior within which know of no other form of that self appears. beha\'ior than the linguistic in which the individual is an object to himself, and, so far as can see, the individual is not a self in the reflexive sense imless he is an object to himself. It is this fact that gives a critical importance to comversation with others.

amputate

that social

1

Si)i//rf the single individual. The meaning of a gesture by one organism, to repeat, is found in the response of

element

in the social act,

CHAPTER

another organism to what would be the completion of the act of the that gesture initiates

and

first

organism which

indicates.

We

sometimes speak as if a person could build up an entire argument in his mind, and then put it into words to convey it to someone else. Actually, our thinking always takes place by means of some sort of symbols. It is possible that one could have the meaning of "chair" in his experience without there being a symbol, but we would not be thinking about it in that case. We may sit down in a chair without

thinking about what

we

are doing, that

is,

the

approach to the chair is presumably already aroused in our experience, so that the meaning is there. But if one is thinking about the chair he must have some sort of a symbol for it. It may be the form of the chair, it may be the attitude that somebody else takes in sitting down, but it is more apt to be some language symbol that arouses this response. In a thought process there has to be some sort of a symbol that can refer to this

meaning, that

this response,

other

and

Our symbols

if

thing

you say You

universal.

that

are

say anything that

tend to

call

out

also serve this purpose for

persons as well.

thought process

is,

is

It

would not be

were not the

all

universal.

a

163

GEORGE HERBERT MEAD: THE EMERGENT SELF

course;

universal

is

it

in

We

character.

its

always assume that the symbol we use is one which will call out in the other person the same response, provided it is a part of his mechanism of conduct. A person who is saying something is saying to himself what he says to others; otherwise he does not know what he is talking about.

There

is,

of course, a great deal in one's con-

versation with others that does not arouse in

one's self the ers.

That

is

same response

tional attitudes.

he

else;

is

One

does he

is

The

a symbolic character.

certain attitude he

is,

as

own

as his audience does.

one

is

It is

not an actor

We do at times act and

the effect of our attitude

is

he

is, if

we

this attitude represents grief.

ural situation;

is,

values given in speech

able to respond to his

some sense

may

emosomebody

bully

conscious of these values; that

is

assumes a aware that

time.

tries to

set of

which are not of actor

arouses in oth-

not trying to bully himself. There

whole

further, a

it

particularly true in the case of

say, If

it

gesture in

not a natall

of the

consider just what

going to be, and

we

deliberately use a certain tone of voice to

case.

bring about a certain result. Such a tone arouses

You cannot

the same response in ourselves that we want to arouse in somebody else. But a very large part of what goes on in speech has not this symbolic

absolutely particular; any-

that has

7:

any meaning

at all is

are saying something that calls

status.

out a specific response in anybody else provid-

ed that the symbol exists for him in his experience as it does for you. There is the language of speech and the language of hands, and there may be the language of the expression of the countenance. One can register grief or joy and call out certain responses. There are primitive people who can carry on elaborate conversations just by expressions of the countenance. Even in these cases the person who communicates is affected by that expression just as he expects somebody else to be affected. Thinking always implies a symbol which will call out the same response in another that it calls out in the thinker. Such a svmbol is a universal of dis-

It is

the task not only of the actor but of the

well to find the sort of expression that arouse in others what is going on in himself. The lyric poet has an experience of beauty with an emotional thrill to it, and as an artist artist as

will

using words he

is

seeking for those words

which will answer to and which will call out

emotional attitude, he himself has. He can only test his results in himself by seeing whether these words do call out in

him

ers.

his

in others the attitude

the response he wants to call out in oth-

He

is

in

somewhat the same position as The first direct and immediate not in the form of communica-

that of the actor.

experience tion.

We

is

have an interesting

light

on

this

from

164

THE CLASSIC TRADITION

PART1:

such a poet as Wordsworth, who was very much interested in the technique of the poet's expression; and he has told us in his prefaces and also in his own poetry how his poems, as poems, arose and uniformly the experience itself was not the immediate stimulus to the poetic expression. A period of ten years might

—

lie

between the original experience and the

expression of

This process of finding the

it.

expression in language which will

out the

call

emotion once had is more easily accomplished when one is dealing with the memory of it than when one is in the midst of the trance-like experiences through which Wordsworth passed in his contact with nature. One has to experiment and see how the expression that is given does answer to the responses which are now had in the fainter memories of experience. Someone once said that he had very great difficulty in writing poetry; he had plenty of ideas but could not get the language he needed. He

was

rightly

words, not

A great

was

that poetry

told

written in

in ideas.

deal of our speech

is

not of this gen-

uinely aesthetic character; in most of

it

we do we

not deliberately feel the emotions which arouse.

We do

not normally use language stim-

out

in

response which

we

to

uli

One

call

ourselves

emotional

the

are calling out in others.

does, of course, have

sympathy

in

emo-

what one is seeking for there is something which is, after all, that in the other which supports the individual in his own experience. In the case of the poet and actor, the stimulus calls out in the artist that which it tional situations; but

calls

out in the other, but this

function of language; the person in

who

is

angry

himself that he

else.

we do

The emotional

is

is

is

not the natural

not assume that

calling out the fear

calling out in

part of our act does not

directly call out in us the response

the other

someone

it

calls

out in

person is hostile the attitude of the other that he is interested in, an attitude which flows naturally from his angered tones, is not one that he definitely recognizes in himIf

a

We

self.

are not frightened by a tone which

we

use to frighten somebody else. On the emotional side, which is a very large part of the vocal gesture, we do not call out in ourselves in any such degree the response we call out in

may

we do in the case of significant we should call out in ourselves the type of response we are calling out in others; we must know what we are saving, and the attitude of the other which we arouse in ourselves should control what we do say. others as

speech. Here

Rationality

which we

means

call

that the type of the response out in others should be so called

out in ourselves, and that this response should

determining what

fur-

and do. communication

that

in turn take its place in

ther thing

What

we

is

are going to say

essential to

symbol should arouse

the

is

what it must have

in one's self

arouses in the other indi\idual. that sort of universality to

It

any person who

same situation. There is a language whenever a stimulus

finds himself in the possibility of

can affect the individual as it affects the other. a blind person such as Helen Keller, it is a contact experience that couki be given to an-

With

it is given to herself. It is out of that language that the mind of Helen Keller

other as sort of

was

built up.

As she has recognized,

it

was

not

until she could get into communication with other persons through symbols which could

arouse in herself the responses they arouse in other people that she could get what

we

mental content, or a self. Another set of background factors genesis of the self ties of

is

represented in the

term a in

the

acti\'i-

play and the game.

Among

priniiti\e people, as

1

ha\e

said, the

necessity of distinguishing the self

and the

we

term the

organism was recognized

in wiiat

"double": the individual has a thing-like self that

is

affected

by the individual as

other people and which the

immediate organism

body and come back

to

is

in that it.

it

affects

distinguished from

This

it

is

can leave the the basis for

the concept of the soul as a separate entity.

CHAPTER

We

find in children something that answers

to this

double, namely, the invisible, imaginary

GEORGE HERBERT MEAD: THE EMERGENT SELF

7:

himself as a parent, as a teacher; he arrests himself as a policeman. He has a set of stimuli

companions which a good many children produce in their own experience. They organize in this way the responses which they call out in other persons and call out also in themselves. Of course, this playing with an imaginary com-

which

only a peculiarly interesting phase of ordinary play. Play in this sense, especially the stage which precedes the organized games, is a

uation.

panion

is

play at something.

A

child plays at being a

mother, at being a teacher, at being a policeman; that is, it is taking different roles, as we say.

We

have something

that suggests this in

what we

call the play of animals: a cat will play with her kittens, and dogs play with each other. Two dogs playing with each other will attack and defend, in a process which if carried through would amount to an actual fight. There is a combination of responses which checks the depth of the bite. But we do not

have

in

such a situation the dogs taking a

defi-

nite role in the sense that a child deliberately

on the what we are working with in the kindergarten where the roles which the children assume are made the basis for training. When a child does assume a role he has in himself the stimuli which call out that particular response or group of responses. He takes the role of another. This tendency

part of the children

is

may, of course, run away when he is chased, as the dog does, or he may turn around and strike back just as the dog does in his play. But that is not the same as playing at something. Children

means that which call they would call

get together to "play Indian." This

the child has a certain set of stimuli

itself the responses that out in others, and which answer to an Indian. In

out in the

play period

the

child

utilizes

his

own

responses to these stimuli which he makes use self. The response which he has tendency to make to these stimuli organizes them. He plays that he is, for instance, offering himself something, and he buys it; he gives a letter to himself and takes it away; he addresses

165

they

out in himself the sort of responses out in others. He takes this group of

call

call

responses and organizes them into a certain

whole. Such

the simplest form of being

is

another to one's

The

self. It

ter

and responds

his

responding

in

in

involves a temporal

something

in

another character

lus to himself in the first character,

conversation

goes

A

on.

him and

certain

is

a stimu-

and so the organized

which and these carry on the conversaof gestures between themselves.

structure arises in replies to tion

sit-

one characanother character, and then

child says

If

we

in his other

it,

contrast play with the situation in an

organized game,

we note the who plays

ence that the child

essential differ-

game must

in a

be ready to take the attitude of everyone else involved in that game, and that these different roles must have a definite relationship to each other. Taking a very simple game such as hideand-seek, everyone with the exception of the one who is hiding is a person who is hunting. A child does not require more than the person

who child

is

is

hunted and the one playing in the

playing, but there

first

is

who

is

hunting.

If

a

sense he just goes on

no basic organization

gained. In that early stage he passes from one role to another just as a

a

game where

a

wliim takes him. But

number

in

of individuals are in-

volved, then the child taking one role must be

ready to take the role of everyone else. If he gets in a ball nine he must have the responses of each position involved in his own position. He must know what everyone else is going to do in order to carry out his own play. He has to take all of these roles. They do not all have to be present in consciousness at the same time, but at some moments he has to have three or

of in building a

four indi\'iduals present in his

a

such as the one the one

who

is

who

is

own

attitude,

going to throw the

going to catch

it,

ball,

and so on.

These responses must be, in some degree, present in his own make-up. In the game, then.

166

PART1:

THE CLASSIC TRADITION

people out of which our civilization has A striking illustration of play as distinct

there is a set of responses of such others so organized that the attitude of one calls out the

itive

appropriate attitudes of the other.

from the game is found in the myths and various of the plays which primitive people carry out, especially in religious pageants. The pure play attitude which we find in the case of little children may not be found here, since the participants are adults, and undoubtedly the relationship of these play processes to that which

put in the form of the rules of the game. Children take a great interest in rules. They make rules on the spot in order This organization

to

is

help themselves out of

the enjoyment of the

Now,

game

difficulties. Part of is

to get these rules.

which a You can demand a if you take a certain

the rules are the set of responses

arisen.

more or

less in the

minds

of

particular attitude calls out.

they interpret

certain response in others

even the most primitive people. In the process of interpretation of such rituals, there is an organization of play which perhaps might be

These responses are all in yourself as There you get an organized set of such well. responses as that to which I have referred, which is something more elaborate than the roles found in play. Here there is just a set of responses that follow on each other indefinitely. At such a stage we speak of a child as not yet having a fully developed self. The child responds in a fairly intelligent fashion to the immediate stimuli that come to him, but they are not organized. He does not organize his life as we would like to have him do, namely, as a whole. There is just a set of responses of the attitude.

type of play. The child reacts to a certain stimulus, and the reaction is in himself that is called

compared

is

to that

which

is

taking place in the

kindergarten in dealing with the plays of children, will least

where these are made

little

into a set that

have a definite structure or relationship. At something of the same sort is found in the

play of primitive people. This type of activity belongs, of course, not to the e\'eryday life of the people in their dealing with the objects

—

about them there we have a more or less defibut in nitely developed self-consciousness their attitudes toward the forces about them, the nature upon which they depend; in their attitude

—

toward

this

nature which

we have

is

\ague and

much more

primi-

out in others, but he is not a whole self. In his game he has to have an organization of these roles; otherwise he cannot play the game. The

uncertain, there

game

ing at the expression of their gods and their heroes, going through certain rites which are the

child

represents the passage in the

from taking the full

of the

role of others in play to

the organized part that

sciousness in the

life

is

essential to self-con-

sense of the term.

PLAY, THE GAME, AND THE GENERALIZED OTHER

We were

response;

and

that

I

more prim-

finds

its

what these indi\iduals are supposed to be doing. The process is one which de\'elops, to be sure, into a more or less definite technique and is controlled; and yet we representation of

it

has arisen out of situations similittle children play at

lar to those in which

speaking of the social conditions

response

expression in taking the role of the other, play-

can say that

under which the self arises as an object. In addition to language we found two illustrations, one in play and the other in the game, and I wish to summarize and expand my account on these points. have spoken of these from the point of view of children. We can, of course, refer also to the attitudes of

tive

a

—

being a parent, at being a teacher vague personalities that are about them and which affect

them and on which they depend. These are personalities which they take, roles they play, and in so far control the development of their own personality. This outcome is just what the kindergarten works toward. It takes the characters of these wirious \'ague beings and gets

CHAPTER

7:

common

them

the

to

undertakings

into such an organized social relationship each other that they build up the character of the little child. The very introduction of organization from outside supposes a lack of

organization at this period in the child's experi-

Over against such a situation of the little and primitive people, we have the game

ence. child

The fundamental

game

anci play

difference

between the

that in the latter the child

is

social

activity

or set of social

which, as members of an organized society or social group, they are all engaged; and he must then, by generalizing these individual attitudes of that organized in

society or social

group

toward different

social projects

given time

as such.

167

GEORGE HERBERT MEAD: THE EMERGENT SELF

it is

itself,

as a whole, act

which

at

any

carrying out, or toward the var-

ious larger phases of the general social process

which constitutes

its

life

and

of

which these

others

projects are specific manifestations. This get-

involved in that game. The attitudes of the

broad activities of any given social whole or organized society as such within the experiential field of any one of the individuals

must have

the

of

attitude

the

all

other players which the participant assumes

organize into a sort of unit, and it is that organization which controls the response of the

ting of the

involved or included in that whole

is,

in other

individual. The illustration used was of a person playing baseball. Each one of his own acts is determined by his assumption of the action of the others who are playing the game. What he does is controlled by his being everyone else

words, the essential basis and prerequisite of the fullest development of that individual's

on

ity

that team, at least in so far as those attitudes

affect his

own

particular response.

an "other" which

is

We

get then

an organization of the

atti-

tudes of those involved in the same process.

only in so far as he takes the attitudes of the organized social group to which he belongs toward the organized, co-operative social activ-

self:

or set of such activities in which that group

engaged, does he develop a complete self or possess the sort of complete self he has developed. And on the other hand, the comas such

is

The organized community or social group which gives to the individual his unity of self may be called "the generalized other." The atti-

plex co-operative processes and activities and

tude of the generalized other is the attitude of the whole community. Thus, for example, in the case of such a social group as a ball team,

individual involved in them or belonging to

the team

processes and activities and institutional func-

enters ity

is

the generalized other in so far as

—as an organized process or social activ-

—into the experience of any one of the

vidual If

it

members

the given

of

human

individual

human

to

take

it is

the

is

develop

to

not sufficient for

attitudes

of

other

individuals toward himself and toward

one another within the human social process, and to bring that social process as a whole into his individual experience merely in these

must

same way

human

society are also possible only in so far as every that society can take the general attitudes of all

other such individuals with reference to these tionings,

and

organized social whole of and interactions thereby and can direct his own behavior to the

experiential relations

constituted

it.

a self in the fullest sense,

him merely

indi-

institutional functionings of organized

—

accordingly. It is

in the

form of the generalized other that

the social process influences the behavior of the

individuals involved in i.e.,

that the

community

the conduct of in this

form

its

it

and carrying

on,

it

exercises control over

individual members; for

that the social process or

it is

commu-

he

nity enters as a determining factor into the

takes the attitudes of other individuals toward

individual's thinking. In abstract thought the

himself and toward one another, take their attitudes toward the various phases or aspects of

other toward himself, without reference to

terms: he

also, in the

that

individual takes the attitude of the generalized its

168

PART1:

THE CLASSIC TRADITION

expression in any particular other individuals;

one of the particular organized subgroups

and

(determined in socially functional terms) of is a member within the entire given society or social community. In the most highly developed, organized, and complicated

thought he takes that attitude in so far as it is expressed in the attitudes toward his behavior of those other individuals with whom he is involved in the given social situation or act. But only by taking the attitude of the generalized other toward himself, in one or another of these ways, can he think at all; for only thus can thinking or the internalized in concrete

—

conversation thinking

of

gestures

which constitutes

—occur. And only through the taking

which he himself

human

social

communities

man — these

civilized

or subgroups of individuals to which any given individual belongs (and with the other individual members of which he thus al classes

enters into a special set of social relations) are

by individuals of the attitude or attitudes of the generalized other toward themselves is the

of

existence of a universe of discourse, as that sys-

clubs, corporations,

tem

of

common

meanings which

or social

thinking presupposes at

context, rendered

its

possible.

two

kinds.

individual, then,

Some

of

them are concrete

which are

tional social units, in terms of

vidual

members

actually func-

all

which

The others are

or subgroups, such as the class of debtors and the class of creditors, in terms of

individual

which

that

group or community as such

is

en-

gaged; and as an individual participant in these social projects or co-operative enterpris-

he governs his own conduct accordingly In example, the individual identifies himself with an entire political party and takes the organized attitudes of that entire party toward the rest of the given social community and toward the problems which confront the party within the given social situation; and he consequently reacts or responds in terms of the organized attitudes of the party as a whole. He es,

politics, for

one

to

abstract social classes

group or community (or of some one section thereof) to which he belongs, toward the social problems of various kinds which confront that group or community at any given time, and which arise in connection with the correspondingly different social projects or organized co-operative enterprises in

their indi-

are directly related

takes or assumes the organized social attitudes of the given social

social

classes or subgroups, such as political parties,

another.

The self-conscious human

—those evolved bv

various socially function-

members

which

their

are related to one another

only more or less indirectly, and which only

more

or less indirectly function as social units,

but which afford or represent unlimited possibilities

for the

widening and ramifving and

enriching of the social relations individual

members

among

all

the

of the given society as an

organized and unified whole. The given indi-

membership

vidual's

in

several

abstract social classes or subgroups

of

these

makes pos-

sible his entrance into definite social relations

(however

number

indirect)

with

an

of other individuals

to or are included within

almost

who

infinite

also belong

one or another of

these abstract social classes or subgroups cutting

across

functional

lines

of

demarcation

enters into various other special sets of social

which divide different human social communities trom one another, and including indi\ idual members from several (in some cases from all) such communities. Of these abstract social classes or subgroups of human individuals the one which is most inclusive and extensive is, of course, the one defined bv the logical universe

relations, with various other classes of individ-

of discourse (or system of universally signifi-

uals respectively, the individuals of each of

cant symbols) determined by the participation

thus enters into a special set of social relations

with

all

the other individuals

that political party;

and

in

these classes being the other

who

the

belong to

same way he

members

of

some

and communicative interaction of indi\iduals;

CHAPTER

7:

the one

The game has

which claims the largest number of individual members, and which enables the largest con-

zation of the self

for of all

such classes or subgroups,

it is

number of human individuals to enter some sort of social relation, however indi-

ceivable into

rect or abstract

it

may

be, with

one another

—

169

GEORGE HERBERT MEAD: THE EMERGENT SELF

end

such an organirendered possible: there is a

a logic, so that is

be obtained; the actions of the individuals are all related to each different reference to that end so that they do other with definite

to

not conflict; one

is

not in conflict with himself

man on

from the universal functioning of gestures as significant symbols in the general human social process of communication. 1 have pointed out, then, that there are two general stages in the full development of the self. At the first of these stages, the individual's self is constituted simply by an organization of

in the attitude of another

the particular attitudes of other individuals

into the organization of other selves

toward himself and toward one another in the specific social acts in which he participates

reach such a stage as that of the game, as over

relation arising

with them. But

development

at the

second

stage in the full

of the individual's self that self

is

the team.

If

one has the attitude of the person throwing the ball he can also have the response of catching the ball. The two are related so that they further the

purpose of the game

They

itself.

are

interrelated in a unitary, organic fashion. There is

a definite unity, then,

which

against the situation of play

is

introduced

when we

where there

is

a

simple succession of one role after another, a situation

which

own

is,

of course, characteristic of

The

one

constituted not only by an organization of

the child's

these particular individual attitudes, but also

thing at one time and another at another, and

by an organization

them, by means of further organizing, and then

what he is at one moment does not determine what he is at another. That is both the charm of childhood as well as its inadequacy. You cannot count on the child; you cannot assume that all the things he does are going to determine what he will do at any moment. He is not organized into a whole. The child has no definite character, no definite personality. The game is then an illustration of the situation out of which an organized personality

generalizing, the attitudes of particular other

arises. In so far as the child

of the social attitudes of the

group as a generalized other or the These social or whole to which he belongs. within the individgroup attitudes are brought are included ual's field of direct experience, and social

as elements in the structure or constitution of his self, in the

same way

that the attitudes of

particular other individuals are;

and the

indi-

vidual arrives at them, or succeeds in taking

individuals in terms of their organized social

bearings and implications. So the its full

self

reaches

development by organizing these

indi-

vidual attitudes of others into the organized social or

group

attitudes,

and by thus becom-

ing an individual reflection of the general systematic pattern of social or group behavior in

—

personality.

child

is

does take the attitude of the other and allows that attitude of the other to determine the thing he is going to do with reference to a common end, he is becoming an organic

member

of society.

He

is

taking

over the morale of that society and is becoming an essential member of it. He belongs to it in so far as he does allow the attitude of the other

group attitudes which, through the mechanism of his central nervous system, he takes toward himself, just as he takes the indi\'idual atti-

he takes to control his own immediate What is involved here is some sort of an organized process. That which is expressed in terms of the game is, of course, being continually expressed in the social life of the child, but this wider process goes beyond

tudes of others.

the immediate experience of the child himself.

which it and the others are all involved a pattern which enters as a whole into the individual's experience in

terms of these organized

that

expression.

170

THE CLASSIC TRADITION

PART1;

The importance

game

of the

entirely inside of the child's

is

that

it

that

it

Hes

experience,

of our modern type of edubrought as far as possible

and the importance cation

is

own

is

within this realm. The different attitudes that a child

assumes are so organized

cise a definite control

attitudes in a

response. In

that they exerover his response, as the

game control his own immediate the game we get an organized which is found in and finds its the immediate experience of the

other, a generalized other,

the nature of the child

expression in child.

child's

itself,

And it is that organized own nature controlling

activity in the

the particular

response which gives unity, and which builds

up

his

own self.

What goes on of the child

all

game goes on in the life time. He is continually tak-

in the

the

ing the attitudes of those about him, especially the roles of those

who

whom

him and on

in

some sense

he depends.

He

control

the process by which a personality have spoken of this as a process in which a child takes the role of the other, and said that it takes place essentially through the use of language. Language is predominantly based on the vocal gesture by means of wliich

Such

arises.

is

I

community are carLanguage in its significant sense is that vocal gesture which tends to arouse in the individual the attitude which it arouses in others, and it is this perfecting of the self by the gesture which mediates the social activities co-operative activities in a ried out.

that gives rise to the process of taking the role

of the other.

nate because

which which

is

way at first. It goes over from the play into the game in a real sense. He has to play the game. The morale of the game takes hold of the child

process

is

activities

can completely enter; its morale may have a greater hold on him than that of the family to which he belongs or the community in which he lives. There are all sorts of social organiza-

then acts in

fairly lasting,

some

a period in

which he

likes "to belong,"

gets into organizations

which come

and he

into exis-

tence and pass out of existence. He becomes a something which can function in the organized whole, and thus tends to determine himself in his relationship with the group to which he belongs. That prt)cess is one which is a striking stage in the development of the child's morale. It

him a self-conscious member community to which he belongs.

constitutes

the

of

more

little

unfortu-

sophisticated than that

it

calling out in

more than the larger morale of the whole community. The child passes into the game and the game expresses a social situation in which he

which are

a

where the child's play takes different Here the very fact that he is ready to pay out money, for instance, arouses the attitude of the person who receives money; the very roles.

of

is

involved in our

degree

tions

some

phrase

suggests an actor's attitude

own experience. To does not correctly describe that which I have in mind. We see the process most definitely in a primitive form in those situathis

function of the process in an abstract sort of a

temporary, into which the child is entering, and he is playing a sort of social game in them. It is

latter

it

actually

is

gets the

tions,

The

him

the corresponding

of the other person involved.

The

inciividual stimulates himself to the response

which he

is

calling out in the other person,

some degree

in

response

and

to that sit-

uation. In play the child does definitely act out

which he himself has aroused in himthat which gives, as I have said, a definite content in the individual which answers to the stimulus that affects him as it affects somebody else. The content of the other that enters into one personality is the response in the individual which his gesture calls out in the other. We may illustrate our basic concept by a refthe role

self. It is

erence to the notion of property. is

my

property,

I

shall control

If

it,"

we

say "This

that affirma-

which anv communitv in which property exists. It in\-olves an organized attitude with reference to property which is common to all the members of the community. One tion calls out n certain set of responses

must be the same

in

CHAPTER

must have

own

a definite attitude of control of his

property and respect for the property of Those attitudes (as organized sets of

others.

responses) that

must be

when one

on the part

there

of

all,

so

says such a thing he calls out in

himself the response of the others. He is calling out the response of what I have called a generalized other. That which makes society possible is such common responses, such organized attitudes, with reference to what we term property, the cults of religion, the process of educa-

tion,

and

the relations of the family.

more

the wider the society the versal these objects

must

must

Of course,

definitely uni-

any case there which we and which can belong be. In

be a definite set of responses,

may speak of as abstract,

to a very large group. Property

is

that

It is

ing the attitude of the other dog. says "This

is

my property"

of the other person. The his rights because

which everybody

he

is

is

A man who

taking an attitude

man

is

appealing to

able to take the attitude

else in the

group has with

171

GEORGE HERBERT MEAD: THE EMERGENT SELF

own

arouses his

which the

self is

self.

The

on which is

structure, then,

built is this response

one has to be a member of a be a self. Such responses are community to they constitute just what attitudes, but abstract we term a man's character. They give him what we term his principles, the acknowledged attitudes of all members of the community toward what are the values of that community. He is

common

to

all,

for

putting himself in the place of the generalized

which represents the organized responses members of the group. It is that which guides conduct controlled by principles, and a person who has such an organized group of other,

of

the

all

responses in the

in itself a

which the indicontrol and nobody else can vidual himself can from that of a attitude is different control. The fight any other bone. A dog will dog toward a dog trying to take the bone. The dog is not takvery abstract concept.

7:

It

goes

a

is

man whom we say

has character,

moral sense.

is

to

which from a group example, cer-

a structure of attitudes, then,

make up

a self, as distinct

We all of us have, for groups of habits, such as the particular intonations which a person uses in his speech. of habits. tain

is a set of habits of vocal expression which one has but which one does not know about. The sets of habits which we have of that sort

This

mean nothing

to us;

we do

not hear the intona-

we

tions of our speech that others hear unless

are paying particular attention to them.

The

which belong

reference to property, thus arousing in himself

habits of emotional expression

the attitude of others.

our speech are of the same sort. We may know that we have expressed ourselves in a joyous fashion but the detailed process is one which does not come back to our conscious selves. There are whole bundles of such habits which do not enter into a conscious self, but which help to make up what is termed the uncon-

What goes

to

make up

the organized self

the organization of the attitudes

is

which are

to the group. A person is a personality because he belongs to a community, because he takes over the institutions of that community into his own conduct. He takes its language as a medium by which he gets his personality, and then through a process of taking the different roles that all the others furnish he comes to

common

get the attitude of the nity.

members

Such, in a certain sense,

is

of the

commu-

the structure of

man's personality. There are certain common responses which each individual has toward certain common things, and in so far as those a

common vidual

responses are awakened in the indiis affecting other persons he

when he

scious

to

self.

is

what we mean by self-consciousness in ourselves of the group of

especially

when

After all,

an awakening attitudes which

we it

are is

responses which go to

arousing in others,

an important

make up

the

set

of

members

community. It is unfortunate to fuse or mix up consciousness, as we ordinarily use that term, and self-consciousness. Consciousof the

ness, as frequently used, simply has reference

172

PARTI:

THE CLASSIC TRADITION

but self-consciousness refers to the ability to call out in ourselves a set of definite responses which belong to the othto the field of experience,

of the group. Consciousness and consciousness are not on the same level. A ers

self-

man

alone has, fortunately or unfortunately, access to his own toothache, but that is not what we

mean by

self-consciousness.

have so

1

far

emphasized what

1

have called

the structures upon which the self is constructed, the

we

framework of the self, as it were. Of course are not only what is common to all: each

one of the selves

is

different

from everyone

but there has to be such a common structure as 1 have sketched in order that we may be members of a community at all. We cannot be

else;

ourselves unless

we are

community

also

members

in

whom

which control the attitudes of all. We cannot have rights unless we have common attitudes. That which we have acquired as self-conscious persons makes us such members of society and gives us there

is

a

of attitudes

selves. Selves can only exist in definite relation-

No hard-and-fast line can be drawn between our own selves and the selves of others, since our own selves exist and enter as such into our experience only in so far as the selves of others exist and enter as such into our experience also. The individual possesses a self only in relation to the selves of the other members of his social group; and the ships to other selves.

structure of his self expresses or reflects the

general behavior pattern of this social group to

which he belongs,

just as

does the structure of

the self of every other individual belonging to this social

group.

aware

of the social "me."

and hinted

the social foundathat the self

does

not consist simply in the bare organization of social attitudes.

We may now

explicitly raise

the question as to the nature of the "1" wliich

is

how

a

to raise

person can

mines what his position is in society and feels himself as having a certain function and privilege, these are all defined with reference to an "I," but the "I" is not a "me" and cannot become a "me." We may have a better self and a worse self, but that again is not the "I" as over against the "me," because they are both selves. We approve of one and disapprove of the other, but when we bring up one or the other they are there for such approval as "me's." The "I" does not get into the limelight; we talk to ourselves, but do not see ourselves. The "I" reacts to the self which arises through the taking of the attitudes of others. Through taking those attitudes we have introduced the "me" and we react to it as an "I." The simplest way of handling the problem would be in terms of memory. talk to myself, and 1 remember what I said and perhaps the emotional content that went with it. The "I" of 1

moment is present in the "me" of the next cannot turn around moment. There again quick enough to catch myself. become a "me" in so far as remember what 1 said. The "1" can this

1

1

1

be given, however, this functional relationship. "1" that we say that we are It is because of the never fully aware of what we are, that we surprise ourselves by our own action. It is as we act that

we

memory

that the "1"

are aware of ourselves. is

It

is

in

constantly present in

We

can go back directly a few our experience, and then we are dependent upon memory images for the rest. So that the "I" in memory is there as the spokesman of the self of the second, or minute, or day ago. As gi\en, it is a "me," but it is a

moments

tions of the self,

do not mean

be both "I" and "me," but to ask for the significance of this distinction from the point of view of conduct itself. Where in conduct does the "I" come in as over against the "me"? If one deter-

experience.

THE "I "AND THE "ME" We have discussed at length

I

the metaphysical question of

in

"me" which was the "I" at the earlier time. It you ask, then, where directly in your own experience the "I" comes in, the answer is that

CHAPTER

comes in as a historical figure. It is what you were a second ago that is the "I" of the "me." It is another "me" that has to take that role. You cannot get the immediate response of the "I" in the process. The "I" is in a certain sense that with which we do identify ourselves. The getting of it into experience constitutes one of the problems of most of our conscious experience;

it

it is

not directly given in experience.

The

"I"

is

the response of the organism to

the attitudes of the others, the

"me"

is

the orga-

nized set of attitudes of others which one himself

assumes. The attitudes of the others constiand then one reacts

tute the organized "me,"

toward that as an

"I."

I

now wish

to

examine

these concepts in greater detail.

There

is

"me" whole act

neither "I" nor

sation of gestures; the

in the converis

not yet car-

ried out, but the preparation takes place in this field of gesture.

Now,

in so far as the individual

arouses in liimself the attitudes of the others, there arises an organized group of responses.

And

it is

due

to the individual's ability to take

the attitudes of these others in so far as they can

be organized that he gets self-consciousness. The taking of all of those organized sets of attitudes gives him his "me"; that is the self he is aware of. He can throw the ball to some other member because of the demand made upon him from other members of the team. That is the self that immediately exists for him in his

He has their attitudes, knows what they want and what the consequence of any act of his will be, and he has assumed responsibility for the situation. Now, it is the consciousness.

presence of those organized sets of attitudes that constitutes that "me" to which he as an "I" is responding. But what that response will be

he does not know and nobody else knows. Perhaps he will make a brilliant play or an error. The response to that situation as it appears in his immediate experience is uncertain, and it is that which constitutes the "I." The "I" is his action over against that social situation within his own conduct, and it gets

7:

173

GEORGE HERBERT MEAD: THE EMERGENT SELF

into his experience orJy after

he has carried out

Then he is aware of it. He had to do such a thing and he did it. He fulfills his duty and he may look with pride at the throw which he made. The "me" arises to do that duty that is the way in which it arises in his experience. He had in him all the attitudes of others, calling for a certain response; that was the "me" of that situation, and his response is the "I." 1 want to call attention particularly to the the act.

—

fact that this

that

is

more

response of the "I" or less uncertain.

something

is

The

attitudes of

others which one assumes as affecting his

own

conduct constitute the "me," and that is something that is there, but the response to it is as yet not given. When one sits down to think anything out, he has certain data that are there. Suppose that it is a social situation which he has to straighten out. He sees himself from the point of view of one individual or another in the group. These individuals, related er,

give

togeth-

all

what is he do? He does not know and nobody

him

a certain self. Well,

going to else knows. He can get the situation into his experience because he can assume the attitudes of the various individuals involved in it. He knows how they feel about it by the assumption of their attitudes.

He

have done certain things

me

says, in effect, "I

that

seem

to a certain course of conduct."

to

commit

Perhaps

if

he does so act it will place him in a false position with another group. The "1" as a response to this situation, in contrast to the "me" which is involved in the attitudes which he takes, is uncertain.

And when

the response takes place,

appears in the field of experience largely as a memory image. Our specious present as such is very short. We do, however, experience passing events; part of the process of the passage of events is directly there in our experience, including then

it

some

of the past

and some

of the future.

