(Re-)Defining Racism: A Philosophical Analysis (African American Philosophy and the African Diaspora) 9783030272562, 9783030272579, 3030272567

Table of contents :
Acknowledgments
Contents
Chapter 1: Introduction: Summary of the Argument
1.1 Problematizing the Concept of Racism
1.1.1 Racism and the Concept of Racism
1.1.2 Competing Conceptions of Racism
1.1.3 A Methodological Intervention
1.2 Racism’s Janus-Faced Character: The Necessity/Contingency Divide
1.2.1 Three Theoretical Problems
1.2.2 Necessity and Contingency
1.2.3 Accidental and Essential Features
1.2.4 “Reverse Racism” and Language-Game Contestation
1.2.5 Racism as a Sociocultural Concept
1.3 An Antiracist Ethic: Racism from the Eyes of the Victim
1.3.1 The Primacy of A Priori Analysis
1.3.2 Valuing the Victim’s Perspective
1.4 A Normative-Pragmatic Pluralism
1.4.1 Trading in Ontology for Pragmatism
1.4.2 Rethinking the Categorial Plurality of Racism
1.4.3 Beyond Wittgenstein: From Descriptive to Prescriptive Grammar
1.5 Chapter Summaries
References
Part I: Racism Without Ontology
Chapter 2: The Problem of Definition: Toward a Conventionalist Framework
2.1 Introduction: On the Question “What Is Racism?”
2.1.1 The Philosophical Question
2.1.2 Metaphysical Analysis
2.2 Grammar and Philosophy: A Conventionalist Approach
2.2.1 Meaning, Use, Understanding
2.2.2 Explanation of Meaning
2.2.2.1 Grammatical Rule and Grammatical Proposition
2.2.2.2 What Grammatical Knowledge Is and How It Is Acquired
2.2.2.3 Explanation of Meaning and Explanation of Racism
2.2.2.4 The Significance of Explanation of Meaning for Philosophy?
2.2.3 Wittgenstein’s Normativism
2.2.3.1 Wittgenstein’s Normativism
2.2.3.2 Demarcating Semantic Rules
2.3 Conclusion: The Aim of This Book
References
Chapter 3: Re-defining “Definition”: An Argument for Conventionalism
3.1 Introduction
3.1.1 Scope of the Chapter
3.1.2 Terminology: “Proposition,” “Sentence,” “Rule-Formulation”
3.2 The Many Sides of Convention: Recasting Metaphysical Predicates as Facets of Convention
3.2.1 The Empirical Side of Convention
3.2.1.1 Contingency as the Mark of Culture
3.2.1.2 What We Affirm and What We Do with What We Affirm
3.2.1.3 The Arbitrariness of Grammar
3.2.2 The Non-Empirical Side of Convention
3.2.2.1 Necessity and Universality
3.2.2.2 Logical Priority
3.2.2.3 Justification and the Arbitrariness of Grammar
Grammatical Propositions as Reasons
Epistemic Justification
Pragmatic Justification
3.3 A Priori Analysis
3.3.1 Normative Descriptions of Grammar
3.3.2 Criticisms of Grammar
3.3.3 Grammatical Approaches
3.4 Empirical Analysis
3.4.1 In Defense of Empirical Approaches to Racism
3.4.2 Beyond Realism and Constructivism
3.4.3 Conventionalism as Naturalistically Plausible
3.5 Conclusion
References
Chapter 4: Re-defining “Meaning”: Defending Semantic Internalism over Externalism
4.1 Introduction
4.2 The Case for Externalism
4.2.1 Some Key Concepts
4.2.2 Putnam’s and Kripke’s Arguments
4.3 Resisting Externalism: An Internalist Account of Conceptual Change
4.3.1 Rival Intensions: Empirical Discoveries as Pragmatic Reasons
4.3.2 The Pirahã: A Living Counterexample
4.3.3 Are the Pirahã Wrong/Confused?
4.3.4 The Arbitrariness of Grammar
4.4 Are Definitions Descriptive in Addition to Being Normative?
4.4.1 Descriptive and Normative Uses of Sentences
4.4.2 A Measure that Measures Itself?
4.5 Conclusion
References
Part II: Theorizing Conceptual Disagreement
Chapter 5: Re-defining “Disagreement”: Rationality Without Final Solutions
5.1 Introduction: From Ontology to Linguistic Norms
5.2 Stage-Setting for a Theory of Disagreement
5.2.1 Normative and Prescriptive Disagreement
5.2.2 A Mere Difference in Word Use?
5.3 Metalinguistic Negotiation
5.3.1 Non-Descriptive Disagreement
5.3.2 Pragmatic Advocacy
5.3.3 The Need for a Stipulative Definition of “Racism”
5.4 Negotiation and Rationality
5.4.1 Blum and Glasgow’s Disagreement
5.4.2 Contested Rationality
5.4.3 No Final Solutions: On Problems-to-Cope-With
5.5 Conclusion
References
Chapter 6: Re-defining “Philosophical Analysis”: Not Descriptive Analysis, or Conservatism, but Pragmatic Revisionism
6.1 Introduction
6.2 Framing the Prescriptive Question
6.2.1 Descriptive and Normative Analysis
6.2.2 Unpacking Conservatism/Revisionism
6.2.3 Metaphysical and Pragmatic Considerations
6.3 Agnosticism as Default Position
6.3.1 Doxastic Inertia or Instability?
6.3.2 Instability and Pragmatic Considerations
6.4 Two Arguments for Revisionism
6.4.1 Conceptual Inflation Argument
6.4.2 Political Morality Argument
6.5 Conclusion
References
Part III: Toward a Prescriptive Theory of Racism
Chapter 7: Adequacy Conditions for a Prescriptive Theory of Racism: Toward an Oppression-Centered Account
7.1 Introduction
7.2 The Moral Condition
7.2.1 A Necessary Value: Advance Nonwhite Interests
7.2.1.1 The Mills-Shelby Objection: Theory Should Not Explain Racism’s Wrongness
7.2.1.2 Arthur’s Objection: Racism Is Not a Moral Flaw, but an Epistemic Flaw
7.2.2 Legitimate Need and Historical Usage: The Racial Oppression Approach
7.3 The Explanatory Condition
7.3.1 Racism as Sociocultural Phenomenon
7.3.2 Criteria and Vagueness
7.3.3 Racism as Open Texture and Unfolding Process
7.4 The Resolution Condition
7.5 Conclusion
References
Chapter 8: Racial Oppression and Grammatical Pluralism: A Critique of Jorge Garcia on Racist Belief
8.1 Introduction
8.2 Garcia’s Theory: Two Senses of “Racism”
8.2.1 Garcia’s Core Essentialism
8.2.2 Infection and Characteristic Racism
8.3 Paternalism and the Primary Sense
8.3.1 Two Pictures of Paternalism
8.3.2 Garcia’s Revisionist Proposal
8.4 Ideology and the Primary Sense
8.4.1 Ideology’s Role in the Racial Structure
8.4.2 Ideology, Social Function, and Intuition
8.4.3 Ideology and the Ideological Role of Virtue
8.4.4 Ideology and Political Morality
8.5 The Secondary Sense as Wrong Explanation
8.5.1 Blum’s Objection and Characteristic Racism
8.5.2 The Wrong Explanation
8.5.3 Moral Grounds for Condemning Intrinsically Wrongful Beliefs
8.6 Conclusion
References
Chapter 9: Coda
9.1 Going Forward from Here: On the Feasibility of Negotiation
9.2 Three Paradigms of Racial Oppression
9.3 Going Forward from Here: Implications and Future Research
References
Bibliography
Index

Citation preview

African American Philosophy and the African Diaspora

(RE-)DEFINING RACISM A Philosophical Analysis Alberto G. Urquidez

African American Philosophy and the African Diaspora Series Editors Jacoby Adeshei Carter Department of Philosophy Howard University Washington, DC, USA Leonard Harris Purdue University West Lafayette, IN, USA

The African American Philosophy and the African Diaspora Series publishes high quality work that considers philosophically the experiences of African descendant peoples in the United States and the Americas. Featuring sing-authored manuscripts and anthologies of original essays, this collection of books advance the philosophical understanding of the problems that black people have faced and continue to face in the Western Hemisphere. Building on the work of pioneering black intellectuals, the series explores the philosophical issues of race, ethnicity, identity, liberation, subjugation, political struggles, and socio-economic conditions as they pertain to black experiences throughout the Americas. More information about this series at http://www.palgrave.com/gp/series/14377

Alberto G. Urquidez

(Re-)Defining Racism A Philosophical Analysis

Alberto G. Urquidez Bowdoin College Brunswick, ME, USA

African American Philosophy and the African Diaspora ISBN 978-3-030-27256-2    ISBN 978-3-030-27257-9 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-27257-9 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the ­publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and ­institutional affiliations. Cover illustration: Alex L. Fradkin / Getty Images This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG. The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

para mis padres, Elena y Elias, por su amor, sacrifcio y todo lo que han hecho por mí

Acknowledgments

I would not have completed this project without the support of my family. My parents, Elena and Elias Urquidez, taught me more than I could ever express in words, including that I must go to college. Mamá, siempre llevaré tu amor y la memoria de mi padre en mi corazón. Les agradezco por todo. I am grateful for all the love and support of my family, both inside and outside the U.S. border. I cannot mention everyone by name, so I provide an incomplete list of family members I’d like to thank for their support and love throughout the years: Joel, Gavy, Sam, Martha, Milu, Licha, Lizzy, David, Lupe, Jaime, Lola, Pancho, Ángel, Stevie, Ricky, Meli, Olga, Junior, Yin, Javier, Nando, Pati, Carmen, Lucha, and my wonderful nephews, Ayden, Eli and Oziel. To every family member  listed here and every one not listed here, thank you for your support. My wife, Marielynn Herrera-Urquidez, has endured much and has sacrificed even more. You have been involved in every aspect of this project from day one, and you have been involved in so much more. You deserve more than this brief mention for your undeserved patience, extended love, and sincere belief in me and my work. I love you! I am honored and fortunate to have collaborated with excellent scholars throughout my academic career. Among them, I extend my thanks and gratitude to Jacoby Carter, Jorge Garcia, Clevis Headley, Rod Bertolet, Chris Yeomans, Daniel Smith, Daniel Kelly, Patrick Horn, Masahiro Yamada, Dorothy Stark, and Charles Mills. A special thanks is due to my dissertation advisor, mentor, and friend, Leonard Harris, for his critical support throughout the years, and for nurturing my ideas during my graduate years. vii

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Acknowledgments

I have learned and profited much from the friendship and philosophical acumen of my friends and colleagues. I mention here only a few: Rocky, Justin, Jacob, Chris, Loreley, Shawn, Morgan, Jaime, Bernard, Charlie, Orlando, Tony, and Mario. I am grateful to the entire team at Palgrave Macmillan and Springer for their support and patience with me, throughout the writing and production process. Finally, I could not have made it this far without the financial support and invaluable resources afforded me by the Academic Advancement Program (AAP) at UCLA and the McNair Scholars Program at Claremont Graduate University (during my undergraduate years), and the Ford Foundation Predoctoral Fellowship and the Dissertation Fellowship at Phillips Exeter Academy  at Purdue University (during my graduate years). This book is a substantial reworking and extension of my dissertation work. As a result, some of this material has benefited from the comments of audience members at various academic venues. Material from Chap. 6, “Re-defining ‘Philosophical Analysis’: Not Descriptive Analysis, or Conservatism, but Pragmatic Revisionism,” was presented at the North American Society for Social Philosophy (2017) and the Florida Philosophical Association (2017). Material from Chap. 8, “Racial Oppression and Grammatical Pluralism: A Critique of Jorge Garcia on Racist Belief,” was presented at the Society for the Advancement of American Philosophy (2015). Chapter 8 is a reworking and extension of my paper “Jorge Garcia and the Ordinary Use of ‘Racist Belief’” in Social Theory and Practice (2017). Chapter 5 incorporates some ideas from “What Accounts of ‘Racism’ Do” in Journal of Value Inquiry (2018). Chapter 6 is an edited version of “A Revisionist Theory of Racism: Rejecting the Presumption of Conservatism,” Journal of Social Philosophy (2020).

Contents

1 Introduction: Summary of the Argument  1 1.1 Problematizing the Concept of Racism  1 1.1.1 Racism and the Concept of Racism  1 1.1.2 Competing Conceptions of Racism  4 1.1.3 A Methodological Intervention  7 1.2 Racism’s Janus-Faced Character: The Necessity/ Contingency Divide  9 1.2.1 Three Theoretical Problems 10 1.2.2 Necessity and Contingency 11 1.2.3 Accidental and Essential Features 13 1.2.4 “Reverse Racism” and Language-Game Contestation 15 1.2.5 Racism as a Sociocultural Concept 16 1.3 An Antiracist Ethic: Racism from the Eyes of the Victim 18 1.3.1 The Primacy of A Priori Analysis 18 1.3.2 Valuing the Victim’s Perspective 19 1.4 A Normative-Pragmatic Pluralism 24 1.4.1 Trading in Ontology for Pragmatism 25 1.4.2 Rethinking the Categorial Plurality of Racism 28 1.4.3 Beyond Wittgenstein: From Descriptive to Prescriptive Grammar 29 1.5 Chapter Summaries 32 References 36

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Part I Racism Without Ontology  39 2 The Problem of Definition: Toward a Conventionalist Framework 41 2.1 Introduction: On the Question “What Is Racism?” 41 2.1.1 The Philosophical Question 41 2.1.2 Metaphysical Analysis 47 2.2 Grammar and Philosophy: A Conventionalist Approach 55 2.2.1 Meaning, Use, Understanding 56 2.2.2 Explanation of Meaning 61 2.2.3 Wittgenstein’s Normativism 75 2.3 Conclusion: The Aim of This Book 85 References 86 3 Re-defining “Definition”: An Argument for Conventionalism 91 3.1 Introduction 91 3.1.1 Scope of the Chapter 91 3.1.2 Terminology: “Proposition,” “Sentence,” “Rule-­ Formulation” 92 3.2 The Many Sides of Convention: Recasting Metaphysical Predicates as Facets of Convention 94 3.2.1 The Empirical Side of Convention 95 3.2.2 The Non-Empirical Side of Convention107 3.3 A Priori Analysis129 3.3.1 Normative Descriptions of Grammar129 3.3.2 Criticisms of Grammar133 3.3.3 Grammatical Approaches136 3.4 Empirical Analysis137 3.4.1 In Defense of Empirical Approaches to Racism137 3.4.2 Beyond Realism and Constructivism142 3.4.3 Conventionalism as Naturalistically Plausible146 3.5 Conclusion152 References153

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4 Re-defining “Meaning”: Defending Semantic Internalism over Externalism157 4.1 Introduction157 4.2 The Case for Externalism158 4.2.1 Some Key Concepts159 4.2.2 Putnam’s and Kripke’s Arguments164 4.3 Resisting Externalism: An Internalist Account of Conceptual Change169 4.3.1 Rival Intensions: Empirical Discoveries as Pragmatic Reasons169 4.3.2 The Pirahã: A Living Counterexample175 4.3.3 Are the Pirahã Wrong/Confused?179 4.3.4 The Arbitrariness of Grammar182 4.4 Are Definitions Descriptive in Addition to Being Normative?187 4.4.1 Descriptive and Normative Uses of Sentences188 4.4.2 A Measure that Measures Itself?190 4.5 Conclusion195 References196 Part II Theorizing Conceptual Disagreement 197 5 Re-defining “Disagreement”: Rationality Without Final Solutions199 5.1 Introduction: From Ontology to Linguistic Norms199 5.2 Stage-Setting for a Theory of Disagreement200 5.2.1 Normative and Prescriptive Disagreement200 5.2.2 A Mere Difference in Word Use?202 5.3 Metalinguistic Negotiation205 5.3.1 Non-Descriptive Disagreement205 5.3.2 Pragmatic Advocacy209 5.3.3 The Need for a Stipulative Definition of “Racism”212 5.4 Negotiation and Rationality216 5.4.1 Blum and Glasgow’s Disagreement216 5.4.2 Contested Rationality221 5.4.3 No Final Solutions: On Problems-to-Cope-With227 5.5 Conclusion229 References230

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6 Re-defining “Philosophical Analysis”: Not Descriptive Analysis, or Conservatism, but Pragmatic Revisionism233 6.1 Introduction233 6.2 Framing the Prescriptive Question236 6.2.1 Descriptive and Normative Analysis236 6.2.2 Unpacking Conservatism/Revisionism238 6.2.3 Metaphysical and Pragmatic Considerations241 6.3 Agnosticism as Default Position245 6.3.1 Doxastic Inertia or Instability?245 6.3.2 Instability and Pragmatic Considerations248 6.4 Two Arguments for Revisionism255 6.4.1 Conceptual Inflation Argument256 6.4.2 Political Morality Argument264 6.5 Conclusion268 References270 Part III Toward a Prescriptive Theory of Racism 273 7 Adequacy Conditions for a Prescriptive Theory of Racism: Toward an Oppression-Centered Account275 7.1 Introduction275 7.2 The Moral Condition278 7.2.1 A Necessary Value: Advance Nonwhite Interests278 7.2.2 Legitimate Need and Historical Usage: The Racial Oppression Approach291 7.3 The Explanatory Condition298 7.3.1 Racism as Sociocultural Phenomenon298 7.3.2 Criteria and Vagueness305 7.3.3 Racism as Open Texture and Unfolding Process310 7.4 The Resolution Condition316 7.5 Conclusion319 References320 8 Racial Oppression and Grammatical Pluralism: A Critique of Jorge Garcia on Racist Belief325 8.1 Introduction325 8.2 Garcia’s Theory: Two Senses of “Racism”330

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8.2.1 Garcia’s Core Essentialism331 8.2.2 Infection and Characteristic Racism332 8.3 Paternalism and the Primary Sense335 8.3.1 Two Pictures of Paternalism335 8.3.2 Garcia’s Revisionist Proposal338 8.4 Ideology and the Primary Sense341 8.4.1 Ideology’s Role in the Racial Structure342 8.4.2 Ideology, Social Function, and Intuition344 8.4.3 Ideology and the Ideological Role of Virtue348 8.4.4 Ideology and Political Morality351 8.5 The Secondary Sense as Wrong Explanation355 8.5.1 Blum’s Objection and Characteristic Racism355 8.5.2 The Wrong Explanation356 8.5.3 Moral Grounds for Condemning Intrinsically Wrongful Beliefs359 8.6 Conclusion362 References364 9 Coda367 9.1 Going Forward from Here: On the Feasibility of Negotiation367 9.2 Three Paradigms of Racial Oppression370 9.3 Going Forward from Here: Implications and Future Research378 References381 Bibliography383 Index395

CHAPTER 1

Introduction: Summary of the Argument

1.1   Problematizing the Concept of Racism 1.1.1  Racism and the Concept of Racism This book is not about racism, but about the concept of racism. Racism is an empirical reality, a lived experience. The concept of racism is the nature of this reality, the nature of this lived experience. This distinction requires elaboration. All of us are familiar with discussions like these: Does racism still exist? Is racism worsening? Is so and so a racist? Activists participate in discussions about what to do about racism; how to live with and survive racism; how to combat, subvert, and resist racism. Some examples will drive the point home: What are some of the ways in which well-intentioned individuals unwittingly participate in racism? How do whites, as a group, benefit from racism? What policies, laws, and social practices are racist? What is being done to reduce or mitigate racism? What recourse is available to victims of racist discrimination (in the workplace, in the classroom, etc.)? Scholars interested in racism’s history, causes, and expressions participate in theoretical conversations: What are the causes of racial inequality? What are the psychological mechanisms of racist cognition? How has racism corrupted this or that institution? What are the short- and long-term effects of racism, for this or that racial group? Where did racism come from—how did it evolve, and from what? And so on.

© The Author(s) 2020 A. G. Urquidez, (Re-)Defining Racism, African American Philosophy and the African Diaspora, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-27257-9_1

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These are all worthwhile and important questions. Many of them can be described as conceptual in some sense of the term. For instance, a respectable sense of “conceptual” applies to the historian’s interest in mapping the development of the idea of racism; it similarly applies to the historian’s interest in parsing the conceptual differences between Medieval manifestations of religious antisemitism and twentieth-century manifestations of race-based antisemitism. As I use the term “conceptual” neither of these inquiries into racism count as conceptual investigations, for they take a particular understanding of racism for granted. Indeed, all of the aforementioned questions presuppose a conception of racism. By “presuppose” I mean that a prior understanding of racism is required in order for the above questions to be intelligible. Empirical theories that inquire about racism’s origins, development, and history only make sense because the term “racism” has been assigned a meaning in the context of these inquiries; it is this meaning which makes observations, recommendations, and predictions about racist phenomena possible. As I use the term, a conceptual investigation into racism is one that investigates the question “What is racism?” How might such an investigation proceed, and why is it important to theorize the concept of racism? We can get a grip on these and related questions by reflecting on two things: the object of racist ascriptions and the phenomenon of conceptual disagreement. Let us start with the former. What is the proper object of a racist ascription? That is, what do we single out for condemnation when we call something “racism” or “racist”? As it turns out, there are many such things. For the terms “racism” and “racist” are applied to various categories of entity: persons, institutions, behaviors, speech, policies, societies, and much more is called racist. But do “racism” and “racist” mean the same across all categories; for example, when applied to persons and institutions? Interesting issues arise in thinking about the relationship of individual racism to institutional racism. If “racist” applies to persons, can members of subjugated racial groups be racist or is it only members of dominant racial groups that can be racist? If institutions can be racist, do they become racist only when they are corrupted by the individuals running them, or are there structural causes of institutional racism? A conception of racism provides answers to these and related questions; it resolves puzzlement concerning the meaning of “racism.”

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The second thing that motivates the distinction between philosophical theories (which investigate the concept of racism) and empirical theories of racist phenomena is the former’s interest in resolving conceptual disagreement. It is not difficult to imagine one’s beliefs about racism being challenged. When this occurs, one is forced to ask: How are we (how am I) to decide which conception of racism is correct? Some examples will quickly illustrate the point: • Example 1: Suppose I assert: implicit racial bias is racist. I suspect that many would reject this proposition, even while many others would accept it. How do we decide which position is correct? The answer largely depends on just what precisely racism is. • Example 2: What if when I recommend a race-conscious policy to mitigate racism, it is immediately shot down or criticized on the grounds that it is racist? The dismissal of race-conscious policies is commonly reported by supporters of affirmative action and proponents of reparations for Native Americans and American Descendants of Slaves (ADOS). A common argument holds that, because affirmative action wrongfully discriminates on the basis of race, it cannot be implemented, not even to correct for historical injustices that were committed at the behest of white supremacy. Is affirmative action, then, racist? If it is, that is partly because we have adopted a certain definition of “racism.” (Perhaps this is the definition that racism is the differential treatment of people, based on race.) • Example 3: Is the criminal justice system racist? Many have argued that it is, yet many others disagree. • Example 4: If a teacher, with no ill intent, calls on a black Haitian student to “provide the black perspective to the class,” some would call this racist; others wouldn’t. • Example 5: If a store manager monitors his Latino customers more closely than his white customers, some would call his practice racist; others wouldn’t. A concept of racism should provide resources to address such controversies. Let us consider how a concept of racism might help us settle the question in our last example: whether the manager’s racial profiling practice is racist. This will afford me the opportunity to introduce some competing conceptions of racism.

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1.1.2  Competing Conceptions of Racism Some defenders of the manager’s racial profiling practice might argue that it is justified if it is motivated by “good business,” that is, if the manager’s desire to protect his profits requires him to monitor those groups that are most likely to shoplift from his store. On this perspective, if he sincerely believes that Latino customers are predisposed to shoplifting, and if he has a “rational” basis for believing this (perhaps he appeals to statistical data), then his practice is not racist (even if his belief about Latinos proves to be false). What are we to make of this argument? What information is pertinent to assessing this case? Addressing these hard questions is precisely the kind of thing a concept of racism can be good for. Most people, I suspect, would want to know the store manager’s intentions. The manager appeals to evidence, yet his profiling practice might not be motivated by good business alone. He may have other (more nefarious) motivations at work, which he conceals. Or perhaps, he is selective about the evidence he is willing to consider. Perhaps his selection bias is an unconscious one, a function of his aversion to, his fear of, or his contempt for Latinos. If his belief about them is improperly motivated, Jorge Garcia and others argue, then and only then should we call it racist; otherwise we shouldn’t.1 This argument presupposes what philosophers call a volitional account of racism, one that defines racism in terms of the agent’s will, including her intentions, motives, and emotions. In other words, volitional accounts focus on the internal mental states of individuals, the noncognitive ones that are thought to drive action. Others might argue that information about people’s intentions and feelings is not always pertinent or useful in deciding whether a case involves racism. For instance, some, like J. Angelo Corlett, might argue that the manager’s profiling practice is racist if it involves racially discriminatory conduct, which is objectionable in virtue of harming Latinos and treating them unfairly.2 Let us call this a behavioral approach to racism, because it defines racism in terms of action and its consequences. Others would identify the manager’s belief as the source of the problem. Beliefs matter because they enter into cognition; that is, they inform how an agent thinks, reasons and acts. They guide behavior even when they happen to be false, for example. Because false beliefs may have unde1 2

 Garcia (1996). See also Gordon (1995).  Corlett (2003. chap. 4).

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sirable effects, such as harming others, one might think that it is wrong to form beliefs irresponsibly (in an irrational manner). So, racism might be defined in cognitive terms, as harboring certain kinds of ungrounded and false beliefs, fallacious forms of reasoning, and the like. Anthony Appiah and Michael Dummett adopt hybrid approaches which incorporate behavioral and cognitive components.3 Focusing on the social consequences of faulty cognition some scholars take the cognitive approach a step further. A socially sophisticated version of the cognitive approach is called the ideological approach to racism. It asserts that practices like racial profiling are racist because they perpetuate invidious racial stereotypes about racially oppressed groups, attitudes that contribute to a condition of group vulnerability to certain harms. Tommie Shelby argues that when invidious racial stereotypes are widely distributed throughout society, it is not just the specific individuals targeted that are harmed, but the entire racial group to which they belong. A widely distributed racial ideology about Latinos can function to stigmatize them, that is, brand them as criminals before they have had a chance to do anything wrong (or not!). Many have observed that this experience is not particularly uncommon in the Latino community, for they, along with other racial minorities, have histories of stigmatization as thugs, gangbangers, illegals, and so on (recall Donald Trump’s “Mexicans are rapists”). The manager in our example contributes (unwittingly, perhaps) to a social structure wherein Latinos do not have full access to the rights and privileges afforded to more privileged racial groups. Consider some of the privileges people generally take for granted (or should be able to take for granted) in our society. Everyone supposedly has the right to feel comfortable in their day-to-day lives (doing normal, everyday things). Yet, some Latinos think twice about entering certain spaces. If I go to such and such restaurant, are people going to stare at me while I eat? If I enter this neighborhood, am I likely to be followed, harassed, and viewed with suspicion? If I go to this college or if I take this job, will people view me as the “diversity hire” (code for: “He didn’t earn his place here”)? And how does this affect my conduct: when I enter that restaurant; walk through that neighborhood; interact with my academic colleagues? The above examples illustrate vulnerabilities to certain types of discomfort and insult. We can easily imagine more troubling scenarios (think of how 3

 Appiah (1990); Dummett (2004).

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the stereotype “Mexicans are rapists” impacts people’s lives under the Trump administration). Is it racist for a business or institution to implement practices that, though arguably useful for some legitimate purposes, exacerbate the burdens imposed on historically disadvantaged racial groups? Aside from ideological/stigmatization accounts of racism, there are institutional/ structural accounts. These theories are variously defined. One popular definition holds that racism is “a practice that is itself free of racial bias but in its implementation has a disproportionately negative effect on subordinate racial groups.”4 By this definition, the store manager’s profiling of Latinos may be thought to be racist because it harms Latinos disproportionately, quite irrespective of whether the manager harbors racial bias or not. Some people might be more sympathetic to an account of racism that appeals to the notions of autonomy and respect. Hence some argue that treating Latinos as potential thugs in the way the manager does is disrespectful to the targeted individuals. One way to flesh out this idea is to elucidate the concept of a person. Persons are rational, autonomous agents. An agent is someone capable of making her own decisions and using her capacity to reason to decide between right and wrong. To strip a person’s autonomy away from her, to deny her the ability to reason and make decisions, is to treat her as though she were a lesser form of human being: a humanoid, perhaps, incapable of exercising reason, self-control, and moral virtue. In light of this, racism might be defined as racial disrespect, where disrespect is understood to mean wrongfully denying or stripping away a person’s dignity. Hence, the problem with the manager’s profiling practice might be that it is disrespectful to Latinos who enter the store. Another way to develop this intuition is to focus on dignitary harm. This type of harm involves an assault on an individual’s personhood that effectively produces a sense of wounded dignity, inferiority, and stigma. Everyone agrees that the use of a racist epithet (like “spick” and “nigger”) conveys a message of inferiority, but proponents of dignitary harm argue that words are unnecessary to convey harmful messages. Certain acts and practices—like rape, violence, chattel slavery, planting a Confederate flag, and enshrining racial segregation into law—are powerful ways of communicating the message of white supremacy and nonwhite inferiority. What is more, individual intent may not be necessary for racism, for the assault in question may be unintended yet avoidable and foreseeable. In that case, dignitary harm will be the result of a callous form of negligence or lack of concern. Bernard Boxill and Clevis Headley argue that dignitary harms, 4

 Blum (2002, 22).

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whether intentional or unintentional, involve an assault on personhood that merits the label racism.5 Let us call these and similar approaches to the definition of “racism” the respect/dignity approach. The preceding discussion is little more than an incomplete survey of the various conceptions of racism on offer. One way to try and reconcile these conceptions—the volitional, behavioral, cognitive, ideological, institutional/structural, and respect/dignity approaches—is to argue that they capture different aspects of racism. But the challenge for this position is that they often compete with one another. That is to say, these approaches are all controversial: acceptable to some but not to others. I use them here to illustrate the difference between a conversation about racism and a conversation about the concept of racism. A definition of “racism” is the core of a theory of racism. For now let us speak loosely as follows: A theory of racism specifies the nature of racism, the kind of thing racism is, the limits of its various forms and manifestations, and the interrelations of its various forms and manifestations (e.g., points of commonality and points of differences between them).6 Conceptual discussions of the sort I have in mind are distinctly philosophical. Philosophy, in my view, is that branch of understanding that, among other things, concerns itself with “What is X?” questions, that is, questions about the nature of a thing (including the question: What does it mean to talk about a nature?). 1.1.3  A Methodological Intervention My book aims to answer the question, “What is racism?” It aims to provide a theory of racism. However, confusion surrounding this question makes it necessary for me to start with a more basic question: How do we decide the correct way to settle the question “What is racism?” Should we, for example, articulate our theory via a priori analysis or via empirical analysis? How do we determine the proper object of a racist ascription (the proper referent of “racism”)? How do we resolve disagreement about  Boxill (1992, 82–85); Headley (2000, 233–236).  One of the questions I take up early in the book is what it means to talk about the nature of a thing. Unlike other philosophers who speak of the “nature” of racism, I do not start with the assumption that this nature is given by the world. The alternative to this view is the position that the nature of racism is given by us, by the practice of the community of speakers that apply this term. 5 6

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what things are racist? To what extent should the theory of racism rely upon ­commonsense thinking about what is called racism? To what extent should it rely on empirical information about racial phenomena and lived experience (e.g., historical and sociological facts)? My primary focus (in Parts I and II) will be on methodological issues about the nature of this question, which set the stage for a theory of racism (in Part III). Why is a conceptual discussion of racism necessary (urgent) at this time? I suspect there are many answers to this question. But a simple answer runs as follows. There is a pressing need to interrogate this concept because the nature of racism is hotly contested—not just by scholars, but by lay people. Donald Trump, for example, sees nothing wrong with (nothing racist about) asserting that many white supremacists and their sympathizers are “very good people.” Moreover, these disagreements are not purely intellectual. They are politicized. They are also emotionally charged. All of this attests to the importance of the concept. It is a testament to the fact that we do a lot with it. It is precisely because of this fact—because so much hangs in the balance—that the question “What is racism?” is much more than an academic exercise. The discussion about “what racism is” too often seems motivated by self-interest and bad faith, by an unwillingness to listen to those who disagree with one. These days discussions of race and racism are difficult to have, in part because they are so emotionally charged, in part because much is at stake in these discussions, and in part because the individual’s lived experience and the way it links up with social reality are extremely complex and difficult to navigate. These are all different kinds of difficulties, and all, in their own ways, pose various obstacles and barriers to a serious conversation about racism. One of the best mediums for having this conversation is a book-length treatment of the topic, such as this, one where the analysis and theory of racism can be articulated in a transparent, sustained, and rigorous manner. So this book, as I have said, develops a theory of racism in the course of intervening in various methodological disputes. My approach to these conversations is somewhat idiosyncratic when judged from the viewpoint of most of my philosophical colleagues, for I appeal to Ludwig Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language. I argue that his insights about the nature of language bear ­significantly on methodological issues in the theory of racism, and that these insights have been neglected and underutilized.

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My primary, though not my only, audience is the philosopher of race.7 My basic contention—that approaches to the theory of racism need to be reconceptualized—makes it necessary to interrogate the question “What is racism?” It is my contention that this question has been misunderstood by philosophers of race, in large part due to linguistic confusions. This makes it appropriate for me to echo Hilary Putnam’s words: it may seem strange that a book with the title (Re-)Defining Racism deals as much or more with issues in the philosophy of language as it does with the ethical, social, and political dimensions of racism. But this is no accident.8 For—again, echoing Putnam—the sub-disciplines of philosophy commonly known as “philosophy of language” and “philosophy of race (and racism)” interlock, and their subject matters often overlap—or so I intend to demonstrate in this book. I draw from resources in Wittgensteinian philosophy of language, in my effort to reframe one of the central problems in the philosophy of race: how best to define the word “racism.”

1.2   Racism’s Janus-Faced Character: The Necessity/Contingency Divide In the remainder of the preface, I will lay out some of the major themes of the book and the conclusions I arrive at. We have seen that, because there are many competing theories of racism, it is necessary to dive into methodological discussions about how best to analyze racism. Here too one finds disagreement among scholars.

7  The philosophers I am most critical of are metaphysicians and metaphysically minded scholars. I defend a pragmatic approach to the theory of racism over and against a metaphysical approach. One of the most common objections to pragmatic theories is that they unjustly trade in the question of truth (“what racism is”) for the question of prudence (“what works”). Having encountered this reaction from colleagues working in the theory of racism, it became clear that, in order to get theorists of racism to take pragmatic approaches seriously, I would have to challenge the metaphysical framing of the question “What is racism?” they take for granted. See Sect. 1.4 below (and Part I) for my critique of the metaphysical approach to racism. 8  Putnam begins his book thus: “It may seem strange that a book with the title Ethics without Ontology deals as much or more with issues in the philosophy of logic, and the philosophy of mathematics as it does with ethics, but this is no accident. For I believe that the unfortunate division of contemporary philosophy into separate ‘fields’…often conceals the way in which the very same arguments and issues arise in field after field” (2004, 1).

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1.2.1  Three Theoretical Problems Sections 1.2, 1.3, and 1.4 of the present chapter discuss the central theoretical issues I grapple with in this book. I begin by sketching each theoretical concern: • First, scholars contest whether racism should be investigated empirically or non-empirically. A non-empirical analysis (otherwise known as “traditional conceptual analysis” or “a priori analysis”) is one that proceeds by reflecting on commonsense intuitions about what is called racism. The idea is that the best way to get a grip on what racism consists in is to consider cases where the term does and does not apply; these “intuitions” are then used to construct a definition: one that states the core of racism in a way that is consistent with commonsense thinking and everyday linguistic practice. The operative assumption of this methodology is that the correct way to think about racism roughly corresponds to the way a competent speaker of English thinks about it. By contrast, those who favor empirical analysis are skeptical of commonsense thinking. These scholars argue that “racism” is a politicized and emotionally charged tool, that the term is widely contested and used in incompatible ways. For these and other reasons, it is argued that the term should be defined by reference to how experts within the relevant social sciences think about racism. The idea is that expert conceptions are superior to everyday conceptions of racism. • Second, scholars contest the nature of racism’s negative valence. Everyone, including the scholar, agrees that racism has a negative valence: that racism is (presumptively) “bad” or “objectionable” in some sense or other. But in what sense is racism “bad”? Is racism a type of character flaw or vice? Is racism an epistemic or cognitive flaw? Is racism an unfair arrangement of society or political injustice? The contestedness of racism’s negative valence makes it necessary to discuss its nature. • Third, scholars contest whether racism has a single nature, whether there is one or several racisms. Monists argue that the terms “racism” and “racist” have a single meaning, one that is capturable in a single definition. This definition is usually conceived as an analytic definition, one that lays down necessary and sufficient conditions for the application of the term. By contrast, pluralists argue that it

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is impossible to accommodate everything that is legitimately called racism in a single definition of the term. Instead, they argue, we should settle for multiple definitions; or perhaps we should recognize that the concept of racism is unified by “family resemblances” rather than characteristic features: these are features that apply across many paradigmatic cases but fall short of applying to all cases. In addition to tackling the basic methodological problems of how to determine the proper referent of “racism” and how to address disagreement about racism, my book tackles these three theoretical concerns: the debate over empirical and non-empirical approaches, the debate between monists and pluralists, and the debate over the nature of racism’s negative valence. Let us consider each of these, in turn. 1.2.2  Necessity and Contingency In this section, I explain my strategy for answering the debate between empirical (a posteriori) and non-empirical (a priori) approaches. In my view, the debate is sometimes framed in a misleading way. For it is not the case that empirical and non-empirical approaches are mutually exclusive or incompatible. I argue that, in fact, both are necessary for grasping racism’s nature. To illustrate, I will briefly discuss one of the central confusions that is an important theme of Chaps. 2 and 3. The question “What is racism?” poses a conceptual challenge that cuts across the necessity/contingency divide. Such a challenge makes the task of analyzing racism exceptionally difficult. I will explain the distinction by starting with Wittgenstein’s favorite analogy, the game of chess. Necessity  Chess is a rule-governed activity and the rules are necessary for playing the game. Consider the powers of the “king.” Its powers partly “make up” the game of chess but it immediately loses them as soon as the game is done. Outside the activity of playing chess, the king is just a piece of wood (or plastic). The abilities of the king, during a game in play, might be called its normative power. By “normative power” I mean the ability to compel behavior in the sense of regulating and orienting conduct. For example, players of the game are obligated to move pieces according to the rules of the game. We hold individuals accountable if they fail to do so: so there are “permissible” and “impermissible” moves. Where does this normative power come from? Clearly, the normative powers of each piece

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stand over and above the powers of the material objects that are used as pieces. Neither the methods of physics or chemistry, for example, can uncover the normative powers of the physical object that we call “the king.” Wittgenstein argues that the reason why rules which license permissions, prohibitions, and obligations dissolve when the game is not in play is that these powers are derivative. Rules derive their normative power from the practice they regulate and make possible. Only in the activity of chess can one speak of what moves are “possible” or “necessary,” of how things “are” or “must” be, of how one “has” to or “cannot” move. Contingency  Let us turn next to the contingent side of chess. This is the empirical, the sociohistorical side of chess.9 Consider these historical investigations into chess: how did the game (or how did particular rules of the game) evolve; why were the pieces named as they were; what broader social purposes did the game serve; and so on. To study chess as a contingent phenomenon is to study it naturalistically, as a product of sociocultural forces or the laws of nature. Studying the contingent side of chess is very different from studying its necessary side. For example, most people who know the game do not know the answers to questions about the game’s historical development. By contrast, people who know the game know it as a normative practice. To study chess as a normative phenomenon is to study its necessary properties. Consider the question: What counts as “good strategy” in chess? The study of good strategy in chess requires a normative inquiry into chess. It involves the study of rule-­governed behavior, of conduct that counts as “making a move,” as playing the game. It presupposes the participant’s for the rules, which determine what moves are permissible and impermissible, required and optional, and so on. One might call this the study of chess from the insider’s perspective, as it were. To study it this way is precisely not to study it as a cultural product, as an expression of human ingenuity, creativity, evolution, historical circumstance, and the like. It is to study it as something timeless and fixed. We have now identified two ways of studying human practice: as necessary and as contingent. At this point, one might be wondering: What does 9  For further discussion about the nature of contingency and its relation to necessity, see Chap. 3.

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the necessity/contingency distinction have to do with racism? The answer is simple: what is true for the concept of chess is true for all concepts, including the concept of racism. The concept of racism, like any other concept, has its necessary and contingent sides. The study of racism’s contingent side can provisionally be distinguished from the study of its normative side. Philosophers tend to focus on the necessary side of concepts. They may want to know, for instance, what the word “racism” means, what things are properly called racist, and what criteria should be used to resolve controversial and borderline cases. These concerns are connected with the question of racism’s nature. Philosophers interested in analyzing racism’s nature sometimes limit their respective theories to racism’s necessary side. That is, they ignore its contingent side, eschewing it as irrelevant to their investigation. Just as one need not investigate the history of chess in order to learn the meaning of “chess” (i.e., how to play the game), it might be thought that one need not investigate the history of racism in order to learn the meaning of “racism.” I think this is mistaken. For unlike the nature of chess, racism’s necessary side is deeply bound up with its contingent side. 1.2.3  Accidental and Essential Features To see why that is so, let us start with the philosopher’s distinction between a concept’s accidental and essential features. Racism’s accidental features are those that do not define its nature. Racism’s essential features are those that do. Consider this feature of the concept of racism: “The concept of racism came into existence after the idea of race was invented.” Assuming this to be a historical fact, it is a fact about the concept of racism that is not important for understanding what racism is (for knowing how to use the term “racism”). The same is true for this next proposition: “The concept of racism was not created until the early 20th century.” A competent speaker of English need not know when the concept of racism came into existence in order to know how to use the term “racism.” So, again, this is an accidental feature of the concept of racism. Consider next the following feature: “Racism is a racial phenomenon.” Here we have stumbled upon an essential feature of the concept of racism. It is impossible to make sense of the term “racism” (what it means) without reference to the idea of race. For purposes of this book, I define “race” as follows: “[race is] a concept that attaches social meaning to visible

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inherited physical characteristics, continental origins, and biological ancestry.”10 Similarly, it is impossible to know what “racism” means without knowing that this term is used to condemn. For the feature “Racism is morally objectionable” is an essential feature of the concept of racism. With the above in mind, I now submit that philosophical analysis is deficient to the extent that it fails to recognize that the concept of racism is Janus-faced. By this I mean that some of the contingent features of this concept are essential (rather than accidental) features of racism.11 One example of this is: “Racism is and is likely to remain a hotly contested concept, the content of which changes over time as sociohistorical conditions change.” If I am correct that this contingent fact about the concept of racism is an essential part of its meaning, then one must understand some aspects of the concept’s contingent side, and not just its necessary side, in order to understand the nature of racism. (Said differently, racism’s contingent and necessary sides dynamically interact with one another.) I do not mean that one must understand every contingent feature of racism to understand its nature. What I mean is rather that some of racism’s contingent features are partly constitutive of its necessary side, of what I shall call the grammar of the term. This peculiar fact about the concept of racism can be illuminated by considering an important type of language-game we play with the word “racism.” A language-game is a rule-governed activity involving the use of a word or expression. For instance, “Shut up!” used as a command to silence someone and used as a reaction to a funny joke are two different languagegames we “play” with this expression. What makes these language-­games different is that the expression “shut up” means differently in each context of application. By focusing on different language-­games, we can better understand how an expression like “shut up” (or “racism”) can mean different things relative to contextual differences in the two cases. Let us now consider a peculiar fact about the grammar of “racism.” Distinct languagegames with the word “racism” sometimes compete with one another in the sense that participants of one language-­game with “racism” allege that par This definition is from Shelby (2016, 23).  Things get tricky here (see Chap. 3). The sense in which a feature of racism is essential, in my view, is that it is or ought to be treated as unassailable (non-negotiable). Contingent facts about racism’s history need not inform the grammar of “racism,” from a strictly logical perspective (see my discussion of the arbitrariness of grammar). However, my claim is that, from a normative-pragmatic perspective, they ought to inform the grammar of “racism” given our moral-representational needs. 10 11

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ticipation in the other language-game with “racism” is racist. In such cases, the two language-games cannot simply be said to be different, for it is clear that they are parasitic on one another and thus compete over which is “correct.” Let us call this the problem of language-game contestation. 1.2.4  “Reverse Racism” and Language-Game Contestation The phenomenon of language-game contestation is exhibited in the debate over the possibility of reverse racism. The term “reverse racism” came into prominence in the 1970s in response to race-conscious policies designed to correct past racial injustice. Affirmative action is the paradigmatic example of a race-conscious policy alleged to involve reverse racism. This policy involves giving preferential treatment to historically disadvantaged racial groups, in an effort to right the wrongs of past racism whose effects continue to disadvantage members of these groups today. Antiracists who support race-conscious policies are sometimes met with the objection that such practices are racist because they involve “discrimination” based on race. These race-conscious policies are sometimes characterized as “reverse racism,” meaning that they involve unfair racial discrimination against whites, the dominant racial group (hence the “reversal”).12 Proponents of race-conscious policies reply that invoking race as a criterion within the context of policy is necessary to repair the harm inflicted upon victims of past racism, largely carried out with the use of law and policy. Sometimes, these proponents charge their reverse racism critics with racism on the grounds that appropriating the term “racism” to oppose antiracist efforts is a form of racism. Some even go further, impugning the motives of the opposition; here it is argued that the term “reverse racism” is deliberately and cynically used by whites, in bad faith. The reason why whites oppose corrective racial measures, it is argued, is that they are fighting to hold on to privileges accrued to them as a consequence of institutionalized racism. Clearly, then, the question of whether reverse racism is a legitimate form of racism is a case of language-game contestation. For it is an example of using the term “racism” to condemn or criticize a competing use of the term. The disagreement at issue—between those who call the practice of alleging reverse racism racist and those who 12  The underlying premise of the reverse racism critique is sometimes called the colorblind principle: a racist-free society is one that is colorblind, one where no distinctions based on race are made (especially in matters of policy).

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espouse that reverse racism is a legitimate form of racism—is both grammatical (about the correct meaning of “racism”) and ethical (questioning the motives, interests, and ethical ideals of the opposing side). Clearly, a more in-depth analysis of the phenomenon of language-game contestation would be worth pursuing. However, I will not attempt to do so here. For I want to focus on an important theoretical implication of the phenomenon of language-game contestation. Consider the proposition: “The very notion of reverse racism is racist.” What does “racist” mean here? To understand the meaning of “racist” in this sentence it is necessary to understand something about the historical legacy of racism: the ways in which antiracist efforts have been historically resisted and stymied by whites; the ways in which the term “racism” is politicized; the ways in which the discourse about racism has been co-opted and cynically applied by some individuals for political gain in the debate about racial equality. A person who does not fully understand these (contingent) historical components of the grammar of “racism” and “racist” will not be able to properly apply and understand these terms in many contexts of application. Hence they will be incapable of understanding the nature of the alleged racism in the expression, “The very notion of reverse racism is racist.” The ordinary use of “racist” within this context of application (within the practice of language-­game contestation) requires knowledge of the history of the idea of racism in a way that language-games involving many other terms (like the term “chess”) do not. The term “chess” has a history, but the term does not signify or connote that history, nor does one need to know it to know the meaning of this term in normal contexts of application. The same cannot be said about the term “racism.” This, then, captures what I mean when I say that the concept of racism is Janus-faced: it is necessary to understand racism’s contingent side if one wishes to understand its necessary side. 1.2.5  Racism as a Sociocultural Concept My claim that racism’s contingent side is grammatically significant provides support for my contention that racism is essentially a sociocultural concept. A sociocultural concept is one that signifies a social phenomenon, understood in terms of its temporal properties. For example, the game of chess is a social phenomenon and an expression of our culture, but “chess” is not for that reason a sociocultural concept. For the concept of chess does not characterize this phenomenon as a temporally extended reality.

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Rather, it characterizes it as a normative reality and, hence, as an atemporal reality. Similarly, “culture” is not a sociocultural concept in some (non-­ academic) contexts of use. Consider the expression, “That is part of his culture.” Outside of academic contexts, the term “culture” is understood as a fixed set of norms that make some actions permissible and others impermissible. So the norms in question are not understood in terms of their temporality. By contrast, “gender,” “race,” and “racism” are sociocultural concepts within the humanities and social sciences (though not always in everyday thinking). For they are normally used to signify “socially constructed” realities. I propose with respect to the concept of racism that it be conceived as a sociocultural concept: one that signifies a temporally extended social relation—between an oppressed group and an oppressor group. Moreover, this temporal relation is to be understood dynamically, as an unfolding (and hence, an evolving) process. The oppressed-oppressor relation is one that changes over time as political and other social conditions change. Racism changes in connection with changes to a wide range of alterations, including alteration of a community’s subjective and intersubjective attitudes, its prevailing moral code, its laws and policies, and so forth. Such changes condition the nature of the oppressed-oppressor relation. My argument here is normative rather than descriptive: that is, I argue that racism should be conceived as a sociocultural concept, not that racism is currently conceived as a sociocultural concept. (For I recognize that often it isn’t so conceived, especially outside of academic contexts.) I can now present the important theoretical upshot of my argument: If the political contestedness of “racism” informs the grammar of this term, then philosophical theory cannot restrict itself to traditional forms of conceptual (a priori) analysis. The conceptual analysis of racism must be informed by empirical (a posteriori) analysis of racism’s contingent features, including the political role of the idea of racism. My argument in support of the Janus-faced character of racism—of incorporating empirical considerations in the theory of racism—is meant to unravel the debate over whether racism’s nature should be investigated a priori or whether it should be investigated empirically. I contend that both ought to be treated as necessary and as mutually supportive theoretical practices. Analysis of the nature of racism must not ignore the temporal character of racism because some of its temporal features are (or should be) constitutive of its nature. In short, the proposition “Racism is a sociocultural phenomenon” is on a par with other essential features of racism, including those expressed in the propo-

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sitions “Racism is a racial phenomenon” and “Racism is morally objectionable.”13 My argument in support of conceptualizing racism as a sociocultural phenomenon is further developed in Chaps. 3 and 7.

1.3   An Antiracist Ethic: Racism from the Eyes of the Victim 1.3.1  The Primacy of A Priori Analysis Having laid out my position that racism is a sociocultural phenomenon and that the theory of racism should be informed by empirical analysis, I want to impress upon the reader that I have nowhere said that philosophical theory should prioritize the empirical over the non-empirical. On the contrary, I believe that theory should privilege a priori analysis in at least one important respect. Namely: Every theory of racism necessarily ­presupposes a set of substantive moral values. I illustrate this in Chap. 5 via my argument that the concept of racism is constituted by incompatible grammatical norms. As an example, I contend that “Racism is racial disrespect” and “Racism is serious racial disrespect” are two guiding norms in much contemporary usage of the terms “racism” and “racist.” These norms, however, are likely to generate incompatible judgments in many cases, depending on which of these norms one chooses to apply. If a phenomenon is racially disrespectful, some will be inclined to call it racist while others will deny this (since those who define “racism” as seriously objectionable may not take this wrong to be particularly serious). And it will be impossible to resolve the dis13  I am not the first philosopher to posit that racism is a sociocultural concept. I have been influenced by Clevis Headley’s (2000) defense of this claim. It is notable that Alain Locke once wrote: “All philosophies are in ultimate derivation philosophies of life and not of abstract, disembodied ‘objective’ reality; products of time, place and situation, and thus systems of timed history rather than timeless eternity…. But no conception of philosophy, however relativist, however opposed to absolutism, can afford to ignore the question of ultimates or abandon what has been so aptly though skeptically termed the ‘quest for certainty.’” (1991, 34). Not only does Lock recognize the sociocultural character of concepts, he clearly recognizes the Janus-faced character of concepts. He also seems to recognize the inherent difficulty in reconciling these aspects: How do we reconcile a concept’s contingent and necessary features when they seem to be in tension? For Locke, the challenge is to recognize the full contingency and temporality of a phenomenon without losing sight of the “question of ultimates.” For a discussion of some parallels in Wittgenstein and Locke’s philosophies, see Richard Jones (2013, 131).

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agreement by appealing to commonsense thinking about racism, since both incompatible judgments fall under the heading of “commonsense thinking.” Said differently, in order to resolve the empirical disagreement (about the particular case) it is logically necessary to resolve the deeper conceptual disagreement (about the nature of racism). What this argument suggests is that philosophical theory requires a theoretical norm (or condition of adequacy) on the basis of which to choose between competing incompatible norms. If the concept of racism is constituted by incompatible definitions of “racism,” then an external norm is necessary to choose between them. In Chap. 6, I argue that the question of whether philosophical theory should be predicated on ordinary usage or not depends on which external values we bring to the table. However, whatever overarching norm is brought to the table, it will not be grounded in experience. By this I don’t mean that the value cannot emerge from the analysis of empirical facts; nor do I mean that one’s value will be completely detached from the facts. Rather, I mean that insofar as one privileges the saliency of some empirical facts over others, the selection process will be intrinsically value-laden. Certain facts must be valued as important, and the value which measures this importance will be taken for granted as necessary and non-negotiable. Hence the ultimate foundation for a theory of racism must be an a priori basis, a set of values that is brought to empirical analysis, rather than a set of values that is determined by empirical analysis. (The overarching norm is akin to a standard of measurement, not to that which is measured.) 1.3.2  Valuing the Victim’s Perspective With that, the starting point I defend on a priori grounds (in Chap. 7) is that the definition of “racism” must be defined from the victim’s ­perspective. This raises the question: How should the “victim’s perspective” be conceived? I argue for conceptualizing the victim’s perspective in collectivist terms. By this I mean that the perspective at issue ought to be that of the victimized racial group. I further contend that group victimization should be understood in political terms rather than personal terms, that is, as an issue of injustice and oppression. Finally, I contend that racism is helpfully viewed as a condition of vulnerability. The first thing we need to sort out is the appropriate type of morality. This is important to the theory of defining “racism,” because the primary

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(though not the only) role of the concept of racism is moral evaluation.14 The term “racism” has two moral functions: (1) to assign personal blame and (2) to express social criticism. We can call this (as I do in Chap. 7) racism’s moralist concern. Is racism primarily “wrong” in that it involves a kind of personal wrongdoing, a character flaw perhaps? Or is it primarily “wrong” in that it involves a kind of social injustice or unfairness in the organization of society? Let us consider each moralist concern, in turn. Personal blame usually implies that an agent or group is responsible for an action. Blame is in order when reparation is in order: that is, when the offender commits a harm that requires her to right the wrong she has committed; when the harmed party has a right to be made whole. Responsibility may take on various forms. A perpetrator may be held responsible in a manner suitable to the context. Blame/responsibility may involve legal sanctioning, verbal reproach, social rebuke, social ostracism, placing a mark on one’s record, and so on. Blameworthy conduct and speech, when it is repetitive and deliberate, often signals a deeper characterological flaw in the agent. Hence issues of personal moral responsibility are often tied to notions of vice and virtue, sincerity and intent, knowledge and justified belief, rationality and irrationality, and awareness and autonomy (free will and control). Let us call this family of moral phenomena—consisting of ascriptive functions of “racism” that link up with practices of individual blame and responsibility— personal morality. By way of contrast, what I am calling social criticism (in a somewhat idiosyncratic use of this term) is the expression of disapproval for inadequacies of political will and response, inequities in results and outcomes, and unfairness and injustice in the organization of both formal and informal institutions, companies and industries, and agencies and societies. Although social criticism may be directed at individuals or groups of individuals, it is also possible to criticize the structure of society. My focus will be on the latter, namely, structural or organizational injustice. Although I do not believe that racism’s moralist concern should be limited to “social  Some scholars argue that racism is best construed as a social-explanatory concept. The idea is that the concept of racism tracks a distinct kind of social phenomenon (say, racial inequality), such that the point of calling something racist is not to condemn the phenomenon but to explain it (why it exists, persists, or recurs). Though I do not deny that the concept of racism has explanatory power, the view I defend is that racism is first and foremost a moral concept. 14

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criticism” in the restricted sense of injustice (which excludes issues of personal moral responsibility), it is this restricted sense that I have foremost in mind when I employ the term “criticism.” The ascriptions of “racism” that most interest me are those that express criticism directed at policy, law, social praxis, cultural norms, and the like. Whereas the goal of an ascription of blame is to provide a reason for holding an agent/s responsible for personal/collective wrongdoing (for something one ought not have done), the goal of expressing social criticism (as I use this term) is to provide a reason for abandoning, replacing, restructuring, or regulating an institution or social pattern. Let us call this family of moral ­phenomena—consisting of ascriptive functions of “racism” that link up with practices of social criticism—political morality. One important question in determining the nature of racism is whether “racism’s” negative moral valence should be construed in personal rather than political terms, or vice versa. Here and in Chaps. 7–8, I explain why racism should be primarily (though not exclusively) conceived in political terms. Some scholars argue that racist ascriptions should be restricted to issues of personal morality, that is, to the condemnation of agents. These proponents argue that blame is the primary if not the only legitimate function of the term “racism.” However, I reply that expressing social criticism is a historical function of this term. So, the suggestion that “racism” should be permitted to perform only one part of its historical function seems unwarranted. Given the deleterious effects of many non-intentional acts, institutionalized racial inequality, and the like, it is perfectly reasonable to insist that “racism” be able to encompass both moral functions, to blame and to criticize. I further contend that the most important moral concern facing victims of racism today is structural and systemic injustice. After all, racism targets racialized individuals: persons who are targeted in virtue of group membership. The groups themselves are often targeted because they are despised or viewed with disgust or contempt, perceived as inferior, menacing, threatening, and so forth.15 As Charles Mills and others argue, centering the theory of racism on issues of personal responsibility limits racism’s scope to the conduct of isolated individuals and groups. This often results 15  A focus on “groups” over “individuals” need not be conceived in metaphysical terms. I think of groups in pragmatic terms: to focus on the group is to focus on the set of shared needs that certain individuals have, the patterned harms and lived experiences that tend to recur, and the social structures that produce these repetitions of experience.

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in conceptualizing racism as a pathological phenomenon: an atypical and deficient person. This is objectionable, however, because racism (­ conceived as unjust racial inequality) is a normal feature of society. Furthermore, racism is not the kind of thing that only a “crazy” white supremacist or racial bigot participates in.16 Conceiving of racism as an anomalous or outlier phenomenon fails to explain the set of racialized harms and injustices experienced by historical victims of racial oppression. Moreover, as proponents of institutional racism have long argued, the harm accrued as a result of structural-systemic patterns tends to be larger in scale and more persistent, making the structural/institutional all the more urgent and pressing a concern from a moral perspective.17 The theorist of racism must be willing to assume a controversial stance. She must be willing to defend her proposed definition on normative grounds. I defend the following desideratum for a theory of racism: The concept of racism should be defined in the interests of (what is commonly called) an “antiracist” agenda. By this I mean that the term “racism” should serve the interests of people of color, as they are the historical victims of the legacy of white supremacy. This is laid down as an adequacy condition for any theory of racism: a definition of “racism” that does not accord with this value is not one worth having. This value is fundamental and non-negotiable, as I argue in Chap. 7. It is, therefore, an a priori starting point for the theory of racism. With this value in place, Part III lays down the following essentialist definition: “Racism is racial oppression.” Paradigmatic types of racial oppression include white supremacy’s classic expressions: racial slavery, racial segregation, racial apartheid, as well as the “new racism” of raceneutral or colorblind oppression. I conceive of racial oppression as the heart of racism, the output (effect) resulting from a wide range of inputs (causes). My essentialist account is pluralist in that it recognizes several causes of racial oppression. For purposes of moral representation, I propose classifying contributing causes of racial oppression under three cate See Mills (2003, 39–40; see also 59–61).  As Sally Haslanger explains: “Persistent institutional injustice is a major source of harm to people of color. Of course, moral vice—bigotry and the like—is also a problem. But if we want the term ‘racism’ to capture all the barriers to racial justice, I submit that it is reasonable to count as ‘racist’ not only the attitudes and actions of individuals but the full range of practices, institutions, policies, and suchlike that, I’ve argued, count as racially oppressive” (2004, 122). 16 17

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gories and mechanisms of white supremacy: racial injustice, racial dehumanization, and racial viciousness. Each paradigm of racial oppression is objectionable in its own right, independent of its link to racial oppression. For example, one does not need to show that an instance of racial viciousness is a contributing cause of racial oppression in order to properly condemn it. Nonetheless, each paradigm’s characteristic connection to racial oppression, and not just its morally objectionable status, makes it criterial for racial oppression. Stated differently, I propose three distinct definitions which collectively constitute the driving causes and objectionable core of racist oppression. What these three constitutive elements of racial oppression define for us is a condition of vulnerability. If racism is racial oppression, then racism involves a social relation: the oppressor who oppresses the oppressed. This is a relation of domination and subjugation. Hence it is possible to analyze each relata. The domination/subjugation relation produces a condition of vulnerability for racism’s historical victims: racialized subjects are disposed to the vicious deeds of others, dehumanization and unjust treatment. For racism’s beneficiaries, this relation produces a condition of access to opportunity, humanization and unearned advantage. Because this way of organizing a society is unfair—since some suffer undeservedly while others benefit undeservedly from that suffering—­ racism (racial oppression) is first and foremost morally objectionable on grounds of racial injustice. Clearly much more needs to be said in elaborating my oppression approach to racism. Although I will have some more to say about it in Part III, I do not develop a fleshed out account of racial oppression in this book. For example, I leave the notion of “contributing cause” of racial oppression unanalyzed. My reason for this is that I have my work cut out for me as things stand. Before I can turn to the task of debating the nature of racism with my philosophical colleagues, I must first explain to them why I reject many of their starting presuppositions. My central aim in this book is to insist that philosophers of race re-examine and re-define their approach to the theory of racism—for example, to focus on what racism ought to be rather than “what racism is.” Part of this involves theorizing conceptual disagreement. Scholars of racism are (wittingly or unwittingly) engaged in articulating pictures of racism that have moral and sociopolitical implications, that uphold some values over others. These values may or may not be consonant with an antiracist agenda. Competing pictures of racism should not be self-serving.

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I hope that my own account speaks to the real need for the term “racism.” There is a logic to normative argumentation, even if that logic starts from fundamental values. We need to reclaim the concept of racism because it is, and has been, under attack; because the term “racism” is highly overused; and because the concept is often hijacked for political gain at the expense of the interests of people of color for whom the concept ought to be deployed. Defining “racism” from the victim’s perspective means that we must squarely identify the oppressor group: white people. This doesn’t mean that all white people intend to oppress, but that they often contribute to racism (often unconsciously) and that whites contribute insofar as they belong to the class of people that Charles Mills calls “white beneficiaries” of racism, regardless of their intentions and motives.18 I presume that the community of philosophers that I engage in conversation about how best to define “racism” is a community of antiracist scholars with whom fruitful discussion on the matter can be made. I also presume that the arguments we present to one another are generally given in good faith. I take this to be a condition that makes entering into rational philosophical debate possible, valuable, and resolvable (see Chap. 5). The task of defining “racism,” in my view, is dialectical and dialogical, an issue of metalinguistic negotiation, but also of social criticism, as I explain below.

1.4   A Normative-Pragmatic Pluralism The final debate I want to touch on in these prefatory remarks is the dispute over how many racisms there are. Here we need to distinguish the claim that racism has plural manifestations from the claim that there are several racisms. Let us call the latter ontological pluralism. Every theorist acknowledges what Lawrence Blum calls the categorial plurality of racism. This is the fact that “racism” is properly applied to several categories of entity: persons, attitudes, behavior, institutions, and so on. Racism’s plural manifestations lead some scholars to conclude that no single definition of “racism” can accommodate all the categories it applies to. Hence the question arises whether there is a single racism (the nature of which can be expressed in a single definition), or whether there are several such racisms. The ontological monist contends that there is exactly one racism, which ranges over every applicable category of entity, while the ontological pluralist contends that there are several racisms, none of which ranges over every applicable category of entity.  Mills (1997, 11).

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1.4.1  Trading in Ontology for Pragmatism Where does my account of racism fit into the monist-pluralist debate? The account I defend is morally monistic, for I claim that racism’s fundamental badness consists in one thing; racism is, for me, a certain kind of injustice. However, my account is neither ontologically monistic nor ontologically pluralistic. For the ontological framing of this dispute rests on conceptual confusion. The terms “racism” and “racist” are applied to many kinds of thing, but it does not follow that racism is a kind of thing. I argue that there is no such thing or kind as racism itself. In making this argument I draw directly from Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language. Definitions of “racism,” in my view, are not descriptions of anything. Hence they are not descriptions of racism. According to Wittgenstein, a definition is the expression of a grammatical rule. The definition “Racism is racial oppression” does not describe the world. Instead, it provides a rule for representing phenomena in the world. It is a rule for representing phenomena as racist. Definitions of “racism” are rules of moral representation. Rules of representation, for Wittgenstein, are analogous to the rules of a game. “The king moves one square at a time” is not a description of reality. To be sure, it is properly called the “description of a game,” but this simply pushes the question back: What does it mean to describe a practice or activity? Contrast descriptions of the game of chess with the following descriptions of chess: “He made a terrible move; it is only a matter of time until he loses the game.” “He castled at just the right moment.” These are what we normally call “descriptions of chess.” To describe chess is to describe something that happened, a temporally extended phenomenon that might have been otherwise. Genuine descriptions of chess are descriptions of a game in play (or a game that has been/will be played). By contrast, to describe the practice of chess as such is not to describe a game in play, but to provide the rules of chess. But Wittgenstein urges us to look at what we do with words. Hence if we wish to understand what it means to talk about “a description of practice,” we must look to what we do with this expression. So what is it exactly that we do with the sentence “The king moves one square at a time”? We use it to provide a rule for the use of the word “king” in chess. But what is the function of a rule? Rules, unlike descriptions, are standards of correctness. “The king moves one square at a time” is used to correct misuses of certain pieces in the game, and it is used to teach someone how to move certain pieces in

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the game. Rules, in other words, govern and guide behavior; they determine permissible and impermissible moves in a practice; they determine obligations and prohibitions; and so forth. Rules are essentially normative, action-guiding. The rules of chess are constitutive of the game of chess. These constitutive rules make the game possible. Rules are conventions, which are the building blocks of practices, institutions, and cultures. My contention is that definitions of “racism” are analogous to the rules of chess in that they are standards of correctness. To define a practice is not to describe reality, but to prescribe reality. It is to lay down a rule of representation, a rule for the correct use of a term. Defining “racism” is an intrinsically normative endeavor. What is the upshot of this argument for the theoretical task of defining “racism”? Does the philosopher state the existing representational practice or does she instead construct the normatively correct practice? Is the goal of theory to describe what the existing representational practice is? Or is the goal of theory to prescribe what the practice ought to be? As I argue in Part II, the goal of theory is to prescribe reality rather than just describe it (this makes our philosophical task an ameliorative analysis). My argument for this can be crudely sketched as follows. The concept of racism is constituted by incompatible definitional norms. Hence we cannot hope to resolve existing disagreement about racism by reference to existing linguistic practice. For to appeal to existing linguistic practice is to leave the disagreement where it is (at an impasse). Hence theory must move beyond describing the current state of definitional disagreement to prescribing what the definitional norm ought to be. The goal of philosophical theory is normative rather than ontological, and prescriptive rather than descriptive. The warrant it must ultimately attain is pragmatic rather than epistemic. The goal is not to define “what racism is” in the ontological sense (for there is no “racism-as-it-is-in-itself” to discover), but to define “what racism is” in the normative sense of ­providing a rule for correctly applying the word “racism.” Our project aims to define how the word ought to be used for purposes of moral representation. (The expressions “what racism is” and “what racism ought to be” are synonymous in our ameliorative context.) This approach is pragmatic because the argument for privileging one competing definition over its rivals is that it is more useful for attaining the valued moral-­ representational end. The theorist must, therefore, articulate the value of racist representation; she must answer the question, “What is the point of

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representing things as racist?” In addition, the theorist must explain why her favored definition better meets this value than rival alternatives. My critique of the metaphysical approach to racism is developed in Chaps. 2 and 3. A significant upshot of my pragmatic approach is that it is mistaken to think that the natural and social sciences disclose racism’s essence to us. (Hence I take issue with semantic externalism in Chap. 4.) Talk about “what racism is” remains within language (a representational norm) and does not exit language. The philosopher’s question “What is racism?” may not be equivalent to the question “How is the word ‘racism’ used?,” but it surely is equivalent to the question “How should the word ‘racism’ be used?” A Wittgensteinian approach to prescriptive grammar starts from the presupposition that grammar is arbitrary in that it is not responsible to reality. Definitions are rules that we lay down in order to make our language-­games possible, and we are free to decide which grammatical conventions to lay down. I thus call my Wittgenstein-inspired approach to the theory of racism conventionalism. One important tenet of conventionalism is that grammar is arbitrary and hence open to revision. If grammar is arbitrary, what is the role of empirical considerations? First, empirical considerations matter to the theory of racism, not as epistemic reasons that make some definitions true and others false; they matter as pragmatic reasons that make some definitions good and others bad to have. In other words, empirical considerations are pragmatic rather than epistemic considerations. Second, empirical considerations matter to the theory of racism because racism ought to be conceived as a sociocultural phenomenon, an unfolding process. That is, we care about incorporating new information about racial phenomena into our theory of racism. For instance, the discovery of implicit racial bias is significant to the theorist of racism who values social justice and racial equality, because implicit bias is a potential impediment to achieving racial justice. New scientific information, in conjunction with certain values, prompts theory to ask whether the concept of racism should be extended to cover the new phenomenon. This is a pragmatic logic rather than an epistemic one. Extending the concept of racism to cover implicit racial bias would exhibit the “unfolding” of the concept; it would exhibit the sense in which racism is a “process”: namely, this scientific discovery prompts the collective question of whether to extend the concept. So although grammar is arbitrary in the sense that it is up to us, we for good reason allow ourselves to be guided by new information in updating sociocultural concepts.

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1.4.2  Rethinking the Categorial Plurality of Racism My pragmatic pluralism provides an alternative framing of the problem of accommodating the categorial plurality of racism. The philosophical task before us is no longer one of identifying racism’s fundamental location (the most basic category of entity to which racism belongs). For we have said that, on conventionalism, definitions of “racism” are not descriptions of an object, but expressions of rules. Stated differently, the word “racism” in the sentence “Racism is racial hatred” is not the name of an object; it does not name, for example, a psychological phenomenon (something “in the head” or “in the mind”). For the sentence is not used to describe the world, but to provide a rule for representing things (as racist) in the world. What is more, the issue of whether there is one racism or several is also rejected as confused. To be sure, we can ask whether a unified account of racism is possible; whether it is possible to come up with a definition that accommodates the whole of what is called “racism” and “racist.” However, positing a univocal account of the ordinary usage of “racism” and “racist” is very different from positing a univocal account of racism itself, where the latter is thought to be some language-independent object or kind. Conventionalism is consistent with a univocal account of ordinary usage, but not with a metaphysical account of racism itself (for there is no such thing as racism itself, on conventionalism). Conventionalism denies that it makes sense to talk about racism, independent of how the terms “racism” and “racist” are used, so it also denies that there is exactly one (or two or three or…) such racism(s). Conventionalism, we have seen, dissolves the metaphysical framing of the location problem. The theorist of racism no longer need worry about how many racisms there are and where they are fundamentally located (is racism a kind of attitude, behavior, practice, etc.). Yet, after this confusion has been dissolved, the theorist still needs to determine which conception of racism is the prescriptively correct one. I propose that racism be conceived in functionalist terms. By a functionalist account of racism, I mean what Luc Faucher and Jorge Garcia call “output-based” and “inputbased” accounts of racism. Whereas the latter defines “racism” in terms of a certain cause, the former defines “racism” in terms of a certain effect. Racial oppression is an effect that emerges from a multiplicity of causes, and so what makes racial oppression racist has more to do with this unjust effect than with the nature of any one particular cause. By defining “racism” as racial oppression, different categories of entity are viewed instru-

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mentally, as causally related to racial oppression. In this way, various categories of entity are or become infected with racism in virtue of their social role of causing, sustaining, or perpetuating racial oppression. The most significant of these are instances of racial viciousness, racial dehumanization and, above all, racial injustice. Tommy Curry has recently proposed viewing racism in a functionalist way, in his award-winning book, The Man-Not.19 I briefly discuss his definition of “racism” in Chap. 9. Racism, in his view, is a kind of group vulnerability. His account is thus consistent with my contention that racism is a kind of vulnerability, conceived in relational terms. My normative-­ pragmatic argument is also consistent with some recent attempts to align the discussion of racism with what Benjamin Mitchell-Yellin calls the “pragmatic aim” for the philosophical theory of racism. This aim, he explains, is to theorize racism in a way that contributes to the goal of eliminating or at least mitigating racism.20 Leonard Harris had already provided a defense of this contention in his 1998 article, “The Concept of Racism: An Essentially Contested Concept.”21 The stipulation that a theory of racism have practical significance is an a priori posit that reflects the value and point of having the terms “racism” and “racist” in the lexicon. The reason why we need these terms is that victims of racial oppression find it absolutely necessary to criticize forms of racial domination and white privilege, which contribute to the subjugation of nonwhites. The language-games we play with these words are practices we cannot afford to give up. 1.4.3  Beyond Wittgenstein: From Descriptive to Prescriptive Grammar This book is an exercise in applied Wittgensteinian philosophy. It is not an attempt to vindicate Wittgenstein’s work per se, though it does attempt to justify the application of Wittgensteinian philosophy of language to axiology, or what I call normative philosophy. I attempt a reconstruction of his philosophy of language in the first two chapters, though always with an eye toward issues in the theory of racism.  Curry (2017).  Mitchell-Yellin (2018, 57). 21  Harris (1998). I assess his argument in Chap. 3. 19 20

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Giving each side of the necessity/contingency divide its proper due has been the most demanding intellectual challenge that I faced in writing it, and I am not certain that I have always succeeded. So I can only echo Wittgenstein in lamenting this fact, which the careful reader will surely recognize as a leitmotif of my monograph: “Not empiricism and yet realism in philosophy, that is the hardest thing.”22 The reader may find it helpful to know the author’s source of inspiration for this monograph, which grew out of a certain tension as I grappled with Wittgenstein’s later work, principally his Philosophical Investigations.23 Unpacking this tension will perhaps help explain some of the peculiarities of my monograph. The tensions I’ve had in writing this book are the precipitate deposits of an earlier tension. Those of us (those few of us) who draw inspiration from Wittgenstein’s work in normative philosophy feel, on the one hand, the pull of Wittgenstein’s claim that philosophy is a purely descriptive practice. Having felt this pull myself, I believe it to be extremely useful in dissolving (certain kinds of) conceptual confusion. Thus I echo Wittgenstein in affirming that many philosophical problems are “deep disquietudes,” as he called them—by which he meant functions of linguistic misunderstandings. Yet, I have always felt, as other Wittgensteinians have, that some philosophical problems involve more than this. I have in mind here the pressing practical concerns that coalesce in what philosophers call normative concepts (moral, social, and political concepts). The resolution of this tension can be stated thus: Wittgenstein was right about certain philosophical problems being the expressions of conceptual confusion, but wrong about this being the case for everything that is called “philosophical problem.” He thought that all philosophical questions betray confusion—and was wrong about this, for only some do. With this background in place, the knot I have struggled to untie is this: How can it be that our grasp of the concept of racism both is and is not a deep disquietude? That is, how can it be that the philosophical problem—“What is racism?”—is a function of conceptual confusion, on the one hand, and not a function of conceptual confusion, on the other? How can it be a legitimate question and a confused one, simultaneously? This sums up my puzzlement.

 Wittgenstein (1983, p. 325 / Part VI, 23).  Wittgenstein (2009).

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Philosophically, part of the problem with the concept of racism is that we don’t have a clear understanding of its grammar. What is lacking is an overview, a surveyable representation, of the concept. However, another part of the problem—and the much more important part of the problem, in my way of thinking—is a distinctly normative difficulty: one that calls for a decision about how the term “racism” ought to be used. I have discussed this two-tiered problem, above, so my remarks here will be brief. Within the philosophical theory of racism there is much misunderstanding about the special difficulties that the concept of racism poses, and this creates a cloud of confusion surrounding the kind of inquiry needed to solve the problem of definition. This is why I think some Wittgensteinian analysis—“Philosophy leaves everything where it is”24—is called for. For by leaving the grammar of “racism” and “racist” where it is, perspicuous descriptions of said grammar can reveal, among other things, the heavy contestation of the concept, along with the incompatible norms that partly constitute it. I claim in this book that once the descriptive task is over— once we have cleared away the dustbins of confusion (increasingly exacerbated by contemporary theory)25—what is brought into clear view is the task that lies before us. That task, as theorists-driven-by-certain-political-­ values, is one of making prescriptive determinations about how the term “racism” ought to be used. In other words, what is rendered perspicuous is that the question “What is racism?” is not a metaphysical question about an ontological nature: an essence given independent of our linguistic practices and moral values. Rather, what this question is about is how the word “racism” ought to be used: a norm given by the values and interests that inform the legitimate use of this term. Moreover, and more importantly, Wittgensteinian therapy reveals that theorists of racism sometimes hide behind a veil of ontology. They do this whenever they pretend their theories of racism are mere descriptions that are neutral on controversial normative matters, so that it is unnecessary for them to enter the political space of conceptual contestation. A philosophy that “leaves everything where it is” can take us some distance; we can achieve clarity about the normative challenges facing theory.  Wittgenstein (2009, §124).  I do not claim to dissolve all or even most conceptual confusions surrounding the concept of racism. Nor do I claim to provide a surveyable representation of the concept of racism, as that would be a purely descriptive task (e.g., to show that racism is a focal concept rather than a family resemblance concept) and my interest in the concept is primarily prescriptive. Most of the conceptual confusions that are discussed in this book are those related to the problem of how best to conceptualize a moral-philosophical approach to racism. 24 25

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Having done so, it will have run its course and no longer prove useful beyond this limit. For prescriptive theory involves prescriptive judgment. In the context of choosing the best or most appropriate definition, the decision called for assumes the form of a “should” claim. This, in turn, seems to call for prescriptive analysis of the kind Haslanger describes as “ameliorative analysis” (or what others call “conceptual engineering”).26 Philosophy, then, should leave the concept of racism where it is when it is tasked with the goal of clearing away confusions that are rooted in linguistic misunderstanding. And part of this is what is going on in the theory of racism, or so I argue in the first three chapters of this book. But once the confusion is cleared up, we see perspicuously what it is we have been trying to ask all along in repeatedly stating to ourselves, “But what is racism, really?” Any Wittgensteinian philosopher who says it is confused to ask this question (because of linguistic misunderstandings) will not, cannot, be taken seriously. There is a substantive problem here, one that does not dissolve with the dissolution of our confusions. But the Wittgensteinian too is right that conceptual clarity (the clearing away of confusions rooted in linguistic misunderstandings) can help us see what this problem amounts to. Conceptual clarity reveals the work that remains to be done: prescriptive decision-making about how best to articulate the concept of racism. In Chap. 5, I call the nature of prescriptive disagreement about racism “metalinguistic negotiation.” The meaning of racism is a negotiation in the sense that it is up to us, as individuals and as a linguistic community, to set the limits on this term.

1.5   Chapter Summaries The book comprises nine chapters, divided into three parts. Part I: Racism Without Ontology (Chaps. 2, 3, and 4) articulates Wittgenstein’s picture of language, his semantic account of grammar and meaning, and other important notions in his philosophy of language. Chapter 2, “Introduction: Toward a Conventionalist Framework,” explains the significance of later Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language for analyzing racism. It begins with a discussion of three approaches to the question “What is racism?”: metaphysical, descriptive, and prescriptive analysis. It then turns to the metaphysical approach, which currently dominates philosophical theorizing about racism. Scholars that in many respects  Haslanger (2012). I briefly discuss her approach in Chap. 1.

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advance vastly different conceptions of racism—for example, Leonard Harris, Clevis Headley, Tommie Shelby, and Jorge Garcia—all take the metaphysical approach for granted. For the metaphysician, the meaning of “racism” is the object which this word stands for, and a definition of “racism” is an ontological description of this object. I call these presuppositions into doubt. The bulk of the chapter lays out and defends an alternative set of presuppositions, rooted in Wittgenstein’s conventionalist picture of language, grammar, and meaning. My chief conclusion is that an explanation of racism is not the description of an ontological reality but the expression of a rule of representation. The upshot is that the problem of defining “racism” need not be construed as a debate about an ontological nature. It can instead be construed as a debate about determining the most normatively defensible representational practice. Chapter 3, “Re-defining ‘Definition’: An Argument for Conventionalism,” builds on my Wittgensteinian contention that the meaning of “racism” is its use, when it is used in accordance with the rules for its proper use. I argue that this conventionalist picture of meaning best accounts for two sets of seemingly incompatible intuitions in the theory of racism. Definitions of “racism,” like definitions generally, have contingent and necessary features. Some theorists stress the contingent side of definition: the word “racism” had an origin in time; the term was invented to serve specific purposes; and its meaning has been modified over time. Others, by contrast, stress the necessary side of definition: racism is a racial phenomenon; and racism is always wrong. Some of racism’s contingent and necessary features can seem incompatible given further assumptions. For instance, if the meaning of “racism” evolves, then it seems false that racism has an essential nature. Because there are oppositional pressures originating from each side of this conceptual divide, it can seem incoherent to theorize racism from both a priori and a posteriori perspectives. This has led some philosophers to pick one side over the other; hence, it has been a source of contestation among theorists of racism. However, I maintain that there is truth in both sets of intuitions, for each describes different aspects of linguistic convention. After reconciling these intuitions under the banner of conventionalism, I go on to dissolve conceptual confusion in Clevis Headley’s constructivist and Leonard Harris’ realist approaches to racism.27 I ultimately conclude that 27  In addition to characterizing his approach as “constructivist,” Headley (2000) variously describes his approach as “empirical,” “sociocultural,” “naturalistic,” and “institutionalist.” Harris (1998), by contrast, describes his own approach as “objectivist” and “realist.”

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empirical and a priori approaches to racism are compatible when properly regarded. Chapter 4, “Re-defining Meaning: Defending Semantic Internalism over Externalism,” considers the objection that conventionalism’s picture of meaning is predicated on a debunked Wittgensteinian semantics. It thus considers the dominant approach to semantics in the philosophy of language, semantic externalism. This approach holds that the meaning of a referring expression (a kind term) is the kind to which it refers, where a kind is a language-independent essence. The essence of a kind term is thought to be the “internal nature” of the objects falling under its extension. Moreover, this internal nature is thought to be discoverable by the relevant science. Wittgenstein’s conventionalism, by contrast, provides an internalist rather than an externalist semantics, because it posits that grammar is arbitrary (a matter of convention) and thus not responsible to the facts. If this is correct, then there is no essence of racism for science to discover. I argue that Kripke and Putnam’s seminal arguments for externalism can be used to support conventionalism; hence they do not demonstrate the plausibility of externalist semantics over internalist semantics. I conclude that Wittgensteinian semantics should not be rejected on the basis of standard arguments for externalism. Part II: Theorizing Conceptual Disagreement (Chaps. 5 and 6) explores the nature of philosophical disagreement about the concept of racism, in light of Wittgensteinian semantics. Chapter 5, “Re-defining ‘Disagreement’: Rationality Without Final Solutions,” challenges the widespread assumption that disagreement about the nature of racism is disagreement about a matter of fact. This assumption is surely false if conventionalism provides the correct picture of meaning and definition. On conventionalism, disagreement about the correct definition of “racism” is disagreement about a norm. That is, disputes about “what racism is” are part of an ongoing process of “metalinguistic negotiation.” The object of this negotiation is a norm, a representational practice. And the method of negotiation consists of pragmatic advocacy in support of a picture about what the term “racism” ought to mean. I also defend, at some length, the contention that metalinguistic negotiations can be rational. Chapter 6, “Re-defining ‘Philosophical Analysis’: Not Descriptive Analysis, or Conservatism, but Pragmatic Revisionism,” considers the question “How should the word ‘racism’ be used?” I argue that answering this question requires that philosophical theory start from a substantive

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value. One such value has been explicitly proposed by some and widely presupposed by others. This is the norm that commonsense thinking about racism must be preserved by an adequate philosophical definition of “racism.” I call this the presumption of conservatism. I develop a framework for assessing this presumption and consider the work of Lawrence Blum, Joshua Glasgow, Jorge Garcia, Tommie Shelby, and others. I conclude that the moral status of ordinary usage is problematic, because, among other things, it reflects an individualistic conception of racism that serves white interests. Therefore, prescriptive theory ought to adopt a pragmatic revisionist approach to racism. Such an approach is one that aims at defining “racism” to meet a particular purpose, accepting along the way, where necessary, substantive revisions and extensions of ordinary usage. Part III: Toward a Prescriptive Theory of Racism (Chaps. 7, 8, and 9) develops a normative-pragmatic framework for articulating a moralist theory of racism, predicated on Wittgensteinian semantics. Chapter 7, “Adequacy Conditions for a Prescriptive Theory of Racism: Toward an Oppression-Centered Account,” articulates criteria for a prescriptive theory of racism and introduces an oppression-centered theory of racism. I propose three adequacy criteria. First, prescriptive theory ought to accommodate usage of “racism” that corresponds to the legitimate need we have for the convention. Second, the explanatory condition holds that a theory of “racism” should seek to explain one form of racism in terms of more basic forms, viz. those that most closely meet the need for the convention. Third, a theory of racism should, as much as possible, resolve practical problems prompted by ordinary usage of “racism,” and should avoid generating any practical problems of its own. My case for defining “racism” as racial oppression is made by reference to these three criteria. Along the way, I repudiate Tommie Shelby and Charles Mills’ arguments against moralist accounts of racism and draw from my oppression theory to illustrate how it might be used to show that implicit racial bias and white privilege are racist phenomena. Chapter 8, “Racial Oppression and Grammatical Pluralism: A Critique of Jorge Garcia on Racist Belief,” assesses the most influential recent ­theory of racism—Jorge Garcia’s volitional account—in light of the criteria articulated in the previous chapter. My central criticism, developed throughout the chapter, is that the term “racist belief” has at least four meanings relative to four distinct contexts of application. Three of these four uses escape Garcia’s volitional analysis. What is more, all of these uses, including Garcia’s volitional use, correspond to a contributing cause of

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racial oppression. Consequently, I conclude that my oppression approach to racism better accommodates ordinary usage of “racist belief” than does Garcia’s analysis. As my argument unfolds, I develop a pragmatic case for retaining each kind of racist belief, including a novel theory of intrinsically racist belief. Chapter 9, “Coda,” closes with a brief summary of the main conclusions of the book. It points to avenues for further research and adds some additional details to my prescriptive proposal that racism is (should be defined as) racial oppression.

References Appiah, K. Anthony. 1990. Racisms. In Anatomy of Racism, ed. David T. Goldberg. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Blum, Lawrence. 2002. “I’m not a Racist, But…”: The Moral Quandary of Race. Ithaca/London: Cornell University Press. Boxill, Bernard. 1992. Blacks and Social Justice. Rev. ed. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield. Corlett, J.  Angelo. 2003. Race, Racism & Reparations. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Curry, Tommy J. 2017. The Man-Not: Race, Class, Genre and the Dilemmas of Black Manhood. Philadelphia: Temple University Press. Dummett, Michael. 2004. The Nature of Racism. In Racism in Mind, ed. Michael P. Levine and Tamas Pataki, 27–34. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Garcia, Jorge L.A. 1996. The Heart of Racism. Journal of Social Philosophy 27: 5–45. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9833.1996.tb00225.x. Gordon, Lewis R. 1995. Bad Faith and Antiblack Racism. Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press International. Harris, Leonard. 1998. The Concept of Racism: An Essentially Contested Concept? The Centennial Review XLII (2): 217–232. Haslanger, Sally. 2004. Oppressions: Racial and Other. In Racism in Mind, ed. Michael P. Levine and Tamas Pataki, 97–123. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. ———. 2012. Resisting Reality: Social Construction and Social Critique. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Headley, Clevis. 2000. Philosophical Approaches to Racism: A Critique of the Individualist Perspective. Journal of Social Philosophy 31 (Summer): 223–257. https://doi.org/10.1111/0047-2786.00043. Jones, Richard A. 2013. The Black Book: Wittgenstein and Race. Lanham: University Press of America.

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Locke, Alain L. 1991. Values and Imperatives. In The Philosophy of Alain Locke: Harlem Renaissance and Beyond, ed. Leonard Harris, 31–50. Philadelphia: Temple University Press. Mills, Charles W. 1997. The Racial Contract. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. ———. 2003. ‘Heart Attack’: A Critique of Jorge Garcia’s Volitional Conception of Racism. The Journal of Ethics 7 (1): 29–62. Special Issue: “Race, Racism, and Reparations”. Mitchell-Yellin, Benjamin. 2018. A View of Racism: 2016 and America’s Original Sin. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 13 (1). https://doi.org/10.26556/ jesp.v13i1.253. Putnam, Hilary. 2004. Ethics without Ontology. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Shelby, Tommie. 2016. Dark Ghettos: Injustice, Dissent, and Reform. Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. Wittgenstein, Ludwig. 1983. Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics. Rev ed., ed. Georg H. von Wright and Gertrude E.M. Anscombe and trans. Gertrude E.M. Anscombe. Cambridge: MIT Press. ———. 2009. Philosophical Investigations. 4th ed., ed. and trans. Peter M.S. Hacker and Joachim Schulte. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell. Abbreviated PI.

PART I

Racism Without Ontology

CHAPTER 2

The Problem of Definition: Toward a Conventionalist Framework

2.1   Introduction: On the Question “What Is Racism?” 2.1.1  The Philosophical Question The problem of definition, of defining the word “racism,” is succinctly ­captured in the question “What is racism?” Unsurprisingly, philosophers disagree about how to answer it. Disagreement is so prevalent that Tommie Shelby posits the following “second-order question”: How should first-­ order disputes about the meaning of the terms “racism,” “racist,” and other cognates be resolved? “[W]hat must be established to demonstrate the correctness or superiority of a particular account of racism.”1 What, in other words, constitutes proper methodology with respect to theorizing racism? In this first chapter, and the next, I begin to reflect on these questions. The form of words “What is racism?” can be used to express different questions. Consider the question of the linguistic novice or noncompetent user of the term “racism.” Think, for example, of the child who puts this question to her parent. In language-learning context what the child requests is an everyday explanation, or a set of such explanations, for applying the word “racism” correctly. An everyday 1

 Shelby (2014, 58).

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explanation is one that specifies what, on conventional usage, can and cannot be called “racism”—that is, the conditions or criteria for correctly applying the term in one’s linguistic community. Everyday parlance permits the gloss that the child acquires the requisite knowledge of racism when she masters the application of the term in accordance with conventional norms. Prevailing trends in the philosophy of language would caution against this everyday wisdom. For they would argue that the kind of knowledge one acquires through education and the mastery of linguistic techniques— namely, the ability to participate in the various language-games we play with the word “racism”—is not, first and foremost, knowledge of the phenomenon of racism, but of a linguistic convention. In other words, these philosophers believe that knowledge of the word “racism” must be distinguished from knowledge of racism itself. The child who knows how to use the term “racism” knows what it conventionally refers to; however, it is a further question whether what the term conventionally refers to is the phenomenon of racism. Or, to articulate the worry in semantic terms: it is a further question whether the true meaning of “racism” is to be identified with the conventional meaning of “racism.” I call this the skeptical worry. The skeptical worry is premised on the idea that questions about ontology (“What is racism?”) and questions about language (“How is the word ‘racism’ used?”) are clearly distinct and that, consequently, the relationship between them is in need of investigation. In particular, whether the nature of racism is fully (or even partly) expressed in everyday usage of the term “racism” needs to be established. For it might turn out that everyday usage is mistaken. As Shelby worries in his well-known critique of Jorge Garcia: “But ordinary usage, no matter how broad or entrenched, is not morally infallible. There are many condemnatory thick concepts that have dubious moral content (e.g., ‘fornication,’ ‘slut,’ ‘shack up,’ ‘fag,’ even ‘nigger’). …[I]t simply is not reasonable to allow ordinary usage to determine substantive moral questions.”2 Shelby is advancing the normative judgment that philosophers should not resolve substantive moral questions by reference to ordinary usage. However, as will be shown below, his normative judgment is grounded in a metaphysical assumption: that conventional usage of the term “racism” might not track the true meaning of this term, which is determined by the real nature of racism. 2

 Shelby (2002, 412).

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When the philosopher asks “What is racism?” clearly she is not asking the child’s question, for although the child and the philosopher’s questions are identical in sentential form, the questions expressed in each instance are different. Each question, for example, springs from a different set of needs or concerns. The child, when she masters the conventional meaning of “racism,” acquires the capacity of linguistic competency—the ability to form meaningful sentences with the word “racism,” to understand other people’s application of the term, and to think and converse intelligibly with others about (what is called) racism. But this is not what the philosopher masters or hopes to master in finding an adequate answer to the question, “What is racism?” For one thing, the philosopher who raises this question already has such abilities and raises it in the face of having them. For another, the possibility of raising the philosophical question presupposes linguistic mastery over the use of the word “racism.” What, then, does the philosopher hope to gain by asking “What is racism?”? The answer will largely depend on the context in which the question is raised and the purpose for raising it. One problem that prompts the question is vast disagreement about what racism is in moral and sociopolitical discourse. Philosophers of racism have largely focused on this context, and not without reason. The aim of moral-philosophical analysis is to articulate a definition of “racism” that is well suited for purposes of moral representation. This presupposes that “racism” is a moral term, a term of moral criticism. This differentiates it from subjective terms, like “gross,” which fail to carry normative weight. If something is called  racist, the normative valence invoked is not a mere subjective disapproval. The normative valence of “racism” (its critical function) also should be distinguished from the valence of “bad,” and similar such notions, which are critical, but not in the way “racism” is. To complain that something is bad, in many circumstances, is not to appeal to a ground for correction (“He’s dressed badly”). Other examples include terms like “fat” and “colored person.” These terms often have negative connotations, but they are not critical terms per se. If something is racist, however, then what is wrong is essentially objectionable and stands in need of correction. The critical aspect of “racism,” in other words, belongs to its meaning, to the essence of how we use it. The question for theory thus becomes: How can the term “rac-

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ism” be defined, so as to meet our need for moral criticism, in the face of disagreement about what it means in normative contexts? This is what I call “the moral context,” which is the focus of this book. One approach to the question “What is racism?” has it that it should be settled by reference to the fact of the matter—the nature of racism itself. Below, I call this a metaphysical approach to the philosophical question. The main goal of this chapter, and the next, is to challenge this approach by undermining one of its central presuppositions. In Part I, I argue that what the philosopher hopes to gain by raising the question “What is racism?” is a theory and definition of the word “racism” which is useful for certain practical ends. The philosophical question is internally related to a set of challenges, and the relation is such that answering it is tantamount to proposing something of a solution to them in the form of an explanation or definition. I do not claim that the practical challenges I discuss in later chapters (e.g., the problems of overusage and moral disagreement) are the only ones posed by the philosophical question. For outside the moral context I am interested in there may be other theoretical problems and endeavors connected with it. For instance, social scientists might debate the nature of racism for purposes of explaining certain social phenomena. In such a context, the moral problems that interest me are unlikely to be salient, for the aim of defining “racism” for social scientific purposes may be far removed from moralist concerns, such as the problem of moral disagreement. Scholars concerned with these issues may have  little reason to worry about how everyday folk use the term to meet their purposes. Manuel Vargas believes it is important to distinguish three different approaches to conceptual analysis: metaphysical, diagnostic, and prescriptive.3 Vargas uses the concept of responsibility to illustrate: One question is what we might call metaphysical in the broad sense: ‘What is the nature of responsibility?’ Other questions include [the diagnostic question]: ‘What do we think about responsibility?’ and [the prescriptive question:] ‘What should we think about responsibility?’ In principle, we might offer different answers to each of these questions, although they will presumably overlap in various ways. 3

 Vargas (2005, 402).

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Vargas’ three approaches to philosophical analysis roughly map on to Sally Haslanger’s (despite her use of different terminology). She writes: “There are at least three common ways to answer ‘What is W?’ questions: descriptive, conceptual and ameliorative.”4 I explain each of these, in turn. One of the major aims of this book is to argue that something like Vargas’ prescriptive question and Haslanger’s ameliorative approach provide the proper framework for theorizing racism. On Haslanger’s terminology, conceptual analysis (descriptive analysis, on my terminology) provides an analysis of our ordinary concept of X, that is, the prevailing conception of a given community. Some analysts turn to their own  conceptual intuitions to analyze X; others rely on “folk” intuitions and turn to empirical methods.5 In either case, an assumption is made that what is said about X is the source of our concept of X. Descriptive analysis (metaphysical analysis, on my terminology), by contrast, provides an analysis of X itself, that is, the object which the ordinary concept purports to track.6 The difference between conceptual and descriptive approaches is that the object of descriptive analysis is X itself, whereas the object of conceptual analysis is the ordinary concept of X. The third approach—ameliorative analysis—differs from the latter approaches by being unapologetically normative. Ameliorative analysis (normative analysis, on my terminology) articulates the concept of X that is best suited to meet the legitimate goals or purposes for such a concept.7 As aforementioned, I leave open the possibility that “What is racism?” might be used to express other philosophical questions. However, for purposes of this book, I suppose that Vargas and Haslanger provide a more or less comprehensive analysis of the sentence “What is X?” within the ­context of philosophical theory. In this book, I use the following  Haslanger (2012, 367).  Haslanger’s conceptual question roughly corresponds to Vargas’ diagnostic question. The major difference is that, for Vargas, diagnostic analysis is preliminary to prescriptive analysis. The point of diagnosing ordinary usage is to determine whether it ought to be conserved or revised. 6  Haslanger’s descriptive question corresponds to Vargas’ metaphysical question. 7   Haslanger’s ameliorative question roughly corresponds to Vargas’ prescriptive question. 4 5

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terminology in discussing three types of philosophical analysis, each of which has a distinct conceptual aim8: Approaches to Conceptual Analysis 1. Metaphysical Analysis. This philosophical project asks what X itself is—independent of the prevailing concept of X—and may be a priori or a posteriori; it is a priori if it looks to conceptual intuitions alone as the means of disclosing the true nature of this entity;  it is a posteriori if it looks to scientific disciplines as the source of true descriptions of this entity (Vargas’ metaphysical analysis; Haslanger’s descriptive analysis) 2. Descriptive Analysis. This philosophical project asks what our ordinary concept of X is (or what the ordinary meaning of the term “X” is) (Vargas’ diagnostic analysis; Haslanger’s conceptual analysis9) 3. Prescriptive Analysis. This philosophical project asks what our concept of X ought to be (or what the meaning of the term “X” ought to be); for instance, the analyst might begin by asking what legitimate purposes we have (if any) for applying the concept X, and which concept of X works best for achieving said purposes (Vargas’ prescriptive analysis; Haslanger’s ameliorative analysis)10 8  Philosophers may wonder and disagree about whether these three philosophical methodologies should be described as “conceptual analysis.” Frank Jackson’s account of conceptual analysis, for example, seems to leave no room for normative analysis. For my part, I see no reason to adopt a narrow view of conceptual analysis. For a defense of this position, see David Plunkett’s (2011) argument that Jackson’s representationalist conception of “conceptual analysis” is objectionable for leaving out normative approaches that provide expressivist analyses of normative concepts. 9  I invoke the term descriptive here in order to remain neutral with respect to the aims of descriptive analysis. This makes it similar to Haslanger’s use of the term. For instance, in considering the example, “What is knowledge?” she writes: “Following a conceptual approach, one is asking: What is our concept of knowledge? and looks to a priori methods such as introspection for an answer. Taking into account intuitions about cases and principles, one hopes eventually to reach a reflective equilibrium” (2012, 367). I don’ find the term “conceptual” helpful here, for the term is generally used in reference to all three approaches (and others). I thus prefer the term “descriptive,” which is more consistent with philosophical usage. See, for example, Anil Gupta (2015, section 1.4) on “descriptive definitions.” 10  Haslanger demonstrates her normative approach by providing analyses of race and gender. She prefaces her arguments with a methodological remark: “I’ve cast my inquiry as an analytical—or what I here call an ameliorative—project that seeks to identify what legitimate purposes we might have (if any) in categorizing people on the basis of race or gender, and to develop concepts that would help us achieve these ends” (2012, 366).

