Re-thinking Religious Pluralism: Moving Beyond Liberal Tolerance [1st ed.] 9789811595394, 9789811595400

Table of contents :
Front Matter ....Pages i-xx
Front Matter ....Pages 1-1
Pluralism About What? Religion as Belief and Identity (Sonia Sikka)....Pages 3-19
Religious Violence in a World of Conflicts: A Phenomenological Narrative (Sebastian Velassery)....Pages 21-34
Front Matter ....Pages 35-35
Philosophical Hermeneutic of/for Religious Pluralism: Some Methodological Considerations (S. Lourdunathan)....Pages 37-54
Religious Pluralism and Ethics (Abhishek Kumar)....Pages 55-60
Some Reflections on Tenability of Pluralism, Transformation and Trivialization of Religions (Rakesh Chandra)....Pages 61-69
Front Matter ....Pages 71-71
Mādhvas Tolerating Rival Truth Claims: Disagreement, Dialogue and Discernment (Deepak Sarma)....Pages 73-83
Religion: One and Many (Shephali Vidyanta)....Pages 85-93
Tagore and Gandhi: On Diversity and Religious ‘Others’ (Bindu Puri)....Pages 95-109
A Gandhian Solution to the Problem of Religious Intolerance (Reetu Jaiswal)....Pages 111-119
Re-living History with Karuna: Towards Transforming Life Through Responsible Dialogue (Saji Varghese)....Pages 121-130
Front Matter ....Pages 131-131
Religion: The Universal and the Local (Sujata Miri)....Pages 133-138
Religious Diversity: The Mao Naga Religion and It’s Moral Beliefs (M. Daniel)....Pages 139-144
Ao-Naga Religious Experience and Ethics: A Phenomenological Inquiry ( Karilemla)....Pages 145-155
Indigenous Perspective on Religious Pluralism: A Tribal Response (Heni Francis Ariina)....Pages 157-170
Religion and Religions: Making Space for Modesty and Music (Bindu Puri)....Pages 171-177

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Bindu Puri Abhishek Kumar   Editors

Re-thinking Religious Pluralism Moving Beyond Liberal Tolerance

Re-thinking Religious Pluralism

Bindu Puri Abhishek Kumar •

Editors

Re-thinking Religious Pluralism Moving Beyond Liberal Tolerance

123

Editors Bindu Puri Centre for Philosophy School of Social Sciences Jawaharlal Nehru University New Delhi, India

Abhishek Kumar Centre for Philosophy School of Social Sciences Jawaharlal Nehru University New Delhi, India

ISBN 978-981-15-9539-4 ISBN 978-981-15-9540-0 https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-9540-0

(eBook)

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. The registered company address is: 152 Beach Road, #21-01/04 Gateway East, Singapore 189721, Singapore

Foreword

It gives me great pleasure to write a brief foreword for this very important publication. It is important for various reasons, but, perhaps, the most important among them is that it opens our eyes to crucially related areas, which hitherto have escaped the attention of most people who are otherwise intelligently concerned with religion. In politics, as well as most academic (including philosophical) matters, worry about religion has been primarily worrying about the big religions of the world, i.e., religions which have very large numbers of international followers, e.g., Christianity, Islam, Judaism, Buddhism. In terms of global politics, this may have some justification, but philosophically, and from a general academic point of view, a justification merely in terms of numbers is eminently suspicious. There are, phenomena which fall undoubtedly, within the boundaries of religion, (even as accepted by those who draw for us the map of deserving academic concerns,) but which are left out of serious consideration just because they do not satisfy the criterion of numbers. If we dig into the historical reasons for this, we may well come up with some unsavoury facts about the community conduct of human beings. But obviously, this is not the place for doing so. But this book deserves praise for breaking ground by bringing seriously into the debate areas like religions of the tribes of the world and beliefs in the multitude of gods. Another important contribution of this book is its novel intervention in the debate on reason and faith, on the one hand, and on liberal rationalism (enlightenment rationality) and the proper place of religion in our lives, on the other. I would like to suggest that this intervention constitutes its most incisive entry into the mainstream philosophy’s engagement with religion. Another interesting aspect of this publication which should not go unnoticed is its stance on the primacy of ethics and how a serious consideration of the plurality of religions helps us realize that ethics is the crowning, though frequently faltering, achievement of humanity qua humanity.

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I have no doubt that this book will find its well-deserved place in the literature on religion that takes religion itself with utmost seriousness and not as the manifestation of something other than itself. New Delhi, India

Mrinal Miri

Introduction

Rethinking the Relationship Between Religions: Moving Beyond Liberal Tolerance Many of us now think that liberalism,1 the dominant political and moral stance of modernity, has successfully addressed all issues relating to the pervasive phenomenon of the plurality of religions. Religions are matters of faith and such matters must be distinguished from skepticism that is part of our rational pursuit of knowledge—the two basic stands of liberalism on religion. As matters of faith, religions are not part of the legitimate knowledge discourse, because the latter is driven by reason as shaped by the enlightenment and its legacy. But religions do make knowledge claims. However, such claims have no room for skeptical oversight, and as such all religions must be placed outside the domain of knowledge. Thus, for liberalism, all religions are, as it were, in the same boat. They enjoy, a sort of equality, negative thought this equality may be. Also, another principle that is central to liberalism, is the principle of tolerance. Almost all forms of human life must be tolerated; and since forms of religious life are an inescapably dominant feature of humanity, liberal tolerance must extend to religions as well. Thus, equality of religions and tolerance of all faiths are the liberal way to understand the 1

It is important to note that the author is aware that there are many variants of liberalism, just as there is many ‘modernity’s’. For the sake of brevity the author refers to utilitarian and Rawlsian versions of liberalism in this book. Liberal theories have been preoccupied with three central issues —liberty, equality, and the distribution of benefits and burdens in society. In his famous opening words in A Theory of Justice Rawls had said that justice is the first virtue of institutions. It could be argued that no matter differences of content the utilitarian principle of justice (as the design of social institutions to promote the maximization of utility), Rawls’ theory of justice as fairness, Nozick’s Libertarianism, the capabilities approach, Ronald Dworkin’s equality of resources doctrine—shared in emphasizing the point that justice regulated the basic structure of society and its patterns of distribution of goods and burdens. Whether these predominant competing liberal accounts of justice emphasized utility or rights they seemed to have thought of justice primarily as a function of consent-based state authority, the rule of law through third-party justice and an abstract equality before the law.

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plurality of religions. This is, of course, a very stark presentation of the liberal attitude to the plurality of religions. And liberalism’s detailed treatment of religions can be highly nuanced and sophisticated. But, occasionally, the stark presentation of a philosophical view is helpful. It makes it easy then to focus on the shortcomings of the view and explore alternative ways of looking at things. This is exactly what the title of the book Re-thinking Religious Pluralism: Moving Beyond Liberal Tolerance is meant to convey. Various essays in the book are attempts to do this ‘rethinking’ in their surprisingly special ways. These essays have made a serious attempt to rethink the relationship between religions from a self-consciously comparative perspective. In this spirit, there are essays in this book, which seek to make a philosophical examination of religious traditions with a view to recovering religious (rather than liberal) arguments about how one ought to respond to different others. There are also essays that re-examine the meaning of religion and possibilities of inter-religious dialogue in the works of classical Indian philosophy (Mādhva school of Vedānta) and more contemporary Indian philosophers such as Gandhi, Tagore, and Ramakrishna Paramhansa. Given that we are increasingly sensitive to the idea that academia ought to look seriously at traditions—other than the European and Anglo American—there is now a greater interest in comparative philosophy. This book self-consciously engages in comparative philosophy as it seeks to bring mainstream liberal arguments for religious toleration into dialogue with traditions from India. In this context, the book has brought out insights on what could be an appropriate response to religious ‘others’ from within the perspective of a devout. At this point, it is perhaps important to state why this book is different from other already existent works on religious pluralism and the relationship between religions. To begin with, it should be said that this is the first book to systematically put together philosophical challenges to the idea of tolerance as the only basis for an argument for the plausibility of plurality. The book examines challenges to mainstream liberal perspectives by looking seriously at Indian religious traditions and is perhaps, the only book to bring the Indian philosophical tradition into the contemporary debate in Western philosophy involving philosophers like Donald Davidson, Richard Rorty, Thomas Kuhn, Heiddeger, Gadamer, and Derrida. As it engages in this exercise, it is also the first book to seriously examine the idea of community, location, and cultural specificity as an unavoidable element in the understanding of all religions. The close attention to tribal religions alongside mainstream religious traditions in India becomes another first for the subject. It is important to note here that while post-colonial India has paid attention to religious diversity the academia has maintained a steadfast silence on the tribes in India. The tribes on their part have gone on living, entrenched in their sacred habitat, meeting religious others in a spirit of friendship and equality. This book attempts to break that conceptual silence by engaging the tribal religions (from the northeastern part of India) in the debate on religious diversity. On a philosophical note, this is the only book to relate the ethics associated with polytheism to mainstream secular ethics.

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The essays in this book fall into four parts. The first part “Religion as Belief and as Identity” looks at the distinction between religion as belief and as a source of identity and the implications of such a distinction for the relationship between religions and the secularist multi-culturist politics in liberal democratic plural societies. The first two essays in the book address this distinction in different ways. In the first essay “Pluralism About What? Religion as Belief and Identity” the critique of the dominant Western perspective becomes a starting point for Sonia Sikka who points out that Western discourse about religion typically assumes a concept of ‘religion’ as primarily a system of belief, grounded on “faith” in the authority of certain texts designated as “scripture.” Sikka argues that on such a view in the “faith community”—the communal character of the community—what its members have in common is ultimately a shared set of beliefs. She argues that in India and in other countries—outside the European and Anglo American world— belief is not necessarily the defining feature of religion. Membership of a religious community is primarily a matter of group identity established by birth. Religion of identity describes “a social location rather than a set of conscientiously held beliefs.” Sikka moves on to argue that religious conflicts in India, in Sri Lanka or Myanmar and Northern Ireland have little or nothing to do with faith and are conflicts over identity and land, in the political context of ethno-nationalism. Distinguishing between religion as identity and religion as belief Sikka argues that such a distinction becomes critical if one is to successfully address the different kinds of “religious” assertions in social and political arenas. This, she argues, is especially important if the moral and political aim is to counter inter-religious discord and violence. In the second essay in this part “Religious Violence in a World of Conflicts: A Phenomenological Narrative,” Sebastian Velassery argues that religious believers need to transcend the bias towards individual faith as a source of group identity and thereby as a vantage point from which rights and dignity can be assigned to different others. Velassery points out that the persistence of religious intolerance and fundamentalist perspectives in the contemporary world suggest that the analysis of religious conflict has been superficial. Such analysis has perhaps, so far, failed to take account of deeper human sensibilities. Velassery calls for a non-contractarian interpretation of the polis which could transcend the boundaries of religion ethnicity and culture. In this direction, the essay posits the possibility of a theology, which hopes for a shared understanding of self and the other, that distants without belonging and belongs without distancing. The point that Velassery is making is perhaps that in a plural state one’s sense of belonging to a religious community should not put one at a complete distance from others. At the same time, one’s collective experience of being different from the religious other should not lead one to confuse religious belonging with national identity. The second part of the book dives into the issues of epistemic and ethical pluralism and is entitled “Religious Diversity: Epistemic and Ethical Pluralism.” The first essay in this part by S. Lourdunathan “Philosophical Hermeneutics of/for Religious Pluralism: Some Methodological Considerations” provisions a hermeneutics of philosophical sensibilities that enables religious pluralism

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anchored on an ethics of equality, justice, and solidarity. Lourdunathan argues that given the pluralistic conditions of human existence monolithic centricism seems implausible. Engaging in philosophical hermeneutics Lourdunathan has attempted to bring out the difference and interrelationship between conceptual/philosophical and contextual pluralism. In this context, Lourdunathan traces ontological monism as a philosophical system to Platonic transcendental idealism—the idea that pure episteme as understanding stands separate from multiplicity. Arguing that early Western philosophy expounds a monistic theory of reality and of truth Lourdunathan speaks of the twentieth-century shift to philosophical pluralism. Making connections between metaphysical and epistemological pluralism Lourdunathan explains that once it is accepted that there are different modes of being, one is bound to accept, that there are different ways of knowing beings. He then brings in the role of philosophical theory as seeking to explore the conditions for the possibility of critical theory as a challenge to the practice of ontological and cultural monism on the one hand and naïve relativism on the other. Lourdunathan emphasizes the need to apply critical theory as a methodology to a rethinking of religion. He makes the point that in order to understand if a religion is pluralistic (or not) one needs to see if it expresses such pluralism in both its theory and practice. Moving to postmodernism Lourdunathan discusses deconstruction in Derrida as a methodology in defense of critical pluralism. Finally, using insights from Rorty and Gadamer, he concludes that if one is to strengthen religious pluralism one needs to continuously engage in both the hermeneutics of faith and of suspicion. In the second essay in this part “Religious Pluralism and Ethics,” Abhishek Kumar makes use of an important distinction—that between monotheistic and polytheistic—religions. The essay explores the crucial differences between the ethics that emanates from monotheism and an ethics of polytheism that inculcates the spatio-temporal reciprocity of Gods and humans. Dr. Kumar argues that the ethics that is commensurate with polytheism is also commensurate with the secular perspective of human life. In this context, the essay refers to Dharma and Dharmic ethics, which addresses the volatility and contingencies of human life in the world. Dr. Kumar contends that an ethics of monotheism makes the truly moral life well nigh impossible in this world, while dharmic and polytheistic ethics are deeply embedded in the necessary spatio-temporal contingencies of this world. The third essay in this part “Some Reflections on Tenability of Pluralism, Transformation and Trivialization of Religions” takes issue with Lourdunathan’s point that there is a shift to philosophical pluralism in twentieth-century philosophy. In this essay, Rakesh Chandra challenges liberal claims of epistemic and ethical pluralism by examining the tenability of so-called pluralistic viewpoints and arguing that most formulations of accommodative religious pluralism either transform or trivialize the religious points of view. Chandra closely considers the liberal treatment of pluralism, which is avowedly non-neutral and favors a disenchanted picture, balancing interests and power. He suggests that while liberal philosophers make room for reasonable disagreement they make no room for value plurality. Giving evidence of a meticulous understanding of Indian, European, and Anglo American traditions, Chandra moves to contrast demands for complete

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un-reason in religion (expressed by thinkers like Hilary Putnam and Kierkegaard) with the presence of reason and argument in religion. In this context, he discusses arguments from the Nyaya Vaishesika and its opponents and from debates in Indian epics. Chandra concludes by making a note of how contemporary discourse on religious pluralism in mainstream academia has already declared that all discussion in religion, on religion, in philosophy, and on philosophy has to be pragmatic. He asks if this is not a conversation stopper? The next two parts in this book bring out the philosophical substance (so to speak) of the comparative exercise attempted in this book. The third part is entitled “The Plurality of Religion: Indian Philosophical Perspectives (Classical and Contemporary)” and has the largest number of essays in the book. The first essay (in this part) by Deepak Sarma focuses on the tradition of debate in the Mādhva school of Vedānta. Raising questions about how members of one faith should interact with those of another Sarma argues for conceptual pluralism. He suggests that taking an opponents position seriously is one of the most respectful responses one can make to rival truth claims. Sarma substantiates the tradition of conceptual pluralism in Hinduism by bringing out the Mādhva perspective that reflection that occurs outside of the Vedas is most valuable in so far as it can sharpen the skill of debate and increase the epistemic confidence of the Mādhvas. As Sarma points out the Mādhva school of Vedānta is a somewhat closed exclusive commentarial religion that does not permit outsiders to access sacred texts and consequently does not permit conversion. Emphasizing the insider epistemology and exclusive commentarial framework of the Mādhva Sarma questions why such a school should permit religious others to access its doctrines for debate and argument. In this context, he points out that Madhvācārya studied Buddhism and summarized debates with Buddhists in his work. Sarma refers to Madhvācārya’s Vādalakṣaṇa and passages in the Anuvyakhyana in connection with Brahma Sūtra 2.1. In an argument that substantiates the point made by Lourdunathan (recall the inter-connection between pluralism in theory and practice), Sarma argues that, even if only for the purpose of refutation, the emphasis on a close reading of other religions, leads to a better understanding of those religions. It is such a conceptual pluralism that makes the best case for respect between religions. The second essay in this part by Shepali Vidyanta entitled “Religion: One and Many” moves from classical to contemporary Indian Philosophy. Vidyanta brings Gandhi and Ramakrishna Paramhansa together to speak about the meaning of religion. She begins by distinguishing the dogma–ritual–practice framework of a religion from the inalienable essence of religion. She argues that the essentially spiritual core of a religion/all religions is “a life of constant finding into one’s being in the world and one’s relation to the surrounding” and this is what generates a profound feeling of oneness between religions that appear so very different from one another. Emphasizing the spiritual core of a religion as a progressive journey to the truth of one’s inner being Vidyanta notes that both Gandhi and Ramakrishna share an emphasis on spirituality as essential to religion. On this view honesty, emphasis on moral values and deep personal reflection within one’s being, lead Gandhi and Paramhansa to think of the relationship between religions along similar

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lines. Gandhi expresses confidence that the truth of all religions is the same though the paths may be varied and recommends an equality of respect. For Ramakrishna, the different religions are means to reach the same goal—the one single truth, the supreme ‘Reality’ or ‘God.’ He suggests that there are no religious reasons for devotees to harbor malice against followers of another faith. The third essay in this part “Gandhi and Tagore: On Diversity and Religious Others” draws Tagore into conversation with Gandhi. The essay argues that Gandhi and Tagore had both thought about the relationship between religio-culturally diverse others. It makes the point that despite differences Gandhi’s arguments for absolute equality of religions and Tagore’s ideas on the religion of man were far more exacting than liberal arguments recommending tolerance. Both Gandhi and Tagore seemed to suggest that rather than tolerate diverse others one ought to be in harmony with the difference being able to honor the world view of cultural-religious others as one would one’s own. Unlike liberals, Gandhi and Tagore spoke of the relationship between diverse religious cultures using religio-moral arguments and reposed trust in the individual rather than in the state. However, having said that, it is important to note that they had very different understandings of religion and of the relationship between the religious beliefs and culture of a community. While Gandhi thought that the cultural practices and religious beliefs of a community were inextricably linked, for Tagore culture was connected to the springs of creativity of a people. Such differences influenced their conceptions of what ought to constitute an appropriate response to religiously diverse others—Gandhi speaking about equality and kinship, Tagore about sharing friendship/maitri and harmony. The next essay in this part, by Reetu Jaiswal, brings out other aspects from Gandhi and is entitled “A Gandhian Solution to the Problem of Religious Intolerance.” Jaiswal criticizes the adequacy of tolerance as a solution to the problems of inter-religious understanding. She draws from the Gandhian ideas of inter-dependence, realization of imperfection of any/all religions, and the insights into the ordered moral government of the universe to initiate an alternative understanding. The discussion in this part is taken further by Saji Varghese in “Re-living History with Karuna: Towards Transforming Life Through Responsible Dialogue.” Varghese looks at the possibilities of rebuilding trust and religious harmony. The essay argues that such rebuilding can be effected by inculcating greater individual responsibility in members of different faiths, within a shared context, to engage in inter-religious conversations with compassion and respect. In this context, the essay revisits historical memories of religious conflict in India and speaks of the necessity of healing. Varghese argues that, while believers cannot change the events of a shared past, a community can change it’s response to that past by inculcating compassion and equal respect for the religious other through inter-faith conversations in the present.

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The last part of the book “Religious Diversity and the Tribes of North-East India” marks a shift of attention. The four essays in this part examine tribal perspectives on religious diversity.2 As Sujata Miri insightfully argues in the opening essay of this part the shift from the holy land to holy books in India (and across the world) lead to a conceptual and practical distancing from tribal religion as from an ecological rootedness which gave people the strength to be truly generous and to recognize the similar rootedness of others. Miri in her essay on “Religion: The Universal and the Local” points to the differences between religions that become universal transcending the bounds of their origin (independent of cultural, temporal, political, and social variations) and tribal religions which do not aspire for such universality. She argues that these two kinds of religion have different perspectives on religious diversity. For religions that aspire to be universal, religious pluralism calls for compromise and at most toleration. However, for tribal religions that emphasize the local, pluralism, is a matter of easy acceptance. Miri like the other commentators in this part emphasizes the point that as tribal religions take man– God–nature in the continuum. They regard all living creatures as necessarily bound to each other as animated by a common dwelling spirit. As a consequence of such a holistic worldview, tribal/local religions are more concerned with the well-being of an inter-related world than with individual and more personal salvation. The second essay in this part discusses the religion of the Mao Naga3 tribe. The essay argues that the religion of the forefathers in the Mao Naga rests primarily on moral values. For the Mao Naga, only a person who lives a good human life can know God. Daniel argues that given such a close connection between the religious and moral life the Mao Naga cannot be anything but generous to the votaries of other religions. The third essay in this part is on the religion of the Ao Naga tribe and it is entitled “Ao-Naga Religious Experience and Ethics: A Phenomenological Inquiry.” As the title suggests, in this essay, Karilemla examines the religious experience of the Ao Naga from a phenomenological perspective bringing tribal religions into dialogue with several mainstream Western Philosophers. In the first section of her essay, the author discusses the close nexus between ‘cognitive framework’ and ‘embodied faith’ in religious traditions. The former, it is clarified, stands for the abstract concepts underlying human behavior in acquiring knowledge of the ultimate reality in religious experience. Karilemla argues that the notion of cognition as embodied faith is the self-experience of the very constitution of faith in the practical modes of everydayness. In the second section of the essay, Karilemla has suggested that attending to the practical modes of the constitution of faith in tribal religions could help bring out the intimate connection between religious and moral arguments in such religions. She clarifies that her essay makes such 2

It is important to note that this part is largely focused on the religions of the tribes in the North Eastern part of India. On account of limitations of size, the present book has not been able to bring in the religions of tribes based in other parts of the country. 3 The Mao Nagas live in the Senapati district previously known as the North district of Manipur state, which is situated in Northeast India. The Mao tribe is one of the major Naga tribes from the state.

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arguments in relation to the Ao Naga religion in the light of the unique embedded praxis of the Ao belief system and the centrality of ‘truthfulness’ as the highest goal of human life. Karilemla devotes the third section of this essay to a discussion of the Ao Naga religious beliefs and explains that two notions are central to this belief system—‘all things are full of God’ and ‘truth is God.’ The essay concludes that the Ao Naga religious beliefs contribute relational modesty and receptivity toward religious others in the public sphere. The last essay in the part and in this book is the one by Heni Francis Ariina and it has been entitled “Indigenous Perspective on Religious Pluralism: A Tribal Response.” The essay reiterates the argument made by other essays in this part that the world view of the tribes of North East India lays emphasis on the harmony between man nature and God. The author has argued that the tribal religions from the northeast of India are essentially non-anthropocentric and have a respect for pluralism and diversity. In an interesting turn, Ariina speaks of the need for an ‘intra-faith’ dialogue between tribals who have converted to Christianity and the traditional beliefs and practices of their own forefathers, which have now become the strange and savage ‘other,’ to their converted/reclaimed self. The author has argued that such dialogue is as important to inculcating respect between religions as inter-religious conversations. The essays in this book have attempted a critical re-thinking of religious pluralism by bringing mainstream Western philosophers and arguments into conversation with the Indian philosophical tradition (classical and contemporary). The book self consciously attempts to draw traditions at the periphery of the discourse on the plurality of religions closer to the mainstream of that discourse. At the same time as it draws, classical and contemporary Indian philosophy into the debate about religious plurality, it also brings tribal religions from the periphery toward the center of the discussion. It is hoped that this exercise will initiate the much-needed change in the way in which the discourse on the plurality of religions has been conceptualized. As will become clear in the course of the book pluralism cannot influence practice unless it begins with ideas, i.e., as a conceptual pluralism. The first place we need to inculcate such pluralism is in the concepts in terms of which we set the discourse about pluralism. Mention may be made here of several liberal notions which have been uncritically adopted to set the terms of any debate in this area-ideas such as tolerance, the public–private dichotomy, and epistemic abstinence about truth in matters concerning justice. This book will move beyond such notions and beyond liberal tolerance. The essays will make some effort to rethink and reinvent the terms of the contemporary, predominantly liberal, discourse on religious pluralism. Bindu Puri

Contents

Religion as Belief and as Identity Pluralism About What? Religion as Belief and Identity . . . . . . . . . . . . . Sonia Sikka Religious Violence in a World of Conflicts: A Phenomenological Narrative . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Sebastian Velassery

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Religious Diversity: Epistemic and Ethical Pluralism Philosophical Hermeneutic of/for Religious Pluralism: Some Methodological Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . S. Lourdunathan Religious Pluralism and Ethics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Abhishek Kumar Some Reflections on Tenability of Pluralism, Transformation and Trivialization of Religions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Rakesh Chandra

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The Plurality of Religion: Indian Philosophical Perspectives (Classical and Contemporary) Mādhvas Tolerating Rival Truth Claims: Disagreement, Dialogue and Discernment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Deepak Sarma

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Religion: One and Many . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Shephali Vidyanta

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Tagore and Gandhi: On Diversity and Religious ‘Others’ . . . . . . . . . . . Bindu Puri

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A Gandhian Solution to the Problem of Religious Intolerance . . . . . . . . 111 Reetu Jaiswal Re-living History with Karuna: Towards Transforming Life Through Responsible Dialogue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121 Saji Varghese Religious Diversity and the Tribes of North-East India Religion: The Universal and the Local . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133 Sujata Miri Religious Diversity: The Mao Naga Religion and It’s Moral Beliefs . . . . 139 M. Daniel Ao-Naga Religious Experience and Ethics: A Phenomenological Inquiry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145 Karilemla Indigenous Perspective on Religious Pluralism: A Tribal Response . . . . 157 Heni Francis Ariina Religion and Religions: Making Space for Modesty and Music . . . . . . . 171 Bindu Puri

Editors and Contributors

About the Editors Bindu Puri is a Professor of Contemporary Indian Philosophy at the Centre for Philosophy, School of Social Sciences, Jawaharlal Nehru University, India. Her areas of interest are contemporary Indian philosophy and in moral and political philosophy. She has published over 45 research papers, in philosophical and interdisciplinary journals of international repute and edited anthologies. Her publications include articles in journals like Sophia, Philosophia and the Journal of the Indian Council of Philosophical Research. She has published six edited books and authored two monographs: Gandhi and the Moral Life (2004) and The Tagore-Gandhi Debate: On Matters of Truth and Untruth (Springer Publications in the series: Sophia Studies in Cross-cultural Philosophy of Traditions and Cultures, January 2015). Abhishek Kumar holds a Ph.D. degree from the University of Delhi. He was awarded a Postdoctoral Research Fellowship by the Indian Council of Social Science Research, New Delhi. He has taught philosophy in temporary capacities in various University of Delhi colleges and now holds a Guest Lectureship at Centre for Philosophy, Jawaharlal Nehru University. His main areas of interest are social and political philosophy and ethics.

Contributors Heni Francis Ariina is from Fürodzümei (Punanamei), Manipur, India. He holds Masters degree in Philosophy from University of Delhi and M.Phil and Ph.D degrees in Philosophy from Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU), New Delhi. His research interests include Social and Political Philosophy, Greek Philosophy, Ethics, Traditional knowledge and culture studies in tribal society. He has

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authored/co-edited books – Tribal Philosophy and Culture: Mao Naga of North-East (Co-edited), Epistemology and Applied Ethics (Co-Authored), and Moral Foundation of Human Rights (Authored). He has published papers in national and International edited books. Currently, he teaches Philosophy, at the Lakshmibai College, University of Delhi. Professor Rakesh Chandra teaches philosophy at the University of Lucknow. His areas of interest are philosophical logic, epistemology, feminist theory, Kant, analytic philosophy, philosophy of religion, Buddhism and critical pedagogy. He was head department of philosophy university of Lucknow, director institute for womens studies, director cultural activities and dean students welfare. He was a member of ICPR, it’s governing body and RPC. He was also in charge of the Academic activities of the Lucknow Centre. He has a book, several articles and reviews in journal and edited volumes. He has been a consultant with Unicef, and has supported many programmes of UNDP, Oxfam and others in India and Nepal. M. Daniel teaches in the Department of Philosophy, University of Mysore, Mysore. His area of specialization is Philosophy of Religion, Ethics and Tribal Cultures. He has published research articles in National and International Journals and also published a book entitled Socio-Cultural and Religious Life of Mao Naga Tribe. He has presented more than twenty papers in International and National Seminars and Conferences. Reetu Jaiswal is an Assistant Professor at the Department of Philosophy, University of Delhi. Her areas of interest include Social and Political Philosophy, Gender Studies and Media Studies. She has various publications, paper presentations and research publications in several national and international forums. Among several other conferences which she organised, she was also the convenor of the first ever All India Philosophy Graduate Conference organised under the auspices of ICPR to provide a platform for young philosophy scholars. She is currently supervising a number of students pursuing their Ph.D and M. Phil dissertations in the field of Gender Studies. Karilemla is an Assistant Professor at the Department of Philosophy, Savitribai Phule Pune University. She received her Ph.D. from Indian Institute of Technology Bombay, and her thesis won the award for ‘Excellence in Thesis Work’ from IIT Bombay in 2017. She researches and publishes in the areas of Continental Philosophy, Philosophy of Technology and Philosophy of Culture. She also works in the interdisciplinary fields of Care Ethics and Cultural Studies. Karilemla was a Fulbright scholar at Emory University, Atlanta in 2013–2014. She has also held a Visiting Faculty position at the University of Porto, Portugal under the Erasmus Mundus Fellowship in 2017. S. Lourdunathan is a visiting Professor of Philosophy at Centre for Philosophy, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, and has served as professor cum head of the Department of Philosophy at Arul Anandar (Autonomous) College, Madurai University, Madurai, for 33 years teaching Philosophy and has guided several

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scholars to Ph.D. in Philosophy. He specializes in Epistemology and Ethics of liberation in Western and Indian Philosophy. He has served as a Visiting Professor of Philosophy and Religions at various institutes of philosophy at national and international level. His publications include Dalit Hermeneutics of Liberation; Conceptual Grounds For Metaphysics; Postmodern Readings of Philosophy, Culture and Religion; Invitation to Logic; Engaging Social and Political Philosophy; and Research Methodology in Philosophy and Social Science. Mrinal Miri retired as Vice Chancellor of the North Eastern Hill University, Shillong, in 2005. He was a Professor of Philosophy at the same university. He served as the Director of the Indian Institute of Advanced Study, Shimla, for Six years. He also served as the Chairman of the Indian Council of Philosophical Research, New Delhi, for two terms. He was nominated to the upper house of the Indian Parliament (Rajya Sabha) by the Honourable President of India. He was awarded the Padma Bhushan for his contributions to the field of education. Sujata Miri retired as Professor of Philosophy from the North Eastern Hill University, Shillong. Her abiding philosophical interest has been to understand and explore the cultures and religions of the various tribes particularly of the North-East of India. She has published several books which include Ao Naga World-view: A Dialogue; The Khasi World View: A Conceptual Exploration; Stories and Legends of Liangmei Nagas; and A Book of Paintings on themes from the North-East. She has also published several articles in academic journals. She is known for opening up new ways of approaching indigenous religions of the country. Deepak Sarma is a Professor of Indian religions and philosophy in the Department of Religious Studies at Case Western Reserve University, Cleveland Ohio, USA. Sarma is the author of Classical Indian Philosophy: A Reader (2011), Hinduism: A Reader (2008), Epistemologies and the Limitations of Philosophical Inquiry: Doctrine in Madhva Vedanta (2005) and An Introduction to Madhva Vedanta (2003). After earning a BA in religion from Reed College, Sarma attended the University of Chicago Divinity School, where he received a Ph.D. in the philosophy of religions. His current reflections concern cultural theory, racism, bioethics, and post-colonialism. Sonia Sikka is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Ottawa. Her primary areas of research are social and political philosophy, philosophy of religion, and continental philosophy. In addition to works on Heidegger, Levinas, and Nietzsche, she has written on Johann Gottfried Herder’s thought in the light of contemporary debates about race, identity, relativism, and multiculturalism. Her current research focuses on aspects of religious identity in the context of political secularism in a number of countries, including India. She is the author of several books and numerous papers in professional journals. Her publications include articles in journals like Sophia, Review of Politics, Argument, Theoria, Constellations, Politics and Religion. She has published several books which include Heidegger, Morality

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and Politics: Questioning the Shepherd of Being (CUP, 2017); Artistic Visions and the Promise of Beauty (co-ed) (Springer, 2017); Construction of the Self and Other Yoga Travel and Tourism (co-ed), (Palgrave Macmillan, 2016); Herder on Humanity and Cultural Difference (CUP, 2011). Saji Varghese is an Associate Professor at the Department of Philosophy, Lady Keane College, Shillong. He has done his Ph.D from the North Eastern Hill University, Shillong on “The Political Philosophy of Antonio Gramsci”. His areas of interest lie in Environmental Ethics, Cultures in transition and contemporary social and cultural issues. He has a number of publications in National and International journals and edited books to his credit including Beyond Humanism (2014), Nature, Culture and Philosophy (2014), Globalization and Cultural Pluralism (2016). Sebastian Velassery UGC National Emeritus Professor, Department of Philosophy, Panjab University, Chandigarh, did his Doctoral studies at Indian Institute of Technology, Kanpur. His areas of interests are value theory, Indian philosophy, Phenomenology and social and political philosophy. He was a Visiting Professor of philosophy at the Catholic University of America, Washington DC, in 1996–97 and 2001 and 2005. Apart from the number of books he has published, Velassery has contributed many articles in philosophy journals both national and international. Velassery was a Visiting Professor at JNU, New Delhi between 2017–2019. Shephali Vidyanta retired as an Associate Professor of Philosophy from Mahadevananda Mahavidyalaya, Barrackpore, West Bengal. Prior to that she served as selection grade lecturer in philosophy in Lady Keane College, Shillong. Presently she has been interested and sincerely involved in various social activities like, (a) free-teaching to the poor and under privileged children of slum areas and (b) she arranges various programmes to make common people aware of the bad effects of plastic use and the scarcity of under ground water and its consequences.

Religion as Belief and as Identity

Pluralism About What? Religion as Belief and Identity Sonia Sikka

Abstract Western discourses about religion typically assume a concept of it as primarily a system of belief, grounded on faith in the authority of certain texts designated as scripture. But many conflicts around the world ostensibly organized around religious identities have little to do with belief. While scholars sometimes describe such cases in terms of politicization of religion, the underlying phenomenon is a conversion of the content of religion (beliefs, symbols, narratives, rituals) into markers of group identity. Philosophies of religious pluralism, such as that of the late John Hick, ignore this in arguing for the (qualified) relativity of religious belief and doctrine. Whether or not their arguments are convincing, analyses of this sort have little relevance to cases of religious communalism, where elements of “religion” serve predominantly as expressions or signs of inherited group identity. In these cases, the operative claims of religion within social life cannot be effectively regulated by the philosophies of religious pluralism focused on the content of faith. It is important to recognize this if the moral and political aim is to discover strategies for countering inter-group violence. Keywords Identity · Religious pluralism · Toleration · Nationalism · Multiculturalism · Secularism Within the philosophy of religion, discussions about “religious pluralism” typically revolve around the status of the truth claims advanced by the world’s various religious traditions. Options such as “exclusivism”, “inclusivism” and “pluralism” chart possible answers to this question, from the assertion that only one religion is true and the others all false, to the view, at the other end of the spectrum, that all of the religions at issue are equally valid. The late John Hick offered an exemplary version of the latter position, arguing that different religions are culturally and historically inflected responses to a transcendent divine reality. Adapting the Jain doctrine of anekantavada, Hick suggested that the diverse content of the world’s major religions S. Sikka (B) Department of Philosophy, University of Ottawa, Ottawa, Canada e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 B. Puri and A. Kumar (eds.), Re-thinking Religious Pluralism, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-9540-0_1

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contains a measure of human projection as well as a measure of truth, a thesis that encourages both mutual toleration and interfaith dialogue (Hick 1985). Hick ultimately justified his pluralist conclusions on philosophical grounds, claiming that the Christian exclusivism he had himself once espoused is “unrealistic in light of our knowledge of the wider religious life of mankind” (Hick 1985, 34). His engagement with non-Christian religious traditions was also motivated, however, by concern over racist bigotry against immigrant minorities in the U.K., of which Hick became acutely conscious during his years as a professor at the University of Birmingham. Those minorities included Muslims, Sikhs and Hindus of South Asian origin, and Hick’s eventual pluralism was strongly influenced by ideas drawn from Indic traditions. Defences of religious pluralism are often prompted by the goal of countering discrimination and violence organized around religious identities, led by the thought that if the followers of different religions could come to see that their claims for the superior and exclusive truth of their own religion are unjustified, they would be less hostile towards members of other religions. Yet a closer look at many cases of contemporary interreligious conflict raises doubts about whether this approach is based on an accurate diagnosis. That so-called “religious” violence is strongly affected by social, political and economic factors is obvious, but analysis of tensions related to religious diversity would benefit, I argue, from drawing a basic distinction between religion as constituted by beliefs and practices, on the one hand, and religion as a matter of collective identity, on the other. This is not the by now well-worn distinction, between religion as belief and religion as practice. I am not alluding to the claim that Asian religions are more concerned with orthopraxy than with orthodoxy. Nor by “identity” do I mean all characteristics that an individual regards as deeply constitutive of who she is, which might well include religious beliefs and values. Rather, in speaking of “religion as identity”, I am indicating the shared self-conception that results from identification with a group, where the name of a given religious identity—Muslim, Hindu, Christian—applies to one group in contradistinction to others. Through a comparative analysis of Western and Asian cases, I want to emphasize that interreligious relations, whether friendly or hostile, often involve conceptions of self and other that have little, if anything, to with theology or religious practice and so with the content of religious doctrine or faith. Instead, they rest on boundaries demarcating identities whose construction, logic and dynamic do not differ substantially from ethnic identities. Philosophies of religious pluralism have scant purchase on conflicts arising from religion as identity in this sense. At the same time, measures based on political principles such as secularism and multiculturalism, versions of which do aim at instituting fair recognition and even-handed treatment for religious groups, are, in a democratic society, inevitably dependent on majority support. They are then at risk of being undermined or subverted by majority indifference, hostility and will to power. Given this reality, political institutions to safeguard minority rights, essential as they are, cannot function effectively without the aid of virtues among the citizenry that act as a countervailing force to the temptations of exclusion and domination. Religious resources are indispensable for the cultivation of such virtues, I propose, as a counterpoint to domineering assertions of religious identity.

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1 Multiculturalism and Religious Equality: Racialized Religious Minorities in Canada, the U.K. and Europe Avigail Eisenberg remarks on a significant shift in legal reasoning within court cases involving religion in Canada, from an approach that had once framed religion exclusively as a matter of belief to one that views it as a form of identity akin to ethnicity, culture and race (Eisenberg 2014). This more recent framing of religion interprets religion as communal rather than individual and as given rather than chosen. It moves away from the conception of religion that underlies longstanding guarantees of religious freedom in Western juridical contexts, towards one that would justify including religious claims under the multicultural paradigm. Eisenberg’s essay is entitled “Choice or identity” (my italics), the implication being that recognizing religion as a form of group identity similar to race, ethnicity and culture means viewing it as not a matter of choice in the way it is held to be when conceived as a system of belief. “The identity approach”, Eisenberg writes, “necessitates the legal obligation to accommodate religious practice publicly because only where religious belief and practice is considered to be an immutable, non-negotiable feature of a person’s identity, as opposed to a choice the individual has made, will the exclusion of a religious practice be viewed as the exclusion of the person or group” (Eisenberg 2014, 10). Notice here, however, that Eisenberg’s analysis, while highlighting the communal character of religious identity, actually continues to understand religion in terms of “belief and practice”.1 By contrast, in Multicultural Politics: Racism, Ethnicity, and Muslims in Britain, Tariq Modood points out that in some cases religious identity is not constituted by belief at all: As in Northern Ireland, the South Asia I am from is contoured by communal religious identities. It has nothing to do with belief. If you assert “I am an atheist”, people will still think it is meaningful to ask, “Yes, but are you a Muslim, a Hindu?” Talk of giving up one’s religion is likely to be seen as a form of selling out. In such a context, religion can be less a matter of individual choice than when some ‘in-between’-skinned people in the United States assert their blackness rather than ‘pass’. (Modood 2005, 16)

Thus, we should not treat “religious” claims within political and legal arenas as if they constituted a single genre. Modood’s observation helps to reveal how the inherited understanding of religion as a matter of belief, within Western legal and political discourses, is especially inadequate for capturing the situations of certain immigrant groups whose members are also identified as visible minorities. It highlights connections between religion, race and ethnicity while suggesting, through the analogy of “passing”, that the question concerns not choice per se, but unjust contexts of choice created by discriminatory attitudes on the part of others. That such discrimination is a type of racism forms the central thesis of Modood’s study, in which he argues that the idea of biological determinism—the central target 1 This

is also true of Eisenberg’s analysis in Reasons of Identity; see Chapter 5, “Religious Identity and the Problem of Authenticity” (Eisenberg 2009, 91–118).

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of anti-racist discourses and activism in Western countries since at least the second world war— is not essential to attitudes and practices rightly conceived as racist. Religion, for instance, “can be the basis of racialization as long as the religion of a group can be linked to physical ancestry and descent” (Modood 2005, 11) and thus to group identities typically described in terms of race and ethnicity. The racialized image of Asians in Britain, for instance, “very soon appeals to cultural motifs such as language, religion, family structures, exotic dress, cuisine, and art forms”, (Modood 2005, 7) without asserting that these attributes are rooted in biology. It emerges, then, that “religious” prejudice against Muslims in Western countries involves reactions to a densely imbricated set of characteristics connected with race, ethnicity and culture. It is a continuation of the social phenomenon that has been termed “neo-racism” or “cultural racism” and connected with a resurgence, since the 1970s, of exclusivist forms of nationalism (Balibar and Wallerstein 1991). Modood’s account captures the indissociability of various elements of collective identity in both the self-perception of British Muslims and the discriminatory attitudes they encounter. This is necessary, it suggests, for arriving at an accurate diagnosis of the social inequality faced by British Muslims, which is in turn an essential prerequisite for formulating appropriate justicial remedies. In this regard, Modood takes an opposite direction to one proposed by Sarah Song, who argues for “disaggregating” multiculturalism to distinguish between the groups named in the title of her essay: “The Subject of Multiculturalism: Culture, Religion, Language, Ethnicity, Nationality, and Race?” (2009). Song’s goal is to isolate and differentiate the claims each of these groups may legitimately advance. She argues, for instance, that culture does not function as “a source of normative authority” in the way religion does. I may say, I must go to mass because I am a Catholic, whereas it does not make sense to say I must eat certain foods because I am Mexican American (Song 2009, 179). This argument is premised on a common and widespread understanding of the category of religion in Western nations and is especially important in the light of the fact that, as Song rightly observes, “most of the cases that bear the weight of multicultural theory are claims about religion” (Song 2009, 178).2 The idea that religion obligates while culture does not fails, however, to register the profound continuities between religion and culture in the lives of many immigrants to Western nations, and the proposal to distinguish these identity categories from race and ethnicity obscures their being the focal point of neo-racist reactions to 2 This

last observation does not quite fit Canadian multiculturalism, whose formulation has been at least equally oriented towards national minorities, to use Will Kymlicka’s term, which in Canada mainly comprises francophone Quebecers and indigenous communities (though these groups have not necessarily welcomed inclusion within the multicultural paradigm, which, some argue, tends to dilute rather than respect stronger claims for the right of social and political self-determination (AbuLaban and Stasiulis 1992; Nootens 2014; Coulthard 2014). With respect to immigrant minorities, however, most of the cases that have reached the courts or been prominent in public discussions about “reasonable accommodation” have indeed been religious ones. These include demands for institutional accommodation of prayer times and spaces, and for the dietary requirements of different religious groups, along with the especially acute focus on the wearing and display of religious garments, such as turbans, headscarves and veils.

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the other within exclusionary assertions of nationalism. The social, legal and political contestations surrounding the wearing of headscarves and veils by some Muslim women are a prime example. Within public and political discourses, these contestations tend to be framed in terms of religious choice, but it is far from clear that, for Muslim women in Western nations, wearing a headscarf or veil is always and only a choice made in response to a sense of religious obligation. Researchers have noted that Muslim women actually wear these garments for many reasons and that their meaning is accordingly complex and varied (Hoodfar 1993; Wing and Smith 2006). A hijab worn in a Western nation may indicate a conscious and conscientious commitment to a particular set of religious beliefs. But it may also, or instead, express a deliberate assertion of identity in the face of marginalization and denigration, or it may be employed as protection from unwanted sexual attention, affirming the dignity and autonomy of its wearer, or it may express more than one of these intentions, among others (Ruby 2006; Hopkins and Greenwood 2013; Nouh 2016). With reference to the controversies over the veil in Europe, Suzanne Last Stone describes the veil as a “practice” rather than a “symbol”, proposing that “such practices may signify diverse things to diverse people, or they may not signify anything at all” (Stone 2014, 42). “Here”, she writes, “claims of conscience are not rooted in discrete dogmas or propositions, but in loyalty to a way of life, much of which is ritualized or rooted in custom, to which the person feels conscientiously bound as a whole” (Stone 2014, 42). Stone describes this kind of loyalty as a feature of “comprehensive religious cultures, such as Islam and Judaism” (Stone 2014, 42), but “loyalty to a way of life”, including the performance of particular practices, can also centrally involve identification with the history and traditions of a particular community. This has to be taken into account when analysing the significance of religio-cultural practices. Wearing a veil may signify membership in a community into which an individual is born, to which she is tied through bonds of familial and intergenerational affection, and to which she feels a loyalty of conscience that is no less deep or compelling than the sense of obligation to a religious duty. A similar point applies to the practice of wearing a turban among some Sikh men. It may be considered a religious obligation, but it may also signify, and enact, the loyal continuation of an identity that is as much a matter of descent and custom as of duty to follow the prescriptions of a religious authority. Considered in this light, the wearing of such garments may not be best described as a practice rather than a symbol, or as not signifying anything. That the significance of wearing a veil or a turban in some cases cannot be interpreted in the same way as the significance of wearing a crucifix does not exclude the possibility that these are meaningful symbols in other, equally important senses. They can also be symbols of group identity, of belonging to a particular historical community. And markers of such intergenerational belonging may well have profound significance for their wearers, even being in their own way sacred, imposing conscientious observance as a matter of loyalty to one’s parents and community (Sikka 2004). This is no trivial matter. The state’s mandating the removal of such symbols in public spaces can represent a deep affront, for to say to someone that you cannot be visible as a member of a particular community in “our” schools or “our” courts

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makes it clear who “we” are and demands an effacement of who “you” are as a condition of being here. That is emphatically not equal treatment, but analysing appropriately the inequality of standing among citizens that demands of this sort involve, as well as the injustice they entail, requires an analysis of groups that do not fit—and whose claims, therefore, cannot be understood in terms of— categorical distinctions between the modern Western concepts of religion, culture and ethnicity. The framing within Western nations of claims for religious accommodation on the part of non-Christian minority groups, especially religious communities that are more recent arrivals in North Atlantic countries, obscures this dimension of the issue. In this regard, consider as well Song’s recognition, in Justice, Gender and the Politics of Multiculturalism, of cultural inequality as one circumstance that supports the case for cultural accommodation (Song 2007, 61). Here, too, Song argues that “the tenets of religion, unlike the demands of cultural affiliation, are matters of conscience and obligation” (Song 2007, 65). At the same time, she affirms the view, advanced by other multicultural theorists, that “‘cultural’ disadvantage’ or marginalization resulting from state establishment of culture must be remedied in order to treat religious and ethnic minorities as equals and to foster their social and political inclusion” (Song 2007, 62). However, if religion is not only conscientious belief but also group identity of a form that cannot be dissociated from ethnicity and culture, the problem is not merely that there is a blurry line between religion and culture. It is that some collective identities cannot be analysed in terms of this distinction at all, with the consequence that the demands of so-called “cultural affiliation” may also be “matters of conscience and obligation”, whose claims against the majoritarian institutions of the state need to be taken seriously. At the same time, we need to understand the role of religious, cultural, ethnic and racial bigotry in shaping the contexts within which many minority groups are negotiating their identities, to ensure that policies grounded in commitments to equality actually foster it rather than being discriminatory themselves. An extreme example is Canada’s “Zero Tolerance for Barbaric Cultural Practices Act” (Bill S-7), tabled by the conservative government of Steven Harper in 2015 but never passed. Given that all of the practices named in the bill—underage marriage, polygamy, “honour” killing— were already covered by existing criminal legislation and the bill was clearly aimed exclusively at immigrant groups, it is legitimate to describe the bill as racist, which many commentators did. The bill’s framers and supporters, though, presented its goal as protecting individuals from oppressive and harmful “cultural” practices. Identifying what is racist about such measures requires exposing the broader narratives about white civilizational superiority that make it possible to view certain practices as products of a backwards culture, while others are just bad things people do, even when they are frequent and supported by widespread social attitudes (Phillips 2007, 29) while assuming that women in or from those backward cultures lack agency and are in need of rescue.3 3 Cf.

Anna Galeotti: “With regard to ‘our’ practices, no matter how objectionable from the point of view of substantive autonomy, rarely, if ever, does one hear calls for public bans of the practice. In contrast, cries for a public ban were central to the protracted public controversy over the Islamic headscarf in France, leading to draconian regulations and to the prohibition on wearing it in school”

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It requires as well that we not draw bright lines between religion, culture, ethnicity and race in analyzing perceptions of inferior others that are a function of these narratives. The phenomenon of rising “Islamophobia” in Western countries has been much discussed in connection with reactions to acts of violence in the name of Islam. In recent years, academic scholarship on this subject has clearly identified Islamophobia as a form of racism, but in popular discourses, including political ones, the term can mislead insofar as it does name a religion—Islam—which in Western countries means a “faith”, a system of doctrine and practice that defines a community of believers and is separate from ancestry and culture. In the context of many Western nations, it is or should be obvious that a good deal of racism hides behind the concepts of religion and culture. It thereby attempts to make itself immune to charges of racism, which still tend to be understood as linked to theses about biology and ancestry.4 Moreover, while Modood argues that, to be distinguished from other forms of “groupism”, racism still has to pick up on some physical features or ancestry, the term is actually still appropriate in contexts where some individuals of a particular ancestry are subject to prejudice, while others are not and where “physical features” include visible markers that are in principle readily modifiable. Anti-Sikh sentiments in Western nations, for example, are often connected with viscerally negative reactions to the physical appearance of men wearing beards and turbans.5 Negative religiocultural stereotypes about Sikhs are part and parcel of these reactions, but surely they count as racist even if the same men might not evoke such a reaction were they to remove their facial hair and turbans. In any case, treating Sikhs as moral and political equals to other citizens in Western nations excludes requiring them to make such changes. The analogy Modood draws with passing is instructive here and worth developing further. A light-skinned African American in the U.S. may pass for white. In a sense, then, he has a choice not to be black. A Sikh man also may remove his turban and a Muslim woman may remove her headscarf. These are possible choices for men and women who normally wear these items, which many Sikh men and Muslim women do not. Few people would (and nobody should) judge that a society in which passing for white gives an individual social advantage is one that treats white and (invisible) non-white citizens equally, or that pressure to make this choice in cases where an individual can do so is fair. Making such a choice requires a person to hide his or her family background and to renounce solidarity with others who face denigration and discrimination on the basis of a similar ancestry that is visible in their skin colour. These are extremely serious costs, and pressure to make a choice that incurs them is unacceptable. The (Galeotti 2015, 60). Phillips likewise draws attention to the “hierarchical differentiation between the agentic individuals from majority or Western ethnocultural groups and those ‘others’ deemed more passive and constrained” (Phillips 2015, 94). 4 “Religion is not a race”, says one Quebec politician, in answer to the charge that the Canadian province’s ban on veils is racist. 5 The racist anti-Sikh posters discovered on the University of Alberta campus in Canada in September of 2016 provide an especially odious example of such attitudes. See Alam (2016).

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case of Sikh turbans and Muslim headscarves is comparable, even though many of the co-religionists of the individuals who wear these items choose not to do so. Where these garments signify membership in a familial and social community that faces hostility and discrimination, the analogy with passing is highly apt. The question in this context should not be whether the Sikh or Muslim religion mandates the practice of wearing these items, or whether the individual sincerely thinks it does, the test proposed by the Canadian Supreme Court in Syndicat Northcrest vs Anselem (2004). We need, rather, to understand what these practices mean within the overall context of people’s identities and, equally important, what it means for the state to legislate against them or for the nation to consider them problematic in the first place. After all, we are not dealing here with practices that could be seen, on some reasonable argument, as constituting a fundamental violation of human rights or as inherently oppressive (notwithstanding the strained and hypocritical construction of veils as symbolic of gender inequality even when their wearing is voluntary).6 Whether or not Western nations opt to describe themselves as multicultural in their approaches to religious diversity, the real question of equality in this context concerns narratives of national identity that exclude the full and unproblematic representation of certain groups from the collective “we”.

