Race, Jobs, & Politics: The Story of Fepc 9780231889056

Table of contents :
PREFACE
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I: ORIGINS
II: THE FIRST FAIR EMPLOYMENT PRACTICE COMMITTEE
III: DECLINE AND DEMISE T
IV: THE SECOND FAIR EMPLOYMENT PRACTICE COMMITTEE
V: THE SMITH COMMITTEE INVESTIGATIONS
VI: CONGRESS AND THE FEPC
VII: THE PHILADELPHIA RAPID TRANSIT CASE
VIII: THE END OF THE SECOND COMMITTEE
IX: THE COMMITTEE IN STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION
X: THE ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE COMMITTEE
XI: FEPC PROGENY
XII: FEPC LEGISLATION AND AMERICAN SOCIETY
XIII: THE MOVEMENT FOR PERMANENT FEPC LEGISLATION
NOTES
INDEX

Citation preview

RACE, JOBS, AND POLITICS

RACE, JOBS, & POLITICS THE

STORY

By L O U I S

NEW

YORK:

OF

RUCHAMES

MORNINGSIDE

COLUMBIA

FEPC

HEIGHTS:

UNIVERSITY

1953

PRESS

LIBRARY O F CONGRESS CATALOC CARO NUMBER:

COPYRIGHT 1 9 5 2 ,

53-IOO15

' 9 5 3 . COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

PUBLISHED IN GREAT B R I T A I N , CANADA, INDIA, AND PAKISTAN B Y OXFORD UNIVERSITY

PRESS GEOFFREY

CUMBERLEGE

PRESS, LONDON, TORONTO, B O M B A Y , AND KARACHI

MANUFACTURED IN T H E UNITED STATES O F AMERICA

TO T H E BLESSED OF MY YETTA

MEMORY

MOTHER RUCHAMES

AND TO M Y

FATHER

SAM R U C H A M E S

PREFACE

is to present a comprehensive picture of the effort to achieve fair employment practices through government intervention. It includes a description of the origins, history, and impact upon discrimination of the President's Committee on Fair Employment Practice, created by the late President Roosevelt in 1941; an evaluation of state and municipal fair employment practice legislation; an analysis of the relationship between fair employment practice legislation and other social problems; and the history of the movement to achieve permanent fair employment practice legislation on a national level. T H E PURPOSE OF THIS STUDY

T h e major emphasis has been placed upon a study of the President's committee, not only because it is the parent of all later fair employment practice commissions but because in its history and achievements one finds the answers to questions relating to the practicability and effectiveness of federal fair employment practice legislation: the pitfalls and problems to be encountered by any future commission, the policies and procedures that it would have to adopt in carrying out its purposes, the forces that would be likely to hamper its efforts and those that would help it, and the means to be used in achieving the creation of a commission with effective powers to combat discrimination in employment. Moreover, the importance of state and municipal legislation has also been recognized, and the history and experiences of the New York State Commission Against Discrimination, as well as similar municipal commissions, have also been examined and evaluated. T h e Negro group emerges as the center of attention in this volume for a number of reasons: the origin of the President's committee was due in greatest part to the persistent efforts and pressures of Negro organizations and leaders, although they were, of course, as-

viii

PREFACE

sisted and supported by others; the majority of complaints against discrimination filed with the committee centered about and were filed by Negroes; the most important and most difficult cases, as well as those which received the greatest publicity in the newspapers, involved Negroes; and, one may even be so bold as to say, the opposition to the idea of a fair employment practice law, or support of it—and this is certainly true of the South—has been determined in large part by the prevailing conception of the place of the Negro in American economic life. In this sense, the rights of Negroes have been the touchstone for the rights of all minority groups in this country. T h e affirmation of their rights has meant the affirmation of the rights of all minority groups, indeed of all Americans. Louis RUCHAMES Northampton, Massachusetts January 14,1953

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I WISH TO THANK all those whose assistance and counsel have been helpful in the preparation and completion of this study. I am indebted particularly to Professor Robert Maclver for guidance at every stage of its preparation and for much else besides. Professors Robert Lynd, Theodore Abel, John Hazard, John Maurice Clark, and Lynn Thorndike read the manuscript and were most helpful in their comments. Invaluable aid was given by members of the staff of the President's committee. These included Messrs. John A. Davis, Clarence Mitchell, Eugene Davidson, Cornelius Golightly, Miss Carol Coan (now Mrs. David Petegorsky), and Mrs. Marjorie Lawson. Members of the committee's regional staff in New York—Mr. Edward H. Lawson, its head; Messrs. Madison Jones, Jr., Robert Jones, Daniel R. Donovan, and the Misses Miriam Irish and Tillie Asepha —were generous in their assistance. T o Mr. Malcolm Ross of the University of Miami, former chairman of the committee, who read all chapters relating to the history and activities of the second committee; to Mr. George M. Johnson, dean of the Howard University Law School and former deputy chairman of the committee, who read the entire manuscript; and to Mr. Will Maslow of the Commission on Law and Social Action of the American Jewish Congress, and former head of the committee's Division of Field Operations, who read Chapters IX through XIII, I owe a great debt of gratitude for their many valuable suggestions. The late Mr. Charles H. Houston, a member of the President's committee, made available documents and offered information concerning certain aspects of the committee's history. Dr. Robert Weaver has helpfully made available to the writer his views con-

X ACKNOWLEDGMENTS cerning the committee's procedures and policies. Professor Harold Faulkner of Smith College read several chapters of the manuscript. Professor Sidney Kaplan of the University of Massachusetts read half of the manuscript in galley and offered valuable comments and suggestions.

In addition to the sources cited in the footnotes, the following volumes have proven useful: The Social Politics of FEPC, by Louis Coleridge Kesselman (Chapel Hill, 1948); Fair Employment Practice Legislation in the United States, Federal-State-Municipal, by W. Brooke Graves (Washington D.C., 1951); and A Study of the Federal Policy for the Fair Employment of Minority Groups, by G. James Fleming (unpublished Master's thesis, University of Pennsylvania, 1944).

Mr. John Temple Graves has kindly granted permission to quote from his essay, " T h e Southern Negro and the War Crisis," and Mr. Henry C. Turner, from his article, "Tolerance in Industry: T h e Record." The Journal of Negro Education, the Virginia Quarterly Review, the Crisis, the Public Opinion Quarterly, and The New York Times have kindly permitted me to quote from essays which they have published. Thanks, also, are due Harcourt, Brace and Company for permission to quote from All Manner of Men by Malcolm Ross and Negro Labor by Robert Weaver; Harper and Brothers for permission to quote from Action for Unity by Goodwin Watson; Columbia University Press for permission to quote from Equality by Statute by Morroe Berger; and the National Community Relations Advisory Council, for permission to quote from their FEPC Reference Manual. T o my wife, whose love and understanding these many years have helped lighten many a difficulty, I owe more than an expression of gratitude could convey. L. R.

CONTENTS

i: n:

ORIGINS

3

T H E FIRST FAIR E M P L O Y M E N T PRACTICE COMMITTEE

22

III:

DECLINE AND DEMISE

46

iv:

T H E SECOND F A I R E M P L O Y M E N T P R A C T I C E C O M M I T T E E

57

T H E S M I T H C O M M I T T E E INVESTIGATIONS

73

CONGRESS AND T H E F E P C

87

V: VI: VII: VIIi: IX: X: XI: XII: XIII:

T H E P H I L A D E L P H I A R A P I D T R A N S I T CASE

IOO

T H E E N D O F T H E SECOND C O M M I T T E E

121

T H E C O M M I T T E E IN S T R U C T U R E AND FUNCTION

137

THE ACHIEVEMENTS OF T H E COMMITTEE

156

F E P C PROGENY

165

F E P C L E G I S L A T I O N A N D A M E R I C A N SOCIETY

l8l

T H E M O V E M E N T F O R P E R M A N E N T F E P C LEGISLATION

199

NOTES

2 17

INDEX

241

RACE, JOBS, AND POLITICS

I: ORIGINS

T H I S IS T H E STORY of an experiment in social engineering. Comparatively few Americans were aware of its beginning, fewer still believed that it would succeed. Indeed, similar experiments in the past had failed. Soon after the Civil War, Congress had passed legislation affirming the civil rights of Negroes and prohibiting their abrogation. T h e Supreme Court ruled such legislation null and void. Individual states had placed similar rights in their statute books. For one reason or another, these were unenforced or disregarded. In June, 1941, with America on the verge of war, the late President Roosevelt bowed to the pressure of an aroused public opinion and issued his executive order creating a Fair Employment Practice Committee and prohibiting discrimination in defense industry and government. Probably not even he believed that his order would achieve results. For generations, students of society had taught that legislation could not eliminate discrimination; that the customs and mores of society were not amenable to directed change. These evolved gradually, it was said, in conformity with their own laws of development, which were independent of the political laws of men. True, in the long run, in the very distant future, the mores might progress to a point where discrimination would cease to exist, but the process could not be hastened or interfered with. In fact, a significant number of learned observers believed that discrimination, based upon physical differences, was a natural and instinctive reaction, and therefore could not be mitigated. This view, which prevailed up to the 1940's, was succinctly and baldly expressed by the Supreme Court in 1896, when it ruled that "legislation is powerless to eradicate social instincts or to abolish distinctions based upon physical differences, and the attempt to do so can only

4

ORIGINS

result in accentuating the difficulties of the present situation." 1 Although there were signs of an abandonment of this viewpoint even before 1940, it was primarily during the period following the creation of the President's F E P C that a broad change of opinion took place. Through its achievements, the President's committee proved that under certain conditions law—even in the emasculated form of an executive order—could alter customs and mores, and hasten the elimination of discrimination in significant sections of American industry. Perhaps the greatest tribute to the committee's success was President Roosevelt's last request of Congress, conveyed on the day of the President's death to Representative Adolph Sabbath, in which he urged that the committee be continued. Although we have suggested that the President's committee was the creature of public pressure, in actuality its birth was the result of a number of circumstances: changing social and economic conditions, the exigencies of war, the experience of previous governmental efforts to eliminate discrimination in employment, and the energetic and unremitting struggle of Negro, labor, and religious organizations to achieve equality of opportunity in government and industry. T h e social and economic circumstances underlying the movement against discrimination first made themselves felt at the turn of the century and during the First World War. Between 1900 and 1910, the number of Negroes in manufacturing and mechanical jobs rose from 275,116 to 552,815. 2 Between 1910 and 1920, the number of Negroes in mining increased from 61,129 t o 73.229; in manufacturing, from 655,906 to 901,181; and in transportation and communications, from 256,098 to 312,53s. 3 However, this mass of labor was utilized primarily in unskilled work because of the prejudice of employers who believed that Negroes were incapable of skilled work and because of the refusal of trade unions to admit Negroes into their ranks. When the United States entered the war in 1917, the discrimination which Negroes encountered in industry, government, the armed forces, and all other walks of life, coupled with the poverty, the lynchings, and the constant degradation to which they were subjected, created apprehension among some government leaders as to their essential loyalty and patriotism. T h e possibility that the

ORIGINS

5

Germans might utilize such conditions for propaganda purposes was too great to be overlooked. T o reassure the Negro "that the Government in general, and the War Department in particular entertained a friendly and just attitude toward" him, Emmett J . Scott, secretary of the Tuskegee Normal and Industrial Institute for Negroes and former confidential secretary to Booker T . Washington, was appointed to the post of special assistant to Secretary of War Newton D. Baker. Scott's duty was to advise the War Department "in matters affecting the interests of the 10,000,000 Negroes of the United States, and the part they are to play in connection with the present war." * Scott concerned himself primarily with Negro servicemen, their families and dependents, and to a lesser degree with discrimination against Negroes in government. However, since his office was purely advisory, there was little he could do. He did take up a number of cases with government officials responsible for discriminatory acts. He cites one instance—that of a young Negro woman who was refused a job in a government agency—in which he succeeded in gaining satisfaction for the complainant. Generally, however, the cases brought to his attention were so numerous that he did not attempt to handle them personally, and his impact upon discrimination in government and private industry may be said to have been practically nil. 5 T h e most significant attempt made by the government to achieve the full utilization of Negro manpower during World War I took place in 1918, when the position of Director of Negro Economics was created in the office of the Secretary of Labor. George E. Haynes, professor of sociology and economics at Fisk University and a secretary of the National League on Urban Conditions among Negroes, was appointed to the post. His function was to "advise the Secretary and the directors and chiefs of the several bureaus and divisions of the department on matters relating to Negro wage earners, and to outline and promote plans for greater cooperation between Negro wage earners, white employers, and white workers in agriculture and industry." 8 T h e work of the director began amidst much fanfare and publicity. Haynes visited those states where problems of Negro workers seemed most urgent. He met with prominent white and

6

ORIGINS

colored citizens in each state, and everywhere received assurance of cooperation. For a time it seemed that definite improvements in Negro working conditions and a lessening in the incidence of Negro discrimination would ensue. On February 17 and 18, 1919, a conference of leading Negroes and whites, representing welfare and social service organizations, was called by the Secretary of Labor and convened in Washington, D.C., "in order that the views and interests of all sections and of both races might be ascertained." T h e conference adopted and recommended the following program to the Secretary of Labor: 1. Survey of Negro labor conditions. 2. The getting of Negro workers into industry. 3. Holding Negro workers in industry, including the improving of living and working conditions in both agriculture and industry. 4. Training the next generation of workers. 5. The general advancement of Negro wage earners in the United States.7 These recommendations could have formed the basis for a very effective program of government action on behalf of the Negro people. However, they were ignored by responsible government officials and the promise inherent in the establishment of a Director of Negro Economics was never realized.8 Viewing the situation as a whole, there is good reason to believe that the Department of Labor and the government created the Division of Negro Economics purely as a sop to Negro morale and never really intended to take decisive and effective action against discrimination. Thus Scott has pointed out that "the Department of Labor itself drew the color line, refusing to employ Negroes for certain purposes altogether on account of their color and regardless of their efficiency." " Moreover, between 1912 and 1918, Leon Ransom observes, Negroes in the Navy, Interior, Commerce, Agriculture and Post Office Departments "were deprived of high clerical positions they had formerly occupied and were either demoted, dismissed, or forced to resign by both obvious and ingenious devices. While it is true that this tendency started even prior to the actual declaration of hostilities in Europe, it is significant that it gained strength, rather than diminished as our participation in the holocaust became more and more inevitable, and the need for the

ORIGINS

7

fullest use of the human resources of our nation was made more apparent." 19 T h e fact that the South was "in the saddle" during that period accounts, in Ransom's opinion, for the elimination of Negroes from government positions, especially those of importance. 11 T o add to the economic woes of Negro labor, many trade unions affiliated with the American Federation of Labor maintained an official policy of excluding Negroes from membership and jobs. In 1913, the constitutions of nine national unions, affiliates of the A F of L, barred Negroes from membership. 12 Other unions used less obvious methods, such as tacit and unwritten agreements, to exclude them. Compared to similar efforts during World War II, the attempts to influence the federal government to combat discrimination throughout World War I were weak, diffident, and inconsequential. In addition to "isolated speeches, pamphlets, and editorials by liberals of both races," 13 two significant attempts at direct pressure, both by the same individual, were made prior to, and at the very beginning of, the war. In 1913 and 1914, William Monroe Trotter, editor and publisher of the Boston Guardian, headed a committee which visited the President to ask him to end, by executive order, the segregation of races in the Post Office and Treasury Departments. T h e mission did not succeed. Trotter later reported that "the President declared in favor of race segregation as beneficial to both whites and Negroes." 14 T h e weakness in the movement on behalf of Negro rights stemmed, to a certain extent, from the amorphous group consciousness of the American Negro, who was at that time poorly organized, poorly led, and relatively inexperienced in mass pressure tactics. In 1917, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, the first national Negro organization to use mass pressure techniques for the attainment of Negro rights, had only 9,282 members in 80 branches throughout the country. 15 Moreover, Negro newspapers, which played an important part in rallying the Negro to the defense of his rights during World War II, were then pitifully weak and uninfluential. Negroes did protest against discrimination and segregation, 14 but continuous and effective action was inhibited by the philos-

8

ORIGINS

ophy of accommodation, the dominant Negro philosophy of the period, which had its foremost exponent in Booker T . Washington. Although Washington taught that the ultimate goal of the Negro was full equality in all respects, he was willing, temporarily, to refrain from pressing the quest for social and political equality and to "soft-pedal the protest against inequalities in justice," in order that Negroes might be "allowed to work undisturbed with their white friends for education and business. But neither in education nor in business did he assault the basic inequalities. In both fields he accepted the white doctrine of the Negroes' 'place.' " 17 T h e effect of Washington's teaching, according to one observer, was that "when Negro civil rights called for organized and aggressive defense, he broke down that defense by advising acquiescence or at least no open agitation." 18 T h e N A A C P and W . E. B. D u Bois challenged this philosophy, but so ubiquitous was its influence that "one's position within the Negro community, and one's interracial status was predicated upon how he accepted and practiced the principles of racial accommodation advocated by the acknowledged Negro 'leader' of the time." 15 In addition, white America, with few exceptions, was little interested in ameliorating the lot of the Negro or in gaining a more sympathetic understanding of his needs. T h e press expressed almost uniform antagonism toward any attempt to change the status quo. When Negroes did protest against existing conditions, their actions were reported in headlines as follows: 20 NEGRO TROUBLE

CAUSED

BY

HUN

PROPAGANDA

the

New

York

Herald., December 5, 1917 SEES PLOT OF FOES TO ROUSE N E G R O E S — T h e

World (New York),

December 5, 1917 GERMANS ARE BEHIND NEGRO COMPLAINTS

Newport NeWS Daily

Press, December 5, 1917 Science Monitor, February 19, 1918 Finally, the Congress of Industrial Organizations, which played an important part in fighting for Negro equality during World W a r II, was then nonexistent, and religious organizations were not as militantly pro-Negro as they were to become at a later date. NEGRO AGITATION LAID TO G E R M A N S — C h r i s t i a n

In sum, it may be said that the Negro made little progress during

ORIGINS

9

World War I in achieving equal social, economic and political rights. However, though his efforts were weak and ineffectual, they represented the beginning of the attempt to secure equality of economic opportunity. T h e lessons he learned were an important step in the process of disillusionment and re-education, which provided one of the foundation stones for the successful campaign on behalf of an F E P C during World War II. This process was intensified in the years following World War I. Instead of the peace, progress, and equality of opportunity which had been expected, the ensuing years brought race riots, lynchings, unemployment, and continued Jim-Crowism. It became more and more evident that compromises, fawning upon the white man, begging for favors, and reliance upon the good will of those who controlled white society would fail to bring about an amelioration of conditions. Only through more militant action by an aroused and organized people conscious of its own power would success be achieved. Negro pressure groups increased in size and effectiveness: T h e N A A C P grew to a membership of more than 100,000 in 450 branches throughout the country. T h e National Urban League, created in 1910 to secure more and better jobs for Negroes, broadened its efforts after the war, accepted the use of pressure techniques as a means of realizing its purposes, interested itself in legislation as an important factor in racial betterment, and reached a membership of 26,000 at the beginning of World War II. 2 1 In 1925, A. Philip Randolph founded the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters, which soon grew to a membership of 8,000 and became "the most powerful all-Negro body in organized labor." 22 Randolph was one of the leaders who later helped bring about the issuance of Executive Order 8802. T h e National Negro Congress, created for the purpose of coordinating the efforts of Negro organizations, was formed in Philadelphia in 1937 and worked vigorously to "organize Negro workers, to defend the civil liberties of Negroes and workers, and to improve the status of Negro women and youth." 23 T h e Southern Negro Youth Congress, formed in 1939 as an affiliate of the American Youth Congress, "concentrated on educating white and black youth in factories, on farms, and on campuses for positive action toward the evils that beset the

io

ORIGINS 14

South." Furthermore, the growth in quality and influence of the Negro press, although in part the result of a heightened Negro group consciousness, proved an important factor in mobilizing the Negro masses for action and in articulating their grievances and demands." In considering the advancement in Negro group consciousness and organization, and the resultant effectiveness of the Negro's efforts to secure an improved status, one must not forget the shift in potential Negro votes from the South, where they were of almost no importance, to the North, where Negroes could vote and thus exert political pressure. T h e Negro vote soon made itself felt in local, state, and national elections, and Negroes were elected to important offices. They were also appointed to federal judgeships and other positions in government. " T h e Negro cast his vote where it yielded the greatest returns. In several states his vote became the balance in electoral power. The Negro was no longer a one-party voter." 24 T h e depression of 1929 and its aftermath provided excellent schooling for the Negro in the use of pressure techniques. T h e successes of militant campaigns in the Herndon and Scottsboro cases and of the "Buy-where-you-can-work" movement, which originated in Washington, D.C., and was publicized by picket lines in many northern cities, showed the Negro how effective mass action and pressure could be. Of decisive importance were changes in the social organization and thought of white America. New and powerful allies of the Negro came into being. T h e CIO, with more than four million members in 1940 and with a forthright platform advocating the abolition of every type of Negro and minority-group discrimination, proved a powerful and ever helpful friend. Other organizations whose primary purpose was to help minorities defend and expand their rights and who had substantial influence among the public and in legislative bodies appeared on the social and political scene. The American Civil Liberties Union, the American Federation for Constitutional Liberties, the National Committee to Abolish the Poll T a x , the Southern Conference for Human Welfare, the Council Against Intolerance in America, the National Lawyers Guild, and the American Jewish Congress, to cite but a

ORIGINS

ii

few, were prepared at the outbreak of World War II to expend every possible effort to eliminate discrimination against minority groups in America. T h e emergence of these numerous and determined allies in white society, buttressed by the previously mentioned changes in Negro psychology and communal life, ensured that the Negro would no longer be content to remain a passive instrument of exploitation, but instead, conscious of his newly acquired power, would demand and, to a limited extent, secure the things he regarded as his by right. His opportunity appeared with the outbreak of war in Europe and the beginning of the defense effort in the United States. T h e administration in Washington realized that, sooner or later, to insure the fulfillment of its military plans, every available source of labor would have to be tapped. Discrimination against minority groups, as a factor preventing the most efficient utilization of manpower, would in time have to be eliminated, or at least mitigated. However, at the beginning of 1940, the need for manpower had not yet become critical. There existed a reservoir of six million unemployed workers, many of whom were highly skilled. The administration, therefore, proceeded leisurely to confront the problem of discrimination. In a manner reminiscent of the First World War, the National Defense Advisory Commission, in July 1940, appointed Robert C. Weaver, formerly a consultant on racial problems to the United States Housing Authority, to the post of administrative assistant on the staff of its Labor Division. His task was to facilitate the training and employment of Negroes in defense industry.27 Without formal power, and with an inadequate staff to assist him, Weaver could accomplish but little.28 This appointment was supplemented by statements issued by government agencies and officials, including the United States Office of Education, the National Defense Advisory Commission and its successor, the Office of Production Management, and the President, which affirmed the government's nondiscrimination policy in defense training and employment. On October 7, in its appropriation for defense training, Congress prohibited discrimination. In addition, the A F of L and the CIO reached an agreement

12

ORIGINS

with the N D A C in which they assumed responsibility for eliminating discrimination against Negroes in defense industry. 49 These resolutions, statements and agreements had little effect. T h e y remained merely declarations of policy. According to Lester Granger, a recommendation of the N D A C issued on August 31, 1940, which had urged employers not to discriminate, "had stirred not a ripple of interest among employers to whom it was addressed." 30 Gunnar Myrdal has observed that, during the early part of the defense effort, Negroes profited even less from the war boom than they did in World War I, and that "in October, 1940, only 5.4 per cent of all Employment Service placements in 20 selected defense industries (airplanes, automobiles, ships, machinery, iron, steel, chemicals, and so on) were nonwhite, and this proportion had, by April, 1941, declined to 2.5 per cent." 31 T h e aircraft industry was closed to Negroes. T h e president of the North American Aviation Company expressed the views of the industry when he affirmed in the spring of 1941 that "regardless of their training as aircraft workers, we will not employ Negroes in the North American plant. It is against company policy." 82 T h e policies of numerous labor unions raised still higher the wall of exclusion. Eighteen international unions maintained constitutional or ritualistic restrictions against Negroes. Independent unions and those affiliated with the A F of L were the greatest offenders. T h e general organizer of Aeronautical Mechanics Local No. 751 of Seattle, International Association of Machinists, declared to the press: "Organized labor has been called upon to make many sacrifices for defense and has made them gladly, but this [admission of Negroes] is asking too much." 33 T h e United States Office of Education and the state employment services, despite numerous statements of policy, did little to combat these discriminatory acts. T h e law requiring equality of training opportunity was disregarded by state educational officers who disbursed funds for vocational training. 34 T h e train ing-within-industry programs sponsored by O P M were rampant with discrimination. Employers who discriminated in hiring continued the same policy in their training programs. Although Negroes constituted 35 per cent of the workers of the Newport News Shipbuilding

ORIGINS

13

Company, they were refused training by the company for positions as electricians and machinists." The state employment services, in general, cooperated with employers who discriminated.5* They were instructed to provide the type of worker requested by the employer—regardless of discrimination. Frequently, personnel of the employment services assumed that white workers were desired unless the employer's request specifically stated otherwise. In the South, with its high level of anti-Negro prejudice, employment service personnel played a more active role in maintaining and facilitating discriminatory policies. It should be noted that such personnel usually looked forward to joining the personnel staffs of business and industrial firms and pursued a friendly and conciliatory policy toward their putative future employers." Summarizing the entire situation, the Chicago Defender, a leading Negro newspaper, remarked bitterly on January 25, 1941: "All efforts toward elimination of racial bias in the industries that are receiving defense contracts have so far met with a stone wall." However, leaders of Negro, labor, and liberal organizations undertook the task of demolishing the wall. Negro newspapers featured evidence of prejudice and inveighed against those who wished to fight for democracy in Europe while denying it to fellow Americans. The NAACP, the National Urban League, and the National Negro Congress, supported by Negro church and professional organizations, stimulated and channeled Negro protest, which took the form of telegrams, petitions, and pilgrimages to Washington and state capitols. Mass meetings were held throughout the country. Five thousand persons met in a protest meeting in Kansas City, the largest Negro protest meeting in the history of that city.58 Surveys undertaken by Negro organizations ascertained and publicized the names of government officials and industrialists guilty of discrimination. In November, 1940, Negro and white leaders from all walks of life attended a conference at Hampton Institute in Hampton, Virginia, on "Participation of the Negro in National Defense." They urged cooperation of government, industry and labor in effectuating the nondiscrimination policy of the National Defense Advisory Commission, "the training of an equitable proportion of Negro

14 ORIGINS workers for Defense industries," and periodic surveys of employment opportunities for minority groups in defense industry." In time, the white press took notice of the many protests and meetings. During the winter of 1940-41, the Saturday Evening Post printed an article by Walter White entitled, "It's Our Country, Too," the Richmond Times-Dispatch carried a series of articles on discrimination, and other newspapers printed editorials favorable to Negro equality. Governors and state legislatures appointed committees to investigate the problem and considered bills banning racial discrimination in defense industry.40 In May, 1940, the Committee on Negro Americans in Defense Industries, under the chairmanship of Dr. Anson Phelps Stokes, made public a statement signed by 160 prominent Americans, which had been sent to William Knudsen, co-chairman with Sidney Hillman of the National Defense Board, requesting universal training opportunities and defense jobs for Negroes.41 The laxness of administration officials in implementing the government's nondiscrimination policy was sharply outlined in January, 1941, when the NAACP urged Knudsen to prevail upon the General Motors Corporation, which he had formerly headed, to abandon its "widespread discrimination." Knudsen replied that he had no control over the corporation's employment policies since he had severed any active relationship with it on assuming direction of the Office of Production Management.42 Negro leaders could hardly fail to conclude that if Knudsen could not influence General Motors, he could certainly not be expected to prove more successful in persuading other firms to abandon their discriminatory practices. According to Lester Granger of the National Urban League, "William Knudsen, Hillman's fellow director, was never sympathetic to a program for increasing effective use of Negro labor. . . ." 43 Walter White of the NAACP claims that "Knudsen of OPM refused even to meet or discuss discrimination with any Negro delegation." 44 This attitude was seemingly shared, at the time, by President Roosevelt. Walter White wrote to John Temple Graves, the southern journalist, concerning repeated requests of President Roosevelt by Negro leaders that he take effective action against discrimination:

ORIGINS

15

On numerous occasions we have pleaded with the President to break his silence and to speak out against this discrimination which not only was doing an injustice to the Negro but was definitely jeopardizing our national security through reduction of our productivity by approximately ten percent. The first time I urged him to do this was at a conference at the White House last September 25 (1940) at which were present Secretary of the Navy Knox, Under Secretary of War Patterson, A. Philip Randolph, and others. On that occasion and on several others the President gave as a reason for not taking definitive action against this discrimination that "the South would rise up in protest." On several occasions I have said to him "What South are you talking about, Mr. President? The South of Bilbo and Cotton Ed Smith, or the South of Frank Graham and Mark Ethridge?" . . . I assured the President that apparently I had more faith in the inherent decency of Southern white people than he did in that I was certain that at least on an issue like this far more Southerners would approve his taking an unequivocal stand than would disapprove. . . . Discontent and bitterness were growing like wildfire among Negroes all over the country.45 Despite the attitude of the administration, the efforts of Negroes and white liberals continued. In a coast-to-coast broadcast on March 30, in which the Lieutenant Governor of New York participated, the National Urban League dramatized its plea for greater economic opportunity for Negroes and the elimination of discrimination in defense industry. 48 Congressional leaders brought the matter to the floor of Congress. In March, Senators Wagner, Barbour, Capper, and Brown introduced a resolution calling for an exhaustive investigation of discrimination against the Negro in the national defense program. 41 During the same month, foreshadowing later attempts to pass permanent fair employment practice legislation, Representative Vito Marcantonio of New York introduced a bill (the first congressional F E P C bill) prohibiting discrimination against minority groups by government agencies and firms holding defense contracts, and providing severe penalties for violations. 48 Public pressure finally forced a slight breach in the wall of government indifference. After an alleged thirty-five hundred protests had reached the desk of William Knudsen, the O P M sent a special letter, signed by Sidney Hillman, to all holders of defense contracts urging the elimination of bans against the employment of Negroes. However, its effectiveness was vitiated at the very outset by the

16

ORIGINS

failure of Knudsen to sign i t " and by his refusal, upon being questioned, to offer any reason for not doing so.50 The immediate reaction of Negro leaders, surfeited as they were with vague and unenforced promises and resolutions, was that the letter was totally inadequate. The National Negro Congress wrote to Hillman that it "had no teeth in it," and called upon OPM officials to issue an executive order prohibiting discrimination and denying contracts to firms barring Negroes from employment.51 The Amsterdam News, a Negro newspaper published in New York City, in an editorial went one step further and called for action by the President: "Mr. Hillman has spoken boldly, but unless he follows through with something more punitive than a mere plea, his words are going to fall on deaf ears. The policy toward Negro workers in America is well grounded. Nothing short of a major catastrophe will shake it, unless the word to do so comes straight from the top with White House influence behind it. Mr. Roosevelt must be prevailed upon to speak out." " On April 19, the National Negro Council adopted a resolution requesting President Roosevelt to abolish discrimination in all departments and agencies of the federal government by executive order." A group of Negro leaders, consisting of Channing Tobias, Walter White, Mary McLeod Bethune and Lester Granger met with Hillman on May 2 and discussed the possibility of the issuance of an executive order prohibiting discrimination in defense industry. Despite assurances by Hillman that the OPM was doing its utmost to solve the problem, they insisted that a letter be sent to the President requesting his intervention to insure a satisfactory solution.54 The members of the Fight for Freedom Committee, a group of prominent white leaders, sent a telegram to Knudsen in May in which they protested discrimination and demanded that Negroes be given greater employment opportunities in defense industries. Signers included Bishop Henry W. Hobson, of the Protestant Episcopal Diocese of Southern Ohio, Colonel William J . Donovan, Maxwell Anderson, Freda Kirchwey, Frank Graham, Herbert Agar, and John Stewart Bryan, president of the College of William and Mary.55 During one week in May, at least four newspapers of the daily press in New York City, including the Herald Tribune, pleaded for equality of opportunity for the Negro."

ORIGINS

17

Meanwhile, a suggestion by A. Philip Randolph, prominent Negro labor leader, at the beginning of 1941, that the Negro people march on Washington, "to exact their rights in National Defense employment and the armed forces of the country," gained recognition and support from Negro newspapers and leaders.57 A Marchon-Washington Committee was formed, consisting of Walter White, William Lloyd Imes, Lester B. Granger, Frank R . Crosswaith, Layle Lane, Richard Parrish, Henry K. Croft and A. Philip Randolph, all outstanding Negro leaders. T h e march was officially scheduled for J u l y 1. Support and promises of participation came from all sections of the country. T h e number of marchers expected to participate grew from ten thousand to five times that number and then to one hundred thousand. At the beginning of June, more than one hundred Negro ministers urged the members of their churches to take part in it.' 8 T h e administration in Washington obviously did not wish to be accosted by one hundred thousand Negroes protesting against discrimination. " I t would have been notice to foreign critics of our domestic disunity at a time when a semblance of unity was most essential to national prestige." M Pressure was put upon the leaders of the march to cancel it. Randolph received a message from Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox asking him to come to Washington for a discussion of the entire matter, and General Hugh S. Johnson wrote to Randolph requesting that the march be called off because it would do more harm than good.40 On J u n e 10, Mrs. Roosevelt wrote to Randolph that she had discussed the entire situation with the President: I feel very strongly that your group is making a very grave mistake at the present time to allow this march to take place. I am afraid it will set back the progress which is being made, in the Army at least, towards better opportunities and less segregation. I feel that if any incident occurs as a result of this, it may engender so much bitterness that it will create in Congress even more solid opposition from certain groups than we have had in the past. I know that crusades are valuable and necessary sometimes, but undertaken when the temper is as tense as it is at present, it seems to me unfortunate, and to run the risk which a meeting such as this carries with it, is unwise. You know that I am deeply concerned about the rights of Negro people, but I think one must face situations as they are and

18

ORIGINS

not as one wishes them to be. I think this is a very serious decision for you to take.81 A few days later, a conference took place at the New York City Hall, in the office of Mayor LaGuardia, in which Aubrey Williams, Mrs. Roosevelt, A. Philip Randolph and Walter White participated. According to the story carried by the A msterdam News," I^aGuardia, Mrs. Roosevelt and Williams requested that the march be called off while plans were made to secure jobs for Negroes in national defense. Mrs. Roosevelt reiterated her opposition to the march, but affirmed her belief in the need for definite action to help the Negro and assured the group that she would so inform the President. Mayor LaGuardia, too, opposed the march but expressed the opinion that pious resolutions were no longer sufficient and that provisions carrying penalties for nonobservance ought to be placed in government contracts requiring defense industries to provide jobs for Negroes. Randolph, supported by White, replied: "We are busily engaged mobilizing our forces all over the nation for the march, and could not think of calling it. off unless we have accomplished our definite aim which is jobs and not promises." He also informed Mayor LaGuardia that on June 27 a march on the City Hall was going to take place. Surprised, LaGuardia asked, "What for, what have I done?" Randolph replied, " T o ask you to memorialize the President requesting him to issue an executive order to end this shameful practice." Aubrey Williams said little at the meeting. But the following day, on returning to Washington, he telephoned Randolph and informed him that it was President Roosevelt's request that the march be called off and that a conference be arranged with the President and the members of the March-on-Washington Committee. Williams explained, further, that the President was ill and confined to his room but would be able to meet with the committee the following Wednesday.63 In the meanwhile, on June 12, apparently in response to increasing pressure and as an attempt to forestall the march, President Roosevelt had issued a memorandum to Knudsen and Hillman, placing the full support of his office behind the Hillman letter to defense contractors. Noting the complaints of discrimination

ORIGINS

19

against the Negro and quoting from the letter issued by Hillman, he affirmed: Our Government cannot countenance continued discrimination against American citizens in defense production. Industry must take the initiative in opening the doors of employment to all loyal and qualiñed workers regardless of race, national origin, religion, or color. American workers, both organized and unorganized, must be prepared to welcome the general and much-needed employment of fellow workers of all racial and nationality origins in defense industries. In the present emergency, it is imperative that we deal effectively and speedily with this problem. I shall expect the Office of Production Management to take immediate steps to facilitate the full utilization of our productive manpower.44 Following the telephone call from Aubrey Williams and the publication of the President's memorandum, the March-on-Washington Committee met, and after due consideration, characterized the memorandum as ineffective, reiterated their demand for an executive order, and issued a statement expressing their determination to make the march "the greatest demonstration of Negro mass power for our economic liberation ever conceived." T h e march, it affirmed, "represents a technique and method of action that is the hope and salvation of the Negro people." es T h e committee did, however, accept the President's invitation, and on Wednesday, June 18, A. Philip Randolph, Frank R . Crosswaith, Layle Lane, and Walter White met with the President. The official minutes of the conference have never been published. However, the Amsterdam News did publish, in its issue of June 28, a report purporting to be an accurate description of what transpired. Much time was spent in discussing the merits of the march, with the President trying to convince the delegation to call it off. They in turn invited him to address the marchers in Washington, which he declined to do. He was informed that the march was not planned by irresponsible "crack-pots" but by a committee of "sober and responsible Negro citizens." At one point in the discussion, the President asked: "What would happen if Irish and Jewish people were to march on Washington? It would create resentment among the American people because such a march would be considered as an effort to coerce the Government and make it do certain things." Randolph replied

20

ORIGINS

that there was no comparison between the situation of the Irish and Jews and that of the Negroes, and that the American people were aware that the Negroes were justified in bringing their grievances to the President and to the public. Roosevelt reiterated his belief that the idea of a march was "bad and unintelligent," and would do more harm than good. He also expressed his intention to eliminate discrimination against Negroes in national defense and to place the full force of his office behind that task. He revealed that he was considering the creation of a board to receive and investigate complaints of persons who were discriminated against in defense industry, since one of the difficulties Negroes faced was the lack of an authority to whom such complaints could be presented. T h e conference lasted half an hour. The President then designated a subcommittee, including LaGuardia as chairman, Secretary of War Stimson, Secretary of the Navy Knox, Knudsen, Hillman, Aubrey Williams, and Anna Rosenberg, coordinator of the Social Security Board, to meet with members of the March-onWashington Committee for the purpose of drawing up a plan to solve the problem. T h e plan was to be presented to the President for consideration and approval. The subcommittee met immediately after the conference and adjourned after deciding to reconvene within a few days. Apparently, the Negro leaders were extremely dissatisfied with the results of both conferences. Although the participants refused to comment publicly on the proceedings, Negro reporters received the impression that "little or no satisfaction had been obtained" and that the President was still inclined toward another memorandum or letter rather than an executive order. "Definite dissatisfaction with the results of both conferences was indicated on the faces and in the mood of each member of the march Committee." T h e leaders of the committee, following the conference, announced, " T h e March will go on." 88 However, on J u n e 24, LaGuardia and Aubrey Williams met with Randolph and three of his aides, who were given the draft of an executive order. Telephone conferences between Randolph and Walter White ensued, and after changes were made to include

ORIGINS

21

previously omitted government agencies within the scope of the order, the draft was approved and the march called off. On June 25, an executive order prohibiting discrimination in government and defense industry was issued by the President."

II: THE FIRST FAIR EMPLOYMENT PRACTICE COMMITTEE

8802, issued by President Roosevelt on June 25, 1941, constituted the most important effort in the history of this country to eliminate discrimination in employment by use of governmental authority. After asserting that national unity and the morale of minority groups were being impaired by discrimination, the order reaffirmed the policy of nondiscrimination in defense industry and government. It declared it "the duty of employers and of labor organizations . . . to provide for the full and equitable participation of all workers in defense industries, without discrimination because of race, creed, color, or national origin." All federal departments and agencies "concerned with vocational and training programs for defense production" were ordered to administer such programs without discrimination, and all defense contracts thereafter negotiated by contracting agencies of the federal government were to include a "provision obligating the contractor not to discriminate against any worker because of race, creed, color, or national origin." A Committee on Fair Employment Practice, consisting of a chairman and four members appointed by the President, was established in the Office of Production Management, to "receive and investigate complaints of discrimination," to redress valid grievances and to recommend to government agencies and to the President measures required to implement the order. 1 EXECUTIVE ORDER

The Negro people generally received the order with great enthusiasm. It was greeted, the Negro Handbook notes, "as the

THE FIRST COMMITTEE

23

most significant move on the part of the Government since the Emancipation Proclamation." * The National Negro Congress characterized it as "a great step forward" in the Negro people's struggle for a "complete democracy." * The Amsterdam News, in an editorial, called it "epochal to say the least. . . . If President Lincoln's proclamation was designed to end physical slavery, it would seem that the recent order of President Roosevelt is designed to end, or at least curb, economic slavery." 4 T h e Chicago Defender headlined the news, "F.D.R.'s Order Kills Defense Bias," and reported that A. Philip Randolph had described the order as the most significant document since the Emancipation Proclamation.® The March-on-Washington was called off. In its place, a mass meeting of celebration was convened in Washington and addressed by Mayor LaGuardia and others. Not all Negroes, however, were overwhelmed with enthusiasm. Some expressed themselves in more moderate accents and adopted a "wait-and-see" attitude. Negro columnist Roy Wilkins wrote: "Well, the President has spoken out on Negroes in defense and in the most effective way he could have spoken—through an executive order. It remains oow to be seen how much compliance will be secured." 9 The Chicago Defender noted that while many Negro leaders had applauded the executive order, some were also pointing out that it provided no penalties for violations.7 Certain Negroes who felt that mass pressure had to be maintained against the administration to reap the full benefits of the order accused Randolph of a "sellout" because of his cancellation of the march.* Although the Negro press greeted the order with front-page headlines and much enthusiasm, the white press neglected it almost entirely. Only a handful of newspapers throughout the country treated it in the manner warranted by its importance: 8 The New York Herald Tribune gave it the best coverage and publicity—a front-page headline and an excellent write-up; The New York Times described it fully, but relegated the story to the back page; PM devoted an entire column to it in the middle of the paper; the Louisville Courier-Journal, whose publisher was to be the FEPC's first chairman, placed the story prominently on the second page; the Washington Post and the Washington Star carried front-page items. A few others wrote editorials commending the order, 10 and a

24 T H E FIRST C O M M I T T E E small number inserted the story in a paragraph or two tucked away inside the paper where it could hardly be noticed. 11 The vast majority, however, did not deem it worth mentioning at all.12 The tendency to ignore the FEPC continued, even among liberal newspapers, during the first year of the committee's existence. Negro newspapers alone followed its activities closely. Nor did government officials regard the order seriously. The FEPC was created as a constituent agency of the Office of Production Management, and for its successful functioning required the cooperation of the members of that agency. Yet, a few days after the order's issuance, Glenn Gardiner, New Jersey State director of defense training for OPM, in an interview with representatives of the New Jersey Urban League, cast doubt upon the ability of the FEPC to eliminate discrimination and upon its power to force OPM and New Jersey State Employment Service officials to abandon their cooperation with employers who discriminated: "This is a very deep-rooted sociological question, which we are being called upon to solve in this emergency," he remarked very cautiously. "I'm not very hopeful that it can be solved 'just like that.' . . . I can't see that the President's order will have any particular effect on our program. Our function is helping companies in their training of employees. It's not for us to say who shall be hired. . . . I'm afraid attempts to pressure the thing in the emergency may not work out." At the same time, local executives of the New Jersey State Employment Service told the Urban League delegation that they were planning no change in procedure as a result of the order. "No change will be necessary, since we have never considered race, creed or nationality in this office," Henry C. Von Weigand, district director stated. "We do not segregate Negroes in any way, either in office [sic] or in our files." However, he explained that the discriminatory request of an employer was adhered to as closely as possible although the employment service itself made no distinction. 18 Thus, the FEPC faced the additional problem of convincing government officials, who were supposed to cooperate with it, that the executive order was meant to be obeyed. As set forth in the order, the committee was to consist of a chairman and four members to be appointed by the President. On July

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25

18, 1941, the President issued Executive Order 8823, increasing the committee to six (including the chairman), and appointed the following as members: Mark Ethridge of Kentucky, chairman; David Sarnoff of New York, Earl Dickerson of Illinois, William Green of Washington, D.C., Milton P. Webster of Illinois, and Philip Murray of Washington, D.C." Ethridge was eminently suited for the position of chairman. At the time of his appointment, he was publisher of the Louisville Courier-Journal, which had been acclaimed the previous year for "its most liberal policy of all United States daily papers on the Negro." He was a member of the Rosenwald Foundation and had spoken and written extensively in opposition to poll taxes and in support of anti-lynching bills. As a southerner, born in Mississippi, he could be counted upon to rally southern support for the committee, and as a fighting liberal he was expected to add vision and determination to its work. David Sarnoff, of Jewish descent, was president of the Radio Corporation of America and a member of Governor Lehman's Committee on Discrimination. As a leading industrialist, reputedly associated with the Rockefeller interests, he could be expected to have significant influence in the committee's dealings with employers. Milton Webster and Earl B. Dickerson were the two Negro members of the committee. The former, at the time of his appointment, was first international vice-president of the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters and chairman of its international executive board. The latter, who had been assistant attorney general of Illinois, was at the time of his appointment a member of the Chicago City Council as alderman of its Second Ward. 15 William Green and Philip Murray were the respective leaders of the AF of L and the CIO. Thus, as originally constituted, the FEPC included one representative of both the South and the newspaper world, another who was a leading Jewish citizen and a prominent member of industry, two outstanding Negroes—a well-known lawyer and a labor leader —and the two most prominent representatives of American labor. All sections of American society whose cooperation was necessary for the success of the committee's work were represented. On August 12, Lawrence W. Cramer was called from his teaching position at the Harvard University Law School to act as the

26

T H E FIRST COMMITTEE

committee's executive secretary. Cramer, the son of a minister, was born in New Orleans, Louisiana. After graduating from the University of Wisconsin and Columbia University, he had taught government and political science at the latter institution, and was subsequently Governor of the Virgin Islands from 1935 to 1941. The Chicago Defender, commenting upon his appointment, described him as a "man of excellent training with great administrative experience and with a reputation for fairness and impartiality toward our people." 14 From its very inception, the committee was handicapped by the inability of the two representatives of labor to attend its meetings. At a conference of the National Urban League in September, 1941, Cramer reported that because of illness Murray had been unable to attend any of the four committee meetings that had been held— John Brophy did represent him at one meeting—and that William Green had attended the first meeting but had failed to make a subsequent appearance. 17 T o remedy this situation, President Roosevelt appointed Frank Fenton as alternate to William Green, and John Brophy as alternate to Philip Murray. Fenton resigned his membership in December, 1942, and was succeeded by Boris Shishkin. 18 As indicated previously, many government officials did not regard the order seriously. T h e many years during which no attempt had been made to enforce government letters and resolutions against discrimination had confirmed their discriminatory attitudes and practices. Furthermore, the possibility of changing the hiring practices of government agencies was lessened by the wording of the executive order which did not seem to apply to government to the extent that it did to private enterprise and unions. T h e committee therefore suggested to the President that he issue a memorandum directing all federal departments and agencies to eliminate discrimination against Negroes in the hiring of government workers. 19 On September 6, the President notified the committee that pursuant to its suggestion he had sent a letter to the heads of all federal departments and agencies emphasizing the necessity of administering the federal civil service without discrimination because of race, religion, or national origin. 20 Although the committee was an independent body, responsible

T H E FIRST COMMITTEE

27

solely to the President, it was placed within the Labor Division of the Office of Production Management and later, with the abolition of that organization, within the War Production Board. 21 This was done, according to Cramer, "purely for convenience in administrative purposes, affording the Fair Employment Practice Committee the already established routine of office facilities and eliminating the time-wasting necessity of creating a brand new set-up." Neither body was immune to committee investigation of its employment policies. 22 Despite the pressing nature of its task, the committee did not organize itself for action until August, 1941. Its first investigator was hired on September 25, three months after the issuance of the order. 23 At the time of its transfer to the War Production Board, the staff included seven officers, most of whom were field investigators, and five clerical and stenographic employees." T w o problems confronted the committee at its inception. First, few people knew of the issuance of the order or of the existence of the committee.25 Secondly, the committee's budget amounted to only $80,000 for its first year of operation—an amount insufficient to provide for the setting up of regional offices throughout the country and personal investigation by field representatives of all incoming complaints.24 T o meet these problems the committee decided to conduct a series of public hearings in each major section of the country. Their purpose was to secure an accurate picture of discrimination in each section, to publicize the existence of the executive order and the committee, and to adjust, through direct negotiation and the pressure of public opinion, actual cases of discrimination introduced at the hearings.27 T h e first hearing was held in Los Angeles on October 20 and 21, 1941, and was followed by others in Chicago, on January 19 and 20, 1942; in New York, on February 16 and 17; and in Birmingham, on June 18, 19, and 20. A hearing scheduled for the Southwest was never held because of pressure from the State Department.28 Except for minor details, the hearings followed a set pattern. T h e chairman of the committee opened the proceedings with a statement outlining the committee's history, functions, and aims. He then called upon prominent citizens of the area, political lead-

28

THE FIRST COMMITTEE

ers, and representatives of minority groups, all of whom affirmed their support of the committee's work and, in some instances, offered information concerning acts of discrimination. They were followed by representatives of management and labor who were questioned concerning the employment practices of their organizations. After each hearing, the committee issued a set of recommendations and directives to the employers and/or unions against whom complaints had been filed. In his Los Angeles talk, Ethridge stressed that the hearing was not a trial but an attempt on the part of the committee to obtain an accurate picture of the employment situation in California with regard to minority groups, and to determine the best methods of implementing government policy. The committee, he pointed out, had therefore invited to the hearing representatives of firms which were "faithfully living up to our national policy," as well as others who had allegedly discriminated. 2 " This procedure was subsequently changed and later hearings were conducted as actual trials. Although, in all other major hearings, community leaders were called upon to testify immediately following the chairman's opening statement, the procedure in Birmingham was altered somewhat. It was felt that the South required a different approach since opposition to the committee apparently centered there. Ethridge, because of his influence in the South, was called upon, immediately following Chairman MacLean's introductory remarks, to deliver a statement which was expected to evoke a favorable response from southern industry and labor. The burden of his message was that "we cannot allow anything to stand in the way of an all-out effort," that the committee came into being not to create, but to ease tension, and that "any employer or union man who indulges his prejudices to defeat the allout war effort is worse than the sugar hoarder, the black-market operator or the tax evader, because he is actually retarding production and prolonging the war." Although he defended the granting of civil rights and equality of economic opportunity to Negroes, he also affirmed his personal support of segregation in the South. Stressing that "the committee has taken no position on the question of segregation of industrial workers," he emphasized that "Executive Order 8802 is a war order, and not a social document,"

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29

that it did not require the elimination of segregation, and that had it done so, he would have considered it "against the general peace and welfare . . . in the Nazi dictatorial pattern rather than in the slower, more painful, but sounder pattern of the democratic process." Denouncing those Negro leaders who "have adopted the 'all or nothing' attitude," who interpreted 8802 as a second Emancipation Proclamation, and "have magnified its import and its possibilities," he denied that the federal government could legislate segregation out of existence, and affirmed that there is no power in the world—not even in all the mechanized armies of the earth, Allied and Axis—which could now force the Southern white people to the abandonment of the principle of social segregation. It is a cruel disillusionment, bearing the germs of strife and perhaps tragedy, for any of their leaders to tell them that they can expect it, or that they can expect it as the price of their participation in the war. They would do better to learn, and to tell, plain truths to their people and to stimulate them into giving the evidence of self-discipline and the example of willingness to sacrifice which will shame the demagogic, and challenge the admiration of decent white people. He concluded by pointing out that "the Southern white man can purchase his own security, his own happiness and his own selfrespect only in that measure in which he is willing to accord them to the Negro." 30 Following the chairman's introductory remarks, representatives of minority, labor, church, and welfare organizations were called upon to testify. They cited numerous instances of discrimination by unions as well as employers and expressed approval of the committee's aims and policies. At the Los Angeles hearing, a Mr. Dellums of the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters, AF of L, observed that the mood of desperation which had overcome many Negroes prior to the issuance of the executive order had lessened with the committee's creation. But he frankly admitted prevailing doubts among minority groups concerning the committee's power and ability to force compliance from "hardboiled employers" and industrialists who previously had "sat down on the President for about six months refusing to accept defense contracts until they got certain tax laws repealed." 31 At the same hearing, Philip M. Connelly, president of the California CIO, welcomed the committee but indicated certain weak-

3

o

T H E FIRST COMMITTEE

nesses in its procedure. Comparing its methods with those of the La Follette Committee, he pointed out that the latter, which had investigated the actions of anti-labor employers, had taken months, utilizing a large staff, to arrange and conduct its investigations, while the FEPC had given the CIO "ten days in which to collect and put into affidavit form the necessary information." He explained that while ten days were inadequate under any circumstances, they were far more inadequate in the case of the FEPC's investigation in Los Angeles, since many persons who had been discriminated against were also intimidated to such an extent that they were afraid to speak "for fear of being eternally blacklisted. Especially is this true of the Spanish speaking people." 35 At the Birmingham hearings, John Busby, the vice-president of the local AF of L Teamsters' Union, exemplified the thinking of some southern, white AF of L union leaders. After denying that the AF of L in Alabama practiced discrimination against the Negro, and affirming that at union meetings white and colored members sat side by side, he maintained that the only discrimination he knew of resulted from control by Jews of the Birmingham department stores and by Greeks of the restaurant business: "We have here in the South, in Birmingham, Alabama, discrimination in the handling of department stores, the sale of goods. A fellow like me couldn't succeed in that business. That belongs to the Jews. . . . In the restaurant business here in Birmingham we can't deal in that because that is turned over to the Greeks." A moment later he justified segregation of Negroes as God's will: "And I can say any Negro, any white man, or Chinaman or anybody else that would step forth and say they want social equality and intermingling of races, he couldn't be acting within his religion and he would be dissatisfied with God, and he would be denying everything God intended to be." In concluding, he voiced his conviction that the labor movement in Birmingham did not discriminate against the Negro.33 MacLean, the chairman, replied: " I hope, Mr. Busby, you will find it possible to attend the rest of the hearing, because there will be some cases in which there will be presented some evidence that runs counter to your testimony this morning." The major portion of each hearing was devoted to an examina-

T H E FIRST COMMITTEE

31

tion of the employment policies of companies and unions engaged in defense production, and revealed widespread discrimination against members of minority groups, especially Negroes. M a c L e a n described the committee's findings in a talk before the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People in Los Angeles on J u l y 15, 1942. " O u r first public hearing was here on the West C o a s t — i n this very city. Here company after company admitted that it did not employ Negroes, or persons of Oriental background, regardless of their fitness for the job. Here, in the midst of aroundthe-clock appeals for national unity and for an all-out effort to b u i l d our instruments of defense, we found unfair employment practices only slightly removed from the Hitler pattern. Here, too, we f o u n d the vicious cycle to which labor, employer and government agencies bowed, that a member of a minority group could not get a j o b if he hadn't the necessary training and he was refused necessary training unless he could give proof of a j o b waiting for h i m . " 34 In Chicago, N e w York, and Birmingham this same condition prevailed. T h e arguments used by company representatives to defend themselves against charges of discrimination were varied. T h e vast majority denied that they had discriminated, either in the past or at the time of the hearings. A few, admitting discrimination in the past, asserted that their policy had changed, while others, admitting discrimination, placed the blame upon the refusal of white workers to work with Negroes. A representative of the LockheedVega Aircraft Corporation explained the placing of the word "colored" u p o n the application of a worker who was rejected as d u e to the need for determining the n u m b e r of colored men not hired. 3 1 A n o t h e r firm explained that it employed no Negroes in its force of 250 workers because none had applied. A n attitude of defiance interwoven with an attempt to attribute discriminatory policy to union pressure and to rationalize it i n other ways, was adopted by J. H . Waterbury of the Consolidated Aircraft Corporation of San Diego. Defending a quota system f o r Negroes in industry as proper, he explained the company's request f o r information about race on its application blanks as a h e l p f u l means of carrying out the national anti-discrimination policy. Maintaining that immediate compliance with the executive order

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was impossible, he announced that a newly adopted company policy of integrating Negroes into skilled jobs would be inaugurated within approximately ninety days.36 Although confronted by the committee with information provided by the United States Employment Service that it had made discriminatory requests for employees as late as October 13, 1941, the Stewart-Warner Corporation denied at the Chicago hearing that it had made such requests through the State Employment Service; it admitted, however, that an interviewer in its employ was guilty of discrimination and promised that in the future it would abide by the executive order.37 The Bearse Manufacturing Company, defending its newspaper advertisement for "Gentile" power-machine operators, explained that its experience indicated that Jewish operators do not work well on heavy canvas goods and that they are not dependable since they are seasonal workers who leave and return to dress factories with the season.38 The Studebaker Corporation claimed that its application required a statement of race and church affiliation in compliance with a recommendation of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Upon contacting the FBI, the committee was told that no such recommendation had ever been made.39 At its first hearing the committee was confronted with the problem of proving, at least to its own satisfaction, the existence of discrimination. Was a question concerning race or religion on an application blank an indication of discrimination? Did the absence of minority-group workers among a large group of employees indicate discrimination on the part of management? How could one ascertain the motives of an employer who had no Negroes, Jews, or Catholics in his employ? T h e answers to these questions were set forth in the committee's first set of "Findings" dealing with the Los Angeles hearings and in subsequent directives. It affirmed that certain facts, while they do not prove the existence of discrimination, do create favorable conditions for its practice and "lend support to the conviction" that discrimination exists. A single fact may not be significant in and of itself, but when viewed as one of a constellation of facts it may help to support a finding of discrimination. Thus, the fact that an employer does not employ members of certain minority groups or happens to employ them in very limited

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numbers, while it may be explained as the result of a dearth of applications from the members of those groups, "lends support to the conviction" that members of minorities are discriminated against in their effort to secure employment.40 In one instance, the committee found that although an employer who requests applicants for jobs to state their race or religion may not be discriminating, such a requirement "does not aid in determining the skill of applicants but affords an opportunity to discriminate against applicants." 41 It therefore recommended that requests for such information be eliminated from employment application blanks and suggested that if an employer found this information essential to the conduct of his business, he could secure it after hiring the worker.42 The use of a pattern or constellation of facts to establish a finding of discrimination may be observed in the case of the Nordberg Manufacturing Company. There the committee found that the absence of Negroes in the company's employ despite numerous applications, "when viewed in the light of the company's position that certain skills are concentrated in certain nationalities, together with the company's practice of allowing its guard to determine what applicants are entitled to consideration for employment, is prima facie evidence" of discrimination.43 Certain facts were regarded as direct proof of discrimination. These included: 1. The practice "of employing members of minority groups as laborers or in custodial work regardless of their particular skills." 44 2. Recruiting of employees from a technical school coupled with a refusal to hire Negro students whose grades may equal those of white students, or the hiring of Negro and Jewish students in smaller numbers than their proportion of the total student body would seem to warrant.45 3. The hiring of employees "based upon the theory that religious beliefs are an indication of employment qualifications." 48 4. The placing of a discriminatory newspaper advertisement.47 5. Submission by an employer to public or private employment agencies of requests for workers bearing racial or religious specifications.48 6. Refusal of an employer to hire Negroes unless certified by a

34 T H E FIRST COMMITTEE labor union which discriminates against Negroes in its certifications.49 T h e committee also developed a number of criteria to determine discrimination by unions: 1. Denial by unions of membership to non-Caucasians regardless of their qualifications "where such unions have agreements with defense contractors under which prospective employees must obtain 'union clearance.' " 50 2. Refusal of a union to admit Negroes to membership or to permit them to work in any capacity so long as members of the union are not employed. 51 3. Refusal of a union to admit Negroes to membership or to permit them to work as steamfitters so long as the Negro steamfitters will not submit to an agreement or plan to do steamfitting work only in Negro communities and then only on Negro buildings." 4. Agreements between an employer or an association of employers and a union preventing the employment or upgrading of qualified Negro or other workers on war projects because of race, creed, color, or national origin. 63 5. The barring from membership of Negroes or members of other minority groups by practice, custom, tradition, or other devices.54 6. Opposition to employment of Negroes except on condition that the employer arrange to have whites and Negroes work in separate buildings. 55 7. The denial by a union of membership to Negroes in its regular local, accompanied by the setting up of an auxiliary organization which they are permitted to join, is discriminatory if it (a) has a preferential hiring or closed shop agreement with the employer; (b) refuses to refer members of the Negro organization to the employer; (c) refuses to permit the auxiliary union to secure work for its members with the employer.56 Following the Los Angeles hearings, and in conjunction with its findings, the committee issued a series of recommendations to defense industries as a whole, rather than to individual employers or unions. It urged that defense industries employ members of minority groups "in all phases of employment," that questions

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concerning race or religion be omitted from job application blanks, that the committee be advised when employees refuse to work with members of minority groups, that companies abandoning discriminatory policies announce the fact publicly, that "the background and attitude toward minority groups" of interviewers and examiners be studied "to minimize the possibility of discrimination against" minority groups, that industries "establish a procedure for reviewing cases of rejected applicants," and that international or national officers of unions which discriminated take steps to eliminate such practices.57 With the issuance of these "recommendations," the committee realized that little would be accomplished by merely urging employers and trade unions to abandon discrimination. If nothing else, the language in which the committee's recommendations were couched would have to carry a greater suggestion of force than was implied in the phrase "the committee recommends," if its recommendations were to be observed. It therefore decided, following the Chicago hearings, to issue a series of "directives," not to entire industries but to individual employers and trade-unions found guilty of discrimination, ordering them to take certain steps in compliance with the executive order. For instance, the Stewart-Warner Corporation was directed to instruct its directors of personnel to comply with the provisions of the executive order and to furnish the committee with copies of its instructions; to file with the committee "a monthly report setting forth the number and classification of new workers employed by the company, the number of Negroes included in this number and the classification of work for which the Negro workers are employed"; to rescind its previous discriminatory orders to employment agencies; to refrain from submitting additional discriminatory orders; and to give written notice to all employment agencies from which it secures workers, including the United States Employment Service, that it would "accept applicants for all classifications of employment without regard to race, color, creed or national origin, copies of such notices to be transmitted to the Committee." " In another case, the committee directed that "the company desist from causing the publication of discriminatory advertisements," and file with it a monthly report revealing the number of

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Jews and Catholics it employed and the classifications of work in which they were employed. 59 T h e Studebaker Corporation was directed to remove inquiries as to race and religion from its application blanks. T h e Allis-Chalmers Corporation, having failed to attend the hearing to which it had been summoned, was directed to file a statement replying to the complaints which had been made against it.80 Following the New York hearing, the committee directed the Wright Aeronautical Corporation to "give written authority to all public and private employment agencies from which it recruits workers, to make the company's requisitions for employees available to the Committee." 61 Where unions were found guilty of discriminatory practices the committee directed that they "cease and desist" from such practices, that they notify companies and employers with whom they had contracts that they had no objection to the employment of Negroes on the same basis as other workers, that copies of such notices be submitted to the committee and to business representatives of the locals involved, 62 and that they "modify, alter or construe" their agreements with employers "in such a way as to permit" employers to hire Negroes "on the basis of equality with other applicants." In one instance the union was directed to take action within a period of ten days and notify the employers with whom it had a contract within five days of such action."3 Furthermore, the international and local officers of the union involved, "as well as all others having authority over the management, control, and supervision" of the union, were directed to put the committee's orders into effect. T h e transcripts and records of the case were ordered sent to the President of the United States for action if the officers of the union failed to comply with the committee's orders. 64 In addition to procedure, the record of the hearings reveals significant aspects of the political and social philosophies of committee members, which influenced their approach to the problem of discrimination. In one instance, an issue completely extraneous to the hearing was introduced by one committee member who was apparently opposed to an organization represented at the hearing. The incident occurred in Los Angeles when Frank Fenton interrupted the testimony of C. E. Pearl, representing the National Negro Congress, and charged the Congress with being opposed to

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national defense and w i t h h a v i n g refused to condemn the Soviet U n i o n in its pact with G e r m a n y , " though the opinions of the Congress on foreign affairs were clearly irrelevant. A t the Chicago hearings Fenton expressed the view that members of minority groups o u g h t not to be accepted into industrial training classes unless jobs were available for them. In effect this meant c o n d o n i n g discrimination i n training against such persons as long as they continued to be discriminated against in employment. T h i s question assumed tremendous importance, at the time, in view of the prevailing pattern of discrimination. Employers failed to hire Negroes because, they explained, Negroes lacked adequate training. O n the other hand, training classes for industrial jobs were closed to Negroes because of an alleged lack of available jobs. It was this vicious circle w h i c h confronted the F E P C and w h i c h could be broken only if the two constituting links—discrimination in jobs and in t r a i n i n g — w e r e attacked at the same time. Fenton, by urging that training b e kept dependent u p o n available jobs, was thereby opposing, although perhaps unwittingly, effective action against the discriminatory process. Eugene Brock, acting chairman of the L a b o r Supply Committee for R e g i o n V I , d u r i n g whose testimony Fenton ventured his opinion, exposed the essentially discriminatory nature of Fenton's position: How could we consistently say to a Negro youth or a Jewish girl or a Polish boy whose parents came over here—they didn't catch the Mayflower, they came at a later date—how can we say to them, "We would like to give you training but there is no use training you because nobody will hire you?" We would be forced, then, in the light of the existing situation to indulge in discrimination ourselves when our national, state, and local policy is against that sort of thing. Mr. Fenton: I can't disagree with that. You are talking about vocational schools there. But I am talking about the immediate job of defense and these courses that are set up. Isn't it much better to train the man that has a job or is sure to get a job, than it is to promiscuously train people without any opportunity to get the job? I know nothing sadder than somebody who spent weeks and months, years, studying something, and then can't be placed. . . . Mr. Brock: I can't see how, in the light of the prevailing policy, unless it is amended and changed—how we could restrict training only to

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those who are acceptable to industry. If we do that, then it seems to me we are not going to do anything to break down this prejudice.6* Fenton's penchant for defending certain forms of discrimination and, occasionally, members of the A F of L who were accused of discrimination, was obvious during the Birmingham hearings and led to a public debate with David Sarnoff. J . M. Shelton, representing Local 735, International Association of Machinists, was being questioned by the committee. Sarnoff asked "whether there is a ritual provision that prevents Negroes joining Local 735." Shelton replied: "That is part of our secret," and would not divulge it. Fenton came to his aid by maintaining that the committee had to regard it as a secret and that "we have no right to go into the internal affairs of the union." This aroused Sarnoff, who replied vehemently: If the internal affairs of the union are interfering with the full utilization of manpower in defense industry, then I say we have a right to go into those internal affairs. . . . I do not accept the answer given by Mr. Fenton's observations, and I further wish to say that in my opinion if this Committee has no power to inquire from unions the terms and conditions under which they accept or reject membership, I think this committee would be practicing gross discrimination if it asked employers for all the kinds of information we have been asking employers to furnish, and did not inquire of unions the terms and conditions upon which they accepted or rejected members.87 In all fairness to Fenton, it should be revealed that at the New York hearing, when it was brought to his attention that the Chemical and Oil Workers Union, Local 22026, a federal labor union directly affiliated with the A F of L, had refused to permit an employer to hire Negroes, he assured the committee and the employer that the local would be asked to change its policy and that if it refused he would guarantee to have its charter taken away.' 8 It should also be noted, however, that the oil workers' local was comparatively insignificant and the removal of its charter would have meant a hardly noticeable loss in membership to the A F of L. On the other hand, the International Association of Machinists, whose representative Fenton had treated with much greater deference at the Birmingham hearings, was one of the most powerful affiliates of the A F of L , it could not be intimidated easily and therefore apparently merited more of Fenton's respect.