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A major task of this book is to assess each of these approaches. I ultimately defend approach 3. Approach 1, metaphysical analysis, is assessed and rejected in Part I (the first three chapters). Approach 2, descriptive analysis, is assessed and rejected in Part II (Chaps. 4 and 5). Approach 3, prescriptive analysis, is defended in Parts II and III (Chaps. 6, 7 and 8). I begin, then, with what I take to be the dominant approach to the philosophical analysis of racism, viz. metaphysical analysis. My aim in this chapter and the next is to argue that the approach rests on a dubious ontological presupposition. To assess it, I offer a Wittgenstein-inspired analysis of some core concepts in the philosophy of language: definition, meaning, and language. 2.1.2  Metaphysical Analysis My reason for beginning with an appraisal of metaphysical analysis is that this seems to be the dominant approach in the philosophy of racism. To demonstrate this, I will briefly cite textual evidence from some leading philosophers in the field. These philosophers vehemently disagree about substantive and methodological questions, but nonetheless agree that philosophical theorizing about racism is essentially a metaphysical enterprise. Consider Tommie Shelby’s depiction of what I call the philosophical question. “The first question [‘What is racism?’] is conceptual,” he writes. “The aim is to articulate, as precisely as we can, just what we are, or should be, referring to when we call something ‘racism.’”11 Taken out of context, this passage seems initially to speak against a metaphysical interpretation. For he describes the philosophical question as “conceptual” rather than metaphysical. Further, his follow-up sentence recognizes descriptive and prescriptive analyses as legitimate approaches to “What is racism?”—for he writes that philosophical theory focuses on “what we are, or should be, referring to when we call something ‘racism’” (my italics). Finally, he seems to leave out any reference to metaphysical analysis. So is my characterization wrong? If Shelby were expressing his sympathies for descriptive and prescriptive analysis in this passage, he would hold that all that is needed to settle the conceptual question are adequate answers to the descriptive and prescriptive questions. The idea would be that once philosophers have determined how the term “racism” is and/or ought to be used (how we do and/or  Shelby (2014, 58).

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should think about racism), there would be nothing left for metaphysical analysis to investigate, nothing of significance that might enhance our understanding of racism’s nature. This reading is only prima facie plausible if the quotation is taken in isolation. Taken within the broader context of the passage, things look different. What the above interpretation ignores is the broader textual context in which Shelby makes these remarks. It also ignores what he says elsewhere (which I discuss below). His aim is neither to conflate descriptive and prescriptive approaches to philosophical analysis, nor to suggest that one or both of these approaches suffice to resolve the philosophical question. His aim is rather to group these approaches together, as possible ways of answering the philosophical question, so as to distinguish them from attempts to settle two different racism-related questions. To place the above remarks in context, this passage states that there are three fundamental questions in the philosophy of racism: . What is racism? 1 2. What makes racism objectionable? 3. And what is the appropriate practical response to racism? The first thing to observe here is that Shelby does not use the term “conceptual question” to contrast with “metaphysical question,” but to contrast with “non-conceptual questions.” For Shelby, (2) and (3) are not conceptual but practical questions (the former being a moral question, the latter being a political one). Theories that address these questions, therefore, are normative approaches. In other words, Shelby’s use of  “conceptual question” assumes a non-committal stance on whether the conceptual question is metaphysical or not. The point of this passage is to convey to the reader that standard approaches to philosophical analysis—metaphysical, descriptive, and prescriptive—are competing approaches to one and the same question, (1). He is here offering a neutral description of the state of the field, thereby evincing recognition of several competing approaches to (1). If the above passage by Shelby reflects his neutral description of approaches to question (1)—“What is racism?”—the question remains as to what his own considered position involves. Which of my three approaches does Shelby himself favor? He seems to favor metaphysical analysis. For him, definitions of “racism” are ontological assertions. To defend this claim, I present evidence of Shelby’s considered position. In an

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earlier paper, he states that philosophers should determine the correct referent of “racism” prior to explaining what makes racism wrong; that is, philosophers should settle question (1) before moving on to question (2). This recommendation seems to be predicated on the logical contention that question (1) logically precedes question (2). In making this point he seems to endorse metaphysical analysis as the proper approach to “What is racism?”: I want to suggest an alternative to both the “thick concept” and “stipulative” approaches, one that takes place in two distinct parts. In the first, we make use of the behavioral sciences (including psychology and history) to define the concept of racism in a morally neutral way. Our reconstruction of the concept should illuminate the history, structure, psychological mechanisms, and social consequences of the phenomenon. Once we have properly identified its referent, we can then offer our moral evaluation, but without antecedently assuming that everything that is properly called “racism” on our theoretical account will turn out to be immoral. (My italics)12

Whereas ordinary usage reflects the prevailing conception of racism, the behavioral sciences determine the concept of racism. The suggestion thus seems to be that racism is an ontological entity that exists independent of the prevailing conception. For example, racism on the ordinary conception is always wrong, but racism itself might not be, at least not in every instance. That Shelby favors a metaphysical analysis of racism explains why it is misguided, on his view, to make normative judgments about racism prior to settling question (1). For the moral status of racism partly depends on what racism consists in. This further explains why, for Shelby, ordinary usage of “racism” is not to be trusted. Recall, Shelby was previously quoted (in Sect. 2.1.1) as saying that ordinary usage is not morally infallible. Apparently, what makes ordinary usage fallible is the possibility of correspondence failure: the current referent of the word “racism” (as it is ordinarily used) might not correspond to the metaphysical fact of the matter (i.e., facts about racism itself). So his claim about the logical priority of question (1) seems to be motivated by the skeptical worry (the worry that the conventional meaning of “racism” and the true meaning of “racism” might diverge). Haslanger, who is sympathetic to Shelby’s ideological approach to racism, has recently endorsed his methodological claim that the “empirical question” (“What is racism?”) is logically prior to “normative questions”  Shelby (2002, 413). I removed Shelby’s original italics from this passage.

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about racism. She thus seems to endorse metaphysical analysis over and against ameliorative analysis (despite the fact that she endorses ameliorative analysis for theorizing race).13 Perhaps more surprisingly, Shelby finds allies among those who reject important aspects of his approach. Jorge Garcia rejects Shelby’s substantive theory of racism, for, among other things, Shelby offers a “political morality” analysis of racism, while Garcia offers a “personal morality” analysis. This disagreement notwithstanding, Garcia shares Shelby’s preference for a metaphysical approach to defining “racism.”14 Garcia uses the term “conceptual analysis” in a way that maps on to what I call “metaphysical analysis” and argues that this is the correct approach—to the exclusion of various alternatives, including pragmatic approaches: The appropriate objective of conceptual inquiry into racism is to explicate its nature. VAR [Garcia’s acronym for his Volitional Approach to Racism] is an ontic claim about racism’s reality, its essence and nature, undertaken through examining our discourse to identify the assumptions and insights behind it. It is not a mere proposed definition of a word, a question of whether “racism is morally wrong by definition.” Rather, the issue is whether, given what we find racism to be, it can sometimes be other than immoral. Such an account must answer to common sense but also, contrary to what Glasgow suggests, can and should be used to correct (“revis[e]”) minor inconsistencies in usage and clarify cases where we are unsure what to say.15 It is “useful” chiefly in illuminating reality and extending our understanding. Its chief goal is not to advance a political agenda (as in Haslanger16), nor to guide social change (as in Blum17), nor to help craft public policy (as in Corlett18). Nor, contrary to Glasgow’s insouciance, is it legitimate for 13  Haslanger (2017, 1–2). “I embrace this invitation and, more specifically, seek to understand the social phenomenon of racism: what it is and how it works, as a precursor to the normative questions raised in (a-c).” Her account of racism, as it happens, leaves room for normative critique, largely because of how she conceives of racism: as a kind of social practice that involves distortive beliefs and attitudes. In this way, she can claim that the philosopher is both a kind of “social critic” and a kind of empirical analyst, one who is concerned with racism qua empirical phenomenon. I too endorse Shelby’s claim that the theorists of racism should be viewed as social critics in, more or less, his sense. 14  In his own words: “The problem is that my philosophical interest is not in the linguistic issue of how to ‘define’ the English term ‘racism,’ but rather in the questions of racism’s essential nature, that in which it consists, and its moral status” (Garcia 2011, 261). 15  Glasgow (2009). 16  Haslanger (2012, 2004). 17  Blum (2002). 18  Corlett (2003).

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people deliberately to extend words beyond their proper and recognized application simply to advance.19

An important methodological difference in Shelby and Garcia’s ­conceptions of metaphysical analysis is that Garcia maintains that the nature of racism can be determined a priori, whereas Shelby thinks it must be determined by reference to the behavioral sciences. For Garcia ordinary usage of “racism” roughly discloses the underlying nature of racism. His approach is a priori in that ordinary usage is determined, not by examining empirical data about “what people say” or “would say” about particular cases, but by examining his own intuitions about particular cases (and perhaps also what he thinks people do or would say about particular cases). Shelby, by contrast, favors the use of empirical data; and because he is suspicious of ordinary usage, he favors social scientific approaches that are not wedded to conserving ordinary usage. These differences notwithstanding, Garcia concurs with Shelby that some version of metaphysical analysis is the correct approach. Other metaphysical approach sympathizers include Leonard Harris and Clevis Headley, as I discuss in Chap. 3. Joshua Glasgow develops a non-­ metaphysical theory of racism. What he offers, he claims, is a descriptive theory, an account of how the term “racism” is ordinarily used.20 After developing this account, he suggests that ordinary usage might be mistaken. He writes: First, recall that focusing on the ordinary concept allows that we can deploy the term ‘racism’ in an incorrect manner. … Second, I don’t mean to deny that semantic externalism and the possibility of erroneous description might have a role to play: we can have false beliefs about the nature of racism, and various experts, including social theorists, might be able to shine a unique light on its nature and meaning.21

19  Garcia (2016, 229–230). He offers a similar criticism of Appiah’s (1990) approach to racism. “My project is not in this way ‘rationally [to] reconstruct’ racism in its intellectually strongest form the better to critique it. Rather, I am to capture, albeit in more precise form, what people, Black and White, are getting at in their ordinary talk about racism” (Garcia 1997, 20). 20  See my evaluation of Glasgow’s approach in Urquidez (2018), and Chap. 5. 21  Glasgow (2009, 92–3).

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This passage comes at the end of his paper. In effect, he is reminding the reader that his proposed definition of “racism” aims to describe what racism is for most people (the prevailing view), not what racism is in itself. To determine the nature of racism itself (independent of how people think about it), he says, it may be necessary to turn to “semantic externalism.” That is, it may be necessary to let the experts within the relevant social sciences determine what racism really is. Consequently, he is more suspicious of ordinary usage than Garcia seems to be, since he does not necessarily disagree with Shelby’s claim that ordinary usage may be metaphysically misleading. It is thus safe to conclude that several philosophers of racism are either sympathetic to metaphysical analysis or explicitly engaged in it. These philosophers would say that Shelby’s question (1)—the philosophical question, as I have termed it—logically precedes his questions (2) and (3). Philosophers like Shelby, Garcia, Harris, Headley, and Glasgow are sympathetic to the view that the ordinary concept of racism is responsible to some standard outside of ordinary usage. This approach entails a distinction between ontology and semantics, and I take this to be the reason why philosophers like Vargas and Haslanger distinguish the metaphysical and descriptive questions. For semantics is thought to track the prevailing conception of racism and not necessarily racism itself. Metaphysical questions are about reality; semantic questions are about language and commonsense thinking. With that, I now turn to an evaluation of metaphysical analysis, which I pursue by rejecting its fundamental premise. The basic premise of metaphysical analysis is this assertion: Ontological Presupposition: The term “racism” in an explanation of racism names something real (an object or kind). This object or kind—call it racism itself—is thought to have reality outside of how we conceive of racism in linguistic representation. That is, the nature of this reality is not determined by how the word “racism” is used, but by facts about racism itself. Call this the language-independence thesis. The point of philosophical theorizing— the point of articulating a definition of “racism”—is to specify the nature of this entity, so as to assess whether (and in what ways) our linguistic representations of racism accurately depict it. With the nature of racism itself on hand, philosophical theory can justify the correct explanation of racism. Whether the nature of racism itself is specifiable by reference to linguistic intuitions (as per Garcia) or discoverable by the relevant social science/s (as per Shelby, Haslanger, and Glasgow) is debatable; whether racism itself is a transhistorical and unchanging essence, or whether it is an immanent and

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evolving nature is debatable. But what is settled on the metaphysical approach is that the word “racism” names something real, something that does not depend on linguistic representation for its existence.

The ontological presupposition may lead (and, I believe, has led) many a philosopher to adopt several auxiliary propositions that are intuitively and/or plausibly linked to it. I consider three auxiliary propositions that I challenge directly in this book. My contention is not that endorsing the ontological presupposition commits one to all or any of these auxiliary propositions. My claim is rather that it makes such propositions plausible and natural, so natural in fact that one might take them for granted without consciously endorsing them. In such cases they function as pretheoretical assumptions. The logic of the first auxiliary proposition is as follows. If racism is an ontological entity, as Garcia holds, then the question “What is racism?” is best analyzed as “What is the nature of this entity?” Thusly understood, the aim of theorizing racism is thought to consist in providing an accurate description of its nature. (I intend for my use of “metaphysical analysis” to be neutral on the question of whether racism itself is best understood as a transcendent or transhistorical essence or whether it is best understood as an empirical and sociohistorical entity, such as a social practice.22) This in turn can naturally lead to the conviction that the proper aim of philosophical analysis is to provide the true definition of “racism,” this being the description that corresponds to the objective fact of the matter. In this way we arrive at the first auxiliary proposition: (a) An adequate philosophical definition of “racism” is a description of a mind-independent entity called racism itself.

Furthermore, if racism is a mind-independent entity, then the meaning of the word “racism” is plausibly conceived as the referent of this term (the object or kind it stands for). This opens the possibility of investigating this kind apart from how the word “racism” happens to be used within a given society. So, among other things, the ontological presupposition, in conjunction with 22  For two critical discussions of racism as a transhistorical and unchanging entity, see Garcia (1997, 8–10) and Headley (2000). Both philosophers reject the notion of racism as transhistorical and unchanging, but for very different reasons. I discuss Headley’s assessment of transhistorical approaches to racism in Chap. 3.

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proposition (a), renders semantic externalism a natural and intuitively plausible theory of meaning. In this way we arrive at the following contention: (b) The reality to which the term “racism” refers is best construed as a natural or social kind whose essence is given by its internal nature; therefore, only an externalist semantics (a certain mode of metaphysical analysis) is capable of specifying the nature of this entity.

Finally, if racism is a real entity, and if the proper goal of philosophical analysis is to provide a true description of this entity, then philosophical disagreement about the nature of racism must consist in disagreement about a matter of fact. In this way we arrive at the following contention: (c) Genuine disagreement about “what racism is” is disagreement about a matter of fact. This alone does not settle which facts are pertinent in resolving this disagreement. But it posits that there must be such facts.

In contrast to claims (a), (b), and (c), which I reject, I will argue that there is no such thing as racism itself. The implication of my argument, however, is not that racism is not real, but that the reality of racism is given by our representations of racism (i.e., by our linguistic conventions). Consequently, I defend the following theses: (a∗) An adequate philosophical definition of “racism” is not a description of a real entity, but an expression of a linguistic norm or rule for the use of the word “racism” and its cognates. (b∗) The term “racism,” as it is used in a definition of “racism,” does not refer to an entity; therefore, we do not need an externalist semantics to specify the nature of this entity. We should instead analyze the meaning of “racism” by reconstructing and evaluating (ordinary and non-ordinary) usage of “racism,” i.e., by doing conceptual justice to the pragmatic structures that underlie ordinary usage. (c∗) Disagreement about “what racism is” is not disagreement about a matter of fact, for it is not descriptive disagreement about whether an entity exists or about the nature of such an entity. Rather, the contestation in question is normative disagreement about a linguistic convention. The disagreement is also prescriptive, for it is disagreement about what the linguistic convention ought to be.

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I defend the first claim in this chapter and the next. I defend claim (b∗) in Chaps. 2 and 3. And I defend claim (c∗) in Chap. 4. My aim in this first chapter is to provide a preliminary defense of contention (a∗) over and against contention (a). That is, I begin making the case against the ontological presupposition. In the remainder of this chapter, I develop a Wittgenstein-inspired approach to Shelby’s second-order question: How should first-order disputes about the meaning of “racism” be resolved?

2.2   Grammar and Philosophy: A Conventionalist Approach This book taps underutilized resources in Wittgenstein’s later philosophy of language to address fundamental theoretical issues in the philosophy of racism. Accordingly, I engage Wittgensteinian scholarship, on one hand, and philosophy of racism scholarship, on the other. As the literature on Wittgensteinian philosophy is vast, I focus on strands that are compelling, both as interpretations of Wittgenstein and as defensible philosophy of language. I call this selection of his philosophy conventionalism. Section 2.2 discusses some pertinent elements of the Wittgensteinian picture of language. Section 2.3 develops the conventionalist framework. I begin by distinguishing descriptive and normative propositions. A descriptive proposition is one that describes. I will elucidate this notion by considering some examples: empirical, norm, and metaphysical descriptions. An empirical description describes a matter of empirical fact (“He went to the bank”). A norm description is a special subset of empirical description: it involves the description of human practice and normativity. “The word ‘bank’ has four letters in it” is an expression used to describe a linguistic norm. Another kind of norm description is what I will call a normative description. This is the statement and clarification of a norm—the kind used in theory and conceptual analysis. Another type of norm description is a norm-existence statement. This is a sociohistorical or anthropological statement of a norm—a statement to the effect that a norm exists (or has existed) or is in force. A norm-existence statement may be historical (“R was the rule in the 18th century”). A metaphysical description is a putative (but misguided) description of ultimate reality (on the analogy of empirical description). Descriptive propositions have in common that their truth or falsity is determined by facts about the natural world and our forms of life. Additionally, empirical and normative descriptions are contingently true or false, for they might have been otherwise.

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By way of contrast, a normative proposition is one that is used to lay down a rule. The central claim of Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language is that grammatical propositions are a subset of normative propositions. “A bachelor is an unmarried male” is an example of a grammatical proposition. “Racism is racial disregard” is another. If the Wittgensteinian analysis of these propositions is correct, then definitions of “racism” lay down norms for using words, including norms of description. Because grammatical propositions are not descriptive, they cannot be analyzed as descriptions of how words are used. Statements describing our conventions—such as statements about how “racism” is used, about which definitions of “racism” are in force, about how the word originated, about how it was used in the past, and about how it has evolved and is evolving today—are not grammatical propositions, in Wittgenstein’s sense of the term. The analysis that follows is meant to capture the central features of grammatical propositions. Additional details will be provided in subsequent chapters. 2.2.1  Meaning, Use, Understanding Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language starts from a fundamental picture of language. That picture can be summed up as follows: To speak a language is to do something, namely, to participate in a rule-governed activity (metaphorically, we can gloss what a speaker does with a linguistic expression as “making a move in a language-game,” where a language-game is a rule-­ governed practice that involves the use of words). The rules of this linguistic activity are expressed in everyday explanations of what words mean. Ordinary explanations of words are expressions of standards of semantic correctness. The minimal unit for making a move in a language-game is a sentence. This brief statement specifies the core of Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language that I will refer to as “conventionalism.”23 Stated differently, I give the 23  Wittgenstein calls his approach to philosophy grammatical. Although I sometimes invoke the term to refer to a philosophical approach, I prefer the term “conventionalism” for a few different reasons. First, by centering the debate on conventionalism rather than grammatical analysis, one shifts the discussion away from Wittgenstein toward a general position in the philosophy of language. This is where the debate should be, in my view. Hence we should debate conventionalism’s commitment to normativism, independent of whether we accept this or that other thesis from Wittgenstein. This is the way a lot of Glock’s work proceeds, and my approach is an attempt to model his, in this respect. Second, the term “grammatical” is most properly reserved for that which relates to grammar. I will generally use this term in connection with Wittgenstein’s view of grammar. (For him, “grammar” has narrow

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label “conventionalism” to a set of doctrines in the philosophy of language that reflect Wittgenstein’s views on: language, explanation of meaning, meaning, rules, and related concepts. Conventionalism is a central feature of Wittgenstein’s methodology (his so-called grammatical approach), but it can be discussed independent of Wittgenstein’s other commitments. Evidence of Wittgenstein’s conventionalist commitments can be found in various places, including his Philosophical Investigations,24 some of which will emerge throughout this discussion. I defend conventionalism in Part 1 of this book and presuppose it in Parts 2 and 3. The most fundamental notion in Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language is succinctly summarized in the elegant slogan, “meaning is use.” A more illuminating formulation, which Wittgenstein provides, is that for a large class of cases, though not all, the meaning of a word (or of a linguistic and broad uses. Most broadly, it refers to the set of rules governing  the use of language, including syntactical norms. More narrowly, the term refers to a subset of these rules: grammatical propositions (explanations of meaning).) Third, as I point out in Chap. 3, there are different kinds of grammatical analysis that are Wittgensteinian or Wittgenstein-inspired. Given Wittgenstein’s idiosyncratic use of the term “grammatical analysis,” the term is generally thought to entail commitment to other aspects of his philosophy, such as his view that philosophy is purely descriptive. But “grammatical analysis”—that is, the analysis of grammatical rules and rule-formulations—need not be restricted to pure description. Hence I prefer the term “conventionalism” to describe my own position. 24  See, for example (Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (2009, §198–199; §355). For a defense of applying the label “conventionalism” to Wittgenstein’s later philosophy, see Yemima Ben-Menahem (1998). See Glock (2005, 2008, 2018) for a defense of conventionalism against some recent objections. I treat “conventionalism” as the name of a set of doctrines, principally a conception of meaning and definition. In this regard, it links up with certain conceptions of necessity and meaning. For example, Robert Brandom (2000, 45–77; see also 1994) offers an expressivist view of necessity that fits well with conventionalism. In the context of Wittgenstein studies, conventionalism is sometimes thought to be a view in the philosophy of logic and mathematics. It is here connected with Michael Dummett’s objections to Wittgenstein’s account of rule-following (his so-called full-blooded conventionalism), as developed in his review of Wittgenstein’s Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics (1959). It is also connected with discussions of Wittgenstein’s so-called rulefollowing paradox (made famous by Kripke’s (1972) skeptical reading of Wittgenstein). For discussion about how Wittgenstein’s view differs from Dummett and Kripke’s readings of Wittgenstein, see Hacker’s Witgenstein’s Place in Twentieth-Century Analytic Philosophy (1996). For a helpful parsing of various interpretations of Wittgenstein’s account of grammatical norms, see Richard Amesbury’s “Norms and Normativity: Between Regulism and Regularism” (2005, 65–85). (He also helpfully brings Rorty, Derrida, and Habermas into the conversation—philosophers  whose works are not typically thought to be relevant to issues in the philosophy of language.)

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expression) is its use in the language.25 What does Wittgenstein mean by “use”? The type of use he has in mind is use, as given by grammar; that is, normative as opposed to descriptive use.26 Hence, ungrammatical uses do not count as uses that Wittgenstein recognizes, for they are like “moves” in a chess game that do not conform to the rules (we reject them as violations). Baker and Hacker elaborate: The sense in which the rules of chess describe the game of chess is that they specify how the game is to be played. That is not part of natural history — for natural history would have to include all the misuses and misapplications of rules (cf. MS 110 (Vol. V), 65). It is a normative description  — like the description of a legal system. To be precise, grammar (in Wittgenstein’s extended sense) states, rather than describes, the rules of language.27

Wittgenstein identifies meaning with use, but does not give either term a precise meaning. His view about meaning is not a theory of meaning, but an observation about the normal use of the term “meaning.” His claim is that “meaning” and “use” mean the same on normal usage—though only for a large class of cases. He is evidently singling out one of several uses of “meaning” for a select purpose.28 Wittgenstein’s interest in the concept of meaning is connected to his aim in philosophy, which is to foster understanding (which Baker and Hacker helpfully distinguish from knowledge). The concept of meaning is internally related to two other concepts, understanding and explanation. Wittgenstein identifies three criteria of understanding, that is, grounds for ascribing understanding to a person, for attributing to her a grasp of the meaning of an expression. A competent 25  Wittgenstein (2009, §43.) Baker and Hacker comment: “Wittgenstein observed that ‘meaning’ is a primitive concept (LW I, §332). And that is surely correct—it is not a sophisticated technical term for linguistic theorists, but an unsophisticated non-technical term for language-learners who do not understand an utterance or word. The form ‘What does “W” mean?’ belongs to it. So too do the forms ‘“W” means a V that is F’ and ‘“W” means the same as “V”’. But when the concept is expanded to include other words that do not fit into such standard forms, strains are manifest, and difficulties and indeterminacies emerge” (2005, 154). See their essay “Meaning and Use” (in 2005) and James Conant’s “Wittgenstein on Meaning and Use” (1998) for expositions of Wittgenstein’s account of meaning. 26  This term is from D. Z. Phillips (2005, 67), who attributes it to James Conant. 27  Baker and Hacker (2005, 147). 28  Wittgenstein recognizes the limitations of his description of “meaning.” For example, the terms “meaning” and “use” sometimes come apart, and they do so in different ways. For a detailed exposition, see section 4 of Baker and Hacker’s “Meaning and Use” in Volume 1 of their commentary on Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations (2005, 152–158).

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speaker understands an expression in her language if she knows how to use it in relevant contexts (use criterion); if she can say—that is, explain—what she means by her use of it in relevant contexts (explanatory criterion); and if she can respond appropriately to others’ use of it in relevant contexts (response criterion).29 This suggests that understanding is primarily a matter of what we do (an ability) rather than of inner processes (in the mind or brain). Correct explanation minimally involves providing examples of the proper use of a term or pointing to a suitable sample if available. Wittgenstein also spoke of what I will call speaker entitlements.30 If S understands an explanation of meaning, she is entitled to: (1) apply the corresponding term when its grounds of application obtain (for the explanation provides a priori knowledge of its grounds); (2) substitute one equivalent expression for another (legitimacy of substitution); and (3) exhibit her understanding of a term by using it, explaining it, and responding appropriately to its use by others (criteria of understanding).31 It might be objected that Wittgenstein’s criteria of understanding are subject to obvious counterexamples. First, don’t we sometimes use an expression correctly that we’re unable to explain? The answer, of course, is that we do. However, if one knows a word one is unable to explain on some occasion, that is because one can normally explain it. Wittgenstein does not hold that correct use and correct explanation never come apart, only that they normally converge. Indeed, we have criteria for saying that one “forgot” the meaning of a word. These criteria are not satisfied by someone who never remembers how to use it. A second counterexample points to the defective explanations that competent speakers sometimes provide. I might provide poor examples in explaining a family resemblance term or point to poor samples in giving an ostensive definition. Alternatively, one might leave an important aspect of use unmentioned. A competent speaker, however, will normally be able to see and correct these mistakes. Wittgenstein acknowledges defeasible criteria of misunder29  For detailed exposition and defense of Wittgenstein’s account of understanding meaning, see Baker and Hacker’s essay on the topic (“Understanding and Ability”), in Wittgenstein: Understanding and Meaning, Part 1: Essays (2005), especially section 6. Many of my arguments in this section and the next draw heavily from two essays in this volume, “Explanation” and “Meaning and Use.” 30  Baker and Hacker (2009, 50–52) 31  For a discussion of Wittgenstein’s account of “criteria” and grounds of application, see Peter Hacker’s “Criteria” in Volume 3 of his commentary on Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations (1990).

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standing: (a) the inability to explain a word; (b) the incorrect explanation of a word; and (c) the inability to apply a correct explanation one is able to give. In such cases, one’s “incorrect use will [normally] defeat the support given by his correct explanation to the assertion that he understands the word.”32 Another objection points to the fact that competent speakers may know how to use closely related, often intersubstitutable, word-pairs—like “nearly” and “almost,” “small” and “little,” and “shut” and “close”— without being able to explain the subtle differences in their grammar. Baker and Hacker reply that these cases do not establish lack of understanding. The internal relations between understanding, meaning, and explanation do not require of a person who understands an expression that he be able to give an overview of its use, “only that if he has used an expression on a given occasion and cannot explain what it means in that context of use, then he does not understand what he said or, other things being equal, what the expression thus used means.”33 First, they point out, it is giving a correct explanation that is a criterion of understanding, not giving a synopsis of use. To satisfy this criterion, it is not necessary to be able to explain, say, how “close” differs in meaning from “shut.” If one provides an accurate explanation of the former, that is sufficient for understanding. Second, the inability to provide a particular (kind of) explanation does not establish the inability to explain. We must not forget that most terms are variously explicable, often via different kinds of explanation (e.g., defining “apple” by analytic definition and by example). That a person cannot explain a word one way does not show she cannot explain it another way. Her ability to do so satisfies a criterion of understanding. Baker and Hacker point out that we should also budget for occasional forgetfulness. One may simply not have thought of an explanation. Yet, if another person prompts one by suggesting an explanation, and if one responds sincerely “Yes, of course. I should have thought of that,” this may be sufficient. It might be objected that the Wittgensteinian view of understanding denies the significance of expertise. It suggests that experts cannot know the real meanings of words, that they can’t know more than ordinary folk. To this I reply that the idea that scientific experts know the real meanings of words (by virtue of uncovering the internal or hidden natures of the kinds denoted by referring expressions) presupposes an externalist semantics—a  Baker and Hacker (2005, 41).  Baker and Hacker (2005, 42).

32 33

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position that I reject in Chap. 4. Knowledge that water is H2O is not a criterion of understanding the word “water” in most contexts of use. Similarly, knowledge of a term’s etymology and/or history usually is not relevant to understanding its normal meaning. The fact that Oziel fails to know that petroleum is extracted from rock strata does not count as evidence against his knowing the meaning of “petroleum.” If Oziel knows that petroleum is a substance that is used to produce fuel for vehicles, if he can describe the substance’s outer properties (its black color, liquid form) in circumstances where one encounters it, and if he is able to use this information in the context of communicating with others, then he knows the (ordinary) meaning of “petroleum.” Yet, it might be replied that there are contexts where such expertise is relevant to understanding; more generally, knowing the distinction between two closely related terms is salient in many contexts (e.g., academia, science, law). The Wittgensteinian reply to this worry is that normal and special contexts must be distinguished. In special contexts where one cannot explain “W,” this provides evidence of one’s failure to understand “W” in that context. This is perfectly compatible with understanding the ­normal use of “W.” 2.2.2  Explanation of Meaning 2.2.2.1 Grammatical Rule and Grammatical Proposition Wittgenstein’s conception of linguistic meaning presupposes the existence of rules. What is a rule? As it turns out, this is the wrong question to ask. For it makes us expect the wrong kind of answer. First, it leads down the rabbit hole of searching for the term’s referent, as though it were some kind of physical object or substance. Second, it encourages a reductionist account, the reduction of the normative to the non-normative. Rules cannot be non-normatively defined without distorting the concept rule. Does this mean we cannot say what kind of thing a rule is? We can say the kind of thing it is, but only by invoking normative notions that are more or less synonymous with it. Hence, a rule can be said to be a standard of correctness (a measure, a convention, etc.), but this account, apart from not being particularly illuminating, does not break free from the normative space we are trying to elucidate by means of the definition; in other words, the account is circular.

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Baker and Hacker provide an illuminating account of rules, one that is functionalist rather than descriptive or referential, for instead of telling us what a rule or standard “consists in,” they tell us the sorts of things we do with standards. They describe six significant roles or functions. The roles of explanations of meaning are special in that they antecede moves in a language-game, for they are conditions of the possibility of making such moves. These “normative practices” constitute the normative space within which linguistic activities and the practices they constitute take place. Baker and Hacker’s account also resists the temptation to analyze rules independent of their connection to explanations of meaning. For although we distinguish between a rule (the standard of correctness) and a rule-formulation (the form of words which is the expression of the rule), the two are internally related. Their account can be summed up as follows: A rule is a standard that is used in: teaching the meanings of terms; defining actions, generating forms of description, and determining the a­pplicability/inapplicability of corresponding characterizations of behavior (e.g., chess rules define the act of castling, generate the form of description “He castled,” and determine the applicability/inapplicability of characterizing someone as having castled); explaining or giving reasons for people’s behavior (e.g., “He stopped because the light was red”); predicting people’s behavior (e.g., “He just made the shot, so the other team will get the ball now”); justifying and criticizing people’s actions (e.g., “She did something wrong in lying (for lying is wrong)”); and participating in various forms of linguistic and extra-linguistic evaluation (e.g., “This act is illegal because it is a felony,” “This argument is logically valid because it has the form of modus ponens”). Wittgenstein took an interest in “normative practices” because he thought they were key to unraveling the mystery of how linguistic meaning is possible. Rules make it possible for language users to do the multiplicitous things we do with language. For instance, we ask questions, issue commands, give prayers, make requests, assert how things are, greet one another, express our feelings, question each other, engage in conversation, lay down moral imperatives and prohibitions, and so forth. All of these practices (language-games) involve speaking and hence, using words in accord with rules for proper use. That these practices are rule-governed is evidenced by the fact that there are correct and incorrect ways to participate in them. Thus, there is no such thing as greeting someone after talking to one for 20 minutes, except perhaps as a joke. Wittgenstein’s analysis of grammatical rules was developed to explain how linguistic meaning is possible. His reflections on grammar are

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s­ cattered throughout his later writings (especially in The Big Typescript).34 He uses the term grammar to signify everything that is necessary for sense, and this includes, not only syntactical rules, but rules for using words. Hence, it includes the lexicon, for lexical entries specify rules for the correct use of lexica. Grammar rules are what is essential to understanding the meaning of an expression. As conditions of sense, grammar rules are essential for comparing a proposition to reality. A grammatical rule is to be distinguished from a grammatical proposition. A grammatical rule is a standard of correctness, a rule for the proper use of a word. A grammatical proposition is the expression of a rule for the proper use of a word. When emphasizing the sentential structure of a grammatical proposition, we can call it a rule-formulation. A rule-­ formulation is a sentence (a form of words) that is used to express a rule; but it should be stressed that an expression counts as a rule-formulation only insofar as it is used to provide a rule. “The table is red” is a sentence that can be used to describe an object or to lay down a rule for the correct use of “red.” Suppose that I am talking to S over the phone and S asks me what color the table is, to which I reply “The table is red.” Here I use the sentence “The table is red” to describe, so the sentence is not a rule-formulation in this context. If instead I teach someone the word “red” by stating that the table is red, I use the same sentence to lay down a rule; so it is a rule-­formulation here. The broader concept at work in Wittgenstein’s account of grammar is what is called “an explanation of the meaning of a word” (or explanation 34  Wittgenstein’s earliest and most systematic account of grammar is provided in The Big Typescript (2013, pp. 184–212; see also The Blue and Brown Books, 1958). (One should also consult his account of philosophy and philosophical problems, since this sheds light on his account of grammar qua method (Philosophical Grammar, p. 300–318.)) Even in The Big Typescript, no detailed exposition is given of what grammar as such consists in. The primary aim of his analysis is directed at answering objections and dissolving confusions about the notion of grammar. Some important aspects of grammar that emerge from this discussion are the necessity of grammar and its arbitrariness (i.e., epistemic unjustifiability). Baker and Hacker gloss a section in Philosophical Grammar thus: “Wittgenstein was inclined to characterize grammar very generally as all the conditions, the method, necessary for comparing the proposition with reality (PG 88). It incorporates any rules for using expressions that have to be determined antecedently to questions of truth and falsehood. Since explanations of meanings of words are standards for their correct use, all explanations of word meaning fall into grammar” (2009, 61). However, they also recognize that Wittgenstein and Wittgensteinians often use the term “grammar” in a narrow sense: to refer to explanations of meaning. That is normally how I use it.

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of meaning, for short). To understand what we call the meaning of a word, he argued, we should look at what we call, in the ordinary practice of speaking the language, an explanation of its meaning. Wittgenstein’s account of grammar can be conceived as an elucidation of the meaning of “explanation of meaning.” Explanations of meaning are expressions of rules, for they provide rules for correctly applying the terms they explain. Explanations are commonly given in response to requests for explanations of meaning (e.g., “What does this word mean?”). For instance, the word “rain” would ordinarily be explained thus: Rain consists of drops of water that fall from the sky. This statement might look like a description, but Wittgenstein writes: “The description of how a proposition is verified is a contribution to its grammar.”35 “Asking whether and how a proposition can be verified is only a special form of the question ‘How do you mean?’ The answer is a contribution to the grammar of the proposition.”36 Generally, to know the meaning of a word “W” is to know the correct answer to the question “What is W?” in normal contexts of application, for “[e]ssence is expressed in grammar” which “tells what kind of object anything is.”37 Wittgenstein observes that “What is W?” and “What does ‘W’ mean?” often have the same use. At the outset of this chapter I provided the example of the linguistic novice’s use of “What is racism?” The child uses this sentence to ask something different from what the philosopher asks. The correct answer to the child’s question is an everyday explanation of how the term is used. Dictionary entries (and analytic definitions more generally) are paradigms of explanations of meaning. But, of course, there are various kinds of explanation of meaning, and, for Wittgenstein, there is no one privileged form of explanation, since different explanations may be better suited to different purposes. Our language recognizes various definitional forms of explanation: ostensive definition, stipulative definition, analytic definition (by necessary and sufficient conditions; by a disjunction of individually sufficient conditions), and so on. It also recognizes non-definitional forms of explanation: contrastive and comparative explanation, explanation by example, explanation by using the target term in a sentence, and so on. Many of these forms of explanation can be invoked, in different situations, to explain the meaning of “racism.”  Wittgenstein (2013, p. 207).  Wittgenstein (2009, §353) 37  Wittgenstein (2009, §371, §373). 35 36

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Baker and Hacker argue that certain features of the institution of explanation have to be in place for explanation to succeed in its normative role, that is, for language to exist. Explanations of meaning must be public and immanent. They are public in that they are intelligible to all (there are no private languages). They are immanent in that they are accessible to us and surveyable by us. If explanations were not public and immanent, they could not fulfill their role as standards of correct use and could not clarify what a speaker meant. Similarly, explanation has to end at some point—it cannot go on forever—otherwise understanding would not be achieved and the purpose of explanation would be defeated. At the end of explanation is consensual action. A linguistic community agrees about the correct and incorrect applications of terms, and where there is vagueness or contestedness (as I argue is the case with racism in Part II), this too must be part of the agreement of how an expression is employed. A linguistic community must, for the most part and most of the time, agree in its explanations of meaning for language to be possible. 2.2.2.2 What Grammatical Knowledge Is and How It Is Acquired Grammatical knowledge consists in the ability to use words, according to the rules governing their use. This is knowledge-how rather than knowledge-­that. The ability to use a word is criterial for knowing it. Abilities are exhibited in behavior and presuppose the mastery of techniques. For to be able to use a word is to have mastered the technique(s) for applying it in appropriate circumstances. There is then something I am able to do, some action (or inaction) I am able to perform, which exhibits my understanding of the word. In addition, I have the ability to explain my behavior, give my reasons for so acting, and thus justify by intentional conduct by reference to a grammatical rule. A third ability that I have if I have grammatical knowledge is the capacity to understand others, and this too is manifest in my behavior. For I react appropriately to what others say (nodding my head, for instance) and respond appropriately to their comments, requests, commands, assertions, and so on. An appropriate response is not necessarily one that agrees with or is conducive to the desires of my conversation partner; rather, it is one that manifests understanding of what the other says. Hence, disagreement may also exhibit linguistic competence. How does one acquire grammatical knowledge? Wittgenstein makes a genetic observation. This observation should not be confused with a genetic theory of language learning. His observation is that we are not born with innate linguistic competence, but acquire competence through

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a process of mastering the techniques of employing words. Knowledge of grammar rules is initially a function of linguistic training, later a matter of teaching. Explanation—as a medium of education and learning—is linked to teaching and training. Training involves the mimicking of behavior, repetitive behavior (drilling), and the cultivation of natural dispositions and reactions. Training lays the foundation of explanation and rule-­ following, for the result of training is mastery of the basic aspects of language. Teaching, by contrast, presupposes a background of proper training and involves a teacher’s citing rule-formulations to lay down standards of correct use, and correcting the pupil’s mistakes. What is learned through teaching is a technique for applying the word thus learned. The notion that grammatical knowledge consists in an ability is closely linked to Wittgenstein’s view that meaning is use. For my understanding of a word (what it means) is exhibited in my following a rule. Obeying a rule is a custom.38 Customs are constituted by recurring actions, behavioral regularities. The difference between accidentally according with a rule and non-accidentally obeying/following a rule is that, in the latter but not in the former, one’s conduct intentionally accords with the rule. Intentional action is brought about by learning the uses of words through explanations of meaning, culminating in the mastery of various techniques of employment. To have mastered a technique is to know the “whens,” ­ “hows,” and “whys” (the reasons) of performance exemplifying rule-following behavior.39 How can one determine whether a behavior is an instance of rule-­ following? After all, couldn’t one merely pretend to know? Wittgenstein answers that there are criteria for pretending to know just as there are criteria for knowing. Moreover, the former presupposes the latter. This does not mean there are no ambiguous or borderline cases. Whether the criteria for pretending to know are satisfied or not in some particular case may be indeterminate and one may be unsure. Nevertheless, there would be no such thing as “pretending” to follow a rule if there were no standard for actually following it. How does one know or learn what the correct technique for the application of a term is? Correct technique, as we have said, is exhibited in what a competent speaker of the language says and does with language.

 Wittgenstein (2009, §199).  Wittgenstein (2009, §150).

38 39

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The teacher is a competent speaker of the language. A competent speaker is one who knows what is called “an explanation of meaning,” who cites explanations of meaning as reasons and who participates in the various normative practices described above. Another source of grammatical standards is the lexicon. Indeed, the lexicon is a product and statement of what competent speakers of the language call such and such (as lexica state the prevailing uses of words), and is generally a reliable source of such information. This is why teachers direct pupils to the d ­ ictionary. Through it, pupils learn paradigmatic forms of grammatical explanation, especially analytic definition. José Medina provides a compelling argument against a popular view which holds that Wittgenstein’s considered view is that language learning is inessential to grammar.40 For Medina, the education brought about by the social interaction of teacher and pupil came to be viewed by Wittgenstein as essential to the normativity of meaning. This shift in Wittgenstein’s thought was brought about by his attempt to explain the possibility of rule-following, the result of which is a naturalized or genetic account of rule-following.41 I will not get into the details of his argument here, but I highlight it to underscore the importance of teaching and the role of the teacher on Wittgenstein’s account. What I want to emphasize here are the necessary presuppositions that make language learning possible. One of Wittgenstein’s interests in describing teaching contexts was to highlight the presuppositions and contingency of linguistic competence. First, grammatical explanations presuppose a background of prior understanding and partial linguistic competence. This background has its foundations in brute training (the acquisition of elementary linguistic skills). This is important for reminding philosophers that language is not grounded in reason. Training does not involve giving reasons to justify doing what the learner is trained to do. Rather, it aims to inculcate habits, dispositions, and tendencies. Wittgenstein’s assertion that training is the foundation for teaching is important for explaining how 40  The standard view is rooted in Wittgenstein’s explicit remarks that the learning process is inessential to grammar. For we can imagine that an individual is born with the innate ability to use language, full-blown. What matters to grammar, to understanding the meaning of a term, is not how this knowledge is acquired but one’s ability to use language. For being able to use a term (and not being able to explain its history) is what is called “understanding the word.” That this position remained his considered view is disputed by José Medina (2002). 41  Medina (2002, ch. 6).

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we are able to understand explanations of meaning. To understand the ostensive definition “This is (called) red,” one takes significant linguistic training for granted. One must already know what color terms are, for example. Understanding the difference between object terms and color terms, substances and predicates, is grammatical knowledge. The connection between teaching and explanation sheds light on the normativity of grammar by elucidating Wittgenstein’s claim that explanations of meaning “belong to grammar,” that is, are foundational to all subsequent learning. These grammatical foundations are various, for we have seen the various normative purposes grammar rules, hence the multiple functions of explanations of meaning. Second, training does not occur in a vacuum, but against a background environment that conditions language acquisition. The possibility of teaching and learning words depends on regularities in nature and patterns in human behavior and reactions. Wittgenstein identifies three “framework conditions” that condition the human ability to learn a language: (i) nature: the natural order of things consists of very general facts and regularities; (ii) human nature: humans have natural discriminatory abilities and reactions, such as the ability to retain information, an instinctive tendency to mimic behavior, and other shared instincts; and (iii) forms of life: linguistic practices are invariably embedded in, and are partly constitutive of, human cultures, so languages have histories and emerge and evolve as sociohistorical contexts evolve. Wittgenstein uses these observations to argue against attempts to justify one grammar over another by reference to the facts. His argument from contingency holds that if a human culture should change as a result of radical shifts in its sociohistorical context, or if the natural word (including human nature) were radically different than it actually is, the grammar of a linguistic community would be radically different. Our existing concepts would be rendered useless and hence, we would develop new needs and corresponding concepts to get along. Paying attention to linguistic training, then, emphasizes the contingency of our concept-scheme. Because language is contingent upon a background of prior and partial understanding, on the one hand, and on framework conditions, on the other, the examination of teaching contexts is a reminder of how malleable and context-sensitive our concepts are. Baker and Hacker emphasize two points in connection with the intra-­ linguistic functions of explanation of meaning. First, its role in teaching

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presupposes that the learner is able to frame questions of the form “What does X mean?” or “Does he mean X by Y?” Language cannot be taught to very young children by means of citing explanations, since they have not yet mastered the basics of language. Later in life, when teaching by explanation is possible (when the child has mastered elementary skills of language), most teaching is not done by means of explanations but by means of examples and exemplification. Second, the use of explanations of meaning to correct and avert misunderstanding also takes basic competence for granted. Explanations of meaning are characteristically provided to answer questions, unclarities, and doubts about meaning, and to resolve misunderstandings about meaning. So the pupil must be able to frame questions, express unclarities and doubts, and manifest misunderstandings. All of this is done with language and thus presupposes the mastery of language. Baker and Hacker thus concur with Wittgenstein that the ability to give and understand explanations of meaning presupposes considerable linguistic competence to get a grip. These intra-linguistic functions of explanations of meaning underscore the kinship of the normative and the contingent, the dependency of “how things should be” upon “how things are.” 2.2.2.3 Explanation of Meaning and Explanation of Racism The established use or custom with the term “racism” poses an interesting test case from a Wittgensteinian perspective. Consider, for instance, that the grammar of racism is hotly contested. This is evinced by the fact that different people provide different—even incompatible—definitions of “racism,” that there is much misunderstanding about what racism is, and so forth. So it might be objected that at least two Wittgensteinian ideas are called into question. First, if agreement in explanations of racism is essential to the intelligibility of “racism,” does the contestedness of the concept undermine this condition? And, if so, is contemporary usage of “racism” meaningless? Second, what are the implications of Wittgenstein’s notion that the ability to give and understand explanations of “racism” presupposes a background of mastery of intra-linguistic techniques of applying this term? For if understanding what “racism” means presupposes that our linguistic community shares a variety of techniques of application, then that these techniques often conflict would seem to suggest that no one really understands what it means. Preliminary responses to these objections are as follows. First, it must be recognized that, as things stand, there are multiple criteria governing

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the application of the term “racism.”42 Not all definitions of ­“racism” are incompatible. Hence the premise that there cannot be (in Wittgenstein’s sense) agreement in definitions of “racism” because the concept is contested is overstated. Of course, there is not uniform agreement in the application of, say, the term “institutional racism,” but there is much agreement about what is criterial for the application of this term. For instance, de jure segregation and racial slavery are criterial for institutional racism (and for racism generally), as is racial discrimination in employment hiring. What is more, for most contested aspects of racism’s grammar, there are sub-communities of competent speakers who share a common conception. And though other sub-communities of competent speakers may disagree, they may nevertheless learn and understand the meanings of those with whom they disagree. A case in point is the proud racist, who knows that racism is wrong (on conventional usage), although she rejects this proposition. Her rejection of this proposition does not prevent her from understanding or even using the term in its standard sense. This leads me to my second point. The shared understanding of racism that exists, in my view, establishes an internally contested, vague and openended concept of racism. Although I think that the concept of racism should, to a degree, be vague and open-ended, the degree to which it is currently so is normatively problematic. There seems to be no one analytic definition of the term that everybody recognizes as correct, though there are many uses of “racism” and “racist” that are widely recognized, even if contested by others. Often, though not always, people are capable of understanding what others say when they call something racist. We can often figure out how other people are using the term by seeing what examples they point to and by requesting explanations. Racial disrespect is one analytic definition that governs ordinary usage. Racial hatred, another; 42  So, for example, racism is said to be the belief that some races are inferior and others superior; it is identified with racial hatred, contempt, and other attitudes, and it is said to be a system of institutional norms which perpetuate racial inequality. Moreover, any social system or form of society historically founded on racial slavery, racial segregation, white supremacy, that continues to harbor inequalities that resulted from that history are called “racist.” Many specific act types such as job discrimination based on race, racially motivated violence (e.g., lynching), racial slurs, and certain racial epithets are all said to be racist. Moreover, individuals employ “institutional racism,” “implicit racism,” and similar terms, in ways that are widely accepted by large segments of the linguistic community. Finally, many paradigmatic explanations and examples cut across the entire linguistic community.

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racial injustice, another. And so forth. The problem, as I see it, is not that the contestedness of the concept renders the concept of racism confused and unintelligible. Rather, the problem is that the contestedness of racism undermines the point of representation. Said differently, people normally seem to ­understand what others say by their use of “racism,” though they may reject such applications. (See Part II (especially Chap. 6) for further discussion of these issues.) 2.2.2.4 The Significance of Explanation of Meaning for Philosophy? I now discuss some of the implications of Wittgenstein’s conventionalism. First, it directs analytical attention to the fact  that the concept of racism is bound up with moral practice, for usage of the term is correlated to a moral-­representational need or set of such needs. The term “racism” is designed to criticize whatever it describes. Conventionalism thus encourages investigation into the normative practices surrounding the way we come to learn and apply this term, the needs it fulfills for us, and so forth. Another implication of conventionalism is that explanations of racism (of what racism is) are not descriptions of racism. As I discuss below, there is nothing over and above our understanding of racism and our explanations of what it is that can be pointed at as its meaning (for the meaning of “racism” is not the object it stands for, but the set of rules governing its proper use). In the next chapter I discuss the implications of this argument for the nature of philosophical analysis. For instance, I consider what it means to say that a grammatical proposition is true, and how and in what way it might be possible to talk about justifying or criticizing competing definitions. A third implication of conventionalism is that the philosophical question “What is racism?” is not a request for an empirical or metaphysical description. Consider a philosophical example of a “What is W?” question discussed by Wittgenstein in his Philosophical Investigations: “What is imagination?” This example sheds light on the significance of his conception of grammar for his approach to philosophy. One ought to ask, not what images are or what goes on when one imagines something, but how the word “imagination” is used. But that does not mean that I want to talk only about words. For the question of what imagination essentially is, is as much about the word “imagination” as my question.

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And I am only saying that this question is not to be clarified—neither for the person who does the imagining, nor for anyone else—by pointing; nor yet by a description of some process. The first question also asks for the clarification of a word; but it makes us expect a wrong kind of answer.43

It is natural to think that “What is imagination?” is about a language-­ independent  psychological reality. If one thinks thus, one will contrast it with the question “How is the term ‘imagination’ used?”, that is, a question about language. To answer the one, in that case, is not to answer the other. Wittgenstein rejects this dichotomy. He holds that these questions are internally related and logically equivalent in a philosophical context. If this is right, then tackling the second question is tantamount to tackling the first. Why does Wittgenstein believe that the question “What is imagination?” makes us expect the “wrong kind of answer”? He seems to have in mind the confusion of taking the surface-grammar of the sentence for its actual grammar. The term “surface-grammar” signifies the form or appearance of a sentence. For on the surface, the question appears to be about reality. If we uncritically accept this appearance, our analysis will begin with the supposition that “imagination” is the name of something real (say, a mental process), and that the aim of philosophical inquiry is to provide the correct description of this object. If, however, explanations of words provide rules for their definienda, then the meaning of “imagination” is not an object but the role of this term in the language.44 To understand the meaning of “imagination” is to understand its role in the language-games that are played with it. Similarly for the question “What is racism?” This is not a metaphysical question, a question about what racism is in itself. It is a question about language stated in the material mode. Philosophical analysis has two possible options here. “What is racism?” could analyze the request for a definition descriptively: “How is the word ‘racism’ used?”? Alternatively, it could analyze the question prescriptively: “How should the word ‘racism’ be used?” or “What is the best use of this term?” I defend the latter approach for the analysis of racism in Part II. To arrive at this point, however, I must first assess the metaphysical interpretation. If my discussion and defense of  Wittgenstein (2009, §370).  As Wittgenstein explains in The Blue Book: “Studying the grammar of the expression ‘explanation of meaning’ will teach you something about the grammar of the word ‘meaning’ and will cure you of the temptation to look about you for some object which you might call ‘the meaning’” (1958, 1). 43 44

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the core elements of Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language are plausible, we already have some reason to doubt the correctness of the metaphysical interpretation. That being said, my first central argument against metaphysical analysis is developed in Chap. 3. There the conventionalist picture of definition is contrasted with descriptivism. Medina provides a related but nevertheless instructive account of the descriptivism-­conventionalism distinction: On Wittgenstein’s view, there is a crucial distinction between symbolic rules and propositions with a descriptive content: the latter can be deemed true or false; the former are norms of representation which cannot be subject to semantic evaluation (cf. e.g., Lectures 1932–35, p. 90). The failure to recognize this crucial distinction gives rise to a descriptivist view of rules. According to this view, the rules of a symbolism express a special kind of truth: a truth that can be asserted but not denied. Against this view, Wittgenstein argues that if a proposition cannot be denied it cannot be asserted either: it is a convention that we lay down. He emphasizes that the grammatical statements that constitute the foundations of a propositional system or calculus are not fact-stating propositions, but symbolic conventions: “A basic rule of a system […] can only be laid down, but not asserted, or denied” (PR §163).45 45  Medina (2002, 112). I should note that although I employ the terms “conventionalism” and “descriptivism” in a way that is analogous to Medina’s discussion of these terms, Medina goes on to argue that Wittgenstein’s “conventionalism” ultimately fails (103). He argues that Wittgenstein was a conventionalist in the early 1930s who eventually worked his way beyond it, abandoning it in favor of a practice-based conception of rules. “Note that Wittgenstein’s emphasis on what is ‘natural’ for us constitutes a rejection of his earlier conventionalism. He now underscores that the starting point of a rule-governed practice is not a set of conventions, a list of rules, but a consensus of action. There are indeed rule-governed practices that are established by arbitrarily stipulated conventions; but for these conventions to yield a normative practice, they have to be set in tune with what is ‘natural’ for us (cf. RFM I.116). And, for Wittgenstein, both nature and nurture play a role in setting the ‘natural limits’ of our understanding. For, as we shall see, what is ‘natural’ for us is determined both by our unlearned, automatic responses (e.g., crying out in pain) and by our learned techniques (counting as we do, for instance, is natural for us ‘though not for everybody in the world’; LFM p. 243)” (214, n. 206). I take my use of “conventionalism” to be consistent with Medina’s “practice-based conception of rules,” because I employ the term differently than he does. Wittgenstein’s conventionalism, as I understand it, is not a mere rule-based account of normativity (similar to Brandom’s view), but one that is deeply interwoven with our practices and forms of life. In rejecting conventionalism what Medina wants to rule out, it seems, is the notion that grammar is a matter of individual decision, as opposed to a matter of practice. This repudiation is consistent with my approach to conventionalism, as I explain below.

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To say that we cannot assert grammatical propositions is not to say that we cannot utter sentences taken to express grammatical rules. We can and do utter them. The claim is rather that one cannot perform the speech act of assertion (or representation) via the use and utterance of a grammatical sentence. For to use a grammatical sentence is not to assert anything about reality, but to lay down a rule. Similarly, Medina is not denying that grammatical sentences cannot be said to be true. We can and do say that, for example, it is true that bachelors are unmarried. The point is, rather, that we need clarity about what it means to call a grammatical sentence true. For it does not mean that a description corresponds to reality. Descriptivism is the view that explanations of meaning are descriptions, whether of reality or of linguistic practice. Conventionalism, by contrast, holds that explanations of meaning are expressions of rules. As Medina explains: According to Wittgenstein, it is a descriptivist view of rules that has led philosophers to “confuse two different things, a law of nature and a rule which we ourselves lay down” (Lectures 1932–35, p. 83)… But statements that express symbolic rules and statements that express laws of nature should be distinguished because they play radically different roles: the latter describe facts of nature, whereas the former do not concern how the world is but how it ought to be described (cf. Lectures 1932–35 p. 84). The descriptivist view of rules leads to the conflation of symbolic rules and natural laws and, consequently, to the assimilation of all science to natural science, imposing the logic of empirical research on all scientific endeavors and thus distorting the purely “grammatical” nature of logic, mathematics, and geometry (cf. Lectures 1932–35, pp. 51ff).46

Although Medina believes that the conventionalism Wittgenstein subscribed to in the 1930s is a position he eventually gave up in favor of a “practice-based contextualism,” a careful reading of Medina suggests that what Wittgenstein gave up, if he is right, was not the view that definitions are conventions in the sense that they are expressions of rules, but that they are conventions in the sense that they are products of decision. It is only by assuming that linguistic conventions are created via human decision that conventionalism seems objectionable. Medina is right that some concepts are not established via human decision and so are not conventions thus

 Medina (2002, 112).

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defined.47 But that is not the sense in which I invoke the term “convention.” A grammatical convention is a rule for the use of an expression that is given by everyday explanations of meaning, that competent speakers understand and appeal to as standards. This view, as far as I can tell, is perfectly consistent with what Medina calls “Wittgenstein’s mature view,” that “what is thinkable and expressible in language can only be contextually determined: it depends, in each case, on the techniques available in our practices (cf. RFM I.116; LFM p. 69).”48 2.2.3  Wittgenstein’s Normativism I have attempted to lay out the core of Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language which is essential to my subsequent inquiries in this book. To be sure, some key aspects (like his account of the arbitrariness of grammar) have yet to be discussed. These will be taken up in Chaps. 2 and 3, where I build on the foundation lain here. In what remains of the present chapter I address briefly Wittgenstein’s brand of normativism, so as to distinguish it from Robert Brandom’s inferentialism.

47  Medina also rejects the standard view that Wittgenstein was committed to the autonomy of grammar thesis.  I am inclined (pace Medina) to agree with Baker and Hacker that Wittgenstein remained committed to the arbitrariness of grammar thesis, post-1930. Moreover, even if Medina is correct on the historical point, I do not see why a Wittgensteinian ought not subscribe to the autonomy of grammar thesis. 48  I agree with Medina that language is essentially social in the sense that it requires a learning process that involves a competent teacher. He develops this position  by articulating a “contextualist” view of communal agreement. “In Wittgenstein’s contextualist view the agreement of the community is not the foundation or the ultimate ground of normativity; it is simply part of the requisite background against which we use language and follow rules. The upshot of Wittgenstein’s arguments is that language use and rule following cannot take place in a vacuum; they are situated activities which require a context: an important part of this context is the agreement in action of the members of a community of speakers or rule followers; another important part consists in what Wittgenstein calls ‘very general facts of nature’ (e.g., PI p. 230). Community agreement and facts of nature play a very similar role in Wittgenstein’s view” (2002, 189). I think this is close to Wittgenstein’s position than more canonical expressions of the “community view” of rule-following, for example, Norman Malcolm’s Nothing is Hidden (1986). For an application of Wittgenstein’s later thought to sociopolitical concepts, which takes a version of the community view to be essential, see Peg O’Connor’s Oppression and Responsibility (2002).

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2.2.3.1 Wittgenstein’s Normativism Because Wittgenstein holds that “meaning is use” and gives the notion of “use” a normative interpretation, he is committed to the normativity of linguistic meaning. As such, his approach to semantics has aptly been described as normativist. This places his semantic account in the same camp with non-Wittgensteinian normativist positions of which Robert Brandom’s inferentialism seems to be the closest parallel. Normativist positions are united on the following front: they assert that meaning is essentially normative.49 Jaroslav Peregrin, a proponent of Brandomian inferentialism, provides a helpful description of this semantic approach: What I take as characteristic of this approach is the view that meanings are roles which are acquired by types of sounds and inscriptions in virtue of their being treated in accordance with the rules of our language games, roughly in the same way as wooden pieces acquire certain roles by being treated in accordance with the rules of chess. It follows—inter alia—that (i) a meaning is not an object labeled (stood for, represented …) by an expression; and that (ii) meaning is normative in the sense that to say that an expression means thus and so is to say that it ought to be used in a particular way.50

Boiling down normativism to its fundamental tenets: (a) “the meaning of an expression is linked to its ‘role’ or function,” and (b) this “role or function is in turn conferred by rules.”51 What is distinctive about the normativism of inferentialism is its focus on a subset of rules governing the use of words, namely, rules governing communication. This contrasts with Wittgenstein’s normativism which holds that all rules governing the use of words that are necessary for sense and understanding are constitutive of linguistic meaning. Hans-Johann Glock explains: Wittgenstein’s normativism accepts “the idea that the meaning of an expression is constituted by the rules for its correct use,” but is distinguished by this idea: “the notion of meaning ought to be clarified by reference to other pertinent notions. The 49  For a helpful introduction to normativism, see Daniel Whiting’s “What is the Normativity of Meaning?” (2016). 50  This is from Peregrin’s “Inferentialism and the Normativity of Meaning” (2012b, 76). The literature on normativism is vast. For a general introduction to normativism, see Glüer (2018). For book-length defenses of inferentialism, see Peregrin’s Inferentialism: Why Rules Matter 2014 and Brandom’s Making it Explicit (1994). For briefer introductions and defenses, see Peregrin’s essays (2012a) and “What is Inferentialism?” (unpublished), as well as the introduction to From Rules to Meanings (Koreň and Kolman 2018). 51  Peregrin (2014, 2).

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meaning of an expression is both what an acceptable explanation of meaning explains and what a competent speaker understands.”52 Thus, in addition to syntactical rules, all explanations of meaning (and not just those that enter into inferences) constitute linguistic meaning. This latter brand of normativism is the one that provides the inspiration for my own approach. Normativism—of both the Brandomian and Wittgensteinian varieties— stands opposed to inferential role semantics and to representationalism in the philosophy of language. Inferential role semantics agrees with the normativist idea that meaning is a function of the use or role of an expression. Specifically, it analyzes semantic content in terms of the causal “role of an expression within inferences actually carried out by speakers or thinkers.”53 By providing a causal interpretation of the role of expressions this position stands opposed to normativism’s fundamental claim that meaning is normative. Hence, Brandom and Peregrin’s objection that inferential role semantics fails to capture the “oughtness” of explanations of meaning. For them, to explain what a word means is not to describe a causal process, but to express a normative attitude.54 Normativism is also opposed to representationalism, which Peregrin explains thus: “A word, it is often claimed, stands for – or represents, or expresses – its meaning, and the reason it can do so is that we humans are simply symbol-mongerers: we have the peculiar ability to let one thing stand for another.”55 Two elements of representationalism stand out. First, representationalists tend to stress homo sapiens’ representational power/s—that is, our psychological or mental ability—to map the meanings or contents of sentences onto the representational contents of thoughts.56 Second, representationalists tend to view semantic/ conceptual content in terms of a world-language connection. As Glock explains: “The negative motivation behind ‘use theories’ [i.e., normativist theories] is the failure of referential (‘Fido’-Fido) conceptions of meaning, according to which the meaning of an expression is an object for which it stands.” Thus, normativists maintain that “even in the case of referring expressions, their meaning is not the object they stand for,”57 for, again, the meaning of an expression, on normativism, is its use or role.

 Glock (2018, 63).  Peregrin (2012b, 76, note 2). Proponents of inferential role semantics include Boghossian (1993), and Fodor and Lepore (1993). 54  For normativist criticisms of inferential role semantics, see Peregrin (2012b, 2014). 55  Peregrin (2014, 1). 56  See Koreň and Kolman (2018, 3). 57  Glock (2018, 65). 52 53

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One objection to normativism is that the alleged normativity of meaning boils down to a nebulous use of the term “correct,” one that supposedly is not reducible to “true.” Paul Boghossian argues that the proper way to analyze “correct use” is to offer a deflationary account: it is correct to apply e to x is synonymous with e holds true of x. To this objection Glock replies by offering a Wittgenstein-inspired account of semantic correctness and incorrectness. He begins by reminding us that Wittgenstein’s account of meaning holds that meaning is not a matter of how words are in fact used, but of how they ought to be used; hence, what is semantically relevant is the correct use of an expression. And correct use is provided by the rules that lay down how it is to be used.58 After offering some critiques of inferentialism, Glock provides four examples of statements exhibiting different types of mistake with respect to saying something. Only the first of the following mistakes is semantic (i.e., confused thought): 1. Semantic mistake: I am mindful not only of our preserving executive powers for myself, but for my predecessors as well. (Statement by George Bush—misuses either “preserve” or “predecessor”) 2. Syntactical mistake: You teach a child to read, and he or her will be able to pass a literacy test. (Statement by George W. Bush—“her” is the wrong pronoun) 3. Social mistake: I know that I cannot win this seat (Statement by a political candidate—is linguistically correct, and may also be factually correct, but is a social gaffe). 4. Factual mistake: Iraq is capable of deploying weapons of mass destruction within 45 minutes of an order by Saddam Hussein. (Statement by Tony Blair—syntactically and grammatically correct, but false) This brief list illustrates different kinds of mistake: linguistic (1–2), social/ pragmatic (3), and factual mistakes (4). Only semantic mistakes result in confusion of the kind that precludes understanding of what is said (i.e., generates a confused thought). Boghossian is, therefore, wrong to conflate semantic conditions with truth conditions, because doing so fails to appreciate that Some uses of words are mistaken solely because of what these words mean, irrespective of any other facts, syntactic rules or social expectations.  Glock (2018, 74).

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Conversely, one can apply a word in a way which is semantically correct— based on a proper understanding of its meaning—without applying it correctly in the sense of saying something true, namely if one errs about pertinent facts.59

As a further illustration, Glock contrasts two mistakes in the employment of the word “drake.” His aim is to show, yet again, that semantic mistakes are not reducible to factual mistakes. To know the meaning of a word is not to know something about what is true, but to understand how a term should be used, the conditions under which it is to be applied. Consider three uses of “x is a drake”: 1. S applies “drake” to x, a male duck, thinking that x is a male duck. [True] 2. S applies “drake” to x, a female duck, thinking that x is a male duck. [False] 3. S applies “drake” to x, a male duck, on grounds other than that x is a male duck. [Semantic confusion] In case (1), the application of “drake” is semantically correct and the assertion true. In case (2), the application of “drake” is semantically correct and the assertion false. And, in case (3), the application of “drake” is semantically confused because the criterion of application is grammatically incorrect. The lesson here is the same as before: semantic mistakes are not identical to factual mistakes. Precisely because (3) is a semantic mistake, it is bound to generate misunderstanding and confusion, which is what the Wittgensteinian would expect in respect to semantic mistakes (given that meaning is internally related to understanding). It thus seem that the normative use of “correctness” is not reducible to some non-normative use of the term. Glock extends his argument by linking the notion of “correctness” to positive evaluation, and “incorrectness” to negative evaluation. His aim here is to show that “correct use” means something more than “x satisfies certain conditions.” For merely satisfying certain conditions lacks the normative component conveyed by the term “correct,” namely, that it is good that x satisfies those conditions. One might think that for something to be correct is for it to meet some acknowledged standard. In that case, to say  Glock (2018, 75).

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that x is correct is to say nothing more than that x meets such a standard— the implication being that whether x’s meeting said standard is good or bad falls beyond the scope of what is said in calling it correct. Glock thinks this view mistaken. He writes: We also characterize x as meeting a standard of positive evaluation. The term ‘correct’ is not purely descriptive or factual, but evaluative. What is more, unlike other evaluative terms, for example, ‘good,’ it carries the further implication that failure to meet the standard is not just undesirable, but provides grounds for intervention. After all, the verb ‘to correct’ means: to set right, rectify, or amend. Applying the terms used in the standard may be purely descriptive, but applying the term ‘correct’ is not. And to call something incorrect is not only to evaluate it negatively; if something is incorrect, then one has grounds for correcting it.60

He contrasts several examples to illustrate: . Glock is not wearing a cap and gown. 1 2. Glock is not dressed correctly. 3. Glock is dressed badly. 4. Glock had to change his dress, because it was incorrect. 5. Glock didn’t have to change his dress, because it was correct. Consider the first four propositions. Do any of them mean anything other than “Glock failed to meet a certain standard”? Glock rejects (1) on the grounds that failing to wear a cap and gown is not intrinsically good or bad. He rejects (3) on the grounds that “dressed badly” is usually understood to evoke a subjective aesthetic preference (thus lacking the relevant normative force). Next, Glock argues that cases (2) and (4) are good candidates for statements that carry normative force. His focus is not on the use of these sentences, but on the sentence-meaning alone. This poses a problem for case (2), for we cannot determine by virtue of the sentence-meaning alone (without reference to a particular context) that an evaluative component exists. However, in the case of (4), it is clear from the “because” that, Glock not only fails to meet a certain acknowledged standard, but that he was wrong not to meet it (as evidenced by the fact that he was made to  Glock (2018, 76).

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correct his behavior). That is, the operative norm in this scenario (whatever it might be) prescribes that he should have met this standard. For the same reason, example (5) also has normative force, and here we get a positive evaluation. 2.2.3.2 Demarcating Semantic Rules We have seen that normativists agree that representationalism is a dead-­ end project, yet they disagree about various other things. For example, inferentialists would likely object to the picture I have been painting of Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language—his assertion that meaning is internally related to explanation and understanding, for example. Another point of disagreement—the one to which I now turn—concerns the proper way of demarcating semantic and non-semantic content. How, for example, are we to distinguish semantic rules from pragmatic rules, syntactic rules, psychological rules, idiolect rules, legal rules, et cetera? How does the Wittgensteinian distinguish semantic and non-semantic rules? What follows is the Wittgensteinian way of drawing the distinction, in light of what we’ve covered above. Glock argues that the key to differentiating semantic and non-semantic rules lies in the following passage, in Wittgenstein’s Philosophical investigations: “‘The meaning of a word is what an explanation of its meaning explains.’ That is, if you want to understand the use of the word ‘meaning’, look for what one calls ‘an explanation of meaning.’”61 This passage is thought to philosophically unilluminating. The first putative problem is that the account of meaning seems trivial, uninformative. To this problem Glock replies that there is something important about this passage, trivial or not. Its message is that meaning is nothing other than, nothing over and above, what is explained by an explanation of meaning. That is, meaning “does not have an existence independently of being explained and understood.”62 The second putative problem with this passage stems from the position that meaning does not exist anywhere, that meaning is not an object. If meaning is nothing over and above what is both understood by a competent speaker and explained by an explanation of meaning, then the Wittgensteinian account of meaning is circular. Glock replies to this

 Wittgenstein (2009, §560).  Glock (2018, 70).

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­ bjection by employing a method of clarification that he calls—following o P. F. Strawson—connective analysis.63 I will present Glock’s connective analysis of this quoted passage in order to shed light on the distinction between semantic and non-semantic rules. In “Semantics: Why Rules Matter,” Glock aims to defend a Wittgenstein-­ inspired normativism as a viable alternative to inferentialism. Unlike the inferentialist who identifies meaning with rules of communication, the Wittgensteinian holds that “the meaning of general terms is determined by rules specifying conditions of application explained and understood by competent speakers.”64 His aim is thus to unpack “Wittgenstein’s idea that the notion of meaning ought to be clarified by reference to other pertinent notions,” specifically, the principles of explanation of meaning and understanding of meaning: Meaning-Explanation (ME): The linguistic meaning of an expression e is what the explanation of e (as opposed to an explanation of the phenomena e refers to or applies to) explains. Meaning-Understanding (MU): The linguistic meaning of an expression e is what a competent speaker or user of e (as opposed to someone who knows everything about the phenomena e refers to or applies to) understands by e. These two connective principles are grammatical, for they essentially unpack the ordinary concept of meaning while remaining within its normative parameters; that is, they illuminate the internal relationship of meaning and explanation in the first case, and meaning and understanding 63  Against the charge of circularity, Glock contends that circular explanations of a concept are perfectly acceptable, provided they are apt and thus illuminating for the purposes at hand. Connective analysis does not attempt to reduce the meaning of a concept-term to some external notion (reductive analysis). Nor does it aim to specify the object supposedly signified by this term in the misguided effort to “break down” the phenomenon into its basic constituents (atomistic analysis). Instead, connective analysis provides “the description of the rule-governed use of expressions, and of their connections with other expressions by way of implication, presupposition, and exclusion. Connective analysis need not result in definitions; it can rest content with elucidating features that are constitutive of the concepts under consideration, and with establishing how they bear on philosophical problems, doctrines, and arguments. ‘Only connect’: Strawson transposes E. M. Forster’s maxim for the understanding of human life to the understanding of our conceptual framework (see Strawson 1992, 17–19; 1995, 15–17)” (Glock 2018, 72). 64  Glock (2018, 63).

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in the second. The significance of these illuminations lies in their relevance for philosophical discussions of semantics. Glock readily acknowledges the circularity of this analysis: “The attempt to single out semantic rules appeals to conventions that can only be separated from other rules governing language by presupposing the notion of meaning.”65 Yet, such circularity is not vicious or otherwise objectionable, for the aim is not to break free from the circle of semantic normativity, but to illuminate it for purposes of motivating a non-inferentialist brand of normativism. What is to be avoided is not explanatory circles as such, but only those that are too narrow or unilluminating for other reasons. The circles—in turn interconnected—summarized by ME and MU, respectively, are not of this kind. They shed light on the problematic notion of meaning by reference to notions that do not invite reification and which seem to be less confusing in philosophical contexts. Both of them also highlight normative dimensions of the concept of meaning of the kind that normativism (whether inferentialist or not) is keen on.66

ME and MU illuminate the distinction between semantic rules governing the use of an expression and other use-governing rules. For instance, the semantics of “Alberto” and “Professor” are (arguably) the same, yet these terms do not have identical uses, for there are cases (such as courtrooms) where the use of one of these terms is appropriate and the other is not. Glock also points out that entries in standard lexica divide the explanans into semantic rules  and other rules concerning the term explained (explanandum). The semantic rules given in the explanans confer semantic conditions for the application of the explananda, whereas other rules concerning the explananda do not. In a good dictionary, for example, nonsemantic rules are often specified in parentheses in order to distinguish them from semantic rules. Some of these will be syntactic or morphological, for example, “(adj.).” But others will specify features of use that qualify as pragmatic, for instance, “(colloq.)” or “(pej.)” or “(anc.).” Even a parenthesis of that kind, however, falls way short of specifying specific rules concerning the impropriety of “cop” in a legal context. This is another respect, therefore, in which fol Glock (2018, 71).  Glock (2018, 72).

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lowing up our apparently stale truism is illuminating: lexica provide a ­well-­established, clear, and generally reliable, though by no means fail-safe, way of distinguishing semantically pertinent from other features of use.67

Wittgenstein’s grammatical remark concerning the meaning of “meaning” is, therefore, illuminating, in spite of its circularity. Turning next to the normative nature of MU, this principle asserts that the meaning of an expression is what is understood or known by a competent speaker of the language. Aside from linking the notion of understanding to the notion of meaning, Glock has little to say about it in this essay.68 However, I have expressed much about this relationship in preceding sections. Hopefully, I have managed to illuminate the notion of understanding meaning by characterizing it as an ability, by linking it to training and learning, by elucidating its relationship to explanations of meaning, and so on. As we’ve noted, Baker and Hacker observe that Wittgenstein provides three criteria for knowing/understanding the meaning of a word: (a) the ability to use it; (b) the ability to explain it; and (c) the ability to respond appropriately to its use by others. Glock is thus correct that “competent speakers, users, or uses are those satisfying certain standards,” viz. the standards specified by the explanations of competent speakers. To determine whether rules governing the use of an expression are semantic, simply determine “whether a speaker needs to be familiar with them to count as a competent user, in the sense of knowing what e means.”69 Wittgenstein’s account of understanding supports his contention that linguistic meanings are not hidden and do not require the theoretical knowledge of experts. Meanings are public, open to view, as we have said. The account also implies that, for any competent speaker of a ­language—call this person S—if S uses a word “W” in a context of use C, then S normally has the ability to produce an everyday explanation of what “W” means in C. This positions was defended in a previous section, so I will not dwell on it here. To sum up, for the Wittgensteinian, linguistic meaning is a correlate of two things: explaining the meaning of a word and understanding the  Glock (2018, 70).  Glock does, however, reflect on this issue elsewhere. See his entries on “Understanding” and “Explanation” in his A Wittgenstein Dictionary (1996). 69  Glock (2018, 71). 67 68

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meaning of a word. ME and MU, which merely unpack the quote from Wittgenstein (above), identify two ways of distinguishing semantic and non-semantic rules of language use: (1) semantic rules are those furnished by explanations of meaning, such as those provided by our dictionaries; (2) semantic rules are those that competent speakers of the natural language employ in virtue of their linguistic competency. As previously argued, (1) does not entail that only lexical entries are capable of providing semantic rules, for there are a diversity of forms of explanations of meaning, and many of them—for example, ostensive ­definition—will not be found in the dictionary. They are acceptable by the lights of condition (2), that is, by being  representative explanations of com­ petent speakers. I conclude that the Wittgensteinian account of meaning can be defended against the charge that it offers no criteria for distinguishing semantic and non-semantic rules of use. The dictionary normally provides an obvious, accessible, and concrete authority on semantic content—its defeasibility and occasional error notwithstanding—such that on normal occasions, if a speaker’s explanation of meaning is incompatible with what it says, the individual (and not the dictionary) is likely confused. At the same time, dictionary entries can be checked against the practice of competent speakers.

2.3   Conclusion: The Aim of This Book In Sect. 2.1, I specified three interpretations of the philosophical question “What is racism?” I began my evaluation by expressing my intention to begin with the metaphysical interpretation. According to it, definitions of “racism” are competing descriptions of an ontological reality called racism itself. This entity supposedly has language-independent existence. In the next two chapters, I engage—and ultimately reject—the metaphysical interpretation of “What is racism?” I focus on this approach because many recent theorists of racism outright endorse or presuppose metaphysical analysis as the correct approach, as I documented in this chapter. This approach presupposes a certain conception of definition (or explanation of meaning) which stands opposed to conventionalism, namely, descriptivism. In this chapter, I have defended an alternative conception of explanation of meaning that constitutes a crucial aspect of conventionalism. My contention was that it is possible and plausible to conceive of definitions of “racism” (and other explanations of meaning) as linguistic

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conventions. If this is correct, then the term “racism,” as used in the context of a definition, is not the name of a social or empirical object, and is not the name of a transcendent entity either, for it is not the name of anything. Rather, the term has a different role in the context of definition. A definition of “racism” is a standard of linguistic correctness. Such a standard directs our attention to the role that the grammar of “racism” plays in our lives as well as the corresponding normative attitudes that inform those practices. If Wittgenstein’s conventionalism provides the correct picture of language, then descriptivism distorts the concepts of meaning, understanding, and explanation of meaning. It is thus necessary to correct such distortion in theory.

References Amesbury, Richard. 2005. Morality and Social Criticism: The Force of Reasons in Discursive Practice. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Appiah, K. Anthony. 1990. Racisms. In Anatomy of Racism, ed. David T. Goldberg. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Baker, Gordon P., and Peter M.S. Hacker. 2005. Wittgenstein: Understanding and Meaning, Volume 1 of an Analytical Commentary on the Philosophical Investigations. 2nd ed. (extensively revised). Oxford: Blackwell Publishing. ———. 2009. Wittgenstein: Rules, Grammar and Necessity, Volumes 1 and 2 of an Analytical Commentary on the Philosophical Investigations. 2nd ed. (extensively revised. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing. Ben-Menahem, Yemima. 1998. Explanation and Description: Wittgenstein on Convention. Synthese 115 (1): 99–130. http://www.jstor.org/stable/ 20118043. Blum, Lawrence. 2002. “I’m not a Racist, But…”: The Moral Quandary of Race. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press. Boghossian, Paul A. 1993. Does an Inferential Role Semantics Rest Upon a Mistake? In Philosophical Issues, ed. A.  Villanueva, vol. 3, 73–88. Ridgeview: Atascadero. Brandom, Robert B. 1994. Toward a Normative Pragmatics. In Making it Explicit: Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, 3–65. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. ———. 2000. Articulating Reasons: An Introduction to Inferentialism. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Conant, James. 1998. Wittgenstein on Meaning and Use. Philosophical Investigations 21 (3): 222–250.

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Corlett, J.  Angelo. 2003. Race, Racism & Reparations, 64–66. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Dummett, Michael A.  E. 1959. Wittgenstein’s Philosophy of Mathematics. Philosophical Review 68. Fodor, Jerry A., and Ernest LePore. 1993. Why Meaning (Probably) Isn’t Conceptual Role. In Science and Knowledge, ed. E.  Villanueva, 15–35. Ridgeview: Atascadero. Garcia, Jorge L.A. 1996. The Heart of Racism. Journal of Social Philosophy 27: 5–45. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9833.1996.tb00225.x. ———. 1997. Current Conceptions of Racism: A Critical Examination of Some Recent Social Philosophy. Journal of Social Philosophy 28: 5–42. https://doi. org/10.1111/j.1467-9833.1997.tb00373.x. ———. 2011. Racism, Psychology, and Morality: Dialogue with Faucher and Machery. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 41 (June): 250–268. ———. 2016. Racist Disrespect in Moral Theory: Dialogue With Glasgow. In Justice Through Diversity? ed. Michael Sweeney. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield. Glasgow, Joshua. 2009. Racism as Disrespect. Ethics 120: 64–93. https://doi. org/10.1086/648588. Glock, Hans-Johann. 1996. A Wittgenstein Dictionary. The Blackwell Philosopher Dictionaries. Malden: Blackwell Publishing. ———. 2005. The Normativity of Meaning Made Simple. In Philosophie und/als Wissenschaft, ed. Christian Nimtz and Ansgar Beckermann, 219–241. Mentis: Paderborn. ———. 2008. Necessity and Language: In Defence of Conventionalism. Philosophical Investigations 31: 1. ———. 2018. Semantics: Why Rules Ought to Matter. In From Rules to Meanings: New Essays on Inferentialism, ed. Ondřej Beran, Vojtěch Kolman, and Ladislav Koreň . New York: Routledge. Glüer, Kathrin. 2018. The Normativity of Meaning and Content. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/meaningnormativity/#IntNorThe Gupta, Anil. 2015. Definitions. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Revised 20 Apr 2015. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/definitions/. Hacker, Peter M.S. 1990. Criteria. In Wittgenstein: Meaning and Mind, Part I: Essays. Volume 3 of an Analytical Commentary on the Philosophical Investigations, 243–267. Oxford: Blackwell. ———. 1996. Wittgenstein’s Place in Twentieth-Century Analytic Philosophy. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing. Haslanger, Sally. 2004. Oppressions: Racial and Other. In Racism in Mind, ed. Michael P. Levine and Tamas Pataki. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

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Haslanger, Sally. 2012. Resisting Reality: Social Construction and Social Critique. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ———. 2017. Racism, Ideology, and Social Movements. Res Philosophica 94 (1): 1–22. https://doi.org/10.11612/resphil.1547. Headley, Clevis. 2000. Philosophical Approaches to Racism: A Critique of the Individualist Perspective. Journal of Social Philosophy 31 (Summer): 223–257. https://doi.org/10.1111/0047-2786.00043. Koreň , Ladislav, and Vojtěch Kolman. 2018. Introduction: Inferentialism’s Years of Travel and Its Logico-Philosophical Calling. In From Rules to Meanings: New Essays on Inferentialism, ed. Ondřej Beran, Vojtěch Kolman, and Ladislav Koreň . New York: Routledge. Kripke, Saul A. 1972. Naming and Necessity. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Malcolm, Norman. 1986. Nothing is Hidden: Wittgenstein’s Criticism of His Early Thought. Oxford: Blackwell. Medina, José. 2002. The Unity of Wittgenstein’s Philosophy: Necessity, Intelligibility, and Normativity. Albany: State University of New York Press. O’Connor, Peg. 2002. Oppression and Responsibility: A Wittgensteinian Approach to Social Practices and Moral Theory. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press. Peregrin, Jaroslav. 2012a. What is Inferentialism? In Inference, Consequence and Meaning (Perspectives on Inferentialism), ed. L.  Gurova, 3–16. Cambridge: Cambridge Scholars Publishing. ———. 2012b. Inferentialism and the Normativity of Meaning. Philosophia 40: 75–97. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-010-9271-8. ———. 2014. Inferentialism: Why Rules Matter. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Phillips, D.Z. 2005. The Way We Were. In Wittgensteinian Fideism? ed. Kai Nielsen and D.Z. Phillips. London: SCM Press. Plunkett, David. 2011. Expressivism, Representation, and the Nature of Conceptual Analysis. Philosophical Studies 156: 15–31. https://doi. org/10.1007/s11098-010-9582-4. Published online first 8 July 2010. Shelby, Tommie. 2002. Is Racism in the ‘Heart’? Journal of Social Philosophy 33: 411–420. https://doi.org/10.1111/0047-2786.00150. ———. 2014. Racism, Moralism, and Social Criticism. Du Bois Review 11 (1). Strawson, Peter F. 1992. Analysis and Metaphysics. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. ———. 1995. My Philosophy. In The Philosophy of P. F. Strawson, ed. P.K. Sen and R.R. Verma, 1–18. New Delhi: Indian Council of Philosophical Research. Urquidez, Alberto G. 2018. What Accounts of ‘Racism’ Do. Journal of Value Inquiry. Published online: March 14. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10790018-9626-0.

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Vargas, Manuel R. 2005. The Revisionist’s Guide to Responsibility. Philosophical Studies 125: 399–429. Whiting, Daniel. 2016. What is the Normativity of Meaning? Inquiry 59 (3): 219–238. https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174X.2013.852132. Wittgenstein, Ludwig. 1958. The Blue and Brown Books. Oxford: Blackwell. ———. 2009. Philosophical Investigations. 4th ed, ed. and trans. Peter M.S. Hacker and Joachim Schulte. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell. Abbreviated PI. ———. 2013. The Big Typescript: TS 213. German English Scholars Edition, ed. and trans. C.  Grant Luckhardt and Maximilian A.E.  Aue. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.

CHAPTER 3

Re-defining “Definition”: An Argument for Conventionalism

3.1   Introduction 3.1.1  Scope of the Chapter Conventionalism is the name of the family of doctrines clustered around a normativist conception of meaning, sketched in Chap. 2. This chapter continues my prima facie defense of conventionalism. My claim is that conventionalism plausibly analyzes definitions of “racism” because it accommodates intuitions that are otherwise difficult to reconcile (Sect. 3.2). These are empirically based intuitions about the sociohistorical character of definition, on the one hand, and a priori-based intuitions about the apparent metaphysical properties of definition, on the other. On the one hand, definitions appear to have a temporal character: they are socially constructed, have an origin in history, and evolve over time. These contingencies incline some scholars to say that racism is an unstable entity, a sociocultural phenomenon. On the other hand, definitions of “racism” seem to be necessary and universal truths. For instance, it seems it is a necessary truth that racism is always wrong. Empirically and a priori-based intuitions have sometimes served as the basis for competing empirical and a priori approaches to racism. I focus on these two classes of properties because of their importance for philosophy generally and because of their indispensability to the ­philosophy of racism. This chapter demonstrates the ­compatibility of these

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intuitions, and hence the compatibility of empirical and a priori approaches. In Sect. 3.3, I argue that although the theoretical standoff between a priori and empirical approaches seems irreconcilable, it is not in fact so. A conventionalist approach (a view of meaning and definition) goes a considerable way toward demonstrating that the two approaches provide complementary analyses of linguistic  convention. To cut through this methodological stalemate, the nature of a priori and empirical analyses must be reconceptualized, for when viewed aright we find that both play important roles in the theory of racism. Roughly speaking, a priori analysis focuses on the values and norms that constitute our conceptual scheme. Empirical analysis focuses on the facts, processes, conditions, and consequences that bear on these norms, and so have the potential to disrupt and re-tool our conceptual scheme. I close Sect. 3.3 by arguing that conventionalism provides a naturalistic account of definition’s seemingly metaphysical predicates. This virtue renders the conventionalist picture of definition more plausible than the descriptivist alternative. The analysis that follows can be classified as connective analysis, on the model of P. F. Strawson (discussed in Chap. 2). My main argumentative strategy involves contrasting uses of “contingent,” “true,” “arbitrary,” “a priori,” “necessity,” “universality,” and “justification” in two contexts: the descriptive and the normative. My conclusion is that, properly understood, these notions mean differently in these contexts. Understanding the grammar of these notions in relation to the contexts of everyday discourse and grammatical/a priori analysis paints a rich, integrated picture of the manifold nature of human convention. I contend that the normative is the primary domain of the conceptual. 3.1.2  Terminology: “Proposition,” “Sentence,” “Rule-Formulation” Throughout this book, I employ technical terminology that may be confusing if left unexplained. I will thus explain it here. I use the term “proposition” to signify an element of a complex. Following Wittgenstein’s use of the term (as explicated by Glock), I define a proposition as a complex involving the use of a linguistic form (including a one-word sentence) on a particular occasion to say something.1 Propositions, then, are comprised of three 1  Glock rightly points out that Wittgenstein took proposition to be a family resemblance concept. That is, Wittgenstein rejected the claim that propositions display a general form. Be

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things: a linguistic form S, a use of S, and what is expressed by the use of S. As I use the term “proposition” throughout this book, I will not always mention every element of this complex; indeed, I will sometimes use “proposition” to signify an element of this complex. The context of use should make clear how I mean it to be understood, that is, the emphasis I wish to place. For instance, if I write The proposition that it is raining is true, I am emphasizing that what is expressed by the use of the sentence “It is raining” on a particular occasion obtains. Alternatively, if I write The proposition ‘It is raining outside’ is a description, the context makes clear that the emphasis is on the form of words (the sentence) that can be used in normal contexts to express a descriptive proposition. In the first example, what is expressed or asserted belongs to the foreground; the sentence and its use belong to the background. In the second example, the sentence belongs to the foreground; its use is implicit in the foreground but not mentioned; and what it expresses belong to the background. In both cases, all three constitutive elements are essential to the practice of saying something (i.e., to the “move” of asserting a proposition in a language-game). The reason for bringing these elements together as a complex is to bring into view that speaking is an activity wherein the notions of speaking, sentence, use, among other notions (such as technique of application) are internally related. To elaborate further, a sentence is a linguistic form that is internally related to grammatical rules that constitute those languagegames wherein the sentence has a use. Wittgenstein calls it the minimal unit for making a move in a language-game (for saying something meaningful). Furthermore, a string of words does not count as a sentence by virtue of having any particular structure, but by virtue of being used on an occasion to perform an intelligible linguistic act. For example, “Shame!” and “Ouch!” count as significant sentences for Wittgenstein (for they can be used to say something), despite their consisting of exactly one word. I will mostly focus on the contrast between grammatical propositions (sentences used to perform the speech act of laying down a rule for the use of an expression) and empirical propositions (sentences used to perform the speech act of describing/reporting/representing/depicting reality). Sentences can be used to express various kinds of propositions—for example, a description on one occasion of use,  a grammatical rule  on another occasion. I also distinguish between a rule-­formulation and the that as it may, Glock holds that Wittgenstein employs a technical sense of “proposition” for purposes of his philosophical investigations. His technical usage “is at odds with what we ordinarily call a ‘proposition’ or ‘sentence’” (Glock 1996, 318).

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rule it expresses. A rule-formulation is a form of words (sentence) that is used to lay down a rule for the correct use of words. “Racism is wrong,” “Bachelors are unmarried,” and “Red is a color” are rule-formulations. That is, they are rule-formulations on just those occasions where they are used to lay down a rule for the correct use of “racism,” “bachelor” and “red,” respectively. It is impossible to determine by the form of a sentence alone whether it is a rule-formulation or a descriptive sentence. For it is the use of a sentence that determines this. Take the sentence “This is red.” This form of words can be used to describe an object’s color or to express a rule for the correct use of “red.” When the latter obtains, the form of words “That is red” is a rule-formulation; when used to describe, it is a descriptive sentence. The rule, by contrast, is expressed by the rule-formulation on a particular occasion of grammatical  use. I will often speak loosely  for the sake of convenience. Consider: The sentence “Racism is wrong” is a rule-formulation that expresses a rule for the use of “racism.” This statement is cumbersome and pedantic. Moreover, it is cleaner English to simply state: “Racism is wrong” is a rule for using “racism.” (The simpler form may generate confusion. For example, one might interpret the simper sentence to mean that the sentence “Racism is wrong” is a rule, which is mistaken. It is not the sentence but what it expresses that is a rule.)

3.2   The Many Sides of Convention: Recasting Metaphysical Predicates as Facets of Convention I will go through several properties commonly attributed to grammatical propositions2 and explain how Wittgenstein recasts them as facets of convention.3 In each case, it will be shown that the form of a sentence is mis2  Gordon Baker and Peter Hacker agree with Glock (see note 1) that proposition is a family resemblance concept. They defend this claim by pointing out that Wittgenstein identified significant differences between propositions (2009, 245–246). He offered different analyses of logical propositions (tautologies), arithmetical propositions (“2+2=4”), ordinary grammatical propositions (e.g., “Red is a color”), metaphysical propositions (“Only my present experiences are real”), hinge-empirical propositions (“The world has existed for many years”). When I speak of Wittgenstein’s views on grammatical propositions throughout the book I am referring to his views about ordinary grammatical propositions and metaphysical propositions. 3  I draw heavily from Baker and Hacker, who, in my view, are preeminent authorities on Wittgenstein, as evidenced by their four-volume commentary on Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations. In this chapter, I draw mostly from Volume 2, Wittgenstein: Rules, Grammar and Necessity (2009).

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leading as to its function. The most common mistake and most fundamental source of misunderstanding is confusing a norm of description with a description. Wittgenstein cautions: “Don’t confuse a rule for the use of the word A with a sentence in which the word A is used.”4 “All bachelors are unmarried” looks like “All bachelors are smart” but the latter is a description whereas the former is a norm.5 This version of the is/ought distinction—the distinction between a descriptive proposition (a description of X) and a normative proposition (a rule for the use of the word “X”)—is foundational to the following discussion. Although I discuss grammatical propositions generally, my aim is to illuminate (analytic) definitions of “racism.” 3.2.1  The Empirical Side of Convention 3.2.1.1 Contingency as the Mark of Culture We feel that some propositions are necessarily true while others are contingently true. Contingent propositions are those that might be true or false, depending on the facts. Classic examples of contingent propositions include empirical judgments. For instance, whether the proposition that it is raining outside (at time t and place p) is true is contingent on the weather (at t/p). Contingent propositions and their negations are internally consistent (i.e., entail no contradiction). For there is no way to tell whether a contingent proposition is true or false in advance of experience. Hence the only way to tell whether it is raining is to get clear on the fact of the matter. A contingent empirical proposition is true if things are as the proposition depicts them as being, and false otherwise. For this reason, Hume describes contingent claims as “matters of fact.” Many grammatical propositions seem also to be contingently true. Some examples include: “The king moves one square at a time,” “Bachelors are unmarried men,” and “One meter is the length of the Standard Meter Bar.” We call them contingent because things could have been otherwise 4  Wittgenstein, The Big Typescript (2013, p.  187). See Wittgenstein’s Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics (1983) and Wittgenstein’s Lectures on the Foundations of Mathematics, Cambridge 1939 (1989, lectures 25–26) for an account of the differences between empirical descriptions and grammatical (normative) propositions. Many of the points discussed below are from these sources. 5  It may seem as though there is something about each sentence that entails a difference in kind. In fact, it is the use of these sentences that accounts for the distinction, as I argue in Chap. 4.

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than they actually are. The rule for the chess king might have been that the king moves two squares at a time; the term “bachelor” might have signified unmarried women; and the Standard Meter Bar, which we’ve selected as the standard for “one meter,” might have had a length of eighty inches. The proposition that bachelors are unmarried appears to be true in a way that is similar to the proposition that bachelors are smart. Namely: the truth of both seems to be contingent on the facts. Had we adopted the norm that bachelors are married, the proposition that bachelors are unmarried would have been false. Thus to describe these definitions as contingent is to say that they might be (or might have been) otherwise. A norm—and just about everything else—is contingent in the sense that it might be different than it is. I take this to be a standard way of thinking about grammar. A mere convention is thought to be a contingently true definition or rule, one that is perhaps true by stipulation. By contrast, a convention that is thought to be more than a mere convention, one that is called a necessary definition or rule, is thought to be grounded in the facts, in reality. For example, “Red is darker than pink” or “Humans are animals” are called necessary truths. I find this account  misleading, if left unqualified. It is just as misleading to say that grammatical propositions (such as definitions) are contingently true6. In both cases, clarity is needed about what precisely these predications do and do not entail. For example definitions are not contingent on the definition provided above, since definitions are not made true by the facts. Normally, outside of philosophical contexts,  we do not speak of the definition of “bachelor” as contingent though we recognize it to be revisable. Indeed, we deny that this is the case. We say that the truth of this proposition does not depend on any facts about the marital status of bachelors, for the truth is analytic (true by definition). Further, anyone who thought she could potentially refute the proposition that bachelors are unmarried by reference to a body of facts (empirical evidence) would be confused about the meaning of “bachelor.” It is not a discovery, observation, or opinion that bachelors are unmarried, but a rule that they are. In this way, it differs 6  “We characterize innumerable logical, grammatical and mathematical propositions as true. Wittgenstein did not deny this platitude; nor did he try to persuade us to stop saying this. For ‘philosophy may in no way interfere with the actual use of language… It leaves everything as it is’ (Philosophical Investigations, §124). What he did, as always, was to press us to examine what we mean by such truth predications” (Baker and Hacker 2009, 270).