We see

and as it does pass part of the ball is covered and part is being uncovered. We remember where the ball was a

a ball falling as

it

passes,

174

PART1:

THE CLASSIC TRADITION

moment ago and we beyond what

anticipate

where

it

will be

given in our experience. So of

is

ourselves; we are doing something, but to look back and see what we are doing involves getting memory images. So the "I" really appears experientially as a part of a "me." But on the basis of this experience

who

we

distinguish that

doing something from the puts the problem up to him. The

individual

"me" who

is

response enters into his experience only

when

takes place. If he says he knows what he is going to do, even there he may be mistaken. He starts out to do something and something it

happens always a he could

to interfere. little

The

resulting action

is

from anything which This is true even if he is

different

anticipate.

simply carrying out the process of walking. The very taking of his expected steps puts him in a certain situation which has a slightly different aspect from what is expected, which is in a certain sense novel. That movement into the future

is

the step, so to speak, of the ego, of the

something that is not given in the "me." Take the situation of a scientist solving a problem, where he has certain data which call "I."

It

is

for certain responses. call for his

others call

Some

of this set of data

applying such and such a law, while for another law. Data are there with

He knows what such and means, and when he has these

the

experience of the

there for us to act in a self-conscious fashion.

gets into experience until after the action takes place.

Such is the basis for the fact that the "I" does not appear in the same sense in experience as does the "me." The "me" represents a definite organization of the in

our

own

attitudes,

now they are in conflict with he makes one response he cannot make another. What he is going to do he does not know, nor does anybody else. The action of the self is in response to these conflicting sets of data in the form of a problem, with conflicting demands upon him as a scientist. He has to look at it in different ways. That action of the "I" is something the nature of which we cannot tell in advance. The

If

"I," then, in this relation of

the "me,"

responding

is

something that

to a social situation

is,

the "\" and

so to speak,

which

is

within

there

calling

a

for

reis

just

and "me" and the grounds for the sepathe two in behavior. The two are sep-

think, the relative position of the "I" in the situation,

ration of

arated in the process but they belong together in the

sense of being parts of a whole. They and yet they belong together.

The separation fictitious. They

his part; but

community

happens. There is no certainty in regard to it. There is a moral necessity but no mechanical necessity for the act. When it does take place then we find what has been done. The above account gives us, I

something that

such coloration

each other.

and

sponse, but the response that takes place

are separated

on

the

is

It

We are aware of ourselves, and of what the situation is, but exactly how we will act never

their implications.

data before him they stand for certain responses

individual.

answer which the individual makes to the attitude which others take toward him when he assumes an attitude toward them. Now, the attitudes he is taking toward them are present in his own experience, but his response to them will contain a novel element. The "I" gives the sense of freedom, of initiative. The situation is

said, the "I" is

an

and the "me"

something that

The "me" does

calculable. sort of

of the "I"

are not identical,

"I" in so far as

for,

as

is I

not

have

is

never entirely

call

for a certain

we meet

the obliga-

but the always something different from what the situation itself calls for. So there is always that distinction, if you like, between the "I" and the "me." The "I" both calls out the "me" and responds to it. Taken together they constitute a personality as it appears in social expetions that are given in conduct "I"

itself,

is

rience.

The

self is essentially a social

process

going on with these two distinguishable phases. If it did not ha\-e these two phases there

CHAPTER

could there

conscious

be

not

and

responsibility,

would be nothing novel

"

"

to

conscious

mind

self or

a self finds

the

of the self-

position

in the

community. Such

expression in self-assertion, or in

its

the devotion of itself to the cause of the

com-

appears as a new type of individual in the social whole. There is a new social whole because of the appearance of the type of individual mind 1 have described, and because munity. The

self

of the self with

own

own

its

assertion of itself of

identification with the

self is the

because

important phase

it is

its

community. The development

in the

in the possibility of the importa-

175

GEORGE HERBERT MEAD: THE EMERGENT SELF

out his being aware of

it. There is, then, a which the individual in interaction with others inevitably becomes like others in doing the same thing, without that process appearing in what we term consciousness. We become conscious of the process when we do definitely take the attitude of the others, and this situation must be distinguished from the previous one. Perhaps one says that he does not care to dress in a certain fashion, but prefers to be different; then he is taking the attitude of others toward himself into his own conduct. When an ant from

process by

in experience.

THE "I AND THE ME AS PHASES OF THE SELF

We come now

7:

means

another nest

is

of

introduced into the nest of other to pieces.

The

human community may be

that

forms, these turn on attitude in the

and

it

tear

it

of the individual himself, refusing to submit

himself because he does take that tude.

The ant case

human

common

an entirely external

is

individual

atti-

affair,

a matter of

tion of this social attitude into the responses of

but

whole community that such a society could arise. The change that takes place through this

taking the attitudes of the others and adjusting one's self or fighting

importation of the conversation of gestures

of the individual as a self in the process of

the

into the conduct of the individual

takes place in the experience of

all

is

one

of the

that

com-

ponent individuals. These, of course, are not the only changes

community. In speech changes take place that nobody is

that take place in the definite

aware of

at

all. It

requires the investigation of

scientists to discover that

taken place. This

human

myth

as

is

such processes have

also true of other phases of

organization.

unconsciously, as of the

is

They change, we

illustrated in

Wundt

say,

such a study

has carried out in his

The myth carries an account of the way in which organization has taken place while largely without any conscious direction and that sort of change is going on Volkcrpsi/chologic.

—

it

out.

it

It is

is

this recognition

using his self-consciousness which gives him the attitude of self-assertion or the attitude of

devotion to the community. He has become, then, a definite self. In such a case of self-assertion there is an entirely different situation from that of the member of the pack who perhaps dominates it, and may turn savagely on different

members

of

it.

acting instinctively, tion. In the

ual

who

human

There an individual

we

is

just

say, in a certain situa-

society

we have an individown attitude but

not only takes his

takes the attitude in a certain sense of his subjects; in

what

so far as he

to expect.

When

is

dominating he knows

that occurs in the experi-

ence of the individual a different response results with different emotional accompani-

After a while he gets to the point of thinking of

ments, from that in the case of the leader of the pack. In the latter case there is simple anger or hostility, and in the other case there is the expe-

himself in this changed fashion, noticing the

rience of the self asserting itself consciously

all

the time. Take a person's attitude toward a

in the

new

fashion.

It

clothes in the

may

at first

be one of objection.

window and

seeing himself in

them. The change has taken place in him with-

over against other selves, with the sense of power, of domination. In general, when the

176

THE CLASSIC TRADITION

PARTI:

community

reaction has been imported into

the individual there

ence and a

new

is

a

new

value in experi-

order of response.

We have discussed the self from the point of view of the "I" and the "me," the "me" representing that group of attitudes which stands for others in the community, especially that organized group of responses which we have detailed in discussing the game on the one hand and social institutions on the other. In these situations there

a certain organized

is

group of attitudes which answer to any social act on the part of the individual organism. In any co-operative process, such as the family, the individual calls out a response from the other

members

of the group.

Now,

to the extent

that those responses can be called out in the

we

individual so that he can answer to them,

have both those contents which go to make up the self, the "other" and the "I." The distinction expresses itself in our experience in what we call the recognition of others and the recogni-

We

cannot realas we can recog-

tion of ourselves in the others. ize ourselves except in so far

nize the other in his relationship to us.

It is

he takes the attitude of the other that the vidual

We

able to realize himself as a

is

as

indi-

self.

are referring, of course, to a social situa-

tion as distinct

from such bare organic responssome of which

bill into our hand and we take it without any definite consciousness of him or of ourselves. Our thought may be elsewhere but the process still goes on. The same thing is true,

advertising

of course, in the care of infants.

ion,

experience of a

is

person adjusts himself unconsciously about him. In such an experience there

no self-consciousness.

One

attains

self-

consciousness only as he takes, or finds himself stimulated to take, the attitude of the other.

Then he

is in

a position of reacting in himself to

that attitude of the other.

selves in an

economic

Suppose we

situation.

take the attitude of the other in

It is

small

simply by

itself. its

The plant

environment,

no experience of a self. When a self does appear in experience it appears over against the other, and we have been delineating the condition under which this other does appear in the experience of the human animal, namely in the presence of that sort of stimulation in the co-operative activity which arouses

but there

is

in the individual himself the

arouses in the other.

When

same response

it

the response of the

other becomes an essential part in the experi-

ence or conduct of the individual; the attitude of the other

when

becomes an

taking

essential

—

then the individual in his behavior appears in his own experience as a self; and until this happens he does not appear as a self. part

Rational societv, of course, specific set of individuals.

is

not limited to

Anv

person

who

become a part of it. The attitude of the community toward our own response is imported into ourselves in terms of the meaning of what we are doing. This occurs in its widest extent in universal discourse, in the reply which the rational world makes to our remark. The meaning is as universal as the community; it is rational can

that community; it is the response that the world made up out of rational beings inevitably makes to our own statement. We both get the object and oinsehes into experience in terms of such a process; the other appears in our own experience in so far as we do take such an organized and generalized attitude.

making an

boy

self

necessarily involved in the rational character of

offer

we

A

always involves

find our-

ing or declining such an

self-consciousness.

it

when we

can express ourselves in acceptoffer. That is a different response of the self from a distinctly automatic offering that can take place without to us that

does appear

or the lower animal reacts to

is

a

a self

an experience of another; there could not be an

we have to those

self.

When

any

where

without there being present in their experi-

ence a

es as reflexes of the organism,

already discussed, as in the case

Young children

which comes to them, they experience themselves to it in an immediate fashadjust that

thrusts

an

CHAPTER

If

one meets

fails to

that

a

person on the

street

whom

who

toward any other

same community. He

is

of the

the other, the orga-

is

nized, generahzed other,

member

a

is

he

him

recognize, one's reaction toward

you

if

One

hke.

takes

he turns in one direction one is to go in another direction. One has his response as an attitude within himself. It is having that attitude within himself that makes it possible for one to be a self. That involves something beyond the mere turning to the right, as we say, instinctively, without selfconsciousness. To have self-consciousness one must have the attitude of the other in one's own organism as controlling the thing that he is going to do. What appears in the immediate his attitude over against one's self.

experience of one's

taking that attitude

self in

what we term

is

able to maintain

is

recognized in the community in so far as

recognizes the others. Such self

which

is

have referred

I

that self which community, that

It is

the

itself in

it

the phase of the

to as

that of the

"me." the

"me"

is

the

"1."

The

indi-

vidual not only has rights, but he has duties; he is

ty

member

not only a citizen, a

nity,

but he

and

one puts up

his side of the case, asserts himself over against others and insists that they take a different attitude toward himself, then there is something important occurring that is not pre-

viously present in experience.

The general conditions under which one going

is

one

who

of the

reacts to this

in his reaction to

it,

as

commu-

communi-

we have

the conversation of gestures, changes "I" is the

seen in it.

response of the individual to the

The atti-

be present in one's experience, but he is as ignorant of just how he is going to respond as is the scientist of the particular hypothesis he will evolve out of the consideration of a problem. Such and such things are happening that are contrary to the theory

has

that

been

a

it.

change which

As we have pointed is

not present in his

own

experience until after it takes place. The appears in our experience in memory. It is only after we have acted that we know what we have done; it is only after we have spoken that we know what we have said. The adjustment to that organized world which is present in our own nature is one that represents the "me" and is constantly there. But if the response to it is a response which is of the nature of the conversation of gestures, if it cre"I"

ates a situation

which

is

in

some sense

novel,

if

He

explanation. is

they

to

be

suggests that the radium atom

breaking down, and

was

a

On

atom

is

consequently setting

the previous theory an

permanent

affair

not get energy. But

now

atom

out of which one could if it is

assumed

that the

system involving an interrelationship of energies, then the breaking down of such a system sets free what is relatively an itself is a

enormous amount of energy. The point I am making is that the idea of the scientist comes to mind,

is

are

radium would keep a pot of seemingly lead to no expenditure of energy. Here something is happening that runs contrary to the theory of physics up to the conception of radium activity. The scientist who has these facts before him has to pick out some

him,

out, this

How

gram of water boiling, and

tude of the community as this appears in his attitude in turn changes

held.

explained? Take the discovery that a

own

experience. His response to that organized

is

may

to act

free energy.

Over against

177

GEORGE HERBERT MEAD: THE EMERGENT SELF

If

is

the "me."

7:

it is

not as yet there in his

rather,

of that idea.

is

A

own mind.

His

the process of the appearance

person asserting his rights on a

certain occasion has rehearsed the situation in

own mind; he has reacted toward the community and when the situation arises he arouses himself and says something already in his mind. But when he said it to himself in the first place he did not know what he was going to say. He then said something that was novel to his

himself, just as the scientist's hypothesis

novelty

Such

when

it

flashes

is

a

upon him.

a novel reply to the social situation

involved in the organized set of attitudes constitutes the "1" as over against the "me." The

178

"me"

is

a conventional, habitual individual.

always

is

THE CLASSIC TRADITION

PARTI:

there.

It

It

has to have those habits,

guage

those responses which everybody has; other-

in

wise the individual could not be a member of the community. But an individual is constantly reacting to such an organized community in the way of expressing himself, not necessarily asserting himself in the offensive sense but expressing himself, being himself in such a cooperative process as belongs to any community. The attitudes involved are gathered from the group, but the individual in whom they are organized has the opportunity of giving them an expression which perhaps has never taken

ment

place before.

This brings out the general question as to

whether anything novel can appear. of course, the novel

and the recognition in

is

of this gets

more general terms

Practically,

constantly happening

in the

its

expression

concept of emer-

is

every

there, but a different use of

new

the reconstruction takes

which they belong. That reconno more given in advance than is the particular hypothesis which the scientist the group to struction

is

brings forward given in the statement of the

problem. Now,

it is

that reaction of the individ-

ual to the organized "me," the

nity,

which represents the

of the

"I" in the

Now

is

of

attitude of the others that guarantees to

own

It

gives

him

dignity of being a

member

which there

himself, that brings to

no novelty. The world is simply a satisfaction of that equation. Put in any values for X and V and the same sides, then, of course, there is

equation holds. The equations do hold, it is true, but in their holding something else in fact arises that

was not

there

is

group of individuals

work

together. In a society there

of

a

common

in all,

under

there before. For instance, that have to must be a set

organized habits of response found

but the

way

in

which individuals

act

specific circumstances gives rise to all of

the individual differences which characterize the different persons. act

in

a

certain

The

fact that

common

they have to

fashion

docs not

him

To be a "me" the important

rights. is

his position, gives

is

absolute equality of the different

experience

primary importance that he is a member community, for it is his taking of the

water is a combination of hydrogen and oxygen, but water was not there before in the separate elements. The conception of emergence is a concept which recent philosophy has made much of. If you look at the world simply from the point of view of a mathematical equation in is

in a

of that

thing.

together, water appears.

is

commu-

The relative values of the "me" and the "I" depend very much on the situation. If one is maintaining his property in the community, it

under those circumstances

hydrogen come

that

of the

self.

was not

time oxygen and

"me"

member

certain sense simply a

but the reorganization brings in something that first

lan-

made

place through the reaction of the individuals to

the recognition of his

The

it is

contact between persons; the ele-

of novelty in

gence. Emergence involves a reorganization, there before.

common

deprive them of originality. The

in the

him

the

community,

it

the source of his emotional response to the

values that belong to

community.

him

as a

member

of the

the basis for his entering into

It is

the experience of others.

At times

it is

the response of the ego or "I"

to a situation, the

importance.

way

One now

which cme expresses one a feeling of prime

in

asserts himself against a

and the emphasis is on the response. The demand is freedom from conventions, from given laws. Of course, such a situation is only possible where the individual appeals, so to speak, from a narrow and certain situation,

restricted

community

larger in

the logical sense of having rights

which are not so

to a larger one, that

restricted.

One

is,

appeals from

which no longer have any meaning to a community in which the rights shall be publicly recognized, and one appeals to others on the assumption that there is a group of organized others that answer to one's fixed conventions

CHAPTER

own

appeal

—even

if

the appeal be

made

to

posterity. In that case there is the attitude of the

over against the "me." Both aspects of the "I" and "me" are essen-

"I" as

tial to

the self in

its full

expression.

One must

take the attitude of the others in a group in

order to belong to a community; he has to employ that outer social world taken within himself in order to carry on thought. It is

through his relationship to others in that community, because of the rational social processes that obtain in that community, that he has being as a citizen. On the other hand, the individual

is

constantly reacting to the social

and

atti-

changing in this co-operative very community to which he belongs. Those changes may be humble and tudes,

process

the

7:

GEORGE HERBERT MEAD: THE EMERGENT SELF

179

ones. One may not have anything to although he takes a long time to say it. And yet a certain amount of adjustment and readjustment takes place. We speak of a person as a conventional individual; his ideas are exactly the same as those of his neighbors; he is hardly more than a "me" under the circumtrivial

say,

stances; his adjustments are only the slight ad-

justments that take place, as sciously.

who

Over against

is

say,

uncon-

the person

who replies to way which makes

has a definite personality,

the organized attitude in a a significant difference. is

we

that there

the "I" that

the experience.

With such

a

person

it

more important phase of Those two constantly appear-

is

the

ing phases are the important phases in the self.

CHAPTER

8

W.E.B. Du Bois:

Double-Consciousness and the Public Intellectual

INTRODUCTION Du Bois was born in Great Barrington, Massachusetts, on February 23, 1868, and died 95 years later in Ghana. His Hfe spans the histo-

W.E.B.

Harvard University. He was by then onh' the sixth

member

of his race to ha\'e attended the

institution since 1870,

when

the

first

African-

movement from March on Wash-

American was admitted. At Har\ard he studied with the leading

and in the course of it Du Bois left his enduring mark as a sociologist, a public intellectual, and a committed activist in the struggle

philosophers of his time, William James, josiah Royce, and George Santayana, and since Harvard had no sociologv department, Du Bois

modern

ry of the

civil rights

the end of the Civil

War

to the

ington,

was an outstanding young student. high school he was trained rigorously

majored in philosophv He graduated cum laude in 1890 and then enrolled in the Ph.D. program in historv at Harxard. During his

and Greek, and

at the age of 16, the graduating class, he was ready for college. Although he was regarded as brilliant and had set his sights on Harvard, he

graduate studies,

lacked the financial resources and, as David Levering Lewis notes in his recent biography,

Gustav von Schmoller, Adolph Wagner, and

for social justice.

Du

Bois

While

in

in Latin

youngest

there

was

in his

a "distinct lack of

enthusiasm

among

many otherwise kindly, charitable white people for helping even a brilliant 'Negro' attend the nation's leading college." Instead, he attended Fisk University, a Congregational

so

school for blacks, in Nashville, Tennessee.

Du

Bois

went

to

Germany

to

some

course work and attended lectures \vith of the major figures in

German

the great sociologist Ma.\ Weber.

social science,

On

his return

United States, Du Bois completed his Ph.D. with a thesis entitled The Supprcfi^km of

to the

the Africiiii

America.

Slave Traiic to the United States of

163S-1S70, which became the

monograph

to

ed series of

Bois received his degree from Fisk in 1888 and

1915,

then took a second baccalaureate degree at

can to

180

Du

attend the University of Berlin where he took

be published 1

larvard

in the

Historical

newly

first

creat-

Studies.

In

became the first African- Ameribe awarded a Ph.D. from Harvard.

Du

Bois

CHAPTER

Du

Bois

8:

WEB

DU

BOIS:

DOUBLE-CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE PUBLIC INTELLECTUAL

held academic appointments at

Wilberforce College, at the University of Penn-

and Atlanta University. At the UniverPennsylvania he wrote The Philadelphia Negro: A Social Study, a work which recorded his findings from a sociological survey of 45,000 African-Americans living in the Seventh Ward of Philadelphia. It remains as a classic work of empirical investigation that stands on a par sylvania, sity of

with contributions from Chicago School sociologists as models of sociological inquiry. Without research assistants, Du Bois conducted a door-to-door survey to get at the facts about the economic, social, religious, and familial life of the inhabitants of the Seventh Ward, in the hope of dispelling the

myths and fantasies that circucommimity. In keeping with

181

enigma of being an AfricanAmerican. His essays begin with epigraphs from famous European poets and writers followed by the musical notation of a bar or two tures the enduring

of

a

meant

Negro spiritual. This juxtaposition is to convey two ecjual cultures, one black,

the

other white, each with

to

make

the

to

anticipates

what

other,

called

is

contribution

its

and

meaningfully

multiculturalism

Du many things may show the

today. In the Forethought to the collection,

Bois writes: "Herein

which

if

lie

buried

read with patience

strange meaning of being black here at the

dawning ing

of the Twentieth Century. This

mean-

not without interest to you. Gentle Read-

is

er; for

the problem of the Twentieth Century

is

in the utility of scientific research in the solution

As you read the essay "Of Our Spiritual Strivings," make careful note of what Du Bois means by "double-

of outstanding social problems. In this scholarly

consciousness." Does

lated in the white

the reformist ethos of the time,

phase of his entire

life,

career,

Du

Bois believed

and indeed tliroughout

Du Bois was a prolific writer.

his

For the

the problem of the color line."

Du

similation or separatism,

How

what?

do

Du

Bois seek either as-

and

Atlanta University Studies on the American

our

Negro, he wrote no fewer than nineteen monographs based on studies he conducted into every aspect of black life in America, including

debates over multiculturalism?

questions of health, education,

a public intellectual

art,

religion,

and economics. Du Bois wanted database that would provide scholars

imderstanding

It

is

his career

to build a

ses

Metropolis, E. Franklin Frazier's The Negro Family in

America,

and William

Truly Disadvantaged.

Julius Wilson's The

His work remains as a

guide and inspiration to urban sociologists who have followed in his wake. In The Souls of Black Folk, a famous collection of his early essays, Du Bois develops the prescient concept of "double-consciousness," which cap-

of

the

contemporary

not only as an academic and scholar

that W.E.B.

crime, family,

and policymakers with the facts they would need in order to make sound and rational public policy. In this he was a rationalist in the early years, and believed in the power of ideas to shape political and social change. The strong influence of Du Bois's empirical sociology of African- American life can be seen in Horace Clayton and St. Claire Drake's Black

neither, then

if

Bois's ideas contribute to

Du

Du

Bois

remembered but also as and activist. Throughout

is

Bois wrote timely political analy-

and published novels and biographical essays. These writings gave a clear, passionate and courageous message about the condition of blacks in America. As early as 1905 Du Bois organized the Niagara to

Movement

to give voice

the struggle for civil rights for African-

Americans, and four years later on July 4, 1909, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People held its founding meeting which consisted of the original group of prominent blacks that Du Bois had brought together in the Niagara Movement and a number of white intellectuals and professionals. Du Bois

became the editor of Crisis, the NAACP journal, which he conceived as an instrument to raise the consciousness of blacks in

became

America.

It

his vehicle to mobilize against the evils

182

THE CLASSIC TRADITION

PART1:

racism wherever it existed. Du Bois's uncompromising position on these issues brought him eventually into conflict with the NAACP leadership and forced his resignation from the journal in 1934. of

As an

Du

early proponent of Pan-Africanism,

also elected international president of the Pan-

and presided over the

African Federation. By 1950, Du Bois's politics had swung far to the left and at the age of 82 he became a candidate for the U.S. Senate on the American Labor Party ticket. On February 16, 1951, he was arrested and arraigned for failure to register as an agent of a foreign government in connection with his membership in the Peace Information Center. Although ac-

Bois helped to found

meeting of the Pan-African Congress in 1919 with the express purpose of planning for

first

the future disposition of Africa following

demanded

German

World War

that

the

colonies in

The Congress

1.

African

colonies

be

removed from German control and placed in trusteeship with the League of Nations, in preparation for freedom and nationhood. In 1926 Du Bois visited the Soviet Union for the first time in order to examine the results of its

socialist revolution first

hand. His interest in

Marx and Marxism deepened and

his career as

an activist and public intellectual seemed to have found its theoretical justification in the Theses on Feuerbach, where Marx writes: "The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point is to change it." (See Theses on Feuerbach, Chapter 2, in this text.) Following the Depression and the New Deal, Du Bois's thinking turned to long-range economic planning and he developed increasing sympathy with socialism as an alternati\'e mode of economic organization that would promise and deliver greater equality

At the age of retirement,

Du

and

66, in 1934,

Bois

social justice.

when

others sought

embarked on another ven-

ture as chair of the sociology

department

at

Atlanta University where for a ten-year period,

he taught, carried on his research, and founded the journal Phylon.

Du

1950s. He had bv now left Atlanta University and become increasingly absorbed with the international dimensions of civil rights. Appointed as an NAACP consultant to the United Nations Conference in 1945, Du Bois was

Bois's

mount during

political

the

difficulties

began

McCarthy period

in

to

the

quitted of the charges

Du

by former colleagues and 1950s he

came

to the

Bois

was

ostracized

friends. In the early

defense of Julius and

Ethel Rosenberg, accepted invitations from the

Union and other Eastern bloc countries, and was lionized wherever he went within the So\'iet

socialist

On to

world.

October

Gus

Hall,

1,

1961, he wrote a long letter

then head of the

Communist

Party in the United States, and applied for ad-

mission to the party. This talism

and the cold war

States,

was

to

be followed by

ture for the Republic of

dent,

letter,

rejecting capi-

policies of the United

Kwame Nkrumah,

Du

Bois's depar-

Ghana, whose a

presi-

long-time friend

and devotee, had extended an in\itation to come to Ghana and direct the Encyclopedia Africana project.

from the United States, because, David Levering Lewis puts it, America, "the promised land, was a cruel, receding mirage for people of color," Du Bois died in Accra, Ghana, on August 27, 1963, on the eve of the massive ci\'il rights March on Washington. In self-exile

as his biographer

CHAPTER

8:

WEB

DU

BOIS:

DOUBLE-CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE PUBLIC INTELLECTUAL

thought best to

W.E.B. Du Bois: The Philadelphia

Negro:

A

make an

183

intensive study of

and afterward to supplement and correct this information by general observation and inquiry in other parts conditions in this

Social Study

THE SCOPE OF THIS STUDY

of the

district,

city.

were used among the nine thousand Negroes of this ward; a family schedule with the usual questions as to the number of members, their age and sex, their conjugal condition and birthplace, their ability to read and write, their occupation and earnings, etc.; an individual schedule with similar inquiries; a home schedule with questions as to the number of rooms, the rent, the lodgers, the conveniences, etc.; a street schedule to colSix schedules

1.

General Aim

This study seeks to present the results of an inquiry undertaken by the University of Pennsylvania into the condition of the forty thou-

sand or more people of Negro blood

now

liv-

ing in the city of Philadelphia. This inquiry

extended over a period of fifteen months and sought to ascertain something of the geographical distribution of this race, their occupations and daily life, their homes, their organizations, and, above all, their relation to their million w^hite fellow-citizens. The final design of the work is to lay before the public such a body of information as may be a safe guide for all efforts toward the solution of the many Negro problems of a great American city.

lect

data as to the various small streets and

al-

and an institution schedule for organizations and institutions; finally a slight variation of the individual schedule was used for house-servants living at their places of emleys,

ployment." This study of the central district of Negro settlement furnished a key to the situation in

2.

The Methods

The

the city; in the other wards therefore a general

of Inquiry

survey was taken

began August the first, saving two months, continued

investigation

1896,

and,

December the thirty-first, 1897. The work commenced with a house-to-house canvass of the Seventh Ward. This long narrow until

ward, extending from South Seventh street to the Schuylkill River and from Spruce street to South street, is an historic centre of Negro population, and contains today a fifth of all the Negroes in this city.^ It was therefore

to note any striking differences of condition, to ascertain the general dis-

tribution of these people,

mation

and

statistics

property, crime

and

as

to

and pauperism,

to collect infor-

organizations, political activi-

and the like. This general inquiry, while it lacked precise methods of measurement in ty,

most

cases, served nevertheless to correct the

errors tical

and

illustrate the

meaning

of the statis-

material obtained in the house-to-house

canvass.

Throughout the study such official statistics and historical matter as seemed reliable were used, and experienced persons, both white and colored, were freely consulted. throughout this study use the term "Negro," to persons of Negro descent, although the appellation is to some extent illogical. I shall, moreover, capitalize the word, because believe that eight million Ameri'l

shall

designate

all

1

cans are entitled to a capital Source Social

From W.

Study (1899).

E. B.

letter.

Du

Bois, The Philadelphia Ne^ro:

A "See

Appendix

A for form of schedules used.

— 184

3.

PART1:

The

THE CLASSIC TRADITION

The best

available

methods

of

sociological

research are at present so liable to inaccuracies that the careful student ciiscloses the results of

individual research with diffidence; he knows that they are liable to error from the seemingly ineradicable faults of the statistical method, to

even greater error from the methods of general observation, and, above all, he must ever tremble lest some personal bias, some moral conviction or some unconscious trend of thought due previous training, has to a degree distorted the picture in his view. Convictions on all great

to

matters of

human

and the varying judgments was thus avoided. Despite all drawbacks and difficulties, however, the main results of the inquiry seem credible. They agree, to a large extent, with general public opinion, and in other respects they seem

by one

Credibility of the Results

one must have to a and they will enter to the most cold-blooded scieninterest

investigator,

of a score of censustakers

either logically explicable or in accord with historical precedents.

Thev are

therefore present-

ed to the public not as complete and without error, but as possessing on the whole enough reliable matter to serve as the scientific basis of further study,

and

of practical reform.

THE PROBLEM

greater or less degree,

some tific

extent into

research as a disturbing factor.

We must

study,

we

must investigate, we must attempt to solve; and the utmost that the world can demand is, not lack of human interest and moral conviction,

but rather the heart-quality of fairness,

and an earnest desire

The Negro Problems

of Philadelphia

In Philadelphia, as elsewhere in the United

Nevertheless here are social problems before us demanding carefvil study, questions awaiting satisfactory answers.

4.

for the tn.ith despite its

possible unpleasantness. In a house-to-house investigation there are

States, the existence of certain peculiar social

problems affecting the Negro people are plainly manifest. Here is a large group of people perhaps forty-five thousand, a city within a city who do not form an integral part of the

—

larger social group. This in itself

is

not alto-

gether unusual; there are other unassimilated groups: Jews, Italians, even Americans; and yet in the case of the Negroes the segregation is

more conspicuous, more patent

to the eye,

and

many

so intertwined with a long historic evolution,

sources of error: misapprehension, vagueness and forgetfulness, and deliberate deception on

with peculiarly pressing social problems of poverty, ignorance, crime and labor, that the Negro problem far surpasses in scientific inter-

outside the attitude of the investigator,

the part of the persons questioned, greatly

viti-

ate the value of the answers; on the other hand,

est

conclusions formed by the best trained and

class questions.

most conscientious students on the basis of general observation and inquiry are really inductions from but a few of the multitudinous facts of social life, and these may easily fall far

and

social gravity

The student

What human

ask.

is

most of the other race or

beings? Of what sub-groups and of

must first group is it composed, exist, what sort

of these questions

the real condition of this

whom classes

short of being essential or typical.

The use of both of those methods which has been attempted in this study may perhaps have corrected to some extent the errors of each. Again, whatever personal equation is to be allowed for in the whole study is one unvarying quantity, since the work was done

^he iippondod stiidv of domestic service was done by Miss Isabel Eaton, Fclknv ol the College Settlements Association. Outside ol tills the work was done bv the one investigator.

CHAPTER

8:

WEB. DU

BOIS:

of individuals are being considered? Further,

phians realize

must clearly recognize that a complete study must not confine itself to the group, but must specially notice the environ-

grown and

the

student

ment; the physical environment of city, sections and houses, the far mightier social environment the surrounding world of custom, wish, whim, and thought which envelops this group and powerfully inflLiences its social development. Nor does the clear recognition of the field of

—

work

investigation simplify the it

rather increases

it,

of actual study;

by revealing

lines of in-

quiry far broader in scope than first thought suggests. To the average Philadelphian the

whole Negro question reduces itself to a study slum districts. His mind reverts to Seventh and Lombard streets and to Twelfth and Kater streets of today, or to St. Mary's in the past. Continued and widely known charitable work in these sections makes the problem of poverty familiar to him; bold and daring of certain

crime too often traced

to

these centres has

problem of crime, while the scores of loafers, idlers and prostitutes who crowd the sidewalks here night and day remind him of a problem of work. All this is true all these problems are there and of threatening intricacy; Lmfortunately, however, the interest of the ordinary man of affairs is apt to stop here. Crime, poverty and idleness affect his interests unfavorably and he would have them stopped; he looks upon these slums and slum characters as unpleasant things which should in some way be removed called

his attention

to

a

—

The social student but must point out that

for the best interests of

agrees with

him so

far,

all.

the removal of unpleasant features from our complicated modern life is a delicate operation

requiring

knowledge and

not a simple

know

fact,

it is

a

skill;

that a

symptom and

slum

far

the removable causes of the

beyond the slum

districts.

is

that to

Negro slums one For few Philadel-

of Philadelphia requires a study that takes

185

DOUBLE-CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE PUBLIC INTELLECTUAL

memory

how

the

Negro population has was a time in the

spread. There

of living

men when

a small district

near Sixth and Lombard streets comprehended the great city.

This

mass of the Negro population of the no longer so. Very early the stream

is

of the black population started northward, but

the increased foreign immigration of 1830 later

turned

back.

it

It

and

started south also but

was checked by poor houses and worse protection. Finally with gathered

police

momentum

from the slums started west, on slowly and surely, taking Lombard street as its main thoroughfare, gaining early foothold in West Philadelphia, and turning at the Schuylkill River north and south to the newer portions of the city. Thus today the Negroes are scattered in every ward of the city, and the great mass of them live far from the whilom centre of colored settlement. What, then, of this great mass of the population? Manifestly they form a class with social problems of their own the problems of the Thirtieth Ward differ from the the emigration

rolling

—

prc")blems of the Fifth, as the black inhabitants

the former ward we have represented the rank and file of Negro working-people; differ. In

and

and waiters. middle class of Negroes feeding the slums on the one hand and the upper class on the other Here are social questions and conditions which must receive the most careful attention and patient interlaborers

This

is

servants,

porters

at present the great

pretation.