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Sarnoff, the industrialist, generally acted aggressively in p o i n t i n g out to employers the error of their ways. W h e n the vice-president of the G u l f S h i p b u i l d i n g Corporation, a M r . H i l l , d e f e n d e d the discriminatory policy of his corporation with the observation that discrimination was a sociological problem a n d insoluble by either management or labor, Sarnoff commented: T h e question is what are you doing as management to help solve these problems? Do you think you are carrying out the spirit of that order when you say it is a sociological question, and there are problems, and until and unless somebody solves these problems you are not going to hire Negroes? Mr. Hill: No, that isn't our attitude. Mr. Sarnoff: T h a t is your act. Whatever your attitude, the testimony given here is that you refuse to employ Negro labor. . . . I agree there are problems. All of us have problems. Mr. Hill: Yes. Mr. Sarnoff: How do you propose to solve them? Mr. Hill: T h a t is largely a question for the workers themselves, I should think. Mr. Sarnoff: No, I don't think it is a question for the workers themselves. I think management has responsibilities. If you do nothing about it and pass the buck to the workers, I don't think you are fulfilling your contract with the government. Mr. Hill: What would you suggest we do? Mr. Sarnoff: I would suggest you should hire them. Mr. Hill: If the operation would be jeopardized, what would you do then? Mr. Sarnoff: I am not willing to admit the operation would be jeopardized, but if it were, I would want to know what was the basis of it being jeopardized, and deal with that basis. I have problems, as an industrialist myself, and so has every other employer of labor, but the answer doesn't lie in the statement it is a sociological question for the workers themselves to solve. T h e workers themselves are not going to solve it. Mr. Hill: Well, if the workers are not going to solve it, what would you suggest management should do? Mr. Sarnoff: I think it is a combination of government, management, trade unions and labor. There are involved a number of factors. Mr. Hill: Yes. Mr. Sarnoff: All of them must cooperate toward the results. I think management has a very serious responsibility, and the first thing I would suggest is that you get yourself in a frame of mind such as that you would feel you would have to comply with that Executive Order 8802, that you

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have got to use your ingenuity to see how to meet the problems as they arise; that you too must undertake a certain element of educational activities with those who labor in opposition to your employment of Negroes, but you can't purge yourself Mr. Hill: Oh, no. Mr. Sarnoff: of whether or not you are going to obey the President's order, because there are problems involved.4* A difference of opinion in which Sarnoff defended an employer against other members of the committee occurred at the Birmingham hearings when a representative of the Alabama Shipbuilding and Drydock Corporation was being questioned concerning the company's upgrading policies.70 T h e original complaint against the company was that it had refused to hire Negroes for certain positions. Members of the committee broadened the inquiry to ask about its upgrading policies as well. The replies of the company representative were accepted with apparent disbelief and suspicion and each additional question indicated growing committee antagonism toward the witness. Sarnoff intervened with the assertion that the Alabama Shipbuilding and Drydock Corporation, which employed large numbers of Negroes—15 or 20 per cent of all its employees—had employed them before the issuance of the executive order and was testifying frankly as to its reasons for not upgrading Negroes. He, furthermore, objected to questioning the company about its upgrading policies, since no complaint had been placed with the committee concerning these policies and the original complaint concerned only discriminatory hiring practices. MacLean, the chairman, replied that since there existed a complaint about hiring policies, it was within the province of the committee to inquire into related policies as well. The final decision of the committee in this matter went against Sarnoff, when it was decided that receipt of a complaint in any one phase of employment permitted the committee to inquire into related phases. T h e most important, publicly expressed, difference of opinion within the committee, involved the question of segregation. In his address in Birmingham, Ethridge had defended segregation and had affirmed that "there is no power in the world—not even in all the mechanized armies of the earth. Allied and Axis—which could now force the Southern white people to the abandonment of the

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principle of social segregation." His statement evoked a storm of protest from Negroes and many liberals. Brooks Atkinson, writing in The New York Times, remarked that "although no one doubts the truth of Mr. Ethridge's assertion, the emphasis he placed on it made many Negroes think he was saying in effect: " 'We need your help in wartime, but don't imagine that you can expect to get permanent improvement out of it.' " 73 Committee member Earl Dickerson said nothing at the hearing but soon afterward issued a public statement in which he vigorously condemned Ethridge's viewpoint: 11

Mr. Ethridge's statement, in support of segregation in the South, in my opinion violates both the letter and spirit of the President's Executive Order 8802. It is inconsistent with our professed belief in the principle of democracy. It shows very definitely that the South is still more interested in "keeping the Negro in his place" than in winning the war for democracy. Instead of marshaling its forces for an all out effort to beat the totalitarian powers, the South is still fighting the Civil War, which, history records, was won over seventy-five years ago at Appomattox. The philosophy expressed by Mr. Ethridge, representing as it does the majority opinion of the white people of the South, is certainly not heartening to America's colored allies. It gives aid and comfort to the enemy, who have long been broadcasting to the world that America is not fighting this war for freedom. If the function of the committee is to bring about full participation of all groups in the war effort, and I believe it is, then, it must press vigorously toward this end. Because of the very nature of its creation, the Committee on Fair Employment Practice must be opposed to segregation and discrimination. It cannot hedge on so-called delicate issues. It cannot make concessions to the South, which after all is still a part of the geographical boundaries of the United States. There should be "no pussyfooting" on segregation by members of the committee.71 Negro leaders and newspapers throughout the country called for Ethridge's resignation. 74 However, the hubbub died down in time, Ethridge did not resign, and the policy finally adopted by the committee was that segregation could be a cause for complaint and committee action only if it resulted in discrimination. Segregation per se was not forbidden by the executive order. T h e hearings succeeded in publicizing the committee's existence, its aims and activities. T h e necessity for such publicity was made evident at the New York hearings: almost eight months after

42 T H E FIRST COMMITTEE the issuance of the President's order, several employers maintained that they had not known of it until a few days before the hearings were to take place/3 For the most part, the newspapers of each region in which hearings were held provided adequate and often extensive coverage. According to an FEPC survey, public opinion as represented by the California press during the Los Angeles hearings was "friendly and constructive." 78 However, although the reporting was fair and impartial, there was no editorial comment, either pro or con, during that hearing.77 Eventually, as hearings were held in each section of the country, newspapers began to comment more frequently and more favorably. The Chicago Times, which in June, 1941, had failed to mention the issuance of the executive order, wrote on January 23, 1942: Incomplete though they were, hearings held here this week by the Fair Employment Board of OPM under the able chairmanship of Mark Ethridge, Louisville newspaper executive, revealed industrial discrimination against the employment of minority national and racial groups— Negroes especially—which certainly must be eliminated. Failure of employers to make use of every bit of available manpower, without regard to color, race, or creed, is incredibly shortsighted in this emergency. So are similar discriminations practiced by certain labor unions.78 Even the Chicago Tribune appeared friendly: "It is to be hoped that the committee will assemble its facts with care and present them to the President forcefully. . . . The abuses complained of make a mockery of our claim to be fighting a war for the four freedoms." At the same time, the Tribune could not refrain from a flank attack upon the committee: "Why should private employers suspected of discrimination be examined in open session and government agencies be examined in secret? The government is by far the Nation's biggest employer, and has repeatedly been charged with unfairness to Negroes. Why this protection to the biggest of the alleged offenders?" 79 When the committee issued its "Findings" in April, 1942, subsequent to the Chicago hearings, newspapers throughout the country reported the story in "bold, sympathetic," front-page headlines,"0 and newspaper syndicates issued very substantial reports about them. "All editorials on the Chicago Findings," observed a com-

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mittee survey, "were sympathetic with the purpose of Executive Order 8802 and the Committee . . . No 'red herrings' were dragged in; neither censure nor ridicule was heaped on the aims or procedure of the Committee." 81 As regards the Birmingham hearings, the southern press proved least sympathetic. Yet, even there, the amount of sympathy expressed proved more abundant than one might have anticipated. Before the hearings started, Brooks Atkinson reported in The New York Times, "all sorts of rumors flew around town. It was rumored that the government was going to abolish separate drinking fountains for the two races and compel employers to employ one Negro stenographer to every two white. 'Social equality,' which means anything from intermarriage to abolishing 'Jim Crow' laws and customs, is the bugaboo that haunts every discussion of racial problems." 82 These rumors were carefully nurtured by certain trade journals and newspapers. Alabama, a journal published in Birmingham, called the committee's investigation "the gravest threat yet to the time-honored right of Southerners to direct the social development of their own region." 83 Throughout the hearings this journal continued its tirades against the committee. " T o Southerners sweating under their bright sun to bring this war to an early successful conclusion," it wrote on June 19, "the three-day Carnival of Reform in Birmingham this week held fearsome implications. For if the apostles of New Dealism will send their sleuths, their prosecutors and their judges into the very heart of the South to stir up the delicate issue of the equality of the races, to what further point on the long road toward despotic and absolute regimentation will they have the effrontery to go?" It concluded with an ominous warning: "For whether the creators of the FEP committee realize it or not, there exists in this part of the country a resolute Committee for the Preservation of Honorable Traditions, and its members are legion." 84 A few days after the hearings, Alabama again commented: " O n the whole, the committee's three-day inquisition in Birmingham was an audacious proceeding, with ominous implications. . . . Our industries are producing well ahead of their schedules. Has this committee with its left-wing supporters and its swarm of re-

44 T H E FIRST COMMITTEE forming 'investigators' produced anything except a grave threat of trouble and dissension among these industries?" 85 In similar vein, the Times of Gadsden, Alabama, accused the committee of seeking "to break down social barriers," 88 and the News-Tribune of Rome, Georgia, remarked that the committee and its friends were "consciously or unconsciously . . . serving its enemies." 8T However, several southern newspapers, such as the Birmingham Age-Herald, and the Birmingham News, were sympathetic to the committee's views and others were at least willing to reserve judgment until they could see the effect of the committee's actions. The Age-Herald,, on June 17, endorsed "the broad purposes of the Committee, which are the purposes of the president," and maintained that these "should be the urgent concern of us all—every last one of us who strives for victory in this war and triumph in subsequent peace and progress." The Birmingham News, after referring to statements by representatives of the committee that Birmingham had less discrimination than any other community in the South, remarked that it was appropriate that hearings be held in Birmingham, "for the aim of this committee is to further this very cause in which this community has shown itself to be a leader. Birmingham and the committee seem well met then. . . . "Of course, there are always some people everywhere who are disposed to take a suspicious or prejudiced view of an undertaking of this kind. Here, happily, we surely can say, such persons are decidedly in the minority." 88 About a week after the hearings, the Montgomery Advertiser commented very favorably on the "calm" and "reserve" with which they were conducted, and observed that "there need be no fear of 'outsiders' deciding this issue. The only cause for fear is the activity of the unscrupulous or the ignorant within our midst who would attempt to panic the rest of us, even as Hitler made use of the Jews and the Communists to achieve his ends." 89 Throughout the country, at each hearing, support for the committee's activities came primarily from public figures, church leaders, representatives of minority groups and labor unions. In the South, however, religious leaders and public figures were conspicuous by their absence. Negro organizations and the CIO constituted the committee's two basic supports. The International

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Union of Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers wrote to the committee expressing their gratitude for the holding of hearings in the South. T h e same union revealed that the Tennessee C I O convention, meeting in Memphis two weeks previously, had welcomed the FEPC to the South and had called for an end to discrimination, and that the Alabama C I O convention had called for full integration of the Negro people into the war effort and for the elimination of discrimination in employment."® T h e Jefferson County Labor Committee Against Job Discrimination, consisting of white and Negro representatives of local unions of the United Steelworkers, the Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers, the United Mine Workers, and others, likewise assured the committee of its wholehearted support. A number of southern Negroes, under the auspices of the Jefferson County Council of the Southern Negro Youth Congress, formed a citizens' committee in Birmingham to help in presenting cases of discrimination to the committee. 91 T h e hearings were successful in achieving the aims set by the committee. Its work was publicized, America was made conscious of the existence of the executive order, and many employers were induced to abandon their discriminatory practices. Perhaps most important of all, as the Chicago Defender commented, "even though it may not have succeeded in bringing to book all the industries which have failed so far to observe scrupulously the order of the Chief Executive, it has given hope to millions of Negro workers whose morale would have been irreparably shattered were it not for their faith in the eventual realization of the Committee's main objective." 82

Ill: DECLINE AND DEMISE

reached the peak of its glory at the conclusion of the Birmingham hearings. MacLean, who had replaced Ethridge as chairman, received the congratulations of the White House and was highly praised, upon his return to Washington, for the excellent work he had done. 1 Members and staff of the committee celebrated its first anniversary on June 25. With the approval of the President, plans were set to increase the staff and budget for an allout offensive against discrimination. 2 The new budget was to be increased to more than $1,000,000, as against the previous year's $80,000, and twelve regional offices were to be established to facilitate the committee's work. 3 These hopes and plans came to naught when, without any advance warning, President Roosevelt announced on July 30 that the F E P C was transferred as an "organizational entity" to the War Manpower Commission, where it would be under the direct supervision of Paul V. McNutt. 4 Although, at the time, no reason was given for the transfer, in the light of later developments there can be little doubt but that its purpose was to restrict the committee's activities. According to one observer, "back of the transfer, as everybody knew, was reactionary Southern pressure. Also involved were top government officials who had been annoyed by F E P C insistence that they put an end to discrimination in their own departments and agencies." 8 As an example of southern pressure, one may cite the rejection, by Governor Dixon of Alabama, of a contract offered by the War Production Board whereby cotton mills operated by the Alabama State Prison were to manufacture cloth for the Army. T h e reason given for the rejection was a clause in the contract prohibiting discrimination against minority groups.8 T H E COMMITTEE

Expressions of alarm and protest were immediately sounded by

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liberal, labor, religious, and minority groups throughout the country. It was charged that the transfer was due to State Department objection to hearings which the FEPC had planned to hold in El Paso, Texas. T h e State Department feared, it was said, harmful effects upon our relations with Mexico and other Latin American countries as a result of expected revelations of discrimination against Mexicans and other Spanish Americans in the Southwest.' T h e Washington Bureau of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People stressed that a by no means insignificant result of the transfer was the opportunity it gave southern congressmen to limit or entirely eliminate funds for the FEPC. For whereas previously the committee had been under the direct jurisdiction of the President and had received its funds from him, under the new setup it would receive its funds from the budget allotted by Congress to the War Manpower Commission—a budget already severely cut by Congress (the commission had been granted only slightly more than one tenth of the allocation it had originally requested). T o provide sufficient funds for the operation of the President's committee, the War Manpower Commission would now have to go to Congress to request an increase in its allocation, thus placing the committee at the mercy of the southern bloc.® Liberals were further alarmed by the fact that President Roosevelt had not consulted the committee or even notified it in advance of the impending change in its status. Apparently, for some reason or other, the committee had fallen into disfavor. Nor was McNutt's known attitude toward the aims of the F E P C reassuring. T h e N A A C P alleged that "despite recent favorable public utterances of Chairman McNutt, the United States Employment Service and the United States Office of Education, since being under McNutt's supervision, have not substantially changed their policies, by which tacit and active endorsement is given to discriminatory practices with respect to Negro placement and training which the F.E.P.C. seeks to eliminate." 9 In response to rising public clamor, President Roosevelt issued a statement through his secretary, Stephen Early, on August 17, in which he defended the transfer and explained that it was his "intention to strengthen, not to submerge, the Committee, and to reinvigorate, not to repeal, Executive Order 8802." The committee, he

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assured every one, would be able to make use of the resources and personnel of the W M C and would have the "friendly supervision" and assistance of McNutt; yet it would "be preserved as an organizational entity" and would "continue to refer to the President all matters which, in its judgment, [required] his decision." 10 T h e President's statement succeeded in appreciably assuaging public indignation, and soon afterward the committee began to discuss with McNutt the integration of its activities with those of the W M C . T h e negotiations continued for three months without result. When, finally, the committee declared its refusal to accept responsibility for the failure to arrive at an agreement, McNutt became more amenable to discussion and a satisfactory agreement was quickly concluded. 1 1 T h e committee was designated as the operating agency within the W M C to handle all aspects of discrimination prohibited by the executive order, and to determine, with the approval of the W M C chairman, all policies and procedures relating to the elimination of discrimination. It was given power to select and remove its own field and headquarters personnel in accordance with established civil service procedure. In the event of an objection by a regional director of the W M C to an FEPC-appointed field representative, McNutt was to approve the appointment. Decisions of the committee to hold public hearings were to be referred to the W M C chairman before being publicized. T h e files of the W M C relating to matters of discrimination were to be amalgamated with those of the committee. Field personnel of the W M C handling problems of discrimination were to be combined with, and become a part of, the committee's field staff, and the deputy chairman of the W M C was to attend the committee's meetings as a representative of the W M C ' s chairman. 1 2 Since the agreement limited the autonomy of the F E P C by subjecting its policies and procedures to the approval of the W M C chairman, it proved disappointing to some groups, 1 3 but MacLean, speaking for the committee, expressed his satisfaction with it and stated that the agreement had effectuated the intention of the President to strengthen the committee and maintain it as an organizational entity. 14 Armed, it was rumored, with a budget four times larger than it

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had been previously granted, the committee prepared to go into action. It announced public hearings for February, 1943, in Detroit, and others in St. Louis, Cleveland, Philadelphia, and Baltimore. Hearings on complaints leveled against certain railroad companies and unions were scheduled for January 25, 26, and 27, 1943. On December 1, 1942, after carefully considering complaints of discrimination in which it was alleged that the Capital Transit Company of Washington, D.C., refused to hire Negroes as bus and streetcar operators, the committee directed the company to bring its employment policy into line with Executive Order 8802 by December 5. 18 Three days later, on December 4, the committee issued an order directing the McAvoy Shipbuilding Corporation, of Savannah, Georgia, and the Savannah Building Trades Council of the A F of L, to cease discriminating against a Negro local labor union in Savannah. 17 In January, 1943, the committee issued similar directives to four leading industrial concerns in the South: the Vultee Aircraft, Incorporated, of Nashville, Tennessee; the Alabama Shipbuilding and Drydock Corporation of Mobile, Alabama; A. J . Honeycutt and Company of Birmingham, and the Gulf Shipbuilding Corporation of Chickasaw, Alabama. 18 Although the committee seemed to be operating competently and aggressively, these outward indications were deceptive. T h e agreement of October 26, concluded between the War Manpower Commission and the committee, had not been put into effect by McNutt despite repeated committee efforts to have him do so. Cases of discrimination brought to the WMC's attention were frequently not referred to the committee; policies and procedures carefully worked out by the committee were disregarded by high officials of the commission. W M C field personnel who handled problems of discrimination were not combined with the field staff of the committee. Persons chosen by the committee for its staff were refused appointment by the commission. T h e deputy chairman of the W M C failed to attend the committee's meetings and the commission did not amalgamate its files on discrimination with those of the committee. 19 At the same time, the committee found itself attacked by external enemies. Soon after the issuance of the "Cease and Desist" di-

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rective to the Capital Transit Company on December 1, the Chicago Tribune published an alleged inside story, the facts of which were provided by Representative Martin Dies, of how the Communist Party was utilizing the committee "to raise racial issues in the nation's capital." 20 Representative Rankin attacked the committee on the floor of the House, attributed its directive in the Capital Transit case to "alien influence," and warned that it might lead to disorders in Washington. 21 Struggling against enemies without and within, the committee received a mortal wound in January, 1943. Without prior consultation %vith the committee, Paul McNutt "indefinitely postponed" the projected committee hearings on discrimination in the railroad industry.22 (This occurred while President Roosevelt was attending the Casablanca Conference.) Although McNutt characterized his move as "merely a postponement," it was regarded by liberal and Negro groups, as well as by members of the committee, as a cancellation. At a press conference a short time afterwards, McNutt explained that he had postponed the hearings to enable the War Manpower Commission to bring about full utilization of manpower in the vital railroad industry and asserted that the W M C could "take care of the situation much better without using force. If we can accomplish something in a normal way, it is much better." 23 In an informal telephone poll conducted by the Chicago Defender, it was learned that committee members Dickerson, Webster, Brophy, and Ethridge were opposed to the "postponement." Ethridge, however, refused to be quoted. Boris Shishkin could not be reached and MacLean stated that he approved of McNutt's action.24 The "postponement" undoubtedly came as a shock to members of the committee and to the public. T h e hearings had been publicized as an important test of the committee's prestige and power. Preparations had begun more than a half year previously. At the time of the committee's transfer to the WMC, McNutt had been informed of the proposed probe and had raised no objection. Charles Houston of the N A A C P and Henry Epstein had already been engaged as special counsel to conduct the hearings. Several weeks prior to the "postponement," John P. Davis, executive secretary of the National Negro Congress, had requested

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the holding of certain hearings. He was informed by McNutt that the W M C had no right to dictate to the F E P C in the matter. Following the "postponement," McNutt was asked under what right he had taken that step. He replied, "After all, the Fair Employment Practice Committee is under the Manpower Commission." 25 T h e surprise and shock occasioned by McNutt's action were all the greater because a few days previously, on December 14, 1943, President Roosevelt, through his executive secretary, had written the N A A C P , in reply to a resolution urging restoration of the F E P C to its original status as an independent agency, that there was no need for the change: ". . . in the final analysis," said the message, "the Committee is still under direct control of the Chief Executive . . . Chairman McNutt is reorganizing the entire manpower set-up and is relying strongly on decisions and recommendations made by the Committee on all questions pertaining to the Negroes." 29 Liberal, labor, and minority groups vigorously protested McNutt's action. The Negro press denounced it "as a surrender to Southern prejudices and as an indication of a purpose to scuttle the committee." 27 A delegation representing several organizations came to Washington to see McNutt. After meeting with Fowler Harper, deputy director of the WMC—according to a newspaper report of the interview, 28 Harper admitted that the "postponement" resulted from pressure of "big business," the railroads, and the southern bloc in Congress—they saw McNutt. He assured them that he was interested in the rights of minority groups and urged them to have faith in him and to accept his judgment. Referring to charges that he had postponed the hearings because of political ambitions, he remarked: " I have undertaken a job which I know is political suicide. I know I cannot please all the people. My job is to help win the war." He suggested that not only would the committee not be destroyed but that out of the current discussions "will come something that will be completely satisfactory to all concerned." He refused, however, to give any reason for the "postponement": " I felt it unwise, and therefore decided they should not be held at this time. I do not care to go further." T h e interview closed on a note of bitterness and hostility. When the group's spokesman, Rev. Charles Hill, chairman of the Citizens

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Committee of Detroit, began to thank McNutt for the interview, several who were present refused to join in the expression of thanks because of the "paternalistic and insulting" reception which they felt they had received. Other delegations demanding that the hearings be re-scheduled followed in increasing numbers. T h e y became so numerous that McNutt finally "refused to receive any more." 29 Leading Protestant, Catholic, and Jewish clergymen joined in a memorial to President Roosevelt requesting that the railway hearings be re-scheduled, that he reaffirm his support of the committee and remove it from the jurisdiction of the WMC. 3 0 A delegation consisting of twenty-five national leaders of labor, church, Negro, fraternal, and civic organizations met with the F E P C and pledged their support to the committee." 1 In the meantime, the committee began to crumble from within. MacLean resigned to enter the Navy. His resignation was followed by those of Ethridge and Sarnoff. Before the end of the month three attorneys who had been retained by the committee as special counsel to prepare for the railroad hearings—Charles H. Houston, Harold A. Stevens, and Henry Epstein—had also resigned.32 Houston accompanied his resignation with a letter to President Roosevelt in which he condemned McNutt's action and warned: "It may be for the present that due to disfranchisement in the South, the Negro by himself cannot muster as much political pressure on the government as the railroad industry and the railroad unions. But if the government thinks it has purchased domestic peace and has satisfied the reactionaries by this surrender of principle, it has forgotten the lessons of history, including Chamberlain at Munich. Instead of being satisfied the reactionaries will feel that this show of weakness on the part of the government proves they have the government on the run." In concluding, he affirmed that "McNutt's action disappoints but does not discourage us. We shall work all the harder to rally the liberal forces of this country behind a program which works by principle and not by panic." 33 With these resignations, the committee reached a new low in disorganization and ineffectuality. T h e Chicago Defender commented bitterly that the committee "has now entered into competition with a circus show under a side tent. It has no more influence

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now with the hardboiled and hard-headed industrialists than has a circus barker. From the point of view of their own respectability, the remaining members of the Committee should tender their resignation without ceremony." " However, public pressure achieved results. On February 3, President Roosevelt announced that he had asked McNutt to call a conference of minority-group leaders to reconsider the status of the committee and to discuss plans for strengthening its scope and powers. He explained that the committee "and its executive director have done an excellent piece of work, placing workers in war jobs. They, however, have been handicapped by the fact that the members of the Committee were working on a part-time voluntary basis, and did not have powers or personnel commensurate with their responsibilities." He emphasized that he considered it advisable to review the entire problem, and that if certain arrangements were made, the railroad and other hearings would be resumed." The conference convened on February 19. McNutt, Attorney General Biddle, and twenty-four representatives of nineteen organizations were present. According to one report, there was no conference in the accepted sense of the word. The government officials refused to reveal their plans for the committee's future and no decisions were reached. T h e invited representatives demanded, nevertheless, that the F E P C be removed from the jurisdiction of the War Manpower Commission and restored to its former independent status, subject only to the supervision of the President. They urged that it be continued as a voluntary, unpaid committee of seven members, that it be given an adequate budget and personnel, that it be given the right to inflict financial penalties upon recalcitrant employers, that the findings of the committee be made binding upon other government agencies and that the railroad hearings be re-scheduled and conducted by those who were at the time still members of the committee. McNutt assured the group that their recommendations would be placed before the President and taken into account in any decision concerning the committee's future.® 9 The recommendations of this conference were reinforced by a series of recommendations which the remaining members of the F E P C sent McNutt in February. They stipulated that the agency

54 DECLINE AND DEMISE be returned to its independent status; that it consist as before of seven voluntary, unpaid members; that it be given an adequate budget to provide for a staff of at least 120 persons, with regional offices and a field staff directly responsible to the committee; that it "be designated as the final administrative agency responsible for the enforcement of Executive Order 8802"; that before holding a public hearing the committee should be required to call upon all other government agencies responsible under the executive order for the elimination of discrimination to carry out that responsibility, and to grant these agencies a reasonable time, not over thirty days, to take action; and, finally, that the committee be permitted to issue directives "only after consultation with and approval of the contracting agency of the government involved. Where no agreement can be reached, then the matter will be certified to the President." 37 In addition, the committee, on March 1, 1943, sent a communication to President Roosevelt accusing McNutt of failing to carry out the W M C - F E P C agreement; it strongly urged that the committee be placed as an independent agency outside the jurisdiction of the WMC, and upheld the need for a fair employment practice committee as a prerequisite for the achievement of a "peaceful, evolutionary and just solution of the minority problem." " For several weeks after the issuance of its statement, the committee remained in a state of suspended animation. The President and his advisors were formulating plans for its reorganization and made no attempt to fill the existing vacancies or to encourage the remaining committee members to continue in their appointed tasks. T h e New York office of the committee—the first and only regional office to be established—was receiving about fifty complaints of discrimination a week, but could handle only fifteen each week because of its limited staff. 3 ' Moreover, the morale of the remaining committee members seemed nil. They cancelled a regular bi-monthly meeting scheduled for the beginning of April with the explanation that nothing could be done until their status was settled.40 Rumors abounded that the committee was being reorganized and that the chairmanship had been offered to a number of nationally known public figures—former Governor Poletti of New York, former Governor Price of Virginia, Dr. Will Alexander of the War

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Manpower Commission, Dr. Frank Graham of the War Labor Board, and former Senator George W. Norris—and had been refused by all. 41 One observer remarked, "a 'prominent white figure' a month turns down the proffered vacant committee chairmanship, as thankless and suicidal. At FDR's orders, McNutt has been trying vainly to give it away." 41 Undaunted by the apparently weak and irresolute action of the President and his advisors, friends of the committee refused to slacken their efforts in its behalf. On March 25, the Interracial Committee of the Women's Division of the Greater New York Federation of Churches urged that the committee be restored to its original independent status "with sufficient funds to carry on its work effectively," and urged "that hearings on discrimination in the railroad industry be rescheduled without delay." 4" Nine nationally known leaders of Negro and white organizations wrote to President Roosevelt expressing their alarm over the situation and requested a conference to discuss the committee's status. Signers of the request included Walter White, Max Yergan, Channing H. Tobias, Lester Granger, Frank R. Crosswaith, and Sidney Goldstein.44 Fifteen participants in the February 19 conference telegraphed to the President on March 12, expressing anxiety at his lack of action and requesting "immediate and satisfactory action with respect [to the] Fair Employment Practice Committee." 46 Responding to mass pressure, McNutt announced at a press conference that the railroad hearings would be re-scheduled immediately following the committee's reorganization.44 At this point, the committee refused to remain inanimate any longer and suddenly erupted into action. Dickerson, acting as chairman, announced that hearings would be held by the committee in Detroit on May 24 and 25, and in St. Louis, Cleveland, Philadelphia and Baltimore on later dates. He indicated, too, that steps would be taken to enforce the committee's decisions against the Capital Transit Company, which had evaded previous orders to cease its discrimination. In making his announcement, Dickerson explained that when the committee had received word on February 4 that it would be reorganized, it was only natural for us to sit by for a while and see if it was going to affect the decisions we had made.

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But now so much time has passed—it's two months almost to the day, now, since the big conference of agencies interested in the reorganization was held here—that we really don't know if there is going to be any reorganization. And it doesn't seem right for us to keep on sitting by and letting all the charges go by. We feel that enough time has passed for us to determine now to move forward vigorously. And if it is true that we are going to be reorganized, you will know as quickly as we will whether the decisions made by us today will be proper." T h e committee's action was apparently evoked by the alleged failure of McNutt to submit to the committee for discussion or comment any of the several plans for the committee's reorganization that he had drafted. 48 T h e decision to proceed with the hearings, and Dickerson's announcement, were both contrary to the rules of the WMC. McNutt had not given his consent to the decision, and the official publicity release announcing it, which had to be approved by him prior to issuance, had actually been censored by him because he did not want the new chairman to be bound by the decisions of the existing committee. However, Dickerson decided to issue the statement despite McNutt's disapproval.49 It may be noted that this action, more than anything else, was probably responsible for the President's failure to appoint Dickerson to the new committee following the reorganization of the old. Dickerson's announcement proved to be the committee's dying gasp. Upon the request of the White House, the committee postponed its scheduled hearings in the Capital Transit case as well as others previously announced. On May 27, 1943, President Roosevelt issued Executive Order 9346, which created a new Fair Employment Practice Committee and redefined its powers and duties; he appointed Monsignor Francis J . Haas, then dean of the School of Social Sciences at Catholic University, its chairman."0

IV: THE SECOND FAIR EMPLOYMENT PRACTICE COMMITTEE

was established as an independent agency— subject only to the authority of the President—within the Office of Production Management. It was given explicit right to conduct hearings, make findings of fact and recommend to the chairman of the War Manpower Commission measures to be used in eliminating discrimination. Its hand was strengthened by the addition of several clauses and phrases not included in the previous order and by a clearer statement of the President's authority to issue the order. 1 It consisted, as the previous committee had, of seven members, and its chairman, who was also its executive secretary, was made a paid official with a salary not to exceed $10,000 per year.2 The six others appointed to serve with Monsignor Haas were John Brophy, Milton P. Webster, Boris Shishkin, Sara Southall, supervisor of employment for the International Harvester Company, P. B. Young, Sr., publisher of the Norfolk Journal and Guide, and Samuel Zemurray of Louisiana, president of the United Fruit Company. 3 Dickerson was the only member of the first committee who was not reappointed, despite an active campaign on his behalf by several Negro organizations.4 Undoubtedly, his aggressive, if somewhat unorthodox, efforts to prevent the first committee's extinction, his granting of press interviews without prior permission from McNutt and, in the words of one newspaper, "his militant stand during" F E P C hearings," had much to do with his not being reappointed. His absence raised doubts in the minds of Negro leaders concerning the committee's competence and sincerity. T h e Chicago Defender editorialized: "Perhaps Dickerson was too insistT H E NEW C O M M I T T E E

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ent on the observance and application of the expressed provisions of the Executive Order 8802, and as a result the old Committee was abolished. Failure to reappoint him raises the question that it was the desire of the Administration to have a hand-picked committee." • The appointment of P. B. Young was received with noticeable coolness. One reporter wrote: "There is a lack of enthusiasm over the appointment of P. B. Young, Sr., publisher of the Norfolk Journal and Guide, chairman of the Southern Conference on Race Relations, and chairman of the Board of Trustees of Howard University. Mr. Young, say these observers, has not been too strong on matters of segregation." 7 Samuel Zemurray and Sara Southall evoked little comment. Zemurray was regarded as an "unknown quantity." 8 Available information had it that he was Jewish and that after coming to America as a boy from Poland, he rose to become a millionaire and the "banana king" of America. Somewhat more was known of the ability and background of Miss Southall, who came to the committee with a fine record of interrace activity. She was at one time on the board of the Chicago Urban League and had worked with the industrial division of the YWCA and the Council of Social Agencies in Chicago. She had also served as government consultant to the War Manpower Commission on the utilization of women in war production and as regional consultant on minority problems on the staff of Dr. Will Alexander, chief of the minorities section of the WMC. Born and educated in the South, Miss Southall brought two very important qualifications to her new position: she knew and understood the South and was sincerely interested in eliminating the discriminatory practices under which Negroes and other minority groups labored.9 The new committee began its career under very inauspicious circumstances. On Monday, May 24, as a result of the old committee's directive to the Alabama Shipbuilding and Drydock Corporation, twelve Negroes were promoted by the company to jobs as welders in its Mobile shipyard. The following day, Negroes throughout the yard were assaulted by white workers who resented the promotions. Although an Army detachment from a nearby camp quickly quelled the riot, more than a score of persons—in-

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eluding whites who went to the help of Negroes—were injured and all work at the yard ceased. As a result of further negotiations between the committee, the War Manpower Commission, the International Union of Marine and Shipbuilding Workers of America and the company, it was agreed that four shipways would be set aside as areas where Negroes would be offered opportunities for promotion to such jobs as welders, riggers, caulkers, erectors, riveters, shippers, and burners. They were barred, however, from jobs as electrical workers, machine operators, and pipe fitters even on the four ways. T h e advantage of this agreement to the Negro was that he was now eligible for promotion to jobs on at least four ways where previously he had been barred. On the other hand, it did seem to condone the practice of segregation and discrimination. T h e agreement aroused criticism, especially in Negro and liberal quarters. Monsignor Haas, who had been sworn in as committee chairman on May 3 1 , a few days before the official publication of the agreement, and had approved it, bore the brunt of the attack. 10 T h e agreement, however, remained in effect. With the appointment of the other members of the committee, a plan of action was soon inaugurated which quickly dispelled all existing doubts concerning the committee's sincerity. With approximately a half million dollars at its disposal, the committee opened twelve regional offices in each of the twelve War Manpower Commission areas throughout the country. 11 It decided to take steps to enforce the orders issued by the previous committee to a number of Detroit firms, and it resolved to come to grips with the Capital Transit Company and the railroad cases. Discrimination on the railroads constituted the most difficult and crucial problem facing the committee. Hearings in the matter had been postponed three times, and their scheduling had been the first committee's undoing. In the camp of the railroads were powerf u l financial and political interests, strongly organized labor unions, and influential southern forces. The battle was joined on September 15 when the oft-postponed hearings opened in Washington with twenty-two railroads and fourteen unions as defendants. 12 They were attended daily by an audience of more than four hundred persons. 1 ' Bartley Crum, chief counsel for the committee during the hearings, referred to them

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as "undoubtedly the most important ever held so far as minority groups are concerned either in this country or abroad." 14 Twentyone railroads were represented by counsel. (This total includes the Virginia Railway against which charges had been dismissed.) Although seven unions sent replies to the committee, none was represented at the hearings. 18 Speaking after Monsignor Haas's opening remarks, Crum explained that the committee's purpose was not "merely to win a case" but "to permit the hard facts to speak for themselves." T h e hearings were needed because "the denial by the railroads of equality of job opportunity to Negroes and other minority groups stultifies our moral leadership of the democracies, provides strong material for Axis propaganda against us, and as the evidence in this hearing will show, has created a situation which, at this very moment, is seriously hampering our effective prosecution of the war." He revealed that the railroads were experiencing grave difficulties as a result of a shortage of experienced workers: "Only two weeks ago, the Director of the Office of Defense Transportation, Mr. Joseph B. Eastman, announced in the most serious terms, a critical lack of railroad manpower. . . . Among the points proposed by Mr. Eastman were a recruiting drive for railroad workers, the utilization of the services of women, the utilization of Mexican workers, and even the utilization of war prisoners." Proceeding to the "hard facts" of discrimination, he pointed out that although few Negro firemen were employed on northern and western railroads, Negroes had had little difficulty in securing jobs on southern railroads as firemen following the Civil War and "constituted a majority of the total firemen employed." However, after the First World War, a continuous effort had been made to reduce the number of Negro firemen and to replace them with whites. This effort had been aided by mechanization which had removed much of the labor from firing a locomotive and had thereby transformed it into a "white man's" job. It was facilitated, too, by the rise of railroad labor unions, especially the Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen, who were hostile to the employment of Negro firemen.14 T h e elimination of Negro firemen was being carried out, he asserted, by means of the "Southeastern Carriers' Conference Agree-

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ment," executed on February 18, 1941. The agreement had been reached under the aegis of an agency of the United States government, the Railway Mediation Board, as the culmination of negotiations involving the Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen and a number of southern railroads. In essence it restricted the employment of all "non-promotable" firemen and helpers. The meaning of "non-promotable" firemen was clarified by a supplementary agreement concluded by the Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen and the Norfolk Southern Railroad on May 23, 1941, which included the following clause: "It is understood and agreed that the phrase 'non-promotable firemen' . . . refers only to colored firemen." 17 Although a subsequent agreement (in 1942) omitted this definition, the meaning remained unchanged. Other Negro railroad workers discriminated against were brakemen, flagmen, baggagemen, and yardmen. As these jobs were less arduous and dirty than those of firemen, they were more eagerly sought after by white workers. The effort to bar them to Negroes achieved substantial success before 1941, through agreements concluded between the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen and the railroads. These provided that the percentage of Negro trainmen employed in any district was not to exceed that prevailing on January i, 1910 (in the case of the Gulf, Mobile and Ohio Railroad, the date set was August 1, 1910), and further, that "Negro trainmen may not be employed as flagmen, baggagemen or yard foremen." As a result, according to Crum, "Negro trainmen presently employed are brakemen only, while white trainmen act as brakemen, flagmen or baggagemen. In yard service, while the white trainman may be a yard foreman, the Negro may not." Other instances of discrimination cited concerned Negro switchmen, shop employees, and dining-car waiters. Sidney S. Alderman, representing the Southern Railway Company, replied on behalf of all the railroads but two (the Union Pacific and the Norfolk and Western Railway Company). Admitting the charges of discrimination and the validity of the evidence submitted by the committee, he argued that the railroads had to abide by the customs, practices, and traditions of the areas in which they operated. These condoned discrimination and segregation

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and could not be disregarded without harming railroad operations, endangering the safety and well-being of Negro workers, and disrupting the war effort. Explaining that the railroad agreements were arrived at "by processes under the Railway Labor Act and earlier controlling United States labor laws, often with governmental assistance and approval," he asserted that the railroads were "not at liberty to disregard or violate those agreements." He denied, furthermore, that the efficiency of railroad operation and service had been impaired by discrimination or had in any way hindered the war effort. While stressing that the railroads had been affording Negroes unequaled opportunities for employment, and that "in the normal course of business . . . these opportunities should improve," he concluded with the warning that "neither the employees nor the patrons of the railroads could be expected to change overnight their long-standing views regarding racial problems, and any attempt to force them to do so by governmental decree could not fail to do harm rather than good." 18 At the conclusion of these statements, more than forty witnesses, including such notables as Dr. Herbert R. Northrup of the staff of the National War Labor Board, Dr. Clyde R. Miller of the Institute for Propaganda Analysis, and Otto D. Tolischus, who had been a reporter for The New York Times, were called to testify.1* Northrup verified the existence of discrimination. Miller and Tolischus revealed that Japanese propaganda had been utilizing discrimination in the United States as a propaganda weapon among the people of Asia.20 The remaining witnesses consisted of workers who had either witnessed or suffered discrimination at the hands of railroad management and labor. On the third day of the hearings, the resistance of one railroad weakened. A Mr. Baukhages, representing the Union Pacific, issued a statement expressing his company's intention to correct the abuses of which it had been accused. Crum immediately hailed it as a "notable contribution to the purposes of the President's Executive order." T h e offer of cooperation by the Union Pacific was all the more remarkable in view of the attitude displayed by the other railroads and unions. T h e unions sent no official representatives to the hearing although requested to do so. T h e railroads were represented by

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their lawyers, who seemed uninterested in the proceedings and spent much of the time reading newspapers. Except for one occasion, they unanimously refused to cross-examine witnesses "or in any way to dramatize the proceedings." A t one point, the defense attorneys rose in a body and proposed that the witnesses be dispensed with, since the railroads were not denying the prevalence of discrimination. T h e i r suggestion was turned down. 21 Obviously, the railroads' strategy, which proved highly successful, was to minimize the importance of the hearings, avoid giving them publicity, and where possible, to make them appear ludicrous. In an interview with the press during the hearings, Crum linked the railroads and the three leading press associations in a conspiracy of silence. "Attempts are being made to soft pedal these hearings. Except for PM we are getting a nice case of freeze-out in the press." 22 One reporter remarked, " A conspiracy of silence threatened today [it was the third day of the hearings] to defeat the effort of the FEPC . . . to call public attention to racial discrimination practiced by the railroads and the extent to which it is impairing the war effort." 28 Other than the Negro press, the only publications represented at the hearings were The New York Times, PM, the Reader's Digest and Newsweek. T h e Associated Press and the United Press sent reporters, it was observed, "for a brief look-see and a briefer story." T h e International News Service disregarded the hearings completely. 24 Apparently, only The New York Times and PM sought to give them adequate coverage. T h e Times, after omitting the story from its Washington edition on the first day, thereafter extended itself to provide a complete report. At the conclusion of the hearings, Monsignor Haas announced that the committee would study the record of the proceedings before issuing its findings and directives. 25 Soon thereafter, Monsignor Haas resigned to assume the post of Bishop of Grand Rapids, Michigan. It occurred to this writer, as it did to others, that the Church might possibly have assigned Monsignor Haas to his new post to avoid the difficult situation into which the committee seemed about to enter with its railroad hearings. Members of the F E P C staff with whom the matter was discussed did not seem to feel that this theory had any validity. T h e i r

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views were upheld by a newspaper report that "Bishop Haas . . . was nominated for Bishop last March—according to Church custom without his knowledge and before he had even considered taking the F E P C chairmanship." 28 In a letter to Monsignor Haas accepting his resignation, President Roosevelt paid tribute to "the increasing usefulness of the Fair Employment Practice Committee, as reorganized under your direction." At the same time, in a letter to members of the committee, he expressed his satisfaction with their "wise and determined dealing with this problem which is essential to the fulfillment of the promises of our democracy." 27 Malcolm Ross, deputy chairman of the committee, was appointed in Haas's place. A former newspaperman, Ross had been in charge of public relations for the National Labor Relations Board and on the staff of the Office of War Information before he joined the F E P C staff. He had written for the Louisville Courier-Journal and the New York World prior to his coming to Washington.28 T h e author of Machine Age in the Hills, a study of the effects of technology in the coal fields of Kentucky and West Virginia, and of Death of a Yale Man, an autobiographical work, Mr. Ross brought to the chairmanship an intimate knowledge of the problems of workingmen and a strong desire to eliminate race discrimination and inequalities of opportunity. Shortly after Ross's appointment, the committee found itself involved in a major crisis resulting from a ruling by Lindsay C. Warren, Comptroller General of the United States. The Southwestern Bell Telephone Company of Kansas City, Missouri, had refused to sign a contract to furnish telephone service to agencies of the federal government because of a clause, inserted pursuant to the executive order, prohibiting discrimination. 29 T h e director of the Division of Central Administrative Services, within whose jurisdiction the contract came, referred the matter to Warren and asked him to decide whether contracts and leases "may be entered into and payments made thereunder in cases where the contractor refuses to execute a contract or lease containing" a nondiscrimination clause, and where "similar services . . . cannot be secured from other sources." 30 Warren replied in a letter addressed to James F. Byrnes, the

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liaison officer of the Office for Emergency Management, that the inclusion of the anti-discrimination clause in government contracts was not mandatory. If the contractor refused to sign a contract including such a clause "no useful purpose could possibly be served" by insisting upon it, "especially if the desired service could not be procured from any other source." 31 This ruling would have reduced the President's committee to complete impotence by permitting defense contractors, if sufficiently determined, to omit nondiscrimination clauses from their contracts. According to one report, contracts had already been negotiated with the clause omitted.*2 (It is interesting to note that although the ruling was issued on October 7, the day of Monsignor Haas's resignation, FEPC officials were not informed of it until October 26, almost three weeks later." On the other hand, approximately a week before the FEPC had officially received it, the full text was published in the Labor News, a publication serving industry and management.34) Highly disturbed, Ross announced that "this ruling would seriously impair our efforts to uphold the Executive Order" and requested an opinion from Attorney General Biddle.55 With little delay, protests began to pour into the White House from Negro, labor, and interracial organizations throughout the country.34 Many cited Warren's previous anti-Negro record. It was recalled that as chairman of the House Committee on Accounts in charge of the House restaurant, he had flatly refused to permit Negroes to use the facilities of the restaurant. It was remembered, too, that Negro organizations had protested five times to the President between 1936 and 1940 against his appointment to the office of Comptroller General.37 Rumors arose that the administration was implicated in the ruling, which was allegedly intended as "a trial balloon to see what will be the reaction of Negro and other liberal groups to the elimination of one more sore spot to the reactionaries." 38 In defense of the administration, White House secretary Stephen Early wrote to the Pittsburgh Courier: "I can tell you in all frankness that until he [President Roosevelt] saw a story about this ruling in the newspapers he knew nothing about it." Early very positively assured the Courier that "steps are being taken" to investigate the effect of

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the ruling upon the work of the committee and denied, furthermore, that it had been requested by Byrnes, or any other White House official." T h e issue was closed on November 5. In a letter to the committee, President Roosevelt countermanded Warren's ruling and affirmed that nondiscrimination clauses were "mandatory and should be incorporated in all government contracts." Faced with this decision, the Southwestern Bell Telephone Company signed a contract incorporating the much-disputed nondiscrimination clause.40 T h e incident probably resulted in an increase in the committee's power, certainly in its consciousness of power. As one observer remarked: " T h e Committee had previously refrained from testing the sanction provided by the non-discrimination clause in government contracts because it feared the possibility of an adverse ruling by the Comptroller-General. With the definite position of the President now clarified, the Committee can confidently hold the threat of withholding payments over the heads of recalcitrant employers." 41 The committee was now prepared to cope once more with the railroads and to issue its conclusions regarding the hearings. On December 1, it made public directives that had been sent to twenty railroads and seven labor unions ordering them to cease their discriminatory practices and to advise the committee "within thirty days of the receipt of these directives, the steps taken or efforts made to comply therewith." 42 Ten of the carriers and one union were directed to set aside the Southeastern Carriers' Conference Agreement as a violation of the executive order. T h e unions cited in the directives were accused of maintaining a policy which "discriminates against Negroes because of race, in regard to membership, thus rendering it impossible (for said Negro workers) to have any adequate voice or representation with respect to grievances and the negotiation of agreements affecting working conditions, employment policy, practices and opportunities." They were directed to "cease and desist" from "discriminatory practices affecting the employment of Negroes." Both carriers and unions were advised that in the event they refused to comply with the directives, the matter would be referred to the President.4®

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T h e directives had been mailed on November 18, 19, and 20. In a covering letter to each carrier, it was stated that they would not be made public before November 29 and that during the intervening period the carriers were free to confer with representatives of the committee "respecting compliance with the directives, or as to any matter they might desire to present to the Committee." However, only the Pennsylvania and the New York Central Railroads contacted the committee and indicated a willingness to comply with the directives. All directives, except those issued to these two roads, were made public on December 1 A t meetings held on October 2 and 18, the committee had decided to issue the directives. Sidney Alderman, counsel for the railroads, was patently in error in charging subsequently that the decision was due to the influence of Ross, successor to Haas, and did not have the latter's approval. Although the committee announced Haas's resignation on October 3, he continued as its chairman and took an active part in formulating its decisions until the nineteenth, when Ross was sworn in. At the October 2 meeting, when the decision to issue the directives was definitely made, Ross had not as yet the right to a vote in the committee.4" A complication in the committee's negotiations with the railroads set in with the premature publication of the directives in a Negro newspaper, during the period of supposed secrecy preceding November 29. Ross relates that he called on Sidney Alderman, counsel for the railroads, "to apologize for the leak, but it was not forgiven." 44 Although it would be naive to believe that this occurrence affected the subsequent attitude of the railroads to the committee's directives, it did afford the railroads an ideal excuse for not abiding by them. With the publication of the findings and directives, a wave of elation swept through the ranks of America's Negroes. On December 3, there appeared a full-page, four-column advertisement in The New York Times and similar advertisements in the Washington Post and the Chicago Tribune, inserted by the Provisional Committee to Organize Colored Locomotive Firemen of the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters. Signed by A. Philip Randolph, international president, Milton P. Webster, international vice-president, and other officers, it was entitled "By This Great

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Decision America's Honor is Vindicated and Radio Tokyo is Answered." Although, for the most part, it presented a summary of the railroad hearings, findings and directives, it also observed that the hearing "has done more to restore the belief of Negro Americans in the genuineness of their country's democratic faith and aspiration than anything that has happened since the President issued his original anti-discrimination order in June, 1941." The reply of the railroads to the directives was not long in forthcoming. On December 13, the participants of the Southeastern Carriers' Conference Agreement addressed a letter to the committee which stressed the "excellent accomplishment" of the railroads, attributed it to the "peaceful and harmonious relations with railway labor" and the "wholehearted cooperation between these managements, labor, and the shipping and traveling public," and warned that any attempt to enforce the directives "would inevitably disrupt their present peaceful and cooperative relations with their employees, would antagonize the traveling and shipping public served by them . . . would result in stoppages of transportation, and would most gravely and irreparably impair the whole war effort of the country. These railroads cannot assume the responsibility for precipitating such disastrous results." Refusing to set aside the Southeastern Carriers' Conference Agreement, they maintained that to do so would mean interfering with the self-determination and self-organization of their employees and arrogating to themselves the right, which they denied having, to change the agreement by unilateral action. T h e letter concluded with the contention that "your Committee was and is wholly without constitutional and legal jurisdiction and power to make and issue the directives which it made and issued, and for this reason the said directives are without legal effect." The reply was sent, simultaneously, to every member of Congress together with a summary of the committee's findings and directives, the statement of counsel for the railroads which had been made at the hearings, and a note requesting that the items enclosed be read into the Congressional Record." Malcolm Ross immediately issued a counterstatement. Reiterating the evidence of a shortage of help on the railroads due to discrimination, he stressed that racial prejudice was no bar to the hir-