2 Secularism and Ethno-religious Nationalism: Asian Cases That is equally true of much interreligious strife in Asian nations. In South Asia, as Modood points out, “religious” identity is not defined by personal belief but is like ethnicity in the sense that it is largely established by birth and constituted by relations of kin. Accordingly, the term “communalism” in South Asia covers mobilizations of group identities that bear the names of religions—Hindu, Muslim, Christian—but involve tensions and conflicts having more in common with interethnic strife than with disagreements over beliefs, practices or values. Modood’s comparative allusion to Northern Ireland also points out that religion as communal identity is not limited to South Asia. Protestant and Catholic identities in Northern Ireland are likewise social locations established by birth and kinship. The sectarian conflict in Northern Ireland revolved around the political claims of these two groups, situated within a fraught political history in which the ethnic categories of Irish and English are also very much at play. While issues of religious belief and allegiance to religious authority figured in the formation of these groupings and are therefore part of the explanation 6 It

is also sometimes claimed that some forms of veiling, such as the burqa, are uncomfortable and may be harmful to women’s health. As Martha Nussbaum points out, however, the same could be said of many common Western items of women’s attire, such as high-heeled shoes, which no one is arguing for banning (Nussbaum 2012, 115). See also note 4 on the double standard used for judgements of autonomy in such cases. It is telling that recent feminist analyses emphasize respecting women’s agency in relation to cases of “choice” that earlier feminists had problematized, such as sex work and pornography, and yet choices such as wearing the hijab readily evoke suspicions of false consciousness (Al-Saji 2010, 881).

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for their origin, “The Troubles” in Northern Ireland were never about religious belief or practice. The Rohingya crisis in Myanmar offers an equally clear example of a conflict structured by religious identity categories that has little to do with disagreement over religious views. It is reported as a conflict between Buddhists and Muslims—which are, within modern Western discourses, the names of “world religions”—but it is also rightly described as a case of ethnic cleansing. Again, religious beliefs will figure in the explanation of the historical formation of these groups, but they are now ethnic groups. The Rohingya are a persecuted ethnic minority suffering violence and expulsion at the hands of a vicious majoritarian ethnic nationalism. The political ideology of this ethno-nationalism claims the land on which the Rohingya live as belonging to a state based on exclusionary identitarian principles that make no room for the existence of this minority within the nation. The moral and psychological dimensions of this kind of assertion of majoritarian identity include the fostering of indifference, contempt and hatred for the other, such that moral principles contained within the texts and traditions of the religion from which the name of the majoritarian identity group is taken are suspended. One could speak of hypocrisy in contexts like this one, but to do so somewhat misses the point. Accusations of hypocrisy suggest a failure to live up to the principles of a religion, as if what is being asserted over the minority were the superiority of a given system of beliefs, practices and values. But it is not. Being asserted is simply the will to exclusive possession of a territorial nation by a group whose identity is an extension of the ego, the sense of “I” and “we”, of its members. That this form of violent assertion is the antithesis of the epistemological, metaphysical and moral core of Buddhist teaching is obvious but also irrelevant to understanding the situation. Likewise, the Sinhalese–Tamil conflict in Sri Lanka has not been about Buddhist vs. Hindu beliefs, but about the antagonistic relationship between communities, rendered majority and minority within the constructed boundaries of a modern nation state, whose group identities have much the same character and history as ethnic ones, even though the groups are at the same time identified and distinguished through religious categories. Peter Schalk speaks in this context of “political Buddhism”, describing “Sinhalatva” as “the ideology of a Sinhala-Buddhist ethno-nationalist centralized state” (Schalk 2007, 134). This does pretend to be an ideology based on Buddhism, but Schalk details the various strategies that have been employed by its supporters to circumvent the Buddhist proscription on violence and war, including the notion that the end justifies the means, the conversion of the group identities of Sinhala and Tamil into racial ones, and historical revisionism. This is a fair analysis, but I am pointing to something more basic than the instrumentalization of religion or its insertion into nationalist politics. I am highlighting the conversion of the content of religion into markers of group identity. By “content”, I mean the beliefs, symbols, stories, rituals and practices that relate individuals to a subject matter—in this case, to subjects typically defined as religious: a god or gods, ultimate reality, life after death and so forth. That includes but is not limited to beliefs, including beliefs about morality, which have a truth value that may be taken on faith but may also be criticized, debated and defended. The latter is the

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kind of thing that occupies people working on, e.g. “Buddhist philosophy” within philosophy departments. By “markers of religious identity”, on the other hand, I mean the reference of these very same elements to a group with which individuals identify themselves. There is nothing intrinsic to the religious elements themselves—whether beliefs, symbols, values or practices —that makes them either content or identity. The difference lies in their signification for the individuals who relate to them, in their manner of relating to them. As noted earlier, a hijab, for instance, can be an expression of religious belief, worn as part of a practice of modesty and submission to God, or it can be a performative expression of belonging to a given community, among other possible significations. Often these significations overlap and have complex relations to one another. I am by no means arguing, moreover, that assertions of religious content are always benign while assertions of religious identity are always malignant. Group identity matters to people and is deserving of respect, within the constraints of justice, as my analysis in the first section of this essay sought to highlight. Sincerely held religious beliefs, for their part, can be highly oppressive, depending on the content of the belief. The point to which I am drawing attention is that belief and identity form two distinct types of “religious” assertion within social and political spheres, which have different motivations and dynamics and need to be addressed in different ways. Cases like that of the Rohingya reveal all too starkly that the moral indifference and cruelty towards others which so often accompanies ethno-nationalist movements bearing religious banners involves an assertion not of religious views but simply of the dominance of the group to which I belong, whether that assertion happens at the political level or the interpersonal and social one. Thus, the difference I am remarking is not between religious and political Buddhism, for instance, but between the content of Buddhist traditions and the conversion of that content into markers of group identity, whose assertion is present in interpersonal relations, whether in the context of an ethno-nationalist state or not. Although cases such as that of the Rohingya in Myanmar involve gross injustice, I stress that interrelations between groups who relate to religion as identity are not necessarily hostile. They can equally well be friendly, as can relations between ethnic groups. We do not have to disregard or hate people who are different from ourselves, nor do we have to dissolve difference in order to surmount these negative dispositions towards others. My analysis in the first section of this essay sought, moreover, to underline the importance of state recognition and accommodation precisely for the religious identities of minority groups, who often encounter social discrimination that may be classed as a form of racism. Only, it is important to understand that “religious” difference covers different kinds of difference. It may involve disagreements about the truth of certain beliefs, including the appropriateness and efficacy of rituals, practices and forms of worship bound up with these beliefs. Western political discourse since Locke’s famous essay on toleration (Locke 1690) has been oriented towards this aspect of religion. But the religious difference may also be a matter of relations between communities where what is at stake is not the rightness or wrongness of a certain set of beliefs and practices—those belonging to a particular religion—but

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the significance of these as representing the past, present and future of a common “we”, however, that “we” has been imagined and constructed. That significance must not be discounted, for identities involving kinship relations understandably matter deeply to individuals. What justice, respect and friendship require across the boundaries of group identity, however, is different from what they require across conflicting worldviews involving truth claims. And, crucially, assertions of identity claims and assertions of truth claims are categorically different, stemming from distinct motivations and needing to be addressed by distinct considerations of justice, including the possible remedy of social and political pluralism. Consider again the case of the Rohingya in Myanmar. It is unlikely that people belonging to this community could avoid persecution through religious conversion, as this is an ethnic community being perceived—othered and mistreated—according to the logic of ethnicity as a fixed feature of identity. Suppose, though, that they could be accepted as equal citizens within Myanmar by the state and by their cohabitants through an act of conversion, of a sort that would redefine their public group identity as Buddhist rather than Muslim. On liberal political theory (including liberal multiculturalism), the obligation to do this as a condition for legal and social equality would be grossly unjust, violating the most basic principles of religious toleration that form the core of classical secularism. In what, though, would the injustice consist if the Rohingya were forced to convert as a condition for ending their persecution and expulsion? What would be the nature of the harm suffered by a minority group in such a case, which would constitute an unfair burden? Would it really consist in compelling individuals to violate deeply held religious beliefs, as classical Western arguments for secularism suggest? Would it be a violation of conscience, of the sort that liberal guarantees of freedom of religion and conscience are supposed to protect? It would indeed involve a violation of conscience, but not primarily, I think, because it would require individuals to act against their religious beliefs. Rather, the central violation in such a case involves the effacement of a common identity to which people are bound by strong ties of memory, affection and loyalty, much as in the case of requirements to remove hijabs or turbans, as I argued earlier. That people feel such ties is natural and legitimate, as is the fact that their sense of who they are is bound up with their sense of belonging to a given community. That sense necessarily involves some imagination and abstraction, since it extends to people—present and past—with whom an individual has no personal connection. Critics of identity are quick to point out the “constructed” character of such imagined communities, whose character and unity, they stress, are often fictions manufactured in the service of political and ideological agendas (Anderson 1991). Yet we need also to acknowledge the real bonds between individual selves and the communities to which they are linked by birth and lineage, which, after all, involve familial relations as well as shared experiences, including experiences of oppression and suffering. The problem in the case of communal strife is not the existence of such identifications, but assertions of them characterized by a lack of compassion and commitment to justice and, perhaps most fundamentally, by a lack of empathetic imagination across the boundaries separating “us” from “them”. The logic of such unimaginative assertions, which can result in truly horrendous acts of indifference and cruelty, is

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continuous with that of other forms of group-centred egoism, such as those resting on race, ethnicity or region. Its motivations stem not from a disagreement over what is good and true but from garden-variety self-centredness in some cases and, in others, from what Nietzsche described as a will to power: the drive to increase and enhance one’s own being through active or reactive domination of others. Translated into communalism, this can take the form of aggressive conquest or resentful revenge, twisted into all manner of psychopathologies, including varieties of toxic masculinity that especially victimize women. While such pathologies are not necessarily linked to nationalist sentiments, they do tend to be exponentially magnified in connection with projects of identitarian nationalism. The term “identitarian” is especially associated these days with white supremacist right-wing European movements, frequently neo-Nazi ones, that are anti-immigrant and particularly anti-Muslim. I suggest it be used more broadly to name the exclusivist self-organization of individuals around a particular group identity—be it religious, ethnic, cultural, racial or whatever—and the promotion of the perceived interests of that group in opposition to those imagined as other. As a modifier for “nationalism”, then, identitarian names the will to a form of nationhood that inscribes this self-organization at the level of the state, so that the nation mirrors and represents the interests of people who define themselves in terms of a given group identity, at least privileging their interests over those of others and at worst attempting to drive the others out of the nation, turn them into internal refugees, or kill them. So-called “religious” nationalism is simply a form of identitarian nationalism. Although it mobilizes religious elements, the significance of these elements lies in their standing as representations of group identity rather than as expressions of sincere belief, and so models of religious pluralism and toleration revolving around belief, faith or conscience miss the target. When one speaks of “religious communalism” in India, the problem at issue is not that of conflicts arising from rival systems of belief held conscientiously on faith or a sense of obligation to perform particular rituals. These are conflicts between groups whose identities and relations function in much the same way that ethnic identities do. That is what makes it appropriate to analyse the situation in India, as elsewhere in South Asia, in terms of ethnic conflict, as many historians and political scientists in fact do. In his discussion of the attacks on Muslims in Gujurat in 2002, Christophe Jaffrelot uses the term “ethnic cleansing” (Jaffrelot 2007, 165) in the broader context of Hindu nationalism that constitutes, in his words, a “militant ethno-religious ideology” (Ibid, 164). Explaining the extreme brutality of many of the perpetrators, Jaffrelot writes: Their actions were overdetermined by an obsessive fear of the Muslim ‘Other’ and an uncontrollable desire to annihilate Islam. The systematic dimension of the pogroms is an indication of the unprecedented responsiveness of society to this deep-rooted xenophobia. (Ibid, 176)

This xenophobia is exacerbated by fears stoked by current events, often instigated and manipulated by political actors for their own purposes. It is also linked to a resentful consciousness of historical relations in which the Muslim other was at one

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time politically dominant in relation to the Hindu we. On the other side, Muslim “religious” assertions, for instance, concerning personal laws, are often reactive responses to identity-based insecurities and resentments, sometimes leading to insistence on maintaining practices that represent the identity of this community, whether or not these practices could withstand critical moral reflection even using Islamic principles. When the perceived threat is to religious identity, issues concerning religious content are not the pertinent ones. The case of gau rakshak (cow protection) in India offers another illustrative example. Understanding religion as conscientious belief might lead to the conclusion that support for cow protection among many Hindus is motivated by beliefs and sentiments about the sacred status of this nonhuman sentient being, perhaps buttressed by moral commitments to doctrines of ahimsa common to many subcontinental religious traditions. In that case, one might see the acts of violence against Muslims and Dalits perpetrated by some lawless cow vigilantes as stemming from religious faith. The remedy would then seem to be to remind these criminals and their sympathizers of the moral imperative to respect and tolerate the religious beliefs of others, and/or—if one is committed to political secularism—the political imperative to bracket religious beliefs in public arenas. However, given the relative lack of attention by gau rakshak activists to the scale of India’s dairy industry and the treatment of cattle snared within it, it would be reasonable to conclude that this movement is actually about asserting a dominant identity, not conforming to conscientious belief. Similar points could be made for many elements of religious content that serve as markers of group identity, whose operative claims within social life are then ill-addressed by political discourses evolved to manage beliefs about salvation or philosophies of religious pluralism focused on the content of faith. Rather, the legal and political frameworks appropriate to managing identity-based religious claims and conflicts are the same as those applied to other varieties of identity-based assertion, such as anti-discrimination and multicultural policies.7 The Indian model of secularism, it has been argued, employs precisely such a framework, as it is based on the principle not of separation between religion and state but of equal recognition and treatment of distinct religious communities. Rajeev Bhargava offers a variation on this idea, suggesting that the ideal of Indian secularism involves a “principled distance” of the state from religion, where the state sometimes intervenes to reform religious practices and sometimes refrains from doing so, in a contextually sensitive manner for which there is no precise formula (Bhargava 2014, 51–53). Tariq Modood asks, though, whether India truly offers a model for managing religious diversity worth emulating, given that “the Indian state has failed to eradicate the high levels of religious violence in India, and failed to protect Muslims from massacres and systematic discrimination” (Modood and Sealey 2019, 19). Modood points to an undeniably serious problem, for whatever may be the ideals 7 This

is not to ignore the many difficulties multicultural models have to confront in balancing individual and group rights, dealing with intra-group oppressions of gender and class, minorities within minorities, concerns about representation and so on, which it is not my purpose to discuss here.

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embedded in India’s constitution, these have not managed to contain majoritarian ethno-religious nationalism to a degree that could possibly be considered morally tolerable. In truth, the dependence of constitutional provisions, laws and state institutions upon majority will is as visible in India as it is in Western nations. Consequently, we need also to reflect on strategies for countering anti-racist and anti-xenophobic dispositions, measures that would oppose temptations towards othering, indifference and scapegoating while fostering counter-attitudes.

3 Religion as Moral Resource But how? And who is this “we”? If the character of the state and its officials is ultimately dependent on the will of the majority in a democratic society, in spite of constitutional safeguards meant to protect minorities, can that same state be relied upon to foster the moral virtues of compassion and self-restraint across collective self-other differences? At the time of writing, the political situation in India and the U.S. suggest they cannot. Although I have argued for a distinction between religion as identity and religion as belief, I also note that appeals to the content of religious beliefs can nonetheless play a powerful salutary role when mobilized against inter-group hatred, violence and injustice organized around religious identities. Operatively, that may require drawing a distinction between “true” and “false” religion. This kind of distinction is, I realize, scrupulously avoided by sociologists and other scholars of religion, whose approach requires defining “religion” and “religions” empirically, in terms of whatever people who call themselves x actually say and do. On this scholarly approach, if a sufficient number of self-described Muslims or Hindus or Buddhists loot shops, set fire to people’s homes, kill children and rape women, then these activities define some—though of course not all—ways of being Muslim or Hindu or Buddhist. But from another perspective, involving a different relation to the category of religion than the scholarly one, religions prescribe specific norms and/or dispositions, whose observance is a condition of membership in the class of, for instance, Christian or Muslim or Hindu or Buddhist, or is even a condition of being religious at all. From that perspective, one can exclude an individual who commits a selfish or cruel act in the name of some religion as by definition not truly a Christian or Muslim or Hindu or Buddhist, or not truly religious at all, just as one can say that a state which censors criticism of its policies is not truly a liberal one, even if it calls itself liberal, or that someone who gives no thought to the suffering of others is not truly compassionate even if she says she is. Terms such as “liberal” and “compassionate” have a content; one cannot make them mean whatever one wants. Likewise, within certain relations to religion and religions, the latter prescribes particular virtues and moral behaviours, so that some motivations and actions are not compatible with their content. This is one reason why excluding religion from public life is not the solution to religious conflict. Positive moral resources desperately needed to respond to injustices committed in the name of religion are thereby lost, and public religious discourse, which cannot in practice be effectively banned, ends

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up being monopolized by the worst rather than the best. If religion as identity is the problem, focusing on religious pluralism may not help, but there is a rhetorical force—at least the possibility of effective shaming— in pointing to the degeneracy of people who call themselves x (as a matter of identity), and yet behave in ways that are antithetical to what the values of x (as a matter of belief) are alleged to be. Concepts such as ahimsa and dharma, for example, can be interpreted in many ways but surely not in any way. They would not seem to be compatible with placing burning tires around people’s necks or with the sexual torture of women (nor, I might add, with the massive suffering and environmental harm that factory farming imposes on nonhuman as well as human living beings). Insofar as terms like these name virtuous dispositions along with behaviours, supposing that they do, religions to which they are central should by definition exclude those who are disposed to assert themselves and their jati (whatever name they give to it) with indifference towards others, let alone with positive malice. Patrick Grant uses the term “regressive inversion” to describe the process “when a universalizing religious vision is redeployed to support special interests despite the contradiction entailed in doing so (Grant 2012, 42). With reference to Northern Ireland and Sri Lanka, he cites the roles of Christianity and Buddhism, respectively, in intensifying “the ethnic dimensions of both conflicts” (42). I am highly sympathetic to this analysis, which is itself an example of using the moral content of religion against unjust assertions of identity. I would, however, warn against demonizing identity, whether religious or ethnic. The problem, again, is not identity but identitarianism, the limiting of friendship, kindness and moral concern to those within my group, together with disregard and domination of others. The problem is also not that ethnic identity may be mixed up with religious identity, for identitarianism can be organized around religious identity as much as any other kind of us–them grouping. What leads scholars to reach for terms such as “ethno-religious” (e.g. Jaffrelot 2007, 164; Bhargava 2014, 45; Modood and Sealey 2019, 59) is not that the members of a certain ethnic group have appropriated a certain religion, but that the religious group has the same structure as an ethnic one, where ethnicity is constituted by familial lineage and kinship. Jewish and Hindu identity are clear examples, but in specific contexts, Catholic, Protestant and Muslim identities may also be “ethnic” in this sense. Such identities need to be respected, given the legitimate significance, people attach to the communities to which they are linked by familial ties. Jesus and Buddha may have given no weight to such ties (Grant 2012, 43), but I do not think it is either realistic or desirable to ask people not to do so. It is, on the other hand, realistic and morally desirable to ask that these attachments be constrained by respect and compassion for others. Grant is right to point to the universalizing content that commands precisely this within Buddhism and Christianity, and there are similar strands in the content of other religious traditions. This content has significant power to move individuals towards virtues that remain utterly indispensable in even the most carefully designed constitutional democracy. It is important that secular and multicultural policies not be formulated in a way that diminishes this resource, either by excluding religion altogether from public life or

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by recognizing religions as nothing but identities.8 For political principles, structures and institutions can only take us so far. Without the aid of morality—which M.K. Gandhi, for one, saw as the essence of religion—they become mere instruments of the dominant tribe.

References Abu-Laban, Y., & Stasiulis, D. (1992). Ethnic pluralism under siege: Popular and partisan opposition to multiculturalism. Canadian Public Policy, 4, 365–386. Al-Saji, A. (2010). The racialization of Muslim veils: A philosophical analysis. Philosophy and Social Criticism, 36(8), 875–902. Alam, H. (2016, September 20). Anti-Sikh posters show up on University of Alberta campus. The Star. https://www.thestar.com/news/canada/2016/09/20/anti-sikh-posters-show-up-on-uni versity-of-alberta-campus.html. Anderson, B. (1991). Imagined communities (2nd ed.). London: Verso. Balibar, É., & Wallerstein I. (1991). Race, nation, class: Ambiguous identities (C. Turner, Trans.). London: Verso. Bhargava, R. (2014). Should Europe learn from Indian secularism? In B. Black, G. Hyman, & G. M. Smith (Eds.), Confronting secularism in Europe and India (pp. 39–59). New York: Bloomsbury. Coulthard, S. (2014). Red skin, white masks: Rejecting the colonial politics of recognition. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Eisenberg, A. (2009). Reasons of identity: A normative guide to the political and legal assessment of identity claims. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Eisenberg, A. (2014). Choice or identity? Dilemmas of protecting religious freedom in Canada. Recode Working Paper Series, Online Working Paper No. 24. https://www.recode.info/wp-con tent/uploads/2014/01/fin.pdf. Galeotti, A. E. (2015) Autonomy and multiculturalism. In G. B. Levey (Ed.), Authenticity, autonomy and multiculturalism (pp. 45–65). New York: Routledge. Grant, P. (2012). Imperfection. Edmonton, AB: Athabasca University Press. Hick, J. (1985). Problems of religious pluralism. London: St. Martin’s Press. Hoodfar, H. (1993). The veil in their minds and on our heads: The persistence of colonial images of Muslim women. Resources for Feminist Research, 22(3/4), 5–18. Hopkins, N., & Greenwood, R. M. (2013). Hijab, visibility and the performance of identity. European Journal of Social Psychology, 43, 438–447. Jaffrelot, C. (2007). The 2002 pogrom in Gujarat: The post-9/11 face of Hindu nationalist antiMuslim violence. In J. R. Hinnells & R. King (Eds.), Religion and violence in South Asia: Theory and practice (pp. 164–184). New York: Routledge. Locke, J. (1690). A letter concerning toleration (2nd ed.) (W. Popple, Trans.). London: Awnsham Churchill. Modood, T. (2005). Multicultural politics: Racism, ethnicity, and Muslims in Britain. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Modood, T., & Sealey, T., (2019). Secularism and the governance of religious diversity. Concept paper for: GREASE: Religion, Diversity and Radicalisation. https://bristol.rl.talis.com;http://gre ase.eui.eu/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2019/05/GREASE_D1.1_Modood-Sealy_Final1.pdf Nootens, G. (2014). Nationalism, pluralism and the democratic governance of diversity. In J. Jedwab (Ed.), The multiculturalism question: Debating identity in 21st century Canada (pp. 173–186). Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press. 8I

do not have space here to elaborate further upon this point, but have developed it in a number of other writings. See Sikka (2010, 2012, 2015).

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Nouh, Y. (Ed.). (2016). The beautiful reasons why these women love wearing a Hijab. Huffington Post, blog with multiple contributors. Retrieved July 2, 2018, from https://www.huffingtonpost. in/entry/the-beautiful-reasons-why-these-women-love-wearing-a-hijab_us_57320575e4b0bc9 cb0482225 Nussbaum, M. (2012). The new religious intolerance: Overcoming the politics of fear in an anxious age. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. Phillips, A. (2007). Multiculturalism without culture. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press. Phillips, A. (2015). Against authenticity. In G. B. Levey (Ed.), Authenticity, autonomy and multiculturalism (pp. 89–103). New York: Routledge. ‘Religion is not a race’: Quebec’s face-covering law heads for court challenge. The Current, November 09, 2017, CBC Radio. Retrieved December 13, 2017, from https://www.cbc.ca/radio/ thecurrent/the-current-for-november-9-2017-1.4393302/religion-is-not-a-race-quebec-s-facecovering-law-heads-for-court-challenge-1.4393380. Ruby, T. F. (2006). Listening to the voices of Hijab. Women’s Studies International Forum, 29, 54–66. Schalk, P. (2007). Operationalizing Buddhism for political ends in a martial context in Sri Lanka: The case of Simhalatva. In J. R. Hinnells & R. King (Eds.), Religion and violence in South Asia: Theory and practice (pp. 133–146). New York: Routledge. Sikka, S. (2004). ‘Learning to be Indian’: Historical narratives and the ‘choice’ of a cultural identity. Dialogue, 53, 339–354. Sikka, S. (2010). Liberalism, multiculturalism and the case for public religion. Politics and Religion, 3, 580–609. Sikka, S. (2012). The perils of Indian secularism. Constellations, 19(2), 288–304. Sikka, S. (2015). What is Indian ‘religion’? How should it be taught? In L. Beaman & L. van Arragon (Eds.), Whose religion? Education about religion in public schools (pp. 107–125). Leiden: Brill. Song, S. (2007). Justice, gender, and the politics of multiculturalism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Song, S. (2009). The subject of multiculturalism: Culture, religion, language, ethnicity, nationality, and race? In B. P. de Bruin & C. F. Zurn (Eds.), New waves in political philosophy (pp. 177–197). Basingstoke: Palgrave-Macmillan. Stone, S. L. (2014). Conflicting visions of political space. In R. Provost (Ed.), Mapping the legal boundaries of belonging: Religion and multiculturalism from Israel to Canada (pp. 41–55). New York: Oxford University Press. Wing, A. K., & Smith, M. (2006). Critical race feminism lifts the veil? Muslim women, France, and the headscarf ban. U.C. Davis Law Review, 39, 743–785.

Religious Violence in a World of Conflicts: A Phenomenological Narrative Sebastian Velassery

Abstract All religions answer questions regarding the origin and meaning of human existence, the nature of a meaningful life, the significance of suffering, the nature of evil and the ultimate purpose of human life. Religion also exhorts its believers to live a good life according to the values/virtues prescribed in holy texts. Given such an understanding about religion in general, then, the starting point of any discourse on religious conflicts necessarily has its base in religion itself. While this essay seeks to bring out the different dynamics of identity-construction in the name of religion on exclusive terms, on the one hand, it throws light on the religious practices which are constructed on relative considerations, on the other. I look at the issue from a phenomenological perspective. Keywords Multi-faiths · Constitutive justice · Sense of existence · Destruction of sense · Conflict · Self · Identity · Culture Human beings have been tempted by their religious hunger to unfurl the mysteries of this boundless universe on the one hand, and, most significantly, realize their own position on it on the other. The question ‘what is the role of religion’ has surfaced and resurfaced again and again in the human mind and all religions have endeavoured to direct different ways of addressing this question. Accordingly, different religions have provided their believers with a certain view of the world which has never been unprejudiced. All religions answer questions regarding the origin and meaning of human existence, the nature of a meaningful life, the significance of suffering, the nature of evil and the ultimate purpose of human life. Religion also exhorts believers to live a life according to the values/virtues prescribed in holy texts and conducts A few phrases/terms and some ideas have been taken from one of my article entitled “Life-world and Religious Consciousness” published in Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research, Volume 36, Issue 3, September 2019, pp. 405–15; co-authored with Dr. Reena Thakur Patra. Dr. Reena Thakur Patra do not have any objection to that. Also necessary permission obtained from the publisher. S. Velassery (B) Department of Philosophy, Panjab University, Chandigarh, India e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 B. Puri and A. Kumar (eds.), Re-thinking Religious Pluralism, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-9540-0_2

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a personal and social life. Given such an understanding about religion in general, then, the starting point of any discourse on religious conflicts necessarily has its base in religion itself. While this essay seeks to bring out the different dynamics of identity-construction in the name of religion understood in exclusive terms, on the one hand, it also throws light on the religious practices which are constructed on relative considerations. I look at the issue from a phenomenological perspective.

1 Religious Experience and Human Condition I am not logically and philosophically clear whether I shall be able to appropriate the meaning and worth of religious experience in these times of modernity or postmodernity. This is also the reason which makes me suggest that I shall not be able to draw any conclusion on the topic of religious experience. One of the reasons is that I am unaware as to what religious experience is. Is it confined within certain rituals that are part of every religion? Or can we say that religious experience goes beyond the boundaries of rituals and the practices that we have been conducting to propitiate the gods? It is at the same time certain that religion and its day to day practices have something to do with personal anxieties, impulses and needs. Therefore, one can effectively claim that religious experience points towards the inner life of a person. That is why some of the thinkers identified religion with the apprehension of the ‘Absolute’ and some others thought that religion has something to do with the notions of sacred and holy. But, all through the history of religions and man’s dependence on gods, religions have evoked a sense of dependence of man upon something that goes beyond his earthly experiences. Thus Abraham Maslow says that “the experience of transcendence is the dynamic source of all great religions, ‘the very beginning’, the intrinsic core, the essence, the universal nucleus of every known high religion” (Maslow 1964, 19). Understood Phenomenologically, transcendence has two features that are immediately evident. The first is that transcendence presupposes the existence of consciousness or subjectivity towards which man tries to reach out. The poet who meditates on nature seeks not only to expand his ego to the size of ‘Mother Nature’ and to become one with the larger entity, i.e. ‘Nature’ but also looks for consciousness or subjectivity that resides in nature and confronts his own inwardness. In his contemplation of nature, he seeks to confront and respond to the subjectivity that resides therein. The second feature of transcendence is that it demands otherness. Man needs the presence of an ‘other’ to realize herself/himself as a concrete and distinct being. Human subject needs the refractory otherness of the world around him for his existence. The unremitting need as well as the pervasive presence of otherness contradicts the demand for expansion and appropriation that is inherent in the primary urge for transcendence. We may say that such a contradiction is experienced as a tension as well as a paradox of transcendence. This accomplishment is, however, possible only by a confrontation with an otherness. Thus, St. Augustine has alluded to it in his Confessions when he referred to the restlessness of the heart that finds fulfilment in God alone. St. Thomas Aquinas takes note of a “native restlessness”

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within all creatures and especially in man to imitate the creator who is pure act. These observations suggest that religion is relevant to human existence and is to be understood in terms of our experience of God as supreme. These observations point toward the idea of God as a referent for religious consciousness. Now, can we say that the referent God is an ‘object’ of our prayers, supplications and worship? According to Paul Tillich, the referent ‘God’ does not specify a particular object because man has conceived and worshipped everything on earth and beneath the earth as objects of worship. He has all the more worshipped everything that goes beyond even heavens such as mist, mind, the stars, the moon and even the sky itself. It implies that a variety of objects can be made the objects of man’s worship. Therefore, we are forced to make a distinction between God as the real object of religion and the God that represents as symbolic constructs of religion. Martin Buber admirably points to this common fallacy in discussing the individual’s relationship to God in relation to Judaism, when he states, “whenever we, both Christian and Jew, care more for God himself than for our images of God, we are united in the feeling that our Father’s house is differently constructed than our human models take it to be” (Buber quoted in Horosz 1971, 309). Following Buber, we need to acknowledge that God as reality is far greater than our projections of His nature. Thomas Aquinas claimed a similar truth when he insisted that God as the object of man’s faith is beyond human understanding of His nature. My submission here is that there is a sharp distinction between man’s symbolic understanding of the ultimate reality and the ultimate reality itself. Therefore, we need to confess that the hypothesis of God by philosophers and theologians as the necessary being or as the highest being is symbolic.

2 Religious Object and Lebenswelt Phenomenologists have varied opinions on using the term God for the object of religious concern. As for instance, the term God will not be a proper substitute for such religious objects as the spirits of animistic religion, the Brahman of the Vedantins, or the non-self of Buddhism. Rather, phenomenologists use such terms like ‘sacred’ and ‘holy’ to indicate the object of religion. We can refer to one of the classic works in the phenomenology of religion—Gearardus van der Leeuw’s Religion in Essence and Manifestation: A Study in Phenomenology (1933) which is primarily devoted to the clarification of the term “object” of religion. Van der Leeuw’s phenomenological method involves systematic introspection and analyses the subject–object relation in religious experience between the ‘object’ that appears and the ‘subject’ to whom it appears. Van der Leeuw affirms that the relation brings about three levels of phenomenality, viz. the virtual concealment of the phenomenon, its gradually becoming revealed and its increasing transparency. According to him, these three levels of phenomenality are correlated with three levels of existence, viz. experience, understanding and testimony. In phenomenological terms, speaking, understanding and testimony constitute the procedure of phenomenology in religious experience.

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According to him, religious structures go beyond what is either merely experienced or abstracted logically or causally but can be stated as what is understood. Understanding leads to the sphere of meaning which is the third realm above subjectivity and objectivity and supported with primordial experience. Here, one distinguishes two dimensions of understanding which are my meaning and its meaning. As a phenomenologist, van der Leeuw holds on to epoche concerning God, Reality, but as a theologian, he argues that faith and intellectual suspense (epoche) do not exclude each other; rather, they supplement each other and do not act as mutually inconsistent. This revision consists of substituting understanding with ‘becoming understood’. One can question van der Leeuw’s failure to perceive the distinction between two goals he entertains, namely, understanding of religion as a phenomenon and the understanding of the transcendent that the phenomenon reveals. In view of the above observation, we can classify the object of religion under three banners. First, there is the God of the philosopher which comes under pure speculation and is said to be the first cause of everything. This is a theoretical entity which does not have an emotional appeal and leaves the devotee unmoved. This theoretical entity cannot evoke any emotional or religious sentiments in any human. We can say that this is said to be the God of scientific speculations which has nothing to do within one’s lifeworld and religious experience. The scientist goes far beyond the natural objects because his concern is the analysis of “states of affairs”. As Frings says “facts of science are “states of affairs” and their substrates are objects meant symbolically. Since their degree of relevancy to human life is less felt than the degree of natural experience, the latter exercises a much stronger effect on a human being, an experience which the scientist has, as soon as he leaves his laboratory, to find himself back in the world of natural facts, the milieu from which he cannot escape, the “naturliche Weltanschauung, or the Lebenswelt” (Frings 1970, 41). Second, religious consciousness is based on faith and experience. This is especially the case with mystics. The mystic as a devotee is not moved by speculation; rather he/she is ignited by an internal vigour that makes him/her seek the fulfilment of life in an entity which is outside of him/her. This is to suggest that devotee’s God is a personal entity who is experiential and thus distinctive. Third, there is an inner desire in every human subject to search for something as an object of his devotion. As Karl Gustav Jung has pointed out, when reality is so universal as the idea of God and worship, it can come only from an inner dynamism of man’s nature. Man’s inner nature longs for something that functions as an object of his devotion. Thus, we can argue that the God of the devotee satisfies such a need in man which can never be the theoretical ground of his experiences. The God of the devotee is a certainty for him that evokes feelings such as devotion, hope and trust and fills him with the feeling of mysterium tremendum et fascinans. What I am driving at home is the point that the intangible object of worship that man seeks in his everyday life becomes a tangible reality for him. Therefore, we have two types of entities that can be qualified as the object of religion (a) objects of saints and gods which are erected in Churches and temples and become an object of worship and (b) the sacred or holy idea behind those erected objects that go beyond the visible object which evokes a religious response.

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As a matter of fact, most of our knowledge is based on natural everyday experience, i.e. naturliche Weltanschauung. We cannot claim that the objects of everyday experience are constructed or abstracted; rather, they are a part of everyday sensibilities. As for example, I can mention two terms that are usually used in Indian philosophy which have identical meanings; they are jagt and samsar, so to say, the world. In fact, though these two terms have identical meanings, yet they are different. If the term jagat indicates an objective world which is shared by every human being, there is another world which is the subjective world of every man. This subjective world-samsar—is distinctively special as it is here I experience my feelings, ambiguities and perplexities. In fact, following van der Leeuw, I would say that it is in the samsar where my meaning contents of inner life are derived and wherein they represent me as a real fact. Apart from ‘its’ meaning, there is a ‘my’ meaning and this ‘my’ meaning is a lived meaning and becomes a lived fact for me. It is here that I live and experience the totality of my life; it is here that I realize my life as most real and proper. What is evident is the pre-theoretical dimension of personal experience that is present in the acts of consciousness. It suggests that every human being has a lived world apart from the objective world in which he is situated. This lived world is filled with passion and compassion and devoid of ratiocination. Following Scheler, I am inclined to argue that such experiences cannot be categorized under mere feeling, nor sensation, but are intentional. Following Merleau-Ponty, I would say that it is prior to all forms of perception and beyond reflective and analytic thought. In fact, our religious experiences are not directed by reason; we cannot claim that religious experiences of a devotee be labelled as an illusory experience. The religious world is the world of events and things as experienced by a devotee. As Durkheim insists, the sacred character of objects is not intrinsic to them, but something added by the religious consciousness. According to Durkheim, “the world of religious things is not one particular aspect of empirical nature; it is imposed upon it” (Durkheim 1961, 229). As Husserl insists, lifeworld is much more than the sum total of the physical objects. It is the world of immediate experience. Husserl describes it as the prepredicative world and its experience is pre-predicative. It is again described as ‘pregiven’ or ‘already there’ or pre-theoretical. It is a pre-theoretical attitude of naive world life. The world of a child is a perfect example of the lived world. According to Husserl, lifeworld should be called as a fundamental order of existence. Therefore, we need to distinguish lifeworld from the universe of science because the universe of science is constructed and not immediately experienced. In the case of lifeworld, it is prior to any kind of conceptualization and to the return of which one can overthrow the dogmatic positions of “standpoint philosophies, like empiricism, realism, naturalism, idealism etc.; which are prejudiced by an interpretation of experience antecedent to experience itself” (Husserl 1969, sec 26, 95–96). In the words of Aaron Gurwitsch, “reinstating the life-world in its original and authentic shape requires not merely turning away from every specific scientific interpretation, relinquishing the idea of the universe as already scientifically determined, as already disclosed as to what it is in itself, but also and above all removing and eliminating the very sense of scientific explicability as such and at large” (Gurwitsch 1970, 49).

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3 Phenomenology of Religious Consciousness In the preceding pages, I have been examining the meaning and significance of religion by taking recourse to Husserl’s concept of ‘Lebenswelt’. It is true that one cannot constitute the religious phenomena just like other objects of experiences. Phenomenological approach to religion focuses on seeking and demonstrating the religious consciousness appearing to man as a phenomenon. What is revolutionary in the phenomenological investigation of religion is the shift toward the sphere of consciousness as the focal point in the quest for religion’s essence and offers a new understanding of subjectivity, so to say, a reflexive plane of subjectivity. Following Bernard G. Prusak, we should admit that “in contrast to Husserl’s focus on the active, constitutive role played by the ego, this phenomenology probes radically passive levels of subjectivity…The ‘I’ no longer precedes the phenomena that it constitutes, but is instead called into being or born as the one who receives or suffers this intentionality … And inversely, the consideration of religious phenomena seems to lead to new possibilities for probing the depths of subjectivity” (Dominique 2000, 116). What is evident is the different conception of subjectivity by Husserl, Scheler and Heidegger. As far as Husserl is concerned, this primary experience of consciousness is a doxictheoretical experience of sense data which is the ground for reaching out to beings themselves. As Manfred S. Frings says, “Being is therefore, object-being and it is this notion of being against which Heidegger’s analysis in Sein Und Zeit are directed… Hence, neither simple, perceptive acts nor theoretical acts of thinking are at the bottom of Scheler’s subjectivity” (Frings 1970, 34–35). One can positively think that ‘doxic’ experience, ‘emotional experience’ and ‘practical instrumentality’ are the primary types of the constitution of subjectivity for Husserl, Scheler and Heidegger, respectively. Following the lines of argument put forward by Frings, we would say that these are the primary types of the constitution of subjectivity in these three thinkers. For Husserl, this is mutatis mutandis his conception of ‘Lebeswelt’, for Scheler it is ‘naturliche Weltanschauung’ and for Heidegger it is ‘Umwelt, ‘inauthentic existence’ or ‘Alltaglichkeit’ (Ibid, 36).

4 Religious Belief and Violence: The Problematic So far, we have been analysing religious experience by taking into consideration the phenomenological concept of Lebenswelt. If religious experience demands a new form of subjectivity which I call passive subjectivity and if religion is not at all a significant factor of one’s life, then why do we have religious conflicts and violence in the society? As, for instance, there are frequent violence in the name of religions in many parts of the world—in Afghanistan, Iraq, Sudan, Sri Lanka, Tibet and China, Israel, India, Nigeria, Lebanon, Northern Ireland, etc. More often, religions have been repeatedly used for fundamentalist and nationalist purposes. Now, the question

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is: why does the assertion of religious identities involve intolerance and bigotry? It is often seen that fundamentalists who are inclined to favour a particular religious ideology compel and control not only the behaviour of a group of people but also their beliefs? (Calhoun 1993, 405) The question that concerns all of us can be put thus: what precisely is the connection between religious belief and religious violence? Perhaps, an answer to this question may lead us towards the character and role of religion. Geertz’s definition of religion is pertinent here. Religion for him is “A system of symbols which acts to establish powerful, pervasive and long-lasting moods and motivations in men by formulating conceptions of a general order of existence and clothing these conceptions with such an aura of actuality that the moods and motivations seem uniquely realistic” (Geertz 1973, 98). Religion, in this definition, is seen as a component of the whole culture acquired or created by humans. We may also recall that in the social anthropological approach, religion is a creation of man. This conviction led Geertz to say: “our problem, and it grows worse by the day, is not to define religion, but to find it” (Ibid, 3). And he adds: “religion may be a stone thrown in the world, but it must be a palpable stone and someone must throw it”. (Ibid) The significance of religion in terms of anthropology or ethnology is solely connected to serve individuals or groups and also to perform as a model for rooted ‘mental’ dispositions. Anthropology thus has two tasks with regard to religion (McLean 1997, 169): (1) analysing the systems of meaning embodied in the symbols which make up the religions and (2) relating these systems to socio-cultural and psychological processes. These issues point towards seeking an answer to such questions as to what is the root of religious bigotry. Why do we violate the human dignity and worth of persons and groups in the name of a God who is believed to be the creator of all? We have seen in India for instance people destroy national monuments, which were suspected to be built by the followers of a certain faith and their identities do not agree with ‘my’ religious faith. We settle ourselves to single out our religious loyalties which are sufficient to guarantee us a spiritually rewarding and making the other human being and his faith inferior and worthless. These observations suggest that we need to reflect and begin to examine questions on religious conflicts. Let us start with concrete incidents that happened in Bosnia, Rwanda and Godhra, three of the ghastly enacted examples of religious brutality to man? These tragedies which are deeply rooted in man’s cruelty to man bespeaks a great deal about the weird and sometimes uncanny psychology which define our self-image and our self-worth. These kinds of violence in the name of religions make us reflect on our identities and thereby to ask a serious question whether religion is relevant to man and if so how far does it affect our lives? Let us turn our attention to these questions and try to find out an answer if any. Coming to the issue of violence, the important question that demands an answer is this: would I be able to make sense of my existence in a world which is constantly threatened by destruction of sense? This is also to suggest that the more I am aware of the sense of my existence, the more I am becoming aware of the destruction of my senses. In fact, my senses are threatened by the destruction of my sense of existence. Such thought points to certain serious questions: how does religious violence differ

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from other kinds of violence? What are the modes of its manifestation? Does it affect my senses? Does it have any implication to my sense of existence? Indeed, there is certain violence which is symbolic in character and there is also violence which is more barbarous and meant for the annihilation of masses. The irony is that both these types are fought in the name of religion and claims to be a part of Dharma. If history can be believed, the partition of India in the name of religion has cost the lives of 800,000 people and uprooted 14 million people. A deeper look into the psychology of religion makes us understand that there are not only differences in dogma but the commonality of insight among them also. Thus, all religions claim that all men and women are brothers and sisters and we should treat others as we treat ourselves. As for instance, Christianity advocates that “All things whatsoever ye would that men should do to you, do ye even so unto them” (Mathew, 7.12. (Holy Bible), King James Version) Judaism: “What is hurtful to yourself, do not do to your fellow man” (Talmud) Hinduism: “Do nought to others which if done to thee would cause thee pain” (Mahabharata 5.5.17) Buddhism: “Hurt not others with that which pains yourself” (Udavavarga 5.18). Although the unity of insights proclaimed by the pathfinders of religions was different in cultural traditions at different times, yet they were unique in advocating what we call harmony and unity. The underlying idea is that religions do not propagate violence but the people who are at the helm of religious groups are responsible for violence and conflict.

5 Makers of Absolute and the Intolerant Other An analysis of religious conflicts from a phenomenological perspective necessitates an exploration of the background and rationale of religious fervour in the contemporary society. What is more striking is the relation between religions and political powers. If we are given to understand that the divine is ineffable, then why are the organized activities in the name of religions? Therefore, the need of the hour is a re-examination of the ongoing relationship between religious leaders and political regime. To answer this question, I refer to the Babel story in the old testament of the Holy Bible (Genesis 11. 1–9, King James Version). The background of the story is Babylonian. Shinar is an ancient name for Babylon. (Babel) The narrative is divided into three parts: Verses 1–4, Verses 5–8 and Verse 9. The first part deals with humans who are the actors; the second part is a discourse in which Yahweh is the chief actor. The final verse is an explanatory supplement that includes a popular etymology of the name Babel and concludes the story. The story is this: The people of Babel gathered on the planes of Shinar to build a tower ‘a tower with its top’ in the heavens, to make a name for themselves, else they thought that they shall be scattered all over the world” (Ibid. 11.4). The Pyramid like tower was intended to reach heaven. The Lord came down to see the city and tower which those men had built and wondered as to what these human beings wish to do with this tower upon which they intended to enter heaven (as based on the Hebrew idiom which connotes “a tower

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into the heavens” as opposed to “a tower reaching towards the heavens”). There are three possibilities: (i) to ascend into heavens and wage a war against God; (ii) to take their man-made deities and set them up in the heavens to be worshipped and (iii) to ascend into the heavens and ruin them into bows and spears. This way they thought that they would gain a name and an identity. God intervened to thwart the builders of Babel from partaking of the powers and glory that belongs only to ‘Him’. The language of the builders was confused; so they could no longer communicate with one another. In their frustration, they abandoned the project. What is portrayed in the incomplete tower of Babel is a symbol of man’s sinful pride and rebellion. People wished for building a tower of Babel so that their selfimportance and egotism shall be satisfied. They thought that they can approach the ‘Almighty’ on their own self-serving terms and found that the gates of heaven cannot be stormed by sheer arrogance and pride. They realized that men and women must approach the Holy in reverence and humility. The tendency to create absolutes cannot reasonably allow discovering one’s self. The implication is clear. As suggested above in the discussion of the tower of Babel, differences in language represent real differences borne in modes of perception and expression. What is required from the human subject is dropping his tendency to form absolutes in one’s own image. The authentic self does not require an illusory absolute and makers of such absolutes cannot tolerate alternatives. We provide artificial sanctities that divide people in terms of religion, ethnicity, caste and race. More often than not, we forget that the divine response to the making of the absolute is contradictory to the character of that reality. These reflections suggest that we need to keep a distance in our belonging to a particular religion and yet a belonging in such distancing. Such a distance in belonging does not distort but dignifies one’s existence; it does not lead to conflicts but to the fulfilment of one’s humanity which can live in covenant with divinity. These reflections undergird the idea that the fundamentalist perceptions and attitudes do not come from religion itself and the God religion represents. In fact, religion is necessarily associated with the ideal of emancipation. Recent religious conflicts in different regions of the world have proved that religion to a certain extent has become a trap of modern man. In a way, religious absolutes have become prisoners of our own makings. Our religious accreditation in a particular religion has not made our world nicer and clean; in turn, we have made more people the victims of terror both physical and psychological. Some of our religious leaders are deprived of religious virtues and ideals; they were not living for certain truth; truth is that they made for themselves; in fact, they are thinking that they are the truth. Therefore, the ideal of emancipation which was supposed to be the primordial ‘discovery’ of religion has lost its discovered truth. Thus, in many societies, including Indian societies, modernization has accompanied religious fundamentalism instead of secularization. Many religious movements such as Islamist movements in different parts of the world, the Hindu revivalist movements in India, Buddhist Revivalism in Sri Lanka, Jewish fundamentalist movements in Israel and Christian fundamentalist movements in the U.S. are all modern phenomena of the product of non-distancing with a belongingness. These “partially eroded group personalities coalesce to form a new national entity” (Mazrui 1969, 334–35). Thus, the new national culture is replaced with the

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culture of the clerics, priests, Sadhus and political ideologies. As Gellner points out “they become secularized” (Gellner 1983, 78). In India, we have reason to believe that religious conflicts have been used inseparably with cultural conflicts. Religious fundamentalism is a factor of conflict, for instance, between Muslims and Christians in Bosnia and Chechnya, in the Philippines and Nigeria. It is again the major cause of conflict between Hindus and Muslims in India, between Buddhists and Muslims in Myanmar. We may also take into consideration the fact that those who ignite religious violence are generally not illiterates. In Serbia, we are told that they were mostly university professors. In India, religious terrorism is structured and patterned by a group of people who are highly educated and are vested with political powers. These egoistic self-promoters succeed in India because of the largely illiterate followers. That is why some of the northern states of India have become communal and have played significant roles in communal crimes.

6 Multi-faiths and Constitutive Justice The above reflections imply that religions have played a dominant role in the creation of religious conflicts when supported with political ingenuity. Though cultural nationalism is said to be a modern discovery in India, it nevertheless puts to use ‘traditional’ religious warrants. As Harsh Mander points out in an article in Indian Express recently, “open expressions of hatred and bigotry against Muslims have become the new normal, from schools to Universities, work places to living rooms, internet to political rallies. Even worse, they are forced to live with the everyday fear of hate violence. Muslim parents caution their children-don’t respond with “Salamalaikum” when we phone; in train, don’t wear a beard or skullcap or hijab; even if someone abuses you, don’t fight back. Public lynching carries the unassailable social message that Muslims are second class citizens: videotaped by the lynch mobs and triumphantly circulated, police typically responds by arresting the victims instead of the attackers” (Mander 2018, 14). What has happened to an 8-year-old child— Asifa—in Kathua of Jammu who does not even know as to what religion she belongs to is really an eye-opener to the Indian humanity. She was gang-raped brutally in front of the deity in a temple where we are not even permitted to enter by wearing a shoe. Ours is a culture where a menstruating woman or a person belonging to another religion is not permitted to enter into a temple. In such a place of divinity, an 8-year-old girl is allegedly raped for a week by intoxicant ‘religious’ persons including the police personnel is a blow to humanity and really shows our hypocrisy. We invoke the names of Gandhi and Buddha and boast ourselves as more humane and compassionate. Recently, what happened in Myanmar is an eye-opener. Thousands and thousands of Rohingya Muslims were thrown out from Myanmar with highly skilled appeals to mobilize support for Buddhists that has provided the movement with sacred authority along with political connivance. Poor Buddha, who is said to be the epitome of compassion, has not served to deter the Buddhists. What happened in Ujjain recently is really heart throbbing. A hospital run by the Christian missionary

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sisters were vandalized. These cases are pointers which made a section of people to ask questions like: where is justice? Are all protected in a political democracy like ours? If so, are we all protected equally? And, where are the caretakers of law and order? A glance at the newspapers in India on any given day is likely to reveal stories involving the struggles of religious groups to reinvent a new social and religious identity. What is at stake here is the false boundaries between people of a particular religion with another religious group and their religions. It necessarily invokes our attention to the vocation of our faith in a conflictual world in which we carve identities purely in terms of our religious groups. Often, we overlook a crucial, logically prior question: who belongs to society? Are we all equally belonging? Recent incidents in India make us aware that hatred towards other religious faiths does not simply grow on trees. They are, rather, the products of a sort of ‘religious engineering’ in which collectivities are moulded through the manipulation of religious identities, their Gods, the consequent fundamentalist perceptions and a range of other parameters. The point that I would like to make here is this: construction of our religious identities have explicitly made boundaries in our daily lives in terms of faiths and most of our leaders pretend that they are not answerable for the consequences.

7 Transcending Boundaries The above illustrations on the religious conflicts and violence obviously point towards transcending our religious boundaries which we have conveniently made to safeguard our imposed religious identities. We need to overcome our particular bias towards our individual faiths from which vantage point we measure others and their faiths. We follow a contractarian reading that has defined our religious, cultural and ethnic identities. Many of us are not able to transcend our sheltered faith which can appropriate the other and his/her worth and dignity. In other words, our proclamations on religious faith and the gods whom we have sheltered could not transcend the trivialities that we have been pampering in the name of a transcendent reality. In fact, our analysis of religious conflicts has been superficial and shallow given the intolerance and existing religious violence. Therefore, the hope for a peaceful society has increasingly become a fantasy or even a mirage. It seems that we have consistently ignored the profound human sensibility and devotion involved in religious faiths which have unfathomable spiritual roots. This is not to be taken as an isolated case in the so-called ‘secular cultures’ which have been a veil for our religious life. The fact is that many a time religion has been used as a concrete alternative for ulterior fundamentalist actions and nationalist purposes. The best example which can be illustrated is the case of Mohammad Ali Jinnah. Jinnah founded Pakistan with an exclusive ideology of preserving the religious identity of Islam, but it is an irony of the fact that Jinnah has never been a rigid faithful of Islam. We may have to take recourse to Swami Vivekananda for transcending our religious boundaries. During his lectures in India and abroad, Vivekananda consistently delivered a message of universal religion, which opens its

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gate to every individual. When he states that it is not the truth, but it is ultimately left to one’s inner likes and choices that determine his religion, it gets universalized. His concept of universal religion supersedes the conflicts between different sects and appears reasonable to them all. His concept of universal religion is a mixture of spirituality of the Hindus, the mercifulness of the Buddhists, the activity of the Christians and the brotherhood of the Mohammedans in practical life (Swami Vivekananada 2016, 79–80). According to Walter Connor, national and religious identity ought not to be confused; in fact, with regard to what makes for intense and enduring social loyalty, the wellsprings of national identity are more profound than are those advocated with religion (Connor 1994, 107). Though there are best-intentioned public efforts at overcoming religious conflicts in India and elsewhere, yet we are left with organized symptoms of religious terror which do not have adequate remedies. The reason is simple: religious conflicts refuse to acknowledge and appropriate the roots of human comity.

