"The EU is Not Them, But Us!" : The First Person Plural and the Articulation of Collective Identities in European Political Discourse [1 ed.] 9781443830751, 9781443828604

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“The EU is Not Them, But Us!”

“The EU is Not Them, But Us!”: The First Person Plural and the Articulation of Collective Identities in European Political Discourse

By

Attila Krizsán

“The EU is Not Them, But Us!”: The First Person Plural and the Articulation of Collective Identities in European Political Discourse, by Attila Krizsán This book first published 2011 Cambridge Scholars Publishing 12 Back Chapman Street, Newcastle upon Tyne, NE6 2XX, UK British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Copyright © 2011 by Attila Krizsán All rights for this book reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the copyright owner. ISBN (10): 1-4438-2860-2, ISBN (13): 978-1-4438-2860-4

I dedicate this book to my wife, Anna, who has not only been my constant inspiration and support during the research, but also had her fair share in the work by discussing with me many of the ideas, questions and problems that had to be dealt with in the course of this project.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

List of Figures ......................................................................... xi Acknowledgements ...............................................................xiii Chapter One ............................................................................. 1 Introduction Chapter Two............................................................................. 7 On Linguistics and Politics Linguistic studies of political discourse Corpus-driven systemic-functional analyses The analysis as a form of interaction: The researcher’s position

Chapter Three......................................................................... 21 Political Discourse in the European Union: The Case of the Fifth Enlargement EU enlargements in their historical contexts Enlargements prior to ER5 The ER5 Conditions for EU membership Enlargement, legitimacy and the formation of collective identity

Chapter Four .......................................................................... 33 Corpus Building and Analytical Categories Description of the texts and criteria for inclusion in the three corpora Aims and categories of analysis Stages of analysis Description of the first analytic round Description of the second analytic round

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Chapter Five ........................................................................... 49 The First Round of Analysis and its Results Referent sets of P1 pronouns The main referent sets of ‘EU’ and ‘Country’ Referent subsets within the ‘EU’ and the ‘Country’ sets ‘General’ referents Referents to ‘Others’ Process types connected to the ‘EU’ and the ‘Country’ referents of P1 pronouns Process types connected to first participants of the ‘EU’ and the ‘Country’ main referent sets Process types connected to the referent subsets of the ‘EU’ and the ‘Country’ sets Second participants and circumstances

Chapter Six............................................................................. 95 The Second Round of Analysis and its Results Referents in the ‘EU specific’ subset ‘EU specific’ referents shared by all three corpora Referents shared by two corpora Unshared ‘EU specific’ referents ‘Country specific’ referents ‘Country specific’ referents in the British corpus ‘Country specific’ referents in the Finnish corpus ‘Country specific’ referents in the Hungarian corpus Intersection of the ‘EU’ and the ‘Others’ referent sets Referents in more than one corpus Referents in the British corpus Referents in the Hungarian corpus Referents in the Finnish corpus Intersection of the ‘Country’ and the ‘Others’ referent sets Referents in the British corpus Referents in the Hungarian corpus Referents in the Finnish corpus Bilateral referents

“The EU is Not Them, But Us!”

ix

Chapter Seven ...................................................................... 143 The Findings of this Study and their Implications for the Discursive Construction of the Fifth Enlargement The main findings and their interpretation Findings in the first analytic round Findings in the second analytic round Significance of the results in terms of discourse, representation and ideology

References ............................................................................ 161 Appendix A .......................................................................... 171 Process Types Connected to the Referent Subsets of the ‘EU’ and the ‘Country’ Sets in the Three Corpora Appendix B .......................................................................... 175 Speeches in the Three Corpora The British Corpus The Finnish Corpus The Hungarian Corpus

Appendix C .......................................................................... 183 Referent Sets, Process Types and Participant Functions Appendix D Specimen Texts .................................................................... 209 Index..................................................................................... 221

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1. System of referent types of P1 pronouns .....................................50 Figure 2. Main referent sets of ‘EU’ and ‘Country’ ....................................52 Figure 3. Distribution of all twelve referent sets, subsets and intersections in the three corpora.................................................................57 Figure 4. ‘Leaders’ and ‘Citizens’ referent subsets within ‘EU’ and ‘Country’ sets of P1 ..............................................................................60 Figure 5. The ‘General’ referent set in the three corpora ............................64 Figure 6. Process types performed by ‘General’ referent set ......................64 Figure 7. Relational, material and mental processes performed by P1 in the three corpora............................................................................69 Figure 8. Process types performed by the main referent sets of ‘EU’ and ‘Country of the speaker’ ..............................................................71 Figure 9. Second participants and circumstances in the three corpora.........................................................................................................88 Figure 10. Second participants and circumstances in connection to P1 referents to the EU ...........................................................89 Figure 11. Second participants and circumstances in connection to P1 referents to the speakers’ country ....................................90 Figure 12. Summary of process types used in connection to second participants in the three corpora ......................................................91 Figure 13. Summary of process types used in connection to circumstances in the three corpora ..............................................................92 Figure 14. Process types connected to the ‘EU’ or the ‘Country of the speaker’ referent sets as second participants .....................................93 Figure 15. Process types connected to the ‘EU’ or the ‘Country of the speaker’ referent sets as circumstances .............................................94

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

In 1989 the communist systems of Eastern and Central Europe collapsed. Out of the many changes that this event resulted in, there was one which I found particularly curious as a primary school student in Hungary at the time: our new history books and the change of perspective these books had on events previously learnt. Most probably this was the first occasion when I grasped something about the nature of the relationship between events and their discursive representation. When more than a decade later I moved to Finland and experienced my own socialization into the Finnish society, I was fascinated by the discovery that so many aspects of one’s identity, especially the social and collective aspects, are in fact also discursive constructions. Since then I have kept my eyes and ears open to ways people represent themselves as members of different collectives by creating accounts of their experiences as academic professionals, sportsmen, a part of the local elite or regional, national and supra-national entities, etc. These investigations eventually resulted in a doctoral dissertation written at the University of Eastern Finland. This dissertation served as the basis of the present monograph. During the years of research I have been constantly amazed by the social and political force behind the representations I encountered both in the materials that are analyzed on the pages of this book and in my private life. However, my inquiries could have stayed at the ‘amazement stage’ and not result in a monograph, had it not been for the assistance of many individuals and institutions and I am very grateful for this assistance. Firstly, I would like to thank the supervisors of my dissertation: Professor Markku Filppula and Dr. Erzsébet Barát for their guidance and their professional and spiritual support through every stage of the work. I am also most grateful to Dr. Susanna Shore and Professor Greg Myers for acting as the readers of my manuscript and the examiners in the public defense of my dissertation; their comments were invaluable for the improvement of the text. Additionally I wish to thank Dr. Stefan Werner for his assistance with the statistical work and Professor Jopi Nyman for encouraging and helping me to turn the results of the dissertation into this book. I am also grateful for the professional assistance and collaboration of several academic institutions and the colleagues working at these

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institutions. In this respect I am indebted to the Foreign Languages and Translation Studies unit of the University of Eastern Finland for being my academic home during this project; LANGNET: the Finnish Graduate School in Language Studies for the peer support and the feedback; the PhD Program in English Applied Linguistics of the University of Szeged, Hungary, especially Dr. Erzsébet Barát, Dr. Anna Fenyvesi and Professor Miklós Kontra for inspiring me to become an applied linguist and assisting at the initial stage of this path; the Network for European Studies of the University of Helsinki, Finland for facilitating my more in-depth comprehension of the social and political aspects in European integration; Professor Kjersti Fløttum and the EURLING research group of the University of Bergen, Norway for the stimulating conversations that helped to clarify my views on the social and methodological aspects of this research project and Dr. Tom Bartlett and Dr. Gerard O’Grady at the School of English, Communication and Philosophy of Cardiff University, UK for their insight on SFL related problems. I also thank Professor Norman Fairclough for his comments on my research methods at a very early stage of their development. In addition to academic institutions and colleagues, I would like to acknowledge the assistance of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Hungary in the building of my corpora by providing data. In this regard I wish to express my special thanks to Dr. Erkki Tuomioja, former Foreign Minister of Finland for helping me to clarify the setting of one of his speeches. Additionally I thank the School of Humanities of the University of Eastern Finland, the North-Karelian Regional Fund of the Finnish Cultural Foundation, the Centre for International Mobility of Finland and the Department of English Language Teacher Education and Applied Linguistics of the University of Szeged for making this research financially possible. Last but not least it would have been much more difficult both mentally and physically to carry out this study, had it not been for the support of my family and friends in Joensuu, Lieksa, Budapest and St. Petersburg. I would like to thank them all for their support and patience.

CHAPTER ONE INTRODUCTION

The end of the Cold War some two decades ago brought substantial change in Europe’s prospects in global politics. The possibilities that opened up for a new united Europe had a major effect on the foreign policies of the so-called Western European, Central and Eastern European and Post-Soviet states. In light of this new global political situation, the process of European integration gained increased significance. All states in Europe came to position themselves in global politics in relation to the process of European integration and to the product of this integration, the European Union. For many of the Central and Eastern European states, European Union membership became the most important issue on their agenda of foreign policies. The fifth enlargement round of the EU (henceforth referred to as ER5) was the first occasion when these objectives could be met and countries of the former Eastern bloc could join ‘the West’ and create a new, post-Cold War European Union. By its sheer existence, the new European polity was supposed to dissolve the East and West division of Europe, a legacy of the Cold War. As a result, the EU as a political project was argued to be a space for shared European values for the first time in modern history, and it was expected to represent and foster ‘the diversity of the people of Europe’. However, during the course of ER5 and in its wake, the EU as a political project has lacked public support. ‘The diversity of the people of Europe’ did not, and does not, express and mobilize a strong attachment to the European polity. The Union is generally perceived as something distant and at the same time too complex to identify with. This lack of public support results in the socalled ‘democratic deficit of the EU’. In practice the Union was and still is bound together dominantly by economic and legal ties between the member states (cf. Mach and PoĪarlik 2008). In addition, historical reasons and reasons of security are also mentioned as motives for integration in the national media and in speeches of politicians in both the old EU member states (henceforth the EU 15) and the applicant states of the ER5. Yet, economic reasons have prevailed as the ultimate rationale for EU enlargement on both sides of the continent.

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Chapter One

Therefore, European integration (at least in the ER5) has been primarily motivated by the conception of the EU as an economic project. However, the EU, with all of its institutions and governing bodies, is more than just a free market of capital, goods, and labor force. In order to exploit the economic potential that is opened up for a common European political entity, such an entity has to be created via non-economic practices of successful European integration as well. This integration of a new European geopolitical space therefore needs to be performed via the articulation of certain values: the values of a ‘European collective’. The values articulated in this discourse then may invite the people of Europe to identify with the imaginary community that the institution of the EU is envisioned to represent (cf. Fuchs and Klingemann 2002, Maurits van der Veen 2002). There have been numerous attempts by EU institutions to create this collective space of belonging. These attempts are visible, for example, in the production of cultural symbols of European unity such as the European flag, the European anthem, or the motto of the European Union. Additionally, different academic exchange programs, among them youth exchange programs such as the ERASMUS or the Marie Curie programs (cf. Maurits van der Veen 2002, Caviedes 2003) and the construction of an official historiography of the European project of unification (with the Schuman declaration as its starting point) have also had among their aims to propagate identification with the EU for its citizens. Despite all of these efforts, the fact still remains that the contemporary EU is not a Europe above nations but a Europe of nations or rather nation states. It is beyond question that the national identification of ‘the diversity of the people of Europe’ is much stronger than their identification with the European polity. Nevertheless, to say that the EU is only a compound of its constituent nations is still a very strong overgeneralization of the current situation. The people of Europe have hybrid political identities, and their national identities are only one of the voices making up the chord of tones in this polyphony, though often the loudest one. Therefore, an analysis of the complexity of collective political identities generated around the European polity is necessary to understand the dialogic relationship between the EU as a political project and its European citizens. In order to delineate the complex patterns of identification of ‘Europeans’, one must identify the voices of different collectives that make themselves heard in the context of this European identity formation, more specifically in the context of European integration and the political

Introduction

3

discourses around it1. Particular European patterns of identification can be investigated by answering the following questions: What collectives make their voices heard in the political discourses around European integration? How are these collectives represented? What are their values? Do they construe themselves on a political, social or economic basis? As a result, the answers facilitate the understanding of how the EU as a political project is construed in the field of political discourse, which, in turn, may be beneficial for increasing public support for the European polity. The majority of the studies investigating collective identities in the EU approach the issue from the perspective of sociology, political science, social psychology, or moral philosophy (e.g., Baumann 1995; Breakwell and Lyons 1996; Fuchs and Klingemann 2002; Risse and Meier 2003; Mach and PoĪarlik 2008; Karolewski 2009; Checkel and Katzenstein 2009). Most of the works written on this subject consider identity to be a matter of process as opposed to that of a state. Currently, this process is more and more often viewed as discursive in nature, which signals a growing awareness in those scientific fields of the relevance of the perspective of discourse analysts and sociolinguists concerning the relationship between language and society. Mole (2007) formulates this thought in relation to the research on European politics as follows: The recognition of identity and discourse as key factors in the conduct of European politics has thus increased significantly over the past ten to fifteen years. However, traditional theories have struggled to make sense of this new social and political landscape, as the dominant role they ascribe to material forces – such as economic and military might – undermines their explicatory strength. In response to these changes and the increased interactions between actors at the sub-state, state and supra-state levels of action, social and political theorists have begun to pay much more attention to questions of identity and discourse. (Mole 2007: 1)

Although discourse is identified as one of the central components in recent studies on collective identities in the EU, discourse analyses that are based on empirical linguistic data are scarce among these works. Such studies are needed to reveal patterns of discoursal identification on a more general basis that are less dependent on the immediate context where these identifications occur. One example of this kind of research is Grad (2008) which contrasts European and national identities constructed in interviews with young adults in Spain and the UK. Among the major values of this 1 After Bakhtin (1981) and Chilton and Schäffner (2002: 22) I view these voices as implicitly dialogic.

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Chapter One

particular study is that it was conducted on a relatively larger amount of data (transcripts of fifty-four interviews) than most (qualitative) discourse analytic studies would typically include. This makes the findings applicable in distinguishing general discoursal patterns of identification of his Spanish and British respondents. Hence, Grad’s study is a significant contribution to an understanding of the articulation of the collective identification patterns of young adult EU citizens in the abovementioned two countries. However, Grad’s results – due to a different focus of his study – have limited value for understanding the ways political discourse contributes to the construction of collective identities in the EU2. Currently, I am not aware of any research that focuses on EU political discourse by analyzing discursive constructions of collective identities on the basis of a vast amount of empirical linguistic data. In my view, the best terrain within which to observe collective identity formation in the EU is the process of European integration. The reason for this is that integration is designed to redraw the boundaries of the EU and thereby reinterpret the borders of existing collectives around it and possibly also create new collectives. The shaping forces of identity formation in the course of European integration are perhaps the most visible in the process of the ER5 as this was the occasion when the EU was to be renewed as a real trans-European polity. Consequently, integration in this event is approached from different perspectives beyond the former dichotomous divide of West and/over East. Therefore, the ER5 can serve as a very fruitful terrain for analyzing the complexity of the processes of identification in the context of a post-Cold War EU still striving for the support of its citizens. Naturally, the insights in such a research project hinge on the analysis of the textual articulation of the various perspectives on integration, since they can lead to a deeper understanding of the motives for belonging to the Union. The analyst therefore has to select the textual materials in a way that reflects the possible different perspectives. In the intergovernmental institutions of the European Union, delegates of the member states act as spokespersons of their national governments. In doing so their official function is to represent their national collectives in a context of EU politics. In other words, politicians, due to their representative function, serve as mouthpieces of the national collectives that they speak for. Their official role is to express the viewpoints of these 2

There are studies that focus on linguistic aspects of collective identity construction in EU political discourse, e.g. Mole 2007, however these studies are less empirical than Grad’s research and they lack the potential of a quantitative perspective based on larger amount of linguistic data.

Introduction

5

collectives on particular issues (concerning enlargement). Their speeches delivered in various EU institutions can be seen as symbolic sites where the discursive constructions of the collectives that they represent are articulated. Political speeches, as far as their language is concerned, operate beyond the level of constative language use, since they function as performative language. This is especially true for official statements. In this sense, politicians are ‘linguistic agents’ who not only represent entities but also create the discursive reality of these entities. Discourse – viewed from this perspective and in this type of context – functions not only as mere linguistic representation but also as social action. The analysis of political speeches therefore helps us to understand how political action (of collective formation) is performed via the use of language. Hence, discovering the ways in which different collectives are represented by linguistic means within political speeches on European integration results in more than a plain description of linguistic features. An analysis of this kind explores the political actions performed by the different collectives via discourse where the very representation of the given collectives is at stake. What is more, in explicating these actions for the broader public, such an analysis counts as political action inasmuch as it influences the discourses that it analyzes. However, in practice, the speeches are influenced by complex political factors that may affect the textual articulation of the representations. This influence can be traced in the ways politicians draw upon linguistic resources to construe different collectives in whose name they are speaking (i.e., by identifying with them). In this study I analyze the ways such collective identities are represented in official statements on the ER5 by presidents, prime ministers and ministers of foreign affairs speaking for Finland, Hungary and the United Kingdom, respectively, in EU intergovernmental contexts between 1998 and 2004. These statements have a sound performative design due to their official function in the ER5 process. Therefore, they are created to perform political action. I interpret the results of the analysis of the linguistic features in terms of their political action in order to describe the ways the forming forces of European integration materialized in the ER5. The linguistic analytic methods that I use are grounded in Halliday’s (Halliday and Matthiessen 2004) systemic-functional grammar; however, I apply this framework to corpus-based data, which is less common among systemic-functional studies. The interpretation of the results of the systemic-functional analysis is based on a social critical approach to discourse in the sense of Fairclough (1995; 2003), Wodak (1999), and Krzyzanowski (2003). Hence, my analysis is an example of a corpus-driven systemic-functional analysis,

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Chapter One

within which I combine both quantitative and qualitative methods on three corpora of official political statements on the ER5. There has been no attempt to produce comparative analysis of current European political discourse that combines corpus-driven and qualitative systemic-functional analysis of official political statements. Furthermore, even the few studies that do combine corpus linguistics and systemicfunctional linguistics do not incorporate statistical testing of their results. Thus, the relevance of this research is twofold. On the one hand, it provides new empirical knowledge about discursive constructions of collective identities in the ER5. On the other hand, methodologically speaking, this is the first study that carries out frequency analysis of transitivity on a corpus with statistical testing integrated into the analytical process. Therefore, the results are useful not only to linguists but also to a wider audience in Finland, Hungary and elsewhere. My discussion starts off with chapter two, within which I describe in details the theoretical models that are relevant for this work and position the perspective applied in this book in relation to them. Chapter three provides an overview of European integration with a special focus on the ER5 and its political-ideological aspect. Chapter four offers a comprehensive description of the data, the research methods and the aims. Chapter five presents the first round of linguistic analysis based on a dominantly quantitative approach to the data while chapter six presents the second round of analysis, which consists of a qualitative analysis of the textual construction of certain collectives. Finally, chapter seven summarizes the results and discusses their implications for the discursive constructions of the collectives in the process of ER5.

CHAPTER TWO ON LINGUISTICS AND POLITICS

In this chapter I explicate my analytical position in order to set forth for the reader the theoretical context for this analysis and interpretation of the subject matter. Therefore, I will outline the general frameworks of analysis that have influenced the present research, after which I will also reflect on my own role as an analyst and its impact on the findings. Finally, I will identify the broader goals of this study as a scholarly work. However, I will not detail my position on the political/ideological background of the texts I analyze or the questions of research methodology. These issues will be addressed in chapter three (interpretation of political discourse surrounding the ER5) and chapter four (corpus building).

Linguistic studies of political discourse There is a long tradition of linguistic analyses of political discourse. Probably the first public speech to be analyzed by linguists is Demosthenes’ On the Crown, delivered in 330 BC (cf. Adams 1927: 131). Rhetoric, the systematic study of public speaking, was already part of the three arts of discourse in ancient Greece. Until the nineteenth century, rhetoric was an essential part of the education of the intelligentsia in Europe. But beyond education, rhetoric was also in the focus of attention of European philosophers. The study of political speeches has not lost its importance in modern times either, quite the contrary. With the appearance of mass media, politicians are able to reach a broader audience, which significantly increases their influence on public opinion formation1. According to Chilton and Schäffner (2002: 24-37), linguists who study political discourse have recently approached their subject either by viewing discourse as interaction or viewing it as representation. When analyzing actual fragments of political discourse, these linguists usually operate with tools that are developed on the basis of pragmatics, text 1 For an example of the extremes, one could consider the effect of the speeches delivered by Hitler and Goebbels during World War II.

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Chapter Two

linguistics, or discourse analysis. Linguists studying political discourse either take a pragmatic or a cognitive approach to political speeches. Linguistic analyses that deal with the pragmatic dimension of the speeches concentrate on political discourse as interaction and investigate how the speaker and the interpreter are positioned. This positioning can appear linguistically, for example, by means of indexicality expressed via the distribution of personal pronouns (person deixis), via signaling time of uttering and verb tenses (temporal deixis), place of uttering (spatial deixis), or the social relationships between the speaker and his/her audience/interpreters (social deixis). The cognitive approach sees itself as an alternative to the pragmatic approach. Linguists who concentrate on the cognitive dimension of speeches analyze the relationship of linguistic structure and discourse to representations in the mind. These researchers apply methods that reflect functionalist approaches to language, such as functional grammar, role and reference grammar, or cognitive grammar. In their interpretations of language use, they either aim to account for the communicative competence of language users by focusing on the social and psychological contexts of language as communication or they attempt to explain language use by cognitive processes (cf. Lockwood 2000: 3646). In this monograph I go beyond the pragmatic/cognitive divide with the help of applying Halliday’s systemic-functional approach to the speeches I analyze. On the one hand, by exploring pragmatic relationships in the analyzed discourse I aim to explicate how discourse functions as a representation of the ‘real conditions of existence’2, that is, as a means of re/producing ideologies of belonging. Thus, I also deal with discourse as representation, just like researchers studying the cognitive dimensions of discourse. In contrast to them, I understand discourse as a social force that influences and shapes the mind’s representations of reality. In this sense I take an approach that interprets the relationship of discourse and the mind from a direction opposite to the perspective of cognitive linguistics. This approach, cutting across the either/or tendencies summed by Chilton and Schäffner (2002), corresponds to Halliday’s dialectic position on the relationship between language (the mind) and reality informing his systemic-functional approach to grammar: Every text – that is, everything that is said or written – unfolds in some context of use; furthermore, it is the uses of language that, over tens of thousands of generations, have shaped the system. Language has evolved to satisfy human needs; and the way it is organized is functional with 2

I use this term on the basis of Althusser (2001: 101).

On Linguistics and Politics

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respect to these needs – it is not arbitrary. (Halliday 1994: xiii, italics added to the original)

As a result of explaining linguistic structural specificities in terms of the needs in a given social context, Halliday is able to consider linguistic meaning production as a social phenomenon, sidestepping the need to venture into the futile either/or debate between a cognitive or pragmatic position. This is why I find systemic-functional grammar the most suitable functionalist approach for rendering social interpretation to textual instances. As Halliday and Matthiessen (1999) later put the above formulation, “instead of explaining language by reference to cognitive processes […] we explain cognition by reference to linguistic processes” (Halliday and Matthiessen 1999: x). Therefore, in my analysis I have chosen to apply Halliday’s systemic-functional model, particularly his theory of transitivity for analyzing the discursive effects of cognitive representations of ‘reality’ in language use. In the following I will briefly discuss transitivity in the broader context of the three metafunctions of language in meaning production and argue for its relevance for my analysis and then I will proceed to discuss its potential in corpus-based analyses. According to Halliday’s theory, meaning production has three aspects, which are referred to as ‘metafunctions’. These metafunctions are the ideational metafunction, the interpersonal metafunction, and the textual metafunction: It is clear that language does – as we put it – construe human experience. It names things, thus construing them into categories; and then, typically goes further and construes the categories into taxonomies, often using more names for doing so. […] There is no human experience which cannot be transformed into meaning. In other words, language provides a theory of human experience, and certain of the resources of the lexicogrammar of every language are dedicated to that function. We call it the ideational metafunction. […] At the same time, whenever we use language there is always something else going on. While construing, language is always also enacting: enacting our personal and social relationships with the other people around us. […] If the ideational function of the grammar is ‘language as reflection’, this is ‘language as action’. We call it the interpersonal metafunction and suggest that it is both interactive and personal. […] But the grammar also shows up a third component, another mode of meaning which relates to the construction of text. In a sense this can be regarded as an enabling or facilitating function, since both the others – construing experience and enacting interpersonal relations – depend on being able to build up sequences of discourse, organizing the discursive flow and creating cohesion and continuity as it moves along.

10

Chapter Two This too appears as a clearly delineated motif within the grammar. We call it the textual metafunction. (Halliday and Matthiessen 2004: 29-30)

As I focus on cognitive representations of ‘reality’ in my analysis, I investigate the ideational metafunction of the texts. I deal with this metafunction on the level of clauses, since Halliday and Matthiessen (2004) consider the clause as the basic unit of meaning. In relation to the content of the clause they discuss its meaning as representation in the following way: Our most powerful impression of experience is that it consists of a flow of events, or ‘goings-on’. This flow of events is chunked into quanta of change by the grammar of the clause: each quantum of change is modeled as a figure – a figure of happening, doing, sensing, saying, being or having [see Halliday and Matthiessen 1999]. All figures consist of a process unfolding through time and of participants being directly involved in this process in some way; and in addition there may be circumstances of time, space, cause, manner or one of a few other types […]Thus […] the clause is also a mode of reflection, of imposing order on the endless variation and flow of events. The grammatical system by which this is achieved is that of TRANSITIVITY (cf. Halliday 1967/8).The transitivity system construes the world of experience into a manageable set of PROCESS TYPES. (Halliday and Matthiessen 2004: 170)

To put this in other words, people build mental pictures of reality through language. Halliday considers the processes of representation in the clause as the grammatical basis of building mental pictures of reality. Processes according to him represent those ‘goings on’ through which this is achieved. In Halliday’s theory such ‘goings on’ are processes of doing, happening, feeling and being, which are indexed by verb phrases and their concomitant noun and adverbial phrases in the grammatical system. Halliday differentiates six types of processes and their corresponding participants (i.e., the doers or the undergoers of these actions) and the circumstances of these processes that make up the transitivity structure of language in his model. Halliday’s systemic-functional model has been among the most frequently used analytic tools in critical discourse analysis (henceforth referred to as CDA) since the early stages of this discipline (cf. Young and Harrison 2004). The reason for this is that both systemic-functional theory and CDA view language a central feature in social life on the basis of the function of language as a social practice. Additionally, systemic-functional grammar can be used to relate grammatical structures of language use to their contexts of use, which enables critical analysts to obtain the kind of

On Linguistics and Politics

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linguistic evidence they need for their social-critical objectives. Another reason why systemic-functional theory has been so popular with CDA is its systematic nature, which, with its close focus on particular textual structures, helps the analyst to avoid making biased interpretations. For a critical linguist, the system of transitivity specifies the types of processes and their grammatical structures that may also function to re/articulate the ideologies informing a speech occasion. In terms of the ideological function of this mental activity, one may argue that people build or rather re-construct meaning ideologically through language use as an effect of hegemonic relations of power3. Therefore, my motivation as a critical analyst for the choice of Halliday’s system of transitivity is based on my understanding that by investigating the ideational metafunction of language, this system is concerned the most with constructed pictures of reality through the discourses, i.e., with ideology construction.

Corpus-driven systemic-functional analyses According to Matthiessen (2006: 103), systemic-functional linguistics (henceforth referred to as SFL) has been linked with text-based research and corpus-based methodology since the earliest versions of the theory. Neale (2006: 145) also argues for conducting corpus-based systemicfunctional analyses because they have the advantage of recognizing the meaning potential that SFL can reveal through ‘instantiation’ or ‘evidence’, which it otherwise lacks. Nevertheless, combining corpus linguistics (CL) methodology with SFL theory is a relatively new approach in linguistic studies. The formal frameworks for establishing connections between the two approaches (SFL and CL) were launched at the 29th International Systemic Functional Congress held at the University of Liverpool in July 2002. Since then many studies have appeared that combined the two approaches yet they are somewhat repetitive in so far as they are all centered on the exploration of the linguistic features of certain registers (Thompson and Hunston 2006: 7). Because of the difficulties of quantifiability, it is much less common to perform corpus-driven analyses of Halliday’s process types in the transitivity structure of language. One such study is Matthiessen’s (2006) paper. Thompson and Hunston (2006: 5) also consider it to be the first to 3 However, not all meaning production is ideological. Whether a particular system of meaning is ideological or not is a matter of whether it is invested in the service or re/producing domination. In this sense, ideology is not necessarily in opposition to ‘truth’; whether a particular ideological practice of meaning production is ‘true’ or ‘false’ depends on the position from which it is viewed.

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Chapter Two

attempt to operationalize frequency as a feature in SFL analysis. Since then there have only been a few corpus-driven studies that analyzed frequencies of process types. Studies that apply this methodology to political discourse have been even less common. I am only aware of three studies that analyze frequencies of process types in political speeches: Behnam and Zenouz’s (2008) “A Contrastive Critical Analysis of Iranian and British Newspaper Reports on the Iran Nuclear Power Program” and Durán’s (2008) “The Analysis of Political Discourse Applied to Bush’s and Kerry’s Speeches”, both published in a collection entitled Systemic Functional Linguistics in Use (Nørgaard 2008). The third study is AlamedaHernández’s “SFL and CDA: Contributions of the Analysis of the Transitivity System in the Study of the Discursive Construction of National Identity (Case study: Gibraltar)” published in 2008 in The Linguistics Journal. However, all of these studies, just like the rest of the existing comparative corpus-driven SFL analyses, lack the feature of statistical significance tests as means of verifying the relevance of the frequency differences between their comparative results. This aspect of comparative corpus-driven SFL analyses is all the more surprising in the light of the fact that there is a long tradition of significance testing in CL and other quantitative linguistic approaches such as quantitatively based sociolinguistic studies. In terms of their analytic position, Alameda-Hernández’s and Behnam and Zenouz’s papers also reflect a novel approach in that their research seems to be among the first corpus-based critical discourse analyses published. The relevance of corpus-based studies for CDA has long been argued for by Stubbs (1997), who finds corpus-driven CDA analysis necessary in order to make up for the lack of statistical and theoretical representativeness of the randomly chosen material in traditional CDA analyses. One of the most frequently cited problems that corpus-based CDA (and corpus-based SFL) faces is that quantitative methods, ironically, reduce the relationship between the texts and their social (or political) contexts (cf. Thompson and Hunston 2006: 3). One way of overcoming this methodological problem is to use corpora that are composed of texts that have similar contextual aspects and interpret the results in terms of the common specific aspects of these texts. Therefore, studies such as Alameda-Hernández’s and Behnam and Zeouz’s, which operate with (political) context specific corpora, are valuable contributions to presentday CDA research. In this monograph, as in my former publications (Krizsán 2008a; 2008b), I wish to contribute to present-day CDA research by performing a Hallidayan corpus-driven critical linguistic analysis of political discourse

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on EU polity. As stated earlier, Hallidayan SFL analyses of texts have long been performed by critical discourse analysts, yet rarely in corpus-based projects4. In order to verify the representativeness of my comparative results of transitivity systems, I apply statistical significance tests as part of my data processing methods. I carry out my linguistic analysis on three topic specific corpora that are built by selecting speeches delivered on the same topic (the ER5) by key politicians of similar institutional functions in their respective countries (Finland, Hungary and the United Kingdom). Although the actual EU institutional context of delivery of these speeches may differ (e.g., they were delivered at different congresses, summits, banquets, the Intergovernmental Conference, the ceremony of the signature of the EU accession Treaty, etc.), all are considered to be official statements by the countries represented. Therefore, the institutional functions of the speeches could be regarded as similar, allowing the researcher to draw general conclusions about the political context of the linguistic data.

The analysis as a form of interaction: The researcher’s position In this study I adopt a critical standpoint towards the ideological investments of the selected speeches. My position is therefore meant to enact a social critique (cf. Hennessy 1993; Van Dijk 1993; Fairclough 1995; Calhoun 1998). In my view social critique in linguistic analysis consists in exploring ideological systems of meaning in accordance with Fairclough’s (2003) definition of ideologies: Ideologies are representations of the social world which can be shown to contribute to establishing, maintaining and changing social relations of power, domination and exploitation. (Fairclough 2003: 9)

Following Fairclough’s critical approach I have chosen my interpretative tools to be those of CDA as developed in Fairclough (1995; 2003). CDA is: […] based upon a view of social semiosis as an irreducible element of all material social processes (Williams 1977). We can see social life as interconnected networks of social practices of diverse sorts (economic, political, cultural, family, etc.). […] Every practice is an articulation of 4 The only studies being the aforementioned Alameda-Hernández (2008), Benham and Zeouz (2008) and Durán (2008).

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Chapter Two diverse social elements within a relatively stable configuration, always including discourse. (Fairclough 2003: 205)

In my analysis I focus on the ways the political network of social practices is constituted via social semiosis. I examine this social semiosis as it is constructed in discourse. My approach is critical in the sense that it considers discourses (various systems of meaning) as effects of relations of power and sees the enactment of certain power positions through particular forms of language use. I consider these positions to be employed either in order to maintain dominance – hence regenerate the status quo – or to resist and even subvert the dominant ideology (cf. Fairclough 2003: 206) and, by extension, producing non-ideological meanings. I base my linguistic analysis on pronominal indexes. According to Mühlhäusler and Harré (1990: 13), pronouns are not just substitutes for other nouns but are also means of establishing moral responsibility. Since the usage of pronouns necessitates the understanding of social relations (cf. Mühlhäusler and Harré 1990: 5), analyzing their employment facilitates the understanding of the relationship of the discursive and the social. Wilson (1990) shows how politicians manipulate the usage of personal markers to avoid or mitigate responsibility, to show solidarity or power, and fill their speeches with ideological content. Since the early 1990s there have been many analyses on the interactional effects of pronominal indexes in political speeches (e.g., Fairclough 1989; Wilson 1990; Gastil 1992; Johnson 1994; Zupnik 1994; Arroyo 2000). While earlier the interactive effects of pronominal indexes were mainly studied by conversation analysts and sociolinguists, most of these analyses do not belong to the traditional forms of conversation analysis (CA) or sociolinguistic studies. I also take a different analytical position to that of CA researchers (cf. Sidnell 2010) in that I do not see the text/context distinction as pre-given but analyze the representative function of language use and, to a lesser extent, its function to encode meanings of attitudes, interaction, and relationships (i.e., the ideational and interpersonal metafunctions, respectively in Halliday’s terminology) as a dialectical process. Therefore, I approach meaning as dynamic and relative to the situation within which participants engage in the ongoing work of being and doing the ‘representative’ of a given (national) community and in and through it being and doing the work of becoming recognized as (symbolic representative) a member of another community (EU polity). In addition to this epistemological difference, there is a methodological difference between sociolinguistic studies (cf. Wardhaugh 2010) and the present analysis in the ways that I use methods of quantitative, corpus-based statistical analyses for legitimizing my interpretations. This difference lies in the

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position the researcher takes regarding the ontological status of these methods. Statistical analyses are quite commonly used in sociolinguistic research but their understanding of the relationship between language use and (social) reality and therefore the role of statistics is basically referential and not constitutive. A sociolinguistic (variationist) approach would investigate language use in a way that the identity of the speaking subject is categorized in terms of his/her characteristic features as his/her ‘variables’ that are given and known prior to the moment of language use and therefore, ‘conveniently’, independent of the moment of its analysis. Consequently, the ways the subject uses language become markers, indexes of his/her language identity. The aim of a sociolinguistic analysis, then, is to describe language use as markers and transparent expressions of the language user’s sociolect, the marker of his/her membership in a particular language community that could be reduced to a self-evident matter of frequency and (numerical) significance. The corollary of this difference between the variationist approach and my critical project is then how the relationship between identity and language use is approached. I investigate language use to describe how (social) reality5, including the speaker him/herself, is (re)constructed or accomplished by the discourses that the speaker enacts and draws on. Thus, the main difference between a variational analysis and the discourse analysis that I have chosen is that, according to the latter, no identity categories of the speaker are presupposed to exist as a template but they are to be re/constituted in the course of the interaction itself embedded in a given institutional context. In this sense I agree with Vološinov on the discursive and situated nature of (both personal and institutional) identities when he states that, “The personality of the speaker [. . .] turns out to be wholly a product of social interactions” in historically specific social institutions (Vološinov 1986: 90). Thus, I follow a mutually constitutive understanding of language and society in contrast to a positivist one that CA comes to be caught within. In correspondence to traditional CDA research (as described by Fairclough 1995), I regard my analysis of the speeches and the social situation of the ER5 as applicable only in the local and temporal situatedness of the discourses the participants are seeking to enact in the course of their negotiations of meanings of belonging. Furthermore, I consider my own situatedness as researcher a key aspect of meaning formation as it appears in my interpretation. As Gee (1999)

5 After Vološinov (1986: 93-100) I see this reality in language as a system of social/political norms.

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argues, (scientific) knowledge is a matter of institutional and intersubjective production: No set of research tools belongs to a single person, no matter how much academic style and our own egos sometimes force (or tempt) us to write that way. […] Whatever approach we take, it holds out the hope that various micro-communities of researchers working in diverse fields can begin to come together, seeing that, using somewhat different but related tools, terminologies, and theories, we are all contributing to a “big picture.” (Gee 1999: 5)

In so far as I consider the identity categories that are relevant for my analysis as emergent in the course of language use, the establishment of the analytical categories themselves comes to be part of the results of this research. The difference between various uses of language then is to be explained in terms of the social positions and power potential the utterances deliver for their speaker(s) to assume. The availability of one position over the other(s) is the result of the ongoing negotiations of various relations of power that shape the actual institutions where the speech event takes place. According to this model, the dominant ideology is re/generated by the discursive re/articulations and contestations of (predominantly) unequal relations of power in the given (contemporary) social institutions The material function of dominant discursive constructions in these institutions then is to ‘naturalize’ that inequity itself as ‘common sense’ within which speakers just are ‘in the dominant discourse’ without doing the work of self-reflexivity. The textual analysis in this study aims to identify some of the discourse strategies used for concealment and avoidance as well. As Macherey (2004) writes, the ‘unsaid’, the implied is the ideal ‘hiding place’ for ideologies informing the text: “The work encounters the question of questions as an obstacle; it is only aware of the conditions which it adopts or utilizes” (Macherey 2004: 222). In order not to encounter the obstacle (or obstacles), the work requires strategies of avoidance. This way, those strategies expose the places of obstacles, the concealed places of the question of questions (the critical questions) waiting for the analyst to reveal and explicate – provided s/he can approach them from ‘elsewhere’ than the logic of the dominant discourses one is expected ‘to be in’. As Hennessy (1993: 40) addresses the materiality of a discursive event, “[It] consists of the relations or supports through which discourses are constituted and which are embodied in institutions.” In other words discourses (including academic ones) do not come to be meaningful in and of themselves but within a system of intelligibility that is shaped by

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particular historically specific social institutions and vice versa. How we come to understand, for instance, the ‘EU polity’ is bound to the (political) discourses by which they are understood at a given moment. Hence, I argue that if we consider the ideological construction of a textual work as a paradigmatic model, then the analysis of the implied or explicitly avoided (in this sense missing) parts may point to the anomalies, the contradictions and inextricably heteroglossic points in the paradigm and enable a critical reading. Furthermore, the ideological effect of strategic concealment and avoidance is that the representation comes to be positioned not as ideological but as ‘factual’, i.e., it can be constructed as the ‘real conditions of existence’6 beyond orders of value and above positions and interests. In order to locate this dominant ideology in the discourse strategies of the speakers, I establish the various categorizations and positioning of identities named or implied by the text through the uses of pronominal indexicality. However, this study – albeit it deals with the ideological meaning production of/in the speeches – could not be classified as a fullscale example of critical analysis of language use because it does not satisfy the criterion of empowerment though self-reflexivity. My research does not identify with any particular social groups in a subordinate power position (such as linguistic and/or national minorities, political organizations or representatives of national, regional or supra-national interest) with an aim to empower them. That is, I have not inquired from such groups regarding their position in order to sustain their interests through my analysis. Therefore, I do not claim that my analysis results in shared, empowering knowledge between the researcher and the group/s re/presented by the discursive strategies in the speeches. However, beyond turning the research site into one of actual empowerment, my analysis addresses the ER5 from a position that disidentifies with the emerging dominant ideological stances on EU membership. In terms of my own role as a social actor, I am representing myself as an expert who de- and reconstructs certain meanings in/of these speeches (and inextricably silences others) by making them part of the academic discourse of linguistics. I draw on the means of a particular tradition of linguistic analysis to legitimize this act and make my interpretation of the speeches acceptable to the academic community. I trust that I am not completely positioned ‘outside’ of the political discourses of the texts I analyze (in academia); thus, my position as the academic expert over the subjects of the study is already politically motivated regarding the ‘object’ 6

This term is from Althusser (2001: 101).

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of my research, i.e., the meaning of belonging in the EU polity. I am, beyond question, influenced by the social and political contexts of the speeches by living in the European Union and closely following the political debate on enlargement, the debate on the future of the Union and other EU related issues (e.g., the debate on the European Constitution). Moreover, my national citizenship (Hungarian) and my place of residence (Finland) must have an effect on my perspective on these matters as well. Additionally, I am in a dialogic relationship with certain political agencies (national foreign ministries and other ministerial offices) as they have been providing data for my analysis and I am planning to make my results available to them. In this way they have had an influence on this research (by affecting the selection of the texts and by providing some of them) and my results may have an influence on them as well. Thus, the present research project is part of both academic and political discourse, and my results should be considered as interpretations that are aimed to be part of the discursive representations of the ER5 of the EU (mainly in academic but also in political discourse). My ultimate objective in this regard is to generate further discussion on the subject matter by means of exploring and exposing a number of connections between language use and power. In my analysis, I describe the discourses represented in three corpora of political speeches. Though I analyze seemingly monologic texts, namely speeches addressed to EU or national representatives or EU institutions by politicians representing a particular nation state, my hypothesis is that, despite the huge amount of linguistic design, the texts are heterogeneous and built from several discourses. The ontological condition of this heterogeneity is the intertextuality of any utterance – the dynamic of explicitly said/assumed propositions. As Chilton and Schäffner (1997) write, Even when a stretch of talk or text is apparently monologic, it usually involves implicit dialogic organization, reflecting oppositional discourses in the surrounding political culture. (Chilton and Schäffner 1997: 216)

To test my hypothesis, I explicate many of the linguistic choices in the speeches, i.e., the systemic uses of the explicit/implicit differentiations that make meaning possible in the first place (in short, the ways the texts are doing/producing meanings in systematic ways). But, according to Vološinov (1986), verbal performance is always accompanied by social acts of nonverbal character, necessitating references to the political context of the speeches to some extent. In order to get a broader picture of how meanings come to be ideological representations of various kinds of ‘realities’, I will focus on the positioning of different collectives represented by the

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speakers. These collectives have an important role in forming the text since they are offered to the audiences as vehicles of identification. Therefore, the ideological design of the speeches is formulated not only by the speakers but by the audiences as well. In this respect I agree with Vološinov who argues that all ideological creativity is directed towards an addressee. In fact, Vološinov’s position is echoed by Althusser (1998) who states that there is no subject without the ideological work of ‘interpellation’. Interpellation (Althusser 1984) is defined by Mills as the ways “individuals are called upon by texts to recognise themselves as particular types of individuals (for example, as consumers, as workers, as parents and so on)” (Mills 2004: 146). Interpellation for Althusser serves to reproduce ideology (cf. Althusser 1998: 299-302). This reproduction works through individuals accepting their ‘types’ or ‘discursive roles’ and submitting themselves to ideology. According to Fiske, “for Althusser, ideology is not a static set of ideas imposed upon the subordinate by the dominant classes, but rather a dynamic process constantly reproduced and reconstituted in practice” (Fiske 1998: 306). Interpellation therefore is a sign of ideological language use (as opposed to non-ideological discourse) and as such it is aimed at the re/production of dominance. In an Althusserian understanding, the subject interpellated via identification (i.e., the addressee, receiver or the other end of the communicative act) has a strong influence on the ideological design of the text, since viable and legitimate identities have to be offered to them in order to make them feel part of the collective offered. This makes all such texts inherently dialogic in nature. Therefore, the ideological creativity directed to the addressee is an essential property of the text (and it can be exposed by means of textual analysis) regardless of whether the actual audience is successfully interpellated by it or not. Such an interpretation of the communicative situation makes my analysis one that interprets the illocutionary force in the political speeches that are the subjects of this linguistic investigation.

CHAPTER THREE POLITICAL DISCOURSE IN THE EUROPEAN UNION: THE CASE OF THE FIFTH ENLARGEMENT

This chapter provides a short introduction to the history of EU enlargement and discusses the discursive function of the speeches in my data at the particular stage of the relevant enlargement process, ER5. I do not, however, present a detailed description of the ways the EU works; neither do I set out to conduct a historical study of EU enlargements. In line with the type of CDA analysis carried out in this study, the present chapter endeavors to discuss the following two questions: (i) What main historical-political circumstances affected the discursive constructions of collective identity categories in the political speeches about the ER5? (ii) What is the function of the speeches in terms of legitimizing EU enlargement and in the articulations of collective identities in EU political discourse?