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from the proposition that bachelors are smart, which would be contingently true (if it were true); for whether bachelors are smart or not depends on facts about the intellectual faculties of bachelors. However, the truth of the definition that bachelors are unmarried is not contingent on an analogous set of facts. It is a necessary truth. We must therefore distinguish different ways that a proposition might be said to be “contingent.” It might be called contingent in the sense that its truth depends on human decision and practice. Grammatical propositions, unlike empirical propositions, are contingent in that they are conventions, and it is for that reason that their truth does not depend on empirical facts, but on human practice. Conventions, of course, can be changed or abandoned. To call the definition of “bachelor” into question is to call the practice or convention into question (as I argue below). Let us then distinguish, as Wittgenstein does, between contingency/necessity in a grammatical system and contingency/necessity of a grammatical system7: 1. Necessity outside the system: A rule is necessary if it must hold for every community (sempiternal). A rule is contingent if it need not hold for every community (e.g., if it could be otherwise). 2. Necessity inside the system: A rule is necessary if it is constitutive of and essential to a practice. A rule is contingent if it is not constitutive of or essential to a practice.8 Wittgenstein argued that grammar is arbitrary—that is, not justifiable by reference to reality—and that, consequently, there is no such thing as necessity outside a system. Thus, outside the English language (i.e., within some other language), there may or may not be a rule about what counts as red. Outside our grammatical system, our grammatical norms become contingent. Thus far, then, I have posited that, outside a system, grammatical propositions are never necessary, but always contingent in that (i) they depend on human practice and decision for their truth; and that (ii) they need not hold for every society, since a community can adopt a different grammatical system. I will briefly discuss some arguments for this position below.  Wittgenstein states: “We must distinguish between a necessity in the system and a necessity of the whole system” (Lectures on the Foundations of Mathematics, 1975, XXV, p. 341). His example is that 25 × 25 = 625 is what we call a necessary result of mathematics, a paradigm of necessity. 8  I qualify this position below. Calling rules “necessary” is misleading, since it might lead to the idea that there are “superhuman” (language-independent)  facts that are true in all possible worlds. Rules, or rather grammatical propositions, are only necessary in a system. Outside the system, rules are contingent. 7

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Here I want to focus on what contingency and necessity amount to inside a grammar system. Within a grammatical system we distinguish between contingent and necessary truths. Contingent truths are true empirical, representational, and descriptive propositions. They are those that individuals assert, posit as hypotheses, provide evidence for, and so on. These truths, because they are contingent, depend on the facts, on how the world is, for their truth. And, of course, it is trivially true that if the facts go one way, they might have gone some other way. Necessary truths are propositions that are constitutive of the grammatical system. They are not representations in the system but norms of representation. These norms may be represented within the system (or outside it), but they cannot be epistemically evaluated from within the system of which they are constitutive. A grammatical proposition may be evaluated as useful or useless, good or bad, but not as (epistemically) true or false. For the conditions of (epistemic) truth and falsehood are provided by the system, by grammatical propositions. What is more, to evaluate a proposition is to provide evidence or epistemic reasons for it. These are reasons for thinking a proposition is true independent of a community’s values, form of life, and decision to adopt it. But what evidence or epistemic reasons can be provided to establish that a rule must be laid down, must be followed? A grammatical proposition is made true by its being laid down as the rule. Grammatical truth is a function of human decision, and is invariably rooted in a community’s values, interests, and so on. If the rules of a system are necessary, constitutive of it, then does that mean that they cannot be modified or abandoned? The rules themselves, as we have said, are not necessary but contingent in that they are conventions; hence they are in principle revisable. And to say this is to make the point stated previously that rules are human creations that are contingent upon human practice. This is a claim about a grammar system, not a claim about contingency or necessity in the system. We should not speak then about necessary rules, but about necessary truths, that is, propositions that are constitutive of a system. A proposition that is necessary in a system is a constitutive norm. Can it be abandoned? Yes, but doing so changes the practice, the language-game in question, just as changing the rules of chess changes the meaning of “chess” and, with it, the practice of chess. And this is, of course, the point of designating a rule “constitutive,” for it defines the practice in question. What does it mean to call a grammatical proposition “true”? One might think that a grammatical proposition is true if and only if it governs or is

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in force; that is, grammatical propositions are norm-existence statements. But this is misguided. Grammatical propositions are not norm-existence statements, though we are liable to conflate the two. “A bachelor is unmarried” and “It is a (current) rule of English that bachelors are unmarried” are not equivalent. The former is constitutive of a representational practice; as such, it functions as a standard of conduct, providing a rule for the correct use of “bachelor.” The latter is (normally used as) an empirical description or temporal statement about an existing practice. Grammatical propositions, in other words, are normative propositions, not descriptions of reality. Unlike a grammatical proposition, the assertion that a grammatical norm exists or obtains (e.g., “R is in force”) is a description the truth or falsity of which depends on the facts. One feature of norm-existence statements is that they are temporal, for whether a norm exists, obtains, or is in force depends on historical facts (e.g., the origin of a norm and how long it has existed).9 They are connected with cultural or anthropological matters more generally. “The king moves one square at a time” and “Throughout the 19th century the king has moved one square at a time” are not analogous, for the latter may shed light on some interesting aspect of a society whereas the former is used to lay down a chess rule. Similarly, “In the early 20th century, English speakers introduced the term ‘racism’ to signify a system of beliefs about racial superiority and inferiority” is a norm-­existence statement about the grammar of “racism.” It can be used to illuminate an important shift in social attitudes toward the socalled “science of race.” This is unlike “Racism is a system of beliefs about racial superiority and inferiority,” which is not (normally used as) an empirical description with a temporal component, but a rule for the use of “racism,” a standard of linguistic conduct.10 What, then, does it mean to call a grammatical proposition true? We speak of “true” and “false” definitions, but it is unclear what purchase these terms have on conventionalism. I answer that sentences that have the form of metaphysical (“Red is a color”), ethical (“Racism is wrong”), and empirical (“Water is H2O”) descriptions are often used as normative propositions. Adding “it is true that” to these sentences does not fundamentally alter their normative function. To say that red is a color is to lay down a standard for the correct use of “red,” and in so doing one tacitly endorses this standard as the correct norm. Uttering “it is true that...”  Baker and Hacker (2009, 278).  The rules of grammar are conditions of sense, the conditions under which such and such can be (meaningfully) said. 9

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does not change the semantic function (which is to lay down a rule), but merely shifts emphasis onto the speaker’s endorsement of the rule. This is analogous to the relationship of “It is raining” and “It is true that it is raining.” Both are normally used to make empirical assertions. Indeed, they are used to say the same thing. As Wittgenstein explains, “p” and “It is true that p” normally mean the same. In conversation with Waismann, he qualified this position by noting an important difference in the use of these forms of words. Although these two propositions have the same semantic content (or, as he would put it, say the same thing), the corresponding sentences are not used in the same circumstances.11 For instance, if someone expresses doubt about my assertion that p, I might reassure one by asserting that it is true that p. To assert that p is both to express that p and my attitude of affirmation that p.12 The addition of “it is true” to the expression does not modify the semantic content of p. However, it may shift the emphasis away from p to the speaker’s affirmation that p. Hence, assertions that include the expression “it is true that…” are prominently used to reassure others that p. Something similar applies to grammatical propositions.13 3.2.1.2 What We Affirm and What We Do with What We Affirm It might be said that there are different kinds of truth, but this can be misleading. It does not seem to be the case that the meaning of “truth”  See Baker and Hacker (2009, 271).  Truth is not predicated of grammatical rules, but of rule-formulations, that is, statements of rules. “The question before us, however, is what it means to call definition true. Although we do not ascribe truth-values to a rule, we have no qualms at all about ascribing truth or falsehood to the statement of a rule – as when we say that it is true that the chess king moves one square at a time, or that it is false that the prime minister presents his cabinet to the president on the third Monday after winning an election – rather, it is the third Wednesday. (This is comparable to our not ascribing truth or falsity to a fact, but only to a purported statement of a fact.) So there is nothing anomalous about holding that arithmetical equations are rules – that ‘2 + 2 = 4’ is the statement or expression of a rule – and that it is true that 2 + 2 = 4” (Baker and Hacker 2009, 278). Baker and Hacker seem to be correct here. We speak of chess rules being correct—as when we insist that a rule has been violated (“No, that rule is incorrect, the correct rule is…”)—but not ordinarily about their being true (“This is the true rule”) or facts. Instead we say that it is a fact (or it is true) that R, which is akin to saying “You must not go to the store!” The “it is true that” might be called pleonastic, but it serves a rhetorical function similar to that of the emphatic “must.” 13  Descriptivism, as I explain below, is a theory of definition which holds that a definition is a description. 11 12

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changes from one kind of proposition to the next. Rather, what changes across different kinds of propositions—say, from empirical to grammatical propositions—is what we are affirming (as true) and what we do with what we thus affirm. As Baker and Hacker explain: “The moot question is: what differences are there between such truth-ascriptions (LFM 68–70)? In particular, what is it that we are affirming, and what different kinds of things do we do with what we thus affirm?”14 What we affirm in the case of an empirical assertion is a description of reality. What we affirm in the case of a grammatical proposition is a rule for describing reality. And what we do with an empirical assertion are such things as provide evidence for another claim, provide relevant information to an interested party, give testimony, et cetera. What we do with grammatical propositions is altogether different, for grammatical propositions play various normative roles, roles constitutive of our language-­games, such as correcting misuses and misunderstandings of words, teaching the meanings of words, et cetera. Consider rule-formulations of the form “Racism is X.” What we normally do with such forms of words is assess behavior, attitudes, institutions, and so on, according to a standard of correct moral representation, for the word “racism” is ordinarily and primarily used to condemn. The use of “racism” to condemn is often a move in the language-game of moral blame that presupposes a rule (like “Racism is X”). In other cases, the term “racism” is used to criticize social arrangements. When I apply the term “moral representation,” I do so broadly to encompass both modes of condemnation, individual wrongdoing and social criticism. (I will return to this distinction in Chap. 7.) 3.2.1.3 The Arbitrariness of Grammar The contingency of linguistic norms is connected with an important aspect of grammar that Wittgenstein calls the arbitrariness of grammar.15 This  Baker and Hacker (2009, 270–71).  See, for example, chapter 56 of Wittgenstein’s The Big Typescript (2013, pp. 184–188). His view is most worked out in Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics (1983) and his Lectures on the Foundations of Mathematics (1989). For helpful expositions of Wittgenstein’s account of arbitrariness, see, in addition to the previously cited references, Hacker’s “The Arbitrariness of Grammar and the Bounds of Sense” (2000) and Michael Forster’s Wittgenstein on the Arbitrariness of Grammar (2004). 14 15

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thesis asserts that no language-independent standard justifies the adoption of one grammatical norm over any other. There is no court of appeal outside of human practice that can underwrite grammar, for every rationally compelling reason to adopt one rule over another presupposes a grammatical system. Nothing outside the language of community C can logically compel its members to adopt rule R (if it is considering R) or retain R (if R is already in force). Thus, the fact that things might be otherwise implies that a community is able to adopt/give up a norm, but not that it should (or should not) do so. One reason for thinking the arbitrariness thesis true is that it is consistent with how we come to adopt and affirm grammatical rules. Grammatical rules are taught to us, not via argumentation and empirical evidence, but via training and explanations of meaning, which we learn to follow blindly. A competent speaker initially serves as our teacher, and a person who regularly challenged the teacher would be incapable of learning the language. Training, the foundation for the teaching of language via explanations of meaning, is a process of non-ratiocinated drilling, whose foundation lies in instinctual reactions, like mimicking behavior. Thus every step of the developmental process is non-rational, in the following sense: languageacquisition is not justified by evidence or argumentation, for it is a matter of blind enculturation. By the time the pupil is able to consult the lexicon and ask questions like “What is the meaning of X?” and “Does he mean Y by X?” he has reached maturation and has mastered a significant portion of the language. Only then is he able to request reasons, develop arguments, and provide rational justifications. The theses of the arbitrariness and revisability of grammar are controversial. For although philosophers might agree that no language-­ independent logic underwrites definitions like “Bachelors are unmarried” and “One meter is the length of the Standard Meter Bar,” some metaphysicians argue that there are rational grounds for holding certain grammatical propositions: say, “Red is a color” or “Honesty is good.” However, it seems to me that any attempt to justify our color scheme will necessarily fall back on our practices, on what is significant to us. Hence, it would simply presuppose what it aims to prove. Similarly for “Honesty is good.” On conventionalism, definitions are contingent in the sense specified above, and so are unjustifiable by reference to facts external to linguistic practice. Yet, this view is compatible with maintaining that we have reasons for adopting these human constructs, even if they are internal to our language, to our forms of life. What is denied, then, is not rationality tout court, but a language-­independent rationality that transcends all human

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practices. The freedom that characterizes our ability to adopt whatever conventions we like is not a limit that is incompatible with the existence of immanent reasons, internal to language. If grammar is unjustifiable by a putative correspondence between grammar and the facts, what kinds of reasons qualify as good reasons for justifying grammar? These are sociocultural considerations broadly construed to include scientific, aesthetic, moral, and other practical considerations. A sociocultural consideration counts as a reason if it appeals to the interests, desires, and goals of the linguistic community. These historically conditioned factors constitute pragmatic or prudential reasons for adopting the grammatical norm. The norm is then said to be pragmatically justified, and this simply means that it satisfies the corresponding need (vis-a-vis the community’s forms of life). We have, for example, representational needs. Definitions of “bachelor” and “racism” are norms of representation. They are justified by reference to our linguistic community’s need to represent things as bachelors and racist, respectively. Grammar rules are means to ends; they are adopted because of their utility for achieving such and such purposes. For example, moral terms (and their definitions) are adopted because of the need to condemn and hold individuals accountable. This implies that if our morality should change, or if our representational needs should change, our moral terms and definitions would also change. It is, therefore, important to distinguish the pragmatic justifiability of grammar from the contingency of grammar. The latter implies, among other things, that every grammar rule is open to revision. It might be objected that the arbitrariness of grammar diminishes the significance of grammar. For instance, if “Racism is wrong” is contingent, then this seems to undermine the deep importance of this rule. The rule, in effect, is rendered pointless or unimportant. This objection is misguided. Conventionalism does indeed assert that this is an “arbitrary” convention, but it invokes the term in Wittgenstein’s technical sense. It is a mistake to equate contingency and revisability with diminished value.  No one would say that the norms of the U.S. Constitution are “arbitrary” in the sense of being pointless or unimportant simply because they are contingent and revisable. (On the contrary, we take the revisability and unfixed nature of the Constitution to be one of its greatest strengths.) There are reasons why we adopt some norms and reject others. Those that are laid down are not arbitrarily selected (even if they are “arbitrary” in Wittgenstein’s sense), for they serve important purposes and meet important needs for us. Moreover, although it is true that we could

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replace the norm that racism is wrong with the norm that racism is good, this in itself is not a reason for rejecting or revising a grammar rule (any more than it is a reason for adopting a grammar rule). The potential revisability of grammar norms is just that, the potential to do so. Whether that potential should be realized or not depends on our needs and forms of life. The point then is this: That definitions are essentially revisable does not imply that they ought to be revised. Whether we ought or ought not revise them depends on the values and practices of our linguistic community, on whether our linguistic norms fulfill their purposes in light of those values. It is also important to recognize something important about the grammar of moral terms. A large segment of morality is, from a grammatical perspective, a subjective and intersubjective matter. For instance, many linguistic communities permit dissent regarding matters of the heart, including many moral concerns. People in our society are not seriously permitted to dissent from the view that lying is wrong, but they are permitted to debate permissible exceptions to this rule. They are free to debate politically charged issues such as abortion, even if they are not free (from within grammar) to outright reject the prominent values that underlie this debate (the values of sanctity of life and the freedom to make choices about one’s body).16 Similarly, we do not take seriously arguments in favor of the claim that racism is good, but we nonetheless debate whether implicit bias is racist, what the conditions of institutional racism are, what constitutes unjust discrimination, and so forth. Notice that Wittgensteinian grammar speaks against the objection that Wittgenstein’s philosophy is conservative. The objection has it that Wittgenstein’s philosophy precludes the possibility of challenging any and every grammatical norm. However, we may retain Wittgenstein’s insights about the nature of language without retaining his conception of philosophy. Every grammar rule is logically open to dispute. This is permissible even on Wittgenstein’s view, provided that the arguments made presuppose a grammar. What cannot be done is to argue against an entire grammatical system (language), all 16  People in our community are not free (from within our grammar) to decide that the values of human life and freedom of choice are misguided. What people are free to decide is what exceptions to this rule should be permitted, and how and whether they apply in the abortion debate. Pro-lifers do not generally argue that the freedom to do what one wants with one’s body is not a legitimate value. Rather, “pro-life” proponents argue that there are limits to doing what one wants with one’s body. Similarly, “pro-choicers” do not reject the claim that human  life is sacred. Rather, they argue for qualifying this notion.  For  further discussion, see Amesbury (2005, chap. 6).

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at once. For one must use language to do so. To do that, in other words, would be to argue from within some alternative grammar. This may seem impossible because Wittgensteinians make statements like “Such and such cannot be said” (as in, “Racism is good” cannot be said in our language, except as an expression of racism). But such assertions, on the part of the Wittgensteinian, are grammatical observations. What is meant is that one cannot say that racism is good and retain the moral apparatus that militates against this norm; endorsing racism amounts  to abandoning our moral grammar. To preserve the need to criticize grammar we can distinguish internal and external grammatical criticisms. External criticisms are those that challenge what I call basic grammatical propositions like “Slavery is racist,” “Racial lynching is racist,” “Racism is wrong,” and so forth. People who contest these basic grammatical norms (white supremacists, perhaps) are condemned as racist. Since I start from the position that these basic propositions about racism are non-negotiable, I do not take external criticisms of the grammar of racism seriously in this book. For to challenge these basic propositions—though one could do so given the arbitrariness of grammar—would call other fundamental aspects of grammar into doubt. We would, in effect, have to significantly revise our moral grammar as a whole. Basic notions like “goodness” and “badness” would have to be revised to render them consistent with racist values—and I, for one, reject such a proposal (and here I am speaking in the first-person, as one who endorses the foundational core of a progressive moral grammar). That being said, I take seriously the ability and need to critically assess grammar from an internal perspective. Internal critiques of grammar start from a set of basic grammatical propositions about racism and proceed to argue for or against non-basic aspects of racism’s existing grammar. A non-basic aspect of grammar is a widely contested aspect, such that rival grammatical norms are partly constitutive of the concept in question. Consider,  for purposes of illustration, the explanation that racism is essentially race-based discrimination. Many philosophers would reject this behavioral account of racism. One objection might be that discriminatory behavior presupposes discriminatory attitudes; hence, racism should be conceived as an intention, emotion, or some other such attitude. Others might develop a nonattitudinal view of racism, and might seek to accommodate racial discrimination that way. And so forth. One of the aims of this book is to discuss the conditions under which internal forms of grammatical critique should be pursued. I argue that non-basic grammatical explanations of racism are assessable by reference to the underlying repre-

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sentational need. Even if the concept of racism is essentially contestable, we are not precluded from bringing conceptual resources to bear on which norms to adopt and which to reject. There can be good reasons for preferring some linguistic norms over others, even if such reasons are immanent (internal to our moral grammar). Grammars exist for the myriad of reasons that other sociocultural phenomena exist. To illustrate, grammatical explanations of racism may be compared to social norms. Like gender norms, the norm that racism is wrong is in a certain manner of speaking made true by social convention, even if no individual or committee decided that this should be the rule. What manner of speaking is that? Like gender norms, the rule that racism is wrong is a function of agreement in practice, that is, established moral practice. The grammar of social terms is immanently rather than transculturally objective, even while being contested, for the representational practice is established. Objectivity here concerns the fact that a practice is the norm, not that it ought to be endorsed. Even where a social norm ought to be endorsed, there is no transcultural standard that determines this fact, no extra-grammatical fact that logically settles which definitions ought to be adopted; hence, it is epistemically unjustifiable because facts/reality always underdetermine which norms ought to be adopted. The contingency of “Racism is wrong” is evident in its sociohistorical character. After all, there have been times when this was not the established norm. A definition is a practical tool that linguistic practitioners adopt to serve their linguistic interests, including their interest in moral, social, and political representation. These interests/purposes/needs furnish pragmatic reasons for adopting/retaining the norm. The contingency of definition is revealed in the historical fact that it is subject to evolve as sociohistorical conditions change. Finally, it is revealed in the anthropological fact that language is constitutive of, and deeply integral to, human culture. For instance, the practice of explaining the meaning of the chess king is interwoven with our peculiar desire to invent and play games, which is of course bound up tightly with other aspects of our culture. Similarly, the practice of defining “racism” is interwoven with the practices of assigning moral blame to individuals, social description and explanation of racial phenomena, and so on. As constitutive rules of our languagegames, grammatical rules make the “moves” of these games possible. The contingent character of grammatical propositions is, roughly speaking, synonymous with its cultural character. This has far-reaching implications. For instance, in order to appreciate why a culture adopts the grammatical norms it adopts—in order to see the pragmatic justification it

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has for its forms of life—we must appreciate the contingencies surrounding its choices. What forms of life characterize this culture? What practical purposes does its language serve? What pragmatic reasons (immanent justifications) do  its practitioners offer to justify their forms of life? What is the history of this culture and how have its norms changed/evolved? Answering these questions will speak to the needs that a culture has for adopting these norms—for example, “The king moves one square at a time,” “Bachelors are unmarried men,” and “One meter is the length of the Standard Meter Bar”—as opposed to others. Changes in immanent conditions are the differences that make a difference as far as concept-­formation and conceptchange are concerned (“Despite the fact that things might have gone differently with them, things went this way, because…”). 3.2.2  The Non-Empirical Side of Convention So far I have tried to show that conventionalism bears a direct relationship to the a posteriori. This by itself does not fully address the objection that conventionalism does not seem to be capacious enough to accommodate full-blown empirical analysis or considerations. I thus return to this objection in Sect. 3.4.1. In this section, I turn to the a priori side of convention. For given my account of grammar, some philosophers will no doubt worry that conventionalism is incapable of accommodating a priori analysis, which concerns itself with “a priori truths,” otherwise known as metaphysical truths. My aim is to demonstrate how conventionalism deflates the notion of “metaphysical truth.” I offer an account of the manifold structure of the a priori—necessity, universality, logical priority, truth and justification—arguing that each element is a facet of grammatical convention. I first consider the notion that some definitions are necessary and universal. In doing so, I consider the notion that some definitions have the character of depth and unpack the source of said depth. I then consider the notion that definitions are or ought to be justifiable. Here I consider epistemic and pragmatic justification. 3.2.2.1 Necessity and Universality Kant famously held that the mark of the conceptual is our talk of necessity (and universality).17 Wherever necessity is expressed in human judgment, 17  For discussion of the similarities and difference in Kant and Wittgenstein’s philosophies, see Hacker (1986).

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therein lies a clue that we are dealing with something a priori. An a priori truth is sometimes defined as a proposition that is and must be true at all times and/or true independent of experience. These propositions are characterized by the logical “must.” This is the “must” that asserts “Things must be thus-­and-­so,” “This is how things must be.” What are we to make of the apparent a priori nature of definitions, the appearance of metaphysical truth? Wittgenstein observed that the logical “must” is associated with a picture of necessity: immovability. This picture feeds into the thought that so-­called a priori truths are metaphysically significant, that they reflect objective reality which is independent of human practice. This a priori reality is sometimes conceived as the (firm and unchanging) structure of the world, which makes objective metaphysical judgments possible. What is imagined is that immovable facts somehow make definitions true. Metaphysicians have a bag full of similes for expressing the aforementioned intuitions. We say that “Necessary truths carve reality at the joints,” that “Necessary truths are those propositions that are true in all possible worlds,” and so on. A priori truths are thought to be analogous to empirical descriptions in that both are conceived as descriptions of reality. The difference is then said to consist in this: empirical descriptions are thought to describe physical reality and so are contingently true, whereas metaphysical descriptions are commonly thought to describe the structure of reality and so are necessarily true. Conventionalism disrupts the traditional conception of the a priori. If definitions are mere conventions, then they are not descriptions of the most basic features of reality (since they are not descriptions), and they are not immovable (since grammar is not immutable). The conventions of grammar, like all conventions, are human creations and are subject to change. Our evolving grammatical practices are not privileged in the relevant sense and so can no longer be viewed as reflections of objective reality. If all of this is correct, however, in what sense are they a priori? In what sense can we attribute something like the property of immutability to them? A norm is immovable in the following sense: we do not allow it to be moved or unhinged.18 Necessity here corresponds to our attitude. We rely on our definitions when we condemn, criticize, and correct violations. For example, we assert that racism is wrong and cling to this norm; we hold 18  The mathematical “must,” he says, is “the expression of an attitude towards the technique of calculation, which comes out everywhere in our life. The emphasis of the must corresponds only to the inexorableness of this attitude both to the technique of calculating and to a host of related techniques” (Wittgenstein 1983, VII.67, p. 430).

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fast to it in the face of transgressions. Like an immovable rock, our norms withstand the assault of transgressors; the norm remains for us a standard of correctness. Its necessity is thus a testament to its governing role in our lives. This form of necessity is not unique to definitions that have the form of metaphysical or ethical descriptions, but is the same for all definitions. We say, for instance, the king cannot move more than one square at a time because this violates the rule. We say that she cannot be a bachelor because only men can be bachelors. And we say that this color cannot be red, because red is that color. In all three cases, the necessity of the proposition consists in our unwavering and immovable commitment to a rule. It thus makes sense to assert, Racism is necessarily objectionable, but the necessity here consists in our immovability, and thus reflects an aspect of our cultural disposition. The necessity of linguistic norms does not consist in the fact that it is logically impossible to revoke their governing power, their “essential character,” for it is always possible for us to alter our forms of life (to adopt new norms). (Our norms do not have an “essential character” in that sense.) Rather, their necessity consists in the fact that we do not revoke their governing power, that they are essential to our lives. But how can definitions be both necessary and contingent? Is this not a logical contradiction? Two points need to be kept in view: 1. We need not retain the grammatical norms we have adopted (contingency) 2. We must retain our grammatical norms, despite the fact that we are not logically compelled to do so (necessity) This pair of truisms invites the question: Why do we (feel we must) retain grammatical norms if we do not have to? The answer to this question reveals something important about grammatical norms. We retain them because of their importance to our lives; indeed, because they are constitutive of our lives. Their importance is not just any importance. It is the kind that can only be expressed in terms of necessity. Thus the contingent nature of our norms is internally related to their necessity. This requires explanation. As standards of correctness, linguistic rules have a regulative function. They are partly constituted by the exclusive function of ruling out certain forms of behavior and the inclusive function of ruling in different behavior. Our linguistic norms thus circumscribe the scope of possible/acceptable human conduct by prescribing some practices and forms of life from

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the endless possibilities available to us.19 Adopting certain norms as ours entails the exclusion of several others that are incompatible with them. Now, our adoption of these norms to the exclusion of others is a contingent matter; we might have adopted different norms. Yet, though we might have adopted different norms, and though we can revise them, it is crucial that we have not done so. We have not done so because our norms are essential to our forms of life. And our holding fast to them reflects their unique place in our lives: their constitutive role. The very fact that we might live otherwise constitutes the contingency of our linguistic norms, and our refusal to live otherwise constitutes their necessity in our lives. Contingency and necessity condition one another. One might say that the necessity and contingency of our norms are two sides of the same coin (two aspects of convention). This way of thinking about the necessary/contingent divide is linked to the discussion of contingency in the previous section. Grammar rules are contingent in the sense that our practices might be otherwise, but they are not otherwise because practices are brought into existence for specific (sociocultural) reasons. From within our language, of course, grammatical truths are not contingently true due to their constitutive role. This explains why the norm that bachelors are unmarried is necessary rather than contingent. We hold fast to it, with unwavering commitment.

19  Anthropologists tell us that there are various color grammars. Reflecting on alternative forms of representation underscores the importance of our own color grammar in our lives, as well as the importance of  alternative color  grammars in other cultures. It thus comes natural for us to say that we reject these alternative color systems. This anthropological use of “exclusion” must be distinguished from the kind of “exclusion from grammar” that Baker and Hacker have as the focus of their discussions on their work on necessity (though see 2009, 320–338 for an exception). They argue that sentences like “Red is not a color” or “Some bachelors are married” are excluded from grammar in the sense that they are useless; that is, they do not express genuine possibilities of sense that are currently included by our grammar. If the former were a norm of representation, for example, it would license the absurd inference: “That box is red, therefore it is colorless.” This form of words is currently nonsense (though perhaps we could introduce an entirely novel practice to render it intelligible). By contrast, “exclusion” in the anthropological sense is a form of incommensurability in forms of life. Prescriptive (critical) grammar, it might be said, is in the business of contemplating, articulating, and critically evaluating “excluded” grammars in this anthropological sense.

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We see, then, that conventionalism captures the empirical intuition that explanations of “racism” are sociohistorical phenomena, and the a priori intuition that explanations of “racism” are necessary, insofar as they are partly constitutive of our sociocultural forms of life. If this is correct, then our linguistic norms are not merely necessary and contingent, they are necessarily both. Necessity and contingency are two facets of grammatical conventions. The confusion is to think that the terms “necessary” and “contingent” are oppositional. Once it is appreciated that the necessity of our norms does not consist in metaphysical or logical necessity, it becomes easier to see that their contingency is an important part of what makes them valuable to us. Their contingency is arguably a condition of the possibility of their necessity (i.e., of their being necessary for us), for it is we who (for contingent sociohistorical reasons) care about whether norms are followed or violated, and this is hardly a trivial matter. The value we attach to them compels us to ascribe the language of necessity to them (“must,” “cannot,” etc.). So, alas, we can revise our linguistic norms—and many philosophers would argue that some of them ought to be revised. But insofar as they are our norms, it follows that it is their necessity for our lives that best explains why we have not (yet) done so. Consider next the feature of universality, predicated of so-called “metaphysical truths.” Like analytic truths, “Every event has a cause” and “Racism is wrong” strike us as universal. What does their universality consist in? By “universal” one might simply mean the same as “necessary,” that is, immovable. If this is what “universal” means, then my analysis of necessity applies here. But there is something else it might mean. Let us begin by noting that universality, like necessity, is a mark of the a priori. Recall the distinction between the necessity of a system and necessity in a system. One of the implications of the arbitrariness of grammar is that no grammatical system is necessary. This forces us to conclude that every grammatical system is contingent. So like the notion of necessity, the explanation of universality must be located within a grammatical system. What is it about grammar that inclines us to call it “universal”? And universal, as opposed to what? A proposition like “Racism is wrong” is universal in that we apply it universally, and this means across sociohistorical contexts and hence across cultures. “Slavery is wrong and racist” is a grammar rule devised by and for the interests of anti-racists. To be clear, however, the rule is not “Racial slavery is wrong and racist for anti-racists,” for that would mean that antiracists give racists a pass, and only condemn someone for slavery when she professes anti-racism. (“It’s wrong for you to betray your own values like

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that!”) Nor is the rule “Racial slavery is wrong and racists for us” where “us” signifies a certain community or subset of such a community (e.g., U.S. society). For that would mean that anti-racists give racists of different societies (or of different sociohistorical contexts) a pass on racial slavery. To be sure, exception-clauses may be built into the rule, but if the rule is universal then it applies universally, to all peoples, places and times, such that the universal aspect of this norm defines the scope of its application.20 The universal scope of this norm is evident in the fact that we condemn racist slaveholders a priori and without taking into account conditions of their psychology, et cetera. Further the fact that our moral grammars are contingent—that is, the fact that things could be otherwise than they in fact are—does not change this feature of our application. We do not eschew the necessity of our moral grammar simply because we can, or because other cultures disagree with us. Moral grammar for us is, to use the Kantian term, a categorical imperative. The feature of universal scope is distinctive of many (though by no means all) moral norms. We have now distinguished: necessity in a system—conceived as the constitutive and essential nature of rules—and the universal scope of a rule—conceived as the transhistorical use of an ethical standard across cultures and sociohistorical contexts. None of these uses of “universality” imply that a system of grammar is universal tout court (for that could only mean that every human society subscribes to our moral grammar, which of course is false); indeed, the very notion of a universal grammar (in the sense we have been discussing) seems confused. For even if every human society shared a common grammar system, it would still be logically possible for any such society to replace it with a different grammar system. 3.2.2.2 Logical Priority The notion of “the a priori” is complex, so I offer a tripart analysis. I distinguish between the elements of necessity, logical priority, and truth. Grammatical conventions like “Red is a color” and “Racism is wrong” intuitively strike us as necessarily true and as having metaphysical reality. We have already explained this first element, so it is to the remaining two that I now turn. Each of these elements generates illusions that reinforce the others; I focus on the following illusions: 20  For further discussion, see Richard Amesbury’s “Agreeing to Disagree: Toward a More Capacious Conception of Tradition” in Morality and Social Criticism (2005).

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• The necessity and metaphysical priority of grammatical propositions gives rise to the illusion that (some) grammatical norms are ­unassailable (true in all possible worlds) and that they are the most general truths (constitutive of the world’s metaphysical structure). • The truth of grammatical propositions gives rise to the illusion that some are true and justifiable in the way empirical propositions are (i.e., true in virtue of corresponding to reality, and hence are epistemically justifiable). Said differently, some grammatical propositions are thought to be synthetic rather than analytic truths. I first tackle the notion of logical priority before turning to the notion of truth. As aforementioned, we are inclined to distinguish between the contingency of norms like (1) “Bachelors are unmarried” and the necessity of norms like (2) “Red is a color.” The former seems not to be true in all possible worlds, the latter seems to be true (or at least, is a plausible candidate for being true) in all possible worlds. The divide between (1) and (2) is characterized by the notion of depth: the latter seems to disclose a deeper truth about reality compared to the former. To refer to those definitions that strike us as having the character of metaphysical depth, I use the term deep conceptual norms. To refer to those definitions that strike us as lacking this depth, I use the term superficial conceptual norms. It seems that deep conceptual norms play a special (metaphysical) role within our conceptual scheme. It might also seem that their truth is a function of something essential—either to the world, human experience, or something outside of experience—for otherwise they would be revisable, which strikes us as wrong since revisionary definitions would simply be false. Whatever the nature of the justifier may be, it seems that deep conceptual norms disclose something fundamental about the structure of the world. Conventionalism can account for our feeling of depth with respect to certain conceptual norms, but the analysis it provides has the consequence that this depth is illusory, for its account cuts across grammar. Grammar, as Wittgenstein says, is “flat” in the sense that no aspect of grammar is superior to any other; there is no hierarchy of grammatical rules.

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The feeling that the propositions that racism is wrong and red is a color have depth is a shadow of the logical priority of grammar.21 Many philosophers of language already accept the proposition that meaning logically precedes truth. A sentence must be meaningful in order to be true or false. Conventionalism takes this assertion seriously, and runs with it. The ­apparent metaphysical depth of grammatical propositions corresponds to the fact that grammar precedes the empirical world in one important sense. It provides a system of linguistic standards for what can and cannot be meaningfully said about the world. Grammar precedes experience in that it determines what counts as experience, for grammatical rules are conditions of sense. To know whether the proposition that it is raining is true or false, one must check the facts. To know whether it makes sense, one must know the meanings of the constituent words (among other grammatical rules of English). And to know the meanings of these words (“it,” “is,” “raining”) is to know the rules governing their proper use. Knowledge of grammar is prior to knowledge of matters of fact. I have to be able to use language before I can be in a position to describe the world, correctly or incorrectly; otherwise, I will not understand the description. My knowledge of grammar, however, is a priori because it is not justifiable by reference to the facts. It is a precondition of epistemic justification. For instance, the grammar of “raining” determines what counts as rain. Knowledge of this grammar is a precondition for determining the truth value of certain propositions concerning the weather. The term a priori literally translates, “what precedes experience.” Let us call this element of the a priori its logical priority. Jaroslav Peregrin, a fellow normativist (of the inferentialist variety), provides a succinct statement of common arguments in support of what he calls, following Wilfrid Sellars and Robert Brandom, “material validity.” This notion presupposes the

21  In Lecture XV of Lectures on the Foundations of Mathematics, Wittgenstein used the term “shadow of reality” to refer to the realm of possible results or applications that are generated by a grammatical rule. “We multiply 25 X 25 and get 625. But in the mathematical realm 25 X 25 is already 625.” Similarly, in Euclidean geometry, a straight line can be drawn between any two points, but, according to Frege, “in fact the line already exists even if no one has drawn it. The idea is that there is a realm of geometry in which the geometrical entities exist. What in the ordinary world we call a possibility is in the geometrical world a reality. In Euclidean heaven two points are already connected. This is the most important idea: the idea of possibility as a different kind of reality; and we might call it a shadow of reality” (1975, p. 144–145).

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logical priority of definitional rules. Peregrin asks us to contrast the following inferences: 1. X is P If X is P, then X is Q X is Q 2. X is a dog X is an animal 3. Lightning now Thunder soon Logicians would recognize (1) as a valid inference rule, but some would recognize (2) as an invalid inference rule. A more charitable reading of (2) would have it that it is valid, but only because we see that it implicitly contains a second premise, Every dog is an animal. Peregrin argues that this is mistaken. (2), without the additional premise, is no less a valid inference rule than (1). Where they differ is in the type of validity at issue. Whereas (1) is formally valid, (2) is materially valid. One argument against the standard (enthymeme) account, already expressed by Lewis Carroll’s regress objection,22 is that, even in (1), it could be argued that an additional premise must be added before it is possible to accept it as valid. The missing premise in (1) might be E: If anything has a certain property, and whatever has this property has a certain other property, then the thing in question has the other property.23 Upon adding E to argument (1), the same line of objection could be raised, yet again.  For  we might continue to feel that there is a “gap” between the premises and the conclusion of the argument, so that we must repeat the procedure of adding a further conditional premise to our argument, ad infinitum. According to Peregrin, what is going on is that our feeling that there is a “suppressed” premise is a shadow of the fact that we want our inference rule to be explicit rather than implicit. This feeling (if left unchecked) generates the requirement that every “premise” (inference rule) must be made explicit, thereby leading to an infinite regress. But Peregrin observes that logicians do not accept that (1) is invalid for failing to explicitly state E:  Lewis Carroll (1895).  He credits Bertrand Russell (1914, 66) with providing this rule.

22 23

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the additional premise [i.e., E] is not necessary [in (1)], because for the inference to hold it is enough that the meaning of if…then… [in premise 2] be fixed; of course, when talking about inferences we assume the context of a specific language, with the meanings of its expressions fixed. But by the same token we can vindicate the original inference [i.e., (2)]: for it to hold, we need nothing more than the meanings of dog and animal be fixed. Let us follow Sellars (1953)24 and call these ‘extra-logical’ inferential rules material.25

If we do not need an additional rule in the case of (1), then we do not need it in the case of (2). For the meanings of the constituent terms of the premises are always taken for granted. Our language “fixes” the meanings of the signs of each argument. The Wittgensteinian spin on Peregrin’s argument, which he might not accept, is that the material rules in question are grammatical rules. These rules, moreover, are logically prior to empirical descriptions in that they are conditions of sense. Consider the grammatical proposition “Bachelors are unmarried men.” This definition is prior to “S is a bachelor” in that it is a condition of sense that makes the empirical description intelligible. No one, of course, is tempted to view the definition of “bachelor” as a deep metaphysical truth. On the contrary, it is universally recognized to be an superficial (and revisable) convention. Kant, however, who introduced the notion of ­analyticity, thought that many other grammatical propositions (which he failed to recognize are grammatical explanations rather than descriptions), like “Every event has a cause,” are synthetic rather than analytic. He thought this because he was taken in by the apparent metaphysical depth of these sentences, a character that, for him, differentiates them from arbitrary conventions (analytic truths). Wittgenstein, by contrast, delves more deeply into the nature of this analyticity. From “S is a bachelor” we immediately infer (without the need to check experience) that “S is an unmarried man.” This argument is valid but does not require the suppressed premise “Bachelors are unmarried men,” because understanding the premise of this argument presupposes understanding the meaning of “bachelor.” The definition of “bachelor” is not a premise at all, but a convention: an inference rule which licenses a transformation, from the empirical proposition “S is a bachelor” to the

 Wilfrid Sellars (2007).  Peregrin (2014, 26).

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empirical proposition “S is an unmarried man.”26 What applies to superficial conventions applies to deep conventions, also. That is, there is no metaphysical depth, no metaphysical priority, only logical priority. The reason why we think that “Every event has a cause” is a metaphysical proposition is that we conflate the necessity of the proposition with the shadow of depth, and necessity, we have seen, is a function not of the content of grammar rules per se, but of our unwavering commitment to them and of their importance in our lives. As Wittgenstein put it, corresponding to the depth expressed in the language of necessity is “the deep need for the convention.”27 If the Wittgensteinian analysis is correct, then it applies to grammar rules governing the use of “racism.” “Racism is wrong” and “Racist phenomena are wrong,” for instance, are conditions of sense, for they are presupposed by meaningful usage of the words “racism” and “racist.” Grammar rules, such as these, must be in place prior to the meaningful use of these words. It is in this sense that grammatical rules are a priori: they logically precede the truth or falsity of descriptions of racism. Definitions establish conceptual connections, connections that obtain without the need to check experience. A linguistic convention can be a rule only if it forges this sort of conceptual connection. Glock puts the point this way: linguistic rules “antecede experience” in the innocuous sense that they are conditions of sense. The point can also be put thus: “Racism is wrong” is an inference rule—a pattern of inference—that licenses valid material inferences. To call

26  Wittgenstein’s account of the a priori is extremely difficult to penetrate, or at least it has been for this author. My understanding is my own, but it has been shaped by many. I will mention a few influences. First, Glock’s illuminating discussion of grammatical propositions as conditions of sense. Second, Brandom’s discussion of Kant and Wittgenstein on necessity, and his discussion of Wilfrid Sellars (1994, chap. 1; see also 2000). Third, Wilfrid Sellars’ “Inference and Meaning” and other essays in the collection In the Space of Reasons: Selected Essays of Wilfrid Sellars (2007, 3–27) lays the foundation for expressivism through an account of material inference rules. Fourth, Amesbury’s helpful discussion  and extension of Brandom’s analysis of material validity into the ethical and religious domains (2005, chap. 4). Fifth, Baker and Hacker’s analysis of Wittgenstein’s account of necessity in “Grammar and Necessity” (2009). Finally, Jose Medina’s (2002) explication of Wittgenstein’s views of normativity, necessity, and teaching. For a more concise discussion of Wittgenstein’s account of grammar, see Hacker’s “Wittgenstein on Grammar, Theses and Dogmatism” (2012), Conant’s “Wittgenstein on Meaning and Use” (1998). Rundle’s critical essays on grammar are lengthier, but helpful (1990, the various chapters on meaning). 27  Wittgenstein (1983, I.§74).

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the argument valid is another way of stating that the inference holds apart from experience—that is, it follows by definition, as a matter of convention. The logical priority of our definitions is a reflection of their conventional nature. A definitional norm must be in place—in force—prior to our being able to use words in meaningful ways. For to use a word in a meaningful way is, inter alia, to use it in accordance with a rule. That is, a rule for the use of a word must be laid down as the norm before one is able to follow it. The norm must “come before,” because it alone ­provides the conditions of what it does and does not make sense to say. It is only because we have standards of linguistic correctness that we are able to make empirical judgments, both true and false. Our linguistic norms make empirical description possible (they are preconditions of truth). If we did not take the “truth” of certain norms for granted, empirical judgments would not make sense. And this simply means that we would not have the corresponding representational practice. Note that the point I am making is not that grammar (language) precedes nature, but that it precedes understanding. Without a grammar for “racism,” that which is called racism might still result in consequences we would condemn as “wrong,” “bad,” “unjust,” “harmful,” and so on (provided we retained the grammar for these other terms). But, without a grammar for “racism,” our condemnations would lack the unity and understanding provided by the concept of racism. Our understanding would be limited. Let us now consider Peregrin’s final example. Peregrin extends the notion of material validity thus: “The recognition of (3) as an inferential rule requires, moreover, recognition of the fact that inferential rules need not be indefeasible: (3) is obviously a paradigmatic case of a ceteris paribus rule. This goes against the tradition that something deserves the name inferential rule only if it is ‘bulletproof’.”28 Peregrin’s observation is interesting, because something similar arguably applies to some inferences we make about racism. Consider this materially valid argument: . Milu’s action is racist. 1 2. Therefore, Milu did something wrong. Does this argument have an enthymeme? Is it missing the premise “Racism is wrong”? The Wittgensteinian answer is that an enthymeme has not gone missing. For if one understands what is said by premise 1, one  Peregrin (2014, 27).

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thereby understands that Milu did something wrong. In other words, conclusion 2 follows immediately and without further ado from the fact that Milu did something racist—for “doing something wrong” is part of what it means to say that a racist action was performed. The terms “racism” and “racist,” we might say, are thick ethical terms that wear their negative valence on their sleeve. The individual who does not understand that doing something racist is wrong does not fully understand what the word means. This individual would be incapable of fully understanding premise 1; a fortiori, she would not fully understand the argument. It is plausible, therefore, to construe “Racism is wrong” not as a premise in the argument, but as an inference rule that licenses the transformation of empirical statements, from “Milu acted racist” to “Milu did something wrong.” The premise and conclusion would then be conceptually connected, not by truth, but by grammar—by an arbitrary convention and “inference-ticket.” What determines the normative content (negative valence) of “racist,” in the above argument? Clearly, it is the term’s definition, the linguistic rule governing the term’s proper use. But the precise nature of grammar rules is often contested where social terms are concerned. For instance, one way to resist the above argument is to judge that there are exceptions to the rule that racism is always wrong. We can imagine someone arguing that cases of implicit bias, though racist, should not be condemned for involving wrongdoing if the agent is unaware of her bias, for one should not be held responsible for conduct that is not under one’s control. I do not agree with this argument, but it is not entirely implausible, so let us suppose it to be sound. In that case we have reason to treat “Racism is wrong” as a ceteris paribus rule, akin to “Lightning causes thunder” and “Lying is wrong.” That is, we can hold this inference pattern to be valid “under normal conditions,” even while recognizing that it admits of many exceptions. Given the “innocuous” account of necessity and logical priority provided herein, we can expel the intuitions mentioned at the outset of this section: namely, that some definitional norms are unassailable (in the sense that they are true in all possible worlds) and that they are metaphysical truths (about the ultimate structure of the world). The depth of “Racism is wrong” is a function of our attitude of steadfastness in respect to it. The norm corresponds to our attitude, not to truth. This attitude of  necessity reflects the fact that this norm is partly constitutive of our concepts of racism and morality. That is, it corresponds to a deep need for

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the convention, as is evident from its role in moral practice. It is the necessity of this norm for our moral form of life that makes it unassailable for us. Moreover, the generality of the norm corresponds to the scope of its application, for “Racism is wrong” governs (virtually?) every moral language-game we play with the word “racism.” At the end of the day, however, we are still dealing with a logically revisable human convention, its necessity, generality, and logical priority notwithstanding. 3.2.2.3 Justification and the Arbitrariness of Grammar Grammatical Propositions as Reasons Language users have a need to justify the claims they make and Wittgensteinians have rightly pointed out that the role of grammatical propositions in the context of justification is the role of reasons for saying/ doing things. Normally, there is no need to justify grammatical norms, for their role is primarily that of justifiers, that is, conditions of sense that license empirical descriptions. It is important that grammatical norms are normally not called into question, for if they regularly were this would undermine their normative status. Their normative status is elucidated by our discussion of logical priority. An argument of the form “X is racist, so X is wrong” is made possible in part by the inference rule “Racism is wrong,” which logically antecedes these propositions and is therefore taken for granted. As D. Z. Phillips and H. O. Mounce argue: Within our society, it is taken as a matter of course that a man should tell the truth rather than lie… People do not normally assert that lying is bad; they assert that a particular act is bad because it involves lying. Here, however, it is apparent that lying is not itself the subject of a prescriptive judgement, for the reference to lying serves as a justification, and implies that to condemn an act as lying does not itself need to be justified. Thus it is just because in general we do not have to justify a condemnation of lying that we can on a particular occasion condemn a man for telling a lie.29

I can justify my judgment that he did something wrong by explaining that he told a lie. Were I pressed to explain why telling a lie justifies my judgment, I should reply, “Because lying is wrong.” If this explanation is called into question, then I have exhausted my reasons and my justification comes to an  Phillips and Mounce (1970, 8).

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end. Wittgenstein writes: “‘Have I reasons?’, the answer is: my reasons will soon give out. And then I shall act, without reasons.”30 Baker and Hacker argue that this claim from Wittgenstein acknowledges that grammatical propositions are justifiers that are not themselves subject to justification31: What he wrote was that my reasons will soon give out, not that I have none. But when I have given my reasons, I need not and typically do not have reasons for holding the reasons I have given to be reasons. For I will quickly reach bedrock, exhaust all justifications, and say ‘This is simply what I do’ or ‘This is what is called doing thus-and-so.’ [PI 217] But this does not mean that I have no justification for what I do. On the contrary, I cite the rule I am supposed to be following as a justification. It is the pattern for my actions.32

But what about the rule itself? Many encounter frustration with Wittgensteinian philosophers on precisely this point. For how can it be that grammar is unjustifiable? Wittgenstein’s claim that justification comes to an end is, fortunately, misleading. Epistemic Justification The truth of an empirical proposition is justified by reference to facts about the world. By “facts about the world” I mean evidence for a proposition of the following form: the evidence verifies or confirms the truth of a proposition, independent of what I or anyone else may think, as one that is true to the facts (as corresponding to them). Because it makes sense to ascribe the predicates “true” and “correct” (and “false” and “incorrect”) to grammatical propositions, we overlook subtle differences in the application of these predicates to empirical and grammatical propositions. In particular, we fail to question whether the methods of verifying empirical truths are appropriate for establishing definitional truths. We take for granted that epistemic justification is the appropriate form of justification for both. Consequently, many philosophers find it problematic that, on conventionalism, grammatical rules are said to be unjustifiable this way. I  Wittgenstein (2009, §211).  The terminology of “justifier”  (that which justifies), which contrasts with  “justified” (that which is justified) is my own gloss on their view. The terminology is from Robert Brandom (1994). 32  Baker and Hacker (2009, 97). 30 31

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will first explain why I reject epistemic justification. I will then explain why it is misleading to say that grammar cannot be justified; that is, I will explain the sense in which grammar is justifiable. It is perfectly licit to say that it is true that racism is bad, so we assume that this statement must be true in virtue of conforming to a fact about the real nature of racism itself. But we have a difficult time pointing to the fact in question, to the object, racism itself. We thus posit a world of moral facts and locate the badness of racism within that world. (I use the term “world” broadly to signify any domain of facts, including Platonic worlds, transcendental worlds, etc.) This impulse is even greater when it comes to grammatical propositions that more strikingly resemble empirical facts than moral propositions. Propositions like (a) “Racism is the belief that the dark races are inferior and the white races superior,” (b) “Racism is racial hatred/contempt/disregard,” (c) “Racism is racial oppression,” and (d) “Racism is a sociocultural reality” strike us as descriptions of matters of fact. Propositions (a) and (b) look like descriptions of human cognition or mental states (and may give the impression that “racism” is a natural kind term). Propositions (c) and (d) strike us as descriptions of social reality and human practices (and may give the impression that “racism” is a social kind term). We are thus inclined to locate the reality of racism within the natural world—physical nature and society. If one has proclivities toward third realms, one may be tempted to locate any of these definitions in a nonnatural world. In any case, we think that philosophical theory has before it a social or ontological task: to posit and account for a moral, natural, social or metaphysical fact. Wittgenstein, however, rejects the idea that it is possible to justify grammar in a language-independent manner that shows it to be superior to alternative grammars. There are no epistemic criteria for assessing whether some particular community (e.g., a culture very distant from ours) has got the “right”/“correct” grammar. Hacker helpfully elucidates Wittgenstein’s arguments for the arbitrariness of grammar—for the claim that grammar cannot be justified by reference to reality.33 I have already mentioned one of these objections. Namely, that any attempt to justify grammar will either be question-begging or lead to an infinite regress. To give a justifi33  Wittgenstein (2009, §§491–497). “The rules of grammar may be called ‘arbitrary’, if that is to mean that the purpose of grammar is nothing but that of language. If someone says, ‘If our language had not this grammar, it could not express these facts’ – it should be asked what ‘could’ means here” (§497).

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cation of grammar is to use language; hence, any proposition offered as a justification of grammar must itself have a grammar. “If it has the same grammar as that which it purports to justify, the justification begs the question. If it has a different grammar, then (a) it determines different concepts and so cannot be about the same thing, hence is irrelevant; and (b) that grammar too will stand in need of justification. So any attempt at grounding grammar in reality will launch us upon an infinite regress of justifications.”34 Why, then, do philosophers believe it is possible to provide an epistemic foundation for definitional norms? The desire to justify definitions on epistemic grounds stems not from careful reflection on the ways in which we do justify actual norms, but from misleading similarities across different kinds of propositions (as just discussed), along with other sources of conceptual confusion. This includes the philosophical mindset of epistemological skepticism. The worry is that if we cannot justify our norms by reference to the facts, then we cannot know them to be true. Once we allow skepticism to creep in, our beliefs and practices suddenly seem shaky and we feel that we must concede that we have no good reason to accept our grammatical beliefs. We then feel that the only way to reply to the skeptic is to meet the skeptical challenge head on, on her own terms, by providing good epistemic reasons. The skeptical worry does not arise on conventionalism for the simple reason that definitions are not descriptions, but expressions of linguistic norms. If one is a competent speaker of the language, one need not worry that one does not “know” whether one’s grammatical proposition is true, as opposed to false. For a grammatical proposition  never expresses a description, but a rule for the use of “racism.” On conventionalism, to know a grammatical proposition is to know the rule it expresses; this consists in the ability to follow it and explain it to others. So, there is no epistemic gap between one’s knowing a rule and one’s knowing whether it is true—these are one and the same. If I am able to use a word, then I know what it means. There is no further question as to whether this meaning is the “right” one. Said differently, grammatical knowledge is knowledge-how rather than knowledge-that, so it is not the proper target for traditional skepticism. Second, a false grammatical proposition would either be a meaningless form of words or an alternative norm of representation (which belongs to a different grammatical system).  Hacker (2000, 76).

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So, again, the skeptical worry does not arise. The only skeptical worry that makes sense in this context is an immanent one. We can imagine a new linguistic practice being touted as superior to the prevailing practice, the former being parasitic on the latter. (For example, my account of language-­ game contestation, discussed in Chap. 1.) Here we might be skeptical of the “truth” of the prevailing form of life, and wonder whether we might be better off living differently. This kind of worry may be legitimate, and resolving it may require appealing to empirical considerations,  but it is akin to an existential dilemma that calls for a decision; it is not amenable to epistemic justification, as I argue below. Another source of confusion stems from the fact that epistemic justification is possible with respect to descriptions of grammar. The description of a definition is correct (true) just in case it corresponds to actual linguistic practice. A philosopher, for example, might ask a purely descriptive question: What is the prevailing linguistic norm (or set of norms) concerning contemporary usage of “racism”?” There are correct and incorrect answers to what the actual grammatical norms of a linguistic community are, for example, facts about how the word “racism” is used. The pertinent fact is not a natural fact, like a fact about the shape of the earth, but a social fact, and more specifically a linguistic fact. Hence it is possible to justify descriptions of ordinary usage on epistemic grounds. The correct answer to the question “How is ‘X’ used?” is a norm-existence statement. A norm-existence statement, we have seen, is a description about linguistic practice. The correct norm-existence statement accurately describes how a word is used by competent speakers of the language. The statement is false if it fails to correspond to actual linguistic practice. It is true if it so corresponds. Since verification and falsification hold the key to the door to knowledge of the true proposition, epistemic justification gets a foot in the door here. The methods used for establishing true grammatical descriptions are the wrong ones for establishing the normative superiority grammar. One cannot marshal empirical evidence to show that a grammatical rule is normatively correct. That is simply the wrong method for this purpose. For the evidence that is necessary to show that a proposition is descriptively correct merely establishes that a certain rule is in force, whereas what is needed is an argument for the normative correctness of said norm. To see this, consider the most common way of establishing the correctness of a definition: namely, appeals to authority. Appeals are made to dictionaries,

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reference books, or experts in a relevant field. What these authorities prove is that a definitional norm captures prevailing linguistic practice. Indeed, the relevant authority might be oneself if one is a competent speaker of the language and the term in question is known by one. When it comes to non-technical  vocabulary, a competent speaker’s explanation of a word suffices as a criterion of meaning. This, of course, makes perfect sense as soon as one reflects on the fact that language is a practice; hence grammar is something  taught by means of training and, later, by explanations of meaning supplied by a competent speaker of the language. However, if one calls the regularity into question by challenging its normative credentials, then no appeal to authority will resolve the dispute. That I use the word “racism” in accordance with the norm that racism is racial oppression is not a reason for thinking that this endorsement is morally legitimate  any more than the fact that there are two genders expressed in a language is a good reason for thinking that this representational practice is morally legitimate. A true description of grammar says something about what a community’s practices are. For to describe grammar is to describe an important segment of social reality, thereby legitimating  important aspects about its cultural milieu. The justification, then, is always internal to the community’s grammar. This might seem to give rise to an is/ought gap.  Our inability to establish the superiority of one grammar over alternatives reflects an important aspect of human convention. Grammars are established by being created, constructed, laid down, not by being proved. Since they are essentially created to meet the needs of the community that creates them, any justification of a grammar necessarily presupposes its values, interests, and rationales. We must therefore turn to the topic of pragmatic justification. Pragmatic Justification If grammar is unjustifiable by reference to reality, does this mean that it is unjustifiable tout court? No, for grammar is not arbitrary in the sense that we lack reasons for employing our grammatical rules. As previously argued, our reasons are, inter alia, socioculturally conditioned needs for representation. These reasons are our values. Before developing this account further, I will begin by discussing the role of empirical considerations in justifying grammar. For if grammar is unjustifiable by reference to reality,

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one might think that this renders empirical considerations moot. This is misguided. Grammar is conditioned by empirical facts. We adopt the explanations of meaning we adopt, not based on arbitrary or random selection, but (partly) based on facts. Wittgenstein observes, for instance, that the naturalness of techniques of employment serves as the “foundation” for (laying down) certain grammatical rules. Techniques of measurement are one example of this. It might appear that our grammatical rules are tailored to “fit the facts,” so that any other grammatical rule would be wrong. But the “fit” between a grammatical rule and the fact it fits is pragmatically  mediated by our needs, interests, and so on. Hence the “fit” in question does not make the techniques true, but useful for achieving the ends in question. Moreover, as argued elsewhere, these facts do not somehow connect grammar to reality, nor is grammar a representation of anything. Despite the fact that empirical considerations condition grammar, theory must place certain core values in the driver’s seat. It is this that gives the question “What justifies a norm of representation?” new (non-­ epistemic) meaning. As Hacker explains, “a system of rules which is simple, convenient, and easily taken in is pragmatically justified. One can give reasons why it is preferable to alternatives. But the justifying reasons do not make the rules right or correct. They make them useful.”35 The pragmatic justification of a definition consists in demonstrating that it satisfies a need for a certain kind of representational practice. Moral needs, of course, are not usually justified by reference to aesthetic considerations (though Hacker thinks they play a role in the context of science). Nor do we normally appeal to considerations  of utility and efficiency, though we occasionally do. For we usually appeal to facts about what causes harm and suffering, and we are usually guided by  deeply held moral convictions, like honesty, respect, fairness, and so on. Aside from moral and aesthetic considerations, other non-epistemic considerations include existential, social, and political considerations. For instance, I argue that “racism” should be politically defined, in a way that serves the interests of nonwhites given the present sociohistorical context. Theoretical considerations are also brought to moral grammar.  One  Hacker (2000, 78).

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example of this is the desire to undertake a consistent way of living; that is, a desire to live in a way that is consistent with a certain set of moral and other value commitments. The desire to attain (wide or narrow) reflective equilibrium is well-known in moral and political philosophy, for example. Finally, to provide just one more example, the desire to articulate a definition may stem from the need to resolve substantive and persistent conceptual disagreement. All of these values may be articulated in normative arguments to provide good pragmatic reasons for adopting one definitional  norm over another. Hence we are concerned with normative-­ pragmatic justification. Pragmatic justification explicitly links definitional norms to the needs and importance we attach to practices.36 A consequence of this approach is that pragmatic justification is always immanent. By this I mean that justification must be internal to grammar and so must presuppose a set of taken-for-granted values. Pragmatic reasons are considerations that make something good to have. What a linguistic community considers “good to have,” however, is not something that is determined by facts alone. It is conditioned by human values, interests, and goals. Unlike epistemic reasons, pragmatic ones bear on how things should be relative to a set of values, aims, and forms of life. It thus follows that pragmatic justification always presupposes a background—a culture with certain forms of life and multifarious values—from which the adoption of a definitional norm can be shown to be reasonable. The background explains why the representational need arises in the first place. The need makes it reasonable to adopt the corresponding linguistic practice. Definitions, for the Wittgensteinian, are tools that are valued as means rather than as ends in themselves. For they are constitutive of linguistic practices that are interwoven with the rest of our lives. Pragmatic justification thus goes well with Wittgenstein’s conception of language as a kind of practice, and his view of meaning as use. Wittgenstein’s account of grammar can account for extensions of grammar and conceptual change. A norm of representation implies a need for the convention, as in the case of moral representation. When a new moral need arises, a pragmatic reason exists to extend moral grammar. Moral grammar is thus conditioned by empirical facts—facts about human harm, suffering, et cetera—even if these facts always underdetermine our decisions. Hence 36  Baker and Hacker tackle further objections to the arbitrariness of grammar in their essay “Grammar and Necessity” (2009, 334–338).

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an important aspect of pragmatic justification is a perspicuous understanding of the empirical conditions that prompt a need for moral representation. These considerations form the basis for advancing pragmatic arguments for adopting and ranking competing forms of moral representation. I thus hold that the theory of racism must start from a set of antecedent values and a picture of the aim of racist representation. It is necessary, in other words, for theory to go beyond “what is the case” (the facts) into the normative domain of “what ought to be the case.” Moral vocabulary matters because moral representation matters. The grammar of “racism” modifies and is modified by our non-racial vocabulary. The grammar of “racism” is interwoven with the grammar of “injustice,” “unfairness,” “wrongdoing,” and so on. So one implication of the Wittgensteinian view is that any revision to the grammar of “racism” will have implications for the grammar of our basic moral vocabulary. For instance, if all persons are inherently equal, and if certain races are relegated to the status of beasts, then either these races are not persons or else there is an implicit rule that determines which human races count as persons. The interwovenness of grammar with our lives shows that modifying a given concept is a matter of modifying other concepts with which it is internally connected within our conceptual scheme. Conceptual schemes, moreover, are internally related to forms of life. Our concepts may be conditioned by the facts, but they are ultimately guided by our values. For various forms of life are possible on the facts, as a cursory survey of cultural anthropology reveals.  The mere reference to facts will never settle our conceptual questions. A priori analysis is thus primary in that it alone starts with our values and argues from them toward a conclusion about the nature of correct representation. To sum up, we have seen that although conventionalism about “racism” may be incompatible with epistemic justification, it remains compatible with pragmatic justification. I began by arguing that the inability to justify definitions by reference to “the facts” is no limitation on conventionalism, for this “inability” reflects the fact that it makes no sense to speak of conventions being made true by “the facts.” The legitimate demand for justification should be distinguished from the distorted demand of philosophers who insist upon epistemic grounding as the only legitimate form of justification. Wittgenstein’s commitment to the autonomy of grammar does not rule out the possibility of justifying particular grammatical propositions in the only sense for which it is possible to request a

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justification. Namely, for any definition we can always ask: Is it useful? What need does it satisfy? What are our guiding values? And so on.37

3.3   A Priori Analysis 3.3.1  Normative Descriptions of Grammar Having now explained the empirical and non-empirical sides of convention, I now turn to the question of what conventionalist semantics entails for philosophical analysis. In this section, I consider the nature and scope of a priori analysis. I present and criticize the orthodox (therapeutic) reading of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy, and defend what I call prescriptive grammatical analysis. In the next section, I build on this theoretical picture to accommodate a version of empirical analysis within its scope. Philosophy, for Wittgenstein, is a practice that “leaves everything as it is.” By “everything” he means our grammar or conceptual scheme. Philosophy thus investigates our conceptual scheme without recommending revisions or changes to it. He also maintains that philosophy does not seek to explain, prove, or justify our conceptual scheme. So philosophy, for him, is descriptive rather than revisionist, and non-­explanatory rather 37  It might be objected that Wittgenstein resisted every form of justification of grammar, including pragmatic forms of justification. For example, he says that unlike the practice of cooking, which is justifiable by reference to the goal of producing good-tasting food, language cannot be  analogously justified by any putative purpose (e.g., communication) (Wittgenstein 2013, pp. 185–186). Glock (1996, 47) explains this as follows: the relationship between language and communication is conceptual, whereas the relationship between cooking and producing tasty food is instrumental. An activity of producing edible food is called “cooking” however poorly the food may taste. By contrast, an activity of making sounds and gestures would not be called “language” if these activities did not facilitate any form of communication. Language, then, cannot be justified by reference to its purpose, because communication is partly constitutive of language. However, another way to look at this is that communication is the reason for the invention (and continued use) of language. Wittgenstein’s point, of course, is that such justification is circular. In the same way, it is circular to say that our reason for laying down the rule “Racism is wrong” is the need to condemn certain instances of racial harm. This is an internal rather than an external justification of grammar. But it is not for that reason irrational or unreasonable. Internal justifications are useful in drawing attention to the empirical and pragmatic foundations of grammatical needs. Wittgenstein’s elucidations of mathematics shed light on our values and human nature: “This calculus, say the theory of numbers, does not show what wonderful properties God has given to numbers, but what properties He has given to us and to things, with the result that this calculus is useful, interesting, and easily carried out with our writing materials” (2013, BT p. 188).

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than explanatory. Some Wittgensteinians thus describe his conception of philosophy as “a priori” and “non-cognitive.” This emphasizes the fact that its aim is not to teach us new information, but to enhance our understanding of the conceptual framework that we employ. Understanding is enhanced by the dissolution of conceptual confusions that stem from our lack of reflection upon the web of conceptual connections that, for most ordinary purposes, we are never called to untangle, clarify, and reflect upon. For instance, as a competent speaker, I know how to use the words “close” and “shut” but my knowledge of these grammars does not normally call on me to distinguish their meanings. Hence, I might be at a loss to do so. Similarly, I know the grammar of “time” if I know how to use and respond appropriately to statements like “Look at the time,” “What time is it?”, and so on. Yet, I might be at a loss to explain the grammar of “time,” in a general way, so as to dissolve confusions about time: “What is time?”, “Is time travel possible?”, “How is time related to space?”, and so on. For Wittgenstein, such questions are expressions of confusion. What distinguishes confusions about time from the confusion about the grammatical difference between “shut” and “close” is that the former set of confusions is distinctly philosophical. Grammarians may be interested in, even puzzled by, the subtle differences between “shut” and “close,” and the task of clarifying these differences may be a difficult endeavor (if looking at the problem afresh), but the puzzlement is patently non-­ philosophical. For it does not tempt us into positing metaphysical entities, third realms, psychological processes, and other metaphysical boogeymen that Wittgensteinians are keen on destroying. In actuality, the two sets of confusions are of the same kind, according to the Wittgensteinian, for both are products of misunderstandings of the ordinary usage of words and both are therefore resolvable by the careful scrutinizing of language. Philosophical and non-philosophical confusions are distinguished, not by a difference in kind, but by a difference in interest. This, then, is a brief depiction of what has come to be called the therapeutic reading of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy. Philosophy, he says, is a kind of therapy, a way of letting the fly out of the fly-bottle. Philosophical problems, for the most part, are dissolved rather than resolved, for they were never legitimate problems to begin with. The problem, at its root, is that we fail to grasp the grammatical complexity of our conceptual scheme. I classify Wittgenstein’s therapeutic conception of philosophy (conceptual analysis) as kind of pure description, for his approach is non-prescriptive and anti-revisionist. It is not the only type of descriptive philosophy on

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offer. For some purely descriptive projects may be more ambitious than Wittgenstein’s therapeutic conception. Pure description, for instance, may purport to describe ordinary usage without revising it, without committing to the claim that ordinary usage is in good normative standing. This non-therapeutic iteration of pure description is Joshua Glasgow’s aim for his own approach, for example. I thus view Wittgenstein’s purely descriptive approach to philosophy (what he calls “grammatical analysis”) as one iteration of descriptive analysis. Descriptive analysis contrasts with normative analysis (e.g., Sally Haslanger’s ameliorative approach) and metaphysical analysis (e.g., Tommie Shelby’s ideological theory). In my view, Wittgenstein’s conception of grammatical analysis is unjustly limiting when it comes to addressing many philosophical problems that are prompted by the analysis of ethical, social and political concepts. My aim in this section is to explain why that is so. Let us begin with Hacker’s distinction between two Wittgensteinian uses of the term “grammar”: Grammar, qua discipline, is a normative description (and investigation) of language (BT 191v, 192v)—in the sense in which jurisprudence is (among other things) the normative description of the laws of the land. A normative description is a statement of, and a clarification of, rules. It no more lays down rules that determine what makes sense than jurisprudence lays down laws determining what is legal. It is a descriptive activity (hence unlike prescriptive jurisprudence). Grammar, qua object, of grammatical investigations, consists of sense-determining rules of a language. What belongs to grammar in this sense is everything required for determination of meaning, for comparing a proposition with reality—hence for understanding.38

In normative description, the philosopher describes grammar. Grammatical reminders state grammatical rules, tell us what they are. These reminders are then used to clarify concepts and criticize philosophical theories. For example, a philosopher might state: “Racism is wrong” or “It is true that racism is wrong.” Within the context of normative description, the philosopher’s statement is not the expression of her endorsement of the rule (i.e., no prescriptive judgment is involved here). (For the philosopher’s grammatical reminder might be a reminder of a rule that belongs to a foreign grammatical system.) The aim of providing grammatical reminders is therapeutic. The aim of providing grammatical reminders is therapeutic.  Hacker (2012, 4–5).

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Consider, for example, Mills’ view that theory must establish that racism is wrong rather than presuppose it, and that in order to establish racism’s necessary wrongness it must first establish the referent of “racism.” Qua Wittgensteinian therapist, I might argue that Mills is misguided, because he ignores the grammar of “racism.” I might remind him that “Racism is wrong” is a rule rather than a true or false description. No object corresponds to a rule, hence there’s nothing for the philosopher to discover. The therapeutic lesson is that there is no such thing as discovering the referent of “racism” prior to establishing the normative status of racism. (I make the case for these claims in Chap. 7.) The therapist’s grammatical reminders are descriptions of grammar. Within this philosophical practice, the practice of normative description, a sentence of the form “It is true that racism is racial oppression” or “Racism is racial oppression is the rule” is functionally equivalent to a norm-existence statement. Such propositions function as true or false descriptions of actual grammar. To assert that a grammar rule is true  in this context involves no prescriptive judgment (no prescriptive endorsement of a rule), for although we call it a “normative description” in the sense that the object of one’s description is a norm, it remains a description for all that. Stating or citing a rule does not necessarily commit one to endorsing it, for, again, the grammatical norm stated may belong to a grammatical system one rejects. It is a true or false predication that depends on facts about the actual grammar for its truth-value. Descriptive grammatical analysis, normative descriptions, is inappropriate in the context of ethics and social and political philosophy, where the philosopher makes a shift away from the practice of descriptive analysis toward that of prescriptive analysis. Normative prescription, or what I will call prescriptive grammar, is a kind of normative analysis that makes philosophical recommendations to conserve, adopt, modify, or eliminate grammatical rules (i.e., linguistic/representational practices). Normative prescription does not “leave everything as it is” and, therefore, falls outside the scope of what Wittgenstein considers philosophy. This is what differentiates it from descriptive grammatical analysis. Both prescriptive and descriptive grammar share the same object of investigation, the “sensedetermining rules of language,” but they differ with respect to their aims, and they often differ in their attitude toward established grammar. For prescriptive grammar has the potential to be critical, in a way that descriptive grammar cannot be.

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3.3.2   Criticisms of Grammar In this section, I explain why Wittgensteinian therapy (by itself) is unwarrantedly limiting within normative (moral, social, and political) philosophy. I claim that although therapy is not completely impotent within normative philosophy, it is not the primary mode of analysis for grappling with many philosophical problems that are characteristic of the ethical and political domains. The time is long overdue for Wittgensteinian philosophy to make conceptual space for a new approach to normative analysis—a characteristically Wittgensteinian one. This is as much an expansion of so-called “ordinary language philosophy” as it is an expansion of normative analysis. To being, I part ways with traditional Wittgensteinians who maintain that philosophy must leave grammar where it is, in every domain of philosophy, including the normative domain which deals with moral, social, and political problems.39 Paul Johnston, for example, has written two  books on ethical problems from an orthodox Wittgensteinian perspective. I find much of what he says in those books valuable and helpful for dissolving conceptual confusions within Anglophone ethical philosophy. However, he maintains, from first to last, that “since grammatical points advance no claims, it makes no sense to deny them or reject them as wrong. The only possible grounds for objection to them would be if they failed to offer an accurate account of the concepts they purported to describe.”40 Notwithstanding his correct point that “grammatical points advance no claims,” I still find his remark misguided—and I say this as someone who accepts the distinction he is aiming to defend in the broader context of 39  This point is increasingly being conceded by Wittgensteinian scholars. Hacker, for example, writes: “I am inclined to think that this [Wittgenstein’s] conception [of philosophy] is at odds with the tenor of his highly naturalist and historicist approach to the problems of philosophy. One would have expected him to favour a broadly Aristotelian and Humean approach to ethics, and to have approved of the endeavours of his pupil Georg Henrik von Wright in his great book The Varieties of Goodness. Be that as it may, it seems to me that when one turns from theoretical philosophy to practical philosophy, new factors come into play. Although conceptual clarification and logical cartography certainly have their place in the domain of ethics, legal and political philosophy, rational debate about how we should live our lives, about what is of intrinsic value in our lives, and about what kinds of laws are appropriate for free people living under the rule of law at a given stage in history are surely licit subjects for philosophers to discuss. These subjects have been part of the task of philosophy ever since its inception with Socrates, and woe and betide us if we relinquish it” (2015, 51). 40  Johnston (1989, 146).

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this passage (namely, the distinction between grammatical remarks and descriptive statements, the latter being “substantive”). The point Johnston is making is that a “grammatical point” cannot be false in the way an empirical proposition can be false. For grammatical remarks are expressions of norms rather than descriptions. To call a grammatical remark true is normally to endorse and lay down a grammar rule. So it is not analogous to asserting it is true that it is raining, where the truth or falsity of this proposition is determined by how the world is. Glock puts the point this way: [Wittgenstein’s] point is that for a necessary proposition to be about something and to be true is toto caelo different from what it is for an empirical proposition to be so (AWL 154; LFM 114, 250-1; PI §251). The role of a grammatical proposition like ‘All bachelors are unmarried’ is not to make a true statement of fact about bachelors but to explain the meaning of ‘bachelor’. We do not verify it by investigating the marital status of people identified as bachelors, and its denial displays not factual ignorance but linguistic misunderstanding. Most importantly, it excludes not a genuine possibility, but only a NONSENSICAL form of words.41

I have no objection to Johnston’s point that a proposition like “Red is a color” is not true based on the facts. It is no more made true by how the world is than “Bachelors are unmarried” is made true by how the world is. Nevertheless, he is wrong to assert that it is incoherent or non-­philosophical to subject grammar to criticism. A possible ground for objecting to a grammatical proposition is that it ought not govern, independent of whether it in fact governs. To call the norm “wrong,” “incorrect,” or “untrue” would then carry normative force: it should not prevail as the norm. Granted, rejecting existing grammatical norms is only possible (only makes sense) against a background that envisions a different or modified version of a practice. Yet, even in the limit case involving a radically novel practice, if such a practice is described to a sufficient degree, and its connections to the rest of our lives explained, then it is perfectly coherent to recommend the adoption of alternative representational practices. In ordinary language, for instance, “Racism is good” might be described as grammatically incorrect. So one might be tempted to say that it is meaningless or makes no sense. But this would be mistaken. To see this envision  Glock (1996, 132–133).

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what it would be like for this to be a widely accepted grammatical rule. We could easily imagine an alternative conception of morality, a moral form of life different from our own. Consider the proud racist who asserts that racism is good. This example may be extreme, but it exists in some corners as a means of resisting and protesting the prevailing grammar. We need not turn to imaginative forms of life to understand what it would be like for “Racism is good” to be the norm, for we already know what forms of life governed by it have in fact looked like, provided we know something about the history of racism. It might be objected that most racists would object to the use of the epithet “racism” to describe their values, and this might be correct. But that is so only because of the stigma associated with the term, because of the high political cost of being openly racist in our society. That is precisely why my example centers the proud racist  as opposed to the secret racist. The proud racist would happily accept the term “racism” as a description of her views, provided that the term were modified to connote moral goodness. What the proud racist contests is the evaluative  content of the concept of racism, not its descriptive content. Said differently, she accepts that racism currently means something that is morally objectionable, but argues that it should not mean this. It might be objected that to imagine an alternative use of “racism” merely introduces a new practice, and so does not in any way undermine the original practice. But this is mistaken. The racist’s use of “racism” to signify something morally good is deliberately parasitic on ordinary usage of the term. It is an unordinary usage of the term in most contexts where it is deployed. Yet, the proud racist isn’t confused, because she is well aware that her usage is incompatible with existing linguistic practice. Indeed, that is her reason for so using it, since by doing so she thereby makes a political statement. Johnston’s mistake is to assume that all disagreement about concepts must be descriptive; for only then can he maintain that philosophy’s attempt to meddle in such disputes is conceptually confused and incoherent. However, I argue in Chap. 5 that this is mistaken, that it is plausible that a substantial amount of everyday disagreement about what is racist presupposes latent prescriptive disagreement about what racism is. I further argue that prescriptive disagreement is rationally resolvable, and that normative philosophy has a substantive role to play in its resolution. Prescriptive grammar, then, is in the business of critical grammatical advocacy. Unlike the proud racist, however, who would like to revise grammar to achieve nefarious racist ends, I aim to prescribe grammar to achieve antiracist ends.

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3.3.3  Grammatical Approaches What I am proposing is the following division between Wittgensteinian philosophy, otherwise known as grammatical analysis. • Descriptive Grammatical Analysis. A method within conceptual analysis (specifically, descriptive analysis) that provides normative descriptions of grammar—that is, clarifications of concepts and the dissolution of conceptual confusion—for the sake of resolving philosophical problems.42 The theoretical assertion that a grammatical proposition is “true” is a grammatical reminder of how a word is used. What it signifies is that a certain grammatical rule is the current/prevailing linguistic norm within some particular languagegame. (This approach is governed by the desideratum that “philosophy leaves everything as it is,” i.e., this practice is committed to the ideal of pure description, on the assumption that the problem it aims to resolve is of the form “I don’t know my way about,” i.e., conceptual confusion.) • Prescriptive Grammatical Analysis. A method within conceptual analysis (specifically, normative analysis) that provides normative prescriptions of grammar—that is, prescriptions to the effect that grammar should be conserved, revised, eliminated, or extended—for the sake of resolving philosophical problems. The theoretical assertion that a grammatical proposition is “true” is a grammatical prescription. What is prescribed is that a certain grammatical rule should be the prevailing linguistic norm, independently of whether or not it is. (This approach is not governed by the desideratum that “philosophy leaves everything as it is,” rather,  it is in the business of critically assessing the normative status of grammar, on the assumption that the problem it aims to resolve is about how to live, rather than the expression of conceptual confusion.) Corresponding to these two domains of grammatical analysis are two distinct uses of the term “true,” as applied to grammatical propositions. We can illustrate this with the definition “Racism is wrong.”

 P. F. Strawson calls this method “connective analysis.” See Chap. 2 for discussion.

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• Descriptive Grammatical Truth. The assertion “It is true that racism is wrong” is (used as) a descriptive theoretical judgment about what the prevailing linguistic practice is. What the proposition expresses is a description of prevailing linguistic practice: namely, that the linguistic norm that racism is wrong is the prevailing linguistic norm within a linguistic community. • Prescriptive Grammatical Truth. The assertion “It is true that racism is wrong” is (used as) a prescriptive theoretical judgment about what the linguistic practice ought to be, independently of what the prevailing practice happens to be. What the proposition expresses is a prescriptive endorsement (a claim about how things should be): namely, that the linguistic norm that racism is wrong is pragmatically justified and therefore ought to govern within a linguistic community. We thus see that whereas descriptive grammatical truth is a matter of a grammatical norm governing or being in force, prescriptive grammatical truth is a matter of it possibly, potentially, and ideally governing. Prescriptive grammar is critical in a creative sense that is uncharacteristic of descriptive grammar. We can bring this out by contrasting two uses of the term “critical.” Descriptive grammatical analysis is critical of philosophical theories, arguments, presuppositions, explanations, hypotheses, and theses. By contrast, prescriptive grammatical analysis is critical of grammar itself, existing representational practices, and forms of life. To criticize grammar in this way presupposes some alternative grammar, form of life, et cetera. To reject a grammatical proposition, like “Racism is wrong” or “Red is a color,” is to defend an alternative form of life. Prescriptive grammatical analysis is critically creative insofar as it is concerned with imagining how things could and should be, not merely for the sake of better understanding and appreciating our prevailing forms of life, but for the sake of potentially improving our lives—that is, envisioning, constructing, and implementing new forms of life.

3.4   Empirical Analysis 3.4.1  In Defense of Empirical Approaches to Racism The aim of this section is to argue that empirical analysis is relevant to the picture of philosophical theory sketched above, what I called prescriptive grammatical analysis. It is particularly relevant for the theory of racism. It

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is relevant, I argue, because we ought to conceive of racism as a sociocultural phenomenon. People concerned about social justice have a stake in viewing racism’s forms and manifestations as unstable and evolving phenomena, where these grammatical  shifts are functions of shifts in social and political circumstances. The cultural or anthropological nature of grammar and its compatibility with the contingent nature of definitions of “racism” is well suited to empirical approaches to racism. To see why and how, I turn to the debate over proper methodology in the theory of racism. This debate largely revolves around whether philosophical analysis should be empirical or a priori. Sally Haslanger defends the former. She writes, an adequate understanding of racism cannot be achieved a priori, but depends on a close analysis of historical examples where race is a factor in the explanation of injustice. Philosophical tools are important, especially at points where the analysis becomes normative, but work done by historians, social scientists, legal theorists, and literary theorists is invaluable in revealing the sometimes subtle ways that injustice is woven through our social life.43

Clevis Headley similarly states: racism best qualifies as a sociocultural phenomenon. This means that any proper philosophical analysis of racism should assimilate the model of a critical philosophical analysis of other sociocultural phenomena, such as nationalism and sexism. Hence, instead of employing an a priori philosophical method of analysis, we can adopt a naturalistic approach and utilize information from the social sciences, sociology, history, law and economics, and so forth in an effort to understand the nature of certain sociocultural p ­ henomena. But we should acknowledge that an appeal to naturalism in the context of sociocultural phenomena does not entail a complete rejection of a priori analysis or of its validity in this or any other context. The point is simply that the validity of certain sociocultural concepts depends on whether we can define these concepts in terms of specific cultural, social, or historical practices. The main objective is to connect sociocultural concepts with human practices…44

Conventionalism is compatible with empirical analyses of racism, because it asserts that grammatical propositions are conventions, human-made,  Haslanger (2004, 98).  Headley (2000, 223–224).

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sociohistorical creations. That a subset of scholars endorse an empirical methodology, of course, does not automatically mean they are or would be on board with conventionalism. For example, conventionalism lends itself to the controversial thesis that explanations of racism are essentially contestable,45 but empirical theorists might reject this. Furthermore, empirical theorists might insist that grammatical norms are defensible on theoretical grounds, and not merely on practical grounds, or that the grammatical system of one culture can be objectively established as superior to that of another, thereby rejecting the arbitrariness of grammar thesis. These factors notwithstanding, conventionalism is one way of justifying an empirical approach to racism. The argument I develop below (and throughout this book) is meant to speak to both a priori and empirical theorists. The anthropological nature of grammar will likely be less welcomed by philosophers who reject a posteriori approaches to racism. Perhaps the most compelling argument against empirical analysis as a mode of metaphysical analysis is that the question “What is racism?” is conceptual rather than empirical. Andrew Valls forcefully presents this argument in defense of Jorge Garcia’s theory of racism: Whether implicit beliefs or all racial ills should be considered racism are separate questions—and they are conceptual questions, not (directly) answerable by reference to empirical data. Conceptual and ethical argument should certainly be informed by the relevant empirical data, but as the case of racism suggests, empirical evidence by itself cannot decide conceptual or ethical issues. Hence it is unclear how, even in principle, empirical studies can show a view like Garcia’s to be incorrect. For all of their richness and interest, the psychological findings discussed by Faucher and Machery ­cannot by themselves tell us how best to understand and use the term “racism.” After all the data are in, the moral and conceptual questions related to racism remain open.46

Valls is correct that “conceptual questions [are] not (directly) answerable by reference to empirical data.” For as I’ve argued in this and the previous chapter, it is essential that we separate conceptual/grammatical questions 45  Unfortunately, I do not have the space to defend this thesis here, though see my paper, “Racism as an Essentially Contested Concept” (unpublished manuscript). 46  Valls (2009, 478–479). For Faucher and Machery’s critique, see (2009); for Garcia’s reply see (2011).

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from empirical/descriptive questions. But while it is true that the empirical is ultimately subservient to the conceptual (for reasons I explain below), this does not suffice for ruling out empirical analysis, at least not as Headley defines it. As we saw above, empirical analysis, for him, starts from the presupposition that “racism” ought to be defined in terms of cultural, historical, or social practices. Crucially, this theoretical prescription may be viewed as a conceptual point. When Headley claims that racism is a sociocultural phenomenon, I read him, charitably, as recommending that we ought to  view it as such. He argues that there are good conceptual reasons for doing so, for many theorists would like to explain such empirical phenomena as the persistence of racial inequality. However, once we’ve adopted the methodological norm that racism should be analyzed as a sociocultural phenomenon, we have answered Valls’ objection. His question is: How can empirical studies, even in principle, show a view of racism to be right or wrong? The answer is: by assessing the degree to which our existing concept is consistent with the conceptual limit that racism is a kind of social reality. The limit on analysis is that any recommended definition of “racism” should be compatible with what we know about the social role of racial phenomena.47 But why, even if racism is a sociocultural phenomenon, must we turn to empirical analysis? I want to propose that empirical analysis becomes conceptually significant under either of two conditions. First, empirical analysis may be necessary to better understand (and refine) an existing concept. For example, ignorance about the etiology, mechanisms, and empirical ramifications of the phenomena identified with racism gives philosophical theory good reason to engage in empirical inquiry to remove said ignorance. (For instance, a h ­ istorical understanding of race that reveals it to be the tool of white supremacy across time and place may give theorists a reason to define “racism” in terms of white supremacy.) Second, empirical analysis becomes relevant if the existing concept is not (or is no longer) useful (or not as useful as it could be). For instance, if a concept is introduced to serve goal Y and if it ends up serving goal Z as a byproduct, then there may be good reason to revise or eliminate the concept. Moreover, if a concept C is introduced to achieve goal Y, but instead of achieving Y it undercuts it by virtue of legitimating or bringing about some antithetical concept Z as a byproduct, then C is not just useless but harmful. (Think,

 Chapter 7 delves more deeply into the “explanatory condition,” as I there call it.

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for example, of “reverse racism” and the arguably racist effects of this discourse.) By calling racism a sociocultural concept, Headley draws attention to the fact that changes in the broader society might make it prudent to modify it from time to time. Here empirical investigation could uncover— as in the case of the sociohistorical shift from the “old racism” to the “new racism”—empirical facts that furnish good pragmatic reasons to modify the existing concept. Valls seems to acknowledge this point when he implicitly distinguishes “direct” and “indirect” forms of empirical relevance. He does not explain what he means by these terms, but if empirical data might be “indirectly” relevant to conceptual matters, as Valls allows, then this seems to open the door to empirical analysis. Valls cannot rule out a priori the significance of empirical analysis without first arguing against Headley’s conceptual point that racism is best construed as a sociocultural phenomenon. And the considerations Headley draws from in his “Philosophical Approaches to Racism: A Critique of the Individualistic Perspective” suggest that there is utility in adopting this conceptual limit. Since I discuss the significance of such shifts in social and political circumstances elsewhere in the book (see my discussion of ideology in Chap. 8), I will not attempt to defend this contention here. My point is simply that there is a practical interest in viewing the concept of racism in sociocultural terms. For instance, the concept of r­ acism has, in my view, been correctly described as chameleonic (subtly adaptive), scavenging (opportunistically in  search of  more optimal ­ configurations), open-textured (empirically modifable), and politicized (serving different interests). It might be objected that, even if empirical analysis is relevant for settling empirical questions about the concept of racism qua sociocultural phenomenon, it is not clear that it is relevant for settling conceptual questions about it qua moral concept. So we need to ask: Is empirical analysis useful for moral representation? Arguably, it is. We can build on Headley’s defense of empirical analysis by recalling one aspect of the contingency of definitions of “racism.” Definitions are contingent in that we need not adopt or retain them if they become useless or impracticable for representational purposes. The utility and prudential value of a definition is contingent upon facts. Empirical facts are, therefore, morally significant because they bear on the need for specific forms of moral representation and for conceptual change. For instance, the ramifications of the effect of implicit bias on human thought and conduct may not be fully appreciated given current knowledge. Empirical investigation may reveal it to be much more

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harmful than scholars have so far anticipated. Should this prove to be the case, this could seriously modify our understanding of racism (i.e., give us good reason to revise our conception). Thus, in Chap. 7, I argue that the harms of implicit bias support political over personal accounts of racism’s badness. If a sociocultural concept is to track radical shifts in sociocultural conditions, it may be necessary for it to undergo shifts of this sort. The adoption of new cultural modes of living, changes in political and legal dynamics, and scientific discoveries and technological advancements could give rise to new representational needs, including the need to revise existing grammatical explanations of racism. In short, inquiry into the nature, effects, and significance of racial phenomena—for the sake of assessing our representational practices along these lines—gives empirical theorists license to challenge the prevailing conceptual standards. Whether a concept remains morally significant for our own day is, for the conventionalist, a practical matter, which cannot be resolved independent of our needs for the kind of representation at issue. Before moving on, I should emphasize that, for reasons expressed in Sect. 3.2.2.3 (the discussion of epistemic and pragmatic justification), a priori analysis has primacy over empirical analysis. For at the end of the day we must decide what is to be called “racism” on the basis of our needs and goals for the concept. “The limit of the empirical—is conceptformation.”48 3.4.2  Beyond Realism and Constructivism To illustrate the compatibility of empirical and a priori approaches, as well as the priority of the latter, consider Leonard Harris’ arguments in “The Concept of Racism: An Essentially Contested Concept?” and “What, then, is Racism?” In both articles, Harris provides a framework for categorizing competing and incompatible approaches to racism. The first category consists of social constructivist approaches to racism, which roughly map on to empirical approaches that define “racism” as the name of a shifting and unstable complex of intersubjective and cultural components. His second category consists of objective realist approaches, which roughly map on to a priori approaches that define “racism” as the name of an enduring and stable social essence. According to Harris, these approaches  Wittgenstein (1983, IV 29, p. 237).

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converge on the question of whether the term “racism” names something real (everyone agrees that it does). Where they diverge is on the question of what it is that is named by “racism.”49 The question implied by his framework then is this: Is “racism” the name of an enduring and stable social essence, or is it the name of a shifting and unstable social complex? To specify what is named by “racism” is to specify the nature of this reality. In “The Concept of Racism,” Harris argues that there is currently no value-free way to decide the question of what “racism” names. This is not necessarily due to the fact that there is no objectively correct answer to it. Rather, it is due to the fact that the evidence necessary for settling it is currently underdetermined. For there are a host of empirical/metaphysical issues that theory cannot yet settle, such as the question of what races are and whether they exist. Hence he thinks that the controversy cannot be settled by appeal to epistemic considerations, only by appeal to pragmatic ones. The argument here is as follows. While theory progresses slowly, with little hope for a consensus in the near future, racially subjugated peoples ­continue to suffer and cannot wait on theory to discover the correct definition of “racism.” Hence, argues Harris, theory must render its decision based on pragmatic argumentation. It might be objected that we should remain agnostic about the nature of racism until the relevant  controversies are settled. Harris finds this response inadequate, because the need to adopt a conception of racism is practically urgent. Hence  we cannot wait on definitive answers to outstanding metaphysical and methodological issues  to decide how best to think about racism. Said differently, the dispute over racism is a “burningly practical” concern (to borrow a description from Charles Mills), as opposed to a mere scholastic riddle to occupy an idle hour.50 This consideration leads Harris to reason that philosophical theory should turn to pragmatic considerations in resolving the realist-constructivist dispute.51 49  The realist, according to Harris, treats the word “racism” as a “metaphorical noun,” which names a “‘thing’ of social reality” (1998, 217). The constructivist treats the noun “racism” as a “metaphorical predicate” or “floating attribute” which names “a phenomenon of predication” (1998, 218). 50  See Mills (1998, 17). 51  “Why, and what, institutional rules and practices perpetuate human misery require explanations of group behavior. These explanations direct us in suggesting solutions that are at least reasonable to consider. Thus assuming that there are no ontologically stable, endur-

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For Harris, pragmatic considerations favor realist over constructivist definitions, because the latter are pragmatically undesirable: they provide unstable/evolving definitions of “racism” rather than stable/enduring definitions. For example, stable/enduring definitions provide unchanging and objective moral criteria for identifying phenomena as racist. In “What, then, is Racism?” Harris defends realism thus: It is objective criteria of what exists, across contexts, that I suggest we use to decide what situations count as racist. …[I]n the absence of adequate information about whether a situation is racist—and it is arguable that we rarely have adequate information—appeal to stable definitions has advantages that subjective [i.e., constructivist] definitions lack. Stable definitions offer, for example, criteria we can use to evaluate changes, such as whether the conditions creating racial misery are increasing or decreasing.52

Given that stable/enduring definitions are generally more desirable than unstable/evolving definitions, there is good pragmatic reason to endorse a realist definition over a constructivist one. So realism has the upper hand in the dispute. While we wait for the evidence to come in, realism is the pragmatically justified default position. Harris’ realism/constructivism framework is incomplete, for it leaves no room for the conventionalist approach to the definition of “racism.” On conventionalism, there is no language-independent fact about what racism is, and the noun “racism” does not name any kind of entity in a philosophical definition of the term. Definitions of “racism” are not competing descriptions of a language-­independent reality, as Harris’ framework suping, and causing group agents, we use heuristic categories to account for why, and what, rules and practices sustain human misery” (Harris 1998, 228). 52  Harris (1999, 447). In “The Concept of Racism” he puts it this way: “Even if racism is considered an indeterminate concept, best understood as a predicate, we must decide when we are faced with an instance of a racism, among the infinite variety of racisms. That is, when we are, for heuristic and practical purposes, required to act in an endurantist fashion—when an object is wholly present at a single moment—we are entrapped. We are entrapped in making moral decisions about persons as if their race was a stable category. We are compelled to proceed as if the definitions we use for when a person is black or white, for example, are stable. We know that Who is Black in America is defined by the one drop rule—one drop of sub-Saharan African ancestry makes a person black. This definition is peculiar to a certain period in American history and has little to do with the myriad of ways races are defined in other parts of the world. When prejudice occurs, it affects enduring persons living under social definitions of their identity, contrived, real, or strictly limited to a particular community” (1998, 227).