8 Relativize the Human Grounded Ties Now, where should we start from? I recall a beautiful instruction given to Abraham by Lord God in the Book of Genesis of the Old Testament. “Now the Lord had said unto Abraham, get thee out of thy country, and from thy kindred, and from thy father’s house unto a land that I will show thee: and I will make of thee a great nation, and I will bless thee, and make thy name great; and thou shall be a blessing and in thee shall all families of the earth be blessed… And Abram was seventy and five years old when he departed out of Haran” (Book of Genesis, 12: 1–4). The call of Abraham broke the silence of his inner self as well as the meaning of the universe. The call was meant to transcend and relativize the human grounded ties. It posits universality in human destiny that relativizes all conflict-engendering particularities. In short, the intercession of God was “metaphysical” in nature; Hence, Abraham was told: ‘Get you out’—let him get out of his old patterns of selfindulgence and all the old ways of life patterns. Abraham was told to get out of his human assumptions into a new and divine sensitivity. He was asked to discover himself as a new entity; Abraham was told to live beyond himself and also from the restraints of mental slavery; he was told to look into ultimate potentials and get rid of the apprehensions that he has been preserving for himself. Again, he was told to get him out from mental make-up; he was asked to go from where he was to where he can be. As instructed to Abraham, moving out of our own mental slaveries and old patterns, we should be able to share the divine life of inexorable becoming is the need of the hour. This unfoldment of the divine–human relationship is all about faith and religion. Once we are capable of comprehending the meaning of this unfoldment, there is the starting point towards a non-conflictual world wherein one acknowledges other religions and their gods. In fact, the call which was given to Abraham (to ‘get out’) should be understood as the vocation of all religions in a conflictual world of today.

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9 By Way of Conclusion So far, I have been trying to look at the issue of religious violence in the name of a God who is said to be the symbol and ‘object’ of all religions. Now, the question arises as to how we shall be able to combat religious conflicts? I am tempted to believe that religious conflicts can be arrested by creating an awareness of the reality of our religious practices and beliefs. In fact, most of our religious practices and beliefs are conditioned by our culture, tradition and customs. Therefore, the question is whether we shall be able to desist from our belief systems including religious practices. The issue is the relativity in our religious practices and customs. If we do not come to a new understanding of each religion’s uniqueness, the problem of religious conflict will disrupt our society. I recall an incident when Sikhs were brutally killed in this country after the assassination of Mrs. Indira Gandhi; many Sikh gentlemen were compelled to shave off their beards and pretend to be Hindus. Similar examples can be adduced from many parts of the world which suggest that most of our religious practices and customs are structured on the cultural edifice and thus relative in nature. What is suggested is the need to get out from what we have been to what we could be which demands a new depth of subjectivity, which I called earlier as the passive plane of subjectivity. In this passive plane of subjectivity, the ‘I’ does not lead the phenomena it constitutes, but is the one who receives this intentionality. The directionality of consciousness is no longer outward in nature but is directed toward itself, so to say, intentional in the sense of coming back to itself which I called the passive subjectivity. Such a path of inward transcendence is a distancing in the midst of belonging and a belonging with a distancing. In the phenomenological tradition of philosophy, distancing amidst belonging constitutes the initial stage of phenomenological reduction which in turn provides the certainty of the self. Phenomenologically understood, distancing in the midst of belonging has two features that are immediately evident. The first characteristic is that distance presupposes the existence of consciousness or subjectivity towards which man tries to reach out. The second feature of distancing with belonging demands an otherness within oneself. Human subject needs the presence of an ‘other’ to realize himself/herself as a concrete and distinct being. All of us need a religious other or a cultural other which enables to realize the certainty of the ‘self’. Let me sum up these reflections with a striking excerpt of the thirteenthcentury mystic Muhyuddin Ibn Arabi of Murcia: “There was a time when I used to discriminate against my neighbour because of his ethnicity or religion. That time is long gone. My heart has become a meadow for the grazing deer, a monastery for the monk, Torah Scrolls for the rabbi, a Kaaba for the pilgrim. I profess the religion of love, and whenever its caravan will turn to, I shall follow.”

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References Calhoun, C. (1993, December). Nationalism and civil society: Democracy, diversity and selfdetermination. International Sociology, 8(4), 387–411. Connor, W. (1994). Ethno nationalism: The quest for understanding. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Dominique, J. (2000). Phenomenology and the theological turn; the French debate (J. L. Kosky, Trans.). Fordham University Press. Durkheim, E. (1961). Elementary forms of religious life. New York: Collier Books. Frings, M. S. (1970). Max Scheler: Focusing on rarely seen complexities of phenomenology. In F. J. Smith (Ed.), Phenomenology in perspective (pp. 32–53). The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. Geertz, C. (1973). The interpretation of cultures. London: Hutchinson. Gellner, E. (1983). Nations and nationalism. Ithaca: Cornel University Press. Gurwitsch, A. (1970). Problems of the life-world. In M. Natanson (Ed.), Phenomenology and social reality (pp. 35–61). Dordrecht: Springer. Horosz, W. (1971). Religion and culture in modern perspective. In C. Feaver & W. Horosz (Eds.), Religion in philosophical and cultural perspective. New Delhi: Affiliated East west Press. Husserl, E. (1969). Ideas 1 (W. R. B. Gibson, Trans.). London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd. Mander, H. (2018, March 24). Indian Express Daily. Maslow, A. (1964). Religions, values and peak experience. New York: The Viking Press. Mazrui, A. A. (1969). Pluralism and national integration. In L. Kuper & M. G. Smith (Eds.), Pluralism in Africa. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. McLean, G. F. (1997). Ethnicity, culture and ‘primordial’ solidarities. In P. Peachey, G. F. Mclean, & J. Kromkowski (Eds.), Abrahamic faiths, ethnicity and ethnic conflicts (pp. 143–174). Washington D.C.: Council for Research in Values and Philosophy, Cardinal Station. Swami Vivekananda. (2016). The complete works of Swami Vivekananda (Vol. 8). Kolkata: Advaita Ashram.

Religious Diversity: Epistemic and Ethical Pluralism

Philosophical Hermeneutic of/for Religious Pluralism: Some Methodological Considerations S. Lourdunathan

Abstract If heterogeneity is the case for existential pluralism, the epistemic issue is—to what extent is the philosophical sense-making of the social world epistemic– pluralistic so as to rationally enhance religious pluralism? This is the central issue while rethinking religious pluralism. The essay provisions a hermeneutics of philosophical sensibilities that enable religious pluralism anchored on an ethics of equality, justice and solidarity. The facticity of cultural and religious heterogeneity calls for a metaphysical, epistemic and ethical justifiability, especially in the context of the erosion of it (by modes of monolithic claims) as the only possible mode of human– cultural existence. Differencing ontological monism, ontological dualism, ontological pluralism and critical pluralism, and juxtaposing each with the other, I argue that monolithic centrism is (historically and socially) non-viable given the conditions of human existence. To consider being as one-and-only-one or even in terms of two ultimate modes, unfortunately, projects a life world that succumbs to autocracy, value degradation and appropriation of existential multiplicity. Critical epistemic and ethical pluralism provides the theoretical space enabling togetherness of theory and practice. Such pluralism provides the normative conditions of a pluralistic social life. Keywords Contextual pluralism · Conceptual pluralism · Epistemic pluralism · Critical theory

1 Problematic How we make sense of the social world and how is such a sense-making, philosophically pluralistic? This question constitutes the foundational query of this essay in the context of rethinking religious pluralism. The question I wish to clarify here is: to what extent are the sensibilities of the religious world views philosophically pluralistic? The answer to this question can in turn help to construe the defence of social–contextual pluralism. One might also ask what are the epistemological S. Lourdunathan (B) Visiting Professor of Philosophy, Centre for Philosophy, School of Social Sciences-I, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 B. Puri and A. Kumar (eds.), Re-thinking Religious Pluralism, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-9540-0_3

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(philosophical) grounds that are in defence or discontent of religious pluralism? If and when, is the heterogeneity of truth-claims, viewed as the viable ground for religious pluralism? The epistemic issue would then be: how is the heterogeneity of truth-claims a justified truth-claim? If it is a justifiable truth claim how does it enable or disable multicultural and religious pluralism? As a response, this essay attempts to clarify the hermeneutics of philosophical sensibilities that enable religious pluralism with an attuned question‚ namely‚ to what extent does religious pluralism entail an ethics of equality, justice and solidarity. The facticity of cultural and religious heterogeneity calls for a metaphysical, epistemic–ethical justifiability, especially in the context of its erosion, by modes of monolithic claims as the only possible mode of human–cultural existence. I argue that there is no good reason to hold, (as some philosophical positions did) monolithic-centrism as the only possible condition of human existence. Because monolithic centrism (as a set of philosophical and cultural claims) is historically antithetical to the conditions of human existence. Put otherwise, between monolithically justified belief and pluralistically justified beliefs, the latter gain more currency when philosophically (epistemically and ethically) positioned taking into account‚ the diverse philosophical theorization transmitted through the history of philosophy.

2 Territory of Pluralism: Contextual and Conceptual 2.1 Contextual Pluralism The sensibility of pluralism is heterogeneous and one can primarily identify pluralism as a fact of human life distinguishable as cultural, social, religious, economic and political pluralism. Such pluralism is termed contextual pluralism which is different from philosophical or cognitive pluralism. The rich plurality of ethnicities, languages, terrestrial differences, biodiversity, diversity of forms of life, religious and cultural variations in practice, etc., refer to the contextual or social practice of pluralism. Contextual pluralism is strengthened by theoretical (philosophical) pluralism. Socially identified, contextual pluralism accepts differences as a fact of life and in so doing avoids any form of extremist or exclusivist or monolithic positions and engages social relations as not conflicting but quite to the contrary‚ as enabling‚ of each other. Contextual pluralism is anti-totalitarian and is sharply at odds with cultural exclusivism. Writings and politics that engage in a discourse against the forms of totalitarianism such as semitism, racism and casteism are all forms of contextual pluralism. There exists a relation between contextual pluralism and conceptual pluralism in terms of mutually entailing and enabling each other. While contextual pluralism is a fact of human existence, conceptual pluralism corroborates it. Contextual pluralism is based upon philosophical pluralism and philosophical pluralism entails cultural pluralism.

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2.2 Conceptual or Philosophical Pluralism The heterogeneous sense of pluralism is identifiable in terms of ontological cum epistemological pluralism. This is also known as theoretical or philosophical pluralism. Ontological pluralism refers to the idea that the senses of being are multiple. There are different ways or modes in which the sense of being is conceived. There is no only one absolute sense of being. It is the doctrine that a logically perspicuous description of reality will use multiple quantifiers which cannot be thought of as ranging over a single domain. Ontological pluralism is thus contrasted with ontological monism. However, one may argue that ontological dualism is also a form of pluralism, in the sense that, it affirms the mode of being as more than one.

2.3 Ontological Monism and Dualism Ontological monism and dualism are in sharp contrast with ontological pluralism. Ontological monism as a philosophical system is accused of being reductionist in its approach or understanding of reality. Such a position springs largely from Platonic transcendental idealism. The idea, is that the pure episteme as understanding, stands away or divorced, from multiplicity. Plato, for example, declared that there existed an ideal realm of epistemic forms and that philosophers could gain some access to this realm by intense thought (by intuitive appropriation). The realm of forms as he has conceived it is eternal, beyond time and space. Mathematically understood theorems are supposed to be true statements about entities that already exist in the platonic realm, irrespective of whether anyone ever knows their truth. We call this last belief mathematical platonism or ontology of Plato. Platonism presupposes that there is a single thing called universals (for example, mathematics whose fundamental nature is in conformity with time). Universals are inevitably true and the understanding of universal truth-claims is also inevitable to human beings. The problem with ontological monism or Platonic monism is that it neglects subjective consciousness and ethical dispositions for the sake of providing or construing a singular impersonal account‚ not of existential plural reality‚ but of what is supposed (pre-judged) to lie behind reality. The scholastic medievalism extends platonic monistic reductionism to the reformulated theo-logos (interpreting God as the Word and as the trans-world word) who is ontologically positioned beyond the realities of the worlds. Ancient and mediaeval Western European philosophy always insisted upon a ruling idea as the governing principle of the reality of the world. For the early Greeks, such a governing idea varies from individual to individual. However, they posit a singular idea/principle as the ultimate stuff of the universe. Thus, early Western philosophy harps on a monistic theory of reality or monistic theory of truth. In the seventeenth century, in spite of rationalistic orientations, modernist philosophers like Spinoza and Descartes conceived that God was supposed to ensure that

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bodies moved in accordance with ‘His’ laws. In the late modern philosophical sensibilities, such monistic or dualistic ontologies, are no longer considered acceptable, at least by way of re-thinking or questioning, them. One result of these developments, wholly unanticipated at the start of the twentieth century, has been to shift the emphasis away from the truth as an absolute concept and towards the probability of truth and the human attempts to its implementable provability. The word ‘pluralism’ is used in cultural, ethical‚ as well as‚ in philosophical contexts. In the last case, it is usually interpreted ontologically: in other words, it claims that the world in itself has more than one ultimate substance (Davies 2006). Ontological pluralism denies that there can be singular or dual modes of being which exist simultaneously by mode of intersubjectivity. It denies the consideration that there are gradations of being—that something exists more (meaningfully) than others. Rather than nothing, there exist something and that something is not exclusivist but inclusive and simultaneous. The existential diversity of modes of being (different worlds of beings) calls for different expressions of it, different words of being or a plurality of interpretations of beings (epistemological pluralism). Modes (worlds) of beings and the interpretations (words) of beings are plural and hence plurality is considered as an irreducible plurality. The metaphysics of pluralism implies epistemological pluralism that holds that there are different modes of being (not gradation of beings) and that there are different ways of knowing or interpreting/understanding beings. There is no absolute or singular or objective sense of knowing beings and this is what is known as epistemological pluralism.1

2.4 Epistemic Pluralism When we use the word ‘pluralism’ we intend it to be interpreted in a purely epistemological sense. Empedocles’ material pluralism, Heraclitus’s flux, Aristotle’s substance pluralism, Russell’s logical pluralism, William James’s ‘radical pragmatism’,2 Karl Popper’s theory of ‘descriptions’3 and Ludwig Wittgenstein’s notion of language games, etc., argue that there is no overarching, single, fundamental ontology, but only a set of overlapping interconnected ontologies ineluctably leading 1 For

a detailed reading about pluralism in science, see Kellert et al. (2006).

2 ‘Radical empiricism’ is opposed to a more singular, monist position and absolutism. James argued

that our experiences of empirical events diverge, and one explanation could never encompass all of those experiences. 3 Descriptions are regarded as human creations, whose relationship with the true nature of the world varies from case to case. Two descriptions may overlap, and should ideally agree with each other when they do. Inadequacies of a description are handled by reducing either its domain of applicability or claims about its accuracy. The goal of scientific investigation is not to progress towards a single description of the world because the world may be too complex for this to be possible. One can however, realistically hope to understand better the domains of applicability of different descriptions, and to find a description appropriate for every type of physical phenomenon. Descriptions provide (partial) understanding of the world.

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from one to another. Descartes characterized these as matter and mind. The relationship between phenomena and noumena in Kant’s work has been a matter of much debate, which we do not attempt to resolve (Davies 2006). Popper’s three worlds relate to physical entities, mental states and the contents of human thought, such as social institutions and scientific theories (Popper and Eccles 1977, 38).

2.5 A Case for Pluralism from Recent Philosophy of Science Epistemological pluralism is in concordance with‘ontological pluralism’.4 Epistemic pluralism holds that there are multiple approaches to knowing. Working in direct opposition to reductionism, epistemic pluralism is inherently hesitant of an over-reliance on a single theoretical approach, and, thus, emphasizes that numerous approaches to knowledge are needed to seek an enhanced truth (Michaud 2015, 77). Taking into consideration the recent advancements in the philosophy of science and mathematics, E. Brain Davies, in his essay on “Epistemological pluralism” argues, “A number of those actively involved in the physical sciences anticipate the creation of a unified approach to all human knowledge based on reductionism in physics and Platonism in mathematics. We argue that it is implausible that this goal will ever be achieved, and argue instead for a pluralistic approach to human understanding, in which mathematically expressed laws of nature are merely one way among several of describing a world that is too complex for our minds to be able to grasp in its entirety” (Davies 2006). He continues, “There is only one world, but we argue that we will probably always have to content ourselves with a wide variety of overlapping ways of understanding it.… The pluralism that we discuss pertains not to the world itself, but to our attempts to understand it in terms accessible to our limited mental powers. We accept that the world is a unity, in spite of the fact that we have no workable description of it in such terms… Whatever might be the ultimate goals of some scientists, science, as it is currently practiced, depends on multiple overlapping descriptions of the world, each of which has a domain of applicability. …These descriptions change over time, and are valued on the basis of the understanding that they provide. Scientific progress is achieved by creating new descriptions, abandoning obsolete descriptions and modifying the domains of applicability of existing descriptions. We will see that descriptions are not currently ordered in a hierarchy, and argue that there is no compelling reason to believe that all descriptions of the 4 There

are varieties of ontological pluralism that include post-second world war or first generation of pluralism, and second generation of pluralism. Post-second world war pluralists used the concept of heterogeneity in a much more constricted sense to defend and promote self-interested interest groups. However, more recently, there has been a return to multiplicities, and Donna Haraway’s (1988) description of ‘situated knowledges’ and ‘embodied objectivity’, in which she argues for ‘epistemologies of location’ where claims of knowledge can only be considered partial, resurrects James. The argument here is that a return to such original notions of pluralism helps validate the diversity of experiences and knowledges that grow out of the variety of ways we are all situated in any number of experiences, including environmental degradation.

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world will one day be deduced from a single fundamental theory” (Ibid). Ludwig Wittgenstein in his Philosophical Investigations argues that propositional representation (picture theory of meaning) is one of the many other ways in which epistemic sense-making is possible.

3 Critical Theory as a Methodological Consideration to Rethink Religious Pluralism 3.1 The Principle of Togetherness as Pluralistic From the foregoing discussion, we may position that pluralism is factual and conceptual. It is factual by being plural and it is conceptual by being understood pluralistically. Context of pluralism entails the concept of pluralistic perceptions. Thus we can broadly locate two types of pluralism, i.e. (i) the sense of pluralism as a fact of life or as social practice, namely Contextual Pluralism (ii) and the sense of pluralism as a philosophical position, which may be called Conceptual (cognitive) Pluralism. Pluralism as social practice fore conditions (aforestructures) it as a theory. The synchronization of theory and practice thus entails the pluralistic social life-world. Pluralism as social practice and as a philosophical position, if understood one in exclusion of the other, will only lead to a lopsided pluralism, logically rendered as the fallacy of exclusivism. The social practice of pluralism entails the theoretical understanding of it. This may be stated from a Kantian perspective as, concepts without percepts are empty and percepts without concepts are blind (Smith 1979, 168). This is a functional principle of togetherness. What does the togetherness principle mean? The principle of togetherness of theory and practice implies that a theory devoid of practice and a practice devoid of its theory simply do not exist or are wholly meaningless. The complementarity of the theory/practice of pluralism can otherwise be termed foundational pluralism. On the other hand, if pluralism is expressed in terms of separation of theory vs. practice it can be termed as naïve/accidental/mitigated/accommodative pluralism. Speaking in the Aristotelian terms of substance and accidents, pluralism needs to be substantial and not accidental. In Hume’s terms, pluralism as a theory is the necessary condition of the practice of it and vice versa. In the complementarity of theory and practice, there is a fundamental principle upon which religious pluralism needs to be perceived for reasons of both text-contextual plurality of existence. The essence and existence enveloping each other make plurality profoundly aesthetic. It is a principle which regulates the relationship and the interplay between the theory of religion and the practice of religions as plural. In this way, the theory–practice is reconsidered as a critical pluralistic position.

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3.2 Critical Theory as Mediation of/for Ethical Pluralism One of the schools of philosophy that strongly proposed the facticity of pluralism (both in theory and practice) is the critical tradition known as the Frankfort school. That argues for a sense of critical pluralism. There are different senses of the use of the pre-fix ‘critical’. Critical pluralism is critical if/when pluralism is only practical (as social) not necessarily theoretical. It implies that the philosophical is the basis for the practical and vice versa for reasons of authenticity. The principle of togetherness of theory and practice as pluralistic is further corroborated with the position of critical theory that “recognizes that the role of theory in the attempt to transform society is not to justify or legitimize or provide normative sanction, not to rationalize what is happening anyway, but rather to critique, to explore conditions of the possibility for change. For the critical theorists, being pluralistic is insufficient for a theory of society. A theory of society should be enabled and positioned from the point of view of an ethic of emancipation. The role of such critical theory is not to describe how things are, (merely epistemically pluralistic) but rather how they might become, how things could and should be, but are not, yet” (Cutrone 2004). Put otherwise, critical theory of pluralism is understood both in terms of foundational pluralism (concomitance of the theory and practice) and a critique of it in the sense of extending or re-conceptualizing (rethinking) pluralism on an ethical basis (ethical pluralism). The critical theory perspective is conceived as a way to challenge the practice of ontological and cultural monism and naïve relativism by ways of uncovering the limitations of each theory. The centrality of the tradition of critical theory lies in its commitment to theoretical, methodological and social pluralism. Ultimately, critical pluralism as a theory aims to guide humans towards emancipation from the dominating principles of ontological and cultural monism. The critical theory approach empowers persons to think critically and question the status quo that pervades in claims of cultural and philosophical monism‚ dualism and naïve relativistic pluralism. This is done via a reflective re-evaluation of the social world and its theoretical foundations, social policies and programmes, with the aim of attainable and meaningful (philosophical and social) transformation. Critical theory is engaged to set free (from forms of reification and deification) theoretical preconceptions that advance monolithic forms of existence and the attuned social practices of domination. This is done through a reflective evaluation of theory and practice in society and by identifying means of change as well as developing attainable goals towards meaningful transformation. The acceptance of multiplicity as the precondition of philosophical engagement and political–social action is central to critical pluralism. Critical pluralists argue towards the transformation of society free from undue capitalism, social (environmental) justice beyond material distribution, democratic and representative political participation beyond power relations, inter-subjective understanding and particular forms of solidarity namely solidarity

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(unity without uniformity) that centres on the process of reconciling difference with the need for concerted political action.5 According to Horkheimer, critical theory that promotes pluralism is “adequate only if it meets three criteria: it must be explanatory, practical and normative… all at the same time. That is, it must explain what is wrong with current social reality, identify the actors to change it, and provide both clear norms for criticism and achievable practical goals for social transformation” (Moisio 2013, 559). Any truly critical theory of society, as Horkheimer further defined, “has as its object human beings as producers of their own historical form of life” (Horkheimer 1993, 21). For Horkheimer, “a capitalist society could be transformed only by becoming more democratic” (Moisio 2013, 560), to make it such that “all conditions of social life that are controllable by human beings depend on real consensus” (Horkheimer and Adorno 1972, 249–50) in a rational society. The normative orientation of critical theory, at least in its form of critical social inquiry, is set towards the transformation of capitalism (ontological/contextual monism) into a “real democracy”. (Ibid). Habermas argued that diverse theoretical and empirical approaches are needed to support informed social criticism.

3.3 Demarcation of Theory/Practice as a Way of Critically Understanding Religion’s Disposition Critical theory has always confronted itself with one crucial methodological concern: the “theory/practice” problem. Prior to critical theorists, one may consider the fact that David Hume makes a distinction between ‘is versus ought’. By way of differentiating, Hume strikes at the distinction between prescriptive and descriptive statements. The prescriptive statements for Hume are ethical whereas the descriptive ones are factual. Put otherwise, existential plurality in itself does not make a position ethical, rather its prescription, namely the ontological and epistemic disposition, must be ethical in the sense of attuning transformation and not necessarily subordination to its centre.6 Critical pluralism thus argues for the need to demarcate between theory (understanding) and social practice and ethics of theory/practice. When critical theory or critical pluralism as the methodology is applied to a rethinking of religions and their conceptual dispositions, there arises the need to differentiate theory versus practice versus ethics of religions per se. By way of demarcating the theory versus practice

5 The

contributions of Jürgen Habermas; Axel Honneth, Richard Rorty, Donna Haraway and Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari are of importance to the contribution of critical pluralism. 6 This separation has been at the basis of those ethical theories that have not recognized moral statements as a truth-property. In other words, alternative reading to the “is/ought” relation have defended either a cognitivist approach (truth-validity of moral statements) or, alternatively, a noncognitivist approach (no truth-validity), as in the case of Emotivism.

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versus ethics of religions, critical theory attempts to critically rethink or reposition the claims of pluralism. How religion(s) can be understood as pluralistic (in its disposition) or what kind of pluralism a religion is advocates, can be clarified by separating its theory (or philosophy of religion) from its practice. As the Critical Theorist Theodor Adorno puts it, the separation of theory and practice is necessary for emancipatory considerations. In order to understand whether a particular religious ethos is either foundationally or partially pluralistic, it is necessary that we separate its theory from the cultural expressions or practice of it. Prior to the claim that one’s religion is pluralistic, it is necessary to consider what kind of pluralism is claimed of the religion concerned. If and when such pluralism is a foundational type of pluralism then only can such a type of religious pluralism be deemed ‘wholly’ meaningful. If a religion is not wholly pluralistic then such a type of sense-making is only partial and thereby, the religion concerned advocates an accommodative or mitigated type of pluralism. When we apply this type of understanding (hermeneutics of pluralism) of pluralism to religions, the searching question is—what type of religious pluralism do religions (like Hinduism, Christianity, Islam, Jainism, Buddhism, etc.) advocate? Devoid of foundational pluralism any claim that a particular religion/culture is pluralistic is only a claim for partial pluralism and hence does not entail that the religion concerned is foundationally pluralistic. Unless a religion’s cultural position is constituted by the principle of togetherness of pluralism in philosophy and practice, it cannot be said to promote pluralism.

3.4 Understanding Knowledge as Interest-Bound as a Way of Understanding Religion In Knowledge and Human Interest, Habermas argues that knowledge systems are not value-neutral, for its own sake, i.e. “knowledge for the sake of knowledge” (Habermas 1972, 314). He held that “Knowledge is guided by human interests namely selfpreservation. The self-preservation interests can be clarified by analyzing the kind of (social) interest knowledge is meant to serve. Is the interest instrumental for the perpetuation of a dominant presence of an ideology and its political interests or is it endowed with emancipatory interests of the whole” (Ibid, 312). As Habermas clarifies: “… human interests …derive both from nature and from the cultural break with nature” (Ibid). And what is needed is to find the emancipatory force of knowledge the fundamental interest of human beings. Habermas’ critical theory thus brings home insightful implications, such as, that knowledge or understanding of the social world is not value-neutral and transcendental in the sense of ‘in itself and for itself’, knowledge is not objective as has been claimed by the positivist school. Since knowledge is strictly embedded in serving human interests, it follows that it cannot be considered value-neutral and objectively independent. Herbert Marcuse’s in his work on One Dimensional Man (1991) exhibits an analysis of the genealogical roots of capitalist

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ideology and he traces them to religious ideological underpinnings. Adorno, in his essay “Freudian Theory and the Pattern of Fascist Propaganda” (1951) argues that the hierarchical domination at the social practical world is interconnected with a sense of hierarchy adjudicated at the theoretical level. Adorno notices that expressions of domination reappear under different guises in the modern cultural industry through the consumption of so-called “cultural commodities”. Therefore, the question is what kind of knowledge interest has religious knowledge been ascribed of? What kind of cultural commodity is a religion clothed with? Critical theorists maintain the normativity of philosophical conceptions such as truth or justice, at the same time as‚ they want to examine the practical contexts in which they may be best promoted. Critical theory attempts to move from ideology to theory and theory as a social practice. It attempts to expose the myth of ontological monism in modernism (ideological and moral promises—enlightenment paradox) and augment it for emancipatory interests.

4 Postmodern Claims of Critical Pluralism The writings of postmodern thinkers amply evidence the claims for (ethical) pluralism as against forms of oppressive ontological monism and dualism. Their contributions can‚ in turn‚ shed light towards understanding religions pluralistically.

4.1 Critique of Meta-Narratives Francois Lyotard argues that “the possibility of a Hegelian ‘unity of knowledge’ came to be disproved by Physics, by the realization that electrons can travel in two different paths thorough space simultaneously. All this leads towards the need for pronouncing “incredulity towards meta narratives, the reason to doubt lies in the very rationale of modernity” (Lourdunathan 2017, 32). Lyotard holds that the social bond (religious bond, for example) is itself a language game, each of our nodes on a communication net, intercepting and resending messages throughout the system. These messages affect the nodes in the language game, causing “moves”, “displacements” and “countermoves”, all of which potentially enhance and enrich the system by creating innovation and novelty. He further states that the postmodern society employs many language games and uses many narratives. It is filed up with a galaxy of micro-narratives and it does not rely on a singular narrative. We grab too many stories to legitimize our differentia of stands. Hence, Lyotard suggests maintaining an incredulity towards “meta-narratives”. Postmodern thought accepts that there cannot be a fixed, static paradigm for legitimation in a system that is fluid, organic and constantly in flux in its process of growth. It is more apparent now than at other previous point in history that we are living in a world of accelerating technological change, and flexibility of the players‚ to create new moves and rules

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will be crucial to society’s functioning. Permanence has always been an illusion, and aligning our interactions and interpretations of society and knowledge more with the notion of transience and ephemerality will only serve in our favour. Lyotard argues that claims such as totality, and stability, and orderliness, common good, the universality of truth of modern society is but a grand narrative or master narrative which is what the modern story, the dominant culture‚ repeats for reasons of its dominance. A “grand narrative” in the modern culture is the story that democracy is the most enlightened (rational) form of government and that democracy, can and will, lead to universal human happiness. According to Lyotard, every belief system or ideology has its grand narratives; for Marxism, for instance, the “grand narrative” is the idea that capitalism will collapse in on itself and a utopian socialist world will evolve. Grand narratives are a kind of meta-theory, or meta-ideology, that is, an ideology that explains an ideology (as with Marxism); a story that is told to explain the belief systems that exist. Lyotard argues that all aspects of modern societies, including science as the primary form of knowledge, depend on these grandnarratives. Lyotard’s version of postmodernism is then a critique of grand narratives, the awareness that such narratives serve to mask the contradictions and instabilities that are inherent in any social organization or practice. In other words, every attempt to create “order” always demands the creation of an equal amount of “disorder”, but a “grand narrative” masks the constructedness of these categories by explaining that “disorder” is chaotic and bad, and that “order” is rational and good.

4.2 Need for Deconstructing Ontological Textuality Jacques Derrida known for his ‘Deconstruction’ provides yet another methodology in defence of critical pluralism. In most of his writings, Derrida strongly criticized and questioned the underlying monolithic (ontological monism as logocentrism) assumptions of Western philosophical traditions and Western culture. In so doing, his writings gained both philosophical and political responses. It is not far-fetched to claim that Derrida’s writing exposed the kind of text-centred racism ingrained in Western philosophico-cultural traditions. His claim that there is nothing outside the text (Derrida 1997, 163) indicates the need for de-centring the text unto which meaning is appropriated and idealized. Derrida argues that we, as humans, are textual and textualized beings. Put correctly, we are textualized texts and we are texts themselves. And hence, we are not we. We are born from/into/through texts and die by texts. We are born into the textual grounds which is pre-texted. For example, if someone is born in a Christian tradition (whose generation parents are Christians) s/he is a texted Christian. If someone is born in a particular caste or race, s/he is texted by his/her caste/racial origin. The point is to get rid of the centric-textualities unto which we are sensed as objectified entities. We are pre-texted before what we are and we know what we are. We are pre-fixed by pre-fixations. Our logos are ‘ontologos’. We speak the texts that others have already spoken; and the texts we speak are

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not our own but cultural, philosophical, political. We speak words that are already spoken, codified, grammatologized, structured, classified and culturally transmitted. We speak the pre-given words/texts. We are normalized to speak the words in the way(s) the superior-other, the race-other, the caste-other, the male/female-other, the religious-other, the he- or she-other likes/dislikes to hear them. According to Derrida, words or expressions (text) do not possess a singular authoritarian meaning because they are structured, in and through, the given cultural context. If and when words are attributed to singular and essential meaning, Derrida argues that such positioning of a text is logocentrism (Derrida 1997, 3). Meaningfulness of a text is not singular, as it has been held by positivism, according to which a statement is meaningful only by its verification. Meaningfulness of a text is not singular as has been held by medieval thinkers according to whom a statement is meaningful, if and only if, it is in coherence with a set of ideas. Texts are construed and institutionalized and written/spoken in/through our cultural premises. Language constructs reality and reality in turn constitutes language. There is nothing beyond the text, and this means that language serves as a coloured glass that colours our ways of seeing (Me/Other) and as a distortion/discrimination through/by the pre-textuality of cultural patterns of language. Prejudice of discrimination is not only social, an out-there reality to be rescued of, but it is already an in-construed/constituted/endowed/by language (texts) through which we speak ourselves and others speak. This ‘linguistic reality’ constitutes a particular type of context that is cultural. Language is thus both a prism and an imprisonment. Therefore, it is not the world that primarily stands in need of liberation but the word of worlds that we speak stands in need of liberation. The ideologically patterned linguistic-cultural reality that calls for hypersensitivity before we claim the out-world stands in need of liberation and we are specially called to bring about social justice to the poor unequal social world. The word of our own world is illegitimate and unethical in that it needs a primary sense of deconstruction (liberation). It is this type of (contextual) language scheme/game/gimmicks that stands in need of deconstruction for Derrida. Belonging to, or ascribing, of hierarchical textuality (political contextuality) and simultaneously to speak about nonhierarchy is not only contradictory but a self-imposed negation.7 Derrida observes that the most effective way of domination (which he calls it metaphysics of presence) unleashed by Western metaphysics is by giving priority to Phonocentrism (Speech-Power-Centre) (Ibid, 11–12) against writing (Gramme). Derrida says, to begin with, the sense of domination exists in the form of speech-power position, which he names as Phonocentrism. Phonocentrism is but the politics of speechpower that defines who/what has the power to speak for himself and for others, and in so doing represent or silence the voice (speech) of others. Derrida identifies different levels of the politics of speech or Phonocentrism. The primary negation that ought to be negated, which is otherwise, the practice of deconstruction. The project of deconstruction considers that language is cultural and political. It is cultural by 7 Without

this primary ‘salvation’ from our own attributed linguistic reality, one cannot speak or bring about ‘equality’ in social reality for we are linguistically ‘possessed’ of high/low deviations.

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its traditions and political by virtue of construing hierarchical binary relations. The cultural is linguistic and the linguistic is cultural. This is the context of text and there is nothing outside the text, that Derrida speaks about. Is there a way out of this deadly circularity, namely the text to text and the text to context-text? Deconstruction, therefore, is to read the text in their cultural combinations/ramifications/manifestations; it is to render the text by its manifestations of meaning(s) or historical apriori attributions; it is to de-decipher its contextuality and ideological textualities. This is why Derrida argues that ‘there is nothing outside the text’. It is to read the text in its own verbal–structural combinations; it is not to read the text to another context for reasons of its application or dethronement. The reader while reading the text enters into a contested context and thereby explores its historical apriority. This is what is meant by reading a text contextually. The textual-context calls in a contested continuum from its configurations. For Derrida, a word in a linguistic structure is but a sign with multiple possibilities of significations. Attributing a singular sense of meaning to a text/word is a violation of it for there is the possibility of difference of sensibilities. Say, for example, the word ‘hot’. Is there a singular sensibility ascribed to this word? Derrida would say, ‘what is hot in the word ‘hot’?’ Take, for instance, the text ‘holy’. Now the question is what is ‘holy’ in the word ‘holy’ is a matter of artificial cultural inhibition. There is no essence of meaning to a text. To attribute an essential (logo-centric) meaning, Derrida would term, the politics of the text. According to Derrida, a text in question calls for an understanding of it. One has to decipher the linguistic culture (context or situation), in and through which, such and such text has been construed in its tradition. Because a text in a linguistic culture is constructed by different ways and its meaning is imposed and composed by multiple layers of sensibilities. The manner of unfolding or de-covering the differentia of the layers of meaning is what he calls deconstruction. Derrida holds that understanding of a text calls for the deconstruction of its multiple sensibilities and becoming aware of the politics into which a particular meaning is used as dominant in relation to, or in opposition with, other sets of meanings. He has argued that understanding a text requires a ‘grasp’ of the ways in and through which it is construed or it is related with other texts/things/world; it requires the capacity to differentiate and relate the text with other sets of texts (meanings). Deconstruction for Derrida does not mean nihilism or relativism. It is not the abandonment of all meaning but attempts to demonstrate that meaning is a matter of arbitrariness. Derrida considers that deconstruction is not an enclosure in nothingness, but an openness to the other and an attempt “to discover the non-place or non-lieu which would be [that] ‘other’ of philosophy” (Chueh 2004, 88). It is a sort of self-enclosure, a sense of logo-centrism. The term ‘deconstruction’, refers to the way in which the ‘accidental’ features of a text can be seen as betraying, subverting its purportedly ‘essential’ message.8 Rorty (1995) (The word accidental is usually interpreted here in the sense of incidental).

8 See

Rorty (1995) for his reinterpretation of deconstruction.

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5 Philosophical Hermeneutics and Its Critical Pluralism The discussion of Gadamer and Richard Rorty is identified as philosophical hermeneutics. Rorty and Gadamer position that as humans we are interpretative and the interpretations are multiple and this, in turn, supports the proposal of foundational pluralism as the mode of being (not having) of the social (religious) world. This is “because meanings cannot be grasped directly and all meanings are essentially indeterminate in any unshakeable way, interpretation becomes necessary, and this is the work of the hermeneutic enterprise” (Josselson 2004, 3). Fundamental to Heidegger’s hermeneutic is the notion of the human as an existential (worldly) being. For Heidegger, being hermeneutical is an ontological priority as it is fundamental to the nature of our very own being. Being situated in a world of beings, interpretation or hermeneutics is the way of being in the world. In being situated primarily in a world, humans disclose themselves through interpretation. For Heidegger, the kernel of hermeneutics is a movement from the as-structure to the fore-structure. The interpretation becomes primordial, only when the fore-structure (hermeneutical situation) consisting of fore-having, the fore-sight and fore-conception (Puthenpurackal 1987, 240). Drawing on the Heideggerian concept of ‘being-in-the-world’ Gadamer suggests that hermeneutics is not a method but a fluid set of guiding principles aiding the human search for truth in the concealed forgetfulness of language. Gadamer asserts that human existence is thoroughly and inescapably historical, it is, in the world. Differentia in interpretation is possible because we ‘belong’ to different cultures and through conversation and dialogical communication there arise a ‘fusion of horizons’ (See Gadamer 2006, 304; 336; 366; 389; 397) that foster the backdrop of any ‘communion’. Gadamer’s view of the hermeneutic project is that good interpretation results from a fusion of horizons, through dialogue, with the text. If the primary goal of interpretation is not the passive reflection of what was in the speaker’s mind but the exegesis of the implicit meanings in the text, then the horizons brought to bear on the interpretation offer a context of understanding which can be enriching to theory (Josselson 2004, 9). The fusion of horizons is the space for the departure from our individuality towards a sense of common or ‘shared understanding’. Hence, the meaning is not merely a matter of a singular theoretical or canonical ground as informed by some individual or institutional authorship, as if it is waiting to be unlocked by a professional, by means of any scientific or structural interpretation. Rather meaning emerges as the text and the interpreter engage in a dialogue, in what Gadamer calls ‘hermeneutical conversation’. The result of which is the possibility of communion, an intersection of the horizons. Thus, the interpretation of reality or a text is not the exclusive property of the so-called scientific observation in terms of objectivity (or official traditionalism in terms of axiological coherency) but a differential of sensibilities that includes the psychological, historical, social, cultural, religious and

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‘linguistic’9 enterprises. For Gadamer, any hermeneutic circle entails a dialectical relation between the pre-conceptions of the interpreter and the text. Truth/meaning transcends the limits of scientific methodological interpretation (meaning lies in the method of verification), namely the cannons of scientific interpretation. It calls for a philosophical hermeneutics not necessarily as a method of determining truth but as an activity to understand the conditions which make truth possible, the conditions under which or the context in and through which, something is asserted to be true/meaningful. Hence, hermeneutics is not the method or the how of interpretation but it is an investigation of the very nature of understanding how our understanding of a particular truth is constituted as meaningful. Thus, hermeneutics (unlike the theological enterprise of it as a method of biblical interpretation) transcends the concept of the method of interpretation or the procedure of interpretation. It goes beyond the limits of methodological reasoning. The truth/meaning of a text/word/language/culture is revealed not by the method of its interpretation but by understanding or discovering the conditions for understanding its meaning. There is no singular ‘scientific’ way of understanding the picture, there is an aesthetic cum cultural experience of it, in order to understand the picture in its wholeness. Thus, truth transcends mere objectivity. The truth of art surpasses the truth of science. There is no one singular canonical manner by which the truth of art (human sciences) can be experienced. Paul Ricoeur distinguishes between two forms of hermeneutics: a hermeneutics of faith which aims to restore meaning to a text and a hermeneutics of suspicion which attempts to decode meanings that are disguised in the text-context (Josselson 2004, 1). Hermeneutics of faith is a dialectical process among the believer and what is believed rooted through a historical–narrative–performative tradition. The Me and the Other is reconciled in it as religiously cultural. The hermeneutics of faith can be conceived of as the dialectical process that brings the religious and individual in a specific order of relationship. The aim of the hermeneutics of faith is to represent, explore and/or understand the subjective world of the participant and/or the social and historical world they feel themselves to be living in. But the aim of hermeneutics of suspicion is to render one critical of the orthodoxy and rigidity ingrained and politicized by certain pre-structures of the given religious pre-text or culture and its thought. It conceives that religious language (and its attuned social practice) limits our understanding and thereby limits the authenticity of our beingin-the-world. A hermeneutics of suspicion attempts to decode meanings that are disguised. From a vantage point, the hermeneutics of faith is the exercise of the hermeneutics of suspicion that problematizes religious claims and narratives and ‘decodes’ meaning beyond the orthodoxy of the text. The hermeneutics of suspicion or demystification broadens the contours of narrative inquiry. While faith in the narrative is about outlaying the text produced as a piece of meaning that can be interminably reinterpreted, the demystifying hermeneutical endeavour would seek to deconstruct and reproach the deception that is inherent with text (Ibid, 1–28). 9 Wittgenstein in continuation of Gadamer’s hermeneutics sees meaning as linguistically contextual

revealed in its uses or what he calls ‘language games’.

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Leaving aside the technicalities of philosophy of hermeneutics, we may emphasis three-dimensional factors for engaging philosophical hermeneutics with reference to the affirmation of a plurality of interpretations. Philosophical hermeneutics insists that (i) as humans we are necessarily interpretative (Heidegger) that is to say that the mode of our being is fundamentally hermeneutical, (ii) our interpretations are not arbitrary or isolated acts from transcendental subjectivity (transcendentalism) or scientific objectivity (scientism) but from the situatedness in the world (standpoint) in the sense that our understanding is rooted in the historical–cultural–social context (Gadamer, Dilthey, Saussure) in which we belong and (iii) finally, the mode of being hermeneutical is not fore-closed (caught in hermeneutic of circularity) or concealed by the conditionality within the boundary of a tradition (text-contextuality) but hermeneutical engagement fosters a ‘pathway’ of towards being-in-the-world (human) by mode of hermeneutical conversation (Gadamer) in the sense that our interpretations of the world are both relationally communitarian and directional. Further by way of engaging philosophical hermeneutics, (using insights from Rorty and Gadamer) we can argue that both hermeneutics of faith (textual and contextual hermeneutics) and hermeneutics of suspicion need to be consistently exercised in order that religious pluralism is strengthened. Thoroughgoing critical pluralism strengthens religious pluralism as foundational (epistemic–ethical) and consciously cautions away from a hermeneutics of absolutism, epistemic non-absolutism or epistemic relativism. Hermeneutics of faith (religion) interpreted as an exercise of textual–contextual orientations in view of plurality without losing sight of a hermeneutics of suspicion is a critical mode of interpreting faith. Here lies the possibility of religions being pluralistic with an ethical orientation as positioned by metaphysical and epistemological pluralism.

6 Conclusion From the foregoing discussion, we are credited with some methodological considerations towards a rethinking of religious pluralism. Almost all religions are construed with a specific philosophical sense of the social world (knowledge) and the religious practice of their philosophical positions. One may identify ontological monism, ontological dualism, ontological pluralism and critical pluralism as the possible foregrounds of religious–philosophical dispositions. Critical theory when ontologically rendered is critical pluralism. Critical theory presents a viable alternative for social and political philosophy and reconsidering religious pluralism more authentically. As an ethical enterprise-critical theory is normative in relation to its attempt of a transformation of a Kantian ethics of autonomy into a conception of freedom and justice in which democracy and democratic ideals play a central role (Horkheimer 1993, 22; Horkheimer 1972, 203). Being as plural is different from having as plural. The philosophical thus legitimizes the practical and the practical construes the philosophical sense of pluralism. That philosophical pluralism provisions the metaphysical, epistemological and moral pluralism; the foundation for contextual pluralism,

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in whose absence, the truth conditions of/for contextual pluralism is jeopardized. Strengthened by insights from critical theory tradition (regarding pluralism) the separation of religious theory or philosophy from its practice is necessary to understand whether the religion in-question is endowed of the principle of togetherness of theory/practice pluralism. In so doing, clarity about, the kind of conceptual bearings (monism, dualism, pluralism or critical pluralism) that religions are characterized of becomes inevitable. The searching questions to consider religious pluralism would include—is a religion ascribed of ontological monism both in theory and in practice? Is a religion ascribed of pluralism (as a principle of togetherness) both in theory and practice? Is a religion ascribed of an exclusivist sense pluralism, namely pluralism as a social practice but not necessarily as a theoretical practice? Put otherwise do religion(s) promote foundational or mitigated senses of pluralism? What kind of pluralism are religions construed of/with? What is the interest of religiousknowledge interests? The contribution of Habermas engaged in as a methodology of understanding religious pluralism is to see what kind of knowledge-interest a religious culture is construed with. It becomes important to ask if its knowledge-interest is emancipatory of the social. Engaging in philosophical hermeneutics once again opens the affirmation of a plurality of existence and a plurality of meanings of existence, but cautions against the hermeneutics of mystification by an interactive mode of the hermeneutics of faith and suspicion. I conclude that religious–philosophical description about the social world if it relies on ontological monism, fails to fit into the scheme of pluralism and is thereby liable to promote contextual monism or reductionism. Such sense-worlds stem from appeals to an authoritative epistemology (epistemological monism) as against the evidential epistemology of critical pluralism (ethical pluralism) highlighted through recent philosophical developments.

References Adorno, T. W. (1951). Freudian theory and the pattern of fascist propaganda. Psychoanalysis and the Social Sciences., 3, 279–300. Chueh, H.-C. (2004). Anxious identity: education, difference and politics. West Port: Praeger Pub. Cutrone, C. (2004). Theory and practice reconsidered: the role of ‘critical theory’. https://philosoph ersforchange.org/2014/03/18/theory-and-practice-reconsidered-the-role-of-critical-theory/. Daves, E. B. (2006). Epistemological pluralism. Available through philosophy of Science Archive. https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3083/. Derrida, J. (1997). Of grammatology (G. C. Spivak, Trans.). Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press. Gadamer, H. G. (2006). Truth and method (Second, Revised Edition J. Weinsheimer & D. G. Mars, Trans.). London, New York: Continuum. Habermas. J. (1972). Knowledge and human interest (J. J. Shapiro, Trans.). Boston: Beacon Press. Horkheimer, M., & Adorno, T. W. (1972). Dialectic of enlightenment. New York: Seabur. Horkheimer, M. (1982). Critical theory. New York: Seabury Press; reprinted Continuum. Horkheimer, M. (1993). Between philosophy and social science. Cambridge: MIT Press. Josselson, R. (2004). The hermeneutics of faith and the hermeneutics of suspicion. Narrative Inquiry., 14(1), 1–28. Lourdunathan, S. (2017). Postmodern readings of philosophy. AAC Pub: Culture and Religion.

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Marcuse, H. (1991). One dimensional man. New York: Routledge. Michaud, G. (2015). Epistemic pluralism in public policy: the critical theory and neuroscience perspectives. The Evans School Review, 5, 76–84. Moisio, O-P. (2013). Critical theory. In A. L. C. Runehov & L. Oviedo (Eds.), Encyclopedia of sciences and religions (pp. 558–560). Dordrecht: Springer. Popper, K. R., & Eccles, J. C. (1977). The self and its brain, an argument for interactionism. London: Rutledge. Puthenpurackal, J. J. (1987). Heidegger through authentic totality to total authenticity. Leuven University Press. Rorty, R. (1995). From formalism to poststructuralism. In The cambridge history of literary criticism (Vol. 8). Cambridge University Press. Smith, N. K. (1979). A commentary to Kant’s ‘critique of pure reason. London: Macmillan. Kellert, S. H., Longino, H. E., & Waters, C. K. (2006). Introduction: the pluralist stance. In S. H. Kellert, H. E. Longino, & C. K. Waters (Eds.), Scientific pluralism volume XIX in Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science. The University of Minnesota Press.