Not even

here, however, can the social in-

He knows that every group has upper class; it may be numerically small and socially of little weight, and yet its study is necessary to the comprehension of the whole it forms the realized ideal of the group, and as it is true that a nation must to some extent be measured by its slums, it is also true that it can only be understood and finally judged by its upper class. vestigator stop. its

a

186

THE CLASSIC TRADITION

PART1:

The

best

class

of

Philadelphia

Negroes,

though sometimes forgotten or ignored cussing the Negro problems,

known

to

many

is

in dis-

nevertheless

Philadelphians.

Scattered

throughout the better parts of the Seventh Ward, and on Twelfth, lower Seventeenth and Nineteenth streets, and here and there in the residence wards of the northern, southern, and

western sections of the ers,

city is a class of cater-

clerks, teachers, professional

merchants,

etc.,

of the Negroes.

men, small

who constitute the aristocracy Many are well-to-do, some are

5.

Plan of Presentment

The study

taken

as

up here divides

—

—

essay permitted. Six chapters consider the general condition

and some hberdifally trained. Here too are social problems fering from those of the other classes, and differing too from those of the whites of a

jugal condition,

corresponding grade, because of the peculiar social environment in which the whole race finds itself, which the whole race feels, but

then more generally for the

wealthy,

all

are fairly educated,

—

which touches this highest class at most points and tells upon them most decisively. Many are the misapprehensions and misstatements as to the social environment of Negroes in a great Northern citv. Sometimes it is said, here they are free; they have the same chance as the Irishman, the Italian, or the Swede; at other times it is said, the environment is such that it is really more oppressive than the situation in Southern cities. The student must ignore both of these extreme statements and seek to extract from a complicated mass of facts the tangible evidence of a social atmosphere surrounding Negroes, which differs from that surrounding most whites; of a different mental attitude, moral standard, and economic judgment shown toward Negroes than toward most other folk. That such a difference exists and can now and then plainly be seen, few deny; but just how far it goes and how large a factor it is in the Negro problems, nothing but careful study and measurement can reveal.

Such then are the phenomena of social conand environment which this study pro-

dition

poses to describe, analyze, and, so far as possible, interpret.

itself

roughly into four parts: the history of the Negro people in the city, their present condition considered as individuals, their condition as an organized social group, and their physical and social environment. To the histor\' of the Negro but two chapters are devoted although the subject is worthy of brief sketch more extended study than the character of this

and sex, conand birthplace; what degree of education they have obtained, and how they of the Negroes: their number, age

earn a living. All these subjects are treated usually for the Seventh Ward somewhat minutely, city,

and

finally

such historical material is adduced as is available for comparison. Three chapters are devoted to the group life of the Negro; this includes a study of the family,

and of organizations of all sorts. It up such phenomena of social maladjustment and individual depravity as crime, of property,

also takes

pauperism and alcoholism.

One

chapter

is

de\'oted to the difficult ques-

and social, one to certain results of the contact of the white and black races, one to Negro suffrage, and a tion of environment, both physical

word form

of general advice in the line of social reis

added.

W.E.B. Du Bois: The Souls of Black Folk

THE FORETHOUGHT Herein lie buried many things which if read with patience may show the strange meaning of being black here at the dawning of the Twentieth Century. This meaning is not with-

CHAPTER

8;

WEB. DU

BOIS:

out interest to you. Gentle Reader; for the problem of the Twentieth Century is the problem of the color

line.

1

prav vou, then, receive

my little

book in all charity, studying my words with me, forgiving mistake and foible for sake of the faith and passion that is in me, and seeking the grain of truth hidden there. I have sought here to sketch, in vague, uncertain outline, the spiritual world in which ten thousand thousand Americans live and strive. First, in two chapters I have tried to show what Emancipation meant to them, and what was its aftermath. In a third chapter 1 have pointed out the slow rise of personal leadership, and criticised candidly the leader

burden of chapters

I

who

his race today.

have sketched

bears the chief

Then,

in

two other

in swift outline the

two worlds within and without the Veil, and thus have come to the central problem of training

men

for

life.

Venturing

now

ing melody from the only American music which welled up from black souls in the dark past. And, finally, need I add that I who speak here am bone of the bone and flesh of the flesh of them that live within the Veil?

Of Our

I

have

of

in the

sand.

mournful cry. and cannot understand

All night long crying with a

As

I

lie

and

listen,

The voice

of

my heart in my side or the

voice of the sea,

O water, crying for rest, is

it I, is it

All night long the water

is

Till

And

the last

the

fire

moon droop and

of the

And

end begin

the heart shall

I?

crying to me.

Unresting water, there shall never be

rest

the last tide

fail.

burn in the west; be weary and wonto

der and cry like the sea, All life long crying without

into deeper de-

avail.

As the water all night long is crying to me.

in

Arthur Syinons

the

clear the present relations of the sons of master

and man. Leaving, then, the white world, 1 have stepped within the Veil, raising it that you may view faintly its deeper recesses, the meaning of its religion, the passion of its human sorrow, and the struggle of its greater souls. All this I have ended with a tale twice told but seldom written, and a chapter of song. Some of these thoughts of mine have seen

—

the light before in other guise. For kindly con-

senting to their republication here, in altered

and extended form,

1

must thank

the publish-

ers of the Aflatitic Monthly, The Worhfs Work,

the Dial, The Nezc World, and the Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science. Before each chapter, as now printed, stands a bar of the Sorrow Songs, some echo of haunt-

—

W.E.B.

Du

Bois, The Souls of Black Folk (1903).

-^

^lit'M'i \

,

j

J

1

ii

-^

J i

^^1^1 ^

^—

Between me and the other world there is ever an unasked question: unasked by some through feelings of delicacy; by others through the difficulty of rightly framing it. All, nevertheless, flutter round it. They approach me in a half-hesitant sort of way, eye me curiously or compassionately, and then, instead of saying directly. How does it feel to be a problem? they say, I know an excellent colored man in my town; or, I fought at Mechanicsville; or. Do not these Southern outrages make your blood boil? At these I smile, or am interested, or reduce the boiling to a simmer, as the occasion may require. To the real question. How does it feel to be a problem? I answer seldom a word. And yet, being a problem is a strange experience, peculiar even for one who has never been anything else, save perhaps in babyhood and in Europe. It is in the early days of rollick-

—

Source

Spiritual Strivings

O water, voice of my heart, crv'ing

two chapters studied the strugmassed millions of the black peasantry, and in another have sought to make tail,

gles

187

DOUBLE-CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE PUBLIC INTELLECTUAL

— 188

PART1:

ing boyhood upon one, all

THE CLASSIC TRADITION

that the revelation

first

bursts

remember well when the shadow swept across me. 1 was a little thing, away up in the hills of New England, where the dark Housatonic winds between Hoosac and Taghkanic to the sea. In a wee wooden schoolhouse, something put it into the boys' and girls' heads to buy gorgeous ten cents package and visiting-cards a exchange. The exchange was merry, till one in a day, as

it

were.

1

—

—

a

girl,

refused

tall

newctimer,

dawned upon me with a that 1 was different from mayhap,

my

refused

peremptorily, with a glance.

it

in heart

and

life

certain

card,

Then

it

suddenness

the others; or like,

and longing, but shut veil. 1 had there-

out from their world by a vast after

no desire

to tear

down

that veil, to creep

beyond it in common contempt, and lived above it in a region of blue sky and great wandering shadows. That sky could beat my mates at was bluest when examination-time, or beat them at a foot-race, through;

1

held

all

I

or even beat their stringy heads. Alas, with the

contempt began to fade; for longed for, and all their dazzling opportunities, were theirs, not mine. But they should not keep these prizes, 1 said; some, all, I would wrest from them. Just how 1 would do it 1 could never decide: by reading law, by healing the sick, by telling the wonderful tales that swam in my head, some way. With other black boys the strife was not so fiercely sunny: their youth shrunk into tasteless sycophancv, or into silent hatred of the pale world about them and mocking distrust of everything white; or wasted itself in a bitter cry, Why did God make me an outcast and a stranger in mine own house? The shades of the prisonhouse closed round about us all: walls strait and stubborn to the whitest, but relentlessly narrow, tall, and unscalable to sons of night who must plod darkly on in resignation, or

years the

all this fine

words

1

—

beat unavailing palms against

the stone, or

steadily, half hopelessly, watcli

the streak of

blue above.

After the Egyptian and Indian, the Greek and Roman, the Teuton and Mongolian, the Negro is a sort of seventh son, born with a veil, and gifted with second-sight in this American world, a world which yields him no true self-

—

consciousness, but only

lets

him

see himself

through the revelation of the other world. a

peculiar

sensation,

this

It is

double-conscious-

always looking at one's self through the eyes of others, of measuring one's soul by the tape of a world that looks on in amused contempt and pity. One ever feels his twoness, an American, a Negro; two souls, ness, this sense of

—

two thoughts, two unreconciled strivings; two warring ideals in one dark body, whose dogged strength alone keeps it from being torn asunder.

The history tory of this

of the

strife,

—

American Negro this

is

the his-

longing to attain

conscious manhood, to merge his double into a better

and

truer

self.

In this

self-

self

merging he

wishes neither of the older selves to be lost. He would not Africanize America, for America has too much to teach the world and Africa. He

would not bleach

his

Negro soul

in a flood of

white Americanism, for he knows that Negro blood has a message for the world. He simply wishes to make it possible for a man to be both a Negro and an American, without being cursed and spit upon bv his fellows, without ha\'ing the doors of Opportunity closed roughly in his face.

This, then,

coworker

is

in the

the

end of

kingdom

his striving: to

be a

of culture, to escape

to husband and use powers and his latent genius. These powers of body and mind ha\e in the past been strangely wasted, dispersed, or forgotten. The shadow of a mightv Negro past flits through the tale of Ethiopia the Shadowy and of Egypt the Sphinx. Through history, the powers of single black men flash here and there like falling stars, and die sometimes before the world has righth- gauged their brightness. Here in America, in the few davs since Emanci-

both death and isolation, his best

— CHAPTER

pation,

8:

WEB. DU

the black man's turning

BOIS:

hither

—

—

DOUBLE-CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE PUBLIC INTELLECTUAL

189

and

thither in hesitant anti doubtful striving has

often

made

his very strength to lose effective-

seem

absence of power, like weaknot weakness, it is the contradiction of double aims. The double-aimed ness, to

ness.

And

yet

like it

—

is

struggle of the black artisan to

—on the one hand

escape white contempt for a nation of mere

hewers of wood and drawers of water, and on the other hand to plough and nail and dig for a poverty-stricken horde could only result in making him a poor craftsman, for he had but half a heart in either cause. By the poverty anci ignorance of his people, the Negro minister or doctor was tempted toward quackery and demagogy; and by the criticism of the other world, toward ideals that made him ashamed of his lowly tasks. The would-be black savant was confronted by the paradox that the knowledge his people needed was a twice-told tale to his white neighbors, while the knowledge which would teach the white world was Greek to his own flesh and blood. The innate love of harmony and beauty that set the ruder souls of his people a-dancing and a-singing raised but confusion and doubt in the soul of the black

—

Emancipation was the key to a promised land of sweeter beauty than ever stretched before the eyes of wearied Israelites. In song and exhortation swelled one refrain Liberty; in his tears and curses the God he implored had Freedom in his right hand. At last it came, suddenly, fearfully, like a dream. With one wild carnival of blood and passion came the message in his own plaintive cadences: prejudice;

—

"Shout,

O children!

Shout, you're

For

God

free!

has bought your liberty!"

Years have passed

away

since then,

twenty, forty; forty years of national

—

life,

ten,

forty

years of renewal and development, and yet the

swarthy spectre

accustomed seat at do we cry to this our

sits in its

the Nation's feast. In vain vastest social problem:

"Take any shape but that, and Shall never tremble!"

my

firm nerves

the beauty revealed to him was the soul-beauty of a race which his larger audience despised, and he could not articulate the mes-

The Nation has not yet foimd peace from its sins; the freedman has not yet found in freedom his promised land. Whatever of good may have come in these years of change, the shadow of a deep disappointment rests upon the Negro people, a disappointment all the more bitter because the unattained ideal was unbounded

sage of another people. This waste of double

save by the simple ignorance of a lowly people.

aims, this seeking to satisfy two unreconciled ideals, has wrought sad havoc with the

of the vain search for freedom, the

artist; for

courage and faith and deeds of ten thousand thousand people, has sent them often wooing false gods and invoking false means of salvation, and at times has even seemed about to

—

make them ashamed

of themselves.

Away back in the days of bondage they thought to see in one divine event the end of all doubt and disappointment; few men ever worshipped Freedom with half such unquestioning faith as did the American Negro for two centuries. To him, so far as he thought and dreamed, slavery was indeed the sum of all villainies, the cause of all sorrow, the root of all

—

The

first

decade was merely a prolongation

seemed ever barely

to

boon

elude their grasp,

that

— like

maddening and

a tantalizing will-o'-the-wisp,

misleading the headless host. The holocaust of war, the terrors of the Ku-Klux Klan, the

lies

of

carpet-baggers, the disorganization of industry,

and the contradictory advice

of friends

and

with no new watchword beyond the old cry for freedom. As the time flew, however, he began to grasp a foes,

left

new

idea.

the bewildered

The

serf

ideal of liberty

demanded

for

its

attainment powerful means, and these the Fifteenth Amendment gave him. The ballot, which before he had looked upon as a visible

190

THE CLASSIC TRADITION

PARTI:

sign of freedom, he

now

regarded as the chief

and perfecting the Hberty means had partially endowed him. which war with And why not? Had not votes made war and emancipated millions? Had not votes enfranchised the freedmen? Was anything impossible to a power that had done all this? A million black men started with renewed zeal to vote themselves into the kingdom. So the decade flew away, the revolution of 1876 came, and left the half-free serf weary, wondering, but still of gaining

inspired. Slowly but steadily, in the following

years, a

new

dream movement, the

vision began gradually to replace of

political

power,

the unguided, another pillar of after a

—a

powerful

the rise of another ideal to guide

clouded day.

It

by night

know and

letters,

but of

life,

of business, of the

shackled his hands and feet. Nor was his burden all poverty and ignorance. The red stain of bastardy, which tw^o centuries of systematic

test

the

of the

dark pupils of these schools know how faithfully, how piteously, this people strove to learn. It was weary work. The cold statistician wrote

down

the inches of progress here and there, noted also where here and there a foot had

some one had fallen. To the tired was ever dark, the mists cold, the Canaan was always dim

climbers, the horizon

were often and far away. If, however, the vistas disclosed as yet no goal, no resting-place, little but flattery and criticism, the journey at least gave leisure for reflection and self-examination; it changed the child of Emancipation to the youth with dawning self-consciousness, realization, self-respect. In those

own

—

ply of

power

white man, the longing to know. Here at last seemed to have been discovered the mountain path to Canaan; longer than the highway of Emancipation and law, steep and rugged, but straight, leading to heights high enough to overlook life. Up the new path the advance guard toiled, slowly, heavily, doggedly; only those who have watched and guided the faltering feet, the misty minds, the dull understandings, of the

of his striving his

that, to attain his place in the world, he must be himself, and not another For the first time he sought to analyze the burden he bore upon his back, that dead-weight of social degradation partially masked behind a halfnamed Negro problem. He felt his poverty; without a cent, without a home, without land, tools, or savings, he had entered into competition with rich, landed, skilled neighbors. To be a poor man is hard, but to be a poor race in a land of dollars is the verv bottom of hardships. He felt the weight of his ignorance, not sim-

humanities; the accumulated sloth and shirk-

cabalistic letters of the

slipped or

dim feeling

the ideal of "bookborn of compulsory

was

learning"; the curiosity,

ignorance, to

fire

—

and he saw liimself, darkly as through a veil; and yet he saw in himself some faint revelation of his power, of his mission. He began to have a

sombre

self-

forests

soul rose before him,

ing and

awkwardness

of decades

and centuries

Negro women had stamped meant not onlv the loss of

legal defllement of

upon

his

race,

ancient African chastity, but also the hereditary

weight of a mass of corruption from white adulterers, threatening almost the obliteration of the

Negro home.

A people thus handicapped ought not to be asked to race with the world, but rather allowed to give all its time and thought to its own

social problems. But alas! while sociolo-

gists gleefully cc^unt his bastards

and

his pros-

titutes, the very soul of the toiling, sweating

man is darkened by the shadow of a vast despair Men call the shadow prejudice, and black

learnedly explain culture

against

it

as the natural defence of

barbarism,

learning

against

ignorance, purity against crime, the "higher" against the "lower" races. To which the

Negro

much

of this

cries

Amen! and swears

strange prejudice as

is

that to so

founded on

just

homage

and meekly does progress, he humbly bows and obeisance. But before that nameless prejudice that leaps beyond all this he stands helpless. to

civilization,

culture,

righteousness,

CHAPTER

dismayed, and personal

that

8:

well-nigh disrespect

WEB, DU

speechless;

and

BOIS:

before

mockery,

the

and systematic humiliation, the distortion of fact and wanton license of fancy, the cynical ignoring of the better and the boisterous welcoming of the worse, the all-pervading ridicule

desire to inculcate disdain for everything black,

from Toussaint

to the devil,

—before

this there

rises a sickening despair that

would disarm

and discourage any nation save

that black host

to

whom

"discouragement"

is

an unwritten

word. But the facing of so vast a prejudice could not but bring the inevitable self-questioning,

and lowering of ideals which ever accompany repression and breed in an atmosphere of contempt and hate. Whisperings and portents came borne upon the four winds: Lo! we are diseased and dying, cried self-disparagement,

the dark hosts;

we

cannot write, our voting

is

what need of education, since we must always cook and serve? And the Nation echoed and enforced this self-criticism, saying: Be content to be servants, and nothing more; what vain;

need of higher culture for half-men? Away with the black man's ballot, by force or fraud, and behold the suicide of a race! Nevertheless, out of the evil came something of good, the more careful adjustment of educa-

— —

tion to real

life,

the clearer perception of the

Negroes' social responsibilities, and the sobering realization of the meaning of progress.

So dawned the time of Sturm uini Drang: storm and stress to-day rocks our little boat on the mad waters of the world-sea; there is within and without the sound of conflict, the burning of body and rending of soul; inspiration strives with doubt, and faith with vain questionings. cal

The bright

ideals of the past,

— physi-

freedom, political power, the training of

brains and the training of hands,

—

all

these in

waxed and waned, until even the grows dim and overcast. Are they all wrong, all false? No, not that, but each alone was over-simple and incomplete, the dreams turn have last

—

—

191

DOUBLE-CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE PUBLIC INTELLECTUAL

of a credulous race-childhood, or the fond imag-

inings of the other world which does not know and does not want to know our power. To be really true, all these ideals must be melted and welded into one. The training of the schools we need today more than ever, the training of deft hands, quick eyes and ears, and above all the broader, deeper, higher culture of gifted minds and pure hearts. The power of the ballot we need in sheer self-defence, else what shall save us from a second slavery? Freedom, too, the long-sought, we still seek, the freedom of life and limb, the freedom to work and think, the freedom to love and aspire. Work, culture,

—

— —

liberty,

gether,

—

these

all

not

we

need, not singly but to-

but

successively

growing and aiding each, and

ward that vaster Negro people, the

ideal that ideal of

together, all

each

striving to-

swims before

human

the

brotherhood,

gained through the unifying ideal of Race; the

and developing the traits and Negro, not in opposition to or contempt for other races, but rather in large conformity to the greater ideals of the American Republic, in order that some day on American soil two world-races may give each to each those characteristics both so sadly lack. We the darker ideal of fostering talents of the

ones come even now not altogether emptyhanded: there are today no truer exponents of the pure human spirit of the Declaration of Independence than the American Negroes; there is no true American music but the wild sweet melodies of the Negro slave; the American fairy tales and folklore are Indian and African; and,

we

black men seem the sole oasis of and reverence in a dusty desert of dollars and smartness. Will America be poorer if all in all,

simple

faith

she replace her brutal dyspeptic blundering with light-hearted but determined Negro hu-

and cruel wit with loving good-humor? or her vulgar music with the soul of the Sorrow Songs?

mility? or her coarse jovial

Merely a concrete

test

of the underlying

principles of the great republic

is

the

Negro

Problem, and the spiritual striving of the freed-

192

PARTI:

THE CLASSIC TRADITION

men's sons is the travail of souls whose burden is almost beyond the measure of their strength, but who bear it in the name of an historic race, in the

name

thers,

and

of this the land of their fathers' fa-

in the

name

of

human

opportunity.

And now what have briefly sketched in let me on coming pages tell again many ways, with loving emphasis and deepdetail, that men may listen to the striving in I

large outline in

er

the souls of black folk.

CHAPTER

9

Karl

Mannheim:

Sociology of

Knowledge and the Role of Intellectuals

INTRODUCTION Karl

Mannheim was born on March

27, 1893, in

Jewish middle-class parents. the Gynuiasimu, Mannheim was

Budapest, Attending

of

heavily influenced by the thriving intellectual

community around him. Along with many Jew-

Mannheim developed a critical world-view due to his marginal status. Mannheim studied with Georg Simmel in Berlin during 1912-13. He was a member of the Society for Social Science, a group of predominantly Jewish intellectuals who met regularly to discuss the ideas of major European and American thinkers. Later Mannheim came under the influence of a brilliant young Hungarian intellectual, Georg Lukacs, a literary critish intellectuals,

and

insightful

with strong interests in the theory of aesthetics, when he joined a small group of idealistic

active

member

Alfred Weber, and

Kantians and bv of

tique of the culture of capitalism.

After

the

Mannheim

October

Revolution

of

1918,

taught at the University of Buda-

pest under his

mentor Lukacs,

who was

an

was influenced by

Edmund

In 1927,

the

Neo-

Husserl, the founder

Mannheim became

economics and sociology

a professor of

at the University of

where he taught until he was forced from the Nazis to England in 1933. In the six years he spent at Frankfurt, he produced most of his best known works, including Frankfurt,

Ideolog]/

in a cri-

How-

phenomenology.

called the Free School for the Humanities. His views were generally considered leftist, although Mannheim was not a

engage

party.

philosopher Martin Heidegger, studied with

to flee

political activist, preferring to

Communist

the Hungarian

ic

intellectuals

of the

communist government collapsed a year later, and Mannheim was forced to flee from Hungary to Germany, as an anti-communist backlash threatened anyone associated with the party. While in Germany, he was influenced by the blossoming academic atmosphere: he attended lectures by the ever,

and Utopia. Mannheim's intellectual he moved from Germany to

interests shifted as

England. While the earlier focus of his work was the sociology of knowledge, during the war years he became an engaged intellectual concerned with the future of democracy and the role to be played by intellectuals in the future.

193

194

PART1:

THE CLASSIC TRADITION

Mannheim developed

his early

work within

the context of the sociology of knowledge, an first generated from within Marxist thought concerning the relationship of ideas to their historical context. Marx wrote that the

idea

cumstances, the context, and the interests that will be, or have been, served by a complex of ideas.

What Marx was interested in unearthing was the ideological function that ideas may serve when they are considered true. In this instance Marx is calling attention to the "false

class.

consciousness"

of

the

proletariat

in

short,

Mannheim

accepted Marx's its

emancipa-

tory praxis.

ruling ideas in a society were the ideas of the ruling

In

sociology of knowledge without

In elaborating his basic thesis,

Mannheim

argued that ideas, facts, and events had to be understood contextually, that is, in the relation to the

dominant

and

historical forces

trends.

There are no eternal or universal truths but only truth claims that always reflect a particu-

believing those ideas about liberty and property

lar social interest or perspective.

Marxism

that clearly benefit their exploiters, the bour-

best seen as an idea system like

others, that

geoisie.

Marx

also spoke of "true conscious-

ness" as the condition of the proletariat

when

it

comprehends its objective condition under capitalism and recognizes how its earlier beliefs have mystified that reality. Mannheim conceived of knowledge as historically determined, tied to both time and circumstance. "Ideology" was the term he employed to characterize the ideas which support the status quo, and "utopia" was that complex of ideas that favored change. The important point here is that, for Mannheim, both sets of ideas advance historical interests and in that sense both have equivalent standing. The Utopian ideas do not have any more truth simply

because

argue

they

Mannheim's position is that of Marx, who saw

for

change.

clearly in opposition to in the "true conscious-

ness" the potential for revolutionary praxis that

would

establish

a

new

truth

in

the

world

through the transformation of social reality. For Marx, the idea of emancipation is a universally valid idea

and

is

absolutely true since

speaks directly to what constitutes being human. Mannheim saw emancipatory ideas as

all

is

an idea complex that is relative to time, and interest. In formulating the problem this manner, Mannheim was grafting in Weber's views on value relevance and perspectives onto Marx's sociology of knowledge, is,

place,

we

claiming that the only truth relational, cal

and

can establish

between ideas and

i.e.,

is

their histori-

social location.

Mannheim designated intellectual,

whom

By virtue of

their

intellectuals

training,

uniquely suited to be

and are thus

a special role for the

he viewed as unattached. critical of all

less likely to

are

perspectives

be special pleaders

for a particular class or party.

The

free-floating

intellectual can see a variety of perspectives,

engage in holisitic analysis, entertain general ideas, and be critical and reflective.

Mannheim furthered his original formulations when he claimed that entire categories of thought are relative to time and place. It is not enough to deconstruct ideologies: one must further examine the concepts and methods that encompass a world-view. For example, while

those which benefit the proletariat, just as the

one can point to Marxism's historical relati\ity, one can go further to penetrate the Marxist world-view, its assumptions about human

bourgeois ideas about liberty and property

nature, the evolution of history,

it

benefit the ruling class.

He

refused to assert

one was true and the other not. The sociolknowledge cannot, he claimed, make a scientific judgment about these matters. What is possible is the careful examination of the cirthat

ogist of

its

vision of

freedom.

Mannheim's writings on

social reconstruc-

completed during his exile in England, seem particularly salient given the course of events in contemporary society. In place of an tion,

CHAPTER

unattached

9;

KARL MANNHEIM: SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE AND THE ROLE OF INTELLECTUALS

intelligentsia,

called for intellectuals

now

Mannheim

committed

to the princi-

and must play an

ples of democracy, social justice, equality,

harmony. The

intellectual strata

active political role in influencing the political elites

and educating

a

population

for

the

preservation of democracy. Social change had to

be planned

in

order to avoid the chaos and

niques of manipulation and propaganda to advance a democratic ideology, to develop a new collective conscience, and to secure a world of harmony and stability. In reading the extracts below, the following

questions should be kept in mind:

edge

way

situateci

is

als really as free

the system, such as depression or inflation.

depicts them?

Mannheim sought

to

War

II,

avoid the consequences

mass politics so evident in the Nazi regime. To this end he called for the use of social techof

and

think

arena?

from

Is

there

project

knowlany

intellectu-

Mannheim

of interests into

the

do you political

any relationship between the and the democratic

relativity of perspectives

process?

Are

interests as

What kinds

intellectuals

If all

relational, is there

to get at the truth of things?

violence that could erupt from any shocks to

Fresh from the experiences of World

195

196

PARTI;

THE CLASSIC TRADITION

Mannheim: The Prospects

Karl

with understanding immediate problems and

of

events emerging from this myopic perspective

Scientific Politics

The Relationship between Social Theory and Political Practice

which obscures everv significant relationship. These seemingly isolated and discrete facts must be comprehended in the ever-present but constantly changing configurations of experience in

WHY IS THERE NO SCIENCE OF

POLITICS?

The emergence and disappearance on our

intellectual horizon are

of problems governed by a

which we are not yet fully aware. Even the rise and disappearance of whole systems of knowledge may ultimately be reduced to certain factors and thus become explicable. There have already been attempts in the history of art to discover whv and in what periods principle of

such plastic arts as sculpture, relief-modelling or other arts arise

and become the dominant

artform of a period. In the same manner the sociology of knowledge should seek to investigate the conditions under which problems and

come

and pass awav. The must be able to do better than to attribute the emergence and solution of problenis to the mere existence of certain talented individuals. The existence of and the complex interrelationship between the problems of a given time and place must be viewed and understood against the background of the structure of the society in which they occur, although this may not always give us an understanding of e\'ery detail. The isolated thinker may have the impression that his crucial ideas occurred to him personally, independent of his social setting. It is easy for one living in a provincial and circumscribed social world to think that the events which touch him are isolated facts for which fate alone is responsible. Sociology, however, cannot be content disciplines

into being

sociologist in the long run

which they actually are lived. Only in such a context do they acquire meaning. If the sociology of knowledge should have anv measure of success in this type of analysis, many prciblems which hitherto, as regards their origins at least, have been unsolved, would be cleared up. Such a de\'elopment would also enable us to see why sociology and economics are of such recent birth and whv thev advanced in one countrv and were

and beset by so many obstacles in othLikewise it will be possible to solve a problem which has always gone unanswered: namethe ly why we have not yet witnessed retarcied

ers.

development of a science of politics. In a world which is as permeated by a rationalistic ethos, as is our own, this fact represents a striking anomaly. There is scarcely a sphere of

we do well as this

life

about which

some scientific knowledge as recognized methods of communicating

not have

knowlecige.

Is it

conceivable then, that the

sphere of human activity on the master)' of which our fate rests is so unyielding that scientific research cannot force it to give up its secrets? The disquieting and puzzling features of this

problem cannot be disregarded. The

question must have already occurred to

many

whether this is merely a temporary condition, to be overcome at a later date, or whether we have reached, in this sphere, the outermost limit of

knowledge which can never be transcended? It

may

be said in favour of the former possi-

bility that the social sciences are still in their

infancy.

It

would be possible to conclude that more fundamental social

the immaturity of the

sciences

explains

"applied" science. SoKrcc York:

I

IB),

Canada.

From U)SS)

K.irl Miinnln-ini, /Jcn/oyi/ miil LltKpin

(.New

Koprinti'd by permission Rmitledgi' in

the If

this

retardation

were

so,

it

of

this

would be

only a question of time until this backwardness were o\'erconio, and further research mii;ht be

CHAPTER

9:

expected to yield a control over society comparable to that which we now have over the

nique for manipulating crowds without which impossible to get on in mass-democracies.

it is

physical world.

History,

The opposite point of view finds support in the vague feeling that political behaviour is qualitatively different from any other type of human experience, and that the obstacles in the way of its rational understanding are much more insurmountable than is the case in other realms of knowledge. Hence, it is assumed that all

history of ideas,

attempts to subject these phenomena to scientific analysis are

foredoomed

nature

peculiar

of

to failure

the

because of the to be

phenomena

analysed.

Even a correct statement of the problem would be an achievement of value. To become aware of our ignorance would bring considerable relief since we would then know why actual knowledge and communication are not possible in this case. Hence the first task is a precise definition of the problem which is What do we mean

—

when we ask: Is a science of politics possible? There are certain aspects of politics which are immediately intelligible and communicable. An experienced and trained political leader should

know

the history of his

own

country, as well as

the history of the countries immediately con-

own and

nected with his

rounding least, a

statistical

conduct.

should

constituting the sur-

world. Consequently, at the

political

knowledge

of history

and the relevant

data are useful for his

Furthermore,

the

own

political

know something about

institutions of the countries with

concerned.

It

is

the

political

leader political

which he

which underlie the instiand through which it func-

likewise be abreast of the politiwhich mould the tradition in which Similarly he cannot afford to be igno-

rant of the political ideas of his opponents.

There are

still

further though less immediate

in our own times have undergone continual elaboration, namely the tech-

questions,

which

disciplines,

knowledge important Were we interested in

to

represent

among of

fields

the political leader.

setting

up

a curriculum

education of the political leader, the

for the

above studies would no doubt have to be included. The disciplines mentioned above, however, offer no more than practical knowledge which, if one happens to be a political leader, might be of use. But even all of these disciplines added together do not produce a science of politics. At best they may serve as auxiliary disciplines to such a science. If we understood by politics merely the sum of all those bits of practical knowledge which are useful for political conduct, then there

be no question about the

would

fact that a science of

politics in this sense existed, and that this science could be taught. The only pedagogical

problem would

consist, then, in selecting

the infinite store of existing facts those

from most

relevant for the purposes of political conduct.

However,

somewhat

it

is

probably evident from statement that

exaggerated

questions "Under what conditions

is

this

the

a science

and how may it be taught?" above-mentioned body of information. In what then does the

of politics possible

do not

refer to the

practical

problem consist? The disciplines which were

listed

above are

with society and the state as if they were the final products of past history. Political conduct, however, is concerned with the state and society in so far as they are still in the process of becoming. Political conduct is confronted with a process in which every moment creates a unique situation and seeks to disentangle out of this ever-flowing stream of forces something of enduring character. The question then is: "Is there a science of this becoming, a science of

He must

lives.

sociology,

theory,

social psychology,

essential that his training be

tutional structure

he

other

and

structurally related only in so far as they deal

of the social relations

cal ideas

many

political

statistics,

is

not only juristic but also include a knowledge

tions.

197

KARL MANNHEIM: SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE AND THE ROLE OF INTELLECTUALS

creative activity?"

198

THE CLASSIC TRADITION

PART1:

The first stage in the dehneation of the problem is thus attained. What (in the realm of the social)

the

is

significance

of

this

contrast

between what has already become and what is in the process of becoming? The Austrian sociologist and statesman Albert Schaffle' pointed out that at any moment of socio-political life two aspects are discernible first, a series of social events which have acquired a set pattern and recur regularly; and, second, those events which are still in the process of becoming, in which, in individual cases, decisions have to be made that give rise to new and unique situations. The first he called

—

the "routine affairs of state," Iniifcndcs Stnnt-

second

sleben; the

"politics."

The meaning

of

be clarified by a few illustrations. When, in the accustomed life of an official, current business is disposed of in accordance with existing rules and regulations, we are, according to Schaffle, in the realm of "administration" rather than of "politics." Administration is the domain where we can see exemthis distinction will

plified

what Schaffle means by "routine affairs Wherever each new case may be taken

of state."

care of in a prescribed manner,

we are faced

not

with politics but with the settled and recurrent side of social life. Schaffle uses an illuminating expression from the field of administration

itself

such cases as can be settled by merely consulting an established rule, i.e. according to precedent, the German word SchiuiincI,' which is derived from the to give point to his distinction. For

Latin simile

is

used, signifying that the case in

be disposed of in a manner similar to precedents that already exist. We are in the realm of politics when envoys to foreign countries conclude treaties which were never made before; when parliamentary representatives

hand

is

to

'Cf. A. Schaffle,

der Politik,"

"Uher den wissenschiiftlichen

Zfilsdirifl

fiir ilic

Begriff

^cmiiiIc Sdm/sic/s.siv/sc/id//, vol.