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poses. Said differently, Harris’ framework tacitly presupposes a descriptivist conception of definition, which holds that definitions of “racism” are descriptions of an ontological entity, racism itself. If conventionalism is correct, however, then descriptivism is false, and “racism” is not the name of anything. A fortiori, Harris’ realist-constructivist framework collapses. A different line of objection is that conventionalism provides a superior approach to both objective realism and social constructivism. In particular, it provides a superior approach by Harris’ own pragmatic orientation. To resolve the realism-constructivism dispute, Harris tacitly relies on the following principle: Given that evidence does not settle disagreement over the correct approach to racism, theorists should endorse the one that provides the most useful criteria for purposes of moral assessment and other theoretico-­ practical purposes. Although Harris’ pragmatic argument eschews epistemic considerations, it does not jettison them as insignificant or irrelevant. Rather, his argument is that epistemic considerations currently underdetermine the correct answer to the question “What is racism?” (much in the same way that William James’ “The Will to Believe” argues that epistemic considerations often underdetermine momentous questions about ultimate reality). By providing conceptual space for epistemic considerations, Harris allows for the possibility that, once the evidence is in, realism might need to be reconsidered. The evidence could ultimately reveal that realism had always been mistaken, and realist theories might have to give way to constructivist theories. If the evidence ultimately vindicates constructivism, then it is simply a fact that “racism” names an unstable entity and that this fact leaves theory with heuristically deficient categories for moral and theoretical purposes. Conventionalism, which also prizes pragmatic reasons, has the advantage of not having the above problem, for it leaves no conceptual room for epistemic reasons. We only have pragmatic considerations to argue from. To be sure, empirical considerations enter into the equation on conventionalism. But empirical considerations do not function as epistemic reasons within the conventionalist framework. Rather, they enter the analysis as pragmatic reasons for judging that one definition is more useful than its rivals. Conventionalism creates the conceptual space needed to lay down normative criteria that meet our practical purposes, and if new evidence comes in, we are free to update our grammatical prescriptions. My critique of Harris’ argument highlights the priority of a priori analysis over empirical analysis. Harris is right to insist that we start from

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our values—from the conceptual problems that prompt the question “What is racism?” The value Harris starts from—the need to address burningly practical concerns about race—is laid down a priori. It enters theory as a condition of sense, and hence as a presupposition of philosophical inquiry. That philosophical theorizing about racism should start from the a priori conviction that a definition of “racism” ought to meet a need for moral representation is one I accept. For the very need that prompts philosophical inquiry into “racism’s” meaning is the same need that explains the etiology of the term “racism” (and its corresponding grammar) in the first place. The term “racism” was coined precisely to meet a burningly practical need, the need to condemn invidious forms of racial cognition. My critique of Harris illuminates the significance of empirical analysis. For although empirical analysis is not always designed to generate moral criteria, it may be useful for other practical purposes. For instance, a constructivist approach that studies the subtle changes in conceptions of racism relative to changes in sociohistorical conditions can enhance our understanding of patterns of racist phenomena. Empirical approaches can uncover phenomena like implicit racial bias, which might then lead us to question established notions of moral responsibility, among other things. What conventionalism enables philosophers to do is focus on practical problems without the need to pay homage to some putative metaphysical essence—a putative reality that may constrain our theoretical endeavors in ways that retard progress. (So here I express another disagreement I have with Harris. Harris seems to assume that constructivist accounts of racism, which treat racism as an evolving and contingent phenomenon, are always undesirable because they provide unstable categories. This seems false, as Headley’s discussion in “Philosophical Approaches to Racism” argues. Headley convincingly—even decisively—demonstrates the virtues of contingent empirical accounts.) 3.4.3  Conventionalism as Naturalistically Plausible At this point, it might be objected that the viability of the metaphysical project turns on the nature of meaning and definition. This objector would maintain that, if the metaphysician shares a burden of proof, then so does the conventionalist. What reason then is there to think that the ontological presupposition is false and the conventionalist presupposition

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is true? Why think that definitions of “racism” are expressions of linguistic norms as opposed to descriptions of reality? Conventionalism does, I concede, have a burden of proof. In an effort to meet this burden I have analyzed (in this and the previous chapter) the ordinary use of “explanation of meaning.” Explanations of meaning bear all the characteristic marks of conventions. First, they are not used to describe, but to prescribe. That is, they are ordinarily used as standards of correctness—in teaching, in correcting misuses of words, and so on. Second, seemingly metaphysical features of definitions can be recast as features of conventions (or our attitudes toward them). This latter point is deflationary in that it demystifies seemingly fantastical features of definitions. What appear to be magical features are quite mundane upon reflection, for they are not unique to definitions of color terms, moral terms, et cetera. What is true for the definition of “racism” is true for the definition of “bachelor,” for example. My account might therefore be described as naturalistic. This is a virtue, because it analyzes the unfamiliar in terms of the familiar. No one thinks that the truth of “Bachelors are unmarried” is determined by the objective fact to which this definition corresponds. But the temptation to think thus is strong when one considers definitions that are more significant to our lives. My argument is that there is no corresponding object in either case, for explanations of meaning provide rules for the proper use of terms. The importance of seemingly ­metaphysical definitions lies not in their ability to disclose ultimate reality, nor in their transcendent or transhistorical character, but in their normative role. We can better appreciate the naturalistic import of conventionalism by assessing an important argument in Headley’s “Philosophical Approaches to Racism.” Here Headley identifies a priori analysis with atemporal/transhistorical analysis. He draws on this  contention to argue in support of empirical-naturalistic approaches to racism. He writes: Many philosophers assume that employing an a priori method entails defining a concept by providing the necessary and sufficient conditions governing the application of that concept. Moving from semantics to ontology, the above view requires that every concept claim an essence. This basic philosophical approach treats a concept as a self-creation capable of a certain self-­ subsistence while existing in total independence of human thought and

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action. However, in the case of the concept of “racism,” any a priori approach will be deficient. Of course, I am not denigrating the legitimacy of traditional philosophical approaches to semantic and ontological issues involved in the definition of concepts and in the identification of their referents. What I am claiming, however, is that these traditional approaches are not fully applicable to sociocultural concepts or, rather, to temporal concepts. A sociocultural concept names a phenomenon whose nature requires apprehension in time, hence the need to appeal to historical, cultural, and social factors. Racism as a phenomenon is the product of human actions, beliefs, perceptions, and the like. As such, it claims no autonomous ontological status but is, rather, a social construction, one that is dependent upon human beliefs, practices, goals, values, and so forth. Thus, any effort to treat racism as an abstraction will prove unhelpful.53 Headley (2000, 243–44)

According to Headley, whereas a priori approaches are best suited to analyze transcendent (atemporal) concepts like beauty and good (his examples), they are less than ideal for analyzing historical (temporal) concepts like sexism and racism.54 The main reason for this is supposedly that atemporal concepts have transhistorical and unchanging essences and a priori analysis is best suited to analyze such essences. By contrast, temporal ­concepts have historical and changing natures and empirical analysis is best suited to analyze them. Like Harris, Headley believes that it is the language-independent nature of the phenomenon in question that determines whether it is best analyzed by a priori or empirical methods. The difference between Headley and Harris is that the former takes “racism” to name an empirical and sociohistorical entity, rather than a transhistorical one. A priori analysis is misguided in the case of racism because it mischaracterizes the object of analysis. Again, one virtue of conventionalism is that it retains Headley’s naturalistic intuition without endorsing Headley’s distinction between  Headley (2000, 243–44).  Headley writes: “Accordingly, I contend that it is not the case that any plausible philosophical analyses of racism should follow the model of an a priori philosophical analysis of nonnatural metaphysical notions, such as the Good in ethics or Beauty in aesthetics. Schmid [(1996)] does not say that he intends to treat racism as similar to these notions. However, he suggests that genuine acts of racism tend to share a common essence of an intention to harm. In suggesting this, he follows the method of defining a concept by isolating its intrinsic features. I disagree with Schmid’s strategy since, on my view, racism best qualifies as a sociocultural phenomenon” (2000, 223). 53 54

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“natural” and “nonnatural” entities. Beauty and Good are, for him, examples of nonnatural (transcendent) objects that correspond to our concepts beauty and good, respectively. By contrast, Headley takes the natures of sexism and racism to be bound up with social practices that are constantly in flux. The nature of a “natural entity” is thought to be discoverable by empirical and historical accounts of our social practices. Consider how a conventionalist theory of the terms “beauty” and “good” would proceed. Conventionalism would reject Headley’s claim that these terms name nonnatural entities. First, these concepts do not come from the heavens or some supernatural realm, but are humble terms in our language just as much as “table,” “apple,” “sit,” and so on. Headley would hold that, although these concepts are human creations, what is named by “beauty” and “good” is something that is not created but objectively and universally present. But this too can be challenged by the conventionalist. There is no need to posit the existence of nonnatural entities, for nonnatural entities are superfluous posits on conventionalism. Definitions of the terms “beauty” and “good” would not be analyzed as descriptions of transcendent entities, but not because they are descriptions of natural entities. Rather, they would not be analyzed as descriptions at all, but as expressions of rules for the correct use of these terms. Headley’s distinction is thus rejected. Conventionalism is compatible with Headley’s claim that the concepts sexism and racism can be empirically investigated, in spite of the fact that it rejects their identification with natural entities, discoverable by the social sciences. “Maleness is a gender,” for example, is not ordinarily used to describe a social reality, but to provide a rule for using the terms “maleness” and “gender.” “Gender is a social construct” is something that we can and do say, but this proposition is grammatical rather than empirical. It expresses a rule for the use of “gender” (within certain theoretical contexts), not a description of social reality. That is, it is a rule for representing social reality (for purposes of social analysis). Acknowledging this does not require treating social terms like “gender” and “beauty” as the names of objective social realities. The rejection of natural entities named by our grammatical propositions does not imply that we cannot (or should not) look to experience in determining whether and how to revise our linguistic norms. There may be good reason to look to experience in analyzing them. That our definitions of “sexism” and “racism” are not descriptions of social objects await-

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ing empirical discovery should not be confused with the claim that we cannot (or should not) draw on empirical considerations in developing critical-normative judgments about these concepts. For that is precisely what prescriptive grammatical analysis involves. Ironically, Headley’s naturalism is not “naturalized” enough, as it were, for his framework retains conceptual space for the transcendent (for supposedly a priori concepts like beauty). This last point alludes to a further argument. By providing a method of analysis for the semantics of terms that do not posit ontological entities as meanings, conventionalism provides an alternative to metaphysical analysis that is more naturalistically plausible. A metaphysical monist posits racism itself as an ontological entity; a metaphysical pluralist posits multiple ontological entities. The conventionalist posits none. Thus, by the principle of simplicity, the conventionalist analysis is, other things equal, more plausible than any metaphysical approach that presupposes descriptivism. Stated differently, metaphysical theories that proceed on the presupposition that there is such a thing as racism itself owe us an argument for this claim. Thus far no such argument has been attempted. Philosophers like Garcia, Shelby, and Mills assert that we must first get our ontology in order before we can move on to consider normative questions concerning racism. We must first explain what racism is, we are told, before we move on to normative explanations of why racism is wrong (e.g., Shelby and Mills) and how best to tackle racism (e.g., Garcia and Shelby). The kernel of truth in these assertions is that meaningful discourse about racism necessarily starts from an understanding of racism. (Grammar is logically prior to these practical concerns.) From this, however, it does not follow that a proper understanding of racism consists in knowledge of a language-independent essence or nature. How do philosophers like Garcia, Mills, and Shelby know that propositions like “Racism is racial hatred” and “Racism is racial ideology” purport to describe the nature of racism? To know this, one must know at least two things: first, that “racism” is the name of an object; second, that a definition of “racism” is a description of this object. But why think these things? Why start from the presupposition that “racism” must be the name of an object (and a definition of this term a description of this object) when we don’t have to? A final objection I will briefly stave off is discussed by Glock. He claims that a normativist account of meaning is precisely one that is ­nonnaturalistic. After all, he observes, one prominent objection to normativist claims, like

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Hume’s assertion that an “ought” cannot be derived from an “is,” is that they transform normative entities into mysterious, ineffable, or supernatural ones.55 Glock himself, however, observes that there are different ways to think about naturalism. What normativism challenges is not naturalism per se, but one way of understanding naturalism. Specifically, it challenges the reductionist tendency among naturalists to reduce rules and normativity to causal relations and processes. This sort of reductionism is confused, however, for the only way to make sense of normative activities (like playing games) is by reference to non-reducible normative notions (like the rules of a game). There is no such thing as giving a causal account of chess, although one could elaborate the causal relations that make a game like chess possible (e.g., explanations of how wooden pieces are made, the laws of physics that make the movement of pieces possible, the psychological and biological mechanisms that make intentional action possible, etc.). Normativism’s corrective to the reductionist brand of naturalism is this: although normativity occurs within the causal world order (and thus presupposes scientific processes and phenomena as preconditions of normativity), normativity is a distinctly human phenomenon; that is, it is properly explained in terms of the anthropological and cultural character of human beings, which is a sui generis component of the natural world.

 “Normativism, generally speaking, is the view that human thought and behaviour differ from inanimate nature and the behaviour of ‘mere’ animals in that they are subject to norms or rules, standards which prescribe and evaluate. Such norms have always appeared a threat to naturalism, since they seem to defy reduction to the causal regularities recognized by the natural sciences. They have also inspired attempts to avoid both epistemological naturalism and ontological supernaturalism, attempts which range from the hermeneutic thinkers of the eighteenth century to contemporary analytic philosophers like Brandom, McDowell, Putnam and Hacker. The basic idea is that human beings are special not because they are connected to a reality beyond the physical world of space, time and matter (a Platonist third realm or Cartesian soul substances, for example), but because they can only be adequately understood from a normative perspective alien to the natural sciences. For this reason, there is knowledge outside of natural science, knowledge of language and logic, for example, even though it does not deal with supernatural entities” (Glock 2005, 219). Hacker has also recently criticized the narrowness of Wittgenstein’s conception of philosophy, arguing that he should have endorsed something like a “broadly Aristotelian and Humean approach to ethics” (2015, 51, quoted above). In a note, he says that by “naturalist” he does not mean Quinean scientific reductionism. Presumably that is because he endorses a normativist naturalism, similar to Glock’s position. 55

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3.5   Conclusion My aim in this chapter has been to provide an analysis of definition that rivals the descriptivist position, presupposed by metaphysical analysis. Whereas descriptivists hold that philosophical definitions of “racism” are descriptions I have argued that they can be analyzed as norms. My argument has proceeded in two parts. These parts, along with an explication of the relationship of empirical and a priori analysis, and with the arguments of the preceding chapter, provide a sustained argument for the conventionalist picture of meaning. First, I articulated a conventionalist analysis of some of the most prominent features of definitions, features that incline philosophers to treat them as descriptions of ontological entities. These seemingly metaphysical predicates—“necessity,” “a priority,” “universality,” et cetera—which commonly get applied to definitions can be recast as predicates of linguistic conventions. Second, I argued that conventionalism is superior to descriptivism, because it provides a naturalized account of the so-called “metaphysical” side of definition. By accommodating the salient predicates commonly thought to ground a metaphysical conception of definition, conventionalism posits fewer ontological entities than descriptivism. In particular, conventionalism posits no ontological entities whatever, for it views definitions as mere expressions of norms. Third, I argued that conventionalism has additional virtues such as dissolving several confusions that lead some philosophers to believe that a priori and empirical approaches to racism are fundamentally opposed or incompatible. In the case of Harris and Headley, we saw that their commitment to metaphysical analysis makes it natural for them to adopt a descriptivist conception of definition which generates conceptual confusion. Headley’s empiricist leanings lead him to emphasize the contingency of grammatical propositions. His interest in the contingent side of ­definition—the ways that definitions are created and the conditions under which they evolve—is manifest in his assertion that definitions of “racism” describe constructed, temporal, evolving, sociocultural phenomena. This emphasis leads him to argue that a priori approaches are committed to “nonnatural entities” and empirical approaches to “natural entities.” However, no such distinction is sustainable or needed on conventionalism, for definitions are not descriptions of anything. By contrast, Harris’ interest in the evaluative function of definition leads him to emphasize the necessity of grammatical propositions, their a priori and atemporal nature.

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He is confused to think that a realist approach is needed in the theory of racism, in order to preserve the stable and persisting properties of objective definitional standards. Conventionalism preserves objectivity by writing it right into conventions themselves, for conventions are not mere regularities, patterned behaviors, but standards of correct use. The special character of these standards is their logical priority as concept-forming conditions of sense. In actuality, then, contingency and necessity are two sides of grammatical convention. Grammar is contingent from one perspective, necessary from another. Pace Headley and Harris, the key to appreciating the sociohistorical and a priori character of definitions is to recognize that they are conventions. To be sure, my account leaves many questions and objections unanswered. I discuss some of these in the next chapter.

References Amesbury, Richard. 2005. Morality and Social Criticism: The Force of Reasons in Discursive Practice. Lanham: Palgrave Macmillan. Baker, Gordon P., and Peter M.S. Hacker. 2009. Wittgenstein: Rules, Grammar and Necessity, Volumes 1 and 2 of an Analytical Commentary on the Philosophical Investigations. 2nd ed. (extensively revised. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing. Brandom, Robert B. 1994. Toward a Normative Pragmatics. In Making it Explicit: Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, 3–65. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. ———. 2000. Articulating Reasons: An Introduction to Inferentialism. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Carroll, Lewis. 1895. What the Tortoise Said to Achilles. Mind 4: 278–280. Conant, James. 1998. Wittgenstein on Meaning and Use. Philosophical Investigations 21 (3): 222–250. Faucher, Luc, and Edouard Machery. 2009. Racism: Against Garcia’s Moral and Psychological Monism. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 39 (1): 41–62. Forster, Michael N. 2004. Wittgenstein and the Arbitrariness of Grammar. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Garcia, Jorge L.A. 2011. Racism, Psychology, and Morality: Dialogue with Faucher and Machery. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 41 (June): 250–268. Glock, Hans-Johann. 1996. A Wittgenstein Dictionary. The Blackwell Philosopher Dictionaries. Malden: Blackwell Publishing. ———. 2005. The Normativity of Meaning Made Simple. In Philosophy—Science— Scientific Philosophy, ed. A.  Beckermann and C.  Nimtz, 219–241. Mentis: Paderborn.

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Hacker, Peter M.S. 1986. Insight and Illusion: Themes in the Philosophy of Wittgenstein. Rev. ed. Oxford: Clarendon Press. ———. 2000. The Arbitrariness of Grammar and the Bounds of Sense. In Wittgenstein: Mind and Will: Part I: Essays, Volume 4 of an Analytical Commentary on the Philosophical Investigations. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. ———. 2012. Wittgenstein on Grammar, Theses and Dogmatism. Philosophical Investigations 35 (1): 1–17. ———. 2015. Some Remarks on Philosophy and on Wittgenstein’s Conception of Philosophy and Its Misinterpretation. Argumenta 1 (1): 43–58. https://doi. org/10.14275/2465–2334/20151.HAC. Harris, Leonard. 1998. The Concept of Racism: An Essentially Contested Concept? The Centennial Review XLII (2): 217–232. ———. 1999. Introduction. In Racism, ed. Leonard Harris, 17–27. New York: Humanity Books. Haslanger, Sally. 2004. Oppressions: Racial and Other. In Racism in Mind, ed. Michael P. Levine and Tamas Pataki. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Headley, Clevis. 2000. Philosophical Approaches to Racism: A Critique of the Individualist Perspective. Journal of Social Philosophy 31 (Summer): 223–257. https://doi.org/10.1111/0047-2786.00043. Johnston, Paul. 1989. Wittgenstein and Moral Philosophy. London: Routledge. Medina, José. 2002. The Unity of Wittgenstein’s Philosophy: Necessity, Intelligibility, and Normativity. Albany: State University of New York Press. Mills, Charles W. 1998. Non-Cartesian Sums: Philosophy and the African-­ American Experience. In Blackness Visible: Essays on Philosophy and Race. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Phillips, Dewi Z., and Howard O.  Mounce. 1970. Moral Practices. New  York: Shocken Books. Peregrin, Jaroslav. 2014. Inferentialism: Why Rules Matter. New  York: Palgrave Macmillan. Rundle, Bede. 1990. Wittgenstein and Contemporary Philosophy of Language. Oxford: Blackwell. Russell, Bertrand. 1914. Our Knowledge of the External World. London: Routledge. Schmid, W. Thomas. 1996. The Definition of Racism. Journal of Applied Philosophy 13: 31–40. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5930.1996.tb00147.x. Sellars, Wilfrid. 2007. Inference and Meaning. In In the Space of Reasons: Selected Essays of Wilfrid Sellars, ed. Kevin Scharp and Robert B.  Brandom, 3–27. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Originally published in 1953. Valls, Andrew. 2009. Racism: A Defense of Garcia. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 39 (3): 475–480.

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Wittgenstein, Ludwig. 1983. Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics. Revised Edition. Eds. Georg H. von Wright and Gertrude E.  M. Anscombe. Trans. Gertrude E. M. Anscombe. Cambridge: MIT Press. Abbreviated RFM. ———. 1989. Wittgenstein’s Lectures on the Foundations of Mathematics, Cambridge 1939, ed. Cora Diamond. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. ———. 2009. Philosophical Investigations. 4th ed., ed. and trans. Peter M.S. Hacker and Joachim Schulte. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell. ———. 2013. The Big Typescript: TS 213. German English Scholars Edition. Eds. and Trans. C. Grant Luckhardt and Maximilian A. E. Aue. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.

CHAPTER 4

Re-defining “Meaning”: Defending Semantic Internalism over Externalism

4.1   Introduction The problem of definition is the problem of how best to answer the philosophical question “What is racism?” Manuel Vargas and Sally Haslanger’s analyses of “What is X?” questions identify three possible interpretations of this question, codified in three  corresponding approaches.1 Though there are differences in their respective framings, they more or less converge on three candidate interpretations: 1. The Metaphysical Interpretation. What is X itself, independent of the prevailing concept of X? (It may turn out that correct method for specifying X’s nature requires looking to the insights of the relevant science.) 2. The Descriptive Interpretation. What is our ordinary concept of X? (or what is the ordinary meaning of the term “X”?) 3. The Normative Interpretation. What should our concept of X be? (or what should the meaning of the term “X” be?) Chapters 1 and 2 were primarily concerned with arguing for a negative thesis: interpretation (1) is misguided. My aim in the present chapter is to extend my critique of metaphysical analysis. For although I articulated a plausible alternative to metaphysical analysis, I did not there discuss the 1

 See Vargas (2005); Haslanger (2012).

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metaphysical approach known as semantic externalism (henceforth, ­externalism). Externalism is one way to vindicate metaphysical analysis as an adequate interpretation of, and approach to, “What is racism?” Its central claim is that the meaning of a referring expression is the kind it picks out. So it is first and foremost an important rival to Wittgensteinian semantics. Indeed, it is credited with being the most compelling semantic theory on offer. To be sure, externalism is not the crude doctrine that is the object of Wittgenstein’s assault in Philosophical Investigations, for its central claim is not that the meaning of a word is the object it stands for, but the kind it stands for. Further, the doctrine does not claim that all words have a meaning of this type, but that only referring expressions do. With these modifications, and a sophisticated mode of argumentation, externalism offers a conception of linguistic meaning that is said to be more plausible than the conventionalist conception of meaning. One important implication of this theory is that it legitimizes the metaphysical project. A defense of Wittgensteinian semantics requires that something be said in respect to externalism. Replying to the externalist’s objections, I believe, will strengthen its plausibility. It will also occasion the opportunity to address additional, as yet unanswered questions and clarify some significant aspects of conventionalism. I present the externalist thesis in Sect. 4.2 and articulate it as an objection to the Wittgensteinian approach. In Sects. 4.3 and 4.4, I present my reply to externalism’s main line of ­argument—conceptual change—and explain this phenomenon in good internalist fashion. Section 4.5 considers and replies to the objection that my arguments are undermined by descriptivism’s contention that sentences like “Water is H2O” seem to express propositions that are descriptive and normative. I reject this proposal along with the notion that the descriptive character of such propositions opens them up to epistemic assessment.

4.2   The Case for Externalism Conventionalism is the view that explanations of meaning—particularly, definitions—are expressions of grammatical rules. As such, they are not descriptions of reality, but norms of description. These grammatical rules are thought to be constitutive of linguistic meaning. In this section, I discuss Kripke and Putnam’s arguments for externalism and explain why conventionalism is incompatible with the externalist account of meaning.

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4.2.1   Some Key Concepts Externalists believe that the meaning of a referring expression is the kind it signifies, a kind with an empirically discoverable internal nature.2 The term internal nature denotes the internal properties of a kind that are constitutive of its essence. These features are “hidden” in the sense that they are not readily observable and hence are not reflected in everyday explanations of the kind. They are, however, discoverable via scientific examination. An example is the internal nature of water, which I discuss below. A kind is an ontological category that ascribes a language-­ independent essence to objects (“stuffs”) that fall under it. A kind is language-­independent in that it exists independent of our linguistic practices. By language-dependence, then, I mean a phenomenon whose reality depends on the set of everyday explanations that are taken to define it. By identifying meanings with internal natures, we supposedly move beyond the domain of language, into the domain of ultimate reality, which is disclosed by science. The internal nature of kinds may be thought to be given by the world (in the case of natural kinds) or social practice (in the case of social kinds). Sally Haslanger gives expression to an externalist view of the former when she discusses naturalized epistemology as an approach to the semantics of “knowledge”: “On a descriptive approach3 [to the analysis of knowledge], one is concerned with what kinds (if any) our epistemic vocabulary tracks. The task is to develop potentially more accurate concepts through careful consideration of the phenomena, usually relying on empirical or quasi-­ empirical methods.”4 Consider next social kinds. An ontologist sympathetic to externalism might take the question “What is racism?” not as equivalent to a question about language but as equivalent to “What social kind does the term ‘racism’ refer to?” 2  Hanseung Kim (2008) observes that the term “semantic externalism” is ambiguous between two views: meaning externalism and content externalism. The former holds that meaning is determined by what is external to a language user and goes against the view that meaning should be founded on a subject’s ideas. The latter holds that the contents of a subject’s mental states are at least partially determined by facts in the external environment in which the subject is situated. “Putnam’s historic Twin Earth thought experiment is supposed to present a strong case for both versions of semantic externalism.” My own usage of the term “semantic externalism” picks out the first view, meaning externalism, though I would modify the internalist position that meaning should be founded on a “subject’s ideas.” 3  Haslanger uses the term “descriptive approach” to signify semantic externalism. 4  Haslanger (2012, 367).

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Michael Levine believes that the true meaning of “racism” is a social kind the nature of which has yet to be fully explicated by social science (his hunch is that “racism’s” real meaning falls under the jurisdiction of psychoanalysis). Tommie Shelby also defends externalism, but his recommendation is that philosophers defer to a different subset of social scientists, namely, those who investigate racial ideology, for he favors sociological accounts of racism. Externalism, then, identifies kinds with l­anguage-independent phenomena.5 The assumption regarding most social kinds  seems to be that they are not linguistically constituted. Going forward, I will reserve the term kind for any putative essence that unifies a group of stuff and is thought to partly constitute the meaning of a term “W” (so that the real meaning of “W” is partly non-linguistically constituted). Wittgensteinian semantics grounds linguistic meaning in ordinary usage, externalism grounds it in stuffs. Yet the latter pays homage to ordinary usage. Haslanger, for example, states that an externalist about knowledge starts from paradigms of knowledge. The previously quoted passage continues as follows: “Scientific essentialists and naturalizers, more generally, start by identifying paradigm cases—these may function to fix the referent of the term—and then draw on empirical (or quasiempirical) research to explicate the relevant kind to which the paradigms belong.”6 Identifying paradigms is conceptually laden. How does the epistemologist determine which knowledge attributions count as paradigms? She might look internally, that is, rely on introspection. In that case, she relies on intuitions grounded in her familiarity with usage of the term “knowledge.” If instead she looks to the intuitions of others—whether “folk” or “expert” intuitions—she relies on their familiarity with usage of “knowledge.” It might be objected that one need not rely on intuition at all, for one might instead rely on empirical inquiry. But even here, linguistic competence invariably guides the philosopher in employing her empirical methods. Linguistic competence is necessary for identifying the object of empirical inquiry. For instance, the epistemological naturalist knows that 5  On externalism, kinds generally pick out language-independent phenomena. But must every kind be language-independent? Perhaps not, for we can at least imagine possible exceptions. Suppose one is interested in the meaning of “linguistic representation.” It might be argued that this term requires an externalist semantics. Plausibly, this term signifies a social kind: the linguistic practice of using terms to represent phenomena. On this view, the real meaning of “linguistic representation” consists of a social convention. Hence externalism is consistent with the claim that the meaning of some terms is language-dependent. 6  Haslanger (2012, 367).

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inquiry into the nature of knowledge will not be found by empirically examining the internal nature of cats or cabbages. Linguistic competency sets limits by guiding the employment of empirical methods toward the right kind of object. Without such guidance, the application of empirical methods is blind and arbitrary. It thus seems that no empirical analysis of the essence of knowledge can escape the starting point that many philosophers call “linguistic intuition.” Haslanger concedes this point ­ when she states that ordinary usage “fixes” the reference of a term. A different but related argument points in the same direction. Consider the skeptical objection to metaphysical analysis. The metaphysician believes that the real definition of “knowledge” might differ from the conventional definition of “knowledge,” for whether they are the same or not is said to be a matter of fact (which depends on whether conventional usage corresponds to the real meaning of this term). This implies that empirical inquiry can potentially expose the incorrectness of ordinary usage. How then does one know whether the “paradigms” provided by the ordinary use of “knowledge” correspond to knowledge itself? What evidence is there to think that ordinary usage discloses (or not) the nature of knowledge? How does the philosopher wishing to give primacy to experience know that her empirical methods, even if they track a kind of empirical reality, track the relevant one? Again, how does the externalist rule out this possibility that the term “knowledge” might be the name of an animal? How do we know we have not been misusing the term all this time? Such epistemological worries are silly. The externalist can reply that this form of skepticism is absurd because it relies on some idiosyncratic use of “knowledge,” one that is completely detached from ordinary practice. This, however, suggests that ordinary use sets constraints on what we can and cannot say. These constraints make it the case that it is an absurd objection to a theory of knowledge that the term “knowledge” might turn out to be the name of an animal. Unless the philosopher aims at developing a novel concept of knowledge that has little if anything to do with what is currently called “knowledge,” paradigms must invariably fix the object of analysis to a significant degree, and to the extent that they do, the metaphysician relies on ordinary use to determine what is and is not a paradigm. Ordinary use is thus essential to externalist analysis, but only in the sense that it fixes the reference of a referring expression without determining the meaning of said expression, for as we have seen, meaning is identified with the internal nature of paradigms. Thus, if we apply this approach to the philosophical analysis of “racism,” commonsense understandings of

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racism must lead the investigation by fixing the reference of “racism.” For these paradigms are preliminary to empirical or quasi-empirical methods of inquiry. The Wittgensteinian approach to conceptual analysis is misguided, if externalism is correct. By identifying meaning as use, the Wittgensteinian position implies that linguistic meaning is not dependent on the external world, but on linguistic practice and human convention.7 The aim of this chapter is to critically assess the case for externalism (what Haslanger calls the “descriptive approach”). Although this theory of meaning has been discussed widely in the philosophy of language, my focus will be on two mutually supporting arguments: the loci classici of Hilary Putnam and Saul Kripke. Both defenses turn on thought experiments that appeal to modal intuitions. As we have seen, externalism is the thesis that the meaning of a referring expression is determined by the kind it refers to. Putnam famously divided the meaning of a term into two constituents: intension and extension. An alternative way of introducing the intension-extension distinction, according to Putnam, is to say that we use the term “meaning” in two distinct ways, to refer to the intension of a term and to refer to the extension of a term. The intension of a term is the complete set of rules governing its proper use at a given time. The extension of a term is the complete set of objects it picks out at that time. Against this backdrop, two questions present themselves: What is the precise relationship of intension to extension, and which of these aspects has semantic priority? Internalists and externalists diverge on these questions. The internalist takes the intension of a term fully to determine its semantic content, whereas the externalist denies this, holding that external facts make a significant contribution to semantic content. Putnam famously defended externalism. Where does Wittgenstein fall on this spectrum? I will briefly explain why the Wittgensteinian approach to meaning falls on the intensional side of the divide. As discussed in Chap. 2, Wittgenstein’s use of the term “use” in the judgment “meaning is use” is a normative notion, not a descriptive one. If the philosopher interested in the meaning of “X” were to describe actual use of this term, her description would encompass both the correct and 7  See Chaps. 1 and 2. For helpful discussions of Wittgenstein’s account of meaning, see Conant’s “Wittgenstein on Meaning and Use” (1998) and Baker and Hacker’s “Meaning and Use” in Wittgenstein: Understanding and Meaning (2005).

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incorrect uses. But a description of the incorrect uses is not what Wittgenstein has in mind when he exhorts philosophers to “look and see” how words are used. His comparison of the use of a word to the use of a piece in a game is a worn but helpful analogy. Just as one describes a game by describing its rules (rules for the use of its pieces), so too does the philosopher describe language by describing the rules for the use of words. To describe the game of chess is to state its rules, and to state its rules is to state how the game is to be played. This is a normative description, like a description of the steps in a recipe or a legal system.8 Wittgenstein’s reference to the use of a word, then, is a reference to use which accords with what is regarded as correct explanation.9 Correct explanations are ordinary, prevailing linguistic conventions. The complete set of grammatical explanations governing the use of a term is synonymous with what Putnam calls the “intension” of that term. Moreover, these linguistic norms are “arbitrary” or “autonomous,” which means they are unjustifiable by reference to reality.10 This, in turn, means that the “correct explanation” of a term is contingent, revisable, and subject to change. For example, that which counts as correct explanation of meaning today might prove to be incorrect explanation tomorrow. The salient point is that the community’s prevailing linguistic convention is what determines the correctness or incorrectness of an explanation. Wittgenstein is an intensionalist because meaning, for him, is a function of “arbitrary” linguistic norms, not language-­independent empirical facts (such as those disclosed in scientific discoveries). On externalism the empirical is primary in that linguistic meaning is not a matter of convention, but a matter of fact; further, the relevant fact of the matter is not a transcendent object, but an immanent one (meaning must be some type of real kind). Semantic externalism has been widely influential and applied to so-called natural and social kind terms. In the philosophy of race, the theory has been applied to the term “race.” More recently, Levine and Joshua Glasgow have suggested that theorists of racism should consider extending this approach to the term “racism.” Levine, for example, appeals to externalism in replying to an objection  Baker and Hacker (2005, 147).  Baker and Hacker (2005, 153). 10  For a helpful analysis of Wittgenstein’s account of the autonomy of grammar see Michael Forster’s Wittgenstein on the Arbitrariness of Grammar (2004). See also Hacker’s “The Arbitrariness of Grammar and the Bounds of Sense” (2000), and his “Grammar and Necessity” (2009). 8 9

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from Jorge Garcia (though he does not go so far as to articulate an externalist theory of “racism”). He compares the semantics of “racism” to that of “water”: “Suppose one discovers a substance that is just like water in every way except that its chemical makeup is other than H2O. Is it water nevertheless? Well, that depends upon one’s views of the semantics of various kind terms. It is one of the preeminent metaphysical and modal questions in recent years.”11 Levine is alluding to Putnam’s well-known argument that the term “water” has an externalist semantics. The semantic content of “water,” Putnam argues, is determined by external (chemical) facts about the kind picked out by the term; H2O is the unifying essence that constitutes the stuffs (objects) we call “water.” Levine is careful to say that the term “racism” is akin to the term “water,” as opposed to saying that these terms belong to the same kind. For he says that “water” is a natural kind term, whereas “racism” might not be; in particular, he suspects that “racism” is a social kind term. For him, “racism’s” kinship with “water” consists in the fact that both terms have an externalist semantics. 4.2.2  Putnam’s and Kripke’s Arguments Putnam introduced his famous thought experiment in his seminal paper, “The Meaning of ‘Meaning.’”12 He asks us to imagine the existence of a planet, Twin Earth, which is just like our planet, Earth, only there’s an exception: what is called “water” on Twin Earth does not have the chemical consistency of H2O, but a complicated chemical structure that Putnam abbreviates XYZ. This substance looks and tastes just like water, nourishes the body just like water, falls from the sky just like water, and so forth. Prior to discovering that the stuffs picked out by “water” consisted of XYZ on Twin Earth, Twin Earthians did not define this term as XYZ. Putnam asks whether, upon discovering the chemical structure of these stuffs, Twin Earthians would revise their definition of the term. If so, this seems to confirm that the meaning of this term is partly determined by external facts about the internal nature of these stuffs. With respect to Earthians, Putnam asks what they would say about the Twin Earthian use of the term “water.” Would they be inclined to say that the Earthian use of this term  See Levine (2004, 89–90, including notes 12, 13 and 14).  Putnam (1975).

11 12

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means the same as theirs, given the similarities in both practices? Or would Earthians be inclined to say that there are two distinct uses? If the latter, argues Putnam, this would seem to confirm externalism. For the only significant difference in these two uses is given by the extension, not the intension of the term. Putnam speculated that Twin Earthians, upon discovering that their water consists of XYZ, would likely revise the definition of “water” to “Water is XYZ.” Furthermore, he thought that they would not stop at saying that this term means differently today than it did prior to the empirical discovery; they would regard the new definition as the correct one. Putnam went on to speculate that Earthians would reason similarly: they would not simply say that the old and updated definitions were different, but that the updated definition of “water” is the correct one. It thus seems that empirical facts partially determine the meaning of referring expressions. The meaning of “water” on Earth appears to be responsible to empirical facts about the stuffs it picks out there, and the meaning of “water” on Twin Earth seems to be responsible to empirical facts about the stuffs it picks out there. Additional confirmation comes from a further speculation. Putnam asserts that Earthians and Twin Earthians would say that the term “water” means differently on Earth than on Twin Earth, because the terms pick out different stuffs, H2O and XYZ, respectively. What makes this intuition important is that where two intensions are identical and only extensions differ, it seems it must be the extension that determines meaning. Kripke also provides a well-known argument for externalism. He begins by considering the proposition “Gold is yellow.” That gold is yellow is, of course, a received rule for the use of the term “gold.” As such, it belongs to the intension of “gold.” Kripke then asks: Could we discover that gold was not in fact yellow? …Suppose there were an optical illusion which made the substance appear to be yellow; but, in fact, once the peculiar properties of the atmosphere were removed, we would see that it is actually blue. Maybe a demon even corrupted the vision of all those entering the gold mines…Would there on this basis be an announcement in the newspapers: ‘It has turned out that there is no gold. Gold does not exist. What we took to be gold is not in fact gold.’?13

 Kripke (1972, 118).

13

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Kripke’s analysis raises several questions. If confronted by the fact that the stuffs called “gold” were not in fact yellow, as we mistakenly thought, would we continue to refer to said stuffs as “gold”? How committed are we to the intension of “gold” in the face of empirical surprise? He claims that were we to reject the proposition “Gold is yellow” in the face of new empirical information, this would provide evidence that the proposition is a posteriori. If instead we were to insist upon the truth of “Gold is yellow” in the face of this new information, this would suggest that the proposition is a priori. The question raised by these modal considerations seems to be this: Can definitional truths be overturned by experience? Kripke thinks they can: It seems to me that there would be no such announcement. On the contrary, what would be announced would be that though it appeared that gold was yellow, in fact gold has turned out not to be yellow, but blue. The reason is, I think, that we use ‘gold’ as a term for a certain kind of thing. Others have discovered this kind of thing and we have heard of it. We thus as part of a community of speakers have a certain connection between ourselves and a certain kind of thing. The kind of thing is thought to have certain identifying marks. Some of these marks may not really be true of gold. We might discover that we were wrong about them. Further, there might be a substance which has all the identifying marks we commonly attributed to gold and used to identify it in the first place, but which is not the same kind of thing, which is not the same substance. We would say of such a thing that though it has all the appearances we initially used to identify gold, it is not gold. Such a thing is, for example, as we well know, iron pyrites or fool’s gold. This is not another kind of gold. It’s a completely different thing which to the uninitiated person looks just like the substance which we discovered and called gold. We can say this not because we have changed the meaning of the term gold, and thrown in some other criteria which distinguished gold from pyrites. It seems to me that that’s not true. On the contrary, we discovered that certain properties were true of gold in addition to the initial identifying marks by which we identified it.14

Putnam’s and Kripke’s arguments are similar, but not of the same kind. Oswald Hanfling, an ordinary language philosopher, helpfully explains the difference between Putnam’s and Kripke’s argumentative strategies:  Kripke (1972, 118–119).

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In the first [Putnam’s argument], a word is applied, in accordance with its intension, to things which are really different in nature. Here we are to say that the word does not have the same meaning throughout, even though this is not known to those using the word. In the second kind of case [Kripke’s argument], the real nature of the objects is the same, but the relevant intensions differ from one time to another. This time we are to say that the meaning remains the same, in spite of changes of intension. In both cases, meaning is determined by the real nature of things and not by intensions.15

We are now better positioned to appreciate the function of ordinary usage on externalism. As we have seen, ordinary usage is relevant for fixing the reference of a referring expression, but not for determining the meaning of that expression. If ordinary usage fixes a term’s reference, does this entail that the meaning of that term can never change? Is Putnam, for example, committed to the belief that “water” must always signify H2O on Earth? If so, this seems wrong. For Earthians might stop using the term “water” in the way that they do, excising it from their lexicon. Alternatively, Earthians might modify the term’s meaning in a radically novel way (e.g., to signify a newly invented sport), introducing some other word to signify water. This objection is misguided, however. For externalism does not imply that we cannot change the definitions of words if all this means is that a word that signifies X is no longer used to signify X. What externalism implies is that once the reference of a word has been fixed, the meaning of that word is no longer entirely up to us. To fix the reference of a term is to fix the set of objects (stuffs) it picks out; that is, reference fixing amounts to fixing the term’s extension. Once this is done, it becomes possible for science to investigate the internal nature of the stuffs it picks out, that is, the essential features of these stuffs that are not perceptible in our everyday encounters with them. Externalism implies that there can be hidden meanings that fall outside the purview of what competent speakers of the language know or employ in their use of words. For the same reason, philosophers of language are in no position to determine the real meanings of words. It is scientists who get the final say, for internal properties of stuffs (hidden natures that translate into meanings) fall under their jurisdiction.  Hanfling (2000, 223).

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Semantic externalism has far-reaching ramifications. For instance, it has important implications for the relationship between the analytic/synthetic distinction and the necessary/contingent distinction. I shall not discuss these ramifications. Yet there are a few points I want to emphasize in ­relation to the semantics of “racism.” First, an externalist semantics for “racism” implies that the meaning of this term is responsible to an external reality. This external reality may be mind-dependent or mind-­ independent, depending on the ontological status of the kind. But the point is that the nature of the referent of this referring expression is determined by its internal nature rather than by our linguistic norms. Second, if externalism is true, then there is a just basis for the skeptical worry. Given that “hidden facts” about a term’s referent have semantic significance, it becomes possible that some members of a linguistic community (or the entire linguistic community) might be mistaken about the true meaning of said term—or, stated differently, the established and widely adopted definition of the term might be mistaken. Notice also that facts about the extension of a term can confirm (and disconfirm) the correctness of the prevailing intension of the term. In the case of “water,” the chemical structure of the corresponding stuffs—H2O—might have disconfirmed pre-scientific understandings of that term. Some scientists, for instance, might have speculated that water had a different chemical structure; they would have been wrong. Meaning is disclosed by empirical facts. The implication is that meanings are public entities in the sense that they are objective and discoverable by the scientific community. Given externalism, science can make important semantic-significant discoveries. What science revealed in the case of water (what we discovered) was that H2O is, and always has been, a constitutive feature of the true meaning of “water.” The word “water” means H2O, despite the fact that H2O was not always part of the term’s intension. Given the threat of semantic externalism for my argument, I now turn to an examination of this rival theory of meaning. I argue that the arguments in favor of externalism do not conclusively establish its credentials. So-called evidence of conceptual change, in the case of “racism,” need not be interpreted as evidence that the meaning of “racism” is determined by the internal nature of the stuffs picked out by this term. For we can tell a plausible alternative story of the conditions that generate conceptual change that is consistent with the semantic thesis that meaning is the use of a word within the context of a rule-governed practice.

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4.3   Resisting Externalism: An Internalist Account of Conceptual Change One way to think about semantic externalism is as a sophisticated defense of the claim that the meaning of a word is the “object” it stands for. As such, it stands in opposition to Wittgenstein’s theory of meaning and his conventionalist conception of definition. His claim that an explanation of a word (or what it means) is the expression of a rule for the correct use of that term implies that explanations like “Water is H2O” and “Racism is morally bad” are human conventions. For these are not descriptions of water and racism, respectively, but rules for the correct use of “water” and “racism,” respectively. Putnam’s and Kripke’s arguments against Wittgensteinian semantics strike many philosophers as persuasive, even decisive. What has the Wittgensteinian to say in reply to them? I argue that it is possible to accept the terms of Putnam’s and Kripke’s thought experiments without affirming their conclusions. One problem with viewing “racism” as a kind term is that the corresponding set of paradigms does not seem sufficiently uniform and stable. That is, the internal nature of the various stuffs picked out by “racism” varies widely from one context and category of entity to another. In addition, the intension of this term is widely contested. In the next chapter I argue that considerations that shed light on the contestedness of racism, such as the fact that the term is widely incompatibly used, call into question the ability of paradigms of racism to fix the reference of “racism” (i.e., to specify a stable kind). A more plausible analysis suggests that the grammar of “racism” is constituted by incompatible norms. In the present chapter, I set this objection aside in order to evaluate Putnam’s and Kripke’s arguments for externalism. 4.3.1  Rival Intensions: Empirical Discoveries as Pragmatic Reasons When scientific inquiry brings the internal natures of stuffs to light, a decision on the part of the linguistic community may be made to revise the prevailing definition. It is undeniable that scientific discoveries have compelled entire linguistic communities to revise their norms. Externalists interpret this tendency as confirmation that the meaning of a referring term is partly determined by the (hidden nature of the) object it stands for. But the logic of this reasoning rests on a questionable presupposition.

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Externalists accept this premise: that the meaning of “W” is partly determined by external facts about Ws is evidenced by the fact that a linguistic community chooses to update the meaning of “W” to reflect this new information. For example, the scientific discovery that certain stuffs consisted of H2O prompted conceptual change. Our linguistic community responded to this information by revising the concept of water, by adopting “Water is H2O” as the correct definition. Putnam interprets this communal response as evidence that chemical facts about the stuffs falling under the extension of “water” partly determine the meaning of this term. Similarly, the discovery of the atomic structure of gold led to the modification of the definition of “gold.” Kripke argues that this communal reaction to the empirical discovery carries evidential significance: it confirms the hypothesis that external facts determine linguistic meaning. My aim in this section is to reject the premise that conceptual change predicated on scientific discovery must be or is best interpreted as confirmation of externalism.16 In developing my argument, I offer an alternative explanation of this human reaction to scientific discoveries. If the tendency in our culture to go along with the findings of science counts as evidence for externalism, then the tendency in non-Western societies to find no inspiration in scientific findings for effectuating conceptual change in their cultures provides counterevidence against externalism. For it suggests that there is no logical necessity in relying on science to update one’s grammar, and no unreasonability in affirming non-scientific grammars that are well suited to non-scientific cultures and societies. The fact that we are reluctant to give credence to this kind of counterexample shows that we are imposing a double standard. The tendency of scientific cultures is to view non-scientific cultures with contempt, to criticize their eschewance of science and technology as regressive, primitive, misguided. 16  The externalist might object to my framing of the internalist/externalist disagreement as a dispute about “conceptual change” or “a change in concepts.” As Glock explains, externalists might object that “the idea that cases in which scientists adopt new criteria for the application of a term like ‘angina’ amount to cases of conceptual change is wrong because it implies that we are no longer talking about the same thing” (1996, 95). Thus instead of speaking of “conceptual change” sparked off by empirical discoveries we may speak of “conception change” sparked off by empirical discoveries. This avoids begging the question against the externalist’s assertion that it is only human understanding (our conception) that changes as a result of empirical discovery, for the reality of angina (the concept) remains the same, on externalism. What I argue below is that Putnam and Kripke’s arguments for positing a real entity which corresponds to the “concept” of a thing are unpersuasive.

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My analysis below exposes this double standard as unwarranted. In doing so, it underlines the pragmatic nature of conceptual change. My alternative explanation of conceptual change is not only consistent with the theory of conventionalism, it is also plausible and, I believe, more respectful of non-scientific cultures. Empirical discoveries result in new information and sometimes this new information influences our linguistic practices. But the factors that influence conceptual change are not monolithic: they are not all of one kind. It is an open question how best to construe the nature of this influence, and the influence may well change from one situation to the next. Thus, the first thing to point out, following Glock, is that: The idea that [the] revisability [of concepts] rules out a distinction between conceptual and empirical role amounts to a fallacy. The fact that a Prime Minister can be relegated to an ordinary Member of Parliament does not entail that there is no difference in political status between the Prime Minister and a Member of Parliament. By the same token, the fact that we can deprive certain propositions of their conceptual status does not show that they never had such a status in advance of the conceptual change. Changes of the conceptual framework can themselves be motivated by theoretical considerations ranging from new experiences over simplicity and fruitfulness to sheer beauty.17

Concept revisability can also be motivated by non-theoretical considerations, considerations more conspicuously grounded in cultural values, as I argue below. The discovery that a certain substance, that we pick out by the term “water,” consists of H2O  did in fact influence our linguistic community’s  decision to revise the definition of “water.” It created newfound knowledge of the internal properties of the stuffs picked out by the term “water.” This, in turn, created a new set of possibilities, an extension of our choices about how best to use the term. Hanfling argues that these incompatible choices are “rival intensions.” In the following passage, he emphasizes the choice that sometimes emerges from scientific discoveries: Putnam is mistaken in treating the issue as one of intension versus extension: it is really about rival intensions. If the visitors from Earth judge that the ordinary qualities constitute the intension of ‘water’, then they will not  Glock (2003, 88).

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report a difference of meaning; but if they judge chemical structure to be of overriding importance, then they will report as predicted by Putnam. The choice would probably depend on the context in which ‘water’ was to be used. But either way, the issue is not about intension versus extension, but about ordinary versus scientific intensions. Putnam thinks that the latter would always prevail, but while they might do in some contexts, there is no reason to think that it would be so in general.18

Following Hanfling, I will talk about rival intensions. When new intensional possibilities emerge we are confronted with a choice between different concepts. This is why Hanfling calls them rivals. In the case of “water,” we chose to modify and expand its intension rather than retain the existing, unmodified intension. Hanfling’s claim that there is no way to know in advance what rival intension a linguistic community would choose (in Wittgenstein’s practice-­ centered sense) seems to suggest that (newly discovered) scientific facts underdetermine a community’s decision. He writes, for instance, that “there is no reason to think that it [the decision to adopt the scientific intension over and against the ordinary intension] would be so in general.” If a genuine choice to extend, revise, or retain a grammatical norm presents itself, then there must be other considerations besides scientific facts that factor into the decision-making process. These extra-scientific considerations are essential for deciding between rival intensions. What, then, is the nature of these non-scientific considerations? I want to suggest that the various considerations that are relevant to choosing between rival intensions are best characterized as pragmatic. A scientist who prefers one theory over another, based on nothing more than simplicity or beauty, invokes a pragmatic consideration, for simplicity or beauty makes one theory good or better to have over its rival. If I am right that these considerations play a primary role in the decision-making process, then the fundamental form of justification at issue is pragmatic, not epistemic. In what follows I will discuss pragmatic considerations that, while encompassing aesthetic preference, go well beyond personal preferences, taking us into the social domain. If Hanfling is right that collective human decision is involved in adopting one rival intension over its rivals, what does this collective decision depend upon? Hanfling does not say in precise terms. He simply states  Hanfling (2000, 226).

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that the choice may “depend on the context in which ‘water’ was to be used” and that “there is no reason to think that it [scientific intensions] would [always prevail].” A community’s “collective decision” is expressed in its practice, and that decision will likely be based on its broader cultural values and forms of life. For consider the objection that Putnam should not be as certain as he is that Twin Earthians would modify their use of “water” in the wake of the discovery of XYZ. After all, it might be argued, how can we know what this hypothetical community would do? To this Putnam might reply that his assurance is plausible, and I am inclined to agree with him because of how he sets up his thought experiment. It is precisely on this point, however, that pragmatic considerations enter the conversation. Recall, Putnam posits that Twin Earthians have virtually identical forms of life to those of Earthians. The high degree of sameness in the lives of Earthians and Twin Earthians entails that Twin Earthians share the same set of value commitments as Earthians. In particular, the discovery that a certain kind of stuff consists of XYZ already presupposes a globally connected set of international communities defined by technological advancement, global capitalism, and scientific domination of virtually every aspect of society and life. The attitudes of most human communities are characterized by positive attitudes toward science, given their dependency on scientific knowledge for the reproduction of daily existence. These attitudes are further conditioned by the understanding of science’s potential futural contributions to human society. Initially, those who would insist upon adopting the definition “Water is XYZ” will be those who made the discovery, that is, members of Twin Earth’s scientific community. These are individuals whom society recognizes as having the authority and know-­ how to make such determinations, in part because it is widely known that such information (about water or just about anything else) might become scientifically and technologically significant. So, since the broader society values and benefits from scientific and technological advancements which depend upon the information of an expert community, it seems likely that it would defer to these experts as to the nature of water. Stated differently, in a society where scientific discoveries are viewed as “progress,” and where the fruits of science are highly valued in the structuring of society, there is a practical stake in adopting concepts which track scientific facts. Under these circumstances, given the ability to choose between a scientific and non-scientific concept of water, the broader community is likely to adopt the scientific concept over its rival.

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The reasons will be that doing so is necessary for the development and continuation of its forms of life, which includes the  perpetual synthesis and integration of scientific information. Scientific inquiry will thus be highly valued in this society. Scientific results enter not just into scientific practices, like the setting up experiments and the constructing of hypotheses. They enter into the interpreting of evidence, the justification of policy and regulation, the construction of physical structures and tools, and the structuring of society. In short, societies whose forms of life are partly constituted by science are antecedently defined by values and interests that make it rational for them to adopt procedures of concept-formation and concept-­modification that rely on scientific findings. Science is instrumentally valuable to societies whose livelihoods and notions of progress are bound up with technological advancement. This is not an argument for the “truth” and epistemic justification of scientific concepts. It is an argument for their utility and pragmatic justification for a certain set of lifestyles and cultural livelihoods. My argument makes room for the kind of Foucauldian and critical perspectives that, for example, feminist epistemologists have made use of in recent decades. An advanced scientific society cannot exist apart from power relations. Gatekeepers of knowledge are essential in establishing social processes, along with criteria for determining what counts as knowledge. This, in turn, raises sociological issues concerning who gets to decide the meaning of the term “water” (the scientific community?). It also raises moral issues concerning who ought to decide. These are issues worth exploring, but I would like to set them aside, for they are not directly relevant to the argument I am making. The claim I am defending is a claim about what a society sympathetic to and dependent upon scientific discovery is likely to be find intuitively obvious, plausible, commonsensical, and so forth, in regard to the meanings of terms. I am suggesting that to the extent that the meaning of “water” is responsible to reality (scientific discovery), it is we who make it so. (And this is, of course, another way of saying that it is not responsible to science, but to human choice or convention.) Hanfling’s argument suggests that scientific facts are relevant to our lives, but not in the way Putnam and Kripke believe. The relevance of scientific facts to our lives is evinced in the fact that upon discovering them we are sometimes led to a choice, not however between competing descriptions of reality (e.g., the nature of water), but between competing practices and/or forms of life. When faced with the choice between rival

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intensions, the final decision will obviously depend upon beliefs about what is true. For example, it will involve the belief that the stuffs picked out by the term “water” consist of H2O, as well as the belief that defining water as H2O is useful for science. However, the choice itself—whether to adopt rival intension I1 or rival intension I2—is not itself a matter of what is true, but about what is useful. Putnam thinks that the decision to modify and update our concept of water was the correct decision and that choosing otherwise would have been incorrect. What makes an intension that includes “Water is H2O” correct and an intension that does not include it incorrect, on his view, is that only the former corresponds to the fact that water is H2O. But one can accept the fact that a certain kind of stuff (that we call “water”) consists of H2O without adopting the definition “Water is H2O” in one’s intension of “water.” One has an interest in making this discovery definitional (concept-forming) if one wishes to manipulate substances and explain various other phenomena. These manipulations and explanatory ambitions are connected with a technologically advanced society’s dependence on a capitalist mode of production, scientific advancement, technological development, and so forth. All of this makes it “unreasonable” for us to resist the scientific intension. But what reason is there to think that it is objectively (transhistorically) unreasonable? If a society does not share the aforementioned values and vision for itself, then it may not be unreasonable at all. 4.3.2  The Pirahã: A Living Counterexample Rather than comparing “Water is H2O” on Earth to “Water is XYZ” on Twin Earth, it is more instructive to situate the former definition within two very different societies, both of which exist in the actual world. So let us consider the Pirahã, an Amazonian tribe. Pirahãs are notorious for resisting religious conversion and cultural assimilation, including efforts to adopt our modern ways of living. While the Pirahã have been exposed to western technologies, such as photography and video, they are not interested in mastering the techniques necessary to reproduce these technologies, even as they derive utility from them. Thus, they may engage in trade for, say, motorized boats, matches, or clothing, and they may be willing to  learn some basic  operations so as to put them to use. But they are unwilling to engage in long-term maintenance of sophisticated machinery (even when taught to do so), since that would require that they alter their day-to-day practices and cultural identity, which they are unwilling to do.

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The Pirahã simply refuse to modify or give up their cultural practices to master the production of such technologies.19 The Pirahãs subscribe to an empiricist epistemology that partly explains these peculiarities. That is, they subscribe to what linguist and cultural anthropologist Michael Everett calls the immediacy of experience principle: This principle states that formulaic language and actions (rituals) that involve reference to nonwitnessed language and actions (rituals) that involve reference to nonwitnessed events are avoided. So a ritual where the principal character could not claim to have seen what he or she was enacting would be prohibited. Beyond this prohibitive feature, however, the idea behind the principle is that the Pirahãs avoid formulaic encodings of values and instead transmit values and information via actions and words that are original in composition with the person acting or speaking, that have been witnessed by this person, or that have been told to this person by a witness. So traditional oral literature and rituals have no place.20

This empiricist epistemology explains why Pirahãs are non-religious, even while claiming to believe in spirits. They have no creation myths (or, indeed, any folktales or fiction21), and they reject belief in God and other religious deities on grounds of lack of experience; that is, on grounds that they have not personally witnessed such entities or heard about them from anybody who has. They believe in spirits, as they believe in the objects perceived in dreams, because they claim to witness these entities, either by perceiving them directly (which means that they consider dream experiences to be real) or by inference (e.g., seeing something move in the bushes). This empiricist epistemology is relevant to my argument because it constitutes the basis for the Pirahã’s grammatical exclusion of scientific explanation. If the only way to “transmit values and information [is] via actions and words that are original in composition with the person acting or speaking, that have been witnessed by this person, or that have been told to this person by a witness I can know,” and if the community in question 19  For a short, popularized introduction to Pirahã culture and grammar, see Daniel Everett (2008). One of the aims of the book is to document the author’s repudiation of Noam Chomsky’s theory of generative grammar. Although never mentioned, the book is very much in keeping with Wittgenstein’s account of grammar (this despite the fact that Everett’s use of the term “grammar” diverges from Wittgenstein’s idiosyncratic use). 20  Everett (2008, 84). 21  Everett (2008, 133–134).

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is scientifically illiterate and lacks any and all interest in science, then such a community will be closed off to knowledge about hidden internal natures. So it is not just that they will lack an interest in science. It is also that as they have no use for scientific literacy (in their culture), they cannot be in a position to have a stake or interest in adopting a scientific grammar for “water” or any other term. Further, Everett argues that the immediacy of experience principle precludes the Pirahã from making high-level abstractions and generalizations. For example, the Pirahã lack a sophisticated arithmetical grammar. Yet, without sophistication, scientific knowledge will be virtually impossible. This limitation is not due to any cognitive deficiency, of course, but to a sociocultural limit. It is a matter of convention, as Everett explains: Since abstractions that extend beyond experience could violate the cultural immediacy of experience principle, however, these would be prohibited in the language. …The Pirahã language and culture are connected by a cultural constraint on talking about anything beyond immediate experience. Declarative Pirahã utterances contain only assertions related directly to the moment of speech, either experienced by the speaker or witnessed by someone alive during the lifetime of the speaker.22

Given the Pirahã’s brand of empiricism, and given the fact that the chemical structure of water can be known only by persons who have undergone sophisticated training in the relevant scientific practices— practices which the Pirahã lack—their form of life precludes them from adopting the definition “Water is H2O.” They could not in any meaningful way adopt it and simultaneously retain important aspects of their culture. For one thing, the concept-forming nature of the definition requires a serious interest in science, but we have seen that they are unwilling to take up such interests, since they refuse to prioritize forms of life antithetical to theirs. Even if they should come to understand what  this expression means, say, on the basis of teaching, this information would only be known to the limited few who patiently sat through the teaching. In all likelihood, the information would not be transmitted to many Pirahãs, as it would be useless information for them. Within a generation or two, no one in the community would continue to understand or believe that water is H2O.  Finally, even if the information were widely  Everett (2008, 131–132).

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transmitted among Pirahãs, it would be misleading to describe this is a “conceptual shift” in Pirahã thought. For the fact that water has a certain chemical structure would not be concept-­forming for them; it would not be hardened into a linguistic norm, since it would not enter into any Pirahã practices. There is, of course, the possibility that they would come to convert to a scientific culture, but short of that I submit that even if they were to assert that water is H2O (as a factual claim), the sentence would fall short of being a definitional norm. This is true even if they were to regularly utter and transmit it to others. In order to function as a definition it would have to be adopted as a norm of representation, which means there would have to be a normative point in doing so. The only way in which this sentence would appear in their lives in any meaningful way is that, from time to time, someone would utter a cryptic sentence like “That water consists of H2O” (cryptic, i.e., from their perspective). Without deep appreciation for science it seems that such a “definition” could be nothing other than cryptic. Is the Pirahã conception of water which does not include among its intension that water is H2O incomplete or mistaken? I reject this. What do “complete” and “incomplete” mean here? Their concept of water (which presumably isn’t radically different from our own everyday, non-scientific concept) would obviously be inadequate for scientific purposes and for any others that presuppose science. But this does not render their concept inadequate or incomplete for them, for it is completely adequate for their purposes and forms of life. Conceiving of water as H2O is unnecessary for having a concept of water that is well suited for everyday purposes. Their concept is useful for expressing their attitudes (desires, intentions) about water and for integration into their forms of life (for drinking water, gathering water from the river, taking shelter from the rain, fishing, and so on). The conventionalist view of definition can be brought in to make sense of the preceding discussion. Concepts, on conventionalism, can be more or less useful, but not true or false (at least not in the relevant sense). Putnam believes that external (scientific) facts are relevant to semantics because they can make true certain intensions and make false others. But the idea that external facts make true certain definitions and make false others is one that is rejected by conventionalism. The proposition that definitions are true or false descriptions (the view I called “descriptivism”) is one that needs to be argued for, but is not argued for in Putnam’s paper. Moreover, I have argued against this claim in previous chapters. If conventionalism is true, then explanations of meaning (such as “Water is H2O”)

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are not true or false descriptions, but expressions of linguistic norms. A fortiori, scientific facts are not in the business of making definitions true or false. So, if Hanfling is right that the rivalry sparked off by scientific discoveries is one between competing intensions and not between intension and extension, then his position confirms conventionalism. For a rivalry between competing intensions is one that is settled by human decision (laying down a convention), based on what is beneficial or useful, not by facts about the external world. 4.3.3  Are the Pirahã Wrong/Confused? Against my  argument it might be objected that, to the extent that the Pirahãs reject or resist the proposition that water is H2O, they are simply wrong in their understanding of water. This objector would  insist that their definition is at best incomplete and at worst (partially) false. After all, to the extent that they fail to understand this proposition (because they have no knowledge or interest in understanding chemistry), they are ignorant of a true empirical fact. For, again, on externalism, external facts about the nature of water are partial determiners of the meaning of the word “water,” independent of whether anyone knows them. I would concede to the objector that the Pirahãs are ignorant of chemistry (and various other scientific facts). Furthermore, I would concede that their willful ignorance and lack of interest on such matters separates their community from ours in ways that might incline some within our own ranks to judge that they are “wrong.” But these concessions do not get us to the heart of the matter. I have argued that their rejection of the definition “Water is H2O” does not show that they are wrong in the sense that they believe something false about water, for definitions are expressions of norms and so are neither true nor false representations. One might instead argue that they are “wrong” in the sense that they do not share the right value commitments and forms of life. And here we could have a normative debate about whether that is correct. But the possibility of that debate is quite different from the position that they have a false belief in the way that believing it is raining outside might be false. Putnam assumes without argument that if empirical facts about a term’s referent matter to us in ways that prompt the revision of the term’s linguistic norms, then those facts make true certain linguistic norms and make false others. This assumption ignores the fact that scientific discoveries, and empirical facts more generally, matter to

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linguistic communities in ways that are non-epistemic. Empirical facts matter to us when they have the potential to influence our lives. Were this not so, all empirical facts would be concept-forming, but clearly only some are. Moreover, the variety of ways that non-epistemic influence might obtain is multifarious. The set of facts that become important for a community largely depends on its forms of life. Generally, we can say that empirical facts matter to us and ought to matter to us, because they often condition behavior and definitions have regulative implications. Certain practices are made possible by adopting as a norm the definition “Water is H2O.” The significance of these practices for our lives gives us good pragmatic reason to adopt it as part of the intension of “water.” But which empirical facts ought to matter to us and how they ought to matter and condition our grammar will depend on our forms of life. The Pirahã provide a living counterexample to the claim that our scientific definition of “water” is and must be the correct definition, because science says so. It is not at all obvious that they are irrational for failing to adopt this definition—despite the fact that the stuffs falling under the extension of what they call “water” consists of H2O. Our disagreement with the Pirahã, if there is one, is a disagreement in form of life, not in empirical judgments. We must distinguish empirical judgments about the internal consistency of certain stuffs (which may be true or false) and normative judgments about which empirical facts should be grammatical for a community  (which is a normative  and cultural issue). Normatively, I see no reason to think that the Pirahãs are rationally obligated to update their intension/s of terms like “water” in their language (so as to get right with the world, as it were). Suggesting otherwise strikes me as an ethnocentric, offensive, and dangerous imperialist proposal. I am inclined to reject it as conceptual imperialism. A more basic logical objection, however, is this: Whether a community should transform an empirical fact into a grammatical norm is not a matter of whether that norm is “true” or “false,” but a matter of whether it is useful or not for that culture. It may be objected that I cannot help myself to conventionalism as a basis for  defending Pirahã culture, for all definitions and intensions  on conventionalism—including theirs—are arbitrary and logically indefensible from a transcultural perspective. This is true. But it is true on Wittgenstein’s use of “arbitrariness” which signifies the unjustifiability of grammatical rules by reference to reality. The arbitrariness of grammar ­thesis is perfectly compatible with defending a culture on practical grounds. My defense, in other words, does not spring from conventionalism per se,

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but from the moral grammar of my own community. Conventionalism does not entail that competing or incompatible grammatical accounts of “water” are “arbitrary” in the sense that choosing between them is a trivial matter. It is no more trivial than adopting one state constitution over another is trivial. For science-dependent societies like ours the scientific intension of “water” is hardly trivial. Indeed, its significance is linked to our society’s broader commitment to science and technology. For it is this that is at stake in the questioning of scientific grammar. My claim is that something similar applies to the Pirahã. Glock raises a similar line of objection against the Putnam–Kripkean argument. He does not deny that, in the case of gold, an empirical discovery prompted a substantive change in the definition of “gold.” What he denies is what is taken to be entailed by the conceptual change, namely, that the discovery somehow confirms the truth of the adopted scientific definition. He resists the idea that a scientific discovery is simultaneously a dual discovery: a semantic discovery (discovery of the “real meaning” of “gold”) and an ontological discovery (discovery of the “real essence” of gold). Following Wittgenstein, Glock argues: We sometimes change the CRITERIA for the application of words. But this amounts to conceptual change sparked off off by an empirical discovery, not to a discovery of ‘the real meaning’ (Z 438). Putnam objects that this ignores the fact that we now know more about gold than before. Wittgenstein could reply that we know more about gold, that is, about the atomic consistency of a certain stuff, without knowing more about the meaning of ‘gold’. The latter is determined by our EXPLANATION of meaning, which specifies criteria that must be fulfilled by anything we call ‘gold’. And we distinguish between UNDERSTANDING the term and having expert chemical knowledge. But even if science does not discover meanings, we, for good reasons, change certain concepts in accordance with its findings, and to this extent language is not autonomous. One might further claim that the new concept is simply correct, since it corresponds to objective features of a stuff (gold). However, that stuff has an indefinite number of objective properties. These could all be used to define different concepts, which may be more or less useful, or have more or less explanatory power. But that is not a matter of corresponding to reality.23

 Glock (1996, 46–47).

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There are a lot of gems in this passage. Empirical discoveries can, and occasionally do, result in a sort of decision, but the decision is always a communal or societal one. The decision to revise an existing concept, or to stipulate a new concept, must be a widely accepted decision (one manifest in practice). Wittgenstein describes this unique kind of “decision” as “agreement in definitions” or conceptual agreement. Conceptual agreement, however, presupposes shared values and practices; agreement in definition is “agreement in form of life.” Consider the case of gold. The communal “decision” involved taking the atomic consistency of a certain stuff to mark a defining (grammatical) feature of “gold.” Glock rightly reminds us that pragmatic considerations led our linguistic community to prioritize certain features over others. Our ability to choose which aspects of a scientific discovery are grammatically salient exhibits our autonomy in the decision-making process. For example, Glock observes that the stuffs falling under the extension of “gold” have several hidden properties that might be taken up as part of the intension of “gold.” Yet we do not give every one of these objective properties equal weight. For our decision is not an arbitrary one, but one guided by certain social and scientific interests. We might have valued other features of the substance, for example, features common to both gold and fool’s gold. Had these commonalities been particularly significant for us, for our forms of life, the empirical discovery with respect to gold might have led to a different decision. We might have decided that what we now call “gold” and “fool’s gold” belong to the same kind. Had our collective decision gone this way, the distinction between “gold” and “fool’s gold”—as distinct kinds of substances—would not have arisen. So, despite what one might think we are not blindly guided by science; empirical discoveries do not determine conceptual decisions, we do. Again, this element of grammatical decision-making reflects our autonomy in choosing which aspects of scientific discoveries are grammatically salient. 4.3.4  The Arbitrariness of Grammar What are we to make of Glock’s contention that “even if science does not discover meanings, we, for good reasons, change certain concepts in accordance with its findings, and to this extent language is not autonomous?” Does this concession undermine Wittgenstein’s arbitrariness of grammar thesis? No. Baker and Hacker explain the sense in which grammar is not arbitrary for Wittgenstein:

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We have argued that grammar pays no homage to reality. It is not answerable to reality in the currency of truth. But grammar can be said to be ‘responsive to reality’ in the following sense: that were the world different in specifiable ways, certain features of our form of representation would no longer be useful. So too, if human nature were different, parts of our grammar might no longer be usable. And if we had a different grammar we would say and do quite different things (cf. ‘Agreement in definitions, judgements and forms of life’, pp. 215–18).24

The kind of justification Wittgenstein rejects is epistemic justification.25 There are no facts that make grammatical propositions (explanations of meaning) true or false. For grammatical propositions are expressions of rules, which are brought into existence by us. The sense in which grammar is not arbitrary is that framework conditions mediate “features of our form of representation.” The conditioning at issue is pragmatic. Were very general facts about the world different from what they actually are; were human nature radically different from what it in fact is; or, were we members of radically different cultures, our grammatical norms would “no longer [be] usable.” Empirical facts constrain grammar in that they make some linguistic norms more or less useful, harmful, and so on. Hence when we assert that human nature and the laws of physics prevent human communities from adopting certain grammars, we must distinguish logical and pragmatic forms of “prevention.” Is the logic of our language then constrained by the facts? In one sense, this is obviously so. Far from denying it, Wittgenstein affirmed that concept-­ formation is empirically conditioned. We do not play board games with pieces that are too heavy to lift or too small to pick up, nor do we play card games with cards differentiated by markings that are not readily discriminable. If these are to be called ‘constraints upon games’, then there are indeed analogous constraints upon grammar. …But such constraints are mischaracterized as ‘constraints upon the logic of our language’. Rather are they constraints within which our languages evolve and within which we construct our notations. These constraints do not make logic or grammar answerable to facts of nature. Nor do they force us to recognize something as making sense which does not in fact make  Baker and Hacker (2009, 339).  Wittgenstein also rejects the possibility of justifying grammar tout court, that is, by reference to the facts, or to a single purpose or social function of language. Though see my account of pragmatic justification in Chap. 3. 24 25

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sense, or conversely to exclude forms of words from use as being senseless which do in fact make sense. Such constraints on concept-formation do not impugn the autonomy of grammar (any more than comparable constraints upon the game of chess could bring it about that we accept certain moves as licit in chess which are in fact illicit, or prohibit certain moves that are permissible).26

Consider empirical constraints on human nature. Some of our conventions regarding emotional expression in bodily reactions may prove unalterable if it is an empirical fact that, say, facial expressions of anger are fixed aspects of human nature. In that case, it would be fruitless to adopt this partial definition of “anger”: “Anger is characteristically expressed in smiling.” This constraint is pragmatic rather than logical. If it were logical, it would be impossible to adopt this definition. But that is not the sense in which we “cannot” adopt it. Rather, the sense in which we cannot do so is that doing so would render the term “anger” impracticable for our current purposes and perhaps potentially harmful. Or take a different example: If one values a technologically advanced society, then one ought to define “water” in accordance with scientific discoveries. Nature thus imposes limits in the sense that it furnishes pragmatic reasons for either adopting or rejecting a grammatical rule. The logical openness of our norms does not imply that there are no limits on the revisability of grammar. Aside from the pragmatic limits that nature furnishes upon grammar, Wittgenstein noted that there are pragmatic limits furnished by sociohistorical facts. Such limits are those imposed by cultural forms of life of specific human communities. Arguably, for instance, our commitment to science makes it irrational for us to reject the scientific (post-1800s) definition of “water.” An opposing corresponding limit applies in the case of the Pirahã. Their unwillingness to accept this definition and, with it, the authority of science is not mere stubborn unwillingness, but sociocultural unwillingness. Sociocultural facts about a human community constrain grammar when they are essential to its form of life; when fundamentally altering them would result in a loss of identity or fundamental values. The salient point here, again, is that the limits in question are pragmatic rather than logical. Although Pirahã grammar is logically revisable, sociohistorical facts about their culture rule out this possibility, that is, render it incompatible with their “non-scientific culture.” There is no necessity to  Baker and Hacker (2009, 214).

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any society’s continuing its cultural way of living. And sometimes sociohistorical facts (e.g., conquest) undermine existing forms of life. The established values and practices of a cultural community typically lead it to view its own grammar as superior to others. This is understandable, for habit, tradition, and the enculturation of children into the culture’s forms of life render its ways of living more intuitive, easier to learn or employ, and more useful to members of the community given its shared values and practices. The community simply cannot—and from an internal perspective, should not—accept our definition of “water” given that it wishes to retain its cultural identity. The line separating natural and sociocultural limits does not seem to be a sharp distinction. Nevertheless, it seems that both the world and our sociocultural practices make certain grammatical rules pragmatically undesirable, as adopting them would be useless, counterproductive, dangerous, or harmful to their culture. Grammar is always immanently justifiable to insiders: that is, insiders can provide reasons for why they do things as they do. This is a kind of pragmatic justification. This gives us what we need to reply to one possible objection to Wittgenstein’s arbitrariness thesis. It might be said that grammar cannot be arbitrary—that is, unjustifiable by reference to empirical facts—because grammar may be justifiable by reference to the naturalness of linguistic norms. The idea is that some of our concepts (and corresponding practices) appear to be grounded in what we find “natural,” as opposed to novel concepts that strike us as “unnatural” and thus incorrect or misguided. Consider, for instance, alternative mathematics. To take a simple example, consider the practice of “counting by two.” Most of us would find it natural to continue the series “2, 4, 6, 8, 10,…” with “12, 14, 16,…” and unnatural to continue the series with “14, 18, 22…”. Does the naturalness of what we call “counting by two” establish that forms of counting that do not conform to this “natural” pattern are mistaken? Baker and Hacker consider and reject arguments of this sort, that is, arguments from what is “natural.” Their objection implies that such arguments conflate the natural and the correct. That it is natural for us, in our culture, to continue the pattern ‘2, 4, 6, 8, 10, 12, 14’ as we do, that this needs little training, that the progression is readily surveyable and not typically confusing, and so forth, is not what makes it correct. Rather, that we find it natural is what makes it reasonable for us to ‘make it correct’. What is natural for most of us is the foundation for a tech-

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nique. ‘Before the calculation was invented or the technique fixed, there was no right or wrong result’ (LFM 95). Is it equally ‘natural’ and ‘inevitable’ for us to extend the series ‘−2’, according to the formula a0 = 1000; an+1 = an − 2, beyond 0 (namely: +2, 0, −2, −4 . . .)? One might indeed say that it is, for our schoolchildren have no difficulty in doing so. But educated people in early modern Europe found it most unnatural – after all, they might have said, one cannot have less than nothing. What is, in this sense, natural today may have been altogether unnatural in other times or in other cultures.27

If Baker and Hacker are correct, the conflation of naturalness with correctness is objectionable on several grounds. First, what is taken to be natural and unnatural is a relative matter. That which is unnatural is always so from certain perspectives, for persons at particular points in history, for particular cultures, and so on. Second, the argument from the naturalness of certain grammatical norms fails to recognize that we sometimes adopt linguistic conventions that are unnatural. These we may adopt when the utility of such norms outstrips their lack of intuitiveness. It also fails to appreciate what we might describe as the “foundational” role of naturalness. What we take to be natural reflects habitual practice and established attitudes. As Baker and Hacker argue, although the naturalness of a rule should neither be equated with its correctness nor thought to be the inevitable cause of our adopting it, naturalness may be an important pragmatic consideration in our decision. This last objection is crucial, for it points to an alternative and non-epistemic form of justification. The sense in which naturalness “grounds” our counting practices is not that it makes the practice correct, but that it makes it efficient and useful for us. A different kind of counting practice would not be incorrect; it would simply be useless, unintuitive, and problematic for our purposes. It may serve other purposes perfectly well. I thus conclude: That something strikes us as “natural” is a poor reason for thinking that grammar is justifiable in the sense of being correct or superior to alternative grammars. It is better conceived as a ground for pragmatic justification as Glock explains: Norms of representation cannot be metaphysically correct or incorrect. But given certain facts—biological and socio-historical facts about us and ­general regularities in the world around us—adopting certain rules can be ‘practical’ or ‘impractical’ (AWL 70). Provided that the world is as it is, people who employed alternative scientific paradigms, ways of calculating or measuring  Baker and Hacker (2009, 329; see also the discussion on 341f).

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for purposes similar to ours, would have to make adjustments which would eventually collapse under their own weight. Drastic changes in certain facts could render rules not only impractical but even inapplicable (RFM 51-2, 200; RPP II 347—9; see FRAMEWORK).28

Given our forms of life and the value we place on science, it would be “impractical” for us to decide to treat fool’s gold as a kind of gold. For there are significant empirical differences between what is called “gold” and what is called “fool’s gold.” Notably, the former is indestructible, unlike its iron pyrite counterpart, and this difference has practical significance for us. If we should decide to treat gold and fool’s gold as the same kind of substance, several unwelcome practical consequences, connected with our socioeconomic practices, would ensue. For instance, the latter, being shatterable makes for a poorer economic currency. This social fact is one practical consideration that speaks in favor of treating these stuffs as distinct kinds of substance. Arguably, considerations such as these, given our forms of life, give us good reason to place the sort of value we place on the internal natures of stuffs. What we have then is a pragmatic reason for distinguishing gold and fool’s gold.

4.4   Are Definitions Descriptive in Addition to Being Normative? I have argued that it is dubious to treat the premise that conceptual change sparked off by scientific discoveries is evidence for externalism. I now turn to an objection to the conventionalist argument I have been developing. This descriptivist objection challenges the conventionalist thesis that definitions are not descriptions, but conventions. Consider the proposition that water is H2O. This proposition strikes many as both descriptive and normative, for the chemical structure of water seems to be a fact, a description of reality, that has normative implications (particularly, for science). The fact that the stuffs called “water” share a chemical structure is something that had to be discovered. This, however, implies that a fact about the essence of water preceded both our conception of water and the intension of “water.” What, then, is wrong with holding this proposition to be a norm of linguistic correctness and a description of reality (a true description, as it turns out)?  Glock (1996, 49–50).

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4.4.1   Descriptive and Normative Uses of Sentences The sentence “Water is H2O” looks like an empirical description, and moreover, we sometimes use it as such. It can be used to describe the internal consistency of a certain kind of stuff, and it can be used to define the term “water.” These days, it seems that the primary scientific use of this sentence is not descriptive, but normative. A liquid that satisfied all of our everyday explanations of water, but did not satisfy our scientific explanations—did not have the requisite chemical structure—would not be called “water.” Considered as a descriptive statement, the claim that the chemical structure of water (a certain kind of stuff) is H2O is an empirical truth. Do these considerations show that the proposition that water is H2O is both descriptive and normative? Wittgensteinian semantics distinguishes the use and sentential form of a sentence. This distinction is rooted in Wittgenstein’s account of saying something. For it is not our sentences that say (or assert) things; it is we who make assertions by means of employing sentences. On this view, the form of the sentence is semantically secondary, for what matters primarily is use. One and the same type-sentence can play different roles in a language-­ game (descriptive and normative roles), but it cannot play them simultaneously, according to the Wittgensteinian. For the Wittgensteinian, the normative and descriptive components of sentences like “Water is H2O” is explained thus:  some  empirical discoveries have normative implications. These implications only obtain once we have “hardened” an empirical fact into a norm of representation. When this occurs there will be two distinct uses of a sentence: its use to make a descriptive judgment on some occasions and its use  to make a  normative judgment on others. Baker and Hacker invoke the use/form distinction thus: the distinction between grammatical and empirical propositions…cannot be drawn for type-sentences without regard to their particular employments. For a sentence that was once used as a defining grammatical proposition may cease to be so used (e.g. ‘an acid turns blue litmus paper red’), and conversely what was once used to express an empirical proposition may now have hardened into a rule (e.g. ‘Water consists of H2O’).29 29  Baker and Hacker (2009, 249). The expression “hardening of a rule” is a taken from Wittgenstein’s remark in On Certainty: “It might be imagined that some propositions, of the form of empirical propositions, were hardened and functioned as channels for such empirical propositions as were not hardened but fluid; and that this relation altered with time, in that

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The Wittgensteinian distinction between form and use can be supported by considering sentences like “This is red.” This sentence may be used to describe an object or to express a rule for the use of the term “red,” and whether it is one or the other seems to depend on context of use. I might use this sentence to describe, as when I report to a blind person the color of an object. I might instead use it to provide an ostensive definition of the term “red,” as when I teach a novice to the language the meaning of “red.” Whether it is a description or a linguistic rule depends on context of use. The upshot, however, is that using it one way immediately precludes using it the other way.30 Baker and Hacker offer additional arguments against the “simultaneity thesis,” as we might call it. Their most important argument appeals to their analysis of Wittgenstein’s account of the Standard Meter Bar in Paris (henceforth, Bar). The Bar is a sample used in an ostensive definition to provide a standard of what it means to call something “one meter.” They write: The distinction [between the use of a sentence to express an empirical proposition and its use to express a grammatical proposition], however, is exclusive. There is no such thing as an utterance which simultaneously makes a grammatical statement (expresses a rule of grammar) and makes an empirical statement. To say that the standard metre is a metre long is not to make a true or false statement about the length of the standard metre bar but to give a definition  – and therefore to express a grammatical proposition (PI §50; see Exg. and the essay in Volume 1, Part I, ‘The standard metre’). But, as just noted, it may be unclear, or even indeterminate, on some ­occasion or other of the use of a sentence, whether it is being used to express a grammatical proposition or to make an empirical statement.31 fluid propositions hardened, and hard ones became fluid. . . . But I distinguish between the movement of the waters on the river-bed and the shift of the bed itself; though there is not a sharp division of the one from the other . . . And the bank of that river consists partly of hard rock, subject to no alteration or only to an imperceptible one, partly of sand, which now in one place now in another gets washed away, or deposited” (1969, §§96–9). 30  When “This is red” is used as a standard for the correct use of “red,” the object one points to is a sample of red (see Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 2009, §16). That is, the object one points to is not described as red, but is the standard on the basis of which other things are to be described as red (and not red). Baker and Hacker provide a helpful discussion of Wittgenstein’s account of ostensive explanation and its connection to his philosophy (see “Ostensive Definition and its Ramifications,” 2005, 81–106). More on this below. 31  Baker and Hacker (2009, 258–259).

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Many philosophers will not find the above arguments convincing. For one thing, they seem theoretically loaded, presupposing the Wittgensteinian conception of grammar. The salient question  thus seems to be whether some of our sentences simultaneously have descriptive and normative functions, or whether these functions  map on to descriptive and normative uses. In other words: Can a sentence be used to express both a description and a normative judgment on a single occasion of use? It seems intuitively plausible that the sentence “Water is H2O” might be used to express a description and a norm, so  why should we follow Baker and Hacker in holding that a sentence cannot be used to express a proposition that simultaneously describes reality and lays down a linguistic norm? 4.4.2  A Measure that Measures Itself? Kripke offers a powerful reply to Wittgenstein’s assertion that that which measures cannot be that which is measured. If his objection succeeds, then the simultaneity thesis seems vindicated. He explains his puzzlement about Wittgenstein’s description that the Bar is neither one meter long nor not one meter long: Wittgenstein says something very puzzling about this. He says: ‘There is one thing of which one can say neither that it is one meter long nor that it is not one meter long, and that is the standard meter in Paris. But this is, of course, not to ascribe any extraordinary property to it, but only to mark its peculiar role in the language game of measuring with a meter rule.’ This seems to be a very ‘extraordinary property’, actually, for any stick to have. I think he must be wrong. If the stick is a stick, for example, 39.37 inches long (I assume we have some different standard for inches), why isn’t it one meter long?32

Wittgenstein’s seemingly paradoxical statement that the Bar is “neither one meter long nor not one meter long” seems incoherent, for it seems to imply that the Bar has no length. After all, it seems every physically and spatially extended object must be one meter long or not. Otherwise, it is not a physically and spatially extended object. But the Bar is such an object, so it must have a length—for example, one that can be measured in inches. Hence it must be possible to determine whether or not it is one meter long. If we deny this, then our talk about the Bar (i.e., of an extended  Kripke (1972, 54).

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object) seems incoherent. Something like this thought  seems to be the fundamental source of Kripke’s worry. Wittgenstein’s argument, however, does not have this absurd implication. To demonstrate where Kripke goes wrong, I will first unpack Wittgenstein’s argument and then proceed to address Kripke’s  worry. Consider the sentence: (1) The Bar is one meter long If the goal in applying (1) is to provide an ostensive definition, then the aim is to provide a rule for the correct use of the expression “one meter.” Wittgenstein’s argument can be presented as follows: “What Measures” Language-game: There is a language-game that involves measuring objects in meters. This language-game is possible in part because there is a standard of correct measurement. Where the Bar functions as this standard, it is a sample. The role of (1) in this context is to provide a rule for the use of “one meter.” Since the Bar is that which determines the length of “one meter,” it is not itself measured; hence there is no such thing as measuring and discovering the Bar’s length in this language-game. Said differently, the very moment one measures the Bar’s length (whether in inches or some other unit of measurement), one ceases to play this language-­ game. When one utters sentence (1) in this language-game, what one says is that the Bar is the standard of “one meter,” i.e., one does not describe the bar’s length but lays down a rule.

Notice that nowhere in the above argument was it claimed that the Bar has no length. On the contrary, its length is essential to the language-­ game, for it is the standard against which measurement takes place. Obviously the fact that we ordinarily play a normative language-­game with sentence (1) does not mean that it is impossible for us to play a descriptive language-game with it. There may be an occasion where one asserts (1) and thereby describes the length of the Bar. This constitutes a different language-game. “What is Measured” Language-game: Imagine that one is genuinely unfamiliar with the Bar’s length. One is interested in determining what its length is and wants to do so using meters as one’s unit of measurement. One then proceeds to do exactly that, measure the Bar, and as a result of this “experiment” one concludes that the Bar is one meter long. Here one uses sentence (1) to provide a true description. However, in order to describe the length of

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the Bar, one must have a standard for determining what counts as “one meter.” Let us suppose that this standard is another object, a sample other than the Bar. (For one cannot measure the length of the Bar against itself to discover that it is one meter.) So on this language-game we succeed in measuring the length of the Bar, but we do so at the expense of presupposing some other sample as the standard of measurement, and now this other standard has the unique property that it is incapable of being measured in this language-game.

In “What Measures,” the Bar has the property of not being measured; a fortiori, the Bar is not discovered to be (via measurement) one meter long, but for the same reason it is not discovered to be not one meter long (e.g., two meters long). In the second language-game, the Bar is measured against some other standard, call it B, so it is B that has the property that it is not (measured as) one meter long nor as some other length. So in either language-game, something must have the unique property of not having a length that is measured. Is this property “extraordinary”? Wittgenstein rejects this. For it is not a supernatural property assigned to it by God. It is a property that characterizes the object’s role as a standard. With this background in place we can now turn to Kripke’s objection. He argues that since it is possible to measure the length of the Bar using some unit of measurement outside of the metric system, we can determine (and hence measure) the length of the Bar. He proposes inches as the unit. He then argues that the result of measuring the Bar in inches is that it is 39.37 inches. Hence it makes sense to use the following proposition as a description: (2) The length of the Bar is 39.37 inches His point then is that even if the Bar is a standard of measurement, a standard for measuring in meters, it is  still possible to  measure the Bar using a different unit of measurement (i.e., a different standard). Indeed, we might extend this thought further by arguing that once we have measured the Bar in inches we can now come to discover new information: (3) One meter is equivalent to 39.37 inches Does this argument refute Wittgenstein’s claim that the Bar turns out to have a length since it clearly has a length in inches? Does his argument undermine Wittgenstein’s claim that what is measured cannot simultane-

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ously be that which measures? If Kripke is right, then the Bar can be both a measure and what is measured, simultaneously. Kripke’s objection turns on more than one misunderstanding. First, as Baker and Hacker point out, Wittgenstein never denies (as Kripke seems to assume) that the Bar has a length. Clearly, the Bar must have one at all times given what is ordinarily called “a bar” or “a stick.” (“Every bar has a length” is a rule.) The concept length plays a role in all language-games involving measurements of the kind under consideration. Further, it is necessary for the Bar to have a length if it is to function as a sample, that is, a standard of measurement. For other objects cannot be measured against the Bar unless they are measured against the length of the Bar. Kripke confuses Wittgenstein’s claim that we cannot measure the length of the Bar in “What Measures” with the absurd claim that the Bar ceases to have a length in this language-game. The reason why we cannot measure its length in this language-game is not that it stops having one, but that its role precludes us from measuring it. In “What Measures” we are not measuring the Bar, but using it to measure other things. Given that we are not measuring it (in this practice), we cannot describe or assert the results of our having measured it (without speaking nonsense). What about Kripke’s claim that Wittgenstein is wrong to assert that we cannot measure the Bar, for we can measure it in inches? It is clear that this is a case of smoke and mirrors. Wittgenstein’s comment is about a very specific language-game, the “What  Measures” language-game. What Kripke does is introduce a new language-game, one that involves a unit of measurement that is foreign to the practice under consideration. In effect he is trying to get Wittgenstein to commit to something that he explicitly denies in stating his position, namely, that the property of not being one meter long nor not one meter long is an “extraordinary property.” For it would be an extraordinary property, indeed, if the Bar could magically retain this property across all language-games, including those where the Bar is not used as a measure! Of course one can measure the Bar in inches, but then one is no longer (at that time!) measuring it in meters (just as one cannot in that case use it as a standard to measure something else). There is no such thing as measuring a thing in meters and inches at the same time. (Though there is, of course, the related but different language-game of converting inches to meters and vice versa; yet,  that too is not the language-­game under consideration.)

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The objector, however, might continue: “Even if Kripke is confused, I still don’t see why a sentence cannot be used both to describe reality and lay down a norm.” Baker and Hacker offer the following explanation (in addition to the ones previously given).33 They ask us to consider the following argument: . Y is the same length as X. 1 2. The length of X is one meter. 3. ∴ the length of Y is one meter. This is a logically valid argument, and premises 1 and 2 are empirical descriptions. However, let us change the terms of the argument. Suppose that X is the Bar and that its role in the argument is that of a standard. Then premise 2 of the argument is no longer an empirical description, but the expression of a rule. Hence, premise 2 is redundant and might as well drop out of the argument, since it is now presupposed as a grammatical proposition (an inference rule). This illustration depicts, in a visual way, that what was originally a premise and empirical description in one argument—premise 2—vanishes or disappears (in a way analogous to what we get in Russell’s analysis of “The King of France is bald”) in the new argument, which now looks as follows: . Y is the same length as the Bar. 1 2. ∴ the length of Y is one meter. The vanishing of the sentence “The Bar is the length of one meter” is now explicit in this rendition. What explains its disappearance? Clearly it is the role of the proposition as an inference rule. Precisely because it has this role, it vanishes as a descriptive premise in the argument. Hence, a proposition cannot simultaneously be a descriptive and grammatical proposition without incoherence. And what is true for this grammatical proposition is true for all grammatical propositions, including “Water is H2O.” Insofar as this sentence is used to express a rule, the expression of a pattern of inference, it cannot be used descriptively, as the expression of an empirical proposition. The role of a premise is very different from that of an inference rule.

 Baker and Hacker (2005, 198–199).

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4.5   Conclusion We can now conclude that in Levine’s discussion of semantic externalism (and his allusion to Putnam) we do not find reason to conclude that the meaning of “racism” is the kind it stands for; or that the grammar of “racism” is (in the relevant sense) responsible to reality. The arguments of this and the previous chapters demonstrate that semantic externalism is predicated on dubious assumptions. It presupposes descriptivism as against conventionalism, for example. It also interprets conceptual change sparked off by scientific discovery as evidence for externalism. This latter claim, however, can be reinterpreted as evidence that science is significant to our culture. I have argued that the scientific value of defining and updating so-called “natural kind terms” in accordance with scientific findings does not consist in tracking reality. We are not brought closer to ultimate truth by adopting one grammar over another, for grammars are not ahistorical and culturally independent phenomena. Our own society’s grammatical dependence on science is not epistemically grounded in some objective, natural, or factual foundation; that is, it is not epistemically justifiable by reference to “ultimate reality.” Rather, our society’s grammar is grounded in the cultural values of “advanced Western societies,” which both value and depend on technologies, production and economic practices, and the authority of scientific expertise. In defending these claims, I have admittedly not shown that semantic externalism is fundamentally misguided, only that its arguments are not compelling. Admittedly, I have not shown that the word “racism” cannot have an externalist semantics, only that it need not have such a semantics and that a plausible alternative exists (one that is arguably more desirable). The Wittgensteinian account of grammar, including its contention that meaning is use, provides a plausible philosophy of language that should be taken seriously in the theory of racism—at least as seriously as semantic externalism. In the next chapter, I consider a couple of more objections to the conventionalist portrait I have been painting. My primary aim, however, is to argue for reformulating ordinary language philosophy as a philosophical practice that concerns itself with prescriptive grammar and not just descriptive grammar. In the theory of racism I argue that the former should be viewed as the primary formulation of the philosophical question “What is racism?”

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References Baker, Gordon P., and Peter M.S. Hacker. 2005. Wittgenstein: Understanding and Meaning, Volume 1 of an Analytical Commentary on the Philosophical Investigations. 2nd ed. (extensively revised). Oxford: Blackwell Publishing. ———. 2009. Wittgenstein: Rules, Grammar and Necessity, Volumes 1 and 2 of an Analytical Commentary on the Philosophical Investigations. 2nd ed. (extensively revised). Oxford: Blackwell Publishing. Conant, James. 1998. Wittgenstein on Meaning and Use. Philosophical Investigations 21 (3): 222–250. Everett, Daniel L. 2008. Don’t Sleep, There Are Snakes: Life and Language in the Amazonian Jungle. New York: Vintage Departures. Forster, Michael N. 2004. Wittgenstein and the Arbitrariness of Grammar. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Glock, Hans-Johann. 1996. A Wittgenstein Dictionary. The Blackwell Philosopher Dictionaries. Malden: Blackwell Publishing. ———. 2003. Analyticity, Apriority and Necessity. In Quine and Davidson on Language, Thought, and Reality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Hacker, Peter M.S. 2000. The Arbitrariness of Grammar and the Bounds of Sense. In Wittgenstein: Mind and Will: Part I: Essays, Volume 4 of an Analytical Commentary on the Philosophical Investigations. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. Hanfling, Oswald. 2000. Philosophy and Ordinary Language Philosophy: The Bent and Genius of Our Tongue. 1st ed. London: Routledge. Haslanger, Sally. 2012. Resisting Reality: Social Construction and Social Critique. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Kim, Hanseung. 2008. Review of Sanford Goldberg (Ed.), Internalism and Externalism in Semantics and Epistemology. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews: An Electronic Journal. 6 Aug 2008. https://ndpr.nd.edu/news/internalismand-externalism-in-semantics-and-epistemology/. Accessed 15 Feb 2018. Kripke, Saul A. 1972. Naming and Necessity. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Levine, Michael P. 2004. Philosophy and Racism. In Racism in Mind, ed. Michael P. Levine and Tamas Pataki, 78–96. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Putnam, Hilary. 1975. The Meaning of ‘Meaning.’. In Language, Mind, and Knowledge, ed. Keith Gunderson, vol. 7, 131–193. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Vargas, Manuel R. 2005. The Revisionist’s Guide to Responsibility. Philosophical Studies 125: 399–429. Wittgenstein, Ludwig. 1969. On Certainty, ed. Gertrude E.M.  Anscombe and Georg H. von Wright and trans. Gertrude E.M.  Anscombe and Denis Paul. Oxford: Blackwell. ———. 2009. Philosophical Investigations. 4th ed., ed. and trans. Peter M.S. Hacker and Joachim Schulte. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.

PART II

Theorizing Conceptual Disagreement

CHAPTER 5

Re-defining “Disagreement”: Rationality Without Final Solutions

5.1   Introduction: From Ontology to Linguistic Norms This book’s primary concern is with addressing the contestedness of racism. It is more specifically concerned with conceptual disagreement, for it is evident that much disagreement about racism is conceptual.1 Thus far, I have said little about the nature of conceptual disagreement. In this chapter I explore some of the implications of conventionalism for addressing conceptual disagreement about racism. Part I developed a prima facie case for a Wittgenstein-inspired conventionalist semantics. It also defended the plausibility of employing such an approach in the service of articulating a serviceable definition of “racism.” In Chap. 2, I argued that definitions of “racism” can be plausibly analyzed as grammatical rules. In Chap. 3, I argued that conceiving of definitions as conventions enables us to accommodate otherwise incompatible intuitions about definitions of “racism.” Constructivists tend to stress the sociohistorical features of concepts, while conceptual analysts tend to stress their a priori features. I argued that the a priori features of definitions are normative facets of our linguistic norms (facets that link up with our normative attitudes and our techniques of application) whereas the 1  For a discussion of conceptual disagreement about racism from a social science perspective, see Etienne Balibar’s “Racism Revisited: Sources, Relevance, and Aporias of a Modern Concept” (2008).

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sociohistorical features of definitions are facets of the anthropological or cultural character of our linguistic norms. In Chap. 4, I argued for the superiority of internalist semantics over externalist semantics. Arguments aiming to show that conceptual change sparked off by scientific discoveries is evidence for externalism can be resisted by reinterpreting the “evidence” as confirmation of the fact that scientific information is deeply embedded in our conceptual scheme and, hence, our forms of life. Part II extends the conventionalist framework by defending a couple of theses. First, conceptual disagreement about racism is normative in two distinct ways. First, it is about linguistic norms, as I’ve argued in previous chapters. Second, disagreement about our linguistic norms is prescriptive rather than descriptive. It concerns what the linguistic norm ought to be; this means that  the question at issue is not “How is the word ‘racism’ used?” but “How should the word ‘racism’ be used?” I further contend that we need to adopt a pragmatic approach to the prescriptive question. Such an approach ultimately leads me to defend revisionism in the theory of racism, as against conservatism. Rather than affirming that the prescriptively correct use of “racism” is the one that best conforms to commonsense thinking about racism, we ought instead affirm that the prescriptively correct use is the one that recommends some substantive revisions to commonsense thinking.

5.2   Stage-Setting for a Theory of Disagreement 5.2.1  Normative and Prescriptive Disagreement It is standardly assumed that disagreement about the nature of racism is factual disagreement. This assumption is plausible if one takes the correct answer to the philosophical question “What is racism?” to be the description of an object. In the previous three chapters, I argued that this assumption is mistaken. I defended a more plausible analysis of the philosophical question. The correct answer to it is not a description of racism, but a rule for describing racism, that is, a rule for the correct use of the term “racism.” I called this position conventionalism. This position stands opposed to the descriptivist view that explanations of meaning—or that a subset of explanations of meaning—are descriptions of matters of fact. The dispute between conventionalists and descriptivists is captured in the following question: What are philosophers disagreeing about when they disagree about the nature of racism? For descriptivists, the object of

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disagreement is a matter of fact, the nature of a partly mind-dependent or mind-independent object. Conventionalists deny this. The two positions can be articulated thus: Factual disagreement: definitional disagreement is about a matter of fact; that is, the object of disagreement is an entity or kind. (Descriptivism) Normative disagreement: definitional disagreement is about a matter of value; that is, the object of disagreement is a linguistic norm. (Conventionalism) My aim in this chapter is to extend the conventionalist paradigm by giving it a critical-prescriptive edge. The thesis I defend in this chapter and the next is that the philosopher’s interest in raising the philosophical question is not just normative, but prescriptive. Philosophical interest in the nature of racism is not merely concerned with what Wittgenstein calls “normative description.” The aim is not merely to understand the existing concept of racism; that is, to describe the prevailing grammatical rule. Rather, philosophical interest aims also to prescribe what that grammatical rule ought to be, that is, to defend a substantive proposal about how we should think and talk about racism. Definitional disagreement about racism is both disagreement about a norm and disagreement about what this norm ought to be. We need, then, to distinguish descriptive and prescriptive forms of disagreement, defined thus: Descriptive disagreement: contestants disagree about what the prevailing definition of a term is; philosophical analysis aims to endorse the descriptively correct definition. Prescriptive disagreement: contestants disagree about what the definition of a term ought to be; philosophical analysis aims to prescribe or recommend the prescriptively correct definition (independent of what the prevailing definition happens to be). Where prescriptive disagreement is at issue, the fundamental question can be articulated in any number of ways. Here are some examples. What should the meaning of term “W” be, all things considered? What is the best concept to employ for such and such a purpose? Sally Haslanger has termed this approach “ameliorative analysis,” while others, like Manuel Vargas, term it “normative analysis.” It is important for the conventionalist to draw a distinction between normative and prescriptive disagreements, as I’ve done above.

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This is important not merely to appreciate that there can be more than one way for the fact/value distinction to emerge. It is important also for drawing distinctions within conventionalist approaches to conceptual analysis. Wittgensteininans have traditionally set aside the prescriptive question, for example. Following Wittgenstein’s dictum that philosophy leaves grammar where it is, many Wittgensteininans believe that merely describing our existing concepts is sufficient for resolving all substantive philosophical problems. I disagree with this position. What is true is that conventionalism is not necessarily committed to prescriptive analysis, even though it is necessarily committed to the position that conceptual disagreement is normative (for conventionalism entails that definitions are expressions of linguistic norms). It is a further question on conventionalism whether disagreement about, say, the nature of racism is disagreement about what its nature is or ought to be. My contention in this chapter and the next is that the contestedness of racism, among other things, makes it necessary for philosophers to take a stance on how the term ought to be used. Since I have defended the conventionalist picture of definition in previous chapters, I take it for granted in the argument that follows. 5.2.2  A Mere Difference in Word Use? My argument can be framed as a response to an objection to prescriptive or pragmatic theories of racism. Conceiving of the object of disagreement as a convention, we are told, misrepresents the point of the dispute; for we are told that contestants take themselves to be disputing the nature of reality, a matter of fact, not a linguistic norm. Jorge Garcia expresses this sentiment when he rejects the social constructivist argument that, because racism is an evolving phenomenon, it is impossible to analyze racism in terms of a single, stable, unchanging essence. He writes: It has become fashionable these days among scholars of racism to insist there is no nature or essence or definition of the phenomenon because it is so varied across times and places. Some social scientists even claim that White people and Black ones use the term differently, the former seeing it as a matter of individual beliefs and actions and the latter as a system of power and oppression. However, I think this disagreement, whatever the racial demographics of its contestants, should be seen as a dispute over what is racist and, perhaps, over what racism itself is. Note that if it is seen as a mere difference in word use, the substantive disagreement between these camps seems to vanish. It would be nice if our differences could so easily be erased, but any position

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that claims they can be should rightly raise our suspicion that it is missing what is important. (my italics)2

If the correctness of a definition of “racism” is a mere matter of convention, then something of fundamental importance is supposedly lost, according to Garcia. But what, exactly? This lost “importance” seems not to be practical, but ontological. That is, the important thing for Garcia is the object of disagreement. This is supported by the fact that if a stable ontological object is traded in for an unstable convention, then the “substantive” element of disputation miraculously “vanishes.” This interpretation is confirmed by Garcia’s claim, elsewhere in the same paper: “Our task is to figure out what it is in virtue of which something belongs to the class of racisms, that is, to determine what racism consists in.”3 Presumably, this passage is suggesting that there is some language-­independent essence that racism consists in, and that the aim of the philosopher is to discover what that essence is. By claiming that prescriptive disagreement misses the object of disagreement, he identifies legitimate disagreement with disagreement about the “nature or essence or definition” of racism. By equating “definition” with “essence” and “nature,” Garcia appears to presuppose descriptivism, the thesis that ­philosophical definitions of “racism” are descriptions of the nature or essence of racism. From this it follows that construing substantive disagreement as anything other than factual constitutes illegitimate disagreement. This way of distinguishing “legitimate” and “illegitimate” disagreement entails the rejection of Wittgenstein’s conventionalist conception of definition, along with his grammatical approach. After all, I, as a Wittgensteinian, side with those “fashionable” scholars who insist that there is no nature or essence of racism, but not because I think there are a plurality of such essences (i.e., several ontological entities). Rather, I deny that the term “racism” in explanations of racism is the name of an ontological entity, for explanations of racism are not descriptions of anything. The conventionalist who endorses a definition of “racism” is not endorsing a description, but laying down a norm for a specific purpose. Garcia’s objection to this approach is that it reduces a legitimate ontological dispute to a mere verbal dispute—that is, an illegitimate dispute. In Chap. 3, I discussed a related worry—which I attributed to Leonard Harris—that originates in the conviction that metaphysical analysis is the 2 3

 Garcia (1999, 13–14).  Garcia (1997, 6).