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ing of Negro firemen. "White southern engineers have for decades had decent working relationships with Negro firemen. Sidney Alderman, counsel for the railroads at the FEPC hearings, stated: 'I certainly do not mean to contend that anything in the south would interfere with the employment of Negroes as firemen on locomotives.' " Referring to the statement that the agreement could not be altered by the "unilateral action" of the railroads, he pointed out that "the Agreement was reached with the Brotherhoods in 1941, and by mutual agreement it can be altered or discarded." He emphasized, finally, that it was not impossible to change "bad practices," that it had been done by Secretary McAdoo, who had equalized the pay of white and Negro firemen in 1918, and that the elimination of discrimination "far from being a cause for disorder, could be so managed as to improve service and to raise the morale of tens of thousands of Negro Americans." " Two weeks later, the committee, by unanimous consent, sent the cases to President Roosevelt. Those certified were the Atlantic Coast Line; Atlanta Joint Terminals; Central of Georgia; Georgia Railroad; Jacksonville Terminal; Louisville and Nashville; Norfolk Southern; St. Louis-San Francisco; Seaboard; Southern; Chesapeake and Ohio; Gulf, Mobile and Ohio; Norfolk and Western; and Illinois Central. In addition, seven unions were certified. Of the seven, three had informed the committee that they would not abide by its directives. Four others had not replied at all. Six railroads were not certified because they had shown a desire to meet with the committee to discuss its directives: the Pennsylvania; New York Central; Baltimore and Ohio; Baltimore and Ohio Chicago Terminal Company; Missouri, Kansas and Texas; and the Union Pacific." On January 3, President Roosevelt announced that he had appointed a committee of three leading citizens to mediate the dispute—Chief Justice Walter P. Stacy of the North Carolina Supreme Court, chairman; Judge William H. Holly of the Federal District Court of Chicago, Illinois; and Mayor Frank J . Lausche of Cleveland, Ohio. Their authority was limited to discrimination against Negroes as locomotive foremen, trainmen, switchmen, and dining-car and shop employees. By imposing this limitation, the

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President deprived the railroads of an important objection to the FEPC's directives—that they were being forced to hire Negroes as conductors and locomotive engineers, jobs traditionally reserved for whites in the South.50 Upon being informed of the new committee's appointment, Ross issued a statement welcoming the President's action. "It is my understanding," he observed, "that this group of three eminently qualified citizens will in no way take the place of the Fair Employment Practice Committee, but will deal with the railroad question for the President." He concluded the statement on a note of optimism. "I have every hope," he said, "that ways will be found by which discrimination may be removed." 51 Soon afterward, Judge Stacy announced publicly that his committee had been meeting with representatives of the railroads, the unions, and the FEPC, that progress was being made and that he was hopeful of finding a solution "acceptable to all the parties concerned." " However, no solution was ever reached. Notwithstanding two Supreme Court decisions on December 18, 1944—in Steele v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company and Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen —that a union acting as bargaining agent for an entire craft or class of railroad workers under the Railroad Act could not lawfully enter into an agreement discriminating against nonunion members because of race,53 the railroad cases represent one of the few instances in which the FEPC was successfully defied by a group of employers and unions who admitted the discriminatory acts of which they were accused. Although the President might have ordered the railroads and unions to abandon their discriminatory policies, the exigencies of war, the strong political and economic forces arrayed against the FEPC on this issue, and the fact that a presidential election was in the offing prevented his doing so. He apparently either permitted the Stacy Committee to refrain from issuing a report, or, if such a report was actually given him, did not make it public. Malcolm Ross believes that the FEPC's greatest tactical error in the railroad cases was its suggestion to the President that he appoint the Stacy Committee. He admits that it was he who originated the idea and convinced the other members of the FEPC of

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its practicality. The underlying theory was that President Roosevelt was too busy directing the war effort to occupy himself with the "complexities" of the cases. Ross believed that if the President were to "summon the carrier and union heads to the White House and, in the presence of someone appointed to assist him, start them on the way to compliance with the Committee's directives, then his authority would have been exerted and only the details of the settlement left in the hands of experts." " Unfortunately for the committee, the President did not summon the railroad and union heads to the White House, but instead used the Stacy Committee as a means of washing his hands of the entire affair. In view of subsequent developments, one cannot disagree with Ross's characterization of his proposal as "an irretrievable mistake," nor with his remark that "if I had wanted the railroad cases to expire quietly over the course of the next two years in the hands of the Stacy Committee, no better move could have been made." 55 On the other hand, with due weight given to the nature and strength of the contending forces, the intransigence of the carriers and unions, the previous violence against Negroes on southern railroads, the requirements of the war effort, and the political exigencies of an election year, there exists sufficient ground for doubting that the result would have been different had the F E P C not suggested the appointment of the Stacy Committee. Indeed, Ross imputes far too much naïveté to the President and his advisors in assuming that the latter would have faced the problem squarely but for the committee's suggestion, or that the appointment of the Stacy Committee, or its equivalent, would not have occurred to the President as a possible way out of a difficult situation. The responsibility for the final result in the railroad cases must be attributed not to the White House but to the complex of forces which made it necessary for a President who was profoundly devoted to the cause of racial and religious equality to refrain from taking action to implement his conviction. One last word. The Supreme Court opinions in the Steele and Tunstall cases were undoubtedly, as Ross has noted, "a vindication of FEPC, not only in the railroad cases but in the Philadelphia traction case where it had similarly said that the adoption of a na-

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tional nondiscriminatory policy makes invalid any previous contracts which run counter to it." " The railroads had asserted that to comply with the committee's directives meant violating the Railway Labor Act under which the discriminatory contracts had been negotiated. The Supreme Court affirmed, as had the committee previously, that the contracts themselves were illegal and invalid insofar as they discriminated against Negroes. Had the opinions been given a year earlier, at least before the appointment of the Stacy Committee, they might have been of great aid to the FEPC in eliminating discrimination on the railroads. Eventually, as Malcolm Ross believes, they may indeed prove to be "a strong tool to enforce the elimination of discrimination." 57 Thus far, however, the effect has been quite limited. The Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen ignored the opinions and continued to enforce the Southeastern Carriers' Conference Agreement until December 1948, when damages were awarded against it for its policy on the Norfolk Southern Railway. Even then, as Charles Houston emphasized in 1949, it continued to enforce the agreement on other railroads "and separate suits have had to be filed on the Southern Railway, Atlantic Gulf Line, and Seaboard Air Line Railroad to abrogate the agreement. These suits are still pending." 58 In the light of these events, the role of the Supreme Court's opinions in eliminating discrimination appears to have been correctly evaluated by the FEPC in its Final Report: Although the Court's opinions left no doubt as to the illegality of the discriminatory agreements, the agreements are so numerous and apply to so many railroads that to invalidate them by litigation would require a multiplicity of suits and the expenditure of much time and money. Moreover, the Steele and Tunstall cases touch only on the rights of Negroes after they have been hired. They do not affect discrimination which bars Negroes from employment in the first place. Hence it is fair to conclude that, as a practical matter, only an administrative agency with the necessary authority can deal successfully with the problems presented by such discriminatory agreements.59

V: THE SMITH COMMITTEE INVESTIGATIONS

the FEPC faced vigorous and unremitting attacks by its enemies. The trials and tribulations of the first committee have already been recounted. With the issuance of Executive Order 9346, the new committee seemed to emerge stronger than ever. Its budget was increased, it planned the establishment of regional offices throughout the country, and most important of all, it appeared to have the firm backing of the President. Yet its enemies were not at all confounded, and continued their sniping whenever the opportunity presented itself. In testifying before the Civil Service Committee in July, 1943, Representative Manasco of Alabama remarked concerning the race riots which had just then occurred in several cities, "FEPC stirs up these race-riots." 1 In August, a number of newspapers, including The New York Times and the New York World Telegram, carried stories criticizing the committee's ruling, adopted at the request of President Roosevelt, that hearings concerning federal agencies accused of discrimination would be conducted in secret, while those involving private companies or unions would be held publicly. Southern congressmen never ceased their attacks in the halls of Congress. Rankin and Smith erupted bitterly against the committee's orders to the railroads. Rankin marked the one hundred and fifty-second anniversary of the Bill of Rights by affirming that "slavery was the greatest blessing the Negro ever had. If the FEPC will leave him alone he will make his own living." 2 During the same month, the City Council of Atlanta, Georgia, passed a resolution demanding the closing of the regional office of T H R O U G H O U T ITS HISTORY,

74 T H E SMITH COMMITTEE INVESTIGATIONS the F E P C in Atlanta, and ordered the regional director, A. Bruce Hunt, a native white Virginian, to leave the city.® These intermittent attacks had no obvious impact upon the committee's work. A more dangerous threat to its existence appeared in the form of the Special Committee to Investigate Executive Agencies, headed by Representative Howard W. Smith, which had been created by the House on February 1 1 , 1943, for the purpose of investigating acts of executive agencies beyond the scope of their authority. Available evidence indicates that the Smith Committee was formed for the purpose of hampering certain of President Roosevelt's policies and discrediting the agencies created to put them into effect. Although its early efforts were confined, for the most part, to finding fault with such agencies as OPA and the National War Labor Board, upon the issuance of the directives to the railroads, it decided to turn its attention to the FEPC. On December 14, Representative Smith announced that his committee was "considering" an investigation of the FEPC's authority to issue directives.4 This announcement, in all likelihood, served to strengthen the railroads and the unions in their refusal to abide by the directives. The Smith Committee hearings into the activities of the F E P C began on January 1 1 , 1944, and continued intermittently through March 13, 1944. Three hearings were held in all. The first was an investigation of directives ordering the Philadelphia Rapid Transit Employees' Union and the Philadelphia Rapid Transit Company to abandon discrimination in the employment of Negroes. Various bits of evidence were introduced to prove that the committee had acted beyond its legal authority in issuing the directives. The first bit was a report which had been submitted to the F E P C by James H. Wolfe, Chief Justice of Utah, and Dan Donovan, a member of the FEPC's staff, concerning discrimination in the Boilermakers' Union on the West Coast. In addition to describing the extent of discrimination, the report analyzed Executive Order 9346 and the scope of the committee's jurisdiction. Indulging in overly subtle and hairsplitting semantics, it questioned the right of the F E P C to eliminate discrimination or to direct labor unions to do so. In arriving at its conclusion, it interpreted the section in the executive order reading "it is the duty of . . .

T H E SMITH C O M M I T T E E INVESTIGATIONS 75 all labor organizations . . . to eliminate discrimination in regard to . . . union membership because of race, creed, color, or national origin," as only a "Presidential declaration of duty. There is no requirement that the labor organizations eliminate discrimination but only a declaration that it is their duty to do so." As to the powers of the President's committee, it said, " T h e committee is given power not to eliminate such discrimination but 'to take appropriate steps to obtain elimination of such discrimination.' " It was suggested, in conclusion, that the F E P C apply to the Attorney General "for an opinion which will clarify the meaning and define the area of action and jurisdiction of the Committee and perhaps to suggest methods of procedure which will be within its sphere of authority." 8 When confronted with the report, during his appearance before the Smith Committee on January 1 1 , Ross commented that the F E P C had not accepted as valid this interpretation of the executive order and had not felt the need for an opinion from the Attorney General. " I think we felt there was a clarity in our Executive order in respect to those problems," he remarked, "that did not require the opinion of the Attorney General." • There was then introduced a letter written by Lawrence W. Cramer while still executive secretary of the first committee, in which he denied the jurisdiction of the committee in cases not involving defense contracts. T h e letter had been in reply to a communication from a Mr. Vemon Felix who complained of discrimination against Negroes by the Santa Fe Railroad. Dated December i, 1941, it read, in part, as follows: I regret to advise you that the President's Committee on Fair Employment Practice has no authority to intervene or to take action except in cases in which discrimination is alleged in defense industries. The Santa Fe Railroad has no defense contract with the United States Government and is, therefore, outside the jurisdiction of the Committee.7 Had this opinion been valid, the committee would undoubtedly have been acting illegally in issuing its directives in the Philadelphia Transit case. Ross denied the validity of Cramer's opinion and asserted that the committee's jurisdiction covered any industry clearly and sub-

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stantially involved in the war effort. Concurring with him, Joseph Sharfsin, special counsel for the F E P C and a witness at the hearing, adduced two opinions submitted to the F E P C by John Lord O'Brian, general counsel for the War Production Board. The first, dated January 7, 1942, had informed Cramer that the essential criterion for determining F E P C jurisdiction over a certain industry was not the existence of government contracts but rather the extent to which the industry was essential to the war effort. The second, dated April 29, 1942, had informed the F E P C that the transportation industry was well within its jurisdiction. 8 Sharfsin buttressed this evidence with the observation that Executive Order 8802 explicitly forbade discrimination in "defense industries," while Executive Order 9346, issued during the war, substituted the term "war industries" for "defense industries." Driving home his point, he added, "It is inconceivable that an order was issued for an idle purpose or one that had no prospect of being enforced." • At one point, Aaron L. Ford, the Smith Committee's general counsel, objected that almost anything might be considered essential to the war effort. Sharfsin replied that although a transportation system should be so regarded, the same need not apply to a profession such as law. Ford then asked, "Where is the limitation on the authority of this Committee?" to which Sharfsin replied: " T h e limitation should be as broad as the requirements that experience tells us total war brings upon us, and that is a matter of day by day development." 10 Once, during the hearings, Ford challenged Ross to prove that the committee had the right to issue directives. Referring to the executive order, Ross pointed out that "it says we may investigate or hold hearings, issue findings and take appropriate steps. I would say a directive was an appropriate step, following the other procedure." 1 1 Although the express purpose of the hearing was to determine whether the FEPC had acted beyond its authority in issuing directives in the Philadelphia Transit case, much time was devoted to matters which seemed to have little or no bearing upon the purpose at hand. The members of the Smith Committee—with the exception of Representative John J . Delaney of New York, who frequently defended the FEPC, and Representative Jerry Voorhis

THE SMITH COMMITTEE INVESTIGATIONS 77 of California—seemed to be more anxious to bolster the transit union and company in their opposition to the F E P C ' s directives and to provide them with a platform for attacking the F E P C than to achieve the ends for which the hearing was called. T h e y accepted signed petitions from members of the union which asserted that "the hiring of Negroes for the operation of trolleys, buses, and subway-elevated trains at this time would be detrimental to the war effort, create racial prejudices and disharmony." 12 T h r o u g h skillful questioning—the answers the Smith Committee sought and approved were clearly implied in the questions—they elicited opinions from witnesses that the workers would strike if the F E P C ' s directives were implemented. T h e following dialogue between Ford and a witness is most instructive: Mr. Ford. If that directive is put into effect, what will the employees do? Mr. Eubanks. Well, the colored employee is not acceptable for those jobs by the men, and they have sent me here to this place today to say there are two places in Philadelphia that we give transportation to, and if they are put on in Philadelphia we could not accept them as fellow workers. Mr. Ford. Will you strike? Mr. Eubanks. Don't say "strike." We don't say what we will do, but we say we will not accept them. Mr. Ford. You are not going to work with them? Mr. Eubanks. We are not going to work with them. If anybody believes it, let them try it. 13 T h e hearing undoubtedly strengthened the company's refusal to abide by the FEPC's directives. Frederick L. Ballard, its general counsel, when asked his opinion concerning the directives' legality, replied that the Smith Committee "would not have been constituted and would not be now engaged in its labors if there was not some question possibly as to the legality or the validity of orders of this kind." 14 Furthermore, he assured everyone that " w e will not take any strong-arm action while any democratic, constitutional body like this committee considers there is a question here and is taking the time to hear it." 15 T h a t the purpose of the hearing was to discredit the F E P C and strengthen opposition to its directives was evident in the friendliness which members of the Smith Committee exuded toward F E P C

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opponents and their antagonism toward Ross and Sharfsin, the two F E P C representatives. A t one point, Ford implied that Ross had a penchant for stirring u p labor disputes: Mr. Ford. Did not they have some labor trouble in N.R.A. when you were connected with it? Mr. Ross. Not that I know of. Mr. Sharfsin. I object to that question. The Chairman. This is not a court proceeding. We do not care about any objections. Mr. Sharfsin. Therefore very informally I am trying to object to that question because it has no relation to this issue. The Chairman. W e do not care to hear from you on that. Mr. Ross. Any question you want to ask me, Mr. Ford, I will be glad to answer if I can, but I do not know what you mean by "labor trouble." Mr. Ford. Was there not some bickering in the N.R.A.? Mr. Ross. There was some; yes. Mr. Ford: Did not you take some part in encouraging that? Mr. Ross. No. Mr. Ford. You wrote something about it in one of your books did you not? Mr. Ross. I do not recall that I did. If you present the book I will see whether I did or not. I do not recall having said a word about it. Mr. Ford. T h a t is all. 14 T h e failure of the Smith Committee to secure valid evidence of the illegality of the Philadelphia directives is highlighted in a colloquy involving Sharfsin and Ford: Mr. Sharfsin. . . . I should like, from you or from someone here, some indication that the procedure or the manner in which this committee handled this matter from the very beginning—upon what basis there could be any possible complaint of their action up to the time this complaint was filed with the Smith Committee. Mr. Ford. I am not prepared to testify about that. I know nothing about it. T h a t is what the committee is here for. Mr. Sharfsin. In other words, there is none. Mr. Ford. No; I do not say that. Mr. Sharfsin. You have no witnesses here, at any rate.17 However, the Smith Committee did strengthen the hands of those w h o were flouting the committee's directives, encouraged them in their opposition, provided a platform from which they were able to state their views, led them to believe that in their opposition to the directives and their threats of striking they had the

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sympathy of influential congressmen, and thus helped to set the stage for, and perhaps precipitate, the violent Philadelphia strike which occurred a few months later. The second Smith Committee investigation, with FEPC only indirectly involved, began on February 25, 1944, at a hearing into complaints presented by the Seafarers International Union, AF of L, against the Recruiting and Manning Organization of the War Shipping Administration. It was alleged that officials of the RMO, two of whom were characterized as "starry-eyed fellow-travelers," were interpreting the President's executive order establishing the FEPC in an "arbitrary, dangerous, and unrealistic" manner. The officials singled out were Craig S. Vincent and Frank Pollatsek of the RMO's Atlantic coast district. As a war agency, the R M O supplemented the manpower of the seamen's unions by maintaining an available pool of registered and trained seamen. Upon request, it referred men to the unions, who in turn referred them to ships. Since the Seafarers International Union pursued a policy of racial segregation, confining Negro seamen to the steward's department, even though they were trained as deck hands, it frequently came into conflict with the RMO, which referred seamen to jobs in all departments aboard ship in the order of application, regardless of race, creed, or color. The union's representatives, appearing before the Smith Committee, argued that the RMO, in the persons of Vincent and Pollatsek, was forcing white and Negro seamen to occupy quarters together aboard ship.18 Confronted with these charges, Vincent and Pollatsek replied that they were concerned only with the problem of providing manpower for ships in a fair and equitable manner rather than with whether or not white seamen occupied quarters in common with Negro seamen. They insisted that they did not force the union to accept any man to whom it objected. They did point out, however, that when a man was rejected because of his color, it was their duty to inform the union that it was discriminating and, if the practice continued, to notify the FEPC. They were upheld in their replies by Marshall E. Dimock, assistant deputy administrator for Recruitment and Manning of the War Shipping Administration, and Warren Adams, director of personnel of the U.S. Maritime Commission.

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The Smith Committee did not confine itself to the legality of the RMO's practice. Beginning with the remarks of the union's representatives, who contended that Vincent and Pollatsek were Communist sympathizers because the policy of the Communist Party was "supposed to be helping the colored man," 19 the committee, unable to find evidence of illegal action, devoted a substantial part of the hearing to an investigation of whether the accused were Communists and in favor of the "Communistic" doctrine of "social equality." After intensive questioning of both witnesses as to their views on "social intermingling," "intermarriage," "free enterprise," and "draft legislation," it was learned that Mr. Vincent believed in social equality and the social intermingling of races, that be had been a member of the American League for Peace and Democracy and of a group called the "Organization Against Police Brutality." It was ascertained, too, that Mr. Pollatsek had been acquainted with an alleged Communist by the name of Nancy Reed, who was an employee of the New York State Employment Service, that he had signed a nominating petition for Eugene Connally of the American Labor Party, and that he believed that capitalism might some day pass out of existence. Although Dimock and other executive officers of the War Shipping Administration informed the committee that Vincent and Pollatsek had performed outstanding service in discharging their duties with the War Shipping Administration, Congressmen Peterson and Hoffman of the Smith Committee demanded that they be discharged. At one point, while questioning Mr. S. D. Schell, executive officer of the War Shipping Administration, Hoffman implied that the appropriation for Schell's department might be cut if the men were not discharged. "Do you think it would help any," asked Hoffman, "if we would cut the appropriation for your department?" Schell refused to be intimidated. "No. That isn't the approach," he replied, and pointed out that the men were regarded by Captain Conway, supervisor of New York port activities for WSA, as "the most efficient, the hardest working men in the whole Recruitment and Manning Organization up there." The hearing failed to uncover evidence that the Recruitment

T H E SMITH C O M M I T T E E INVESTIGATIONS 81 and Manning Organization had exceeded its authority in implementing the President's executive order. However, the attacks on Vincent and Pollatsek did prove that the Smith Committee was far more active in harrying men who held liberal views on racial and other social and political issues than in achieving the purpose for which it had ostensibly been created. T h e most serious and best-thought-out attack upon the authority and legality of the F E P C occurred when the Smith Committee, on March 2, 1944, began its hearing into the FEPC's directives in the southern railway eases. Its chief witness was Sidney S. Alderman, representing ten of the fourteen southern railroads whose cases had been referred to the President and who had organized themselves as the MacKay Committee. 20 He condemned the F E P C for unjustly singling out for censure the southern railroads, "which do employ Negro firemen and trainmen, and always have, simply because they do not employ still more of them," while exempting "railroads in the North and West which have never employed any Negroes as firemen or trainmen." Stressing that "it is still a part of the fundamental, constitutional liberty of contract that a man may employ whomsoever he chooses," he deduced therefrom the right of the railroads to practice discrimination and characterized FEPC's procedures as an invasion of "the constitutional liberty of contract." His most powerful blows were leveled at FEPC's authority to issue directives. He made much of a statement by Frank L. Mulholland, general counsel of the Railroad Labor Executives Association, who reported having been told by Bartley Crum, prior to the railroad hearings, that the committee would only make findings of fact and would leave the issuance of directives to the President. This was interpreted by Alderman as an admission by the committee that it had no power to issue directives. He attributed their subsequent issuance to the influence of Malcolm Ross, who had convinced the committee of its right to do so. He discovered additional evidence that the directives lacked legal validity and enforceability, in the President's failure "to enforce them, either by court action or by executive decree," in the appointment of the Stacy Committee, and the President's use of the term "impasse" in referring to the conflict between F E P C and the railroads. "Only as to a mere fact-finding board without any power to issue legal orders

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or directives, or to enforce obedience to them, could it be apt to refer to an 'impasse' between it and recalcitrant defendants. And the President is a great master of apt language." He denied, furthermore, that the committee's right to "take appropriate steps" to eliminate discrimination, conferred upon it by the executive order, included the right to issue directives. Referring to an F E P C letter requesting the railroads to appear at a hearing and bring with them information concerning their employment policies, he noted that the railroads were not summoned "as a court would summons [sic] defendants charged with illegal acts or crimes. . . . T h e form of the letter and the language used were those appropriate only to a fact-finding board. . . . The letter indicates that such was the F.E.P.C.'s conception of its function at the date the letter was written." The railroad unions were perfectly within their rights, he averred, in barring Negroes. Citing the decisions of several state courts, which had ruled "that trade unions have the constitutional and legal right to exclude Negroes from their membership," he accused the F E P C of going "beyond any possible constitutional or legal power in undertaking to direct and order the railway labor unions to admit Negroes to their membership." Near the end of his statement he warned that "any attempt by the railroads to obey its directives would inevitably disrupt transportation and irreparably impair the whole war effort. It might well lead to the defeat of this Nation. It certainly would cost thousands of lives of our soldiers, sailors, and marines." Charles H. Houston, a prominent Negro lawyer and assistant to Crum at the railway hearings, appeared in the FEPC's defense. 21 Although he attempted no comprehensive refutation of all the accusations, he did make several interesting observations. The directives, he acknowledged, were only "recommendations" and "do not have judicial sanction behind them, I think in that sense, they are directives which are recommendations." As to the charge that the southern railroads had been arbitrarily singled out for prosecution, he explained that because the FEPC acted only upon complaints and "the majority of complaints came from the South," it seemed that the F E P C was singling out that section of the country. "It is true traditionally few Negroes have been employed in train serv-

THE SMITH COMMITTEE INVESTIGATIONS 83 ice in the North. Very few complaints came from the North, and where those complaints were made, findings were made in those complaints where testimony was properly introduced and recommendations made." Supplementing Houston's remarks, Ross issued a comprehensive reply to Alderman's testimony on March 13." H e produced a letter from C r u m which denied the statement allegedly made to Mulholland that the F E P C w o u l d issue no directives following the railroad hearings. C r u m wrote: Need I say that, as special counsel for the Committee in connection with the railroad hearings, I had no authority to bind the Committee as to what course it would follow? . . . No such conversation ever took place, as Mr. Alderman could very easily have found out had he asked me about it at the time of the hearing. In a matter so important it is unusual practice, to say the least, for one attorney representing one group to rely entirely upon a hearsay statement reported to him by another attorney and purportedly originating with a third attorney. Ross proved that he had played no part in the decision to issue the directives to the railroads and that it was under the chairmanship of Monsignor Haas that the decision was reached. H e denied that directives had been issued only to southern railroads: ". . . directives against the Baltimore & Ohio, the Union Pacific, the Baltimore & O h i o Chicago T e r m i n a l , and Missouri-Kansas-Texas Railroads were made public at the same time that the directives against the southern roads were given to the public. T h e same thing is true of the order made in the case of the Chicago &: North Western Railroad." T h e directives previously issued to the Pennsylvania and N e w York Central Railroads had not been publicized because the roads had indicated a "willingness to negotiate when the opportunity was offered." N o n e of these roads had been certified to the President because, subsequent to the issuance of the directives, they had indicated a willingness to sit down with committee representatives to discuss a solution to the problem. Did the committee demand a hasty overnight and impracticable elimination of discrimination? Ross said it did not: The Committee's directives in all cases did not demand absolute results at any appointed arbitrary date, but merely directed that a statement of willingness to comply be filed within a certain period. FEPC has been represented to your Committee as exacting a strict and immediate ad-

84 T H E SMITH COMMITTEE INVESTIGATIONS justment of all discrimination at one stroke. The best answer to that charge of arbitrary intention is the Committee's actual attitude toward any railroad or union which indicated a willingness to initiate action toward eliminating discrimination. While the Committee could wish to see quicker action and more results, it is not unappreciative of the difficulties involved, and it has proven itself not to be willfully impatient. Ross demonstrated that the committee did not discriminate between northern and southern railroads. " T h e situation sums up to this: All the railroads which ignored the Committee's directives •were certified to the President and for that reason alone. Those roads, northern and southern, which proposed cooperation were not certified." He pointed out that "the certification of the 14 southern railroads to the President was made necessary by the position taken in their joint letter to the Committee dated December 13, 1943. In that letter the carriers stated that it was impossible for them to place into effect the Committee's directives," and denied the committee's right to issue them. "Under these circumstances the Committee rightfully construed the letter of the 14 carriers as foreclosing any hope of adjustment except by intervention of the President." He denied that the appointment of the Stacy Committee was a sign of the President's "doubt as to the legal validity and enforceability" of the directives. The suggestion was made on the Committee's own initiative that the President appoint such person or persons as might be necessary to assist in effecting compliance with the Committee's directives. The latter suggestion was made in acknowledgment of the complexity of the problem and of the urgent necessity to conserve the time and energy which the President would have had to expend in addressing himself to these complexities in the first instance. T o prove the ineffectiveness of the F E P C and the lack of power of its directives, Alderman had stated that "the old F E P C had issued 'directives' against some 20 or more industries, none of which had been obeyed; that the 20 or more industries had been cited by the old F E P C to the President for violation of or disobedience to its directives; and that nothing had ever come of their cases." Ross replied: This statement is in error on all points. First, the directives issued by the former FEPC were not disregarded but, on the contrary, resulted in compliance in most cases. Secondly, the former FEPC did not cite 20

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cases to the President but, on the contrary, it cited one single case. T h i r d l y , in this one instance, the Committee found that a labor union barred a qualified Negro from a shipyard, solely because of his race. Following unsuccessful efforts to adjust the matter, the Committee certified the case to the President. T h e President acted and as a result the bar to the employment of Negroes was removed and the matter satisfactorily adjusted. T h i s , the only action of the former Committee which can be compared to the certification of the railroad cases to the President by the present Committee, was as near as counsel for the railroads shot to the mark with his quiver of 20 cases cited and 20 denied. W e r e the d i r e c t i v e s of t h e F E P C c o n t r a r y to the p r o v i s i o n s of t h e R a i l w a y L a b o r A c t ? R o s s m a i n t a i n e d that, to the c o n t r a r y , there is n o conflict between the directives and the provisions of the Railway L a b o r Act. . . . T h e F E P C directives contemplated that the carriers and the unions would abrogate the Washington Agreement within the framework of the procedures established by the Railway Labor A c t . . . either the carriers or the unions could immediately proceed under the Railway L a b o r Act to serve a 30-day notice of intention to renegotiate and modify the Washington Agreement according to the F E P C directives in order to bring it in conformity with national policy as expressed in Executive Order 9346. Both the provisions of the Railway Labor Act and the initiatory steps under the F E P C directives w o u l d have been satisfied. In e x p l a i n i n g t h e n a t u r e of a d i r e c t i v e , he p o i n t e d o u t t h a t the Committee takes the position that its directives are: (1) its judgment as to the specific duties the responding parties are called upon to perform; (2) its instructions and guides as to the manner in which performance is desired. In this sense directives are directory only and not mandatory orders. In this connection it should be pointed out that the Committee has never taken the position that it could of itself enforce, or call upon the courts to enforce its directives as other government agencies, expressly authorized by statute to make and issue rules and orders, may do. T h e Committee has recognized that, aside from the force of public opinion, its ultimate and only sanction, is the disposition of the President to use his good offices or his power to effect compliance with its directives. Ross c o n t r a d i c t e d t h e r a i l r o a d s ' c o n t e n t i o n that to p r o m o t e N e groes to j o b s as e n g i n e e r s a n d c o n d u c t o r s m e a n t to p r o v o k e resentm e n t , riot, a n d b l o o d s h e d , since it represented a r e v o l u t i o n a r y i n n o v a t i o n f o r the S o u t h a n d was c o n t r a r y to the mores of t h e reg i o n . H e r e v e a l e d that h e h a d b e e n i n f o r m e d b y the R a i l r o a d R e -

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tirement Board "that southern roads, including several of those who complained of the Committee's directives, reported the employment of Negro locomotive engineers and conductors on their compensation returns for 1942. It would then appear by the railroads' own submission to another agency that the appointment of Negroes in these capacities is not altogether a Utopian dream." Experience proves that discrimination can be eliminated, Ross observed. Either a forceful employer or a forceful union—preferably both—can persuade the rank and file that discrimination is un-American, destructive of war manpower effectiveness, short-sighted from a labor union viewpoint, and calculated to destroy the war morale of those who are its victims. A firm stand against discrimination has settled many FEPC cases at those early informal stages when good plant practice and patriotism can be quietly brought to bear without the disadvantage of having to operate in an atmosphere of public clamor. It is only when both employers and workers embrace prejudice and stand recalcitrant that the problem of solving discrimination becomes a matter where some third party must interject a reminder that the need for war manpower and the good health of democracy transcend self-interest and prejudice. Although the Smith Committee labored mightily to prove the illegality of the F E P C ' s actions, it met with no success. Lacking valid evidence to substantiate its charges, it finally decided to drop the entire matter. N o report based upon its F E P C hearings was ever issued. Nevertheless, despite its failure in one respect, it did succeed in another. T h r o u g h its hearings, it demonstrated that powerful forces were at work in Congress to undermine the authority and prestige of the F E P C and to put it out of existence. T h e testimony aired before it was subsequently used on the floor of Congress in attacks upon the President's committee and in preventing passage of permanent F E P C legislation. Moreover, it lent courage and strength to employers and labor unions who were bent upon evading the provisions of the President's executive order, and therefore, to a certain extent, was responsible for the Philadelphia Transit strike which burst forth in opposition to the committee's directives.

VI: CONGRESS AND THE FEPC

the Smith Committee engaged in its attacks upon the FEPC, an important threat to the FEPC's existence developed in the Senate. It occurred during consideration of the Independent Office Appropriation Bill (H. R. 4070), which appropriated for the executive office and its various bureaus and agencies for the fiscal year ending J u n e 30, 1945. Senator Richard B. Russell of Georgia, a member of the Senate Committee on Appropriations, and chairman of the subcommittee then considering the bill, submitted an amendment which provided that no appropriation could be allotted to any agency established by executive order and in existence for more than one year, "if the Congress has not appropriated any money specifically for such agency or instrumentality or specifically authorized the expenditure of funds by it." 1 This meant that instead of providing funds for the F E P C out of his emergency fund, without recourse to congressional approval—as had been the procedure theretofore— the President would have to request Congress for a specific appropriation for the committee. T h e F E P C would thus be placed at the mercy of a Congress many of whose members were hostile to it. Although couched in the most general terms and applicable to all executive agencies, the amendment was undoubtedly directed at the FEPC. Indeed, Senator Russell remarked soon after its introduction that he hoped it would wipe out the agency.2 It was hardly surprising that F E P C officials immediately announced that the committee was "in the most serious peril since its creation." ' On February 28, the subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee voted unanimously to recommend the amendment/ which was subsequently passed by the full committee without a dissenting vote. Thereupon, President Roosevelt assumed that the WHILE

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amendment would probably receive congressional approval, and in order to ensure adequate funds for the F E P C for the fiscal year beginning J u l y 1, 1944, he submitted on its behalf a request to the House for an appropriation of $585,000. T h e request, although necessary, served to strengthen the committee's enemies, who now argued that it implied presidential approval of the amendment. However, the amendment did not pass Congress without a sharp struggle. When H. R . 4070, with the amendment included, came before the Senate during the latter part of March, two efforts were made to mitigate its effects. T h e first, introduced by Senator Ball of Minnesota, provided that the appropriation bill, including Senator Russell's amendment, was not to take effect until J u l y , 1944, and was quickly adopted. 8 T h e second attempt, which appeared as an amendment by Senator Ellsworth B. Buck of Delaware, proposed to "except the Fair Employment Practice Committee." Despite Senator Russell's objections that the amendment contradicted the principles of Senator Buck's party, the Republican, which opposed "bureaucracy" and "bureaucratic agencies of the executive department exercising too great powers," Senator Buck did not withdraw his amendment and it was passed by a vote of 36 to 22.® However, Senator Russell refused to accept defeat. When the Senate moved to consider his amendment, rendered innocuous by the removal of the F E P C from its jurisdiction, he succeeded in converting defeat into victory. Realizing that the weakest members of the opposition were the Republicans, who had been fighting President Roosevelt on the issue of executive power versus that of the Congress, he directed his most powerful arguments at them: . . . many Senators who have gone up and down the country protesting and inveighing against bureaucracy and denouncing the usurpation of the constitutional powers of the Congress by the executive branch of the Government have proven that they did not mean what they said by voting to sustain the right and power of the Executive to create agencies of Government by fiat and proclamation. It is amazing to see Senators who have been the loudest in protesting that the executive department was taking over the powers and functions of this body to the discredit of Congress now voting against the way they have talked for so long by declaring themselves in favor of executive agencies. It is an amazing abandonment of principle. In this case principle means nothing. But the desire to appeal to certain groups of voters seems to mean everything.

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He concluded with a dramatic gesture: ". . . if I, as the author of this amendment in committee, have the right, I should like to withdraw it." 7 He was told that according to Senate rules he could no longer withdraw his amendment unless he received the unanimous consent of the Senate, and when he found it impossible to receive such consent, he replied: " I wish to say, Mr. President, that before I should be a party to any such proceeding as this, that I am now placed in the position where I shall vote against my own amendment." ® Senators Walter F. George of Georgia and Bennett C. Clark of Missouri arose to support him. T h e former invoked the name of democracy to attack the Buck amendment and the F E P C . "Human liberty cannot exist in any democratic country anywhere, any time, when the people fall under the rule of bureaucracies created by Executive order. Where is there in America a lawyer of any responsibility who will assert that the single agency which Senators have excepted from the operations of the amendment stands upon any legal foundation whatsoever?" 8 Senator Clark alleged that the Buck Amendment was actually "the brain child of a man by the name of Edgar Brown, who held a very good job under the Democratic administration for 5 or 6 years." He charged that Brown had approached a number of Senators and had asked them to vote for a provision identical with the Buck Amendment and emphasized that passage of the Buck Amendment was tantamount to acting "in accordance with the whim of a lobbyist, who would thus control the action of the Senate of the United States." 10 As the debate continued, Senators Clark and Russell argued further that the President "by sending in a Budget estimate, acted in accordance with the effect of the Russell Amendment," that the Republicans were abandoning all principle in voting for "the most arrogant of all bureaucracies" and that the Communist Party of the District of Columbia was behind the amendment. 11 T h e strategy of Senator Russell and his friends achieved results. Senator Edwin C. Johnson of Colorado moved that, since he had mistakenly voted for the Buck Amendment, the vote be reconsidered. His motion was passed by a vote of 30 to 28. When the amendment was again voted upon, several Republicans changed their

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votes, thus contributing to its defeat in a vote of 33 to 26, with 37 abstaining." On March 24, the Senate passed H.R. 4070, and included the Russell Amendment in the form desired by the Senator from Georgia. However, the House revised the amendment to have it take effect not on J u l y 1, 1944, but on January 1, 1945, and when finally passed by both houses of Congress, it was the House version that was approved. It has already been mentioned that soon after the Senate Committee on Appropriations had approved the Russell Amendment, President Roosevelt requested the House to appropriate funds for the FEPC. T h e amount requested was $585,000, for one year's operating expenses beginning July 1, 1944, and exceeded by $110,067 the sum allocated to the committee by the President during the preceding year." On May 25, the House Committee on Appropriations reported out H . R . 4879, a deficiency appropriation bill for war agencies, for the fiscal year beginning July 1, 1944, which, among others, approved an appropriation of $500,000 for the FEPC, $85,000 less than the amount requested by the President. The request for the appropriation was accompanied by a most sympathetic report. It attempted to quiet opposition, especially southern, by pointing out that "there has been much misunderstanding concerning the purposes and powers of the Committee on Fair Employment Practices. It has no jurisdiction whatsoever over social problems such as discrimination in restaurants, on busses, or in other public places. Its jurisdiction is confined by the order to discrimination in 'employment in war industries and in government.' " The report emphasized, too, that "the powers of the Committee on Fair Employment Practices are largely persuasive. . . . Most cases are settled by negotiation. . . . Only two cases have proceeded to the point where they were certified to the President by refusal of a party to cease discrimination." T h e report made clear that the FEPC needed every penny of the amount recommended, and concluded with a tribute to the competence and fairness of Malcolm Ross and his staff.14 Despite this report, the bill entered the House amidst a storm of controversy. On May 23, Representative Clarence Cannon of Missouri, head of the Committee on Appropriations, had asked unanimous consent of the House to place the bill before it for considera-

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tion, and requested that all points of order be waived (a usual procedure as regards appropriation bills—to facilitate their consideration). Consent was given without any objection being raised.1® However, when the bill came before the House on May 25, Representative Malcolm C. Tarver of Georgia objected to the agreement waiving points of order and implied that if members of the House had originally known of the appropriation for F E P C they would never have given their consent.14 Despite Representative Tarver's contention, Speaker Rayburn ruled that the agreement was valid and remained in effect. A surprising incident then took place. Representative Cannon arose and proceeded to defend his action of May 23 requesting that points of order be waived. He explained that the only reason for objecting to the waiving of points of order was that "the bill contained one provision on which certain Members of the House have a deep conviction." Moreover, "it seems to be generally believed that this item is subject to a point of order—that it is legislation on an appropriation bill." This belief is a "misapprehension" since "this item is submitted by the Bureau of the Budget as being authorized under the war powers of the President." However, to prove himself innocent of "sharp practice" in making the request and "to be certain that every Member of the House is given every opportunity to exercise his parliamentary rights—or what he construes to be his parliamentary rights—and in order to demonstrate the innocuous effect of the order on the particular item in question," he asked "unanimous consent that the special order for the consideration of the bill be modified so as not to apply to" the FEPC appropriation. 17 Representative Vito Marcantonio of New York, the most vigorous and consistent fighter for F E P C in the House, sensed the danger to the F E P C and the possibility that the appropriation might fail of passage as the result of a point of order. Despite Representative Cannon's assurance to the contrary, he objected: ". . . it seems to me that all of this maneuvering would make it possible to make a point of order against the appropriation of $500,000 for the F.E.P.C. This request would vacate the unanimous-consent request heretofore granted which prohibits points of order against the F.E.P.C. item. Therefore, I object." 1S Although Marcantonio's

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objection merely made it possible for the House to vote on the FEPC appropriation, Representative Rankin remarked indignantly that "this is the beginning of the end of parliamentary government in this country." In the afternoon of the same day, the House undertook consideration of the FEPC appropriation. T h e attack upon the committee was led by southern Democrats and a few northern Republicans. In opening the debate, Representative John Taber of New York, a member of the Committee on Appropriations, charged that the FEPC had attempted to force manufacturers with war contracts to employ Germans, while millions of dollars were being spent "for the F.B.I, and other governmental organizations to protect the United States of America and the war effort from just that sort of thing." 19 Taber had previously raised the identical question at an Appropriations Committee hearing. Malcolm Ross had informed him, then, that the FEPC concerned itself with discrimination against aliens, only in those industries where aliens had officially been permitted to work and had been cleared by the FBI. Ross had likewise called his attention to a joint statement issued by the Secretary of War, the Attorney General, the Secretary of the Navy, and the chairman of the Maritime Commission to the effect that "for contractors or subcontractors of the War or Navy Department, or of the Maritime Commission to require American citizenship as an essential condition for employment is considered a breach of the clause in the contract and is contrary to the national policy as expressed in the Executive order." 20 During the same hearing, with Representative Taber present, Will Maslow of the FEPC had explained further that "early in the war it was found that there were a great number of experienced tool and die makers in Detroit who were German aliens. The War Department was then faced with the fact that if they were not going to allow the employment of these expert mechanics it might cripple war production in Detroit. For that reason the War Department took the initiative in directing employers to employ any alien whom the War Department certified as being loyal. T h e hundreds of thousands of war contractors of the War Department were notified by it of this policy." 21 However, knowledge of these

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facts did not prevent Representative Taber from repeating his accusation on the House floor. Representative Colmer of Mississippi, following Taber in the debate, charged that in the administration of the F E P C there existed discrimination against white workers.22 Representative Marcantonio defended the FEPC against the accusations of Taber and Colmer. He denied that any evidence existed to prove that the committee discriminated, and he made it clear that the F E P C was interested solely in preventing, and not in furthering, discrimination. 23 T h e debate did not begin in earnest until the following day. Then, all rules of fact and logic were thrown aside and arguments which would have done credit to Nazi theoreticians of the race question were introduced without compunction. T h e specter of communism threatening the land was attributed to F E P C activities and there were those among the southern contingent who threatened "bloodshed" should the FEPC continue in existence. Representative Malcolm Tarver of Georgia invoked divine sanction for white supremacy: ". . . the fact remains that God Almighty when He made the races of mankind provided the white man with more powerful mental faculties than He did the people of the Negro race and endowed the Negro with certain racial traits and characteristics which will never permit him to be a satisfactory social associate of the white man." Characterizing the F E P C as "only one tentacle of a devilfish which is seeking to fasten itself today upon the structure of southern civilization," he nevertheless assured his listeners: " I am a friend of the Negro race. I believe in according to the people of that race the fullest measure of economic opportunity which they are capable of using advantageously." 24 Representative Jamie L. Whitten of Mississippi emphasized that the FEPC program would destroy the southern system of segregation and would lead to social intermingling: " T h e natural result through the years means a mongrel race. We from the South will have no part of it." 25 Representative Sam Hobbs of Alabama suggested that the FEPC program meant, in effect, that a man "must be compelled to work if he has the proper color of skin, the proper religion, or is of proper national origin. In other words, that, in

94 CONGRESS AND T H E FEPC itself, is almost a violation of the thirteenth amendment." 26 Representative John S. Gibson of Georgia did not hesitate to threaten that "there are only two things that are going to save this Nation. One is ballots and the other is bullets. If the ballots of the Members of the House, who have been entrusted with the destiny of the Nation, do not have courage enough to save the Nation, then I ask the people of the United States to think deep enough and have courage enough to save this Nation by their ballots, that it may not have to be saved by bullets." 27 When Representative Tarver moved an amendment to strike out the FEPC appropriation, the southern Democrats seemed to gain renewed strength and waxed almost hysterical in their arguments. Representative John Rankin of Mississippi rose to new heights of impassioned diatribe and vilification: OhI This is the beginning of a communistic dictatorship, the like of which America never dreamed. They want to dictate to you who shall work in your factory, who shall work on your farm, who shall work in your office, who shall go to your schools, and who shall eat at your table, or intermarry with your children. It is sponsored by the C.I.O. Political Action Committee, headed by Sidney Hillman, a Russian-born racketeer whom the anticommunist American [51c] of his own race literally despise, and who is raising money by the shake-down method with which he is now trying to control our elections. He wants to be the Hitler of America. Referring to the members of the subregional office of the FEPC in Los Angeles, he announced that "this group is composed of one Negro and four whites, all of whom have foreign names. It is true that Jack B. Burke does not sound alien, but the truth is his real name is Jack Burton Burkowitz. I understand he had his nose operated on and his name changed in Pennsylvania, but failed to pay the doctor who did the facial operation; so the physician exposed him by threatening to bring suit against him." 28 T h e final polemic against the committee was delivered by Representative L. M. Rivers of South Carolina, who predicted a new Civil War should the FEPC continue: "Let us stop this F.E.P.C. If we do not, gentlemen, I say with every ounce of sincerity within me there is going to be bloodshed in my part of the world the like of which has never happened before in the history of this country." 28

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However, F E P C ' s opponents did not have things entirely their own way. Its friends, including Representatives Vito Marcantonio of N e w York, Louis L u d l o w of Indiana, William L. Dawson of Illinois, A r t h u r G. Klein of New York, and Mrs. Mary T . Norton of N e w Jersey, were forthright in exposing the motives and interests of their opponents and refuting their allegations. Marcantonio accused them of disregarding facts and refusing to discuss the actual record of the F E P C : " T h e y have refused to discuss the fact that F.E.P.C. has handled 2,200 cases and they have failed to tell you what the record is in connection with these cases . . . and they have failed to tell you that F.E.P.C. has at all times exclusively concerned itself with one problem and one problem alone, and that is the problem of discrimination in employment because of race, color, or creed." Sweeping aside the contention of FEPC's opponents that it had never been authorized by Congress and was therefore illegal and not entitled to funds, he charged that the argument was a façade for other, less idealistic motives, and that those who offered it w o u l d not favor funds for the F E P C even if the committee were authorized by Congress. H e asked: A n d why will you not support it? The real reason is because you want to perpetuate a Hitlerite concept of race supremacy in this country . . . You speak about revolution. T h e record so far will show that insurrectionary language was used by the opponents of F.E.P.C. . . . It is the first time I have heard language as extremely insurrectionary on the floor of this House, and it came from the opponents of this measure. . . . T h e fundamental issue involved here is the principle of the equality of man, the very foundation of our Nation. You oppose F.E.P.C. for one reason and one reason alone, the very same reason that the Emancipation Proclamation was opposed in these United States. F.E.P.C. is a continuation of the Emancipation Proclamation; it is democracy in action, the democracy for which men are fighting and dying everywhere in the world.30 Representative Klein adumbrated the wider implications of the controversy: " T h e forces here, which are arrayed in opposition to the F.E.P.C. are the forces that represent intolerance, and who have been behind every reactionary movement, and have been opposed to all liberal, forward-looking legislation that has come before this House in my time. T h e same Members have been opposed

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to legislation to outlaw the poll tax and in favor of restrictions on organized labor." 31 Referring, as did Representative Marcantonio previously, to the argument that the F E P C had no legislative sanction and, therefore, did not merit an appropriation, Representative Norton remarked: "Since when have we become so terribly disturbed over legislative sanction? I recall many appropriations under war powers granted to the President that were scarcely noticed by this body. Why are not we honest about this subject? Why try to camouflage the issue?" 32 These arguments had little effect at first upon the majority of the House's members. Representative Tarver's amendment to strike out the F E P C appropriation was carried in the Committee of the Whole by a vote of 141 to 103. However, when the Committee of the Whole reported the appropriation bill back to the House, and requested that it be put to a vote, the tables were turned. Although Marcantonio's demand for a roll-call vote was rejected, the Tarver amendment was defeated in a teller vote by 123 to 119- The appropriation bill was then approved over the opposition of the southern members of Congress.33 With House approval granted, the controversy shifted to the Senate on June 15. Actually, the struggle in the Senate over the appropriation had begun some time previously when the Senate's Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations voted to eliminate a $500,000 F E P C appropriation from the War Agencies Appropriation Bill, introduced in the Senate as H.R. 4879. The vote of the subcommittee was afterwards reversed, and the original appropriation restored by the full Committee on Appropriations. T h e latter, however, added two amendments. One reduced Chairman Malcolm Ross's salary from $10,000 to $8,000; the other specified that the appropriation was "to enable the Committee . . . to carry out any functions lawfully vested in it," instead of, as previously stated, "the functions vested in it." 31 T h e Senate began to consider the bill on J u n e 15. T w o additional amendments, both affecting the FEPC, were submitted the same day. The first, introduced by Senator Russell, moved the deletion of the appropriation for the committee. T h e second, spon-

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sored by Senator John A. Danaher of Connecticut, attached a rider setting up a permanent F E P C . " Senator Danaher's amendment, although ostensibly a gesture friendly to the FEPC, nevertheless caused its friends a good deal of consternation. Since its passage required a two-thirds vote, it was felt that some Senators who would vote for it, would also, if it were defeated, then vote against the appropriation on the ground that they could not vote an appropriation for an agency which the Senate had refused to approve. 34 However, the following day, Danaher withdrew his rider and revealed that he was doing so at the suggestion of Malcolm Ross.87 T h e Senate proceeded to approve the two amendments recommended by the Committee on Appropriations and began consideration of the Russell amendment. T h e arguments advanced by Russell for omitting the F E P C appropriation were similar to those heard in the House on previous days: The dangers of "centralized bureaucratic government in Washington," the encroachment by the executive upon the constitutional powers of Congress, the need for government by law instead of government by men, and usurpation of congressional power by "boards, bureaus, and agencies which have been created by fiat or by proclamation." The FEPC, he maintained, had "the wholehearted support" of the CIO, it was never approved by an act of Congress nor were its powers defined by Congress, and finally, "if the powers claimed are approved, without a single legislative standard or any safeguard whatever thrown about them, when we vote the money, it is no exaggeration to say that we will have gone a long way toward nationalizing or socializing American business." 38 The debate continued on June 19 and 20. Senator Eastland of Mississippi accused F E P C employees of being members of "Communist-front" organizations and of having signed communist election petitions. He expressed the fear that, if given the appropriation, the F E P C would use it "to displace management and control American industry, and it is my responsibility as a Senator from the State of Mississippi, as I conceive my duty, to protect the business and labor of this country from communism." He explained, too, that "what the people of this country must realize is that the white

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race is a superior race, and the Negro race is an inferior race." " Senator Bilbo of Mississippi warned that approval of the appropriation meant that every Senator would have to accept "highbrown or yellow girls as their stenographer," and that "back in the heart of every Negro in America who is behind movements of this kind is the dream of social equality and intermarriage between whites and blacks. They boast of the fact." 40 Senators Chavez of New Mexico and Mead of New York were the chief spokesmen for FEPC. 4 1 T h e former revealed the committee's significant contribution in creating and maintaining friendly relations with South American countries. After discussing discrimination against Mexicans in the United States he remarked: "In my opinion, the activities of the F.E.P.C. in trying to adjust cases of discrimination which come to its attention have done more to bring about actual good will in Latin America than the many millions spent by the Coordinator's Office, by lend-lease agencies, or by the former Board of Economic Warfare combined." Senator Mead provided the most comprehensive defense of the committee and its activities. Discussing its personnel, which, according to its opponents, was overbalanced in favor of Negroes, he noted that it was necessary to have Negro field examiners because they "inspire confidence among Negro workers and are able to control their actions." Denying that the committee was dominated by the CIO, he pointed out that William Green, president of the AF of L, was one of its staunch supporters. Nor was the committee interested in social problems, he remarked, as its opponents contended. The committee "has no jurisdiction over allegedly discriminatory practices in education, housing, the armed forces, and social relationships." As to the accusation that the committee aggravated the race problem, he pointed out that "the larger number of satisfactory adjustments achieved by the Committee contradict this charge. F.E.P.C. inherited a problem it did not invent." In defending the large number of Negroes in the FEPC, he also stated: "As the minority subject to most widespread discrimination, it is natural that the Negro minority should produce the largest proportionate number of skilled experts in this difficult field." T h e Russell amendment was put to a vote on June 20 and defeated, 39 to 21. However, Senator Russell was not disheartened.

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Immediately thereafter, he offered a series of additional amendments. The first provided for appeal from FEPC decisions to the President of the United States.41 The second provided that no plant or property of a person, plant, or corporation could be seized by federal authority for failure to abide by an FEPC decision or ruling.43 The third proposed that no committee regulation or order could repeal, amend or modify "any law enacted by Congress." 44 These were all approved by the Senate. Two other amendments were rejected. The first would have prevented any FEPC effort to persuade "an employer and a labor union to amend or abrogate an existing contract between such employer and such labor union," 48 while the second provided that "not more than 25 percent of the part of this appropriation which is used for the payment of compensation for personal services shall be used for the payment of compensation of persons who are members of any race comprising less than 15 percent of the total population of the United States, according to the 1940 census." 48 With these amendments out of the way, the Senate, on June 20, proceeded to pass the appropriation bill, with the FEPC appropriation included,47 thus assuring the committee's continuance for one more year.

VII: THE PHILADELPHIA RAPID TRANSIT CASE

of the struggle in Congress, one of the most exciting events in F E P C history occurred in Philadelphia. Perhaps more than any other, it highlighted the tangled skein of forces involved in the effort to eliminate discrimination in employment on the American scene. On August 1, 1944, as the result of a strike of transit employees against the employment of Negroes, all bus, trolley, elevated and subway transportation ceased, and the F E P C was confronted with the "supreme test" of its history. 1

W I T H THE TEMPORARY TERMINATION

T h e strike was but the culmination of a long series of events involving the Philadelphia Transportation Company, the Philadelphia Rapid Transit Employees Union, the CIO, the FEPC, the War Manpower Commission, Congress, and the armed forces of the United States. For years, Philadelphia had been practicing discrimination toward its Negro residents, as had so many other cities throughout the country. T h e Philadelphia Transportation Company had never employed Negroes as conductors or operators. Despite its extreme need for workers—in January, 1943, it asked the United States Employment Service for one hundred "white" motormen 2 —and despite the fact that it had five hundred Negroes employed in less skilled occupations, 3 the company refused to employ Negroes in any of the more skilled classifications. In 1941, after the issuance of Executive Order 8802, a group of Negro employees met with the president of the company and requested that they be given the opportunity of promotion to platform and clerical positions. They were informed that the company could do nothing without the assent of the Philadelphia Rapid

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Transit Employees Union, which represented its employees at the time and with which it had a contract specifying, among other things, that "customs bearing on employer-employee relationship shall continue in full force and effect until changed by agreement between the parties." 4 When the officers and members of the executive board of the union were approached they refused even to consider the matter. T h e Philadelphia branch of the N A A C P intervened but met with no greater success. The company referred the group to the union, and the union replied that the matter "is not a subject over which the Union has any control." ' Thus, both management and labor shifted responsibility to one another and evaded taking action. Soon afterward, the United States Employment Service and the War Manpower Commission entered the case. A conference between Reginald Johnson, representing the WMC, and Dr. A. A. Mitten, representing the company, elicited the response that the company would upgrade and employ Negroes in certain jobs only if directed to do so by the government. On January 1 1 , 1943, the USES received a company request for one hundred white motormen. Although the USES demanded that the company withdraw its patently discriminatory request, the company refused. On May 1 1 , W M C representatives again discussed the company's discriminatory policy with officials of the company and met with similar failure. In the meanwhile, the USES had informed the F E P C of the company's discriminatory policy. Other complaints began pouring in to the committee's offices. On April 28, Maxwell Windham, Jr., a company employee, filed a complaint alleging that the company had refused to upgrade him. In September and October, twentyfour individual complaints of discrimination were filed with the F E P C regional office in Philadelphia." In October, the F E P C office in Philadelphia took action.7 T h e company and the union were notified that they were violating the President's executive order, and conferences with management and the union were held. However, the attitudes of both company and union remained the same. T h e former avowed its willingness to hire Negroes but pointed to its contract with the union as a bar; it further reported that the union had refused to approve the employment of Negro

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platform men. Representatives of the union, Frank M. Cobourn, the secretary-treasurer, and Frank P. Carney, its president, refused to take a definite position. Although they denied that the union had refused to approve the hiring of Negroes as platform workers, they admitted that the "customs" clause did prevent Negroes from securing certain jobs and asserted that the company had never made any request for a change in the clause to permit the hiring of Negroes. Moreover, they refused to agree to such a change without consulting the other officers of the union.8 T h e regional F E P C representative, seeing that the problem was too difficult to be handled on a regional level, referred the case to Washington. On November 17, 1943, after conferences between Malcolm Ross and representatives of the company and the union, the F E P C issued a list of "Proposed Findings and Directives." 9 It found that the company and the union were parties to a contract which included the "customs" clause, and that the clause, if interpreted as prohibiting the employment or upgrading of Negroes to certain positions, was in violation of Executive Order 9346.10 The company was directed to "reconsider without regard to race or color, all hiring, transfer or upgrading applications filed with the Company by its Negro employees and by Negro applicants since June 25, 1941," and to file periodic reports of its employment trends with the committee. 11 At the same time, the union was directed not to "interpret any section or provision of its contract with the Philadelphia Transportation Company so as to prohibit, limit, or in any manner interfere with, the employment or upgrading by the Company of qualified Negroes in or to positions as street car and motor coach operators and conductors; motormen, guards, platform attendants, and station cashiers on the Company's elevated and subway lines; or in or to any other job classification with the Company not presently held by Negroes." 1 2 T h e committee did not wish to make its findings and directives public without first giving the membership of the union an opportunity to consider them. They were therefore revealed to Carney and Cobourn on November 5 with the understanding that they would not be issued until November 17, in order to permit the officers to discuss them with the union. When officially issued on

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the seventeenth, the findings included a proviso that they would become final "on and after November 27, 1943 unless, prior to that date, either party shall file with the Chairman at Washington, D.C., a request for a public hearing." T h e union's decision was to request, on November 24, that the F E P C hold a public hearing. The company, on the other hand, did not object to the findings and directives and made no request for a hearing." T h e hearing was held at the City Hall in Philadelphia on December 8, 1943, and was conducted by Malcolm Ross and Milton P. Webster. An overflow crowd of four hundred persons attended the proceedings." T h e union was represented by counsel. T h e only testimony in its behalf was presented by its secretarytreasurer, Frank M. Cobourn. T h e company was not officially represented since it had not contested the findings and had not requested a hearing. Cobourn read a prepared statement in which, according to an F E P C summary," he gave nine reasons for the union's opposition to the committee's directives: 1. The Union does not discriminate against any group. 2. Although the Company is "essential to the war effort," it holds no contract with any Government agency, which seems to be necessary in order for the Fair Employment Practice Committee to make an order. 3. The Committee and the Company should institute an educational program among the employees first before directing a change in the

status quo.