EU enlargements in their historical contexts Enlargements prior to ER5 After WWII supranational organizations such as the European Coal and Steel Community, the European Atomic Energy Community and the European Economic Community were formed in the Western part of Europe in order to prevent further war between France and Germany. Later on the European Economic Community (EEC) gained control over the former two communities and after its enlargements became what is today known as the European Union. The EEC was founded on March 25, 1957 in a treaty signed in Rome by the foreign ministers of six European countries: Belgium, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Luxemburg, and the Netherlands. Hoffmeister (2004) in the Handbook on European Enlargement argues that the economic success that the EEC

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achieved due to the reduction of trade barriers soon attracted other European countries in the 1960s (Hoffmeister 2004: 87). Although one of the main motivating factors for other European governments to join the ECC was economic (free or less limited trade in particular), the first round of enlargement did not actually take place before 19731 when Denmark, Ireland, and the United Kingdom joined the community. The subsequent rounds were mostly motivated by various political reasons. After the liberation from the Colonels’ regime in 1974, the newly appointed Greek government aimed to strengthen the political stability of the country through membership and Greece joined the EEC in 1981. A similar scenario took place in the third enlargement in 1986 when Spain and Portugal became members of the community in response to the fall of their authoritarian fascist regimes. The fourth enlargement is the first one officially called an ‘EU enlargement’ after the creation of the European Union in the Maastricht Treaty in 1993. This enlargement was preceded by the rejection of creating a European Economic Area (EEA). The EEA agreement was rejected by a popular vote in Switzerland, and since Sweden, Finland and Norway were considering EEA membership, the uncertain future of this new community is seen as a chief motivating factor for these Nordic countries to apply for EU membership instead. Hence, this enlargement was mainly motivated by economic reasons on the part of the applicant states. The Norwegian application was rejected in a popular referendum though; thus, in 1995 only Finland and Sweden joined the EU together with Austria. In a simplified interpretation of the history of EU enlargements, one could find two types of motivating factors for enlargement shared by the applicant states and the EU: economic reasons for securing free trade and the need for political stability. These two main cohesive forces forging the EU polity are often referred to in EU political discourse articulated in the various documents as the institutional means for a globally competitive economy and for the preclusion of another European war. They are thus likely to appear as essential values of orientation for collectives forming around the EU in the political discourse about EU enlargement.

The ER5 In December 1997 the Luxembourg meeting of the European Council agreed to start negotiations for EU accession with the Czech Republic, 1

This was partly caused by the French opposition to the British application and national referenda in the applicant countries.

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Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia, and Cyprus (i.e., the so-called Luxembourg six). Also, another five applicants (Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, and Slovakia) were preparing for membership under a Reinforced Pre-Accession Strategy. Turkey was found eligible for membership as well, but it did not meet the political and economic criteria to be recognized as a candidate. Accession negotiations with the ‘first wave’ of candidates eventually started at the end of March 1998. In December 1999 at the Helsinki meeting of the European Council, negotiations were opened with the second wave of applicant countries: Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, and Slovakia as well as Malta, which had reactivated its application for membership in September 1998 (i.e., the Helsinki six). In April 2003 in Athens, after the annual monitoring of the progress of the applicant countries by the Commission, the Accession Treaties were signed for ten applicant states from the two waves (Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, and Slovakia). Fifteen years after the collapse of the Soviet bloc, in May 2004 the accession treaty entered into force and these ten countries officially became member states of the European Union. The ER5 has been the largest enlargement of the Union in terms of the number of countries, land area, and population. Moreover, it is considered to be a historic event because it reunited Europe (or at least a part of it) after decades of division caused by the Cold War. Thus, the ER5 can be expected to influence discursive strategies about the European polity in a way that they deconstruct the ideological distinction of West and/over East during the Cold War, or at least it should allow for a reconfiguration of the border shifted more to the East, as argued by Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2002): “The future borders of the EU will replace the old East-West line of the Cold War as the central cleavage in the European system” (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2002: 501). The various rounds of EU enlargements have had an influence on the discursive representations of what Europe has come to mean. According to Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, this is increasingly true for the ER5: Europe has increasingly come to be defined in terms of the EU; the Europeanization or Europeanness of individual countries has come to be measured by the intensity of institutional relations with the Community and by the adoption of its organizational norms and rules. (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2002: 501)

With respect to the discursive representations of post-ER5 Europe, it is interesting to note that the ER5 is often called the Eastern enlargement of

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the EU, where East is used more in a political than a geographical sense, disregarding not only the inclusion of Malta in the same round but also the various ‘East bloc’ countries outside of the EU treaty. In this sense the name ‘Eastern enlargement’ still operates within the dichotomic distinction of the Cold War era. Contrary to the logic informing the statements about an alleged united Europe, the applicant states are represented in the position of the ‘Eastern others within’. Political speeches about the ER5 often reflect this Eastern position as pointed out by Sher (2001) in a study on speeches delivered by four prominent EU officials about the ER5. Sher argues that in these speeches “discursive strategies are employed in an attempt to promote and legitimize the project of enlargement and simultaneously preserve the dominance of the current EU member states” (Sher 2001: 265-266, italics added). She concludes that the drawing of “a familiar line dividing Europe in two parts by invoking the antithetical constructs of the Cold War era” and “the framing of enlargement as the EU’s civilizational mission towards the applicants” were among the discursive strategies used by these officials (Sher 2001: 266). In fact, I would add, these two strategies can be related through their shared ideology. The appeal to the alleged need of an always unidirectional civilization of the new members by the old ones is to function as the legitimization for the ‘necessity’ to draw on and re-appropriate the Cold War legacy of geopolitical exclusion. In my analysis I draw on this extension of Sher’s points on the two major discursive strategies and show how they are employed for construing a dominant position for the EU 15 over the new applicant states of ER5. The fact that the so-called Eastern enlargement has become a commonly used synonym for the ER5 in political speeches had to have an influence on the constructions of collective identities in these speeches. Representing the ER5 as ‘Eastern’ may have had an effect on how the future collective of the EU was constructed discursively just as much as politically (if these two can be looked at as separate means of construction at all). In terms of the political aspect of community building, it is possible that the bipolar distinction created by the Cold War still influenced political views on enlargement and caused fear from the ‘Eastern other’. This phenomenon along with a better defined EU voice (which is pointed out in the following section) was bound to be among the main reasons for more systematically constructed and more thoroughly monitored accession criterion for the ER5 than ever before.

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Conditions for EU membership EU membership conditions were among the most commonly referred to circumstances in political statements on the ER5. On the one hand, EU member states had to appear as popularizing these conditions while monitoring and also encouraging their fulfillment from the side of applicant states. On the other hand, applicant states had to construe themselves in relation to these conditions as understanding, accepting and fulfilling them. In the ER5 the conditions for EU membership were based on the criteria adopted by the Copenhagen European Council in 1993 and on the additions agreed upon at the Mardid European Council in 1995. In 1997 the Luxembourg European Council stated that “compliance with the political criteria is a prerequisite for the opening of any accession negotiations.”2 The Copenhagen criteria defined the economic and political conditions required for EU membership. The political criterion requires a candidate country to have stable institutions that guarantee democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and respect for and protection of minorities. The economic criterion requires the existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union. In addition to these two criteria a candidate state is also expected to take on the obligations of membership, including adherence to the objectives of political, monetary and economic union. The European Commission monitored the fulfillment of these criteria by the applicant states. During the ER5 the Commission published ‘Monitoring Reports’ in order to guide the candidate countries in the process and to keep the Council and the European Parliament informed about the candidates’ preparations. However, in the previous rounds of enlargement these criteria were not applied in the same way as in the ER5. The reason for the discrepancy may partly be the fact that the definition of the values that the EU represents has been evolving throughout the history of the Union. This changing definition also influenced the ways in which collective institutional EU identities came to be negotiated and articulated in the emerging political discourses. Therefore, it is worth taking a look at the criteria that the EU applied to its applicant states in the past and exploring the historic legacy of the self-definition of the EU potentially available for the political discourses in the ER5. In 1952 when the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) Treaty was signed, Robert Schuman, the French Foreign Minister who is 2

Luxembourg European Council, December 1997, Presidency Conclusions, para. 25.

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traditionally credited for being one of the founders of the EU, said that the community would be open for all ‘free’ European states, that is, states that operated on the basis of parliamentary democracy and market economy. As the first group of states unquestionably satisfied these conditions, the first enlargement of the EC was based on bilateral agreements between the community and the applicant states. In 1978 the Copenhagen European Council restated that respect for and maintenance of parliamentary democracy and human rights were the basic conditions for entry into the EC. The Commission already applied the latter statement as a criterion during the Greek and then the Spanish and Portuguese accessions, respectively. However, neither Greece, Spain nor Portugal were required to demonstrate their ability to meet the economic criterion because the importance of the political stability provided by EU membership in these countries overruled all other aspects. In the fourth enlargement, when Austria, Finland and Sweden joined the EU, the economic criterion was not investigated either since these states were already EFTA members and had free trade agreements with the EEC since 1972/73. The political criterion was not investigated either as all of the applicant states had exhibited stable democratic institutions. In this sense the fourth enlargement of the EU was not based on requiring the applicant states to meet the Copenhagen criteria but rather based on mutual (economic and political) interests. As the above overview shows, the different criteria for EU membership were not always applied and when they were applied this was not done consistently. In other words, these criteria and their application were highly influenced by the historical-political situation and the status of the applicant countries. Furthermore, although the political values of democracy and human rights were always among the essential political values of the community, it was not until 1993 (the Copenhagen Council) that the EU came up with a set of well-defined criteria for accession. What is more, it was only during the ER5 that these criteria were first institutionally applied in the assessment of the applications of the candidate states. The ER5 was the moment when a common and systematically channeled EU discourse emerged in terms of the fundamental economic and political values of the Union – in fact set in motion by the time the first candidates from the ex socialist states of the ‘East’ were ready to join the new polity. Therefore, I hypothesize that it is likely that the values representing a united Europe reappear as discourse markers of the dominant ideology in the political speeches on the ER5 in my data and that these values influence the ways collective identities are represented in the speeches. Given the nature of the discourse in the analyzed political speeches as pro-

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enlargement speeches, a dominant EU voice would appear in the position of a ‘cultivator’, i.e., as an agent spreading the above-mentioned values from within to the aspiring political subjects who lack them. This distribution of positions rests on the assumption that the ‘cultivator’ possesses these values and that they are likewise desirable for the candidate countries to aspire to. This assumption is in line with Sedelmeier’s (2003) who argues that “by articulating the promotion of human rights and democracy as a distinct and central rationale of its eastern enlargement policy, EU policy-makers affirmed a self-image of the EU as an actor whose identity prescribes the promotion and protection of these principles” (Sedelmeier 2003: 11). The distribution of the ‘cultivator’ and ‘the more backward nation’ discursive positions would make all subjects at the receiving end of the communication construed as ‘naturally’ less developed and therefore in need of the values articulated by the terms of the ‘provider’. The communication of the existing EU as ‘cultivator’ is highly ideological, legitimizing the interpellation of the accession subjects as the ‘Easterner others within’. Interpellation in this context functions as the abovementioned process of the reproduction of ideology. Subjects interpellated by a dominant EU voice could theoretically have two options in this arrangement of positions. First, they can choose to identify themselves via the interpellation and reproduce the dominant discourse, assuming a subordinate position as if it was desirable and/or the only ‘naturally’ possibility. The second option is that they may have access to the same dominant position as the agent by identifying with it through reproducing its voice. In relation to cases when the cultivator position of/in the EU was communicated towards EU applicant states, the first option could, for example, materialize in collective self-representations that are based on achievements connected to adopting EU values on the part of the applicant countries. In contrast to this, the second option requires that the interpellated subjects are constructed discursively as possessors of the same values as the agent of the dominant voice, granting thus a similar power position. As a result, both the agent of the voice in relation to the EU enlargement and the interpellated subjects within the context of EU enlargement are allowed to speak from the position of ‘allies’ by constructing common ground. Examples for this second option could be found in statements in which common ground is constructed on the basis of the dominant (and naturalized) value system of the EU (both between member states and between member states and applicant states). In my view, such constructions function to strengthen the dominant ideology as well. In the second round of analysis presented in chapter six, I provide

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textual illustrations of cases for both of these options and discuss the relevance of these options in connection to the actual cases I analyze. At this point, however, I must note that a third option, the position of resistance to the dominant ideology (in this case the refusal of the imposition of the EU value system one-sidedly) is also possible for interpellated subjects in the scenario discussed above. However, in my data I have not found any textual instances that would propagate such a position. The reason for this may lie in that an EU-skeptical point of view was very unlikely to be voiced in speeches presented by representatives of the states that had applied for EU membership, let alone by representatives of the EU member states entitled to perform the value judgments. However, this does not mean that the texts I analyze are monologic in nature, reflecting only a dominant position. As it will be demonstrated by the examples in my linguistic analysis, these speeches are in dialogue with oppositional discourses and as such, heterogenous. Therefore, Chilton and Schäffner’s (1997: 216) observation about the implicit dialogicity of any utterance as discussed in chapter two applies to the speeches in my data as well.

Enlargement, legitimacy and the formation of collective identity During the past decade, the ‘democratic deficit’ of the EU has been a popular topic of academic discussions about the Union in political science and cultural theory (e.g., García 1993, Bachoff and Smith 1999, Eriksen and Fossum 2000, Just 2004). The phrase has been used since the 1980s for organizations falling short of fulfilling the principles of representational democracy. The EU is believed to have a democratic deficit as compared to a democratic nation state partly because of its lack of acceptance and support by EU citizens. This is argued to become manifest, for instance, in the low turnout in European elections or in a neutral, if not negative, attitude toward the Europeanization of politics. Just (2004: 39) highlights the interdependence between the democratic deficit of the EU and legitimacy, a collective EU identity and European public opinion. On the question of legitimacy, she turns to Banchoff and Smith (1999), who define the concept as follows: “A political regime’s legitimacy is, broadly speaking, measured by that regime’s reasonableness and justifiability, by the degree to which the regime is commended to and accepted by its subjects” (Banchoff & Smith 1999: 4). Just differentiates between three constitutive elements of democratic legitimacy: juridical, social, and political legitimacy. She further distinguishes between two

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types of political legitimacy: input and output legitimacy (Just 2004: 40). She bases her categories on Scharpf’s (1999: 7-13) definition of these two subtypes of political legitimacy and identifies them the following way: Input legitimacy designates modes of participation, ways of ensuring that members of society are represented by the political system; output legitimacy deals with the results that the political system delivers to its members, the solution offered to social problems. […] Put simply, input legitimacy is government by the people, whereas output legitimacy is government for the people. (Just 2004: 40)

In my view, EU enlargements help to provide output legitimacy for the EU as a political institution. In EU political discourse this materializes in the frequent constructions of enlargement as a historical result or a solution to (dominantly economic and safety) problems. Additionally, representing enlargement as a cultivating mission functions to construe output legitimacy for the EU as well. The intention of the candidate countries to join the European polity may be, in turn, referred to as enactments of input legitimacy provided by the EU as a political system. Investigating EU enlargement from an ethical-political approach, Sjursen (2002) argues that, “Justification [of EU enlargement] would rely on a particular conception of ‘us’ and a particular idea of the values represented by a specific community” (Sjursen 2002: 494). In this context, collective identities represented around the Union in political speeches on enlargement in official EU settings function to generate the output legitimacy of the EU. In my data this function was realized by the exclusivity of pro-enlargement speeches (even if these speeches were appealing to differential reasons and articulated from differential positions). The creation of output legitimacy is achieved in practice by constructions of collective European subject positions that are offered to the audiences of the speeches for identification. In my understanding, the need to legitimize influences the constructions of collective identities as it makes certain subject positions available and others unavailable. The available subject positions are articulated in the values presented as the set of criteria for successful entry into the EU polity. Thus, the state of political legitimacy informing the speeches can be revealed by analyzing which collectives are constructed in the speeches (through inter alia the use of first person plural pronouns as discourse markers), at which points of the texts and in what ways they are connected to the abovementioned values. In this sense the analysis I carry out (in chapter five and six) on speeches about the ER5 is closely connected not only to the linguistic

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constructions of collective identities but also to the ideological-political background of the speeches that I deal with. Speeches delivered on the ER5 between 1998 and 2004 are part of what Krzyzanoswski (2005: 149) calls ‘EU discourse about the future of Europe’ and as such is designed to do the ideological work of legitimizing the new polity after the Cold War. He states that this discourse: Serves legitimizing the existence and functioning of the EU, and, by achieving that this discourse also serves constructing and re-constructing the political and institutional identity of the EU. […] the ‘EU discourse about the future of Europe’ serves, in an implicit way, constructing and reproducing a set of visions of Europe, which may be defined as the mainstream voice. (Krzyzanowski 2005: 149)

Since appearances of the mainstream voice signal articulations of the institutional identity of the EU, in my investigation I look for discursive displays of this voice in representations of collective identities. An institutional EU identity, according to Krzyzanowski, is the “most visible among representatives of current EU member states involved in (‘denationalised’) EU institutions” (Krzyzanowski 2005: 149). Thus, it will be interesting to examine whether the mainstream voice appears in speeches delivered by representatives of different member states more frequently than in speeches delivered by representatives of Hungary, an applicant state, in my database. In my analysis I also intend to point out the differences in the ways this mainstream voice functions for the three countries as a point of orientation. Moreover, it may be fruitful to compare how the legitimization of the EU works in these speeches in contrast to the legitimization of the nation states that the speakers represent via identification as well. The relevance of political speeches in relation to the ER5 for the re/articulation of the social legitimacy of the EU then lies in their function to serve as discursive sites for constructions of collective identities that are represented as political subjects in agreement about the values of the imagined EU polity. The relationship between legitimacy and identity is further examined in Just (2004). She bases her position on Verhoeven (2002), who argues that “A system enjoys legitimacy when it achieves an identification between rulers and ruled in the sense that politics can be seen as constitutive to the identity of society […] Legitimacy becomes ‘constructive’ in that it hinges on effective identity-building” (Verhoeven 2002: 11). Just therefore argues that “the degree of social legitimacy is determined by the society members’ actual identification with the collective identity offered to them by the system, that is, by the society’s

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legal framework and the politicians who derive their authority from this framework” (Just 2005: 42). Therefore, in Just’s understanding the representative function of politicians entails their power to shape the collective identities of ‘citizens’ (in my case via the discoursal constructions of collectives in their speeches), which may then secure the legitimacy of the given social formation (such as the membership in the EU polity). Viewed from this perspective, politicians affect the social legitimacy of the EU in their speeches about EU enlargement by their discursive constructions of collective identities. In so far as enlargement is necessarily oriented toward the future, it entails the discursive work of constructing prospective EU collectives (see Krzyzanowski 2005: 149 above on the ways discourse about the future of Europe is used to legitimize the existence and functioning of the EU). Political speeches on the topic often represent how the institutions that politicians represent envision these future collectives. Hence, these speeches are not mere sites for creating new collective identities around the EU but also discursive spheres for the construction of the future legitimacy for the EU. In the case of the ER5 texts, however, it is theoretically possible that there are several collectives other than the EU-based ones represented in the speeches about this enlargement round (moreover, one should also take into consideration the possibility of representations of hybrid collectives as well). Since the speakers (based on their institutional functions) appear as representatives of their states, it seems unavoidable that they also construe collective identities around their countries, i.e., that they speak in the name of their countries using a collective voice of the ‘nation’. However, an essential difference between discursive constructions of national or EU collectives is that these national entities do not have to face a democratic deficit in the same sense as the EU does (at least not in the case of Finland, Hungary or the UK). Therefore, representing national collectives in the analyzed speeches does not in fact function to legitimize the existence of these (nation) states. Thus, instead of the creation of input or output legitimacy for (nation) states, one can expect that these country-based collectives embody voiced discursive positions on the issue of the ER5 from the perspective of the ‘country’ of the speaker. For this reason, my analysis discusses how these national collectives come to be represented in relation to the ER5. Furthermore, I also investigate whether these representations are influenced in any ways by the political position of these nation states in the process of ER5. Hence, in my analysis I embark on examining the ways in which one type of collective is represented in contrast to the other (e.g., in terms of entities connected to them, in terms

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of the distribution of actions attributed to them, their activity/passivity etc.). If my hypothesis based on the institutional representative function of the speakers and their differential position or status in the EU polity is right then the speeches should show systematic differences in terms of the discoursal articulation of the collectives connected to the European Union or the countries of the speakers.

CHAPTER FOUR CORPUS BUILDING AND ANALYTICAL CATEGORIES

In this chapter I present the empirical material and the rationale for the actual analytical categories before I undertake the analysis in chapter five and six. The purpose of this chapter is to present the criteria for the selection of the texts and provide their description, to give an account of the research categories used in both the first and the second analytic round, and to identify the analytic goals and the scope of the study.

Description of the texts and criteria for inclusion in the three corpora The data is comprised of thirty-five speeches that were publicly available in 2007, the time of data collection, and that fulfilled the eight criteria of selection discussed below. Out of these thirty-five speeches, fourteen comprises the British corpus (32,616 words), thirteen are in the Finnish corpus (20,185 words), and the remaining eight are speeches in the Hungarian corpus (15,965 words). The speeches were obtained from two major sources. Firstly, I approached the foreign ministries, presidential offices or the prime ministers’ office of the three countries for the relevant speeches and received these texts via the post or electronic mail. Additionally, some of the speeches were downloaded from the websites of the appropriate European Parliament site dedicated to the EU enlargement (http://www.europarl.europa.eu/enlargement/archives_en.htm) or from the portal site of the EU (http://europa.eu); the latter is administered by the European Commission in partnership with the other European institutions. These institutions include the European Parliament, the Council of the Union, the Commission, the Court of Justice, the Court of Auditors, the Economic and Social Committee, the Committee of the Regions, the European Central Bank and the European Investment Bank.

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In the following I discuss the grounds for selecting the texts. A more detailed description of the actual contexts of the delivery of the speeches is given in Appendix B. The criteria for the texts selected to be included in the three corpora were as listed: 1.

All texts had to be official transcripts of speeches. I am aware that they may not be completely identical to what was eventually delivered. However, my research operates with a restricted scope of interest: it is concerned with linguistic means of meaning production. Therefore, my analysis deals with strictly textual data and it focuses on the illocutionary forces of the statements in the speeches; furthermore, it considers the position of a speaker only as a representative institutional role. For these reasons, transcripts serve best the purposes of this type of analysis.

2.

All speeches had to be written and delivered in English1. To achieve the most reliable comparison of first person plural pronoun use in the three corpora it was necessary to investigate this feature in a database representing a single language, i.e., English as a lingua franca in European political discourse. Since the first language of the speakers (and in some cases the first language of the creators of the speeches) differed, first language influences on the outcome of my analysis cannot be completely disregarded. However, the speeches were written by professional teams (including native speakers of English in most of the cases). Furthermore, my analysis was based on the written texts of the speeches and not on their delivery. Therefore, such influences, if they existed, must have had only a minor effect on the results. Moreover, since my analysis centers on patterns of representation (i.e., what entities are indexed by certain pronouns and why those entities), the first language of the writers could have had no significant influence on my results. The reason for this is that although the quantity of these pronouns or the ways they are used could theoretically be influenced by the first language of the creator

1

There were three speeches in the Hungarian corpus (speeches 5, 6 and 7) where I could not identify the original language of the speech with one hundred percent certainty. Out of these three speeches, speech 6 was most probably delivered in Hungarian. Nevertheless, this feature should have no influence on my results as language typological differences have no effect on the patterns of representation I focus on in my analysis.

Corpus Building and Analytical Categories

of the texts, this can hardly be said about the referents of the pronouns. 3.

The speeches had to be delivered by official representatives of the Finnish, the Hungarian or the British governments at the time of the speeches; i.e., they had to be presidents, prime ministers, ministers of foreign affairs, ministers for Europe or ministers of state in these governments. In this way I hope to ensure that the speakers appeared in their institutional function representing their countries in the ER5 context of EU politics. In short, the speeches can be regarded as textual sites aimed at articulating the official positions of the given governments on particular issues of the current political discourse surrounding the ER5.

4.

All speeches had to be connected to the topic of the ER5. I selected speeches about the same topic delivered by the representatives of these particular countries for two reasons: on one hand, the three countries are expected to be positioned differently relative to the history of their membership in the EU. On the other hand, control of the topic makes the political perspectives represented in the three corpora comparable.

5.

All speeches had to be delivered between March 1998 (the opening of negotiations on the accession of Hungary to the EU) and May 1, 2004 (the accession of Hungary with nine other new member states to the EU in the ER5). The temporal limitation of the contexts of the speeches allowed for the analysis of a more or less fixed political situation where EU enlargement was the focus of EU political discourse and Hungary appeared in the role of an EU applicant state.

6.

All speeches had to be delivered either at an EU institution (such as the EP or the EC) or in connection to an event organized by the EU (at the IGC, an EU summit, an EU enlargement reception, signing of the EU Accession Treaty etc.) or at a national event connected to EU integration. This criterion ensured that all contributions could be considered as part of EU political discourse in official settings. Other non-official or semi-official settings (e.g., tabloid interviews or blog entries of the politicians) would have produced different ways of representation (as they were created for other purposes than official functions). Furthermore, the illocutionary

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force of official statements by legitimate representatives differs from statements by the same speakers in non- or semi-official settings, since official statements count as actions that create obligations (e.g., a promise of financial help or a declaration of war), while the same statements in unofficial settings produce no such results (i.e., the former ones are more declarative in their nature while the latter ones are more informative). 7.

All speeches had to be delivered in the presence of official representatives of at least one other EU member state or an applicant country that gained membership in the ER5. This criterion ensured that the speeches were directed to other EU member states or applicant states. Thus, the particular positions expressed in these speeches were intended to be received by other entities within the framework of the (future) European Union (in contrast to, for instance, entities connected to the country of the speaker only). Therefore, criteria 6 and 7 were applied in order to limit my sources to speeches where patterns of representation functioned to carry meaning for institutional representatives of the EU.

8.

Exceptions from criteria 6 and 7 are speeches categorized as official statements on the ER5 by the EP, contributions to the ‘Debate on the Future of Europe’ and welcome speeches for the new members. The reason for this exception is that all of these speeches were intended for the broader European political sphere and they were broadcast accordingly; therefore they were aimed at and received by institutional representatives of the EU.

Aims and categories of analysis As discussed in chapter three, my analysis is based on the assumption that all of the speeches function to articulate official representation of the states at issue in the public discourse of EU politics, i.e., the publicly expressed institutionalized collective identities that the political subjects of the speaker’s state are expected to identify with. Since my ultimate finding is that only pro-enlargement speeches could be heard in the ER5 context, they also served to legitimize the functioning of the European Union as they presupposed the social and political legitimacy of the Union as their a priori condition for the formation of those ‘we’ collectives. The ideological background to the ER5 presupposes certain positions in the discourses on

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the issue of enlargement on the basis of the countries the speakers represent. The most obvious assumption one might make is that there will emerge at least two positions regarding the issue of enlargement between that of EU member states (UK and Finland) and applicant state (Hungary) position. However, because of their different positioning in the EU and different history of membership, I also expect to find differences between the Finnish and the British position in my analysis. These and other possible divergent positions among representatives of the same countries result in producing mainstream and non-mainstream voices. By using these voices the speakers act according to their pre-supposed roles or refuse them, while they display linguistic patterns of ideological dominance, subordination or resistance. Consequently, their ways of using language indicate the differences in the power-positions of the participant countries in the ER5 discourse. I examine in my research the relationship between (political) language use and identity (formation of the imaginary citizens of the EU polity). My analytical category to investigate and trace down the different strategies of categorization and ways of positioning of the entities in the texts is the linguistic means of pronominal indexicality. I mainly consider the personal pronouns indexing verbs but not exclusively (sometimes adjectives are also considered). The pronominal indexes of an utterance in a speech reflect the speaker’s relationship to the action, the type of process in the utterance, by positioning him/her either as the narrator (second and third person indexes) or the actor (first person indexes) of the processes signaled by the verb in the utterance. In this study I only analyze those ‘actor’ type of utterances where the speaker represents his/her institutional identity as a member of a collective and disregard constructions of individual identity2. In other words, I analyze and compare the uses of the first person plural and its role in constructing collective identities in the three corpora. My approach to the question of identity is inspired by CDA. I focus therefore on the ways social and political domination is reproduced by text and talk (cf. Fairclough 1995; 2003) in the process of collective identity construction. The concept of identity I adopt in my research is a dynamic one based on Fairclough’s (1992: 65; 2003: 223) understanding and motivated by the views of Wodak (1999) and Krzyzanowski (2003; 2005) as well. Fairclough (2003) views social and personal identities as partly discursive and partly material. His concept of ‘social identities’ (of persons such as politicians) unquestionably has its material components 2

In my analysis of example sequences I sometimes refer to (first person singular) constructions of individual identity when they are used instead of a collective identity construction (by first person plural indexes).

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(rooted in the physical embodiment of a person). In contrast to this approach, Krzyzanowski (2005) considers identity fully discursive. Krzyzanowski and Wodak talk about national or supra-national identities, which are (real or imaginary) identities of (real or imaginary) groups of people or other social entities. As such, these identities are social constructions and fully discursive by nature. Since in my analysis I focus on the latter kind of identities, I see them as fully discursive as well. Drawing on the abovementioned views on identity, I consider identity to be a discursive construction that functions for self-positioning in the social sphere. As a discursive construction, identity should be interpreted against the speech situation where it performs a social, cultural or political function. In my view, the importance of analyzing (collective) identity constructions then lies in the exploration of the actual social or cultural meaning they come imbued with. At this point I need to differentiate between personal, interpersonal and collective identities, although the latter two concepts sometimes overlap with one another. Hatch and Schultz (2004: 67-69) distinguish between the personal self and the social self, referring to the former as individuated (i.e., attributed to aspects of self-concept of self-differentiation) and the latter as relational (i.e., attributed to aspects of self-concept of groupassimilation). In this model, social selves can be constructed on two levels: on the interpersonal and on the collective level. Interpersonal identities (such as lovers, friends, parent-child) are based on “personalized bonds of attachment” while collective identities (e.g., parents or professionals) are “impersonal bonds derived from common identification with some symbolic group or social category” (Hatch and Schultz 2004: 67). According to Hatch and Schultz (2004: 68) the social motivation for collective (or group) identities is collective welfare, while interpersonal identities are motivated by the other’s benefit. In my view as collective identities are to emerge while engaging in doing something, they are process-like interactive positions that are constructed discursively between participants. While both collective and interpersonal identities are built on shared senses of ‘we’, for collective identities ‘we-ness’ is based on the speaker’s awareness of the importance of signifying collective agency. In political discourse collective agency is often embodied by representatives of a particular collective. The official role of these representatives is to perform (discursive) actions in order to pursue the interests of their collectives. This process – among other things – involves reflections on shared values and the positioning of ‘us’ in relation to ‘others’ in the social sphere. Therefore, it also involves the (re-)articulation of collective identities of the interest group a speaker represents.

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In this study I only analyze collective identities because they carry the official representative role of the speakers and also because they influence the social legitimacy of a given group. They are more persistent as discursive constructions than personal identities and are thus less dependent on situational contexts and more dependent on ideological investments and systems of intelligibility. Therefore, analyzing such constructions in their political contexts should reveal more about the power struggle in particular institutional contexts, e.g., over the meaning of ‘we, EU political subjects/citizens’. My objective is to compare the linguistic specificities of the collective identity constructions in the chosen political speeches and explain them in terms of the political context that they are part of. The theoretical research question I investigate is the following: What social/political factors inform the use of one identity category over another in the speeches investigated? In order to find answers to this question I seek to expose the relationship between the ways collective identities are represented at particular points in discourse and the influence of political and other aspects of the speech situation (e.g., the influence of global events or formulations of linguistic politeness required from the speaker) on these representations. The analysis focuses on the ideational metafunction of language (i.e., language as representation) in relation to these collectives by analyzing processes of transitivity connected to them in the speeches. In particular, I attempt to demonstrate how different political positions of each of the three nations on the EU and their countries are represented in the discourse strategies of national representatives when they articulate one collective identity category instead of another. To reveal the different actions connected to the collective identities indexed by the first person plural, I analyze first person plural verbal usage using M.A.K. Halliday’s (Halliday and Matthiessen 2004: 168-305) system of transitivity. As discussed in Chapter two, this theory is concerned with how speakers construct their own pictures of reality through discourse; thus, it works as a constructive tool in analyzing discursive identity constructions. However, in contrast to a traditional Hallidayan analysis I handle my data on a quantitative basis and will test the significance of differences and similarities in my comparative results in order to find general tendencies of the ways of collective identity construction in my data. I am using Halliday’s categories of main participant types, participant functions and process types as the basic analytical categories. In my account of identity as a linguistic construction, different verbal structures indexed by different personal pronouns (as subjects, objects etc. of the actions) indicate different identity positions as an effect of the ‘process types’ and ‘participant

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functions’. ‘Process type’ refers to the discursive constructions of reality associated with the identified participants, while ‘participant function’ signals whether a participant is directly or indirectly involved in the action marked by the verb. Before I discuss the main process categories in the transitivity system of systemic-functional grammar, I describe the general build-up of transitivity processes. According to Halliday a process consists of three components: 1. a process unfolding through time 2. the participants involved in the process 3. circumstances associated with the process: These are organized in configurations that provide the models or schemata for construing our experience of what goes on [in the world]. (Halliday and Matthiessen 2004: 175)

Circumstances are typically realized by adverbial groups or prepositional phrases and they add more detail to the description of ‘what is going on’. Participants are most commonly realized by nominal groups, and they can either be first participants, that is, doers of actions, or second participants, that is, undergoers of actions. The transitivity system in SFL categorizes our shared knowledge of social action in reality according to ‘goings-on’ such as ‘doing’, ‘happening’, ‘feeling’, and ‘being’. Halliday sets up six main process categories for analyzing the clause as representation of action: (i) material processes, (ii) mental processes, (iii) relational processes, (iv) behavioral processes, (v) verbal processes, (vi) existential processes. According to him, material processes are the processes of doing when someone/something is doing something to someone/something or someone/something brings about something. This kind of process involves an actor and a goal or a patient for its participants. Mental processes are the act of sensing, such as perception, affection, or cognition. They have no actor-goal trail, but they always have a human or a personified participant positioned as senser set up in relation to the second ‘participant’ of phenomenon. Relational processes are the doing of being. They construe

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a relation in which something/somebody is identical to an entity, is in a state, or possesses something. They articulate the participants of carrier and attribute. Behavioral processes denote physiological and psychological behavior, such as breathing, smiling etc.; linking the behaver and the behavior3. Verbal processes are processes of information exchange. They include quoting and symbolic exchange of information as well. They establish the relationship between the position of a sayer and that of the verbiage. Finally, existential processes mark the existence of the ‘existent’ participant and hence they do not connote any relationship: the cases when something or somebody exists or happens, like the verb ‘to be’ in the sentence: There seems to be a problem. However, as Shore (1992: 65) points out, systemic-functional theory is based on a prototypical approach to grammar as opposed to the view of grammatical categories as entirely discrete and absolute. This implies the existence of borderline cases or overlaps between process types; furthermore, it also implies that not all actual examples of a process type possess all of the properties of that given process type. In addition to this, the connection between the ‘names’ of the above-mentioned six process types and what they stand for is barely emblematic. That is, these ‘names’ simply indicate the major contrasts between process types, but they do not fully characterize these processes. Halliday initially intended to use numbers to distinguishing between the six process types. Labeling them by ‘names’ was a development that served purposes of practicality4, i.e., helping analysts (often language teachers, as the original purpose of Halliday was to support language teaching by his grammar) to remember and use these categories. The first description of process type analysis was published in Halliday (1976) and has been developed into Halliday (1985) and its later editions (Halliday 1994 and Halliday and Matthiessen 2004). There have also been several volumes on Halliday’s theory written for 3

This type of process did not turn out to be relevant for my analysis; it did not occur in the texts due to their genre. 4 Based on Tom Bartlett’s Advanced Transitivity lecture at the Cardiff Summer School in SFL on 14/9/2010 and e-mail communication with Tom Bartlett on 18/11/2010. Bartlett illustrated the ambiguity the names of process types invoke with the example He showed me his stupidity, which, he considered a verbal process, since ‘showing’ refers to the transfer of information. Halliday also confirmed this classification. However, classifying this process on barely notional criteria, one could mistakenly categorize it as a material process, since ‘to show something’ is a material act. Therefore, the ‘names’ attributed to the process types in some cases may be misleading, while they undoubtedly serve as useful ‘aide memoires’ (term by Bartlett) in distinguishing the categories of process types in most of the cases.

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non-specialist audiences, e.g. Downing and Locke (1992), Eggins (1994), Bloor and Bloor (1995), Butt et al (1995) Thompson (1996) and Humphrey (2002). In addition to these works, alternative descriptions of process types also emerged, such as Fawcett (1980; 2008), Morley (2000) and Neale (2002)5. In its original form, the transitivity system in SFL was most commonly applied in qualitative analyses when analysts interpreted clauses in (parts of) a text. As already stated, this study is based on a larger database. There are a number of problems involved in applying SFL to a large database using corpus-linguistic methods; thus, I had to adjust this system to suit my analytic purposes. First of all, for a statistical analysis I could not take into consideration the elements Halliday calls ‘circumstantial’. According to Halliday these elements are: […] almost always optional augmentations of the clause rather than obligatory components. In contrast, participants are inherent in the process […] In the text in general, the average number of circumstances per clause is roughly 0.45 (see Matthiessen 1999). (Halliday 2004: 176)

In my analysis I disregarded such elements except for the few cases when P1 referents appeared in circumstantial roles. Some of these cases involved P1 forms appearing as part of the ‘circumstance’ as pre- or postmodifiers of a phrase. Secondly, as my main interest is in investigating the discoursal articulation of collective identities of ‘we’, I did not analyze all the sentences but selected only the ones whose participants are marked for first person plural. Since these participants could appear in many roles6, I had to analyze the syntax and the semantics of every clause in each of the speeches to be able to group the processes. However, I list only those clauses that are associated with P1 when providing the results of referents, process types and participant functions in the statistics in Appendix C. Additionally, double indexed clauses (e.g., by a P1 subject and a P1 reflexive pronoun) are only displayed once in the appendix. Thirdly, I only concentrate on the main categories of Halliday’s process types (namely: material, mental, relational, verbal and existential 5

Both the list of introductory works on systemic-functional grammar and descriptions of alternative versions of SFG were taken from O’Donnell et al. (2010). 6 These roles can be compared to the theta roles of generative grammar (Filmore, 1968: 1–88), which describe the number and the type of noun phrases (arguments) required syntactically by a verb.

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processes) as I found that using a detailed differentiation within them would produce a high degree of specificity, that is, covering relatively small proportions of the data. This would make statistical interpretation unreliable. From a discoursal point of view, I consider the different uses of P1 highly representative of the textual articulation of collective identity because utterances involving first person plural are used to encode who or what we are, what we do and what is done to us. Hence, the linguisticanalytical part of this research focuses on three interconnected questions in the three corpora: (i) What do P1 pronouns refer to in the texts? (In other words, the focus is on the identification of the referents.) (ii) What kinds of, or aspects of collective identities do they refer to? (That is, I focus on the description and classification of the referents.) (iii) What process types (in the sense of Halliday and Matthiessen 2004) are indexed in the use of P1 in relation to the different collective identities established? (In other words, the focus is on the verbs used by/in connection to the collective identity categories.) I investigate these questions in order to cross-compare the three corpora and establish the linguistic patterns of transitivity in clauses indexed for P1. In other words, I search for representations of ‘us’ and their distribution í as in the quotation in the title that is taken from a speech delivered by President of Finland Tarja Halonen at a celebration of the enlargement of the European Union í in order to provide a descriptive account of them. From a social critical perspective the question I investigate is: What are the social/political factors informing the production of one meaning of ‘we’ over another at any given point in these speeches? My research is aimed at producing a comparative description of officially constructed collective identities by the Finnish, Hungarian and British governments for the political institutions of the European Union as an audience of the speeches. This description should reveal the differences and similarities in the ways the three countries officially represent themselves as a ‘national collective’ and as actual members of the EU polity in the given setting. Therefore, the results of my research help to understand better the discoursal formation of the concepts of national and EU identities relative to the EU status of the country the speaker is entitled to represent.

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Stages of analysis Before carrying out an analysis of the particular ideological investments of the various systems of meaning on ‘we, the political subjects’ of the EU and/or a particular nation state, I analyzed the frequency of the chosen linguistic categories employed in the speeches on a broader scale with the help of statistical methods. I must note here that currently there is growing critical awareness of null hypothesis testing, i.e., statistical significance (Beaulieau-Prévost 2006), especially among social scientists working with quantitative methods. Among the most criticised elements in tests of statistical significance are the following four features: (i) the effect of the sample size on the outcome (i.e., given the ‘right’ amount of data, it is always possible to find significant differences); (ii) the lack of plausibility of the null hypothesis (i.e., there is always some level of correlation between any two randomly chosen variables, therefore it is not plausible to hypothesize a non-relation); (iii) the unfalsifiability of null hypothesis testing (i.e., it is used to prove a hypothetical relation by refuting a non-relation) and (iv) the logical improbability of the null hypothesis (i.e., the fact that the null hypothesis is a point hypothesis, which means that it can only have the parametric value zero, while it is used to evaluate a range-based hypothesis H1, which can have several values except zero to be true. Since the value options for H1 are infinite, the null hypothesis is logically improbable on a continuous scale) (cf. Beaulieau-Prévost 2006: 14-15). Therefore, despite using the term ‘statistically significant’, I only view ‘significance’ as an indicator of a higher than 95 percent7 probability of having a real difference. In addition to this, I do not differentiate between statistically significant and highly or extremely significant results. I consider the results of statistical tests of significance to indicate probability on a range from zero (the difference is certainly not due to chance) to one (the difference is completely due to chance). Thus, in my interpretation I do not regard statistically significant results as proofs that a difference certainly exists; furthermore, neither do I completely disregard 7

However, some statisticians use 90 percent probability as the threshold for significance (cf. Biber et al., 1998: 276)

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highly probable differences that fall below the 95 percent probability level. Hence, in my analysis I always indicate the exact probability levels (the so-called ‘p-values’) for each difference discussed. The statistical tests that I apply for my data are two-tailed z tests and McNemar tests. I evaluate the differences between two independent samples by two-tailed z tests, while I apply two tailed McNemar tests for differences between interrelated sets of data. Both of these tests are among the most common standard statistical tests used for the above-mentioned data types. I opted for using the two-tailed versions of these tests as opposed to one-tailed tests since my research methods are heuristic, which does not allow for presuming the direction of differences beforehand (a pre-requisite for one-tailed tests). Applying statistical tests on the findings helped me to identify the main tendencies and discourse strategies in the speeches and the results could substantiate my comparison of the three corpora. They also made it possible to locate the stretches of texts that could be examined in a close analysis. I analyzed the three corpora in two analytic rounds. In the first round (chapter five), I made use of a statistical comparison of the referent types (defined as referent sets and subsets) emerging in the three corpora and the process types associated with them. This was done to find answers to the research questions (i) and (iii). In the second round of analysis (chapter six), I dealt with those referent types (defined as sets, subsets and their intersections) where a statistical comparison would not have led to meaningful results. This is because there was a high variation of referents across the three corpora; they occurred in different contexts or their frequency was low. Research question (ii) was answered by the interpretation of the data in both of these analytic rounds.

Description of the first analytic round The first analytic round was performed in three stages. At the first stage, the three corpora were tagged manually for first person plural subject, object and reflexive pronouns8: ‘we’, ‘us’, ‘ourselves’ (henceforth referred to as P1 pronouns). Only those cases of reflexive pronoun usage were considered for analysis when the referent of the reflexive pronoun (ourselves) was not double-indexed by another P1 (subject) pronoun. At the second stage, the referents of P1 pronouns were identified in the following way: the referents of the pronouns ‘we’, ‘us’ and ‘ourselves’ 8 The categories of ‘subject, object and reflexive pronouns’ indicate the typical not the actual syntactic function of these pronouns.