Religious Pluralism and Ethics Abhishek Kumar

Abstract There are countless religions in the world apart from the so-called world religions like Christianity, Islam and perhaps Buddhism. But, there is a fundamental division among these religions and this is the division between monotheistic religion and the religions that are polytheistic. Monotheistic religions like Christianity and Islam make a distinction between a world that is eternal and untouched by the contingencies of the world of humans—a world that is the ‘home’ of gods. Polytheistic religions on the other hand make no such stringent division between the world of gods and the human world. Gods are regular visitors to this world in all their physical reality and temporal here and now. The essay explores the crucial differences between the ethics that emanates from monotheism and ethics that is part of the spacio-temporal reciprocity of gods and humans of polytheism. My contention in this essay is that the ethics that is commensurate with polytheism is also commensurate with the secular perspective of human life. In this context, there will also be a discussion of Dharma and Dharmic ethics which addresses the volatility and contingencies of human life and the ethics that can address the challenges presented by them. Ethics of monotheism makes the truly moral life well-nigh impossible in this world while dharmic and polytheistic ethics are deeply embedded in the necessary spacio-temporal contingencies of this world. Keywords Polytheism · Monotheism · Moral self · Spacio-temporal · Dharma Religion is generally associated with beliefs in the existence and efficacy of beings who transgress the bounds of spacio-temporal contingency of the world of our sense. The efficacy of such beings consists in their power over the destiny of the human world. One can think of the semitic religions, on the one hand—Christianity, Islam and Judaism; and the innumerable non-semitic religions. The interesting thing about I am indebted to Prof. Mrinal Miri for what I say in this essay. Some of the ideas in it emanates from an unpublished paper of his which I had the opportunity to read. A. Kumar (B) Guest Faculty, Centre for Philosophy, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 B. Puri and A. Kumar (eds.), Re-thinking Religious Pluralism, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-9540-0_4

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the semitic religions is that all of them believe in one supreme all powerful being who is eternal, i.e. beyond the limits of temporality, and who controls the destiny of the human world through his “moral” reign over this world. The pervasive moral interest and its attendant difficulties also open up the possibility of another powerful eternal being who opposes the supremacy of the other and create hurdles in his work. This is the “Devil” of Christianity. Religions which believe in this kind of a supreme being, let’s call it God, are designated monotheistic. As opposed to this there are religions which believe in multiple powerful beings who are not bound by the spacio-temporal limitations of the human world, and who wield power over human destiny. Such religions are called polytheistic. Hinduism, in some of its varieties, is polytheistic. Most of what we call folk or tribal religions are polytheistic. Popular Buddhism is polytheistic. But Buddhism, in its origin, is neither polytheistic nor monotheistic. It does not believe in any powerful eternal, non-contingent beings at all. The most pervasive presence of religions is in the life of human communities which are bound together by common performance of rituals, and reiterations of faith, which have evolved through time. For both monotheism and polytheism rituals are necessary because they are essential instruments of being in touch with the powerful beings beyond our world, in the absence of ordinary knowledge. The development of rituals in different varieties of Buddhism is of particular interest and requires special understanding. There is also the strand in most religions which lays down the possibility of a spiritual confrontation with a being or beings which transcend the spacio-temporal limits of our world. But spiritual or mystical confrontation with non-temporal reality must be ineffable, because our language is necessarily spaciotemporal. The philosopher Wittgenstein’s words, therefore, seem to be the last word on this matter: “Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent” (Wittgenstein 1999, Sect. 7). Monotheistic religions regard God as the guardian of human morality. Although God is eternal and beyond the limits of our spacio-temporal world, God can with total strictness supervise man’s adherence to his moral commands which he has issued through his special revelation to man. This morality is universally applicable to all men (including of course women) without exception; they are also totally unconditional—independent of any human contingencies. It is interesting to compare this account of morality with a modern secular account which has a very large following among philosophers—the Kantian account. The moral/immoral distinction applies to human actions emanating from our free will. It is reason that is universally present in all freewill wielding humans that underlies this distinction. The will issue commands for action and these commands are called imperatives.[A very strange way of explaining the genesis of human action!!!]. An imperative is either “hypothetical” or “categorical”. A hypothetical imperative is conditional: if you want something, then you must do something else; therefore not universal. A categorical imperative is unconditional—obeyed not for any other end but for itself, therefore universal. All moral imperatives are categorical. As philosophers have pointed out, there are many, to my mind, insurmountable difficulties with Kant’s theory. Take the claim about universalizability. Reason alone,

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unaided by anything else, determines the moral/immoral distinction. This raises the most profound objection to Kant’s theory—emotions, and most importantly traits of character are totally irrelevant in determining the morality of an action. The truly moral self acts independently of any consideration of the contingencies and conditionalities of the empirical world. There are of course temptations and distractions on the path of action; but reason—the principle of universalizability—enables me to do the moral thing by deciding for me in the midst of these temptations and distractions. My character, what I am as a person, (e.g. honest, caring for my dignity and honour, self-respecting as well as respecting others, kind and loving, just, courageous, unbiased assessment of my as well as the other’s motives) does not come into the picture at all. The idea that the truly moral self (the universalizability driven agent) is thus characterless, is unacceptable for various reasons, but perhaps more than a sufficient reason is that it is unrealistic in the extreme. It completely defies our understanding of the ethical life. There are other serious difficulties with Kant’s theory—some of them specific to his particular version, and others with the type of the theory as such. One difficulty that has to do with the particular Kantian articulation of the theory is: if morality is necessarily contingent upon the possibility of free action, the question to ask is, how is free action possible if the empirical self is totally embroiled in the causal nexus of the world? The free self is transcendent; how does it then get embroiled in action which is necessarily a part of the phenomenal, empirical world? The similarity between Kantian ethics and strict monotheism is quite striking. The moral imperatives (commandments) issue from one and only God, who is transcendent, and eternal. Disobedience to a divine imperative is immoral, sinful and necessarily generates guilt. One is thus moral or immoral, sinful or pure, guilty or not guilty independently of the circumstances and conditionalities of life in the world—independently of who or what one is, what kind of cultural and social milieu one belongs to, what the commonly shared values of one’s community are in terms of which one’s character is moulded and assessed. Historically the requirements of absolute monotheism proved all but intolerable. The Old Testament is a record of mutiny, of spasmodic but repeated reversions to the old gods whom the hand can touch and imagination house. About monotheism of Christianity, I content myself with quoting an authoritative western voice, Pauline Christianity, “while retaining something of the idiom and centralised symbolic lineaments of monotheism, it allowed scope for the pluralistic, pictorial needs of the psyche. Be it in their trinitarian aspects, in their proliferation of saintly and angelic persons, or in their vividly material realisation of God the Father, of Christ, of Mary, the Christian churches have, with rare exceptions been a hybrid of monotheistic ideals and polytheistic practices. The single, unimaginable, rigorously speaking unthinkable God has little to do with the threefold, thoroughly visualized pantheon of the Churches”. (Pauline Christianity in Steiner 1971, 39). A much more plausible way of looking at morality is to suggest that morality is not given apriori, it is fashioned by humans, and, in the manner of its functioning, it acquires a sort of authority, which goes beyond its contingent origin. One of ¯ the clearest statements of this is to be found in the Dharma Shashtras; Apastamba Dharma S¯utra: “Right and wrong (dharma and adharma) do not go about saying

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‘Here we are’; nor do gods, centaurs (gandharvas) or ancestors say, ‘This is right, this is wrong.’”1 (Doniger 1991, 11). The proper arena of the moral is the world of vyavaharika satta, the world of our ordinary, day to day life. There is also, of course, according to most Indian schools of thought, the “world” of paramarthika satta, the world, beyond our ordinary experience. But this “world” since it is beyond the limits of spacio-temporal particularity, is ineffable and cannot have room for any judgments as such, including moral judgments objects of which are spacio-temporal particulars. The widely accepted view among philosophers nowadays that morality is, in important ways contextual, fits in well with this account of the moral/immoral distinction. Let us look briefly at a possible understanding of dharma as expounded by Manu. As AK Ramanujan says, “One has only to read Manu after a bit of Kant to be struck by the former’s extraordinary lack of universality. He seems to have no clear notion of universal human nature from which one can deduce ethical decrees…To be moral for Manu is to particularise - to ask who did what, to whom and when”. (Ramanujan 1989, 45–46). All aspects of dharma are context-sensitive: relative factors of dharma, appropriate to each stage of life, each station or class, each given nature, each community, most importantly, dharma of apada—extremity. God does not love impermanence, change; the liberated soul—free from the deep predicaments of the moral life—achieves eternity, changelessness, permanence. Morality, on the other hand, is the child of the incredibly diverse contingencies—the vyavaharika uncertainties, confusions and volatilities of human life. Dharma, as morality or ethics, as the regulator of human conduct, is therefore of this world—ever sensitive to its contextual particularities. The context sensitivity of dharma is what enables its application to the most intransigent of human dilemmas (apada). Sanatana dharma—abstract normative principles—that the human condition teaches us for general guidance for leading a fulfilling human life. Sanatana dharma admits of exceptions depending on the complexity of contexts in which a particular situation of ethical predicament is embedded or encapsulated, as the philosopher Collingwood might have said. Unravelling of the capsule in a conflict situation; detailed, sensitive, and imaginative attention to contexts on both sides—a painstaking and arduous effort. Here the ego and propensity to deceive oneself are the main enemies. Take the traditional mother-in-law-daughter-in-law syndrome, or in the moral-political sphere, the case of Kashmir. The best way to describe the origin and nature of morality is to say that it is an internal regulatory system honed by vastly complex human contingencies and its purpose is to show humans the way to a life of fulfilment and well-being. What then about polytheism and morality? Nietzsche, one of the most insightful of modern philosophers says of polytheism, “In polytheism lay the freedom of the human spirit, its creative multiplicity. The doctrine of a single Deity, whom man 1 na dharm¯ adharmau carata a¯ vam sva iti. na devagandharv¯a na pitara ity a¯ caks.ate ‘yam dharmo ¯ ‘yam adharma iti’. (Apastamba Dharma S¯utra 1.7.20.6.) (Pandeya 1969).

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cannot play off against other gods and thus win open spaces for their own aims, is ‘the most monstrous of all human errors’” (Steiner 1971, 38). The Indian pantheon of gods, other divine, semi-divine beings, rakshasas (malignant demons) is a triumph of a community’s mythical imagination. The primary theatre of activities of gods is the temporal world itself—the vyavaharika world—not the eternal—timeless world of spiritual bliss (about this a little later). It is in this world that gods, humans and demons act out their morality play—gods sometimes in opposition to each other and sometimes in friendly collaboration, frequently embroiled in human conflicts; and in consistent deadly opposition to demons, and sometimes to powerful humans. The puranic stories, one might say, are, in one way of looking at them explorations of the possibilities of the ethical life. They are almost never the last word on what is moral and what is immoral; but they are pointers toward further reflection on what it is to lead a good life here in this world. Take, for instance, the story of Bhasmasura, of Shiva and Sati, of the coming into being of Ganesha. The point of it is that it is in this world of space and time which is the arena of the moral life, and gods as well as humans act out their morality play. (The stories are not themselves didactic giving unambiguous moral lessons—but more occasions for critical reflection on morality—the moral and the immoral). What makes it possible for us to ask the question, what is it for me to lead a good life? and seek an answer to it needs no appeal to a transcendent atemporal reality. Everyone knows that simply to pursue what you want and avoid what you fear is not the stuff of morality. If those were your only motives, then you are not within morality, and you do not have, in a broader phrase, an ethical life. And soon enough we learn that mere self-indulgence and fear were not all that were expected. We soon come to recognise someone’s ability to act selflessly, feel the awakening of the emotion of shame, recognise the virtues of courage and justice, develop a sense of honour and dignity, respect for others and self-respect. It is these and much more that are the stuff of the ethical life. The truly moral self, unlike the moral self of Kant and stringent monotheism, is shaped by them. To pursue the ethical life is a continuous effort to build the ethical self in the rough and tumble of the vyavaharika reality. And you do not need either a transcendent “Reason” or a transcendent “God” to explain why we feel that the ethical motive must have a sort of necessity attached to it. Just reflect on the assertion “I must do this” made on some occasions, say by a painter after a long layoff from painting, “I must start painting again”. This is not an ethical must and does not require the imposition by an external agency (e.g. reason or God) for it to be intelligible. Similarly, it is not difficult to understand the “must” of “I must do the honourable thing” without making a reference to either Kantian reason or a monotheistic God. There are necessities which are neither logical, nor empirical, nor imposed by the divine—they may simply be human necessities (ethical psychology as part of moral philosophy). The dharma discourse which is thought to be the Indian counterpart of the moral discourse of the western intellectual tradition is obviously very different in crucial aspects from the latter. For a start, all aspects of dharma are context-sensitive: appropriate to each stage of life, each station or class, each given nature, each community. Most importantly, the idea of dharma of apada—extremity. If dharma is regarded as

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the regulator of moral conduct, then obviously morality is inseparable from contingencies: it is the child of incredibly diverse contingencies—the vyavaharika uncertainties, confusions and volatilities of human life. Think of the dharmic provisions to meet the predicament of a married couple’s childless existence; or the predicament of a marital tie that is beyond the limits of normality. The dharma discourse is unparalleled in its recognition of the possibility of the waywardness of human desires, diversity of human relationships and human predicaments and the need to bring them within the limits of the ethical. The vyavaharika world is subject to change in time from generation to generation, from age to age. Hence yuga dharma. In conclusion, I would like to say a word about spirituality. We do talk, for instance, about a quality of the spiritual permeating the life and actions of a person in this world. We also believe that we may err in attributing such a quality in a particular case. Gandhi thought that the only criterion of authenticity here is morality; the truly spiritual must be truly moral. Perhaps this is a claim that is worth discussing in the context of Gandhi’s thought. But I would like to end with a thought which may in fact be totally useless in trying to understand the quality of the spiritual. Still for whatever it is worth: to be touched by spirituality in one’s actions and conduct is to exhibit a natural innocence in one’s behaviour an ease in doing the right thing, a total absence of contrivance and a compelling transparency of motives—in short, to be at home, to be at ease with life of the ethical. In any event, polytheism is a philosophically happy companion of morality, conceived in the dharmic way, monotheism is the painful opposite.

References Doniger, W. (Ed.). (1991). The law of Manu. With an introduction and notes translated by Wendy Doniger with Brian K Smith. London: Penguin books. ¯ Pandeya, U. C. (Ed.). (1969). Apastamba Dharma S¯utra. Kashi Sanskrit Series (Vol. 93). Varanasi: Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series Office. Ramanujan, A. K. (1989). Is there an Indian way of thinking. Contributions to Indian Sociology, 23(1), 41–58. Steiner, G. (1971). In Bluebeard’s castle: Some notes towards the redefinition of culture. New Haven: Yale University Press. Wittgenstein, L. (1999). Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Translated by C. K. Ogden With an Introduction by Bertrand Russell. Mineola, New York: Dover Publications.

Some Reflections on Tenability of Pluralism, Transformation and Trivialization of Religions Rakesh Chandra

Abstract In this essay, I try to examine a few basic questions about the tenability of any pluralistic viewpoint and further see how most formulations of accommodative religious pluralism either transform or trivialize the religious points of view. I consider Baghramian’s idea of innocent defensible pluralism against Davidson’s objection, but wonder whether it would satisfy the religious practitioner and theorist. I also consider the liberal treatment of pluralism which is non-neutral and favours a disenchanted picture balancing interests and power; there is reasonable disagreement but no genuine value plurality. I also worry about criteria of what will count as ‘egregious human right violation’ and who will divide the reform. Many religions do not share the idea of the equal autonomous moral agent of liberal democracy. I briefly illustrate the presence of reason and argument in religion with the help of some examples from Nyaya Vaishesika and its opponents. I also mention debate in Indian epics to illustrate rational argument in tradition. This is to especially contrast with demands for complete unreason in religion expressed by notable thinkers like Hilary Putnam and Kierkegaard. Keywords Reason · Liberalism · Divine · Religious pluralism · Dharma · Purvapaksha Discussion on pluralism is often unclear. Common grammar tells us singular and plural are used to indicate numbers of the same kind e.g. dog-dogs, man-men, while dog-animal, man-animal are not instances of singular and plural. Sometimes it seems that the inclusivistic, mainly ethically directed, characterization of religions tries to subsume other religions as a subclass not a genuine instance of a separate entity. Curiously, many traces the roots of philosophic pluralism to the distinction drawn by Immanuel Kant between the data of our sense-experience and its organizing forms of intuition and categories of understanding. We cannot talk about the world without our conceptualization and this paves way for conceptual pluralism and ontological relativism. Donald Davidson rejects conceptual scheme pluralism on grounds that we can R. Chandra (B) Department of Philosophy, University of Lucknow, Lucknow, India e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 B. Puri and A. Kumar (eds.), Re-thinking Religious Pluralism, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-9540-0_5

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accept alternative conceptual schemes only if it is untranslatable into our language or conceptual scheme. We cannot compare or contrast schemes in this sense nor can we speak of a single scheme as we cannot tell what it would be like to be more. Conceptual pluralism is an error as it assumes the scheme content dualism which is the third dogma of empiricism. Baghramian (2000) tries to reject this position and argues for some defensible versions of scheme/content dichotomy which may save some conceptual pluralism without committing us to the pernicious dualism of thought in conceptualization of the world and leading to offensive cognitive relativism of conceptual schemes or perspectives. In this version, conceptual schemes are embodied in languages and cultures but they are not free-floating unrestricted by the role that the world plays in shaping conceptualization. Direct access to world is not denied but it is pointed that our life experiences are from different standpoints offering different understandings and coping methods. So there is a possibility of alternative ways of life. Can religion be seen as a conceptual scheme in this way? Will religious practitioners of different religions see themselves as being in the grip of ‘unvarnished truth’ or ‘a perspective’? Ordinary believers who may not claim to know the ‘truth’ which their religion professes perfectly may still maintain that they have a relation with that truth simply by virtue of being a member of that community with its seers and books. Just as scientific truths are not known in their completeness by non-scientists and yet the community still feels authorized to use the terms so also the religious person may claim his use of terms to be authorized by her or his group faith. The claim here is with regard to truth and not perspectives. It is often imagined that liberal theory can address potential conflicts of pluralism, of individual life plans by creating a neutral political space and locating difference in the private realms. But can religion (understood as world views and more) be so located? There are strong differences and such pluralism of incommensurable goods is hard for liberalism to accommodate. John Gray points out that liberalism is not neutral and has an idea of good. Gray concludes, in his essay, “Where Pluralists and Liberals Part Company” (Gray 2000, 85–102) that settlements of conflicts are settled by compromises of interests and power. It is interesting that most liberal thinkers seem to suggest that there is actually no objective value pluralism in terms of a real difference of anchorage as the world is disenchanted and therefore there is only a question of adjustment of power, modus vivendi. Liberal explanations of the fact of pluralism refer to the characteristic features of reason in terms of uncertainty, fallibilism and diversity. John Rawls in his account of Political Liberalism (1993) speaks how many conceptions of the world can plausibly be constructed from different standpoints. Diversity naturally arises from our limited powers and different standpoints (Rawls 1993, 58). This would encourage and justify a certain kind of epistemological restraint which may also lead to religious restraint. We are now asked to view our views as provisional and we are forbidden to impose our truth on others who may disagree with us. Here is a case of reasonable disagreement not objective plurality. Many scholars believe that in the present consciousness of the world, equal rights for all belong to the moral horizon of human beings as they have grown in history. They endorse the liberal doctrine of tolerance

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and accept plurality based on such a doctrine. However, there will be a problem of adjusting and accommodating conflicting values of the so-called rainbow spectrum in a pluralized public sphere. The other big issue especially with reference to religion is that many religions may not accept the idea of human equality and fallibilism. How are these to be accommodated? Liberal accommodation may appear as condescension and an advice to cheat to the true believer who is seen as the illiberal. It is a curious liberal theory which allows for groups to exist on an equal footing but then puts internal restrictions into question with reference to human dignity and rights. It is strange why liberals are squeamish in accepting that their scheme of things is individual rights based and cannot accept groups. Liberal protests of group based, caste and gender-based violence and isolations can well be understood in the individual human rights perspective. Many scholars believe that liberal paternalism does not serve as an adequate justification of liberal values except in the case of egregious human right violations. But who evaluates this egregious human rights violation and why have human rights to be given precedence over religious duty is a question that can be posed by the cultural relativist. Curiously, this may also be an argument of a mono-cultural religious fundamentalist. Where I use the term in an absolutely non-pejorative philosophic sense of a believer who considers the truth of a religion to be revealed and given. The civic concept of liberalism in Rawls enjoins that citizens view themselves not as inevitably tied to the pursuit of a particular concept of the good that they affirm at any given time. Rather as citizens, they are seen as capable of revising and changing this conception on reasonable and rational grounds and they may do so if they so deserve, conversion does not change persons. This, however, may seem strange to religious practitioners. There is much debate and argument within the human history but certainly a certain group of Hindus may claim that bound by karma, man is not entirely autonomous, svadharma, sadharanadharma, yugadharma have scaffolding. Islam enjoins submission to God as the maker and dispenser of justice. The ideas of fairness, cooperation, rational self-interest may have also found some place in religion but do not seem to determine its authoritativeness. Most religious societies in their vision will be seen as hierarchical and held together by a divine law. Are we demanding a certain double life of a private religion and public civility which requires cheating on either or both? Advocates of pluralism often take John Hick’s understanding of religious pluralism where it is taken as a view that “the transformation of human existence from self-centeredness to reality centeredness is taking place within religious traditions. There is not one way but a plurality of ways of salvation or liberation… there is a plurality of divine revelation making possible plurality of saving human response” (Hick 1985, 34). A fairly realistic criticism of Hick’s view is given in the Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy by Philip L. Quinn examining the two aspects of plurality hypothesis (Quinn 1998, 260). Reality being differently experienced and reality itself being plural. Quinn states “It should be noted that on either interpretation, Hick’s pluralistic hypothesis purchases such parity at a high price. It is rival to the main lines of self-understanding within the major religious traditions” (Ibid, 262).

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Most members of such traditions would reject the claim that their beliefs are true only of ways in which ultimate reality appears to them, or of the phenomenal objects it contributes to producing, and are not true of that reality as it is in itself. If they employed the distinction between the phenomenal and the noumenal, Muslims would be likely to insist that internal reality is personal and Advaitic Hindus would be likely to insist that it is impersonal. Hick can attribute only mythological truth to be nothing more than literal falsity plus a tendency to evoke appropriate dispositional attitude. So Hicks vision of pluralism attributes massive literal error to both Muslims and Advaitic Hindus. This is not surprising because their traditions remain, for the most part, stoutly pre-Kantian in their self-understanding. Of course, Hick’s pluralism attributes equally large literal error to all other major religious traditions. Hence it will be unacceptable to most people who at this time participate in any of the major religions; such people will prefer to hang onto their doctrinal ‘exclusivism’. I would consider this account to be cogent as a description of such revisionary proposal and its rejection. Many scholars have used the idea of forms of life and language games to understand religion and religious pluralism. I am inclined to believe that most religious practitioners would not accept the line of argument for the same reason, as Quinn rejecting Hick’s proposal. The relativism and contingency of the outlook go against the spirit of religion and its attitude. Curiously, one of the most popular views on religious pluralism and coping with it is a view which differentiates non-public and public culture of public practice advocating secularism in the public realm and leaving the inward private domain of conviction for religion. This, again, is a view of the scope of religion which would not capture the beliefs of most religious persons. Religion as understood by many religious believers consists of metaphysics, epistemology, a theory of virtue and appropriate individual and social action. The rights and rituals of most religions are also symbolically connected to their deep metaphysical beliefs (e.g. the process of ‘Ahuti’ and chanting ‘Idam na mama’ is a practical ritual assertion of non-attachment to deeds as the ultimate reality is not this ephemeral world. Similarly, in other religions). Different religions do not put forward the same spiritual goals which are reflected in their rituals and practices. For a Muslim, identity with the Divine is blasphemy. No one can participate in the class of God. For an Advaita minded Hindu, this is the real nature of man, the identity with the absolute. Hick’s assumption that they are all paths to the same goal is a fond hope, and there is perhaps no religion which believes that scriptural statements are human interpretations subject to modifications. This is well understood by the term ‘Gospel Truths’. To suggest that religious standpoints are like an aesthetic worldview having no cognitive claim is also a revision not accepted by followers of religion. Most modern-day discussions on society and politics emphasize that like Rawls we must understand society and public sphere as cooperation of equal members who for mutual advantage accept rule-governance which is flexible. This is obviously not what is “a fixed natural order or an institutional hierarchy justified by religious or aristocratic society.” (Rawls 1993, 15) I have obviously been trying to argue that a non-cognitivist reading of religion to accommodate pluralism seems to completely disregard what actual religions and

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their practitioners say. The often quoted remarks of Wittgenstein that religion is not a body of statements or a doctrine is a peculiarly false description. I now wish to consider briefly the question of presence or absence of reason in religion and possibility of conversation in and on religion. Let me begin with the Indian philosophic discussion on proofs and disproof of the existence of God which are undertaken with considerable rigour and not just treated as issues of an adjustment of power, consensus or convenience. That there is a God as the sole agent who creates the world out of pre-existent material and also sustains as well as destroys the world at regular intervals is accepted and argued for in Prasastapada’s Padarthasamgraha, Udyotkar’s Nyayavartika and Nyaya Kusumnajali of Udayana as well as by Nyaya Bhasanam of Bhasarvagya and many others. Properties of God in terms of eternity, immediate knowledge, desire, volition, unconditional mercy, impartiality are also mentioned and problematized. The views about God given by Nyaya and Vaishesika are also vigorously opposed on many counts by many from the fellow Veda-sammat schools as well as outsiders like Buddhists and Jainas. While some argued for the non-necessity of accepting God as author of Vedas or creator of the world, others argued for God’s incompatibility with suffering and Karma. Also, there is much discussion on possibility of a disembodied God having desire, cognition and volition. Udyotkara discussed at length the satisfactory or dissatisfactory nature of God’s creation as lila or natural expression of svabhava. The discussion went on for generations. It is charming to see how Purva mimamsakas are responded to by Naiyayikas on the question of Vedic authorship. Jayanta Bhatt claims that if we admit absurd view that words without author or speaker combine to form sentences we may also admit that threads weave themselves to form cloth without a weaver. Sridhar Bhatt the author of Nyaya Kandali argues that since God has immediate apprehension without error; he has no raga, dvesha or pravrtti due to attachment and so no merit or demerit occurs to him. The UdyotkarDharmakirti reengagement and proving God of Nyaya is scrupulous, analytic and enriching. I mention these not to argue on the merits of the reasons but only to illustrate the admission of reason in matters pertaining to central beliefs of religion including God. The epics abound in debates about what is dharma and also whether heroes including Rama, Krishna, Arjuna and Yudhisthira have followed the path of dharma, the enjoined moral path of righteousness. Here too, I am not arguing for the correctness of arguments or acceptability of the conclusions drawn. I am only suggesting that reason is not restricted from entry in both the ontological as well as the normative discussions of religion. I mention this especially with the reference to some notable philosophers’ plea that religion is completely an area of unreason especially Hilary Putnam’s last work Jewish Philosophy as a Guide to Life (Putnam 2008). From scientific realism of 1957 to 1975 to internal realism of 1976 to 1988 to pragmatic realism in later years, Putnam seems to hold on to reason but as the Jewish apologist, he gives it up completely. It is true that from early engagement with

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verificationism, Putnam’s later works argue against representationalism. Influenced by Classical pragmatists like William James and also by John McDowell, he is inclined to disengage from quest of definitive answers to canonical philosophical problems. However, in his 1981 classic Reason, Truth and History (Putnam 1981), he argued that though as subjectivists’ claim there is no fixed a-historical organon which defines what it is to be rational, from this we cannot argue that reasons can be anything and end up in what he called some fancy mixture of cultural relativism and structuralism, like some French philosophers. Putnam in his last work takes Martin Buber, Rosensweig, Levinas and Wittgenstein as part of Jewish way of life. He argues “And I am sure that Wittgenstein, like Kierkegaard, would have regarded the idea of ‘proving’ the truth of the Jewish or the Christian or the Muslim religion by ‘historical evidence’ as a profound confusion of realms, a confusion of the inner transformation in one’s life that he saw as the true function of religion, with the goals and activities of scientific explanation and prediction” (Putnam 2008, 13–14). One may wonder what gives Putnam and his ideals the exclusive right to declare the purpose and nature of ‘true religion’. How do they declare religious motives of hundreds of believers as pseudo-historical, pseudo-juristic, pseudo-logical and pseudo-ethical declaring miracles do not constitute history, martyrdom is not a fact without taking an old positivistic verificationist stance. The understanding may appeal to many but is hugely revisionary where thousands have laid their lives for homeland and faith including Jews. Jewish mysticism sometimes speaks of concealment and four levels of reading the Bible Pshat- literal, Remez- Hint based on the literal, Drash-allegorical interpretation and God-hidden secret mystical. But is this account to give up reason completely? Putnam announces “Religious beliefs could only be like a passionate commitment to a system of reference. Hence, although it is a belief, it is a way of luring or a way of assessing life” (Ibid, 27). Since Jewish religion is a way of life, therefore, it is exempt from reason, debate and law has a familiar resonance in some of our local apologists. Religions are often offered as loving alternatives of mutual availability in needness as Levinas’ notion of ‘Nineni’ suggests. But in times where local and global conflicts of identity have taken threatening proportions, the space for rational dialogue needs expansion rather than reduction. As mentioned earlier, Indian epics present huge critical argumentation and Bimal Krishna Matilal wittily remarks, “The point however is that tradition did not have to wait until something like the age of enlightenment came in order to question basis of moral and religious beliefs” (Matilal 2002: 52). So whether it regards God virtue or other issues, there is discussion not acquiescence in ways of life. Five authorities of Dharma are alluded to by Manu: I. II. III. IV. V.

Vedas Dharmashastra Virtues of Vedic scholars Good conduct of the honest Satisfaction of the mind.

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This bespeaks of rational debate in the light of tarka. In case of dispute, a jury of 10 is suggested with interesting detail. Three scholars of three Vedas, one logician Haituka, one dialectician—Tarka, one expert of semantics and etymology, one Dharmashastri, one celibate student, one householder and one retired person. Subjecting revision to reason and analysis seems still welcome to some seeking cosmopolitanism. We are well reminded that several analytic thinkers like R. M. Hare, Bertrand Russell, Isaiah Berlin and others believed that German behaviour in Second World War was due to philosophic errors. In combination of the structure of the ethical language was, well understood and empirical facts, well and clearly stated. This would be a powerful weapon against totalitarianism. Philosophical debates on religion seem to be a little timid in their approach. As I argue, it seems most discussions on religion and religious pluralism create space for religion by changing its character—keep its factual cognitive claims out, convert it into some private attitudinal commitment without publicity. Outside the technical realms of academic philosophy, sometimes we find bold comparisons of religion and some useful suggestions. Rajiv Malhotra considers certain anxieties based on postures of difference and responds with his arguments. He believes that those who claim that theirs is the only true religion and all must convert to it have an attitude stemming from Judeo-Christian religions, while Indian spirituality not only allows for religious pluralism but is built on it. He argues that enculturation also does not show respect for natures, cultures and is a deception to gain easy entry to retain a strategy of subverting the native faith. Interestingly, he responds to Hinduttva ideology as being too political and reactionary, which adapts the western approach of difference and excessive emphasis on unique history. Malhotra refers to the tradition of considering purvapaksha thoroughly by the Indian philosophical tradition which needs to be reconsidered for “an understanding of the need to reform and correct the self aggrandizing and self referential institutional network- that produce cultural analysis including academic institutions, foundations, the media and publishers” (Malhotra 2011, 50). Malhotra refers to Fanon, Sarte as instances of gaze reversal to the west. Never seriously considered by the philosophic community, Malhotra has some interesting proposals in the critical part of his work. The constructive part, however, borders on soft romanticism where it is carelessly assumed that since philosophic tradition had the Purvapaksha representation and response, the lived reality also had the same responsiveness. However, he has the boldness to ask such questions. Can the person whose religion prohibits idol worship respect the idol worshipper in a non-patronizing way? Malhotra presents an Indian challenge to western universalism which is apparently curious. Sunil Khilnani while writing on the Idea of India (Khilani 1998) thought that Nehru quarantined national politics from religious demands. Some others timidly advocate secularism as a cross-cutting constitutional obligation in inter-community issues, while advocating liberalism in each community persuading their co-religionists to abandon absolute and reactionary practices. This response of patronizing religious and other communities is based on a view which disenfranchises the very claim of religion as ‘truth-bearer’.

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Several philosophers like Clifford had spoken of epistemic responsibility not to accept anything without evidence. James responded to it by claiming that religion is a ‘live’ momentous choice forced on us and cannot wait for evidence. Kierkegaard declares objectivity to be only suggestive of postponement and argues that in religion, it is subjectivity and personal relation to believe that matters. A robust philosophical analysis would be an invitation to clarify what it is to be religious? What is the scope of fallibilism within religion? How do we debate with others including other religions? What is to count as evidence? How do absolute truths of religion function in the so-called post-truth worlds? How do we carry on conversations? Is religion truly a conversation stopper? As Richard Rorty titled one of his provocative essays. Rorty gives up the epistemic notion of rationality as a virtue as it presupposes that human subject can surmount appearance and reach reality. But in giving this up, he has given up on the principle beliefs of most religions. The moral notion of rationality that he advocates is only a preference of persuasion over force (Rehr and Bahman 2001). To some like Stephen L. Carter, privatization of religion is trivializing it. Rorty argues that love, family and poetic joy are not trivial but private (Feminists would worry). Search for private perfection in a pluralistic democracy is allowed but not relevant to public policy. Pluralistic democracy will beat voice of God, reason, science, etc. all at par. For Richard Rorty, the spiritual depth of a democratic participant in public debate is as relevant to public debate as is her hobby or hair colour (Rorty 1999, 174). This I believe is not a conversation stopper. However, in the new discussions of democracy in the so-called West, people imagine that discussions on religion and political authority have shifted. Entries in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy on “Religion and Political Theory” (2015) begin by saying “In the first place divine authorization account of political authority has lost the day to consent based approaches” (Eberle and Cuneo 2015) with the reality of Islamic state and its influential presence is an ostrich like assertion. The whole discussion on religious restraint in public discussion presupposes an assent to pragmatic view of not only politics but also of philosophy. There also is a suggestion of new traditionalists that they need to distance themselves from the liberal state and live in small communities which owe allegiance to the Church or some larger religious traditions. It is, however, interesting that some religious scholars trace back liberal ideas of human rights to Buddhism, Kuran, Avesta and the Vedas. This is contested by MacIntyre and many others. However, how is it that we continue conversation maintaining tenability of pluralism without transforming or trivializing religion? Also, how do nonfoundationalists and foundationalist philosophers keep the conversation going? This is a question for us to ponder in times where it is almost assumed that all discussions of plurality, unity, interpretation and truth will be discussed within the paradigm of impure reason, practical significance and American neo-pragmatism.

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References Baghramian, M. (2000). On the plurality of conceptual schemes. In M. Baghramian & A. Ingram (Eds.), Pluralism: The Philosophy and Politics of Diversity (pp. 44–59). New York: Routledge. Eberle, C., & Cuneo, T. (2015). Religion and political theory. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2015 Edition). Retrieved March 27, 2020, from https:// plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2017/entries/religion-politics/. Gray, J. (2000). Where pluralists and liberals part company. In M. Baghramian & A. Ingram (Eds.), Pluralism: The Philosophy and Politics of Diversity (pp. 85–102). New York: Routledge. Hick, J. (1985). Problem of Religious Pluralism. New York: Macmillan. Khilnani, S. (1998). Idea of India. London: Penguin. Malhotra, R. (2011). Being Different: An Indian Challenge to Western Universalism. New Delhi: Harper Collins. Matilal, B. K. (2002). In J. Ganeri (Ed.), Ethics and Epics: Philosophy, Culture, and Religion. Oxford University Press. Putnam, H. (1981). Reason, Truth and History. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Putnam, H. (2008). Jewish Philosophy as a Guide to Life. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Quinn, P. L. (1998). Religious pluralism. In Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Vol. 8, pp. 260– 264). New York: Routledge. Rawls, J. (1993). Political Liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press. Rehr W., & Bahman, J. (Ed.). (2001). The ambiguity of rationality. In Pluralism and the Pragmatic Turn. The MIT Press. Rorty, R. (1999). Philosophy and Social Hope. London: Penguin.

The Plurality of Religion: Indian Philosophical Perspectives (Classical and Contemporary)

M¯adhvas Tolerating Rival Truth Claims: Disagreement, Dialogue and Discernment Deepak Sarma

Abstract In a pluralistic society, there are assumptions about the ways that religious communities ought, and ought not, to react to one another. Such modes of civility seem required in a secular democracy. The M¯adhva school of Ved¯anta, whose origins are found in thirteenth-century India, anticipated a multicultural religious and philosophical landscape and prescribed strategies that fostered a robust sam . v¯ada (discussion and debate) that helped to sustain the tradition and may even be applied to contemporary and secular worlds. Keywords Vedas · Upanis.ads · Vi´sis.t.a¯ dvaita · M¯adhva ved¯anta · Vitan.d¯a · Dvijas · Brahman · Moks.a

1 Introduction How should the members of differing religions interact with one another? Should adherents of a religion tolerate rival truth claims of other religions? What stance should a religious person take that is authentic, respectful and that does not conflict with the ideals of an idealized secular democracy? This essay asks these and related questions from the perspective of an adherent to the M¯adhva school of Ved¯anta. I believe that answers found within the tradition are useful ones even when applied to contemporary and secular worlds. M¯adhva Ved¯anta is found within a commentarial framework, which serves as the basis for discerning the truth and value of other religions. This framework is shared by all of the schools of Ved¯anta and centers around a body of text, namely, the Vedas. According to the M¯adhva perspective, reflection that occurs outside of this framework is valuable only insofar as it sharpens the debate skills of M¯adhvas and concurrently increases the epistemic confidence that M¯adhvas have in the truth of their own religion.1 D. Sarma (B) Department of Religious Studies, Case Western Reserve University, Cleveland, OH, USA e-mail: [email protected] 1 For

more on “epistemic confidence,” see Griffiths (2001)

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In this essay, I will first characterize “commentarial frameworks” and “exclusive commentarial frameworks.” I will then place M¯adhva Ved¯anta within these frameworks. My intention is to show that, for M¯adhvas, religions outside of the Ved¯anta commentarial fold have no truth whatsoever and are valued only as living examples of proverbial “straw men” for M¯adhva students. Equally, if not more important, debate with rival traditions requires that participants learn an opponents system intimately. In this connection, I argue that taking an opponent’s position seriously, and as likely being false, in this way, is the most respectful way to tolerate rival truth claims.

2 Commentarial Frameworks Religions that operate within a commentarial framework (commentarial religions) must have a body of texts that are the objects of commentary and that serve as their epistemic foundation. I will refer to these as the “root texts”. Root texts may be preserved and disseminated orally or textually. These religions have virtuoso readers of the root texts whose commentaries are deemed epistemologically authoritative.2 Their authority derives from criteria that are likely to be found in the root texts. The doctrines, teachings, and practices, of religions outside of the framework of a commentarial religion (I will refer to these as alien religions)3 will be relevant only insofar at they assist (or detract from) the commentaries offered by virtuoso readers. Similarly, dialogue with members of alien religions is valuable if it assists with readings of the root texts, if it is prescribed by the root texts themselves, if it confirms the beliefs of those of the home religion,4 or if its content is merely descriptive of, or informative about, the home religion. It is possible that there are intra-religious disputes about the accuracy of readings. In such cases, intra-religious dialogues are between disputing virtuoso readers, who are operating within the same framework despite their disagreement. Typically there are methods for adjudicating disputes that are found in the root texts of commentarial religions.

3 Insider-Epistemologies and Commentary Among religions that operate within a commentarial framework, there are religions whose root texts and commentaries are not made available to outsiders. These religions operate within an exclusive commentarial framework. They may limit access to books if the root texts are in written format or they may restrict attendance to oral 2 For

more on “virtuoso readers,” see Griffiths (1999) and Sarma (2005). am reliant upon Griffiths’ formulation of “alien” religions as found in his Problem of Religious Diversity (2001). 4 I am reliant upon Griffiths’ formulation of “home” religions as found in his Problem of Religious Diversity (2001). 3I

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recitations of root texts and subsequent oral commentaries offered by virtuosos if the root texts are preserved and disseminated orally. Some may allow outsiders to convert and, therefore, to obtain access to these root texts and commentaries. These are open exclusive commentarial religions. The ensuing dialogue that might occur between the new convert and a virtuoso would, of course, be an intra-religious dialogue and not an inter-religious one. There are religions that do not permit conversion and thus severely limit access to their root texts and commentaries. These are closed exclusive commentarial religions. An informed inter-religious dialogue with the virtuosos of such religions becomes impossible or, if it does occur, it must be only on a superficial level. These religions are founded on highly restrictive insider epistemologies. It is possible that members of these religions have conversations with outsiders, in which they offer simple accounts of their doctrines or merely correct misunderstandings. It is also possible that members may learn about alien religions for the purpose of finding flaws in them and, consequently, in confirming the truth of their own. This learning could occur in the context of dialogues or via texts. The value of the doctrines of alien religions, then, is merely to verify the truth of the doctrines, teachings, and practices put forth by the home religion. The M¯adhva School of Ved¯anta is a closed exclusive commentarial religion that does not permit outsiders to access root texts and also does not permit conversion. It also places little importance on the value of alien religions, other than the pedagogical importance for students of finding their internal flaws. I will first offer a brief characterization of the school of Ved¯anta. I will then turn to M¯adhva Ved¯anta. After contextualizing historically, I will examine the rules that it enforces to maintain the secrecy of its root texts and to create a closed exclusive commentarial framework.

4 Ved¯anta M¯adhva Ved¯anta identifies itself as a school of Ved¯anta. Its predecessors include the ´ . kar¯ac¯arya, in the eighth century CE, Advaita (non-dualism) School, founded by Sam and the Vi´sis.t.a¯ dvaita (qualified non-dualism) School, founded by R¯am¯anuj¯ac¯arya in the eleventh century CE. Leaving aside their widely differing epistemologies and ontologies, the schools share similar core root texts. In fact, the term ved¯anta, a determinative compound (tatpurus.a) comprised of the two terms, veda and anta, means “the culminating sections of the Vedas”. That Ved¯anta is named after this body of texts marks their importance and centrality they give to commentary. These texts are the Vedas, of which there are four, namely, the R.g, Yajur, S¯ama, and Atharva Vedas. Each Veda ¯ . yakas, and the can be further subdivided into the Sam . hit¯as, Br¯ah.manas, the Aran Upanis.ads. The Vedas are believed to be revealed root texts (´sruti), without human

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origin (apaurus.eya) and are self-valid (svatah.-pr¯am¯an.a). For this reason, they are held to be eternal (nitya) and free from defects (nirdos.a). The schools of Ved¯anta were not the only ones to hold the Vedas in such high esteem and grant them unquestioned epistemic authority. Their most important predecessor was the M¯ım¯am . s¯a School (Jaimini composed the M¯ım¯am s¯ a S¯ u tras in c. 25 CE), which devoted the entirety of . its intellectual efforts to interpreting the ritual injunctions prescribed in the Vedas. Much of the hermeneutic foundations of Ved¯anta, in fact, can be found in M¯ım¯am . s¯a texts. The insider epistemology that is shared by all of the schools of Ved¯anta also ´ relied heavily on the writings of M¯ım¯am (400 CE) and his . s¯a thinkers like Sabara commentators. For these reasons, Ved¯anta is sometimes known as Uttara M¯ım¯am . s¯a (Later Investigation). Though the schools of Ved¯anta include the Vedas in their canon, each expanded its boundaries to include additional texts. Leaving aside these supplements to the canon, the Vedas are the primary root texts for the schools of Ved¯anta and are the critical objects of commentary. Above and beyond the Vedas, all of the schools also include the Brahma S¯utras as a root text. The Brahma S¯utras, composed by B¯adar¯ayan.a (also known as Vy¯asa) in the fifth century CE, is regarded as a summary of the teachings of the Vedas, specifically the Upanis.ads, and, indirectly, an explanation of how to obtain liberation (moks.a). In the introduction to his commentary (bhasya) on it, Madhv¯ac¯arya explains, “He, namely Vy¯asa, composed the Brahma S¯utras for the sake of the ascertaining the meaning of the Vedas.”5 (Madhv¯ac¯arya, Brahma S¯utra Bh¯as.ya 1911, 1.1.1) The text is four chapters long and is comprised of 564 pithy aphorisms (s¯utras). Its brevity makes it difficult to read without the commentaries produced by the founders of each of the schools of Ved¯anta and the multiple subcommentaries produced by subsequent thinkers. It is likely that the aphorisms were merely mnemonic devices used for pedagogical purposes. Whatever the reasons, the elusive nature of the Brahma S¯utras lends itself to concealment, limits the extent to which aliens can speak with M¯adhvas, and is an important component in their exclusive commentarial framework. The Vedas and Brahma S¯utras were interpreted in conflicting ways by each school, and each has different theories about the nature of the liberated state and how it can be achieved. Training in Ved¯anta centered on close studies of these root texts, the production of new commentaries, and the careful study of old ones, where all of these activities were conducted in the confines of monasteries (mat.has) and in other traditional teaching environments such as the residences of teachers (gurukulas). The importance that the schools of Ved¯anta gave (and give) to commentary and commentarial activities are reminiscent of their counterparts among the scholastics in medieval Christianity.

5 …tadarthanirnay¯ aya

brahmasutr¯an.i cak¯ara | . All translations are mine.

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5 The M¯adhva Closed Exclusive Commentarial Framework As already mentioned, the significant difference between the Ved¯anta commentarial tradition and those of medieval Christian scholastics, is that the schools of Ved¯anta gave access to the root texts and commentaries only to male Brahmins. The schools of Ved¯anta thus operate within a closed exclusive commentarial framework. According to Madhv¯ac¯arya, “Not everyone possess the eligibility (adhik¯ara)” for acquiring knowledge of the Supreme Being (brahman) and for obtaining release (moks.a) from the cycle of birth and rebirth6 (Ibid, 3.4.10). Not every enduring self (j¯ıva) has full access to M¯adhva root texts, the source of the knowledge that is efficacious for learning about the nature of the Supreme Being, for obtaining release, and for learning the intricacies of M¯adhva dialectics. The M¯adhva insider epistemology hinged on this restriction of access to the root texts and made possible their exclusive commentarial framework. Madhv¯ac¯arya directly addresses eligibility requirements in his gloss of the first complete word (pada), of the first decree (s¯utra), of the Brahma S¯utras of Badarayan.a; “Then, therefore, the inquiry into brahman.” (ath¯ato brahmajijñ¯asa). The term “then” (atha) glosses the sequence of eligibility. The expanded passage reads “Therefore, after having met the requirements for eligibility, the inquiry into brahman is to be undertaken.”7 (Ibid, 1.1.1) In his Brahma S¯utra Bh¯asya, a commentary on the Brahma S¯utras, Madhv¯ac¯arya explicates the requirements for eligibility. He thereby establishes rules and regulations as to who can and cannot become a virtuoso reader of M¯adhva root texts.8 Given the rich and complex ontology envisioned by Madhvacarya, he must “determine the eligibility for a wide variety of sentient beings, both human and non-human. Not surprisingly, he restricts eligibility” (Sarma 2000, 783) and, therefore, training as a virtuoso reader to a select group of sentient beings based on gender and class (varn.a). “In the human realm, initiated males of the highest three classes, the brahmins, ks.atriyas, and vai´syas, also known as the twice born (dvijas) have eligibility to access some texts and doctrines” (Ibid). Among them, brahmins have the highest access. Only they can become virtuoso readers. “Male members of lower classes and women from all classes only have limited access to summaries of M¯adhva doctrine conveyed orally” (Ibid) by virtuoso readers. Their limited access does not allow them to join monasteries (mat.has) to examine M¯adhva doctrine, and to obtain training as virtuoso religious readers. Only male dvijas who undergo the prescribed training in M¯adhva monasteries can become virtuosos (Ibid). Thus, M¯adhva Ved¯anta is operating within a closed exclusive commentarial framework. 6 na

sarve´sa¯ m adhik¯arah. | ma´ngal¯artho ‘dhik¯ar¯anantary¯artha´s ca | atah.s´abdo hetvarthah. | The word “then” is used as an auspicious expression and for sequence of eligibility. The word “therefore” refers to the reason. 8 For more on these virtuoso readers in M¯ adhva Ved¯anta, known in the tradition as a¯ pta-gurus, see Sarma (1998) 7 atha´sabdo

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M¯adhva Ved¯anta is also founded upon a position of predestination. There are those qualified for release who can be liberated from suffering (mukti-yogyas) and those who cannot be liberated from suffering (mukty-ayogyas)9 (Madhv¯ac¯arya, Tattvasam . khy¯ana, 1969–74, 5) These sentient beings neither can be released from suffering, nor can they achieve liberaration (moks.a). They are further subdivided into those who are fit only for darkness (tamo-yogyas), and those who are eternally caught in the cycle of birth and rebirth (nitya-sam . a¯ rins, literally, “those who remain in the journey”).10 (Ibid). Who do the M¯adhva virtuosos speak to? Typically they speak and have spoken to others in the Ved¯anta commentarial fold and to other lay-Hindus, though not exclusively. Throughout history, there are numerous cases of virtuosos from the M¯adhva tradition engaging with the textual depiction and refutation of representations of doctrines of11 Buddhist and Jain scholars, as well as debating with their members, though neither Buddhists nor Jains are included in the Ved¯anta commentarial framework (see Sarma 1998). So why does a tradition that operates within an exclusive commentarial framework appear to debate with religious aliens or depict and refute representations of their doctrines?

6 Debate with Heretical Religions If a religion prepares its adherents to debate with members of alien religions then it would seem that conversion of outsiders is a possibility. Depending on the topics of the debate, access to relevant doctrines may also be permitted to the debaters, regardless of class, caste, gender, etc. There are several places in Madhv¯ac¯arya’s corpus where he addresses issues of debate and argues against doctrines of alien religions that are outside of their commentarial framework. This interest in debate with religions outside of the commentarial framework must be explained given that they are within an exclusive commentarial framework. Why is there an interest in debating with outsiders? Why, for example, did Madhv¯ac¯arya examine Buddhism and why did he summarize debates with them in his texts? What was the purpose of critically examining the doctrines of religions outside of the commentarial framework of Ved¯anta? To approach these questions I examine two locations in the M¯adhva corpus where such matters are discussed. First I examine Madhv¯ac¯arya’s V¯adalaks.an.a, a text devoted to the rules and regulations surrounding debate. Then I examine several passages in Madhv¯ac¯arya’s Anuvy¯akhy¯ana in connection with Brahma S¯utra 2.1, 9 devarsipitrpanar¯ a

iti mukt¯as tu pañcadh¯a | evam . . . vimuktiyogy¯as´ … | ca tamog¯ah. sr.tisam sthit¯ a h | . . The terms tamoyogy¯ah. and nityasam . s¯arin were first used by Jayat¯ırtha in his Pram¯an.apaddhati: ayoginah. api trividh¯ah. | muktiyogy¯ah. nityasam . s¯arin.ih. tamoyogy¯as´ ca iti | Jayat¯ırtha, Pram¯an.apaddhati (1982b), 19. 11 Thanks to Paul J. Griffiths for this language. 10 …

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known as Samayavirodha, the contradictions [in other] doctrines. Finally, I speculate as to why there are accounts in Madhv¯ac¯arya’s hagiography, the Madhvavijaya, of debate with Buddhists and other outsiders. Though this hagiographic text is not composed by Madhv¯ac¯arya, it nonetheless may contain important information about the actual, rather than the ideal, community that must be addressed.

6.1 The V¯adalaks.an.a The V¯adalaks.an.a, also known as the Kath¯alaks.an.a, is a brief text in which Madhv¯ac¯arya sets out the proper types of debate in which devotees can engage. Madhv¯ac¯arya lists three types of appropriate debating methods. These are v¯ada, jalpa, and vitan.d.a¯ 12 (Madhv¯ac¯arya, V¯adalaks.an.a 1971: 2, 69). Although this treatise on polemics is useful as a dialectical handbook for adherents who wish to debate, it does not contain any explicit summaries of restrictions regarding debate with outsiders, with those who do not have eligibility (adhik¯ari) to read the root texts of Ved¯anta and, therefore, who may not be able to become virtuoso readers. That is, Madhv¯ac¯arya states the rules and regulations regarding the practice of debate but does not address any restrictions in connection with the eligibility and qualifications of each of the participants of the debate. Several conclusions may be drawn from this. First, it may be that there are no restrictions regarding who can and who cannot participate in debate. Second, it may be that Madhv¯ac¯arya has assumed that all participants have eligibility and are legitimate (and virtuoso) religious readers. In this case, there would be no need to address the eligibility and literacy of the participants. Though the first conclusion is possible, the second clearly is more likely; one must have familiarity with the Vedas and similarly restricted texts to argue with the M¯adhva about his own doctrines. Arguing with a M¯adhva about his doctrine presumes knowledge of the root texts. These root texts, as I have shown above, are restricted. If a debate were to take place between a M¯adhva and an outsider (mleccha) it would have to be one-sided as the outsider/religious alien would not be able to partake in arguments about the proper interpretation of passages. It is thus reasonable to conclude that debate with M¯adhvas about M¯adhva doctrine can only be undertaken by those who are (or can become) skilled readers of M¯adhva doctrine. That is, only intra-religious dialogue is possible. Third, it also is reasonable to conclude that these debating rules could be employed by M¯adhvas when they argued via reductio against the doctrines of other schools. This way M¯adhvas can refute rival positions and, at the same time, need not reveal their own doctrine. To this end, Madhv¯ac¯arya characterizes the vitan.d¯a style of argument:

12 v¯ ado

jalpo vitan.d.eti trividh¯a… | The threefold [debating methods] are v¯ada, jalpa, and vitan.d.a. V¯ada is a debate whose purpose is the pursuit of truth. Jalpa is a debate whose purpose is to bring fame and glory to the competitive victor. More on vitan.d.a below.

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D. Sarma The vitan.d.a¯ argument is [characterized] for the sake of truth [when the argument is] with another [wicked opponent]. The Real is hidden in this [argument style].13 (Jayat¯ırtha, V¯adalaksan.atik¯a 1971, 3).

This style is not unusual in the history of debate among South Asian religions. Nevertheless, this passage indicates that it was part and parcel of M¯adhva debate. It moreover provides a reasonable explanation for the occurrence of M¯adhva debates with debaters who are not skilled readers of M¯adhva texts.

6.2 Brahma Sutra ¯ 2.1, Samayavirodha, The Contradictions [in Other] Doctrines The relevance of debate with other traditions is exemplified in the introduction to Brahma S¯utra 2.1, known as Samayavirodha, the contradictions [in other] doctrines. The passages in Madhv¯ac¯arya’s Anuvy¯akhy¯ana, a commentary on the Brahma S¯utras, are introductions to this series of refutations of rival positions. They are the textual depictions and refutations of representations of the doctrines of rival schools. These rival schools are the Ny¯aya, Vai´ses.ika, S¯am . khya, Yoga, C¯arv¯aka, Buddhism, Jainism, ´ ´ akta schools. Madhv¯ac¯arya first states reasons as to why these Saiva, and, finally, the S¯ doctrines exist: The adherence to the knowledge regarding the falseness of the world is because of ignorance, because of the scarcity of correct understanding, because of the abundance of those who have little knowledge, [and] because of the ceaseless hatred for the highest Reality and for the knowledge of the Real.14 (Madhv¯ac¯arya, Anuvy¯akhy¯ana 1991, 551-552).