4. It is questionable if there is available any idle manpower in the Philadelphia area. 5. Compliance with the Committee's Directives may result in disturbances which will impair the transportation of workers to and from war industries. 6. The service rendered by the Company is adequate. 7. The effect of the Directive is to single out the Company and Union while ignoring other transit systems whose employment practices are no different. 8. Compliance with the Committee's Directive, requiring the Company to reconsider without regard to race or color all applications filed with it by Negroes since June 24, 1941, would disturb seniority and affect the transfer conditions of all employees. 9. The present relationship between the Company and the Union should not be changed without first consulting the Union's 1,000 members in the armed forces.

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Under cross-examination, Cobourn admitted that the union's policy prevented the company from hiring Negroes to replace white men who left their jobs, or from hiring white men to replace Negroes. He admitted, too, that the union interpreted the "customs" clause as barring Negroes from certain jobs. However, he objected to the use of the term "discrimination" to characterize the union's policy. Representatives of the FEPC, in replying to Cobourn's arguments, emphasized that the committee's powers extended to all "war industries" and not merely to industries having contracts with government agencies; and that it was duty-bound to take steps to eliminate discrimination in all industries classified by the War Manpower Commission as "essential" to the effective prosecution of the war. Since the Philadelphia transit system was so classified, the employment policies of the company and the union were within the committee's jurisdiction. Cobourn admitted that despite his emphasis on the need for an educational program, the union had "not endeavored to carry out any campaign of education on this question," and that although the question of employing Negroes as streetcar and bus operators had been discussed informally at union meetings, "no actual resolution on the floor had been considered." He explained, rather lamely, that his fourth assertion, questioning the availability of idle manpower in Philadelphia, was based solely on the "several advertisements appearing in the paper requesting skilled and unskilled labor" and that he hadn't heard "any representations to the effect that there is available idle manpower in this area." In refutation of his contention that the company was rendering adequate service, he was confronted with newspaper advertisements, inserted by the company, seeking additional employees. His explanation was that these were possibly due to the company's desire to have "an extra reservoir there for contingencies." Ross informed Cobourn that the Philadelphia Transportation Company and the union were not the only ones under investigation in the transportation industry and observed sarcastically that the union's "researches" had apparently not been "quite wide enough to find out the places where the Committee has acted." T o the allegation that employee seniority would be affected by

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the F E P C directive requiring the company to "reconsider without regard to race or color all hiring, transferring or upgrading applications filed with the company by its Negro employees and by Negro applicants since J u n e 25, 1 9 4 1 , " Ross replied that the seniority of employed workers would not be affected, that the date mentioned in the directive referred simply to the date from which applications were to be considered, while seniority would continue to be determined by the amount of time each worker was actually employed. T h e date, he emphasized, "has no relation to any possible seniority rolls of that time." Finally, the union's insistence that its members in the armed forces (over a thousand strong) had to be consulted before it changed its employment policy was characterized as a device seemingly conceived by the Union's Executive Board as a means to forestall compliance. Obviously, however, even if it were possible to poll the Union's members who are now serving in the armed forces, their judgment could not be taken to override the President's Order. The alleviation of the present critical manpower situation, the assurance of an adequate volume of supplies to our Army and Navy, and the successful prosecution of the war, cannot be held in abeyance pending the ascertainment of the racial views of any special group. The Committee will presume that the members of our armed forces who daily are risking or preparing to risk their lives in the cause of world democracy, as well as those busily engaged in making America the "Arsenal of Democracy," believe in democracy at home for all citizens irrespective of race, creed, color or national origin. Subsequently, on December 27, the committee issued its final "Directives" and " O p i n i o n " in which it "affirmed" its findings of November 17 and made effective, immediately, its directives of that date. It directed the company to comply at once with its previously issued directives and requested that it be informed of any opposition thereto from the union or anyone else. 16 T h e hearing, in the meantime, had aroused important sections of the public to demand of the company and the union a renunciation of their discriminatory policies. At the hearing itself, the Council for Equal J o b Opportunity, representing seventeen civic, labor, professional, racial and religious organizations in Philadelphia, filed a statement urging the company and the union to abide by the committee's directives. T h e Catholic Inter-Collegiate Inter-

106 T H E P H I L A D E L P H I A R A P I D T R A N S I T CASE Racial Council of Philadelphia, representing Catholic high schools and colleges, submitted a copy of a resolution previously sent to the company, the union, and the Mayor of Philadelphia, urging all three "to reconsider their stand and to follow the example of other leading cities in the country and open these avenues of employment to qualified Negro men." 17 At about the same time, the C I O Central Labor Council approved a resolution urging immediate acceptance of the directives. On December 14, as a result of the efforts of Philadelphia church groups, a petition bearing the signatures of more than 12,500 Philadelphia residents who favored a policy of nondiscrimination on the transit lines was sent to the company. 18 However, both union and company "remained adamant." T h e union, in fact, took the offensive, and in a radio broadcast defied the directives, emphasized again the issue of seniority which it had raised at the hearing, and "questioned the constitutionality of FEPC." On December 29, its representatives wrote to Congressman Smith and requested his aid. 1 " They also wrote to the F E P C on January 3, 1944, informing it that "we cannot comply with the terms of the directive and we are so advising the Philadelphia Transportation Co." In a letter to the company they wrote: " T h e union wishes to state very definitely that compliance with the directive by the union cannot be expected at this time. You will, therefore, please take no steps to comply with the directive at this time, it being our contention that such compliance would be violative of our contract and that acquiescence of both employer and employees is needed to carry out the terms of the directive." On receiving this letter, the company wrote to the F E P C that "the company will consider itself bound by its contract and will not take action in violation thereof unless and until the validity of your committee's directives, now challenged, shall be finally established." 20 Without consulting the F E P C , and in response to the union's letter, the Smith Committee decided to hold a hearing on the Philadelphia Transit situation. T h e F E P C received the first inkling of the imminence of the hearing from the Washington newspapers on January 6. T h e hearing took place on January 1 1 and has been described in Chapter V. Suffice it to say that with the

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exception of Representative Delaney, and to a lesser degree of Representative Voorhis, members of the Smith Committee displayed a marked hostility to the aims and activities of the F E P C and encouraged the union in its intransigent attitude toward the committee's directives. T h e union's threats of a strike against the directives were warmly received and apparently approved by a majority of the Smith Committee's members. T h e crux of the entire situation was touched upon by Frank Cobourn in his testimony before the Smith Committee when he noted: " I think that this whole thing has probably been brought on by outside parties. . . . I feel that probably part of this trouble may have been brought on by rival labor organizations. An independent labor organization is usually open to attack all the time. They spend quite a little time fighting." 21 Rivalry among several labor unions was an extremely important factor, probably the most important, in the entire controversy. Four unions were involved: the Philadelphia Rapid Transit Employees Union, the Transport Workers Union of the CIO, the A F of L Amalgamated Association of Street and Electric Railway and Motor Coach Employees of America, and the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen. Although neither the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen nor the Amalgamated issued any public statement on the question of discrimination against Negroes—in fact the bylaws of the Brotherhood excluded Negroes, and it was alleged that Amalgamated organizers had expressed a hostile attitude toward them—the T W U was publicly known as being opposed to discrimination." When the Brotherhood withdrew from the contest in January, 1944, the struggle became a three-cornered affair. An election was held on March 14 to determine which union was to have the right of representing both the maintenance and transportation workers. T h e T W U emerged victorious. During the period which elapsed between the issuance of the directives at the end of December and the election in March, the F E P C made little effort to enforce its directives. It apparently marked time to see which union would win. Following the T W U ' s victory, which meant that the discriminatory contract between the original union and the company existed no longer and could no longer serve as an argument for barring Negroes, the FEPC de-

io8 T H E P H I L A D E L P H I A R A P I D T R A N S I T CASE cided that the time had come for action and began to press the company for compliance with its directives. At a conference with Dr. A. A. Mitten, director of industrial relations for the company, F E P C representatives urged the immediate upgrading of Negroes. Dr. Mitten, however, persuaded the FEPC representatives to permit the question of upgrading and employment of Negroes to be settled by the company and the union in the course of their contract negotiations, which were to begin the following day. The negotiations resulted in a new contract which eliminated the much-debated "customs" clause and gave no sanction to any kind of racial discrimination. T h e departmental seniority provisions, which had been a part of the previous contract, remained unchanged and were incorporated in the T W U contract. T h e contract, which called for wage increases and improved working conditions, was ratified on June 30 at a meeting of more than 2,000 T W U members.28 On July 1, the War Manpower Commission decreed that employers whose industries were essential to the war effort would thenceforth have to do all their hiring through the United States Employment Service and that discrimination in hiring would not be countenanced. T h e company posted notices on its property announcing that it would obey the order and would give its Negro employees an opportunity to apply for operating jobs. At the same time, in a newspaper interview, company officials made it clear that they were complying not with the FEPC directives, but with the W M C order.24 Soon thereafter, the company selected eight Negroes for training as streetcar operators and began their training on July 30. 25 The trainees were scheduled to operate streetcars on trial runs, beginning August 1, without taking on any passengers. At a meeting of representatives of the company, the T W U and several civicminded white leaders of Philadelphia on July 3 1 , the latter were assured that no trouble was expected to result from the training of the Negro operators.26 The assurances of the company and the union were immediately contradicted by events. T h e hiring of Negroes provided the defeated P R T E U with the opportunity for which it had probably

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been waiting—an opportunity to recoup its political fortunes and regain its former position as bargaining representative of all Philadelphia Transit workers. Since the official T W U policy condemned discrimination against Negroes and was identified with the new policy of hiring Negroes, the P R T E U obviously thought that if it could lead a successful movement against the hiring of Negroes and popularize it as a defense of the jobs of white men against the incursions of Negroes, it would emerge as the chief defender of the white workers' rights, discredit the T W U , and regain the popularity and leadership which it had previously lost." This plan may have had the approval of the company. Indeed, the company's attitude toward the events that subsequently transpired can be understood only in terms of its sympathy for the aims of the P R T E U , and its previous relationship to that organization. T h e P R T E U had been formed in 1937, after a company union known as the "Cooperative Association" had been rendered illegal by the Wagner Labor Relations Act. It became the bargaining agent for the employees in a hurried election which evidenced the determination of company and city officials to ensure victory for the offspring of the "Cooperative Association." It remained the bargaining agent until supplanted by the T W U in 1944. During that period, its relationship with management was characterized by good "team work." 28 Obviously, the election of the T W U in place of the tractable P R T E U was not a very pleasant development for management. One can therefore understand why management would look favorably upon any attempt of the P R T E U to regain its former position of power.29 Soon after the company posted its notices announcing its intention to upgrade and employ Negroes, the P R T E U moved into action. Protest meetings were held both on and off company property. At these meetings speakers agitated against the upgrading of Negroes and urged a strike in the event the company implemented its new policy. Handbills which bore notices such as the following were posted on company bulletin boards: Your buddies are in the Army fighting and dying to protect the life of you and your family, and you are too yellow to protect their jobs until they return. Call a strike and refuse to teach the Negroes, the public is with you, the CIO sold you out.30

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At one meeting of seventy-five workers held in a company carbarn, the president of the defeated P R T E U delivered an address urging the men to report "sick" if Negroes were upgraded. At this same meeting, the workers voted to strike despite the efforts of a T W U official who was present and who urged them to reject the advice of the P R T E U president. The company, in the meantime, made no effort to prevent the strike agitation or to prohibit strike meetings on its property.* 1 On J u l y 3 1 , a meeting of about fifty men, including several P R T E U leaders, sent a notice to the company that unless they received word prior to 4:00 A. M., August 1, that the issue of upgrading Negroes would be submitted to a referendum of all company workers, a strike would be called. Apparently, the company never replied to this notice, nor did it make an effort to prevent the strike despite the presence of company officials in their offices the entire night of July 31. 3 2 The strike began on Tuesday morning, August 1, at 4:00 A. M., during a change in shifts. A number of bus and trolley workers reported sick. Flying squads visited carbarns and depots, and urged workers who were then coming to work to report sick also. Soon hundreds of workers were refusing to man their trolleys and busses. T w o hours later, at 6:00 A. M., all surface transportation had stopped, and by noon, all subway and elevated lines were brought to a standstill. The strikers showed a high degree of cleverness in their timing and organization. T h e four-o'clock shift was the smallest and therefore most easily contacted by flying squads. T h e streetcar system was singled out for the beginning of the stoppage. Since streetcars are stored in long lines on tracks, it is possible for one man, manning one car at the head of the line, to tie up the whole line. A few men were thus able to tie up the entire streetcar system. Flying squads then reported to bus drivers and other operators that the trolley-car men had gone on strike, and urged them to do likewise. T h e strikers were also helped by the company. According to one source, the operators of the subway and elevated trains were willing to continue working even after the strike had begun, but company officials shut off all power, explaining that they feared violence, and thereby brought all transportation to a standstill. At

T H E PHILADELPHIA R A P I D T R A N S I T CASE in first, the maintenance men, who numbered the largest proportion of Negroes and were most sympathetic to the T W U , also struck. However, they returned to their jobs the following day and thereafter did not participate in the strike." T h e strike leaders were James McMenamin, William Dixey and Frank Carney, all leaders or officers of the P R T E U . McMenamin had been with the company for more than twenty years as a subway motorman, and Carney had been the last president of the P R T E U . " T h e strike seems to have been engineered and planned by a comparatively small number of men—one source claims less than two hundred. Certainly, no more than fifty or seventy-five attended the final pre-strike meeting the night of July 31. 3 5 According to the grand jury report, issued after a careful investigation, "this was no widely planned strike. The rank and file of the Employees knew nothing about any such plan. T h e few men returning from runs late Monday, July 3 1 , or early Tuesday, August 1st, learned of the meeting at Allegheny and of the Instructions to report 'sick.' Those reporting for work on Tuesday learned largely through difficulty in finding transportation or from fellow employees when they arrived at their respective depots." 39 Fortunately for the strike leaders, suitable conditions existed for the strike. These were, to cite the most important, the ability of a few men to tie up the movement of all streetcars, careful organization, excellent leadership, the sympathetic attitude of the company, and finally, the presence among the employees of "that curiously weak social attitude which makes the right thinking man hesitate to stand right when he sees his fellows act wrongly. Fear of the term 'scab' was present." 37 One observer maintains that "the rank and file of the strikers were never strongly in favor of the strike. Interviews among the striking employees indicated that a considerable proportion of them would have returned to work very soon after the strike started or at any time thereafter if they had been assured of adequate protection against intimidation and violence." 38 However, the Mayor of Philadelphia, Bernard Samuel, perhaps not unwittingly, failed to provide such protection (see p. 1 1 4 below). The issue which gained the support of most workers for the strike was not antagonism to Negroes or their employment as mo-

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tormen. According to the grand jury report, there were only a "comparatively small number who really seriously opposed the employment of Negroes in platform positions." 89 T h e problem that disturbed most striking workers was that of seniority and the seniority rights of the newly upgraded Negroes as compared with those of the whites. " T h e official position of the strikers was that they did not want to discriminate against Negroes, but that they disputed the rights of the upgraded colored workers to claim operators' seniority from the time they were first employed by the company. (5 of the 8 trainees had records with the P T C which ranged from 3 t o 19 years)." 40 Their apprehension was increased by the FEPC's directive to the company that all applications filed by Negroes after June 25, 1941, be reconsidered. Although these fears should have been dispelled by the T W U contract, which called for the continuance of departmental seniority and by F E P C statements that the seniority of Negro workers would begin as of the date of employment and not as of June, 1941, the strike leaders continued to raise these issues and succeeded in inoculating many workers with false fears. Thus, a myth concerning seniority, created and publicized by a few men, served as the precipitating cause of the strike. As a result, tens of thousands of workers were unable to get to their factories, and Philadelphia, the second largest war production center of the nation, saw its production crippled. Absenteeism in some war plants increased as much as 50 and 60 per cent.*1 At the very beginning, the T W U denounced the strike and attempted to get the men back to work. T W U representatives, in the company of Army and Navy officers, visited work locations and unsuccessfully appealed to the men to return to work. At one meeting, according to an official, the representatives were howled down by the men.42 T W U officials also wired Attorney General Biddle to investigate the sponsorship of the strike. Biddle relayed their request to the U.S. Attorney in Philadelphia and asked the F B I to join the investigation.43 During the first day of the strike, the T W U succeeded in rounding up 250 operators who returned late in the afternoon and attempted, for about two hours, to operate a number of cars. The movement failed when some of those operating the cars refused to permit passengers to step aboard.44

T H E P H I L A D E L P H I A R A P I D T R A N S I T CASE 113 T h e company seemed to adopt an attitude of benevolent neutrality and appeared willing to accede to the strikers' demands. Its first reaction appeared in the form of an announcement by its publicity department that the strike was a "complete surprise." 45 However, the federal grand jury report issued afterward cast doubt upon the truth of this announcement: The Jury regrets the failure of the officials of the Philadelphia Transportation Company to take firm hold on the situation after information on the signing of a petition and on the proposed meeting in Allegheny barn had been brought to their attention on Monday afternoon, July 31st. . . . Their general attitude after the strike began seems best expressed in the weak excuse—"What's the use?" Actually on the first day of the strike a prominent official expressed it thus to the head of the War Manpower Commission: "It's your baby and it's on your lap." 4(1 At a meeting with representatives of the F E P C and W M C soon after the strike began, company officials requested permission to post the following notice, which had already been mimeographed and prepared for posting, on the company's bulletin boards: Stoppage of PTC service has crippled every war industry in the Philadelphia area. Service must be restored immediately to prevent critical interference with vital war production. The first duty of this company is to provide service to the war effort and the public. Therefore, provisions of the notice dated July 7 , 1 9 4 4 , regarding changes in employment practices to comply with the directive of the WMC are suspended.*1 Representatives of the F E P C and W M C refused to grant the desired permission, which would have meant a cancellation of the government's nondiscrimination policy and an invitation to other employers and labor unions to disregard the President's order.48 F E P C officials asked the company to close its carbarns, which were serving as centers of strike agitation and meeting places for the strikers. T h e request was turned down with the explanation that back-to-work rallies, as well as the other meetings, were being held there.49 The company closed the barns, however, on Wednesday evening, after 200 T W U stewards had voted unanimously to initiate a back-to-work movement. They were opened again the following morning. 50 It is worth noting that throughout the strike

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not a single statement was issued by an official of the company urging the strikers to return or condemning the strike itself." T h e Mayor of Philadelphia, Bernard Samuel, seemed benevolently neutral toward the strikers and adopted an attitude almost similar to that of the company. It should be noted that it was to a certain extent due to the Mayor's efforts that the P R T E U had been declared the official bargaining agent for the workers in 1937. Although he and three others were members of the company's board of directors as representatives of the public, he refused to call a meeting of the board during the strike. " H e went almost completely incommunicado during the strike and even failed to call a meeting of his official race relations committee." 52 Moreover, at no time did he provide sufficient police protection for those who wished to return to work. In one instance, a back-to-work movement, initiated by the T W U , failed for lack of police protection, although protection had previously been promised.58 On Tuesday night, August 1, just before midnight, representatives of the F E P C and WMC, at a conference with the Mayor, issued a written statement that "nothing effective can be done locally to end the transit stoppage." " On Wednesday, the National War Labor Board referred the strike to James Byrnes for action by the President.56 CIO officials and others were now publicly attributing the strike to efforts of the P R T E U to stage a "comeback," and accused the company of "playing with the company union." 56 One newspaper observer wrote: "That the strike . . . is due to efforts of the 'company union' to stage a comeback is the judgment of a number of Government officials, all of whom, however, refuse to permit the use of their names." " Interesting were the reactions of the eight Negroes who were the strike's precipitating cause. They apparently believed that the rank and file of their fellow workers were not opposed to their being employed as motormen. Lewis Sylvester Thompson, an employee of the company for almost twenty years, told a reporter that when he came to work on Wednesday morning during the strike there were about four hundred men in the barn. "They were very friendly. They have always been friendly and decent. These are my friends. They're not responsible for this thing. The rank and

T H E P H I L A D E L P H I A R A P I D T R A N S I T CASE 115 file don't want anything like this, I know. I worked with some of them 19 years." Rufus G. Lancaster, forty-two, had been employed as a porter by the company for eight years before he qualified as a motorman. "It's hard to understand," he remarked. "We never had any trouble with anyone, any time before." He pointed out that he and his fellow Negroes could get back their old jobs with the company— jobs which in some cases were better paying than those as motormen—but that they would refuse to take them. "We think of ourselves as pioneers. And we're going to keep up the spirit. We still want to be trolley operators and I think we will." Emmett Wigglesworth, who had been a porter with the company for eight years, remarked that several hundred white workers were in the barn when he reported for work. " I didn't do any talking naturally but they were not unfriendly. I'm sure it's only a handful of the guys who brought this whole thing on, certainly not the rank and file. Our relations have always been good." 88 T h e strikers were condemned by the public for hindering the war effort and opposing racial equality. They were denounced publicly by E. A. Palmquist, head of the Philadelphia Federation of Churches, and by the Philadelphia newspapers. One striker remarked to a reporter: "Did you see them editorials in all the papers yesterday? You'd think we were criminals or crooks or something." Another striker admitted that "the only thing I don't like is this business of my neighbors giving me hell for holding up the war effort." 59 A back-to-work movement developed Thursday morning, August 3, when four hundred men reported for work and proposed to operate cars from the Woodland Avenue barn. They had been promised adequate police protection by the district police captain, but when only one elderly policeman appeared as guard, the group decided to suspend their efforts.90 Finally, the Army took over the Philadelphia transit system that night in response to an order from President Roosevelt. Major General Philip Hayes, commanding general of the Third Service Command, announced the seizure and publicly declared that the Army would operate the transit lines "on the basis of conditions that prevailed before the strike." 81 This meant that the government would maintain the nondiscrim-

116 T H E P H I L A D E L P H I A R A P I D T R A N S I T CASE ination policy laid down by the War Manpower Commission. He announced, too, that the transit lines would resume normal operations on Friday morning, August 4. " I am counting on the cooperation of every employee in getting that job done." 62 He also appealed through the radio to the transit workers to return to their jobs Friday morning. Notices were posted in all subway stations, trolley cars, and busses announcing the Army's seizure of the lines. Nevertheless, transit operations did not resume on Friday. T h e Army had not planned to operate the lines or even to use its own forces to provide protection for returning workers. It had expected to make use of the local police force and, if necessary, the state militia. But the police force could not provide adequate protection, and the Army's failure to utilize its own forces was interpreted by strike leaders as a sign of indecision and weakness. T h e strike committee "took the position that the Army summons to P T C workers to return to their jobs was not an order but a request." 83 Flying squads continued to visit the various work locations and threatened injury to returning workers. With its first attempt at transit operation a failure, the Army decided to apply more stringent measures. On Saturday afternoon, five thousand troops were moved into Philadelphia. They were dispersed throughout the city so that one or two soldiers could be sent for protection with each bus, streetcar, or train. Several hundred additional soldiers were held in reserve to operate the system if such a step proved necessary. At five o'clock that day, General Hayes issued an ultimatum, warning that unless the strikers returned on or before Sunday at midnight, the Army would operate the system without them. He warned that those who did not return and could not show a doctor's certificate proving illness would lose their jobs and, if of draft age and physically fit, would be inducted into the Army. Strikers attempting to prevent others from working would be liable to penalties under the Smith-Connally Act. He announced, too, that, according to War Manpower Commission policy, those continuing to strike would not only lose their jobs but would also receive no unemployment compensation." Selective Service headquarters in Washington sent telegrams to Philadelphia draft boards ordering them to reclassify all recalcitrant workers into the l-A classification. On Saturday evening, the four

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most prominent strike leaders, James H. McMenamin, William Dixey, Frank Carney, and Frank Thompson, were arrested on charges of violating the Smith-Connally Act. These measures brought the consequences of the strike to each striker in a very personal way and proved successful. Workers began to report to work twenty-four hours before the Army's deadline. By mid-afternoon of Sunday, twenty-five of forty-one bus lines and forty-three of sixty-three streetcar lines were in operation. On Monday, August 7, all transit lines were operating at capacity. Although the normal absentee rate for the six thousand operating employees on the transit lines was 9.5 per cent, on Monday only thirteen workers failed to report to work at their appointed schedules." Several days afterward, instruction of the Negro trainees was resumed. On August 15, seven of the eight trainees were on their regular runs.88 T h e integration of these workers in the labor force proved so satisfactory and their service was so well received by the public 97 that the company decided to provide opportunities for additional Negro motormen. In January, 1945, eighteen Negro motormen were in its employ.88 With the resumption of normal operations, the Army returned the transit lines to the company and departed from Philadelphia on August 17. 89 Despite the collapse of the strike, small groups of workers persisted in a campaign to discredit the T W U and the principle of nondiscrimination. Cards bearing the following message, F R A N K L I N TO E L E A N O R YOU KISS T H E NIGGERS AND I ' L L KISS T H E J E W S AND W E ' L L S T A Y IN T H E W H I T E HOUSE A S LONG AS W E CHOOSE

were distributed by the hundreds to the company's employees, and were accompanied by forms announcing the withdrawal of the signatories from the union. 70 These efforts petered out in time. At a T W U election held in October, the number of voters indicated a gain rather than a loss in union membership. 71 It is noteworthy, too, that a Negro was elected vice-president of the local union, and that 85 per cent of the voters of the Luzerne carbarn, which had served as headquarters for the strike, voted for the ticket on which he ran for office. 12 The four strike leaders who had been arrested on August 5 for

1 1 8 T H E P H I L A D E L P H I A R A P I D T R A N S I T CASE violating the Smith-Connally Act and subsequently released on $2,500 bail, were dismissed by the company on August 7. A federal grand jury, which had immediately thereafter begun an investigation of the entire affair, indicted thirty company operators in October on a charge of violating the Smith-Connally Act. On March 12, 1945, twenty-seven of the defendants were found guilty and fined $100 each for violating the act.73 Thus ended one of the most significant cases in the history of the President's Committee on Fair Employment Practice. T h e settlement of the Philadelphia strike had important effects upon other F E P C cases. It facilitated a satisfactory conclusion to negotiations which had been continuing for several years among the committee, the Los Angeles Railway Company, and the Los Angeles local of the A F of L Amalgamated Association of Street and Electric Railway and Motor Coach Employes of America. T h e Los Angeles Railway Company, which had never previously employed Negroes, witnessed the firmness with which government officials met the situation in Philadelphia. In response to an F E P C directive and with the approval of the local union, it began to train its first Negro operator on August 23. A week later, fifteen Negroes were operating street cars in Los Angeles. Except for the resignation of one employee who refused to work with Negroes, the company's operation continued as usual. 71 The Philadelphia and Los Angeles transit cases suggest an important lesson in the strategy of anti-discrimination action—a lesson which has been emphasized by Joseph Weckler in an article entitled "Prejudice Is Not the Whole Story." 73 After reviewing the efforts to secure the employment and upgrading of Negroes in the transportation systems of three different cities—Philadelphia, Los Angeles, and Chicago—and the varying degrees of resistance encountered in each of those cities, he rejects the thesis that variations in "race prejudice" determined "the observed variations in resistance to Negro upgrading." He points out, for instance, that "the general social milieu in all these cities is similar. As a matter of fact, Negroes are less discriminated against and less segregated in Philadelphia [where the most serious and violent resistance occurred] than in either of the other cities." He notes, too, that "mobilized public opinion had no apparent effects on either man-

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agement or employees" in the Philadelphia and Los Angeles cases. In seeking a clue to the variations in resistance to employment and upgrading encountered in the three cities mentioned, he finds an explanation in the type of labor-management relations prevailing within each of the three situations. In the Philadelphia Transit case, he attributes the strong resistance to both the interunion struggle for employee representation and management's efforts to aid the company union against the CIO. Similarly, he makes it clear that the Los Angeles case, which took two years to settle, "was also characterized by distrust between management and employees and by dissension within the union. Management, after preliminary opposition, appeared to be willing to upgrade Negroes. But it feared to take any initiative lest employees vent their resentment against management by refusing to cooperate. Union officials, unsure of their following, were paralyzed by the presence of one individual in their ranks who was politically powerful in the local and who was bitterly opposed to fair employment practices." On the other hand, in Chicago where the employment of Negroes was achieved without difficulty, "labor-management relations," he notes, "were apparently aboveboard and reasonably cordial. T h e unions had been in operation for several years and were well-knit organizations in which the officials enjoyed the confidence of their memberships. Under these conditions the managements of the various concerns did not hesitate to exercise their prerogatives of determining hiring and upgrading policies. Union officials approved of the move and were secure enough to squelch the few verbal objections offered by white workers." Management-union relationships as well as interunion and intraunion politics were important factors in each of the three situations mentioned. Although they may not play an important part in every situation, Weckler is obviously correct in concluding that in certain cases "it is more effective in changing policy to analyze and, if possible, manipulate labor-management relations than it is to mobilize external public pressure," or for that matter, to direct one's attention and arguments primarily to the evils of discrimination and prejudice. He concludes that whenever a federal or other agency tries to introduce Negro upgrading in a plant or business concern, the agency should inform itself about

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the industrial relations and internal politics of the concern. With this knowledge, steps can sometimes be taken to prevent the confusing of Negro upgrading with essentially unrelated issues. I am convinced, for example, that the Philadelphia traction workers would not have struck solely on an anti-Negro basis. They were purposely confused on the false seniority issue by men who wanted to destroy T W U and regain power. If someone with authority and prestige, realizing what was really afoot, had spiked the seniority issue in time, the strike would never have occurred. In Los Angeles, again, if the bases and implications of the antagonisms that prevented cooperation between management and the union had been understood, a federal agency could have issued the order that was needed to break the impasse. Such an agency might even have taken charge of an employee training program. These steps would have prevented the long delay which management and the union officials were unable to overcome.

VIII: THE END OF THE SECOND COMMITTEE

D U R I N G T H E MONTHS that followed the settlement of the Philadelphia and Los Angeles cases, little of outstanding importance occurred in F E P C history. An exception was the agreement between the FEPC and the United Auto Workers of the CIO in September, 1944. Signed by R . J . Thomas, president of the union, and Malcolm Ross, it provided for close cooperation between the various regional offices of the committee and the union's War Policy Committee. T h e union agreed to assist the F E P C in conducting investigations, inform all union personnel concerning its policy of nondiscrimination, and use every possible effort to help the committee settle cases of discrimination. T h e agreement, the first of its kind, was hailed by Ross as "a great step forward in the American trade union movement which shows an ever growing realization that preservation of the right to work for all men regardless of race, creed, color, or national origin is the keystone to its future healthy existence." 1

The major part of the committee's work was carried on without fanfare or undue publicity. During the month of October, 1944, the committee succeeded in adjusting 120 cases satisfactorily. Eleven of these involved discriminatory dismissals and were adjusted with the rehiring of the dismissed. In four cases involving refusal to promote, three were settled with the promotion of the individuals involved. 2 During the entire year of 1944, 3,712 cases were closed, with 1,324, or 35.7 per cent, of the total satisfactorily adjusted.3 However, the committee's days were numbered. Before the close of the fiscal year ending June 30, 1945, it had to repeat its previous

122 T H E E N D OF T H E S E C O N D C O M M I T T E E year's campaign for an appropriation from Congress. This time, however, its efforts were undertaken under highly unfavorable circumstances. Three conditions made its task more difficult: President Roosevelt's death, the rapidly approaching end of the war which had provided the raison d'etre for the issuance of the President's executive orders, and the introduction of legislation in both houses of Congress to create a permanent FEPC. T h e last provided foes and lukewarm friends of the F E P C with the excuse that there was no need for continuing the President's committee since legislation creating a permanent committee was already pending. On March 21, 1945, President Roosevelt had requested a budgetary appropriation for the committee of $599,000 for the fiscal year beginning July 1. On April 12, the President died. On May 22, the subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee, to which the President's budgetary requests for the F E P C and nineteen other war agencies had been referred, voted to limit the F E P C appropriation to $250,000.* T h e Appropriations Committee went one step further and omitted the F E P C appropriation entirely. In its report, the Appropriations Committee explained that since there were bills before Congress providing for the establishment of a permanent FEPC, it would be best to await their outcome before appropriating any funds for the existing committee.8 On June 7, the House began to consider H . R . 3368, the war agencies appropriations bill, as reported by the Appropriations Committee. In the ensuing discussion, Representative Cannon, chairman of the Appropriations Committee, repeated a revised version of the argument presented in the committee's report: since no money could be appropriated for the F E P C without prior authorization by law, the F E P C appropriation would have to await the outcome of legislation setting up a permanent FEPC. He was immediately challenged by Representative Marcantonio, who correctly pointed out that the appropriation for F E P C and legislation establishing a permanent F E P C "are two separate and distinct matters." Furthermore, Marcantonio declared later, "the excuse that is given is that the legislation for a permanent F E P C is pending, and, since it is pending, there is no reason for the Committee on Appropriations to appropriate for the existing FEPC. This agency from a

T H E END OF T H E SECOND C O M M I T T E E 123 parliamentary standpoint is not even remotely related to the permanent FEPC legislation. Therefore, its excuse is very lame. What I fail to understand is what reason is there for the Committee on Appropriations to have changed its course with respect to this temporary FEPC appropriation. Why has the Committee on Appropriations failed to recommend this appropriation for this agency which has had appropriations recommended for it by the gentleman's committee last year? Why last year and not this year?" Referring to the argument concerning the FEPC's lack of legislative authorization, he stressed that "the Committee on Appropriations determines whether or not an appropriation should be recommended. The argument that there is no authorization does not prevail because time and time again the Committee on Appropriations has recommended appropriations to the House even though there has been no legislative authorization. In fact, in this very bill there are many items for which there are no legislative authorizations.8 Why an exception in this case? . . . Further, why did not this Committee on Appropriations recommend the appropriation and then go before the Committee on Rules and ask for a rule waiving all points of order, as you did on two separate and distinct occasions this session of Congress? " T T o understand Marcantonio's arguments, and those that followed, it should be recalled that during the previous year the appropriation for FEPC had passed the House only because unanimous consent waiving points of order had been granted the appropriation bill. It happened while opponents of the FEPC were caught unawares. This time, however, the southern Democrats and others were determined not to grant unanimous consent. Moreover, whereas during the previous year parliamentary experts believed that an appropriation for FEPC was an expenditure previously authorized by law (an executive order could be regarded as an authorization by law and therefore not subject to a point of order), in the intervening period the presiding officer of the House, Representative Sparkman, had ruled, with reference to an appropriation for the War Relocation Authority, that an executive order was not an authorization by law within the meaning of the House rule. This meant that an appropriation for FEPC or for any agency created solely by executive order without statutory authorization

T H E E N D O F T H E 184 SECOND C O M M I T T E E —for instance, the Office of Scientific Research and Development, the Office of War Information and others—was vulnerable to a point of order. 8 Without "unanimous consent" the appropriations bill could be brought before the House for a vote only if the Rules Committee issued a rule prohibiting points of order against the executive agencies included in the bill. Representative Cannon had apparently consulted members of the Rules Committee about the possibility of securing a rule and had been told that it would not be granted to any bill which included an FEPC appropriation. T h e Appropriations Committee then concluded that its only alternative was to eliminate the FEPC appropriation altogether, thus making it possible to secure a rule for the other agencies should one be needed. Obviously, however, the item for the FEPC was omitted because the Committee on Appropriations decided to sacrifice the FEPC to avoid endangering the other executive agencies, and not because it was awaiting the passage of permanent FEPC legislation. It was to elicit this truth that Representative Marcantonio had criticized Representative Cannon, and demanded to know why the Committee on Appropriations did not recommend the appropriation and then ask the Committee on Rules for a rule waiving all points of order. Cannon replied that

when we suggested to Members of the House that the bill was ready and that we would require the usual rule we were informed that if certain items were incorporated in the bill, no rule would be given for the bill or any part of the bill. Now, what can we do? What course is left open to the Committee? Here are the war agencies, the continuance of which is vital to the success of the war. Appropriations for them must be available by the 30th of June, and we are told that if certain agencies are included in the bill no rule will be forthcoming. What recourses have we but to eliminate any such items? 9 However, Marcantonio issued a threat of his own. Since the Committee on Appropriations had not yet secured a rule, he warned that "reluctant as I feel about raising a point of order to the other agencies, I am seriously considering doing it not because I am opposed to the agencies, but because I want to throw the whole thing into one issue: We either have a rule for all or for none." When Cannon in turn argued that "I am certain that he would not want to leave our forces desperately battling a savage

T H E END OF T H E SECOND C O M M I T T E E 125 enemy in the Orient today without a single service which this bill proposes to give them in the preservation of their lives and in their success on the battlefield," Marcantonio suggested: " T h e gentleman can save these services by requesting a rule to make all of the war agencies, including F E P C , in order." A f t e r an interruption by Cannon, he continued: Raising the point of order is not going to kill these agencies, it is just going to raise the issue properly and squarely of discrimination employed against the FEPC appropriation. It will place the burden upon the Appropriations Committee for saving or killing the FEPC agency set up by President Roosevelt's Executive order and now most seriously defended by President Truman. It will compel it to go before the Rules Committee and request a rule that would make FEPC as well as the other agencies in order. . . . If the Rules Committee refuses the request then it will assume full responsibility for the resulting calamity in the eyes of the Nation. 10 T h a t day, Cannon proved that he preferred to side with the foes of the F E P C rather than with its friends. In order to nullify Marcantonio's threat, he appeared before the Rules Committee and requested a rule barring points of order "against the bill or any provision thereof." A l t h o u g h Marcantonio also appeared before the Rules Committee and requested that its rule include amendments to the bill (this would have given Marcantonio an opportunity to add an amendment to the bill to provide funds for the F E P C ) Cannon's, rather than Marcantonio's request, was granted. O n behalf of the Rules Committee, Representative Howard Smith of Virginia introduced a resolution providing that during the consideration of the bill all points of order against the bill or any provisions thereof be waived. 1 1 In the ensuing debate, liberals in favor of the F E P C found themselves in a dilemma. If they voted for the Smith resolution it meant that they were willing to consign the F E P C to oblivion. If they voted against it, they would be acting contrary to the demands of the war effort. Representative Sabbath, chairman of the Rules Committee and a sincere supporter of F E P C , exemplified the dilemma. W h i l e urging passage of the resolution, he at the same time requested House approval for an amendment providing for an appropriation for the F E P C . T h e latter request was meaningless since such an amendment could be brought to a vote only if the House waived points of order through

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"unanimous consent" or if the Rules Committee issued a rule barring points of order against the amendment. Sabbath's committee, however, despite his own efforts, had refused the necessary point of order when requested by Marcantonio and had thereby rendered useless the introduction of an amendment. Continuing his efforts on behalf of the FEPC, Sabbath presented a letter from President Truman urging approval of a permanent FEPC. After reading it, he commented: " . . . I believe he would welcome and appreciate if we would today make in order an amendment which would provide for the appropriation for the Fair Employment Practice Commission." In passing, it may be mentioned that although the President's letter was acclaimed as an important contribution to the struggle for an FEPC appropriation and for the creation of a permanent FEPC, the hosannahs which greeted it were not entirely merited. Although it did urge passage of permanent F E P C legislation, it made no request for an appropriation for the existing F E P C which was then fighting for its life. One wonders whether it was the President's intention to speak out on behalf of a bill which had little chance of passing and at the same time do nothing to secure funds for the existing FEPC, which would have been materially aided by his efforts. Was it perhaps an attempt to curry favor with liberal groups in and out of Congress while at the same time not antagonizing those who opposed FEPC? After reading President Truman's letter, Sabbath revealed a fact which highlighted the great loss suffered by friends of the F E P C in the death of President Roosevelt. He noted that "the very last request made by the late President Roosevelt on the day that he died was that the Fair Employment Practice Commission be continued. His secretary called on me at 3 o'clock in the afternoon on that day conveying the President's request that I do everything in my power to endeavor to bring about the adoption of a rule for this legislation." 12 Despite opposition, the Smith resolution did pass, thus preventing the House from voting on the F E P C appropriation. Marcantonio remarked bitterly: Mr. Chairman, we find the House of Representatives placed in a position where it is powerless and deprived of any opportunity to pass upon

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a most important question, and that is, on the appropriation for the FEPC agency. . . . It cannot vote on it for two reasons: first, because the Committee on Appropriations refused to appropriate for this agency, and second, because the Committee on Rules refused to grant a rule which would have made an amendment appropriating for this agency in order. That is not only strange, it is tragic.13 For the sake of the record, although knowing in advance that the motion would fail, Marcantonio moved an amendment to the bill to include an appropriation of $599,000 for the FEPC. Representative Rankin moved a point of order against the amendment, contending that "the amendment is not germane, it is not in order on this bill, it is legislation on an appropriation bill and it is not authorized by law." 14 The chairman sustained the point of order and Marcantonio's effort failed. The House then proceeded to pass the bill. The first round of the battle had been won by America's racists. Soon thereafter, the bill was referred to the Senate, which in turn referred it to the Senate Committee on Appropriations. The subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, in a tie vote of 4 to 4, with half of its members absent, voted against restoring the appropriation for the FEPC deleted by the House. The full committee, however, decided upon a compromise. It voted 14 to 4 on June 20 to report out the war agencies bill without the FEPC appropriation. At the same time, it authorized Senator Chavez, one of its members, to introduce a motion suspending the rules in order to permit an amendment appropriating $446,200 for the FEPC. T o understand this action of the Senate Appropriations Committee one must understand Senate rules concerning amendments to appropriation bills. Section 2 of Rule XVI forbids the reporting by the Appropriations Committee of an appropriation bill "containing amendments proposing new or general legislation." Nor may an amendment proposing such legislation be offered from the Senate floor. The penalty for violation of this rule by the Appropriations Committee is not only the elimination of the forbidden clause "but the recommitting of the entire bill." 15 The Appropriations Committee had to decide whether an appropriation for the FEPC—an agency established not by Congress but by executive order—was "new or general legislation." Al-

128 T H E E N D OF T H E SECOND C O M M I T T E E though a good case could have been made for not regarding the appropriation as new legislation—it simply provided funds for the implementation of a law which had been issued by the President in the form of an executive order, and the law in the form of the executive order existed whether Congress appropriated for it or not—the committee refused to seek a ruling from the presiding officer by including the F E P C item in the appropriations bill. As has been pointed out, if the presiding officer had found the item to be new or general legislation and had recommitted the entire bill, a new bill omitting the F E P C item could have been reported out the next day." Instead, Senator Chavez was authorized to move that the rules be suspended in order to permit the amendment to appropriate $446,200 for the FEPC. This made passage of the F E P C appropriation more difficult. A motion to suspend the rules requires a two-thirds vote, whereas passage of an ordinary appropriation requires merely a majority vote. Since twenty-six senators were definitely opposed to F E P C — twenty southern Democrats and six Republicans—the supporters of F E P C had to secure at least fifty-two votes (twice those opposing) to ensure passage of the motion. 17 T h e bill was reported out on June 20, but despite the urgency of the situation, 18 the Senate did not consider it until June 26. According to one report, Senator McKellar, president pro tem of the Senate and chairman of the Committee on Appropriations, was asked by a group of southern senators to delay action on the bill until Senator Russell of Georgia and Senator Maybank of South Carolina, two leaders of the anti-FEPC forces, could return from a trip to Europe. Upon receiving reports that pro-FEPC senators would be able to muster a two-thirds majority, McKellar decided to accept the suggestion.18 The day after the Senate moved to consider the bill, Senator Bilbo succeeded in getting the floor and refused to surrender it; he thus prevented the introduction of Chavez's amendment as well as consideration of the appropriations bill. In monopolizing the floor, Bilbo initiated what amounted to a filibuster. During his extended speech-making, he repeated practically every known Nazi and Fascist doctrine. He spent much of the time reading letters which had supposedly come to him from people throughout the country, and

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especially the South, attacking the FEPC. One letter from Atlanta, Georgia, read in part: " I continuously travel the United States and give my word from close examination that the birds behind all this social race equality stuff are Jews—from that rat Winchell to the most illiterate second-hand man." 20 At one point, on J u n e 27, McKellar interrupted Bilbo and suggested a "compromise": that the F E P C be given $250,000 instead of the proposed $446,200, with the understanding that the amount be allocated for a period not exceeding six months and beginning J u l y 1, 1945. Chavez agreed to accept the proposal, providing FEPC's opponents would refrain from demanding, as a condition for the appropriation, that the F E P C be liquidated after six months. Bilbo refused this condition. 21 The impasse continued for several days with Bilbo in control of the floor. After a great deal of wrangling and maneuvering, which included the filing of a closure petition by Senator Robert Taft, and a session lasting until slightly past midnight on June 28, a compromise suggestion was made by Senator Alben Barkley that the F E P C be granted $250,000 without specifying a six-month limit, thus enabling it to use the appropriation for an entire year's activity. Barkley's suggestion was accepted by both sides. Bilbo surrendered the floor, Barkley introduced his suggestion in the form of an amendment, no point of order was raised against it, and on J u n e 30 it was approved by a vote of 42 to 26." Although Senator Mead defended the compromise as a means of ensuring FEPC's continuance for another year, it was indignantly denounced by Senator Wayne Morse of Oregon: "By decreasing the appropriation for F E P C to the amount which finally was granted . . . the F E P C was dealt a mortal blow. . . . The compromise just adopted is the product of a type of expediency which I will never support." 23 Some observers went so far as to characterize the compromise as "a major political error." It was generally felt, at the time, that friends of the F E P C did have a two-thirds majority and could have secured the necessary two-thirds vote if the filibuster were ended and the issue put to a vote. Since a petition for closure had already been submitted by Senator Taft, the original FEPC appropriation would have been put to a vote sooner or later and undoubtedly approved. Opponents of F E P C were on the verge

130 T H E E N D OF T H E SECOND C O M M I T T E E of total defeat when Barkley submitted his compromise and thereby gave them a new lease on life. His move was apparently motivated, in part, by a desire to keep the Republican party from receiving credit for forcing closure and securing funds for the FEPC." After being approved by the Senate, the war agencies bill should have gone to conference. Although the House rules require that a bill amended by the Senate must first be referred to the committee having jurisdiction—in this instance the Committee on Appropriations—this rule is usually waived by unanimous consent of the House and the bill sent directly to conference. However, four southern representatives, still striving for the complete elimination of FEPC, voted against sending the bill to conference. It therefore had to be returned to the House Committee on Appropriations for approval. In the meanwhile, the new fiscal year began without available funds for the sixteen war agencies. On July 3, the Committee on Appropriations voted not to report out the bill as passed by the Senate, but instead proposed an entirely new bill similar to the one it had reported out on June 1, 1945, omitting the F E P C appropriation. 20 However, a somewhat different situation now prevailed as regards the F E P C appropriation. Whereas previously the Rules Committee had issued a rule barring points of order against the bill, this time, when the Appropriations Committee requested a ruling, it was refused. The refusal was due to a movement by friends of the F E P C to amend the requested ruling, on the House floor, to include an F E P C amendment to the appropriations bill. 26 Without a rule, the new appropriations bill was open to points of order by friends of the FEPC, who decided that since F E P C had been excluded they would prevent appropriation of funds for the other executive agencies as well. Representatives Marcantonio, Celler, and Norton thereupon made points of order against the appropriations for the National War Labor Board, the Office of Defense Transportation, the Office of Economic Stabilization, the Office of Inter-American Affairs, the Office of War Information, the War Production Board, the War Shipping Administration, the Office of Strategic Services, and the Petroleum Administration for War. T h e points of order were sustained, and the bill minus these agencies was passed and sent to the Senate.27

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T h e Senate, in turn, refused to consider the bill as approved by the House. T h e Senate Appropriations Committee, to which the bill was referred, decided to take no action until a more satisfactory bill was received from the House. 28 T o give the House time to arrive at a solution to the impasse, the Senate recessed for several days. In the meantime, the anti-FEPC forces in the House began to weaken. Fearing that a prolonged deadlock on the F E P C issue might so arouse the opposition that permanent F E P C legislation, then pending in both houses, would be passed, the House Appropriations Committee, on Wednesday, July 11, approved and voted to report out the original war agencies appropriations bill (H.R. 3368) as amended by the Senate. It included an added provision that the appropriation for the F E P C was to be used for liquidating the agency. 28 As the House began consideration of the bill, Representative Marcantonio pointed out that the fund appropriated for the F E P C could be used for no purpose other than its liquidation: This means that not a single penny may be spent for carrying out the functions of this agency. Every penny that this committee gives this agency must be spent for the purpose of closing shop. This proposal therefore is not a compromise at all, it calls for the interment of FEPC, and I do hope its friends will oppose it. Unless the committee amendment is amended, making it abundantly clear that the FEPC agency may continue its operations, the amendment should be voted down.50 Representative Dirksen of Illinois thereupon assured Marcantonio that it was the intention of the Committee on Appropriations to provide funds for the continuation of F E P C operations, "for all operating expenses within the terms of the two Executive orders under which the FEPC operates . . ." He announced that he would submit amendatory language to make that clear.®1 T h e next day, Representative Cannon, on behalf of the Committee on Appropriations, offered an amendment appropriating the $250,000 for the purpose of "completely terminating the functions and duties of the Committee on Fair Employment Practice," but added thereto: "Provided, T h a t if and until the Committee on Fair Employment Practice is continued by an act of Congress, the amount named herein may be used for its continued operation until an additional appropriation shall have been provided." 32

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An additional amendment, submitted by Representative Case, and reading, "Provided further, That in no case shall this fund be available for expenditure beyond June 30, 1946," was carried by a vote of 142 to 1 1 6 . " The bill was then sent to conference where the House version was adopted. Both Houses of Congress passed the bill as recommended by the conference. On July 13, it became law." The compromise, which granted $250,000 to the FEPC, meant the beginning of the end for the committee. When that sum had first been suggested, F E P C officials predicted that it would be a severe blow to the agency's activities. Prior to its passage in the Senate, Senator Morse had remarked: " I do not think that my party has lived up to its pledge made at the convention or it never would have agreed to this compromise. But the Administration leadership forced this compromise on the Congress and in my opinion it would be better if the F E P C had not a single cent rather than insufficient funds on which to operate." 35 These forebodings were soon realized. With insufficient funds to continue its operations, the committee reduced its staff in August and December from a total of 128 to 3 1 , and all but three field offices were closed.33 Coinciding with the decline in its working force, the committee suffered a further loss in authority and prestige as the result of an action by President Truman during the month of November. For several years, the F E P C had been attempting, without success, to persuade the Capital Transit Company of Washington, D.C., to abandon its policy of discrimination toward Negroes. When, on November 21, as the result of a work stoppage, the government seized the lines of the Capital Transit Company, the F E P C decided that the opportune moment had arrived for action on the issue of discrimination. On November 23, the committee voted to issue a directive ordering the company to cease and desist from its discriminatory policies. Without consulting the committee or offering it an opportunity to present its views, the President, on November 24, ordered the committee not to issue the directive. On the following day, Charles H. Houston, on behalf of the committee, wrote to the President and requested that the committee be given the opportunity to confer with him on the matter. The letter was completely ignored.37

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On December 3, Houston, piqued by the President's attitude, resigned from the committee. In a bitterly worded letter of resignation to the President, he emphasized that "since the effect of your intervention in the Capital Transit case is not to eliminate the discrimination but to condone it, to that extent you not only repudiate the Committee, but more important, you nullify the Executive Orders themselves." Referring to a prevailing opinion that "the Government is bound by the existing terms and conditions of employment in effect on Capital Transit at the moment of seizure," and could therefore not institute a new policy of nondiscrimination, he pointed out that according to the F E P C legal staff "the Federal Manager of the Capital Transit system is not only empowered to, but must enforce the national policy of nondiscrimination in employment so long as the system is under his operation and control," and that "neither the Capital Transit management nor the union leadership has ever claimed that the exclusion of Negroes as platform workers and traffic checkers was a term or condition of employment." In closing, he asserted that "the issue of the Capital Transit case far transcends the question whether a few Negro workers shall be placed on the platforms of street cars and busses and as traffic checkers on the Capital Transit system. It raises the fundamental question of the basic government attitude toward minorities. T h e failure of the Government to enforce democratic practices and to protect minorities in its own capital makes its expressed concern for national minorities abroad somewhat specious, and its interference in the domestic affairs of other countries very premature." 38 President Truman replied to Houston's letter on December 7. He reiterated the view that there was a conflict between the directives of the F E P C and the law under which the government had seized the Capital Transit property. The law, he claimed, provided that the property "shall be operated under the terms and conditions of employment which were in effect at the time possession of such plant, mine, or facility was so taken." Because of the law, he explained, "it was thought best to suggest that the order be, temporarily postponed. T h e property was not seized for the purpose of enforcing the aims of the Fair Employment Practice Committee, laudable as these aims are, but to guarantee transportation

134 T H E END OF T H E SECOND C O M M I T T E E for the citizens of Washington and vicinity." The President, in his letter, then accepted Houston's resignation." In order to prevent such situations from recurring, and to clarify the committee's jurisdiction and powers in view of the war's end, President Truman, on December 20, 1945, issued Executive Order 9664, which continued "the duties and responsibilities" of the committee as defined in previous executive orders, "for the period and subject to the conditions stated in the National War Agencies Appropriation Act, 1946." The committee was empowered to "investigate, make findings and recommendations, and report to the President, with respect to discrimination in industries engaged in work contributing to the production of military supplies or to the effective transition to a peacetime economy." 40 Although, at first glance, the President seemed to be lending his support to the committee, actually the new executive order meant a further weakening of its powers. By continuing only the "duties and responsibilities" of previous executive orders, the President effectively barred the committee from issuing further directives or "cease and desist orders," %vhich it had in the past issued as a right but not as a duty or a responsibility.41 The President thus transformed the committee into another fact-finding agency. Walter White termed the order a "tremendous disappointment" and remarked that the time for "fact-finding on Negro discrimination is past," and that, instead, "immediate vigorous Federal action is necessary." 41 For the remainder of its career, the committee, in accordance with the executive order, confined itself to fact-finding, to an investigation of postwar discriminatory practices and to an attempt "to draw together its entire five years' experience, in the belief that it will serve as a guide to the solution of the continuing problem of employment discrimination." 43 Although active committee operation, except for volunteer work, ceased on May 3 when all employees were placed "on leave without pay status," the committee remained in existence until June 28 when it issued its Final Report. T o friends of democracy in America the report was, in many respects, discouraging. Since VJ-Day there had been "an unchecked revival of discriminatory practices." 44 The report noted, for ex-

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ample, that "discriminatory advertisements in daily newspapers have increased greatly since VJ-Day, both against Negroes and Jews. A sample study of job orders in 11 selected areas during February 1946 showed 24 percent of the orders to be discriminatory. In a large sampling of orders for Government jobs, 10 percent had discriminatory specifications." 45 It reported, too, that veterans who were members of minority groups were meeting greater difficulty than others "in entering school, being admitted to apprenticeship training, getting G I loans and being placed in jobs at their skill levels." It found Veterans' Employment offices, both in the North and the South, guilty of discrimination and unequal treatment of members of minority groups." On the other hand, the report was not without its element of hope. The committee had found that discrimination in industry could be eliminated through vigorous and intelligent government action: " T h e Committee's wartime experience shows that in the majority of cases discriminatory practices by employers and unions can be reduced or eliminated by simple negotiation when the work of the negotiator is backed up by firm and explicit National policy." The failure of the committee in certain cases to obtain cooperation from employers or unions was attributed to the fact that "executive authority is not enough to insure compliance in the face of stubborn opposition. Only legislative authority will insure compliance in the small number of cases in which employees or unions or both refuse after negotiation to abide by the National policy of nondiscrimination." 47 The committee transmuted its five years of experience in handling the problem of discrimination into the following three recommendations to the President: 1. Conformity to the national policy of nondiscrimination will come only when fair employment practice legislation has been adopted by the Congress. We recommend, therefore, that you continue to urge upon the Congress the passage of legislation which will guarantee equal job opportunity to all workers without discrimination because of race, color, religious belief, or national origin. 2. The mere existence of a Federal policy of nondiscrimination will not in itself result in fair employment practices within the Federal service or by Government contractors. We recommend therefore, that the

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Federal Government take steps not only to promulgate its policy more widely, but to enforce it as well. 3. T h e employment handicaps of minority-group workers are not fully known because of the incomplete reporting on employment and unemployment by race and by sex within industries and occupations. We recommend, therefore, that the appropriate Government agencies be instructed to include such statistics.48 T h e letter which accompanied the report to the President included also the formal resignations of the committee's members. With the President's acceptance of the report and the resignations, a significant chapter in the history of the effort to combat discrimination in America came to an end.