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were identified on the basis of the anaphoric or cataphoric uses of these pronouns. If this was not possible (because there was no noun phrase that served as a clearly identifiable anaphoric or cataphoric referent of these pronouns), then they were identified on the basis of the setting of the speech or the textual environment of the pronoun. The third stage consisted of defining the process types and the participant types (in the sense of Halliday and Matthiessen 2004) for each case of P1 indexation. The ambiguity of some of the categories in transitivity can occasionally create difficulties in the coding of process types. For example, the verb ‘to need’ is often ambiguous when one is trying to determine the process type it denotes, since it can either indicate somebody being in the state of physically lacking something (a relational process) or somebody believing/thinking/feeling that he/she is in need of something (a mental process). Therefore, in these occasions not only the syntactic but also the conceptual structure of each clause must be considered individually. In some other cases further analysis of transitivity processes could make a considerable difference in the interpretation of what is represented by particular segments of text. This is often overlooked, especially in quantitative analyses. For example, both of the following clauses: a) ‘we have a solution’ and b) ‘we have a problem’ could be identified as possessive relational processes where ‘we’ appears in the role of a possessor. In political discourse the differences between what is possessed in each of these cases does make a considerable difference in the representation of the speaker’s collective. However, because of the limitations that quantitative methods impose on the scope of the research such details often cannot be accounted for or else one should create several sub categories, e.g., for possessive relational processes on the basis of differences in what is possessed. I decided to keep process types on a more general level to make them suitable for quantitative comparisons. This decision was facilitated by the fact that such cases that would have required further subdivision of the analytic categories were very rare in my data. Therefore, I did not distinguish between the subcategories of the six main process types nor did I establish new analytic subcategories. The ambiguity of transitivity categories has been recently investigated by O’Donnell et al. (2010). The authors state that SFL “does not provide a single process type classification of any clause. The classification a coder makes rather depends on the model being employed” (O’Donnell et al. 2010: 47). In determining the different models of process type classification, the researchers first distinguish between conformist (ones who code conforming to a standard) and non-conformist (ones who follow own rules) coders and then they divide conformist coders by whether they

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establish their categories on the basis of syntactic versus structural criteria (O’Donnell et al. 2010: 56–57). The coding of process types and participant roles I apply in this work is dominantly conformist (cf. the socalled APR level in O’Donnell et al. 2010: 57), and it is based on the conceptual structure of the clauses rather than on syntactic criteria. In other words, I identify clauses i) and ii) as verbal processes versus material (i) and behavioral (ii), while I categorize iii) as a mental process instead of interpreting it as a material process, which would be the result of categorization on the basis of syntactic criteria: (i) A roar greeted his effort at authority (ii) and talked about his hometown of Motown (iii) If you’ve gotta count the sheep (examples taken from O’Donnell et al. 2010: 58–59) In order to increase the reliability of my coding, I gathered the results of the three above-mentioned analytic stages in two data processing sessions. During these sessions the results of each of the stages were kept separate and without being assigned to each other. A four-week intermission was left between the two sessions to weaken the influence of the first data processing session on the results of the second session. On completion of the second session, the results of the two sessions were checked against each other. Approximately ninety percent of the results gained in the two sessions were identical. Then I proceeded with analyzing the discordant cases. The referents were categorized and arranged into a set diagram on the basis of their referred entities (see figure 1 on p. 50). In case of referential ambiguity (e.g., when a P1 referent could have stood for ‘we, the UK government’ or also ‘we, UK citizens’) a more general referent set was chosen (‘we the UK’ in our example). In the set diagram this choice appears as the choice of a main set over a subset. Participant functions and process types were assigned to these referent sets and subsets, and the results were summarized. Appendix C contains the summaries of participant functions and process types associated with these referent sets and subsets.

Description of the second analytic round In the second analytic round, I dealt with cases where a quantitative comparison would not lead to meaningful results. The low frequencies of referents in certain referent sets and their different textual functions in the three corpora resulted in subsets that either did not occur in all three

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corpora (e.g., referents to Finns who are not farmers) or even if they occurred, they appeared in different meanings (e.g., ‘EU member states’, which appeared very infrequently and the referents were sometimes ambiguous, standing for either states, nations or governments). Since the entities that these sets contained were so different in the three corpora, investigating the particular occurrences of these referents in more details was necessary. The referent subsets that were discussed in the second analytic round were the following: (i) the specific subsets (namely, the ‘EU specific’ subset and the ‘Country of the speaker specific’ subset); (ii) the intersection of the ‘EU’ referent set and the ‘Others’ set; (iii) the intersection of the ‘Country of the speaker’ referent set and the ‘Others’ referent set; (iv) the intersection of the ‘EU’ referent set and the ‘Country of the speaker’ referent set. In the second analytic round, I focused on the most informative individual cases of referents that belong to these sets and intersections and analyzed the collective identities construed by them. My analysis systematically investigates all (four) subsets and intersections mentioned above. Using a dominantly qualitative approach, I discuss the above-mentioned referent categories in the three corpora in terms of the shared features and the differences in their representations. My analysis follows the build-up of the referent categories, where I first focus on shared referents and then differences across the three corpora.

CHAPTER FIVE THE FIRST ROUND OF ANALYSIS AND ITS RESULTS

In this chapter I present the results of my first round of linguistic analysis based on a dominantly quantitative approach to the data. First, I establish the distribution of the referents of P1 (i.e. ‘we’, ‘us’ and ‘ourselves’) in the three corpora. I describe the main referent sets of P1 pronouns and their subsets; furthermore, I examine the use of general P1 referents and P1 referents to ‘other’ entities1 in the speeches. Second, I analyze the process types connected to the referent sets and subsets of P1 pronouns and their respective participants, dealing with first participants and then with the few cases of second participants and circumstances.

Referent sets of P1 pronouns The distribution of the various referent categories implicating ‘us’ in the three corpora is displayed in the set diagram in figure 1. The diagram in figure 1 contains altogether twelve categories: the four main sets divided into eight further categories as their subsets and intersections. The four main sets turned out to be the following: (i) ‘referents to the EU’, (ii) ‘referents to the country of the speaker’ (iii) ‘general referents’, and (iv) ‘referents to others’ (defined in each case in Appendix C). The referents to the ‘EU’ set and the referents to the ‘Country of the speaker’ set both have a specific subset (i.e., the ‘EU specific’ and the ‘Country specific’ subsets), which can be divided into two further subsets: ‘leaders’, ‘citizens’, respectively (referents defined in each case in Appendix C). These referent sets and subsets could theoretically intersect with each other as semantically it was possible for the representatives to identify with two or more referent sets at the same time, such as, e.g., ‘the leaders of the country of the speaker and the 1

The ‘Others’ referent category contains entities other than the ones that could be represented by the speakers on the basis of their institutional functions.

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citizens of the country of the speaker’ or ‘EU leadership and the leaders of the country of the speaker’ and ‘EU citizens and others’.

Figure 1. System of referent types of P1 pronouns

I established the system of referent types on the basis of analyzing the anaphoric or cataphoric referents of each P1 pronoun in three steps. First of all, I identified the referents of P1 pronouns and established the major referent sets on the basis of the most frequently shared aspects of meaning among the referents2. Then I established the subsets based on frequently shared features of meaning among the referents in the main sets. Finally I categorized ambiguous referents or referents with no anaphors/cataphors. In cases of referential ambiguity, I chose a more general referent group (i.e., a main set over the subsets in question). In addition to this, referents 2 These shared aspects of referents of P1 pronouns turned to be either their connectedness to the EU or to the country of the speaker (i.e., nearly all of these pronouns referred to ‘we, the EU’ or ‘we, the country’ in one way or another). This is predictable, given the genre of the textual data and the actual political event (the ER5).

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that were not indexed by nouns as their anaphors or cataphors were assigned to more general referent categories (such as the ‘EU specific’ subset instead of the ‘EU citizens’ subset or the ‘Country (non-specific)’ set instead of the ‘Country specific’ subset) on the basis of their textual context. Thus, it is not surprising that the ‘EU (non-specific)’ and the ‘Country (non-specific)’ referent sets were among the most frequent ones in the speeches in all three corpora. These two sets contain those referents to the EU or to the country of the speaker that index the two entities but could not be assigned to any of the specific subsets. The ‘General’ (iii) set comprises referents of generic P1 pronouns appearing either as indefinite pronouns, e.g., everybody, anyone, or as general nouns, e.g., mankind, the people, the world. The ‘Others’ (iv) set contains referents to entities that the speaker could not represent on the basis of his/her institutional function but still spoke in the name of by using P1 pronouns to refer to such entities as Poland or Lithuania. The ‘specific’ subsets contain referents such as EU member states in NATO (in the ‘EU specific’ subset) or Finns who are not farmers (in the ‘Country specific’ subset). It was also possible to establish two subsets within both ‘specific’ subsets: including either the referents to leaders or those to the citizens, respectively. The two ‘leaders’ subsets include such referents as the Intergovernmental Conference (EU leaders subset) or the New Labour Government (‘Country leaders’ subset). Referents of the ‘citizens’ subsets are indexed by nouns such as Europeans, EU citizens (‘EU citizens’ subset), Hungarians or national citizens (‘Country citizens’ subset). As the intersecting circles in the diagram show, there are also referents assigned to the intersection of the ‘Country’ (non-specific or specific) and the ‘EU’ (non-specific or specific) sets. This intersection contained referents to the speakers’ own country and the EU at the same time, such as Hungary and EU member states. The intersections of the ‘Others’ set with either the ‘EU’ set or the ‘Country’ set contain ‘complex’ referents in the sense that its members index the EU together with another political entity outside the EU or the country of the speaker and another political entity outside this country, for example EU and the international community (intersection of the sets ‘EU’ and ‘Others’) or the Baltic Sea region (intersection of the sets ‘Country’ and ‘Others’). In the final step of my analysis, based on the results of the referent analysis, I identified and listed the process types and the participant functions marked by the processes. I used Halliday's system of transitivity for each case of P1 indexation and summarized my results in Appendix C.

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The main referent sets of ‘EU’ and ‘Country’ My quantitative results revealed significant differences across the three corpora concerning the frequencies of the first two main sets of referents (‘referents to the EU’ and ‘referents to the country of the speaker’) of P1. The referents investigated under the heading ‘main sets’ always include all referents to the entity in question (i.e., referents from both ‘specific’ and ‘non specific subsets’ as well). The summary of the results is displayed in figure 2.

Figure 2. Main referent sets of ‘EU’ and ‘Country’

The results in figure 2 are expressed in percentages of the total numbers of P1 referents for each corpus (for textual examples of the referent categories cf. the section on referent subsets in the ‘EU’ and the ‘Country’ sets below). Referents of P1s indexing the European Union (indicated by black bars) have the highest proportion in the British corpus (56.78% of all P1s). This figure was significantly higher (p = 0.0003825 based on twotailed z-tests ) than in the Finnish corpus, where the same referent set turned out to be the second highest among the three corpora (43.22% of all P1). The lowest proportion of P1 indexing the European Union occurred in the Hungarian corpus, where the frequency of using this referent set (32.5% of all P1) was significantly lower than in the British speeches (p = 1.308e-07 based on two-tailed z-tests ) and in the Finnish speeches (p = 0.035 based on two-tailed z-tests).

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Referents of P1 indexing the countries of the speakers (indicated by white bars) show an almost reverse order. The highest proportion of this referent set could be found in the Hungarian speeches (50% of all P1). Also, the Finnish corpus (49.08% of all P1) is practically the same in this regard, although there are statistically non-significant differences between the two corpora (p = 0.932 based on two-tailed z-tests). Furthermore, both corpora contained this referent set in a significantly higher proportion than the British corpus (for differences between the Finnish and the British corpus p = 0.001; for differences between the Hungarian and the British corpus p = 0.003, based on two-tailed z-tests), in which 36.24% of all P1 referents were used to represent the UK. Differences between the two main referent sets (i.e., the EU and the country of the speaker) within the British and the Hungarian corpus were also significant, while in the Finnish corpus the two sets were represented in a statistically similar proportion (in the British corpus p = 5.945e-15 and in the Hungarian corpus p = 0.019 for the differences between the two referent sets, based on two-tailed Mc Nemar tests of correlated samples; in the Finnish corpus p = 0.345 for the differences between the two referent sets, based on twotailed Mc Nemar tests of correlated samples). The results in figure 2 suggest a correlation between the duration of EU membership of each country and the frequencies of the P1 referents to the EU and the speakers’ own country: the longer the membership the more referents are used for the EU and vice versa. This correlation naturally does not imply a direct causal relationship between these two factors. Yet, it is not unreasonable to assume that, for example, in the Hungarian speeches Hungary’s status as an applicant country has had an influence on the referent categories of P1 pronouns. Insofar as the Hungarian speakers were expected to represent their own country (as a prospective member) in most cases and not the EU, the systematic pronominal choice is a telling linguistic articulation of that EU status. It is also very likely that the British speakers are more accustomed to speaking from the perspective of the Union, and, in fact, when addressing representatives of applicant states, such as Hungary, they are positioned to be representing the EU to their audience. Furthermore, because the UK became a member in 1973 the British politicians may have felt more committed to the union as a political project vis-a-vis younger member states, such as Finland. Moreover, the strategy of representing their collective identity as ‘we in the EU’ provides a good opportunity for the British speakers to signal belonging in the same collective with all the other countries participating in a shared discourse of enlargement, instead of marking their internal difference by presenting promises, opinions and

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actions on behalf of a separate British national entity. The indication of belonging to the same collective appealing to the widest possible group of listeners is a strategy that is frequently employed in political speeches in order to avoid or preclude conflicts within organizations that a speaker represents or may represent. Since the logic of the enlargement discourse positioned Hungary as an applicant country at the time, this discursive position (i.e., building common ground on the basis of EU membership) was not available to the Hungarian speakers yet. This difference in EU status is clearly revealed by the comparison of the pronominal references to collective identity constructions in the corpora. The Finnish speakers appear to speak in more or less the same roles as the Hungarian ones when it comes to P1s indexing the European Union. Furthermore, the high presence of national P1 (‘we’) positions the Finnish corpus much more similar to the Hungarian corpus. To put it differently, there are more speeches in the Finnish corpus about the position of the speakers’ country (i.e., Finland) within the EU than about common EU matters. This results in the observed differences between the Finnish and the British corpus in their proportions of P1 references to the speakers’ own country. So much so that statistically the Finnish corpus is the same as the Hungarian one concerning this ratio. One explanation for this dissimilarity of referent sets in the British and the Finnish speeches is the fact that unlike Britain, Finland was a much younger state at the time of ER5 and closer to recalling the experiences of admission that were about basically the same issues in the case of Hungary. Another reason that accounts for the similarity between Finnish and Hungarian choices of referents in figure 2 is the geopolitical position of Finland. Its culturally, demographically or geographically understood so-called ‘peripheral status’ in the EU probably triggers more frequent use of constructions of Finnish national identities in the European political discourse than occurs by countries of stronger influence, such as Britain. However, the observed differences between the Finnish and the Hungarian corpora suggest that possibly there are also differences between the Finnish position and the position of an applicant state, such as Hungary. Considering the differences between the Finnish and the Hungarian corpus in terms of referents to the countries of the speakers and to the EU, it seems likely that Finns occupy an in-between position between the Brits and the Hungarians. The interpretation of the Finnish position as somewhat in-between is further supported by the statistically non-significant difference between referents of P1 indexing the EU and Finland in this corpus. The results indicate that alongside the strong tendency to construct national identities, the Finnish speakers also act as

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representatives of the EU in situations when they are speaking to representatives of the applicant states, for example, even if this position is significantly less frequently enacted by them than by the British speakers. Regarding the ideological investment of the given pronominal referent category, i.e., speaking in the name of the EU, one must investigate the patterns of collective construction from a critical perspective. This aspect can be interpreted in terms of what Krzyzanowski (2005) calls EU ‘mainstream voice’: The ‘mainstream voice’ is to be understood as a certain form of a collective voice, which stems from a way of self-understanding (cf. Delanty 2003) of the political group of those directly involved in EUpolitics and EU-institutions. However, the mentioned self-understanding is in a way imposed by those who, through their political position, are able to control and design such issues as communication flows or public images of EU institutions and politics. Therefore, the ‘mainstream voice’ may be seen as a form of overriding ideology, which serves legitimizing EU politics and its broad, social and political influence [on terms of the more influential members]. (Krzyzanowski 2005: 14)

Used towards non-mainstream ‘others’, this EU ‘mainstream voice’ establishes a more dominant power position for the collective of the speaker. Since many of the British speeches were directed to EU applicant state audiences, the most frequent British identification with the EU indicates that British representatives spoke from a dominant position most often. There is one more factor that needs to be taken into consideration when evaluating the Hungarian results in figure 2. In some of the speeches in the Hungarian corpus (e.g., the ‘Speech at the Conference on the Enlargement of the European Union’ by László Kovács, Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs, 15/06/2003, Jerusalem), the Hungarian speakers turned out to represent the EU to other non-EU member states, such as Israel, at a political event. Nevertheless, the EU referent P1 choice was very infrequent in the Hungarian speeches. I believe this can be seen as an expression of the speakers’ strong perception of their country’s applicant status, resulting in a preference for P1 referents to Hungary. This preference then materialized in the dominance of this referent set (including its subsets of citizens, such as Hungarians, and leaders, such as the Hungarian Government, etc.). Consequently, there is a strong tendency in the Hungarian speeches to construct their national identities through the use of the P1, regardless of the actual constitution of their audiences.

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Referent subsets within the ‘EU’ and the ‘Country’ sets As shown in figure 1, there emerged referent subsets within the two main sets (i) ‘referents to the EU’, and (ii) ‘referents to the country of the speaker’, namely the ‘specific’ and the ‘non-specific subsets’. The ‘specific’ subsets were further dividable into the ‘leaders’ and the ‘citizens’ subsets. However, there were some referents in the specific subsets (e.g., Finns who are not farmers), which did not belong either to the ‘leaders’ or to the ‘citizens’ subsets. These referents were interpreted simply as (‘EU’ or ‘Country’) ‘specific’. Because of the multiple cross-sectionality of the referent sets and subsets (see figure 1 on p. 50), the boundaries between the various categories were occasionally indistinct. These are cases where there were no anaphors/cataphors assigning a given pronoun to a particular referent subset. In such cases the referent in question was always assigned to a more general referent set (e.g., to a ‘non-specific’ set instead of a ‘specific’ set). For these reasons, testing the statistical significance of differences between the subsets of the P1 referents in a given corpus – just like testing the internal significance of the differences within each subset between the three corpora – may produce slightly misleading results3. Nevertheless, a comparative chart of the main sets and their different subsets in the three corpora can still be used to illustrate the tendencies in which the different collective identity groups were construed in them. Figure 3 displays the relative frequencies of the subsets within the ‘EU’ and the ‘country of the speaker’ main referent sets of P1 pronouns, such as the ‘EU specific’ or the ‘leaders of the country’ subsets, as they were indexed by anaphoric or cataphoric nominal referents. The results for the three corpora are indexed by bars of different colors, respectively, with the black bars indicating the results for the British corpus, the white bars displaying the results for the Finnish corpus, and the grey bars presenting the results for the Hungarian corpus.

3

The reason for this is that there were many referents that most probably indexed, e.g., ‘EU leaders’ (i.e., a subset of the ‘EU specific’ set), but as they had no such anaphors or cataphors which would clearly identify them as ‘EU leaders’, I had to group them into the ‘EU specific’ set or to the ‘EU non-specific set’ (both more general referent sets than ‘EU leaders’) on the basis of their textual contexts.

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Figure 3. Distribution of all twelve referent sets, subsets and intersections in the three corpora

Since all referents to the EU or the country of the speaker that were not indexed by anaphors or cataphors as ‘specific’ were grouped into the nonspecific categories of EU or Country, it is understandable that the ‘EU non-specific’ and the ‘Country non-specific’ referent categories were among the most frequent ones. On the other hand, the subsets that were created on a particular anaphoric or cataphoric basis were more informative about the referent structure of each corpus and were grouped into one of the specific subsets. The ‘EU specific’ subset contained referents such as supporters of the EU or European nations or EU member states in NATO, etc. The diversity of the actual referents in this subset indicates the complexity of the representations of the speakers’ perceived collective EU identities. (This will be further discussed in the section on referents in the ‘EU specific’ subset.) Figure 3 shows that the most frequent use of this category was found in the British speeches (8.78% of all P1 subject and object pronouns); this is followed by the Finnish speeches (6.74% of all P1 subject and object pronouns); while EU specific referents were rather infrequent in the Hungarian speeches (3.1% of all P1 subject and object pronouns). On the basis of these figures, it can be inferred that in the former two corpora representations of ‘we, the EU’ were more complex than in the Hungarian speeches, though this did not apply to the British and the Finnish corpus to the same extent. However, as the referents in this subset are rather diverse in nature, a qualitative analysis of their occurrences can be more informative about the representations of collective identities performed via this subset than a quantitative comparison and will

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be therefore dealt with in the section on referents in the ‘EU specific’ subset below. The ‘EU leaders’ subset was created for such referents of P1 as the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC), The Convention on the Future of Europe or leaders of EU member states, such as PM Paavo Lipponen and PM Tony Blair. This subset was used the most frequently in the Finnish speeches, yet both in the Finnish (23.80% of all P1 subject and object pronouns) and in the British (19.03% of all P1 subject and object pronouns) speeches it was nearly twice as frequent as in the Hungarian ones (10.07% of all P1 subject and object pronouns). The ‘EU leaders’ referent subset reflects a functional role for the speakers and allows for them to assume a place of discursive neutrality (especially in the light of the fact that – except for the Hungarians – all speakers were practically members of some of the EU leader groups mentioned above). The Finnish speeches contain the highest proportion of this referent subset, even though they contain significantly less frequent P1 references to the EU altogether (including both EU non-specific and EU specific categories) than the British speeches (see figure 2 on p. 52). This indicates that the Finnish speakers are trying to articulate a more neutral voice by using more nuanced referent subcategories. The absence of the ‘EU leaders’ subset in the Hungarian speeches can also be accounted for the legal status of the speakers. Since the leaders of candidate countries, such as Hungary, were not functioning as EU leaders yet, they could not avail themselves of this collective identity group. The ‘EU citizens’ subset within the ‘EU specific’ set seems to function for constructing a more personal tone since the actual cases of P1 indexing refer to the private domain of the speakers’ lives. Referents in this subset included ‘we, Europeans’ or ‘we, EU citizens’. In political speeches in general, a private referent of P1 also functions to establish common ground with the audience of the speeches. Yet, this referent subset is very rarely used in the three corpora (3.76% of all P1 subject and object pronouns in the British speeches; 1.58% of all P1 subject and object pronouns in the Finnish speeches and nonexistent in the Hungarian speeches). In my reading this statistically insignificant presence of the subset must be due to the official setting of the speeches and their functional roles. In other words, all speeches in the three corpora were delivered in official EU institutional settings for purposes of reaching certain political goals or fulfilling certain political obligations in the ER5. Furthermore, they were delivered to an actual audience mostly made up of politicians themselves who are in support of the enlargement already. Consequently, ‘experts’

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were speaking to ‘experts’ in most of the cases who agree on the actual political agenda of the ER5. This may have accounted for the impression that these speeches contained less frequent use of rhetorical devices designed to reach a popularizing effect such as to gain support, construct common ground with, or convince the audience, in contrast to what usually occurs in speeches delivered for the wider public. The lack of a popularizing intention then could also have manifested itself in low frequencies of use of such referent subsets of P1 as ‘citizens of the EU’, which referent could help the wider public identify with the speaker. Therefore, it is interesting to observe the contrast between the frequencies of referents to ‘citizens of the EU’ and such referent subsets as ‘EU leaders’ or ‘country citizens’. The rationale for the investigation of this aspect is that the abovementioned subsets have the least diverse referents across the three corpora, thus they give a common ground for a reliable comparison. Moreover, a comparison of these referent subsets illustrates the differences between the three corpora in terms of the speakers’ preferences for appearing in their functional roles (as ‘leaders’) or as representatives of their citizens. In addition to this, the distribution of the frequencies of the references to ‘leadership’ and ‘citizenry’ within both the ‘EU’ aspect or the ‘country of the speaker’ aspect of collective identity formation across the three corpora can be informative about the respective position of the countries of the speakers in the enlargement discourse (witness the differences between, e.g., identifications with the ‘EU leadership’ or ‘the national citizenry’). A more detailed picture of the ways the representatives articulated their collective identity groups in relation to the EU and their countries can be seen by comparing the results of the ‘the EU’ and ‘the country of the speakers’ referents of P1 with the results of the most frequently used referent subsets. Figure 4 represents the comparison of the ‘leaders’ and ‘citizens’ referent subsets in the ‘EU’ and ‘Country’ main sets in the three corpora.

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Figure 4. ‘Leaders’ and ‘Citizens’ referent subsets within ‘EU’ and ‘Country’ sets of P1

With regard to P1 indexes of ‘leaders’, the ‘country leaders’ referent subset contains referents of P1, such as the New Labour Government, previous Finnish Governments or the Hungarian Government, while the ‘leaders of the EU’ category includes examples, such as the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC), The Convention on the Future of Europe, and leaders of EU member states. First of all, the bar charts indicate that the speakers in all three corpora represented their collective identities as ‘EU leaders’ more frequently than as ‘leaders of their countries’4. This means that in each corpus the speakers positioned themselves as representing the ‘leadership of the EU’ more often than representing the ‘leadership of their countries’. Furthermore, the results in figure 4 also indicate that Hungarian speakers identified with the leadership of their country (4.65% of all P1 subject and object pronouns ) much less frequently than the British (9,83% of all P1 subject and object pronouns ) or Finnish ones (9.52% of all P1 subject and object pronouns ), who are practically the same in this regard. A possible reason for this is that Hungarian politicians were focusing on representing the citizenry of their country instead of its leadership. This interpretation is further supported by the high frequency of P1 referents to Hungarian citizens in this corpus as it is discussed below.

4

The percentage values for the referent subsets are given in Appendix A and discussed in the section on process types connected to referent subsets of the ‘EU’ and the ‘Country’ sets.

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The proportion of ‘we, EU citizens’ and ‘we, national citizens’ differs in the three corpora as well. The British speeches contain the highest number of references to ‘we as EU citizens’ and the least to ‘we as national citizens’. Finnish speakers identify with ‘EU citizens’ less frequently and with ‘national citizens’ slightly more frequently than the British. In contrast to them, the Hungarian speeches contain no P1 references to ‘we as EU citizens’ (probably due to the applicant status of the country) and P1 indexes of ‘we as national citizens’ are much more frequent in the Hungarian speeches than in the other two corpora. Thus, we may come to the conclusion that, concerning the subset citizenship, the distribution of P1 indexes in the three corpora follows the pattern of the main referent sets of ‘EU’ (i) and ‘Country’ (ii) in that it shows a correlation with the duration of EU membership of each country. In terms of the ‘country citizens’ referent subset, the frequency figures show a reverse trend than in the ‘country leaders’ subset (1.67% of all P1 in the British speeches; 2.38% of all P1 in the Finnish speeches and 14.72% of all P1 in the Hungarian speeches). One interpretation of this reversal is that in their speeches the British and Finnish speakers appeared more in their functional roles as leaders of their countries, while the Hungarian speakers more often employed their representative role in order to speak in the name of the citizens of Hungary. Since Hungary was an applicant state, the Hungarian representatives functioned to represent ‘all Hungarian citizens’ as they would all be citizens of the enlarged EU. Furthermore, as the enlargement negotiations were taking place between the Hungarian representatives and representatives of the EU leadership at the time of these speeches, and this could have had an influence on the collectives the British and the Finnish representatives identified with. This influence then could explain the frequent P1 constructions of ‘we, EU leaders’ in the Finnish and in the British corpus as an outcome of their speeches being directed towards representatives of applicant states (as well). The ‘Country specific’ referent subset (excluding its ‘leaders’ and ‘citizens’ subsets) represents referents such as Hungarian society and organizations, Finns who are not farmers and British supporters of the EU. The frequency ranked comparison of ‘country specific’ referents in the three corpora shows an inverse image of ‘EU specific’ referents, that is, it is present in the highest proportion in the Hungarian and in the lowest proportion in the British speeches (1.04% of all P1 in the British speeches; 2.38% of all P1 in the Finnish speeches and 5.42% of all P1 in the Hungarian speeches ). Based on the figures alone, this would mean that the articulation of ‘we, Hungary’ is more detailed than, for example, the

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articulation of ‘we, Britain’. However, this conclusion may be somewhat speculative, because this referent category in the Hungarian corpus itself is fairly infrequent and as most of the Hungarian referents occurred in one speech5. However, as the referents in this subset are rather diverse in nature, a qualitative analysis of their occurrences can be more informative about the articulations of collective identities performed via this subset than a quantitative comparison and will be dealt with in the section on ‘Country specific’ referents. The intersection of the ‘EU’ set and the ‘Others’ set (marked as ‘EU and others’ in figure 3) contained referents of P1 that indexed the EU and another entity, such as Europeans who are citizens of countries on the whole continent, EU and the international community, EU and the US, etc. This referent subset partly displayed the build-up of a European collective identity constructed by the speakers, but most of the times it was applied for topical necessity. As the referents in this intersection were closely connected to the topics of the actual speeches, a qualitative analysis of these occurrences can be more informative about the articulations of collective identities performed via this referent group than a quantitative comparison (see chapter six). The intersection of the ‘Country of the speaker’ referent set and the ‘Others’ referent set of P1 (marked as ‘NAT and others’ in figure 3) indexed the speakers’ countries and other entities, such as for example Britain and Estonia, the Baltic Sea region (in the case of Finnish speakers) or the EU applicant countries (in case of Hungarian speakers), etc. The majority of these cases occurred in bilateral speeches (e.g., speeches of British representatives in Estonia), and they were used to build common ground with the listeners and their countries. However, some cases reflected the speakers’ intentions to represent entities that are connected to their countries but are broader than that in meaning (e.g., the Baltic Sea region or EU applicant states). These cases indicated regional political units within the EU with which the speakers identified and therefore could articulate themselves as representatives thereof. A qualitative analysis of the occurrences of each of the referents in this intersection can be more informative about the articulations of collective identities performed via than this referent group than a quantitative comparison and will be dealt with in chapter six. The intersection of the ‘Country of the speaker’ and ‘EU’ referent sets of P1 (marked as ‘EU and NAT’ in figure 3) contained referents such as 5 Speech at the Conference on the Common Future of Hungary and the EU by President of Hungary, Ferenc Mádl.

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Hungary and EU member states or Britain and Europe. This subset had very few elements and most of them came from the Hungarian corpus as Hungary was not an EU member state at the time of the speeches. A comparison of the results of the ‘the EU’ and ‘the country of the speakers’ referents of P1 with the results of the most frequently used referent subsets discussed in this section gives a more detailed picture of how the representatives of the three different countries articulated their collective identity groups in relation to the EU and their countries.

‘General’ referents The distribution of P1 referents in the main category ‘General’ (iii) (see figure 1 on p. 50) shows how frequently the speakers generalized their collective identity in each corpus through referring to indefinite entities (i.e., indexing indefinite pronouns or general nouns as anaphors or cataphors of P1 or using P1 without any identifiable anaphors or cataphors). In most cases generalizing membership in collective identity groups functions as a discourse strategy to avoid the speaker’s explicit responsibility through attributing actions to these general collectives6. Figure 5 contains the proportions of general referent sets in the three corpora. The bar chart in figure 5 shows that P1 referents in the ‘General’ category were used most frequently in the Hungarian speeches. Their frequency of usage was significantly higher than in the British (p = 0.001 based on two-tailed z-tests) and in the Finnish (p = 0.017 based on twotailed z-tests) corpus, while there was no significant difference between the latter two corpora (p = 0.729 based on two-tailed z-tests) concerning this feature. The results in figure 5 suggest that Hungarian speakers tried most frequently to avoid responsibility for the actions marked by the verbs. A possible explanation for this feature from a political point of view would be that Hungary’s political and economic dependency on the listeners’ judgment of the speaker’s speech as the immediate source of suitability of Hungary as an applicant country influenced the discourse strategies of its representatives. This dependency then would result in more cautious language use, marking less linguistic responsibility for actions performed via verbal usage in the texts. 6

A hypothetical example for the generalization of P1 collectives would be the speaker’s use of we [mankind] should have done that instead of we [the government] should have done that.

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Figure 5. The ‘General’ referent set in the three corpora

In order to assess the relevance of this category, we then need to look at the activities attributed to these generally referred actors. Referents in the ‘General’ main set appeared as first participants in the majority (87.5% of all general referents in the Hungarian corpus, 100% in the Finnish corpus and 96.96% in the British corpus ) of the cases in all of the three corpora. That is, most of the actions that were connected to general referents were the actions performed by them. However, there was a relevant difference between the process types of the verbs connected to the general P1 referent sets in the three corpora. Figure 6 below shows the process types performed by these general referents.

Figure 6. Process types performed by ‘General’ referent set

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In the British and in the Finnish corpus general P1 referents were most often performers of mental processes7, while the Hungarian corpus was much more balanced in terms of proportions of material and mental processes, although mental processes occurred slightly more frequently in this corpus as well. These results indicate that most of the actions attributed an indefinable or ambiguous ‘general’ collective, were connected to verbs of perceiving, feeling and thinking (i.e., mental processes), as illustrated by example (1): (1) I think that what happened in Kosovo was hardly a surprise for anyone. We have known for three or four years that it is impossible to stabilise the Balkans with the current regime in power in Belgrade. (Source: Hungarian corpus, speech 2)

As well as featuring a P1 general referent as a mental senser, example (1) above also demonstrates the ways a general P1 referent can be used for avoiding responsibility. The representative of the P1 collective in this example admits that his collective was aware of the possible escalation of the situation in Kosovo. However, the fact that he attributed this awareness to a generic ‘we’ collective (instead of, e.g., the EU, the NATO, Hungary or any other collective that the speaker was entitled to represent) serves as a way of getting around articulating the responsibility of the speakers’ actual collective for not taking action. In the Hungarian speeches (and also in the British ones), material processes were also very frequent in this role. However, looking at the actual cases of the material processes in the Hungarian corpus, one can see 7 There are no significant differences across the three corpora concerning the proportions of material and mental processes performed by general referents. Based on two-tailed z-tests for the differences between material processes performed by general referents in the British and the Finnish corpus p = 0.681, for the differences between the British and the Hungarian corpus p = 0.183 and for the differences between the Hungarian and the Finnish corpus p = 0.08 (significant on the ninety percent confidence level). For the differences between mental processes performed by general referents in the British and the Finnish corpus p = 0.324, for the differences between the British and the Hungarian corpus p = 0.359 and for the differences between the Hungarian and the Finnish corpus p = 0.055 (significant on the ninety percent confidence level), based on two-tailed z-tests. Nevertheless, the slight differences (on the ninety percent confidence level) between the Finnish and the Hungarian corpus can suggest that representations of general P1 collectives in the Hungarian speeches were more likely to be concerned with actions and less likely to be concerned with perceptions than in the Finnish ones. However, this tendency may be a result of the nature of the data (see the findings on the page below).

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that all of the material processes that have a general Hungarian P1 group as their first participant contain a median or high level of modality/modularity8. In other words, these cases do not express what ‘we’ in actual fact do now but what ‘we’ must do or what ‘we’ can do in the future in order to achieve that act such as in example (2) below (a quotation from Confucius by the Hungarian Prime Minister) where establishing law and order is only a matter of serial commitment: (2) To put the world in order, we must first put the nation in order, to put the nation in order, we must put the family in order, to put the family in order, we must cultivate our personal life, and to cultivate our personal life, we must first set our hearts right. (Source: Hungarian corpus, speech 2)

Furthermore, two-thirds of these cases in the Hungarian corpus occur in a single speech9, that is, they are highly influenced by the actual context and the style of the particular speaker, with tropes used in one given speech. Taking in consideration this idiosyncrasy and the low number of occurrences of this particular reference set, it is difficult to reach any conclusion regarding the process types connected to this reference set. Yet, it is possible to state that, although the ‘General’ P1 referent set is represented mainly as performers of mental processes in all of the three corpora, the Hungarian corpus may differ from the others by a more frequent featuring of material processes (i.e., verbs connected to ‘doing’ things) as well. This may imply, on the one hand, a lesser degree of responsibility expressed for ‘doings’ from the side of the Hungarians or a 8

As will be reflected by some of the examples, the processes analyzed in this study do not always represent ‘what is going on’, but rather ‘what is most likely going on’ or ‘what should be going on’. Philosophical semantics refers to the former case as ‘epistemic’ modality and the latter one as ‘deontic’ modality. Halliday (Halliday and Matthiessen 2004: 618) views ‘epistemic’ modality (‘modalization’ in Halliday’s terms) and ‘deontic’ modality (‘modulation’ in Halliday’s terms) as indicators of the speaker’s relation to what is represented in the clause. According to him different values can be attributed to different levels of modality, based on “the value that is set on a modal judgement” (Halliday and Matthiessen 2004: 620). The results of the investigation of systematic differences and similarities between modality levels across the three corpora turned out to indicate that these levels were mostly influenced by the process types used. Namely, material processes were more often modalized than other process types. Although the question of whether this tendency is genre specific or general is an interesting one to investigate, it is beyond the scope of this study. 9 Hungarian corpus, speech 2: Speech on the Congress ‘Europe 2000: a Union for the Citizens. A Union with Global Responsibilities’ Speaker: PM Viktor Orbán.

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weaker Hungarian identification with the EU (since most ‘material’ actions are attributed to EU collectives in all three corpora). Both implied scenarios are probably rooted in the applicant status of Hungary.

Referents to ‘Others’ P1 pronouns belonging to the fourth major category, the ‘Others’ referent set were very few and they occurred only in the British and in the Finnish speeches, whereas there were none of these pronouns in the Hungarian corpus. Yet, these few cases revealed very interesting speaker positions. For example, in one of the British speeches delivered in Poland the speaker used the P1 pronoun ‘we’ to refer to Poland, which he did not represent in practice. Witness example (3) where Prime Minister Tony Blair talks about Poland and the UK: (3) So: here we are, two similar nations, who share many of the same instincts, have a common history and are now debating a common future. Why join Europe? And what sort of Europe are we joining? (Source: British corpus, speech 14)

As the UK was already a member of the EU (referred to as Europe in this example), the ‘we’ could semantically represent Poland only. However, Prime Minister Blair merges the Polish position with the British in this P1 referent by building up a hybrid British-Polish collective via the textual context in the preceding utterances. This discursive action makes the British Prime Minister a legitimate representative of the above-mentioned collective (since now the UK was brought into the picture); thus, it allows him to popularize EU enlargement for the audience as one of them. Most P1 referents to ‘Others’ were created towards EU applicant audiences, often in close textual proximity of expressing possible difficulties once their countries are EU members. Their importance is therefore that in the context of possible difficulties, these identity constructions could signal some virtual sharing and hence offer a more convincing place of collective belonging.

Process types connected to the ‘EU’ and the ‘Country’ referents of P1 pronouns The actions connected to the ‘EU’ and ‘Country of the speaker’ referents feature these referents in various participant functions. In my view it is worth discussing these actions (classified into process types) for each participant function separately, since the use of participant functions can

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reveal the positions the speakers take in connection to the actions verbalized in the speeches. The P1 group appearing as doers of actions in the speeches is bound to appear as first participants, while the second participants are construed as being affected by others’ actions. Circumstances, in turn, appear as realizing other types of indirect involvement in the action. Such a distribution of participant functions has the effect of making the P1 collective look more active when it is realizing a first participant function. Additionally, this collective takes the role of a passive undergoer – which is oftentimes victimized – when it appears in a second participant function. Furthermore, when a P1 collective realizes a circumstantial function, it appears as an entity that has little or no responsibility expressed for the action taking place. However, the distribution of the main participant types for all referents of P1 only schematically describes the possible collective identities in the speeches, as P1 pronouns can index many different entities. Furthermore, different process types invite different constructions of first participants, second participants and circumstances. Thus, a qualitative analysis of the actual cases may turn out to be more fruitful than a quantitative comparison of participant and circumstantial functions alone. On the other hand, cross-comparing the frequency of usage of participant functions across the three corpora could theoretically display some of the differences in the discourse strategies of the speakers. This will be done below. I start my analysis with the actions performed by the first participants, and then I discuss second participants and circumstances. .

Process types connected to first participants of the ‘EU’ and the ‘Country’ main referent sets Regarding the results of the transitivity analysis of all P1 referents in the three corpora, existential processes occur only in one corpus (the British corpus), and even there their proportion is less than one percent of the total number of processes and as such statistically insignificant. Furthermore, as verbal processes are very infrequent in general (occurring between 2.3% to 3.1% proportions of the total case numbers) I will only discuss material, mental and relational processes that featured P1 subject and object pronouns as first participants (which was the most frequent participant role). Figure 7 shows the proportions of these three process types broken down into the three corpora.

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Figure 7. Relational, material and mental processes performed by P1 in the three corpora

The bar chart in figure 7 indicates the following tendency: the British corpus is dominated by material processes, the Hungarian corpus is dominated by mental processes, while the Finnish corpus is characterized by a more or less balanced proportion of the two. Concerning the differences of the individual process types across the three corpora, material processes occurred in a significantly higher position in the British corpus than in the Hungarian or in the Finnish corpus (for the difference between the British and the Finnish corpus p = 5.739e-05 and for the difference between the British and the Hungarian corpus p = 8.344e-07 using two-tailed z-tests). Mental processes were used in a significantly higher proportion in the Finnish and in the Hungarian corpus than in the British (for the difference between the British and the Finnish corpus p = 0.009 and for the difference between the British and the Hungarian corpus p = 0.001 using two-tailed z-tests). Relational processes occurred in the highest proportion in the Finnish and in the Hungarian corpus but with no significant difference between the two (for the difference between the Finnish and the Hungarian corpus p = 0.801 using two-tailed z-tests).

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These figures display a decreasing10 tendency going from the British to the Hungarian corpus in the frequencies of material processes and a reversed tendency of increase in the frequencies of mental processes (although the difference between the Finnish and the Hungarian corpus for material processes is only meaningful for the ninety percent confidence level, and the difference between the two corpora is not meaningful for mental processes: p = 0.089 for material and p = 0.267 for mental processes for the differences between the two corpora, using two-tailed ztests). In other words, going from the British speeches to the Hungarian ones the P1 collective identity groups perform less and less actions connected with verbs of doing and happening, and they are more and more performers of actions connected with verbs of thinking, perceiving and feeling. Since the proportions of the main referent sets in the three corpora change in similar directions (the changes go from the Hungarian corpus to the British corpus or in the opposite direction: see figure 2 on p. 52), an investigation of the differences in the main referent sets and their connection to the differences in the process types can bring interesting results. These will be presented below in figure 8. In the British and Finnish corpus, there is a significant increase in the frequencies of mental processes (the ones that refer to feeling, thinking, needing, etc.) when the speakers referred to what we do as a country in contrast to cases when they referred to what we do as the EU (p = 0.001 in the British corpus and p = 0.031 in the Finnish corpus for the differences between the two referent sets based on two-tailed z-tests). In the Hungarian corpus, the frequency of mental processes also appears to increase in the same direction, yet, this increase is not statistically significant (p = 0.132 using two-tailed z-tests)11. Additionally, in all of the three corpora there is a marked decrease in material processes (the ones that refer to doing things) in the direction from the referents to the ‘Country of the speaker’ to the referents to the ‘EU’ (for the Hungarian corpus p = 0.002, for the Finnish corpus p = 0.01 using two-tailed z-tests), though only on the ninety percent confidence level in the British corpus (p 10

When describing figures 7, 8 and 9, I use references to ‘decrease’ and ‘increase’ metaphorically in order to simplify the comparative description of the results. Therefore, the terms used in this context are not intended to implicate a diachronic change in the data. 11 Given the pattern reflected by the results and the fact that the Hungarian corpus contained the least amount of data (15,969 words against 20,185 and 32,616), it is probable that having more referents the differences between the Hungarian results for mental processes performed by the ‘EU’ and the ‘Country of the speaker’ collectives would have turned out to be significant as well.

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= 0.058 using two-tailed z-tests). Figure 8 describes the frequency figures of the process types cross-cut by the two major P1 referent sets, i.e., ‘EU’ and ‘speaker’s country’ first participants in the three corpora.