53(1897).

^The Germdn word note]

tor's

new measures of taxation; when an election campaign is waged; when certain opposition groups prepare a revolt or organize carry through

strikes

ible.

mcdns "mould."

ITninsUi-

For instance, the cumulative effect of a grad-

ual shift of administrative procedure in a long series of concrete cases

new

may actually give rise to a

principle. Or, to take a reverse instance,

something as unique as a new social movement may be deeply permeated with "stereotyped" and routinizing elements. Nevertheless the contrast between the "routine affairs of state" and "politics" offers a certain polarity which may serve as a fruitful point of departure.

If

the

dichotomy is conceived more theoretically, we may say: Every social process may be divided into a rationalized sphere consisting of settled

and routinized procedures in dealing with situations that recur in an orderly fashion, and the "irrational" by which it is surrounded. We are. '

^For the sake of precision, the following remark should be added: The expression "settled routinized elements" is to he regarded figuratively. Even the most formalized and ossified features of society are not to be regarded as things held in store in an attic, to be taken out when needed for use. Laws, regulations, and established customs only have an existence in that li\'ing experiences constantly call them into being. This settledness signifies merely that social life, while constantly renewing itself, conforms to rules and formal processes already inherent in it and this constantly generates itself anew in a recurrent manner Similarly, the use of the expression "rationalized sphere" must be taken in the broader sense. It may mean either a theoretical, rational approach, as in the case of a technique which is rationally calculated and determined: or it may be used in the sense of "rationalization" in which a .sequence of events follows a regular, expected (prbable) course, as is the case with convention, usage, or custom, where the sequence of events is not fully understcxui but in its structure seems to have a certain settled character Max Weber's use of the term "stereotype" as the broader class might be used here, and two sub-classes of the stereotyping tendency then distinguished,

(i?)

this distinction

traditionalism, is

(I')

rationalism.

Inasmuch as

not relevant for our present purpose,

we

use the concept "rationalized stnictua-" in the moR' comprehensive sense in which Max Weber uses the general notion ot stereot\ping. will

i^cliiiiniul

—or when these are suppressed.

must be admitted that the boundary between these two classes is in reality rather flexIt

CHAPTER

KARL MANNHEIM: SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE AND THE ROLE OF INTELLECTUALS

9;

therefore, distinguishing

between the

"rational-

ized" structure of society and the "irrational"

A

matrix.

further observation presents

this point.

ture

is

itself at

The chief characteristic of modern cul-

the tendency to include as

much as

possi-

and to bring it and, on the other

ble in the realm of the rational

under administrative control

—

hand, to reduce the "irrational" element to the vanishing point.

A

simple illustration will clarify the mean-

199

There is no question that we do have some knowledge concerning that part of social life in which everything and life itself has already been rationalized and ordered. Here the conflict between theory and practice does not become an issue because, as a matter of fact, the mere treatment of an individual case by subjecting it to a generally existing law can hardly

be

designated

Rationalized as our

as

life

political

may seem

practice.

to

have

ing of this assertion. The traveller of 150 years

become,

ago was exposed to a thousand accidents. Today everything proceeds according to schedule. Fare is exactly calculated and a whole series of administrative measures have made

place so far are merely partial since the most

travel into a rationally controlled enterprise.

The perception of the distinction between the rationalized scheme and the irrational setting in which it operates provides the possibility for a definition of the concept "conduct."

The a

file

who

disposes of

in the prescribed

manner, or under the the law and

action of a petty official

of

documents

of a judge

who

finds that a case falls

provisions of a certain paragraph in

disposes of

it

accordingly, or finally of a factory

worker who produces

screw by following the prescribed technique, would not fall under our definition of "conduct." Nor for that matter

would

a

the action of a technician

who,

in achiev-

ing a given end, combined certain general laws of nature. All these

modes

of behaviour

would be

considered as merely "reproductive" because they are executed in a rational framework, ac-

cording to a definite prescription entailing no personal decision whatsoever. Conduct, in the sense in which

we reach

we

use

it,

does not begin until

where rationalization has not yet penetrated, and where we are forced to make decisions in situations which have as yet the area

not been subjected to regulation.

It is

in

such

sit-

uations that the whole problem of the relations

between theory and practice arises. Concerning this problem, on the basis of the analyses thus far made, we may even at this stage venture a few further remarks.

all

the rationalizations that have taken

important realms of our social life are even now anchored in the irrational. Our economic life, although extensively rationalized on the technical side, and in some limited connections calculable, does not, as a whole, constitute a planned economy. In spite of all tendencies towards trustification and organization, free competition still plays a decisive role. Our social structure is built along class lines, which means that not objective tests but irrational forces of social competition and struggle decide the place and function of the individual in society.

tional life

Dominance is

in national

and

interna-

achieved through struggle, in

itself

which chance plays an important part. These irrational forces in society form that sphere of social life which is unorganized and unrationalized, and in which conduct and politics become necessary. The two main sources of irrational, in

irrationalism

in

the social

structure

(uncon-

and domination by force) constitute the realm of social life which is still unorganized and where politics becomes necessary. Around these two centres there accumulate those other more profound irrational elements, which we usually call emotions. Viewed from the sociological standpoint there is a connection between the extent of the unorganizeci realm of society where imcontrolled competition and domination by force prevail, and trolled competition

the social integration of emotional reactions.

The problem then must be stated: What knowledge do we have or is it possible con-

— 200

THE CLASSIC TRADITION

PART1:

life and of the type which occurs in it?^ But now our original problem has been stated in the most highly developed form in which it seems to lend itself to clarification. Having determined where the realm of the political truly begins, and where conduct in a true sense is possible,

cerning this realm of social of conduct

we

can indicate the

ciifficulties existing in

the

between theory and practice. The great difficulties which confront scientific knowledge in this realm arise from the fact

relationship

that

we

are not dealing here with rigid, objec-

with tendencies and strivings

and social thinking, we must, in my judgment, recognize actual differences in stvles of thought differences that extend even into the realm of logic itself. political

—

In this, doubtless, lies the greatest obstacle to a science of politics. For according to ordinary

expectations a science of conduct sible

only

when

would be pos-

the fundamental structure of

thought is independent of the different forms of conduct being studied. Even though the observer be a participant in the struggle, the basis of his thinking, i.e. his observational apparatus and his

method

changes continuously. Wherever the same forces, each unchanging in character, interact,

of settling intellectual differences, must above the conflict. A problem cannot be be solved by obscuring its difficulties, but only by stating them as sharply and as pronouncedly as possible. Hence it is our task definitely to estab-

and

lish the thesis that in politics the

tive entities but

in a constant state of flux.

A further difficulty is

that the constellation of the interacting forces

their interaction,

too,

follows a regular

possible to formulate general laws.

course,

it is

This

not quite so easy where

is

new

ty

is

Still

another

difficul-

that the observer himself does not stand

outside the realm of the irrational, but

is

a par-

ticipant in the conflict of forces. This participa-

tion inevitably binds

him

to a partisan

view

through his evaluations and interests. Furthermore, and most important, is the fact that not only is the political theorist a participant in the conflict because of his values, and interests, but the particular

presents

thought

manner

in

which the problem

him, his most general mode of including even his categories, are

itself to

bound up with general ciercurrents.

So true

is

political

statement of a

logical techniques involved

vary with the political position of the observer.

and forming

incessantly entering the system

unforeseen combinations.

forces are

problem and the

and

this that, in

unthe realm of social

THE POLITICAL AND SOCIAL DETERMINANTS OF KNOWLEDGE We shall now make an effort to show by means of a concrete

example

that political-historical

thinking assumes various forms, in accordance

with different political currents. h\ order not to go too far afield, we shall concentrate primarily on the relationship between theory and practice. We shall see that even this most general and fundamental problem of a science of political conduct is differently conceived bv the different historical-political parties.

This

may

be easily seen by a survev of the

various political and social currents of the nineteenth

and twentieth

centuries.

As

the

important representative ideal-types, necessary here to repeat that the concept of the "pohtical" as used in conjunction with the correlative concepts, rationahzed structure, and irrational field, represents only one of many possible concepts of the "political."

the following:

1.

Bureaucratic conservatism.

While particularly suited for (he comprehension of certain relationships, it must not be regarded as absolutely the only one. For an opposite notion of the "political" cf. Schmitt, "Der Begriff des Politischen," Archil^ fiir Soziahms-

2.

4.

Conservative historicism. Liberal-democratic bourgeois thought. The socialist-communist conception.

5.

Fascism.

"it

is

C

scii.sc/wf/ Kill/ SiKinli'olitik. vol.

5S (1428).

3.

most

we

cite

CHAPTER

KARL MANNHEIM: SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE AND THE ROLE OF INTELLECTUALS

9:

The mode of thought of bureaucratic conservatism will be considered first. The fundamental tendency of all bureaucratic thought is to turn all problems of tration. tics in

As a

politics into

problems of adminison poli-

result, the majority of books

the history of German political science are

on administration. If we considalways played, especially in the Prussian state, and to what extent the intelligentsia was largely an intelligentsia drawn from the bureaucracy, this onesid-

df fncto treatises

er the role that bureaucracy has

201

administrative mentality constructs only closed

systems of thought, and is always faced with the paradoxical task of having to incorporate into its system new laws, which arise out static

of

the

unsystematized interaction of living if they were only a further elaboration

forces as

of the original system.

A

typical

example of the military-bureau-

The attempt to hide all problems of politics under the cover of administration may be explained by the fact that the sphere of activity

every type of the "stab in the back" legend, Dolclistosslegendc, which interprets a revolutionary outbreak as nothing but a serious interference with its own neatly planned strategy. The exclusive concern of the military bureaucrat is military action and, if that proceeds according to plan, then all the rest of life is in order too. This mentality is rem-

of the official exists only within the limits of

iniscent of the joke about the specialist in the

laws already formulated. Hence

medical world, who is reputed to have said: "The operation was a splendid success. Unfor-

edness of the history of

political science in

Ger-

many becomes easily intelligible.

the development of law of his activity.

As

falls

the genesis or

outside the scope

a result of his socially limited

horizon, the functionary

fails to

see that behind

every law that has been made there lie the socially fashioned interests and the Weltaiisclmiiinigen of a specific social group. it

He

takes

for granted that the specific order prescribed

by the concrete law general.

He does

rationalized order

which

is

equivalent to order in

not understand that every is

only one of

many forms

in

socially conflicting irrational forces are

reconciled.

The administrative,

own

legalistic

peculiar type of rationality.

mind has

When

its

faced

with the play of hitherto unharnessed forces, as, for example, the eruption of collective energies in a revolution, it can conceive of them only as momentary disturbances. It is, therefore, no wonder that in every revolution the bureaucracy tries to find a remedy by means of arbitrary decrees rather than to meet the political situation on its own grounds. It regards revolution as an untoward event within an otherwise ordered system and not as the living expression of fundamental social forces on

which the existence, the preservation, and the development of society depends. The juristic

cratic mentality is

tunately, the patient died."

Every bureaucracy, therefore, the peculiar emphasis on

its

in accord

own

with

position,

own

experience and to realm of administration and of smoothly functioning order represents only a part of the total political reality. Bureaucratic thought does not deny the possibility of a science of politics, but regards it as identical with the science of administration. Thus irrational factors are overlooked, and when these nevertheless force themselves to the fore, they are treated as "routine matters of state." A classic expression of this standpoint is tends to generalize

overlook the

its

fact that the

contained in a saying which originated in these circles: "A good administration is better than the best constitution."^ In

addition to bureaucratic conservatism,

which ruled Germany and especially Prussia a very great extent, there was a second type conservatism which developed parallel to

^Obituary of Bohlau by the jurist Bekker. Zeitschrift Germanist. Abtlg., \oL \'iii, p. vi ff.

Savigny-Stiftiiiig.

to

of it

tier

202

THE CLASSIC TRADITION

PART1:

and which may be called historical conservatism. It was peculiar to the social group of the nobility and the bourgeois strata among the intellectuals who were the intellectual and actual rulers of the country, but between whom and the bureaucratic conservatives there always existed a certain amount of tension. This mode of thought bore the stamp of the German universities, and especially of the dominant group of historians. Even today, this mentality

still

finds

its

support largely in these

The je ne sais quoi element in politics, which can be acquired only through long experience, and which reveals itself as a rule only to those who for many generations have shared in state.

Historical conservatism

the fact that life

it is

is

characterized by

aware of that irrational realm which cannot be man-

of the state

aged by an unorganized and incalculable realm is which is the proper sphere of politics. Indeed it focuses its attention almost exclusively on the impulsive, irrational factors which furnish the real basis for the further development of state administration.

It

recognizes that there

and society. It regards these forces as entirely beyond comprehension and infers that, as

which the

human

herited

is

impotent

"silently

instinct,

to

working"

spiritual

drawing their strength out of the depths of the unconscious, can be of aid in moulding the future. This attitude was already stated at the end of the eighteenth century by Burke, who served as the model for most of the German conservatives, in the following impressive words: "The forces,

the

"folk

spirit,"

science of constructing a

Volksgeit^t,

commonwealth

of

every other experimental science, not to be taught a priori. Nor is it a short experience that can instruct us renovating

that

it

or reforming

practical

it,

science."''

is

like

The

sociological

roots of this thesis are immediately evident.

It

expressed the ideology of the dominant nobilitv in England and in Germany, and it served to

G. Selby (London:

MacmilUm and

Co., 1890), p. 67.

bv

group which

is

blinded to the

by reason of its administrative preconceptions, from the very political aspect of a situation

beginning the nobility is perfectly at home in this sphere. Right from the start, the latter have their eyes on the arena where intra- and interstate spheres of power collide with one another. In this sphere, petty textbook wisdom deserts us and solutions to problems cannot be mechanical-

deduced from premises. Hence it is not individual inteUigence which decides issues. Rather ly

is

every event the resultant of actual historical conservative theory,

political

which

is

essentially the expression of a feudal tradition'

become

self-conscious,

is

primarily concerned

with problems which transcend the sphere of administration. The sphere is regarded as a completely irrational one which cannot be fabricated by mechanical methods but which grows of its own accord. This outlook relates everything to the decisive dichotomy between "construction according to calculated plan"

and "allowing things cal leader

it

is

to grow."** For the politi-

not sufficient to possess merely

knowledge and the mastery of certain laws and norms. In addition to these he must possess that inborn instinct, sharpened through long experience, which leads him to the correct

the right answer.

'Cf.

""Burke's Reflections on the Rn'olution in France, edited

that

life to

another position do not respond.

those in

The

reason

makes

social interests of

sensitive to certain aspects of social

forces.

F.

in

group make the members of

a given

understand

in

aristocratic class. This

manner

clear the

or to control them. Here only a traditionally in-

such,

intended to justify gov-

political leadership, is

ernment by an

Whereas the bureaucracy

circles.

in the

legitimatize their claims to leadership in the

133

"Das konservative Denken,"

ff.

"/bid., p.

472, n. 129.

he.

cit.,

pp. 89, 105,

— CHAPTER

9:

Two types of irrationalism have joined to produce this irrational way of thinking: on the one hand, precapitahstic, traditionahstic irrationalism (which regards legal thinking, for instance, as a way of sensing something and not as mechanical calculation), and, on the other hand, romantic irrationalism. A mode of thought is thus created which conceives of history as the reign of pre- and super-rational forces. Even Ranke, the most eminent representative of the historical school, spoke from this intellectual outlook when he defined the relations of theory and practice.'* Politics is not, according to him, an independent science that can be taught. The statesman may indeed study history profitably, but not in order to derive from it rules of conduct, but rather because it serves to sharpen his political instinct. This mode of thought may be designated as the ideology of political groups which have traditionally occupied a dominant position but which have rarely participated in the administhe

trasted,

two solutions thus far presented are conit will become clear that the bureaucrat

tends to conceal the political sphere while the historicist sees

it

all

thought which either does not see the elements in life and in thought which are based on will, or, if it interest, emotion, and WcUaiischaiiiiiig does recognize their existence, treats them as

—

though they were equivalent to the intellect and believes that they may be mastered by and subordinated to reason. This bourgeois intellectualism expressly demandeci a scientific politics, and actually proceeded to found such a discipline. Just as the bourgeoisie found the

which the

institutions into

first

gle could be canalized

and

electoral system, tions), so

the

new

tional

a

later the

discipline of politics.

The bourgeois attempt

social theory.

its

The organiza-

of bourgeois society appears

thoroughgoing

world

League of Na-

also created a systematic place for

anomaly

also in at

it

political strug-

parliament and the

(first

rationalization

forced nevertheless to halt

is

of

the

when

it

reaches certain phenomena. By sanctioning free

competition and the class struggle, ates a

new

irrational sphere.

it even creLikewise in this

type of thought, the irrational residue in reality

trative bureaucracy. If

203

KARL MANNHEIM: SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE AND THE ROLE OF INTELLECTUALS

the

more sharply and

exclu-

sively as irrational even though he singles out for

remains undissolved. Furthermore, just as parliament is a formal organization, a formal rationalization of the political conflict but not a solution of it, so bourgeois theory attains merely an apparent, formal intellectualization of the in-

emphasis the traditional factors in historical events and in the acting subjects. At this stage we

herently irrational elements.

come to the chief adversary of this theory which,

this

as has been pointed out, arose originally out of

tic

aristocratic feudal mentality, namely, the liberal-

thought, discussion, and organization to mas-

democratic bourgeoisie and its theories. ^° The rise of the bourgeoisie was attended by an extreme intellectualism. Intellectualism, as it is

as if they were already rationalized, the power and other irrational relationships that dominate here. Thus, inter alia, it was believed

used

in this connection, refers to a

mode

of

The bourgeois mind

new in

so

far

as

it

says on the

Diis

fiolitische

Ceipriich

same theme:

pp. 21

" Reflcxionen"

der Theorie," "Uher die Venvandtschaft

(1836), ff.

(1832),

ed.

by

Also other es-

"Vom

Einfluss

und den Unterschied

der Historic mid der Pclitik."

'"For the sake of simplicity we do not distinguish liberalism from democracy, although historically and socially they are quite different.

it is

of

intellectualis-

attempts solely through

that political action could without difficulty be

was assumed

a.d., Saale, 1925),

aware

of course,

ter,

scientifically defined.

Cf. Ranke, Rothacker (Hall

is,

irrational realm, but

First

—the

The science

in question

to fall into three parts:

theory of ends,

i.e.

the theory of

the ideal State.

—the theory of the positive — the description of the Third Second

State.

"politics,"

manner

in

i.e.

which the existing State

formed into a perfect

State.

is

trans-

204

PARTI:

THE CLASSIC TRADITION

thought we "Closed Commercial State" which in this sense has been very acutely analysed by Heinrich Rickert,'^ who himself, however, completely accepts this position. There is then a science of ends and a science of means. The most striking fact about it is the complete separation

As an

mav

illustration of this type of

refer to the structure of Fichte's

between theory and practice, of the intellectual sphere from the emotional sphere. Modern intellectualism is characterized by its tendency not to tolerate emotionally determined and evaluative thinking.

When,

nevertheless, this

encountered (and all political thought is set essentially in an irrational context) the attempt is made so to construe the phenomena that the evaluative elements will appear separable, and that there will remain at least a residue of pure theory. In this the question is not even raised whether the emotional element may not under certain circumstances be so intertwined with the rational as to involve even the categorical structure itself and type of thought

to

make

is

the required isolation of the evaluative

elements de facto unrealizable. Bourgeois intellectualism, however, does not worrv over these difficulties. With undaunted optimism, it strives to

conquer a sphere completely purged

of irrationalism.

As regards there

is

ends, this theory teaches that

one right

set of

duct which, in so far as found, may be arrived the

original

ends of

political con-

it

has not already been

at

by discussion. Thus

conception

of

parliamentarism

was, as Carl Schmitt has so clearly shown, that of a debating society in which truth is sought

mode

of thought lay. behind every theory there are collective forces expressive of group-

self-deception

in

this

Today we recognize

that

purposes, -power, and -interests. Parliamentary discussions are thus far from being theoretical in the

may

sense that they

ultimately arrive at

the objective truth; they are concerned with

very real issues to be decided in the clash of terests.

It

was

left for

the socialist

in-

movement

which arose subsequently as the opponent of the bourgeoisie to elaborate specifically this

aspect of the debate about real issues.

we

In our treatment of socialist theory

are

not for the time being differentiating between

communism,

socialism and

we

for

are here

concerned not so much \vith the plethora of historical phencimena as with the tendencies which cluster around the opposite poles that essentially determine modern thought. In the struggle with its bourgeois opponent, Marxism discovered

anew

that in historical

and

political

matters there can be no "pure theory."

behind everv theorv there

that

lie

It

sees

collective

The phenomenon of collective which proceeds according to interests and social and existential situations, Marx spoke of as ideology. points of view. thinking,

In this case, as so often in political struggles,

an important discoverv was made, which, once it became known, had to be followed up to its final

this

conclusion. This was the more so since discoverv contained the heart of the prob-

lem of

political

thought

in general.

The concept

ideology serves to point out the problem, but the problem is therebv bv no means soh'ed or cleared up.'"

A

thoroughgoing

clarification

is

by theoretical methods.'"^ We know all too well and can understand sociologically wherein the For what folkuvs Part

should be referred to for furwhich only the essentials will be repeated here. The concept of total, general, and non-evaluative ideology, as described earlier, is the one used in the present context. Part IV will deal with the evaluative conceptions of ideology and Utopia. lenceforth the concept to lu~ used will be determined by the immediate purposes of the investigation. '

II

ther discussion of the problem, of

"Cf. Heinrich Rickert, "Ulu-r idi-nlistische I'olilik als Wissenschaff. Ein Beitrngzur I'rublonigoscliichteder Staatsphilosophie," Die Akiutciiiic, ticit 4, Erlangon. ''Cf. Carl Schmitt, Pic \;ci!^lc^^CMiiiclitliclic Ln^c ilcs hciiti-

gcn

Parliiiiicutiirit^imis,

2nd

edit. (Leipzig, 1926).

I

CHAPTER

attainable only

9:

by getting

rid of the one-sided-

ness inherent in the original conception. First of all, therefore, it will be necessary for our

purpose with,

it

to

make two

could easily be

205

KARL MANNHEIM: SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE AND THE ROLE OF INTELLECTUALS

To begin

corrections.

shown

that those

who

think in socialist and communist terms ciiscern the ideological element only in the thinking of

opponents while regarding their own thought as entirely free from any taint of ideology. As sociologists there is no reason why we

is

the discov-

is

up with

the essential

social

This

life.

is

integrally

bound mean-

"It is not the determines their

ing of the oft-quoted sentence,

consciousness of existence but,

men

on the

that

contrary, their social exis-

tence which determines their consciousness."'*

But closely related to

their

should not apply to Marxism the perceptions which it itself has produced, and point out

our opinion,

tion of ideology, in

ery that political thought

this is

tant feature of Marxist thought,

another impor-

namely

a

new

conception of the relationship between theory and practice. Whereas the bourgeois theorist

devoted

a special

chapter to setting forth his

from case to case its ideological character. Moreover, it should be explained that the concept "ideology" is being used here not as a

ends, and whereas this always proceeded from

negative value-judgment, in the sense of insinuating a conscious political lie, but is intended

the Utopian element in socialism. From the beginning he refused to lay down an exhaustive set of objectives. There is no norm to be achieved that is detachable from the process itself: "Communism for us is not a condition that is to be established nor an ideal to which

to designate the outlook inevitably associated with a given historical and social situation, and the Weltanschauung and style of thought bound up with it. This meaning of the term, which

more closely on the history of thought, must be sharply differentiated from the other meaning. Of course, we do not deny that in

bears

may

other connections

it

conscious political

lies.

also serve to reveal

normative conception of society, one of the most significant steps Marx took was to attack a

reality

must adjust

itself.

We

movement which

the actual

conditions.

call

communism

abolishes present

The conditions under which

movement proceeds

result

from those

this

now

"'''

Through

this

existing.

procedure nothing that has a

positive value for scientific research in the notion of ideology has been discarded.

The

great reve-

If

we ask a communist, with a Leninist what the future society will actually be he will answer that the question is an

today

training, like,

historical

undialectical one, since the future itself will be

and political thought is essentially conditioned by the life situation of the thinker and his

decided in the practical dialectical process of becoming. But what is this practical dialectical

lation

it

groups.

affords

It is

is

that every

our task

form of

to disentangle this insight

one-sided political encrustation, and to elaborate in a systematic manner the thesis that

from

its

how one looks at history and how one construes a total situation from given facts, depends on the position one occupies within society. In

every historical and political contribution it is possible to determine from what vantage point

process?

we cannot calculate a priori should be like and what it will be like. We can influence only the general trend of the process of becoming. The ever-present concrete problem for us can only be the next step ahead. It is not the task of political thought to It

what

signifies that

a thing

the objects were observed. However, the fact that our thinking

position

is

the contrary, insight.

is

determined by our social

not necessarily a source of error.

The

it

is

On

often the path to political

significant element in the concep-

'"Karl Marx, A Cotitributicn to the Critique of Political Economy, tr. by N. I. Stone (Chicago, 1913), pp. 11-12. '"Cf. Marx-Engels Archiv, ed. bv D. Rvazanov (Frankfurt a.M.), vol.

i,

p. 252.

206

PART

1

THE CLASSIC TRADITION

:

up an absolute scheme of what should be. Theory, even including communist theory, is a set

function

of becoming. The between theory and

process

the

of

relationship

dialectical

practice consists in the fact that,

first

of

all,

the-

ory arising out of a definitely social impulse clarifies the situation. And in the process of clarification

reality

undergoes

new

thereby enter a

a

We

change.

situation out of

which

a

new

two currents of thought is a very flexible conA basic lesson derived from political experience which was most impressively formulated by Napoleon in the maxim, the

ception of theory.

"0)i

s'eiigagc,

puis

methodological

becomes illuminated when

This theory leads to a certain kind of action; (3) Action changes the reality, or in case of failure,

must go with them.

forces us to a revision of the previous theory.

sis

in

the actual situation brought

new

theory.^''

This view of the relationship between theory and practice bears the imprint of an advanced stage in the discussion of the problem.

notes that

it

was preceded by

One

the one-sided-

ness of an extreme intellectualism and a complete irrationahsm, and that it had to circum-

vent

dangers

the

all

which were already

revealed in bourgeois and conservative thought and experience. The advantages of this solution the fact that it has assimilated the previous formulation of the problem, and in its awareness of the fact that in the realm of politics the usual run of thought is unable to accomplish

here finds

Indeed,

its

pohtical

a concrete situation

penetrated, not merely through acting and

is

act gives rise to a

I'o/f,"''

thought cannot be carried on by speculating about it from the outside. Rather thought

theory emerges. The process is, then, as follows: (1) Theory is a function of reality; (2)

The change about by the

on

sanction.'^

doing, but also through the thinking which

SociaHst-communist theory is then a syntheof intuitionism and a determined desire to comprehend phenomena in an extremely rational way. Intuitionism is present in this theory because it denies the possibilitv of exact calculations of events in advance of their happening.

tendency enters because it aims scheme whatever novelty comes to view at any moment. At no time is it permissible to act without theory, hut the theory that arises in the course of action will be on

The to

rationalist

fit

into a rational

a different level fore.''* It is

from the theory

that

went be-

especially revolutions that create a

lie in

On the other hand, this outlook is too thoroughly motivated by the desire for knowledge to fall into a complete irrationahsm like anything.

conservatism. The result of the conflict between

hv means of the class struggle and thereby the whole social taking cognizance of the changed social situa-

"'"When the changes

its

structure, in

of

proletariat

position in society

finds itself face to face not merely with a its position

tion,

i.e.

new

object of understanding, but also changes

itself,

it

subject. The theory serves to bring the prok^consciousness of its social position, i.e. it enables simultaneously both as an object and it to envisage itself a subject in the social process." (Georg Lukacs, Gcfcliichtr

as a

knowing

tariat to a

iind

—

K/(issra(ic!('i(,ssf,sci?i,

Berlin,

192,'^.)

"This consciousness in turn becomes the motive force of activity, since theory becomes a material force once it seizes the masses." (Marx-F.ngels, Nnchlnss, i, p. 392.)

new

'indeed both Lenin and Lukacs, as representatives of the dialectical approach, find justification in this Napoleonic

maxim.

''""Revolutionarv theory is the generalization of the experiences of the labour movement in all countries. It naturalh' loses its very essence if it is not connected with revo-

lutionary practice, just as practice gropes in the dark if its path is not illumined bv revolutionary theory. But theory can become the greatest force in the labour movement if it is indissolubly bound up with revolutionary practice, for it alone can give to the movement confidence, guidance, of the inner relations between alone can help practice to clarif\- the process and direction of class movements in the present and near future." (Joseph Stalin, Fouiidalionf of /.ivi/msiM, rev. ed..

strength,

and understandmg

events and

it

New

York and London, 1432, pp. 26-7.) '"Revolution, particularly, creates the situation propitious to significant knowledge: "History in general, the history of revolutions in particular, has always been richer, more varied, and variform, more vital and 'cunning' than

concei\'ed of b\' the best parties, b\' the most conscious vanguards of the most advanced classes. This is natural, for the best vanguards express the consciousness, will, pasis

CHAPTER

9:

KARL MANNHEIM: SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE AND THE ROLE OF INTELLECTUALS

207

more valuable type

dencies which, even though they are subject to

tutes the synthesis

change, through their very presence do never-

of knowledge. This constiwhich men are likelv to make when they live in the midst of irrationality and recognize it as such, but do not despair of the

theless determine to a large extent the various possibilities.

does not deny the existence of an irrational sphere and does not try to conceal it as the

cies

first task of Marxism is the and rationalization of all those tendenwhich influence the character of the situa-

tion.

Marxist theory has elaborated these struc-

bureaucratic mentality does, or treat

tural tendencies in a threefold direction. First,

attempt

thought

interpret

to is

it

Marxist

rationally

akin to conservative thought in that

it

purely intellectual fashion as

if it

were

as liberal-democratic thinkers do.

it

in a

rational,

Therefore, the analysis

it

points out that the political sphere in a given

based on and

always characterized

distin-

society

is

guished from conservative thought, however, in that it conceives of this relative irrationality as potentially comprehensible through new methods of rationalization."" For even in this type of thought, the sphere of the irrational is not entirely irrational, arbitrary, or incompre-

by the

state of productive relations prevailing

It

is

no statically which this creative process conforms, nor are there any exactly recurring sequences of events, bLit at the same hensible.

fixed

It

and

is

true that there are

definite laws to

time only a limited number of situations can occur even here. And this after all is the decisive consideration. Even when new elements in historical development emerge they do not constitute merely a chain of unexpected events; the political sphere itself is permeated by ten-

sions,

and

revolution altation

fancies of hut tens of thousands, is

and exertion of

all

whereas the

moment of the exceptional exthe human faculties conscious-

effected at the

—

ness, will, passion, phantasy, of tens of millions, spurred

on

by the

nil

bitterest class war." (N. Lenin, "Left" Commi(nisiii:

Infantile Disorder,

New York and

published by the

London,

Toiler, n.d. pp. 76-7, also

accumulated rationaHty tested out experimentally

in the

individual experiences of millions.

sudden and unexpectview which arises therefrom, are conceived of as functions of the degree in which our under'"Thus, fate, chance, everything

and the

religious

standing of history has not yet reached rationality.

the

stage or

The productive

relations are not

regarded

statically as a continually recurring

economic

cycle, but, dynamically, as a structur-

al

interrelationship

which

is

itself

constantly

changing through time. Secondly, it sees that changes in this economic factor are most closely connected with transformations in class relations, which involves at the same time a shift in the kinds of power and an ever- varying distribution of power. But, thirdlv,

it

recognizes that

it is

possible to

understand the inner structure of the system of ideas dominating men at any period and to determine theoretically the direction of any change or modification in this structure.

"Fear of the blind forces of capitalism, blind because they cannot be foreseen by the masses of the people, forces which at every step in the lives of the proletariat and the small traders threaten to bring and do bring 'sudden,' 'unexpected,' 'accidental' disaster and ruin, converting them into beggars, paupers, or prostitutes, and condemn them to starvation; these are the roots of modern religion, which the materialist,

No

if

he desires

to

remain a

materialist,

must

educational books will obliterate religion from the minds of those condemned to the hard labour of capitalism, until they themselves learn to fight in a united, organized, systematic, conscious manner the roots of religion, the domination of capital in all its forms." (.Selections from Lenin The Bolshevik Party in Action, 1904-1914, ii. From the essay, "The Workers' Partv and Religion," New York, pp. 274-5.) "The mode of production in material life determines the general character of the social, political, and spiritual processes of life." (Marx, Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, tr. by N. 1. Stone, Chicago, 1913, p. 11.) recognize.

1934.)

It is interesting to observe that from this point of view revolution appears not as an intensification of the passions resident in men nor as mere irrationality. This passion is valuable only because it makes possible the fusion of the

ed,

at the time."'

is

—

208

Still

THE CLASSIC TRADITION

PART1:

more important

in the fact that these

not considered

three structural patterns are

independently of one another.

It

is

precisely

which are made to constitute a single group of problems. The ideological structure does not change independently of the class structure, and the class structure does not change independently of the economic structure. And it is precisely the interconnection and intertwining of this threetheir reciprocal relations

fold formulation of the problem, the economic,

the social,

and the

ideological, that gives to

Marxist ideas their singularly penetrating quality. Only this synthetic power enables it to for-

view of history on the basis of be possible at any moment to ask ourselves where we are now and at what stage of development does our movement find rationalized

which

will

it

itself.-

Groups the

of pre-capitaUstic origin, in

communal element

together bv traditions or ments alone. In such a group, theoretical reflection is of entirely secondary importance. On the other hand, in groups which are not welded together primarily by such organic bonds of community life, but which merely occupy simi-

orous theorizing

acceptance of the irrational. Instead

ties

eliminate as

much

of

it

as possible

tries to

by a new

sociologist

the question of the

is

confronted with

general historical-social

form of existence and the particular situation from which the mode of thought peculiar to Marxism arose. How can we explain its singular character which consists in combining an extreme irrationalism with an extreme rationalism in such a manner that out of this fusion there arises a

new

kind of "dialectical" ratio-

nality?