IX: THE COMMITTEE IN STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION

BECAUSE of the limited means at its disposal, the first Fair Employment Practice Committee was small and simply organized. Originally numbering five members, then seven, all of whom were paid only expenses, it was assisted by a staff consisting of an executive secretary, an assistant executive secretary and six field investigators. T h e committee members formulated policy, conducted hearings, and issued directives. T h e executive secretary and the assistant executive secretary supervised the day-to-day implementation of committee policy, and with the assistance of the investigators, received, investigated, and adjusted complaints. T h e assistant executive secretary also served as general counsel and assumed charge of all matters relating to the hearings. 1 Lacking sufficient funds, the first committee did not establish permanent regional offices. It received, investigated and adjusted complaints primarily through correspondence. "Obviously," states the first committee's report, "investigation by correspondence from Washington is not the most effective method for arriving at the facts in all cases. In certain situations it has been necessary and possible to send investigators into the field to bring about adjustment or clarification of issues." 2 Until April, 1942, the committee's efforts were supplemented by an arrangement with the staff and field forces of the Negro Employment and Training Branch and the Minority Groups Branch of the Office of Production Management, which had been formed prior to the issuance of the first executive order for the purpose of increasing job opportunities for Negroes and other minority groups in the defense program. With the creation of the FEPC,

138 C O M M I T T E E IN S T R U C T U R E A N D F U N C T I O N these agencies assumed the task of initiating all investigations into complaints of discrimination in private defense industry. They had no jurisdiction, however, over complaints of discrimination in departments or agencies of the federal government. Complaints which they could not adjust satisfactorily were turned over to the committee for further study and action. This arrangement proved unsatisfactory to the committee, which found itself confronted with a situation where its primary investigations into complaints and attempts at settlement were conducted by individuals over whom it had no authority, whose methods and procedures it could not control, and whose services were available to it only on a part-time basis.3 T h e arrangement was discontinued in April, 1942, and was never again reconstituted, although certain efforts to do so were later made by the committee. T h e public hearing, as utilized by the first committee, proved to be an important method of investigating and settling complaints. Six such hearings in all were conducted in different sections of the country between October, 1941, and December, 1942. Although the first hearing was intended primarily to publicize the first executive order, the others served as means of investigating and adjusting particular grievances and eliminating discriminatory practices. T h e final report of the second F E P C comments, as follows, upon the work of the first committee: In this new and controversial field the first Committee did yeoman service by devising a set of policies and by holding public hearings to examine specific complaints of discrimination because of race, creed, color, or national ancestry. The open disclosure through public testimony of discriminatory practices inspired considerable hostility against the Committee. Nevertheless, a subsequent check showed that the war industries involved in hearings scattered west, south and north, resulted in a higher utilization of minority group workers in the war plants involved than obtained in war plants not subjected to hearings.4 T h e second F E P C , because of more ample finances and its independent status, was able to increase both the size and complexity of its organization. At its head were the members of the committee, who decided policy and program, heard cases which could not be adjusted by its investigators or regional offices, and issued directives. T h e chairman served also as the executive officer, imple-

C O M M I T T E E IN S T R U C T U R E A N D F U N C T I O N 139 mented the program, and directed the staff. At the base of the organization were the regional and subregional field offices, fifteen in number, scattered throughout the country; they received complaints of discrimination and sought to adjust them. The regional field offices were constituted within the Division of Field Operations, which assumed responsibility for receiving and settling all complaints amenable to adjustment without being referred to the committee itself. Other sections of the organization were the Legal Division, which prepared and presented cases which could not be settled by the Division of Field Operations and had to be heard by the committee; the Administrative Division, responsible for "administrative management, budget, personnel, and fiscal matters"; the Division of Review and Analysis, which analyzed committee operations and carried on research and program planning; and the Information Office, which served as the committee's public information department. 5 T h e handling of complaints and their adjustment constituted, of course, the committee's primary activity. As has previously been noted, the base of the committee's structure consisted of fifteen regional and subregional field offices. These were the receiving centers for complaints. Every complaint of discrimination, in order to receive attention, had to be registered initially with the field office representing the area in which the act of discrimination had allegedly occurred. T h e committee operated in terms of a system of case "docketing." A complaint was "docketed," that is, it became a "case" and received further investigation, if it satisfied certain initial requirements. It had to be "a signed complaint, against a named employer, union, or Government Agency, alleging discrimination, relating to employment, placement or training, because of race, creed, color or national origin." Any verified information concerning discrimination submitted by a government agency or a civic organization was also a docketable complaint. The committee did not limit complaints to the aggrieved person but accepted them from anyone who had verifiable evidence concerning an act of discrimination committed by an employer, a labor union, or an agency of the government. On the other hand, a complaint was not docketed if

140 C O M M I T T E E IN S T R U C T U R E A N D F U N C T I O N it did not include one of the qualifications previously cited or if it did not happen to fall within the scope of the committee's jurisdiction. T h e committee's policy—based upon the wording of the executive orders—of acting on the basis of complaints and only of such complaints as met the prescribed requirements, meant that it did not initiate investigations of its own to ascertain the existence of discriminatory policies in various areas of employment and take action to eliminate them. As Malcolm Ross once remarked, "We do not go into fishing expeditions." 6 Although this meant that the committee had to overlook instances of discrimination which it knew existed but concerning which it had no formal complaints, the charge that it wished to stir up ill-feeling and hatred where there was none was thereby avoided. Perhaps another consideration in the committee's strict interpretation of the executive order was that its funds prevented it from making a continuous and thorough investigation of all industries within its jurisdiction. At best it could have conducted only a series of limited investigations into several selected industries. This would certainly have left it wide open to the charge that its investigations singled out certain industries or employers and were, therefore, unfair and discriminatory.7 After docketing a case, the F E P C regional field investigator secured from the complainant and from other sources, such as government agencies, race relations organizations, and other interested parties, any additional evidence and information capable of throwing light upon the issues involved. At this point, if the examiner felt that the complainant had not offered sufficient evidence of discrimination, or that discrimination had actually not taken place, he dismissed the case because of "insufficient evidence." On the other hand, if the available evidence seemed to indicate the existence of discrimination, the investigator then contacted the party against whom the complaint had been brought, and in a personal visit secured his side of the story. After comparing the latter's version with that of the complainant, the investigator again had to decide whether or not a case of discrimination existed. If he felt that there was no basis for further action, the case was "dismissed on merits." If, on the other hand, he felt the accusation

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to be justified, he undertook to negotiate with the accused and attempted to arrange a satisfactory adjustment. According to the committee, a satisfactory adjustment of a valid complaint is based upon written commitments, must in no way conflict with the policies of the Committee, and should achieve (a) the elimination of discrimination against the complainant, (b) the cessation of other acts of discrimination in employment discovered during the course of the investigation, and (c) the implementation of a fair employment practice program by the party charged which will serve to prevent future discriminatory acts.8 In actual practice, the accused might be required to promise, in writing, to "cease and desist" from practices of discrimination, to rehire the complainant, to issue written instructions to his personnel officers to eliminate discrimination in hiring or upgrading, to notify employment agencies from which he secured employees that he did not discriminate, to eliminate questions as to race and religion from application blanks, to delete from union ritual and constitution rites or clauses tending to discriminate against racial or religious groups, and any other steps deemed necessary by the examiner to assure the elimination of a proven discriminatory policy. If the accused agreed to the recommendations of the investigator, the case was considered to be satisfactorily adjusted and closed. However, if efforts on the regional level failed, the case was referred to the FEPC director of field operations in Washington for settlement. About 5 per cent of all cases were referred to the national office. In certain instances, it was unnecessary to transfer the case entirely to Washington. The entrance into a situation of a field investigator from the national office, at the request of the regional director, frequently helped to bring about a satisfactory adjustment. If the director of field operations, after further negotiations with the accused and after utilizing the aid of government agencies such as the War Manpower Commission and others having contracts with the accused, made no substantial progress toward an adjustment, he referred the case to the Legal Division for further investigation and action preparatory to the scheduling of a hearing. The hearing itself did not take place automatically as a result of referral to the Legal Division. The members of the committee in Washing-

142 C O M M I T T E E IN S T R U C T U R E A N D F U N C T I O N ton, upon receiving a recommendation for a hearing from the Legal Division, then decided whether to continue informal negotiations with the accused or schedule a hearing. T h e hearing, if decided upon, was conducted according to definite procedural rules and regulations, adopted and published by the committee. T h e committee's First Report notes that the hearings were "essentially fact-finding proceedings the purpose of which is to determine the existence of discrimination, the duties of employers, and the rights of employees under Executive Order 9346." * A n additional purpose of the hearing was to bring the pressure of public opinion to bear upon the recalcitrant employer or labor union. For this reason, all hearings, except those which involved government agencies, were held publicly. T h e y were conducted either by the full committee or by a designated member or panel of members. T h e accused was given ample notice of the hearing and of the specific charges involved, and had the right to appear in person or be represented by counsel. He was afforded the opportunity to present evidence and to cross-examine witnesses. Additional regulations of the committee, promulgated to assure a fair hearing, provided for "motions, exceptions, briefs, oral argument, reargument, rehearing, and appeal to the President." 10 It is important to note that the committee did not have the power to subpoena witnesses or records. For attendance and cooperation, it relied upon moral suasion, the pressure of public opinion, and the threat of possible action by procurement agencies or, ultimately, the President. Failing a satisfactory adjustment during the hearing, the committee issued its final decision, which consisted of findings of fact, a conclusion, and either recommendations or directions or both. 11 With regard to its decisions, the committee lacked the power which statutory law would have conferred upon it. It could not enforce its orders in the courts, and it could not seek financial penalties for willful violation of its directives. In the event of a refusal to abide by its directives, if a defense contract happened to be involved, it could suggest to the appropriate government agency to cancel the contract or refrain from renewing it. T h e committee never took such action (so drastic a step might have impeded the war effort), but the threat of so doing sometimes brought success.

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In certain cases, the committee did secure the assent of the United States Employment Service and the War Manpower Commission to refuse to refer workers to employers who discriminated. This sanction, or the threat of its application, was effective, however, only where the employer could not get workers from a private employment agency, or in those industries and areas of labor scarcity where, according to government decree, an employer was obligated to secure workers only through the USES. In the event of noncompliance with the directives, all means available to the committee having thus been exhausted, the case was referred to the President. Theoretically, the President could use his wartime powers as Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy to compel obedience to the committee's decision. As the southern railroad cases reveal, the President was not always willing or able, because of political exigencies, to take effective action. In reviewing the case handling procedure of the FEPC, one must conclude that it placed a maximum of emphasis upon negotiation and education. T h e national office in several memoranda to regional directors stressed the importance of a friendly and unbiased approach in the handling of complaints, and the need for tact in dealing with an employer or a union accused of discrimination. In one memorandum, Will Maslow, director of field operations, remarked: We have occasionally noticed that letters to parties charged from our regional offices are so formal in tone that they give the impression of being peremptory. Please review your correspondence in the spirit of selfcriticism and eliminate expressions that may be misunderstood. Use conciliatory expressions and especially phrases like "I should appreciate it," or "Will you be good enough to" instead of coldly formal words like "It is hereby requested." . . . Remember that a tactful approach and a forthright position are not incompatible.12 In another memorandum, the following was listed as one of the "boners" a regional director should guard against: " A regional director charges an employer with a violation before he has ever heard the employer's case and then wonders why he is accused of bias." 18 The committee not only stressed personal contact with the employer but also sought a thorough examination of each complaint before burdening the employer with charges and accusations. For

i 4 4 C O M M I T T E E IN S T R U C T U R E AND F U N C T I O N instance, concerning charges of discrimination forwarded by the United States Employment Service, the regional director was urged not to rely solely upon the USES report, but to "interview some of the persons referred and rejected for employment." 14 Complaints against employers and trade unions, as well as negotiations, were kept in utmost confidence and secrecy. T h e committee believed that ordinarily more could be accomplished through quiet and patient negotiation than through a public airing of accusations. Its policy of protecting the accused from publicity which might prove harmful to his business affairs, as well as personally annoying, indicated that the committee was more interested in eliminating discrimination than in gaining publicity for itself. Only in exceptional cases, where the accused proved completely recalcitrant, and then only after months and, in certain instances, even years of negotiation, were public hearings held. T h e committee's respect for a defendant's feelings was expressed in a memorandum concerning cases adjusted on a regional level, and publicity relating thereto. It announced that although it wished to publicize instances of satisfactory adjustments "for the purpose of reflecting credit upon the party charged and to stimulate similar settlements," it had decided "not to disclose, without their permission, the identity of parties charged, who satisfactorily adjust complaints made against them." 15 Regional directors were urged to approach their negotiations with employers and others with maximum preparation: "Whenever possible, evidence should be obtained to refute anticipated defenses . . . T h u s where an employer charged with refusal to hire Negroes claims that there are no available Negroes for employment try to ascertain through WMC or the Urban League or otherwise the extent to which Negro manpower may be available. Where an employer claims employment of minority peoples is against the local pattern, evidence to the contrary should be obtained when available, such as the names of any nearby companies in which integration has been accomplished." 16 Field investigators were advised to "make systematic use of appropriate documentary 'exhibits' in negotiating with parties charged. Such material, descriptive of the successful application of fair employment practices, will often prove persuasive in such negotiations. T h e mate-

C O M M I T T E E I N S T R U C T U R E A N D F U N C T I O N 145 rial to be exhibited will vary, depending upon the type of business and other factors, but should be organized into a 'kit' which the examiner might carry with him." 17 On August 1, 1944, the national office ordered all regional directors to undertake compliance "check-ups" of all cases satisfactorily adjusted, and to report thereon. It suggested that about 10 per cent of the working time of the staff of each region be spent on such activity, to be undertaken at least two months after the close of a case, preferably by the examiner who had originally closed it. T h e data to be secured included reports from the USES and the W M C as to possible discriminatory orders by the employer during the intervening period, information from the original complainant regarding his status, and a personal conference "preferably at the plant" with a responsible officer of the accused. Regional directors were instructed to avoid giving the impression, either during the compliance visit or in seeking an appointment for it, of an attempt "to check up on the good faith of the party charged; rather explain that you would like to discuss its experience, to offer your help in meeting problems, and to evaluate its success in revising its policies." T h e evidence to be secured during the visit to the employer included statistical information relevant to the original violation, the number of Negroes or members of other minority groups employed and the type of work at which they were engaged. T h e investigator was requested, in the event the party charged had upgraded or hired workers previously discriminated against, "to discuss with the party charged its experience with such groups, and if suggestions would be appreciated, offer them." If the compliance check-up disclosed a violation of the executive order, the regional directors were requested either to open the old case or docket a new one, depending upon the nature of the violation disclosed. It is interesting to note that the request for compliance check-ups was accompanied by the advice that "if you encounter real resistance to the disclosure of employment figures, remember that a refusal to furnish such figures is not a violation of the Order." 18 It is the impression of the writer, however, that refusals to furnish such information were infrequent. A significant aspect of the committee's activities involved rela-

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tionships with other government agencies. In May, 1942, having concluded on the basis of its experience that the major contracting agencies of the government could contribute substantially to the elimination of discrimination, the committee addressed identical memoranda to the Secretaries of War and the Navy and the chairman of the Maritime Commission, requesting the issuance of instructions to contracting firms with a view toward reducing discrimination. The firms involved were to be asked to instruct all personnel officers and employees to refrain from discriminatory practices, to omit references to race or religion from application blanks, to notify employment agencies of their nondiscriminatory policies, and the like. Although the agencies concerned did not accept the committee's suggestions in their entirety, they did take steps to effectuate the executive order. Subsequently, the committee entered into formal and detailed agreements with seven government agencies, including the War and Navy Departments and the Maritime Commission—a step which helped to increase its effectiveness.19 T w o important factors impeded the committee's efforts in its relationships with other government agencies. First, at the request of President Roosevelt, it was compelled to hold all hearings involving such agencies in executive session. This prevented it from bringing the pressure of public opinion to bear against offenders. Its only recourse, in such cases, was an appeal to the head of the agency concerned or, if that did not bring results, to the President. With a war to be fought, neither the heads of agencies nor the President had much time available for inquiring into accusations of discrimination and doing anything about them. Second, the primary task of the contracting agencies of the government was to maintain a high level of production in order to provide sufficient material for the waging of war. When the attempt to eliminate discrimination met with resistance on the part of workers, or with threats of strikes, the frequent reaction of the agencies' personnel was to disregard the executive order. T h e committee was thus placed in a role secondary to that of the winning of the war and suffered thereby. Both factors played a part in FEPC's relations with the War and Navy Departments. Though these agencies did much to implement

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the President's executive orders, their policies were also frequently characterized by passivity and indifference to discrimination. The committee has pointed out that "Navy officers, as their Army counterparts, were inclined to be passive toward the day-by-day responsibility of enforcing the letter of Executive Order 9346." 20 A former member of the committee's staff writes as follows: " I recall many hours spent in trying to persuade the War Department to prevent contractors from continuing clear-cut and admitted violations of the Executive Order. T h e contracting agencies made no bones about it, getting the contracts performed came first and the F E P C second." 21 T h e exigencies of war were in large part responsible for preventing the War Shipping Administration and the Maritime Commission from taking effective action against discrimination despite the sincere efforts of officers of both agencies to do so. Though the Maritime Commission intervened successfully in ensuring the employment and promotion of members of minority groups in shipyards on the West Coast and in the Northeast, it found itself impeded in similar efforts in the South. T o cite but one example: In 1943, the Maritime Commission joined the F E P C in insisting that the Alabama Shipbuilding and Drydock Corporation of Mobile, Alabama, cease its discriminatory practices against Negroes. In compliance, the company employed twelve Negro welders on a night shift. However, when a large group of white workers attacked Negro employees and drove them from the yard, the commission and the F E P C were compelled to abandon their plan to eliminate discrimination everywhere in the yard. Instead, it was decided to permit the company to segregate four ways for Negro employees, who were thus given an opportunity to work at certain jobs from which they had previously been excluded. Threats of strikes and violence, entailing the possibility of harm to the war effort, explain the Maritime Commission's failure in the South and why "very little progress in upgrading Negroes was made in the southern and Gulf yards. With few exceptions, the yards south of Virginia utilized Negroes in a limited number of occupations, most of which were unskilled." 22 The War Shipping Administration faced an equally difficult

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problem. Its recruiting arm, the Recruiting and Manning Organization, which supplemented the efforts of the seamen's unions in providing personnel for ships, followed a nondiscriminatory policy in referring men. In maintaining this policy it came into conflict with the Seafarers International Union, A F of L, which discriminated against Negroes and permitted them to work only in the steward's department aboard ship. Since "the prompt sailing of a ship, even though qualified seamen were left ashore through discrimination, was held by R M O to be paramount," it could do nothing more than inform the F E P C of discriminatory acts. As the committee has noted, "in most instances this was academic, since the ship had already sailed." 23 Consequently, throughout the war, discrimination and segregation continued aboard ships manned by SIU members, with the War Shipping Administration and the FEPC unable to take effective action to correct the situation. T h e F E P C experienced what may well have been its most trying difficulties in its contacts with the War Manpower Commission. The W M C , as the agency primarily responsible for the wartime mobilization, training, placement, and utilization of America's manpower, occupied a crucial position in the program for the elimination of discrimination. Unfortunately, the commission did not always prove equal to its tasks, and its relationship with the committee was characterized far more by conflict than by cooperation. One of the important sources of conflict was the policy of the United States Employment Service, an operating agency of the commission. In 1942, the USES, contrary to official government policy, issued an operations bulletin, No. C-45, which in effect condoned discrimination. T h e bulletin instructed USES personnel to refer workers to jobs without discrimination. However, it stated that when an employer's order included discriminatory specifications and when efforts by local USES personnel to have him withdraw such specifications proved unavailing, his request was to be honored. These instructions were not to apply to those states where discrimination was forbidden by law. Although the director of the USES admitted, at the time, that his instructions made it incumbent upon USES employees to aid employers in committing discriminatory acts, appeals by the F E P C to the chairman of the WMC,

C O M M I T T E E IN S T R U C T U R E AND F U N C T I O N 149 Paul V. McNutt, and to President Roosevelt to have the instructions withdrawn were unavailing. In August, 1943, following the reorganization of the FEPC, the committee and the WMC concluded an agreement which settled many of the conflicts between the two organizations, brought about a much greater degree of cooperation between them (see Chapter III), and resulted in a change in USES policy. It was agreed that WMC personnel were to assume responsibility for, and seek to adjust, instances of discrimination received by them in the course of their work. In the event of failure to eliminate a discriminatory practice during a specified period of time, the commission was to refer the case to the FEPC. In each WMC regional office, one staff member was to be assigned "to coordinate the agency's activities in regard to discrimination and to cooperate with the regional or central office of FEPC." 24 Additional agreements between the regional offices of FEPC and WMC increased still further the areas of cooperation between the two agencies.25 Furthermore, on September 3, 1943, the USES issued a revised field instruction in which "the referral of workers by the Employment Service on the basis of discriminatory specifications constituted discrimination by that agency." It also provided for the use of specific forms for the reporting of instances of discriminatory specifications which were not adjustable on the local level.28 This did much to secure the cooperation of local USES employees in implementing FEPC's policies. Of additional value was WMC's newly adopted policy of making the USES subject to charges if it referred workers on a discriminatory basis. These steps, however, were not completely effective. The South, above all, proved recalcitrant. FEPC's Final Report notes that "there was general failure of USES southern offices to report to FEPC the discriminatory practices of employers and unions," and that "it was common USES practice to fill skilled and semiskilled job orders from applicants in white offices while unskilled and semiskilled job orders were filled by referrals from separate Negro offices." 27 FEPC's achievements in the Northeast, in contrast to its poor showing in the South, may, to some extent, be attributed to the difference in cooperation between southern and northern USES officials.

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FEPC's relations with the Civil Service Commission were of a quite different character. Even prior to the committee's creation, the Civil Service Commission had forbidden discrimination because of race against any employee or applicant for employment in the Executive Civil Service. As a means of limiting discrimination, it had also discontinued the use of photographs of applicants and had substituted fingerprinting as a method of identification. Several months after the issuance of Executive Order 8802, the commission and F E P C concluded an agreement authorizing the former to investigate and adjust complaints of discrimination brought to its attention and obligating it to inform FEPC of each complaint and the nature of the adjustment. F E P C was to be free to criticize the handling of each case, to request the commission to take further steps, and to take over such cases as the commission seemed unable to adjust.28 During the ensuing years, additional agreements were concluded between regional representatives of the two organizations. The commission also took additional steps to make its policy of nondiscrimination more effective. The commission's efforts helped to increase the number of Negroes in government and to improve the types of jobs at which they were employed. In one respect, however, it proved weak. This involved the handling of cases of discrimination brought to its attention. Between October, 1941, and March, 1946, it handled 1,871 cases of discrimination based on race, creed, color, or national origin, and made a finding of discrimination in only fifty-eight.29 In its Final Report, the F E P C comments: " F E P C experience indicated that this did not reflect the degree of discrimination current in Government. The Commission found discrimination only when one of its rules had been violated. A conclusion may therefore be reached that some unrecorded discrimination was practiced within the field of discretionary action allowed a personnel officer by civil service rules." An additional reason for the commission's inability to act vigorously against discrimination, according to the FEPC, was the "large measure of discretion" enjoyed by departmental personnel officers of the federal civil service. " F E P C experience indicates that this discretion is wide enough to permit much discrimination over and beyond that which the Commission defines as violation of its own rules." 30

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The committee suggests that "at the present time under Civil Service Commission rules and regulations, there are few adequate remedies for the person who has suffered discrimination. The Commission cannot compel reinstatement of a person removed on a discriminatory basis. There is no remedy for discriminatory misassignment, transfer, or promotion. There are, in short, many things within the discretion of the departments which the Commission cannot reach." It concludes, therefore, that the part which the Civil Service Commission can play in any effort to eliminate discrimination is a limited one, and although "the Civil Service Commission has an important role in the prosecution of a nondiscrimination policy in Government, it is not logically the main enforcement agency." 31 The few F E P C cases that have received most publicity and national attention, either because of the violence which accompanied them or the defiant utterances of certain leading participants at public hearings, have tended to obscure and overshadow the many thousands of cases solved by the committee on a regional level through quiet and patient negotiation. In three years, the committee handled some eight thousand complaints of discrimination within war industry and government service.32 Of these, only 5 per cent were handled at the national office because of unadjustability on the regional level, and no more than an additional 10 per cent were referred to the national office, on an informal basis, for advice and consultation. All others were handled solely and exclusively by the region. 33 As practiced by the committee, the elimination of discrimination constituted an art rather than a science. T h e insight of the regional investigator or national office into the various factors involved in a discriminatory policy played a crucial part in solving cases. Correct insight and evaluation were vitally important in determining the approach to a case, the strategy used, the actions taken, their timing, and, consequently, their success or failure. An example of inadequate insight is provided by the Philadelphia Transit case. The national FEPC office failed to realize the strategic importance of the union's argument that the employment of Negroes meant the loss of white workers' seniority and misjudged the extent to which the transit workers were actually in-

152 C O M M I T T E E IN S T R U C T U R E A N D F U N C T I O N fluenced by it. Although in his conferences with the union's officers and at the Smith Committee's hearings, Ross denied that white workers would lose their seniority, his denial was not emphasized sufficiently nor given adequate publicity among the union's rank and file. As has been noted in a previous chapter, Joseph E. Weckler, a careful student of the Philadelphia Transit case, believes that the strike could have been averted had the seniority issue received greater attention from F E P C officials and a more vigorous effort made to convince transit workers that their seniority rights were not endangered by the employment of Negroes. Similarly, poor judgment led to several errors in strategy in the Capital Transit case. Malcolm Ross cites two of these in A11 Manner of Men. One was a talk by McNutt, at a meeting approved by the committee, to two thousand white Capital Transit platform workers, to persuade them to permit the employment of Negroes as operators. T h e meeting proved to be a fiasco. "It wound up," to quote Ross, "with insults to the featured speakers and a confirmation in the minds of Capital Transit workers from Virginia and North Carolina that they were in the saddle." 34 T h e error committed was that the meeting was not a step in a well-thought-out plan but merely a lone educational device to persuade white workers to accept Negroes. It might have proved useful had it been held for the purpose of informing the white workers concerned that the company was determined to employ Negro platform workers, explaining to them the reasons for the company's step, and stressing that the government would use all the forces at its command to insure the successful implementation of the company's decision. However, because the meeting was conducted as a purely "educational" device and attempt at conversion, the workers were given the impression that their opinions were the important factor in determining whether Negroes would be employed and, consequently, the meeting served but to strengthen their intransigence. A second error occurred when the committee agreed to a company proposal that a trained sociologist be permitted to survey the white employees' attitudes toward the employment of Negroes. The sociologist found that the majority of white employees would strike if Negroes were employed. T h e company thereupon decided that it could not undertake to employ Negro operators without at

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the same time seriously endangering the system's operation, and refrained from making the attempt. The FEPC erred, as Ross points out, in agreeing to the survey in the first place, since it lent strength to the assumption that the enforcement of the President's executive order was conditioned upon its acceptance by the white workers involved. T h e committee avoided this error in the New York Telephone Company case when it refused to agree to a poll of union members to determine their attitude to the employment of Negroes. As a result of the committee's overly cautious and hesitant approach in the Capital Transit case—almost two-and-a-half years elapsed between its receipt of the first complaint and its hearing in January, 1945—the final result was failure. It is true that circumstances in the Capital Transit situation offered numerous grounds for proceeding with caution. A strike on the transit lines in the nation's capital during the war would have given comfort to this country's enemies and hampered, to some extent, the conduct of the war. It would also have strengthened FEPC's enemies in their attacks upon the committee. Yet, America's enemies derived no less comfort from the existence of discrimination in this country. And the impairment of the morale of millions of Negroes who witnessed FEPC's inability to cope with discrimination was no less important than the sabotage to the war effort threatened by some of the transit workers in Washington. Moreover, the fact that every law involves the risk of resistance to its enforcement does not in itself provide an excuse for dilatoriness in its enforcement. Undoubtedly, official pressures were brought to bear to prevent the committee from pursuing a resolute course. It is necessary to emphasize, however, that whatever the cause, the committee's unduly hesitant, cautious, and in certain respects, inept strategy did retard the successful adjustment of the Capital Transit case, thus proving the importance of insight and good judgment in the correction of discriminatory situations. T h e committee's success or failure frequently depended upon knowing when to bring an issue to a head and gauging the opportune moment for holding a hearing or issuing a directive. It meant knowing or correctly sensing how far one could go in negotiating and educating, and when additional pressure was required. It involved being able to avoid pitfalls resulting in strengthened resist-

154 C O M M I T T E E IN S T R U C T U R E A N D F U N C T I O N ance to its efforts. Much of this type of knowledge and ability is a function of experience. Although the factors involved in each new situation bear with them the seeds of new errors, it is possible to apply the lessons gained in one situation to others, and there can be little doubt that some of the errors committed by the committee in early years were avoided in later cases. Indeed, what is most apparent in the committee's record is the extent of its achievement, and the great insight its officers and investigators displayed in most instances, in a new and uncharted field and under the most trying circumstances. T o the impartial observer, the committee's errors pale into insignificance in the light of its successes. Some time ago, a well-known newspaper stressed the importance of the FEPC's use of negotiation and education as a means of enforcing its policy, and minimized the need of force and sanctions. " T h e wartime FEPC made some progress," it observed, "South as well as North, but its great victories were won by education and persuasion. . . . A federal F E P C with power to investigate, recommend and conciliate but no power to enforce might get further than one with a policeman's club." 35 T o draw this conclusion from FEPC's achievements is to distort the meaning of the committee's experience. It achieved success not only because its officers knew how to influence people. There is no doubt that individually they were intelligent and personable, and in most cases were able to use persuasive arguments. But they were convincing, most often, because behind their activities certain sanctions and force were implied. True, these could not be applied directly by the committee, nor could it call upon the courts to do so, but it could threaten to have the W M C remove an employer's manpower priorities, or have his defense contract revoked for failure to abide by its anti-discrimination provision. It could remind a worker that if he went on strike against the committee's directive, the President might take over the industry in which he worked, and he might lose his job or draft deferment or both. The Philadelphia Transit case was a striking example of what could happen to workers who struck against the elimination of discrimination and of the pressures that could be brought to bear against them. Thus, certain sanctions and pressures were present at all times as background to the process of negotiation and education. T h e

C O M M I T T E E IN S T R U C T U R E A N D F U N C T I O N 155 nature of the process and the techniques comprising it cannot be understood or adequately evaluated apart from this background. In denying or overlooking its presence one cannot but arrive at erroneous conclusions concerning the methods required to eliminate discrimination in industry. However, in certain instances, these pressures, because they were limited, proved inadequate. In the case of the southern railways, the Boilermakers' Union of the West Coast, and others, the committee's directives were openly flouted. In such instances, negotiation and education combined with the limited powers available to the committee, were incapable of producing results. Because of these failures the F E P C concluded in its final report to the President that "executive authority is not enough to insure compliance in the face of stubborn opposition. Only legislative authority will insure compliance in the small number of cases in which employers or unions or both refuse after negotiation to abide by the National policy of nondiscrimination." 36

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the achievements of the F E P C in eliminating discrimination, it is unfortunately impossible to present a precise statistical picture of the number of government executives, employers, and labor unions that were induced to change their discriminatory policies as a result of the executive orders and the F E P C . Nor is it possible to cite accurate statistical data of the number of Negroes and other minority groups who were employed as a result of IN DETERMINING

F E P C action.

There is no way of knowing how many employers, union leaders, and government executives changed their policies, merely as a result of the issuance of the executive order, without coming into conflict with the committee. Nor is it known how many employers and local union officials altered their policies as a result of a satisfactory adjustment in the case of a fellow employer or union officer whose action set an example followed by others. Lack of adequate manpower during the war, apart from any other consideration, forced many an employer to abandon discriminatory policies and hire members of minority groups. Most gains in Negro employment occurred after 1942, paralleling the growing labor shortage during the war. It has been estimated that, although in the summer of that year no more than 3 per cent of those employed in war industry were colored, by September, 1944, the proportion had increased to over 8 per cent.1 According to Weaver,2 "the acceptances of Negro women by war plants was delayed until most other available labor had been absorbed," while "in many individual plants, Negro males were not considered for employment until great progress had been made in

T H E A C H I E V E M E N T S OF T H E C O M M I T T E E 157 tapping the reserve of available white women." Of about a million and a half Negroes in war industry, in September, 1944, 48 per cent were in areas of acute labor shortage, as compared with 38 per cent of war workers as a whole. There is hardly any doubt that economic necessity played a very important and perhaps "the most important" part in the entrance of Negroes and other minority groups into the various phases of war work. Moreover, the F E P C was aided considerably by government agencies with whom it had agreements—the War and Navy Departments, the Maritime Commission, the Civil Service Commission, the War Production Board, the War Manpower Commission and others. T h e agreements provided, in effect, that the agencies concerned were obligated to make an effort to eliminate discrimination, inform the F E P C of complaints they received, and turn over to the committee those complaints which they could not adjust satisfactorily. T h e personnel of these agencies frequently helped to effectuate the executive orders, and succeeded in bringing the executive orders to the attention of contractors and in eliminating instances of discrimination. The final report of the F E P C states that "in the Philadelphia area, when private yards had not yet undertaken the employment of Negroes as welders, shipfitters, electricians, and machinists, the navy yard was already employing them in these capacities and served as the principal outlet for Negro trainees. Even in the establishments in Norfolk, Va.; Charleston, S.C.; and the naval air station at Jacksonville, Fla., the Navy's employment policies were more nearly in full conformity with the national policy of nondiscrimination than were those of neighboring private employers." * The same report tells of a successful effort by the Navy in eliminating a policy of discrimination practiced by a large war contractor in Macon, Georgia: "Although this plant employed a considerable number of nonwhites in unskilled jobs, there was consistent refusal to admit Negro women to paid training courses. This issue was the subject of considerable discussion in the community and at one time 5,000 persons staged a protest mass meeting on the problem. Management and local school officials argued that qualified Negro women were not available. However, the Navy Department requested the company to comply with Executive Order

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9346, and when the classes were opened, 55 Negro women enrolled in the first group." * T h e War Manpower Commission, the most important recruiting agency for the war effort, also proved helpful in eliminating discrimination. Especially after August, 1943,5 the W M C was able to convince many employers that only by using all available workers, without regard to race, color, or creed, could they meet their manpower requirements and production schedules. Through its corps of experts, including the divisions headed by Robert Weaver and Will Alexander, the W M C offered guidance to employers concerning the methods to be used in integrating minority groups into a labor force. Furthermore, local offices of the United States Employment Service were under instructions, after September, 1943, not to honor discriminatory hiring orders and to make every effort to persuade employers to abandon discriminatory specifications. Cases that they could not cope with were referred to the F E P C for action. Although, in certain areas, USES officers were lax in their duties, in others they were very helpful and cooperative. T h e agreements between the FEPC and other government agencies indicate that the FEPC was not always directly responsible for changes in discriminatory policies. On the other hand, the FEPC, as the sole agency devoted entirely to the elimination of discrimination, acted in a sense as a gadfly to others and made certain that they were carrying out their obligations as set forth in the agreements and the President's executive orders. When the committee learned that agreements were not being carried out, it brought the facts to the attention of the proper authorities and negotiated for their elimination. Thus, whenever government agencies did bring about the elimination of discrimination either in private employment or within their own ranks, the results stemmed from the impact of the executive order and FEPC cooperation with these agencies. It is therefore impossible to assess, in any accurate fashion, the precise contribution of the FEPC to the successful efforts of government agencies in eliminating discrimination, although one may assert that it was not inconsiderable. In addition, action by private minority-group agencies and labor unions, especially within the CIO, also contributed to the elimination of discriminatory practices.

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The F E P C has published data indicating the extent to which it succeeded in adjusting complaints of discrimination and persuading offenders to change their policies. Between July, 1943, and December, 1944, the committee docketed a total of 5,803 complaints of discrimination which, at first glance, seemed to be valid. Of these, about 64 per cent were dismissed soon after docketing because of lack of merit, insufficient evidence, and other causes. T h e remaining 36 per cent were satisfactorily adjusted. 6 As the FEPC's First Report observes, The 1,723 satisfactory adjustments cover a wide range of territory and varying patterns of discrimination. Resistance has not been a matter of the compass, nor has successful application of the Executive order. Southern shipyards were persuaded to use Negro welders, aircraft plants to upgrade Mexican-Americans, white workers to cooperate with colored workers on the same production lines. Reluctant eastern manufacturers of highly involved war mechanisms through experience discarded their belief that Negro workers could not acquire the requisite skills. Government agencies accepted in new positions qualified minority workers referred by Civil Service. Trade unions policed their own nondiscrimination policy in the cases of recalcitrant locals. Employers rearranged work schedules to permit Sabbatarians and Orthodox Jews opportunity to observe religious customs. In some 40 war plants where racial disputes led to work stoppages, the strikers were persuaded to go back to work and, having done so, paved the way for the removal of the causes of racial friction.7 The committee closed an average of 250 cases a month during its most active two years. Of these, 100 a month were satisfactorily adjusted.8 The FEPC's First Report indicates that whereas in March, 1942, two years after the start of the defense program, Negro workers constituted only 2.5 to 3 per cent of all workers employed in war production, by November, 1944, nonwhites, of whom about 96 per cent were Negroes, constituted 8.3 per cent of war workers whose industries filed reports with WMC. Between April, 1940, and April, 1944, Negro employment in skilled crafts, and in positions as foremen and semiskilled operatives doubled from half a million to one million, while, during the same four years, Negro civilian employment increased by one million persons.9 A significant increase in the employment of Negroes in government service can also be noted. Whereas, in 1938, Negroes were 8.4

160 T H E A C H I E V E M E N T S OF T H E C O M M I T T E E per cent of those employed in the federal services in Washington, in March, 1944, they constituted 19.2 per cent of departmental personnel, most of whom were in Washington. Improvement was also evident in the types of jobs at which Negroes were employed. While, in 1938, 90 per cent of all Negroes employed in federal jobs in Washington were doing custodial work, with 10 per cent in other categories, during the war the percentage of Negroes in custodial work declined to 40 per cent, with 60 per cent working in other categories. 10 This increase was no doubt due partly to the labor shortage, which made employers more amenable to hiring Negroes and others previously excluded from employment, and partly to the intervention of the War Manpower Commission and other government agencies. There is no doubt, however, if one examines these statistics in conjunction with the histories of cases adjusted by the committee, that the executive order and FEPC's efforts contributed to increased Negro and other minority-group employment. For instance, the A. O. Smith Company of Milwaukee, Wisconsin, appeared before the committee at a hearing in January, 194a, and at that time employed no Negroes in any capacity; it then promised not to discriminate and immediately thereafter began to employ Negroes in increasing numbers. By March, 1943, 636 Negroes were employed in various categories as follows: Professional Skilled 37 Semiskilled 82 Unskilled 516 At one time or another, more than two hundred of its Negro employees were enrolled in the company's in-plant training program. 11 In March, 1943, the War Manpower Commission reported that war industries in Los Angeles, California, had increased their employment of Negroes by more than 100 per cent between May, 1942, and January, 1943; the greatest increase took place in the aircraft industry, which had been particularly guilty of discrimination and had been the object of the committee's hearing in Los Angeles in October, 1941. Mentioning three of the companies which had appeared before the committee (Douglas, North Amer-

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ican, and Lockheed-Vega), the report observes: "Negroes are employed in skilled, semiskilled and unskilled capacities in all of these plants, and the number of skilled workers is being increased through upgrading and in-plant training." 12 In its First Report, the FEPC published statistical data indicating the effect of the four major hearings of the first committee, held in Los Angeles, Chicago, New York, and Birmingham, upon the employment practices of thirty-one of the thirty-seven companies that were involved. At the time of the respective hearings, the total number employed at the various plants was 277,681, of which 4,262, or 1.5 per cent, were nonwhite. Following the hearings, the proportion of nonwhites to whites increased rapidly, resulting in a tota the employment of 23,759 l 468,517, or 5.1 per cent of 13 all employees. The latter percentage did not equal that of nonwhite workers in all war industry, which, according to the War Manpower Commission, reached 7.2 per cent as of January, 1944. It therefore does not seem very impressive at first glance. One must remember, however, that the plants involved in the hearings were those which had theretofore offered the most stubborn resistance to the employment of Negroes and had in many instances employed virtually no Negroes at the beginning of the defense effort. Indeed, proportionately, the plants investigated by the committee showed a greater increase in Negro employment than did defense industry in general. Nonwhite employment, in the latter, rose from approximately 2.5 to 3 per cent, three months after Pearl Harbor, to 8.3 per cent in November, 1944, while, in the former, it rose from 1.5 percent, at the time of the respective hearings in 1941 and 1942, to 5.1 per cent during the winter of 1943-1944." Even more impressive is the evidence of advances in plants whose discriminatory employment policies were adjusted on a regional level without recourse to hearings. The committee studied the employment records of forty-one plants chosen as major cases by FEPC examiners; the chief criterion of a "major" case being the number of manhours spent on it. In May, 1942, 7,086 nonwhite workers out of a total of 356,456, or 2.0 per cent, were employed in these plants. In April, 1944, nonwhites numbered 46,733, or 7.5 per cent of 623,003 workers.15

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T h e committee has made available additional statistical data comparing the percentages of nonwhite employment in plants represented at the hearings with those in other plants of the same companies that were never accused of discrimination and were therefore not involved in the hearings. They point up the effectiveness of the hearings and the committee's directives. Between the summer of 1942 and the early months of 1944, employment for all plants involved in the four hearings increased approximately 25 per cent, while employment of nonwhites increased 228 per cent. At the same time, the total increase in employment for remaining plants of the same firms was more than twice as much, or 59 per cent, while the increase in nonwhite employment was approximately the same, or 230 per cent. 16 T h e committee has compared the gains in nonwhite employment in all reporting plants of the firms involved in the four hearings with the general gains in the same industries. T h e plants were divided into eight industrial categories: aircraft; blast furnaces, steel works and rolling mills; communication equipment and related products; engines and turbines; general industrial machinery; scientific instruments; shipbuilding; and tanks. It has reported that in five out of eight categories—the exceptions were scientific instruments, shipbuilding, and tanks—"the firms investigated by F E P C show the larger percentage of nonwhites employed in January 1944, as well as the greater proportionate increase." 17 In the case of one of the exceptions, "tanks," all or most of the plants of the two firms involved in the hearings were located in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, where nonwhites were a small percentage of the labor force, while other firms in the industry were located in areas where nonwhite industrial workers comprised a larger proportion of the population. 18 It is possible to cite case after case of employers who at one time or another had failed to employ Negroes, Jews, or members of other groups, who changed their policies after FEPC intervention, hired a few, found them satisfactory, and then began to hire such workers in large numbers without discrimination: the New York Telephone Company in its employment of Negro telephone operators; a large Cincinnati firm which, in October, 1943, employed no Negroes but gradually increased its Negro employees to four hun-

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dred after F E P C intervention; the Chicago transit lines which employed Negroes as trainmen, conductors, motormen, or bus drivers for the first time; and the Los Angeles Transit Company, which did likewise—all are examples in point. The histories of these cases and hundreds of others indicate that in the vast majority of instances in which it intervened, the F E P C did succeed in altering discriminatory employment practices and helped to increase employment opportunities of Negroes and members of other minority groups. Yet, if these achievements are to be correctly evaluated, they must be seen within the context of the problems and difficulties facing the committee during the years of its existence. In reviewing the story of the committee's eventful life, one is hard put to find a period in which it did not face a crisis or a serious problem. Lack of funds, limited power, attacks by congressmen, difficulties in securing annual budgetary appropriations from Congress, the insufficient cooperation of some government agencies, and other problems previously mentioned harassed the committee continually and constituted almost insuperable obstacles to effective action. There seems little that the committee could have done to avoid these recurrent difficulties. Indeed, its most serious problem—the opposition in Congress—stemmed from the very success of its efforts. Had it been more successful, the opposition of southern congressmen and their allies would have been still more vigorous. T h e committee would have been far more effective had the late President Roosevelt supported it more adequately during its first two years. With sufficient funds, which at that time it received from the executive budget rather than from Congress, it would have been able to set up field offices and to utilize the personal contact of field investigators instead of relying upon correspondence for the adjustment of complaints. With adequate support, it would have been able to avoid almost a year of frustration, beginning in June, 1942, and it would have commanded the cooperation of other executive agencies to a far greater extent than it did. In justice to President Roosevelt, however, it should be noted that despite his weak and vacillating support of the committee during its infancy, it was he who took the initial and revolutionary step of prohibiting discrimination by executive order and created the committee for its enforcement; it was he who kept the committee

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alive despite the attacks of its enemies, and as it proved its mettle, supported it with ever greater enthusiasm. It should be recalled, too, that Roosevelt, no less than the committee, felt the pressures of numerous political and economic forces, and that his primary task throughout the committee's history was the winning of the war. When it appeared to him that the committee's activities conflicted with the effective prosecution of the war, he sacrificed the former, though never entirely, for the latter. An understanding of the obstacles and difficulties faced by the committee provides the necessary perspective for evaluating its achievements. Without this perspective, any judgment would be incorrect and misleading. With it in mind, a picture emerges of an organization committed to the aim of eliminating discrimination in employment, fighting against tremendous odds to accomplish its task, and finally, despite every conceivable obstacle, achieving a noteworthy and imposing record of successes. However, this represents only half the picture. T h e committee was far more than an agency securing jobs for members of minority groups. F E P C concentrated in itself the dreams and hopes of millions of people who had never before been given the opportunity of sharing in the processes of American democracy. Degraded and impoverished by their fellow Americans, many had come to regard discrimination as in the nature of things American. Embittered and disillusioned, they saw no hope of better things for themselves or their children. F E P C changed all that. It brought hope and a new confidence into their lives. It gave them cause to believe in democracy and in America. It made them feel that in answering the call to their country's colors, they were defending, not the oppression and degradation to which they had been accustomed, but democracy, equality of opportunity, and a better world for themselves and their children. The government of the United States was now doing something to help them, and in defending that government, and the country it represented, they were defending their own destiny and future. All this F E P C came to mean to men and women throughout the United States. Here, perhaps more than in its case histories, lie its true significance and achievement.

XI: FEPC PROGENY

N O T W I T H S T A N D I N G the committee's success in eradicating discrimination, its greatest importance lies in the stimulus it gave to the movement for permanent F E P C legislation. As the committee's reputation grew, the opinion that legislation could help to eliminate discrimination gained ever wider currency. Public opinion, expressed through civic, religious, labor, and minority-group organizations, demanded with increasing vigor that the committee's lessons be applied on state and municipal levels and that Congress enact permanent F E P C legislation. Will Maslow, writing in 1945, commented that "not since the Civil War has there been so much local interest in preventing racial or religious discrimination in employment: forty-nine different bills have been introduced in twenty states this year." 1

This interest and agitation soon bore fruit. Beginning in 1945, eight states—New York (1945), New Jersey (1945), Massachusetts (1946), Connecticut (1947), New Mexico (1949), Oregon (1949), Rhode Island (1949), and Washington (1949)—have approved laws prohibiting discrimination in employment and have created commissions to enforce them. A Colorado law (1951) provides enforcement provisions only for public agencies. T w o states, Indiana (1945) and Wisconsin (1945), have passed laws without providing for their enforcement. Twenty-eight cities have enacted municipal fair employment practice ordinances. 2 In all, during a period of eight years, states and municipalities with a combined population of approximately sixty million people have enacted laws banning discrimination in employment. The state laws, with some exceptions, follow a similar pattern. They include legislative findings concerning the harmful effects of discrimination, they prohibit discrimination in employment be-

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cause of race, creed, color, or national origin, and they define the "unfair labor practices" which constitute discrimination. Persons, types of establishments, and fields of employment covered by the act are noted, and an administrative agency, either especially created for the purpose or already in existence, is given the power to investigate complaints of discrimination, hold hearings, and enforce the law.® The laws of Indiana and Wisconsin differ, in one fundamental respect, from the others that have been enacted. They merely empower certain existing agencies or state officers to "investigate discriminatory employment practices . . . to formulate programs to eliminate such discrimination, and to recommend legislation to the Governor and General Assembly." 4 They do not grant these agencies the right, as in other states, to issue "cease and desist" orders or to enforce such orders in the courts. Moreover, the Colorado law in effect limits the administrative agency's authority to government employees, and permits only "educational" measures to be used against employers who discriminate. The laws of Wisconsin and Indiana have been characterized by Will Maslow as "counterfeit measures." He notes that "they hold out a semblance of activity, but so far as we can determine practically nothing is being done in those two States to eliminate discriminatory employment practices." e As to the Colorado law, Maslow writes: Colorado's measure should give scant comfort to proponents of equal job opportunity. . . . Indeed, one section of the Colorado law thumbs its nose at the entire concept of fair-employment practice by its declaration ". . . that under the American system it is equally discriminator)' of the right of the private employer to require [him] to employ one who . . . would not fit into his business." 6 The New York Ives-Quinn law, enacted on March 12, 1945—its provisions went into effect on July 1, 1945—created the first state FEPC and has served as a model for F E P C legislation in other states. The experience of the New York State Commission Against Discrimination provides insight into the obstacles that are encountered in the enforcement of state F E P C legislation and indicates, to some extent, the nature of the results which may be expected during the early years of a state F E P C law.

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The New York law forbids discrimination in employment because of race, creed, color, or national origin, by employers, labor unions, and employment agencies. (In 1952 the law was amended and the commission's jurisdiction extended to prohibit discrimination in places of public accommodation, resort, or amusement.) The powers of enforcement are lodged with a State Commission Against Discrimination, consisting of a chairman and four commissioners who receive annual salaries of $11,000 plus expenses and are appointed by the governor of the state, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, for five-year periods. T h e commission is empowered to receive, investigate and adjust complaints, hold hearings, subpoena witnesses, books, and papers, and issue "cease and desist orders." It is given the right to obtain court orders for the enforcement of its decisions. At the same time, persons accused of discrimination by the commission may obtain court reviews of its decisions. Penalties in the form of fines and imprisonment are provided for those who "wilfully resist, prevent, impede or interfere with the Commission" in the performance of its duties. It may also create community advisory and conciliation councils to study the problem of discrimination and supplement the commission's educational program. It has seven offices—in New York City, Albany, Buffalo, Syracuse, Binghamton, White Plains, and Rochester— where complaints of discrimination may be filed in person or by mail. The New York law assumes that discrimination in employment is related to other types of discrimination and that the elimination of discrimination in employment, if it is to be permanent, must coincide with the elimination of discrimination in other areas of society. It assumes, too, that the creation of an informed and sympathetic public opinion is one of the necessary conditions for the ultimate success of an F E P C law and that this goal may be achieved by securing the cooperation of leading citizens in each community to further a program of education designed to attain that end. T h e commission has, thus far, created twelve community councils—in Albany, Bronx County, Broome County, Buffalo, Kings County, Manhattan, Queens County, Richmond County, Rochester, Syracuse and Onondaga County, Troy, and Westchester County. Council members serve without compensation. They are

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chosen from among educators and religious leaders, as well as from the ranks of labor and management, and include individuals of various backgrounds and points of view. "They are empowered to study discrimination, to make recommendations to the Commission for programs of formal and informal education, and to foster through community effort, better understanding and cooperation among the various groups and elements in the population." 7 Although it is still too early to evaluate their effectiveness, it is clear that the councils have undertaken diverse activities which, over a period of time, may have considerable impact upon discrimination in New York State. They have initiated surveys of intergroup education and activity, conducted forums on discrimination, set up speakers' bureaus, and have cooperated with local school systems by meeting with administrators and vocational guidance counsellors of public and parochial schools and arranging for representatives of the commission to address public school students. They have also met with individual employers and organized groups of employers and merchants. One council has conducted a study of discrimination in public housing in its community. In order to publicize the Ives-Quinn law and its own existence, the commission has issued large quantities of literature. In 1949, it distributed 318,082 copies of thirteen different pieces or items. It has also distributed more than 100,000 posters—listing the important provisions of the law—to employers, unions, employment agencies, and educational agencies and has reprinted and distributed thousands of magazine articles dealing with various aspects of discrimination. In 1949, the commission completed the production of the March of Time film, An Equal Chance, which portrays its work and achievements. By the end of 1950 the film had been seen by more than one million persons in 354 movie houses in eighty communities.8 In 1951, films on human relations made available by the commission were seen by "audiences totalling approximately 225,000 persons." 9 The commission has also used the press, radio and television to publicize its work. 10 As of December 3 1 , 1951, the commission had received a total of 2,103 verified complaints and had closed 1,986. Of these, fifty were withdrawn by the complainant and 140 were dismissed for lack of

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jurisdiction. In 851 cases, no discrimination was found. In 438 cases, it was found that no discrimination had been practiced against the defendant although investigation disclosed the existence of a discriminatory employment policy. In 504 cases, the complaint was validated and discrimination "adjusted" by the commission. T h r e e cases were ordered for hearing; two of these were adjusted prior to the date of hearing. 1 1 Numerous employers have voluntarily appeared before the commission and have asked to have their employment policies reviewed. Other employers, on entering the state from other areas, have consulted the commission before recruiting labor. A l t h o u g h the enforcement powers of the commission apply only to cases based upon formal complaints, it has also initiated investigations in response to information of discrimination received from reliable sources. Of 647 such investigations, discrimination was found to exist in 461 instances and was adjusted as a result of the commission's intervention. 1 2 T h e r e is little reason to doubt that the commission has, in many instances, succeeded in breaking down racial and religious barriers in employment. Henry C. T u r n e r , the commission's first chairman, has testified as follows to its effectiveness: T h e law has been in operation two years and it is now possible to form an appraisal of its effectiveness. T h e testimony of people actually engaged in job placement activities reveals that fields of opportunity previously closed to certain groups have been opened and that resistance to the law has lessened. Pre-employment inquiries are now the exception rather than the rule. T h e evidence all points to a continuing and progressive lessening of illegal discriminatory employment practices. T h e experience of the commission has been a continuing demonstration of the fact that the objectives of the law can be attained. 13 T h e New York Herald Tribune

wrote on March 28, 1949:

Legislation against discrimination in employment is practical and successful. This is common knowledge in New York; the evidence is everywhere plain. There were serious doubts when our State Commission Against Discrimination began operation in 1945, but the subsequent record is one of expanding progress. T h e achievements have been many and precise, and the New York system is so well established and recognized that it is now taken as a model in other forward-looking cities and states."

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A survey of the volume of complaints of employment discrimination filed with private Jewish defense agencies during comparable periods ending in March, 1945, and March, 1946, respectively, offers additional evidence concerning the impact of the law upon discriminatory employment practices. Seven cities were included in this survey: Boston, Chicago, Cincinnati, Detroit, Milwaukee, New York, and Philadelphia. The result showed a striking contrast between New York and all other cities in the volume of complaints. Whereas every other city reported an increase of 77 per cent or more, with an over-all increase for the six cities, excluding New York, of 93 per cent, New York reported 6 per cent fewer complaints in the latter period." A survey in 1946 of 247 private employment agencies in thirteen cities—Boston, Chicago, Cincinnati, Cleveland, Detroit, Kansas City, Milwaukee, Minneapolis, Newark, New York, Philadelphia, St. Louis, and San Francisco—provides significant information about the effect of F E P C laws upon questions concerning race and religion asked on employment questionnaires. Only two of 107 agencies surveyed in New York and Newark, where F E P C laws then existed, included references to religion on their registration forms, whereas 91 per cent of the 140 agencies surveyed "outside of New York and Newark included questions about religion on their registration blanks." A marked difference was shown between the latter two cities and Milwaukee, Wisconsin (Wisconsin's F E P C law does not include enforcement provisions). In Milwaukee, five of the six agencies investigated asked questions concerning religion. According to the survey, "the marked contrast between this practice and that in New York and Newark suggests that the lack of enforcement powers in the Wisconsin statute has in large measure nullified the intent of the law." 16 There is no doubt that the outward and more obvious manifestations of discrimination—discriminatory advertisements and questions as to race and religion on employment registration blanks—have decreased in New York and other states with F E P C laws. It is also true that areas of employment previously closed to Negroes, such as department stores, have been opened as a result of such laws.