Figure 8. Process types performed by the main referent sets of ‘EU’ and ‘Country of the speaker’

The results in figure 8 show that the nature of the collective identity groups of the representatives is differently articulated on the basis of whether the processes are connected to the ‘Country of the speaker’ or to the ‘EU’ P1 referent in each corpus. Collective identity groups connected to the EU are performers of mainly material processes, and they are represented as actors of verbs denoting ‘taking’, ‘challenging’, ‘achieving’, ‘doing’, ‘making’, etc., as the following examples indicate: (4) […]but most of all what is here tonight is a recognition that in future we of the European Union will join together to create a better, more prosperous, more secure future. (Source: British corpus, speech 3) (5) The significance of the Convention is further highlighted by the fact that the candidate countries participate in its work on an equal basis. This is crucial since we are now shaping our common future. (Source: Finnish corpus, speech 13)

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Chapter Five (6) Today’s conference also symbolises the EU's commitment to Israel and the Mediterranean Region in general as we strive to facilitate the creation – within the framework of the "Wider Europe" policy – an extended zone of security, stability and socio-economic prosperity in the immediate neighbourhood of Europe. (Source: Hungarian corpus, speech 3)

This way the ‘we, the EU’ set is constructed more as ‘doers of practical activities’ in contrast to the ‘we, the country’ since the latter set is most frequently represented as ‘sensers’ of mental processes, that is, as performers of verbs denoting ‘perceiving’, ‘thinking’, ‘feeling, ‘needing’, etc., as demonstrated in the examples below: (7) Britain has set out its own position clearly. We believe a single currency can make sense in a Single European market. (Source: British corpus, speech 7) (8) Finland will continue to support the development of the new member states so that they can participate fully in the Union’s activities as soon as possible. We consider it important to continue the enlargement process […]. (Source: Finnish corpus, speech 2) (9) The next IGC will certainly be an important step in the history of European integration, not just because of the significance of the decisions to be made there, but also because we hope and expect to be sitting at the negotiating table as full-fledged members of the European Union […]. (Source: Hungarian corpus, speech 8)

In so far as the ‘we, the country’ set in all three corpora is used more frequently to express the thoughts, perceptions and feelings of this collective identity group, the national collective of ‘we’ comes to be constructed more on the lines of intellectual action, perception and emotions than the acting and therefore by inference more reason oriented ‘we, the EU’ collective. The speakers, regardless of their national background12, make a 12

I am aware of the fact that this difference in the Hungarian corpus is somewhat weaker in terms of mental processes, yet the Hungarian speeches still show a significant difference for material processes in this respect. In my view there can be two reasons for the differing Hungarian result on mental processes: 1) the smaller size of the Hungarian corpus than the other two corpora (15,969 words against 20,185 and 32,616) combined with the Hungarian speakers’ least frequent identifications with the EU. This can result in making detailed comparisons statistically less meaningful in the Hungarian corpus. 2) The more frequent usage of mental processes in the Hungarian speeches in general, which can be rooted in

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contrast between representing a practical, i.e., an activity- and successcentered EU and an intellectual, thinking, perceiving and feeling, i.e., a belief and ideal centered country of their own. This trend can reflect the attitudes of leading politicians and the institutions they represent regarding the ER5 in EU political discourses. This phenomenon then may allow for EU functionaries to consider the EU as more of a practical/bureaucratic construction, a tool for achieving certain political, economic or other goals. In contrast to such an understanding of the EU, they attach more intellectual, perceptual and emotional properties to their own country, which entity may come to think and make the intellectual decisions prior to their practical implementation in the EU. In addition to such contrast in the representations of politicians’ own countries versus the EU, the speakers’ identifications with the EU often serve purposes of domination over non-EU others (such as the applicant countries in the ER5, Turkey, Israel or Iraq). These cases are generally based on the enactment of EU ‘mainstream voice’. The differences in the above mentioned discursive representations can produce material effects: on the basis of the representative function of the politicians (as expressed by Just 2004: 41, discussed further in the section on enlargement, legitimacy and the formation of collective identity) the (intellectual vs. practical) properties politicians attach to the EU or to their countries can influence the ways EU citizens perceive these entities. After investigating the common aspects in the ways the ‘EU’ and the ‘Country of the speaker’ collectives were represented in the speeches I now move on to cross-comparing the three corpora for differences in these representations. In the following I will discuss the differences accross the corpora in terms of the most frequent process types (material, mental and relational) performed by the two main sets of referents of P1: the ‘EU’ and the ‘Country of the speaker’. As regards P1 referents to the EU, the proportion of material processes is higher in the British corpus on the ninety percent confidence level than in the Finnish corpus and it is still higher than in the Hungarian corpus, yet the latter difference is not significant (for the difference between the British and the Finnish corpus p = 0.06 and for the difference between the the applicant status of Hungary causing less ‘powerful’ ways of language use for its representatives. Nevertheless, there is still an observable difference between the frequencies of mental processes used in the ‘Country of the speaker’ and in the ‘EU’ referent sets in the Hungarian speeches. These two referent sets seem to be constructed differently in this regard, following the pattern seen in the British and in the Finnish corpus. This interpretation of the results is further supported by the pattern of differences in material processes in the three corpora.

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British and the Hungarian corpus p = 0.112 using two-tailed z-tests)13. The difference between the Finnish and the Hungarian corpus in this respect is not significant either (p = 0.918 on the basis of two-tailed z-tests). A possible interpretation of this result is that all speakers, regardless of their national background, explicitly commit themselves the most to action when speaking about what they are doing for EU membership. However, it is likely that this feature is the strongest among the British representatives based on the (less substantial) differences across the three corpora. The proportion of mental processes performed by the ‘EU’ referent set is higher on the ninety percent confidence level in the Hungarian corpus than in the British corpus and it is also higher in the Finnish corpus than in the British, yet this difference is not significant (for the difference between the British and the Hungarian corpus p = 0.067 and for the difference between the British and the Finnish corpus p = 0.111 using two-tailed z-tests). There is no significant difference between the Finnish and the Hungarian corpus in this respect either. In addition to the statistical similarity of the results in terms of material and mental processes, relational processes performed by P1 ‘EU’ referents are statistically the same across the three corpora as well. The abovementioned similarities (and minor differences) in the results support earlier findings about the influence of the collective represented over the national background of the speaker. These results indicate that ‘we, the EU’ was represented more as actors of doings and happenings in all three corpora, however they also suggest that this articulation is the strongest in the British speeches. Furthermore, in the Hungarian speeches, the ‘EU’ set is seem to be represented more as sensers of perceiving, thinking, feeling or needing something than in the British ones. In addition to the statistical similarity of the frequencies of material and mental processes, it also seems that this referent set is identified with or attributed to something same frequently in all three corpora in statistical terms. Thus these results indicate, that, in spite of the minor differences, the representations of what ‘we the EU’ collective ‘had been doing’ were very much alike in the speeches, regardless of the actual corpus where it was constructed. Concerning P1 referents to the ‘Country of the speaker’, the figures for the proportions of the most frequent process types are somewhat different from the results obtained for referents to ‘we, the EU’. The proportion of 13

The smaller difference between the Finnish (40.67%) and the British corpus (51.53%) came out to be significant on the ninety percent confidence level while the somewhat greater difference between the British (51.53%) and the Hungarian corpus (38.46%) was not significant. This result is possibly rooted in the fewer number of cases in the Hungarian corpus than in the other two corpora.

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material processes is significantly higher in the British corpus than in the Finnish (p = 0.002 using two-tailed z-tests) or in the Hungarian corpus (p = 1.237e-05 using two-tailed z-tests). Furthermore, this process type also occurs in a higher proportion on the ninety percent confidence level in the Finnish than in the Hungarian corpus (p = 0.084 using two-tailed z-tests). The proportion of mental processes is higher on the ninety percent confidence level in the Hungarian than in the British corpus (p = 0.068 using two-tailed z-tests). In addition to this the proportion of relational processes is also higher on the ninety percent confidence level in the Hungarian corpus than in the British (p = 0.053 using two-tailed z-tests). Thus, the distribution of material processes indicates that ‘we, the country of the speaker’ is represented more as actors of doings and happenings in the British than in the Finnish or in the Hungarian speeches. In addition to this, it is also very likely that this representation is stronger in the Finnish speeches than in the Hungarian ones. Moreover, based on the results for mental processes, the ‘Country’ referent set is represented as sensers of thinking, perceiving, feeling or needing something most frequently in the Hungarian speeches. This difference suggests a representation of ‘we Hungary’ more on the lines of intellectual action and needs than what is created for ‘we Britain’ in the British speeches. Furthermore, the results for relational processes imply that ‘we, Hungary’ may be more frequently made to appear as being in a particular state or possessing something than ‘we, Britain’. These results suggest that while ‘we the EU’ is articulated in very similar manners in all three corpora, there are still differences in the speakers’ discursive constructions of their own countries. Based on the nature of these differences (i.e., ‘we, Britain’ as the most frequent actor and ‘we, Hungary’ as the most frequent senser of mental processes) it seems that the representation of the British collective was the most active and powerful, while Hungarians appeared to speak from a lower power position, focusing on expressing views, needs preferences and referring to the current status of Hungary.

Process types connected to the referent subsets of the ‘EU’ and the ‘Country’ sets Appendix A displays the frequencies of process types occurring in each referent subset of the ‘EU’ and ‘Country’ main sets. With both the ‘nonspecific EU’ and ‘non-specific country’ referent subsets, material processes are used in the highest proportion in the British corpus. Example (10) features a ‘non-specific EU’ referent while example (11) features a ‘non-specific country’ referent:

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In all the three corpora, the proportions of material processes decrease in the non-specific subsets, going from P1 referents to the EU to P1 referents to the country of the speaker. The decrease is the highest in the Hungarian corpus, although there is a slight decrease both in the British and the Finnish corpus as well. This decrease corresponds to the tendency in the overall figures for the process types demonstrated by ‘the EU’ and ‘the country of the speaker’ referent sets í including all of their subsets. Mental processes occur in the highest proportion in connection to nonspecific referents to the country of the speaker and they are most frequently used in the Hungarian corpus. Example (12) demonstrates such a mental process connected to the above-mentioned referent in the Hungarian corpus: (12) In line with the enlarged EU’s quest for a major international role, we believe that the Union has to take an active part in strengthening the collective security of its Southern neighbours. (Source: Hungarian corpus, speech 3)

The proportions of mental processes increase in the British and in the Hungarian corpus, going from P1 referents to ‘the EU’ to P1 referents to ‘the country of the speaker’. However, in the Finnish corpus the proportion of mental processes decreases slightly in the same direction. Furthermore, in the ‘non-specific EU’ subset the Finnish corpus contains mental processes in the highest proportion, dominating over all other process types. The following sequence is an example of one of these cases: (13) The EU has a comprehensive Security Strategy, which includes all the instruments of crisis management, civilian and military, as well as prevention of armed conflicts. What we need now is a similar Union strategy for managing globalization. (Source: Finnish corpus, speech 3)

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Consequently, we can argue that in the non-specific referent subset of the Finnish speeches a counter-tendency occurs in comparison to the main sets of referents concerning the proportions of material and mental processes. Therefore, the dominance of material processes in the EU main referent set in this corpus is generated by the other three subsets. From P1 referents of the EU to P1 referents of the country of the speaker, relational processes show an ascending tendency in the Hungarian corpus and a slightly increasing tendency in the Finnish corpus, while they decrease in the British corpus. Other process types occurred in very small percentages (less than 5%) in this subset. The results for the non-specific referent subsets show a very similar picture to the main referent sets in the Hungarian and in the British corpus, except that the proportions of mental processes in the country of the speaker non-specific subsets are higher than in the main referent sets. This feature results in the dominance of mental processes in the non-specific ‘country of the speaker’ subset in the British corpus. The Finnish corpus has a quite similar distribution of process types for both the ‘country of the speaker non-specific’ and the ‘EU non-specific’ referent subsets. This means that in the Finnish corpus the ‘EU non-specific’ subset contains higher proportions of verbs connected to intellectual and mental action and perceiving than the EU main referent set. Consequently, unspecified EU identifications are more often represented as ‘perceiving’, ‘believing’, ‘feeling’, ‘thinking’ about something in this corpus than specified ones. This indicates that the Finnish speakers identify with the EU more on an emotional or intellectual basis (parallel to how they identify with their countries) when they talk about it in general. Yet, when they identify themselves as a specific group within the EU (such as, e.g., ‘EU leaders’), they appear more as actors of doings, such as ‘achieving’, ‘taking’, ‘challenging’, ‘making’ things. The specific subsets contain higher percentages of material processes in the ‘country of the speaker specific’ referent subsets than in the ‘EU specific’ referent subsets in the British and in the Finnish corpus, which shows a countertendency when contrasted to the results for the ‘EU’ and the ‘country of the speaker’ main referent sets. Mental processes occur in lower percentages (or were nonexistent) in the ‘country of the speaker’ specific subsets. Relational processes also occur in all subsets with the exception of the ‘country of the speaker specific’ subset in the Finnish corpus. In the ‘EU specific’ subset in the British corpus this process type is connected to first participants, second participants and circumstances in the same proportion, which means that this subset sometimes appeared as an attribute or a beneficiary of processes in connection to verbs denoting

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‘being something’, ‘being in need of something’ or ‘being at a certain state’, etc. In the ‘EU specific’ subset of the Finnish corpus, this role is reduced to first participants and circumstances of this process, just like in the ‘country of the speaker specific’ subset in the Hungarian corpus. Thus, in the British and in the Finnish corpus the specific subsets are dominated by material processes regardless of whether they are ‘EU specific’ or ‘country of the speaker specific’ in these two corpora. Consequently, these subsets are represented most frequently in relation to verbs connected with doings or happenings, often as affected by somebody else doing something (as in the cases with second participants in the ‘EU specific’ subset in the British corpus and the ‘country of the speaker specific’ subset in the Finnish corpus) or as a circumstance of the action (in the cases of both specific subsets in the Finnish corpus and the ‘EU specific’ subset in the British corpus). Below are examples of each case. Example (14) and example (15) feature the specific subsets appearing as second participants (in the British and in the Finnish corpus respectively), while example (16) and example (17) feature a circumstance (in the British and in the Finnish corpus respectively): (14) The EU has not only brought peace to its nations. It has made us more prosperous created more jobs and liberated our citizens to live, work, and travel anywhere within the EU's borders. (Source: British corpus, speech 9) (15) Already on this first day of the visit, my entire delegation has been able to feel the closeness and atmosphere typical of a meeting between good friends and kin. You have received us with dignity, but also with informality and warmth. (Source: Finnish corpus, speech 10) (16) As well as the profound political shock brought about by the fall of Communism, the last decade has also seen a revolution in the ways that we think about social and economic policy. The EU is a forum for us to explore, to share and to promote that thinking. (Source: British corpus, speech 6) (17) I know that our farmers have had to show greater adapatability than the rest of us. (Source: Finnish corpus, speech 7)

However, as the ‘country of the speaker specific’ subset occurs very infrequently in these two corpora, these differences may be due to the low numbers and cannot therefore be considered relevant. Moreover, as the referents in these two subsets are rather diverse and occur only sporadically, a qualitative analysis of their occurrences can be more informative about

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the articulations of collective identities performed via the subsets than a quantitative comparison. (See chapter six for further discussion.) In the Hungarian corpus, the frequency-ranked order of the process types in the specific subsets reflects that of the main sets. That is, the ‘EU specific’ subsets are dominated by material processes as in example (18) below: (18) It is in the light of these challenges and possible responses that the goals of the Union may be broadened and its mission renewed. Then we may adjust together the existing system of institutions and may outline the means that are most suitable for achieving these common goals in the framework of community and intergovernmental cooperation. (Source: Hungarian corpus, speech 6)

In contrast to this, the ‘country of the speaker specific’ subsets are dominated by mental processes as illustrated in example (19): (19) With a history like ours and with the lessons we learned from the East, you can also understand that there was no other way to proceed than through membership in NATO. (Source: Hungarian corpus, speech 2)

Concerning material and mental processes, the ‘EU leaders’ and the ‘leaders of the country of the speaker’ subsets in the British corpus show a distribution pattern similar to the ‘non-specific EU’ and the ‘country of the speaker non-specific’ sets. That is, both were dominated by material processes and both had higher proportions of mental processes in the ‘leaders of the country of the speaker’ categories. In contrast to this similarity of the ‘EU leaders’ and the ‘leaders of the country of the speaker’ subsets, relational and verbal processes – although they occur very infrequently – are more often used in the ‘leaders of the country of the speaker’ category in this corpus. Example (20) and example (21) contain instances of both relational and verbal processes in this subset, respectively: (20) Add to this the search for peace in Northern Ireland - difficult and fraught though it is – and you can see we have a full and ambitious programme. (Source: British corpus, speech 7) (21) As we have consistently made clear, there are key areas of the draft that we and a number of others cannot agree to […]. (Source: British corpus, speech 4)

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Moreover, the ‘leaders of the country of the speaker’ subsets also contain more circumstances in connection to material processes than the ‘EU leaders’ subset in the British corpus, yet this difference may not be meaningful as circumstances occurred very infrequently in both subsets. In the Finnish corpus, the ‘EU leaders’ and the ‘leaders of the country of the speaker’ subsets also show a similar distribution pattern as the two main referent sets (i) and (ii) (i.e., the ‘EU’ and the ‘Country’ set). The ‘EU leaders’ referent subset is dominated by material processes and the ‘leaders of the country of the speaker’ subset is dominated by mental processes. Relational processes are more frequent in the ‘EU leaders’ subset. Material and mental processes in the ‘leaders’ subsets in the Hungarian corpus show a similar distribution pattern as the main referent sets (i) and (ii). However, there is a lack of relational processes in the ‘leaders of the country of the speaker’ subset in this corpus (probably due to the low frequency of this referent subset). Moreover, in one out of the two cases connected to material processes this subset is represented in a circumstantial role, which indicates that in connection to material processes it did not always have an agentive role. However, the low numbers of tokens do not allow any general conclusion about this feature. The ‘EU leaders’ subset in the Hungarian corpus appears as a second participant in one case. Although this occurrence allows for approximately one-tenth of the material processes in the ‘EU leaders’ subset, the low numbers of tokens make it difficult to reach any general conclusion based on this data. Still, the fact that even among the few material processes in the ‘EU leaders’ subset there is an occasion when this referent category is represented as a second participant, shows that it was possible for the Hungarian speakers to construe the ‘EU leaders’ collective as undergoers of actions. Cross-comparing the three corpora indicates that the ‘EU leaders’ subset is most frequently represented as doers of actions or events in the British speeches, as in example (22): (22) Once we have clarified what the EU should be doing, we should turn to my second question: how can we make the EU more democratically accountable? (Source: British corpus, speech 2)

This corpus also contains the least frequent articulations of this referent subset as being something or being in a state. All ‘EU leaders’ subsets are sensers of processes connected to ‘perceiving’, ‘thinking’, ‘feeling’ and ‘needing’ in more or less the same frequency. Furthermore, in the British and in the Finnish speeches they are also occasionally represented as the sayers or receivers of verbal action.

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The ‘leaders of the country of the speaker’ subsets are most frequently represented as sensers of processes connected to ‘perceiving’, ‘thinking’, ‘feeling’ and ‘needing’ in the Finnish and in the Hungarian corpus (with the Hungarian corpus having the highest proportion of mental processes). Example (23) and example (24) feature mental processes in the ‘leaders of the country of the speaker’ subset in the Finnish and the Hungarian corpus, respectively: (23) At the same time, we were well aware of the risks related to the potential asymmetry of the traditional production base of our economy. (Source: Finnish corpus, speech 9) (24) We continue to regard the year 2002 as the date of Hungary's accession. (Source: Hungarian corpus, speech 2)

In contrast to the previous examples, this referent set was dominantly represented as actors in material processes in the British corpus, as in example (25): (25) Since being elected, the New Labour Government has set its course according to these principles of the third way, the radical centre if you like. First, we have tightened public finances sharply. (Source: British corpus, speech 7)

Relational processes occur rather infrequently in this referent subset, thus the representations of ‘we, leaders of the country of the speaker’ lack construals of direct (self-)definition (identifying relational processes) or possessing things (attributive relational processes). In contrast to the lack of direct (self-)definition, a few occurrences of verbal processes in the British and in the Finnish corpora represent both ‘leaders’ subsets as sayers (or receivers in a small number of cases) as well. Example (26) and example (27) feature the occasional cases of this referent subset as sayers in the British and in the Finnish corpus respectively: (26) We have better to explain why collective decision-making is sometimes more efficient; but not take this assumption for granted. (Source: British corpus, speech 2) (27) In Finland, we reported to our citizens and parliament at an early stage – openly and without avoiding questions that were awkward from our country’s point of view. (Source: Finnish corpus, speech 7)

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The ‘EU citizens’ subset is very infrequent in all corpora. Referents of this subset occur in the highest proportions in the British corpus, which is structured in the same way as the ‘EU leaders’ subset, except that it contains existential processes and does not contain verbal processes. As regards the proportions of each process type in the ‘EU citizens’ subset, material and mental processes occur in a lower and relational processes in a higher proportion than in the ‘EU leaders’ subset. Thus, the representations of ‘we, EU citizens’ are more often identified with something, as relational processes contain articulations of ‘what/where we are’. Furthermore, there are a few occurrences of second and third participants of material processes in the ‘EU citizens’ subset. Yet, these differences may be explained by the fact that the ‘EU leaders’ subset is more frequent in the British corpus than the ‘EU citizens’ subset. The ‘citizens of the country of the speaker’ subset is very different from the ‘EU citizens’ subset in the British corpus as it is dominated by both material and mental processes. Material processes occur in lower proportions in this subset than in the ‘EU citizens’ subset, while mental processes occur in much higher proportions. Moreover, this subset also contains a high frequency of relational processes. Furthermore, the ‘citizens of the country of the speaker’ collective never appears as a second participant or a circumstance. Consequently, in the British corpus this subset is more often represented as doers of all actions in relation to the ‘EU citizens’ subset and these actions are more commonly connected to verbs of ‘perceiving’ ‘thinking’, ‘feeling’ and ‘being something’ or ‘being in a certain state’, than in the ‘EU citizens’ subset where material processes dominate. Example (28) features the ‘citizens of the country of the speaker’ subset as the senser of a mental process, which is the most common process type performed by this collective: (28) We have to acknowledge and identify ourselves as fellow Europeans. (Source: British corpus, speech 6)

Comparing the ‘citizens of the country of the speaker’ subset to the ‘leaders of the country of the speaker’ subset in the British corpus, one can see that it contains a lower proportion of material processes, a higher proportion of relational processes, no circumstances and no verbal processes. Thus, the ‘citizens of the country of the speaker’ subset in comparison to the ‘leaders of the country of the speaker’ subset is represented less as ‘doing’ or ‘saying something’ and more as ‘being something’ or ‘being in a certain state’ in this corpus. This representation implies that the speaker was reiterating the hierarchical power relations articulated by this distribution of process types.

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In the Finnish corpus, the ‘citizens’ subsets are very infrequent. The ‘EU citizens’ subset contains only material and relational processes occurring in the same proportion. In comparison with the ‘EU leaders’ subset, this subset contains higher proportion of relational processes and no mental or verbal processes. That is, the ‘EU citizens’ subset is represented less as ‘perceiving’ ‘thinking’, ‘feeling’, ‘needing’ or ‘saying something’ but more as ‘being something’, ‘being in a state’ or ‘having something’, as in example (29) below: (29) We have, as Europeans, all the tools at our disposal. (Source: Finnish corpus, speech 13)

However, because of the low numbers of tokens, the dominance of relational processes in this referent subset cannot be firmly established. The ‘citizens of the country of the speaker’ subset also contains a high proportion of relational processes where it appears in a circumstantial role. These cases involve clauses such as “it is well known to us, Finns” or “the problems […] are no longer alien matters to us”, etc. In contrast to the ‘leaders of the country of the speaker’ subset (which was dominated by mental processes), ‘citizens of the country of the speaker’ are represented as actors of material processes, sensers of mental processes or, less frequently, as sayers of verbal processes. The two former process types have a balanced distribution, while verbal processes are missing in the ‘citizens of the country of the speaker’ subset. The Hungarian corpus has no P1 references to ‘EU citizens’, while the ‘citizens of the country of the speaker’ referent subset is the second most frequent among the subsets in the Hungarian corpus (after the ‘country of the speaker non-specific’ subset). However, this subset has a distribution of process types more characteristic of ‘EU leaders’ subsets, as it is dominated by material processes, as shown by example (30): (30) History has too frequently denied us Hungarians the right to choose the course of our own progress. In 1989/90, we embarked on the road to the European Union of our own free will. (Source: Hungarian corpus, speech 6)

Moreover, this referent subset contains mental processes only as the third most frequent process type, and it also contains verbal processes. The frequent usage of circumstances and a few cases of second participants among the participants of material processes make this subset less active than the same subset in the British corpus, in particular. In contrast to the ‘leaders of the country of the speaker’ subset, ‘Hungarian citizens’ are less

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frequently represented as sensers of ‘perceiving’, ‘thinking’, ‘feeling’ or ‘needing something’ and more frequently as ‘being something’, ‘being in a state’, ‘having something’ or ‘saying something’. Deontic expressions are also very frequently used in connection to this subset, resulting in constructions of what ‘we, Hungarians’ should do. In a cross-comparison of the three corpora, the ‘citizens’ subsets turn out to be differently represented in each corpus. Yet, it is possible to say that in general ‘EU citizens’ are predominantly represented as doers of actions. In contrast to this general picture, they are also positioned to be affected by others’ actions and represented as circumstances of actions in a few cases in the British speeches. Moreover, they are also identified as ‘being something’ or ‘being in a state’ in the Finnish speeches. The ‘citizens of the country of the speaker’ subsets are represented more frequently as sensers of ‘perceiving’ ‘feeling’, ‘thinking’ and ‘needing something’ than the ‘EU leaders’ subsets. The highest proportion of mental processes can be found in the British speeches, but all the three corpora have almost the same proportions of material and mental processes connected to this referent subset. The intersection of the ‘EU’ and the ‘Others’ main sets in the British corpus has a slight dominance of material processes illustrated in example (31): (31) Europe and the international community must develop the tools to tackle this problem. We are improving our capacity to tackle state failure through the use of aid and trade incentives. (Source: British corpus, speech 11)

However, considering only the first participants, the proportion of material processes equal that of the mental processes (and both of these process types are closely followed by relational processes in a frequency ranked order). This balance is well demonstrated by the mental process in example (32) - immediately following the material process in the previous example: (32) But these tools are not in themselves a panacea. Ultimately, as in the case of Afghanistan and – in Britain’s case – Sierra Leone, we may have to consider military intervention to rescue states from collapse. (Source: British corpus, speech 11)

The intersection of the ‘Country of the speaker’ (ii) and the ‘Others’ (iv) main sets has a more solid dominance of material processes than the intersection of the ‘EU’ (i) and the ‘Others’ (iv) main sets’; yet, in the former intersection, mental and relational processes are also connected to

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second participant roles. Example (33) illustrates the intersection of the ‘country of the speaker’ and the ‘Others’ main sets as a second participant connected to a material process, example (34) features this intersection in the second participant role in connection to a mental process, while example (35) presents this referent group in the same participant role in connection to a relational process: (33) Europe affects us, in or out. (Source: British corpus, speech 14) (34) British and Hungarian troops support each other in Kosovo, where they are working together to establish freedom and stability. I want us soon to be partners also within the European Union. (Source: British corpus, speech 9) (35) Can we win the debate? It’s up to us. But great nations don’t hide away or follow along, stragglers at the back. (Source: British corpus, speech 14)

A circumstantial role is also assigned to this intersection in connection to relational processes. All in all, the intersection of the ‘EU’ and the ‘Others’ main sets in the British corpus is represented slightly less frequently as doers of actions or events and more frequently of ‘perceiving’, ‘thinking’, ‘feeling’ and ‘needing something’ or ‘being something’, ‘being in a state’ and ‘possessing something’, while the intersection of the ‘Country of the speaker’ and the ‘Others’ main sets is sometimes represented as affected by others’ actions. The Finnish corpus contains only two referents in the intersection of the ‘EU’ and the ‘Others’ main sets, and in all of the cases they are represented as mental sensers. Examples (36) and (37) contain these two occurrences: (36) On the eve of Europe Day in 2002, we are looking at enlarging the sphere of stability on our continent. (Source: Finnish corpus, speech 13) (37) Democracy, respect for human rights and protecting the rights of minorities – like the Roma – are still not things that we can take for granted in our own continent. (Source: Finnish corpus, speech 10)

The ‘Country of the speaker’ and the ‘Others’ intersection is also dominated by mental processes, but it contains material and relational processes as well. Material processes are more often used than relational ones for this intersection, however they are still infrequent. Nevertheless, in one case, the intersection of the ‘Country of the speaker’ and the

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‘Others’ main sets is also represented as being affected by others’ actions. Thus, not all of the material processes feature referents in this intersection as doers, in contrast to mental and relational processes. In the Hungarian corpus the intersection of the ‘EU’ and the ‘Others’ main sets is dominated by mental processes. Example (38) presents one of these cases: (38) Traditions are an odd kind of thing. It is something that we are proud of in Europe. (Source: Hungarian corpus, speech 7)

Relational processes are the second most frequently used in this intersection and material processes are the third, although half of them featured the intersection of the ‘EU’ and the ‘Others’ main sets as affected by the actions of someone/something. This intersection is represented as sayers of verbal processes in the same proportion as doers of actions or happenings. In comparison to this, the rarely occurring intersection of the ‘Country of the speaker’ and the ‘Others’ main sets is articulated as ‘being something’ or ‘being in a state’ and as circumstances to actions done by others. Yet, in the latter case this collective is represented as a receiver or as an entity that gains something from others’ actions. Example (39) features the intersection of the ‘Country of the speaker’ and the ‘Others’ main sets as a first participant in a relational process and example (40) displays this intersection in a circumstantial role (as a beneficiary) of a material process: (39) I think Hanna Suchocka is still right in what she said that since 1990, we are continuously 5 years away from EU-membership. (Source: Hungarian corpus, speech 2) (40) The Convent may be the pattern which can give us the fullest possible participation. Any other forum would offer us a more restricted, rather formal and less substantive way to contribute. (Source: Hungarian corpus, speech 8)

In a cross-comparison of the three corpora, it seems that the intersection of the ‘EU’ and the ‘Others’ main sets is dominated by mental processes, which goes against the material dominance of the EU main referent set. However, as this intersection indexed the EU and another entity, its construction is influenced by the speakers’ relation to that other entity as well. The intersection of the ‘Country of the speaker’ and the ‘Others’ main sets has the same semantic build-up, yet it is represented quite differently in the three corpora.

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The intersection of the ‘EU’ and the ‘country of the speaker’ main sets exist only in the British and in the Hungarian speeches and even there it is of low frequency (one case in the British and four cases in the Hungarian corpus altogether). What is more, in the only case in the British corpus it realizes an actor of a material process with a high level of modularity: (41) I want the politics of Britain and of Europe to be based on solidarity, on the common good. But I know that the world has changed. We must change the way of achieving our goals for today. (Source: British corpus, speech 7)

In the Hungarian speeches, this referent group appears as an actor of material processes (which always contained some degree of modality), as in example (42), or as a senser of mental processes (in the same proportion), as in (43): (42) It is our conviction that with joint efforts we can provide further impetus to the historic endeavours of establishing European unity and hence enter the third millennium opening a genuinely new phase in the history of the continent. (Source: Hungarian corpus, speech 4) (43) I hope that this somewhat simplistic view will be enriched by Hungary’s contribution to building a new Europe and we will all truly envisage the European Union as the framework of our common future […]. (Source: Hungarian corpus, speech 6)

A qualitative analysis of the occurrences of each of the referents in all three intersections (‘EU’ and ‘Others’, the ‘Country of the speaker’ and ‘Others’, ‘EU’ and the ‘Country of the speaker’) can be more informative about the articulations of collective identities performed via referents in these intersections than a quantitative comparison and will be dealt with in chapter six.

Second participants and circumstances The quantitative comparison of the participant functions shows no statistically significant difference across the three corpora in the cases related to the frequencies of the usage of second participants and circumstances indexed by P1. Thus, in general there is no major difference in the three corpora concerning the degrees of responsibility claimed for the actions by the usage of different participant types. Figure 9 shows the percentage values of second participants and circumstances in terms of P1 referents to the EU and to the country of the speaker.

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Figure 9. Second participants and circumstances in the three corpora

Going from the British corpus to the Hungarian, the proportions of second participants decrease while the proportions of circumstances show an increase. However, the differences between the three corpora in terms of these participant roles are not statistically significant (for proportions of second participants p = 0.564 for the difference between the British and the Finnish corpus, p = 1 for the difference between the Finnish and the Hungarian corpus and p = 0.5265 for the difference between the British and the Hungarian corpus; for proportions of circumstances p = 0.4948 for the difference between the British and the Finnish corpus, p = 0.7177 for the difference between the Finnish and the Hungarian corpus and p = 0.2532 for the difference between the British and the Hungarian corpus using two-tailed z-tests). On the other hand, when distinguishing between P1 referents to the EU and P1 referents to the speakers’ own country the distribution of participant types shows a different picture14. Figure 10 displays second participants and circumstances in connection to P1 referents to the EU, and figure 11 displays second participants and circumstances in connection to P1 referents to the speakers’ country.

14

In this section I only discuss two main sets: referents to the ‘EU’ and referents to the ‘Country of the speaker’. The reason for this is the low case numbers of referents in the ‘General’ and in the ‘Others’ main sets and the fact that referents in both of the investigated sets appeared dominantly as first participants.

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Figure 10. Second participants and circumstances in connection to P1 referents to the EU

The highest proportion of circumstances is used in connection to referents to the ‘Country of the speaker’ in the Hungarian corpus and the lowest proportion of circumstances is used in connection to referents to the ‘EU’ in the same corpus. This difference is meaningful on the ninety percent confidence level (p = 0.098 using two-tailed z-tests). Thus, ‘we, Hungary’ is likely to be represented more often as being connected to other people’s actions than ‘we, the EU’ in the Hungarian corpus, which creates a representation for Hungary as less focal, perhaps less important than the EU in the Hungarian speeches. However, I must note here that technically speaking the low percentage of Hungarian speakers’ representation of ‘we the EU’ can also be due to the applicant status of the country. Second participants are most frequently used in connection to P1 referents to the EU in the British and in the Hungarian speeches and they are the least frequent in connection to P1 referents to ‘the speakers’ country’ in the same two corpora. Since cases containing referents of P1 as second participants or circumstances occur very infrequently, all of the results of this section show probable tendencies only. Based on these results, it is probable that in the British and in the Hungarian speeches ‘we, the EU’ is represented as affected by others’ actions more than ‘we, the country’ is in the same speeches.

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Figure 11. Second participants and circumstances in connection to P1 referents to the speakers’ country

The following four figures will show the types of processes these referents are affected by or articulated as circumstances of. In figure 12 the bar chart displays the proportions of process types in connection to P1 referents as second participants. Figure 13 shows the proportions of process types in connection to P1 referents as circumstances. Figure 14 contains the same data as figure 12 displays, but it is cross-cut by the ‘EU’ and the ‘country of the speaker’ referent sets while figure 15 contains the same data as figure 13 presents cross-cut by the same two main sets of referents. Figure 12 shows P1 referents represented as affected by others’ actions. In the Hungarian speeches, the P1 collective is most frequently featured as a receiver or beneficiary of others’ actions, as illustrated by example (44) below: (44) Regardless of whether we are a member or a candidate for membership of the Union, these values and principles make us Hungarians part of the European demos. (Source: Hungarian corpus, speech 6)

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Figure 12. Summary of process types used in connection to second participants in the three corpora

Most frequently in the British but also in the Finnish speeches P1 referents are also represented in connection to ‘identifying something’ or ‘being attributes of something’ (in circumstantial roles); witness example (45): (45) For us, Poland is an old friend in the new Europe now taking shape. (Source: British corpus, speech 14)

The Finnish corpus contains P1 referents as ‘being perceived by somebody/something’ more often than the British corpus. Furthermore, in one case in the British corpus they appear as ‘conditions of existence for something’ as well. Figure 13 below shows the process types in connection to referents of P1 represented in circumstantial roles in the three corpora (including the P1 referent being part of the ‘circumstance’ as a pre- or post-modifier of a phrase).

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Figure 13. Summary of process types used in connection to circumstances in the three corpora

The results in figure 13 show a distribution somewhat similar to that represented in figure 12. There are slight differences among material, mental and relational processes, but these differences might be caused by the low case numbers. In general, referents of P1 in the Hungarian speeches are represented most frequently in a circumstantial role in connection to ‘doings’ of others, as demonstrated by example (46). Furthermore, the frequency of circumstantial roles in connection to both relational and material processes shows a gradual increase in this corpus. (46) History has too frequently denied us Hungarians the right to choose the course of our own progress. (Source: Hungarian corpus, speech 6)

P1 referents in the Finnish speeches appear most often as circumstances of either others’ ‘doings’ or others ‘being identified by something’, simply ‘existing’, or ‘attributed to something’, as in example (47): (47) For us the accession of the Baltic States is a central goal. (Source: Finnish corpus, speech 7)

Referents in the British speeches are less frequent in circumstantial roles, yet, they appear as circumstances of a wider range of process types, including mental processes, as in example (48), and relational processes,

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as in example (49)15, (i.e., as circumstances of somebody/something perceiving somebody/something or being attributed to something): (48) You, like us, desperately wish them not to be in conflict. (Source: British corpus, speech 14) (49) History and progress were with you in lifting the Communist yoke; they were with us both in defeating the Nazi tyranny; they are with us now in helping shape and build a common European destiny. (Source: British corpus, speech 14)

Figures 14 and 15 display the distribution of the process types connected to second participant and circumstantial roles of referents of P1 to the ‘EU’ or the ‘country of the speaker’ in the three corpora.

Figure 14. Process types connected to the ‘EU’ or the ‘Country of the speaker’ referent sets as second participants

15

N.B. This example can also be interpreted as an existential process.

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Figure 15. Process types connected to the ‘EU’ or the ‘Country of the speaker’ referent sets as circumstances

The distribution of the findings in figures 14 and 15 closely reflects that of figures 12 and 13. Therefore, it seems that, in connection to second participants and circumstances, there are no differences across the three corpora when comparing the ‘EU’ and the ‘country of the speaker’ main referent sets. Thus, these results reinforce my readings of the data based on figures 12 and 13.

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Certain referent subsets in my data invite an analysis with more of a qualitative approach than a statistics-based quantitative analysis. The reason for this shift in my approach is rooted in the differences in the sizes and the textual functions of the particular sets in question and the subsequent diversity across the three corpora in terms of the emergence of these sets. The particular subsets involved are the ‘EU specific’ subset and the ‘Country of the speaker specific’ subset on the one hand and the three intersections of the main sets, that is the intersection of the ‘EU’ referent set and the ‘Others’ set, the intersection of the ‘Country of the speaker’ referent set and the ‘Others’ referent set, and the intersection of the ‘EU’ referent set and the ‘Country of the speaker’ referent set. In this chapter, therefore, I am going to discuss these sets and intersections based on individual cases of referents that are the most informative regarding the specificities of discoursal articulation of collective belongings in the three corpora.

Referents in the ‘EU specific’ subset Referents in the ‘EU specific’ subset illustrate the complexity of the representations of the speakers’ perceived collective EU identities. The definition of this subset is somewhat problematic because of the diversity of the possible referents, since this subset consists of referents indexing any entity that could be connected to the EU (but could not be considered a member of any of the other EU subsets, such as, e.g., the ‘EU leaders’ or the ‘EU citizens’ subsets). In many cases there is only a minor distinction between the EU referent set and the entities categorized as members of the ‘EU specific’ subset (e.g., compare the referents identified as ‘EU’ and ‘EU states’). However, these minor differences can reveal the ways of the actual representation of the EU collective in its given context. Whenever an EU specific referent is used, the EU appears as being represented as a

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specific entity (as, e.g., European nations or the national governments of the EU 15) for certain reasons (be it topical or being based on a discourse strategy). These specific representations make the EU appear from a particular perspective, which gives an additional meaning to what is said in these sentences in connection to the EU. Thus, it is necessary to take a look at the referents categorized into this group. The diversity of the referents in the ‘EU specific’ subset across the three corpora is partly due to the different topics the speakers cover, but these referents are also influenced by the different discursive positions connected to the entities the speakers represent. Considering the relatively greater political influence of Britain within the EU and its longer duration of membership, it is not surprising that, based on the results of my quantitative analysis, the ‘EU specific’ collective appears most frequently in the British speeches, and this is followed by the Finnish speeches, while the least frequent occurrences can be found in the Hungarian speeches. Looking at the entities indexed by P1 in this subset shows that the variation of the types of referents reflects the tendency seen in the quantitative analysis concerning the frequency ranked order of the referent sets, i.e., the British speeches contain the most varied types of referents in the ‘EU specific’ subset. Again, they are followed by the Finnish speeches, whereas this subset is the least varied in the Hungarian speeches. However, taking a look at each referent type and analyzing the actual cases where these referents appear is a logical analytic step as the multiplicity of referent types may as well be a result of the size of the corpus (the British corpus contains the highest number of words and the Hungarian contains the lowest). In the following I describe the ‘EU specific’ referents common to the three corpora and then discuss cases connected to referents not shared by the ‘EU specific’ subsets in each corpus.

‘EU specific’ referents shared by all three corpora EU member states or nations in the EU1 appear as an ‘EU specific’ referent shared by all three corpora. Consequently, representing the EU as a sum of its building blocks (i.e., as the member states/nations) is a common construction used by representatives of all three countries. However, the ‘we, EU member states’ collective appears slightly differently 1

Although semantically the two entities are not the same, I had to group them under the same heading as they both stand for ‘the EU perceived as the sum of its building blocks’ and because there was no analytical use in making more differentiated categories which would then contain fewer occurrences.

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in the three corpora. For instance, in the British speeches, ‘EU member states’ are also represented as the governments of these states; witness example (50): (50) Our citizens expect their national governments to ensure their security and prosperity. But in many respects, this can no longer be done through measures which apply only within our national boundaries, if ever it could. On one issue after another: crime, asylum, the environment and many others we have to work across national boundaries: but these days we do this most effectively not just by cooperating, but by pooling sovereignty. (Source: British corpus, speech 2)

Prior to the text in example (50), the speaker lists the achievements (such as peace and cooperation) by European (EU member) states thanks to their EU membership, and then he mentions the work of national governments (i.e., governments of EU member states) that are legitimized by the expectations of national citizens of each state. He then discusses the benefits of these governments (and thus the citizens) from EU membership (the supranational level). The role of the national governments (whose role is often questioned in ongoing debates on more centralized power vs. national sovereignty, e.g., in the debates on the Constitution for Europe) in this sequence is construed in a way that legitimizes the existence of the EU. On the basis of the chain of argumentation in the text, it emerges that citizens of the member states need national governments (to ensure their security and prosperity) and national governments need the EU to help them to be more efficient with respect to these issues. Inversely, these governments reach these goals by pooling sovereignty, thus, by placing limitations to their own power. National governments in the text are represented as forming a connection between the EU and the ‘people’, i.e., the citizens of these countries, whom these governments work for. Therefore, the existence of the EU is legitimized on the basis of the legitimate existence of national governments. Thus, this legitimization is represented as serving the needs of the citizens (of EU member states). In addition to references to governments of EU member states, a further difference between the British corpus and the other two corpora is that, when representing an ’EU specific’ collective, the British speakers more frequently identify with EU nations than the Finnish (or Hungarian) speakers. This shows that in the British speeches the ‘building blocks’ of the EU are sometimes represented on the basis of their cultural facets rather than their political ones, since a nation is associated culturally, value-, language- and religion-wise to a certain group of people while a

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state is a self-governing political entity of a particular group/groups of people residing within a given geographical area. Naturally, members of a nation can live in different states and one state can also be inhabited by many different nations. Thus, the EU as a political unit is built up by its member states and not by the nations living within its boundaries (i.e., states can apply for EU membership and not nations). However, it is hard to question the statement that culturally the EU can be perceived as a compound of the nations living within it. Thus, the P1 collective in connection to the ‘building blocks’ of the EU in the British speeches is defined more on a cultural basis than in the Finnish corpus. In the Hungarian corpus, there is only one reference to the ‘EU specific’ collective as EU states/nations, which does not allow a reliable comparison with the other two corpora. However, the lack of such EU specific groups as EU states/nations in the Hungarian corpus in comparison to, e.g., the British corpus illustrates the difference between British and Hungarian representations of ‘we, the EU’. The fact that the ‘we, the EU’ picture is more complex in the British speeches than in the Hungarian (and in the Finnish) speeches can derive from a stronger identification with the EU from the side of the British speakers and from their more frequent usage of the ‘we the EU’ dominant power position. Nevertheless, the majority of the actual examples of ‘we, EU nations’ show that the British speakers use the term ‘nation’ as a synonym for ‘country/state’. Thus, the British understanding of this collective is built on a political basis; furthermore, Brits less frequently perform cultural representations of the EU than political ones. Example (51) displays ‘EU nations’ in the way this collective is frequently represented in the British speeches: (51) Europe’s preoccupation can therefore no longer be solely within Europe but must be about Europe’s place in the world. And the reasons for European union are reasons no longer simply to do with putting peace in place of conflict, but to do with the vital national and strategic interests of the countries that make up Europe, in facing the new challenges – economic or political – of the outside world. The purpose of the European Union is to give us, the individual nations that form it, greater economic and political strength. (Source: British corpus, speech 14)

In example (51) the EU is represented as a tool, just as in example (50). This approach is reflected in the Finnish speeches as well where the tool metaphor is commonly applied for the EU. In comparison to this, EU

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enlargement in both corpora is often represented as (having/offering/ containing) an opportunity for the member states, as in example (52): (52) It is important for European economic growth that our economic union is built on a firm foundation and close economic policy cooperation. The efficiency of the single market depends on the member states within it. The enlargement of the EU offers us a unique opportunity to expand prosperity, democracy, human rights and the rule of law in Europe. (Source: Finnish corpus, speech 2)

In the Hungarian corpus, the EU nations referent appears once, and this occurrence can also be interpreted as a representation of the ‘EU nonspecific’ referent set as there is no noun phrase that serves as an anaphor or a cataphor of the P1 pronoun ‘we’, witness (53): (53) When developing the single market, when adopting legislation, regulations with respect to the single market, often the main features of products part of the national culture, of national traditions are at risk, features we badly want to preserve as part and foundation of our national identity and a constitution to European cultural diversity. (Source: Hungarian corpus, speech 8)

In this example the speaker talks about maintaining the diversity of European cultural identity by preserving national culture and national traditions. Thus, example (53) can be viewed as containing a stronger identification with the cultural side of ‘EU specific’ collectives (nations) than with the political ones (states). Therefore, this occurrence can be interpreted as containing the referent EU member states or nations. The fact that the ‘EU specific’ referent group (indexing EU member states or nations) was so infrequent in the Hungarian corpus can be due to Hungary’s status as an applicant state at the time of delivery of these speeches. Consequently, its representatives had limited access to the position of representing an EU member state in more complex ways.

Referents shared by two corpora There are referents that appear in more than one corpus but not in all three corpora. These are Member States in the enlarged EU appearing in both the British and in the Hungarian corpus, New Member States and the EU 15 and the EU 15, appearing in the British and in the Finnish corpus. In the following I analyze cases in which these referents occur. (Member states in) the enlarged EU always appear in relation to descriptions, feelings and actions connected to the future of the EU.