He next locates the upholders of these rival doctrines in his threefold distinction of sentients (j¯ıvatraividhya), and, threefold doctrine of predestination (svar¯upatraividhya): The doctrines are maintained because of the fitness of the endless impressions of many demons (asuras) due to their being caught by foolishness15 (Ibid, 553).

The doctrines are kept alive by those who are predestined to do so. The phrase “endless impressions” refers to their predestined status. Having thus accounted for the existence of rival traditions in his cosmology, Madhv¯ac¯arya states the importance of studying and refuting these traditions:

13 vitanda ¯

. . tu sat¯am anyais tattvam es.u nig¯uhitum | Madhv¯ac¯arya, V¯adalaks.an.a 1971, 3. anyaih. asadbhis saha | [The word] “with another” [means] along with wicked [opponents]. 14 daurlabhy¯ ac cchuddhabudh¯ın¯am b¯ahuly¯ad alpavedin¯am | 15 an¯ adiv¯asan¯ayog¯adasur¯an.a¯ m . bahutvatah. | dur¯agrahagr.h¯ıtatv¯ad vartante samay¯ah. sad¯a |

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Therefore, those who are suitable for that which is connected with the understanding of the Lord, [who are suitable] for correct understanding, who observe the [doctrines of the] sacred texts (¯agamas), they would always destroy the darkness [that is the ignorant].16 (Ibid, 554)

He further addresses the reason why these refutations are important: Therefore [Vy¯asa] the lord of knowledge composed the refutations of each of the [rival] doctrines for [his] own devotees for the purpose of establishing a sharpened intellect.17 (Ibid, 555).

Given these portions of the introductory passages, it appears that examination and refutation of the doctrines of religious aliens are primarily for the sake of having a correct understanding of one’s own position and for increasing one’s mental dexterity. Neither a correct understanding nor mental dexterity are ends in and of themselves. Both contribute to obtaining proper knowledge of the Lord, increasing one’s skill as a religious reader, and eventually obtaining liberation (moks.a). If this is the case then there is no need to reveal one’s own position even if one debates with a religious alien. One can argue vitan.d.a style and employ reductio ad absurdum methods, find fault with the doctrines of others, yet reveal nothing about one’s own position. The intent then, is not to convert those who are most opposed to the M¯adhva position. Instead, the intent is to reaffirm the truth of one’s own position for oneself through argument with outsiders. Conversion due to loss in a debate may indeed be possible if the interlocutor is a twice born (dvija) (or former dvija), eligible, and, therefore, can become a skilled religious reader of M¯adhva Ved¯anta. Research has not uncovered any instances in M¯adhva works of responses to critiques of M¯adhva doctrine by those outside of the Ved¯anta commentarial framework. The responses that I have discovered refer to criticisms made by Advaita and Vi´sistadvaita opponents. If there were responses to external critiques then this may indicate that M¯adhva thinkers permit the possibility of outsiders, twice-borns and otherwise, to understand M¯adhva doctrines. However, I found no cases of this type of response.

6.3 Accounts in the Madhvavijaya Although N¯ar¯ayan.a Pan.d.it¯ac¯arya’s Madhvavijaya18 is a hagiographic text and often contains hyperbolical anecdotes, the descriptions of successful debates against outsiders nevertheless need to be explained. The instances when Pan.d.it¯ac¯arya states that Madhv¯ac¯arya debated with Buddhists, among others, are too numerous to be 16 tath¯ api

s´uddhabuddh¯ın¯am ¯ıs´a¯ nugrahayogin¯am | suyuktayas tamo hanyur a¯ gam¯anugat¯ah. sad¯a | tamah. ajñ¯anam | (Jayat¯ırtha, Ny¯aya Sudh¯a 1982a, 3162). [The term] “darkness” [refers to] the ignorant. 17 iti vidy¯ apatih. samyak samay¯an¯am . nir¯akr.tim | cak¯ara nijabhakt¯an¯am buddhi´sa¯ n.atvasiddhaye | 18 The Madhvavijaya is sometimes rendered as the Sumadhvavijaya.

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documented here. How are they to be understood given the doctrines that restrict access to the root texts that Madhv¯ac¯arya has set down? It is neither clear if Madhv¯ac¯arya argued via the vitan.d¯a style, nor if his interlocutors were only twiceborns (dvijas). This, however, is unlikely since, according to the hagiography, he won a debate against a Buddhist. Buddhis¯ag¯ara, a Buddhist, is mentioned as a disputant encountered by Madhv¯ac¯arya in Pan.dit¯ac¯arya’s M¯adhva Vijaya.19 (Pan.d.it¯ac¯arya, Madhvavijaya 1989a, b, 5.8.) Pan.d.it¯ac¯arya may be signaling the legitimacy of the debater and, consequently, the debate when he states that his interlocutor was a twice born. In his Bh¯avaprak¯as´ika Pan.d.it¯ac¯arya states: He whose name is V¯adisim . ha, the twice born, is a knower of the essence of the Vai´ses.ika [system].20 (Pan.dit¯ac¯arya, Bh¯avaprak¯as´ika 1989a, b, 5.8.)

It is also not clear if the debates were conducted in Sanskrit or if they occurred in vernacular languages. These debates, though in a hagiographical text, may indicate that the actual M¯adhva community was less restrictive than the one envisioned by Madhv¯ac¯arya.

7 Conclusion I first offered a stipulative characterization of “commentarial frameworks” and “exclusive commentarial frameworks.” I then placed M¯adhva Ved¯anta within these frameworks. I showed that for Madhvas, religions outside of the Ved¯anta commentarial fold have no truth whatsoever and are valued only as living examples of proverbial “straw men” for M¯adhva students. I showed that there is very little of value in the doctrines, teachings, and practices of alien religions, when placed in the particular religious framework within which M¯adhva Ved¯anta functions. When one critically evaluates, one pays close to attention to the coherence of the overall system that has been presented, the coherence of arguments put forth to justify or defend the system, and the coherence of arguments made against rival traditions. This is known as sam . v¯ada (discussion and debate). When one participates in sam . v¯ada, one is required to know the opponent’s position in depth, including their rules for logic, so that one may engage in a proper reductio ad absurdum. This method, I think, is respectful of rival religions and their truth claims. 19 samastav¯ ad¯ındragajaprabhadgadaß

caranavany¯am . pratipaks.ak¯an.ks.ay¯a | vedadvis.a¯ m . yah. prathamah. sam¯ayayau sav¯adisim . ho ‘tra sa buddhis¯agara | Buddhis¯agara, the best among the haters of the Vedas, who is the defeater of all the elephants who are the best disputants, wandering along with V¯adisim . ha, with the desire of [meeting] opponents, came here. 20 Vai´sesikavi´sesajño v¯ adisim . . . h¯abhidho dvijah. | mah¯ım . vijitya sam . pr¯apto bauddh¯agamyam . buddhis¯agara | He whose name is V¯adisim . ha, the twice born, is a knower of the essence of the Vai´ses.ika [system]. Having conquered the earth, Buddhis¯agara fell in with the incomprehensible followers of Buddha.

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References Griffiths, P. (1999). Religious reading. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Griffiths, P. (2001). Problems of religious diversity. Oxford: Blackwell Pub. Ltd. Jayat¯ırtha. (1971). V¯adalaks.an.atik¯a. In P. P. Laks.m¯ın¯ar¯ayan.op¯adhy¯aya (Ed.), Da´sa Prakaran.a¯ ni (4 Vols.). Bangalore: P¯urn.aprajñ¯a Vidy¯apit.ha. Jayat¯ırtha. (1982a). Ny¯aya Sudh¯a.. Bangalore: Uttar¯adi mat.ha Uttar¯adi mat.ha. Jayat¯ırtha. (1982b). Pram¯an.apaddhati. R. S. Panchamukhi (Ed.) Dharwad: Sri Raghavendratirtha Pratishthana. Madhv¯ac¯arya. (1911). In R. Raghavendracharya (Ed.), Brahma S¯utra Bh¯as.ya. Mysore: Government Branch Press. Madhv¯ac¯arya. (1969–74). Tattvasam . khy¯ana. In Govind¯ac¯arya (Ed.), Sarvam¯ulagranth¯ah. . Bangalore: Akhila Bharata Madhwa Mahamandala. Madhv¯ac¯arya. (1971). V¯adalaks.an.a. Vol. 1. In P.P Laks.m¯ın¯ar¯ayan.op¯adhy¯aya (Ed.), Da´sa Prakaran.a¯ ni (4 vols.) Bangalore: P¯urn.aprajñ¯a Vidy¯apit.ha. Madhv¯ac¯arya. (1991). Anuvy¯akhy¯ana Pan.d.urangi. Bangalore: Prabha Printing House. Pan.d.it¯ac¯arya, N. (1989). Bh¯avaprak¯as´ika. In Sumadhvavijayah., Bh¯avaprak¯as´ik¯asametah.. ed. Prabhañjan¯ac¯arya. Bangalore: Sri Man Madhwa Siddantonnahini Sabha. Pan.d.it¯ac¯arya, N. (1989). Sumadhvavijayah., In Prabhañjan¯ac¯arya (Ed.),Bh¯avaprak¯as´ik¯asametah.. Bangalore: Sri Man Madhwa Siddantonnahini Sabha. Sarma, D. (1998). Exclusivist strategies in M¯adhva Ved¯anta. Ph.D. diss, University of Chicago, Chicago. Sarma, D. (2000). Let the Apta (Trustworthy) Hindu Speak! Journal of the American Academy of Religion, 68(4), 781–790 Sarma, D. (2005). Epistemology and the limitations of philosophical inquiry: doctrine in M¯adhva Ved¯anta. Oxford: Routledge Curzon.

Religion: One and Many Shephali Vidyanta

Abstract There are many religions in the world and they have their sub-divisions too. Every religion consists of separate institutions, dogmas, beliefs and practices. Individual human beings may belong to any one/none of the religions. Since religions are many in number mutual tolerance among them is necessary for their co-existence. In recent times many untoward incidents take place due to belief in separate religions. Secularism, in the sense of equal respect for all religions has become a myth. Members of the society who belong to different religions suffer a feeling of distrust and hatred for fellow beings. Therefore, a critical survey and a re-estimation of the idea of religion becomes a necessity. The meaning of the word ‘religion’ has to be grasped, not by any attempt of its definition (since it is difficult), but by its role and significance in the life of ‘sincerely religious’ people. Our study into the life of such people would throw some light on the idea of religion and that might help us to wipe out the misconceptions about religion and stop its misuses. A handful of people are recognized as sincere practitioners of different religions, out of them I would make an attempt to study Ramakrishna Paramahansa and M.K. Gandhi in my humble way. Keywords Morality · Plurality of religion · Faith · Devotion · Spirituality · Truth Religion consists of some aspects like doctrines, dogmas, beliefs and practices. Though these aspects are common to all religions, in their detail they widely differ from one another. Every religion has separate sets of doctrines, dogmas and rituals. Some of the major religions are Christianity, Hinduism, Islam, Buddhism and so on. Each of them represents an institution with its distinctly identifiable separate sets of beliefs, theories and practices. Every institution of religion has got its experts and authorities. They guide the followers in their religious activities. Institutions of religion celebrate different occasions in which believers of respective faiths meet together, they communicate and share each others feelings and emotions. A kind of

S. Vidyanta (B) Associate Professor (Retd.), Department of Philosophy, Mahadevananda Mahavidyalaya, Barrackpore, West Bengal, India e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 B. Puri and A. Kumar (eds.), Re-thinking Religious Pluralism, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-9540-0_7

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passionate bonding is developed among the members of a particular religious group. There are many religions and our society consists of many religious groups. Presence of any two or more things in the same place is explained by their relations. They have similarities and dissimilarities; agreements and contradictions. When many religions are found present in a society surely there arise questions regarding their co-existence; mutual acceptance and rejection, superiority and inferiority to one another. Throughout history, we have seen that people from various parts of the world with their different cultures and faiths entered our country, stayed here and shared everything and continued to live with their own distinguishable religious beliefs. Sometimes there have been disagreements, conflicts among the people of different religious groups, but people still continued to live together as citizens of the same country, going beyond all rigidity and separateness of religions. Among diverse cultures, races, traditions, languages and religions a cord of union runs through every one living in the country and that is uniquely ‘Indian’. This profound feeling of ‘oneness’—lead Swami Vivekananda to claim that the people of his country had no problem in welcoming and living with the people belonging to other countries or other religions. In the World-Religious Conference at Chicago in 1893, he said that he represented a religion which never taught one to refuse any other religion what so ever, and had come from a country where no one was sent back if in need of a shelter. In contemporary India, Indians live on the soil of the same country, but are not sure if the same claim can be made. The uniqueness of ‘Indian’ life is missing with the change of time and situations. Difference in religions has become an important issue. People belonging to any particular religion understand that they belong to a great religion and all fellow believers constitute a great religious community. People of other religious communities do not belong to them. A sense of separation and division prevails in the minds of people in general. They naturally start comparing and contrasting their religion to that of others with a feeling of ‘mine’ and ‘yours’. The feeling of separation has become quite strong and that gradually brings division in the mindset of the people living in the same society. They start losing faith among themselves. Cordial relationship among neighbours, or simple and friendly bonding among the children of a locality are gradually found missing. The pride of Indian culture as a heritage of ‘unity in diversity’ becomes a myth. Division among religions are basically made by different religious institutions, for example, Christianity, Islam, Hinduism, Buddhism, Judaism and so on. The distinctions are pointed out on the basis of the differences in their theories, dogmas, rituals, i.e. in their aspects. Such aspects differ from religion to religion. Sometimes the difference is too wide, they are even opposed to each other. Such aspects are intimately, even inalienably connected to a religious faith; and since faith is a matter of emotion and passion the believers are strongly influenced. They get carried away in religious controversy. Leaders and authorities of different religious institutions organize regular meetings in which lectures are given and doctrines are discussed. They arrange social gatherings where some rites and rituals are performed together by the members of the same religious group. Frequent meetings and regular gettogethers have an impact upon the members. While such socio-religious activities

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tie the members of a particular religious group together they also isolate that group from people belonging to other religions. The separation brings competition and criticism which gradually results in intolerance and antagonisms among the members of different religious groups. Many untoward incidents in connection with difference in religious faiths are found to take place every day. The point to be noted is that, the aspects based upon which the religious institutions create an atmosphere of division and separation among religions, are not inalienably essential to ‘religion’ (taken in its true sense). Theories, dogmas, beliefs and practices, i.e. the aspects of religion are historically conditioned and subject to change and reinterpretation. Religion in its true sense is not contained in its aspects. They are external to it. Moderations and alterations of the aspects cannot bring any change on the central meaning of the term ‘religion’. It transcends the aspects and goes much beyond. Then it is a phenomenon which is directly connected to an individual, it is an experience, a realization private to oneself. True meaning of religion is, therefore, beyond the purview of religious institutions. Religion is a way of life in the sense that every action, every thought, every attitude and behaviour of a religious man is guided and directed by his religious faith. It is living with a dedicated attention into one’s within, it is a life with constant finding into one’s being in the world and one’s relation to the surrounding. Religion as an enquiry into the meaning of life germinates, blossoms and grows‚ in and through‚ various experiences throughout life. It is a realization within the private chamber of an individual mind. The subtlety of the idea is pointed out by the ancient thinkers in their saying ‘dharmasya tatta nihita guhayam’.1 Meaning of religion, taken in this sense, is manifested only to one whose mind is sincerely ready to cultivate and nourish the same. The point is that every mind is not capable of experiencing the true meaning of religion. Only a few blessed ones yearn for it, and try to achieve it within. Since individual minds are the sheets of religion, it is felt that, our honest attempt to know the lives of some truly religious persons who have some experience of it, would throw some light upon the idea. Our attempt, in this connection, should not be a rational or academic one, but it has to be a sincere, intimate look into the life and activities of the true believer. Though such individuals are rare, yet some prophets and individuals are believed to exist in all ages. They are thought to experience religion in the true sense. Gandhi and Ramakrishna are regarded to belong to this group and are believed to have experienced some revelations of ‘Spirituality’ and ‘Truth’ in their life. Gandhi and Ramakrishna, are both religious, but each of them is religious in his own way. While for Gandhi religion is a matter of achievement which is attained through continuous relentless struggle of the moral agent, Ramakrishna appears as an enlightened personality, a living embodiment of spirituality. I shall try to take them separately to see how religion has been unfolded to them in their sincere and graceful journey of life. Gandhi believed that man has a strong power of inner transformation. For him a human being is basically a moral being and the transformation he/she is capable 1 The meaning of word Dharma is very complicated (goodh); it may not have only a specific meaning.

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to undergo is moral transformation. The capacity to distinguish between good and bad, right and wrong is inbuilt in human nature. If a person tries to be good, he/she turns good, but the person is not to stop there. It is just the beginning—may be a milestone in the path of moral progress but he/she has to proceed further. The moral life, thus, is a continuous journey in which human beings undertake relentless struggle with the definite goal of achieving excellence. In course of this progress the meaning of the ‘Good’, or in Gandhi’s words—the ‘Truth’—is gradually unfolded to the human being. Morality and religion, for Gandhi, are necessarily related to each other. He says, “as soon as we lose the moral basis, we cease to be religious. There is no such thing as religion overriding morality. Man, for instance, cannot be untruthful, cruel, incontinent and claim to have God on his side” (Gandhi eCWMG, Vol. 25, 147). True religion and true morality are inseparably bound up with each other. Religion is to morality what water is to the seed that is sown in the soil (Gandhi 1936, 29). “The foundation of his (Gandhi’s) thought and his practice is the unqualified conviction that our existence is spiritually grounded, that spirituality and moral purity must necessarily inform each other, that man’s true fulfilment lies in moral-spiritual self-knowledge and action that necessarily flows from such selfknowledge” (Miri 2003, 122). The moral practitioner in and through his continuous and persistent attempt to do good with a definite direction to attain the better, places himself in the process of achieving the Goodness. Idea of this ‘Goodness’ goes much beyond particular good deeds of everyday life and focuses with direct attention at an enlightenment. When one reaches this state of existence the practitioner is believed to have undergone an inner transformation. The following expressions give a vivid picture of Gandhi himself having such experience in his own life—“it may entail continuous suffering and the cultivating of endless patience. Thus, step by step we learn to make friends with the entire world: we realize the greatness of god or truth. Our peace of mind increases in spite of suffering, we become braver and more enterprising …… our pride melts away, and we become humble. Our worldly attachments diminish and so does the evil within us diminish from day to day” (Gandhi, eCWMG Vol. 49, 408). It is a journey of self-discovery. In this attempt of self-discovery a person overcomes self-deception. He/she wins over self-ignorance. In this process of continuous growth while the individual is engaged in constant watchfulness into his/her within and deeply involved in meditation the small self, i.e. the ego, ‘the big fat ego’, in Iris Murdoch’s words, stands in between the person’s attempt and his/her goal. In his/her movement onward when the person gains the glimpse of unconditional love the ‘I’ gets dissolved into an ocean of awareness. Each and every action of the truly religious person is, thus, an experiment in the process of preparing oneself capable to attain the ‘Truth’ which is in its essence the ‘Spirituality’, the ‘Divinity’. For Gandhi, the religious vision is inseparable from spiritual experience and the authenticity of the latter is guaranteed by the moral transformation that follows. The spiritual life or the religious life, for Gandhi, is an active, total engagement of the individual in various experiments in decision-making situations. Now we come to Ramakrishna, the famous devotee of the goddess Kali, who lived at Dakshineswar, on the bank of the river Hooghly. He is considered a perfect

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embodiment of the ‘Eternal Truth’ and the incarnation of the ‘Supreme Lord’, a specially commissioned person. He was not brought up within the precincts of any institution, but drew the flow of his wisdom neither from any book, nor scripture, nor from any ancient prophet but directly from the eternal fountainhead of all knowledge and wisdom. Every idea he expresses in his conversations with his disciples, devotees and visitors was fresh and direct, unadulterated by the product of human intellect or scholastic education. For other practitioners, while it takes a whole life’s struggle, however sincere he/she is, to realize some phases of the ‘Ultimate Truth’, Ramakrishna had, in a few years, realized God in all ‘His’ phases. He himself was spontaneously aware that he was a free soul. When Ramakrishna used to worship the goddess Kali in the Dakshineswar temple he used to offer flowers on the feet of the deity, simultaneously, he would put some flowers on his own head, and then he used to be absorbed in deep meditation. Ramakrishna, in his meditation used to enter into the ecstatic mood (samadhi) through which he would pass to the transcendental state in which there was no difference between the worshipper and the worshipped. In time of his conversations with the visitors and devotees he would tell stories, give analogies, and through some parables he used to convey, in a very simple way, the most valuable truths of human reality. For him rational analysis and speculative discussions could not bring out the nature of the reality or the truth. So, he never delivered any lecture. Through the practice of continuous prayer and passionate devotion he had the direct experience of the goddess. Goddess Kali is known as a deity in Hinduism, and Ramakrishna, by his endless love had a direct vision of the deity inside the temple of Dakshineswar. He never went through any doctrine of Hinduism, nor did he believe in the typical dogmas of Hinduism. He used to say that one should not discuss the ‘Impersonal God’ or the path of knowledge with a devotee. Through great effort perhaps the devotee is just cultivating a little devotion. It would be injured and may be destroyed if anybody tried to explain and analyse it. He did not believe in the power of lectures. If anybody tried to lecture on the matters of religion he said: “vultures soar very high in the sky, but their eyes are fixed on rotten carrion on the ground. Book-learned are reputed to be wise, but they are attached to women and gold. Like vultures they are in search of carrion, they are attached to the world of ignorance” (Gupta, Gospel of Sri Ramakrishna,2 2007, 416– 417). ‘Brahman alone is real and the world illusory—’ this is reasoning. According to Ramakrishna, this is an extremely difficult path. He insisted on the path of devotion. He stated that the greatest manifestation of God is through ‘His Incarnations’. The devotee in his attempt to realize God, should worship and serve an incarnation of God as long as ‘He’ lives in a human body. He has to develop a passionate devotion and unconditional love for the reality. The devotee has to attempt the journey through deep meditation in solitude. Ramakrishna was emotionally absorbed in the ecstatic mood of boundless transcendental love. The specific rules in the practice of rites and 2 The

Gospel of Sri Ramakrishna is the English translation of the Sri Sri Ramakrishna Kath¯amrita, the conversations of Sri Ramakrishna with his disciples, devotees and visitors, recorded by Mahendranath Gupta, who wrote the book under the pseudonym of ‘M.’ This was then translated into English with an Introduction by Swami Nikhilananda.

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rituals of Hinduism, to which he belonged by birth, did not have much importance for him. He went through some discipline to maintain the calmness and quietness of his mind. The ego or the ‘I’ consciousness in us is the greatest obstacle in the path of God— Vision. The ‘I’ is like a thick cloud. As a small cloud can hide the glorious sun, so the cloud of ‘I’ hides the glory of the Infinite. The cloud or the obstacle, according to Ramakrishna, is Maya. He suggested that maya is nothing but the egotism of the embodied soul. The egotism covers everything like a veil. The maya with its multiple upadhis distorts the concentration of the individual. All troubles come to an end when the ego dies. If by the grace of God, a man but once realizes that he is not the doer, then he at once becomes a jivanmukta, “This m¯ay¯a, that is to say, the ego, is like a cloud. The sun cannot be seen on account of a thin patch of cloud; when that disappears, one sees the sun”. (Ibid, 653–54). The struggle to remove the cloud of ‘I’ or ego or Maya is a tremendously difficult task. According to Ramakrishna, at this stage an efficient spiritual Guru can help the individual, “If by the grace of the guru one’s ego vanishes, then one sees God…. God is the nearest of all, but we cannot see Him on account of the covering of m¯ay¯a” (Ibid, 654). Ramakrishna is believed to be an incarnation of Lord Vishnu. Awareness of the presence of God was always in him. He could easily enter into the ecstatic mood (samadhi) at any time. He did not have to undertake any extra practice to attain the light of ‘Ultimate Reality’. All the attempts and practices which he recommended were meant to teach his disciples. Monks and house-holders—all were his disciples. For the monks, he advised strict practices, while for house-holders he was liberal. He advised the monks to take the vow of absolute continence and eschew all thought of greed and lust. On the other hand, he wanted the house-holders to discharge their obligations to their families. According to Ramakrishna spiritual life could not be acquired by flying away from responsibilities. One has to serve one’s duties without any attachment to their results. It has to be achieved in solitude through devotion, prayer and meditation. He prescribed the companionship of sadhus for them. The point is clear that God-realization for both Ramakrishna and Gandhi is a matter of achievement and both insisted on continuous attempts on the part of the individual. For Ramakrishna while it is through faith, prayer and devotion that one can reach the spirituality, Gandhi holds that God or Truth can be attained by relentless practice of morality. Ramakrishna never had any problem regarding the question of plurality of religion. He was firmly convinced that religion, in its true sense, is one and same for all, but the method of reaching it is different for different persons. He himself practised under the guidance and advice of the experts of different religions and realized in himself that various paths lead to the similar goal. One should have nishtha or single-minded devotion to achieve it. It is also described as ‘chaste and unswerving devotion to god’. He gives the example of the gopies, who are believed to be the symbol of true love and limitless devotion. When we talk of the varieties of religion, we come across the names like Hinduism, Christianity, Islam, Buddhism and many more. For Ramakrishna, they are just different means to reach the same goal: the one and single ‘Truth’, the ‘Supreme Reality’—God. Once the indomitable desire to reach

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the Supreme is there the person will reach, through whichever path he/she may walk. According to Ramakrishna: “God can be realized through all paths. All religions are true. The important thing is to reach the roof. You can reach it by stone stairs or by wooden stairs or by bamboo steps or by a rope. You can also climb up by a bamboo pole” (Gupta, Gospel of Sri Ramakrishna, 2007, 451–52). Whether one is a Christian or a Hindu or a Mohammedan or a Buddhist, or one belongs to the Saiva Sakta or Vaishnava sect,—or one believes in God with form or without form—all these are just meaningless for the true seeker. For Ramakrishna, therefore, there is no point to harbour malice against one another. There are three great systems of thought, they are known as Dualism, Qualified Non-dualism and Absolute Non-dualism—Dvaita, Visishtadvaita and Advaita— Ramakrishna perceived them as the theories that represent three stages of man’s progress towards the ‘Ultimate Reality’. They are not contradictory but complementary and suitable to different temperaments. Ramakrishna says “for the ordinary man with strong attachments to the senses, a dualistic form of religion, prescribing a certain amount of material support, such as music and other symbols, is useful. A man of God-realisation transcends the idea of worldly duties, but the ordinary mortal must perform his duties, striving to be unattached and to surrender the results to God. The mind can comprehend and describe the range of thought and experience up to the Visishtadvaita, and no further. The Advaita, the last word in spiritual experience, is something to be felt in samadhi, for it transcends mind and speech. From the highest standpoint, the Absolute and Its manifestations are equally real—the Lord’s Name, His Abode, and the Lord Himself are of the same spiritual Essence. Everything is Spirit, the difference being only in form” (Ibid, 208–09). As to the question of the plurality of religions Gandhi’s answer is not far from that of Ramakrishna. Gandhi is confident that the truth of all religions is the same, although there may be diverse paths to this truth. In Hind Swaraj he writes: “ If a man reaches the heart of his own religion, he has reached the heart of others too” (Gandhi, eCWMG Vol. 10, 273). He fully agrees with Ramakrishna when he says: “Religions are different roads so long as we reach the same goal. In reality, there are as many religions as there are individuals” (Ibid, 270–71). Gandhi’s assertion is based on the profound conviction that “spirituality (religion) and morality are inseparable, that to have achieved spirituality is to be established in a form of life whose motivating force is love (ahimsa) and justice, that spirituality is what breathes life into our religion and, therefore, that every living religion must have a spiritual-moral core” (Miri 2003, 125). Gandhi’s answer to the question, “how ought I, as a believing Hindu, treat other religions?” is: “I must treat all religions with equal respect”. Today’s religion (by which I mean the institutionalized religions) misses two points,—(i) religion is a matter of spiritual apprehension, (ii) religion is inseparably related to the individual. The institutionalized use of religion has, totally, distorted the idea of religion. Honesty, morality and deep personal reflection within one’s being, in other words, the major constituents of religion, are entirely missing from present institutionalized religious practice. All kinds of immoral and dishonest activities are done in the name of religion.

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The question arises as to if institutions of religion do not represent religion in its true sense, and if the presence of different institutions brings antagonism and hatred among the people in the society, then for what do the institutions like Hinduism, Christianity, Islam, Buddhism and so on, exist? Why do people still follow the rules and guidelines imposed by the institutions? In an attempt to answer these questions, we find that the presence of many religious institutions in the society is a fact. If they were really unnecessary for man, they would have gradually disappeared in the natural course. But their number is found to be rather increasing. The point is, religious institutions do have certain roles in our social life. For example, (i) common people can recognize a religion by the practice of particular religious occasions in temples, or churches or mosques, etc. (ii) Aspects of religion (doctrines, dogmas and practices) may not be essential for a true believer, but for common people they represent the identity of a religion. The kind of religious experience we have talked about in connection to Gandhi or Ramakrishna, is not easily grasped by common people. Nonetheless a belief in the supernatural or a faith in something beyond, something more powerful is found present in the history of mankind. (iii) Religious institutions help to respect and explain such beliefs. Doctrines and dogmas satisfy man’s inquisitiveness in religious matters through some stories and theories. (iv) Religious activities like prayer and performances of rites and rituals which are observed in groups, as organized by the institutions, help to develop a feeling of togetherness which is essential for a social life. (v) There are many people who earn their livelihood by observing different religious practices. That keeps them busy and they find meaning in them. (vi) Study of religious theories increases knowledge, and readings of the stories and parables of religious literature help the common people to develop social and moral values. All this helps to enrich and develop the socio-cultural life of man. I think, they are achievements of the institutions of religion. These institutions deal with a basic phenomenon of human life. The administrators and the priests of different religious institutions, in the course of their activities and programmes‚ can easily reach the common masses. It is easier for them to influence and motivate the society to move in a particular direction. We can focus on the point that, it is the responsibility of the clergymen and authorities of religious institutions to guide the mass in the right path. Religion is a matter of faith, people who deal with religion, i.e. religious preachers and priests are usually accepted by common people with deep faith and devotion. The advice and impositions given by the experts who run the institutions (religious) are also accepted with great respect and reverence. It is the duty of these authorities to see that the well being of human beings as a whole is properly taken care of.

References Gandhi, M. K. Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi, electronic edition (eCWMG), accessible online at http://gandhiserve.org/cwmg/cwmg.html. Note that between Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi CWMG 100 Volumes (Ahmedabad, Navajivan publishing, 1955) and electronic edition (eCWMG) there are disputed differences of content and different volumes and page numbers.

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Gandhi, M. K. (1936). Ethical Religion. Ahmedabad: Navajivan Press. Gupta, M. (2007). The Gospel of Sri Ramakrishna. New York, Ramakrishna-Vivekananda Center: Translated into English with an Introduction by Swami Nikhilananda. Miri, M. (2003). Identity and the Moral Life. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.

Tagore and Gandhi: On Diversity and Religious ‘Others’ Bindu Puri

Abstract Gandhi and Tagore were both sensitive to the complex ways in which religious and cultural beliefs were interwoven in diverse ways in the lives of individuals and communities. They had given much thought to the relationship between moralreligious culturally diverse people. Gandhi was no stranger to the conflicts caused by cultural and religious pluralism having dealt with three serious self and other conflicts—with the religious racial and colonial other. Tagore also was no stranger to conflicts caused by pluralism and his arguments against (what he called) “Western” Nationalism had emerged from a deep appreciation of the diversity that characterized India. This essay will suggest that Gandhi’s affirmation of kinship between religions and Tagore’s conception of the religion of man were far more exacting than liberal positions that recommended (at best) tolerance between religions. Gandhi and Tagore both seemed to suggest that rather than tolerate diverse others one needed to be in harmony with difference being able to honour the world view of religious others as one would one’s own. Keywords Diversity · Religion of man · Culture · Surplus · Tolerate · Honour · Maîtri · Harmony · Sharing · Kinship · Absolute equality This is perhaps a slightly ambitious essay in that it seeks to bring together insights from two of the great minds of India. Both Tagore and Gandhi (albeit in very different ways) had thought about the relationship between religiously diverse people. It is significant that Tagore (more than any other Indian of his times) had travelled all over the world out of an interest in the people and natural and religio-cultural environments of different communities. There are insightful accounts of his responses to these environments in his travelogues in both English and in Bengali. Writing about his travels in China, Tagore1 had drawn parallels between the transition from dusk to B. Puri (B) Professor, Centre For Philosophy, School of Social Sciences, JNU, Delhi, India e-mail: [email protected] 1 Quite

prophetically Tagore had written, while travelling in China, that looking at the morning break in the countryside he had insights about the end of the erstwhile ages when races of men were segregated from each other.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 B. Puri and A. Kumar (eds.), Re-thinking Religious Pluralism, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-9540-0_8

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dawn in the countryside and the coming of the new age “the light which is for all men and for all times” (Tagore 2012g, 713) ending the night of isolation of erstwhile insulated communities. Unlike liberals, Gandhi and Tagore both spoke about the relationship between diverse religious cultures using religio-moral arguments and reposed trust in the individual rather than in the state. Having said that it is important to note that they had very different understandings of religion and that these differences translated into differences between their arguments. While Gandhi thought that the culture of a community was inextricable from its religious beliefs; for Tagore, culture was primarily connected to the springs of the creativity of a people. Accordingly, he thought that the cultural life of a community was as much constituted by its art literature and music as by its religious beliefs. Such differences between them influenced Tagore and Gandhi’s conceptions of how one should respond to diverse others— Gandhi speaking about equality and kinship, Tagore about sharing, friendship/maitri and harmony. This essay will fall into three sections. The first will examine Gandhi’s position on the relationship between religions and his conception of the proper response to religiously diverse others. The second section will explore Tagore’s notion of the surplus in man and the related idea that both culture and religion abide in that surplus. This (and the next) section will attempt to bring out Tagore’s mystical conception of religion—as he described it himself—the religion of the artist/ “a poet’s religion” (Tagore 2012c, 127)—as the source of his recommendation of harmony and sharing as the appropriate response to religious others. The third and last section will bring out both the differences and points of agreement between Tagore and Gandhi.

1 Absolute Equality and Kinship: Gandhi on Moral-Religious Cultural Diversity Gandhi’s position on honouring religious others did not emerge from a position (best described as liberal) where one could be respectful to religious others in public space because one understood that one’s religious beliefs should be relegated to one’s private moments. Quite to the contrary, Gandhi seemed to have argued that religious beliefs pervaded all the aspects of a believer’s life. He often emphasized that the socio-cultural identity of a community is inextricably linked to its religion: It (Indian civilization) is a mingling of the cultures represented by the different faiths and influenced by the geographic and other environments in which the cultures have met…And everyone who calls himself or herself an Indian is bound to treasure that culture, be its trustee and resist any attack upon it. (Prabhu and Rao (eds) 2007, 431).

Here (and at countless other places in his writing) Gandhi rejected the division of an individual’s life into, the public and private, saying instead that a religious person ought to live an integrated life;

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I claim that human mind or human society is not divided into watertight compartments called social, political and religious. All act and react upon each other…One’s everyday life is never capable of being separated from one’s spiritual being. (Ibid, 101).

This emphasis on the inter-connections between the religious beliefs and the sociocultural life and practices of a community becomes even clearer when one considers Gandhi’s position on conversion. Gandhi had often argued that conversion from the religion of one’s ancestors would inevitably compromise one’s way of life and identity. Several arguments against conversion (made in the course of the debate with Ambedkar and in response to Christian missionaries) might come to mind here. Gandhi was emphatic in his insistence; During our earthly existence there will always be these labels. I therefore prefer to retain the label of my forefathers so long as it does not cramp my growth and does not debar me from assimilating all that is good else where. (Murti (ed) 1970, 116).

It becomes important at this point to reflect a little upon how Gandhi understood Religion. Gandhi believed that a religion was constituted both by an essence of moral-spiritual beliefs and by what (he called) “creed or dogma” (Gandhi, eCWMG, Vol. 36, 475/Vol. 57, 363).On this view, it was the latter that made for the differences between religions. Gandhi suggested that unlike the accompanying framework of creeds and dogmas fundamental moral beliefs at the essence of religion constituted “that religion which underlies all religions” (Gandhi, eCWMG, Vol. 10, 264). Spelling out the common core of religion/all religions Gandhi placed a commitment to truth and non-violence/ahimsa and the devotee’s relationship with the Divine at that core.2 : After a study of those religions to the extent that it was possible for me, I have come to the conclusion that, if it is proper and necessary to discover an underlying unity among all religions, a master-key is needed. That master-key is that of truth and non-violence. When I unlock the chest of a religion with this master-key I do not find it difficult to discover its likeness with other religions. (Gandhi, eCWMG, Vol. 78, 411-12)

Making the same point Gandhi argued that while religions “are many rivers, and they appear different from one another….” (Gandhi eCWMG, Vol. 7, 315) the fundamental moral-religious beliefs at the core of a religion are shared across all religions: All religions are divinely inspired, but they are imperfect because they are the products of the human mind and taught by human beings. The one religion is beyond all speech. Imperfect men put it into such language that they can command and their words are interpreted by other men equally imperfect. (Gandhi eCWMG, Vol. 50, 79).

It is significant to note that while he emphasized a common essence Gandhi was certainly not innocent of the ineradicable differences between religio-moral cultures. In fact he appreciated the importance of differences and of the custom-ritual-myth 2 According to Gandhi though it was true that a relationship with the divine was at the core of every

religion, it was equally true that all religions, indeed all devotee’s, would negotiate that relationship in their own unique ways.

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framework that uniquely contextualized the specifically moral-religious beliefs (at the essence of each religion) to the form/way of life of a religious community. This idea of the unique ritual-myth-creed-custom framework of every religion might well remind the reader of what Sikka (in a very different context) in the opening essay in this book describes as religion as identity. Gandhi had noted the significance of such a unique set of “creed or dogma” (Gandhi, eCWMG, Vol. 36, 475/Vol. 57, 363) to the self-identity of individual believers and to the way of life of the community. This (as noted earlier) is abundantly evidenced by his well-cited arguments against religious conversion. Since (on a Gandhianview) any believer could follow the religion which is at the essence of all religions by practising the moral principles which are common to all religions it might not seem surprising that Gandhi should have argued against conversion. What was a little surprising, however, was that his sense of confidence and comfort with the religious tradition of his forefathers was in itself constitutive of a feeling of kinship with other religious traditions. This is best conveyed by— samata, samadarshana and samabhava—three Sanskrit terms that Gandhi used in the context of the relationship between religions. These three terms come from a common root sama which (like the English word “same”) means equal or constant.3 Gandhi thought of the relationship between diverse religions as an “absolute equality”. (Gandhi, eCWMG, Vol. 59, 137). Consequently (for Gandhi) one could only respond to religious diversity by an affirmation (even celebration) of equality in ineradicable difference. (Puri 2019). For me different religions are beautiful flowers from the same garden, or they are branches of the same majestic tree. Therefore, they are equally true, though being received and interpreted through human instruments equally imperfect. (Gandhi eCWMG, Vol. 70, 367).

Having spelt out Gandhi’s position on the relationship between religions—as one of affirming equality in immense difference—it becomes important to see if Gandhi had (as a matter of fact) agreed that tolerance was the best response that could be made to religious others. One might be compelled to answer this question in the negative if one considers the sort of the reasons that liberals have offered in support of tolerance. It seems evident that most liberal arguments for tolerance emerge from uncertainty or scepticism about religious truths. One need only to recall some of the well-cited liberal arguments for tolerance such as those offered by Mill and by Locke. In On liberty Mill, for instance, lays out a meta-inductive argument for tolerance recommending tolerance on the basis of the fact that we know that we have been wrong about what we held to be true in the past and consequently are not infallible about matters that concern us deeply (Mill 2006, 24). On a similar note in the 1667 essay on toleration Locke has argued that religious beliefs are “purely speculative opinions” (Locke 1997, 137).

3I

would like to state that the translations here are rough approximations: samadarshana as “to see things with an equal eye despite inequalities”, Samabhava as having the “attitude of equality to things as they are/exist” and, samata as referring to “the status of equality”.

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Striking a contrary note it seems clear that Gandhi’s recommendation to honour religiously diverse others does not seem to have come from a position of scepticism and uncertainty about the truths sought by religion. This might become obvious if one appreciates that honour can only emerge from the insight that religions are fitting objects of veneration (and not scepticism) as they all seek Truth/God. Consequently, liberal reasons for responding to religious others with tolerance seem to be at complete variance with Gandhi’s affirmation of the absolute equality of all temporal (and vastly different) religions. Further even a superficial reading of Gandhi can show that he did not like the notion of tolerance: Equality of Religions. This is the new name we have given to the ashram observance which we know as ‘tolerance’. ‘Sahishnuta’ is a translation of the English word ‘Tolerance’. I did not like that word… Kakasaheb, too, did not like that word. He suggested ‘Respect for all religions’. I did not like that phrase either. Tolerance may imply a gratuitous assumption of the inferiority of other faiths to one’s own, and respect suggests a sense of patronizing, whereas ahimsa teaches us to have the same respect for the religious faiths of others as we accord to our own, thus admitting the imperfection of the latter. (Gandhi, eCWMG, Vol. 50, 78).

Gandhi suggested more than tolerance and recommended a friendly blending of cultures; Either people of different faiths having lived together in friendship have produced a beautiful blend of cultures, which we shall strive to perpetuate ….or we shall cast about for the day when there was only one religion…and retrace our steps to that exclusive culture. (Prabhu and Rao (eds) 2007, 431).

A closer reading of Gandhi could reinforce his differences from the liberals by bringing up his metaphorical use of kinship in the context of religious diversity. Gandhi used this metaphor with considerable skill, to bring out the sense of familial regard, that could be seen to be involved in samabhava/ seeing things with an equal eye; I have no other wish in this world, but to find light, joy and peace through Hinduism…it has enabled me to treat other religions on a footing of absolute equality and their followers even as my blood brothers and sisters. (Gandhi, eCWMG, Vol. 59, 137). I, who believe in the absolute equality of the great religions of the world from my early days have learnt to honour other religions as my own…. (Gandhi, eCWMG, Vol. 62, 259).

There are some important issues that need to be clarified at this point of the argument. The most important relates to the need to reconcile Gandhi’s emphasis on one’s own tradition with his recommendation that all traditions need to be honoured as if they were one’s own. The problem with holding both positions emerges if one considers the following—If I believe that my traditional set of beliefs are true how can I honour the contrary beliefs of others that inform their ways of life in complex and interwoven ways? One way of solving this problem would be to say, that like the Jains, Gandhi perhaps endorsed a thorough going relativism about truth. I have at several places expressed my difficulties with such a position coming primarily from

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Gandhi’s contrary emphasis on the duty of resistance (See Puri 2015, 2018, 2019). It seems obvious enough that if Gandhi accepted that truth was relative to the point of view of a believer he could not consistently have recommended the kind of resistance (to the point of death) against positions that were untrue/unjust that he, in fact, did: We should have equal regard for all human beings-for the wicked as for the saintly, for the impious as for the pious-but we should never tolerate irreligion. (Gandhi, eCWMG, Vol 50, 79).

A related issue that is significant to the present discussion is what Gandhi could have meant by saying that the essence of all religions is the same? What he seems to be suggesting, at any rate, is that believers of one religion are aware of God in exactly the same way as the believers of any other religion. This naturally makes one ask what then makes for the difference between religions? On a Gandhian view it is the cultural elements, the creeds and dogmas, that make for the differences between religions. Though morality is part of the cultural trappings—since we uniquely learn moral notions from our experience of life in the community—to be aware of God (on Gandhi’s view) is to be aware of truth ahimsa and love. In fact, for Gandhi this awareness comes even before we become aware of God. This explains why Gandhi could say (for example) that the atheist is a truth/God-fearing man. The point that he was making was perhaps that the values we attribute to God are values we uniquely learn from the contingencies of tradition and yet they are the values that are at the essence of all religions and make for their absolute equality. This Gandhian emphasis on the truth of one’s own religious tradition can be reconciled with the seemingly contrary recommendation to honour other (often contrary) socio-religious-cultures by reflecting upon three points—the manner in which Gandhi thought about the relationship between an individual and her tradition, his understanding of God as truth and the discipline he recommended to come close to God/Truth, i.e. ahimsa. The following three subsections will briefly discuss these points.

1.1 The Individual and Her Religious Tradition The first clarification relates to the manner in which Gandhi thought of the relationship between an individual and her tradition. The important question here is whether Gandhi’s emphasis on the tradition of one’s forefathers translated into an orthodox affirmation that one’s own tradition was the only source of the idea of the proper and true. One can appreciate that such a position would not be easily reconcilable with a sense of honour for the traditions of others. In this context, it is important to examine Gandhi’s insights into the relationship between an individual and her tradition. Though Gandhi often emphasized the tradition of one’s ancestors he was equally emphatic that all devouts had a religious duty to critically engage with their religious traditions. In this context it is interesting to note some passages from the Anasaktiyoga;

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Like man, the meaning of great writings suffers evolution. On examining the history of languages we notice that the meaning of important words has changed or expanded. This is true of the Gita. The author has himself extended the meanings of some of the current words. We are able to discover this even on a superficial examination. (Gandhi, eCWMG, Vol 46, 174).

Gandhi goes on to explain that believers have a religious duty to re-interpret their religious texts; It is possible that, in the age prior to that of the Gita, offerings of animals in sacrifices was permissible… there is not a trace of it in the sacrifice in the Gita sense… The third chapter seems to show that sacrifice chiefly means bodily labour for service….Similarly has the meaning of the word sannyasa undergone, in the Gita, a transformation. The sannyasa of the Gita will not tolerate a complete cessation of all activity. The sannyasa of the Gita is all work and yet no work. Thus the author of the Gita, by extending meanings of words, has taught us to imitate him…… With every age the important words will carry new and expanding meanings. But its central teaching will never vary. The seeker is at liberty to extract from this treasure any meaning he likes so as to enable him to enforce in his life the central teaching. (Ibid, 174–175).

In this context, it is significant to note Gandhi’s arguments that the Bhagavad Gita does not contain a set of unchanging moral rules. His position (here and elsewhere) seems to indicate that it is difficult to conceive of morality as a set of uncompromising general rules. Sensitivity to the context matters when making moral decisions. Gandhi explicitly makes this point; Nor is the Gita a collection of do’s and dont’s. What is lawful for one may be unlawful for another. What may be permissible at one time, or in one place, may not be so at another time, and in another place. Desire for fruit is the only universal prohibition. Desirelessness is obligatory. (Ibid, 175).

Moving beyond this emphasis on a critical engagement with tradition and related reiteration of the religious duty of re-interpretation of sacred texts it seems important to take note of the role of criticism itself in Gandhi’s understanding of the relationship between a devout and her tradition. It is surely significant that Gandhi spoke of the need to criticize one’s own tradition in the light of the moral-religious convictions that were shared between (and lay at the essence of) all religions: Therefore I try to understand the spirit of the various scriptures of the world. I apply the test of ‘satya’ (Truth) and ‘ahimsa’ (non-violence)laid down by these very scriptures for their interpretation. I reject what is inconsistent with that test, and I appropriate all that is consistent with it. (Gandhi, eCWMG, Vol 32, 335).

Gandhi seemed to be suggesting that once the devotee becomes progressively settled in the religio-moral life she can critically examine the accompanying creeds and dogmas of her religion in the light of the moral beliefs at the core of her own/all religions. However, there is an important caveat here, which is‚ that Gandhi was clear that such criticism could only come from within the tradition. On this view, it was only those who lived out the beliefs of a particular tradition who could critique

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and thereby reform it. In this context one can note the following statement from Gandhi; I ask people to examine every religion from the point of the religionists themselves. (Prabhu and Rao 2007, 67)

It is important at this point to examine the point (made by critics) that Gandhi’s emphasis on the tradition of one’s ancestors was a position of an orthodox traditionalist who appreciated tradition as the only source of the notion of proper/thekhana. As Ajay Skaria reminds us in Unconditional Equality “It would be easy enough to indicate the many occasions on which Gandhi’s…. explicit formulations draw heavily on the trope of the thekana (rightful place) in thinking the role of Women or Varnadharma….” (Skaria 2016, 23). Skaria notes (in this context) that “so long as Gandhi works within the terms of the proper, then, he can only appear the way he does to Jawaharlal Nehru or, even more, to Dr. B. R. Ambedkar- as thoroughly unable to even recognize the demand for equality from the margins.” (Ibid, 24). Gandhi’s emphasis on the duty of criticism and rethinking of tradition suggests, to the contrary, that he might not uncritically have accepted tradition as the source of all notions of thekana/proper way. This is not to deny that Gandhi might have adopted a traditional view regards the issues mentioned above. The limited point I seek to make here is only that Gandhi’s recommendation of criticism of religious tradition and emphasis on the duty of re-interpretation makes it difficult to dismiss him as an uncritical and orthodox traditionalist. At the very least putting Gandhi’s understanding of tradition in perspective makes it possible to see that his emphasis on the tradition of one’s forefathers (as certainly not beyond reproach and as essentially imperfect) could be reconciled with a sense of honour for the traditions of others.

1.2 Truth is God The second point to keep in mind in this context is that Gandhi often equated Truth with God: If it is possible for the human tongue to give the fullest description of God, I have come to the conclusion that for myself God is Truth. But two years ago, I went a step further and said that Truth is God. You will see the fine distinction between the two statements. (Gandhi 1931 in Murti (ed) 1970, 73).

Since Gandhi believed that God was best described as truth, it seems possible to understand why he should have thought that all religio-socio-cultural traditions were essentially seeking the same God. Gandhi could recommend that religious devouts ought to honour (rather than merely tolerate) the religious traditions of contrary cultures. This was on account of his resolute conviction that at “heart” (Gandhi in Bose (ed) 1948, 256) all religions are one. One expression of this belief is that for Gandhi all religions worshipped the same God: “To me all religions are one… All religions worship the same God” (Gandhi, eCWMG, Vol. 94, 404).

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In support of such an understanding one might be able to appreciate that, however, much they may differ from each other, all religions seek the truth as opposed to falsehood. As Gandhi put it: Denial of God we have known. Denial of Truth we have not known. (Gandhi, eCWMG, Vol. 66, 112).

1.3 Ahimsa and Truth The third point (related to the last one) is the alternative epistemology suggested by Gandhi—ahimsa/non-violence was the only path to truth. Gandhi’s emphasis on ahimsa as the only path to truth/God implied that one needed to be full of love for the religious other if one wanted to arrive at the truth/God of one’s own religion. It is significant to note here that Gandhian ahimsa was much more than non-injury and involved compassion and love for those who differed from oneself. The point that is important (in the context of the argument of this essay) is that given Gandhi’s emphasis on the connection between ahimsa and truth any departure from non-violence would distant a devotee from the truth/God of her own religion. This meant that the connection between honouring the truths of one’s own religion and honouring the truths of other religions was somewhat internal to the religiosity of the Gandhian devout.

2 Tagore: On Diversity and the Religion of Man Tagore was aware that the progressive dismantling of boundaries between countries had brought the world increasingly together making it important for people to think about inter-religious-cultural understanding. This was a point he re-iterated in both his prose and poetry: Human civilization has crossed the boundaries of social and national segregation.We are today to build the future of man on an honest understanding of our varied racial personality which gives richness to life, on.. sympathy and co-operation in the great task of liberating the human mind from the dark sources of unreason and mutual distrust of homicidal pride of sect and lust for gain. (Tagore 2012e, 656).

Or again, The night has ended Put out the light of the Lamp of thine own Narrow dark corner Smudged with smoke The great morning which is for all

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Appears in the East Let its light reveal us to each other Who walk on the same path Of pilgrimage. (Ibid, 657). Tagore argued that India could bring “the light of the East” to other world communities walking down the same path of “pilgrimage”. He used the metaphors of light and pilgrimage speaking of the harmony between cultures in the language of religion. However, it is important to note that Tagore’s understanding of the religion of man (as lying in the unity of inter-relationship between men) was certainly not a re-iteration of Gandhi’s emphasis on tradition and the religion of one’s ancestors. Tagore had a different understanding of religion, a mystical conception which (as he said) was non-sectarian and best described as “a poet’s religion” (Tagore 2012a, 127). The inspiration for the same seemed to have come from ancient Upanishadic texts which speak of non-duality and from the religious folk music of Bengal. In this connection, mention must specifically be made of the music and poetry of the baul4 singers to whom he often referred. While Gandhi had argued for the inextricability between religion and culture Tagore had a slightly broader understanding of culture. He argued that the culture of a community emerged from the springs of creativity in the individual/group rather than solely from their religious beliefs. It is in this connection that it becomes important to examine his idea of the surplus in man. This idea becomes a key to Tagore’s understanding of culture and the relationship between diverse religious cultures. Some insights emerge in the following passages; Life is perpetually creative because it contains in itself that surplus which ever overflows the boundaries of the immediate time and space, relentlessly pursuing its adventure of expression in the varied forms of self-realization…. (Tagore 2012f, 690).

and, Of all living creatures in the world, man has his vital and mental energy vastly in excess of his need, which urges him to work in various lines of creation, and therefore of the origin of art. Like Brahma himself,he takes joy in productions that are unnecessary to him, and therefore representing his extravagance and not his hand-to-mouth penury. The voice that is just enough can speak and cry to the extent needed for everyday use, but that which is abundant sings, and in it we find our joy. (Ibid, 689).