Considered sociologically, of an ascendent class

Viewed theory

a prerecjuisite of cohesion.

is

sociologically this extreme need is

for

the expression of a class society in

which persons must be held together not by local proximity but by similar circumstances of life in

an extensive social sphere. Sentimental

are effective only within a limited spatial

area, while a theoretical Weltanschauung has a

unifying power over great distances. Hence a

effort at rationalization.

Here again the

social-economic system, rig-

lar positions in the

mulate ever anew the problem of the structural totality of society, not only for the past but also for the future. The paradox lies in the fact that Marxism recognizes relative irrationality and never loses sight of it. But unlike the historical school it does not content itself with a mere it

which

may be held by common senti-

prevails,

which

this is the is

theory

not concerned

with momentary successes, and which therefore will not resort to a "putsch" as a means for seizing power, but which, because of its inherent revolutionary tendencies, must always be sensitive and alert to unpredictable constellations in the situation. Every theory which arises out of a class position and is based not on unstable masses but on organized historical

groups must of necessity have a long-range view. Consequently, it requires a thoroughly

rationalized conception of history serves as a socially unifying factor for

space, ity to

groups dispersed in

same time furnishes continugenerations which continuously grow up and

at the

into similar social conditions. In the formation of classes, a similar positicm in the social order

and

primary imporEmotional ties which subsequently spring up are only a reflection of the already existing situation and are always more or less regulated by theory. Despite this extreme ratioa unifying theory are of

tance.

nalizing tendency,

which

is

implicit in the pro-

letarian class position, the limits of the rationality of this class

are defined

and, particularly, by

its

by

its

oppositional

allotted revolutionary

position.

""Without hition.irv

a rfVolutionar\- tlieor\ there

mo\eniont." (Lenin, What

York and London, m3L)

/.ritv. The better explanations start from the premise that the communication structures that have

systematically

been

as they

framework within which the structural model of ego, id, and superego can be recast.'' Instead

irritability

of an instinct theory that represents the relation

set free in the family

for socialization that are as

are vulnerable.

The

grows, and with

it

pro\ide conditions

demanding

potential

for

the probability that instabili-

distorted

communication— the

reification of interpersonal relations

— the point

of reference for investigating pathogenesis.

theory of communicati\'e action

ot

ego

to inner

The

pro\ides a

nature in terms of a philosophy

— CHAPTER

—

on the model of relations between subject and object we have a theory of socialization that connects Freud with Mead, of consciousness

—

fective stereotypes of a ly replicates

what

16:

mass on

405

THEORY

CRITICAL

culture that mere-

exists;

the other hand,

it

gives structures of intersubjcctivitv their due,

uses up a culture cleansed of all subversive and transcending elements for an encompassing

and replaces hypotheses about

system of

instinctual vi-

cissitudes with assumptions about identity formation."''

more

This approach can

(i)

appropriate

recent developments in psychoanalytic

research, particularly the theory of object relations""

and ego

psychology,'"'

(ii)

take

up

the

theory of defense mechanisms'" in such a way that the interconnections between intrapsychic

social controls,

which

is

spread over

individuals, in part reinforcing their

weakened

internal behavioral controls, in part replacing

mode

them. The industry

is

of functioning of the culture

said to be a mirror

image of the

psychic apparatus, which, as long as the internalization of paternal authority was still functioning,

had subjected

instinctual nature to the

way

and communication disturbances at the interpersonal level become comprehensible,^" and (iii) use the assumptions about mechanisms of conscious and uncon-

control of the superego in the

scious mastery to establish a connection be-

cal

tween orthogenesis and pathogenesis. The cognitive and sociomoral development studied in

against

the Piagetian tradition'" takes place in accord with structural patterns that provide a reliable foil for intuitively recorded clinical deviations. (c) Mass media and mass culture. With its distinction between system and lifeworld, the theory of communicative action brings out the in-

consideration

dependent

ences in programming, viewing practices, po-

communication

logic

barriers

of

socializatory

interaction;

between two contrary types of communication media makes us sensitive to the ambivalent potential of mass communications. The theory makes us skeptithe

corresponding

distinction

cal of the thesis that the

essence of the public

ogy had subjected outer nature

that technol-

domina-

to its

tion.

Against this theory we can raise the empiriobjections that can always be brought oversimplifications

stylizing

—that

it

proceeds ahistorically and does not take into the

structural

bourgeois public sphere; that

enough

to take

differences

in

the

not complex

account of the marked national

—from differences between private,

public-legal, al

change it is

and

state-controlled organization-

structures of broadcasting agencies, to differ-

and so

But there

an even

litical

culture,

more

serious objection, an objection in princi-

ple, that

is

can be derived from the dualism of

media discussed I

forth.

above."'''

distinguished two sorts of media that can

sphere has been liquidated in postliberal soci-

ease the burden of the (risky and demanding)

According to Horkheimer and Adorno, the communication flows steered via mass media take the place of those communication structures that had once made possible public discussion and self-understanding by citizens and private individuals. With the shift from writing to images and sounds, the electronic media first film and radio, later television present themselves as an apparatus that completely permeates and dominates the language of everyday communication. On the one hand,

coordinating mechanism of reaching understanding: on the one hand, steering media, via

eties.

—

it

transforms the authentic content of

culture into the sterilized

modern

and ideologically

ef-

which subsystems are differentiated out of the lifeworld; on the other hand, generalized forms of communication, which do not replace reaching agreement in language but merely condense it, and thus remain tied to lifeworld contexts. Steering media uncouple the coordination of action from building consensus in language altogether and neutralize it in regard to the alternative of coming to an agreement or failing to do so. In the other case we are dealing with a specialization of linguistic processes of con-

406

PART

MODERNITY AND POST-MODERNISM

3:

sensus formation that remains dependent on recourse to the resources of the lifeworld background. The mass media belong to these gener-

aUzed forms of communication. They free communication processes from the provinciaHty of spatiotemporally restricted contexts and permit pubhc spheres to emerge, through estab-

• the broadcasting networks are exposed to

far

removed

in space

political and ideological, and aesthetic viewpoints;* nomially the mass media cannot, without gen-

professional •

erating conflict, avoid the obligations that ac-

crue to them from their journalistic mission and the professional code of journalism; • the

and time and through

programs do not

even

texts.

lar

same time remove

—

they considerably strengthen the cacy of social controls. But tapping this authoritarian potential is always precarious because there

into

built

and

practice sets

processes

communicative

against the direct

mass

the technical

development of

electronic

ralism"

and

moment

"television

not

much

democracy" are

more

than

at the

anarcliist

visions."*"

(d)

Potential for protest.

My thesis concerning

the colonization of the lifeworld, for

Weber's theory of served as a point of departure, societal

critique of functionalist reason,

When

media

does not necessarily move in the direction of centralizing networks, even though "video plu-

of

responsible actors.

ma-

media;''^

and •

reaching understanding, but it is only in the first instance that they relieve interaction from

yes/no responses to criticizable validity claims. Abstracted and clustered though they are, these communications cannot be reliablv shielded from the possibility of opposition by

up defenses

nipulative inter\'ention of the

communication structures concentrate

its

against a certain subadtural backgromid;*'

Mass media can simultaneously

contextualize

re-

turned into

is

• the inner logic of everyday

effi-

themselves.

critical

popular

opposite under conditions of being received

a counterweight of emancipatory po-

is

tential

contain as

cause the intended meaning

their

below

may

culture

• ideological messages miss their audience be-

—

—

for the most mass culture;^ forms of popu-

venge;

restrictions

ambivalent potential. Insofar as in lies media one-sidedly channel communicamass centralized network from the tion flows in a or from above to center to the periphery

—"popular

'

even

vv^hen they take the triWal

entertainment, they

messages

at the

on the horizon of possible communication. The one aspect cannot be separated from the other and there-

only, or

part, reflect the standards of

keeping messages available for manifold con-

These media publics hierarchize and

economic,

iiTtegrate

lishing the abstract simultaneity of a virtually

present network of communication contents

com-

peting interests; they are not able to smoothly

which

rationalization

based on a which agrees

is

communications research is not abridged in an empiricist manner and allows for dimensions of reification in communicative evervdav practice,^ it confirms this ambi\'alence. Again and again reception research and program analysis have provided illustrations of theses in culture criticism that Adorno, above all, developed with a certain over-state-

with the critique of instrumental reason only in

same energy has

authoritarian state. In this respect, the earlier

ment.

In

the nieantime, the

been put into working out the contradictions resulting from the facts that

and in its ironic u.se ot the word 'reason'. One major difference is that the theory of communicative action conceives of the lifeworld as a sphere in which processes of as reification do not appear as mere reflexes emaintegration manifestations of a repressive nating ivom an oligopolistic economy and an its

intention

—

critical

theory merely repeated the errors of

Marxist functionalism."

My

references to the

CHAPTER

socializatory relevance of the uncoupling of

system and lifeworld and my remarks on the ambivalent potentials of mass media and mass culture show the private and public spheres in the light of a rationalized lifeworld in which system imperatives dash with independent communication structures. The transposition of communicative action to media-steered interactions and the deformation of the structures of a

damaged

intersubjectivity are

by no means

new

16:

CRITICAL

THEORY

407

an expression of and attitudes that R. Inglehart has observed in entire populaDalton, tions.'*'* Studies by Hildebrandt and and by Barnes and Kaase, confirm the change in themes from the "old politics" (which turns on questions of economic and social security, This

tvpe of conflict

is

the "silent revolution" in values

internal tics.

"^^

and military security) to a "new poliThe new problems have to do with

quality of

life,

equal rights, individual self-real-

and human

predecided processes that might be distilled

ization,

from a few global concepts. The analysis of lifeworld pathologies calls for an (unbiased) in-

terms of social statistics, the "old politics" is more strongly supported by employers, workers, and middle-class tradesmen, whereas the new politics finds stronger support in the new

vestigation of tendencies ami contradictions.

The

fact that in welfare-state

class

thereby pacified does not tential

mean

that protest po-

has been altogether laid to

potentials for protest

ent lines of conflict

pect

mass democracies

has been institutionalized and

conflict

them

to

rest.

But the

emerge now along differjust where we would ex-

ing internal colonization.

the thesis of the coloniza-

economic-administrative

if

rights.

we

If

take the view that the growth of the

complex

sets

were correct. In the past decade or two, conflicts have developed in advanced Western societies that deviate in various ways from the welfare-state

processes of erosion in the lifeworld, then

pattern of institutionalized conflict over distri-

rectly

tion of the lifeworld

bution.

They no longer

up

flare

in

domains

of

In

middle classes, among the younger generation, and in groups with more formal education. These phenomena tally with my thesis regard-

—

emerge

participation,

would expect old

new the

ones.

A

be overlaid with forms between, on

conflicts to

line of conflict

one hand,

off

we

a center

composed

of strata di-

involved in the production process and

interested in maintaining capitalist

growth as

material reproduction; they are no longer chan-

the basis of the welfare-state compromise, and,

neled through parties and associations; and

on the other hand,

they can no longer be allayed by compensa-

variegated array of groups that are

tions. Rather, these

new

conflicts arise in do-

mains of cultural reproduction, social integration, and socialization; they are carried out in subinstitutional tary

—forms

of

—or

at

protest;

least

extraparliamen-

and the underlying

deficits reflect a reification of

communicatively

domains of action that will not respond to the media of money and power. The issue is not primarily one of compensations structured

the welfare state can provide, but of defending and restoring endangered ways of that

life.

In short,

the

new

conflicts

are not ig-

nited by distribution problems but tions

having

of hfe.

to

do with

the

grammar

by quesof forms

gether.

are

Among

further

a periphery

composed of a lumped to-

the latter are those groups that

removed from

the

"productivist

core of performance" in late capitalist soci-

have been more strongly sensitized consequences of the growth in complexity or have been more strongly affected by them.'*' The bond that unites these heterogeneous groups is the criticjue of growth. Neither the bourgeois emancipation movements nor the struggles of the organized labor movement can serve as a model eties,'"'

to

that

the

self-destructive

more movements of the early industrial period, which were supported by craftsmen, plebians, and for this protest. Historical parallels are likely to

be found

in the social-romantic

408

PART

MODERNITY AND POST-MODERNISM

3:

workers, in the defensive movements of the

move-

populist middle class, in the escapist

ments (nourished by bourgeois critiques of civilization) undertaken by reformers, the Wnndcrviigcl, and the like. The current potentials for protest are very because scenes, groupings, change very rapidly. To the extent that organizational nuclei are formed at the

difficult to classify,

and

topics

level of parties or associations,

cruited from the

same

members

are re-

diffuse reservoir.^^

following catchphrases serve at the

The

moment

tion

for

the sake of communicatively struc-

tured domains, and not at conquering

new

ter-

There is an element of particularism that connects feminism with these movements; the emancipation of women means not only establishing formal equality and eliminating male privilege, but o\'erturning concrete forms of life marked by male monopolies. Furthermore, ritory.

the historical legacy of the sexual division of labor to which

women were

subjected in the

bourgeois nuclear family has given them access

to

to contrasting virtues, to a register of values

identify the various currents in the Federal Re-

complementary to those of the male world and opposed to a one-sidedly rationalized everyday practice. Within resistance mo\'ements we can distinguish further between the defense of traditional and social rank (based on property) and a defense that already operates on the basis of a rationalized lifeworld and tries out new ways of cooperating and living together. This criterion makes it possible to demarcate the protest of the traditional middle classes against threats to neighborhoods by large technical projects, the protest of parents against comprehensive

public of Germany: the antinuclear and envi-

ronmental movements; the peace movement (including the theme of north-south conflict); single-issue tive

and

local

movements; the

movement (which encompasses

"scene," with

its

alterna-

the urban

squatters and alternative pro-

communes); the mihandicapped, and so forth); the psychoscene, with support groups and youth sects; religious fundamentalism; the

jects,

as well as the rural

norities (the elderly, gays,

tax-protest

movement, school

ents' associations, resistance to

forms; and,

by par-

"modernist"

re-

women's movement. Of significance are the autonomy

finally,

international

movements

protest

the

struggling for regional, linguistic,

and also religious independence. In this spectrum I will differentiate emancipatory potentials from potentials for resistance and withdrawal. After the American civil rights movement which has since issued in a cultural,

—

particularistic self-affirmation of black subcul-

tures

—only

the feminist

movement stands

in

the tradition of bourgeois-socialist liberation

movements. The struggle against patriarchal and for the redemption of a promise that has long been anchored in the acknowledged universalistic foundations of morality and law gives feminism the impetus of an offensive movement, whereas the other movements have a more defensive character. The resistance and withdrawal movements aim at stemming formally organized domains of acoppression

schools, the protest against taxes (patterned after the

movement

in

support of Proposition

13 in California), and most of the

autonomy, on the one

movements

from the core of a new conflict potential, on the other: youth and alternative movements for which a critique of growth sparked by themes of ecologv and for

side,

peace is the common focus. It is possible to conceive of these conflicts in terms of resistance

toward a colonization of the lifehope now to indicate, at least in a cursory way.'* The objectives, attitudes, and wavs of acting prevalent in youth protest groups can be understood, to begin with, as reactions to certain problem situations that are to tendencies

world, as

I

perceived with great sensitivitv. "Green" ('whlcms. scale

industry

into

The intervention ecological

of large-

balances,

the

nonrenewable natural resources, as well as demographic de\'elopments

growing

scarcity of

CHAPTER

present industrially developed societies with

major problems; but these challenges are ab-

and call for technical and economwhich must in turn be globally planned and implemented by administrative stract at first ic

solutions,

means. What

16:

CRITICAL

THEORY

409

mentalism is also a motivating force behind most alternative projects and many citizens' action groups the painful manifestations of deprivation in a culturally impoverished and one-sidedly rationalized practice of everyday

—

tangible destruction of the urban environment;

life. For this reason, ascriptive characteristics such as gender, age, skin, color, neighborhood

the despoliation of the countryside through

or locality, and religious affilitation serve to

housing developments, industrialization, and pollution; the impairment of health through the ravages of civilization, pharmaceutical side that is, developments that effects, and the like noticeably affect the organic foundations of the

build

and make us drastically aware of standards of livability, of inflexible limits to the deprivation of sensual-aesthetic background

enough to be familiar, of decenforms of commerce and despecialized activities, of segmented pubs, simple interac-

needs.

sets off the protest

is

rather the

—

lifeworld

up and separate

tablish

subculturally

off

communities, to escommunities

protected

supportive of the search for personal and collective identity. lar,

The revaluation

of the particu-

the natural, the provincial, of social spaces

that are small tralized

—

plants,

and dedifferentiated public spheres all meant to foster the revitaliztion of possibilities for expression and communication that have been buried alive. Resistance to reformist

atomic waste, genetic engineering, the storage

interventions that turn into their opposite, be-

and the are combined, howev-

cause the means by which they are implemented run counter to the declared aims of social

tions

Problems of excessive complexity. There are certainly good reasons to fear military potenfor

tials

and

nuclear

destruction,

power

central utilization of private data,

These real anxieties er, with the terror of a new category of risks that are literally invisible and are comprehensible only from the perspective of the system. These risks invade the lifeworld and at the like.

same time burst

its

dimensions. The anxieties

function as catalysts for a feeling of being over-

whelmed

view of the possible consequences which we are morally accountable since we do set them in motion technically and politically and yet for which we can no longer take moral responsibility since their scale has put them beyond our control. Here resistance is directed against abstractions in

of processes for

—

—

—

upon

this is

integration, also belongs in this context.

The new conflicts arise along the seams between system and lifeworld. Earlier I described how the interchange between the private and public spheres, on the one hand, and the economic and administrative action systems, on the other, takes place via the media of money and power, and how it is institutionalized in the roles of employees and consumers, citizens and clients of the state. It is just these roles that are the targets of protest. Alternative practice

is

directed against the profit-dependent instru-

mentalization of

work

in one's vocation, the

the lifeworld, although

market-dependent mobilization of labor power,

they go beyond the spatial, temporal, and so-

against the extension of pressures of competi-

that are forced

cial limits of

entiated

complexity of even highly

lifeworlds,

centered

as

differ-

these

are

around the senses. Overhiiniening the communicative infrastruc-

Something

expressed rather blatantly in the manifestations of the psychomovement and renewed religious fundature.

that

is

tion and performance all the way down into elementary school. It also takes aim at the monetarization of services, relationships, and time, at

the

consumerist

spheres of

life

of

private

life-styles.

Further-

redefinition

and personal

more, the relation of clients to public service is to be opened up and reorganized in

agencies

— 410

PART

3:

MODERNITY AND POST-MODERNISM

a participatory

mode, along the lines of selfIt is above all in the dopolicy and health policy (e.g., in

help organizations.

mains of

social

connection with psychiatric care) that niodels

move them from the clutches of the steering media, and return these "liberated areas" to the action-coordinating mechanism of reaching understanding.

However

of reform point in this direction. Finally, certain

forms of protest negate the definitions of the role of citizen and the routines for pursuing interests in a purposive-rational manner forms ranging from the undirected explosion of disturbances by youth ("Zurich is burning!"), through calculated or surrealistic violations of rules (after the pattern of the American civil rights movement and student protests), to violent provocation and intimidation. According to the programmatic conceptions

—

of

some

theoreticians, a partial disintegration

employees and consumers, and citizens of the state, is supposed

of the social roles of of clients

to clear the

way

for counterinstitutions that de-

velop from within the lifeworld in order limits to the inner

and

to set

dynamics of the economic

political-administrative

systems.

action

These institutions are supposed, on the one hand, to divert out of the economic system a second, informal sector that is no longer oriented to profit and, on the other hand, to oppose to the party system new forms of a "politics in the

first

person," a politics that

is

expressive

and at the same time has a democratic base.^'' Such institutions would reverse just those abstractions and neutralizations by which in modern societies labor and political will-formation have been tied to media-steered interaction. The capitalist enterprise and the mass party (as an "ideology-neutral organization for acquiring power") generalize their points of social entry via labor markets and manufactured public spheres; they treat their employees and voters as abstract labor power and voting subjects; and they keep at a distance as environments of the system those spheres in which personal and collective identities can alone take shape. By contrast, the counterinstitutions

—

—

are intended to dedifferentiate the formally organized

some

domains

parts of

of action, re-

these ideas

unrealistic

may

be,

they are important for the polemical signifi-

cance of the

movements

new

resistance

and \vithdrawal

reacting to the colonization of the

lifeworld. This significance

is

obscured, both in

and oppo-

the self-understanding of those involved in the ideological imputations of their

nents, tural

if the communicative rationality of culmodernity is rashly equated with the

functionalist

rationality

of

self-maintaining

economic and administrative action systems that

is,

world

whenever the is

rationalization of the

life-

not carefully distinguished from the

increasing complexity of the social system. This

confusion explains the fronts

—which are out of

place and obscure the real political oppositions

—between

the

Young Conservatives tiv^e

antimodernism of the and the neoconserva'

defense of postmodernity^" that robs a

modernity at variance with itself of its rational content and its perspectives on the future.^ C.

—In

this

work I have

tried to introduce a the-

ory of communicative action that

clarifies the

normative foundations of a critical theory of society. The theory of communicative action is meant to provide an alternati\^e to the philoso-

phy

on which earlier critical theory is no longer tenable. It is intended as a framework within which interdisciplinarv research on the selective pattern of capitalist modernization can be taken up once again. The illustrative observations (a) through (d) were meant to make this claim plausible. The two additional themes (c) and (f) are a reminder that the investigation of what Marx called "real abstraction" has to do with the sostill

of history

relied,

but which

cial-scientific tasks of a

theorv of modernity,

not the philosophical. Social theory need no longer ascertain

the

normative contents of

bourgeois culture, of art and of philosophical

CHAPTER

16:

CRITICAL THEORY

411

thought, in an indirect way, that is, by way of a With the concept of a com-

transcendental grounding, but they do call for a self-understanding regarding the character of

municative reason ingrained in the use of language oriented to reaching understanding, it

this

critique o( ideology.

again expects from philosophy that

it

take on

systematic tasks. The social sciences can enter into a cooperative relation with a philosophy that has taken

up

the task of

working on

a the-

ory of rationality. It is no different with modern culture as a whole than it was with the physics of Newton and his heirs: modern culture is as little in need of a philosophical grounding as science. As we have seen, in the modern period culture gave

rise of itself to those structures of rationality

Weber then discovered and described as value spheres. With modern science, with positive law and principled secular ethics, with authat

tonomous

art

three

cism,

and

institutionalized

moments

art

criti-

reason crystallized

of

without help from philosophy. Even without the guidance of the critiques of pure and practical reason, the sons and daughters of modernity learned how to divide up and develop further the cultural tradition

aspects of rationality justice, or taste.

an empiricist abridgement of the rationality problematic is a steadfast pursuit of the tortuous routes along which science, morality, and art communicate with one another. In each of

More and more

the sciences

as a whole. Cognitive ethics separates off prob-

ly

life

deontological,

that Just.

and concentrates on

universalizable

strict-

aspects,

so

what remains from the Good is only the And an art that has become autonomous

pushes toward an ever purer expression of the basic aesthetic experiences of a subjectivity that

is

decentered and removed from the spa-

tiotemporal structures of everyday tivity frees itself

daily

life.

Subjec-

here from the conventions of

perception and

of

The mediation of the moments of reason is less a problem than the separation of the aspects of rationality under which questions of truth, justice, and taste were differentiated from one another. The only protection against no

different

dropped the elements of worldviews and do without an interpretation of nature and history lems of the good

—

tive rightness, or authenticity.

questions of truth,

under these

—as

knowledge. Two questions must be an(i) whether a reason that has objectively split up into its moments can still preserve its unity, and (ii) how expert cultures can be mediated with everyday practice. The reflections offered in the first and third chapters [of Volume 1] are intended as a provisional account of how formal pragmatics can deal with these questions. With that as a basis, the theory of science, the theory of law and morality, and aesthetics, in cooperation with the corresponding historical disciplines, can then reconstruct both the emergence and the internal history of those modern complexes of knowledge that have been differentiated out, each under a diftruth, normaferent single aspect of validity swered:

purposive

activity,

from the imperatives of work and of what is merely useful. These magnificent "one-sidednesses," which are the signature of modernity, need no foundation and no justification in the sense of a

these spheres, differentiation processes are ac-

companied by countermovements that, under the primacy of one dominant aspect of validity, bring back in again the two aspects that were at first excluded. Thus nonobjectivist approaches to research within the

human

sciences bring

viewpoints of moral and aesthetic critique to without threatening the primacy of bear""* questions of truth; only in this way is critical social theory made possible. Within universal-

—

istic

ethics the discussion of the ethics of re-

sponsibility

and

the

stronger

consideration

given to hedonistic motives bring the calculation of consequences and the interpretation of needs into play^' and they lie in the domains

—

of the cognitive

and the expressive;

materialist ideas can

come

in

in this

way

without threaten-

412

PART

ing the

MODERNITY AND POST-MODERNISM

3:

autonomy

avant-garde art

is

of the moral.'''' Finally, post-

theory of communicative action

characterized by the coexis-

foundationalist claims.

tence of tendencies toward realism and engagement with those authentic continuations of classical modern art that distilled out the inde'^'^

pendent logic of the aesthetic; in realist art and Vart engage, moments of the cognitive and of the moral-practical art itself,

and

come

at the level of the

that the avant-garde set free.

radically

into play again in

differentiated

It

wealth of forms

seems as

moments

of

if

the

reason

such countermovements to point tonot a unity that could be had at the level of worldviews, but one that might be established this side of expert cultures, in a nonreified communicative everyday practice. How does this sort of affirmative role for philosophy square with the reserve that critical theory always maintained in regard to both the

want ward

in

a unity

—

is

guilty of

we must see how philosophy changes when it enters into cooperation with the sciences. As the "feeder" [Zubringer] for a theoFirst

its

role

ry of rationality,

it

finds itself in a division of

labor with reconstructive sciences; these

up

ences take

the pretheoretical

sci-

knowledge

of

competently judging, acting, and speaking sub-

knowledge of tramost general features of the rationality of experience and judgment, action and mutual understanding in jects,

as well as the collective

ditions, in order to get at the

language. In this context, reconstructions un-

dertaken with philosophical means also retain a hypothetical character; preciselv because of their strong universalistic claims, they are open to further, indirect testing. This can take place in

such a

way

that the reconstructions of uni-

established scientific enterprise and the sys-

versal

tematic pretensions of philosophy?

municative action, of argumentative speech, of experience and of objectivating thought, of moral judgments and of aesthetic critique,

Is

not such

open to the same objecpragmatism and hermeneutics have

a theory of rationality tions that

and necessary presuppositions

of

com-

brought against every kind of foundationalism? Do not investigations that employ the concept of communicative reason without blushing bespeak universalistic justificatory claims that will have to fall to those only too well grounded metaphilosophical doubts about theories of absolute origins and ultiniate grounds? Have not both the historicist enlightenment and materialism forced philosophy

enter into empirical theories that are supposed

which the tasks of a theory of rationality must already appear extravagant? The theory of communicative action aims

ry,

**

—

—

into a self-modesty for

at the

moment

of unconditionality that, with

criticizable validity claims, is built into the con-

ditions of processes of consensus formation. claims they transcend

and

time,

all

all

As

limitations of space

the provincial limitations of the

given context. Rather than answer these questions here with arguments already set out in the introductory chapter (to

Volume

1|,

1

shall

by adding two methodological arguments that speak against the suspicion that the

close

to explain otlwr

phenomena

—for example,

the

ontogenesis of language and of communicative abilities, of

tence;

the

moral judgment and social competransformation of

structural

reli-

gious-metaphysical worldviews; the develop-

ment

of legal systems or of forms of social

integration generally.

From I

the perspective of the history of theo-

have taken up the work of Mead, Weber,

and Durkheim and tried to show how in their approaches, which are simultaneously empirical and reconstructive, the operations of empirical science and of philosophical conceptual analysis intermesh. The best example of this cooperative division of labor

theory of knowledge.

A

is

Piaget's genetic

"

philosophy that opens its results to indiway is guided by the fallibilistic consciousness that the theory of rationality it once wanted to develop on its own can now be sought only in the felicitous coherence rect testing in this

CHAPTER

of different theoretical fragments. Coherence

is

the sole criterion of considered choice at the

on which mutually fitting theories stand one another in relations of supplementing and reciprocally presupposing, for it is only the individual propositions derivable from theories that are true or false. Once we have dropped foundationalist claims, we can no level

to

longer expect a hierarchy of sciences; theories whether social-scientific or philosophical

—

—

have to fit with one another, unless one puts the other in a problematic light and we have to see whether it suffices to revise the one or the other. in origin

The test case for a theory of rationality with which the modern understanding of the world is

to ascertain its

own

universality

would

cer-

throwing light on the opaque figures of mythical thought, clarifying the tainly include

and innot only compre-

bizarre expressions of alien cultures,

deed in such a way that we hend the learning processes that separate "us" from "them," but also become aware of what we have unlearned in the course of this learning. A theory of society that does not close it-

16:

CRITICAL THEORY

413

and speak with one another, stands we have seen, to the explicit knowledge of something. The horizontal knowledge that communicative everyday prac-

gether, act

in peculiar contrast, as

with it is paradigmatic for the with which the lifeworld background is present; yet it does not satisfy the criterion of knowledge that stands in internal relation to validity claims and can therefore be criticized. That which stands beyond all doubt seems as if it could never become problematic; as what is simply unproblematic, a lifeworld can at most fall apart. It is only under the pressure of approaching problems that relevant components of such background knowledge are torn out of their unquestioned familiarity and brought to consciousness as something in need of being ascertained. It takes an earthquake to make us tice iacitly carries

certainty

aware that we had regarded the ground on which we stand everyday as unshakable. Even in situations of this sort, only a small segment of our background knowledge becomes uncertain and is set loose after having been enclosed in complex traditions, in solidaric relations, in

through a critique of deformations that are

competences. If the objective occasion arises for us to arrive at some understanding about a situation that has become problematic, background knowledge is transformed into explicit knowledge only in a piecemeal manner. This has an important methodological implication for sciences that have to do with cultural

rooted in the selective exploitation of a poten-

tradition, social integration,

self off a priori to this possibility of

unlearning

has to be critical also in relation to the preunderstanding that accrues to it from its own social setting, that

is, it

has to be open to

self-criti-

cism. Processes of unlearning can be gotten at

tial

for rationality

that

was once

There

is

also another

of society based tive action

and mutual understanding

now buried over. reason why the theory

available but

is

on the theory of communica-

cannot stray into foundationalist by-

ways. Insofar as it refers to structures of the lifeworld, it has to explicate a background knowledge over which no one can dispose at will. The lifeworld is at first "given" to the theoretician (as it is to the layperson) as his or her own, and in a paradoxical manner The mode of preunderstanding or of intuitive knowledge of the lifeworld from within which we live to-

tion

came

of individuals clear to

—

and the

pragmatism and

philosophy, each in

socializa-

an implication that be-

its

own

to

hermeneutic

way, as they came

to doubt the possibility of Cartesian doubt. Al-

who so convincingly depicted the mode of unquestioned familiarity,

fred Schutz,

lifeworld's

nevertheless missed just this problem; whether a lifeworld, in

its

opaque take-for-grantedness,

eludes the phenomenologist's inquiring gaze or is opened up to it does not depend on just choosing to adopt a theoretical attitude. The totality of

the background

knowledge

constitu-

tive for the construction of the lifeworld is

no

414

PART

more

anv soan objective challenge

at his disposition than at that of scientist

cial

MODERNITY AND POST-MODERNISM

3:

—unless

which the lifeworld as a whole becomes problematic. Thus a theory that wants to ascertain the general structures of the lifeworld cannot adopt a transcendental approach; it can only hope to be equal to the ratio essciidi of its object \vhen there are grounds for assuming that the objective context of life in which the theoretician finds himself is opening up to him its ratio cogjioscciidi. arises, in the face of

Marx applied

the type of reflection called for

by Horkheimer

He

one of

to

explained there

why

economy

of political

abstraction,

which

is

rest

his central concepts.

the basic assumptions

on

a

seemingly simple

in fact quite difficult:

step forward for Adam Smith throw out every limiting specification of wealth-creating activity not only manufacturing, or commercial, or agricultural labor, but one as well as the others, labor in general. With the It

was an immense

to

—

abstract universality of wealth-creating acti\-ity

This implication accords with the point behind Horkheimer's criticjue of science in his

we now have

programmatic essay "Traditional and Critical Theory": "The traditional idea of theory is abstracted from scientific acti\-itv as it is carried on within the di\-ision of labor at a particular stage in the latter's development. It corresponds to the acti\itv of the scholar which

labor as such, but labor as past objectified labor

takes place alongside

the other activities of a

all

but in no immediately clear connection with them. In this \'iew of theory, therefore, the

the universality of the object de-

fined as wealth, the product as such or again

How

difficult

and great

tem.

Now

it

might seem that

that

all

which human beings

tion in

—

—

whatever form

in

of society

real social function of science is not

one respect. Not in another ence toward specific labors corresponds

ifest;

conveys not what theory means

it

human

life,

but only what

means

it

lated sphere in which, for historical reasons,

comes

into existence."*'"

critical social

theory

is

to

the self-referentiality of that in

calling;

its

act of

belongs to the objective context of

The context

does not remain external

of

its

it

knowing

it

that

it

emergence

to the theory; rather,

the theory takes this reflectively

up

into

itself:

needs and goals, the experiences and skills, the customs and tendencies of the contemporary form of human existence have all played their part."*'' The same holds true for the context of application: "As the influence of the subject matter on "In

this

intellectual

activity

the

the theory, so also the application of the theor\' to the subject tific

matter

is

not only an intrascien-

process but a social one as well.""^

In his

economy

.

.