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Naturally, this collective appears in the highest proportions in the Hungarian speeches (as Hungarian representatives could only identify with the EU in the future), but it also occurs in speeches delivered to EU applicant states2 or on the future of the EU3 in the British corpus. In the former case the function of this referent group is to create common ground with the audience, which is done by establishing a collective that both representatives of applicant and member states can identify with, as shown in example (54): (54) [Enlargement] will make all member states richer – because it will create by far the largest single market in the world. With half a billion people, it will be more than twice the size of the second largest single market of the United States. It will make us all stronger: because the bigger the club the bigger the clout. It will remove tension in the halls of power: because EU member states settle their differences by discussion not confrontation. It will make our streets safer: because the threats to Europeans today – crime, terrorism, drugs, pollution – can only be addressed through joint action across the continent. All member states of the European Union have a strong incentive to count the benefits of enlargement. (Source: British corpus, speech 9)

Enlargement in example (54) is represented as benefiting all EU member states by providing solutions to many of the existing problems of these states. Such a representation construes EU member states in the future to be in a much better position than before enlargement, therefore reinforcing the need for EU enlargement and thus legitimizing the existence of a future enlarged EU. In example (55) the speaker propagates EU enlargement for his audience by using the Member states of the enlarged EU collective: (55) Enlargement is the only right and sensible response to the changing pressures and circumstances of the past decade and the new century. Enlargement will cement the sense of stability, the respect for democracy, the promotion of human rights and cultural diversity which candidate countries have themselves worked so hard for. These are issues and values that cut across national boundaries, issues that 2

Championing Enlargement, speaker: Robin Cook, Foreign Secretary of the UK, location: Hungarian Ambassadors’ Conference, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Budapest, date: 25/07/2000 3 EU Enlargement: Future Directions and Trade Opportunities, speaker: John Battle, Minister of State of the UK, location: ‘Europe 21’ EU Enlargement: Future Directions & Trade Opportunities Conference, Queen Elizabeth II Conference Centre, London, date: 23/03/2000

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need us to co-operate with and talk to each other. Similarly, there are issues on which we need to take action together, where the European Union is uniquely well placed to provide common solutions, implemented by national governments. (Source: British corpus, speech 6)

The speaker in example (55) represents EU enlargement as the only solution to the challenges of the future and to what happened in the past (the democratization of the former communist bloc). Enlargement is also displayed as the way to assure stability, democracy, the promotion of human rights and cultural diversity for the applicant countries. An implicit assumption of this representation is that these values are bound to the EU as their only terrain (since without EU enlargement the political and cultural stabilization of these new democracies would not be possible). A further assumption is that these values did not (fully) exist in the applicant countries previously (but they have been working towards them, motivated by the prospect of accession to the EU). This statement is therefore used to legitimize the existence of the EU and propagate its dominant ideologies by representing it as the only guarantor of democracy, stability and human rights (in contrast to non-EU Europe). In the Hungarian speeches, (Member states of the) enlarged EU serves to state the Hungarian position on the EU as displayed in examples (56) and (57): (56) It is in the light of these challenges and possible responses that the goals of the Union may be broadened and its mission renewed. Then we may adjust together the existing system of institutions and may outline the means that are most suitable for achieving these common goals in the framework of community and intergovernmental cooperation. (Source: Hungarian corpus, speech 6) (57) The enlarged EU will be an important international player, but in order to improve our foreign policy performance we need a Common Foreign and Security Policy that thinks strategically. (Source: Hungarian corpus, speech 3)

By the use of the P1 collective, example (57) expresses the above-mentioned Hungarian position on the foreign policy of the EU in a way that the justification of this position is based on the common needs of the EU (i.e., it is represented as being in the best interest of both the EU and not just Hungary). P1 referents to New member states and the EU 15 appear in the British and in the Finnish corpus. Both the UK and Finland were among the 15

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EU member states, and when their representatives identify with New member states and the EU 15, this functions to express common ground with the applicant states, on the one hand, while implying heterogeneity of the collective by distinguishing between its two components (old member states and applicant states) on the other. The majority of these referents are applied in speeches where representatives of the UK or Finland were delivering speeches to representatives of the applicant states. Naturally, all of these instances appeared in connection to the future of the enlarged Union as shown by (58): (58) The significance of the Convention is further highlighted by the fact that the candidate countries participate in its work on an equal basis. This is crucial since we are now shaping our common future. (Source: Finnish corpus, speech 13)

In example (58) the New member states and the EU 15 collective is represented as actively working on their common future. This representation establishes a similarly important role for the applicant countries as for the EU 15 in the enlarged EU. Moreover, it construes a representation of the enlarged EU that both the EU 15 states and applicant countries can consider as their own. References to the EU 15 serve to distinguish the old EU member states from others (usually applicant states, but not exclusively) as can be seen in the following examples: (59) The second challenge is to improve those military capabilities of European states. The process is underway for ESDP. Member States are tackling their capability weakenesses in targeted small groups. We want the non-EU Allies and EU applicants included in this process. There is a simple logic: soon the capabilities of the applicants will be a part of the EU pool. And the steps Member States take must be consistent with their efforts within NATO, particularly the changes we expect the Prague Summit to make. (Source: British corpus, speech 10) (60) We have a lot of work to be done. But together in the context of the European Union, we will be able to do it. In Finland we are looking forward to Lithuania joining us around the tables in Brussels. (Source: Finnish corpus, speech 13)

In (59) the others (i.e., non EU 15) are explicitly named as non-EU Allies and EU applicants. The role of the speaker in this example is to act as an advocate of the EU 15 (based on his representative role) by expressing the needs of the old EU member States towards the two other entities that are

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mentioned. However, out of the two other entities, which are subjects to interpellation, only representatives of one EU applicant state, (Hungary), were present at the speech occasion. Therefore, the use of another other entity (non-EU allies) functions to make the claim less direct. Furthermore, since the speech was delivered in Hungary for a Hungarian audience the wishes expressed in the name of the EU 15 (taking part in the ESDP) are supposed to be addressed to Hungary in practice. Addressing these wishes generally to applicant countries functions to weaken the directness of the claims within. Example (60) is taken from a speech delivered in Lithuania, and it contains an expression of courtesy in order to win the sympathy of the Lithuanian audience. Here the separation of ‘us’ (the EU 15) and ‘them’ (Lithuania) seems to be dissolved in the future by the Lithuanian EU membership. Although future obligations (work to be done) are mentioned, EU membership for Lithuania is still displayed in a positive light as it would ease the joint fulfillment of those obligations. Thus, the EU is represented here as a tool (although not by the explicit use of the ‘tool metaphor’) both for Lithuania and the old Member States (Finland primarily).

Unshared ‘EU specific’ referents Some referents in the ‘EU specific’ subset appeared only in one corpus. These provide information about the differences of the representations of the EU collective as being influenced by the positions of each of the three countries. In the following I discuss these ‘EU specific’ referents separately, broken down by corpora. The British Corpus The British corpus contains the most ‘EU specific’ P1 referents that do not appear in the other two corpora. These referents are: EU member states in NATO, Western Europe, the national governments of the EU 15, European governments, EU politicians, an imaginary EU nation, the current EU generation and Europeans supporting the USA. P1 referents to EU member states in NATO appear only once in Mr. Jack Straw’s speech at the British-German forum in 2002. The sequence of the speech within which this referent occurs is not connected to EU enlargement but to military issues, the speaker arguing for increased military expenditures of EU member states in NATO:

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In example (61) the P1 collective (EU member states in NATO) is asked to increase military expenditures indirectly by an external reference (i.e., ‘Europe’ must increase expenditures). Moreover, this request was placed as a necessity to “preserve the integrity of the most successful military partnership in history.” Thus, it is not the speaker who asks ‘Europe’ to perform this action (as a representative of the UK, the EU or the EU member states in NATO collective), but instead, the necessity of this action is based on an obligation (coming from outside of the institutional functions of the speaker) in order to avoid the dismantling of the Atlantic alliance. Therefore, the EU member states in NATO collective is represented more as an actor out of necessity than by free will. P1 referents to Western Europe occur only once in the British speeches, yet it functions for justifying (NATO and EU) enlargement as shown in example (62): (62) But history shows that European security depends on more than sound bilateral relations. Multilateral institutions – NATO and the EU – have been the guarantors of peace in western Europe for the past fifty years. For the past decade we have been trying to extend these benefits to the central and eastern part of the continent. Milosevic and the Balkan conflagration highlighted the urgency of the task. Now is the time to deliver. (Source: British corpus, speech 10)

Prior to the quoted sequence in (62), the speaker talks about the mutual benefits of the partnership between the UK and Hungary and of the intention to strengthen this partnership (within the frameworks of the EU and NATO). In (62) the P1 collective, Western Europe appears as trying to deliver its achievements to “the central and eastern part of the continent.” By this, Western Europe is represented as a region of peace and prosperity and Central and Eastern Europe (including the Balkans) is articulated as being in need of what Western Europe can offer. This ideologized viewpoint construes (EU and NATO) enlargement as more needed by

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Central and Eastern Europe than Western Europe. In addition to this, Western Europe is shown as being capable of satisfying the need of Central and Eastern Europe for enlargement. What is more, Western Europe is represented as trying to satisfy this need out of obligation. The national governments of the EU 15 referent appears in one speech in which P1 collective indexes the national governments of EU member states and it is contrasted to Central and Eastern Europe. Therefore, this collective can be identified as the national governments of the EU 15 as displayed in example (63): (63) Similarly, there are issues on which we need to take action together, where the European Union is uniquely well placed to provide common solutions, implemented by national governments. As well as the profound political shock brought about by the fall of Communism, the last decade has also seen a revolution in the ways that we think about social and economic policy. The EU is a forum for us to explore, to share and to promote that thinking. And enlargement is a way for us to extend that process. The countries of Central and Eastern Europe have already made great strides in the policy areas that crucially affect all our citizens’ lives. (Source: British corpus, speech 6)

In example (63) the EU is articulated as a forum and enlargement is described metaphorically as a way (for reaching goals). These representations feature the EU and its enlargement as a tool that is at the disposal of (old and future) member states. This representation of the EU is very common in the speeches, and it is most frequently used to promote the views of the EU 15 on social and economic policy; therefore, it has an ideological function. The European governments referent indicates a broader domain than the governments of the EU 15. This referent appears only once in Jack Straw, British Foreign Minister’s speech at the British-German Forum in 2002 and it stands for the governments of (future) EU and NATO states as shown in example (64): (64) Next month NATO will welcome several new members into the Alliance, administering the last rites to the Cold War. At the same time, the European Union is grappling with an intimidating array of challenges, from reunification of the continent and economic and institutional reform to the drafting of a constitution. It is a time for vision and courageous leadership from all European governments. The prize is great. If we manage these challenges successfully, Europe will further enhance its world role, deliver jobs and prosperity

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The European governments collective in example (64) is represented as responsible for EU and NATO enlargement and also for creating a draft constitution for the EU. These tasks are featured as challenges that the P1 collective must face. Their possible completion is described as rewarding the EU by enhancing (the united) Europe’s role in the world, providing jobs and prosperity to European citizens and stabilizing peace. Thus, European governments are articulated as the possible protectors of peace, stability and prosperity in Europe, while EU and NATO enlargement appears as the (only) means of achieving these goals. The ‘EU-specific’ referent EU politicians appears in the British Minister for Europe, Peter Hain’s speech at the Italian Chamber of Commerce Dinner in 2002 and it is displayed in example (65): (65) But there’s still a great deal to do. And the UK and Italy have been in the vanguard pressing for further and faster reform. we need to: Cut unnecessary and expensive regulation, boost learning opportunities, innovation and job creation by giving people access to the latest information and communication technologies, fully liberalise energy markets, provide business with more access to cheaper capital, transform Europe’s research expertise into a better competitive advantage. But European politicians can’t do all this on their own. We need the help of business to drive this reform through. We need you to be active too. Talk to your German friends about the importance of agreeing a Takeovers Directive. (Source: British corpus, speech 13)

In example (65) the P1 referent to European politicians stands for politicians in the EU (mainly in Britain and Italy). They are represented as being responsible for economic and educational reform. However, they are also construed as having limited means to carry out these reforms as they are dependent on the help of the business sector. Such a representation implies that business dominated over politics and not vice versa. Furthermore, as this speech was delivered to members of the business community, example (65) displays the dependency of the speaker’s collective on his audience. Thus, ‘we, EU politicians’ in this quotation are represented as a responsible but dependent collective, which is not capable of the implementation of its tasks alone. Consequently, the speaker is trying to manipulate his audience by trying to evoke their sympathy to motivate cooperation.

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Referents to An imaginary EU nation appear in Tony Blair, British Prime Minister’s speech at the First Congress of the Polish Forum for the Lisbon Strategy, Warsaw in 2003, and they stand for a(ny) country in the EU as becomes evident from example (66): (66) The belief that Europe is something done to us, that everyone else spends their time ganging up on us, to do us down, is a belief fit for a nation with an inferiority complex not a proud nation that knows it can win and has proven its courage and its confidence by its record in history. (Source: British corpus, speech 14)

Example (66) occurred in a speech delivered by a British government representative in Poland. Consequently, the setting indicates that the message (to be a confident nation instead of one with an inferiority complex) addressed to an imaginary EU nation was intended for the Polish audience indeed. Yet, as the ‘nation’ referred to in the text is represented in a negative light (as having an inferiority complex), the speaker prefers to use a general (imaginary) collective in order to avoid being offensive towards his Polish listeners. The fact that P1 is used for this imaginary collective instead of P3 helps to take the sting out of a possibly negative inference, since through his use of P1 the speaker himself is indexed as a member of this group. Thus, (although the message was intended for Poland) semantically, the imaginary collective referred to implicitly contains both Poland and Britain. The current EU generation is represented as being responsible for taking or not taking the opportunity of EU enlargement as example (67) demonstrates: (67) But our concerns about the CAP [Common Agricultural Policy] do not dilute our support for enlargement. The United Kingdom’s – and the European Union’s – commitment to EU expansion is unwavering, as the conclusions of the Seville European Council confirmed. Reunification will be the greatest achievement of the current European generation. If we allow this opportunity to slip from our grasp it would represent Europe’s greatest failure since the Second World War. (Source: British corpus, speech 10)

Consequently, this example reflects the frequent picture in the British speeches where an ‘EU specific’ group is construed as responsible for something (usually EU enlargement). In example (67) this opportunity is used in a metaphorical sense to advocate EU enlargement. The Europeans supporting the US referent appears in a speech delivered to a Polish audience by UK Prime Minister Tony Blair. First, the

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speaker draws parallels between Britain and Poland in terms of a double alliance: one with the EU and one with the US. This parallelism is followed by the text in example (68): (68) And in the past months, there has been division between Europe and the United States. There’s no disguising it. And even for those of us who have supported the United States and believe passionately in that support, it has divided our nations. (Source: British corpus, speech 14)

The referent of ‘us’ in example (68) is ambiguous as it can index any EU member state, not only those who support the US. However, the choices for the referents of the pronoun are further specified by the defining postmodifying relative clause (“who have supported the US”). Therefore, in this example I interpret the referent on the basis of both the P1 pronoun and its defining postmodifying relative clause. Example (68) works with contrasting supporters of the US with those who do not support the United States. Thus, it construes one collective by contrasting it to a countergroup. The quoted sequence is followed by Poland and Britain being identified to be on the same side in this issue, helping the US “to shoulder the burden of policing the world”, as also took place with regard to the mission in Iraq. Then the speaker argues for the importance of supporting the US in its fight against terrorism. Since Poland was already a supporter of the US (and it is represented as such in this speech), this argument functions more to establish a common British-Polish identity (as supporters of the US) than to convince the audience. The speaker also makes a distinction between supporters and non-supporters among Poles and Britons (and possibly other nations). What is more, this distinction is naturalized as it is stated as a fact of life: “And even for those of us who have supported the United States and believe passionately in that support, it has divided our nations.” Such a statement in this form serves to establish common ground between Britain and Poland (as both countries are represented as being in the same situation, dealing with US nonsupporters among them who they have to fight against). In addition, the ‘supporters’ among the listeners can feel a stronger sense of belonging to the collective represented as ‘us’ as they are contrasted not only to other ‘non-supportive nations’ but to non-supporters amongst their own nation as well. Since the speaker clearly argues for supporting the US, those being on the same side (most likely the majority of his audience as they were official representatives of Poland) can feel a sense of community, importance and dominance.

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The Finnish corpus Referents in the ‘EU specific’ subset in the Finnish corpus that do not occur in the other two corpora are: Other EU countries, Northern regions of the EU, European family and EU participants in enlargement. Other EU countries occurs in a speech delivered in the Netherlands in 1999 by the President of Finland Martti Ahtisaari, and they stand for EU member states other than the Netherlands, as is illustrated by example (69): (69) In the Netherlands cooperation between the Government and different interests in society has proved an effective means of ensuring favourable conditions for the economy. This has resulted in brisk economic growth and low unemployment, a situation that other European countries have reason to envy. This ‘Polder model’ may be a very Dutch solution, which is not applicable elsewhere quite as such, but we all can learn from it as we seek solutions to our own problems. (Source: Finnish corpus, speech 11)

The other EU countries collective in example (69) is positioned in contrast to the Netherlands. The discursive function of this collective at this point of the speech is to contextualize the compliment about the Dutch ‘Polder model’. Other EU countries are represented as admiring the Netherlands and being able to learn from it. Therefore, ‘the Netherlands’ is articulated as a successful country and a possessor of valuable knowledge. The Northern regions of the EU referent is used in an address to the National Assembly of Slovenia in 1998 by Martti Ahtisaari, President of Finland. Example (70) displays this occurrence: (70) We have been pleased to note that the EU is paying more attention to its northern regions. At the Vienna meeting of the European Council we shall be deliberating a report on the development of the EU’s Northern Dimension and we hope to be able to secure support for the project. It is important in an integrating Europe that we in the north are interested in the southern parts of our continent and vice versa. (Source: Finnish corpus, speech 7)

Example (70) operates with a distinction between the Northern and the Southern regions of the EU. It begins by an expression of gratitude for the EU for paying more attention to its Northern regions. The speaker then discusses the importance of interest in the Southern regions of the EU (which includes Slovenia) on behalf of the collective he represents (Northern regions of the EU) as a reaction to the ‘South’ being interested

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in the ‘North’. By this, he credits the ‘Southern regions’ for the attention that the Northern regions get from the EU, which positions his audience (Slovenian representatives) in the role of ‘helpers’. A P1 referent to the European Family appears in a speech delivered in Budapest in 2002 by Tarja Halonen, President of Finland, as is illustrated in example (71): (71) The past seven years have shown that a small country like Finland can, whilst preserving its own identity, work successfully as a member of the European family. Indeed, to our kin the Hungarians we have this to say: “Welcome to the family table, to resolve shared problems and draft plans that will enable us to build a better European home in the future!” (Source: Finnish corpus, speech 10)

The European family in example (71) refers to a collective that both Finns and Hungarians belong to; thus it is used to establish common ground between the two countries (the one the speaker represents and that of the audience) beyond linguistic ‘kinship’. The ‘family’ and ‘home’ metaphors used for the European Union make the EU appear in a positive light for the Hungarian representatives, where problems are solved around ‘the family table’ with promise of a better future (as “a better European home in the future”). The EU participants in enlargement referent is used in a speech delivered in Vilnius in 2002 by Jari Vilén, Minister for Foreign Trade for Finland: (72) Europe is at an important crossroads. The future of Europe is being formed even as we sit here today: by the enlargement negotiations, by the Convention meeting in Brussels […] The current round of enlargement negotiations is historic in its scope. Its significance lies also in the de facto reunification of Europe after the Cold War. At the same time, we are not only participating in a process with historical or theoretical implications. (Source: Finnish corpus, speech 13)

The actions listed in example (72) that are performed in order to shape “the Future of Europe” (enlargement negotiations, Convention meeting as well as reforms of the EU) are carried out by EU member states. Yet, the referent of EU participants in enlargement is clearly broader than the existing EU member states, and it includes future member states (thus, present candidate states, such as Lithuania) as well. It is interesting to note the nature of forming “the future of Europe”, since it is formed mainly by negotiations and meetings. Thus, forming the “future of Europe” comes to be understood as a discursive act. The P1 collective that is involved in

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carrying out the enlargement is represented as being participants in the historic and (later on) economic process of the “reunification of Europe”, which establishes their importance in the contexts of both the past and the future of Europe. The Hungarian corpus In the Hungarian corpus, there are no ‘EU specific’ referents that do not occur in the other two corpora. This is most probably due to Hungary not being an EU member state. In the texts, this manifests itself through the lack of a detailed EU identity as a member state represented by the Hungarian speakers. A further reason for this finding in the Hungarian corpus can be that it contains the smallest number of words, which must have an effect on the level of detailedness of the representations of collectives in this corpus.

‘Country specific’ referents Referents in the ‘Country specific’ subset index various collectives that the speakers use to express their membership of as representatives of their countries. Naturally, these collectives are different in each corpus as they are built on the basis of different national collectives in contrast to common EU ones. Thus, they help to understand the differences between the kinds of national identities represented in the three corpora.

‘Country specific’ referents in the British corpus The British corpus contains the least frequent and the least varied ‘Country specific’ referents. I must note here that many of the occurrences of this referent subset are motivated by the topics of the speeches. Furthermore, there is no statistical significance between the frequency results in the three corpora (see figure 3 on p. 57) in terms of the country specific referents. Contrary to this similarity in the frequency of occurrence, it still seems that the British speakers represent collectives in connection to their country in the least detailed way. This interpretation is further supported by the fact that the only ‘Country specific’ referent in the British corpus is British supporters of the EU. This referent occurs in two speeches: in Jack Straw, British Minister of Foreign Affairs’s speech at the Annual General Meeting of the Labour Movement for Europe in London in 2003 and in Denis Mac Shane, British Minister for Europe’s speech at the Estonian

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Foreign Policy Institute in 2002. Examples (73) and (74) display these two occurrences: (73) But those of us who support the Union and Britain’s place within it must acknowledge that, at times, the EU can appear both opaque and less accountable than it should be. […]It is that confusion which has provided the context in which the EU’s opponents have been able to nurture doubts and fears. But I believe we now have an opportunity to resolve this issue once and for all. (Source: British corpus, speech 4) (74) Somehow there is a swathe of British people who visit Europe regularly, know it well, and love much of what it has to offer. Yet they don’t feel at ease with Britain’s role in the European Union. Those of us who believe passionately about Britain’s place in Europe, as I do, need to stand up and make the case. Those of us who believe profoundly, as I do, that our peace and prosperity depend heavily on our role in the EU, need to take our share of responsibility for winning over the doubters. We need both to take the argument to the vocal minority who oppose membership outright. And we need to win over the many who are not necessarily outright hostile, just disengaged. (Source: British corpus, speech 8)

The P1 pronoun ‘us’ in example (73) indexes British people, but the action ‘obliged to acknowledge’ is done by the phrase with demonstrative as head and a defining postmodifier (“those of us who support the Union and Britain’s place within it”). Thus, the action is attributed to the British supporters of the EU collective. The request directed to this collective is followed by an argument for the existence of the EU and an opportunity offered to resolve the issue of whether the EU is good for Britain or not (naturally, with a positive result for the supporters). Thus, the British supporters of the EU collective is articulated as about to win over its counter-group, the ‘EU’s opponents’. This picture is strengthened by the same collective (indexed by ‘we’), represented as having an opportunity to resolve the issues concerning the EU’s image. Example (74) operates with the same contrast between ‘opponents’ and ‘supporters’ of the EU and the same task of ‘winning the argument’ (for supporters). The counter-collective of the ‘opponents of EU’ is articulated in this example as disengaged and “not necessarily hostile”, which construes the ‘supporters’ collective as ‘emphatic’ or ‘understanding’. In both examples the British supporters of the EU collective is represented as having the prospect of a future success in the debate against the ‘opponents of the EU’ (yet they appear as emphatic with their adversaries). As the second speech was delivered in Estonia, it has a further message to

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the Estonian audience. This message is to ‘join the winner’, i.e., join ‘us’ the supporters of the EU.

‘Country specific’ referents in the Finnish corpus Referents in the ‘Country specific’ subset of the Finnish corpus are the following: Finnish Government, Parliament and administration, Finnish delegation in Hungary and Finns who are not farmers. As can be seen from these referents, the majority of them occur on the basis of the setting or the topic of a certain speech. Finnish Government, Parliament and administration appears in a speech delivered in Cyprus in 1998 by the Foreign Minister of Finland, Tarja Halonen: (75) EEA negotiations also served as a useful learning process for the government, the Parliament and the whole Finnish administration. […] The starting point for our accession negotiations was that we had an interest to join the Union. We shared its goals and principles and we were prepared to accept its legislation. In the negotiations we concentrated our efforts on a limited number of issues, where special solutions were needed. The most complex issues related to our desire to ensure that agriculture could continue in the whole country and that long distances and a sparse population would be taken into account in regional policies. We also wanted to maintain our higher norm level on certain issues. The autonomous status of the Aland Islands called for special arrangements. As a whole, we negotiated around ten special solutions or transitional arrangements. The government conducted the negotiations in an open way. The parliament was kept well informed about the developments in the negotiations. The interest groups, like employers, trade unions etc. were integrated in the process. (Source: Finnish corpus, speech 1)

Finnish Government, Parliament and administration appears in this example as the collective (or as three collectives) responsible for the enlargement negotiations for Finland in the Fourth Enlargement round of the EU. The Finnish speeches in general are the most sensitive and the least ambiguous in defining the boundaries of the collectives responsible for certain actions. The Finnish Government, Parliament and administration collective is constructed in this example as an active participant of the enlargement negotiations, which ‘negotiates’, ‘concentrates efforts’, etc. The different roles of the different groups within the collective are also defined, i.e., the government negotiated, the parliament was monitoring (it was being kept informed) and other interest groups were also involved.

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The representative function of the P1 collective is also clearly referred to in this section, as the negotiations were held keeping the Finnish national interests in view by, e.g., “maintaining higher norm levels”, etc. Thus, the Finnish Government, Parliament and administration collective is articulated in this example as an active heterogeneous group which was working for the benefit of the country it represents. As the speech took place at the European Institute of Cyprus when Cyprus was a candidate country for EU membership, the represented P1 collective also functions to set an example for Cypriot representatives during their negotiations at the ER5. Referents to the Finnish delegation in Hungary appear in a speech delivered by Tarja Halonen, President of the Finland at a banquet hosted by Ferenc Mádl, President of Hungary. These referents are mainly used for reasons of diplomatic formality as demonstrated by example (76): (76) I would like to express my warm thanks for your invitation to make a state visit to Hungary. Already on this first day of the visit, my entire delegation has been able to feel the closeness and atmosphere typical of a meeting between good friends and kin. You have received us with dignity, but also with informality and warmth. (Source: Finnish corpus, speech 10)

The P1 collective in this example is used to express compliments to its counter-collective: ‘the Hungarian hosts’. The metaphor of kinship, which is common in the Finnish speeches for Hungarian audience and vice-versa, is applied in this section as well. Thus, the Finnish delegation in Hungary collective is represented as a kindly received relative by its hosts, whose articulation created a picture of hospitality for the hosts. The Finns who are not farmers collective appears in a speech delivered to the National Assembly of Slovenia in 1998 by Martti Ahtisaari, President of Finland. This collective (that implicitly identified the Finnish President as not a farmer as well) is used to illustrate to the audience that for certain collectives EU membership is more beneficial than to others: (77) In the final analysis, weighing the pros and cons of EU membership is always subjective. I know that our farmers have had to show greater adapatability than the rest of us. But Finland has undeniably gained a great deal from membership. (Source: Finnish corpus, speech 7)

In this example the P1 collective is represented on the basis of a negative semantic relation (i.e., a ‘not X’ relation) to its complementary group (as not being Finnish farmers). Although EU membership is described as less demanding for the P1 collective than for its complementary group (Finnish

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farmers), the passage concludes that EU membership is beneficial for the majority of the citizens of the country. Thus, the main argument of the speaker could be translated as ‘although there are necessary sacrifices, it is worth to be a member state of the EU’.

‘Country specific’ referents in the Hungarian corpus On the basis of the higher proportion of the ‘Country specific’ referent group in the Hungarian speeches (see figure 3 on p. 57), the representation of ‘we, Hungary’ seems more detailed than the representation of ‘we, Britain’ or ‘we, Finland’. However, as this referent category is rather infrequent in the Hungarian corpus, conclusions on levels of detailedness from this difference may be somewhat speculative, since they cannot be supported by statistical data. Additionally, this implied conclusion is even weaker considering that most of the Hungarian referents (all referents that stand for Hungarian society and organizations) occur in one speech titled: Speech at the Conference on the Common Future of Hungary and the EU delivered in 2001 by President of Hungary Ferenc Mádl: (78) It is worth summarising the approach of Hungarian society and the huge variety of organisations in this country about the European framework we are soon to become a member of. What tasks and objectives do we expect it to accomplish? What role do we cast for it to play globally, in Europe, in Hungary and locally? What kind of governance should be adopted, what competencies should it be awarded at community, national and regional level? To find a proper answer to each of these queries, we will first need to examine the challenges the Union is facing, the changes in the Union and its closer and broader environment that have a bearing on us and are likely to materialise in the near future. We also need to address the role Hungary may accept and play in seeking answers and the areas where we have solutions to recommend. (Source: Hungarian corpus, speech 6)

There are two other collectives that are established in relation to the P1 collective (Hungarian society and organizations) in (78). The first is the ‘European framework’ or the ‘Union’, in other words, the EU as an organization, while the second collective is ‘Hungary’. In terms of the ‘EU as an organization’, the P1 collective is represented being in search of the definition of the function of the EU. This searching process is grammatically displayed via questions of two dimensions: first question is about the tasks and objectives that the EU as an organization is expected to accomplish, and the second question is about the role of the EU as an organization

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(serving the purposes of the P1 collective the best). Thus, in this example the EU is represented as a ‘tool’ that is used to achieve the goals of the P1 collective. Obligation is expressed (on median level) in connection to examining the changes the Union is facing. A reason for this action is defined as the need for seeing the effects of these changes on national collectives represented by the speaker (N.B. the ambiguity of the referent which could be either ‘Hungary’, or Hungarian society and organizations). As for the second other collective, ‘Hungary’, (median level) obligation is expressed by Hungarian society and organizations in addressing the “role Hungary may accept and play in seeking answers.” Consequently, the P1 collective represented in relation to Hungary appears as working for the country. The second ‘Country specific’ referent in the Hungarian corpus is the Hungarian nation. It appears in a speech delivered in 1999 by Viktor Orbán, Prime Minister of Hungary: (79) For 500 years in history the Hungarian nation has sought the security which has been finally secured by NATO membership. With a history like ours and with the lessons we learned from the East, you can also understand that there was no other way to proceed than through membership in NATO. (Source: Hungarian corpus, speech 2)

The Hungarian nation in this example is represented as having a strong motivation for NATO (and EU) membership because of historical reasons. It is interesting to notice that the ‘insecure, hard times’ that the Hungarian nation had to endure during the last five hundred years (and among it the Soviet influence) is indirectly referred to. This construes the hardships of the Hungarians in discourse as common knowledge accepted by everyone (witness “you can also understand...”). Thus, in this sequence the Hungarian past is naturalized as insecure and negative, which then functions as a strong motivation for the Hungarian nation in order to avoid being under the influence of the ‘East’ again. This goal, as shown by example (79), could only be achieved by belonging to an alliance that was founded to stop the spreading of ‘Eastern’ influence (i.e., the past ‘communist threat’). Consequently, in this example the articulation of the Hungarian position operates with the reconstruction of the dichotomy of the East and the West of the Cold War era. The fact that this dichotomy still influences the Hungarian point of view shows that it was not really deconstructed by the enlargement process but was rather transformed and became part of the enlargement discourse. Such a transformation signals a relatively weaker Hungarian position as an ‘Easterner’. This can also be

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traced in this example displaying the Hungarian desire not to be categorized as ‘Easterner’.

Intersection of the ‘EU’ and the ‘Others’ referent sets The intersection of the ‘EU’ and the ‘Others’ referent sets usually indexes collectives that the speakers acted as representatives of and that are connected to the EU in a broader sense. Such collectives are citizens of European countries (including non-member states) or EU and the US. Furthermore, referents to Europe in a (possibly) broader sense than the EU were grouped into this intersection as well. Many referents in this intersection were motivated by the topics of the speeches. However, not all of these referents were topical and the intersection of the ‘EU’ and the ‘Others’ referent sets can show the different perspectives the state representatives used when connecting the EU to various other entities and representing them as one unit.

Referents in more than one corpus Europeans, which indexes the citizens of the countries in Europe (in a broader sense than EU citizens), is the only referent that appears in the intersection of the ‘EU’ and the ‘Others’ referent sets in more than one corpus. This referent appears both in the Hungarian and in the Finnish corpus, and in the latter it is the only referent in this intersection. Thus, the Finnish corpus has the least degree of variation of the referents in the intersection of the ‘EU’ and the ‘Others’ sets. The Europeans P1 referent appears twice in the Finnish speeches4 5 and in both cases it is ambiguous, as it could index both the citizens of the EU or a broader European entity (since this collective always appears as the possessor of the European continent). In both cases Europeans are represented as mental sensers as illustrated by example (80): (80) On the eve of Europe Day in 2002, we are looking at enlarging the sphere of stability on our continent. (Source: Finnish corpus, speech 13) 4

Speech by President of the Republic Tarja Halonen at a banquet hosted by Ferenc Mádl, President of Hungary. Speaker: President of Finland, Tarja Halonen. Location: Budapest (banquet). Date: 27/08/2002 5 Speech on the occasion of the Europe Day. Speaker: Jari Vilén, Minister for Foreign Trade of Finland. Location: Vilnius (Europe day). Date: 07/05/2002

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Appearing as a mental senser construes Europeans on the lines of intellectual action, which goes against the tendency of representing the EU as material action centered and is more like the representations of collectives connected to the speakers’ own countries. In the Hungarian speeches, the ‘we, Europeans’ referent appears in one speech, the Hungarian Prime Minister’s Speech at the Munich Economic Summit: (81) The United States have a major advantage which is a small number of traditions. Traditions are an odd kind of thing. It is something that we are proud of in Europe. We have something to look back on. However – by necessity – traditions also keep us back. So traditions are magnificent but they can also be an impediment to flexible thinking. You have to change your ways you were following in the past and this is certainly an issue Europe has to face. (Source: Hungarian corpus, speech 7)

In example (81) the P1 pronoun indexes Europeans because the adverbial of place ‘in Europe’ indicates an entity within Europe and the mental process performed through the verb phrase ‘to be proud of’ signifies an animated senser. This P1 collective is contrasted with the United States in connection to mobility and traditions. The US in this comparison is described as more pragmatic than Europe and is thus represented as having an advantage over Europe. According to the speaker, Europe has to change its ways in order to overcome this advantage and to catch up with the US. However, the imperative to change ways is addressed to the second person as: “you have to change your ways.” This indicates that the speaker (as a member/representative of the Europeans collective) does not identify with ‘Europe’ when it comes to the action of ‘changing ways’. What is more, in the following sentence he contrasts the US with ‘Western Europe’ to make this demarcation even more explicit (since he was a representative of a former communist country in Central Europe). Therefore, he construes European traditions as a possession of all Europeans when he talks about the values of those traditions, yet, when it comes to their impracticability and the need to change the ways dealing with them, then they come to be connected to Western Europe only (as the entity responsible for carrying out these changes). By this the speaker avoids the responsibility of his collective for the changes needed to be carried out.

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Referents in the British corpus The British corpus contains the biggest variation of referents in the intersection of the ‘EU’ and the ‘Others’ referent sets. Those referents that appear in this intersection are: Europe, Europe and the International community, Many European Governments, NATO Member States, NATO Member States in ESDP, the EU and the US and Europeans supporting the United States. P1 referents to Europe index a broader domain of European countries than EU member states. In British Prime Minister Tony Blair’s welcome speech in 2004, these referents appear in an ambiguous way, referring either to the (post-)communist countries or to the whole of Europe (communist and non-communist countries) during the socialist era: (82) And then I reflect as to where we are today because for many of these countries in Central and Eastern Europe, unfortunately the turmoil and terror of fascism wasn’t the end of the story for them. Then what happened is that we were under the lash of Communism. And then for decades more people’s freedoms were suppressed; they were unable to express their basic democratic rights, and it was only literally fifteen years ago that that then changed for the better. (Source: British corpus, speech 3)

In example (82) the speaker talks about the reunification of Europe and then the hardships of Central and Eastern European countries under the communist regimes. Taking into consideration that the speaker was a British Prime Minister, (i.e., a representative of the United Kingdom) the referent of the P1 pronoun stands for both the communist and the noncommunist part of Europe. This interpretation is also supported by the fact that the speaker contrasts citizens of the communist countries to the P1 collective by using a third person pronoun to refer to the former collective: “they were unable to express their basic democratic rights.” However, the usage of the P1 subject pronoun (‘we’) is still ambiguous in this context and therefore allows the speaker to construct common ground with those listeners who were representatives of post-communist countries. Since this speech was delivered to representatives of the EU accession countries, the ambiguity helps the audience to identify with Prime Minister Blair and perceive him as ‘one of us’. Europe is also used to refer both to the EU and (Western) Europe in the past in Prime Minister Tony Blair’s Message to Poland on Joining the EU in 2003:

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Example (83) contrasts the European past with the future of Europe, which, according to the speaker, can only be bright for individual European countries (such as the UK) if they form an alliance (the EU). The speaker sets forth Britain as an example for Poland, despite the fact that the global role of Poland could not be considered the same as that of Britain, since these two countries have greatly differed in their influences on “the world’s vital decisions” in the past. Yet the future prospect of influencing global decisions should serve as a motivating factor for the Polish representatives in supporting the alliance. It is interesting to note that this speech was delivered in 2003, only a year before Poland joined the EU; thus, the Polish dedication towards the EU was not a question any more at this time. All occurrences of the referent Europe and the International community (or Europe and the world) appear in Jack Straw, Foreign Secretary of Britain’s speech at the British-German forum in 2002, and they are used to gain support for intervention in Iraq by articulating weapons of mass destruction, terrorism and failing states as new threats to Europe and the International community that must be answered: (84) None of us wants military action. But the only chance of resolving this issue peacefully is by making clear that we are prepared to use force. We in Europe have long supported multilateral organisations and the system upon which they are founded. We have an obligation to ensure that Iraq does not continue to flout the authority of the United Nations. International law is also threatened by global terrorism. There can be no dialogue with the perpetrators of the atrocity in Bali last weekend. They oppose the values we hold most dear. They will maim and murder people of all nationalities and faiths to achieve their twisted ends. There is only one possible response. Europe and the world must pursue the campaign against global terrorism with unrelenting determination. (Source: British corpus, speech 11)

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Example (84) shows a classic example of enemy construction through ‘othering’6. The P1 collective is represented as threatened by others (namely ‘global terrorism’) who oppose the values held by this collective. This situation implies that the present status quo is at risk. Thus, Europe and the International community is articulated in the role of a victim, making its reactions seem to be characterized as self-defense instead of aggression. As a possible reaction in self-defense, the speaker suggests solving the Iraq crisis by force. Since Europe and the International community did not share the view of the speaker unanimously, and this was especially true for German representatives (a major part of the audience), this speech is aimed at convincing the German audience by articulating an endangered Europe and the International community collective that is unified on the issue of Iraq as opposed to a disjointed one. The referent Many European Governments appears in connection to the topic of European defense policy in the speech delivered in Budapest in 2002 by Jack Straw, British Foreign Secretary: (85) But the fact remains that Europe is not investing sufficiently in its armed forces, nor in the flexible, deployable capabilities that NATO will need if it is to carry out new missions. Many European governments spend just 1.5% of GDP on defence; this is simply not enough to make a proper contribution. We have to rectify this; if we fail, then the military credibility of NATO will suffer. (Source: British corpus, speech 10)

The referent in this example is ambiguous; it can either be Many European Governments that are responsible for the rectification of the sum spent on defense or Europe (the EU or European members of NATO) who is in charge of making Many European Governments increase this sum. The message for the Hungarian audience in this speech is to increase the budget for defense in line with other European governments. By displaying the need for this action in P1, the speaker makes his demand less direct (than using, e.g., the second person), which results in an indirect request in the place of a direct obligation.

6 Term by Said (1978). Mills defines ‘othering’ as “The process whereby the inhabitants of colonized countries are represented in negative and degrading ways and often generalised about as if they were all the same” (Mills 2004: 146). Currently the term is used in a broader sense, often in connection to contemporary modes of colonization, such as cultural or financial colonization.

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The P1 referent NATO Member States in the intersection of the ‘EU’ and the ‘Others’ referent sets appears in two British speeches: in the speech of Jack Straw, British Foreign Secretary, delivered in Budapest in 2002 and in Tony Blair, Prime Minister of the UK’s speech at the Hague in 1998. Both occurrences cast the NATO Member States collective in a positive light, as performers of actions that either reflect progress or help to achieve goals: (86) And, through the newly established NATO-Russia Council, we are now working with the Russians to pursue common projects in a number of fields as equal partners – an unthinkable prospect just a few years ago. (Source: British corpus, speech 10) (87) We willingly pay the price of pooled sovereignty in defence, for the greater prize of collective security through NATO. (Source: British corpus, speech 7)

Although both examples (86) and (87) are related to European states in NATO, it is only in (88) that the European NATO Member States (or NATO Member States in ESDP) referent collective has a noun-phrase as its cataphor: (88) There are two linked challenges to EU and NATO states in ESDP. The first is to agree a mature relationship between the EU and NATO – a true partnership in crisis management. Following months of negotiation, we now seem closer to finalising the arrangements fixing the participation of the non-EU European Allies in ESDP, and allowing EU access to NATO's planning and assets – the so called ‘Berlin Plus’. But we are not there yet, and it has taken longer than we would have liked. (Source: British corpus, speech 10)

The NATO Member States in ESDP collective in example (88) is represented as being in the state of having a yet unreached goal. Thus, this example implicitly operates with the commonplace metaphor of ‘being on the track’, signaling that even though the designed arrangements are not yet reached, the P1 collective is already progressing towards reaching them. P1 referents to The EU and the US occur in Tony Blair, Prime Minister of the UK’s Message to Poland on Joining the EU in 2003: (89) The United States, in turn, can recognise that the European dilemma is that of wanting to be America’s partner not its servant. Part of Europe believes the only alternatives are subservience or rivalry. Yet just in the past few weeks, the United States has reached out a long

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way to recognise the concerns of others. In the United Nations we have come back together. (Source: British corpus, speech 14)

The speech where (89) occurs is strongly contextualized by the Iraq crisis as it was delivered shortly after the war in Iraq was officially declared as completed by the President of the United States. Both the UK and Poland supported the US intervention in Iraq with invasion troops (and with contribution to the coalition troops later on). Since both Poland and the UK supported the US in Iraq, they were met with disagreement by many other European states. The fact that the P1 collective (The EU and the US) is shown as having “come back together” along with the statement that the US “has reached out a long way to recognize the concerns of others” suggests that the UK and Poland are on the ‘right side’ of this disagreement. Consequently, example (89) is supposed to build a sense of community with the UK for the Polish listeners; furthermore, it is supposed to evoke in them the feeling of being right in their views. The referent Europeans supporting the United States is used in connection to the same issue as The EU and the US referent and it appears in the same speech (in Tony Blair, Prime Minister of the UK’s Message to Poland on Joining the EU in 2003): (90) There are those who believe the USA is fundamentally, culturally and politically different to Europe, is hellbent on hegemony and we should distance ourselves. These are not the points of view of evil people. They are perfectly decent, well motivated people with whom we happen to disagree. And they represent one part of the European debate and that debate continues. When Poland, as with Britain becomes part of the European Union that debate then affects you directly. (Source: British corpus, speech 14)

Example (90) operates with othering. In this example others are articulated as not evil, yet their views are made to appear as unrealistic, as something that Europeans supporting the United States disagree with. Thus, these others are not to be defeated but rather to be won over. This makes the P1 collective (including the UK and Poland) represented as ‘being right’ in their view (in contrast to the others, who are wrong).

Referents in the Hungarian corpus The Hungarian corpus contains two referents in the intersection of the ‘EU’ and the ‘Others’ referent sets that did not appear in the other two

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corpora. These referents are the International community and Contributors to the debate/participants of the speech occasion. The referent to the International community appears in a different light from Europe and the International community in the British speeches, although the two could be interpreted as the same entity since both turn up in connection to NATO and both entities involve the EU (or EU member states). Yet, in the British speeches Europe and the International community distinguishes Europe from the international community since this collective is used to gather support for military action against terrorism (in line with the interests of the US and the ‘developed countries’) from the European audience. Thus, naming Europe separately has the ideological function of interpellation. In contrast to the British usage of this referent, when the International community P1 referent is used in the Hungarian corpus, the speakers focus more on constructing an image for Hungary as a member and a supporter of this International community; witness example (91): (91) I have to tell you that we, on our side, could not have been more understanding and supportive of action. The fact that the international community did in the end start to act gave us a comforting thought. […] Fourth, although I myself warned you of being optimistic too soon, we can say that by and large, the tactics of NATO have proven to be successful. In the light of the recent events, we can risk to say that the use of airpower is capable of attaining the political goals we set to ourselves. Many criticised NATO in this intervention, and true, it is most disheartening to see people suffer by the mistakes in the air attacks. Yet, the strategy is proving successful. (Source: Hungarian corpus, speech 2)

Example (91) expresses the support of the Hungarian Government for the International community in connection to the NATO campaign in Serbia. Hungary was a new member of NATO at the time of this speech, and it must have been important for the Hungarian Government to take a stand by NATO in connection to a war so close to Hungarian borders. Identification with the international (NATO) campaign in this situation also meant identification with the EU (paid by sacrificing good relations with neighboring Serbia). Aside from example (91), other occurrences of the International community P1 referent also appear in the same speech and represent the P1 collective as in need of working out a solution in Kosovo. All of these occasions strengthen the picture of Hungary as a capable and potent member of the international community, and they probably help the country to a better perspective of EU membership.