Tagore’s idea of the surplus in man at once explains both the universal and individual aspects of human personality. At one level the surplus in the human being leads her to express the personality of, both the individual and the community, in unique cultural artistic and literary ventures. At another level, the fact that all such ventures emerge from an essentially shared/universal aspect of human personality, at once invites all human beings to share in cultural/literary achievements wherever they may be located. The idea that people of very different religions can share each 4 The

bauls are a group of mystic minstrels from Bengal.

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other’s socio-cultural achievements as belonging to the surplus in human personality leads Tagore to recommend co-operation and sympathy between cultures—rather than tolerance—as the appropriate response to diversity. One might appreciate that sharing seems different from (and demands much more than) tolerance. Sharing is also somewhat different from respect and even from honour born from recognition of equality. Think of sharing a piece of cake with another person. One would need an easy intimacy and perhaps trust (that the other would give you your fair share) to make it possible to participate in the act of sharing, cutting it into two halves and so on. By extension to share of one’s art custom literature religio-social and architectural creations require inter-religious conversations of a sort that must begin with and deepen friendship/maitri. Emphasizing the individual character of such inter-relationships and friendship Tagore had clarified that the goal of such an “intercourse of culture and friendship” (Tagore 2012g, 711) was to be able to establish “wide relationship with a large number of other individuals” (Tagore 2012c, 459). It is very important to note here that (like Gandhi) Tagore recognized that such friendship and these inter-religious conversations were not meant to do away with the absolute difference between religious-cultures whether such Religions be from within or outside of the nation; Let us…abide by our obligation to maintain and nourish the distinctive merit of our respective cultures and not be misled into believing that what is ancient is necessarily outworn and what is modern is indispensible. (Tagore 2012g, 714). …the true way to maintain a harmonious unity is by according due distinctness of individual parts.. (Tagore 2012c, 459).

Tagore was clear that such a relationship/maitri between diverse communities would not be affected solely by making political or social arrangements such as a league of nations. In his view the best place to enable inter-religious conversations and friendships were at educational institutions such as Visva Bharati. He spoke in this context on the aim of education and especially of the role of education in the fine arts as enabling cultural conversations to bring diverse socio-religio-cultures into harmony. He drew parallels between such harmony and diverse notes that are brought together into rhythm in a piece of music. It may be useful to note Tagore’s comments about education; All educational development must proceed from within outwards. It is really a spiritual process,not merely an intellectual or a mechanical one. The spirit being greater than the body and even the individual mind, education is a process covering the widest area. Education is,in a real sense,the breaking of the shackles of individual narrowness.The aim must, therefore, be to develop not only the individual aspect of the mind but also the universal or the spiritual. It is therefore necessary to bring together in every educational organization, all the different cultures found in India and as far as possible, all the cultures in the world, all the phases of religion and art, in which the universal mind has expressed itself in different ages and countries, i.e., to co-ordinate these various cultures without attempting the suppression of the natural differences… (Tagore 2012h, 748).

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Tagore’s reference to the universal and the spiritual takes me into the next section which attempts to bring out what might be common to Tagore and Gandhi’s different approaches on the relationship between socio-moral-religious cultures.

3 Tagore and Gandhi: Points of Agreement and Difference It seems evident that there were both points of agreement and of difference between Tagore and Gandhi on the relationship between religious cultures. To begin with the similarities between their approaches, it may be noted, that there were two important points of agreement between them. The first that both stressed the need to develop a friendship between the religious cultures of India before attempting to develop an understanding of world cultures and the second that both made primarily religious (rather than liberal) arguments for inter-religious understanding. Both Tagore and Gandhi emphasized that inter-religious understanding needed to begin with the near to hand and in one’s own immediate surrounding. They emphasized the need to understand the diverse mind of India before understanding the mind and life of the other religio-cultural communities in the world. One may take note that Gandhi, for instance, said that; Nothing can be farther from my thoughts than that we should become exclusive or erect barriers. But I do respectfully contend that an appreciation of other cultures can fitly follow, never precede, an appreciation and assimilation of our own. It is my firm opinion that no culture has treasures so rich as ours has. We have not known it, we have been made even to depreciate its study, and depreciate its value. (Prabhu and Rao (eds) 2007, 430).

Tagore made similar arguments; As a people we must be fully conscious of what we are. It is a truism to say that that the consciousness of the unity of a people implies a knowledge of its parts as well as of its whole. But, we not only have no such knowledge of India, we do not even have an eager desire to cultivate it. (Tagore 2012d, 493).

The second and perhaps more important point of agreement between them was that though Gandhi failed to appreciate the point that the source of culture lay in the springs of human creativity he came close to Tagore in offering religious reasons to honour culturally diverse others. As Gandhi’s arguments have already been explored in the previous section it is important here to bring out arguments that Tagore offered in support of inter-religious harmony. Tagore emphasized that when “the call of humanity is poignantly insistent” (Tagore 2012b, 363) then “…comes the time for man to know that his salvation is not in political organizations and extended trade relations, not in any mechanical rearrangement of social system, but in a deeper transformation of life, in the liberation of consciousness in love, in the realization of God in man”. (Ibid). It is important to emphasize that, in Tagore’s view, such a realization of God in humanity did not rest upon all human beings following the same God. To the

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contrary Tagore re-iterated the need to appreciate differences between people while realizing the “universal or the spiritual” (Tagore 2012h, 748) in man. While it might seem possible to take such a reference to the universal in man as a version of a liberal appeal to public reason as a shared basis for conversations in inter-cultural space it seems clear that Tagore was not referring to any concept close to that of the public reason invoked by liberals. When he spoke of such conversations Tagore referred to creativity abiding in the surplus in human nature as common to all human beings and as differentiating them from all other species. It was on account of such an understanding that he recommended that inter-religious-cultural conversations should be initiated in educational institutions through a sharing of literature art and music: This living atmosphere of superfluity in man is dominated by his imagination, as the earth’s atmosphere by the light. It helps us to integrate desultory facts in a vision of harmony and then to translate it into our activities for the very joy of its perfection, it invokes in us the Universal man who is the seer and doer of all times and countries. (Tagore 2012f, 690).

It might be useful in such a connection to look at the essentially religious arguments Tagore made in support of the “inner unity” (Tagore 2012b, 361) between diverse socio-religious-cultures. One can revisit, for instance, arguments he made in the essay “Race Conflict” (1912): …to find out the essential unity in diversity of forms, to know that however different be the symbols and rituals, God, whom they try to represent, is one without a second and to realize him truly is to realize him in the soul of all beings. (Tagore 2012b, 361).

Here and at other places one finds Tagore recommending harmony between the believers of different religions on the basis of an appeal to the “the divine which is in man”/man of the heart (Tagore 2012a, 129). He argued that; From the time when Man became truly conscious of his own self he also became conscious of a mysterious spirit of unity which found its manifestation through him in his society. It is a subtle medium of relationship between individuals, which is not for any utilitarian purpose but for its own ultimate truth…. Somehow man felt that this comprehensive spirit of unity has a divine character which could claim the sacrifice of all that is individual in him, that in it dwells his highest meaning transcending his limited self…. (Tagore 2012a, 144).

It seems clear enough that unlike liberals both Tagore and Gandhi addressed their arguments for inter-religious-cultural understanding to the religiosity of the religious. However, they had their differences and two important points may be emphasized in the present context. The first point to be made is that Gandhi could not appreciate Tagore’s emphasis on the surplus in man and the springs of creativity in humanity as the initiating point of inter-religious-cultural conversations. A related point of difference (which perhaps emerged from this) was that Gandhi spoke of equality and love between followers of different religions and not like Tagore of harmony and rhythm. It is important to recall the manner in which Tagore drew parallels between harmony of cultures and rhythm of notes in a piece of music. In the Religion of man

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Tagore speaks of humanity as music makers seeking “harmony in the all” (Tagore 2012a, 118). And says; The difference between the notes as mere facts of sound and music as a truth of expression is immense. For music though it comprehends a limited number of notes yet represents the infinite. It is for man to produce the music of the spirit with all the notes which he has in his psychology…. (Tagore 2012a, 137).

In the same text, Tagore referred to the prophet Zarathustra and the “sacred gospel of fight” as ending in “the house of songs, in the symphony of spiritual union” (Tagore 2012a, 119). It is perhaps this notion of harmony (very different from Gandhi’s idea of equality in difference) that differentiates Gandhi and Tagore on the relationship between socio-religious-cultures. It is perhaps most fitting to end this essay on a joyous and musical note from Tagore evoking rhythm and harmony between religious cultures: I am a singer myself, and I am ever attracted by the strains that come forth from the House of songs. When the stream of ideals that flow from the East and from the West mingle their murmur in some profound harmony of meaning it delights my soul. (Tagore 2012a, 119).

References Bose, N. K. (Ed.). (1948). Selections from Gandhi. Ahmedabad: The Navajivan Trust. Gandhi, M. K. Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi, electronic edition (eCWMG), accessible online at https://gandhiserve.org/cwmg/cwmg.html. Note that between Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi CWMG 100 Volumes, Ahmedabad, Navajivan publishing, 1955) and electronic edition (eCWMG) there are disputed differences of content and different volumes and page numbers. Locke, J. (1997). An essay on toleration. In Political Essays edited by Mark Goldie: Cambridge University Press. Mill, J. S. (2006). On liberty and subjection of women. A. Ryan (Ed.), London: Penguin Classic. Murti, V. V. R. (Ed.). (1970). Gandhi Essential Writings. New Delhi: Gandhi peace Foundation. Prabhu, R. K., & Rao, U. R. (Eds.). (2007). The mind of Mahatma Gandhi. Ahmedabad: Navajivan Publishing House. Puri, B. (2015). The Tagore-Gandhi debate on matters of truth and untruth (Vol. 9). Springer (Sophia Studies in Cross-Cultural Philosophy of Traditions and Cultures). Puri, B. (2018). Gandhi’s truth: debating Bilgrami. In P. Billimoria (Ed.), History of Indian philosophy in the series Routledge history of world philosophies. England & USA: Routledge. Puri, B. (2019). Absolute equality and absolute difference: Gandhi on the plurality of religions. Philosophia. (ISSN0048–3893) published on 04–12–2019. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-01900136-x. Skaria, A. (2016). Unconditional equality Gandhi’s religion of resistance. Ranikhet: Permanent Black. Tagore, R. (2012a). Religion of man. In S. K. Das (Ed.), The English Writings of Rabindranath Tagore (Vol. 3, pp. 83–189). New Delhi: Sahitya Akademi. Tagore, R. (2012b). Race conflict. In S. K. Das (Ed.), The English Writings of Rabindranath Tagore (Vol. 3, pp. 359–363). New Delhi: Sahitya Akademi.

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Tagore, R. (2012c). The way to unity. In S. K. Das (Ed.), The English Writings of Rabindranath Tagore (Vol. 3, pp. 459–469). New Delhi: Sahitya Akademi. Tagore, R. (2012d). Notes and comments. In S. K. Das (Ed.), The English Writings of Rabindranath Tagore (Vol. 3, pp. 489–494). New Delhi: Sahitya Akademi. Tagore, R. (2012e). Reply to the welcome by the Emperor of Iran. In S. K. Das (Ed.), The English writings of Rabindranath Tagore (Vol. 3, pp. 656–657). New Delhi: Sahitya Akademi. Tagore, R. (2012f). The Religion of an artist. In S. K. Das (Ed.), The English Writings of Rabindranath Tagore (Vol. 3, pp. 683–697). New Delhi: Sahitya Akademi. Tagore, R. (2012g). China and India. In S. K. Das (Ed.), The English Writings of Rabindranath Tagore (Vol. 3, pp. 711–715). New Delhi: Sahitya Akademi. Tagore, R. (2012h). On some educational questions. In S. K. Das (Ed.), The English Writings of Rabindranath Tagore (Vol. 3, pp. 746–749). New Delhi: Sahitya Akademi.

A Gandhian Solution to the Problem of Religious Intolerance Reetu Jaiswal

Abstract This essay is an attempt to solve the problem of religious intolerance by the Gandhian notions of Truth, Non-violence, and interdependence. Various thinkers have attempted to solve this problem by presenting the notion of tolerance. I wish to argue that those who believe in the notion of tolerance as the sufficient solution of religious intolerance seem to be mistaken. We live in a plural society and the mere condition of equality of all values and tolerance towards them would not suffice to stop religious conflicts. In this essay, I would like to focus on how the notion of tolerance is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the solution of this problem. Tolerance is only the means to achieve the ultimate end, it cannot be the ultimate end. We need to find some end which can be the ultimate value of these religions and which can solve the problem of religious intolerance. I have made an attempt to argue that the Gandhian conceptions of interdependence, realization of imperfection of all religions, and understanding of the ordered moral government of the universe could be used to solve this problem. Keywords Intolerance · Conflict · Truth · God · Religious pluralism · Exclusivism In a plural society, the problem of religious intolerance has been one of the significant problems. According to David Basinger, “religious intolerance, defined as the practice of keeping others from acting in accordance with their religious beliefs, is not new. However, there is world-wide concern over the increasing amount, and increasingly violent nature, of such behavior. Accordingly, there is understandably a renewed interest in fostering religiously tolerant environments in which individuals with differing religious perspectives can practice their faiths unencumbered” (Basinger 2018). This problem has been discussed and various thinkers have tried to solve this problem. In this context Mill and Locke have primarily focused on the notion of tolerance. They believe that people of various religions should consider each other as equals and accordingly they should respect each other. This essay makes R. Jaiswal (B) Department of Philosophy, University of Delhi, Delhi, India e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 B. Puri and A. Kumar (eds.), Re-thinking Religious Pluralism, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-9540-0_9

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an attempt to find out the solution to the problem of religious intolerance by applying various Gandhian conceptions. In this essay I would like to argue that the solutions given by religious exclusivists, inclusivists, and pluralists, in support of tolerance, have been inadequate. I will then argue how the Gandhian notion of ‘Truth’ could be a more appropriate means to solve this issue. I Religious conflicts primarily arise due to the belief that one’s own religion is superior and any other religion is (or could be) either of no value or a threat against one’s own religion. Whereas conflict is quite usual in such a situation, there can also be various other reasons for religious conflicts. In the following three points I will deal with various theories related to religious diversity, i.e., religious exclusivism, religious inclusivism, and religious pluralism. While elaborating these positions, I will make an attempt to find out whether religious conflicts can indeed be resolved with reference to any of these theories: 1. The first position could be where two religions have different values and one religion claims to have more value than the other. This could be due to various reasons such as that the state favors one religion over the other or the majority belongs to one religion or the people of one religion are better-off than that those of other religions. However, one’s faith in the superiority of one’s religion is not necessarily dependent on, nor limited by, such contingent factors. This position is called religious exclusivism. In such a case people of one religion would try to overpower the people of other religions considering themselves to be superior to others. This, for example, is what happened under the leadership of Hitler in Germany and this was also attempted by the Christian Missionaries in India during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. They either tried to convert Indians into their own religion or took other measures to destroy their opponents. One can argue that such an approach could not be successfully applied to solve the problem of religious intolerance, because one simply cannot declare that one religion is superior and the other one is inferior, as this would lead to conflict or destruction in the name of religion as had been the case in the above-mentioned examples. If a religion considers itself to be the superior one and the only way to realize God, and if on the basis of this faith it attempts to convert people of other religions by arguing that such religions are full of imperfections, there will only be conflict. The feeling of tolerance is, largely absent in this case, and, if not absent, then is practiced in a negative sense, where the overpowering religion tolerates the other religion as fundamentally flawed and superficial. 2. The second position could be that of religious inclusivism, where the followers of a religion, like exclusivists, believe their religion to be the superior one, but simultaneously, hold the belief that the religions of others have significant or at least some value. In such a case, religious conflicts could arise when the believers of other religions, who are not considered to be primary, do not agree with the overarching value of the one dominant religion. The problem which

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arises in the case of the exclusivists could arise here as well. The notion of religious inclusivism was discussed in detail by Karl Rahner (Peterson et al. 2013, 334–335) who believed that Christianity is a religion which is the only source of salvation of men; but people of other religions named as “the anonymous Christians” could also attain salvation, even if they do not follow Christianity, by the grace of love of the God. Other inclusivists have also given more or less similar arguments. This approach too is not viable to solve the problem of religious conflicts as it also inculcates the feeling of intolerance at some level. If one religion is considered to be the only source of salvation and others are said to be playing a part in that greater endeavor, it shows some kind of exclusivism and suffers from the same problems raised against the exclusivist’s position. If the feeling of tolerance is based on this prejudiced notion of inferiority and dependence of other religions on one superior religion, it can lead to protest from the other side. Other religions might feel that this kind of attitude is a way to diminish their importance and demean them. Hence such tolerance of religious inferiors so to speak would not suffice to resolve religious conflict. 3. The third position could be where all the religions are considered to hold equal value, while no one religion is regarded as the perfect one. In a plural society, if all religions believe that each religion has its own understanding of truth and God and hence, that no one is superior or inferior, there would be no intolerance. One thing that should be remembered here is that these religions are not equal in all the senses, but that they treat each other as equals when they want to live together in a plural society. However, if all religions hold equal value and all of them believe in a concept of truth, no one of them can be the perfect one. John Hick1 argues that the truth claims of all religions are equally valid, however, no one of them represents the final or ultimate truth. McGrath says, “the attraction of pluralism lies not in its claim to truth, which are remarkably elusive and shallow but, in its claim, to foster tolerance among the religions” (Okholm and Philips 1996, 208). The notion of imperfection of every religion and giving equal respect on that basis could be the foundation of tolerance for resolving conflicts in such a case. If all religions are tolerant and they accept their imperfection, then the problem could be solved. Can we admit that in this way, the problem of religious intolerance would be solved? Can it be argued that “mere condition of equality of all religions” would suffice to solve religious conflicts? I argue that tolerance towards each other’s existence in itself cannot be sufficient to resolve religious conflicts, and that other conditions are required: (1) religions need to have tolerance or respect for others as one of the moral principles in their own religious practices, (2) they should admit that they are each imperfect and that no one religion could represent the ultimate notion of Truth or God and, (3) every religion should accept that individual religious believers are 1 His

views are presented in his various works e.g.. Hick (1980, 1983, 1984, 1985, 1989).

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dependent on followers of other religions for the realization of the ultimate Truth. All these ideas are presented in the views of Gandhi. Significantly while retaining his faith in Hinduism, Gandhi has shown us the path of how to resolve the problem of religious intolerance. II Gandhi had a firm belief in Hinduism, but that did not cause, in him, hatred or feeling of intolerance towards other religions. He has related his experience about how Christian and Muslim friends tried their best to convince him that their religions were the best and that Hinduism was full of imperfections. Hence, they had suggested that he should become a Christian or a Muslim. Although he read various books of different religions and discussed the values of these religions at length with his friends with open-mindedness, he could not feel the same kind of respect and closeness as he felt for Hinduism. He admitted that Bhagavad Gita and Ramayana were the two texts that influenced his life the most.2 He had argued that since human beings are inevitably associated with some context, that context develops faith in particular cultures, traditions, and religions. However, he continued to hold that one should be open to accepting and respecting the views of other religions. Gandhi repudiated any kind of conversion by force and criticized religious exclusivism from his early understanding of religion. He said that “No one faith is perfect. All faiths are equally dear to their respective votaries. What is wanted, therefore, is a living friendly contact among the followers of the great religions of the world and not a clash among them in the fruitless attempt on the part of each community to show the superiority of its faith over the rest” (Gandhi 1949, 21). Hence, tolerance is the ultimate value but part of the process too. If religions do not promote (as one of their fundamental beliefs) the idea of being tolerant, towards religious others as equals, conflicts cannot be resolved. They will have to accept that they are not perfect and that they need religious others in order to make their own religion better. Gandhi was a critic of religious exclusivism and never believed that one religion could be the superior or perfect one. Rather, the views, he has presented in the abovementioned quotation, shows that he believed in religious pluralism and that he had requested people of different faiths to show equal respect for all religions. The supporters of tolerance have been trying to solve the issue of religious intolerance by assuming that both parties should consider each other to be equal. John Stuart Mill believes that each opinion and expression of thought has equal significance and that we should not stop people from expressing their opinions (Mill 2006). He bases the concept of tolerance on the notion of equal significance and fallibility of each opinion. He argues that we can never be sure that we have attained the truth because our conception of truth is not infallible. It is when we mistakenly assume our notion of truth to be infallible that we reject the significance of others’ opinions. Due to this we become intolerant towards each other. He uses the notion of fallibility in place of imperfection to argue why we should be tolerant.

2 To

read more on this point see Gandhi (1949).

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Although this position of religious pluralism has been theoretically popular, it seems to be problematic when applied at the practical level. While it is expected that religions should accept their imperfection, they consider themselves to be perfect; and hence, there is a possibility that in practise religious believers would not be tolerant of religious others. It is generally seen that believers of all religions consider their respective religions to be perfect and hence superior to others. In liberal democratic societies, it is possible that some religions could live with other religions in a plural society. But the harmony or peace between them could be disturbed in cases of conflicts of interest. Whenever there is a conflict and both parties think that they are right, they start fighting with each other. In these cases, even though religious believers might accept and realize that they are imperfect, they could still consider the religious other to be malignant and wrong. So the question is not that of being equal to one other but that of being right or wrong. Now, when there is a conflict of interest we do not say we are equal to each other and that we should be tolerant, but we make every possible effort to establish the power of our religion over that of others. In such cases, believers might accept that their religion is imperfect or fallible and that all religions are equal. However such acceptance might be outweighed by the realization that the other is not a part of one’s collective religious self because that other has done something which is against the self, and has hurt the fundamentals of the self, and that the collective religious self can only be protected if the other is destroyed. The other religion though considered to be an equal is often found to be in the wrong. This makes it impossible to practice tolerance. To play down such a kind of distinction between the self and the other and the hatred consequent on making such a distinction, Gandhi appeals to us to go back to our religion and realize that it is still in the process of evolution and that all religions are also going through the similar process. He argues that the issue of comparing one religion with another should not emerge and that we should rather focus on our defects and try to make our own religion better. He states: We have not realized religion in its perfection, even as we have not realized God. Religion of our conception, being thus imperfect, is always subject to a process of evolution and re-interpretation. Progress towards Truth, towards God, is possible only because of such evolution. And if all faiths outlined by men are imperfect, the question of comparative merit does not arise.... We must be keenly alive to the defects of our own faiths also, yet not leave it on that account, but try to overcome these defects. Looking at all religions with an equal eye, we would not only not hesitate, but would think it our duty, to blend into our faith every acceptable feature of other faiths (Gandhi 1949, 54).

If we are not able to realize at this moment that there are so many aspects of life where we are inter-dependent we cannot be tolerant. The self is dependent on the other because plurality of views and values is a reality. The interdependence might not be in the name of religion, still it is there and if we cannot tolerate the existence of the other, this feeling of intolerance will gradually extend to the level that no one will be able to tolerate any pointed dissent at a personal level. Hence, it is a necessary condition of our existence as a social being that we understand our interdependency.

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This view could be understood in a clearer way by looking at the views of Gandhi. Gandhi argues that: Interdependence is and ought to be as much the ideal of man as self-sufficiency... His social interdependence enables him to test his faith and to prove himself on the touch stone of reality. If man were so placed or could so place himself as to be absolutely above all dependence on his fellow beings he would become so proud and arrogant as to be a varitable burden and nuisance to the world. Dependence on society teaches him the lesson of humanity (Gandhi 1958, 120).

Hence, we cannot deny that we cannot live independently and to develop the virtues of love and humility we need to realize the necessity of the existence of religious others and our dependence on them. Gandhi further says: “The golden way is to be friends with the world and to regard the whole human family as one. He who distinguishes between the votaries of one’s own religion and those of another miseducates the members of his own and opens the way for disregard and irreligion” (Ibid, 120). This means that in order to solve the problem of religious intolerance, one cannot be satisfied with the feeling of tolerance and hope that inter-religious conflict will be satisfactorily solved. This is just a way to push this problem into the background for some time. The same will re-occur whenever there will be such incidents which involve conflicts of interest. Religious believers need to understand that until individual votaries of one religion realize that all religions are not only equal but also dependent on each other for their very existence, they cannot live peacefully in this world. It might be the case that one set of co-religionists completely destroys the other religion and the followers of that religion, but they still will not be able to destroy the sense of otherness, whether in the form of the other religion, or other sects of the same religion or the belief system that may lingers in the heart of individual converted believers of the destroyed religion. Gandhi rightly claims, “There are as many religions as there are individuals” (Ibid, 59). The true meaning of religion can perhaps only be understood when religious believers realize that every religion is a way to the same end, which is the realization of the ultimate reality which cannot be based on the destruction of others nor on the enforced assimilation of them. Whereas on the one hand, Gandhi has put forth the view of religious pluralism with full force, on the other hand, he has presented the inclusivist approach in the discussion of the moral government of the universe. This can be clearly seen, when he states: “Indeed religion should pervade every one of our actions. Here religion does not mean sectarianism. It means a belief in ordered moral government of the universe. It is not less real because it is unseen. This religion transcends Hinduism, Islam, Christianity, etc. It does not supersede them. It harmonizes them and gives them reality” (Ibid, 59). Hence, when he discusses religion Gandhi’s approach is that of religious pluralism, but when he relates it to the ordered moral government of the universe, he seems to pose the superiority of this understanding of religion over other understandings. It could be questioned that why would people of other religions accept Gandhi’s idea of the ordered moral government of universe, which seems to have

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arisen from the Vedas. Another question could be raised, namely, how is this different from accepting any individual religious belief system. Gandhi has said repeatedly that all religions are imperfect and their understanding of Truth or God is limited as we are constrained by the limitation of human understanding. However, this does not mean that there is no Truth or God. All religions are in the process of the realization of that ultimate Truth and they are united by the ordered moral government of universe which is unseen, but refers to the existence of the Truth. Realization of truth is different from all individual religions as it transcends them and gives them reality. Hence, his inclusivist approach does not face the charges of exclusivism, because he believes this moral government of universe to be higher than Hinduism itself. His ultimate motivation is to show that we will have to believe that no religion has reached the level of perfection and hence by virtue of living in a plural society, we will have to develop the feelings of respect and mutual tolerance (Parel 2005, liv). The above discussion does not establish that individual religions do not each have any content of truth. It is admitted that the ultimate value is truth without which any religion will not be able to exist. Even if a religion considers itself to be imperfect, it can not exist as a religious belief system without having some truth in itself and no one can deny that every religion is equally interested in the search for truth. According to Gandhi, the ultimate essence of religion is the truth which can only be realized by means of ahimsa/non-violence. Gandhi‚ first of all‚ stated that God is Truth and then later on he realized that Truth is God, because even an atheist believes in truth and no religious believers can deny that they are ultimately in search of truth. It might be argued that the notion of truth is different for different people and hence one cannot force others to accept his/her notion of truth as the ultimate one. Since people do not believe in one notion of truth, like they do one religion, they become intolerant to each other’s notions. Based on one’s notions, the other becomes wrong. This understanding of the truth is mistaken. According to Gandhi, “Eternal truth is one. God also is one” (Ibid, 26–27). He further admits: “And when you want to find Truth as God the only inevitable means is Love, i.e., non-violence, and since I believe that ultimately the means and the end are convertible terms, I should not hesitate to say that God is Love” (Ibid, 66). A religion could not be a religion in a true sense, if it does not adhere to the concept of morality, in the form of love and humility. A religion which teaches its votaries to be violent towards others cannot be a true religion. The views of Gandhi carry additional value when compared with that of other inclusivists and pluralists. The way Gandhi has presented the views of truth and non-violence, it fills even the opponents with additional spiritual power of love and compassion. Instead of focusing more on the external aspects of how to resolve religious conflicts Gandhi has focused on how to develop the power of love instead of hatred, non-violence instead of violence, forgiveness instead of vengeance, inner strength instead of power over others. In this way, he has established a close connection between morality and religion. According to Gandhi, “As soon as we lose the moral basis, we cease to be religious. There is no such thing as religion overriding morality. Man for instance cannot be untruthful, cruel and incontinent and claim to

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have God on his side” (Gandhi 2018, 308). He moves one step ahead and claims that “The highest moral law is that we should unremittingly work for the good of mankind” (Ibid, 308). More reflection on Gandhian thoughts would clarify the issue as he asserts: That is why I say they are equally true and equally imperfect. The finer the line you draw, the nearer it approaches Euclid’s true straight line, but it never is the true straight line. The tree of Religion is the same, there is not that physical equality between the branches. They are all growing, and the person who belongs to the growing branch must not gloat over it and say, ‘Mine is the superior one.’ None is superior, none is inferior, to the other (Gandhi 1994, 112).

A votary of truth would not be able to endorse violence and self assertion. Gandhi says, “truth is not to be found by anybody who has not got an abundant sense of humility. If you would swim on the bosom of the ocean of Truth you must reduce yourself to a zero” (Ibid, 67). Hence, if we read his thoughts closely, it becomes clear that any religion, that teaches its votaries to destroy others, to look at other religions with a sense of otherness and hatred, and tries to establish that it represents the Truth and imposes this notion on others with violence, cannot be a true religion. As it is contradiction in itself to believe that any religion can exist with such characteristics. The problem of religious intolerance could be solved when we develop the feeling of mutual respect, not only the feeling of tolerance; the feeling of love and nonviolence and not hatred and violence: “Mankind has to go out of violence only through non-violence. Hatred can be overcome only by love. Counter hatred only increases the surface, as well as the depth of hatred.” (Gandhi 1958, 107) In this respect, it is very important to understand that if one cannot accept the other and cannot change the self, one cannot expect that the other should change for one’s sake. The best solution could be found in the Gandhian notion of being an exemplar3 where he says that individuals should become an example of what they want to see in others. If one will be so influential in one’s own actions that others start following then one would be successful and can be assured of following the right path. If others are not following it is not their fault, but one’s own‚ in that one could not present a strong enough example as to be followed. In the case of religious intolerance too, believers should make an attempt to become exemplars of what a true religion must be, and what a true devotee should be, so that the other might be influenced by the votaries of one faith and their actions and start following the same thing. We can never stop violence with violence. If individual believers start following the true sense of their religion with full faith in it, they will never be intolerant towards others because a true religion never teaches violence and hatred. This could only be developed by the purity of heart and the realization of the strength of one’s religion. Violence only occurs when believers feel insecure about their own religion and when they feel that it is so feeble that it could be destroyed by anyone. If on the contrary such believers were to believe in the ultimate strength of religion, which is the strength of truth and 3 Akeel

Bilgrami has discussed this aspect of Gandhi’s views in detail in his articles “Gandhi: the philosopher” and “Gandhi’s Integrity: the philosophy behind the politics”. To study the detailed analysis of this point refer to (Bilgrami 2003, 2006).

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non-violence, they would never be intolerant. Gandhi urges, “I want to see heart unity established among the people of this land professing different faiths. In nature there is a fundamental unity running through all the diversity we see about us. Religions are no exception to the natural law. They are given to mankind so as to accelerate the process of realization of fundamental unity” (Gandhi 1949, 53). Therefore, the problem of religious conflict would perhaps not be solved only by focusing on the notion of tolerance. It could be one of the necessary conditions, but not sufficient to stop religious conflicts. Until the believers of various religions, as has been argued by Gandhi, develop the feelings of love, respect, humility and dependence towards others, realize that these are essential aspects of their religion, these conflicts will continue to happen.

References Basinger, D. (2018). Religious diversity (Pluralism). In N. Zalta (Ed.), The standard enclyclopedia of philosophy. Spring 2018 Edition. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives.spr2018/entries/religiouspluralism/. Bilgrami, A. (2003, Sept 27). Gandhi, the Philosopher. Economic and Political Weekly, 38(39). https://www.epw.in/journal/2003/39/special-articles/gandhi-philosopher.html. Bilgrami, A. (2006). Gandhi’s integrity: the philosophy behind the politics. In A. Raghuramraju (Ed.), Debating Gandhi: a reader. New Delhi: OUP. Gandhi, M. K. (1949). Mahatma and the missionary: selected writings of Mahatma Gandhi. C. Manshardt (Ed.), Chicago: Henry Regnery Company. Gandhi, M. K. (1958). All men are brothers: life and thoughts of Mahatma Gandhi as told in his own words. K. Kripalani (Ed.), Switzerland: UNESCO. Gandhi, M. K. (1967). Political and national affairs, 1 (2&3). Ahmedabad: Navajivan Trust. Gandhi, M. K. (1994). What is Hinduism? New Delhi: National Book Trust. Gandhi, M. K. (2001). Hind Swaraj. Ahmedabad: Navajivan Press. Gandhi, M. K. (2018, Dec 11) Selections from Gandhi. In N. K. Bose (Ed.), Encyclopedia of Gandhi’s thoughts. Ahmedabad: Navajivan Mudranalaya. https://www.mkgandhi.org/ebks/Sel ectionsFromGandhi.pdf. Hick, J. (1980). God has many names. London: Macmillan Press Ltd. Hick, J. (1983). On conflicting religious truth-claims. Religious Studies, 19, 485–491. Hick, J. (1984). The philosophy of world religions. Scottish Journal of Theology, 37, 229–236. Hick, J. (1985). Problems of religious pluralism. New York: St. Martin’s Press. Hick, J. (1989). An interpretation of religion: human responses to the transcendent. New Haven: Yale University Press. Mill, J. S. (2006). On liberty and subjection of women A. Ryan (Ed.), London: Penguin Classic. Okhlohm, D., & Philips, T. (1996). Four views on salvation in a pluralistic world. Grand Rapids: Zondervan Publication. Parel, J. A. (Ed.). (2005). Hind Swaraj and other writings. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Peterson, M., Hasker, W., Reichenbach, B., & Basinger, D. (2013). Reason and religious belief: an introduction to the philosophy of religion. New York: Oxford University Press.

Re-living History with Karuna: Towards Transforming Life Through Responsible Dialogue Saji Varghese

Abstract Values cannot be just theoretical. They must find expressions in relationships and all actions, thoughts, feelings and speech. It is impossible to be actually aware of values as distinguished from talking or thinking about values without expressing them in action and behaviour (Burnier 2010, 2). While colonialism and the subsequent emergence of class structure among the third world and developing nations are continuously blamed for the evils of division, partition, conversion, communal and religious violence, it is also a known fact that the socalled de-colonising movements have only further added to the existing divisions and polarisation. Keeping in mind the perspective of the predicament of minority faiths in the subcontinent, this essay will look at the possibility of rebuilding trust and subsequently religious/communal harmony. The emphasis will be on evoking greater individual responsibility to engage in dialogue with the other with compassion and respect within the essentially shared contexts. Keywords Decolonising · Polarisation · Memory · Healing · Responsibility · History

1 The Present is Reliving the Past History is not simply a series of unconnected events happening in time and space. There is a connection between happenings of the past and what is being created or thought about today. Memory is another crucial element in history. It has been talked about since the time of St. Augustine that the present is the memory of the past. It is the link between the consciousness of the past and what is happening in the now. An individual’s memory is not just his own creation. He remembers what is commonly shared among the members of the community. They take narratives given to them by others to augment their own memories. In societies where only oral tradition is prevalent, the members of the older generations pass on these shared memories to the S. Varghese (B) Department of Philosophy, Lady Keane College, Shillong, Meghalaya, India e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 B. Puri and A. Kumar (eds.), Re-thinking Religious Pluralism, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-9540-0_10

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younger generations. This is more a known phenomena among Tribal communities of India. The younger generation is equipped for survival because of learning the skill of hunting and practicing a certain type of cultivation, handed down to them by means of oral communication. We compose our own memories with support from the community and also by being a part of celebrations of significant events (such as festivals and rituals) the distinguishable feature of a particular community that may have changed the course of history for the groups to which we belong. These are well-known experiences (Halbwachs in Ricoeur 1996, 15). The memory of an individual is a small fraction in that collective memory of a nation where there is a lived experience. Recollecting the words of Leibnitz, Halbwachs writes, “Every individual memory is a point of view on the collective memory” (Halbwachs quoted in Ricoeur 1996, 15). Every individual’s memory is what one wishes to remember of the lived experience. It is subjective consciousness that shapes it within the individual. No present is free from the past, the historical consciousness is the conglomerate of what has been inherited and how that inheritance has been built into the present. As claimed by Hobsbawm “Memory is not what happened, but what people felt what happened” (Hobsbawm 1996, 121). Thus, after the events or happenings which involve the entire community, what is remembered passes on to history. These collective recollections shape the history of a group or a nation. In the historical event of the Partition of India where millions of Hindus crossed over to present day India, with deep emotion, age old miseries and violence were experienced while crossing over to “Hindustan”. Inter-subjectivity gains prominence in this aspect of memory and subsequently in history. The question, however, is what makes social contexts of memory a possibility? How are we to understand the continuity and discontinuity between the individual bearer of experience? While memory properly understood belongs, in each case, to humans, an individual’s memory exists as a shared part of a composite, collective memory; a shared past is within the minds of the members of a community. A nation subjected to misery of the colonial past is not just a creation of an individual’s memory or cognition but is one shared by the affected group or section. An individual and his identity is constituted over a period of time through association with other members who are equally a part of the community. The Serbs were subjected to misery and humiliation that remained in their memory, during and after World War II. The Partition between India and Pakistan led to conflicts and the death of thousands. The memories of the same often cause further conflicts among the present generation of Indians and Pakistanis. The British Empire bequeathed a series of partitions (Anderson 2012, 76) Ireland, Palestine, India and Cyprus. Though the colonial principle of “divide and rule”’ seemed to have been beneficial to the colonisers, it had larger connotations and played havoc in the lives of all the colonised communities. In more contemporary times, Wuhan (a city in China) would go down in time to have a shared memory of how the community fought and saved itself from “COVID-19”, a virus outbreak in the year 2019 which extended to the year 2020. All states have minorities within their borders and if they divide according to community, they will find other minorities within the new area and so on ad infinitum.

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History records repeated clashes between neighbouring communities. And thus, ancient hatreds are carried forward and remain. A narrative of victory stirs resentment on the part of those who were defeated. A narrative of defeat calls for redressing a grievance no matter how many years have passed (Glover 2001, 146). It has been a tendency in humans that we choose to revive our memories being moved by self pity. We remember only that which we wish to and as we wish to. Memories of events less favourable to our self-images are conveniently kept within a category of unfortunate events. Only a proper and careful handling of memories can make living a life meaningful both at the individual level as well as the level of the world at large. The measures/means to heal memories thus gain prominence.

2 Inner Peace and World Peace Peace as understood by ordinary people, throughout history, has been in terms of absence of violence which Michael Howard describes as “the bedrock meaning of peace” (Howard 1983, 18). According to him, “Peace is the simple assurance that one can sow a crop with some hope of reaping it, build a house with good hope of living in it, raise a family, learn and pursue a vocation, lead a life which will not be interrupted by the incursion of violence, by physical destruction, wounding, maiming, torture, death” (Ibid, 18–19). Conceptions of peace transcend established faiths and cultures, involving such values as security and harmony, as well as justice and human dignity. The concept of Peace is used in a variety of ways that are connected with diverse theories and practices. At times it acquires a connotation of a moral category to characterise a virtue that people or societies ought to have. Elsewhere (especially in religious circles) it is used as a religious category to describe the profound state of peace that God can provide or to name an aspect of the divine, as in “the Prince of Peace”. In Social Science research, it finds a place as a conducive condition that ought to prevail for progress. It is often thought of as a state or condition of a social system. According to Martin Luther King, “Peace is more than simply the absence of war; it is the presence of justice” (Carson et al. 1997, 23). We are reminded by Mother Teresa “If we have no peace, it is because we have forgotten that we belong to each other” (Collopy 2002, 31). She stated that “nations put too much effort and money into defending their borders” (Ibid). She argues that the world would be a more peaceful place if such funds went into the defence of the poor in terms of providing them with food, clothing and shelter. Peace is often taken as the absence of such negative factors like violence and armed conflict between nations, within an administrative territory of a nation. Generally, it is perceived as the absence of conflicts of all sorts—inner turmoil, confrontation, aggression, personal violence, hostility and so on. But beyond these, there is a positive aspect of peace which is the prevalence of a conducive condition for justice to prevail and for development of one’s personality to the best level. The inner urge for peace has been an important motive in the life of a man from his cradle to his last breath.

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It is certain that the matters of conflict and harmony have increased in intensity and urgency, with the progress of civilization beyond its material content (Horowitz 1957, 47). There is no definition of peace which is as lucid as Spinoza’s, which is “Peace is not an absence of war; it is a virtue, a state of mind, a disposition of benevolence, trust and justice” (Ibid). In Indian Philosophy too the orthodox/astika schools aim at a state of “Bliss” which stands at the highest level of contentment. In the Srimad Bhagvad Gita, Lord Krishna consoles Arjuna who refused to use his weapon to fight against his own kin in the battle of Mahabharata, when he suffered from an inner conflict, in the following words: Even when a man of wisdom, tries to control them, Arjuna, the bewildering senses attack his mind with violence…he has no understanding or inner power; without inner power, he has no peace; and without peace where is joy? (Miller 1986, 37–38).

In the twentieth century, the most renowned personality who ensued peace and stressed on the means of attaining it as non-violence (ahimsa) is none other than Mahatma Gandhi who wrote that “the way of peace is the way of truth. Truthfulness is even more important than peacefulness. Indeed, lying is the mother of violence. A truthful man cannot long remain violent.” (Gandhi, eCWMG, Vol. 35, 245–46). Gandhi prescribed Truth and non-violence as the means to reach and attain peace, both at the level of the individual as well as at that of the community and nation. Gandhi led the Indian movement against the colonialists’ rule through different methods such as Civil Disobedience Movement (1930–1932) and the noncooperation movement (1921–1922). These movements were non-violent in nature. He also aimed at Hindu-Muslim unity and fought for the eradication of social evils such as untouchability. The Yoga school of Indian Philosophy also prescribes various postures of the body aiming at the attainment or realisation of inner peace. Further to the level of eternal Bliss from this state of mental calmness. This inner peace must be understood as a state of calmness (devoid of anxieties) where one can completely focus and work with a feeling of contentment. Schopenhauer’s view of the most transformed human being is that of an ascetic, one who has defeated his will and has overpowered all desire to reach a state of meta-empirical, trans-cognitive cosmic union. Schopenhauer believes in an inner peace which is compassionate as the term compassion suggests, “the great mystery of ethics” which aims at eliminating the barrier between the self and the other and encourages abandonment of the narrowing covetousness that generally governs our lives. By acting out of empathy one ensures being in the present. This is followed by a spontaneous response of doing what we ought to do. This is due to the fact that when we act, Schopenhauer adds “free from all egoistic motives”, this “awaken[s] in us that inward contentment called the good, satisfied, approving conscience” (Schopenhauer 1999, sec. 16). At this juncture, Schopenhauer is not merely hinting at the very common dictum of necessarily performing good deeds voluntarily due to the “feel good” factor but it is the compassion which fills us with inner peace and harmony as we inevitably aim towards attaining an equilibrium. This explains the obvious motive of conforming to compassionate feelings. He says, “it is

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one and the same essence that manifests itself in all living things… [and] compassion is the proper expression of that view” (Ibid, sec 22). It is essential to comprehend that (in Schopenhauer’s opinion) compassion arises from our deepest roots which we share with the transcendental will that is the source of all things. This is the metaphysical ground for the expression of compassion by any living being. Seeking inspiration from the great traditions of both East and West one would argue that there can be no world peace without inner peace (Merton 1965, 31). This can be further known by comparing two different ways to achieve world peace. One way begins with the adoption of non-violent means for settling issues that confront nations that would address individuals’ mental conditions. Another approach includes working with the individual’s mental outlook and thereby proceeding towards the outer world. The second way moves from within moving towards the world. This way suggests that we must first look within ourselves and then prepare ourselves for the global challenges. While many propagate both the approaches they must be seen as interrelated and equally capable of realising the end (Fox 1991).

3 Contextualising Violence; India the Land of Diverse Cultures Probably there is no nation more internally diverse than India. Linguistically diversity prevails with twenty-two official languages and about three hundred spoken languages. Hinduism is the religion of the majority but there are many more religions followed in India with Muslims and Christians, Parsis, Buddhists, Jains, Sikhs and some Jews. There are also immense regional differences. Some regions, especially in the south, had for centuries more association with South and South-East Asia, than other parts of India. In India riots were very common in places like Bombay (present Mumbai) where a large number of non-Hindus and migrants live. The latter were victims, often of political vendetta of groups/individuals who consciously spread hatred and violence, in the name of religion and caste. There are two conceptions of the Indian nation prevalent among the ordinary citizens and members of political parties. India is a pluralist democracy created around diversity and respect for equality and freedom. However from the time of the partition in 1947, there have been persistent clashes between those who propose ethno–religious homogeneity and the supporters of a pluralist India.

4 Social Healing: A Possibility “For hatred does not cease by hatred at any time. Hatred ceases by love; this is the old rule” (Dhammapada 5).

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In any society situations of violence and its trauma leave trails on the generations to come and it becomes necessary for communities to be healed. “Time is the best healer” and true to its essence in the decades that have passed after the freedom struggle, the present generation seems to have overcome the social trauma it had caused. The reminder of trauma remains in the school lessons which end in a temporal time frame. Social healing is a phenomenon that seeks to deal with the scars left behind by a large ordeal experienced within a community. Wounds which have been caused due to challenges of a political agenda of a government or oppression of minorities by the majority need to be treated and overcome in a positive way. Thus it is “justice building” addressing and solving social wounds, not punishing the human evils (Thompson 2005, 47). The primary requirement here is to understand the history of the community which has suffered or gone through the traumatic experience, their experience both pre- and post-violence. Primarily communities have an inevitable need to survive and utilise available resources. However there is no denying the grievances in the form of both the individual and collective voice. The voice of the unspeakable misery, John Paul Lederach asks “how do people express and then heal from violations that so destroy the essence of innocence, decency and life itself that the very experience penetrates beyond comprehension and words?” (Ledrach and Ledrach 2010, 1–2). The sense in which Gayatri Spivak talks of subalterns is probably similar. “Subaltern” is used in the sense of a group in any society which are oppressed even though unfortunately they can be more in number than the oppressing dominant group. The tragedy lies with such section that they have no voice, that they are not heard, as Spivak puts it “Subaltern cannot speak” (Spivak 1988, 284–85). Though common suffering and its memory is an enduring element of nation building, suffering in itself is negative. Gross human rights violations and collective violence often result in a large scale loss in lives and properties. Words are inadequate to explain the depth of tragedy in such cases, which have happened or have been intentionally created, all over the globe. A primary requirement of healing in today’s context lies in a deeper understanding among the antagonistic groups or parties. Co-existence is a necessary factor for a reasoned peace between the groups. David Crocker calls it a “thin” rather than a “thick” understanding of reconciliation (Crocker 1999). Political understanding of it is that one is able to coexist without forgetting or even forgiving their crimes. As Mencius1 wrote “whoever is devoid of the heart of courtesy and modesty is not human, whoever is devoid of the heart of right and wrong is not human” (Lau 2003, 140). There is a need for confidence building among the affected, the victims of the unfortunate happenings such as war, revolution and exploitation. The pre-tragic era and the post-traumatic would be different. One might bring in here the experience of corona in contemporary times where there is a talk of “new normal” which would be rather different from the earlier period. The survival which was the prime concern now becomes “existing together” for one another as a group, as a collective strategy. For building the psychological condition and the objective to be attained, the community prayer service, counselling, recreation activities, community engaging games are 1 Mencius

is a fourth century BCE Confucian thinker.

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arranged. On the sites associated with wars, explosion, revolution, etc. such as Ground Zero, world trade tower site, Verdun, Gettysburg, Auschwitz, Hiroshima, there are prayer and rituals carried out by religious groups recollecting the tragic experiences (Parker 2001, 141). Forgiveness is considered a blessing in Judaeo-Christian culture of the West. Another aspect of memory which is equally positive is to be able to “forget and forgive”. The traumatic experience need to be treated with this positive element. It amounts equally to the “healing of memory”. The concluding remarks of Viktor E. Frankl in Man’s Search For Meaning is worth mentioning here “The crowning experience of all, for the homecoming man, is the wonderful feeling that, after all he has suffered, there is nothing he need fear anymore—except his God” (Frankl 2008, 100).

5 Through Dialogue Responsibility as a dynamic movement includes compassion and confrontation. Compassion extends the discourse of rights and justice as we know it and brings to it a dynamic of generosity. Responsibility, like justice and rights, involves epistemic acts—ways of knowing, rather creative ways of knowing, to know is not only to know of, but to know with (Rajan 1998, 221). In fact, knowing here becomes part of a process of what can be termed and realised as “knowing together with compassion and confrontation”. Responsibility involves epistemological work but this epistemological work is not bound within available epistemes; it needs to go beyond dominant epistemologies such as Western epistemologies which have constructed the world in a violent way, killing many different ways of knowing and being (Santos 2014, 151). This journey of the epistemological beyond epistemology is also a journey of cognitive justice (Visvanathan 1995). In a related way, responsibility involves both the subjective and objective. The objective constitutes the unavoidable challenge of our commonality which calls for a way of knowing and being with and beyond our subjectivity. But this objectivity is not one of fixed objectivity or fixed positionality. Objectivity here emerges out of our transpositional journey across positions and it is not a reproduction of positional objectivity as positioned objectivity (Sen 1993). Dialogue involves a hermeneutics of putting one’s feet not only in the self but also in the other, not only in one culture but also in another culture. Dialogue does not happen only with the homeland certainty and security of self and culture but also involves mediating with other cultures. As Carlos Antonio Aguirre Rojas holds, “It is clear that relations among cultures that dominate and those that are dominated within one society, do not only include diverse realities and expressions of the opposition and struggle that exists between both cultures, but rather, a vast range of interrelationships. These interrelationships include exchanges, borrowing, and mutual refunctionalizing, together with situations of commitment and confluence that also include dialogue as one of the many forms of connection between both subaltern and hegemonic cultural universe” (Rojas 2005, 188). Dialogue as a method can be applied among the diverse cultures where there

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is domination of one over the other or even when one particular culture is dominant over the rest. The long drawn dialogue leads to its desired end in the ultimate analysis. As Christiane Hartnack makes an observation (relating to clashes between two antagonistic societies in South Asia) he writes; “The increasing number of communication threads connecting India and Pakistan coincides with a growing percentage of young people in both countries for whom British India and a unified subcontinent lie far in the past. It might theoretically be quite conceivable that relations between the two countries could continue to move along a path toward normalization where each country is a wholly separate state with its own future” (Hartnack 2012, 255).

6 Conclusion The premises above, lead one to the conclusion that conflicts are negative and often end up dividing and fragmenting society. Religious communities in a society with distinctive beliefs and ways of worship should not add to the existing conflicts. The broad understanding of dialogue as the link across borders, for example, interreligious dialogue and global responsibility, is made clear by Paul F. Knitter, a seminal thinker in this field. For Paul Knitter: [..] Religious traditions have the capability, if not the established record, of affirming global responsibility as ground and goal for inter-religious encounters. (Knitter 1995, 151).

Religions of the world must focus on communicating with responsibility‚ which lies with the believers individually and collectively. As Knitter states: [..] Different religions can and must share a global responsibility for eco-human well-being and justice. (Ibid).

Inter-religious dialogue—dialogue across religious boundaries—as part of a wider movement of dialogues across borders such as cultures, civilizations and philosophies—is an important part of global responsibility. India with its heterogeneous culture and age old history of pluralistic cultures and coexisting traditions offers multiple pathways to epistemology, to know and to comprehend, the other. As India’s Philosophy and religion have a very long history so also oppression, domination and ideologies of passive resistance and subversions. Riots and instances of violence and their consequences upon the later generations must find an answer, and such an answer can come only through healing by way of creative day to day exercise of dialogue. The following passage of Rabindranath Tagore communicates the possibility of generating new truths by meeting and being in constant communication with others (races) with a cultured mind. He says, “I have tried to save children from the vicious methods which alienate their minds, and from other prejudices which are fostered through histories, geographies and lessons full of national prejudices. In the East there is a great deal of bitterness against other races, and in our own homes we are

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often brought up with feelings of hatred. I have tried to save the children from such feelings …It will be a great future, when base passions are no longer stimulated within us, when through their meeting new truths are revealed” (Tagore 1961, 216–217).