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appropriate methodology in theorizing racism. It might seem that if the object of disagreement is an arbitrary linguistic norm (as opposed to an objectively existing entity, racism itself), then there can be no univocal, non-relative answer to the question, “What is racism?” If a linguistic convention is what we are after in addressing disagreement about racism, then one potential strategy for resolving it is to gather interested parties together to negotiate the linguistic norms surrounding the use of “racism” and thereby negotiate what the nature of racism will be. (In fact, this is the position I defend in Sect. 5.2.) The relevant parties to the dispute should then get together to decide, as a collective, how best to conceive of racism, for moral representational purposes. The notion of negotiation implies variability in potentially correct answers and also implies that whatever is negotiated is correct by virtue of being normative for the collective. Yet, from a metaphysical perspective, this proposal seems absurd. What sense does it make to posit negotiation as the appropriate method by which to resolve disagreement about the nature of a thing? Natures, ontologically conceived, are not the kind of thing that can be negotiated. Hence, the idea of negotiation makes sense only where the object of disagreement is a norm rather than a thing. That is, it makes sense on conventionalism, but not on descriptivism. Moreover, if disagreement about the nature of racism is something that can be negotiated, how can there be objectively correct and incorrect answers to the question “What is racism?” I will tackle these objections in the course of articulating a theory of legitimate disagreement about “the nature of racism” consistent with conventionalism. If conventionalism is a view about the nature of meaning and definition, the present chapter offers a more praxis-centered conception of conventionalism. It is more praxis-centered in that it holds that disagreement about “what racism is” (alternatively, “the nature of racism”) must be resolved in one’s life, in a decision about how to live. Moving towards a praxis-centered conception enables the conventionalist to answer the metaphysician’s objections. It will allow me to argue that although definitional disagreement is “merely verbal” in the sense that it is strictly about how best to talk about racism (how best to represent racism in the world), it is not “merely verbal” in some pejorative sense (e.g., a normative decision is not trivial, unimportant, or rationally indefensible). For a decision about how to talk about racism determines how we live (beginning with our representational practices).

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5.3   Metalinguistic Negotiation David Plunkett and Tim Sundell’s “Disagreement and the Semantics of Normative and Evaluative Terms” seeks to undermine an intuitive form of reasoning, namely, “the argument from (a) the premise that an exchange between two speakers expresses a genuine disagreement to (b) the thesis that those speakers mean the same things by the words they use in that exchange.”4 They cite R.  M. Hare as an example of a philosopher who defended such reasoning. The idea seems to be that, even if two speakers disagree about the referent of the disputed term, they must share a conception of its meaning, for shared meaning is a condition for the possibility of disagreement. The argument here is that, otherwise—if our speakers had radically different conceptions of the meaning of “X”—they would be disagreeing about nothing of substance. At best, their disagreement would be about a mere label: is “X” the proper label or should one be using some other term? Their disagreement would be purely verbal and would therefore be illegitimate (so the argument is reminiscent of Garcia). Suppose that S asserts “X is good” and P asserts “X is not good.” It appears that S and P are disagreeing about something. It is natural to think that if their disagreement is legitimate (non-confused), the word “good” must mean the same on each assertion. Plunkett and Sundell deny that the word “good” must mean the same in order for it to be possible for S and P to disagree. The assumption that “good” must mean the same for disagreement to be possible is false. It is at least conceivable that the word “good” might mean one thing for S and another for P without it being the case that S and P are talking past one another. For Garcia, however, this is mistaken. If “good” does not mean the same, then the disagreement between S and P “vanishes” on account of a mere difference in word use, for there is then nothing about which they disagree. Plunkett and Sundell develop an argument that undermines the necessity presupposed by this logic. 5.3.1  Non-Descriptive Disagreement Plunkett and Sundell distinguish factual and prescriptive disagreement by means of several examples (I present two). Although their examples are not designed to generalize to all explanations of meaning (since they do not seem to accept Wittgenstein’s analysis of explanations of meaning), 4

 Plunkett and Sundell (2013, 2).

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my employment of them will be filtered through a conventionalist frame. For their first example, we are asked to consider the sentence “Feynman is tall.” Plunkett and Sundell contend that this sentence need not be used to convey new information concerning Feynman’s height. Instead, it might be used to convey information about “a certain contextually supplied standard.” This is a context-relative standard for the correct use of “tall.” In their example, it is a standard for social practices involving judgments of height within a particular region or country. Suppose [y]ou ask me what counts as tall in my country. “Well,” I say, “around here, …” and I continue by uttering [“Feynman is tall.”] This is not a descriptive use in the usual sense. … All I have done is given you guidance concerning what the prevailing relevant standard for tallness happens to be in our community; in particular, that standard must be no greater than Feynman’s maximal degree of height.5

They go on to show that individuals might disagree about this standard: Suppose that another party to the conversation might simply object and says “no, Feynman is not tall”. Just as the original utterance conveyed information not about Feynman’s height but rather the appropriate usage of ‘tall’, so too would the ensuing dispute be a matter not of factual disagreement over Feynman’s height, but rather opposing views about the contextually appropriate usage of ‘tall’. Barker uses ‘metalinguistic’ to refer to the type of sharpening use at play here. Accordingly, we call the corresponding disputes over the correctness or appropriateness of those types of usages metalinguistic disputes.6

Notice that the metalinguistic dispute has normative and descriptive components. It is normative in that it is about a norm. It is descriptive in that there is a fact about what the current norm happens to be, that is, a fact about what is considered “tall” in this specific country or region. Plunkett and Sundell elaborate: [T]here are antecedently settled facts about the linguistically relevant features of the conversational context, facts which are at least partially independent of the intentions—or at least the very local intentions—of the parties to the conversation. … If a disagreement should arise over that information, 5 6

 Barker (2002, 1–2); quoted in Plunkett and Sundell (2013, 14).  Plunkett and Sundell (2013, 14).

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as it does in our extension of Barker’s case, then the disagreement is a factual one about which of two or more competing characterizations of the shared conversational context is most accurate. However, not all cases of metalinguistic usage fit this profile.7

Plunkett and Sundell rightly observe  that a speaker may be wrong about  what the prevailing norm is  or about which of several prevailing norms happens to be the appropriate one, for the context in question. Hence “Feynman is tall” may be a correct standard in one region  and an incorrect standard in another. Despite the local character of the ­contextually supplied context Plunkett and Sundell are interested in, I believe their analysis generalizes to other cases of definitional or conceptual disagreement. Consider the definition of “bachelor.” Here too it is possible for individuals to disagree about what the actual linguistic norm is and there are right and wrong answers to the question “What does ‘bachelor’ mean?” For instance, the term “bachelor” normally denotes an unmarried man; anyone who thought it denoted an unmarried man (or a married or unmarried woman) would be confused. Yet, in a special but familiar context, the term “bachelor” may denote something slightly different: the unmarried man (at the bachelor party) who will soon marry. What we seem to have, then, are two definitions of “bachelor”: • A bachelor is an unmarried man • A bachelor is the unmarried man who has been singled out for special attention because he is getting married soon The latter definition corresponds to utterances like “Where’s the bachelor?” (uttered at a bachelor party). At a bachelor party, there may be several bachelors in the first sense but only one of them (typically) is the bachelor in the second sense. It is possible to conflate the general use of “bachelor” (to refer to an unmarried man) with the special use of “bachelor” (to refer to the unmarried man who will marry soon). I might mistake Eli, a bachelor in the general sense of “bachelor,” for Ayden, the bachelor in the special sense of the term; that is, I might apply the contextually wrong standard. If, on the basis of employing the wrong standard, I should enter into disagreement with someone who employs it in a different sense, the dispute 7

 Plunkett and Sundell (2013, 14).

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could be easily and objectively resolved by clarifying the context of use (i.e., by reference to the correct contextually supplied standard).8 In the above quote, Plunkett and Sundell mentioned that not all cases of metalinguistic  disagreement fit the profile of factual disagreement. What they want is a case of metalinguistic disagreement that cannot be resolved by reference to an empirical fact about prevailing social practice (and, more specifically, the contextually established linguistic norm). To identify a normative dispute of this sort—one that does not presuppose an antecedently established norm—Plunkett and Sundell ask us to consider Oscar and Callie’s exchange. These individuals are cooking chili together. On tasting their creation, the following conversation ensues: Oscar asserts, “That chili is spicy,” and Callie objects, “No, it’s not spicy at all.” Plunkett and Sundell call this form of disagreement “metalinguistic negotiation”9 to highlight the fact that antecedent facts about linguistic practice (by themselves) cannot settle some disputes about linguistic norms—namely, prescriptive disputes. They write: In this case, it is much less natural to think that there is some antecedently settled, objective fact of the matter about the contextually salient threshold for “spiciness.” Rather than advancing competing factual claims about some independently determined threshold, it seems most natural to think of Oscar and Callie as negotiating what that threshold shall be.10

Hence, the following definition of metalinguistic negotiation: We use the term metalinguistic negotiation to refer to this second type of metalinguistic dispute—those disputes wherein the speakers’ metalinguistic use of a term does not simply involve exchanging factual information about 8  This point is acknowledged by Plunkett and Sundell, for their account is meant to apply to many “context-sensitive expressions” (2013, 16). 9  The term “metalinguistic statement” is sometimes used to signify a statement about language. For example, “The word ‘red’ is used to signify a color that is darker than pink.” I do not limit my use of “metalinguistic” to explicit statements about language. As Glock points out, grammatical propositions “expressing a linguistic rule need not be a metalinguistic statement about the employment of words, or contain expressions of generality. Rather, they depend on whether an expression has a normative function on a given occasion” (1996, 324). After all, “Red is darker than pink” and “The king moves one square at a time” are not explicitly about the words “red” and “king,” respectively, and yet they function as norms governing the use of these terms. 10  Plunkett and Sundell (2013, 15).

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language, but rather negotiating its appropriate use. We think that metalinguistic disputes of this latter type are common. Indeed we think such usages extend well beyond the kitchen, to disagreements about what should count as “tall” during our basketball draft, or “cold” in our shared office, or “rich” for our tax base. In any such case, speakers each assert true propositions, but they express those true propositions by virtue of the fact that they set the relevant contextual parameters in different ways.11

Might it be that many conceptual disputes about ethics, aesthetics, and other areas of life, are disputes about terms “in search of a meaning,” as opposed to disputes about terms that have an antecedently settled meaning?12 5.3.2  Pragmatic Advocacy Plunkett and Sundell’s argument shows that individuals can disagree about the correctness of a linguistic norm when no fact of the matter is at issue. Such disputes are made possible by the set of common interests, goals, and concerns that prompt the dispute in the first place. The term “negotiation” underscores the fact that in arguing over the correct definition, a shared set of interests, goals, and concerns sets limits on what counts as an acceptable negotiation: Why are such exchanges perceived as disputes, when the speakers fail to assert inconsistent propositions? Because in addition to asserting those propositions—in fact via their assertion of those propositions—they also pragmatically advocate for the parameter settings by virtue of which those propositions are asserted. The claim that one “spiciness” threshold is preferable to some competing “spiciness” threshold is very much the kind of thing over which two speakers can disagree.13

To “pragmatically advocate” in favor of certain “parameter settings” is to defend a contested standard or definition on grounds of its benefit or utility  Plunkett and Sundell (2013, 3).  This felicitous phrase is Georg Henrik von Wright’s: “Philosophic reflexion on the grounds for calling a thing ‘x’ is challenged in situations when the grounds have not been fixed when there is no settled opinion as to what the grounds are. The concept still remains to be moulded and therewith its logical connexions with other concepts to be established. The words and expressions the use of which bewilder the philosopher are so to speak in search of a meaning” (1967, section 3). 13  Plunkett and Sundell (2013, 15–16). 11 12

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for meeting a certain end. The idea, then, is that what contestants in the dispute share is not a conception of the meaning of the contested term, but the need to settle the definitional dispute via the selection of a standard. The need at issue in Oscar and Callie’s dispute is to determine what counts as goodtasting chili. The chili might be more enjoyable to Callie if it were “spicier”; hence, Callie’s assertion would be an attempt to negotiate the appropriate standard for this purpose. Now, it might be objected that since taste is subjective, there can be no objectively correct definition of “good chili.” But this ignores the ­contextual parameters at play in their dispute. If Oscar and Callie were making two batches of chili, they could easily make each according to their own taste; then no dispute would arise. The dispute arises, because they are making only one batch, and they need to arrive at a consensus about what counts as good chili for purposes of creating the most enjoyable meal for both individuals, given their different tastes; perhaps, the “sweet spot,” as it were, is the middle ground which both parties can accept. There can be an objective standard in this context if the standard is determined not by Oscar or Callie’s subjective taste, but by their objective agreement about what counts as good chili for this particular purpose. Each individual’s subjective taste, however, constitutes a parameter around which negotiation occurs. Plunkett and Sundell rightly observe that negotiable standards are often contextualized, and their line of argumentation lends itself to extending their analysis to more socially significant contexts. After all, the very idea of negotiation implies that the standard of objectivity is a socially mediated notion, since it requires consensus among two or more negotiators. Consider their explanation of why the dispute over the meaning of “spicy” is not a trivial matter: Why would Oscar and Callie consider it worth their time to engage in such a disagreement, when they already agree on what the chili actually tastes like? Why engage in a dispute over how to use a word? The answer is the same as before: it is worth engaging in such a dispute because how we use words matters. For Oscar and Callie, as for many of us, an agreement amongst all the cooks in the kitchen that the chili can be described as “spicy” plays an important role in collective decision-making. In particular, it plays an important role in decision-making about whether to add more spice. This may have nothing at all to do with what is analytic about “spicy”. Rather, it derives from sociological facts about how people in kitchens act when their creations earn that label. Why should Callie have to refrain from further seasoning when the chili cannot even be described as “spicy”?14

 Plunkett and Sundell (2013, 15).

14

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The significance of Oscar and Callie’s dispute is determined by the significance of the practice of eating tasty food. This is a reminder that practices have a point. The surroundings of the practice contribute to its justification. Practices are internally related to the needs and the desires they satisfy. The right kind of reason for participating in a practice bears on the need for the practice. This point is reminiscent of Leonard Harris’s contention that pragmatic considerations should have primacy in establishing a definition of “racism.” Empirical considerations are significant, not as epistemic reasons, but as pragmatic reasons. Empirical considerations assume a pragmatic role in arguments for and against adopting definitions. Empirical considerations are valuable to us because of their bearing on matters of importance to us. In one sense, it is not necessary that any human practice exist. Yet, we speak of what “must” be the case, what is “necessary” to exist, and what is “needed.” The game of chess, driving in traffic, and the legal court system do not have to exist. These are practices that we want to exist. These are practices that, given certain ends and interests, we need to exist. In the same way, representational practices involving racist ascriptions are morally important and are, arguably, morally necessary. This necessity bespeaks the need for a definition of “racism,” and hence the need for metalinguistic negotiation over the meaning of this term. It also bespeaks against the notion that negotiating a definition of “racism” denigrates the conceptual project of defining “racism,” that negotiation somehow trivializes it by reducing the debate to one about “mere words.” Negotiating the meaning of “racism” should not be thought to trivialize substantive disagreement about racism. Nor should disputation about racism be thought to be less important than factual disputation simply because what is at issue in the former case is a convention. If conventionalism about definition is correct, if disagreement about racism is disagreement about a convention, and if the disagreement in question is a kind of metalinguistic negotiation, then Garcia may be correct or incorrect in observing that disputes about the proper use of “racism” are not mere disputes about word use. He is incorrect if he assumes that normative disagreement about word use is illegitimate and that only factual disagreement is legitimate. However, his assertion can be interpreted in a way that renders it correct. Legitimate “verbal disputes” always have an extra-­ linguistic flavor, in that they have practical ramifications. It is misleading, for instance, to say that the dispute about chili is merely about language, as  though the pragmatic parameters that frame it and the interests that rationalize it and  give it its significance are not empirically mediated.

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Although the dispute about how best to define terms is representational, how we represent things in the world is interwoven with the rest of our lives. Again, the linguistic dispute about the word “chili” is interwoven with the practice of cooking chili, with satisfying the contestants’ own tastes and/or those of their customers, with selling chili at their restaurant and making a living, and so on. Because non-linguistic concerns, empirical factors, enter into the parameter settings of metalinguistic negotiations, the negotiation process may be  mediated by sociohistorical and intersubjective considerations. Suppose Oscar and Callie are chefs and co-owners of the same restaurant. They have a common interest in producing chili that will satisfy customers’ tastes but disagree about whether the chili is spicy. Their judgments about the “spiciness” of the chili are attempts to negotiate the appropriate level of spice for the sake of pleasing customers. Here the correctness or incorrectness of Oscar and Callie’s judgments will depend on the demographic of the customer, on intersubjective agreement (to the extent that it exists). This renders sociological information about customer tastes relevant to the parameter settings in this case. Such information may be helpful and yet inconclusive, for the customer base may be a diverse population that lacks a relatively uniform conception of spiciness. Nevertheless, once the normative standard gets fixed, its objectivity is thereby fixed. So the point here is that the objectivity of the norm does not necessarily entail the most optimal standard possible, for there may be no such standard. There may be no “final solution” in the sense of a rationally univocal and incontestable standard. Negotiation no more guarantees such a standard than it guarantees a universal, immutable and transhistorical standard of “spiciness.” Their negotiated definition can be objective, even while being socially and (inter)subjectively mediated, contingent, and locally specific. The empirical and sociocultural character of a negotiated standard may give it a kind of openness, yet it may be reasonable for all that. 5.3.3  The Need for a Stipulative Definition of “Racism” If the dispute over defining “racism” is necessarily a matter of negotiation, then it seems that a stipulative definition is necessary to resolve the dispute. To better appreciate this point, it will be helpful to clarify the notion of stipulative definition. In ordinary language, to “lay down a definition” can mean the same as “stipulating a definition.” For instance, “He laid down the rule” might

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mean the same as “He stipulated the rule.” Both expressions are ambiguous. First, they might signify the creation of a new rule; second, they might signify the appeal to (and hence, the endorsement of) an already existing rule.15 I highlight three important aspects of stipulative definition: (a) In stipulating a rule the intentional decision is made by the agent to create or modify a rule. (The agent may be an individual or group.) (b) In stipulating a rule the agent stipulates  the content of the rule (including its grounds of application and technique of employment).16 (c) The stipulation of a rule entails the speaker’s endorsement of the rule. One of the tasks of philosophy is to articulate a stipulative definition where this would be helpful in resolving some conceptual problem or other. When I speak of the need for theory to stipulate a definition of “racism,” I have in mind a stipulative definition that is consistent with some or all of the above three conditions. The definition I shall “stipulate” is one that involves the modification/revision of an existing norm. I do not think it is necessary to construct an entirely new definition, from scratch, in order to resolve the conceptual problems associated with the problem of defining “racism.” (I argue this in the next chapter.) The question I would like to consider is whether and under what conditions it is rational to 15  Rules must be followed intentionally, but intentionally following a rule does not imply a conscious decision to follow a rule; nor does it imply the presence of the rule in one’s mind as one follows it. “Although rule-following presupposes a regularity in behaviour, this does not distinguish it from natural regularities like the movement of the planets or human acts which happen to conform to a rule unintentionally. If an agent follows a rule in Фing, the rule must be part of his reason for Фing, and not just a cause. He must intend to follow the rule. However, this intentionality is only virtual. He does not have to think about or consult the rule formulation while Фing, it is only required that he would adduce it to justify or explain his Фing” (Glock 1996, 324–325). 16  To commit oneself to grammatical rule is simultaneously to commit oneself to a technique of application. This technique determines the range of possible applications. It follows from this that although grammatical rules themselves may be arbitrary, their application is not. (See Lectures 1930–32, p. 58.) The stipulation of a rule always involves, implicitly or explicitly, the positing of an explanation of meaning (e.g., a rule-formulation) that determines the range of possible applications. It further follows from this view that, once a grammatical rule (an explanation of meaning) is established, what counts as the correct application of the rule is no longer a matter of individual or collective decision, for the normative force of the rule is given by the practice and not by the attitudes of individuals as such.

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stipulate a definition of “racism” in an attempt to resolve a conceptual dispute. I suggest that it is sometimes rational to do so if the practice conforms to the structure of problem-­solving, that is, has something like the following structure: one or more individuals have the need for a rule; they deliberate about which convention would best address the need at issue; they make a decision to institute said rule and stipulate it as the rule. Whatever definition we arrive at in the case of racism must be defended by reference to the need for the definition; that is, pragmatic advocacy will prove essential to the theoretical task. The stipulation should be grounded in the critical evaluation of ordinary usage of “racism.” Among other things, this involves consideration of which uses ought to be eliminated, which ought to be preserved, and which ought to have primacy over others. Prescribing the elimination of some uses and adopting others amounts to stipulating a definition (or a set of definitions) of “racism.” This brings me to one of my reasons for adopting Plunkett and Sundell’s model of disagreement-as-­metalinguistic-negotiation. Negotiation is often, though not always, connected with the following: critical back-and-forth dialogue, rational deliberation, giving up and getting some of what one wants from a representational practice, conserving and revising established usage, drawing from shared ideas and values. Among the background of (hopefully) shared ideas are fundamental values guiding the determination of content (such as the norms of antiracism and to define “racism” from the perspective of the victim), as well as conversational values, like mutual trust, mutual respect, the presumption of good-faith criticisms, and empathy. The definition I propose in Part III—that racism is racial oppression— should be understood as a contribution to the conversation about what racism ought to be. It is a contribution to our collective and ongoing negotiations. Yet, it might be objected that the practice of resolving disagreement about racism via a stipulative definition of “racism” is irrational, unreasonable, or confused. Garcia criticizes “purely conceptual” approaches to racism that proceed by stipulative definition. He writes: David Theo Goldberg says that those addressing the nature of racism have proceeded in one of two ways: “There are two basic ways to get at the meanings of socially significant terms: The first is purely conceptual: to stipulate definitions largely a priori on the basis of what the terms ought to signify…” As for the “first way,” stipulative definitions can be useful, but not when the term for which a meaning is stipulated is the one whose meaning one is investigating. It would be silly merely to stipulate a meaning which we

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decide a priori that the term ‘racism’ ought to have. On what could such a normative judgment be based?17

Let us consider the two objections Garcia registers in this quote. His first objection is that stipulative definitions are not useful “when the term for which a meaning is stipulated is the one whose meaning one is investigating.” He seems to assume that “investigating” the meaning of a term necessarily consists in describing its current or ordinary meaning. We have seen that this is not necessarily true. What Garcia overlooks is that many disagreements about racism—for example, Blum and Glasgow’s, which I discuss below—are disputes about what “racism” should mean. It only seems “silly” to stipulate the meaning of a term that one is investigating if the aim of the investigation is to describe (in order to endorse) its prevailing meaning. If, instead, the aim is to critically examine that meaning, then normative analysis may well terminate in a stipulative definition that improves upon the established definition. Garcia is, therefore, wrong to reject Goldberg’s “first way” of approaching socially significant terms. Stipulating a definition can be a reasonable way of resolving some philosophical problems. Indeed, it seems essential to resolving disputes that require a decision. As to the second part of Garcia’s objection, he rhetorically asks: “On what could such a normative judgment be based?” There is a perfectly respectable answer to Garcia’s question. The philosophical judgment to adopt a stipulative definition of “X” could be based on pragmatic considerations that address the practical problems raised by ordinary usage of “X.” Perhaps Garcia overlooks this obvious response because he presumes that all disputes about “what racism is” are factual disagreements. In that case, he is guilty of overlooking philosophical problems that take on the form of substantive prescriptive disagreement (i.e., metalinguistic negotiations). Garcia seems to imagine that a stipulative decision would have to be based on arbitrary fiat, or perhaps on speculation over a matter of fact. That this is wrong, however, is evident from the fact that a definition might be justified or unjustified by virtue of whether it fulfills the need for which the term was coined—what Wittgenstein calls “the deep need for the convention.” In the case of definitions of “racism” it is plausible that the reason for inventing this term is to satisfy one or several moral needs. Therefore, to the extent that any definition of “racism” fails to satisfy an  Garcia (1997, 5). Garcia’s quote is from Goldberg (1992, 544).

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important moral need, it may be wise to abandon, moderately reform, or substantially revise it. Its correctness is to be measured not by means of epistemic justification, but by means of pragmatic justification. I’ve now argued that conceptual disagreement about racism—disagreement about the correct definition of “racism”—can be legitimately conceived as a kind of metalinguistic negotiation. Or, rather, it can be conceived as a kind of metalinguistic negotiation within the context of moral–philosophical analysis, where the aim of analysis is to provide a philosophically defensible definition for moral purposes. When philosophers dispute “what racism is” (within this moral–philosophical context), their proposed definitions do not provide factual information about racism; instead, they give expression to competing representational practices and corresponding needs. If philosophers  are attempting to negotiate what racism ought to be, it is possible to make sense of disagreement about racism’s nature without presupposing a language-­independent entity, racism itself, as Garcia seems to suppose we must.

5.4   Negotiation and Rationality I have argued that it is perfectly respectable to analyze conceptual disagreement as a kind of negotiation. However, to show that metalinguistic negotiation is a respectable enterprise is not to establish, in the particular case of conceptual disagreement about racism, that this particular ­disagreement is best construed as an instance of metalinguistic negotiation. I aim to defend this contention in this section. My chief example is the dispute between Joshua Glasgow and Lawrence Blum. These philosophers disagree about whether it is racist for a high school teacher to call on one of his students, a black Haitian student, to provide “the black perspective” to the class. I contend that their dispute is best construed as prescriptive. I draw from my analysis of metalinguistic negotiation. I then extend this analysis by applying John Kekes’ conception of rational disagreement to their dispute. 5.4.1  Blum and Glasgow’s Disagreement Is it racist for a teacher to call on a black student to provide “the black perspective” to the class? This question might strike us as factual. It either is or is not racist, depending on the correct standard. But this standard is precisely what is in question for Blum and Glasgow. Their disagreement

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about this case is predicated on a conceptual dispute concerning the nature of racism. Glasgow, for instance, argues that because the teacher’s conduct is racially disrespectful it should be considered racist. He starts from the definition,  “Racism is racial disrespect.” He endorses this definition because he thinks it is reflected  in ordinary usage.18 Blum agrees with Glasgow that the teacher’s action is racially disrespectful, but denies that the act is racist, because he thinks that racial disrespect is not a serious enough racial ill to merit an ascription of racism.19 Blum, unlike Glasgow starts from the intuition that racism is seriously morally objectionable.20 He then reasons that since virtually everything that goes wrong in the racial domain is condemnable as racist on ordinary usage, including relatively non-serious racial ills, ordinary usage must fail to convey the proper meaning of “racism.” For Blum, to accept contemporary usage is to accept the conflation of racial ill and racism, and he thinks there is good practical reason for wanting to preserve this distinction; namely, preserving this distinction allows us to preserve the moral opprobrium connoted by the term “racism.” Said differently, condemning the teacher’s act as racist contributes to the inflatedness of the concept and, consequently, diminishes the term’s condemnatory force. For this reason, Blum advocates turning to a more refined definition of “racism,” one that deviates from much contemporary usage. He proposes defining the term disjunctively, “Racism is either racial antipathy or racial inferiorization.”21 Glasgow understands his dispute with Blum to be descriptive. That is, he thinks that he and Blum disagree about how the term “racism” is used, rather than about how it ought to be used. As such, he takes it to be legitimate for him to appeal to ordinary usage (the prevailing definition) to justify his contention that the teacher’s action is r­ acist. However, he is confused on this point. Even if we were to concede to Glasgow that racism, on ordinary usage, is racial disrespect, ordinary usage cannot be invoked  as the standard for resolving his disagreement with Blum. For Blum’s proposed definition (“Racism is racial inferiorization or racial antipathy”) does not aim to capture commonsense thinking about racism. Its aim is not to describe ordinary usage, but to prescribe what it should be. The goal of

 Glasgow (2009, 92).  Blum (2002, 55–57). 20  Blum (2002, 2). 21  Blum (2002, 8). 18 19

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Blum’s definitional project is to resolve the set of practical problems associated with inflated usage of “racism.” And for this he thinks it best that he develop a pragmatic argument in defense of a stipulative definition.22 Stated differently, Blum quite self-consciously is engaged in a revisionist project, for he thinks the prevailing concept of racism is normatively awry. His disagreement with Glasgow is not descriptive, but prescriptive.23 His argument for his proposed definition is that it resolves the inflation problem, the problem of overusage of “racism.” His theory is an attempt to provide a pragmatic justification of the prescriptively correct use of “racism,” independent of prevailing usage. Glasgow, as we have said, takes it that his own conception of racism is superior to Blum’s. This follows from the fact that he lays it down as a standard in resolving his dispute with Blum about the teacher. His argument is that the teacher’s action is racist because it is racially disrespectful. In advancing this argument he tacitly endorses the prevailing norm, so he seems not to be arguing in a purely descriptive mode. If he were making a purely descriptive point, his judgment that Blum’s assessment of the teacher’s action is wrong would not carry normative weight. In that case he would merely be observing that Blum’s judgment “The teacher’s act is not racist” fails to conform to the prevailing definition of “racism.” I take it, however, that his assertion that Blum’s assessment of the situation as “incorrect” is meant to carry normative weight. Evaluative terms like “wrong” and “incorrect” typically entail grounds for intervention. Hence to call something—say, the use of a word—incorrect does not simply mean a use that fails to conform to a standard, but a use that stands in need of correction because it fails to conform to a standard. Glasgow, then, cannot be said to be entering this dispute as a neutral observer. He is tacitly arguing from a substantive prescriptive position, namely, a conservative position. The norm he takes for granted is that prescriptively correct uses of “racism” conform to the rule supplied by ordinary usage. If he were not arguing from a conservative position, he would not be in a position to resolve his dispute with Blum. Consequently, the most plausible reading of their disagreement is that it is not about what the prevailing definition of “racism” is, but about what it ought to be. Blum and Glasgow’s disagreement can therefore be plausibly understood as a metalinguistic nego-

 Blum (2004, 76).  This is a crude summary of my argument in “What Accounts of ‘Racism’ Do” (2018).

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tiation over the best normative definition of “racism.” It is analogous to Oscar and Callie’s dispute about spiciness. Metalinguistic negotiation involves advocacy on behalf of a possible linguistic standard. We have thus far encountered two kinds of advocacy that can be invoked to defend and criticize competing linguistic standards. One approach is to follow Glasgow in appealing to a conservative strategy: one might seek to demonstrate that the content of the actual concept should be preserved as much as possible. The conservative might defend this strategy by appealing to the virtue that the ordinary definition will strike most people as “natural” since it corresponds to commonsense thinking. The upshot of this line of argumentation is that conservative definitions have an upper hand in disputes about what racism is that revisionist definitions must overcome by means of special justification. A different kind of strategy is to follow Blum in appealing to a revisionist strategy: one might seek to demonstrate that the content of the prevailing concept is normatively problematic; that, to invoke Blum’s example, the concept is inflated because the concept-term is overused. Here it is incumbent upon the revisionist to articulate the virtues of modifying much commonsense thinking, as Blum attempts to do. That it is possible to defend and contest ordinary usage in these ways shows that it is possible and potentially fruitful to think about conceptual disagreement about racism as a kind of metalinguistic negotiation. Garcia is thus wrong in claiming that there is something odd or misguided about the idea of pragmatically advocating on behalf of competing stipulative definitions. It might be objected that arguing for and against a definition on pragmatic grounds fails to preserve the integrity of reason in the deliberation process. How can there be rational disagreement about racism when the standard of racism is one that is determined by negotiation? Given any two competing definitions of “racism,” if our only means of deciding between them is to participate in a negotiation process, what aspect of this method justifies the assertion that the selected definition is the normatively correct one? Is the issue a mere matter of persuasion? Is it simply a matter of yelling the loudest or delivering the most persuasive rhetoric? And what assurance do we have that the negotiated definition is not a mere reflection of group interests, circumstances, and power dynamics? How are we to choose among competing norms? For example, by what rational method can we resolve Blum and Glasgow’s definitional disagreement? Each p ­ hilosopher’s attempt to negotiate the meaning of “racism” appeals to a definitional stan-

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dard that the other philosopher rejects. It is unsurprising, therefore, that each normative proposal is met with resistance from the other side. These considerations suggest that a comprehensive discussion of the method of negotiation is in order. What follows is an attempt to touch on some of these questions, while setting others aside for later chapters. Still, others will not be addressed at all, as this is not the proper place to discuss the literature on the nature of reason and rational disagreement. My aim in this section is modest. I aim to motivate the notion that it is prima facie plausible to view metalinguistic negotiation as a type of rational deliberation process. Disagreement is rational if and only if there is a way to establish a correct answer. For if no correct answer is possible, then there can be no incorrect answer, either, and the disagreement proves futile. I argue that this basic condition is satisfiable on the negotiation approach. A salient question that needs to be addressed here is: What is the shared need, the contextually determined purpose, that might be invoked to establish a contextually determined standard of correctness? If we can identify the need for a definition of “racism,” we could then appeal to this standard as a basis of rational resolution. Although I do not attempt to specify the particular standard here (see Chap. 7), I defend the rationality of the logic of negotiation. I do so by appealing to arguments presented in John Kekes’ essay on essentially contested concepts. My proposal is not meant to be an iron-clad, comprehensive theory of rational disagreement. Indeed, it is little more than my crude reflections about such a theory, reflections that obviously require further elaboration and refinement. My hope is that it will generate a critical discussion. My argument’s main upshot is a prima facie plausible way of making sense of rational disagreement without the postulation of ontological entities. Before turning to this discussion, I will simply mention the following point: rational resolution need not be possible in every imaginable situation or context in order for the problem of defining “racism” to be a metalinguistic negotiation. For as I’ve argued, metalinguistic negotiations are invariably contextual, predicated on specific needs and purposes. Hence there may not be a general answer to the question: How should racism be conceived for moral purposes? Though I think a general answer to this question can be given, the question I am interested in is a more general one: What is it about the procedure or practice of metalinguistic negotiation that makes it rational?

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5.4.2  Contested Rationality Kekes provides an account of the logic of normative disputes that I draw on for my argument. In his “Essentially Contested Concepts: A Reconsideration,” Kekes analyzes disputes that have the following features: (a) they are not reducible to “public occasions upon which the participants flaunt their prejudices”24; (b) they are not predicated on conceptual confusion25; (c) they can go on indefinitely; and (d) they are rational (i.e., rationally resolvable).26 Kekes’ term for concepts that satisfy these (among other27) conditions is essentially contested concepts.28 His paper is an attempt to explain how such concepts are possible. Roughly, the logic used in resolving disputes of this kind is that of practical problem-­solving. Kekes offers his problem-solving account of rationality as an alternative to what I call “final solutions” rationality. A common way to think about rationality affirms that rationality is concerned with final solutions. This is certainly the way many philosophers think about rationality in relation to “solving” philosophical problems. A final solution is an all-things-considered solution to a problem that uniquely and definitively ends the problem, once and for all; it is the uniquely correct solution and so reigns supreme over the various candidates. The implication, then, is that every rational person who objectively weighs the evidence will arrive at the same solution. That is, any person who does not arrive at this solution is mistaken and, perhaps, unreasonable. The logic of final solutions rationality does not entail that d ­ isagreement will not continue. It simply entails that beyond the rational limit, to continue objecting and disagreeing with the argument is to engage in irrational behavior, for reason  Kekes (1977, 72).  Kekes (1977, 75–76). 26  Kekes (1977, 84–86). 27  Kekes thinks that there are six necessary and sufficient conditions for essentially contested concepts: “I regard the following six [conditions required for a concept to be essentially contested] as necessary: first, the concept must signify a type of voluntary and goal-directed activity; second, the concept must be used appraisively and the debate stems from conflicting appraisals; third, the participants in the debate must share a need and a goal, and the aim of the debate is to find the best way of satisfying the need and of achieving the goal; hence, both the existence of the debate and its resolution are in the interest of the participants; fourth, the type of activity signified by the concept must be internally complex; fifth, the importance of the elements comprising the internally complex type of activity must be variously assessable; hence the use of the concept is modifiable; sixth, the debate about the correct use of the concept must be capable of rational resolution” (Kekes 1977, 86). 28  The concept and term were originally introduced by Gallie (1956). Kekes presents his analysis as a modification of and improvement on Gallie’s account. 24 25

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has marked the end of the dispute. Metalinguistic negotiation seems to eschew final solutions rationality. For it entails that there is no unique way of ending a problem. A negotiation is by definition open to any of several answers being “correct,” for the correct answer is the one arrived at through a conversational process of garnering consensus, and there is no a priori formula or  predetermined route that such  a conversation must assume. Furthermore, it is always possible that upon negotiating a solution to a problem participants in the dispute might change their minds and overturn the established decision (for circumstances may change, giving them reason to re-negotiate the prevailing standard). Consequently, it is impossible to construe any negotiated solution to a problem as a “final” solution, since there is no guarantee that a solution cannot be revisited, questioned, changed. Metalinguistic negotiations are contingent by virtue of their practical nature; hence, they are subject to change. Kekes offers a conception of rationality that rejects final solutions, for he is concerned with establishing the possibility of rational resolution for essentially contested concepts. These are concepts for which rational resolution can continue indefinitely. The term is somewhat misleading, since it is ambiguous between two positions. If the term “racim” refers to a concept the correctness of which it is always possible to contest on rational grounds, then racism is arguably an essentially contested concept. However, to say that the concept of racism is “essentially contested” in this sense is not to say that it will be or must be contested. Rather, it is to say that it is essentially open to rational contestation. The objector, then, is right that conceptual disagreement may go on indefinitely despite the possibility of arriving at a rational resolution. What I argue is that although rational disagreement is always possible, this fact about many normatively contested concepts does not undermine Kekes’ claim that such disputes—and the negotiations people arrive at through collective deliberation—are nonetheless rational. Kekes’ argument relies on the concept of “internal complexity.”29 The term signifies that a practice comprises several constitutive rules that are variously assessable. He argues that the possibility of assessing these rules in incompatible ways provides the condition for both rational disagreement and rational resolution. Consider the question: What does “winning in basketball” consist in? Winning might be defined differently by different 29  “By this [“internal complexity”] I mean that the activity must comprise many elements, each of which plays a role in the performance. An element contributes to the internal complexity of the activity if without it the activity could not be what it is. So internal complexity is due to necessary, and not merely to accidental, elements involved in normal performance” (Kekes 1977, 79).

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individuals, despite the fact that every participant of the practice agrees about all the rules (save, of course, rules about what counts as winning).30 Contestation of what it  means to “win” at basketball will, of course, be motivated by specific interests or problems. But what makes disagreement possible here? For Kekes, disagreement is made possible by the fact that the practice is “internally complex”—that is, comprising several constitutive rules that are open to various value assessments. For instance, basketball consists of the following elements: rules about how the ball must make its way into the basket; rules governing proper defensive techniques; rules governing proper ball handling and passage; rules governing proper rebounding techniques; and so on. Given this internal complexity, observers of the game can provide alternative rankings and assessments of the various elements.31 For example, one person might rank teamwork, rebounding, and good defense over and above scoring the highest number of points, while another person might rank the latter element over and above every other element. The possibility of alternative rankings is determined by a complex system of rules which give rise to various strategies for meeting the objectives of scoring the highest number of points while preventing the opposing team from doing the same. Notice that although basketball has two main objectives, they do not necessarily determine the meaning of the terms “winner” and “winning.” The multiplicity and significance of the rules of basketball makes the existence of incompatible ranking systems— and hence disagreement about ranking systems—possible.32 Even if the constitutive rules of a practice are fixed/determinate, Kekes maintains that the inflexibility of the rules does not preclude the possibility of prescriptive disagreement. For example, it is easy to imagine how ­disagreement about the nature of basketball may be prescriptive rather than descriptive. It is prescriptive if it is predicated on competing ranking 30  I am not suggesting that the concept winning in basketball is normally contested. It is not. My point is that the concept could be contested due to its internal complexity. Indeed, there are times when the concept is contested: e.g., when a referee makes a bad call which costs the “losing” team the game; or, when children play for fun, without keeping score, and the team with the highest number of points claims victory. 31  A “ranking,” as I use the term, is one of several possible evaluative hierarchies of a concept’s internal elements. Consider Kekes’ fifth necessary condition: “The importance of the elements in an internally complex activity instantiating an ECC [essentially contested concept] must be variously assessible” (Kekes 1977, 80). 32  “Modification is possible,” writes Kekes, “because various elements can be ranked in different hierarchies. Internal complexity and the various assessibility of the elements guarantee the openness of ECCs [Essentially Contested Concepts] and their openness makes the activities modifiable” (1977, 81).

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systems that express or imply a prescriptive judgment of the form: This ranking system is the normatively correct one (as in: this ranking ought to define “winning at basketball”). After all, contestants to this dispute might acknowledge that, according to the official rules of the NBA (or the NCAA, etc.), the formal winner and loser of a game is determined by the final scores of each team, and yet their dispute might persist, for theirs need not be a dispute about what the prevailing standard of winning is, but about what it ought to be. Two or more individuals may disagree about who the “real” winners are if they apply different ranking systems, for these systems function as competing criteria for determining winning and losing (independent of which team is considered the formal winner). What, then, makes rational resolution possible? Kekes argues that it is the shared set of values—namely, the constitutive rules of the game—that make resolution possible. For everyone agrees that such-and-such rules are to be followed; hence, every participant can see the value in each ranking system. But there is a further component: the practice as a whole has a point or purpose, which every participant also values. Here I am not referring to the internal objectives of a practice (e.g., scoring the highest number of points), but to the point of the practice as a whole; that is to say, to its role within a broader social context or form of life. Is the goal of playing basketball, for instance, for participants to pass the time doing something fun? Is it to entertain a crowd? Is it to test the athleticism and skill set of each team? Is it to participate in a fun form of exercise? And so on. The overall point of the practice may vary from one situation to the next, and this point may make a substantial contribution to the pragmatic parameter ­settings within which disagreement about “winning” and “losing” takes place. Consequently, to the extent that participants agree on these parameter settings, they share an interest in resolving the dispute. This interest in conjunction with a high degree of agreement in practice is the condition for rational resolution, on Kekes’ account. Kekes’ analysis shows how the conjunction of common interest and agreement in definition makes rational resolution possible, despite the fact that disagreement can go on indefinitely and that there is no practice-­ independent standard of correctness. We can illustrate the model by applying it to Blum and Glasgow’s dispute. Both philosophers see the value in the practice of classifying individual conduct as racist, because they agree about the objective of this representational practice. The point of classifying behavior as racist is to satisfy a moral need. There is a moral need to condemn objectionable racial behavior and to hold individuals that exhibit such behavior morally accountable for it. What gives rise to this need is the

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fact that objectionable forms of racial behavior produce undesirable results: harm, suffering, offense, inequality, and death, to name just a few. Antecedent agreement regarding the undesirable nature of these results establishes a shared need in condemning forms of racial conduct that produce these results  as “morally wrong.” The moral concept of racism is predicated on this moral need, which confers upon contestants a common interest in resolving their disagreement. Moreover, the fact that they agree about the point of calling something racist makes it possible for them to appreciate the argument of the opposing side. Blum appreciates that the high school teacher’s action is a kind of racial wrong by virtue of being racially disrespectful. Glasgow likewise recognizes that not all instances of racial disrespect share the same moral valence, for some are more morally problematic than others. In recognizing these facts, these philosophers reveal their agreement on several points, including the following: (i) racism is a racial phenomenon and (ii) racism is wrong and should be condemned. This agreement determines a trivial definition of the general practice in question: Racism is (a kind of)  racial wrongdoing. Kekes argues that normative disputes about the correct meaning of a term are rational inasmuch as they conform to a common, albeit trivial, general definition such as this. The idea is that conceptual disagreement about the nature of racism is predicated on agreement about the domain that limits the number of candidates over which contestants can disagree.  Although contestants agree about the domain, they disagree about how to rank its constitutive elements; but it does not follow that the ranking possibilities available to contestants are endless. Thus any of several ranking systems might be used to characterize the domain, while many other ranking systems will be excluded  by it. The shared domain determines which ranking systems are potential contenders that can be adopted, as each system conforms to the same generic definition. This is a substantial contribution to the possibility of rational agreement and disagreement. In the case of Glasgow and Blum’s dispute, a more refined definitional standard might be presupposed as a condition of their disagreement. For Blum and Glasgow agree that the high school teacher’s action is racially disrespectful and that racial disrespect is a form of racism. For Glasgow, racial disrespect is always racist; for Blum, it is only sometimes racist. What Blum would add is that racial disrespect must be seriously objectionable in order to be racist. We thus have two competing definitions: Racism is racial disrespect (Glasgow) and Racism is serious racial disrespect (Blum). Glasgow calls the former Disrespect Analysis (DA), so we might term Blum’s analysis Serious Disrespect Analysis (SDA).

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Arguably, then, Blum and Glasgow’s disagreement is predicated on the shared definition, DA.  DA, in other words, can be understood as the domain of racist phenomena over which Blum and Glasgow agree, the condition that makes their disagreement about what precisely racism is possible. Their disagreement thus turns on a qualification of this definition. Glasgow holds that racial disrespect is necessary and sufficient for racism, whereas Blum holds that is necessary but not sufficient for racism. What is taken for granted in this dispute is the shared presupposition, which constrains their dispute: the possibility of defining “racism” in this general way shows that Blum and Glasgow, by and large, agree about the domain of racism.33 Because Blum and Glasgow’s acceptance of something like this definition expresses a common value that reveals a common interest in resolving their dispute, it provides a necessary condition for rational resolution. For a common interest in resolving their disagreement gives these contestants an interest in negotiating, a reason to seek consensus. One of the virtues of Kekes’ account of rational normative disagreement is that it draws attention to the conceptual domain that is shared and presupposed by opposing parties to that dispute. What the analysis underlines is Wittgenstein’s insight that legitimate disagreement always rests on shared agreement. Although scholars vehemently disagree about which end ought to be prioritized, shared agreement consists in the fact that scholars on all sides can see the normative importance and significance of the opposing views. What we have, in other words, is a set of constitutive rules that are variously assessable and, hence, can be variously ranked. All scholars agree that “racism” signifies a racial phenomenon, that it is a term of moral reproach, and that racism is a morally objectionable phenomenon, objections to moralized approaches to racism, notwithstanding. Rational resolution does not preclude competition among different ranking systems. To develop an adequate prescriptive definition of “racism” it is necessary that we argue our way toward a ranking system.

33  For as Kekes observes: “Of course, such generalities irresistibly call forth the Socratic questioner hiding in each philosopher. However, my point is not that these generalities should be left unquestioned, but that they define a domain upon which the questioning must be concentrated. The disputes and controversies have a common subject and it is that subject that ECCs signify” (Kekes 1977, 76).

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5.4.3  No Final Solutions: On Problems-to-Cope-With Conventionalism opens the door to the possibility of pessimism concerning the problem of definition—of deciding how best to represent things as racist. If definitions are expressions of normative standards, then they are by their very nature action-guiding, and to adopt or recommend a definition is to endorse or recommend living one way rather than another. The recommendation to live one way rather than another—to follow this rule rather than that one—is teleological/purposive. The aim is to resolve, avoid, or mitigate a certain practical problem. If, however, the practical problem is life-encompassing, complex, and essentially unavoidable, it may be that no representational norm will be capable of addressing every relevant aspect of the problem. In that case, choosing one form of representation over another may entail that some aspects are represented while others go unrepresented. For instance, if we choose to represent racism as serious racial disrespect (as Blum might suggest), this may mean that relatively “non-serious” forms of racial disrespect must go unrepresented as racist. Another possibility is that some of what is called institutional racism will be deemed non-racist, since not all instances of institutional racism involve racial disrespect. Adopting one definition of “racism” over another for moral purposes might be necessary even in the face of these limitations. Hence a rational community may be forced to make decisions about the best way to live and it may be that whatever decision it ultimately makes will determine a normatively imperfect or less than ideal form of representation. This seemingly pessimistic way of construing the problem of racist representation resonates with Kekes’ analysis of rational resolution: A feature of these [practical] problems is that solving them does not remove the problems. Solution, in this case, consists in finding a way to cope with the situation, to develop a workable, consistent attitude; the solution is always a modus vivendi. Most problems are not like these: normally, finding a solution leads to the disappearance of the problem. Proving a theorem, scaling a mountain, making one’s way in a literal or metaphorical maze, understanding an argument, a person, a joke, are problems only until a solution is found. But having decided, say, that nature is neither good nor bad, but neutral, or that a certain amount of solitude is necessary for one’s well-­being, or that respecting other people’s dignity is often more important than helping them, does not remove the problems that

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these decisions solve. The solution consists in adopting a way of coping with them. I shall call these two kinds of problems “problems-to-copewith” and “problems-to-remove.”34

The problem of defining “racism” is a problem-to-cope-with rather than a problem-to-remove, though the Kekesian language here is somewhat misleading. It might be objected that racism is a problem to remove rather than a problem to cope with. Calling racism a problem to remove signals the hope that racism might one day come to an end, for if racism is not inevitable there is hope that a final solution might eradicate racism. Others, such as self-described “racial realists,”35 may be inclined to describe racism as a problem to cope with. For these scholars believe that the prospect of ending racism is not a real possibility but mere wishful thinking. So one might wish to reserve the terminology of “problem to cope with” and “problem to remove” for competing views about whether ending racism is possible. The debate over whether racism is a permanent feature of society is not the proper place to locate Kekes’ terminology. To apply the Kekesian phrase “problem to cope with” to racism is not to assert that it is impossible to remove racism. A problem to cope with, for Kekes, is an existential condition—a problem of living predicated on a set of social conditions. These conditions will typically be ongoing and likely to persist in the near future, but the Kekesian isn’t committed to their permanence or inevitability. Problems to cope with are conditions people are “thrown into” and so are unavoidable, insofar as the condition persists. While such problematic conditions persist, they are problems that can only be addressed by cultivating a consistent attitude and practice of coping. Of course, such problems might one day go away and might one day be removed, just as an oppressive regime might someday meet its end. But the point is that so long as the problem endures, one is forced to address it, and this can be done only by choosing to live a certain way. Racism, at least for its victims, is clearly a problem to cope with in this sense. And  as long as the problems of racial wrongdoing, injustice, and so forth, endure, so too will the problem of racist representation endure.  Kekes 1977, 87–88.  I use the term “racial realist” here in connection with a particular school of critical race theory associated with the work of Derrick Bell (1992a; 1992b). According to Bell, racial realism is, among other things, the position that racism is a permanent feature of society. For discussion and defense of this thesis, see Tommy Curry (2009). 34 35

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As Leonard Harris reminds us: “We can, and must, decide how to treat social wholes enduring long enough to suffer across generations. Ethnic groups, classes, and categories such as woman, homosexual, or aboriginal people, for example, have histories and forms of immiseration associated with their existence.”36

5.5   Conclusion The preceding has been an exercise in what Alexis Burgess and Plunkett call “conceptual ethics.”37 In light of contemporary philosophy’s “heavy workload,” which is to say its heavy focus on descriptive projects, they write, it may come as no surprise that comparatively little has been written on the nature or methodology of semantic and conceptual prescriptions. As we underscore in the present paper, however, claims about how one ought (or would do well) to think and talk are nearly as ubiquitous in philosophy as their descriptive counterparts, not to mention their prevalence in ordinary discourse. For reasons to be elaborated shortly, we might call such normative and evaluative issues about representation “conceptual ethics.”38

Conceptual ethics is the field of philosophy that concerns itself with the range of normative and evaluative issues about representational choices and changes, such as those discussed in relation to racism. For example, conceptual ethics concerns itself with the internalist–externalist debate over semantic content. “The textbook externalist thinks that our social and natural environments serve as heavy anchors, so to speak, for the interpretation of our individual thought and talk. The internalist, by contrast, grants us a greater degree of conceptual autonomy.”39 What makes this a debate within conceptual ethics is that internalism and externalism offer competing answers to the following question: How should we think about conceptual choice and conceptual engineering? The issue of properly characterizing the nature of definitional disagreement about racism is a problem for conceptual ethics. Analyzing definitional disagreement as a kind of negotiation is one position in this field:

 Harris (1998, 228).  Burgess and Plunkett (2013a, b). 38  Burgess and Plunkett (2013a, 1091). 39  Burgess and Plunkett (2013a, 1096). 36 37

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David Plunkett and Tim Sundell have argued that many normative disputes about ostensibly first-order, object-level questions  – e.g., Is this painting beautiful? – are in fact more plausibly understood as disagreements about how to use language in the context at hand; negotiations about which concept a word like “beautiful” will express.40 Indeed, Peter Ludlow has recently suggested that almost all linguistic communication involves this kind of negotiation.41 Both views hold that many such disputes are mediated pragmatically, without ever rising to the level of overt assertion and argument, and thus that speakers are often unaware they are effectively engaging in conceptual ethics. If something like this story were right, then presumably we would do better to make these disagreements explicit, address them wittingly, and adjudicate them with greater care (at least when the disagreements arise in the course of philosophical inquiry).

If disagreement about the meaning of “racism” is prescriptive rather than descriptive, then the task before theory is this: What features of the concept of racism and of the parameter settings within which conceptual disagreement occurs are relevant for resolving the dispute? In the chapters that follow, I take Burgess and Plunkett’s advice seriously, offering an explicit articulation of the parameter settings that “pragmatically mediate” the problem of definition, for moral-philosophical purposes.

References Balibar, Etienne. 2008. Racism Revisited: Sources, Relevance, and Aporias of a Modern Concept. PMLA 123 (5), Special Topic: Comparative Racialization (October), 1630–1639. https://www.jstor.org/stable/25501966 Barker, Chris. 2002. The Dynamics of Vagueness. Linguistics and Philosophy 25: 1–36. Baker, Gordon P., and Peter M. S. Hacker. 2009. Wittgenstein: Rules, Grammar and Necessity, Volumes 1 and 2 of An Analytical Commentary on the Philosophical Investigations. 2nd ed. (Extensively revised). Oxford: Blackwell Publishing. Bell, Derrick. 1992a. Racial Realism. Connecticut Law Review 24 (2): 363–379. ———. 1992b. Faces at the Bottom of the Well: The Permanence of Racism. New York: Basic Books. Blum, Lawrence. 2002. “I’m Not a Racist, But…”: The Moral Quandary of Race. Ithaca/London: Cornell University Press.

 Plunkett and Sundell (2011).  The authors cite Peter Ludlow’s “The Dynamic Lexicon” (unpublished manuscript).

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———. 2004. What Do Accounts of ‘Racism’ Do? In Racism in Mind, ed. Michael P. Levine and Tamas Pataki, 56–77. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Burgess, Alexis, and David Plunkett. 2013a. Conceptual Ethics I. Philosophy Compass 8 (12): 1091–1101. ———. 2013b. Conceptual Ethics II. Philosophy Compass 8 (12): 1102–1110. Curry, Tommy J. 2009. Will the Real CRT Please Stand Up? The Dangers of Philosophical Contributions to CRT. The Cut (Winter): 1–47. Gallie, Walter B. 1956. Essentially Contested Concepts. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 56: 167–198. Garcia, Jorge L.A. 1997. Current Conceptions of Racism: A Critical Examination of Some Recent Social Philosophy. Journal of Social Philosophy 28 (2): 5–42. ———. 1999. Philosophical Analysis and the Moral Concept of Racism. Philosophy and Social Criticism 25 (5): 1–32. Glasgow, Joshua. 2009. Racism as Disrespect. Ethics 120: 64–93. https://doi. org/10.1086/648588. Goldberg, David T. 1992. The Semantics of Race. Ethnic and Racial Studies 15: 543–569. Glock, Hans-Johann. 1996. A Wittgenstein Dictionary. The Blackwell Philosopher Dictionaries. Malden: Blackwell Publishing. Harris, Leonard. 1998. The Concept of Racism: An Essentially Contested Concept? The Centennial Review XLII (2): 217–232. Kekes, John. 1977. Essentially contested concepts: A reconsideration. Philosophy & Rhetoric 10 (2, Spring): 71–89. Kripke, Saul A. 1972. Naming and Necessity. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Ludlow, Peter. The Dynamic Lexicon. unpublished manuscript. Mitchell-Yellin, Benjamin. 2018. A View of Racism: 2016 and America’s Original Sin. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 13 (1). https://doi.org/10.26556/ jesp.v13i1.253. Plunkett, David, and Tim Sundell. 2013. Disagreement and the Semantics of Normative and Evaluative Terms. Philosopher’s Imprint 13 (23): 1–37. Sundell, Tim. 2011. Disagreements about taste. Philosophical Studies 155 (2): 267–288. Urquidez, Alberto G. 2018. What Accounts of ‘Racism’ Do. Journal of Value Inquiry 52: 437. ———. Racism as an Essentially Contested Concept. unpublished manuscript. von Wright, Georg Henrik. 1967. The Varieties of Goodness. The Gifford Lectures Series. Routledge and Kegan Paul. Retrieved online: https://www.giffordlectures.org/books/varieties-goodness Wittgenstein, Ludwig. 1969. On Certainty, ed. Gertrude E.M.  Anscombe and Georg H. von Wright and trans. Gertrude E.M.  Anscombe and Denis Paul. Oxford: Blackwell.

CHAPTER 6

Re-defining “Philosophical Analysis”: Not Descriptive Analysis, or Conservatism, but Pragmatic Revisionism

6.1   Introduction The question “What is racism?” is a request for a definition of “racism.” In the previous four chapters, I defended conventionalism, the view that definitions of “racism” are mere expressions of linguistic norms. Conventionalism implies that competing answers to the question “What is racism?”—that is, competing definitions—are normative disputes about linguistic representation. Language is a practice, and disputes about the proper use of “racism” are interwoven with moral practices. Such disputes are not factual. Definitions of “racism” are not true or false descriptions of racism, for they are not descriptions at all. Just as the definition “Bachelors are unmarried” is not a true or false description of bachelors but a rule of representation, so too “Racism is racial oppression” is not a true or false description of racism, but a rule of representation. The normative nature of definitions of “racism” makes disagreement about the concept difficult to resolve. For the upshot of conventionalism is that we cannot straightforwardly turn to the social sciences to settle our dispute. If disagreement about “what racism is” is disagreement about which convention ought to be deployed, the proper grounds for definitional justification cannot be a straightforward appeal to “the facts.” This does not mean, of course, that empirical facts are useless. Rather, this means that they are not the final court of appeal. Definitional justification

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must be grounded in a representational need; the facts will then be appealed to vis-à-vis this need. Empirical considerations are significant to the degree that they are conducive to “racism’s” moral-critical function. That being said, identifying the moral-representational need for the term “racism” would likely be contested. How, then, do we resolve substantive normative contestation about what our linguistic representational need is? If we cannot appeal to “the facts,” what standard ought we appeal to? The previous chapter showed that, as a general matter, rational resolution of definitional disputes is possible via a process of negotiation. Practically speaking, however, how do we resolve representational disputes when contestation is largely about which representational needs matter or which are most important? In this chapter, I bring some preliminary reflections to bear on these questions. The first thing to say in this regard is that we cannot hope to resolve representational disagreement apart from affirming a substantive value—whether  it be a moral or political stance about what we want racism to be. This is necessary because proper usage of “racism” is hotly contested—not just among scholars of racism, but among everyday folk. The need to resolve such disagreement makes it necessary to assume a value-­laden picture of racism. To propose a definition of “racism” is tacitly, if not explicitly, to commit to a value—or so I have argued in the previous chapter and continue to do so here. Even if the goal of defining “racism” is not to resolve substantive disagreement within the public domain, but within the confines of one’s own private thinking, it is necessary to take up a normative stance. For there are many pictures of racism on offer, and they often serve different interests. Selecting a picture from the many currently on offer may be done more or less reflectively or unreflectively. Philosophy is in the business of making these normative reflections explicit. My aim in this chapter is to argue against a common assumption among analytic philosophers. This is the assumption that, in the debate over how best to think about racism, ordinary usage should be privileged in some way or other. I call this view conservatism, though it is important to recognize important qualifications and subtleties, which I discuss below. The presumption of conservatism, as I will call it, seems to be the default position in theorizing racism. This principle holds that conservative theories are, other things equal, superior or preferable to revisionist theories. This presumption is by no means trivial, as it crucially frames one’s approach to the theory of racism.

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The presumption of conservatism is a procedural norm, one that does not provide specific content to the term “racism.” Indeed, it does not lay down a specific moral-representational need. Instead, it lays down a procedure that sets a limit on how theorists arrive at a legitimate definition. Nevertheless,  conservatism entails a value judgment which supports the status quo (whatever it happens to be) and thus stands opposed to the revisionist’s values, whatever those happen to be. Whereas conservatives start from the value that ordinary usage is in good normative standing, revisionists start from the value that ordinary usage is not in good normative standing. A preliminary to adopting a substantive representational value is to assess the orientations of conservatism and revisionism. In this chapter, I ask: Which of these positions, if any, should be adopted as the default position? The normative framework I develop here supports an agnostic starting point that will lay the groundwork for a prima facie defense of a revisionist theory of racism. My agnostic contention simply states that both conservatives and revisionists share equal burdens of proof. They are two poles on the same normative continuum, offering opposing answers to a common normative question (Is current usage of “racism” normatively correct or normatively awry?). Consequently, both approaches require positive argumentation. I call this position the presumption of agnosticism and argue that it is the appropriate default position. I then provide arguments against the normative status of ordinary usage. My arguments proceed from the value that theories of racism can be assessed by reference to whether they promote white or nonwhite interests. White-interest serving usage of the term “racism” in philosophical inquiries into racism undercuts that point of a theory of racism. I begin, in Sect. 6.2, by clarifying our two competing approaches. I then move on, in Sect. 6.3, to provide a general argument for the presumption of agnosticism and against the presumption of conservatism. In Sect. 6.4, I explain how my framework might be invoked to defend the revisionist approach. Here I focus on Lawrence Blum’s so-called inflation or “overusage” argument; I also outline a family of political arguments against ordinary usage. My basic argument is that ordinary usage reflects an individualistic conception of racism, which serves white interests. However, a political conception of racism would be more useful for those who are called “racism’s historical victims.” Therefore, ordinary usage should be revised to reflect a political conception of racism.

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6.2   Framing the Prescriptive Question 6.2.1  Descriptive and Normative Analysis As discussed in previous chapters, following Manuel Vargas1 and Sally Haslanger,2 I distinguish three different approaches to philosophical analysis. The primary aim of the preceding chapters has been to show that the first of these approaches, metaphysical analysis, is misguided in the case of racism, for the term “racism” in a philosophical definition is not the name of an ontological entity, racism itself, as there simply is no such entity. This leaves us with the remaining two approaches—descriptive and normative analysis. In the previous chapter, I suggested that descriptive analysis is incapable of resolving interesting cases of disagreement, because interesting cases of disagreement are predicated on objections to ordinary usage. I elaborate this point in what follows. In his “Racism as Disrespect,” Joshua Glasgow develops a theory of racism that he characterizes as “descriptive.” He explains the difference between descriptive and normative analysis in three passages, two of which are: I don’t mean to deny that we also might want to use and unpack the term ‘racism’ in a way that deviates from ordinary usage but that serves various pragmatic or liberating ends. But investigating what our terms refer to and exploring what they could and should refer to are attempts to paint two different pictures. DA [his “Disrespect Analysis”] is an analysis of the former variety.3 Perhaps we’d be better off if we reserved the term ‘racism’ for a different set of social ills than what it currently covers; perhaps not. In either case, though, a focus on what it currently covers is the constraint by which any descriptive analysis must abide.4 1  As discussed in Chap. 2, Vargas identifies different approaches to conceptual analysis: metaphysical, diagnostic, and prescriptive: “One question is what we might call metaphysical in the broad sense: ‘What is the nature of responsibility?’ Other questions include [the diagnostic question]: ‘What do we think about responsibility?’ and [the prescriptive question:] ‘What should we think about responsibility?’ In principle, we might offer different answers to each of these questions, although they will presumably overlap in various ways” (2005, 402). 2  Haslanger writes: “There are at least three common ways to answer ‘What is W?’ questions: descriptive, conceptual and ameliorative” (2012, 367). Her approaches roughly map on to Vargas’ approaches. See Chap. 2 (Sect. 2.1) for further discussion. 3  Glasgow (2009, 93). 4  Ibid.

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Note Glasgow’s sharp distinction between descriptive and normative projects. The former, he says, aims at “investigating what our terms refer to,” “what a term currently covers.” What it does not do is enter the unique terrain of normative analysis, which explores “what [our terms] could and should refer to.” Normative analysis, unlike descriptive analysis, is in the recommendation business, for example, the recommendation of revisions to ordinary usage to serve “various pragmatic or liberating ends.” Given Glasgow’s sharp distinction, the descriptive analyst must not recommend revisions to ordinary usage, for doing so automatically places her in the normative camp. This is most evident in the second passage, where Glasgow posits a “constraint” on descriptive analysis the violation of which defeats the theorist’s pretension to be merely describing. Violation of this constraint entails a slide into normative analysis. We can therefore call it the normative neutrality constraint: “[T]he constraint by which any descriptive analysis [of ‘racism’] must abide,” says Glasgow, is “a focus on what it [the term ‘racism’] currently covers.” This constraint ostensibly renders Glasgow’s account of “racism” purely descriptive.5 For the descriptive analyst is precluded from endorsing any standard of correct usage, including the following normative judgments: (i) the term “racism” should refer to what it currently refers to (conservatism); (ii) the term “racism” should not refer to what it currently refers to (for the term should be revised or eliminated) (revisionism); (iii) radical or novel uses of the term “racism” should be introduced into linguistic practice (revisionism). Pure description cannot address the question “How should the term ‘racism’ be used?” for it restricts itself to the question “How is the term ‘racism’ used?” As will be shown below, descriptive theories of racism fail to address the normative concerns that prompt the philosophical question “What is racism?” For given that they are limited to what is currently said about racism, they are normatively ill equipped to grapple with normative problems. To better see this, we need only remind ourselves that the term “racism” is hotly contested. There is disagreement about what is and what is not racist, as well as conceptual disagreement about what racism itself is. In addition, there is methodological disagreement about whether, for example, the presumption of conservatism is justified. Most theories of racism seek to resolve disagreement at some or all of these levels. Purely d ­ escriptive 5   Wittgenstein’s philosophy is also purely descriptive  (Philosophical Investigations, 2009, §109, §124). Hence it too is governed by the normative neutrality constraint. I discuss Wittgenstein’s conception of philosophy in Chap. 3.

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theories, however, cannot engage this broader debate. They can be indirectly normatively useful—for example, in dissolving conceptual confusion or diagnosing substantive problems with ordinary usage (say, by uncovering internal inconsistencies). However, once the current concept is clarified and our understanding is freed from confusion, our conceptual disagreements remain where they are. What is more, the question of whether theorists should start from a presumption of conserving ordinary usage or from some other presumption remains unsettled. The only way to resolve our conceptual and methodological disputes is to abandon pure description. Hence, the need for prescriptive analysis. 6.2.2  Unpacking Conservatism/Revisionism Conservatism posits a definition that purports to accommodate ordinary usage and endorses said definition as prescriptively correct. I take the theories of Anthony Appiah, Jorge Garcia, Michael Dummett, Thomas Schmid, Paul Taylor, and, arguably, Joshua Glasgow, to be conservative in this sense.6 Conservatives hold that a theory of racism should seek to conserve ordinary usage of “racism” and its cognates. Garcia gives expression to this adequacy condition: “Among other things it should count in favor of an understanding of racism if it does, and count against it if it does not…conform to our everyday discourse about racism, insofar as this is free from confusion.”7 I call this desideratum, or any modified version of it, Ordinary Usage Condition (OUC). Formulations of OUC typically specify two things: first, that ordinary usage ought to be conserved (the preservationist aim); second, whether and to what extent refinements to ordinary usage are permissible and at what cost, if any (the reformist aim). For example, Garcia qualifies OUC by permitting modest refinements when such changes “stand continuous with past uses of the term ‘racism’, or involve a change of the term’s meaning that represents a plausible transformation along reasonable lines 6  K. Anthony Appiah, “Racisms” (1990); Jorge L.  A. Garcia, “The Heart of Racism” (1996); Michael Dummett, “The Nature of Racism” (2004); Thomas Schmid, “The Definition of Racism” (1996); Paul Taylor, Race: A Philosophical Introduction (2004); and Joshua Glasgow, “Racism as Disrespect” (2009). Appiah’s case is an interesting one, because he draws from ordinary usage but does so to develop the most rational reconstruction of racism. His approach still qualifies as conservative, because ordinary use is a constraint or limit of his so-called rational reconstruction. 7  Garcia (1997, 6).

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of development.”8 For most philosophers of racism, the preservationist aim is only one among several desiderata for a theory of “racism,” so it is to be expected that competing conservative theories might prioritize OUC differently relative to other desiderata. Consider, for example, Glasgow’s formulation: “other things equal, the more that an analysis can accommodate ordinary usage, the better.”9 His formulation differs from Garcia’s in that it treats all revisions of ordinary usage as costly: “Some defenders of rival views will perhaps see revising ordinary usage as an acceptable by-­product of other concerns or commitments. Such moves are understandable, but I maintain that those revisions nonetheless count as a cost of those views.”10 In my view, it is the preservationist aim that is the heart of conservatism. For suppose we include the reformist aim as essential to conservatism. Then any theory that endorses a definition which purports to capture the whole of ordinary usage, without introducing any reforms, cannot be conservative precisely because it fails to recommend reforms. This result is counterintuitive. The opposing view to conservatism is revisionism. Revisionism is the desideratum that a theory of racism should revise ordinary usage of “racism” and its cognates in order to achieve some important end. Whether that end be practical (e.g., to rehabilitate racial discourse) or ontological (e.g., to get at the real nature of racism), the revisionist purports to have good reasons for wanting to revise ordinary usage; which is to say, for taking ordinary usage to be problematic. Revisionists are committed to rejecting OUC as desideratum. But this negative thesis has a positive upshot. Revisionists prescribe that normative analysis be governed by some standard other than the prevailing one. That is, they are committed to three methodological claims: (i) OUC should not govern normative analysis; (ii) a methodological standard other than OUC—call it N— ought to govern, instead; and (iii) a definition that conforms to N entails revisions to ordinary usage. Charles Mills explains revisionism as the claim “that because of some scientific discovery, or conceptual insight, or other comparable innovation  Ibid.  Glasgow (2009, 65). Earlier I characterized Glasgow as committed to descriptive analysis (i.e., pure description), so it might be argued that this desideratum is not an adequacy condition for normative analysis. I argue against this contention in “What Accounts of ‘Racism’ Do” (2018). 10  Glasgow (2009, 65; see also 80). 8 9

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it needs to be realized that everyday usage is misleading.”11 Revisionist theories satisfy Manuel Vargas’ criterion of “paradigmatic revisionism”: “A theory is for our purposes paradigmatically revisionist if it prescribes something other than what it diagnoses. [A ‘diagnosis’ is, roughly, a descriptive theory.] …[T]o determine whether a theory is revisionist or not in the paradigmatic sense, we need only determine whether its diagnosis and prescription are the same or different.”12 One implication of Vargas’ analysis is that a theory that prescribes any changes to ordinary usage is revisionist, independent of whether those changes constitute radical revisions or modest reforms. I take Lawrence Blum and Tommie Shelby to be proponents of paradigmatic revisionism.13 I can now frame the central question of this chapter. Drawing on pragmatic considerations of types (i) and (ii), my chapter works its way toward an answer to the following: Is the prevailing conservative default assumption—that existing usage of “racism” and “racist” should be preferred—­ justifiable or not?14 I juxtapose the conservative view that existing usage is the appropriate starting point for a theory of “racism” with the agnostic view that the proper starting point is to assess the normative status of existing usage in light of all relevant considerations. On agnosticism, the view I defend, all substantive theories of racism posit a norm that stands in need of justification. The normative considerations adduced in this chapter are rooted in the need to resolve practical difficulties prompted by ordinary usage. My argument is as follows: (a) The default assumption that conserving existing usage should be preferred is unjustified, because (b) there is reason to doubt whether existing usage is in good normative standing, and, indeed, there is prima facie good reason to revise existing usage. My case against conservatism is not definitive by any means. Rather, the definitive case is against the presumption of conservatism—the position that the philosophical analysis of racism should start from the presumption  Charles Mills (2003, 32).  Manuel R. Vargas (2005, 403). 13  Lawrence Blum, “Racism: Its Core Meaning” (2002); Tommie Shelby, “Racism, Moralism, and Social Criticism” (2014). I take Charles Mills (2003) and Andrew Pierce (2014) to be revisionist sympathizers. 14  I am indebted to an anonymous reviewer for stating the question this way. 11 12

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that ordinary usage is to be conserved. Whether the philosopher ought to adopt this (or any other) desideratum about ordinary usage depends on the normative status of ordinary usage. The problem of defining “racism” is inextricably linked to a normative question. That is, “What is racism?” invariably brings us into contact with “How should the word ‘racism’ be used?” Among other values,  we must consider whether ordinary usage should be conserved or revised, if only because conservatism is still a dominant position in the literature. The idea, then, is to open the door to revisionist theories, to establish a neutral playing field that invites revisionists to defend non-conservative definitions by providing a more comprehensive analysis of the normative status of ordinary usage. 6.2.3  Metaphysical and Pragmatic Considerations Because conservatism and revisionism are prescriptive theories, they share in common their rejection of the normative neutrality constraint. Moreover, we have noted that conservatism is typically presumed the proper default position. This might lead one to think that conservatism has strong credentials. We should thus query: On the strength of what argument do philosophers presume that conservatism is the correct default position? What, in short, makes a theory that preserves ordinary usage preferable to one that revises it? One possible answer, subscribed to by some conservatives, is that ordinary usage tracks racism itself. This position presupposes a distinction between metaphysical and pragmatic considerations. Metaphysical ­considerations bear on racism’s real nature, either because they provide a reason for believing that a certain entity exists, or because they specify the referent of the term “racism.” Pragmatic considerations bear either (i) on the pragmatics and communicative success of everyday usage or (ii) on the moral and sociopolitical status of racial discourse, more generally. Following Garcia,15 one might think that our best bet at specifying the nature of racism is to turn to our linguistic intuitions about what we mean 15  In “The Heart of Racism” Garcia (1996) defends a theory of racism on the grounds that it better accommodates ordinary use than rival accounts. He has since clarified that his theory of racism is not a purely descriptive one, but a metaphysical theory. “What we seek to discover is what, in applying the term [“racism”], we are saying about the things to which we apply it. To find this out in light of the origins of the term ‘racism,’ and to sort out various inconsistencies and misunderstandings in the ways people use it, is the most promising path to discovering what racism is” (1997, 6). See also the passage quoted in the next paragraph.

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by the word “racism.” This is a kind of metaphysical defense of conservatism over revisionism, because the premise is that our intuitions are suitable for extrapolating information about racism’s nature. Benjamin Mitchell-Yellin has recently argued that a theory of racism ought to adopt the “pragmatic aim,” which posits that theories of racism should be assessed according to whether they contribute to the project of ending or mitigating racism.16 Mitchell-Yellin thus lays down a pragmatic type (ii) consideration. His paper does not completely eschew metaphysical considerations, but is exceptional in arguing that metaphysical analysis ought to be curbed by pragmatic constraints. Other metaphysicians may downplay the significance of pragmatic considerations on grounds of irrelevance, and some argue that pragmatic considerations are potentially distortive of philosophy’s proper task. Consider, for instance, Garcia’s objection to Glasgow’s claim that the normative approach to the definition of “racism” is a legitimate philosophical project: [T]he [philosophical] issue is whether, given what we find racism to be, it can sometimes be other than immoral. Such an account must answer to common sense but also, contrary to what Glasgow suggests, can and should be used to correct (“revis[e]”) minor inconsistencies in usage and clarify cases where we are unsure what to say. It is “useful” chiefly in illuminating reality and extending our understanding. Its chief goal is not to advance a political agenda (as in Haslanger), nor to guide social change (as in Blum), nor to help craft public policy (as in Corlett). Nor, contrary to Glasgow’s insouciance, is it legitimate for people deliberately to extend words beyond their proper and recognized application simply to advance. (My italics)17

This passage expresses Garcia’s opposition to normative analysis. So it is likely that he would reject Mitchell-Yellin’s claim that the pragmatic aim is essential to the project of defining “racism.” He would argue, instead, that philosophical analysis has a metaphysical but not a pragmatic aim.18 16  Benjamin Mitchell-Yellin, “A View of Racism: 2016 and America’s Original Sin” (2018, see 57–60). Sally Haslanger has also endorsed this position. See her “Racism, Ideology, and Social Movements” (2017, 4). 17  Garcia, “Racist Disrespect in Moral Theory: Dialogue With Glasgow” (2016, 229–230). 18  This is not to say that Garcia thinks metaphysical analyses have no pragmatic value; on the contrary, he has argued that the correct metaphysical definition of “racism” (his volitional theory) has normative significance, for he thinks that only by understanding racism in volitional terms can we hope to put an end to the problem of racism (see Garcia 1999, 18–20; and 2004, 51–55). The pragmatic significance of his theory notwithstanding, Garcia thinks theory gets things wrong if it allows pragmatic considerations to guide it.

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(Another noteworthy point that emerges from this passage is that Garcia is a conservative, but he thinks revisions to ordinary usage may be necessary to correct “minor inconsistencies in usage” and clarify controversial cases.) As previously mentioned, metaphysical considerations will not play a role in the analysis that follows, for I have previously argued that metaphysical analysis is bankrupt. However, even if metaphysical analysis were a legitimate philosophical project, I think there is something fundamentally misguided in Garcia’s claim that only metaphysical considerations are relevant to the philosophical analysis of racism. Metaphysicians of the Garcian brand start from the premise that our intuitions reflect the nature of racism. But what is the argument for this claim? The mere intuition that ordinary usage captures racism’s essence is not an argument against the skeptical worry (discussed in Chap. 2); for it does not establish the reliability of ordinary usage. What is needed is an argument that establishes the relevance of semantics for ontology. To my knowledge, no such argument has been provided by Garcia or anyone else. On the face of it, it might seem plausible that, other things equal, metaphysical considerations, which bear on the nature of racism itself, should be privileged over pragmatic considerations. Yet, if my criticisms of metaphysical analysis are unconvincing, metaphysical accounts of racism should take  pragmatic considerations seriously. For metaphysical  theories often recognize, as they should, that ontology is only one of the aims of theory. Most seem to have practical and metaphysical aims. For example, MitchellYellin’s approach appears to be metaphysical and pragmatic. Garcia gives us no reason to think that this sort of hybrid approach is mistaken. Garcia’s impatience with pragmatic considerations is therefore unwarranted. In this chapter, I discuss two pragmatic reasons for rejecting the normative status of ordinary usage. There are many pragmatic considerations one might propose for consideration, but I focus on the two that are most salient in the literature; each corresponds to a different type (i) and (ii) consideration. In Sect. 6.4, I consider whether  ordinary usage illicitly reflects a group-interest bias. Suppose, for example, that ordinary usage reflects a volitional conception of racism, which, it turns out, favors the political interests of whites.19 In that case, the social function of the 19  This is a view that one occasionally comes across in the literature. The argument for this view typically relies on polling data. Consider a CNN poll cited by Andrew Pierce (2014, 35). The poll, conducted by Opinion Research Corporation (2006), “shows that black Americans are more than twice as likely as white Americans to say that racism is a ‘very serious’ problem.” This may reflect the fact that whites and blacks have different conceptions of

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current grammar of “ ­ racism” provides a moral consideration against ordinary usage—assuming, of course, that it is wrong to define this term in a way that favors the interests of whites (i.e.,  those who have historically perpetrated and benefited from white supremacy). A second consideration is Blum’s argument that contemporary usage is too unstable to lend itself to a single conception of racism. He explains that the instability of “racism” is a function of the term’s overusage in moral discourse, which contributes to the deterioration of its moral-condemnatory force. Drawing on these considerations, I argue for the relevance of non-metaphysical, pragmatic considerations in settling the prescriptive question, in favor of revising ordinary usage. Philosophical attitudes to ordinary usage matter for at least two reasons. First, if one believes that ordinary usage of “racism” is legitimate, perhaps because one thinks it expresses what racism really is, this will likely function as a guiding principle in one’s theory of racism, and revisions to ordinary usage will be viewed as suspect, costly (Glasgow), or misguided (Garcia). This, in turn, means that revisionist theories of racism, like Blum and Shelby’s, will be ruled out or disadvantaged from the start. Second, attitudes toward ordinary usage are important because they may have ethical, social, and political implications. For suppose for a­ rgument’s sake that individualistic conceptions serve the political interests of whites and institutionalist conceptions serve the interests of persons of color. Suppose further that Garcia is right that his volitional definition best captures everyday usage. Then one of the ramifications of Garcian conservatism is racism. For if one views racism in intentionalist terms, racism may be thought to be on the decline (as most persons disavow racism, view it as morally wrong, and deny that they harbor racist attitudes). Many believe this to be the dominant view among whites. By contrast, if most blacks tend to have an institutionalist conception of racism, then the persistence of unjust racial inequality suggests that racism is well and alive today rather than on the decline. A survey conducted by Robert P. Jones and Daniel Cox (2012, 51–57) confirms that there are significant differences between whites and non-whites on issues of racial discrimination and diversity. On one interpretation of this data, the reason why whites and blacks differ in their views about the existence of “racial discrimination” is that blacks view racial discrimination as linked to racism, whereas most whites might not make this connection. Hence it is arguable that whites and blacks have different conceptions of racism. (I am indebted to an anonymous reviewer for bringing the Jones and Cox survey to my attention.) For general discussion of differences in racial attitudes, see Michael Omi and Howard Winant’s discussion of racism in Racial Formation in the United States (1994, 69–76).

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that the metaphysically correct approach to racism entails a political endorsement of an individualistic conception that serves white interests. Hence, philosophical attitudes matter for two reasons: for the scope/limits of philosophical analysis and for the practical ramifications and political interests they promote.

6.3   Agnosticism as Default Position Is conservatism the correct default position or not? This can be reframed as the question: Should OUC be taken as presumptively correct or not? In this section, I consider and ultimately reject an argument for conservatism that originated in the theory of moral responsibility. 6.3.1  Doxastic Inertia or Instability? One argument for the presumption of conservatism which has been discussed outside the philosophy of race, is the argument from “doxastic inertia.” Kelly McCormick attributes this argument to Vargas: principle of conservatism: we should abandon our standing commitments only as a last resort and, when we abandon them, there is pressure to limit the scope of revision as much as possible. That is because widespread revision of our beliefs will likely have a large impact on the stability of our overall doxastic commitments. We greatly value the stability of these commitments, and so, in lieu of significant pressure to revise them, they have a kind of “doxastic inertia.”20

Note that, for McCormick, the principle of conservatism is a normative principle, for it is a claim about when it is permissible to abandon our “standing commitments.” Furthermore, her argument for this principle is also normative. Her argument is that revising our standing commitments would likely destabilize our overall doxastic system and that it is bad to do this; therefore, we should refrain from revising our standing ­commitments. Extending this argument to the theory of racism, the claim would be that revising commonsense thinking about racism would likely destabilize a valued system of doxastic belief. I will assume that this valued system consists of our moral beliefs, and more specifically our  Kelly McCormick’s “Revisionism” (2017, 115).

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e­valuative commitments within the racial domain. Revisions, on this argument, should be pursued only as a matter of last resort. Whatever the merit of this argument in the context of theorizing “moral responsibility,” I think it fails in the context of theorizing “racism.” The argument assumes that the term “racism” currently has a stable meaning and that this meaning is connected to our system of doxastic beliefs in ways that might undermine the system if revisions are introduced. This assumption is hardly obvious and is itself part of what is in question by raising the prescriptive question in the first place. Many ethical terms are contested, but “racism” is heavily contested in ways that many ethical terms are not.21 Though there are paradigm cases of racism that everyone agrees to, there is more than one way to analyze or explain them. Take, for example, the truism that race-based slavery is wrong. Philosophers all agree on this point, but they disagree about why it is racist. The evidence of incompatible usage discussed below (in my discussion of Blum) is consistent with this point. Some folk call race-based slavery racist because it involves oppression (thereby meeting an injustice criterion of racism), while others might call it racist because it fails to respect the autonomy of individuals (thereby meeting some individualist or disrespect criterion of racism). More generally, we know that the term “racism” is contested along several dimensions, including: it is disputed by scholars and ordinary folk alike; people contest which categories of entity can be racist (whether racism is an individual or institutional phenomenon; whether it is an attitudinal or behavioral phenomenon; etc.); people contest which groups of people can be racist, and why; and people contest whether racist phenomena merit severe moral opprobrium or not, and whether racism is always wrong. In light of such considerations, the following rule of thumb seems correct. When a concept-term is heavily contested (with respect to its descriptive and normative content), one of the aims of philosophical analysis is to determine whether the term has a stable object as its referent (i.e., whether the method of pure description can be used to elucidate the nature of the putative object). Even if one is merely concerned about the question “What is 21  Leonard Harris has considered whether racism is an essentially contested concept. See Harris’ “The Concept of Racism: An Essentially Contested Concept?” (1998). He argues that it is not essentially contested, but his grounds for thinking this are pragmatic. See my critique of Harris’ argument in Chap. 3. For a different kind of argument that racism is  an essentially contested concept, see my “Racism as an Essentially Contested Concept” (unpublished manuscript).

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r­acism?” a precondition for settling it is that the term “racism” have a stable meaning to begin with (as opposed to several meanings or an unstable meaning). In cases of heavy contestation, a normative theory can shed light on whether a stable meaning exists for the theorist to conserve. Suppose, for example, that commonsense thinking about racism is internally inconsistent, unstable, and tenuous. Then prescribing a correct use of “racism” will establish a stable meaning by positing a consistent and fixed definition. Furthermore, if the referent of “racism” is unstable, then revising existing usage will likely not undermine the stability of our overall doxastic system. On the contrary, retaining commonsense thinking about racism might contribute to the inefficiency and instability of said system. Hence, the presumption of preserving existing usage is unjustifiable in cases of heavy contestation. Something like this argument has not gone unnoticed. Consider Shelby’s objection to Garcia: Nowadays, as Garcia himself correctly points out, the term “racism” is so haphazardly thrown about that it is no longer clear that we all mean, even roughly, the same thing by it. Some even complain that the term is fast becoming (or has long since become) a mere epithet, with strong emotive force but little or no clear content. This doesn’t mean the concept is no longer useful, but it does suggest that we need to clearly specify its referent before we can determine whether the relevant phenomenon is always morally problematic. This will require some philosophical reconstruction, which may diverge, even radically, from ordinary usage. Until such a reconstructive project is completed, though, we should remain agnostic about whether every instance of “racism” is immoral, for our best reconstruction may show that many of our pretheoretic moral convictions are unfounded or inconsistent.22

What Shelby adds to the aforementioned discussion is an explanation of the cause of doxastic instability. The explanation is that the term “racism” is widely overused (“haphazardly thrown about”) and, as such, “it is no longer clear that we all mean, even roughly, the same thing by it.” This claim is not original to Shelby, as he seems to have taken it from Blum and/or Robert Miles. Since this is an important claim for the revisionist, I discuss it below in Sect. 6.4. For now, however, we can observe that if this claim is justified, then conservatives owe us an argument, not merely for  Shelby (2002, 412).

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the claim that ordinary usage tracks racism itself, but for the claim that ordinary usage is relatively stable and unified. Without such an argument, positing OUC in the context of prescriptive analysis begs the question against revisionism. 6.3.2  Instability and Pragmatic Considerations The argument that revising current usage threatens to destabilize our system of doxastic beliefs is objectionable on another ground, as well. In order to know the consequences of revising ordinary usage, one must know the normative status of ordinary usage, but this cannot be known independent of prescriptive analysis. The conservative is right to demand that the revisionist provide good grounds for revising current usage; she is also right to demand that the revisionist explain why revising ordinary usage would likely not destabilize our doxastic system. These concessions rightly signal the burden on the shoulders of the revisionist. But they signal the burden on the shoulders of the conservative, also: for it must be shown that introducing revisions would (likely) cause doxastic destabilization. That is to say, we do not yet know what costs and benefits might accrue from revising ordinary usage if we have not yet carried out a philosophical analysis of ordinary usage. The costs and benefits of revising ordinary usage are (pragmatic) considerations the conservative must be aware of in order to advance a warranted claim about what is likely to follow or not from introducing revisions. But the conservative who starts from a conservative default position has not carried out any such analysis. She simply assumes without argument that certain negative doxastic consequences would ensue. Since, on this starting point, we do not yet know the normative status of ordinary usage— as this is precisely what, according to the agnostic, we ought to figure out—starting from the conservative default position begs the question against the revisionist. Our conservative argues as if  the destabilization worry is not contingent upon the actual effects of revising concepts. Since the destabilization argument assumes that destabilization would occur, it is incumbent upon the conservative to provide the grounds for this assertion.23 But once the conservative satisfies this burden, her conservative 23  Ultimately, the worry that revising ordinary usage would destabilize our system of doxastic beliefs amounts to an intuition, an unsubstantiated claim, that I do  not share. There seems to be no widespread intuition about doxastic inertia. For instance, consider Joshua Knobe and John M. Doris’ intuition in their “Responsibility” (2010): “Of course, most plausible views will lie somewhere on the continuum between extreme conservativism

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“starting point” ceases to be a default position, as the starting point is now justified. Thus the presumption of conservatism begs the question against the revisionist. Conservatism cannot be presumed; it must be established— it cannot be justified by sheer stipulation. In light of the failure of the doxastic inertia argument for the presumption of conservatism, a different argument might be presented instead. It might be argued that some of our commonsense semantic intuitions ought to be treated as privileged, because without them it is impossible to make sense of intelligible discourse involving the term “racism.” It is plausible, for example, that the term must have a meaning of sorts, since otherwise an important domain of discourse—one that intersects moral, social and political discourses—would not exist. It seems we are forced to posit some successful usage of the term “racism” in order to explain the fact that the term is used to make meaningful judgments. Looked at from the perspective of speech act theory, a meaningful expression is one that can be used to say something. And we seem to succeed in performing various illocutionary acts with “racism,” such as condemnation. It seems that our ability to perform the acts of assertion, imperative, and so on, as well as our ability to understand and engage in racial discourse, presupposes a more or less stable grammar. But once this is granted, the objector continues, it is plausible to argue that the grammar of this term (and hence the discursive practices it makes possible) is justifiable on pragmatic grounds. After all, these speech acts have pragmatic value for us. Therefore, we ought to conserve ordinary usage of the term “racism” as much as possible. I agree with the objector up to a point. I agree that for all the confusion and disagreement about what racism is, and what is and what is not racist, some assertions and discourses which invoke the term “racism” are both meaningful and worth preserving. For example, everyone agrees about certain paradigms of racism (e.g., “Slavery is racist”). A similar example is that everyone but the proud racist agrees that racism is wrong, and even she understands that her belief that racism is good is considered wrong and racist by most competent speakers. Examples like this suggest that some of what we say about racism is intelligible. Finally, it seems plausible that positing the intelligibility of some of our discourse about racism seems and extreme revisionism. On one hand, it seems unlikely that everything about our existing practices is perfectly fine just the way it is; on the other, it seems unlikely that everything about these practices is fundamentally flawed and in need of revision. Presumably, we shall find that some aspects of our practices are now correct while others need to be revised” (349).

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necessary in order to explain the possibility of legitimate disagreement about racism. For otherwise our disagreement about what is racist would be reduced to conceptual confusion, to individuals talking past one another. Hence the word “racism” cannot be meaningless; nor is it tenable to hold, pace the suggestion of some scholars, that the term “racism” has become a mere epithet. The force of these arguments should be conceded, in my view. As a Wittgensteinian I hold that disagreement about racism presupposes a substantial amount of agreement in definitions. Nevertheless, I do not agree that this argument succeeds in establishing a presumption in favor of conserving ordinary usage of “racism” as much as possible. What this argument shows, I think, is that we should preserve some of what is called “racism”— what I have called basic grammatical propositions in Chap. 3—for otherwise we might destabilize the pragmatic foundations of racial discourse. For instance, we should grant and must start from certain foundational claims about racism: “Racism is a racial phenomenon,” “Racism is always morally objectionable,” “Racism is manifest in history,” “Race-­based slavery is racist,” “White supremacy is racist,” and so on. Such “framework propositions,” as we might call them, set limits on an adequate theory of racism. Taken collectively, however, they seem not to fix a stable meaning (and referent) of “racism.” At best, they determine a vague or indeterminate concept. To better see this, we can distinguish two senses in which usage of “racism” might be said to have a meaning, or two senses in which usage of the term “racism” might be deemed useful. First, the grammar of “racism” might be meaningful/useful in the sense that it enables (some) thoughts to be expressed and potentially understood by others. Second, it might be useful in the sense that it enables the social purposes of discourse to be achieved. I think the grammar of “racism” is useful in the first sense, but I think it reasonable to be suspicious of how useful it is in the second sense. Two people might use the term “racist” in a way that expresses distinct thoughts about racism, confirming the fact that the grammar of this term is useful in the first sense. However, these intelligible thoughts might be incompatible; further, our speakers might be unaware of this fact if confusion ensues. And confusion might ensue if the concept is vague enough so that it is difficult to understand which thought is expressed on a given occasion of use. The result of this interaction might be the thwarting of the social purpose in question.

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Suppose that on a given occasion of use, an individual managed to express a thought; further, imagine that one’s purpose was to persuade one’s conversation partner that some racial ill was wrong (by calling it racist) and to explain why it was wrong (by virtue of invoking a certain definition of “racism”). The fact that one’s usage of “racist” is stable enough to permit the expression of an intelligible thought does not by itself guarantee that this particular thought will be the one that others grasp or are willing to accept. Our practices of employing this term might not be stable enough to achieve the intended goal in using it. Furthermore, if we suppose that mutual understanding is achieved during a conversational exchange, the conversation might be stymied if one or more participants to the conversation reject as ungrammatical or confused another participant’s employment of “racism.” Conversation partners might reject each other’s claims about racism on account of subscribing to different conceptions of racism. The nature and extent to which meaningful discourse about racism is possible and the extent to which ordinary usage prompts conceptual confusion on this front is a significant factor in determining whether it is pragmatically justifiable for the purposes of social practice and communicative success. The point here is not simply that two individuals might not know how the other person is using “racism” on a given occasion of use. The point is also that the concept of racism is (or might be) too vague to resolve interesting cases of disagreement, because ordinary usage of “racism” permits incompatible uses. This may be because ordinary usage is constituted by several incompatible standards of correctness. For instance, ordinary usage may allow us to say both that X is racist (on one ordinary usage) and X is not racist (on some other ordinary usage). Consider the example from the previous chapter, Glasgow and Blum’s disagreement about a particular case. Suppose that a high school teacher calls on a black Haitian student to provide “the black perspective” on race relations to the class. Is the action racist? If “racism” is ordinarily used by a sufficiently large number of people to condemn everything that is racially disrespectful, these folk may conclude that the teacher’s action is racist. And if the term is also used by a sufficiently large number of (different) people to condemn only those cases that involve serious racial disrespect, then these folk may conclude that the teacher’s action is not racist. Hence ordinary usage may be too unstable to resolve substantive disagreement about the high school teacher’s action. For the disagreement would be a function of ordinary usage, which furnishes two incompatible norms. If it is plausible, as it I think it

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is, that Blum and Glasgow’s definitions of “racism” reflect different segments of our linguistic community, then their dispute reflects the internal inconsistency of ordinary usage.  In that case, Glasgow appeals to the established  norm “Racism is racial disrespect” (call this DA) and Blum appeals to the established norm “Racism is serious racial disrespect” (call this SDA).24 DA and SDA are incompatible in the sense that these norms generate incompatible judgments, like “The high school teacher’s action is racist” (given DA) and “The high school teacher’s action is not racist” (given SDA). Given this type of  performative incompatibility, a proper solution to this disagreement requires a normative decision: an endorsement of one or the other of these competing norms. (Or, perhaps, an endorsement of some other competing norm.) It seems plausible that there may be other incompatible norms, akin to DA and SDA, and that these too may be partly constitutive of ordinary usage (e.g., the dispute between individualists and institutionalists about the correct definition of “racism”). I take examples like these to show that it is plausible to wonder whether the existing concept of racism is currently too unstable to provide the final word in resolving substantive disagreement. If ordinary usage is unstable in the way I have suggested, then the idea that introducing revisions to ordinary usage might destabilize ordinary usage is dubious. On the contrary, introducing revisions to ordinary usage might be necessary to stabilize ordinary usage. If this is correct, then not only do doxastic inertia (destabilization) arguments fail to establish the presumption of conservatism, but thinking through them leads to a persuasive instability argument against conservatism and for revisionism. Destabilization arguments are a type of pragmatic argument, because they attempt to justify the presumption of conservatism by reference to the utility of retaining everyday usage. The problem for such arguments is that any such value is called into question by vast amounts of disagreement and conceptual confusion about racism. This creates the room needed by revisionists to turn such arguments on their head. The revisionist would here appeal to the same set of pragmatic considerations that motivated McCormick’s argument for the presumption of conservatism. For the instability of the term “racism” threatens to undermine our system of dox24  This is a plausible interpretation of their dispute, because Glasgow subscribes to the moral condition—the desideratum that racism is always morally objectionable, while Blum subscribes to the serious moral condition—the desideratum that racism is always seriously morally objectionable. For further discussion, see Chaps. 1, 5, and 7.