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P1 referents to Contributors to the debate / participants of the speech occasion appear in two speeches in Viktor Orbán, Hungarian Prime Minister’s Contribution to the Debate on the Future of Europe and in Péter Medgyessy, Hungarian Prime Minister’s Speech at the Munich Economic Summit. In both speeches these referents index representatives of EU member states and other states (mainly EU applicant states). In the Speech at the Munich Economic Summit, the Contributors to the debate/participants of the speech occasion collective is featured as a mental senser, i.e., as agreeing, seeing and thinking about issues: (92) Finally let me say a few words about the economy and economic policy. It is my conviction that we agree on this all that the key success is a functioning economy. We can all see that Europe is full of countries and companies without exception that the fairly expensive state operates the expensive social systems. Reform is unavoidable. And I also want to emphasize here, that the basic condition for stability is change. (Source: Hungarian corpus, speech 7)

A closer look at example (92) reveals that the P1 collective in this sequence is used by the speaker to make his statements, such as “the key success is a functioning economy” or “Europe is full of countries and companies without exception that the fairly expensive state operates the expensive social systems” indirect and to justify their validity by claiming them to be consensually based. Thus, the mental senser role of the P1 collective is used here for rhetorical purposes, i.e., for displaying these statements as if they had been based on a consensus. The Contributors to the debate / participants of the speech occasion P1 collective in the Contribution to the Debate on the Future of Europe appears as a verbal actor: (93) Let us just recall the heroes of Berlin, Budapest, Prague and Warsaw; these peoples have repeatedly tried to shake off internal and external dictatorship, but their lonely struggles were doomed to fail. By the last decade of the century they had managed to accumulate enough strength to regain their freedom one after the other, the freedom and independence of which they had been deprived for nearly half a century. It was this victory that made it possible that here and now we may talk about the reunification of Europe and the future of Europe as a whole. (Source: Hungarian corpus, speech 1)

The verbal act in example (93) is expressed via low level modality (by the modal auxiliary ‘may’). Thus, ‘talking about the reunification of Europe’ is only a possibility for the P1 collective. What is more, this possibility is

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made available for them by the ‘victory’ of Eastern and Central European countries (especially East-Germany, Hungary, the former Czechoslovakia and Poland) that they achieved by dismantling their former communist regimes and rid themselves of Soviet influence. As the speaker is a representative of Hungary (one of the countries mentioned as making the possibility of talking about reunification available), this sequence also functions to gain credit from the German audience for the role Hungary played in contemporary European history. Thus example (93) also attempts to establish a position for the Hungarian representatives to participate in the discussion about European reunification on equal grounds with the existing EU member states (and other European countries), based on the role mentioned above.

Referents in the Finnish corpus The Finnish corpus does not contain any referents in the intersection of the ‘EU’ and the ‘Others’ sets that do not occur in the other two corpora. Consequently, (except for the P1 referents to ‘Europeans’) there are no such issues discussed in the Finnish speeches where the Finnish representatives use a hybrid ‘EU and another entity’ perspective to gain support for their goals. As became evident from the British and the Hungarian speeches, the ‘EU and Others’ P1 referents are most frequently used in connection to issues where it is important to help an inconsistent EU audience identify with a perspective of an ‘other entity’ supported by the state of the representative (e.g., the US in the Iraq intervention or the NATO in Serbia). Thus, the fact that there are no specific P1 referents in the Finnish speeches in this intersection is perhaps due to the lack of importance of such foreign policy issues for Finland between 1998 and 2004, or, alternatively, it may as well be rooted in the ‘peace negotiator’ image of Finland.

Intersection of the ‘Country’ and the ‘Others’ referent sets Most of the referents in the intersection of the ‘Country of the speaker’ and the ‘Others’ referent sets appear in bilateral speeches. Besides referring to bilateral entities, some referents clearly indicate entities of special interest for the countries of the representatives; these referents are: Coalition against Iraq in the British speeches, New Members of the EU, EU Applicant countries and Central and Eastern Europe in the Hungarian speeches and The Baltic Sea region in the Finnish speeches. In the

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following I discuss these referents prior to the bilateral referents that occurred in this intersection.

Referents in the British corpus The Coalition against Iraq referent appears in a speech delivered in Poland by Tony Blair, British Prime Minister: (94) Britain and Poland, along with many others in Europe supported action in Iraq; and in our case fought in Iraq. We are happy to help shoulder the burden. But to be fair, so did France and Germany support the action in Afghanistan; and in Kosovo. France may have disagreed with what we did in Iraq; but it is at the forefront of those wanting to build up European defence capability. It is not against using force; but was against this particular use of force. (Source: British corpus, speech 14)

The P1 referent in this example is ambiguous and it can also be categorized as a bilateral referent (as it appeared in a bilateral speech). The P1 pronoun ‘we’ in the text can either index all contributors of the intervention in Iraq or it can refer to Britain and Poland (among the contributors), since the previous referents of P1 index the collective of these two countries. Thus, the fact that Britain and Poland both took part in the Coalition against Iraq is an important aspect in using this collective as a referent in a speech delivered by a British representative in Poland. The P1 collective is represented in this example as an actor of an action that others disagree with. By this, members of the P1 collective, such as Britain and Poland, appear to be even further united as they are contrasted to a group of others (supposedly Germany and France). However, this group of others is described as having the same perspective as the P1 collective, except for one single particular situation (the military intervention in Iraq). Consequently, these others are not constructed as ‘enemies’ but as ‘allies with minor disagreements’. Representing Germany and France as ‘enemies’ could not have been possible under the global political situation of the time of the speeches, since both Germany and France were allied with Britain and Poland in the NATO and in the (future) European Union. Yet, expressing their general consent to the British and the Polish approach on the ‘war on terrorism’ serves to justify the validity of the British and Polish position in general.

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Referents in the Hungarian corpus The New Members of the EU referent indexes EU applicant states in the future. It occurs in János Martonyi, Hungarian Foreign Minister’s Speech on the Future of Europe at an informal meeting of foreign ministers of the European Union in 2001. In this speech New members of the EU appear as beneficiaries of material processes: (95) The most appropriate forum to prepare the IGC seems to be a body submitting to the Conference options and alternatives, serving as a basis for the final political decisions to be taken – obviously – by the member states of the Union. The Convent may be the pattern which can give us the fullest possible participation. Any other forum would offer us a more restricted, rather formal and less substantive way to contribute. In 2004 we may, already together, take important steps towards a new Europe, towards creating a future Constitution. (Source: Hungarian corpus, speech 8)

As demonstrated in this example, a beneficiary role is only articulated (via modal verbs) as a future possibility. Thus, the actions expressed by the verbs (‘give the fullest possible participation’ and ‘offer a way’) do not appear as happenings but as requested actions. Consequently, this example functions as an indirect request for taking part in the Convent in the name and for the benefit of the New Members of the EU. The referent EU applicant countries appears in a speech delivered by Viktor Orbán, Hungarian Prime Minister at the congress Europe 2000: a Union for the Citizens. A Union with Global Responsibilities: (96) What a funny twist of fate that something Hungarians pursued for five hundred years was accomplished eight years after the democratic changes. And our integration in Europe, something we had until the Second World War, something that was a natural part of our life, still seems to be out of reach. I think Hanna Suchocka is still right in what she said that since 1990, we are continuously five years away from EU-membership. (Source: Hungarian corpus, speech 2)

At the beginning of this example, the speaker uses P1 pronouns to refer to Hungarians. However, he assigns the final critical statement (“we are continuously five years away from EU-membership”) to Hanna Suchocka, the former Prime Minister of Poland. Consequently, as Hanna Suchocka is represented as the sayer of this statement, the P1 subject pronoun (‘we’) indexes the EU applicant Eastern and Central European countries (or Hungary and Poland as a less likely alternative). The EU applicant

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countries P1 collective in this example is articulated as not being able to reach their goals (EU-membership) or progress towards them. Since it was not stated that the postponement exists because of some kind of a disability of this collective, it can be interpreted as an indirect accusation of others who prevent EU applicant countries from reaching their goals. These others could then be identified as the ‘EU leadership’, since they postponed the dates of EU accession for many of these countries. The fact that the statement about the delay of EU accession is performed by an outer source (namely, Hanna Suchocka) reassured its function as an accusation, since it indicates that the speaker does not claim responsibility for it but rather attributes this statement to someone else. Moreover, assigning this statement to an outer source makes it seem more objective and less personal. The P1 referent Central and Eastern Europe is used in a speech at the Munnich Economic Summit in 2003 by Péter Medgyessy, Prime Minister of Hungary: (97) But we should also look at Central and Eastern Europe. In thirteen years, changes worth of a hundred of years have been implemented. Of course, these changes were made by force, we had no other choice than to adapt quickly. Quick change also meant that there was a necessity for mobility. This opens the question what can Central Europe contribute to the European way of thinking. I believe – and this is not a distinction between old and new Europe – that these countries can contribute through dynamism. Simply because these countries were forced to learn dynamism. (Source: Hungarian corpus, speech 7)

Central and Eastern Europe in this example is represented as being forced to reform. Although, the motivation for this dynamic reform in this region is described as coming from outside, the P1 community is still represented as being able to face the challenge of making up ‘a hundred years leeway’ and successfully accomplishing this task. This experience then gives an advantage to Central and Eastern Europe over its counter-collective, a collective of those who had the ‘hundred years advantage’ and needed not to reform, i.e., Western Europe. Consequently, in this example Central and Eastern Europe is represented as a ‘possessor of knowledge’ and a valuable part of the union of East and West in the ER5.

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Referents in the Finnish corpus The only specific (i.e., not bilateral) P1 referent in the intersection of the ‘Country of the speaker’ and the ‘Others’ referent sets in the Finnish corpus is The Baltic Sea region. Naturally, this referent appears in a speech delivered in a Baltic State (in 2002 by Jari Vilén, Finnish Minister of Foreign Trade): (98) Opportunities for enlarged cooperation will now exist within the framework of the Union. The concept of security is different for the Baltic Sea region today from what it was a decade ago. The perceived threats are no longer military. Instead we are confronted by common environmental concerns. We can also work constructively to prevent organized crime: such as drugs, prostitution, trafficking in humans, stolen cars and the spread of transmissible diseases: HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis. (Source: Finnish corpus, speech 13)

The Baltic Sea region appears in this example as bound together by common threats of environmental and criminal issues that can be overcome by cooperation in this region. Thus, EU membership for the Baltic countries represents an opportunity for this area to act as a region and cooperate with Finland. Therefore, the issues mentioned above help to establish The Baltic Sea region collective as a part of the future EU.

Bilateral referents Bilateral referents occur in speeches delivered at bilateral meetings of government representatives. In these speeches the audiences consist of representatives of only one member state or applicant state that is different from the state of the speaker. The fact that there were no bilateral speeches in the Hungarian corpus may be due to the political strategy of Hungary at the time of the ER5 process. Although there were bilateral meetings between Hungarian representatives and representatives of EU member states during this period, these were usually framed as meetings to ‘discuss experiences’. As a basic communicative strategy of the Hungarian governments during the ER5, Hungary communicated all of its official statements about enlargement to a wider EU audience. The British corpus In the British corpus, there are six collectives that occur in bilateral speeches and index an entity connected to Britain and the states of the

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audience. These collectives are: Britain and Estonia, Britain and Germany, Britain and Hungary, Britain and Italy, Britain and the Netherlands and Britain and Poland. Most of the bilateral referents in the British corpus are indexing Britain and Poland even though the total numbers of words in British speeches delivered for Polish audience are only the fourth highest (this amount was preceded by the numbers of words in speeches delivered for German, Hungarian and Dutch audiences7). The dominance of Britain and Poland over the rest of bilateral referents is significant (p = 0.001 for the difference between the frequency of Britain and Poland over the second most frequently used bilateral Britain and Estonia referents using twotailed McNemar tests). Although all of the Britain and Poland referents occur in the one speech delivered in Poland – thus the personal style of the speaker and the setting can have an influence on the outcome of the statistical analysis – the results still may signal that Poland and the Polish audience had a special importance for the British representatives in the ER5. The speech where all the Britain and Poland P1 referents occur is delivered by Tony Blair, Prime Minister of the UK at the First Congress of the Polish Forum for the Lisbon Strategy in Warsaw. P1 referents to Britain and Poland appear most frequently when the speaker is talking about ‘NATO (and about EU defense)’ or ‘the debate’ about a more or a less centralized EU and its relationship to the US. The fact that collective referents to Britain and Poland appear in connection to these topics (and not, e.g., in connection to ‘economic reform and globalization’ and ‘the opportunities and challenges of the EU’ which are the two other main topics discussed in the speech) reveals a British intention to have Poland allied with the UK in the three abovementioned issues (namely, a common European defense, the structural build-up of the EU and its relationship with the US). This displays that Britain probably considered Poland more as a military and political ally than an economic partner in the ER5. The following example displays the Britain and Poland collective in connection to the debate about a more centralized EU and its relationship to the US:

7

The two British speeches delivered in Germany contained 5,299 words, the two British speeches delivered in Hungary contained 4,799 words, the one British speech delivered in the Netherlands contained 3,961 words, the one British speech delivered in Poland contained 3,771 words, the one British speech delivered for an Italian audience contained 2,422 words and the one British speech delivered in Estonia contained 1,926 words.

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Chapter Six (99) For Poland as with Britain, our strategy should be: get in it, make the most of it, have the confidence to win the debate not be frightened by it. Do we believe that the Europe our people want is a Europe of nations not a federal superstate? Yes. Do we believe Europe must reform economically to succeed? Yes. Do we believe Europe and the USA should be allies? Yes. Are our arguments good ones? Yes. Can we win the debate? It’s up to us. But great nations don’t hide away or follow along, stragglers at the back. They lead. They win. (Source: British corpus, speech 14)

The speaker in (99) acts as the mouthpiece of the Britain and Poland collective and answers his own (rhetorical) questions about the beliefs of this collective in their name. He represents Britain and Poland as possibly capable of leading the official opinion in the EU on the relationship with the US, on centralization, etc. However, this possibility implies that (Britain and) Poland should do something to win the debate on these issues. Consequently, this example functions as an indirect request for action from the audience (who are representatives of Poland). It is interesting to compare the representation of Britain and Poland with that of Britain and Estonia and Britain and Hungary because all of these index collectives of the UK and an EU applicant state. Thus, they display the similarities and differences of an official British position on the relationship of the United Kingdom and (certain) EU applicant states. Furthermore, contrasting the similarities of these representations with representations of ‘Britain and an EU member state’ might lead to a more detailed understanding of implicit expressions of the British position on EU enlargement. P1 referents to Britain and Estonia turn out in the second highest proportion among bilateral referents in the British corpus. Yet, all of these referents occur in one speech: the British Minister for Europe’s speech at the Estonian Foreign Policy institute. Furthermore, as most of these referents (four out of five cases) occur consecutively, this result cannot be considered a reliable indicator of comparison. The appearance of P1 references to the Britain and Estonia collective in the speech was preceded by the speaker’s compliments on the Estonian economy and his hopes for the cooperation of Britain and Estonia on the economic reform of the EU. For more details about how these topics are articulated in the speech before the Britain and Estonia P1 collective is represented witness (100): (100) I hope that Britain and Estonia can work closely on the EU’s economic reform agenda. Our economic partnership is already impressive, and our trade rose by 35% in the first half of this year. Estonia knows well the benefits of economic reform. It is widely

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recognised as one of the most open markets in Europe. A country with minimal tariffs. A leader among candidates in liberalising its economy. And a pioneer in creating an extensive e-society and egovernment. (Source: British corpus, speech 8)

The example indicates that in contrast to military issues that are the main topics connected to the Britain and Poland collective, Britain considers Estonia a partner in reforming the EU economy. Thus, the British Minister for Europe focuses on business relations between Estonia and the UK. Yet, the time of the speeches may have influenced the difference between the British attitude towards these two countries as the speech in Poland took part shortly after the US-led military intervention in Iraq (20/3/2003– 1/5/2003). Poland supplied one of the largest contingents to this intervention and even took part in the invasion of Iraq (while Estonia, although supporting this operation, sent one of the smallest contingents and even that happened a year later). Therefore, representing Britain and Poland as military allies could have easily been triggered by the current happenings of the time. In contrast to British-Polish relations, the main issue in connection to which the P1 Britain and Estonia collective appears is the EU’s Foreign policy towards its (new) neighbors: (101) We also need to push forward EU thinking on its relations with those countries that will soon become its new neighbours. Britain and Estonia are already working together to spread reform through our triangular UK/Estonia/Georgia projects. We should repeat this excellent example elsewhere. We also need to take forward the EU’s relations with Russia. Estonia and other new Member States have an obvious interest in all these subjects. You are an important voice in this discussion. I hope that Britain and Estonia can work in partnership on all the issues where we find common cause. (Source: British corpus, speech 8)

In three cases out of the four consecutive occurrences of the Britain and Estonia collective, this collective appears as having a median level obligation to do something, such as ‘to push forward EU thinking’, ‘to repeat the success of the economic reform process in the UK/Estonia/Georgia project’ and ‘to improve relations with Russia’. The first two of these cases can be connected to the ideology of ‘spreading democracy’, while the third case (taking forward relations with Russia) is of great interest for Estonia, because of its geopolitical and demographic situation. Consequently, this case was used by Britain to construct common ground with Estonia on the basis of attributing the Estonian

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interest to the Britain and Estonia collective (instead of Estonia). In the fourth case, the speaker expresses hope for future cooperation with Estonia on indefinite future issues. The adverbial of manner ‘in partnership’ in the main clause of the last sentence in this case represents Estonia on equal grounds with Britain in these future issues. In all of the four cases where the Britain and Estonia collective appears, this collective is represented as being capable of (and in the majority of the cases being obliged to) improving the state of certain issues that are political and/or economic rather than military. The fifth occurrence of the Britain and Estonia collective represents the British and Estonian Governments as having the “task of explaining to our people the real, hard benefits of EU enlargement, and the opportunities of EU membership.” Consequently, in this last case, the P1 collective of the British and the Estonian government is contrasted with the citizens of these countries (as the others), who have to be convinced about their governments’ view on enlargement. This construction represents the governments of the two countries as ‘knowing the right thing’ or ‘having the right view’ that must be popularized. P1 referents to Britain and Hungary were very infrequent8 and all of them appear in connection to Hungary’s accession to the EU: (102) And as many of you will know, Britain and Hungary work together in many international organisations from the OSCE to the OECD. And we are joint allies in NATO. British and Hungarian troops support each other in Kosovo, where they are working together to establish freedom and stability. I want us soon to be partners also within the European Union. (Source: British corpus, speech 9)

The first part of this example constructs common ground for the Britain and Hungary collective on the basis of different international organizations within which the two countries work together. By this the speaker represents Britain and Hungary as having similar values (since the OSCD is an economic organization that was founded to deal with economic social and environmental issues, the OSCE is a security oriented organization and the NATO is a military organization). The OSCE was used as an EastWest forum during the Cold War era, and it is often credited for propagating democracy in the former Eastern bloc, while the OECD acts as a showroom for democracy and liberalism as well. Consequently, the common ground for the Britain and Hungary collective is the liberal and 8 There were only two occurrences in two speeches that contained 4,799 words altogether.

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democratic values (that this collective is represented as working for) along with the military alliance in the framework of the NATO. It is interesting to note that when the speaker expresses hope for Hungary to join the EU (and be partners with Britain), he uses the first person singular as opposed to plural (P1). Thus, when uttering this statement, he steps out of his representative role and expresses this hope in a personalized tone. This example is followed by claiming credit for Britain’s support of starting the accession negotiations with Hungary and promising further British support for enlargement: (103) I want us soon to be partners also within the European Union. I spoke in Budapest three years ago when I addressed the National Assembly. I promised then that Britain would launch the accession negotiations with Hungary while Britain was President of the EU. I kept that promise. Today I promise you that Britain will be a champion of enlargement throughout the negotiations. (Source: British corpus, speech 9)

The consistent usage of first person singular in example (103) continues to construct the speaker’s private face (as a trustworthy person) instead of his representative role. By this it functions to claim credit for the British role in EU enlargement for the speaker himself. Yet, this device is also used to claim responsibility in first person singular for the promise in the last sentence. As a result, having this promise placed after constructing a trustworthy face in first person singular increases the credibility of the promise. A comparison of the three representations of collectives that included the UK show that the Britain and Poland collective is constructed more around military alliance, Britain and Estonia is represented as having common economic duties, and Britain and Hungary appears as participating in the same organizations and having the same values (to promote). Yet, along with the different British positions enacted towards these countries, these differences are also motivated by the diverse global political events happening around the time of the speech occasions (e.g., the military intervention in Iraq, which took place after the British speech in Estonia and well after the speech in Hungary). Speeches delivered for a German audience contain the highest number (5,299) of words among the bilateral speeches in the British corpus. The two speeches that belong to the British-German bilateral category are delivered by the same speaker, Jack Straw, UK Minister of Foreign Affairs, and these speeches are rather close to each other temporally. The

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first speech attempts to construct common ground via the Britain and Germany collective on the basis of mutual interest: (104) […] he has been one of Britain’s most consistent champions of a close partnership with Germany. Today this partnership has never been stronger. We may differ on individual aspects of EU policy, but we share a strong commitment on the fundamentals: a reunified Europe which delivers practical benefits to our citizens, be they jobs and investment or cleaner beaches and safer streets. We agree on the importance of Europe having a stronger voice in the world. Today Germany is a pillar of international peacekeeping […]. (Source: British corpus, speech 11)

It is interesting to observe that those issues where the two countries share a commitment according to the speaker are rather general and they are most probably shared by every EU member (and applicant) state. Yet, references to common interest for these two countries (Britain and Germany) were important at the time of this speech as it was delivered shortly before the propaganda for the invasion of Iraq started (in early 2003), which was supported by Britain but opposed by Germany. Since an opposition between these two countries in such a significant issue of the time must have had an influence on their diplomatic relationship, the construction of a common Britain and Germany collective had to be based on general matters. The fact that the quoted text is followed by compliments to Germany for taking part in international peacekeeping and in the mission in Afghanistan supports the theory that there is a possibility for the influence of the Iraq issue on this speech. In the second speech, the Britain and Germany collective appears under the topic heading: “UK-German relations” in the transcribed version of the speech. The first three referents to this collective represent it as doing something (beneficial) as partners, as displayed in example (105): (105) I would first like to pay tribute to the strength of the UK’s partnership with Germany. Together we have taken great strides in developing the European Union and promoting a shared agenda. […] I also welcome the fact that we are working together to avert the very present prospect of conflict between India and Pakistan. I will be travelling to New Delhi and Islamabad later today to urge both parties to exercise restraint. I know that Joschka shares my commitment to getting India and Pakistan to the negotiating table. I also welcome the fact that we are working together in respect of India and Pakistan. (Source: British corpus, speech 12)

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In example (105) the P1 collective is represented as working together. Before each representation of this collective, the speaker uses first person singular. This first person singular ‘leading in’ functions to add a personal tone of preference to the representation of Britain and Germany in cooperation, and it constructs a positive face towards the German audience. Britain and Germany also appear in connection to EU enlargement under the same topic heading in (106): (106) To underpin stability and prosperity throughout Europe, NATO and EU enlargement must proceed hand-in-hand. EU enlargement to eastern, central and southern Europe is one of the biggest challenges currently facing our two countries, not least our diplomats. I know there are difficulties. I understand people’s reservations. But we must hold our nerve. We made promises to the new democracies in 1990. Now is the time to deliver. (Source: British corpus, speech 12)

In example (106) EU enlargement is described as a challenge, where the Britain and Germany collective (that indexes the governments or the diplomats of the two countries) is requested to keep calm and withstand the pressure of British and German citizens in order to proceed with enlargement. Thus, in this example the leadership of the two countries is contrasted with the citizenry. Therefore, a community of British and German leaders is created via implicit othering. Enlargement, in this context is described as a task that must be fulfilled. The obligation to fulfill this task is based on previous promises just as much as on the need to establish stability and prosperity in Europe. Consequently, enlargement here is represented as a necessity for the member states as well as a desire of the applicant states. According to Krzyzanowski (2005: 16–17) representing enlargement in this way is a characteristic of EU mainstream voice. However, the enactment of this mainstream voice does not result in a power position over the immediate audience of the speeches, as they are from another EU member state. Nevertheless, this representation presupposes that enlargement is in the interest of the applicant states only, which construes a dominant discursive power position for the EU 15 or Britain and Germany over EU applicants (as they are the ones in the position to deliver). The Britain and the Netherlands collective appears in a speech delivered in the Netherlands by the newly appointed Prime Minister of the UK, Tony Blair on the occasion of Britain taking over the EU Presidency from Luxembourg (which was preceded by the Dutch EU presidency). Both occurrences of the Britain and the Netherlands collective appear

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consecutively, and they function to build sense of a community via references to common history, trade and global-political interests at the beginning of the speech: (107) Geography and history have made our two countries friends and allies, despite a few little naval misunderstandings in the 17th century. The Second World War brought us particularly close together. Our common trading interests and our common approach to global issues now make us natural partners in almost every area. I am personally determined to turn this into a still closer partnership, working together in the European Union and NATO. (Source: British corpus, speech 7)

In both cases the Britain and the Netherlands collective appears in a second participant role, that is, as affected by others’ actions or other happenings. This results in naturalizing the existence of this collective as such, since the common ground built for the two countries is represented as if it occurred spontaneously, on the basis of ‘outer forces’, such as WWII or current global issues. At this point it is worth mentioning that references to some of these ‘outer forces’ such as WWII as an agent of community building are exclusive in use, i.e., in mainstream public discourse they can only be used between representatives of the allied powers but not, for example, between Britain and Italy or Germany and Finland. P1 referents to Britain and Italy occur in a speech delivered for members of the Italian Chamber of Commerce, and they index either the British and the Italian Government or British and Italian businesses: (108) Our two governments are working more closely than ever before to promote competitiveness and to ensure the New Europe is not a Brussels based superstate but is based upon independent nation states. We will continue to work together with all our EU partners to achieve this aim. (Source: British corpus, speech 13) (109) So enlargement isn’t a gift to the applicants. It’s gift to us as well. But we risk losing out if business doesn’t prepare properly. British and Italian business has no divine right to these benefits. Our global competitors are also after them. And if we don’t take advantage, they will. (Source: British corpus, speech 13)

In (108) the British and the Italian Government is represented as working on making the EU less centralized. This premise contains the supposition that there are certain others who have preferred a more centralized EU. Thus, the cooperative collective of ‘the British and the Italian government’ comes to be created against these others. Yet, this collective appears as

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working together with their ‘EU partners’, which makes the collective constructed alongside the ‘supportive others’ in the EU. Thus, this construction does not explicitly include opposing others. Consequently, the British and Italian position on the structure of the EU is made to appear as a natural and dominant position that is widely supported in the EU (regardless of whether it was the actual case or not at the give moment in the ER5). Example (109) displays the British and Italian businesses collective in a situation in which it needs to act together in order to outplay the competition by others, i.e., the ‘global competitors’. Therefore, this is a contingent collective that appears to be forged by the necessity to avoid losing out on a business opportunity. The opportunity in question was provided by the markets of the applicant countries that could be entered by British and Italian businesses. Hence, the British representatives articulate the EU enlargement in this example as an emerging opportunity instead of a necessity or a duty (which are the two other most common interpretations of this event in the speeches). The Finnish corpus Bilateral referents in the Finnish corpus are indexed as Finland and Austria, Finland and France, Finland and Hungary, Finland and Lithuania and Finland and the Netherlands. The only referent to Finland and Austria is used to construct common ground between the two countries on the basis of their size: (110) I believe we share many common interests, not least in defending small and medium size countries’ interests in a new, united Europe. (Source: Finnish corpus, speech 5)

The ‘common interests of the two countries’ is articulated from a personalized point of view by the use of first person singular, which allows these interests to be expressed as the belief of the speaker. This constructs the speaker’s positive face for the audience, yet it also lightens the factuality of the statement. Referents to Finland and France appear in the speech delivered by President of Finland, Martti Ahtisaari in honor of President Jacques Chirac and Bernadette Chirac in Helsinki in 1999. Most of the referents to this collective articulate the construction of a united Finland and France on the basis of common values said to be shared by the two countries, like example (111):

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Chapter Six (111) Democracy, respect for human rights, the rule of law and the freedom of the individual are part of the foundation of values that we share. […] During the difficult years of the Cold War, the national leaderships of Finland and France were often able to agree on common goals in order to ensure stability in our continent. We were on the side of peace, against war. In the big questions of international politics, we were on the same side. (Source: Finnish corpus, speech 8)

Example (111) is the first occurrence of the Finland and France collective in the speech. Its opening sentence appeals to the general present day values of Western representational democracies as a community building force, while the end of the quote represents the second characteristic textual strategy of community building in the speech. It enacts the commonplace metaphor of the Cold War, which implicates the two countries to have the same values in their vaguely defined recent history. As a result, the reference to the Cold War functions as a historical era of political community construction. Thus, the Finland and France collective is created in terms of common values from an ideological perspective on the recent past. As an alternative to the common values described above, the last occurrence of this collective in the text deals with the future of Finland and France on the basis of not common values but technology: (112) Since the visits of Prime Minister Jospin and Culture Minister Trautman the information society has become one of the most important fields of cooperation between France and Finland. We should have an ability to combine our strengths creatively in various sectors of expertise. One of Finland’s aims during her stint at the helm of the EU will be to present a comprehensive conception of the opportunities that the information society offers and of goals in relation to it. (Source: Finnish corpus, speech 8)

Information society as a basis of cooperation between the two countries is used to introduce the issue as a priority of the Finnish EU presidency (which took place during the second half of 1999). Having it articulated as an issue of common importance (and a building force of the Finland and France community in the future) makes it easier for Finland to gain support from France for prioritizing this issue. The only occurrence of the Finland and the Netherlands collective is constructed alongside common values, just like the Finland and France collective:

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(113) Finland’s links with the Netherlands are centuries-old. They were born of trade, but have gradually evolved on the basis of the values that we share: parliamentary democracy, the rule of law, good administration and respect for human rights. (Source: Finnish corpus, speech 11)

The values mentioned in this example are closely akin to those mentioned as the common ground for the Finland and France collective (the only difference is ‘freedom of the individual’ in the former and ‘good administration’ in the latter case). Yet, the values referred to in both cases were common(place) values of Western representational democracies; furthermore, both speeches were delivered by the same speaker in a comparable setting and close to each other temporally, which may account for the similarities of these collective constructions. Referents to Finland and Hungary also appear in a single speech, delivered by the President of Finland Tarja Halonen on her official visit in Budapest, Hungary in 2002. The first two referents to this collective appear in the speech consecutively and construct this collective in connection to the security of Europe: (114) In a Europe of changes, relations between Finland and Hungary have remained stable and good to an exemplary degree. The environment in which our bilateral relations are conducted will soon expand to include another dimension, the European Union. In our political relations we share a concern about factors that threaten the security of our continent and countries, and we are actively trying to find ways of preventing them. (Source: Finnish corpus, speech 10)

In the first case, the Finland and Hungary collective is represented as a mental senser, a collective that has a common concern about the security threats of its broader environment. The second case features the Finland and Hungary collective as actors of a material process and represents it as an entity that is active in its doings. Example (114) is followed by a sequence that is concerned with the mutual trade of Finland and Hungary. This is used to reassure the Hungarian audience that the bilateral trade of the two countries would be emergent in the future when Hungary would be an EU member state. The third case of the Finland and Hungary referent functions to create common ground for these two countries in a rather uncommon way, on the basis of the separate cultural heritage of the two countries: (115) Alongside language, lively cultural exchange has been one of the cornerstones of the special relationship between our two countries.

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Although in example (115) both Finland and Hungary are represented as separate entities with their own culture, the Finland and Hungary collective (indexed by the object pronoun ‘us’) is created on the basis of similar feelings attached to these cultures (pride), and it is placed in the context of a lively cultural exchange between these two countries. Thus, the third example adds the aspect of cultural exchange to the common ground of the Finland and Hungary collective (alongside the previously discussed security concerns and trade). Referents to Finland and Lithuania all revolve around the idea of (the two governments) working together: (116) We will soon be working together in the Union to develop our common Europe, and to make the Union into an increasingly effective global economic and political actor […]. We have a lot of work to be done. But together in the context of the European Union, we will be able to do it. […] As neighbours across the Baltic Sea, Lithuania and Finland share many common interests. Lithuanian accession to the European Union will bring us into cooperation on an increasing number of important issues. (Source: Finnish corpus, speech 13)

The first and the third example represent Finland and Lithuania as cooperative partners, while the second example indicates that within the EU framework this cooperation would be successful. In all of the three examples the work to be done is placed in the future, after Lithuania’s membership in the EU. Thus, in all three examples (the governments of) the two countries are represented as colleagues in a future EU setting, which representation functions to propagate EU membership for the Lithuanian audience.

CHAPTER SEVEN THE FINDINGS OF THIS STUDY AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR THE DISCURSIVE CONSTRUCTION OF THE FIFTH ENLARGEMENT

The present research project was designed to explore the linguistic articulations of collective identity groups, i.e., the differential voices of us as various political interest groups enacted in official statements by political representatives of three European states in the context of the fifth enlargement round of the EU. Both statistically and qualitatively processed data were adduced to describe the kinds of collectives that emerged in order to illustrate the differences and the similarities between them. As a general tendency, the results show that the linguistic representations of the ‘we’ collectives tend to differ depending on whether they were formed around the EU or the countries of the speaker. Furthermore, in the analysis I find dissimilarities between the three corpora in the ways collective voices appeared in the speeches. In my interpretation of the results I offer a social-political explanation for this tendency. This interpretation is based on the assumption that the abovementioned dissimilarities are relative to the perceived ‘stability’ of the EU status of the particular countries. In other words, the results of my analysis show that the representatives of the oldest EU member state, the UK, identify more frequently with the EU, and they speak from a more dominant discursive position than the Finnish or the Hungarian representatives. Finnish politicians use more a ‘middle ground’ position between identifying with their countries versus the EU. Furthermore, their articulations of collective identities come from a less dominant power position than that of the British speakers. The motivations for such Finnish articulations of collective identities in my understanding are closely linked with the geopolitical position of Finland and the younger member state position of the country. Hungarian collective identity constructions are the most concentrated on national identities and these constructions contain the least amount of linguistic responsibility expressed. I reason that this is due to the applicant state status of Hungary in the ER5. In the following I revisit my explanations in terms of the

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various ideological investments of the linguistic formations of ‘we’ in the speeches. In the second part of the chapter I discuss the possible contributions that this research project makes to the analysis of political discourse and the implications of the results for discursive constructions of collective identities in the ER5.

The main findings and their interpretation In this section I provide a summary of the findings of my linguistic analysis connected to the P1 referent sets carried out in the first round of the analysis. I go on to discuss the contributions of the second analytic round and forge connections to the findings of the two rounds.

Findings in the first analytic round In the first analytic round, I initially categorized the referents of the P1 (i.e. ‘we’, ‘us’ and ‘ourselves’) in the three corpora on the basis of their anaphoric or cataphoric referents. The first round of analysis focused primarily on coding of the data in terms of the semantic fields of the P1 referents in order to establish the network of categories informing the corpora. Figure 1 (on p. 50) displays the division of categories into main referent sets of P1 and their subsets. At the same time, I carried out the calculation of the statistical significance of the distribution of the main referent categories across three corpora. I used quantitative methods to find the general tendencies of P1 collective constructions in the speeches with the help of which I could legitimize the comparisons I drew across the three corpora. In addition, I also analyzed the process types of the verbs connected to the referent sets and subsets of P1 and calculated the statistical significance of the differences between the most common process types performed by the main P1 referent categories of ‘EU’ and ‘Country’. Below I summarize the findings of this analysis. General referents Frequent general referent usage is considered to result in a more cautious language use. The reason for this tendency is generally believed to consist in its rhetorical effect of producing less responsibility marked for the actions performed by a general subject (i.e., a subject that could be identified as ‘everyone’ or ‘mankind’, etc.) than would be the case for a definite subject (i.e., a subject with a particular referent such as the ‘we’

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that can be identified through anaphora/cataphora as ‘the Hungarian government’, etc.). General P1 referents are used most frequently in the Hungarian speeches. Therefore, in my interpretation of this feature I suggest that Hungarian speakers try most frequently to avoid responsibility for the actions marked by the verbs, mitigating the potential negative value judgments of the immediate audience of the speeches. From a political point of view, such an interpretation may signal Hungary’s political and economic dependency on the listeners’ judgment. If this interpretation of the data is correct, my results can be said to indicate that the concern of suitability of Hungary as an applicant country comes to shape the discourse strategies of avoidance enacted by the speeches of its representatives. The main referent sets Referents of P1 indexing the European Union appear in the highest proportion in the British corpus whereas the lowest proportion of P1 indexing the European Union occur in the Hungarian corpus. Referents of P1 indexing the countries of the speakers show a reverse order as the highest proportion of this referent set can be found in the Hungarian and in the Finnish corpus (with no statistically significant difference between the two). These results indicate a correlation between the duration of EU membership of each country and the frequencies of the P1 referents to the EU/their countries. In my interpretation I question whether this correlation simply implies a direct causal relationship between the two factors. However, I still find it highly probable that Hungary’s status as an applicant country influences referent categories of P1 pronouns in the Hungarian corpus. The reason for this is that the representative function of the Hungarian speakers is in most cases limited to being representatives of their own country making claims to entry to the EU in the ER5. Therefore, in my view the Hungarian results reflect the political status of being a representative of an EU applicant state in terms of the strategic choices of pronominal references to collective identity constructions. As far as the frequency results of the main P1 referent sets of the ‘EU’ and the ‘Country’ in the British corpus are concerned, I find it very likely that the British speakers are more accustomed to speaking from the position of the Union than the Finnish, let alone the Hungarian speakers, are. Moreover, when addressing representatives of applicant states, such as Hungary, they are speaking in their capacity as representatives of the EU to their audience. Thus, to some extent there may be an influence not only of the duration of EU membership reflected in the British results but the

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status that comes implicated in relation to this duration as well. Being representatives of a country that is an EU member state since 1973, the British politicians are indirectly positioned to be ‘the state that has met the requirements before the other two’ and hence legitimate gate-keepers of membership for the others. This in turn can allow them to position themselves explicitly as the ‘we’ who is more committed to the union as a political project. Additionally, the strategy of representing our collective identity as the EU also may provide a good opportunity for the British speakers to establish a common ground with all the other countries participating in the enlargement discourse. From a critical perspective, this complex strategy of representing the EU as one’s collective ‘we’ serves to legitimize the functioning of the Union on terms of the member countries of status holders. Krzyzanowski (2005) calls this collective voice in EU political discourse the ‘mainstream voice’ of ‘we, the EU’. He argues that when used in relation to the nonmainstream voices of others, like the Hungarian or other applicant ‘we’-s, this EU mainstream voice signals a dominant power position, one that is marked for the relatively highest degree of status temporarily available in the political institution. Since many of the British speeches were (at least partially) directed to representatives of EU applicant states, the fact that British politicians identify with the EU the most frequently in my reading signals a twofold discursive strategy. Not only does it signal that they are already within the EU and thus are entitled to judge the performance of the applicants on behalf of this EU ‘we’ but at the same time it also signals an internal power differentiation within the EU. They also position themselves as more dominant in their discourse than, for instance, the Finnish representatives of the same institution when addressing the applicant countries. And the ‘middle ground’ position of the Finnish data in terms of the lower ratio of ‘EU’ versus a higher figure of ‘country of the speaker’ does support this reading. In the Finnish speeches, I find the high proportion of P1 references to the country of the speaker to be rooted in the fact that in the Finnish corpus there are more speeches about the position of the speakers’ country (i.e., Finland) within the EU than about common EU matters. A possible explanation of this specificity may be grounded in the influence of Finland being a younger EU member state and as such not as committed to the European project yet. However, I find this explanation less probable in the light of the speeches analyzed. Perhaps a more feasible reason for the Finnish results regarding the distribution of the ‘EU’/’Country of the speaker’ main referent sets of P1 can lie in the geopolitical position of Finland. Its cultural, demographic or geographic peripheral status in the

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EU probably call for more frequent constructions of Finnish national identities in European political discourse than for EU identifications. However, differences between the Finnish and the Hungarian corpus in terms of referents of P1 indexing the European Union show that the Finnish corpus contains several speeches in which the Finnish speakers act as representatives of the EU for representatives of applicant states. Yet such speech situations do not occur so often as in the case of the British corpus, which contains more speeches of representatives addressing admission countries. The process types connected to first participants of the main referent sets In all three corpora, collective identity groups connected to the EU were performers of mainly material processes. They are represented in the texts as actors ‘taking’, ‘challenging’, ‘achieving’, ‘doing’, ‘making’, etc. Therefore, the ‘we, the EU’ collective is constructed more as ‘doers of practical activities’ in contrast to the ‘we, the country’ collective that is most frequently represented as sensers of mental processes, such as ‘perception’ ‘thinking’, ‘feeling’, ‘needing’, etc. As the ‘we, the country’ referent set in the three corpora is used more frequently to express thoughts, beliefs and feelings than the ‘we, the EU’ referent set, the national collectives of ‘we’ come to be constructed more on the grounds of intellectual and emotional properties than the acting and, therefore, by inference the more reason oriented ‘we, the EU’ collective. The fact that the speakers, regardless of their national background, all make a contrast between representing a practical, activity and success centered EU and an intellectual, perception, thinking and feeling centered country of their own, can be the expression of the ideological investment of the apparent complementarity of the process types. The division of labor between the EU and its constituent countries may result in the perception of the EU more as a practical/bureaucratic institution, a tool for achieving certain political, economic or other goals that are to be reflected upon and to be committed to by the constituent states. In fact, the complementary distribution of the process types rearticulates a neo-conservative perception of political struggle over power, which comes to be reduced to matters of ‘practical management’ of governance. This reading of the figures also seems to be reinforced by the fact that it is the British corpus that has the highest frequency of ‘we, the EU’ referents, the potential participants marked for the role of ‘actor’. Their speakers’ identification with the EU can serve purposes of domination both internally (see the difference between the British and the Finnish corpora in figure 2 on p. 52)

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and over the applicant states represented by the Hungarian corpus in my data. In contrast to representations of ‘we, the EU’, EU citizens can attach more emotional properties of collectivity to their own countries than to the EU based on the influence of the representative function of politicians on the collective identities of the members of the society.