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T h e precise degree, however, to which discriminatory practices have declined is open to debate. In many instances, evasion through the use of subtler methods of discrimination has taken the place of conformance. A representative of one New York employment agency is reported to have remarked concerning employers: " T h e employer can state religious preference only to people in agencies that he knows. But, today, employers will have to try in a backhand fashion to get the inference across to agencies." " Indeed, the employment agency seems to have become the primary instrument of evasion. This was attested to by Representative John E. Rankin of Mississippi before a Senate subcommittee in 1947: " T h e businessmen in New York tell me that they have had to resort to employment agencies to get around this thing." 18 An investigation of the practices of employment agencies in New York State in 1945 and 1946, by the Commission on Law and Social Action of the American Jewish Congress, revealed wholesale violations of the law. 19 In the 1946 survey, 121 of a total of 194 licensed "white collar" agencies in Manhattan, Brooklyn, and Long Island were telephoned by investigators who, without identifying themselves, asked if they could secure a Protestant stenographer. T h e comments of the agencies were recorded on prepared questionnaires. Of the 121 employment agencies investigated, only fourteen, or 12 per cent, refused to fill the discriminatory job order. T h e vast majority, despite emphatic repetition of the discriminatory order, accepted it without comment. " A large minority" referred to the anti-discrimination law while expressing their intention to fill the order. A typical remark was, "Yes, though we cannot be so indiscreet as to ask religion, we have means of knowing and can certainly fill your order." Only 22 per cent of those willing to accept discriminatory orders voiced any hesitancy. Although the investigations of 1945 and 1946 are not strictly comparable because of a difference in method, it appears that in 1945, 32 per cent of 1 1 2 agencies investigated had refused to fill the orders, as against the 12 per cent who refused in 1946. In 1945, 38 per cent of those who filled the orders had voiced hesitancy compared with 22 per cent in 1946. That employment agencies in large numbers have continued to disregard the law was demonstrated by another survey conducted

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by the American Jewish Congress in Manhattan, in the spring of 1949.20 It was found that two-thirds of the Manhattan employment agencies supplying white collar personnel were willing to accept a discriminatory job order from an unidentified person over the telephone. Observance of the law by these agencies has increased over 1946, but only to a slight degree. . . . If so many agencies are willing to accept a discriminatory request over the telephone from an unidentified caller, it can be safely assumed that an even higher proportion of agencies will accept such orders, in violation of the law, when made in person.21 T h a t these facts are indicative of widespread violations of the law by employers is verified in a report issued on March 11, 1948, by the Committee to Support the Ives-Quinn Law. 22 After noting that "there is evidence of a reduction at least in outward discrimination in that discriminatory advertisements and inquiries on application blanks are now a rarity in New York State," it comments that "nevertheless, such checks as have been made indicate that violation of the law is still widespread." T h e State Commission Against Discrimination has been cognizant of these wholesale violations of the law by employment agencies. It has thoroughly investigated their policies and practices, it has conferred with representatives of the agencies and their legal advisers, and has succeeded in bringing about the removal of discriminatory questions from the application blanks used by the agencies. But, basically, it has achieved little. In fact, a number of agencies have begun a counterattack. Doris M. Ivory, an official of the Association of Private Office Personnel Agencies, initiated an action in the courts in 1950 in which, among other things, she challenged the commission's right to demand that employment agencies post a commission notice setting forth the provisions of the Ives-Quinn law.23 T h u s far the courts of New York State have upheld the commission. Several reasons account for the continued prevalence of discrimination in New York. One is that it takes time to eliminate discriminatory practices. T h e process is fraught with many problems and difficulties, and it may be years before the commission's educational activities and the operation of the law will successfully inhibit discrimination. Another is the "soft" commission policy. In a letter to The New York Times on March 7, 1949, Lester B. Granger,

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executive director of the National Urban League, charges that "commission policy has leaned backward in favor of the 'soft' approach. But softness too long continued becomes mere mushiness and encourages not compliance but contemptuous violation." 24 Until October, 1949, the commission had not felt impelled to issue a single cease and desist order, or to hold a public hearing. Since then, three hearings have been ordered, two of which were not held because of settlements prior to the hearings. One hearing was held in 1950, and resulted in a cease and desist order by the commission to the firm involved. Obviously, cease and desist orders, public hearings, and court actions are not valuable in and of themselves. Their absence, however, may be symptomatic of a weakness in the commission's policy. T h e Committee to Support the Ives-Quinn Law has maintained that "it seems difficult to avoid the suspicion that SCAD is willing to settle for less than full compliance with the letter and spirit of the law, in order to avoid the public hearing stage." 25 Certainly, the employer who wishes to discriminate will do so if he knows that being caught will not involve him in any particular difficulties or in the adverse publicity occasioned by a public hearing, but will entail simply a promise to obey the law in the future and "at worst . . . some sort of an adjustment for the individual complainant." 24 This has created in the minds of many of New York's citizens the impression that it is possible to evade the law and that the filing of a complaint with the commission will not necessarily bring satisfaction to the complainant. A survey conducted among a selected sample of 504 New Yorkers has confirmed the existence of this impression. It has revealed that only 8 per cent of those interviewed, "had any 'genuine understanding* of" the law. When they were informed of the provisions of the law, 56 per cent believed it to be inefficient and easily circumvented; yet 85 per cent of those questioned approved of the law itself.27 Such skepticism in the mind of the average person, who is the one most apt to require the commission's aid, must ultimately result in the law's impotence and failure. This situation has been further aggravated by other faults in the commission's procedure. T h e time required for adjusting complaints is regarded by many as "unduly long." In thirteen cases filed by the Urban League, "the average length of time from the date

174 FEPC PROGENY of filing to the date of closing the case was 13 weeks." 28 The commission stated in 1948 that, on the average, it required three months to dispose of a complaint. 2 * For the ordinary worker, this delay is far too long for the law to be of any help to him. Moreover, with reference to the complainant, the commission's standards of "adjustment" or "conciliation" are so flexible that they lose much of their validity. A statement of these standards may be found in a pamphlet entitled "Patterns of Conciliation Under the New York State Law Against Discrimination," written by Henry Spitz, general counsel of the commission, and published by the commission. They are summarized in the Annual Report for 1951. It is interesting to note that in its settlement of a case involving, for instance, proven discrimination in hiring, the commission does not feel bound to demand that the accused hire the complainant either at once or at the next available opportunity. In this respect, it is far behind the Connecticut Inter-Racial Commission whose announced policy is "that in every case of unlawful refusal to employ an applicant, the only satisfactory adjustment would be an outright offer of a job." 30 It feels even less impelled to demand partial or complete back pay for the complainant, from the moment of refusal to hire. Similar considerations apply to other types of discrimination. In this respect, Morroe Berger, a recent student of the subject, is justified in asserting that "SCAD's main function seems to be to reach as many employers as possible and to get across to them its 'educational' message rather than to obtain a satisfactory settlement for the individual complainant." 31 But in so doing the commission sacrifices perhaps the more important function of educating the man in the street to the importance and value of its work. This weakness is aggravated by the commission's record with respect to the number of complaints which it has found valid. During its existence it has sustained about 25 per cent of the complaints that it has received. (In 43 per cent of complaints received, although it has not sustained the individual complainant, it has discovered evidence of discrimination in other aspects of the respondent's employment policy.) In 1950, the percentage of complaints sustained reached a low of 22 per cent.32 In 1951, it rose to 28 per cent.33 Obviously, either the complaints are weak or the commission's stand-

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ards of adequate evidence and guilt are too severe. In either case, its rejection of two thirds or almost three fourths of all complaints is hardly calculated to increase its stature in the eyes of the average worker. The commission's policy has thus contributed to the impression that it accomplishes little, that its scrutiny is easily evaded, and that the person who files a complaint is not likely to emerge with any tangible gain. The result is apathy and inertia and only a very small number of complaints filed each year—far smaller than prevailing discriminatory practices would seem to call forth. In 1949, there were 3 1 5 verified complaints. In 1950, the number declined to 257, and a further decline, to 243, ensued in 1951. 3 1 This leads to one further result. The law limits the commission's enforcement powers to verified complaints of discrimination, filed by aggrieved persons. Where the commission initiates investigations of its own into employment practices, it lacks the power to enforce any decisions it may make. It has, moreover, adopted a selfimposed rule of not initiating investigations unless it first receives "a modicum of credible evidence" concerning existing discriminatory practices. In view of these limitations, the number of complaints filed and the extent to which they reflect discriminatory practices, must ultimately determine the law's effectiveness. As a result of the current small number of complaints being received by the commission and the fact that they do not reflect existing discriminatory practices, the commission's efforts must ultimately prove inadequate. With a view to correcting this situation, the Committee to Support the Ives-Quinn Law has made the following recommendations to the commission: 35 I

That the Commission accept as its first responsibility in complaint cases, the protection of the individual's civil right; that it first investigate and, where the complaint is sustained, adjust the individual complaint; that it then proceed to effect a change in the overall policy of the respondent. In implementing this policy, it is urged that the Commission: 1. Take steps to speed up the handling of complaints. 2. Set forth concrete standards of what constitutes adjustment of a complaint; that such standards be clearly stated in its manuals of operation and in its annual and other reports.

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FEPC PROGENY That the Commission revise its publicity policy to include: 1. Releases reporting on the disposition of all cases satisfactorily adjusted or dismissed, including in the former cases, terms of adjustment; these releases, to be sent to all interested agencies as well as to the press. 2. The issuance of a monthly docket of all cases filed, pending or closed that month, indicating the status of each; such docket to be distributed to all interested agencies. That the Commission undertake full investigations on an industrywide basis, for example of such industries as banks, insurance companies, public utilities, or department stores; and that it make public its plans for and the findings of such investigations.

In its initial reaction, the commission refused to recognize the existence of the above-mentioned faults and rejected the recommendations as, among other things, "impractical" and "unacceptable." •• Except for publishing isolated illustrations of settlements, it maintains its refusal to reveal publicly the terms of adjustment of all cases satisfactorily adjusted. In this policy, it has been followed by all other existing state anti-discrimination commissions. As has recently been pointed out, "none as yet gives complete and .systematic reports on the number of complainants who have actually been offered (and have accepted) employment, the number of cases in which back pay has been awarded, and so on. In other words, it is impossible for the public to judge the enforcing agencies' standards in attempting to eliminate discrimination in employment." 37 The commission has not, however, been unresponsive to public pressure. On October 3 1 , 1949, it scheduled, for the first time, a formal public hearing on a complaint of discrimination. The case was settled before the hearing opened, with the employer acceding to a previously rejected decision of the commission. T h e hearing was thereupon called off. 38 On October 17, 1950, the commission held its first public hearing, on the complaint of a Jewish Czechoslovakian-born veteran of the United States Army, who was asked discriminatory questions by the Kirk Lucas Employment Agency. Subsequently, in the same case the commission issued its first cease and desist order.39 The commission has also approved the need of industry-wide investigations and actions against discrimination. Commissioner

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Caroline K. Simon stressed this in an address in defense of the commission's policies in 1 9 5 1 : The Commission has always taken the position that it must do more than simply deal with complaints; and in its 1948 Report of Progress it formally announced its conviction that major emphasis must increasingly be given to an effort to prevent and eliminate discrimination on an industry[-wide] basis. One aspect of this effort has been the action of the individual investigating commissioner in conferring with official representatives of an industry of which a particular respondent is a part. The most recent effort of the Commission has been a program for the formation of industrywide committees to work in cooperation with the Commission. Some of these committees have already been formed and others are in the process of being established.40 Perhaps the most heartening indications of the commission's responsiveness to the suggestions of civic agencies were the results of a conference in September, 1 9 5 1 , in which the commission met with representatives of thirty-three intergroup agencies and civic groups. T h e commission indicated a readiness to accept a number of the recommendations put forth by the agencies. Among the recommendations that received assent were the f o l l o w i n g : 4 1 That emphasis be placed on follow-up by agencies in cases where they have encouraged the filing of a complaint, and that they be informed of the progress of these complaints so that their follow-up activities will be effective. That agencies be alert to report to the Commission any situation regarding either an individual, firm or industry which seems to be discriminatory, so that the Commission can initiate an investigation. That the Commission publicize the results of its industry-wide investigations, giving the names of the firms involved and any statement of policy agreed to by these firms. That the Commission recommend to the Governor and state legislators that the law be strengthened so as to give the Commission power to initiate complaints and to cover places of public accommodation. That the Commission establish a liaison committee in the banking industry.

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While state F E P C legislation is the most important phase of the current effort to eliminate discrimination in employment, a significant supplement to such effort lies in the enactment of municipal F E P C ordinances. Municipal anti-discrimination legislation has several advantages. First, it may be easier to enact, since the strength of minority groups and movements for the equalization of employment opportunities generally center in the large cities. Second, enforcement of the law should prove more vigorous and efficient on a local level. Third, local F E P C ordinances and commissions are more effective as educational instruments than state or federal laws. "Education at the local level," write two observers, "if properly carried out, should yield maximum benefits." 42 The most comprehensive municipal ordinances, proposed or enacted,43 include the purpose of the ordinance and/or findings concerning the evil effects of discrimination; coverage—usually city officials and employers, contracting agencies, private business firms of a certain size, unions and employment agencies; 44 types of employment practices regarded as unfair, and enforcement procedures and penalties.45 The latter are usually of two kinds: those which create a commission to administer and enforce compliance with the law, and "those which merely provide penalties for violation" and leave the act's enforcement to the aggrieved individual or to the prosecuting authorities of the city.48 Thus far, the legality of municipal F E P C ordinances has not been determined. A memorandum issued by the Commission on Law and Social Action of the American Jewish Congress states that "because of the diversity of state and local law and the novelty of the legal question, no definite answer can be given now as to the constitutionality of a city (as distinguished from a state) FEP law." 47 A study of the question in The Yale Law Journal arrives at a different and more favorable opinion. The authors believe that "unless the trend of decisions in a particular state has been especially narrow in interpreting the extent of municipal power, an effective fair employment practices ordinance can be drafted which would withstand attack in the courts. Such an ordinance should provide for an administrative agency to make possible the use of educational and persuasive techniques and to aid in effective enforcement." They caution, however, that "where an administrative

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agency is provided, special care must be used in drafting standards for the guidance of the agency, in order to avoid the pitfall of invalid delegation of legislative power." 48 There exists sufficient evidence to indicate the effectiveness of municipal legislation. Senator Hubert H. Humphrey, testifying before a congressional committee, noted that within six months following the enactment of an F E P C ordinance in Minneapolis, numerous department stores were hiring Negroes as clerks and supervisors for the first time.49 At the same hearing, Frank S. Loescher, executive director of the Philadelphia Fair Employment Practice Commission, reported that during the year following the passage of the Philadelphia ordinance, the number of department stores hiring Negro cashiers, clerks, and salespeople had increased greatly. Specialty shops and chain stores had expanded their employment of Negroes. Public utilities and at least one insurance company had opened positions to them, and the Philadelphia Fire Department had abolished segregation.50 As interesting contrast exists between the progress achieved in these cities and the situation in Chicago, which was the first to enact a fair employment practice ordinance. Chicago's ordinance obligates all contractors for the city not to discriminate in their employment policies, but does not provide for a commission to enforce the law or for penalties to be applied to those who flout it. The result is evident in its lack of progress against existing discriminatory practices. Indeed, discrimination seems more prevalent in Chicago than elsewhere in Illinois, which has no state FEPC law. In a recent survey, the Illinois Interracial Commission found that "85 percent of the firms which contract to the city use discriminatory application forms." Its report notes further that with few exceptions, the 91 firms analyzed which supply goods and services to the city of Chicago on a contract basis, violate their signed pledges to adhere to fair-employment practices. As a group they provide substantially less over-all employment to nonwhite workers than does Illinois industry as a whole, substantially less than the proportionate population of nonwhites in Chicago would indicate.*** It is apparent that 9 out of 10 nonwhites employed are at the very lowest occupational levels, and that white-collar jobs for nonwhites are not available in these firms.51

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As one reviews existing state and municipal FEPC laws, the following conclusions emerge: Laws prohibiting discrimination have proven effective in opening areas of employment to minority groups. Laws which do not provide procedures for enforcement, which fail to create an agency to receive complaints and to check on compliance, and which do not provide sanctions for noncompliance, are useless. Indeed, in so far as they instill false hopes among minority groups and weaken the struggle for adequate legislation, they are far more injurious than helpful. Finally, the effectiveness of even the best law will depend upon those who administer it. A timid commission, fearful of antagonizing powerful interests and refusing to enlist mass support in its law enforcement activities, will tend to create apathy and cynicism among those who need the law most. Although it may be able to point to certain positive achievements, these must of necessity be far less than would obtain if it enjoyed the enthusiastic cooperation and support of all minority groups.

XII: FEPC LEGISLATION AND AMERICAN SOCIETY

IN EVALUATING the history and achievements, as well as the future, of F E P C legislation, several questions come to mind. T o what extent, one may ask, does such legislation undermine private enterprise and the right of an employer to hire whom he chooses? Do F E P C laws result in an exodus of business from those states which enact them? A r e FEPC's benefits overshadowed by the resultant strikes, violence, and increased prejudice which are attributed by some to FEPC action? W o u l d an F E P C law be applicable to the South with any degree of success? What is the relationship of F E P C legislation to the economic well-being of society and how would such legislation fare during a depression? Finally, can FEPC legislation succeed in a segregated society? These are fundamental questions and the answers to them should determine our evaluation of fair employment practice legislation. Fortunately, there exists a sufficiently significant body of authentic information to enable us to provide the answers. THE QUESTION OF FREE ENTERPRISE

Those who argue that fair employment practice legislation undermines our system of private enterprise usually contend that it does so by frequently embarrassing and burdening employers with false accusations of discrimination and prejudice, and by forcing them to hire workers of a certain race or religion. T h e information at our disposal indicates that by and large these allegations lack foundation. Fair employment practice committees are not interested in whom the employer hires so long as the hiring is done pursuant to nondiscriminatory principles. Indeed, they usually

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seek to shield employers from unjust and unwarranted complaints. The President's committee dismissed approximately 64 per cent of the complaints it received because they were unsubstantiated, or invalid for other reasons. According to one of its reports, "there were some 800 employers who never knew they had been charged with discrimination, since FEPC, without notice to the parties charged, persuaded the complainants that they did not have valid cases." 1 The burden of proof was placed upon the complainant rather than the employer. Accusations to the contrary notwithstanding, the President's committee and its regional offices made a serious effort to abide by these principles. State fair employment practice commissions have been no less zealous in their concern for employers. As of the end of 1950, the New York State Commission had dismissed 723 of a total of 1,743 verified complaints filed since its inception, because of "no probable cause found." 2 In its report for 1948, the commission comments as follows: "New York has demonstrated beyond the peradventure of doubt that such a law can be administered without confusion, recrimination . . . and without threat to the stability and order of business enterprise." 3 As has been indicated previously, certain critics of the New York commission's policies have accused it of being too concerned with the "stability and order of business enterprise" and not enough with the welfare of individual complainants. The New York commission's tactful and very considerate approach to problems of discrimination has earned for it the allegiance of numerous businessmen who were at one time opposed to anti-discrimination legislation. The Bronx Chamber of Commerce, which originally opposed the Ives-Quinn Law of New York, has unanimously approved a resolution supporting "federal legislation similar to the New York State law having to do with discrimination in employment." * Peter Grimm, former president of the New York State Chamber of Commerce, has remarked that "the administration of the law has been effective and salutary." 5 Julius H. Barnes, a former president of the United States Chamber of Commerce, has written that "the FEPC ideal appears to me to be one of even-handed justice and equal opportunity, assured by the authority of Government itself." 6 The increasing support for

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FEPC legislation by prominent businessmen throughout the country—men such as William L. Batt, president of S.K.F. Industries; Paul G. Hoffman, president of the Studebaker Corporation and former administrator of the ECA; Henry R . Luce, editor of Time, Life, and Fortune magazines; Nelson A. Rockefeller; Beardsley Ruml, chairman of the board of R. H. Macy and Company; Spyros P. Skouros, president of Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corporation; and Eric Johnston, former president of the United States Chamber of Commerce 7—is sufficient proof that such legislation does not curb or harm business enterprise. Nor have the predictions of those who have prophesied that states enacting FEPC legislation would be faced with an exodus of industry been borne out by events. T o cite but one example: during 1948, the third year of the operation of the Massachusetts law, thirty-six new business organizations were established in metropolitan Boston and fifty-eight firms began new construction at a cost of $300,000,000.' T H E QUESTION OF INCREASED P R E J U D I C E AND V I O L E N C E

Granted, then, that FEPC laws are not burdensome to business, do they not, however, result in labor disorders, violence, and increased prejudice? The affirmative contention is usually coupled with the suggestion that discrimination can be eliminated only through education and persuasion and that it is in the attempt to use the power of legislation and sanctions that violence and increased prejudice occur. Fair employment practice officials would be the first to admit that force alone cannot eliminate discrimination or lessen prejudice. They would stress, however, that FEPC laws do provide for persuasion and education, as preferable to other means, and that sanctions are invoked only as a last resort. It is interesting to note that, thus far, state fair employment practice commissions have rarely had to impose sanctions or apply to the courts to secure compliance with their decisions. Education, persuasion, and conciliation have been almost the sole methods used. Yet these have been made possible by the existence, in the background, of laws enabling the commissions to compel obedience to their decisions when persuasion and education have failed. It is this combination

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of education and enforcement power which accounts for the superiority of F E P C legislation over other methods. From another viewpoint, the underlying principle of such legislation is that legislation itself, as the expression of public opinion, may serve as a powerful instrument of education and that that education is best which educates by doing. Fair employment practice commissions seek to eradicate discrimination not only by providing information and changing attitudes but also by altering habitual behavior patterns. The tendency of Negroes and whites to establish cordial relationships upon being placed together in industrial plants and department stores indicates the correctness of this approach. Goodwin Watson has observed that "persuasive effort to alter prejudice is largely wasted so long as social institutions are accepted which incarnate these very prejudices. It was heartening to observe in our survey how often the breaking down of segregation led to the discovery of friendly qualities which overcame prejudice." 9 That education and legislation serve to bolster and sustain one another is affirmed in a well-known pamphlet dealing with F E P C legislation: " T h e complementary character of education and legislation is strikingly demonstrated by the fact that it became necessary to pass laws making school attendance compulsory before our educational system itself was able to function effectively. It is almost a universal maxim that 'honesty is the best policy.' Nevertheless, laws dealing with departures from that policy are no less universal. Indeed, the Ten Commandments themselves have had to be reinforced by legal sanctions." More important yet, it continues: "Laws do not of themselves ever automatically end the abuses they are designed to correct. Our criminal statutes have not eliminated crime nor have the juvenile courts abolished delinquency. Laws do, however, establish criteria by which our actions may be judged. Passage of this legislation will establish that employment discrimination is inimical to the public welfare. It will indicate that public policy is opposed to hiring standards based on race, religion, color, or national origin, and it will thus provide a frame of reference within which the necessary educational processes can be accelerated." 10 Dr. Will Alexander, former chief of the Minority Groups

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Branch of the War Manpower Commission, has testified to the importance of such legislation by comparing the effectiveness of the government agency of which he was head with that of the President's committee: "And we went through the persuasion period, and we know, with all sincerity, and with the emergency back of it, how impotent we were to get this thing done by persuasion, and it was not until the President appointed the Fair Employment Practice Committee that we began to get results." 1 1 A comparison of F E P C laws that provide enforcement powers with those that do not offers irrefutable evidence that although force alone is incapable of eliminating discrimination and prejudice, education unaccompanied by at least the possibility of force is futile. In the combination of education and enforcement powers provided by law lies the best possibility of effective action. T h e contention that F E P C laws have resulted in increased prejudice, strikes, and violence is confuted by a report of the President's FEPC. "Once the barriers were down," it notes, "the workers of varying races and religions worked together efficiently and learned to accept each other without rancor." 12 The usual result, the report observes, "is a friendlier attitude of race toward race. Cooperation takes the place of rancor. Plant morale improves. A series of such advances in local industries can go far toward changing community racial relationships, and can provide the foundation for better interracial feeling." 13 T h e plausibility of this observation may be inferred from our knowledge of the factors which aid in maintaining discrimination. An employer who does not hire Negroes because he thinks them inefficient or believes his employees will object and thus lower the plant's efficiency, or because of habit or fear of the new and the strange, may be expected to change his opinion once he introduces a Negro into his plant and discovers that efficiency has not been reduced, that the Negro is a good and faithful worker, and that the employees do not create difficulties—perhaps they even accept the presence of a Negro as a normal phenomenon. As for those workers who object to having Negroes in their midst, once the Negro is introduced into the plant, they usually find that their fears of him are unfounded: he is a rather decent sort of fellow, and no different, except in color, from other workers. They

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then accept him and cease to feel hostile or strange toward him. Even where opposition to Negroes is a result of economic factors, antagonism and manifestations of intolerance need not follow upon the hiring of a Negro. Where employees feel that the hiring of a Negro will be destructive of their seniority rights, as was the case in the Philadelphia transit situation, the employment of Negroes over a period of time will effectively prove otherwise. Where they believe that the hiring of Negroes reduces the number of positions available to white men, the basis of their belief is the view that whites and Negroes are distinctly separate and hostile groups; this, in turn, results in the desire to exclude Negroes from one's own group and from the jobs to which members of one's group have access. But this group exclusiveness is broken down by the employer's act of hiring a Negro and making him a member of the white labor force. T h e cooperation required between all units of the force creates social bonds between the Negro and other workers and thus strengthens the feeling that the new man is an integral part of the group. This may help to explain why, once the barrier between groups is lowered, as happened in the case of the New York Telephone Company, the Philadelphia and Los Angeles Transit companies and others, it becomes a relatively simple matter, accompanied by far less difficulty than the original step, to hire other members of the same group. Goodwin Watson, in his survey of methods used to eliminate discrimination writes: Persons with strong prejudices who have to live and work together soon experience human qualities and relationships which tend to break down the prejudice. Our survey presented many illustrations of this important truth. White workers in factories forced by the war, the FEPC and the CIO unions to accept Negro co-workers came to tolerate and eventually to like their new companions. Families which planned to move out of housing projects when Negroes came in but were delayed in this moving discovered that they liked their new neighbors and that they no longer cared to move.14 On the other hand, it should be emphasized that group antagonism and exclusiveness will not be completely eliminated unless the Negro is hired on terms of complete quality in all conditions of employment. His employment under inferior conditions is a con-

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stant and visible reminder of his membership in a separate, "inferior" group and of his nonacceptance by the dominant group. Even where opposition by workers to the employment of Negroes has resulted in strikes, which were in turn broken by threats of sanctions against the strikers and the application of sanctions against strike leaders, we find no evidence of a resultant increase in prejudice. In the Philadelphia transit situation where, if nowhere else, resentment following the breaking of the strike might have been expected, the opposite actually took place. T h e Negroes who were hired were completely integrated into the labor force, and one Negro was elected a vice-president of the local union by an overwhelming majority of those workers who originally went out on strike. Apparently, opposition and strike action against the employment of minority groups are usually the product of agitation by a small nucleus of workers. Once this nucleus is isolated, or its demands rejected, and action is taken to end discrimination despite the existing opposition, the vast majority of workers tend to adjust themselves to the new situation without difficulty. One additional consideration is of extreme importance. If in certain isolated instances the efforts of the President's committee did lead to strikes, in most cases it was useful in preventing and settling strikes resulting from racial issues. Not only do white men strike against the employment and upgrading of Negroes; Negroes also strike against discriminatory conditions. Between July, 1943, and December, 1944, the committee helped to settle twenty-two strikes conducted by Negroes in protest against discriminatory employment practices. These involved a total of 198,643 workers, white and colored. 15 During the same period, the committee settled eighteen strikes (involving a total of 87,366 white and colored workers) initiated by white workers in protest against equal employment opportunities for Negroes. It succeeded in averting major strikes in plants of the Carnegie-Illinois Steel Corporation, Jones and Laughlin Steel Company, Youngstown Sheet and T u b e Company, and others. Its successes in these instances were due to its specialized knowledge of the causes of interracial conflict, its ability to use the methods best calculated to settle such conflicts, and finally, to the confidence it evoked from workers, which enabled its representatives

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"to persuade them to return to work after management and other Government agencies [had] failed." 18 T h e mitigation of industrial conflicts resulting from these efforts was undoubtedly far greater than any increase in conflict caused by the committee's policies. As one considers the racial conflicts and riots which characterize the American scene and which owe their origin to the bitterness and frustration caused by discrimination and racial segregation, one must inevitably conclude that the elimination of discrimination in employment through FEPC legislation has contributed substantially to the interracial contact and understanding which must undergird any attempt to achieve racial peace and friendship. T H E SOUTH

We proceed now to another significant problem. What of the applicability of F E P C legislation to the South? Would southern customs and mores render a national FEPC statute inoperative in that section of the country? If so, would Congress be wise to enact such a law? T h e answers to these questions can best be arrived at by studying the experience of the President's FEPC. Undoubtedly, the committee encountered its strongest resistance in the South. During its Birmingham hearings, despite several noteworthy exceptions, the majority of southern newspapers were unrestrained in their antagonism. In the opinion of Robert Weaver, "the most violent and intemperate statements emanated from the South, where the color-caste system was most firmly intrenched." 17 T h e committee established its first southern regional offices in Atlanta, Georgia, and Dallas, Texas, during the latter part of 1943. Before southeastern regional director A. Bruce Hunt, white and Virginia-born, had the opportunity to move his staff into FEPC's offices in a downtown office building in Atlanta, the City Council passed a resolution requesting members of Congress to close the office and ordered Mr. Hunt to leave the city. A t a later date, the attempt was made to require the FEPC in Atlanta to segregate its two Negro and three white employees in different offices. Although these actions had the active support and approval of Representative Ramspeck of Georgia, at that time Democratic whip in the House of Representatives and chairman of the House Civil Service Commission, 18 they were successfully resisted by the FEPC. T h e Negro

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members of the staff were accepted as government employees by other workers in the building and no difficulties ensued as a result of their presence. The committee's Final Report notes, significantly, that "there is no evidence that large numbers of the white citizens joined in the opposition to FEPC, and white members of labor organizations appear to have had little part in the movement." 19 Statistics dealing with complaints filed with the committee in various regions of the country indicate that, in proportion to its Negro population, the South lagged far behind other regions in the number of complaints filed and in satisfactory adjustments. Between July 1, 1943, and June 30, 1944, complaints involving Negroes, docketed by the FEPC throughout the country, totaled 3,188. Of these, 1,099 were filed in the East, 843 in the South, 740 in the Midwest and 506 in the Far West.20 It is pertinent to the discussion to compare the size of the Negro population in the South with that of other regions: In 1940, between nine and ten million Negroes, constituting approximately three fourths of all Negroes in the United States and one third of the southern population, lived in the South. At about the same time, approximately a million and a half Negroes, or 4 per cent of the total population, lived in New England, and in New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania and Delaware; approximately 2,100,000, or 6.6 per cent of the total population, lived in the eight states of Ohio, Michigan, Indiana, Illinois, Wisconsin, Missouri, Kansas, and Arkansas; the remainder lived in the Far West.21 After giving due consideration to the fact that the South is not as highly industralized as other sections of the country and that therefore the proportion of Negroes seeking opportunities in southern war industries would have been lower than elsewhere, the number of complaints filed in the South seems almost unbelievably small.22 The FEPC has attributed this condition to three factors: lesser industrialization of the South as compared to other regions, the tendency of southern Negroes to accept discrimination in employment as an unavoidable evil, and the effect of the southern press, which impaired the confidence of southern Negroes in the ability of the committee to eliminate discrimination. It may be added that fear of reprisals constituted an additional factor.

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The F E P C in the South met with even less success in adjusting complaints than in receiving them. Whereas that region was second in complaints received, it was third in satisfactory adjustments. T h e percentages of satisfactory adjustments for the four regions are as follows: East 39 4; South 18.6; Midwest 24.5; Far West 17.5. 33 Lest one be tempted to attribute undue significance to the higher rate of satisfactory adjustments in the South as compared to the Far West, the F E P C report explains that "the low satisfactory adjustment rate of the Far West can be explained chiefly by the large number of complaints against the Boilermakers." 24 Perhaps the most serious problem encountered by the committee in the South was in its relationship to the United States Employment Service, whose employees insisted upon fulfilling discriminatory requests for workers. Prior to the war, all USES offices had been under a decentralized state control, and those in the South had accepted and put into effect the employment practices current there. The use of separate USES offices for Negroes and whites facilitated discriminatory practices. Negro USES offices received calls for unskilled and domestic workers only, while requests for skilled labor were made through the white offices. Not only did USES officers in the South comply with discriminatory requests and fail to report to the FEPC the discriminatory practices of employers and unions, they actually initiated discriminatory policies of their own. In one city, trained Negro welders were recommended for out-of-town employment despite a serious local need for welders. In another, local USES officers were opposed to the establishment of a training school for Negroes because they felt it unwise and inopportune to train Negroes for skilled work while the demand for common labor was still great.25 The attitude of the USES in the South contrasted sharply with its cooperative attitude in the Northeast. The New York USES office, for instance, settled numerous cases of discrimination without calling in the F E P C and insisted that employers refusing to abandon discrimination be denied manpower priorities until such time as they altered their practices.2® However, although the South did prove most resistant to F E P C efforts, one must also recognize that it differed from other regions only in degree. Of the East, where the F E P C met with most co-

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operation, the committee writes as follows: " F E P C nevertheless found difficulty in removing barriers to Negroes in expanding war industries. It experienced also considerable resistance to placing qualified Negroes in skilled jobs. The East also tended to relegate Negroes to the so-called H jobs—hot, heavy and hard." " Moreover, as in other areas, the committee's efforts in the South achieved noteworthy successes as well as failures. The committee reports that "in two important Georgia industries WMC-USES changed its policy and worked successfully with F E P C to persuade the employers to begin a training program and eventually to employ many hundreds of Negroes. In each of these instances the employment of skilled Negroes was accomplished without discord." 28 T h e percentage of adjustments in the South was undoubtedly lower than elsewhere; yet of even greater significance is the positive fact that in 18.6 per cent of its southern cases the committee did achieve satisfactory adjustments. In view of these facts, one may conclude that discrimination in the South, though widespread and strongly resistant to change, is nevertheless not so well entrenched and unamenable to change as to nullify all efforts to eliminate it. Undoubtedly, powerful factors militate against its elimination. The tradition of a slave economy with its emphasis upon Negro inferiority; the belief that the welfare of the white man precedes that of the Negro; the vested interests of employers in maintaining wage differentials between white and Negro workers as a source of high profits and a preventive of trade union organization; and the discriminatory policies of various labor unions—these are all involved and are not easily overcome. Nevertheless, there are other factors which operate in favor of equality of opportunity and against discrimination. Most important are increasing industrialization and urbanization, which render more difficult the maintenance of a caste system derived from a plantation and rural economy. An additional factor is the growth of unionism, especially industrial unionism. During the last war, unions which emphasized the common interests and need for unity of all workers, contributed to the advancement of equality of employment opportunities in the South and better understanding between white and Negro workers. As has been mentioned in Chapter

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II, certain C I O unions, including the United Steelworkers and the Mine, Mill, and Smelter Workers, were in the forefront of those who welcomed the President's committee to the South. T h e United Mine Workers of America, while still in the A F of L, pioneered in establishing racial equality in employment in the South and served as a model for the early C I O unions in their attempts to solve racial problems. 29 T h e United Packinghouse Workers of America (CIO) is doing excellent work, in the South and elsewhere, in seeking to eliminate segregation and discrimination in its industry. T h e majority of unions and union leaders (notwithstanding the discriminatory policies of some) undoubtedly realize that segregation and discrimination are contrary to their best interests. As Herbert Northrup has written in Organized Labor and the Negro, ". . . with the exception of the Machinists, and possibly of the Railroad Trainmen, the Electrical Workers, and the Plumbers and Steamfitters, the important unions in expanding industries are favorably disposed toward continued improvement in the economic status of the Negro. T r a d e unionism should thus continue its service of alleviating the American race problem." 80 Moreover, the organization of white and colored workers into one union, the meetings of white and colored workers on the basis of common interests and their united action in solving common problems have undoubtedly created greater understanding and friendship between the two races. T h i s understanding has had results beyond the confines of the plant and the union meeting: " T h e union has often been the means of easing racial tensions. A t times it has been a potent factor in preventing race riots. Often white union men have intervened to protect Negro members from attacks by non-union whites who resented employment of Negroes on skilled jobs. There have been striking examples of this in the South, as well as in other sections." 31 One of the most encouraging signs that an F E P C law would be accepted by many southern white workers is the report of a survey recently conducted by the McGraw-Hill Research Department. T h e report shows that 48 per cent of southern workers are in favor of FEPC. 3 2 Although this figure probably includes Negro as well as white workers, it nevertheless indicates that a substantial number of white workers would welcome a fair employment practice law.

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Organizations of employers in the South have been in the forefront of the opposition to the F E P C and its efforts. Yet, individual employers have implemented policies of equality in their plants. T h e F E P C remarks in its Final Report that "discrimination in employment in Southern States is not overwhelmingly supported by white employers and employees. A number of unions are educating white workers against discrimination, and a number of employers have acted on their own initiative and without publicity to integrate Negroes in skilled jobs. T h e operator of a large textile plant has employed Negro women to work side by side with white women." 33 Obviously, employers in the South are likewise amenable to reason and persuasion on the question of discrimination. In view of the foregoing, it may be concluded that discrimination in the South, as in other areas of the country, is susceptible to change and can be eliminated, or at least diminished, through the cooperative endeavors of employers, labor unions, and government. THE PROBLEM OF F U L L

EMPLOYMENT

Another problem of vital importance to the future effectiveness of F E P C legislation is that of full employment. T h e r e can be little doubt that the condition of full employment and labor scarcity which has obtained during and since the war has provided an incentive for the utilization of the labor of minority groups and has materially aided existing fair employment practice commissions in the performance of their duties. It is probably true, too, that FEPC legislation requires continued full employment for its continued effectiveness, but despite the strong possibility of a deterioration in the employment situation, with all that this might mean to the welfare of minority groups, little attention has thus far been paid to this aspect of the problem. "With the exception of organized labor," writes Robert Weaver, "few have had the statesmanship to indicate that employment opportunities for any group cannot be secured without regard for the volume of total employment; no group can hope for job protection unless there are enough jobs for all." 34 Undoubtedly, the relationship between full employment and discrimination is far more complex than appears at first glance. Unemployment may be of short or long duration. If the former, the

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most important objective of a fair employment practice commission would be the prevention of wholesale, discriminatory dismissals of minority-group workers. T h e successful achievement of this goal would depend upon the length of existence of the commission, and the extent to which it had succeeded in bringing about among employers and workers of the majority group an abandonment of discriminatory practices, respect for the law, the willingness to cooperate with it, and a friendly relationship between workers of the majority and minority groups. It is quite probable that, at least at the very beginning of a depression or recession, when layoffs are first taking place and their significance in terms of prolonged unemployment and suffering is not yet clear, the commission may prove effective in preventing discriminatory firing of workers. Moreover, the hiring of members of minority groups during a period of full employment, when followed by their integration into trade unions and their achievement of seniority, renders their discriminatory discharge during a depression far more unlikely. On the other hand, should unemployment attain the proportions of previous depressions and continue for any length of time, there is little doubt but that the most stringent and wisest F E P C law would prove ineffective. This result is, of course, contingent upon one important assumption: that a depression, when and if it does come, will find the employment practices of employers and the attitudes of whites toward Negroes, and of Christians toward Jews, substantially the same as they are today. In other words, in the area of employment, people will still be thinking of themselves as members of competing religious and racial groups rather than as individuals. This assumption is certainly valid for any depression which may take place within the next few years. No matter how heroic the work of existing fair employment practice commissions may be—and the results of New York's F E P C have shown that discriminatory practices are not immediately eliminated—discriminatory attitudes and practices will continue for some time and will become more insistent and demanding once large-scale unemployment and suffering begin to appear. Thus, Weaver's assertion that "from the point of view of race relations, one of the most serious consequences of mass unemployment is the fact that it will create an economic situation in which

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gainful employment for the Negro can and will be interpreted as a menace to insecure white workers," 35 is as true today as ever before, and will still be applicable several years hence. In the event of a depression, unions which are currently pursuing discriminatory policies will probably intensify their discrimination while those which are solicitous of the welfare of their Negro members will be hard put to maintain their policies. Past experience proves that industrial unions with nondiscriminatory policies "have been relatively ineffective in maintaining occupational advancements for Negroes in periods of general unemployment." 34 T h e United Mine Workers, for instance, whose policy of equal treatment of Negroes and whites served as a model for other industrial unions, failed to prevent a decline in the proportion of Negro workers in the mines, which resulted from the substitution of machine loading for hand loading during the '30s.37 White workers will undoubtedly be incited to press for jobs at the expense of Negroes. Progressive union leaders endeavoring to maintain the seniority rights of all workers and a fair policy in layoffs, may find themselves outvoted by a terror-stricken and insecure white membership, continually incited by the small minority of racists who are to be found even in the most progressive unions today. During a depression, certain employers may find it convenient to stir up racial and religious animosities as a means of destroying the unions of their workers. Should the latter insist upon defending the seniority rights of all their members, the employers may appeal to the short-sighted self-interest of their white and/or Christian workers to repudiate the unions and their policies of nondiscrimination. A situation of this sort would obviously not be conducive to effective F E P C action. Conciliation and persuasion as practiced by a fair employment practice commission, and the arguments of "fair play" and "the American Creed," would hardly prove appealing to men intent upon keeping themselves and their families from hunger. Nor would forceful means succeed where reason and persuasion had failed. For what would one lose by resisting a decision of a commission if the alternatives were hunger and dire poverty? And let us remember, too, that throughout that period a small minority would be actively inciting white and Christian workers to act against their Negro and Jewish fellow workers and to reject the commis-

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sion's decisions. Aside from the ultimate possibility of a fascist victory, such as happened in Germany in the '30s under conditions of widespread unemployment and suffering, and the enactment of anti-Negro and anti-Jewish laws, there is no doubt that an F E P C law would under such circumstances prove difficult to enforce. Full employment and a feeling of security on the part of America's workers are necessary conditions for the successful functioning of F E P C laws. Those who wish to enact such laws must, at the same time, strive for a society, a government, and a system of laws capable of assuring these conditions. Otherwise, their efforts are doomed to failure. SEGREGATION

In conclusion, there remains one more problem of importance to be considered. Segregation in the South and elsewhere, especially that sanctioned by law, constitutes an important obstacle to the successful elimination of discrimination in employment. Aside from preventing the physical contact and social intercourse which are so essential to friendship and understanding between individuals and groups, segregation implies, as has been observed concerning segregation on the railroads, "that colored citizens are so inferior and degraded that they cannot be allowed to sit in public coaches occupied by white men." 38 Segregation by law or custom, whether it be applied to railroads, schools, public drinking places, restaurants, hotels, theaters, resorts, bathing beaches, housing, or other areas of group contact, serves to emphasize not only racial differences or the desire for separation on the part of the dominant white group, but also the basic "inferiority" and "untouchableness" of the minority group. Within the context of American, and especially southern, practice, segregation serves as a "badge of servitude," 38 for the Negro people. In the words of the President's Committee on Civil Rights, "segregation has become the cornerstone of the elaborate structure of discrimination against some American citizens. Theoretically this system simply duplicates educational, recreational and other public services, according facilities to the two races which are 'separate but equal.' In the Committee's opinion this is one of the outstanding myths of American history for it is almost always true

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that while indeed separate, these facilities are far from equal. . . . No argument or rationalization can alter this basic fact: a law which forbids a group of American citizens to associate with other citizens in the ordinary course of daily living creates inequality by imposing a caste status on the minority group." 40 Under such circumstances, it becomes doubly difficult to substitute equality of employment in place of discrimination, unless one proceeds, at the same time, against the entire system of segregation which serves to bolster discriminatory practices. An integral part of this problem is segregation within commercial and industrial establishments, such as segregated toilet facilities, locker rooms, drinking fountains, restaurants, and departments within factories. The persistence of such arrangements is obviously detrimental to the ultimate end of eliminating discrimination in employment. Apart from the usual inferiority of facilities for Negroes as compared with those provided for whites, segregated facilities within a plant prevent contact between the races and retard the development of habits of cooperation and sentiments of friendship which are fundamental to the ultimate realization of equality in employment. Because of the explosive nature of the problem of segregation and the diverse views which existed among its members, the President's F E P C never did take a positive and explicit stand on the question. This was due, too, to the fact that the executive orders did not mention segregation and limited the committee's jurisdiction to acts of discrimination. Since, as is frequently argued, segregation per se is not necessarily discriminatory, the committee might have been accused of overstepping its legal bounds had it taken a stand against segregation. Malcolm Ross once told a congressional committee that "segregation, per se, is of no concern to my committee." 41 T h e committee did take action only when segregation culminated in, or directly involved, discrimination. Each case of segregation was therefore examined and decided upon its own merits. For instance, in the case of the Alabama Shipbuilding and Drydock Corporation of Mobile, Alabama, where in 1943 rioting and violence resulted from the attempt to promote Negroes, a settlement was reached which limited Negroes to four areas or ways. T h e

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committee, however, issued a statement on July 6, reading as follows: " T h e Committee accepts the accomplished fact of the settlement made in Mobile to end a crisis in war production, except that the Committee cannot give its approval to the complete segregation of Negroes on the four ways and does not consider that as a precedent." In another instance, that of the Western Electric Company plant in Point Breeze, Maryland, where white workers struck in protest against the elimination of segregated toilet facilities, the committee did take a stand against segregation: " T h e Committee takes the position that in the circumstances of this case, where there are frequent and temporary transfers of workers from department to department, such installation of segregated duplicate facilities cannot but lead to discriminatory employment practices and would be in violation of Executive Order 9346." 42 On the other hand, the New York State Commission Against Discrimination has ruled that segregation in employment is illegal, even though the law does not explicitly forbid segregation. This commission has thus assumed that segregation is, by its very nature, discriminatory. 43 T h e position to be taken on this issue by a statutory, national F E P C will depend upon the political situation and the powers granted it by Congress. Perhaps the ruling of the President's committee, if enacted into future F E P C legislation, would prove wisest as a means of securing the support of whites in the South who are opposed to discrimination but favor segregation. Should the bill become law and succeed in winning the approval of increasing numbers of Americans, it would then be possible to amend it to cover segregation as well. It cannot be too strongly emphasized, however, that, in the long run, segregation must be banished from the American scene if the elimination of discrimination is to be assured.

XIII: THE MOVEMENT FOR PERMANENT FEPC LEGISLATION

F E P C bill was introduced by Representative Vito Marcantonio on July 20, 1942. It called for the establishment of the President's committee as a statutory agency, with power to inquire into discriminatory acts and to issue cease and desist orders. These orders were to be subject to review and enforcement by the federal courts. 1 The bill lacked popular support, however, and despite Marcantonio's strenuous efforts it was never reported out of committee.2 Since then the effort to enact a permanent F E P C law has been a story of frustration and defeat. T w o high points characterize the history of the movement: the first and second sessions of the Seventyninth Congress (1945-1946), and the second session of the Eightyfirst Congress (1950). The first period was preceded by the formation of a National Council for a Permanent FEPC, with Senators Wagner (Dem.-N.Y.) and Capper (Rep.-Kans.) as honorary chairmen, and also by a conference of Negro, Jewish, labor, and religious organizations on January 20 and 21, 1944, which urged the creation of a permanent FEPC. F E P C bills were introduced and hearings were held in the House and the Senate. Leaders of religious, labor, and minority groups, as well as a number of congressmen, testified in their favor. Only one witness, a Mrs. Agnes Waters, opposed the bills at the hearings. She emphasized that the Senate bill "sets up and legalizes a Red government in Washington." 3 At the same hearing, W. C. Hushing, chairman of the National Legislative Committee of the American Federation of Labor, filed a statement which indicated that although the A F of L had supported the President's committee, it was opposed to the creation of a T H E FIRST

200 M O V E M E N T FOR P E R M A N E N T FEPC LAW permanent FEPC. 4 At the House hearing, Representatives O. C. Fisher, A. L. Miller, and C. E. Hoffman, all members of the Committee on Labor, which was holding the hearings, opposed the bills and suggested "education" and "orderly progress" in place of legislation. Despite favorable reports by committees of both houses of Congress, the session closed without further congressional action. During the congressional recess, the Republican Presidential convention encouraged F E P C supporters by declaring, "We pledge the establishment by Federal legislation of a permanent Fair Employment Practices Commission." The Democratic convention, overwhelmed by southern strength, evaded the entire issue by stating, "We believe that racial and religious minorities have the right to live, develop and vote equally with all citizens and share the rights guaranteed by our Constitution. Congress should exert its full constitutional powers to protect those rights." 5 At the beginning of the first session of the Seventy-ninth Congress in January, 1945, thirteen separate bills proposing the creation of a permanent F E P C were introduced in the House. All were referred to the House Labor Committee. The committee decided that its hearings of the previous year had been sufficient, and without further ado, reported out a bill 0 which Representative Norton had introduced at the committee's request.7 Representatives O. C. Fisher and C. E. Hoffman filed dissenting minority reports. In a resolution which was referred to the Rules Committee, Mrs. Norton then asked for a House vote on her bill. T h e resolution required a special rule of the Rules Committee, since only revenue and appropriation bills and the bills of a few minor committees may be acted upon by the House without a special rule. 8 The issuance of a rule by the Rules Committee is in effect a recommendation to the House to vote upon the bill in question. Following the issuance of a rule, and prior to any vote on the bill, the House must vote to adopt the rule. Although the Rules Committee usually acts immediately upon an application by a committee chairman for a rule, when Mrs. Norton, on March 8, 1945, appeared before it and requested one, no definite action was taken until June 12, 1945. At that time, as a result of a tie vote of 6 to 6 within the Rules Committee, Mrs. Norton's request was refused.

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According to several observers, the tie vote was the result of collusion between southern Democrats and Republican members of the committee. T h e membership of the committee consisted of eight Democrats and four Republicans. T w o of the Democrats, Adolph J . Sabbath (Dem.-Ill.) the chairman, and John J . Delaney (Dem.-N.Y.) were in favor of F E P C legislation and of granting Mrs. Norton's request. The six others, representing southern and border states, were opposed. T h e four Republicans were committed to its support by the Republican party platform adopted at the previous presidential convention. T h e committee was thus evenly divided on the issue, and a vote in favor of Mrs. Norton's request could have been obtained only during the absence of one of the bill's opponents. Because of the absence of one or more southern committee members on various occasions, the opportunity for a favorable vote arose several times. However, the Republicans, who were theoretically in favor but actually opposed to the legislation, engaged in dilatory tactics whenever such an eventuality seemed probable. One observer remarks that "these maneuvers are not a matter of formal record, but the writer attended the public meetings of the Rules Committee and observed Republican members walk out of the committee room just before the vote on the F E P C rule was scheduled to take place. Albert Gore (Dem.-Tex.) charged that the Republican members of the committee 'procrastinated' to avoid a vote in the absence of a Democratic committee member." 9 Following this defeat, Mrs. Norton had two alternatives left: a discharge petition and the use of Calendar Wednesday. (The twenty-one-day rule, whereby a committee chairman could, after that period of time, place before the House a bill for which the Rules Committee had for more than twenty-one days refused a rule, had not yet been passed). The House rules provide that the Rules Committee may be discharged from further consideration of a special rule or order of business previously referred to it, if 218 members file a petition to that effect. The House must then vote upon the adoption of such rule. "In effect, therefore, the signing of Mrs. Norton's discharge petition by the requisite number would have been tantamount to a special rule reported by the Rules Com-

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mittee."

10

LAW

However, as of December 20, 1945, only 157 members,

of whom fifty were Republicans, had signed, and this attempt, too, failed. 11 Mrs. Norton then decided to use Calendar Wednesday as a last resort. T h e House rules provide that reports of committees requiring a special rule from the Rules Committee may be called for on Wednesday of each week without such a rule. A committee may use only one Wednesday for its report. Calendar Wednesday may be omitted only by unanimous consent or a motion requiring approval of two thirds of the members present. On Tuesday, September 25, Mrs. Norton objected to suspending the following day's Calendar Wednesday, and consequently a session was held. However, fifteen minutes after Wednesday's session began, William M. Whittington (Dem.-Miss.) moved that the House adjourn. T h e motion was carried, and Calendar Wednesday was brought to a close. Although three other attempts were made to utilize Calendar Wednesday, none succeeded, and the House phase of the effort to secure the approval of the Seventy-ninth Congress for a permanent F E P C came to an end. 12 T h e sponsors of F E P C legislation in the Senate met with no greater success. On January 6, 1945, Senator Chavez introduced a new F E P C bill with the sponsorship of six other senators. 13 Despite the obvious need of uniting all friends of the F E P C behind one bill, Senator Taft, on February 5, introduced another bill, which differed from the Chavez bill in several important respects.14 Unlike the former, it provided only for investigatory and advisory, but not enforcement, powers. It did not make discrimination illegal. It made no mention of discrimination because of national origin or ancestry, and it did not require government agencies to include in their contracts clauses forbidding discrimination. A subcommittee of the Committee on Education and Labor, headed by Senator Chavez, held public hearings on March 12, 1 3 , and 14, to consider both bills. T h e thirty-six witnesses who testified represented labor, farm, religious, civic, professional, racial, and business groups totaling more than sixty million people, and were unanimous in supporting the Chavez bill. 15 T h e Committee on Education and Labor reported out the Chavez bill favorably on May 24, 1945, but did not attempt to bring it to the floor of the

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Senate. When, on December 21, 1945, Senator Joseph Ball (Rep.Minn.) announced his intention "to force consideration of this bill early in 1946," Senator Chavez countered that he proposed to ask Congress to consider the bill immediately after the holiday adjournment.16 The Seventy-ninth Congress reconvened on January 14,1946. On January 17, Senator Chavez moved that the Senate consider his FEPC bill. The motion was made before 2:00 P.M. to prevent a filibuster by FEPC foes (Chavez took advantage of a little-used Senate rule which considers as non-debatable motions introduced before that hour). The motion was carried and Chavez began to discuss the bill. However, at 3:42 P.M., Senator McKellar moved that the Senate adjourn until the next day. His motion was adopted, and the Senate adjourned.17 When the Senate reconvened on the eighteenth, and Senator Barkley, the majority leader, requested unanimous consent for approval of the Journal without reading (a "routine request"),18 Senator Overton objected. He moved that the Journal for the previous day's proceedings be read and then moved to amend it to have it include "the prayer delivered by the Chaplain of the Senate at the convening of the Senate on said day." 19 Since a motion to correct the Journal is "a privileged question until disposed of," and "debatable at length," and since as regards debate concerning such corrections, the Senate "does not allow a motion for the previous question," Senator Overton and other southern congressmen were now in a position to conduct a full-dress filibuster against the Chavez bill, and proceeded to do so. Their task was lightened by the Senate's rules which "do not require a Senator's remarks to be germane or even addressed to the question under consideration." 20 Beginning with a discussion of the Journal, the filibuster continued as a tirade against the Chavez bill. As a commentary upon the democratic process within the Senate, it should be noted that according to Senator Overton's own admission, a majority of senators were in favor of the Chavez bill, and that his purpose was to prevent the majority from prevailing.21 On January 23, Senators Pepper and Taft attempted by various means to end the filibuster but failed. In order to make certain that only enemies of the FEPC would occupy the Senate chair when

204 M O V E M E N T FOR P E R M A N E N T FEPC LAW decisions had to be made affecting the continuance of the filibuster, Senator McKellar, the presiding officer, permitted only southerners to occupy his chair between January 8 and January 30. On February 4, an attempt was made to invoke the closure rule and thus limit debate to one hour per senator. Senator Barkley filed a closure petition signed by forty-eight senators. However, Senator McKellar blocked this move by ruling that the motion to amend the Journal was the only business before the Senate, and could be brought to a close only by unanimous consent. Senator Barkley appealed the ruling with the argument that the unfinished business before the Senate was the Chavez bill which was still pending from the previous day's business. When Senator McKellar ruled that Barkley's appeal itself was debatable, southern Democrats began to debate it and a filibuster within a filibuster developed.22 Matters dragged on until February 7. Friends of the FEPC had grown tired of the struggle, which had been conducted halfheartedly in the first place,23 and enemies of the bill had become confident of their voting strength. The two groups agreed to put the closure petition to a vote and to abandon the fight for the FEPC bill if it failed of adoption by the requisite two-thirds vote. Senator Barkley withdrew his appeal against Senator McKellar's ruling that the closure petition was not admissible, and the motion to amend the Journal was likewise withdrawn. The vote on the closure petition was set for February 9." The result—48 votes for and 36 against, which left the affirmative eight votes short of the two-thirds majority required to end unlimited debate—meant the defeat of FEPC legislation during that session. Of the forty-eight affirmative votes, twenty-five were Republican, twenty-two Democratic and one Progressive. Of the thirty-six negative votes, twenty-eight were by Democrats and eight by Republicans. Following the vote, in accordance with the previously arranged agreement, Senator Chavez moved that the Senate consider another bill. His motion was passed, 71 to 12, and the Seventy-ninth Congress ended with no further attempt being made to enact fair employment practice legislation.25 As one reviews the events of the Seventy-ninth Congress, what appears most striking is the halfheartedness with which friends of FEPC legislation, at least in the Senate, pursued their objective.