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astic beliefs, inasmuch as our concept of racism is intricately related to moral concepts such as racial wrongness, moral wrongness, moral responsibility, and so forth. Stated differently, the pragmatic need to stabilize the otherwise unstable concept of racism puts pressure in the direction of revising it. This sums up my argument for an agnostic default position. Conservatives have the burden of establishing the utility of ordinary usage in the second sense described above; they must show that ordinary usage is sufficiently stable enough to meet the needs of social discourse. Prescriptive argumentation is necessary to show that ordinary usage is sufficiently stable, in the face of widespread disagreement and confusion about racism, to resolve substantive disagreement. Revisionists have the burden of undermining the prospects of such a virtue; or, at least, they have the burden of showing that there are equally pressing virtues on the side of revision. One possible strategy here, as I have outlined, is to argue that widespread disagreement and confusion is a fundamental source of social difficulties so drastic that revisions to ordinary usage are desirable, if not necessary. The presumption of agnosticism is superior to the presumption of conservatism because it respects the contingency of ordinary use. We know that the meanings of words are subject to change, to evolve. Further, it is plausible that the normative status of the ordinary use of a term is subject to change as sociocultural conditions change. This is particularly so with concepts that are about sociohistorical phenomena, like racism. Sociohistorical conditions mediate and shape our needs, including the need to introduce a new term, or modify an old one. Hence it is plausible to think that the correct answer to the question “How should ‘racism’ be used?” is likely to evolve with changes to social conditions: as new modes of racial inequality emerge, as racial progress is made, and so forth. Agnosticism is consistent with this evolutionary aspect of grammar. For agnosticism does not judge that either revisionism or conservatism is the correct approach. Instead, it judges that the correct approach depends on the social circumstances, on the pressing grammatical or linguistic needs of the day, and on the prevailing linguistic practices of society. The principle of agnosticism is thus consistent with the pragmatic nature of grammar. The antecedent commitment to preserving existing usage not only begs the normative question against the revisionist; it implausibly assumes that linguistic meanings are not subject to change, as though they were transhistorical, or eternal, essences—which is a point that even

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some conservatives allegedly reject.25 For only on such an assumption, it seems to me, does it make sense to eschew the relevance of practical considerations a priori. The heavy contestation of a term is largely a function of empirical considerations that are unpredictable and not determinable a priori. Commonsense thinking, as we know, may be harmful and oppressive, a source of misunderstanding and confusion, politically biased, and so on. Yet, there is no a priori way to detect these deficiencies independent of the facts and their examination. Empirical investigation is required to identify the pertinent facts and organize them into a prescriptive argument for or against ordinary usage. The normative status of ordinary usage is not something one can determine by intuition; so it should not be treated as obvious, self-evident, or knowable independent of investigation and argumentation. For example, I discuss below the conceptual inflation of the term “racism.” Overusage of this term is Blum’s evidence for rejecting the normative status of ordinary usage. His empirical argument reveals some of the relevant questions it is impossible to settle independent of empirical inquiry: Does ordinary usage of “racism” promote or stymie interracial dialogue? Is ordinary usage a major source of misunderstanding, conceptual confusion, substantive disagreement, and so on? Does ordinary usage prompt categorial drift, or “racismor-nothing” fallacious reasoning? The answers to these questions are contingent upon various facts—some of which may not emerge unless they are “dug up” by empirical inquiry. Polling data might be used to confirm deficiencies and progress in racial discourse and might additionally help scholars identify the source/s of disagreement, and measure, more or less precisely, how divided individuals are on the issue of racism. Blum takes a different route, looking primarily to news stories, discussions of contemporary events, and examples of public disputes about what is and what is not racist, he identifies a wide variety of incompatible uses and other practical difficulties emerging from current usage of “racism.”26 25  See Garcia’s (1997, 7–10). For a defense of the claim that racism is a contingent, sociocultural phenomenon, see Clevis Headley, “Philosophical Analysis and the Problem of Defining Racism” (2006). 26  For some representative examples of Blum’s evidence in support of the inflation problem, see Sect. 6.4.1, below. There are, of course, other ways to challenge the normative status of ordinary use, including polling data suggesting that there is no one “ordinary use” of “racism,” because whites and non-whites use the term differently. Another line of argument I consider below (in Sect. 6.4.2) is that ordinary usage is biased in favor of individualistic accounts of racism.

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So the proper method is to begin by looking at  data about existing usage of the term (which bears on its stability), as opposed to presuming (a priori) that existing usage of the term is in good normative standing. Perhaps some may object to the merits of Blum’s empirical methodology. It might be argued, for instance, that his “loose” methodology is too ­scattered and unsystematic to draw reliable social scientific conclusions about the normative status of ordinary usage. Supposing we grant this objection, it nevertheless seems that Blum is on the right track in endeavoring to assess the normative status of ordinary usage on empirical grounds. Implicit in his approach is the recognition that some sort of empirical methodology is required to address practical objections and questions about ordinary usage. The same is true for Shelby and other philosophers’ political arguments, which I discuss below. These philosophers claim that ordinary usage may reflect the interests of certain social groups and that this may give us reason to revise or endorse ordinary usage. This, too, implies that the normative status of ordinary usage cannot be determined a priori. For the interests of particular racial groups is a contingent matter. Agnosticism is, therefore, the more reasonable default position because it respects the fact that the justifiability or reasonableness of ordinary usage (commonsense thinking) is contingent upon experience. The contingent nature of experience thus seems to confirm agnosticism as the most appropriate starting point when assessing the conservative and revisionist debate.

6.4   Two Arguments for Revisionism I have now argued that philosophers should start from the presumption of agnosticism and that, consequently, OUC is a substantive normative claim that must be argued for. Very roughly, my argument was that ordinary usage can be shown to be problematic and that this gives us a reason to set aside OUC until we have properly established the normative status of ordinary usage. Adopting OUC without such argumentation betrays a conservative bias, that is, a bias that consists of the unwarranted privileging of conservative theories of “racism.” My argument up to now has taken for granted that ordinary usage of “racism” is the source of several practical problems that undermine, or at least seriously challenge, the normative status of ordinary usage. It is now time to provide a more proper defense of this premise. Starting from an agnostic default position, what normative arguments lend support to a revisionist theory of “racism”? I endeavor to show that Blum and Shelby’s

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arguments for problematizing ordinary usage undermine the positive normative standing of ordinary usage of “racism.” Blum identifies several pragmatics problems facing contemporary usage, based on overusage of the term “­racism.” Shelby, and others, direct our attention to several interconnected political problems ­facing contemporary usage, which support the claim that “racism” should be defined in non-individualistic terms. Together, their arguments construct the following obstacle to defining “racism”: How ought we to use the word “racism” given its current overusage (which prompts various pragmatics problems we would like to resolve) and given our evaluative starting point which is rooted in non-negotiable political values (which may be contested and incompatible with some values expressed in ordinary usage)? Their arguments, I contend, tilt the balance in favor of a revisionist definition of “racism.” My thesis, then, is that (a) the default assumption that conserving existing usage should be preferred is unjustified, because (b) there are reasons to hold that existing usage is problematic and should be revised. 6.4.1  Conceptual Inflation Argument Having articulated the general structure of my prescriptive argument, I turn to Blum’s normative critique of ordinary usage. In “Racism: Its Core Meaning,” Blum identifies a series of problems associated with what he calls the “conceptual inflation of racism.” This term is not original to Blum, as it was coined by Robert Miles. In “Conceptual Inflation,” Miles defines this term as a process “whereby the concept has been redefined to refer to a wider range of phenomena,” and develops an analysis that details the diversity in application of the term “racism” inasmuch as it has been used to denote various ideologies, intentional practices, and unintended processes or consequences.27 For the most part, Miles’ critical discussion of conceptual inflation is limited to scholarly usage and select moments of political usage. By contrast, Blum’s argument is much more general in scope, for he discusses conceptual inflation as rooted in everyday linguistic practice. This renders his argument and approach to inflation the more relevant source of pragmatics problems with the term “racism.”

 Robert Miles (1989, 42).

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The problem of conceptual inflation is the fact that, currently, in ordinary usage, the concept of racism covers too much phenomena in its extension, that is, more than it reasonably ought to cover. What makes conceptual inflation problematic, argues Blum, is its contributing to several practical problems: (i) a deficiency in the meaning of the term “racism” (which either consists in the term’s vagueness or indeterminacy of meaning, or in its loss of meaning on particular occasions of use); (ii) a deficiency in the moral force connoted by the term “racism” (that is, weakening of its condemnatory force); (iii) the inhibition of (inter)racial dialogue and communication, partly due to the fact that people (especially whites) are fearful of being called “racist” as a result of uttering the wrong thing in racial contexts; (iv) the problem of “categorial drift” (see below); and (v) the problem of “racism-or-nothing” false dichotomous reasoning (see below). Conceptual inflation is the most fundamental problem here, as it explains problems (i)-(v) (as well as problems (vi)-(viii), introduced below). I thus begin with this notion. Blum defends his contention that ordinary usage of “racism” is conceptually inflated by specifying three sources of inflation and arguing that each contributes to one or more of the aforementioned practical problems. The three sources28 are as follows: 1. Racial moral overload—the term “racism” currently picks out morally too diverse phenomena in the racial domain (for the term picks out everything that goes wrong in the racial domain). 2. General moral overload—the term “racism” currently picks out morally too diverse phenomena in the moral domain (for the term picks out every form of group discrimination, oppression, or denial of dignity). 3. Categorial undifferentiation—the term “racism” currently picks out a categorial plurality of entities and people often fail to recognize that different categories of racist entity carry different moral valences. (The fallacious reasoning that moves from the premise that one category of entity is racist to the conclusion that some other—generally more objectionable—category of entity must be racist is called “categorial drift.”29)

 Blum (2002, 31).  Blum (2002, 13–14).

28 29

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Consider the first source of inflation—what Blum simply calls “moral overload.” In the chapter’s opening paragraph, Blum writes: Some feel that the word [“racist”] is thrown around so much that anything involving “race” that someone does not like is liable to castigation as “racist.” “Is television a racist institution?” asked an article concerning the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People’s (NAACP) criticism of prime-time network shows for having no “minority” actors in lead roles.30 A local newspaper called certain blacks “racist” for criticizing other blacks who supported a white over a black candidate for mayor.31 A white girl in Virginia said that it was “racist” for an African American teacher in her school to wear African attire.32 The Milton, Wisconsin, school board voted to retire its “Redmen” name and logo depicting a Native American wearing a headdress, because they had been criticized as “racist.”33 Merely mentioning someone’s race (or racial designation), using the word “Oriental” for Asians without recognizing its origins and its capacity for insult, or socializing only with members of one’s own racial group are called ‘racist.’34

It is easy to see how these sorts of examples contribute to problems (i)– (v), above. Yet it is just as easy to see how the moral overload of the word “racism” might contribute to further practical difficulties, difficulties which Blum does not explicitly name. I will rely on Blum’s examples (from the quoted passage) to illustrate these additional difficulties: (vi) ambiguous usage/conceptual misunderstanding (e.g., it’s not clear whether black support for a white mayoral candidate is thought to be racist because whites are, for some reason, unable or unwilling to represent the interests of blacks or whether it is because blacks have some moral duty to stand in solidarity with fellow blacks); (vii) objectionable usage/conceptual confusion (e.g., a teacher’s wearing African American attire to school is surely not racist; however, it might be mistakenly thought to be, if wearing African attire is  Bernard Weinraub (1999, A1, A14).  “Black and White in Baltimore,” Indianapolis Star-News, Aug. 23, 1999 (article ID no. 19999235133, on www.Indystar.com) 32  David K. Shipler (1997, 92). 33  Kathleen Ostrander, “Milton Board Decides to Retire Indian Logo, Name,” Milwaukee Journal Sentential (online, July 20, 1999). 34  Blum (2002, 1). 30 31

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confusedly thought to be a token racial expression and if deliberate and overt racial expression is confusedly thought to be racist); ( viii) contested usage/disagreement about what is and what is not racist (e.g., the lack of minority actors in lead roles on prime-time television is undeniably racially problematic, but whether it is racist and why that is so—if it is racist—may be legitimately disputed on ordinary usage; that is, the allegation of racism is not obvious to all competent speakers, but controversial). Turning to the second source of conceptual inflation, it will be helpful to differentiate the problem of the “moral overload” of the word “racism” from what I above called the “general moral overload” of this word. The difference is that the scope of the latter is broader than the scope of the former. That is to say, whereas moral overload is restricted to the racial domain, general moral overload extends beyond the racial domain. As Blum explains: “Conceptual inflation and moral overload arise from another source as well—designating as ‘racism’ any prejudice, injustice, inferiorizing, or bigotry against human groups defined, say, by gender, disability, sexual orientation, or nationality.”35 As an example he cites Avishai Margalit’s definition of “racism” which identifies racism with “the denying of dignity to any human group….” Blum then offers the following criticism: This inflated use of “racism” does, certainly, pay indirect tribute to racial oppression and denial of dignity as the central form of such mistreatment in contemporary Western consciousness; and that centrality is reflected also in coinages such as “sexism,” “ableism” (discrimination against the disabled), “classism,” and “heterosexism.” This proliferation of other “isms” at least avoids the confusion wrought by Margalit’s conflating all of them with “racism” itself and discrimination, exploitation, and denials of dignity based on race and those based on gender, sexual orientation, disability, national membership, and the like. But Margalit’s subsuming all these moral ills under “racism” cuts off such inquiry at the starting line, and, in so doing, contributes to a counterproductive inflation of the term “racism.”36

 Blum (2002, 3).  Blum (2002, 3).

35 36

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Thus Margalit’s “counterproductive” inflation of “racism” is deemed problematic because it conflates different kinds of group wrong, such as racism and sexism. To this criticism we can add that Margalit contributes to the problems of conceptual misunderstanding and confusion by obscuring these discrete categories. As regards the third and final source of conceptual inflation—what I have termed “categorial undifferentiation”—Blum introduces it thus: We have looked at two ways that “racism” and “racist” have been conceptually inflated and morally overloaded, diminishing their usefulness and forces as concepts expressing moral reproach: the tendency to apply them to every malfeasance in the racial area, and to use them as general concepts for all forms of group discrimination, oppression, or denial of dignity. We are now in a position to discuss a third such devaluation of these words, which results from their undifferentiated use in regard to very different entities: beliefs, acts, attitudes, statements, symbols, feelings, motives, and persons. I call this confusion “categorial drift.” For instance, a person commits one racist act and is called “a racist,” or makes a racist statement and is assumed to be doing so from a racist motive. Here we have drift from one category of racism to a second, generally more objectionable one.37

We see here that one common type of categorial drift involves an inference from “S did something racist” (or “S said something racist”) to “S is a racist person.” Another common type of example involves an inference of the form: “Institution X involves racist agent S, so X must be a racist institution.” Thus if an institution (such as a school) involves some “bad apples” one might mistakenly infer that the entire institution is contaminated with racism. Blum’s guiding idea, however, is that different categories of racist entity should be judged according to different criteria of racism—that is, criteria suitable to that particular category of entity, which do not automatically travel across categories. Moreover, the moral valence of one category of racist entity may not be the same as that of other categories of racist entity. As Blum explains: Once one moves away from the general idea of “racism” as a kind of large undifferentiated thing, an “impersonal force,” as Bob Blauner once referred to it, it is obvious that not all forms and instances of racism are equally heinous. An act of racist violence is worse than telling a racist joke. Believing in  Blum (2002, 13–14).

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the human inferiority of a racial group is not as morally evil as acting on that belief in order to deprive the group of its rights. Harboring racist feelings that one never expresses is not as morally bad as expressing them whenever one has the chance.38

Blum’s argument presupposes a positive thesis about the nature of racism, which we have yet to discuss. Like many philosophers of racism, Blum maintains that racism is always wrong. However, he goes further in maintaining that “‘Racism’ and ‘racist’ should be reserved for certain especially serious moral failings and violations in the area of race.”39 Blum also uses the term “severe” (as well as “serious”) to characterize the degree of moral force (that ought to be) connoted by the term “racism.” Blum’s judgment is clearly normative, as it is a recommendation for patching up ordinary usage. As such, his normative proposal might be disputed. Yet it has the virtue of being both intuitively plausible and partly supported by the fact that it is reflected in historical usage of the term “racism.” Blum argues that his normative proposal has important historical roots in the evolution of the use of this term.40 Blum’s contention that racism is essentially a “severe” or “serious” form of racial wrong might be thought to conflict with his claim that the moral force of the term “racism” varies from one category of entity to the next. For example, if harboring racist feelings is “not as morally bad as expressing them” in action and behavior, does this then imply that some forms of racism are not severe forms of racial wrong or that some are not seriously morally objectionable—thereby contradicting his general position that racism as such is always seriously objectionable? Blum offers the following reply to this objection: But if the term “racism” carries such different moral valences in its many manifestations, what remains of the idea that it is always a term of strong moral opprobrium, for the reasons mentioned earlier? The answer, I think, is that the opprobrium operates within categories of racist manifestations. Thus racist beliefs are particularly vile types of beliefs: racist symbols, particularly vile symbols, and so forth. But the comparative vileness does not operate across categories. Racist belief is not necessarily more objectionable morally than harmful nonracist behavior.41  Blum (2002, 29).  Blum (2002, 2). 40  See Blum (2002, 3–8 and 27–28). 41  Blum (2002, 29). 38 39

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Thus there is no contradiction in observing that some instances of racist wrongdoing are less “seriously objectionable” than other instances of non-­ racist wrongdoing of a different kind. For the severity attributed to racist entities is relative to, and operative within, particular categories of entity. I now turn to a discussion of problem (v), above, which Blum calls the problem of “racism-or-nothing” reasoning.42 Like the other difficulties, problem (v) is a function of inflated usage of “racism,” but is more specifically a function of the moral overload of “racism” (as will become evident soon). For it stems from the following presupposition: The moral overload assumption: Everything  in the racial domain  that is morally wrong is racist The “racism-or-nothing” problem consists in a fallacious form of reasoning that takes one of two forms. Form 1: Some racial wrong, X, which merits moral condemnation but not serious moral condemnation, is recognized to be wrong and so is wrongly condemned as racist (i.e., as a serious moral offense). Form 2: Some racial wrong, X, which merits moral condemnation, is not condemned at all, because it is rightly recognized not to be racist. We can use two Blumsian examples to illustrate: [N]ot all remarks, jokes, and symbols that have a racial significance are necessarily racist. Jokes that depend on a stereotype of Italians as loving pizza or whites as a bit uptight may offend; but they are not racist. They do not portray their targets in a degraded or seriously deficient light. The characterization of something as racist must be done with care, partly to avoid emotionally and morally overloading a situation that does not warrant it, partly to assure that other ills and missteps in the racial arena garner their appropriate claim on our consciences, and partly to protect the severe opprobrium that currently attaches to the epithet “racist.”43

Let J stand for the joke or stereotype that “Italians love pizza” (alternatively, “Whites are bit uptight”). Then the racism-or-nothing mentality might lead to this fallacious inference:  See, for example, Blum (2002, 2, 29, 31).  Blum (2002, 20).

42 43

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1. Everything in the racial domain that is morally wrong is racist, and every instance of racism is seriously morally objectionable. 2. This racially offensive joke or stereotype J is a wrong within  the racial domain. 3. Therefore, J is racist and seriously morally objectionable. The argument is unsound. Premise 2 is true, but premise 1 is false, according to Blum, because its first constituent proposition (the moral overload assumption) is false. The agent who reasons thus fails to see that J, although morally wrong, is not seriously objectionable. Hence the source of the problem is the moral overload assumption. Consider now an example of  fallacious reasoning, also predicated on the racism-or-nothing mentality: 1. Everything in the racial domain that is morally wrong is racist, and every instance of racism is seriously morally objectionable. 2. This racially offensive joke or stereotype J is not seriously morally objectionable. 3. Therefore, J is not racist and is not a moral wrong in the racial domain. Premise 2 is again true and premise 1 false, according to Blum. Here the agent’s reasoning fails to appreciate that just because J is not racist doesn’t mean that J is not morally objectionable. That is, the agent fails to see that some wrongs in the racial domain are worth condemning even if they are not racist. So, whether in forms 1 or 2 “racism-or-nothing” reasoning involves a false dichotomy that overlooks a third possibility. The moral overload assumption is misguided because it conflates moral wrongness (in the racial domain) with racism. That is, it conflates racial wrong with racism. The corrective to such reasoning is embracing the truism: Not everything that is morally wrong in the racial domain is racist. Some racial ills may be wrong and yet not racist. We have now identified eight distinct pragmatics problems associated with ordinary usage of the term “racism.” These practical difficulties are internal to ordinary usage—that is, to the current content of the term— inasmuch as they are prompted by everyday linguistic practice. We have seen that these difficulties arise from three sources of conceptual inflation— racial moral overload, general moral overload, and categorial undifferentiation. I thus conclude that, currently, ordinary usage of “racism” is normatively problematic. That is, Blum’s arguments give us reason to think

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that the way the term is currently used is not the way it ought to be used. This, in turn, gives us good prima facie reason to think that we would do well to revise the meaning of “racism.” Moreover, these problems, especially problems (vi) and (viii)—the problems of ambiguity and contestation—give us good reason to think that the current referent of “racism” is too unstable to lend itself to monistic analysis (one that accommodates all and only those things that are called “racist,” on ordinary usage). In particular, the moral threshold for something’s counting as racist seems hotly contested. If these problems do not undermine the moral purposes of racial discourse, they make it extremely difficult to achieve them. Normative analysis seems necessary, then, not merely to fix the referent of “racism,” but to ensure that the process by which the referent is fixed is morally justifiable. For instance, we do not merely want to settle on a definition of “racism” that resolves the problem of inflation. We can easily do that by stipulating a simple, arbitrary, consistent definition. What we want, however, is to solve the problem in a responsible manner. We need to ensure that whatever definition we posit satisfies the various needs we have for condemning things as racist. This will become more evident as we turn to the political critique of ordinary use. The objection here is not that ordinary use is too unstable to fix the referent of “racism,” but that (some?) of it promotes a certain conception of racism that attends to the wrong set of needs and promotes the wrong set of practical interests. 6.4.2  Political Morality Argument In this section, I will mention some political worries and objections to ordinary usage. That is, I will not provide details or empirical evidence in support of them. For my aim is merely to illustrate how such political arguments might be developed in an argument against the normative status of ordinary usage. In his paper “Racism, Moralism, and Social Criticism,” Shelby agrees with Blum that the terms “racist” and “racism” are overused; indeed, he agrees that these terms no longer have a determinate meaning in everyday life. Nevertheless he argues that, from a pragmatic point of view, philosophers should favor an approach that assigns less weight to how the term “racism” is used in everyday life.44 The problem of rehabilitating ordinary usage (in an effort to facilitate racial comity) is a relatively insignificant  Tommie Shelby, “Racism, Moralism, and Social Criticism” (2014, 59).

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practical concern compared to a much more pressing political matter. Without rejecting Blum’s arguments, Shelby rejects the priority Blum assigns to the aim of repairing interracial dialogue. He writes: “The conversation-stopper problem that Blum highlights should be taken seriously. But solving or mitigating that problem does not require us to accept a narrow-scope conception of racism.”45 [I]t would be just as reasonable, from a pragmatic point of view, to define the scope of “racism” by focusing on those race-related ills that have the greatest consequences for the liberty, material life prospects, and self-respect of individuals. It is no doubt because of these urgent practical concerns that many African Americans insist that racism be understood (primarily) as a system of oppression rather than (strictly) in terms of individual prejudice. For example, in their influential book Black Power, Stokely Carmichael and Charles V. Hamilton (1967) famously urged that we shift our critical eye away from identifying racist individuals and toward understanding the subtle dynamics of institutional racism. They recognized that overt expressions of personal bigotry were becoming less common but that Blacks and other racial minorities in the United States were still oppressed. They wanted a conception of racism that focused squarely on the unfair burdens that racial minorities were being forced to carry, regarding individual prejudice, whatever its normative valence from the standpoint of personal morality, as much less practically significant. Antiracist considerations such as these suggest placing questions of social justice at the center of accounts of racism, where the focus is on whether the major institutions of social life treat all individuals justly regardless of their race.46

Shelby is not alone in questioning ordinary usage. Consider, for instance, Andrew Pierce’s distinct but  related objection to Glasgow’s ordinary usage condition: Worse yet, deferring to the ordinary usage of a morally and politically loaded term like racism can actually discourage using the term in non-typical ways that nonetheless might illuminate important features of social reality, like the existence of unjust, systematic racial disadvantage. In fact, I think this is precisely the problem with standard accounts of racism, which typically do reflect the way the term is ordinarily used, a use that is deeply connected to the individual, agent-based view, and therefore makes it difficult to r­ ecognize  Shelby (2014, 62).  Shelby (2014, 61–2).

45 46

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forms of racism that don’t readily correspond to individual moral failings. In describing institutions that systematically disadvantage some racial groups as “racist,” I am admittedly parting with some forms of ordinary usage, but this is because those forms are an impediment to recognizing some of the most harmful instances of racial disadvantage.47

Given that the logic of individual agency fails to map on to what Pierce calls “institutional agency,” he concludes that we should move away from an individualist conception of racism. Thus, if Shelby and Pierce are correct, deviating from ordinary usage, given a pragmatic or moral perspective, proves to be a virtue for moral theory, rather than a vice. Clevis Headley similarly worries about the individualistic focus of much contemporary usage of the term “racism”: Most individuals in mainstream society can complacently claim to have no hatred for or hold any ill-will toward blacks and, hence, say they are not racist. Now, all the while many, if not most, blacks still find themselves unable to secure adequate housing, meaningful employment, good education, and equal access to health care. We are confronted by the situation where most members of society confess their commitment to formal universal principles of justice and equality, yet there remains persistent racial subordination.48

Headley emphasizes the intentionality that underwrites much contemporary usage. He thus follows a long line of scholars in arguing that ordinary usage permits whites to espouse “their commitment to formal principles of justice and equality” while opposing race-conscious policies that are arguably necessary to bring about racial justice.49 Shelby explains how the principle of race-neutrality or colorblindness contributes to racial injustice: According to this principle [of colorblindness] a person’s race should never be a consideration in determining how government institutions treat him or  Pierce (2014, 35).  Headley, “Philosophical Analysis and the Problem of Defining Racism: A Critique (2006, 11). 49  See, for example, George Lipsitz’s “The Possessive Investment in Whiteness: Racialized Social Democracy and the ‘White’ Problem in American Studies” (1995).  For systematic discussion of the various ways that appeals to the values of colorblindness and liberalism are used to rationalize existing racial inequality, see Eduardo Bonilla-Silva, Racism Without Racists: Color-Blind Racism and the Persistence of Racial Inequality in the United States (2006). 47 48

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her, even if the proposed race-conscious policy is designed to promote some otherwise worthy social goal, such as reducing occurrences of racial discrimination, creating greater racial integration, or attenuating the legacy of racial exclusion. Most Whites have a material stake in treating colorblindness as an absolute moral principle, for in viewing it thusly redistributive measures that would be costly to them can be regarded not only as bad policy— that is, as unwise, ineffective, or inefficient—but as unjust.50

It is not difficult to see how such considerations might be brought to bear on the normative status of ordinary usage. If most whites use the term “racism” in a way that limits racism to instances of individual wrongdoing—to the detriment of uses that are more sociopolitically significant to the interests of historical victims of racial prejudice and ­discrimination— and if the term is ordinarily used to condemn race-conscious, corrective policies (like affirmative action or reparations) as a matter of principle, then it is arguably the case that ordinary usage of the term “racism” is morally objectionable. Policies that might otherwise have a fighting chance at closing the gap on racial inequality are condemned as racist by whites who tout a colorblind ideal to protect their white privilege. The white counterargument is that policies like affirmative action are wrong (or racist) because they discriminate on the basis of race. For Shelby, the colorblind commitment of many whites is not accidental, for its material basis is sociopolitical—it serves white interests. Whites as a group benefit from this social and linguistic norm which has it that race talk—particularly race talk that seeks to correct ongoing racial inequalities—is wrong. Shelby thus concludes: I raise this issue to express general doubts about the common-sense morality of race in the “postracial” era. In particular, I want to urge caution about how we use the public discourse about race—an often self-serving, deeply dishonest, and conflict-ridden discourse—in our philosophical analyses of racism. Racial common sense, whether rooted in the sensibilities of dominant groups or subordinate ones, should not determine the conclusions of systematic theory, and generalizations about what “we” mean by “racism” should be viewed with skepticism.51

Summing up the upshot of Blum, Shelby, Pierce, and Headley’s arguments, we can extract two practical objections to existing usage of “racism.”  Shelby (2014, 62).  Shelby (2014, 62–3).

50 51

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The first is the set of problems stemming from overusage or conceptual inflation—including the “conversation-stopper problem” Shelby mentions. The second problem—and the more pressing one, from Shelby’s p ­ erspective—is a problem of political morality. Ordinary usage of the term “racism” exacerbates oppressive racial disparities and inequalities by identifying racism with individual wrongdoing and the standard of colorblindness. A philosophical definition of the term “racism,” according to Shelby, ought to be a moral-political tool for individuals concerned with racial justice. However, a prevailing definition of “racism” currently reflects the material interests of whites who use it in connection with issues of personal morality, making this a favored tool of the opposition. By emphasizing personal racism, ordinary usage distracts more than helps—for example, a focus on personal morality feeds into debates about identity politics and political correctness, as Linda Martin Alcoff has argued.52 Following Shelby and Headley, there is arguably a case to be made that if one truly values social justice, then one ought to question the normative status of ordinary usage. In short: If ordinary usage of the term “racism” prompts significant practical problems—for instance, if the “race talk” that is required to adequately address the most pressing problems of race today is inhibited by inflated and white-interest-serving usage—then the prescriptive question “How should ‘racism’ be used?” cannot be properly answered by mere reference to what is called “racism,” since ordinary usage (commonsense thinking about racism) is part of the problem.

6.5   Conclusion How do the above criticisms bear on the destabilization of “racism”? The political objections to ordinary usage we’ve considered suggest that ordinary usage is politically skewed toward white interests, that ordinary usage promotes an objectionable political agenda. These arguments do not seek to show that ordinary usage is unstable (though they arguably presuppose that it is). Blum’s argument, by contrast, shows that the meaning of “racism” is so inflated that ordinary usage allows us to call virtually everything that goes wrong in the racial domain racist. Hence, although both arguments suggest that the presumption of conservatism is misguided, only Blum’s argument speaks directly to the instability of ordinary usage. 52  Alcoff’s Visible Identities (2006) provides a helpful survey of social scientific literature on the role of racial discourse in identity politics disputes. She argues that what are in fact legitimate racial concerns are castigated as “identity politics” rhetoric.

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Ultimately, both sets of arguments are complementary by virtue of providing distinct  normative considerations that support the decision to start from the presumption of agnosticism. Taken together, these arguments provide a prima facie case for the superiority of revisionism over conservatism. Adopting revisionism as the correct normative approach, however, does not imply that no aspects of ordinary usage are worth preserving. Rather, it implies that we need an ideal other than OUC to guide us. Moreover, we have seen that there are no good independent arguments for OUC and that conservatives simply proceed on the unwarranted assumption that conserving-ordinary-usage-­for-its-ownsake is prima facie plausible or obvious. In the next chapter, I defend a substantive normative ideal  that I take to be consistent with the revisionist approach. This is the ideal of defining “racism” from the perspective of the historical victims of racial prejudice, discrimination, and the like. The tentative or prima facie argument I have laid out for revisionism— and thus for the rejection of OUC—can be summarily presented as follows: 1. Ordinary usage of “racism” prompts significant practical difficulties (like conceptual inflation, conceptual misunderstanding, conceptual confusion, disagreement about what is racist, and so on), though such difficulties might be averted by revising ordinary usage. 2. If ordinary usage of “racism” prompts significant practical difficulties that might be averted by revising ordinary usage, then this fact counts as a mark against the normative status of ordinary usage and so counts as a reason for revising ordinary usage (hence for rejecting OUC). 3. Therefore, the fact that ordinary usage of “racism” prompts significant practical difficulties counts as a mark against the normative status of ordinary usage and so counts as a reason for revising ordinary usage (hence for rejecting OUC). Prima facie evidence for both premises was provided, though my case is defeasible. Clearly, a more thorough accounting of the social and political dynamics involved in the practice of ordinary usage might reveal additional considerations relevant to its normative status. Finally, I will leave it to others to more thoroughly investigate the various normative critiques of ordinary usage we have considered. What I have sought to provide is a plausible prima face case against conservatism for purposes of u ­ ndermining

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the conservative default position. Moreover, I hope to have shown that something along the lines of premise 2 of the above argument should be adopted as an adequacy condition for a prescriptive theory of “racism.” That is, premise 2 can be viewed as a partial answer to the methodological question “Given an agnostic default position, how should we decide between conservatism and revisionism?” The preceding argument underscores the importance of justifying substantive adequacy conditions, such as OUC.  I will attempt to defend a desideratum consistent with revisionism in the next chapter. Acknowledgments  This chapter is a modified version of “A Revisionist Theory of ‘Racism’: Rejecting the Presumption of Conservatism,” forthcoming in Journal of Social Philosophy.

References Alcoff, Linda Martin. 2006. Visible Identities: Race, Gender, and the Self. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Appiah, K.Anthony. 1990. Racisms. In Anatomy of Racism, ed. David T. Goldberg. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Blum, Lawrence. 2002. “I’m not a Racist, But…”: The Moral Quandary of Race. Ithaca/London: Cornell University Press. Bonilla-Silva, Eduardo. 2006. Racism Without Racists: Color-Blind Racism and the Persistence of Racial Inequality in the United States. 1st ed. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishing. Carmichael, Stokely, and Charles V. Hamilton. 1967. Black Power: The Politics of Liberation in America. New York: Vintage Books. Dummett, Michael. 2004. The Nature of Racism. In Racism in Mind, ed. Michael P. Levine and Tamas Pataki, 27–34. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Garcia, Jorge L.A. 1996. The Heart of Racism. Journal of Social Philosophy 27: 5–45. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9833.1996.tb00225.x. ———. 1997. Current Conceptions of Racism: A Critical Examination of Some Recent Social Philosophy. Journal of Social Philosophy 28: 5–42. https://doi. org/10.1111/j.1467-9833.1997.tb00373.x. ———. 1999. Philosophical Analysis and the Moral Concept of Racism. Philosophy and Social Criticism 25 (5): 1–32. ———. 2004. Three Sites for Racism: Social Structures, Valuings, and Vice. In Racism in Mind, ed. Michael P.  Levine and Tamas Pataki. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Glasgow, Joshua. 2009. Racism as Disrespect. Ethics 120: 64–93. https://doi. org/10.1086/648588.

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Harris, Leonard. 1998. The Concept of Racism: An Essentially Contested Concept? The Centennial Review XLII (2): 217–232. Headley, Clevis. 2006. Philosophical Analysis and the Problem of Defining Racism. Philosophia Africana 9: 1–16. Jones, Robert P., and Daniel Cox. 2012. Beyond Guns and God: Understanding the Complexities of the White Working Class in America. Washington, DC: Public Religion Research Institute, September 20. Knobe, Joshua, and John M. Doris. 2010. Responsibility. In The Moral Psychology Handbook, ed. John M.  Doris and the Moral Psychology Research Group. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Lipsitz, George. 1995. The Possessive Investment in Whiteness: Racialized Social Democracy and the “White” Problem in American Studies. American Quarterly 47 (3): 369. McCormick, Kelly. 2017. Revisionism. In The Routledge Companion to Free Will, ed. Kevin Timpe. New York: Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group. Miles, Robert. 1989. Conceptual Inflation. In Racism. London: Routledge Press. Mills, Charles W. 2003. ‘Heart Attack’: A Critique of Jorge Garcia’s Volitional Conception of Racism. The Journal of Ethics 7 (1): Special Issue: “Race, Racism, and Reparations,” 29–62. Omi, Michael, and Howard Winant. 1994. Racial Formation in the United States: From the 1960s to the 1990s. 2nd ed. New York: Routledge. Ostrander, Kathleen. 1999. Milton Board Decides to Retire Indian Logo, Name. Milwaukee Journal Sentential (online), July 20. Pierce, Andrew. 2014. Structural Racism, Institutional Agency, and Disrespect. Journal of Philosophical Research 39: 23–42. Schmid, W. Thomas. 1996. The Definition of Racism. Journal of Applied Philosophy 13: 31–40. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5930.1996.tb00147.x. Shelby, Tommie. 2002. Is Racism in the ‘Heart’? Journal of Social Philosophy 33: 411–420. https://doi.org/10.1111/0047-2786.0015. ———. 2014. Racism, Moralism, and Social Criticism. Du Bois Review 11 (1): 57–74. Shipler, David K. 1997. A Country of Strangers: Blacks and Whites in America. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. Taylor, Paul C. 2004. Race: A Philosophical Introduction. Cambridge: Polity Press. Urquidez, Alberto G. 2018. What Accounts of ‘Racism’ Do. Journal of Value Inquiry. Published online: March 14. https://doi.org/10.1007/ s10790-018-9626-0. Vargas, Manuel R. 2005. The Revisionist’s Guide to Responsibility. Philosophical Studies 125: 399–429. Weinraub, Bernard. 1999. Stung by Criticism of Fall Shows, TV Networks Add Minority Roles. New York Times, September 20. Wittgenstein, Ludwig. 2009. Philosophical Investigations. 4th ed., ed. and trans. Peter M.S. Hacker and Joachim Schulte. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.

PART III

Toward a Prescriptive Theory of Racism

CHAPTER 7

Adequacy Conditions for a Prescriptive Theory of Racism: Toward an Oppression-Centered Account

7.1   Introduction If the argument that’s unfolded in preceding chapters is sound, the philosophical question “What is racism?” is best viewed as the expression of a grammatical need, one that has an important practical dimension. The concept of racism is hotly contested and different groups have different interests for its use. Political contestation (perhaps in conjunction with other factors) means that the ordinary concept  racism is constituted by multiple representational norms, some of which are incompatible in the sense that they generate incompatible judgments. For this reason, the philosopher must pragmatically advocate for revisions that will introduce an internally consistent set of norms. Negotiation of the grammar of racism, at least in some contexts or occasions, seems a promising way forward, for a definition that is not followed by the relevant community is at best a possible rule. Negotiation, in order to be successful, must be realized in practice.1 In this chapter I present my case for three adequacy criteria for a prescriptive theory of racism. 1  The metalinguistic negotiation I envision is not the result of a single conversation. Nor is it one that will come out of a voting committee at a session of the American Philosophical Association. It is naïve for any scholar to believe herself unique in possessing the magic sauce that will transform her peers into proponents of her doctrine. Scholarly consensus will likely be achieved, if at all, the old fashioned way—over a course of many years, with scholars arguing back and forth, making some converts here and there, modifying one’s own views,

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In the course of arguing for certain adequacy criteria, I provide a sketch of a definition of “racism” that I take to satisfy my criteria. My reason for including an account of racism in a chapter that aims to develop prescriptive criteria for an account of racism is as follows: my criteria are generated a priori, from the same source that inspires my account of racism. Said differently, after much effort, I came to discover that I would not be able to discuss my criteria for a theory of racism without simultaneously presupposing a definition of “racism.” Thus it is reasonable to read this chapter as a rationalization of my proposed definition, as a discussion of the considerations that weighed with me in grappling with my puzzlement about how best to define the term. My proposed definition is essentialist in some sense of the term, but not in an ontological sense. It is not an account of “what racism is,” if by that is meant a true description of reality. For, as I’ve argued, the philosophical question “What is racism?” is equivalent to the question “How should ‘racism’ be used for moral-­ representational purposes?” It is not a request for a description of racism, but a rule for representing things as racist. To orient the discussion, I start from the following non-negotiable value judgment (which I develop et cetera. This is a communal rather than an individual effort. However, we must distinguish negotiation among philosophers or scholars of racism and negotiation of “racism” in the wider moral community. Making converts in the latter domain may seem even less realistic, largely because political prejudices tend to be more prevalent and less constrained by rational norms (not everyone argues in good faith, for example). What, then, is the value of negotiation if it is unachievable? The criticism rests on a questionable assumption. It assumes that wide-scope consensus within the entire moral community is necessary if the notion of negotiation is to have a place in moral and political discourse. As I argue in Chap. 9, however, most consequential decisions do not require unanimous agreement within the entire community. Where unanimous agreement is required, it may only be required for a subset of the larger community.   Moreover, it is usually not agreement about definitions that is essential, but agreement about policy. A social critic brings her conceptions (and hence, her arguments for these conceptions) to relevant political discussions. Clearly, agreement in definitions may be important to achieving her political ends, but the way in which these conceptions inform her arguments for substantive policy proposals may be more important to achieving her political ends than convincing others to adopt her particular definition. Similarly for the academic. The hope of a book like mine is that its ideas will make a contribution to the ongoing discussion about “what racism is.” As scholars, despite our knowing that our ideas may never become adopted by our peers, we continue to write and defend them. This is analogous to the struggle for social justice. One struggles with the hope that with time, and with more articulate proponents of one’s views, and with…, one’s ideas will catch on. I take this to be related to what Shelby calls the role of the “social critic”—that is, one who develops conceptions that directly and indirectly inform public policy issues, strategic planning, and the like.

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below): a theory of racism should provide a definition (along with other conceptual resources) in service of an anti-racist agenda. I propose three all-things-considered criteria for any satisfactory theory of racism. I first state the desiderata in generic fashion, then elaborate and qualify each in the sections that follow: The moral condition: a moralist definition of “racism” should accommodate usage of the term (whether ordinary, scholarly, or novel) that satisfies a legitimate moral need for the corresponding linguistic convention. Legitimacy is to be determined by establishing an analogue to paradigmatic cases that are furnished by historical usage. (It should thus accommodate usage that corresponds to the needs of historical victims of racial oppression; hence why I argue the political morality approach is superior to the personal morality approach.) The explanatory condition: as much as possible, a moralist definition should strive to explain forms of racism in terms of more basic forms, for example, by showing that the latter are the causes of the former (I argue that individualistic forms of racism should be explained in terms of structuralist and institutionalist forms of racism.) The resolution/ameliorative condition: as much as possible, a moralist definition of “racism” should resolve or mitigate practical problems (including pragmatics and moral-political problems) prompted by ordinary usage, and should avoid generating any practical problems of its own. (I take this condition to be of secondary importance, relative to the other criteria.) I begin, in Sect. 7.2, by defending the moral condition. My account is, from beginning to end, moralist in the sense described in that section. I clarify what I mean by “moral” and “legitimate” in the expression “legitimate moral need,” and reply to the objection that moralist accounts are inherently biased. In Sect. 7.3, I elaborate and defend the explanatory condition (though see my application of it in the next chapter for illustration). In Sect. 7.4, I turn to the resolution condition. Here I briefly address the moral and pragmatics problems that are prompted by ordinary usage. Before moving on, I should note that my adequacy criteria are not designed to govern social scientific work on racism, for they are criteria for theories of moral representation. Perhaps, they probably ought not be implemented in many social scientific projects, since much social scientific

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work has a descriptive rather than a moralist aim. To take this a step further, it is not my position that the concept of racism is only a moral concept; it is also social and political. As a complex phenomenon it should be studied from multiple perspectives and employed for different purposes.

7.2   The Moral Condition Below I argue that the concept of racism is and ought to be amenable to revision. But this limit does not hold for every feature of the concept. Some features should be permanent, held with unwavering commitment. One of these non-negotiable features is that racism is bad (seriously morally objectionable). Another is that racism is a sociocultural concept (see below; also, Chaps. 1 and 2). In this section, I defend the claim that racism is unjustifiable and seriously objectionable. This is the heart of what I call the moral condition, which states that prescriptive theory should define the term “racism” by reference to a legitimate moral need. The questions I address in this section are:  What counts as a legitimate moral need? What  is the particular moral need  that determines legitimate usage? In addition, I consider some interrelated worries raised by Tommie Shelby and Charles Mills, which can roughly be characterized thus: moralist accounts of “racism”  lack  warrant because they uncritically  start from accepted moral values that bias the ensuing account. 7.2.1  A Necessary Value: Advance Nonwhite Interests The heart of the moral condition is the term “legitimate moral need.” Since this term is vague, a sharpening of the term is in order. I begin with the expression “moral need.” Along the way, I introduce terminology that I will use throughout the rest of this chapter. As aforementioned, the relevant moral need that orients my philosophical investigation is the ideal of anti-racism. Benjamin Mitchell-Yellin puts it this way: Though they offer distinct analyses of racism, the political view and the moral view are both closely connected to what we can call the pragmatic aim: the aim of eliminating, or at least mitigating, racism. This aim is apparently furthered by the political view’s commitment to focusing on institutional and social structures, the elimination of which would effect widespread and materially beneficial changes in the lives of those who suffer most from racial oppression. As suggested above, this seems to be one major attraction

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of the political view. But the pragmatic aim is related also to the moral view in that it is justified by that view’s commitment to the necessary immorality of racism. To claim that racism is immoral is to claim that there are reasons to combat it.2

Mitchell-Yellin calls this feature pragmatic, but, clearly, it is also moralist, for the notion that we should commit to ending racism presupposes that racism is morally objectionable. Moralist theories wear their anti-racist agenda on their sleeves. As I deploy this term, moralism is a feature predicated of philosophical theories and approaches to racism that treat anti-­ racism as fundamental and uncompromisable to their analytical projects. Mitchell-Yellin’s “aim of eliminating racism” goes beyond the requirement to account for racism’s moral badness. Taken to its logical conclusion, his criterion implies that prescriptive  theory ought to  serve the interests of victims of what has historically been called racism. I will use the expression “racism’s historical victims” to signify the class of individuals who have been relegated to a subordinate racial group (i.e., nonwhites). Before going further with this discussion, I will pause to provide some terminology for purposes of this chapter. Although we may distinguish various kinds of moral badness, following Mitchell-Yellin (and Tommie Shelby), we can group racist phenomena into two types of badness, two levels at which the value of anti-racism applies: personal and political morality. I begin, however, by positing a generic term to differentiate racial ills in each domain. • the term wrongness signifies something (e.g., lying) that is objectionable on personalist grounds (e.g., lying is a vice); more specifically, “wrongness” applies to anything for which an individual can be morally criticized and/or held responsible, including sins of the ­ “heart” and “mind.”3 • the term injustice signifies a social arrangement or practice (e.g., a voter ID law) that is objectionable on political-moral grounds; here, “injustice” applies to the conditions that produce/sustain unfair advantage for some racial groups and unfair disadvantage for others. It is objectionable in that there are reasons to combat or change it.4  Benjamin Mitchell-Yellin (2018, 57–8).  Some personal morality approaches to racism: Appiah (1990), Schmid (1996), Garcia (1996), Blum (2002). 4  Some political morality  approaches to racism: Mills (1997),  Headley (2000), Pierce (2014), Shelby (2016), O’Connor (2002), Haslanger (2004), and Curry (2017). Virtually 2 3

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In principle, racial wrongs and racial injustices may be objectionable without being racist. Which racial wrongs/injustices are racist and why will depend on the criteria for racism. (For example, my account of racism-as-­ racial-oppression implies that nonwhites cannot be racist toward whites in most actual contexts and situations. For anti-white prejudice does not usually function to oppress whites. Hence we can say that anti-white prejudice is racially wrong, but not racist.) When I speak of morality in a broad sense—that is, to pick out racist phenomena as morally objectionable—I use the term racial badness/vileness: • The term racial badness/vileness is an umbrella term that covers every significant racial ill that merits an ascription of racism (i.e., an ill that is seriously morally objectionable). This distinguishes racially bad/vile phenomena from what Lawrence Blum calls “racial ills.” • The term racial ill is a broader umbrella term than “badness”/ “vileness”; it picks out every morally problematic phenomenon that occurs in the racial domain, including non-racist racial ills. The above terminology (“wrongness,” “injustice,” “racial badness,” “racial ill”) should be understood as stipulative. I invoke it merely for purposes of clarity of exposition. (My contention below will be that all instances of racial injustice are racist, and many racial wrongs [though not necessarily all] are also racist.) We can now specify the meaning of “moral need.” The moral need that underlies prescriptive theory is the need to represent some racial ills as worse than others, as viler than others. Specifically, there is a need for historical victims of racism to combat the deleterious legacy of racialized thinking, which is still alive and well, today. The way to do this is to single out for special attention the set of racial ills that are characteristically harmful to this group. This vileness we single out and convey via the weight of all racial oppression accounts of racism are injustice approaches to racism, including nonphilosophical approaches. For non-philosophical accounts of racism-as-racial-oppression, see hooks (2015), Carmichael and Hamilton (1967), Feagin (2006), and Sidanius and Pratto (1999). Much work in the humanities and social sciences presupposes an oppression approach to racism.

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the terms “racism” and “racist,” thereby signifying the high moral severity of these racial offenses. To mark this distinction, I will say that those racial ills that “rise” to the level of racism—those that are, in some way or other, demonstrably harmful to nonwhites—are seriously/severely objectionable. My use of “moral need” in this context should be understood as a purely terminological point. I do not wish to imply that “non-­serious” racial ills are not serious in any ordinary sense of the term; rather, the sense in which they are “not serious” is that they should not be called (condemned as) racist  in moral representation. I call the criterion for determining the moral seriousness of a racial ill severity constraint. Below I address the questions: What makes some racial ills worse than others? What determines severity? My discussion will be couched in the context of some initial objections to moralist theories of racism. 7.2.1.1 T  he Mills-Shelby Objection: Theory Should Not Explain Racism’s Wrongness A philosopher might grant that racism is always wrong and yet maintain that a moral-philosophical theory of racism should not start from this presumption. At least initially, the idea seems to be, a philosophical definition of “racism” ought to be neutral on the question of what accounts for racism’s normative valence. This intuition is further supported by the notion that theory is, first and foremost, concerned with the metaphysical rather than normative nature of racism. After all, the initial goal of theory is to determine what precisely racism is. The semantic externalist thus argues that only once the referent of “racism” is determined should the theorist go on to raise questions about the normative status of racism. For it might turn out that upon discovering what racism is, we might learn, to our surprise, that racism is not always objectionable. Alternatively, we might arrive at the conclusion that the objectionable status of racism is not a matter of personal wrongdoing, but of the unjust structuring of society, or something along those lines. This position has been defended by Charles Mills and Tommie Shelby. Here is Shelby’s argument: Nowadays, as Garcia himself correctly points out, the term “racism” is so haphazardly thrown about that it is no longer clear that we all mean, even roughly, the same thing by it. Some even complain that the term is fast becoming (or has long since become) a mere epithet, with strong emotive force but little or no clear content. This doesn’t mean the concept is no longer useful, but it does suggest that we need to clearly specify its referent

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before we can determine whether the relevant phenomenon is always morally problematic. This will require some philosophical reconstruction, which may diverge, even radically, from ordinary usage. Until such a reconstructive project is completed, though, we should remain agnostic about whether every instance of “racism” is immoral, for our best reconstruction may show that many of our pretheoretic moral convictions are unfounded or inconsistent.5

Mills presents the same worry, though with different emphasis: “it is not legitimate to eliminate, or at least handicap, competing analyses by presenting as seemingly obvious what is in fact a theoretically heavily loaded prerequisite. The necessary immorality of racism is something that has to be argued for, not something that can be stipulated in advance.”6 “Moralist approaches,” he says, stipulate (a priori) “that racism in its different varieties is always wrong before we seek to do an analysis of racism,” and this “aprioristic assumption may distort the investigative project.” Garcia is cited as the characteristic example of this fallacy: Rather than approaching things neutrally, we may find ourselves denying that certain phenomena which prima facie seem racist, or have been taken by many to be racist, are such, because they do not pass the (im)morality test. Shelby argues, and I agree, that this is just what has happened in Garcia’s account. By moralizing racism, by making it (always) a vice, a sin, he not only ties himself to an account with implausible implications, but distorts his own investigation, ending up tailoring the description of the phenomena to fit his preferred definition.7

Shelby and Mills’ arguments are two sides of the same coin. The former can be said to raise a concern about concept distortion (moralist theories get things backwards: by stipulating the necessary wrongness of racism prior to determining its referent, theorists risk distorting the concept. The latter can be said to raise a concern about theory distortion (moralist criteria are biased by virtue of excluding racist phenomena that fail to meet the aprioristic standard). To avoid distortion in either case, theory must first specify the referent of “racism,” by presenting a reconstruction of the concept. Both Shelby and Mills think this is to be properly done by refer Shelby (2002, 412).  Mills (2003, 34). 7  Ibid., 58. 5 6

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ence to empirical work rather than by reference to ordinary usage or commonsense thinking. Both are, therefore, committed to semantic externalism as the appropriate vehicle of metaphysical analysis. My first reply to these objections is that the externalist semantics taken for granted is questionable. I have considered and rejected semantic externalism in Chap. 4. The idea that we must first specify the referent of “racism” is confused, because there is no language-independent referent of “racism.” Definitions of “racism” are not descriptions of racism, so they are not descriptions of why racism is wrong. Definitions of “racism” are norms of representation. Since these issues were extensively discussed in the first four chapters of the book, I will not repeat my arguments here. What about Shelby’s worry that the term “racism” is so haphazardly thrown about that it is no longer clear that we all mean, even roughly, the same thing by it? I conceded this point in previous chapters. The term “racism” is overused, in part because of the concept’s intrinsically politicized nature. The term naturally lends itself to use as a political weapon by individuals who have incompatible material stakes in how the term gets applied. This very point, however, is precisely the reason why grammatical negotiation is called for: we must decide how the term “racism” ought to be used, so as to give it a definite meaning, one that can be pragmatically justified by reference to the moral need of racism’s historical victims. At the very least, we must negotiate the meaning of the term in moral contexts where definitional  agreement is essential to achieving a desirable social, pedagogical or political end. If this is correct, then the Mills-Shelby objection does not undermine moralist accounts generally, nor mine ­specifically. Their argument, in my view, simply underscores the need for a prescriptive account of racism (i.e., the need to make a decision). For Mills, moralist accounts are individualistic (agent-centered)  theories which focus on personal virtue and vice, blame and praise, rightful and wrongful action, and the like. This is consistent with Shelby’s account of moralist definitions. A “moralistic definition of racism,” he says, is “a definition that treats every instance of racism as a culpable failure of some individual or group to endorse or comply with a valid moral principle.”8 My use of the term “moralism” differs from theirs. As I use the term, any account that appeals to racism’s intrinsic wrongness or badness is moralist; that is, any account that advances criticisms on the presumption that “racism” is a term of criticism, reproach, or condemnation is moralist. My 8

 Shelby (2014, 65).

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reason for broadening the category of moralist approaches beyond individualistic notions is that I think it incoherent (hence, impossible) to analyze the concept of racism for moral-political purposes on the assumption that racism is not objectionable. The presumption that racism is objectionable is necessary if we want a concept that retains its condemnatory-critical function for the purpose of promoting anti-racist ends. At the same time, in order to avoid biasing the account, we need to acknowledge that there are multiple levels of vileness which are currently associated with “racism.” Some or all of these may be legitimate, and so should not be precluded by a moralist approach, without argumentation. Shelby claims that a theory of racism need not be moralist, since it is sufficient that it have moral significance.9 This claim makes sense as an objection to individualistic accounts of racism that exclude the concerns of political morality. However, the solution to this exclusion is not to remove the concept’s moral content, even provisionally, as semantic externalism proposes, but to determine the scope of racial ills we would like to condemn with this term. Said differently, Shelby’s requirement that a theory of racism must have moral import presumes at the outset that racism is morally objectionable on some level or other. Or is he seriously proposing that science might discover that racism is morally benign or, alternatively, morally good? Obviously, he wouldn’t accept any theory of racism that suggested either of these. So, his account is pretheoretically informed by moral intuition, and should not pretend otherwise. Moral theory must start from a basic moral conviction if it is to address the political contestedness of the term (e.g., the dispute between individualists and institutionalists). And, as mentioned above, the notion that we can somehow provisionally remove the moral content of racism is predicated on a dubious externalist semantics for “racism.” Shelby writes as if his interest in using the concept of racism for political purposes is unimportant to this discussion. His political interest, however, is an expression of his moral perspective. I agree with him that “racism” should be primarily used as a critical social term. But this is a substantive normative point, and the basis for this judgment should be made explicit and defended on normative-pragmatic grounds (as I attempt below). Shelby tacitly acknowledges his substantive moral 9  He writes: “we could maintain that racism, whatever its form or mode of expression, is prima facie a cause for moral concern (in accordance with postulate 2 of the wide-scope conception) but that not everything properly regarded as racist represents a moral failing (in accordance with postulate 4)” (ibid.).

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­ osition in his discussion of an “alternative set of initial assumptions,” p all of which are substantive moral-­grammatical propositions. One of them is that not every instance of racism is a grave moral failing, and another is that instances of racism are prima facie cause for moral concern. He then makes this important concession: “I won’t defend these postulates by suggesting they are all self-evident. They clearly are not. The strength of my case will depend on showing how the postulates advance our understanding in comparison with a compelling alternative set of initial assumptions.”10 He later adds: Suppose, for purposes of moral criticism, that we wanted to put the phenomenon of racism into some familiar category of recognized wrongs, such as intolerance for legitimate differences. We could not do so properly if we failed to grasp the nature of the phenomenon at issue, if, for example, we were wrongly to assume that it is a response to cultural differences between racially defined groups. Social scientific research will therefore be essential to ensuring that our moral assessments are suitably informed by the relevant facts. In addition, it is important to recognize the possibility that these facts, as with all scientific facts, may diverge from or conflict with common sense, prompting us to revise our pre-conceptions.11

I have defended (and will further defend below) the claim that grammar should be informed by empirical facts about racial phenomena. But it is illusory to think that philosophers are merely being guided by facts. For as Shelby himself has pointed out, fixing the referent of “racism” is not enough: we must ultimately start from an “initial” set of substantive moral assumptions.  One of these non-negotiable assumptions is that racism is vile. 7.2.1.2 A  rthur’s Objection: Racism Is Not a Moral Flaw, but an Epistemic Flaw Any account of racism that aims to explain why racism is wrong or unjust is moralist, as I’ve defined the term. We have dealt with a set of methodological objections to moralist accounts. John Arthur, however, provides a different line of objection. He argues that not all instances of racism are deserving of moral condemnation. “But is it true,” he writes, “that racism alone constitutes a moral defect? If so, what is the nature of the defect?” He  Ibid., 61.  Ibid., 63.

10 11

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invites us to consider the case of the reluctant racist, a case involving a racially hateful person (perhaps, due to his upbringing), who despises and “deeply regrets” his hostile attitudes.12 According to Arthur, the racist’s hostile attitudes are not morally objectionable “unless there is something that he has done that warrants condemnation. … The core of racism and its normative force is therefore epistemic.” He concludes: Although he is still a racist, it seems clear that it would be wrong to blame such a person. He is like a person who is born with an inclination to violence or a kleptomaniac who has a tendency to steal worthless junk. Indeed, there is reason to feel some sympathy for the person. Such a reluctant racist, were he to exist, has a heavier moral burden to bear than others who are more fortunate.13

What are we to make of Arthur’s claim that we should not call the reluctant racist  a morally depraved person, but should instead  lament his impoverished cognitive state and extend our sympathies? Joshua Glasgow rejects this argument on the ground that it fails to accord with ordinary usage of “racism” (though he acknowledges that ordinary usage might be problematic in its own right).14 Whether reluctant racism is possible on  John Arthur (2007, 17).  The position that racism involves an epistemic flaw rather than a moral one no longer seems to be the dominant view in the literature, but it is not uncommon either. Dummett, for instance, defines racism as a kind of irrational prejudice that manifests in hostile behavior toward a racial group (2004, 28). According to Dummett, a negative generalizing belief about an entire race of people is normally irrational because it will either be empirically indefensible or will be based on ignorance. It can be rational, says Dummett, if it is based on a kind of plausible ignorance. “A belief in the inferiority of a whole racial group in either respect can be sustained with some show of rationality only if it is held that the group will never produce anyone of the highest achievements: that, say, there will never be a great orator, writer, artist, musician, or scientist from that group—say, from Africa and the black population of the New World, or, again, from the subcontinent. It would need a remarkable ignorance to put forward such a proposition; but then, some people, though rational, are remarkably ignorant” (2004, 29). Even if the prejudice is rational, however, the behavior based on it will be irrational if it is “of the kind that usually characterizes racists. It would be a poor reason for not wanting someone of a certain racial group to enter one’s house or buy the house next door that one did not expect any great scientist or artist to stem from that group. No great amount of either intelligence or artistic talent is needed for ordinary day-today dealings between human beings. One could not justify withholding common courtesy, just treatment, or compassion from someone by a plea that that person lacked high intelligence and great talent, even if one was oneself a genius or prodigy” (29). 14  Glasgow (2009, 80). 12 13

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ordinary usage is not particularly relevant, in my view, for conforming to ordinary usage is not an adequacy criterion for a theory of racism. I reject Arthur’s claim  that racists who are indoctrinated into racist antipathy, disdain, disregard, and the like should not be seen as responsible for their untameable cognitive attitudes. The idea that they should get a free pass if they have tried their best, et cetera is objectionable. It is similar, though not completely analogous, to cases where an agent is unaware that she harbors implicit racial biases and acts in harmful ways toward others when these are triggered. We can imagine that she has no reason to suspect that she harbors such biases. In both cases we are supposed to conclude that racial wrongdoing is not worthy of serious moral reproach, regrettable though that may be, because of the exculpatory condition of control: an individual must have control over her attitudes in order to be morally culpable for her conduct. In the case of implicit bias, there is an additional argument that might be used: an individual cannot be morally culpable for an attitude she is unaware she holds. I will explain the problem I have with applying the exculpatory and awareness conditions in the context of implicit racial bias before turning to Arthur’s application of the former in the case of the reluctant racist. Tommy Curry, following a line of critical race theorists, draws attention to empirical studies and social science work (e.g., social psychological studies) that support the claim that “white implicit bias prevents whites from acting against blatant acts of racist violence, recognizing Black human rights during catastrophes, or simply acknowledging racism that they themselves have witnessed.”15 A moment’s reflection on the ramifications of these conclusions reveals that the effects of implicit bias are far-­ reaching in that they impose unfair burdens on subordinate racial groups (i.e., nonwhite races). I start with this point, because the conversation about moral responsibility for implicit bias ought to be addressed within a sociocultural framework. It is tempting to evaluate cases of implicit bias as isolated events, as though broader social forces at play are morally insignificant. However, when these social forces perpetuate a condition of ­vulnerability that is burdensome for nonwhites, these social forces surely become morally significant. Implicit racial biases are widespread and consist of invidious racial stereotypes that originated in the racism of the past. What is more, these biases are learned at a very young age, which implies 15  Curry (2010, 554). He cites as evidence for these claims Goff et al. (2008), Hanson and Hanson (2006), and Kawakami (2009).

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that they  are products of racist culture  that continues to persist. Consequently, failing to criticize the phenomenon of implicit racial bias on the grounds that individuals are either unaware or incapable of controlling them has a  complicitous effect with this racist culture; it is  functionally equivalent to endorsing the underlying racism in our culture. For whether whites are aware or able to control their racial biases does little to mitigate the fact that an unjust burden is placed on the shoulders of the victim group. The question should therefore be framed as a question of justice: Who should bear the brunt of carrying the burdens of implicit racial bias? Plausibly, the collective burden should be placed on whites rather than nonwhites, since this psychological and intersubjective phenomenon is most harmful to nonwhites, who suffer from stigmatization. Furthermore, the existence of this phenomenon is one that was cultivated and sustained over a long period of time. That is, it is a function of a racist past that has worked to the detriment of nonwhites and the benefit of whites. The political norm of fairness, of fairly distributing social burdens, overrides the moral norm of holding individuals accountable for attitudes and conduct over which they have control and awareness. Given the value of racial justice, whites should sometimes be held responsible for implicit biases of which they are unaware and lack control. (How and in what ways they should be held accountable is something that requires further discussion.) To be sure, accountability would place a social burden on whites, but this is a fair price to pay given the collective benefits and privileges whites have accrued as a consequence of past racism and its continued presence in our racist culture. In other words, shifting the burden onto whites brings a modicum of justice to the political problem of which racial bias is one component: the problem of creating a more racially just society. We have reason, then, to condemn white implicit bias independent of whether the agent is aware or capable of controlling her attitudes. In addition to having a demeaning effect on the racial other, implicit racial bias contributes to racial dehumanization, stigmatization, and injustice: it contributes to the subordinate position of nonwhites. An important upshot of my argument is that intentional wrongdoing is not the only relevant factor in developing a moralist evaluation of implicit racial bias. A second problem with this argument is that, if racist attitudes are in fact functions of longstanding racial oppression, we should expect that virtually all people born into the society will be enmeshed in racist culture and thus acquire implicit racist attitudes. In a society shaped by hundreds of years of white supremacy, it would be astonishing if most denizens were not tainted by racist attitudes. Most people then are without excuse

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if and when such attitudes are activated. That is to say, individuals have a moral responsibility to try to identify what racist attitudes they may or may not have, and to do what can be done to mitigate those attitudes or prevent them from being activated.16 We should call these attitudes racist when nonwhites are the object of a negative association qua nonwhiteness, or when whites are the object of a positive association qua whiteness. At this point, however, we arrive at a disanalogy with the case of the reluctant racist. For the reluctant racist, we are imagining, has done everything he could to mitigate his hostility. If the reluctant  racist has tried his best to unlearn racism or at least constrain it, is the racist off the hook? The preceding discussion of implicit racial bias suggests that the answer here is, No. Arthur’s flawed assumption is that  characterological considerations are the only way to address the issue of personal accountability, the only just basis for condemning the reluctant racist. Further, he seems to incorrectly assume that it is coherent to talk about someone being racist without being morally responsible for one’s racism. The term “racism” is not just a term of individual criticism, but of social criticism. In the case of the reluctant racist this means that we ought to critically assess two things: the agent and the society that birthed him. We ought therefore to consider whether the reluctant racist’s attitude is a symptom of a racially oppressive society. Here we would be interested in the  social causes and not merely the psychological or characterological causes of his attitudes/conduct. The racist hostility that our reluctant racist has learned (let us imagine this is through no fault of his own) presupposes a racist culture as the background condition that makes this case a real possibility (i.e., a possibility for the actual world). A racist culture is not, of course, logically necessary to imagine such a person. But imagining such a person within the context of a racist culture seems necessary for generating intuitions that apply to the actual world. For without painting this background, the reluctant racist would be inexplicably pathological: he would be analogous to someone who harbored hostility for individuals with pimples (or some other arbitrary physical feature). As social critics we ought to ask: To what degree is unwitting racial hostility an intersubjective phenomenon among whites? Is the reluctant racist’s attitude an expression of a systemic or historically patterned effect? Addressing these questions is 16  This argument is increasingly being made by empirically minded philosophers of race. See, for example, Natalia Washington and Daniel Kelly in “Who’s Responsible for This?” (2016); Madva’s “A Plea for Anti-Anti-Individualism: How Oversimple Psychology Misleads Social Policy” (2017).

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preliminary to addressing this moral issue from a perspective that privileges the needs of (actual) victims of this form of racist agency. Arguably, the reluctant racist’s attitude can be condemned on account of contributing to racial stigmatization and  racial oppression. I thus conclude that questions concerning moral responsibility (for implicit bias and reluctant racism) should not simply be assessed from the lens of personal morality, but also from the lens of political morality. Giving reluctant racists a pass seems unjust: it seems to legitimate the unfair burdens that are currently being carried by racism’s historical victims. The logic of political morality can be extended to assess the idea that we should “pity” the reluctant racist. Assuming she is white, the idea is particularly  worrisome in the context of Arthur’s argument. If we are not careful to separate the conceptual question about racism from the sympathies we may have for a victim of pathological thinking, these feelings can lead to the  magical transformation of a member of a privileged social group, a beneficiary of racism, and an agent of oppression into a victim. In deciding how best to define the term “racism” our sympathies ought to be with the historical victims of racism, not with its historical perpetrators. Exculpating the perpetrator in effect amounts to complicity with injustice. The idea that we should limit the grammar of “racism” (racism’s necessary vileness, in particular) so as to express sympathy toward reluctant racists prioritizes the interests of whites at the expense of those who tend to be most harmed by irrational attitudes such as racial animus. (In public life, we should of course sympathize with whites or anyone else that is psychically ill, suffers from pathological tendencies, and so forth, but the context of concern here is not interpersonal interactions. Rather, we are here concerned with a conceptual matter. The question before us is this: Which set of burdens should we be “sympathetic” to for purposes of defining the term “racism”?) The failure to extend sympathy to those most commonly targeted by racism—those who experience it as a condition rather than an isolated event—adds insult to injury; it also perpetuates their second-class status. I thus conclude that Arthur’s objection fails. I shall therefore proceed on the premise that racism is morally bad. I have now argued that a theory of racism must explain racism’s moral badness. Minimally, this consists in: specifying the type of badness at issue (personal morality, political morality); the moral grounds of condemnation; and criteria for determining which phenomena or categories of phenomena can be(come) bad on these grounds. An explicit statement of each element need not be necessary, of course, provided that answers to

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these questions can be provided. Before we address these points, however, a more basic question is in order. What makes racism morally bad? Specifically, what gives it its special objectionable status, such that some racial ills (those that are racist) are more seriously objectionable than others? I will have more to say about this below. But two remarks are in order. First, the ills in question are pervasive: they affect several aspects of a victim’s life. Second, historical victims—those who bear the brunt of patterned forms of racial harm—suffer immensely (often with great intensity) as a result of these ills. Many of these racial ills continue to be inflicted to this day. Hence there is a need to meaningfully distinguish racism and racial ill, and not just in any old way, but in a way that is conducive to the representational needs of racism’s historical victims. Resolving this matter is all the more urgent for theory, given that racism is politically contested, often by non-historical victims of racism who have an interest in controlling the content of this norm. Since conceptual disagreement about what counts as racist must be addressed via prescriptive intervention, moralists must lay down the anti-racist value discussed in this section as a necessary and uncompromisable desideratum. Of the three theoretical burdens mentioned above, my account will focus on the following two: (1) to specify a broad principle for deciding what racial phenomena ought to be condemned as racist; and (2) to provide moral grounds for condemning said phenomena as racist. 7.2.2  Legitimate Need and Historical Usage: The Racial Oppression Approach Having explained what “moral need” means in the expression “legitimate moral need,” I now turn to the meaning of “legitimate.” To sharpen this term for theoretical purposes it is necessary to stipulate a criterion of legitimacy. Clearly, not just any limit on the concept racism which distinguishes it from racial ill qualifies as legitimate, for not just any limit will address the moral need described above. The proposal I defend is that the bounds of “legitimacy” should be rooted in historical usage of “racism.” I am not the first to identify historical usage as an adequate criterion for this purpose— for example, Blum has made a similar proposal.17 His argument is the basis

17  Blum writes: “The moral force of the term lies in both the violation of fundamental moral norms and in their relation to the evils of historical systems of oppression within which racist phenomena have been embedded” (2002, 32).

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for my own, but my argument is critical of certain aspects of the way he develops it, and I ultimately arrive at a different definition than he does. Expressions are introduced into language to fulfill specific needs. In the case of “racism,” that need is representational: to represent as-worthy-of-­ condemnation. By “historical usage” I mean usage that is constitutive of those practices of predication which have persevered over long tracks of time, and which have historically functioned as standards for establishing continuity between past and current usage as well as for extending the term. Since the referent of “racism” has changed, not just over time, but across contexts of use, it will be important to look to the underlying pragmatic structures and not merely the content of any one particular definition. An objection is likely to be raised at this point. The normative authority of historical usage as a standard of legitimate moral use is not intrinsic to it. So, why privilege historical usage? I submit that historical presence explains the longstanding practical need for the term. In other words, the longstanding need for the linguistic convention is a correlate of historical usage. For if historical linguistic practice did not meet this ­longstanding need, it seems likely that it would have long been forgotten and fallen into disuse (having joined the dustbin of antiquated terms and uses). Perhaps this point does not always hold; perhaps one must always be attentive to, and potentially critical of, the underlying values presupposed by an established practice. In the case of “racism,” however, the term was coined in the twentieth century as a tool of the oppressed. The term has continued to fulfill an important need for anti-racists, even if the term has also been appropriated by historical beneficiaries of racism.  The ongoing and consistent preservation of this term as a tool of moral reproach is a strong indicator that it corresponds to a deep need for the linguistic convention. This is particularly true if the term is so used by victims of racism and their anti-racist allies. It seems plausible, then, to hold that historical usage reflects underlying anti-racist values which are still worth preserving. Hence the desideratum: other things equal, historical usage should be privileged. One of the implications of my argument is that the core of historical usage must be exhibited in much (though certainly not all) contemporary linguistic practice. Hence it should be possible to reconstruct this core by analyzing the pragmatic structure that grounds historical usage. What longstanding practical need does historical usage reflect? Blum thinks it is the need to condemn racial ills that are seriously morally objectionable. His argument is that attentiveness to the term’s evolution reveals

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that its various extensions were always prompted by an important moral-­ critical need. This need, moreover, evolves in response to changes in social conditions. Old forms of racial harm and injustice are replaced with new forms. It ultimately transpired that, over time, rather than narrowing in scope, the concept has broadened and branched out in various directions. From its humble beginnings as a term restricted to insidious theories of racial belief and ideology, it expanded to cover motives, intentions, practices, institutions, societies, and so forth. These extensions reflect the growing need to condemn serious racial ills. But what is our criterion of “seriousness”? What makes one racial ill more or less serious than another? According to Blum, the severity connoted by “racism” is a function of the oppressive effects of systems of racial domination: [T]he moral wrong of race-based violations can not lie solely in their violating general moral norms, that is, violations that carry the same force for any victim. Otherwise, showing contempt for someone based on her race would have the same moral status as doing so because she has bad taste. What is it about racially-based violations of these human norms that intensifies the moral wrong involved. The additional opprobrium is racism’s integral tie to the social and systemic horrors of slavery, apartheid, Nazism, colonialism, segregation, imperialism, and the shameful treatment of Native Americans in the United States—all race-based systems of oppression. US law recognizes that racially based wrongs are more serious than other similar wrongs by calling race a particularly ‘invidious’ distinction. Because racial distinctions have been the source of the most heinous forms of systemic mistreatment, American law requires any policy that makes racial distinctions to pass the most stringent level of scrutiny as to whether its likely benefits outweigh its presumed wrongs.18

Blum maintains that racism increases the negative valence of antecedently objectionable phenomena. For instance, if lying is morally wrong, then lying to someone because of her race is even worse. If murdering someone is wrong, then murdering him because of his race is even worse. If discrimination is bad, then racial discrimination is worse. And so on. That which confers additional moral opprobrium upon racist phenomena (in contrast to non-racist phenomena of the same kind) is racism’s 18  Blum (ibid., 27). For Blum’s historical argument, see (ibid., 3–8). For a helpful historical account of racism, one that defines “racism” as an ideology that is integral to systems of racial oppression, see Frederickson (2002).

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historical link to racial oppression. According to Shelby’s understanding of Blum, “the association of race with such great evils [as racial oppression] is enough to give the charge of racism extra condemnatory power.”19 That is not the view I take here. I am not suggesting that a mere association between ascription of racisms and great racial harm is sufficient to explain why racism is always wrong. We must not confuse a genetic thesis or description of how “racism” came to connote serious harm with the criterial status that we confer to “racism.” Racism’s serious objectionable status stands in need of justification. The justification I propose is this: racial ills that rise to the level of racism are worthy of severe condemnation because they have historically contributed to racial oppression. For instance, consider racist jokes, which some people would say are not particularly harmful on normal occasions. Even if we grant that offensive jokes are not particularly harmful to specific individuals who hear them, racial jokes may play a role in sustaining racial oppression. Suppose that racial jokes are more likely to have a stigmatizing effect than non-racial jokes, where the brunt of the joke is a racial minority. This may be explained in more than one way. Perhaps, the racial minority is one that has been historically targeted for demeaning stereotypes. If these stereotypes are widely believed within the society, the practice of making racist jokes may reinforce the belief that these stereotypes are true (even if joke-makers do not necessarily believe this). In this case, a prima facie case can be made for condemning the joke as racist. (Making racist jokes may also be objectionable on grounds of moral viciousness, especially when it flows from the racist character of a person.) This argument is strengthened by the premise that racist jokes occur within a sociocultural context of racial oppression. I  have suggested that racism is racial oppression, but  what exactly  is racial oppression? I will not try to develop a definition of “oppression” here. Instead, I will settle for an intuitive understanding of the notion, with a few refinements based on a brief survey of the literature on oppression theory. My aim is to highlight some characteristic features of oppression, especially the types of harms it tends to produce. The first thing to emphasize in this regard is that oppression transgresses multiple virtues and undermines multiple essential human goods. Thus Iris Marion Young analyzes oppression as a structural concept, one that involves a power relation between social groups, that is constituted by the “five faces” of oppression:  Shelby (2014, 68).

19

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exploitation, marginalization, powerlessness, cultural imperialism, and violence.20 Jason Chen has recently identified seven distinctive harms. He takes these to be exhaustive: (1) political deprivation; (2) economic deprivation; (3) freedom deprivation; (4) social deprivation; (5) psychological harm; (6) the deprived capability to self-develop; and (7) some combination of these. The “core harm” of oppression, according to Chen, is the deprived capability to self-develop, where self-development is defined as “the development of one’s capacities in accordance with one’s true values.”21 He argues, along the way, that oppression is a species of domination and therefore entails domination.22 Clearly, the types of harms that oppression commits are far-reaching, shaping significant aspects of one’s life. Ann Cudd’s Analyzing Oppression argues that oppression “is an institutionally structured, unjust harm perpetrated on groups by other groups through direct and indirect material and psychological forces.” She claims that oppression is essentially a kind of social injustice, “a harm through which groups of persons are systematically and unfairly or unjustly constrained, burdened, or reduced by any of several forces.”23 Deprivation of freedom seems to be the primary explanatory harm, on her account, though she holds that there is no one harm of oppression. The phenomenon, moreover, cannot be properly understood by reference to its consequent harms alone. To properly analyze it, we must understand its causal mechanisms.24 One reason for this is that understanding the causes of oppression helps to answer an important and puzzling question about oppression: “How does oppression endure over time in spite of human’s rough natural equality? …To answer this question theorists have always had to show how the oppressed are induced to participate in their own oppression rather than resist it.”25 She describes the process in question as “cyclical”: I shall argue that material forces, by which I mean physical and psychological violence and economic domination, initiate a vicious cycle of harm that subjugates the oppressed to one or more privileged groups. These forces work in part by coercing the oppressed to act in ways that further their own  Iris Marion Young, “The Five Faces of Oppression” (1990).  Jason Chen (2017, 430). 22  Ibid., 436. 23  Cudd (2006, 23). 24  Ibid., 25. 25  Ibid., 21. 20 21

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oppression. Direct forces externally affect the choices of individuals, while indirect forces shape the background social beliefs and desires with which we perceive and behave toward others. The most important and insidious of these indirect forces is an economic force that acts by means of the oppressed persons’ own preferences and rational choices. Psychological forces, both direct and indirect, reinforce and secure oppressive institutions.26

“Racism” is plausibly defined as oppression because of its near-universal connection to the system of white supremacy. The systemic and all-­ encompassing nature of white supremacy accommodates all of the aforementioned forms of harm. Moreover, white supremacy’s lasting power thrusts onto the lap of theory Cudd’s question: What explains the persistence of racial oppression? This parallels the sociologist’s question: What explains the persistence of racial inequality? Regardless of whether people hold explicit racist attitudes or anti-racist and liberal attitudes, racial oppression seems to persist. This suggests that there are structural elements that stand above and beyond individual attitudes and ­conduct. Arguably, racial oppression persists both because of the “material forces” at play (“physical violence” and “economic domination”) and because of “indirect forces” which includes widespread “background social beliefs and desires.” Together, these forces function to create a condition of vulnerability for the victim. Unlike Cudd, Peg O’Connor’s Oppression and Responsibility stresses the invisibility of some forces of oppression. She helpfully cites a remark from Wittgenstein that she uses to illuminate the collaborative nature of producing and reproducing oppression: “What determines our judgment, our concepts and reactions is not what one man is doing now, an individual action, but the whole hurly-burly of human actions, the background against which we see any action.”27 This collaborative effort is often unseen and hence unknown because it is invisible: This ‘hurly-burly’ is infused with power relations that are in no way simply given. They are created, implemented, utilized, and deployed through our practices. Sexual abuse, battering, racism, homophobia, marital rape, and being closeted as queer are all practices that are part of this hurly-burly. These practices and the beliefs about them are part of the background.28  Ibid., 26; see also 79–80.  This passage is from Wittgenstein’s Zettel (1967, sect. 567). 28  O’Connor (2002, 4). 26 27

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As an example she notes, as Curry does, that whites often cannot see racism and racist acts.29 They see acts, behaviors, practices, and institutions, to be sure. They often even see the undesirable consequences of all this. But they do not see these things as racism, as manifestations of racial oppression. For that, one needs the requisite concept. Following O’Connor, I contend that racial oppression provides the background against which the legitimate use of terms like “racist action” and “racist ideology” acquires a prescriptively justified sense. By positing that racism is racial oppression I am laying down a form of representation that will hopefully prove useful for its explanatory power. It is an attempt to see the connections in things, to view racial oppression as the glue that binds otherwise discrete forms and manifestations of vile and often insidious racial phenomena together.  As illustrations, I would point to my analyses of responsibility for implicit racial bias and reluctant racism. The oppression approach to racism strikes me as promising, because the all-encompassing nature of oppression seems to be precisely what is needed to bring unity and clarity to the discrete phenomena that are justly called “racist.” After all, oppressive systems are, functionally speaking, notorious for generating multifarious ills, and white supremacy in particular has been a source of the types of historical injustices mentioned above. There is a need then to condemn racial oppression, and to conceive of this harm as seriously morally objectionable. The above is not of course meant to be a complete justification of my contention that racism ought to be viewed as racial oppression. It is but  the prima facie justification of a preliminary investigation. Moreover, a final caveat is in order. My proposal is that ­racism is the core or the most basic form of racism. Most of what is justly called “racism,” however, is not intrinsically or characteristically oppressive, but is oppressive in virtue of its role as a contributing cause (symptom). Hence the norm “Racism is racial oppression” is but a helpful shorthand for the following rule-­formulation: “Racial oppression is a special kind of racial injustice as well as the core of racism, that by reference to which ascriptions of racism are to be explained and justified.  Racial oppression is the background condition that explains the various forms of racial ills which merit an ascription of racism.” (I will say a bit more about racial oppression as a kind of injustice in Chaps. 8 and 9.) 29  Ibid., 5. Elsewhere in the book, she develops this point through an extended discussion of the meaning of church burning as a practice (see chapters 3 and 4 of her Oppression and Responsibility).

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7.3   The Explanatory Condition My second desideratum for a moralist theory of “racism” is that it should attempt to explain one form of racism in terms of more basic forms. I have already noted that explanation does not exist in a vacuum, and is essentially guided by our values. In deciding which forms of racism are most basic, for instance, we presuppose a certain teleological orientation: there is a particular moralist end in mind. I have argued that this end should center  the moral-representational needs of racism’s historical victims. However, there is a second kind of explanation that theory must provide: sociocultural explanation.30 My aim in this section is to clarify this form of explanation. 7.3.1   Racism as Sociocultural Phenomenon As discussed in Chaps. 1 and 3, I accept Clevis Headley’s notion that racism is a sociocultural phenomenon.31 Let us consider the way in which this notion enters social scientific discourse. In social psychology and education the term “sociocultural approach” is used to denote a certain methodological orientation. This approach is highly critical of individualist accounts of racism, and originated in response to individualism in these fields. Scholars in the sociocultural  tradition argue that racism must be viewed as a social-structural problem rather than an “atomistic” problem. Sociocultural approaches view racism as a system of racial oppression, and they take racial oppression to be a normal (and constitutive feature of society. Racism is a system that is deeply embedded in society. Atomistic (individualistic/personalist) approaches, by contrast, locate racism in the hearts, minds, and conduct of individuals. Racism on this alternative is thought to consist in mental states, such as  hostility or  prejudice, or in behavior, such as discrimination. In my view, the sociocultural approach provides a way of framing judgments about what is racist and what is not.

30  As argued in Part I, Wittgensteinian philosophy subordinates the a posteriori to the a priori, at least in this respect: grammar can be justified only on pragmatic grounds, by reference to the need for the convention. Hence sociocultural explanation should be subordinate to moral explanation for purposes of a priori moral theorizing. 31  For examples of non-philosophical scholarship that embodies what I am calling the sociocultural approach, see Glen Adams et al. (2008a), Glen Adams et al. (2008b), Oyserman and Swim (2001), and Swim and Stangor (1998), Crenshaw (1991), and Freeman (1978).

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It is helpful in allowing one to view phenomena in terms of their role in sustaining racial oppression. Proponents of the sociocultural approach argue that it is superior to methodological individualism. First, it has the virtue of defining “racism” from the victim’s perspective rather than the dominant group’s perspective. A second virtue is that racism is seen as deeply embedded, that is, as highly integrated into public and political life. This, of course, complicates our understanding of racism, but in so doing extends our appreciation of racism as a problem foundational to society. This is what makes Mills’ notion of a society founded on a racial contract so powerful.  To illustrate, consider the notion that particular manifestations of racism should not be viewed as isolated or localized problems, but as manifestations of problems that are organic to society. In Chap. 1, I discussed the hypothetical situation of a store manager racially profiling his customers, on the premise that members of some races are more likely to shoplift than others. Is the manager’s practice racist? Standard evaluations of the manager’s practice are often discussed in localized fashion. The focus tends to be on the practice’s public rationale or intended consequences, or else on the agent’s intentions and motives. It is possible, however, to assess the practice in relationship to other social phenomena, that is, in respect to its role within society. If our evaluative scope is restricted to the practice’s rationale or its consequences for the specific individuals targeted, or if the scope is restricted to the agent’s motives or moral character, then one will not take account of the burden that such a practice can impose on the targeted group. This is objectionable, however, for imposing an unjust burden on a group of people is a morally relevant consideration. Indeed, it is all the more relevant when that group suffers from stigmatization due to a legacy of past social injustice. If this logic is correct, then the moral status of a particular case of racial profiling cannot be determined independent of taking account of the empirical fact that past racism continues to have an impact on the present. This causal effect, in other words, is morally significant since it reproduces group vulnerabilities. Nonetheless, some will view this holistic approach to moral evaluation as a limitation rather than a virtue for a theory of racism, because  it fails to jive with commonsense thinking about issues of personal responsibility, which do not always acknowledge such entities as group sins and responsibilities. To this I reply that, in the previous chapter, I argued that the goal of prescriptive theory is not to systematize commonsense thinking, but to theorize how we ought to think about racism. Plausibly, the p ­ ragmatic

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warrant for the grammar of “racism” is that it is (and ought to be) a tool for social justice. In this section I analyze a few grammatical propositions that are congenial to a sociocultural approach to racism. I do so in an effort to more sharply distinguish a priori and empirical analysis within the study of racism, and to elucidate their relationship. (1) Racism is a sociocultural phenomenon is a methodological norm of representation within some social scientific circles. This norm licenses inferences of the form: “X is racist, so X is (a part or is otherwise related to) a sociocultural phenomenon.” The idea is that something should not be called racism in the social sciences if it cannot be shown to be systematically linked to a sociocultural phenomenon. Some view this broader sociocultural phenomenon as a system that is properly called racial oppression. Given this norm,  nothing should be called racism within the practice of social-empirical explanation that does not bear the proper relation to a system of domination (e.g., white supremacy). What I would like to suggest is that this empirical limit on social scientific explanation is relevant to moralist theories of racism. For instance, to say that racial hatred is racist, on this approach, is to say that racial hatred is a part or an aspect of racial oppression. That is, it plays a role in racial oppression. This role, in my view, is morally significant in that understanding it is relevant to the practice of social criticism. One may be interested to see how racial hatred functions in the production of racial inequality, for instance. The idea is to broaden the scope of moral resources for assessing the moral status of racial hatred. Racial hatred may be more than a vice, it may also be a virulent political force, and insofar as it is this fact is clearly morally significant; in particular, racial hatred should be condemned for being a vehicle of racial inequality. This analysis has implications for how we think about extensions of “racist,” say, “racist person.” To think about racism socioculturally is to theorize entities (like individuals) in their roles within the system of racial oppression. Individuals may have more than one role to play in the subjugation of subordinate racial groups. An individual’s role in racism may be that of an agent of racial oppression—say, an administrator of racist policies, “someone who is disposed to act on racist assumptions, even when that person does not fully know that such assumptions shape his or her conduct,” as in cases of implicit bias.32 A socioculturally informed approach to political morality analyzes forms of agency in terms of the agent’s social roles. Consider the question of whether white beneficiaries of racism are  Shelby (2016, 24).

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racist. Some philosophers are inclined to follow Cudd in arguing that beneficiaries of racial oppression are only weakly morally responsible for their complicity with a racist system. But consider the following scenario. Some who oppose reparations have benefited from wealth inheritances that were unjustly accumulated by their white ancestors, through acts of theft and economic exploitation. A white beneficiary of past racism claims that she herself has done nothing to bring about this unjust state of affairs. This individual advances her interests on the basis of that injustice, yet fails to see that her material inheritance is an unjust transaction. Her opposition to any form of monetary rectification thus lacks moral standing. The interest of social justice would be more concerned to create a more equitable sharing of economic burdens; that is, it would prioritize correcting past injustices over disadvantaging and inconveniencing those who presently benefit from that injustice vis-à-vis their superior social position. The intuition that it is wrong to punish whites for the sins of their fathers is presently valued more highly than the intuition that systematically locking out entire groups of people from intergenerational wealth is wrong. This moral disconnect and disregard merits the label “racism” because it is a means of sustaining a permanent, economic undercaste. Now, a sociocultural perspective would take account of the functional complicity that standard discourses against reparations play in controlling the narrative surrounding reparations. Do such discourses lack moral standing? Do they quell the political efforts of those engaged in the morally just cause of reparations by virtue of undermining a national political will that helps to explain why a reparations program is rarely taken seriously? If so, then the individuals propounding such discourses are arguably racist, that is, play a racist role in perpetuating the unjust economic burden placed upon subordinate racial groups. Commonsense thinking is thus challenged by taking account of the empirical reality, which embodies the legacy of racial oppression. In commonsense thinking, the connection between racism and individuals is usually conceived in terms of personal morality. This relationship might be expressed thus: (2) Racism is a matter of individual or personal wrongdoing. How this would apply in the case of individualist phenomena is obvious. To call a belief racist would be to condemn it as an aspect of the individual; hence, it would be to condemn the individual. Recent theorists have sought to extend moral-individualist accounts of racism by theorizing institutional racism in agential terms. However, none have explicitly sought to account for the phenomenon of racial oppression. Is racial

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oppression always racist, on these individualist theories? How might the statement,  “Racial oppression is racist” be analyzed on an individualist definition of “racism”? Presumably, racial oppression would be analyzed as a function of personal wrongdoing. The analysis would specify criteria for identifying and condemning racial oppressors (i.e., for holding them accountable for their individual contribution to a system of oppression). Blum and Garcia seem to be committed to something like this view. Blum, for example, argues that calling a practice institutionally racist “implies that the practice was, or is, driven by racist motives (despite that implication’s being disclaimed in the [standard] definition), and tars it with an opprobrium that implies that it could never be morally acceptable.”33 If every instance of racial oppression, on the personal/agential approach, must be intrinsically linked to “racist motives,” as Blum claims, then it is clear that racial oppression necessarily entails that racial bigots are actively at work in keeping subordinate races in their place. This, in turn, suggests that Blum’s agential approach is impotent to accommodate more subtle forms of racial oppression, such as those considered above. That is, Blum’s account has the unintuitive implication that certain forms of racial oppression are not racist. For instance, suppose we concede that the racial wealth gap is an instance or contributing cause of racial oppression. How might Blum’s individualist theory explain the wrongness of this case? He might implausibly assert that all or most white beneficiaries of the racial wealth gap have racist (unconscious) motives. Alternatively, he might assert that there are no such motives and that, therefore, there is no racism here. The former seems implausible, whereas the latter seems to entail the absurdity that racial oppression is not necessarily racist. This counterexample suggests that a broader sociocultural approach to racism is necessary to account for cases of racial oppression (i.e., structuralist accounts of institutional racism). I have now contrasted two approaches to racism, the personal and political approaches. The personal approach presupposes (2) and is cen33  Blum (2002, 23). The definition under consideration is a standard account of institutional racism: it is any “practice that is itself free of racial bias but in its implementation has a disproportionately negative effect on subordinate racial groups” (22). The example under consideration is the seniority system: “since previous employment discrimination has allowed whites to accumulate much more seniority than blacks and Latinos, a system of greater job protection and rewards for seniority has disproportionately negative impact on these racial groups. With less seniority, black and Latino workers are those most vulnerable to layoffs due to recession or downsizing” (22–23).

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tered on issues of personal responsibility, viewed within a characterological or some other individualist moral framework. The political approach, by contrast, presupposes (1) and is centered on issues of justice and injustice. This approach, as we have seen, is characterized by the sociocultural premise that racist phenomena necessarily  play a role in racial oppression. The guiding norm here might be expressed thus: (3) Racism is a sociocultural phenomenon that is the central object of cultural criticism (i.e., social and political criticism). Shelby and Haslanger, among others, have recently advocated for this approach.34 We should be careful, however, to avoid caricatures of the political approach. One might hold, for example, that the political approach reduces all moral ills to political ones. To take a famous example: some scholars, who subscribe to the “prejudice plus power” model of racism, argue that blacks cannot be racist against whites. This is interpreted by some rather uncharitably: as suggesting that blacks are never morally responsible for manifestations of racial bigotry or resentment against whites. This is a “straw man” characterization of the position, for the power plus prejudice model only makes a conceptual point about racism. The claim is not that blacks lack moral responsibility in the racial domain (in their interactions with whites), but that their failings in this domain should not be condemned as racist. This is consistent with availing ourselves of existing moral (including racial) vocabulary to condemn the wrongdoings of blacks against whites. Terms like “racial insensitivity,” “racial prejudice,” and so on may be legitimately applied to blacks. Another caricature is that the political approach is not in the business of generating criteria for holding agents personally responsible, and that it is consequently antithetical to the concept of personal responsibility. This too is mistaken. If a political theorist concludes that racial profiling is racially unjust, this may entail that agents who participate in racial profiling should be punished and their behavior condemned. Hence both personal and political approaches advance theories that have implications for interpersonal relations and their moral status. What is distinctive about the political  approach is that holding individuals accountable for personal wrongdoing is not its final aim. Rather, considerations of personal responsibility inform and are informed by considerations of social justice. Political morality accounts of racism ascribe moral responsibility to individuals when individual wrongdoing is systemically integral to racial oppression.

 Shelby (2014, 63). Haslanger (2017, 2, 6).

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One of the ramifications of my defense of sociocultural analysis is that empirical analysis is important to moralist theory. It is important for the following reason: if we are to properly criticize racism qua sociocultural phenomenon, it is necessary that we understand how social phenomena work, including the role played by race neutral practices. Empirical analysis may offer explanations and  causal accounts of sociocultural phenomena, thereby helping us to understand the causes of racial oppression. In addition, empirical analysis can uncover new racial ills for moral theory to assess. For it is the business of empirical theory to discover subtle, covert, and new forms of racial ill when they emerge. Good examples of this include the discovery of institutional racism and, more recently, implicit racial bias. In short, as critics of the harmful roles of race in society, moral theory is in a better position to advance its criticisms if it is informed by empirical theory. This, of course, comes back to my position that moralist theory is justified by reference to a moral-representational need, the need to combat racial oppression. Having defended the primacy of political morality over and against personal morality in the theory of racism, I can now codify the above in a definition of  “racial oppression”: Racial oppression is  the core of racism; it is perhaps best conceived as the set of social conditions that bring about an unjust condition of racial vulnerability. To sum up, I have argued that we should not call something racist unless it plays a role in racial oppression. To come full circle, this brings me to my initial formulation of the explanatory condition in Sect. 7.1. There I stated that a moralist definition should strive to explain one form of ­racism in terms of more basic forms, for example, by showing that one is the cause of the other. My oppression-centered theory of racism meets this desideratum by positing the norm: racial oppression is the focal point from which all forms and manifestations of racism are to be explained. One example of this is that individual forms of racism should be explained in terms of racial oppression. This may well have revisionist implications, as far as ordinary language is concerned. On the one hand, it may mean that some personal racial wrongdoings are not racist if they do not play the right kind of role in racial oppression. On the other hand, it may mean that some things which are not normally called racist (say, because they do not involve personal wrongdoing) ought to be called racist because of their role in racial oppression. A theory of “racism” ought to explain how various forms and manifestations of racism are part of a wider sociocultural system, a web or nexus of sociocultural interactions, directed at a common function (racial oppres-

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sion). In the actual world, this function is best conceived in terms of reproducing a system of white supremacy. To identify something as racist is to implicate it as having a role in the nexus of white supremacy. A final point. Theoretically, one could accept the explanatory condition without identifying racial oppression (or white supremacy) as the ultimate function. Nevertheless, I maintain that “racism” should be defined operationally, as a function or output (regardless of what one takes that function to be). For apart from a functionalist definition, I do not see how any essentialist account of racism can successfully accommodate the various things that are properly called racist. Function-essentialism stands in contrast to category-essentialism. The categorial essentialist believes that it is possible to define “racism” in terms of a specific category of entity, which captures every instance and form of racism. A functionalist account also posits a common form: but it is one that makes no reference to the characteristic properties of objects. Instead, the form it imposes makes reference to the characteristic function of a certain kind of objectionable racial phenomenon. My function-essentialism is one I am prescribing. And my recommendation is partly based on the premise that a theory of racism ought to accommodate much of the categorical plurality of racism, for most, if not all, categories of entity are capable of playing a role in racial oppression. 7.3.2  Criteria and Vagueness It might be objected that my account of racism-as-racial-oppression is unhelpful because it is too vague for purposes of moral analysis and everyday ascriptions of racism. Here it becomes important to talk about criteria of application. We have some well-established criteria for the application of “racism.” A criterion, in Wittgenstein’s sense, is a priori evidence that immediately licenses the application of a term (see Chap. 2). The evidence is a priori because it forges a conceptual connection. A “license” is here conceived as an inference ticket; one need not cash one’s ticket, but one is permitted to do so (for the a priori connection makes the inference intelligible). The definition of “bachelor” licenses me to call an unmarried man “a bachelor,” but I am not obliged to do so. Similarly, cases of racial slavery license the judgment, “That is racist.” A general definition of “racism,” I admit, does not automatically generate specific criteria for other uses of “racist” and “racism.” The methodological discussion of the previous section added an additional criterion: if something can be shown to play a contributing role to racial oppression, then this should be condemned

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as ­racist. Perhaps it will be objected that this criterion is not as informative as it ought to be. After all, it does not provide an algorithm for generating criteria for most  categories  of entity. For instance, it does not generate specific criteria for “racist belief,” “racist intention,” et cetera. All of this suggests that “Racism is racial oppression” is too vague to be helpful in determining criteria for the various things that are called racist. Is this not a problem for my oppression approach to racism? Not necessarily, for although it does not provide a mechanical procedure, it does provide a set of tools that can be applied on a case-by-case basis. No mechanical procedure is possible, on my approach, because the phenomenon of racism is sociocultural: its temporal and empirical nature renders judgments of racism contingent upon the facts and circumstances. We might say that a sociocultural approach to racism entails a contextualist principle. The ways in which racial oppression may be sustained can change over time. What is more, there are various kinds of “contributions” or “causes” of racism, so clearly more needs to be said here. The a priori starting point, however, is the primacy of the historical victim. And the explanatory model it offers is that racist phenomena are to be explained in terms of their role in sustaining a condition of racial vulnerability. We have seen that this is a workable model, since we have witnessed its ability to account for some cases. What is correct about this worry is that my proposed norm of representation is vague, for I do not presume that we have decided in advance of every possible situation what we are and are not willing to call a contribution to racial oppression. Nevertheless, my criterion is a start. And I chose to start at the broadest level possible: my norm should be understood as the most general and overarching criterion of racism, as I’ve argued. I should also note that the vagueness of the concept of racism is not something we can escape, at least not if we want the concept to be empirically dynamic. Given the vagueness of my general criterion, it might be objected that adopting it would allow us to condemn more than we would like. That is, it overdetermines the concept of racism, overinflates it in ways that are obviously objectionable. Garcia provides an instructive example: Now, imagine that a program of large-scale deincarceration, undertaken for antiracist reasons of the sort recently advanced by Angela Davis and Glenn Loury (among many others), turned out to hurt Black people on the whole, or most Black people, or the worst-off Black people, and to do so in ways that could have been anticipated. Note that, like Glasgow’s first ‘Real Estate’

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scenario,35 the program’s implementation depends on the occurrence of past racism, which partially accounts for the disproportionally large number of Black inmates. Does this combination of racially disparate impact with racially tainted history suffice to make the decarceration program institutional antiBlack racism? Intuitively, we think not. Indeed, just the opposite: it is an antiracist initiative, even if an unsuccessful, even counterproductive, one.36

To fit his counterexample to my proposal, if decarceration contributes to the racial oppression of racialized black and brown men, then it seems that this “contribution to racial oppression” satisfies my criterion of racism, for the individuals that are harmed are historical victims of racism. Consequently, the decarceration program seems racist. But, intuitively, it seems that this type of effort is precisely what we should not call a racist measure. On the contrary, this is what we should call an anti-racist measure. What are we to make of Garcia’s objection? One way out is to argue that, if the decarceration program has harmful racial results that “could have been anticipated,” then a case can be made that the program was implemented prematurely, which is to say negligently. Suppose, however, that no negligence and irresponsibility is involved in the articulation and application of this program. What this example shows is that the concept of racism-as-racial-­oppression needs an additional constraint to stave off this type of worry. In my view, the issue before us is analogous to refining a moral principle like “Murder is wrong” and “Lying is wrong,” both of which admit of various exceptions. One possible way to refine the notion at issue is to stipulate that: Sincere and reasonably well-thought out strategies that aim at combating racial oppression cannot be racist, even if they inadvertently contribute to racial oppression. This might seem like cheating, but is not so. For it is we who are in charge of our grammar, as it is a vehicle of our needs. Our grammar is not responsible to any body of facts. The grammatical norm requires pragmatic justification, however, since it breaks with our criterion of racism. An illuminating example developed by Leonard Harris will aid me in developing the pragmatic case for just such an exception. He queries: Are slave insurrections unjust? They occasionally occurred during the heyday of chattel slavery. These revolts, he claims, were morally necessitated, despite the fact that they were doomed to failure in almost all cases. If we were to employ, say, David Goldberg’s criterion for “irrational” or “unreasonable”  See Glasgow (2009, 72f).  Garcia (2016, 225).