References Aguirre Rojas, C. A. (2005). Hegemonic cultures and subaltern cultures: between dialogue and conflict. Review (Fernand Braudel Center), Vol. 28, No. 2, Discussions of Knowledge (2005), pp. 187–210. Published by: Research Foundation of SUNY for and on behalf of the Fernand Braudel Center Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/40241628. Accessed: 03 Sept 2013. Anderson, P. (2012). The Indian ideology. New York: Verso. Burnier, R. (2010). Editorial. Wakeup India (Vol. XXXV No. 3). Carson, C., Burns, S., Carson, S., Powell, D., & Holloran, P., et al. (1997). The papers of Martin Luther King, Jr. Volume III: Birth of a new age, December 1955-December 1956. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. Collopy, M. (2002). Architects of peace: visons of hope in words and images. New World Library. Crocker, D. (1999). Reckoning with past wrongs: a normative framework. Ethics and International Affairs., 13(1), 43–64. de Sousa Santos, B. (2014). Epistemologies from the south: justice against epistemicide. Boulder: CO: Paradigm Publishers. Fox, M. A. (1991). Peace. Darshana International, 31, 48–56. Frankl, V. E. (2008). Man’s search for meaning. London: Rider. Gandhi, M. K. Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi, electronic edition (eCWMG). https://gandhi serve.org/cwmg/cwmg.html. Note that between Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi CWMG 100 Volumes, Ahmedabad, Navajivan publishing, 1955) and electronic edition (eCWMG) are disputed differences of content and different volumes and page numbers. Glover, J. (2001). Humanity. London: Pimlico. Halbwachs, M. (1950). La Memoire collective. Paris: PUF. Hartnack, C. (2012). Roots and routes: the partition of British India in Indian social memories. Journal of Historical Sociology, 25(2), 244–260. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6443.2012.014 24.x. Hobsbawm, E. (1996). The age of extremes. New York: Vintage Books. Horowitz, I. L. (1957). The idea of war and peace in contemporary philosophy. New York: Paine Whitman Publishers. Howard, M (1983). The concept of peace. Encounter 18–22. Knitter, P. F. (1995). One earth, many religions: multi-faith dialogue and global responsibility. Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books. Lau, D. C. (trans.) (2003). Mencius. Hong Kong: Chinese University Press. Ledrach, J. P., & Ledrach, A. J. (2010). When blood and bones cry out. Queensland: University of Queensland Press. Merton, T. (Ed.). (1965). Gandhi on non-violence: selected texts from Mohandas K. Gandhi’s non-violence in peace and war. New York: New Directions. Miller, B. S. (trans.) (1986). Bhagvad Gita. New York: Bantam Books. Parker, R. (2001). Healing wounded history. London: Longman & Todd. Rajan, S. (1998). Beyond the crisis of European sciences: new beginnings. Shimla: Indian Institute of Advanced Studies Publication. Ricoeur, P. (1996). Memory, forgetfulness, and history. The Jerusalem Philosophical Quarterly, 45, 13–24. Schopenhauer, A. (1999). On the basis of morality (E. F. J. Payne & D. E. Cartwright, Trans.). Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company.

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Sen, A. (1993). Positional objectivity. Philosophy & Public Affairs, 22(2), 126–145. Spivak, G. C. (1988). In other worlds: essays in cultural politics. London: Routledge. Tagore, R. (1961). To teachers. In A. Chakravarty (Ed.), A Tagore reader. Boston: Beacon. Teresa, M. (2002). Architect of peace. In M. Collopy & J. Gardener (Ed.), Architects of peace: visons of hope in words and images, 8. New World Library. Thompson, J. (2005). On forgiveness and social healing. Massachusetts: Harvard University School. Visvanathan, S. (1995). On unravelling rights. Studies in Humanities and Social Sciences., 2(2), 109–159.

Religious Diversity and the Tribes of North-East India

Religion: The Universal and the Local Sujata Miri

Abstract Religions have local origins and local attributes. However, particular religions have relentlessly transcended the bounds of their origin and become universal. It is significant that tribal religions do not aspire for such universality; for them, the local has the inalienable character of the sacred and therefore cannot be transcended without distorting the very character of the religion. Consequently, the perspective on plurality of religions for the two kinds of religions is enormously different from one another. For one, it would be a matter of internal churning and difficult compromises. For tribal religions, however, it is a matter of easy and friendly acceptance. This is also because exteriority of nature remains central to the general conceptions of man and nature developed in the universalistic discourse, while the tribesman does not recognize a (ultimate) tension between man and nature- man, God and nature are a continuum. This paper argues that it is ecological rootedness which gave local/tribal religions the strength to be truly generous and to be able to recognize the similar rootedness of others. Keywords Nature · Ecology · Tribal religions · Culture · Virtue · Exclusivism Particular religions have particular local origins. Human contingencies of specific kinds, forces determining man’s relationship to other human beings and nature, vagaries of cultural, political and social compulsions of a particular time and space have frequently formed the fertile basis for the genesis of religions with significant local attributes. Christianity and Islam are good examples of this. But both these religions have relentlessly transcended the bounds of their origin and have become universal—independent of cultural, temporal, political and social variations. They relate as it were to man as man abstracted from all his local encumbrances. But tribal religions do not aspire for such universality; for them the local has the inalienable character of the sacred, and therefore cannot be transcended without distorting the very character of the religion. Consequently, the perspective on plurality of religions S. Miri (B) Professor (Retd), Department of Philosophy, North Eastern Hill University, Shillong, Meghalaya, India e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 B. Puri and A. Kumar (eds.), Re-thinking Religious Pluralism, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-9540-0_11

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for the two kinds of religions would be enormously different from one another. For one it would be a matter of internal churning and difficult compromises; for tribal religions it would be a matter of easy and friendly acceptance. There is an implicit acceptance of the dichotomy between the sacred and the secular in the universalist’s orientation according to which the sacred consists of what is normally recognisable as religious rites and rituals and the secular covers almost all other spheres of life. Local religions, specially our tribal religions existed in the shadows of a sacred consciousness, not giving special status to individual human consciousness. Human concerns were seen as interlinked with the collective spiritual concerns. That there are religious concerns divorced from this worldly concerns (such as social and political) was totally unacceptable to locally bound religions. While the universalist’s orientation got the recognition and blessings of the liberal secularist, all else were branded as dogma and superstition. What was in line with the new awakening was reformed Christianity, Islam, or Hinduism. These in their various formulations reject community as the basis of interpreting faith. The Koran, the Bible or the Gita are taken to address humanity as such or human beings as such transcending their cultural or community embodiments. Reverence for them must transcend reverence for the hearth or a tree or a mountain, or a forest grove. As an example allow me to refer to the ‘Adi’ (one of the tribal communities of Arunachal Pradesh) conception of the ‘Supreme being’: If evidence is required for his presence we may just turn towards the sun and feel its warm touch. Indeed all natural phenomena whether in the cooling effect of the moon or the revealing nature of the sun reflect his presence. I quote the following oath the elders take when they meet for Kebang. ‘Sun mother, Moon father, if I have committed theft or any other crime, if I have drunk anything forbidden, this day’s rising sun, you, this eve’s setting moon you, in a manner that all can see and know, clearly testify’. The exteriority of nature remains central to the general conceptions of man and nature developed in the universalistic discourse. ‘The first object of man is man. The sense of Nature, …is a later product’ (Feuerbach 2008, 47). So also the supreme being apart from man and nature is suitably violated (a), God takes the shape of man and (b), man takes godlike features. Having godlike features, he is taken to be qualitatively superior to other human beings. He does not divinize nature preferring to enslave others having himself become God (Feuerbach in Torres 2008, 113). Privileging the binary makes it impossible to consider the significance of the recognition given to the other (nature) in the tribal religion. By identifying the religious ecology of the tribes with primitivism, animism and barbarism, the academia undermined the very foundation of their religion and culture. The tribesman does not recognise a (ultimate) tension between man and nature. By ignoring this and other related points of their religion we fail to give adequate expression to their insights— man, God and nature are a continuum whole. All living creatures are animated by a common indwelling spirit and are necessarily bound together with each other. Man and nature share a common life which incidentally includes a common moral framework. Local legends in their unique ways describe creation of the world for instance (a) as a result of the love between the pair of the sky god and the earth goddess or (b) the

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sun goddess and the earth god, who willingly separate from each other so that there will be room for others to flourish and grow. Other legends describe mountains, rivers and clouds as beings/gods who felt, thought perceived and deliberated as persons. We are aware, a powerful constituent of a tribal form of life is a profound ‘affective’ bond (spiritual?) between man and everything around him. Now this affective bond is also constitutive of the unique kind of knowledge that the tribesman has of himself in relation to this environment. His ontology comprises the self and the other, which includes his community as well as his environment. When the tribesman conceives of harmony he sees it as a truth and is not concerned about its ‘objective’ validation. ‘They can never see it’s entireness from outside; for they are one with it’ (Tagore 1931, 48). The reality of existence is in harmony with the real within us. The emotive and the cognitive are inextricably woven into their articulation of nature in songs, dance and ritual. Most interesting to note is the fact that one can discover in traditional tribal religions a strong sense of the preservation of their ecology. This is connected with their unquestioned respect for nature, man and animals. The preservation of the order or ‘system’ of nature thus acquires a scared aspect, and this aspect is embodied in elaborate rules relating to man’s interaction with nature. Nature may be mother and different objects may inspire reciprocity in love and care. Imagination in songs, dances, stories and mythical tales generates respect, concern and a sense of solidarity and active togetherness. And in the tribal awareness and self-awareness this has a palpability and intimacy which mere reason can never provide. Allow me at this point to say a few words about the Khasis, a prominent community of North-East India. The Khasi way of life is one of joyousness, of an openhearted acceptance of life which regards the universe as basically good rejecting indulgence as well as puritanism as aberrations and a denial of life. There is an appreciation of the play of nature which is born of an overflowing exuberance and open-handed generosity. Virtue/righteousness may be referred to as uprightness symbolised by standing erect while dancing of the female if you happen to witness one of the Khasi celebratory dances. Uprightness is also the goal of the moral endeavour—it embodies the quality of moral goodness. The journey towards this goal is, however, carefully scrutinised by the society. A good life is the normal Khasi life. There is not thought to be any alternative for a manner of life which ignores the moral obligation of a Khasi. Khasis have a strict moral code, but it arose out of a profound sense of decorum necessary for the smooth functioning of ritual ceremonies and other occasions as well as the everyday life of the people. To do right is to obey the laws of nature and of society and to live in conformity and harmony with them. Failure to do brings retribution, disharmony and consequent misery. Incidentally, the gods are as bound by these ordinances as is man, in line with the general tribal belief in the mutual interdependence of all things. Right conduct thus comprises duties to nature, to society and to those connected with the observance of morality. All these are morally obligatory practices. It is altogether natural therefore that the Khasi saw in one and the same being the source of all obligation. One can go on to say that the

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beliefs about morality and nature became so united that they are almost inseparable from one another. Nature may be mother and different objects may inspire reciprocity in love and care. Imagination in songs, dances, stories and mythical tales generates respect, concern and a sense of solidarity and active togetherness. And in the tribal awareness and self-awareness this has a palpability and intimacy which mere reason can never provide (You may call this, if you like, the tribal philosophy of environment, but in doing so one must be aware of the pitfalls of moving closer to the world of theory and ideology.). The tribal/local religions are concerned more with the well-being of a well-knit world comprising of man, animal and nature than with personal salvation. This would be incomprehensible to someone who is schooled in modernity which places man at the centre of the Universe isolated both from God as well as nature. The project of the representative of universal religion is twofold. (a) to instal the conception of the true God, replacing the local pagan deities and (b) to subjugate his otherness of identity and culture into a world of sameness. Conversion is crucial to this logic of identity though it takes unique forms. In brief the universalist aims at eradication of difference and otherness through either annihilation or assimilation. Examples of the dire consequence of resistance to propagation of universal religions are plenty in history. The eradication of the religion of the Zeliangrong Nagas and the execution of its leader- Jadonang (1931) by the British is an example in this context. An instrument that is used with overwhelming effect in the universalization of particular religions is the availability of the written scriptural text. ‘Writing transforms religion as it transforms everything. The universal religions are precisely those whose deities reside not in idols or temples but in texts, (and the God of Israel makes explicit in the second Commandment that, being defined by a text …he can tolerate no graven images.) The text embodies universality of thought and it emancipates itself from place and time and addresses itself to all who can read and hear….the local shrine may retain its holiness, it is holy….as an instance of god’s visitations’ (Scruton 2005, 19). The universalist bloated with feelings of power (rising number of believers?) very similar to that of the coloniser has become a world apart from the world of the local who is seen as without any ontological weight. Taking on the role of master/benefactor, he waits for him to acquire the desire to be like him. Usually the local ‘has no other possibility than to turn to the religion of the master, since the master has wiped out or at least strongly devalued the religions of the slave’ (Torres 2008, 112). In the North-East, for instance, the Mizo and the Naga communities tried to discard ‘primitivism’ by adopting Christianity, the plains tribal groups joined the bhakti movement in Assam. The words of Roger Scruton would be apt here: ‘A community that has survived its gods has three options. It can find some secular path to the ethical life. Or it can fake the higher emotions, while living without them. …Or it can give up pretending, and so collapse… “into the dust and powder of individuality”’ (Scruton 2005, 14).

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After independence a lot of attention has been paid to the ways in which states and social institutions understand, monitor and regulate religious diversity. The challenges of the disparities between formal constitutional guarantees and legal regulations have been mapped, the normative contents of particular regulatory regimes identified, and the move from the secular into the post-secular proclaimed. Yet in the midst of this flurry of academic activity not a word about our tribal ancestors’ handling of difference and negotiating their way through it, is ever heard of. Entrenched in their own sacred habitat, they went about their everyday life encountering the other (belonging to another religion), the outsider and the occasional visitor in a manner that achieves a de facto justice, a sense of fairness and recognition of equality. By setting the individual in the context of the group, by providing him with ritual expressions and the path to collective release, by uniting him in thought with the unborn and the dead and by imbuing his thoughts with ideas of sanctity and sacrilege, the culture enables the tribesman to give safe and sincere expression to the feelings that social life requires. His culture, depicting man-god-nature nexus, tells him how and what to feel, and in doing so raises his life to the ethical plane where the thought of judgement by the gods inhabits whatever he does. The extraordinary uniformity of the religious life of the tribes points towards a common imagination and a common faith which underline them. E. A. Gait, the first British historian of Assam perhaps tried to express the same thing in saying the following ‘…..religion of these tribes (Assamese) – shamanism, animism, nature worship or whatever name may be applied to it- is everywhere practically the same. There are differences of practice rather than of fundamental principles, and are far less important than those which divide the Saktas from the Vaishnavas, the Unitarians from the members of the Salvation army’ (Gait quoted in Misra 1978, 622). The relegation of religion to the sphere of the transcendent, of the other world, has been one of the gravest mistakes of the modern day understanding of religion. The very identity of different communities was linked with their ecologies and it is this link which their religions articulated and symbolised. It is this more than anything else that accounts for the distinctiveness of each religion. However, our incomplete reading of the ancient Indian tradition has rushed us to a very biased conclusion regarding our local traditions. Inspired by such convictions, for instance, religio-political moves reiterate the need for replacing the tribal religions with a more ‘consistent’ system of beliefs. These moves to my mind, are linked profoundly to the people’s alienation from their own land—the land which in multifarious ways defined the horizons of a meaningful human life for them. The passage from the holy land to the holy books has brought in its wake confusions and tensions which were never a part of the emotional life of the people. The loss of the ecological rootedness which gave the people the strength to be truly generous, and to be able to recognise the similar rootedness of others has now given way to exclusivism of various kinds defined primarily in political and economic terms. The non-exclusivist ideologies such as the so-called world religions including the modern democratic liberalism, appear to somehow promote and cement the new exclusivism. The alienation of traditional religion from its ecological centre is almost complete. It does not any longer seem possible to understand the wonderful diversity of human

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life in terms of religion, nor does religion seem any longer to provide the ground for a deep understanding, a deep sympathy of the other and the different.

References Feuerbach, L. (2008). The essence of Christianity. Translated from the original German by George Eliot. Mt. San Antonio College, Walnut: MSAC Philosophy Group. Misra, U. (1978, April 8). The Naga national question. Economic and Political Weekly 13(14), 618–624. Scruton, R. (2005). Modern culture. New York: Continuum. Tagore, R. (1931). The religion of man. London: Allen and Unwin. Torres, N. M. (2008). Against war: Views from the underside of modernity. Durham & London: Duke University Press

Religious Diversity: The Mao Naga Religion and It’s Moral Beliefs M. Daniel

Abstract The Mao Nagas live in the North-East of India. They are one of the Major Naga tribes from the state of Manipur in India. They practice the traditional religion called Opfoo Ope Chiina or also known as the ‘forefathers’ religion’. They believed in one Almighty God (Oramai) and also in many lesser spirits, both good and evil. They used to offer many types of sacrifices and offerings to propitiate the deities and several manes (religious taboos) constituted their rituals. The Maos believed that they were created by God (Oramai), the cosmic force, who is the creator, sustainer and destroyer. The relationship between God and humans in the Mao tradition is not one of a personal love relationship, but a relationship ruled by awe, wonder and fear of the cosmic force. They considered their God to be the source of everything. He would protect mankind from danger and bring good luck to the human beings, but displeasing ‘Him’ could invite ‘His’ wrath; individual punishments like sickness and social/community punishments like epidemics, hailstorms, bad harvest, loss of cattle and so on. The Maos considered the sky as the father and the vast landscape as the mother. They believe that the father sky, who is above, would protect everything whereas; the mother earth would nurture and takes care of everything that is on earth. The Maos believe in life hereafter, it is their belief that all the dead people’s spirits go into the land of the death called Kathe Lozho and continue their life there. The Mao religion is an oral tradition. Keywords God (oramai) · Forefathers’ · Lesser spirits · Rituals · Punishments · Kathe lozho · Deities This essay attempts to bring out the central elements of the marginalised religion of the Mao Naga who belong to the North Eastern tribes of India. The essay argues that given that their religion emphasised moral values, the Mao Naga looked on religious others with sentiments of equality and in a spirit of harmonious co-existence. The Mao Nagas live in the Senapati district previously known as the North district of Manipur state, which is situated in Northeast India. The Mao tribe is one of M. Daniel (B) Department of Philosophy, University of Mysore, Mysore, India e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 B. Puri and A. Kumar (eds.), Re-thinking Religious Pluralism, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-9540-0_12

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the major Naga tribes from the state. Today, the Maos are scattered in different States of the North-East of India and also in other parts of the country. Even though they are living in different parts of the country, they, more or less, follow their traditional cultural practices wherever they live. In Manipur most of the Maos are settled in the hill region of the state. They can be easily identified by their appearance, language they speak called Maola and their beautiful traditional dress. Their society has been cohesive and effective in bringing about a harmonious life for members of the community. The religious tradition of the Mao Nagas was called in their own language Opfoo Ope Chiina, meaning ‘religion of the forefathers’. The Mao traditional religious and moral beliefs are closely related. In fact, it is difficult to strictly differentiate between their religious and moral beliefs. The Mao’s believed that there is one Almighty God who has created the whole universe, whom they called Oramai or Ora Kajiio. He is the creator, the sustainer and also the destroyer. It is their belief that God or Oramai took control of the course of nature and human life as he has infinite power and is greatly wiser than human beings. They considered their God to be the source of everything. He would protect mankind from danger and bring good luck to human beings. The Mao people strongly believe that displeasing God could invite his wrath; individual punishments like sickness and social/community punishments like epidemics, hailstorms, bad harvest, lost of cattle and so on would be awaiting for anyone who offends God. However, the Mao’s do not really worry about their God as he is regarded to be benevolent, good and harmless. He is reverently remembered and invoked. His presence is felt in most of the important events in their life. These events include feast of merits, festivals, marriage, childbirth, success in war, construction of house, purification ceremony and competitive games. On this view God was the giver of all that humans could look up to and if one was good to the other, God would bless him/her. This world was conceived as a place where one can have happiness through the favour of God. There was plentiful in everything and life was in happiness. It is the belief of the Mao that with the blessing of God man would live a long and happy life in this world. The traditional Maos were very religious people. They acknowledged their God in everything they did. This is very evident from their daily life. For instance, whenever a Mao would sit to eat or drink, he would throw a morsel of food and wine inviting Oramai to eat and drink first. They believed that if they did not live according to the wish of their God, they might become crippled in life, that their generations might become perverted, that their cattle and crops might perish, that they might fall sick, die premature and become poor. These beliefs among the traditional Maos kept their social fabric intact and individual lives morally exemplary. It is the belief of the Maos that they were created by God in a special way by giving them more knowledge and ideas, so that they could take care of all the other living beings in this universe. Though the Maos acknowledge the existence of the supreme deity and the spirits, they never entertained image or idol worship. This fact can be gathered from the wood carvings of the Maos, among which one can notice no carvings of the deities. The traditional Maos may be considered polytheistic, though they believe that there is one supreme God; at the same time, they also believe that there are lesser

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gods or spirits. In the Mao religion there are two types of lesser gods—the ones that cause evils and misfortunes called Orakashi and the ones that cause good fortunes called Orakayi. The Maos believe that though Orakayi and Orakashi have extrahuman power they can still be overpowered by human beings who follow the right method. Though Orakayi and Orakashi are like superhuman beings or demigods the higher place in Mao religion is occupied by God. Orakayi and Orakashi are regarded as present everywhere, moving around with the people in the society though they are invisible most of the time. People believed that Orakashi brought nightmares, suffocation, pain and terror in their lives and they are considered dangerous and destructive and the cause of all kinds of human suffering. The Orakashi and Orakayi were thought to be moving with the cloud and wind, and they were believed to be present on mountains, rivers, jungles and lowland areas. These deities were not worshipped though some sacrifices were offered to them by giving them domestic animals, clothes, food, cut metals and coins. This was done just to mollify them. Instead of worshipping them, they were to be feared. They believed that Orakayi appeared white in colour and Orakashi Black. According to the Maos, the day was for the human beings or Omai and the night for the lesser gods. They believed that when human beings saw Orakashi and Orakayi during the day, they suffered pain and even the loss of hair. Similarly, when Omai/human beings were seen by the Orakashi and Orakayi in the night, they also suffered. It is said that once in the olden days the human beings could see Orakayi and Orakashi. This ability was taken away from the humans and given to the dogs. For the Maos, the dog is considered to be of the best companion of humans. The element of fear is reduced with the presence of a dog. The Maos did not have any particular place of worship like other conventional religions. They feel that they could pray and worship their God anywhere as they believed that God is present everywhere. However, the village gate was thought to be a sacred spot, because most of the offerings were made at the gate. Even the hearth of every home was considered revered and a place fitting for prayer and offering. The Mao Nagas worshipped God and offered sacrifices in their houses, at the village gate, on the roadside and in their fields. The Maos considered violating the customary law to be a direct offence against God. Such transgressors were liable for ex-communication from the community. Moreover such transgressors would have no advocates, as their best friends would also try to avoid them because they would rather take care of their own image and reputation than stand with their friends. In the Mao community, there is always a collective as well as individual commitment or responsibility to uphold or strengthen the integrity of the community. Going against the will of the elders in the community is also an offence because the Maos considered the elders as the messengers of God and they were thought to be next to God. It is noteworthy that the elders’ commands are given respect in the society. Living a moral life constituted the very being of the traditional Mao. The Maos believed that good and bad actions would be accordingly rewarded hereafter. There is a strong belief that justice would be meted out both here and now and hereafter. God would grant human beings their just reward at ‘His’ own time and by his will. They also said that God’s justice would not be like chilly which had an immediate effect, but his action would be gradual. Cheating another or telling

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a lie meant more than committing a crime. Honouring a promise and keeping one’s word were considered characteristic features of a religious life. They believed that helping the helpless like widows and orphans was a serviced rendered to God. A person who lived a moral life in the community with his/her fellow beings is said to be a person who knows God. Strangely, the notion of Orachithobokopfo is that of a humble patient person, who forgives wrong done to him/her and never takes revenge. There is a saying in Mao ‘Mazhe morona chiku kapi mei sii Oramaina khrupule’ which meant, that whosoever showed love to the orphans and took care of them were in turn blessed by God. The rich people never ignored or disturbed the poor and the orphans. Instead they gave them food to eat, clothes to wear and even a place to stay. They felt that, this was their duty and were happy doing it, since they thought that it was their moral obligation to bring joy and happiness to the needy and poor. They also believed that by doing these good actions they would be blessed by God and this would keep them happy and healthy. An important feature of any religion is following the rites and rituals such as public sacrifices, prayers, etc. It is important to note here that, for the Maos not everyone could perform rituals and sacrifices. These could only be performed by the priest called khehrepfoona or the village elders or by the appointed elders from the clan. When the Maos make propitiatory offerings to God in order to be blessed by him, they choose the best cow, cock or eggs. These items chosen for sacrifices should not be defective in any way. The Maos believed that through the sacrifice, the state of the sick person’s health could be known. For instance, to take an example here, if the sacrificial chicken is taken beyond the village gate and let off and it moves back towards the village of the sick person, then it is learned that the sick person may not recover from the illness and he may even die, because, as it is said, God did not accept the offering or sacrifice. However, if the chicken, on the other hand, moves away into the jungles or move away from the village, it is believed that the God is happy with the sick person’s offering. While making the sacrifices spontaneous prayers are usually uttered. The prayers reveal the motive and character of the propitiatory offering. The prayers are mainly supplications for good harvest, freedom from sickness and victory over enemies. Prayers are also offered with food and drinks to the ancestral spirits. The Mao believe that ancestral spirit never departs from them. Even after physical death the spirits of the dead are still considered to be present with the family helping the family directly or indirectly. They are often invoked for help and for the welfare of the living members of the family and clan. In all major festivals and during any special occasions like marriage or entering into a newly constructed house the Mao appeal to the ancestral spirits to join them. Such worshipping and giving of respect to the ancestral spirit makes an essential component of the Mao religion. The Maos believe that there is a spirit present in all the human bodies and here after this life goes into the land of the death called Kathe lozho. For the Maos the strongest proof for life after death is the practice of necromancy in their village life. Necromancy is the ability to communicate with the dead person’s spirit. According to the Mao the customs of the community were framed with the power of God. Therefore, violating these laws is taken as direct offence against God. If any members from the community acts in violation of these law such a person will be

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strongly reprimanded and also face ex-communication from the community. Going against the will of the elders in the community is also an offence because the Maos considered the elders as the messengers of God and they were thought to be next to God. The elders command carried weight in the society. The demise of the elders is one of the main reasons behind the deterioration of the Mao religion. The elders are the backbone of the community and they teach members how best to perform rituals and sacrifices. With their death there was a break in tradition and even the system of the community collapsed, because the knowledge which they had could not be comprehensively passed on to the next generation. The elders are considered as the ‘seen God’. In the Mao community there were prophets called prakoru chu kapemai. These people were believed to be gifted with supernatural strength and seen as being able to predict and foretell about the future events like war, epidemics, natural disaster, etc. They were thought to be in communion with a special deity. They could talk to the deity in a strange language which could not be understood by the other members. They moved around in the community and looked up to the sky and communicated with the deity who told them everything that was going to happen. Thereafter they informed their people about the impending occurrences. People initially laughed at them and made fun of them saying that prediction can never come true. However, looking back today‚ the modern Maos feel‚ that their prophetic ancestors’ prediction has become a reality. There were also fortune tellers called kriipingumai in the community. They could help the people with their paranormal powers of prediction. They used paddy or twigs in performing rituals and could come out with the answers to the people’s queries. People went to them with queries about their future, family, buying of paddy fields, forest, sickness, etc. It is also believed that they had the power to heal the sick persons by means of releasing the spirit of the person that had been held captive by the evil spirits. It was believed that through the performance of rituals the kriipingumai could come to know the demands of the evil spirits. They would then (the kriipingumai) tell the sick person to perform the sacrifices to the evil spirits at the appointed places. The sacrificing items could be of rooster, eggs, clothes, cut metals, coins, etc. Among their other powers it is believed that the kriipingumai have the power to reveal secrets, identify persons, places and objects. The word taboo is referred to as mane in Mao. The concept of mane or taboo is an integral part of life of the traditional Maos. When mane was declared, the normal functioning of the community was suspended for the purpose of conducting rituals, worship of God and purifying of oneself and the whole community. They were even forbidden to touch or eat food so as to remain pure during the time of the mane. During mane days trade was not allowed between the villages, which meant that they were not supposed to take out or bring anything into the village from outside. They were also restricted from going to their friends in the village and from entertaining their friends in their own village. The parents and elders informed the younger generation clearly about the mane and the consequences of violating the rules of mane. This prompted the Maos to observe the mane in a faithful way. There were nineteen manes which were common to all the Mao villages. Out of which

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some are monthly occurrences and the rest are seasonal. Besides all these nineteen manes, there are certain manes which are observed when a person sees any event. Manes are to be strictly observed, for violation was thought to bring evil effects and invite a curse from the villagers and the supernatural forces. Every community has its own concept of life after death, however vague it may be. The Maos believed that if a person lived a good and religious life while living on this earth they would reach the land of the death called kathe lozho without much problem after they die, but for the bad people it would be tough going as they would be obstructed by several difficulties on their way to their destination. The Maos strongly believed in the immortality of the soul, though no one could tell the exact place of kathe lozho where all the souls of the dead peoples assembled and live together in the land of the death, which bears resemblance to the life on earth. It is also their belief that the dead souls continue to work and go on with their lives. Once they have reached their destination, they would all be the same. There will not be any difference between the more moral or the less moral person. But the punishments (obstacles and hardships in the progress towards the kathe lozho) are sure to be meted out to the immoral person for actions like cheating, dishonesty, immoral murder, adultery, etc. Maos have their own belief system which is unique and different from other major religions such as Hinduism, Islam, Buddhism, Christianity and so forth. The fundamental philosophy of the Maos is based on observance of morality and ethical principles which help the people to lead a virtuous life. As morality is one of the main concerns of the Mao people, it is impossible for a Mao man to hate other religions or become intolerant towards people who are following a different belief system. The Mao Naga people view other religions with deep love and reverence. Generally, Maos are peace loving people, though there are people who belong to other religions living in the areas where the Mao are predominant there has never been communal violence in such areas. Communal violence is one of the main issues in modern India. Discrimination has been prevalent in the name of caste, creed, colour, class and religion. The Maos believed in living a harmonious life with one another within their community and also with the people around them. They clearly understand that only a healthy mind can create a healthy society. So, Maos have emphasised on the ethical and religious way of life. The strict ethical principles of the Maos never allowed them to become intolerant or anti-social. The Maos believe that God or Oramai sees and hears everything, and as such is angered by the violation of the moral code of conduct. The religious and moral beliefs of the Maos are closely related to their culture which they have followed in the past. This makes their way of life essentially harmonious with the religions of others which might differ from their own.

Ao-Naga Religious Experience and Ethics: A Phenomenological Inquiry Karilemla

Abstract This essay will examine religious experience from a phenomenological perspective. The first part of the essay deals with the nexus between “cognitive framework” and “embodied faith” in religious traditions. By cognitive framework, I mean the abstract concepts underlying human behavior in acquiring knowledge of the ultimate reality in religious experience. In contra-distinction to this account of knowledge is the notion of cognition as embodied faith. Embodied faith is the selfexperience of the very constitution of faith in the practical modes of everydayness. In the second part, I attempt to show that the embedded praxis of the embodied faith is tied to existential faith which I argue is not a cognitive framework. This debate would help to attend to the practical modes of the very constitution of faith‚ and I bring in the debate‚ to highlight religious arguments in relation to morality. I do so with reference to the Ao-Naga religion of India’s North East region. In light of their unique embedded praxis of beliefs system and the centrality of “truthfulness” as the highest goal of human life, Ao religious belief is seen in terms of the body-mindculture circuit tested through generations of practices that make up the Ao religious system. The concluding remarks will highlight the cultivated ethos which in turn will be instrumental in explaining how the Ao-Naga occupies space in the public sphere with the religious “other”. Traditional Ao religion shows that Ao religious beliefs contribute relational modesty and receptivity towards others in the public realm while contesting the notion of absolute tolerance. Thus, Ao religious beliefs inculcate a broader ethic of equality. Keywords Ao-naga · Embodied · Ethics · Religion · Ritual

Karilemla (B) Department of Philosophy, Savitribai Phule Pune University, Pune, India e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 B. Puri and A. Kumar (eds.), Re-thinking Religious Pluralism, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-9540-0_13

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1 Introduction Phenomenology describes how phenomena show themselves from themselves to us in our forms of experience. In this sense, religion is a phenomenon, a particular manifestation of the reality and a part of our experience within the domain of culture. Religion is embedded in the culture and is a set of practices within it. Religion is, thus, understood as one of the particular modes of our experience of the different realities and one practice among many others. Different cultural contexts create different realities. In this connection, there are different responses and enduring explanations for religious appeal. The theist, atheist, exclusivist, inclusivist, and the pluralist profess differently in the affirmation/denial of a transcendent absolute reality. It is to be noted that different religious faiths display their differences not only in content but also in their method and organization. Todd Tremlin’s book entitled Minds and Gods: The Cognitive Foundation of Religion holds “some faiths feature strong leadership and are acted out within highly structured institutions…some religions communicate their beliefs through standardized, repetitive doctrines and practices; others place a premium on personal experiences and stimulating services” (Tremlin 2006, 184). Albeit, one current feature of the phenomenon of religion‚ that most scholars agree to‚ is assigning a kind of non-natural agent that grounds religion. The supernatural agents are not “…merely ornaments in religious systems but are objects around which religious belief, behavior, and community coalesce” (Ibid, 144). The nature of supernatural agents is as wide-ranging as their form. They can be allknowing, good, indifferent and embodied. The notion of the ultimate reality, however, does not confine itself to God concepts alone. For instance, Daoism, Confucianism and Buddhism do not believe in the idea of God at all. Religious pluralism, I argue is the consequence of the quest of a specific faith by each community or group. Further, while the experiences and practices of religious diversity and disagreement offer valuable insights about our place in the world yet such diversity also creates conflict in equal intensity. Hence, our understanding and awareness of religious plurality and diversity call for philosophical reflection. Reflection on the unique belief structure of each religion and a deeper understanding of (and appreciation for) the religious “other” is a contemporary concern in our world.

2 Cognitive Framework and Embodied Faith Turning to the nexus between “cognitive framework” and “embodied faith” in religious traditions (mention of which one finds in the writings of anthropologists, social scientists, cognitivists and philosophers) would orient us to the larger picture of my argument to arrive at a phenomenology of religion with reference to Ao-Naga tribal tradition.

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By cognitive framework I mean the abstract concepts underlying human behavior in acquiring the knowledge of the ultimate reality. It is a mental act that claims in some way that the knowledge of religious representations is confined within the mind and forms the necessary basis of religion. Religion is, in this vein, considered as a product of mental arithmetic. The existence of a divine being is taken as intuitive, automatic, and God is only an idea in the mind. There is a robust field in the study of “cognitive science of religion” that has been strong since the early twentieth century. Cognitivists opine that mind contains conceptual predispositions and our mission is to recognize those conceptual predispositions in order to explain the basic concepts and acquire knowledge with ease. In short, cognitivists adhere to the view that mental predispositions influence religious behavior in ways that may lead people to alter even the already accepted and established religious systems and explain those aspects which are left unexplained in the arena of a religious system (Ibid, 190). Many cognitivists, philosophers and social scientists place the operation of ritual and embodied experience within the category of a cognitive framework. Having said that, they discredit the views of many social and behavioral scientists that mental knowledge is composed of culture. If one goes by Clifford Geertz, the definition of religion as a “cultural system” and the understanding that religion is so embedded in culture, the cognitive approach appears to reduce both religion and culture as commodities of mind which require cognitive models in the formation of cultural knowledge and in the explanation of religious beliefs. I argue that cultural devices and inputs play a fundamental role in the production of mental knowledge. In fact, cognition and culture are so intimately connected to each other between the form, acquisition and transmission of representations but not in the form of dependency. Culture should not be understood as solely dependent upon cognition in order to identify its religious beliefs and system. In contra-distinction to this account of knowledge of cognition understood as mental thought is the notion of cognition as embodied experience upon which faith anchors. Cognition is embodied “when it is deeply dependent upon features of the physical body of an agent, that is, when aspects of the agent’s body beyond the brain play a significant causal or physically constitutive role in cognitive processing” (Wilson and Lucia 2017). In order to develop mental thought, for instance, the God concept, we need to first of all understand the agent concept because agency plays an important role in explaining the experience of religious beliefs. While illustrating the several instances of religious beliefs that are held to be true without questioning, Ilkka Pyysiäinen holds that there are certain characteristics in religious belief that differ fundamentally from science and fiction. For him, religion tends to favor the agency for the explanation of beliefs to mechanistic explanation because science tends to reduce personalistic explanation to mechanistic ones. “Religious representations are acquired without explicit tuition, whereas scientific representations are closer to explicitly taught” (Pyysiäinen 2003, 219). He further argues that religious truths must be differentiated from fiction because religious representations are taken to be literally believed religious truths whereas fiction is only metaphorical. It is a vague category. It sustains as long as the story lasts. It is to be admitted that in the philosophy of religion, attempts have been made to describe

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religious representations through other means apart from the literal truth. Pyysiäinen cites an example to consider “…metaphorical expressions of certain basic existential questions as expressions of commitment to a specific way of life….” (Ibid, 220). Religious representations are part of a tradition and shared by people in a group. Hence, the cognitive framework seems insufficient to explain religious beliefs and runs counter to the very notion of embodied faith. Embodied faith is the self-experience of the very constitution of faith in the way humans engage with the world. One needs to make sense of embodied faith as embodied practices. It is composed of cultural devices and the constitution of belief. The embedded character of embodied faith, to use Connolly’s term, is sustained by “a mixture of cultural devices, including at the young age, common rituals, shared stories, mockery of other faiths, epiphanic experiences, and public arguments all mixing into each other” (Connolly 2005, 46). For Talal Asad, an anthropologist, advocacy of the body-brain-culture of embodied faith tested through generations of practices that make up the religious system is pertinent when it comes to the question of embodied faith. When religious faith falls under the authority of a cognitively pure belief, the material manifestation of the idea of faith in the forms of ritual and ceremonies, for instance, is completely reduced to a mental act. In short, the lived experience in meaning-making is negated and the importance of cultural components in general gets obscured, which I argue, is fundamental in the very constitution of the embodied faith. If one goes by the cognitive framework, the operation of ritual which is one of the features of embodied faith‚ is taken only to symbolize faith. The bodily act, tools used, and the designated space to perform the ritual carries meaning. Religious praxis is crucial in embodying the rites more than the mechanistic technique involved in ritual. Within the cognitive framework, religious beliefs seem to be confined to the world of ideas and concepts. The cognitive framework prioritizes itself over that of the embedded experience of human beings’ relationship and involvement with the world. One can, of course, philosophically conceptualize what is grasped in its practical engagement. However, any theoretical conceptualization towards things is possible only on the basis of this primordial comportment. Heidegger, and later Michael Polanyi and Thomas Kuhn, hold the view that theoretical knowledge depends on (and presupposes) practical skills. “The kind of dealing which is closest to us is as we have shown, not a bare perceptual cognition, but rather that kind of concern which manipulates things and puts them to us” (Heidegger 1962, 95). However, this does not imply that the objects discovered in theoretical transaction depend on these skills. In Connolly’s work, one finds that the repetitive practices of important cultural components help to constitute the character, ethos and sensibility of the believer. Connolly holds that the importance of the cultural component is “its embodiment in repetitive practices that help to constitute the dispositions, sensibilities, and ethos through which meaning is lived, intellectual beliefs are settled, and relations between constituencies are negotiated” (Ibid, 56). These dispositions, I argue, resonate in our attitude towards the religious other. The embedded character of embodied faith is tied to the existential faith because it is in the embodied practices of faith that

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we participate back and forth and unconceal the true essence of being in religious experience.

3 Existential Faith By existential faith I mean the way in which faith retains the ultimate character of being where existence and all existential comportments including knowing unfold within a world and through lived experiences. This element finds expression with others in organized institutions. Theorization of belief cannot tear itself apart from the context of life where existence finds meaning. Connolly defines existential faith as “an elemental sense of the ultimate character of being. That sense is typically shared with others, albeit often incompletely and imperfectly” (Ibid, 25). Human beings are inhabited by existential faith often accompanied by incompleteness. For human beings, no matter how incomplete and imperfect it could be, the notion of faithlessness simply doesn’t exist in the domain of existential faith. Connolly further opines that existential faith also finds expression in the doctrine and belief on the epistemic plane yet its intensities extend below this plane. In this connection, he explains two types of dimension: the horizontal and the vertical dimension. In the horizontal dimension, the religious beliefs of morality, divinity and salvation are professed and refined in comparison with beliefs advanced by other faiths. On the other hand, the vertical dimension enacts and confesses the doctrinal element that express embodied feelings, habits of judgment, patterns of conduct which distance itself from the domain of intellectual control (Ibid). Existential faith with its emphasis on the embedded character of embodied faith (in Connolly’s terminology) seems to contest the notion of Spinoza’s philosophy that reason is self-sufficient and need not invoke faith to contest and support itself. In a similar vein, Kant’s later writings also echo the idea that faith should be under the dictates of reason and not vice versa. A specific faith requires other faiths in order to demarcate itself by weighing its agreements and disagreements. However, in this exercise one should be aware that “… the publication of those alternative faiths, needed for the specification of yours, can also threaten self-confidence that your faith expresses the essence of being” (Ibid, 27). When this faith is disturbed, the essence of being is shaken and one finds oneself in a reactionary manner in various forms. The consequence could be in the forms of physical violence, doctrinal debate, and could be by any other means. Other faiths might pose a threat to one’s own faith. The consequence could be in two forms: that it brings internal conflicts within one’s own belief system and, it also generates conflicts in the form of revenge against the other though they might not have limited one’s ability to express one’s own religious faith (Ibid). Secularism promotes co-existence of faiths in the public sphere in order to allow space for public reason away from any particular faith. In this connection, there arises a question, will secularism be our saving grace when one’s faith is being threatened? Connolly opines that “secularism constitutes a noble attempt to respond to the problem of

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evil within faith. But secularists themselves very often have inordinate faith in the self-sufficiency of the public procedures they endorse” (Ibid, 28). Existential faith does not endorse a fundamental truth of being as universal criteria because each specific faith punctuates an idea of difference and each investment to the public doctrine makes a difference as well. What is important is that when the ultimate character of being is left unthought, then it leads to the oblivion of being. For Connolly, the oblivion of being subsists as a disruptive dimension in the existential faith. Having showed that the existential faith is not a cognitive framework because it is sustained by a mixture of cultural components and religious beliefs of morality, divinity, etc., I argue that the lived experiences are then the sphere that makes it possible for me to both‚ own up my being and also a disclosure of meaning‚ in my religious experience. For instance, the operation of ritual cannot be reduced to a mere mechanistic act that represents belief rather it should be considered as a medium through which our senses are educated and through which embodied habits, sensibilities and dispositions are cultivated. It is on the basis of turning away from the understanding of the cognitive framework to the embodied and existential faith that we can work on a phenomenology of religion in the context of Ao-Naga tribal religious tradition. I argue in light of the Aos’ unique embodied praxis of belief system and the centrality of “truthfulness” being the highest goal of human life, that Ao religious beliefs contribute relational modesty and receptivity towards others in the public realm while contesting the notion of absolute tolerance. Hence, the Ao-Naga religious belief system that I now turn to is located in the materiality of everydayness rather than being a mere conceptual idea of faith.

4 Ao-Naga Religious Beliefs: Truth is God Two pivotal notions need to be understood to gain a grasp of Ao-Naga religious beliefs as a whole: “all things are full of Gods” and “truth is God”. The Ao’s unique embodied praxis of belief system and the centrality of “truthfulness” being the highest goal of human life is significant in order to contest the notion of the cognitive framework in religious traditions. This does not, however, delimit their belief in Asüyim (the land of the dead) which they believe is stable and devoid of the unfortunate contingencies of life on earth. The traditional Ao religious beliefs show that their religious faith is not a useless abstraction but embedded in the materiality of everydayness. Having said that, I shall show that the concepts of God, land, truth and ritual available in Ao-Naga worldview are tied to the religious beliefs which provide insights to argue for the Ao’s embodied praxis of religious system. Like the pre-Socratic thinker, Thales, the ancestors of the Ao believed that all things are full of Gods. For Thales, the elements are alive and all things are full of Gods or spirits. J. P. Mills in his book, The Ao Nagas opines that Gods in Ao country “…are everywhere - in the village, in the fields, in the jungle,…They are regarded as resembling in some way the people of the locality in which they live” (Mills 1926,

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216). Ao’s practical mode of living with things and their everyday engagement with Gods is conceived as Gods imagined in this life-like, communitarian fashion (that is, as the community of life). The tribal religious belief is seen in terms of the humannature relationship as one of involvement and interaction. This provides the leeway to argue for the embodied praxis of Ao’s religious system. Tsungrem in the Ao vocabulary is used to denote several Gods which appear to have no hierarchy in the Ao’s belief system. “Worship of Tsungrem follows an agricultural cycle because of the belief that they control the elements and nature” (Ao 1999, 52). Therefore, propitiation of the place they inhabit was deemed necessary to invoke blessings for prosperity, health and truthful citizens tied to the land. Ritual is an integral part of the religious and cultural life of the Ao’s. They believe that land is holy and truthful. Therefore, if the land is truthful, any action performed within that space would also be truthful and would in turn yield good deeds. Truth and ritual are intimately connected to each other. The latter is identifiable only with reference to the former (I will elaborate this point a little later when I bring in the narratives). Here, one needs to differentiate ritual that is undertaken only to symbolize a belief; from that of the Ao’s religious ritual and its practices. For Aos, ritual is the kernel of their religious faith and is connected to the events of human life. In short, ritual is the material expression of their religious faith. It is intrinsic to their cultural particularity in order to connect to the transcendent reality. In philosophy, ritual is typically considered to be irrational, instinctual and interpreted as non-cognitive behavior. It is never considered as an activity that involves learning, knowing and thinking. The engagement of learning, knowing, and thinking involved in ritual was never explored and has never been taken up as of philosophical interest “…but such an approach has the potential to provide the conceptual tools to see rituals as activities in which ritualists are not simply repeating traditional gestures but are rather raising and seeking to settle a problem” (Schilbrack 2004, 3). It also means we are embodying the rites. Mr. Meyawati Walling from Longkhum village gives us an elaborate account of how the purity of ritual should be strictly followed in order to resolve the problem that arises between the practitioner of ritual and the divine. Performing ritual also means training into a “truthful” way of life. He narrates: Once a designated place is unanimously selected to perform the ritual, we would never change that place again. We shall perform the ritual forever at that place only. In order to sanctify the place, the Ao ancestors would break an egg and hoist a bamboo stick to keep the egg shell. It is believed that god never accepts our offering if we perform the rituals and sacrifices on any random date. We observed six days Amou (a ritual practiced by the Ao ancestors) prior to performing rituals and sacrifices. During this period, we are not supposed to attend funeral services and visit dead persons’ homes. (Miri and Karilemla 2015, 37)

Walling further opines that the first and foremost requirement to perform ritual is to speak the truth and abstain from any kind of immoral activities including physical intimacy. If they fail to perform the proper rituals and sacrifices, the offerings of the performers, will go in vain because of displeasing the gods. Hence, ritual must be performed with meticulous correctness. Meticulous correctness entails training of both the body and mind to act and think with sensibility. Two ideas are central to

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the ritual: first, that it is a pursuit of truth in one’s everyday routines and relations, and second, that in embodying the rites through the agency of body, the bodily act opens up a meaningful world of one’s conscious engagement with the ultimate reality. Moreover, the repetitive engagements in ritual train and transform the individual’s original nature; training of both the body and mind contributes to the formation of one’s dispositions and sensibilities. In this connection, repetition of ritual does not imply that ritual has fixed patterns and practices and is irrational. Rather, the cultivated ethos through ritual practices, in turn, will be instrumental in how we occupy space in the public sphere. For Aos, the results of leading a truthful life are not limited to one’s own self but rather extend to the ethical/religious “other” as well. Traditional Ao ancestors believed that truth determines one’s own fate on this earth. Rongsenwati Longchar from Yimyu remarks that “our forefathers were truthful people and our core belief is to live a truthful life” (Banerjee and Karilemla 2016). If we listen to the narration of Ao elders, training and socialization into a truthful way of life is the core belief of Aos worldview. “Truth” appears to be not only a religious virtue but a blend of ontological, epistemological and religious virtues within the Ao worldview. The training in these virtues requires the practice of truthfulness. Truthfulness is not confined to the individual who speaks the truth but it has a social valence as well. “…it was instrumental in inculcating the value of friendship among peer groups in and outside the dormitory, members of the same clan, members from another clan and, other non-Ao” (Ibid). Friendship with the complete outsiders to the Ao community and the latter’s integration into citizenship also emphasize a blending of friendship with an ethos of equality. Thus conceived, “equality” becomes an ethical virtue that provides a way of grasping oneself in relation to others. It also has social and religious valence. The virtues inculcated and learned through the various modes become the medium for Ao’s unique embodied praxis of belief system which constitutes relational modesty and receptivity towards the religious Other. The American Christian missionaries traveled to the Ao country in 1872 armed with the Baptist version of Christianity in order to convert the heathen. With the advent of Christianity in Molungkimong, a historical village in Nagaland, the traditional Ao religion was threatened and challenged by the bearers of an alien faith. The new religion professed the abode of heavenly life for people who embrace and convert to the new faith. They showed, for example, how their statues of the cross symbolize divinity and not idols, whereas the rituals and ceremonies practiced by the Aos were now condemned as being evil. Christian Missionaries taught them that all the ancient gods were evil. They looked down at the traditional faith as involving evil practices. Meyawati Walling remarks “we are not claiming that our god is the real and true god and your god is unreal and untrue. Whatever people think of us let them think. They tell us that our god is not the true and real god that we believe in Temenen (evil) God. But there is only one god. What is the difference between Temenen god and not Temenen god? They won’t be able to explain and differentiate the two” (Miri and Karilemla 2015, 194). Further, Kikasangla Imchen opines that “I believe all gods are equal. There is only one god and all gods are one. With this understanding in me, I did not embrace the new religion which is known as Christianity” (Ibid, 191). The above remarks echo the disagreements of the Ao with Christian faith in certain

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respects and the challenges that they faced against the practice of absolute tolerance. It also indicates that absolute tolerance is altogether impossible. For absolute tolerance would either result in extreme hatred towards those who forcefully convert the Ao to an alien faith because conversion should come from within or it might lead to the abandonment of a religious faith that has been there for generations. Walling’s remark in particular voices a counter argument to the concept of the labeling of Ao religious faith as involving an evil god (Temenen Tsungrem). Meantime, Walling assumes a relational modesty towards the religious other while negotiating the ethos of the Ao faith. Traditional Ao religion also extends to show that one’s faith regime should not rule over the other because of the attachment to one’s own faith. Rather, one should accommodate in the equation with the faith of others. Imchen’s remark also shows salutary acknowledgment of different approaches to the ultimate reality and towards the inculcation of a broader ethic of equality. Connolly’s voice is relevant here as well. “And if you include yourself and your faith in the equation, rather than pretending to float above the fray, you place yourself in a better position to commend a pluralist ethos to others” (Connolly 2005, 49). Receptivity towards the religious other in the public sphere while contesting the notion of absolute tolerance becomes clearer as we listen to Walling’s remark: Let us make one thing clear. We do not wish to either praise our goodness or insult other religions in not converting to Christianity. There are so many religions in the world yet we do not wish to pick and choose we wish to remain truthful and that we can do only in our own religion that is where we find our happiness…we are not telling that Christianity is bad and our religion is good. It is our understanding and belief that if we are truthful to our god, he will bless us. No matter, how much we talk about issues related to religion, our ultimate aim and need is only god. Therefore, we should praise him and live a truthful life. (Miri and Karilemla 2015, 193).

The traditional Ao religion embraces the difference rather than commend sameness and uniformity in religious belief. At the same time the Ao-Naga rejects the notion of an exclusivist faith. Walling’s remark echoes such an understanding that the potential conflict is inevitable and conversion is a possibility. For him, conversion is harmless and “…let them do so if they think that they will find their happiness in doing that. We can neither stop them nor direct them in what they should do” (Ibid, 193–194). From the narration, one can understand that the traditional Ao religion exercises presumptive receptivity towards the other. It also reassures us that the imperialist and hegemonic aspects in relation to the religious other are not what the Aos religious tradition advocates. The Ao’s unique embodied praxis of belief system aligns itself with the pluralist ethos. It sets limits to tolerance in order to prevent the indoctrinated religious regime. An interesting aspect of the Ao’s religious belief is that the ethos of relational sensibilities and receptivity towards the religious other finds expression‚ first of all‚ in the home space and thus can be extended from the home space to the larger communal space. Narration from Walling authenticates such a remark. He holds that “we teach our children to live a truthful life and to give their best service to the people and not to bring any shame on us. We tell our children not to feel ashamed of thinking that their parents are ‘animists’. We tell them to go to church regularly” (Ibid, 194). The work and moral responsibility of raising

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children for imbibing them with unique orientations towards the religious other is seen as an extension from the home space to the larger communal space, and, thus, everyday material practices of religious belief and experience of the individual is safeguarded. Religious conversions took place gradually in different parts of the Ao territory. Some members of the Ao embraced the new religion early, while others did so later and some still uphold the traditional religion.