Findings in the second analytic round In the second analytic round, I investigated the referent subsets and intersections that invited an analysis of more of a single-case based qualitative nature. The reason for this was that certain subsets and intersections had so different textual functions in the three corpora that there was little point in comparing them based on a statistics driven approach. These subsets include the so-called specific subsets in figure 1 on p. 50 (namely, the ‘EU specific’ subset and the ‘Country of the speaker specific’ subset) and the intersections of the main sets (namely, the intersection of the ‘EU’ referent set and the ‘Others’ set, the intersection of the ‘Country of the speaker’ referent set and the ‘Others’ referent set, and the intersection of the ‘EU’ referent set and the ‘Country of the speaker’ referent set). The EU specific referents Referents in the ‘EU specific’ subset illustrate the complexity of the representations of the speakers’ perceived collective EU identities. In the British corpus, the EU specific voice appears via self-representations of the following collectives: EU members states, EU member states in NATO, Member states in the enlarged EU, New member states and the EU 15, Western Europe, The EU 15, The national Governments of the EU 15, European governments, EU politicians, An imaginary EU nation, The current EU generation, and Europeans supporting the US. In the Finnish corpus, collectives that are represented by an EU specific voice are the following: The EU 15, EU member states, EU member and candidate states, Other EU countries, Northern regions of the EU, The European family and EU participants in enlargement discourse. In the Hungarian corpus, only two collectives appear through the EU specific voice; these are: The enlarged EU and Nations in the EU. The only self-representation which occurs in all of the three corpora in the ‘EU specific’ referent set is ‘we, EU member states’. Yet, this collective appears differently in the three corpora, which is partly due to the different topical setup of the speeches and partly to the political

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positions of the three countries on EU enlargement. In the British corpus, ‘we, EU member states’ occurs as benefitting from the existence of the EU. Hence, the EU here is represented as a tool used in order to realize the goals of EU member states. A similar approach is reflected in the Finnish speeches in the representation of this collective. Here, EU enlargement is articulated as an opportunity to pursue the goals (such as expanding prosperity, democracy and human rights) of EU member states. In the Hungarian speeches, however, ‘we, EU member states’ appears in connection to national culture and traditions and particularly in connection to the preservation of Hungarian national culture and traditions in the future EU. This occurrence, although it is statistically not significant, could still be a signal of a different attitude to the EU and EU enlargement from the part of Hungary as an applicant state. The Hungarian position in this case appears as being more conscious of the threats that come with EU enlargement, while the British and Finnish positions focus on the opportunities provided by it. This difference can be rooted in the different audiences targeted by the message of these speeches. The Hungarian speech in which this collective occurs was delivered to the foreign ministers of the EU, whereas one of the British speeches featuring this referent was delivered bilaterally to a Polish audience, while the pertinent Finnish speech was delivered at the signing of the accession treaty. In this sense both the Finnish and the British speeches are designed to encourage EU enlargement (therefore they focus on the opportunities what the EU represents) for the applicant countries while the Hungarian speech is employed to argue for a better Hungarian position in the future EU in terms of national culture, etc. Although there are no more EU specific referents that are shared in the three corpora, shared features in different corpora can be found in the ways the EU specific groups are represented. One of these shared features is already mentioned as the representation of the EU (or EU enlargement) as a tool, which is common to the British and the Finnish speeches. Another shared feature between these two corpora is the construction of common ground with the audience of the speeches on the basis of EU membership. A third feature that appears both in the British and the Finnish corpus was the representation of ‘we, the EU 15’ or ‘we, Western Europe’ in the role of possessors of peace, stability and democracy with an intention to spread these values. As discussed in chapter six, this self representation implicitly involves a construction of EU applicant others in a dependent, therefore less powerful, position. EU specific referents limited to one corpus usually reflect the influence of the immediate context of the speeches or topical influence. Yet, some of

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these referents indicate the broader political interests of the country of the speaker in relation to the EU. One of such referents is Europeans supporting the US in a British speech delivered in Poland, which (as both Britain and Poland supported the US in the military intervention in Iraq) is used to propagate the British position on the intervention in Iraq along with constructing common ground with the Polish audience. In the Finnish corpus, Northern regions of the EU appears in a similar specific position. This referent functions to credit the ‘South’, Slovenia in particular, for being interested in the Northern regions of the EU. Yet, by representing this collective to the Slovenian audience, the Finnish President construes a ‘Northern European entity’ in contrast to the ‘South of Europe’. As a result, the (in a discursive sense, previously not existing) Northern European entity is presented as a possible topic or a target of future interest. Therefore, this discursive construction could be perceived as a tool for gaining attention for the ‘North of the EU’ in the future. In the Hungarian corpus, there is no such ‘EU specific’ referent that did not occur in the other two corpora. On the one hand, this is probably caused by the fact that Hungary was not an EU member state at the time of the speeches; therefore, these speeches lack detailed representations of ‘we, the EU’. The smallest number of words in the Hungarian corpus may have also contributed to these results in a technical sense. Yet, as described earlier in the discussion of EU specific referents that occur in more than one corpus, there are instances of Hungarian speakers representing an EU specific entity. In these representations Hungarian representatives use an EU specific voice which resembles the ‘EU specific’ voices in the other two corpora in terms of the identification of the speaking ‘we’. However, this resemblance is not entirely similar as the Hungarian EU specific voice differs from the ‘EU specific’ voices enacted in the British and the Finnish corpus in its function. The reason for this is that it is used as a channel of statements about the Hungarian national position on certain matters in the enlarged EU in contrast to being the vehicle of EU community building. The Country specific referents Country specific referents function to represent the speakers’ countries in more detailed ways. They achieve this by speaking in the name of the various P1 collectives which they use to represent their countries. However, country specific collectives appear rather infrequently in the speeches, and this is most probably due to the topic of EU enlargement. Consequently, EU enlargement in all three corpora is more or less

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described in the context of the relationship of countries and the EU as opposed to the relationship of specific national collectives and the EU. The results show that the British speakers are the least detailed in terms of representations of country specific collectives. The five occurrences in this corpus all indicate one country specific referent, British supporters of the EU. In opposition to their results for country specific referents, British speakers are representing EU specific groups the most frequently out of the three corpora (as was discussed above). Therefore, it seems that the results of the second round of analysis support the results of the first round in terms of the differences of EU mainstream voice used in the three corpora. Although both the Finnish and the Hungarian corpus contain ‘country specific’ referents in a slightly higher proportion than the British corpus, these are often contextual (e.g., the referent Finnish delegation in Hungary) or occur consecutively in the same speech (e.g., the referent Hungarian society and organizations). Referents in the ‘Country specific’ subset of the Finnish corpus are the following: Finnish Government, Parliament and administration, Finnish delegation in Hungary, and Finns who are not farmers. All of these referents occur in speeches delivered to applicant states, and the majority of them are used in giving detailed information to these applicant states about EU membership (N.B. the exception being the Finnish delegation in Hungary, which is used to express gratitude for the Hungarian hosts). Thus, it seems that in their more detailed representations of their countries Finnish politicians are somewhat motivated by communicating the Finnish experiences of EU enlargement towards applicant states. In the Hungarian corpus, there are two country specific referents: the Hungarian nation and Hungarian society and organizations, although these occur somewhat more frequently than country specific referents in the Finnish speeches. Both of these referents are used to pursue Hungarian interests or to evoke sympathy for Hungary. Although the ways that country specific referents are used in the three corpora seem to be connected to the three countries’ different foreign policy priorities, farreaching conclusions about these differences cannot be made because of the small numbers of cases. The intersection of the ‘EU’ and the ’Others’ referent sets The only referent in the intersection of the ‘EU’ and the ‘Others’ referent sets that can be found in all three corpora is Europeans. Oftentimes, this referent is used in ambiguous ways, indexing either citizens of the EU or

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citizens of countries in Europe, the continent. This ambiguity helps the speakers to establish a representation of the EU as stronger and more influential than it is. In contrast to the majority of P1 referents to the ‘EU’ (i.e., specific and non-specific EU referents altogether), Europeans are dominantly represented as sensers of mental processes. Thus, Europeans are construed on the lines of intellectual action, going against the tendency of a material action centered EU (as shown in chapter five) and their articulations are more like the representations of collectives connected to the speakers’ own countries. However, because of the small number of cases, a comparison of referents to ‘we the EU’ with ‘we, Europeans’ is only speculative. The comparison of the three corpora in terms of referents that are not shared brought much more fruitful results in describing the national differences of the three countries in relation to their positions towards the EU. As the analysis of such corpus specific referents shows, the ‘EU and Others’ set is mostly used to help an inconsistent EU audience identify with the perspective of an ‘other entity’ supported by the state of the representative (e.g., the US in their Iraq intervention or NATO in Serbia). Such ‘other’ entities are more commonly found in the British and in the Hungarian corpus than in the Finnish corpus. Thus, representatives of these two countries more often support issues in the interest of a different entity than the EU itself. The British corpus contains the largest variation of referents in the intersection of the ‘EU’ and the ‘Others’ referent sets. P1 referents that belonged here are Europe, Europe and the International community, Many European Governments, NATO Member States, NATO Member States in ESDP, The EU and the US and Europeans supporting the United States. Most of these referents are used to gain popularity for the British position either on the intervention in Iraq (e.g., the Europe and the international community referent) or in supporting the US (e.g., the EU and US and the Europeans supporting the United States referents). Further referents are also used for enacting indirect requests in order to pursue British interests (e.g., the Many European Governments referent). As indicated by the abovementioned examples, referents in the intersection of the ‘EU’ and the ‘Others’ referent sets in the British speeches are often used for channeling national interest under the cover of the EU needs/actions. In the Hungarian corpus, there are two referents in the intersection of the ‘EU’ and the ‘Others’ referent sets that do not appear in the other two corpora. These referents are the International community, and Contributors to the debate/participants of the speech occasion. In the majority of the cases these referents are used to create a picture of a Hungary that is EU

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compatible. The speakers attempt to reach this goal either by focusing on constructing a representation for Hungary as a member and a supporter of the international community (in connection to the NATO campaign in Serbia) or gaining credit for the role Hungary played in contemporary European history. Despite the small number of occurrences, referents in this intersection indicate the Hungarian efforts of trying to create a positive image for Hungary for EU audiences. The fewer number of referents in the intersection of the ‘EU’ and the ’Others’ referent sets in the Finnish corpus and the fact that there are no corpus specific ones amongst them result in the Finnish speeches being the most neutral. The reason for this is that in the majority of the cases when Finnish politicians represent the EU, they do not use this discursive position to pursue interests of another entity in order to reach certain goals of Finnish foreign policy. This is perhaps due to the lack of importance of such foreign policy issues for Finland between 1998 and 2004, or it may as well be rooted in the attempt to construe a neutral, ‘peace negotiator’ image of Finland. The intersection of the ‘Country of the speaker’ and the ‘Others’ referent sets Most of the referents in the intersection of the ‘Country of the speaker’ and the ‘Other’ referent sets appear in bilateral speeches. Many of these referents are found in one speech, such as all of the referents to Britain and Poland, Finland and France or Britain and Estonia. Other referents, e.g. Finland and Austria or Finland and the Netherlands, occur only once, which is probably caused by the fact that they are generated by the speech occasions of bilateral speeches. Although the influence of the person of the speaker and the setting of the speeches cannot be disregarded in these cases, still the results indicate that these referents describe important details of the differences in the positions of the speakers’ countries towards other entities. In the British corpus, the majority of bilateral ‘Country and Others’ referents index Britain and Poland even though the total numbers of words in British speeches delivered to a Polish audience are only the fourth highest. Although these referents occur in the one British speech delivered in Poland, it is still highly possible that Poland and the Polish audience had a special importance for the British representatives. As regards the different bilateral collectives in the British corpus, a comparison of their representations shows that the Britain and Poland collective is constructed more around military alliance, Britain and

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Estonia is represented on the basis of their common economic duties, and Britain and Hungary appear as participating in the same organizations and having the same values (to promote). The Britain and Germany collective is based on generalizations about being allies, the Britain and the Netherlands collective has its foundation in discursively created common history and in common trade interests, while the Britain and Italy collective is based on common business opportunities and expectations about the EU. On the basis of these results, it seems that in the British speeches enlargement is propagated for audiences that consist of representatives of applicant states via collectives that contain an applicant state and Britain (the first three collectives discussed). In contrast to this, enlargement is represented as an opportunity (for, e.g., the Italian audience) or a duty (for, e.g., the German audience) for member state audiences via collectives that are made up of an EU member state and Britain. This difference describes well the ways the topic of enlargement is channeled for different audiences by the British politicians in order to popularize enlargement and pursue British interests in the same time. Yet, along with the different position Britain takes towards these countries, the differences described above are rooted in differences in the surrounding global political events around the speech occasions as well (e.g., the influence of the intervention in Iraq, which happened after the British speech in Estonia and well after the speech in Hungary). Bilateral referents in the Finnish corpus stand for Finland and Austria, Finland and France, Finland and Hungary, Finland and Lithuania and Finland and the Netherlands. In the Finnish speeches, it is difficult to find such a division of expressed interest towards certain groups of these countries as in the British speeches, which is mainly due to the small number of occurrences in the Finnish corpus and the strong influence of the actual context of the speeches. There is an observable yet weak tendency to base collectives with EU member states on common values in a very general sense, as is the case of the Finland and France and Finland and the Netherlands referents. However, in contrast to the abovementioned examples, the Finland and Austria collective is established on the basis of both of these countries being small EU member states. The same diversity can be detected between referents to applicant states and Finland, since the Finland and Lithuania collective is formed around future cooperation and Finland and Hungary is established on the grounds of similar concerns about political issues and the pride about national cultural heritage. In the Hungarian corpus, there are no bilateral referents, which is the result of the fact that all Hungarian speeches were delivered at international

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summits, congresses and conferences. Therefore, none of the Hungarian speeches were performed in a strictly bilateral setting. Besides bilateral referents, there are further entities indexed in the intersection of the ‘Country of the speaker’ and ‘Others’ referent sets. As the results of the second analytic round demonstrate, these entities clearly indicate the directions of special interest for the countries of the representatives. Such entities are: Coalition against Iraq in the British speeches, New Members of the EU, EU Applicant countries and Central and Eastern Europe in the Hungarian speeches and The Baltic Sea region in the Finnish speeches. The Coalition against Iraq referent is found in a speech delivered by the British Prime Minister in Poland. It is used in an ambiguous sense, since the P1 subject pronoun (‘we’) can here also be interpreted as indexing Britain and Poland. The Coalition against Iraq collective is represented in contrast to a group of others who disagree with their action. By this, the P1 collective appears to be even further united, which supposedly helps the Polish audience identify with the British point of view. The fact that the Coalition against Iraq (even if in an ambiguous sense) appears in a British speech on EU enlargement (Tony Blair’s message to Poland on joining the EU) shows how important this issue was for Britain. The three non-bilateral referents in the Hungarian corpus (New Members of the EU, EU Applicant countries and Central and Eastern Europe) all occur in connection to EU enlargement and all express the desire of the Hungarians to be a member of the EU. Therefore, as it comes out in connection to the referents discussed below, the most important Hungarian foreign policy issue pursued in the speeches is EU membership. New Members of the EU is used to express the indirect request of the Hungarians (in the name of all new EU member states) to be allowed to take part in the Convent. The referent EU applicant countries conveys a sense of disappointment because of a constantly delayed perspective of EU membership. The utterance containing this referent also expresses the desire of the Hungarians (in the name of the EU applicant countries) to be members of the EU besides that it functions as an indirect accusation. Central and Eastern Europe is represented as being forced to reform, a task it successfully accomplishes. By this, the articulation of this collective is based on two elements: a) the motivation for being EU compatible (the goal that forced this reform on these states) and b) the experience of a rapid reform, which gives power to Central and Eastern Europe over the Western part of the continent.

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Out of the three corpora, Finnish speakers are the most restricted in terms of representing hybrid identities of their countries and other entities. The reason for the Finnish speakers not representing other entities along with their countries may lie in the lack of foreign policy issues pursued in connection to EU enlargement. The only collective that is represented by Finnish politicians in connection to their country is The Baltic Sea region. The Baltic Sea region appears as bound together by common threats of environmental and criminal issues that have the prospect to be overcome by cooperation. Thus this collective is represented as one that should act together under the framework of the future EU. Such a discursive representation (in a Finnish speech delivered in Lithuania, a Baltic state) helps to establish common ground between the Finns and the Lithuanian audience; furthermore, it helps to cast EU membership in a positive light, as a tool to overcome problems. The results of the second analytic round demonstrate that a more qualitative approach to the research materials supports the results of the first analytic round, which was more quantitative in nature. Furthermore, it illustrates the differences in political goals pursued by the three countries via the speeches of their representatives about the ER5. Based on these findings, it seems that in the ER5 context British politicians are highly concerned with certain foreign policy goals of Britain that are not so closely connected to EU enlargement; Finnish speakers are attempting to represent Finland in as a more or less neutral country, while Hungarian speakers focus on the representation of Hungary as EU compatible and highly motivated to be an EU member state.

Significance of the results in terms of discourse, representation and ideology My aim in this work is to contribute to present-day CDA research by the means of a corpus-driven critical linguistic analysis that draws on the grammatical categories of Halliday’s transitivity system. My major concern, on the one hand, is that there is a lack of corpus-driven systemicfunctional analyses of political discourse. This is especially true for the CDA studies where systemic-functional linguistic analysis is conducted from a social-critical perspective. On the other hand, my additional concern is that even the few studies that investigate other issues by combining corpus linguistics and SFL do not include statistical significance tests (cf. chapter two). Therefore, the present study intends to contribute to bridging this twofold gap.

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Thus, in the first place I had to ensure that the results of this analysis are based on corpora composed of texts with similar contextual aspects, which in my case was the fifth enlargement round of the European Union. This methodological decision made it possible to assign a social interpretation to the linguistic data. This social interpretation is supported by the emergent referent categories and the statistical significance of the differences between these categories and the process types associated with them across the three corpora. On the one hand, the intersection of statistics and ideology critique in context-specific corpora help me to move beyond the limitations of the connection between texts and their social contexts that corpus-based linguistic analyses are often criticized for (cf. Thompson and Hunston 2006: 3). I could establish the linkage of the linguistic specificities of the texts to their political contexts on the basis of the statistical legitimization of the tendencies of ideological investments of meaning connected to one particular aspect of the texts: their status as official statements on the ER5. On the other hand, the other methodological decision that facilitated the social interpretation of the data in this study was the single-case based qualitative analysis undertaken in the second analytic round since it confirmed many of the tendencies observed in the first analytic round. However, I am not arguing that using contextually similar corpora and establishing the statistically significant distributions of the chosen categories complemented with a dominantly qualitative second round of analysis result in a systematic ideology critique of the particular strategies of belonging in the ER5 discourse as full scaled CDA analyses often do. Yet this is not among my analytic goals. In this analysis I find it more important to cover larger amounts of data and discover general tendencies in it than to provide detailed explanations of specific cases. Put differently, my analysis focuses on the system of choices in so far as the results turn out to be statistically meaningful instead of analyzing randomly selected particular textual sequences, no matter how telling the researcher may tacitly see them to be. In this sense my concern is similar to Halliday’s (2002) position. He uses the simile of the relationship between weather and climate to explain the connectedness of language as a system and language as instance: The climate and the weather are not two different phenomena. They are the same phenomenon seen by two different observers, standing at different distances – different time depths. To the climate observer the weather looks like random unpredictable ripples; to the weather observer, the climate is a vague and unreal outline. So it is also with language; language as a system and language as instance. They are not too different

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Chapter Seven phenomena; they are the same phenomenon as seen by different observers. The system is a pattern formed by the instances; and each instance represents an exchange with the environment – an incursion into the system in which every level of language is involved. The system is permeable, because each instance redounds with the context of situation, and so perturbs the system in interaction with the environment. (Halliday 2002: 359)

For analyses on the level of the system (i.e., observations on the ‘climate’ in the simile), Halliday suggests corpus-based studies on grammatical frequencies: The study of grammatical frequencies is not, I think, some kind of optional extra: such quantitative patterns are a feature of the lexicogrammaticalisation of meaning, the process by which the meaning potential becomes effectively without a limit. The project cannot be other than a corpus project. (Halliday 2006: 299)

The reader of this monograph can discover the findings of such quantitative patterns among the results of the first analytic round. However, I must underscore here that I find it necessary to explicitly reflect upon the data by so-called qualitative methods in order to connect the statistics-driven findings in the first analytic round to the contexts of the actual instances of choice. In my view, the social/political interpretation of my quantitatively founded linguistic results could only succeed by intrepreting these results in terms of their ideological investments complemented with the qualitative results of the second analytic round. I firmly believe that only the intersection of what is traditionally believed to be strictly quantitative and qualitative analysis can explain the interaction between the observed discursive patterns in the language system and the social/political environment of the speeches realizing those choices. The main focus of my analysis is set on the relationship between linguistic choices of P1 usage and collective identity construction in political discourse around the ER5. The analytic methods I use explicate many aspects of this relationship that would have been difficult to point out by means of other types of social critical or linguistic analyses. Based on the results of this study, it seems that there is a strong difference between officially constructed collectives around the EU and around nation states. Although the present research centers on political discourses surrounding the ER5, it is very likely that the differences found in this respect would appear in similar ways in other spheres of EU political discourse as well. This supposition is further supported by Duchesne and Frognier (1995: 193) who write: “As the institutions of the EC have

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largely been created independently of the expressed will of national populations, we might anticipate that people’s attitudes [to the EC] are basically instrumental.” The stronger intellectual and emotional attachment that EU politicians have towards their countries than to the EU is not only a symptom of their relationships to these entities but these can also be understood as means of discursive constructions of their countries and the EU for the eyes of the public. Likewise, there is a powerful discursive effect of the more frequent identification of these politicians with the EU when it comes to material action; furthermore, their view of the EU as a tool and sometimes as an instrument of dominance has a political force as well. According to Mole (2007) the discursive effect of identification functions as a forming force, which gains its political power through the act of legitimization: The ‘forming force’ of identity discourses with regard to social and political action derives from the establishment of rules and the fixing of meanings which condition and constrain political action by legitimising certain agents and policies and delegitimising certain others. (Mole 2007: 15)

The majority of the discursive constructions identified in my analysis of the speeches strive to represent the EU as a tool/instrument as opposed to an entity with more animate characteristics, e.g. ‘the motherland’. Thus, while these constructions legitimize the EU in the role of a (super-) state, they leave the strongest building blocks of collective identities (i.e., the perception of sameness or emotional connection) for nation states. Therefore, when it comes to identification, these speeches sustain a country-centered worldview, which in the long run may have a negative influence on the public support of European integration. Based on further results of this analysis, the quantitative differences of P1 indexation between the three countries reflect the political situation of each country in relation to their power position in the ER5, whereas their qualitative differences of P1 usage demonstrate the effect of certain foreign policy issues for the countries involved. Consequently, these results support the abovementioned dominance of national perspectives in the speeches when it comes to constructions of collective identities. Furthermore, they highlight the fact that the discursive representations of these national perspectives are influenced by the power position of each country in the ER5. Additionally, the results of my analysis confirm the relational nature of collective identities, as they explicate the ways in which these collectives are always constructed in relation to the targeted audience. Therefore, the

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results indicate that collective identity groups function in a discursive sphere in relation to other entities constructed alongside them in certain ideological contexts. The outcome of my analysis suggests that the discourse strategies of the speakers concerning their collective identity constructions resulted from a synthesis of the following four factors: (i) the actual entity represented at a certain point of a speech (e.g., country of the speaker or the EU); (ii) the targeted audience of the speeches; (iii) the context of the speeches as official occasions for representing national interests in connection with the enlargement of the European Union; (iv) differences in the power positions of the countries involved in the negotiations. On the basis of the differences, it seems that the roles that were assigned to each country in the negotiations are reflected in the language use of the speakers concerning the usage of verbs and P1 pronouns. This systematic variation signals the presence of what Fairclough (2003) calls the ‘order of discourse’: Social practices networked in a particular way constitute a social order – for instance, the emergent neo-liberal global order referred to above, or at a more local level, the social order of (the ‘field’ of) education in a particular society at a particular time. The discourse/semiotic aspect of a social order is what we can call an ‘order of discourse’. It is the way in which diverse genres and discourses and styles are networked together. An order of discourse is a social structuring of semiotic difference – a particular social ordering of relationships amongst different ways of making meaning, i.e. different discourses and genres and styles. One aspect of this ordering is dominance: some ways of making meaning are dominant or mainstream in a particular order of discourse, others are marginal, or oppositional, or ‘alternative’. (Fairclough 2003: 206)

As is shown by my analysis, the majority of the analyzed linguistic data in the speeches contribute to the reproduction of the mainstream ‘order of discourse’ around the ER5. Therefore, the ‘order of discourse’ in these textual instances functions to constitute the social order these texts are part of. In this sense the speeches serve as discursive sites for the reproductions of the general status quo in the EU polity at the particular moment of the fifth enlargement round.

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APPENDIX A PROCESS TYPES CONNECTED TO THE REFERENT SUBSETS OF THE ‘EU’ AND THE ‘COUNTRY’ SETS IN THE THREE CORPORA∗

∗

N.B. Referents to the EU are represented by the ‘EU non-specific’ subset, the ‘EU specific subset’, the ‘EU leaders’ subset, the ‘EU citizens’ subset; referents to the country of the speaker are represented by ‘Country non-specific’ subset, the ‘Country specific subset’, the ‘Country leaders’ subset, the ‘Country citizens’ subset. Intersections of the various main sets are displayed as the intersection of the ‘EU’ and Others’ sets, the intersection of the ‘Country’ and ‘Others’ sets and the intersection of the ‘EU’ and the ‘Country’ set. The results are displayed separately for each corpus. Subsets that are not displayed in any of these figures contain no referents.

172

Appendix A

1) Process types used in the referent subsets of the ‘EU’ and the ‘Country’ sets in the British corpus

Process Types Connected to the Referent Subsets

173

2) Process types used in the referent subsets of the ‘EU’ and the ‘Country’ sets in the Finnish corpus

174

Appendix A

3) Process types used in the referent subsets of the ‘EU’ and the ‘Country’ sets in the Hungarian corpus

APPENDIX B SPEECHES IN THE THREE CORPORA

The British corpus 1. Title: Message from Tony Blair, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom – A people’s Europe Speaker: Prime Minister Tony Blair Location: Debate on the Future of the EU (EP) Date: 03/04/2001 Number of words: 617 2. Title: Reforming Europe: New era, new questions Speaker: Jack Straw, Minister of Foreign Affairs Location: The Hague Date: 21/02/2002 Number of words: 4252 3. Title: We will be your allies and partners in making Europe work – Blair welcomes the EU accession countries Speaker: Prime Minister Tony Blair Location: EU Enlargement Reception, The Foreign Office, London Date: 28/04/2004 Number of words: 1062 4. Title: European enlargement – opportunities and challenges Speaker: Jack Straw, Minister of Foreign Affairs Location: Annual General Meeting of the Labour Movement for Europe, London Date: 03/12/2003 Number of words: 995

176

Appendix B

5. Title: Speech on the European Bank for Reconstruction and EU enlargement Speaker: Prime Minister Tony Blair Location: EBRD Date: 19/04/2004 Number of words: 1227 Note: categorized as an official statement on enlargement by the EP 6. Title: EU enlargement: future directions and trade opportunities Speaker: John Battle, Minister of State Location: ‘Europe 21’ EU Enlargement: Future Directions & Trade Opportunities Conference, Queen Elizabeth II Conference Centre, London Date: 23/03/2000 Number of words: 2285 7. Title: Change: Modern Britain in a modern Europe Speaker: Prime Minister Tony Blair Location: Ridderzaal, The Hague Date: 28/01/1998 Number of words: 3961 8. Title: At ease with Europe; influential in Europe Speaker: Denis MacShane, Minister for Europe Location: Estonian Foreign Policy Institute Date: 07/11/2002 Number of words: 1926 9. Title: Championing enlargement Speaker: Robin Cook, Foreign Secretary Location: Hungarian Ambassadors’ Conference, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Budapest Date: 25/07/2000 Number of words: 2105 10. Title: Collective Security in an enlarged Europe Speaker: Jack Straw, Minister of Foreign Affairs Location: Inter-Continental Hotel, Budapest Date: 09/07/2002 Number of words: 2694

Speeches in the Three Corpora

177

11. Title: Leadership in Europe Speaker: Jack Straw, Foreign Secretary Location: British-German Forum Date: 17/10/2002 Number of words: 2363 12. Title: A new mission for Europe Speaker: Jack Straw, Foreign Secretary Location: Berlin Date: 27/05/2002 Number of words: 2936 Note: delivered to German specialists in foreign policy 13. Title: Britain, Italy and the new Europe Speaker: Peter Hain, Minister for Europe Location: Italian Chamber of Commerce Dinner, London Date: 26/09/2002 Number of words: 2422 14. Title: Tony Blair’s message to Poland on Joining the EU Speaker: Prime Minister Tony Blair Location: First Congress of the Polish Forum for the Lisbon Strategy, Warsaw Date: 30/05/2003 Number of words: 3771

The Finnish corpus 1. Title: Finland in the European Union: membership from the perspective of a small country Speaker: Tarja Halonen, Minister of Foreign Affairs Location: EIC seminar hall Date: 12/10/1998 Number of words: 2544 Note: categorized as an official statement on enlargement by the EP 2. Title: On Enlargement Speaker: President Tarja Halonen Location: Athens, signing of EU accession treaty Date: 16/04/2003 Number of words: 525

178

Appendix B

3. Title: The Challenges of Enlargement - Pitfalls and Opportunities Speaker: Foreign Minister Erkki Tuomioja Location: Copenhagen, Denmark Date: 02/03/2004 Number of words: 1065 4. Title: On the future of Europe Speaker: Prime Minister Paavo Lipponen Location: PASOK (Panhellenic Socialist Movement) conference Date: 23/11/2001 Number of words: 916 5. Title: Regional Cooperation: Building Block of a United Europe Speaker: Prime Minister Paavo Lipponen Location: European forum Wachau 2002 - Göttweig Date: 30/06/2002 Number of words: 2517 6. Title: Speech at a celebration of the enlargement of the European Union Speaker: President Tarja Halonen Location: Finlandia Hall Date: 04/05/2004 Number of words: 1348 7. Title: Address to the National Assembly of Slovenia Speaker: President Martti Ahtisaari Location: Ljubljana Date: 9/12/1998 Number of words: 1229 Note: categorized as an official statement on enlargement by the EP 8. Title: Speech in honor of Pres. Jacques and Mme Bernadette Chirac Speaker: President Martti Ahtisaari Location: Helsinki (banquet) Date: 10/05/1999 Number of words: 1539 Note: categorized as an official statement on enlargement by the EP

Speeches in the Three Corpora

9. Title: 1999 City Europe Lecture London Speaker: Prime Minister Paavo Lipponen Location: London Date: 02/02/1999 Number of words: 2717 Note: categorized as an official statement on enlargement by the EP 10. Title: Speech by President of the Republic Tarja Halonen at a banquet hosted by President Ferenc Mádl Speaker: President Tarja Halonen Location: Budapest (banquet) Date: 27/08/2002 Number of words: 846 11. Title: Speech at the reception at the upper house of the Statesgeneral of the Netherlands Speaker: President Martti Ahtisaari Location: reception at the upper house of the States-general of the Netherlands Date: 20/1/1999 Number of words: 929 Note: categorized as an official statement on enlargement by the EP 12. Title: Address by the President of the Republic of Finland to the Senate of Spain Speaker: President Martti Ahtisaari Location: Senate of Spain Date: 02/02/1999 Number of words: 748 Note: categorized as an official statement on enlargement by the EP 13. Title: Speech on the occasion of the Europe Day Speaker: Minister for Foreign Trade Jari Vilén Location: Vilnius (Europe day) Date: 07/05/2002

179

180

Appendix B

The Hungarian Corpus 1. Title: Contribution to the Debate on the Future of Europe Speaker: Prime Minister Viktor Orbán Location: Budapest Date: 05/06/2001 Number of words: 1211 2. Title: Speech on the Congress “Europe 2000: a Union for the Citizens. A Union with Global Responsibilities” Speaker: Prime Minister Viktor Orbán Location: Congress “Europe 2000: a Union for the Citizens. A Union with Global Responsibilities” Date: 06/06/1999 Number of words: 2117 Note: categorized as an official statement on enlargement by the EP 3. Title: Speech at the Conference on the Enlargement of the European Union Speaker: László Kovács, Minister of Foreign Affairs Location: Jerusalem (conference) Date: 15/06/2003 Number of words: 2145 4. Title: Statement on the occasion of the opening of negotiations on the accession of Hungary to the European Union Speaker: László Kovács, Minister of Foreign Affairs Location: Brussels Date: 31/3/1998 Number of words: 3258 5. Title: Speech at the opening session of the Intergovernmental Conference of the European Union Speaker: Prime Minister Péter Medgyessy Location: IGC Date: 07/10/2003 Number of words: 589

Speeches in the Three Corpora

6. Title: Speech at the Conference on the Common Future of Hungary and the EU Speaker: President Ferenc Mádl Location: Budapest Date: 05/06/2001 Number of words: 1920 7. Title: Speech at the Munich Economic Summit Speaker: Prime Minister Péter Medgyessy Location: Munich Economic Summit Date: 02/05/2003 Number of words: 2051 8. Title: Speech on the Future of Europe Speaker: János Martonyi, Minister of Foreign Affairs Location: informal meeting of the foreign ministers of the European Union, Genval Date: 08/09/2001 Number of words: 2674

181

APPENDIX C REFERENT SETS, PROCESS TYPES AND PARTICIPANT FUNCTIONS

Legend Codes used for the referent sets of P1 0 – GENERAL 1 – EU (NON-SPECIFIC) 2 – EU SPECIFIC (REFERENT INDICATED) 3 – EU LEADERS 4 – EU CITIZENS 5 – EU AND OTHERS (INTERSECTION; REFERENT INDICATED) 6 – COUNTRY (NON-SPECIFIC) 7 – COUNTRY SPECIFIC: (REFERENT INDICATED) 8 – COUNTRY LEADERS 9 – COUNTRY CITIZENS 10 – COUNTRY AND OTHERS (INTERSECTION; REFERENT INDICATED) 11 – OTHERS (REFERENT INDICATED) 16 – EU AND COUNTRY (INTERSECTION; REFERENT INDICATED) 27 – EU SPECIFIC AND COUNTRY SPECIFIC (INTERSECTION; REFERENT INDICATED)

184

Appendix C

The referent sets in a set diagram

Codes used for the process types and participant functions XYZ: X = Process type Y = Participant category Z = Participant type X: 1 – Material process 2 – Mental process 3 – Relational process: 3a: Attributive 3i: Identifying 3p: Possessive 4 – Existential process 5 – Verbal process 6 – Behavioral process Y: 1 – First participant 2 – Second participant 3 – Circumstance

Referent Sets, Process Types and Participant Functions

185

Z: C – Carrier A – Attribute Id – Identified Ir – Identifier Pr – Possessor Pd – Possessed 1 – Range 2 – Beneficiary 3 – Location 4 – Extent 5 – Manner 6 – Cause (R, P, B) 7 – Accompainment 8 – Role 9 – Matter 0 – Angle 00 – Target 000 – Contingency

Other elements of coding Further elements of coding may be indicated as suffixes of the codes of process types and participant functions. These elements follow the codes of process types and participant functions and they are always preceded by an underscore. Suffixes used after the first underscore: MA – modalization MU – modulation 1 – low level of modality 2 – median level of modality 3 – high level of modality I – inclination O – obligation P – probability U – usuality

186

Appendix C

Suffixes used after the second underscore: N – negative (N.B. High and low values of transferred negatives are calculated on the basis of their switched polarity as discussed in Halliday and Matthiesen 2004: 620-621) Q – question R – double indexed case (reflexive pronouns)

Further explanation Pro Ref Proc indexing referent category process type pronoun and participant function An example:

Id identification number in the corpora

[[[we]]] 0 11_MA1P [might] we general referent material process first participant low level modalization (probability)

40 in the corpus this case is found under we40

Summary of referents, process types and participant roles for ‘we’ ‘us’ and ‘ourselves’ The British Corpus Pro

Ref

Proc

Id

[[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]]

0 0 0 0: Part. of the meeting 0 0 0: Part. of the meeting 0: Part. of the meeting 0 0 0 0 0: undeterminable 0

11_MA1P[might] 11_MA2P[can] 11_MU2O[need to] 11_MU2O[should] 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21[cond ‘would’] 21

40 234 159 48 17 31 86 87 93 145 278 300 331 343

Referent Sets, Process Types and Participant Functions [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] {{{us}}} [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]]

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0: the speaker 0 00 (6 [AMBI]) 00 (1/6 [AMBI]) 00 (1 [AMBI]) 1 1 1: EU 15 1: EU 15 1 1 1: EU 15 1 1 1 1: EU 15 1: EU 15 1: EU 15 1: EU 15 1: EU 15 1 1 1 1: EU 15 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

21 21 21[cond ‘if’] 21_MA2P[can] 21_MA2P[can] 21_MU2O_N[should] 21_N 21_N 21_N 3a1C 3a1C_MA2P[can] 3a1C_MA2P_N[can] 3p1Pr 51_MAA2U[sometimes] 51_MA2P[can] 53Recipient 3p1Pr 11_MU2O[need to] 11_MA1P[could] 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11_C[cond ‘if’] 11 11_C[cond ‘if’] 11_C[cond ‘would’] 11_C[cond ‘would’] 11_C[cond ‘would’] 11_C[cond ‘provided’] 11 [‘as’ temp] 11_MA2P[can] 11_MA2P[can] 11_MA2P[can] 11_MA2P_Q[can] 11_MA2P_Q[can] 11_MA2P_Q[can] 11_MU2O[need to] 11_MU2O[need to] 11_MU2O[need to] 11_MU2O[should]

187 425 426 336 94 210 46 340 90 91 190 233 342 301 341 332 9 112 134 251 92 222 304 345 370 371 395 399 419 5 252 273 284 285 286 431 308 223 274 430 18 19 20 14 15 25 95

188

Appendix C

[[[we]]] 1 [[[we]]] 1 [[[we]]] 1: EU 15 and candidates [[[we]]] 1 [[[we]]] 1: EU 15 [[[we]]] 1: EU 15 [[[we]]] 1: EU 15 [[[we]]] 1 [[[we]]] 1 [[[we]]] 1 [[[we]]] 1: EU 15 [[[we]]] 1 [[[we]]] 1 [[[we]]] 1 [[[we]]] 1 [[[we]]] 1 [[[we]]] 1: EU 15 [[[we]]] 1: EU 15 [[[we]]] 1 [[[we]]] 1: EU 15 [[[we]]] 1: EU 15 [[[we]]] 1: EU 15 [[[we]]] 1 [[[we]]] 1 [[[we]]] 1: EU 15 [[[we]]] 1: enlarged EU [[[we]]] 1 {{{us}}} 1 {{{us}}} 1: EU 15 {{{us}}} 1: enlarged EU {{{us}}} 1 {{{us}}} 1 ///ourselves/// 1: EU 15 ///ourselves/// 1 ///ourselves/// 1: EU 15 [[[we]]] 1 [[[we]]] 1 [[[we]]] 1 [[[we]]] 1 [[[we]]] 1 [[[we]]] 1 [[[we]]] 1 [[[we]]] 1 [[[we]]] 1: EU 15 [[[we]]] 1 [[[we]]] 1

11_MU2O[need to] 11_MU2O[need to] 11_MU2O[need to] 11_MU2O[need to] 11_MU2O[need to] 11_MU2O[need to] 11_MU2O[should] 11_MU2O[need to] 11_MU2O[need to] 11_MU2O[should] 11_MU2O_N[can] 11_MU3O[must] 11_MU3O[must] 11_MU3O[must] 11_MU3O[must] 11_MU3O[must] 11_MU3O[have to] 11_MU3O[must] 11_MU3O[must] 11_MU3O[must] 11_MU3O[have to] 11_MU3O[have to] 11_MU3O[must] 11_MU3O_N[must] [META] 11_MU3O[must] 11_MU3O_N[must] 11_MU3O_N[must] 12 12 132 132 133L 131 135 136B 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21_C[cond ‘if’] 21[temp when]

128 131 152 198 254 255 326 368 409 444 205 23 118 119 122 147 149 235 250 253 360 361 386 211 329 367 420 32 27 11 13 10 5 7 4 32 35 123 151 217 221 305 440 347 349 354

Referent Sets, Process Types and Participant Functions {{{us}}} 1 [[[we]]] 1: EU 15 [[[we]]] 1: enlarged EU {{{us}}} 1 [[[we]]] 1 [[[we]]] 1 [[[we]]] 1 [[[we]]] 1: enlarged EU {{{us}}} 1 [[[we]]] 1 [[[we]]] 1 [[[we]]] 1 {{{us}}} 1 [[[we]]] 1 [[[we]]] 1 [[[we]]] 1 [[[we]]] 1: enlarged EU [[[we]]] 1: EU 15 [[[we]]] 1 [[[we]]] 1 [[[we]]] 1 [[[we]]] 1 [[[we]]] 1 [[[we]]] 1: EU 15 [[[we]]] 1 [[[we]]] 1 [[[we]]] 1 [[[we]]] 1 [[[we]]] 1: EU 15 [[[we]]] 1: EU 15 [[[we]]] 1: EU 15 [[[we]]] 1 {{{us}}} 1: EU 15 {{{us}}} 1: EU 15 {{{us}}} 1: EU 15 MS [[[we]]] 1 [[[we]]] 1 [[[we]]] 1 [[[we]]] 1: EU 15 and candidates [[[we]]] 1 [[[we]]] 1 [[[we]]] 1 [[[we]]] 1 ///ourselves/// 1 [[[we]]] 2: EU MS’ NGOs [[[we]]] 2: W. Europe / 6 [AMBI]

21_IMP[let’s] 21_MA1P[would] 21_MA2P[can] 21_MA2P[would] 21_MA2P_N[can] 21_MU2I_Q[can] 21_MU2O[should] 21_MU2O[need to] 21_MU2O[should] 21_MU3O[have to] 21_MU3O[must] 21_MU3O[must] 21_N[let’s] 3a1C 3a1C 3a1C 3a1C 3a1C 3a1C 3a1C 3a1C 3a1C 3a1C 3a1C 3a1C 3a1C 3a1C_MA1P[would] 3a1C_MU2O[need to] 3a1C_MU2O[should] 3a1C_MU2O[should] 3a1C_MU3O[must] 3a1C_N 3a2A 3i22 3i31 3p1Pr 3p1Pr 3p1Pr 3p1Pr 3p1Pr_MU3O[must] 41 41 51_MA2P[can] 12 11 11

189 24 236 115 15 317 439 16 366 30 24 328 441 50 22 55 70 100 144 146 212 225 318 330 346 369 429 224 6 270 272 271 384 47 39 14 124 125 132 158 385 120 121 114 2R 29 283

190 [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] {{{us}}} {{{us}}} {{{us}}} {{{us}}} {{{us}}} {{{us}}} {{{us}}} {{{us}}} {{{us}}} {{{us}}} [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] {{{us}}} {{{us}}} {{{us}}} {{{us}}} {{{us}}} {{{us}}} [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]]

Appendix C 2: The current EU gen. 2: European Govts 2: EU MS in NATO 2: EU European nations 2: EU MS 2: EU 15 MS 2: EU nations 2: EU MS 2: EU 15 MS 2: EU 15 MS 2: EU 15 MS 2: EU MS’ NGOs 2: EU nations 2: EU nations 2: EU nations 2: EU nations 2: EU MS 2: EU MS 2: EU nations 2: MS in the enlarged EU 2: new MS and EU 15 2: Nations forming the EU 2: an imaginary EU nation 2: an imaginary EU nation 2: Europeans supporting US 2: EU 15 = European states 2: EU 15 = European states 2: EU-European politicians 2: EU-European politicians 2: EU 15 MS 2: EU MS 2: EU and its nations 2: EU MS 2: EU nations 2: Enlarged EU nations 2: EU MS and applicants 2: EU MS 2: an imaginary EU nation 2: EU 15 NGOs 2: EU 15 NGOs 3 3 3 3 3 3

11_C[cond ‘if’] 11_C[cond ‘if’] 11_C[cond ‘if’] 11_MA2P[can] 11_MA2P[can] 11_MU2I+MU3O[can+must] 11_MU2O[need to] 11_MU2O[need to] 11_MU2O_N[can] 11_MU2O[need to] 11_MU2O[should] 11_MU3O[have to] 11_MU3O[must] 11_MU3O[must] 11_MU3O[must] 12 12 132 12 12 12 132 12 12 130 21 21 21 21 21_C[cond ‘if’] 21_MU3O[(have) to] 3a1C 3a1C_MU2O[should] 3a1C_MU3O[must] 3a2A 3a2A 3a2A 3i31 3i36B 3i36B 11 11 11 11 11 11

303 312 315 30 355 264 150 232 265 266 365 28 422 423 424 3 4 7 29 31 34 44 55 56 49 296 297 382 383 364 215 417 192 421 16 19 36 54 17 18 7 34 36 49 57 61

Referent Sets, Process Types and Participant Functions [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]]

3 3 3: IGC 3: IGC 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3: IGC 3 3: IGC 3: IGC 3: IGC 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3: IGC 3 3 3 3 3 3: Convention 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11_C[cond ‘if] 11_C[cond ‘would’] 11_MA1P[could] 11_MA1P[could] 11_MA1P_N[could] 11_MA2P_N[can] 11_MA2P[can] 11_MA2P_C[can] [cond ‘if’] 11_MA2P[can] 11_MA2P[can] 11_MA2P[can] 11_MA2P_N[can] 11_MA2P_Q[can] 11_MA2P_Q[can] 11_MA2P_Q[can] 11_MU2O[should] 11_MU2O[should] 11_MU2O[should] 11_MU2O[should] 11_MU2O[should] 11_MU2O[need to] 11_MU2O[need to] 11_MU2O[need to] 11_MU2O[need to] 11_MU2O[need to] 11_MU2O[need to] 11_MU2O[need to] 11_MU2O[need to] 11_MU2O[need to] 11_MU2O_N[should] 11_MU3O[have to] 11_MU3O[have to] 11_MU3O[have to] 11_MU3O[have to] 11_MU3O[have to] 11_MU3O[have to]

191 74 81 258 259 267 363 376 377 378 380 77 262 59 260 261 263 58 64 78 268 387 391 41 51 63 9 11 50 52 56 257 350 351 357 358 381 388 392 393 8 39 42 44 53 82 84

192 [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] {{{us}}} {{{us}}} [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] {{{us}}} [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] {{{us}}} [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] {{{us}}} [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]]

Appendix C 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3: leaders of EU 15 (IGC) 3 3: at Laeken 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3: IGC 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4

11_MU3O[must] 11_MU3O[have to] 11_MU3O[have to] 11_MU3O[have to] 11_MU3O[have to] 11_N 11_N 11_Q[pseu ‘how’] 11_Q[pseu ‘how’] 132 131 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21_MA1P[could] 21_MUA2I[eager] 21_MU2O[should] 21_MU3O[have to] 21_MU3O[have to] 21_MU3O[have to] 21_MU3O[have to] 21_MU3O[have to] 21_MU3O[must] 22 3a1C 3a1C_MU3O[must] 3p1Pr 3p1Pr_MU3O[have to] 3p1Pr_N 51_MU3O[have to] 51_MU3O[have to] 53Recipient 11 11 11_C[cond ‘if’] 11_C[cond ‘if’] 11_MA2P[can] 11_MA2P[can] 11 _MU2I_C[can] [cond ‘if’]