.

is

cor-

Indifferto a

form

of society in wliich individuals can with ease transfer

from one labor

to another,

chance

of indifference.

and where the them, hence

for

Not onh' the categor\' 'labor,' but become the means of cregeneral, and has ceased to be or-

labor in reality has here ating wealth in

ganically linked with particular individuals in

any specific form. Such a state of affairs is at its most developed in the modern form of existence of bourgeois society then, for the

first

—

in the

modern economics, namely category

'labor,'

of 1857,

United States. Here,

time, the point of departure of

the abstraction of the

'labor as such,' labor

pure and

simple, becomes true in practice.""^

Smith was able to lay the foundations of modern economics only after a mode of production arose that, like the capitalist mode with its differentiation of an economic system steered via exchange value, forced a transformation of concrete

acti\'ities into

abstract performances,

intruded into the world of

famous methodological introduction

to his critique of political

rect in

it

kiiows

life

play the role of producers. This

specific kind is a matter of

As opposed to this, become conscious of

and through the very

strives to grasp.

in

in the iso-

had been

achieved thereby was to discover the abstract expression for the simplest and most ancient rela-

society,

made man-

mav

this transition \\'as

be seen from how Adam Smith himself from time to time still falls back into the Physiocratic sys-

work with

this real

and thereby created a problem for the workers themselves: "Thus the simplest ab-

abstraction,

CHAPTER

which modern economics places at its discussions and which expresses an immeasurably ancient relation valid in all straction

the head of

forms of

society, nevertheless achieves practical

truth as an abstraction only as a category of the

most modern

society."^''

A

theory of society that claims universality for its basic concepts, without being allowed

simply to bring them to bear upon their object in a conventional manner, remains caught up in the self-referentiality that Marx demonstrated in connection with the concept of abstract labor. As I have argued above, when labor is rendered abstract and indifferent, we have a special case of the transference of

domains

tively structured

communica-

of action over to

"how even

the

structures of the lifeworld as a tion,

NOTES 1.

A. Gouldner, The Coming Crisis of Wcsterji Sociology (New York, 1970), pp. 25ff.; B. Gruenberg,

"The Problem of Reflexivity 2.

3.

sis of Social

ter of this abstraction, t-hemselves likewise a

(1978): 20ff.

product of historical relations, and possess their full validity only for and within these relations."'''' The theory of communicative action this is so: the

5.

The

modernity that

1

modern

communicative action "becomes practically true" in the deinstitutionalized forms of intercourse of the familial pri-

Politics: Studies in the

De-

1985), pt.

2.

On what

follows, see H. Dubiel

and A.

Sollner,

Recht und Staat im Nationalsozialismus (Frankfurt,

is

such an expansion of the scope of contingency for interaction loosed from normative contexts

H. Dubiel, Theon/ and

"Die Nationalsozialismusforschung des Instituts fur Sozialforschung," in Dubiel and Sollner, eds.,

have here

societies there

discussed in W.

velopment of Critical Theory (Cambridge, Mass.,

sketched in broad strokes permits us to recognize the following: In

is

eds., Sozialforschung nls

Kritik (Frankfurt, 1982). 6.

7.

of

program

state of the

Bonss and A. Honneth,

privileged access to the general structures of the lifeworld.

Consciousness," Theory and Society 5

See the nine-volume reprint of Zeitschrift fur Sozialforschung by Kosel Verlag (Munich, 1979).

development of

give rise to the problem situ-

ed., Zwischenbi-

4.

ations that objeciively afford contemporaries a

The theory

Sociology of

W. Mavrl, "Genetic Structuralism and the Analy-

epochs, are nevertheless, in the specific charac-

itself

in the

Science," Philosophi/ of SocinfScieiice8(\978):32\fi. See the contributions by K. O. Hondrich, K.

Eder, J. Habermas, N. Luhman, J. Matthes, K. D. Opp, and K. H. Tjaden to "Theorienvergleich in

preall

ac-

cessible to us.

— —for

because of their abstractness

why

in ques-

become

Innz dcr Soziologie (Stuttgart, 1976), pp. 14ff.

cisely

must

whole

they have

der Soziologie," in R. Lepsius,

categories, despite their validity

society

why

can account for

most ab-

stract

can explain

415

THEORY

—

case in regard to the category of labor holds true for this as well:

CRITICAL

systems penetrate into the lifeworld and, through monetarization and bureaucratization, force an assimilation of communicative action even to formally organized domains of action in areas where the action-coordinating mechanism of reaching understanding is functionally necessary. It may be that this provocative threat, this challenge that places the symbolic

media-steered interaction. This interpretation

decodes the deformations of the lifeworld with the help of another category, namely, 'communicative action.' What Marx showed to be the

16:

1981), pp. 8.

that the inner logic of

7ff.

As Marcuse presented it even then: "Social Implications of Modern Technology," Zeitschrift fiir Sozialforschung 9 (1941

9.

E.

):

414ff.

Fromm, "Uber Methode und Aufgabe

einer

analytischen Sozialpsychologie," Zeitschrift

vate sphere as well as in a public sphere

Sozialforschung

stamped by the mass media. At the same time, the systemic imperatives of autonomous sub-

in E.

Fromm,

1

fiir

(1932): 28ff. English translation

Tiie Crisis of

wich, Conn., 1971).

Psychoanalysis (Green-

416

10.

PART

MODERNITY AND POST-MODERNISM

H. Dahmer, Libido und Gesellschaft (Frankfurt, 1973);

11.

3;

H. Dahmer,

Dobert

R.

and

1975); T. Ziehe, Pubertdt furt,l 1975); R.

(New

ment and "Politics

27.

Fromm,

und Narzissmus (Frank-

M. Merelman, "Moral Develop-

Potential Radicalism in Adolescence,"

Youth and Society 9 (1977):

York,

und Angestellte am Vorabeiid des Dritten Reiches: Eiiie sozialpsychologische Uutersuchung, ed. W. Bonss (Stuttgart, 1980). E. M. Lange, "Wertformanalvse, Geldkritik und die Konstruktion des Fetischismus bei Marx," Neue Philosophische Hefte 13 (1978): Iff. H. Marcuse, "Philosophy and Critical Theory," in

13. E.

Nunner-Winkler,

G.

Adoleszaizkrise and Identitdtsbildung (Frankfurt,

gie (Frankfurt, 1980).

1942).

15.

See

They did not change their position. See T. W. Adorno, "Sociology and Psychology," Neic Left Rcviezu 46 (1967): 67-80, and 47 (1968): 79-90.; H. Marcuse, Eros and Ciz'ilization (Boston, 1955); and

idem. Five Lectures (Boston, 1970). 12. E. Fromm, Escape from Freedom

14.

26.

ed., Aiialytische Sozialptsycholo-

29ff.;

C. A. Rootes,

Moral Protest and

of

Legitimation

Problems of the Modem Capitalist State." Theory and Society 9 (1980): 473ff. See J. Habermas, Knoicledge and Human Interests (Boston, 1971), esp. chaps. 10-12; A. Lorenzer,

Arbeiter

Sprachzerstorung und Rekonstruktion (Frankfurt,

Menne, M. Looser, A. Osterland, K. and E. Moersch, Sprache, Handlung und

1970); K.

Brede,

Unbezousstes (Frankfurt, 1976). 28.

J.

Habermas, "Moral Development and Ego

Identity," in

Communication and

the Evolution of

pp. 69-94; R. Keagan, The Evoking Self (Cambridge, Mass., 1981).

Negations (Boston, 1968), pp. 134-58, here p. 135.

Societi/,

16. Ibid., p. 147.

W.

R. D. Fairbane,

An

Object Relations Tlieory of

17. Ibid., p. 158.

29.

18. Ibid.

(London, 1952); D. W. Winnicott, The Maturational Process and the Facilitating Environment (New York, 1965). 30. See E. Jacobson, The Self and the Object World (New York, 1964); M. Mahler, Symbiose und Indi-

19.

See

J.

Personalit]/

Habermas, Communication and

tion of Society (Boston, 1979), esp.

20.

On

the Eivlu-

chaps. 3 and

4.

the discussion of the breakdo'ivn of Keyne-

economic policy in the West, see P. C. "The Breakdown of the Keynesian Model," Public Interest (1978): 20ff.; J. A. Kregel, "From Post-Keynes to Pre-Keynes," Social Research 46 (1979): 212ff.; J. D. Wisman, "Legitimation, Ideology-Critique and Economics," Social sian

Roberts,

P Davidson,

Research 46 (1979): 291ff.;

Keynesian Economics," Public

Interest

"Post

viduation,

mus

Habermas:

Critical

Debates

(New

(1980):

vol.

H. Kohut, Narzissmus, eine Theorie der Beliandlung narzistischer

25.

and idem. Die Heilung

32. R. Dobert, G.

On

J.

Habermas,

33.

(New York,

W. Damon,

ed.,

1980).

Nnc

Directions for Child Dei-

ment. 1 vols. (San Francisco, 1978); H. Furth, Pi-

(New

York, 1962); Erik

Erikson, Identity and the Life Cycle 1959).

Nunner-Winkler, and

Selman, The Grozcth of Interpersonal Understand-

The Culture of Narcissism

Adolescence

Swan-

York, 1966);

des Selbst (Frank-

York, 1978).

Bios,

(New

eds., Entzi'icklung des Ichs (Cologne, 1977); R. L.

ing

Christopher Lasch,

P.

Meclwnisms of Defense

(Frankfurt,

Personliclikeitsstorungen

furt, 1979).

(New

the

Ego-Functioning," journal of Neurological Mental Disease 148 (1969): 14ff.

2

(Frankfurt, 1981).

24.

Ego and

York, 1946); D. R. Miller and G. E.

L. B. Murphy, 'The Problem of Defense and the Concept of Coping," in E. Antvonv and C. Koipemik, eds., The Child in His Family (New York, 1970); N. Haan, "A Tripartite Model of

(Cambridge,

Schriften,

Kohut,

(Frankfurt, 1978).

31. A. Freud, The

and Authoritarian Held and J. Thompson,

Mass., 1982), pp. 196-218. 22. L. Liiwenthal, Gesammelte

1972);

1976); O. Kemberg, und pathologischer Narziss-

son, Inner Conflict and Defense

State Socialism," in D.

1973);

(Stuttgart,

(Frankfurt,

Borderline-Storungen

21. A. Arato, "Critical Sociology

23.

vols.

Psychoanalyse

ISlff.

eds.,

2

Narzissmus: H. Kohut, Introspektion, Empathie und

(New

York,

and Knowledge (Chicago, 1981). 277ff., this volume. C. W. Mills, Politics, Poiver and People (New York,

agct 34. 35.

See pp.

CHAPTER

Rosenberg and D. White, eds., Mnss 111., 1957); A. Gouldner, The Dialectics of Ideology and Technology (New York, 1976); E. Barnouw, The Spenser (New York, 1977); D. Smythe, "Communications: Blind Spot of Western Marxism," Canadian ]ournal of Political and Social Theory 1 (1977); T. Gitlin, "Media Sociology: The Dominant Paradigm," Theory and So-

(Beverly Hills/London, 1979).

Society:

46.

Ibid.,

38. A.

47.

"TV,

Ideology and Socialist

munikation: Die kritische

49.

50.

Funktion

(Frankfurt,

Kritik

1982),

manuscript by K. W. "Zur Diskussion um

a

und

Perspektive

der

"Alternativbewegung";

Huber,

Wer

und Wertwandel

in den supplement to the weekly paper Das Parlament, September 1980,

J.

Raschke,

"Politik

Demokratien,"

pp. 23ff. the dual economy, see A. Gorz, Abschied vom

On

alles ic

pp.

J.

das alles cindern? (Berlin, 1980).

Proletariat (Frankfurt, 1980);

gen," in W. Bonss and A. Honneth, eds., Sozialals

found

helpful:

1980.

13ff.

und MassenkomTheorie und ihre Fol-

"Kulturindustrie

Kellner,

(Frankfurt,

"Okologie- und Alternativbewegung," Munich,

Emancipatory

Review 45 (1979):

1

very

48. Hirsch,

Mass Culture (Lon-

Action

Alternativen

politische

point

this

westlichen

Kellner,

forschung

On

soil

Popular Culture," 40. D.

und

Brand

pp. 38ff. of

Political

1980).

Entstehung,

Singlewood, The Myth

417

Hirsch, "Alternativbewegung: Fine politische

Ritual

don, 1977). 39. D.

J.

al..

THEORY

Alternative," in R. Roth, ed., Parlainentarisches

"Network Television and American Introduction to a Critical Theory of Tele-

vision," Theory and Society 10 (1981): 31 ft.

J.

Huber, Wer

soil

das

dndern? Concerning the effects of democrat-

mass

on the lifeworld contexts of votClaus Offe. "Konkurrenzpartei und

parties

482-515.

ers,

From

koUektive politische Identitat," in Roth, Parla-

Lazarsfeld's early radio studies on the

dual character of communication flows and the role of opinion leaders, the independent weight

communication in relation to mass communication has been confirmed again and again: "In the last analysis

it

inentarisches Ritual.

with people more than people listening reading, or looking at the

mass media

causes opinions to change." Mills, Power,

and People, p. 590. See P. Lazarsfeld, and H. Gaudet, The People's Choice

to,

B.

Kluge, Ojfentlichkeit und Erfahrung (Frankfurt, 1970), and,

by the same authors,

Geschichte und

Eigensinn (Munich, 1981).

91

ff.

Benhabib, "Modernity and the Aporias of

Critical Theory," Telos 49 (1981): 38-60.

44. R. Inglehart,

halten," in

J.

"Wertwandel und Matthes,

politisches Ver-

ed., Sozialer

Wandel

in

Wes-

teuropa (Frankfurt, 1979). 45. K.

Hildebrandt and

R.

J.

Biirgerinitia-

example, P. Berger, B. Berger, and Das Unbehagen in der Modernitdt

Kellner,

J.

Habermas, "Modernity versus PostmoderniNew German Critique 22 (1981): 3-14; Baier, "Wer unsere Kiipfe kolonisiert," in Lit-

L.

craturmagazin 9 (1978). 54. R. Bernstein,

55.

The Restructuring of Social and

Politi-

cal

Theory (Philadelphia, 1976).

In

"The Methodological Illusions of Modern PoTheory," Neue Hefte fiir Philosophic 21

litical

Benhabib stresses the fact proposed by K. O. Apel and myself treats calculations of consequences and, above all, interpretations of needs as essential elements of moral argumenta(1982): 47-74, Seyla

H. M. Enzenberger, "Baukasten zu einer Theorie der Meiden," in Palaver (Frankfurt, 1974), pp.

43. S.

Guggenberger,

ty"

York,

P Lazarsfeld and E. Katz, Personal Influ(New York, 1955). Compare O. Negt and A.

B.

(Frankfurt, 1975). 53.

Berelson,

1948);

ence

H.

Politics

(New

for

52. See,

or

that really

example,

tiven in der Parteindemokratie (Stuttgart, 1980).

people talking

is

see

51. See, for

of everyday

42.

et

S.

ciety 6 (1978): 205ff.

41.

H. Barnes, M. Kaase

1963); B.

Culture (Glencoe,

36. D. Kellner,

37.

CRITICAL

16:

Dalton, "Die neue Poli-

tik," Politische Vierteljahresschrift 18 (1977): 230ff.;

that the discourse theory of ethics

tion. See K. O. Apel, "Sprechakttheorie und transzendentale Sprachpragmatik, zur Frage ethisch-

er

Normen,"

in K. O. Apel, ed., Sprachpragmatik

und Philosophie (Frankfurt, 1976), pp. 10-173; J. Habermas, Moralbeivusstsein uiul kommunikatives Handein (Frankfurt, 1983).

418

56.

PART

On

3:

MODERNITY AND POST-MODERNISM

this point,

und

alismus

Max Horkheimer's Moral,"

forschung 2 (1933): 263ff. 57.

P.

Biirger, Theory of the

lis,

58. R.

essay "Materi-

Zeitschrift is still

fiir

Sozial-

worth reading.

Aimnt-Garde (Minneapo-

1984).

Rorty,

Philosophy and

the

Mirror of Nature

(Princeton, 1979). 59. R.

F.

45 (1980):

I

materialism

so comprehensive that

own

aims

at

it

encompasses

contexts of origin and applica-

tion. The theory specifies the conditions under which a self-reflection of the history of the species has become objectivelv possible. At the it

addressed,

who

names those can with

whom

to its

the theory

is

help gain enlighten-

ment about themselves and

have examined the methodological pe-

on the context of

its

emancipatory With this reflection origin and this anticipation

connec-

of the context of

its

application, the theorv un-

und Hegels

Dialektik (Frankfurt,

tion with the division of labor

phy and psychology

between phUoso-

in Kohlberg's theor)' of the

development of moral consciousness, in "Interpretive Sociale Wetenschap versus Radicale Hermeneutick," Kennis eii Method 5 (1981): 4ff. In M. Horkheimer, Critical Theor]/ (New York, 1972), pp. 188-243, here p. 197.

62. Ibid., p. 196.

I

once characterized the relation be-

social theory

and

social practice in the

their

role in the process of historv'.

derstands

itself

as a necessary catalytic

moment

complex of social life that it analyzes; and it analyzes this complex as an integral network of coercion, from the viewpoint of its posin the very

sible

transformation."

(Boston, 1973), pp. 2-3. 63. K. Marx, Grundrisse 1973), pp. 104-5.

61. Ibid., p. 205.

tween

is

the theory's

same time

culiarities of reconstructi\'e sciences in

60.

which

Nomna-

257ff.; T. Kesselring, Puigets genetische

Erkenntnistheorie 1981).

"Historical

achieving an explanation of social evolution

and Psvchologism," Synthese

Kitchener, "Genetic Epistemology,

tive Epistemology,

same way:

64. Ibid., p. 105. 65. Ibid.

Theory/

and

Practice

(Harmondsworth,

Eng.,

CHAPTER

17

Post-Modernism

INTRODUCTION The term post-modernism or post-modernity has come to mean many different things. Some associate

it

with the post-industrial

others with the post-Marxist world,

view

movement

society,

still

others

and some view it as a legitimation for new voices in a diverse and multicultural society. It is obviit

as a

in literary criticism,

ously difficult to give a single, encompassing definition to an intellectual

movement

that has

developed in so many different directions. Two basic themes are explored in the excerpts below: one deals with the question of the Enlightenment promise, and the other, and relattheme deals with the relationship of theory

ed, to

knowledge. In the discussion of

and power. In other words, knowledge good can be rationally apprehended, or put differently, knowledge and power are separate and distinct spheres of human action. It is the burden of Michel Foucault's work to interest

of the

demonstrate the opposite: to claim that knowledge and power are inextricably linked. Foucault was born in 1926 in Poitiers, France, where he was educated in Catholic schools and eventually made his way into the Sorbonne and took his degree in philosophy at the Ecole Normale Superieure. He subsequently studied psychology and took a diploma in psychopathology, which led to research and publication

Habermas' work,

refer-

ence was made to his commitment to the Enlightenment project, a view which proposes a democratic and just social order as an evolutionary outcome of modernity. This view is predicated on the assumption that people will be able to come to a rational understanding of the public good, and that this political knowledge can be obtained, under appropriate conditions, without recourse to the distortions of

on mental

illness in a

book

entitled

Men-

and Psychology. Foucault taught at a number of foreign universities but returned to France and in 1964 was appointed to the Chair of Philosophy at the University of ClermontFerrand. In 1970 Foucault was designated "Professor of the History of Systems of Thought" in the College de France. In Discipli)U' and Punish, which is excerpted below, as well as in other works, such as Madness and Civilization, The Birth of the Clinic, and tal Illness

419

420

the

PART

first

3:

MODERNITY AND POST-MODERNISM

volume

of The History of Sexuality, Fouhow the human sciences

cault demonstrates

have become techniques of power by shaping the views and behaviors of

knowledge,

Scientific

human

sciences,

is

in

human

subjects.

instance

this

the

not a separate sphere of ac-

talents and interests of a community of scholars. On the contrary, the knowledge produced in these disciplines has had a profound impact on the hves of ordinary people and has shaped their views of themselves and others around concepts of normality and deviance. The human sciences have taken human subjects and instead of empowering them with knowledge, they have made them the objects of inquiry and subjected them to norms and rules of appropriate behav-

engaging the

tivity

rarified

have been legitimated by the idea of science itself. Knowledge, therefore, brings power in its wake as it produces new types of human beings who are deemed better because ior that

they are normal. In formulating the

problem

in these terms,

Foucault reconceptualizes power and embeds it

This

ciety."

is

The

what he means by real transactions of

scientific explorations in the past,

otard

tells

us

is

Kuhnian paradigms and tend

the significance of those events empirically. To abandon these metanarratives is to accept the idea that history may have no purpose, that it is not an e\olutionarv or progressi\'e march towards an emancipatory telos, but rather a contingent set of events, often accidental and with

many unanticipated consequences. One consec^uence of this claim privileged position of theorists

the "carceral so-

power

serting

everyday are not in

tion.

stage,

its

own

workers, and psychiatrists.

These are not the benign and amelioratory aides of the welfare state but rather moral agents whose disciplinary power is based on their membership in the credentialed knowledge elite. A related theme of post-modernism is explored by Jean Francois Lyotard in his book, The Post-Modcni Condition: A Rcpoii on K)Hnrl-

Here Lyotard launches a by which

direct assault

he

means

al

truths,

power

ly since there is

"metanarratives,"

that the

is undermined and thev are seen as upholding a viewpoint that promises an objective truth but reveals a partial view that suppresses other views as false or unworthy of considera-

the relationships of people to teachers, doctors,

edge.

is

and philoso-

phers

struggle for

social

impose mean-

to

ing onto historical events rather than to explore

the relationships of citizens to the state, but in

therapists,

but what Ly-

that metanarratives operate like

Played out on the contemporary political post-modernism has legitimated the expression of voices from many quarters, each as-

in the socialization processes of

life.

broadly philosophical discourses, like Marxism and other Enlightenment theories, that have distorted our ability to see the truth of our condition by coloring our perceptions with claims of emancipation, progress, and justice. Metanarratives have given meaning and purpose to

no longer any higher

authority that can In

and each engaged

in a

to legitimate itself political-

sit

in

intellectu-

judgement.

debunking the modernists' commitment knowledge, and to

io reason, to disinterested

truths that are universal, the writings of Foucault

and Lyotard go

far in delegitimating in-

tellectual structures that surreptitioush' exer-

power under the guise of engaging in The contrasts with Habermas could not be greater, and these are directh' drawn out

cise

science.

on

in the essay

the

this chapter.

by Richard Rorty

that concludes

CHAPTER

Michel Foucault: The Carceral Were

date of completion of the

to fix the

I

carceral system,

would choose not 1810 and

1

the penal code, nor even 1844,

laying

down

ment was passed; 1838,

when

the law

the principle of cellular internI

might not even choose

when books on

prison reform by Charles

Lucas, Moreau-Christophe and Faucher were

published. The date

I

would choose would be

22 January 1840, the date of the of Mettray.

Or

better

still,

official

opening

perhaps, that glori-

ous day, unremarked and unrecorded, when a child in Mettray remarked as he lay dying: 'What a pity I left the colony so soon.' This marked the death of the first penitentiary saint. Many of the blessed no doubt went to join him, if the former inmates of the penal colonies are to be believed when, in singing the praises of the

new

punitive policies of the body, they re-

marked: 'We preferred the blows, but the cell suits us better.' Why Mettray? Because it is the disciplinary form at its most extreme, the model in which are concentrated of behaviour. In

all it

the coercive technologies

were

prison, school, regiment'.

erarchized

groups,

into

to

be found

'cloister,

The small, highly hiwhich the inmates

were divided, followed simultaneously five models: that of the family (each group was a 'family' composed of 'brothers' and two 'elder brothers'); that of the army (each family, commanded by a head, was divided into two sections, each of which had a second in command; each inmate had a number and was taught basic military exercises; there

was

a cleanliness

inspection every day, an inspection of clothing every week; a roll-call was taken three times a day); that of the workshop, with supervisors

and foremen, who were responsible for the regularity of the work and for the apprenticeship of the younger inmates; that of the school (an hour or an hour and a half of lessons every day; the teaching was given by the instructor and by the deputy-heads); lastly, the judicial model (each day 'justice' was meted out in the parlour: 'The least act of disobedience is punished and the best way of avoiding serious offences is to punish the most minor offences very severely:

was confinement the best means of children; religion,

it

Reprinted from Michel Foucault, "The Carcerand Punish: Vie Birth of the Prison, (Pantheon Books). Copyright © 1977 by Alan Sheridan. Copyright © 1975 by Editions Gallimard.

is

to one's cell; for 'isolation is

acting on the moral nature of

there above

is

even

if

it

hearts, recovers all

all that the voice of has never spoken to their its emotional power'; the

entire parapenal institution,

which

created in

is

order not to be a prison, culminates in the

on the walls of which are written ters: 'God sees you.'

cell,

in black let-

This superimposition of different models

makes

it

possible to indicate, in

tures, the function of 'training'.

its

specific fea-

The

chiefs

and

Mettray had to be not exactly judges, or teachers, or foremen, or non-commissioned officers, or 'parents', but something their deputies at

of

all

of

mode

these things in a quite specific

intervention.

They were

behaviour;

of

in a sense technicians

engineers

of

conduct,

ortho-

was to produce bodies that were both docile and capable; they supervised the nine or ten working hours of every day (whether in a workshop or in the fields); they directed the orderly movepaedists of individuality. Their task

ments of groups of inmates, physical

exercises,

military exercises, rising in the morning, going to bed at night, walks to the accompaniment of bugle and whistle; they taught gymnastics;' they checked cleanliness, supervised bathing.

was accompanied by permanent obbody of knowledge was being constantly built up from the everyday behaviour of the inmates; it was organized as an instrument of perpetual assessment: 'On entering the servation; a

Source

word

Mettray, a useless

at

punishable'; the principal punishment inflicted

Training

al," in Discipline

421

POST-MODERNISM

17:

422

PART

MODERNITY AND POST-MODERNISM

3:

colony, the child

is

subjected to a sort of inter-

rogation as to his origins, the position of his

which he was brought

family, the offence for

before the courts and

make up

all

the other offences that

and often very sad existence. This information is written down on a board on which everything concerning each inmate is noted in turn, his stay at the colony and the place to which he is sent when he leaves.' The modelling of the body produces a knowledge his short

of the individual, the apprenticeship of the tecliniques induces

modes

the acquisition of skills

is

of beha\-iour

and

inextricably linked

with the establishment of power relations; strong, skilled agricultural workers are produced; in this very work, provided it is technically super\-ised, submissive subjects are produced and a dependable body of knowledge built up about them. This disciplinary technique exercised upon the body had a tiouble effect: a 'soul' to

be maintained.

be

One

known and

a subjection to

result vindicated this

work

moment

vvhen 'the fever of revolution fired the imagination of all, when the schools at Angers, La Fleche, Alfort, even the boarding schools, rose up in rebellion, the inmates of Mettray were calmer than e\er' of training: in 1848, at a

was

same apsame coercions as the

to subject the future cadres to the

prenticeships and to the

inmates themselves: they were 'subjected as pupils to the discipline that,

thev would

tors,

were taught the the

first

later,

power

art of

relations.

It

so happens that historians of the

during these same years, it seems, Weber was manipulating his little compass for the measurement of sensations. What took place at Mettrav (and in other European countries sooner or later) was obviously of a quite different order It was the emergence or rather at this time:

the institutional specification, the baptism as

were,

of

a

new

type of supervision

most as humble' as those of the inmates themnever

left their side,

ob-

the formation

And

appearance of these professionals of discipline, normality and subjection surely marks the beginning of a new stage. It will be said that the quantitative assessment of sensorial responses could at least derive authority from the prestige of the emerging science of physitilogy and that for this alone

it

deserves to feature in the

histon' of the sciences. But the supervision of

normality was firmly encased in a medicine or it with a sort of 'sci-

a psychiatry that provided entificity';

among them

ratus which, directly or indirectly, gave

network

permanent obserxation. And, in order to train them themselves, a specialized school had been organized in the colony. The essential element of its programme i>f

vet, in

and growth of psychology, the

serving them day and night; thev constituted a

it

—both

—over individuals who

resisted disciplinary normalization.

selves; they practically

human

sciences date the birth of scientific psychology

knowledge and power

But it cannot be identified absolutely with them. Nor with administration in the strict sense. Heads or deputy-heads of 'families', monitors and foremen, had to li\'e in close proximity to the inmates; their clothes were 'al-

was

'penitentiar\'' was not simply a project that sought its justification in 'humanity' or its foundations in a 'science', but a technique that vvas learnt, transmitted and which obeyed general norms. The practice that normalized by compulsion the conduct of the undisciplined or dangerous could, in turn, by technical elaboration and rational reflection, be 'normalized'. The disciplinary technique became a 'discipline' which also had its school.

Where Mettray w'as especially exemplary was in the specificity that it recognized in this operation of training. It was related to other forms of supervision, on which it was based: medicine, general education, religious direc-

It

training college in pure discipline: the

(Ferrus).

tion.

as instruc-

themselves impose.' They

it

was supported by

a judicial

appa-

it

legal

Thus, in the shelter of these two considerable protectors, and, indeed, acting as a link between them, or a place of exchange, a justification.

CHAPTER

423

POST-MODERNISM

17:

and the right of parAnd, if the appaform of confinement

carefully

worked out technique for the supervinorms has continued to develop right up to the present day. The specific, institutional supports of these methods have proliferated

courts, paternal correction

sion of

ents to lock

since the founding of the small school at Met-

very soon reactivated, rearranged, developed in certain directions. But what is still more important is that it was homogenized, through the

tray; their tity

apparatuses have increased in quan-

and scope;

their auxiliary services

have

increased, with hospitals, schools, public ad-

ministrations

and private

enterprises;

their

agents have proliferated in number, in power, in technical qualification; the technicians of in-

discipline

have founded a

family. In the nor-

up

their children.)

ratus of the great classical

was

partly (and only partly) dismantled,

which were already blurred tended to disappear and to constitute a great carceral continuum that diffused penitentiary techniques into the most intions of discipline,

power of normalization, in the arrangement of a power-knowledge over individuals, Mettray and its school marked a

in the classical age,

new

nocent

But why choose this moment as the point of emergence of the formation of an art of punishing that

is still

more

own? Precisely somewhat 'unjust'. Be-

or less our

because this choice is cause it situates the 'end' of the process in the lower reaches of criminal law. Because Mettray was a prison, but not entirely; a prison in that it contained young delinquents conciemned by the courts; and yet something else, too, because it also contained minors who had been charged, but acquitted under article 66 of the code, and boarders held, as in the eighteenth century, as an alternative to paternal correction. Mettray, a punitive model, is at the limit of strict

whole

penality.

It

was

famous of a beyond constituted what

the most

series of institutions which, well

the frontiers of criminal law,

one might

call

the carceral archipelago.

Yet the general principles, the great codes

and subsequent legislation were quite clear on the matter: no imprisonment 'outside the law,' no detention that had not been decided by a qualified judicial institution, no more of those arbitrary and yet widespread confinements. Yet the very principle of extra-penal incarceration

was

in fact never abandoned. (A whole study remains to be done of the debates that took place during the Revolution concerning family

was

mediation of the prison, on the one hand with legal punishments and, on the other, with disciplinary mechanisms. The frontiers between confinement, judicial punishment and institu-

malization of the

era.

it

disciplines,

transmitting

disciplinary

norms into the very heart of the penal system and placing over the slightest illegality, the smallest irregularity, deviation or anomaly, the of

threat

delinquency.

carceral net, with

A

compact

subtle,

graduated but also

institutions,

separate and diffused methods, assumed responsibility for the arbitrary, widespread, badly

integrated confinement of the classical age. I

shall not attempt here to reconstitute the

that formed first the immediate surroundings of the prison, then spread farther and farther outwards. However, a few references and dates should give some idea of the breadth and precocity of the phenomenon. There were agricultural sections in the

whole network

example of which later by Fontevrault, Les Douaires, Le Boulard); there were colonies for poor, abandoned vagrant children (Petit-Bourg in 1840, Ostwald in 1842); there were almshouses for young female ofiiiaisoiis

was

fenders ing a

ci'iitmlcs

Gaillon

who

life

in

(the first

1824,

followed

'recoiled before the idea of enter-

of disorder,' for 'poor innocent girls

whose mothers' immorality has exposed

to

precocious perversity,' or for poor girls found on the doorsteps of hospitals and lodging houses. There were penal colonies envisaged

by the law of demned, were

1850: minors, acquitted or conto

be sent

to these colonies

and

424

PART

'brought

MODERNITY AND POST-MODERNISM

3:

up

in

and trained

common, under strict discipline, work and in the

in agricultural

principal industries related to

were

it';

later,

they

be joined by minors sentenced to hard labour for life and 'vicious and insubordinate to

wards

of the Public Assistance.'

farther

still

away from

And, moving

penality in the strict

widen and the form the prison slowly diminishes and finally dis-

sense, the carceral circles

of

appears altogether: the institutions for abandoned or indigent children, the orphanages

Neuhof

demand,

age, a

a

norm. In the

common

od, despite a certain

classical peri-

reference to of-

the order of the crime, the

fence in general,

order of sin and the order of bad conduct remained separate in so far as they related to separate criteria and authorities (court, peniconfinement).

tence,

mechanisms

Incarceration

of surveillance

with

its

and punishment

functioned, on the contrary, according to a principle of relative continuity. the

of

institutions

The continuity which were

themselves,

or Mesnil-Firmin), the establish-

linked to one another (public assistance with

ments for apprentices (like the Bethleem de Reims or the Maison de Nancy); still farther away the factory-convents, such as La Sauvagere, Tarare and Jujurieu (where the girl workers entered about the age of thirteen, lived confined for years and were allowed out only under surveillance, received instead of wages pledged payment, which could be increased by bonuses for zeal and good behaviour, which they could use only on leaving). And then, still farther, there was a whole series of mechanisms that did not adopt the 'compact' prison model, but used some of the carceral methods: charitable societies, moral improvement associations, organizations that handed out assistance and also practised surveillance, workers' estates and lodging houses the most primitive of which still bear the all too visible marks of the penitentiary system.'^ And, lastly, this great carceral network reaches all the disciplinary mechanisms that function throughout so-

the orphanage, the reformitory, the peniten-

(like

—

school

have seen

that,

in

penal

justice,

the

with

the

prison;

the charitable society,

the

workshop, the almshouse, the penitentiary convent; the workers' estate with the hospital and the prison).

A

continuity of the punitive crite-

and mechanisms, which on the basis of a mere deviation gradually strengthened the rules and increased the punishment. A continuria

ous gradation of the established, specialized and competent authorities (in the order of knowledge and in the order of power) which, without resort to arbitrariness, but strictly according to the regulations, bv means of observation and assessment hierarchized, differentiated, judged, punished and moved gradually from the correction of irregularities to the punishment of crime. The 'carceral' with its many diffuse or compact forms, its institutions of supervision or constraint, of discreet sur\'eillance

and

insistent coercion, assured the

tion of

ciety.