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Many observers, according to Arthur Krock in The New York Times, characterized the congressional fight over the Chavez bill as "phony," and referred to the filibuster as "the banking-hours filibuster." 24 He quotes the following description of the filibuster by C. P. Trussell of The Times: Though there were hot oral exchanges about "discriminations because of race, creed, color, national origin and ancestry," they always ended with displays of the old Senate good fellowship. After Senator George made his withering attack on those, including the President, who had brought up the bill, Senator Chavez, in charge of it, was among the first to grasp his hand after recess. Frequently there would be smiling huddles among representatives of the "warring" groups. It was interesting to observe that, though the Senate often sits until 5 p. M. or much later in discussions far less controversial, Senator Russell, manager of the filibuster, would signal to Senator Chavez about 4:30 P. M. to move for overnight recess, which was done.27 Senator Morse, who was most vocal in demanding that the filibuster be halted and recommended the holding of twenty-fourhour sessions in order to do so, "did not," Krock notes, "resort to the continuous quorum calls that would have made this a possibility and were employed against the delaying action on poll-tax repeal. A n d this was the first five-day-week filibuster that old hands can recall." Even the crowds in the gallery "seemed to sense that much of it was pure political theatre." 28 Another observer 29 has attributed the halfheartedness and good fellowship with which the fight for the Chavez bill was conducted to the indifference of the majority of senators, the opposition of Republican leadership, and "flaccid" leadership by President T r u m a n . In the House, Republican maneuvering made it possible for the Rules Committee to deny a rule to Mrs. Norton. In the Senate, Senator Taft's bill, introduced in opposition to that of Chavez, undoubtedly weakened the fight for the latter, while the votes of eight Republicans against closure sounded the death knell of the Chavez bill. If one notes, too, that the Republican leader, Senator White of Maine, was opposed to the bill, one will probably agree with the observation made at the time of the Senate debate that "Republican leadership is selling the Negro down the river in this fight despite the FEPC pledges of 1944." 30 As for President Truman, although he had made known his sup-

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port of permanent fair employment practice legislation and had sent a letter to Representative Sabbath in June, 1945, asking that a rule be granted Mrs. Norton, his support of such legislation lacked vigor and initiative. 31 Concerning the President's attitude, I. F. Stone has observed, " H e has come out for the FEPC again and again, but the manner has been that of a candidate supplying a necessary indorsement." When, at a press conference on January 24, 1946, he was asked for an opinion concerning the filibuster against the FEPC, he replied that it was a matter for the Senate to decide without outside interference, although he personally, as a senator, "had always been against filibusters and for cloture." A positive statement by the President, at that time, in favor of the F E P C would undoubtedly have heartened F E P C supporters and perhaps helped turn defeat into victory. However, the attitude he assumed "seemed to cut the ground from under his Senate Majority leader," 32 and contributed to the defeat of the Chavez bill. T h e Eightieth Congress (1947-1948) preceded the second major effort to enact an F E P C law. Dominated by Republicans, it made far less of an effort on behalf of F E P C than its predecessor. Although committed to F E P C by their platform of 1944, Republican leaders evinced little interest in the issue and made no effort to bring it out of committee and before Congress. The first session of the Eighty-first Congress opened in January, 1949, under what seemed to be more favorable circumstances. T h e re-election of President Truman, who had publicly committed himself to civil rights legislation, including FEPC, and the return of what seemed to be a similarly sympathetic Democratic Congress, raised the hopes of F E P C partisans. Bills were introduced in both Houses: in the House by Representative Adam Clayton Powell (Dem.-N.Y.), and in the Senate by Senator J . Howard McGrath (Dem.-R.I.), who was subsequently U.S. Attorney General. A subcommittee of the House Labor Committee, headed by Representative Powell, held hearings in May, 1949. As the months began to go by, it became apparent, however, that congressional leaders—even those who were ostensibly sympathetic to FEPC—were not putting forth every effort to enact the bills as quickly as possible. On June 29, the National Council for a Perma-

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nent FEPC noted that Rep. John Lesinski (Dem.-Mich.), chairman of the House Committee on Education and Labor, which was considering the bill, "has wavered somewhat in his determination to push F E P C through at the earliest possible moment; we must tell him what a vital spot FEPC holds in the legislative program." Moreover, although the Powell subcommittee had held hearings on the bill in May, it was not until July 29 that the full Committee on Education and Labor reported the bill out. Despite a dearth of business, which resulted in a recess during most of September, no effort was made, during the remainder of the year, to bring the bill to the floor of the House. In the Senate, the McGrath bill was not reported out of committee until the latter part of October—two days before Congress adjourned. Thus the year 1949 passed without any significant action. Aroused by congressional apathy, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People initiated a nationwide mobilization to secure passage of the pending F E P C bills. Beginning in November, 1949, the mobilization gained a "sponsorship of 60 national church, civic, labor, fraternal and minority group organizations." 33 It concluded with a conference in Washington on January 15 through 17, attended by more than four thousand delegates from thirty-three states, representing every section of the country. Senators and representatives were visited by individual delegates, who made every effort to secure commitments for support of the legislation. As Congress reconvened in January, 1950, the basic problem facing friends of F E P C was bringing the Powell bill to the floor of the House. The usual method—securing "a rule" from the Rules Committee—was defeated when a coalition of Republicans and southern Democrats on the committee refused to vote the requested rule. A second method, known as "Discharge Mondays," whereby the chairman of a committee whose bill has been refused a rule for more than twenty-one days may bring the measure before the House on the second and fourth Mondays of each month, provided he is recognized by the Speaker of the House, failed when Speaker Rayburn refused to recognize Representative Lesinski. 34 A third method, the use of a "discharge petition," also failed when petitions submitted by Representatives Powell and Franklin D. Roo-

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sevelt, Jr., did not receive the required number of signatures. T h e measure was finally brought before the House through the use of "Calendar Wednesday." O n "Calendar Wednesday" the roll of committees is called alphabetically and committee chairmen, in the order of call, may present any bill approved by their committee. O n Wednesday, February 22, the Committee on Education and Labor was called and Representative Lesinski, its chairman, presented his measure to the House. Despite strenuous efforts by friends of F E P C the measure did not pass. Instead, a substitute measure, introduced by Representative McConnell (Rep.-Pa.), which eliminated the enforcement features of the Powell bill, was approved by a vote of 240 to 177. T h e vote found friends of F E P C divided. Since the new bill was generally regarded as inadequate, if not a sham, those who voted for it explained that they did so only to "keep the issue alive," and to ensure Senate action. 35 On January 26, 1950, in a column of The New York Times entitled "Has Mr. Rayburn A Senior (Silent) Partner?", 38 Arthur Krock presented an interesting analysis of the factors that were preventing passage of F E P C legislation and which ultimately resulted in the failure of the movement for F E P C in the Eighty-first Congress. H e based his analysis upon a number of "current political mysteries": the failure of President Truman to mention the House FEPC bill in a meeting at the White House with Speaker Rayburn and the Democratic leaders of Congress, although he knew that several hours later Rayburn was to decide whether or not to permit Representative Lesinski to bring the bill before the House; the paradox of President Truman's public espousal of F E P C in the most vigorous terms, and his lack of annoyance with Rayburn for preventing consideration of FEPC on "Discharge Monday"; the inability of alleged supporters of FEPC on the Rules Committee, numbering four Democrats and three Republicans—a majority of the committee—to secure a majority vote for the legislation when all they had to do was to cast their votes in its favor. Krock's suggested explanation of these "mysteries" was that "most of the principals in the parliamentary farce now going on want to keep the F E P C issue alive for campaign purposes in the Congressional elections of 1950." President Truman's failure to mention F E P C to Rayburn "on the morning its fate rested in the Speaker's

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hands," he attributed to the fact that "the President will not be displeased if it is unfinished business when the voters go to the polls in 1950. That is also the reason why he shows no displeasure over the fact that Mr. Rayburn twice used his plenary powers to prevent the House from passing the bilL" Even the southern Democrats, he averred, were not averse to keeping the issue alive, "not only because on a showdown it would probably pass both the House and the Senate, but because as unfinished business their opposition to it will serve to head off aspirants for their seats in the oncoming primaries." Admitting that his explanations "of the murky maneuvers on the bill are very cynical indeed," he affirmed that they were, nevertheless, "naturally evoked by what has been happening. Very seldom do informed observers agree with Representative Marcantonio, yet a good many did when he remarked last Monday, after the Speaker denied the measure its chance of passage: " 'It is obvious to everyone, due to the events of today, that everybody wants civil rights as an issue but not as a law, and that goes for Harry Truman, the Democratic party and the Republican party.' " The attempt to enact FEPC legislation in the Senate began on May 5, with a motion by Senator Lucas calling for consideration of the McGrath bill. Debate and filibuster ensued on May 8 and continued for several days. However, with the failure of an attempt to invoke closure by a vote of 52 to 32 on May 19," the movement for the bill lost all momentum and the Senate proceeded to other business. A second, halfhearted attempt to invoke closure was defeated on July 12 when only 55 votes were cast for the affirmative.88 If the proceedings in the House were a "parliamentary sham," as Arthur Krock has charged, those in the Senate were no less so. Leaders of the Democratic party, boasting a majority in the Senate, were bold and vigorous in their public affirmations of support for FEPC, but singularly weak, hesitant, and inactive on the Senate floor. The McGrath bill was reported out of committee and placed on the Senate calendar on October 17, 1949.39 Congress adjourned two days later and consideration of the bill was postponed to the second session. Although Senator Lucas had promised at the close of the first session that FEPC would be first in the order of business

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of the second session,40 he announced after Congress reconvened in January, 1950, that the measure would be considered immediately after a bill to repeal federal taxes on oleomargarine. 41 On January 24, he "estimated that the measure would be taken to the floor by mid-February." 42 On January 31, following a meeting of the Democratic Policy Committee of which he was chairman, he announced "that there was 'no reason' why the House should not act first on F E P C legislation." 43 This meant, as The New York Times correspondent indicated, that action on the measure would be postponed "until late February, early March or even later." 14 On April 1 1 , Democratic party leaders, with the approval of President Truman, announced a further postponement until after consideration of the European Recovery Program appropriation bill. The President, beset by indignant friends of FEPC, explained that the step was taken because of the possibility of a filibuster on F E P C that would delay the E R P program.45 Leaders of minority groups, and liberal organizations noted, however, that the problem would not have arisen had the leaders of the Democratic Party in the Senate kept their promise to take up FEPC at the beginning of the session, in January. 46 In replying to critics of his many postponements, Senator Lucas at one point remarked: "It is not a question of just when F.E.P.C. will be taken to a test, but of the enthusiasm and determination with which a filibuster will be fought when it goes to the floor. A determined fight will be waged—and I mean 'determined.' " 47 The following facts will indicate the degree of "enthusiasm and determination" with which F E P C was supported on the Senate floor: On May 2, less than a month after this strong expression of determination, Lucas showed a decided change of heart when he announced that in the event of a filibuster he would not hold the Senate in continuous session but would file a closure petition after two or three days of discussion. "If that failed by a small margin, he stated, he might try it again." 48 On May 8, the first day of debate, The New York Times correspondent reported that "Senator Russell, who in the past has held the floor for many hours against civil rights measures, spoke for only about two hours today. In the corridors it was remarked that this looked like a 'rocking-chair' or 'kid

M O V E M E N T F O R P E R M A N E N T FEPC L A W

211

gloved' filibuster, with no all-night sessions threatened and n o laryngitis or body strain in sight." 48 Apparently, northern and southern Democrats had come to an agreement that the fight for F E P C w o u l d not be too determined, thus obviating the need for a prolonged filibuster. N o r did this halfhearted debate continue for any length of time. O n May 10, on a motion introduced by Senator T a f t , it was voted, 50 to 22, to put aside F E P C in favor of a bill to abolish the independent office of general counsel of the National L a b o r Relations Board. 5 0 T w o days later, the Senate returned to F E P C . By that time, the fraudulent nature of the struggle was obvious. A g a i n we cite The New York Times: At the close of the first week of the struggle, three Southern Senators had taken the floor. Their speeches had not reached beyond two hours. Meanwhile, other business, including the killing of two of President Truman's major government reorganization programs, had occupied the Senate. Brass-throated Southern Senators, apparently eager for battle, were "benched." It appeared through several days that other Senators, among them eager supporters of F.E.P.C., simply would not permit the filibuster to get under way, because of desire to talk about other problems. Outside Congress, organized supporters of F.E.P.C. appeared to be mystified, disappointed and angry. Organizations speaking for civil rights, human rights and for the advancement of Negroes bombarded Senators with appeals for a showdown. At this stage, it was complained that not a Southern Senator was suffering from hoarseness or physical strain. Questions were asked about "the lost filibuster." 51 T h r e e days later, it was again reported: When Senator Scott W. Lucas of Illinois, Majority Leader, moved ten days ago that the bill be called up, Washington expected one of the toughest, most gruelling filibusters in history to be started by the Southerners. Developments have not borne this prediction out. Instead of all-night sessions with hoarse and weary Southern Senators drawing crowded galleries, the Senate has quit before dinner time.52 Shortly afterward, The Crisis, the monthly publication of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, car-

212

M O V E M E N T FOR P E R M A N E N T FEPC LAW

ried a trenchant analysis of the defeat of F E P C in the Senate. It noted that of the fifty-two who had voted in favor of closure on May 19, thirty-three were Republicans and nineteen Democrats. " T h e F E P C vote May 19 was simply on shutting off debate to allow the bill to come before the Senate for debate. It was on a motion to take up the bill as the business of the Senate. . . . Even so, only 19 Democrats voted for it. . . . Of the 32 votes against cloture, 6 were cast by Republicans . . . and 26 by Democrats. . . . Of the 26 Democrats opposing cloture, 5 were from outside the South: Hayden and McFarland of Arizona, Kerr of Oklahoma, Johnson of Colorado, and McCarran of Nevada. Thus there was a total of 11 non-Southern votes against cloture." It noted, also, that there were twelve absentees and that "absence was the same as voting 'No.' . . . Ten of these absentees are from outside of what is considered the die-hard South. Adding them to the 11 non-Southern votes against cloture gives a total of 21 votes which northerners and westerners cast against giving a hearing to the F E P C bill. "So neither the Republicans nor the Northern Democrats can blame the Dixiecrats. Cloture on F E P C was blocked by northern and western senators of both parties, nine Republicans and twelve Democrats." 63 With the defeat of F E P C in the Eighty-first Congress, the movement for equal rights in employment has weakened considerably. Its chief proponents in and out of Congress seemed to become demoralized and incapable of gathering renewed strength for another effort in the Eighty-second Congress. Leaders of minority groups are now placing most of their emphasis upon the demand for a change in the rules governing closure as a prerequisite for the passage of civil rights legislation. This change in strategy will not, however, bring victory closer for FEPC. T o change Senate rules is no less difficult a task than passage of an F E P C measure. It involves the same problem—overcoming a filibuster by anti-civil rights senators —while it incurs the additional drawback of channeling agitation away from a direct demand for F E P C into the side issue of closure and thus weakens the movement for FEPC. The movement for national F E P C legislation has thus far received very powerful support. Its foremost proponents include Negro and other minority-group organizations, religious groups—

MOVEMENT FOR P E R M A N E N T FEPC LAW

213

Protestant, Catholic and Jewish—the Congress of Industrial Organization and the American Federation of Labor. Even the South, which has been the fountainhead of opposition to FEPC includes large numbers of workers who favor such legislation. The organizations demanding a permanent FEPC are undoubtedly far superior in numbers to those that oppose it and are more nearly representative of the majority of Americans. Thus far, however, they have not made their numbers felt. They have failed to mobilize their constituents and the masses of Americans who favor FEPC in an adequate pressure campaign to ensure congressional support for the legislation. As a result, they have been duped with impunity by political leaders whose campaign promises concerning FEPC have far exceeded their actions on the floor of Congress. The only answer to past defeats and future betrayals is a new outpouring of effort that will weld into a powerful and effective force the currently diffuse and unorganized sympathy of the American people for FEPC and provide the momentum that will carry FEPC to victory in Congress. It is to the task of stimulating, guiding, and bringing this movement to fruition that those who wish to see a permanent, federal FEPC created must dedicate themselves.

NOTES

NOTES

Works issued by the President's FEPC will be found in library catalogues under: U.S. President's Committee on Fair Employment Practice. I:

ORIGINS

1. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). For discussions of similar views held by social scientists and other students of Society, see Gunnar Myrdal, An American Dilemma (New York: Harper, 1944), II, 1031; Carey McWilliams, "Race Discrimination and the Law," Science and Society, I X (1945), passim. 2. Lorenzo J . Greene and Carter G. Woodson, The Negro Wage Earner (Washington, D.C.: Association for the Study of Negro Life and History, Inc., 1930), p. 341. 3. Robert C. Weaver, "The Employment of the Negro in War Industries," Journal of Negro Education, X I I (1943), 386. 4. Emmett J . Scott, The American Negro in the World War (Chicago: Homewood Press, 1919), pp. 40, 41. 5. Ibid., pp. 370 ff. For evidence of discrimination in government employment during the First World War, see Leon Ransom, "Combatting Discrimination in the Employment of Negroes in War Industries and Government Agencies," Journal of Negro Education, X I I (1943), 408. 6. U.S. Department of Labor, Division of Negro Economics, The Negro at Work During the World War and During Reconstruction, by George E. Haynes (Washington, 1921), p. 12. 7. Ibid., p. 17. 8. The division went out of existence in 1920, when the House of Representatives "failed to renew its appropriation" (Ransom, Journal of Negro Education, X I I [1943], 407n). 9. Scott, The American Negro, p. 462. 10. Ransom, Journal of Negro Education, X I I (1943), 408. 11. Ibid. W. E. B. Du Bois writes that President T a f t "began his reactionary administration by promising the South that he would appoint no Federal official to whom the Southern people were opposed" (Dusk of Dawn [New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1940], p. 233).

2 18

NOTES

12. Charles H. Wesley, Negro Labor in the United States (New York: Vanguard Press, 1927), p. 264. 13. Ransom, Journal of Negro Education, X I I (1943), 408-9. 14. Ibid., p. 409, quoting the Washington Herald, December 16, 1914. 15. Roscoe E. Lewis, " T h e Role of Pressure Groups in Maintaining Morale Among Negroes," Journal of Negro Education, X I I (1943), 465. 16. Ibid., p. 464. 17. Myrdal, An American Dilemma, II, 739. 18. Du Bois, Dusk of Dawn, p. 72. 19. Ira De A. Reid, " A Critical Summary: The Negro on the Home Front in World Wars I and II," Journal of Negro Education, X I I (1943), 512. 20. Lewis, Journal of Negro Education, X I I (1943), 465. 21. Ibid., p. 468. 22. Ibid. 23. Ibid., p. 467, quoting Russell Kurtz, ed., Social Work Year Book (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1943), p. 654. 24. Ibid. 25. Kenneth B. Clark, "Morale of the Negro on the Home Front," Journal of Negro Education, X I I (1943), 421. 26. Reid, Journal of Negro Education, X I I (1943), 517. 27. FEPC; Negro Employment and Training Branch, Labor Division, OPM; Minority Groups Branch, Labor Division, OPM, Minorities in Defense (Washington, 1941), p. 10. 28. Lester B. Granger, "Barriers to Negro War Employment," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, C C X X I I I (September, 1942), 75; Robert C. Weaver, Negro Labor (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1946), p. 131. 29. F E P C and others, Minorities in Defense, pp. 8-9. 30. Granger, Annals, C C X X I I I (September, 1942), 73. 31. American Dilemma, I, 409, 412. 32. Lester B. Granger, "Negroes and War Production," Survey Graphic, X X X I (1942), 470. 33. Granger, Annals, C C X X I I I (September, 1942), 76. 34. Ibid., p. 75. 35. Ibid. 36. Ibid., p. 76. 37. In New England, for example, workers in the state employment services have entered personnel services of corporations. 38. Granger, Annals, C C X X I I I (September, 1942), 74. 39. Hampton Institute Conference on the Participation of the Negro in National Defense, Findings and Principal Addresses (Hampton, Virginia, 1940), p. 12. 40. Granger, Annals, C C X X I I I (September, 1942), p. 76. 41. Amsterdam News (New York), May 10, 1940, p. 2; see also Granger, Annals, C C X X I I I (September, 1942), 76. 42. Chicago Defender, January 11, 1941; February 15, 1941, p. 2.

I: O R I G I N S

219

43. Granger, Annals, C C X X I I I (September, 1942), 75. 44. John Temple Graves, " T h e Southern Negro and the War Crisis," Virginia Quarterly Review, X V I I I (1942), 508. 45. Ibid., pp. 507-8. 46. Amsterdam News, April 5, 1941, p. 16. 47. Ibid., March 29, 1941, p. 2. 48. Chicago Defender, June 14, 1941, p. 3. 49. Amsterdam News, April 19, 1941, p. 17; FEPC and others, Minorities in Defense, p. 11. 50. On the same day, Hillman created the Negro Employment and Training Branch and the Minority Groups Branch in the Labor Division of OPM, and named Robert G. Weaver and Will W . Alexander the respective heads of the two units. T h e primary purpose of the new organizations was to help competent Negroes and members of other minority groups to "participate in the training and employment opportunities of the national defense program" (FEPC and others, Minorities in Defense, pp. 7-9). They had no power to eliminate discrimination, although they did attempt to "persuade" employers to abandon discriminatory practices. In certain cases they succeeded in persuading employers who had never done so before to hire Negroes and members of other minority groups, and to that extent did lessen discrimination. 51. Amsterdam News, April 19, 1941, p. 17. 52. Ibid., p. 16. 53. Amsterdam News, April 26, 1941, p. 1. 54. Ibid., May 10, 1941, p. 3. 55. Ibid., May 17, 1941, p. 2. 56. Ibid., p. 12. 57. Chicago Defender, February 8, 1941, p. 14; Amsterdam News, April 12, 1941, pp. 9, 17. 58. Amsterdam News, May 17, 1941, p. 1, and June 7, 1941, p. 1; Granger, Annals, C C X X I I I (September, 1942), 77-78. 59. Granger, Annals, C C X X I I I (September, 1942), 78. 60. Amsterdam News, June 14, 1941, p. 1. 61. Ibid., June 21, 1941, p. 3. 62. Ibid., pp. 1, 2. 63. Ibid. 64. FEPC and others, Minorities in Defense, pp. 14-15. It appears that the memorandum was not made public until Sunday, June 15. See PM (New York), June 18, 1941, p. 9. 65. Amsterdam News, June 21, 1941, pp. 1-2. 66. Ibid., p. 1. 67. Will Maslow, " F E P C — A Case History in Parliamentary Maneuver," University of Chicago Law Review, X I I I (1946), 40971. Maslow's information is based upon a letter from one of the participants and a statement by Rayford W. Logan in What the Negro Wants (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1944), p. 16. Logan was one of Randolph's aides.

NOTES

220 II:

THE FIRST

FAIR EMPLOYMENT COMMITTEE

PRACTICE

1. FEPC, First Report (Washington, 1945), pp. 104-5. 2. Florence Murray, ed., The Negro Handbook, 1944 (New York: Current Reference Publications, 1944), p. 2 1 1 . 3. Amsterdam News (New York), July 5, 1941, p. 14. 4. Ibid. 5. Chicago Defender, July 5, 1941, p. 1. 6. Amsterdam News, July 5, 1941, p. 14. 7. Chicago Defender, July 5, 1941, p. 1. 8. Ibid. 9. All on June 26, 1941. 10. T h e Birmingham News, the New York Post, the Brooklyn Eagle, the Virginia Pilot, the Cincinnati Enquirer, the Colorado Sentinel, and the Los Angeles Times. 1 1 . T h e Boston Herald, the Buffalo Evening News, the Philadelphia Inquirer, the Seattle Times, the Nashville Banner, and the Atlanta Constitution. 12. These included such outstanding newspapers as the Richmond Times-Dispatch, the Chicago Daily News, the St. Louis Post-Dispatch, and the New Orleans Times-Picayune, as well as the Hearst, McCormack and Patterson press. 13. Newark Sunday Call, June 29, 1941, p. 10. 14. FEPC, First Report, p. 9. The committee was increased to seven by Executive Order 9 1 1 1 , issued on May 25, 1942. Dr. Malcolm S. MacLean of Virginia, president of Hampton Institute, was appointed chairman of the committee. Ethridge, who had resigned as chairman, remained with the committee. 15. T h e data on the committee members is taken from Amsterdam News, July 26, 1941. 16. Chicago Defender, August 23, 1941, p. 12. 17. Amsterdam News, September 13, 1941, p. 7. 18. FEPC, First Report, p. 9. 19. New York Times, August 28, 1941, p. 12. 20. FEPC; Negro Employment and Training Branch, Labor Division, OPM; Minority Groups Branch, Labor Division, OPM, Minorities in Defense (Washington, 1941), p. 13. 21. FEPC, First Report, p. 10. 22. Amsterdam News, September 27, 1941, pp. 1, 4. 23. Revealed in a speech by MacLean, July 15, 1942, before a convention of the NAACP. Apparently, the three months were spent in working out procedural details. See also, Amsterdam News, September 27, 1941, pp. i, 4. 24. FEPC, First Report, p. 10. In May, 1943, the staff consisted of 27 professional persons and 16 clerical employees, a total of 43 members. Of these, 35 were in the central office and 8 were in the field.

II: T H E F I R S T

COMMITTEE

221

25. T o publicize its work, the committee sent 2 4 " by 2 8 " blue posters, quoting the executive order, to defense plants for display in personnel offices and on shop bulletin boards. Posters were also sent to all State Employment Service offices by J o h n Corson, director of the Bureau of Employment Security, at the request of the committee (Chicago Defender, December 20, 1941, p. 6). 26. J o h n Beecher, "8802 Blues," New Republic, C V I I I (1943), 248 ff. It should be noted that the Negro Employment and T r a i n i n g Branch of the Labor Division of the Office of Production Management, headed by Robert C. Weaver, and the Minority Groups Branch, of the same division, headed by Will W. Alexander, were supposed to cooperate closely with the committee and to make "primary investigations and employer contacts on complaints involving Negro workers" and minority groups "which have been filed with the President's Committee on Fair Employment Practice" (Minorities in Defense, pp. 7, 9) and to "adjust employment difficulties." T h e assistance provided by these organizations was, however, apparently not sufficient to enable the F E P C to perform its tremendous task adequately, within the limits of its budget. 27. Executive sessions were subsequently held at each hearing to adjust cases which apparently could not be adjusted in public. 28. New York Times, January 12, 1943. p- 14. 29. F E P C , A Summary of the Hearings . . . Held in Los Angeles, California, October 20 and 21, 1941, with Findings and Recommendations (mimeographed), p. 1. See also F E P C , Transcript: Los Angeles Hearings (typewritten), p. 14. 30. F E P C , Press Clipping Digest, No. 4, July 6, 1942, pp. 30 ff. 3 1 . F E P C , Transcript: Los Angeles Hearings, pp. 1 1 7 - 1 8 . 32. Ibid., p. 118. 33. F E P C , Transcript: Birmingham Hearings, June 18, 1942 (typewritten), I, 9 1 . 34. Mimeographed copy of speech issued by the F E P C , p. 6. 35. F E P C , Summary, Los Angeles Hearings, p. 4. 36. Ibid., pp. 5, 6. 37. F E P C , A Summary of the Hearings . . . Held in Chicago, Illinois, Januaiy 19 and 20, 1942, with Findings and Directions (mimeographed), p. 2. 38. Ibid., p. 5. 39. Ibid., p. 7. 40. F E P C , Summary, Los Angeles Hearings, p. 9. 41. Ibid. 42. Ibid. 43. F E P C , Summary, Chicago Hearings, p. 9. 44. F E P C , Summary, Los Angeles Hearings, p. 9. 45. F E P C , Summary, Chicago Hearings, pp. 4-5. 46. Ibid., p. 6. 47. Ibid. 48. F E P C , A Summary of the Hearings . . . Held in New York,

228

NOTES

New York, February 16 and iy, 1942, with Findings and Directions (mimeographed), p. 4. 49. FEPC, Summary of Hearings on Complaints of Negro Steamfitters Against the Steamfitters' Protective Association, Local 597, Held in Chicago, Illinois, April 4, 1942 . . . with Findings and Directions (mimeographed), p. 3. 50. FEPC, Summary, Los Angeles Hearings, p. 10. 51. FEPC, Summary of Hearings on Complaints of Negro Steamfitters . . . Chicago, April 4, 1942, p. 3. 52. Ibid. 53. Ibid. 54. FEPC, Summary of Hearings on Complaints of Negro Plumbers Against the Chicago Journeymen Plumbers' Union, Local 130, Held in Chicago, Illinois, April 4, 1942 . . . with Findings and Directions (mimeographed), p. 3. 55. FEPC, Summary of Hearings . . . Held in Birmingham, Alabama, June 19,1942; Findings and Directions Against A. J. Honeycutt & Company (mimeographed), pp. 1-3. See also FEPC, First Report, p. 57. 56. FEPC, Summary of Hearings . . . Held in Birmingham, Alabama, June 20,1942, with Findings and Directions Against Delta Shipbuilding Corporation and Local #37, The International Brotherhood of Boilermakers, Shipbuilders, Welders and Helpers of America (mimeographed), pp. 1-4. 57. FEPC, Summary, Los Angeles Hearings, pp. 9-10. 58. FEPC, Summary, Chicago Hearings, p. 2. 59. Ibid., pp. 6-7 (with reference to the Simpson Construction Company). 60. Ibid., pp. 7, 12. 61. FEPC, Summary, New York Hearings, p. 3. 62. FEPC, Summary, Birmingham Hearings, p. 3 (with reference to A. J . Honeycutt & Company). 63. FEPC, Summary of Hearings on Complaints of Negro Steamfitters, pp. 3-4. 64. Ibid. 65. FEPC, Transcript: Los Angeles Hearings, p. 77. 66. FEPC, Transcript: Chicago Hearings, January 19-20, 1942, pp. 55 ff. (typewritten). 67. FEPC, Transcript: Birmingham Hearings, I, 125 ff. 68. FEPC, Transcript: New York Hearings, p. 546 (typewritten). 69. FEPC, Transcript: Birmingham Hearings, II, 249 ff. 70. Ibid., p. 352. 71. FEPC, Press Clipping Digest, No. 4, July 6, 1942, p. 33. 72. New York Times, July 2, 1942, p. 44. 73. Chicago Defender, July 25, 1942, pp. 1, 3. 74. Ibid. 75. FEPC, Transcript: New York Hearings, p. 95.

III: D E C L I N E AND DEMISE

223

76. FEPC, Press Clipping Digest, No. 1, November 7, 1941, p. 1. 77. Ibid. 78. Quoted in FEPC, Press Clipping Digest, No. 2, February 14, 1942, p. 1. 79. Ibid., p. 2. 80. Outstanding were PM, The New York Times, the New York Herald Tribune, the Washington Post, and the Baltimore Sun (see FEPC, Press Clipping Digest, No. 3, May 13, 1942, p. 1). 81. Ibid., p. 2. 82. July 2, 1942, p. 44. 83. June 12, 1942, as quoted in FEPC, Press Clipping Digest, No. 4, July 6, 1942, p. 20. 84. Ibid., p. 21. 85. Zfct'd., p. 22. 86. Ibid., p. 15. 87. Ibid., p. 19. 88. Ibid., pp. 2-4. 89. Ibid., p. 13. 90. FEPC, Transcript: Birmingham Hearings, III, 7 1 1 . 91. Chicago Defender, May 30, 1942, p. 2. 92. Ibid., February 7, 1942, p. 14. Ill:

DECLINE

AND

DEMISE

1. John Beecher, "8802 Blues," New Republic, C V I I I (February 22, 1943). 2502. Chicago Defender, July 1 1 , 1942. 3. Beecher, New Republic, CVIII (February 22, 1943), 250. 4. FEPC, Important Dates in F.E.P.C. History (mimeographed), p. 2. This step was preceded by the transfer of the Negro Employment and Training Branch and the Minorities Group Branch—originally of the Office of Production Management and later of the War Production Board—to the War Manpower Commission. At about the same time, the WMC assumed jurisdiction over the United States Employment Service as its recruiting agent. Thus, all agencies involved in combatting discrimination were now within the jurisdiction of the W M C and under the direct supervision of McNutt. 5. Beecher, New Republic, CVIII (February 22, 1943), 250. 6. Florence Murray, ed., The Negro Handbook, 1944 (New York: Current Reference Publications, 1944), p. 8. 7. Chicago Defender, August 15, 1942, p. 2. 8. Ibid. 9. Ibid. 10. Chicago Defender, August 22, 1942, p. 1. 11. FEPC, Report (confidential), May, 1943, pp. 78-79. (Multigraphed.) 12. Ibid., pp. 79-80. 13. Chicago Defender, November 7, 1942, p. 2. 14. Ibid., October 31, 1942, p. 2. 15. Ibid., December 5, 1942, p. 1.

224

NOTES

16. O W I - W M C Release, December 1, 1942. 17. O W I - W M C Release, December 4, 1942. 18. O W I - W M C Release, January 4, 1943. 19. FEPC, Report (confidential), May, 1943, p. 81. 20. Chicago Defender, December 12, 1942, p. 3. 21. Ibid. 22. The Negro Handbook, 1944 (p. 212) notes January 11 as the date. Charley Cherokee wrote in his column in the Chicago Defender on January 30, 1943 (p. 15), that McNutt later told members of the FEPC that a telephone call from the White House at 10:00 A.M., January 9, ordered the hearings postponed, with no reason given; see also The New York Times, January 12, 1943, p. 14. 23. Chicago Defender, January 16, 1943, pp. 1, 2. 24. Ibid. 25. Ibid. 26. Ibid., January 2, 1943, p. 4. A mimeographed copy of the letter is also in the files of the NAACP. 27. Murray, ed.. The Negro Handbook, 1944, p. 212. 28. Chicago Defender, January 23, 1943, pp. 1, 2. Participating were the UAW-CIO, the United Transport Service Employees Association, the Federation of Churches, the Jewish Community Council, and the East Side Merchants Association, all of whom were from Detroit; also present were representatives of the Negro Labor Victory Committee of New York, the National Maritime Union (CIO), and the national CIO. T h e committee totaled forty-one persons, twenty-eight of whom were from Detroit. 29. Murray, ed., The Negro Handbook, 1944, p. 212. 30. Chicago Defender, February 6, 1943, p. 2. 31. Ibid., January 30, 1943, pp. 1, 2. 32. Murray, ed., The Negro Handbook, 1944, p. 212. 33. Chicago Defender, January 30, 1943, pp. 1, 2. 34. Ibid., p. 14 (editorial). 35. Ibid., February 13, 1943. A mimeographed copy of the White House release, dated February 3, is in the files of the NAACP. 36. Chicago Defender, February 27, 1943, p. 1. 37. FEPC, Report (confidential), May, 1943, p. 83. 38. Ibid., pp. 83-84. 39. PM (New York), April 2, 1943, p. 11. 40. Chicago Defender, April 10, 1943, pp. 1, 4. 41. PM, April 2, 1943, p. 11. 42. Chicago Defender, April 24, 1943, p. 15. 43. New York Times, March 26, 1943, p. 20. 44. Chicago Defender, April 3, 1943, p. 1. According to NAACP files, the letter was sent on March 24. 45. Copy of letter in NAACP files. 46. Chicago Defender, April 10, 1943, pp. 1, 4.

IV: T H E S E C O N D C O M M I T T E E

225

47. Ibid., April 24, 1943, p. 1; May 1, 1943, pp. 1, 4. 48. Ibid., May 1, 1943, pp. 1, 4. 49. Ibid. 50. According to Malcolm Ross, the issuance and provisions of the new executive order were largely the result of Francis Biddles's suggestions (All Manner of Men [New York: Reynal & Hitchcock, 1948], p. 22). T h e files of the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library at Hyde Park indicate that Biddle favored a much more stringent order than was actually issued by the President. IV: THE SECOND

FAIR EMPLOYMENT COMMITTEE

PRACTICE

1. Executive Order 9346 explicitly stated that it was issued by Roosevelt "as President of the United States and Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy." The word "all" in paragraph 5, line 6, and the clause "including the several Federal departments and agencies" in paragraph 5, lines 6 and 7, were not included in the previous order. T h e economic areas in which discrimination was prohibited—hire, tenure, terms or conditions of employment, and union membership—were cited in the new order but not in the old. Finally, the new order appeared to call for a more active effort against discrimination by employers, labor unions, and federal agencies. (Compare paragraph 5 of 9346 with paragraph 3 of 8802.) 2. Following the appointment of Monsignor Haas, Cramer announced that he was entering the Army (Chicago Defender, June 5, 1943, p. 1). 3. FEPC, First Report (Washington, 1945), p. 10. 4. Chicago Defender, July 3, 1943, p. 1. 5. Ibid. 6. Ibid., p. 14. 7. Ibid., July 10, 1943, pp. 1, 4. 8. Ibid. 9. Ibid. 10. Ibid., June 19, 1943, p. 1. 1 1 . Florence Murray, ed., The Negro Handbook, 1944 (New York: Current Reference Publications, 1944), p. 212. T h e first regional office serving the states of New York, Connecticut, Rhode Island, Massachusetts, Maine, Vermont, and New Hampshire was opened on September 8, in the Empire State Building in New York City, with Edward Lawson, formerly of the National Urban League and managing editor of Opportunity, as regional director. For a complete list of FEPC regions and regional offices, see FEPC, First Report, pp. 106-7. 12. FEPC Release N-618, n.d. See also U.S. Congress, House, To Investigate Executive Agencies, Hearings before the Special Committee to Investigate Executive Agencies, House of Representatives, 78th Cong., ist and 2d Sess., on H. Res. 102 (Washington, 1944), Part 2, p. 2 1 1 3 . According to this report, the number notified to attend was twenty-three, but before the hearing the Virginia Railway case was adjusted. The unions included the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, the

226

NOTES

Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen, the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, the Brotherhood of Railway Carmen of America, the International Association of Machinists, and the International Brotherhood of Boilermakers, Iron Shipbuilders and Helpers of America. 13. FEPC Release N-6i8, n.d. 14. Quoted in PM (New York), September 17, 1943, p. 4. 15. To Investigate Executive Agencies, Hearings on H. Res. 102, 78th Cong., ist and 2d Sess., Part 2, p. 2114. 16. FEPC, "Opening Statement by Bartley Crum . . . at the Railroad Hearings, September 15, 1943, Washington, D.C." (n.d.; mimeographed). 17. Ibid. 18. To Investigate Executive Agencies, Hearings on H. Res. 102, 78th Cong., ist and 2d Sess., Part 2, pp. 2125 ff. 19. FEPC Release N-618, n.d. 20. Ibid. 21. PM, September 17, 1943, p. 4. 22. Ibid. 23. Ibid. 24. Ibid. 25. FEPC Release N-618, n.d. 26. PM, October 12, 1943, p. 4. 27. Chicago Defender, October 23, 1943, p. 1. 28. Ibid. 29. Congressional Record, 78th Cong., 2d Sess., X C (June 16, 1944), 6026. 30. Ibid., p. 6027, contains the letter of the Comptroller General to Byrnes, dated October 7, 1943. 31. Ibid. 32. Chicago Defender, November 6, 1943, pp. 1, 4. 33. PM, October 28, 1943, p. 5. 34. Chicago Defender, November 6, 1943, pp. 1, 4. 35. PM, October 29, 1943, p. 3; October 31, 1943, p. 4. 36. Ibid., October 29, 1943, p. 3; Chicago Defender, November 6, 1943. P- i; 37. Chicago Defender, November 6, 1943, p. 2. 38. Ibid. 39. PM, November 4, 1943, p. 3. 40. Chicago Defender, November 13, 1943, p. 1; Congressional Record, 78th Cong., 2d Sess., X C (June 16, 1944), 6028. 41. Chicago Defender, November 13, 1943, p. 1. 42. New York Times, December 1, 1943, p. 15. 43. Ibid. 44. FEPC Release ("Before the Select Committee to Investigate Executive Agencies [H. Res. 102]: T h e Railroad Cases," statement by Malcolm Ross), March 13, 1944. T h e railroads involved in the Southeastern Carriers' Conference Agreement were the Atlantic Coast Line Railway Company, Atlanta Joint Terminals, Central of Georgia Railway Company, Georgia Rail-

V: SMITH COMMITTEE INVESTIGATIONS

2*7

road, Jacksonville Terminal Company, Louisville and Nashville Railroad Company, Norfolk Southern Railroad Company, St. Louis-San Francisco Railway Company, Seaboard Air Line Railroad Company, and the Southern Railway Company. The other railroads found guilty of discrimination were the Baltimore and Ohio; Baltimore and Ohio Chicago Terminal; Chesapeake and Ohio; Chicago and Northwestern; Gulf, Mobile and Ohio; Illinois Central; Louisiana-Arkansas; Missouri, Kansas and Texas; Norfolk and Western; Union Pacific. See The New York Times, December 1, 1943, p. 15. The labor unions found guilty were the Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen, the Brotherhood of Railway Carmen of America, the Order of Railway Conductors, Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, International Association of Machinists, and the International Brotherhood of Boilermakers, Iron Shipbuilders and Helpers of America. 45. FEPC Release, March 13, 1944, pp. 15-16. 46. Malcolm Ross, All Manner of Men (New York: Reynal 8c Hitchcock, 1948), p. 1 3 1 . 47. To Investigate Executive Agencies, Hearings on H. Res. 102, 78th Cong., ist and 2d Sess., Part 2, p. 2132. 48. FEPC Release, December 13, 1943. 49. FEPC Release N-761, n.d. 50. PM, January 4, 1944, p. 4. 51. FEPC Release, January 3, 1944. 52. Office of War Information Release N-863, n.d. 53. Steele v. Louisville 6- Nashville Railroad Company, 323 U.S. 192 (1944); Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen, 323 U.S. 210 (1944). 54. Ross, All Manner of Men, p. 133. 55. Ibid., p. 132. 56. Ibid., p. 138. 57. Letter to the author dated September 17, 1952. 58. U.S. Congress, House, Federal Fair Employment Practice Act, Hearings before the House Special Subcommittee of the Committee on Education and Labor, 8ist Cong., ist Sess., on H.R. 4453 and companion bills (Washington, 1949), p. 220. 59. FEPC, Final Report (Washington, 1947), pp. 13-14. V: THE SMITH 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

COMMITTEE

INVESTIGATIONS

Chicago Defender, July 10, 1943, p. 15. PM (New York), December 16, 1943, p. 5. Chicago Defender, December 18, 1943, p. 5. PM, December 15, 1943, p. 3. U.S. Congress, House, To Investigate Executive Agencies, Hear-

228

NOTES

ings before the Special Committee to Investigate Executive Agencies, House of Representatives, 78th Cong., ist and 2d Sess., on H. Res. 102 (Washington, 1944), Part 2, p. 1895. 6. Ibid., p. 1897. 7. Ibid., p. 1896. 8. Ibid., pp. 1902-3. 9. Ibid., pp. 1903-4. 10. Ibid., p. 1908. 11. Ibid., p. 1897. 12. Ibid., p. 1872. 13. Ibid., p. 1878. 14. Ibid., p. 1882. 15. Ibid., p. 1883. 16. Ibid., p. 1900. 17. Ibid., p. 1918. 18. Ibid., p. 1991. 19. Ibid., p. 2004. 20. Ibid., pp. 2 1 1 0 ff. 21. Ibid., pp. 2173 ff. 22. FEPC, Release ("Before the Select Committee to Investigate Executive Agencies [H. Res. 102]: The Railroad Cases," statement by Malcolm Ross), March 13, 1944. VI: CONGRESS

AND THE

FEPC

1. Congressional Record, 78th Cong., 2d Sess., X C (February 23, 1944), 1963. 2. PM (New York), February 29, 1944, p. 3. The daily press almost unanimously interpreted the amendment as primarily an attack upon the FEPC. See FEPC, Weekly News Digest, Vol. I, No. 14, March 3, »9443. Daily Worker (New York), February 29, 1944, p. 1. 4. FEPC, Weekly News Digest, Vol. I, No. 14, March 3, 1944. 5. Congressional Record, 78th Cong., 2d Sess., X C (March 24, 1944), 3059-60. 6. Ibid., pp. 3060-62. 7. Ibid. 8. Ibid. 9. Ibid., p. 3063. 10. Ibid. 11. Ibid., pp. 3063 ff. 12. Ibid., p. 3065. 13. U.S. Congress, House, National War Agencies Appropriation Bill for 1945, Hearings before the Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, 78th Cong., 2d Sess., on H.R. 4879 (Washington, 1944), Part 2, p. 522. 14. U.S. Congress, House Committee on Appropriations, National War Agencies Appropriation Bill, 1945, H. Rept. 1 5 1 1 to accompany H.R. 4879, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. (Washington, 1944), pp. 13 ff. 15. According to House rules, a point of order may be raised against a provision in an appropriation bill providing funds for an agency which has not previously been authorized by law. T h e point of order has the effect of eliminating the provision. Any member of the House may raise a point of order against such a provision in order to safeguard a House rule which provides that the Appropriations Committee may not report an appropriation "for any expenditure not previously au-

VII: P H I L A D E L P H I A T R A N S I T CASE

22g

thorized by law." However, points of order may be "waived" by unanimous consent. See Will Maslow, "FEPC—A Case History in Parliamentary Maneuver," University of Chicago Law Review, X I I I (1946), 413 ff16. Congressional Record, 78th Cong., 2d Sess., X C (May 25, 1944), 499°17. Ibid., pp. 4993-4. 18. Ibid., p. 4994. 19. Ibid., p. 4999. 20. National War Agencies Appropriation Bill for 1945, Hearings on H.R. 4879, 78th Cong., 2d Sess., Part 2, p. 596. 21. Ibid., p. 599. 22. Congressional Record, 78th Cong., 2d Sess., X C (May 25, 1944), 499923. Ibid., p. 5000. 24. Ibid., pp. 5028-29. 25. Ibid., p. 5031. 26. Ibid., p. 5038. 27. Ibid., p. 5048. 28. Ibid., pp. 5054 ff. 29. Ibid., p. 5058. 30. Ibid. 31. Ibid., p. 5062. 32. Ibid., pp. 5062-63. 33. Ibid., p. 5067. 34. U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations, National War Agencies Appropriation Bill, 194$, S. Rept. 960 to accompany H.R. 4879, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. (Washington, 1944), p. 3. 35. Congressional Record, 78th Cong., 2d Sess., X C (June 15, 1944), 5940-41. 36. PM, June 16, 1944, p. 13. 37. Congressional Record, 78th Cong., 2d Sess., X C (June 16, 1944), 6014. 38. Ibid., pp. 6022-30. 39. Ibid., pp. 6152, 6259. 40. Ibid., pp. 6250-51. 41. Ibid., pp. 6157, 6170-71. 43. Ibid., p. 6266. 42. Ibid., p. 6264. 44. Ibid., p. 6269. 45. Ibid. 46. Ibid., p. 6271. 47. Ibid., p. 6277. VII: THE PHILADELPHIA

RAPID

TRANSIT

CASE

1. Herbert C. Bergstrom and Glenn Everett, The FEPC Faces a Crisis: The Philadelphia Strike, issued jointly by the Race Relations Committee of the American Friends Service Committee and the Washington Newsletter of the Friends Committee on National Legislation (Philadelphia and Washington, D.C., September, 1944). Unpaged. 2. FEPC, Chronological Summary of Developments in Philadelphia Transportation Company and PRT Employees' Union Cases (copy of "Smith Committee" Exhibit No. 462), p. 1. (Mimeographed.) 3. Carol Coan, "Report Concerning the Philadelphia Transit Case"

230

NOTES

(May 11,1945; typewritten). Miss Coan was a member of the committee's research staff. 4. FEPC, Chronological Summary, p. 1. 5. Ibid. 6. Ibid. 7. T h e delay between the first complaint, filed with the committee in February, and its action in October was due to the difficulties the committee was having with McNutt and the War Manpower Commission prior to May, 1943, and the committee's reorganization during and immediately after May, 1943. 8. FEPC, Chronological Summary, p. 2. 9. Ibid., p. 3. 10. FEPC, Release OWI-2729 (Maslow-WMC 2285), November 20, 1 94311. FEPC, Proposed Summary, Findings and Directions, in re Philadelphia Transportation Company and Philadelphia Rapid Transit Employees' Union (November 17, 1943; mimeographed; unpaged). 12. Ibid. 13. FEPC, Chronological Summary, p. 3. 14. Ibid. 15. FEPC, Summary 0} the Evidence With Opinion and Order, on Hearings . . . Held in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, December 8, 1943: In the Matter of Philadelphia Rapid Transit Employees Union, p. 8. (Mimeographed.) 16. Ibid., pp. 10-11. 17. Ibid., p. 7. 18. Joseph E. Weckler and Robert C. Weaver, Negro Platform Workers (Chicago: American Council on Race Relations, 1945), p. 9. 19. FEPC, Chronological Summary, p. 3. 20. U.S. Congress, House, To Investigate Executive Agencies, Hearings before the Special Committee to Investigate Executive Agencies, House of Representatives, 78th Cong., ist and 2d Sess., on H. Res. 102 (Washington, 1944), Part 2, pp. 1863-4. 21. Ibid., p. 1866. 22. Weckler and Weaver, Negro Platform Workers, p. 10. 23. Ibid., p. 11. 24. Ibid., p. 12. 25. Coan, "Report." 26. Weckler and Weaver, Negro Platform Workers, p. 13. 27. Similar interpretations are to be found in Joseph E. Weckler, "Prejudice Is Not the Whole Story," Public Opinion Quarterly, IX (1945), 126 fE. See also Weckler and Weaver, Negro Platform Workers. 28. Weckler and Weaver, Negro Platform Workers, p. 6. 29. Weckler, Public Opinion Quarterly, IX (1945), 130 fr. 30. Weckler and Weaver, Negro Platform Workers, p. 12. 31. Ibid. 32. Ibid. 33. Ibid., p. 14. 34. Ibid., p. 16. 35. Ibid., p. 13; Grand Jury, U.S. District Court, Eastern District of Pennsylvania, Report of Investigation of the Philadelphia Transportation Company Strike (June term; mimeographed, 1944), p. 5.

Vili: END OF SECOND COMMITTEE

23»

36. Grand Jury Report, p. 6. 37. Ibid. 38. Weckler and Weaver, Negro Platform Workers, pp. 16-17. 39. Grand Jury Report, p. 5. 40. Coan, "Report." 41. PM (New York), August 2, 1944, p. 11. 42. Ibid. 43. Ibid. 44. Coan, "Report." 45. PM, August 2, 1944, p. 11. 46. Grand Jury Report, p. 8. 47. Coan, "Report." 48. PM, August 2, 1944, p. 11. 49. Coan, "Report." 50. Weckler and Weaver, Negro Platform Workers, p. 15. 51. Ibid. 52. Ibid. 53. Coan, "Report." 54. Grand Jury Report, p. 8. 55. Coan, "Report." 56. PM, August 3, 1944, p. 10. 57. Ibid. 58. PM, August 3, 1944, p. 12. 59. Ibid., August 4, 1944, p. 4. 60. Coan, "Report." 61. PM, August 4, 1944, p. 3. 62. Ibid. 63. Weckler and Weaver, Negro Platform Workers, pp. 17 ff. 64. Ibid., p. 18. 65. PM, August 7, 1944, p. 3; August 8, 1944, p. 14. 66. Weckler and Weaver, Negro Platform Workers, p. 19. 67. Weckler and Weaver cite examples of the white public's friendliness toward the Negro operators (ibid., p. 14). 68. Coan, "Report." 69. Weckler and Weaver, Negro Platform Workers, p. 19. 70. Ibid. 71. Ibid., p. 20. 72. Coan, "Report." 73. Weckler and Weaver, Negro Platform Workers, p. 20. 74. Ibid., pp. 34 ff. 75. Weckler, Public Opinion Quarterly, IX (1945), 126-39. VIII: THE END OF THE SECOND

COMMITTEE

1. FEPC Release, September 4, 1944. 2. FEPC Release, December 6, 1944. 3. FEPC Release, January 31, 1945. A satisfactory adjustment, according to the committee, "is a settlement in which is eliminated any discriminatory practice or policy in violation of the Executive Order 9346 and redress is given the complainant" (FEPC Release, August 16, 1944)-

232

NOTES

4. Will Maslow, "FEPC—A Case History in Parliamentary Maneuver," University of Chicago Law Review, X I I I (June, 1946), 422. 5. U.S. Congress, House Committee on Appropriations, National War Agencies Appropriation Bill, 1946, H. Rept. 653 to accompany H.R. 3368, 79th Cong., ist Sess. (Washington, 1945), p. 1. 6. Among the items he was referring to were appropriations for the Office of Defense Transportation, the Office of Scientific Research and Development, the War Relocation Authority, and the Office of War Information. 7. Congressional Record, 79th Cong., ist Sess., X C I (June 7, 1945), 5734-

8. For a discussion of the legal issues involved see Maslow, University of Chicago Law Review, X I I I (June, 1946), 423 ff. 9. Congressional Record, 79th Cong., ist Sess., X C I (June 7, 1945), 5734-

10. Ibid., p. 5735. 11. Ibid., p. 5751. 12. Ibid. (June 8, 1945), p. 5796. 13. Ibid., p. 5812. 14. Ibid., p. 5831. 15. Maslow, University of Chicago Law Review, X I I I (June, 1946), 424. 42516. Ibid., p. 425. 17. Ibid., pp. 425-26. 18. The fiscal year begins July 1, and lack of an appropriation prior to that date meant that the agencies involved would be deprived, at least temporarily, of needed funds. 19. PM (New York), June 22, 1945, p. 7. 20. Congressional Record, 79th Cong., ist Sess., X C I (June 27, 1945), 6809. 21. Ibid., pp. 6820, 6822. 22. Ibid. (June 30, 1945), p. 7065. 23. Ibid., p. 7066. 24. PM, July 1, 1945, p. 1 1 . 25. Maslow, University of Chicago Law Review, X I I I (June, 1946), 43>26. Ibid., note. 27. Congressional Record, 79th Cong., ist Sess., X C I (July 5, 1945), 7226-36. 28. PM, July 8, 1945, p. 10. 29. Congressional Record, 79th Cong., ist Sess., X C I (July 11, 1945), 7408. 30. Ibid. 31. Ibid. 32. Ibid. (July 12, 1945), p. 7474. 33. Ibid., p. 7489. 34. New York Times, July 14, 1945, p. 1. 35. PM, July 13, 1945, p. 9. 36. FEPC, Final Report (Washington, 1947), p. X . The remaining three were in Detroit, Chicago, and St. Louis. 37. The above facts are included in a letter written by Mr. Houston

IX: COMMITTEE IN STRUCTURE

233

to President T r u m a n on December 3, 1945, a typewritten copy of which is in this writer's possession. 38. Ibid. 39. In a privately circulated memorandum, Houston afterwards contended that the President's letter had not touched upon the "basic points of the Houston resignation letter of December 3, 1945." These were, first, that the administration was duty bound, even without a directive by FEPC, to enforce a policy of nondiscrimination in managing the property of the Capital Transit Company, in accordance with previously issued executive orders. "Otherwise the administration itself will be operating the Capital Transit contrary to law; and in discrimination against one class of its citizens." Second, there was nothing in the law to prevent the President from enforcing a nondiscrimination policy since both management and the union had denied the existence of a racial policy as a term or condition of employment. Third, the President did not explain why he had not consulted with the committee before ordering it not to issue the directive. Fourth, the President had seized the company's property, according to his own executive order of November 21, 1945. " 'subject to applicable provisions of existing law' . . . Either Executive Orders 8802 . . . and 9346 . . . are existing law or they are not. If they are existing law, the administration is obligated to observe same." T h e typewritten memorandum is in the writer's possession. 40. FEPC, Final Report, p. 101. 41. Executive Order 9664, cited in FEPC, Final Report, p. 101. 42. PM, December 19, 1945, p. 12. 43. FEPC, Final Report, p. V. 44. Ibid., p. VIII. 45. Ibid., pp. XI-XII. 46. Ibid., p. XIII. 47. Ibid., p. V. 48. Ibid., p. VI. IX: THE

COMMITTEE

IN STRUCTURE

AND

FUNCTION

1. FEPC, First Report (Washington, 1945), p. 10. 2. FEPC, Report (confidential), May, 1943, p. 36. (Multigraphed.) 3. Ibid., p. 37. For a critique—not entirely justified—of the relationship between FEPC and the Negro Employment and Training Branch and the Minority Groups Branch of the OPM, see Robert Weaver, Negro Labor (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1946), pp. 137-9. 4. FEPC, Final Report (Washington, 1947), p. 2. 5. For a more detailed analysis of the committee's organizational structure and functions, see FEPC, Final Report, p. 2; First Report, P- 96. U.S. Congress, House, To Investigate Executive Agencies, Hearings before the Special Committee to Investigate Executive Agencies,

234 NOTES House of Representatives, 78th Cong., ist and 2d Sess., on H. Res. 102 (Washington, 1944)» Part 2, p. 1885. 7. For further discussion of this question, see Weaver, Negro Labor, pp. 143-44; Robert M. Maclver, The More Perfect Union (New York: Macmillan, 1948), pp. 162-63. 8. FEPC, First Report, p. 19. 9. Ibid., p. 20. 10. Ibid. 11. Prior to its issuance of directives, the committee usually issued either a proposed decision or the proposed findings and conclusions of its counsel. Only in exceptional cases, demanding immediate action, was a final decision issued without the previous issuance of a proposed decision or finding. 12. Field Instruction No. 5-A, June 1, 1944. 13. Field Instruction No. 6-A, November 16, 1944. 14. Field Instruction No. 43, February 13, 1945. 15. Field Instruction No. 10, September 10, 1943. 16. Field Instruction No. 43, February 13, 1945. 17. Field Instruction No. 45, March 13, 1945. 18. Field Instruction No. 37, August 1, 1944. 19. FEPC, Report (confidential), pp. 72 ff.; First Report, pp. 23 ff. 20. FEPC, Final Report, p. 26. 21. Letter from Will Maslow to the author dated December 24, 1947. 22. FEPC, Final Report, p. 27. 23. Ibid., p. 29. 24. FEPC, First Report, p. 23. 25. For an account of FEPC's relations with various government agencies, see FEPC, First Report, pp. 23-28; Final Report, pp. 23-33. 26. FEPC, Final Report, pp. 110-11. 27. Ibid., pp. 34-35. 28. Ibid., p. 31. 29. Ibid., pp. 31-32. 30. Ibid., p. 32. 31. Ibid., pp. 32-33. 32. FEPC, Final Report, p. 2. 33. FEPC, First Report, p. 19. 34. All Manner of Men (New York: Reynal & Hitchcock, 1948), p. 1 5735. New York Times, February 24, 1948, p. 24. 36. FEPC, Final Report, p. V. X : THE ACHIEVEMENTS

OF THE

COMMITTEE

1. Robert C. Weaver, Negro Labor (New York: Harcourt, Brace, »946), p. 792. Ibid., p. 81. 3. FEPC, Final Report (Washington, 1947), p. 25. 4. Ibid., p. 26. 5. See Chapter IX, p. 149.

XI: FEPC PROGENY

SJ5

6. FEPC, First Report (Washington, 1945), p. 2. 7. Ibid., pp. 2-3. 8. FEPC, Final Report, p. 9. 9. FEPC, First Report, p. 65. 10. FEPC, Final Report, p. 31. 11. FEPC, Report (confidential), May, 1943, p. 53. (Multigraphed.) 12. Ibid., pp. 53-54. 13. FEPC, First Report, p. 66. 14. Ibid., pp. 65, 66. The statistics for defense industry as a whole refer only to those reporting to the WMC. 15. Ibid., p. 73. 16. Ibid., p. 69. 17. Ibid., p. 70. j8. Ibid. XI: FEPC

PROGENY

1. "Fair Employment State by State," Nation, C L X (April 14, 1945), 410. 2. Akron, Cleveland, Campbell, Cincinnati, Girard, Hubbard, Lowellville, Lorain, Niles, Steubenville, Struthers, Warren, and Youngstown, Ohio; Philadelphia, Monesson, Pittsburgh, Sharon, and Farrell, Pennsylvania; Richmond, California; Phoenix, Arizona; Chicago, Illinois; Gary and East Chicago, Indiana; Sioux City, Iowa; Minneapolis, Minnesota; Milwaukee, Wisconsin; Pontiac and River Rouge, Michigan. 3. Alex Elson and Leonard Schanfield, "Local Regulation of Discriminatory Employment Practices," Yale Law Journal, LVI (February, »947). 4344. Will Maslow, "The Law and Race Relations," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, CCXLIV (March, 1946), 795. Testimony of Will Maslow, Federal Fair Employment Practice Act, Hearings before a Special Subcommittee of the Committee on Education and Labor, House of Representatives, 81st Cong., ist Sess., on H.R. 4453 and companion bills (Washington, 1949), p. 417. 6. Will Maslow, "State Civil Rights Laws—1951," Congress Weekly, X V I I I (December 17, 1951), 8. 7. New York State Commission Against Discrimination, Report of Progress, 1950, p. 61. 8. Ibid., pp. 66 ff. 9. New York State Commission Against Discrimination, Annual Report (January 1, 1951—December 31, 1951), p. 79. 10. See ibid., pp. 78-86, for a comprehensive account of the commission's manifold publicity efforts. 11. Ibid., pp. 7-10. 12. Ibid., Table 8, p. 19.

836

NOTES

13. Henry C. Turner, "Tolerance in Industry: the Record," New York Times Magazine, August 24, 1947, p. 39. 14. P. 16. 15. Committee on Employment Discrimination of the National Community Relations Advisory Council, Postwar Employment Discrimination Against Jews (New York, 1946), p. 8. 16. Ibid., pp. 9-10. 17. Quoted in Eve Ross, "Does the Ives-Quinn Law Work?" Congress Weekly, XIV (February 14, 1947), 10. 18. U.S. Congress, Senate, Anti-discrimination in Employment, Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, Senate, 80th Cong., ist Sess., on S. 984 (Washington, 1947), P- 697. 19. Ross, Congress Weekly, X I V (1947), 8-10. 20. Commission on Law and Social Action of the American Jewish Congress, "Survey of Manhattan Commercial Employment Agencies," CLSA Rights (May 31, 1949; mimeographed), p. 2. si. Ibid. 22. Anne Mather, "Report on the Experience of the Urban League, NAACP, and American Jewish Congress with the State Commission Against Discrimination" (Urban League of Greater New York, March 1 1 , 1948, mimeographed), p. 8. These three organizations constitute the Committee to Support the Ives-Quinn Law. 23. New York State Commission Against Discrimination, Annual Report (January 1, 1951—December 31, 1951), pp. 44-46. 24. New York Times, March 7, 1949, p. 20. 25. Mather, "Report on the Experience of the Urban League," p. 8. 26. Will Maslow, " T h e Enforcement of Northern Civil Rights Laws," an address delivered before the Fisk Institute on Race Relations, Nashville, Tennessee, June 28, 1950, in Commission on Law and Social Action of the American Jewish Congress, CLSA Reports (n.d.), p. 13. 27. Gerhart Saenger and Norma S. Gordon, "The Influence of Discrimination on Minority Group Members in its Relation to Attempts to Combat Discrimination," Journal of Social Psychology, X X X I (»95°). 95"!2o. 28. Mather, "Report on the Experience of the Urban League," p. 3. 29. Morroe Berger, Equality by Statute (New York: Columbia University Press, 1952), p. 135. 30. Morroe Berger, "Fair Employment Practices Legislation," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, C C L X X V (May, 1951), 36. 31. Berger, Equality by Statute, p. 167. 32. New York State Commission Against Discrimination, Report of Progress, 1950, Table 6, p. 102. 33. New York State Commission Against Discrimination, Annual Report (January 1, 1951—December 31, 1951), Table 6, p. 10.