199 204 352 353 359 47 83 201 200 6 33 10 66 68 69 72 73 79 269 389 390 67 2 65 54 60 62 71 80 256 38 362 193 379 75 33 43 45 37 2 356 13 4 12 160 306

Referent Sets, Process Types and Participant Functions [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] {{{us}}} {{{us}}} [[[we]]] {{{us}}} {{{us}}} [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] {{{us}}} [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] {{{us}}} [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]]

4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4: next generation 4 4 5: Europe 5: NATO 5: Europe and int. comm. 5: EU and US 5: Many Eur Govts 5: NATO MS 5: EU and US 5: Many Eur Govts 5: Europe and int. comm. 5: Europe 5: Europe 5: Europe 5: The people of Europe 5: Europe and int. comm. 5: Europe and int. comm. 5: Pro-US Europeans 5: EU NATO MS in ESDP 5: Europe and int. comm. 5: Europe and the int. comm. 5: Europe 5: Europe (Eastern EU?) 5: Europe 5: EU NATO MS in ESDP 5: EU NATO MS in ESDP 5: Europe and int. comm. 5: Europe 5: Europe and int. comm. 6 6 6 6 6 6: Br EU presidency 6 6

11 _MA2P[can] 11_MU3O[have to] 11_MU3O[have to] 12 132 21 3a1C 3a1C_IMP[let’s] 3i1Id_Q 41 432 11 11 11 11 11_C[cond ‘if’] 11_MUA2I[willingly] 11_MU2O[should] 11_MU3O[have to] 11_MU3O[must] 133L 21 21 21 21 21 21_MAA2P[happen to] 21_MU2I[would] 21_MU1O[may have to] 21_N 3a1C 3a1C 3a1C 3a1C 3a1C_N 3a1C 3a1C 3p1Pr 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11

193 307 139 287 5 40 3 1 20 157 1 189 275 288 324 443 290 191 442 289 323 43 26 27 102 320 322 445 295 325 35 88 89 203 293 294 319 405 321 85 111 153 155 202 207 213 218

194 [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] {{{us}}} [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]]

Appendix C 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 (Labour party?) 6 6 6: Br EU presidency 6 6: Br EU presidency 6: Br EU presidency 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6: Br EU presidency 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6

11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11_C[cond ‘if’] 11_MA2P[can] 11_MA2P[can] 11_MU2O[should] 11_MU2O[need to] 11_MU2O[need to] 11_MU2O[need to] 11_MU2O_N[should] 11_MU3O[must] 11_MU3O[must] 11_MU3O[must] 11_LOSE 11_LOSE 11_LOSE 132 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21

220 237 240 241 242 243 280 302 313 316 333 334 408 447 156 446 113 130 148 196 398 195 214 219 412 413 414 41 96 99 126 129 133 154 206 208 226 229 230 238 239 276 277 281 282 292

Referent Sets, Process Types and Participant Functions [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] {{{us}}} [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] {{{us}}} [[[we]]] [[[we]]] {{{us}}} [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] {{{us}}} {{{us}}} [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]]

6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6: Br EU presidency 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6: Br EU presidency 6 6 7: Br supporters of the EU 7: Br supporters of the EU 7: Br supporters of the EU 7: Br supporters of the EU 7: Br supporters of the EU 8: Br reps in EU debate 8: Br reps in EU debate 8 8 8 8 8 8

21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21_MA2P [can] 21_MA2P [can] 21_MUA2I[fully] 21_N 21_Q 235 3a1C 3a1C 3a1C 3a1C 3a1C 3a36P 3i1Id 3i1Id 3i30 3p1Pr 3p1Pr 3p1Pr 422 51 11_MU2O[need to] 11_MU2O[need to] 11_MU2O[need to] 11_MU2O[need to] 3p1Pr 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11

195 298 299 314 335 348 394 400 401 402 407 418 427 455 101 279 327 164 406 48 76 197 291 415 448 46 97 98 42 169 180 194 103 48 227 228 25 26 104 106 107 117 168 171 172 174 175

196 [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] {{{us}}} {{{us}}} [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] {{{us}}} [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] {{{us}}} [[[we]]]

Appendix C 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8: PM, FS, Keith Vaz 8 8 8 8 8 8 8: New Labour Govt 8 8 8: PM and Peter Hain, ME 8 8: Br reps in EU debate 8: Br reps in EU debate 8 8 8 8 8 8: Br reps in EU debate 8: Br reps in EU debate 9 9 9 9 9 9: Brits: Br supporters of EU 9

11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11_MA1_P[may] 11_MA2P[can] 11_MU3O[must] 130 137 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21_C[cond ‘if’] 21_MU2I_N[can] 21_N 3a1C 3a1C 3a31 3p1Pr 51_C[cond ‘if’] 51 51 11 11_MU3O[have to] 11_MU3O[have to] 21 21_MU3O[have to] 21_MU3O[must] 3i1Id

176 177 179 181 183 184 185 187 216 372 411 170 188 373 45 8 21 116 127 141 142 143 161 162 163 167 178 209 374 397 109 110 173 182 23 186 410 105 108 38 137 138 37 140 12 135

Referent Sets, Process Types and Participant Functions [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] {{{us}}} [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] {{{us}}} {{{us}}} {{{us}}} {{{us}}} [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] {{{us}}} [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] {{{us}}} {{{us}}} {{{us}}} [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]]

9 10: Br and Ger 10: Br and Ger 10: Br and Ger 10: Br and Ita Govts 10: Br and Pol [AMBI EU] 10: Br and Pol 10: Coalition against Iraq 10: Br and Pol 10: Br and Pol 10: Br and Pol 10: Br and Pol 10: Br and Est 10: Br and Est 10: Br and Est 10: Br and Ita businesses 10: Br and the Netherl 10: Br and the Netherl 10: Br and Pol 10: Br and Pol 10: Br and Est 10: Br and Ger 10: Br and Ger 10: Br and Pol 10: Br and Pol 10: Br and Pol 10: Br and Pol 10: Br and Pol 10: Br and Pol 10: Br and Pol 10: Br and Hun 10: Br and Est Govs 10: Br and Pol 10: Br and Pol 10: Br and Pol 10: Br and Ger 10: Br and Ger 10: Br and Pol 10: Br and Pol 10: Br and Pol 10: Br and Hun 11: Poland 16: Br and Europe 27: Br & European politicians

3i1Id 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11_IMP[let’s] 11_MA2P[can] 11_MA2P_N[can] 11_MA2P_Q[can] 11_MU2O[need to] 11_MU2O[should] 11_MU2O[need to] 11_N_C[cond ‘if’] 12 12 12 12_N 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21_Q 21_Q 21_Q 22 3a1C 3a1C 3a1C 3a1C 3a1C_MA1P[may] 3a1C_MU3O[must] [META] 3a2A 3a37 3a37 3i1Id 11_Q 11_MU3O[must] 11_MU2O[need to]

197 136 337 338 339 375 428 436 438 57 432 416 454 244 245 246 396 21 22 51 52 247 310 311 433 434 435 437 451 452 453 28 231 403 449 450 309 344 53 58 59 249 404 165 166

198

Appendix C

The Finnish corpus Pro

Ref

Proc

Id

[[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] {{{us}}} [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] {{{us}}} [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] {{{us}}} {{{us}}} [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] {{{us}}} {{{us}}} [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]]

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 (1/6) AMBI 0 (?) 0 0 (?) 0 0 0 0 00 (1(/6)) 1 1 (/3) 1: old and new 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 (/4) 1 1 1: Europeans 1 1 1 1

11 11_MA2P_N[can] 21 21 21 21 21(_Q) 21_MA2_P_N[can] 21_MA2P[can] 21_MA2P[can] 21_MA2P[can] 21_MU3O[must] 21_N 21_N[let’s] 21_Q 21_Q 3a1C 51[time ‘when’] 51_MA2P[can] 21 11[let’s] 11_MU2O[need to] 11_MU3O[have to] 11_MU3O[have to] 11_MU3O[must] 11_MU3O[must] 11_MU3O[must] 11_MU3O[must] 11_MU3O[must] 11_MU3O_N[must] 12 132 21 21 21 21 21 21 21_MU2O[need to] 21_MU2O[should] 21_MU3O[have to]

108 102 41 47 68 74 42 128 147 205 81 164 63 5 62 38 183 67 95 33 7 161 35 104 121 139 170 171 197 138 29 26 21 24 48 165 27 28 66 50 223

Referent Sets, Process Types and Participant Functions [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] {{{us}}} [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] {{{us}}} {{{us}}} {{{us}}} [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] {{{us}}} {{{us}}} [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]]

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2: Old Member States 2: EU Memb. and Cand. 2: all the member states 2: EU States 2: old EU states 2: Member States 2: European family 2: Member States 2: other EU countries 2: other EU countries 2: Scandinavian EU States 2: EU participates in enl. 2: Member States 2: Member States 2: ESDP 2: European economy 2: Old Member States 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3: Part.s of Europe Day 3: negotiators of enl. 3

21_MU3O[have to] 54 21_MU3O[must] 72 21_MU3O[must] 98 21_MU3O_N [must] 236 21_Q 22 3a1C 103 3a1C 156 3a1C 57 3a1C 60 3i2Ir 6 3p1Pr 27 3p1Pr 59 3p1Pr 69 3p1Pr 82 11[cond ‘faster’] 96 11 214 11_MA2P[can] 100 11_MU3O[must] 116 131 30 132 2 132 19 21 37 21 191 21_MA2P[can] 190 3a1C 115 3a1C 212 3a35 3 3i35 10 3p1Pr 40 3p1Pr 85 432_MA2P[can][cond ‘sooner’]97 11_C[cond ‘whether’] 45 11 51 11 52 11 53 11 73 11[temp ‘as’] 76 11 80 11 83 11 84 11 87 11 90 11 99 11[temp ‘as’] 210 11 213 11_MA2P[can] 58

199

200

Appendix C

[[[we]]] 3 [[[we]]] 3 [[[we]]] 3 [[[we]]] 3 [[[we]]] 3 [[[we]]] 3 [[[we]]] 3 [[[we]]] 3 [[[we]]] 3 [[[we]]] 3 [[[we]]] 3 [[[we]]] 3 [[[we]]] 3: Lipponen and Blair [[[we]]] 3 [[[we]]] 3 [[[we]]] 3 [[[we]]] 3 {{{us}}} 3 [[[we]]] 3 [[[we]]] 3 [[[we]]] 3 [[[we]]] 3 [[[we]]] 3 [[[we]]] 3 [[[we]]] 3: Lipponen and Blair [[[we]]] 3: Lipponen and Blair [[[we]]] 3 [[[we]]] 3 [[[we]]] 3 [[[we]]] 3 [[[we]]] 3 [[[we]]] 3 [[[we]]] 3 [[[we]]] 3 [[[we]]] 3: Ahtisaari and Chirac [[[we]]] 3 [[[we]]] 3 [[[we]]] 3 [[[we]]] 3: Schüssel and Lipponen [[[we]]] 3 [[[we]]] 3 [[[we]]] 3 [[[we]]] 3 [[[we]]] 3 [[[we]]] 3 ///ourselves///3

11_MA2P[can] 11_MU2O[must] 11_MU2O[need to] 11_MU2O[need to] 11_MU2O[need to] 11_MU2O[should] 11_MU2O[should] 11_MU2O[should] 11_MU3O[must] 11_MU3O[have to] 11_MU3O[must] 11_MU3O[must] 11_MU3O[must] 11_MU3O[must] 11_MU3O[must] 11_MU3O[must] 11_Q 12 21 21_C[cond ‘whether’] 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21_MU2O[need to] 21_MU3O[must] 21_MU3O[must] 21_MU3O[must] 21_Q 3a1C 3a1C 3a1C 3a1C_MU2O[need to] 3a1C_MU2O[should] 3a1C_MU3O[must] 3p1Pr 3p1Pr 3p1Pr 51 51_MU2O[should] 51_MU2O[should] 51_Q 12

101 75 225 25 26 49 77 93 23 71 92 153 168 233 239 240 218 23 39 44 46 64 65 88 167 169 198 78 70 211 234 216 154 91 124 86 219 79 61 224 241 55 43 56 217 1R

Referent Sets, Process Types and Participant Functions [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] {{{us}}} {{{us}}} {{{us}}} {{{us}}} {{{us}}} [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]]

4 4 4: citizens in enlarged EU 4 5: Europeans AMBI 5: Europeans (broader) 6 6 6 6: Finnish Presidency 6 6 6 6 6 6(/8) 6 6(/8) 6 6 6 6 6: Finnish Presidency 6(/3) 6 6 6 6: Finnish Presidency 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 (/8) 6 6 6 6 6 6

11_MA2P[can] 11_MA2P[can] 3a1C_Q 3p1Pr 21 21_N 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11[temp ‘when’] 11 11 11_MA2P[could – past] 11_MU2O[need to] 11_MU3O[must] 12 12 12 132 132 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21

201 208 209 215 207 237 181 5 15 20 30 89 118 119 120 123 126 142 178 186 203 204 132 160 129 1 12 22 11 17 8 11 16 17 19 28 29 31 32 34 36 105 112 122 130 135 148

202 [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] {{{us}}} [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] {{{us}}} {{{us}}} [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]]

Appendix C 6 6: Finnish Presidency 6 (/8) 6 (/8) 6 (/8) 6 (/8) 6 6 (/8/9) 6 6 6 (/8) 6 (/8) 6 6 6 6(/8) 6 (/8) 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6: Finnish Presidency 6 6 6 (/8) 6 (/8) 6 6 6 (/8) 6 6 6 6 6 6 6(/8) 6(/8) 6(/8) 6(/8) 7 (8): Gov., Parl., admin. 7: Halonen and Fin. del.

21 21 21 21[cond ‘would’] 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21_MA1I[could] 21_MA1P[could] 21_MU2I[shall] 21_MUA3I[eagerly] 21_MU2I_N[cond ‘would’] 22 3a1C 3a1C 3a1C 3a1C 3a1C 3a1C 3a1C 3a1C 3a1C 3a1C 3a1C 3a1C 3a1C 3a1C_MA1P[may] 3a35 3i30 3p1Pr 3p1Pr 3i1Id_N 3p1Pr 3p1Pr 3p1Pr 3p1Pr 51 51[cond ‘would’] 51_MA2P[can] 11 11

155 159 163 175 180 195 200 206 226 228 230 235 136 6 106 179 162 13 2 9 13 14 111 125 131 137 166 194 199 221 222 145 14 24 117 202 3 1 4 7 182 174 176 177 12 184

Referent Sets, Process Types and Participant Functions {{{us}}} {{{us}}} {{{us}}} [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] {{{us}}} {{{us}}} {{{us}}} {{{us}}} [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] {{{us}}} [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] {{{us}}} [[[we]]]

7: Fin. del. in Hungary 7: Finnish del. in Hungary 7: Finns except farmers 7 (8): Gov., Parl., admin. 8 8 8 8 8 8: previous govts 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8: Rainbow coalition govt 8 8 8 8 8 (/6) 8 8 8 8 8 9 9: Finns 9: Finnish people 9: Finns 9 9 10: Hungary and Finland 10: Fin and Lit (govts) 10: Baltic Sea Region 10: Finland and Lithuania 10: Finland and Austria 10: Finland and France 10: L.ships of Fin and Fra 10: L.ships of Fin and Fra 10: Hungary and Finland 10: Fin and the Netherlands 10: Finland and Hungary 10: Baltic Sea Region

12 132 135Comp 21 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11_MU3O[must] 11_MU3O[must] 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21_MU3O[had to] 3a1C 51 11 21 3a30 3a30 3a31 3a31 11 11 11_MA2P[can] 12 21 21 21[META] 21[META] 21 21 21 3a1C

203 18 21 8 10 18 107 144 152 187 189 193 149 150 110 113 114 143 146 151 157 158 196 220 227 243 192 188 109 201 140 4 9 15 16 173 238 232 25 94 127 133 134 172 185 20 231

204

Appendix C

[[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]]

10: Fin and Lit (govts) 10: France and Finland 11: Lithuanians

3a1C 3a1C_MU2O[should] 11

242 141 229

The Hungarian corpus Pro

Ref

[[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] {{{us}}} {{{us}}} {{{us}}} [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] {{{us}}} [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] {{{us}}} [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]]

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1: EU pres. and fut. MS 1 1: EU pres. and fut. MS 1: Europe (=EU) 1: Europe (=EU) 1: Europe (=EU) 1 1 1 1 1 1

Proc

Id

11_MA2P[can] 11_MU3O[have to] 11_MU3O[must] 11_MU3O[must] 11_MU3O[must] 11_MU3O[must] 12 132 132(Recipient) 21[cond ‘if’] 21 21 21[temp ‘as’] 21[let’s] 21_MA2P[can] 21_MA2P[can] 21_MA2P[can] 21_MA2U[can] 21_MU2O[should] 3a1C_MU3O[must] 51_MA2P[can] 51_MA2P[can] 51_MA2P[can] 51_MA2P_N[can] 11 11 11_MA2P[can] 11_MU2O[need to] 11_MU2O_N[should] 11_MU2O_N[should] 11_MU3O[have to] 11_MU3O[have to] 11_MU3O[have to] 11_Q 12 21 21_C[cond. ‘if’] 21_C[cond. ‘if’]

26 7 30 31 32 33 3 11 2 6 16 20 50 1 11 8 109 128 11 18 13 19 25 10 36 41 129 37 130 121 40 122 123 4 8 116 114 118

Referent Sets, Process Types and Participant Functions [[[we]]] 1: EU pres. and fut. M.S. 21 [[[we]]] 1 21_MU2O_N[should] [[[we]]] 1 21_MU3O[have to] [[[we]]] 1 21_MU3O[must] [[[we]]] 1 21_C_N[cond. ‘if’] [[[we]]] 1 3a1C ///ourselves/// 1 3a1C[META] [[[we]]] 1 3p1Pr [[[we]]] 1 51_MU3O[must] ///ourselves/// 1 53Recipient [[[we]]] 2: IGC (=EU Leaders) 11 [[[we]]] 2: Enlarged EU 11_MA1P[may] [[[we]]] 2: Nations in the EU 21 [[[we]]] 2: Enlarged EU 3a1C [[[we]]] 3: IGC 11 [[[we]]] 3: of the Enlarged EU 11_MA1P[may] [[[we]]] 3: of the Enlarged EU 11_MA1P[may] [[[we]]] 3: of the Enlarged EU 11_MA1P[may] [[[we]]] 3 11_MU2O[need to] [[[we]]] 3 11_MU2O[should] [[[we]]] 3 11_MU3O[must] {{{us}}} 3 12 [[[we]]] 3: old and new 21 [[[we]]] 3: old and new 21 [[[we]]] 3 21_MU2O[need to] {{{us}}} 3 3a33P {{{us}}} 3 3i33P [[[we]]] 5: international community 11 {{{us}}} 5: Europeans (broader than EU)12 ///ourselves/// 5: NATO 131 [[[we]]] 5: Europeans (broader than EU)21 [[[we]]] 5: Participants 21 {{{us}}} 5: Participants 21 [[[we]]] 5: Participants 21_MA2O[can] [[[we]]] 5: international community 21_MU3O[must] [[[we]]] 5: international community 3p1Pr [[[we]]] 5: Europeans (broader than EU)3p1Pr {{{us}}} 5: international community 3p32 [[[we]]] 5: contributors to the debate 51_MA1P[may] [[[we]]] 6 11 [[[we]]] 6 11 [[[we]]] 6 11 [[[we]]] 6 11_MA2P[can] {{{us}}} 6 131 {{{us}}} 6 (/8) 132 [[[we]]] 6 21

205 131 100 117 115 119 1 6 38 120 5R 73 101 132 39 79 134 135 136 76 78 75 21 126 127 5 9 7 27 16 1 110 124 17 125 22 23 111 5 2 55 61 43 105 18 4 56

206 [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] {{{us}}} [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] [[[we]]] {{{us}}} [[[we]]] {{{us}}} [[[we]]]

Appendix C 6 21 6 21 6 21 6 21 6 21 6 21 6 21 6 21 6 21 6 21 6 21 6 21 6 21 6 21 6 21 6 21 6 21 6 21 6 21 6 21 6 21 6 21 6 (/8) 21 6 21 6 21_MA2P[can] 6 3a1C 6 (/8) 3a1C 6 3a1C 6 3a1C 6 3a1C 6 3a1C 6 3a1C 6 3a1C 6 3a1C_MU2I_N[could] 6 3i1Id 6 3a33T 7: Hungarian soc. and org. 11_Q 7: Hungarian nation 21 7: Hungarian soc. and org. 21_MU2O[need to] 7: Hungarian soc. and org. 21_MU2O[need to] 7: Hungarian soc. and org. 21_Q 7: Hungarian soc. and org. 3p1Pr 7: Hungarian soc. and org. 3p31 8 11 8 (or organizers of the debate)132 8 21

57 58 62 63 64 65 68 71 74 77 93 17 24 28 29 42 44 45 47 49 51 54 69 133 70 60 66 67 84 94 46 48 9 21 104 6 96 12 97 98 95 99 12 34 14 59

Referent Sets, Process Types and Participant Functions [[[we]]] 8 21 [[[we]]] 8 21 [[[we]]] 8 21_N [[[we]]] 9 11 [[[we]]] 9 11_MA2P[can] [[[we]]] 9 11_MU2O[need to] [[[we]]] 9 11_MU2O[need to] [[[we]]] 9 11_MU2O[should] {{{us}}} 9 12 {{{us}}} 9 131 [[[we]]] 9 132 {{{us}}} 9 133P_MA2P[can] ///ourselves/// 9 135_MA2P[can] [[[we]]] 9 21 [[[we]]] 9 21_MU2I[would] [[[we]]] 9 21_MU2O[need to] [[[we]]] 9 21_MU2O[need to] ///ourselves/// 9 22 [[[we]]] 9 3a1C [[[we]]] 9 3i1Id [[[we]]] 9 3i1Id_C[cond. ‘whether’] [[[we]]] 9 3p1P [[[we]]] 9 3p1Pr [[[we]]] 9 51 ///ourselves/// 9 53Recipient {{{us}}} 10: New Members 132 {{{us}}} 10: New Members 132 [[[we]]] 10: Applicant countries 3a1C [[[we]]] 10: Central and Eastern Europe 3p1Pr_N [[[we]]] 16: Hungary and the EU 11_MA2P[can] [[[we]]] 16: Hungary and Europe 11_MU2O[need to] [[[we]]] 16: Hungary and EU MS 21 [[[we]]] 16: Hungary and EU MS 21_MU3O[must]

207 35 53 52 106 89 90 91 88 13 15 107 10 2 82 108 85 92 3R 83 80 102 14 87 81 4R 19 20 15 113 72 3 103 86

APPENDIX D SPECIMEN TEXTS

1. The British corpus [speech 1] I welcome the debate on the future of the European Union. Europe is where [[[we1]]] live. Europe is what [[[we2]]] make it. This debate offers an opportunity for all European citizens to help shape the Europe of tomorrow. The European Union of today is a success. It has helped bring unparalleled peace and prosperity to countries. It has allowed Europeans to work together to address the common challenges [[[we3]]] all face. And it is today embarked on two historic projects. To make Europe the leading economy in the world by 2010 with full employment and social cohesion. And, through enlargement, to reunite a continent so long divided. If [[[we4]]] succeed in meeting these challenges, all of {{{us1}}} will be safer, richer and stronger. But if [[[we5]]] are to sustain the EU’s success, [[[we6]]] need to be sure that it in a position to adapt to suit changing circumstances and changing needs. That is why the debate [[[we7]]] are launching on the future of Europe is so important. [[[we8]]] should not start this debate with an abstract discussion of philosophy or institutional change. [[[we9]]] should start with what [[[we10]]] want the European Union to do. In particular [[[we11]]] should start with what the people of Europe want it to do. Most people I meet are not very interested in Qualified Majority Voting, the Community versus intergovernmental approach or a debate about a European constitution. What they want is a better life. More jobs. Growing prosperity. A clean environment. An end to crime, drug trafficking and

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illegal immigration. The EU is tackling all these. Working together [[[we12]]] Europeans can do far more than if [[[we13]]] worked apart. But there are also areas where people doubt whether action at the EU level is the right response to a problem. So I hope those contributing to this debate will say where they think the EU should do more and where they think it should do less. Just as important as what the EU does is how it does it. Most people will support European action where it can deliver benefits Member States acting alone cannot. But they will only support such action if is taken forward in a way which respects their own interests and national identities, and takes account of their own views. [[[we14]]] need to find ways to make the EU more responsible, more accountable and more flexible. And [[[we15]]] need to ensure that European citizens feel real ownership of the EU’s activities. That is why I have proposed an annual agenda for Europe, agreed by its elected leaders at the European Council. That is why I have proposed a statement of principles, setting out what should be done by the EU and what should be left to the Member States. And that is why I have proposed a second chamber of the European Parliament, drawn from national Parliaments, which could review the EU’s work in the light of these principles to ensure that the EU focuses on what really matters to Europe’s citizens. There are several other proposals and ideas on the table. I hope this debate will stimulate many more. [[[we16]]] should look at each on their merits. What matters is what works. As this debate gets under way, those of {{{us2}}} in government are eager to hear your views. Governments need to listen to what their voters are saying about Europe. Parliamentarians need to listen to their electorates. MEPs to their constituents. Because the people who really matter in this great debate are not the politicians or the institutions or the academics, but the people of Europe themselves. ***

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2. The Finnish corpus [speech 1] It gives me a great pleasure to be here with you today. This Institute specialises in discusses issues related to European integration, such as enlargement and other important developments of the EU. Since accession process is still rather fresh on minds, I will briefly tell you some about own experiences. Then I would like to share with you ideas about the direction in which the Union should be developed. Cyprus is actively seeking EU membership. Substantial negotiations are just about to start. It will not be an easy nor speedy process. There will be difficulties, but at least [[[we1]]] have the experience that it is worth the effort. Inside the Union even small countries have influence and the membership opens up a wide range of new opportunities. Soon Finland will have been a member in the Union for four years. I think that it is fair to say that [[[we2]]] have become an equal member with the others in the Union. [[[we3]]] are no more a newcomer. The Union has developed a lot during these years and [[[we4]]] have had an active role in contributing to those changes. The Union which Cyprus will eventually join, will also be different from that of today. Accession process The accession negotiations of Finland lasted only 13 months. However, integration to Europe started many years earlier, first with EFTA co-operation from 1960 and with the free trade agreement with the EEC in 1974. Negotiations on the European Economic Area were opened 1989. On the basis of EEA [[[we5]]] began to apply the single market legislation. That simplified task in the accession negotiations, which started in 1993. [[[we6]]] could concentrate on those sectors which were not covered by the EEA, like agriculture and structural policies. EEA negotiations also served as a useful learning process for the government, the Parliament and the whole Finnish administration. More than 500 civil servants participated in that process. They were obliged to learn not only the acquis communautaire but also the decision making rules and procedures of the EU. Internal preparation for accession had

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started. I mention all this to underline that adaptation to EU membership is a long process. And it is never unproblematic. The starting point for accession negotiations was that [[[we7]]] had an interest to join the Union. [[[we8]]] shared its goals and principles and [[[we9]]] were prepared to accept its legislation. In the negotiations [[[we10]]] concentrated efforts on a limited number of issues, where special solutions were needed. The most complex issues related to desire to ensure that agriculture could continue in the whole country and that long distances and a sparse population would be taken into account in regional policies. [[[we11]]] also wanted to maintain higher norm level on certain issues. The autonomous status of the Aland Islands called for special arrangements. As a whole, [[[we12]]] negotiated around ten special solutions or transitional arrangements. The government conducted the negotiations in an open way. The parliament was kept well informed about the developments in the negotiations. The interest groups, like employers, trade unions etc. were integrated in the process. The negotiators also briefed the media very openly, not only on the achievements but also on the difficulties. At the end there were no real surprises concerning the negotiating result. I believe that this was one of the reasons for the positive result in referendum. EU membership enjoys the support of the majority of Finns even today, unlike in some other member states. There are several reasons for that. Firstly, the promises about the effects of the membership, like decrease in food prices (by 11%) came true. Enterprises have easier access to EU markets and more possibilities for co-operation. The young generation has more opportunities for studies and work abroad. And finally, the sense of security about place in Europe has increased. Quite significant, especially from the government’s point of view, is the increase in the influence of Finland. [[[we13]]] are now an equal partner among EU member states, taking part in the decisions which without participation would affect {{{us1}}} anyway. international role has been strengthened. Third countries listen to views with more attentively. [[[we14]]] represent not only Finland but also the Union, which is an important player in the international scene. As a consequence of the membership of Finland, the EU has changed as well. [[[we15]]] have brought into the Union

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own traditions and values, which bring new nuances to the policies and working methods of the EU. Geographically, in the last enlargement, the EU gained a new dimension, covering the Baltic Sea and arctic areas. EU has now, as a result of accession, a common border of 1300 km with Russia. Finland has launched an initiative called the Northern dimension of the EU in order to make the Union better understand and define its common interests in the northern regions of the Union. There are both challenges and possibilities, which are common to the whole Union. I only mention environmental problems, nuclear waste, criminality and on the positive side the huge energy reserves. The Commission is now preparing an interim report on the Northern Dimension to the EU Summit in Vienna in December. That will hopefully make it easier for the EU to determine its policies towards that region. It is not idea nor in interest to try to move the attention of the Union away from the south to the north. They are both equally important to the Union. As a sign of interest in the south, Finland organised a year ago the ministerial meeting on Mediterranean environmental questions in Helsinki. Opportunities and risks are common to all EU countries. This applies on the Mediterranean region as well as on the northern parts of Europe. Finland as a member As a member Finland continues the same basic line as she did in her accession negotiations. [[[we16]]] aim for constructive and predictable behaviour. [[[we17]]] concentrate on essential questions. experience after almost four years of membership proves that, the opinions of all member states are listened to and taken into account, if they are well founded. This is true also for small member states. The seeks consensus in its decision making and it is very seldom that a country is left alone with its problems. As a concrete example of influence I’d like to mention the Intergovernmental Conference which led to the Treaty of Amsterdam signed in October 1997. Finland participated in this negotiation process as a full partner, proposed many new formulations into the treaty and had them accepted by other member states. One such proposal was the joint Finnish-Swedish initiative on strengthening the crisis management

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capacity of the Union. Many formulations concerning environment, transparency, equality between men and women, social dimension etc. came from pen. The possibility to participate in drafting the basic treaties of the Union started a new phase in membership. Another significant development since accession relates to the decisions taken on the EMU. government had a clear goal to participate in the third phase of the EMU from the beginning. [[[we18]]] reached this goal and Finland will be, due to the time difference with Central Europe, the first country in Europe, to join the third phase of EMU on 1st of January 1999. Other EMU partners will join one hour later. The EMU membership will stabilise economy and currency further. [[[we19]]] have already noted the positive effect. The present economic crisis both in Asia and Russia, has so far had relatively little effect on Finland. interest to participate in the EMU was, however, not purely economic. decision was also affected by desire to belong to that group of member states which will make decisions on economic policies in Europe. Anyway these decisions affect also countries outside the EMU. Future challenges The European Union, which [[[we20]]] joined, was not yet ready. Then the Amsterdam Treaty was negotiated, many changes were made and still the Union is not ready. The European Union is an ever developing union of independent states, responding to challenges and new demands of today and tomorrow. Soon [[[we21]]] will face the new millennium. For decades the EU member states have been able to live in peace. And yet, so close to the borders of the Union, on continent, a bloody war has continued for years. One of the biggest challenges for the Union at the eve of the new millennium is to strengthen the Union’s capacity to act in its external relations. The EU must be able to act effectively in military crisis management so that early action can be ensured. The Treaty of Amsterdam has created the framework. It still needs efficient implementation. Another big challenge will be to determine in which direction [[[we22]]] want the Union to develop. What are the areas where the EU should have competencies? In accordance to the subsidiarity principle, the Union shall act only in such fields where it can produce results more effectively than individual member states. [[[we23]]] must apply this principle so that the

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core competencies of the Union, such as the efficient functioning of the internal market, shall not be endangered. [[[we24]]] need a strong and efficient Union. [[[we25]]] need to improve the effectiveness of the Council and the Commission. Much can be done already on the basis of the present rules, by more effectively implementation and looking into some practices of the meetings. Hardly any new treaty rules will be needed. By improvement of the efficiency and by concentrating on the essential tasks the Union can also improve its legitimacy in the eyes of the citizens. This is an additional challenge for the Union. How to make citizens understand the importance of the EU? What is the value added of the Union for their every day life? The Union should be able to respond to the fears and problems of ordinary people in areas like environment, international crime, drugs, employment. The Amsterdam Treaty already made some changes so as to enable better cooperation between the member states on these questions. [[[we26]]] need to improve the efficiency of the EU institutions, especially before next enlargement. In the Amsterdam Treaty certain changes were made, but not yet enough for the whole enlargement. According to the Amsterdam Treaty the Union can enlarge by five new members, each of the member states having their second Commissioner on condition that they are compensated within the system of weighting votes in the Council. A more comprehensive intergovernmental conference should be organised when the union gets more than 20 new members. It is essential that [[[we27]]] have a strong and efficient Commission. A strong Commission is the best support for a small member state. [[[we28]]] need it to keep an eye on the big member states. Another important question is the composition of the Commission. [[[we29]]] find it necessary that there will be also in the future a national from each member state in the Commission. This is needed also to ensure the credibility of the Commission in the eyes of the citizens. On the question of reweighing of votes, Finland is ready to negotiate on a well-functioning and overall solution. For the improved efficiency the coverage of the system of qualified majority voting should be extended. Some changes were made already in the Amsterdam Treaty but not yet enough. In an enlarged Union it will become ever more difficult to reach decisions on questions which need to be decided unanimously.

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These three main questions left partly open in Amsterdam should form the agenda of the next IGC. An agenda extended to many new issues, could lead to lengthy negotiations and thereby a delay in one of the historic challenges of the Union, the enlargement process launched about a year ago. The Union should solve its internal issues in a way which would enable future enlargements. The enlargement necessitates in addition to institutional changes also other internal reforms in the Union. Especially reforms are needed in the agricultural policies and structural policies. Financing of the Union must be organised in a way which covers the cost of enlargement. These reforms under the so called Agenda 2000 package proposal of the Commission, are presently under intensive discussion among the member states. The aim is to reach political agreement on the whole package by next March. Taken as the whole Finland can accept the Commission proposals. This on the condition that specific conditions due to northern location, will be taken duly into account and compensated. The most difficult part in the package will be the financing of Union policies. How to ensure fair balance between the richer member states now paying to the budget much more than what they receive and those who are net receivers especially the so called cohesion countries? These questions are especially complicated at a time when member states are implementing very strict budgetary policies in order to live up to the EMU criteria. Despite the difficult questions ahead the Union is politically fully committed to enlargement. It is seen as a historic opportunity and a necessity in responding to challenges faced by the whole continent. Common problems can better be solved in close co-operation in this era of interdependence. A strong and large union can also better compete and develop in global competition. Finland will have next year an extra challenge, the Presidency of the Union. This task has become ever more demanding with many key issues of the future of the Union being on the agenda. Accession of Cyprus It is important to bear in mind that the EU takes new member states, not Governments. Today’s opposition may be tomorrow’s Government, but the membership still applies. One of the most important issues on the agenda of Presidency will be enlargement, where the substantial negotiations are probably well under way by then. [[[we30]]]

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will do best also in that field to ensure an efficient process with all the applicant countries, Cyprus included. Of course a lot depends of the applicant countries themselves, how they advance in the fields of economy, legislation, administration as well as implementation of the so called political criteria. [[[we31]]] have noted that Cyprus is fully committed to undertake the necessary reforms in order to apply the acquis by the time of accession. Cyprus is already in many ways well prepared. However, the division of the island presents a difficult problem. [[[we32]]] hope that accession negotiations could help bring about reconciliation on the Island. The EU believes that the accession of Cyprus should also benefit the Turkish Cypriot community. [[[we33]]] want to encourage the Government of Cyprus to intensify its efforts to involve the Turkish community in the process. Progress towards accession and towards a just and viable solution to the Cyprus problem will naturally reinforce each other. Membership in the EU has been beneficial for Finland and it certainly would be for Cyprus. [[[we34]]] wish you a lot of success in your efforts to join the Union. ***

3. The Hungarian corpus [speech 1] Now, in the early months of the 21st century, [[[we1]]] are in a phase of the evolution of European integration that will determine the fate of Europe for decades to come. The reunification of Europe and the establishment of Europe of the 21st century are at stake. The 20th century brought a lot of suffering to the peoples of Europe, but the last decade decided the battle between freedom and oppression, democracy and dictatorship. The challange for the new century is how to successfully reorganise Europe, and how a reunified Europe should meet the challanges of the 21st century. The main trend of development in the western part of Europe has been driven by the European Communities, the European Union for more than half a century.

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This development has led to remarkable achievements. European integration has placed inter-state cooperation on the foundations of law, and woven a fabric of cooperation between member states and their citizens of hitherto unknown density. With the creation of the single internal market and with the introduction of the single currency, the integration process has reached its highest level so far. Furthermore, the Union has initiated common European policies in critically important areas such as foreign, security and defence policies, and with a view to safeguarding the security of citizens, co-operation has started in the field of justice and home affairs. These achievements need to be preserved and strengthened in the next round of enlargement and in the course of the development of the Union. As a consequence of the unjust order of peace following World War II., the central and eastern parts of Europe were ousted from the above developments for decades. Let {{{us1}}} just recall the heroes of Berlin, Budapest, Prague and Warsaw; these peoples have repeatedly tried to shake off internal and external dictatorship, but their lonely struggles were doomed to fail. By the last decade of the century they had managed to accumulate enough strength to regain their freedom one after the other, the freedom and independence of which they had been deprived for nearly half a century. It was this victory that made it possible that here and now [[[we2]]] may talk about the reunification of Europe and the future of Europe as a whole. It became the top priority in the foreign policy of the first democratically elected Hungarian government to reinstate Hungary to her natural place in the mainstream of European development. Now, over a decade after the political change, it is safe to say that, thanks to the sacrifices and diligence of citizens, the transition has been completed, and Hungary has become a willing and able partner in further building a common Europe built on the principle of equal rights and status. The European Union has fulfilled - and through the reinforcement of the Nice Charter it will have fulfilled by 2003 - the conditions it has set for its members for the commencement of enlargement. I am confident that by 2003 Hungary, too, with only a few derogations to be noted in the treaty of accession, will have fully adopted the rights and obligations and as such, will be ready to actively participate in the work of the European Union.

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At the conference scheduled for 2004 in Nice to deal with the future of the Union, Hungary no longer wishes to be in attendance as an outsider, but as a peer, sharing the responsibility for defining the further goals and milestones of integration. It is my conviction that Hungary and Europe have a bright future. It is exactly in this period of time, when the answers to the global challenges set by this new century have to be found, that [[[we3]]] need to take joint action and seize the opportunity and exploit the added energy generated by a reunified Europe . What will the Europe of the 21st century be like? What sort of Europe shall [[[we4]]] build ? A common Europe of human dimensions, a Europe of own. A Europe that every citizen regards as his own, where citizens endorse and actively shape the goals set, where citizens understand and support the system of laws and the operation of institutions. To that end, [[[we5]]] need to think over how operations could be made more transparent, bringing the common European system of institutions closer to the citizens. A responsible Europe, where the powers of the various common institutions are unambiguous, and there is a clear-cut sharing of tasks and democratic empowerment. Citizens need to be able to follow the methods and levels of decision-making and should be equally aware of who is responsible to whom for the decisions taken. The decisions of the Union fundamentally influence the living conditions of its citizens. Therefore it is indispensible that the citizens can make themselves heard and participate in the formulation of goals and in decision-making. For this reason, too, it is very important that this dialogue just starting take place with broad social involvolvement. An efficient Europe. For the efficient operations of the Union it is imperative to have an amalgamated system of federal and intergovernmental elements that will provide for the efficient operation of the Union, for the strengthening of its role in the world and for the consistent consideration and application of the principle of subsidiarity at the same time. Those, and only those functions and powers should be delegated to the EU which can be discharged and exercised most efficiently in the interest of the public at the European level.

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A competitive Europe. The enlargement of the European Union will make it easier for Europe to meet the requirements of the 21st century. Enlargement will bring added resources to the EU in facing successfully the challenges of inevitable globalisation. A Europe of shared interests. The knowledge and wealth of experience accumulated in two thousand years are concentrated in this part of the world. The whole of the intellectual heritage of the ?old continent? determines history, everyday life and lays the foundation of future. The notion of Europe stands less for a geographic area than for a school of thought and shared values. It is these core European values on which the basic documents and sets of norms of the Union are built. It is befitting to mention here The Charter of Fundamental Rights adopted in Nice, however, the charter can be further improved, as the safeguarding of minority rights should become an important element of it. A Europe of nations and regions. In parallell with ever stronger cooperation within the EU, the identity of European nations must be preserved and further strengthened. Besides its unity, the strength of Europe lies exactly in its multifariousness, its diversity of languages, cultures and customs. The wide-ranging debates of years to come about the future of an already enlarged Europe, that is, about common future, involving legislatures, governments, trade unions and non-governmental organizations as well as laymen will be unprecedented in the evolution of integration. I wish that the Hungarian and E.U. home pages of ?The Future of Europe? may become popular fora and make valuable contributions to the emerging dialogue.

INDEX A Althusser, Louis, 8, 17, 19 attitudes to the EU, 73, 149, 159 avoidance strategies, 16, 145 B Bakhtin, Mikhail Mikhailovich, 3 C Chilton, Paul, 3, 7-8, 18, 28 cognitive grammar, 8 collective agency, 38 conversation analysis, 14 Copenhagen European Council, 2526 critical discourse analysis, 15 and corpus linguistics, 12, 156 and identity, 37 quantitative vs. qualitative approach, 157 D democratic deficit, 28 of the EU, 1, 28 national vs. EU, 31 Demosthenes, 7 dialogicity, 18-19, 28 dichotomy of East and West, 1, 2324, 116 discourse, 5, 8, 14, 16 academic, 17-18 dominant, 16 EU political, 22, 25-26, 29-30 order of, 160 political, 18, 38 dominant ideology and European values, 26

E empowerment, 17 EU enlargement and democracy and human rights, 26, 101, 149 and legitimacy, 29, 36 economic criterion, 25 political criterion, 25 EU mainstream voice, 30, 55, 73, 137, 146 European integration, 2 and collective identity formation, 4, 159 Europeanization, 23

F Fairclough, Norman, 5, 13-15, 37, 160 fifth enlargement round of the EU, 1, 4, 22-26 and British, Finnish and Hungarian political goals, 156 and Hungarian communicative strategy, 130 and EU political discourse, 158 and national perspectives, 159 speeches on, 30-31, 36 Filmore, Charles, 42 Fiske, John, 19 functional grammar, 8

H Halliday, M.A.K., 5, 8-14, 39-43, 46, 51, 66, 156-158 Hennessy, Rosemary, 13, 16 heterogeneity, 18 Hunston, Susan, 11-12, 157

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I

K

identity, 3, 16 and discourse, 38

Krzyzanowski, Michal, 5, 30-31, 37, 55, 137, 146

and discourse and political action, 159 and discourse strategies, 160 and legitimacy, 30-31 as a linguistic construction, 39 collective, 38 collective EU, 28-29, 147 collective EU vs. national, 7173 collective Finland, 143 collective Hungary, 143 collective UK, 143 collective national, 147 collective, studies on, 3 discursive, 15 EU institutional, 25, 30 EU political, 2 interpersonal, 38 national, 2 national and supra-national, 38 personal, 38 relational, 160 social, 37 ideology and addressee, 19 and collective identity, 39 and concealment, 17 and discourse, 16 and ideational metafunction of language, 11 and interpellation, 19, 27-28, 124 and language use, 11 and legitimacy, 30 and personal markers, 14 and representation of the EU, 27 in the fifth enlargement, 36, 147 illocution, 19, 34-35 interpellation, 19 intertextuality, 18

L legitimacy, 28 input, 29 output, 29 types of, 28 linguistics and political discourse, 7-8

M Macherey, Pierre, 16 Matthiessen, C. M. I. M., 5, 9-11, 39-43, 46, 66 metafunctions of language, 9 metaphors for the EU, 98, 103, 105, 110 modality, 66 deontic, 66 epistemic, 66 monologic text, 18

O OECD, 134 OSCE, 134 othering, 121, 123, 137

P pragmatics, 7 pronouns and responsibility, 14

R rhetoric, 7 role and reference grammar, 8

S Schuman, Robert, 25 Schäffner, Christina, 3, 7-8, 18, 28 social critique in linguistic analysis, 13

“The EU is Not Them, But Us!” sociolinguistics, 14-15 statistical significance, 44-45 systemic-functional grammar and cognitive linguistics, 8 and corpus linguistics, 6, 11 and critical discourse analysis, 10 and functionalist approaches to language, 8 and prototypes, 41

T theta roles, 42 Thompson, Geoff, 11-12, 42, 157

223

transitivity, 11, 39 and ambiguity, 46 and corpus linguistics, 11 and critical linguistics, 11 differences in classification, 46

V Van Dijk, Teun, 13 Vološinov, Valentin Nikolaevich, 15, 18-19

W Wodak, Ruth, 5, 37-38