We

the disciplinary battalion,

tiary,

the

punishments according

quantity;

it

connected

communicaand

to quality

in series or

disposed ac-

prison transformed the punitive procedure into

cording to subtle divisions the minor and the

a penitentiary technique; the carceral archipel-

serious penalties, the mild and the strict forms

ago transported

of treatment, bad

this

technique from the penal

institution to the entire social body.

With sever-

important results. 1. This vast mechanism established a slow, continuous, imperceptible gradation that made al

marks and light sentences. end up in the convict-ship, the slightindiscipline seems to say; and the harshest

You est

will

of prisons says to the prisoners life:

I

shall

condemned

to

note the slightest irregularity in

offence and back frt>m a transgression of the

your conduct. The generality of the punitive function that the eighteenth centin\' sought in

law

the 'ideological'

it

possible to pass naturally from disorder to to a slight

departure from a rule, an aver-

technique of representations

CHAPTER

and signs now had as its support the extension, the material framework, complex, dispersed, but coherent, of the various carceral mechanisms.

As

a result, a certain significant general-

moved between

ity

the greatest crime; the attack on the

the least irregularity

was no longer

it

common

the offence,

interest,

was

it

the

professional network. Careers

enemy was transformed into a deviant, who brought with him the multiple danger of disorder, crime and madness. The carceral network linked, through innumerable relations, the two long, multiple series of the punitive and the abnormal.

The

carceral,

with

its

far-reaching net-

works, allows the recruitment of major 'delint]uents.' It organizes what might be called 'disciplinary careers'

exclusions

assistance associations, residential apprenticeships, penal colonies, disciplinary battalions,

prisons, hospitals, almshouses. These networks

were already well mapped out

beginning

at the

of the nineteenth century: 'Our benevolent es-

and

in

which, through various

rejections, a

whole process is set opened

to the grave.

in the confines or interstices of society the

confused, tolerant and dangerous domain of

which eluded the power: an uncertain space that

Follow the course of the unfortu-

man: you will see him born among foundlings; from there he passes to the nursery, then to an orphanage; at the age of six he goes off to primary school and later to adult schools. If he cannot work, he is placed on the list of the charity offices of his district, and if he falls ill he may choose between twelve hospitals Lastly, when the poor Parisian reaches the end of his career, seven almshouses await his age and often their salubrious regime has prolonged his useless days well beyond those of the rich man' (Moreau de Jonnes, quoted in nate

.

The

carceral

side.

It

takes back with one

exclude with the other.

the 'outlaw' or at least of that

to

including what

ground and a rethere poverty, unemployment,

gion of refuge;

innocence,

cunning,

the

struggle

network does not

it

waste even what

it

is

unwilling to

panoptic society of which incarceration

is

is

in the law, at the

and produced

saves everything, It

the omnipresent armature, the delinquent

this

not outside the law; he

the system, inculcated docility

It

no outseems

it

has decided to disqualify. In

and laws, and organized crime all came together as chance and fortune would dictate; it was the domain of adventure that Gil Bias, Sheppard or Mandrin, each in his own wav, inhabited. Through the play of disciplinary differentiations and divisions, the nineteenth century

delinquency by the same mechanisms. There was a sort of disciplinary 'training,' continuous and compelling, that had something of the pedagogical curriculum and something of the

is

hand what

punishes.

against the powerful, the refusal of obligations

constructed rigorous channels which, within

.

cast the unas-

similable into a confused hell; there

direct hold of

for criminality a training

.

Touquet).

in motion. In the classical period, there

pursued

it,

life:

tablishments present an admirably coordinated

adversary of the sovereign, the social

was

emerged from

as secure, as predictable, as those of public

whole by means of which the indigent does not remain a moment without help from the cradle

alized in the sphere of tactics. Replacing the

up

425

was

it

lum or the prison. It generalized in the sphere of meaning the function that the carceral gener-

2.

POST-MODERNISM

haunted the school, the court, the asy-

departure from the norm, the anomaly; this that

and

17:

is,

from the very outset,

very heart of the law, or at least in the midst of those mechanisms that

from disfrom deviation to offence. Although it is true that prison punishes delinquency, delinquency is for the most part produced in and bv an incarceration which, ultitransfer the individual imperceptibly

cipline to the law,

mately,

prison

perpetuates in

its

turn.

The

merely the natural consequence, no more than a higher degree, of that hierarchy laid down step by step. The delinquent is an institutional product. It is no use being surprison

is

426

PART

MODERNITY AND POST-MODERNISM

3:

prised, therefore, that in a considerable proportion of cases the biography of convicts passes

through

all

these

mechanisms and

ments, whose purpose, to in

establish-

widely believed, is lead away from prison. That one should find them what one might call the index of an irit is

Ushments may reproduce the law, the punishments imitate the verdicts and penalties, the

them

to

with

produced by

a

and,

which

in relation to

them

a

is

pure

a sort of official sanction. its

The

carceral,

long gradation stretching from the con-

childhood spent in a reformato-

victship or imprisonment with hard labour to

according to the lines of force of the general-

communicates a type law validates and that justice uses as its favourite weapon. How could the disciplines and the power that functions in them appear arbitrary, when they merely operate the mechanisms of justice itself, even with a view to mitigating their intensity? When, by generalizing its effects and transmitting it to

ized carceral system. Conversely, the lyricism of

model;

police

form, unadulterated and unmitigated, gives

condemned ry,

the

these multiple establishments, the

all

prison,

repressibly delinquent 'character': the prisoner

hard labor was meticulously

repeat

surveillance

above

marginality

image of the

may

find

inspiration

'outlaw', the great social

in

the

nomad,

who

prowls on the confines of a docile, frightened order. But it is not on the fringes of society and through successive exiles that criminality is born, but by means of ever more closely placed insertions, under ever more insistent surveillance, by an accumulation of disciplinary coercion. In short, the carceral archipelago assures, in the depths of the social body, the formation of delinquency on the basis of subtle illegalities, the overlapping of the latter by the former and the establishment of a specified

of

power

every

But perhaps the most important effect of its extension well

that the

level,

makes

it

it

possible to avoid

its full

rigour? Carceral continuity and the fusion of the prison-form

make

it

possible to legalize, or

any case to legitimate disciplinary power, which thus avoids any element of excess or in

abuse

it

may

entail.

pyramid gives punishment a con-

But, conversely, the carceral to the

criminality. 3.

diffuse, slight limitations,

power

text in

to inflict legal

which

it

appears to be

free of all excess

the carceral system and of

and

beyond legal imprisonment is that it succeeds in making the power to punish natural and le-

apparatuses of discipline and of the successive 'embeddings' that they involve, the prison does not at all represent the unleashing of a

gitimate, in lowering at least the threshold of

tolerance to penality.

may be

It

tends to efface what

exorbitant in the exercise of punish-

It does this by playing the two registers which it is deployed the legal register of justice and the extra-legal register of discipline against one another. In effect, the great

ment.

—

in

—

all

violence. In the subtle gradation of the

simply an addidegree in the intensity of a mechanism that has continued to operate since the earliest forms of legal punishment. Between the latest

different kind of power, but tional

where one

the law and

difference

sentences gives a sort of legal

sanction to the disciplinary mechanisms, to the decisions and judgements that they enforce.

Throughout

many

this

'regional'

network, which comprises so institutions,

relatively

au-

tonomous and independent, is transmitted, with the 'prison-form', the model of justice itself. The regulations of the disciplinary estab-

'rehabilitation,'

where one

is

taken in order to avoid prison, and the prison

continuity of the carceral system throughout its

of

institution

is is

sent after a definable offence, the

(and must be) scarcely perceptible.

There is a strict economy that has the effect of rendering as discreet as possible the singular power to punish. There is nothing in it now that recalls the former excess of sovereign power when it revenged its authority on the tortured body of those about to be executed. Prison continues, on those

who

are entrusted

CHAPTER

work begun elsewhere, which

the whole on each individual through mechanisms of discipline. By

427

POST-MODERNISM

17:

of society pursues

question by the fiction of a juridical subject giving to others the power to exercise over him

innumerable

the right that he himself possesses over them.

to

it,

a

means

of a carceral continuum, the authority

that sentences infiltrates all those other author-

that

ities

transform,

supervise,

correct,

im-

might even be said that nothing really distinguishes them any more except the singuprove.

It

larly 'dangerous' character of the delinquents,

the gravity of their departures from normal be-

haviour and the necessary solemnity of the ritual. But, in its function, the power to punish is not essentially different from that of curing or educating. It receives from them, and from their lesser, smaller task, a sanction from below; but one that is no less important for that, since it is the sanction of technique and rationality.

power power

The

carceral 'naturalizes' the legal

to punish, as to

simply,

new economy

of power, the

which is its basic instrument, permitted the emergence of a new form of 'law': a mixture of legality and nature, prescription and constitution, the norm. This had a whole series of effects: the internal disloca-

power

tion of the judicial

or at least of

its

one were ashamed to pass sentence; on the part of the judges to judge, assess, diagnose, recognize the normal and abnormal and claim the honour of curing or rehabilitating. In view of this, it is useless to believe in the good or bad consciences of judges, or even of their unconscious. Their immense 'appetite for medicine' which is constantly manifested from their appeal to psy-

both arouse, thus depriv-

emerged.

to accept the

this

thus homogenizing

ing, as

if

a furious desire

— criminology—expresses

chiatric experts, to their attention to the chatter of

that the

By operating at every level of the social body and by mingling ceaselessly the art of rectifying and the right to punish, the universality of the carceral lowers the level from which it becomes natural and acceptable to be punished. The question is often posed as to how, before and after the Revolution, a new foundation was given to the right to punish. And no doubt the answer is to be found in the theory of the contract. But it is perhaps more important to ask the reverse question: how were people

made

With

be violent in one and

the same calculated, mechanical and discreet methods from one to the other, the carceral makes it possible to carry out that great 'economy' of power whose formula the eighteenth century had sought, when the problem of the accumulation and useful administration of first

4.

carceral system,

In

ing excess in either of any purpose, circulating

men

and real, immediately material counterpart of that chimerical granting of the right to punish.

may

arbitrary in the other, attenuating the effects of

may

the smallest coercions to the longest penal detention, constituted the technical

functioning; an increasing difficulty in judg-

discipline.

revolt that they

tween the power of discipline and the power of the law, and extends without interruption from

'legalizes' the technical

it

them, effacing what

highly probable that the great carceral continuum, which provides a communication beIt is

power

when punished,

to punish, or quite

tolerate being so.

The

theory of the contract can only answer this

power they

tured'; that

it

is at

a certain level

laws; that at another, it

the major fact

exercise has been 'dena-

governed by

more fundamental

functions as a normative power;

economy

power

it

level

is

the

and not that of their scruples or their humanism, that makes them pass 'therapeutic' sentences and of

recommend

that they exercise,

'rehabilitating' periods of impris-

onment. But, conversely, ever more reluctantly to of

condemning, the

if

the judges accept

condemn

for the sake

activity of judging has in-

creased precisely to the extent that the nor-

malizing power has spread. Borne along by the omnipresence of the pline,

basing

itself

on

all

mechanisms

of disci-

the carceral appara-

428

PART

tuses,

it

MODERNITY AND POST-MODERNISM

3:

has become one of the major func-

tions of our society.

The judges

are present everywhere.

We

of normality

are in the society

power;

called for a technique of overlapping

it

subjection and objectification;

new

procedures

carceral

on them that the universal reign of the normative is based; and each individual, wherever he

tures of this

Knowable man,

may

ness, conduct,

find himself, subjects to

gestures,

his

behaviour,

it

his

it is

his body, his his

aptitucies,

human

the

brought with

it

The

network constituted one of the armapower-knowledge that has made

of the teacher-judge; the doctor-judge, the ed-

ucator-judge, the 'social worker'-judge;

it

individualization.

of

sciences

possible.

historically

(soul, individuality, conscious-

whatever

it is

ject-effect of this analvtical

called)

is

the ob-

investment, of this

The carceral network, in its compact or disseminated forms, with its systems of insertion, distribution, surveillance, observation, has been the greatest support, in

nevertheless decried from the outset.

modern

been no more than an instrument of rejection

achievements.

5.

society, of the

The

both the

carceral

normalizing power.

texture of society assures

real capture of the

body and

per-

its

by its verv nature, the apparatus of punishment that conforms most completely to the new economy of power and the instnmient for the formation of knowledge petual observation;

it is,

very economy needs. Its panoptic functioning enables it to play this double role. that

this

By virtue of recording,

it

its

methods of

fixing, dividing,

has been one of the simplest, crud-

also most concrete, but perhaps most indispensable conditions for the development of est,

immense

examination that has If, after the age of 'inquisitorial' justice, we have entered the age of 'examinatory' justice, if, in an even more general way, the method of examination has been able to spread so widelv throughout socithis

objectified

activity of

human

behaviour.

and to give rise in part to the sciences of man, one of the great instruments for this has been the multiplicitv and close overlapping of the various mechanisms of incarceration. am not saying that the human sciences emerged from the prison. But, if thev have been able to be formed and to produce so many profound changes in the episteme, it is because they have been conveyed by a specific and new modalitv ety,

1

domination-observation. 6.

This no doubt explains the extreme solidi-

ty of the prison, that slight invention that If it

was had

or repression in the service of a state apparatus,

would have been

its more more acceptable substitute for it. But, rooted as it was in mechanisms and strategies of power, it could meet any atit

easier to alter

overt forms or to find a

tempt

transform

with a great force of inerwhen it is a question of altering the system of imprisonment, opposition does not come from the judicial institutions alone; resistance is to be found not in the prison as penal sanction, but in the prison with all its determinations, links and extrajudicial results; in the prison as the relay in a general in

to

One

tia.

it

fact is characteristic:

network of disciplines and surveillances;

the prison as

it

functions in a panoptic

mean that it cannot be alnor that it is once and for all indispensable to our kind of societv. One mav, on the regime. This does not tered,

two processes which,

contrary, site the

very continuitv of the processes that

in the

make

the

prison function, are capable of exercising considerable restraint cm

ing

its

internal

its

use and of transform-

functioning.

these processes ha\e alreadv

degree. The

first is

that

And no doubt begun

to a large

which reduces the

utili-

ty (or increases its inconveniences) of a delin-

of power: a certain policy of the body, a certain

quency accommodated as a specific illegalitv, locked up and siiper\ised; thus the growth of

way

great national or international illegalities di-

group of men docile and involvement of of knowledge in relations of

of rendering the

useful. This policv required the

rectly linked to the political

definite relations

paratuses

(linancial

and economic ap-

illegalities,

information

CHAPTER

17:

services,

arms and drugs trafficking, property makes it clear that the somewhat rustic and conspicuous work force of delinquency is proving ineffective; or again, on a smaller scale, as soon as the economic levy on sexual pleasure is carrieci out more efficiently by the sale of contraceptives, or obliquely

Paris, neatly

speculation)

improved plan

through publications, films or shows, the

racks, courtrooms, police stations,

much

ar-

429

POST-MODERNISM

ordered and arranged, here

is

the

which all like things are gathered together At the centre, and within a first

in

enclosure:

almshouses for

hospitals all

for

prisons, convict-prisons for

es,

and

Around

children.

diseases,

all

types of poverty, madhousthe

first

women

men,

enclosure, bar-

houses for

its

prison warders, scaffolds, houses for the exe-

former usefulness. The second process is the growth of the disciplinary networks, the multi-

cutioner and his assistants. At the four cor-

plication of their exchanges with the penal ap-

of Peers, the Institute

more important powers that are given them, the ever more massive transference to them of judicial functions; now, as

Outside, there are the various services that

medicine, psychology, education, public assis-

and

chaic hierarchy of prostitution loses

of

paratus, the ever

tance,

'social

work' assume an ever greater

ners, the

Chamber

of Deputies, the

Chamber

and the Royal

Palace.

supply the central enclosure, commerce, with swindlers and

its

its

bankruptcies; industry

furious struggles; the press, with

its

its

sophisms; the gambling dens; prostitution, the

share of the powers of supervision and assess-

people dying of hunger or wallowing in de-

ment, the penal apparatus will be able,

bauchery, always ready to lend an ear to the

in turn,

become medicalized, psychologized, educaand by the same token that turningpoint represented by the prison becomes less useful when, through the gap between its penitentiary discourse and its effect of consolidating delinquency, it articulates the penal power and the disciplinary power. In the midst of all these mechanisms of normalization, which are becoming ever more rigorous in their application, the specificity of the prison and its role as to

voice of the Genius of Revolutions; the heart-

tionalized;

less

something of their purpose. an overall political issue around the prison, it is not therefore whether it is to be corrective or not; whether the judges, the psylink are losing If

there

chiatrists

is

or the sociologists are to exercise

more power

in

it

than the administrators or su-

it is not even whether we should have prison or something other than prison. At present, the problem lies rather in the steep rise in the use of these mechanisms of normalization and the wide-ranging powers which, through the proliferation of new disciplines, they bring with them. In 1836, a correspondent wrote to La Pha-

pervisors;

lange: 'Moralists, philosophers, legislators, flat-

terers of civilization, this

is

the plan of your

rich

against 1

are

.

.

.

shall stop

now

Lastly the ruthless

(La Phalange, 10

all'

far

with

this

away from

August

war

of

all

1836).

anonymous

text.

We

the country of tortures,

dotted with wheels, gibbets, gallows, pillories;

we ers,

are

far,

from that dream of the reform-

too,

less than

fifty

years before: the city of

which a thousand small thewould have provided an endless multiatres representation of justice in which the coloured punishments, meticulously produced on decorative scaffolds, would have constituteci the permanent festival of the penal code. The punishments

in

city, with its imaginary 'geo-politics,' governed by quite different principles. The extract from La Phalange reminds us of some of the more important ones: that at the centre of this city, and as if to hold it in place, there is, not the 'centre of power,' not a network of forces, but a multiple network of diverse elements walls, space, institution, rules, dis-

carceral is

—

model of the carceral city is body of the king, with the powers that emanate from it, nor the contractual meeting of wills from which a body that course; that the

not, therefore, the

— 430

PART

MODERNITY AND POST-MODERNISM

3:

was both individual and collective was born, but a strategic distribution of elements of different natures and levels. That the prison is

NOTES 1.

it

asleep

court and the docile or clumsy instrument of the sentences that sults that

would

it

court that

it

hands out and of the

like to achieve; that

external

is

cupies,

it

of 'carceral'

series

are a

enough

alall

but

the

to

— to a

plicity of illegalities, in all

the order of

of severe provisions against noise,

upkeep

.

.

of the dwellings, for

good behaviour,

devotion and each year these prizes

competed for by a large number of competi(Houze de I'Aulnay, 13-15). Crime was explicitly defined by certain jurists such as Muyart de Vouglans and Rousseaud de la Combe. tors'

their diversity of 3.

and the different ways in which they are dealt with by the punitive mechanisms. And that ultimately what presides over all these mechais

is

the heart of the regulations. There

are

whole multi-

nature and origin, their specific role in profit

nisms

number

for signs of

apparatus of production

'commerce' and 'industry'

is

.

the

plied not to transgressions against a 'central' law,

It

.

power of mechanisms are ap-

tend, like the prison, to exercise a

normalization. That these

fall

pillow'

drunkenness, disorders of all kinds. A serious offence brings expulsion. Brought back to regular habits of order and economy, the workers no longer desert the workshops on Mondays. The children are better supervised and are no longer a cause of scandal. Prizes are given for

mechanisms which seem

—since they are intended to leviate pain, to cure, to comfort — but which

distinct

the

example, the following description of

for

Cf.,

the day.

oc-

it

touch

they

nineteenth century: 'Cleanliness

not alone, but linked to a whole

is

moment

the

to

workers' accommodation built at Lille in the mid-

to the

prison. That in the central position that

body helps

taken that games

(Ducpetiaux, 1854, 375-6). 2.

the

it is

and subordinate

re-

is

consist of violent exercise. At night, they

not subordinated to the

is

the

tire

expel bad thoughts; so care

not the daughter of laws, codes or the judicial apparatus; that

'Anything that helps to

not the unitary functioning of an ap-

paratus or an institution, but the necessity of

Jean-Francois Lyotard: The Post-

combat and the rules

Modern Condition: A Report on Knowledge

of strategy. That, conse-

quently, the notions of institutions of repression, rejection, exclusion, marginalization, are

not adequate to describe, at the very centre of the carceral leniencies, acts

of

the formation of the insidious

city,

unavowable petty

cunning,

calculated

cruelties,

small

methods,

tech-

niques, 'sciences' that permit the fabrication of the disciplinary indiviciual. In this central

centralized

ment

of

humanity, the

effect

and

and

instru-

complex power relations, bodies and by multiple mechanisms of

I

define iposimodeni as incredulity toward meta-

narratives. This incredulity

forces subjected

institution

'incarceration,' objects for discourses that are

narrative

themselves elements for must hear the distant roar of

in

this

strategy,

of

this point

knowledge

in

a

which

in the past relied

function

is

losing

its

on

it.

functors,

The its

battle.

1

modern

undoubtedly

we

end a book that must serve as a historical background to various studies of the power of ni>rmnlization and the formation At

is

product of progress in the sciences: but that progress in turn presupposes it. To the obsolescence of the metanarrative apparatus of legitimation corresponds, most notably, the crisis of metaphysical philosophy and of the university

society.

tlit' University of Lyotard, The PosI-MmIcni Comlilioit: A Rcforl mi Kiimi'laigc. English translation 1984 by the Univerity of Minand Forward copyright

Source

Reprintod with permission of

Minnesota Press from

Je.in-Friini;ois

©

nesota Press.

CHAPTER

17:

POST-MODERNISM

431

—narrative,

but

has no relevance for judging what is true Is legitimacy to be found in consensus obtained through discussion, as Jiirgen Haber-

also denotative, prescriptive, descriptive,

and

mas

great hero, its

its

great goal.

narrative

great dangers,

language elements

Conveyed within each cloud

so on.

matic valencies specific to lives at the intersection of

ever,

great voyages,

its

being dispersed in clouds of

It is

we do

its

are prag-

kind. Each of us

many

of these. Hov^'-

not necessarily establish stable lan-

guage combinations, and the properties of the ones we do establish are not necessarily communicable.

Thus the

society of the future falls less with-

in the province of a

Newtonian anthropology

(such as structuralism or systems theory) than a pragmatics of language particles. There are

many

different

languages games

—a

hetero-

geneity of elements. They only give rise to institutions in patches

—

local

determinism.

The decision makers, however, attempt to manage these clouds of sociality according to input/output matrices, following a logic which implies that their elements are commensurable and that the whole is determinable. They allocate our lives for the growth of power. In matters of social justice and of scientific truth alike, the legitimation of that power is based on its

—

optimizing the system's performance

efficien-

The application of this criterion to all of our games necessarily entails a certain level of terror, whether soft or hard: be operational (that is, commensurable) or disappear. The logic of maximum performance is no cy.

doubt inconsistent in

many ways,

particularly

it

or just.

thinks? Such consensus does violence to

the heterogeneity of language games.

Quebec like to its

social

burden of the

incredulity

is

cies, as Still,

idle population). But our such that we no longer exrise from these inconsisten-

now

pect salvation to

did Marx. the

disenchantment as

positivity

of

is it

delegitimation.

after

the metanarratives,

side?

The operativity

as is

much to the

Where,

can legitimacy

criterion

is

re-

technological;

to

be said that the author of the

philosopher, not an expert.

I

—

two very different lancombine thein here with the re-

the other questions

guage games.

sult that neither quite succeeds.

The philosopher at least can console himself with the thought that the formal and pragmatic analysis of certain philosophical litical

and ethico-po-

discourses of legitimation, which under-

the report, will subsequently see the light

The report will have served to introduce from a somewhat sociologizing one that tnmcates but at the same time

that analysis slant,

situates

it.

Such as stitut

postmodern condition

a stranger to

blind

the

would

ter

lies

(to

I

The latknows what he knows and what he does not know: the former does not. One concludes, is a

of day.

it

at the request of its president.

thank him for his kindness in allowing

remains

report

demands both less work lower production costs) and more (to lessen field:

in-

is

publication. It

with respect to contradiction in the socioeco-

nomic

And

always born of dissension. Postmodern knowledge is not simply a tool of the authorities; it refines our sensitivity to differences and reinforces our ability to tolerate the incommensurable. Its principle is not the expert's homology, but the inventor's paralogy. Here is the question: is a legitimation of the social bond, a just society, feasible in terms of a paradox analogous to that of scientific activity? What would such a paradox be? The text that follows is an occasional one. It is a report on knowledge in the most highly developed societies and was presented to the Conseil des Universites of the government of vention

it is, I dedicate this report to the InPolytechnique de Philosophie of the Uni-

—

de Paris VIII (Vincennes) at this very postmodern moment that finds the University nearing what may be its end, while the Instiversite

tute

may just be beginning.

432

PART

3:

MODERNITY AND POST-MODERNISM

Transformation in the nature of knowledge, have repercussions on the existing public powers, forcing them to reconsider their relations (both de jure and de facto) then, could well

with the large corporations and, more generally, with civil society. The reopening of the world market, a return to vigorous economic competition, the

breakdown

of the

hegemony

to

repay each person's perpetual debt with

THE PROBLEM: LEGITIMATION the working hypothesis defining the

That

is

field

within which

1

intend to consider the

question of the status of knowledge. This sce-

one that goes by the name computerization of society" (although ours is advanced in an entirely different spirit),

of

American capitalism, the decline of the soa probable opening of the Chinese market these and many other factors are already, at the end of the 1970s, preparing

nario, akin to the

cialist alternative,

"the

States for a serious reappraisal of the role they

What

have been accustomed

fine capacity for discrimination.

—

to

playing since the

re-

spect to the social bond.

makes no claims is

of being original, or even true.

required of a working hypothesis

is

a

The scenario the most highly de-

1930s: that of guiding, or

even directing invest-

of the computerization of

ments. In this

new

veloped societies allows us to spotlight (though with the risk of excessive magnifica-

light, the

technologies can

only increase the urgency of such a reexamination, since they make the information used in

making (and therefore the means even more mobile and subject

decision control)

knowledge and

to

civil institutions

is

not hard to visualize learning circu-

lating along the

of for

effects

its

—

on public power and

would be difficult from other points of view. Our hypothesis, therefore, should not be accorded predictive value in relation to reality, but effects

it

to perceive

piracy. It

tion) certain aspects of the transformation of

of

its

same

lines as

money, instead

"educational" value or political (ad-

strategic

value

in

relation

to

the

question

ministrative, diplomatic, militarv) importance;

raised.

the pertinent distinction would no longer be between knowledge and ignorance, but rather, as is the case with money, between "payment knowledge" and "investment knowledge" in other words, between units of knowledge exchanged in a daily maintenance framework (the reconstitution of the work force, "survival") versus funds of knowledge dedicated to optimizing the performance of a

it has strong credibility, and in our choice of this hypothesis is not arbitrary. It has been described extensively by the experts' and is already guiding certain decisions by the governmental agencies and private firms most directly concerned, such as those managing the telecommunications industry. To some extent, then, it is already a part of observable reality. Finally, barring economic

project.

stagnation or a general recession (resulting, for

were the case, communicational transparency would be similar to liberalism. Liberalism does not preclude an organization of the flow of money in which some channels are used in decision making while others are only good for the payment of debts. One could similarly imagine flows of knowledge traveling

example, from a continued failure to solve the world's energy problems), there is a good chance that this scenario will come to pass: it is hard to see what other direction contemporary technology could take as an alternative to the computerization of society. This is as much as to say that the hypothesis is banal. But only to the extent that it fails to

—

If

this

along identical channels of identical nature, some of which would be reserved for the "decision makers," while the others would be used

Nevertheless,

that sense

challenge the general paradigm of progress in science and

technology,

to

which economic

— CHAPTER

POST-MODERNISM

17:

433

growth and the expansion of sociopolitical power seem to be natural complements. That scientific and technical knowledge is cumulative is never questioned. At most, what is debated is the form that accumulation takes some picture it as regular, continuous, and unanimous, others as periodic, discontinuous, and contlictual."

sions of the question of authority.

But these truisms are fallacious. In the first place, scientific knowledge does not represent the totality of knowledge; it has always existeci in addition to, and in competition and conflict with, another kind of knowledge, which I will

ditions in order to be accepted as scientific. In

narrative in the interests of simplicity

and experimental verification) determining whether a statement is to be included in that discourse for consideration by the scientific community. The parallel may appear forced. But as we will see, it is not. The question of the legitimacy

call

(its

be described later). I do not mean to say that narrative knowletlge can prevail over science, but its model is related to ideas of internal equilibrium and conviviality next to which contemporary scientific knowledge cuts a poor figure, especially if it is to undergo an exteriorization with respect to the "knower" and an alienation from its user even greater than has previously been the case. The resulting demoralization of researchers and teachers is far from negligible; it is well known that during the 1960s, in all of the most highly developed societies, it reached such explosive dimensions among those preparing to practice characteristics will

professions

these

was

— the

students

— that

there

noticeable decrease in productivity at labo-

and universities unable to protect themselves from its contamination.^ Expecting this, with hope or fear, to lead to a revolution ratories

(as

was then

often the case)

is

out of the ques-

change the order of things in postindustrial society overnight. But this doubt on the part of scientists must be taken into account as a major factor in evaluating the present and future status of scientific knowledge. tion:

it

will not

civil

law as an example:

Take any

states that a given

it

category of citizens must perform a specific kind of action. Legitimation is the process by

which

a legislator

is

authorized to promulgate Now take the example of

such a law as a norm.

a scientific statement: that a statement

must

it

subject to the rule

is

fulfill

a given set of con-

this case, legitimation is the process

by which

"legislator" dealing with scientific discourse

a is

authorized to prescribe the stated conditions (in general, conditions of internal consistency

of science has been indissociably linked to that of the legitimation of the legislator since the

time of Plato. From

what

to decide

is

this point of view, the right

true

what

is

not independent of the

even if the statements consigned to these two authorities differ in nature. The point is that there is a strict interlinkage between the kind of language called science and the kind called ethics and politics: they both stem from the same perspective, the same "choice" if you will the choice called right to decide

is just,

—

the Occident.

When we examine

the current status of

sci-

—

knowledge at a time when science seems more completely subordinated to the prevailing powers than ever before and, along entific

new

second demoralization has an

technologies, is in danger of bemajor stake in their conflicts the question of double legitimation, far from receding into the background, necessarily comes to the fore. For it appears in its most complete form, that of reversion, revealing that knowledge and power are simply two sides of the

impact on the central problem of legitimation. I use the word in a broader sense than do contemporary German theorists in their discus-

same question: who decides what knowledge is, and who knows what needs to be decided? In the computer age, the question of knowl-

It

is

all

the

more necessary and this

—

consideration since point

—the

scientists'

to take is

it

into

the

with the

coming

a

—

434

edge

PART

MODERNITY AND POST-MODERNISM

3;

now more

is

than ever a question of gov-

tains

an ambigious relation to knowledge. It that knowledge is only worthy of that

shows

ernment.

name

to the extent that

("lifts itself

ing

DELEGITIMATION and culture—postindustrial society, postmodern culture" the question of the legitimation of knowledge is formulated in different terms. The grand narrative has lost its credibility, regardless of what In contemporary society

—

mode

of

whether tive of

unification

it is

it

uses,

regardless

of

a speculativ^e narrative or a narra-

emancipation.

The decline

of narrative can be seen as an efblossoming of techniques and technologies since the Second World War, which has shifted emphasis from the ends of action to its means; it can also be seen as an effect of the redeployment of advanced liberal capitalism after its retreat under the protection of Keynesianism during the period 1930-60, a renewal that has eliminated the communist alternative and valorized the individual enjoyment of goods and services. Anytime we go searching for causes in this way we are bound to be disappointed. Even if we adopted one or the other of these hypotheses, we would still have to detail the correlation between the tendencies mentioned and the decline of the unifying and legitimating power of the grand narratives of speculation and fect of the

emancipation. It

is,

of course, understandable that both

renewal and prosperity and the disorienting upsurge of technology would have an impact on the status of knowledge. But in order to understand how contemporary science could have been susceptible to those effects long before they took place, we must first locate

the seeds of

and nithe grand narra-

"delegitimation"''

hilism that were inherent in

tives of the nineteenth century. First of all, the speculative

own

its

sublated)

itself

by

cit-

statements in a second-level dis-

mediacy, denotative discourse bearing on a certain referent (a living organism, a chemical

phenomenon,

etc.) does knows. Posinot a form of knowledge. And

property, a physical

know what

not really

tive science is

speculation

it

on

feeds

thinks

it

The

suppression.

its

Hegelian speculative narrative thus harbors a certain skepticism toward positive learning, as

Hegel himself admits.^ A science that has not legitimated not a true science;

meant

if

itself is

was

the discourse that

seems to belong to a prescientific form of knowledge, like a "vulgar" narrative, it is demoted to the lowest rank, that of an ideology or instrument of power. And this always happens if the rules of the science game that discourse denounces as empirical to legitimate

it

are applied to science

itself.

example the speculative statement: "A scientific statement is knowlecige if and Take

only

for

if

can take

it

its

place in a universal

process of engendering." The question this

statement knowledge as

Only

if

it

can take

its

process of engendering.

do

ists

it

itself

is:

Is

defines

it?

place in a uni\'ersal

Which

it

can. All

it

has

presuppose that such a process ex(the Life of spirit) and that it is itself an exis

to

pression of that process. This presupposition, in fact, is indispensable to the speculative lan-

guage game. Without it, the language of legitimation would not be legitimate; it would ac-

company at least

if

science in a nosedive into nonsense,

we

take idealism's

word

for

it.

But this presupposition can also be understood in a totallv different sense, one which takes us in the direction of

apparatus main-

reduplicates

it

lu'bt sich auf: is

course (autonymy) that functions to legitimate them. This is as much as to say that, in its im-

to

capitalist

up,"

we

postmodern

culture:

could sav, in keeping with the perspective

CHAPTER

we adopted

435

POST-MODERNISM

17;

that this presupposition

knowledge, and through didactics they guar-

must accept in order to play the speculative game. Such an appraisal assumes first that we accept that the

antee the replication of teachers rather than the

earlier,

defines the set of rules one

mode we understand

production of researchers. This is the state in which Nietzsche finds and condemns them."

The

"positive" sciences represent the general

of

knowledge and second, language

this

that

imply certain formal and axit must always

to

iomatic presuppositions that

make

explicit.