5 Conclusion Religious pluralism introduces discourses about the philosophical conceptions of the many religions of the world. There can be no conception of religious pluralism without recognizing all the religious traditions whether these be dominant or marginalized religious traditions. Denial of diversity limits individual and collective potential and encourages risks of oppression and domination. It is acknowledged that different cultural contexts create different realities through socialization processes. Indeed, we are embedded in our cultural particularity. Our understanding of the transcendent reality in religious beliefs is also conditioned by our own cultural particularity. Yet, it is from within the cultural particularity that the norm of universality emerges. John Russon in his essay titled “Conscience, Religion, and Multiculturalism: A Canadian Hegel” holds that our cultural peculiarity is for establishing a human universality. “This notion that the norm of universality is intrinsic to our cultural particularity...” (Russon 2018, 93). The truth of exclusive forms of cultural perspective is indeed necessary to overcome exclusivity itself. Hence, the understanding of different universalities and the difference playing out within the different universalities comes up with new and interesting philosophical resources in religious traditions. In this reconstituted task of philosophy, I believe, the traditional Ao-Naga religious belief system can be a source of strength.

References Ao, T. (1999). The Ao-Naga oral tradition. Baroda: Bhasha Publications. Banerjee, A., & Karilemla. (2016). Arju as “Caring Space, In-Between:” Philosophical reflections on “Care” from Ao Naga, India. In A. Banerjee & B. Mann (Eds.) The journal of the society for philosophy in the contemporary world, vol. 23, no. 1 (pp. 91–105). Connolly, W. E. (2005). Pluralism. Durham and London: Duke University Press. Heidegger, M. (1962). Being and time (trans: J. Macquarrie and E. Robinson, with a new foreword by T. Carman). New York: Harper and Row Publishers. Mills, J. P. (1926). The Ao Nagas. London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd. Miri, S., & Karilemla. (2015). Ao Naga world-view: A dialogue. New Delhi: Indian Council of Philosophical Research and D.K. Printworld (P) Ltd. Pyysiäinen, I. (2003). How religion works: Towards a new cognitive science of religion. The Netherlands: Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden.

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Russon, J. (2018). Conscience, religion, and multiculturalism: A canadian hegel. In S. M. Dodd & N. G. Robertson (Eds.), Hegel and Canada: Unity of opposites (pp. 88–99). Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Schilbrack, K. (2004). Introduction: On the use of philosophy in the study of rituals. In K. Schilbrack (Ed.), Thinking through rituals: Philosophical perspectives (pp. 1–30). New York: Routledge Taylor and Francis Group. Todd, T. (2006). Minds and gods: The cognitive foundation of religion. New York: Oxford University Press Inc. Wilson, R. A., & Foglia, L. (2017). Embodied cognition. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.) The stanford encyclopedia of philosophy (Spring 2017 Edition). https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2017/entries/ embodied-cognition/.

Indigenous Perspective on Religious Pluralism: A Tribal Response Heni Francis Ariina

Abstract This essay examines the ideas of indigenous religion(s) and beliefs which are largely excluded from the ambit of established religious systems. In the public domain, inter-faith dialogue assumes differences in approach to the claimed “Truth,” “Real” or “Being” for a dialogue to take place among different religions. The categories interplay with cultural settings as setting the milieu for understanding the differences between religions. In such a complex scenario, religious pluralism confines its discourse to the mainstream religious traditions. What is intriguing is that the lesser known or neglected tribal worldviews (weltanschauung) have been subdued as ambiguous and obscured in conceptualising the “Real” itself. Some of the immediate questions that arise in this context are how do tribal communities live out the ideas of equanimity, harmony, peace and well-being in their social relationships?—What are the possibilities of engaging the tribal religious views in the conversations about religious pluralism? This essay attempts to answer such questions and to address the lacuna in the contemporary discourse on religious pluralism by bringing out an indigenous tribal perspective on the relationship between religions. Keywords Eco spirituality · Religious pluralism · Inter-faith dialogue · Makrü hrü (makhelian race) · Dzüliamosüa/dzüliamosüro · Genna-thini/mani · Pfope Zhi · Taboo/chüno · Dharma

1 Introduction Religious pluralism celebrates the diversity of religions. Plural societies are based upon acceptance of the equality of all faiths and such societies ignore sectarian claims and arguments. It is important to note that religious pluralism does not only entail accepting the existence of multiple religions but also acknowledges that each religion has something good to offer.

H. F. Ariina (B) Department of Philosophy, Lakshmibai College, University of Delhi, New Delhi, India e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 B. Puri and A. Kumar (eds.), Re-thinking Religious Pluralism, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-9540-0_14

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Inter-religious dialogue attempts to promote respect for religious others. However, it is noteworthy that tribal worldviews are conspicuously absent from contemporary versions of such dialogue. This essay attempts to address this lacuna by bringing out an indigenous tribal perspective on religious pluralism. The essay attempts to bring out the phenomenon and transcendental aspects of the tribal worldview found in “oral knowledge” which otherwise is losing its relevancy in the contemporary discourse. As many tribals were either converts or accepted Christianity, Buddhism, Hinduism, Judaism and Islam as their religion, the term “indigenous” becomes relevant as these new faiths/beliefs lead individual tribals to form a disjunctive relation to the religious beliefs and practices of their own forefathers. The acceptance of the new religious beliefs and way of life brings changes in the social relations and other cultural practices of converts in terms of food, clothing, cultural habits, social outlook, etc. It might be appropriate to construe the forefather’s traditions, ideas, beliefs and practices as indigenous. The “tribal response” is an attempt to build a discourse or dialogue with the established religions which had at some point of time caused “epistemic violence” in appropriating tribals as converts. Some of the immediate questions that require our attention comprise: how do tribes recommend that social relationships embody the ideas of equanimity, harmony, peace and well-being? (These values/virtues are also important to more established religions.) What are the possibilities for engaging the tribal religious view in relation to religious pluralism? Can the tribal worldview contribute to the discourse of religious pluralism which is important to the contemporary discourse on religion? Can the symbiotic relations between humans, nature and God in the tribal worldview enhance the understanding of contemporary religious pluralism? These concerns will be critically evaluated in the essay. It may be noted that the contemporary discourse on religious pluralism is otherwise a little removed from a holistic discourse with the tribal’s worldview. The analysis in this essay will be based on tribal religious view with some references to Christianity.

2 Indigenous People Broadly, the term “indigenous” refers to original settlers of the land, whose original land and resources are occupied by the coloniser—“Natives,” “first nations” (Canada and America,) “Aboriginals” (Australia and New Zealand,) “Adivasi” or tribal in India. When we situate the indigenous communities in India, reference to people includes the Adivasi and tribal communities. In India’s North-east community the religious beliefs and practices are overwhelmed in one way or the other by the other major dominant religions of the world. The space for tribal life world seems to be limited. In this context, the tribals can be termed “indigenous” as almost every form of their social institutions, beliefs and practices are overwhelmed both by the material and immaterial things either given to them or brought unto themselves from outside of their society. The values, beliefs and practices which were

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necessarily important in defining the tribal life are inversely related to the mainstream faith/religions (Christianity, Hinduism, Buddhism, Judaism and Muslim.) It becomes important to necessitate a harmonious co-existence between the tribals and other mainstream religions without annihilating the existence of the lesser known cultures and its people. A bird’s eye view into the world indigenous population read: the United Nations estimates that there are over 370 million indigenous people living in over 70 countries worldwide (world population 7 billion.) This would equate to just fewer than 6% of the total world population. This includes at least 5000 distinct peoples in over 72 countries. And in India Adivasi is used as the collective term for the indigenous peoples in mainland South Asia. Adivasis/tribals makes up 8.6% of India’s population, or 104 million people, according to the 2011 census.1 The indigenous populations are shrinking their space. Indigenous ideas, cultures, practices and beliefs as traditional forms of learning are gradually being moved from “open field” and “participatory form” to “classroom learning.” The traditional forms of knowledge such as know-how, skills and practices are developed through lived experiences of the community. These forms of knowledge are passed down from forefathers to their children. Knowledge is embedded in “oral tradition” of the tribal community, and the community cherishes and practices indigenous knowledge systems for thousands of years and attempts to pass down these systems to the future generations. Moving to the tribal communities of the North-Eastern parts of India which are the concern of this essay‚ it should be noted that‚ the idea of “good” plays a crucial role in the life world of these communities. The “good” as such is a collective notion—good for the whole community in relation with God and nature. The knowledge which was considered as good shaped the worldview in understanding the cosmos and moral beliefs of these tribes. The indigenous knowledge of the tribal folk in the fields of agriculture, medicine and the natural world was specified by the people’s sense of place and their holistic conceptualization of man-nature-god relationship. The tribals know their place in this world, their role, duties, and values. They do know that life is short and transient and that they need to live life to the full. They know the change of time and season and know how to differentiate the good, right and true from the bad, wrong and false. The agricultural crops are seasonally harvested and stored in a barn (Obe) for the rest of the year. Their skill in agricultural farming extends to different areas of cultivation. The traditional knowledge in medicine ensures that each member of the community is kept in good health. The well-being of each member is inversely related to the well-being of the entire community. What then is tribal religion? Do the tribals believe in God?

1 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2011_Census_of_India,

accessed on 21/03/2018.

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3 Nuances of Tribal Religions It is generally believed that religiosity in man/woman exists because a person feels incomplete in oneself. For the mortal being, clothed with various forms of predicaments and limitations, there can be no easy escape from the existential crisis that surrounds us—no poetic verse or rhetorical speech will suffice to satisfy the human beings ultimate quest for the “Real.” To extend the discussion a little further, the metaphysical notions of “original sin,” “samsara,” “birth and re-birth,” and “reincarnation” at times create difficulties in one’s pursuit of good life. Such forms of human contingencies are the starting point for a person being religious and accepting a supernatural “Being” as the end/goal of religion. Most of the major religions explain the existence of God as a necessity to rely on greater power due to fragile human nature (See Hick, 1985; 1988.) John Hick describes humanity "as a naturally religious animal, displaying an innate tendency to experience the environment as been religiously as well as naturally significant and feel required to live in it as such” (Hick 1990, 112.) The desire to have answers becomes a philosophical quest. The theistic argument provides different kinds of proofs for God’s existence— cosmological arguments, a priori argument or the ontological arguments, teleological arguments, moral arguments, arguments from religious experience, etc. Each of these arguments attempts to construe God as the “Supreme Creator” and sustainer of all things. Very roughly, these are attempts to move from the concept of God to the necessary instantiation of that concept or from the suggestion that perfection entails existence and that therefore the perfect “Being” (God) exists (Messer 1993, 1.) Such arguments often rely on religious scriptures and reasons. In the secular outlook, many anthropologists and sociologists took up the study of tribal people. They viewed the tribal beliefs and practices from various perspectives. Such perspectives may not necessarily represent the indigenous way of understanding things in life. For example, Evan Pritchard (an anthropologist) classified primitive religion into two categories— psychological and sociological, Bronislaw Malinowski (who studied magic, science and religion of the tribes of Trobian Island) and R.K Merton classified primitive religion into manifest and latent functions (Mitchell 1968, 117). From another angle we can also have the study of tribal religion based on evolutionism (nineteenth century— Spencer) and functionalism (twentieth century—Emilie Durkheim), intellectualism (Spencer—Mana and E.B. Taylor—Animism) and emotionalist (Mitchell 1968, 7.) On the one hand, these analyses are important in the study of indigenous communities as they provide some material giving a glimpse of the past to tribes in assessing their own complex society. On the other hand, tribal religion and their “beliefs” are reduced to ambiguity and obscurantism. Their views are taken to be unscientific, superstitious, lacking coherency and rationalism. The tribal religions and their belief system have something more to present than what was written about them by the “others.” Such writers have used different methods of comprehending the indigenous community from functionalism, primitivism, animism, etc. each view claiming to be more authentic than the other.

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In contrast, the tribal worldview is embedded in wholesomeness. There is a nonexistence of divides setting the components into binaries. Rather there exists a deep symbiotic relation between man-nature-god. It is said that the Makrü Hrü2 (Makhelian race) represents the Tiger (Okhe,) God (Ora) and Human (Omei.) There are legends that speak of them as three children born from the same mother called Dzüliamosüa (crystal clear water/pure water). In other words, Dzüliamosüa gave birth to three different species. The relationships between these three are of mutual co-existence and respect for each other. This acceptance gives space to each species to dwell in their respective places. This legend represents a harmonious relationship between the three species. Similar views are found in the Ao Naga tribe. Sujata Miri and Karilemla in their book Ao Naga Worldview: A Dialogue speak of human beings, animals and trees. “In olden days, men and animals lived together, there was inter-marriage with tigers, snakes and birds” (Miri and Karilemla 2015, 78.) Human beings have a relation with nature and God. Generally the tribal prayers are always addressed to the supreme God. In a sense they believe that an all powerful Being surrounds the members of the tribe as they pray to God. For example, in the Mao Naga, the elders’ utterance on the divine is directed to the “Supreme Being”— “Pray to the God of gods. It is the word of the elders. It is the story of the elders… Pray to the Mother and Father God” (Ashukho 2005, 7.) The prayers are addressed to the “God of gods,” which implies that there could be many gods but what they worship is the Supreme God. Again in the early morning, when one wakes from sleep the utterance is of prayer: Pray to the God of gods, the blue sky my father, the flat earth my mother, “Ramei ratho, Rachü madi Apfo-e, Ojü mashü Apfü-e” (Ibid.) The elders have a very clear idea in their mind to which “Spirit,” “Real,” “Truth” or “God” they worship and pray. Their prayer to the “Spirit” is of the good “Spirit” and their disposition is orientated to that “Spirit.” Their religion is an ancient religion but‚ should not for that reason‚ be considered as meaningless. Ancient vedic sages also prayed: Om Asato Maa Sad-Gamaya—Lead me from unreality towards reality; Tamaso Maa Jyotir-Gamaya—Lead me from Darkness/Ignorance towards Light/Spiritual Knowledge; Mrtyor-Maa Amrtam Gamaya—Lead me from Death towards Immortality; Om Shaantih Shaantih Shaantih—May there be peace, peace, peace.3

The elements of prayer are for the “Truth” and the “Real.” This discussion largely pertains to the characteristics of indigenous religion of the Makrü Hrü. However, many characteristic beliefs of this religion can (and do) overlap with the religions 2 Makrü

Hrü refers to the Naga people who trace their migration from the place called Makhel (Makrüfü). The oral narration speaks of a period of Makhelian race that once lived in abundance and thrived in prosperity. In the early period of their settlement, Makhel as a place would imply the land that stretch from the NH 2 to Tobufü Village, approximately 5 kilo meters in distance. Makhel is a historic place for the Nagas since the grand dispersal took place from Makhel. And this oral tradition is substantiated by the existing Wild Pear Tree (Chütebu Kajü), Charagho, Stones, monoliths, etc. 3 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pavamana_Mantra, accessed on 21/03/2018.

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of other indigenous communities in the North East of India. Some of the general characteristics of tribal religion of Makrü Hrü are as mentioned below.4 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12.

God the supreme-Being is worshipped in Spirit. There is no description of shape, size and image of a God. There are no specific places of worship. God is worshipped at all places and God is everywhere. King/elders invoke God’s blessings in public gatherings. Women’s role is central to the fulfilment of performing rituals. Life on this earth is equally important as life is after death. The Makrü Hrü/ Mao Naga believe in seven stages of death.5 There is no religious symbol. There is no founder. There is no centralised official religious priest. In good times and bad times God is always worshipped.

It should be noted that the belief in the God is not the end/goal of the Mao Naga religion. They translate that “Ontological Being” into their social relations—community spirit of brotherhood, spirituality of labour, common fellowship, feast of merit, etc. For example, inculcating the spirit of brotherhood, when someone has died in the village, the entire villagers are obliged to refrain from normal work/everyday life and are required to visit the house of the dead person and extend any kind of help they can. If any member of the community chooses not to go, he/she would face public embarrassment later. An omission of social obligation in the tribe brings about not only personal shame but also guilt and condemnation, and the fulfilment of the same in contrast‚ brings public appreciation and personal spiritual satisfaction. In all their activities, there is a sense of rhythm which promotes holism to their wellbeing. Beneath the religious life and attitude, there is a deep sense of eco-spirituality prevailing among the indigenous people (Neli 2012, 32.)

4 Eco-Spirituality and Sustainability Ecological sensitivity has been the hallmark of tribal spirituality (Ibid, 33.) As there is a notion of mutual co-existence between man-nature-God (spirit) a violation of any part of this organism causes imbalances in ecology. A respect for each space holds the key to growth and development. On such a view just because, human beings have hands and possess a higher faculty of reasoning‚ does not permit them 4 Most

the reference cases with regard to the exposition of the essay are considered from the Mao Naga perspective. However, the ideas discussed in the essay is not exclusive of a tribe but of tribal from the India’s Northeast. 5 Mao Nagas believe in seven stages of death. The physical death is the first stage and then the soul continues to die till the last stage. In a way, they believe in some form of transmigration of the soul. The idea of life after death also varies depending on the kind of the story that the narrator intend to convey its meaning to the member.

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to destroy nature. In the tribal conception the relationship between God man and nature involves a process of interaction and interdependence between man, nature and spirit. Such a conception is reflected in the tribal way of life and culture. There is an emphasis on fulfilling the genuine needs of each individual and sustainability of economic resources. Unlike the anthropocentric view, the indigenous spirituality removes any form of centrality in their relationships. Lynn White remarked “What people do about their ecology depends on what they think about themselves in relation to things around them … Human ecology is deeply conditioned by beliefs about our nature and destiny– that is, by religion” (White 1974, 24.) It is important to note that there is no notion of hierarchy in the tri-logical relations between man nature and God in the tribal worldview. It is believed that they live in mutual co-existence each occupying the designated space. A sense of reverence is attributed according to the necessity of time and requirements. The Creator (God) the spirit consists of both benevolent spirit and malevolent spirit. The malevolent spirit harms human beings if the abode of the spirits is disturbed. The doer can face the wrath of the malevolent spirit in situations where human beings intrude into the space of the spirit. In order to avoid unnecessary confrontation with any such entity, man seeks permission to carry out any task that could lead to such an intrusion. This is manifested for instance, in the case of cutting a gigantic tree for the purpose of carving out the village gate(s) or pulling down stones to host a feast of merit (Zhoso mozü) for the spirit may also dwell in such stones. It is believed in this worldview that the desire to own the object does not legitimise one’s claim but one needs to have a proper disposition at the time of making a claim on the object. When an individual wants to make a claim to‚ for instance‚ cut a tree he/she would take an account of the entire day’s activities in order to know whether any objections may arise from the spirit who dwells in the object. In this context the tribals would also make an analysis of the dreams of people (with the guidance of the elders that the will of the spirits is known) who went for the search and marked the object such as stone for monolith, gigantic tree for village gate (Koro chükhu,) houses, pounding wood (Opa,) bed (Ozü,) etc. This last point can be understood if we take the more detailed example of the felling of large trees to shaped out the village gate(s) in the Mao Naga communities (includes Tenymei tribes,) Let us assume here that around 8–10 youths would search for the desired tree. It was recommended that the tree should not be hollowed, screwed by caterpillars, straight and should have big size to cover the village entrance road. It should be noted that it could take days to search for the suitable tree. In accordance with the religious beliefs of the Mao Naga community once the tree is identified, a little portion of tree’s bark is cut with a knife. The youths who have cut it then utter “let God be worshipped, both of us will be companion of each other to the end.” On that night the concerned boys sleep and then‚ after they wake up the next day‚ their dreams are interpreted. If these dreams prove to be unfavourable, the boys would opt for another tree (Saleo 2008, 89.) In another instance, respect for a tiger is demonstrated in a situation of encountering a tiger in the forest. The forefathers revered and respected Tiger (Okhe) because according to the mythical creation story in the Mao Naga the Tiger (Okhe) is the eldest, God (Ora) is the middle and Man (Omei) is the youngest. So the forefathers of the Mao

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Naga revered the Tiger (Okhe) and honoured the Tiger. It is told that even if a man meets a Tiger (Okhe) in the forest the man utters “I revere you, if female you are my mother, if male you are my father, give me way.”6 It is with a deep sense of wholeness that the Mao Naga exercise their wisdom and knowledge to nurture the interest of the community—people, trees, animals and so on. There is a commitment to the sustenance of eco-spirituality of the people who find meanings and fulfilment in their relationships with the entire environment. Unfortunately, such deep eco-spirituality lacks resonance with the development activities and commercialisation of natural resources. Ecologically speaking the tri-logical relationships between Tiger-God-Man has been disturbed in the times in which the tribes now find themselves. One of the ways of assessing the imbalance caused in the relationship requires reassessment of the metaphysical notion of understanding the relationship between man and nature itself. In the tribal religious worldview in the North East of India, there is avoidance of anthropocentrism in conceptualising the human beings relationship with nature. Unlike in the Abrahamic faith the tribal religious view maintains a sense of equilibrium between nature and God. The sense of conserving and preserving nature is also part of the religious beliefs of the Mao Naga. However, the Mao Naga and other tribal religious worldviews are often left out in inter-faith dialogue between the established more mainstream religions.

5 Further Analysis Though the tribes in India’s North-east have widely accepted Christianity as a new found religion challenges keep surfacing in practical life. Dilemmas and confusions emerge in the times of traditional festivals as to who should pronounce prayers and blessings—ordained reverend or King? (supposedly a pagan/non-Christian.) With the arrival of the Christian Missionaries and also devouts of other religions, the tribal worldview was confronted with other worldviews. The worldviews (Weltanschauungen) met interacting face to face with each other. What this meant was that those who followed the traditions of their forefathers (Pfope Zhi, Haraka, Donyi-polo— each tribe has a name in their own dialect) or natural religion and those who followed a conventional/established more mainstream religion were suddenly confronted with each other. The discourse of forming binaries continues to the present—sacred and profane, religious and irreligious, Christians and pagans, holy and unholy, cultured and uncultured, etc. The new religions ushered a new beginning that which was not known to the tribals became knowable, that which is hidden is revealed, that which is feared is dispelled with trust, and that which is considered as unclean is cleansed and 6 This

was narrated by Sani Adani, an elderly person of 86 years of age. It is also believed that when a tiger is hunted, people do not prefer to eat tiger meat. This could be due to the carnivorous nature of the tiger which could also have eaten human flesh at some point of time. A genna would be observed when a tiger is hunted.

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purified for good. However, there are other aspects which took on in a different note in the understanding of the new found religion. To take an example, expulsion faced by the early Christians in their own village was not necessarily because of the “God” which is presented as a revealed “Truth” but because of the integrity of the community/culture. Living together in solidarity strengthens community spirit and relationships with one another. There are surely no claims that the forefathers showed complacency in proclaiming the perfection of their traditional beliefs and practices. The tribals showed an openness towards the “Truth” but such generosity to other ways of thinking did not extend to a compromise with their own cultural integrity. It is this cultural integrity and concern for sustaining traditional knowledge and beliefs that set the need for philosophical clarification about the tribal religious view. The sustainability of traditional knowledge and belief systems in the NorthEastern Indian tribal communities “is possible only because of the existence of strong taboos either to prohibit or allow individual or group members to think, act and adjudicate right and justice in the society” (Ariina 2019, 366) on their own. As tribals do not have systematised established institutions, the idea of taboos (chüno) plays an important role in shaping the moral beliefs of the society. In the Naga society, Linus Neli observed, The beliefs and values are compounded in what one ‘should not do’ (prohibition or taboos) and one ‘should do’ (mandatory authorization). It is the observance of the taboos ‘should do’or ‘not to do is forbidden’ and ‘should not do’ or ‘to do is forbidden’ that one can understand the Naga dharma. (Neli 2012, 31.)

Taboo is a Naga dharma. “Taboo evokes a sense of fear and reverence in the mind of the people. To the external observer of the Naga tribes, there exists very little tangible evidence to show that their ancestors/forefathers engaged in strict adherence to taboo” (Ariina 2019, 366–367). To outsiders it often seems that performing rituals and observing taboos are the evidence of animism without giving due respect to the value that such observances hold for the community. With the non-observance of tribal religious beliefs and practices by the new converts, a sense of negligence and an indifferent attitude were shown in following the tradition. It was natural enough then that the converted tribals should have experienced some disconnectedness between their new found faith and the traditional belief systems and practices of which they were a part. Note for example, that traditional folksongs, folklores, musical instruments, cultural songs, dance, cultivation, the art of brewing rice beer (Zhechu), weaving, knitting baskets, rice barn and so on are fading from the collective practices of the life of the tribal communities who have converted to Christianity. Engagements with these activities are rather considered as unbecoming of a Christian. Therefore, negligence in traditional practices over the period of years has served to distance such converts from their traditional knowledge and beliefs. It might seem important to note here that a God who possesses the quality of goodness and love will not want the culture into which one is born to be tarnished and discarded. Living with the traditional beliefs and practices can co-exist with

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the new faith after conversion. This can be the case even though the converts might think that the new/mainstream religion offers a better explanation on complex ideas such as salvation, sin and life after death, existence of God, angels, soul, heaven and hell. These complex set of ideas are embedded in the doctrines and teachings of established religions and appeals to human reason. The tribal beliefs and practices may seem obsolete and unverified with the limitedness of the data available to them. Perhaps, this explains why the missionaries were able to profess their beliefs to the tribal people. This also explains why the new converts were able to rely on the whole truth of their new religion. What breaks the traditional rhythmic lifestyle is not necessarily the acceptance of the new religion but the way the tribal converts themselves have left their own cultural practices, beliefs and experienced a feeling of disgust for the older traditional way of life of their community. The negation of the “self” in being with old beliefs and practices but clothed with new forms of life brings a virtual line of divide within the community members. For this reason, early converts faced segregation from their own village in terms of expulsion. They often formed a Christian colony in the peripheral area of the village or ventured out to form a new settlement. There were objections from the traditional community when the converts started practicing Christianity in the villages (Kohusii 2017, 457). This happened on account of the fact that the early converts were breaking traditional beliefs and practices of their forefathers and this was vehemently resisted by the other members of the community. The ruptures in the social fabric of the community were multi-layered affecting almost every aspect of community life. The Indigenous religious beliefs were questioned; genna7 and taboos were rendered futile, imbibing the community spirit of solidarity (as seen in the feast of merits) was no longer found appropriate. And at the same time the converts followed a new system of organising themselves in the spirit of Christianity. Instead of genna, Sunday was observed as a day of prayer and rest, drinking of rice beer—Zhechu was prohibited among the new converts, Christian songs were introduced substituting traditional folksongs and folklores and so on. Gradually the sanctity of traditional beliefs and practices were vanishing as the new religion began to foster its footprints into the tribal community. Most tribes in India’s North-east are Christians and they follow a religious system different from the traditional practices of the tribes. The acceptance of Christianity as their religion is now undeniable as they had been with the faith for more than a 7 Genna

is a term used by the Anthropologist in India’s Northeast to imply social and religious ordinances based on sanctions. The restrictions from physical work depend on the type of gennas. Some gennas are observed by the whole village for prayers and supplication to God while some gennas are confined to clan and family (birth of a child.) Some genna are observed depending on natural calamity, for example when the branch of Wild Pear Tree (Chütebu Kajü) is felt by storm or by itself genna is observed by the whole of Makhelian race. The village observed genna (mani) even if they received information after weeks. The general gennas comes into effect with the pronouncement of the village king. The term gennas is widely implied as prohibition from works in various tribals cultural practices in India’s Northeast – tribes of Nagas, Khasi, Abors, Missing, Mishmis etc., See, T.C. Hudson, “Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute,” Vol. xxxvi (1906,) Major P.R.T. Gurdon, “The Khasi,” (1907,) T.C Hudson, “The Naga Tribes of Manipur,” (1911) and J.H. Hutton, “The Angami Nagas,” (1921.).

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century. Different tribes have integrated themselves in various ways and recognised Christianity as their own faith. Samuel Kapani observes, “It is true, as many tribals in North-east India would claim that Christianity came to the rescue of a folk repressed by the slavish idea of Spirit-infested tradition” (Kapani 2012, 49.) Before Christianity, people worshipped God but they did not know whom they worshipped—the nature, shape and size of God are not known to them and yet people always utter “God be worshipped.” The coming of the new religion was seen as a revelation of the salvation purpose for the souls. A sense of disowning one’s own cultural beliefs and practices for the sake of saving souls took precedence over their forefathers’ traditions. Therefore, people holding on to two worldviews continue to distraught those Christians who neglect the traditional beliefs and practices and uphold Christianity as the only way of their life. The argument can be analysed in two ways. On the one hand, there are both scholars and converts from the tribes who consider that Christianity has eradicated many social evils practices and beliefs, and brought a new life to the community. They hold that the new religion promotes better living and strengthens their moral life. For example, it is argued that “Head” hunting (Pidu Piva) practices that were considered abominable were gradually eradicated from the Naga society due to the spread of Christianity. On such a view the tribals have been transformed by the divine spirit of love and compassion for one another post the arrival of Christianity. On the other hand, the converts also agree that Christianity brought about many restrictions that prevent the members from taking part in traditional practices. Generally speaking tribal cultural practices and traditional beliefs were considered inappropriate on becoming Christian. Christian puritanism discourages Christian members from participating in traditional festivals, feast of merits, observance of genna (thini/mani) and taboo (chüno), taking rice beer (Zhechu) etc. which otherwise were part of their own indigenous religio-cultural practices. For example, gennathini/mani has a deep meaning for the community. A genna called Phehrü mani is a day of prayer to God. A day set apart for the sanctification and purification of body and spirit. On this day, in the early morning all men folk have to go to a particular pond; take bath, wash their implements and tools (gun, spear, knife, spade, etc.,) a mark of having been cleansed from evils, sickness and diseases. Thereafter, one of the important rituals for the year is performed called Osa kopfü.8 The water taken from the springs is sprinkled on the sick at home and on those elders who could not make it to the pond. This also marks spiritual renewal for community members to lead a virtuous life (Nepuni 2010, 160.) For the converted tribals there is now the dilemma of permissible and non-permissible as there are church rules and doctrines that limit the display of cultural practices in the church. For example, people who drink rice beer (Zhechu) are not allowed to enter inside the church. In fact the names 8 Osa

kopfü is a ritual which is held after the bathing ritual at the pond. The ritual activities are secret and no members taking part in the bathing rituals would also know who would participate in Osa kopfü. Usually two or four young men of 17–20 years of age; unmarried, chaste, without having bad dreams of the night, bearing good names etc. are chosen to do the rituals. When personal questions are asked by elders before the ritual, the young men ought not to lie. The ritual aims to have a glimpse for the year events through the reading of the signs performed in that ritual.

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of offenders were often deleted from the primary membership of the church. For the farmers, rice beer (Zhechu) made from paddy rice is a part of their food. Rice beer has very less component of yeast, and every household brews rice beer (Zhechu) for food and drink. And what could they drink otherwise? In another instance, elders would carry a spear in their hand, a common practice as they left their house to visit relatives, friends, etc. But the church banned the practice and restricted those with spears in hand from entering the church. Folk songs and folklores are prohibited in the Church as they are not oriented to church doctrines. At this point it is important to suggest that there should be a dialogue in reliving the tribal beliefs and practices along with the new religion tribals may be converted into. The problem arises because those who profess a new religion may not return to their ancestors’ way of life as they may have reasons to remain in that new faith. However, the traditional beliefs and practices also must be assured of their own space. As religious pluralism encourages open conversation with other beliefs the discourse should also extend to the indigenous community. Both inter-religious dialogue between religions and intra-religious dialogue between converts and the religion of their ancestors are equally important for peace and understanding in the society. Contemporary discourse of religious pluralism has not accorded any theoretical space to tribal religious-cultural beliefs and practices. One of the approaches for the tribals to be assured of their space in the accepted religion(s) is to engage in the “intra-faith-cultural” dialogue between their indigenous faiths and the newly found faith to which many have been converted. Religious pluralism fundamentally means that all religions are accorded equality and respect. Religious dialogue may not bring the world religions into a single religion or reorient one’s faith to monotheism. Each time converts are brought into touch with tribal life, beliefs and values they find such beliefs and values to be fundamental to human life. Of course questions can be raised as to whether tribal religious beliefs are Christianised because of the conversion of members to Christianity. The young converted tribals have often been curious about how their forefathers had lived. If they have wondered at all, I think a way for dialogue has begun in itself. Such an “intra-faith-cultural” dialogue is imperative if converted tribals are to remain close to the traditional practices that remain relevant to the contemporary way of life of the tribes.

6 Conclusion The “intra-faith-cultural” conversations in the case of the tribals attempt to promote respect for the indigenous religions of the India’s North-east in the converted tribals. In a sense such a dialogue is essential if the tribals are to be in harmony with their own tradition as with other members of their community who have not been converted to other religions. The significance of both‚ what I call intra-faith dialogue as well

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as inter-faith dialogue‚ is imperative for understanding different religions and for their co-existence in peace and harmony. There are different views of interpreting the idea of the “Real,” the “Truth” or the “Absolute” called by different names by different religions. Often conflict and misunderstanding emerge in the name of this metaphysical “Being” who is otherwise one and the same in the ultimate realisation. With the spread of globalisation there is an experience of interaction and meeting of different religions. At times religion has the capacity to create fear and deep seated prejudices. The pursuit of a dialogue can help in understanding the differences between religions and promote positive interaction of different religious traditions. John Hick remarked “The fact that there is a plurality or religious traditions, each with its own distinctive beliefs, spiritual practices, ethics outlook, art forms and cultural ethos, creates an obvious problem for those of us who see them, not simply as human phenomena, but as responses to the Divine” (Hick 1998, 365.) The indigenous perspective on religious pluralism is a response to locate space for “intrafaith-cultural” dialogue in the contemporary discourse on inter-religious conversation in plural societies.

References Ariina, H. F. (2019). Tribal philosophy: An Epistemological Understanding on Tribal Worldview. In M. C. Behera (Ed.), Shifting Perspectives in Tribal Studies. Singapore: Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. Ashukho, A. (2005). Mao Chüthuni Celebration. Nagaland: Dimpur. Hagopian, F. (Ed.) (2009) Religious Pluralism, Democracy and the Catholic Chruch in Latin America. Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press. Hick, H. J. (1985). Problems of Religious Pluralism. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Hick, J. (1988). Religious Pluralism and Salvation. Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian Philosophers, 5(4), Article 2, 365–377. Available at: https://place.asburyseminary. edu/faithandphilosophy/vol5/iss4/2. Hick, H. J. (1990). Philosophy of Religion (4th Ed.). New Jersey: Prentice Hall. Kapani, S. (2012). The Legacy of Ratho Tradition: An Appraisal in Mao Naga Perspective. In A. Kaisii & H. F. Ariina (Eds.) Tribal Philosophy and Culture: Mao Naga of Northeast. New Delhi: Mittal Publication. Kymlicka, W. (2002). Contemporary Political Philosophy. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. Kohusii, S. M. (2017). Christianity and Divisions: the Case of Mao Nagas in Manipur. Imperial Journal of Interdisciplinary Research (UIR) 3(8), 2017. https://www.onlinejournal.in. Messer, R. (1993). Does God’s Existence Need Proof? Oxford: Clarendon Press. Miri, S. (2006). Stories and Legends of the Liangmai Nagas. New Delhi: National Book Trust, India. Miri, S., & Karilemla. (2015). Ao Naga World-view: A Dialogue. New Delhi: DK Print World. Mitchell, G. D. (Ed.) (1968). A New Dictionary of Sociology. London: Routledge Publication. Neli, L. (2012). Nuances on Naga Spirituality. In A. Kaisii & H. F. Ariina (Eds.) Tribal Philosophy and Culture: Mao Naga of Northeast. New Delhi: Mittal Publication. Nepuni, W. (2010). Socio-cultural History of the Shüpfomei Naga Tribe: A Historical Study of Ememei, Lepaona, Chüluve and Paomata Generally known as Mao-Poumai Naga Tribe. New Delhi: Mittal Publication. Rao, C. N. S. (2004). Sociology: Primary Principle. New Delhi: S. Chand & Company Ltd.

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Saleo, N. (2008). Imemei Kohrü Ko (Mao Naga Culture). Pfosemei: Pfosena Union Publication. Sen, A. (2005). The Argumentative Indian. New Delhi: Penguin Books. Sharma, C. D. (2000). A Critical Survey of Indian Philosophy. New Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Publishers Private Limited. White, L. Jr. (1974). The Historical Roots of our Ecologic Crisis. In David and Eileen Spring (ed.) Ecology and Religion in History. New York: Harper and Row. Wittgenstein, L. (1953). Philosophical Investigations (trans: Anscombe, G.E.M). Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Religion and Religions: Making Space for Modesty and Music Bindu Puri

Abstract Re-thinking the plurality of religions is meaningful only to the extent that one is fastidious and self-conscious in recognizing it to be unfinished, a project in the making, as it were. It is here that one might find Liberalism to be wanting given that it offers, what it considers, the best possible response to religious plurality. This Chapter makes a case for modesty in ideas and argues for a conceptual pluralism in philosophical theory. In this context the chapter suggests that there is need to think about the plurality of religions from outside the framework of the terms set by European and Anglo American notions of ‘religion’. Keywords Music · Religion as belief Sacred land · Sacred word

· Religion as identity · Maîtri/Friendship ·

How does one conclude a book, which attempts to conduct an exercise that is meaningful only to the extent that it is unfinished? One way to conclude might be to simply put together the insights that have emerged in the process. These insights might then serve to guide any further progress along the essentially unfinished process of such re-thinking. A word now about the idea that re-thinking the plurality of religions is meaningful only to the extent that one is fastidious and self-conscious in recognizing it to be unfinished, a project in the making, as it were. Given that the experience of living with diverse religions has evoked hostility, resentment, discord, and conflict down the centuries it might seem apparent that human beings have not yet been able to understand religion, and even more so, the plurality of religions; or have yet been able to develop the appropriate response to significant (often hostile) religious others. One essential aspect (at least) of what might be considered an appropriate response to the plurality of religions seems to have become clear from the experience of religious conflicts over the last many centuries. This insight points to the idea that, at the very least, an appropriate response to the plurality of religions must include modesty in holding on to one’s own truth claims about religion. Taking a philosophical clue from this, one might suggest, that another aspect might then be a more fundamental B. Puri (B) Centre for Philosophy, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 B. Puri and A. Kumar (eds.), Re-thinking Religious Pluralism, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-9540-0_15

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modesty, that is a modesty in ideas. Any/all theoretical positions that make claims to have arrived at the appropriate response to religious pluralism should be held with some hesitancy/modesty. It is here that one might find liberal theory and practice to be wanting. Liberalism, albeit its undeniable variety, offers what it considers an appropriate, and indeed the best possible, response to religious diversity. This response (despite the varied versions of liberalism) is singular in the sense that (despite their differences) all liberals proceed from a position of skepticism about the possibility of truth in general and religious truth in particular. Given such a unifying skepticism about religion, liberal theory and practice, recommends a private/public divide and relegates religion to the private aspects of man’s life suggesting little more than tolerance in the public sphere. This means that liberal democratic states (without hesitancy) keep religio-moral arguments away from matters pertaining to the public sphere, which is decidedly secular qua, equidistant from any/all religious considerations. It may be significant to note that the terms ‘liberal’ and ‘democracy’ have been basically conflated together in our times and liberal democracies are the norm across the world. It is interesting that as a corollary to this development the liberal preference for political and public minimalism rules the day in contemporary democratic states. While traditional political theory about democracy tended to be ‘maximizing’ emphasizing ‘internal checks’, in liberal democratic theory, freedom completely replaces traditional categories such as ‘virtue’ and the ‘good life’. As Dahl (1956) points out the reference to internal checks has been progressively replaced by external or procedural checks to restrain oppressive practices. As can be seen such checks are themselves the result of contractarian arrangements and hence are dependent on changing individual preferences (Dahl 1956). This shift to political minimalism is evidenced the world over and can be seen in America since the writings of James Madison. Minimalist liberal theory and practice do not consider religious reasons to be relevant to matters in the shared public sphere inhabited by people belonging to all/no religions. It can be argued that Rawls is an exception as he might be seen to deviate a little from such a liberal position in so far as he comes up with the idea of the overlapping consensus making conceptual room for religious reasons in support of a purely political non-comprehensive conception of justice. This notion does make some effort to make room for religious arguments in matters concerning justice in the public sphere but one needs to put this in perspective. On reflection, one might recall that Rawls recommends an epistemic abstinence about truth in matters that concern public reason. Such abstinence means that debates about issues in the public sphere, for instance, debates about justice, are not (on a Rawlsian view) about truth at all but only about reciprocity. In which case, religious arguments may not remain relevant (even though they may be permitted in a Rawlsian scheme), as these are arguments involving claims about truth—at least from the point of view of the devout. This last insight re-iterates Rakesh Chandra’s argument (in this book) that most liberal formulations of accommodative pluralism end up either transforming or trivializing the religious points of view. If there is to be some element of modesty at the level of theory we might need to go beyond minimalist liberal theory and practice even beyond it’s more accommodative Rawlsian version. There is some

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reason to suggest that at the very least one might need to make room for a conceptual pluralism in philosophical theory. Such pluralism would mean that arguments about justice for instance or about religious pluralism (that belong in the public space) ought to make some effort to draw insights from comprehensive non-liberal traditions (not illiberal/fundamentalist), non-European non-Anglo American traditions and even from traditions that are all things at once, i.e., non-European non-Anglo American and non-liberal (the obvious caveat is of course that such traditions must not be fundamentalist/illiberal). One argument in support of the above-mentioned conceptual openness/intellectual modesty may also be derived from the consideration that arriving at moral values that hold across religions and that serve to constitute shared normative considerations for guidelines in the public sphere involve the idea of universals. The process of arriving at moral universals that can be shared across religions and religious cultures, if it is not to be a self-defeating process, must be inclusive. How important it is to include ideas and arguments from the erstwhile marginalized religions and religious cultures into the process of arriving at the universals (for want of a better word) might become apparent if we consider that the human understanding of the transcendent reality in religion is conditioned by cultural particularity. It is from within such cultural particularity that the norm of universality emerges. Hence the truth of exclusive cultures is required to rethink universality of so-called universals and make universality itself less exclusive. It seems to be important to include the marginalized exclusive religions in the process of arriving at universals, which, it may be mentioned, always need to be held tentatively if they are to be properly universal at all. This exercise has been attempted in the last part of the book bringing insights from tribal religions to bear upon re-thinking, for instance, the idea of modesty as a relational modesty. Once again, I will like to refer to how the devotees in indigenous tribal religions in North East India find it easy to translate modesty into an easy acceptance of the religions of others. This relational modesty moves from the conceptual to the practical levels in delightful ways. It may be noted here, for example, that in the Khasi (the indigenous people belonging to the state of Meghalaya) those serving food or tea bend down very low so as not to disturb, or in any way obstruct, the conversation or even the vision of those engaged in a conversation. Modesty pervades both the ideational and behavioral aspects of tribal life in intimately inter-related ways. It might by now have become clearer why such a process of re-thinking religious pluralism must remain unfinished. Clearly, if such a re-thinking is to consistently retain conceptual pluralism it should always be open to fresh considerations and must, therefore, (by the nature of the case) remain essentially unfinished. This book has participated in just such an unfinished intellectual exercise. Consequently, the most that can be done in the conclusion is to bring out insights that have emerged in the essays, which might serve as guidelines, for the ongoing project of re-thinking religious pluralism. In this context, there are some insights that have emerged in the course of the essays put together in the book. The first relates to the subtitle of the book itself “moving beyond liberal tolerance”. One point that most essays seem to have emphasized (in different ways) is that liberal tolerance does not go far enough in dismantling hostility between religions. The essays in the book have explained why

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this should be so in different ways. One argument for why tolerance is not the last word on the subject comes from Gandhi. Gandhi seems to have suggested that there can be some moral difficulty with the idea of tolerance itself. Gandhi has emphasized that tolerance is not a moral emotion and that there can be some sense of patronage associated with tolerating the other. Note in this context Gandhi’s remarks made in connection with the plurality of religions: Equality of Religions. This is the new name we have given to the ashram observance which we know as ‘tolerance’. ‘Sahishnuta’ is a translation of the English word ‘Tolerance’. I did not like that word... Kakasaheb, too, did not like that word. He suggested ‘Respect for all religions’. I did not like that phrase either. Tolerance may imply a gratuitous assumption of the inferiority of other faiths to one’s own, and respect suggests a sense of patronizing, whereas ahimsa teaches us to have the same respect for the religious faiths of others as we accord to our own, thus admitting the imperfection of the latter. (Gandhi 1955, eCWMG, Vol. 50:78)

There is a strong suggestion here that the term ‘tolerance’ itself implies a gratuitous assumption of patronage. This can be brought out by recapturing the sense in which the one tolerating assumes a superior position to the one being tolerated. Francis Ariina’s essay in this book has brought out a more difficult aspect of the pejorative connotation that attaches itself to the notion of toleration, that toleration might actively work against the idea of the equality of all religions. The essay on tribal religions by Ariina re-iterates the idea that toleration involves mutuality. It involves two parties—the one tolerating and the one being tolerated. Ariina seems to suggest that for toleration to work at all there must be much more at work than mutuality. Tolerance actually demands not reciprocity but quiet acquiescence in assuming the inferior position on the part of the one who is being tolerated. Such a person/group must tolerate being inferior to the one who tolerates her/them. Ariina has argued against the idea of toleration by bringing in the idea that tribal religions were tolerated as savage and primitive and, the tolerant acquiescence of such criticism by practitioners of tribal religions, lead to the marginalization of such religions. Hence toleration (both for the one tolerating and the one being tolerated) might actually work against equality between religions. This argument serves to bring out the tension and opposition between the values of toleration and respect and thereby re-iterates the need for discussions on the plurality of religions to move beyond liberal tolerance. A related argument against the idea of tolerance seems to have come up from the thought that tolerance is not enough because it is simply not generous enough. The idea here is that human beings need to do more than to tolerate those whose religious beliefs might differ from their own religious/non-religious/atheistic world views. In this connection, my own essay in this book refers to the need to take Tagore’s ideas on the religion of man more seriously. Rabindranath Tagore has spoken in Religion of man of ‘the hall of songs’ as the appropriate image for inter-religious conversation. Using the metaphor of music he suggests harmony and maîtri/friendship as the appropriate response to otherness. A related idea here is of sharing, which suggests co-operation and easy acceptance of each other rather than mere toleration. The contrast between toleration and harmony might serve to underscore the distance that the discourse on plurality needs to traverse.

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Moving beyond the idea that we need to look for more than tolerance these essays also bring out a second important insight—the need to inculcate some awareness of the distinction between religion as identity and religion as belief—through rethinking the terms of the discourse on the plurality of religions. This consideration has emerged in totally unexpected ways in this book. One such surprising way might become clear if we consider that Sonia Sikka brings up the distinction in a fairly straightforward way in the opening chapter stating that in the case of religious conflicts it needs to be kept in mind that several issues at stake in interreligious conversations make “claims that cannot be understood in terms of—categorical distinctions between the modern western concepts of religion, culture and ethnicity” (Sikka p. 16 in this volume). She clarifies that by “religion as identity” she is indicating “the shared self-conception that results from identification with a group, where the name of a given religious identity –Muslim, Hindu, Christian-applies to one group in contradistinction to others” (p. 11). She has argued that the “common and widespread understanding of the category of religion in western nations” (p. 14) fails to “register the profound continuities between religion and culture in the life’s of many immigrants to Western nations” (p. 14). Such a failure to understand the role of “symbols of group identity” (p. 15) is traced to the dominance of the western category of religion, which does not lend itself, or lends itself a little less (whatever this can mean) to such distinctions. Sikka argues that while religious identities need to be respected it is also be kept in mind that sometimes “the religious group has the same structure as an ethnic one” (p. 27) She argues that “…Jewish and Hindu identities are clear examples, but, in specific contexts, Catholic, Protestant and Muslim identities may also be “ethnic” in this sense.” (p. 27) Her point is that in the cases of religious conflict the western “legal and political frameworks” (p. 25) in “multiculturalist” societies are not able to adequately address such conflicts. This is because in some cases of conflict the contentions relate to identity rather than beliefs. Sikka argues that the discourse of the plurality of religion needs to reflect on the distinction between religion as identity and religion as belief . However, the essay makes us come to reflect on this distinction at two very different levels. On a first reading, we might become aware that the western legal and political framework is dominated by Western discourses about religion. Such discourse (based on the western understanding of what constitutes a religion) typically assumes a concept of it as primarily a system of belief, grounded on faith in the authority of certain texts designated as scripture. However, as Sikka reminds us, many conflicts around the world ostensibly organized around religious identities have little to do with belief. It is critical to realize that at another level we might question whether this line of argument makes too hasty a distinction between religion as a system of belief (on which western discourses are based) and other religions which are primarily about identity (on which conflicts in non-western religions are based).1

1 Sikka explains that by other religions she means to refer to religions where the religious community

has the same structure as an ethnic group (of which she says the Hindus and the Jews are the clearest examples).

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We could think in a completely different way—think from outside the framework of the terms—set by European and Anglo American notions of ‘religion’. We might then be lead to see that all religions (both those that inspire western discourses and non-western discourses) are about both belief and identity. It might then seem more important to reflect on the different ways in which identity and belief are inter-related in the life world of devotees. To do this in any meaningful way we need perhaps not only be sensitive to the way immigrants are attached to identity markers unable to distinguish between religion as belief and religion as identity but we need to do more. We need perhaps to let these other religions and their conceptual frameworks into mainstream philosophical debate in both the philosophy of religion and in the debate about the plurality of religions. We might realize that it is difficult to find the religions of belief which (on Sikka’s view) inspired western discourses in western nations. For it might turn out that, even if one looks really hard, one might not find any religion, which is predominantly about belief and not about identity. It can perhaps be argued that Christianity, for example, is a dominant religion in the west and yet Christianity is as much about identity as any other religion. One need only look here at the many crusades (across centuries) between the different Christian denominations. These were arguably about identity as much as about belief. The thing to take away from this is that there is an urgent conceptual need to let other religions into the mainstream discourse about the plurality of religions. Here, more than in any other area in philosophy, there is a greater tendency for Euro and Anglo American centricism to exit from the front and enter from the back door, as it were, and continue to influence the terms of the debate. There may then be some need to look beyond liberalism. As Rakesh Chandra has so well reminded us liberal philosophers make room for reasonable disagreement but they make no room for value plurality. A third insight that seems to serve as a pointer for future research is the relationship between conceptual pluralism (for which I have argued in the last few paragraphs) and an ethics of equality and solidarity. Many essays have argued against a monolithic centricism, which emphasizes a single truth. It is in this connection that Loudrunathan has argued, for instance, that to be genuinely pluralistic religions need to be so in their conceptual frameworks as much as in their practice. This also creates a role for philosophical theory to challenge ontological and cultural monism at an ideational plane. It is in such a context that Abhishek Kumar’s essay in this book argues, for instance, that monotheistic religions like Christianity and Islam make a distinction between a world that is eternal and untouched by the contingencies of the world of humans—a world that is the ‘home’ of Gods and on the other side the temporal/contingent all too human world. Polytheistic religions on the other hand make no such stringent division between the world of the Gods and the human world. Gods are regular visitors to this world in all their physical reality and temporal here and now. The point is that the ethics that is commensurate with polytheism is also commensurate with the secular perspective of human life. In this connection, the last part of this book has looked at tribal religions, which are polytheistic. Such religions it turns out have an ethics that makes it easy to accept difference. Polytheism in tribal religions also seems to have a close connection to the fact that these faiths are not textual religions—they are tied to the sacred land rather than to

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the sacred word. This last point is in harmony with their vision of man-nature-God as continuous with each other and with the consequent notion of nature as sacred. There are philosophical consequences to the ecological rootedness of tribal faiths. At a straightforward level, we see these being explored in contemporary environmental ethics. However, (as Sujata Miri has pointed out in her essay) ecological rootedness of tribal religions has made devout’s sensitive to the similar rootedness of other faiths and translated into an ethics of equality and easy acceptance of difference. Philosophical approaches to the plurality of religions need therefore to be more open to the local rather than tied (as they are) to the universal in religion. The essays in this book have brought up these insights in a variety of ways. The book leaves these as pointers, that can guide future conversations about the plurality of religions so that such conversations initiate conceptual pluralism of a sort that can be reflected in harmony between followers of different religions. It might be apt then to end this book with the words of Tagore: We are the music-makers, We are the dreamers of dreams. (Tagore 2012, 135) The difference between the notes as mere facts of sound and music as a truth of expression is immense. For music though it comprehends a limited number of notes yet represents the infinite. It is for man to produce the music of the spirit with all the notes that he has in his psychology and which, through inattention or perversity, can easily be translated into a frightful noise. (Tagore 2012, 137)

References Dahl, R. A. (1956). A preface to democratic theory. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Gandhi, M. K. (1955). Collected works of Mahatma Gandhi, electronic edition (eCWMG). Accessible online at https://gandhiserve.org/cwmg/cwmg.html. Note that between Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi CWMG 100 Volumes (Ahmedabad, Navajivan publishing, 1955) and electronic edition (eCWMG) there are disputed differences of content and different volumes and page numbers. Tagore, R. (2012). Religion of man. In S. K. Das (Ed.)The English Writings of Rabindranath Tagore, vol. 3 (pp. 83–189). New Delhi: Sahitya Akademi.