XII: FEPC AND AMERICAN SOCIETY

237

34. New York State Commission Against Discrimination, Report of Progress, 1949, p. 13; 1950, p. 6; 1951, p. 7. In 1952, the number of complaints increased to 258. See ibid., 1952, p. 7. 35. Committee to Support the Ives-Quinn Law, "Recommendations for the Consideration of the New York State Commission Against Discrimination," (New York, April 1, 1948; mimeographed). 36. New York State Commission Against Discrimination, "Memorandum Report of State Commission Against Discrimination R e Recommendations of Committee to Support the Ives-Quinn L a w " (New York, n.d.; mimeographed), p. 1. 37. Morroe Berger, Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, C C L X X V (May, 1951), 36. 38. New York State Commission Against Discrimination, Report of Progress, 1949, pp. 69-73. 39. New York State Commission Against Discrimination, Report of Progress, 1950, pp. 53-56. 40. Quoted in Berger, Equality by Statute, p. 163. 41. New York State Commission Against Discrimination, Annual Report (January 1, 1951—December 3 1 , 1951), pp. 103-5. 42. Elson and Schanfield, Yale Law Journal, L V I (February, 1947), 43543. For example, Minneapolis, Philadelphia and Cleveland. 44. T h e ordinances of Akron, Cincinnati, Phoenix, Sioux City, and Richmond, California, apply only to employment by the city and its agencies and to contractors with the city—not to private employers. All others include private employers as well. 45. T h e Akron and Phoenix ordinances lack enforcement powers. 46. Elson and Schanfield, Yale Law Journal, L V I (February, 1947), 43747. "Memorandum on Municipal Fair Employment Ordinances" (n.d.). 48. Elson and Schanfield, Yale Law Journal, L V I (February, 1947), 453-5449. U.S. Congress, House, Federal Fair Employment Practice Act, Hearings before a Special Subcommittee of the Committee on Education and Labor, House of Representatives, 81st Cong., ist Sess., on H . R . 4453 and companion bills (Washington, 1949), p. 96. 50. Ibid., p. 396. 51. Quoted in ibid., p. 324. XII: FEPC LEGISLATION AND AMERICAN SOCIETY 1. FEPC, First Report (Washington, 1945), p. 2. 2. New York State Commission Against Discrimination, Report Progress, 1950, Table 6, p. 102.

of

238

NOTES

3. New York State Commission Against Discrimination, Report of Progress, 1948, p. 80. 4. U.S. Congress, House, Federal Fair Employment Practice Act, Hearings Before a Special Subcommittee of the Committee on Education and Labor, House of Representatives, 81st Cong., ist Sess., on H.R. 4453 and companion bills (Washington, 1949), p. 320. 5. Ibid., p. 322. 6. Ibid., pp. 322-23. 7. Ibid., pp. 321-22. 8. Ibid., p. 249. 9. Goodwin Watson, Action for Unity (New York: Harper, 1947), pp. 148-49. 10. Committee on Employment Discrimination of the National Community Relations Advisory Council, F.E.P.C. Reference Manual, 1948 edition, p. 66. 11. U.S. Congress, Senate, Fair Employment Practice Act, Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Education and Labor, Senate, 79th Cong., ist Sess., on S. 101 and S. 459 (Washington, 1945), P- 2312. FE PC, Final Report (Washington, 1947), p. VIII. 13. Ibid., p. XVI. 14. Watson, Action for Unity, pp. 64-65. 15. FEPC, First Report, Table B, p. 80. 16. Ibid., p. 81. 17. Robert C. Weaver, Negro Labor (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1946), p. 238. 18. Chicago Defender, December 18, 1943, p. 5; FEPC, Final Report, P- 3419. FEPC, Final Report, p. 34. 20. FEPC, First Report, Table 2-C, p. 119. 21. FEPC, Final Report, pp. 33-37. 22. It may be noted that the large number of complaints filed in the East, in the committee's opinion, reflects the eastern Negroes' consciousness of their rights as citizens, and the more zealous activity of civic and minority-group organizations (ibid., p. 36). 23. FEPC, First Report, p. 33. 24. Ibid., p. 33. 25. FEPC, Final Report, pp. 34-35. 26. Ibid., p. 36. 27. Ibid. 28. Ibid., p. 35. 29. Weaver, Negro Labor, p. 100. 30. (New York and London: Harper, 1944), p. 255. 31. Lucy R. Mason, "The CIO and the Negro in the South," Journal of Negro Education, XIV (1945), 556. 32. "What the Worker Really Thinks," Factory, CVII (November, 1 949). 105. 33- P. 3534. Negro Labor, p. 249.

XIII: MOVEMENT FOR PERMANENT LAW

239

35. Ibid., p. 254. 36. Ibid., p. 252. 37. Ibid. 38. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896)—Justice Harlan's dissent. 39. Ibid. 40. President's Committee on Civil Rights, To Secure These Rights (Washington, 1947), pp. 81-82. 41. U.S. Congress, Senate, National War Agencies Appropriation Bill for 1945, Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, Senate, 78th Cong., 2d Sess., on H.R. 4879 (Washington, 1944), p. 162. 42. Quoted in ibid., p. 160. 43. U.S. Congress, House, Federal Fair Employment Practice Act, Hearings before a Special Subcommittee of the Committee on Education and Labor, House of Representatives, 81st Cong., ist Sess., on H.R. 4453 and companion bills (Washington, 1949), p. 247. XIII:

THE MOVEMENT FOR PERMANENT LEGISLATION

FEPC

1. H.R. 7412, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942); Chicago Defender, February »3. »943» P2. Will Maslow, "FEPC—A Case History in Parliamentary Maneuver,^"University of Chicago Law Review, X I I I (1946), 409-10. 3. U.S. Congress, Senate, Fair Employment Practices Act, Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Education and Labor, Senate, 78th Cong., 2d Sess., on S. 2048 (Washington, 1944), pp. 129-30. 4. Ibid., p. 195. 5. Quoted in Maslow, University of Chicago Law Review, XIII (1946), 417«. 6. H.R. 2232. 7. Maslow, University of Chicago Law Review, X I I I (1946), 418. 8. Ibid. 9. Ibid., p. 41971. 10. Ibid., p. 420. 11. Ibid., pp. 420-21. 12. Ibid., pp. 421-22. 13. S. 101. 14. S. 459. 15. U.S. Congress, Senate, Fair Employment Practice Act, Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Education and Labor, Senate, 79th Cong., ist Sess., on S. 101 and S. 459 (Washington, 1945), passim. 16. Congressional Record, 79th Cong., ist Sess., XCI (December 21, >945). 'ZÖOZ17. Maslow, University of Chicago Law Review, XIII (1946), 434-35. 18. Ibid., p. 435. 19. Congressional Record, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., XCII (January 16, 1946), 114. 20. Maslow, University of Chicago Law Review, XIII (1946), 436.

24o

NOTES

21. Congressional Record, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., X C I I (January 18, 1946), 117. 22. New York Times, February 5, 1946, p. 14. 23. Ibid., February 14, 1946, p. 24. 24. Ibid., February 8, 1946, p. 4. 25. Ibid., February 10, 1946, pp. 1, 12. 26. February 14, 1946, p. 24. 27. Ibid. 28. Ibid. 29. I. F. Stone, "Swastika Over the Senate," Nation, C L X I I (February 9, 1946), 158-59. 30. Ibid. 31. I. F. Stone, "Where There Is No Vision," Nation, C L X I I (February 2, 1946), 118-19. 32. Ibid. 33. NAACP, Crisis, L V I I (February, 1950), 100. 34. New York Times, January 24, 1950, p. 1. 35. Ibid., February 24, 1950, p. 1. 36. P. 26. 37. New York Times, May 20, 1950, p. 1. The 52 affirmative votes were 12 less than the 64 required for closure. 38. T h e vote was 55 to 33. See The New York Times, July 13, 1950, pp. 1 , 1 8 . 39. Ibid., April 12, 1950, p. 18. 40. Ibid. 41. Ibid. 42. New York Times, January 25, 1950, p. 19. 43. Ibid., February 1, 1950, p. 20 (italics mine). 44. Ibid. 45. New York Times, April 14, 1950, p. 16. 46. Ibid., April 12, 1950, p. 18; April 13, 1950, p. 18. 47. Ibid., April 12, 1950, p. 18. 48. Ibid., May 3, 1950, pp. i, 23. 49. Ibid., May 9, 1950, p. 23. 50. Ibid., May 11, 1950, p. 1. 51. Ibid., May 13, 1950, p. 3. 52. Ibid., May 16, 1950, p. 3. 53. Crisis, L V I I (June, 1950), 374-75.

INDEX

Acquiescence, Negro philosophy of, 8 Adams, Warren, 79 Aeronautical Mechanics Local of Seattle, 12 Agar, Herbert, 16 Alabama, excerpt, 43 Alabama Shipbuilding and Drydock Corporation, 40, 49, 58, 147, 197 Alabama State Prison, 46 Alderman, Sidney S„ as counsel for the railroads at hearings, 61 f., 67, 69, 81, 83. 84 Alexander, Will, 54, 58, 158, 184, 219, 221; quoted, 185 Aliens, employment of, 92 Allis-Chalmers Corporation, 36 All Manner of Men (Ross), 152 Amalgamated Association of Street and Electric Railway and Motor Coach Employees of America, AF of L, 107, 118 f. American Federation of Labor, 38; discrimination against Negroes by unions affiliated with, 7, 12; agreement with National Defense Advisory Comm., 11; unions affiliated with, 29, 49, 79, 107, 195; (see also their titles, e.g., United Mine Workers): the thinking of some southern leaders of, 30; President Green a supporter of FEPC, 98; attitude toward movement for FEPC national law, 199, 212 American, for other entries beginning with, see under subject, e.g., Civil Liberties Union, American Amsterdam News, 18, 19; excerpts, 16, 20, 23 Anderson, Maxwell, 16 Application blanks, discriminatory questions asked, 170, 172 Appropriation bills, congressional struggles over FEPC, 87-99; and war agencies, 96, 122-30, 132; re a point of order

raised against a provision in, 123 ff., 228 Appropriations, see also Budget Appropriations Committee, House, go ff., 122 ff., 13öS.; Senate, 87, go, 96, 97, 127 ff., 132 Army, seizure of Philadelphia transit system, 115; lines returned, 117 Associated Press, 63 Association for the Advancement of Colored People, see under National Association of Private Office Personnel Agencies, 172 Atkinson, Brooks, quoted, 41, 43 Atlanta, Ga„ rejection of regional office and director, 73 t., 188 Atlanta Joint Terminals, 69, 226 Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 69, 226 Atlantic Gulf Line, 72 Baker, Newton D„ 5 Ball, Joseph, 88, 203 Ballard, Frederick L „ 77 Baltimore and Ohio Chicago Terminal Co., 69, 83, 227 Baltimore and Ohio R.R., 69, 83, 227 Barbour, Senator, 15 Barkley, Alben, 129, 130, 203, 204 Barnes, Julius H., 182 Batt, William L., 183 Baukhages, statement re Union Pacific, 62 Bearse Manufacturing Co., 32 Beecher, John, quoted, 46 Berger, Morroe, quoted, 106, 174 Bergstrom, Herbert C., and Glenn Everett, quoted, 100 Bethune, Mary McLeod, 16 Bibliography, 217-40 Biddle, Francis, 53, 65, 112, 225 Bilbo, Senator, 15; quoted, 98; filibuster against FEPC appropriation, 128 f.

242

INDEX

Birmingham, Ala., F E P C hearings held in, 27, x8, 30 f., 38 ff.; newspapers' antagonism, 188 Birmingham Age-Herald, excerpt, 44 Birmingham News, excerpt, 44 "Bloodshed" threatened by southern congressmen, 93, 94 Boilermakers' Union, 74, 155, 190, 226, 227 Boston, 170; new business in, 183 Brock, Eugene, quoted, 37 Bronx Chamber of Commerce, 182 Brophy, John, 26, 50, 57 Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, 225, 227 Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen, 60, 61, 226, 227; the T u n stall decision, 70, 7 1 , 72; damages awarded against, 72 Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, AF of L, 61, 107, 226, 227 Brotherhood of Railway Carmen, 226, 227 Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters, A F of L, 29; founder: membership: power, 9 Provisional Committee to Organize Colored Locomotive Firemen, 67 Brown, Senator, 15 Brown, Edgar, 89 Bryan, John Stewart, 16 Buck, Ellsworth B., 88 Budget, 46, 47, 48, 59; increased after issuance of Executive Order 9346, 73; congressional battles over, 87-99, 1 S 2 " 132; amount requested by President for 1945-46, 122; compromise grant, 132 Burke, Jack B. (Jack Burton Burkowitz), 94 Busby, John, quoted, 30 Business, effect of F E P C legislation, 18183; see also Industry "Buy-where-you-can-work" movement, 10 Byrnes, James F „ 64, 66, 114 Calendar Wednesday, 201, 202, 208 Cannon, Representative, 90, 91; action re 1945-46 appropriation, 122, 124, 131 Capital Transit Co., Washington, 49, 50, 55. 56. 59: lines seized by government: effect of Truman's intervention, 132 f.; reason for errors in strategy, 152 f.; grounds for proceeding with caution, 153; Houston's memo re Truman's position, 235

Capper, Senator, 15, 199 Carnegie-Illinois Steel Corporation, 187 Carney, Frank P., 102, 1 1 1 , 117 Case, Representative, 132 Case-handling procedure, of national FEPC, 139 ff.; of N.Y. State Comm. Against Discrimination, 168, 174, 175; a satisfactory adjustment defined, 231; reasons for large number of complaints filed in the East, 238 Catholic Inter-Collegiate Inter-Racial Council, 105 Celler, Representative, 130 Central Administrative Services, Division of, 64 Central Labor Council, CIO, 106 Central of Georgia R.R., 69, 226 Chambers of Commerce, officers' approval of FEPC ideal. 182 Charleston, S.C., 157 Chavez, Senator, 98, 127, 128, 129, 205; introduction and support of new F E P C bill, 202 ff. Chemical and Oil Workers Union, 38 Cherokee, Charley, 224 Chesapeake and Ohio R.R., 69, 227 Chicago, 170; FEPC hearings held in, 27, S 1 - S 2 - 35' 37- 4 2 ! effect of "labormanagement relations" upon employment and upgrading of Negroes, 119; Negroes on transit lines, 163; first to enact an FEPC ordinance: reasons for lack of results, 179 Chicago and North Western R.R., 83, 227 Chicago Defender, excerpts, 3, 13, 23, 26, 45. 5°. 5 ' . 52. 55. 57. 5 8 ' 6 5. 6 6 ' 73 Chicago Times, excerpt, 42 Chicago Tribune, 50, 67; excerpt, 42 Christian Science Monitor, 8 Cincinnati, Ohio, 170 Cities, municipal FEPC ordinances and commissions, 165, 178-80, 235; seven included in survey of complaints: contrast between N.Y. and others, 170 Civil Liberties Union, American, 10 Civil Rights, Committee on, 196 Civil rights for Negroes, fate of early legislation in behalf of, 3; when change of opinion took place, 4 Civil Service Commission, relations with, 150, 157; forbad discrimination: reasons for inability to act vigorously, 150 f. Clark, Bennett C „ quoted, 89 Cleveland, Ohio, 170

INDEX Coan, Carol, quoted, 112, 113 Co bourn, Frank M., 102, 104; quoted, 103, 107 Colmer, Representative, 93 Colorado, anti-discrimination law and commission, 165, 166 Committee, for entries beginning with, see subject, e.g., Education and Labor Communism, specter of, attributed to FEPC activities, 93 Communist Party, 50; of the District of Columbia, 89; R M O officials accused of sympathy with, 80 Community councils created by N.Y. State Comm. Against Discrimination, 167 f. Complaints, reason for large number filed in the East, 945-46. 122-3«; when an appropriation bill vulnerable to a point of order, 123 ff., 228; Senate rules re amendments to appropriation bills, 127 ff.; compromise grant to end FEPC, 132; opposition in, its most serious problem, 163; movement for permanent FEPC legislation, 199-213; when and by whom bills introduced, 199, 200, 202, 206; provisions re Rules Committee, 200, 201; the campaign: Seventy-ninth Congress, House, 200-202, 205, 206; Senate, 202206; Eightieth Congress, 206; Eightyfirst, House, 206-9; Senate, 206, 209-12; necessity for change in rules governing cloture, 212 Congress of Industrial Organizations, 97, 98, 224; important part in fighting for Negro equality, 8, 10; membership, 10; agreement with National Defense Advisory Comm., 11; cooperation with FEPC, 44, 121, 192; stand taken at southern convention, 45; unions affiliated with, 94, 106, 107, 121, 192, 224 (see also their titles, e.g., Transport

243

Workers Union); a supporter of movement for a permanent FEPC, 212 Congressional Record, 68 Connally, Eugene, 80 Connecticut, anti-discrimination law and commission, 165 Connecticut Inter-Racial Commission, '74 Connelly, Philip M., 29, 30 Consolidated Aircraft Corporation, 31 Constitutional Liberties, American Federation for, 10 Contracts, government: r u l i n g re antidiscrimination clause in, 64 ff. Conway, Captain, 80 Cooperative Association, 109 Corson, John, 221 Council, for entries beginning with, see under subject, e.g., Intolerance in America, Council Against Courts, may review decisions by N.Y. State Comm. Against Discrimination, 167; have upheld Commission, 172; state commissions have rarely had to apply to, 183 Customs and mores of society, whether independent of political laws, 3, 4 "Customs clause" in labor contract, 101, 102, 104, 108 Cramer, Lawrence, W., 25, 225; quoted, *7. 75 Crisis, The, excerpts, 207, 2 1 1 f. Croft, Henry K.., 17 Crosswaith, Frank R „ 17, 19, 55 Crum, Bartley, 81, 82; as chief counsel d u r i n g railroad hearings, 59-63 passim; quoted, 83 Dallas, Tex., regional office, 188 Danaher, John A., 97 Davis, John P., 50 Dawson, William L„ 95 Death of a Yale Man (Ross), 64 Decision, the final, 142, 234 Defense Advisory Commission, National, 11 f., 13; succeeded by Office of Production Management, 11 Defense Board, National, 14 Defense Transportation, Office of, 130 Delaney, John J., 76, 107, 201 Dellums, statement by, 29 Democratic Policy Committee, s i o Democrats, convention evasion of FEPC legislation, 200

244

INDEX

Democrats, southern: diatribes against F E P C activities, 73, 91 ff.; opposition to F E P C appropriation bills, 87 ff., 1 1 8 , 130; collusion between Republicans and, in opposition to permanent F E P C law, 201-12 passim; why not averse to keeping the issue alive, zog; see also South Department stores, 170, 179 Depressions, unemployment during, '95 RDetroit, Mich., 170; organizations from, to protest McNutt's action, 224 Dickerson, Earl, 25, 50; quoted, 41; announcement re hearings, 55, 56; not appointed to new committee, 56, 57 Dies, Martin, 50 Dimock, Marshall E., 79, 80 Directives, question of legality and authority of FEPC's, 74-86 passim; nature of a, 85; issuance and enforcement, 142 f., 234 Dirksen, Representative, 131 "Discharge Mondays," 207 Discrimination, generations-long beliefs about, 3; elimination hastened by law, 4; social and economic circumstances underlying movement against, 4; ruling re anti-discrimination clause in government contracts, 64 ff.: question of right of F E P C to eliminate, or to direct unions to do so, 74; elimination of, proved by experience, 86; unchecked revival following VJ-Day, 134; three recommendations based upon five years' experience in handling problem of, 135; in employment held coincident with, in other areas of society, 167 Discrimination, Committee on, 25 Division of, see under subject, e.g., Negro Economics, Division of Dixey, William, 1 1 1 , 1 1 7 Dixon, Gov. of Alabama, 46 Docking of complaints, 139 f. Donovan, Dan, 74 Donovan, William ]., 16 Douglas Aircraft, 160 Du Bois. W. E. B „ 8; quoted, 8, 217 Early, Stephen, 47; quoted, 65 Eastland, Senator, quoted, 97 Eastman, Joseph B., 60 East Side Merchants Association, Detroit, 224 Economic Stabilization, Office of, 130

Education, emphasis upon conciliation or persuasion and, 143 ff., 154, 183; standards of conciliation and, N.Y. State Comm. Against Discrimination, 174; effective combination of legislation with, 184 f. Education and Labor, Committees on, Senate, 202; House, 207, 208 Education, Office of, 1 1 , 12; under McNutt's supervision, 47 Elson, Alex, and Leonard Schanfield, quoted, 178 Employers, voluntary cooperation with N.Y. State Comm. Against Discrimination, 169; whether embarrassed and burdened by fair employment commissions, 181-83; interest in maintaining wage differentials and preventing union organization, 191; opposition vs. advanced policies, by southern, 193 Employment, importance of full, to future effectiveness of FEPC legislation, >93 96 Employment agencies, private: questions re race and religion on application blanks, 170, 171, 172; survey of, in thirteen cities, 170; violations revealed, i7.f. Employment services, state: did little to combat discrimination, 12, 47; cooperation with employers, 13, 24, 32 U.S., see United States Employment Service Epstein, Henry, 50, 52 Equal Chance, An, film, 168 Equal Job Opportunity, Council for, 105 Ethridge, Mark, 15, 42, 50, 220; why suited for position of chairman, 25; message at Los Angeles hearing, 28 f „ 40; policy of, condemned: partially adopted, 41; replaced as chairman, 46; resignation, 52 Eubanks, dialogue between Ford and, 77 Executive Agencies, Special Committee to Investigate, 225 Executive order, regarded as an authorization by law, 123; whether subject to a point of order, 123 ff., 228; whether an appropriation established by, was new or general legislation, 127 Executive Order 8802, 3, 21, 22; compared with Executive Order 9346, 76, 225 Executive Order 8823, 25 Executive Order 9 1 1 1 , 220

INDEX Executive Order 9346, when issued: created a new FEPC, 56, 57; favorable effects, 73; compared with Executive Order 8802, 76, 125; when "customs clause" of contracts a violation of, 10s Executive Order 9664 issued by Truman; its limitations, 134 Fair Employment Practice Committees, municipal ordinances, 165, 178-80 Fair Employment Practice Committees, national: executive orden creating or enlarging first and second, 3, 21, 22, 56f., 76, 220, 225; first congressional bill introduced, 15; established in Office of Production Management, 22, 24; purpose, 22; history of the first, 22-45, 137 f.; reception by Negroes and press, 22 S.; committee personnel, 25; executive, 25 f.; first problems encountered, 26, 27; hearings by, 27 ff., 49,50 ff., 55 ff., 59-73 passim, »38, 142, 155, 161 f.; later placed within War Production Board, 27; FEPC Press Clipping Digest, quoted, 42; budget, 46, 47, 48, 59, 73, 87 ff., 122 ff., 132; why transferred as an "organizational entity" to War Manpower Commission, 46; under supervision of Paul V. McNutt, 46 ff.; decline and demise of first, 46-56; peak of its glory, 46; disorganization and ineffectuality, 52; conference and recommendations of minority-group leaders, 53; communications to President, 54, 55; regional offices, 54, 59, 139, 188; erupted into action, 55; dying gasp, 56; second, created by Executive Order 9346, 56; chairmen, 56, 57, 64; committee personnel, 57 f.; independent agency within Office of Production Management, 57; involved in crisis resulting from ruling re antidiscrimination clause in government contracts, 64 ff.; the Stacy Committee, 69 ff.; Steele and Tunstall cases a vindication of, 71; Smith Committee investigations, 73-86, 106 f.; jurisdiction, 75 f., 98; question of its authority and right to issue directives, 76-86 passim; congressional campaigns over appropriation for, 87-99, 122-32; extent of concern re employment of aliens, 92; whether it had legislative sanction, 95, 96; continuance for one more year assured by appropriation, 99; confronted with "supreme test" of its history, 100;

245

Philadelphia rapid transit case, 100-20 passim; end of second committee, 12136; legislation to create a permanent, pending, 122, 131; compromise grant the beginning of end; liquidation process, 132; Executive Order 9664 and its effects, 134; Final Report, 134 ff. (excerpts, 72, 134, 135, 138. 147, 148, 155. •57' >85, 189, 191, 195); elements of discouragement, 134; elements of hope, 135; recommendations to President growing out of five-year experience, 135; structure and function, of first, 137 f.; of second, 138-55; casehandling procedure, 139 s.; First Report, 142, 161 (excerpts 141, 148, 159, 182, 188, 190), education, 143 ff., 154, 183; compliance check-ups, 145; relationships with, and aid by, other government agencies, 146 ff., 157 f.; complaints handled during active years, 151, 159 ff.; reasons for successes and for failures, 151 ff., 158, 163 f.; importance of sanctions and pressures, 154; achievements explained and summarized, 156-64; why accurate statistical data not possible, 156; summary of problems and difficulties faced: opposition in Congress the most serious, 163 f.; extent of Roosevelt's support, 163 f.; effect upon morale of minority groups: its true significance and achievement, 164; greatest importance lies in stimulus given movement for permanent legislation, 165; state laws and municipal ordinances its progeny, 165-80; questions re effect of legislation upon society, 181-98; free enterprise, 181-83; prejudice and violence increased? 18388; interracial conflicts and strikes settled by, 187; applicability to the South, 188-93; importance of full employment, 193-96; problem of segregation, 196-98; position by a statutory, national, will depend upon political situation and powers granted by Congress, 198; movement for permanent legislation, 199-213; two high points of its history: preceding period, 199 f.; fate during Seventy-ninth Congress, 200-206; Eightieth, 206; Eighty-first, 206-12; analysis of factors preventing passage, by N.Y. Times, 205, 208 f., 210, 211; by The Crisis, 211 f.; movement weakened: supporters, 212; only answer

246

INDEX

F E P C , national (Continued) to defeats and betrayals, >13; see further under subjects listed above, eg., Hearings; Philadelphia; Regional offices; etc. Fair Employment Practice Committees, state laws, 165-77, l 8 ° ; N Y - Ives-Quinn law the first, 166; effect of laws upon questions of race and religion, 170 Fascism, possibility of, following unemployment, 196 Federal Bureau of Investigation, 3s, 92, 112 Federation of Churches, 224; Interracial Committee, 55 Felix, Vernon, 75 Fenton, Frank, 26, 36, 38; quoted, 37 Fight for Freedom Committee, 16 Filibusters, to prevent a permanent F E P C law, 203, 204-12 passim; need for change in rules governing, 212 Films of N.Y. State Comm. Against Discrimination, 168 Final Report, F E P C , 134 ff.; excerpts, 72, 134. '35- >38. »47. >48. 155. >57. '85, 189, 191, 195 Firemen, Negro, on southern railroads, 60, 61, 69 First Report, F E P C , 142, 161; excerpts, 141, 148, 159, 182, 188, 190 Fisher, O . C., 200 Force cannot eliminate discrimination, 183, 185 Ford, Aaron L., counsel of Smith Comm., 76 ff. Free enterprise, effect of F E P C legislation, 181-83 Full employment, importance to f u t u r e effectiveness of F E P C legislation, 19396 Gardiner, Glenn, quoted, 24 General Motors Corporation, 14 George, Walter F., 205; quoted, 89 Georgia Railroad, 6g, 226 Germans, employment by war contractors, 92 Germany, unemployment and Fascism, 196 Gibson, John S., quoted, 94 Goldstein, Sidney, 55 Gore, Albert, 201 Government bureaus and officials, discrimination against Negroes, 6; attempts to influence them, 7; Negroes

appointed to judgeships and other positions in, 10; affirmed nondiscrimination policy in defense work, 11; laxness in implementing policy, 12 f., 14; public pressure forced breach in wall of indifference, 15; ruling re anti-discrimination clause in contracts, 64 ff.; hearings private, 73, 146 f.; j o b orders with discriminatory specifications, 135; FEPC's relationships with other agencies, 146 ff., 157 f.; increase in employment of Negroes, 159 Graham, Frank, 15, 16, 55 Granger, Lester B „ 12, 14, 16, 17, 55, 172; quoted, 12, 14, 17, 173 Graves, John T e m p l e , 14 Green, William, 25, 26, 98 Grimm, Peter, 182 Guardian, Boston, 7 G u l f , Mobile and Ohio R.R., 61, 69, 227 Gulf Shipbuilding Corporation, 39, 49 Haas, Monsignor Francis J., 67, 83; chairman of second FEPC, 56, 57; agreement approved by, 59; resigned to become bishop, 63; Roosevelt's tribute to, 64 Hampton Institute, 13 Harlan, Justice, quoted, 196 Harper, Fowler, 51 Hayden, Senator, 212 Hayes, Philip, 115, 116 Haynes, George E., 5 Hearings, railroad cases, 49, 50 ff., 55 ff., 59-63 (see under Railroads); private for government agencies, 73, 146; public for private companies and unions, 73; purpose, procedure, 138, 142; effect of first committee's four major, upon employment practices of companies involved, 161 f. (see also under Birmingham, Chicago, Los Angeles, New York); industrial categories of plants involved, 162 Herald Tribune, see New York Herald Tribune Herndon case, 10 Hill, debate with Sarnoff, 39 Hill, Charles, 51 Hillman, Sidney, 14, 20; letter to holders of defense contracts, 15; President's support of letter, 18; urged to take further action, 16; vilified by Rankin, 94; branches in Labor Division of O P M created by, 219 Hobbs, Sam, 93

INDEX Hobson, Henry W., 16 Hoffman, C. £., 80, too Hoffman, Paul G., 183 Holly, William H., 69 Honeycutt, A. J., and Co., 4g House committees, etc., see under subject, e.g., Appropriations, House Committee on Houston, Charles H., 50,5s, 7 2; on FEPC's attitude toward railroads, 8s; letters to T r u m a n , 13s, 133; resignation, 133, 134; private memo, re Truman's position in connection with Capital Transit Co., »35 Humphrey, Hubert H., 179 Hunt, A. Bruce, 74, 188 Hushing, W. C., 199

Illinois, no state FEPC law, 179 Illinois Central R.R., 6g, 1*7 Imes, William Lloyd, 17 Independent Office Appropriation Bill, 87 Indiana, anti-discrimination law, 165, 166 Industry, how discriminatory practices can be reduced or eliminated, 135; proportion of nonwhites to whites in war industry, 161; effect of FEPC legislation upon private enterprise, 181-83 Insight and evaluation, importance of, •5 1 Inter-American Affairs, Office of, 130 International Association of Machinists, is, 38, 226, 327 International Brotherhood of Boilermakers, see Boilermakers' Union International News Service, 63 International Union of Marine and Shipbuilding Workers of America, 5g International Union of Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers, 45 Interracial Commission, Illinois, excerpt from report, 17g Interracial Committee of the Women's Division of the Greater New York Federation of Churches, 55 Intolerance in America, Council Against, 10 Iron Shipbuilders and Helpers of America, 227 Ives-Quinn law, N.Y., and its enforcement agent, 166-77 (see also N.Y. State Commission Against Discrimination);

247

extensively publicized, 168; violations by employment agencies, 171 f. Ives-Quinn Law, Committee to Support, excerpts from report, 17», 173; recommendations by, 175 Ivory, Doris M., 172 Jacksonville, Fla., 157 Jacksonville Terminal Co., 6g, 226 Jefferson County Labor Committee Against Job Discrimination, 45 Jewish Community Council, 224 Jewish Congress, American, 10; investigations of N.Y. employment agencies, 171 f.; memo, re state and local laws, 178 Jewish defense agencies, survey of complaints filed with, 170 Jews, i5g, 162; discrimination against since VJ-Day, 135 Johnson, Edwin C., 8g, 212 Johnson, Hugh S., 17 Johnson, Reginald, 101 Johnston, Eric, 183 Jones and Laughlin Steel Company, 187 Journal, House action re approval of, 203, 204 Kansas City, Mo., 170; Negro protest meeting, 13 Kerr, Senator, 212 Kirchwey, Freda, 16 Kirk Lucas Employment Agency, 176 Klein, Arthur G., quoted, g5 Knox, Frank, 15, 17, 20 Knudsen, William, 18, 20; refusal to stand against discrimination, 14, 16 Krock, Arthur, on congressional fight over permanent FEPC law, 205, 208 f. Kurtz, Russell, quoted, g Labor, inability of Murray and Green to attend FEPC meetings, 26; employment of minority groups aided by scarcity of, 156, 193; whether FEPC legislation results in strikes, 183 ff. Labor, Dept. of, discrimination against Negroes, 6 Division of Negro Economics, 5, 6 Labor Committee, House, 200, 206 Labor-management relations, an influence in resistance to Negro upgrading, 118 ff. Labor News, 65

248

INDEX

L a b o r Relations Board, National, 64, t u L a b o r unions, discrimination against Negroes by A F of L affiliates, 7, 12; restrictions by international, 12; defendants in cases against railroads and, 59 (see under Railroads); rights re elimination of discrimination, 75; question of right of railroad unions to exclude Negroes, 82; rivalry among, as factor in disputes, 107; four involved in Philadelphia rapid transit case, 107; United A u t o Workers' agreement a great step forward, 121; how discriminatory practices can be reduced or eliminated, 135; contribution to advancement of equality in the South, 191 f.; difficulties and actions during periods of unemployment, 195; see also American Federation of Labor; Congresi of Industrial Organizations; and names of unions, e.g., United Steelworkers L a Follette Committee, 30 L a Guardia, Fiorello H., 18 ff., 23 Lancaster, R u f u s G., 115 Lane, Layle, 17, 19 L a t i n America, State Dept. m i n d f u l of relations with 47; good will resulting from F E P C activities, 98 Lausche, Frank J., 69 Lawson, Edward, 225 Lawyers Guild, National, 10 League on Urban Conditions among Negroes, National, 5 Legislation, effective combination of education with, 184 f. L e h m a n , Governor, 25 Lesinski, John, 207, 208 Lewis, Roscoe E., quoted, 8, 9 Lockheed-Vega Aircraft Corporation, 31, 161 Loescher, Frank S., 179 Logan, R a y f o r d W., 219 Los Angeles, F E P C hearings held in, 27, 28 ff., 31 ff., 36, 42, 43 f.; subregional office, 94; employment of Negroes in w a r industries, 160 Los Angeles R y . Co., 118, 119 Los Angeles Transit companies, 163, 186 Louisiana-Arkansas line, 227 Louisville and Nashville Railroad, 69, 226; the Steele case, 70, 71, 72 Louisville Courier-Journal, 23, 25 Lucas, Senator, action re the McGrath F E P C bill, 209, 210, 211

Luce, Henry R., 183 Ludlow, Louis, 95 McAdoo, Secretary, 69 McAvoy Shipbuilding Corporation, 49 McCarran, Senator, 212 McConnell, Representative, 208 McFarland, Senator, 212 McGrath, J. Howard, bill for F E P C law, 206, 209 McGraw-Hill Research Department, 192 Machine Age in the Hills (Ross), 64 Mac Kay Committee, 81 McKellar, Senator, 128, 129, 203, 204 MacLean, Malcolm S., 48, 50, 220; at Los Angeles hearing, 28, 30, 31,40; replaced Ethridge as chairman, 46; resignation, 5» McMenamin, James, 111, 117 McNutt, Paul V., 149, 152, 230; F E P C under supervision of, 46-56; attitude toward discrimination, 47; postponed railroad hearings, 51; protests against actions of, 51, 52, 54; promise to reschedule hearings, 55; all agencies combatting discrimination under supervision of, 223 Macon, G a „ 157 Management-labor relations, an influence in resistance to Negro upgrading, 118 ff. Manasco, Representative, 73 Marcantonio, Vito, 93, 96; introduced first FEPC bill, 15, 199; quoted, 91, 95, 209; arguments on behalf of appropriation for FEPC, 122-27 passim, 130, 131 March of T i m e film, 168 March-on-Washington Committee, and activities, 17-21, 23 Maritime Commission, 79; FEPC's relations with, 146 f; 157; why effective action against discrimination impossible, >47 Maritime Union, National, C I O , 224 Maslow, Will, quoted, 92, 127, 147, 165, 166, 201, 203; directions to field operators re handling of complaints, 143 Mason, Lucy R., quoted, 192 Massachusetts, anti-discrimination law and commission, 165; new business following, 183 Maybank, Senator, 128 Mead, Senator, 98, 129 Mexican Americans, 47, 159

INDEX Miller, A. L., 200 Miller, Clyde R.. 62 Milwaukee, Wis., 16«, 170 Mine, Mill, and Smelter Workers, CIO, 192 Minneapolis, Minn., 170, 179 Minority groups, hope and new confidence brought to, 164; labor scarcity an incentive for utilization of, 193; effect of depressions, 194 f.; see also names of groups, e.g., Jews; Negroes, etc. Minority Groups Branch, War Manpower Commission and Labor Division of Office of Production Management, 137, 184 f., »19, 221 Missouri, Kansas and Texas R.R., 69, 83, 227 Mitten, A. A., 101, 108 Montgomery Advertiser, excerpt, 44 Mores and customs of society, whether independent of political laws, 3, 4 Morse, Wayne, 205: quoted, 129, 132 Motion picture publicity for Ives-Quinn law, 168 Mulholland, Frank L., 81, 83 Municipal FEPC ordinances and commissions, 165, 178-80 Murray, Philip, 25, 26 Myrdal, Gunnar, 12; quoted, 8, 12 National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, 8, 14, 31, 50; membership, 7,9; stimulated and chaneled Negro protest, 13; quoted, 47; Philadelphia branch, 101; nationwide mobilization to secure passage of FEPC bills, 207; Crisis the monthly publication of, 211 National Council for a Permanent FEPC, 199, 206 National, for other entries see under name of organization, e.g., Urban League, National Navy Department, FEPC's relations with, 146 f., 157; employment policies of private employers and, 157 Negotiation and education, see Education Negro Americans in Defense Industries, Committee on, 14 Negro Congress, National, 16, 23, 36, 50: when and why created, 9; stimulated and channeled Negro protest, 13 Negro Economics, Division of, 5, 6

249 Negro Employment and Training Branch, Labor Division of OPM, 137, 219, 221 Negro Handbook, excerpts, 22, 50, 51, 52 Negro Labor Victory Committee, N.Y., 224 Negroes, post-Civil War legislation affirming rights of, 3; attitude toward, and movements for and against, at turn of century and during World War I, 4 ff.; job statistics, 4; amorphous group consciousness: poorly organized and led, 7; influence of Booker Washington's philosophy of acquiescence, 8; white doctrines of the Negroes' "place," and "white supremacy," 8,41,93; beginning and effects of pressure groups, voting power, concerteid action, g ff.; results of shift of votes to North: no longer oneparty voters, 10; indifference toward, and discriminations against, at beginning of World War II, 11 ff.; efforts of white liberals and: their effects, 13 ff.; shipbuilders, 59, 147; railroad jobs, 60, 61, 69; employment and upgrading of, in transportation systems, 61, 100-120 passim (see also entries under Philadelphia . . .); reason for large number in FEPC, 98; manpower shortage and greater employment, 156 f., 159 if.; use of women, 156 f., 193; number in War industry, 157; employment in government service, 159; hope and new confidence brought into lives of, 164; acceptance of, after introduction into working force, 185 ff.; strikes against discriminatory conditions, 187; population figures, 189; segregation a "badge of servitude" for, 196; reasons for large number of complaints filed in East: growing consciousness of rights, 238 Newark, N.J., 170 Newark Sunday Call, excerpt, 24 New Jersey, anti-discrimination law and commission, 165 New Jersey State Employment Service, 24 New Mexico, anti-discrimination law and commission, 165 Newport News Daily Press, 8 Newport News Shipbuilding Company, 12 Newspapers, see Press News-Tribune, Rome, Ga., 44

250

INDEX

Newsweek, 63 New York, City, FEPC hearings held in, *7- S 1 - S6> 38, 41; regional office, 54, 225; percentage of complaints in six other cities and, 170 New York, State, the Ives-Quinn law a n d its enforcement agent, the N.Y. State Commission Against Discrimination (q.v.), 166-77; reasons accounting for continued prevalence of discrimination in, 172 New York Central R.R., 67, 69, 83 New York Herald, 8 New York Herald Tribune, 16, 23; excerpt, 169 New York State Chamber of Commerce, 182 New York State Commission Against Discrimination, enforcement of lves-Quinn law, 166-77; community councils created, 167 f.; members, jurisdiction, powers, 167; its seven offices, 167; films and other means of publicizing, 168; extent of its effectiveness, 169 ff., 182; action against and by, private employment agencies, 172; accused of favoring the "soft" approach, 173; standards of adjustment and conciliation, 174 f.; legal limitation upon enforcement powers, 175; recommendations made to, text, 175, 177; reactions to them, 176; responsiveness to public pressure and civic agencies, 176 f.; allegiance of businessmen won by tactful and considerate approach, 182; ruled segregation illegal, 198 New York Telephone Co., 153, 162, 186 New York Times, The, 23, 63, 67, 73, 172; excerpts, 41, 43, 66, 154, 210, 211; on congressional fight over permanent FEPC law, 205, 208 f., 210, 2 1 1 New York World Telegram, 73 Nordberg Manufacturing Company, 33 Norfolk, Va., 157 Norfolk and Western Ry. Co., 61, 69, 227 Norfolk Journal and Guide, 57 Norfolk Southern R.R., 61, 69, 72, 227 Norris, George W „ 55 N o r t h American Aviation Co., 12, 160 N o r t h r u p , Herbert R., 62; quoted, 192 Norton, Mrs. Mary T., 95, 130; quoted, 96; introduction and support of, bill for permanent FEPC, 200, 201, tog, 205

O'Brian, J o h n Lord, 76 Office of, for entries beginning with, see under subject, e.g., Education, Office of OPA, see Price Administration, Office of OPM, see Production Management, Office of Order of Railway Conductors, 227 Oregon, anti-discrimination law and commission, 165 Organized Labor and the Negro (Northrup), excerpt, 192 Overton, Senator, 203 Palmquist, E. A., 115 Parrish, Richard, 17 "Patterns of Conciliation Under the N.Y. State Law Against Discrimination" (Spitz), 174 Patterson, Robert P., 15 Pearl, C. E.. 36 Pennsylvania R.R., 67, 69, 83 Pepper, Senator, 203 Peterson, Congressman, 80 Petroleum Administration for War, 130 Philadelphia, 170; extent of discrimination toward Negroes, 100; the rapid transit case, 100-120; hearings on the case, 103, 106; attitude of public re discrimination and strike on transit lines, 105 f., 115; of Mayor toward strike, 111, 114; of police, 114, 116; opportunities opened to Negroes after passage of antidiscrimination ordinance, 179 Philadelphia Federation of Churches, 115 Philadelphia navy yard, 157 Philadelphia Rapid Transit Co., see Philadelphia Transportation Co. Philadelphia Rapid Transit Employees' Union, question of legality of directives issued against, 74 ff.; events leading to strike, 100-110; opposition to upgrading of Negroes, 101-12 passim; defeat by Transport Workers Union, 107; efforts to regain position as bargaining representative, 109; handling of the strike, 110-17; its leaders, 111; had once been declared bargaining agent, 114 Philadelphia transit strike, Smith Comm. helped to set stage for, 79, 86; example of inadequate insight: seniority issue, 151; no evidence of a resultant increase in prejudice, 187 Philadelphia Transportation Company, events leading to strike of transit em-

INDEX ployees, 71,86,100-120, 154, 186 passim; question of legality of directives issued against, 74II.; policy re employment and upgrading of Negroes, 100, 101, 108, 117; attitude toward strike, iog ff.; federal grand jury report, excerpts, 111, 1 '3 Philosophy of accommodation, 8 Physical differences, theories about distinctions based on, 3 Pittsburgh Courier, 65 PM, 23, 63; excerpts, 60, 64, 65, 73, 113, 114, 115, 116, 134 Point of order, congressional debates over, 123 S., 228 Poletti, Gov. of New York, 54 Political Action Committee, CIO, 94 Pollatsek, Frank, attacks on, 79 S. Poll of white workers' attitude re Negroes, 152, 153 Poll T a x , National Committee to Abolish, 10 Powell, Adam Clayton, 206, 207 Prejudice, whether increased by FEPC legislation, 183 ff. "Prejudice Is Not the Whole Story" (Weckler), excerpt, 118 ff. President, second FEPC subject only to authority of, 57; action possible when case referred to, 143; see also Roosevelt, Franklin D.; Truman, Harry S. Press, Negro: growth in quality and influence, 10; excerpts, 13, 16, 22, 23; reception of Executive Order 8802, 22 f.; followed activities closely, 24; denouncement of McNutt, 51; reaction to findings and directives against railroads, 67 white: antagonism toward attempt to change the status quo, 8; changing attitude, 14, 16; N.Y. newspapers' plea for equality, 16; how Executive Order 8802 received, 23; attitude toward Birmingham hearings, 43 f.; toward railroad hearings, 63; unrestrained antagonism of southern, 63, 188 Press associations, disregard of railroad hearings, 63 Price, Gov. of Virginia, 54 Price Administration, Office of, 74 Private enterprise, effect of FEPC legislation, 181-83 Private Office Personnel Agencies, Association of, 172

25« Production Management, Office of, 14; successor to National Defense Advisory Commission, 11; training-within-industry programs spondored by, 12; letter to holders of defense contracts, 15; President's support of letter, 18; Fair Employment Practice Committees established in, 22, 24, 57; heads of, and primary purpose of, two Labor Division units, 219 Minority Groups Branch and Negro Employment and Training Branch, 137, 219, 221 Publicity, policy of protecting accused from, 144; films and other means of, for Ives-Quinn law, 168; state commissions' refusal to reveal terms of case adjustments, 176; recommendation to publicize, by civic and intergroup agencies, 177; see also Press Race, prejudice, not only cause of resistance to Negro upgrading, 118; questions by employment agencies, 170, 172; friendlier relationships, 185 f.; opposition and strike action resulting from racial issues, 187; labor unions often the means of easing tensions, 192 Railroad Labor Executives Association, 81 Railroad Retirement Board, 85 Railroads, FEPC's projected public hearings, 49, 50 ff., 55; the hearings: statements, testimony, directives, 59-63, 66, 155; problem of discrimination on: coming to grips with their cases, 59; firemen on, 60, 61, 69; jobs closed to Negroes, 61; publication of findings and directives: effect, 67; reply of railroads, 68; names of those certified and not certified to President, 69; mediation by Stacy Comm., 69 f., 71; effect of Supreme Court decisions in Steele and Tunstall cases, 70, 71 f.; greatest tactical error made in cases against, 70; responsibility for final result, 71; Smith Comm. investigation of FEPC's authority to issue directives against, 74-86 passim; question re discrimination against southern, 81 ff.; the MacKay Committee, 81; those certified to President, 81; those not certified, 83; question of unions' right to exclude Ne-

252

INDEX

Railroads (Continued) groes, 8s; see also their titles, e.g., Union Pacific R . R . Co. Railway Labor Act, 62, 70, 72; whether FEPC directives contrary to, 85 Railway Mediation Board, 61 Ramspeck, Representative, 188 Randolph, A. Philip, 15, 25, 67; Negro leader: important accomplishments, 9; activities re "March-on-Washington," 17 ff. Rankin, John, 50, 127; quoted, 73, 92, 171; diatribe by, g4 Ransom, Leon, quoted, 6, 7 Rapid transit cases, see under location, e.g., Philadelphia . . . Rayburn, Speaker, 91; actions re permanent FEPC law, 207, 208, 209 Reader's Digest, 63 Recruiting and Manning Organization of War Shipping Administration, 148; Smith Comm. investigation of complaints against, 79 ff. Reed, Nancy, 80 Regional offices. New York, 54, 225; in War Manpower Comm. areas, 59; Atlanta's treatment of director and, 73 f„ 188; first committee did not establish, 137; and subregional field offices the base of committee's structure: number, activities, 139; first two in South, 188 Reid, Ira De A., quoted, 8, 10 Religion, questions by employment agencies, 170, 171, 172 Republicans, fight against President's powers, 88; convention pledge to establish a permanent FEPC, 200; collusion between southern Democrats and, in opposition to permanent FEPC law, 201-12 passim Rhode Island, anti-discrimination law and commission, 165 Richmond Times-Dispatch, 14 Rivers, L. M., quoted, 94 Rockefeller, Nelson A., 183 Roosevelt, Eleanor, opposition to "March-on-Washington," 17 f. Roosevelt, Franklin Delano, 16, 50, 73, 115, 149; executive orders creating first and second FEPC, 3, 21, 22, 56, 57 f.; that committee be continued, his last request of Congress, 4; reasons for not always taking definite action, 14 f., 143, 163; prevention of March-on-Washing-

ton: steps taken, 17 if.; Executive Order 8823 issued by, 25; transfer of FEPC to War Manpower Commission, 46; actions following the transfer, 47, 51, 53, 54> 55' 56; creation of second FEPC: appointed Monsignor Haas as chairman, 56, 57; tribute to Haas, 64; Warren's ruling unknown to, 65; countermanded, 66; railroads and unions certified to, 69, 81; appointment of Stacy Committee, 69, 71; devoted to cause of racial and religious equality, 71; Smith Comm. formed to hamper policies of, 74; railroads not certified, 83; whether industries cited to, 84; Republican fight against powers of, 88; requests for appropriations, 88, 90, 122; death, 122, 126; last request that FEPC be continued, 126; request re hearings involving government agencies, 146; extent of support by, 163; felt pressures of political and economic forces: winning the war his primary task, 164 Roosevelt, Franklin D., Jr., 207 Rosenberg, Anna, 20 Rosenwald Foundation, 25 Ross, Malcolm, 67, 97, 10s, 152, 225; writings: stand against discrimination, 64; as chairman of second committee, 64-72; suggested appointment of Stacy Comm., 70; why saw it a mistake, 70, 71; appearance before Smith Comm., with excerpts of testimony, 75-85 passim; tribute to, by a congressional committee, 90; quoted, 92, 121, 140, 152, 197; salary, 96; hearing re Philadelphia rapid transit case, 103-6; on Capital Transit case, 152 Rules Committee, House, see under Congress Ruml, Beardsley, 183 Russell, Richard B., 128, 205, 210; moves in opposition to FEPC, 87 ff., 96 ff.; quoted, 88, 89 Sabbatarians, 159 Sabbath, Adolph, J., 4, 125 f., 201, 206 St. Louis, 170 St. Louis & San Francisco Ry., 69, 227 Samuel, Bernard, 1 1 1 , 114 Sanctions and pressures, importance when implied, 154; as last resort only, >83 San Francisco, 170

INDEX Santa Fe R.R., 75 Sarnoff, David, 25; quoted, 38; aggressive action: debate with Hill, 39; resignation, 52 Saturday Evening Post, 14 Savannah Building Trades Council, AF of L, 49 Schell, S. D., 80 Scientific Research and Development, Office of, 1x4 Scott, Emmett J., 5; quoted, 6 Scottsboro case, 10 Seaboard Air Line R.R., 69, 7», 1x7 Seafarers International Union, AF of L., 79- >4« Seamen's unions, manpower, 79 Segregation, defended by Ethridge, 28, 40; policy that FEPC finally adopted, 41; importance as obstacle to elimination of discrimination in employment, 196-98; as cause of duplication of facilities, 196; why FEPC never took a positive stand, 197 Selective Service, order re drafting strikers, 116 Senate committees, etc., see under subject, e.g.. Appropriations Committee, Senate Seniority issue in Philadelphia rapid transit case, 105-30 passim, 151 "Separate but equal" facilities, 196 f. Sharfsin, Joseph, 76, 78 Shelton, J . M„ 38 Shipbuilders, Negro: opportunities broadened, 59, 147 Ships, discrimination and segregation aboard, 148 Shishkin, Boris, 26, 50, 57 Simon, Caroline K., quoted, 177 Skouros, Spyros P., 183 Sleeping Car Porters, see Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters Smith, A. O., Co., 160 Smith, Cotton Ed, 15 Smith, Howard W„ 73, 74, 106, 125 Smith Committee, when created: purpose, 74. 76, 77; investigations and hearings, 73-86, 106; general counsel, 76; antagonistic attitude toward FEPC, 76, 78, 107; effects of the hearings, 78, 86; failures, 78, 80, 86; most active in harrying liberals, 81 Smith-Connally Act, penalties for violation of, 116, 117, 118 Social intermingling, diatribes on, 93, 98

m

Sociologist, survey of white employees attitudes toward Negroes, 152 Source material, 217-40 South, responsible for elimination of Negroes from government positions during World War I period, 7; shift in potential Negro votes from, 10; reactionary southern pressure, 46, 47; conditions on, and hearings against, railroad« and unions in, 59, 60, 69; discriminatory practices of USES offices in, 149, 190; question of the applicability of FEPC legislation to, 188-93; size of Negro population, 189; statistics re complaints in, 189 f.; differed from other regions only in degree, 190; factors that operate against, and also in favor of, equality of opportunity, 191 ff.; discrimination in, susceptible to change, 193; see also Democrats, southern Southall, Sara, 57, 58 South America, see Latin America Southeastern Carriers' Conference Agreement, 60, 66, 68, 72; names of railroads involved in, 226 Southern Conference for Human Welfare, 10 Southern Conference on Race Relations, 58 Southern Negro Youth Congress, 9, 45 Southern Ry. Co., 61, 69, 72, 227 Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 64, 66 Sparkman, Representative, 123 Special Committee to Investigate Executive Agencies, see Smith Committee Spitz, Henry, 174 Stacy, Walter P., 69, 70 Stacy Committee, members, 69; authority limited, 69, 70; why deplored, 70, 71; dispute re purpose of appointment of, 81, 84 State Commission Against Discrimination (SCAD), see under New York State State Department, feared revelations of discrimination against Spanish Americans, 47 States, those that have passed laws prohibiting discrimination: provisions for enforcement, 165-77, 180; pattern followed, 165 f. (seealso understate names, e.g., New York); Ives-Quinn law (q.v.) the first created, 166-77; l a w s 'hat a r e ineffective "counterfeit measures," 166; appeals to courts rare by FEPCs, 183

254

INDEX

Steele v. Louisville & Nashville RJt. 70, 71, 7* Stevens, Harold A., 51 Stewan-Wamer Corporation, 32, 35 Stimson, Henry L., go Stokes, Anson Phelps, 14 Stone, I. F., quoted, 205, 206 Strategic Services, Office of, 130 Strikes, whether increased by FEPC laws, 185 ff.; opposition and, resulting from racial issues, 187; of rapid transit employees, see under locations, e.g., Philadelphia . . . Studebaker Corporation, 32, 36 Supreme Court, ruled against post-Civil War legislation, 3; on danger in attempts to eradicate social instincts by legislation, 3; decision in cases re discrimination, 70, 72; role of decisions evaluated by FEPC, 72 Taber, John, 92, 93 T a f t , Robert, 129, 203, 211; FEPC bill introduced by, 202, 205 T a f t , William Howard, 217 Tarver, Malcolm C., 91, 93, 94, 96, 97 Telephone Co., N.Y., 153, 162, 186 Thomas, R. J., 121 Thompson, Frank, 117 Thompson, Lewis Sylvester, 114 Times, Gadsden, Ala., 44 Tobias, Channing, 16, 55 Tolischus, Otto D „ 62 Training-within-industry programs, sponsored by OPM, 12 Transport Workers Union, CIO, involved in Philadelphia Transit case, 107, 109, 112; opposed to discrimination, 107; efforts to end strike, 112; gain in membership, 117 Trotter, William Monroe, 7 Truman, Harry S., 125, 211; attitude re permanent FEPC law, 126, 205, 206, 208, 209, 210; action re Capital Transit Co., 132, 235; defense of action, 133; issued Executive Order 9664, 134 Trussell, C. P., quoted, 205 Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen, 70, 71, 72 Turner, Henry C., on effectiveness of N.Y. law, 169 Tuskegee . . . Institute, 5 Unemployment, minority groups during periods of, 193 ff.

Union Pacific R.R., 61, 62, 69, 83, 227 Unions, see Labor unions United Auto Workers, CIO, 121, 224 United Mine Workers, AF of L, 45, 192, '95 United Packinghouse Workers of America, CIO, 192 United Press, 63 United States Chamber of Commerce, 182 United States Employment Service, policy under supervision of McNutt, 47; involvement in Philadelphia rapid transit case, 100, 101, 108, 116; W M C directive re hiring through, 108; sanction assented to, by, 143; regional directors not to rely solely on reports by, 144; policy of, a source of conflict with FEPC, 148; southern offices recalcitrant: their cooperation with employers, 149, 190; WMC assumed jurisdiction over, 149, 223; effect of new policy, 149; instructions not to honor discriminatory hiring orders, 158; cooperative attitude in the Northeast: help given by N.Y. office, 190 United Steelworkers, CIO, 45, 192 United Transport Service Employees Association, 224 Urban League, National, 15, 26, 173; when and why created: membership, 9; stimulated and channeled Negro protest, 13 Urban League, Chicago, 58 N.J., 24 N.Y., 173 Veterans of minority groups, discrimination and unequal treatment of, 135 Vincent, Craig S., attacks on, 79 ff. Virginia Ry., 60, 225 Von Weigand, Henry C., 24 Voorhis, Jerry, 76, 107 Vultee Aircraft, Inc., 49 Wage differentials, interest of employers in maintaining, igi Wagner, Senator, 15, 199 Wagner Labor Relations Act, 109 War agencies appropriations bill, congressional consideration of, 96, 122-32 passim; names of the agencies, 130 War Department, directive to war contractors to employ loyal aliens, 92; Army's seizure of Philadelphia transit

INDEX line», 1 1 5 , 1 1 7 ; FEPC's relations with, 146 f., 157 War Information, Office of, 64, 1x4, 130 War Labor Board, National, 74, 114, 130 War Manpower Commission, 58, 59, 154, 161, 230; F E P C transferred to: its status, 46; budget, 47; jurisdiction over committee, 48-56 passim; why railroad hearings postponed, 50; demand that FEPC be removed from jurisdiction of, 53; F E P C given right to recommend measures to, 57; regional offices in areas of, 59; involvement in Philadelphia rapid transit case, 100, 1 1 3 ff.; directive re hiring through U.S. Employment Service, 108; sanction assented to, by, 143; FEPC's difficulties in contacts with, 148; cooperation between them, 149, 157, 158, 160; most important recruiting agency for war effort, 158; efforts of Minority Groups Branch compared with powers of F E P C , 185; USES and other agencies combatting discrimination within jurisdiction of, 223 War Production Board, 46, 76, 130, 157; FEPC placed within, 27 War Relocation Authority, 123 War Shipping Administration, why effective action against discrimination impossible, 147 f. Recruiting and Manning Organization, 148; Smith Comm. investigation of complaints against, 79 ff. Warren, Lindsay C., ruling by, 64; antiNegro record, 65; ruling countermanded, 66 Washington, Booker T . , policy of acquiescence, 5 Washington state, anti-discrimination law and commission, 165 Washington Post, 23, 67 Washington Star, 23 Waterbury, J . H., 31

255

Waters, Agnes, 199 Watson, Goodwin, quoted, 184, 186 Weaver, Robert C., 1 1 , 158, 219, 221; quoted, 156, 188, 193, 194: quoted, iog, 1 1 1 , 114, 116 Webster, Milton P., 25, 50, 57, 67, 103 Weckler, Joseph, 152; on effects of management-labor relations, upon status of Negroes, 118 if.; quoted, 109, 1 1 1 , 114, 116 Western Electric Co., 198 White, Senator, 205 White, Walter, 16, 55; quoted, 14, 134; articles by, 14, 17 ff. "White supremacy," claimants, 93 ff. Whitten, Jamie L., 93 Whittington, William M., 202 Wigglesworth, Emmett, 1 1 5 Wilkins, Roy, quoted, 23 Williams, Aubrey, 18, 20 Windham, Maxwell, Jr., 101 Wisconsin, anti-discrimination law, 165, 166, 170 Wolfe, James H., 74 Women, Negro: in war plants, 156, 157, «93 World, The, 8 World War I, attitude toward demotion and progress of Negroes during, 4 ff.; conditions following: lessons learned, 9 World War II, discriminations against Negroes, 11 ff.; efforts of Negroes and white liberals: their effects, 13 ff. Wright Aeronautical Corporation, 36 Yale Law Journal, The, excerpt, 178 Yergan, Max, 55 Young, P. B „ Sr., 57, 58 Youngstown Sheet and T u b e Co., 187 Youth congresses, 9, 45 Zemurray, Samuel, 57, 58