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beliefs and conduct, we would be forced to conclude that slave insurrections are almost always irrational and unreasonable.37 Yet, slave insurrections always have as their aim liberation from human bondage. Moreover, Harris argues, they are meritorious because they are expressions of self-­ respect, tenacity, personal dignity (among other virtues), under conditions of oppression. Garcia’s decarceration program and Harris’ slave insurrections are both likely to exacerbate racial inequality, that is, produce undesirable consequences: decarceration could lead to the worsening of blacks’ social condition just like  a failed revolt could lead to the deaths of an enslaved community, including children and others who may not have participated in it. These are unwitting and unintentional contributions to racial oppression (though they could have been foreseen), but they are not racist. Indeed, it is not even clear that they are morally wrong. It seems that what is needed is elaboration of the notion “contribution to racial oppression,” which ought not blame the victim for resisting oppression, for affirming one’s humanity and dignity. Said differently, to blame the victim of oppression would be to undermine the point of the concept of racism. For the point is to use it to advance the interests of the oppressed. We might here appeal to some principle of justice. In his Dark Ghettos, Shelby thinks deeply and carefully about the justification of violent conduct, which he understands in relation to Rawlsian principles of justice and legitimate forms of social defiance and disobedience.38 He defends violent forms of defiance in particular circumstances. His basic idea is that Rawlsian reciprocity is at the heart of justice. Thus the basic structure of society commands respect and obedience to its laws and institutions, but only under conditions of mutual reciprocity. The basic principle he derives from Ralws is that every denizen of society has a reasonable expectation to build a dignified life in the society. If one has the ability to survive only, say, on a “starvation wage,” then this reasonable expectation is not met. When  one’s repeated attempts to do right by the laws of society are unsuccessful and unreciprocated, one is free to resist and defy the norms of the state. When it is an entire group that is targeted, this is even more unjust, for it suggests that society does not care about its obligations to a devalued minority class. Shelby thus argues that when the basic structure is so inherently tilted against particular groups, they are not bound by the norms of reciprocity and fairness. Their basic right to a dignified life justifies overt acts of defiance, even violent defiance, provided that its aim is liberation from oppression.  Harris (2002). For Goldberg’s criterion, see (1999).  Shelby (2016, part III).

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If Shelby is correct that the injustice of racial oppression licenses acts of civil disobedience and defiance, then Harris is correct that oppressed peoples stand in need of their own ethic, a logic of insurrection. Harris’ insurrectionist ethic is partly a logic of self-preservation, but it is principally, in its core, a logic of liberation and hope, by means of cultivating resources such as self-respect and dignity to resist oppression. The logic of cultivating virtues of self-respect under conditions of oppression explains why insurrectionist acts are capable of having moral worth. It may seem absurd to hold that beating and murdering one’s master or his innocent children is a meritorious act. One might believe that such acts are wrong, regardless of the circumstances. To this I reply that prioritizing the value of personal moral responsibility over the value of liberation from oppression amounts to blaming the victim for a situation she did not desire or have any control in creating. We must not forget that it is not just the innocent white child, that is murdered during an insurrection, that is innocent, but the enslaved man and woman, also. What is more, the situation is socially constructed and depends entirely on the oppressive will of the oppressor class. The victim did not find herself there merely through misfortune or bad luck; she was placed there, with the aim of subjecting her to a state of degradation and dehumanization, for the sake of exploitation. Precepts of moral responsibility surely apply first and foremost to agents who have the freedom and ability to set things right. If this is correct, then racial oppression, at least in paradigmatic cases, creates an oppressive condition that compels those in bondage to say: “I simply have no choice, but to…” There is a moral “must” expressed in this assertion. Perhaps this is more than a “must” of material necessity and survival; perhaps it is also a “must” of moral compulsion. Does moral theory have a duty to take the victim’s moral “must” seriously? Following Harris, I believe that it absolutely does. He argues that moral theory must start from the rationalization and justification of insurrectionist acts. Similarly, I argue that a theory of racism must start from the rationalization and justification of the logics that oppressed peoples are compelled to contemplate. Arguably, they have a moral duty to make sense of their lived experience and develop reasoned articulations under conditions of oppression. The oppressed individual’s lack of choice and feeling of compulsion establishes a pragmatic ground that an anti-racist approach to the definition of “racism” ought to take seriously. If the aim is to define “racism” from the perspective of the victim, in the service of the victim’s interests, then a decision to admit exceptions to the rule “Whatever contributes to racial oppression is racist” might be reasonable given the logic we are trying to systematize in theory. As Baker and Hacker point out (in

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a very different context), how we draw the ­essential/inessential distinction “is often a context-dependent and purpose-relative matter.” “Our criteria for sameness and difference of meaning are often indeterminate. If one has to give a determinate answer to this kind of question in a given context, it is a decision that is called for, not a discovery.”39 7.3.3  Racism as Open Texture and Unfolding Process There is one more issue about vagueness that I would like to discuss. One might have thought that if the aim of a book is to provide a definition of a term, then it is a mark of the author’s failure that the definition provided is vague and open-ended. In this section I explain why this objection is misplaced. My contention is that in the case of racism, the desire to remove complete vagueness is undesirable. On the contrary, some vagueness is a desirable feature of any proposed definition of the term. One virtue of using the term “racism” to refer to an empirical process or condition has not gone unrecognized by scholars of racism. The empirical world, we are inclined to say, far from determining a static and unchanging essence, determines a modifiable and malleable world for us. Empirical processes, including those contingent upon social practices, are fuzzy, not always well-defined. Our concepts are often left vague or indeterminate, so arguments for limiting the concept one way rather than another are called for. The open-endedness of empirical concepts is best captured, I believe, by the concept of open texture. Friedrich Waismann introduced this concept to describe empirical terms. He thought that “most of our empirical concepts are not delimited in all possible directions.”40 One example he gives is of the concept gold. Suppose we discovered some piece of gold-looking substance that satisfied all our criteria for gold but emitted some new radiation, unlike any piece of gold known to have existed. Should we call it gold? We may choose to, thereby updating our definition. Or we may choose against doing so. In either case, the appropriate conclusion to draw, according to Waismann, is this: a decision is called for precisely because our concept has not been delimited in this particular respect. Experience can throw new information at us, and when it does we encounter the possibility of updating our definitions. What is true for gold, however, is true  Baker and Hacker (2005, 156).  Waismann, “Verifiability” (1945/1951).

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for almost all empirical terms. For empirical patterns are not always uniform, but come in degrees, admit of variation and, in some cases, have unforeseen consequences. Moreover, subtle and drastic shifts, in initial conditions can generate a wide range of possible outcomes. The term “open” thus signifies an indeterminate phenomenon, one constituted by an essentially endless set of possibilities. Some of these possibilities may be likelier than others. But these possibilities underline the openness of our concepts.41 Peter Hacker thinks that Waismann’s position has an unwelcome implication that undermines the notion of open-texture. The implication  is that it is impossible for a competent user of an open-texture term to know every possible thing to which the term applies.42 He then observes that this theory of empirical concepts is incompatible with Wittgenstein’s account of criteria of understanding (see Chap. 2). For understanding a word consists in knowing how to use it in the relevant contexts, and for Wittgenstein this means that meaning, or a term’s conditions of application, must be transparent to competent speakers. No one is acquainted with every thing to which the term “dog” applies (since no one has witnessed every dog there is), but every competent speaker knows the conditions under which this term  applies. At the limits of this knowledge, of course, lie borderline cases over which there can be legitimate disagreement. However, from the Wittgensteinian perspective, these cases, which reflect the indeterminacies of our concepts, are not cases for which we do not “know” whether the concept applies or not. Rather, they are cases about which we have not decided whether to apply the term or not. Have we decided that “game” is to be applied to War Games? Logic Games? Degenerate cases of chess? And have we decided how many rules of chess can be abandoned before the game in question is no longer properly called chess? It seems clear that we have not decided such cases, for different people will have different intuitions about them. Settling these disputes is a matter of decision rather than of being true to the facts. It is a matter of weighing pragmatic considerations and making a decision (and we

41  For a helpful discussion of open texture concepts, in the social sciences, see Root (1993, 210f). 42  Peter Hacker (1996, 164). Hacker takes “open texture” to mean “not vagueness but the possibility of vagueness” (ibid.).

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normally do so relative to the task at hand, for generally speaking we choose to leave the concept open). For Wittgenstein, the idea that we do not now know some of the cases to which the term applies is confused. However, there is a way to preserve the spirit of open texture, on the Wittgensteinian approach. We can hold that an open texture concept is one that is extensionally open in the sense that we treat it as modifiable in light of new information. For many social terms (among other referring expressions), we expect to uncover indeterminacies in applying them. We anticipate changes in our social environments and discourses which will generate questions about the utility of the underlying concept. Sometimes these considerations  will raise the issue of  whether to extend the concept. In such cases, it may be prudent to describe the referent of the term as a temporal/sociocultural phenomenon. Sociocultural concepts are distinguished from other “open” definitions in that their openness to modification and refinement is based on politically significant shifts in the empirical and social landscape. For it is ultimately a politically significant phenomenon that the linguistic community aims to track. The above criticisms of open-texture notwithstanding, I argue that this concept (or at least this metaphor) is a useful one.43 It is common for scholars to describe racism as a temporal concept.44 Racism is said to change, evolve over time, to be chameleonic, to be an enduring condition, and so forth. To provide just one example, George Frederickson describes the concept of racism as a “scavenger concept,” one that latches on to new forms of racial dynamism when it is opportune to do so: “Racism is therefore ‘a scavenger ideology, which gains its power from its ability to pick out and utilize ideas and values from other sets of ideas and beliefs in specific socio-historical contexts.’ But there are also ‘strong continuities in the articulation of the images of the “other,” as well as in the images which are evident in the ways in which racist movements define the boundaries of “race” and “nation.”’”45 What I want to consider is the following grammatical proposition: Racism is a temporally unfolding process. I think this pattern of inference is warranted. What does it amount to? What is its significance in the context of moral theory? Why not, for example, settle for saying that the concept of racism (as opposed to racism 43  Headley (2006, 2) has also suggested that the concept of racism can be fruitfully understood as an open-texture concept. 44  See, for example, Goldberg (1993); Headley (2000). 45  Frederickson (2002, 8, 22).

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itself) is embedded in a sociohistorical process? I argue that the picture of racism as an evolving and unstable entity is attractive because it anticipates and lends itself to adding new forms of racism. Is implicit bias racist, for example? Are microaggressions racist? A decision is called for. In the next chapter I discuss a “shift” from old racism (biological racism) to new (colorblind racism). What does this shift consist in? To call it a shift is somewhat misleading. For it primarily consisted in adding new criteria to our concept of racism, and only secondarily (if at all) in removing old criteria. There was no radically revisionist transformation of our concept of racism. For example, a biological conception of race was taken to be criterial for racism. The criterion can be expressed in a grammatical proposition: “Racism is belief in the biological superiority of some races and the biological inferiority of others.” We did not abandon this rule simply because we adopted new criteria, such as this one: “Racism is the belief that some cultural expressions are inferior, based on race.” More generally, in expanding our concept of “racial ideology” to cover new forms of discourse (such as Bonilla-Silva’s “abstract liberalism”), we did not abandon the aforementioned criterion for racist ideology. The belief that some races are superior and others inferior remains a paradigmatic kind of racist belief. After all, we do not say: “It used to be racist to believe that some races are inferior and others superior, but now it’s okay.” And this reveals something about the grammar of “racism.” The concept (for the most part—when it is doing moral work for us) is expanded to cover new possibilities, but not to remove old ones. The extension of the concept in any given instance introduces a new technique of applying “racist.” Thus the new criterion for “racist belief” permits us to condemn forms of discourse that were not associated with racism before (for example, “cultural racism”). The shift that occurred on the material level (in sociohistorical conditions) led to a conceptual shift. But the conceptual shift was marked by the expansion of the concept. New techniques were added, but existing techniques remained. It is in this sense that racism can be fruitfully thought of as an “unfolding process.” From its humble beginnings, the terms “racism” and “racist” have greatly expanded their reach. We now talk about “institutional racism,” “racist ideology,” “colorblind racism,” “structural racism,” ­“cultural racism,” “racist liberals,” and so forth. Shifts/expansions in our concept of racism should be welcomed if they enhance our understanding of phenomena on the ground. But we are not looking to add just any concept-­ forming technique of application. We must keep the victim’s

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needs at the forefront of our thought. Interestingly, the justification for adding new techniques appears to have been grounded in old ones. Hence we speak of continuity and evolution from one form of racism to another, and of racism going “underground” (by which we mean: becoming covert), but not of old forms of racism becoming obsolete. Or rather, when we say that they have become obsolete, we mean that they are no longer widely practiced, not that they are no longer racist. Racism, then, is an unfolding process. (“More and more reality is daily being brought to light.”) To retain coherence in the notion of racism-as-a-process I propose that we view it as unfolding in the sense that the concept permits of new criterial additions, new forms of racism. These new forms are properly understood as emerging from shifting conditions in the reproduction of racial oppression.46 What is the significance of viewing racism as an unfolding process? A whole range of phenomena resemble certain forms of racism in various respects, but it is not clear whether we ought to call them racist. Is implicit racial bias racist? Are microaggressions racist? Is white privilege racist? Are all white people racist (as some philosophers have charged in recent years)? Can nonwhites who lack “power” be racist against whites? Is the discipline of philosophy racist (as Leonard Harris and Charles Mills argue)?47 Can academic disciplines be racist? Do we have predetermined criteria to decide all these cases? The concept of racism is currently vague on at least some of these issues. By viewing racism as an open texture—or as I prefer to say, an unfolding process—we acknowledge that there is no predetermined answer to the question of whether such and such should be called racist, because the concept has not yet “unfolded,” as it were, on that particular matter. It is we who must make the decision, not some putative essence given by the ontological nature of racism. Further, adopting this perspective encourages deliberation and discussion about our representational needs and whether in this or that case to extend the concept. Much disagreement about racism, it seems, is not disagreement about the concept per se, but about whether to extend the concept to such and 46  The only time we should toss out an existing form of racism, the only time we should revoke its criterial credentials, is when it is not pragmatically justifiable or when it conflicts with other criteria of racism, and conflicts in a way that undermines the point of the concept or prompts significant practical problems. And then we should say, “X has never been a legitimate form of racism, it should have never been called ‘racism.’ X is not part of the unfolding process of racism.” 47  Harris (1995).

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such cases. Not every question about whether such and such is racist is one in search of a criterion of racism; some are in search of empirical information to apply an existing criterion. For instance, do we need a new criterion of racism to determine whether the movie industry is racist? Or do we simply need to apply the criteria we have? Perhaps what we need is more information about whether discrimination goes on, to what degree it goes on, and so forth; or perhaps we need information to decide whether some institutional norm of fairness is systematically violated in order to decide. That is to say, we may simply need to apply the definitions of “unjust racial discrimination” and “institutional racism” to settle the issue. Nevertheless, there are cases where a conceptual determination is called for. Isn’t implicit bias, for example, very similar to what is called racist belief? It is similar, but is it sufficiently so? And in what respects? There are analogies and disanalogies for us to consider. Arguments are thus made on each side, and in each case an appeal is made to a similarity or difference by comparison to paradigmatic forms of racism. To help resolve these matters, an overarching principle would be helpful. A widely accepted principle of racism would enable us to  generate narrower  criteria of application. For example, the question my definition invites us to ask is this: Does implicit racial bias contribute to racial oppression? If so, then a case can potentially be made for calling it racist. Successful argumentation terminates in the recommendation of a new criterion of racism, a new grammatical proposition and rule for the correct use of “racism.” To be clear, my proposed definition is not a replacement of existing criteria. As a unifying and overarching norm, it may entail revisions to current usage, but its primary functions are to solidify existing criteria under a common form, and to serve as a means of generating new criteria. The rationale for imposing an overarching unity on the concept of racism is that doing so will best satisfy the representational needs of historical victims of racism. We can now explain why a  vague  concept of racism is desirable. It is desirable because systems of racial oppression are dynamic and capable of responding to forms of resistance; that is, they have a tendency to change. As forms of racial oppression are molded in novel ways, an open-textured concept of racism allows us to condemn and criticize such ­transformations. One such development, which was discussed in Chap. 1, is the phenomenon of language-game contestation in the development of the term “reverse racism.”  Given  harmful and objectionable attempts to include new criteria for “racism” which decenter racism’s historical victims, theo-

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rists must be vigilant in challenging such attempts. Conceptual resources are necessary to license the judgment: “The claim that affirmative action is racist is itself racist.” There is a need to condemn assaults on race-­conscious policies, ostensibly rooted in liberal principles, often made in bad faith. What is the criterion for saying that affirmative action is not just ineffective or counterproductive, but racist”? Where did this criterion come from, and how did it become established as a widely accepted criterion in society? Empirical analysis is called for. These changes in social conditions generate a need to condemn new forms of discourse and practice. If we define “racism” as racial oppression—that is, if we settle for this vague criterion as our overarching principle—then we are one step closer toward explaining why the charge of reverse racism is not just false but racist. Racism, then, is not just an unfolding process, but  one that is  necessarily directed by values, which currently are under assault and must be safeguarded.

7.4   The Resolution Condition One of the claims I defended in the previous chapter can be stated as follows: “If ordinary usage of the term ‘racism’ prompts significant practical difficulties that might be averted by revising it, then this fact counts as a mark against the prescriptive status of ordinary usage and so counts as a reason for revising it.” This provides a sketch of an adequacy condition that may be fleshed out thus: Resolution condition: Other things equal, a philosophical theory of “racism” is preferable over rival alternatives to the degree  that  it resolves practical problems prompted by ordinary usage  and generates fewer such problems than its rivals. Because I provided the basis for this condition in the previous chapter, my discussion of it here will be brief. Two kinds of practical problems were identified in Chap. 6: pragmatics problems and political problems. Blum’s inflation problem and Shelby’s political morality problem were cited as examples. From Blum we learn that the ordinary concept of racism is inflated and that it ought to be deflated, as much as possible. Doing so requires the elimination of some common usage of “racism.” Blum is correct that deflating the concept would be a virtue, but not for intrinsic reasons. Its value would derive from the fact that deflation would go some way towards ameliorating certain communicative problems. In particular,

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a deflated concept would mitigate potential conceptual confusion and avert misunderstanding. It could also have the potential to rehabilitate the moral force of “racism,” since the inflatedness of the concept functions to diminish its moral force. How does my proposal that racism is racial oppression fair on these fronts? On the pragmatics front, it might be argued that my oppression definition of ‘racism” falls victim to Blum’s inflation problem. For it is arguable that most racial ills (particularly those committed by whites) contribute to racial oppression in some way or other. How should we respond to this objection? It seems unlikely that every racial ill contributes to racial oppression. However, if defining “racism” as racial oppression inflates the concept, which it plausibly will to some extent, then that is because racial oppression permeates almost every aspect of public and private life. The guiding a priori value of my analysis is to stipulate criteria for defining “racism” that will benefit historical victims of racism. Hence the setbacks of inflation must be weighed against the setbacks of defining “racism” in a way that might otherwise not powerfully address the representational stake that historical victims of racism have in this debate. I do not have the relevant empirical data, nor have I considered the relevant arguments on this front, but my suspicion is that the need to criticize the pervasiveness of racial oppression overrides the need to resolve the inflation problem that my proposed grammatical norm is likely to perpetuate. Moreover, there is no reason to think that, if my proposed norm of representation should be adopted as the prevailing norm, it would exacerbate the existing level of inflation beyond what is currently  the case in the practice of using “racism.” My oppression theory inflates the concept of racism by positing that virtually every category of entity can be racist, for in principle any category of entity can play a causal role in sustaining racial oppression (given the right social conditions). At the same time, it imposes a uniformity that does not currently exist across linguistic practice. This uniformity consists in the requirement that an ostensibly racist phenomenon must be shown to be racist by reference to its role in sustaining white supremacy. More importantly, because the simplicity of the definition makes it clear and easy to grasp (though not always easy to determine in practice), conceptual confusion and misunderstanding will be mitigated on my definition, as it would on most generalizing definitions (e.g., Glasgow’s “Racism is racial disrespect”). How does my proposed definition deal with the problem of political contestation? On the one hand, if racism were widely viewed as racial oppression, it would be naive to think that alternative and incompatible uses would not also prevail. That is, no definition of “racism” can be

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reasonably expected to end all contestation about what is racist. For that, we need a magic wand, not a philosophical analysis. Further, political contestation would persist even if everyone agreed that racism is racial oppression. One reason for this is that there remains the question about what the primary causes of oppression are. Perhaps, some would be inclined to view a phenomenon like implicit racial bias as racially oppressive while others would not. Such issues are decidable by reference to empirical arguments of the sort I sketched in my example of implicit racial bias. There may be empirical limitations on our ability to adequately address this question; these limitations may be a function of insufficient information about the relationship of implicit bias to racial oppression.  In any case, my point is that these outstanding issues are decidable. Another aspect of the political problem is that much disagreement is a function of political contestation. In my view, where political interests are involved,  many who favor, say, an individualist definition of “racism,” will probably continue to do so if they have a large enough stake in conceiving of racism thus. There may be no way of persuading people by moral-pragmatic argumentation in such cases. But then it does not follow that we must abandon the theory of racism. As an anti-racist community, we are obligated to insist upon a definition of “racism” that places the victim at the center. Perhaps that is the most we can hope to accomplish. Another way to deal with the political reality of endless contestation is to embrace the role of “social critic,” ala Shelby. “Social critics seek to inform, and possibly shape, public opinion with clear and careful thinking, well-established facts, and moral insight.” The principal role of the philosophical social critic, as here conceived, is to shed light on the most fundamental conceptual and normative issues that race-related questions raise. Indeed, I propose that we view the contemporary debate over the meaning of “racism” as, at its heart, a disagreement among philosophically-minded social critics. In this discursive domain, generating general agreement on the meaning of “racism” is not the aim. The objective is to arrive at the most illuminating account of racism, even if that account is gained at the cost of breaking with common sense or seeming to deny the obvious.48

 Shelby (2014, 63).

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Presumably, the reason why “generating general agreement on the meaning of ‘racism’” should not be the aim of theory is that it is a dim, impractical prospect, and that for political reasons. Shelby might be right (though I would need to see more argument for this), but I would argue that one of the roles of the social critic—one of the ways that she “sheds light” on conceptual and normative issues—is by convincing others about what she takes racism to be. Policy discussions, for instance, may turn on a definition, and it is the role of the advocate to argue for the superiority of one definition over the  others. Hence the role of the social critic cannot be completely detached from metalinguistic negotiation and consensus building. Finally, I would add that if “[t]he objective is to arrive at the most illuminating account of racism, even if that account is gained at the cost of breaking with common sense or seeming to deny the obvious,” then my proposal that racism is racial oppression should be seriously considered.49 If my argument in the previous chapter was meant to motivate my contention that it is prima facie plausible that a prescriptive definition of “racism” is superior to alternatives to the degree that it addresses all relevant practical problems prompted by ordinary usage of “racism,” my argument in this section hopefully shows that despite any potential setbacks for my proposed definition, it is plausible to conceive of racism as racial oppression.

7.5   Conclusion In this chapter, I defended criteria for a definition of “racism” and defended an account of racism. I argued that we should start with the vague definition that racism is racial oppression. On my view, racial oppression is vile for many reasons, but its racist vileness is best explained in terms of political considerations. Additionally, racial oppression generates other forms of wrongness and injustice. One implication of this view is that racist ascriptions suggest that there are other elements at work—other racist phenomena—that are part of the network of racial oppression. Although one of my aims has been to provide a prima facie defense of that definition, my overarching aim in this book has been to make the case for a normative-pragmatic approach to defining racism. My proposed definition can thus be viewed as a foil for discussing various adequacy conditions for prescriptive theory, in order to illustrate the virtues of a normative-pragmatic approach (conventionalism). To further refine my  Ibid.

49

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conception, I propose that racial oppression be analyzed in terms of three distinct paradigms: racial viciousness, racial dehumanization, and racial injustice. Phenomena that fit any of these paradigms are primary causes of racial oppression. Hence these norms function as criteria of racism. These may be viewed as centers of variation, or paradigms as I prefer to call them. I do not have the space to argue for them here  (though see my brief remarks in Chap. 9). Whether a single definition is capable of resolving all the relevant practical problems we would like to resolve remains to be seen. I have given some reason for thinking the complete resolution of practical problems unlikely. However, I did attempt  to address some of them. In the next chapter I provide an illustration of how my adequacy criteria can be invoked to critically assess existing theories of racism. I apply my criteria to Jorge Garcia’s influential volitional theory. I argue that although his theory is admirable for its rigorous attempt to comprehensively accommodate the categorial plurality of racism, it ultimately fails to accommodate the full scope of what is (legitimately) called “racism,” because he ignores the grammatical plurality of racism. Further, his theory fails to satisfy the moral condition, because it does not always take into account the legitimate moral needs we have for condemning phenomena as racist. Another major aim of the next chapter is to show that it is plausible to think that an oppression approach to racism can accommodate the categorial and grammatical plurality of “racism,” and do so in a way that is rooted in pragmatic rather than epistemic justification.

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CHAPTER 8

Racial Oppression and Grammatical Pluralism: A Critique of Jorge Garcia on Racist Belief

8.1   Introduction In the previous chapter I defended three adequacy conditions for a definition of “racism.” One of my desiderata holds that usage of this term ought to be preserved if it is pragmatically justifiable by reference to the moral aim of combatting racial  oppression  facing historically subjugated racial groups. My aim in this chapter is to argue that much contemporary usage is defensible on this condition. To this end, I explore some of the ways in which racially objectionable beliefs contribute to racial oppression. Racial oppression is an all-encompassing phenomenon. A consequence of this is that racial oppression contaminates human life, well-being, and social relations. It is thus unsurprising that racism is predicated of a wide range of phenomena. Blum, for instance, speaks of the “categorial plurality” of racism, while Glasgow speaks of racism’s various “locations.”1 The notion of categorial pluralism posits that the terms “racism” and “racist” apply to several categories of entity. Attitudes, persons, institutions, symbols, language, and much else besides are called racist. Prescriptive theory is not committed to accommodating the full categorial plurality of racism. The fact that a category of entity can be racist on ordinary usage is not in itself sufficient for preserving it. For prescriptive theory’s interest is not ultimately in describing ordinary usage, but in prescribing correct usage. The prescriptive theorist must critically differentiate uses that are worth 1

 See Blum (2002, 71); Glasgow (2009, 69).

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preserving from those that are not. To this end, I argued in the previous chapter for a  criterion of prescriptive adequacy: A category supplied by ordinary usage is legitimate and ought therefore be preserved by prescriptive theory if it contributes to racial oppression. A strong prima facie indicator (though not a decisive consideration) is that the particular usage in question aligns with historical usage. The goal, then, is to critically accommodate the categorial plurality of racism, as much as pragmatic argumentation necessitates. This task is not as straightforward as one might think. For doing so requires the accommodation of what I call racism’s grammatical pluralism. Grammatical pluralism posits that a single term (e.g., “racist belief” or “racist action”) may have more than one semantically significant use (meaning), such that different uses entail different kinds of racism (e.g., different kinds of racist belief or racist action, respectively). My focus in this chapter is on the category of racist belief. My aim qua prescriptive theorist is to articulate a definition of “racism” that accommodates the various attitudes falling under the category of racist belief, where a racist belief is one that contributes to racial oppression. Racist beliefs of different kinds should be accommodated without obscuring the nature of their wrongness and their role in sustaining racial oppression. For instance, if a belief is racist because it stigmatizes the targeted group, thereby contributing to their low station in life, theory should not reject this explanation or downplay its significance for theory simply because it does not so easily fit the philosopher’s preferred account of racism’s wrongness. Against my oppression theory of racism, it might be objected that it entails an implausible moral monism (a monistic account of moral badness that distorts other kinds2 of ill). However, the objection is misguided, for my account is output-driven (rather than input-driven). As such, it recognizes that an entity can be wrong for categorial (internal) and functional (external) reasons. For instance, if racial hatred is racist, then it must contribute to the wrong of racial oppression, on my account. However, this fact should not lead us to conclude that racial hatred is only because it contributes to racial oppression. For the phenomenon might be wrong for intrinsic reasons (as well). Prescriptive theory should respect rather than distort this fact.

2  Note that by “kind” I do not mean a kind in standard philosophical jargon. My focus in this chapter is on grammatical/conceptual kinds, as given by prescriptively correct usage, not ontological (language-independent) kinds, such as those I reject in Chap. 4.

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My functionalist approach is compatible with moral pluralism about racial ills, for moral pluralism about racial ills is compatible with moral monism about racism. My account leaves open the question of whether a racial ill is wrong or objectionable for reasons having to do with the kind of thing it is. With respect to racial hatred, for example, my analysis insists that, in addition to being objectionable on, say, volitional grounds, this phenomenon is objectionable for being a cause of racial oppression. By the same token, a racial ill that is not causally related to racial oppression should not be called racist, even if it is still wrong and objectionable on other racial grounds. For instance, calling white people “whitey” is racially offensive and, perhaps, morally wrong; however, it does not seem to contribute to the racial oppression of any racial group, hence it should not be condemned as racist. In this way, my account encourages the use of moral vocabulary other than “racist.” Prescriptive theory, as I’ve discussed it, is in the business of investigating the pragmatic grounds for calling and not calling something racist. My account is potentially revisionist in that it assesses ordinary usage by reference to a standard, outside of ordinary usage. In this way, it is not slavishly committed to preserving ordinary usage for its own sake.  Consider the desire to accommodate the categorial plurality of racist belief. This aim is not generated by the requirement that ordinary usage be accommodated as much as possible. Rather, it is generated by the possibility that much of what is called racism may be a cause of oppression. Claims to the effect that some instance of ordinary usage is worth preserving must be backed by pragmatic argumentation. The justificatory requirement of pragmatic argumentation is the burden of demonstrating a moral-­critical need. Philosophers engaged in descriptive analysis  do not see themselves as being in the business of offering pragmatic arguments in defense of ordinary usage. For their “descriptive” task, as they see it, is to describe commonsense thinking about racism by laying down a definition that captures such widespread thinking. Descriptive analysts, like Glasgow, are  thus motivated by a desire to accommodate all of racism’s locations. That is, descriptive analysis often aims at comprehensive theoretical explanation. This is not so in the case of the pragmatic approach I have defended. As was argued in the preceding chapter, the desire to accommodate the existing grammar of “racism” is limited to the full range of predications that correspond to the legitimate moral need for the concept. The aim, in other words, should be to specify those uses of “racism” that describe seriously

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objectionable racial phenomena (i.e., causes of racial oppression). Below, I argue that the category racist belief divides into four species or kinds of racist belief, each of which is pragmatically justifiable. I do not claim that this is a comprehensive rendering of everything worth preserving with respect to our use of the term “racist belief.” There may well be others. What justifies each kind is the unique moral-representational need to which it corresponds. These distinctive needs can be brought out by grammatical analysis. Each distinctive usage and corresponding moral need is related to the others. The common thread running through each representational practice is a harmful social function: each kind of belief reflects and helps to sustain a condition of racial vulnerability, a condition of  oppression. At the same time, these four kinds are wrong for different reasons, even if they are all wrong, in part, for contributing to racial oppression. The pragmatic legitimacy of each usage suggests that any theory of racism that fails to accommodate one or more of them is normatively incomplete and/or inadequate. The foil for my argument is Jorge Garcia’s volitional approach.3 My analyses of the grammatical plurality of racism aim to expose a methodological deficiency in his argument. Garcia’s project fails to accommodate three of the four uses of “racist belief” I discuss, despite his claim to the contrary. This is problematic for his approach inasmuch as he claims that his metaphysical analysis of racism captures the core of ordinary usage of the terms “racism” and “racist.” His account’s inability to accommodate the grammatical plurality of “racist belief” means that it fails to comprehensively accommodate the category of racist belief. This in turn means that his account is prescriptively inadequate, hence pragmatically unjustified. My critique also underscores a potential danger with conflating normative analysis with metaphysical analysis. More than simply failing to accommodate pragmatically justifiable uses of “racist belief,” Garcia’s approach eschews them as false or misguided. This is partly due to his interest, especially in subsequent work, in providing an ontological theory of racism itself. (It is partly also a function of his desire to provide a univocal/essentialist account of racism.) In previous chapters, I’ve documented that Garcia rejects the proposition that a theory of racism should be guided by a pragmatic desideratum; that is, he thinks it a mistake to use pragmatic 3  For other critiques of Garcia, see Shelby (2002); Mills (2003); Blum (2004); Headley (2006); and Faucher and Machery (2009). For a defense  of Garcia against Faucher and Machery’s critique, see Garcia (2011); Valls (2009).

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considerations to evaluate the legitimacy of a theory of racism. This is not to say that he thinks his account is pragmatically useless. Rather, his position seems to be that pragmatic warrant is not an adequate criterion for assessing whether the theory is true (on this point Garcia and Shelby seem to agree). I have argued, in previous chapters, that this is a mistake, and will not attempt to show this here. The ability of Garcia’s account to explain much ordinary usage in terms of a single unifying core blinds him to the fact that there are moral-­ representational needs that escape this core. His argument, one might say, fails to take Wittgenstein’s advice to heart: “Don’t say: ‘They must have something common, or they would not be called “games”’—but look and see whether there is anything common to all.—For if you look at them, you won’t see something that is common to all, but similarities, affinities, and a whole series of them at that. To repeat: don’t think, but look!”4 As Wittgenstein draws attention to different kinds of game, I want to draw attention to different kinds of racist belief. My Wittgensteinian method considers the use of “racist belief” across contexts of use and highlights substantive differences. My most basic criticism is that Garcia does not “look and see” whether everything that is called “racist belief” is necessarily connected to racial disregard. He thus overlooks certain uses of the term. I employ a modified version of Wittgenstein’s “grammatical method” in analyzing “racist belief.” The most important modification is that I do not employ it as a purely descriptive method, although clarifying existing usage for the sake of dissolving conceptual confusion is a crucial component of my Wittgenstein-inspired approach. My aim in employing it goes beyond description (even if it mostly consists in describing), for in addition to clarifying the concept of racist belief, I aim to justify a portion of the grammatical plurality of “racist belief” on pragmatic grounds. Again, I do not aim at comprehensive description, for I do not claim to uncover every possible and legitimate use of this term. Finally, my appropriation of Wittgenstein’s grammatical method should not be taken to mean that I endorse the stronger descriptive claim that the prevailing concept of racism has no essence or that it is a family resemblance concept, as some scholars suggest.5 For one thing, my project is neither descriptive nor metaphysical. When most philosophers claim that a concept has a certain kind of unity (e.g., necessary and sufficient concept, family resemblance concept, cluster concept), they are almost always 4 5

 Wittgenstein (Philosophical Investigations, 2009, §66).  See Tamas Pataki (2004, 10, 20) and Clevis Headley (2000, 245).

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­ aking a factual claim. They may be claiming that their account captures m the core  of commonsense thinking; alternatively, they may be claiming that their account captures the nature of a thing in itself. In either or both of these contexts, the theses of essentialism and (alternatively) of antiessentialism ought to be the result of descriptive analysis rather than stipulated in advance.6 Nothing in this chapter, at least not by itself, undermines either possibility. For my goal is not to preserve commonsense thinking about racism per se, and I believe that metaphysical accounts of racism are confused. That being said, from a perspective, I believe that racism should be conceived as a focal concept with an essence, centered on the notion of racial oppression. As such, the present chapter does not refrain from making recommendations and evaluative judgments about how the term “racist belief” ought to be used. These judgments cannot be justified by reference to Wittgenstein’s grammatical method, as he conceived it, for my arguments do not leave ordinary uses of “racist belief” where they are. A racial belief might be called racism, for example, if it is harmful, but this, on my view, is not by itself an adequate reason to call it racist. The prescriptive judgments I recommend below are intended to conform to my desiderata for prescriptive grammatical analysis (especially the explanatory and moral conditions). I take for granted that the philosophical question “What is racism?” is best analyzed as the prescriptive question “How should the term ‘racism’ be used?”

8.2   Garcia’s Theory: Two Senses of “Racism” In his seminal paper “The Heart of Racism,” Garcia develops a theory of racism that can be read as a descriptive project. His goal seems to be to unpack and systematize commonsense thinking, rather than to capture the essence of racism itself. He states that his aim is to describe the ordinary use of “racism” without significantly revising it. He argues that his theory “better reflects contemporary usage of the term, especially its

6  Approaches like those of Joshua Glasgow (2009) proceed on the supposition that racism has an essence, in an effort to identify what that essence is. Since it is possible that the analysis will fail, his essentialism is methodological. However, he takes his methodological essentialism to be a desideratum (2009, 77). Hence his approach is biased against pluralistic and non-essentialist approaches, for it deems such approaches less plausible or desirable a priori and without argument.

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primary employment as both descriptive and evaluative.”7 In his “Current Conceptions of Racism,” he specifies several adequacy conditions for a theory of racism. I argue that he fails to meet the following two: “[I]t should count in favor of an understanding of racism if it does, and count against it if it does not: [1] clarify why racism is always immoral (without trivializing the moral judgment by making it a matter of definition); … [2] conform to our everyday discourse about racism, insofar as this [sic] free from confusion.”8 8.2.1  Garcia’s Core Essentialism I distinguish two kinds of essentialism, core and property essentialism. Property essentialists, like Joshua Glasgow and Paul C. Taylor, believe that a set of properties cuts across all instances (and categories) of racism. The basic idea is that everything that is properly called “racism” is racist in virtue of sharing a set of properties.9 Garcia rejects this approach to essentialism: [Robert] Miles challenges those who insist on talking only of ‘racisms’ in the plural to ‘specify what the many different racisms have in common’ (Miles, 1989: p. 65). This may go too far. Some philosophers have offered respected accounts of common terms that seem not to require that every time A is an F and B is an F, then A and B must have some feature in common (other than that of being-an-F, if that’s a feature). Nominalism and Wittgenstein’s ‘family resemblance’ view are two examples. However, if we are not dealing with two unrelated concepts the English terms for which merely happen to have the same spelling and pronunciation (like the ‘bank’ of a river and the ‘bank’ that offers loans), then we should be able to explain how the one notion develops out of the other.10

By contrast, Garcia’s core essentialist approach seeks to (a) identify the core form of racism (that underlies commonsense thinking) and (b) explain alternative kinds of racism in terms of this core. According to Garcia, the core of racism is the volitional core of the agent, what he calls “the heart” of the individual (will, intention, desire, motivation, etc.). For  Garcia (1996, 6).  Garcia (1997, 6). 9  See Glasgow (2009) and Taylor (2004, 32–38). 10  Garcia (1996, 10). 7 8

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purposes of defining “racism,” Garcia divides the volitional core into two types: My proposal is that we conceive of racism as fundamentally a vicious kind of racially based disregard for the welfare of certain people. In its central and most vicious form, it is a hatred, ill-will, directed against a person or persons on account of their assigned race. In a derivative form, one is a racist when one either does not care at all or does not care enough (i.e., as much as morality requires) or does not care in the right ways about people assigned to a certain racial group, where this disregard is based on racial classification. Racism, then, is something that essentially involves not our beliefs and their rationality or irrationality, but our wants, intentions, likes, and dislikes and their distance from the moral virtues.11

In this passage, Garcia identifies two types of disregard: hatred or ill-­ will, on the one hand, and not caring enough or in the right ways, on the other. Charles Mills has argued that there are significant differences in the two cases.12 However, for the purposes of this chapter I set aside his objection that Garcia conflates these notions. I will use the term “racial disregard” to refer to one or the other of these types (the one that best fits the context at hand). 8.2.2  Infection and Characteristic Racism Garcia introduces, and masterfully deploys, a form of focal explanation that he calls an infection model of theoretical explanation. Here is how defines it: Infection models of wrongdoing—according to which an action is wrong because of the moral disvalue of what goes into it rather than the nonmoral value of what comes out of it—seem the best approach within virtue-based ethics. In such ethical systems, actions are immoral insofar as they are greedy, arrogant, uncaring, lustful, contemptuous, or otherwise corrupted in their motivational sources. Finally, desires, wishes, and intentions are racist when they either are, or in certain ways reflect, attitudes that withhold from people, on the basis of their being assigned to a particular race, levels or forms of good-will, caring, and well-wishing that moral virtue demands. At its core, then, racism consists in vicious attitudes toward people based on their  Garcia (1996, 6–7).  Mills (2003, 36).

11 12

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assigned race. From there it extends to corrupt the people, individual actions, institutional behavior, and systemic operations it infects” (11).

Garcia’s infection model, which is at the heart of his theory, entails an important distinction between primary and secondary forms of racism. Racial disregard is the primary form and focal point from which extensions (i.e., distinct kinds of racism) arise. I will sometimes refer to these extensions as secondary forms of racism. At other times I will refer to them as infections, for secondary forms are analogous to an infectious disease. Imagine a cancer that is initially isolated in a certain region of the body, but soon spreads to infect the rest of the body. Garcian essentialism understands racial disregard as akin to an infectious disease that originates in the will of a person. It can spread internally, within the individual (to one’s beliefs, actions, etc.). It can also spread externally, outside the individual (to institutions, laws, symbols, etc.). However, unlike cancer, racism always arises in the same central location: volition.13 It might be helpful to illustrate how Garcia’s infection model accommodates cases of racism that are not instances of racial disregard. Take a swastika. Garcia can maintain that it is not racist in and of itself—in virtue of its physical or internal properties—but in virtue of infection. Volitional considerations explain the infection: the swastika’s racist symbolism is linked to a history of racial disregard. For whites have used this symbol to express their hatred and alleged superiority. In other words, the object (better: what it symbolizes) is condemnable insofar as its meaning is connected to individual intent. Evidently, talk pertaining to the viciousness of the object (or what it symbolizes) is metaphorical: a way of expressing condemnation and ascribing moral responsibility to individuals. Contingent facts about the object—say, its effect on victims (generating fear and leading people to avoid certain spaces) or facts about the practice (that it is placed in a public space)—do not explain why it is racist. It is the infection that explains this: it symbolizes racial hatred in virtue of belonging to a practice that involves ill-will, hatred, and the like. The notion that racism spreads from the heart of the individual to swastikas and other racist symbols generalizes to all secondary forms of racism. Garcia, for example, relies on an infection model to explain cases of racist 13  The point of the analogy is logical rather than psychological. It is not a claim about what causes people to believe what they do. Garcia is not committed to the view that racial disregard is the only mechanism that drives individuals to form racist beliefs.

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action and belief: “Actions and beliefs are racist in virtue of their coming from racism in the desires, wishes, and intentions of individuals, not in virtue of their leading to these or other undesirable effects.”14 Racial disregard (and arguably the racist person) is racist in virtue of its nature and is therefore the primary form. Racism’s secondary forms consist of all instances of racism that are racist in virtue of infection. The volitional core, which constitutes the primary form, entails a plurality of secondary forms, for there are many kinds of things that are racist besides the will: beliefs, actions, symbols, institutions, et cetera.15 Garcia’s infection model thus seems to accommodate much of the categorial plurality of racism. Unfortunately, it does not accommodate everything that is called “racism,” as I argue below. Garcia seems to recognize this limitation since he supplements his infection model with the thesis of characteristic racism (or perhaps more aptly termed, the thesis of what is characteristically called “racism”). He writes: “Racism is not, on this view, primarily a cognitive matter, and so it is not in its essence a matter of how or when one makes one’s judgments. Of course, we can still properly call prejudiced-based beliefs racist in that they characteristically either are rooted in prior racial disregard, which they rationalize, or they foster such disregard.”16 The idea here seems to be that prejudiced-based beliefs are properly called “racist” even though they are not necessarily racist. For they are “characteristically” infected by racial disregard. “Characteristically” appears to be synonymous with “generally,” “usually,” or “typically.” One way to think about the distinction is in terms of belief-types and their tokens. A belief-type might be properly called “racist” even though some of its tokens are not racist. Another way to think about his proposal is that the set of things that are properly called “racist” divides into two groups: what is called “racist” in virtue of being racist and what is called “racist” in virtue of being characteristically racist. The remainder of this paper will proceed as follows. Sections 8.3 and 8.4 assess Garcia’s infection model of racism. In Sect. 8.3, I consider paternalistic racism and its connection to racist belief. I argue that one form of paternalism, the kind articulated by Charles Mills, is both rooted in ordinary language and bears no connection to racial disregard. Section 8.4 considers beliefs that are racist in virtue of their ideological function  Garcia (1996, 11).  Plurality is also evident within the volitional core. See Garcia (2011). 16  Garcia (1996, 12–13). 14 15

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(independent of intent). I argue that ordinary language should be extended to cover scholarly uses of “racist belief,” such as the ideological use, which satisfy an important moral need. That is, it is prima facie warranted on pragmatic grounds. Section 8.5 considers beliefs that are wrong in virtue of their content alone. I argue that Garcia’s thesis of characteristic racism (TCR) provides a misguided explanation of the necessary wrongness of intrinsically wrong beliefs.

8.3   Paternalism and the Primary Sense I begin my evaluation by considering the central component of Garcia’s theory, his infection model. He claims that racism is essentially a matter of volition and that all secondary forms are explicable in volitional terms. Hence, one way to undermine Garcia’s infection model is to show that the volitional core fails to explain a kind of racist belief. 8.3.1  Two Pictures of Paternalism Garcia maintains that belief becomes infected with racism when it is held “for racist reasons.” He provides two individually sufficient conditions for infection: (1) A belief is racist (in his primary sense) “when it is duly connected to racial disregard,” i.e., meets one of the following conditions: (i) “it is held in order to rationalize that [racial] disaffection”; or (ii) “when contempt inclines one to attribute undesirable features to people assigned to a racial group.”17 I argue for the existence of other uses of “racist belief” which Garcia’s theory fails to accommodate. I present three counterexamples in Sects. 8.3, 8.4, and 8.5, respectively. The first of these is based on a criticism by Mills.18 Mills’s objection to Garcia’s infection model is that racial disregard is unnecessary for racism. Scholars have long maintained as an empirical matter that many whites were paternalists—that is, seemingly good-­ intentioned individuals whose paternalistic treatment of blacks was based 17  Garcia (1996, 13). Garcia holds that beliefs that do not satisfy either sufficient condition can still be classified as racist, not in virtue of infection, but in virtue of being characteristically racist. This claim is assessed in Sect. 8.5. 18  Mills (2003, 51–57).

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on racial inferiorization.19 To inferiorize an individual (or group) is to believe that one (or it) is inferior on account of race, and to harbor attitudes and paternalistic behavior consonant with that belief. Garcia, however, argues that he can offer an alternative account of this phenomenon consistent with his infection model: What is essential is that [racial antipathy] consists in either opposition to the well-being of people classified as members of the targeted racial group or in a racially based callousness to the needs and interests of such people. This, I think, gives us what we need in order to see part of what makes our patricians racists…. They stand against the advancement of Black people…. They are averse to it as such, not merely doing things that have the side effect of setting back the interests of Black people. Rather, they mean to retard those interests, to keep Black people “in their place” relative to White people. They mean to adopt this stance of active, conscious, and deliberate hostility to Black welfare either simply to benefit themselves at the expense of Black people or out of the contemptuous belief that, because they are Black, they merit no better. In any event, these aristocrats and their behavior can properly be classified as racist.20

I call this conception Garcian paternalism, a corollary of which is that benevolent racists are not really benevolent.21 As a matter of fact, Garcia’s view implies that it is logically impossible for paternalists to act from benevolent motives, since “they [really] mean to retard” black interests. If he is correct, the proposition that some paternalists have good intentions toward those they inferiorize is false or incoherent. Surely it is plausible that some paternalists pretended to be benevolent while acting from ulterior racist motives. That is, they surely “mean[t] to retard those interests, to keep Black people ‘in their place’ relative to White people.” A paradigmatic picture of keeping blacks in their place is one of intentional force, domination, and oppression: for example, the 19  Mills, for instance, quotes several passages from Litwack’s Trouble in Mind (1998, 186, 202, 204, 211, and 245). 20  Garcia (1996, 17), quoted in Mills (2003, 52). 21  My reading of Garcia might be contested. I interpret Garcia as holding that paternalists merely pretend to have benevolent motives while actually having malevolent intentions. An alternative reading is that paternalists think they have benevolent intentions while actually having malevolent intentions. Being racist while pretending not to be racist is different from being racist while thinking one is not racist. The former implies malevolent intent while the latter does not; the latter implies false belief while the former does not.

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desire to impose brute force, the intention to dominate, and so on. Examples such as these suggest that Garcia is right that ordinary usage is equipped with the resources to condemn paternalistic beliefs on volitional grounds. Mills, by contrast, thinks that the inferiorization of blacks has not always been connected with racial hatred, ill-will, and the like. He thinks that good intentions are compatible with inferiorization: A white person has feelings of good-will toward Native Americans (whom he wants to see successfully assimilate), to black slaves in the United States (whom he wants to take care of, since they are incapable of taking care of themselves), to blacks, browns, and yellows in the colonial world (whom he wants to civilize). His feelings of benevolence seem quite real, but in each case they are predicated on his belief in the inferiority to whites, whether biological and/or cultural, of the nonwhite racial groups. So these ­inferiors— Tonto, Faithful Ol’ Uncle Remus, Gunga Din—need to be helped, and he gets real pleasure out of doing what he can to help them. Now in the literature on racism, this is seen as an important sub-variety; racism comes in more than one form, and there are other kinds besides the malevolent kind. Yet most theorists would insist that this still counts as racism, since what is crucial for them, unlike Garcia, is the doxastic dimension: the paternalist’s belief in the racial inferiority of these nonwhites.22

Mills defends this view by distinguishing objective and subjective racism.23 A paternalist’s inferiorizing beliefs are objectively wrong when they lead to racially harmful consequences for the inferiorized individual. They are subjectively good when the paternalist’s intentions and motives aim to further the well-being of the inferiorized individual. For, “in general, if I have a certain (mistaken) picture of your needs, capabilities, and limitations, which I sincerely believe, and I act on the basis of this picture to further your well-being, then it cannot justifiably be claimed, when you suffer by my actions, that I desired to harm you.”24 Given that morality, for Mills, covers the objective and subjective alike—morally good and bad intentions, and good and bad outcomes—a paternalist may pass the subjective test while failing the objective test. He fails the objective test if he harms and degrades blacks in his treatment of  Mills (2003, 51).  Mills (2003, 53). 24  Mills (2003, 52). 22 23

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them, despite his benevolent intentions. It follows that Garcia’s volitional approach wrongly restricts morality to the subjective domain. The argument can be helpfully articulated as an objection to definition (1) above. Everyone agrees that the paternalist’s inferiorizing beliefs are racist. But Mills’s argument suggests that they are not racist in virtue of what Garcia calls “racist reasons,” that is, the paternalist’s beliefs are not rationalizations of his disaffection toward Rs, and race-based contempt is not what inclines him to attribute undesirable features to Rs. So definition (1) does not explain this instance of racist belief. What makes a paternalistic belief racist if not the paternalist’s intention? One might think that inferiorizing beliefs are racist in virtue of their content—a claim I consider later in the chapter. However, we have seen that, on Mills’s account, they are racist in virtue of their effects, that is, objective outcomes. Inferiorizing beliefs determine a racist form of life that keeps those ineferiorized in a state of perpetual subordination. Hence it is not merely the belief’s content that is relevant, but more importantly its ensuing effects. To this we might add that intention has an important role to play to the extent that intentions motivate action. I call this analysis Millsian paternalism. Mills’s analysis implies the following explanation of “racist belief ”: (2) S’s belief about race R is paternalistically racist if the belief depicts Rs as inferiors, and if this belief leads S to form benevolent intentions toward Rs, which results in harmful and objectionable conduct toward them (most notably, a condition of racial oppression). 8.3.2  Garcia’s Revisionist Proposal We have now seen that Garcia and Mills differ in their accounts of paternalism. For Garcia, the paternalist is malevolent rather than benevolent, and deliberately deceptive. For Mills, the paternalist is honest and truly benevolent, but cognitively misguided. Their disagreement is in part about the proper use of expressions like “keep blacks in their place.” I now argue that Mills has the upper hand in this dispute. To demonstrate the inadequacy of Garcia’s account, Mills does not need to show that Garcian paternalism is impossible. He only needs to show that racial disregard is inessential to some racist beliefs. By contrast, Garcia claims to have the univocally correct analysis of “racist belief.” He therefore needs to undermine Millsian paternalism as a legitimate kind of racism.

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One way to illustrate the burden on Garcia’s shoulders is to consider two types of meaningful statement: I. This black man must be kept in his place, because he is my property; because I am white and he is black; because I can and will dominate this inferior; et cetera. II. This black man must be kept in his place, because otherwise he might hurt himself or get himself into trouble; because he cannot fully control his violent dispositions; because he needs assistance; et cetera. Garcian paternalism offers a plausible analysis of type (I) statements, but not of type (II) statements. However, Garcia might argue that although type (II) cases are possible, they do not involve racism. This reply to Mills renders Garcia’s position consistent with the following theses. First, only those cases of paternalism that fall under type (I) satisfy the proper definition of “paternalistic racism.” Second, some cases that seem to fall under type (II) are properly categorized as falling under type (I) instead. This accounts for the intuition that some (perhaps most) white paternalists are deceivers: they appear to be benevolently motivated and present themselves as such, but in fact they are not so. Third, to the extent that type (II) cases exist, these are not legitimate instances of racist belief. Millsian paternalism may well correspond to an actual ­phenomenon, but this phenomenon should not be described as racist. To describe it thus is to misuse the term “racist.” Unfortunately, Garcia presents no argument against type (II) cases, and I can see no reason to think that if type (I) cases obtain (so that Garcia’s analysis of “keep blacks in their place” is correct), then type (II) cases cannot obtain (so that Mills’s analysis is incorrect). Hence, both types of case seem possible; ordinary language is broad enough to encompass both. If I am right about this, Garcia’s essentialist analysis of “racist belief” is inadequate—not because it fails to get the phenomenon right, but because it fails to get the whole phenomenon right. That is, it excludes a kind of racist belief. It seems plausible because it captures a large segment of ordinary usage, but it retains its plausibility by presenting a one-sided diet of examples, namely the use of “keeping blacks in their place” to express ill will, contempt, and the like. If, however, we focus on Millsian examples, we see that Millsian paternalism is also at home in ordinary language. Given that Mills’s and Garcia’s pictures of ­racist belief correspond to different uses of

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expressions like “keep blacks in their place,” Garcia’s analysis, which excludes type (II) cases from the category of racism, should be understood as an attempt to revise ordinary usage. For a theory that rejects certain segments of ordinary usage is revisionist. We thus see that on the most charitable interpretation, Garcia’s position amounts to the recommendation that we not describe type (II) cases as “racist.” It follows that Garcia is misguided in thinking that his theory of racism describes ordinary usage without significantly revising it. Millsian paternalism aptly describes type (II) cases, but Garcia claims that Millsian paternalism is misdescribed as racist. His misdescription charge amounts to the judgment that Mills does not use the term as he ought to (i.e., a prescription). Implicit in this objection is the recommendation that we revise ordinary usage to remove type (II) cases from the category of racism. So, Garcia unwittingly misrepresents the goal of his analytical project, for he misdescribes it as capturing the core of ordinary usage. What is more, given that his prescription excludes an important source of racial oppression, it strikes me as a rather significant revision to ordinary usage. The upshot is that the dispute over whether type (II) cases ought to be considered racist cannot be settled by appeals to ordinary usage. That said, one might try redeeming Garcia’s theory by dropping the descriptive pretense and recasting the theory as a substantive revisionist proposal. Indeed, one of Garcia’s adequacy conditions seems to make room for such a move, for he maintains that a theory might revise ordinary use along plausible lines of development.25 Going down this road requires some sort of prescriptive argument for revising ordinary use, for we have seen that both uses of “keep blacks in their place” seem worth preserving. It seems to me that there is good reason to retain both. Garcian and Millsian uses of “racist belief” correspond to a common moral need, one that is justifiable by reference to the moral condition. The argument can be summed up as follows. The definition of “racist belief” that follows from each philosopher’s analysis of paternalism is partly constitutive of a distinct moral language-game. Garcian paternalism is primarily wrong, according to Garcia, because it offends against the virtues, because racial hatred (and the like) is morally vicious. Millsian paternalism is primarily wrong (it would seem) because it denigrates and disrespects agents, who are treated as inferiors. We thus have two ways to account for the wrong Garcia (1996, 6).

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ness of each kind of racist belief. However, my argument would be that each of these language-­games is worth condemning as racist because each instance of belief contributes to racial oppression. Garcian paternalism is morally objectionable on “subjective” grounds, yet this particular form of subjective wrong has been the source of enslavement, forced labor and servitude, and unearned benefits for whites. Consequently, both Garcian and Millsian paternalism are objectionable on “objective” grounds of perpetuating conditions of unjust privilege for whites and unjust subordination for blacks. Benevolent forms of paternalism have inflicted harm on so grand a scale that historians credit this phenomenon a key explanation of the persistence of racial subjugation. Millsian paternalism helps to explain how racial subordination can persist in a society where many individuals do not have racist hearts. Therefore, the Millsian use of “racist belief” does not merely belong to ordinary usage, it also ought to be preserved. To sum up, Mills rightly argues that Garcia’s theory does not provide a necessary condition of racism because, as far as ordinary language is concerned, non-intentional forms of racist paternalism are possible. The Garcian reply that racial disregard corresponds to a plausible picture of paternalism is correct, but inadequate as a reply to Mills. At issue is not whether racial disregard can account for a certain kind of racist belief, but whether Mills’s analysis offers an account of a distinct type of racist belief. Type (II) cases are meaningful condemned as racist, and there seems to be good pragmatic reason to continue doing so. Since Mills’s paternalistic use of “racist belief” appears to be free from conceptual confusion and satisfies Garcia’s desideratum [2], it offers a legitimate counterexample to his infection model—which attempts to treat racial disregard as the most acceptable account of racist belief.

8.4   Ideology and the Primary Sense In this section I discuss a third use of “racist belief” that I call the ideological use. The ideological use is arguably not at home in ordinary usage if “ordinary usage” signifies the normal or most common usage across an entire linguistic community. For, as I explain below, the popular Marxianinspired use of “racial ideology” is a technical, refined employment. This limitation notwithstanding, I argue that we should retain this expert use because it meets the moral condition I laid out in the previous chapter. Stated more simply, a theory of racism ought to accommodate scholarly

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usage of “racist belief” when it is justifiable on moral-pragmatic grounds. If a scholarly definition satisfies the need for moral representation, then we ought to adopt it, even if it is currently unordinary, for this simply means that our language should be expanded. I will argue that the ideological use of “racist belief” is justifiable on pragmatic grounds. I will further show that ideologically racist beliefs are not racist in virtue of Garcian racial disregard, but in virtue of their social function. Therefore, the ideological use constitutes the second counterexample to Garcia’s infection model. 8.4.1  Ideology’s Role in the Racial Structure Tommie Shelby gives expression to a standard account of “ideology”: “Put briefly and somewhat crudely, ‘ideologies’ are widely accepted illusory systems of belief that function to establish or reinforce structures of social oppression.”26 This definition is in keeping with the presupposition that racism is a sociocultural phenomenon, not simply because of its reference to oppression but because it acknowledges the relevance of empirical considerations. Present day racial oppression and the historical legacy that generated it is presupposed as the background condition that makes the social role which ideology occupies possible. This is not, of course, a new idea. Racism has historically been conceived as an ideology. Originally, racism was defined in racialist or scientific terms, as the ideology that there are discrete biological races. At the heart of this racialist ideology is the conviction that certain racial groups are biologically inferior to others, this being a natural product of human evolution by natural selection, on the more sophisticated defenses of biological racism. The social function of this ideology was the rationalization of the oppression and mistreatment of enslaved Africans and indigenous peoples. Like all social products, ideologies are susceptible to change as social conditions change. Ideologies are in a constant state of flux, evolving in accordance with changes to the sociohistorical context.27 The argument is thus made that new ideologies 26  Shelby (2002, 415). When this chapter was first published (in 2017), I had not yet read Shelby’s Dark Ghettos or his other essays on racial ideology. His definition of “racism” in these other pieces is more elaborate and illuminating: “racism is an ideology: a widely held set of associated beliefs and implicit judgments that misrepresent significant social realities and that function, through this distortion, to bring about or perpetuate unjust social relations” (2016, 22). 27  Frederickson (1999, 2002). Omi and Winant (1994).

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gradually replace older ones when the latter are no longer efficacious, for example, because they are no longer widely regarded as morally or scientifically defensible. The contemporary ideology which many sociologists think has come to replace biological racism, particularly in the United States, is sometimes called “the new racism” or “colorblind racism.” We should distinguish colorblind racism qua ideology and qua praxis; the two, however, work hand in hand. Theorists maintain that after the collapse of Jim Crow segregation it was no longer socially acceptable to openly discriminate against people of color. White beneficiaries of the old racism, however, wanted to retain their privileged status. Among other things, they wanted to retain unjustly accumulated wealth that was created for their benefit by de jure and de facto forms of white supremacy. Therefore, racism’s institutional expression changed forms and became covert. Specifically, it was now expressed in colorblind regulations, policies, and laws that disproportionately harm non-whites, though theoretically they apply to everyone. Michelle Alexander provides a vivid illustration of differential racial treatment, based on a colorblind policy: “Among other harsh penalties, the legislation [AntiDrug Abuse Act of 1986] included mandatory minimum ­sentences for the distribution of cocaine, including far more severe punishment for distribution of crack—associated with blacks—than powder cocaine, associated with whites.”28 Many would describe this colorblind practice as institutionally racist in virtue of its racially-targeted harmful effects.29 Crucially, this social function does not depend on individual intention. Thus the new racism has been described as “racism without racists.”30 The term “colorblind racism” thusly used refers to institutionally racist practices. Eduardo Bonilla-Silva identifies another important use of the term. In Racism Without Racists, he uses the term “colorblind racism” to describe the set of discursive practices and racial(ized) categories (“criminal,” “gangster,” “welfare queens,” “deadbeat dads,” etc.) that are commonly invoked to rationalize deleterious colorblind practices. For instance, the discourse of liberalism, what Bonilla-Silva terms “abstract liberalism,” is regularly used to rationalize institutional racism. A pertinent example is the assertion that race-conscious policies, like reparations and affirmative action, are racist because they discriminate on the basis of race. This argu Alexander (2010, 53).  The term “institutional racism” was coined by Carmichael and Hamilton (1967). 30  See Bonilla-Silva, Racism Without Racists (2006). For an illuminating account of the New Racism at work in the U.S. criminal justice system, see Alexander (2010). 28 29

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ment appeals to the liberal value of “equality,” but the notion is understood abstractly. Treating people equally is said to mean “treating people the same,” and the effect of so treating people is that policies and practices are implemented without regard to salient racial differences. Thus by implementing a notion of equality—abstracted from the material fact that nonwhites have never been made whole and therefore do not have the resources and opportunities necessary to succeed on an “equal” playing field—relevant racial differences are erased  from collective memory and are disregarded as irrelevant factors at best or racially divisive at worst. The term “racism” is thus deployed to attack policies designed to correct for the racial injustices of the past. Bonilla-Silva refers to this form of discourse as a “discursive frame” of colorblindness and argues that there are others.31 Hence colorblind racism—qua ideology—is distinct from the colorblind practices it rationalizes. Together, they work to uphold racial oppression. To capture this relationship, Bonilla-Silva introduces the notion of a “racial structure”: I have argued that racism should be conceived in materialist rather than idealist fashion. That is, that racism is above anything, about practices and behaviors that produce a racial structure—a network of social relations at social, political, economic, and ideological levels that shapes the life chances of the various races. This structure is responsible for the production and reproduction of systemic racial advantages for some (the dominant racial group) and disadvantages for others (the subordinated races). Thus, racism as a form of social organization places subjects in common social locations. As subjects face similar experiences, they develop a consciousness, a sense of “us” versus “them.”32

The notion of racism-as-racial-ideology was thus introduced to help explain an important source or cause of institutional racism. It constitutes a force of racial oppression. 8.4.2   Ideology, Social Function, and Intuition As sociologists conceive it, racial ideology is a causal mechanism of institutional racism. The way in which this mechanism works is relevant to the theory of racism. A belief is ideologically racist in virtue of its social  Bonilla-Silva (2006, Chap. 2).  Bonilla-Silva (2015, 1360).

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function. I will unpack this idea further, below. But I begin by underlining an important ramification of this definition: ideological racism cannot be determined a priori or solely in virtue of the content of belief. Consider the proposition “Mexicans are rapists.” In the next section I suggest that a proposition of this sort is justly criticized as objectionable in virtue of its content alone. Yet, if the belief is ideologically racist, its content is insufficient to determine its status as racist. For experience is needed to inform us of the social role of the belief. If a society largely believes that Mexicans are ­rapists, intuitively we would expect this belief to play a role in rationalizing the deliberate mistreatment of those identified as Mexicans (which will, of course, include many non-Mexicans); we would expect it to rationalize the desire to oppress them. This is precisely the role of this belief within contemporary US society. Imagine now that “Whites are rapists” were widely adopted within society. What is the likely role of this belief in contemporary US society? It is not farfetched to believe that it would rationalize an educational campaign to study this pathological tendency among whites. Perhaps it would also rationalize a well-funded health campaign to treat the “sick victims” of this pathology (especially if “whites” were construed broadly to include white women). Experience, then, conditions our predictions and intuitions about what “would follow” (or “what would be likely to follow”) if such and such were the case. Independent of experience and the inferences that experience enables us to make, there is no way of knowing the social role of belief. The sociohistorical character of ideological racism suggests that we should not rely on our intuitions in assessing the moral status of the social role of belief. A belief might seem harmless, complimentary, flattering, or morally benign judging by its content alone, and yet, it may be morally harmful and objectionable when judged by its social role. Take, for instance, the belief that blacks are naturally athletic and strong.33 Like 33  For another example of a seemingly “benign” attitude, which can nevertheless  be extremely harmful, consider Schmid’s argument for the claim that most people have a natural disposition to socialize with members of their own racial group. Smith calls this “ordinary racism” because he says it is extremely common and not particularly serious. “Here, clearly, the ‘preference for one’s own kind’ in terms of one’s own ethnic or racial group may be an essentially beneficent and relatively benign attitude. It exhibits racial preference, to be sure, and it may contribute to discrimination and injustice (even of the kind which we prohibit in public life), but it is not the kind of racism that we should have foremost in mind when we

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racial stereotypes generally, this belief is false; nevertheless, its propositional content is arguably morally benign. One would not assume, independent of experience, that this belief is commonly used to rationalize racial oppression. However, imagine a society in which most people believe—indeed, it is “common knowledge”—that blacks are naturally predisposed to violence and criminality, prone to harm whites, easily aroused, impulsive, and lacking in self-control. In a society such as this, the belief that blacks are naturally strong may be racially harmful, particularly if it is commonly invoked in connection with these other stereotypes. We know, for example, that black males in the U.S. have been and continue to be assaulted by police officers that view them as larger, older and stronger than they are. This implicit bias is connected with the history of antiblack racism in this country and the stereotypes of black males as menacing threats to society. Even within societies that do not draw these connections, their potential to do so is alarming. The more time passes the more social conditions are likely to change; hence the likelier it will be that at some point the belief will be employed to rationalize sentiments, judgments, policies, and practices that are harmful toward blacks. Since intuition often belies social reality, we would do best to minimize our tendency to draw conclusions about the benign or harmful role of a belief a priori, that is, by generating an intuition about its content. Hence philosophical intuitions have a limited role to play in the analysis of ideological racism. Indeed, intuitions that are unattuned to sociocultural facts are likely to mislead and distort the phenomenon in question. The emphasis on social function should not be taken to mean that the content of belief and the reasons why it is believed are entirely irrelevant to its ideological function. For the content of a belief B obviously makes a contribution to the social role of B. Consider the content of the belief that Sam is stronger than most people. This belief is potentially useful for any number of purposes. Strength is associated with fear, so people who say, ‘He’s a racist’” (1996, 33). Although he calls the belief a “kind of racism,” it is clear that he wishes to contrast it with what he elsewhere terms “true racism,” that is, racism that is seriously morally objectionable. Schmid’s argument dismisses and minimizes the moral significance of beliefs that are harmful in virtue of their social function, as Headley argues (2000). To this extent, his argument potentially has an ideologically racist function, for it provides a rationalization of racially oppressive practices. (By calling his belief racist in the ideological sense, I am suggesting that it plays an objectionable social role, not that Schmid himself is “a racist person” in his own motivational sense of the term.)

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believe this proposition might be disposed to respect Sam out of fear. But their fear might lead them to rationalize a policy of control, extermination or exploitation. Strength is also associated with desirability and attractiveness. So the belief that Sam is strong might dispose people to want to date or socialize with Sam. Can the belief that Sam is strong justify thinking just any old thing about Sam? It is difficult to see how this stereotype could justify branding him as a schemer or as a lover of politics. Hence although a belief’s social role is contingent upon social circumstances, its content sets limits on what this role can be. Let us consider a few more features of racial ideologies. Racial ideologies, as Shelby and Bonilla-Silva define them, are Marxian ideologies. As such, they are more than mere ways of mapping and making sense of the world. In particular, they have two characteristic features that make them especially ­dangerous: they are false and widespread. False beliefs may generate conduct, even a general orientation, that’s misguided and distorted. When false beliefs are consequential in relation to society and social groups, they are likely to inspire socially harmful conduct. The widespread nature of false beliefs creates a veil of ignorance that conceals the ripple effects of discrete actions, which conform to deleterious pattern of conduct; hence, they are likely to reproduce existing forms of ­oppression without the individual agent’s knowing any better. Another aspect of ideology is that they generate social meaning and significance. This means that the content of an ideology must be distinguished from the content of the individual  beliefs  that comprise it. An ideology can provide social meaning which is greater than the sum of its parts, that is, which no constitutive belief, taken by itself, is able to provide. As Bonilla-Silva explains, beliefs about race are commonly expressed in social type terms (i.e., terms saturated with social meaning), like “black man,” “welfare queen,” “immigrant,” “Mexican,” or “racial minority.” Terms such as these cannot be understood in isolation from the broader web of beliefs (associations) that gives them their significance. These terms enter forms of description that are widely recognized and understood in specific ways (e.g., “They hired a Mexican” in some contexts conveys “They made a diversity hire”). Their social meaning is not reducible to their analytic meaning. Nor is it reducible to the sentence-meaning, or even to the normal use of term/sentence. To apprehend their social meaning, one must understand them in the context of society’s  racial “story

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lines,” that is, “socially shared tales that are fable-like and incorporate a common scheme and wording”—the “of course” of racial narratives. What makes these story lines “ideological” is that storytellers and their audiences share a representational world that makes these stories seem factual. Hence, by telling and retelling these story lines, members of a social group (in this case, the dominant race) strengthen their collective understanding about how and why the world is the way it is; indeed these stories tell and retell a moral story agreed upon by participants. These racial narratives, therefore, do more than assist dominant (and subordinate) groups to make sense of the world in particular ways; they also justify and defend (or challenge, in the case of oppositional stories) current racial arrangements.34

The need to feel justified in oppressing others is psychologically crucial to sustaining an oppressive regime. Sustaining a sense of moral uprightness is much easier when one belongs to a community that provides reassurance that everything is as it ought to be. In the case of oppressive societies, this means that a common mythology must be established and constantly reinforced. Hence the importance of ideology.  The unique claim of the ideology theorist is that analyzing the propositional contents and individual practices and attitudes of individuals is not enough to understand the rich cultural meaning and social significance of an ideology, for example, the way it becomes constitutive of the identity of the oppressor group that defines itself in contradistinction to the oppressed group. Analyzing the propositional contents of individual units of belief will not fully explain why the community adopts a fundamentally irrational and unwarranted position. An important part of the story must go beyond reason, into the depths of cultural meaning, notions of self-worth, material stakes and group interests, and so forth. Hence ideology theory encourages the ethnographical study of  racial story lines, in connection with recurring patterns  and  social structures. All of this is required  if theory is to understand the social dimension of individual belief. 8.4.3  Ideology and the Ideological Role of Virtue We have defined racially ideological beliefs as those that harm a subordinate racial group and that justify/rationalize group oppression. Another characteristic feature of ideological beliefs is that they have a way of perpetuating/  Bonilla-Silva (2006, 76).

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sustaining the oppression they produce and rationalize. The way in which they do this is by concealing the oppression in question, by hiding it from plain view. They achieve this by means of naturalizing or normalizing oppression. Indeed, it is important to the proper functioning of many ideologies that their wrongfulness and unfairness be unknown to most members of society. Consider Thomas Schmid’s example of a store manager who believes that young blacks are more likely to shoplift from his store than whites or Asians. Let us assume that the manager sincerely believes this on the basis of statistical data. Schmid finds the practice objectionable on grounds of violating the principle that all people should be treated the same. Yet, he rejects the claim that the practice is racist, for he argues that in order to be racist it must be motivated by racial animus or the desire to oppress, which, per hypothesis, is not the case.35 Since the only thing that matters for Schmid is the desire or intention of the manager, his moral assessment overlooks whether the manager’s belief contributes to the unjust stigmatization of young black males. The manager might be unaware of the deleterious consequences of his belief, yet his belief may contribute this injustice just the same. The belief’s ideological function no more depends on the manager’s knowing this than it depends on Schmid’s knowing this. For individuals can be ignorant (or have false beliefs) about what forms of oppression exist in the society and what their causes are. In some cases, the deleterious consequences of belief might depend on widespread public ignorance about its social role. Suppose that the manager has the second-order attitude that his first-order attitude (his belief that blacks are predisposed to shoplifting) is justified on empirical grounds. The manager’s second-order belief that profiling blacks in his store is justified helps to explain why institutional racism in places like his store still exists. For if he knew that his first-order belief about blacks contributed to a harmful social function, he might have given it up. Or at least he might have done so, if he valued social justice and subjected his first-order belief to critical scrutiny (for he might have concluded from such an interrogation that the belief is false or unjustified); alternatively, he might have concluded that despite his sincere belief that his first-order belief is true it is wrong to act on it because it  contributes to a condition that unfairly brands young blacks as criminal. After all, he may not want to contribute to the oppression of blacks. In this way, the actual social harm that his belief produces might partly depend on his not knowing its actual social  Schmid (1996, 37).

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role, just as it might depend on his sincere belief that his first-order belief is racially benign since it is an “statistical fact.” Ideological racism might also depend on the believer not having racial disregard in her heart. We have already seen, in the case of the paternalist, the kind of harm that can be done by well-intentioned people that harbor false beliefs about racialized groups. Christian colonists and missionaries who think about their indigenous subjects as inferior savages can enforce oppressive assimilationist regimes if they think of themselves as virtuous persons. As Mills argues in his critique of Garcia, an important step in thinking of oneself as a virtuous person is that one believes that one’s views about the outgroup are well founded. If a person is thought to be mentally inferior, then treating her as a mentally inferior (sub)human is the right thing to do. To intend to so treat one is to harbor good rather than bad intentions toward her. Contrary to what Garcia maintains, the intention to limit an individual’s autonomy is not inherently misguided from an intentional perspective, for this limitation can be conceptualized in more than one way. Limiting the autonomy of a child, for example, is a means of protecting her, not of abusing her. (Such paternalism is called “good parenting.”) And this, of course, is similar to how many slave holders thought about their slaves. If this is correct, then the objectionable status of ideologically racist belief might in some cases presuppose the believer’s benevolent intentions and lack of desire to oppress the targeted group. Garcia’s infection model cannot condemn such cases as racist, because volitional considerations do not enter the explanation in the right way. On the contrary, the way in which they enter the analysis problematizes personal morality by implicating it as a contributing source of oppression. We could put the point this way: ideological racism exposes the vile role of personal virtue within oppressive cultures. I  thus conclude that the possibility of ideologically racist belief need not be connected to Garcian racial disregard. Moreover, virtuous volitional states are sometimes racist in virtue of their role in sustaining oppression. To the question “How is it possible for well-intentioned persons to oppress others?” part of the answer may be that ideology has an insidious way of coopting moral virtue to vicious effect. For, if my analysis is correct, benovelence is sometimes required for racist beliefs to perform their  ideological function. The possibility of ideologically racist belief entails the inadequacy of Garcia’s infection model, which cannot account for, and is sometimes at odds with, this particular kind of racist belief.

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8.4.4  Ideology and Political Morality One limitation of Garcia’s account is that although it explains part of what is wrong with some instances of institutional racism, it misses those aspects that crucially depend on the social role of belief, that depend on what I have termed “ideological racism.” It is important to distinguish, as Shelby does, moral evaluation within two different contexts: personal morality and political morality.36 Roughly, one way to think about these approaches is that they differ in regard to the order of moral explanation. Personal accounts of racism acknowledge the existence of structural and institutional forms of racism. Political accounts recognize the existence of agential forms of racism. Where they differ is on the question of which forms should be primary in explaining racism’s negative valence. Political accounts stress the institutional and structural as being of first importance, whereas personal accounts stress the agential as being of first importance.  Following Shelby, I believe that the concept of racism should be analyzed, essentially, as a tool of political morality. To condemn belief on political grounds is to assess according to standards of social justice rather than  standards of personal responsibility. Political morality is not, first and foremost, an attempt to assess an individual’s intentions, motivation, and character; it is an attempt to assess the fairness of social practices, organizational roles, and the like. The premise is that rule-governed practices are worthy of critique, independent of issues of personal accountability. Personal morality makes a different assumption. For example,  when we judge that someone is a racist, we do not always need to consider the social context in which she acts. We often  look to her subjective states and conduct—her intentions and actions, for example—and determine on this basis alone that she is a racist. This practice is well-suited to the task of assigning blame and responsibility based on a person’s character and the kind of person she is. However, assessing the heart of the individual (her flaws and vices) does not always disclose her role in sustaining unjust social arrangements. This is the point of condemning paternalistic racists and ideological racists. For these individuals acquire their harmful social roles in virtue of their beliefs (and, in some cases, also their good volitional states). What is in the heart of individuals is surely one source of injustice, but so is her cognitive apparatus. Where the goal is to criticize social practices that create an unjust society, the goal of calling someone racist should be to identify and condemn her  Shelby (2014).

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role within racial injustice. Hence it is essential that we not treat individuals in isolation from their social surroundings. We must consider them as agents situated within a broader social nexus, as playing a certain kind of role in it. Garcia’s analysis of racism misses the moral significance that we assign to social practices, because he assumes that, for purposes of condemning racism, social practices can only be (morally) assessed from the vantage point of what is in the heart. To borrow Headley’s term, Garcia unjustly restricts the moral domain to the actions of “isolated individuals.”37 Hence the moral status of the manager’s racial profiling practice is thought to be fully analyzed by reference to the volitional core of the agent, without regard to whether it contributes to the stigmatization of a racial group. The implication is that the social environment wherein the agent acts is of no moral consequence. The political issue of how to structure society so as not to impose further burdens on racially disadvantaged groups is presumed to be beyond the scope of moral theory. This arbitrary limit is a convenience which serves white interests well, but is detrimental to the representational needs of racism’s historical victims. Political morality, by contrast, asserts that the current organization of society, which distributes burdens and privileges unevenly, and the question of how best to reorganize society so as to correct these injustices is the heart of the theory of racism. We have said that the theory of racism has a political interest in grappling with norms of corrective justice. How best to grapple with injustice, however, depends on what its causes are. This renders Bonilla-Silva’s sociological questions pertinent to political morality: How is it possible to have this tremendous degree of racial inequality in a country where most whites claim that race is no longer relevant? More important, how do whites explain the apparent contradiction between their professed color blindness and the United States’ color-coded inequality? In this book I attempt to answer both of these questions. I contend that whites have developed powerful explanations—which have ultimately become justifications—for contemporary racial inequality that exculpate them from any responsibility for the status of people of color. These explanations emanate from a new racial ideology that I label color-blind racism.38

The sociologist may be interested in social explanation rather than political morality, but it is clear that sociological accounts which uncover the  Headley (2000, 238–39).  Bonilla-Silva (2006, 2).

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distribution of differential burdens and benefits are relevant to prescriptive moral theory. The explanatory criterion laid down in the previous chapter (in connection with the presupposition that racism is a sociocultural concept) calls for accommodating forms of racial harm that contribute to racial oppression; hence we are required to take seriously the arguments of sociologists when these arguments identify a legitimate moral need. Bonilla-Silva’s account of “racist belief ” corresponds to a need to condemn—and not merely  explain and understand—racial inequality. ­ Since racial ideology is a major cause of racial inequality (oppression), it ought to be condemned as racist. This is relevant to my assessment of Garcia because his account fails to meet the explanatory condition, as it fails to take seriously discussions of racial ideology. However, it also illustrates my claim that prescriptive theory must take empirical analysis seriously. I close this section by considering an objection. Garcia might reply that the goal of his analysis was not to accommodate sociological (or expert) usage of “racist belief,” but to accommodate ordinary usage of the term. On the assumption that the former is not part of the latter, my reply is that ordinary use should be expanded to accommodate it. After all, the term “racism” was initially introduced by experts and the same goes for “institutional racism,” among other extensions of the term. Over time, these terms were incorporated into the broader culture. It was incorporated because of its utility in moral representation. So, it seems that the historical lesson here is criterial. Our criterion for determining the proper definition of a term should not be grounded in answers to questions like: “Who introduced the term, an expert or a non-expert?” and “Did the term arise organically in the culture or by sheer stipulation?” In the previous chapter, I argued that we should adopt a moral criterion in assessing the pragmatic value of prospective definitions of racist phenomena: What needs does this term purport to meet and does it succeed in meeting them? Plausibly, the ideological use passes this test. Further, one of Garcia’s adequacy conditions gives license to extensions of “racism” along pragmatic lines. He claims that a theory of racism should “either stand continuous with past uses of the term ‘racism’, or involve a change of the term’s meaning that represents a plausible transformation along reasonable lines of development.”39 I would argue that the ideological use of “racist belief” bears sufficient resemblance to the paradigm of  Garcia (1997, 6).

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institutional racism, thereby passing Garcia’s test. To begin with, ideologically racist belief retains the condemnatory function of the terms “racism” and “racist.” Second, it retains the characteristic connection to racial oppression. For not only does racial ideology resemble what is called institutional racism in terms of its effects, it is causally linked to it. Some forms of institutional racism are racist (in part) because of the racial harm they produce. The ideological use simply extends this thought: some beliefs perpetuate institutional racism in virtue of entering into discursive frames that function to justify and rationalize institutional racism. These beliefs are unjust because they perpetuate the institutional harm that they rationalize. Consequently, moral and pragmatic warrant exists for extending the term “racist belief”: there is a moral need to combat these discursive practices, which sustain white supremacy. To conclude, ideological accounts of racism start from the premise that belief content and the reasons why beliefs are held (doxastic and volitional attitudes) are not the only things that are relevant to moral assessment. A belief with morally benign content can be connected to benevolent motives and yet be ideologically racist. The possibility of ideologically racist beliefs, having no connection to racial disregard, undermines Garcia’s volitional account of “racist belief.” We can therefore lay down a third definition of “racism,” and counterexample to Garcia’s theory: (3) A belief is racist when it is objectionable on account of its harmful and unjust social function; specifically, when it contributes to racial oppression, as exhibited in  patterns of discrimination, exclusion and disproportional harm for members of historically disadvantaged racial groups, independent of the content of belief and the reasons why it is held. In light of my argument in the previous section it is clear that racist beliefs (2) and (3) are closely connected. Paternalistic racism is predicated on a particular type of racial ideology, one that inferiorizes the racial other. Hence it can bring about an unjust social function if the ideology is sufficiently widespread and the relevant societal conditions are in place. However, there are two major differences between (2) and (3). First, a paradigm of ideologically racist belief involves non-inferiorizing attitudes, such as colorblind attitudes. Second, a paradigm of paternalistically racist belief is that it involves an intention to harm or dominate in the case of Garcian paternalism, whereas no such intention is found in the case of

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colorblind racism. In any case, what I have argued is that, in both (2) and (3), racist belief is causally linked to racial oppression.

8.5   The Secondary Sense as Wrong Explanation I have argued that Garcia’s infection model cannot accommodate definitions (2) and (3) of “racist belief.” However, it might be replied that I did not discuss (2) and (3) in relation to Garcia’s thesis of characteristic racism which introduces a secondary sense. I will first illustrate the significance of the thesis by showcasing its ability to reply to a recent objection from Lawrence Blum. I will then argue that the Garcian reply offers the wrong explanation inasmuch as it fails to capture the necessary wrongness of racism. 8.5.1  Blum’s Objection and Characteristic Racism On Garcia’s infection model, only racial disregard can be racist in itself. All other racist phenomena must be racist in virtue of infection, that is, in virtue of some connection to racial disregard. It follows that no belief can be racist in virtue of its function, effects, or content alone. Blum rejects this corollary as obviously false. He offers the following counterexample: But what about the proposition P itself? Isn’t the proposition ‘blacks are subhuman’ a morally repulsive proposition, independent of what leads anyone to believe it? That is, isn’t there something about the content of propositions itself that can make them racially objectionable—that they declare a racial group to be humanly deficient, or inferior in some fundamental way, or … that they portray a racial group as worthy of hate?40

Blum’s objection focuses on propositions, but an analogous objection applies to beliefs. For instance, the belief that blacks are subhuman is called “racist” in virtue of its content alone. Blum’s intuition is thus captured in the following definition: (4) A belief is racist when its racial content denigrates or degrades the dignity, personhood or humanity of a racial group, irrespective of why it is believed or what its effects are.  Blum (2004, 72).

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Garcia seems to have anticipated this line of objection. For his Thesis of Characteristic Racism (TCR) seems apt to address it. Why do beliefs like “Mexicans are rapists” intuitively strike us as racist? Garcia might answer that given the content of such beliefs and independent of experience it is plausible to suspect racism. For we can readily imagine the kind of person who would believe this sort of thing (the bigot). Moreover, apart from intuition, we know from experience that beliefs of this kind are usually racist. The belief that Mexicans are rapists is a xenophobic and white supremacist trope that is characteristically accompanied by racial antipathy, which it is used to rationalize. The belief, moreover, is used by political opportunists to fear-monger, scapegoat, and, ultimately, justify harmful policies. Currently, Donald Trump has used this racist stereotype to criminalize Latinos, deport undocumented Latino immigrants, and separate Latino children from their families. If “Mexicans are rapists” is likely to engender racial disregard, then it is rightly called “racist” in virtue of this characteristic connection. If this is correct, Garcia can reply that beliefs with objectionable content are racist in his secondary sense of “racism,” even if they are not racist in virtue of their content alone. Since his thesis successfully accommodates the linguistic practice of calling said beliefs “racist,” Blum-like counterexamples are unsuccessful. Garcia could use the same strategy to reply to my objection that his infection model excludes Millsian paternalism (i.e., cases that conform to definition (2)). The argument would be that instances of Millsian paternalism are properly called “racist” even though they are not in fact racist in every instance. Beliefs about the innate inferiority of certain groups are characteristically racist, that is, standardly involve racial disregard. The aim of the present section is to undercut this line of defense. I will argue that, among other things, TCR does not properly capture the relevant linguistic practice because it offers the wrong kind of explanation. 8.5.2  The Wrong Explanation To develop my argument, I will focus on the following belief, which I take to be racist: B = Blacks are intellectually inferior to whites

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Since Garcia holds that racism is always wrong (see his desideratum [1]), his account of racist belief must explain why B is wrong in every instance. He cannot settle for the claim that B is racist 90% or 99% of the time. If there is even one token of B that is not wrong on Garcia’s account, then his theory has failed in that instance. If he replies that TCR allows us to call it racist in every instance, then his argument should be rejected. Accommodating B on TCR is beside the point. The explanation that we are justified in calling something racist because it is normally racist is the wrong explanation. What we need is an explanation that shows us why this something is actually racist. My criticism can be illustrated with an imaginary conversation between Garcia and Joel: Garcia: A belief is racist when it is held for racist reasons; that is, when it bears some connection to racial disregard. For example, a racist might affirm that B in order to rationalize her racial hatred. Joel: What if someone believes that B on empirical grounds, so that the belief has no connection to racial disregard? In that case, is it racist? Garcia: In the case you describe B would not be racist; however, that would be an unusually rare case. And in any case, it is proper to describe B—this type of belief—as racist, for it is the kind of belief that is normally used in connection to racial disregard. Calling it “racist” might communicate the rightful suspicion that the believer of B has unethical motives or a corrupt moral character. Or calling it thus might communicate the potential it has to foster racial disregard; that is, it might caution people against believing it. TCR analyzes “B is racist” as an empirical description or association rather than as an expression of moral condemnation. Rather than explaining why B is morally wrong, we are given an empirical judgment—an association of a type of belief with moral badness. We are told that beliefs like B have a general connection to racial disregard, as opposed to a necessary connection. In particular, Garcia’s analysis implies that some tokens of B are not infected with racism, for example, those that are sincerely held on empirical grounds and have no connection to Garcian racial disregard. For Garcia, something counts as morally objectionable in his primary sense if and only if it is identical to racial disregard or is infected by racial disregard; and since no belief is identical to racial disregard, Garcia’s

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infection model implies that beliefs must be infected with racial disregard to be racist. Hence non-infected tokens of B are not racist. If Garcia should here appeal to TCR to make up the difference, this does him no good. For TCR merely conflates an explanation of why something is wrong with an explanation of why it is usually wrong. Said differently, we do not merely want to know why beliefs usually are racist or why they are properly called “racist.” We want to know why they are racist. It follows that TCR does not provide a proper explanation of the badness of some Bs. TCR accommodates the linguistic practice of calling beliefs of a certain type racist, while failing to accommodate an important part of what we mean by “racist belief.” Consequently, TCR provides the wrong kind of explanation for calling B racist. An analogy may help. If I say that murder is properly called “unjust” because it usually causes needless pain and suffering or because it usually is motivated by malice, I imply that an act of murder is not necessarily wrong. That is, I imply that the wrongness of murder is contingent upon a certain relation. However, if part of what we want from an account of murder is an account of why it is wrong, then contingent explanations are inadequate. Similarly, part of what we want from an account of B’s racist character is an account of its badness. TCR permits calling tokens of B racist, but for the wrong reason: not because they are truly objectionable, but because they are tokens of a type that is usually objectionable. The source of my difficulty is Garcia’s volitional limit on the proper use of “racism.” I have argued that TCR provides an improper kind of moral explanation. It analyzes “B is always racist” as “B is always properly called ‘racist’ (for it usually is racist).” That said, that TCR offers the wrong kind of moral explanation does not mean that its explanation has no legitimate moral function. Let us imagine Joel—who has just been schooled on the proper use of “racist belief”—conveying this newfound information to his friend, Gabriel: Joel: It is not always racist to believe that blacks are intellectually inferior to whites. The belief is not racist if racial disregard is completely absent. However, the belief is a moral “red flag” and is to be avoided; for it is a common way of rationalizing racial disregard and is likely to foster racial disregard. As such, it is rightly called “racist” in the secondary sense that it usually is connected to racial disregard. Thus, we ought to be suspi-

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cious of the motives of anyone who claims to believe B on strict empirical grounds. When Gabriel learns that somebody believes that B, he will not yet know whether this token is truly racist, for true cases of racism have some connection to racial disregard and Gabriel does not yet know why the individual believes that B. Gabriel is in need of further information to justify an attribution of blame. However, in the interim, Gabriel can have legitimate moral concern. The worry might consist in moral suspicion (that someone who believes that B might be racist) or moral caution (akin to a signpost of potential risk, “Danger up ahead”). So TCR has an important moral function: it calls attention to the potential pitfalls of believings of certain types. These virtues notwithstanding, Gabriel’s moral concern is not that (some token of) B is morally objectionable, but that it might be so or that it has the potential to be(come) so. TCR replaces the expression of condemnation and the attribution of badness with the expressions of moral suspicion and moral caution. However, it seems that the former rather than the latter captures the point of calling B “racist” as the expression is ordinarily used. Further, by Garcia’s own account of what a proper explanation of racism consists in, he owes us an explanation of B’s necessary wrongness. 8.5.3   Moral Grounds for Condemning Intrinsically Wrongful Beliefs I close by considering some likely objections to my argument, and by applying my own account of racism to the problem of intrinsically wrong belief. Garcia might reply that I have missed the point of TCR. For I have criticized TCR for offering an improper explanation of racism’s necessary wrongness as if the point was to provide such an account. Perhaps, however, the point of TCR is to offer an account of how non-infected beliefs can be(come) morally problematic. This is a type of criticism, after all, he might argue. As we have seen, Garcia’s secondary sense provides grounds for moral suspicion and moral caution. Since TCR serves an important critical function, albeit one that does not explain racism’s necessary wrongness, does my analysis miss its target? If I have misinterpreted the goal of TCR, this by itself does not get Garcia off the hook. For the question remains: How can Garcia account for B’s necessary wrongness, if not by reference to TCR? The starting

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point of my argument was Blum’s objection to Garcia’s infection model. Blum worries that, on Garcia’s theory, intrinsically wrong beliefs are impossible. For instance, we cannot assert that believing that blacks are subhuman is always racist and mean by “racist” that it is wrong of the individual to believe this. It was precisely for this reason that we turned to TCR as a way of offering an analysis of this type of belief. If we now concede that TCR is incapable of explaining the necessary wrongness of said beliefs, then we have not yet answered Blum’s objection. In reply, Garcia might argue that Blum and I are mistaken in claiming that beliefs like B are intrinsically wrong. However, such an objection poses a problem for Garcia’s own account, for the claim that B is intrinsically racist is grounded in ordinary usage. Garcia thus owes us an account of why ordinary usage fails. I do not think he can adequately undermine the pragmatic underpinnings of this piece of ordinary usage, for it accords with the moral condition, as I now argue; that is, there is good pragmatic reason to preserve it. There is a need to condemn B outright and unconditionally because it falsely depicts blacks as inferiors and so dehumanizes them and because dehumanization is functionally designed to oppress. In the next chapter, I briefly touch on David Livingstone’s Smith’s account of dehumanization. He holds that the primary psychological function of dehumanization is to remove one’s inhibitions against committing atrocious acts of violence, including the extermination of one’s target. If he is right about the psychology of dehumanization, then there is a perfectly reasonable sense in which racial dehumanization can be described as “intrinsically racist.” The term “intrinsically” is not herein used in the logical sense that denotes racist “in all possible worlds.” Rather, the relevant sense is this: B is always racist in the actual world. For dehumanizing attitudes are closely linked to dehumanizing actions and atrocities; hence, objects of dehumanization are vulnerable to these corresponding atrocities. If these atrocities are never carried out, objects of dehumanization are nevertheless entrapped; for they cannot escape living under their shadow, under the perpetual threat of their activation. Targets are thus forced to live in a condition analogous to a Hobbesian “state of war,” that is, they must live under the horizon of imminent danger. Since being forced to carry such a burden is unfair, beliefs like B are, for all practical purposes, “intrinsically” racist (in the non-logical sense described above) in virtue of their psychologicalsocial role, and this simply means such beliefs are oppressive in the actual world. Moreover, this conclusion is compatible with racially dehumanizing beliefs being wrong in virtue of their content alone. By contrast,

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Garcia’s analysis requires that we wait and see whether B has a corrupting moral function in the individual before we can condemn it as racist. His analysis demands that we ignore the corrupting moral function of B within society; for instance, the way in which it stigmatizes blacks. Given the dehumanizing nature of B, which is a crucial first step in the direction of racial oppression, there is good prima facie reason for retaining the ordinary use of “B is racist.” How is it possible, on my output-based approach, to accommodate that which is intrinsically wrong, when intrinsic wrongness is a function of inputs, not of outputs? I might not have a decent answer to this question were it not for Shelby’s distinction between wide- and narrow-scope conceptions of racism’s badness. Narrow-scope conceptions define “racism” narrowly and draw moral distinctions across a wide range of racial ills (racism being only one type of racial ill). Wide-scope conceptions define “racism” widely and draw moral distinctions within the category of racism. In this way, wide-scope conceptions allow that different categories of racist entity can have different moral valences. This is a useful tool for outputbased approaches, like mine. For the wide-scope approach, to which I subscribe, allows me to say that some racist beliefs are always wrong in virtue of their content and others are wrong only under certain conditions. Consider the principle of equal opportunity which is partly constitutive of abstract liberalism. The theorist who objects to colorblind ideology as racist does not assert that this principle is intrinsically bad; rather, he asserts that its badness is contingent upon certain social conditions—that is, the principle is contingently racist. Here it becomes important to distinguish an explanation of what makes X’s social role racist (and bad), on the one hand, and what makes X’s nature bad (if indeed it is bad), on the other hand. The explanation of why X is racist and bad will be similar across categories and contexts. (What makes them racist is a causal connection to white supremacy in the actual world.) However, the explanation of what makes X’s nature bad will differ from one category of entity to another. Whereas some categories of entity may be intrinsically bad, others will not be. Hence, X may be necessarily bad in virtue of its nature, and contingently racist in virtue of its social role. Is it not a problem for my view that beliefs like “Mexicans are rapists” are contingently racist? My account seems to fly in the face of Blum’s argument that we intuitively deem “Mexicans are rapists” and similar such beliefs necessarily objectionable. This Blumsian intuition can be defended by reference to the following thought experiment. Suppose we have complete knowledge of the circumstances under which an agent S believes that

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Mexicans are rapists. Suppose we know that S’s belief bears no connection to Garcian racial disregard and is unlikely to foster it in the future. Suppose further we are certain that the belief will not contribute to a deleterious social role that victimizes Mexicans. Intuitively we want to say that S’s belief is racist. But we cannot say this on my output-based theory of racism. How should we think about this counterexample? I might first reply that my revisionist theory is not committed to accommodating ordinary usage. However, this reply is inadequate, for I have argued, against Garcia, that there is good reason to preserve the belief that it is racist to believe Mexicans are rapists. A more adequate reply is that, on my theory, the belief that Mexicans are rapists may be objectionable in virtue of its content alone, even if it is not racist in virtue of its content alone. Alas, then, I concede that, on my theory, “Mexicans are rapists” is contingently racist. However, contingency isn’t a problem for my view because I conceive of racism as a sociocultural phenomenon. If dehumanizing racial stereotypes should magically cease to produce racial oppression, this would entail fundamental changes in the nature of the empirical phenomenon my analysis aims to condemn, that is to say, changes in the way racial oppression operates in society. In the imaginary universe of the objector’s thought experiment, dehumanization operates in a radically different manner from how it actually operates. For if most of society can sincerely believe that a subgroup of society is a band of rapists, without this belief’s influencing the majority group’s conduct and other attitudes, without contributing to the stigmatization of the minority group, then indeed it is plausible that dehumanization does not deserve the opprobrium we attribute to it in the actual world. For the psychological and causal nexus which conditions our behavior and creates the need for many of our moral concepts find no foothold in this possible world. What this thought experiment really shows is that the grammar of racism which I am proposing is pointless within this fictional universe. Yet, I maintain that my grammatical analysis of “Mexicans are rapists” captures an important moral need in the actual world—a world with our psychological makeup, and all the rest.