This

exactly

is

what Nietzsche

is

potential

erosion intrinsic to the

for

other legitimation procedure, the emancipation

apparatus flowing from the Aiifklnruiig, is no less extensive than the one at work within speculative discourse. But it touches a different

doing, though with a different terminology,

aspect.

when he shows

grounds the legitimation of science and truth

"European nihilism"

that

re-

sulted from the truth requirement of science being turned back against itself.'" There thus arises an idea of perspective that is

not far removed, at least in this respect, from

the idea of language games.

here the

is

What we have by The "crisis" which have

a process of delegitimation fueled

demand

for legitimation itself.

of scientific knowledge, signs of been accumulating since the end of the nineteenth century, is not born of a chance proliferation of sciences, itself an effect of progress in technology and the expansion of capitalism. It represents, rather, an internal erosion of the legitimacy principle of knowledge. There is erosion at work inside the speculative game, and by loosening the weave of the encyclopedic net in which each science was to find its place, it

eventually sets them

The ous tion

between the

vari-

—disciplines disappear, overlappings occur

new

borders between sciences, and from these

territories are born.

The speculative

hier-

archy of learning gives way to an immanent and, as it were, "flat" network of areas of inquiry, the respective frontiers of

which are

in

is

that

it

autonomy of interlocutors involved in and political praxis. As we have

ethical, social,

immediate problems with this form of legitimation: the difference between a denotative statement with cognitive value and seen, there are

a prescriptive statement with practical value

is

one of relevance, therefore of competence. There is nothing to prove that if a statement describing a real situation

is

true,

prescriptive statement based of

which

will necessarily

that reality) will

be

be

it

follows that a

upon

it

(the effect

a modification of

just.

Take, for example, a closed door. Between relation of

"Open the door" consequence as defined

in propositional logic.

The two statements be-

"The door is no

there

is

closed" and

long to two autonomous sets of rules defining different kinds of relevance,

free.

classical dividing lines

fields of science are thus called into ques-

at the

in the

distinguishing characteristic

Its

competence. Here, the

and therefore of

effect of

dividing reason

into cognitive or theoretical reason

on the one

hand, and practical reason on the other,

is

to at-

tack the legitimacy of the discourse of science.

Not is

a

but indirectly, by revealing that it language game with its own rules (of

directly,

which the a priori conditions of knowledge in Kant provide a first glimpse) and that it has no

universities lose their function of speculative

game of praxis game of aesthetics, for that matter). The game of science is thus put on a par with

legitimation. Stripped of the responsibility for

the others.

constant flux. The old "faculties" splinter into institutes

and foundations

research (which

was

of

stifled

all

kinds,

and the

by the speculative

special calling to supervise the

(nor the

If

this

"delegitimation"

and

narrative), they limit themselves to the trans-

slightest

mission of what

Wittgenstein

is

judged

to

be established

if

its

does

is

scope in

his

pursued in the widened (as own way, and is

436

PART

MODERNITY AND POST-MODERNISM

3:

thinkers such as Martin Buber and

Emmanuel

Levinas in theirs)'" the road is then open for an important current of postmodernity: science plays its own game; it is incapable of legitimating the other language games. The game of prescription, for example, escapes it. But above all, it is incapable of legitimating itself, as spec-

assumed

ulation

The

it

could.

social subject itself

seems

to dissolve in

this

dissemination of language games. The so-

cial

bond

is linguistic,

but

is

not

woven with

a

formed by the intersection of at least two (and in reality an indeterminate number) of language games, obeying different rules. Wittgenstein writes: "Our language can be seen as an ancient city: a maze of little streets and squares, of old and new houses, and of houses with additions from various periods; and this surrounded by a multitude of new boroughs with straight regular streets and uniform houses."'^ And to drive home that the principle of unitotality or synthesis under the authority of a metadiscourse of knowledge is inapplicable, he subjects the "town" of language to the old sorites paradox by asking: single thread.

It is

a fabric

—

"how many houses fore a

town begins

—

or streets does

to

it

take be-

New

languages are added to the old ones, forming suburbs of the old town: "the ibolism of chemistry and the notation of the infin•

itestimal calculus."'^ Thirty-five years later to the

list:

trices of

game

theory,

to relinquish its legitimation duties,''

why

plains

we

machine languages, the ma-

new systems

philosophy

is

which ex-

facing a crisis wher-

such functions studv of systems of logic or the history of ideas where it has been realistic enough to surrender them.'** Turn-of-the-century Vienna was weaned on ever

it

persists in arrogating

and

is

this

pessimism: not

reduced

to the

just artists

such as Musil,

Kraus, Hofmannsthal, Loos, Schonberg, and Broch, but also the philosophers Wittgenstein.'''

theoretical

and

They

Mach and

carried awareness of

and

artistic responsibility for dele-

gitimation as far as

it

could be taken.

We

can

say today that the mourning process has been

completed. There

is

no need

again. Wittgenstein's strength

opt for the positivism that

oped by the Vienna

over

to start all is

that he did not

was being

devel-

but outlined in his investigation of language games a kind of legitimation not based on performativity That is

what

the

rative.

their

It

Circle,""

postmodern world

people have

duced

be a town?"'"*

can add

become compartmentalized and no one can master them all.'" Speculative or humanistic philosophy is forced ished tasks of research have

in

is all

about.

Most

lost the nostalgia for the lost nar-

no way follows

to barbarity.

knowledge

What

that

that they are re-

saves them from

legitimation can

it is

only

own linguistic practice and communicational interaction. Science "smiling into its beard" at every other belief has taught spring from their

them

the harsh austeritv of realism."'

of musical

notation, systems of notation for nondenotative

forms of logic (temporal logics, deontic logics, modal logics), the language of the genetic code, graphs of phonological structures, and so on. We may form a pessimistic impression of this splintering: nobody speaks all of those languages, they have no universal metalanguage, the project of the system-subject

is

a failure, the

goal of emancipation has nothing to science,

we

are

all

do with

stuck in the positivism of

this or that discipline of learning, the learned

scholars have turned into scientists, the dimin-

LEGITIMATION BY PARALOGY Let us say at this point that the facts we have presented concerning the problem of the legiti-

mation of knowledge today are sufficient for our purposes. We no longer have recourse to the grand narratives we can resort neither to the dialectic of Spirit nor even to the emancipation of humanity as a \alidation for postmodern scientific discourse. But as we have just seen, the little narrative [petit ivcit] remains

—

CHAPTER

the quintessential form of imaginative inven-

guage of science.

most particularly in science."" In addition, the principle of consensus as a criterion of validation seems to be inadec^uate. It has two formulations. In the first, consensus is an agreement between men, defined as knowing free wills, and is obtained intellects and through dialogue. This is the form elaborated by Habermas, but his conception is based on

ic

the validitv of the narrative of emancipatit>n. In

consensus."

tion,

the second, consensus

is

a

component

of the

discussion,

is

morphogenesis.

17;

POST-MODERNISM

437

This, in the context of scientif-

the It

is

same process Thom

calls

not without rules (there

it is always loApplied to scientific discussion and placed in a temporal framework, this

are classes of catastrophes), but cally determined.

property implies that "discoveries" are unpredictable. In terms of the idea of transparency, it is

a factor that generates blind spots

This

summary makes

it

and defers

easy to see that sys-

which is what legitimates the system power. The problem is therefore to determine whether it is possible to have a form of legitimation based solely on paralogy. Paralogy must be distinguished from innovation: the latter is under the command of the system, or at least used by it to improve its efficiency; the former is a move (the importance of which is

tems theory and the kind of legitimation it proposes have no scientific basis whatsoever: science itself does not function according to this theory's paradigm of the system, and contemporary science excludes the possibility of using such a paradigm to describe society. In this context, let us examine two important points in Luhmann's argument. On the one hand, the system can only function by reducing complexity, and on the other, it must induce the adaptation of individual aspirations to its own ends."*' The reduction in complexity is required to maintain the system's power capability. If all messages could circulate freely

often not recognized until later) played in the

among

pragmatics of knowledge. The fact that it is in reality frequently, but not necessarily, the case that one is transformed into the other presents

formation that would have to be taken into account before making the correct choice would delay decisions considerably, thereby lowering

no

performativity. Speed, in effect, is a power component of the system. The objection will be made that these molecular opinions must indeed be taken into ac-

system, which manipulates tain ject

and improve of

mann's

its

It is

procedures,

sense. In this case, to

order to main-

performance."

administrative

an instrument

in

it

its

the ob-

in

only validity

Luhis

as

be used toward achieving the

real goal,

—

difficulties for the hypothesis.

Returning to the description of scientific pragmatics (section 7), it is now dissension that must be emphasized. Consensus is a horizon that is never reached. Research that takes place under the aegis of a paradigm"^ tends to stabilize; it is like

the exploitation of a technological,

economic, or artistic "idea." It cannot be discounted. But what is striking is that someone always comes along to disturb the order of "reason." It is necessary to posit the existence of a

power

that destabilizes the capacity for ex-

all

individuals, the quantity of the in-

count if the risk of serious disturbances is to be avoided. Luhmann replies anci this is the second point that it is possible to guide individual aspirations through a process of "quasi-ap-

—

—

prenticeship,"

"free

of

all

disturbance,"

respect individuals' aspirations: the aspirations

planation, manifested in the promulgation of

have

new norms

their effects. Administrative procedures

for

understanding

in a proposal to establish

scribing a

new

field

or, if

new

one

prefers,

rules circum-

of research for the lan-

in

order to make them compatible with the system's decisions. The decisions do not have to

make

to aspire to the decisions, or at least to

individuals

needs in order

to

should "want" what the system perform well."' It is easy to

438

see

PART

what

MODERNITY AND POST-MODERNISM

3:

role telematics technology could play

in this. It

cannot be denied that there

persuasive

is

force in the idea that context control

and domi-

nation are inherently better than their absence.

The performativity

"advanprinciple adherence to a

criterion has its

tages." It excludes in metaphysical discourse;

ation of fables;

cold wills;

it

it

it

requires the renunci-

demands

clear

minds and

replaces the definition of essences

with the calculation of interactions; the "players"

assume

it

makes

responsibility not only

for the statements they propose,

but also for

which they submit those statements in order to render them acceptable. It brings the pragmatic functions of knowledge clearly to light, to the extent that they seem to the rules to

relate to the criterion of efficiency: the prag-

matics of argumentation, of the production of proof, of the transmission of learning,

and

of

the apprenticeship of the imagination. It

also contributes to elevating

all

to self-knowledge, even those not withrealm of canonical knowledge. It tends to jolt everyday discourse into a kind of metadiscourse: ordinary statements are now displaying a propensity for self-citation, and the various pragmatic posts are tending to make an indirect connection even to current messages concerning them."^ Finally, it suggests that the problems of internal communication experienced by the scientific community in the course of its work of dismantling and remounting its languages are comparable in nature to the problems experienced by the social collectivity when, deprived of its narrative culture, it must reexamine its own internal communication and in the process question the na-

in the

made

in

name. At risk of scandalizing the reader, I would also say that the system can count severity among its advantages. Within the framework of the power critcricm, a request (that is, a form of prescriptit)n) gains nt)thing in legitimacy by its

but from the fact that the alleviation of hardship improves the system's performance. The

needs of the most underprivileged should not be used as a system regulator as a matter of principle: since the

means

of satisfying

them

is

already known, their actual satisfaction will

not improve the system's performance, but

only increase

its

terindication

is

expenditures. The only counthat not satisfying

destabilize the whole.

new

requests

norms

a redefinition of the

them can

against the nature of

It is

be ruled by weakness. But

force to

nature to induce

meant

of

is

it

in its

to lead to

"life.""''

In this

seems to be a vanguard machine dragging humanity after it, dehumanizing it in order to rehumanize it at a different level of normative capacity. The technocrats declare that they cannot trust what society desigsense, the system

nates as

language

games

ture of the legitimacy of the decisions

on the hardship of an unmet need. Rights do not flow from hardship, virtue of being based

needs; they

its

know

"know"

that society

own

needs since they are not variables independent of the new technologies.'"^' Such is the arrogance of the decision makers and their blindness. cannot

its

—

What

their "arrogance"

means

is

that they

identify themselves with the social system con-

ceived as a totality in quest of

mative unity possible. matics

of

is

we

we

its

most perfor-

look at the prag-

such

an

impossible: in principle, no

sci-

science,

identification

If

learn

that

embodies knowledge or neglects the

entist

"needs" of a research project, or the aspirations

on the pretext that they do not add to the performance of "science" as a whole. The response a researcher usually makes to a request is: "We'll have to see, tell me your of a researcher,

story."^' In principle,

he does not prejudge that

a case has already been closed

power

of "science" will suffer

In fact, the

Of

opposite

is

or that

if it is

the

reopened.

true.

does not always happen like in reality. Countless scientists have seen this their "move" ignored or repressed, sometimes for decades, because it too abruptly destabicourse,

it

CHAPTER

lized the accepted positions, not only in the

university

and

scientific hierarchy, but also in

the problematic.^"

The stronger

the "move," the

more likely it is to be denied the minimum consensus, precisely because it changes the rules of the game upon which consensus had been based.

But when

functions in this

knowledge

the institution of

manner,

it

is

acting like an or-

dinary power center whose behavior is governed by a principle of homeostasis. Such behavior is terrorist, as is the behavior

by Luhmann. By terror by eliminating, or threatening to eliminate, a player from the language game one shares with him. He is si-

of the system described I

mean

the efficiency gained

lenced or consents, not because he has been refuted, but because his ability to participate has

been threatened (there are many ways to prevent someone from playing). The decision makers' arrogance, which in principle has no equivalent in the sciences, consists in the exercise of terror.

to

It

says:

"Adapt your aspirations

—

toward the various made conditional on performativity.

norms of life enhancing the system's competence

consists in

That

evident in

of the

this is the case is particularly

for

power.

the introduction of telematics technology: the

439

POST-MODERNISM

general metalanguage in which all other languages can be transcribed and evaluated. This

what prevents its identification with the system and, all things considered, with terror. If the division between decision makers and ex-

is

ecutors exists in the scientific

community (and

system and not of the pragmatics of science itself. It is in fact one of the major obstacles to the imaginative development of knowledge. The general c]uestion of legitimation becomes: What is the relationship between the antimodel of the pragmatics of science and soit

does),

ciety? Is

it is

it

a fact of the socioeconomic

applicable to the vast clouds of lan-

guage material constituting a society? Or limited to the

game

of learning?

And

is it

if

so,

what role does it play with respect to the social bond? Is it an impossible ideal of an open community? Is it an essential component for the subset of decision makers, who force on society the performance criterion they reject for themselves? Or, conversely,

is it

ate with the authorities, a

our ends or else." Even permissiveness

games is The redefinition

17:

a refusal to cooper-

move

in the direction

of counterculture, with the attendant risk that all

possibility for research will

due to lack of funding?^" From the beginning of

be foreclosed

this study,

I

have em-

phasized the differences (not only formal, but also pragmatic) between the various language

this

games, especially between denotative, or knowledge, games and prescriptive, or action, games. The pragmatics of science is centered

process attractive for them is that it will result in new tensions in the system, and these will

on denotative utterances, which are the foundation upon which it builds institutions of

technocrats see in telematics a promise of liberalization

tween

and enrichment

interlocutors;

lead to an

in the interactions be-

but

improvement

in

what

its

makes

performativity.

learning (institutes, centers, universities,

etc.).

postmodern development brings a decisive "fact" to the fore: even discussions of denotative statements need to have rules. Rules

To the extent that science is differential, its pragmatics provities the antimodel of a stable system. A statement is deemed worth retaining the moment it marks a difference from what is already known, and after an argument and proof in support of it has been found. Science is a model of an "open system,"'^^ in which a

But

scribe

what

statement becomes relevant if it "generates ideas," that is, if it generates other statements and other game rules. Science possesses no

be

order to be admissible). The function of

its

are not denotative but prescriptive utterances,

which we are

better off calling metaprescrip-

tive utterances to

in

the

avoid confusion (they preof language games must

moves

the differential or imaginative or paralogical activity of the current pragmatics of science is

440

PART

MODERNITY AND POST-MODERNISM

3:

to point out these metaprescriptives (science's

"presuppositions")

'

and

to petition the play-

ers to accept different ones.

make

tion that can

ble

is

new

that

this

The only

legitima-

kind of request admissi-

will generate ideas, in other

it

words,

plicity" of scientific

have the "simpragmatics. It is a monster

formed by the interweaving of works of heteromorphous classes

it

There

would be

metaprescriptives

\'arious net-

of utterances

performative,

prescriptive,

nical, evaluative, etc.).

think that

tech-

no reason

is

the rules

possible to determine

common

to all of these lan-

metaprescriptions

regulating

the

totalitv

of

statements circulating in the social collectivity. a matter of fact, the contemporary decline

—be they traditionor "modern" (the emancipation of humanity, the realization of the Idea) — tied the aban-

of narratives of legitimation

to

is

absence for which the ideology of the "system," with its of this belief.

pretensions to

It

is

totality, tries to

its

compensate and

which it expresses in the cynicism of its criterion of performance. For this reason, it seems neither possible, nor even prudent, to follow Habermas in orienting our treatment of the problem of legitimation in the direction of a search for universal consensus through what he calls Diskiirs, in other words, a dialogue of argumentation.'*'^ This would be to make two assumptions. first is

come

that

for dissent) destroys a

underlies Habermas' s research,

subject seeks its common emancipation through the regularization of the "moves" permitted in all language games and that the legitimacy of any statement resides in its contribut-

ing to that emancipation.^" It is

it is

possible for

all

speakers to

agreement on which rules or metaprescriptions are universally valid for language games, when it is clear that language games are heteromorphous, subject to heterogeneous sets of pragmatic rules. The second assumption is that the goal of dialogue is consensus. But as I have shown in the to

analysis of the pragmatics of science, consen-

easy to see what function

this

recourse

plays in Habermas's argument against Luh-

mann.

Diskiirs is his ultimate

weapon against The cause is

the theory of the stable system.

good, but the argument is not.*' Consensus has become an outmoded and suspect value. But justice as a value is neither outmoded nor suspect. We must thus arrive at an idea and practice of justice that is

not linked to that of con-

sensus.

A recognition of language tion.

of the

games

is

a

heteromorphous nature first

step in that direc-

This obviously implies a renunciation of

which assumes that they are isomorphic make them so. The second step is the principle that any consensus on the rules defining a game and the "mo\'es" playable terror,

and

tries to

within

on by

must be

it

its

local, in

other words, agreed

present players and subject to eventu-

al cancellation.

The orientation then favors a by which

multiplicity of finite meta-arguments,

'^

The

still

sal)

al

donment

and the search

belief that

to

guage games or that a revisable consensus like the one in force at a gi\'en moment in the scientific communitv could embrace the totalitv of

As

is

end.

its

namely, that humanity as a collective (univer-

statements.

Social pragmatics does not

(denotative,

only a particular state of discussion, not Its end, on the contrary, is paralogy. This double observation (the heterogeneity of sus

1

mean argumentation

scriptives

and

is

that concerns metapre-

limited in space

and

time.

This orientation corresponds to the course that the evolution of social interaction

is

cur-

temporary contract is in pracsupplanting permanent institutions in the

rently taking; the tice

professional, emotional, sexual, cultural, family,

and international domains, as well as

litical affairs.

This evolution

is

in po-

of course

am-

biguous; the temporary contract is favored by the system due to its greater flexibility, lower cost, and the creati\o turmoil of its accompany-

CHAPTER

ing motivations

—

all

of these factors contribute

to increased operativity. In any case, there is no question here of proposing a "pure" alternative to the system: we all now know, as the 1970s

NOTES 1.

2.

it.

knowledge decision to such and the games as of language rules and effor their responsibility assume precisely is significant effect Their most fects. what validates the adoption of rules the quest

—

We how

mativity principle. In that case,

it

would

evitably involve the use of terror. But

it

3.

5.

banks. ^"

data

of possible utterances

—

—

is

inexhaustible. This

sketches the outline of a politics that

would

re-

spect both the desire for justice and the desire

hegemony

On

this

"demoralization," see A. Jaubert and

].

eds., (Auto) critique de la sci1.

Habermas, Legittmationsprohleme im Spdtkapitalismus (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1973) [Eng. trans. Thomas McCarthy, Legitimation Crisis (Boston: Beacon Press, 1975)]. Certain scientific aspects of postmodernism are inventoried by Ihab Hassan in "Culture, Indeterminacy, and Immanence: Margins of the (Postmodern) Age," Humanities in Societxf 1 (1978):

Jiirgen

51-85. 7.

Claus Mueller uses the expression "a process of delegitimation" in The Politics of Communication (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973), p. 164.

8.

"Road

of

doubt

.

.

.

road of despair

.

.

.

skepti-

cism," writes Hegel in the preface to the Phenomenology of Spirit to describe the effect of the speculative drive on natural knowledge.

Language

games would then be games of perfect information at any given moment. But they would also be non-zero-sum games, and by virtue of that fact discussion would never risk fixating in a position of minimax ecjuilibrium because it had exhausted its stakes. For the stakes would be knowledge (or information, if you will), and language's reserve the reserve of knowledge

unknown.

6.

give the public free access to

memory and

(1978):

1970s and the current dispersion, especially under the influence of Kuhn; not much information on German sociology of science. The term has been given weight by Ivan Illich, Tools for Conviviality (New York, Harper & Row,

M. Levy-Leblond,

in-

by supplying them with the information they usually lack for making knowledgeable decisions. The line to follow for computerization to take the second of these two paths is, in princi-

19

information on

1973). 4.

could

also aid groups discussing metaprescriptives

la soci-

of Merton's school until the beginning of the

the computerization of society affects this

for the

sociologie

Good

ence (Paris: Seuil, 1973), Pt.

It could become the "dream" instrument for controlling and regulating the market system, extended to include knowledge itself and governed exclusively by the perfor-

the

de

English and American currents: the

problematic.

ple, quite simple:

europeennes

257-336 (bibliography).

for paralogy.

are finally in a position to understand

et ses utilisateurs," la societc.

Lecuyer, "Bilnn et perspectives de

P.

Archives

This bears witness to the existence

of another goal within the system:

B.

L'lnfonnntisntion dc

3,

ologie des sciences dans les pays occidentaux,"

to a close, that

tolerates

"La Nouvelle Informatique

Annex

an attempt at an alternative of that kind would end up resembling the system it was meant to replace. We should be happy that the tendency toward the temporary contract is ambiguous: it is not totally subordinated to the goal of the system, yet the system

come

441

POST-MODERNISM

17:

9.

For fear of encumbering this account, I have postponed until a later study the exposition of this group of rules. [See "Analyzing Speculative

Discourse as Language-Game," The Oxford ary Revicu' 10. Nietzsche,

N

VII

(MS. 3);

4,

Liter-

no. 3 (1981): 59-67.]

"Der europaische Nihilismus" (MS.

"der NihiHsm, ein normaler Zustand" VII II 1); "Kritik der Nihilism" (MS.

3);

W

"Zum

kritisclie

Plane" (MS.

W W III), in Nietzsches Werke

Gesaintausgabe,

(1887-89) (Berlin:

De

vol.

7,

pts.

1

and 2

Gruyter, 1970). These texts

have been the object of

a

commentary by

K.

442

PART

MODERNITY AND POST-MODERNISM

3:

Nietzsche,

Ryjik,

"On

preamble

the future of our educational institutions,"

de

in Complete Works, vol. 3.

12.

Martin Buher,

Icli

Du

und

(New York: Charles

Thou

and Dinhglsches Leben

Emmanuel

Schocken Ver7 and

(Berlin:

Levinas, Totalite

and

An

Infinity:

Miiller,

1947);

Alphonso

Lingis, To-

20.

die

Philosophen

in

Erkenntnis

theorie"

Kohlhammer, 1963) [Fr. trans. "Martin Buber et la theorie de la connaissance," in M);)/s Propres (Montpellier: Fata Morgana,

21.

22.

15. Ibid.

for

example,

"La

taylorisation

recherche," in (Auto) critique de

pp. 291-93.

And

Little Science,

especially D.

Big Science

University Press,

between

split

la

1963),

a small

J.

(New

de

and

the

23.

of highly produc-

a large

science considered as a social entity

in-

is

"undemo-

and that "the eminent scientist" is a hundred years ahead of "the minimal one" (p. .59)

Desanti, "Sur

sciences et de silencieuse,

la

le

rapport traditionnel des

The

reclassification of

la

is

condemned

academic philosophy as

ble that

it

but it is possiwill not be able to carry out this work, to disappear,

the

title

of

Without Qual-

Exam-

local deter-

fact that the current

tendency to

and weaken administra-

24.

tion is encouraged by society's loss of confidence in the State's performance capability. In Kuhn's sense.

25.

Pomian ("Catastrophes") shows

science

one of the human sciences in this respect has a significance far beyond simply professional concerns. 1 do not think that philosophy as legitimation

is

open systems,

deregulate, destabilize,

philosophie," in La Philosophie

ou critique des phUosophies de

(Paris: Seuil, 1975).

18.

Man

ities. Cited and discussed by J. Bouveresse, "La Problematique du sujet." It has not been possible within the limits of this study to analyze the form assumed by the return

emphasizes the T.

Beard"

realized" (p. 125). Y. Stourdze, "Les Etats-Unis,"

56). J.

its

of Musil's The

—

Columbia

high productivity researchers only really

See

1

minism, antimethod in general, everything that 1 group under the name paralogy. Nora and Mine, for example, attribute Japan's success in the field of computers to an "intensity of social consensus" that they judge to be specific to Japanese society {L'Infonnatisation de la Societc, p. 4). They write in their conclusion: "The dynamics of extended social computerization leads to a fragile society: such a society is constructed with a view to facilitating consensus, but already presupposes its existence, and comes to a standstill if that consensus cannot be

Solla Price,

creases every twenty years. Price concludes that

17.

"Science Smiling into

de

York:

mass of researchers with low The number of the latter grows as square of the former, so that the number of

cratic" (p.

John Viertel (Boston:

1971)].

ples are: the study of

productivity.

the

ed., trans.

of narrative in discourses of legitimation.

la

tive researchers (evaluated in terms of publication)

German

science (note 4),

who emphasizes

number

J.

chap. 72, vol.

1976)].

See

and

Beacon Press,

13. Philosophical Investigatious, sec. 18, p. 8.

16.

de [Vin-

|

(Stuttgart:

14. Ibid.

VIII

Piel, ed., "Vienne debut d'un sie339-40 (1975). See Jtirgen Habermas, "Dogmatismus, Vernunft unt Entscheidung Zu Theorie und Praxis in der verwissenschaftlichen Zivilisation" (1963), in Theorie und Praxis Theorif and Practice, abr. ed.

of 4th

Jahrhunderts

20.

des

Paris

—

Essay on Exteriority (Pitts-

Buber und

"Martin

Departement

cle," Critique,

burgh: Duquesne University Press, 1969)], and (1958),

de

See Allan Janik and Stephan Toulmin, Wittgenstein's Vienna (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1973),

(La Haye:

et Infinite

(typescript,

Universite

cennes], 1979). 19.

Scribner's Sons, 1937)], (Ziirich:

Nijhoff, 1961) [Eng. trans. tality

to the Projet d'un institut polytechnique

phdosophie

philosophie,

[Eng. trans. Ronald G. Smith,

lag, 1922)

without revising its ties to on this matter the

it,

the university institution. See

de Paris VIII [Vincennes]).

versite 11.

or at least advance

manuserit de Lenzer Heide

le

Departement de philosophie, Uni-

(typescript,

that this t\'pe of

functioning boars no relation to Hegelian dialectics.

26.

"What entails

the legitimation of decisions accordingly is

fundamentally an effective learning

process, with a

minimum

of friction, within the

CHAPTER

social system. This

question,

is

an aspect of the more general

31.

'how do aspirations change, how can

the pohtical-administrative subsystem,

itself

only

tions in society through

its

tiveness of the activity of

decisions?'

what

is

the whole, will in large measure

well

it

persons or social systems

effec-

only a part, for

Luhmann,

diircli

1950);

(New

29.

He

." .

.

Feuer, Ein-

S.

(New

York:

As Moscovici emphasizes

born

in

ct

le

Complexe,

(Bruxelles'

in

was

"Relativity

'academy'

makeshift

a

des generations

conflit

1979)],

by

formed

one of whom was a physicist; were engineers or amateur philosophers." friends, not

33. Orwell's

all

"We

paradox. The bureaucrat speaks:

(Boston: Beacon,

are not content with negative obedience, nor

(Le Metalangage, pp. 228ff.)

even with the most abject submission. When finally you do surrender to us, it must be of your

1966).

Rey-Debove

a story yet."

the Generations of Science

Alexandre, Einstein

Man

make

his introduction to the French translation [trans.

is

Marcuse, One Dimensional 28. Josette

and

Basic Books, 1974).

Verfniiren,

developed in David Riesearlier studies. See Riesman, The Lonely (New Haven: Yale University Press, W. H. Whyte, The Organization Man York: Simon & Schuster, 1956); Herbert

This hypothesis

man's Crowd

results don't

For a famous example, see Lewis stein

p. 35).

27.

"My

structures, telling stories 32.

—without thereby pro-

Legitimation

a

concludes, "Scientists are building explanatory

voking considerable functional disturbances" (Niklas

Medawar makes

of expressions often heard in laboratories, in-

cluding,

expectations

— whether these are

{Art of the Soluble, pp. 151-52) compares scientists' written and spoken styles. The former must be "inductive" or they will not be

list

depend on how

new

succeeds in integrating

into already existing systems

The

Medawar

considered; as for the second,

part of society, nevertheless structure expecta-

443

POST-MODERNISM

17:

notes the proliferation of marks of indirect discourse or autonymic connotation in contempo-

own

rary daily language. As she reminds us, "indirect discourse cannot be trusted." As Georges Canguilhem says, "man is only truly healthy when he is capable of a number of norms, when he is more than normal" ("Le Normal et la pathologique" [1951], in Ln Counnis-

ogy the paradox would be expressed as a "Be free," or a "Want what you want," and is analyzed by Watzlawick et al.. Pragmatics of Human

sance de

la

vie

[Paris:

Hachette, 1952],

[Eng. trans. Carolyn Fawcett

On

the

p.

Normal and

David comments that society can only be aware of the needs it feels in the present state of

30. E. E.

its

technological miheu.

It is

basic sciences to discover

of the nature of the

unknown

properties

which remodel the technical milieu and create unpredictable needs. He cites as examples the use of solid materials as amplifiers and the rapid development of the physics of solids. This "negative regulation" of social interactions and needs by the object of contemporary techniques is critiqued by R. Jaulin, "Le Mythe technologique," Revue de

I'entreprise 26, special

"Ethnotechnolo-

gy" issue (March 1979): 49-55. This is a review of A. G. Haudricourt, "La Technologie culturelle, essai de methodologie," in Gille, Historie des techniques.

will"

[New

(1984

Harcourt,

York:

game

terminol-

Communication, pp. 203-7. On these paradoxes, see J. M. Salanskis, "Geneses 'actuelles' et

geneses

'serielles'

de

I'inconsistant

de

et

I'heterogeme," Critique 379 (1978): 1155-73.

210)

the Pathological (Boston: D. Reidel, 1978)1.

free

Brace, 1949], p. 258). In language

34.

See Nora and Mine's description of the tensions that mass computerization will inevitably pro-

duce

in

cicte,

introduction).

French society (L'lnformatisntion de

35. Cf. the discussion of

wick

open systems

et al.. Pragmatics of

Human

in

la so-

Watzla-

Communication,

pp. 117—48. The concept of open systems theory is the subject of a study by ]. M. Salanskis, Le Systematique ouvert (forthcoming). 36. After the separation of

Church and

State,

Feyerabend (Against Method) demands

Paul

in

the

same

"lay" spirit the separation of Science

and

State.

But what about Science and Money? one way of understanding this

37. This is at least

term, which

comes from Ducrot's problematic.

Dire.

38. Legitimationsprobleme (note 5), passim, especially

pp. 21-22: "Language functions in the

manner

of

444

a

PART

MODERNITY AND POST-MODERNISM

3:

transformer

.

.

changing cognitions into

.

technique of

propositions, needs and feelings into normative

expectations (commands, values). This transfor-

mation produces the far-reaching distinction between the subjectivity of intention, willing, of pleasure and unpleasure on the one hand, and expressions and norms with a pretension to uni-

on the other. Universality signifies the knowledge and the legitimacy of

versality

objectivity of

prevailing norms; both assure the

community

[Genieinsamkeit] constitutive of lived social expe-

We

rience."

see that

1972);

by formulating the prob-

lematic in this way, the question of legitimacy

al

is

criticjue,

ideal

which dissociates conceptual to the former, and or

"suprasensible

life

The subordination

of laws) to Diskurs 144:

every citizen

is explicit,

it

sense that

on his file (about them and address a complaint

to see the entries

example, on

p.

to validity is

it-

them

for

it

whom

about them to the municipal council and if need be to the Council of State; the right of all citizens to know (on request) which data concerning

of the metapre-

the normalization

"The normative pretension

self cognitive in the

40.

(i.e,

of rules: exclusive au-

citizens to all data (on payment); the right of

of

50), to correct

scriptives of prescription

number

which and under what conditions they are communicated; access for all

humanity. 39. Ibid., p. 20.

editori-

in the press; pirate radios (before their

data are collected, to

nature,"

the only possible horizon for the

United States

thority of the municipal council to decide

which forms the horizon of the latter, and on the other hand it maintains that consensus (Gemeinschtift) is

work

enacted a certain

appropriate

universality,

in the

development in Italy); administrative files, the IBM monopoly, computer sabotage. The municipality of Yverdon (Canton of Vaud), having voted to buy a computer (operational in 1981),

that of the subject of action (in opposition to

Kant's

community radios

and Canada; the impact of computers on

fixated on one type of reply, universalitv. This on the one hand presupposes that the legitimation of the subject of knowledge is identical to

universality,

management

'social profiles' to the

mass of the population; the logic of security produced by the automatization of society." See too the documents and analysis in Interferences f and 2 (Winter 1974-Spring 1975), the theme of which is the establishment of popular networks of multimedia communication. Topics treated include: amateur radios (especially their role in Quebec during the FLQ affair of October 1970 and that of the "Front commun" in May of the

is

communicated and

to

whom

(L