8.6   Conclusion We have identified several interconnected problems with Garcia’s theory. First, his infection model is sometimes exclusionary, that is, it excludes ordinary usage of “racism.” It excludes the Millsian paternalistic use, the ideological use, and the use that condemns beliefs that are racist in virtue

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of content alone. Second, his account is revisionist. Adopting Garcia’s definition as correct would result in revising ordinary usage. Third, Garcia’s theory is in need of pragmatic justification, for the uses he recommends for exclusion correspond to moral needs that would remain unsatisfied were we to adopt his revisionist proposals. Perhaps Garcia thinks these consequences a good thing, if, as it appears, he favors an individualistic picture of racism that undermines many charges of racism from the political left. But his position still requires defending. Simply appealing to ordinary usage will not do, for terms like “paternalistic racism” and “B is racist” have uses that Garcia’s theory overlooks. His theory sometimes avoids the aforementioned objections only to err in the direction of improper explanation. B is not just potentially dangerous, but morally objectionable. On TCR beliefs that strike us as intrinsically wrong can be called “racist,” but such an assertion does not express moral condemnation. Consequently, the TCR analysis of “racist belief” does not allow us to mean what we ordinarily mean by this term. For all of the above ­reasons, I recommend rejecting Garcia’s theory of racism, as he presents it, namely, as a comprehensive descriptive and prescriptive account of racism.41 My critical arguments against Garcia have proceeded by means of clarifications of ordinary usage in conjunction with appeals to pragmatic justification. I have presented reminders of grammatical differences in the use of “racist belief” in an effort to underscore the grammatical plurality of this category. Wittgensteinian grammar consists of the set of rules governing the correct use of words, and his descriptive method involves the use of these reminders to dissolve conceptual confusion. Freedom from conceptual confusion is the negative aim of Wittgenstein’s method, but I hope that the positive upshot of this negative task is deeper understanding of the grammar of “racism.”42 Going beyond this purely descriptive task,  In  most of his papers Garcia presents his account of racism as a metaphysical theory. Indeed, “The Heart of Racism” is the only paper in which he explicitly frames his argument for a volitional theory of racism as an argument about ordinary usage. My contention that his theory is “revisionist” is directed at his claim about ordinary usage. 42  My heartfelt thanks to Mark LeBar and three anonymous referees for their thoughtful comments on earlier drafts of this chapter. These comments greatly improved the quality and structure of the chapter. I am grateful to Phillips Exeter Academy for awarding me a Dissertation Year Fellowship, as it was during my residence at the Academy that the nascent idea for this chapter was born. I gratefully acknowledge funding from the Phillips Exeter Academy Professional Development Stipend, the William L.  McBride Travel Grant (Department of Philosophy, Purdue University), and the Summer Institute in American Philosophy Graduate Student Travel Grant. These generous funds made it possible for me to 41

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I have sought to provide pragmatic arguments in defense of uses of “racist belief” that Garcia would have us exclude. My arguments have sought to vindicate these uses of the term by appealing to the moral need to condemn the causes of racial oppression. Unlike Garcia, I attempted to retain the intrinsic wrongness of beliefs like B by turning to empirical analysis. In doing so, I hope to have to shown conventionalism’s methodological capacity to find a place for both a priori and empirical analysis in the theory of raicsm. I hope also to have shown conventionalism’s explanatory power in explaining the grammatical plurality of “racist belief,” including its ability to outline a novel theory of intrinsically racist belief. On my output-model, racism is a sociocultural phenomenon, the wrongness of which is contingent, contextual and political rather than intrinsic, atomistic, and personal. Acknowledgments  This chapter is a modified and expanded version of “Jorge Garcia and the Ordinary Use of ‘Racist Belief’” in Social Theory and Practice, vol. 43, no. 2 (April 2017): 223–248.

References Alexander, Michelle. 2010. The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness. New York: The New Press. Blum, Lawrence. 2002. I’m not a Racist, But…: The Moral Quandary of Race. Ithaca/London: Cornell University Press. ———. 2004. What Do Accounts of ‘Racism’ Do? In Racism in Mind, ed. Michael P. Levine and Tamas Pataki, 56–77. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Bonilla-Silva, Eduardo. 2006. Racism Without Racists: Color-Blind Racism and the Persistence of Racial Inequality in the United States. 1st ed. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishing. ———. 2015. The Structure of Racism in Color-Blind, ‘Post-Racial’ America. American Behavioral Scientist 59: 1358–1376. https://doi. org/10.1177/0002764215586826. Carmichael, Stokely, and Charles V. Hamilton. 1967. Black Power: The Politics of Liberation in America. New York: Vintage Books. present an early draft of this chapter at the 2015 Conference of the Society of Advancement of American Philosophy, University College Dublin. The chapter benefited from discussions at the conference and from conversations with Jacoby Carter, Marielynn Herrera-Urquidez, Rod Bertolet, and Christopher Yeomans. Finally, I owe a special thanks to Leonard Harris for encouraging me to apply Wittgenstein’s approach to the philosophy of race in my dissertation work, and for challenging me to sharpen my critique of Garcia.

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Faucher, Luc, and Edouard Machery. 2009. Racism: Against Garcia’s Moral and Psychological Monism. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 39 (1): 41–62. Frederickson, George M. 1999. Reflections on the Comparative History and Sociology of Racism. In Racism, ed. Leonard Harris. New York: Humanity Books. ———. 2002. Racism: A Short History. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Garcia, Jorge L.A. 1996. The Heart of Racism. Journal of Social Philosophy 27: 5–45. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9833.1996.tb00225.x. ———. 1997. Current Conceptions of Racism: A Critical Examination of Some Recent Social Philosophy. Journal of Social Philosophy 28: 5–42. https://doi. org/10.1111/j.1467-9833.1997.tb00373.x. ———. 2011. Racism, Psychology, and Morality: Dialogue with Faucher and Machery. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 41 (June): 250–268. Glasgow, Joshua. 2009. Racism as Disrespect. Ethics 120: 64–93. https://doi. org/10.1086/648588. Headley, Clevis. 2000. Philosophical Approaches to Racism: A Critique of the Individualist Perspective. Journal of Social Philosophy 31 (Summer): 223–257. https://doi.org/10.1111/0047-2786.00043. ———. 2006. Philosophical Analysis and the Problem of Defining Racism. Philosophia Africana 9 (1): 1–16. Litwack, Leon F. 1998. Trouble in Mind: Black Southerners in the Age of Jim Crow. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. Mills, Charles W. 2003. ‘Heart Attack’: A Critique of Jorge Garcia’s Volitional Conception of Racism. The Journal of Ethics 7 (1): Special Issue: “Race, Racism, and Reparations,” 29–62. Omi, Michael, and Howard Winant. 1994. Racial Formation in the United States: From the 1960s to the 1990s. New York: Routledge. Pataki, Tamas. 2004. Introduction. In Racism in Mind, ed. Michael P. Levine and Tamas Pataki. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Schmid, W. Thomas. 1996. The Definition of Racism. Journal of Applied Philosophy 13: 31–40. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5930.1996.tb00147.x. Shelby, Tommie. 2002. Is Racism in the ‘Heart’? Journal of Social Philosophy 33: 411–420. https://doi.org/10.1111/0047-2786.00150. ———. 2014. Racism, Moralism, and Social Criticism. Du Bois Review 11 (1): 57–74. ———. 2016. Injustice. In Dark Ghettos: Injustice, Dissent, and Reform. Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. Taylor, Paul C. 2004. Race: A Philosophical Introduction. Cambridge: Polity Press. Valls, Andrew. 2009. Racism: A Defense of Garcia. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 39 (3): 475–480. Wittgenstein, Ludwig. 2009. Philosophical Investigations. 4th ed., ed. and trans. Peter M.S. Hacker and Joachim Schulte. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell. Originally published in 1953.

CHAPTER 9

Coda

9.1   Going Forward from Here: On the Feasibility of Negotiation We have seen that contentiousness surrounding the discourse of racism is the source of the philosophical question, What is racism? This is the problem of definition. In this book, I have developed a framework for settling this question and have defended a resolution to this problem, which takes the form of a recommendation. In Part I, I proposed that a definition of “racism” is the expression of a rule governing the proper use of this term. Competing definitions of “racism” are thus competing rules of representation. The meta-theoretical framework that emerges from this argument is an analysis that takes the question “What is racism?” to be a prescriptive question. This prescriptive question is roughly equivalent to “How should the word ‘racism’ be used?”1 1  This is akin to what Sally Haslanger calls “ameliorative analysis,” an approach she applies to the theory of race. However, she seems to take a non-ameliorative analytical approach to the theory of racism in her “Oppressions: Racial and Other” (2004). For although she provides a revisionist account of racism, her account aims at capturing the core of commonsense and historical usage. Luc Faucher seems to think otherwise. He writes that her account is “explicitly revisionary,” unlike Blum’s “disjunctive account,” which “tries to ground his analysis in both history and current folk use” (2018, 419). This is misguided on two fronts. First, Haslanger’s account is indeed revisionary, but so is Blum’s account. (As we have seen,

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In Part II, I argued that conceptual disagreement about racism is best understood as disagreement about competing answers to the prescriptive question. From there I went on, in Parts II and III, to develop a normative-­ pragmatic framework for settling the prescriptive question. I argued (among other things) that whites and nonwhites have competing material stakes in deciding the prescriptive question. Philosophical theory must, therefore, start from a non-negotiable value. I laid down the following a priori norm: the definition of “racism” should serve the interests of racism’s historical victims. Consistent with this value, I argued for adopting a norm of representation according to which racism is racial oppression. A question that has up to now remained in the background of my argument is a practical one: Of what use is a definition? What can be done with it? Many things, as it turns out. Definitions form concepts. So, in addition to the various things we do with definitions (e.g., teach the meaning of a word and correct misunderstanding), a definition of “racism” can serve the purposes of the social critic. It can inform thinking as one deliberates about policy, advises like-minded colleagues and community organizers, educates politicians and leaders in positions of power, offers public commentary on contemporary events, and so on. Of course, the role of the social critic is not necessarily that of one who participates in these activities herself (though she may well do so). Shelby correctly distinguishes the role of the social critic from that of the public intellectual. A social critic, he says, need not be a public intellectual. I agree. The primary way that the social critic “informs” others is through the medium of scholarly work. The philosopher herself need not be a public figure for her ideas to enter policy deliberation, public and personal debates, counsel, education, and social commentary, among other things. The social critic’s role is defined by the practice of developing conceptual resources, instrumental to antiracist projects. Blum explicitly argues that the point of his definition—his claim that racism is best defined as racial antipathy or racial inferiorization—is to rehabilitate ordinary usage. His strategy is thus to deflate the concept of racism by eliminating some of what is called racism. For further discussion, see Urquidez (2018); Shelby (2014, 61). Second, Haslanger’s account is rooted in history and folk usage of “oppression,” like Blum’s: “I believe that racial oppression is counted as a form of racism both in popular discourse and in some academic contexts. So an inquiry into what racism is and how we should combat it reasonably includes attention to racial oppression. …What is racial oppression? …Presumably, in order to understand racial oppression, we should consider oppression in general, as well as historically specific instances where racial injustice is at issue” (2004, 97–98).

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Is the problem of definition only a problem for scholarly discussions about the nature of racism? Can it be a problem for other linguistic communities? The problem of definition, I believe, applies both to scholarly and non-scholarly communities. For it is not just academic scholarship that relies on a shared conception or understanding of racism. One antiracist project which is valued by the social critic is the practice of converting others to her political agenda. One way to convert people to a political agenda is to argue that it is necessary for mitigating or ending racism. Hence one of the aims of social criticism is to shape and change people’s minds about the nature of racism. For instance, the problem of definition arises within the philosophy classroom. One of the aims of the social critic (though not her only aim if she is the instructor) is to intellectually engage students with the aim of converting them to her way of thinking. This is to be done, of course, by conforming to the norms of intellectual rigor and critical evaluation, and without compromising other pedagogical values (including respecting students’ freedom to dissent and to express disagreement). Hence the problem of definition applies to communities outside the scholarly community. Indeed, this problem emerges in all discursive contexts where competing understandings of racism prevail and where agreement about the definition of “racism” is instrumental for achieving some antiracist end. I have argued that (a) the problem of defining “racism” has no final solution, since the grammar of racism is arbitrary and the issue is essentially a matter of negotiation. Consequently, (b) in some instances, the problem of definition will not be resolvable by a single individual or scholar, since this problem has an ineliminable collectivist dimension in some contexts. Suppose, then, that one agrees with me that metalinguistic negotiations are rational endeavors and that achieving scholarly consensus about the meaning of “racism” is both possible and rational, as I have argued. In that case, one might nonetheless question the feasibility of achieving consensus. Let us call this the practical feasibility challenge. The challenge can be stated thus: Is achieving consensus about the definition of “racism” practically feasible in scholarly and other contexts? The honest answer is that it sometimes is and sometimes is not feasible. I will qualify this answer in three ways. First, that consensus is sometimes unfeasible does not undermine the role of the social critic. We have seen that there are other political roles for a definition of “racism” to play. For example, the social critic’s ideas can inform antiracist praxis vis-à-vis informing policy deliberation, ­ argumentation,

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advising/counsel, pedagogy, strategic planning, and social commentary. Second, where consensus is necessary—that is, where metalinguistic negotiation is a condition of achieving some antiracist end—it is important to recall that consensus is sometimes feasible. The feasibility of achieving consensus partly depends on external factors, such as the size of the community and the open-mindedness of its members. Consider the following context: a one-on-one conversation with a friend or family member about the need for reparations for Native Americans. Let us imagine that the conversation quickly evolves into disagreement about the justice of reparations, one that turns on a conceptual disagreement about racism. Assuming that one’s conversation partner is open-minded and is arguing in good faith, the possibility of conversion may be feasible. This is not to say that conversion is easily achievable. Feasibility may strengthen with time. It may turn out that ongoing conversation about reparations is instrumental to the process of persuasion. This brings me to my third point. Even where consensus is necessary for achieving a political end, the process of making the case for a definition of “racism”—the process of clarifying and defending a definition on more than one occasion—may have instrumental value in achieving one’s political aims. A conversation need not result in immediate conversion to be valuable. It may make a more modest contribution, that is, it may “plant a seed,” as it were, that may go on to bear fruit at some later point. Plausibly, this may be one important way that prevailing attitudes and “national conversations” about socially contentious issues and policies evolve. The above description provides a gloss on the practical significance of my Wittgenstein-inspired, normative-pragmatic framework for the theory of racism. My focus on the question “What is racism?” unfortunately means that I have had limited space to develop my oppression theory of racism. Thus I was unable to articulate a comprehensive account of racism’s grammar, and unable to defend it against objections. What follows is an expansion of my account with an eye toward future work.

9.2   Three Paradigms of Racial Oppression My aim in this section is to provide a brief illustration of the utility of defining “racism” as racial oppression. In The Man-Not: Race, Class, Genre, and the Dilemmas of Black Manhood, Tommy Curry lays down this definition: “Racism is a complex nexus of cognitive architecture used to invent, reimagine, and evolve the presumed political, social economic, sexual, and psychological superiority of the white races in society, while materializing the

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imagined inferiority and hastening the death of inferior races.”2 This definition has cognitive and behavioral components. A cognitive definition is one that defines “racism” in terms of belief or cognition. A behavioral definition defines “racism” in terms of behavior or action. Curry’s definition also seems to have a functionalist component. A functionalist definition is one that defines “racism” in terms of its output or results. The functionalist nature of his definition is evident from two considerations. First, Curry does not say that racism is a kind of belief or behavior, but a “complex nexus” that involves these components. Hence he seems to treat cognition and behavior as means to racism. Second, he speaks of the “use” of cognitive architecture for “evolving” a social reality. What, then, is the core of racism, on his account? The core seems to be the social functions of “materializing” racial inferiority and “hastening” the death of inferior races. In other words, the cognitive architecture and the behavior that make use of this architecture are significant because of their social role in sustaining white supremacy (for they are used “to invent, reimagine, and evolve” material superiority for some and material inferiority for others). Racism, for Curry, is a process of racial construction, deconstruction, and reconstruction, which aims at subjugation and domination. The fundamental proposition of his book is that US black males are constructed as death-ridden subjects. However, I will limit my discussion to Curry’s definition rather than his argument about black males. Curry’s definition adds some much-needed flesh to the account I gave of racism in Chap. 7. First, it provides the mechanisms through which racial oppression is sustained (political, social, economic, sexual, and psychological forces). Second, it explicitly names the system of racial oppression: white supremacy. One might object that this latter qualifier is problematic since it limits the scope of racism to white racism. However, I take his account to be a historical one. That is, it is not meant to be an account of every possible form of racism, but only of actual forms of racism. The account does not apply in every possible world, for it aims to account for racism in the here and now. To build on Curry’s account, I offer an analysis of what makes racism objectionable. I argue that it is principally objectionable on political grounds and secondarily on moral grounds. Before building on the above account, I will pause to note that Curry’s account is far from complete. For instance, it lacks specificity in articulating criteria for differentiating racist and nonracist phenomena. How do we determine, for example, whether some racial harm is racially oppressive, 2

 Curry (2017, 4).

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that is, contributes to the materializing of nonwhite inferiority? Curry’s definition suggests that cognitive architecture in conjunction with certain conduct must play an essential role. But what if the cognitive architecture at work is not an antiblack stereotype? Should we call it racist? Moreover, belief, practice, action and policy are not the only kinds of things that can be racist. The election of a black man as US president may causally contribute to white supremacy in the way that President Barack Obama’s election and reelection did. The white backlash that his presidency effected may have contributed to the election of a white supremacist sympathizer (Donald Trump), which may have contributed to a growing regressive white supremacist class. Are we then to call the election of President Obama racist? It would seem that not just any causal contribution to white supremacy should be called racist. Surely, the contributing cause must be more than an empirically detectable pattern of racial harm and injustice; it must be a pattern that is directed at nonwhites. But how do we determine whether an empirically detectable pattern of racial harm is “directed” at nonwhites? This problem does not simply apply to Curry’s account. It applies to my own account, as well. In fact, it is a problem for functionalist (output-driven) accounts of racism, in general. This is a problem I hope to return to in future work. What makes racism wrong? My proposal is that racial oppression is wrong, because it violates a principle of social justice, but racial oppression is often wrong for other reasons as well. Tommie Shelby helpfully articulates the Rawlsian approach to social justice. The “basic structure” of any society, he says, necessarily has effects on the freedom and life prospects of individuals [which] are immense and wide-ranging, and these effects have an impact on the quality of individuals’ lives from birth until death. Because each of us must make a life for ourselves under the dominion of the basic structure of some society or other, we each have a legitimate claim that these institutions treat us fairly.3

Every denizen has a “legitimate claim” to access fair opportunities and resources to survive and thrive under the basic structure of her society. If, for example, a professional degree is necessary for denizens to access good health care and a home to raise one’s family, then every denizen should have access to the educational resources requisite to achieving a profes3

 Shelby (2016, 21).

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sional degree. Similarly, this individual should have access to similar job and housing opportunities as other members of the society. Otherwise the society which deprives some of these resources is unjust. People are entitled to this because they are forced to make a life under the dominion of the basic structure of their society. Among the opportunities and resources every denizen is entitled to are basic human rights: the right to life, to freedom from violence, and so on. A society is obligated to protect these rights. When the basic structure treats certain individuals or groups unfairly, their life prospects are limited by a condition of vulnerability. Structural injustices often have wide-ranging effects on a person’s life, and one has no choice but to try and make a life under their dominion. Shelby argues that blacks are often consigned to ghettos which frustrate these rights and resources. Curry argues that black men are the primary targets of violent acts (including sexual violence), although blacks as a race suffer violence and other modes of stigmatization, degradation, and social disadvantage. Thus far I have argued that racial oppression is most fundamentally wrong because it violates a principle of justice—that people are entitled to fair treatment under the basic structure of society. Injustice, then, is the first and most central paradigm of racism. An oppressive system that is founded on a rigged set of rules—rules that produce stratification, differential opportunities, health disparities, differential incarceration rates, and so on—is morally unjust because every individual has a right to make a life for herself under the dominion of the basic structure of the society she is born into. Nevertheless, if racial oppression is unjust, this is not the only ground on which this phenomenon is morally objectionable. Racial oppression is wrong for other reasons, as well. A system of racial oppression, of subjugation and domination, cannot function without mechanisms in place to sustain it. Racial oppression thus infects other social phenomena with racism. Racial oppression is sustained by several causes. For my purposes, I will group them into two families. The first family I will call racial viciousness. The second family I will call racial dehumanization. Both categories are deliberately moralized (value-laden), for my aim is to use them to shed light on what makes racism bad. I begin with the former. Racial viciousness is first and foremost a harm that occurs at the characterological level, so it is a wrong of personal morality (unlike racial injustice which belongs to political morality). Garcia’s account of racial viciousness, or what he calls “volitional racism,” captures most of what falls under this category. Recall

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that, for him, racism is hatred (ill will) and disdainful disaffection directed at an individual, based on her assigned race. We have seen that Garcia’s infection model helpfully explains how the volitional core of the agent causes racism outside the agent’s volitional core and outside the agent. For instance, we saw, in Chap. 8, that Garcia’s account can accommodate much of the categorial plurality of racism. This point was illustrated with the example of racist belief. Similarly, Garcian volitional racism is the source of what Joshua Glasgow calls “institutionalized attitudinal racism.” That is, the racist attitudes of an agent can infect the design and operation of an institution. However, unlike Garcia, I do not believe that racial viciousness must originate in the volitional core of the agent. As Shelby and Mills have argued, it is not at all clear that racial viciousness, within the will of the agent, can exist without reference to the beliefs of the agent.4 Belief and will interact in ways that, plausibly at least, make infection a co-constitutive relation. Let us, then, briefly mention some of the moral deficiencies that characterize racial ideologies. Here I draw from Shelby’s brief discussion. According to Shelby, “we often criticize persons who are careless or credulous when it comes to forming their beliefs. And we also criticize those who are dogmatic. Such dispositions can be viewed as character flaws, and the beliefs formed because of these flaws accordingly could be regarded as morally tainted.”5 Similarly, sometimes “ideological justifications, race-­based or not, are offered in bad faith,” which “constitutes a wrong in addition to the dominance itself,” since “racists promulgate these absurd things to cover their tracks or soothe their souls but don’t, at least on reflection, honestly believe them.”6 Finally, ideologies run into a “moral inconsistency” problem, for “believing that Blacks are subhuman yet producing offspring with them or celebrating liberty and equality while holding slaves” is a kind of hypocrisy.7 Character flaws, like dogmatism and credulity, are moral wrongs, but their wrongness does not necessarily depend on the (racial) content of these attitudes. They are arguably wrong because of the harm they produce. Why should racial viciousness, whether as a characterological flaw or an epistemic flaw, be construed as racist, on my account? What is the role of racial viciousness in producing or reproducing racial oppression? Both  Mills (2003, 37–39, 47–48); Shelby (2002, 414).  Shelby (2014, 64). 6  Shelby (2014, 69). 7  Shelby (2014, 70). 4 5

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types of viciousness can be accommodated by my oppression theory of racism. Garcia rightly argues that racist beliefs are often rationalized by racial hatred or racial disaffection, and that racist actions and practices, including those that are partly constitutive of institutional conduct, are often motivated by racial hatred, race-based lack of concern, and so forth. Similarly, bad faith, credulity, and moral hypocrisy/inconsistency are often functions of racial disregard, in Garcia’s sense. What makes characterological flaws of this sort racist is that (i) they corrupt agents (e.g., conscious and unconscious racial bigotry). Further, (ii) corrupted agents are disposed to participate in racially harmful conduct (e.g., paternalistic practices), thereby causing stigmatization which is a kind of dignitary and expressive harm.8 Stated differently, (i) and (ii) are racist because they are characteristic causes of racial oppression. It is important to note here that (i) and (ii) may contribute to racial oppression, even if they are not connected to Garcian racial disregard. Shelby is right that some characterological failings need not be explained in terms of the volitional core of the agent. For instance, credulity—or the readiness to believe things, including insidious racial stereotypes—need not be motivated by Garcian racial disregard in order to be morally objectionable. Racist beliefs “make faulty claims to knowledge; they mislead and distort; they create and spread myths; they misinform and conceal.”9 The epistemic dimension of racist belief is politically significant, independent of volitional concern. Epistemic deficiencies, which may distort one’s outlook and bring about harmful conduct, are morally significant insofar as they are sources of invidious racial mythologies. A false belief may function as a shield against sound criticism. And under the right circumstances, it may contribute to unjust paternalistic oppression and stigmatization, even if the belief is unmotivated by racial animus. Consequently, false beliefs about race and racial matters are cause for moral concern and merit moral condemnation, even if the basis of such concern is a justice claim. To sum up, what makes racial viciousness racist is that it lends itself to characterological flaws, habituated conduct, and institutionalized attitudinal practices that are racially oppressive. Characterological flaws are objectionable on personal morality grounds. However, racial viciousness, in both its characterological and epistemic modes, should be classified as rac-

8 9

 See, for example, Headley (2000, 230f).  Shelby (2014, 68).

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ism because viciousness is a characteristic cause of racial oppression. Racial viciousness thus constitutes the second paradigm of racism. The third fundamental harm of racial oppression is racial dehumanization. By dehumanization I mean those (conscious and unconscious) beliefs regarding the innate or cultural inferiority of some races and the innate or cultural superiority of others. David Livingstone Smith discusses an extreme form of dehumanization, namely, the belief that a certain race is subhuman or less than human. Consistent with Curry’s account of Man-­ Notness, he claims that the primary psychological function of dehumanizing attitudes is to solve a cognitive problem: Dehumanization is a response to conflicting motives. It occurs in situations where we want to harm a group of people, but are restrained by inhibitions against harming them. Dehumanization is a way of subverting those inhibitions. For a population to be dehumanized they must be perceived as a race (a natural human kind) with a unique racial essence. The racial essence is then equated with a subhuman essence, leading to the belief that they are subhuman animals. The function of dehumanization is to override inhibitions against committing acts of violence.10

Clearly, then, racial dehumanization is a paradigmatic cause of racial oppression—one that can foster multiple forms of violence, depending on the goals of the dehumanizing agent. However, as I use the term “dehumanization,” the practice need not involve the belief that a racial group is subhuman, though it may. Weaker forms of dehumanization involve the belief that a racial group is culturally inferior in some respect or other. What is required for dehumanization, then, is what Blum characterizes as “inherentism.” This is the belief that a certain group just is the way it is; that its being this way is inherent to the group. The claim of inherency holds “that certain traits of mind, character, and temperament are inescapably part of a racial group’s ‘nature’ and hence define its racial fate.”11 Inherentism may come in biological or cultural forms and may come in unqualified or qualified forms. Unqualified inherentism attributes certain traits and dispositions to all members of the group; qualified inherentism attributes it to most. Biological inherentism attributes innate properties to biological endowment (e.g., genetics); cultural inherentism attributes them to culture. If dehumanization in Smith’s sense is essential to the rationalization of violence, genocide, and  Smith (2011, 264).  Blum (2002, 133).

10 11

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other overt forms of subjugation and domination, then dehumanization in the form of inherentism is essential to rationalizations of milder (and more common) forms of racial discrimination, lack of concern, and disaffection for the racial other. Inherentism dehumanizes when it attributes non-human traits to a human group, when it denies positive human traits to a human group, or when it exaggerates the traits of a human group in a way that is deleterious to that group. Racial dehumanization, in both its weaker and stronger forms, is objectionable on grounds of disrespect, viciousness and injustice. Here I will focus on dehumanization’s characteristic connection to injustice. Shelby provides a helpful summary of the flaws of racial dehumanization, conceived as a kind of ideology. First, racial ideologies are dehumanizing when “they deny that members of the relevant subordinate group are equal members of the moral community entitled to just treatment.”12 For this kind of dehumanization not only commits a kind of expressive harm against those targeted, but also stigmatizes the entire group. Second, dehumanizing racial ideologies imply “permanent subordinate status,” for unlike, say, religious ideologies, racial subjugation denies the possibility of converting to a different race. Third, “They contribute to the production and reproduction of unjust social arrangements by concealing the fact that these arrangements are unjust.”13 For Shelby, this last deficiency constitutes the central wrong of Marxian forms of ideology, in general. “Most importantly, they legitimate group domination through their misrepresentations.”14 I thus submit that racial dehumanization is a criterion of racial oppression, and hence, a criterion of racism. It constitutes a third paradigm of racism. I have now identified three paradigms of racial oppression: racial injustice, racial viciousness, and racial dehumanization. These paradigms constitute three distinct but interrelated families of racial ill, each of which is morally objectionable in its own right and by its own standards. Dehumanization, viciousness, and injustice need not be based on race to be objectionable. However, when they are, they are properly condemned as racist. Moreover, all three paradigms of racism are arguably necessary for producing a racialized state (white supremacist society)—what Mills describes as “globalized white supremacy.” In this way, they become integrated into the patterned fabric known as the basic structure of society, rendering it fundamentally unjust.  Shelby (2014, 69).  Shelby (2014, 70). 14  Shelby (2014, 68). 12 13

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These three paradigms provide an important point of departure for the theory of racism, for they provide a crude response to my question: By what criteria do we determine that Curry’s “cognitive architecture” and social forces are racist? I submit that they are or become racist when they can be linked to one of my three paradigms of racial oppression.15 In other words, I am proposing that my oppression approach to the theory of racism can accommodate historical accounts of racism, such as Curry’s analysis. It can do so by directing our attention toward the social and explanatory role of racially objectionable phenomena in producing and sustaining a white supremacist regime. Each paradigm is seriously morally objectionable, and intrinsically so. Racial injustice (by definition) transgresses a criterion of justice, while racial viciousness (by definition) transgresses principles of personal moral virtue. Racial dehumanization, at the personal level, seems to transgress some principle of respect or moral virtue. At the social level, racial dehumanization transgresses a principle of justice (this occurs when dehumanizing attitudes contribute to racial stigmatization, systemic forms of violence, structural discrimination, and the like). The intrinsic wrongness of each paradigm means that we do not need to call them racist to condemn them. What makes them racist is that they bear a characteristic connection to systems of racial oppression.

9.3   Going Forward from Here: Implications and Future Research I would like to conclude by laying out some of the theoretical and practical implications of my theory of racism. First, it provides an account of racism’s objectionable moral status, in terms of political and personal morality. Many philosophers, including Garcia, Schmid, Blum, Glasgow, and Headley, hold that racism is either always morally objectionable or seriously morally objectionable. Others, like Shelby, Mills and Arthur claim that racism is not always morally objectionable; for them, racism is always objectionable in some sense, but not necessarily a moral sense. I have argued that political morality is a kind of moral position. The term should not be restricted to personal morality accounts of racism. Political 15  This, of course, does not fully resolve the need to fine-tune the criteria for racism. For there remain legitimate questions about criteria I do not address in this book: Are there borderline cases of racial dehumanization, racial viciousness, and racial injustice? If so, how do we decide these cases? What about apparent counterexamples and objections to my argument?

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morality accounts are correct to locate racism’s negative moral valence in injustice. The fundamental wrong of racism is that it is oppressive: it creates a condition of vulnerability to death, stigma, insult, lack of opportunity, lack of access, health disparities, and the like. It structures society in ways that privilege historically dominant white races and ways that disadvantage historically subjugated nonwhite races, which is fundamentally unfair. A second theoretical implication of my theory is that it resolves Blum’s “categorial plurality” problem, which Glasgow describes as the “location problem.” This is the problem of specifying the primary category of entity wherein racism is located or originates. I have defended an output-driven account of racism. An output-model, such as mine, identifies racism with a certain effect or output rather than a specific categorial location. If racism is racial oppression, then the various things that are called “racism” can all be contributing causes to oppression. Racism is best viewed as a function rather than a category of entity. Racism is not a thing, but a condition brought about by an unjust social structure, which is racially organized. In this way, my account also solves the problem of grammatical plurality. For most if not all the things that are called “racist belief,” for example, can be explained this way. Perhaps my account does not ­accommodate the full grammatical plurality of “racism,” but arguably it captures everything that ought to be captured. A third theoretical implication of my approach is that theorists of racism are encouraged to analyze putative cases of racism (e.g., borderline cases) from a sociocultural perspective. I provided the example of implicit racial bias. The assessment of this phenomenon should not be restricted to the narrow set of issues that are prominent within discussions of personal responsibility, such as the psychology and agency of those who harbor implicit biases. It should also be assessed in terms of its social role. Hence my theory encourages a broader set of questions, including these: Does implicit racial bias impose extra burdens on historically subjugated racial groups? If so, how can the exculpation of moral responsibility for implicit bias be justified? I suspect that it cannot, at least not in a way that escapes the charge of racism. Fourth, my account encourages theorists to consider new social phenomena, not ordinarily considered racist, in search of “latent” or “hidden” causes of racial oppression. These, in turn, are to be investigated vis-à-vis their relationship to my three paradigms of racism. This implies that philosophers should make use of empirical analysis in deciding

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whether to extend the concept. My analysis thus appropriates a priori and a posteriori modes of analysis. A priori analysis furnishes the non-­negotiable standard of defining “racism” from the perspective of the historical victim, with an eye toward condemning and repairing the victim’s ongoing state of oppression. Staying true to this standard requires that empirical considerations be taken seriously in determining the ways in which victims are oppressed. As forms of oppression change, so too might the nature of racism change. Racism, in this sense, is an unfolding process. In addition to resolving some important methodological issues, my account is helpful in resolving controversial cases. For example, it implies that, normally, nonwhites cannot be racist against whites. This is a revisionist conclusion, which deviates from ordinary usage. Why can’t nonwhites be racist against whites? I think it is justified by reference to the need of historical victims of racism: the term “racism” should be used to condemn racial oppression. The collective body of individuals known as “whites” either do not belong to historically subjugated racial groups or else these groups have been assimilated to whiteness. One exception to this rule is antisemitic racism. Although Jews have overcome many forms of oppression, they evidently continue to be oppressed in some respects. This becomes patent whenever an important strand of white supremacist ideology rears its ugly head, as it is currently doing. Suppose that a black person mistakenly thinks herself white and subscribes to white supremacist ideology. She harbors anti-Jewish sentiment, rooted in her belief that the Semitic races are inferior to the Aryan race. Does this delusional black person harbor anti-Jewish racism? If so, then isn’t it possible for blacks to be racist against whites? I am inclined to say that the black person is (ought to be judged) racist against Jews. However, this is consistent with my claim that, normally, nonwhites cannot be racist against whites. There are other implications I could discuss, but these will have to wait for another moment. In future work, I hope to do several things. First, I hope to apply my normative-pragmatic theory of racism to controversial cases, with an eye toward generating criteria of application. The aim would be to analyze and appraise the rich grammar exhibited by our racial vocabulary. If my oppression theory of racism is to be worthy of being called “the (prescriptively) correct definition of ‘racism,’” it needs to generate criteria of application for such terms as “racist person,” “racist discrimination,” “institutional racism,” “intentional racism,” and “ideological racism.” Careful assessment of the grounds for each criterion must be accompanied by prescriptive argumentation. Second, I have said very little

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about the relevant notion of race that informs my conception of racism. So, I need to delve more deeply into the historical record, to discuss the relationship of race to racism. Third, I hope to provide a sustained empirical account of racism-as-racial-oppression. Finally, I hope to further refine my a priori adequacy condition, which holds that racism should be defined from the perspective of the victim, especially in respect to the meaning of “contributing cause of racial oppression.” In this book I have sought to criticize and correct much of what strikes me as problematic in the theory of racism. However, at the end of the day it is obvious that this book has not gone far enough in providing a sustained analysis of racism. Part III of this book barely scratches the surface as far as a theory of racism is concerned. The other two parts articulated a framework for theorizing racism. Hopefully, I have succeeded in demonstrating that there is much conceptual confusion in the theory of racism, and that a substantial amount of this confusion is methodological and rooted in linguistic misunderstanding. “For our forms of expression, which send us in pursuit of chimeras, prevent us in all sorts of ways from seeing that nothing extraordinary [I want to say: nothing metaphysical] is involved.”16 “One might say: the inquiry must be turned around, but on the pivot of our real need.”17 This partly explains why the important part of this book is the part I didn’t write: the dustbins of confusion needed to be cleared first, so that inquiry into racism could be turned around on the pivot of our real need.

References Blum, Lawrence. 2002. “I’m Not a Racist, But…”: The Moral Quandary of Race. Ithaca/London: Cornell University Press. Curry, Tommy J. 2017. The Man-Not: Race, Class, Genre and the Dilemmas of Black Manhood. Philadelphia: Temple University Press. Faucher, Luc. 2018. Racism. In The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Race, ed. Paul C.  Taylor, Linda Martín Alcoff, and Luvell Anderson. New  York: Routledge. Haslanger, Sally. 2004. Oppressions: Racial and Other. In Racism in Mind, ed. Michael P. Levine and Tamas Pataki. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

 Wittgenstein (2009, §94).  Wittgenstein (2009, §108).

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Headley, Clevis. 2000. Philosophical Approaches to Racism: A Critique of the Individualist Perspective. Journal of Social Philosophy 31 (Summer): 223–257. https://doi.org/10.1111/0047-2786.00043. Mills, Charles W. 2003. ‘Heart Attack’: A Critique of Jorge Garcia’s Volitional Conception of Racism. The Journal of Ethics 7 (1): 29–62. Special Issue: “Race, Racism, and Reparations”. Shelby, Tommie. 2002. Is Racism in the ‘Heart. Journal of Social Philosophy 33: 411–420. https://doi.org/10.1111/0047-2786.00150. ———. 2014. Racism, Moralism, and Social Criticism. Du Bois Review 11 (1): 57–74. ———. 2016. Dark Ghettos: Injustice, Dissent, and Reform. Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. Smith, David Livingstone. 2011. Less than Human: Why We Demean, Enslave, and Exterminate Others. New York: St. Martin’s Press. Urquidez, Alberto G. 2018. What Accounts of ‘Racism’ Do. Journal of Value Inquiry. Published online: March 14, 2018. https://doi.org/10.1007/ s10790-018-9626-0. Wittgenstein, Ludwig. 2009. Philosophical Investigations. 4th ed., ed. and trans. Peter M.S. Hacker and Joachim Schulte. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.

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Adams, Glenn, Monica Biernat, Nyla R.  Branscombe, Christian S.  Crandall, and Lawrence S.  Wrightsman. 2008a. Beyond Prejudice: Toward a Sociocultural Psychology of Racism and Oppression. In Commemorating Brown: The Social Psychology of Racism and Discrimination, ed. G.  Adams, M.  Biernat, N.R. Branscombe, C.S. Crandall, and L.S. Wrightsman, 215–246. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association. https://doi.org/10.1037/11681-012. Adams, Glenn, Vanessa Edkins, Dominka Lacka, Kate M.  Pickett, and Sapna Cheryan. 2008b. Teaching About Racism: Pernicious Implications of the Standard Portrayal. Basic and Applied Social Psychology 30 (4): 349–361. https://doi.org/10.1080/01973530802502309. Alcoff, Linda Martin. 2006. Latinos, Asian Americans, and the Black-White Binary. In Visible Identities: Race, Gender, and the Self. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Amesbury, Richard. 2005. Morality and Social Criticism: The Force of Reasons in Discursive Practice. Lanham: Palgrave Macmillan. Appiah, K. Anthony. 1990. Racisms. In Anatomy of Racism, ed. David T. Goldberg. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Arthur, John. 2007. Race, Equality, and the Burdens of History. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Baker, Gordon P., and Peter M.S. Hacker. 2005. Wittgenstein: Rules, Grammar and Necessity, Volumes 1 and 2 of An Analytical Commentary on the Philosophical Investigations. 2nd ed. (Extensively revised). Oxford: Blackwell Publishing. ———. 2009. Wittgenstein: Rules, Grammar and Necessity. Vol. 2 of An Analytical Commentary on the Philosophical Investigations. 2nd ed. (extensively revised). Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.

© The Author(s) 2020 A. G. Urquidez, (Re-)Defining Racism, African American Philosophy and the African Diaspora, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-27257-9

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Index1

A Adequacy conditions for descriptive theories of racism moral condition (see Moral condition) ordinary usage condition (OUC) (descriptive); Garcia’s, 238–239; Glasgow’s, 239, 265–266; normative neutrality constraint (NNC), 237; preservationist aim, 238, 239; reformist aim, 238–239; Shelby’s critique of the, 42, 49 Adequacy conditions for prescriptive theories of racism, 275–320 antiracist value as non-negotiable (see Antiracist value) explanatory condition, 277, 298–316 (see also Sociocultural approach) moral condition (see Moral condition) ordinary usage condition (OUC) (conservative); normative status of ordinary usage, 281

pragmatic aim (Mitchell-­ Yellin), 278–279 resolution condition, 277, 316–319 Agent-based theories of racism, see Personal racism Agnostic default position, 253, 255 Agreement in definition/explanation/ practice/form of life about definitions of “racism”; internal contestation doesn’t undermine intelligibility of “racism,” 69; shared understanding is internally contested, vague, 70 communal/intersubjective, 104 as a condition for rational resolution, 222, 224, 227–228 disagreement with the Pirahã, 179–182 human attitudes and, 173 importance of–for achieving political ends, 276, 283, 370 Alcoff, Linda Martin, 268, 268n52

 Note: Page numbers followed by ‘n’ refer to notes.

1

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396 

INDEX

Alexander, Michelle, 343, 343n28, 343n30 Ameliorative analysis conceptual engineering, 32 conceptual ethics, 229–230 See also Conceptual change; Prescriptive analysis, approaches to Amesbury, Richard, 104n16, 117n26 Analytic/synthetic distinction, 113, 116, 168 Anthropological nature (of grammar), see Culture/anthropology Antiracist value, 265 ethic/agenda/commitment, 18–24 and historical victims of racism, 19–24 starting point for prescriptive theory; serve the interests of racism’s historical victims, 279 See also under Non-negotiable values Appiah, Kwame Anthony, 5, 5n3, 51n19, 238, 238n6, 279n3 Approaches to the theory of racism conventionalism (see Conventionalism qua framework for prescriptive theory) descriptive analysis, including descriptive grammatical analysis (see Descriptive analysis) empirical analysis (see Empirical analysis of racism) Goldberg’s purely conceptual/ stipulative (see Stipluative definition) metaphysical approaches; conceptual analysis (see under Approaches to descriptive theories of racism); externalism (see Semantic externalism); See also Metaphysical analysis

moralist approaches to racism; ameliorative analysis (see Ameliorative analysis); conservatism (see Conservatism); revisionism (see Revisionism); See also Moralism A priori analysis, 18–19, 129–137 a priori-based intuitions about definition; a priori as “what precedes experience,” 114; depth, 116–117; epistemic justification (see Epistemic justification); immovability/unwavering attitude/commitment, 108–109; inference rule, 115–117; logical priority of grammar (meaning precedes truth), 112–120; material validity, 114–115, 117, 118; necessary truth, 108; necessity in a system and of a system, 111, 112; pattern of inference, 117–118; universal in application, 112; universal truth, 107–112 constitutive rules, 26, 106, 222–224, 226 as descriptive grammatical analysis/ pure description (see under Descriptive analysis) primacy of–over empirical analysis, 18–19 Arbitrariness of grammar, 101–107, 120–129, 182–187 grammar not responsible to reality, 122 (see also under Epistemic justification) and pointless/unimportance of grammar; the U.S. Constitution as arbitrary, 103 Arbitrary decision to lay down a rule, 212–213 definition (see Arbitrariness of grammar)

 INDEX 

Atomistic approach; inability to accommodate racial oppression, 328; See also Isolated individual racism as an–problem, 298 Autonomy of grammar, see Arbitrariness of grammar B “Bachelors are unmarried” is rule, not a description, 74, 94–97, 99, 102, 107, 110, 113, 116, 134, 147, 233 See also A priori analysis Badness, see under Moralism Baker, Gordon P., 19, 58, 58n25, 58n27, 59n30, 60, 60n32, 60n33, 62, 63n34, 65, 68–69, 75n47, 84, 94n2, 99n9, 100n11, 100n12, 101, 101n14, 117n26, 121, 121n32, 127n36, 163n8, 163n9, 182–183, 183n24, 184n26, 185–186, 186n27, 188, 188n29, 189n30, 189n31, 190, 193, 194, 194n33, 309–310, 310n39 Barker, Chris, 206, 206n5, 207 Basic/non-basic grammatical propositions basic propositions as foundational core of moral grammar, 105 basic propositions as framework propositions, 250 internal v. external grammatical criticisms, 105; internal criticisms of non-basic propositions, 133–135 Bell, Derrick, 228n35 Benevolent racism, see Racism, examples of, paternalistic racism Blum–Glasgow disagreement, 216–220

397

Blum, Lawrence, 6n4, 24, 35, 50, 50n17, 215–220, 224–227, 235, 240, 242, 244, 246, 247, 251, 252, 252n24, 254–265, 267, 268, 279n3, 280, 291–294, 302, 302n33, 316, 317, 325, 325n1, 328n3, 355–356, 360, 361, 367–368n1, 376, 376n11, 378, 379 Bonilla-Silva, Eduardo, 313, 343, 344, 344n31, 344n32, 347, 348n34, 352, 352n38, 353 Boxill, Bernard, 6–7, 7n5 Brandom, Robert, 57n24, 73n45, 75–77, 114, 117n26, 121n31, 151n55 Burden of proof in establishing stability/instability of ordinary usage (see Agnostic default position; Conservatism) in establishing the nature of definition (see under Conventionalism qua view of definition) Burgess, Alexis, 229, 229n37–39, 230 C Carmichael, Stokely, 265, 280n4, 343n29 Carroll, Lewis, 115, 115n2 Categorial drift/undifferentiation, see under Practical problems generated by ordinary usage Categorial plurality, see under Pluralism Ceteris paribus rules/laws, 118, 119 Colorblindness ideology; a liberalism, 313, 343, 361; new racism vs. old racism, 141, 313 praxis/practice, 343 principle, 266–267 See also Institutionalist critiques of individualism; Racial ideology

398 

INDEX

Competent speakers, 10, 13, 59, 60, 66, 67, 70, 75, 77, 81, 82, 84, 85, 102, 123–125, 130, 167, 249, 259, 311 Conant, James, 58n25, 58n26 Concept-formation extensions of grammar of “racism” as, 127 “Water is H2O” as, 61, 99, 158, 169, 170, 175, 177–180, 187, 188, 190, 194 See also Language learning/language acquisition Concept/ion accidental and essential features of, 13–15 necessity and contingency of, 11–13, 97, 141 of racism; chameleonic, 312; competing, 4–7; as constituted by incompatible norms, 19, 31, 169, 251–252; as contested, 8, 10, 14, 17, 69–71, 105, 106, 119, 169, 199, 221–226, 234, 237, 246, 246n21, 259, 264, 275 (see also Essentially contested concept); a moral concept, 20n14, 141, 225, 253, 278, 362; narrow-and wide-scope, 265, 361; and natural/ non-natural entities, 148–149, 152; open-texture, 311, 312, 312n43, 315; politicized, 8, 10, 16, 283; scavenging, 312; as self-­creation, eternal, 147; as social-explanatory concept, 20n14; as a sociocultural concept (see Sociocultural approach); vague/open-­ended, 70, 310 Concept-term, 82n63, 219, 246

Conceptual analysis, see under Approaches to the theory of racism Conceptual change as evidence of semantic externalism, 34, 52, 54, 157–158, 159n2, 163, 168, 169, 195, 283, 284 internalist account of, 34, 162, 169–187, 229 sparked off by scientific discoveries, 27, 169–174, 179, 181, 182, 184, 187, 195, 200 See also Ameliorative analysis; Concept-formation Conceptual confusion, see under Wittgenstein’s conception of philosophy Conceptual disagreement, see under Disagreement Conceptual engineering, see under Ameliorative analysis Conceptual ethics, see under Ameliorative analysis Conceptual imperialism, 180 Conceptual inflation of “racism” and “racist,” 217–219, 235, 254, 254n26, 256–264, 268, 306–307, 316, 317 practical difficulties generated by (see under Practical problems generated by ordinary usage) Conceptual investigation into racism, 2, 3, 10, 17, 48, 53, 160, 162, 215, 379 importance of, 203 Conditions of sense, 63, 99n10, 114, 116, 117, 117n26, 120, 146, 153 Connective analysis, 47–51, 82, 82n63, 136n42 Conservatism, 238–242, 244–245, 269, 270 presumption of, 35, 234, 235, 237, 249, 252, 253, 268 principle of (Vargas/McCormick), 245

 INDEX 

Conservative bias (conservatism), 255 objection to Wittgnestein’s philosophy (see under Wittgenstein’s conception of philosophy) Contestedness of racism (see Disagreement about racism; see also Essentially contested, racism as) Context context for metalinguistic negotiation (Plunkett and Sundell); contextually supplied standard, 207, 208; contextual parameters, 209; See also Metalinguistic negotiation context in understanding grammar and meaning (Medina); contextualist view of meaning, 75n48, 306; practice-based contextualism, 73n45, 74 context-sensitivity, 68, 208n8 Context of use, see under Language-games Contingency contingency as mark of culture, 95–100 contingency of convention; can be changed, revised, challenged, 106–107; depend on decision and practice, not facts, 97; mere convention, 96, 108 contingency of definition of “racism,” 106, 141 Janus-faced character of racism (necessity/contingency divide), 9–18 See also Facts Contributing cause of racial oppression Harris’ insurrectionist defense (see Insurrectionist ethics) what counts as a cause, 327

399

Conventionalism qua framework for prescriptive theory critique of Wittgenstein’s conception of philosophy, 129–132 goal of prescriptive theory; prescriptive endorsements of grammar, 137 as naturalistically plausible and superior to descriptivism, 146–151 normative-pragmatic pluralism, 24–32; prescriptive grammatical analysis, 29–32 as superior to objective realism and social constructivism, 142–146 Conventionalism qua view of definition burden of proof in debate over the nature of definition, 146–147 disagreement is about, 200–202; what the norm is (descriptive disagreement), 201; what the norm ought to be (prescriptive disagreement), 201 explanations of racism, 131 meaning as use, 162 metaphysical predicates recast as facets of convention, 94–129 object of definition; is an entity or kind (descriptivism), 201; is a norm (conventionalism), 201 object of disagreement, 200–202; a convention (normative disagreement), 201; a matter of fact (factual disagreement), 201 rules of representation, 25–26, 367 standards of correctness, 25–26, 109, 147, 251 See also Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language

400 

INDEX

Conventional meaning of “racism,” see under Skeptical worry (What is racism?) Conversational values, 214 Corlett, J. Angelo, 4, 4n2, 50, 50n18, 242 Correct/correctness, 60, 162–163 definition, 78 (see also Definitions, truth of) no practice-independent standard of, 224 use; descriptive grammatical correctness, 132; grammatical correctness, 61–65; as ground of intervention not just fails to conform to a standard, 80; Paul Boghossian on “correct use,” 78; prescriptive correctness, 28, 136 Criteria of understanding, see Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language, sense and intelligibility, understanding meaning Cudd, Ann, 295, 295n23, 296, 301 Culture/anthropology, 94–151, 169–187 cultural/anthropological nature of grammar, 138, 139 custom, 66, 69 non-scientific culture, 170–171, 173, 178, 184 sociohistorical character of necessity/a priori, 91 temporal nature of grammatical propositions, 99 undermining grammar is undermining a cultural way of living (conquest), 185 Curry, Tommy J., 29, 29n19, 228n35, 279n4, 287, 287n15, 297, 370–373, 376, 378

D DA/SDA distinction, see under Disrespect, racial Decision/choice based on aesthetic or personal preferences (Glock), 80 collective/communal (human) decision; collective decision-­ making, 210; may be forced, 227 decision exhibited in practice, 182 decision-making process is pragmatic not epistemic, 27 to extend/modify grammar, 128 individual decision, 73n45 to resolve a dispute by stipulation, 212–216 resolving disagreement about borderline cases by decision, 311 See also Metalinguistic negotiation Default assumptions, see under Presumption Definitions contingency of, 106, 141 as conventions (see Conventionalism qua view of definition) as descriptions (see under Descriptivism) of racism; as expressions of norms, 134, 152, 179; as rules of moral representation, 25, 26, 43; See also Explanation, of racism a tool, 106 truth of; descriptive grammatical truth, 137; rhetorical function of “it is true that…,” 99–100, 100n12, 122, 131, 132, 134, 137; true in all possible worlds, 97n8, 108, 113, 119, 360; See also Grammatical analysis

 INDEX 

Dehumanization as injustice, 377 and intrinsically wrong/racist belief, 360–362 as paradigm of racism (see under Paradigms of racism) psychology of, 360 See also Stigmatization Descriptive grammatical truth, 137 proposition; definition of, 55; descriptions of reality, 55 Descriptive analysis captures commonsense thinking, 219 Glasgow’s, 236, 237, 239n9 Wittgenstein’s; descriptive grammatical analysis (pure description), 132, 136; See also Wittgenstein’s conception of philosophy Descriptivism definitions as descriptions, 73, 124 and facts (see Facts) simultaneity thesis, 189, 190 in the theory of racism, 145 Wittgenstein and, 73, 73n45, 74 See also Conventionalism qua view of definition Desiderata for a theory of racism, see Adequacy conditions for descriptive theories of racism; Adequacy conditions for prescriptive theories of racism Destabilization arguments, see Instability arguments Disagreement conceptual, 3, 19, 23, 127, 199, 200, 202, 207, 216, 219, 222, 225, 230, 237, 238, 291, 368, 370 factual, 201, 208, 211, 215

401

legitimate/illegitimate, 203; object of–vanishes, 203 normative, 54, 201–202; descriptive, 201; prescriptive/ non-descriptive, 200–202, 205–209 about racism; Blum-Glasgow’s disagreement (see Blum-­ Glasgow disagreement); as essentially contested (see Essentially contested concept); as heavily/hotly contested, 8, 14, 69, 234, 237, 246, 264, 275; and intelligibility of “racism” (see under Agreement in ­definition/explanation/ practice/form of life); is rational/resolvable, 221; may go on indefinitely, 222; as metalinguistic negotiation, 34, 205–213, 216, 220, 222, 275n1, 319, 369, 370 See also Metalinguistic negotiation Discovery of real essence/real definition, see under Real definition; see also Real essence Disrespect, racial DA and SDA distinction, 252 dehumanization as, 377 theory of racism, 6, 18, 70, 217, 225–227, 251, 252, 317 Domain of racism, see Racism, domain of racism (that limits candidates for racism), trivial definition of Domination/subjugation relation, see Oppression, racial, domination/ subjugation relation Doris, John M., 248n23 Doxastic inertia, 245–249, 252 Dummett, Michael, 5, 5n3, 57n24, 238, 286n13

402 

INDEX

E Empirical analysis of racism, 9, 18, 19, 107, 137–151, 300, 304, 316, 353, 364, 379–380 empirical intuitions about the nature of definition; contingent, arbitrary, evolving, sociohistorical, 111 Haslanger on, 138 Headley on, 138, 140, 141, 146–150 Valls’ objection to, 139–141 when–is justified, 140 Empirical discoveries generate rival intensions, 169–175 as pragmatic reasons (see Pragmatic reasons) provide new information, 171 See also Facts; Justification Epistemic justification and arbitrariness of grammar, 121–125; grammars are created/constructed, not proved, 125; lexica are standards of descriptive grammatical correctness, 63, 67, 83 objections to–of prescriptive grammar; fails to establish normative superiority, 124; grammar is unjustifiable by facts, 121; is circular, 129n37 science as–for grammar (see Science) skeptical worry epistemic gap; of descriptive grammatical propositions, 123, 124 Epistemic/pragmatic justification, see under Justification Essence, see under Real definition Essentialism core essentialism v. property essentialism, 331–332

function-essentialism v. category-­ essentialism, 305 Essentially contested concept Kekes’ conditions for, 221, 221n27, 223n31 as practical problems (see also Problems-to-cope-with) racism as, 220, 222, 246n21 Everett, Daniel, 176, 176n19–21, 177, 177n22 Expert intuitions, see under Intuition Explanation of grammatical proposition, 61–65 of meaning, 59, 61–75, 77, 81, 82, 147, 163, 181, 213n16; comes to an end, ends in consensual action, 65; dictionary/lexical, 63, 64; diversity of, 85; as public and immanent, 65 of racism, 69–71 Extensions of grammar, see Concept-formation Externalism, see Semantic externalism; see also Conceptual change F Facts empirical facts/considerations; and concept-formation, 183; constrain grammar by making norms useful, 183; contingency of, 111; hardened into rules, 188–189n29; as pragmatic reasons (see Pragmatic reasons); See also Empirical analysis of racism grammar is conditioned by, 126–128 matters of fact, 95, 114, 122, 200 science; non-epistemic significance of, 180; and the Pirahã (see also

 INDEX 

Pirahã); scientific–don’t make definitions true, 178–179 sociocultural facts, 346; about a human community, 184 very general–of nature (regularities), 68, 75n48, 183 Faucher, Luc, 28, 139, 139n46, 328n3, 367n1 Final solution, see Rationality Fodor, Jerry A., 77n53 Following a rule/rule-following, 57n24, 66, 67, 75n48, 213n15 Form of life, 120, 124, 127, 135, 137, 180, 182, 184, 224, 338 See also Agreement in definition/ explanation/practice/form of life Forms of representation, 10n19, 183, 227, 297 Forster, Michael, 82n63 Foundation epistemic–for definitional norms (see Epistemic justification) of moral grammar (see under Basic/ non-basic grammatical propositions) naturalness as–for a technique, 126; makes linguistic norms useful, practicable, practical, impractical, 186–187 pragmatic–of racial discourse, 250 science as epistemic–for grammar (see Science) for teaching language, 67 for a theory of racism, 19 training as–of explanation and rule-following, 66 Framework propositions, see under Basic/non-basic grammatical propositions Frederickson, George M., 293n18, 312, 312n45, 342n27 Functionalist, see Output-v. input-­ models of racism

403

G Gallie, Walter B., 221n28 Garcia, Jorge Ll. A., 4, 4n1, 33, 35–36, 42, 50–53, 139, 139n46, 150, 164, 202, 203, 203n2, 203n3, 205, 211, 214–216, 219, 238, 238n7, 239, 241–245, 247, 254n25, 258, 279n3, 281, 282, 302, 306–308, 320, 325–364, 373–375, 378 Glasgow, Joshua, 35, 50–52, 131, 163, 215–220, 224–226, 236–239, 242, 244, 251, 252, 252n24, 265–266, 286, 286n14, 306, 307n35, 325, 325n1, 327, 330n6, 331, 331n9, 374, 378, 379 Glock, Hans-Johann, 56n23, 57n24, 76–84, 92–93n1, 94n2, 117, 117n26, 129n37, 134, 134n41, 150, 151, 151n55, 170n16, 171, 171n17, 181, 181n23, 182, 186–187, 187n28, 208n9, 213n15 Goldberg, David T., 214–215, 215n17, 307–308, 308n37, 312n44 Grammar as arbitrary (see Arbitrariness of grammar) criticisms of (see under Basic/ non-basic grammatical propositions) as heavily/hotly contested (see under Disagreement, about racism) knowledge of, 65–69, 114, 123, 130 not responsible to reality, 27 qua discipline v.–qua objection of grammatical investigations, 131 of “racism” is internally contested/ inconsistent, 70, 247

404 

INDEX

Grammar (cont.) See also Arbitrariness of grammar; Conventionalism qua view of definition; Grammatical explanation; Language-games; Language learning/language acquisition; Rules; Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language Grammatical analysis, 136–137 goal of; descriptive grammatical analysis (see Wittgenstein’s conception of philosophy); prescriptive grammatical analysis, 129, 136, 137, 150, 330 two kinds of grammatical truth; descriptive grammatical truth, 137; prescriptive grammatical truth, 137 See also A priori analysis; Conventionalism qua framework for prescriptive theory; Conventionalism qua view of definition Grammatical explanation, 61–65 explanation of meaning, 59, 61–75, 77, 81, 82, 85, 147, 163, 181, 213n16; as a grammatical reminder, 131–132, 136 grammatical proposition; basic/ framework (see Basic/non-basic grammatical propositions); as justifiers, not justified, 121n31; prescriptive, 27, 29–32, 129, 132, 135–137, 150, 195, 330; as reasons, 120–121 and justification; I will reach bedrock (reasons will soon give out), 121; made true by convention, 126, 128 understanding a; background of prior understanding, 67–68;

and learning/teaching/ training, 65–66 See also Grammar; Grammatical analysis Grammatical knowledge, see Language learning/language acquisition Grammatical propositions, see under Grammatical explanation Grammatical rules, see Grammatical explanation Grammatical truth, 98, 110, 137 v. empirical truth, 121 See also Grammatical explanation; Truth H Hacker, Peter M. S., 58, 58n25, 58n27, 59n29, 59n30, 60, 60n32, 60n33, 62, 63n34, 65, 68–69, 75n47, 84, 94n2, 94n3, 96n6, 99n9, 100n11, 100n12, 101, 101n14, 101n15, 107n17, 110n19, 117n26, 121, 121n32, 122, 123n34, 126, 126n35, 127n36, 131, 131n38, 133n39, 151n55, 163n8, 163n9, 182–183, 183n24, 184n26, 185–186, 186n27, 188–190, 193, 194, 194n33, 309–311 Hamilton, Charles, 265, 280n4, 343n29 Hanfling, Oswald, 166–167, 167n15, 171–174, 179 Hare, Richard M., 205 Harris, Leonard, 29, 29n21, 33, 33n27, 51, 52, 142–146, 148, 152, 153, 203, 211, 229, 229n36, 246n21, 307–309, 314, 314n47 Haslanger, Sally, 22n17, 32, 32n26, 45, 45n4–7, 46, 46n9, 46n10,

 INDEX 

49–50, 50n16, 52, 131, 138, 138n43, 157, 157n1, 159–162, 201, 236, 236n2, 242, 242n16, 279n4, 303, 303n34, 367–368n1 Headley, Clevis, 6–7, 7n5, 18n13, 33, 33n27, 51, 52, 53n22, 138, 138n44, 140, 141, 146–150, 152, 153, 266–268, 279n4, 298, 312n43, 312n44, 328n3, 329n5, 346n33, 352, 352n37, 375n8, 378 Heavy/hot contestation, see under Disagreement, about racism Historical victims of racism, see under Antiracist value I Ideological racism, see under Racial ideology Immanent grammar of social terms is, 106 justifications of grammar; explanations of meaning as, 65; reasons (internal to language), 103 pragmatic reasons provide– justifications (see under Pragmatic reasons) racism as an–reality, 163 Immovability, see under Necessity Implicit/unconscious racial bias, see types/categories of, under Racism Inclusive/exclusive function of rules, 109–110 Individualism/individualist, 246, 252, 266, 284, 298, 299, 301–303, 318 See also Atomistic, approach; Institutionalist critiques of individualism; Personal morality; Personal racism

405

Inequality/injustice, see racial Injustice, under Paradigms of racism Infection model, 332–335 primary sense, 333, 334 secondary sense, 333–334 Inference rule, see under A priori analysis Inference-ticket, see under A priori analysis Inflated usage, see under Conceptual inflation of “racism” and “racist” Input-v. output-models of racism, see Output-v. input-models of racism Instability arguments, 252 Institutionalist critiques of individualism, 27, 35–36, 42, 50n13, 51n19, 78, 139n46, 145–146, 256, 264–268, 325–364 See also Atomistic, approach; Colorblindness; Racial ideology; Sociocultural approach; White-interests-­ serving usage Insurrectionist ethics, 309 See also Contributing cause of racial oppression Intention/intentional action, 66, 151 decision to create/modify/revise a rule, 213, 213n15 racism, 380 Internal complexity, 222, 222n29, 223, 223n30, 223n32 See also Rationality Internalism, see Conceptual change; internalist semantics, under Semantic externalism Internal relation, 60, 82 Intrinsically racist/wrong belief, 36, 335, 359–364

406 

INDEX

Intuition, 51, 91, 111, 119, 148–149, 160–162, 199, 217, 241–243, 248n23, 249, 254, 281, 284, 289, 301, 311, 339, 344–348, 355–356, 361 and descriptive/conceptual analysis, 45 as evidence of correct definition (e.g., Garcia), 34, 143, 170, 180, 209, 210, 216, 252, 380 expert, 160 folk/ordinary, 45 unreliability of, 243 Isolated individual, 21, 352 See also Personal Morality J Janus-faced character of racism, see under Contingency Johnston, Paul, 133–135 Jones, Richard, 18n13 Jones, Robert P., 244n19 Justice/injustice, 3, 10, 15, 19–23, 25, 27, 29, 33, 71, 138, 246, 265–268, 279, 280, 288, 290, 293, 295, 297, 299–301, 303, 308, 309, 319, 320, 344, 349, 351, 352, 370, 375, 377–379 Shelby’s definition of injustice, 279 See also Moral condition Justification, 4, 20, 29, 62, 65, 67, 68, 71, 92, 97, 102, 103, 106, 107, 113, 114, 120–129, 137, 139, 142, 144, 163, 172, 174, 183, 185, 186, 195, 211, 213n15, 215–219, 233, 237, 240, 247, 249, 251, 252, 255, 264, 270, 283, 286n13, 294, 297, 298n30, 304, 307–309, 314, 320, 325, 327–330, 337, 340, 342, 347–349, 352, 354, 356, 357, 359, 363, 374, 379, 380

concepts may be conditioned by facts, guided by our values, 127–128 definitions are tools (means), 127 epistemic (see under Epistemic justification) facts about human harm/misery establish moral norms, 126, 127, 144n51 immanent–of grammar (see under Immanent) pragmatic (see under Pragmatic justification) K Kekes, John, 216, 220–228 Kim, Hanseung, 159n2 Knowledge, 16, 20, 42, 46n9, 58, 59, 65–69, 84, 114, 123, 124, 130, 141, 150, 151n55, 159–161, 171, 173, 177, 179, 346, 375 externalist semantics of, 60–61 (see also Grammatical knowledge) feminist and Foucauldian critiques of, 174 gatekeepers of, 174 of racism itself (see under Skeptical worry (What is racism?)) of word “racism,” 42 Kolman, Vojtěch, 76n50, 77n56 Kripke, Saul, 34, 57n24, 158, 162, 164–170, 174, 181, 190–194 L Language as family resemblance concept, 11, 31n25, 59, 92n1, 94n2, 329, 331 is interwoven with; our language-­ games, 106; our lives, 127, 212

 INDEX 

meaning; criteria of understanding (see Understanding meaning); demarcating semantic rules, 81–85; dictionary entries give semantic information, 64; meaning does not have an existence, does not exist anywhere, 81 multiplicity of things we do with language: commands, pray, requests, etc., 62 See also Concept-formation; Language-games; Language learning/language acquisition Language-games, 14–16, 27, 29, 42, 62, 72, 98, 101, 120, 124, 188, 191–193, 315, 340, 341 of blame, 101 context of use; clarifying language-­game by clarifying, 193 making a move in the, 12, 56, 93 problem of–contestation, 15–16 of social criticism, 101 of “What Measures” and “What is Measured” (see under Standard Meter Bar) See also Language Language-independence thesis meaning exists independent of language; logical priority of metaphysical question, 52–53 ontological presupposition, 52 Language learning/language acquisition, 41 and concept-formation, 183 how–is acquired, 65–69; teacher, 67; training, 66–68 knowledge of grammar; as ability (mastery of a technique), 65, 66, 69; is exhibited in action (my following a rule), 66; is

407

knowledge-how rather than knowledge-that, 65, 123; and understanding, 65–69 normative significance of teaching, 68 presuppositions of, 67 Legitimate/illegitimate disagreement, see under Disagreement Levine, Michael, 160, 163–164, 164n11, 195 Linguistic rules/norms, see under Rules Location problem, see Categorial plurality Locke, Alaine, 18n13 Logic of disagreement, see Problems-to-cope-with Ludlow, Peter, 230, 230n41 M Machery, Edouard, 139, 139n46, 328n3 Margalit, Avishai, 259, 260 Mastery of technique, see under knowledge of grammar, under Language learning/language acquisition Material validity, see under A priori analysis McCormick, Kelly, 245, 245n20, 252 Meaning, 10, 14, 34, 46, 56–86, 92, 93, 96, 98, 100–102, 106, 114, 116–118, 123, 125–127, 130, 134, 146, 147, 150, 152, 157–195, 200, 201, 204, 205, 209, 210, 215, 280, 310, 311, 326, 333, 339, 341, 347, 348, 353, 368, 381 as the object or kind picked out, 164, 168, 169, 171, 175

408 

INDEX

Meaning (cont.) of “racism,” 3, 15, 16, 32, 33, 42, 43, 49, 53–54, 71, 160, 195, 211, 217, 219, 225, 230, 238, 246, 247, 249, 250, 257, 264, 268, 283, 319, 369 as the use of a word (see under Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language) Medina, José, 67, 67n40, 67n41, 73–75, 117n26 Metalinguistic negotiation, 34, 205–216, 219, 319, 369, 370 contested rationality, 222 contextualized standards in, 210 conversational values, 214 limits of negotiation, 275n1, 369, 370 negotiating the meaning of “racism” (see Negotiating (the meaning of) “racism”) objections to; and loss of objectivity, 210, 212; natures can’t be negotiated, 208 objective agreement in, 210 parameter settings, 209–212 pragmatic advocacy on behalf of stipulative definition, 209–212 problem-solving logic of, 214 as rational deliberation process, 214, 220 what makes–rational, 211–214 Metaphysical analysis, 9n7, 21n15, 27, 28, 31, 45–55, 73, 85, 131, 139, 152, 157, 158, 161, 203–204, 236, 242, 243, 283, 328 externalist approach (see Semantic externalism) Harris’ objective realist approach, 142–145; objection to Headley’s naturalism, 150; objective realism, 145; objective

standards, 144; social constructivism, 145; on stable/ enduring definition, 142–144 Headley’s institutionalist/ naturalistic approach, 33n27 non-empirical approach, 107, 108, 112–114, 116, 117, 119, 122 (Expert intuitions; see also A priori analysis) presuppositions of; auxiliary propositions, 53; descriptivist view of definition, 200; ontological presupposition, 52–55 the skeptical worry (see Skeptical worry (What is racism?)) See also Contingency; Descriptivism; Language-independence thesis; Philosophical question, the, the form of words “What is racism?,” Racism, itself (racism-as-it-is-in-itself) Miles, Robert, 247, 256, 256n27, 331 Mills, Charles W., 21–22, 22n16, 24, 24n18, 35, 132, 143, 143n50, 150, 239–240, 240n11, 240n13, 278, 279n4, 281–285, 299, 314, 328n3, 332, 332n12, 334, 335, 335n16, 336n19, 336n20, 337–341, 350, 374, 374n4, 377, 378 Mitchell-Yellin, Benjamin, 229, 229n20, 242, 243, 278–279, 279n2 Modus vivendi, see Problem of definition/of defining “racism,” Problem-to-cope-with; Problem-to-resolve Monism, see Moral monism v. moral pluralism; see also pluralism Moral condition, 252n24, 277–297, 320, 330, 340, 341, 360

 INDEX 

historical usage criterion of legitimate usage, 291–293 legitimate use/usage, 291–297 objections to “racism is wrong”; Arthur’s objection, 285–291; Blum’s defense, 355–356; the Shelby-Mills objection, 281–285 personal blame v. social criticism, 20–21 “racism is wrong,” 70, 94, 99, 103–106, 108, 111, 112, 114, 117–120, 129n37, 131, 132, 136, 150, 249; Blum’s, 355–356; Garcia’s version, 355–362; Glasgow’s version, 225; Urquidez’s version and defense of, 283, 285 severity constraint on the, 281, 293 Moralism badness/vileness, 280 injustice, 279 pragmatic aim (see Adequacy conditions for prescriptive theories) racial ill, 279, 280 “racism is wrong” (see Moral condition) wrongness, 279 See also Moral condition Morality is subjective/intersubjective, 104 personal, 20, 21, 50, 265, 268, 277, 279n3, 290, 301, 304, 350, 351, 373, 375, 378 political, 21, 50, 264–268, 277, 279, 284, 290, 300, 303, 304, 316, 351–355, 373, 378 subjective and objective (Mills), 337 Moral monism v. moral pluralism categorial pluralism, 28–29 grammatical pluralism, 326–327 racism’s plural forms, 24

409

See also narrow-and wide-scope, under Concept/ion; Pluralism Moral-philosophical analysis, 43, 216 See also Approaches to the theory of racism Mounce, Howard O., 120, 120n29 N Narrow-scope conception of racism, see narrow-and wide-scope, under Concept/ion Naturalness, see Foundation Necessity, see under A priori analysis Need, 291–297 “the deep need for the convention” (Wittgenstein), 117, 119–120, 215 the–for a definition of “racism” (for defining “racism,” for a stipulative definition; to lay down a definition), 26, 56, 94, 212–216, 354 moral–confers a common interest, 126, 127, 215, 216, 224, 225, 227, 278, 280, 281, 283, 291, 320, 327, 328, 335, 340, 353, 354, 362–364 “pivot of our real need” (Wittgenstein), 381 Negotiating (the meaning of) “racism,” 211 Non-empirical analysis, see A priori analysis Non-natural entities, see under Concept/ion Non-negotiable (political) values, 276, 368 antiracist value/ethic as, 19, 22 in the interests of racism’s historical victims, 22, 23 “racism is wrong” as non-negotiable (see under Moral condition)

410 

INDEX

Normative/normativity, 24–32, 75–85, 129–132, 187–194, 200–202, 236–238 grammatical analysis, 129, 131, 132 as human creation (cultural product), 98, 108, 149 power/force of, 80, 81, 177 v. prescriptive distinction (see under normative, under Disagreement) proposition, 80, 131, 132, 187–190, 192, 194 as sui generis component of natural world, 151 a temporality, 24 Normativism, 56n23 Brandomian normativism, 77 Glock, Boghossian, 77–78 Wittgenstein’s normativism, 75–85 See also sense and intelligibility, under Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language Norm-existence statements, see under Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language O Objective/objectively agreement, 210 correct, 143, 204, 210 fact, 53, 147 good, 337 meanings, 168, 182, 195 moral criteria, 144 realism (approach), 18n13, 108, 142, 145 reality of racism, 18n13, 108 standard, 210 Omi, Michael, 244n19, 342n27 Ontological presupposition, see Language-independent thesis; Metaphysical analysis

Open negotiation is–to change/ updating, 310 negotiation is–to several correct answers, 222 racism as–texture concept (see under Vagueness); as open-ended (see under Vagueness) racism as–to rational contestation, 222 Oppression as an injustice (the political wrong it commits), 295 as a condition of vulnerability, 19, 23, 296, 304, 328, 379 racial; defining “cause of racial oppression” (see Contributing cause of racial oppression); domination/subjugation relation, 23, 371, 373, 377; paradigms of racism (see under Paradigms of racism); racism as, 22–23, 25, 28–29, 35–36, 122, 125, 132, 233, 259, 277, 278, 280, 280n4, 288, 290–309, 314–320, 325–364, 368, 368n1, 370–381 See also Stigmatization Ordinary usage condition (see under Adequacy conditions for descriptive theories of racism; Adequacy conditions for prescriptive theories of racism) of “racism” and “racist”; correct/ incorrect use of (see Correct/ correctness, use); historical function of, 21; incompatible uses of, 246, 251, 254, 317; as inflated (overinflated, overused) (see Conceptual inflation of “racism” and “racist”); linguistic intuition about, 52, 161, 241–242; moral functions

 INDEX 

of–(personal blame, social criticism), 19–21; ordinary vs. expert intuitions about, 160; serves white interests (see White-interests-serving usage); See also “Racism,” referent of reflects commonsense thinking, 8, 10, 19, 35, 52, 200, 217, 219, 245, 247, 254, 255, 268, 283, 299, 301, 327, 329–331 See also Conservatism; Revisionism/ revisionist Output-v. input-models of racism functionalist; account of rules, 62; definitions of “racism,” 28, 29, 305, 371, 372; theory of “racism” (output-driven account) (see under Output-v. input-models of racism, output-driven/output-model/ output-based) function-essence, 305 output-driven/output-model/ output-based, 28, 326, 361, 362, 364, 372, 379; output as effect/input as cause, 22 See also Moral functions of “racism” and “racist,” under Ordinary usage Overusage (overinclusive usage) of “racism” and “racist,” see Inflated usage P Paradigms of racism racial dehumanization, 23, 29, 288, 309, 320, 360–362, 373, 376–378 racial injustice, 15, 23, 29, 71, 266–267, 280, 297, 320, 344, 352, 368n1, 373, 377, 378, 378n15

411

racial viciousness, 23, 29, 294, 320, 333, 373–378 See also racial, under Oppression Pataki, Tamas, 329n5 Paternalism, see examples of racism: paternalistic racism, under Racism Patterned experience, see under Regularities Pattern of inference, see under A priori analysis Peregrin, Jaroslav, 76, 76n50, 76n51, 77, 77n53–55, 114–116, 118, 118n28 Personal morality, 20, 21, 50, 268, 277, 290, 301, 304, 350, 351, 373, 375, 378 individualist conception that serves white interests, 266 individualist v. institutionalist, 252, 284 isolated individual (see Atomistic, approach) See also Personal racism Personal racism characterological flaws, 20, 289, 303, 373–375 individualistic forms; behavioral racism, 4, 5, 49, 51, 105, 246, 371; cognitive racism, 5, 287, 334, 370–372, 378; volitional racism, 4, 35–36, 50, 242n18, 243, 244, 320, 327, 328, 331–335, 337, 338, 350–352, 354, 358, 363n41, 373–375 (see also racial viciousness, under Paradigms of racism) personal blame/moral responsibility for, 20 racist person; pathological racism, 22, 289, 290, 345; proud racist, 70, 135, 249; reluctant racist, 286, 287, 289–290 See also Personal morality; Racism

412 

INDEX

Phillips, Dewi Z., 58n26, 120, 120n29 Philosophical question, the the form of words “What is racism?”; the child’s question, 43, 64; philosophical question as function of confusion, 30; the second-order question, 41, 55; See also Skeptical worry (What is racism?) problem of definition; the problem of defining “racism,” 31, 33, 41–86, 157, 213, 220, 227, 228, 230, 241, 369; problem to cope with (see Problem-to-cope-with) three interpretations of, 41–47; descriptive (see Descriptive analysis); metaphysical (see Metaphysical analysis); prescriptive (see Prescriptive analysis, approaches to) See also Language-­independence thesis Picture pictures of necessity (immovability, etc.), 108 picture/s of racism, 363; as an evolving, unstable entity, 313; competing, 23 two pictures of paternalism, 335–338 Wittgenstein’s (conventionalist)–of language and meaning, 33, 152; picture of definition, 73, 92, 202 Pierce, Andrew, 240n13, 243n19, 265–266, 266n47, 267, 279n4 Pirahã, 175–182, 184 Are they mistaken/confused?, 178 (see also Sociocultural facts, under Facts) cultural immediacy of experience principle, 177

empiricist epistemology, 176 See also Agreement in definition/ explanation/practice/form of life; Culture/anthropology Plunkett, David, 46n8, 205–210, 214, 229, 229n37–39, 230, 230n40 Pluralism, 24–32, 35–36, 203, 257, 305, 320, 325–364, 374, 379 categorial (see under Moral monism v. moral pluralism) grammatical (see under Moral monism v. moral pluralism) moral (see Moral monism v. moral pluralism) normative-pragmatic (see Conventionalism qua framework for prescriptive theory; Moralism) ontological, 24 Political morality, 21, 50, 264–268, 277, 279, 284, 290, 300, 303, 304, 316, 351–355, 373, 378 and moral badness/injustice, 279, 290 and normative status of ordinary usage, 264, 267 and social criticism, 21 superiority of–to personal morality, 277 See also Personal morality; Social criticism Practical problems generated by ordinary usage political problems (see Colorblindness; Political morality; White-interests-­ serving usage) pragmatics problems (incomplete list), 256–264; ambiguous usage, 258; categorial drift, 254, 257, 260; contested usage, 259; disagreement, 259;

 INDEX 

general overload, 257, 259, 263; inhibition of interracial dialogue, 257; moral overload, 257–259, 263; See also Conceptual inflation Practice as a complex system of rules, 223 language as a, 62, 64, 67, 68, 106, 125, 223 language-game as a, 15, 16, 29, 56, 62, 98 Pragmatic aim, see under Adequacy conditions for prescriptive theories of racism Pragmatic justification, 106–107, 125–129, 142, 174, 185–187, 216, 218, 307, 363 and empirical facts/considerations in establishing grammar, 126, 127 of the grammar of “racism,” 128 and naturalness, 126; naturalness as foundation for a technique (see under Foundation) and prescriptive grammar; deep need for the convention, 117, 119–120, 215, 292; of moral grammar, 127; shared need for the convention, 220, 225 sociocultural considerations (see under Facts) See also Language learning/language acquisition; Pragmatic reasons Pragmatic reasons, 169–175 defense of–over metaphysical reasons in the theory of racism, 236 justify against a background (form of life), 98, 120, 124, 135, 137, 177, 180, 182, 184, 224, 238 as non-epistemic reasons, 126, 180, 186

413

and our moral need, 127 as prescriptive justifications (for how things should be), 69, 127, 137 provide immanent justifications of grammar, 107 types of, 80, 103, 126–127, 172, 228 Prescribe/prescription, 26, 132, 136, 140, 145, 147, 151n55, 201, 217, 229, 239, 240, 340 Prescriptive analysis, approaches to conservatism (see under Conservatism) prescriptive grammar/grammatical analysis, 27, 29–32, 129, 132, 135–137, 150, 195, 330 presumption of agnosticism (see Agnostic default position) principle of conservatism (see under Conservatism) revisionism (see under Revisionism) See also Adequacy conditions for prescriptive theories of racism; Ameliorative analysis Prescriptive correctness, see under Correct/correctness, use Prescriptive grammar/grammatical analysis, see Prescriptive analysis, approaches to Presumption of agnosticism (see Agnostic default position) of conservatism (see Prescriptive analysis, approaches to) Problem of definition/of defining “racism,” see Philosophical question, the Problem-solving, see under Rationality Problems-to-cope-with, 227–229 Solution to a–is always a modus vivendi, 227 See also Practical problems generated by ordinary usage

414 

INDEX

Problem-to-resolve, 2, 18–19, 26, 35, 69, 125, 127, 136, 145, 204, 212–214, 218, 227, 233, 234, 237, 238, 240, 251, 253, 264, 277, 317, 320, 379 Proposition descriptive (see Descriptive proposition) grammatical (see under Grammatical explanation) normative (see under Normative/ normativity) Pure description, see Descriptive analysis Putnam, Hilary, 9, 9n8, 34, 151n55, 158, 159n2, 162–175, 178, 179, 181, 195 R Race definition of, 13–14 race-conscious policies, 266–267; affirmative action, 3, 15, 267, 316, 343; reparation, 3, 20, 267, 301, 343, 370 race-neutrality, 266–267 (see also Colorblindness) racialized individuals, 21 Racial dehumanization, see under Dehumanization Racial discrimination, see under Racism Racial hatred/disregard, see under Personal racism; Racism Racial ideology, 341–355 Bonilla-Silva’s definition of, 344 ideological racism; abstract liberalism, 313, 343; social meaning and racial story lines, 344–348 Shelby’s definition of, 342, 342n26 See also Colorblindness

Racial ill, 251, 269, 284, 293, 361, 377 definition of, 280 and racism, distinction, 279–281, 291, 294, 317, 327; Glasgow’s conflation of distinction, 217 see under Moralism Racial injustice, 3, 10, 15, 19–23, 25, 29, 71, 128, 138, 228, 246, 259, 266–267, 280, 280n4, 288, 290, 293, 295, 297, 299, 301, 303, 309, 320, 344, 345n33, 349, 351, 352, 368n1, 372, 373, 377, 378, 378n15, 379 as a paradigm of racism (see under Paradigms of Racism) Racial prejudice, see under Racism Racial viciousness as a paradigm of racism (see under Paradigms of Racism; see also Personal racism) see also under Paradigms of racism; see also Personal Racism Racism examples of; Blum’s teacher example, 3, 216–218; criminal justice system, 3; immigration policy; lynching, 70n42; paternalistic racism, 335–341, 354, 363; profiling, 3, 4, 6, 299, 349, 352; racist joke and speech, 249, 260, 262, 263, 294; segregation/apartheid, 70, 343; slavery, 70, 105, 111–112, 246, 249, 250, 305 from the eyes of the victim (see under Antiracist value) itself (racism-as-it-is-in-itself), 26, 42, 44, 49, 52–54, 85, 122, 145, 150, 202, 204, 216, 236,

 INDEX 

237, 241, 243, 248, 259, 312–313, 328, 330; no such thing as, 25, 28, 54, 62, 66, 97, 132, 151, 189, 191, 193; as superfluous posit, 149 as racial oppression (see under Oppression) and sexism, 148–150, 260 as a sociocultural phenomenon (see Sociocultural approach) theories of, 4–7; disrespect/dignity, 6, 7, 18, 70, 217, 218, 225–227, 236, 246, 251, 252, 259, 308, 309, 317, 355, 377; ideological, 5, 6, 49, 334–335, 341, 342, 345, 346, 348–351, 353, 354, 380 (see also Racial ideology); individualistic (see Personal racism); institutional (see Institutionalist critiques of individualism); stigmatization, 5, 6, 288, 290, 294, 299, 326, 349, 352, 361, 372, 373, 375, 377, 378 (see also Stigmatization) types/categories of; dehumanization (see Dehumanization); discrimination, 15, 70, 70n42, 104, 105, 244n19, 259, 267, 269, 293, 298, 315, 345n33, 354, 377; disregard, 56, 122, 287, 301, 329, 332–335, 338, 341, 342, 344, 350, 354–359, 362, 375; expressive/dignitary harm, 6, 375, 377; hatred/ antipathy, 28, 70–71, 122, 150, 217, 287, 300, 326, 327, 332, 333, 336, 337, 340, 356, 357, 368n1, 374, 375; implicit/ unconscious racial bias, 3, 4, 35, 37, 104, 119, 141, 142, 146, 287–290, 297, 300, 304, 313–315, 318, 346, 379;

415

inequality, 1, 20n14, 21, 22, 70n42, 140, 244n19, 253, 266n49, 267, 268, 296, 300, 308, 352, 353; inferiorization, 217, 259, 336–338, 354, 368n1; institutional racism, 2, 6, 15, 21, 22, 70, 70n42, 104, 227, 244, 244n19, 265, 301, 302, 302n33, 304, 315, 343, 343n29, 344, 349, 351, 353, 354, 374, 380; prejudice, 144n52, 221, 259, 265, 267, 298, 303; racist belief, 35–36, 261, 306, 313, 315, 325–364, 374, 375, 379; “reverse racism,” 15–16, 141, 315, 316 (see also problem of language-­game contestation, under Languagegame); white supremacy, 3, 6, 22, 23, 70n42, 140, 244, 250, 288, 296, 297, 300, 305, 317, 343, 354, 361, 371, 372, 377 wrongness/badness/vileness of (see under Moralism) See also Concept/ion “Racism is wrong,” see under Moral Condition Racism-or-nothing fallacious reasoning, see categorial drift, under Practical problems generated by ordinary usage “Racism,” the term definition of (see Definitions, of racism) domain of racism (that limits candidates for racism); trivial definition of, 211, 225 expert use/usage of, 341, 353 meaning of, 3, 15, 16, 32, 33, 42, 43, 49, 53–54, 71, 160, 195, 211, 217, 219, 225, 230, 238, 246, 247, 249, 250, 257, 264, 268, 283, 319, 369

416 

INDEX

“Racism,” the term (cont.) moral function of, 20, 361 as name of an entity in a definition, 144 negotiating (see Negotiating “racism”) ordinary use/usage of, 16, 19, 28, 35, 36, 42, 45n5, 49, 51, 52, 70, 124, 130, 131, 135, 147, 160, 161, 167, 214, 217–219, 234–241, 243–244, 248–257, 259, 261, 263–269, 277, 283, 286–287, 316, 319, 325–330, 337, 339–341, 353, 360–363, 368n1, 380 referent of, 7, 11, 49, 53, 61, 132, 160, 168, 179, 205, 241, 246, 247, 250, 264, 281–283, 285, 292, 312; object of racist ascription, 2, 7 why “racism” is needed; satisfies moral needs of injustice, unfairness, wrongdoing, 128, 278–281 See also Ordinary usage Rational disagreement/resolution, see disagreement and rationality, under Rationality Rationality, 102, 286n13, 332 contested, 221–226 disagreement and rationality; agreement in definition as condition of rational resolution, 220, 221n27, 222, 224, 226–228, 234; rationality with/without final solutions, 34, 199–230; See also Disagreement Dummett on, 286n13 John Kekes’ problem-solving account of, 221 Real definition, 161 discovery of, 169–175

real essence; single, stable, unchanging, 202–203 of water, 164, 165, 170 Real essence, see under Real definition Reference meaning as the referent of a word (see Meaning, as the object or kind picked out) referent of “racism” (see “Racism,” the term; Stabilizing the referent of “racism”) Reference fixing, see under Semantic externalism Regularities, 66, 125, 151n55, 213n15 in nature, 68 patterned experience (forms and effects of harm), 153 in practice/forms of life, 68 Representationalism, 77, 81 Representation/representational forms of, 110n19, 183, 227, 297; ideal, 227 moral, 14n11, 22, 25, 26, 43, 71, 101, 127, 128, 141, 146, 204, 234, 235, 276, 277, 281, 298, 304, 328, 329, 342, 353 norms/rules of, 25, 73, 98, 103, 186–187, 283, 367 racist, 26, 128, 227–228, 284n9 representational possibilities, 110n19 representational practices, 26, 33, 34, 99, 106, 118, 125, 126, 132, 134, 137, 142, 204, 211, 214, 216, 224, 328 Revisionism/revisionist, 200, 235, 237–242, 248, 249n23, 252, 253, 255–270 costs of revising ordinary usage, 239 Glasgow’s tacit, 218 paradigmatic (Vargas), 240

 INDEX 

recommendations; Garcia’s implicit, 340 theorists (see Blum, Lawrence; Shelby, Tommie; Urquidez, Alberto) theory sympathizers (see Mills, Charles W.; Pierce, Andrew) See also Moralism; Ordinary usage Rule formulations, see under rules; see also Grammatical rules Rules agreement about rules; antecedent agreement in definitions (see Agreement in definition/ explanation/practice/form of life); negotiating agreement, 216–220 constitutive, 26, 106, 223, 224, 226 functions of rules; defining action, 62; inclusive/exclusive function, 109; other functions, 110; teaching, 66 lay/stipulate a, 26, 27, 56, 63, 74, 78, 94, 99, 100, 134, 213 linguistic rules, 109, 117, 119, 189, 208n9; syntactical rules, 63, 77 of representation, 25 rule-formulation, 57n23, 63, 92–94, 100n12, 101, 213n16, 297; internally related to a rule, 62; lay down, 66; representational practice, 99 rules governing communication (inferentialism), 75, 76, 78, 82 rules necessary for sense and understanding (see under Grammar; Grammatical rule) unjustifiability of, 121 (see also Epistemic justification) what are rules, 25–26 See also Grammatical rules Russell, Bertrand, 115n23, 194

417

S Schmid, W. Thomas, 148n54, 345n33, 349 Science, see under Culture/ anthropology; Facts; Pirahã Sellars, Wilfrid, 114, 116, 117n26 Semantic externalism externalist semantics for natural kinds; “Gold is yellow” example (Kripke), 166; “Water is H20” example (Putnam), 169, 170, 175, 178, 188, 190, 194 externalist semantics for social kinds; Glasgow’s on externalist approach, 163; racism, 34, 54, 60–61, 160n5, 164, 168, 195, 200, 283, 284 (see also Conceptual change); Shelby’s externalist approach, 51, 52, 160–162, 281, 283, 284 intension/extension distinction, 162 internalist semantics; Putnam and Kripke’s arguments against, 164–168; rival intensions, 169–175 internal nature, 54, 159, 161, 164, 167–169, 177; hidden nature, 60, 167, 169 kinds; natural, 122, 159, 164; social, 54, 122, 159, 160, 163, 164; See also Semantic externalism; Semantic/s logical priority of metaphysical question over practical moral questions, 112–120 paradigms, 160, 169 reference fixing; and ordinary use, 167; solution to skeptical objection to metaphysical analysis, 168 Twin Earth/Twin Earthian, 159n2, 164, 165, 173, 175

418 

INDEX

Semantic/s correctness/incorrectness, 25, 26, 41, 56, 61–63, 73, 78, 79, 86, 109, 118, 124, 147, 161, 163, 168, 186, 187, 203, 206, 209, 212, 216, 220, 222, 224, 251, 268; licenses intervention, 309 evaluation of rules; correctness, 25, 26, 61–63, 109, 118, 124, 163, 186 externalism and internalism (see Normativism; Semantic externalism) inferential role, 77 and non-semantic mistakes (factual, social, semantic), 78, 79 relationship of–to ontology, 243 rules; employed by competent speakers, 59, 60, 67, 70, 75, 82, 84, 85, 124, 167, 249, 259, 311; given by explanations of meaning, 57n23, 62, 63n34, 64–69, 74, 75, 77, 84, 85, 102, 125, 126, 147, 158, 178, 183, 200, 205 Sentence descriptive v. normative uses of, 188–190 minimal unit for making a move in a language-game, 56, 93 use of v. form of, 94 Serious/severe moral wrongness. see Severity constraint, under Moral condition Shelby, Tommie, 5, 14n10, 33, 35, 41, 42, 47–52, 55, 131, 150, 160, 240, 244, 247, 255, 256, 264–268, 276n1, 278, 279, 281–285, 294, 303, 308, 309, 316, 318, 319, 329, 342, 342n26, 347, 351, 361, 368, 368n1, 372–375, 377

Simultaneity thesis, see under Descriptivism Skeptical worry (What is racism?), 42, 49, 123, 124, 168, 243. See also Language-independence thesis; Philosophical question, the knowledge of “racism” v. knowledge of racism, 42 the linguistic novice’s question, 41, 64 ordinary usage might be mistaken, 51 the philosopher’s question, 27, 43 true meaning v. conventional meaning of “racism,” 42, 49, 160, 168 “What is racism?,” 2, 11, 27, 30–32, 41–55, 64, 71, 72, 79, 85, 139, 145, 146, 157–159, 195, 200, 204, 233, 237, 241, 275, 276, 330, 367, 370; question about reality v. question about language, 72, 159 Smith, David Livingstone, 360, 376 Social criticism moralist aim of (see Moralism) the philosopher as a social critic, 50n13, 318 Sociocultural approach, 298n31, 298, 300, 302, 306 analysis of racism as; racial oppression (see Racial, under Oppression); sociocultural concept, 16–18; sociocultural phenomenon, 18, 27, 91, 138, 140, 141, 148n54, 254n25, 298–305, 312, 342, 362, 364; unfolding process/open-­ texture, 305–310 Headley’s conceptual limit on theory of racism, 6, 18n13, 33, 51, 52, 140, 141, 146–150, 378

 INDEX 

social-explanatory concept, 20n14 victim’s perspective (see Historical victims of racism, under Antiracist value) See also Atomistic, approach; isolated individual, under Personal morality Sociocultural facts, see under Facts Stabilizing the referent of “racism,” 253 Standard dictionary/lexical, 63, 64, 85 tacit endorsement of a, 99, 218 Standard Meter Bar, 187–194 Kripke’s objection to Wittgenstein’s argument; extraordinary property of, 190, 193; the has no length, 190, 191 the role of the bar, 192; measure that measures itself, 190–194 “What is measured” language-­ game, 191 “What measures” language-game, 191, 193 Starting point for a theory of racism, see Adequacy conditions for descriptive theory; Adequacy conditions for prescriptive theory; Nonnegotiable value; Presumption Stigmatization dehumanization and, 362 as injustice, 299 Stipulative definition, 212–216 features of, 212–215 “mere difference in word use” (see under Legitimate/illegitimate disagreement) stipulate/lay down a rule, 26, 56, 63, 74, 94, 100 Strawson, Peter F., 82, 82n63, 92, 136n42

419

Successful/meaningful usage, 249 Sundell, Tim, 205–210, 214, 230 T Taylor, Paul, 238, 331 Technique of application, 66, 69, 93, 199, 213, 213n16, 313, 380 of measurement, 126 Temporality, see under Culture/ anthropology A temporality/timelessness of grammar, see under Normativity Theoretical problems for a theory of racism, 10–11 U Understanding meaning, see under Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language Unfolding process, see sociocultural analysis of racism as unfolding process, under Sociocultural approach Universal truth, see under Truth Urquidez, Alberto aim of book (methodological intervention), 79 future research, 378–381 Use bad faith s of “racism” and “racist,” 8, 15, 374, 375 competing s of “reverse racism,” 15–16, 141, 315, 316 (see also Language-game contestation, problem of–contestation) meaning as (see Meaning) of “racism” and “racist,” 2, 10, 16, 25, 28, 29, 31, 70, 240, 260, 313, 325

420 

INDEX

Use (cont.) of a racist epithet or expression, 6 white-interests-serving of “racism” and “racist,” 268 of a word or expression, 14 W Waismann, Friedrich, 100, 310, 311 “What is racism?,” see Philosophical Question, the White-interest-serving usage, 235, 268 White supremacy. see under Racism Wide-scope conception of racism, see narrow and wide-scope conceptions of racism, under Concept/ion Winant, Howard, 244n19, 342n27 Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 8, 55, 92, 158, 201, 237n5, 296, 329 Wittgenstein’s conception of philosophy descriptive endorsements of grammar, 245 (see also prescriptive endorsements, under Conventionalism qua framework for prescriptive theory) noncognitive aim of philosophy; aims to foster understanding (not knowledge), 58; conservative objection to, 104; philosophy leaves everything where it is, 31, 136 philosophy as therapy; clears up misunderstanding, 32; conceptual confusion, 25, 30, 31n25, 33, 123, 130, 133, 136, 152, 221, 228, 250–252, 254, 258, 269, 317, 329, 341, 363, 381; philosophical problems as deep disquietudes,

30; therapy in the theory of racism, 27, 33, 370 role of the philosopher, provide; normative description (remains a description), 55, 58, 129–132, 136, 163, 201; norm-existence statements, 55, 99, 124, 132 See also A priori analysis; Descriptive analysis Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language, 8, 25, 32, 56, 57, 73, 75, 81 essence expressed in grammar, 64 family resemblances, 92n1, 329, 331 language as practice; making a move in a language-game, 56, 93; normative practices, 62, 67, 71, 73n45; speaker endorsement of a rule, 132; speaker entitlements, 59; speaking/ saying something, 78, 79, 93, 188 learning a language (see under Language learning) as philosophically plausible, 73, 195, 200 sense and intelligibility; criteria of understanding, 58, 59, 311; explanation of meaning, 61–75, 77, 81, 82, 85, 86; meaning as use, 127, 162; normativism, 56n23, 75–85, 151, 151n55; understanding meaning, 59n29, 60, 84; What is X? questions, 7, 157; Wittgensteinian semantics, 34, 35, 158, 160, 169, 188 See also Agreement in definition; Concept-formation; Conventionalism; Culture/ anthropology; Decision/choice; Definitions; Descriptive; Form

 INDEX 

of life; Foundation; Grammatical explanation; Language-games; Learning language; Normative/ normativity; Pragmatic justification; Rules; Rules, of representation; Standard Meter Bar; Truth; Wittgenstein’s conception of philosophy

421

Wrong explanation (for racism’s intrinsic wrongness), see Intrinsically racist/wrong belief Wrongness/Wrongdoing, see under Moralism; Racism Y Young, Iris M., 294, 295n20